Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

I turned Aircraft X below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA); not realizing he was IFR. The entire time I dealt with this Pilot; nothing he did or said led me to believe he was on an IFR flight plan nor an IFR rated pilot. He screwed up every read-back. He flew through final and lined up for the wrong runway. His phraseology was non-standard and apologetic. He screwed up his radio calls. I didn't recognize the N number as a local aircraft and he seemed unfamiliar and confused. Yes; VFR aircraft have an asterisk beside their call sign and a time-share (v) by the call sign. I missed those visual cues because all the auditory questions told me this was another student VFR pilot; probably not used to flying in controlled airspace and certainly not comfortable talking to ATC. The feeds to me on Local from the TRACON were less-than-stellar and thinking back now on the event it makes sense that I ended up trying to rectify a bad sequence with a rapid overtake on final. I wonder if the two RADAR Controllers were working together on the sequence; or even realized what they handed me until one of them called to see if I'd provide Visual Separation between the two aircraft. One Controller was a Supervisor that doesn't spend a lot of time on the scopes and was failing to ship aircraft to my frequency. I had to have Ground make a couple calls to switch aircraft to me; one of which was Aircraft Y whom I first talked to on a 2 mile final. The other Controller is someone I don't work well with. We have polar different views on working traffic; strip usage and marking; feeds to the Tower etc. So; that's the setup. Here's what happened. Aircraft X came to me from TRACON on the 10 mile range ring; a normal place to switch VFR aircraft to the Tower. I cleared him to land Runway 10R; which he read-back with his call-sign. I was working pattern traffic in the South pattern for Runway 10R; Aircraft Y. There appeared to be no conflict with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. TRACON called me on the shout line to ask if I could provide Visual Separation with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y? I stated I would. I looked at the Tower RADAR display to figure out why he even called me about that. I found that coordination odd because the green 'VISUAL' button was illuminated indicating that I will provide Visual Separation on final; as long as wake turbulence is not an issue. When scanning the Tower RADAR display; I realized that Aircraft X was northbound; setting himself up for a 10 mile final and Aircraft Y was bearing down on him; straight-in from the West. I instructed Aircraft X to proceed direct the numbers; Runway 10R. His response was; 'We'll try.' Really? It looked like it would still work if he went to the numbers Runway 10R as long as I slowed Aircraft Y; who was tagged for the parallel runway. Well; I wasn't talking to Aircraft Y yet and thought this was because the RADAR Controller working him was slowing him to final approach speed to help this crappy sequence work. Not so. I buzzed into the RADAR Controller's ear to ask him to switch Aircraft Y as Aircraft Y was asking; 'Should we go to Tower?'I had to make a snap decision. Operating under the assumption that Aircraft X was VFR; on a 3 mile final for the wrong runway; 80 kts slower than Aircraft Y; now not enough miles in trail for the same runway. The decision was a natural. Get the VFR guy out of the way! I thought I did something good. Salvaging a bad sequence by breaking out the confused pilot who messed it all up by extending out; flying through final and lining up for the wrong runway. If he were VFR; this was the correct thing to do. There was NO WAY that sequence would work once Aircraft X aligned for Runway 10L. That was a TCAS RA or collision waiting to happen. Well; now that I understand Aircraft X was IFR; I should have called the TRACON; told them that I'm not talking to Aircraft Y; break him out. Aircraft X lined up for the left and I couldn't turn him because he was at 3;800 ft.My MVA there is 4;000 ft. The coordination from my polar opposite RADAR Controller should have been a clue that Aircraft X was IFR. Why else would he be overly concerned about visual separation? I missed it. As mentioned above; I don't operate the way that Controller does and I just chalked it up to over-coordination by him ensuring I would not allow Aircraft Y to overtake Aircraft X.All 3 of my previous facilities used an 'X' symbol and the last three digits to denote VFR aircraft. For example; Cherokee XXXYZA would be 'XYZA' for the call-sign. That was the way we did business up until a couple years ago but we made a change to full call-signs for all aircraft. Although it's been a couple of years; I still struggle with it. It is not readily apparent at a glance; who is VFR and who is IFR. Under the 'X'; last three digits way of doing business; I could walk up to any RADAR screen and instantaneously point to every VFR aircraft with 100% accuracy. Now; you have to 'scan with a purpose' to catch that little; teeny (*) or a (v) beside the call-sign to recognize who is VFR. We are busy and getting busier. We were just upgraded and we are showing increased traffic every month over years past for those months. The scope is more and more crowded. Why would we make it more difficult? You're a Controller too. You know that when you simplify as many tasks as you can; it allows you more brain power to scan and plan. Well; I missed this little gem in my scan and I was led to believe the pilot's incompetence was because he was a new pilot and I tried to do right by him; even going so far as to be overly polite and understanding with him on frequency.Without realizing it; I missed a lack of call sign use on a read back while working Local Control; and now this little gem shows me I really need to step up my game in the Tower. I am working standing up; not sitting down and chatting with coworkers. I actively scan the final and the runways; ever vigilant for wrong runway landings which we have had a rash of this past year. Now; we are under fire for massive MVA violations and now I come and add another log to the fire. I feel really bad about this.

A Tower Controller thought an IFR aircraft was VFR and allowed it to fly below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) .5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Multiple aircraft reported 'Severe Turbulence' on the CAPSS and CAVLR STARs into the DC Metro Area from the South. Despite multiple reports and PIREPs being recorded TMU refused to reroute aircraft onto a different STAR away from this turbulence. Unfortunately for this aircraft he reported severe turbulence (fear could be heard in his voice) while descending via on the CAVLR3 STAR. The aircraft was unable to continue descending on the STAR as the pilots said 'Unable to descend fighting the turbulence.' To me this sounds like the aircraft was in extreme turbulence which according to the Pilot Controller Glossary is defined as 'the aircraft is violently tossed and is practically impossible to control. It may cause structural damage.' Fighting the turbulence and not being able to descend would seem to fit into this definition in my opinion.I would recommend that when multiple reports of severe turbulence are reported over a very short span of time; by multiple aircraft types and multiple air carriers/operators that the TMU be more proactive in routing aircraft around this weather instead of continuing to run aircraft into it. There was no reason that this aircraft should have had to endure that ride or the undue stressed it caused on the pilots' as heard in their voice when listening to the tapes. Multiple latent errors had occurred by the TMU in ignoring the PIREPs and continue to route planes into this weather. We were very lucky that the plane had no structural damage and that there were no injuries as a result.

ZDC ARTCC Controller reported that multiple aircraft were not re-routed away from severe turbulence by the Traffic Management Unit.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

After delayed flight because of maintenance delay due to A check and Engine 1 replacement we departed. At approximately 100 ft I noticed the OVHT Eng 1 NAC EICAS message and at 200 ft noticed the Fire Eng 1 ECIAS message. We climbed through 400 ft and received the master warning accompanied by the Fire Warning Bell. Autopilot was engaged and we climbed through 1000 ft and I preformed the QRC for Fire Eng 1 and started our EFP and notified ATC and a Mayday aircraft. Completed QRH recall review followed by after takeoff checklist. Upon completion of the QRC checklist the Fire Eng 1 Warning disappeared so we did not need to blow the fire bottles. We asked for vectors back to [the airport] and requested the fire department standby to inspect the engine for any signs of a fire. After landing we exited runway and parked on taxiway. Fire department inspected engine and determined there was no indication of a fire and we were cleared into the maintenance ramp stand. We notified Ops enroute of the return and on the ground notified maintenance control; Ops; Dispatch; and scheduling.

A Boeing 747-400 captain reported observing #1 Engine Overheat and Fire Warning lights shortly after takeoff. The appropriate emergency checklists were completed; and a return to the departure airport was successfully accomplished.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon arrival to ZZZZ I quickly went outside to do my preflight walk around. Upon return to the jetbridge all the passengers and rest of the crew were deplaned. Flight attendants said aircraft filled with fumes. I went to look inside the plane and surely it was full of fumes and a melted crayon smell. Poor and rushed maintenance procedures. Aircraft has history and same event happened within 30 days on the same aircraft. A better maintenance procedures overlook [recommended].

Air Carrier First Officer reported a fume event during preflight at gate. Passengers and flight crew deplaned during maintenance action.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Direct; Vectors; Visual Approach; STAR Y

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 140

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We departed ZZZ en route to ZZZ1. Captain and myself; First Officer; noticed a light harmonic droning noise during climb out but no vibration. About 30 minutes after takeoff while in cruise at FL370 the LH Gen Master Caution illuminated. We ran the QRH and reset the LH generator. At this time the generator did not come back online. We then decided to reduce the electrical load on the remaining generator. The QRH indicated to land as soon as practical. With one hour and 20 minutes left in flight we elected to continue to our destination with the remaining generator.At this time we informed Dispatch. Along our route of flight we determined which airports were suitable for landing in the event we lost our right generator. This proved to be beneficial due to the events that happened down the road. About 40 minutes after the LH generator failed the LH engine rolled back. N1 fell back to almost idle and the ITT dropped immediately as well as fuel flow. We then advised ATC of our engine problem and determined ZZZ2 was suitable and asked ATC for radar vectors direct to ZZZ2.Captain pulled back the power lever on the LH engine at which time we noticed the engine spooled back up but was fluctuating erratically. We started our descent since we were only about 65 nm from the airport. During the descent the engine seemed to stabilize. The droning noise became louder and strangely seemed to come from the front of the aircraft. No noticeable vibration though. Descending into the pattern at ZZZ2 the droning noise become pretty loud and we felt a thump in the fuselage. The thump we latter determined to be a bird strike on the RH wing. (No damage to wing). Conditions on the field were night VFR and the runway was dry. With the loud noise that appeared to come from the front of the aircraft Captain decided during landing to hold the nose off as long as possible. We landed with no issues and no structural damage. We then taxied off the runway and were met with the Airport Fire Department. Priority handling was not requested; but fire was staged as a precautionary measure. As we were taxiing to Company; a repair station on the field; Captain gently pushed up the LH throttle at which time we both noticed it had spooled down by itself. He then went to idle cut-off. Being that Fire was following behind the aircraft a firefighter advised us that he saw a very large puff of smoke from the back of the LH engine when it died. Employees from Company were waiting on the ramp also saw the same plume of smoke. Upon the walk around inspection we found no evidence of structural damage to the engine or any damage where the bird struck had occurred on the right hand wing. The fan blades turned easily. We did observe underneath the LH engine cowl large black streaks from the starter generator cooling exit.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CE525 Flight Crew reported the failure of the  L/H Generator and a Roll Back on the L/H Engine resulted in a diversion.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors

During my take off roll off Runway 9 in BOS the red Take off Hold Lights (THL's) illuminated. At the time the lights came on I had already passed through 4R; the only active intersecting runway for that take off configuration. I determined that the safest course of action was to continue the take off roll. Had I been unfamiliar with airport layout or had the lights illuminated earlier in the take off roll I might have decided on a high speed abort. The FAA's guidance on THL's states the following: 'Whenever a pilot observes the red lights of the THLs; the pilot will stop or remain stopped. The pilot will contact ATC for resolution if any clearance is in conflict with the lights. Should pilots note illuminated lights while in take off roll and under circumstances when stopping is impractical for safety reasons; the crew should proceed according to their best judgment while understanding the illuminated lights indicate that continuing the take off is unsafe. Contact ATC at the earliest possible opportunity.' I notified ATC on climb out about the issue and told them I'd like to give them a call when I landed. I called the Tower; the Controller I spoke to was interested in the event. The Controller told me they'd look into it and asked if the Tower Chief could give me a call. I gave her my cell number. I haven't heard back from anyone. I'm writing this report because this has happened before with no traffic in bound for 4R; it also happens automatically when you take off from K on 9 with someone in position full length and the lights can cause an unreasonable distraction for the pilot. Suggestions; I would like the Tower to look into scenarios that might cause erroneous illumination of the THL's. I would also like our pilots to be aware that the THL's will be on if they are issued a take off clearance for Runway 9 at K with another airplane in position full length.

Air Carrier departure from Runway 9 at BOS elected to continue take off after noting the Take Off Hold Lights (THL's) illuminated; the reporter noting a abort was impractical given the circumstances.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I had just sat down at the sector and was on position for no more than 5 minutes when the situation happened.  I was briefed that Aircraft Y was by himself on AR207NE.  Aircraft X was on course at FL310 requesting FL350.  Aircraft Y was on course (so I thought) at FL330.   Aircraft Y requested a descent to block FL260 through FL280 and wanted clearance for refueling with a tanker.  He said he was MARSA with the tanker.  I did not have the tanker and told him I had his request.  I put a 5 NM halo around Aircraft Z as Aircraft Z and Aircraft Y were diverging.  As soon as I had 5NM I climbed Aircraft Z and descended Aircraft Y.  I had already QU'ed [route check] Aircraft Y and it was showing right on course up AR207NE.  I noticed Aircraft Y turning left into Aircraft Z.  I turned Aircraft Y 30 degrees right; then I turned Aircraft Z 30 degrees left.  I then called traffic to both aircraft one at a time.  It appeared to show about 4-4.5NM at the same altitude at FL320 at the closest.  After getting separation; I asked Aircraft Y why he was turning.  He told me they filed for a delay at a fix and was cleared as filed.  My flight plan did not show any delay except a request for one in the remarks section.  When I told him I showed a request in my flight plan; he acknowledged that it was in his remarks section as well.  He said; 'My bad' and that he should have at least announced that he was going to make a turn up ahead.  The pilot thought he was cleared to enter a delay.  Whether he was or not; I do not know; but if he was; it wasn't communicated up the chain and the delay wasn't entered into the flight plan.  If he wasn't; it was a pilot deviation.Controllers need to make sure if they clear for a delay; they either forward the information or enter the delay in the flight plan if that was the issue.  Military tanker pilots need better training to make sure they have proper clearances and understand the difference between a clearance and a remark.

ZJX Controller reports a loss of separation due to an aircraft that turned off course into another aircraft route because the pilot thought it was allowed.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Procedure

This [Report] is filed to report FAA violation.Aircraft arrived IAH with both engines t-r hinge bump fairings in wrong configuration. These hinge bump fairings are to be installed only on inboard side of both engines.  But; on this aircraft the right engine inboard t-r hinge bump fairing was completely missing - see log XXXXXXX and sdr# XXXXXXX. The right engine outboard t-r was configured correctly with no fairings installed.... Now; the left engine inboard t-r was configured correctly with fairings installed. But the left engine outboard side also had t-r hinge bump fairing installed and this is wrong. The outboard side of left engine should not have this fairing installed - see log XXXXXXX. See attached pictures of both engines correct and wrong configuration; Illustrated Parts Catalog reference and amm reference. In a nutshell; the left engine has an extra fairing installed on outboard side and right engine is missing the required fairing on the inboard side.

Technician reported that incorrect parts were installed on both thrust reversers.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 100

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Normal flight from departure to destination. The ride had been bumpy the whole way; so we were interested in getting on the ground. We were tracking toward the IAF for the ILS to our destination. During the descent; ATC descended us to 3;000 FT; then to 2;000 FT; then amended the altitude to 2;500 FT; and started to call traffic. Right at the highest workload time (naturally); I hear a pop; and lose the electric trim and the altitude alerter (which; I found out; is powered by the same circuit breaker). Now I've got a handful of airplane that I have to switch to manual trimming; lose my altitude alerter; and ATC starts in with the vectors and calling traffic. Though an experienced pilot; I am used to 121 two pilot operations and have only started flying single pilot GA again recently. I was very surprised how one or two simple things can spike the workload almost instantaneously. I managed to keep the airplane on altitude and heading. We got cleared for the visual; at which time we canceled IFR; and proceeded visually; and had to do a 360 to space behind another aircraft on final. Moral of the story...watch the distractions. When they creep up on you; play defense.

A BE-35 pilot became very busy in bumpy air on the TPA IFR arrival when his Altitude Alerter and Electric Elevator Trim failed while ATC was issuing altitude changes and traffic.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

JANNY5 arrival into BUR at night. Cleared to cross JANNY at and maintain 8;000 feet. SoCal Approach solicited Runway 15 visual approach (probably should have declined being at night). Crew accepted visual approach to Runway 15. We were given a descent to 6;000 ft. and a heading of 200. Turned to a heading of 200; bugged 6;000 ft. on the altitude select but failed to select a descent mode (another mistake). Cleared for the visual approach Runway 15 final at or above 3;000 ft. Crossed the mountains high and had to make a steeper than normal approach with S turns (another mistake). SoCal failed to hand the crew off to Burbank Tower (ATC error). Pilot flying was focused on the descent to get on profile for landing Runway 15. Pilot flying contemplated requesting left traffic for Runway 8 but decided to continue Runway 15 as we were getting on profile (should have requested left traffic to Runway 8). Pilot monitoring stated that a green laser light illuminated the cockpit and was distracted and failed to notice we were not handed off to Tower. Through 1;000 ft. we configured but were not quite stable. At 500 ft. we were stable and on profile. We landed at the 1;000 ft. markers and came to a stop on Runway 15. The pilot flying noticed that the RMU did not have the correct Tower frequency. We established communication with Tower and Tower asked if we saw his light gun signal to clear us for landing. We did; but after the fact as we thought it was a green laser illumination. Total Swiss cheese event that had many opportunities to break the incident chain. We technically landed with a clearance to land Runway 15; but it was unknown at the time of touchdown. Too many events as well as task saturation caused this incident to mature as it did.

EMB-135 Captain reported landing without contacting Tower following a high workload night visual approach to BUR.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 713; Flight Crew Type 575

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

This incident occurred on the FBO ramp.  I was on a volunteer mission for Angel Flight to pick up children and take them to a special camp.  Upon landing; I taxied to the ramp and saw my patients waiting outside. I throttled to idle; set the parking brake; and set the throttle tensioner and did not shut the airplane down.  I quickly exited the plane; loaded the children and got back in the airplane.  The decision not to shut down was based on two valid reasons.  My airplane is extremely difficult to hot start when it has been immediately shut down. I was very concerned about severe weather which was approaching from the west and possibly being stuck [at this airport]. I was comfortable with the existing weather and was trying to leave in a timely and safe manner.  I was also concerned about the perception that the parents might have if I experienced extreme difficulty starting the airplane with their children onboard.  I fully recognize that leaving an airplane; even momentarily; is not without risk but I feel that the parking brake and throttle lock minimizes those risks.  I believe that it was necessary to leave the airplane running and always strive to be a conscientious and safe pilot; especially when doing volunteer Angel Flight missions. I would in most situations shut the engine down; but do not believe that any FAR Regulations require me to do so.  This landing and takeoff was without consequence and no other airplanes were involved. I completed my mission and returned home without incident. I am reporting this incident because an unknown pilot has reported this. He confronted me on the FBO ramp and became very aggressive toward me while I was loading the children.

PA-32 pilot left his engine running to board passengers for an Angel Flight due to concern that the engine was very difficult to restart when warm and weather was approaching the field.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 15600; Flight Crew Type 10800

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

I called Dispatch over 4 hours prior to my departure to share my concerns regarding flying through the Middle East. I wanted to be sure I was not being routed over RANAH on the Turkmenistan/Afghanistan border. I was told by the Dispatcher that RANAH was the planned route. I told her that I wanted to be routed over AMDAR further to the north. I felt the route through Turkmenistan was too close to the Iranian border. Only about 20 miles. I believe that under the current geo-political issues with the region; we should not be using this route. The Dispatcher did agree to change my route. However; I believe company policy should remove the southern route as a dispatch option.

Air carrier Captain requested an amended routing from Dispatch during preflight preparations in order to avoid flying too close to the Iranian border.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy; Aircraft

Upon arrival at aircraft I found that the O2 pressure for the temperature of 32C for 3 people in cockpit was 695 PSI. The pressure gauge for the crew O2 read 700 PSI. This was close enough to the limit for 3 people in the cockpit that I was going to change the O2 bottle for safety reasons. However; with having a restraining order which states that I the AMT can be fined for creating delays I had to re-evaluate whether to change the crew O2 bottle or not. I ended up deferring the decision to the crew chief to avoid the possibility of a fine. The crew chief decided to let the aircraft go with the current pressure. I have been limited by the restraining order imposed by a federal judge to make border line decisions on safety issues due to the threat of a fine being imposed if such decision results in a delay.

Technician reported uncertainty in processes in determining whether or not to replace a crew O2 bottle that was five PSI over the minimum limit due to a restraining order in place.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 1345; Flight Crew Type 306

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While doing takeoff and landings at ZZZ; I had just turned crosswind climbing off of Runway XX; reaching pattern altitude I pushed the nose to level out and saw 4 aircraft coming at me head on. I pitched and turned left since the other aircraft were approaching from the right. They had departed from ZZZ1 which is 2 miles east and also has left traffic to Runway XX because of the close proximity. I was making normal radio position reports in the pattern; I did not hear any radio reports from that formation until after the incident someone said 172 in the pattern say your intentions; I replayed I was staying in the pattern at ZZZ and they should announce their intentions to enter the pattern. I landed and parked the aircraft. I talked to ZZZ1 Tower later and he said he was watching as it happened though he has no control.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC during departure with and aircraft departing an airport in close proximity.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 4500

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While being vectored to airport 9G1; I (as pilot not flying) was monitoring and communicating on the CTAF frequency for the destination airport. I was unable to contact the FBO personnel; but did contact a helicopter; who was parked on the approach end of Runway 35 waiting to depart. Approximately 10 miles east of 9G1; the PIC elected to cancel the IFR portion of the flight and continue VFR. The PIC had briefed a visual approach; backed up electronically with an Omni Bearing Selector (OBS); and landing on Runway 35 based on the calm winds and the position of the drop-off location for the passenger on-board.Approximately five (5) miles east of the airport; I called on CTAF to relay our intentions to the helicopter and confirm his position and intentions. The helicopter said that he was waiting for an IFR release. I responded that we just cancelled with Pittsburg Approach and that he should have his clearance. At this time; the PIC noted the rising terrain west of the airport and that he was going to fly a right traffic pattern for Runway 35 instead of over-flying the airport and enter left-traffic; as previously brief. The helicopter said that he was moving off the runway to the grass area east of the runway so that we may land Runway 35.As we turned south for the right downwind leg; I could see that the helicopter was moving off to the side of the runway. Once turning final; the PIC (pilot-flying) noted that the helicopter was clear of the runway and was continuing to land Runway 35. I made all appropriate downwind; base; and final calls on CTAF and the helicopter called that he was clear of the runway. We landed on Runway 35 with a safe distance between us (aircraft landing) and helicopter (parked in grass.)The issue was with a woman (who never identified herself) who believed that our landing created a safety problem. She questioned me if I contacted the airport prior to landing. I told her that I did try on the CTAF frequency but no one answered; but the helicopter did; and that we were in constant contact with the helicopter. She did not accept this; even when another woman (possibly her assistant) [said] that she did not have the radio.Putting myself as an observer on the ground; I could see how an aircraft landing and a helicopter might seem close; based on the straight line view that they had; and a distorted view of perspective based on relative size and the distance. But the aircraft; and helicopter were in constant contact; both found the landing situation/ distance acceptable.Unidentified observers on the ground; without radios to listen to the aircraft coordination should not make safety decisions after-the-fact.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

A flight crew was in communication with a helicopter that was working in the pattern at the airport where the crew was to land. The helicopter pilot was parked in a grass area next to the runway waiting IFR release. The plane landed. An unidentified woman took exception to the distance between the plane and the helicopter and would not accept explanations.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 75

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 767

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

FO was the PF and Captain was monitoring. An uneventful departure and coast out. IRO took the first break then the FO swapped out. As we settled in for the briefing; the IRO noticed a blue 'Status Message' indication on the EICAS. Pressing the status button revealed R Oil Filter. The Captain and IRO brought out the QRH and began running the QRH checklist for R Oil Filter. The IRO assumed the radios and the Captain assumed control of the aircraft. The FO was brought back up into the observer's seat. The checklist called to retard the throttle until the R OIL FILTER message disappeared or in the event of it not extinguishing; it called for the engine shutdown. The Captain began a slow retardation of the throttle. We were at FL320. The throttle came back and the airspeed began to decrease. The message remained so we decided to call Maintenance Control/Dispatch. We began our Satcom call to Maintenance Control. We came on with dispatch and were patched through maintenance control. Maintenance control initially told us to press on and monitor. We queried him telling him that was not QRH procedure. We were then patched to a 767 Systems Matter Expert on hand. We explained the situation to him and he suggested that we make sure we got the throttle all the way to idle before continuing a full shutdown. At that point we were required to descend to FL240 to be able to maintain airspeed. We requested the altitude descent via CPDLC. ATC queried our descent and ask for the nature of the descent. Asked if we were in an emergency. We explained the situation and were granted FL240. Upon leveling at FL240 we retarded the throttle to idle and the message remained. At this point all parties involved agreed to continue with the shutdown of the right engine. We shut it down via the QRH procedure. We then asked dispatch for our best options to divert. After evaluating the weather and alternates the decision by the company and the Captain was to continue to ZZZZ. We were rerouted via the quickest route possible. The landing by the Captain was uneventful.

B767 flight crew reported shutting down the right engine after observing a right oil filter Status message.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were given vectors to join the 24 right localizer and subsequently received an approach clearance. The aircraft was in the [right] turn to intercept the localizer when we received instructions from the Controller to turn to a heading of 160 degrees. This seemed unusual since it was a left turn and would take us off of the 24 right localizer and cause us to cross the south complex. However due to the volume of traffic and time constraints we read back the clearance and complied. Before the turn was complete a different controller said: 'What are you doing? You are doing the opposite of what we are telling you to do! You're killing us. You flew across the 25's under a descending aircraft.' A few seconds later we received further vectors and a climb clearance. Prior to issuing a second approach clearance the controller asked us if we intended to follow his instructions this time. We complied with all clearances and completed the flight without incident. After some discussion we are still convinced that we were given a 160 degree heading for reasons unknown to us at that moment. We are also convinced that we read back a 160 degree heading. We hypothesized later that what the controller meant to give us was a 260 degree heading because she did not like the intercept picture she saw on her display. This would also explain the second controller's comments about 'Doing the opposite of what we are telling you.' This situation was likely a result of a read back/hear back problem by one of the parties at a critical time in the approach environment. Paying more attention at that time by the errant person(s) would help. Additionally the second controller's comments using non-standard terminology such as; 'What are you doing' you're killing us. Do you intend to follow instructions this time?' caused even more tension and anxiety at a critical time. Instead of effectively communicating the problem by telling us we were assigned a 260 heading and we appeared to be flying a 160 heading or something to that effect; we were left wondering if we had navigation problems that would reoccur on the second approach.

It was a normal SADDIE6 arrival; crossed the SMO VOR then descended to 2;600 FT on a heading of 070 Degrees as per SoCal Approach instructions. About 4 miles past MERCE at 2;600 FT (in IMC in a marine layer during this event) it was here we were given our base turn instruction; heading 180 degrees; maintain 2;600 FT. Then a separate instruction; heading 240 degree intercept the 24R Localizer maintain 2;600 FT. A moment later SoCal stated maintain 2;600 FT cleared for the ILS 24R Approach. Everything was going normal; nothing was confusing nor was the clearance given late. The aircraft started to bank to the right as it was capturing the LOC; it was at that moment another/different controller was heard over the radio stating loudly 'Flight XXXX what are you doing!?' The original controller came back on right away and gave us of a left turn immediately heading 160 degrees. It was at this point when everything fell apart. The other controller then came back on and stated that we are not doing anything we are told to do and gave us a climbing instruction and turned us east where we were eventually put back into line for 24R Approach. The root cause was for this event may have been the assigned heading of 160 degrees. As stated there were 2 different controllers during this event. We were talking with a female controller since downwind to base to localizer intercept. The second controller came on and asked us 'what we were doing?' when we were in the turn intercepting the LOC. We slightly overshot the LOC no more than a half scale deviation but it was NOT full scale deviation and definitely not enough to cause question. I believe that the (male voice) controller did not hear the instruction left turn heading 160 given to us by the female controller because after we leveled on 160 degree heading he got on the radio permanently and began questioning our ability to listen to instructions; to which he added that we were flying south and were 1;000 FT under another aircraft established for 25L. This is evidence that the assigned heading of 160 may have been a mistake by the original SoCal Controller. What followed was him giving us climbing instructions and vectoring us east back into line for 24R all the while slowing other aircraft and complaining that we cannot follow instructions. This made it more confusing to us because we were doing what we were told. The Captain and I heard the same instructions so that added to the confusion. That ATC mindfully listen to pilot's read backs; and [more caution] when there are two controllers working one sector [training]. No matter how familiar a pilot is with a certain airport/airspace; always use due vigilance and it is important to speak in a slow; calm; clear voice especially on a busy night like it was during this event.

Air Carrier flight crew reports being issued a 160 degree heading as they are intercepting the Runway 24R localizer at LAX and complies. This is not what ATC intended and the crew is excoriated for crossing the south complex before being vectored back for another approach.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Closely spaced parallel approach to SFO Runway 28R. Approximately 1/2 mile behind B777 landing 28L. Winds were 250 at 6 Kts. We noted a slight disturbance on the water surface in the Bay from the wake turbulence. It was a gentle progression and we discussed go-around procedures again and elected to continue the approach. At approximately 150 ft; FO noticed slight vibrations in the yoke (not stick shaker). Within one second the aircraft started rolling off to the left approximately 25 to 30 degrees left wing down and a go-around was already initiated at the first sign of roll off. After an approximate 5 kt loss; a go-around was normal. We returned for landing 28L without further incident.

B737 Captain reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence at 150 AGL on approach to SFO Runway 28R from a B777 on the parallel approach to Runway 28L.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 14000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

We were on a visual approach just about to intercept the localizer. I was hand flying the airplane with auto-throttles OFF. Just as we were approaching CHOLA; I observed a pop up TCAS target at 1130 position 500 feet below us in the climb. I notified the First Officer of the target and he reported it to ATC. Simultaneously we got an aggressive RA to Climb; Climb NOW and ATC gave us a traffic alert climb immediately! I went to TOGA (Take Off/Go-Around) thrust from flight idle and began to follow the RA guidance on the VVI. To my and the first officer's surprise; the thrust took 4 to 5 seconds to go to TOGA!!! Recognizing the delay in thrust response; I started a right turn away from the TCAS target to evade the target laterally. The FO reported to ATC we were in a TCAS climb and called for me to keep climbing and confirmed I had TOGA selected. As thrust finally went to TOGA and with the turn away from the target; we began to aggressively climb and the RA conflict resolved. We simply could not believe how long it took for the thrust to go to TOGA! We wrote up the airplane thrust system upon arrival at the gate in DEN. The aircraft was taken out of service to test the thrust system. I called approach and they concurred what data that had at the time indicated we had 200 feet and 1 mile separation.

We were on a vector to intercept the ILS; and had just been cleared for the visual approach to that runway. The captain was hand flying the aircraft; with the autothrust off; the flaps were up; and we were leaving 10;000 feet and descending to 7;000 feet. As we approached CHOLA intersection we saw a TCAS target appear on the ND; at about the 1130 position and about 300 feet below and climbing. The captain remarked about the traffic and I called ATC and advised them of the traffic. We then received a climb command from TCAS. The captain began the TCAS climb; pushing the throttles to TOGA. ATC then directed us to make an immediate climb. I responded that we were executing a TCAS RA climb. With the throttles at TOGA from idle thrust; the power took about 4 to 5 seconds to respond. Because of the lag; the captain also began a turn away from the target. We never acquired the target visually; and it passed below us and continued away from us. We talked with the controller and proceeded to re-intercept the visual approach and landed uneventfully.

A320 flight crew reports receiving a TCAS RA while descending to 7;000 feet with the engines at flight idle. After selecting Takeoff/Go-Around (TOGA) mode to evade; a 4-5 second delay is experienced before TOGA thrust is achieved.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Scheduled flight was a completion test flight of a new Gufstream 650ER by the OEM from ZZZ. Brief; start; and taxi were uneventful. Immediately after takeoff from Runway XX; the PIC experienced a failure of the primary attitude reference and erroneous airspeed and altitude indications in the Heads Up Display (HUD) and the Pilot's Primary Flight Display (PFD). Initial assigned altitude was 3;000 ft. Approaching assigned altitude it became apparent that capturing and holding altitude would be difficult so a block altitude of 3;000 to 5;000 ft. was requested by the copilot and assigned by ZZZ Approach Control. An altitude of approximately 3200 to 3300 ft. was reached prior to ZZZ Approach Control granting the requested block altitude. ZZZ Approach Control vectored us for an uneventful ILS approach to landing on runway XY at ZZZ.

G650 flight crew reported erroneous airspeed and altitude indications after takeoff.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116.6; Flight Crew Total 1055.2; Flight Crew Type 525.1

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

While conducting training; the trainee's brakes fully compressed and airplane veered off of the taxiway into the grass for a brief time. Using the copilot brakes we were able to get back into the taxiway without incident. No damage was found.

Cessna 402 instructor pilot reported a brake system anomaly while taxiing caused the aircraft to briefly depart the paved surface.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Total 2515

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

We received a TCAS RA at roughly 1000 ft. on the visual approach to Runway 27 at SAN. The traffic alert started and I noticed a target off to my 10 o clock at 300 ft. low. Almost immediately after the TA we received a Resolution Advisory. The RA instructed us to 'climb; climb'. This RA was followed by another instruction to 'increase climb; increase climb'. We initiated the climb maneuver immediately after the first instruction and increased our climb after the second instruction. Once we were clear of the conflict we initiated a go-around maneuver. At the point Lindbergh Tower told us to turn left to approximately 220 and climb to 2;500 ft. Tower said she had both us and the conflict traffic in sight and it was no factor. Tower said it was a Navy T-34 landing at North Island NAS. We were vectored back around to another visual approach. After landing the Captain called the Tower to discuss what happened. On speaker phone; we were told this is a known issue and there are multiple traffic alerts due to the traffic pattern flown at North Island. We were told the T-34 wasn't actually a factor; but since it does not have a proper transponder to give our transponder conflict information; our transponder errors on the side of caution and gives us an RA. We were told the traffic pattern at North Island has the aircraft pointed directly at us on our short final while they are on a base turn. So the transponder thinks they are headed directly at us and doesn't realize they will be turning final at North Island before there is a mid-air. I feel this is something we should be advised about. It is not very often that we receive secondary advisories on a TCAS RA. At the time I felt we were very close to a mid-air and it was unsettling to me. If this is in fact all true and the normal procedure; then we should be notified with an ATC traffic advisory or a staggered approach to avoid this from happening.

B737 First Officer reported experiencing a TCAS Resolution Advisory which resulted in a Go-Around from his approach to Runway 27 at San Diego.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 232; Flight Crew Type 9075

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 294; Flight Crew Type 10300

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Our call sign was Air Carrier XYXX. Approximately one hour into the flight at cruise altitude; both the Captain and the First Officer heard ATC clear us to descend to 35;000 feet. The Captain repeated the clearance to ATC and the First Officer set 35;000 feet into the mode control panel and confirmed the new altitude with the Captain before starting the descent. As the aircraft descended through 35;300 feet ATC told us that we had accepted a clearance intended for Air Carrier XXXX and told us to climb back to 36;000 feet. ATC then told us that Air Carrier XXXX was on frequency and had a similar sounding call sign. The rest of the flight and landing was uneventful.

Air carrier flight crew reported taking a clearance intended for a different aircraft with a similar sounding callsign.


Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

We had taxied out for departure to Runway 22 and we were number 3 for departure. We had started the number 2 engine about 5 minutes earlier; and had shut down the APU. As we were waiting we noticed that an aircraft on short final went around and then Tower directed the 2 aircraft ahead of us to go across to the other side of the runway as another aircraft was instructed to go-around. As we moved up; Tower informed us that they were rolling the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) equipment for an APU fire behind us. Thinking that it was on an aircraft behind us we assumed that he would be moving us out of the way also. Tower came back and said that an aircraft behind us saw fire in the tailpipe of our APU and that it wasn't going out and that he thought that we should fire the extinguisher. As we began to process that this was on our aircraft and not a different one; the aircraft behind came on the frequency and advised us that the fire was still burning and that we should fire the extinguisher to try to put it out. We were still somewhat hesitant to just go ahead and fire the extinguisher without any guidance so we quickly took a minute to check the APU page; looked through the QRH; and just shared ideas between the two of us to try and get some sense of direction. By this time; ARFF had surrounded the back of the aircraft and Tower told us to go to the emergency frequency that they were on. Because they were talking to each other; we were not able to make immediate contact with the ARFF personnel but after maybe 30 seconds I was able to contact Truck 1 and asked them to give me an assessment of the situation with our APU. He advised that there was still fire in the tailpipe area of the APU; that it wasn't going out; and that we should fire the APU fire extinguisher to try and get the fire to go out because they didn't want to spray it and blow it back into the APU area. After assessing what had taken place up to this point; assuming that the people outside the aircraft had a better vantage point than we did; and taking into consideration that we had no basis to judge how much fire was too much; we went ahead and fired the APU fire extinguisher bottle which apparently extinguished the fire according to the ARFF people on the ground. After they checked the area for any residual heat with thermal imaging; we taxied down the runway and back to the gate where one more check showed that the situation was under control and that Maintenance could now take over and check out the APU. After giving information to various law enforcement agencies; calling the Chief Pilot's office; Dispatch; and Scheduling; we waited for Maintenance to complete their inspections; and then with the APU on MEL we continued on to our filed destination.We assume that the event occurred because of fire in the tailpipe of the APU that was not extinguishing itself in a reasonable amount of time. If this is a problem that has happened before; there should probably be some guidance to the pilots as to what the cause is and if there is any other way to solve this other than firing the fire extinguisher bottle. Maybe even start the APU to blow it out? There really isn't time to get Maintenance on the phone at that point. Unfortunately; once other aircraft and ARFF are involved you're going back to the gate anyway; but maybe we wouldn't need to fire the extinguisher. As always clear communication is a vital part of any emergency and it seemed to us that we were not getting clear and concise information that the APU fire was on our aircraft at first; and also establishing communication with ARFF seemed to take a little more effort than I would have expected. This is not to be critical of the Tower or ARFF; they both did a great job; just looking at where we can always make improvement in these situations.

The Company and Manufacturers should look at this issue and provide guidance for crews that experience APU tailpipe fires.

While holding short for takeoff; an A320 was informed about an apparent APU tailpipe fire and advised by ARFF and a flight crew parked behind to fire the extinguisher which did put the fire out. The aircraft returned to the gate for maintenance.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

On preflight; First Officer found #1 engine IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) service door open. He observed looking glass for IDG to be empty of fluid. No write up was in book. Maintenance was contacted and responded that they found that the previous shift had started inspection; intended to fill fluid; and then left. Fluid was refilled and door secured. Maintenance Technician responded that only Transport Workers Union techs were now on duty and that the previous techs were International Association of Machinists and had left fluid unserviced. I found this statement rather disturbing.Inattention to detail and lack of documentationFollow maintenance card or document in logbook for next shift.

B737 flight crew reported that the Integrated Drive Generator had not been filled with fluid; resulting in a maintenance action.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 93; Flight Crew Total 23400; Flight Crew Type 162

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was cleared to taxi to Runway 28L via 'Z and Z1'. Using the Jeppesen taxi chart I verified the taxi route and taxied to the runway. Enroute; I noticed what appeared to be an 'IFR' hold short line. Since IFR operations were not in effect I taxied past the line. I was immediately instructed by ground control to stop; and complied.Just prior to takeoff clearance I was given a phone number and directed to call back to the tower after I landed. Upon landing I contacted the tower and was directed to provide my name; address; phone number and certificate number. When I asked if a violation was coming I was told that I 'would probably get a warning letter because this happens all the time'. I suggested that if 'this happens all the time' it is not just a pilot issue but also an airport issue; pilots don't intentionally violate rules. There should be a sign near the hold short line to make it obvious; so pilots don't miss it. The Jeppesen taxi chart does not show a hold short line for taxiway Z1; but does show one for taxiway A1; on the other side of the runway. The hold short line for a1 is a hotspot with an explanation. The same needs to be done for the hold short on taxiway Z1.

EMB500 Captain reported passing the IFR hold short line when IFR operations were not occurring. Once passed the line the Ground Controller told him he would receive a pilot deviation for crossing the line.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Concerning a GPWS event which occurred as we descended toward MDPC. We were in level flight with the TERR button pushed. Nothing was indicated on the screen. We got a Terrain Pull up call. We did it 1.5 G to 5;000 feet and continued on to MDPC for a normal landing.

An A319 Captain reported taking evasive action to an EGPWS alert level at 5;000 feet preparing for an approach to MDPC/PUJ Runway 9. The NAVIGATIONAL TERRAIN Display did not activate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22500; Flight Crew Type 11000

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

On climbout passing about FL260 received ECAM for COMPRESSOR VANE ENGINE 2.  First Officer continued to fly aircraft and handle radios while Captain handled ECAM and pulled out QRH.  The First Officer notified ATC of request to maintain FL290 while coordinating future plans with possible diversion to ZZZ.  ECAM and QRH instructed to disconnect Autothrottles and minimize throttle movements.  Captain called Dispatch and Maintenance Control to discuss problem.  Aircraft was still north of ZZZ about 120 NM when event occurred.  Captain's discussion with Dispatch and Maintenance Control included previous maintenance plans to change the engine later that night in a maintenance base.  Maintenance Control also informed crew of only 1 Maintenance Technician at the destination.  Crew discussion was whether to continue to destination or divert to ZZZ.  After considering all information crew; elected to divert.  First Officer notified ATC and aircraft was given clearance direct to a fix for the arrival to ZZZ.  A turn was begun direct to the fix and a descent began to FL270.  Further clearance was given to FL100 and 250 knots.  On descent with thrust lever 2 approach Idle; Compressor Stall occurred and subsequently Engine 2 was shut down and ECAM completed.  Emergency was declared and approach was continued followed by an uneventful landing.  Aircraft exited the runway and stopped while fire trucks and firemen approached aircraft for inspection.  Inspection showed some fluid leaking from number 2 Engine; with no signs of fire and no excessive temperatures.  Aircraft was cleared to taxi to gate.

On climbout passing FL260; ECAM ENG 2 COMPRESSOR VANE.  Followed ECAM; leveled at FL290.  Engine parameters normal.  Coordination with both Dispatch and Maintenance Control.  Initial thought was to divert to ZZZ.  After initial discussion with Maintenance Control; we looked at continuing to destination.  When told of my aircraft refusal out of destination airport; coordination to divert to ZZZ accomplished and executed.  On arrival when thrust was reduced toward idle; Engine 2 COMPRESSOR stalled.  ECAM commanded Engine 2 shutdown.  Declared emergency with ATC.  Continued with arrival and approach.  No issues through approach; landing; rollout; and taxi.  Met and inspected by emergency personnel.  Cleared to taxi to gate.  Normal shutdown and deplaning.

A320 flight crew on climbout passing FL260 reports receiving ECAM for COMPRESSOR VANE ENGINE 2.  The company wants the crew to continue to destination; then on to maintenance.  The Captain declined and the crew diverted to a suitable alternate.  During descent the engine compressor stalls and the engine is shut down. A single engine landing ensues.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 13000

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

ATC was working multiple frequencies; and was task overloaded. At XA:30 Local time with heavy thunderstorm activity I need to be able to effectively communicate with my Controller. This was not possible today. Controller staffing needs to be returned to a safe level. We deserve that layer of Safety and Service.

Air carrier Captain reported not being able to talk to ATC due to Controller working multiple frequencies and being task overloaded.


Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Multiply bird strikes during takeoff from Mayaguez airport in San Juan Puerto Rico. Cut grass and maintain airfield condition.

Air taxi flight crew reported a bird strike while taking off from MAZ. They indicated that the bird hazard at this airport is significant and needs to be mitigated.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 21000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

About halfway [to] DEN; Salt Lake Center asked us what arrival we would like to fly going into Denver. Feeling confused by the request; we said; 'which ever one works for you.' The Controller wasn't sure; and the one he finally suggested was wrong for aircraft landing south at DEN. We asked if that approach would work for a south flow since it appeared to be for a north flow. He told us that he would just let the next guy; 'Denver' sort it out. We both were stunned at the unsureness of this Controller. At the time we were cleared to GWEDO with no further clearance.The Controller switched us to Denver Center as we approached GWEDO. We explained that we were not given an approach (STAR) to fly into DEN after GWEDO and needed one. The Controller ignored the request. About to cross GWEDO; we told the controller; 'Company at GWEDO needing clearance.' Still no quick reply. When the Controller acknowledged us; he gave us a right turn 90 degrees or more. After the turn; and no information about a plan for us; I asked; 'What's the plan for Company.' He responded; 'I'm going to fly you out another five minutes' or something like that. This was concerning due to the lack of communication; but we did it with no further questions.After what seemed like more than five minutes; he gave us a left turn to 180 degrees or more to the north. I asked him what the plan was for us; and added 'I have never been treated by a Controller this way. We have had numerous clearances given then taken back for our approach; and we just would like to know a plan.' The Controller responded; 'Don't block my frequency.' I responded; 'I'm sorry; but I feel alone up here; just asking for a plan.'As you can tell; he took me to a very frustrating point. I don't like to bother Controllers with questions when they are covered up with traffic; but due to our situation; there comes a point when one-way communication from a Controller is unacceptable. He finally told us to fly direct SKARF and the remainder of the KAILE TWO. Soon after; he handed us off to Approach with no comments. We had no further comments or questions; and the next several frequencies were all professional.This Controller needs help when it gets busy; and it was. I feel they need to be reminded that they live in a 'have a plan environment;' and so do we. If they can't answer a simple question; [it] can end up being a big problem for us due to other concerns such as fuel.

B737-800 Captain reported he had some difficulty getting a clearance for arrival into DEN.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 69; Flight Crew Total 1357; Flight Crew Type 1357

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During cruise flight; the Purser called to advise that the passenger seated in X was not complying with established face mask policy. Per the flight attendants; the passenger was tearing layers of the mask away. The flight attendants offered a new face mask from onboard PPE provisions but the customer refused. The Purser advised multiple de-escalation attempts were made along with the flight deck making a PA.  The Purser advised that non-compliance continued and; ultimately; the operations center was advised. A customer service representative was requested to meet the flight after coordination with the Inflight crew and operations center security. Purser advised that a FA a report would be submitted for this event.

Air carrier Captain reported passenger was not compliant with face mask policy during flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were cruising at FL360 when we felt several jolts coming from what appeared to be the #2 engine. We then encountered what felt like a strong vibration from the right side as well. At almost the same time that this was happening we received a call from the Flight Attendants who reported hearing loud banging coming from the right side of the aircraft. The only indication from the engine instruments that we observed was the N1 on the #2 engine dropping to approximately 54%. I was the Pilot Flying and disengaged the auto throttles and pulled the #2 thrust lever back until the vibration ceased which was when the thrust lever was at idle. The banging and vibration stopped and the engine seemed to have no further problems at idle. I did attempt one time to increase the thrust but felt the vibration return almost immediately; so I returned it to idle. We [advised] ATC and found that ZZZ was the nearest suitable airport. We requested a lower altitude and were given lower and vectors for ZZZ. I continued to fly the aircraft and the Captain ran the appropriate checklists and coordinated with ATC; Dispatch; the Flight Attendants and Passengers. We requested that ARFF meet us on the runway to inspect the engine. I flew a single engine visual approach to Runway XX at ZZZ and backed it up with the ILS. We stopped the aircraft on the runway and set the brakes. The Captain made the PA to remain seated and AARF came and checked the engine for visible damage or fire. None was detected; so we secured the engine and performed a single engine taxi to the gate with AARF in tow. The passengers were able to deplane via jet bridge. I do not think anything other than the maintenance issue caused the event or my role in the event. I do not think that anything can be done to prevent events like this.

After a step climb from FL340 to FL360; shortly after level off; we observed loud banging and some airframe vibration. The FO (First Officer) was the PF (Pilot Flying) and assumed control of the aircraft. Simultaneously we received a call from the Flight Attendants. They reported banging coming from the right hand side of the aircraft near the #2 engine. We observed that the N1 had dropped to around 45-55% on the #2 engine. The Auto throttle was disengaged and the #2 thrust lever was pulled to idle per the checklist. The engine then ran smoothly. It was determined that the vibration and banging returned when the #2 thrust lever was advanced beyond idle. We [requested priority handling] with ATC and requested a lower altitude. We then requested a diversion to ZZZ; the nearest suitable airport. While the FO flew; I completed the necessary checklists; communicated with ATC; the company; the passengers and the flight attendants. We made a visual; single engine approach to Runway XX and stopped the aircraft on the runway. ARFF observed the aircraft and saw no signs of fire or severe damage so we secured the #2 engine and single engine taxied to the gate. Passengers deplaned normally via the jet bridge and we rebooked on a later flight.

Flight Crew reported engine vibration and RPM decay resulted in a diversion and precautionary landing.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our aircraft was pushed onto Taxiway Golf (G) tail east. We requested to taxi via G and N to runway 26R due to light poles on left side of aircraft. Upon taxi out the FO noticed that there is not ample room for the aircraft to pass behind a widebody aircraft parked on the hardstand just right of Terminal 1. I advised the Captain to make a hard left to avoid striking the tail of the widebody aircraft with the right wing of our aircraft. Had the Captain not turned left of center line the right wing would have struck the widebody aircraft. There was approximately 15 feet of overhang from the right wing to the non-movement line. There is simply not enough room for our widebody to pass behind any aircraft when taxiing west on Golf. However; due to light poles on the ramp our aircraft cannot taxi east or south on Golf. I was told they know there is not enough room but the pilots can just taxi far left of center. I informed them of the dangers of doing this. Apparently; if they park our aircraft on the other side of the airport where there is plenty of space; they have issue with catering; fueling; and boarding flights.  I would recommend restricting taxiway Golf (G) to aircraft with shorter wingspan or not allowing another aircraft to park at Terminal 1 if we have a widebody adjacent to it.

Widebody turbojet First Officer reported insufficient room to taxi on Taxiway Golf if there is another aircraft on the hardstand adjacent to Terminal 1 at ONT.


Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Total 6570; Flight Crew Type 5361

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Received phone call from flight dispatch manager after shift about issue with flight I released but was not airborne at the time of my shift end. Flight dispatch manager notified me that flight released with an MEL for Left Recirculation Fan. This MEL restricts the AFT cargo bin from being loaded. Dispatcher who relieved me received phone call from load planning supervisor who notified that the aft cargo bin was loaded in ZZZ. The flight was en route by the time this was discovered. Dispatch notified flight crew of situation and flight dispatch manager. Relief dispatcher also notified me of the event.

MEL in for inop reciprocating fan. There was a second MEL for a inoperable hydraulic pump. First Officer (FO) and I went over the items for flight crew (pilots) for both MEL. It took almost 30 minutes to read the MEL items aloud and discuss all the parameters. During the cruise portion of the flight; dispatch sent a note that the aft cargo compartment was not empty as required by the MEL. On the ground; I did not call load planning and inform them of the restriction. Totally my fault.

B757 flight was released with an MEL for Left Recirculation Fan Inoperative; which restricts the AFT cargo bin from being loaded. Dispatcher received phone call from station's Load Planning Supervisor notifying that the aft cargo bin was had been loaded and the crew advised while en route.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 19300; Flight Crew Type 16500

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 78; Flight Crew Total 7710; Flight Crew Type 5509

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Human Factors

[We were] cleared to taxi to Runway 08 via Taxiway G. On Taxiway E1; called ready and was cleared for takeoff; but I believe we crossed the hold short line prior to takeoff clearance; although we were short of the actual runway. E1 Intersection is designated Hot Spot 1. I called out the hold short line approaching the Runway 12; red lighted hold short sign and the pilot not flying confirmed we were cleared to Runway 08; and I proceeded across. Neither of us saw a marking for Runway 08 hold short. In retrospect; I am thinking the hold short lines for Runway 12 and Runway 08 were perhaps one in the same. If so; this was not clear to either of us. Runway 12 runway lights were off. And there was construction in the Taxiway E1 area. These may have been contributing factors.

Neither of us ever remember seeing an indication that the hold short bars were for both runways. The intersection is very confusing between G and E1.

A flight crew realized that they crossed the common hold short line for ABQ Runways 08/26 and 12/30 on Taxiway E1 after they were cleared to takeoff on Runway 08. The hold line is unexpectedly distant from the Runway.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

This is as most safety reports a combination of events: First management closes three International desks and spreads that workload to remaining dispatchers.  Saturdays are busier than normal but no effort to adjust that today.  Then management assigns domestic on what they thought was an open desk [XX] but that desk was open and they make that domestic dispatcher who showed at XA00 to move off the desk they assigned in error to desk [XX] one and half hours after being here; in that time of moving desk to desk [YY] they received several calls (please note that releases have that desk number on it) so the one remaining international desk [ZZ] has to now answer and transfer the calls to correct desk; while working their new workload which is in beginning of shift and they are also working to remain in control of desk. The Domestic Dispatcher is now rushing to move and reset up and transfer flights between desks; and of course there are several calls and now all desks in international which where reduced by two are forced to help the lone domestic dispatcher with these issues; in addition.  Now that this Dispatcher moved all but one flight was moved that was caught by incoming Dispatcher and moved to the original desk that had it on the domestic side since new Dispatcher was also on a call and still trying to set up their new desk.  The phones kept ringing on wrong desk and the lone Domestic Dispatcher asked for help not knowing that two of the International Dispatchers where already on phone with the Domestic Dispatchers other issues.  I asked the International Dispatcher next to me to get the Chief to lend assistance but they where in the bridge morning meeting discussing the weather and daily assignments.  The International Dispatcher came back to report that Chief was unavailable; and I suggested that the Chief needs to leave that meeting and help domestic dispatcher for they are swamped and bringing down the entire Caribbean team; so the other dispatcher went to Chief and insisted on getting help for domestic dispatch and fortunately there was a Chief in training who came down to answer phones and lend a hand.  The phone calls I took where Flight ABCD time off gate was generated in error and needed to be removed; Flight DAEE was in ZZZ going to ZZZ1 and they where given a ground delay and ATC re-route so then I had to get reroute ensure compliance build that route and verify that we had petrol to accomplish this: I got so in detailed with this issues I did not get time out and I had to ask International Dispatcher to remove that time.  While working on weather briefing and re-route another of the Domestic lines where ringing and all International Dispatchers where on phone so I grabbed the call and placed them on hold to finish re-route but that person hung up and then called.  I advised the captain of Flight DAEE that I would finish re-route after I briefed on weather and send them an ACARS with route and burns; since the Domestic Dispatcher was at this point under water and not coming up.  The Captain said that would be fine and I built his new route while I answered another one of the Domestic Dispatchers phone lines.  This was a flight attendant who once I answered she said they had a medical emergency and needed Medlink!  I asked for flight number while I was still engaged in the re-route for the Domestic Dispatch (placing all my international desk and its duties on lower priority).  The Flight Attendant (FA) was not using proper radio telephone procedure; nor had any patience; to connect to Medlink we need basic info flight number; age; gender; problem or issue but the FA when placed on hold thought they where disconnected and called back but to further aspirate the issue they called the original desk domestic side of room and needed to be transferred to international side of room.  So this one flight and one flight attendant had to be spoken to sternly just to remain on line with Medlink.  Now once Medlink got on lineagain the FA did not provide information had to be extracted by Medlink and that conversation was very difficult because the FA world speak pause and speak not allowing Medlink to speak or speaking over Medlink with the constant live mic one of the mics stuck open and there was a constant hiss in back ground and flight attendant kept telling doctor to speak louder and the doctor was practically yelling; finally the FA said that they could not hear so I ACARS crew to have PIC call in and speak to Medlink; since the doctor on board was saying they needed to land now; the Domestic Dispatcher got that call and remained on line with the Medlink and did divert the flight but this poor planning of management and multiple error caused problems for a international section that was already task saturated due to managements closing of several desk and distributing that international workload.Several failures:  First Management not understanding that it is not the number of flights but the quality of work and the management team has closed desk that was originally planned open based on published schedule.  Second; Management not familiar with work on quad and placed a Domestic Dispatcher on a weekend International desk; third; the decision to move was not well thought or executed and if it was not for another dispatcher an airborne flight would have been left unattended; Forth; placing a domestic dispatcher in an area by themselves with no support of other domestic dispatchers working similar area and familiar with weather; GDP; and ATC initiatives; fifth; only having one chief who was also task saturated; sixth; not having properly training flight attendants on proper radio telephone etiquette and protocol. Stop closing desk; and Staff properly (follow workload committee models numbers and not a number that is not truly representative of the actual work.  Have sector managers that come from ranks of dispatch and fully understand issues on floor or at least have them trained by dispatch instructors who have worked the floor.  Place like dispatchers together i.e. domestic working NE or ZZZ1 or SE together so highest quality of information is properly disseminated to flight crews without taking extra time and further task saturating the other dispatchers and areas.  Have an International Chief and Domestic Chief (or at least two Chiefs; who are current and qualified to better aid floor dispatchers).  Properly train all flight attendants for proper radio telephone etiquette and protocol.

Dispatcher reported staffing issues resulting in being inundated with various tasks and moving from the desk to desk in order try to maintain operational control and communications with their flights.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Observer; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Arriving DFW at night; VMC; approximately 13 miles SW of the airport on a NE heading; descending through 4000 feet (all altitudes MSL); being vectored to a runway 36L intercept just outside of CHARR when we were cleared for a visual approach. First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying and I was the Pilot Monitoring. Shortly after; the aircraft ahead of us announced they were responding to a TCAS RA. This got my attention. I looked down at the Navigation Display and observed a TCAS target approximately 2.5 miles ahead at 3000 feet on what appeared to me to be a converging course. I alerted approach control to the presence of this aircraft and he instructed us to maintain 4000 feet. By this time we were already descending through 3500 feet and as the FO adjusted the flight path we also received a TCAS RA to which the FO responded. Some very long seconds later we received the 'clear of conflict' indications. At the point of the execution of this maneuver the TCAS indicated 200 feet vertical separation and no discernible horizontal separation. We were re-cleared to execute the visual approach to 36L and landed uneventfully. Neither the FO nor I acquired the traffic visually but our jump seater witnessed the aircraft pass 'about' 200 feet below our left wing.At the completion of the Parking checklist I phoned TRACON and spoke with the Manager on Duty (MOD). He had witnessed the incident from TRACON and said that the aircraft involved was an aircraft that had departed an area outlying airport headed westbound and checked in at 2000 feet with a transponder with an inoperative Mode C. According to the MOD; their radar returns indicated 'all zeros;' which I assume means there was no data. About 20 minutes later the MOD called me back and said that after review of their data they had acquired one brief altitude readout that showed his altitude at 2800 feet and climbing as he crossed the 35L localizer about 10 miles south of the airport. By this time they had spoken with the pilot and he swore that he maintained 2000 feet. I believe otherwise.The above narrative includes the facts as I understand them to be. Now for my assessment. This is the closest I have ever come to losing an aircraft in my 40 years of flying. Were it not for TCAS technology; our training and the inexplicable decision on the part of the small aircraft pilot leave a malfunctioning Mode C transponder in the altitude reporting position I am convinced that the outcome would have been very dire indeed. Though I have tried to relay these events as dispassionately as possible; suffice it to say that all of us in the cockpit were shaken. Regardless; my FO handled the situation in a very calm and professional manner and I must also commend his actions for the successful outcome.Several things occur to me. First of all; the aircraft we almost hit was NOT at 2000 feet. As I understand it; the TCAS will not command an RA unless it has valid Mode C data from the other aircraft. We have three independent altitude verifications; two from TCAS indications and one from ground-based radar. We also have the eyewitness account of the jump seat occupant. What was witnessed by the crew of the aircraft in front of us I cannot say.Secondly; a heads-up would have been nice. Why did ATC not alert either crew to the presence of a VFR aircraft transitions the final approach course in such close proximity to the airport; even if they believed it to be 1000 feet below us? I don't know what the consequences would be for a controller if we were to collide with an aircraft for which he was not strictly required to provide separation; but the consequences for my passengers; my crew and myself would be the same were we to collide with any aircraft--IFR or VFR. Finally; why would an aircraft with a malfunctioning transponder be allowed cross 5 final approach paths; at night; in such close proximity to one of the busiest airports in the world at rush hour? This is a max workload environment for us and the chances of seeing a [small aircraft] at night against the backdrop of a major metropolitan environment are slim.It is not my intent to disparage the fine work of our ATC professionals. They do a terrific job. But; as the airspace grows more crowded; there does seem to be a growing disconnect between what is desirous for maximizing traffic flow and the capabilities of our aircraft and crews. I would like to see this incident investigated; in particular; but in the light of what I perceive to be a larger problem--too may airplanes and too little airspace.

Air carrier Captain reported a near-mid-air-collision with a small aircraft during a night VMC approach to DFW.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During cruise at FL320 we got a brief Avionics Smoke indication that lasted approximately 3-5 seconds and extinguished. Following that indication approximately 2 minutes later the indication occurred a second time and remained indicated. We complied with the ECAM and QRH. Despite no visible smoke or smell we treated the indication as a valid indication and donned O2 masks and requested priority handling. We proceeded to ZZZ and landed on RWY XY. Fire trucks found no fire indication and we proceeded to taxi into [the gate]. Maintenance indicated after block in that the aircraft had suffered water intrusion days earlier and that they believed something in the avionics bay possibly shorted out causing the Avionics Smoke indication.

A300 Captain reported an AVIONICS SMOKE alert that lasted 2 minutes during cruise. The Captain requested priority handling to their destination airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 2000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

We were expecting vectors for the RNAV RWY 17 approach into Asheville. We were cleared to ONZIQ; told to cross at 6000; cleared for the approach; and told to report inbound.  We turned inbound over ONZIQ and began our descent. After descending and flying final for a few miles; Approach called and asked us to climb to 8000; which we did.  After some vectors and clearing us for the full RNAV 17 approach; they asked us to call their phone number after landing. I called; and the supervisor told me that we should have flown the full approach instead of flying it as vectors.  I explained that we didn't recall any phraseology that indicated a full approach; and we were simply told to report inbound. He admitted that they probably should have worded it properly like 'cleared full approach' and 'report procedure turn inbound.' He also admitted that since they rarely do full approaches into Asheville; and that the radar issues they were having had them off guard; so to speak. This was indeed my observation; because there were a lot of non-standard ATC phraseology and procedures used today in Asheville by approach control and tower/ground.

Air taxi pilot reported not flying the full approach into AVL as ATC intended due to a poorly worded clearance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Filed flight plan uploaded. DLC (Data Link Communication) departure different/changed from uploaded flight plan. JeppFD-Pro flight plan also denoted change to filed and uploaded flight plan. Safety compromised by DLC not having the same format as PDC as well as the inability to print the DLC.

B737 Captain reported he was concerned that their Data Link departure change message does not have the same format as the predeparture clearance message.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 10.0

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Weather; Staffing

This was the most dangerous I have ever seen air traffic control get in years I have been here. We are very lucky there was not an accident and somebody did not die or get hurt. The day started off with large areas of thunderstorms causing all the aircraft to deviate for weather into one clear area. The controllers worked over two hours; we worked red sectors the entire night. At one point a controller working a sector said he didn't know what was going on. He had a tracker and an assist side and was still red with nothing else to split. Our management as well as TMU (Traffic Management Unit) knew about this weather since the day before from what we were told. One of the TMU Supervisors told a controller that the next day was going to be bad. This sector was pretty much red (over the designated limit of number of airplanes) on the TSD (Traffic Situational Display) all night; with no help from anybody. Another sector was also split and was red and yellow all night. And another was the same red and yellow pretty much the entire night. Our management had no idea how to handle the situation our Supervisors and OM (Operational Manager) are so removed from the area they don't know how to help us on sectors that they are not certified on. Our OM this evening around X o'clock came down to work the row and made the Supervisor plug-in and work a position because at this point if I recall there was nobody on break. We were so saturated this night I don't even remember if I went over two hours. I'm confident I did. I do know that plenty of us did go over 2 hours after the night was over. Around XA:30 I was plugged in working my sector. I had roughly been there for about an hour and a half. I was working the sector by itself and I was working traffic deviating around weather. At this point in the night I was feeling tired and beat down. The sector directly above me with the Supervisor working had a report of severe turbulence at 39000 feet and moderate turbulence at 37000 feet. His aircraft started to descend to prepare to come into my airspace. By this point I was saturated trying to pre plan to get his guys out of the severe and moderate turbulence and to blend them with my traffic. I called the adjacent Center and told the controller I cannot take anymore westbound aircraft. We had a report of severe turbulence and I'm trying to get guys down out of that and I'm saturated. The adjacent Center controller was very combative and was not complying with what I was asking him to do. I tried to get back to working my aircraft and the controller was still coming at me and was just not being helpful. At one point he told me if I'm not gonna take his he's not gonna take mine. The safety event occurred with an aircraft after I asked them to hold them that he ran into my air space at 34;000 feet with no handoff or point out. I had to turn my aircraft that was climbing to 35;000 feet to avoid that aircraft. Action was taken by myself when conflict alert went off with the other traffic. Prior to this after I asked them to hold; I told the OM; I shut Houston off; you need to call the Supervisor; I need to get caught up and I need help now. At one point after that she came behind me and asked me something about my judgment. I responded back to her I cannot take anymore aircraft from the other Center; I need to get my sector under control and get it safe and manageable. Do you want me to take the handoffs and hope I don't have a deal? I was very busy still at this moment. I was trying to get the sector under control. She had no idea what to do I had to prompt her to call the Houston Supervisor again. When I went and I looked back to see what she was doing she was working an Assist for another sector not concerned about my position at all. The adjacent Center did not spin the aircraft when I asked them to; they kept driving them towards my sector and I believe violated me a couple of times. They eventually did start to turn out but it was right on the boundary and was too late. One of the hardest parts was dealing with the other Center controller. He was very upset and I understand we both had a lot of volume. Safety was compromised this night; safety was not a priority. Our traffic management as well as our FAA management knew about this the day before. Please look up and see how the night was ran from X o'clock until X a.m. You will see lack of leadership; safety being completely disregarded. We had no help from our management during this night shift. This was the most dangerous night I have ever seen in years. Very disappointing and scary. We needed help from the beginning of our shift and received no help or direction from our OM. Our Supervisors and our OM's have no idea how certain positions work because they don't have certifications on them. We have some Supervisors who only have one Assist position. How are we expected for a Supervisor with one position to lead us and expect them to know how the area runs? We have Supervisors who react and are not proactive; because they run the area off of the TSD because that's all they know how to do. We don't know the other positions they don't have certifications on.

ZAB Controller reported a shift working sectors alone that were unsafe due to being over-saturated with traffic deviating for weather and the adjacent facility sector allowing airplanes to enter their airspace even though the reporter was not accepting the handoffs and had told the facility they could not accept anymore aircraft.