Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4212; Flight Crew Type 1700

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were cleared to intercept the final approach localizer to Runway 30L into STL. We were about 6 miles from the runway set; cleared for the visual; when Tower cancelled our landing clearance; to give way to a formation flight of F-18s. He let them come in first from a right downwind and right base to 30L in front of us. Tower asked if we would instead land on Runway 29. Because it was so late in the approach; we told tower 'Can't comply'. Tower then asked if we would make a 90 degree right turn; to start an S-turn; to give way to the F-18s. We did; then tower asked us to maintain visual with the F-18s; and cleared us to land behind them. We performed the S-turns; while trying to maintain visual separation with the fighters; but in doing so; we got disoriented; and ended up lining ourselves up with Runway 30R instead. In addition; Runway 30R; although it was closed; did not have an 'X' on it; which added to the confusion. Tower saw that we were on short final for Runway 30R and told us to execute a go around; which we did. We then came back around; and had departure vector us to the ILS Runway 30L. I believe that this could've been avoided; if we simply would've just said 'Can't comply' with both of Tower's requests. If this were to happen again; in the future; that would be my solution; in addition to checking our instruments; in order to make sure we're tracking the correct NAVAIDs.

HS-125 Captain reported becoming disoriented and lining up for the wrong runway at STL.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Type 775

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

ATIS reported the wind as 310/9 and when cleared for takeoff Tower reported wind of 310/12. During takeoff roll the Captain applied appropriate control inputs for a left crosswind with mild gusts to include left aileron and rudder necessary to maintain directional control. When 'rotate' call was made; the aircraft was rotated to takeoff pitch attitude; this occurred as the aircraft was rolling over the intersecting runway. As the nose lifted there was an abrupt roll to the left which the Pilot Flying corrected and continued rotation to a normal takeoff attitude. The gear was retracted and the remainder of the takeoff/departure was normal. Passing about 18;000 toward our assigned altitude of FL190; the Flight Attendant in the aft of the aircraft called the cockpit to inform that she heard a loud scraping noise during our takeoff and suspected a tail strike. Pilot Monitoring consulted the QRH procedure which calls for a landing at nearest suitable. Since the tail strike could not be verified and the procedure requires depressurizing the aircraft; it was decided to land ASAP. Captain and Dispatcher agreed that ZZZ was the nearest suitable field. Max landing weight and landing distance was determined from FM charts and all parameters were within the limits. An uneventful approach and landing was made at ZZZ for required maintenance action. There was no indication whatsoever in the cockpit of a tail strike.

On takeoff just as we were lifting off the runway I heard scrapping metal and could feel it underneath my jumpseat at 2L. It was loud enough to concern me and didn't feel right at all. After sterile cockpit was over I immediately called the cockpit and informed them that what I thought might have happened was a tail strike. Captain told me he would call me back in just a few moments. The crew was then informed we were dumping fuel;something about depressurizing; and diverting to ZZZ and just to prepare the cabin for landing. No prep for evacuation was issued. We landed safely. The Captain was very informative.

After takeoff B767-300 flight crew is informed by a Flight Attendant seated in the rear that a tail strike may have occurred during the takeoff. Flight diverts to the nearest suitable airport for maintenance inspection.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 42; Flight Crew Type 42

I was flying with my instructor in Aircraft X on a night XC (cross country) flight for training. Shortly after reaching ZZZ1 as a check point we made direct to ZZZ2 with active flight following. Cruising westbound at 4;500 ft. we had a near miss with Aircraft Y who was flying at the same altitude eastbound. My ADS-B in kicked in and we offset 20 Degrees to the left to avoid collision. We received a traffic notice from ZZZ Approach as we maneuvered. The aircraft in question was not on freq at the time. The pilot in Aircraft Y showed inept skills in selecting proper altitude and scanning for non-ads-b aircraft.

Pilot reported a NMAC with another small aircraft that ATC issued traffic for and was displayed on the reporter's ADS-B.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft touched down on runway during strong crosswinds and pockets of standing water on the runway. Aircraft began to veer to the left after thrust reversers were deployed. Autobrakes were engaged and aircraft seemed to pull harder to the left. Autobrakes were turned off and the Pilot Flying applied manual braking and the anti-skid system engaged while trying to maintain directional control. Aircraft subsequently veered off of left side of the runway 27L with the nose and left main gear in the grass. Aircraft came to a stop; ATC notified; crew passengers were taken off safely.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]

The reporter stated a detailed analysis of the aircraft system data found that the right brake anti-skid malfunctioned during hydroplaning and prevented brake application while the left brake was functioning correctly. The crosswind; rain and standing water amplified the brake malfunction.

During an ERJ-175 landing roll out in rainy; windy conditions; the right main wheel anti-lock; anti-skid sensor prevented brake application symmetrical with the left brake; and in hydroplaning conditions; the aircraft exited the left runway edge.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On a calm clear day taking off behind an A319 with winglets we were cleared for takeoff just as they rotated. We were fairly heavy with tanker fuel so we rotated at about the same point down the runway. Between 500-800 ft. AGL we began to quickly bank to the right and ended up at approximately 50 degrees of bank. I immediately unloaded the aircraft with nose down force while continuously increasing left aileron. I pushed the thrust levers into APR thrust and turned on the Continuous Ignition as well during this maneuver. We recovered about 5-8 seconds after initial indication; notified ATC; and continued on without incident. I also checked with our flight attendants to verify that no one was injured and she said that no one seemed to notice. No aircraft damage was found.Calm air; heavy aircraft; and close separation.

Reporter stated he was surprised at the intensity of the wake since the preceding aircraft was not a heavy.

CRJ-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing CLT in trail of an A319 that resulted in an uncommanded 50 degree bank.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 89; Flight Crew Total 2523; Flight Crew Type 953

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After landing; the local controller instructed me to turn right from runway 14 to runway 1 and contact ground control. After taxiing off runway 14 and on to runway 1 southbound; I contacted ground control and advised that I was back taxiing on runway 1 as per the instructions of the local controller and requested taxi clearance to [FBO]. The ground controller instructed me to taxi via alpha and bravo. I stated to the ground controller that this made no sense and requested an amended clearance. The controller stated that it made 'perfect sense' and explained to me the original routing. What she failed to understand is that when I received this original clearance; I was already passing taxiway alpha. It is not the first time I've experienced this tower giving clearances that doesn't work; I suspect; and many other pilots also suspect in their own experiences; that these controllers are simply not even looking out the tower cab window. I believe the ground controller erred in this situation. If she looked out the window; she would have known that there was no way I was able to make taxiway alpha without having to make a 180 degree turn back. I was given an amended clearance to taxi off runway 1 via bravo three instead.I requested the controller to save the tapes and that I would call them to discuss. Another controller jumped on the frequency; provided a telephone number so quickly and so angrily and stated that I can have all the discussion I want. I wasn't able to copy down the telephone number because it was given so abruptly and so fast. After returning to the ramp; I decided that it was not worth calling because I know these controllers and the supervisor at this tower will not do anything to make changes. I know this because of many years of past experience with providing feedback and only seeing the same nonsense; unprofessional behaviors; and controllers errors go without recourse or punishment.I'm submitting this report because I find this control tower to be dangerous.

C172 instructor pilot reported he felt the controllers at FRG are using unsafe practices.


Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Due to the warm conditions and heavy flight load; we had elected to takeoff at NTOP power. When climbing through 'acceleration altitude' I notified the Captain of rising oil temperature on the right engine. We notified Center that we would need to level out at 5;000 FT and would get back to them.We then ran the QRH 'Engine Oil Over Temp Checklist;' which called for reducing the power levers 20% from their current position. The engine temperature then spiked to 119C. The Captain further reduced power levers and the oil temperature remained outside of limitations. In the interest of safety; we elected to secure the right engine. Prior to executing the 'engine; fail fire' checklist the Captain notified the flight attendants of the problem; that we would be shutting down the number 2 engine and would be returning to the airport. We then shut down the right engine and I briefed the passengers; advising we would be returning to our departure airport; would be stopping on the runway and would require ground assistance including a tug to tow us to the gate. I finished by asking them to please follow the flight attendants' instructions.We landed without further incident; completed QRC and shutdown checklists and remained on the runway until the passengers were transferred onto a 'people mover'. We did not feel an emergency evacuation was necessary as there was no fire or danger posed after shut down. We opened the R2 and L2 service doors along with the boarding door for ventilation. The flight attendants also provided a water service while Airport Operations arranged their transportation back to the terminal. The entire flight crew did a fantastic job! It's truly disheartening that the Captain and I were the only ones to give praise to our flight attendants. Instead; their Supervisor tried to assign them a flight an hour after this incident. In no way were they emotionally or professionally ready to be assigned further duty following this emergency. Having an inflight engine shutdown is not a common occurrence; however; it is starting to become common place with our airline. I would strongly recommend a detailed review pertinent maintenance policy and procedure.

Following a spike in oil temperature on the right engine a Q-400 flight crew shut it down; declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport. The reporter believes inflight shutdowns at his airline are becoming commonplace and suggested review of maintenance procedures as an ameliorative measure.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Captain was talking with the ground crew. First Officer and Relief Pilot were monitoring Ground. Instructions [were] to push onto Quebec Taxiway. Captain was having issues and a language barrier with the tug driver. As the push started the Captain was explaining the Ground instructions; but it was apparent that the tug driver was not understanding clearly. The First Officer let Ground know of some confusion with the push crew. The Captain asked the push crew to stop the push and attempted to place the brakes on when the First Officer overheard the Captain and realizing that he was setting the brakes; quickly stated that we were still moving. The ground crew in SCEL had a new tug driver and there was an apparent language barrier. They did not understand simple taxi instructions and this resulted in miscommunications.

The cockpit was contacted by Ground Crew and told they were ready to push. The First Officer contacted SCEL Ground Control for push back clearance. Instructions were relayed to the tug driver...brakes released cleared to push tail south onto taxiway 'Q'. The female on the interphone asked me to explain. I repeated brakes released cleared to push tail south onto Taxiway 'Q'! There was a reluctant response of 'ok'. I asked if she understood our clearance. Again she asked me to repeat. I told her we were cleared to push back; and push us behind the B767 on her left. Again I asked if she understood. At that time I should have stopped everything and requested a new tug driver; but I didn't! She did reply this time 'ok'; abeam the gate. We started the push; but the turn onto Taxiway 'Q' never happened. I attempted to get her to understand we were going the wrong direction and onto the wrong taxiway. The First Officer was in constant contact with Ground Control explaining our communication problem with our ground crew. The push back continued onto Taxiway 'G' with our tail west. I tried numerous times to get her to stop the push. There was never much of any acknowledgment again from her. At this time we were blocking 2 aircraft and blocking Taxiway 'S'. SCEL Ground Control was not very happy with us. I did finally get her to stop the push. I told her do not move the airplane anymore as we had 2 planes directly behind us. Hoping we could stop and taxi our way out; I again told her to stop the push. Finally stopped; I told her I was going to park the brakes; when the First Officer yelled out that we were moving. A very alert First Officer helped me; and I can't thank him enough for that. She did eventually stop the push and a new tug driver ran across the ramp and rescued us! Train again and supervise this tug driver. The ground crew in Santiago HAS TO KNOW AND UNDERSTAND our push back procedures; clearances and language. They have to understand the danger of being on the wrong taxiway going the wrong directions with or without planes around! On my part; I should have never let this push back start. Never again will I put my crew; passengers or the ground crew in such a dangerous situation again. I learned as much from this as I hope they did!

B767 flight crew reports difficulties during pushback due to poor comprehension of english by the tug driver at SCEL.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During preflight brief with First Officer I stressed the importance of listening for and paying attention to EXTENSIVE TAXI instructions. No heads down during taxi and checklist completion only after we stop moving aircraft. I briefed the fact that he and I were not so familiar with ORD. I briefed that we would complete as much of before takeoff check prior to taxi after engine start so NO heads down and aware of position at all times so as to prevent errors during taxi. Ready to taxi we called Ground Metering: they said 'you have wheels up time of 42' (30 minute hold) plan on holding at 'Scenic Pad. Monitor Ground' Preparing to taxi out of the alley I was expecting a left turn from Ground on BRAVO to the 'Scenic hold pad'. Ground called issued LONG AND FAST taxi instructions; 'taxi Alpha to A16; left to Bravo; right to M2; Mike; right; hold short of 32L.' The First Officer read back clearance and I think Controller couldn't understand First Officer accent and thought it was a bad transmitter. (First Officer is Puerto Rican/Cuban and has strong accent difficult to understand at times.) So I read back clearance which Ground understood. (Those taxi instructions didn't coincide with the 'Scenic' hold pad but we wanted to depart 32L so we started to taxi.) Coming around Alpha there was a B777 right at A16 coming at us nose to nose so I stopped to allow him to pass and Ground said 'hold position; when the heavy clears continue.' First Officer read back the instructions but Ground once again was having difficulty understanding his read back. So I read back the instructions. It was a bit burdensome! Continuing on Alpha Taxiway First Officer then initiated completion of challenge and response portion of before takeoff checklist! I said 'NO STAY WITH ME ON THIS TAXI OUT! We can work checklist at the hold pad! I continued taxi on ALFA and wasn't aware I had past A16 (missing my left turn) and Ground said just use A15. Well A15 was just passed on the left when I noticed the A15 sign. I realized I had passed it. Ground said; just continue on up to A9 and turn left onto Tango to T10 and we will cross 32L there. So First Officer read that clearance back and it once again was an issue so I just continued taxing via the amended instructions. We held at '10 hold pad' until wheels up time. [We] completed checks [and the] rest of taxi and flight uneventful. First Officer and I were in Mexico City two nights before and he was a true pleasure to have there because he spoke SO well with the controllers. It didn't go as smooth in Chicago leading to frustrations on my part. I contained my frustrations but it caused lots of confusion. I needed him to back me up with the Airport Diagram as we taxied and he was trying to do the checklist. I want to add: I think the ORD Controllers are the best in the world! There were no errors on there part that I am aware of. They don't know that we are not from Chicago and unfamiliar with ORD.

B737 Captain describes a miscue during taxi at ORD partly due to the First Officer's Puerto Rican accent.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 2250

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

New York Approach cleared us down to 2;000 feet from 4;000 feet on arrival into MMU. Both pilots heard ATC instruct us to descend to 2;000 feet; and confirmed the altitude in the altitude selector. Passing through 2;500 feet we received a terrain advisory and stopped the descent when we were also queried by ATC. We immediately climbed back up to 3;000 feet and continued the approach in MMU. After the flight we talked about the event as a crew. We have done this arrival many times with New York Approach and believe the previous controller had cleared us down to 2;000 feet too early; since that is an altitude they frequently assign us on the arrival; and there may have been a controller change which added to the confusion.

CE750 First Officer reports being cleared down to 2;000 feet during approach to MMU resulting in a terrain warning and a low altitude alert from ATC. A climb to 3;000 feet is initiated and the approach is continued.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 2225; Flight Crew Type 50

Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated

At approximately XA00; I was piloting our company assigned aircraft in conduct of aerial survey work; along with my passenger/sensor operator on board. While 3/4 into our third survey line; heading north bound; the aircraft began to experience a sudden partial loss of power. I began to take corrective action first by verification that the fuel selector was selected on and the fullest tank. Secondly; I advanced the mixture control towards the full rich position; but had to back off as the engine experienced further roughness. I then checked each magneto; left and right; but no significant change was evident. Oil pressure and temps were at their normal operating range; as well as CHT. There was a significant drop of EGT indicated. At this point; I decided it would be in our best interest to make a pre-cautionary return to our remote base; as the corrective action I took had no positive effect. While we were en route to our remote base; I asked for a received priority handling and explained our situation to Center. While we were approximately 8 miles Southwest from ZZZ; we experienced a further loss of power to the point where we were unable to sustain level flight (began a gradual descent) I then [notified ATC] and set our squawk code to 7700 and hit direct to ZZZ on our Garmin 430 GPS; which was the nearest airport. I circled the approach end of runway 17 until we were at an altitude where I could make a safe approach to land. At approximately 1200' I selected the gear handle lever to the down position; but there was no mechanical response present. With not enough power to level off to go around and no leeway of time to attempt pumping the gear handle down manually (as we still were gradually losing altitude) I decided to prepare for a belly up landing and focused on making the landing as smooth as possible without making the situation worse. After crossing the threshold of runway 17; I selected the fuel selector to the off position; mixture to idle cutoff; and turned the magnetos off. We skidded to a stop approximately 500' past the second 1;000' runway hash marks. We evacuated the aircraft without any injuries as emergency personnel responded to the event.

Pilot conducting aerial survey work in a single engine aircraft reported an in-flight event of partial power loss resulting in a forced landing at a nearby airport. Additionally the landing gear would not extend and with no ability to troubleshoot resulted in a gear up landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

On approach in the landing configuration; around approximately 2000 feet MSL; there was a noise from outside the front of the aircraft; and the landing gear warning horn sounded for approximately 3 seconds. At the same time as the outside sound and warning horn; the First Officer (who was pilot flying) noticed the NLG red transit light flash on; then off; and concurrently the amber and green NLG lights extinguished then came back on. The First Officer and I quickly conferred and concluded that the NLG had tried to cycle its position to some degree. The First Officer had recently experienced a similar event on another aircraft. It was decided to discontinue the landing and perform a go-around and request vectors for another landing approach utilizing the alternate gear extension procedure. While being vectored back around for an approach and landing; we performed an alternate landing gear extension per the aircraft non-normal/emergency checklist. Upon completion of the gear extension; all indications were that the gear was down and properly configured; and I as pilot flying (per the checklist) made a normal approach and landing. An emergency was not declared for this event; nor was assistance requested once on the ground. Taxi to and parking at the gate was made on two engines without nose wheel steering; per procedure. Once parked at the gate with engines shut down; the First Officer promptly engaged the nose wheel locking mechanism; and main gear was subsequently pinned per the aircraft checklist. Presumed mechanical anomaly in landing gear operating and/or monitoring systems.

Dash 8-300 Captain experiences a momentary nose landing gear unsafe indication during approach after the gear had already been verified down and safe. A go-around is initiated and the gear is extended utilizing the alternate gear extension procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 153; Flight Crew Type 9600

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Observer

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Aircraft

During engine start; the Number 2 Engine did not ignite after the start lever was brought to start position. We ran the boxed item for Aborted Engine Start and referred to the QRH. After blowing out the fuel and waiting the appropriate time and checking circuit breakers; we tried again on the same igniter (right). After another failed ignition; we accomplished the above procedure again and then decided [to] start the Number 1 Engine on the (right) igniter. We then attempted to start the Number 2 Engine on the (left) igniter. We did get ignition; but the Flight Attendant soon called and said we had a flame coming out the back of the engine. We terminated the engine start and verified the flame was out from the Flight Attendant as well as another Carrier who was pushing behind us. We then ran the QRH for Tailpipe Fire; asked for Fire coverage to come take a look at the engine; and returned to gate. Maintenance was called and the procedures were accomplished for the engine check and appropriate MEL. I was so impressed with our passengers' response to the situation. We asked everyone to keep their seats for a few minutes once we were in the gate. I explained to them the situation that they saw was the excess fuel from the first attempt. I further explained that; since there was ignition on the engine this time; there would be no more excess fuel and we were able to identify the problem of the igniters as the primary problem. After the flight was completed without any other occurrences; multiple passengers told me what a great job the flight attendants did during the whole situation and also indicated they appreciated the way the pilots kept them informed and explained things. After filing this report; the Assistant Chief called me and asked for some qualifying remarks due to a letter from a passenger. After consideration; the Assistant Chief pointed out that I may have deviated from the QRH by performing a start on the Number 2 Engine with the (left) igniter. He pointed out that the QRH said to refer to the MEL for dispatching. I would not have dispatched without contacting Dispatch but my goal was to get my engines started to move off of the taxiway so I could MEL the igniter as required. Since the (right) igniter is not a MEL event without Maintenance and by starting the engine on the Number 2 Engine; the chiefs thought this could be misconstrued as troubleshooting. Since there is no way of telling if the excess fuel would have been there after maintenance; to MEL a possible inducement to the tailpipe fire. Although it was not my intent to troubleshoot; but to get the engines started to clear the taxiway so I could contact Dispatch; I can see where the QRH would have taken me directly back to the gate for maintenance and further instruction. The First Officer and I were intent on complying with every aspect of the QRH and even reviewed it and debriefed it after we were airborne. I think I saw something referring to the MEL prior to dispatch was as my discretion as to 'when' (i.e. cleared of the taxiway; prior to takeoff; and the book updated). In the future I will view this as an 'action' step to be accomplished in order. I think discussion and visibility of these comments might also help others do the same.

[Narraitve 2 contained no additional information.]

A B737-300 flight crew was notified by a Flight Attendant and another aircraft that they had a tail pipe fire on a third start attempt after completing the QRH following a second no light off start. The aircraft was returned to the gate for maintenance with the Fire Department monitoring.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Upon taking Runway 25R the right engine would not spool up. After several attempts the right engine appeared to respond and the takeoff was initiated. At 80 knots I felt things were settling to normal and we could continue the takeoff. I was then out side and prior to V1 the First Officer called abort. The abort was several knots bellow V1. The right engine was erratic again and that is why we aborted. The abort was normal with no further incident.Do not continue a takeoff above 80 knots if either engine is not within parameters.

[This Report contains no additional information.]

An MD-83's right engine stabilized at takeoff thrust after being slow to spool; but at about 120 KTS its EPR began oscillating so the Captain rejected the takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41.9; Flight Crew Total 557; Flight Crew Type 24.5

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Diverted

I departed with 35 gallons of fuel on board; 4 passengers and one bag. The weather at destination was clear with winds 8 KTS at about 220 degrees at departure. Approaching destination; I saw on my iPad the winds had changed to 17 KTS gusting to about 27 KTS at about 220 degrees; almost a 90 degree crosswind. I then revised my flight to ZZZ where the winds were 17 KTS at about 250. ZZZ has one Runway 10/28; so they were favoring Runway 28 with much less crosswind factor. I set up on a straight in approach for [Runway] 28. I was able to slip the plane and maintain runway centerline for at least 3 miles. At about 10 FT above the runway; a gust of wind unlike anything I have experienced before blew me up and slightly to the right. I added power and kept the plane centered over the runway. I then reduced power to land. As soon as I reduced power; the nose was blown to the right and I landed with the mains 10 to 20 degrees off the runway heading. I was not able to straighten the plane or get airborne again. I dodged the runway lights; crossed the grass; crossed the taxiway; and skidded upright to a gradual stop after hitting 2 fence posts; one with each wing. No one was injured and the ELT was not activated.

BE36 pilot reports losing control during landing in strong gusty winds; departing the runway and striking two fence posts.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

At Flight Level 390 about 150 north of ZZZ we received a Warning Aft Cargo Fire; notified ATC that we had an emergency situation and wanted to head back to ZZZ. Worked the checklist for AFT Cargo Fire warning; extinguished the fire bottle; fire warning went out after a few minutes. Continued to ZZZ for normal approach and landing. Fire Crew detected no heat coming from cargo area; continued to the gate and was met by Maintenance. Last I heard no fire but failed sensing. Flight crew did excellent job.

Air Carrier Flight Crew flying 777-200 aircraft reported aft cargo fire warning in flight.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 35447; Flight Crew Type 4300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Logbook Entry; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure

Flight started out of ZZZ1 with an extended duty period that included X days 'on the road' (unknown to the crew at the time).  I did not verify the aircraft records to see when the next maintenance inspection was due.I usually always look at the aircraft book to see this information.  I did 'open' the aircraft book to retrieve the aircraft keys but did not check the numbers.  We usually have our aircraft books in the office and was my practice to look at all the numbers in the office.  During the COVID crisis it became our policy to keep the office locked up with no personnel so the books were now kept in the airplane.  Without Checking the numbers I flew .4 past the required inspection.

Pilot reported flying an aircraft without the proper documentation and correct maintenance records.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

We had already begun the descent for the RNAV arrival and were at FL310 when we heard the cabin altitude warning horn. We (including the jumpseater) immediately donned our O2 masks; ran the immediate action checklist and went to the QRH. As the First Officer started on the pressurization checklist; I asked the jumpseater (737 CA) to coordinate with the flight attendants to tell them of our situation (TEST). We told ATC we had a pressurization issue if we could commence our arrival descent. They gave us clearance to descend immediately so we performed an emergency descent to raise the cabin altitude at the same time the First Officer and the jumpseater where closing the outflow valve to raise the cabin manually. The cabin altitude never went above 10;500. Since we were already in the descent portion of our flight and since ATC gave us the normal clearance to descend and since we only lost some pressurization; I opted not to declare an emergency. We knew that if our condition deteriorated we could declare an emergency at some point in the remaining flight. Also; the jumpseater said everything was fine in the cabin. We felt no pressure discomfort whatsoever. The First Officer and the jumpseater continued to manage the manual pressure controller to set us up for landing differential. Told ATC we would not need any other assistance and landed normally.

B737 Captain experiences a cabin altitude warning horn at FL310 during the descent phase.  ATC is advised and the descent rate increased while the First Officer and a jump seating Captain manage the outflow valve manually. The cabin altitude does not exceed 10;500 FT and a normal landing ensues.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

This leg was the first leg of a four-day sequence which was; for both the CA (Captain) and I; the first experience with the procedural changes from challenge and response checklist to 'triggers and flows.' Both of us had reviewed the new checklist as well as accomplished the 'training' provided by the company. Regardless of that preparation; we found the transition to be substantially more difficult. Upon recognizing this issue; we identified our new checklist/flows as a threat; not only to our operation but to our CRM. Throughout this four-day sequence (which I flew with two different CAs) our new procedures were a focal point; and it often created confusion and obstacles to effective CRM. The triggers in many cases are at weird times. The 'flows' are cumbersome and have some portions that are very sporadic.....and don't 'flow'. The 'silent' portions include some very critical information which breaks down cockpit communication and CRM. The so called 'training' we received....a 12 minute video....on a procedural change...that doesn't seem like it was put together by pilots. In my opinion; it was very eye opening to see how much those changes in our checklist created confusion and impacted CRM. This needs to be look at again closely. The checklist needs to be changed to make more logical sense (from a pilot perspective) on the triggers; and the flows need to be more intuitive to include making some of the silent items; not silent to facilitate CRM. Training needs to be accomplished in a simulator.

737-800 First officer reported the new checklist; 'Triggers and Flows;' created confusion.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

A Baron was inbound at 5;000 looking for a Visual Approach to the runway. Tower called requesting clearance on a Caravan off the runway; the Tower Controller said that he was ready to go off the runway. I asked if he could be off in 1.5 minutes or less; Tower said yes. I based my decision on the fact that it would be more than 2 minutes before the Baron would be adjacent to the airport thus they would always be at the very least parallel to one another without being converging in any way. I also thought that the Caravan would depart and turn shortly after departure; which is normally what they do when given direct their destination. Since it was extremely VFR and great visibility; I also told the Baron that he could turn to the right to set up for a base to the runway. I'm not sure of the time of departure; but the Caravan did not turn on course direct their destination as expected; and it actually appeared as though he turned south; I questioned him and told him it appeared he flew a 200 heading; not the 240 heading that they normally fly off the runway. The Baron didn't turn to the right at all to set up for base. Since I had already cleared the Baron for the Visual Approach; and he was below the MVA; I couldn't legally vector the aircraft; but at this point I was pretty sure that we were going to have at least 3 miles and that safety wasn't compromised. Both aircraft were on my frequency and diverging. I issued once again direct their destination when able and then the Baron turned direct to the Caravan's destination. I don't know if he was flying the departure procedure assigned by Tower; or if he just flew it on his own. I could have told Tower to just hold the Caravan on the ground; but I've done this thousands of times and have never really had a problem. I was told that the Caravan was ready to go and I couldn't see having him wait unnecessarily. I also could have vectored the Baron to the right and left him at the MVA (4;200) until I got the Caravan in RADAR contact and then cleared him for approach. There was no chance of the 2 aircraft ever hitting. I think that we should be able to use 3 miles around airports that we provide approach services to.

Enroute Controller described a possible loss of separation event between an IFR departure and an IFR inbound aircraft cleared for a Visual Approach; the event occurring during approach services to a VFR Towered airport.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After two vectors off arrival; Center cleared us direct to a fix. At FL240; 270 KTS assigned; approximately 30 miles southeast of the fix; Center cleared us to descend via the arrival. I knew we were already very high on the profile and told First Officer that we needed to get down. First Officer went to level change and fully extended speedbrakes. This was not correcting our profile error of 3;000 FT high quickly enough and I told Center twice that we were going to have a problem making the 10;000 FT restriction. There was no response from Center on both occasions and I assumed that I was either stepped on or they were ignoring me. At approximately 15;000 FT; 270 KTS and approximately 2;000 FT high on profile I told First Officer that we needed to extend the slats in order to get down. First Officer started to reach to extend them and then realized that it was the pilot not flying's job and I extended them. Soon after we heard a loud bang and received a Slat Disagree warning; with no associated roll. I looked at the QRH and put the slats back up. The alert went away. We did make the 10;000 FT restriction. We extended the flaps early because I thought the problem might return and it did. We complied with the QRH; stowed slats; declared an emergency and made an uneventful landing; cleared runway; had emergency personnel look over the aircraft for damage and taxied to the ramp. Late descent by ATC and lack of ATC response led to perceived problems making altitude restrictions.

[During descent] on the RNAV arrival; we were vectored off; on; back off the arrival; then back on with a descend via clearance. We were high and getting higher to our 10;000 FT crossing restriction and we were slowed to 270 KTS or less. The tools we have are idle power; we were in level change starting at the first vector. Speed; we were slowed to 270 or less. Speedbrakes; they were full. The only additional tool is slats. To make the crossing restriction we selected slats at 270 KTS; 15;000 FT; 2;000 FT high on the vertical profile for crossing at 10;000. We got a SLAT DISAG after selecting slats followed by a hard plane shuddering thud on the right side of the aircraft. It is unclear if the 'boom' is associated with the slats or coincidental. We had queried ATC about the crossing restriction; and then with the slat disagree; we continued to try for the crossing restriction and made it; all while running the QRH and investigating the possible cause of the bang. The QRH was followed and a no slat/flap 28 landing at 190 KT was made by the Captain with uneventful results other than some very warm brakes. A SLAT DISAG is an abnormal we train for. The use of speedbrakes and slats to meet ATC constraints on a routine bases is unacceptable. The arrivals with vectors and speed restrictions followed by an unreasonable 'descend via' are no way to protect our aircraft serviceability in the long run.

MD11 flight crew reports a loud bang and a Slat Disagree warning while extending slats at 270 KTS during descent to make a crossing restriction. The Slat Disagree warning disappears when the slats are retracted; but reappears when extended during approach; resulting in a no slat flap 28 landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

During an arrival push; while working arrivals; a CRJ-200 was inbound to CVG via the TIGRR fix at 110; heading approximately 230. When the CRJ was 1 mile from my boundary; I noticed an untagged aircraft; on a discrete beacon code; 7 miles SW of the CRJ's position; indicating 100; eastbound. I gave the CRJ a vector of heading 255 and immediately issued traffic. As soon as I issued the vector; I noticed the target appeared to have turned northbound and was still climbing. I issued a vector of H270 to the CRJ and once again issued the traffic; this time at 12 o'clock and 2 miles; out of 106 and still climbing. My trainer stepped in and issued a traffic alert and a climb to the CRJ; who then told us he was responding to a RA and would miss the aircraft by 1;000 feet. Recommendation; I suspect this unknown aircraft was a skydiving aircraft; operating out of Waynesville airport; which our facility does not have a LOA with. This company needs to be notified that even if they are VFR; anything above 100 is a bad place to be at the inbound fix. I'm not sure why the aircraft was on a discrete code; or who was working the aircraft.

CVG Controller described a TCAS RA event between an IFR air carrier arrival and a non-identified target on a discrete code a likely skydiving aircraft.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 3500

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

I had seen tach fluctuation on a previous flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ 2 days prior. Since I was in [city] on business I decided to take the airplane up for a short checkout flight to assess the tach issue. I checked the FAA TFR site for TFR restrictions and did not see any listed. I pre-flighted the airplane per my usual checklist; including visual fuel inspection and oil level. I took off VFR from ZZZ and headed north to avoid the town while I checked the airplane inflight at an altitude of 2;000'. Approximately 10 minutes after [takeoff] my engine began surging wildly; and the tach followed. I was fearful of a catastrophic engine failure even though oil pressure and temp were normal. This persisted for approximately 1 minute consistently; even after switching tanks and applying the fuel pump. I decided to get the airplane on the ground immediately and hit my 'NRST' button on my GPS and it responded that ZZZ2 was within range. I proceeded directly to ZZZ2 and saw the TFR inner ring on my GPS display; so I was fully aware that I would intrude on the TFR; but this was an emergency and I decided to proceed. I was intercepted by a Coast Guard helicopter and I tried to communicate with him on the ZZZ2 radio frequency but we did not hear each other. I landed at ZZZ2; taxied up to the ramp and shut down. I was met by Secret Service and Coast Guard officials. I went into the FBO and contacted TRACON and told them it was an emergency landing. As it turned out; I was taking off into a TFR (outer ring) from ZZZ even though the FAA TFR site did not list it. That was completely unintentional but my error was in NOT calling FSS for a TFR report/briefing. The mechanic at ZZZ2 proposed that I had water in my gas tank which made sense because I believe the airplane was refueled in a hard rain; so it is possible that when I pulled gas from the sumps and inspected them during my preflight; I may have seen pure water and not the light blue of AvGas. I think water was the cause of the engine problem and the mechanic at ZZZ2 corroborated that. He did a full run up and saw the tach fluctuation but said it was not serious and saw no other irregularities in the engine performance. It is likely that the water in the tanks went through completely by the time I landed the airplane.

PA32 pilot reported violating a TFR while handling an inflight engine roughness emergency likely caused by contaminated fuel.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 1080; Flight Crew Type 135

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

EGPWS message. On a visual for 12; we entered a 3.5-4 mile downwind at 2;300 feet for the FAF. Upon reaching 2 miles south; south-east of the FAF; we had the EGPWS message; 'Caution; Terrain; Pull up! Pull up!' Autopilot was disconnected; max thrust was initiated; and an immediate climb began as per procedure. Within 200 feet of initiating the climb; the message ceased. We climbed to 3100 and leveled off. Nothing was showing on the terrain feature on the MFD. Following the maneuver; we began our descent back down and did a regular pattern with no further instances.Not entirely sure why it happened; but it seemed to may have been caused by the wind and an obstacle 2 to 3 miles away. There is a tower at 1502 feet just south of the FAF for runway 12. We had a 45 knot crosswind pushing us northeast towards the field. Because we were only 800 feet above; and being pushed in towards the field; I believe this is what may have set it off. [Suggest] when doing the visual for 12 at HTS and coming from the south; either stay at 2;600 feet MSL and turn after WYLEE IAF; or do a 5 mile wide downwind leg. Hopefully this will avoid encountering our event.

EMB-145 Pilot reported receiving an EGPWS terrain warning and believes it was caused by winds pushing the aircraft towards a tower located just south of the approach course.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics

MEL; Logbook Entry; Human Factors; Aircraft

When performing Number 2 Engine Oil Supply Tube Flow Check on Number 6 bearing; the reading on the pressure gauge of the test equipment read between 30.5 and 31 psi. I tighten fitting on Tester to oil supply tube and reading was then right at 31 psi. The Task Card read; if 27 psi or less OK for service. If gauge read 27- 31 psi; I could defer; if pressure above 31 psi; item had to be repaired prior to the next flight. I conferred with the Lead Mechanic and he in turn called the Maintenance Co-coordinator; explained what we had and Maintenance Co-coordinator said we could defer. I followed the process to defer item for five flight cycles; stating in Log sheet the pressure was at 31 psi. Two days later; after aircraft had made several flights and was out of the country; someone was reviewing the Maintenance computer list of log inputs to clear items and in their judgment; felt that the aircraft was out of compliance with the statement of 31 psi that was stated on the Log sheet. I was notified of the maintenance event.

Several flights after performing a Number 6 bearing Oil Supply Tube Flow Check on a GE CF6-80C2; Number Two engine; an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed the MEL deferral he created for the borderline high pressure oil reading was out of compliance.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Just after taking of runway 09R in ZZZ we were climbing out of approx. 10;500 feet when I saw something black and of roundish shape out of the corner of my eye from left to right.  It impacted the aircraft.  My First Officer (FO) stated 'that's a bird'.  As soon as it impacted the aircraft we immediately got an ECAM for ENG 2 STALL.  Assuming that it was a bird we felt that it had gone through the engine.  My FO stated that he also saw the engine indications decrease.  We requested ATC to level of at 13;000 feet and to turn back to ZZZ.  The engine did stabilize and seemed to be working normally.  The FO briefed the flight attendants and then I made an announcement to the passengers.  A normal approach and landing was made.   We were below max landing weight.  We pulled off of the runway and had the emergency crew do a drive around the aircraft as a precaution.  They stated that they did not see anything unusual so we taxied to the gate normally.

An A319 Captain reported abnormal engine indications after a bird strike shortly following takeoff. The flight crew elected to return to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

On descent [I] heard the unmistakable sound of loose cans moving in the lower forward cargo compartment. Landed uneventfully. This is the third such event I have experienced in the last 7 days and all three had the potential of disastrous outcomes; had the resulting load shifts been significant enough to move the CG (Center of Gravity) out of limits; or move it fast enough during takeoff or landing to cause loss of control of the aircraft. Obviously; lives were at risk both in the air and on the ground from this event. FAA certification is also at risk in such events.Maintenance personnel determined floor locks were not defective and therefore had been left down by the Ramp Load Crew. Load crews need emphasis in training as to how deadly their mistakes can be; whether it is in improperly positioning the locks or failing to recognize when hardware is deteriorating to the extent that maintenance needs to be accomplished. While on the subject; I will also mention I have had to intervene in loading operations on numerous occasions when it was obvious that unnecessary force was being used in movement of cans to the extent that potential for significant damage to the aircraft could have occurred; especially floor locks and rails. This is also a training issue.

Air carrier Captain reported cargo load shifts related to deviations from SOPs.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passenger in XX2 was asked 4 times to have his mask on.  Passenger in YY1 told XX2 to hold a bottle of water; use it as an excuse enabling him to keep talking to YY5. [Passenger] YY1 then pulled his mask off and pretended to be drinking through the flight. During final approach he was again asked to put face mask on and he did not comply. He proceeded to eat something just to keep himself from wearing the mask. [Passengers] YY5 and YY1 would not comply with the seatbelt PA during turbulence and taxi-in. Both passengers YY1 and XX2 were standing up during taxi. Both were ask to take their seats and they did; but not properly.

Flight Attendant reported the misconduct of a group of passengers during the flight regarding compliance with face mask policy.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Right after takeoff; flight Attendants seated in the aft galley area of the 737; called me and told me there was a very loud; ear piercing loud air leak in the aft galley area. They could not determine where it was coming from exactly but it was loud and went away after about 10 minutes after lift off. I informed the Captain and he asked a few questions about where exactly was it coming from; etc. by the time we started our descent; the noise returned; and we advised the pilots again. After landing and passenger deplaning; we asked if a mechanic was going to check the aircraft. The Captain said there was no mechanic at the airport. Now we are asking why he did not inform dispatch about the problem and asked for a mechanic to be called/ flown into ZZZZ? He did not write up the malfunction in the log book........we; all flight attendants; felt ignored and not taken seriously. After talking during our short ground time; the Captain; went to check the aft doors for any debris around the door frame....He also mentioned; that the only thing that had been written up in the logbook; that maybe had 'something to do' with the air leak was a hole on the floor of the cargo hold and had been speed taped. This had been written up in the log book back in September; 2014. Needless to say we; the flight attendants; were shocked.......honestly; we should have walked off the aircraft and refused to take it back. We did not have much time to 'analyze' or decide what we were going to do about the whole situation and went ahead and boarded the plane and on our way home. Again; on takeoff the air leak; ear piercing noise came back. Also; another strange noise was detected. Like a motor running constantly under the galley floor. Flight attendants in the back; described it as like the sound that the flushing motor in the lavs makes; and it was constant throughout the flight. They had heard it before on the previous flight but were not sure and did not mention it to the pilots. We have always been told that we are the 'eyes and ears' for the pilots......... We as flight attendants were undermined and ignored on that first leg. We feel that the Captain decided not to write up the discrepancy in the log book; after that first flight;  so as not to delay his flight back home....... Since they were only doing the turn and going home for the day. We knew there was no mechanic in ZZZZ but we did our part; informed of the high pitched noise (air leak) right as it was happening and expected the Captain to have maintenance check it out at our destination. They could have had a mechanic flown in or so we thought.  There was time to do all that; and ensure that the aircraft was safe to fly home.

B737-800 flight attendants report an air leak in an aft cabin door that makes a loud squeal that increases initially; then stops as the aircraft ascends. The anomaly is reported to the Captain who chooses not to make a logbook entry; due to the lack of maintenance at this airport; much to the reporters chagrin. The return flight is a repeat of the first flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 1400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On approach to landing; I discovered the throttle would not completely close resulting in too much power for a normal approach/landing. On very short final I turned off the engine and landed the airplane. When on the ground I notified the Tower that I had turned off the engine on short final and would be coasting off runway at Taxiway-F. I announced to the Tower that I had cleared Runway-32 and would attempt a restart to taxi to the FBO. On restart; the engine speed remained high as the throttle would not close completely. The Tower instructed me to taxi to the Ramp via Taxiways 'A' and 'E'; which I did without issue. Mechanical work [was] performed by an FBO over the next two days and resulted in the discovery of a detached Accelerator Pump Discharge tube in the carburetor and subsequent replacement with a factory overhauled carburetor. At no time was there an emergency situation; or a declaration of an emergency situation by the pilot.

A single pilot reports he had to turn off his engine in a C-170 aircraft on a very short final because the throttle would not close completely resulting in too much power.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Cruise ....wake turbulence caused an aircraft over speed. Mach 0.83 for three (3) seconds.I can't really give an answer to help prevent this occurrence. It is not uncommon for this to happen and cannot be addressed until it occurs. Once it occurs we can make certain changes such as changing altitude or flight path.

A320 pilot reported a short-duration overspeed occurred in cruise flight; and cited wake turbulence as the probable cause.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 554; Flight Crew Type 14200

At the gate in ZZZ; I noticed there was no tape on the center Pedestal Gap. The tape is supposed to stop paper from slipping through a gap and ending down under the pedestal. I knew I had just read in a Safety Notice that Maintenance would be correcting the problem. I called Maintenance and told them there was no tape on the pedestal to block the gap and to see if they could send out a Maintainer; and they said they could. They also said they knew of no requirement for the tape or that there was even a need for it.When arriving at the aircraft I discussed the issue and the Maintainer said they were not familiar with the problem. I said I had called the Chief Pilot on Call and he was trying to find the article I had read; since he had also just recently read it. I asked the Maintainer to open the panel. He did and we were both glad that he did. For the next five minutes; he pulled over 50 sheets of paper out from the pedestal wiring and others stuck against the pedestal framing. Many sheets were brown from heat and brittle. I then noticed that the panel he removed actually had tape on it. Scotch tape that had been broken; allowing sheets to slip under the panel. The Maintainer took a picture of the emptied area. He then taped the area with a black tape the looked like Duck-tape but thinner. He took the papers to show his supervisor.

B737 MAX 8 Captain reported over 50 sheets of paper were found underneath the center pedestal; which had slipped through a gap that is usually taped over.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were cleared to taxi to Runway 31C at MDW via P; G. While on Taxiway G; there was a Company aircraft holding short of 31C on taxi line E1. With E2 and E3 taxi lanes open; I taxied behind the E1 aircraft and held short of 31C on taxi line E3. Almost clear of the E1 holding aircraft's tail; MDW Ground Control called and said I should not have passed behind the aircraft. After stopping at the hold short; MDW Tower cleared a smaller business aircraft to change from 31C and cleared him to land on 31R. Even though there was no aircraft inbound to 31R when I taxied around/behind the aircraft at the 31C hold short; I think I crossed the hold short line for 31R with my left gear. I still think Taxiway G ends and dumps into the huge apron of E1; E2; and E3 hold lines for 31C. I have done this many times; and never been called by Ground Control. I have often been holding short for 31C on E3 and/or E2 and had aircraft be cleared to land 'over' me on 31R. This is why I did not consider my movement around the holding aircraft to be an encroachment of another runway.

We pushed and deiced off of [the] gate and were cleared to taxi to 31C via P; G; cross 31R. We understood the instructions and taxied uneventfully most of the way. Approaching 31C; a Company aircraft was waiting for departure on the E1 line. My Captain began to taxi around him and I saw we were going to encroach upon 31R. I alerted the Captain and asked if we were going to enter 31R to which he replied (paraphrase) no; he was only going to go around Company. I checked final; which was clear; while I told him directly that we were about to cross the hold short line; and then a second later let him know; unnecessarily; that we were on a runway without clearance. I told him I was very uncomfortable; to which he replied that he'd been doing that for 15 years and it wasn't a problem. A moment later Tower called us and said (paraphrase) that in future we should not taxi around other aircraft without permission. I acknowledged the transmission and Tower came back clearing an aircraft on final to 31C to sidestep and land on 31R. We lined up on E3; which has the shortest distance between runways; but as we were not in a 737-800; I don't believe that posed any additional threat with landing traffic on 31R.

B737NG flight crew reported a runway incursion at 31R in MDW.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

I was loading the rear of flight XXXX on [Gate XX]; ZZZ-ZZZ1; when [Gate XY] was pushed out for departure. It was sent across to the C side for departure. Entirely too much power was used to make the turn to go across. I just managed to turn around and grab the belt loader to keep from being knocked to the ground and; while I had my back turned to the departing aircraft; I saw a package go flying past and underneath my aircraft. When the wind stopped; I turned around and found a plank in excess of six feet long with nails sticking up out of it less than four feet away from me and numerous ones scattered and broken in my gate area. [A] vehicle; which had stopped short of the tail of my aircraft; had the wooden bed slats blown out of the truck bed from the blast from the engines. The package ended up on [Gate XZ] along with several slat boards that; fortunately; went underneath the plane instead of up into it.

Air carrier ramp personnel reported aircraft pushing off adjacent gate used too much power causing equipment and FOD to be blown across tarmac.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Flight was operated without any incident or irregularity until the gate arrival at ZZZ. Taxi instructions were to enter the ramp at spot XX; join the blue line; and taxi to Gate XX.Approaching Gate XX; we saw that the ramp crew wasn't ready; so I stopped the aircraft on the blue line; set the parking brake; and waited. After a couple minutes; the ramp crew removed a baggage cart from the safety area; got into position (3 crew: 1 at each wing tip and the lead marshaller); and they all signaled a clear/thumbs up.We both surveyed the gate area and from my perspective; I believed it to be clear. I made the 90 degree turn from the blue line onto the center of the gate lead-in line. Again we had a clear signal from all ramp personnel; so I focused my attention on the marshaller; taxied as directed; and brought the jet into its parking spot. We set the brake; completed checklists; said goodbye to passengers and flight attendants; and headed off to our next flight.After arriving at our next jet; I was notified that during parking at Gate XX; the lower left scimitar had made contact with a fuel truck.We returned to the original gate to meet with [Chief Pilot]. We completed drug and alcohol testing.[Chief Pilot] received a ramp video of the incident which we reviewed. We also walked back onto the ramp to look closer at the area.After seeing the incident video and walking around the ramp area; it became clear that the fuel truck was out of position and inside the safety zone. The red safety line in that area makes several turns; which had been blocked by the truck itself; and they are intermixed into various diagonal yellow lines. The proper configuration of the lines wasn't obvious to me as I turned the jet. That; combined with the all-clear signal from the wing walker led me into believing that all was clear and safe. We both thought that we were operating safely and taking care to navigate the dangerous ramp. We stopped and waited for the rampers to move a baggage cart; get into position and signal us to proceed forward to our parking spot. We both surveyed to gate area; and both believed it to be clear.I observed the parked fuel truck; but from my perspective I thought it to be clear of the safety area. The wing walker was near the truck and gave me the clear signal. At the time; I was apparently confused by all the yellow lines on the ground; and the red line with its turns and angles next to the truck. I certainly would have stopped the jet had I been in doubt or instructed by the ramp crew.I will double down on verifying that the gate area is safe and clear.Even when you think a gate area is clear; it's not always.Ramp and service vehicles are parked everywhere. The gate areas are very congested; and markings can be confusing and/or obscured. When a vehicle is parked within an aircraft's safety zone it would be helpful if there was an obvious signal either on the vehicle or in the area while the vehicle is there. This is especially true; when the intrusion is 'just too close'. While a truck on the center line is obvious; one just a few inches over the line is not. Maybe a traffic cone; tethered to the truck; which is placed in the safety zone?Better training for ramp personnel; to include surveying the safety zone; closely examining anything that looks close; and looking at the wing tips and the area of movement.Even though I believed my jet clear of any obstruction; it wasn't; and I take responsibility for that. I will continue to improve my diligence for safe operation.

Upon arrival at Gate XX in ZZZ; we had contact between our left lower scimitar and a fuel truck. Neither the Captain nor I were aware of the incident until we were contacted by phone during preflight on the subsequent leg.ZZZ ops reassigned us to Gate XX upon arrival. We taxied in via spot XX and the blue line to Gate XX. We came to a stop adjacent to and with our nose 90 degrees to the parking spot while we waited for the ground crew to raise their wands. I made a 'stay seated' announcement to the passengers; and the Captain and I visually surveyed Gate XX and the surrounding area. There was the usual amount of surrounding equipment; including a fuel truck servicing an aircraft at Gate XX. Nothing stood out as unusual to either of us.With three sets of wands now raised; the Captain advanced the throttles; made the 90 degree turn; and proceeded in to the gate. I focused my primary scan ahead and to the right; with a peripheral scan to the left. I believe I verbalized my usual 'All clear right;' and we taxied into the gate as normal; with the marshaller providing normal signals all the way to aircraft stop. At no point did either of us see; hear; or sense anything to be amiss until we received the phone call. A few factors:There are a number of overlapping and potentially visually overwhelming features painted on the surface to the left of Gate XX. The yellow crosshatching of the fire lane and to the multiple zigzags of the circle of safety; in combination with the position of the fuel truck at the time; somehow seem to have failed to trigger any suspicion on our part.While the left wing walker was out of sight to me after we began our left 90 degree turn into the gate; at no point did the marshaller or either wing walker signal any issue.I do not believe any form of distraction or lack of vigilance was a primary cause here. Both of us were engaged and focused on the task at hand; free of superfluous conversation or attention elsewhere.Having made those points; I take responsibility as part of the flight crew for failing to see something was amiss with that fuel truck. I cannot say I wish I'd paid better attention to my instincts; because I never sensed anything was amiss.Having said that; I take responsibility as part of the flight crewI've made a resolution to spend a few hours this week reviewing all the documents and diagrams I can find covering airport markings; signs; and procedures. I'm also redoubling my attention to all movement on the ground; with particular attention to the sight picture of surrounding personnel; equipment; and markings on 'normal' days.The rest seems pretty obvious: the fueler should not park where he does not belong; and the wing walkers should signal a stop command if they see anything amiss.

B737 flight crew reported a failure of the ground crew to ensure adequate wingtip clearance; resulting in a collision with a fuel truck.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 223.3; Flight Crew Type 378.65

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Descending via the EAGUL arrival runway 26 in VFR smooth conditions encountered moderate wake turbulence from preceding 737 estimated at 7 miles ahead.  Seatbelt sign was off but turned on at first indication of wake.  Coordinated with ATC for a 1 nm offset. Prior to the offset encountered wake a second time.  No injuries.  I did not make the FA turbulence commands over the PA because it happened so fast and my attention was on aircraft control and I didn't have time.  The bank rolled left and right but we did not exceed any limitations.  The first encounter only kicked off the LNAV and the second kicked off the autopilot because it could not control the bank.  Made reassuring PA after verifying FA was safe and no injuries.

B737NG Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into PHX in trail of a B737.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

We were level at FL190. Our call sign was Air carrier XXY; several times the controller called us Air carrier XZY. Also Air carrier XZY answered calls to us several times. After a couple of wrong call signs the controller called us by our correct call sign and cleared us to cross 40 miles south of Bairn intersection at 14000 feet. Both the FO and I heard her say 14000 feet and that's what I read back when I acknowledged the clearance. As we were starting our descent out of FL190 the controller gave us a frequency change. I tried to check in on the new frequency twice with no answer. I returned to the old frequency and when I told the controller I had no reply on the new frequency she asked what altitude we were going to. By this time we were descending through about 15500. I told her we were going to 14000 and that's what I had read back to her when we got the clearance. She said it was suppose to be 17000 feet; but it was ok; and said to just level at 14000. This event occurred due to confusion on the radio. The controller calling us by the wrong call sign and the other plane answering our calls added to the problem. I think the controller had called us Air carrier XZY instead of Air carrier XXY and when she finally got the call sign right she mixed up the 3 and 2 again and cleared us to 14000 instead of 17000. Then when I read back 14000 as our clearance she did not catch that I didn't say 17000 like she had meant.

Hard altitudes on Arrivals that ATC makes stick; instead of mixing it up all the time. MIA-MCO is a very quick leg; with a lot to do. Changing an altitude that is not on the arrival and a point that is not on the arrival during this time could be asking for trouble. If this is a common occurrence; why not add a note on the arrival to expect to cross 40 miles south of BAIRN at 14;000 ft. Or add a fix and put the possible altitude on it. Also; I see this a lot. There are a LOT of similar flight numbers departing areas in our system at the same time. I don't know if Air carrier XXY being on frequency at the same time; and climbing out at the same time; was THE reason for this; but I can't help to think that it's a contributing factor.

An air carrier on frequency with a company similar call sign was called incorrectly by ATC which confused everyone. Finally; with a frequency change; the crew descending to 14;000 was told their clearance was to 17;000; but that crew never heard 17;000.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Type 50

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 166; Flight Crew Total 21346; Flight Crew Type 3253

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Our flight received a vector and a descent from Approach that resulted in overshooting the localizer; XXL at ZZZ. The aircraft was configured with flaps 20; airspeed set to 180 knots and we were between 4000-5000 about 15 miles out. I was uncertain what the aircraft would do in an overshoot situation and felt that we were still high energy. Not knowing the way the aircraft would react distracted me from the fact that speedbrakes were out and I was in FLCH. And we were descending to the cleared altitude; so I may have unintentionally guarded the throttles at idle. Other crew members alerted me to subsequent airspeed decay followed shortly by the stick shaker. I immediately selected close to max power briefly and the altitude quickly rose to between 500-1000 above cleared altitude. I disengaged the [autopilot] and recovered the aircraft to stable conditions and recaptured the localizer and glideslope. The remainder of the approach was hand flown. Landing flaps were selected; the landing checklist was completed and the aircraft was landed without further incident.

Everything was going great on the way home to ZZZ and the First Officer's performance was above average in most areas; despite his returning from an absence from airline flying. He had thoroughly briefed the arrival and landing to XXL in ZZZ. While being vectored to a position about 17 NM north of the airport he became uneasy and was concerned that we were getting in too close. We were descending to 5;000 feet in FLCH with a speed of 180 knots and configured at flaps 15. When the controller turned us to a heading of 100 degrees for a close base; he called for flaps 20 and pulled full speed brakes. We got a late turn to 170 degrees to join and we were in a hard turn to the right with LOC captured; autopilot on; when we got slow. One reason for the late turn was I didn't hear the assigned heading and needed it repeated.I had observed him pull the throttles back earlier and I believe he unconsciously pulled them back and held them at idle against the servos. He seemed stressed about the turn and being high. In reality; we were about 15 miles out at 5;000. This resulted in a rapid airspeed decrease as we leveled. The bank angle was near 30 degrees with full speed brakes. I was surprised at how quickly we got into the airspeed red and the stick shaker activated. I yelled for pitch and thrust; get the nose down (push; roll; thrust; stabilize would have been better). He clicked off the autopilot and as the power came up he failed to control the aircraft's pitch and we quickly climbed to 6;000. He didn't seem to have situation awareness of airspeed and altitude as he attempted to recover. When the controller asked about our altitude I said we had an autopilot problem and were okay. She cleared us to 4;000 and we joined the glideslope and made a normal approach to the runway. He settled down and flew a nice approach to a great landing on XXL. The controller did not mention our altitude excursion again.We did a thorough debrief and each pilot had input as to what they saw. The relief pilots were fully engaged and offered good support during the event.

Boeing 787 flight crew reported pilot approach procedural errors coupled with late ATC final vector heading resulted in speed and altitude deviations.


Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Apparently encountered the 'Ice Crystal Icing' phenomena while in cruise; in IMC; at FL380; storms in our area but not close. FMC indicated 'buffet limit'; as the autothrottles retarded from .78 to a commanded .74 mach. Max altitude/optimum altitude in FMC went from 38.4/39.2 to 34.5/34.5; as we slowed at FL380. Total Air Temperature (TAT) was 0 degrees; and we did have moisture that appeared as light rain on the windshield. There was no noise or odors associated with it; as mentioned in the QRH. We did not overfly any storms; which the QRH warns against; nor were there any radar returns indicating possible engine ice crystal icing. The checklist was accomplished; and as the engine Anti Ice (A/I) was turned on; the FMC slowly returned to normal; and the mach slowly climbed back to the previous .78. We did not end up disconnecting the autothrottles; as they did respond with power after we recognized the problem; but if it happens again I will most likely disconnect them.Recommend watching for the 0 degrees TAT; and especially an uncommanded speed drop while in cruise in IMC.

A B737-NG FMC indicated 'BUFFET LIMIT' as the autothrottle reduced thrust to maintain M.74 from M.78 at FL380. The Total Air Temperature was near Zero; with no apparent icing and no radar returns but the crew suspected engine core icing and followed the QRH to counter the suspected Ice Crystal Icing phenomenon.


Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working Ground 1/2; CD-FD for COVID staffing.  Local Control and FLM were separate.  I had an aircraft pushing off of Gate XX/YY area which is right in the intersection of Kilo and Alpha.  Aircraft X exited Taxiway Tango; and had to make a hard left turn onto Taxiway B to go around towards the Alpha gates.  When I gave Aircraft X the instructions; they read it back and began a slow turn of about 135 degrees to go east bound onto Taxiway B.  I thought nothing unusual of it.  Then to my surprise I heard Local Control cancel Aircraft Y's takeoff clearance.  My first thought was that they (Local) did not remember that Aircraft X had to go left onto Bravo and was anticipating the runway separation.  At the time; it was clear that Aircraft Y was not rolling; and shortly after Aircraft X cleared completely they once again cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff.Well after the event the FLM and I were in an annual review discussion and they said that I probably did not notice it; but that I turned Aircraft X left on Bravo causing the departure delay of Aircraft Y probably saved an airborne VFR to IFR event that would have been significant.  They explained to me that during this same time frame; while they were monitoring Local Control; a [group of] VFR aircrafts had called and were transitioning the airspace northwest bound.  The first problem was that the UHF frequency got deselected and so when the Local Controller did not respond [the group of] VFR aircrafts returned to TRACON.  While this was going on; and the frequency was subsequently selected; the Local Controller was trying to beat the Aircraft Z flight and I am guessing from the structure of the conversation that when all was said and done they told the Local Controller they should probably report the event.I have a few pieces of input:1. The FLM is one of the newer FLMs and extremely solid operationally; as well as very strong in communicating with people.  I am not aware of how the interaction went between them and Local to get the cancellation of the takeoff clearance; as there were no words spoken above the volume only the two of them could hear. 2. The Controller working is a newer check out to the facility and a breath of fresh air operationally.  I cannot say enough about them; from the perspective of being here to learn the job and become more proficient; in the times that I have worked with them.  3. The rest of the facility could learn from this event; and chances are there may be a briefing made from it; to express the importance of awareness of operational equipment; performance expectation bias; and not rushing when we are in a COVID traffic level; where there is really no need to push anything out of the ordinary.

Ground Controller reported a procedural error that resulted in delaying a departing aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A line of strong thunderstorms had moved across the United States causing tornadoes in the DFW area [several days earlier] was moving into the ATL area quickly. Upon arrival at the aircraft; I called the Dispatcher regarding our fuel load and the strong possibility of the ATL closing after I pushed from the gate. We had ZZZ2 as an alternate due to the forecast of wind shear in ZZZ at 2000 feet of 40 knots (WS020/15040KT) which was predicted for a period of 11 hours. [The Dispatcher] assured me we could delete the alternate in order to reduce the [minimum fuel] if I needed it during taxi or for an airport closure. We began to board the aircraft soon after I arrived and I began to receive tornado warnings with the line of weather and track of rotation coming directly towards ATL Airport. After concurrence with the Dispatcher and Ops; I decided to deplane the aircraft due to the Tornado Warning for KATL. After deplaning the passengers; I went downstairs and looked at the radar further. The line of strong thunderstorms which was currently hitting KATL was moving in a more northerly track as opposed to an easterly track. With my departure and flight path; I was to remain within the convective activity during the entire flight with not much assurance of a safe landing in ZZZ based on the storm track and other information available. I contacted [the Dispatcher] again and brought this to his attention. [He] asked me if it would be 'good enough' if he brought up the past weather for ZZZ1 as well as the current METAR for ZZZ; and told me the 'visibility in [there] went from 4SM down to 2 1/2 SM; down to 1 1/2SM and then came back up. The ceiling was only down to 4000 so you'll be fine'. He also told me 'this is what you (myself) get paid to do'; alleging it was my duty to transport the passengers regardless of the conditions based on my pay scale. As the conversation continued; I told him I was truly concerned for the first time in 15 years for the safety of this flight since I was not ever 'flying away from the weather' and was to be in it the entire time. He again made the comment of it's what I'm 'paid to do'. I asked him who made the ultimate decision on the cancellation of this flight since a [another] flight just cancelled and it will have a similar issue in direction of flight. He responded he 'can't help the [other] flight' but he makes the ultimate decision and relays it to the Sector Manager. I told him I wasn't comfortable with operating the flight and he told me he saw 'no reason whatsoever' to consider the cancellation of this flight since the METAR and TAF are legal. He also made the comment of 'since you (myself) seem to be taking control over this from me; what do you suggest?' I finally tired of his snide; unprofessional comments; told him I was the one who had to safely transport passengers through the weather; and told him I was calling the Chief Pilot on call. I spoke with [the Chief Pilot] and briefed him on the situation. [He] fully agreed with me and suggested I wait an additional 30 min to an hour to see what the line of weather would do. My primary concern was flying within the line the entire time and the convection expected and [the Chief Pilot] agreed. I called [the Dispatcher] back and told him of [the Chief Pilot's] concurrence with my views and my decision to wait an additional 30 minutes. During this time; Ops decided to auto-board my aircraft again even though I asked the Gate Agent to wait. Seeing it as a huge inconvenience to deplane the passengers a second time; I decided to keep them on the aircraft as I watched the radar. I kept the passengers informed the entire time and during each step. Approximately [30 minutes later]; Ops called me on the radio and told me the flight had cancelled. I contacted [the Dispatcher] yet again (no indication from him it was cancelled); and he told me he had 'brought my concerns to the Duty Manager and the Duty Manager said we needed a weather cancellation anyways so we decided to cancel your flight'.[The Dispatcher's] lack of professionalism and concern for the overall weather situation; direction of flight; and inflight conditions are alarming; especially when the concerns of the PIC are brought to his attention and he makes snide comments on them. I should not have to tolerate at any time a Dispatcher telling me 'it's what you're paid to do' or other snide comments. The Dispatcher showed no concern whatsoever in the overall safe operation of the flight. The Dispatcher was adamant the flight was 'safe to operate' based solely on TAF and METAR information available; primarily on the actual and forecast visibility and cloud coverage at the destination airport. There was no consideration or concern for inflight weather. The direction of the flight between ATL and ZZZ was north/northeast; which was the exact track of the storm system which produced tornadoes south of ATL upon completion of boarding in ATL the first time. Only after tiring of the Dispatcher's snide remarks of its 'what you're (myself) paid to do'; I called the CP on call. [He] fully concurred with my decisions based on my experience with this storm system over the last 2 days as well as based on current weather conditions and radar. This valuable information was provided to the Dispatcher; who blatantly ignored it.

The pilot of a Regional Jet reported being concerned about the weather along the planned route of flight. The Dispatcher was reported to not share the same concern and seemed to be pushing the Captain into operating the flight. Ultimately the flight was cancelled without ever leaving the gate.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During the approach in CHO on the visual backed up with the RNAV 21; we received a terrain warning alert. We tried to join the final for 21 but due to terrain that was to the left of the course we had a terrain warning. When the warning came on we climbed out until the warning stopped and we were clear of the terrain. After clear we leveled off and started to rejoin the final we realized that we were going to be too high for a stable approach. We executed a soft go around and advised tower. We requested a visual pattern back around for another approach. They approved our request and we join a downwind for runway 21. Once on the downwind for 21 we reloaded the RNAV 21 approach. We decided to make sure that we were clear of the terrain and extend our downwind clear of the terrain. Once we were clear we joined the RNAV approach course and landed in CHO without any more issues. The cause of the terrain warning was that [our] final [approach course] and center line of the runway were not aligned. We tried to line up with the runway too early and were too close to the terrain that was to the left of the final. We should have held off on turning final until we were closer to the approach course that was offset from the runway center line.Next time we do that approach we will make sure that we follow the approach as published and not join the final [too] soon.

While conducting a visual approach into CHO we received an audible terrain warning. We were on base preparing to intercept the CHO RNAV RWY 21 approach course outside of MUSOJ; descending to 2400 from 3000. The warning occurred slightly above level off. The high terrain was to the left. Upon receiving the warning I arrested our descent and added power; additionally the Captain advanced the thrust levers to the max power detent to aid in establishing a climb quicker. A go around was executed when it was determined we were too high at that point to make a safe landing. We did a traffic pattern; and re-intercepted the inbound course further out between EUCEUS and WITTO to give us more space [from] the high terrain; and landed safely.We were doing a visual approach and tried to intercept the approach too close to the FAF; we were aware of the terrain out the left side of the aircraft and I believed that we were far enough away from it. In hindsight we should have not done a full visual approach and instead gone farther out; giving us more distance from the high terrain.

Air Carrier flight crew reported taking evasive action after receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to CHO.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 1500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Landed to drop off a passenger and taxied to GA hangars to drop him off. Proceeded to return to take off asked ground for progressives and he responded 'return the way you came in'.I proceeded the way I came in and the taxiway ended in the middle of the runway (there was not a parallel taxiway) and I inadvertently stopped on the do not cross markings. Contact was then made with the tower for back taxi on the active runway and then takeoff.Perceptions: I proceeded on a clearance of 'return the way you came in' which included taxiing down the runway to the exit point. I was prepared to taxi down the runway as a taxiway but stopped on the do not cross markings to confirm and contacted the tower for continued taxi.I believe what caused the problem was the knowledge that the flying that the controllers were there to control (national guard) was done for the day and the controller and the pilot were unusually relaxed about the communications.More professional radio work would result in more professional reactions for both parties.

When asked for a 'Progressive' Taxi in a Lake Amphibian LA-4; the pilot misunderstood the Controller's instructions. The pilot didn't realize the instructions included taxiing down an active runway.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During cruise we were at 22;000; we climbed high to avoid moderate icing. We were above the clouds and the temperature had dropped significantly so we began to add more and more heat from the bleed system. As we added heat a noticeable smell began and grew stronger and stronger. After a little while it began to burn our eyes and throat. We discussed the matter and began our descent. I elected to set the pressurization to 10;000 feet to slowly de-pressurize hoping it would draw the smell out of the cabin. This was mildly successful. We landed without further incident and squawked the aircraft. We never had any visual sign of smoke but the smell was acrid enough that we wanted Maintenance to look into the source. The smell resembled a Sharpie marker. No clue [what caused it]; something in the bleed system was aggravated by the heat.

Beech 1900 Captain reported experiencing strong fumes in the cockpit when calling for increased heat at a high altitude.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

On a published section of the IMPED 3C STAR; near point DB520. We were descending to 8000 ft. and had slowed to 230 KIAS directed by ATC. Autopilot was engaged. Passing through 9000 ft.; we encountered what felt like wake turbulence from a preceding aircraft. The aircraft began an abrupt left bank; throttles were at idle. I thought the autopilot would correct the attitude; but when we reached about 30 degrees of bank; I disconnected the autopilot and began to roll right to wings level. I didn't catch it in time and the Pilot Monitoring (PM) noticed on his PFD that a momentary over bank warning displayed. At the time I began rolling back to wings level; the stick shaker momentarily activated. Our minimum clean wing speed was 210 KIAS and we were holding 230 KIAS. That did not make sense to me; but I simultaneously reduced pitch and increased power; but I failed to cross check my Angle of Attack indicator. I never believed we were airspeed critical and not sure why we had a momentary stick shaker. Once I got the airplane back to wings level and back on course; autopilot was re-engaged and worked normally the rest of the flight. An aircraft behind us reported a similar event. Another reason for this report was that I failed to write up this event. We had 2 hot brakes after landing which we wrote up; and I forgot to check the FOM at the aircraft. Once at the hotel; I checked the FOM and realized my mistake. I tried calling the ramp; but couldn't get through; so I notified the chief pilot. I completed the write up over the phone with a maintenance representative. The aircraft had already departed Dubai.Cause: Either high altitude windshear/turbulence or wake turbulence from preceding aircraftSuggestions: I don't think a flying event like this can be eliminated because of environmental events. My mistake in not writing up this event had to do with not having time in a congested area to make a write up when it happened and then forgetting the event after landing. Probably a better personal discipline to research/recollect everything before leaving the aircraft.

MD-11 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into OMDB.