Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I rushed the take off by adding power before the First Officer could put the heading into the autopilot. The light aircraft (repositioning flight) caused us to climb faster and only added to the stress of the situation. Lastly the 26 hour delay and 5 hour sleep period because our hotel was an hour away did not help the situation.The original departure was scheduled for the day before but with ground stops totaling more than 7 hours we were told at midnight that the flight would be delayed till the next morning. The only hotels scheduling could find were near ZZZ so after much transportation issues our ride arrived 3 hours later and we arrived at our layover hotel at 4:15 am.The next morning we woke up to transportation issues again and made it to the gate around 1:30pm. As the crew and I began our preflight duties; the first class flight attendant noticed the emergency lights had been turned on after we left by the cleaning crew. The emergency battery packs were now dead and the maintenance delay pushed us until 6pm.When the logbook had been signed off; I began looking for our gate agent and not finding a [company] representative until I started making my way to the ticket counter and found a new agent coming on shift prior to exiting security.She helped push us out but as we closed the door she and the Ramp Agents left until we could find a crew 30 minutes later. 26 hours later; our flight from the day before was on its way as a repositioning flight to ZZZ1.I was the pilot flying and as we were cleared for takeoff; Tower gave us a heading to fly of 090 degrees. The First Officer was the pilot monitoring and as the clearance was given I began applying power while he spun the heading knob. He had difficulty with the knob and began asking me what was the heading. As we lifted off and I called for speed and flap commands; the First Officer was behind the airplane so I decided turning the autopilot on would be wise. And in the fatigue of the day I said put it on the heading of 040 they assigned us.Tower sent us over to departure and the First Officer checked in without our heading to which I asked him to tell them our heading. Departure turned us to the 090 heading and queried our recent heading saying there was no traffic conflict but know for next time it was heading us toward ZZZ departures. The controller said there is nothing we need from y'all; you are ok but just make sure next time the heading assigned is flown or if it is heading north east toward ZZZ query the clearance.Next time and every flight to come I will be sure a new heading or altitude assigned while also given the takeoff clearance is put into the autopilot before power is added.

Air carrier Captain reported that time pressure; fatigue; and poor crew coordination resulted in a navigation error on departure.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 30

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was filed IFR. I was unfamiliar with flying into CRG. I had gotten the ATIS for CRG and was anticipating landing on runway 32. Also the actual weather; unlike the ATIS report was more like MVFR There was a lot of traffic in the area with many airports in the Jacksonville area. JAX approach was holding me a bit high and giving me vectors but stated they were 'working on lower'. Eventually I was asked if I had the airport in sight. I was almost on top of the airport; saw an airport with the 'V-shaped' dual runway configuration and a runway that matched the RW32 I was anticipating. Though I thought it was a little early I called the airport in sight for a right downwind to RW 32 and was told to switch to CRG tower. Tower eventually asked again if I had the airport in sight and I told them I was about to make a right turn to base. Tower then asked me my position and I stated that I was south of the airport to which they responded that I was actually north of the airport. I was then told that I was actually looking at JAX. I was given vectors to CRG but due to the haze and being at the base of a 2700' cloud layer I had a hard time picking out the airport. Additionally tower told me I was being vectored for a left downwind to RW14 which didn't make sense to me. Eventually when we called the airport in sight we were actually indeed on left downwind for RW32 and landed uneventfully.I was questioning why I was asked if I had CRG in sight when I was overhead JAX 13nm away because the current visibility would not have allowed it. Lessons learned for me: Though I thought my situational awareness was accurate I was trapped by a situation where two airports with similar looking runway arrangements; in a dense traffic area that I was unfamiliar with was a classic gotcha. Also combined with MVFR conditions with early morning sun angles made it challenging.

Pilot reported misidentifying landing airport due to MVFR weather and sun glare.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 520

While being vectored from the GESSNR One to intercept the 8L localizer; with instructions to maintain an altitude of 3;000 feet MSL; we received a TA indicating a climbing intrusion 500 feet below; approaching from behind and crossing left to right. When the intruding aircraft was 400 feet below I received an RA 'DO NOT DESCEND' at this point I focused my attention to the PFD and anticipated a climb command.However; the intruding aircraft passed and there was no additional RA given and there was no deviation from the assigned flight path.After discussion with colleagues; we concluded that filing a report was not required due to the fact that we did not deviate from our assigned flight path. However; given that the aircraft encroached on our ATC assigned flight path; I felt it might be in the interests of safety to report.

EMB-175 First Officer reported an NMAC on approach to IAH airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Radar 6; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working the airspace that was IMC throughout. I received a GI (General Information message) from the OM (Operations Manager); which was at the time regarding UAS activity at the ZZZ [VOR] 145 [radial] 24 [NM] fix 5;000 ft and below. I used the draw feature on my scope to specifically see where this was and how it affected my airspace. I was already concerned at the idea of UAS in IMC conditions up to 5;000 ft. The area we were notified as being used was about X miles northeast of ZZZ and overlayed fixes named ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 which are IAF's for ZZZ [Airport] and ZZZZZ1 is very commonly used for holding aircraft and inbound aircraft to ZZZ1. The UAS activity also abutted Sector X's airspace. [At] XA:33 weather at ZZZ: XA:17 01003KT 1/2 SM RXX/2000V2400FT FG VV002 02/01. ZZZ1: XB:53 00000KT 1/4SM FG VV002 00/00 A3032. I first alerted the CIC (Controller in Charge) to my concern. Once they saw and realized where it was; they called the OM that issued the NOTAM; who told them to look up the COA (Certificate of Authorization) on the drive. There was no COA to be found regarding UAS at this location.  I talked to ZZZ [TRACON]; who was never notified of this activity except on the landline because of my concern. They pointed out an aircraft holding at ZZZZZ1 at 5;000 ft; I alerted them of the possible activity and they climbed the aircraft to 6;000 ft. Though the OM did not initially seem interested in what the effect on sectors/airspace/ and other facilities had; we continued to press for more information and eventually found that the OM put out an incorrect radial for the UAS activity in question. The actual radial was on the ZZZ 195. This radial still affects traffic at ZZZ and ZZZ2 and abuts Sector X's airspace; who; was still not notified. We (the CIC) eventually did find the COA after a lot of digging on the drive and found some information about chase planes and seemed ambiguous as to the meteorological conditions in which they could operate and whether or not they'd be able to. After reviewing; we don't think they could even operate in this low of weather. The number one thing to prevent this sort of confusion and potentially dangerous situations is to have a manager that is taking these phone calls that understands or even baseline cares about the operation and the impact to safety. Sending out a mistyped GI blocking 5;000 ft and below in hard IMC along approaches and missed approaches; near airports; along MEA's without being able to answer basic questions or express any concern over operational impact shows the slip from safety interests that exist in certain managers practices. Knowing how bad the weather is immediately raised questions for every controller in the room about UAS activity yet it was treated without scrutiny to detail by the Operations manager. The fact that the GI about this possible activity was never passed to ZZZ [Approach] who has IAF's that go through the airspace is a systemic issue and not the first time I've heard of this. As our airspace becomes more congested and UAS becomes more prevalent; their proximity to airspace needs to be looked at with greater scrutiny by those that are taking the calls from the user that the UAS may be active so that all parties are knowledgeable. This situation caused a lot of confusion and luckily we had available altitudes and time on sector to bring more attention to it.

Center Controller reported there was UAS activity in an area near fixed wing aircraft arrivals in conditions of low visibility and ceilings and was concerned about the proximity of the UAS to other aircraft.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working interior mod; the work card to install galley were vague.  The instructions were to install brackets if removed and brackets where not removed; so I N/Aed the step. The FAA found this and made me write an explanation as to why.

Technician reported confusion over steps contained on a work card while installing a galley.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 425; Flight Crew Type 60

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was in the pattern in a C182T practicing touch and goes. During the previous landing I was behind a PA-28. On the upwind of that landing the Tower was switching numerous other aircraft on our runway to the secondary Tower frequency but I did not hear a switch for myself and I don't remember if the PA-28 was switched or not. Due to the smoke and hazy conditions it was hard to keep visual on the aircraft in the pattern; including the PA-28 who I assumed was still in front of me in the pattern. Upon reaching 6300 ft. MSL which is approximately 500 ft. AGL; I began my normal crosswind turn. Upon entering the turn I noticed the PA-28 at my 9 o'clock headed in the downwind; approx. 100 ft. above me and 500 ft. from me horizontally. I widened the crosswind and stopped my climb momentarily to keep this traffic in sight. I also told the Tower on the radio I had visual on the traffic and was trying to stay out of his way; and the Tower replied 'You've been behind him the whole time'. I complied with the Towers instruction to widen the downwind to remain east of the interstate; and after an extended downwind I was then cleared for another uneventful touch and go.I believe the following contributed to this situation:1) My loss in Situational awareness as my head was focused on all of the radio traffic from Tower switching other aircraft and wondering why I wasn't being switched. I believe the Tower might have also lost situational awareness and not asked for the aircraft in front to turn an early enough crosswind and/or me to continue upwind as they had on previous touch and goes prior to this to keep us separated and in line.2) The smoky conditions making it extremely hard to see other traffic against the gray/white background; which could have made it difficult for any of us involved (me; the other pilot; or ATC) to successfully avoid any potential conflict.

Pilot reported taking evasive action to avoid a collision with another aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I am filing this report to call attention to the fact that is engaging in a policy of intimidating its pilots into not using the Company's fatigue policy. One of our Captain's has been suspended purely and solely for calling in fatigued. I am familiar with the facts of the fatigue call; and it is a textbook case of a pilot; concerned with safety; properly applying the Fatigue Policy that the Company pays so much lip service to. Instead of supporting this Captain the Company; in a fit of retribution; has suspended him and is considering termination.As such; this is a blatant case of Company intimidation of not only this particular pilot but all of its pilots. Currently and in the future any pilot who is wrestling with a decision as to whether he or she is too fatigued to safely operate the flight must include as a factor to be considered that if they call in fatigued they are putting their job at risk.Furthermore; this Company intimidation of its pilots over a determination of safety obviously doesn't stop with its refusal to honor its own Fatigue Policy. As I determine whether I'm fit to report for duty; whether I can agree to a too-low fuel load on the release; or whether to accept an aircraft with multiple MEL's; I must consider the personal risk to my continued employment if I make the correct call with regard to safety.Now; as a Captain I am less susceptible to such intimidation than most; but I am extremely concerned with the significant; detrimental safety impact this action by the Company will have. Word gets around. Just how likely is it that a First Officer on probation; with all the last minute call outs and body-clock swapping zone shifts that entails; will have the nerve to call in fatigued -when actually so fatigued it would be unsafe to fly the trip -when they've heard that a Captain has been suspended for a fatigue call?The Company's Fatigue Policy looks great on paper; but it only exists on paper; not in implementation. They are suspending pilots who actually try to do the right thing by calling in fatigued. This renders the Fatigue Policy null and void; and will result in pilots flying fatigued out of fear of Company reprisals.Immediately suspend those managers responsible for attempting to intimidate pilots into not using the Fatigue Policy and thereby compromising the safety of our airline. Retrain them to actually uphold our safety policies rather than using them as window dressing while ignoring them under the guise of 'operational necessity'. If they prove untrainable; terminate them and hire managers who won't push pilot and who will; in fact; carry out the safety policies; rather than using those policies to intimidate pilots.

Air Carrier Captain reported the company is engaged in a policy of intimidating pilots into not using the company's fatigue policy.


Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Company Policy

Beautiful sunny morning with good visibility. Was told to taxi from the to Runway 28 Via Charlie and Bravo. First Officer read it back as stated and correctly. I taxied via Charlie and took a right turn on Bravo One followed by a left on Bravo. The Ground Controller stated we made a wrong turn and I stopped. We sat there for about 25 minutes or so and waited to be released to our destination. Neither the First Officer nor I caught the mistake until [the] Controller told us. I believe the only factor involved was fatigue: Two nights earlier was a reduced rest later PM finish with 8 hours behind the door. I probably slept 6 hours that night. The night previous to this incident was a minimum compensatory 11 hours from duty of which I only slept 3 or 4 hours. I Just could not sleep the night before. More sleep would definitely make me more alert and less apt to make mistakes such as this.

A fatigued CRJ-200 Captain made an error while taxiing on an early morning departure after two nights of poor rest; the first night with reduced rest; the second just poor sleep.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On many aircraft the inflight wifi allows the use of specific messaging applications without buying the internet plan. This is becoming a problem; as more and more people are addicted to their phones. I'm getting tired of reminding first officers that they shouldn't be texting while flying. This isn't a generational thing -- I see it with old people; and I see it with young people. It's a phone addiction thing. Apparently some captains do it too; because the first officers tell me that some captains are okay with it. By allowing this free access; the company is putting those of us who like to follow the rules in an awkward position. Yes I'm the Captain and I have the authority and responsibility to prohibit this unauthorized and unsafe behavior; but I shouldn't have to exercise this authority on a majority of flights. Other pilots should know better. I suspect they do know better; but like I said it's a phone addiction thing. Deviance is being normalized here. The company should solve this problem by turning off free access to text messaging apps on the aircraft wifi. As it currently stands; they're setting us up for failure -- and that could mean a failure in crew communications; or it could mean a failure to fly the airplane.

B757 Captain reported the need to remind pilots it is in violation of the FAR's to text and fly. The Captain suggests the company shut off the free Wi-Fi inflight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165.48; Flight Crew Type 314.00

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

The tug driver told me he was ready for pushback. I told him to stand by while we awaited maintenance paperwork. This delay waiting for the [Maintenance Release] took 5-10 minutes. Once we got the [Maintenance Release] and completed our checklists; we obtained pushback clearance. At this point; I'm supposed to release the brakes and say 'brakes released; cleared to push'. Instead; I asked the tug driver if he was still ready to go. This is non-standard phraseology on my part; but after the delay I wanted to make sure the ramp was still ready to go prior to brake release. It's a good thing I did ask; because I got no response. It turns out there was a shift change; and our pushback crew left. Nobody ever said a word to me. This is exactly the scenario that is never supposed to happen. Having laminated phraseology cards in the tugs does not solve this problem. This challenge/response procedure is faulty; and it could have led to uncommanded aircraft movement. When we got a new pushback crew; they tried to push us with an electric tug; but the tug would not capture the nose wheel properly. The tug driver told me it might be a low battery; so we waited some more while they found a standard tug. Once the standard tug was connected and ramp was ready again; the tug driver told me; 'We had to get a standard tug because we're not qualified to use the electric tug.' I don't fully comprehend what happened here; but if they weren't qualified to use the electric tug why did they try to use it? That's just not acceptable.

B757 Captain reported a number of deviations from SOP during pushback from the gate.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While at FL 350 the flight attendants notified us of a rubber burning smell in the forward cabin . They stated the smell lasted for about one minute. The First Officer went back to the forward cabin area to assess. He did not notice the smell; queried some of the passengers for any input and concerns. There were no ECAM indications showing a problem. We continued on to ZZZ and notified Maintenance.

At FL350; the lead Flight Attendant called the Captain and said she smelled a burning rubber odor. The Captain instructed me to go back to the first class cabin and investigate. After one of the flight attendants came in the flight deck; I went back to the first class cabin and forward main cabin and did not smell anything. I spoke to the first class cabin passengers and they said they did smell a burning rubber odor but it lasted only a minute. I went back to the flight deck and reported back to the Captain. We continued to ZZZ and landed without incident. The Captain spoke to Maintenance and the outbound crew about what happened.

A320 flight crew reported they were notified by the flight attendants of a brief rubber burning" smell during cruise."


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Software and Automation; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

At XA:41z Aircraft X was transferred by ZOA (Oakland Center Oceanic) to cross the FIR (Flight Information Region) into Sector 69. The strips appeared to not have been marked and filed appropriately and as a result the aircraft had no data tag manually entered on the screen to indicate a non radar. The Sector 60 controller did not see the limited tag come in and the pilot (when he reached out via SAT phone much later) reported that he had not received any communication instructions from Oakland and was unable to get a response via CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications) either. The aircraft was in the sector for close to 30 minutes without a code or communications as a result. No loss of separation was apparent.This is a known problem area for both non radar and communications and Data Link often cannot smoothly connect because of the dual ANC Center CPDLC addresses PAZA and PAZN. All of these issues easily led to the Aircraft X not being able to establish contact with ATC. The first issue of 'missing' the non radar strip has been reported several times as a systemic safety hazard.  Work began on correcting with issue in 2018 and a resolution was proposed in November 2020 to isolate the coding (in that area) that already existed within Microearts (Microprocessor Enroute Automated Tracking System) to enable the auto track start functionality when a CPL is received from ZOA.  This would be a visual indicator for the radar team of an incoming non radar aircraft. I do not know the status of the initial ticket; whether it is still pending or not; but should be followed up with automation.The second piece of this is the communication portion. We are unsure why the aircraft did not receive communication instructions via CPDLC from Oakland in this case; but often; depending on where they enter the FIR; the auto contact message for what frequency to use could easily be wrong.  When the aircraft is flying through PAZN and in short succession into PAZA; the automatic NDA tries to send before the aircraft is even 'current' with the first and will not disconnect properly as a result. It could be true in the case of Aircraft X (though this is speculation on my part) that because he was in such close proximity (inside the expanded boundary of the oceanic airspace) that the NDA sent for PAZN first and then PAZA before the contact center message went out and as a result Aircraft X was unable to receive the uplink for comms from ZOA.  If he was then never disconnected manually from the AFN window by the Oakland controller; that link would stay open and not allow Aircraft X to properly switch; which is why he was unable to get any response via his CPDLC request for a VHF frequency because it was 'hung up' behind him.I don't think that this issue will be fixable unless there is an airspace redesign for the 'corner' shared by Oakland; Sector 10; and Sector 68/69 which has also been discussed and presented in the past and I am unsure of the outcome of that at this time.

I was made aware that during the last portion of my shift yesterday working as an A-side on the combined 63/68/69 (sec 68 in this event) there was a aircraft that was filed non-radar coming in from Oakland airspace that I did not recognize and handle as a standard non-radar strip. Later on after I was off sector the aircraft came into our airspace and proceeded for some time unidentified until recognized by another sector. I do not recall handling this aircraft but from the times in the logs the strips appear to have printed within the first few minutes of me getting onto the sector. Due to the nature of our airspace and how non-radars are transferred there is a bit of a trap built into these events if a strips entry fix is not recognized by the A side or whoever may be handling the strips then there is little to no fail safe in identification of an aircraft after they cross into the sector. This coupled by the aircraft potentially having not received/following appropriate comm instructions to contact ZAN after crossing their boundary point seems to be potential factor as well.It is my understanding that there has been a potential solution in the works for almost 2 years at this point that the plans and programs group has been in the loop on that would allow for these non radar targets to auto-populate a tag to help identify and draw attention to them when they cross into our airspace. I feel that this would be a great starting point to help alleviate issues like this from happening. Otherwise I will continue to try and pay closer attention to my own shortcomings to prevent my own role in its re-occurrence.

An Anchorage Center Controller reported an aircraft transitioning from Oakland Center non radar airspace flew 30 minutes unidentified into Anchorage Center airspace without communications transfer or flight data information updated. The reporter states a flight strip to indicate the traffic was inbound was missing and several issues with CPDLC connectivity and airspace configuration are a recurring issue in this airspace.


Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Weather

Cleared for the ILS 16R at SEA and established on the LOC; prior to Bugne; SEA Approach Control advised new cleared for the LOC 16R. [GPS] was set-up 'Vectors-to-Final' and #2 Nav set-up to the LOC. I started flipping thru approaches to bring-up the fixes; the weather was bad; faster traffic behind me; using the #2 Nav/DME; I had the field in sight; and continuing to flip thru the approaches to bring-up the fixes. My altitude was then 2;700 feet prior to Bugne (3;200 ft) and then Approach Control advised me to 'Cross Bugne at 2;700 feet.' Then halfway between Bugne and Finka (1;900 feet); the Gilde Slope came alive and I continued to landing.After landing and waiting for clearance to cross 16L; I flipped thru the approaches again; pressed Agane fix and there was what I was trying to get. I can only explain that I had a brain-lock at the worst possible time.

Air taxi pilot reported his confusion during an SEA ILS Runway 16R Approach.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

On departure climbing in icing conditions with engine and airfoil anti-ice on the Captain airspeed and altitude alerted to 40 feet [difference] from First Officer and airspeed 30 kts. [difference]. After a few minutes; alert cleared; and everything was normal up to cruise altitude. Flight continued normal until we descend into icing conditions. Radar showed scattered precipitation and ATC reported turbulence ahead. At 14;000 feet we got into heavy rime ice. Captain airspeed indicator went to zero; autopilot disconnected; FADEC went to alternate all 3 engines; LSAS (Longitudinal Stability Augmentation System) all failed. I started hand flying checking FO (First Officer) and standby instruments; First Officer notified ATC of the failure of our airspeed and altitude due to ice. The First Officer instructions looked to be reliable compared to the standby; so I transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer and assumed Pilot Not Flying duties doing the checklist. After about 10 minutes Captain airspeed and altitude started working again. We were given a speed restriction of 260 kts. or less and to cross intersection ZZZZZ at 14;000 feet and then cross ZZZZZ1 at 12;000 feet. The incident happened just after ZZZZZ. We were not able to make the restriction at ZZZZZ2. I told the FO to stop descent until we were sure of the instrument readings while we were communicating with ATC telling them of our situation. We cross ZZZZZ2 at 13;800 feet about 280 kts. I took control of the aircraft back from the First Officer and continued the arrival and approach via ATC instructions.We were immediately aware of the malfunction. There were multiple alerts and warnings going off when it happened.After landing the mechanics did a CFDS (Centralized Fault Display System) check which showed a MSC (Miscellaneous Systems Controller) failure. Look like the Captain pitot tube was not being heated properly and descending into the icing conditions cause it to become blocked. Immediate corrective action was taken by both me and my First Officer to fly the airplane and contact ATC.

Captain reported that while flying in heavy icing conditions the autopilot disconnected and the airspeed indicator went to zero. Subsequent maintenance inspection determined that a pitot tube was not heating properly and had become blocked.


Air Traffic Control Developmental; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 180; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Touchdown was uneventful. Upon application of the brakes; both pedals were soft. I then pumped and reapplied the brakes only to find the left one was firm and the right went all the way to the floor. As a result; the aircraft swerved off of the runway and through a barbwire fence. I taxied back to the ramp without incident. The damage appeared to be limited to the leading edge of both wings being dented from the impact with the fence posts.I had flown the aircraft on two separate occasions a few days before and the brakes had operated normally.

The pilot of a Piper PA-32 experienced loss of braking system on landing rollout; resulting in a runway excursion and contact with a fence.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 217.78; Flight Crew Type 2185.97

The electrical operation of flight deck door was inoperative and MELd. This required the crew to use the manual pin to lock the door in accordance with both the MEL and the FM. We had a long discussion among the crew about cockpit access in the event of pilot incapacitation. The flight manual has a warning not to use the manual pin unless directed by the MEL. In this case the MEL did direct us to do that. However; I now regret accepting the aircraft. There have been two fatal aircraft accidents that I can remember that have been caused by pilot incapacitation. I understand the necessity of the locking pin in case of door failure after dispatch. I also understand having the MEL in certain cases such as ferry flights. Dispatching the aircraft with that MEL with passengers on board is something that I am no longer comfortable doing.

B757 Captain reported accepting the aircraft with the cockpit door electrical operation inoperative and deferred; but also expressed safety concerns with the conditions.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We we cleared to Line up and wait on Runway 1 and the taxi line and lights made our turn onto J1 very obvious and the only choice.  I looked right into what seemed like a black hole and it appeared to me that this taxiway was the end of the runway; however as soon as we took the runway it became clear that there was still another taxi way at the very end of Runway 1 which I did not see!  We both had our Commercial airport diagram out at the time.  I quickly contacted Tower and they stated 'no problem' and we cleared the runway at taxiway J so as not to be rushed.  The Tower had no issue as they were very busy with arrivals.  We did a 180 turn on Taxiway J and waited for takeoff clearance without further issue.  The third leg of a very long day and the visibility and lack of lighting to taxiway J were poor to nonexistent.  The airport lighting in this area was very poor and even though I was looking towards Taxiway J; it looked like a dead end.  The obvious choice was Taxiway J1 which seemed like the only path to the runway end.  Tower did not specify which taxiway to take and had they stated J specifically; we would have stopped and not entered at J1.  I was unfamiliar with the airport and can see how easily this mistake was made.

B737 First Officer reports confusing Taxiway J1 and J at the approach end of Runway 1 at DCA.  Reporter cited fatigue and poor lighting as factors and resulted in entering the runway at J1 instead of J.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were held down at 5;000 feet for traffic while essentially on a left downwind departure. After flying level at 5;000 feet for a couple of minutes we were cleared to climb to 16;000 feet. Once established in the climb and climbing out of 6;000 feet; we were climbing at a rather high rate. As we were established in climb; we received a TCAS TA on traffic at 1 o'clock; which appeared to be converging on us. No sooner than we noticed; we received a 'DESCEND; DESCEND' TCAS RA. I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles while simultaneously idling the thrust levers and pitching down to comply with the RA. Essentially; we went from full climb thrust in a climb at 250 knots below 10;000 feet to needing to descend promptly. That's a pretty dramatic change of aircraft energy state. I saw from the corner of my eye that it appeared to be a twin turboprop. The conflict aircraft passed right over us; most certainly less than 500 feet.  As we were descending in our RA maneuver; ATC warned us to stop climb immediately. We informed him we were responding to TCAS RA already. After the threat aircraft was behind us; we resumed our climb and queried ATC as to why they didn't point out the traffic to us. The Controller said he 'didn't see him and wasn't talking to him.' I found that answer to be strange; but as it turned out; the top of the Class B airspace was below us. We reported the event to Dispatch and the Captain filed an incident report as per the policy. The question I have is whether the ATC can somehow remove VFR targets outside of their airspace band that are squawking VFR and wonder if that's what happened here. The threat aircraft was well within his rights to fly VFR above Class B airspace without talking to ATC; but without TCAS and without Controller pointing out traffic; because they may be 'squelching' VFR traffic outside of Class B; this could have ended really badly especially considering several cloud layers that we encountered. I recently flew an aircraft with TCAS MELed and I'm sure glad this happened when we actually had a functioning TCAS.

Air carrier pilot climbing on departure reported a NMAC with an unidentified VFR aircraft just above the Class B Airspace ceiling. ATC stated they 'did not see' the aircraft so did not issue traffic to the air carrier.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Ramp

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were told to Taxi C - G cross Runway XX to the gate. We contacted ramp and were given taxi to the gate. Our gate was X2 and we made the mistake of picking the wrong alley and started down the odd gate side. We realized our mistake as well as Ramp Control and we asked to go up the next line over and then to the even numbered side gates. We apologized for this and Ramp was pleasant towards us; told us 'Oh you're good; don't worry' allowing us to turn. It was not a busy time on the ground and we had plenty of room to make our turns to get to our gate. There was no safety issue involved but I feel it to be the correct choice in filing this.Contributing factors: I had not touched an airplane in over 1 month and I had not flown as Captain in well over 1.5 months or been to ZZZ in over 2 months; so I was focusing and not splitting attention accordingly I would say. I had my charts open and just misread.We were delayed all day so there was a time pressure.The gate that I was going to next was on the odd numbered side and I think I was thinking of the odd side due to this.I had been sitting in a crash pad for a few days and I believe that the stress of commuting and not being home for over 6 days may have had a factor on my mental state.Things learned: Slow down and read the charts better as well as make sure to properly look at the gate information displayed on the ACARS. It is always OK to ask for help. Never assume one gate vs the other. Not actively working means focus more on the task at hand for degraded skills.

Air carrier pilot reported a ramp incursion and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Ground personnel are being asked to leave their work area; travel in their own vehicle to a random clinic. We are not opposed to being screened but believe the screener should come to us at our place of work. We feel it is unsafe to be placed in an environment that is filled with people who might have serious medical conditions during a pandemic.

Ground employee reported concerns about being sent to a random clinic for screening during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I came into work and knew right away weather was going to be nasty and the volume was going to spike. After working a sector for about an hour and talking with the controller on another sector; I knew the weather was closing over the airspace. I made Management aware. A supervisor was aware as was TMU (Traffic Management Unit) of the situation developing as they had formulated a plan in the form of a TMI (Traffic Management Initiative) to help us out for the night shift since we were short staffed. Again; this was a known situation and would have been briefed to the Operations Manager taking the night shift. The situation was still under control once the day shift left; and apparently this led the Operations Manager to cancel the pending TMI that was put into place to help us because in the Operations Manager's opinion; everything was working still. This is the result of them being woefully unqualified to be an Operations Manager (OM); and their overall negligence in their position.The TMU and the Operations Manager did their jobs in preparing for this shit show; this isn't on them; this is 100% the OM's fault. The OM deliberately created an unsafe situation for the flying public through their incompetence and dereliction of duty or just general negligence; but more about that later. It's a miracle that there wasn't a loss of life. Later; the situation was rapidly spinning out of control as numerous sectors were going red according to the TSD (Traffic Situational Display); and it wasn't just a little red; it was spiking as the holes in the weather were rapidly closing and in so doing forcing all east bound aircraft south. Three other sectors were all red with some in the low to mid 30's of aircraft despite whatever Management claims to the contrary. If they claim otherwise; they're either lying or being deliberately deceptive; more on that later as well. I then remember getting overwhelmed as I was trying to help out my fellow controllers in the adjacent sectors by rerouting and dumping aircraft to miss red sectors.I was doing this because there was a lack of leadership from the OM. I vividly remember our Supervisor asking for guidance and leadership from the OM; to which they simply froze and had no answer to anything; she nervously just ran around with deer in the headlights expressions. Our FLM was left without any support from her; and as a consequence; we as the controllers were left vulnerable as well. It was clear that she didn't have any idea on what to do; so we simply ignored her; the big distraction that she was; and just started dumping and rerouting planes. It got to the point to where there was no other sectors to move the planes into either via route or altitude to avoid other sectors which were simultaneously all red. I told the OM we need to hold aircraft and keep them from entering; and she simply ignored me; so I became more forceful at which point she said no don't hold them. It was clear that we were going to be leaderless from the top the rest of the night; the only thing the OM knows what do is to cut our breaks short whenever they come around which is often hours in situations like these.The OM decided that we were in an emergency situation and decided to make a controller work a shift in excess of 10 hours; an emergency situation created by the OM's own doing. But even with the emergency situation; there wasn't a TMI put out; there wasn't any help until later; as the OM is lethargic in their responses due to their overall lack of abilities in their position as an OM. As the night progressed and we became shorter staffed after all the people that were held over went home; with at least one going over 10 hours on the shift; we actually stayed as busy or worse. I finally got to the point of being able to leave for a break; realizing the lack of empathy and concern for the controllers; I decided to buy pizza for the area so at least everyone would have dinner; and on that break they cut that short as well. There was never any acknowledgment for dinner or fatigue of the controllers. I come back from my shortened break again and opened up a sector during a brief lull in the action only to be overwhelmed again with the aircraft all capped at 27;000 feet and below to alleviate pressure from other sectors. I found myself going red with a seemingly endless flow of aircraft; all screaming about light chop or wanting higher to which the answer was a very professional unable. Finally after about 2-2.5 hours on position; I was able to take a break without leaving a red sector for my fellow controller relieving me. The OM tried to cut short my break again and hold me over to which the answer was unable. The night was a disgraceful nightmare of the OM's own making; it wasn't TMU or the Supervisor's fault; this was the OM's; and this was a known situation well in advance. TMU knew a day ahead of time about this and told us it was going to get nasty.The Operations Manager threw the controllers under the bus and endangered the lives of the flying public in their fear of declaring a staffing TMI. While I don't believe it was intentionally malicious; it was however due to incompetence in my opinion. There is no confidence in her as an OM from the perspectives of us controllers or even her own supervisors who deride her constantly as do we all. The flying public deserves to be safe; the flying public expects to be safe; through her actions; or better yet; lack thereof; she endangered the lives of tens of thousands the flying public. I talked with the controller on another sector; he admitted to not having an idea of what was happening because they were so busy.There is an attempted cover up going on currently; an attempt to down play how dangerous the situation was from the Air Traffic Manager no less. The Air Traffic Manager is attempting to spin the narrative that nothing really happened. For them to try and make that argument as thousands of lives were endangered is ridiculous. The Air Traffic Manager is guilty of gross negligence and needs to be removed. They don't understand their role in helping us keep the public safe. Until there is dramatic change in Management at this Center; this will continue to happen. NORDO aircraft moving through an incredibly busy and complex environment added to an already overwhelming workload. The NORDO aircraft was a direct cause of too much volume combined with weather in the airspace. We wasted precious time trying to find the aircraft. The Center Controller was so overwhelmed that they couldn't even talk to the planes they had. This situation has happened in the past for years; and will continue to happen in the future until the OM's and the air traffic manager are removed and replaced with effective outside leadership. The Center's management culture is inbred in the sense that nobody has any experience in mid to high level management in any serious capacity or time outside the building. All the OM promotions are from in house and as such you get group think; and the same rehashed terrible ideas and hollow promises on how 'this won't ever happen again' there is an unwillingness to issue TMI's to help with staffing; as they won't admit that they have been lying about how bad the situation is out here; and would have to justify how they're issuing staffing TMI's while at the same time promoting CPC's to the management ranks to help their own staffing. Remove the OM from any kind of operational role; give them a position screwing something else up that at least won't get anyone killed. Have the OM write an apology letter to every flight crew and passenger that was endangered; or consider retirementBring in new Management from outside the building and replace some of the OMs we have; OMs that will actually issue TMI's and won't just try and run out the clock for their high 3 until they retire. Promote the competent OMs who actually care and will take positive action in the right direction. We work constant 6 day weeks; our breaks are now being shortened; I'm afraid to declare fatigue; i come to work exhausted and ragged because of the lack of staffing and the way we get hammered with weather and volume. I've thought more and more about resigning and doing something else. Trainees are starting to do the same thing. Nobody at the Center other than the above mentioned OM's cares much. We often start shifts with 6 or 7 controllers and that's with overtime. We start shifts unable to open sectors; and or do training for the trainees. None of this will be admitted to by Local Management or it will be marginalized. This Center operates in a perpetually unsafe and hopeless environment.We need more staffing. We need less managers. Stop promoting from the controller ranks. We need controller incentive pay to get people in the building. We need more funding in general. We need TMI's issued in a timely manner; and more importantly; don't flake out on the issuance of them; trust the data and do your job. We need fatigue mitigation; as in limit hours per month able to work like airline pilots get.

A Center Controller reported decisions by their management to cancel flow restrictions during a shift with busy weather deviations created an unsafe workload for the controllers.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

The First Officer loaded the flight plan and LOC approach in ASE. We verified the PDC on this route as entered correctly. After discussing the flight and weather we decided to fly the visual approach into ASE. He then copied the route and loaded the visual approach into the primary flight plan. As we were doing this we were handed the weight and balance. What we missed was that the SID reloaded and took out two of our fixes between CONNR and DBL when we entered the visual approach. This is a very unusual situation in that the Approach affects the Departure airport SID. When we selected a different approach into ASE it deleted the SID. This is something new that only started when DEN went to the RNAV SID's. Since I don't fly ASE regularly so I missed that the SID got deleted when the visual to ASE was loaded.It would have been better to wait and run the Pre Start check after the FMS is done being loaded.

At the gate loaded the route into FMS as the PDC cleared us. Elected to enter the visual approach into ASE after loading the PDC routing. While enroute ZDV asked us if DEN departure had cleared us direct to DBL vs. our assigned BLDOG WERNR ZAKOR DBL routing. We double checked the PDC and realized what had happened. Center cleared us direct DBL; which is what we were actually flying at the time.The causes were distractions with the weight and balance being delivered immediately after the visual was loaded and our failure to re-verify the route after entering the new approach. The FMS dumping the previously entered routing also contributed to the problem. Always verify any changes made to the FMS routing/programming. If there is a distraction; then; if able; deal with that distraction later and continue the verification. When the Pre-Start checklist is called for; take a moment to double-check the routing; even if we believe that we had done it before.

A flight crew entered the PDC ASE clearance in the FMS then changed the arrival to a visual; but did not they realize until ATC questioned their track that the visual approach programming caused two fixes to drop from the routing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 6540; Flight Crew Type 450

Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6200; Flight Crew Type 400

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While hand flying the TECKY ONE departure out of SJC on a 'climb via the SID' clearance; we received a level off and maintain 6000 feet MSL radio call from NorCal Departure. Upon doing so we reviewed our FMS and saw that rather than continuing a climb to 13;000 feet MSL; we were to level off at an intermediate altitude of 5000 feet MSL at the SPTNS RNAV waypoint. We deviated above the SPTNS altitude constraint. The issue arose from not setting 5000 feet MSL as our initial climb altitude and instead set 13000 feet MSL. We did not use vertical guidance on the SID thereby removing FMS vertical guidance and level off prompts from the flight director. Contributing to the issue was hand flying the aircraft and not selecting vertical guidance (VNAV) as the vertical flight cue. Corrective actions included compliance with ATC instruction; engaging the autopilot and reselecting an intermediate altitude on the altitude preselect system. The erroneous perception was to set 13;000 feet MSL as a top of SID altitude and not anticipate an intermediate altitude level off. The decision to hand fly; without VNAV guidance on a new SID affected human performance in terms of degraded situational awareness. A more thorough SID brief of the TECKY ONE departure would have shown that 5000 feet MSL (like the SJC 9) is the first vertical constraint encountered and not the top of SID altitude of 13;000 feet MSL.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

G550 flight crew reports being cleared via TECKY1 RNAV departure from SJC to maintain 13000 feet. The crew does not notice nor do they enable the aircraft automation to notice an altitude restriction of 5000 feet at SPTNS. ATC assigns a level off at 6000 feet; once 5000 feet is exceeded.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Total 10082; Flight Crew Type 7041

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

On visual approach to 18R at MCO; cleared for the visual approach cross TUFFE at or above 2;500 feet. Between HAMMY and [TUFFE] encountered the wake of the preceding aircraft; approximate altitude loss 300 feet; autopilot disengaged due to the turbulence; crossed TUFFE 300 feet low.

B737-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence from preceding aircraft on approach to Runway 18R at MCO.


Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other; Party2 Maintenance

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Maintenance; Person Ground Personnel

Procedure; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy

A few weeks ago there was a need to get emergency personnel to the A concourse due to an employee injury. Radio communication kept failing to communicate correct location where the accident had happened for the paramedics. I finally had to communicate with emergency personnel where the employee was located. [Few days prior] we were called off the ramp due to lightning in the area. According to Maintenance Control upstairs they called over the airwaves twice to get off the ramp area. The call never came through. [Company X] was not an original tenant at this airport but they have a system in place that works very well to keep their employees safe and off the ramp when need to. [Company Y] at the A concourse also have a proven system that works very well. I work the south side of the terminal at the B concourse and I actually look at the A concourse to see if we are off the ramp since they have an amber light on the roof of the building. Sometimes it take 5 to 10 minute delay to call us off the ramp based on the amber light that I monitor when bad weather rolls out. We talk about this issue all the time in our safety meeting but it appears that no one here can properly address the issue or resolve this ongoing issue that we have had for years. We have had an employee hit by lightning in the past.

Airport personnel reported there is a lack of clear communication procedures at this location when an urgent situation or emergency exists.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I have brought this up before; but feel compelled to do so again. The amount of confusion; caused by similar sounding call signs; I was witness to this past week operating in and out of ZZZ will eventually lead to a violation or mishap. [Company] scheduled at least three flights beginning with 16 (inbound) or 17 (outbound) and ending in 9 to be operating on the same approach control frequency at the same time each and every night. Please I implore you to listen to the tapes and hear the number of times that the wrong aircraft answered an ATC transmission; or missed a call; or that ATC misunderstood an aircraft call. This is an accident waiting to happen and when it does someone will have to answer for it. This issue has been raised for a long time and we will eventually not be able to keeping dodging bullets. I don't fully know the compelling operational reason for this lunacy.Focus on the flight safety concern and not the current scheme's entrenched obstruction to doing the right thing. Listen to the tapes if you doubt the seriousness of this situation. Ask the controllers. Put yourself in the shoes of the flight crew on day five of hub turning with two legs outbound from the AM launch.

A300 Captain reported several similar sounding call signs on the same ATC frequencies repeatedly.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

Landing overrun into the paved stopway area. We were on a stabilized visual approach backed up by the ILS.  Aircraft touched down on speed and in the touchdown zone. Conditions at arrival were clear with variable winds and a clean dry runway. Once nose wheel was lowered to the ground the aircraft immediately darted/veered left and experienced a moderate to severe nose wheel shimmy knocking off the copilots AHRS and Yaw Damper. Crew varied braking and nose wheel pressure to control aircraft and attempt to mitigate the shimmy but it continued all the way until the aircraft came to a stop. At this point; the crew realized the front of the aircraft had entered the stopway area. The stopway area is paved with recessed lighting therefore no damage was done to the aircraft or airport property.

CE750 Captain reports aircraft veering to the left after landing when the nose wheel is lowered to the runway. Aircraft control is maintained but severe shimmy is noted until the aircraft is stopped in the over run. No damage is reported.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 120

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1.4; Flight Crew Total 521; Flight Crew Type 21

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Normal approach; wind out of the south at 3 kts. Pilot with tail wheel endorsement flying his plane made nice 3 point landing; no bounce. On rollout; the plane suddenly veered to the left and the right side of the airplane dropped to the runway. Pilot and I exited airplane.  The right main gear leg was lying beneath the airplane. I think there was a complete mechanical failure of the right main landing gear leg.

I was receiving instruction; we were attempting our first touch and go; uneventful three point landing; upon which the plane turned unexpectantly and violently to the left; right main landing gear collapsed.

Cessna 170 Instructor Pilot and student reported the right main landing gear collapsed after a normal landing.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft

A Ramp Agent brought an electric chair to the 2R door and wanted me to open the door so they could load it onto a catering truck. I explained to him that we do not open the doors from the inside but the caterer could open it from the outside. An Agent Supervisor (a woman in street clothes) came down and insisted that I open the door and I explained again that we do not open doors from the inside. She said that she was calling Inflight [Services].She called me out to the jetway phone and said that when it rang again it would be an Inflight Supervisor. When I answered the Supervisor never asked me what was going on or what the problem was; simply started quoting manual chapters to me. I told her that it is hammered into us all year that we do not open the doors from the inside. She said that I had to open the door. When I objected she said 'SWEETIE I am an Inflight Supervisor.' I then had another Flight Attendant confirm the door was disarmed and I opened it. I was forced to open a door with a large wheelchair sitting in front of the door and leaning out a four story open door with a straight drop to concrete. After I opened the door they discovered that the lift would not even come close to the door opening. Now I was forced to lean out the four story drop again to close the door that should never have been opened. So I had placed myself in danger for nothing.They then did what they should have done in the first place before causing a thirty minute delay and found a way to get it out via the jetway. Our Inflight Manual; section XXXXX says; 'flight attendants are NEVER to open an aircraft door from the inside...that; if there is a problem; they should contact an agent or Maintenance'. If the Inflight Supervisor had asked questions she would have [learned] how dangerous her demands were. If I had bumped the wheelchair in the opening and lost my balance or slipped while reaching outside the aircraft I would have dropped out of the four story opening onto the concrete below and there would have been a dead flight attendant on the tarmac.The Agent Supervisor would not listen to my safety concerns or to other options. The Inflight Supervisor was never interested in knowing what was going on from our safety perspective on the aircraft and never asked any questions about what was happening on the aircraft. They both forced us into putting our own safety in jeopardy for something that was never going to work in the first place. After the flight the woman that owned the chair came and talked to me. When I told her that the Ramp Agent told me that the battery was dead she said that if they had come and asked her she could have told them that [the battery cables] just come loose and she could have come and reconnected it. She was very upset about our treatment of her and her chair. All this happened because both supervisors were not interested in getting all the information before they made decisions and neither gave one moment's concern for the safety of the crew.

An acrimonious exchange resulted when supervisors from passenger boarding and Inflight Service Departments demanded that a Flight Attendant (the reporter) open the A330's 2R cabin level passenger service door from inside the aircraft in direct violation of the company's Flight Attendant's Operations Manual forbidding doing so; the intended reason being to remove a passenger's electric wheel chair from the aircraft to a catering truck and thence to be boarded in cargo. After compelling the Attendant to do so they discovered the lift vehicle intended to remove the chair was unable to access the door opening.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 150

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was carrying too much speed on final and proceeded to float for what I felt like was too long.  My training beat into my head; when in doubt go around so out of an abundance of caution (I thought) I began to execute a go around.  What I failed to realize is the 8 seconds that a turbofan engine takes to spool up so before full power was given my wheels were on the ground and I was slowing.  We sped up and I saw the end of the runway coming too quickly and decided to make the decision to stop the go around and slam on the brakes with very little runway remaining.  We were nearing the end of the runway and to avoid slamming into the large runway lights I turned onto the grass at the last minute and used the dirt to stop us completely.  No damage to the airplane; only some new tires needed.

Pilot flying SF50 Vision Jet departed runway on landing after unstable approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 226; Flight Crew Total 17020; Flight Crew Type 11900

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During takeoff; I noticed that the nose wheel landing gear was louder than normal. Approaching V1; the First Officer and I heard what appeared to be debris hitting the bottom of the fuselage. The aircraft controllability was normal and the liftoff and rotation were normal. We advised Tower we may have left debris on the runway. ATC later relayed to us that tire fragments were found on the runway. I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and they confirmed a suspected; right nose wheel tire failure. We considered all options including our weight; fuel and weather and decided to continue to our destination. I briefed the flight attendants and later the passengers for a normal landing with emergency equipment standing by. I declared an emergency with our destination airport Approach and we were vectored for a visual approach. Gear extension was normal and the touchdown was normal. We cleared the runway and Airport Rescue and Fire Fighter visually inspected the aircraft and we taxied to the gate under our own power. I made a logbook entry for Maintenance.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

During the takeoff roll; a B737 nose wheel vibration and something striking the aircraft belly lead the crew to suspect a nose tire failure which ATC confirmed. So; at their destination an emergency was declared and a normal landing completed.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

First; some background information. My area is currently at a staffing level that affects safety on a daily basis. We consistently do not have enough people to safely staff a shift but are forced to work around it and do our jobs as best we can. Most of us; myself included; are working 6-day workweeks on a regular basis. This week for me was no exception. My first shift of the week; [Day 1]; was short staffed. [Day 2] was even worse. I made two requests for earlier shifts on [Day 2] in order to get more rest on my quick turn; among other reasons; but both were denied. During one rotation; I went over 2 hours on position. I was worn out and burned out. [Day 2] evening I went home and my child was ill. [Day 2] night; I put in a request for one hour of leave for [Day 3] morning in order to help care for my sick child. I didn't sleep well and kept checking web schedule overnight to see if it had been approved.It was addressed around [late]; at which point I was already leaving for work. The request was denied and I was frustrated. Lately it is difficult to maintain family life with the inability to change shifts or get leave. This was just one more example on a heap of hundreds of examples in the last year. I arrived to work and sat on position for about 1 hour and 55 minutes my first round; which did not help to curb my frustrations at the situation. When I got to work; we had two supervisors and both were plugged in. They were using one of our controllers to staff CIC (Controller in Charge). All of this to say that during the time of the event I was distracted by a year's worth of staffing issues; being tired; and my child being sick. I took sector XX at XA:07. I knew when I took the position there were several items needing addressed right away: I had around 7 departures to transition; ZZZ spacing to achieve; a slow TBM needing routing and a climb; a slow ZZZ1 arrival underneath a faster ZZZ2 arrival that needed swapped out; etc. However I didn't have time to address any of this because literally 1 second after I gave my initials; I was told via landline call from [another] sector that they were handing me off a medical emergency aircraft; Aircraft X returning to [Departure airport] and descending to 28;000 feet. The aircraft was in a terrible spot; right on top of a slew of departures. I got control from the sector. At this point; I had trouble coming up with a solid plan whereas usually I would be able to easily make a plan. I attribute this to the aforementioned background influences leading up to this event. Aircraft X checked on and requested a turn for [the Airport]. Because I didn't have a better plan yet; I issued a westbound heading of 250 so the aircraft at least wouldn't be going in the complete opposite direction of [the airport]. I descended the aircraft to 24;000 feet and began coordinating with approach control. My supervisor was aware of the emergency (I believe another sector controller told him). He was standing next to the sector from when I took the handoff on the emergency; until after the event took place; to my knowledge. Aircraft X had an aircraft below him; Aircraft Y; a departure climbing to 21;000 feet. My priority was to get the emergency aircraft lower so I attempted to stop another aircraft; Aircraft Z; at 18;000 feet so that when separation was achieved between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y via the Aircraft X's heading; I could safely descend Aircraft X to 19;000 feet. However; I didn't have communication on Aircraft Z so I had to coordinate yet again and change the plan. I descended Aircraft X to 22;000 feet (he read it back correctly); and handed him off to approach control with their control reference Aircraft Y underneath. I switched communication at XA:11; 4 minutes after taking the position and the handoff on the aircraft. I didn't get a chance to put the new assigned altitude in the data block and by the time I realized it; approach control had the handoff and my workload was too heavy.While this was all going on; the amount of workload for the sector had gotten to a crazy level and I remember wondering why the Supervisor didn't give me an assist Controller to do all the coordinating I was doing; but I didn't have a moment to stop and ask. Especially because while I was trying to keep airplanes separated and manage the sector; the Supervisor was in my other ear continually asking me questions and trying to get me to get more information about the emergency from the pilot. I truly felt like I didn't have a second to spare; and I got the information I could and then switched the Aircraft X to approach control.The Supervisor had been bugging me to ask if the passenger was a male or a female and at that point; I just couldn't handle any more distractions so I switched the aircraft thinking approach control could get more information when there was time; whereas I didn't have the time. I was frustrated at the Supervisor for adding a distraction of persistent questioning when really I needed help; but I tried to push past this and continue to do my job. Just before the event; the complexity of the sector involved: multiple aircraft checking on and stepping on each other; a ZZZ1 departure in confliction with ZZZ1 arrivals; a ZZZ1 arrival in confliction with an ZZZ2 arrival and another faster ZZZ1 arrival behind; and other aircraft needing attention. I remember seeing the Aircraft X data block reflecting the aircraft being at 22;000 feet; the assigned altitude. At XA:11:58 the AIRCRAFT X showed a hit of 21300 feet. I saw this hit a few seconds later. At this time the AIRCRAFT X was 1.78 miles and 300 feet from the Aircraft Y according to replay. At the time just before this hit; I had 4-6 aircraft checking on at once and a phone call that I was attempting to sort out. My brain when it saw the first hit did not comprehend what it was showing. I irrationally thought maybe it was a bad hit or maybe approach control was using visual separation (yes I know this is not possible at this altitude; but as I said; my initial thoughts were irrational). While my brain was trying to process what I was seeing; I switched an aircraft to another frequency; kind of on auto-pilot. Around 5 seconds after I noticed the first hit; the second hit showed the Aircraft X at 20;600 feet and that's when it hit me that the aircraft was actually descending. On this hit; the aircraft were .72 miles and 400 feet according to Falcon. It bothers me that it took me those 5 seconds to process the event. I should have called traffic immediately to the Aircraft Y. By the time I had processed; it was too late and the Aircraft X was already showing 400 feet below the Aircraft Y and in a rapid descent. I called approach control to ask what the AIRCRAFT X was doing and the controller said the Aircraft X said he had been assigned 20;000 feet; which was not the case according to the replay review. At the time of the event; I was looking at approximately 20 data blocks on my scope. After the event took place; The Supervisor who had witnessed the event; asked if I wanted to be pulled off position. This was well-intentioned but yet another distraction. I was too busy to give the sector to another controller for about 10 more minutes; when I was more caught up and could give a position relief briefing. The Supervisor  reviewed the replay with me afterwards. He said they would be asking him why there was no Assist Controller and he wanted me to agree with him that the sector had not been busy and that I hadn't needed one until the event and by that time it was too late; or something to that effect. I couldn't agree with him; but I don't know if he would have gotten one there in time had I had the chance to ask for one; as the whole event occurred in less than 5 minutes after taking the position.We need better staffing. We need more overtime budget allowed because every day we have less staffing than we can safely manage in our area and are told thatmore controllers will not be called in on overtime. We need supervisors that can recognize a bad situation and staff the sectors appropriately. We need less time on position so we are not constantly burned out and fatigued. As for me; I need to recognize better when I'm not as rested as I could be. I need to take the time to ask for an Assist when things get critical. I need to remember to issue a safety alert. I need to not let distractions get in the way of doing my job. I am haunted by this event and will take many lessons from it. I don't know or understand why TCAS didn't go off for the Aircraft Y. That is supposed to be our fail-safe. I don't know if it went off for the Aircraft X. I don't remember if Conflict Alert activated.

Center Controller reported an aircraft descended through its assigned altitude which resulted in an NMAC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 6198

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 227; Flight Crew Total 12371; Flight Crew Type 10620

Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Approximately 3 hours into flight passenger became acutely ill with bladder pain. Onboard medical doctor diagnosed patient to be suffering from obstructed bladder. After multiple attempts to insert catheter failed doctor insisted patient would need immediate hospitalization or risk renal failure. After conferring with medlink and dispatch decision was made to divert to Anchorage international. Captain advised flying crew to [advise] Edmonton ATC and request clearance to ANC. Clearance received was direct to TIBOY then ANC. Due to distance to TIBOY being almost 700 miles the fix was not visible on navigation screen. When FO proceeded to clean up original route to PVG along with new route discontinuities by using the divert now prompt; we believe TIBOY fix was inadvertently erased. No course changes were noted due to fact that Direct ANC was very close to the same direction. Other FO on duty was coordinating with dispatch for fuel dump necessity as well as communicating with Captain who was already in cabin when decision was made to divert. No problems were noted until approaching Anchorage FIR. ATC asked flight crew what route they were assigned from Edmonton ATC and Captain; who was now back on the flight deck replied we are on a direct to ANC as had been requested. ATC noted there was a discrepancy and route deviation and requested a phone call once on the ground. Call to ATC was made shortly after blocking in and ill passenger was removed. ATC informed Captain that no loss of separation had occurred and they would be filing a report and requested we inform them on our report as well.

B777 flight crew reported a passenger became ill while on an international flight. A diversion was requested and; with the exception of a minor route deviation; successfully executed.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Minimum Fuel Declared to ATC requesting Priority Handling: Weather enroute and in destination was planned for with an additional 12;200 LBS of fuel. Enroute we experienced no deviations and arrived at TOD with slightly less than 1;000 LBS below planned fuel. We were given descent to cross XXXXX Intersection at 9;000 FT. At XXXXX we were slowed to 210 KTS which required slats extend. Then we were told to expect a track 40 NM south of the airport and a 30 NM final for landing south. At that time we had 36;000 LBS Fuel On Board.I calculated bingo fuel and timing; we had plenty of fuel to make the 200 mile track for landing. ATC continued to descend and slow us. We were given 170 KTS about 120 NM track to landing which we refused so we didn't have to add flaps. 10 minutes prior to our Bingo Fuel we advised ATC of Minimum Fuel State. They made no changes in our placement (about 7th for landing) or track. During this time we started getting tank pump low pressure warnings (all 3 tanks by landing); we had a 2;400 LBS imbalance in tanks 1 and 3; and we had 800 LBS not accessible in tail and auxiliary (due deck angle); and communication with company flight control.We continued on final; past our 'padded' bingo fuel; and landed. We cleared the runway with approximately 20;000 LBS and parked with 19;500 LBS after burning 16;000 LBS of fuel on arrival.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

During arrival crew received low fuel warnings and declared a minimum fuel emergency.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Climbing through FL240; we smelled a very strong odor of burning. We completed our memory items and asked ATC for a return for smoke in the cockpit. The Flight Attendant also confirmed a burning odor in the cabin. We declared an emergency and made an expedited return. I was the Pilot Not Flying so I ran the Smoke in Cabin/Cockpit QRH. We landed and had the Fire Department inspect the exterior of the aircraft once we were stopped. We also took a firefighter onboard and had him check the cabin area for evidence of fire. After getting the all clear we returned to the gate and deboarded the passengers. Factors: Fatigue from short overnight and early show; crew communication through oxygen masks; expedited air return [with a] high checklist workload.

I was the Pilot Flying on our climb out when we recognized a strong odor of smoke. There were no visible or aural indications of smoke in the cockpit. We executed the immediate action items and checklist and notified ATC of our emergency and desire to return. We called our Flight Attendant and inquired if the smell was also prevalent in the cabin; which it was. He prepared for our landing and we expedited our arrival; landed and the aircraft was met by the Fire Department. After it was determined it was safe to continue to gate we did so and deplaned without further incident. This was a good reminder to slow down even in an emergency with smoke or a fire to ensure everything is done.

EMB145 flight crew experiences a smoke odor in the cockpit with no visible signs or smoke alarms during climbout. The Flight Attendant also reports a strong smoke odor and the crew returns to the departure airport.


Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On vectors to ZZZ in the vicinity of ZZZZZ waypoint cleared to and level at 8;000 ft. Traffic was reported VFR at 7;500 ft. Autopilot was on and we were Alt Hold at 8;000 ft. Never got a visual of the traffic but TCAS showed it 500 ft. below. TCAS momentarily showed traffic at 400 ft. below which triggered a TCAS RA. We disconnected the autopilot and auto throttles and followed the RA climbing approximately 250 ft. Almost immediately TCAS reported clear of traffic. We simultaneously reported the RA to ATC and they also showed us clear of traffic. We then continued our approach. ATC reported the traffic prior to the event and told us to expect lower once clear. It was a light civil that had us in sight but we never got a visual on them. We were coming over the mountains and it is possible thermals might have caused the light civil to momentary climb causing the RA. Our instruments showed us steady at 8;000 ft.

We were cleared for the visual and cleared to land on Runway XXR by Tower. We were descending on profile when Tower reported traffic at our ten o'clock 700 feet below type unknown. I immediately leveled off and went high on the approach and started my scan for the traffic. TCAS also showed the traffic 700 feet below. I finally got a visual on the traffic just before we went over the top of them. The traffic continued north as we were heading west to land on Runway XXR. Because we were clear of the traffic we continued down on the approach now high. We were able to get back on path and make a stable approach to landing.

Flight crew reported a TCAS RA event while on approach.


Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Arriving from ZZZ; myself and the Captain were preparing for an ILS to Runway 12 based on available weather at hand. Once handed off to Approach Control; we were instructed to expect the RNP 30. Given our close proximity to the airport; I scrambled quickly to load the FMS and review the changes. I failed to notice the available IAFs available and was instead hastily looking for one of the IFs in the FMS. Given our plan to conduct a visual approach and use the RNP for guidance; I elected to select 'no approach VIAs' and to add the additional fixes requested by ATC. As we progressed on the approach; we got multiple GPWS alerts while in VMC; including 'pull up.' The Captain discontinued the approach and elected for a go-around followed by the published hold to troubleshoot. We later completed an ILS to Runway 12; circle 30 without event. Thoroughly review approach plate and recognize the appropriate approach VIA option. If needing additional time; request delay vectors.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving multiple GPWS alerts on approach to BZN airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 10000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Upon initial review of our weather package and Dispatch Release; it appeared we were not legal to land at destination based on the weather forecast.   The wind forecast placed us out of limits for a runway that was planned and forecast to be wet-fair.   When I called Dispatch to inquire; I experienced a confrontational Dispatcher and seemingly not sharing any care about my concern for legality.  Only upon my request did he update the forecast.  His new forecast changed the wind speed by a one knot crosswind component and that was enough to make us legal.  I am concerned that I can be presented paperwork that essentially tells me we were not legal to go (but only after a complete review of all the planning material) and the Dispatcher not having any awareness of that.  Then when I sought support; I instead received a confrontational attitude that even later morphed into questioning my judgment if the need to divert was likely (as the weather clearly indicated a higher likelihood than normal).  The Dispatcher also did not express any concern nor acknowledge my concern for being so close to a limit with real safety implications (landing on an icy runway in blowing snow conditions) outside of the legal question.

A B737 Captain questions the legality of forecasted arrival weather. He is met with confrontation and attitude upon contacting the Dispatcher to receive an updated forecast and discuss the paperwork.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 10

While landing on runways at VKX at night; the PAPI on each runway (in this case; Runway 6; but Runway 24 has the same problem) is unreliable. For example; coming on Runway 6 the NOTAM says; 'DCA 03/236 VKX RWY 6 PAPI UNUSABLE 3 DEG LEFT OR RIGHT OF COURSE 1403131725-PERM.' However; there is only one light on the P2L PAPI that changes from White to Red as you get too low. The AIM says there should be two lights. Most pilots at the airport are skeptical of the PAPI; so they don't use it. This 'communal' knowledge tends to work out because the VKX airport is in the DC-FRZ; so there are few (if any) visitors to the airport. However; the NOTAM and maintenance system needs to be upgraded to better disseminate this information.

Small aircraft pilot reports that VKX NOTAM for PAPI lights references unusability beyond three degrees left or right of center; but no mention of lights being out; which there appear to be.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was working the high west departures. Special Use Airspace (SUA) was active 21000 feet to 25000 feet. There was weather in the area mostly to the southeast. There were a lot of reroutes to my sector. Also there were Traffic Management restrictions for 15 Miles in Trail over two of my routes. Normal operations we climb the departures to 23000 feet. When the SUA is active we climb southwest bound departures to 20000 feet until they clear the active airspace. I accidentally climbed Aircraft X to 23000 feet like normal operations. The airspace has not been active in months so it is not a common thing anymore.

PCT Controller reported climbing an aircraft into military special use airspace.


Installation; Inspection; Testing; Work Cards

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) and I were working on checking the adjustment of the door warning targets reference Aircraft Maintenance Manual (M/M) 32-61-32; per paperwork we installed [landing] gear pins and body gear door lock.  Due to hangar bay-3 APU run procedures; we had to stop work and push back plane out of the hangar.  After that; we started the rig check of [proximity] sensor which required to close right wing gear door and check gaps and remove body gear door lock before closing of [right wing gear] door per Maintenance Manual (M/M) 32-00-30 201.  I forgot to remove the [body gear door] lock due to distraction of moving aircraft which resulted in right wing gear door making contact with body gear door lock.

While accomplishing the adjustment of the right wing gear door proximity sensor; reference Maintenance Manual (M/M) 32-61-32; we installed body gear door lock to gain access to upper side of wing door.  In order to raise gear doors; hydraulic system -1 and -4 need to be pressurized which requires the APU to be run.  After repositioning the aircraft to run the APU in the hangar; due to local policy; we then continued our job of checking the sensor adjustment.  When [right wing] gear door was raised and then lowered; damage to aft edge [of right wing door] was noticed due to contact with body gear door lock.  Time constraint was an issue due to aircraft on XB:30pm [departure] routing and XA:00am due on gate time.

Two line mechanics report a B747-400 right wing gear door trailing edge was damaged after making contact with the right wing body gear door lock.  Mechanics were checking the adjustments of the landing gear door proximity warning targets.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Workload; Fatigue; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft; Company Policy

B747-400 L3 COCKPIT WINDOW CRACK AND VINYL DEFORMATION. During preflight; I noticed what appeared to be a crack in the upper right hand corner of cockpit windshield L3. The crack appeared to be .75 inches in length; approximately 1 inch out from the corner. It appeared to have sub-fractures emanating from the main crack. There were also signs of some delamination; but that was not of concern to me. We reported this defect to Maintenance by ACARS and radio. A Mechanic and a Maintenance Supervisor came out and inspected the window. They both determined the crack to be located in one of the fail-safe layers and needed to be replaced. About 30 minutes later; the Mechanic Supervisor returned to tell me that he had inspected the window from the outside and determined it to be a simple deferrable delamination. They offered to let me see it from the outside; to which I agreed. My observation from the outside revealed even more damage to the window than originally observed; some of which could not be seen from the cockpit. There were obvious signs of vinyl deformation at the window edge (pictures to be forwarded to Engineering by email). The Mechanic was adamant that it was a simple delamination but I disagreed; referring him to the Boeing definition of delamination. A delamination is defined by Boeing as being flat; smooth; and with a circular edge. This defect was neither flat; smooth; or with a circular edge. The damage was similar to photographic examples provided by Flight Operations detailing unacceptable window defects. The vinyl deformation visible from the outside of the window also appears to be very similar to what is shown in Boeing Fleet Team Digest 747-400-FTD-56-05001; in which Boeing indicates such a defect requires a window change. My knowledge of window defects is fairly extensive and is the result of my long history as a safety representative and my work as the current Fleet Safety Coordinator. After a good bit of discussion; the Mechanic Supervisor advised me that they would be continuing with replacing the window. It's unfortunate that this defect caused the delay of our flight; but what is more disappointing is that we could have avoided the delay entirely had Maintenance properly inspected the windows prior to departure when the aircraft arrived hours earlier. The window replacement took about 3 hours once the work was started. We arrived in our destination approximately 5 hours late. The Maintenance Supervisor did advise me that he had asked a Mechanic to inspect the cockpit windows prior to our arrival at the cockpit. However; the Mechanic performing the inspection failed to note the defect. It is my experience that; generally speaking; our mechanics do not have a good grasp on what constitute's notable window defects or what is contained in the Maintenance Manual with respect to cockpit windows. On many occasions; I have had mechanics attempt to defer or simply brush off NOGO window defects. In one recent situation; both the Mechanic and the Mechanic Supervisor attempted to defer a NOGO window until a Line Engineer from the Maintenance Base advised them of its NOGO status. Problem with the crew desk; crew rest rooms not offered I made several calls to Operations to try to find out when the flight would depart. I was concerned about a lengthy delay and its potential detrimental effect on fatigue. Our original departure was supposed to be at noon; with a crew check-in of two hours prior. I could not get any information from Operations. They kept saying that they would get back to me; which didn't happen. I tried to call the crew desk several times but my calls went unanswered. Finally; I was able to contact the crew desk who informed me that they had posted a departure; some 4:43 minutes late. My crew would now be pushing 19 hours on duty. This; to me; appeared to be an intentional act by the crew desk to avoid having to give us hotel rooms for the over 5 hour delay prior to an 11 hour-plus flight; with our dutyperiod exceeding 19:30. We should have been offered crew rest rooms immediately when the crew desk knew that this would be a lengthy delay or when the new departure time was posted.

A B747 Captain discovered a delaminated L3 cockpit window during his preflight which Maintenance reluctantly changed causing a nearly five hour departure delay.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Passenger came on the plane with mask but then when he was seated he took it off. I made an announcement about airline policy to wear a mask on the plane. Passenger didn't comply; I went over and asked him why he wasn't wearing a mask; he said that he had a medical condition and that he didn't have to. I looked at the manifest on my device; there was no notification about his medical condition. I asked him if he notified our gate agent and he said he talked to them about it; and they said it was OK. When the gate agent came on board I asked her to go talk to the passenger; because she said that no one talked to her about any medical conditions. After gate agent spoke to passenger; she got back to us and said that he claims that he has a medical condition; and that he might have talk to someone about it but it wasn't her. She said that she will make a note about this passengers situation.  Can we please make it clear to the passengers about providing medical documents to gate agents. This is frustrating for flight attendants because we can't force someone to wear a face masks; and we can't take them off flights because he claims he has a medical condition and he can claim discrimination.  I don't know if this passenger has a medical condition or not but there needs to be something done to help flight attendants and gate agents to our job and help our passengers.

Flight attendant reported a passenger was not wearing a COVID-19 mask because he stated that he had a medical condition; but was unable to provide any documentation.