Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The pilot in command and I were taxing down Taxiway XX for a Runway XX departure from ZZZ. During the taxi; the red Baggage Smoke" annunciator turned on. The pilot in command decided to shut down the aircraft and evacuate the aircraft on the taxiway. We informed Ground Control of our intentions; and while the pilot in command completed the emergency evacuation checklist; I got out of my seat to open the passenger door and briefed the passengers of the situation. We were able to get both passengers to safety and secure the aircraft on the taxiway. I think the situation was handled well. We shut down the aircraft as fast as we could. The passengers were able to evacuate the aircraft without incident and organization was maintained throughout the event."

C525 First Officer reported a Baggage Smoke annunciation on taxi for takeoff and the Captain elected to stop aircraft operations to have both the passengers and crew safely evacuate the aircraft.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

As I was servicing on one of our airplanes with oxygen (O2) for the Crew [oxygen]; the hose on the O2 service bottle disconnected from the O2 fitting. As this happened the blast from the hose caused hearing loss in my right ear for several days. I was treated for the problem at the doctor and I am progressively getting better. The hose also cut and bruised my right arm and dented the plane which was reported and maintenance action was taken. I just would like to see or know if the service hoses on our o2 bottles and nitrogen service bottle have; or can have; inspections and/or cycle dates. The pressure on the hose at that time was only 1;800 PSI which I know is well below its limits.  Defective hose.  [Recommend] routine Inspection [Work] Cards on hoses [for] hose life limit.

Reporter stated he was outside on the Ramp servicing the Crew Oxygen (O2) on an EMB-145 aircraft. They use a rubber type servicing hose with a flexible braided metal sheath around the rubber. There is a three inch hard metal line with a 'B' fitting on one end that connects to the external servicing port on the aircraft's fuselage about chest level. Oxygen is then routed directly to the onboard Crew oxygen bottle. The oxygen servicing line from the oxygen cart's supply bottle is attached to the opposite end of the three inch metal line. He was bending over to see if the oxygen pressure in the servicing line from the supply bottle was building pressure; when suddenly the hose separated from the three inch metal line. The blast sounded like a shotgun had gone off next to his ear. Reporter stated the braided metal oxygen hose was snaking violently around under pressure; hitting him in several places including his collar bone and arm and finally wrapping itself around the nose tires before he could shut-off the oxygen supply pressure. His hearing has not returned to normal.  The three inch hard metal line remained attached to the aircraft's servicing port. The rubber hose material had deteriorated at the connection to the three inch line; but was not visible under the braided metal covering. His air carrier has not responded to his suggestion to have at least an Annual Equipment Maintenance Inspection implemented. He now holds onto the supply hose while servicing Crew oxygen.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes his injuries; including hearing loss; after an oxygen supply servicing hose separated at the Crew oxygen external servicing port on an EMB-145 aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4600; Flight Crew Type 1000

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On an IFR repositioning flight from the Atlanta area to Daniel Field (DNL) to pickup passengers from a local event I inadvertently lined up on AGS instead of DNL due to momentary position disorientation.  While still 15 miles north of DNL; Augusta Approach cleared me from 3;000 feet to 2;000 feet and advised of DNL airport ahead; the airport was visually identified and per the event recommendations I cancelled IFR prior to landing.  I was told to squawk 1200 and contact Advisory (CTAF) for DNL field.  While descending to 2;000 feet traffic was observed on TCAS ahead and low.  I stopped descending and waited for the traffic to pass behind as it was not announcing on CTAF.  While watching the traffic pass I momentarily lost sight of DNL.  When I turned back towards a base leg for the active runway (Runway 23) I located an airport which I mistook for DNL.  While calling position and maneuvering for the pattern an airplane called (on DNL CTAF) that it was taking Runway 23 at DNL for departure.  I observed a jet aircraft taking the runway I mistook for 23 but it was at AGS (Augusta Regional) Class D immediately south of DNL.  The coincidence of an aircraft calling taking the runway and visually observing the same to occur delayed my realization that I had miss identified the airport.  My FMS was set for DNL and when I realized the runway alignments were incorrect I immediately veered north and climbed; changed to AGS Tower; confessed my situation and awaited instructions.  AGS Tower switched me back to Approach Control where I again declared my mistake and requested vectors back to DNL.  DNL was located and the flight was completed.  Due to radio congestion I did not pursue a ground contact; and there was no 'note to call' after landing at DNL.  I normally do not cancel IFR so far out from an unfamiliar airport; and felt compelled to do so; due to the regional notice to airman and procedures for the local Event.  The momentary distraction of traffic caused my loss of visual contact with the field long enough for AGS to replace it in the same visual area; when my attention returned to the airport.  I had the visual approach setup in the FMS; however it was dropped accidentally when cleared direct to the field.  I only attempted to reprogram the FMS once I realized my disorientation.  I never received a TCAS alert or other visual traffic conflict at AGS.  I do not believe any actual FAR violation occurred; as I did not land; enter; or overfly the runway environment at AGS.  However; professionally this event bothers me greatly.  Visual distractions in a high traffic uncontrolled airspace area lead to mistakes; ones I made.  Traffic was heavier due to the weather the day before causing increased arrivals.  The temporary Tower normally at DNL was not active; yet as the event technically begins the next day.  I believe that had the Tower been in place it would have caught my mistake much earlier; as I was operating against my normal SOP's of cancelling IFR/Flight Following at an unfamiliar field based on guidance (though not mandatory) from the region for the special event.  Current high end FMS systems offer visual approach guidance; which I had setup to use; however do not follow VFR procedures such as a normal traffic pattern; they normally just give a 3 or 5 mile final.  My cancelling the initial 5 mile final fix in order to fly as cleared 'direct to' the airport caused the box to drop out the airport.  For the Collins Proline; it will not automatically allow direct to airport operations; which I knew; but failed to correct for on this day.

CE525 Captain reports confusing AGS for DNL during a visual approach. The single pilot operation and a TCAS alert were cited a factors in the incident.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

An IFR student and I were on an IFR training flight in his G1000 equipped DA40 to MGJ. We received the MGJ ASOS report about 20 miles south as OVC 2600 calm winds visibility 7 temperature/dew point 14/12 Baro 30.20. When we were switched to NY Control we informed them we had current weather and requested vectors for the ILS 3. We were vectored to the ILS and joined the localizer about 6 miles from FAF of DIYAD at 3;000 FT in IMC. We were then cleared for the approach; and advised to contact advisory and cancel on the ground when able. We changed to MGJ UNICOM frequency; turned on the lights and announced our approach at 5; 3; and 2 mile final. We continued to descend to FAF at DIYAD and intersected the glideslope and proceeded down the approach breaking out at 800 FT; visibility estimated about 4 SM. At about 600 FT over the runway approach lights I (the instructor) looked to our left and saw a small tail dragger which looked like an Aeronca with white and red markings abeam our left wing at about 200 FT distance horizontally at the same altitude as the DA40. I altered the student/owner; who was the pilot flying the DA40. He immediately reacted by adding power and banking to the right away from the other aircraft. The Aeronca banked left away from us. I called the aircraft on common traffic frequency several times. No response. The Diamond DA40 is equipped with TCAS traffic avoidance system. It did not register the Aeronca. We have to assume the aircraft had no radio (or at least did not have it on the Unicom frequency) and no transponder (or did not have it on). It had [hard to see] N numbers; so it might be an older aircraft without an electrical system. These are just conjectures on our part. We do know the aircraft did not respond to us or register on our traffic system. At this point the owner/student had maneuvered the DA40 parallel right of Runway 03. The Aeronca then maneuvered back right toward the Runway 03 and under the DA40 and landed Runway 03. After our initial confusion; student/owner advanced the throttle and re-entered IMC at approximately 800 FT MSL and initiated the published missed approach to HUO. Fortunately; we had not cancelled our IFR. We called ATC; informed them we had gone missed (but not the reason) and asked to pick up our filed IFR clearance. We were given the IFR clearance after a short delay. In retrospect; though the ASOS reported marginal VFR at MGJ; the conditions for our entire route of flight were worse than forecasted or reported. Further; we suspect that a pilot could believe based on the ASOS at MGJ; that the weather was better than it actually was and one might be able to perform pattern work. It was not. Bad weather; no radio and no transponder combined to make a near collision with a well equipped IFR aircraft following a filed flight plan with ATC guidance.

DA40 instructor with student on an IFR flight plan report an NMAC with an Aeronca just after breaking out at 800 FT AGL on the ILS 3 to MGJ. A missed approach is executed by the DA40. The Aeronca had no radio and no transponder.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Non standard signage. Abdication by ATC to advise hold short of Runway 9C. Jet runway incursion Runway 22R  at Runway 9C.Runway Signage at runway 22R and 9C only indicates Runway 9C. The standard signage should have 27C - 9C. NOTAM the lack of painted holding positions on the runway along with the lack of holding position signage. The Runway 9C sign adjacent Runway 22R is a sign designated by the Aeronautical Information Manual to be a starting position sign. That signage along with the lack of markings fails to designate the runway intersection. In pavement markings and 'WIG WAGS' could have aided in the prevention of this event.

Air Carrier pilot reported a runway incursion due to insufficient  runway and taxiway signage and markings.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Staffing

Soon after an uneventful departure and climb; and leveling at our final cruising of FL390; the Captain's -  PF (Pilot Flying) - ADI (Attitude Direction Indicator) screen failed. We promptly transferred controls to the right seat CA (Captain) and evaluated the situation. We doubled checked the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) but found no checklist; as expected. Just as we were to contact Dispatch/[Maintenance Control]; we detected the classic burning electrical smell. The odor persisted and slowly intensified. We donned our O2 masks and [requested priority handling with] ATC. Due to the burning electrical smell; combined with a primary instrument failure; we elected to divert to the nearest suitable field; ZZZ. After receiving ATC vectors and descent instructions; the burning electrical smell further strengthened and was temporarily present while wearing the O2 mask. We then increased our rate of descent and began the Smoke; Fire; Fumes QRH checklist. While completing the checklist; the alternate airport and approach were programed in the FMC (Flight Management Computer); which was XXC; as directed by ATC as the best runway for CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) and our direction of arrival. Quickly; while completing these tasks; I looked over the circuit breakers to search for more clues as to the source of the fumes. At that time; no breakers were observed to be tripped. At about this time the CA's ADI flickered momentarily and blanked again. Due to the donned O2 mask; it was hard to determine if the fumes persisted throughout the remainder of the flight; but the intermediate and final approach segments were completed without any issues and according to SOP's. CFR met the aircraft on the runway and inspected the aircraft; noting no visible fire source. On the flight deck; we then checked if the fumes still existed; and there were none present. We exited the runway and coordinated parking. While waiting for parking instructions; we continued to monitor the aircraft for signs of fire; and clues as to what caused the fume event. During this time; the Captain's ADI circuit breaker was found to be tripped. After approximately 1 hour of waiting; on an active taxiway; Dispatch informed us; via ACARS; spot 3 was available and noted it was unconfirmed. We proceeded to the gate; with CFR in tow; and parked the aircraft. First; we quickly debriefed the Fire Chief; then contacted Local Operations and Maintenance. Local Operations stated they were uninformed as to our arrival; and Maintenance orally took our discrepancies. After this time; we were confined to the flight deck with very limited contact from any local personnel; and there was confusion as to our status from [Operations Control]. Dispatch was under the impression we would be able to depart only an hour after block-in; however the aircraft was not ready; awaiting a maintenance resolution; until at least XA:30 local.Considering the inherent danger of electrical fires; and the required rapid action; the event went smoothly. The right seat CA and I divided the workload; as we were trained; and the outcome was proof of concept. The critiques of our flight were only for after we landed and it was confirmed there was no further fire risk. The coordination between [Operations Control]; Dispatch; [Maintenance Control]; and local Maintenance was disjointed at best. At no point did a company representative ask if we were fit to continue; considering the high stress situation; it should have been at least discussed. Furthermore; no accommodations were made for our; what turned out to be; 6 hour delay. All the while; Dispatch expected us to operate; with no human factor consideration; ASAP. The other Captain and I discussed the matter and attempted to remain with the aircraft; fit for flight. After 8 hours in ZZZ; on the flight deck; and over 10 total hours on the aircraft; we could no longer consider ourselves safe/fit to operate. There could have been multiple alternate options for recovering this aircraft and/or cargo; but none were considered; as far as we were informed. The lack [of] support was discouraging; and more so the absence of consideration of the crew. It was disappointing being forced to utilize the FRMP (Fatigue Risk Management Plan) as opposed to alternate options.

B767 Captain reported electrical burning smell with total loss of instruments resulting in a diversion and ATC providing priority handling.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

[We] reviewed the log book [and] discussed #2 engine stall momentarily ECAM write-up. Normal push back; engine start and taxi to departure Runway XXR. After takeoff; climbing out of 11000 ft. and accelerating to 280 kts; the #2 engine stalled; EGT went to the red indication. Stopped climb at 12;000 feet. Capt. continued to fly aircraft; Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) displayed #2 engine Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) exceedance.[Requested priority handling] with departure and requested a return to ZZZ. First Officer was the non-flying pilot; he performed ECAM procedures; Quick Reference Handbook and checklists. We secured the #2 engine. Completed a visual overweight landing to runway XXL. Stopped on runway to have fire department inspect #2 engine. Inspection by fire department was normal. Taxied to gate and deplaned passengers.

A321 Captain reported an engine in flight shut down and air turn back after the #2 engine experienced a re-occurrence of a compressor stall.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 160

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I arrived in Orlando International (MCO). After touchdown the Tower instructed me to exit the runway to the right on Taxiway J but I was not able. I was not slow enough to safely exit the runway on J. I replied to the Controller [that I] was not able; and then the Controller asked me to exit to the right on Y which was further ahead. At that time I slowed down the airplane to a speed that would allow me to see and identify the taxiway; so I could safely exit the runway. It was night and I'm not familiar with MCO. I have been there maybe 3 or 4 times in the past 10 years. At that time the Controller instructed me to exit the next taxiway to the left; that I have faster traffic coming behind; so I exited I believe it was B5 or B6; stopped and contacted Ground. The Ground Controller give me a taxi clearance; but I was not able to move because the clearance did not match the taxiway signs around me; and further ahead on the taxiway I saw some vehicles with blinding strobe lights that made the taxiway signs more difficult to see. After a few minutes the Controller sent a vehicle for me to follow to the ramp. In a later conversation over the phone the same night with the Controllers I asked them if I [committed] any violation and they said no; that they just wanted to know what happened. They assured me that there was no violation or damage to anything or anyone that it was just a routine conversation to make sure everything it was ok and if I could tell them what they can improve in that area of the taxiway to make it more visible; because other pilots have been confused with that construction area and signs. Also he said that the Ground Controller was confused about where I was because they cannot see that area of the taxiway where I was from the Tower.

Small aircraft pilot reported being unable to follow taxi instructions due to poor signage and construction at MCO airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After deicing (TYPE I&IV) application; conducted physical check at gate. Taxied to Runway XXC. Took about 12 minutes. (HOT was 2 hrs). Set icing level to 2. Took off and rotated at Vr. The aircraft started pitch up without normal back pressure and kept pitching up quicker and higher without PF (Pilot Flying) input. Yolk needed to be pushed forward to maintain normal 9 degree pitch. Pitch trim was not responding from both switches on Yolk and STBY. CCAS (Centralized Crew Alerting System) announced icing and selected level 3 at 3000 ft. Hard to maintain altitude and advised ATC to return to ILSXXC. After landing and taxing to[ramp] observed ice accumulation on many aircraft surfaces during post flight. After takeoff rotation; aircraft kept pitching up without PF input.Maintenance suspected that there was ice inside of the pitch trim system. Manually flew aircraft without pitch trim and requested to return to ILSXXC at ZZZ.Should observe all flight control surface movements from outside after deicing application.

Air carrier cargo Captain reported loss of pitch trim control after takeoff. The Captain returned to the departure airport. After a maintenance inspection the cause of the malfunction was suspected to be ice in the control system.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 510; Flight Crew Type 262

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on a training flight with a student pilot working on pattern work. We were cleared for the option for Runway 17R and instructed to make left closed traffic on the go. ATC cleared a gyrocopter for take off on Runway 17L while we were on short final for Runway 17R. On climb out following the touch and go; the gyrocopter drifted into the extended upwind for Runway 17R. We had to stop our climb and make an evasive turn to the left to avoid collision. After maneuvering to avoid the gyrocopter; we were instructed by ATC to start our left crosswind when able.Given the relatively low speed of the gyrocopter and the proximity of the parallel runways; clearing the gyrocopter for takeoff while we were simultaneously executing a touch and go on the right runway and instructing us to make left closed traffic posed a risk for midair collision. This was further compounded by the gyrocopter drifting into the extended upwind of the parallel runway.

Instructor Pilot reported an NMAC with a gyrocopter in the pattern at DWH airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 6500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Taxiing to 22R.  Holding short of E on B.  Ground put an air carrier in front of us and told us to follow them. We followed the air carrier across 22L and Ground got mad.  22L was closed at the time.  Ground said we did not have clearance to cross a runway.  Pretty sure a closed runway is not a runway.

Non-flying pilot follows aircraft but crosses a closed runway without permission.


Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I have several concerns on the handling of assistance devices as some specialty wheelchairs can weigh up to 400 lbs.  Lifting them onto or off the belt loader requires 4 or 5 people to safety lift it.  Once it is on the belt loader there is a concern that it may fall off. (Especially on 757s; Airbuses and wide body aircraft) Getting them to and from the passenger takes a lot of time as elevators and not always readily available.

Reporter describes problems with loading specialty wheelchairs that weigh in up to 400 pounds into an aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 12358; Flight Crew Type 3541

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 76; Flight Crew Total 13900; Flight Crew Type 6200

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Manuals; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

During final cockpit preparation; a significant amount of attention was paid to the [company] update for verifying performance. This resulted in not trapping an error of arming LNAV instead of our assigned heading on the MCP. That error was trapped as we were calling for taxi; unfortunately correcting that error resulted in me forgetting to call for 'Flaps 10' prior to aircraft movement. During the Before Takeoff Checklist the focus during the flaps checklist item became verifying that the FDP flaps matched the FMC setting; instead of verifying flaps 10 on the Upper EICAS. The EICAS CONFIG warning trapped the error as the takeoff roll was started; resulting in a low speed reject. The aircraft cleared the runway; the flaps were set correctly; the Takeoff Runway or Performance change procedure was completed; including the Before Takeoff checklist; and the subsequent takeoff was completed normally.

We rejected takeoff due to CONFIG EICAS warning (flaps not set to takeoff range). Upon being cleared for takeoff on Runway XXR the Captain called for 'Set takeoff thrust.' As the throttles were advanced; we received a CONFIG EICAS and aural warning; and throttles were immediately closed to initiate the rejected takeoff without reverse thrust or braking prior to approximately 40 knots ground speed. The aircraft was taxied clear of the runway. The crew reviewed the takeoff performance data; re-entered the takeoff performance data using the Runway or Performance Change Checklist from the QRH; then re-accomplished the Before Takeoff Checklist; properly configuring the flaps to 10. Brake temperatures were noted by the crew to be '0'. The flight was subsequently cleared for takeoff again and departed uneventfully. During preflight there was considerable discussion among the crew with regard to becoming more comfortable with incorporating the latest changes to our performance data entry procedures. This heightened focus on the new performance entry procedures likely began our collective crew distraction away from focusing on the actual checklist items themselves; and properly accomplishing them. After pushback and engine start; as the Mechanic was disconnecting from the aircraft; the crew discovered that the MCP was set to an incorrect roll mode for our planned departure; at which point the Captain and First Officer diverted their attention from properly configuring the aircraft to recycling the flight directors and selecting the proper pitch and roll modes on the MCP. This distraction from the normal flow led to the Captain not calling for 'Flaps 10' and the First Officer not immediately selecting flaps 10 prior to calling for taxi clearance.During the Before Takeoff Checklist; when the 'Flaps' item was called by the First Officer; the First Officer held up the Performance Printout to verify the performance data flap setting matched to FMC flap setting; which likely distracted the entire crew from focusing on the more important fact that the flap handle was not in the proper takeoff position; nor was there any flap setting displayed on the upper EICAS screen. Since the closed loop of the electronic checklist will not allow Takeoff checklist completion without the flaps being property set to the planned takeoff position; we are becoming conditioned away from actually looking at the EICAS Flap Position Indication and actual flap handle position; due to the expectation bias that if all of the items on the checklist are green; the checklist must me complete.We should procedurally establish that once performance data is entered and verified by the Captain and First Officer with [program] during preflight; sole crew focus should then be on normal pushback; startup and taxi flows and procedures. If a change to the MCP is required; for instance; accomplish the change after the current flow or checklist is complete; unless that change in itself is for compliance with the current checklist item. Reemphasize that accomplishment of checklist items should only focus on the item identified by the checklist and not incorporate additional information that has already been input and verified during the preflight. Crew attention for items like 'flaps' should ONLY be directed to the Flap Position EICAS and actual position of the flap handle in comparison to the FMC flap setting and not add additional verification of the [program] that has already been verified during preflight. Even though we don't read green checklist items in the electronic checklist; perhaps we need to re-emphasis actually looking at the referenced checklist item (in this case; EICAS Flap Position Induction and Flap Handle Position) when we confirm 'Checklist Complete' in order to continue reinforcing where we need to be focusing our eyes.

Air carrier flight crew reported a low speed rejected takeoff due to improper flap setting.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 39.1; Flight Crew Total 179.0; Flight Crew Type 128.8

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

When I was around 17 NM northwest of the airport at 7;500 feet I contacted the Tower requesting 2 full stop taxi backs and then a northwest bound departure. I was told to enter a left base for Runway XXL and report a 2 mile base. As I was descending down to the airport's traffic pattern altitude I completed the descent and approach checklist and continued to descend. When I was at a 4 mile base Tower contacted me clearing to land on Runway XXL. So I proceeded as cleared. After turning final I did the Landing Checklist and everything seemed normal. Just as I was making my 300 feet stabilized approach callout the engine went from 1500 RPM to 0 RPM; without any sputtering or prior indications of an eminent failure. As the engine quit I contacted Tower telling them that my engine had failed and that I might not be able to make it to the runway. I tried restarting it as best as I could to no avail called up Tower again and said that the engine did not restart and I will not be able to reach the runway. My indicated airspeed was 55 knots at the time of the failure which is the speed on final for this aircraft; I pitched down slightly to get to best glide speed of 73 knots but could reach that speed as I leveled off momentarily to avoid trees and the airport fence; I cleared the fence and landed around 130 feet short of the runway the aircraft bounced and came back down still short of the runway. The aircraft then rolled on to the runway missing the REIL. The aircraft came to a halt on the Runway and I tried restarting the aircraft again; the first to attempts were not successful. On the third attempt the engine started but had a very low RPM for the power setting and very low idling RPM. I taxied the aircraft to the ramp where I proceeded to shut down the aircraft. And tie it down. After which I contacted my school telling them what had just happened.During the run-up check at the previous airport; while doing the engine idle check to make sure the engine does not die with the throttle at idle; it did sputter and almost shut before coming back to normal idling RPM with out any control input from my end; upon doing this check for the second time this did not occur. During the cruise phase of the flight the engine ran at a low CHT and EGT even though proper leaning of the mixture was done.

A DA-20 engine suddenly quit on short final and landed short of the runway but rolled onto it. The pilot then started the engine and while developing low power; was able to taxi to the ramp.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 155.42; Flight Crew Total 20311; Flight Crew Type 1805.52

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5227; Flight Crew Type 331

Physiological - Other; Distraction; Other / Unknown

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While executing the CGO1A departure from GRU; RW09L; after completing the turn to a 269 track and passing through 3;000 AGL; the aircraft was illuminated by a green laser from almost directly below and to the right of the aircraft.The laser hit the FO (PF) in the right eye and was observed by the CA (PM) and RP on the Flight Deck ceiling. The laser was extremely bright and focused. The FO reported pain and seeing spots in his right eye. Nearly two days later; the FO contacted the CA and informed him that he will seek medical attention as he is still experiencing pain and vision issues from the event. CA informed ATC of the laser attack. ATC ignored the report but the CA wanted the other departing flights on departure frequency to be aware of the event.

On takeoff from GRU at night; I experienced a laser event that affected my eyesight. Partial blindness in my right eye. Laser was very powerful!! It appeared it was tracking all aircraft on the departure because it looked like it was shining on the aircraft ahead of us and then it swung towards us and that is when I looked down and caught it in my vision. We were in a right hand turn which increased my exposure to the laser as it was on our right side and I was the First Officer. I had to get help from the pilot monitoring to fly the aircraft due to my vision degradation.

A B787 flight crew experienced a laser event that partially blinded the First Officer on the initial climb after takeoff. Two days after the event he was still experiencing pain and vision problems and will seek medical help. The Captain reported the event to ATC but was ignored.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After pushback from the gate area- the tug operator had difficulty getting the tug to back away from the aircraft due to the angle between the tug and aircraft nose wheels. Eventually other tug operators assisted and after several attempts the aircraft and the tug would not separate due to the position of the nose wheel on the tug's ramp.The tug operator asked me to turn on the steering in order to turn the nose-wheel (this was to assist them with getting the tug separated) however I told them I could not do that with them standing there. Maintenance personnel arrived and via headphones asked me to turn on the steering and they assured me all ground people were clear of the aircraft.  The steering would not work.  The nose wheel was stuck or locked into one position and would not move.  After several attempts by maintenance the tug was able to back away from the aircraft however there was no steering.  The decision was made to return to gate using a tug.  However this did not work out because the nose wheel would not turn and eventually the sheer-pin for the tow-bar broke.  A second attempt to tow the aircraft (aft to a closer parking area) caused the second sheer-pin to break too.  At this time I told all personnel that we will put deplaning of passenger as the number one priority and only after the passengers leave will we resume dealing with the aircraft.  The Port did get a bus to us; all passengers and their bags were transported away from the aircraft and back to the terminal.  A third attempt to tow the aircraft; with just the crew onboard; was successful and the aircraft was parked at the gate.During this event the Flight Attendants kept the passengers informed; provided water and snacks; and coordinated getting everyone (in need) up to the bathroom. The First Officer provide excellent advice; PAs and his help was invaluable. I attempted to make several PAs too- in order to keep the passengers informed of our status.While I believed the nose-wheel steering system was selected to OFF during pushback; it appears that it was actually ON.  I suspect I am responsible for inadvertently turning on the system and not being aware.  This resulted in damage to the steering system. This is the only plausible reason; at this time; which I believe could cause this to happen.

A Q400 Captain apparently left the nose wheel steering powered during pushback which resulted in the ground crew's inability to disconnect the tow bar. The aircraft returned to gate for maintenance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

I was the pilot flying and on the takeoff roll several seconds after the 100 KTS call the Captain stated 'I have it; aborting.'  I then switched into my First Officer duties for abort mindset. I told the Tower [we were] aborting XXR. I believe the Tower asked 'who is aborting?' to which I repeated '[our flight number] aborting XXR'. He then asked for the reason and I believe I stated generically that we had an engine problem. I stated '60 KTS' as we were slowing and believe I asked the Captain if he wanted the passengers to remain seated to which he responded in the affirmative. I then got on the PA and said 'Remain seated; remain seated.' I believe the Tower asked if we needed any assistance and the Captain stated 'no we need to taxi back to the gate' and I repeated that to the Tower. He then gave us taxi instructions to cross [Runway] XXL to [Taxiway] E and hold short of [Runway] YYR. As we were taxiing the Tower again asked the reason for the abort. The Captain stated 'low oil pressure light left engine' and I repeated that to the Tower. I then told the Captain I would run the 'Aborted Takeoff Checklist' which I read out loud. About the time I was completing the checklist the Tower gave us instructions to cross the YY's and go to Ground. After we crossed the YY's I requested and was assigned a new gate from Ramp. As we were entering the ramp I asked the Captain 'have you said anything to the passengers?' He stated no and then gave a PA explaining the situation to the passengers.

Prepared for departure and was taxiing down the runway when the Captain aborted the takeoff and we braked heavily to come to an abrupt stop on the runway. When we came to a complete stop I assessed out door XXL and saw no fire etc. After a few minutes the First Officer came on the PA and said to 'remain seated.' All of the passengers complied and a few minutes later we taxied back to the gate. A couple of the passengers were visibly shaken but nobody appeared to be injured. The passengers deplaned and the Captain debriefed us as well as in-flight Supervisor.

B757-200 flight crew describes a rejected takeoff for a low engine oil pressure light at 120 KTS. It was the First Officer's takeoff; but he did not see the low oil pressure indication when the Captain called for the reject and assumed command. The low oil pressure light extinguished shortly after the reversers were deployed. The Flight Attendant in charge also provides her perspective.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During climb passing through 9;000 feet precipitation started. The Captain engaged ice protection systems. Shortly after; I noticed sparks and a varying intensity orange glow apparently coming from the #2 engine inlet and surrounding cowling area accompanied by the smell of smoke. No fire annunciations or warnings were observed. I informed the Captain of my observation and I exchanged control of the aircraft back to the Captain. At that time; the Captain made the decision to make an immediate air return. I informed Approach we needed an immediate return. They cleared us for a visual approach and asked if we were declaring an emergency. I informed them that we were [requesting priority handling] and requested fire services be on standby. On descent; I noticed and stated the orange glow and sparks were no longer present. Emergency checklist was discussed and Before Landing checklist was completed. During descent; the Captain requested me to ask ATC for the runway that what was briefed prior to departure. I informed Tower of our request and they promptly cleared us to land. We had a safe landing. We rolled all the way to the end of the runway. We re-verified no sparks or flames as we cleared the runway. We requested fire trucks to follow us all the way to parking at Air Cargo. We completed the After Landing checklist and taxied to the ramp and shut the aircraft down in accordance with the Shutdown checklist. We exited the aircraft and stood a safe distance away while the firefighters conducted an inspection to verify there were no hazards. During this time; we contacted Dispatch and the Chief Pilot. When cleared to approach the aircraft; we noted the engine inlet boot had melted. All procedures were followed as outlined in the SOP.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Beech 99 flight crew reported smelling smoke and observing sparks coming from one of the engines during takeoff and returned to land.


Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Flight Data Processers (FDP) backup processor had been out for a couple of weeks (maybe) before this event. FDP has been marked 'intermittent' on our outage sheet. At the time I was receiving a Radar Assist skills check. We overheard another sector telling their supervisor that FDP was not responding. A few minutes later all FDP stations were reporting down and the facility declared a full FDP outage for about 5-10 minutes. This didn't impact my sectors too bad as we weren't busy. If this had happened just a couple hours sooner it would have had an enormous impact on the safety of our sectors.

The Flight Data Processor (FDP) was out of service at this facility. The back-up processor had already been out of service for about two weeks. FDP is how the facility receives; updates and processes all the flight plans automatically. When this is out of service all data must be accomplished manually.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Flight was filed ZZZ to ZZZ1. This was the fourth day flying with the same Captain. It was our third leg of the day and our second on [this] aircraft. Weather in both locations was clear with light winds out of the north. We pushed from the gate in ZZZ early with 13 passengers. Because of the light load; I pitched to 15 degrees on takeoff to avoid any chance of over-speeding the flaps. On the initial climb; I accelerated to 230 and continued. Through 5;000 ft.; I noted a creaking sound in the airframe and mentioned it to the Captain. Around the same time; he noted the pressurization panel. The cabin differential and cabin altitude were pegged to zero while the cabin showed a slight descent. Rapidly approaching 10;000 ft.; we noted that if we weren't pressurized; we should get a Master Warning chime through 9;800 ft. There was no warning chime. The caution panel remained dark. We began to wonder if it was the gauges that had failed. We discussed this for a moment and agreed to bring Maintenance into the situation. The Captain called Maintenance on SATCOM; and I took over ATC and continued to fly.Reaching FL200; we leveled and set cruise power. I had AUX2 turned down so I could focus on flying and ATC; so I didn't hear the Captain's conversation with Maintenance directly. Shortly after leveling; the Captain asked me to request 15;000 ft. while still on the call. The concern then was a potential overpressurization since we didn't know what the cabin differential was. I told ATC that we needed a descent to 15;000 ft. for a potential pressurization issue. We were cleared: 'Descend and maintain 16;000. Expect lower shortly.' The controller followed up by asking if we needed any assistance. I responded; 'Not at this time.' I set the alerter for 16;000; pressed ALT SEL; verified ALT SEL with the Captain while he was still on the call; and started a descent.The call with Maintenance was completed shortly after starting down; and the Captain recapped the conversation with me. Maintenance was fine with us continuing to ZZZ1 at a lower altitude. He asked for my thoughts on it. I asked if we had performance for it; and he said Maintenance checked with Dispatch and we were fine at the lower altitude. We agreed to reassess the situation at the lower altitude and make a decision from there. Shortly after; the Captain asked 'How are you feeling? I think I'm feeling a little lightheaded.' I responded; 'Yeah; I think my fingers are tingling a little. How about we go down to ten?' We agreed; and I told ATC that we needed 10;000 ft. Once we were cleared; I switched to IAS mode and reduced power to flight idle. The autopilot responded aggressively; so I disconnected it momentarily to establish the descent and reengaged it once we were stable. We used oxygen during the descent and discontinued use reaching 10;000 ft. The Captain asked the flight attendants what conditions were in the back: if the flight attendants were experiencing any symptoms; if the passengers were experiencing any symptoms; if they noticed any abnormalities or heard any hissing noises? Meanwhile; I was handed off to Approach. The Captain and I circled back. He informed me that the flight attendants had reported physiological symptoms that were commensurate with our own--starting in the descent. I don't recall any complaints from passengers; and there were no abnormal noises in the cabin. I reported that we were level at 10;000 ft. talking to [Approach] with a correct altimeter setting.At that point; we were approaching the Valley west of ZZZ2. The Captain noted that we were still at least 130 miles from ZZZ1. We both came to the conclusion that we didn't know what was wrong with the plane; specifically; and we didn't know why we weren't feeling right. Neither of us were comfortable with continuing to a higher-density airport at a lower altitude under the current circumstance. We agreed that a diversion to ZZZ2 was the best course of action. The Captain began coordinating with Dispatch; the flight attendants; and addressed the passengers. I advised ZZZ2 Approach that we needed to plan a diversion to ZZZ2; needed delay vectors; and a lower altitude. We were given present heading; 8;000 ft.; expect visual [Runway] XXL. ATC asked if we required assistance. I repeated; 'Not at this time.' By now; ZZZ2 was off of our right wing; so I slowed to 200 KIAS to allow time to set up and brief the approach and began a descent to 8;000 ft. During that time; the TRACON went through a shift change. I changed the destination in the EFB and requested performance for ZZZ2. I also set up the FMS for the RNAV XXL.Once each of us had everything taken care of; the Captain and I circled back to brief the approach. We acknowledged that [there] were several threats in front of us and outlined the visual approach backed up with the RNAV XXL. By this point; we were on a high downwind for XXL. We completed the descent and approach checklists and descended for the approach. We were left fairly high on the base turn; so I increased our descent rate until we were in a better place for the approach. The controller vectored us at a sharp angle for final and asked if we had the airport in sight. The Captain responded that we needed vectors to final; and we were given a sharp turn to intercept XXL then cleared for the visual approach. The FMS began overshooting the turn; so I disengaged the autopilot and made the corrections to get back on profile. We continued a stable approach to a normal landing. Once clear of the runway; we contacted [Operations] for a gate assignment; continued to the gate; and deplaned. After recounting the anomalies to maintenance personnel; the crew met in the back to debrief and discuss the events that had happened. No additional info needed for [this report].In the sequence of events that unfolded; it was interesting that there was no singular trigger that indicated that we were approaching a [critical situation]. Our expectation for depressurization or lack of pressurization was a CABIN PRESS annunciation associated with a Master Warning. That expectation wasn't realized; so we decided to bring Maintenance into the discussion. In the time that it took to address each level; with what seemed like appropriate action at that time; the situation escalated or more information was learned requiring a further escalation of action. I think CRM played a key role in being able to mitigate the rolling events that resulted in a diversion on an already short flight. From my perspective; it made a huge difference that the Captain had confidence in my ability to handle the airplane; our flight path; and communication with ATC. That allowed him to handle all of the communication with company and flight attendants all while keeping the passengers informed. I especially liked the fact that he continually asked for my input; opinion; and feelings on decisions. We established a collaborative environment in which we quickly assessed where we were; assigned expectations for the next few moments; completed those tasks individually; gathered information; and then circled back to evaluate and repeat the process. I also recognize that we both felt empowered; even for me from the right seat; to say I'm not comfortable with this and stop the operation. In retrospect; I am concerned that the trigger for the Master Warning failed in tandem with the instrumentation on the cabin pressure control panel. I feel like the warning system should be independent of the system itself. Given that; having the visual pressurization check on the after-takeoff flow and the cruise flow helps trap that threat. Going forward; if there's ever any question of pressurization; I would level at a lower altitude and assess the situation. In hindsight; because we hadn't received a Master Warning annunciation; we believed that we were in fact pressurized and sought additional input before making further decisions.

Operating flight; departing ZZZ to ZZZ1; our aircraft and aircrew were in good operating order. Ceilings and visibility departing ZZZ were unrestricted and we were about to finish the final leg of our 4 day trip. The First Officer was the pilot flying and the Captain was the pilot monitoring for this leg. Just prior to passing through 10;000 ft. on our climb-out the Captain checked the pressure indication control panel which indicated the cabin was pressurizing at a rate of about 500 fpm; which isn't unusual for a departure from a near sea level airport; combined with the high climb rate of our light aircraft. What did seem odd was the readings on the other two instruments; the differential gauge was pegged at zero; as was the cabin altitude gauge. These two instruments clearly were not in agreement with each other; or with the pressurization rate gauge. In talking with the First Officer as we climbed through 10;000 ft.; we thought that another way to confirm if we were pressurizing was if the Cabin Press master warning was triggered through 9;800 ft. Also we confirmed that the bleeds and packs were on with normal flow control setting. We did discuss that we were both experiencing popping ears and the First Officer thought he might have heard a creaking noise from the airframe. As we received no master warning; we thought we were probably pressurizing as the rate indicator showed; but possibly had faulty cabin differential and cabin alt gauges. At this point this Captain informed the First Officer that he was going to call Maintenance Control to help troubleshoot the gauges and to get a second opinion as to if we were in fact pressurizing as the crew had thought. The Captain handed the radios over to the First Officer.Maintenance Control informed this Captain that there was not anything they could guide the flight crew in with respect to troubleshooting the pressure indication control panel; and that they could evaluate the system on the ground in ZZZ1 but there was not anything that could be reset or diagnosed in flight from their standpoint. At this time we were climbing through about 15;000 ft. and the panel was reading the same as it had previously; there was a slight cabin pressurization rate with no Cabin Press warning. The Captain and First Officer held a discussion between themselves if they were feeling any symptoms of hypoxia and both pilots were free of such physiological effects. The Captain relayed to Maintenance Control that there seemed to be something wrong and it was the Captain's concern that the pressure vessel could exceed limitations of maximum pressurization differential and for safety of flight wanted to descend back down to 15;000 ft. At this time we were climbing through approximately 16;000 ft. Maintenance Control asked the Captain if the call could be forwarded to Dispatch to make sure there was enough fuel on board to safely operate the flight to ZZZ1 at a lower altitude than planned. The Captain agreed and the call was forwarded.While waiting for the call to be picked up by Operations the Captain once again did a self check and felt no physical effects of hypoxia. The Captain asked the First Officer if he was feeling hypoxic; which the First Officer stated he was not. The Captain then asked the First Officer to call the flight attendants to see if they; or the passengers were feeling off at all; which might indicate high or low pressurization problems. According to the First Officer the reports from the back were that all was seemingly normal. The flight attendants also reported that they did not hear any whooshing or whistling sounds that might indicate a leak in the pressure vessel. We had just leveled off at 20;000 ft. with no master cautions or master warnings. The pressure indication control panel read the same here as it had at the other points indicated in the climb.When Operations picked up their line they quickly ran performance numbers and we agreed that in the interest of safety we would descend to 15;000 ft. While still on the phone with Operations the Captain asked the First Officer to request a descent with ATC. This request was immediately granted; if it was not; it was this Captain's intent to [request priority handling] and inform ATC of our descent to 15;000 ft. Before we reached 15;000 ft. on our descent the Captain started feeling light headed and experienced tingling in his fingers and increased popping in his ears. When asked; the First Officer reported similar altitude effects. It was our assumption that since we were descending the symptoms would not develop too severely as we were descending into more dense air. We then called the flight attendants back and they reported similar hypoxic effects and also frequent ear popping. At about 16;000 ft.; we decided to continue our descent down to 10;000 ft. which we had no problem obtaining clearance for with ATC. At this point the Captain determined we were about 130 miles South of ZZZ1; which was our filed destination. We were also almost directly over ZZZ2. The Captain did another self assessment and felt that it was probably best to not continue to ZZZ1; but wanted to check with the rest of the crew to see how they were feeling about a diversion. The First Officer also reported that he felt like the more conservative approach was to divert to ZZZ2. The Captain specifically remembers feeling that it was irresponsible to continue the flight as planned with an undiagnosed pressurization problem; but with multiple crew members reporting symptoms of hypoxia. This Captain also thought about the fidelity of the operation and did not want to be too aggressive in a manner that would bring unneeded scrutiny on our company if the decision was made to continue and people arrived in ZZZ1 feeling sick. The Captain decided then that in the interest of safety; as the most conservative decision; the flight would divert to ZZZ2. He then called Dispatch back and informed the Dispatcher that we would be diverting to ZZZ2. The Captain asked the First Officer to request vectors from ATC back to ZZZ2 and to inform them that we would be diverting. The Captain then called the flight attendants to inform them about our upcoming change of plans and to make sure everyone in the back was feeling okay. The flight attendants reported feeling relieved that we were diverting and that nobody in the back was reporting feeling sick. This was good news and the Captain determined that emergency services would not be necessary upon landing. Descending through 10;000 ft. both the Captain and First Officer began feeling light headed and were experiencing mild cognitive decline. The pilots then took turns briefly donning oxygen masks in an attempt to raise our blood oxygen levels and stave off hypoxic effects which was helpful. The Captain made an announcement to the passengers informing them that due to a mechanical difficulty we would be making a brief stop in ZZZ2 for safety.The Captain and First Officer then came together to ensure that we were on the same page and to catch each other up. We briefed our approach and ran the descent and approach checklists. The First Officer then landed the aircraft at ZZZ2; once clearing the runway we received a parking spot from Operations; proceeded to the terminal and terminated our flight. [Report] also filed. This was a challenging situation to identify and manage because of the nature of the failure that we experienced. In talking with maintenance personnel in ZZZ2; the nature of the failure that we experienced; a faulty cabin pressure controller; not only provides information to the gauges we use to monitor the pressurization status of the aircraft; a component inside of it also triggers the master warning for a high cabin pressure altitude if the airplane loses pressurization. When we thought we were using independent systems to verify the pressurization status of the aircraft; we were in fact relying on the same system that waspresenting multiple failures throughout many aircraft fail safes.

Q400 flight crew reported aircraft failed to pressurize due to a failed cabin pressure controller and crew began to feel hypoxic effects; requiring a decent to a diversion and a precautionary landing.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 23L

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 7491

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Descending on the AVSAR 3B arrival to [Runway] 23L at MMMX we encountered wake turbulence from a B-747 12 miles ahead on the same arrival. We adjusted our speed and descent rate to avoid any further encounter. A few minutes later we were cleared for the ILS 23L and to caution wake turbulence behind the 747. The following controller told us to turn to a 160 heading to intercept the ILS. I told him I didn't want to cut the turn to the ILS to reduce our wake turbulence separation. He insisted that we turn at that time. We began the turn as requested but at a gradual rate to maintain a safe distance. The wind was out of the east at about 7 kts which would have maintained the wake on the glide slope. We landed uneventfully.

A B737 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence 12 miles in trail of a B747 on approach to MMMX.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Preparing to taxi to Runway 01 at SGU; an uncontrolled airport; I as pilot monitoring began monitoring the CTAF frequency. Hearing nothing upon completing our final taxi check; I made a radio call on the correct frequency indicating our position and type of aircraft and that we would be taxing for takeoff on Runway 01 via A. The wind was reported as calm. Hearing no one else on the CTAF; we began our taxi as briefed and broadcast. I placed the CTAF frequency as active in the number 2 radio and selected the Captain to hear and respond to that frequency. Meanwhile; I selected ARTCC as the active in number 1 radio; selected 2 in standby so I could also hear CTAF; and then picked up the clearance.Since we heard no one else on frequency; I advised ATC that we were ready for departure on Runway 01. We were released for departure. Upon coming back to frequency; I switched radio number 1 back to CTAF and ensured both pilots were listening and tuned for that frequency. After completing the final checklist; I made another CTAF announcement that we were; 'taking Runway 01 for departure; climbing to 13;000 via the SID.' Hearing nothing in response; we proceeded onto the runway; and as we aligned with centerline; the Captain stated that he saw an aircraft rotating on the same pavement; opposite direction on Runway 19. I made no less than four immediate queries to the Cessna aircraft as he flew overhead. I asked if he was on CTAF; if his radio was broken; and also to identify himself via callsign. There was no reply until he was out of sight. Having turned crosswind; he made a position announcement. I then queried him again as before but he simply replied that there was another aircraft waiting to takeoff on Runway 19 and that he was exiting the pattern to the east.  Immediately; the other aircraft spoke on CTAF and said that he was holding short of the runway still and that it was clear. We then departed without further incident.The cause of this event is the lack of communication from general aviation pilots at a non-towered uncontrolled airport.  I made several checks that our CTAF frequency was in fact correct and that the volumes were turned up. Runway 01/19 at SGU is 9300 feet long and due to the crown and general slope of the pavement; small light colored aircraft are extremely difficult to see at that distance. In fact; the Cessna did not even become visible until rotation whereby his undercarriage contrasted sufficiently with the runway in order to be seen. SGU is known to be hazardous due to the volume of general aviation traffic mixed with turbojet aircraft. The lack of situational awareness and cavalier radio attitude shown in this instance is at best alarming and at worst recklessly negligent. A contributing factor may have been that since we heard no other traffic on frequency; we made the assumption that we were in fact alone at the airport and did not adequately clear the far end; however as aforementioned; small aircraft are near impossible to see against the mountainous horizon at that distance.SGU is well-known by part 121 pilots who frequent it; as an extremely hazardous airport due to the lack of any ATC controlling presence including radar. The airport has significant traffic volume that it is not atypical to have as many as four or five aircraft in the traffic pattern at one time. This is busy for any general aviation airport but the introduction of turbojet traffic makes for increasing hazards. As a personal note; I have never without exaggeration spoken to a fellow 121 pilot about SGU who hasn't agreed that the field should be towered and controlled at least on a limited basis. I also think that despite terrain surrounding the field; the FAA would be wise in designating a specific runway as the 'preferred' calm wind runway. I have reviewed our company notes on the field and found no such designation.  My suggestion would be to designate Runway 19 for this purpose.

Air carrier First Officer reported proceeding on to the runway at a SGU non-towered airport and observing an aircraft that had not been transmitting on CTAF departing the opposite direction runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

The flight was normal in almost every way. The First Officer was the pilot flying this leg; he seemed a bit quiet and [not very] confident in his abilities but was new and had minimal flight experience so this was not out of the ordinary for his situation. The ILS approach was normal; we broke out of the weather at about 500 ft and were stable. Just under 300 ft we experienced a gust of wind which ballooned the aircraft slightly and made the airspeed jump less than 10kts. The FO (First Officer) pulled the thrust to idle; I forcefully stated not to pull to idle and to add power. The FO did not respond in a timely manner; we came through the gust and developed a sink rate and the airspeed decreased not more than 10kts but at a good rate. We were within 100 ft of the runway at this point; the sink rate and airspeed were acceptable with a perception that the landing would firm but safe. At this point the FO added power; we slightly touched and ballooned; then he pulled the thrust to idle and we sank immediately and bounced. He added power we both stated go around and I helped him on the controls to execute a balked landing by adding power and arresting the sink rate with the yoke while gaining airspeed. At this point the FO missed several callouts and did not follow the flight director. I had to make all the callouts and hit the TOGA button to get the flight director up; called the go around on Tower; switched to departure freq; set a climb altitude; pulled up the flaps to 8 then the gear then put the autopilot on; and spun a new heading. As all this was happening the FO was not pulling the power back as the aircraft leveled at the set altitude and the speed increased into the range where it over-sped the flaps by less than 10kts before I caught up and helped him reduce the power and bugged an appropriate speed to fly in the downwind. After the event once we were at the gate; the FO mentioned he was on special tracking from the company and this sort of thing had happened before.The root cause of the event was a lack of experience on the part of the pilot flying; not following directions in a timely manner; not performing the correct actions or callouts. Contributing factors were task saturation of the pilot not flying/pilot monitoring. Slightly stiff thrust levers; within normal range of tension however could have been a factor.In the future it would be beneficial for crewmembers to know if any other crewmembers are on special tracking by the company to raise awareness of potential deficiencies in the performance of their duties. Also a more conservative mentality on calling go arounds early at the onset of instability could have avoided this event.

CRJ-200 Captain reported the relatively inexperienced First Officer appeared to be weak in procedures knowledge and flying skills.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

We rolled out to the end of Runway XXC and exited. We arrived at night in moderate rain conditions. Taxi instructions [were] from Ground. ZZZ ramp is uncontrolled and no further contact with ATC is necessary to access our gate. As we made the left turn around the concourse that put us on the straightaway between [two gates]; I noticed a provisioning truck out of my periphery to the right. I did not perceive the truck as a threat as it appeared we had more than adequate clearance as the truck was on an access road. Additionally; the First Officer did not alert me to a proximity concern so I continued my taxi course and speed. We felt no impact or sound passing the provisioning truck. It was only after we were parked at the gate did I subsequently learn about our winglet grazing the back end of the provisioning truck. I also learned that the provisioning truck had departed the access road paved surface and was stuck in the grass. This was not evident to us as we approached the vehicle.As the PIC; I take full responsibility for the event that occurred. Night; rain; and the close proximity of the inbound taxi lane at ZZZ to the vehicle access road all were contributing factors along with the fact we had no warning of a disabled vehicle that could potentially cause an impedance to our taxi in. That being said; had I simply altered my taxi course; in which I had space to do so; queried the First Officer more proactively; or stopped the aircraft to positively ensure clearance; this ASAP would not have been written.   In addition to the above mentioned crew actions; it is incumbent on both pilots to speak up; as forcefully as necessary to prevent this type of event from occurring. Both of us are to assess the risks to the aircraft at all times. We can never just be along for the ride; become complacent; or assume the other guy always knows what he is doing. We have two pilots because it is required; and it also requires both pilots to be present and engaged.

Air carrier flight crew reported after parking; ground crew notified the crew the aircraft winglet made contact with a truck on the access road.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

The purpose of this report is to point out a possible safety issue in regards to the no fly zones going to South America. Flying over South America there are two no fly zones; one in the Peruvian Airspace and the second one extends from south of Peru across the Andes mountains all the way down to the south of Chile. Those areas where depicted in our old paper navigational charts and every no fly zones had waypoints. Those waypoints where depicted; for example the no fly zone over Peruvian airspace had the following waypoints depicted on the old paper navigational chart as follows: NFZ01; NFZ02; etc.; up to NFZ06. Those way points are still on our Nav (Navigation) Database and can be still used for safety awareness by building the no fly zones on the secondary flight plan. When we switch to Electronic Flight Bag you can still see the no fly zones but the way points are taken away. Based on my experience; about 80% of the times that we fly to South America; the iPad loses his own ship due to lack of signal and you cannot use the electronic chart for reference to make sure that you are not getting over any of the no fly zones; especially when we are deviating from weather. The only place that we can find those no fly zones way points is in the diversion guide page XX. I always put those way points on the secondary flight plan so I can see them on the Nav Display just in case we have to deviate due to weather and the iPad loose the signal. On my last flight to Lima we had to deviate due to weather over the shore line and because we had those no fly zones on the secondary flight plan; we were able to stay away from that area. I been flying into South America for over XX years in different fleets and we always had use that procedure and the information was everywhere. Now we have lost that information when we switch from paper to electronic nav charts. We also are getting new pilots from other bases that never been in those routes before and the majority are not even aware of those way points; and have no clue how to find them and use them. I believe that in the name of safety; those way points should be inserted into the electronic navigational charts and the company should provide more information about those way points.If you need any additional information please don't hesitate to contact me.Thank you for your time and attention to towards this matter.Experience flying this division.As I mentioned before; I believe that in the name of safety; those way points should be inserted into the electronic navigational charts and the company should provide more information about those way points.

Air carrier Captain reported the waypoints that marked no fly zones in South America on the old paper charts are no longer available in the electronic charts.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 510; Flight Crew Type 450

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

On my flight activity with [student]; we had an actual engine failure in Aircraft X. At approximately 2;200 ft. I simulated an engine failure for my student to recover from. As always; I turned the carb heat on and pulled the power back with the throttle. I told my student to recover at approximately 1;200 ft. To our surprise; when the throttle was pushed in; we did not get any power. I immediately said 'My flight controls' and ran through the engine restart procedure by memory. I had my student verify that it was all complete by referencing his checklist. After that; I immediately squawked 7700 and [advised ATC] all while lining the aircraft up with the grass in between the highway for an off-airport landing. I continued with the memory items of the forced landing checklist which consisted of unlatching the doors and confirming that the seat belts and shoulder harnesses were secured. After continuously trying to restart the engine and purposely not securing it; with the intent to restart the engine; our engine restarted at approximately 50 ft. AGL. I immediately climbed to a high altitude and remained close to the highway in case of another engine failure. I coordinated with Tower and proceeded inbound to land at ZZZ. For background information; our carb heat was working during the run-up and during other maneuvers that required carb heat.

Pilot reported carburetor ice was the best suspect. After maintenance review; no other issues were found with this aircraft.

C172 Flight Instructor reported a temporary loss of engine power; resulting in a precautionary landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flew ZONNA1 arrival to TUS. I was PF (Pilot Flying) and did the arrival briefing prior to descent which included terrain hazards and the MSA. Both pilots had terrain selected. Approach control gave us a clearance to turn right to 270 and descend to 10;000' for sequencing. Soon after this clearance we entered IMC. Passing north and abeam Mt Lemmon at about 10;300'; we got an EGPWS TERRAIN PULL UP warning. I executed the EGPWS Recovery Action. Almost immediately we went VMC. After passing the MSA of 10;700 and visually verifying terrain clearance; I resumed normal flight; leveled at 11;000' and informed ATC that we had responded to a GPWS terrain warning. They acknowledged and gave us a descent to 9000'. Remainder of flight was uneventful.Either the Terrain system gave us a false alert or we were given a clearance to descend below the radar minimum altitude. We never got any indication on the Terrain display. STAR page showed us north of Mt Lemmon and the terrain depicted around it. While we had good terrain awareness; I should have queried Approach about an IMC descent below the Sector MSA.I recommend a Radar Minimum Altitudes chart be included in the Jeppesen pages for TUS.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a EGPWS warning while being vectored for approach to TUS airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 829; Flight Crew Type 177

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Upon takeoff from Corona Airport; I climbed to 1;700 feet; and began my normal route to LA metro. Upon reaching the water treatment plant I was informed of a Presidential TFR. Fullerton Tower asked me if I was aware of the TFR; and stated that I was at the boundary. I quickly made a 180 degree turn back to Corona. I then called up SoCal Approach and asked if there was a way around the TFR so that I could continue my work. ATC informed me there was not and asked me to copy down a number for the TFR deviation.From now on I always check for current TFR's and I receive a briefing and check the FAA website. Doing so will prevent you from encountering TFR's and being violated. Being a safe pilot is most important to me and one should always check and double check. The TFR was on the Santa Monica VOR DME 044 degree radial at 6.1 nautical miles from the surface up to but not including 18;000 feet and was a 35 NM radius TFR.

Pilot was flying out of an airport and as approaching the destination was questioned if he knew about the VIP TFR. The pilot responded he did and made a 180 turn. He then contacted Approach Control and asked if there was a way around the TFR to his destination. There was not and pilot was given a number to call for pilot deviation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I first noticed something awry as the center pumps were nearing empty. The mains should have been perfectly balanced; yet they weren't. When the center tank was empty; I did a quick crossfeed to balance the 3 to 400 pound imbalance.Soon after; we crossed the first fix on our fuel/position estimates printout. We were 2 minutes early; 400 pound over burn. Usually; our flight plans are more accurate than that. We had leveled off at our first cruise altitude; but already we were ready to climb to our final cruise; so we requested and received clearance to climb. The mains indicated another imbalance occurring; approximately 500 pounds. We leveled off again; but my concern over the situation was growing slowly - I balanced the mains; and then watched the results carefully. After going back to four pumps on; crossfeed closed; the left main dropped 500 pounds in approximately 3 minutes. At this; I was on high alert. I pulled out the QRH; and began going through the checklist. I didn't want to take action too quickly; so I stopped short of taking any irreversible action for a few minutes.I called the FAs; and requested they look for signs of fuel leak. They didn't observe any misting behind the engine; but they did see liquid around the engine pylon; and at the trailing edge of the flaps. This was inconclusive; since we'd deiced fully (type 1 and 4) before takeoff.The initial drop to 500 pound imbalance tapered off; but continued; so over the next ten minutes or so; the imbalance reached 900 pounds. We were approaching our next fix on the plan; and we were now 1900 pounds over expected fuel burn.At this point; I decided it was time to commit to the checklist; which required shutting down the leaking engine; and divert. Company outstation was convenient at that point in time; so we made that the plan. I shut the engine down per the QRH; and walked the panel -- Dispatch; FAs; and passengers.Communication was difficult as we descended to our drift down altitude. We were in mountainous terrain; and had trouble reaching the Local Approach Controller; as well as raising Operations on company frequency. I didn't have the chance to try DTMF microphone before were able to get back in contact with ATC; and this point; I was too busy to get back to Dispatch over the radio; when the essentials of re-dispatch had already been accomplished.We landed slightly overweight; approximately 46;000 pounds; with a flaps 15 max of 44;200. The landing was smooth; with a minimal sink rate. I think the whole situation proceeded very smoothly. It's a very busy checklist; so I did my best to take my time; and get everything done properly. By the time we landed; I felt we were ready and well-prepared; rather than rushed or stressed.

Captain reported unusual fuel loss during flight; requiring an inflight engine shutdown and diversion.


Beechcraft Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 700

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Departed with fuel 100-125 gallons (I thought). I added 60 gallons and aircraft fuel gauges indicated 50 at [my departure airport]. Flight time for IFR filing estimated to be 1:43 which included a 15 KT headwind. Departure uneventful leveled at 14;000 - reduced fuel flow and encountered a mixture control that would only reduce fuel flow to 23.5 GPH. Normal fuel burn 19.5/20.5 GPH. Approximately 20 minutes from planned landing fuel totalizer showed 20 gallons needed to complete flight. Aircraft gauges showed 20/25 left/right remaining. Right engine failed first attempted to cross feed and within a few minutes left engine started losing power and then both shut down. Lessons:First; never trust aircraft fuel gauges until it is determined the exact readings.Secondly; adjust flight profile when normal limits are exceeded. Lastly; if any doubt -land as soon as possible and take corrective action. Flying for 50 years and never thought I would run out of fuel but I was advised by a retired FAA employee to file this report. Even though it said it is not intended for accidents. Reports have been made to FAA and NTSB.

The Reporter stated that both tanks were just below the yellow quantity caution when the engines quit at which time he assumed meant he had 40 gallons total on board. He was talking with his destination airport Tower Controller when the second engine fail so he attempted to land at a nearby CTAF airport; but landed just short of that airport's closest runway. He decided at the approach to stall shudder he had better get the aircraft on the ground. He was not injured even though the aircraft was damaged.

A B60 pilot reported an off airport landing after both engines shutdown in flight because of fuel starvation even though his fuel quantity system indicated fuel on board.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Day 4 of a 4 day with a new First Officer (FO). The FO mentioned before departure that he'd been off on vacation for a few weeks prior to this trip. We had two flights that day so I told him he could pick which one he wanted to fly or could fly both to get comfortable again. He elected to fly this leg and the flight was uneventful until we began to descend to DEN. Moderate turbulence in VMC for the last 10 min of the flight. As Pilot Monitoring (PM) I asked for lower and was given 8;000 feet abeam the airport where it finally became only light turbulence. We were given a base turn; called the airport in sight; and were cleared for the visual approach to RWY 35L. The FO lined up for the runway; asked for flaps 1 and began a slow descent while I contacted tower and obtained our landing clearance. I then noticed that we were approaching 1;200 feet AGL outside of the FAF and we were below the glideslope (in VMC). I alerted the FO that we were low and to level off while we finished configuring the aircraft. He did so but the aircraft briefly descended to 1;000 feet AGL before he completely leveled off. We configured the aircraft and were stabilized and landed uneventfully. We briefed and successfully alerted the Flight Attendants (FA) early coming into DEN due to it being a mountainous airport. However; we should have briefed the high airport elevation during the approach briefing so we would have paid extra attention to the RA which would have told us we were lower than we thought.

As I began to slow the aircraft down I realized that we were too low and at approximately the same time that the Captain stated the same. I had already begun arresting the descent by turning off the auto pilot and hand flying the rest of the approach; noting that we were in Flight Path Angle (FPA) mode and that the altitude window was lower than the 7;000 feet I intended to set. Right after that ATC gave us a low altitude alert call and we continued to a normal approach and landing. After we arrived at the gate; we debriefed the approach and although it was a visual approach and the subsequent landing was normal it felt prudent to make this report.By me being more aggressive in the monitoring of my altitude selection as either I misled my intended target initially or hit the altitude select knob in error at some point. A contributing factor to this may also be having 19 days in between this flight and my last.

ERJ-170 flight crew reported descending below the glideslope to 1;000 feet AGL on a visual approach to DEN.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Boarded the aircraft and sat because the flight was delayed. FA2 (Flight Attendant 2) came from the back of the aircraft asking if it smelled weird to us. I walked to the back and before I lowered my mask I could already smell a musty dirty sock smell; it was very strong. There was a deadheading pilot onboard and we asked him to come smell it; he acknowledged the smell but wasn't worried about it which put us at ease. Once we were up in the air the smell remained and was strong back in the galley. FA2 called the pilots and they said they could also smell it in the flight deck and were already starting to write a report. The smell dissipated about 20 minutes later; as we started descending the smell came back and was really strong. My head was hurting and I felt dizzy. FA2 indicated similar and even strong reactions; FA3 indicated she had a bad headache and FA1 in the front said she felt dizzy and faint. We communicated our symptoms with the pilots and asked they call for people to meet the flight. After deplaning we connected with a [Flight Attendant Service personnel] and she helped us get connected to a hospital to get tested. We waited about an hour trying to get transportation to the hospital to get checked out; we arrived at the hospital and they said they've had crews there before. They took vitals and blood tested us to make sure we were okay. Our tests came back negative although our symptoms all remained. We then spent two hours after being discharged trying to get a hotel and transportation so we could rest.

I FA2 (Flight Attendant 2) smelled something when I boarded the plane. It smelled like mold or dirty socks. It was very prevalent mainly towards the aft galley and aft half of the airplane. We had to wait an hour and a half for the pilots to arrive. So we held off on boarding but the crew and two deadheading pilots stayed on board. I was sitting by the aft galley for about 20 minutes when I went to ask the deadheading pilots and crew if they smelled anything and that the smell in the back was really irritating me and starting to give me a headache. The pilots went to the back to smell and said yes it did smell but that since it was rainy outside maybe the rain got the air conditioning filter wet and the filter was probably dirty. I believed this because it really did smell like mold/ dirty air conditioner.  So we ignored it and it started to get a bit better. We ended up boarding; the pilots arrived; we pushed back and took off. On takeoff we started to notice the same smell again becoming more prevalent. About 20 -30 minutes or so after take off I called the pilots to let them know about the smell and how we had smelled it on the ground as well. I said maybe it's mold or something. And they said; it's not mold; we smell it too and we're already in the process of writing it up. Within the next half hour we all started to feel dizzy; headache; light headedness. So we called the pilots back and said we wanted to get checked out at the hospital in ZZZ as we knew then it was in fact fumes in the cabin. And we were experiencing symptoms. Upon descent the odor became so strong in the aft galley I had to plug my nose and try not to take a deep breath and I began feeling so faint that I grabbed an oxygen bottle to use during landing.  Once we landed the smell started to go away again. When we arrived to the gate in ZZZ I guess the paramedics were there but they thought they were meeting a passenger and they left. There was some confusion so I'm not entirely sure what happened there. A flight service manager met us and helped us get set up to getting to a hospital in ZZZ. We arrived there maybe an hour and a half later and within another hour or so got our blood tests to test for carbon monoxidePilots should [not] just dismiss these smells as not a big deal. Get maintenance on board asap/ land plane asap and deplane. Also please put carbon monoxide detectors in the cabin so we can provide a safe environment for passengers and employees.

Air carrier flight attendants reported a fumes event during pre-flight which dissipated initially and resumed during descent. Flight attendants reported experiencing physiological symptoms to the Captain who requested medical assistance and submitted a fumes report to maintenance at gate arrival.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Go around from low altitude initiated by the crew due to Wake Turbulence by preceding landing Airbus 321. Wind was virtually light and variable allowing wake from preceding aircraft to linger over the approach end requiring greater than normal sidestick inputs to stay aligned with the runway.

A321 Captain reported executing a go-around at CLT when wake turbulence was encountered on short final.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 6000

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 6000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was the First Officer and Pilot Monitoring for Flight #XXXX; ZZZ1-ZZZ. The flight had been uneventful all the way through the approach. We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway XX at ZZZ; and after contacting Tower; we were given our landing clearance. Aircraft were landing and departing on Runway XX as well as departing on Runway XYR. I did not specifically hear a takeoff clearance for an aircraft for Runway XX while we were on final. At 400 ft. AGL; an aircraft entered Runway XX. The Captain said out loud that this didn't look right and I commented that the aircraft may be crossing the runway where an FBO is on the other side but it seemed closer than what the Tower usually allowed. The aircraft then made the ninety degree turn to lineup on the runway and immediately started taking off. At that instant the Captain already said he was going around; and before I could say anything [to] the Tower; the Controller directed us to go-around. We were then given a right turn and altitude to climb. The Captain performed a smooth and normal go-around and we were handed off to Departure. Approach re-vectored us for the visual back to Runway XX; where we landed without further incident and taxied to the gate.Go-around when an aircraft entered red landing runway while on short final.

Landing configuration; Runway XX (ZZZ). We were cleared to land. Aircraft entered the landing runway at approximately 500 ft. AGL. We initiated a go-around; and circled back to land with no further incident. Go-around due to aircraft on landing runway. Radio congestion; increase awareness of surroundings at a busy facility.

B737-700 flight crew reported a ground conflict during short final resulting in a go-around.


Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

My flight review expired at the end of month.  I had been in State X for most of next month and then spent two weeks in place Y for yet the next month.  When I returned the COVID-19 pandemic was starting to take over everyone's life.  I had no time for flying in that period; until I was asked to fill in for an instructor who was leaving.  For whatever reason; I never looked at my Flight Review date and missed it.  I flew on that date and four subsequent dates before something made me look.  I was out!  Inattention to details has never been a problem till Coronavirus came along.  Purely human error - mine.  Sorry.

Pilot reported being outside of flight currency requirements and cited distraction from the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.