Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 28.0

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Weather; Staffing; Human Factors; Company Policy

This last week of [weather] has been a nightmare. The first few days nobody had any idea of what was going on and it was total chaos. The planes were afraid to fly and constantly torturing us for information and help. We could give none. I am not going to go into great length here because I could literally write pages. But almost everyday sectors go red and need a tracker. Why? The rest of the center is doing nothing. Doesn't Traffic Management Unit (TMU) have enough time to help us from keeping the sectors from going out of control? The people in the FAA Command Center say we are slowing down the system too much. You cannot ram 40 or 50 airplanes into one sector no matter how big that sector is. No one human can talk to that many airplanes at once. Impossible. And no matter how much we tried to tell the pilots about what to do when they departed it did not seem to help. There was pretty much zero information distribution to the users. They all just hopped in their airplanes and thought Cneter would take care of everything like we always do. Except for the efforts of the controllers in the Ocean Area; it seemed like nobody else cared what was happening as long the planes kept getting through. Like I said; trackers plugged in everywhere. Handoff and Assist positions everywhere. We do not have enough controllers in my area for this. People outside of this building need to get a clue and come down here and watch how totally unsafe this is.

A Center Controller reported their sectors are being overloaded with complex traffic and Traffic Management Units are not doing anything to affect the flow.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 21654; Flight Crew Type 13158

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During climb thru approximately 15000 ft Captain PM (Pilot Monitoring) took a call from flight attendant. All operations normal to this point. Lead FA (Flight Attendant) informed Captain that there was a very strong odor; a burning smell; what appeared to be smoke and acrid haze permeating the cabin; especially toward the back of the aircraft. She noted that the smell was very strong and haze was getting worse. Captain questioned if they could identify the location or source and they said no but were looking. Captain decided that best and safest course of action was to [advise ATC] and coordinate [a return to the departure airport]. FO (First Officer) remained flying pilot and worked with ATC to turn aircraft back to [the departure airport]. Captain ran smoke; fire or fumes checklist and spoke again with flight attendants. Passengers were then briefed. Further coordination with ATC; company and maintenance. PM then returned to assist PF (Pilot Flying) in descent and arrival planning and briefing. Final call to FAs PM was informed that smell and haze was dissipating and uneventful overweight landing weight was made. ARFF met aircraft and no hotspots were noted on aircraft. Aircraft was then taxied to gate. No further abnormal events.

B737 Captain reported smoke in the cabin during climbout.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 414; Flight Crew Type 12000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

While taxiing out at ATL; with taxi light illuminated and aircraft in motion; we were cut off by a (other carrier) baggage cart. The tug had no identifying marks visible; but the aft of the two empty baggage carts was XXXXXX. This action hindered the safe operation of my aircraft; causing us to take appropriate actions to prevent a mishap. Most concerning is that this is a very common occurrence with (other carrier) [ramp workers] in ATL; making it one of the most dangerous ground operations in our system. Once out of the Ramp Area; Ground Control has a great handle on things. This was reported immediately to Atlanta Ground Control.

B737 Captain reported a ground conflict with a tug and baggage carts as they moved through the ramp area.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I removed and replaced number 20 and number 6 fan blades on left engine of aircraft; and I believe I may have put the wrong blade back into the number 6 position. I had both new and old blades in my box and might have mixed them up.I was speaking to another mechanic and possibly mixed up the blades. [I need] to double check and even triple check serial numbers off parts being installed.

A maintenance technician described the conditions that contributed to the installation of an incorrect fan blade.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After I leveled off at 9;000 FT; the engines started running rough. There was knocking and rocking of the airplane. The right CHT [indication] was significantly lower than the [left] one. I cycled the mags; when I got to the right engine left mag off; the right engine nearly quit. I returned back to [the departure airport] without any problems. I did not declare an emergency and [ATC] gave me radar vectors around to final [approach].

The pilot of a Cessna 402 experienced a rough running engine in cruise flight. After cycling the magneto switch; he observed that the right engine had a malfunctioning right magneto; so he elected to return to the departure airport where a successful landing was performed.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 809; Flight Crew Type 743

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Filed IFR to ROA 10;000 FT MSL.  Encountered clouds with turbulence and rapid build-ups.  Thunderstorms reported ahead and airlines being diverted.  Wholly inadequate weather support on board.  While in contact with Flightwatch; deviated from course in attempt to escape immediate peril and failed to notify Cleveland Center in time.  Experienced precession errors too.  Also; altitude excursions of approximately 500 FT.  After course reversal due to turbulence and shear returned to base.  Now investing in more sophisticated weather instrumentation and services. (Enough discomfort -- time to write a check.)

PA28 pilot on IFR flight plan at 10;000 FT reports encountering thunderstorms and turbulence. A course reversal is initiated prior to advising Center and several altitude deviations occur.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

After takeoff on 26L at ATL on a RMBLN 7 RNAV SID the Tower called and asked 'you are in a right turn; correct?' I said that we were on the RMBLN 7. The Tower Controller said to turn right to 300 degrees; which we immediately did. Just prior to the turn I noticed that the north wind had blown us slightly south of the magenta line. The wind was out of the north at 55 KTS. We maintained the 300 heading as we switched to Departure. Departure asked if we saw the traffic at 10 o'clock. We did; and told him so. It was an RJ; turning away from us. The Controller said to maintain visual contact. He then asked if we had difficulty on the RMBLN7. I assumed that this was his way of asking me why we were on a heading. I replied that the north wind had caused a southerly drift; and hence the 300 heading. He then cleared us direct to RMBLN.We should always engage the autopilot on RNAV SIDs. If the Tower was concerned about a conflict; I would have appreciated an immediate instruction to correct; rather than start the conversation with a question (which wasted a few seconds before the correction was issued).

After takeoff in NAV TRK mode; the flight director and CDI were all showing on course on the initial 275 heading. Tower asked if we were in a right turn. The turn to the 288 course to SNUFY was depicted on the map as still ahead of us and we had not yet reached that point on the departure. Tower turned us to a heading of 300 and switched us to Departure. Departure asked if we had trouble flying to SNUFY. According to all the indications in the cockpit we were on course on the departure and not even to the point to make the right turn to SNUFY. As far as we were concerned; we never deviated from the RNAV SID track.

The Tower was alarmed and issued a heading to an MD-80 departing 26L at ATL on the RMBLN RNAV SID when they drifted south immediately after takeoff while flying the charted 275 heading with the winds out of the North at 55 KTS.


I was the First Officer and the pilot monitoring. We were cleared to descend via the ZZZZZX. Approaching FL200 on the descent; I noticed my airspeed start to decrease rapidly without any change in airplane thrust or pitch. I called out 'airspeed' while inspecting the standby and Captain's airspeed indicator. We called unreliable airspeed and started the QRC (Quick Reference Checklist). We followed the QRC followed by the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook). We were able to confirm that the Captain's airspeed indicator was accurate based on the pitch and power settings and correlating with the standby airspeed indicator. The QRH instructed us to reengage the autopilot and change the ALT SOURCE selector to the Captain's side. This allowed my airspeed indicator to correspond with the Captain's and standby airspeed indicator. After we dictated which airspeed was accurate; ATC had given a heading and altitude to continue into ZZZ. I completed the QRH checklist for Unreliable Airspeed but kept the unreliable airspeed tables open to make sure the pitch and power settings correlated with our speed. We continued to fly the ILS approach into ZZZ without any further incident. The Captain notified Maintenance and Dispatch once we were blocked in and the door open. We were unable to conclude the cause that created the unreliable airspeed situation. But; I will become more familiar with the airspeed unreliable checklist and table so that I may refer to it and utilize it more efficiently in the event of another similar occurrence.

B737-800 First Officer reported unreliable airspeed indications on Captain's side during arrival descent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 158; Flight Crew Type 933

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We encountered severe turbulence last about 5 seconds in clouds while deviating around thunderstorms. The radar was on and operational but was not painting strong echoes on our current flight path. The turbulence was immediate (went from very light to severe instantaneously). The aircraft initially rolled about 25 degrees to the left and lost about 200 feet. The auto pilot and auto throttles self-disconnected. The command bars disappeared from view. The First Officer (PF) manually rolled the wings level and climbed back to altitude. After the turbulence subsided the flight directors; auto throttle and auto pilot were re-engaged. The seat belt sign was on and according to the flight attendants all passengers were seated at the occurrence time. The flight attendants took their seats immediately. I made a re-enforcing PA to the passengers to adhere to the seatbelt sign. Once the aircraft was back under control with the auto pilot on I called the lead FA to make sure everyone was ok. She verified all FAs were ok and not injured. I asked about passenger injuries. She said she'd check and get back to me. One passenger had spilled hot water on her hand and fingers. The flight attendants administered ice and Neosporin. I made a severe turbulence PIREP to ATC and they asked about damage or injuries. I stated no apparent damage and one passenger injury including the extent. I contacted dispatch regarding the turbulence and passenger injury and dispatch made arrangements for paramedics to meet the flight. A severe turbulence write up was entered in the logbook and sent via ACARS to Maintenance Control. I communicated with the Duty Manager via ACARS as well.

B737 Captain reported encountering severe turbulence at FL350 while deviating around thunderstorms.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

We didn't receive a handoff from one ATC to another. We were receiving ATC just fine and also listening to chatters to other aircrafts. Guard was also monitored on comm2. All of a sudden; we can only hear aircraft transmit and no reply from ATAC (sounds like talking to themselves). That's a sign for us. We determined we were forgotten; and need to talk to the next ATC. The first frequency we tried just handed us off to the correct frequency. Eventually; we were talking to the right center and proceeded without incident.  We were monitoring guard at all time. No one or other aircraft tried to call us on guard.Distraction was a major component. We just received a new iPad tray on the window mount. It was protruding lower into the elbow area when hand flying. We were discussing how to prop it higher to get it out of the way. When hand flying while turning the yoke; the new mount definitely gets in the way

A B737 First Officer reported the distraction caused by a newly issued iPad window tray mount protruding low into his elbow area while hand flying.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 285; Flight Crew Total 25300; Flight Crew Type 1475

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Evacuated

Prior to take off from ZZZ we experienced a long delay due to heavy bank of departures. I asked the First Officer (FO) to shut down the right engine to save fuel. We were to follow [another aircraft] to the runway and we were advised by the ground controller that we should stay with him. When we asked about our sequence we were told that we were number 20.As we moved closer to departure runway it appeared to me that we would be taking off soon; but the controller had not switched us to the tower. I asked the First Officer to restart the right engine at this time. Meanwhile; the ground control frequency had been busy the whole time and it was hard to get a word in. We finally asked the ground controller if he needed us to switch to tower. He replied in the affirmative and DID NOT say that he had asked us to do that earlier; as I was concerned we had missed his call.As we switched to tower the [preceding aircraft] that we were following was turning onto the runway. First Officer started to run the before takeoff checklist below the line as the tower was giving us instructions to get on the runway. I was observing EICAS indications relating to the right engine; and I said something like 'that's not right' as I observed no N1 on the right engine. All other indications except N1 appeared normal. I advised the tower that we had an engine issue and that we would not be ready to take off. Tower then gave us instructions to turn right on XYR; turn left on Yankee and left on Papa. We acknowledged the clearance and started to taxi. As we taxied; a couple of aircraft started mentioning that the right engine was on fire; however; we had no cockpit fire or overheat indications other than the mentioned abnormal start indications. I continued to taxi and as I turned onto taxiway Papa I stopped the airplane and set the brakes. Other aircraft kept advising us that the fire was still going. Since we had no indications in the cockpit; I was thinking 'Engine Torching' vs. the correct term Tailpipe fire. I was about to call for that checklist when to me; it sounded like someone said over the radio that we should do an evacuation.Since we had several reports of a fire; at this time I advised the tower that we were starting an Evacuation and asked the First Officer to run the Evacuation check list. Again; we had no cockpit indications of a fire. As a caution and because time was of essence I wanted to tell the Flight Attendants to prepare for possible evacuation. Since the last [aircraft] we flew [had] a different flight inter-phone; I was not immediately sure which button was for talking to the back. So; I decided to make a PA announcement to the flight attendants to 'Prepare for Evacuation'. My intent was to have them prepare and assess the situation from their vantage point. By this time; I believed; because the FO was running the Evacuation checklist; that she had actuated the evacuation signal. I then started hearing the sounds of the evacuation going on and made a PA announcement to 'evacuate on the left side only'. As I put my attention back in the cockpit the FO was at the point on checklist where we needed to pull the fire handles. I said something to the effect that we needed to pull them; but she pointed me to a statement that said 'illuminated fire handle'. We both decided that there was no illuminated handle and elected not to pull them. I now realize that was procedurally incorrect. However; in the rush of the moment we thought we did the correct procedure; and by this time the Evacuation was almost complete. We proceeded to do a sweep; and verify that all passengers and Flight Attendants had evacuated the airplane. And then we used the slides to exit the airplane. Thankfully; the evacuation went smoothly except for a few minor injuries. Our inflight crew did an excellent job of herding all passengers away from the aircraft.

The reporter stated that they didn't realize they had a fire until other aircraft informed them. The reporter stated that they did not have any indications in the cockpit of a fire except that the #2 engine appeared to have a hung start. The reporter stated that he suspects the First Officer may have introduced fuel into the engine a little too early therefore the fuel did not light off as it normally would and fuel was just pouring into the tail pipe. The reporter stated they went through the QRH and started the check list for engine fire. The reporter stated it was very busy in the cockpit due to the fact they were lined up for takeoff with ATC very busy with multiple aircraft in line waiting for takeoff. The reporter stated they may not have pulled the fire handle because it's only called for if the handle is lighted. The reporter also stated that they decided to get off the runway and evacuate the aircraft. The reporter stated that while accomplishing the evacuation procedure and attempting to deal with the fire; the First Officer may have accidentally turned off the APU causing the starter cutout message on EICAS. The reporter stated that by time the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting arrived the fire had gone out; but it was still smoldering. Smoke was coming out the front and back of the engine. The reporter stated that there was black soot all over the pylon area and when they water washed the engine all the black soot came off. The reporter stated that after the water wash they could not find any damage to the engine or the wing.The reporter stated that the company is constantly changing the checklists and it makes it difficult to ensure you are following the proper procedure.

On taxi-out to runway XYR/W we realized there would be a long delay for takeoff. We were told to remain with ground and follow [another aircraft]. I queried as to our sequence and was told number 20 for departure.After reviewing the release; we realized that we were only planned for 20 min of taxi fuel; so the Captain asked me to shut down number 2. We started the APU so there would be no interruptions in the cabin for power. Captain asked me to send a message to the dispatcher alerting them of our on time off the gate; and our subsequent delay. The ground frequency was very congested; but we kept hearing other aircraft transferred to tower 'number nine for departure;' but they never switched us. The captain made an announcement that we were number 20 for departure and talked with the flight attendants and advised them of the delay. As we inch closer to taxiway W he asks me to again query Ground for our sequence because we needed to start the right engine... because of the congestion; I could not; and so he tells me to start number 2. It appeared to be a normal start; with a rollback around 350 (all engine indications similar to the left engine). While I was starting the engine; I was finally able to ask Ground if he wanted us to monitor tower. He said yes; I checked in with tower; and at the same time noticed 'STARTER CUTOUT-R' and no N1 indication on the right engine. Tower cleared us to line up and wait; to which we replied unable. I did the obvious corrective action of ENG START selector to Auto; and the message disappeared. At that point we were unaware of any fire indications. Hindsight; if someone would have told us about the flames; I should have performed the Tailpipe Fire checklist. We had no fire or overheat indications at any time.I had already completed all other checklists to the line. They again cleared us for takeoff; and the captain confirmed we had power to the right engine; but no N1 indications so he came on the radio telling tower we were unable to takeoff due to an engine issue. Tower then gave us instructions to turn right on XYR; left Y; left P. I read back the instructions. As I was pulling out the QRH; that is when other aircraft on frequency advised us that we had flames coming out of the right engine. Multiple aircraft stated our right engine was still on fire and tower asked our intentions. One of the transmissions from another aircraft at that time said something to the effect of 'you guys need to be clear when talking about fire; because if they still have a fire they will be evacuating based on your observations.' I believe I came on frequency and asked if there were still flames since we had no fire indications; bells; or lights; nor did we even have a hot start. Aircraft or tower confirmed our engine was on fire. We asked to have the equipment rolled; and the captain commanded the evacuation checklist. I read it slowly; and performed the first 5 steps. The Captain did the PA to prepare for evacuation and then asked me about pulling the fire handles. I misunderstood him; and thought he wanted me to discharge the bottles. We went through the checklist and both confirmed that step 7 said we did not have any fire warning indications so I didn't want to discharge the bottles.That is when I heard the slides deploy; the EVAC light illuminate; and the flight attendants giving their commands. The captain quickly made a PA to only evacuate on the left side.Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) had not arrived by that point; and with an unknown confirmed fire; I believe our crew performed the safest action based on the information we had; rather than wait for a confirmation of the fire extinguished or worsening.By the time we finished the remaining checklist items; only one flight attendant was on board. We did a final sweep of the aircraft to make sure no other people were on board and then we came down the slide. We talked with ARFF while performing the final walk.

An air carrier flight crew reported being advised of an engine fire while lining up for takeoff; resulting in an evacuation.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

Found a battery with unprotected terminals in the shipment. Also no special provision noted on the AWB for shipping batteries.

Ramp employee reported finding a battery in the cargo compartment with unprotected terminals and no required hazmat documentation for air transport.


Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure

A military aircraft flying the ILS to LMT Runway 32 (IFR flight plan in IMC) began descending on the glidepath and as he broke out of the weather; visually acquired a blue and white helicopter. The pilot aggressively maneuvered away from the helo and prevented not only the loss of life of all the aircrew; but the associated danger of having a fighter and a helo crash into the surrounding city. The Control Tower was in two radio communication with the helicopter (I was monitoring the Local Control frequency) and the Radar Control facility had previously pointed out 'light civil traffic' to the fighter pilot prior to telling him to contact Tower. The fighter pilot (with an instructor in his backseat) used his onboard radar to try to locate the traffic. The fighter pilot locked the helo just as he broke out of the weather and simultaneously found the traffic visually. Despite very low airspeed associated with the final portion of an instrument approach (around 200 KIAS) he was able to aggressively push his jet toward the ground in order to avoid a collision and passed within a few hundred feet of the traffic. The helo was one mile outside of Class D airspace and the Tower simply said 'he was legal.' Although technically accurate; the point is that both Seattle Center and the Tower saw the helo and did not positively de-conflict the IFR traffic from a very real conflict. The fact that the helo was one mile outside the Class D would not have been of much comfort to the public if burning wreckage had fallen on them. In the interest of safety; I recommend adding extensions to the Class D airspace 2 additional miles along the approach courses of the instrument Runway 14-32 in order to ensure protection of IFR traffic operating to and from the airport.

An IMC Fighter on final to LMT Runway 32 was advised about VFR helicopter traffic on final but did not detect the aircraft visually until clear of clouds then flew beneath the helicopter while avoiding it.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

While taxing to our gate area I taxied past our parking spot. We did not see the ground crew. There were two other aircraft parked. One aircraft was parked deeper than the other. This made me think that the one parked deeper was not at a jet bridge but on the open ramp where a ramp is placed up to the aircraft for the passengers. As I passed the the plane I realized that I was wrong and that I passed my spot. With the aircraft at gate two parked that deep I believed that I could make a u-turn. I had a ground personnel marshal me through the turn. He was giving me the signal to continue. As I neared the exhaust area of the parked aircraft he signaled to stop. He used his flashlight to check the area and signaled me to continue. I cleared the tail of the parked aircraft and and was still being given the clear hand signal. Then as the turn was nearly complete the ground crew guy giving me signals started to maneuver over to where I would line up in my parking spot. Then I felt something like you would if you taxied over a drain on the ramp and stated 'what was that.' When I observed a mechanic walking out I realized that I had made contact with the other aircraft. I should have set the brake and asked for a tug to maneuver the aircraft back to its parking spot. The preventative measure would be to never maneuver the aircraft at anytime you suspect the room to safely maneuver is in question.

As we turned onto the back taxiway we saw two company aircraft parked. The position of the two planes made it look as if one aircraft was on the hard stand; at gate X3; and the other was at gate X2. The X2 gate is positioned closer to the terminal than gate A1 and appeared as if the aircraft parked there is on the hard stand when both gates X1 and X2 are occupied. X3 is a cramped gate and its view is blocked by gate Y6; which was occupied. The taxi line to X1 is arced in a way that makes it look as if the taxi line turns behind the aircraft on X1. This led us to believe X1 was open. After we realized that X1 was occupied the Captain brought the aircraft to a stop. I told the Captain that I would call for a tug. The Captain thought a 180 turn could be made and started the turn. I thought the turn was tight; but since a marshaler was below the aircraft on gate X2; the turn could continue. At no time did the marshaler indicate for us to stop the turn while I could see him. He gave the proper signal for being clear of the other aircraft. When the nose of our plane passed the tail of the other aircraft; there was a fair amount of distance between the two aircraft. This distance was enough that I thought the radius of our wing would clear the other aircraft. I could not see the wing out of the Captain's window or the marshaler when the two aircraft came into contact. It is obvious now that we should have gotten a tug to pull us into the gate. I believe that it would have been prudent to have taken more time to make the decision to make the 180 degree turn on the ramp. I had attempted an in range call several times and never received a response from operation at VPS. If we had known the gate; this may have prevented us from overshooting our gate. Also; it might be valuable if the wing walker is positioned in a way that is more easily seen by incoming aircraft.

Air carrier flight crew reported while maneuvering into parking spot; aircraft made contact with another airplane.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Our aircraft had [a] deferral for the right inner tank fuel quantity indication. We had no working cockpit indication for the fuel quantity in that tank. The MEL requires an alternate means of verifying fuel tank quantity prior to each flight. A logbook entry is required by maintenance to confirm that the fuel quantity in that tank is known. The logbook on this flight was properly signed off by the mechanic verifying a known quantity in the tank with the deferral. During pre-flight; the First Officer compared what he believed to be the fuel remaining from our inbound flight that morning to the fuel added; based on the new fuel slip. He believed that there should have been more fuel onboard than was indicated by the computed total we were given. We talked with the mechanic on duty and asked him about this possible difference. He was very certain that the quantity in the right inner tank was confirmed.He said that there is a digital quantity indication on the re-fueling panel that was working; and confirmed the correct total in that tank. The First Officer said he remembers the mechanic also talking about sticking that tank to confirm the quantity. I don't remember hearing that; but I may have been out of my seat at that moment. The mechanic was adamant that the quantity was right. I've interacted with this mechanic many times over the years; and he is very conscientious. In the end; we had to trust the people that physically check the quantity. We knew that if there were a discrepancy; it would be on the conservative side. We would have more; not less fuel than planned. After takeoff; I immediately noticed that the aircraft wanted to roll to the right. It was easily controllable; but noticeable. This continued throughout the flight; and made me suspect that there may have been more fuel in the right inner tank than was indicated. I decided to make a logbook entry stating that I thought there might be extra fuel in that tank. I suggested that maintenance completely drain that tank and re-fill it to a known quantity for the next flight. I didn't want to pass on a possible discrepancy to the next crew.It would be interesting to know what the actual fuel quantity was in that tank. If it turns out that there was more fuel in that tank than we realized; I can see one possible way that it happened. We receive little; if any training on the re-fueling panel; so I don't know much about how it works. It seems to me that the mechanic was relying mainly on the digital quantity indication on that panel to determine fuel in the right inner tank. Is it possible that the digital indication is actually a fuel counter that measures the amount of fuel added; instead of measuring the total fuel in the tank? If so; that could explain a discrepancy. I'm not sure if the mechanic that we worked with is the one who oversaw the re-fueling of the airplane. It may have been done earlier with a different mechanic. I'm filing this report in the interest of advancing safety. Maybe we can learn something from this.

Air Carrier Captain reported an issue with the fuel quantity gauge with one fuel tank which was deferred by Maintenance. Crew was unsure of the actual quantity in the tank.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 45

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Engine oil pressure maxed out during flight. Requested ATC to direct me to nearest airport. ATC sent me to ZZZ1. I landed safely. In light of this event; I believe the FAA should not exempt club aircraft from the same maintenance schedules required by training/school aircraft. A law should be implemented that aircraft for rent; for example; through a club; should require the exact same maintenance requirements as training/school aircraft. In talking with the owner of the plane; owner and his son both knew there was an engine oil pressure [gauge] issue; but allowed me to rent his plane and fly it. I noticed [gauge] was slightly high during run-up. The needle went full deflection after reaching cruise. I believe this situation could have been avoided if the [club] came down harder on aircraft owners to maintain their planes. It should be mandated to impose stricter maintenance schedules on club planes for rent. The airplane owners in the club have very little incentive to spend the money to keep the planes properly maintained; beyond the annual inspections. Pilots suffer due to owner thriftiness.

Single pilot reported that engine oil pressure exceeded operating limits resulting in a divert and successful precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 4800; Flight Crew Type 420

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8135; Flight Crew Type 2080

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Weather

When departing on the TEB 8 Departure out of TEB; the non flying pilot (trip Captain) selected NAV/VNAV/VVS on the flight guidance panel (as per my brief). I initially brought the power back at around 500 FT AGL; then engaged the autopilot at approximately 1;000 FT MSL (the non flying pilot was contacting Departure; so I engaged the autopilot myself as the flying pilot). Soon after; it clearly appeared to me that the autopilot was not going to capture the altitude; there was short discussion from the non flying pilot that it would capture; it was in VALT; as he saw that I was about to disengage the autopilot to take action to correct. I had already switched from VNAV to VS (do decrease the rate of climb manually) on the flight guidance panel; however; in that moment; the VNAV had already gone to VALT; therefore; it did not take. Then; at approximately 200 FT prior to the required 2;000 FT level off altitude; he said 'OK; it's not going to' (level off). We both had our hand on the yoke; I disengaged the autopilot and we nosed over; but overshot our altitude by approximately 350 FT. What I believe caused the problem was not bringing additional power back soon enough in addition attempting to change the flight guidance panel from VNAV/VVS to VS at a very critical time (right when it changed to VALT; unknowingly). Taking action sooner; when I originally began too; would have prevented the overshoot. Note: Weather above is approximate; the rain had cleared out and visibility increased prior to our departure.

Pilot flying overshot assigned altitude by 350 FT. The TEB 8 departure for Runway 01 was briefed and followed. At 1;000 FT MSL; I (pilot not flying) called 'one thousand to go' and the pilot flying connected the autopilot with a climb rate of 3;500 FPM and still in the climb power setting. The preselect was set to 2;000 FT as required for the departure procedure and the autopilot immediately went into capture mode. The pilot flying then attempted to adjust the vertical speed with the pitch wheel on the flight guidance control panel and the autopilot went into pitch mode. I called altitude and asked if the pilot flying had the aircraft two times. The autopilot was switched off at 1;800 FT by the pilot flying and was manually leveled off after the aircraft overshot the assigned altitude by 350 FT. I reduced the power without command to assist in the correction. At about the time of the overshot; the Controller assigned us a climb to 7;000 FT. This problem came about from the pilot flying being behind the airplane and not anticipating the assigned low altitude level off. Lack of experience and judgment and the reluctance to follow SOP also contributed.

A CL30 which departed on the TEB 8 Runway 1 SID did not capture the 2;000 FT set in the MCP and so overshot by about 350 FT at which time ATC issued a higher altitude.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While parking this morning; the Marshaller did not make any motion for us to slow or stop at the appropriate line. He was still signaling for us to taxi forward normally. Being aware that there was a small GPU (the kind that runs off electricity from the building) was in place approximately where the 'EMB-170' line is and not visible to my First Officer by this point; I stopped to get things sorted out. As I was stopping I saw another Ramper who I had not seen initially beside the GPU; motioning for the Marshaller to signal for me to stop. I made eye contact with this Ramper; and he signaled for me to set the parking brake. The Marshaller later said that he had been focused on the '200' of the 'CRJ-200' line instead of the 'Q200' line.

DHC8-200 Captain reports stopping his aircraft during marshalling into the gate after sensing that he was passed the normal stop point. The Marshall had been looking at the CRJ200 line instead of the Q200 line.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Inspector 15; Maintenance Lead Technician 20; Maintenance Repairman 30; Maintenance Technician 30

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot

[B777 aircraft Main] Battery had severe overheating.

Reporter stated they are Repair Station. The B777 Main Aircraft Battery that raised their concerns had been received in December 2012.  The Fiber Nickel Cadmium (FNC) battery had signs of severe overheating; was scorched and blackened. The external green battery container; which is made of steel and approximately one and one-half foot by one and one-half foot (1' 1/2' x 1' 1/2') in size; had similar discolorations. The interior liner of the container is made of a plastic-type material similar to 'Gill Flooring' material and separates the battery from the steel container. The liner had melted across the top of the battery posts and sidewalls of the green box (battery container); even though the liner material is approximately .060' thousandths of an inch thick.Reporter stated there is only one Manufacturer (MFG) of the FNC type battery used on B777 aircraft. FNC batteries are sealed; 'No-Vent valve battery and are not a Gel type battery. Out of all the FNC batteries they repair; an average of seven FNC batteries a year are found with similar conditions. Batteries with three or more damaged cells; out of twenty-four cells per battery; are not repairable per the MFG. The damaged battery he reported on was not repairable. One of their Electrical Engineer's noted the battery damage was indicative of overcharging and believes the cutoff protection system for the FNC battery's electrical charging cycle is failing. If a FNC Battery has a cell that shorts and continuously demands a charge and starts to overheat; thermal expansion will migrate to the other cells in the battery and the battery will overheat. He does not know if the B777 aircraft's Main Battery Charger System can detect a failed cell or several cells that may demand continuous charge and cause overheating and possible fire in the aircraft's Main Equipment Center (MEC). Reporter stated all the FNC batteries they receive in their Shop come inside the green colored steel battery containers. The batteries had been removed by different Air Carrier Operators of B777 aircraft for either a 'Time Change' requirement; or an 'On Condition' situation due to a battery write-up. But not all Air Carriers were aware of the extensive damage some of their FNC batteries had incurred when their Main batteries were removed for 'Time'; not until they arrived in his Repair Shop. With the recent events involving the B787 aircraft and Lithium batteries; he feels the B777 Main Battery overheating issue has not been resolved and is a safety of flight concern.

A Repair Shop Maintenance Inspector reports about a Fiber Nickel Cadmium (FNC) battery received in their Shop with evidence of severe overheating; scorching and blackened.  FNC type batteries are used as the Main Battery on B777 aircraft.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The Captain was the pilot flying; I (the First Officer) was the pilot not flying. We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 11L in Tucson; Arizona. The Captain made a right downwind; then a right base; then intercepted the localizer for the visual approach (backed up by the ILS) to Runway 11L. After calling the field in sight and subsequently cleared for the visual approach; the Captain entered direct 'WASON' in the FMS and set 5;500 FT in the Altitude Window on the MCP; which I confirmed per the Approach Plate. As we were descending just outside of 'WASON' toward 5;500 FT and simultaneously intercepting the Localizer; we received a GPWS 'Terrain' 'Pull-Up'. The Captain immediately went TOGA and climbed over 1;000 FT. At this point; since we were still 8 or 9 miles from the runway and still in a normal position to continue the approach to a normal VFR landing (still with ILS backup); the Captain elected to continue the visual (ILS backup) approach to a normal landing and taxi-in. I believe the Captain flew all the correct altitudes; consistent with the ILS Runway 11L step-down altitudes listed on the Approach Plate. Further; what I believed triggered the GPWS was the 4565 FT obstacle located just outside of 'WASON' which we would've flown almost directly over during our controlled descent to 5;500 and 'dogleg' localizer intercept. Since the Enhanced GPWS is predictive in nature; I believe the software was projecting a 'continued' descent (i.e. below 5;500 FT) toward this database obstacle; even though we were subsequently going to 'level out' momentarily per the step-down altitude guidance on the Approach Plate. Therefore; GPWS issued the warning as a direct result of this 'descending projection'. Again; I believe the Captain complied with company SOP's and executed properly. The terrain outside of WASON (on the approach to Runway 11L) has been known to trigger GPWS; since the altitude clearances are so tight and the aircraft is normally descending for the approach. Enhanced GPWS is predictive and thus sometimes 'projects' continued descents on 'step-down' Approaches. Nonetheless; all GPWS Warnings must be obeyed and proper SOP's followed; and were followed in this event. I believe it would be helpful to include data on the TUS Airport Advisory Page with draws attention to the rising terrain around 'WASON' on the approach to Runway 11L; and the subsequent EGPWS potential (particularly on VFR Arrivals).

We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 11L in Tucson; Arizona. I made a right downwind; then a right base; and then intercepted the localizer for the visual approach (backed up by the ILS) to Runway 11L. After calling the field in sight and subsequently cleared for the visual approach; I entered direct 'WASON' in the FMS and set 5;500 FT in the Altitude Window on the FCU; which I confirmed per the Approach Plate. As we were descending just outside of 'WASON' toward 5;000 FT and simultaneously intercepting the localizer; we received a GPWS 'Terrain' 'Pull-Up'. I immediately went TOGA and disconnected autopilot and climbed over 1;000 FT. At this point; since we were still 8 or 9 miles from the runway and still in a normal position to continue the approach to a normal VFR landing (still with ILS backup); I elected to continue the visual (ILS backup) approach to a normal landing and taxi-in. I believe I flew all the correct altitudes; consistent with the ILS Runway 11L step-down altitudes listed on the Approach Plate. Further; what I believed triggered the GPWS was the 4;565 FT obstacle located just outside of 'WASON' which we would've flown almost directly over during our controlled descent to 5;500 and 'dogleg' localizer intercept.Although I know about this issue and initially said to the First Officer that I wasn't going to call the field and have ATC vector me so that I would have the added barrier to keep clear of the terrain; I accepted the visual when ATC asked if I had the airport in sight. This set me up to get too close to the terrain. I was also fatigued from the long day and late hour and the night conditions. The pairing I was scheduled to do was a violation of the contract and possibly a violation of FAR 117 as scheduling extended us to the 14 hour limit as a matter of planning the pairing not as a matter of an 'unforeseen delay'.

A321 flight crew reports an EGPWS terrain warning approaching WASON on a visual ILS to TUS and takes evasive action. The FCU altitude had been correctly set to 5;500 FT but the EGPWS software was not aware of the planned level off and triggered the warning.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

On our initial climbout on AKUNA9 it felt like we were hitting the wake from the Airbus in front of us.  We both mentioned it and continued the climbout. After I put the flaps up I did the After Takeoff flow and followed up by verifying it with the After Take Off check list. During that time it felt like we were still in the Airbus wake. As soon as I completed the After Takeoff checklist; I looked at my display and saw we weren't turning and it was at that point DFW departure gave us a heading of 090 followed by another heading of 070. ATC inquired if we were given a SID and told us we were close to traffic to our right. The Captain communicated that we were trying to avoid the wake of the aircraft in front of us. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.

B737-800 flight crew member reported a track deviation occurred departing DFW in trail of an Airbus when the pilot flying was distracted by a wake turbulence encounter.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

My First Officer was flying a visual approach to 17L in DFW; aircraft was stabilized at the appropriate altitude and he continued his stabilized approach to the runway. The aircraft was on a good/acceptable visual glide path to the runway and hit a small area of unsettled air from a previous arrival close to the runway threshold that caused a small settling which cause the PAPI lights to all go red on short final. There were no glideslope or sinkrate calls from the EGPWS before touchdown.  The aircraft touched down in the touchdown zone on speed and with an appropriate sink rate to effect a safe landing.  Be a little more proactive/careful about flying through potential areas of wake turbulence/disturbed air from previous arrivals.

CRJ-700 Captain reported they got a bit low on a visual approach to DFW after a wake turbulence encounter.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Doing the Stadium Visual for the first time at night as assigned by Approach; RWY 29 into EWR; winds were 310/16G25; fully configured by GIMEE. I was having difficulty identifying points after the stadium; specifically the cemetery; [and] we flew into the wake of the 737 that landed before us; causing a loss in altitude and an obstacle announcement. We corrected; added power; turned over the railway; climbed and then landed without any further [issues]. There were no queries from ATC at any time during the event. There were other aircraft requesting ILS 22L; but because we had already briefed the approach and programmed it into the box I did not want to change the approach during a critical phase of flight. In hindsight I should have requested the ILS into 22L and dealt with x-wind when Approach originally advised us of the Stadium Vis Approach. I am quite familiar with this; I do it often and it would have been comfortable.

Embraer Regional Jet First Officer reported difficulty navigating the Stadium Visual approach into EWR; and encountered wake turbulence in trail of a B737.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

I was PM when I checked in with CLE Approach; they said that a few aircraft that had landed before; had dipped down on the glideslope (GS) to maintain visual with the runway. ATC told us that they were going to clear us for the ILS 24R and that they wanted us to fly the GS all the way down to runway so they could check out the GS. The Captain and I thought this was a weird request but we obliged. We were cleared to 4;000 feet and cleared for the approach. As the GS was captured we followed it down from 4;000 [feet] at CIVAC. At CIVAC ATC said to fly the GS; fly the GS. So we did and at JEDSU ATC asked if we were on the GS and I said yes. He said impossible because JEDSU is 3;000 feet. He then asked if we had runway which I responded yes. ATC cleared us for a Visual Approach and at that moment the GS went full scale up; we reported that to ATC and nothing else was said. CLE must not realize that the final fix and GS intercept is far off.

When we checked in with CLE Approach; they had a request. They told us to expect ILS 24R and asked if we could please fly the glideslope all the way down. They said that previous aircraft had been dipping below the glide slope near the FAF. They said they believed the aircraft were doing this to stay below clouds to maintain visual with the runway. The FO and I were perplexed. We had never heard of such a request. Why would aircraft do that on an ILS approach? This raised some flags. We were then cleared to 4;000 feet and cleared for the approach. At 4;000 feet we were on glideslope a few miles from CIVAC. The airport was in sight. The minimum altitude to CIVAC was 4;000 [feet;] so I selected Nav mode and Alt mode to stop descent until passing CIVAC. The glideslope was passing below us at this time. It seemed as if the controller saw us going above the glidepath because he again told us to please stay on the glideslope that they needed to make sure it was working properly. Since we were by now passing CIVAC I started back down to the glideslope. Approaching JEDSU we switched to Tower. I was hand flying now. The Tower asked if we were on the glideslope. The FO and I looked at each other; puzzled. We had the airport in sight; exactly on glideslope. I told the FO to tell him we were exactly on glideslope. The Tower responded that that was impossible because we were supposed to be at JEDSU at 3;000 [feet.] He asked if we had a visual on the runway; the FO responded yes. At that time the command bars abruptly commanded fly up. I flew up to the command bars. Tower cleared us for a Visual Approach. I told the Tower about what we had just experienced. I told them that the sudden change of glide slope probably would have disconnected the autopilot had it been on.This was either a malfunctioning glideslope or more likely a temperature change that caused the glideslope to cross under the minimum altitudes. This phenomenon must not happen much at CLE; since it was obvious that the controllers did not know what they were dealing with. If they did; they would not have asked us twice to maintain the glideslope so that they could check it. I have never experienced this in over 25 years. Only once in the simulator; and it only resulted in a 30 foot deviation. Unfortunately; that did not leave much of an impression. I should have maintained the minimum altitudes all the way to the FAF. I did this initially; however Approach kept asking us to please stay on the glideslope.I will always brief the minimum altitudes and monitor them on ILS approaches. In the simulator training scenario that I experienced; there was only a 30 foot loss: however; the possible deviation was much more substantial in this event. It left much more of an impression. I will watch for this the rest of my career; however; I may never see it again. I have never seen the glideslope take me below crossing altitudes before. The Sim Instructor had taught me a dive and drive technique; verifying every altitude on the approach with the pilot monitoring; and resetting the altitude selector for every fix. That was very tedious; but worked great in a quiet simulator. I can't see using that technique at an airport like DTW; where the communications are constant on final approach. I will set the missed approach altitude when cleared for the approach and monitor the crossings like we do on a descend via arrival. If we do not comply with a minimum crossing I will then select Nav and Alt until we pass the fix; then continue down to the glideslope when past the minimum altitude fix. I will brief and or teach this to pilots that I fly with on the line; during IOE and during line checks.I think it would be good to put a small note about this risk and the requirement to cross check crossing altitudes in the ILS training section of the OM. Most pilots read this section of the OM once a year preparing for their training. It would be a good reminder. When one flies thousands and thousands of hours; and the glide slope always meets the minimum crossing altitudes; it's easy to let one's guard down.

CRJ700 flight crew is asked by ATC to follow the glideslope all the way down for the ILS 24R at CLE as a test. This results in crossing JEDSU below the glideslope intercept altitude of 3;000 feet.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Air Carrier X was at FL380 landing CMH. Air Carrier Y was at FL360 landing PHX; routed under Air Carrier X. I cleared Air Carrier Y direct VHP to keep him north of Air Carrier X and turned Air Carrier X 15 left (south) for his descent. After getting Air Carrier X clear of Air Carrier Y; I cleared Air Carrier X direct AIR which should have kept him south of Air Carrier Y and descended Air Carrier X to FL350. Air Carrier X turned northwest instead of west and headed back into Air Carrier Y. I then turned Air Carrier X 10 left and Air Carrier Y 10 right but needed more and turned Air Carrier X an additional 15 left. [Should have] assigned Air Carrier X a heading until below Air Carrier Y instead of a Direct route.

ZOB Controller described a conflict event when issuing a 'direct' clearance when a more positive method of separation should have been used.


Troubleshooting; Confusion; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

When arriving at new aircraft; the ground power was connected. The temperature in the back of the plane was stifling - it had to be 95 degrees Fahrenheit in the plane. I told my forward Flight Attendant (FA) and we reported to Captain. Passengers were allowed to board and they immediately began taking off as many clothing layers as possible. FAA and company regulations still require everyone to wear masks; despite CDC warnings that masks should be removed when overheated. As the AFT FA; I am responsible for making announcements in a mask; which is laborious and requires many more breathing pauses than usual. Saying the announcements with a mask; in ridiculous heat is more; exhausting; distracting; and physically concerning. My only focus was being able to breathe and the health of my passengers. I walked to the front of aircraft to get some air; but also to get water for the poor passengers. Thankfully; the plane did cool off in the air; but it was still extremely uncomfortable.Extreme heat conditions on the airplane combined with mandatory mask compliance for passengers and crew caused this event.  Crews can be terminated/lose benefits if removing masks on board the aircraft in front of passengers. Until recently; FA's were not required to wear masks while making announcements. Passengers can be fined/lose flight privileges for removing masks. The threat of the FAA fines and penalties under the new federal mask mandate appears to supersede common sense safety practices and concern and care for crews and passengers.Masks; may help prevent viral spread (there is much data to refute those claims); but prevents the passengers and crew to breathe much needed fresh oxygen. The effects of not getting enough oxygen and the potential for hypoxia were ingrained into me during FA training. I am greatly concerned that airlines and the FAA are continuing to put the safety of passengers and crew at risk with mandatory mandates that restrict fresh oxygen; which can cloud judgement and critical thinking abilities. Heat exhaustion and the need for fresh oxygen when wearing masks was acknowledged by the CDC. Of course; the CDC recommended spacing of self 6 feet away; but plane passengers and crew do not have the luxury of a 6 foot distance. Mandatory mask mandates on planes should also come with the ability to tell passengers and crew to remove masks when feeling anxious or stressed or when breathing is compromised. If one feels sick or faint because of heat and a mask; the ability to lower a mask on a plane should be allowed. FAs should be empowered to use their common sense when enforcing masks in extreme heat conditions. The 'appearance of safety' seems to be aviation's new standard of practice rather than 'actual safety' of anyone on board an aircraft. This is a very serious shift in thought for the FAA and airlines.  The unintended consequences of these 'appearance of safety' standards are frightening.

Flight Attendant reported concern for passenger health regarding the face mask policy when the aircraft is on the ground with little or no air circulation and the cabin is hot.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 410; Flight Crew Type 10000

This event is my third time this winter my aircraft windshield wipers failed on short final. This was the second flight with this aircraft. The first flight; the Captain's windshield wiper failed on final. The Captain landed uneventfully because rain was light. Maintenance was called; came to the aircraft; stuck his hand out the window; grabbed the wiper and it started working. Problem 'solved.' This flight it happened again; same aircraft; it was raining so hard it was difficult to monitor the First Officer's (FO) landing. Was forced to look out the F/O's window to taxi back. The F/O's wiper failed on short final in heavy rain; where I had to take the aircraft; landing uneventfully. His wiper started working again after touchdown. I believe the wipers are poorly engineered. There is no preflight check on them since you are not supposed to turn them on when the windshield is dry. The first time you know they will not work is when you need them. We can't stick our hand out the window to fix the problem. I hope the wipers will not be a cause of a future mishap. Recommend talking to Boeing for a fix.

B737 Captain reported several events of windshield wiper system failure during rain conditions on landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Cruising at FL360 on our way to ZZZ; FA called me and informed me that passenger in seat 15C was not feeling well and seemed 'woozy'. And is possibly in and out of consciousness. I asked her to find out if there is a doctor or nurse on board. She called me back and told me that there were two RNs on board and were checking on the passenger's situation. I asked both the flight attendants to find out all the required info as per the sample checklist and I read it to them. Flight Attendant (FA) got back to me on the intercom with the following information 'The passenger has a nut allergy and inhaled a pump (inhaler) before coming on board. She was noticed by a passenger next to her looking fainted. The only thing we got out of her; the pulse is dropping fast as stated by the nurse'. I spoke to the nurse on the phone and the nurse advised me that her pulse is dropping and the passenger needs proper medical attention rightly away and we should land. I discussed this with my First Officer and offered ZZZ1 as a possible diversion (We were only 20 miles west of ZZZ1) for the medical issue. I informed Dispatch and they agreed with me and sent me the gate info in ZZZ1 and advised me that medical personnel will be standing by. We informed ATC of our situation and squawked 7700 and we were cleared to ZZZ1 via Radar Vectors. We landed without incident and proceeded to the gate. passenger was treated by medics and I was informed that she may have a peanut allergy and consumed a snickers bar at some point prior to boarding. The lady was taking off in an aisle chair and her teenage son accompanied her. The duty pilot called me and I explained everything to him and answered his questions. We were re-dispatched to ZZZ with the remaining passengers.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported passenger serious illness requiring diversion.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13.0

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft was westbound descending from 23;000 feet to 10;000 feet as per the Letter of Agreement with Approach. The Approach Controller had accepted the handoff of Aircraft. I was going to ship communications to approach. The aircraft was leaving around 15;000 feet when Aircraft said he was responding to an RA. There was a VFR limited data block in the area that is believed to be a VFR test aircraft; which are often working in the area; but traffic was never issued to the Aircraft because it was never a factor until the VFR made a rapid turn combined with a rapid descent. After stating he was responding to an RA Aircraft asked what I wanted him to do. My reply was to have his aircraft do whatever the RA had instructed him to do. I assumed the VFR aircraft was in contact with the approach control facility; so I thought the best course of action was to transfer communications of Aircraft to approach.The test aircraft often cancel their IFR clearances after they are done with their high altitude checks; and work VFR before returning to land. Often times they do this and request to go VFR without flight following. These aircraft are making extreme maneuvers in high performance aircraft at high speeds combined with rapid climbs and descents in an area just east of the airport. My recommendation would be to either have these aircraft be required to be in contact with ATC or at least have them in a designated area away from the regular arrival and departure aircraft in and around the airport.

ZKC Center Controller reported a descending aircraft reported an NMAC with an unidentified VFR target performing abrupt maneuvers.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Approaching the hold short for the runway at ZZZ; and waiting for one aircraft to land; I stopped the aircraft. As I set the parking brake; the right Rudder Pedal Assembly broke loose; (concurrent with a snap and clunk sound); the pedal rested in the full forward position. First Officer and I set the parking brake; he used his brake pedals; while I used my hand on the parking brake handle to set the brakes. We started the APU; shutdown the engines; and requested to be towed back to the Ramp. Prior to the decision to request tow; First Officer and I discussed (briefly) what we should do. It was very clear that we did not know what our ability to stop the aircraft would be; or even the extent of any damage that may have occurred. We concluded that our safest course was to be towed in. First Officer and I coordinated with Ground Control; Line Maintenance; Operations Control; and Maintenance Control; and the aircraft was safely returned to the Ramp where repairs could be made. Logbook entry was made. Support group dropped a plane in for the freight; our duty day expired and we dispatched to the hotel. Maintenance history [noted that] Maintenance found the bolt where the right rudder pedal pushrod attaches to the rudder pedal arm to be sheared. Somehow; this bolt sheared while I was setting the parking brake. Thankfully this did not occur during flight; or a more critical phase of flight; V1 cut; crosswind landing; etc. To clarify; the right rudder pedal broke; moved freely with no affect on flight controls. The pedals on the First Officer's side still worked; and my left pedal still worked as well. Gate return.

While taxiing for departure to the runway at ZZZ; the Captain went to set the parking brake to hold short of the runway for landing traffic. At that moment; we heard a loud bang; and the Captain's right rudder pedal appeared to completely separate from the assembly. It subsequently moved freely back and forth and he was unable to 'Set' or use brakes; and had no rudder control. I was able to set brakes from the First Officer's side; and we elected to shut down and get towed back to the Ramp. Upon inspection; Maintenance discovered that the bolt where the right rudder pedal pushrod attaches to the rudder pedal arm was sheared off.

Two pilots report about a Captain's right rudder pedal attach bolt that sheared (broke); while setting the parking brake on a B757-200 aircraft when they stopped to hold short for another aircraft to land. Aircraft towed back to gate.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Staffing; Weather

I was working both finals positions combined to one. I encountered heavy arrival demand that was overwhelming since aircraft were unable to fly visual approaches which led me to have to run instrument approaches. When we run instrument approaches to the parallel runways we can run dependent staggered approaches with a 3 mile stagger; or independent simultaneous approaches with two final controllers. Due to our staffing shortage; there was no one available to staff a second final position to run independent approaches and my sector became overloaded.Due to a recent budget cut of overtime funds. To compensate for our lack of proper staffing we are forced to manage the operation at F11 with a reduced number of Controllers. The only method implemented by management to mitigate the risk of lower staffing levels is to reduce break times to prevent any Controller from exceeding 2 hours on position. This plan does not allow for positions to be staffed according to the traffic volume and often leads to many Controllers becoming fatigued by spending close to 2 hours on a busier than normal sector and having to take shortened breaks and then come back for another busy session with anywhere from 1.5- 2 hours on position again. While a 20 minute break is legal; it does not always allow for enough time to decompress from an intense session before going back to work yet another intense session.After my intense session on final; I had a 20 minute break and then went back and ended up on the most difficult position in the TRACON. I was lucky that about 20 minutes into my session; another Controller who was just beginning his shift; offered to work the sector and let me work a less intense sector. During discussions with management this week about plans to compensate for our reduced staffing daily; we are told right now we are just hoping for an increased budget and the only thing done to help is a reduced break policy which varies from 15-25 minutes based on the supervisor's discretion. We are told by management we shall not ask for a reduced arrival rate to help ease the burden since opening additional sectors to manage traffic volume is not always practical at this point. We are also told not to shut down our sector if we feel overloaded as this would bring attention to our facility.We are told to be reactive when we get overloaded; to then ask for in trail spacing to catch up.In my case of an overloaded final sector; typically with that volume of traffic running instrument approaches; the precedence has been to staff a second final to manage the frequency congestion; workload; and provide a better service to the user. In this case; each arrival to the same runway would only need 3 miles in trail instead of 6 miles to accomplish the 3 mile stagger. Many aircraft were vectored across the localizer to get extra spacing because the rate of traffic exceeded the capacity of the airspaces configuration. The Traffic Management (TMC) position was not staffed this morning and the Supervisor was having to manage that TMC position and perform Supervisor duties.If we cannot get the funding needed to staff the facility to provide the same level of service that we used to then we need to reduce the level of service to maintain the integrity of the National Airspace System (NAS). We cannot sustain the same traffic volume that we did when there were 4-5 more Controllers on scheduled overtime. This will happen again and again until staffing can be adjusted to match the traffic volume or the traffic volume is reduced to match the reduction in staffing.

A TRACON Controller reported being forced to work an overloaded finals sector to two runways for extended periods of time due to the TRACON not having the staffing to de-combine sectors.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 200

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

The flight was mostly uneventful up to about 10 miles before landing. It was challenging to keep engine temps at 380 and below 400F CHT without throwing a lot of fuel at it; but I worked on that most of the flight (cowl flaps opened). I had 82 gallons of fuel; enough for a return flight as long as I was burning closer to 15 gallons than 20 gallons per hour (there was virtually no headwind). I checked that I had 8qt of oil before takeoff. During the flight; the fuel totalizer failed; so I didn't know what my fuel flow was and I tried to use fuel based on CHT temperatures only without knowing what the flow was. This was a known fault with this plane that was going to be fixed eventually.When I got over the mountains; we got smoke in the cockpit. Strangely it felt like it came from the back of the plane and because I was carrying a lot of batteries (lipo and lithium); I had my passenger look in the back to make sure none were on fire (they were in a fire proof lipo safe bag; but still; I wanted to be sure). He looked through all the luggage and couldn't find anything. By then; the smoke had stopped things were back to normal and I figured it was probably one battery I was carrying that shorted and things were back to normal. I was busy with the approach since I had to follow a specific route and altitude; and unfortunately at the time; I didn't think about looking at the alternator; but I got no low voltage warnings. It's possible the alternator did die and that I was running on batteries. I made the mistake of not checking electrical systems or oil pressure/temperature; mostly because after I felt confident that I didn't have an active fire in the plane; and no more smoke; I was close enough to my destination that I had to concentrate on the approach.At the time; I didn't think/know anything was wrong with the airplane (clearly; I made a mistake there); but soon I could tell the engine sounded a bit differently; something like a pinging sound when I was a lowered throttle (maybe 20'). I saw CHT go to 410F and added more fuel (more than needed); and unfortunately I was too busy worrying about not busting airspace and being over the right places to approach landing to think about looking at oil pressure and temperature when I heard the pinging; but I'm guessing they were bad.The pinging soon (maybe within 2 minutes at most; I didn't time it) changed to what felt like a cylinder that failed and very heavy shaking. I feathered the prop and just shut off the engine because of how bad the vibrations were. I believe the prop stopped on its own. On the ground; it was not possible to turn the prop by hand. I was able to make a perfect glide to the runway numbers and land smoothly at the airport. Because of the location I likely could have landed safely anywhere else; but given the choice of gliding to a hard runway; I went for that).I had enough speed to turn on a taxiway before the plane stopped entirely; and it then had to get towed. I had a bit of oil on the windscreen (not a lot thankfully); and after landing took this picture which was my first strong hint that the smoke did come from the cockpit and likely the alternator that shorted; or some other wires that went loose and shorted. I don't know if this in turn caused a failure that messed with oil delivery and killed the engine; hard to say; but it would be a possible outcome. It is also possible that I had a failure with the oil system that caused a leak that caused an electrical short and the smoke we got. Clearly; I got so concerned about lipo batteries being in fire that I totally forgot to check those systems unfortunately.I'm happy that I did remember to put the gear down and that I had enough electrical power for it to go down because I don't think I could have pumped it fast enough. I was able to coast off the runway and was later towed to the airport parking. There we no injuries; the landing was perfect; but the plane likely has an engine that isdestroyed. I hope that I didn't cause it to die by not keeping it cool enough (I've been told under 400F CHT is ok; but maybe that was too close to the limit; or the engine had other issues that caused it to be marginal and more likely to be damaged by any temperatures above 380F).

After crossing a high mountain range; a C182RG had an apparent engine failure. The pilot saw smoke in the cockpit earlier and felt vibrations severe enough that they shut the engine down before landing.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Enroute wake turbulence at FL340. 767-300 12 miles ahead and 2000 ft higher. Crew monitored assigned speed/altitude and descended out of it after ATC clearance.

B757 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence at FL340 12 miles in trail of a B767-300 at FL360.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 3

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

While providing night instruction to a student working toward a private pilot certificate; our aircraft struck a buck deer on the runway. The deer ran head first into the propeller while we were on the takeoff roll approximately 1500 feet down the runway. One contributing factor to the incident may have been that the runway lights were not on at the time of the strike. My student just commenced an approach and landing with a simulated failure of the onboard radio leaving him unable to activate the runway lights. Our source of illumination for the runway landing area was the landing light of the aircraft. If the runway lighting system had been turned on it is possible we may have been able to see the animal sooner and avoid the strike.

PA28 Instructor with a student reported striking a deer well into the takeoff roll. The runway lights were not on at the time and the landing light revealed the deer too late to take evasive action.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1000

VFR flight via GPS direct. After uneventful cruise at 5500 ft MSL; engine running rich-of-peak by 50 degrees and with no change in controls the engine momentarily seemed to 'quit'; not roughness or vibration but rather a momentary loss of power that lasted maybe 1 to 4 seconds. I increased mixture; switched tanks and turned on aux fuel pump. Engine ran for another 30 to 50 seconds then quit again for a few seconds. Process repeated approximately 5 or 6 times enroute to [destination airport]. ATC advised of the condition and I requested maintaining altitude and would continue to destination. Landing uneventful.Had mechanics go over the engine and fuel system the following morning. NO anomalies found to explain the event. NO evidence of water or other fuel contamination. JPI data evidently was corrupted and not usable (instrument to be sent to factory for repair). Eventually flew the return trip using a route over lower terrain in case of engine failure but flight was uneventful.

The reporter has not identified a cause for the momentary loss of engine power. Aircraft is fuel injected; has fuel bladders; flush fuel caps; and is hangared. No water has ever been found in the fuel system.

Cessna 206 pilot reported several occurrences of momentary engine power loss for unknown reasons.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 14400

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure

Departing runway 4R from BOS on the HYLND4 departure I note an issue with the charting of the SID.Using the NOS version of the chart; the plan view calls out climbing to 520 feet MSL then flying RNAV to NHANT fix then HURBE fix.  Here is where the confusion begins.  There are two routes that cross the next fix names STAYC while en route to the terminus fix HYLND.The narrative on page 2 offers little help either.  The narrative also describes flying to the HURBE fix as above; and ends with ...Thence...Continuing; '... on depicted route to HYLND.'The question remains; which route...?It is my understanding that the pilot is required to have either the plan view or the narrative of the procedure in their possession to be considered properly charted.  As both versions are lacking information and require the other to complete; and even at that the information is misleading; I would have to say this chart is not in keeping with regulation.Referencing the Jeppesen version of the chart; the Jeppesen version adds 'flags' to the route to indicate which path to follow.  However; the narrative of the departure route is identical to the NOS verbiage.Asking my fellow pilots about this procedure; I find some would rely on their pre-coded FMS routing to make the determination of proper routing.  As there does not go a week without a navigation alert from Jeppesen on mis-coded fixes/intersections/procedures somewhere in the world; reliance on the pre-coded fixes is an issue in its own right.The only rectification is to query ATC on the actual route effectively negating the 'time and radio congestion' reasons to have charted procedures in the first place.And let's touch a minute on the final leg of the departure serving runways 4; 9 and runways 22.  Three routes with final courses to be flown that have a total of a 6 degree variance.  Really? Blamed on noise? With all that water out there?  This must be better thought out.As to charting; I would refer all to the routing presentation of the 'ForeFlight' folks.  While building a route for the navigation logs; departure/arrival procedures are depicted and; as runway and originating/terminating fixes are described; the routing is graphically simplified.  As the industry is moving to more electronic charting; the current spaghetti-lined paper charting; I think; will finally go away.  In the interim; let's be careful out there.

A pilot reported the NOS version of the BOS HYLND FOUR RNAV SID Runway 4R became ambiguous at waypoint STAYC because without textual or graphical description a pilot could fly to either waypoint HYLND or SHAAN.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 1635

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Captain noticed heavy aileron control descending into Denver upon disconnecting the autopilot descending through approximately 20;000 feet. [The Captain] transferred controls to me briefly to verify. Our speed was still around 280 knots and we were set up for an RNAV Z approach to XYR. Initially the only concern was maintaining the RNP (Required Navigation Performance) arc so we informed ATC that we would need a visual approach. As the airplane slowed controllability primarily along the roll axis worsened. The controls were briefly transferred to me several times - I would describe it as driving an old car without power steering. Perhaps not nearly as hard as full manual reversion as duplicated by a simulator; but definitely abnormal. Hydraulics indicated normal. At this time we [advised ATC] and ultimately made an uneventful landing on XYR and upon determining operable brakes and steering taxied to the gate. On base leg we got a quick call to the flight attendants advising them that we had an abnormal situation and as a precaution fire trucks would likely follow us to the gate. On final a rear Flight Attendant called the flight deck as she hadn't heard the initial conversation. Repeated it to her. [ATC was advised] roughly abeam the airport on the downwind leg; perhaps 5 minutes before landing. A large weather reroute had left us landing with about 5000 lbs of fuel. The weather was great in ZZZ; although LLWS (Low Level Wind Shear) advisories existed. No wind shear was encountered.

B737 Captain reported stiff feel to the roll mode after disengaging the autopilot.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 12800

Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 5000

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway XXR. The First Officer was flying. We had intercepted the final approach course with Flaps 10 and assigned a speed of 170 or less. The airplane intercepted the final approach course with VOR/LOC armed. The autopilot intercepted the final at 2;200 feet; just outside of ZZZZZ; and at that time APP mode was selected. Upon intercepting the Glide Slope; the First Officer called for 'Flaps 15; Landing Gear down.' The aircraft captured the glideslope uneventfully. Shortly after passing ZZZZZ; the First Officer called for 'Flaps 30.' I selected Flaps 30 and as the flaps were moving to Flaps 30 the aircraft abruptly pushed the nose over approximately 8 to 10 degrees down. The First Officer and I were startled by the pushover; and both of us did a rapid assessment of what was happening. Approximately three or four seconds into the push over event and a full dot low on the G/S; the GPWS issued a 'Caution Obstacle.' The First Officer responded by disengaging the autothrottle and the autopilot. He corrected the flight path and landed the aircraft uneventfully.

Reporter stated that further data analysis showed the pitch down event was due to a glide slope drop out that was caused by another aircraft on the runway ready for departure. Reporter also stated that these types of glide slope losses were known to occasionally occur with this runway.

We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway XXR. [I] was flying. We had intercepted the final approach course with Flaps 10 and assigned a speed of 170 or less.  The autopilot intercepted the final approach course with VOR/LOC armed. Approach mode was then selected. The autopilot intercepted the glide slope at 2;200 feet just outside of ZZZZZ. Upon intercepting the G/S; [I] called for 'Flaps 15; Landing Gear down.'  The aircraft captured the glideslope uneventfully. Shortly after passing ZZZZZ; [I] called for 'Flaps 30.'  [Captain] selected Flaps 30; and as the flaps were moving to Flaps 30; the aircraft abruptly pushed the nose over approximately 8 to 10 degrees down. [We] were startled by the push over; and both of us did a rapid assessment of what was happening.  Approximately 3 or 4 seconds into the push over event and a full dot low on the G/S; the GPWS issued a 'Caution Obstacle.'  [I] responded by disengaging the autothrottle and the autopilot. [I] corrected the flight path and landed the aircraft uneventfully.

B737 MAX flight crew reported the aircraft abruptly pitched down during flap extension while on a visual approach with automation engaged. Pilot flying disconnected automation and executed an uneventful landing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.4

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I was working R49 and R18 combined with a D-side. Metering for ATL. The airport was running visual approaches and not under any strain for volume. As I sat down to take over the sector I noticed numbers out of sequence resulting in delay times. I reshuffled the list which did little to fix the problem. I then proceeded to vector aircraft in order to make the assigned times. After doing so and after we lined them all back up; the numbers shifted from ones and twos up to threes and fours. Almost all aircraft were already reduced to 250kts. I asked the supervisor to call TMU and ask why they shuffled the list without notifying us. TMU says that they did not. TBFM [Time Based Flow Management] is already; in my opinion; causing us as controllers to take unneeded risks in order to space aircraft out when the airport is not being pressed. I almost went into the hold to make the numbers work today. Now there appears to be an anomaly that causes an unintended shift in delay times after spacing requirements have been achieved. This is one of the many; many issues I've come across in regards to the use of TBFM at ZTL. When I ask questions about why things happen the way they do; I get 5 different answers from five different people. How can we possibly make this work if no one understands how it works?First recommendation: Suspend TBFM into ATL until we fix the issues. Second: ensure that all SMEs; TMCs; FLMs and OMs understand how it works so as to be able to answer questions posed by CPCs. Do not operate TBFM again until all controllers in the building have been re-briefed in an all hands meeting or some other medium to allow for addressing of concerns.  If no one understands how to use it properly; it will never work here and currently there is an overwhelming distrust of the system and those charged with overseeing its operation resulting in an extremely unsafe environment. Third: The inability to see the numbers on aircraft not in your altitude stratum inhibits the controller's ability to plan the sequence and adjust aircraft accordingly. Three times in the last week I've had aircraft come over so far out of order that the first aircraft in the list was actually number 9 or 10 on the scope. TMU is either unaware of these situations (i.e.; not paying attention) or unwilling to 'ripple the list' to make it work correctly and therefore we end up with ridiculous numbers that cannot be fixed by the controller because the aircraft that is out of order is so far back. Solution: Implement a patch that allows us to see arrival's TBFM numbers in adjacent airspace so that we; as controllers; can plan accordingly; or teach TMU how to properly use the equipment. Additionally; we were all briefed that TBFM would be suspended during weather deviations. This has not been the case; causing additional safety problems and bringing another issue to light: I had an aircraft deviate out of the arrival sector and into a departure sector. The departure sector will not show a time even though they have track control because; as I've been told by a SME; only arrival sectors will see the times. Well then; we either need to suspend TBFM when that happens or patch the system so that all sectors working ATL arrivals will see numbers.

ZTL Controller reported a situation while using TBFM [Time Based Flow Management] into Atlanta when he observed a shift in times that made his job more difficult. Controller wants TBFM stopped until everyone at ZTL understands how it supposedly works.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on the PAATS3 STAR. It was not busy so ATC had us hold heading at ESSSO to avoid the rest of the arrival and shortcut to base leg Runway 9R. We had to expedite descent since we were not doing the full arrival. We used spoilers; flaps; and gear. ATC cleared us to 2;000 feet and cleared us for visual approach. The First Officer armed the approach and we noticed glideslope alive from above. It captured and we continued down. I failed to notice we hadn't crossed the FAF yet [and] were descending below FAF altitude. As I noticed we were low; ATC gave us a low altitude alert and the First Officer climbed back to FAF altitude (1;800 feet). The aircraft had captured a false Glideslope and we didn't catch it immediately. The airplane was stable at 1;000 feet and First Officer did a fine job with the rest of approach and landing.We were rushed to descend and were worried about being high not low. I should have been cross checking our position reference to our altitude. I will be cognizant of the possibility of false glideslope captures and be vigilant on monitoring altitude and position on approach.

We must have captured a false glideslope which overrode the 2;000 feet foot protection usually afforded by the altitude selector of the automation. We were very busy trying to go down and slow down at the same time while having the runway in sight at all times. This high work load initially made us miss that the plane was descending a bit too early. As soon as we recognized things were not what they should be; I disconnected the automation and hand flew the airplane back to the proper altitude. Lesson learned is to wait with 'approach mode armed' while on a vector until actually reestablished on a proper LNAV course; I should have just armed 'LOC only' until we had crossed KELEE before selecting Approach mode.

B757 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to Runway 9R PHL after descending on a false glideslope.