Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 30

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff; during climb phase; clearance was given from ZZZ Approach [Control] to climb restrict to 12.000 feet direct ZZZZZ intersection. When crossing 10;500 feet; ZZZ Approach instructed to call ZZZ Center on frequency XYZ.AB. I did try to call ZZZ [Center] on XYZ.AB several times; but no contact received. I could listen ZZZ Center very weak on XYZ.AB; and could listen the other aircraft communicating. I tried to ask another aircraft for a relay between me and ZZZ Center; but no answer. No answer from ZZZ [Center] also. I tried to contact back ZZZ Approach and ask for a different frequency; but had no answer from ZZZ Approach also. I started looking on my charts and started calling ZZZ Center on other frequencies; but no answer again. I tried to contact XYX.ZB; but no answer also. This was when I realized that I was facing a communication fail. At this moment; I selected 7600 (communication fail code) on my transponder (squawk). Decided to continue the flight following my flight plan clearance received; towards my destination. Over ZZZ1 tried to call ZZZ [Approach] but no answer. During all time I tried to use different radio equipment on board and also keep trying contact with ZZZ Center; ZZZ1 Approach; ZZZ Tower; another aircraft that sometimes I could listen very weak; but no answer.When approaching ZZZZZ1 intersection; on XYX.ZB I started listening ZZZ Center transmitting blind for me a telephone number for me to call. I also could listen if I received the message to press ident; I did. After that; ZZZ transmitted to me; blind again; to turn left heading 270 and descend to 6;000 feet; and asking me to press ident if I received. I pressed ident; and followed the instruction given. ZZZ [Controller] replied that they see my ident; and weather information for ZZZ [Airport] was given to me; together with a VFR approach and landing clearance on ZZZ3 Runway XX; and ident was requested again. I understood and pressed ident again. ZZZ Center said to me to try contact with ZZZ1 Approach on XCY.DZ I tried; but no answer was received again; and I kept monitoring both frequencies; the reception was very weak and noisy. After few moments I could listen a last transmission saying me the weather and clear to land on Runway XX; after landing try to call ground.I did land on Runway XX; and after landing; vacated the Runway via Taxiway 1; stopped and tried to call Ground. Again; no contact. Decided to turn left on Taxiway 2 and look for a place to park. I couldn't see any signal from Tower or follow me car at that time. When I was closer to the Tower; I could listen to Ground calling me; and I replied back. He said he was receiving me too weak. Instruction was given to continue Taxiway 2; hold short Runway XY. Next instruction; cross Runway XY turn left on [Taxiway] 3 and hold short Runway XX. At the holding; communication was lost again. Parking brakes applied. I took my phone; called ZZZ [Center] and asked ZZZ1 Tower telephone number. I tried to call Tower but phone didn't complete the call. After few minutes; I decided to make a 180 turning back; to not cross the runway. I did it and followed Taxiway 2 back; when I received a transmission on the ground frequency saying to turn left on Taxiway 4 and park. This was what I did. After stopping the aircraft; I didn't move from inside until police and the airport ground personnel came to me and said me that I can leave the aircraft. Before leaving the flight deck; I took my phone and called the ZZZ Tower again and after speaking with [the Controller]; situation explained; he asked me to call ZZZ center on phone number given. I did call ZZZ; asked to call with the supervisor. I explained all the situation and the same I am writing here on this report.After all done; I was asked to taxi the aircraft to another apron. I asked to park the aircraft at the hangar; closer to the FBO; where an aircraft technician could help me to troubleshoot and fix the airplane. A follow me car was provided to me and the taxi was done following the follow me car; and aircraft parked in front of the hangar.

Albatross pilot reported that the aircraft's communication system malfunctioned in flight causing weak transmissions and eventually a loss of communications.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10350; Flight Crew Type 800

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

During flight training; the student pilot flared aggressively resulting in the airplane being 4 or 5 ft. above the Runway at low speed with flaps fully extended. I told the student to go around. He delayed but added full power after a second or two. He then raised the nose abruptly resulting in an immediate stall warning. I attempted to lower the nose but the student remained on the controls and continued to pull back. As a result; I was unable to reduce the angle of attack. The airplane stalled and began to roll and yaw to the left. The airplane was only a few ft. above the Runway. The student released the controls but the aircraft was stalled and had no control effectiveness. I reduce the thrust to idle to arrest the incipient spin and the airplane landed on the left main landing gear. It was not a hard landing but the airplane continued to roll to the left. The left wingtip contacted the Runway surface. We were then at about a 45 degree angle to the Runway Centerline and exited the Runway into the grass. I regained directional control and brought the airplane to a stop.There were no injuries. As of this writing; the only damage I am aware of is a cracked and broken plastic wing tip and some slightly bent aluminum at the left wing tip. Mechanics are inspecting the airplane now.

C172 Flight Instructor reported student improperly attempted landing; lost control; which resulted in runway excursion and aircraft damage.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 1500

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After a non-eventful landing at BED started our taxi. Made the turn from a snow covered taxiway onto a taxiway that had just been swept but not sanded; all 3 wheels lost traction simultaneously and we began to slide sideways to the edge of the taxiway. Only one main (right) and the nose-wheel barely entered the snow and the left main was still on the taxiway. Due to the existing conditions the rate of taxi was slower than normal which prevented the aircraft from sliding at a fast rate or traveling far resulting in zero damage to the aircraft. [Ground crew] was able to successfully tow the aircraft out and to the FBO where a Mechanic did a thorough inspection which verified no damage and the aircraft was returned to duty. I believe the sweeping of the taxiway revealed the underlying ice sheet; had it been sanded or not swept at all I believe the incident could have been avoided.

Taxiing in at BED went from snow covered taxiway to one ice covered that had been broomed but not sanded. We were taxiing very slowly; but in the turn went into a slow slide into grass. No damage was done as only one main was in snow bank;and nose was just off taxiway. [Ground personnel] came out and pulled us out. We had mechanic inspect everything; and we were on our way the next day.

Small jet flight crew reported loss of directional control during taxi in snowy and icy conditions at BED that resulted in an excursion off the taxiway.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft X was IFR when he requested a destination change. I issued the clearance 'Cleared to the ... airport via direct; descend at pilot's discretion; maintain one zero thousand; ... altimeter' The pilot stumbled a bit on his readback and added something at the end that was unreadable; but I figured it was the reason he was diverting; so I asked him to say again the last part. He responded that he had a left alternator issue. I asked if he needed any assistance; and he said 'no'.I then tried to communicate with the pilot about NOTAMs and have him report receipt of weather; but got no response. I later observed the aircraft descend below the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude); down to 9500 feet. Since he had reported an alternator issue; I could only imagine that he'd lost radio contact and had the field in sight and was commencing approach. He later got back on radio and said he had been off the radio listening to weather. I restated one zero thousand as assigned altitude and he climbed back up. Upon review of the radio tape; the pilot did not read back the assigned altitude when I initially cleared him to his destination.I would question when a pilot doesn't readback an altitude clearance. Even though the only thing technically required of them to read back is a hold short clearance; the language says pilots 'should' readback altitude assignments; and I as a controller can solicit a readback.

A Center Controller observed a diverting aircraft with an alternator problem descend without a clearance to an altitude below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 9900; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was on an IFR flight to FAR flying freight on board. Conditions at FAR was IMC with ATIS reporting ½ mile visibility and 200 overcast with fog. The Tower reported 4;400 RVR when I was cleared to land on Runway 36. I saw the runway at minimums and landed safely. While taxing on the runway the Tower requested a breaking action report and cleared me to exit right onto Charlie. I reported the breaking action as fair to good; but upon reaching Charlie and starting my right turn the plane started to slide past the taxiway. I noticed that I had gone too far past the taxiway to continue a right turn onto it and applied left break and differential power to make a tight left turn that allowed me to get on Taxiway Charlie. I was so relieved that I did not go off the runway that I failed to inform the Tower. I thought I was taxiing at a safe speed but failed to take into account that the edge of the runway might be slicker than the center of the runway. There was no other plane waiting to takeoff at the time or on approach to the runway.

A pilot reported that after landing on FAR Runway 36 he was instructed to exit right on Taxiway C but because of ice slid past Charlie and made a tight left turn back to exit on C but did not notify the Tower of the incursion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Manuals; Company Policy

Flight Attendant was removed from flight due to COVID exposure. Pre-flight complete with review of AML. Airplane swap from a Type 1 to a Type 0; due too no FA replacement. Running behind schedule. Pre-flighted aircraft and apparently did not verify AML which was left behind and in Maintenance hands. Could have sworn both First Officer and I had hands on! Departed to ZZZ1 without AML.Rushed.I always turn around and confirm that AML is on board at the stage of the checklist when it's announced. Obviously a lack of attention on my part. Still can't believe it happened.

During pre-flight the CA and I conducted our respective preflight duties; including the Before Start Checklist. At the line item AML and flight forms; we both verified that the AML was on the aircraft. The CA then placed it in the CA side bin. At XA:25 I was notified by the Duty Chief that Maintenance reported the AML for aircraft and XXX was left in ZZZ.Unknown; as we do not know how the AML was left behind. In the future I will be more vigilant in checking that the AML is onboard once the flight deck door is closed.

Air carrier flight crew reported departing without the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook (AML) onboard.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

Aircraft Y was slow climbing out of 16000 for 19000 feet and head on with Aircraft X who was descending out of 26000 feet via the RAZRR star. I called the Center sector to give them a heads up and gave them a data block on Aircraft Y. I called the TRACON sector to ask what his plan was for the two aircraft. The TRACON sector said; 'Oh; i took a point out on him'. It seems like TRACON was working Aircraft Y. Eventually; the TRACON departure sector picked up the line and gave me control for turns to separate the airplanes that were in the TRACON Arrival sector airspace. I explained that I wasn't in communication with Aircraft Y and he was outside of my airspace now. I couldn't do anything to save it. He needed to talk to the Center sector. The center Aircraft X to TRACON instead of issuing an amended altitude of 20000 feet to Aircraft X. To save what was looking like a bad near miss TRACON issued a panic vector of 130 (50 degrees rt) to Aircraft Y.The TRACON Arrival sector is the only sector that knows about both aircraft.  They should not take a point out on an aircraft they have traffic for in anticipation that Center will climb the aircraft. The TRACON Supervisor looked at the FALCON radar replay and said; 'Well; if you guys would have climbed Aircraft Y; this wouldn't have been a problem'. THIS IS NOT A SAFETY CULTURE RESPONSE. What happens when the aircraft doesn't take a frequency change? The TRACON Arrival sector needed to issue a heading that would keep Aircraft Y safe from Aircraft X.I would have been unable to safely climb the Aircraft Y without a strong turn to the north.

ZOA Center Controller reported the adjacent TRACON sectors took point outs on aircraft that were head on into confliction instead of taking communication and control of the two aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At approximately XA40; I arrived at Aircraft X. Upon arrival; I contacted First Officer (FO) who was in contact with a Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT). The AMT stated Aircraft X had returned to the gate with several open defects. The AMT further stated all open defects had been either repaired; or deferred; and that he and his colleagues were currently in the process of documenting their actions and transmitting a new Maintenance Release Document (MRD). The AMT then departed the aircraft to complete the aforementioned documentation.As [the] FO and I initiated our preflight preparations; we discovered through the Release Verification process that; despite the aforementioned verbally communicated open defects; the last MRD [sent] via ACARS; was still valid. At this point; approximately XA55; MRD was approximately 2 1/2 hours old. As a cross-check; I requested a reprint of the most current MRD via ACARS/REPORTS/MISC/M4. This request produced a reprint of MRD XC21.I contacted Maintenance; advised them of our discovery and concerns; and requested an AMT re-dispatched to our aircraft. Approximately five minutes later; two AMTs arrived. FO and I communicated our concerns to them. The Lead AMT suggested that perhaps a recent aircraft/flight number change could have created the incorrect appearance of the aforementioned apparently valid MRD. I stated that; based on my understanding of the Maintenance Release system; a valid MRD is only associated with a specific aircraft and has no association with a flight number.The Lead AMT advised he would return to his computer terminal to resolve the MRD discrepancy. I asked that; based on the seriousness of the MRD discrepancy; he return to our aircraft to provide verbal clarification of how the MRD discrepancy occurred and how it was ultimately resolved. Shortly after the Lead AMT departed; at approximately XB33. MRD XB33 was transmitted to our aircraft. Upon completing the Release Verification process; MRD XB33 was verified as valid. Approximately ten minutes later; approximately XB44; the Lead AMT returned to our aircraft. He stated he was unable to explain how the MRD discrepancy had occurred. He further advised he would complete a report regarding the incident and suggested I do the same.The aforementioned incident resulted in a pushback at XB49; a delay of nineteen (19) minutes from our scheduled departure time of XB30.Clearly; the above documented MRD discrepancy presented a serious risk of maintenance/pilot deviation. If [the] FO and I had not been in physical contact with Maintenance prior to departure and had not cross-checked the results of our Release Verification process with their statements; we could have departed with an improperly documented and/or defective aircraft and an invalid MRD.

A319 Captain reported they had a late pushback due to discrepancies with the Maintenance Release Document.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Prior to descent; the WLEEE5 RNAV Arrival was assigned by Houston ARTCC; loaded into the FMC; and validated. Current ATIS indicated that RNAV and visual approaches were in use to Runways 17L/R. Based upon previous experience with AUS Approach Control; we changed the approach to the RNAV Z 17R and configured the FMC for the approach. The FMC linked the arrival and the approach perfectly! We validated the approach; but did not notice that the FMC deleted the last two waypoints on the RNAV arrival in the process.Upon checking in with Austin Approach we were advised to 'expect Runway 17R;' but no approach was specified. As we reached the transition point for the RNAV Z 17R; the First Officer (pilot flying) noted that 'SSURF' (on the tail end of the arrival) was missing. As he was attempting to insert it quickly; ATC advised 'looks like you missed the turn at SSURF...fly heading XXX.' Shortly thereafter; we were cleared for and completed a visual approach to 17R without incident.The final fix on this WLEEE5 RNAV Arrival is BEESO; accompanied by the note 'Expect RNAV RNP Approach; or Vectors...' However; the RNAV Z 17R approach does NOT have a BEESO transition. In fact; the only common fix for the arrival and approach is XWING; not BEESO. The arrival and the approach do not link at BEESO; the note notwithstanding. Accordingly; when the arrival and the approach procedures are loaded in accordance with proper procedure; the FMC drops SSURF and BEESO to automatically close the discontinuity. This is a trap! I'm not aware of any way to prevent the FMC from doing this; if both the WLEEE5 and the RNP Z 17R are selected. And it would not be prudent to wait until the approach clearance is issued to insert and validate and brief the RNP procedure.These AUS RNP approaches appear to be unusual designs in that they are close-in arcs that 'shortcut' the downwind leg and bypass typical approach gates (6-mile final at around 1;800 feet). If the crew expects; and loads; the RNAV approach as they should - as directed by the note on the WLEEE 5 - the last two fixes on the WLEEE 5 are eliminated and the downwind leg will not be flown. Normally; on initial contact I'd expect to hear 'expect the RNAV Z 17R after XWING;' or something similar and specific. AUS Approach did not indicate what approach to expect; and we assumed it would be an RNP approach; as in previous experience.Now that I'm aware that a procedural mismatch like this might exist; I'll specifically look for it when inserting and validating RNAV procedures; and if necessary; query Approach Control as to the track they intend for the aircraft to fly. This will provide a barrier against future ambiguous arrival tracks.Ultimately; I think the AUS RNAV arrivals and approaches need to be examined and redesigned as necessary to make them compatible with each other. Since we cannot accept vectors to [right final] legs; I don't see how the RNAV 17R approach as designed; can be utilized if the WLEEE5 is flown to BEESO as charted.

A319 Captain reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV Z 17R approach to AUS.


Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I found this morning that I may have violated the TFR NOTAM FDC XX/YYYY on a local area orientation flight. There was a planned local area orientation flight to be conducted by me for two other people from Page; AZ to include 2-3 hours of day flight and 2 hours night flight.  Because of the duty time and night requirements I checked in 4 hours early at the base as I was planning to be done with the flights.  As soon as I came in; I logged in; preflighted the aircraft; and then called [Specified] Comms to put the base back in service as it had been out of service since approximately the previous night pilot going off shift.  During the call to [Specified] Comms I was told that we were being put on standby for a scene call.  I then checked weather for the scene.  I noticed while checking weather that the previously present TFR icon for the fire in between Flagstaff and Sedona was gone; I also knew that the fire had been mostly if not completely contained so I assumed the TFR had been lifted.  My normal procedure includes looking on the FAA TFR website to verify any TFRs and their status.  I was then notified that the flight was requested to be launched.  The flight would not take me near the previous TFR area so I did not look at the FAA TFR website or call the FSS to verify the lack of the TFR at that time thinking I would have the time and opportunity after the requested scene flight. After completing the scene flight (which was canceled after arriving on scene) I forgot to check into the TFR further.  During the area orientation flight; shortly after lifting from Flagstaff heading to the Phoenix area; I noticed that the GPS was displaying the previous TFR that had a rectangular shape just north of Sedona; AZ.  My previous knowledge of the TFR was that it was only in effect during daylight hours and that coupled with remembering that it was not displayed [earlier;] I assumed it had not updated on the GPS and the TFR was either not currently in effect or not in effect at all.  During that leg of the flight I do not believe we violated the TFR; but just skirted the eastern edge of it. We might have flown through the western edge of the rectangular TFR.  Again I was still under the assumption that the TFR was either not currently in effect or not in effect at all.  Upon arriving on duty today and doing my normal duty day activities I noticed that the FDC NOTAM (TFR) XX/YYYY was in effect 24 hours a day. The shape of the TFR was also a trapezoidal shape instead of the previous rectangle.  Upon looking at the new location and remembering the route of flight from [northern Pheonix area] to PGA; it is possible that we flew through the TFR.   I will be sure to complete my normal routine of preparing for my duty day each and every shift (which includes reviewing NOTAM information from approved resources) before accepting any flight request.  In last night's case I should have contacted the FSS in flight to verify the presence or lack there of the TFR.  I believe some of the contributing factors of the possible TFR violation was that my duty day was significantly different than a normal duty day in that I started several hours later than normal; the base was out of service  when I arrived; and I was assuming that I would look up the TFR information after the scene request. The flight was conducted under a flight release obtained by me.

Our lead pilot received a flight release; checked weather; and NOTAMS.  He was the PIC during an orientation flight for our work area. I and another new pilot to this base were taking turns flying while our lead pilot directed our flight routes for the area orientation.  On the final leg home; we may have possibly flown through what the lead pilot believed was a non-active fire TFR near Sedona; AZ.  The PIC believed the NOTAM that he had reviewed showed the TFR not in effect from sunset to sunrise.  Fortunately; we were a few hundred feet from the top of the TFR and what we believe was the edge of the TFR.  The following morning; after 10 hours of rest; our lead pilot reviewed weather and NOTAMS for his upcoming shift and reviewed the TFR for any changes.  This is when he realized his possible error.I believe printing out a narrative and map of any possible TFR's along with any pertinent NOTAMS for my area of work could be carried with me in the aircraft during my shift.  This information and location should be passed on to the oncoming pilot; regardless of his own NOTAM review.

Pilot report of possibly violating a TFR due to handheld equipment or applications; that didn't display the NOTAM correctly.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft

The Red Quarter-Turns [latch brackets] used to secure the [Service] carts in place are too short on the B777D to also secure the doors. On this flight; all carts were latched closed. On takeoff; I watched as the aft-facing carts in First Class (F/C) Galley rocked back and forth; causing the latch to move upward. I could not get to it before the door unlatched itself. The door swung open and five racks of glasses and coffee mugs fell out and smashed to pieces on the Galley floor! The Quarter-Turns just barely reach the top of the cart door; but with movement; they are ineffective at preventing the door from opening. They need to be replaced with the longer ones found on other versions of the B777.

A Flight Attendant reports the Red Quarter-Turn latches used to retain First Class galley service carts were too short to secure the cart doors during takeoff. Five racks of glasses and coffee mugs that fell out were smashed to pieces on galley floor on a B777-200 aircraft.


During preflight checks; L AOA heat amber msg; CA (Captain) ran the system reset procedure; which cleared the msg. We boarded late; everything was done and we pushed back. After we started Eng 2 and the push; we ran our after start checklist and L Static heat msg displayed. We ran appropriate system reset off-gate procedure but message did not clear. We called Maintenance ran the reset procedure one more time; but the message did not clear. We returned to gate; kept passengers on board until we got information from Maintenance that this was going to take a while to fix; so in coordination with Dispatch and Ops; we deplaned. The aircraft was eventually fixed; pushed off of the gate again; late. We then took off without any issues.As we were on cruise at FL220 and getting ready to start our briefing for the approach into ZZZ; we got L 10th Duct red warning and aural warning. I maintained PF (pilot flying) duties and took over the radios; and CA ran the appropriate QRH checklist. The message did not clear after running the QRH procedure; and it required us to land at nearest suitable airport; to bring the L thrust lever to idle; and land at flaps 20. We decided the nearest suitable airport was ZZZ; weather was good and runway was a suitable length for safe landing. CA then [advised] ATC; and told them we did [not] need any special assistance. CA then started communicating with the FA (Flight Attendant); Dispatch/Ops; and prepared for the approach. He then made an announcement to the passengers notifying them it should be a normal landing.Once the approach was fully setup; CA took over the PF duties and conducted the approach and landing. We landed at flaps 20 without any issues.

CRJ First Officer reported observing a pneumatic duct overheat warning while in flight.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 12800; Flight Crew Type 700

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Inbound to ZZZ airport cancelled IFR when Center switched us to CTAF. Was told there was another aircraft inbound to airport; and that we were much faster. Announced 12 miles NW planning overhead left downwind entry to Runway X shortly after a Comanche reported South of the airport for Runway Y. After our call Comanche stated 'we will use Runway X also so we will both be going the same direction.' After fully configuring on downwind and turning base leg to Runway X the Comanche states on CTAF 'I have you in sight and will be flying right underneath you.' I said to SIC 'WHAT??? Why would he be doing that.' SIC looking out right window says 'I see him at 5 o'clock and that's exactly what he is going to do.' 'He will be coming out your side.' I looked out the window and see him at 8 o'clock directly behind left wing. I said 'does he think he is landing ahead of us?' SIC asked him 'to pull off his approach and come around behind us.' He agreed to do that. When he approached our aircraft on right rear our TCAS indicated -200 ft. Based on my sighting of him I'd say that was accurate. Based on where he was versus where we were I can't figure out how he thought he would land on Runway X before us. The position I saw him at would have been a right downwind for Runway Y. Certainly not on final approach to either runway. I would expect to see him at 12 0'clock when I'm on base if he is on final landing before us. After he landed he taxied to hangars on the north side of the field; so appears to be based at this airport. I can't in any way make what this guy did make sense. Arrogant and stupid to think it's a good idea for a single engine airplane to fly directly under jet engines. I'm hoping you figure out who this was and can hopefully prevent this from happening again.

CE680 Captain reported a NMAC while on downwind for the active runway.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were assigned direct to KILBE at 3000 feet into LYH for the ILS 4. As we were nearing several miles from the localizer; we got the 'Terrain; Terrain' aural three times; then followed by the 'Pull Up' aural. We began a climb above 4000 ft and leveled once the warning had silenced. We told ATC about the event then he vectored us around for another approach to Runway 4; this time from the east side of the localizer. During this process; we did receive one more 'Terrain; Terrain' aural; but no 'Pull Up.' We continued on the ILS approach for Runway 4 and landed uneventfully. I can't say for certain; but I believe the Terrain; Pull UP aural may have been erroneous due to the erratic RA indications. Perhaps ATC needs to leave us higher in that area. ATC had us at 3300 feet initially before giving us 3000 as we were coming to KILBE.

Pilot reported receiving GPWS Alerts and a Pull-up Warning during vectors to the ILS 4 to Lynchburg Regional Airport.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On arrival at night we were told to slow as much as possible for opposite direction traffic. We were attempting to fly the RNP Z to Runway 23. I was flying about 190 KIAS in a clean configuration. When given clearance for the visual approach we began a descent on the RNP profile. I called for gear down to help us get down on profile; the PM (pilot monitoring) set the condition levers to 1020 as required and the aircraft began a rapid decrease in airspeed. As I attempted to call for flaps 5 as we passed by 180 KIAS we reached about 171 KIAS before power was advanced and the flaps were selected to 5 degrees. I was also is slight descending right hand turn. So we did get below Vmin for flaps 0 by about 9 knots. Airspeed was increased back above 180 KIAS until the flaps reached 5 degrees.I do not agree with our change to selecting flaps as we slow. I do understand this was done to help prevent flap overspeeds and to not use the flaps as a slowing mechanism.  But; what we are setting ourselves up for is more stick shaker events as we head in to winter. If I had the Ref Speed Increase switch on there would have been a good chance of a shaker event if I had loaded the aircraft with a bit more G loading in the turn. Now we set up another set of risks. Do we miss? Do we just as trained add power and continue? Am I still on course? Do I over speed on the recovery? In a jet I can see this working; in the prop world we have 13 feet of propeller drag that is pretty instant on each side of this aircraft. When those props go to 1020 and power is back; we slow very very quickly. My suggestion is we go back to the previous way of putting down the flaps with including the reduction in maximum flap speeds that we used for a couple of years. I do agree putting the gear down first is a good way to slow and should be continued in the profile. Flying by Vmin and putting the flaps down is not a safe way to fly this aircraft. In the summer it is OK but come winter and that Vref increase we will have shaker events. I am sure we have drastically decreased our flap overspeeds but at what cost in overall safety. Remember that the [turboprop] is not in the same environment as the [jet] that pretty much does straight in visual and ILS approaches every leg. The [turboprop] is a complicated aircraft that often flies more intense procedures in a higher risk environment. Safety is number one and this flap procedure should not be continued in this aircraft as we head into winter flying. The reason I am reporting this is I think this is a major safety issue. If I as a 30+ year pilot and former check airman and instructor [am] having problems with this procedure how are our 1000 hour pilots doing with this a busy dynamic environment? I often am calling airspeed flaps as we slow accidentally below 180 KIAS in a clean configuration. I am not looking forward to winter with this procedure. I know the response to me will be that I can select flaps 5 prior to 180 KIAS but pilots due things by repetition and they will continue to use 180 KIAS as the flap selection point in most stressful situations.

Captain of a Part 121 twin turboprop reported getting too slow when transitioning from clean to the first flap setting.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 2282

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

End of Course Check for Private [license]. We were on left base while a Yak aircraft was right base. Yak was cleared number 2 cleared to land. We started turn to final early just to create spacing from the YAK. At that time the Yak also started his turn to final. We had visual on him until about 1/2 mile final when we lifted our high wing. After that he was above us. I told the student to conduct a Go Around and sidestep to the left since the traffic was on top of us. The tower asked the Yak once he landed if he ever saw us. He responded with no he was cleared to land.

Instructor reported executing a go-around from after an airborne conflict with an aircraft that had cleared to land number two.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64; Flight Crew Total 9412; Flight Crew Type 87

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 13340; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Arrival at Teterboro (TEB). Weather at TEB >10 miles vis and Clear sky. Cleared for the Wilks-Barre Four Arrival to TEB followed by vectors to the ILS Runway 6; Circle to land runway 1. FMS setup with Wilks-Barre4 and vectors giving a discontinuity and DANDY as the next fix. Departed STW vector 140 heading; eventually cleared to 2000 feet. To clear the discontinuity on the FMS; DANDY selected as the away from fix (made blue). Approaching the Centerline; cleared to turn left 090 and join the localizer. During the turn to pick up the localizer cleared for the approach and maintain 180 knots to DANDY. Localizer established; and aircraft configured 10 flap and gear selected down with glide path indicating 1.5 dots in anticipation of descent. Approaching DANDY; ATC said; 'I need you at 1500 feet.' The co-pilot replied 'Roger; descending on the glide slope.' To which he replied 'Negative; 1500 feet is mandatory'. Rate of descent was increased to maintain below the glide path to meet the restriction. Cleared to circle at TORBY for Runway 1 and aircraft landed without event.Lesson Learned: The Approach was briefed in good time before the descent. The 1500 feet at DANDY was briefed but neither pilot emphasized it as a mandatory crossing (the Jep chart that we were using does show a step-down to 1500 feet after VINGS; we did not cross VINGS; but '1500 feet mandatory' is annotated at DANDY on the vertical profile. Just intercepting and following the glide path prior to DANDY does not ensure crossing DANDY at 1500 feet. If ATC had been busy and not told us we would have been above 1500 feet at DANDY.We were good VMC visual with the field; and intercepting the localizer at 2000 feet from our position meant that we would intercept the glide path as normal; comfortable with the ILS guidance combined with looking for traffic; planning our circle looking for the towers and Giants stadium (good guide for the circle) all distracted from the rigor of the approach plate.Flying the full approach through the IAF at SBJ or joining the localizer and crossing VINGS would have kept our concentration on the approach plate. As we were joining the approach closer and off a vector; although not officially required a reminder of the altitude restriction as we were given the approach clearance would have helped.

On descent into TEB on the Wilkes-Barre4 arrival; and upon receiving current ATIS info; we briefed on the approach in use; the ILS Runway 06; and set it up in the FMS. Departing STW; the final fix on the arrival we were assigned 140 degrees; and eventually cleared to 2000 feet. To clear a discontinuity in the FMS; DANDY was selected as the away from fix. Approaching the final approach course; we were instructed to turn left to 090 and intercept the localizer. Upon intercepting the localizer we were cleared for the ILS Runway 06 approach; circle to land Runway 01; and maintain 180 knots to DANDY. With the localizer and GS established; we configured the aircraft flaps 10 and gear down. Approaching DANDY; ATC said; 'I need you at 1500 feet. I replied; 'Roger; descending on the glide slope.' To which ATC replied; 'Negative; 1500 is mandatory.' A quick glance at the approach chart and I realized our mistake in not noticing the mandatory altitude of 1500 feet. The Pilot Flying (PF) immediately began descent to 1500. We were then cleared to commence circle for Runway 01 at TORBY; and we landed without incident. I am not sure at what altitude we crossed DANDY; except that the PF was making the correction as quickly as practical. The lesson is learned to go over every detail of the approach during the brief. This approach is a little different in requiring the step down to a mandatory altitude once on the localizer course. It is common practice to descend on the Glide Slope once cleared for the approach; even though the minimum crossing altitude of the final approach fix or other fixes on the final approach course; may allow descent to a lower altitude. That common practice led to complacency on this approach and could have led to an altitude deviation.

Pilots reported of flying an approach; but did not see a mandatory crossing altitude on the approach. The pilots briefed the approach but did not see the mandatory altitude. ATC corrected the problem.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 91; Flight Crew Type 14749

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144.53; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 4302.90

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

After previous aircraft lifted off we were cleared for takeoff. He was on same routing (Epkee) with pretty good right turn after takeoff. As I rolled into 30 degrees of bank out of about 6;000 ft. his wake pushed us over to about 45 degrees of bank. I rolled back and continued on departure.

During initial climb out after takeoff on 34L; we were in a right turn on the Epkee departure. We encountered wake turbulence and the airplane rolled to approximately 45 degrees of bank. The Captain promptly rolled back to our standard rate turn and we continued on the departure.

B737NG flight crew reported a wake turbulence encounter departing DEN rolled them into a 45 degree bank.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

On approach into ZZZ while slowing to assigned speed; flaps 1 selected with no motion indicated at all from slats or flaps.  Checked circuit breakers and found none tripped.  Notified ATC we needed delay vectors to accomplish required checklist.  While the First Officer flew aircraft I accomplished Flaps; Trailing Edge: Symmetrical Non-normal/No Flaps checklist. When Alt Flap Switch moved; received full slats and slight flap split noticed. Continued with 'TE flaps do not operate or an asymmetry develops:' side of checklist with flaps up. Dispatch notified of problem; flight attendants notified; and PA made to passengers identifying problem but would have them safely on ground and at gate shortly. Ran data for current configuration; requested long runway from ATC and requested equipment standing by. They came back that since I requested equipment that 'they' were declaring an emergency; to which I agreed.  When we got to landing portion of checklist; transfer was made to me being flying pilot; and the First Officer ran remainder of Landing Checklist.  Landed; emergency equipment there at our turn off point; and the First Officer referred to brake cooling concerns of which we had none. Made a PA and slowly taxied to gate where Maintenance met aircraft and logbook entry made.I'm sure Dispatch had good intentions; but ACARS message received that burn to [Maintenance base] was 2.5.  This was NOT something to consider since we were at 4;000 feet orbiting ZZZ in good weather with 6;500 lbs. of fuel at this time; and ZZZ was nearest suitable airport. I typed back short message; 'busy landing ZZZ.'  Again I'm sure good intentions meant; but concerned this could lead to someone considering going to base or alternate with a problem that could compound; or land with less than as in this case 4;000 lbs.

B737-700 Captain experiences flap and slat failure during approach and asks for vectors to accomplish QRH procedures. When alternate flap switch is moved LE slats extend to full extension and a TE flap asymmetry is detected with flaps almost up. A flaps up full slat landing ensues without complications.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Ferry aircraft with airframe vibration written up.  Possible worn elevator hinges. Previous crew noted vibration occurred at 308 knots on climb through FL220 and 308 knots on climb through FL280.Dispatch filed us above FL220 with no speed restriction. We contacted them and had them change our plan to cruise at FL190 no faster than 250 kt. The flight progressed without incident within these aforementioned parameters. Company was contacted [and] connected me to [a] CA (Captain) who assisted me with my decision to accept this aircraft. I felt that I was in a realm outside the airworthiness of the aircraft. An EA (Engineering Authorization) suggested to me that the aircraft had been deemed not to be airworthy and data had been collected to confirm that it is safe to fly. My question was whether I was permitted to take such an aircraft as a non-test pilot. Apparently; I am.Advise all line pilots that they may be placed in this scenario as the fleet apparently declines due to wear on elevator hinges.

Captain reported encountering issues with a ferry permit.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 5; Maintenance Technician 15

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

The Maintenance Release arrived from a Cessna Vendor in ZZZ1. I was assigned the [completed] Work Package for review. When reading the pilot write-up; the [Elevator Trim] actuators were lubed and the Trim System passed the Functional Check. The Cessna [Maintenance] Discrepancy states that after running the system several times; some resistance was felt. It was determined by Cessna that the actuators needed lubed so they [lubed] them and noted that the grease pushed out during the lube indicated contamination. [The Cessna Vendor] did not say if it was with water; or an inappropriate type of grease. After the lube; the system was run several times and the Functional Test was within specs; referencing [the Cessna] 560XL Maintenance Manual (M/M) 27-37-04; so I released the aircraft.  I was made aware of a problem with the ZZZ1 Cessna [Vendor's] maintenance when I arrived at work [the following] day at XA:00pm and filed this report. [Recommend] if we would like to have components replaced if contamination is found; we may want to add that statement to the discrepancy.  We could develop a Checklist for Maintenance Control to review with the Vendor to ensure the system was troubleshot; not just a small portion of the system looked at; before the work is started and before the Maintenance Release is submitted for Return To Service (RTS).  The Director of Maintenance (DOM) approved the release [of the CE-560XL aircraft] for frozen or restricted flight controls.

Reporter stated he is part of his organization's Quality Control and oversees parts removal and replacements accomplished by Contract Maintenance Vendors. Some of their Cessna CE-560s are occasionally parked outside for four or five days in cold weather and the grease in the Elevator Trim Actuator in the tail section thickens and draws moisture. That moisture tends to freeze and either locks-up the Trim Actuator; or makes the cockpit Elevator Trim mechanical thumbwheel difficult to move. The grease in the Trim Actuator gearbox is generally the problem area.Reporter stated the original discrepancy written-up by the Flight crew described an Elevator Trim problem in flight. At the time; his company did not believe they had a replacement actuator in stock. So the Cessna Contract Vendor pumped new grease into the Elevator Trim Actuator; purging the old grease out; performing a Functional Check of the Trim Actuator per the Cessna Manual which describes that procedure as acceptable for a maintenance sign-off for that type of discrepancy. The aircraft was then given a Maintenance Release by the Vendor.Report stated that in the meantime; a Serviceable Elevator Trim Actuator had been located in-house and sent to the Contract Vendor after the Vendor had signed-off the Maintenance Release. The CE-560XL was still at the Vendor and had not yet departed. Because of the known concern about the Elevator Trim issue; his organization prefers to replace the Trim Actuators.  The Vendor was notified to change the actuator. When the Vendor Maintenance personnel re-opened the tail section; they also found one of the Trim cables had completely 'Bird-caged;' (Bird-nested) [cable strands separated] at the Trim Actuator. 'How' and 'Why' the Trim cable condition was missed when the Vendor mechanics purged the Trim actuator grease has not been resolved. Questions about what was actually checked prior to the Maintenance Release being siged-off has become an issue.

A Quality Control Representative for a Part 135 Operator describes the maintenance practices of a Contract Maintenance Vendor and the events surrounding a questionable Maintenance Release sign-off of one of their CE-560XL aircraft.  The Elevator Trim Actuator had previously frozen in flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 10500; Flight Crew Type 95

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

The takeoff was done by the Captain. Due to the heavy weight of 365;000 lbs and obstacle departure procedure we elected to use a maximum thrust takeoff setting. Takeoff roll and rotation was normal. At 400 feet we selected LNAV and commenced the right turn for the departure. At approximately 600-700 feet AGL; in the right turn; there was a slight jerk to the left and the aircraft stopped turning. We both verified the left engine had quit. The engine failure was sudden and without warning. There were no abnormal indications prior to the engine failure. After verifying what happened we were over our turn point for the special engine out procedure. Heading select was called for and we continued the right turn. At this point we contacted ATC and advised them of our intention to fly the 206 heading. We continued the climb to level off height and began to speed up and clean up the aircraft. At this time we also confirmed that the left engine had flamed out. We coordinated with ATC for a higher altitude and began to run the 'Engine failure/Shutown' checklist. We both agreed that attempting a restart would be time consuming and distracting; and going to [destination] was obviously not an option anymore. We made the decision to land single engine back in ZZZ. After finishing the 'Engine failure/Shutdown' checklist we consulted the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance Table. We were going to land at approximately 360;000 lbs; about 32;000 lbs over weight. We had virtually no center tank fuel to dump and we were still feeding the good engine with what was left in the center tank which was about 3;000 lbs. We asked for and were given the longest runway for landing which gave us about 2;000 feet more runway for the overweight landing. The approach and landing were uneventful. Manual brake usage was used on rollout and were what I would describe as minimal. Deceleration was normal with maximum reverse thrust used on the right engine. After turning left we informed the tower we would let the fire crew examine the left engine. At this time we were informed by fire crew that there was fluid leaking out of the left engine. Also at this time fire crew notified us of smoking left brakes. Not wanting a pool of fuel by the hot brakes we cleared the fire crew away and continued the taxi; very slowly; East towards the ramp to cool the brakes. The hottest brake temperature we saw on the left was one 9 and three 8's. The right side was mostly 5 and 6. While taxing we were informed that the leak was still there. With brakes as hot as they were; the possibility of fuel leaking and the potential for thermal plug discharge; we elected to stop the aircraft and chock the aircraft. While waiting for ground support the brakes cooled to reasonable levels. That's when the thermal plugs started to blow. The brake temperatures at this time were one 7 and three 6's. We lost 3 tires on the left side while waiting for ground support.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

B767-300 flight crew experiences a sudden engine failure at 700 feet AGL after takeoff. The engine is shut down and the flight returns to the departure airport for an overweight landing. ARFF reports fluid leaking from the shut down engine and three of the four tires on that truck deflate due to temperature.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Soon after assuming the position; I noticed a surge through the ICSS on 3 of our 4 shout lines to other facilities.  I didn't think that much of it because that has happened in the past during storms or a power surge.  Around 10 minutes later; a dial line rang and I answered it.  It was SHV Approach calling to tell me that they could not raise me on the shout line.  I did a line check on all of the shout lines and only TYR Tower responded.  I informed the FLM of our equipment problem and then tried contacting all of the overlying ARTCC sectors of our status. At the time ZFW DONIE Sector sent a reroute aircraft to TYR because of a ground stop to DFW International Airport.  I took the handoff and when the aircraft established radio contact with me I issued a descent to 3;000 feet.  By the time the aircraft crossed the TYR VOR (his clearance limit) it was still 4;000 feet above my airspace.  The pilot asked for instructions and I told him to fly a 020 heading after he crossed the TYR VOR even though he was not inside the vertical boundary of my airspace. I had attempted to reach DONIE Sector; but due to aircraft saturation; he could not answer the dial line. When the FLM called the AF Technician and the MOCC about the problem; a Technician came into the TRACON to ascertain the nature of the problem but then told the FLM that his shift was ending and he had to go home.  The FLM called the AF Manager to request that the tech be allowed to stay to help and consult with the company that administers the phone lines; but his request was denied.  I was relieved from my position after; with the equipment outage unresolved.At this facility; the AF manager has shown open contempt for controller requests and concerns due to equipment outages. The ATM has backed the AF manager over the objection of the controller workforce on virtually every occasion.  In this instance; the inability of the RADAR Controller to coordinate with neighboring facilities is a potentially profound risk to the flying public.  The situation was exacerbated by the fact that due to the ground stop at DFW airport; the overlying ARTCC controllers were extremely busy.  More than once; AF management has dismissed controller concerns out of hand on issues as wide-ranging as this communication breakdown all the way to RADAR calibration.  I know that as a controller; I cannot perform my job without the help of support personnel like the AF technicians.  However; the AF manager does not seem to understand that his personnel are here to SUPPORT the operation and help ENSURE the safety of the flying public. It is unacceptable that a tech would be sent home during a period of potential crisis because the AF manager does not want to authorize overtime.  Air traffic control is serious work and controllers deserve a serious effort from the technicians and their management.

GGG Approach Controller describes situation where the facility loses land lines and is unable to get Technician to fix problem due to lack of overtime available.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft

After intercepting the glideslope inbound on the ILS 19 into TEB; ATC told the crew that the aircraft we were following had just gone missed at TEB due to low weather; but that the aircraft before him had made it in.  ATC did not state what the current visibility or ceiling was.  The last ATIS received by the crew was 16013G18KT 10SM RA BKN047 BKN060 OVC110 27/19 A2980.  The radar picture revealed numerous rain showers and cells in the area.  The crew elected to continue the approach.  Upon reaching DA; with no runway in sight; a missed approach was executed.  The missed was conducted as briefed; but the crew might have inadvertently climbed above 1;500 feet prior to TROVA.  Although the approach was briefed on the ground at MMU; the First Officer thought the missed approach red make a climbing right turn to 1;500 feet then climb to 3;000 feet upon completion of the turn; while I interpreted it to read that we should cross TROVA at 1;500 feet then climb and maintain 3;000 feet.  1;500 feet was set in the altitude select upon glide slope intercept.  During the missed approach I called out 500 feet climbing 1;500 feet and then continued with my missed approach flow and SNAP check.  By the time I completed my flow/check we were climbing through 1;500 feet and I told the First Officer we were supposed to level at 1;500 feet and then preceded to nose over and return to 1;500 feet.  Upon checking in with Approach (prior to TROVA) [we] were given a climb to 2;000 feet and vectors to the northwest.  The flight continued uneventfully to a normal landing without further incident.   The published missed approach procedure could be revised to remove some ambiguity as to whether 1;500 feet at TROVA is mandatory (much like the approach plates for the ILS 6 has DANDY at 1;500 feet or the TEB 8 SID has a note to cross 4.8 dme AT 1;500 feet). Even changing the wording to:  Immediate climbing right turn to 1;500 via heading 205 and TEB VOR/DME R-278 to cross TROVA/4.7  DME AT 1;500 feet; then climb to 3;000 via TEB R-278 to MORNS INT and hold; would remove any ambiguity as to what the aircraft is supposed to do.  Complicating this was a short flight in a high workload environment; with unforecasted weather; and a relatively low time (first rotation following IOE) First Officer.  Also; the light weight of the aircraft (~18;800lbs) allowed us to climb much quicker than normal and with only 1;200 feet to climb; gave much less time to catch and trap the error.  Lastly; the +RA; low IMC; and moderate turbulence encountered during the missed all contributed to our workload during the possible altitude deviation.

BAE125 Captain reports confusion over the altitude to be maintained initially on the missed approach from the ILS 19 at TEB.  The flying First Officer believes the climb is to 3;000 feet but the Captain helps him return to 1;500 feet.


Workload; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While descending on the FYTTE 2 Arrival; with a clearance to cross BHAWK at 240 ATC re-cleared us to descend via the FYTTE 2 except maintain 300 knots. At this point we were about ten miles west of BHAWK descending in LNAV and VNAV. The altitude window was reset from 240 to 11000. I put 300 knots in the speed window. I then edited the speed on the VNAV descent page to 300 knots and edited the speed restrictions on the legs page at STNLE and CUUPP to 300. After executing these revisions I noticed the airplane began an uncommanded right turn off of the magenta line. At this point I hit heading select and slewed the heading cursor back around to re-intercept the magenta line. I now noticed that although the magenta line still went through BHAWK the fix itself had turned white and STNLE the next fix on the arrival had become active. I rearmed LNAV; but it did not capture as we flew back through the course; so I slewed the heading select back towards BHAWK. The airplane was slow to respond; so I disconnected the autopilot and was now hand flying to BHAWK. As we approached BHAWK ATC asked if we are still descending via the FYTTE 2. The co-pilot then said we need to cross BHAWK above 220 and informs me that I am already low and still descending. I leveled off and we crossed BHAWK below 220. In the confusion of losing the BHAWK fix and flying the aircraft back to the now white fix indication I had not realized that the FMC had lost the vertical crossing restrictions at BHAWK. After passing BHAWK the flight director recaptured the magenta line into STNLE and the VNAV path came back. I re-engaged the autopilot with no further problems.My opinion of the overall problem here is we do too much typing and not enough flying.

While descending on the ORD FYTTE2; ATC issued a 300 knot speed restriction. When the B777 Captain modified the waypoint speed constraints it caused LNAV and VNAV to disconnect. The aircraft descended below profile and deviated from the desired heading until manually corrected.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On approach to PGD the Approach Controller called out a traffic target at our 10 O'clock position about 500 feet below us. We did not see the traffic immediately; but had them on TCAS. The controller issued a left turn vector toward the traffic and indicated that the aircraft had turned away from us. I spotted the traffic visually and it appeared to be a single engine aircraft doing turns around a point in the VFR/general aviation practice area clear of the Class D for PGD. As it continued its turn and began to fly towards us again; we got a 'monitor vertical speed' aural warning. The traffic then appeared to start climbing and we received an 'adjust vertical speed' command. The FO disconnected the autopilot and promptly responded to the climb command. We were clear of conflict within seconds and reported the RA to ATC as well as asked for a NMAC report to be filed.After landing I was given a phone number to the RSW supervisor. I explained to him what happened; which also mirrored what his controller had reported to him. He said he would file a NMAC report.

Captain reported responding to an RA on arrival into PGD that involved a single engine aircraft near the practice area.


Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

After swapping planes due to a return to gate Maintenance issues and a 4.5 hour delay; we were provided with release 3 on a new aircraft. Release 2 had provided a gate fuel amount of 35.0. During my walk around; the fueler stopped me and asked what the fuel load was; because he had not received anything yet for this aircraft; and wanted to get it fueled so we could depart. I told him the release had said 35.0 but not to quote me on it; and to wait for the fuel release. Upon doing the before push checklist; Captain referenced the Release 3 [flight plan] packet and called; Planned gate 34.9; 35.0 onboard. Once airborne; the [estimated fuel] in [destination] was reading about 8.0; but the [fuel chart] was saying we should land with 11.8. Upon investigating the problem; we realized that [flight plan] Page 1 from release 2 was included in the packet of release 3; and we referenced the wrong fuel ladder during the before push checklist. Release 3 had a plan gate of 38.5. We were referring to the correct release 3; but the fuel ladder from release 2 was sequenced before the fuel ladder for release 3.

Was Captain on [flight]. The aircraft had a BCL FAULT written up twice; it was fixed at gate. Took a delay for that. On taxi out we got same fault and did gate return. At gate Dispatch ACARSed us and told us VCTS (Thunderstorm in Vicinity METAR) and asked if we wanted gas; which brought plan gate FOB (Fuel on Board) to 35.0. Maintenance fixed more things and did an engine run; at this point we are 3 hours late. We board and fault appears again. Deplane again. This time we get a new airplane. New release for new airplane wasn't up yet; but we got PDC with old route and ATC told they would keep it active. I call Dispatch and was told we got new release shortly. Everything was loaded up and the fueler put 35.0 onboard the new plane. I referenced release 3 but the file for some reason included release 2 [flight plan] page 1. This is a huge issue that needs to be addressed. While browsing through flight plan I noticed the route was different from PDC we got. This happened right before push and while we loaded the new route in we missed [estimated fuel] at destination. On climbout we notice FOB is much less than we anticipated. I referenced FOB at gate for the before push checklist with release 3 but was zoomed in on page 2 which was still release 2. I had a bias that it was release 3 because even the title of the page said release 3. In the end we took well above release 2 minimum to fuel but below release 3. On climb after seeing the problem we immediately got in touch with Dispatch who gave us release 4 which still kept the alternate and we had enough fuel to continue. This is a perfect case where things just slipped through the cracks with many things going wrong and not working properly. I learned a lot and will be much more cautious with plane swaps and releases.

A320 flight crew reported using the wrong fuel numbers for the flight.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

The purpose of this [report] is to explain a situation where I unintentionally used a high rate of descent to recapture a glide path landing in DEN in a 737 MAX. I have flown the MAX a few times [before] but this was the first time I've flown it in a high density altitude airport. The landing was uneventful and I felt like I was in control the entire final approach but the rate of descent was higher than I anticipated or normally use due to my hesitancy to quickly revert from reliance on technology to visual approach procedures. I understand the emphasis on visual approaches in training and safety. After an uneventful flight to DEN we were given a left downwind turn to base for DEN runway 16L outside of LEETS at 7000 feet. It was a clear night so I accepted the visual when offered and slowed appropriately for the final decent. To increase my familiarity of the MAX; prior to top of descent; I briefed and intended to engage ARM III below 5000 feet AGL and set up the HUD to do so. As we neared LEETS I pushed the Approach ARM button (with 7000 feet in the MCP) but my attention was outside and on the flight display system when I made a rookie mistake. I didn't notice that the Approach mode did not arm. I have flown the 737 MAX a few times and was familiar with; what I believe to be; slightly different descent characteristics. Also; I armed the speed brakes but apparently when I did so the handle was slightly past the detent. I don't know if the ARM switch wouldn't engage as a result of this or not? Also I don't know if the Landing Attitude Modifier behaves differently due to the speed brake handle not precisely set in detent? Of course since I had 7000 feet in the MCP as we flew past LEETS I lost vertical path display and in the moment(s) it took to evaluate what was happening; I got high on path. The vertical guidance displays were now unusable so I abandoned the idea of the CAT III practice and adjusted to a high rate of descent to visually get on the PAPI. Since DEN is 5434 feet I rationalized that a higher descent rate was appropriate due to the high density altitude and called 'stable' at 1000 feet with a 1200 feet rate of descent but correcting. When I adjusted the throttles; the speed brake green light went to amber and the FO (First Officer) quickly and correctly armed the speed brake. I didn't get enough power in soon enough and ended up getting three reds on the PAPI and a 'Glide Slope' announcement to which I adjusted up to regain path. I continued to an uneventful landing. As a result of this situation which happened very quickly; I will 1) recommit to confirming buttons arm when pushed; 2) recommit to confirming the speed brake handle is fully in the arm detent (in addition to the green arm light) 3) react more swiftly to visual methods (or go around) when appropriate when displays don't appear as expected and 4) continue to ensure stabilized approaches or go around as necessary.

B737 MAX Captain reported an unstabilized approach into DEN due to human factors and aircraft familiarization.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1710; Flight Crew Type 38

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

We were planning a flight and had been monitoring a line of weather from the Midwest to the Gulf of Mexico. We found what looked to be the lowest spot but improving; and when it got to 1;500 FT ceilings; we launched. En route the ceilings were going lower; but we could still see light below them with good visibility. The pilot flying elected to press on. I was looking at the sectional; noticed that up ahead was a wind farm; and notified the pilot. He had gone off the planned track to vector around weather; so I wasn't exactly sure where we were. I thought the wind farm was about 5-10 miles ahead. About 30 seconds after I notified the pilot; he saw the supports of one turbine ahead; with the tops in the clouds. He added power and began to climb. We were immediately in IMC. The pilot flying is very experienced; but not recently on round dials. As he climbed; I attempted to call Center for a pop-up. There were 4 frequencies nearby on the chart; but no one answered. Another non-flying pilot onboard noticed we were picking up ice and ran the carburetor heat and other engine controls for me as I dealt with radios. As we neared 9;500 FT; we broke out between layers. I was able to get Approach for a pop-up; although we remained in VMC the rest of the way to our filed destination. Several contributing factors were involved in this event. One; we had departed late; and there was pressure to make it to base for a planned demo and static display. Two; there was a steep authority gradient in the cockpit. The pilot flying is also the owner of the airplane and we do things his way. I suggested returning to an en route airport for landing; but was dismissed. I did not feel I could speak up again. Three; the pilot flying had lots of bush experience in Alaska and felt we could make it. We did right in climbing immediately; but I am not proud we flew into these conditions with passengers onboard.

A B-25 First Officer reported that at an 800 FT cruise altitude the aircraft deviated from the planned track for weather and then encountered a wind farm; which forced a climb into IMC with icing and an IFR clearance.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 40

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Everything was perfect with me and my wife sitting in the right seat; reading (clear skies and a 30 KT tailwind) when suddenly there was a loud pop. The pressure differential needle dove backward and cabin altitude red light illuminated. I immediately told Center that we needed to descend now as I put the gear down and started a steep descent. Center immediately said descend to FL210. I said; no; I need lower. (By now we have our oxygen masks in hand but I could not reach the black knob on the tank because it had been installed right behind the left seat.) Eventually my wife turned the black knob on the oxygen tank; but the flow meter indicator window did not confirm that oxygen was flowing. As I dove right though FL210; Center said; OK we are declaring an emergency for you. I deliberately did not confirm or dispute those words because by now we were stable and no longer in an emergency situation. However; our descent rate had been 4;500 FT/minute at an indicated airspeed of 200 KTS in smooth air (VNE is 203K). We had already broken through the latest assigned altitude of 17;000 FT. I finally leveled out at 15;000 FT with oxygen working fine. By now this was definitely not an emergency and I told Center to 'cancel the emergency' and give me vectors to a nearby airport. They gave me the visual to the divert airport. I cranked in direct on the Garmin 530 (with shaky fingers) and we landed without incident. However Tower said to 'call Center after landing. Advise when ready to copy down this phone number.' After arriving at the FBO and taking in a few deep breaths; I called Center on the phone and to my surprise and delight he was pleasant; even congratulatory on the safe outcome but at the same time reminding me of my descent through assigned altitudes and the matter ended. My next call was to my Flight Instructor. He was quick to point out the problem was surely from failure of the squat switch. He pointed out all of the times we covered this situation in Safety Seminars. This event might have been avoided by immediately pulling the pressurization dump breaker. Pressurization could have been restored by cranking the 'rate' knob up and we could have continued on. A couple of weeks later I received a call from the FAA. The caller simply said news of the incident had reached the FAA office and he wanted to know if I had taken steps to correct the pressurization problem. I told him there had been a new squat switch installed and that I was sure the problem was solved. He said thank you and goodbye. However; when I went to pay the bill; the maintenance shop informed me that they had been visited by the FAA and wanted to see exactly what the Mechanic did to fix the pressurization problem. The Mechanic showed the FAA Inspector and that was the end of that; at least as far as I know. In the meantime I found out that the same squat switch failure has occurred at different altitudes in Piper Cheyennes; Navajos and in at least five other PA-46's. In fact; it is so serious that my Flight Instructor; during many trips always pulls the breaker rather than risk the failure while en route. I will not rest easy until I find out why my squat switch failed along with so many others.

The Reporter stated that this oxygen system is unique to this aircraft because he removed a seat for weight constraints and so also moved the oxygen bottle behind the pilot's seat. He now knows that it is difficult to reach the open valve while attempting to descend rapidly and keep the aircraft's speed under control. As a result he will be moving the bottle's location to an accessible place.

A PA-46 lost pressurization at FL270 after the landing gear squat switch failed. An emergency descent was completed and the flight diverted to a nearby airport for repair.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Departing HTO. The clearance given was HTO HVN CMH V23 SAX Direct TEB. There is a temporary Tower located at HTO during the summer. It is confusing who actually controls the airspace in the area. Is it NY or the temporary Tower. When departing Runway 10; we were cleared for takeoff without further instructions. We climbed on runway heading to 2000' FT. The HTO Tower switched us to NY on 125.97 and we checked in with NY. After checking in with NY; the Controller ask if we were in the turn to HTO to which I replied we were runway heading. NY then asked if we were cleared direct to HTO. I conferred with the pilot flying who had picked up the clearance and he said that the clearance was to HTO as our 1st way point but that we did not receive instructions to turn direct to HTO after departure. When the Tower Controller cleared  us for takeoff; that was all he said; cleared for takeoff Runway 10. There was no altitude deviation or anything inappropriate; just misleading instructions. The NY Controller queried us about the phraseology used and we told him our instructions given by the Tower Controller. Since the Tower Controller just cleared us for takeoff without further instructions for a turn or OD procedure; we flew the runway heading. That was what we felt the proper procedure was per the takeoff instructions. The flight continued to TEB without further incident. Suggestions; the airspace and the controlling agency of the airspace in and around HTO has to be clarified better. I believe this is a private Tower set up for the summer months only. Proper phraseology needs to be given along with the proper instructions. Neither one of us felt that what we performed during the takeoff was incorrect and given the takeoff instructions; we performed the departure the way we understood it to be. If we were to turn direct to the HTO VOR; the Tower Controller should have phrased it that way when clearing us for takeoff. In reviewing the clearance with the flying pilot during and after the event; given the takeoff phraseology; we would probably perform the departure the same way again.

IFR departure from HTO reported confusion regarding the differing instructions issued by an apparent 'temporary' Tower and N90. The reporter indicated increased clarity is necessary regarding ATC service in the area.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 1522; Flight Crew Type 456

I was departing Runway 01L at CCR (Concord; CA) with a student on an initial training flight. The Concord class delta airspace changed to class golf airspace as soon as the tower shut down (at XA:00 due to an FAA-mandated reduction in ATC facility hours). The weather (as reported on the AWOS) indicated the wind was variable between direction 260 to direction 280 with a velocity of approximately 10 kts. The windsock confirmed this. Given Runway 01L was a much less complex and shorter taxi from our position on the airport; I announced our taxi route over the common traffic advisory frequency and proceeded to Runway 01L. Upon completion of the run-up; I heard an aircraft on frequency indicate their position was at the shoreline (approximately a 4-mile final on Runway 19R) and their intention was to fly a straight-in for Runway 19R. The aircraft acknowledged my presence of holding short of Runway 01L and announced over the radio that; should I depart Runway 01L; they would likely not be a factor. After a short delay (maybe one-minute; although I cannot remember exactly how long); consisting of reviewing the checklist and briefing the departure; I announced that I was departing Runway 01L and would offset my departure with an early right-hand turn; so as to ensure I was not a conflict for the traffic inbound to Concord on the straight-in Runway 19R approach. At this time; the aircraft on the straight-in approach announced on frequency that they were approaching the 'pond;' or approximately a two-mile final. I decided sufficient spacing existed; and proceeded with the departure. As we rotated; I could see the landing light of the inbound aircraft to Runway 19R; and made a right-hand 30-degree departure; departing on a heading of approximately 040. While I maintained visual contact with the aircraft on final approach for Runway 19R at all times; I feel there was a loss of separation between the two aircraft. As indicated in the report; I believe we were about 500 ft. apart from one another; with vertical separation of 100-200 ft. While this event did not cause the inbound aircraft to execute a go-around or alter their approach; I believe an incident like this can be prevented going forward. Here are a few of my reflections: in reviewing this incident; I should have never departed with opposite direction traffic within 4-miles of the airport. Second; I was in absolutely no rush and should have held short of Runway 01L until the inbound traffic was on the ground and clear of the runway. Third; I could have elected to use Runway 19R; the runway that seemed to be slightly favored by other aircraft before and after this event; despite the more difficult and longer taxi. Fourth; it would have been prudent of me to verify the inbound aircraft's position before departing; this would have ensured minimal ambiguity as to the position of the aircraft given the infrequency of traditional position reporting at an uncontrolled field (additionally; I have never flown [that type of aircraft]; the inbound aircraft; and realized that they have a much higher groundspeed than a C172; thus covering more ground and getting to the airport more quickly than I would have guessed). I spoke with the pilot of whom was piloting the aircraft inbound and we agreed that my actions compromised safety. I am reviewing FAA-related publications on decision making; uncontrolled airport operations; and proper aircraft communication techniques to ensure this does not happen again. Additionally; I will seek mentoring from a more experienced flight instructor about how to best address this incident and learn from my mistake.

C172 Instructor reported a NMAC with an opposite landing aircraft.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We departed with First Officer (FO) flying the airplane; and experienced a 'R Pack Off' EICAS on the initial climb out. The Autopilot was engaged; and [First Officer (FO)] continued to fly the plane and operate the radios; as I ran the QRH checklist. The QRH guided us to continue operations normally. Within a few minutes; the 'FWD EQPT OVHT' EICAS illuminated. I ran the QRH procedures; put the EQUIPMENT COOLING selector in STBY; and waited for 5 minutes. The 'FWD EQPT OVHT' once again illuminated. I then put the EQUIPMENT COOLING selector in OVRD; and [FO] noted that the 'No Cooling' warning light also illuminated. We then began to wait the requisite 30 minutes. During the waiting period; both EADI's flickered; and then lost their color display. We also noticed the 'Standby ADI' beginning to fail; indicating a climbing turn. After our eventual course reversal; it indicated a 90 degree bank.Upon climbing through approximately 24;000 feet. (internet records show a maximum altitude of 28;500 ft; so my memory of that may be incorrect); the 'CABIN ALT' EICAS illuminated. We donned the oxygen masks; and observed the cabin altitude and rate. It indicated 11;000 feet.  Shortly thereafter; I heard a loud rushing of air; and the cabin rapidly depressurized to approximately 16;000 feet.  We then [had a situation]; received a clearance to the MEA of 11;000 feet; and promptly descended. At this point of multiple failures; and not knowing how long our instrumentation would remain operative; we decided to proceed to the nearest airport with which we were familiar. We elected to return to [departure airport]; knowing that daylight would still remain; the weather was VFR; the terrain non-mountainous; and we were well within maximum landing weight for that runway.  Sometime after reaching 11;000 feet; the packs were both back to normal operation; and the 'FWD EQPT OVHT' indication had extinguished. We made our approach and landed without incident.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].

B767 flight crew reported multiple issues; including a rapid depressurization at FL240; and elected to return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 250

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Our departure clearance was climb on runway heading to 2;000 feet. Before lining up I noted and verbalized to Pilot Flying (PF) of glider tow traffic to the west of the runway departure end; but didn't think it was an issue since it was so close in to the airport and ATC was talking to multiple aircraft in the vicinity. They didn't appear to be moving into our departure path.After departure and on initial climb out I noticed a TCAS target plus 4 (400 above) approx 2-3 miles ahead of us. I zoomed in on my display (during high workload time; nonetheless) to see it was actually less than a mile in front of us; and rapidly converging on our position. I looked out of the window and saw a glider in tow immediately on a collision course. The glider released and turned directly toward us. I believe the PF's head was down and I called out 'traffic - push down. Push down; turn right' and proceeded to grab the controls and keep saying this while helping him maneuver. He acquired the glider and we aggressively maneuvered to avoid a collision. No RA was given since we were close to the ground.This happened while simultaneously being handed off to NY [Center]. I advised them of our maneuver for a near-miss with a glider. Had we not taken evasive action we might have collided with the glider and/or the tow plane. I believe we could have queried about the traffic before departing to be sure; but some time had passed since us seeing that traffic and being cleared for take-off. We didn't see any traffic immediately before being cleared for takeoff. I believe ATC may have made an error in clearing us for departure - it should have been delayed to avoid this close-in traffic. It was a nice day and lots of GA activity was happening on the airport. I believe we could have more aggressively maneuvered or maneuvered sooner when seeing the TCAS target. It was a high workload time but collision avoidance and flying should have taken precedence over all else when seeing an airplane on a converging flight path. In the future I will not hesitate to speak up and ask about potential conflicts instead of just assuming ATC has handled it.

The reporter stated that on contact with ZNY the crew was deviating from a Near Miss to which the controller responded 'Oh; I didn't know they had glider operations in progress.' FOK Tower was in operation at the time; but the reporter does not know if the other two aircraft were talking with ATC even though all three aircraft were in Class D airspace at the time.

A Corporate aircraft departed FOK IFR and had near miss below 1;500 feet with a glider and tow aircraft off the runway end with Class D airspace in operation.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was moving over to take Radar (TR)/CIC. Aircraft X was on a local IFR flight plan (cleared to KSUX via radar vectors) for practice ILS approaches. As I plugged in; [Controller A] asked Aircraft X how this approach would terminate. No response by the pilot. [Controller A] made several unanswered transmissions and I attempted to reach Aircraft X on the PET2000 portable radio located in the tower cab. No response was received by us. I observed Aircraft X's mode C then drop off their full data block and the target displayed ISR. Aircraft X was then observed making a right turn back inbound to KSUX. I relieved [Controller A] from the TR position; [Controller A] remained on as CIC; and verified with [Controller B] that Aircraft X was cleared to land on Rwy 13 which was approved by [Controller B]. I gave an unanswered broadcast to Aircraft X on TR frequency that tower advised Aircraft X was cleared to land on Rwy 13. [Controller B] on LC (Local) position began preparing to send light gun signals to the aircraft as Aircraft X approached Rwy 13. The pilot of Aircraft X then called the tower via the commercial telephone line; stating they had lost their alternator and their electrical equipment was becoming inoperative. I gave Aircraft X their landing clearance via telephone and asked if the pilot required any assistance. The pilot responded no assistance was needed. I then passed the telephone off to [Controller B] on the LC position and [Controller B] remained on the telephone with the pilot. Aircraft X landed without incident and taxied to the ramp under their own power. No recommendations. Current procedures were adequate for handling the incident.

SUX Controller reported a GA aircraft lost communications during practice IFR approach.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Company Y is our business partner in ZZZZ and they handle our operation to include ramp functions.   Upon arrival; in pit 1; dirty used gloves and used paper towels were left in the pit.  With the rise of COVID cases in ZZZZ1; the Company Y ramp employees are concerned these used gloves and trash may be contagious. This is a repeated occurrence. The ZZZZ1 Team is aware and are doing briefings.

Ramp employee reported COVID-19 related concerns regarding used gloves and paper towels repeatedly left in aircraft pits.


Rain; Thunderstorm; Windshear; Turbulence; 5

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 13346; Flight Crew Type 2400

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

We arrived at the airport two hours early and set up the cockpit for a TETERBORO EIGHT DEPARTURE from Runway 1 based on winds.We initially received a clearance of the TEB departure; however; several changes of runways and clearances were occurring. We were then cleared to taxi to Runway 24. We reviewed the SID and noticed it was for runways 1; 6 or 19 but not Runway 24.When you load the FMS in a Primus Epic cockpit the runway/SID (or STAR; etc) combination automatically displays the appropriate commercially prepared chart for the SID; STAR or Approach etc. The green coloring on the commercially provided chart selection menu indicates you are on the correct chart by design. Subsequently selecting Runway 24; however; continued to display the TEB8 for [runways] 1-19-6. The system gave us the wrong chart. Subsequently; after the incident; we found out that there are two charted procedures with same exact name.We have been flying in and out of TEB for years. This did not seem correct to us. We queried Clearance of the proper SID TEB8 for Runway 24. They stated yes it was correct TEB8.There was confusion to the proper procedure for TEB8 departure on Runway 24 because it indicated 2;000 FT for runway 1-19 and 6 not 24. During taxi we asked ATC to please verify the TEB8 and altitude after departure because we thought we were assigned the wrong SID. Never have I seen two SID with same name. Ground stated 'As published' and we reviewed chart again.Upon taking the runway we asked Tower to please verify our altitude assignment. Again Tower stated 'As Published'. We were frustrated that Tower; Ground and Clearance were unwilling to verify our SID and altitudes despite multiple requests.The Captain stated 'this is not right we will maintain 1;500 FT until we confirm with departure.' We selected 2;000 FT on pre-select altitude per SID displayed and planned manual level off at 1;500 FT MSL.As we reached 1;500 FT the Captain tried to stop the aircraft ascent but we were in moderate turbulence going up creating negative G's the aircraft power was still at takeoff power because the preselect was at 2;000 FT and the aircraft wanted to climb due to wind shear and turbulence we were at 1;800 FT as we were contacting departure still trying to go down as an updraft took us up with nose pointing down. Newark Departure stated we should be at 1;500 FT. There was no conflict and we were cleared to 5;000 FT on 270 heading. We requested further right for weather and the Departure Controller seemed very helpful and not concerned. Human factor: Teterboro Tower should be more diligent in verification of altitudes. There have been a lot of issues with altitudes after departing TEB. They need to fix it.Note: NOS Charts have ONE TEB8 SID with all runways. [There should be] only ONE SID with same name. The commercial supplier has two. Secondly the FMS selection of SID and runway combination leads to wrong charts on the Primus Epic system.

The reporter reiterated that although they had changed their selected Runway from 1 to 24 when ATC assigned their takeoff runway the TEB SID chart displayed by the Primus Epic avionics suite remained the version intended for use with Runways 1; 6; and 19. At that point the crew was unaware of the second version for use with Runway 24 and their angst with ATC refusal to provide the altitude information ensued. Reporter did; however; state that the procedure displayed on their moving map/FMS was correct for Runway 24 when they made the change during taxi out. This only increased their confusion as the map/FMS was showing the 1;500 MSL altitude restriction and associated headings dictated by the Runway 24 version but which were nowhere displayed on their chart.The reporter also noted that the FMS displays indicated At or above 1;500 feet which is contrary to the charted 'At 1;500' until crossing the 'TEB VOR 4.5 DME' arc; thence to climb and maintain 2;000 MSL.Reporter strongly reiterated his/her belief that there should not be two SIDs with the same name; notwithstanding the clear indication in their titles as to the runways to which each is applicable; citing again the fact that the government published TEB SID is a single chart applicable to all associated runways.

A GLF5 flight crew was confused by the manner in which their digital avionics suite displayed the TETERBORO RNAV SID; not realizing that the commercially provided digital chart displays utilized two separate charts; one for departures of Runways 1; 6 and 19 and the other for departures from Runway 24. Their confusion was exacerbated when their departure runway was changed to Runway 24 and; although the map display was appropriate for their newly assigned runway the chart displayed remained the one for the other runways. Because the altitudes were different and because ATC was unwilling or unable to help clarify their confusion altitude deviations ensued.