Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were on approach to landing Runway 27. I was pilot flying. The approach was normal; in the flare I brought the thrust levers to idle at the appropriate time. The left thrust lever stopped at idle and the right continued slightly. When I went to deploy reverse thrust; the left reverser deployed and the right thrust lever went back a little bit more. The Captain took control of the airplane when only the left reverser deployed. After we were pulled off the runway; I saw the right engine was in shutdown and the engine was spooling down. We stopped on the parallel taxiway and restarted the engine before taxiing back to the gate.

First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying and I was the PM giving instruction. Approaching Runway 27 everything looked really good; FO was doing a good job keeping airspeed and keeping the aircraft on glideslope. Touchdown was firm and on centerline and well within our standards. I was guarding the flight controls with my feet on the rudder pedals and hand on the yoke. My right hand was down low on the lower pedestal just in case I needed to take over and add power. After main wheels touchdown FO brought the nose wheel down nice and gentle. On the roll out; FO deployed thrust reversers with only the left deploying. I looked down at the switches and both reversers where armed. Rolling down the FO told me there was a split on the power levers and it was then that I realized the right engine was shut down. I took over the controls and taxied off the runway. I never saw the FO pull the [shut-off] trigger and I always saw his hand on top of the power levers. I really do not know how the right engine shut down. I really cannot say what the cause of this was; since Standard Operations Procedures (SOP) was followed. FO or I never pulled the trigger to shut down the engine. FO and I retraced our steps and could not come up with an explanation on what could have caused the right engine to shut down while on the rollout.

Reporter stated the First Officer was in training and transitioning from Turboprops to their CRJ-700 aircraft. The aircraft and FO were performing just fine when the right engine suddenly shutdown. He has thought over and over again about the sequence of steps they had accomplished prior to the engine event and cannot find any reason for the shutdown except for an inadvertent contact with the shut-off trigger handle (switch) on the lower aft side of the engine throttle lever. All the more frustrating because the First Officer had performed very well and neither he; nor the FO could remember ever touching the shut-off trigger. Since the right engine restarted without any problems and no EICAS fault messages appeared; the possible movement of the right engine shut-off trigger seems to be the only plausible explanation.

A First Officer and Check Pilot reported a sudden; unexplained shutdown of the right engine on a CRJ-700 aircraft during the landing rollout on a training flight. The Check Pilot noted he never saw the FO pull the right engine shut-off trigger and only observed the First Officer's hand on top of the power levers.


Icing; Rain; Thunderstorm; Turbulence; 0

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 4700; Flight Crew Type 380

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On a typical; hot; Texas day I was flying a relatively light payload of cargo with building thunderstorms near Dallas and Houston. Our original flight plan was scheduled to make a fuel stop in Houston Hobby; then continue to destination. Upon looking at the current radar summary and satellite; the Captain and I decided to change our flight plan to Shreveport as the cells appeared to be moving in separate directions. Houston appeared to be in the path of the largest part of the storm. I had an XM weather display as well as the on-board WX radar to monitor the storms as we approached. The movement of the storms changed as they were growing rapidly; and the gap between them was getting smaller. About 50 miles to the south of the storms Houston Center advised that the gap was closed and aircraft had not penetrated the line for almost an hour. After discussing with the Captain; the on-board radar still showed almost a 15 mile gap in the cells with heavy precipitation. The tops in all the adjacent areas were reported 24;000 FT and lower. We were cruising at 17;000 FT and requested a block altitude of 16;000 to 18;000 FT in case of turbulence. Houston Center handed us off to Ft. Worth Center; who subsequently climbed us to FL190; deleting our block altitude clearance. We were told that the area was clear and we were given 'Deviations as necessary for Weather'. I slowed the plane to our turbulence penetration speed before entering the area between the cells 'painted' on the radar. The flight conditions included some light and moderate precipitation; trace rime ice; and light to moderate chop. The Captain issued a PIREP to the Controller as light chop; however; for just a moment or two we were caught in a moderate down draft and lost about 400 feet of altitude. We were close to the company limit on our Turbine Temps; and I elected that it was not necessary to add power. This resulted in slightly more time spent in our altitude deviation. Fort Worth acknowledged our deviation and advised us to return to FL190 when able. I returned to FL190 as soon as the aircraft was able; and within 15 more minutes we were out of IMC and descending for Shreveport. We continued the rest of the way to destination without further incident and delivered out freight.

SD3 First Officer reports loosing 400 feet from FL190 while passing between thunderstorms in IMC with with some moderate down drafts. The engines were operating near their limits; delaying the return to assigned altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 9225; Flight Crew Type 4825

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Total 9700; Flight Crew Type 830

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

While being vectored to final during the dogleg we received a Level 2 'Air System Pressure 3 Lo' alert. I began to secure air system 3 using our QRH. During this time we noticed a 'Confirm Engine Out/Clear' prompt on our MCDU. I asked the Captain if he had split the throttles for some reason and he replied 'no.' I selected 'clear.' Shortly after we then received a Level 2 'Engine 3 RPM Lo' alert as we rolled out on approximately 8 mile final. We then initiated the QRH checklist then upon reaching the FAF the Captain elected to finish configuring. The runway was in sight; aircraft was stable; and the Captain left the throttle in idle (still producing power) and landed uneventfully. After clearing the runway the Captain elected to secure the Number 3 Engine. Taxi was uneventful. There were many factors in play during this approach. Newark was just finishing a strong blizzard; JFK and other area airports (we had heard) were closed so rather than going back into the weather we elected to land. In hindsight; since we had enough fuel we probably should have been vectored back out for another approach; declare an emergency and verify we had run all appropriate checklists.

We were being vectored to the ILS when we had an Air System 3 low press alert. The First Officer took out the checklist and secured the Number 3 Air System. We were about 15 NM from the airport. We continued with the approach while beginning to configure for landing. Just before being vectored for the final intercept heading the First Officer asked if I had split the throttles. I said no. He then cleared the confirm engine out that came in the MCDU. The Number 3 Engine had not rolled back enough for us to notice a problem. The autopilot was on and flying the aircraft just fine. As we approached about an 8 NM final we got an Engine 3 low RPM alert. The First Officer initiated the Engine 3 Low RPM Checklist. We were then approaching the outer marker. I told the First Officer to complete the Landing Checklist as we finished configuring for landing. We then finished the Low Rpm Checklist after landing. The weather was well above CAT 1 minimums with good braking action. I decided to land instead of going around because I did not want to go back into the weather when I had the runway in sight. We were very busy and I had the thought to call for an emergency but elected to land. In hindsight I should've declared an emergency just to make sure ATC was in the loop.

MD11 flight crew experiences an Air System 3 low pressure alert while being vectored for approach. A few minutes later an Engine 3 low RPM alert is displayed. The Low RPM Checklist is initiated by the First officer; but the Captain elects to complete the Landing Checklist and land before completing the Low RPM Checklist.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 193; Flight Crew Type 3

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

When I just landed at ZZZ; Ground gave me instruction to taxi via Bravo-Echo (for refueling). So after that I went to the parking spot and parked my plane; and one gentleman from [the FBO] came and told me to move my plane all the way to the end to park my plane because the current place is for helipad (in my defense they didn't put any sign for the helipad; etc.); so I agreed to taxi the plane to the very end of their parking spot.When I am taxiing until the end; my parking spot was on the right side; the ground crew from [the FBO] gave me a turn sign (turn lights sign); instead of turn off the plane; so we can tow the plane and park (give an X sign).Before I can proceed my turn; I was pointed to the jet airplane that parked on my left side and the ground crew keep giving a sign for me to turn (because the ground crew parked his golf cart on the right side of my wings). With caution I proceeded to turn and I collide with the very tip part of the jet airplane wing. Before the accident happened there wasn't any cones around the jet plane.As the pilot-in-command I failed to secure the safety of my aircraft; and will evaluate this as part of learning process for me to be a safe and professional pilot.

C162 pilot reported contacting the wingtip of a parked aircraft during taxi to parking spot.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 446; Flight Crew Type 11000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Climbing through FL380; we observed significant wing tip vortices and wake turbulence approaching our flight path. Anticipating possible aircraft upset I quickly turned off course to avoid; but did not have time to notify ATC until after initiating the turn. ATC called us to inquire about the turn as we were about to notify them. We turned back on course after avoiding the wake turbulence.Initially we believed we were going to avoid the wake turbulence; but it quickly moved towards our flight path. I should have been more conservative and requested a turn from ATC earlier to avoid even the possibility of encountering the wake turbulence.

B737-700 Captain reported a track deviation occurred when he turned to avoid visible indications of wake turbulence; which did not allow enough time to coordinate with ATC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

While providing training on outbound ground; the following event happened:Aircraft X was given taxi instructions to Runway 28R/N5 intersection departure. The session was extremely heavy/mostly difficult for the CPCIT Career Professional Controller In Training. After giving taxi instructions; the CPCIT moved on to other tasks that needed to be handled. After the session; the FLM told both the CPCIT and me that Aircraft X had to 'slam on the brakes' to avoid hitting another taxiing aircraft on an adjacent taxiway. When that happened; a flight attendant was injured; forcing the aircraft to return to the gate.After watching and listening to the replay; it is obvious that both the CPCIT and I missed a traffic call that should have been made to avoid the situation.While I cannot speak for the CPCIT; CPCIT may have thought that the aircraft established on the A taxiway would be blocked by that heavy jet; allowing the time needed to taxi Aircraft X off gate XWE. However; after viewing the replay; I do not believe this is the case. My focus was on things elsewhere on the airport when this aircraft was taxied; and I missed the instruction and traffic call.The only thing I can recommend that would have prevented this from happening is to ensure that my scan; as well as the CPCIT's scan is complete and through; and that any coordination between outbound ground and inbound ground is accomplished.I will continue to work on my abilities as a veteran Controller to maintain my scan; and pass those traits on to those who I train.

Tower Controller reported aircraft under their control had to slam on the brakes to avoid contact with another taxing aircraft; resulting in a Flight Attendant injury.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We were at FL370 in cruise. The first indication noticed by the crew was the low oil pressure alert for the #2 Engine. The oil pressure was rolling back through the yellow and below 13 PSI as I was pulling the QRH. We followed the QRH procedure for Low Oil Pressure to Engine Shutdown. We declared an emergency with ATC and requested FL200 after consulting FMC engine out altitude of FL226. We received clearance for direct [the departure airport] and to descend to FL200. After the turn was executed; the Captain transferred controls to me and alerted Dispatch (via ACARS) and briefed flight attendants and passengers. The Captain returned and received clearance to the IAF for the ILS. We briefed approach and arrival; analyzed the non-normal configuration landing chart; single-engine go-around procedures; confirmed ARFF would be available and standing by; completed QRH through approach and landing and executed a single engine overweight landing.

My First Officer advised me that we had a Master Caution and the Engine Display was annunciating LOW OIL PRESS on the Number 2 Engine. We checked the oil pressure indication and observed it rapidly falling and as we were watching; it fell below red line and appeared to stop at about 10 PSI. I retained control of the aircraft and asked my First Officer to run the checklist. I disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft while my First Officer accomplished the shutdown. Once the power was pulled back and the aircraft stabilized; I asked my First Officer to declare an emergency with ATC and request descent to FL200 as our single engine max altitude was being displayed as approximately FL220. Center cleared us direct to the airport and approved our descent to FL200. I set MCT on the Number 1 Engine; slowed the aircraft to our single engine speed of 243 KTS; engaged the autopilot; and began a driftdown while my First Officer completed the remainder of the 'Engine Failure/Shutdown' checklist. Once he reported the checklist complete; I transferred control of the aircraft to him so I could do some communicating and brief for the arrival. I first contacted my Purser and advised her that we had shutdown an engine due to low oil pressure and that we were returning. I gave her an estimate of 20 minutes until landing and that an evacuation was not anticipated and that she did not need to prepare the cabin for one. I then made a PA to our passengers explaining that we had a low oil pressure indication on an engine and that; as a precaution; we had shut the engine down and would be returning. I emphasized we were in no danger; that we receive a lot of training dealing with just this type of situation; that we would be landing soon; that our in flight crew would be preparing the cabin for landing and that I appreciated their understanding and cooperation. I then sent an ACARS message to our Dispatcher that we had shutdown an engine due to low oil pressure; and were returning. I began running the 'Single Engine Approach and Landing' checklist and briefed the arrival. There seemed to be some confusion with ATC as the Approach Controller asked us if we needed any emergency service. I emphasized to him at that point that we had shut an engine down; we had declared an emergency; and that; yes we were requesting emergency equipment upon landing. That seemed to get the point across. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. Even at high density altitude and landing weight about 6;000 LBS over maximum landing weight we only used about 2/3 of the runway and were able to exit and taxi to the gate without any assistance. Once we arrived at the gate; I made a logbook entry stating we had shutdown Number 2 Engine due to low oil pressure; and that we had completed an overweight single engine landing. I was subsequently contacted by Maintenance Control and spoke to an Engine Specialist who requested more specific information regarding what kind of oil pressure indications we had received and how much time the engine was run at low oil pressure before being shutdown. Interestingly; it wasn't until we were at the gate and talking to a Maintenance Technician that we noticed the oil quantity at zero. We had been so focused on the oil pressure that we failed to even see that the oil quantity was zero. Maintenance Control advised us that the ACARS download showed that the loss of oil and low oil pressure happened very quickly and that there was really nothing we could have done to save the engine. Both my First Officer and I commented to each other that we remembered the oil tank was full on that engine before departure because it stuck out to us that it was reading 100% when we initialized the ACARS for the flight.

B737 flight crew experiences loss of engine oil and engine oil pressure shortly after level off at FL370. The engine is shutdown and flight returns to the departure airport for an overweight landing.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft X was on approach talking to Tower. Tower called requesting control of Aircraft X so he could clear him for the visual approach. Aircraft X was cleared for the visual approach. Aircraft Y was several miles behind Aircraft X and reported the runway in sight; and was cleared for the visual approach. The spacing looked good so Aircraft Y was then shipped to Tower. Tower called moments later to inform me that both aircraft were going around due to wind shear and they were now requesting the opposite direction runway. I believe my mistake in this moment was that as a Radar Controller; I should have given Tower altitudes and headings to give to both aircraft before shipping them to me. At the very least; I should have inquired about what both aircraft would be doing when they came to me. Aircraft X checked in first requesting an ILS approach. He was in a climb through 3;800 feet in a 3;300 feet minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) and appeared to be runway heading so I assumed he had missed approach instructions. Shortly after; he leveled off at 4;000 feet. When I saw this; I immediately issued a climb to 7;000 feet but by then he entered a 4;200 foot MVA at 4;000 feet. Additionally; his response was asking me for a heading. I vectored him out for an ILS approach. Aircraft Y checked on at 3;800 feet in a 5;000 feet MVA. I did not issue him a climb or heading. I asked if he still had the runway in sight and wanted to do a visual approach. He said yes to both questions so I cleared him for the visual approach and shipped him to Tower. The Tower could have kept both aircraft on their frequency and worked them in the pattern since both aircraft have the runway in sight. He could have just changed them to the opposite direction runway. If that was not an option; then I should have given altitudes and headings for him to give the aircraft prior to them being returned to my frequency. We need standard missed approach instructions for visual approaches at for both runways.

A TRACON Departure Controller reported two aircraft called him executing missed approaches due to windshear and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude due to lack of coordination and no established procedure.


British Aerospace Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 11450; Flight Crew Type 2300

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

As we were being vectored for an ILS; TRACON gave us successive headings that turned us toward localizer interception. Then we heard and acknowledged a heading change to 170 degrees; almost 180 degrees from the inbound course. We were still several miles away from the localizer course. I commented that was odd; the PM said they must have had a conflict and wanted us behind another aircraft. A few moments later; TRACON commented that there were two aircraft with similar sounding callsigns; and called Aircraft X (us) to return to 330 degrees heading; our last previous intercept course; and for Aircraft Y to fly heading 170. No mention was made of any conflict. All subsequent radio calls were made with our complete call sign; and active crew concurrence of each transmission. We noted that the other aircraft required repeated contact attempts for Controller instructions. I should have pressed for verifying the instructions when we received the heading that put us on radar downwind after being on a 45 deg heading to intercept final. Had we been aware there was a similar callsign situation; we would have been more wary.

Two aircraft were on TPA TRACON frequency with similar sound call signs; one aircraft took the other aircraft vector which put it nearly 180 out of the intended track. ATC realized the error and became more accurate.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Wake turbulence encounter following a Boeing 747 on final approach. On radar downwind in VFR conditions we were cleared a visual approach following a 747 that was already established on final.  On the dog leg to final I was descending to arrive at the FAF at what would be a normal intercept for glideslope to runway 07R. Autopilot and autothrottles were connected at this time.  I noted on TCAS that we were 6 miles behind the heavy as we were about be aligned on final. Suddenly we encountered the wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft and the aircraft rolled quickly to the left. I took over controls manually and disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles while simultaneously recovering the airplane from the sharp bank to the left. The event happen very quickly; so I am unsure as to what bank angle we reached but estimating more than 30 and less than 45deg. We received a roll authority alert as the auto pilot had been unable to maintain level flight with the quick onset from the wake turbulence.  The aircraft recovered and we re-established ourselves on final. I mentioned to the First Officer that I was going to climb and maintain above the preceding aircraft flight path and also stay above glide slope for the remainder of the approach; planning to touchdown at 2;000 feet. The rest of the flight was uneventful and we landed normally in Anchorage.Looking back on this event I could have easily avoided encountering the wake turbulence.  When cleared for the visual approach behind the 747 I should've maintained my altitude instead of starting a gradual descent. I had plenty of time to descend later and descending at that time only increased the chances of encountering the wake. At the time; I was considering the fact that our distance was adequate and that we wouldn't have any issues following the 747 using normal visual cues /angle approaching the runway. I was wrong.  Even 6 miles behind the heavy the turbulence was strong and the rolling tendency abrupt. Not worth the risk; not to mention the discomfort to the passengers and crew. In the future I will certainly keep this in mind for a visual behind a preceding heavy aircraft to avoid this type of encounter.

B737-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to ANC in trail of a B747.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport

We operated a night flight to OAJ. We noted on the dispatch release the fact that the OAJ airport had a new; operational Tower and Ground Frequencies. The Company 10-7 page did not have the new frequencies; but since we had them from the release/NOTAM information; we were good. There was a note on the Dispatch NOTAMs about the new CTAF frequency being 132.65; but no mention of which frequency to use for the Pilot Controlled Lighting (PCL); once the Tower closed for the night (It is not mandated or required by the FAA to be the same as the CTAF; sometimes it's different). So on the night; RNAV approach; we asked the corresponding ATC facility 'which was the light frequency; 123.0 or 132.65?' Approach responded that we needed to use 123.0 for lights. We actually shot the first RNAV approach (due to the ILS being NOTAMed OTS; plus tailwind factor on 5) and had to miss; because at the derived DA minimums; we did not see the runway until it was too late. The runway end has no approach lights; not even simple ODALS; just the very basic REIL lights; which made it very difficult to see at minimums and in a foggy night. We set up for a second try at the RNAV/GPS approach; since we had plenty of fuel for that and then planned to divert to our alternate if necessary; with lots of reserve and extra fuel remaining. We were successful in seeing the runway REILS at minimums on the second RNAV/GPS 23 Approach. After a successful and safe approach and landing on RWY 23 at OAJ; we were taxiing in on the parallel taxiway when the runway and taxiway lights suddenly went out. We stopped the aircraft momentarily; while we clicked the light frequency given by Approach 7 times; as well as 5 times; to no avail. The lights never came on. We quickly decided that even with the failed lights (at least that was what we thought-we never guessed ATC gave us a bad or wrong frequency...); we could safely taxi the remaining 50-75 yards to the ramp entrance; which was very well illuminated; and go into our gate. The next day; when getting ready to depart OAJ during the day; we asked the new Tower what frequency should be used for the PCL lights; and explained that Approach gave us 123.0; and the 'new' Tower told us that Approach was in error; that the correct frequency to use for the lights is 132.65; and that they would pass the new and correct frequency to the approach facility. At least one problem was solved. We don't know how or why the runway lights were on already at night; since the Tower was closed and the lights would require normally pilot action; but we are certainly glad that they were on and stayed on long enough for us to land on a foggy night; and taxi 99 percent of the way to the ramp before going off. This unsafe condition was caused by a couple of unusual circumstances: First; by Approach Control giving out the incorrect frequency for the Pilot Controlled Lighting to an arriving night flight (they gave 123.0 instead of the correct 132.65). Secondly; by the Company not having an updated 10-7 airport page containing accurate frequency data. The best way to prevent such night incidents; which easily could have ended up in an unsafe aircraft state (such as; if the lights had gone dark during the flare on landing; or even during the last 50 feet of the landing; allowing a pilot to lose visual perception; and perhaps land hard; since a go-around that low would normally allow the landing gear to make contact with the runway); is to have good and accurate information. The NOTAM section of the Flight Release from Dispatch was a good effort (it had the new Tower and Ground Frequencies); but not enough; since it did not specify the Pilot Control Light frequency. And of course; having the FAA ATC approach facility be up to date and give to aircraft under their control the 'correct' frequency is a must. ATC can't be giving erroneous frequencies; or bad things are bound to happen. Additionally; keeping the Company 10-7 pages current is extremely helpful inpreventing incidents.

Air carrier Captain reported being issued the wrong frequency to activate pilot controlled lights at an airport where the Tower was closed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 11307; Flight Crew Type 8075

Approaching ZZZ we had a Dual FMC failure for about 32 minutes. We completed QRH for dual FMC failure. Advised ATC and [Maintenance Control]. Finished flight with conventional navigation. VOR to VOR and vectors for an ILS in ZZZ1.

B737 Captain reported Dual Flight Management Computer failure in flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Total 10594; Flight Crew Type 3001

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Enroute to coast-out was extremely busy. The initial FP had routing on/near the New York and Gander OCA's. After several queries as to who would issue our Oceanic Clearance; and several failed attempts at requesting CLNC through ACARS; we were give a re-route to 45N/50W.  Meanwhile Dispatch was suggesting a re-route north of an area of turbulence and weather that would have us entering the tracks at 47 or 48 North latitude.  Gander Domestic received that route and issued it verbally - RONPO 4750 4740 4830 as filed. I went direct RONPO and began editing the new route in the FMC.  I typed N4750 N4740 N4830 and then closed the route after 20W. This added 3 minutes to our FMC PROG page arrival time. We were cleared direct 4750 shortly later. I then queried dispatch about ETOPS ALTNS and ETP's. He said the RLS2 FP ETOPS ALTN's were still good; which was the previous re-route sent to us in flight. I entered them on Route2 and they looked proper as well i.e.; - they were near; but not exactly on the cleared route. This was expected since I didn't yet have the new FP (with exact ETP's - RLS3).  The printer later began printing RLS3; but did not finish until minutes before crossing N4750. I immediately began performing an ETOPS waypoint verification. The Relief Pilot had just come back from break. I pointed out to him that the bearing and distances from 50W to 40W and 40W to 30W were off by 6-7 degrees and 5 miles - showing 406NM vice 411 NM. Typically I see these match within 2-3 degrees and 0-2 NM.  Also of note looking back on the event; I was unable to upload new winds. We received an ACARS error message after sending an FMC wind request. Both of these occurred within minutes of crossing 50W. Radar service was terminated 5 minutes prior to crossing N4750. We had been proceeding direct to that point for about 30 minutes. Immediately after crossing 50W; we were called by Gander Oceanic [and informed] that we were 30 NM north of course. They directed us to turn 30 degrees right to re-join our route. The said they could see all our points on the crossing were 30 NM north of the cleared route.  As everything looked proper on the FMC legs and ND I then checked the POS init page and saw our position in the vicinity of 47.5N latitude; one half degree or 30 NM to the North. Gander issued further clarity that the waypoints must be typed incorrectly and check that the 'N' is trailing the lat/long vice leading. Specifically; 47N50W should be entered as 4750N vice N4750. I typed all the new points in with a leading 'N.'  Incredibly; a very recent database change accepts this as 47.5N/50W. We returned to course uneventfully thereafter.  I typed the waypoints incorrectly with a leading 'N;' and despite independent verification with the Captain; it was not discovered.

Our original route was ...JEBBY 45N040W 46N040W 48N030W 50N020W DINIM.... Our routing was on the border of Moncton FIR and New York Oceanic. We then received a reroute from Gander to NANSO RAFIN VODOR 45N050W. Then the Dispatcher recommended a more northerly route for turbulence avoidance. We agreed and then told by Dispatch that new route was approved by Gander. Route was RONPO 47N050W 47N040W 48N030W 50N020W SOMAX. At this point the route was entered as N4750 N4740 N4830 N5020 SOMAX ATSUR. IT SHOULD have been entered as 4750N 4740N 4830N 5020N with the N designator following the waypoint coordinates. The First Officer and Captain both monitored the waypoint entry and both missed the incorrect format of waypoints. We were then cleared direct to 47N50W and proceeded direct. We were in radar contact until terminated just before 47N50W. Captain was on break now. Because 47N50W was inserted as N4750 we were 30 miles north of course when the First Officers were notified by Gander of the course deviation. They were instructed by ATC to turn 30 degrees right to intercept the true course. The First Officers typed in the correct waypoints after Gander mentioned that the coordinates may have been entered wrong into FMC. We contacted Dispatch and the Duty Manager via SATCOM and Dispatch seemed to know exactly what we did as he reminded us of NOTAM CYHQA3151/14 stating that this issue has occurred several times in the North Atlantic since April and that this happened to a company flight last week. At no time was there any conflict with any other aircraft in the area.

B767 flight crew reports a navigational error entering the NATS at 47N50W after a reroute is issued by Gander. The three new waypoints required are entered with a leading 'N' instead of a trailing 'N' producing a waypoint that is accepted by the FMC but a half a degree north of the desired latitude. This error is detected by Gander and the cause is known.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Confusion; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Manuals; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy

My Airlines is approved for EFB Type B applications in 2013; and both the Captain and I were utilizing the Apple iPad as a Type B EFB; utilizing the Jeppesen Jepp FD Pro application to access Enroute and terminal charting. Both EFB's were operational and were utilized to conduct the approach briefing and to set up the aircraft to conduct an instrument approach to the ILS on Runway 20.During the approach; the Captain went to refer to his approach plate on his EFB. His screen was locked and requested that he change his passcode. He was unable to access his EFB during the approach. As we were on vectors to join the final approach course; he discontinued using his EFB and asked me for the information he was looking for referring to my iPad EFB. For about 45 seconds; while the Captain was dealing with his locked iPad; I continued the approach and accomplished both the pilot flying and pilot monitoring duties; configuring the aircraft and switching from approach to Tower. The Captain stopped working with his iPad and ran the Before Landing checklist and resumed the PM duties. The flight broke out at 300 FT AGL and landed uneventfully. Our Air Carrier's exchange account appears to require periodic passcode changes. Users have no control over when it requires the passcode change; and as the iPad EFB is still relatively new; neither one of us had personally seen this behavior in our EFB. Although recently we have heard anecdotally about the iPad asking for a passcode change. In this instance; the iPad requested a pass code change in a critical phase of flight; disabling the Captain's iPad as we intercepted and joined the localizer in IMC conditions.I would suggest: 1. Change the security settings of the Exchange account so that it does not require periodic passcode changes; or 2. Allow users to dictate when to change the passcode. 3. Disable the exchange account as recommended by Jeppesen.

An Air Carrier First Officer reported his Captain's iPad locked in flight because the Company supplied software required periodic pass code changes; and this periodic event which locks the EFB occurred during final approach in IMC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 500

Training / Qualification; Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

We were extended for almost 5 miles upwind before being cleared to turn our crosswind. While still far out on the downwind; Tower cleared another aircraft not even in the pattern yet to land and follow another aircraft on final. The aircraft replied they were still looking for traffic. I kept monitoring my student's downwind. About midfield downwind while watching my student's airspeed and altitude; a target popped up on our ADS-B MFD display just in time for me to look up and see this aircraft diving down from above and behind us on the left into the downwind right in front of us. I immediately took the controls from my student and initiated a 360 turn in the downwind and informed Tower what we were doing. Tower replied and apologized and soon after I noticed another Controller took over. I believe the incident occurred because the previous Controller was not monitoring traffic flow and sequencing correctly and the fact that this other aircraft had an inoperative transponder as do several other aircraft from this FBO. Being a highly congested airspace; having a transponder would have allowed us to see the aircraft earlier and possibly slow down or maneuver appropriately for spacing. Tower needs to address issues with sequencing and flow as there has been an increase in these problems recently.

C172 instructor pilot on downwind at PRC reports a NMAC with another C172 entering the pattern under Tower control. Reporter informs the Tower and initiates a right 360 to reenter the downwind.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 246; Flight Crew Type 31

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 1028; Flight Crew Type 50

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

We finished flight and taxied back to ramp. When we were close to the entrance of the ramp; my instructor took the flight controls and I just focused on the front side and left side. My instructor thought we can taxi clear of the King Air beside us; but we made a mistake and our aircraft's right wingtip scratched the nose of the King Air; which caused the strobe lights of our aircraft broken and a hole in the nose of King Air.

I went on a flight with my student to complete an incomplete lesson. As soon as we got back he was supposed to go to his commercial multi [checkride]. We went out and flew and came back and landed with no incident. As we taxied in I noticed that there was a pull through spot for the aircraft available. While turning into the ramp I took controls from my student. There were a line of two King Airs and a Twinstar to my right. While I was taxiing in I looked to the right and cleared the first aircraft. I then looked back to the right to see if I would clear the second aircraft and it looked like I would. I looked forward to ensure I didn't hit anything else. While I looked forward I struck the King Air. I then parked the aircraft and advised my supervisor.

DA-42 flight instructor and student reported contacting a parked King Air during taxi.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 10000

We were on the DRLLR 5 RNAV. The First Officer had already briefed the assigned runway which was the ILS 26R. I believe just prior to the DOMNO fix Approach asked us if we would be interested in the RNAV Y Runway 26R. Approach stated it would be much quicker getting us in. We both agreed and accepted the new assigned approach. I selected the approach in the FMC with the transition and we both verified the box. We felt a little bit rushed since it was a last minute reassignment; but it was totally self-induced.We were cleared to 5;000 feet and cleared for the RNAV Y Runway 26R just prior to SKLER intersection. To be honest; I don't remember if I actually saw the DRKAR fix in the box or not. Shortly after crossing SKLER fix I heard the First Officer state the aircraft is not turning. I directed my attention to the FMC to see what had gone wrong. Apparently; the First Officer had already selected heading to try to stay on the lateral portion of the approach; but over compensated in the turn.When I looked up and was about to say you need to come left; ATC was already giving us instructions to break away from the approach; and gave us vectors followed by a climb to 7;000 feet. ATC also advised us of a course deviation. Shortly after; ATC vectored us for the ILS 26R. The [remainder] of approach and landing was uneventful.

B757 Captain reported a track deviation occurred on the DRLLR RNAV STAR into IAH; following a late change in the arrival.


Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 7266; Flight Crew Type 19

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Upon touching down; the aircraft immediately made an uncommanded right turn. I immediately applied left rudder and brake. This halted the rotation; but my plane was headed for a parked jet on the ramp. I made the decision to apply hard right brake to keep from hitting the parked jet; knowing that it would most likely result in a ground loop. The left landing gear was sheared off; the prop hit with engine running; and the left wing hit the ground.I believe that I probably had some right brake applied when the wheels touched down; which initiated the initial right turn. Upon reflection; I feel that when the foot is on the rudder pedal; maintaining clearance between the toe brakes and rudder is a difficult position for the foot. I plan to mention this to the kit manufacturer. A little more angle would provide a safety factor. Secondly; the long landing gear strut has a weak point at the threads of the long shock; which makes a strong side loads problematic. A reinforcement collar at that location would help in this area. I plan to also mention this to the kit manufacturer. In any case; since this is an experimental classed aircraft; I will make these modifications to my aircraft.

JA30 experimental aircraft pilot reported an immediate uncommanded right turn on touchdown. Left rudder and brake were applied to stop the rotation; but the aircraft was headed for a parked aircraft; so right rudder and brake were applied to avoid them. The left gear was sheared off and the wing hits the ground.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 93; Flight Crew Total 3351; Flight Crew Type 3351

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Type 667

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

This report details a wind shear event on approach that led to a diversion.During approach; there was a strong rain shower (radar returns stronger than rain only but contours less defined than a thunderstorm) between the final approach fix and Runway 12L threshold. Rain was visible out the bottom of the cloud. Other airplanes were getting in (although I'm not sure of the name or type of the planes). Given its relative strength from radar returns on minimum gain settings; we decided to try an approach. The First Officer was the pilot flying. Prior to entering the rain shower; I flipped the start switches to FLT. The First Officer vocalized the potential need for me to turn on windshield wipers once we cleared the cell. Shortly after entering the heavy rain; at roughly 1;000-1;500 feet. AGL; a wind shear alert was heard. I do not recall which alert it was with 100% certainty; however; I believe it was 'Wind shear Wind shear.'I announced; 'Wind shear! Set max thrust. Stow speed brake.' The First Officer responded properly. I then informed Tower that we were going around. We quickly left the wind shear threat zone; however; I should have vocalized this to the First Officer. Concurrently; the First Officer started the go-around callouts. When it came time for retracting the flaps; I was overloaded with radio calls; monitoring the First Officer's flying (which included slightly higher pitch attitudes than were called for by the flight directors during the wind shear event). The First Officer; in an effort to continue cleaning up the aircraft; moved the flap lever himself from 5 to 1 to up. We [later] debriefed the importance of not changing the configuration of the aircraft without proper communication with other crewmembers.The First Officer used heading select to get back onto the LNAV missed approach path; which resulted in slight lateral course deviations until back in LNAV.We held as published for 15 minutes or so. During that time; we coordinated with passengers; flight attendants; and Dispatch to create a plan. After another aircraft went around on approach; we decided a diversion was most prudent given how slowly the storm was moving away from the field.After informing dispatch and ATC; our flight proceeded and successfully flew the RNP approach to Runway 30 in visual conditions. Roughly 1 hour later; our flight was fueled and ready to depart. The return flight was completed without event.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported encountering wind shear; resulting in a diversion.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 800

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I was with a student doing work in the pattern practicing takeoffs and landing. While set up on final a ship turned right into our flight path within a few hundred feet of 24L. I asked the Tower if they knew about the [ship] and the immediate response was; the Tower does not control the waterways and it was all reported in the AFD and NOTAMs. We took evasive action and landed safely. My concern was although no hazard or potential hazard existed; a student pilot; or another pilot with limited hours or experience would end up in a LOC situation with an obstacle so close to the approach end of Runway 24L. Once discussed with the Tower; the same response was; they have no control over the waterways. There was no concern about safety; there was no concern about communications with a potential incursion from a ship. There was only concern; that this issue was not the responsibility of the Tower.

C172 pilot reported he took evasive action on final at BKL to avoid a conflict with a ship near the end of 24L.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 173.12; Flight Crew Total 25255; Flight Crew Type 9520.72

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were met at the hotel by the van to be transported to ZZZZ [airport]. The driver wasn't wearing a mask when he loaded the bags. He finished loading and sat down in his seat without a mask. I said something to the effect of; 'You aren't wearing a mask?' He didn't really say anything. After a few seconds; I said; 'Since you aren't wearing a mask; we will need fresh air.' I assumed that after seeing the 4 pilots with masks on and me saying something; he would put his mask on. He never did.Instead; he started fumbling with the AC controls. I told him that without a mask; we would need the front windows opened in order to ensure ventilation in the van. He eventually complied. We then drove 30 minutes to ZZZZ with the windows open with the OAT ~ 34 degrees. We were freezing cold.We were all upset; cold; and potentially distracted for our flight. This is a safety of flight issue. We used our CRM skills to identify this threat and deal with it. But; the bottom line is that we shouldn't have had to deal with this easily avoidable threat in the first place.

Air Carrier Captain reported the van driver from the hotel to the airport would not wear a face mask.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

While conducting on the job training to a trainee; Aircraft X; a Gulfstream was on a Visual Approach and descending for the airport. Aircraft Y; a Husky; departed a satellite airport and their data block indicated they were requesting a VFR area tour. [Both aircraft] became a conflict 3 miles just inside the Class Charlie airspace. I tried to have the trainee issue a traffic alert to [the Gulfstream] but he was slow and gave an incomplete traffic call instead. The pilot of [the Gulfstream] responded that they had a TCAS RA and were responding. I then had the developmental issue the go around procedure to [the Gulfstream]; a heading 315 and maintain 3000 feet. The pilot of the Husky never checked onto our frequency until he was inside the Class Charlie airspace and after the Gulfstream was already going around. The closest proximity I observed was 300 feet vertically. The Husky was never given the Brasher warning and transitioned through Tower Class C airspace. The area where [both Aircraft] became a conflict is a constant hot spot for aircraft arriving with aircraft landing or departing this adjacent airport. There needs to be either an airspace redesign or a better route for aircraft into; or out of this airport so they are not a constant conflict with other airport arrivals. Also perhaps an altitude restriction for VFR airport departures to keep them below aircraft landing at other airports.

ATC Tower Controller reported a VFR aircraft not in communication violated Class C airspace and caused an arriving aircraft; on short final; to respond to a TCAS/RA and go around.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were on a flight to IAH. As we were getting close to IAH; ATC changed our arrival. We were cleared direct TORNN for the GUSHR3. Then right as we were coming up to TORNN (5 to 8 miles away); we received a holding clearance. We were told to hold at TORNN as published at FL280 and given a EFC time. I then checked the chart and saw the hold at TORNN had an outbound leg heading of 243 with 10 mile legs. After I set the hold on the FMS I thought the hold depiction looked off set so I asked the captain to take a look and we double checked that I had input the hold correctly. We had the right outbound leg as shown on the chart the turn in the right direction and the leg distance put in so we thought it was correct. I figured the angle looked wrong because we weren't coming in on the arrival. We had been given direct to TORNN and therefore were coming at it from a different angle. By this point we were pretty much right over the fix as I activated the hold. The FMS took us on a teardrop entry into the hold. Shortly before we started our turn back inbound the controller asked us if we had started our turn back to TORNN. We told him not yet and that we were about to. The controller then told us that we should have done a direct entry into the pattern. This made us question the hold again but thought it still looked right and the error had to do with executing the hold as we were passing over the top off the fix. I was also preoccupied with trying to figure out how long we could stay in the holding pattern and still have fuel to go to the alternate should it come to that. But something was still bothering us about the holding pattern. The captain wanted to ask the controller about it but the radio was very busy and it was hard to get back to him. Fortunately he called us back. Unfortunately; it was to tell us that we were holding west of TORNN instead of north. He gave us a couple of vectors to straighten us out then we were cleared back onto the arrival. Before we changed; we heard another flight ask the controller if the outbound leg of the hold was suppose to be 243. He told them no; it is charted as 343. That's when we figured out the chart had a misprint on it. We were off by 100 degrees.The root cause of this event was a misprint on the arrival chart. The GUSHR 3 arrival actually has two holding patterns with incorrect outbound legs depicted. Also the hold was assigned very close to the fix leaving us little time to check it. With more time we may have noticed 243 leg didn't match up with the northern hold pattern depicted on the chart. Also not contacting the controller about our concerns sooner contributed to the event. I think the biggest thing to stop this from happening again would be to fix the chart. But also; we should have asked the controller for clarification sooner. It looked off to us but we couldn't see what was wrong with our bad information. We should have tried sooner to get the Controller's attention.

Gushr Three RNAV into IAH. TORNN INTERSECTION. (SAME TYPO AT THE CHMPZ INTERSECTION). ATC indicated the hold did not look correct and gave vectors. Altitude FL280. JEPP FOR THE ARRIVAL HAS THE WRONG OUTBOUND COURSE HEADING. READS 243 DEGREES SHOULD Read 343 degrees.

CRJ900 flight crew is issue direct TORNN on the GUSHR3 arrival to IAH then issued a hold as published at TORNN. The pattern does not look correct; but is correctly entered. ATC agrees and issues vectors to reenter the holding pattern at TORNN. It is discovered that the charted out bound course of 243 degrees is off by 100 degrees at CHMPZ and TORNN. It should be 343 degrees.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It is almost a daily thing. We lose computers. Today we lost communications; plotting; and ACARS all at the same time (losing all three is a daily event). Today I was talking to a flight that couldn't get landing data and was asking for my help. Today's malfunction came in the middle of this conversation.  We were told by the company to exit all computer related systems while IT worked on computers until further notice.  Earlier today; in an unrelated event; I received an ACARS message that I should have gotten hours earlier. In this case; I got a message about a takeoff delay. I received it after the aircraft was already in the gate at its destination. Not being able to talk to a plane in mid conversation while the system is down is kinda big. They are expecting me [to be available] on this one means of communication.

A Dispatcher related concern regarding routine and frequent computer related outages primarily related to communications with the flights for which he is responsible.


Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During climbout of ZZZ southbound just north of ZZZ1; ATC called out a Cessna 208 at our 12 o Clock and below us. We spotted the traffic and immediately after; a RA was triggered and it told us to monitor vertical speed. The traffic passed 400 feet below us and then we received a clear of conflict message. Flight continued uneventfully.Pilot of Cessna seemed to start a climb. ATC could have done a better job of keeping traffic separated.Always be vigilant of other traffic; especially on a VFR CAVU day.

CL-350 pilot reported an NMAC during departure climbout.  The conflicting aircraft was reported to be 400 feet below.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 3600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

After initial climb out to 4000 feet; while being vectored; my student was given a heading of 320; with which we complied. We were then given a heading of 360. Based on our heading indicator; we turned to and were tracking a 360 heading. Moments later; ATC informed us that we had turned too far and to immediately turn back to 360. Since we looked to be on the correct heading; I verified the Heading Indicator (HI) to the compass; and it was off. I reset the HI; and turned to correct our heading. Again ATC said we were way off and needed to correct. Suspecting a problem; I checked our heading against the compass and the GPS; and reset the HI again; while correcting heading based on the compass and GPS. It became evident that the HI was not working correctly; because each time I tried to set it; it immediately was off again. I informed ATC that we were having a problem with our HI; which I was attempting to resolve. At this point the attitude indicator also began to wander; and it was evident we were having a vacuum system failure. I took control from the student (to avoid a potential unusual attitude and loss of control). ATC contacted us again; and it was evident that I had missed a radio call or two while bringing the plane back under control. I informed ATC that we had a vacuum system failure and requested vectors back to our departure point.ATC then provided us with assistance; and we received no-gyro turns and vectoring back towards our departure point. As soon as we were back in VMC; I cancelled IFR and landed VFR.Under similar conditions in the future; I would suspect a vacuum system problem earlier and listened more carefully for ATC calls while troubleshooting.

C182 instructor pilot reported ATC advised them of a heading deviation that he soon realized was related to a vacuum system malfunction.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

B777 aircraft had a Non-Essential Equipment and Furnishings (NEF) [Chapter] 31-40A [deferral] issued 133 days ago for the Fuel Synoptic Display missing the green flow bars to the engines. The flight crew questioned the legality of using NEF 31-40A instead of MEL 28-19 for the fuel synoptic display. I agreed with the flight crew that MEL 28-19 should be used. However; doing a review of the NEF that was issued 133 days prior and finding three other B777 aircraft with the same problem and also placarded under NEF 31-40A; I suggested to the flight crew that both Boeing Engineering and [our] Air Carrier's Engineering were aware of this and that they were working on a software revision to correct the problem and that is why we were using the NEF instead of the MEL. I told the flight crew that if they insisted on using the MEL then the aircraft would be out of service because the MEL would be expired. The flight crew elected to fly with the NEF.The following morning my management was made aware of this problem and all of the affected aircraft were assigned No Fix No Fly [status] to have the problem corrected per Boeing 777-pilot report and Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) 28-22-00 which was redlined and issued by [our] Air Carrier Engineering. Incorrect deferral reference used.

A Maintenance Controller informs a flight crew that if they did not accept a Non-Essential Equipment and Furnishings (NEF) type deferral of their EICAS Fuel Synoptic Display missing the green flow bars to the engines on a B777; than their aircraft would be taken out of service; because a standard MEL 28-19 would have expired. The NEF had been issued 133 days prior.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Company Policy

From Captain X - 'When I approached the gate for my flight the boarding agent was talking on the phone.  As a courtesy I waited until he was off the phone to identify myself (as working crew).  I overheard his side of the conversation and clearly heard him state that he was (now) aware that the first four rows of coach class could not be occupied due to weight and balance and that he would re-seat the passengers that were booked in those seats.  During my FA briefing I said nothing about those seats because there was no mention in my flight release that the first four rows of coach should not be occupied.  During pre-flight in the cockpit I called my Dispatcher to ask for additional fuel and an alternate and during this conversation nothing was said about the first four rows of coach not being occupied.  We pushed at XA:15Z and got airborne eight minutes later.  The closeout had a note about the first four rows not being occupied; but since I recalled the agent saying that he would re-seat the passengers in those rows I did not pursue it any further.  After climbing out of ten thousand I called the #1 FA and told him to make sure that no passenger changed their seats to the first 4 rows of coach during the flight and was then told that there were 3 passengers sitting in the first 4 rows of coach.  I called my Dispatcher to make sure we were restricted and was told we were.  I asked Dispatch to find out why those seats were assigned by the gate agent after I heard the agent acknowledge over the phone that those seats were restricted due to weight and balance and should not be used.  I also asked my FA to re-seat the 3 passengers and make sure the first four rows of coach remained unoccupied for the duration of the flight. I don't know why the agent who said he was going to re-seat the passengers didn't do it.  The passenger manifest clearly showed that at least one of those 3 passengers was assigned a seat in the first 4 rows of coach by the agent during our boarding process.'   To tag along with what Captain X said; the TPS did not have any weight and balance information about seat restrictions. The closeout did; but since Captain X knew that the gate agent knew about it already; we figured no one would be assigned those seats. For some reason; those passengers got assigned those seats; I assume because they were non revs and the gate agent was under pressure to get the flight out so they probably forgot about the restriction. Time pressure; gate agents are under a lot of pressure; and seem understaffed during COVID. Due to this; they should be commended for doing the work that they are. They should be thanked for making sure non revs make it on. The intense amount of pressure agents work under day in and day out; adds up and a mistake is bound to happen. This mistake; although a procedural mistake; was not one of extreme error. The margin of error built into weight and balance is wide. If weight and balance is truly as tight as 3 passengers; the FAA would make sure we weighed every single bag individually and get true cargo weights instead of averaging bag weights. We would also weigh passengers instead of simply assuming there are average summer and winter weights per passenger. The flight was completed successfully; transporting XX or so people across the country.Don't work gate agents so hard. Give them the tools they need to succeed and ease up on micromanaging. Let agents make real decisions and they will feel empowered to complete their tasks; like making sure 4 rows are empty on a flight. I could place the blame on the agent and make a bunch of suggestions and punishments up; but I'm tired of the culture of pitting work group against work group here. This is the only airline I've worked for where this practice is known and visible. We are all working toward the same goal of trying to save the airline industry. Let the agent know of the mistake and move on. We need to work together now more than ever.

Air carrier First Officer reported that the first four rows of the aircraft were to be left unoccupied for weight and balance reasons; but found out when airborne some of the seats were occupied.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was working south departure while ORD arrivals were going to Runway 4R and 10. I RADAR identified an E145 departure off ORD heading 140 climbing to 5;000 FT. I turned the aircraft south to tunnel under the arrivals that were at 70. A supervisor was standing behind to tell me about a go-around I would be getting off of Runway 4R; when I heard an aircraft say their callsign 'The E145'. That wasn't his callsign; but I noticed right away that the E145 had traffic right in front of it descending to their altitude. The traffic was an A320. It was an arrival for Runway 4R on a westbound heading; descending to I don't know what. The A320 should have not been lower than 7;000 FT. By the time I noticed the A320; he was already at 5;200 FT. I immediately called traffic to the E145 and told him to turn. I believe both aircraft were already in the process of responding to a RA. Once the altitudes were corrected and traffic was no longer a factor; the E145 continued without further incident. I didn't know this until today; but I was told this is a continuous problem for aircraft being vectored for Runway 4R. Some aircraft respond to the runway assignment as a clearance to descend to 4;000 FT. I'm not one for extra phraseology; but maybe restate the altitude assignment when assigning Runway 4R.

We checked in with ORD departure with our heading (180) and altitude (5;000 FT). The Controller acknowledged and no further instructions were given. I saw the conflict aircraft on TCAS and noticed it was descending below 6;000 FT and getting closer. When the aircraft was about 3 miles horizontal and 500 FT vertical from us on the TCAS I queried ATC with no response. I queried again and right then we received a 'Descend' RA. I pushed the nose down and started to make a left turn to pass behind the conflict aircraft (moving from left to right). We announced to ATC that we were in a 'TCAS descent.' After receiving the 'clear of conflict' message we returned to our original assigned heading and 5;000 FT altitude and advised. At this time we did acquire the conflict aircraft visually. The Controller asked if we had received an RA and we replied 'yes.'

C90 Controller and EMB-145 F/O described a conflict event when an arrival aircraft descended below issued altitude toward a departure aircraft being tunneled underneath; the C90 Controller reporter noting a Runway 4 assignment may have been confused with a 4;000 altitude clearance.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I assumed control of the sector approximately 5 minutes prior to discovering this issue. The previous R-side controller was still present when I saw this. Aircraft departed ZZZ-ZZZ1 according to the pilot they were cleared to ZZZ1; however the destination that I was shown was ZZZ2. When I saw the aircraft free-tracking I questioned the previous R-side and asked if he had turned the aircraft for traffic prior to me working. He stated negative. The aircraft was approximately 40 miles north of his route to ZZZ2. I asked the pilot if they were direct ZZZ2; the pilot stated they weren't going to ZZZ2 they were going to ZZZ1. I told him that I showed his destination was ZZZ2. The pilot stated that they had two flight plans in the system; they were originally supposed to go to ZZZ2 but they changed it to ZZZ1 and that's what they were cleared to on departure. The aircraft's route line showed him leaving my airspace to D46; the actual aircraft was heading for D18 and then to D46. I updated the route back to ZZZ2 while this was going on to progress the flight plan to D18; once realizing the error when the aircraft departed I re-cleared the aircraft to ZZZ1 and changed his destination to show the correct destination; and immediately handed it off to D18. When researching this incident; a search on the aircraft showed the route was updated three separate times; since it departed ZZZ. The aircraft traveled 850 miles before this error was finally discovered. This was a particularly dangerous situation because ZZZ2 and ZZZ1 are only 35 miles apart from one another; and even though it was only 35 miles apart the difference in MEA's from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1 is 1000 feet. According to ZDV ZZZ2 MEA is 080 and ZZZ1 MEA is 090. Also there is no STAR for ZZZ2 that we issue however there is one for ZZZ1 that takes the aircraft northeast away from the two DEN RNAV arrival streams where the aircraft are descending on their own. Aside from that if the ZDV controller descended the aircraft to the MEA for ZZZ2 of 080 and the aircraft flew past on the way to ZZZ1 with an MEA of 090 controller flight into terrain; or a cell phone tower could have occurred.

Controller questioned pilot about destination after he saw the aircraft tracking north of anticipated track and discovered two flight plans on file.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Stabilizer electric yoke trim worked well on the ground. On climbout; the Captain's trim switches would not work. He gave me the aircraft to see if mine worked. They did not. I engaged the autopilot; because that is another way that stabilizer trim gets an input. That didn't work either. Ran the Stabilizer Trim Inoperative Checklist. Requested priority handling with ATC. Manually trimmed unintended handles on trim wheel. Flaps 15. Overweight landing. Touchdown very smooth. Equipment followed us to Ramp Area. Wrote up stabilizer trim electric inoperative and overweight landing. Chief Pilot onboard and talked with us; no issues about continuing our trip. Deplaned. Got a different airplane and flew to ZZZ1. We followed all SOP. Uneventful with highly successful outcome. Trained well to handle this type of event. We had both noted that this was written up before. So; neither were surprised when it did happen again.

A321 First Officer reported both sets of stabilizer trim switches became inoperative after takeoff.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

My shift started at XA30 and I showed up twenty minutes early to do my preflight and paperwork. Upon completion of those two things; I briefed the crew on weather and went over engine failure and single engine landings as my daily safety topic. The tones went off shortly after XA30 for an inter-facility transfer. We accepted the flight. The flight to the hospital was as planned with no issues. I departed the hospital with two medical crew; a baby (patient) and patient's mother on board. Shortly after leveling off at altitude the GEN OVHT caution appeared on the number one side of the CAD. I shut the number one generator off and after one minute the light was still illuminated; so I announced to the passengers that I need to do a single engine shutdown and I then did the single engine shut down of the number one engine. I watched my torques limits closely and beeped up my rotors. I remained within the normal One Engine Inoperative limits during the whole procedure. Once everything was under control I ask the nurse to read me the GEN OVHT emergency procedure to make sure I hadn't missed a step. All was good. The crew made the call to [company] and I contacted approach control and let them know I would need to come in and land at the airport. They cleared me to land on Runway XX and I requested the taxiway instead. They approved me as requested. I transferred to the tower frequency and continued inbound to the airport. Along the way I briefed the crew but they were already aware of the procedure because this exact emergency procedure was discussed in our safety topic of the day briefing. I communicated with the mother to make sure she understood what the landing was going to be like. At 200 feet I let the passengers know that we needed to have a sterile cockpit. I maintained 40 knots until I was within 12 feet and started to slow up. I knew I wouldn't have enough power to hover because my hover power at the hospital was over 70% torque. When I reached an airspeed in which I could no longer bring in power I gently lowered collective and we completed the flight with a running landing. I went into the OEI (One Engine Inoperative) transient just before touchdown for a couple seconds. Everyone was ok and the patient was transported by our other base. After landing; I walked around the helicopter to inspect for any signs of fire and didn't find anything.

MBB BK-117 pilot reported they had a GEN OVHT caution light which required a shutdown of the number one engine. Successful landing was made at an airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Wrong Dispatch Release; arrived in operations about 1 hour 10 minutes before departure and Company flight plan (release 1) had already been printed by station personnel. After review; the Captain called the Dispatcher to clarify his dispatch remarks about optimum altitudes en route. While the Captain was signing and printing the release; I stepped to the aircraft to start the exterior inspection. Cockpit setup was not rushed. During push-back we received final weights which didn't quite make sense. TOW had increased from Rel 1; but the line TOW CHANGE indicated minus 1;900 LBS. We dismissed the minus as an error by Load Planning; thinking it should be a plus. We got new takeoff data for the final takeoff weight and completed our departure. Later in the flight; we realized Load Planning had not made an error; there was a release 2 for zero fuel weight increase. The final weights reflected 1;900 LBS less than Release 2. In hindsight; the Captain probably signed release 2; but both our copies of the flight plan were release 1. Route verification procedures were accomplished with Release 1 without us realizing it was not current. Departure time was [after midnight] Domicile time. Circadian cycle/fatigue was possibly a factor.

First Officer reports departing on an ETOPS flight using Release 1 with amended takeoff weights; to discover enroute that the amended weights were for Release 2. Fortunately the route had not changed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 400

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

5 minutes prior to departure I put a cable into my EFB backup battery. I noticed the lights flashed and never recalled seeing this before. About 2 seconds later I noticed smoke coming out of the battery. I tried to turn the battery off; but the lights remained on. Multiple attempts to turn the device off were not successful. We decided to leave the battery with the supervisor so we could depart. I realized after takeoff that we should have contacted dispatch prior to block out instead of enroute. Both EFBs had a high charge and the Captain had his fully charged backup battery on board.

Air carrier First Officer reported a smoking external battery when it was connected to the EFB prior to departure. Attempts to turn it off were unsuccessful. The battery was disconnected and left with a company agent.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On approach to 28C at ORD we heard a report of wind shear ahead of us. One report was a 50 knot change in wind. At least one aircraft ahead of us performed a missed approach. We discussed doing the same. I waited for the First Office (FO) to advise Tower we were going to go around as well. We started the maneuver above 1;000 AGL. At that point we were not in the wind shear. We believe we had the flaps retracted before entering the actual wind shear.We entered the wind shear at about 1;200-1;400 AGL. The FO announced 'escape'; I did perform the escape maneuver. We lost 200-400 feet passing through the wind shear. Exiting the wind shear we encountered a strong updraft. The first altitude given by ATC was 2;500 feet MSL. That was not going to be possible so ATC changed that to 4;000 feet MSL. The updraft was very strong. I flew to 4;500 feet MSL before arresting the climb. I then returned to 4;000 feet MSL. Airspeed got as high as 315 KTS. We got settled and returned for landing. We entered the max power event in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML).The extreme conditions of the wind shear made the maintaining of some limits secondary. I've only been on the airplane about 5 months. I've been flying with all the automation on as recommended. I am against that. I believe we need to hand fly more often so that we have all the numbers in our heads for the power settings for the different conditions we fly in. i.e. cruise; climb (clean); climb (dirty); traffic pattern while configured; pushing down the glideslope. I recently asked an FO; who has been on the airplane [over ten years]; what power setting to use to push it down the glideslope. He told me depends on the winds; weights. Of course it does; but he/we should have good start point numbers in our heads. I still know the basic numbers for the [the previous aircraft I flew]. I hand flew those more often. We are so spoiled flying with autothrottles on all the time and autopilot on all the time that we lose the feel of the aircraft. I think I would not have at least exceeded the limits by as much if I had a better feel for the aircraft. I don't believe I'm the only one lacking that feel. More training should be done without all the automation; and less emphasis on always having it on.

Widebody air carrier Captain reported experiencing severe windshear then executed a go-around. Second approach and landing were normal.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During the climb the First Officer reported that the airplane 'wanted' to roll left. A couple of minutes later I observed that the left inboard roll spoiler was rapidly and intermittently moving between fully retracted and partially extended. Up to about one quarter scale full deflection. No caution lights were illuminated. After leveling off at 14;000 ft.; the spoiler remained fully retracted. At this point; we were about halfway to our destination; so we elected to continue to our destination. I advised Dispatch and Maintenance.

Pilot reported that a spoiler malfunction resulted in a maintenance event.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Type 55

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

It was snowing sideways on an early morning departure out of DTW. Ramp was mostly covered; making following taxi lines more difficult. We were cleared to taxi to the Central Deice Pad via [Taxiways] K; E2; and E3. Nowhere on our charts is E3 shown. E2 is shown going all the way to the deice pad. After searching unsuccessfully to find Taxiway E3; we queried Ground and they informed us to follow the routing shown as E2 on our charts to the deice pad (Spot 7). It would be nice if this were corrected (E3 shown) on our charts to avoid adding this additive condition every time any crew deices in the frozen tundra of Detroit.

An Air Carrier Captain reported taxiway E3 at DTW is not published on their charts.


Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft LH MLG landing gear aft trunnion pin sheared during landing; gouging the MLG support beam. I was assigned by supervision and engineering to blend the two damaged areas and provide dimensions after the blends were complete. I was given an AVO 8258 by engineering that provided detailed instructions regarding the blend requirements. After completing the blend; I documented the blends and made updates to have inspection perform fluorescent penetrant inspection ref AVO 8258.  was informed by inspection today that the airplane had been quarantined. At the time I blended the damage; I was not aware the aircraft was in quarantine and was doing as instructed.

Technician reported repairing aircraft damage on a B737-800 that was quarantined because of miscommunication.


Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passenger came onboard without a mask (wasn't even on his person). The other FA asked him to put a mask on and he did. During boarding; he had to be reminded to wear his mask. During climbout; passenger ignored seatbelt sign and got up. Announcement was reiterated to remain seated. He sat back down but did not put seatbelt back on until he was approached to do so. During service; he was again; not wearing mask. I told him to put it on and he complied. During walk through; his seatbelt was once again off while the seatbelt sign was on. He had to be asked again to put it on. He wasn't happy about it but complied. After the cabin had been secured for landing and the cabin had been secured for anticipated turbulence; he took his mask back off.  At that point; it was turbulent and unsafe for us to get up. The other FA had to motion for him to put the mask back on. He complied but the mask continued to come off and we continued to motion to put it back on. After gear came down; the passenger got up (in moderate turbulence and on final approach) and moved seats. We made an announcement for him to be seated immediately. He did not stay in his original seat; but ultimately moved to a different seat anyways.Upon landing; the other FA told him moving when he did was absolutely unsafe and completely unacceptable. He just got off the airplane.  The passenger got up in turbulence on final approach after gear came down and moved seats despite being told not to. It was unsafe to make him move back to seat for weight and balance.This passenger had a complete disregard for safety and was incredibly non compliant. While all little non compliant moments at first; it continued until he did something that was truly dangerous to the people sitting near him. Not only was he non compliant with our mask policy but his reckless behavior in moving around during turbulence after being told not to could have easily injured those around him. He shouldn't be allowed to travel with us in the future.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non compliant with face mask policy and also changing seats while in turbulence and on final approach.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 2400

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I landed on the newly-resurfaced and painted Runway XXR at ZZZ; although this runway was closed by NOTAM.I was returning to my home airfield after three weeks away. Although I checked NOTAMs for the several stops enroute home from the west coast; I failed to check the NOTAMs for ZZZ; a very familiar airport; for the final leg of this trip. I also failed to catch the note on the ATIS that advised Taxiway 1 was being used as Runway XXR. The 2-3 minute ATIS transmission contained extensive information about no IFR operations and multiple taxiway and access closures.I was cleared to land on 'Runway XXR' and cautioned about the strong and gusty winds. The landing was uneventful and posed no risk to personnel in the airplane or on the ground. There were no workers or service vehicles in the area. I was able to back-taxi on the closed runway under tower supervision and exit at the normal point to my rented hangar on the northeast side of the field.I understand that the runway was closed for good reason--the yet to be completed lighting systems--and that such a landing is always a potential risk to pilots and ground crew. I hope (and believe) I would have noted and aborted the landing had any people or equipment been on or near the runway I landed on.I attribute this incident to complacency on my part. I expected a clearance to land on Runway XXR; based on the winds; and when I saw the newly-resurfaced runway; I went for it. I am embarrassed by the fact that I would make such an error after XX+ years of flying.

LNCA4 single pilot reported inadvertently landing on closed runway.


Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

While at 10;000 MSL on descent in MDW; we were cleared to cross at HALIE at 6;000. Earlier in the descent; the Captain and I were (ironically enough) talking about VNAV and altitude restrictions and the programming and proper use of the FMC; VNAV etc. A few miles from HALIE; ATC asked us in a sarcastic tone of voice: 'Do you remember that crossing restriction at HALIE!?' I looked at the FMA and we were in VNAV PATH. I looked at the Descent page on my FMC/CDU and saw HALIE at 6;000 FT. I looked at the MCP and saw 6;000. I looked at the Cruise page and saw 10;000 FT. I cannot explain why the jet did not initiate a descent earlier and on proper descent profile.I disengaged the autothrottles (I believe) and deployed the speedbrakes; and at the same time; both the Captain and I knew we would not make HALIE at 6;000; so I told the Captain to ask for relief. He then asked Approach for a turn; apologized; and Approach quickly gave us a vector and a descent to 4;000. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. What bothers me so much is that we verified the programming; verbalized the callouts; and monitored until we were distracted with our own discussion of VNAV crossing restrictions. All the while this jet was not about to make the restriction even though; I believe; all programming and VNAV functions were done correctly. I'll be the first to admit my mistakes; but I need to know what they were so I (and others) can learn from this! If the jet was not going to make HALIE at 6;000 why did it stay in VNAV PATH and not switch to VNAV SPD like we see a lot of times when we are not going to make the next restriction and further action is required? This is what puzzles me so much!I realize and understand we need to monitor the airplane; and as we get more automation and functionality; it is that much more important. However; it has always bothered me that when the jet drops out of VNAV PATH and switches to VNAV SPD; there needs to be more than just an FMA change; a light; an FMC annunciation; or something. For an action as critical as not making an altitude restriction; we need a better warning system in place for the jet to tell us that it is not going to make an altitude restriction unless action is taken.

Although they believe they programmed the FMS properly to comply with ATC's clearance to cross HALIE at 6;000 MSL the flight crew was surprised to find they had never left 10;000 MSL when ATC queried them about making the restriction. An acknowledged contributing factor was the flight crew's failure to monitor their flight path; anticipating that the FMS would do what they thought they had programmed.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4300; Flight Crew Type 1200

Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Transiting south under VFR conditions with rain in the area. IFR was decided against due to high terrain; airplane performance; and possible ice at airway altitudes. NEXRAD (Next-Generation Radar) weather displayed on phone app. Aircraft WAAS-GPS (Wide Area Augmentation System) equipped with terrain awareness system. Weather behind was clear with high ceilings and terrain was dropping. My plan was to move airport to airport if the weather was ever in question; taking a look-see and retuning if conditions were marginal. Weather was VMC with high ceilings and showers in the vicinity; and I was flying at approximately 1;000ft AGL. I told my non-pilot (but professional cockpit aircrew) passenger to keep an eye on the terrain display while I remained visual and watched the weather. We briefed flying on the west side of the valley and always keeping a turn-out option to the left (pilot flying side). Closest airport was calling VMC with high clouds. NEXRAD showed precipitation; but sunlight could be seen on the horizon ahead. At South the visibility in light rain and mist dropped to estimated 3 miles and I descended over the highway to maintain orientation. We both pointed out power lines and I called out specific intentions. I slowed to approximately 100 KIAS. Then I descended below terrain to our left and upon realizing the turn-out restriction I stated; 'If this gets any worse we'll make an emergency landing on the southbound highway' and; 'these are helicopter altitudes I'm familiar flying at.' As the sunlight increased on my left I flew more easterly and began setting up for landing; at one point briefly crossing into restricted airspace which my passenger pointed out and I turned back right. We landed in clear conditions and discussed what went wrong and whether we should continue. Because of worsening weather at our destination; we drove home from the airport where we landed. The electronic tools certainly assisted. Get-home-itis was not a major factor since we had no events and had already decided driving the last distance was likely. I believed I was familiar with the terrain because of years driving in the area; but I followed the weather lower than ever intended and was drawn to the light on the horizon.

Grumman American AA-5 pilot reported flying in VFR conditions when the weather closed in and they found themselves in IMC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 8450; Flight Crew Type 800

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Copied clearance prior to departure [from APC] was 'MERLO1 then Cleared as Filed'. That filed route was SAC.SWR. During climb; ATC had previously issued vector heading 030 followed by 'Cleared direct Truck'. Because TRUCK did not appear in our FMS flight plan; I instructed PNF to enter TRK in FMS and temporarily go direct as I assumed there was a TRK VOR located near the airport TRK. The FMS recognized the TRK WPT and proceeded in what seemed a reasonable direction. The controller soon after asked if we were headed direct TRUCK and we responded 'yes'. He then confirmed the spelling of the intended WPT as 'TRUCK' (not TRK). We requested a vector until we got the WPT sorted out. The controller issued a 'turn right heading 270.' We then had corrected the FMS WPT to TRUCK and advised and were cleared direct.A mistake on my part was assuming WPT spelling and not verifying w/ ATC when they issued something that was not in our flight plan. This is also the second time that our departure clearance from APC has been different or in error. Short of requesting a full route clearance; there isn't anyway to know that what is being issued as '..then cleared as filed' matches what was actually filed.

BE30 Captain reported a track deviation after departing APC when he was cleared to TRUCK; but navigated toward TRK.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 3900; Flight Crew Type 650

Loss of GPS reception to both receivers. Lost reception in 530 unit followed by 430 unit about 30 secs later with associated Dead Reckon advisory. Advised Joshua of loss and they gave me a position report. About 4 mins later the units received the satellites again and worked fine.

Helicopter pilot experiences loss of GPS reception on two seperate GPS units near PMD at 7500 feet. Both units return to normal operation after about four minutes.