Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On climbout the flight encounters light to moderate mixed icing in the clouds 12;000-18;000 FT.  I noticed my airspeed indicator tape on the EADI had a SPD flag showing and the analog airspeed indicator was 0/45. I called out the anomaly. Crosschecked the Captain's and standby airspeed indicators which both indicated normal. The Captain handed me the QRH and said find a checklist for that. I completed the airspeed unreliable checklist. There was some confusion on the flight deck due to other indications present and not present on our alerting system. Examples: airspeed buffet announced in the FMC. No failure or non-heater lights within the pitot static annunciator system. All dashes in the thrust mode annunciator. Autothrottle limit Annunciation. I personally just finished my yearly qualification with the company training the day before this trip. This situation was uncannily close to training scenarios the training department designed for this year. Located on my airline's training documents on the iPad/Electronic Flight Bag. In short; I realized that we probably had the icing over of a pitot probe tube that affected the First Officer's airspeed indicator and Air Data Computer. The training I recently had helps me to understand that I could have a failed probe heater without the Pitot Heat lights illuminating. The flight continued on to the filed destination airport. Conditions were VFR. The First Officers pitot heat was failing slowly not giving an indication of failure during the flight and only after testing it failed with the light on.Slowly failing pitot probe heater without warning light annunciation.

During climb in icing conditions; a B737-400 First Officer had a SPD flag alert along with an airspeed loss; a FMC buffet alert and other indications that his pitot static system was icing even though no pilot system alerts were present.


Dassault-Breguet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 730; Flight Crew Type 680

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Instructed to line up and wait on [Runway] 30R. After a short delay; we were cleared for takeoff. As we were on the takeoff roll; a Falcon Jet crossed the Runway at A4. Decided to continue takeoff roll because we were already rotating as we noticed the jet crossing. Jet had exited the runway by the time we flew over A4 and there was no loss of separation.

DA20 flight instructor reported a ground conflict while on takeoff with a Falcon Jet.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Type 840

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Type 8000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Pushback; start; and taxi to Runway were uneventful. We were given a right turn to 090 after departure and cleared for takeoff. After setting takeoff thrust and prior to the '80-knot' call; I heard an aircraft on approach to 5L reporting windshear on final and subsequently executing a go-around. Tower advised the go-around aircraft to continue runway heading since we were taking off on the parallel runway. However; the go-around aircraft reported he was unable runway heading and needed a right turn. This turn towards our takeoff path created a conflict and Tower immediately cancelled our takeoff clearance. I called; 'reject; reject; reject' around 95 knots. The Captain assumed control of the aircraft and stopped the aircraft. We taxied cleared and proceeded to a clear area adjacent to Taxiway to complete all checklists and check brake energy in the performance computer. The performance computer called for an eight-minute wait prior to initiating another takeoff. Once cleared; we coordinated with Dispatch to ensure we had sufficient fuel to complete our flight and a return to the gate was not necessary. Once the weather (TS) moved from the field; the flight to [destination] was uneventful.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

B737 flight crew reported rejecting their takeoff when ATC cancelled their takeoff clearance because of a potential airborne conflict.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

During pushback from the gate; our tug driver inexplicably left his operating tug for an extended period of time. Neither my Captain nor myself had any idea where he was (under the aircraft perhaps?) or why he departed his operating tug. Further; no interphone communication was ever made to inform us that he was leaving his tug. Therefore; we were hooked up to an operating tug (in gear perhaps?) with no tug driver; a fully loaded aircraft and no brakes set and positioned away from our gate. A few minutes later; our tug driver reappeared and said that he left his position to check whether some late arriving baggage/parcel had been loaded onto our aircraft. The Captain sternly reminded the tug driver that safety was just compromised but the tug driver seemed more interested in critiquing the Captain for dressing him down on the interphone and seemed disinterested in discussing the safety implications of his actions. In my opinion; the tug driver did not grasp the severity of the safety lapse he was solely responsible for moments earlier. Safety was compromised when our tug driver inexplicably left his operating tug for an extended period of time after beginning our aircraft pushback from the gate. I do not believe that this tug driver grasped the potentially dire safety implications of his actions and therefore additional safety training regarding aircraft pushback procedures and standard operating procedures (SOP) regarding aircraft pushback procedures is clearly warranted in this case at this particular station.

Told tug driver; 'Parking brake released; cleared to push. Tug driver acknowledged my call and started the push. After pushing a few feet; the tug driver stopped the push. He then stood up in the tug; removed his headset and left the tug; all without communicating with me in any manner. After a brief period of probably over a minute; the tug driver returned to the tug; sat down and put his headset back on and checked in with me. I stated to the tug driver; 'Don't you EVER leave the tug with the aircraft hooked up and not communicate with me what you are doing.' The tug driver responded that we are all working hard here and he is respecting me and that I was not being respectful. I responded that this has nothing to do with respect; it has to do with safety and that he CANNOT leave the tug during mid-push.  I was completely in the dark and uninformed. There was absolutely no communication with me. Who was controlling the aircraft at that point?The tug driver again responded with the point about respect and did not even acknowledge the point that I was making.  His complete disregard of safety prevented me from allowing him to continue being in control of my aircraft during the pushback. I then informed the tug driver that I was setting the parking brake and that if he could not follow direction I would get someone who could and that I wanted a new driver for the tug. The tug driver told me he was the crew chief and that he was the only driver available. I told him that I was calling operations on the radio and requesting a new driver. The tug driver said fine; he was going inside.I called Operations on the radio and reported the issue and requested that a different tug driver be tasked with completing the pushback.  Almost immediately; another tug driver was on the tug and checked in with me. I briefly explained to him the incident. The new tug driver said he heard about my situation and that they would talk to the previous tug driver.We completed the pushback and departed.  This calls into question how contract ramp personnel are trained--particularly crew chiefs and tug drivers--their experience level; situational awareness and safety priorities. Safety is the number one priority. I really do not think the tug driver understood the seriousness of the situation and his responsibility while in control of an aircraft that he is pushing.

During pushback of an air carrier aircraft the tug driver; without explanation; stopped the movement and exited the vehicle. When the tug driver returned; he was reportedly unaware of the safety implications involved with his actions. The Captain set the brakes and requested a new tug driver.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency

The Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded at FL330. An emergency descent was initiated and an emergency was declared. I was given direct [to our destination] and a descent to 10;000 FT. I let the aircraft descend to 9600 FT. When I checked in with approach; ATC gave me 9000 FT. A visual approach was flown to RWY 26.Prior to the Emergency Descent; we had been cleared to descend via the SID; 4000 FT was set in the Altitude window. After donning the O2 masks and starting the descent; a good cross check of the FMC and CDU should have been accomplished.

After receiving a 'descend via' clearance from ATC and setting the altitude alert at 4;000 FT per the procedure the flight crew of a B737NG received a cabin altitude warning and began an emergency descent; cleared to 10;000 FT. They failed to reset the new cleared altitude and a modest overshoot occurred before ATC recleared them to 9;000 FT.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 275; Flight Crew Type 270

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Helicopter requested autorotation to Runway XX; helicopter was cleared to land [Runway] XX. I was cleared to land Runway XX after helicopter. I was already uneasy about the landing after hearing that the helicopter was going to do an autorotation to the runway and I was on a 5 mile [final] at that time.  I was worried that the helicopter would still be on the runway as I approached.I was given a traffic advisory for helicopter in left downwind for [Runway] XX. I didn't see them initially and responded to tower 'looking for traffic.'Controller asked helicopter to extend downwind but I didn't hear a cancel landing clearance command. I do not remember the helicopter pilot's response. I visualized helicopter turning base to final within 500 ft. of my position which was one mile from the Runway X. Helicopter then started turning right; back towards downwind and converging directly at me. I took evasive action and deviated right. I announced my intentions go around and to turn right. I initially started to initiate a right turn but realized that would take me over Runway XY.  I knew there was another airplane; landing on Runway XY so I straightened out on a 100 heading until clear of the helicopter. I received another clearance to land Runway XX and responded that I was going around on runway heading. I maneuvered back over the runway to complete the go around and received instructions for a left pattern. I executed the pattern and landed. The helicopter pilot approached me on the ramp and apologized for the incident. I called the ATC Supervisor on Duty and asked if I should file an incident report. He asked the Tower Controller about the incident and stated that it seemed like the helicopter pilot didn't follow instructions. He said it was up to me whether or not to file a formal incident report. I said that at would like to file a report and he took my name and phone number and said he would call me back. I did not receive a phone call so I'm filing this report instead.The safety concerns I am worried about:Helicopter pilot not following the controller instructions.Controller clearing two aircraft to land on the same runway without acknowledgement from either pilot that visual contact with each other has occurred.Controller clearing the autorotation landing on Runway XX without securing safe sequence distance for other landing aircraft.Controller not cancelling landing clearance of the helicopter with the new instructions to extend the downwind leg of the patternI did not have a good way out in this scenario given a converging aircraft required an evasive maneuver to the right for me which would place me on a heading to cross Runway XY at a low altitude.

Pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter while attempting to land.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft X; a B777-200 aircraft was here; at the ZZZ Maintenance Base; because of damage caused by an engine fire of sorts.  There were several parts damaged on the wing.  The  Left-hand (L/H); Outboard (O/B) Flap and Flaperon were beyond repair; so other units were acquired.  Our Air Carrier policy and procedure is that parts are supposed to be routed to the home shop for inspection and to have the proper documentation attached to it.  We are required to put a company parts tracking tag and a company Part Number (P/N) tag on the unit and issue an FAA-8130 serviceable tag [for the unit] that documents several things about the unit specific. The Flap and Flaperon were not sent to the Shop and the proper inspection was never accomplished.  Also; the company parts tracking tag and P/N tags were never put on these two units.  Also; no FAA-8130 tag from our Air Carrier was issued for either part [Flap-Flaperon].  According to the General Maintenance Manual (GMM) 9-20-25; the parts are 'Not Serviceable' until the Inspection and documentation is complete. I have not been able to find any supporting documentation; that any of our policies or procedures were followed.  If that is the case; the Flap and Flaperon [installed] on Aircraft X are not serviceable.  It is very clear in the GMM and FAR Part 145 dealing with parts that are 'Received'; that the home shop is responsible for making the unit Serviceable and that procedure was ignored in this case.

Reporter stated that there was a fireball on engine start on the left engine of one of their B777-200 aircraft.  This splattered fuel on the L/H O/B Flap and Flaperon lower surfaces that ignited in which caught fire; burning the Flap and Flaperon.  The fire damage was severe enough that both parts (units) had to be destroyed (made Not-Serviceable).  That's why new units were purchased. Reporter stated that repeated attempts by Shop Production and Inspection Management to have the new parts 'Received';  routed; into their Flight Control Shop per the practices and procedure requirements of their General Maintenance Manual (GMM) were ignored by a different Manager.  The same Manager also ignored and overrode the required proper documentation; inspections and tagging of the units.  The installed Flap and Flaperon units are still flying on the B777; but reporter believes they are not legal under their FAR 121 Operating Certificate and GMM requirements.

A Maintenance Base Mechanic reports their General Maintenance Manual (GMM) policies and procedures were ignored when a new Left-Hand (L/H) Outboard (O/B) Flap and Flaperon did not go through their Flight Control Shop prior to being installed on a company B777-200 aircraft.  No Inspections were accomplished; no company tracking or Parts Tags; nor FAA-8130 Serviceability Tags were issued.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Our aircraft had three MEL's when we arrived at the plane. One of which was a write up for Right Engine FADEC fault 1. The write up from the previous day was an R ENG DEGRADED caution message and was corrected with the R Engine FADEC fault 1 MEL that we had on our plane. The MEL book was consulted and we saw that we could dispatch so long as a Left Engine FADEC fault 1 was not present. We didn't have that; but we did have a Left Engine FADEC fault 2 status message that was also on MEL. The first part of the flight went off normally. Engine start; takeoff; and initial climb were all fine without any notable discrepancies. The problem began as we were climbing through FL240. I noticed the plane begin to make small; unusual movements and I noticed an odd sound; similar to when a pack cycles on and off in flight. As I looked up at the engine controls; I noticed that the left engine was at MCT thrust; while the right engine was at CLB thrust. Very quickly there afterward; the right engine instrument gauges (N1; ITT; N2) all disappeared and were replaced by yellow dashes. Accompanying these dashes were a few caution messages. The ones [I] remember were RUDDER LIMITER and APR CMD SET. It's possible that there were other messages that I did not see; particularly status messages. It was all happening very quickly and unexpectedly. Reacting to the messages I saw; I took control of the radios and instructed the First Officer to reference the QRH for APR CMD SET. As he began to do that; we received the master warning 'Engine Oil' and associated warning message. As well; the engine gauges came back but appeared as a windmilling engine might (N1 around 23; low ITT).I began to press the rudder to compensate for the change in yaw motion and to bring the brick back to center. I informed ATC that we had lost our right engine and that we needed a descent back to FL240; since by this time we were at about FL245. He immediately gave it to us and told us to advise him what we wanted to do.While all of this was happening; about 30-45 seconds after the engine initially went out; it began to come alive again and very quickly all of the messages went out; expect APR CMD SET; which stayed for another 30 seconds after the engine relit itself. We advised ATC that we needed to return to [the airport] immediately. We were approximately 75 miles west of the airport at the time of the incident and we received vectors direct to the airport. While we turned back and began to head to the field; I gave control of the radios back to the first officer and advised the flight attendants of what was going on and told them that; at that time; I didn't have any special instructions for them. I also sent an ACARS message to the company to tell them what we were doing. The first officer; meanwhile; picked up the ATIS and got all the appropriate landing data. We briefed the approach we were expecting and ran the 'In Range Checklist.'The approach itself and the landing were normal. After we landed; I spoke with the dispatcher and a maintenance controller and told him all the details of what happened. I was informed that the issue was most likely a bad FACDEC and that they would have to fly in a new FADEC to fix the engine.As far as I am aware; during the whole event; all standard operating procedures were adhered to and at no point were any clearances deviated from. The only suggestion that comes to mind would be for maintenance not to dispatch with both FADEC's having faults; since our L Engine FADEC also was on MEL for a FADEC 2 fault. The write up from the previous day was an R ENG DEGRADED caution message and was corrected with the R Engine FADEC fault 1 MEL that we had on our plane. I would suggest some sort of check of the FADEC after a DEGRADED message instead of an MEL fix for 10 days.

The reporter stated that the aircraft had two MEL items that were very similar but were legal per the FOM to dispatch with this condition. The reporter stated that both MEL items were for the Full Authority Digital Engine Control; (FADEC). The reporter stated that the Right-hand (RH) engine had a FADEC channel 2 fault and the Left-Hand engine had a FADEC 1 fault. The reporter also stated that with each FADEC having only two channels; and each FADEC having one channel deferred; that leaves you with half of your redundancy. The reporter asked if the working channel on a FADEC fails; does the other FADEC have the ability to operate both engines using only one channel? The reporter also stated that perhaps this type of deferral should be looked into to ensure this issue doesn't occur again. The reporter stated that they also got a 'Rudder Limiter' fault due to the asymmetrical thrust because of the loss of the RH engine.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Bombardier CRJ flight crew reported that during climb the plane began to make small unusual movements the right engine instrument gauges (N1; ITT; N2) all disappeared and were replaced by yellow dashes.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 60

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Training flight going to TVF for landings. Setup for left downwind entry for Runway 04 and made traffic calls 10 nm out and while entering downwind. Did a stop [and] go and while rolling down the runway for departure; [we] heard a CTAF call for an aircraft crossing Runway 04. [We] looked to the side of the runway and saw an aircraft crossing the runway hold-short markings. [We] immediately aborted the takeoff and came to a stop approximately 500 [feet] from the intersection while the aircraft crossed. [We] asked if he had seen us and he had not. After the aircraft safely crossed the runway; we initiated another takeoff and returned to base. If the takeoff had not been aborted; I believe that we would've impacted the crossing aircraft.

PA44 flight instructor reported a rejected takeoff due to a ground conflict with crossing traffic at a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Police / Security Involved

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Upon arrival at the Aircraft; the flight crew realized that the Tower had just closed making the airport environment uncontrolled and runway maintenance on the intended departure had just commenced. This caused us to use the smaller runway on the other side of the airport. Coming up with the taxi plan we elected to steer clear of runway maintenance since taxiway C was NOTAM'd closed; but the taxi route we chose would have taken us on taxiways that were too narrow for the A321. We began the taxi to runway XXL via A;D;K but the taxiway widths were poorly marked on the Jepp 10-9 and we didn't realize how narrow the taxiways were until the CA (Captain) was taxiing on A with intention of turning right on D but while passing the taxiway it was so narrow it appeared to be an access road and when the CA turned on to what he thought was taxiway D we were turning onto Runway YY. The only way to exit that runway at that point would have been Taxiway E which appeared to be just as narrow as taxiway D. The crew decided with Dispatch to shut down engines and call a tug to push us back to taxiway A. We made all the appropriate radio calls to keep any potential traffic from landing on Runway YY. We then started engines again and got a follow me from airport ops to 9L via A; Q and a backtaxi on XXL. Take off and departure was uneventful.Poorly notated company guidance with no taxiway widths. Little to no information from the company on Tower and Runway closures witch the company was unaware of.Update of [airport] pages or some company guidance with taxiway widths that are less than standard and Dispatch and company passing better information to crews when doing things that are non-standard ie night; unfamiliar airfields; unfamiliar and nonstandard taxi. A page sheet with some helpful tips on how to navigate a difficult and nonstandard environment would have been very helpful.

I was short call reserve. I was not given ANY information on nature of the mission; type of ferry; operational specifics; etc. I was lucky and able to self-print up a flight plan at the inbound gate before terminal was completely closed down. After a lengthy delay getting in contact with Wi-Fi installation contractor; my FO (First Officer) and I were picked up at terminal and taken to the jet (A-321). During preflight; ATIS stated tower was closed. ATIS also stated Main Runway (10;000ft) was also closed for scheduled maintenance. I called Dispatch and told them the only runway now available was XXL which is only 6000 feet long and across the field. Tried to look up minimum runway length limitations in FOM/OPs/OM with no results. Dispatch sent new take off data for short runway. Next we briefed a taxi route to far side of airport using Jepp Pro 10-9 plate considering ATIS announced closed runways and taxiways. On taxi out from the hangar ramp the taxi lights were minimal; and as we taxied off ramp to Taxiway Alpha to Delta to Kilo; I taxied from A; and past D because it is very narrow and looked like an access road. I then turned onto Runway YY which is parallel to Delta and Taxiway width. On the moving map it is so close to Delta that map icon looked correct. As soon as aircraft turned the corner onto Runway YY I realized the error but could not turn off the runway as we were too far off taxiway A and the end taxiway Echo is too narrow and too short for a mainline jet. We were now stuck on an active runway at an uncontrolled airport at night with no communication via radio to any controlling agency on the field. As we tried to raise anyone at the airport via radio and cellphone I turned on all exterior lighting and monitored Unicom to prevent an aircraft from trying to use the runway. We eventually made contact with airport police via radio; and the [FBO] contract personnel via cellphone through dispatch who then returned to the airport. [FBO] brought a tug and we were pushed and towed back onto taxiway A; where an airport personnel radio car then led us to Runway XXL via taxiway A to Q to the runway mid-length with a back taxi on the runway for full length take off. T/O and flight were normal. Dispatched to operate at night; at an unfamiliar Non-Mainline airport with a known Tower and runway closure. No special instructions for crew. No information on Jepp 10-9 plate with taxi width information and many taxiways too small for mainline jets.

A321 flight crew reported difficulty taxiing at an unfamiliar airfield due to a scheduled runway closure and lack of taxiway information.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was working the Military Coordinator position; combined with the Denver Arrival position in TMU. We had scheduled airspace for PR2 MOA/ATCAA and Gateway West ATCAA; which is scheduled by ZLC in coordination with RCA Base Ops. All of these pieces of airspace were scheduled from XA:15-XD:15. At XA:13 The ZLC military coordinator sent an automated entry through the NTML [National Traffic Management Log] indicating the airspace was being returned to ZDV/ZLC/ZMP as it was not going to be used. ZLC sent two entries: the first returned the PR2 low/high MOAs from XA:15-XD:15. The second entry returned both the PR2 and Gateway ATCAAs; but only from XA:15-XB:59. Normally the PR2 MOAs and ATCAA are always treated the same; so I was not expecting to see that they were returning the airspace in non-standard pieces and for different timeframes. It also is quite common that when these two airspace groups are canceled; they are canceled for the entire scheduled timeframe; and certainly not for different times. I read the first PR2 cancelation was for the entire period; and this caused me to overlook the different specifics in the second message which were intended to clarify and differentiate the partial cancelation times. I sent automation messages to our operational areas and verbally coordinated all areas were canceled through XD:15. When I returned to TMU at XC:15 I was told that ZLC had called complaining that our controllers weren't showing the ATCAAs as going hot again at XC:00. I then assisted in getting the correct information entered into ESIS [Enhanced Status Information System] and coordinated with our operational areas.We currently have no standardized format on how military airspace between ZLC/ZDV should be returned to us. RCA is the military user of this airspace and is well known for making extremely frequent real-time changes to these areas which cause numerous potential points of failure as the information is entered by ZLC in one system; and by the military in another. This information is frequently not in agreement between the various systems; which leads to confusion; as well as problems with inaccurate NOTAMs being issued; and then not canceled or amended as appropriate. The automated message format for canceling or amending active or imminently scheduled military information between ZLC/ZDV needs to be standardized. Additionally there should be a verbal notification requirement for these real time changes. As this was a very non-standard type of change to these airspace groups I would expect a verbal conversation between the two facilities would have highlighted and clarified the unusual aspects; and would have prevented the problem from occurring.

Denver Center Military Coordinator and Traffic Management Controller reported of problems related to military airspace usage and coordination between ATC facilities.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Following what we thought was a normal shutdown; I noticed the left engine ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) was slowly rising. The rise was very gradual; and if I had just gotten up out of my seat following the checklist I might have missed it. Watching it; I realized something was wrong; and I knew we had been given a similar scenario during initial. I knew the remedy was to dry motor the engine which I started doing before the ITT exceeded limits. I motored the engine; monitoring the slowly dropping ITT while I asked my partner to look for an appropriate checklist. I did not immediately recall the name of the checklist because I had only seen the scenario once during initial; and the simulator presented a very different set of symptoms: instead of the slow rise; the sim presented a much more rapid rise. Once I got the ITT below 150; I stopped motoring; and the ITT began to rise again. This too was different than the simulator scenario; where the fire went out after a single dry motoring. My Partner on IOE (Initial Operating Experience) could not identify an appropriate checklist; so I decided to call the Company for assistance; he got out of the seat and opened the door because line service was trying to gain our attention. They reported seeing a fire on our initial shutdown. On the third dry motoring; while talking with Maintenance; the ITT finally dropped to a normal level; but again began a slow rise. We discussed shutting off the fuel with the fire switch; but by this time the engine had cooled on cycle 5 of the starter. After the immediate crisis I was able to look at the QRC and found that the correct checklist was Tail Pipe Fire. However; that checklist would have had us essentially abandon the aircraft after attempting to dry motor once. At no point did the ITT exceed limits; but I'm fairly certain that the starter limits were exceeded. See recommendationsEmphasize this scenario at training; with a revision to show a much more insidious ITT rise. Revise the checklist to be clear as to how many times the engine should be dry motored before pressing the fire switch; and clarify if dry motoring should take place after pressing the fire switch. Further revise the checklist on what steps to take if the APU is inoperable; or otherwise shut down. Clarify the meaning of the starter limitations; it's described several different ways; which adds ambiguity.

CL-650 Captain reported encountering tail pipe fire after engine shutdown.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was enroute and was cleared ILS Approach. A VFR 1200 code target tracking east of the localizer northbound climbing slowly. I called traffic to Aircraft X several times but they were unable to get a visual on the 1200 code. I canceled Aircraft X's approach clearance and assigned 9000 feet. The VFR target began to turn to cross the localizer and toward Aircraft X and so I turned Aircraft X 10 degrees right. The targets were close; about 600 feet and about 1 mile lateral. Aircraft X reported the traffic in sight and was re cleared for the ILS Approach. Several minutes later the VFR aircraft identified itself as Aircraft Y. Company traffic; Aircraft Z had reported to me that Aircraft Y following him out of KOA. I had reached out to Aircraft Y but they were not on frequency. When Aircraft Y did come up on frequency I asked if they had had the Aircraft X in sight and he responded that he had. I asked as professionally and courteously as I know how that he please contact center for VFR advisories in the future to avoid this situation in the future. This airport is way past being serviced by enroute radar approach control. There absolutely needs to be a terminal radar and Class C services to that airport.

HCF TRACON Controller had to vector an air carrier off of the ILS Approach to avoid unidentified conflicting VFR traffic.


Testing; Installation; Inspection; Repair

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On [Date] I was given the work assignment of running the #1 engine on Aircraft X for a BUG (Back-Up Generator) operational and leak check by my lead mechanic; ref log page. I knew that there was a fuel leak in the pylon for the #1 engine as I had written it up the day before; ref log page. At this time the left wing had 30;000 lbs of fuel in it to help find the leak source into the pylon. I declined to run the engine to verify the operation of the relatively minor repair of the BUG replacement compared to the danger of fire from an active fuel leak into the #1 engine's pylon. I explained my reasoning to the pair of shift foreman. They went away and returned with the directive to 'Run the Engine' regardless of the fuel leak or my concerns. The foreman said the Operating Manager had directed this.  At this point I decided to run the engine as they ordered me to do rather than risk losing my job. I ran the engine with an eye for protecting my work partners and the aircraft as much as possible given the situation management forced me into. As the days have gone by since this happened it has bothered me more and more until I felt I had to reach out to the [Aviation Safety Action Program] and Ground Safety committees. Please take note of [Company] Engine Run Policy [Number].'At no time will safety be compromised for operational reasons'.

Air Carrier Maintenance Technician reports Management pressure to ignore safety concerns.


Flight Crew Total 29.8; Flight Crew Type 29.8

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While practicing some solo steep turns; I noticed that the radios and turn coordinator started flashing a red off tag; then the DME display started flashing indicating that I was 110 NM out from the airport (the VOR sits in the middle of the airport) then it would flash 14.3 NM which sounded more accurate. I tried listening to the ATIS and planned to head back to my home airport but there was only a high pitch noise coming from the airplanes radio. I then proceeded to go through my emergency checklist and when I finally got to the circuit breakers all checked OK; none were tripped. I then realized I had lost the electrical system to the airplane. Then I turned off the anti collision lights and radio master switch for about a minute then after turning it back on I retried contacting the Tower but I did not get any response. Since I did not receive any response from the Tower I squawked 7600 and pressed the IDENT button on the transponder to try and get the Controller's attention if the transponder was working. I then started heading back to the airport for a landing. While enroute to the airport I remembered I had my cell phone on my left pocket and tried calling my flight school to inform them about my situation; once I saw that the call had been answered I informed them what was going on and asked them to call the Tower and let them know I was going to land on Runway 28L which I had taken off from an hour earlier. I could not hear them because of the noise inside the cockpit. Once I was in the airports airspace I entered on a 45 for the downwind leg and lined up for the runway. I tried looking for any light signals from the Tower with no success. At that point all that was in my mind was to get the plane in the ground and that's all I concentrated my attention to. After I landed I was greeted by one of the instructors who told me that the runway I used was closed at the time. He said after talking with the Tower they said they had been using the red gun signals which I did not see to let me know I was not cleared to land. No injuries or property damage resulted from the situation; yet I still consider that this report is appropriate since I technically landed on a runway on which I was not cleared to land. I had an extensive talk with my instructor and reviewed what I could have done to better deal with the situation if it was to present itself again. I definitely took this as a really valuable learning experience which I am sure I will never forget. I believe this was my first in flight emergency and even though there were things I could have done better I believe that I handled it in an appropriate manner.

A solo C-172 student pilot lost all electrical power; squawked 7600; called his instructor on a cell phone and landed on a closed runway after failing to see ATC's red light signal.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

When the ASDEX was turned off; within a minute the radar scope in the Tower Cab flashed with a yellow bar towards the top and the mode said failed. I do not know what that means. It will normally say Mode: normal. In the TRACON they had something in red indicating a failure on two scopes and had to transition to ESL mode. This happened during the national ASDE-X outage to fix a clock issue. Management was aware of the occurrences. Nothing was logged by management. Airway Facilities was not aware of it. A [report] was filed on this and I believe it is closed. The previous [report] was written questioning if the ASDEX outage caused this. The response was 'NO' because they are two independent systems. However; something happened. It seems more than coincidental that all of this took place almost immediately after the ASDEX was taken down. We have spoken with the local Tech Ops guys and agreed a new [report] should be filed to see if this happened anywhere else. The information is no longer available as it only lasts 45 days.I do not understand how this could not have been logged and checked in to. We lost two radar scopes and something occurred on a third one. This type of thing rarely happens and now the data is lost. I would like to know if anyone else in the country had anything similar to this happen. It is my understanding that only one report was originally filed on the outage.

During a scheduled ASDE-X outage this Tower and the TRACON also experienced Primary Radar software outages on some of their radar displays requiring the back-up system to be necessary.The reporter states that the appropriate maintenance office was not notified of the Radar display outages. The reporter wanted to know if this was a coincidence or a known issue that the controllers should have been briefed on.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 500

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Routine flight.  A route I've flown many times. I was the pilot in command but the pilot not flying in the right seat. The approach to be used at ZZZ was the ILS 19 with a circle to RWY 24 due to gusty winds from 280 degrees. The approach which both crew members were very familiar with; was briefed way ahead on the descent on to the area. The Pilot Flying showed some anxiety about the circling maneuver. In the past he has struggled with visually flying maneuvers such as a circle to land. Initially we briefed that due to the fact that the weather was CAVU (Clear and Visibility Unlimited) that upon transitioning from FMS GPS based navigation to 'green needle' land based navigation ie; ILS that me as a right seat pilot not flying would change the FMS to runway 24 vs runway 19 ILS to give the Pilot Flying some help with lateral and vertical navigation for the circling procedure.We were now being vectored to the final approach course and I realized that by changing the FMS the way the Pilot Flying had desired to give him help with his lack of skill in visual flying; that I could not do this because by doing so it would wipe out the missed approach for the ILS 19 procedure in the FMS. If on the circle we were to have to go missed approach we would be required to fly the charted missed approach procedure. I verbalized this to the PF (Pilot Flying) and thought he understood that he would just have to start the circle using VFR maneuvering skills. Now; this said; the procedure at ZZZ during this circle is rather easy. At the final approach fix 'ZZZZZ' which is 5 miles out from runway 19 is where you start the circle. Basic airman ship here required.At about 4 miles from ZZZZZ; Tracon gave us a vector heading of 140 to intercept the runway 19 localizer and maintain 2000 feet until established. The Pilot Flying intercepted the localizer and picked up the glide slope as well; fine. He then asked me to select runway 24 in the FMS. I once again told him I could not do this because we would lose missed approach FMS data; and that he would have to fly visually upon starting the circling maneuver from ZZZZZ. I also told him that I would help him with headings and altitudes for a visual circle and that this is a piece of cake routine procedure. This is where things went wrong with CRM.The Pilot Flying who was already very anxious about flying the circle became very irate that we couldn't provide runway 24 FMS lateral and vertical navigation. At this point the Pilot Flying was hand flying the approach. He was so irate and having what I call a meltdown that he started to not only hand fly the aircraft but also start trying to change the FMS with no crew coordination from me. He was very upset. I tried to calm him down by saying 'listen just fly visually we are 5 mile from the airport' he had none of this and continued to be very irate. This was disconcerting but I tried my best to keep my cool and watch his flying. Things snowballed from here. He now; due to flying the airplane and being head down on the cockpit; got off course from the localizer and 200 feet low on the glide slope. I insistently told him to stop messing with the FMS and fly the airplane. At this point we had already been switched to the tower. The tower called us and said low altitude alert due to us being off course. I told the Pilot Flying to correct immediately. The tower then asked if we had the airport in sight and I replied affirmative. We had the airport from probably 15 miles out prior to vectors for the ILS.The pilot flying continued to act irate and irrational and basically clammed up any communication with me destroying CRM. I helped the Pilot Flying visually maneuver giving him headings on the guidance panel as well as watching altitudes. For some reason he also manually changed the speed with the auto throttles to 10 knots higher. I told him to return to the briefed speed for the approach and he at least did that. We then finally got stabilized and proceeded to make a fairly normal landing. I tried to debrief after shutting down the aircraft to no avail. The Pilot Flying acted very defensive. Threatened my job. Would not listen to any constructive discussion regarding how a very easy routine approach was turned into a non-stabilized screwed up approach.How to avoid issues like this in the future is what I'm trying to figure out. This particular pilot has had a pattern of very poor airmanship and CRM skills. His inability to adapt to even a very minor change is worrisome. His reliance on automation is very similar to accident reports I've read. He is a person who has a higher position in the company therefore it is a catch 22 so to speak if I were to bring this up in even a constructive way with management let alone with the said person who was PF who it would probably be my job that would be in jeopardy. Yes; pretty messed up. Very unprofessional behavior. Best solution is for me to find another job. There's way too many very professional pilots that I fly with that this would never happen.

Corporate Pilot reported CRM breakdown with the copilot during approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 1762; Flight Crew Type 654

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 2125; Flight Crew Type 1050

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was the Captain on Flight XXXX; ZZZ to ZZZ1.During the climb; passing FL330 to FL 350; ECAM ADR1.  Complying with instructions from ECAM; additional ECAMs: AP 1& 2; A/THR; RUD TRV LIM and GPWS.  We also lost both FD (Flight Display).[Advised ATC] and asked for vector to divert to ZZZ2.  ZZZ2 weather was clear; ZZZ had thunderstorms.Phone patch with Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] and advised of situations and intentions.Descended into ZZZ2.  Asked for delaying vectors to get under landing weight.Raw data landing was normal.  Completed [Maintenance Manual].

I was the First Officer on Flight XXXX; ZZZ to ZZZ1.During the climb; passing FL330 to FL 350; ECAM ADR1.  Complying with instructions from ECAM; additional ECAMs: AP 1&2; A/THR; RUD TRV LIM and GPWS.  We also lost both FD (Flight Display).[Advised ATC] and asked for vector to divert to ZZZ2.  ZZZ2 weather was clear; ZZZ had thunderstorms.Phone patch with Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] and advised of situations and intentions.Descended into ZZZ2.  Asked for delaying vectors to get under landing weight.Raw data landing was normal.  Completed [Maintenance Manual].

Flight Crew reported diverting caused by loss of ADR1 and associated NAV and FLIGHT Displays.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Procedure; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy

While completing the Preliminary Inspection on aircraft before Avionic's work was to begin; found the #1 tire required servicing. When Service Cart was brought to aircraft; noticed that the normal Brass High Pressure inflation tool was replaced with a High Pressure screw-on tool with gauge with approximately 6 FT of hose. This style of inflation tool is inappropriate due to the fact if you are not paying attention or there is a defect in Gauge/Regulator you could have a catastrophic tire burst resulting in aircraft damage or personal injury. If you review the two incidents of Company aircraft where this has happened; you will see that the screw-on tool was used. Also recently here a tire valve was damaged by this same screw-on equipment. Next the Tire Cart Service regulator has a large leak coming from the [bottle] regulator. If this happens in conjunction with a defective screw-on type tool or the Technician is not paying attention; this could cause damage/injury if tire does burst. One other thing; it [screw-on tool] is very bulky and clumsy to use (attaches to valve stem); could cause unseen damage if improperly used.[Recommend] keeping the screw-on style tool for those mechanics that feel comfortable using [that tool] along with training as to what could happen if not used correctly. But also place the Brass High Pressure service chucks back on the [Service] carts for the mechanics that do not feel comfortable using the other [screw-on] style. What are a few bucks? Next when it comes to the Service Carts; there should be some type of weekly/monthly inspection/repair program in place to keep them in top performance. High pressure fluids/gases are not something to play around with.

Reporter stated the high pressure screw-on type tool he was referring to requires the Technician to physically 'screw' the tire servicing tool onto the valve stem of the tire; as opposed to just 'pushing-on' and holding the tool in position; as the tire is serviced with air. Some mechanics prefer to use the screw-on type when servicing the Nose tires because the Nose Gear doors are low and interfere with servicing the tires; especially when the valve stem is positioned at the twelve o'clock position.Reporter stated the screw-on type servicing tool was involved with two incidences. First; the Schrader valve was blown out of the nose wheel due to Mechanic unaware that excessive pressure had been applied. The other incident was because the Mechanic was reading Kilos instead of P.S.I. on the bottle pressure and applied 1500 PSI pressure to the tire. The line pressure gauge is six feet from the end of the screw-on fitting that attaches to the valve stem and not held in Mechanic's hand while servicing; whereas the eight inch Brass High Pressure type inflation tool and gauge are; making the line gauge pressure easily read.Reporter stated his Air Carrier has removed all the screw-on type inflation tools [adapters] from their system and now only uses the solid Brass High Pressure inflation type. He is aware that other Operators still use the screw-on type inflation tool; and feels that future incidents will occur.

An Inspector has safety concerns involving the use of High Pressure 'screw-on' type inflation tools (adapters)that are used to service aircraft tires on their Gulf G-200 aircraft; compared to the Brass High Pressure type 'push-on' type tire servicing equipment.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft X was level at 4;000; Aircraft Y was level at 3;500.  The traffic passed; Aircraft X was allowed to descend once it was well past Aircraft Y.  Once they were about a mile apart and on opposite courses; the conflict alert (CA) activated.When working busy traffic; erroneous conflict alert alarms are distracting and take the controller's focus away from actual traffic situations.  This problem seems to have gotten worse with the implementation of Fusion radar processing at NCT.  These situations should be documented and reviewed to identify problems in the system; and then those problems should be fixed.

NCT Controller reports of aircraft being separated and then after they passed about a mile apart the conflict alert went off.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

I was providing OJTI for the first time since the COVID lockdown. My trainee was on his first day back training. Aircraft X was doing practice approaches at ZZZ. When they were done; they came off [Runway] XXR heading. My trainee gave them their clearance to ZZZ1. Aircraft X read back all correctly except for the altitudes which my trainee promptly reissued. At that time; I had to turn Aircraft Y onto final at ZZZ2 as my trainee did not do in a timely manner. We then had a call from ZZZ3 and a request from another aircraft back to back. I failed to realize that Aircraft X did not enter their new squawk code and thus did not tag up in STARS. They ended up flying for 98 miles without a handoff or point out to other sectors at 12;000 feet. This can only be attributed to not having provided OJTI for the past 6 months. Otherwise if I had been working the position by myself this probably would not have happened.I would recommend a redoubling of effort to scanning while providing OJTI or while performing CIC duties for OJTI.

TRACON instructor reported an aircraft departing and not squawking; flying close to 100 miles through various different airspace at 12;000 feet.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Presidential movements continue to be an issue between DCA and PCT. Aircraft X was ADW inbound to [DC Area]. DCA tower called with a 3 minute to lift call off ADW which is 7 miles SE of DCA. We begin holding arrivals at that point. We were just beginning an arrival push and approach/final had 15 planes or more. While we were holding airplanes in the sky and backing up ZDC; DCA tower continued to release airplanes compounding the issue. A lot of arrivals spinning and more departures entering the NAS is a dangerous game for DCA tower to play. DCA tower took it two steps further this movement by launching two departures with Aircraft X less than a mile and no altitude; converging. How is it we on approach are not allowed to run arrivals yet they have the authority to release airplanes right at presidential aircraft? Advise DCA tower the needs of the TRACON during these movements and educate them on proper coordination. Develop a Work group between DCA/PCT/ADW on VIP movements.

I was working Aircraft X from ADW to the National Observatory (NOB). On initial contact; Aircraft X advised that they would be using alternate routing. I acknowledged their transmission and advised the tower supervisor and local controller. Aircraft X proceeded via Woods Corner - to the river - route 4 - route 1 - to the NOB [National Observatory]. I was advised later on that PCT MTV [Mount Vernon Area] had concerns about the amount of time that arrivals were stopped and about departures off of DCA. Basic separation was maintained and I had Aircraft X in sight from WC all the way to their destination.We do not question when a [VIP] aircraft changes its route. If they could provide earlier notification then initial call on frequency it would be optimal. We understand when bad weather forces a change.

PCT TRACON and DCA Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation involving VIP movements.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

During a high power performance run; at approximately 96% torque; the parking brake handle released and the plane lurched forward; jumping the chocks. The left engine struck the GPU and damaged the #1 propeller. The aircraft movement was stopped by applying the toe brakes; retarding the throttles and reapplying parking brake. [In the future] chock all three gear; remove GPU from run area.

A Maintenance Technician described an engine high power run where the parking brake became released; which resulted in the propeller contacting a piece of ground equipment.


Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While cruising in flight with the autopilot on (STEC-50 model); heading and altitude mode were selected. I pulled out the aircraft AML to perform the trend checks; in addition to organizing all of my respective paperwork/jepp charts. Only a minute or two had passed (as I was just completing my paperwork); but when I glanced up to fully rescan my instruments; the aircraft was in an usual attitude: the nose was slightly highly; and the aircraft was banking to the right approximately 30 degrees. The aircraft had deviated 200 feet higher than my assigned altitude of 12;000ft; and had deviated course by 160 degrees. I immediately disconnected the autopilot via the control yoke button; and corrected the unusual attitude with pitch and bank. While correcting; I notified ATC of the deviation: Center re-cleared me to a heading of 320; heading direct when able to my next Nav-Aid; and re-assigned 12;000ft for my altitude.One thing that I saw upon recognizing the unusual attitude; was also that the autopilot status lights still showed the unit was engaged: The green active light was on; in addition to the 'HDG' and 'ALT' modes engaged (via their amber annunciators). In monitoring the autopilot for the remainder of the flight; I noted that the altitude would not uncommonly deviate by as much as 100ft; yet the autopilot would not give the 'trim up' or 'trim down' annunciations. When completing paperwork and organizing charts; devote more time to quick instrument scans to avoid automation.

A SA-227 with the STEC-50 autopilot made an uncommanded climb and turn with HDG and ALT mode engaged annunciated. Later; the autopilot would deviate ± 100' without a TRIM UP or TRIM DOWN alert.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

Our CPDLC Clearance was the ORCKA1; except maintain 5000 feet. After taking off of Runway 24L; we were soon cleared to 12000 feet with a left turn direct to KLIPR. When inbound to KLIPR; Departure control cleared us to climb via SID. We made the restriction of 10000 at KLIPR and leveled off at 12000 feet. We were approaching KEGGS; which has an altitude restriction between 13000 feet and 19000 feet. The pilot flying and I were discussing our altitude clearance when Departure Control said that he noticed that we had leveled at 12000 feet and was having trouble with this SID all day. He asked us what we would like to hear for a climb clearance; and I suggested that he say; 'Climb via SID to FL230.' As a result of our little discussion; we started our climb too late to make the altitude restriction at KEGGS; crossing at about 12300 feet. Throughout the ATC system; pilots climb and descend to destination; or limit; altitudes; and do not fly through restrictions. Even on STARs; when descending via; the destination altitude is the altitude set for the runway transition. I understand that this is new phraseology for SIDs and STARs; but in this case; the instructions are incomplete. Saying only to 'Climb via SID' told us how to climb; but not where to climb to. Our altitude restriction as we understood it was 12000 feet.I suggest that the phraseology be amended; particularly with SIDs; to ensure that pilots know what altitude they are flying to as well as how they will fly to it. This is in keeping with the rest of the ATC system. I suggested to the Departure controller to say; 'Climb via SID to FL230.' Or perhaps say 'Climb via SID to top of SID.'

Air carrier pilot reported they misunderstood Departure Controller's altitude assignment due to new phraseology associated with new OAPM RNAV departures.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Electrical / sulfuric type burning smell detected in flight deck at 17;000 ft. MSL. [Requested Priority Handling]; went on oxygen and smoke goggles. Determined ZZZ was the closest suitable airport in terms of time. Started the QRH procedures and descent with approach. Upon landing and pulling off Runway XX with CFRs; approximately 5 seconds after bag door EICAS indication; the smell returned for a few seconds. No damage or injuries noted. Smell in flight deck of a mix between ozone (electrical) and a sulfur type odor.Cause: Unknown. We were told that during the previous night's emergency that Maintenance had determined it was an issue with pack 1 and it was placarded inoperative and MEL'd. We still got the same smell today.

EMB-145 First Officer reported 'electrical/sulfuric' fumes during climb and executed an uneventful emergency diversion.


Air Traffic Control Radar 1; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 290; Flight Crew Type 220

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

On the departure from HND I was incorrectly maintaining 481 feet per minute or better instead of 481 feet per mile. The Controller asked for best rate and I corrected the problem quickly by asking for a brief shuttle climb which he approved but he still indicated he got an altitude alert. My terrain system never showed us below 1;000 feet above the terrain. However; I recognize I did not comply with the departure procedure. I have since reviewed this procedure with a flight instructor and the routing which I correctly had and never deviated from but I did repeatedly verify with the controllers that I was on the correct 080 radial and connected to the correct airway. When I was handed off to LA Center; the Controller indicated he was told I had trouble with the routing but I never deviated. In the future I will make sure that I get the right climb rate based on the per mile not per minute which will lower the concern when arriving or departing a new busy airspace like Las Vegas allowing me to be more confident of the routing as well.

A C-182RG pilot departing HND was given a Terrain Alert by ATC when he improperly maintained his climb rate at or above 481 feet per minute; rather than the 481 feet per mile as required for terrain clearance.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During walk-around; [the] FO (First Officer) found a dent in [the] aircraft; aft left side; near lavatory service. [The case was] entered into [the] AML and [we] informed Maintenance. Contract Maintenance took pictures; detailed measurements; and notes for submittal to ZZZ2 Maintenance Control. After approximately an hour; it was determined that [the] aircraft was good to go; item was deferred; and the paperwork was completed. Flight was uneventful to ZZZ1. At the gate in ZZZ1; a Mechanic came out to the aircraft with some ACARS paper that was requested inbound. We mentioned the dent; so he said he would go take a look. During this time; [the] aircraft was serviced; passengers were boarded; and the flight was 'ready' for departure. The door was actually closed when the Crew Chief informed us that we were on a maintenance hold. The same Mechanic returned and told us that the dent was very significant and the aircraft should be taken out of service for repairs. He mentioned that the aircraft shouldn't have flown and was a 'blowout' waiting to happen. A Maintenance Supervisor came out; evaluated the situation; and the aircraft was subsequently taken out of service. Why and how was it determined that the aircraft was 'good to go' at an outstation; but when the plane gets to a hub it's taken out of service? I understand a forward-leaning mentality when it comes to serving our passengers but this should never be at the expense of safety. We were informed by the Maintenance Supervisor that the discrepancy was deferred in ZZZ but the aircraft was to undergo further evaluation when it arrived in ZZZ1. This sounds plausible; except; the only reason the discrepancy was 'further evaluated' was because we needed ACARS paper and happened to mention the dent to an experienced and highly trained Mechanic; who applied the brakes to this situation. Mistakes can happen; but in situations where there is doubt regarding airworthiness; it is better to err on the side of caution.

B737 Captain reported confusion and miscommunication led to a flight with a damaged aircraft that was later found to be beyond proper limits and unairworthy.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Procedure

Signed off for the wrong procedure. Misread. Did not see the word Fixed and assumed that it was for the handheld ELT. Completed procedure for the ELT (portable) using proper ETN and signed off the block. I suggest that this block have a concise description within the statement that identifies which ELT so that the word at the top is not missed.

Technician reported misreading work cards and performing the maintenance task incorrectly.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were cleared to descend on the HYDRR 1 Arrival to Phoenix via the 25L Transition. We were then given a runway change to 26 due to an anticipated Runway Inspection (RWY 25R was closed). Just prior to CHAVO waypoint; the airplane FMS Mode went from PATH to Vertical Speed (pink) and the airplane pitched over to a greater than 3;000 FPM descent. Even though the VNAV mode was pink; the airplane flew through the 9;000 foot restriction at CHAVO. The Captain alerted the First Officer verbally (flying pilot) that the FMS/Auto Pilot had basically failed and to hand fly the airplane and return to 9;000 feet. The plane got as low as 8;500 to 8;600 feet. We returned promptly to 9;000 feet.English is not the 'home' language for the First Officer. He was surprised (zone of confusion) when I told him to hand fly the airplane and get the FMS/Autopilot off. Thus; the reason for the very quick 500 feet altitude bust. It should be noted; that the Phoenix Approach Controller never told us to check our altitude as we were over an area of high terrain.

EMB-175 flight crew reported descending through an altitude on the arrival when the FMS/autopilot failed to level off after an aggressive descent rate.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I was the FLM on duty in the Tower cab providing OJTI to a CPC at the time of the incident. I was explaining MORs (Mandatory Occurrence Report) and significant events notifications and showing the CPC where to find the contact numbers. Traffic was light and there were only two positions open as per the COVID staffing; LC1/LC2/LA were combined as CD/FD/GC were also combined. I had one other person on a break.While giving instruction and demonstrating required activity for significant MORs to the CPC; I heard the ASDE-X alarm 'Runway XR go-around' I immediately looked up and scanned Runway XR to assess the situation and determine what caused the alarm. I observed Aircraft Y; 1/2 mile final landing on Runway XR and a small GA aircraft on Taxiway [5] turning South on Taxiway [3]. I didn't observe any other targets or obstructions on the runway surface area. At that time Aircraft Y was already flaring out on the runway. I then asked the LC Controller why wasn't Aircraft Y sent around. The Controller responded; 'The other aircraft cleared the runway.' I then informed the Controller if the safety logic says to send someone around on a runway which the aircraft was landing it was mandatory to comply. The Controller advised me that they thought it was safer to land than send the aircraft around. I then informed the Controller that we are obligated to send the aircraft around per the JO7110.65 and if the pilot decided to land anyway then I would have a conversation with the pilot.Remind controllers that the safety logic overrides same runway separation and that it's mandatory to comply with the safety logic instructions. I did have this conversation with my crew after the incident and was shocked to know they weren't aware of this and thought it was a discretionary decision.

Tower Front Line Manager reported a runway incursion and concerns with the Local Controller not issuing a go-around instruction to an aircraft landing on the same runway.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

As Pilot Flying; at approximately 1;050 feet AGL on the ZZZZZ3 departure; we experienced a rapid succession of three bursts. At the same time; I was reducing the thrust levers to CLB mode. The gear was already up and the Captain; Pilot Monitoring; was just checking in with departure. Both of us weren't sure if we had hit a bird or something else. We had another rapid succession of three bursts with associated ECAM that almost instantaneously cleared the screen. The Captain quickly recognized the right engine (#2) indications were 'rolling back' and stated so clearly. He then ensure positive aircraft control by verbally stating; 'Your aircraft'. I responded with 'My aircraft'. The right engine ECAM message went away just as quickly as it displayed. The right engine then showed normal parameters and 'parallel' with the left engine. The Captain reviewed the Quick Reference Card and determined no action from the QRC required. He [advised] ATC while I simultaneously flew the aircraft on crosswind and turned downwind. The thrust levelers remained at CLB setting and flaps 1 on downwind with no other associated engine indications at approximately 2;500 feet MSL. We both agreed the best resolution was to land the aircraft ASAP. Our current weight was below max landing weight. I very quickly briefed a visual approach to Rwy XXR while the Captain loaded an approach in the FMGC. With gear down; I made the right turn on a base leg. I pushed the SPD button for managed speed as I thought we were in APPR Mode however; I quickly pulled the SPD button for selected speed once I noticed the engines were increase thrust for a higher speed. At this point we experienced one more rapid succession from the right engine which quickly resided again with speed now selected and winding back to approach speed. We configured final flap setting to 3 and briefed our potential go-around if required. The Captain successfully ensured our Descent and Before Landing checklist were completed with clearance to land. Upon a successful landing; the Captain ensured the passengers and crew were informed to remain seated while we taxied to the gate. ARFF did a complete review and temperature check of the engines with nothing significant to report. Noteworthy items...the aircraft was hand flown until downwind. Auto pilot was engaged briefly once at 2;500 feet MSL. The autopilot was disengaged when turning base leg and hand flown for the visual approach.Definitely a startle factor; particularly since it happened just above 1;000 feet AGL while thrust levels are normally set to CLB mode. Additionally; the initial confusion as to whether we had hit something (bird?) since the ECAM did not display an action. Furthermore; once the ECAM action did display it was nearly instantaneously gone as the engine continued to attempt to resolve the problem.Since ENG Stall isn't on the Checklist; this scenario could be used in future training events to increase awareness and action based on a low altitude scenario during take-off phase.

First Officer reported compressor stalls forced an air turn back and precautionary landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather; Staffing; Procedure

I had just arrived for my shift for the day. It was mostly slow to start with; however bad weather had already moved through the airspace and another; much larger weather system was moving into the sector below me. I was told the ZZZ [Airport] and ZZZ1 [Airport] arrivals were shut down over ZZZ2 [Airport] and would be coming my way. Next thing I know; I have about 20 planes flashing at me from sector X West of me and every airplane was routed ZZZZZ [Intersection]; ZZZ [VOR] next fix. A lot of those next fixes were bad routes and would have not been per the letter with how we would give planes to ZZZ Approach or ZZZ1 [Approach]. Besides that; though; a lot of those airplanes were not properly separated and would have been in conflict shortly after entering my airspace with not only the airplanes they were handing me but with the airplanes I already had. They needed ZZZ1 [Airport] arrivals down to at least FL280 or lower at Sector Y (the sector I was feeding) and we were receiving them. Stacked from [Sector] A and [Sector] X some as high as FL400. That gave us approximately 20 miles to get them down all the while receiving north bound traffic over the same 10 miles stretch that we were putting south bound planes through because ZZZ1 [Airport] departures and overflights from ZZZ3 [Airport] had not been shut off. After it become so congested at the south end of my sector that I could no longer separate planes or data blocks; I requested a D Side. One was not available because the only staffing we had was currently plugged-in working. I then told informed my Supervisor that I could no longer accept hand offs from Sector X. He said he would tell them. Sector X; however; continues to drive airplanes into my sector without a handoff or point out. I had to take evasive action on one airplane and turn one of mine 35 degrees to avoid hitting an airplane that was 10 miles in my sector with no hand off or point out. Once we finally got that sorted out; those airplanes continued south to [Sector] Y who became so saturated that he could no longer take handoffs from me so I had to put airplanes into holding with nowhere to hold them because military airspace was active and I was still very congested. I may have violated military airspace because of trying to descend airplanes to avoid another aircraft at the same altitude. I also had to pull my mask off at one point when I started to get bad read backs because I didn't have time for bad read backs. Every second counted when you are solid red with no D side. I did eventually receive a D side sometime later.There NEEDS to be better pre-planning. Especially from TMU. Also; when it is requested that TMU shuts down departures from ZZZ1 [Airport] they need to do it! Telling ZZZ1 [Airport departures] we can still take them but 15 in trail doesn't work. Also; the masks are a safety hazard when we are busy!  Pilots cannot hear us properly and if we are having to repeat ourselves; wait for another read back it is taking away precious seconds we could be giving the next plane a control instruction and breaking our thought process to the next airplane. Also having only enough staffing for one D side in the entire area is ridiculous!  Every sector needed a S side and there was only one available. We are back to normal schedules and working 6-day work weeks with overtime and the staffing is still not enough for safety! Not to mention we are tired working 6-day weeks. It doesn't allow us to properly recoup after long days working. There also needs to be more organization when something is shut down. Planes should come to us sequenced so we can then Sequence with the airplanes we already have and not aimed at the same fix.

Center Controller reported an unsafe shift due to weather and lack of staffing resulting in handoff and separations issues.


Supervisor / CIC; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

At the time of the event I was working; Ground Control; Flight Data; Clearance Delivery; and Controller-in-Charge combined. Traffic complexity and volume were average on Local Control; so I decided to monitor Local as much as I could. As I monitored I noticed two aircraft setting up on opposite bases for Runways 32R and 32L (these were the active runways at the time). The Cessna on right base for Runway 32R was Aircraft X and the Cessna on left base for Runway 32L was Aircraft Y. This is a routine; safe operation and if the Local Controller had allowed the aircraft to continue for their respective runways then the operation would have remained routine and safe. Instead; even though both aircraft are base to half mile final with approximately 500-700 feet of altitude; Local Control offers to change Aircraft Y to Runway 32R if they will turn back to the downwind to follow Aircraft X. After hesitating briefly Aircraft Y accepts Local's offer for Runway 32R. I do not know if Aircraft Y misunderstood Local's request to turn back to the downwind to follow Aircraft X or; because of the stage of flight Aircraft Y; could not comply. Whatever the case; Aircraft Y did not do as requested but instead; appeared to swerve to the right to avoid Aircraft X who was right base to half mile final for Runway 32R. And; even though Aircraft Y flew through final to come in behind Aircraft X the two aircraft still ended up in very close proximity to one another. In order to gain spacing Aircraft Y began executing several hard S-Turns all at low level (600 feet descending) and with only half a mile on final to the runway. At this time Aircraft X appeared to speed up; I believe; to gain spacing between themselves and Aircraft Y.Local did nothing to correct Aircraft Y when they failed to comply with his initial request to turn back to the downwind and; only belatedly approved Aircraft Y's S-Turns after they were already executing them. Nor did Local do anything to ensure the two aircraft would remain separated such as; cancelling Aircraft X's clearance for the Option and giving them a Touch-and-Go or Low Approach; or giving either aircraft a Go Around.In short; the Local Controller through poor judgment; bad phraseology; and lack of control instructions caused and unsafe situation to occur by; allowing these two aircraft to become too close to one another and; in so doing; causing the pilot(s) to execute extreme maneuvers at low altitudes on short final; increasing pilot workload in an already workload heavy stage of flight (i.e. landing). Worse of all the Local Controller did nothing to correct the situation he created or insured separation/safety. If the pilots of Aircraft Y and Aircraft X had not been aware and working as hard as they were to increase separation; Local would not have had proper Runway separation

Controller reports of observing a poor performance by the Local Controller resulting in a NMAC.


Workload; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While on our base turn to intercept the localizer both Pilot Flying and Pilot Not Flying switched from white needles to green needles with the final approach course set to 190 degrees. On the final vector turn (heading 160 degrees) the approach mode was armed. The autopilot captured the localizer and initiated an erroneous left turn to a heading of approximately 110 degrees before I noticed it and instructed the Pilot Flying to select heading mode and turn the aircraft manually to a heading of 210 to re-intercept the localizer. At this time I checked to see that we were not in conflict with an aircraft on the parallel approach and luckily they were below us by about 1;500 FT. Approach Control asked if we had the localizer captured and I stated we had an autopilot issue but were established on the course inbound. CRJ pilots received a memo about this issue with the autopilot system. It will occasionally capture and aggressively attempt [to] align the aircraft with the inbound course; sometimes outside the maneuvering capabilities of the aircraft. The manufacturer has no fix for this issue so the solution is to capture the inbound course using white needles and then switch to green needles. Lately; during yearly proficiency training; pilots; including myself and the Pilot Flying have been told to capture using green needles which contradicts the memo. While I understand capturing using green needles works 100% of the time in the simulator it does not in the real world. In the future I will follow the guidance of the memo and hope the manufacturer is able to come up with a fix for this potentially lethal issue in the future.

The reporter stated a Company bulletin describes the issue experienced by this crew and adds that the same event can occur during or prior to glideslope capture. In fact; several years ago the reporter's aircraft did attempt to abruptly fly up to the glideslope before the glideslope was active and captured. The current procedure at his Company is contrary to the published procedure in that the crews are to capture in White Needles (VOR/LOC); let the aircraft stabilize then select Green Needles. The reporter is concerned about parallel and PRM approaches in the future. He has noticed in his years as a Captain that ATC is spacing aircraft more closely; and in this specific event the margin of safety was maintained by the altitude separation.

A CRJ-700 in Green Needles with the Approach Mode Armed turned away from the localizer final approach course after LOC CAP so the crew selected heading mode and returned to the localizer. The particular aircraft's compass system was an AHRS and the reporter has noticed that the Inertial equipped aircraft seem to be somewhat more stable in the capture mode.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.9

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 3.9

Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I received a briefing including a management mandate requiring every aircraft landing Denver to be slowed to 170 knots or slower prior to the FAF. There are no exclusions or exceptions to the rule and the verbiage of the mandate has already been changed a couple times. We were given no training or proficiency time. Management stated there will be no reduction in rates for the adjustment period. There is much confusion in the room as to whether this rule is in effect because only part of the work force has received the briefing. Today I was assigned to work arrivals for the first time since the mandate was supposed to start. I did not have more than five aircraft at a time; but this new rule caused significant impact and additional effort on my final. The first aircraft entered the final with an accelerated ground speed due to a common tail wind. The aircraft was descending appropriately for the Visual Approach until I remembered I was supposed to slow the aircraft. It is my professional opinion that had I slowed the aircraft at the appropriate time in order to comply with the mandate; the aircraft would no longer have been able to accomplish the rate of descent necessary to conduct a stable approach.The second situation I had to resolve was with another aircraft who was first on approach. I had not yet had enough aircraft on the final to identify the difference in ground speed versus indicated speed. Because I am no longer allowed to assign an aircraft 170 knots or greater; I did not want to assign the aircraft 170 knots in case it was slower than what he was currently doing. The aircraft I was vectoring to follow I had slowed to 170 knots to compensate and it was barely enough. All of this happened inside of 10 miles when I had limited time to make these decisions. This type of situation causes tunnel vision and a lack of awareness; I felt very uncomfortable.First and foremost to remove the mandate and address proficiency issues of improper speed control to the individual on a case by case basis. If that is not an option; proficiency training to teach this new technique. Opportunities to practice this in the lab may help but will be difficult since speeds and winds are unrealistic. A decrease in traffic volume for an adjustment period. Provide some exclusions to the mandate where controllers can utilize their best judgment in cases such as emergencies or operational priority. Consistency in training; dissemination; enforcement and support; everyone needs to be on the same page.Watching replays where the 170 knots is utilized in unsafe; efficient and effective manner would be beneficial.

Working finals position this morning with the new management mandate to issue 170 knots to every aircraft on final prior to switching to the tower; no exceptions. This caused a significant increase to my workload with additional time needed to hang on to aircraft in order to comply with the restriction; and additional phraseology. The wind for aircraft on the downwind at 11;000 feet was 250 degrees at 40 knots. This caused between 120-150 knot ground track difference between aircraft on the downwind and aircraft on the final; making timing particularly challenging.Having to hold aircraft longer in order to issue speed is affecting timing; increasing spacing and adding to frequency congestion. It also gives the tower less time to do what they need to with the aircraft; like issue safety alerts for wind shear if necessary.An aircraft was number one; I hung on to the aircraft until two miles outside the Final Approach Fix in order to keep his speed up. The second aircraft I chose not to slow because I had a rapid overtake with the aircraft behind while I was figuring out the winds to adjust my spacing on final. Another aircraft I had to hold on to until two miles outside the Final Approach Fix for spacing while I established my final.At this point; the next five aircraft were issued 170 knots; which I would have done normally to hold spacing on final. However; this had to be done sooner than normal to comply with the new restriction; resulting in 4 to 4 1/2 mile final on a 2 1/2 mile runway. At this point there was no way to get the spacing back because I had to issue the speeds early in order to have time to turn aircraft in appropriately.There was extra frequency congestion about winds and turbulence. One aircraft reported he needed to fly a 210 heading to track a 200 which I approved because he was three miles to the FAF and I had no time to do anything else. 210 heading for the runway does not comply with assigned 30 degree or less final approach course intercept requirement. I used the heading tool to verify that he was tracking 200 and he was. The next two aircraft I would've let fly in at normal speed and restricted to comply. The next aircraft I held on to until 2 miles outside the FAF to close a gap. The next two aircraft I would've restricted normally to maintain spacing. By my count; this new mandate negatively impacted 11 of the 15 aircraft I worked.Remove the mandate of 170 knots or provide some exceptions for the situations like I described. Provide an opportunity for proficiency training to get used to this new technique. Management has told us this mandate is an attempt to correct a specific group of controllers who lack the proficiency to assign proper speed control on final. I have been regularly commended for my performance on final and not been told that I issue improper speeds.

D01 TRACON has mandated controllers to assign a specific speed to every aircraft at the final approach fix into DEN which led to concerns on specific scenarios.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92.03; Flight Crew Total 9475.43; Flight Crew Type 5083.83

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Due to numerous emails from management regarding vaccination requirements and issues regarding reasonable accommodation I became distracted. During before takeoff checklist; I failed to notice our final weights had not been sent and used the weight on our T/O performance data. We finally received our weights after takeoff. This caused another distraction that resulted in a missed ATC traffic call and vectors from ATC.

Air carrier First Officer reported failing to notice the final weights had not been sent and inadvertently used old data. The reporter stated they were distracted by company communications regarding vaccination requirements.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 1500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After departing runway 23 at MMU on MMU 6 Departure Procedure (DP); I contacted New York departure control and reported climbing 1200 for 2000. New York acknowledged and asked if we had traffic to our right side at approximately 2000. I acknowledged seeing the traffic; at which time ATC issued a right turn to heading 110 with climb to 10000. Knowing that the MMU 6 departure has a left turn to 160 as published; this revised ATC clearance could pose a possible conflict with target aircraft insight so I queried ATC again and ATC response was turn right to 110 and climb and maintain 10000. The PIC and I looked at our position in relation to other aircraft and decided we could comply with the ATC clearance while maintaining visual separation with other aircraft. We anticipated receiving a TCAS alert and RA; which we did momentarily and complied with the RA while maintaining a visual on target aircraft; and subsequently received a level off alert due to another aircraft later pointed out by ATC to our left; which was most likely EWR outbound traffic. All TCAS RA alerts cleared; and by this time; we were well above and away from initial target and EWR traffic and heading 110 while climbing to 10000 and informed ATC. ATC acknowledged saying we were supposed to turn left; not right to a heading of 110 at which time we were given a frequency change and proceeded uneventfully.I refrained from questioning ATC`s remarks on right turn versus left turn due to traffic volume and frequency congestion. The PIC and I both heard and confirmed ATC's right turn request from initial call and when queried for a second time as well. The fact that ATC knew traffic was to our right and asked if we had a visual on him points to the fact that his intentions were for us to make a right turn and not a left turn. Contributing Factors: Asking crew to amend a DP; and knowingly putting our aircraft in a compromising position; when obviously staying on the DP; or making a left turn would have avoided this situation. ATC apparently not seeming to know left from right at initial point of contact. Confusion due to initial target traffic; and MMU 6 DP. Action Taken: Compliance with TCAS RA alerts while maintaining safe visual separation from initial target aircraft and subsequent aircraft pointed out by ATC.

A DA2000 Captain reported they were vectored off the SID with a right turn to an assigned heading toward traffic that had been previously pointed out and acknowledged. He questioned ATC about the direction of turn and was told a second time to turn right. The crew complied with the instruction; received a RA; complied with the RA; and then they were told by ATC that the turn was supposed to be to the left.