Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Flight Crew Total 2940; Flight Crew Type 991

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were cleared for ILS runway 28R [at SFO] and assigned 180 KTS to AXMUL. Before CEPIN; we noticed a TCAS target 2 1/2 miles in front and 800 feet below us. Being IMC; we were concerned about the closure rate. As [we] slowed; ATC told us to maintain 180 KTS to AXMUL. We did. As we broke out of the clouds; we noticed no traffic ahead of us on either 28L or 28R.On [a prior similar approach;] I executed a go-around because of a TCAS RA at 800 feet on runway 28R. When I talked to the Tower [later] that day; he informed me there was no aircraft below us. I would like someone to explain to me why I'm getting ghost targets on runway 28R going into San Francisco. I'm concerned safety is being jeopardized and this matter should be looked into.

Reporter stated he had not heard of the TCAS null bus fault but said it sounds like that is a possible explanation.

B757 Captain reported receiving an apparently false TCAS RA on short final at SFO Runway 28R on two approaches on different days. On the first approach; the Captain executed a go-around.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16.8

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I had just relieved a CPC at Ground Control. I was briefed that Runway 32 was active; and that Ground owned no runways. A PA32 was taxiing northwest on Taxiway Delta to taxi to the ramp via Delta and Golf. Aircraft X called from the ramp to taxi to the active. I issued 'Runway 32; taxi via Golf 5; Runway 19; and Delta'. Tower was rolling Aircraft Y on Runway 01. Aircraft Y rotated approximately 1;200 FT down Runway 01 (a little past G2 Intersection). Tower called out that he was rolling Runway 01; I said 'stop him'; but it was too late; so I stopped Aircraft X. Aircraft X stopped with the nose-wheel past the runway edge line; and the mains just short of the line. Golf 5 Intersection is 4;400 FT down the runway.We have runway ownership strips that are kept at the position that owns the runway; as per the SOP. For myself; the absence of the strip is not an attention getter. Years ago; before we were required to have the runway ownership strips; controllers would place a strip vertically across the bay as a flag to remind themselves that they don't own the runway. If it were required to place a strip across the bay; then the controller I was reliving would have done so. So even though I completely forgot that I did not own Runway 01; the sight of the strip vertically across the bay would have jarred my memory.I would recommend that the SOP be amended to require a positive memory aid; like a strip vertically across the bay. I find the runway ownership strip useless. The absence of the strip at the position is not an attention getter. We worked for decades without them; with no problem. Since they are mandated by national order; we are stuck with them; unless that changes. They don't do any harm; nor do they do any good in my opinion. Other memory aids such as 'RUNWAY CLOSED' is a positive flag that is hard to miss.

FRG Ground Controller issues crossing instructions while departure is rolling down the runway. Ground doesn't realize he doesn't own the runway. Memory Joggers were available to show who owned the runways; but not used.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I taxied Aircraft X to Runway 10L full length with a clearance to cross Runway 21 on Kilo. At the time of this instruction; I had control of Runway 3/21. There were no conflicts along the taxi route so I passed the strip. Aircraft Y had cancelled IFR and the Local 1 Controller made the decision to bring Aircraft Y to Runway 03. This was based on ragged fog at the approach end of Runways 10 left and right as well as the southwest. The LC1 Controller then asked for control of Runway 3. I scanned my strip bay and the runway and seeing no traffic; I gave control of Runway 3 to the LC1 controller. I did not realize Aircraft X had not yet crossed and reached the approach end of 10L. The Clearance Delivery Controller recognized that Aircraft X was in the process of crossing Runway 21 at Kilo as Aircraft Y was on short final. He recognized the conflict and advised the LC1 Controller. The LC1 Controller issued go around instructions to the LC1 Controller. When I heard the LC1 Controller issue go around instructions I scanned the runway and adjacent taxiways for conflicts. My thought was an aircraft in the vicinity of Echo and Foxtrot had mis-executed my instructions. I did not see Aircraft X and recognize the conflict. Additionally; before regaining control of Runway 3/21; I issued taxi instructions to Aircraft Z via Kilo with the clearance to cross 21. I take full and complete responsibility for this incident. It was my responsibility to ensure that no conflicts existed prior to transferring control of Runway 3/21. Additionally; it was my responsibility to protect the runway when I do not have control of it. I did not execute those responsibilities. I expect to be held accountable as I would expect anyone in this organization to be held accountable for mediocre; sub-standard; unsafe performance. I am completely supportive of any and all remedial training opportunities to include classroom training; skill enhancement training and decertification. I do not want to be a minimally competent controller. I welcome the chance to get better. After discussions with senior experienced controllers about their techniques in this type of situation; I am not going to give up control of my runway until visually verifying that all aircraft in the receiving controllers bin are accounted for prior to releasing the runway. I am open to all constructive comments and ideas to be better. I am available for any clarifying questions.

Portland Tower Controller reported a ground conflict and runway incursion were managed by issuance of go-around instructions.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

SCT Newport Sector owns airspace up to 130 around LAX. ZLA Sector 21/22 owns 140-FL230 above this airspace. The LOA between SCT and ZLA allows SCT to climb to 170 into ZLA airspace upon radar contact from ZLA provided that SCT Newport Sector gives ZLA Sector 21/22 5 miles in trail and increasing or APREQS a stack. Today while I was working 21/22 I had taken a hand off on Aircraft X a LAX departure on the KARVR Departure climbing to 170 and also on AIRCRAFT Y; a LAX departure on the Holtz Departure climbing to 170. Newport shipped Aircraft X to me out of 109 with Aircraft Y at 105. The expectation is that SCT is using degrees divergence or visual or altitude until shipping these aircraft to 21/22. I climbed Aircraft X to FL230 with the expectation that SCT was either climbing reference vacated altitudes or using degree divergence. Aircraft Y started to out climb Aircraft X and overtake Aircraft X. I had a bubble up on Aircraft X and Aircraft Y was inside but I still was not talking to him. I called SCT Newport to get control for turns to turn Aircraft X to a 120 heading about a 20-30 degree turn to the right so that the Aircraft Y on about a 080 heading could go behind. The SCT controller approved and so I turned out Aircraft X to 120 heading. As Aircraft X was climbing out of 130; I see Aircraft Y now climb above Aircraft X to 137 and I tell the Supervisor that Newport is again breaking the LOA. Aircraft Y is inside the bubble of Aircraft X and now higher and I am still not talking to Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y then checks on climb out of 150 while still in the bubble with Aircraft X. At no point in time did SCT provide ZLA with adequate spacing as per the LOA (5 miles in trail and increasing). This was the third time this happened today with the 21/22 Sector only being open for about 2.5 hours. The prior 2 incidents was with the Controller I relieved. This happens on a regular basis and ZLA is left to guess what SCT is doing. Questions like 'are they going to ship me the high aircraft or the low one' run through our minds all the time. And most of the time they ship the low aircraft! This is completely unsafe and should not be allowed to happen. But because it has been like this for so long everyone seems like that is the norm and just deals with it. In the mean time ZLA is constantly filling out reports. To completely avoid this situation from ever happening 1 of 2 things should happen.1. SCT only climbs to 130; the top of their airspace like in any other sector in ZLA. This allows ZLA to ENSURE and not GUESS what separation is being used.2. SCT takes the airspace up to 170 and ZLA will own FL180 to FL230.

Reporter states an unsafe situation where another facility is not following the LOA and is causing operational errors.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At AVL; there are two (parallel) runways. One is a temporary runway with an ILS and GPS approach. The other runway is new (under construction) with fresh asphalt pavement and markings. On a five mile visual approach; it can be confusing as to which runway is the active runway and which runway is under construction. During the daytime; the flashing 'X' at the approach end of the runway under construction is difficult to see until approximately a 2 mile final. Unless you are tracking the localizer or the GPS course to the 'west' runway; it is entirely possible to line up and land on that new runway. Also; there are no NOTAMs associated with the new runway except for some taxiway NOTAMs. Add to [the company's] release a note describing the two runways and to not mistake the east runway as an active/open runway. Also; there should/could be a NOTAM filed regarding the current runway situation.

Air Carrier Captain reported there is not a NOTAM or company flight plan note regarding runway construction.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Letter of Agreement between NCT [NorCal Tracon] and FAT [Tracon] requires aircraft going from NCT to VIS airport be at 5;000 FT. Aircraft X was given pilot's discretion maintain 5;000 FT while the aircraft was at 7;000 FT. The aircraft did not descend for over 30 miles. Clarify that a 'pilot's discretion descent' does not meet the requirements of the LOA and requires coordination. Alternately; include PD descent as an option in the LOA to avoid the receiving Controller from expecting the aircraft to descend.

FAT Tracon Controller does not believe that NCT is meeting the requirements of a LOA for pilots inbound to VIS to be at 5;000 FT by issuing a clearance of 'pilot discretion to 5;000 FT' before turning them over to FAT.


Thunderstorm; Rain; Hail; Turbulence; Windshear; 5

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 739; Flight Crew Type 200

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Pilot was flying ZZZ-VOR-ZZZ1 on an IFR flight plan.  Pilot was flying with Sentry and XM radar weather. In communication with ZZZ Center; pilot was communicating heavy rain storm cells and asking for vectors to avoid the same. ZZZ Center authorized pilot to change course based on visual avoidance of clouds and based on XM weather. On heading of 269 south of VOR pilot was transiting through a line of light precipitation. Based on ATC guidance or XM weather no 'red' cells were observed on the radar. Pilot encountered significant hail and rain at that altitude and was having difficult holding altitude and advised ZZZ Center altitude errors and asked for a block hold. Upon trying to climb/vector to avoid thunderstorms pilot encountered a severe microburst that changed the heading of the plane from 269 to 090 in less than 15 seconds and pilot immediately reported the deviation and asked center for urgent assistance. Center authorized block altitude of 5;000-10;000 ft. and vectored the pilot back east away from the thunderstorms. Pilot flew back towards ZZZ and the transitioned north based on vectors from ZZZ. Pilot experienced loss in altitude and heading upon transitioning through the outer edge of the heavy precipitation cell.Pilot was concerned that XM radar data was outdated (>10 mins old) and was constantly inquiring about vectors from ATC. Sentry data was sporadic and difficult to load. Lack of quality data resulted in flight into significant thunderstorms resulting in change of heading and altitude. Pilot was flying on auto pilot and removed the autopilot hold after the direction change. Auto pilot worked fine for the duration of the flight.

PA-28 pilot reported loss of control after the aircraft entered a microburst.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 61; Flight Crew Total 196; Flight Crew Type 142

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

I was cleared to land on XXL. A PA-28 was cleared for XXR however got confused with ATC and understood 'Call your base' as 'Call my final' The aircraft proceeded across the final for XXR and XXL passing very close in front of me at the same altitude. In order to avoid the aircraft I rolled more than 60 degrees into a tight left 360. I proceeded around the 360 and landed normally with no damage to the aircraft. The other aircraft did not make any significant avoidance maneuvers despite calling out the conflict just prior to me seeing the plane come into view from below my wing. After I turned he started a very shallow turn and did not seem to understand the severity of the situation at all. Listening to the saved recordings of ATC; it sounds like ATC confused 2 PA-28s in the pattern and gave the pilot a 'Call your base' command while he was already on base but the pilot did not speak up or ask for clarification and assumed he meant 'Call my final' before proceeding across both finals and into my path.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in the pattern.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

On climbout; once above low level turbulence we noticed unusual and severe vibrations that appeared to be coming from the engines. We ran the QRH for Unusual Engine Vibrations which enabled us to isolate the problem to the #2 engine. The QRH then instructed us to proceed to the Engine Shutdown Checklist which was completed as well. At this point we declared an emergency with ATC and were turned direct back to the departure airport for an emergency landing. We notified the Flight Attendant of the situation; that we would be making an emergency landing and the approximate time to landing. We then called Operations; informed them that we were an emergency aircraft returning and asked them to let Dispatch know. The passengers were then told about the situation; that the aircraft flies just fine on one engine and that we would be landing shortly. ATC brought us immediately back [landing]. We shot the visual approach and landed without further incident. After exiting the runway the emergency vehicles met us and inspected the aircraft for damage or fluid leaks before allowing us to taxi to the gate under our own power. We returned to the gate and deplaned the passengers. A brief inspection of the number #2 engine led to the discovery of a loose prop blade.

[No additional information was provided in narrative 2.]

An SF340 developed a number 2 engine vibration after takeoff so the engine was shutdown; an emergency declared; and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 150

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Though we had no issues; I wish to report that a staff shortage was causing great delays and potential problems. When we arrived at FRG a single Controller was operating all ATC frequencies: Tower; Ground; and Clearance. The airport was too busy for that and needed another Controller. We got clearance to land from a visual approach very late due to traffic and frequency congestion. While taxiing in; we heard of an airplane blocking another (not sure if that was a bad taxi clearance or pilot error). After unloading and refueling we waited a very long time for our departure clearance. The Controller; though keeping her cool; was obviously overworked still handling all 3 frequencies. When we departed; at a possible shift change; a new person did come on Tower frequency. It was the first time we had heard a different voice. If this was the normal controller schedule for the day; then it was not enough. This is a busy airport with small piston aircraft mixed in with jet aircraft of all sizes; as well as 3 runways. Add communication with New York Approach into the mix; the Tower Controller should not be handling any other frequencies.

A corporate jet pilot reported that all FRG ATC functions were being handled by one person at a very busy time of the day; which caused extensive clearance and departure delays.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

When the flight crew arrived at the aircraft; cockpit door was observed to be locked and APU was running (most likely done by the tug crew prior to crew show).  Inputting the emergency access code would not open door and no lights or tones were seen/heard; indicating that the emergency cockpit door access panel was not working properly.  Maintenance was advised and two mechanics responded.  Eventually; to access the cockpit; they forced an automatic APU shutdown which depowered the door and allowed cockpit access.  However; when they deferred the emergency access panel in accordance with their maintenance procedures; they used the wrong procedure and disconnected wires/plugs behind the 'center console door panel' instead of the overhead 'cockpit door control panel' and subsequently pulled and saftied the PAX MON CB.  Both pilots checked the Maintenance Release and MEL and followed listed procedures; pushing back and taking off with no unusual events.In flight; while opening the door to receive meals; it was found that the cockpit door strikers were completely depowered and the door had been unlocked since maintenance had released the aircraft and could be opened from the cabin by forcefully pushing on it.  The door was immediately barricaded with crew bags and the center jumpseat was slid into position to keep the door in the closed position and to prevent cockpit access. The Captain notified Maintenance Control; Dispatch and the Duty Manager; and after they sent the proper MEL procedures the flight crew realized that Maintenance had used the wrong procedure to defer the malfunction which resulted in an illegal dispatch.  The proper MEL pilot items were complied with and the PAX MON CB was pushed in at Maintenance Control's direction.  The door locks energized and the door was checked to be secure. Maintenance was thoroughly debriefed on the ground; as was the oncoming crew.

The flight crew arrived at the aircraft to find the cockpit door locked. The keypad would not unlock the door. Maintenance personnel were eventually able to get the door open. maintenance personnel applied MEL Reference number X (Cockpit Access Keypad Inop) in the log book. At XA33z while the acft was in flight dispatch received a message that was relayed to Maintenance Control that maintenance had pulled and collared circuit breaker; which removed all power to the door latch. The door was not able to be secured. Maintenance control confirmed that circuit breaker should not have been pulled and/or collared and advised the crew to reset the breaker which the flight crew did and the door was secured. In a phone patch between the flight and maintenance control; it was determined that the MEL was improperly executed and notated in the log book. The crew also failed to confirm door secure procedures in the before pushback checklist. The airplane will be grounded in EWR on arrival pending a maintenance inspection.

A319 flight crew discovers upon arrival at the aircraft that the cockpit door is locked and that it cannot be unlocked using the keypad. Maintenance is called and defers the lock using the wrong MEL procedure which renders the door locking mechanism inoperative. This is not discovered by the crew until enroute.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were about 20 miles prior to TOD on arrival landing south with ZZZ Center; clearance PD to FL240 all systems normal. Captain PM; First Officer PF.Felt a vibration and noticed engine 2 roll back N1 to about 50% accompanied by ENG 2 STALL ECAM which directed us to turn on engine ignition. After ignition selected on; N1 returned to normal cruise setting but was accompanied by N2 vibration of about 4.5 units.ECAM complete; QRH referenced for ENGINE STALL. That checklist directed us to bring thrust lever on affected engine to idle and check engine indications. If abnormal; it directs to shut the engine off.When thrust lever was brought to idle; engine 2 again stalled accompanied by N2 vibration of about 9.9 units. With engine stalled and apparent damage; we continued to shut down engine 2.At this point; A position Flight Attendant called and advised vibrations felt and flames observed exiting engine 2 tail pipe. I told him we were aware and working on it and would call him back. As we ran ECAM to shut down engine 2; we began our descent to FL240. Remaining engine able to maintain managed speed. Once engine 2 secured and APU started; we re with Center. They cleared us to descend landing south. Called A position Flight Attendant and gave him NTSB with 20 minutes remaining and NO brace command. Had him prepare cabin for normal arrival and landing; advised would be stopping on runway and they would see fire trucks approach the airplane to ensure engine 2 safe enough for us to taxi to the gate. Made a PA to guests; advising them of situation.Approach vectored us and cleared us for ILS in VMC to XXR. Flaps 3 landing; stopped on XXR just short of Taxiway XX. Made PA advising guests to remain seated; all was fine; and the fire trucks were approaching to ensure that we were safe to continue taxiing to the gate. CFR advised no visible problems with engine 2 except oil leaking. Tower and ground controllers then cleared us to our gate with CFR following us to the gate. At the gate; CFR came on board and asked if further assistance required. We declined and they left. Guests deplaned normally; maintenance logbook entry made; and maintenance personnel met us to inspect the engine. Engine 2 oil quantity about 10 quarts at completion of flight. Also met by 2 Inflight Supervisors who joined us as we debriefed Flight Attendants.

[Report narrative added no additional information.]

A319 flight crew reported multiple engine stalls; so crew elected to shut down the Number 2 engine and make a precautionary landing at destination.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On take off I noticed a smell of dirty feet. It went away after a couple minutes. I didn't say anything because I honestly thought someone in the back took their shoes off. It wasn't until we were in the van on the way to the hotel that the Captain asked if we smelled dirty socks on landing. I told him I didn't smell it on landing; but I did smell it on takeoff. He said that he wrote it up; but no one ever said anything or called to ask if we smelled anything.

A320 Flight Attendant reported a fume event during initial departure. 'Dirty socks' odor dissipated shortly thereafter.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy

We noted the EMZOH3 STAR places the aircraft below the San Francisco Class B airspace. It does not indicate this airspace; and the aircraft's flight management system does not take the associated speed limit into account (the Legs page displays the normal 240 knot speed at MYNEE and later fixes). We programmed the required 200 knot speed; but recommend this should be coded into the arrival. A busy crew could easily miss the specific altitudes of the Class B shelf. On a previous flight; the pilot with whom I was flying said he was slowing to comply with this requirement; and the Captain said '...I've never had a problem with the Class B before;' indicating that he didn't agree with the deceleration; and that the first officer should have maintained 250 knots. I recommend charting improvements to indicate Class B airspace on STAR. This arrival places aircraft below Class B.We could address this via bulletins; but I believe these are not permanent solutions. A note on the station page would be more effective (and currently exists); but publishing (and coding) the relevant speed would be best; in my opinion.

An air carrier pilot reported the EMZOH3 STAR to OAK published speed is above the speed limit for being underneath the SFO Class B airspace.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229; Flight Crew Type 229

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

We were flying the POAS 4 Departure Runway 07 [from MROC]. We briefed the POAS 4 Departure; as well as the MROC Runway 07 Departure Procedure on the MROC Station Information. We had everything loaded and configured in the OPC (Operational Program Configuration) and the FMC; including the POAS 4 Departure with all the points verified in the LEGS page of the FMC; as well as the thrust reduction set to 2500 ft AGL in the Takeoff Ref; and everything else in accordance with the MROC Runway 07 Departure Procedure. Our actual takeoff weight was also just 300 pounds shy of our takeoff-limited ATOG (based on obstacle clearance); so we planned and flew a bleeds off takeoff. The ATIS reported winds at something like 100/12; with a temperature of 27 or 28 degrees Celsius.After takeoff; climbing thru about 500 ft AGL; we got a message that appeared in the FMC scratchpad. It said something like 'Route Discontinuity Inserted'. Something changed in the LEGS page as well; but I was concentrating on monitoring the departure to make sure we started the right hand turn on time. This was our first indication that a system was starting to degrade. At the TIO 4 DME; per the Departure Procedure; we initiated the right hand turn to turn back direct to the TIO VOR. At 5500 ft MSL we began accelerating to flaps up maneuvering speed and began cleaning up the flaps. We remained north of the TIO R-113 as we proceeded inbound to the TIO VOR. At some point inbound to the VOR; the entire map display on both the Captain and First Officer display units went blank and displayed some error message on the map display. The FMC on both sides dropped out as well and reverted to the Menu page; with only the DLK (Data Link) and ACMS (Aircraft Condition Monitoring System) options available at LSK (Line Select Key) 2L and LSK 3L. Where the option 'FMC' at LSK 1L is normally located; it was completely blank. We could not engage LNAV OR VNAV and continued using HDG SEL to turn outbound on the TIO R-012; per the POAS 4 Departure. We slightly overshot the R-012 as we crossed the TIO VOR.After about one to two minutes; the map display and FMC on both sides returned to normal operation and function without any intervention by the Pilots. It all happened so fast; and we were concentrating on avoiding the mountainous terrain; staying north of the TIO R-113; and not overspeeding the flaps; that we couldn't properly diagnose what exactly went wrong; and what error messages came up. But we do know that we did lose all map displays and both FMCs during a critical phase of flight in mountainous terrain while doing a special departure procedure. Fortunately we were in daylight VMC conditions. If the event would have occurred in IMC and/or night conditions; it could have been a potentially disastrous outcome.

B737NG Captain reported receiving an error message in the FMC scratchpad; MAP displays went blank; both FMS's dropped out and were unable to engage VNAV and LNAV.  All returned to normal soon after with no input from either pilot.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

At gear retraction; the right main gear light showed gear unsafe. We followed the Abnormal check-list 'Gear unsafe light(s) illuminates after gear retraction'. We contacted Maintenance Control. We were directed to return and we landed uneventfully; below maximum landing weight; and returned to the gate. We were assigned a new aircraft. This was a mechanical issue. Maintenance has not informed me why this occurred.

B717 Captain reports receiving a right main gear unsafe indication after gear retraction. Abnormal checklist procedures are complied with and flight returns to departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

The inside tire on the right main gear left debris on runway during takeoff. Witnesses say that at approximately 4;000 FT down the runway; rubber started separating. An Airbus crew said that it looked like 30-40 pieces of rubber were laying on the runway. We were notified by Center 15 minutes after departure of what happened. We had no idea that this took place. We started the communication and information gathering process; declared an emergency with Center and made an uneventful landing at destination.

During climb; Center told us that Tower wanted to talk to us. Tower advised us that after our take-off there were many pieces of tire left on runway. An Airbus pilot then said he witnessed a bucketful of foot long pieces being picked up. After receiving [this] information; we were approaching cruise alt and decided to continue to destination. Declared an emergency and landed without incident. Later found the tire inflated but most of the rubber missing outside of chord.

Air Carrier flight crew is informed by ATC that one of their tires shed most of its' rubber during takeoff. Flight continues to destination and lands normally after declaring an emergency. The tire was found inflated but missing most of its' tread.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 16

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 238; Flight Crew Total 15031; Flight Crew Type 7248

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 3014; Flight Crew Type 491

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was the flying pilot. During the preflight set up; I positioned my V1 and Vr bugs at an incorrect setting that was at least 10 knots below where they should have been. Because of my unfamiliar and uncomfortable use of the preflight checklist I did not catch my error when the preflight checklist was read. We took off on Runway 16; the SID VEBIT_3S requires an aggressive tight turn to the left starting 'at 2000 feet but not before KLO 1.0 DME.' During the Takeoff roll I began to rotate at my incorrectly set Vr speed. The Captain put his hand on the yoke and said something like 'don't rotate yet'. I delayed the rotate until he said 'rotate'. My sight picture was strange and I was suffering from some poor situational awareness. This led to a slow reaction when we reached the SID turn point. I initiated the turn at about 2.0 DME and passing about 3000 feet MSL. As we had briefed I kept the speed at V2 +15 and used an aggressive AOB of 25deg - 30deg until we were heading toward BREGO. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

The First Officer set his airspeed bugs incorrectly; resulting in an early rotation which was corrected by the Captain. The resulting confusion and distraction led to a late turn on the departure.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

It was a normal takeoff. After the gear handle was selected to the up position; we heard an unusual noise; followed by an EICAS MSG 'HYD QTY LOW C.' After switching to departure control we got vectors. The aircraft PF (Pilot Flying) duties were transferred to the FO (First Officer). We started running the appropriate checklist. Eventually we got an additional EICAS MSG 'HYD PRESS SYS C.' That checklist was run; in addition to the non-routine Landing checklist and the Overweight Landing checklist. A call was made to the Flight Attendants to explain the situation; and a PA was made to the passengers to explain the situation. A message was sent to Dispatch via ACARS and a tug was requested. Coordination was accomplished with Approach and Tower. After accomplishing a landing assessment for our conditions knowing we had enough runway; even though we were overweight; we did not dump fuel. PF duties were transferred back to the Captain and a landing was made back at [departure airport]. After stopping on the runway; Tower requested we shut down all engines. The airport safety personnel accessed our plane. We were tugged to a hard stand.I understand there was a failure in one of the hydraulic lines.

Flight experienced center hydraulic failure upon gear retraction. After checklist procedures; the aircraft returned to land overweight. Improper crew coordination resulted in the lack of a logbook entry.

B777 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after a HYD QTY LOW C EICAS message was received upon gear retraction.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 700

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I took a VFR flight to ZZZ. After checking in with ZZZ tower I was instructed to enter left downwind for Runway XXR. I entered the pattern on a left downwind and lowered my landing gear abeam numbers as I usually do. Shortly after I was told by tower that I would be following a Cessna traffic two mile final. Anticipating a long downwind; I retracted my landing gear and requested tower to call my base. All was smooth and as expected from downwind to final when tower called out traffic that was landing at the same time on Runway XXL. I continued a vigorous visual lookout for traffic to short final. Over the threshold I did a visual check to confirm I had 3 greens. Not seeing green lights; I visually confirmed gear handle in up position and at the same time applied power. As the airplane slowed its descent and started to climb; I heard a loud sound outside of the aircraft. At this point I decided going around would not be a safe option. After the gears were fully lowered and locked; I confirmed ample runway available for a safe landing and performed a smooth; safe landing exiting the runway. After contacting ground controller; I then taxied to transient area via Alpha taxiway and shut down. When I inspected the aircraft after landing; I noticed that the propeller had been damaged.

Lancair Legacy pilot reported a propeller strike when he noticed he did not have three green lights on short final. He added power and lowered the gear for a safe landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight was holding due to severe thunderstorms.  The decision was made to divert to ZZZ1.  The first error occurred while trying to divert to ZZZ1.  I received [an aircraft performance error].  I was unable to divert the flight at all; requiring the Chief to be called over to resolve the issue.  The second error was far more substantial.  After we diverted to ZZZ1; weather began to build over the field and other aircraft began to go around.  The crew decided it was best to divert to ZZZ2.  I was unable to provide a new release or landing data due to numerous [software] errors. When I tried to divert from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 [software] said [the diversion was already entered and it needed a non-stop entry].  After entering [non-stop]; I was still unable to divert the flight to ZZZ2.  Without performing the [data entry] properly; I was unable to release the flight to ZZZ2.  I was not able to provide the crew with an updated release; or landing data.  We were never able to get [software] to show the flight diverting to ZZZ2.  The aircraft landed in ZZZ2 without any updates; or release to ZZZ2.  It took numerous managers and the chief to get this issue sorted out and show the aircraft on the ground in ZZZ2.

An air carrier Dispatcher reported multiple problems with his software program that prevented him from properly handling a flight that encountered weather and diverted to another destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 182; Flight Crew Type 9459

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

First officers leg to fly. As PM as I performed the after takeoff checklist the landing gear would not retract. Continued to clear above surrounding terrain. Positioned aircraft to safe altitude; and executed CLR / CRM and QRH's to resolve. All appropriate checklists completed. Key item-- we were unable to communicate with company with clarity. ACARS was our primary means to communicate with company. Unable to establish comm with company either via VHF COMM or ARINC. Aircraft did not have SATCOM. Continued and [advised Company] via ACARS and ATC. Accomplished related checklists; landing performance received. Uneventful landing at ZZZ. Had emergency/CFR equipment standing by for due caution. Overweight landing accomplished.

FO was the PF and CA was the PM. The Inbound flight was delayed therefore; delaying our departure time. All was considered normal ops until pushback. Pushed back from gate. During the pushback; both the CA and I heard a loud clunk from the nose gear area. The CA inquired from the push back crew if they heard the same. The push back crew confirmed the noise and advised that they taxied over an uneven surface. The CA inquired again to make sure that was the case; since from our view point we did not see any uneven surface on the ramp from the gate to the present position. The push back crew reaffirmed that all looked normal including the nose gear assembly. We started our taxi for takeoff. There were no notable steering issues or any other noises during the taxi and takeoff roll. The takeoff roll was normal. Upon rotating and achieving positive rate; the 'Gear Up' call was made. The CA as PM attempted to bring the gear lever from the OFF position to the UP position; but was unable to. The FO as PF continued flying the RNAV SID and called to clean up the flaps on schedule. Once terrain was not an issue; the CA advised ATC of our issue and requested to maintain speed at 240 Knots and an altitude of 10;000 while on LNAV track with the SID departure. With the R CMD Autopilot engaged; I as the PF remained as PF and also communicated with ATC. The CA went through the QRH and followed the checklist for 'Gear Lever will not move Up'. Because of the clunking noise we heard on the ground during pushback and inability to verify the condition of the nose gear; we both agreed that we will not retract the gear through the alternate method provided by the checklist. Bottom line was; we did not want to create an additional problem if the nose gear was damaged for any reason and did not retract properly; possibly not extending normally when needed. We requested to climb to FL190 to have a better clearance from terrain and requested vectors while in VMC conditions. The CA communicated the condition of flight to the FAs and passengers. The CA attempted to establish communication with dispatch via AIRINC; SELCAL and VHF; but was not able to. Dispatch was notified via ACARS of the situation. After multiple attempts to establish communication with Dispatch; we decided that at that point the best course of action was to return. Dispatch was advised and a return to the departure airport will be attempted through ACARS. [ATC was advised] that we had three gear down lights with a disagree message. We requested vectors to the runway. After setting up for the approach; the CA became the PF and the FO became the PM. The PM continued to go through the QRH checklist for 'Gear Disagree' and 'Overweight Landing' until it was completed. The CA reaffirmed the FAs of the situation and plan of action and as well communicated to the passengers on the return and the reason for it. While setting up for the approach the; auto brakes failed to arm. The QRH 'Auto brakes' checklist was completed with the auto brakes set to OFF as per the checklist. ALL abnormal checklists and deferred items were completed prior to landing. Landing performance data was also taken into consideration. The landing was an overweight landing with 32;000Ibs of fuel in the tanks. ZFW was 196;686IBS. A successful Flaps 30 landing was made. The CA slowed the aircraft on the runway to taxi speed prior to engaging nose wheel steering via the tiller. CFR equipment provided a visual ok message; prior to taxing back to the gate. During the landing rollout and taxi back to the gate; the left engine oil pressure read amber between 25-27 psi multiple times and was steady at times. The flight parked at the gate successfully. Further review of the logbook; indicated that the landing gear module was repaired or replaced approx. 4-5 days prior. The CA made the appropriate entries in the logbook reflecting the abnormal occurrences of the flight.

The 757 landing gear failed to retract; so the crew returned to the departure airport. The alternate retraction method was not considered because of an unusual noise heard in the nose gear area during pushback.


Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Aircraft X on 2 hour turn. Was told that during COVID-19 Pandemic all surfaces are to be wiped down by the cleaners. Surfaces include tray tables; countertops; and armrests among the items in question. Did not see cleaners wipe down any surfaces other than countertops. Was advised by Union Stewards to report any deviation from cleaning instructions briefed to technicians.

Flight Attendant reported witnessing the aircraft's cleaning crew did not follow Covid-19 procedures and only sanitized the galley counter tops.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

On Aircraft X found left nose landing gear tire worn to limits; removed and replaced left nose gear tire I.A.W. (In Accordance With) B767 AMM 32-45-02 and serviced tire to 175 psi.During shop vist found nose landgear tire from Aircraft X to still had tang washer installed on tire and not to be installed on tire on aircraft.

Technician reported discovering the tang washer on the old nose tire and wheel assembly instead of reinstalled on the aircraft after a tire change.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

We departed ZZZ. We had received a short-range clearance via the ZZZZZ1 Departure Procedure to the ZZZ1 VOR with a climb to 9;000 and as part of the clearance; told to expect filed route and altitude within 10 minutes …. The routing I had filed was ZZZ ZZZZZ1 ZZZ1 ZZZ2.The copilot is a very experienced pilot; but new to both the aircraft and the older avionics in the aircraft. During the climb; we were given a heading of 340 degrees and cleared to climb to 12;000 feet MSL. Shortly afterwards; we were issued our 'filed route' with the exception that ATC added ZZZ3 and ZZZ3 005/060 to the route prior to ZZZ4 and to climb to 14;000 feet and a new heading was issued to intercept the ZZZ3 005 radial. The aircraft is equipped with older EFIS and FMS. We were climbing very quickly and somehow we missed selecting the altitude preselect arm. We had briefed the need to always arm and altitude selector with each and every change in altitude and to also verify that it was armed 1000' prior to the preselected altitude. I realized that we were probably close to intercepting the assigned radial and rather than ask my copilot to set things up in an FMS that he was still unfamiliar with; I put my head down to program the FMS with the new routing. The copilot called out the altitude deviation as we were going through 14;300 at a high rate of climb. It took another couple of hundred feet to arrest the rate of climb and work our way back to 14;000 feet.I believe that there were several factors involved in this incident. First and foremost; as PIC; I simply failed to properly manage my inexperienced (in that aircraft) copilot. I failed to follow the principle of AVIATE; NAVIGATE and COMMUNICATE.Contributing factors were that we were both rusty - our flying had been significantly reduced due to the COVID-19 quarantines. [X] days before the incident we had flown the aircraft [X] hours on a series of test flights. Prior to that; the last time we had flown the aircraft was over two months ago.Additionally; the Tower personnel at ZZZ could have issued a more appropriate short-range clearance out of ZZZ. I have received the 'ZZZ3 ZZZ3005/060...' routing many times in the past for northbound flights out of the ZZZ4 area when departing out of ZZZ5 which is north of ZZZ4. However; this was my first flight northbound out of ZZZ which is south of ZZZ2. In the past; on departures out of ZZZ to the South; East and West; the clearance received when contacting ZZZ4 Approach was actually the same as what I had filed. I know that this information is available to the ATC staff at the ZZZ Tower; or should be; because after the fact; I checked my email and discovered that [company] had sent me an email giving me the 'Expected ATC Routing' for the flight that included the 'ZZZ3 ZZZ3005/060' between ZZZ1 and ZZZ2. Having this information included in the 'expect...' clearance issued prior to departure would allow flight crews to program their nav systems prior to takeoff. It is a very simple thing that reduces workload and would therefore enhance safety.Finally; as a flight crew; we debriefed the event and discussed the appropriate techniques and safeguards that we need to strictly follow as we resume flying.

Pilot reported experiencing an altitude deviation during departure. Reporter cited routing clearance issues and lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic as contributing factors.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24.2; Flight Crew Total 780; Flight Crew Type 112

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

At 0W3 with multiple skydive operation had skydivers turn over the active runway at 200-400 feet.  On two occasions I had to execute an aggressive go around. Discussed the matter with the skydive operation and the pattern continued except jumpers would land at the edge of the runway.

A pilot reported having to execute two aggressive go-arounds because of skydivers turning over the 0W3 runway at 200 - 400 FT.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

The following occurred while I was working the North Departure/North High positions (E & H).  Aircraft X was descending on the JAIKE3 arrival.  As the aircraft was approaching the boundary with N90; I noticed that N90 Metro sector had not accepted the handoff.  I called Metro on the line for a handoff.  The Metro controller answered the line and stated that they were on the JFK radar site and couldn't see my traffic.  He stated that I should have already gotten the word on that.  I had not been advised of this; or any short-term procedure for dealing with it.  Anyway; since my aircraft was now entering N90's airspace; I requested permission from the Metro controller to enter his airspace.  The N90 Metro controller approved that request and I allowed Aircraft X to continue on the route into N90's airspace.  A few miles into N90 airspace; the controller accepted the automated handoff and I transferred communications.A few minutes later Aircraft Y was descending on the JAIKE3 arrival.  I called METRO when the aircraft was 15 miles from the boundary and requested permission to enter N90 airspace with Aircraft X.  The controller said okay.  I entered N90 airspace with Aircraft X and a few miles into their airspace the N90 controller accepted the automated handoff.  I transferred communications at that time.There is no procedure in the PHL/N90 LOA that deals with this issue between these 2 sectors.  We do have a 'Late Handoff Procedure' that deals with other sectors; for traffic transiting via RBV; but it does not address traffic between the PHL North High and Yardley sectors and the N90 METRO and Yardley sectors.  In other words; there is no late handoff procedure for JAIKE or V3 traffic.I spoke to the supervisor and the OM about how we should be handling the JAIKE and V3 traffic today; since N90 cannot see the traffic until it is in their airspace.  OM advised that we will use non-radar procedures with traffic on these routes.  I made a request of my OM and PHL TMU for 20 miles-in-trail from ZDC on traffic entering my airspace on the JAIKE3 arrival.  My request was denied; with no reason given.1.  'Late Handoff Procedures' do not currently exist for the sectors/routes described above (V3/JAIKE3/MAZIE2/V214 traffic).  There seems to be some confusion among N90 and PHL controllers regarding this fact.  Since we do have 'Late Handoff Procedures' for RBV traffic; I think that many controllers; FLMs; and OMs at both facilities assume that we also have them for other sectors/routes.  We do not.  This needs to be re-briefed to the workforce; including management.2.  'Late Handoff Procedures' should be developed jointly between N90 and PHL to address the sectors/routes above; to deal with instances when N90 is using backup radar.3.  N90 should adopt fused mode to provide them with adequate radar coverage of their entire airspace.4.  In the absence of #3 and #2 above; PHL airspace should be extended 5 miles to the east along the boundary with Metro.  PHL currently uses fused mode which provides much better radar coverage in this area than N90 currently has.  In the event that PHL loses fused mode for some reason; the PHL and the NXX radar sites still provide very good radar coverage in this location.5.  In the absence of #2; #3; and #4 above:  A 'Turn out area' should be developed and depicted on the radar map.  It could be conditional airspace; used for reversing course when N90 doesn't accept the hand off.  The LOA could be amended to say something like: 'PHL shall have control to take JAIKE traffic all the way to REGAL waypoint. If a hand off cannot be accomplished by REGAL; PHL shall be authorized to enter N90 airspace; in a left turn to a 240 heading (course reversal); at 7000.'6.  When PHL is using non-radar procedures on a major arrival route like the JAIKE3 arrival; a controller's request for modest miles-in-trail should not be denied.  The denial of my request for miles-in-trail will undoubtedly put the north high sector at risk for an operational error or worse.  I requested 20 miles so that we would be able to provide the appropriate non-radar separation to N90 (10 minutes) without having to vector all over our airspace prior to re-establishing the aircraft on the route in order to transition into non-radar.  Because the request was denied; the north high controller must now vector excessively for spacing; in a very small space; while also working PHL departure traffic; and then get the aircraft back on the route; pass the estimates; and terminate radar.  This denial of miles-in-trail leads me to believe that management and TMU do not understand non-radar separation and the workload increase it will cause.

PHL TRACON Controller described a situation where the receiving sector is using a different radar feed which the PHL Controller is not aware of. Airspace is violated by the receiving controller and when he calls the other sector; he finds out about the radar use. Controller implements plan for future handoffs and requests Miles In-Trail [MIT]; which are denied by management.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Something was burning on our plane and we had to make an precautionary landing. We were given safety instructions; including the brace position; which we need to hold during landing. Before takeoff; we were told that there were computer and HVAC problems. There were clearly electrical wiring problems and I would like to know if there has been an investigation on this plane; and what is the outcome of the report.

Passenger on flight reported 'burning fumes' resulting in a diversion.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Our LOA / COA with the UAS operators states they are required to establish 2 way communication and ATC approval prior to exiting R-XXXX. They are restricted to the recovery route called the Green Route; specifically designed to remain clear of 2 military airport finals in case of a lost link emergency scenario. Aircraft X exited R-XXXX on the green route; with Aircraft Y in trail; without establishing communications and approval with FAI approach. The controller attempted different frequencies; MAINS; STBYs; RTR's; and even guard calls with no success. Finally; the controller had to call FBK ATCT to request the call sign of the chase aircraft. The controller was successful in reaching the chase aircraft and had the chase aircraft relay to Aircraft X to contact approach. By the time communication was established; Aircraft X was 8.59 miles outside of R-XXXX; inbound to FBK on the green route. Follow the COA / LOA; or update it with more current operations since it is over 2 years old.

ATC reported a loss of communication with a UAV and its chase aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 460; Flight Crew Type 65

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 29; Flight Crew Type 28

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

[Student] is a student pilot that I have been teaching for the last few months. He was working on his private pilot license out of ZZZ. His total time was 29.8 and was ready for his first solo cross country. He had the required endorsements not only for solo and xc; but also night solo. These were given because [Student] showed proficiency and knowledge from previous flight in which I was present in the airplane with him on a dual lesson. The day the incident happen we completed the long cross country flight. [Student] had multiple flights where he went ZZZ1. One time was for his night cross country dual flight that was completed two weeks ago. There were a total of two times that [Student] had been to ZZZ1. During these flight he needed little to no instructor guidance to aviate; navigate and communicate enroute to ZZZ1. After seeing him show me his proficiency I gave him the cross country solo endorsement to ZZZ1. After looking at this navigation log before he went out everything was accurate and correct for the flight to and from.I was under the impression that [Student] would have departed around XA:30. However he did not take off until approx. XB:30. I warned [Student] that it would be dusk or night on his return back to ZZZ. He already had his solo endorsement for night flight. He acknowledged this comment and said that he was prepared to come back at dusk. On his return flight from ZZZ1 it was dusk turning into night. I received a phone call from him in the air indicating to me that he was lost. I instructed him to follow the lost procedures which are the 5 C's. Confess; climb; conserve fuel; communicate and comply. In the communication part of this I told him to dial in [frequency] also known as TRACON so they can give him a squawk code and give him vectors back to ZZZ. At the time I did not know he had been flying around for 35-50 minutes. Then the connection gets lost on the telephone and I call TRACON. They inform me that he is pointed in the right direction towards ZZZ. I am now listening to ZZZ Tower on Live ATC to make sure he gets back safely and I could meet him on the ground at ZZZ. I then hear on the radio that he can no longer make any runway at ZZZ. He does not declare an emergency and makes a thought out decision to land on a road instead of trying to stretch the landing to a runway at ZZZ. I then drove my car to meet him at the airplane to see if he is okay. In all; [Student] made a great execution of a power off landing off airport property and did not damage any person or property. To reiterate [Student] had all the required endorsements and training to conduct a safe flight. Aeronautical decision making and lost procedures training was conducted prior to his first solo flight as well as during his training on the remainder of dual flights.

Departed ZZZ at XA:30 for ZZZ1 on a VFR flight plan. The first leg was uneventful. While at ZZZ1; I exited my aircraft to evaluate my fuel situation. Only after learning my fuel for the night VFR was my planned flight +45 I began my return to ZZZ from ZZZ1 after dusk and was uneventful until the last 20-30 miles. I mistook my position and turned from a North heading to an Eastern heading to fly to a known reporting point for ZZZ. I descended down to 1500 ft. to enter the Class D airspace but could not find the reporting point. I asked ZZZ Tower about my position and was told to Ident. After 'Identing'; the Tower said he could not find me and that he would be able to if I was within 40 miles of the airport. It was at this moment that I became extremely disoriented on my position. Tower instructed me to contact [TRACON] and they could find my position and guide me to ZZZ. After a couple minutes of weak/broken radio calls I was able to enter the transponder code requested by [TRACON]. At that moment; I was against the shoreline and knew ZZZ was either North or South of my current position. [TRACON] responded shortly and told me I was West of ZZZ2 class D airspace and that I needed to proceed southbound. After flying southbound for several minutes I was asked by [TRACON] if I was at a specific altitude. When I told them I was about 1;000 ft. below the specific altitude [TRACON] told me that they had been looking at the wrong aircraft and was unable to locate me. [TRACON] told me to contact [TRACON] as they might be able to help me. I contacted [TRACON] and was told I was above and around ZZZ3 and needed to go Northbound along the shore above flight level 2;500 ft. My lack of situational awareness on time and location led me to believe I would have enough fuel to make it to ZZZ. As I flew along the shoreline I passed several airports but was not confident which airport was which and what their frequencies would be to contact them about landing. After contacting ZZZ at the appropriate distance; I was told to fly Northwest to [highway] and follow it to the North placing me in the pattern to land. ZZZ Tower told me there was a plane in front and I was #2 and cleared to land Runway XL. After observing the #1 aircraft on final I began a right base to final turn. While in the turn my engine sputtered and quit. My response was to push in the throttle; ensure I had a rich mixture; and turn on carburetor heat. My input of pushing in the throttle brought my engine back for a moment only to sputter and quit again. I turned for the closest runway of Runway XR while simultaneously informing the Tower of my engine issue. He asked if I was [requesting priority handling] and in the heat of the situation I cannot remember my response. I set a proper glide and was pointed towards the runway. I evaluated the situation and determined I did not have the altitude to make it to even the edge of Runway XR and I would end up in the tree. I picked an unpopulated road parallel to Runway XR to the south of the field and evaluated the location for obstruction and width to land. At this point I was committed to that road but had to make it over the preceding commercial buildings first. I overflew a row of power lines and set the aircraft down on the road as I would have on Runway XR. I avoided obstructions in and around the road and rolled to the end and then off of the road where it transitioned to grass. Although the engine was dead; I executed the shutdown procedures as I would have normally.

C172 student pilot reported loss of situational awareness that caused fuel starvation and an off airport landing.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency

VIP movement [resulted in] ATC hold; EFC 20 minutes; held 20 minutes; given another 20 minutes airborne hold; unable to hold; declared emergency fuel and landed [with] 4;500 LBS; reserve fuel 3;199 LBS.

Dispatcher reported an aircraft was holding because of VIP operations; but finally had to declare a fuel emergency when the delay dragged on.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Airspace Structure; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On initial climb out we were given a climb to 16;000 and a heading of 240; and handed off to JAX Center. We were unable to contact JAX Center due to frequency congestion and were forced to turn the aircraft to a heading of 180 to avoid level 5 convective activity at our 12 o'clock position. At that time we attempted to declare an emergency but were not sure if the Controller ever received it. At a later time the Controller handed us off and our flight resumed uneventfully.

An Air Carrier crew was unable to contact ATC during the climb and because of level 5 convective activity they declared an emergency in the blind; changed course to avoid the severe weather and ATC said nothing at the frequency change.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 260; Flight Crew Type 255

While practicing commercial maneuvers in the practice area during the initial climb of a lazy eight; I observed a tail wheel aircraft approximately 100 ft. vertically and 100 ft. horizontally from our aircraft. I immediately made an evasive climbing maneuver to avoid the aircraft. The aircraft was not observed on ADSB [and] did not make radio calls for the practice area.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC in the practice area.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Manuals; Procedure

Aircraft X was descended to 3;000 feet by the trainee with control from the adjacent TRACON sector. We didn't talk to him soon enough to offer a 30 degree intercept for the RNAV Approach.  We vectored him back around after requesting control from the other TRACON again. We were discussing assigning 2;000 feet to Aircraft Y landing at a different airport. The trainee turned Aircraft X heading 340; which I questioned and suggested heading 270. When the trainee issued the amended heading; she also descended Aircraft X to 2;000 feet. I did not catch it as during the same time; the trainee had released Aircraft Y off one airport and Aircraft Z off another airport; who were in conflict; in addition to an air carrier departure requesting practice approaches. I took over the frequency; and noticed Aircraft X already at 2;000 feet but he was not quite established on the approach and therefore; assigned an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. When doing something out of the ordinary  the controller trying to help could also put the aircraft on a better heading to intercept especially when we never approved the aircraft descending to 3;000 feet. Offer Aircraft X a different RNAV approach or offer to run the approach for the lows. The Low Altitude Alert never alarmed.

TRACON Controller conducting on the job training reported they did not hear the trainee descend an aircraft to an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude because they were distracted by the trainee releasing aircraft off airports that were on conflicting routes.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 249; Flight Crew Type 8500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Type 168

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During the pre-departure briefing; while comparing our CDU route to the PDC; both pilots read the SID from the filed line; and missed the SID change to -VTU5- in the line directly above.  Upon check-in with SoCal on departure; we confirmed that we thought we were cleared for the CASTA 4 Departure; but after checking the PDC in-flight; we realized our error.SoCal re-cleared us via runway heading; expect radar vectors RZS..AVE..PXN.PXN3 Arrival.  Due to the later; evening departure traffic was light in that sector and there were no known conflicts.There is no reason to list the filed route in the PDC clearance.  Recommend listing only the actual cleared route in its entirety point-by-point.  Eliminating the unnecessary information would declutter the PDC and clarify exactly the route cleared by ATC.

A B737-700 flight crew reported they flew the wrong departure out of LAX when they failed to catch a routing change in the PDC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 73; Flight Crew Total 340; Flight Crew Type 312

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

My student and I were flying a C172 on the RNAV XY at ZZZ; planning to circle-to-land on Runway XX. We made radio calls on CTAF for 10 miles; 5 miles; 3 miles; and when starting to circle. We only heard calls from a plane on short final. During the circling procedure; before we were established on downwind; my iPad with ADS-B In (via Sentry) alerted that there was traffic 10 o'clock; less than a mile. Both my student and I observed the other aircraft; a C152; pass less than 200 feet above us and less than 500 feet horizontally away. I made another call on CTAF and the C152 finally made a radio call that they were performing a teardrop maneuver to the downwind. My student and I proceeded to do a touch-and-go and fly the missed approach procedure on the RNAV XY. We did not hear any more radio calls from the other plane.

Flight Instructor with a student flying a Cessna 172 reported a NMAC on final approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Type 2447

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 219; Flight Crew Type 6739

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

FO was flying approach when at 400 feet AGL left engine thrust increased uncommanded to maximum thrust. Auto throttle was already disconnected when event occurred; engine remained at full power until shutdown; no control possible with power lever despite attempt. FO executed a missed approach; landing was not possible. Tower was informed of missed approach with reason why. Captain made decision at about 2500 feet to shut left engine down immediately; both pilots agreed that speed and altitude would be difficult; if not impossible to control. With power on right engine near idle; coordination was imperative. FO added power to right engine as left engine shut down; expertly handling aircraft; leveling at 3000 feet as instructed by ATC. Departure Control [was advised]. QRH engine shutdown checklist accomplished. Flight Attendants were briefed. No evacuation was planned. Passengers were briefed of situation by Captain. Flight landed with no further incident a short time later.

While on final approach; at approximately 500 feet the left engine accelerated to full power. After realizing the engine was not responding to power lever inputs; we agreed a go-around was the best course of action and initiated one between 200 and 300 feet AGL. During the go around maneuver; we elected to shut down the left engine; run the appropriate checklist; and [advised ATC]; as the aircraft would not perform as desired with one engine operating uncontrolled at full power. After running the appropriate checklist and briefing the flight attendants and passengers; the Captain resumed ATC and PM duties. We re-briefed the approach and landed without incident.

B757 flight crew reported an uncommanded engine acceleration while on final approach. A missed approach was initiated; the engine was shut down; and an uneventful single engine approach was accomplished.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Number 2 Engine Stall ECAM and loud bang happened at the same time. The First Officer was initially flying the aircraft. I took over soon after the event. He followed the immediate action of reducing power to idle on #2 Engine. EPR indication: 0. Other engine parameters normal. We elected to land at a nearby airport. We declared an emergency; and had the flight attendants prep the cabin for evacuation. We requested fire equipment to stand by. The landing was uneventful. We stopped on the runway; and had the firemen look us over. We then taxied to the gate.

An A319 ECAM alerted ENG 2 STALL concurrent with a loud bang at FL340; so power was reduced; an emergency declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 126; Flight Crew Total 8320; Flight Crew Type 3300

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

I was piloting a Citation X+ business jet. I was acting as pilot in command and flying the aircraft from the left seat. My First Officer was acting as second in command and monitoring from the right seat. We departed on a beautiful morning with 9 passengers. We departed with 10;300 lbs of fuel for the 1 hr 15 min flight (estimated 3400 lb fuel burn); 1800 lbs of passenger weight; and 270 lbs of baggage weight. Weather at ZZZ was forecast to have southerly winds with an overcast layer that was to quickly burn off. As we approached ZZZ; we realized the overcast was still lower than forecast which would require an instrument approach to get through the layer. We requested vectors for the VOR rwy XX approach; with the plan to level off at traffic pattern altitude once visual and circle to land on the longest favorable runway. All of this went smoothly and we were well prepared for the approach.Once established inbound; we began configuring for landing. Flaps were selected to 2 (full flaps is 3 which we were planning to set later); and the gear was selected down. Shortly after the gear was confirmed down and locked (approximately 10-15 seconds) we received an amber CAS (Crew Alerting System) message alerting us 'HYD VOLUME LOW A'. The Citation X has two independent hydraulic systems; with A being the most critical as it operates the gear; wheel brakes; and nose wheel steering... all of which have non hydraulic backup systems. We immediately leveled and called ATC to request termination of the approach and vectors for ZZZ1. ZZZ1 was ideal because it had much longer runways; good weather; and a Service Center. Knowing that the A side hydraulics controlled landing gear actuation; we left the gear extended and flaps set in position 2. ATC gave us a heading of 060 and an altitude of 5000 ft. We flew slow (170 kts) towards ZZZ1 and ran through the appropriate checklists. The first checklist; for the loss of hydraulic volume; had us unload the appropriate pump and pull the PTU (Power Transfer Unit) circuit breaker so the PTU wouldn't adversely affect the remaining B side hydraulics. We were then directed to the checklist for landing procedures with no hydraulic system A pressure. Flaps 2 was the maximum flap input allowed and normal flap 2 landing distance was to be increased by a factor of 1.7. Our normal flap 2 distance was computed to 3310 ft and increased with the appropriate factor to 5630 ft. We chose the runway which was nearest the service center. Our landing weight was to be just under 30;000 lbs. We considered reducing our weight further; but reduction in distance required wouldn't have been very significant. Our computed Vref speed was 134. Braking was going to be accomplished via a pressurized nitrogen bottle which is used in lieu of hydraulic fluid. The biggest disadvantage with this system is that it doesn't allow for anti-skid braking. I've been attending recurrent simulator training events twice a year for [many] years on Citation models. They all use the same nitrogen system and its imperative during simulator training that you ease back on the braking handle gently and smoothly or the wheels will lock up; resulting in blown tires and lateral runway excursions at high speed. After the airplane slows to 80 kts or so; the handle can be pulled more aggressively and the airplane comes to a stop within the computed landing distance. Pilots are also trained not to release or pump the handle as nitrogen pressure will be expelled overboard. A single smooth and steady pull is what is ingrained and also advised in the checklist. Because of this; we called and explained our situation requesting that they be prepared to meet us on the runway with a tug to pull us from our stopping point to the Service Center; as we didn't want to let go of the handle. We also let ATC know of the situation and requested that emergency vehicles be standing by to assist if need be. Most X pilots are also aware of a runway excursion which happened at JFK where the crew had to utilize the backup system and deployed the right thrust reverser (with thrust; which is prohibited); resulting in a high speed lateral excursion and major aircraft damage. With this on our minds; and an additional 3000 ft of runway available; I elected to leave the right thrust reverser and speed brakes stowed. I didn't want to impede directional control as I felt that we had more than sufficient runway available and the landing distance calculations are not based on the usage of either of these systems anyway. I also train with leaving them stowed and it's never adversely affected the stopping performance; but the thrust reverser in particular can adversely affect directional control. My primary focus on landing was to not lock up the wheels (again; no anti-skid protection) and to keep the airplane tracking straight. My training experience led me to believe the braking system would be more than adequate with the runway we had available. As we joined final approach; I noticed my speed was a little fast... in the 150 range. I only fly flap 2 approaches in training; so it took a little while to find a power setting which kept us close to Vref. The pilot monitoring gave a 'ref plus 10' call at 100 ft and I pulled the throttles back to idle. The flare and touchdown were smooth; if maybe a little long. As soon as the nose was grounded; I reached for the emergency brake handle and applied smooth and steady pressure. The airplane did not seem to decelerate much. At the midpoint of the runway; I began increasing pressure; but again did not feel the responsiveness that I was used to in the simulator. The aircraft gave a 'three thousand' foot call to announce runway remaining. I now pulled much harder and the airplane finally began to slow; but did not ever lock up the wheels or provide the aggressive braking that I was accustomed to and expecting. With 1000 ft remaining; it was clear that we were going to roll off the end; but we had lost enough momentum that I knew there would be no damage; other than to my pride. It felt akin to sliding on an icy road; when you know you're not getting stopped but that you'll not hit anything either... just along for the ride. The nose wheel has accumulator pressure to provide limited steering inputs; so I used the tiller to avoid edge lighting and the ILS structures straight ahead. I veered slightly left and the aircraft exited the end of the asphalt at maybe 10-15 mph. We rolled through a layer of gravel separating the asphalt from the dirt and came to rest in a grass field approximately 15 ft from the edge of the pavement. Vehicles were on the scene and Cessna also responded rapidly. The PM escorted the passengers from the aircraft while I secured the cockpit. There were no injuries; dents; or even scratches on the paint. Surprisingly; passengers were all smiles as they exited the aircraft and the whole event began to feel surreal. Despite the positive outcome; I still had a pit in my stomach that we must have done something wrong. Pride was getting the better of me. The hydraulic leak was the result of a failed O-ring in the slat control valve. When we retracted the slats after departure; fluid began leaking at a slow rate. It did not leak enough in the first 45 minutes to get noticed; and during the last 45 minutes we were so busy preparing for our approach and circling procedure that it wasn't noticed either. The CAS message doesn't alert the crew until it reaches 16%. The flight parameter data was downloaded from the aircraft's monitoring systems. It showed that we did in fact land a little fast... 6 kts over Vref and approximately 500 ft beyond the normal touchdown zone. [We] also felt that the landing weight contributed to our difficulties stopping the aircraft. The checklist makes no mention of landing weight limitations outside of the normal structural weight. There were a couple of pilots present who acknowledged that the simulator training promotes cautious use of the brake lever due to it's propensity to blow tires and felt that it may not be an accurate simulation of the system. We left the meeting in agreement that if the simulator isn't accurate; then pilots need to be educated on how to actually operate the handle as it's intended; since they'll only have a few seconds to recalibrate their rooted habits when they actually need to use it (8 seconds from our nose wheel touchdown to departing the runway). We also urged them to reconsider the 1.7 factor if it is based on maximum braking and being perfectly on speed to which they agreed to consider. Lessons learned and objectives going forward:First and foremost; Citation pilots need to be educated that the emergency brake system does not produce the results that pilots have become accustomed to during simulator training.  I will hold a safety meeting within our department to explain the event with our own company pilots; so that they know what to expect and what they could do to help themselves out in a similar scenario. Namely; go slow. I feel that we were plenty prepared for what we expected to happen; but not well prepared for the unexpected... which had a much higher possibility of occurrence; given the circumstances. If I had it to do over; I would have requested a holding pattern north of ZZZ1. I would have taken 30 minutes or more to burn off excess fuel; brief a plan of action if everything works out as expected; discuss what's likely to go wrong and a plan of action if it does; and also a plan of action if things go horribly wrong. We advised ATC of our situation and intentions; but we could have gone deeper. I'd take that time to call our operations and maintenance team so that everyone is aware of what is happening and to expect our call upon landing for either good news or bad news. I'd give consideration to even longer runways; even if they're inconvenient for passengers or maintenance. However; given the close proximity to water that most nearby airports are; I'm not sure they'd be as preferable as ZZZ1 was. Rolling into the water at another nearby airport would've been very bad news. Lastly; I'd fly the approach as precisely as possible and touch down with as much remaining runway as possible so that my performance can't be judged or cited as a contributor to a potential incident.Despite the very fortunate results of this incident; there is always room for improvement.There is a very unique opportunity for myself and many others in the Citation community to learn and grow from this experience.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

C750 flight crew reported a hydraulic failure that required use of the emergency brake system on landing which did not slow the aircraft enough. This resulted in a runway excursion of about 15 ft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On arrival into ZZZ. Passing through 9;000 feet; flight-deck crew smelled a strong musty/dirty smell that lasted throughout the landing. Maintenance was notified; a write-up made; and a fumes report filled out on iPad after gate arrival.

A321 Captain reported strong 'musty/dirty' smell on approach and landing.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were descending on the HAWKZ 4 arrival approaching PIKEZ intersection when we received a runway change from ATC to 16C. The first officer selected 16c in the FMS; which caused a disconnect on the legs page and took the autopilot out of LNAV just as the aircraft was just about to make the turn from PIKEZ to COFAY . I heading selected the aircraft to the right toward COFAY while the first officer fixed the disconnect in about 2 seconds. LNAV was reengaged. The aircraft was never off course and the ATC controller did not say anything. The point of this report is that this is a common occurrence with the FMC when a runway change is made during the middle of the arrival. The fixes seem to double up; in this case PIKEZ was at the top of the legs page followed by a disconnect and then below that PIKEZ intersection was there again below the disconnect. I don't know if it is a software problem or what but it occurs often with a runway change.

B737-900 Captain describes the FMC's reaction to a runway change entered during an RNAV arrival. A route discontinuity is created and the autopilot reverts to heading hold.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Runway

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airport

There is construction taking place on the approach end of runway 14 at RAP. The runway is shortened 1550 feet. To utilize all of the available runway a back taxi is required due to a closed taxiway. We taxied out to runway 14 via taxiway T1 and taxiway Alpha. We were then cleared to back taxi runway 14.  There is a displaced threshold with the construction and it was closed for taxi operations. I turned around on the wrong side of the displaced threshold line. Tower informed us of that error and cleared us for takeoff.

We need a special airport page for this airport. If that portion of the runway is not for use they could bring the barricades up to the threshold line to help us see it's closed.

Forced by airport construction to back taxi on Runway 32 to utilize the full remaining length of 14 an air carrier flight crew taxied beyond the temporary displaced threshold prior to reversing course.  The Tower reminded them of their technical 'violation' and cleared them for takeoff.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On Date midnight shift I had a flight [to] ZZZ on Aircraft X. ZZZ1 was listed as a destination alternate however at time of dispatch ZZZ was not requiring an alternate but there were some rain showers moving out. As the flight was halfway over the [body of water]; I received a WSI Fusion alert of ZZZ1 ceiling and visibility dropping. There was a tempo from 10/11Z of 1SM BR VV002. I looked at the TAF for ZZZ2 and saw that it was above mins. At the time; ZZZ2 was P6SM VCSH SCT003 SCT120 in the TAF until 14Z. The METAR was 1SM RXXL/P6000FT BR BKN003 BKN110 Date1/Date1 A2992. I sent an ACARS to the Captain alerting him of the falling ZZZ1 weather and that his alternate was changed to ZZZ2. I sent him fuel numbers; ZZZ2 weather and NOTAMS around XA:42Z. I received no response to the ACARS. As the flight got closer; ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 ceiling and visibility started dropping and fogging in. ZZZ was fogging in as well. As the flight was approaching ZZZ2; flights began holding in ZZZ due to RVR being around 5000. I sent an ACARS to the Captain at XB:35Z; alerting him to the holding and suggesting that we divert to ZZZ3 for a gas and go due to flight being tight on fuel. Once again; I received no response to this ACARS. The flight continued flying towards ZZZ. As the flight was lined up for landing on RWY XYL; the RVR dropped to 2000 prior to the final approach fix and the flight had to go missed. Since ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 were now fogged in as well; the Captain had to divert to ZZZ4. ZZZ4 had a tempo of BKN004; but since the flight was now tight on fuel it was the only viable airport left to divert to. Dispatch sent an ACARS to the flight at XC:06Z; instructing him that the flight needed to divert to ZZZ4 immediately. Once again; Dispatch received no response from the flight. The flight did divert to ZZZ4 and landed at XC:33Z. I had flights going through areas of moderate turbulence in the Midwest; so my attention was partially focused on them. I had nine (9) red-eyes in the air; so the workload and task saturation of flight following was high. When ZZZ1 weather dropped; the only airport I could fit on was ZZZ2 due to a heavy payload restricting the amount of fuel onboard. This in turn created more workload and task saturation. The lack of communication from the flight crew regarding my ACARS messages also contributed to my stress and workload issues.The Captain not responding to and possibly ignoring all ACARS messages from Dispatch about the deteriorating weather in south State is unacceptable. The Captain did not acknowledge the deteriorating ZZZ1 weather; ZZZ weather or ZZZ2 weather and new fuel burn and alternate change to ZZZ2. The Captain did not acknowledge Dispatch suggestion of diverting to ZZZ3 due to airborne holding/diversions in progress in ZZZ. The Captain did not acknowledge Dispatch ACARS of needing to divert to ZZZ4; when landing in ZZZ was not possible. Dispatch was kept in the dark of the thinking of the flight crew; Dispatch shares joint responsibility but in this case it seemed the Captain determined Dispatch was not on a need to know basis. This absolutely needs to change; maybe all ACARS messages need to be replied to/awk in the future.

Dispatcher reported a flight crew did not respond to multiple messages providing the crew with alternate and divert airports due to deteriorating weather conditions in the arrival area.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On initial call to taxi-out from the ramp; Tampa Ground issued the following instructions: 'Air Carrier X; taxi via Alpha; Bravo 6; Whiskey.' We waited to hear if he was going to say anything else but he didn't. We asked him to clarify and he re-stated those taxi instructions exactly as before. I responded with: 'OK for Air Carrier X you want us to taxi via Alpha; Bravo 6; and Whiskey; then stop for further instructions?' The Controller replied with a raised voice; 'NO; I want you to taxi to Runway 18R!' I replied that he hadn't cleared us to taxi to that runway and hadn't even mentioned the runway in his clearance. His reply was something to the effect of; 'Well; the active runway is on the ATIS and you DID say you had the ATIS.' Tampa Ground Controller should be reminded of the importance of using standard phraseology when issuing taxi instructions. At no airport that I have flown to has the runway been omitted from the taxi instruction unless we have not been cleared to taxi to that runway. At no other airport have I been told that the runway to taxi to can be omitted because it is included in the ATIS.

Air Carrier taxiing for departure at TPA questioned ATC's lack of runway information contained in the taxi clearance. ATC responded that the runway information was contained on the ATIS and not required in the taxi clearance.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

I was relieving Clearance Delivery; the Supervisor was also being relieved. The ASDE-X went off for 27R and 35 converging. The Controller on Local East took no action. Both 27R (an E190) and 35 (a CRJ2) aircraft landed and a [Runaway] 35 departure was at the end of the runway. I don't know if this was legal; it was certainly the tightest 27R and 35 I have ever seen in many years at PHL; and this operation is our standard. I believe this to be very dangerous; even if the operation were legal. I think it is highly likely that the pilots may choose to go around on their own; and if both aircraft's pilots made that decision simultaneously it could be disastrous given that both would be a tie in the air with noses up and unable to see one another. I believe this has been reported as an issue in the past. There was to have been a work group to study this operation. I do not think it was ever formed. So far as I know; management at PHL has taken no action. I suggest this work group be formed. It has also generally been practice to send one aircraft [around]if the ASDE goes off with the converging when in this operation. I don't know if that is suggested practice; but if so; perhaps the facility should be reminded of it.

PHL Controller witnessed an ASDE-X conflict alert that was unheeded by the Local Controller. The reporter notes this type of no-action event is on-going and very dangerous.


Workload; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing; Procedure

Supervisor pulled a CSR (Customer Service Representative) to the gate from the lobby. [The CSR] expressed her concerns that she is not gate qualified to the Supervisor however [the CSR] still had to meet an arrival and work 2 flights. This is a possible violation with FAR laws as [the CSR] was not licensed to operate a jet bridge. [The CSR] was able to acquire the assistance of [another CSR]. Assigning [a CSR] to operate a jet bridge that [they have not] been trained on could have put in jeopardy the facility; aircraft and any adjacent at the moment of operation. In addition; [the CSR] felt overwhelmed and began to feel the effects of her rising blood pressure rising and anxiety.

Air Carrier personnel reported a Customer Service Representative was forced to operate a jet bridge without proper qualification.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I got a gate call for an overhead flap/slat position light (amber) taking a few seconds to go out before the others. I talked to the Captain and he told me the #3 Krueger flap light was slow to extinguish. I explained that I did not think there was any relief for a Krueger flap problem. I cleared the [area around the] airplane and set the flaps down. I visually inspected the flap; position sensors; targets; and a general visual to make sure there was no damage. I retracted the flaps and it took about 2-3 seconds longer for the light to go out. I called Maintenance Control and explained what I did and another Controller got on the phone and said he had the MEL ready to go. Apparently; unknown to me; the pilot called Maintenance Control and I am not sure what was discussed. Since Maintenance Control had a MEL ready; I assigned the MEL to the aircraft. The MEL was pulled up and I followed the MEL procedures. I assumed the MEL list must have changed since the MEL was being assigned for a Krueger Flap. I should have reviewed all the documents required to verify the job was done correctly; and speak directly to Maintenance Control to coordinate our understanding of the corrective action. Do not assume the procedures have changed and double check my work.

A Maintenance Technician applied the MEL called for by Maintenance Control without verifying that it was the proper reference.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

I was on the Radar Assist position and the person working the Radar was conducting a flight break up. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y completed their refueling mission and requested the break up from FL200B230. The Radar Controller had Aircraft Y come up on frequency and reported level at 22000 ft. Aircraft X also reported level at 22000 ft. The radar Controller radar identified Aircraft Y and instructed the aircraft to descend to 21000 ft. The loss of separation occurred since ATC instructed Aircraft Y to descend instead of the flight leader; Aircraft X. We all need to have a full understanding of the procedures when conducting a flight break-up/join. ATC cannot issue a control instruction if standard separation isn't first met. The controller must only relay instructions through the flight leader until standard separation is gained.

A Controller reported a loss of separation following a military formation flight break up.