Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I haven't had much experience in the [737-Classic] over the last few months. I realized as soon as we sat down in the airplane that I was making little mistakes; things like arming the LNAV on the ground; forgetting that in the older model aircraft it will disarm at lift off and need to be selected again. It just didn't feel comfortable or familiar.We are on day three of a four-day trip. It was my leg. Approach cleared us direct to the FAF and then subsequently for the visual approach. I had the aircraft navigating direct to the FAF and was using V/S mode to be over the FAF at 1900 ft. Meanwhile; around two miles from the fix; I asked the Captain to lower the landing gear and select flaps 15. My plan was to have LNAV intercept the final approach course; then select VOR/LOC and finally APCH as we crossed the fix. I reached up to select VOR/LOC and nothing happened. I tried APCH and nothing happened. Meanwhile the airspeed continued to decrease. My 'plan' was to have the airplane intercept the glideslope and that would maintain the speed. Unfortunately; the airplane maintained 1900 ft as instructed. By the time I looked back at the airspeed indicator; we were at TARGET but still at flaps 15! I quickly disconnected the automation; lowered the nose; and added quite a bit of thrust while simultaneously asking for flaps 30. About that time; I realized that my switch was still in NAV. I flipped it down to VOR and asked the Captain to arm Approach. The remained of the approach was concluded without incident.This event scared and embarrassed me. It was unacceptable to allow the airplane to get into that energy state especially low to the ground. I take full responsibility for my actions; but I wanted to submit this ASAP to offer the thought that as there are fewer and fewer [737-Classics] in the fleet it should come as no surprise when we don't fly one for several weeks or even months. So when all of a sudden you find yourself in one; it doesn't feel comfortable or familiar. It isn't the lack of screens. I flew round-dial DC9s; 737s; Saabs; and Jetstreams in my previous life. It is the fact that there are subtle differences between the types that are easy to forget about when you haven't flown in a while. My solution would be for our Company to build pairings that are entirely older model or entirely new model aircraft. Don't swap back and forth between types during a single trip. As for me; I'm going to look for some trips with a little more older model flying and reacquaint myself with the type.

B737 First Officer reported mistakes made while flying the B737-Classic after flying only B737-NG aircraft for months.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Type 7273

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

We were cleared to contact Tower over [FIX]; [but I forgot] to switch to Tower. Changing aircraft configuration for landing put us behind the 8-ball due to this being first day in a MAX since its grounding. MAX training conducted in Month. Original aircraft had been -800. Was expecting a MAX at some point in time; but would have been more prepared for differences in flight deck layout had I been aware of short notice change.

We landed without clearance. It was VMC; but windy; approaching at VRef +11. I should have left the automation on a little longer; as I had my hands full with gusty winds and updrafts. The FO didn't contact the Tower as instructed. I was so busy flying the aircraft; I didn't notice until clearing the runway.  In gusty winds; perhaps keeping the autopilot on longer may be a good idea. That way I can monitor the Monitor.

B737 MAX series flight crew reported landing without Tower clearance.  The FO cited MAX series differences as contributing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62.1; Flight Crew Total 538.1; Flight Crew Type 3

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

While cruising at 9;000 MSL on an instrument training flight with a private pilot instrument student we noticed a drop in oil pressure. We kept checking the oil temperature and suspected the oil pressure gauge was inoperative. After several minutes the oil temperature began to rise and we had a drop in engine RPM. The pilot notified Center that we had a rough running engine and requested vectors to the nearest airport. They initially gave us a bearing towards an airport some distance away; but we asked for something nearer our position. They gave us a heading of 240 toward a nearby non-towered airport then handed us off to TRACON. Soon after our engine began to shake and make unusual noises indicating internal damage. The engine soon stopped and we notified ATC of a complete engine failure. The failure happened about 8-9 miles from the airport. ATC lost radar contact with us around 5;000 MSL and advised us to switch to the advisory frequency. We completed S-turns to lose altitude and airspeed and touched down about one fourth of the way down the runway. We came to a stop with approximately one thousand five hundred feet of runway remaining. No damage other than to the engine occurred. In retrospect; I wish we had immediately declared an emergency with ATC while we only had a rough running engine. I let the pilot do the flying; as he has several hundred hours in Canard type aircraft. I made suggestions where I felt they might be needed and helped with landing gear; ATC; etc.

An instructor pilot and his private rated instrument student suffered engine failure in their canard; pusher homebuilt. Their high altitude; 9;000 MSL; at the time of the failure and Center vectors allowed them to glide to and adjust their rate of descent to make a successful landing at the nearest suitable airport with no further damage to the airplane.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174; Flight Crew Type 11000

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While at level cruise at FL340 in a mostly smooth ride; we experienced sudden moderate turbulence with an abrupt right roll to 45 degrees of bank. The autopilot disengaged; and we made manual control inputs to return to level flight. The turbulence lasted for about five seconds. No Passengers or Crew were injured. We reported the event to ATC; but I do not recall if we were talking to Boston or New York ARTCC. The Controller said a [Widebody Transport] had crossed our path about 20 miles in front of us.  He did not mention it because he thought the heavy traffic was far enough away to not be a factor. We were in and out of IMC; so we never saw the [Widebody Transport]. We did have a 60-knot headwind.My recollection of our position [during] the event is vague; but it was near the coast in the Atlantic City to Baltimore area.

Air carrier Captain reported encountering wake turbulence at FL340 when a Widebody Transport aircraft crossed their path 20 miles ahead of them that resulted in an uncommanded 45 degree bank.


Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS DME 1 Runway 05R

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were inbound to MMMX on the AVSAR 1C Arrival between SL359 and SLM when we were given direct MAVEK at 12;000 feet. MAVEK sits between a 9;800 foot mountain to the east and rising terrain up to 13;000 feet to the west. We were in IMC conditions and both had our terrain feature on. The elevation for MMMX is 7;316 feet. This whole scenario happened only a few thousand feet above the ground. While direct MAVEK our heading was approximately 215 degrees. A few miles outside MAVEK ATC gave us a heading of 250. While in the turn we were given a 260 heading and a descent to 11;000 feet. We received a descending right turning RA.The RA was complied with. We now had rising terrain in front of us and just before I told ATC we needed a turn we were given a southbound turn. ATC said to intercept a radial; but he did not give a fix and immediately gave us another heading change. We then received another descending RA and complied. We were given another heading change and a climb. I told ATC that we couldn't climb and had to descend for traffic. Then we got another vector followed by another RA. Once again we complied with the RA.Between the second and third RA; ATC said they had traffic and they didn't know what the traffic was doing. We saw the traffic on TCAS to the right of us. After the third RA ATC said that an (other carrier) aircraft was not following instructions. They said the (other carrier) was now southbound and they gave us a vector south toward the (other carrier) aircraft and we refused the turn toward (other carrier) aircraft. I told ATC (other carrier) aircraft almost hit us three times. All three of these RA events happened during about a two minute time period. With each RA we regained our altitude to maintain terrain clearance. We then received vectors to the north and back around to complete the approach. We landed uneventfully. My First Officer did an amazing job with these RA events.After we landed I called the Approach Facility with the help of the agent. The Approach Controller told me that (other carrier) flight had made several wrong turns and that we did nothing wrong. I asked him if the (other carrier) pilots knew the impact of what they had done and he said no. I think the pilots of (other carrier) need to be made aware of what happened and possibly retrained.

While on the AVSAR 1C Arrival; Mexico City we were cleared direct MAVEK and followed by SMO for the ILS DME 1 Runway 05R approach. Aircraft configuration 180 KIAS; Flaps 5; autopilot on; 12;000 feet; IMC. Just prior MAVEK ATC directed us to turn 250. While in the turn; ATC assigned an updated heading to 260. Prior to reaching the assigned heading we got a descending right RA. After complying with the RA and notifying ATC of it they assigned us another westerly heading. This heading pointed us in the direction of a 13;000 foot mountain to the west of MMMX.As the Captain and I discussed the terrain ATC assigned us a southern heading (I do not recall exact heading) which resulted in a second descending RA and again I complied. ATC told us that there was a plane out there that they did not know what it was doing. At some time during this discussion they gave us what I believe was an easterly heading; which almost immediately resulted in a third RA. After complying with and initiating a climb to the north; ATC once again tried to turn us back to the southeast in the direction of the other aircraft.The Captain advised them that that would put us back in the direction of the other aircraft. We continued north and were vectored around again for the approach. All three RAs happened between 10;000-12;000 feet and within approximately two minutes. In attempting to recall the details of the RA symbology during all this; I thought I saw 00 in red; but can't be 100% certain. After landing the Captain contacted Mexico ATC for an explanation and was told that the (other aircraft) did not comply with instructions.In my opinion; the other aircraft turned in the wrong direction at the IAF. The in trail spacing between the other aircraft and us did not allow for ATC to recognize the mistake and properly vector us. Nor did it allow for our mistake prior to the RA. Increase in trail spacing.

B737 flight crew experienced three separate TCAS RA events within two minutes during the AVSAR 1C Arrival to MMMX.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I entered the ramp from Taxiway E5; established on the center line. Traveling parallel; same direction; in the designated vehicle lane to my left was a large fuel truck. Rate of travel was approximately 10 - 15 mph with my aircraft overtaking. As I approached where the vehicle lane has a T intersection and runs across the taxi line to the parking ramp; the fuel truck took the turn without stopping. As soon as I noticed the vehicle taking the turn; I immediately initiated a stop with foot brake and full engine reverse. The driver noticed my aircraft as soon as he made the turn and also stopped. The fuel truck then reversed to provide wing tip clearance so I could proceed. If I had taken evasive action that involved any turn away from the fuel truck; it is likely that the left wing tip would have been close to; if not impacting the front area of the fuel truck. There was little to no margin. After parking and securing the aircraft; I did talk to the fuel truck driver. He admitted that he did not see my aircraft and that the large fuel trucks have a blind spot on the right hand side; which is where I was in relationship to him. However; he acknowledged that he did not stop to clear the turn. This vehicle roadway and subsequent T intersection does not have any mandatory vehicle stop markings before traveling across the ramp center line. It may be suggested to add markings to reinforce the practice of stopping to clear the turn. I would also suggest that [the truck operator] add larger mirrors or combination of mirrors to address the blind spot issue if they haven't already. Finally; this underscores the necessity of reasonably slow travel speeds for both aircraft and service vehicles for ALL operators. Had either fuel truck or my aircraft been traveling faster; which has been observed in the past; it is very likely a collision would have occurred despite the evasive action taken.

Small Transport pilot reported a near-collision with a fuel truck while taxiing at PDX.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flight ZZZ-ZZZ1 wing A/I fail warning message in moderate ice. [Advised ATC] descended to 9000 ft. to exit ICE conditions.

Captain reported wing anti ice failure in cruise; requiring a descent to exit icing conditions.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 400

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

A possible near miss occurred in the uncontrolled traffic pattern at Ak-Chin RGNL (A39). My aircraft just completed a touch and go off Runway 04 to depart the pattern. I did not hear any traffic entering left downwind so I announced my left crosswind turn to depart the airport traffic pattern at 400-500 feet AGL and well past the departure end of the runway. After doing my 45 degree right turn to depart the pattern; I noticed another aircraft ahead entering an extended down wind leg. I maintained my lower altitude of about 500 ft below the published traffic pattern to avoid any conflict. The other aircraft passed overhead at about 400-500 feet and finally announced his position above me. I was a low wing aircraft and the downwind aircraft was a high wing Cessna so both aircraft maintained sight until passing. No conflict but a learning event for us both. See and avoid and more radio calls if possible when two aircraft are converging.Contributing factors for me was a large flock of bugs hitting my right side of the windscreen hindering my clear vision to my right and ahead. This made it harder for an earlier detection of an aircraft approaching from that angle. I also did not hear any downwind calls from the aircraft ahead to alert me of any possible traffic. If I knew an aircraft was ahead or entering downwind I would fly further upwind before turning for my cross wind departure from the airport and pass will behind any extended downwind aircraft.

GA pilot reported an NMAC departing A39 airport.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was dispatched from my company to serve as Part 135 PIC (Pilot in Command) on board Aircraft X. The aircraft was operating under an existing MEL over a popped Right Transfer Pump Circuit Breaker. The Circuit Breaker was thereby collared. That MEL has a restriction that states that both fuel gauges be operational. However; given there was a flight restriction associated with this MEL; the mechanic who recorded the MEL in to the Record Of Deferred Maintenance (RODM) portion of the aircrafts Daily Maintenance Record (DMR) failed to notate 'Flight Restriction- See Item Remarks' within the Discrepancy portion of the RODM. During my preflight of Aircraft X I checked the RODM and was aware of the MEL; however because I did not see the specific notation 'Flight Restriction- See MEL Item Remarks' I did not take further action to investigate. I departed in Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 where upon climbout I noticed the right fuel indicator operating erratically; varying from normal to below zero and back again. After landing and disembarking crew and patient I called the company on-call mechanic to report the discrepancy. During our conversation I reported there was an existing MEL for the transfer pump. It was decided to MEL the right fuel quantity indicator and then the on call mechanic asked me to call the company Maintenance Control operator to receive a MEL Control Number to use for the writeup. I then called Maintenance Control and discussed the discrepancy and was given the MEL Control Number. I was instructed to make the appropriate write-ups in the DMR (Deferred Maintenance Report) and RODM (Report Of Deferred Maintenance) and then send the Maintenance Control technician photograph copies of both. I did so and received confirmation of his receipt. Within the 'Remarks or Comments' section of the Fuel Quantity Indicators portion of the MEL it specifically states (among other things) that 'Both NO FUEL XFT Annunciators are operative.' I verified the operation of the NO FUEL XFT annunciators by pressing the Annunciator Test Button that illuminates all of the aircraft dashboard annunciators. Indeed both NO FUEL XFR Annunciators did Illuminate/Operate. I would later come to learn during a debrief with my Assistant Chief Pilot that the Right NO FUEL XFR Annunciator should not have been considered Operative since the Right Fuel Transfer Pump Circuit Breaker had been 'collared' by the previous MEL.I then departed Part 91 with my crew back to base ZZZ1 to ZZZ. After my required rest period I dutied back on with a call to Dispatch and then learned that the aircraft was out of service due to improper application of MEL.This Occurrence was 'Self Reported' to the FAA on DATE by our Director of Maintenance after the oncoming pilot performed the aircraft's preflight and discovered the conflict. Fortunately this was the same pilot involved with the initial discovery of the Right Fuel Transfer Pump discrepancy which led to the MEL. As such; he was recently made familiar with that MEL's requirement of operative fuel quantity indicators. A special ferry flight permit was later authorized and the aircraft was repositioned to ZZZ for necessary repairs.Upon reflection and after speaking with my Director of Operations; I realize that instead of relying on the writeup in the RODM; if I had taken the extra time to investigate the previous MEL; I would have been made aware of the MEL's Limitation requiring both fuel quantity indicators to be operative. I would have then known that the aircraft would require maintenance in ZZZ; be unable to apply for the Fuel Quantity Indicator MEL; nor allowed to fly further. Although the 2nd MEL would not apply; I also understand that the Right NO FUEL XFR Annunciator should not have been deemed Operative given the collared Circuit Breaker. However; it seems the MEL wording could make this distinction more clear.The company's General Maintenance Manual makes clear that Right Transfer Pump MEL requires the specific notation 'Flight Restriction- See Item Remarks.' I Believe the failure to make that notation was a link in the chain that led to this unfortunate event. The two maintenance technicians I spoke with on the phone that early morning were aware; or made aware of the existing (and conflicting) MEL. Specifically; as I understand it; it is the job of the Maintenance Control Technician to ensure compliance. Again; missed opportunities. Lastly; I believe the late/early hours of the morning in which this event occurred may have played a factor given the studies involving disrupted circadian rhythms which are an inherent part of our Medivac operation. I deeply regret this occurrence and will increase my diligence to help reduce the chance of something like this happening again.

Pilot reported misidentifying conditions requiring additional log book entries and MEL actions and operating the aircraft.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

ATC changed our arrival to the GUSHR3 and gave us direct to REFYN and a descent. We were several miles from REFYN when ATC asked our speed. We replied 300KTS. Then ATC replied if we knew about the speed note on the arrival and it was 280KTS. I understood that because we were not on a published portion of the arrival due to the direct to REFYN that the speed restriction was not applicable. We had several miles to REFYN and had planned to slow to 280KTS by REFYN as the arrival states to cross at. At that point we slowed to 280KTS and continued the rest of the arrival and landed with no other event.

The captain and I are both unclear about whether the 'descend via mach until 280 KIAS' restriction applies to aircraft that are NOT on a published portion of the arrival. Nearly all of the RNAV arrivals into Houston Intercontinental include this note. The note does not state that it applies to aircraft not on the published route of the arrival. If it does apply to such aircraft; we would like to know where it begins; as Center will occasionally issue substantial direct-to clearances with descents that would have the aircraft at 280 KIAS for an inordinate amount of time if this restriction was applicable. Additionally; if this note does apply to aircraft not on the published arrival route; do other speed restrictions at other fixes apply when vectored off the published arrival route? In essence; are we required or expected to slow when passing abeam a fix with a speed restriction?

EMB-145XR flight crew reported they were advised by ATC of non-compliance with a speed restriction on the GUSHR3 arrival into IAH. The flight crew was confused about the advisory; since they were not on the published arrival; but were cleared direct to a point on the arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Type 3000

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were cleared to land and landed on Runway 33L. Because of very gusty crosswind conditions and a need to control aircraft drift and speed changes; we crossed the threshold five knots fast. Gusts in the flare caused us to float a little and then we landed. We did not feel the need to make Foxtrot while transferring aircraft control and got off expeditiously at Hotel. Tower called and said he planned for us to exit at Foxtrot and we needed to inform him if we were going to Hotel. I replied that landing the aircraft safely precludes me needing to get off at Foxtrot.Yes; 95 percent of the time we make Foxtrot; but Tower needs to understand we fly the aircraft not him. We were not directed at any time (nor asked) to try to make Foxtrot. I do not feel we did wrong; a missed approach was not appropriate or directed. We opted to be conservative and let it roll. I was going to get on the brakes but the Captain said 'let's get off at Hotel'. While we could have made Foxtrot it was not required or necessary. I just want Tower to understand what is safe; is not always convenient.

B737 First Officer reported exiting the runway a bit further down than the Tower Controller was planning on.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

On our climb through approximately FL280 we received a Right Windshield Heat Caution message. I made the decision to have my FO run the simple QRH procedure and the QRH failed to correct the issue. After completion of the checklist; my FO noticed a very large crack running across his windshield and mentioned the QRH for a cracked windshield. I had my FO go ahead with that procedure and upon realizing that the procedure might affect pressurization; we stopped and read ahead. After gaining confidence in the procedure to be done; we proceeded with the procedure and may have done it a bit slow. We quickly received a Cabin ALT warning message and aural alert. That being the case; we immediately donned our oxygen masks and established communication with one another. I then directed my FO to read off the QRC for an expedited descent. We began our descent; and the FO notified ATC of our situation and intentions before the checklist called for it; but jumped back into the QRC as directed. Reaching 10;000 feet; oxygen masks were removed and a PA was made that it was safe to remove oxygen masks. The FO was directed to get weather for our diversion airport as I began setting up for the approach. On initial vectors I called the FA to tell her we had 12 minutes until landing. As I sent for landing data; my FO continued on to the QRH procedure that follows the QRC for expedited descent. He got a few steps in and I instructed him to stop the QRH as we were nearing final approach and were landing.At 500 feet we received a SMOKE TOILET Caution message; and the FO called the FA to ask for visible signs of smoke which there were none. I made a normal landing and fire/rescue personnel were waiting for me as I exited the runway. After clearing the active runway; I set the parking brake and instructed my FA to walk to the lavatory to check for fire or smoke; as fire personnel did an external walk around of the aircraft. After the all clear from the fire personnel and my FA; we taxied to the gate with the escort of the fire department. As we neared the gate; my FA again called and said that it seemed a little smoky now; so I had her again go check the lavatory; as I was certain the smoke and haze was from the oxygen mask deployment. There was no fire or issue. When we were ready to open the main cabin door; the door would not open and the aircraft began to pressurize. We remembered then that the descent QRH had not been finished; and to alleviate the issue I hit the EMER DEPRESS switch. EMS was there and waiting; and they assisted a passenger who was bleeding from a possible sinus/ear issue. After communication with customer service; I deplaned the airplane normally and began communication with the company.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported a cracked windshield in flight. While performing the appropriate checklists; the oxygen masks deployed. A successful landing was accomplished at a diversion airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 4600; Flight Crew Type 1100

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On landing rollout; a gust of wind from the west lifted the right wing and caused the aircraft to weather-vane into the wind. The left wingtip contacted the runway surface; but the aircraft was corrected back onto all 3 wheels before departing the runway surface at a 45 degree angle at approximately 40 MPH. Braking was applied in an attempt to stop the aircraft in the runway shoulder of gravel which is approximately 30 feet wide while avoiding a runway edge light. Braking was limited to ensure the aircraft did not nose over causing the prop to strike the ground. There was no prop strike; but just prior to coming to a stop the right main gear rolled down a steep embankment on the side of the runway. At that point gravity pulled the right wing down causing it to impact the ground. There were no injuries to either occupant. The aircraft was pulled back onto the runway and rolled to the ramp. From a visual inspection by the pilot the damage is limited to the right wing tip; left wing tip and a crack in the plexiglass over the cockpit.The problem arose when insufficient control inputs were applied to counter the unexpected gust from the right. This airport does not have any type of weather reporting other than the wind sock which did not indicate gusty winds on initial overflight or on final approach. The lack of visual or control feel wind indications lead to a perception of calm conditions resulting in a lack of preparation for the gust on landing rollout.

Light utility aircraft pilot reported that a gust of wind on landing resulted in a runway excursion.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Avionics 6; Maintenance Inspector 10; Maintenance Lead Technician 10; Maintenance Technician 16

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A pilot reported that the right side of aircraft was resting low. After performing an X [cylinder] dimension check and referring to the Maintenance Manual; it was determined the left main landing gear strut X [cylinder] dimension was too high and the right main landing gear strut was too low. During the servicing of the right main landing gear strut; the nitrogen depleted to the point that fluid began to escape from the Schrader valve on top of the strut. I noticed the discoloration of the hydraulic fluid (MIL-H-5606) and the fact that it lacked any color of red to it. The fluid that came out was grey and smelled like fuel. Upon identifying the problem; the customer was notified of the findings.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information]

Maintenance personnel report that on several occasions they have found Lear jet landing gear struts serviced with jet fuel rather than hydraulic fluid.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 250

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Around 1100 [feet] my student and I were flying south of Buckhorn Lake and west of JNX practicing maneuvers; when I noticed a moving object at my 1 o'clock. It was pretty close to me on my right at about the same altitude (3;500 ft). The drone was heading North bound towards BuckHorn Lake; at a fast speed. The color of the drone was red and it looked like it had 4 small rotors and that is all I could detect. I made a call on the Johnston County Unicom about the drone and planes in the area evacuated. As soon I landed I called Raleigh approach on the telephone and made the report.

A flight instructor and his student encountered a UAV/Drone while practicing training maneuvers. They announced its presence on a local CTAF and; along with other aircraft in the practice area; departed as a precaution.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

When hooking tow bar up to aircraft at end of check; noticed that the nose landing gear - taxi lights were on dim. Aircraft was on ground service for power. Ground service switch was cycled at lower panel. Taxi lights followed switch. The landing light switch in the cockpit was in the off position. When aircraft power was turned on and taxi light switch turned on; additional circuit breakers popped. Smoked was noticed in the cockpit. Aircraft power was turned off. Ground power plug was pulled and batteries disconnected. Avionics was called for troubleshooting. Damaged wiring was located in the lower aft section of the forward avionics compartment. Damage to wire bundles occurred in feed-through to right pack bay.

While on ground power; a maintenance technician noticed the nose taxi light was dimly illuminated. When aircraft power was applied and the taxi lights selected; several circuit breakers popped and smoked was noticed in the cockpit. Damaged wiring was identified in the avionics compartment.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4949; Flight Crew Type 2154

Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

In preparation for a relocation flight the crew had performed a thorough preflight check of the oxygen system and checked both masks; but then turned the oxygen off to return to the FBO. When we returned to the aircraft to depart; I pulled the oxygen back on; and even checked the position of the handle while running checklists; but did not realize the system was not pulled quite all the way on. While enroute at FL280; approximately 10 minutes into cruise; the passenger oxygen masks dropped in the cabin. The cabin altitude indicated 12;000 ft and the cabin differential was around 5.0 PSI. I did not notice the cabin rate. I attempted to lower the cabin altitude with the altitude control knob; and adjusted the cabin rate controller to no avail. I then chose to attempt to cycle the bleed air valves. I turned the left bleed air valve to Inst and Enviro Off; then back on. At approximately the same time the CAB ALT HI master caution light illuminated (as would be expected with decreased airflow). There was dialog between the crew about feeling hypoxic; and I then realized that my faculties were notably decreased. I felt light headed and on the verge of tunnel vision. I assumed control of the aircraft; began a rapid descent; and [advised ATC]. During the descent the cabin altitude continued to rise. The highest cabin altitude indication that I noticed was 15;000 ft.We began to use oxygen; and the FO pointed out that there was no oxygen flowing (I think that I got the last breath or two of residual oxygen pressure remaining in the system). I saw there was still 1700 PSI oxygen; had received some oxygen; and visually saw that the oxygen handle was on. I was not able to wrap my head around the idea that the handle was not pulled all the way on; and was not able to figure it out until we were level at 10;000 ft. If I had handled the situation better; I would've directed the FO to focus on why there was no oxygen; while I focused on the descent. Regarding my communications with ATC controllers and requested lower. I received multiple step-down altitudes; but should've initially indicated to ATC that I was going to descend to 10;000 ft i.e. my first radio call should've been; 'Aircraft X is descending to 10;000 ft' instead of 'Aircraft X; we need lower'. Regarding CRM issues; we go to safety conferences and train as single pilot operators. I think that we can improve our operation by spending time simulating emergency situations as a crew and more clearly defining expectations of each crew member. The aircraft was safely returned to the departure airport without further incident.

BE20 Captain reported a loss of pressurization at FL280; but the crew could not get oxygen from their masks.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This aircraft's inoperative APU generator was annotated on page one of the [flight plan]. Dispatcher remarked that ZZZ Station was advised and will have ground power at the ready upon arrival.After landing; multiple radio calls were attempted to ZZZ Operations to ensure the station knew this aircraft required ground power be applied before the remaining engine was to be shutdown. No station personnel answered these calls nor did any ZZZ personnel answer telephone calls via a [company] phone patch after the fact. No ZZZ supervisory personnel were available at any time during these events.I taxied in. Ground personnel did not understand any of my repeated visual signals appealing for ground power. The cabin door opened and passengers deplaned after which I opened the cockpit side window and verbally ordered/directed ground personnel to immediately connect ground power and the visual signal received from below was the engine-cut sign. UNBELIEVABLE.The actions of ZZZ Ground personnel exemplified a lack of understanding of basic aircraft ground handling and standard visual signals. Their actions marginalized safety; were uncomfortable and completely avoidable. These actions demonstrate a need for further training and remediation for all ZZZ Ground Support personnel.Contributing factors: these events and events similar while not overly common happen all too often within the narrow-body [company] operation because [our company] outsources station operations. Outsourcing the operation outsources the safety; the quality; the standardization; customer service; and the brand's reputation for good or bad. Being out here on the line; I see a common link in non-standard ground operations and that link is the variability present within the operation due to outsourcing. Of course this is anecdotal; but if you are out in the operation it is reality. All outsourcing operations must either be standardized to [company's] standard or replaced by [company] operators.Lastly; the inability to contact any station supervisory personnel during normal operating hours is completely [unsatisfactory].

A319 Captain reported the ground crew was not aware the APU was inop and did not understand hand signals for connecting ground power to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Filed clearance was DUUKE2.TRM transition. PDC had crew alert ATC routing change to STREL1.TRM. First Officer; who is still on high minimums; folded the PDC and the routing change was not visible when I looked at the PDC so I went along with the DUUKE2. Shortly after takeoff; Departure asked if we were flying the DUUKE2. We replied the affirmative. She said that the DUUKE2 no longer existed and we should have been flying the STREL1. The pilot not flying (First Officer) put it in the box and the pilot flying (Captain); myself; maneuvered to TANGL on the STREL1 departure. The aircraft was never more than a mile off the STREL1 track. Also; when we called for taxi; we told Ground that we were on the DUUKE2.

A B737 departed SNA and ATC questioned if they were flying the cancelled DUUKE2.TRM SID after the First Officer folded the PDC in such a way that masked the revised clearance; STREL1.TRM.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

During cruise flight at FL270 the BLEED LEAK 1 Amber CAS message illuminated. We referred to the QRH checklist and followed it. This checklist led us to donning O2 masks; descending; depressurizing the cabin; and ultimately securing the #1 Engine. We [advised ATC] and asked for a clearance to ZZZ which was at our one o'clock and approximately 40 miles. I requested assistance from the Airport Fire Crew just as a precaution. All handling by ATC went smoothly and we landed on RWY 7 without further incident. After we parked at the FBO; I asked my FO to call the ACP while I talked to the Fire Captain and Airport Security officer who were waiting outside the plane. There is nothing noticed on the preflight that made me think this event would happen. The QRH and QRC checklists had a logical flow that was easy to comply with. All Company SOPs were complied with.

EMB-505 Captain reported diverting to a nearby alternate after a precautionary shutdown of the #1 engine because of a bleed leak.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

I printed and reviewed my DSTG (Departure Staging Guide) and DDLR (Display Departure Load Record) and proceeded to load [a departing flight]. During the process I received a 4 lbs. piece of cargo that had a label that I [was not] accustom. I have been a lead for [many] years and this was the first time I have seen such a small piece without any recognizable labels. After the flight departed it was gate returned because that 4 lbs. piece turned out to be Dangerous Goods. As I mentioned previously; as [an experienced] lead I have never seen this label and thought the DG was in a freight can.The aircraft came back to the gate because there were only 10 securing the 4 lbs. DG box.During the conversation between Cargo and the Ramp it was revealed that technically it is not DG however it was treated as DG; (UN3373 Biological).I am up to date on my training and consider myself very professional and efficient as a Lead. Dangerous Goods labeling should always be clear and obvious to prevent any oversight. As per the [our company manuals].

Ramp Lead Supervisor reported an aircraft ground return due to incorrect transport configuration of Hazmat cargo.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 191; Flight Crew Type 191

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The conditions were clear; it was night and VMC; and the ramp was dry.  After arrival; there was an aircraft at our gate.  This aircraft needed to be towed off the gate and we waited nearly abeam the gate on the taxiway.   After the aircraft departed the gate; we were cleared into the ramp by Tower Control.  The number two engine was shut down in accordance with the FOM.  Upon lining up for the lead in line for the gate; both the Captain and I visually cleared the safety zone; which was clear; and verbally confirmed this with one another in accordance with the FOM prior to entering the zone.  The Marshaller had the proper wands and cleared us in.  After the brake was set; as the jetway pulled up to the aircraft; there began a low rumble and vibration.  Both the Captain and I checked the engine indications and then stated that we thought something might have been ingested into the engine.  The Captain shut the engine down immediately; the whole process took seconds.  The aircraft became dark and the Captain started the APU.  Not being sure of what had happened; I opened the window to ask the Ramp Personnel what was happening; but they had scattered due to debris being thrown forward and rear of the engine.  I gained the attention of a Ramper and asked what had happened and he ran out of view.  The Captain brought the APU online and the lights came up for our Passengers to deplane.  At this point; the Agent appeared on the aircraft and informed us that we had ingested the air conditioning hose into the number one engine.The safety zone was clear and according to the Agent; the hose was not chained down.  I think that we need to have a procedure where the wands that the Ramp uses to marshall us into the safety zone are attached or clamped to that chain that secures the air conditioning hose.  It could be as simple as the wands do not come off that chain until it is secured.  Once the aircraft is stopped and the hose connected to the aircraft; the wands would be clamped to the chain again.  After the APU is started and the hose disconnected from the aircraft the wands would not be removed for the wing walkers until the chain is secured.  After the aircraft is pushed back; the wands again would be secured to the chain and the whole process would begin again for the next aircraft.  You don't touch the wands until the chain is secured.  The Ramp is a busy place.  At night; the lighting is reduced and sometimes the Rampers are moving from one issue to the next.  This is something that needs to be [ingrained] into the Ramp's flow; like checking your configuration before landing.

A B737-700 First Officer reports a ground air conditioning hose being sucked into the number one engine as the the jetway was moved toward the aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 157.55; Flight Crew Total 7833.47; Flight Crew Type 1529.53

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft X had more than 50 entertainment and power systems become inoperative during our flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ. The flight crew communicates with Dispatch in hopes of having the team compensate the effected individuals. Unfortunately; the team's response was to have the flight attendants utilize their handhelds and enter in each customers information. The team said they did not have the ability to address our partial cabin issue.With the current pandemic; it would be prudent to limit flight attendant interaction with customers. Especially; in a situation where the exposure is high for extended periods of time. Maybe we should rethink how the team can help keep our flight attendants safe and provide a quality product to our customers?

Air carrier Captain reported entertainment and power systems failed during flight and had to use fight attendants to record data so the affected passengers would receive some type of reimbursement.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was called in by crew tracking to cover a flight to ZZZ1. When I arrived I was told by the FO that the previous Captain had to call in sick 'because his fever had gotten so bad he could no longer safely fly.' It's extremely reckless in this current environment (COVID-19) to send more crew into an environment that is known to be contaminated. I would suggest that the affected area be sanitized after the sick crew member leaves that aircraft. I would also make sure crew is notified.

Air carrier First Officer reported being called in to fly because the previous Captain had called in sick with a fever. Reporter suggested the aircraft cockpit should be sterilized after a sick crew member leaves the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5900

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Our flight had been in the air for 1+30 when we heard the autopilot kick off; bottom screen only EICAS had numerous messages; overhead panel had many inoperative items. Because First Officer was already the pilot flying I told him to fly airplane. I scrolled thru EICAS to what I thought was the first message of BUS ISOL. [We] looked at its QRH procedure which really wasn't a procedure. It just mentioned not to cycle the ISOL switch. I also started APU in hopes this would be a shortcut to restoring power; but then read that only way to get power back to left AC was via an engine generator. So APU was turned off. We then discovered that L GEN OFF was actually the first EICAS message. Its procedure allows one reset of GEN. We did this and power was restored for 1-2 seconds; but then reverted back to L AC Bus being isolated. We then tried to contact company via VHF. This process took many tries (about 10 minutes); but contact was eventually made to Maintenance. About the only thing we hadn't done to that point was making sure all Circuit Breakers on First Officer's lower right side were in. Hoping maybe a generator field relay were open. When that didn't happen decision was made to divert where a normal approach and landing were made. CFR was asked to remain with us to gate because we still had EQP OHT on EICAS and overhead. As far as declaring emergency; we did this after the R GEN reset had failed and it became quite certain we would not get it back. The reason I was persistent about getting in touch with maintenance had several factors. In no particular order; the weather was clear and a million; there was not any better suitable alternate; and we still had time to get a fix from Maintenance before having to totally commit to diverting.

B757 Captain experiences a left AC Bus failure at FL350. The QRH is consulted and a generator reset is attempted without success. Flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Passenger in [seat] X3 yelled at FA while FA was doing beverage service because he was upset I asked passenger in [seat] Y1 to wear his mask while not actively eating or drinking. Which then caused other passengers to speak up on FA behalf. FA A had asked passenger in Y1 twice already to wear his mask when he walked on and wore it as an eye mask and when he took his seat. I told him 'I'm going to ask one last time for you to wear your mask; and they will also ask you while connecting to ZZZ1 to wear it.' He put his mask on and I continued service. When I got to X3 he began yelling and asking me how I didn't know the gentleman didn't have a heart condition. I stated it was policy to wear masks regardless and unless specified. He said I was wrong and too authoritative to the gentleman. I calmly stated 'Okay; sir' and continued to do my service. The rest of the flight went fine and no other words were exchanged. Give FA material stating policy explicitly so they can hand material to questioning guests. Passenger in X3 should be suspended for being rude and causing commotion.

Flight Attendant reported having to tell one passenger to wear a face mask while another passenger spoke up to the Flight Attendant.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 173.6; Flight Crew Total 701.2

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Prior to departing for an introductory flight training lesson I; as the instructor; walked my student through the pre-flight actions and walk around for the Cessna 172 we would be flying. He had previous training at other flight schools so I let him help me with some of the checklist items. Once I had finished the walk around with my student I had him help me pull the pre-flighted airplane out of the hangar. As we were pulling the airplane out; my student reminded me that he was in need of a headset. I set the tow bar down; still attached to the nose wheel; and went to retrieve a headset from inside our flight training building. When I came back out; I handed him the headset and explained how it worked as I approached the airplane from behind. Both the student and I entered the plane from the rear unable to see the still attached tow bar. We started the airplane and taxied to the runway without any indication or warning that the tow bar was still attached. Everything seemed normal as we took off. We spent an hour familiarizing with the airplane before we came back for landing. I was at the controls during the entire approach and landing. The landing was soft and there was no indication of any impact from the tow bar. We taxied off the runway and returned to park; still with no abnormal effects from the tow bar. It was not until we shut the engine down that we were informed that it had been attached for the entire flight. The bar managed to cause no major damage to the aircraft other than a few millimeter nick on the tip of one of the propeller blades.Fortunately; no one was injured and no major damage was caused to persons or property but this incident could easily have been avoided. A quick double check and walk around before engine start would have revealed that the bar was still there. It also would have been beneficial to pre-flight the aircraft after it had been towed into position rather than prior. Distraction was a primary cause that should have been dealt with after the tow bar had been removed. There is no reason or excuse that this incident should ever happen again in the future and extra diligence will be taken from now on to ensure the aircraft is ready for flight.

C172 Instructor Pilot reported that distraction led to departing on a training flight with the tow bar still in place; resulting in minor damage to the prop.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Local Control and had a Citation waiting to depart XXL; there was a regional jet landing and Aircraft Y was about 5 miles in trail.  After the first jet landed; I put the Citation in position and told him to be ready to go because it was IFR conditions and I needed 2 miles increasing to 3.  As the first jet cleared the runway; I cleared the Citation for take off but since he was holding short of the critical area; he was just then pulling onto the runway.  Aircraft Y was on about a 2 mile final at that point and I realized it wasn't going to work and I cancelled the Citations take off clearance and instructed him to exit the runway to the right.  He must not have heard me because I got no response and he continued to take off.  I sent Aircraft Y around on about a little over a mile final and turned him 90 degrees to the left. I turned the Citation 20 degrees to the right although by that time Aircraft Y was diverging.  From now on; working in those conditions I need to slow things down and not try to hit the small gaps.  I also need to keep my awareness up; I got focused on the first arrival clearing the runway instead of watching the Citation get into position.

Tower Controller described a go-around event when misjudging the time required for an aircraft to take off from the ILS critical hold line position; the Reporter acknowledges a need for increased vigilance during these types of weather conditions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Total 3044; Flight Crew Type 3044

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

At cruise altitude; approximately 100 NM from top of descent; we received a Master Caution Warning and noted the HYD light was displayed on FO annunciator panel. We looked at the Hydraulic Panel on the Forward Overhead Panel and noted ENG 1 LOW PRESSURE light was illuminated. We then looked at our Multi Function Display SYS on Lower Display Unit and noted quantity in the Hydraulic A system read 21%. I was pilot flying at the time FO the incident. The CA told me to continue my flying duties and to take over communications while he referenced the QRH. The CA followed checklist for Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure which led us to turning off the ENG 1 Hydraulic Pump switch. We continued to monitor the quantity and noted that it was continuing to decrease at a decent rate. The CA informed me of his intentions to [advise ATC] before the situation deteriorated and I agreed with his assessment. We [advised] ATC and flew direct to ZZZ. The CA notified dispatch of our situation and briefed flight attendants. In anticipation of possibly losing system A we reviewed the 'LOSS OF SYSTEM A' QRH checklist. The CA asked Dispatch to also provide us with a value for the non-normal landing distance to check against his calculation and the values agreed. All of these actions were just preparation in case we lost system A. Eventually our quantity indicated 0%; but we still had good pressure in the system with no other warning or caution lights. Once communications had been completed and QRH checklists run and reviewed; the CA again took over ATC communications. We briefed the approach and again reviewed our plan if we lost system A. Except for indicating no quantity in system A; we had a normal descent and approach. We lowered gear and flaps earlier than we would normally considering the possibility that the increased demand on the system could lead to a loss of pressure. When we lowered the gear; we noted quantity increased to 20%; where it stayed for the entirety of flight. We had an uneventful landing and taxi in to the gate. We debriefed with local maintenance. We also debriefed our performance. We felt we maintained safety; managed the emergency well; followed standard procedures; communicated and considered possibilities if the situation deteriorated and how we would handle those situations.

B737 First Officer reported Hydraulic System A quantity malfunction during cruise.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 22500; Flight Crew Type 16836

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

During walk-around prior to flight; visible gap in top of engine 2 nacelle was visible from rear of engine. Item logged; maintenance responded and determined seal was missing. After diagnosis and discussion; item was deferred; new maintenance release document was issued; and flight departed. After takeoff and during handoff from tower controller to departure controller; ATC said they were contacted by company maintenance during our takeoff roll to notify us to return to the gate. PNF (Pilot Not Flying) contacted maintenance via VHF to ascertain what this was about. Maintenance said they were concerned about the deferral and whether it was appropriate; properly used; properly performed; and/or properly documented; and asked us to consider return to departure airport to resolve the issue. PNF clarified that we had departed and queried about the necessity to return to departure. Maintenance advised a return. All systems were normal from our perspective and concern in that moment was coming from maintenance; but given the nature of the deferral we shared concern about having proper deferral or maintenance action taken. Weighing the options of a return to departure airport with a currently healthy but potentially unairworthy airplane; or climbing up from pattern altitude and flying to destination on the assumption that maintenance's excessive caution was just that; we chose to divert to the maintenance base immediately below us [instead of] climbing to cruise altitude and proceeding to a non-maintenance base over an hour away. We were below any operational limit weights and the weather was excellent directly beneath us. Dispatch was advised. Dispatch objected to the protocol followed by maintenance and suggested we proceed to destination. We thought the more conservative choice was to return to departure airport. We returned to destination and flight ended uneventfully. Maintenance took the airplane out of service; we flew the flight on a new airplane; publicly embarrassed by the debacle but feeling that the safer course of action was taken.

A319 Captain reported an improper maintenance deferral of a potentially unairworthy aircraft; requiring flight to return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 4500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

During descent to Chico; with Oakland Center offering Flight Following; a target appeared on TCAS at the 6 mile outer limit of the screen; at the 12 o'clock position. It was about 1;200 FT low and climbing and eventually showed to be coming opposite direction. At about the 4 mile range; it looked to be slightly to the right of head-on so I started a left turn. At just beyond 2 miles; TCAS announced 'traffic; traffic' and it showed about 400 FT low. At about a mile; I saw the plane and it passed about 1/4 mile to my right and within 100 FT of our altitude. During this whole time; Center was chatting with another airplane about descent performance profiles in the SMF area. When the target was at the 2 mile range; I IDENT'ed the transponder; but was not acknowledged; so at 8 miles out switched to Tower; due to lack of interest. If it had not been for TCAS; it would have been extremely close if we had even seen each other at all.

BE90 with ZOA descending into Chico experienced a TCAS RA; the pilot questioning the ATC service provided.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 300

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

In cruise flight at FL190; the right engine suddenly failed and the propeller began windmilling. After shutting off the autopilot; adjusting the operative engine's power controls and performing the memory items from the Engine Failure in Flight Checklist; I consulted the checklist to confirm all items had been completed. I then informed ATC that we had an engine failure and would like to divert to the nearest suitable airport. ATC advised there was an airport straight ahead and 40 miles away; but I elected to divert to ZZZ; having found the airport information in the onboard GPS database. ZZZ was roughly 23 miles to the south. ATC asked if I would like to declare an emergency; and I responded in the affirmative and was given clearance to descend at my discretion to 8;000 FT and to turn direct to ZZZ. As I descended; I informed the passengers of the situation and plan; and that they should make sure their seat belts were secure. At this time I executed the Securing Inoperative Engine Checklist. I was cleared for the visual approach and landed uneventfully.

A C421 Captain experienced an engine failure at FL190 and diverted to the nearest suitable airport after shutting the engine down.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

At the Tallahassee Regional Airport There is a large sod field on the north end of the airport east of Taxiway A adjacent to the windsock. This area is outside of the movement area but within the airport boundary fence. The area is routinely used by helicopters for training both day and night; as a staging area for firefighting helicopters; and as a mooring area for transient blimps. On the north end of the area are four unlit communications towers which are approximately fifty feet tall which are fed by power lines that extend from the towers Easterly toward the airport fence. Several utility poles support the wires. Until recent these towers; wires; and poles were not a hazard as they were positioned along the edge of a stand of pine trees which served as a very visible barrier. Several months ago the stand of trees was removed leaving the obstructions exposed without markings in the middle of what is now a very large field. While the towers and poles are visible during the day the wires are not always visible based on the scene background. During night time hours the towers and poles are sometimes invisible as well at some approach angles. The unlit structures as well as the exposed aboveground power lines present a hazard to aircraft operations especially at night. I submit that all four towers need marker lights and the power lines need to be placed underground to prevent an accident.

Power lines and towers within the airport boundary at TLH to the north and east of Taxiway A are unlit and unmarked.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 2385; Flight Crew Type 1747

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

The purpose of this flight was to test the recently serviced brakes which had been serviced at the request of the owner/operator of the aircraft. (Both right and left calipers had shown evidence of leaking hydraulic fluid; and it just made sense to replace the pads following caliper service.) A second purpose was to check the full power fuel flow to the engine which had also been adjusted.Taxi from the FBO ramp to [the runway] via A; C; D; and H was without incident and the brakes were tested. However; no high speed testing is possible while taxing an aircraft.Take off and flight were without incident; flew a short flight round trip to a local airport to obtain a straight-in to Runway 31. Fuel flow performance was fully verified on takeoff and during flight. The aircraft was cleared for straight in 31 approach about XA15 from roughly over the lake (west) with a final call required 5 miles straight-in. Final call was made about XA20 at 5 miles with clearance to land issued by the tower.Landing was uneventful - except for the gusty winds down the Runway. Hard breaking was applied at about taxiway G in order to 'speed-test' the brakes. The brakes grabbed as expected; and within seconds the right brake suddenly failed - probably about taxiway F. Immediate call was made to the tower stating the (right) brake had failed. Stopping and controlling the left-turn tendency of the aircraft became of major concern. At no time was control of the aircraft lost. The aircraft was at slow taxi speed by the time it entered the intersecting area of Runway 17/35 and 31/13; however; the aircraft did not want to turn to the right (into the wind); so rather than shut the aircraft down on the only useable runway; the aircraft was allowed to roll left onto and along Runway 17/35. A call was made to the tower that the aircraft would be 'shut down here and then towed.' With the aircraft now clear of Runway 31/13 and heading south along Runway 17/35; shut down of the engine was initiated. At this point in time; a wind gust 'weather-vaned' the aircraft off of the hard surface onto the grassy area on the east side of runway 17/35. Sufficient control of the aircraft was maintained so that the left main did NOT hit the 'yellow/orange' runway light located nearby. It should be noted that had braking been applied; the left brake action would have probably pulled the aircraft into the Runway light (plus the propeller was still 'windmilling') so the conscience decision was made to allow the aircraft to come to a halt on its own. The owner/operator knew by this time that no damage would occur to aircraft or Runway environment.Further inspection by mechanic and owner/operator showed no damage to the aircraft. Hydraulic fluid was leaking from the right caliper signifying a blown O-ring.

A C210 pilot conducted a post maintenance test flight following fuel control and brake maintenance. After landing; hard braking caused an O-ring to fail; so the pilot safely exited the runway onto an infield area which resulted in no damage.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 490; Flight Crew Type 40

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Procedure

We were approximately 3 NM southeast of JKA establishing our aircraft inbound in the 45 degree entry to the left downwind for Runway 27. We had previously broken off our approach due to traffic congestion and lack of separation. When attempting to re-enter the pattern via the 45 degree entry; a banner tow pilot passed about 100 feet directly below us in a perpendicular direction to our flight path. We never heard any of his traffic calls and by the time we saw him pass underneath us I took the controls and initiated a climb to increase separation. Banner tow operations are continuously in effect approximately 3 NM south of JKA. When Runway 27 is the active runway there is not enough distance between the banner tow traffic and the traffic flow into JKA.

An instructor pilot took control of the aircraft at 1;000 feet on final to CTAF JKA after a banner tow aircraft passed directly below without any communications.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I'm on 787 OE; FO. I served as PM for the [international] flight. I'm coming off a 3-year leave of absence; and in addition to learning a new airplane; international operations; and philosophies; I've had a lot of catching up to do. I can now also allow as how simply a mental return to aviation basics could be added to my to-do list.Conditions were light snow and gusty winds; and [the] Captain did a great job of briefing possible approach scenarios and contingencies. We ended up flying an ILS during which we ended up going VMC shortly past the OM and well before reaching 1000 feet. Originally we briefed for F30; and I was running the checklist and handling the radios; which at this stage in my coming back to work may have been more demanding than I realized; even though we had the FB and FC present on the fight deck to help. And I may have missed [the] Captain's decision to change from an F30 landing to F25 due to earlier-than-usual task saturation.I had the ECL open to 'before landing'; and when we ended up with F25 at about 1000 feet; I looked down and saw the 'flaps' item was still open. Then [the] Captain called for REF+10; and I didn't have a basis for which to set the speed. F30 REF was still programmed in the box. So rather than leave the airplane configured as is; I reached down and selected F30; which created an unstable condition. [The] Captain noted as such; and asked everyone whether we were comfortable with landing out of this condition since it was VMC. Everyone agreed. And we landed without incident.I've mentioned a mental return-to-basics; and that would include not changing the configuration below 1000 feet. I could also have simply overridden the ECL item; and that would've taken care of it; or I could've simply asked [the] Captain what I should do. I remember feeling a modicum of uncertainty when I realized the checklist was technically not complete. Unfamiliarity with the airplane was a causal factor in part. Amazing airplane; fantastic opportunity to come back and resume my career after this long an absence; and the highest-quality training department I've ever seen. [The] Captain is simply the most competent; most intuitive; most effective OE Captain I could ever hope for. I hate to have disappointed him. But I believe his decision to land was still the correct decision to make and did not create any additional safety hazard. A Go Around would have been the less safe decision to make in my estimation.

B787 First Officer reported confusion on short final regarding final flaps setting; related in part to human factors after a long absence from work.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.75

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft X was in traffic pattern on Runway 36 and requested Runway 27 for crosswind landings. I was performing OJT with a trainee that was on only his second hour of Local Control. He put Aircraft X in the right downwind for Runway 27 and was wondering if he should extend him because we had a jet call ready for departure Runway 36. About the same time another aircraft checked on inbound for Runway 36 and the trainee asked a general question about whether to clear him to land or have him report final. We cleared the jet for departure Runway 36 to get him through the intersection of Runway 27 before Aircraft X even turned base; then cleared Aircraft X for the option Runway 27. We forgot to get Runway 27 from Ground Control and he had an airport vehicle just finishing up a runway check on Runway 27 west of Runway 36. I had scanned the runway and somehow missed the vehicle who was about to exit at C5 Taxiway (the departure end of 27); when Aircraft X asked; if there was a vehicle on the runway. We then noticed the airport vehicle exiting at the end and instructed Aircraft X to go-around prior to them crossing the threshold. They went around and reentered the downwind for Runway 27. We had the correct runway strips in our strip bay; but failed to do a proper scan of that. Had we done a proper scan of our strip bay; we would have noticed we didn't own Runway 27. Ground Control had some things going on so he wasn't aware of the situation.The only recommendation would be for me to improve my runway/strip bay scan that would have alerted me to the vehicle on the runway. I always check the runway; but maybe the vehicle was behind one of the pillars that separate the Tower windows and I missed him. We teach our trainees how important it is to scan the runway and since he was so new on position; it didn't take many aircraft for him to feel a little overwhelmed. The only other recommendation I have is to always have vehicles contact Tower (Local Control) prior to going on any runway. It is something that would have to change in our SOP and our LOA with the airport; but I believe would have prevented this from happening. This is an isolated incident here at Fargo; so I don't believe it is a procedural (SOP or LOA) problem; but rather just a mistake by my trainee and myself.

Reporter stated that the norm of the facility is to use red strips with the runway number on it to show runway is owned by another position. A green strip with runway number indicates ownership of the runway. He stated that the strip showing red Runway 27 was indeed in front of him; but did not see it because the trainee blocked his view. Discussion was then had about possibly keeping the runways assigned to Local Control even though they were closed instead of giving them to Ground Control.

Controller reports aircraft on final asks if a vehicle is on runway they are cleared to land on. Controller realizes he doesn't own runway currently and sends aircraft around.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

CRJ-200 was sequenced on approach to runway 10C behind a B757. The pilot of the CRJ-200 asked me what type aircraft was ahead of him on approach because he was experiencing significant wake turbulence. I advised that the aircraft was a B757. The distance between the two aircraft at the time of inquiry was approximately 2.72 miles. The pilot of CRJ-200 did not request any alternate instructions at that time. After CRJ-200 landed runway 10C; I advised him that the current wake turbulence reclass rules permitted the distance he was following the B757. I advised him that I would tell management of his complaint. I then asked him how severe the turbulence was and he described the turbulence as moderate with a couple severe bumps. Both aircraft landed safely without incident. The airport wind at the time of complaint was 100/09.Perhaps some investigation into the proper distance behind some or all models of the B757 could be done to make sure the current reclass rules are in fact safe to following aircraft. With our current reduced separation on final rules and the possibility of Tower using visual separation for even less separation on final; it may be prudent to make sure there are no minimum distances we should be providing.

ORD Tower Controller reported a CRJ-200 encountered wake turbulence 2.7 miles in trail of a B757 on approach to Runway 10C.


Pilot Not Flying; First Officer; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 2977.; Flight Crew Type 234

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 149; Flight Crew Total 10295; Flight Crew Type 6361

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

During our arrival to ZZZZ; we were held and vectored off course for weather and a priority aircraft. After vector delays; we were cleared for approach. On approach and at about 2;500 feet; ATC issued a microburst alert of winds at +/- 40 KTS and shear of 800. After; the aircraft preceding us went missed approach and at about 1;900 feet; we went missed as we encountered the microburst and uncontrollable airspeed fluctuation. During vectors after the missed approach it was evident we would not be able to make another approach into ZZZZ; so we diverted to ZZZZ1.After several attempts to get a course or heading to our desired destination and evaluating our fuel; [we identified as an emergency] as our fuel on landing was indicating 4.1 on touchdown. After climbing and evaluating the situation; we determined that the fuel on board and the calculated fuel in the FMC were not in agreement so taking the safest course of action we changed our alternate to ZZZZ2 as it was closer and gave the FMC fuel on landing of 8.1. We landed and had 18.0 in the totalizer and 8.2 in the FMC.

Flight to ZZZZ with ZZZZ1 as an alternate. We were on fuel schedule when we received a low altitude hold inbound ZZZZ. Left hold and proceeded towards airport on the STAR when we were turned away due to an inbound emergency aircraft. Vectored around and was finally cleared for a second time for the approach to 34L. We were fully configured at 2;500 feet and at our target speed with the autopilot on. Towers had cleared us to land and moments later announced a microburst alert. At 1;900 feet; our speed went to plus 40 knots and First Officer (Pilot Flying) promptly and appropriately announced going around. We were still IMC; and in light to occasional moderate turbulence. Cleared to fly the published missed; which we did. Climbed to 4;000 feet and received a heading from departure control to fly approximately east. Quickly discussed with crew our fuel situation and all agreed we did not have enough fuel to attempt another approach; miss; and proceed to alternate; so we asked an extremely busy departure control for a clearance to ZZZZ1 and a climb. Fuel was becoming an issue but we were still showing enough on the totalizer. After installing ZZZZ1 in the FMC the fuel remaining value was showing around 3;000 lbs. We we're extremely busy with Communication; flying aircraft; and trying to rectify why we were going to have so little fuel on arrival in ZZZZ1. During this time; we were having no success in getting a clearance to ZZZZ1 or even a turn towards the alternate. After 3 or 4 attempts to get some kind of a clearance to alternate; we decided due to our fuel situation and the fact we couldn't rectify why the fuel remaining was so low on arrival we decided to [identify as] a fuel emergency. By doing so; we did get a clearance to climb and a turn towards ZZZZ1. Proceeding towards ZZZZ1 and still unable to resolve our fuel dilemma we changed our alternate destination to ZZZZ2 as it was considerably closer and had good weather. Received approach and landing clearance and landed without incident. Arrival totalizer fuel showed 18.1 but FMC was showing 7.6. We were never able to identify the difference in the two; which was the determining factor in wanting to get aircraft on ground and to operate the aircraft as safely as possible.

B777 flight crew reported that fuel quantity on the totalizer and the FMC were not in agreement.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

While pushing back out of ONT gate onto Taxiway S via Taxiway S2; Ontario Ground Control cleared a single engine aircraft to taxi to parking via Taxiway S2.  Ground Control cautioned the single engine aircraft of a 757 pushing back onto Taxiway S2.  While in the throat of Taxiway S and S2 under the control of the tug with wing walkers; the single engine aircraft taxied past our aircraft on the east side of Taxiway S2.  From our viewpoint in the cockpit the single engine aircraft was outside of the confines of Taxiway S2 on the east side of the taxiway.  The single engine aircraft came very close to our wing walker and the tug. The tug driver came to an emergency stop until the single engine aircraft passed.  We contacted Ontario Ground Control and reported the incident.Poor guidance by Ground Control and poor judgment used by the pilot of the single engine aircraft.Ground Control could have given the single engine aircraft a hold short until we were clear of S2. Ground could have also asked the single engine aircraft to hold short of S2 and asked us to do a long push on S Taxiway and hold until the single engine aircraft had entered the Ramp via S2.

ONT Ground Control cleared a single engine aircraft to park via Taxiway S2 which forced an air carrier tug and wing walkers pushing an aircraft onto S2 to take evasive action until the single engine aircraft passed.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 8300; Flight Crew Type 2400

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

IFR flight to SLC.  Weather conditions at SLC were reported as 1 mile visibility; Overcast 500; light snow.  Cleared to proceed from QWENN Arrival at 11000 feet to HLMET intersection and commence the LDA 35 Approach.  Mins of 4480 MSL were set into the FMS previous to commencing the approach.Tracked the LOC inbound and altitudes met at waypoints prior to waypoint WEEL.  WEEL waypoint is 2 miles to Runway 35 threshold and altitude is listed at 4900 MSL.  Just short of WEEL; aircraft inadvertently descended below 4900 MSL. Tower made low altitude call and asked if there was a problem and to climb; additionally the aircraft terrain avoidance system activated and called to climb. Correction was immediately made to climb back to 4900 MSL.   Once aircraft was back at 4900 MSL; aircraft continued to VDP at which time Runway 35 was visible and uneventful landing was made.Once the aircraft was shutdown; PIC and SIC debriefed why descent below published altitude at waypoint WEEL happened.  PIC had visual contact with the ground prior to WEEL and inadvertently allowed aircraft to descend below published altitude.  Crew discussed importance of situation awareness and crew coordination throughout entire phase of flight to shutdown.  Also discussed importance of flying a stabilized approach throughout to landing. Multiple lessons learned today.

Captain reported loss of situational awareness; allowing aircraft to descend below approach altitude in IFR; resulted in GPWS and ATC low altitude alerts.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The pilot of Aircraft X entered my airspace at FL270. The Pilot requested FL350 and direct LBL just south of CME. He stated that the aircraft was equipped to fly in Non-RVSM airspace. I climbed the aircraft. The pilot and I had a somewhat long discussion as to whether or not he could legally enter RVSM airspace. After questioning him; I got the unfortunate impression that it was legal for him to enter that airspace. It turns out that he could enter the airspace because he was a 'test flight' but he obviously needed the required 2000 feet separation and proper coordination; neither of which I conducted. Aircraft X didn't violate anyone in my airspace; but I'm sure he did later on during the en-route phase of his flight. Aircraft X was also filed as a /L but he was really a /G hence; no coral box.Pilots need to file proper flight plans; especially concerning their equipment suffixes. Also; I as the radar controller could have used better communication with the pilot as far as NON-RVSM airspace is concerned.

ZAB Controller describes a situation where the aircraft suffix is different then what it actually is. This error may have led to a loss of separation throughout the flight of the aircraft. The aircraft suffix was actually a G but filed as a L; which allowed the aircraft to be in RVSM airspace.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 98; Flight Crew Total 8803

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We had an early morning showtime in ZZZ of XA:45am. There was one pack inoperative on our aircraft. There was previous overnight snow; low visibility; deice required; involved mountain airport departure and EO (Engine Out) procedure; so there was added workload for departure. On climbout through FL220; the remaining pack did not maintain pressurization; the cabin was climbing slowly through 10;000 ft. We slowed the climb; then eventually descended to get the cabin altitude lower; but still could not control the cabin pressurization. The Captain [requested priority handling] with ATC; and we made an emergency descent and diverted into ZZZ1. After almost 5 hours on the ground; maintenance fixed the aircraft and we departed to ZZZ2. We received notices from the crew desk that they wanted to re-assign us to fly another flight upon arrival in ZZZ2. This would have taken us within an hour of our [duty time]; and would have extended our duty day to over 12+ hours. I declined the re-assignment and declared fatigued upon arrival in ZZZ2.

A319 First Officer reported diverting due to the aircraft's inability to maintain cabin pressure.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

While climbing to cruise altitude after leaving ZZZ; #1 Engine A system pump low pressure light illuminated. The A hyd level went rapidly to 1/4 full after about 15 min it went to E and the electric A pump low pressure light illuminated. Ran checklists and reviewed the procedure for lowering gear. After ACARS to Dispatch; we elected to declare an emergency with Center and divert to a nearby airport where we made a normal landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

A B737-300 flight crew diverted to a nearby airport after suffering the loss of the A hydraulic system.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Cleared to taxi into position and hold Runway 4 LGA. Later cleared for takeoff. As we began our roll; power was set and I saw [an aircraft] rolling across our runway. At the same time tower cancelled our takeoff clearance. I reduced power to idle and applied brakes. I estimate we were less than 60 knots. I took the next taxiway to the left and FO ran rejected takeoff checklist and informed tower we needed 15 minutes for brake cooling.Either wait for landing aircraft to exit runway before issuing takeoff clearance; or have landing aircraft apply brakes harder and get off runway.

CRJ900 Captain reported being cleared for takeoff on Runway 4 at LGA then told to cancel takeoff clearance as an aircraft landing Runway 31 rolls through the intersection. The takeoff is rejected at 60 knots.


Improperly Operated; Failed; Malfunctioning

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25.7; Flight Crew Total 1809.6; Flight Crew Type 771.4

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

My wife; daughter and I were returning home in our A36 turbo-normalized Bonanza. We tried unsuccessfully to top some weather at FL230 and picked up light rime on the leading edges even with the TKS (wing weeping de/anti-ice) system running; so I elected to request and was cleared to descend to 11;000 where the OAT was around +1C according to the engine monitor data. Based on the forecasts I had reviewed prior to the flight I believed there was no significant icing risk but encountered icing nonetheless.After leveling at 11;000 I left the power at my descent settings because we were in bumpiness for a bit. The ice we had collected was shedding from the leading edges with the TKS system running in deice mode. I did not observe any more ice building on the tip tanks or other unprotected surfaces. We finally reached smoother air; although we were still in IMC; and I decided to increase the power for a faster cruise. I pushed the mixture to full rich and the prop from 2300 to 2500 RPM; intending to pull the mixture back LOP while observing the engine monitor. I wanted to observe the monitor as I leaned because something about the engine just didn't feel right. The throttle was wide open and the boost pump was off. Pushing the mixture full rich flooded the engine. A wiser pilot would probably have immediately leaned the mixture again but I was not that wise. We were instead without power in IMC for approximately 90 seconds according to the engine monitor data I later reviewed. The data also shows that for the two minutes before I pushed the mixture full rich the fuel flow had decreased from 15 to 12 GPH; which I had not noticed but probably contributed to my sense that the engine was not right. I think the reduced fuel flow was due to reduced air flow resulting from ice collecting on the induction air filter. After losing power; my daughter in the right seat pointed out that the alternate air door light had illuminated; indicating that the door had opened. (The light is obscured by the control arm when setting in the left seat unless you lean your head to the right.) I disconnected the autopilot after seeing that the airspeed had dropped to 80 KTS; then pitched for best glide speed while declaring an emergency with Center; identifying the nearest suitable airport 8 miles away (a 3;100 FT runway at 540 MSL elevation) and starting a turn toward it. I switched tanks for good measure then tried pulling the mixture back which restarted the engine. By the time we leveled off after the restart we were somewhere around 7;500. I was cleared down to 7;000 then direct to our destination after letting ATC know that we again had power. The alt air door light remained illuminated for a few minutes then went off. The OAT at 7;000 was about +4C.

The pilot of a well equipped BE36 encountered icing at FL230 and descended to 11;000 expecting to exit icing conditions. Instead he suffered engine failure when he selected full rich mixture before attempting to lean the mixture. A subsequent leaning of the mixture affected a recovery of engine power and the flight continued to its original destination.


On second start of the day after morning sortie; right engine oil temperature began to rise. At 109 degrees and climbing; PIC decided to secure engine. Oil temperature continued to rise to 115 degrees after shutdown.  Submit to maintenance for a detailed investigation of malfunction.

King Air pilot reported high engine oil temperature after engine start.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I am reporting today because when I arrived back form break I witnessed a very unsafe operation followed by a runway incursion by a coworker who has continually had several runway incursions and routinely does unsafe operations at ZZZ. (Controller has already had this exact runway incursion situation where Controller changed someone to runway 25R with someone landing simultaneously on the crossing runway 19R runway in the recent past.)My role in this situation was to relieve this Local 1 controller from the Local 1 position I was not actually on a position yet.When I arrived upstairs I looked out the window to see Aircraft X angled on a very unstable approach on a 2 1/2 mile final to runway 25L. The LC1 controller (LC) had the aircraft doing an extreme S turn for spacing but didn't request it until Aircraft X was very late and low in the aircraft's approach to get it. Then Controller asked the pilot to change to the parallel runway on a mile and a half final which was also unsafe choice instead of executing standard go around instructions. I observed the assist controller point to the aircraft landing on the crossing runway; Aircraft Y; and he advised Controller not to change Aircraft X's runway there wasn't enough spacing and could result in sending Aircraft Y around. LC argued responding 'I have the spacing I got this I'm landing'. Even the Local 2 controller advised Controller he had Aircraft Y on a 2 mile final and it would not work. Again Controller argued with fellow controller and said aircraft was landing. Controller then hit the runway intersecting device light before Aircraft X had even put all of its wheels down on the runway which was an illegal operation like that made it ok. Controller did not issue exiting instructions to the Aircraft X prior to giving the green light to the other local controller so he could land. Against local procedures and against the 7110.65. Aircraft X was clearly still loudly hitting the brakes down runway 25R when the crossing runway Aircraft Y crossed landing threshold.It was a poor decision to S turn the aircraft on such a short final and a poor decision to offer him the parallel runway. Controller had several more experienced controllers advising that it WAS NOT GOING TO WORK and yet Controller argued with each one of them; displaying a very poor attitude and going against their recommendations.I have personally witnessed this individual have 3 runway incursions (even more that I haven't been witness to) within the last year and each time Controller's allowed to return to working position right away and does not receive any remedial training prior to returning to position and continues to make poor decisions the rest of the day and week.I recommend that management provide training and guidance before Controller is allowed to return to working primary local positions and continuing with runway incursions; bad judgments and bad attitude.

Tower Controller reported a loss separation that could have been avoided if the Local Controller would have listened to others in the cab. Converging runway operation was done incorrectly causing an unsafe situation. Reporter questioned the Local Controller's training.