Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Our flight was set to leave ZZZ; however due to weather moving over the field we delayed until the front passed and then we were able to push back. Due to the weather; priority was given to inbound aircraft that had been holding due to the storm moving over ZZZ. Due to this weather/departure delay; a line of aircraft formed. This put us about 15-20 aircraft deep in line for departure. We sat in line for departure for over 1 hour. As we got close to our [minimum fuel] of 13.3 we contacted dispatch and had them remove our [hold fuel] allowing us to have a new [minimum fuel] of 12.8.We then departed ZZZ; and began our way to IAH. Enroute to IAH we encountered the line of weather my dispatcher told me about via telephone at the gate prior to departure. The line was the trailing edge of the same system that passed over ZZZ earlier. Before our ground delay on ZZZ; the line of WX had gaps in it and we had been filed through one of those areas. Many aircraft had already gone through the gaps. However; due to our 1 hr plus delay; by the time we got to the gap along our filed route we found that the line had intensified and solidified. Some aircraft were able to top the line; however due to our weight we could not. We therefore continued further SW along the base of the line looking for a gap to cross through. During this time we were in contact with dispatch and ATC for potential routes through the line. We continued approximately 150nm SW along the line looking for a gap. We didn't find a gap and my FO (First Officer) and I decided the best course was to continue another 100 miles SW to the end of the WX line and then direct CVE. I began to become concerned of our fuel situation as EFOA (Estimated Fuel On Arrival) at this time was showing 3.8 and we were still deviating for the WX. I ACARS'd Dispatch and advised them to begin thinking of a possible gas diversion. He copied and provided us with 2 burn plots at .77 & .80 from [present position]. We were still deviating for the line.When we cleared the line we made our turn to CVE; and our EFOA was 3.1 (or 400lbs from our reserve.) We both found this 'buffer' quite concerning. We were still about an hour from IAH at this time. We were above our [reserve fuel]; and IAH was a clear path. I decided that a fuel diversion was not required and we continued to IAH.It was at this time I declared MIN FUEL with ATC to ensure no undue delay for our arrival to IAH. ATC cleared us direct to IAH. I notified Dispatch and they copied. Dispatch said it should be clear from there to IAH. We pulled the aircraft back to .77M; which was our best EFOA burn that we could ascertain at that time.We were then handed off approximately 2 times over the next 10 minutes. We continued to monitor our EFOA; which was hovering around 3.3 direct to IAH. The next controller we were handed off to said we were no longer able [to continue] direct to the field as we currently were doing. And that we had to be put back on the arrival. We plugged in the arrival and EFOA became approximately 2.9. This was extremely close to our [reserve fuel] and beyond any comfort buffer we previously had. I told ATC we would like to continue direct to the field as we were previously doing. [After notifying him of the situation in full; we] were cleared direct to IAH. Our plan was to stay as high as possible as long as possible. By staying at cruise and .77M our EFOA came up to approximately 3.3. We planned for a straight in approach to 15R. We descended; and landed uneventfully. Our fuel on landing/arrival at IAH was 3.3 (500lbs) above [reserve fuel] or 1;100lbs below planned landing fuel.In my aviation career this closest I have ever come to dipping into [reserve fuel]. The decision I made was based upon the multitude of factors/threats we had already encountered that night during the flight; and the possible ones not yet seen at IAH (i.e. a possible go-around; vectors; holding; or any unforeseen delay.)The FAs (Flight Attendants) were informed of our emergency status; but as fuel was still above [reserve fuel] (albeit slightly); I felt there was no need inform the passengers. That would have only caused undue worry; for a situation that ended legally and uneventfully. No passengers deplaning had any idea what had occurred and many thanked us for the 'smooth flight' and the 'incredible light show' from the storm.Kudos to the professionalism of my crew; specifically that of my FO. As this was his first [emergency situation]; I must say he acted above the level expected of [Company] pilots and I am glad I had him on the flight deck for this event.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a low fuel situation due to weather diversions.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Pinion Sector combined with the Guard Dog CAP; FL240BFL280. At the time there was more than 1 tanker and 2 fighters in the CAP (not sure how many of each though-some were waiting to depart the CAP soon). There was some average volume in the Pinion sector; with Automated Information Transfer (AIT) aircraft and other regular coordination going on. The volume in Pinion is not normally complex; but with the added Guard Dog sector combined and extra data blocks on the scope; the complexity level increased. Especially since no one is technically certified or trained on [this sector]; and not having worked military ops on a routine basis; it was a little bit much.One of the fighters; I believe it was Aircraft X; called requesting a 190 heading for 30 miles and block altitude 3000-5000 feet to track a Target of Interest (TOI). I called for a D-side to coordinate (initially he thought it was an emergency). We told Potomac approach Fluky sector what the aircraft was doing; and they took Radar. I told Aircraft X approved as requested; and he descended. I switched the aircraft to the FLUKY sector.I was under the impression that the fighter jet was under Agreement for Fighter Interceptor Operations (AFIO) and was performing a TOI procedure. After reviewing the events; I am not so sure that was the case. Nor was I aware of the specific requirements that AFIO has to be declared by the using agency; not the pilots. I thought they could just go down to a TOI; especially since this TOI was near DC. I recommend sufficient training and procedures for Sector 8 for all controllers that work it. There is no sector 8 in the SOP; and no mention of it in the ZDC Training order. There is no certification procedures listed for Certified Professional Controllers (CPC) or trainees.

ZDC Center Controller reported training related to intercept procedures.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 1260; Flight Crew Type 1260

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I conducted a training flight with a student. A through preflight was conducted and the landing gear was visually inspected with no issues. Upon coming back in to ZZZ I extended the gear and had a green light and mains were down. Upon the student's landing; I felt the right main gear collapse under us. I immediate took the controls and executed a go-around. I exited the traffic pattern and exited the area to the west to troubleshoot. I cycled the gear up and down a few times and it still would not fully extend. I used the emergency gear extension checklist and the left main would not fully extend. I repeated this process multiple times. I made a phone call to our Maintenance Assistant Chief. He called [an] A&P and AI Mechanic. [The mechanic] called me on the phone and had me attempt to recycle the gear using the emergency gear extension. That did not work. I then exited the pattern and used maneuvers to see if I could get the gear to lock into place. That did not work. I retracted the gear and conducted a low pass to ensure the gear was retracted. The individuals on the ground said that the gear appeared to be retracted. I requested EMS to be present for the landing. I flew around to burn some fuel off and wait for the EMS to arrive. Once they arrived I conducted full flap no gear landing.

C172 pilot reported a gear-up landing was executed when all attempts to lower the landing gear failed.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 1410

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 111; Flight Crew Total 7971; Flight Crew Type 1938

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

While on the arrival into CYVR; we were instructed to descend and maintain 10;000 and we complied. After a few minutes at 10;000; we thought we were instructed to 'Descend unrestricted and maintain 4;000'. We read back the clearance and followed SOPs and initiated standard 1;500 foot per minute descent to 4;000. We did not hear any objection from ATC concerning the read back. Upon reaching approximately 8;600 ATC queried our descent and informed us our clearance was to maintain 10;000. We quickly arrested the descent and began climbing back to 10;000 while scanning for any potential TCAS conflicts. We told ATC that we thought we were instructed to descend unrestricted and maintain 4;000 and they said negative; that was not for your call sign. We explained that we had read back the clearance to descend unrestricted and maintain 4;000 with our call sign and they did not reply. We continued the flight uneventful and landed. Shortly after leaving the aircraft and briefing the situation as a crew; we determined that we should call Approach Control via telephone and discuss the situation and find out more information concerning the event. The Shift Supervisor informed us that this has occurred multiple times in the past due to their ground communication equipment being digital. He informed us that only one aircraft can transmit and if another is trying to transmit; it will be blocked and not heard at all. This is what he said occurred in our situation. He said the old analog system would transmit with a lot of static when two aircraft would transmit at once and used to help them identify these types of situations. Also their transmissions were very difficult to understand call signs due to accent and fast paced annunciation.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

After beginning an early descent because of a communications misunderstanding; a flight crew was informed CYVR digital communications systems acknowledges only one radio call at a time; blocking a second caller. Their incorrect descent clearance acknowledgement was not heard.


Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling

A visual; Flaps 25 approach to Runway 28R at SFO was briefed and due to NOTAMs; we were planning on using the 2.9 GP for 28R in our Pegasus FMS and VNAV Path for [glide] slope guidance. On approach to SFO; due to traffic below; SFO ATC held us high and then due to a medical emergency behind us; they kept us fast. We accepted the FMS Bridge Visual to 28R; but ATC insisted we maintain higher than normal speeds throughout the approach. The sun was directly in our faces in the descent (landing was at 1932L) and that was a slight distraction. With the glare; I found myself spending more time looking inside at the instruments. In addition; the GS and PAPIs for both 28R and 28L were inoperative.As the pilot flying; I twice insisted on a slower speed from ATC and also used full speed brakes and early gear extension to manage the approach. We were correctly set up to use VNAV Path in the end game. I configured to Flaps 25 around 1;500 feet AGL and captured the VNAV path very soon after. I reduced our sink rate quite a bit and added power to stay on the VNAV path and followed the flight director that was commanding about a 600 FPM descent. Almost immediately; I observed the runway picture and asked the F/O if he thought we looked high and he agreed that we did. I increased the sink rate for a short while and we set up vertical speed 800 down as a better reference (better than the inexplicably high and incorrect VNAV path.) I was configured and on speed prior to 1;000 AFL and stabilized the sink rate shortly thereafter. But then; I made one more assessment that we still looked high and I did one more increase in sink rate prior to landing. I started to pull back before the EGPWS warned 'sink rate' and we settled into a stable path immediately after the EGPWS said 'sink rate.' Both of us were totally eyes out assessing the runway and our visual path with (and I am now realizing that I have become GS; PAPI and VNAV Path dependent) and we were unaware of when we passed 500 feet. I realize now that my second increase and then decrease in sink rate may have resulted in an unstable approach at or below 500 feet. The fact that we landed smoothly and in the touchdown zone is good; but no consolation for the fact that I should have been doing better cross checking of the runway and instantly disregarded the erroneous VNAV Path capture and should have been more eyes out on this entire approach.When all the various factors put us high and fast; then I must put the gear down even sooner. In other words; I should be even more aggressive when faced with developing threats about taking action to reverse the trend; and in this case; gear sooner would have helped to give myself more time to assess and settle into a nice; comfortable final approach. Also; I should be super aware of 3 to 1 and mostly eyes out in these slam dunk situations; visually assessing the runway early and often (especially with no PAPI or GS) and not relying solely on VNAV Path for my SA.

The Captain was trying to use FMS glide path info to assist his descent. Due to sun angle; I had my attention on airspeed and path until the Captain asked how he was doing. I looked up and saw we were at a higher than normal altitude in relation to the runway; but I said we were still looking okay.

A B757-200 flight crew struggled to achieve a stabilized approach inbound to Runways 28L/R on the FMS BRIJJ visual with GS/PAPI/VASI OTS for both runways. Requests from ATC to keep their speed up to assist with a following aircraft with a medical emergency was a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

After takeoff during gear retraction both engine and electrical A system hydraulic low pressure lights illuminated. Lights extinguished but quantity remained between 31-35%. Decision made with concurrence of Dispatch and Maintenance Control to return. Emergency declared on our behalf by ATC. Return uneventful. Overweight landing made with approval from Maintenance.

B737 experiences fluid loss and low hydraulic system A pressure during gear retraction. After gear retraction pressure is normal but quantity is very low and the decision is made to return to the departure airport for an overweight landing.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I extended the gear and performed my Before Landing Checklist with normal indications (3 Green; No Red; No gear warning horn). I landed on the mains. As I went to lower the nose the nose continued down until it hit the pavement. I notified ATC and evacuated the passengers. Post flight inspection revealed that the nose gear had collapsed.

C402 pilot reports nose gear collapse after landing with with normal gear indications.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft X was LUAW (Line Up and Wait) with Aircraft Y on final. I cleared Aircraft X twice for takeoff with no response either time. Told Aircraft Y to expect to go around and he acknowledged. CIC/CD said he was going to try NORDO aircraft; I expected him to see if aircraft had switched to his frequency. I keyed up to say cleared for takeoff again to Aircraft X but CIC was on my frequency asking if the aircraft was on; not exit the runway or cleared for takeoff- which was needed. I told him to get off my frequency and reached out to Aircraft X again and had him exit the runway. Aircraft stopped on the taxiway. CIC was distracting me explaining why he keyed up my frequency and I shouldn't tell him to get off my frequency; during this time I saw the aircraft stopped and keyed up to have aircraft move forward; but the ASDE alarmed and I had to send Aircraft Y around. I tried to coordinate the go-around with the departure sector twice but they were too busy. CIC was too angry to help me and coordinate so aircraft was switched to departure without coordination. Get permission before taking somebody's frequency and be clear. Help positions with coordination if they are busy. Do not be a distraction.

SAN Tower Controller reported a NORDO aircraft on the runway caused confusion in the cab and the subsequent arrival to go-around.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 32000; Flight Crew Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

In cruise flight at 6000 feet IMC condition working ZZZ ATC. I had an electrical problem. A battery was replaced as plane would not start. About an hour and a half [later] I noticed Volt meter was going between a high reading to a low reading. I was on autopilot with altitude hold. The aircraft is equipped with an air impact generator which I was trying to deploy; and the generator would not deploy. A jammed cable I think; I had asked to descend to 4000 feet and was given clearance to 4000 feet. The autopilot was acting up. It was turned off. I had started turning off equipment I could do without. Also at this point I had experienced a total electrical failure. The aircraft is equipped with an Aspen display system receiving information from a Garmin 430 so with trying to restore some power I descended to 3600 feet; realized it and immediately returned to 4000 feet. When the controller asked if I was OK; I had made him aware that I was having an electrical problem. The ATC people worked very well with me; I had not flown this plane in a while and dealing with the electrical problems made a very strenuous situation. The backup generator not deploying added to the problem. There was no other aircraft near me. At the time I was cleared to ZZZ1 about a 280 heading at 6000 feet.

A Cessna 182 pilot reported losing all electrical power.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 323; Flight Crew Total 1042; Flight Crew Type 845

Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On active IFR flight plan on frequency with Miami Center on VOR 12R approach into Vero Beach airport; I requested holding instructions at BUEYE intersection (IAF); prior to approach for training purposes. Controller advised hold would be two or three turns for traffic sequencing. On inbound turn from first hold; Controller asked 'are you ready?' I responded by saying 'affirmative.' Controller advised of traffic '1000 ft below and to reference traffic prior to descent from 4000 ft to 3000 ft.' I advised Controller of traffic was in sight and began descent. The misunderstanding began with the assumption of what the Controller's question 'are you ready?' really meant. I concluded with the expectation that further descent instructions were to be given immediately; and consequently descended below the assigned altitude of 3000ft. Controller responded by asking what our current altitude was. When asked this question; I immediately recognized the mistake; and responded by saying 'correcting altitude from 2800 back to 3000 ft.' Controller responded by warning that we were not cleared for approach and to 'be aware of possible pilot deviation.' Some consideration given to the fact that I had approximately 5-6 hours of sleep the night before; while completing last flight on a 6 hour+ flight day; fatigue could've contributed to this event. I had to use the restroom facility on the ground urgently; which could've rushed the decision-making process to getting too far ahead of ATC instructions. I also could've asked Controller to clarify what he meant when asked 'are you ready?' which ended up being a vague and confusing instructions; meant to descend from 4000 ft to 3000 ft; not given approach clearance; and to ask Controller to 'confirm cleared for approach' if any question about whether or not to be cleared for approach was actually given. Moving forward; my students and I will make sure that we have written down on paper all assigned headings; altitudes; and clearances; cross out old headings; altitudes; and clearances; whenever new ones are given. Students and I will emphasize three-way aircraft control; as both of us were flying this approach together; since this was only the student's second time flying approaches on an IFR flight plan.

PA28 flight instructor reported departing from cleared altitude in response to a confusing clearance. Reporter cited fatigue as contributing.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X was turned from the downwind to SAN and cleared to follow traffic for a visual approach. Aircraft Y was cleared for an approach from straight in behind Aircraft X. Aircraft X did not turn towards the airport in an acceptable amount of time causing me to cancel Aircraft Y's approach clearance. I stopped Aircraft Y at 3800 ft. which is the MVA in that area and vectored him to a heading of 340 to gain separation with the intent to re-clear him after separation was ensured. Aircraft Y stated that he had continued descent. I issued Aircraft Y a low altitude alert and eventually climbed him to 5000 for re-sequencing. Aircraft X should have turned to final sooner. I could have ensured the turn but experience told me that [company] typically turns to final within an acceptable window for this situation to work.

SCT Controller reported B737 descended below assigned altitude; entering a lower MVA.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181; Flight Crew Type 2236

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were at FL370 and were directed by ATC to descend now to FL270. As the pilot flying I engaged level change after FL270 was entered in the altitude window. Prior to reaching FL270 ATC gave us 'descend via the KAILE 2 arrival'. I never engaged the VNAV function to ensure altitude protection. Approaching SKARF; ATC gave us a low altitude warning. At this point we realized we had descended below the MSA of 16;000 feet to an altitude of 15;000 feet. We immediately initiated a climb and pushed the throttles full forward. We were able to climb to 17;000 feet prior to SKARF. I had terrain mode up on my displays. We did not receive any EGPWS warnings. Upon reaching 17;000 feet we were notified of possible moderate turbulence on the remainder of the descent. The Captain told the FAs (Flight Attendants) to take their seats due to possible turbulence. As soon as the Captain notified the FAs we encountered the turbulence. It started out at as light to moderate but soon became severe turbulence. The aircraft's autopilot had a hard time maintaining level flight and the lateral control system disengaged reverting the control wheel steering function. I was able to maintain control and eventually engage the LNAV function. The turbulence continued until we were on a segment of the published approach for RWY 16L.

B737 First Officer reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC after overshooting a target altitude on descent into DEN.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 100

Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I departed ZZZ for ZZZ1 and comes to 3;200 ft. direct to the ZZZZZ intersection. Upon leveling off at 3;200 ft. I turned on the autopilot to complete some paperwork. After about 10 minutes the Controller asked what altitude are you at? At this point the autopilot had turned off with no warning. I flew the rest of the day with the autopilot off. The next day when the preflight test was done the trim warnings would not silence. At that point our mechanic inspected the system and then implemented MEL documentation. Subsequent IFR flights have been a challenge being a 100 hour Captain. I has been rough maintaining standards when operating as a single pilot. Then compound all that with system failures. I have been operating for two weeks now without an autopilot.

C208 Captain reported auto pilot and trim warning failure resulted in workload challenge on subsequent IFR flights.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Today on Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 we experienced a hydraulic system 3 low pressure warning shortly after getting vectored onto the final approach course for ILS Runway XX in VMC conditions. We saw the caution message and checked the hydraulic synoptic page to see that there was no fluid left in our hydraulic 3 system; but there was pressure in the line. We asked for delay vectors and discontinued our approach to run the QRH. After running the QRH we got to the gear extension portion and after talking it through decided to drop the gear using the conventional method. The gear went down and locked 3 green; however the pressure was completely depleted in system 3 after that. We decided to pull the manual gear extension in case the reading was faulty as advised by the QRH. We ran the rest of the QRH procedure and [requested priority handling] with the Tower. After all checklists were run we were vectored back onto the approach. I was the FO was flying during the checklist and procedure. After the procedure was completed we decided that the Captain should land the aircraft and we transferred the controls to his side and I took over the job of pilot monitoring. We landed the plane safely and let ATC know that we would not be able to exit the runway. ARFF was standing by to inspect the aircraft for leaks and none were found. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via ACARS while on the ground and informed them of the situation. Once inspected by ARFF a tug towed us into the gate.Not sure what the cause was; there were no other indications during flight that caused alarm until close to the airport when we received the caution message.

On the morning of Date; I operated my second flight of the day; Aircraft X; from ZZZ to ZZZ1. It was the FO's leg to fly and I was Pilot Monitoring. The flight progressed normally with good weather and no apparent threats until we began our approach into ZZZ1. We were being vectored onto the localizer for the ILS [Runway] XX approach into ZZZ1 at 3;000 ft when the FO asked for Flaps 8 shortly before intercepting about a 10 mile final. Shortly after being established on the localizer; the FO requested Flaps 20 as we slowed to 180 kts. Moments after selecting Flaps 20; a Master Caution appeared for 'HYD PUMP 3B' at which point we requested delay vectors off the approach to run the QRH. We maintained 3;000 ft; 180 kts and flaps 20 configuration while we worked the QRH. The QRH directed us to switch the 3B pump to the 'ON' position and if the message didn't extinguish; turn the pump off and that was the end of the procedure. Upon looking at system 3 on the hydraulic synoptic page; I noticed the 3A pump was still holding pressure; the 3B pump was Amber; and the HYD quantity read 0%. Based on my system knowledge; and aircraft mechanic experience; I knew a larger problem was affecting system 3 that the EICAS hasn't had opportunity to alert us of. I searched for a QRH non-EICAS procedure for low or no hydraulic fluid; but didn't find anything. With no other QRH guidance beyond the 'HYD PUMP 3B' procedure; I presented the idea to lower the gear knowing that system 3 is largely responsible for actuating the landing gear. We both agreed it would make good use of the remaining pressure and fluid in system 3 and probably prompt more EICAS messages to give us QRH guidance. We lowered the landing gear; which yielded 3 down and green indications as well as caution messages 'HYD 3 LOW PRESS' and 'IB GND SPOILERS.' At this point I referenced the QRH procedure for 'HYD 3 LOW PRESS' and [requested priority handling]; telling Approach Control we will be stopping on the runway with reduced braking capability and inability to steer the aircraft. We ran the QRH to completion configuring the aircraft and determining Runway XX in ZZZ1 to be suitable for changes in landing distance and landing configuration. At this point we were on a base leg to intercept final for Runway XX again. The FO suggested that I land the airplane. I agreed; so we transferred the controls to me and I flew the approach and landed the airplane. With firm braking and full reverse thrust; I was able to stop the aircraft short of Taxiway XX. Emergency vehicles approached and inspected the aircraft while I briefed the flight attendants and then the passengers on the situation. We decided to shut down the engines on the runway as the tug approached to tow us back to the gate. We turned on the 2B pump for brake pressure as we were towed to the gate. There; we ran a shutdown checklist; and deplaned our X thankful passengers. Failure of a Major Hydraulic system.QRH guidance that would help better direct the crew in a situation like ours where we found ourselves without any QRH guidance after completing the first QRH procedure. We had to effectively induce more EICAS messages to appear by lowering the gear so that we could be directed to the proper QRH procedure for the situation.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported the loss of the main hydraulic system during final approach.


Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During taxi for takeoff; we were given a new initial departure clearance of fly heading 290 climb; and maintain 12;000 feet (apparently for noise). Takeoff was normal. Upon checking in with SoCal; we were given a heading of 150 'vector to GRIDR'. Two minutes later we were given direct to GRIDR; resume the ZZOOO 1 Departure. As we were proceeding to GRIDR; I noticed that we were approaching 12;000 feet and we hadn't been given a clearance to a higher altitude. I asked SoCal for higher. The Controller once again cleared us direct to GRIDR. I again asked for higher; the Controller responded that the assigned altitude for that departure was FL230. I again asked for higher; the Controller responded that FL230 is the final altitude. I believe I then stated that I needed a clearance or something like that. The Controller told us to climb and maintain FL230. The remainder of the departure was uneventful.My understanding of RNAV departure procedures is that once the altitude on the departure has been modified (12;000 feet); the Controller must either re-clear you to 'climb via' or issue a 'climb and maintain' clearance. Simply stating; 'resume the departure' does not clear you to continue climbing via the departure. The ATC Handbook 7110.65 appears to support my position; but I'm not sure. I tried looking for Company resources in Training and Standards but was unable to find any archived.I previewed the flight packet cover sheet; which highlights issues with improper check-in phraseology and was prepared to make the correct check-in on with SoCal; however; that became moot with the amended clearance. I felt that in that circumstance; in order for me to legally climb to a higher altitude; SoCal either needed to give me a climb via or a climb and maintain clearance. I reviewed the ATC recording online; unfortunately; the recording I listened to only has SoCal; not our transmissions. ['If we were mistaken in this situation; Pilots need further guidance. It seems to me most Pilots would not be comfortable climbing to a higher altitude when given just a resume departure clearance.']

Boeing 737 Captain reported Departure Control climb clearance confusion due to ATC incorrect clearance phraseology.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 2350; Flight Crew Type 123

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

A wheel landing was made and the airplane was slowed without braking such that the tailwheel had been set down. At a speed of about 20mph; the left wing gained lift and the aircraft swerved to the right in a ground loop. Left rudder and left aileron inputs were made at the first indication of directional instability. The right main gear left the edge of the pavement and sank into the soft; wet surface; pulling the aircraft further to the right. The aircraft rolled forward into a drainage ditch approximately 6 feet deep containing low standing water; midway down the right side of the runway at an estimated speed of 10-15mph. Neither wing struck the surface; and the prop tips were not struck or damaged. When the aircraft nosed into the ditch; the front cowling was bent and the main landing gear were damaged. There were no injuries and there was no damage to property other than to the aircraft as described above.

Pilot reported a loss of directional control that resulted in a runway excursion and damage to the aircraft.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Before our flight; there was an odor in the cabin. The aircraft was written up and Maintenance could not duplicate the issue that caused the smell. When we were [enroute]; the Flight Attendants called and said that they were smelling the odor again which was described as a locker room type smell; while conferring with Dispatch the Flight Attendants called again and said there were a few Passengers complaining of the smell around the emergency exit row. One of the Flight Attendants reported feeling dizzy; and soon after the other two Flight Attendants from the back of the aircraft reported the same.  We decided to divert the flight to ZZZ.  We did experience some burning of the eyes but there was no odor or fumes in the flight deck.

B737-800 First Officer reported they made a diversion after notification of 'locker room odor' in the cabin reported by cabin crew and passengers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 597; Flight Crew Type 14000

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 1630

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

From the gate to conducting the takeoff roll all was normal operations. During the takeoff roll after 80 knots (100 knots or so) we noticed a discoloration on the runway. We had no idea what is was; maybe just a visual anomaly. After V1 we realized that it could be birds; however not until we began rotation (moving at 250 fps) did the birds start flying. We flew into the middle of the flock of birds; hard to say how many; but it was a big flock. We heard the numerous bird strikes hit the aircraft; at this time we assumed that both sides of the aircraft took strikes; as we could not tell the exact locations. The landing gear was left down. Shortly after takeoff the right engine vibration meter; as well as physical vibration was indicated.The Number 1 engine was stable; Number 2 engine was indicating vibration of 5.6 (on the VIB meter) with reverse highlighting and box around engine parameters. We informed the Tower of the bird strike; requested return to the airport and [advised ATC]. At 400 feet N1; N2 and EGT seemed to be stable on both engines; although the vibration indication was high on the Number 2 engine. We discussed possible shut down; however we had no idea as to the condition of the Number 1 engine. We continued to 1;000 feet and at this time our gear was down and flaps were set at 10 degrees. We elected to leave the flaps at 10 degrees not knowing of any damage sustained during the bird encounter. We reduce thrust; continued to climb to 2;000 feet and began left turn for left traffic to XXR.As we reduced the thrust the VIB meter lowered to around 2.5 and we noticed the physical vibration reduced as well. F/A (flight attendants) and passengers were notified and told our intentions. We consulted the QRH vibration issue and possible engine shut down if conditions changed; we still did not know if the Number 1 engine was affected. We elected to continue and land at ZZZ; although our options remained open as condition warranted. We both agreed to land on XXR. Knowing that the Number 2 engine and possibly the Number 1 engine were affected by the strike; getting back on the ground safely was our goal. Either of our alternate options was extending our air time; by our estimate five to ten minutes. Runway XXR had positive stopping margins; however if flaps had problems or a shutdown of an engine was required ZZZ1 or ZZZ2 were our options.On base flaps were lowered to 15; the FO (First Officer) informed me that no abnormal indications were noticed; we continued as discussed. Turning final; flaps 30 were selected with no adverse effect or control issues. Upon reaching 1;000 feet all stable indications were observed and we continued for landing. Touchdown was smooth and braking normal as auto brake was selected. As we turned off runway nose wheel steering was difficult at first; after re-centering it perform normally. Rescue trucks were off to the east side north of our turnoff; we taxied up to and shut both engines down to have the rescue crews to clear and check the aircraft. FA and Passengers were notified of our current condition and a delay back to the gate.

B737-800 flight crew reported striking a large flock of birds during takeoff; resulting in damage to the Number 2 engine; and an immediate return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After a 2 hour delay for aircraft to be placed in service after an overnight 'A' check. Maintenance Technician was rebalancing hydraulic A and B fluid levels. It was replenished to 95%. After reaching cruise flight at FL350 I began to monitor Hydraulic System quantity and pressure. I alerted Captain to A level at approximately 74% and started to drop progressively 1-2% in the next several minutes. Captain gave aircraft flying duties to myself and contacted company Maintenance and Dispatch via radio. After 2 separate conversations with company and upon reaching the quantity level of approximately 62% on A Hydraulic system; the Captain felt the safest course of action was an air return to the departure airport. I agreed. It afforded us the longest runway available and premier Crash/Fire Rescue services. We reviewed QRH and briefed flight attendants/passengers/Cockpit Jumpseat Rider. Captain assumed flying duties and I resumed pilot monitoring duties. An emergency was declared and ATC cleared us back direct. Minimal aircraft maneuvering was requested. A flaps 30 autobrakes 3 landing was performed without incident and Crash/Fire Rescue advised no exterior negative mechanical indications were observed. We taxied to gate and deplaned passengers and affected a logbook entry as to the aircraft condition.

B737 First Officer reports receiving an aircraft from Maintenance after an 'A' check. At FL350 Hydraulic System A quantity is noted to be solely decreasing and crew elects to return the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Elevator trim would not allow nose down travel. Suggestion: Inspect; identify; and repair problem.

After passing through 10;000 feet and accelerating during a departure from ZZZ to ZZZ1; the aircraft ran out of 'nose down' trim around 280 kts. We became aware of the issue after a trim warning (red) appeared on the PFD. Upon disengaging the autopilot the indicated malfunction was confirmed with the aircraft pitching up without manual input. We (Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring simultaneously) were unable to push the control column forward until the Pilot Flying decreased the power and subsequently the speed decreased below 260 kts. At that point the Pilot Flying moved the trim aft from its forward limit and neutralized the control column forces. Once the Pilot Flying was in control again and after we executed the associated abnormal checklist; the Pilot Flying was able to duplicate the issue by accelerating the aircraft. Once the aircraft was back under control we coordinated a diversion to ZZZ3 with company and ATC. We continued the flight to ZZZ3 without further while maintaining an indicated airspeed at or below 250 kts. No abnormalities were noticed during post-flight exterior inspection of the aircraft.

Hawker 900XP flight crew reported a trim control problem during departure that resulted in a diversion.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Safety Related Duties; Service; Deplaning; Boarding

Confusion; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On our flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 this morning .... seats X3 and Y4 were open; yet the Gate Agent booked a passenger in X6 right next to me. A large man. It was my understanding that X6 was a LAST resort!  With COVID cases escalated; as well as full flights...exactly how is this protecting our health?  This is not right. The passenger was in X3 and at the last minute got changed to X6! He was last passenger on the plane.Stop seating X6!

Everything was good to go on my flight out to ZZZ this am. Until the last passenger boarded and demanded I move to clear the way to his seat in X6. As I was the A (FA); I knew that he was blocked in at X3 and showed him his seat. He told me that he didn't want that seat; he wanted what was changed for him at the gate. The Gate Agent was at the boarding door within moments and I asked her why he was moved into a social distance block seat. She told me that he wanted the seat. That isn't enough of an argument for me. The X FA; upset and arguably so came up and asked why this passenger wasn't in his previously assigned seat and the agent got very cold and told us he is technically allowed and wanted this seat; so rather than argue she gave it to him. (He's a premium passenger; go figure.) We pushed back as crew and told her that that isn't protecting the crew and that we still have over 10 minutes to have his seat changed; but I was met with a cold agent who refused to back down and shrugged off our frustrations and concerns with a nonchalant; 'It was a problem yesterday too but it's a short flight.' I was asked if we could close and that was that.About half way through the flight; I was cornered in my galley by the passenger in X6 and asked why the X FA was so unfriendly. In an attempt to cover for the Company I engaged in damage control apologizing for any discomfort and explained that the reason he was originally in X3 was due to a social distance block on his seat due to the health and safety of our flight attendants. I explained that if any crew member made him feel anything less than welcome; we did not intend to and that it was operational confusion between the agents and the crew. He told me then again that that was the seat he wanted and attempted to tell me that he understood where we were coming from but he just preferred that seat which is why he didn't want to move to any of the open seats on the flight that weren't right next to the flight attendant's jumpseats. He told me he knows a lot of people that fly for our Company and that he was thrown off that the X FA wouldn't engage in conversation during taxi and takeoff. I told him at this point that we are here for safety first and comfort second and that as flight attendants; we are observe a sterile galley allowing minimal distractions as we silently review safety procedures in the unlikely event of an emergency. He seemed pacified enough and moved to a point I could get around him and recirculate myself back to the isle. I am appalled by this incident on so many levels:1. Blatant disregard for FA health and safety from an agent that didn't follow protocol around the social distance block.2. FA should not be expected to sit next to a passenger who may or may not follow mandated COVID protocols. 3. The market we were flying into requires an online form filled out acknowledging the high COVID rates and need to quarantine due to ICU capacities and here you have the FAs sitting among the noise?! Nah. 4. It put both the X FA and the A FA in a compromising spot with the passenger and their perception of our service and this made us both highly uncomfortable when it wasn't at all called for or necessary to do so.5. Having passengers trying to talk our ears off and be chatty is not only UNSAFE because it is encouraging the virus to spread; 6. It's also unsafe because it is causing distractions during the times we as FAs need to be focused the most.7. For the Gate Agent to tell me that this was a problem yesterday too; it means that they have no clear understanding of the social distance block and no regard for their team mates who have to endure the flight with a sniffling; sneezing passenger for 2+ hours.8. A passenger preference for a window is not reason enough to forgo social distance block procedure.   This put me in a compromising situation with a dissatisfied passenger. I was cornered in my galley without warning and it startled me. Also; to have toback pedal over a topic that I felt the X FA was in the right and had every reason to be upset about was unnecessary and upsettingBETTER CRM.More education around social distance block for agents who don't know what it's like to be on the front lines and trapped with a plane full of passengers and no place to go without being bombarded with passenger questions as we fight for space over an arm rest.

Flight Attendants reported a passenger was moved to a seat; against company policy; near their jump seat by the Gate Agent.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

In A position ZZZ-ZZZ1; several passengers approached me during deplaning to tell me that two passengers in seats XX5 and XX6 were spitting and wiping saliva; phlegm; and blood all over their seats; armrests; tray tables; window; and wall. They explained they were unable to call an FA because they saw this while standing in the aisle several rows behind these people as all passengers waited to deplane. The two passengers were able to exit the aircraft before the other passengers could notify me. I assured them the plane was terminated and would be sanitized for the evening and we agreed that the only thing remaining we could do about it was to notify Operations and request they inform the cleaners of the location to take extra precautions to protect themselves and to sanitize that area thoroughly. The blood [was] intentionally smeared into an X shape on the wall. I presumed the blood came from tearing open a scab or some other small wound. It was a clearly visible amount but didn't indicate heavy bleeding.By the time [deplaning] was complete and I could go to row XX; most of the moisture from the saliva and nasal secretions had dried and was barely visible; only the blood stood out. Without their notification; and even with the easily visible blood; it would have been impossible to realize the extent to which they had contaminated every possible surface. It would have dried completely had we taken the time to tidy the aircraft first. In our PA about passenger compliance we emphasize seat belts and smoking and perhaps that is outdated and detracts from where the emphasis currently should lie. We state federal law prohibits tampering with a lav smoke detector; perhaps we have a law that prohibits passenger misconduct and could be stated in such a way that explains the criminality (if any) to such behavior. I do not believe those passengers believed they could face any consequence for these actions. Regardless of taking place during a pandemic; at any time this behavior poses a risk to other passengers; crew; and employees.

Flight Attendant reported that two passengers were observed spitting; and wiping their saliva and blood over their entire seating area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While cruising at 37;000 feet we observed what looked like windshield condensation on the front windows that turned out to be ice.  The ice detector did not detect ice so we manually selected the anti ice to 'ALL.'  We then received an amber IAS comparator alert.  Checking my instrument with the standby and Captain's; we deemed mine to be inaccurate.  Shortly after; we got an altitude comparator alert with SPS advanced and the AUTOPILOT FAIL. We decided this could be severe icing and requested an immediate descent.  ATC was unable to accommodate us due to traffic so we declared an emergency.  When we began our descent; my airspeed showed slowing while the Captain's accelerating leading me to believe that my pitot tube had been blocked. We were about 100 miles from ZZZ; it was our nearest suitable airport as we had to work hard to get it down in time to do the ILS. Aircraft handling was reported normal by the captain (PF) and as we descended airspeed and altimeter readings appeared to return to normal indications.  We requested ATC to give us frequent airspeed and altitude read outs to back us up in case we were experiencing any failures that we were unaware of.  When we landed all EICAS messages were cleared and all indications in the cockpit were normal. The Captain contacted Dispatch and Maintenance while I did my post flight inspection so they could have Maintenance check ADC and ice detector issues.  No defects were noted during post flight and the aircraft was found with no ice upon landing.

Ice detector did not detect ice and we lost valuable minutes until ice was visible to flight crew. Suspected unforecast severe ice encounter.  Perhaps better detection of severe icing if that is possible (we were just completing a long deviation around level 5 thunderstorms). Better maintenance of ADC instruments and/or ice detector.

EMB145 Flight Crew experiences the loss of the First officer's airspeed indication at FL370.  An emergency is declared and the flight continues to destination for a normal laneding.  During descent all pitot static systems return to normal.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I can't say exactly what caused this. Everything was entered correctly into the FMS and the proper navigation mode was selected. The FMS and autopilot had worked correctly prior to and after that fix. The DOMNO fix is the last fix before the arrival splits into one of three directions depending on the runway assigned. My thought is that since there are several brand new procedures into IAH that there could possibly be a bug in the database of the FMS or it was an isolated incident. We were on the new DRLLR one arrival into IAH when I noticed approaching DOMNO intersection that the autopilot was not starting a turn towards DOOOM intersection. We hadn't reached the fix yet but we were at the point where the autopilot starts leading the turn. I quickly checked that the arrival was put in correctly; it was; and that the First Officer had the plane in LNAV; he did. We were now on top of the intersection and I spun the heading bug to point us at DOOOM. The plane crossed over the fix and went into lateral mode so I hit heading mode to get the plane back on course. ATC said it looked like we had just flown over the intersection and I told him that we were navigating towards DOOOM. Nothing else was said and we continued the arrival. I would like to address these descend via arrivals that we are now receiving. Some of these arrivals; including this new DRLLR one in IAH; are increasing the cockpit workload to dangerous levels. I was so busy as pilot monitoring and PIC making sure that all of these step downs and airspeeds were complied with that I was very late at calling in range; getting landing performance; briefing the passengers and setting up for the approach. Our attention is so focused on making sure we comply with the arrival that if any other situation arises such as weather; mechanical issues; passenger issues; approach briefing discussions; we run a very high risk of missing a restriction. I understand that this is the new approach that ATC wants to take with arrival procedures and it probably works great for pilots who fly airplanes that are VNAV equipped but it is creating a hazard to those of us who don't have these capabilities.

Another EMB145 crew experiences the failure of the autopilot to make the turn over the DRLLR fix on the DRLLR 1 RNAV arrival to IAH. Manual intervention minimizes the deviation.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

EICAS displayed LE SLAT DISAGREE ; LE SLAT ASYM on Final approach. Go Around-Ran QRH -Landed no problems.EICAS Displayed LE SLAT Disagree; LE SLAT ASYM. Ran QRH and landed on next approach.

B757 Captain reported executing a go-around after receiving a LE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message. Crew ran QRH and subsequent landing was uneventful.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 192; Flight Crew Type 6566

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 4597

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was the Pilot Monitoring to IAH. During our descent to IAH; we were vectored east off the MSCOT4 arrival into IAH for traffic separation. Houston Approach advised us to expect the DRLLR4 arrival now and also advised we would be following a heavy B777 which was following a Super A380. We were given direct to MPORT and cleared to descend via DRLLR4 after MPORT. We were assigned 280 KTS and were told to expect 250 KTS after MPORT. TCAS display had target at about 8 NM precisely on arrival ND green line in front of us. I looked at our wind and noticed calm winds at FL180. I then stated something to the effect that this wasn't going to be good for wake turbulence. Somewhere between MPORT and DRLLR around 15000 FT MSL and prepared for an encounter; we hit the worst wake turbulence I have ever experienced! With autopilot on in NAV and DES mode the aircraft rolled toward 35 degrees left very quickly. At 30 degrees AOB (Angle of Bank); without thinking; I immediately turned off the autopilot and thought I said I have the controls (not sure) and rolled the aircraft back towards wings level. We then got a 'DUAL INPUT' call and Captain stated he had the controls. We leveled off and called Houston Approach with PIREP. Approach immediately assisted us with vectoring us off course and had us level off at 14000 FT MSL. The aircraft behind us also quickly complained about wake turbulence very soon after our encounter. After additional separation from the Heavys; Approach cleared us to descend and we received a different runway assignment to avoid additional encounters.I called Houston Approach and asked that they review the tapes and see if there were and separation/spacing issues and suggested they save the tape for data collection on significant wake turbulence encounters. During our conversation I learned that we trailed the Heavy 777 by 6 miles when we entered its wake. The precision of the GPS and RNAV arrivals/departures combined with standard 3 degree descent profiles are now creating a greater risk of wake turbulence encounters. Add to that a light wind summer day aloft and we have the formula for a serious incident.I would also like for the [company] to review our data for collection and training. Our flight profile could be used for a [training] event and I believe my reaction could have made the situation worse if I hadn't had a very similar wake turbulence episode with 'Dual Input' as the pilot flying on takeoff. During that event I had proper full stick right during the recovery and the IOE Captain reacted like I just did but didn't stop his input when 'Dual Input' was heard and we rolled all the way over to 35 degrees to the other side before we recovered. Having flown the A320 for over 13 years; not knowing what the other pilot is doing with the stick input can be a serious deficiency when attempting unusual attitude recovery. We need to re-emphasize unusual attitude recovery with auto-pilot on and wake encounters.

On the arrival into IAH (DRILLR RNAV ARR) we were advised by ATC that we were following an A-380 heavy. Descending thru 15;000 feet A/P engaged; the aircraft entered into slow progressive 35 degree left bank. I disengaged the A/P and flew the airplane manually. Advised ATC what had happen and we were given a different altitude and heading; re engaged the A/P continued on the arrival. Rest of flight was uneventful.

A320 flight crew reported encountering severe wake turbulence 6 miles in trail of a B777 on arrival into IAH.


Final Approach; Initial Approach; Descent

Flight Crew Total 3394; Flight Crew Type 1136

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We picked up [aircraft] to ferry it to ZZZ. This aircraft did have a test flight performed on it earlier with no issues. Due to a late inbound deadhead; we were about 2 hours late. We would arrive at ZZZ after midnight; so fatigue was a concern; despite being rested from before.Our aircraft was ready for us with a valid MRD. After a thorough inspection we departed without any event. Approximately 1 hour prior to landing we received a momentary EICAS message for Unscheduled Stab Trim. The incident appeared to be an anomaly as it cleared before we could get the checklist out and the aircraft flew normally. We reviewed the checklist as a precaution and chose to proceed to ZZZ. At this time; while most likely unrelated; we noticed that the Right HYD QTY dropped from its pre-departure level of 1.0 to .78 where it stabilized for the duration of the flight.We elected to conduct a CATIII approach into ZZZ (VMC) because it was due for the aircraft. On approach after lowering the gear; we received 3 greens but the Gear Door light remained illuminated. As we did not have time to get the checklist out; we elected to go-around and troubleshoot. Due to our concern for the gear possibly not cycling correctly; and the fact that we were still indicating 3-greens; we decided not to retract the gear during the go-around. We configured for F5 180 knots. The gear door light went out during the go-around.ATC vectored us around for the visual. During the second approach I noticed that the flap handle did not 'feel right'. In my opinion; it seemed very loose except for around the 15-20 detents were it appeared to almost bind. I was able to select and receive 30 degrees. Then; we performed a normal landing; however; on roll-out the #2 Thrust Reverser would not deploy. Upon clearing the runway we brought the flaps up; which again; did not feel normal.All of these things were written up and fully debriefed to Maintenance.

B757 First Officer reported that they received a momentary EICAS message for an Unscheduled Stab Trim.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

Approaching assigned altitude of FL270; both FUEL XFR LEVEL LO annunciators began to cycle erratically. Verified switches were in correct position (AUTO); and fuselage tank was almost empty. At this point both lights stayed on. Since operating these pumps without fuel present creates a rapid; high-heat situation; we did a control transfer; declared an emergency and diverted. We executed the appropriate abnormal checklist; which successfully secured the transfer pumps via pulled CB's; and landed uneventfully. Appropriate transfer pump checklist item was successfully completed during preflight. Fuel transfer pumps failed to shut off after fuselage tank empty.

BE400 Captain reports failure of fuel pumps in the fuselage to shut off when the tank is empty. The abnormal checklist is consulted and the pumps are secured via pulled circuit breakers. The flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 6733; Flight Crew Type 1681

I was on an IFR flight plan; in the clouds; nearing the THA airport. My plane was equipped with an IFR certified GPS system. I had planned the flight carefully (I thought) and had reviewed all necessary information and NOTAMS for the flight. I was being handled by Memphis Center. The controller asked which approach I wanted. Given that the ceiling was reported 2500 broken but variable; and just below the 3300 transition altitude; I told him that I wanted the VOR 24 approach. He cleared me direct to the Tullahoma VOR (UXM) at 3300 and cleared me for the approach. I had been navigating using the GPS system in my plane and continued to use it to go direct to the UXM VOR. I tried tuning in the UXM VOR on my VOR receiver; but did not get a good signal. I told ATC that I was not receiving the VOR. He told me that he did NOT have any NOTAMS showing that the UXM VOR was out of service. So I continued to use the GPS to navigate to the UXM VOR--which is allowed--thinking that since the VOR was a low powered one that I was just not yet getting a good signal. Another plane behind me asked for the VOR 24 approach. Then he reported that he was not receiving the UXM VOR either and asked for a different approach. I began to be concerned; but I knew that I could substitute my IFR certified GPS for an out-of-service VOR legally; but I could not use it for navigation on the final approach fix. Soon I started getting needle movement on my VOR receiver; but never a good signal. I don't know what this signal was--perhaps another VOR? I continued to navigate to the UXM VOR using my IFR certified GPS system and broke out of the clouds into VFR conditions just before reaching the UXM VOR. I started to descend VFR; turning back toward the airport. While doing this; I reported to ATC that I had lost the signal on the UXM VOR again; but that I was VFR. I cancelled IFR at that time--while VFR and before having to navigate the final approach course for the UXM VOR.As it turns out; the UXM VOR had been NOTAMED out of service (OTS) and I had missed this NOTAM in the dozens that had to be reviewed. ATC apparently also missed it; because the controller told me that he did not have any NOTAMS for the UXM VOR. The other plane behind me also missed the NOTAM; because he also asked for the VOR 24 approach using the UXM VOR. So two pilots and one controller did not know that the UXM VOR has been NOTAMed OTS.Certainly; I should have been more careful in my review of the NOTAMS. Having said that the NOTAM system is badly broken and the FAA is working on fixing it. As it stands now; pilots and controllers are supposed to review pages and pages of NOTAMS many of which are basically un-readable. Nonetheless; I should have seen the NOTAM and requested a different approach. I will be more careful in the future.I do not believe that any violation of the FARs occurred. I was navigating the approach transition to the UXM VOR using an IFR certified GPS system and broke out into VFR conditions without using that system to navigate the final approach course. Having said that; missing the NOTAM was sloppy at best. But two pilots and the controller not knowing about the NOTAM testifies to problems with the NOTAM system as it is today.

An Bonanza 36 pilot reported flying a VOR approach using a NOTAMed out of service VOR. Reporter cited the poor formatting and presentation of NOTAMs as contributory.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.25

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was on the RNAV Z approach for Runway 22L. The aircraft had been cleared to land. The approach naturally brings aircraft in on a slight angle to the runway. Aircraft X appeared to be coming in at an angle on short final; but aligned with the runway prior to crossing the threshold. However; an ASDE alert triggered with Taxiway Y; which is parallel to Runway 22L. I instructed the aircraft to go-around. The aircraft went around and later landed without incident.This approach is likely to be problematic in the future because the angle it brings in aircraft on lines up with Taxiway Y until the last minute. It might be best this approach not be used if it can be avoided.

MDW Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation when an aircraft lined up with a taxiway instead of the runway.  Controller reported this approach is likely to be problematic because the angle it brings in aircraft on; lines up with Taxiway Y; until the last minute.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 5021; Flight Crew Type 3721

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

While taxiing for departure at MCO from a southwest location on the field to a departure from Runway 17R ([Runway] 18L closed for construction and [Runway] 18L closed for aircraft issue); Ground Controller gave me taxi instructions from the FBO to Alpha to Bravo 2 cross [Runway] 18R and hold short of [Runway] 18L. After arriving and holding short of [Runway] 18L he issued further instructions to cross [Runway] 18L turn right on Charlie then left on Juliette to Juliette 4 and hold short of Juliette 4. Ground then gave a corporate jet following me the same instructions except for them to hold at Juliette 2. I asked Ground to clarify my hold at Juliette 4 and he confirmed. I continued taxi when he said for me to hold and let the corporate jet pass me since he had a slot time into his destination; which I did. He said after the corporate jet passed to continue on to [Runway] 17R and monitor Tower on 118.45. I asked the Ground Controller if he still needed the hold at Juliette 4 which he said I was already past Juliette 4 and just follow the corporate jet.Then I realized that the Juliette 4 taxiway sign was positioned facing to the north and it was necessary to face south to see it. I was taxing east on Juliette and failed to see the sign. I had seen the Juliette 3 sign and was prepared to stop; but obviously got past J4 and stopped before I got to J5 when I observed the sign. There were no other aircraft in the vicinity other than the corporate jet; which passed me on the Airside 2 ramp and no issues resulted to my knowledge. I have been flying out of MCO for many years and this was a highly irregular taxi due to the closure of both [runways] 18R and 18L; so I was diligently paying attention to the taxi instructions since I was operating in the air carrier environment. I am amiss how I could have possibly gotten by J4 without seeing it. In reviewing the airport diagram for MCO it appears J3 and J4 share the same taxiway that is undivided by a median of grass so maybe one is for inbound and the other for outbound to the north side of Airside 2 air carrier ramp. If that is the case the sign was positioned on the east side of the taxiway thus past it before it is visible. I know it is my responsibility to adhere to all instructions and I obviously missed this one. In the future I will stop taxi and query the controller before potentially making a similar mistake. I don't think any issues resulted; but nonetheless I don't like making mistakes especially when I am so diligently paying attention and watching intently for my hold short point.

The reporter returned to that area of MCO by ground vehicle and visually verified that the correct taxiway signage on the north side of Taxiway J approaching Taxiways J3 and J4. The signs are difficult to see in a small aircraft; but probably not difficult in an air carrier type aircraft higher off the pavement.

A pilot reported he failed to hold short of MCO Taxiway J4 while taxiing eastbound on J because he did not see the J4 sign because it was difficult to see in an aircraft low to the ground.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were scheduled to take a CRJ 700 on a passenger revenue trip however; due to multiple cancellations and maintenance issues; we wound up taking an empty jet instead. Nevertheless; we requested cargo load report (CLR) from ramp crew and prepared the manifest. Upon running the number -- w/ negative bags -- ACARS returned a solution indicating a need for ballast (in the forward cargo area). The Captain relayed the information to Ramp Personnel -- face to face -- and the Ramp Personnel relayed the information to their Operations office to process and authorize the request. Shortly thereafter; Ramp Personnel returned to the flight deck and advised they'd place 400 pounds of ballast onboard the aircraft -- in the forward cargo area -- and handed us a new CLR which indicated the same. We continued our checklists and tasks and proceeded without incident. Upon our arrival and after shutdown; the Captain advised Ramp Personnel we we'd arrived with 400 pounds of ballast and they were welcome to it. During my prefight walk around; the ramp crew advised there was absolutely NO ballast aboard the aircraft. I returned to flight deck and informed the Captain. A moment later; as we prepared for the return flight; Ramp Personnel came up to the flight deck and reconfirmed what they'd told me earlier -- there was NO ballast aboard when we arrived. The ramp crew [from origin airport] said they'd put it on and never did.The requirement for [company] ramp crews to seek permission and authorization from [company] operations when the need for ballast arises removes ramp crew autonomy and adds an extra layer of oversight to a process that may not need it. Remove [company] operations personnel from the equation...allow ramp crew chief to execute the loading of ballast upon request from the flight crew.

CRJ-700 First Officer reported they were notified at arrival station that their requested ballast was not loaded.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

A Dash 8 taxiing to depart Runway 35 at K. Aircraft cleared for take off while still on Taxiway E. Procedures do not allow aircraft to line up and wait for an intersection departure after sunset. A CRJ2 landed Runway 26 and was exiting runway. The CRJ2 was given exiting instructions and cleared to taxi D and G and to cross Runway 35. The Dash 8 was not on runway yet and was overlooked. I was distracted by conversation in the tower.

PHL Controller reported a possible runway separation error between a landing aircraft cleared to cross Runway 35 at Taxiway G and a departure cleared for take of from Runway 35 while still on Taxiway E.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On departure out of ZZZ we were notified our aircraft was off course. ATC then asked us if our clearance was to ZZZZZ we agreed ZZZZZ was our clearance however this was when we noticed the aircraft was improperly navigating on the ZZZZZ1 transition. ATC told us to fly heading 071 and then re-cleared us direct to ZZZZZ.Once ATC notified us of our error; it was immediately clear I had loaded the incorrect transition and we both missed this error during the route review. This is a common 'gotcha' out of ZZZ that I am normally very vigilant of; because both ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 have similar names and departure directions. Expectation bias was the casual factor in my case; as I had the clearance in my hand and checked the route points as they were read aloud but as ZZZZZ1 was stated and I crossed checked the printed clearance I now realize that I likely saw and read back ZZZZZ1 on the printout even though ZZZZZ was printed on the actual clearance. Lastly our lack of recency due to the flying draw down was a contributing factor in committing this error. Neither Captain or myself had flown much at all in the last 70+ days. This was also the first east bound flight on the ZZZZZ3 [departure] for both of us in about 2-3 months.While the error clearly rests within the cockpit in this instance; I do believe the similarities in names of both fixes creates an additional challenge. I think all established company procedures are designed to trap this very type of error so nothing else should be added/changed with SOP. We followed company procedure in our route verification however; the execution of that procedure was in error.

At the gate we checked the route and didn't catch the error loading the flight plan. I read the box and the FO checked it against the clearance/flight plan. Similar sounding transitions on the ZZZZZ departure were verified. Total mileage didn't vary enough to trap any errors either. We were cleared the ZZZZZ transition but started to fly the ZZZZZ1 transition. After passing ATC verified our clearance a few miles after ZZZZZ2 and gave us a heading then cleared us to a fix down line. Been off for 2 months I'm sure had a bearing on the event both the FO and I had been off for a long time due to COVID-19 reductions. Verify the clearance. Go slower to make sure all points are verified in the box. Especially after being off for such a lengthy time.

Air carrier flight crew reported flying an incorrect departure transition that had a similar sounding name as the clearance transition. The crew stated that lack of recent flying was a contributing factor.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 1780; Flight Crew Type 1467

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

Aircraft X checked on and I informed him that I would need to climb him to 12;000 in the BYI area due to the MEA. He acknowledged. When aircraft X was a few minutes away from BYI; I issued a climb to 12;000. No response. I tried again to no avail. I then proceeded to have two different aircraft on a different frequency attempt to reach aircraft X to issue the climb. The other frequency is to the west side of BOI instead of the one to the East. I thought it was possible that aircraft X was put on the west frequency.Neither aircraft were able to reach aircraft X. I continued to try and reach aircraft X on the frequency that he should have been on and then a VFR aircraft that was in the same vicinity; again to no avail. Big Sky Approach also attempted and got no response. The VFR aircraft in the same vicinity as aircraft X then gave it an attempt using Big Sky Approach's frequency and still nothing. By now; aircraft X was past BYI where the MEA jumps up to 11;400 and now clipping an MIA area of 11;300. I notified the CIC and he in turn let the next sector know. At this point; the next sector has the handoff w/ NORDO in the fourth line. Then; out of the blue aircraft X checked on and stated that a 'fellow on a different radio' called him. I issued the climb to 12;000 since there was another MIA ahead above 11;000 (11;400). It appeared that he was already climbing; as the mode C showed 11;400 or 11;500 right after I issued the climb. I then coordinated with the sector that had radar control of the aircraft.I would say I should have been more aware of what frequency the aircraft was on upon check on. And I could have always issued the climb earlier and possibly been able to reach the aircraft.

I was flying direct at 11;000 feet and had been transferred to Center. I had checked in with them; but was having problems hearing them since there was lots of static in the air. I assumed it was due to the cloud build up in the area. They did mention that I would need to climb to 12;000 feet further ahead. I told them I would wait to hear from them when they wanted me to climb. Further along the flight I received a call from another airplane that Center wanted me to climb to 12;000 feet and contact them.I started my climb and contacted Center. They said to climb to 12;000 feet. I acknowledged that I was climbing to 12;000 feet. When I landed the Tower said to call Center for a possible pilot deviation. I called the number and talked to a man who said he was Operations Manager. He said I had went through MEA (Minimum Enroute Altitude) of 11;000 feet to 12;000 feet. I told him I received the call from the other plane who said SLC wanted me to climb to 12;000 feet contact them which I did while I was climbing. He said it looked like I did everything I could and after the air to air I called them right away and was already climbing. He did not see it as a pilot deviation; but will pass it along. He said if someone wants to call me he has my cell number. He was puzzled why I could not hear them on their frequency. I told him as soon as I heard the air to air I called and was already in the climb. I told him there was quite a lot of static today that I thought might have something to do with the cloud buildup in the area.

A Center Controller reported attempting to climb an aircraft entering higher terrain; but lost radio contact with the aircraft.


Aircraft / UAS; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 4531; Flight Crew Type 2567

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Visual Observer (UAS); Person UAS Crew

We were conducting a training flight at ZZZ in Aircraft X large fixed wing UAS. All pre-departure activities were normal and uneventful. We took off from Runway XX. Our Visual Observer for the day was overhead in position for departure. We applied power and began a normal takeoff run and became airborne somewhere near the midfield point. About one minute after power application we were over the departure end of the runway (directly over the numbers for Runway XY) and had just reached approximately 300 ft. AGL. We were about to commence our right turn into the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern when I saw an aircraft; later identified as helicopter Aircraft Y; come into view from the left side of the HUD display. The aircraft appeared to be at our same altitude and on a collision course with us. I yelled out 'Hard Right Turn' and the pilot at the controls immediately complied. It appeared full control input was not applied; so I told him full deflection turn; which he complied with. Almost immediately after ordering the hard right turn; we heard Visual Observer come on the radio and advised an 'immediate right turn to the east' which we complied with. At this point we lost all sight of the helicopter and were completely reliant on Visual Observers for our situational awareness. After arriving at our easterly heading; Visual Observer advised to continue the turn to the south which we again complied with. During this turn I asked our Visual Observer if continuing the turn to the west would be advisable to avoid the helicopter and they said yes. We continued the right turn to heading of west. The helicopter continued east and I called for a climb to 6;500 ft. MSL to put some distance between the two aircraft. Shortly after we leveled off at 5;000 ft. MSL; Visual Observer advised that the helicopter had landed on the southeast corner of the [landmark]. This would have put them directly under our final approach to Runway XX at about 1.5 miles or so. We remained at this altitude for approximately 15 minutes when Visual Observer advised the helicopter had shut down on the ground and their rotors were no longer turning. We descended for the traffic pattern during which we noticed the visibility decreasing rapidly from smoke blowing into the area from local fires. I contacted Visual Observer to see if they concurred with the observation which they did. They said the flight visibility was decreasing alarmingly fast so we decided to conduct a full stop and call it a day. The helicopter was transiting from south to north directly over the departure end of an active airport runway at approximately 300 ft. AGL with no radio communication whatsoever. Attempted to contact the helicopter with no response.

UAS pilots had a near miss with a helicopter on climb out and took evasive action.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Upon passing about 20;000 feet to 21;000 feet in the vicinity of ZZZ VOR; both the FO (First Officer) and I heard an unusual 'popping' sound coming from behind the door; then a steady loud 'hissing' sound. Before we finished asking each other what was that; one of the FAs (Flight Attendant) called; saying the noise is coming from the main passenger door. I had immediately said to the effect; for them to sit down and get buckled just in case there is a door failure; and we will be descending to a lower altitude. My FO must have heard me say about the descent; as he appeared to hit the ALT button on the flight control panel; and scrolling 10;000 feet. Just to be clear; I said to the FO; emergency decent and I'm requesting priority handling with ATC. I called Center; [Requesting Priority Handling] for a probable pressurization and main door issue; initially needing 10;000 feet as our safe altitude. Center gave it to us. The FO; PF (Pilot Flying); performed the rapid descent.A few moments into the descent; I noticed the cabin pressure was increasing; but not rapidly. I checked the Doors page; and all doors indicated 'Green;' including the main passenger door; but without being more certain about any damage yet; we descended at our current airspeed.  Around 16;000 feet; I gave Center the souls on board count; asked direct to ZZZ; and would get back with them. The FO continued PF duties; while I was talking with Center; talking with FAs about their status; pulling out the QRH for Passenger Door with No-EICAS message (none; with closest being Passenger Door Warning); and ACARS Dispatch being a [priority] aircraft for the Passenger Door. In my peripherals while doing these things; the average decent rate was about 2;500/minute holding current airspeed; pressure was stabilized; going lower; with less possibility of masks deploying or sudden loss of pressure.During the initial ACARS messages; I informed Dispatch we were an [priority] aircraft; descending to 10;000 feet with passenger door issue; pressure was stable/stabilizing; doors are indicating 'green' and we could continue to ZZZ. In hind-sight while writing this; I should have asked Dispatch if to continue to ZZZ; or divert somewhere closer and suitable. I learned later with a call from on-duty pilot in [Dispatch]; I had not included [Maintenance Control] with the initial couple ACARS; and this could have also aided in the decision-making process to continue as we did; or divert.While cruising at 10;000 feet direct to ZZZ; I continued to write ACARS; talk to FAs as needed; and Center as needed. Talking with the FA's was difficult for us to understand each other with the continuous hissing sounds. I had informed the FAs; that we are continuing to ZZZ and expecting a normal landing; therefore it's a Yellow Level; they seemed to verbalize a confirmation understanding Yellow Level and continuing to ZZZ.Shortly after talking with the FAs about the Yellow Level; I proceeded to make a PA to all the passengers. I informed them; we had descended to a lower altitude for an abundance of caution; at that time we were continuing to ZZZ; expecting a normal landing there along with the expected time of arrival; and apologized for the discomfort the sounds may be causing.Approaching ZZZ; I gave the standard in-range PA to the passengers; with gate information; arrival time; and again stated expecting a normal landing at this time.During the final approach and landing; the hissing sound stopped at about 2;000 feet. Upon landing; we double check the doors page; asked the FAs if the door was physically normal; and if they knew anyone needing special assistance. Once they gave a hurried yes indication; I notified Tower we would terminate the emergency. We taxied to the gate as normal. At the gate; I learned the forward FA; was complaining of terrible headache; and difficulty hearing. I asked her directly; if she needed medical attention. After a couple times asking; she said she should get checked out by medical personnel. I asked the FO; to call operations as our forward FA needs to be checked by medical personnel. No other passengers or crew needed medical attention. Because I was completing the discrepancy log; talking with Maintenance; and then phone call from on-duty pilot; I am uncertain if she received medical attention near the gate; in the jet-bridge; or anywhere else in the airport. What I can say; is she was talking on the phone with likely Dispatch saying about needing to be checked out; and the same with the gate agent. Myself; the FO; and aft FA continued on to the [next leg]; with a new FA taking the other's place.Maintenance met aircraft at the gate; and discovered approximately 4-6 inch area of the door seal had separated from the door. The seal itself was still serviceable from what the mechanics said when they had invited me down to see for myself.

I was the PF (Pilot Flying) and the Captain was the Pilot Observing. Climbing through approximately 22;000 feet. I heard a loud almost popping like sound then a constant loud hissing like sound coming from the other side of the flight deck door. When that happened the Captain and I looked at each other instantaneously with big eyes and at the same time the call button rang from the forward FA (Flight Attendant). I overheard the Captain tell the FA to sit down and buckle up. When he hung up I quickly asked him something to the effect 'do we need to descend to 10;000 feet?' (I suspected main cabin door seal) The Captain said yes so I stopped our climb immediately while the Captain was [Requesting Priority Handling] and requested a descent to 10;000 feet. We got immediate clearance to do so; so I put 10;000 feet in the altitude pre-select; the thrust levers to idle; full speed breaks and selected vertical speed and initially set rate of about 4;000 FPM and pulled my oxygen mask out; and I did not put it on. The autopilot was engaged the whole time.Once we were established in the descent I had a second to look at the cabin altitude. From my recollection it was showing about 2;100 feet and I believe a cabin rate increase of about 600 feet. At that point it did not appear that we were having a rapid decompression; I pointed out the cabin pressure to the Captain and did not feel a descent as aggressive as I was doing was necessary so I slowed the rate down to 2;500 FPM. Leveled off at 10;000 feet and continued to ZZZ. I continued to fly the aircraft as the Captain communicated with Dispatch; [Maintenance Control]; ran checklists and made a PA to the passengers. At some point a Controller asked us if we wanted to turn back to ZZZ1 or continue to ZZZ; we had good door indications so we elected to continue to ZZZ. We had several Controller changes enroute to ZZZ and we never [retracted priority handling]. I only said that because the Dispatcher kept asking if we were going to [Request Priority Handling] with approach? We got priority handling to ZZZ; we were greeted by ZZZ's [Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting]. We taxied off the runway without incident and stopped on the taxiway for a few minutes to asses everything then we continued to the gate without further incident. I stayed in the flight deck while the passengers were getting off the airplane and the Captain stood at the door. I only heard one lady say something like 'I didn't understand why we were descending that quickly at first.' That is the only comment I heard. The forward FA was complaining about having a headache and that their ears hear so the Captain asked me to contact operations and have them send medics to the airplane to check out the FA. After all the passengers were off I gathered my things and hurried across the terminal to our next flight. Nobody met us at our plane; like from management; to check on the Captain and I. There were a couple people there for the FA's but I couldn't tell you who you were.A 4-6 inch piece of the main cabin door seal dislodged from what holds it to the airplane is what I hear caused all the noise. Could have looked at the cabin altitude and rate before being so aggressive with the descent but wanted to get the aircraft descending first because of what could be a time critical situation.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported entry door seal failure inflight; resulting in a diversion.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Company Policy; Aircraft

On Aircraft X arrival walk around found signs of delamination to right wing outboard trailing edge aft flap lower skin at inboard corner. A line technician and a lead line technician performed a tap test and agreed that flap shows signs of delamination. This was confirmed by a line sheet metal technician with a tap test and found out of limits per [manual] and updated the log page with details. But after all this; a Maintenance Supervisor signs off this log just by saying flap appears to be previously repaired; and provided no evidence and/or documentation of previous repair. Not only that but the Maintenance Supervisor also failed to mention in the sign off which trailing edge flap was inspected; left wing or right wing; inboard or outboard?This [report] is filed to report an FAA violation. The review of the log shows a trailing edge flap and also a bearing placed on AOG (Aircraft on Ground) since they were not in stock. A review of Maintenance log history was also performed and showed no record of repair done to this right wing outboard trailing edge aft flap. So let's get this straight: a line technician; a line lead technician and a line sheet metal technician agreed that this flap is delaminated with [manual] reference; but a Maintenance Supervisor can just say; appears to be; and sign it off! Really? Is this how we do maintenance? The union steward was informed of this and is investigating.

Technician reported that a supervisor signed off a log book entry and allowed an unairworthy aircraft to return to service.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During start of the Number 2 engine; after the fuel lever was placed in the on position; we observed the mechanic at our 10 o'clock position giving us the hand signal to shut down the Number 2 engine. We shut down the Number 2 engine and the mechanic immediately plugged into the intercom. He directed us to motor the Number 2 engine for 2 minutes. After approximately 1 minute; he directed us to pull the Number 2 fire handle and discharge the Number 1 fire bottle. We asked if we were on fire because we had no fire indications in the cockpit. The mechanic said we were on fire and to discharge the remaining fire bottle into the Number 2 engine. The mechanic told us they were bringing a lift truck to door L1 and we were to evacuate through that door. We executed the Evacuation Checklist per the QRH and egressed as directed through door L1.

During engine start; mechanic monitoring saw tailpipe fire on MD11 Number 2 engine. Crew discharged two fire bottles into the Number 2 engine and evacuated the aircraft.