Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was working LC1; I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff; after Aircraft Y had completed his landing roll I instructed Aircraft Y to hold short of Runway 25R at A7; and I received a proper read back of the required hold short instructions. I then went to work trying to sort out the horrible sequence my ground controller had given me. I was looking at my upcoming departure strips when the ASDE-X alarmed stating 'Runway 25R occupied!' I immediately looked up to see Aircraft Y crossing Runway 25R at A7 while Aircraft X was rolling down Runway 25R at a very high rate of speed; too late to cancel their takeoff clearance. I attempted to key up to resolve the situation; but it was too late to do anything about it. Aircraft X rotated a couple seconds later somewhere between A5 [and] A6 and departed overtop of Aircraft Y still on the runway. I advised Aircraft Y their instructions were to hold short of runway 25R; to which he replied 'yeah we screwed up.'Even if I hadn't had a bad departure sequence; the events happened so fast I'm not sure it would have been caught in a normal scan with the traffic volume at the time.

LAS Tower Controller reports of a runway incursion caused by a pilot who did not hold short as instructed. Departure aircraft had been cleared for takeoff and was rolling when ASDE-X alerted controller of the incident. Controller did not have enough time to react and departing aircraft flew over crossing traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 27563; Flight Crew Type 3653

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

A Flight Attendant called and reported a loud bang or pop in the aft galley. We asked if they could smell any fumes or see any smoke. They said no and said they would call us back if they could; and that they would try to figure out what it was. We said we had no unusual indications of any problem. They later called us back and reported that they found a shattered [cigarette] lighter. It was on a food tray inside a food insert that had been warming in an oven in the aft galley. Apparently the heat from the oven expanded any air/gas in the lighter and popped it.

During climbout on a B767; the flight attendants reported hearing a loud noise in the aft galley. Upon investigation; they found that a cigarette lighter had been left on a tray that was warming in the oven; and had burst.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While approaching EWR on the PHILBO3 from the south at 6;000 at the METRO Intersection; NY Controller gave us an instruction to FLY PRESENT HEADING. I responded to that call as it was our call sign. My First Officer was Pilot Flying and followed the instructions as he heard it too.About two minutes later; the Controller asked what procedure we were flying and what our routing was. I informed him of the PRESENT HEADING that he gave us. He said something to the effect that he meant another flight. We were following Aircraft Y. Our call sign was Aircraft X. He then gave us several other vectors and handed us off to another frequency. Nothing else was said about this confusion of aircraft; as it was on the controller and not us.

Air carrier Captain reported a track deviation on the PHILBO3 arrival to EWR as the result of ATC Controller confusing similar call signs and issuing clearance to the wrong aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 18500; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22500; Flight Crew Type 7900

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Concerned over being blamed for passing aircraft flying simultaneous PRM approach into SFO we were flying the LDA PRM 28R approach into SFO. Approach Control on 120.35 (with monitor frequency in #2 radio) had us maintaining 250 KTS; and at one point on the approach; NCT told us to maintain 170 KTS; which we slowed to immediately; and maintained it until I felt it necessary to slow to final approach speed. We slowed to final approach speed earlier than would normally be done; as we observed on TCAS; another aircraft on the PRM 28L approach. We were aware that when we made visual contact; one of the items of importance on the approach details was to attempt to not pass the other aircraft. NCT Approach never mentioned their presence nor issued any other speed request/reduction. We were at our minimum approach speed. The relative location of the other aircraft was hard to determine viewing our TCAS display; and we were still in instrument meteorological conditions until essentially DARNE; just above published decision altitude. When we broke out of the overcast; it was raining and we could see Runway 28R; and an aircraft just to our left. We contacted the Tower; were cleared to land; and advised the Tower we had them in sight. The other aircraft did not report us in sight; and the Tower did not issue any other instructions. With strong winds out of the south; (our heading was left of our track) that aircraft's position; while visible at approximately our 9 O'clock position; was apparently very slightly behind us. We did not pass that aircraft after breaking out of the clouds. A while later; SFO Tower sent the regional jet around and when questioned by the Regional jet; SFO Tower alleged 'the aircraft to your right passed you on the approach.' If that was the case; sequencing control was still in the hands of the RADAR Controller until we observed them for the first time (when they appeared slightly behind us); and since we were at our minimum approach speed; we could not limit them from dropping back behind if they slowed further. We had not yet maneuvered left to join the extended center line of Runway 28R. With the south winds; and additional ground track distance involved; we would have ended up slightly behind that aircraft when we were both on extended center lines. With the strong winds from the south; there was never any wake turbulence issue.

We were flying the LDA PRM 28R Approach into SFO. NCT Approach Control on 120.35 (with monitor frequency in #2 radio) had us maintaining 250 KTS; and at one point on the approach; NCT told us to maintain 170 KTS; which we slowed to immediately; and maintained it until I felt it necessary to slow to final approach speed. We slowed to final approach speed earlier than would normally be done; as we observed on TCAS; another aircraft on the PRM 28L approach. We were aware that when we made visual contact; one of the items of importance on the approach details was to attempt to not pass the other aircraft. NCT Approach never mentioned their presence nor issued any other speed request/reduction. We were at our minimum approach speed. The relative location of the other aircraft was hard to determine viewing our TCAS display; and we were still in instrument meteorological conditions until essentially DARNE; just above published decision altitude. When we broke out of the overcast; it was raining and we could see Runway 28R and an aircraft just to our left. We contacted the Tower; were cleared to land; and advised the Tower we had the other aircraft in sight. The other aircraft did not report us in sight; and the Tower did not issue any other instructions. With strong winds out of the south; (our heading was left of our track) that aircraft's position; while visible at approximately our 9 O'clock position; was apparently very slightly behind us. We did not pass that aircraft after breaking out of the clouds. A while later SFO Tower sent the regional jet around and when questioned by the regional jet; SFO Tower alleged 'the aircraft to your right passed you on the approach'. If that was the case; sequencing control was still in the hands of the Radar Controller until we observed them for the first time (when they appeared slightly behind us); and since we were at our minimum approach speed; we could not limit them from dropping back behind if they slowed further. We had not yet maneuvered left to join the extended center line of Runway 28R. With the south winds; and additional ground track distance involved; we would have ended up slightly behind that aircraft when we were both on extended center lines. With the strong winds from the south; there was never any wake turbulence issue. At no point was there any uncertainty about maintaining a safe operation.

Air Carrier conducting an LDA PRM 28R approach to SFO described a go-around event by parallel traffic on Runway 28L. ATC claimed the reporter's aircraft passed parallel traffic causing the event.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 2200

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 11400; Flight Crew Type 3000

Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on the localizer for Runway 19 at TEB; level at 2;000 between UNVIL and TUGGZ (approximately 8 miles from the runway). NY Approach handed us off to the tower and as I looked up from the frequency change; we got a TA from a jet inbound to EWR at 1;000 above us (3;000) southeast bound. We saw him at 1:30 and then a second or two later we got a TA from another aircraft at 2:00 at our altitude (2;000); that immediately turned into an RA. The flying pilot climbed and then leveled off in compliance with the TCAS guidance. We both saw the low wing aircraft with pulse lights flashing pass about 400 feet below us.When I queried the tower controller; she said they weren't talking to the other aircraft and that he was operating legally below the Class B outside the Class D. The arrivals into Teterboro are frequently challenging since NY Approach brings us down low far (30-50 miles) from the airport; in close proximity to many small airports. In this case an extension to the Teterboro Class D to accommodate the ILS 19 would be prudent.

The crew was on an IFR flight plan to Teterboro and approaching TEB from the North West for an ILS 19 approach when we received a TA on TCAS; at this time NY Approach called the traffic; a second later we received an RA on the TCAS and followed the command bars for a TCAS CLIMB. The entire event was over in less than 30 seconds; NY explained to the crew over the radio that this is a regular event in that area because technically the airspace below the 3;000 Class B and above TEB class D is a VFR no reporting area. Both aircraft had 400 feet vertical separation during this event.

A Corporate flight crew on the TEB 19 ILS at 2;000 feet received a TCAS TA from an inbound EWR jet at 3;000 feet and a TCAS RA CLIMB from VFR traffic 400 feet below.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Cleared to descend via the arrival.  Approaching an intersection we noticed traffic displayed to our north on our TCAS.  We were descending out of 17;000 feet.  As I queried ATC about the traffic; we received an RA to climb for the traffic.  ATC did not notify us of the traffic.  These arrivals are so heads down for pilots flying the MD-82 that we did not acquire the traffic visually.  I advised ATC of the TCAS RA and that we were climbing as directed by TCAS.  After we were clear of the conflicting aircraft we returned to the assigned altitude restrictions via the arrival.  I informed ATC we were returning to our clearance of 'descending via' This traffic conflict could have been avoided with ATC intervention to maintain our altitude due to traffic.  I'm not knowledgeable of ATC radar systems and maybe this traffic just 'popped up on radar' with no time to manage the conflict.  I will say; the TCAS system functioned great.  I would suggest; based on the last few weeks of flying these arrivals on the MD-82; that anytime the TCAS is not operational the crew should not accept any arrival with a 'descend via' clearance.

MD-82 Captain reported receiving a Resolution Advisory (RA) on a 'descend via' clearance; citing workload in the old technology transports as interfering with their traffic scan.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 2800

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were set up for an autoland approach to 35R at DEN. All three autopilots were engaged. Weather was 1/4 mile light snow. We were about 4 miles behind an Airbus approaching the outer marker when we encountered wake turbulence. Aircraft rolled about 40 degrees to the left. Captain disengaged the autopilot and rolled back to join the localizer. We determined that we were not in a position to continue the approach so First Officer called the Tower and said we were going around. ATC vectored us around for an approach to 35L. We were cleared to 8;000 FT. We were at flaps 5; 190 KTS. On the downwind leg ATC gave us a heading of 350. When we rolled out Captain noticed that this heading would have us join the localizor after the FAF. Before we had a chance to question the heading; ATC vectored us left to a 170 heading; climb to 8;500 FT. Finally we were instructed to climb to 9;000 FT. ATC was very busy with several aircraft and approaches to 35R; 35L and 34R. There seemed to be some confusion with vectoring us to fit in with the flow. We finally were cleared for the ILS to 35L and landed 6 miles in trail of another plane.

[Narrative 2 provided no additional information.]

B757 flight crew encountered wake turbulence in trail of an A320 on approach to DEN. When the resultant roll took them off course they executed a go around and were vectored to another approach.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During take-off roll; noticed a 'red' message appear on ECAM. Could not immediately determine its significance; so I rejected the takeoff and returned to the gate. Flight was subsequently cancelled.This was a mistake on my part. The message I had actually seen was a magenta 'T.O. Inhibit' message; which is a normal take-off message which appears when the takeoff inhibit function of the ECAM activates. I guess I thought the message would be in green; and so seeing it in (almost) red; made me think there must be a problem. I have to admit; in the instant before I commenced the rejected takeoff; the A320 rejected takeoff accident in Philly a couple years ago flashed thru my mind. Given that background; I thought it would be better to reject early and get a handle on what I was seeing; rather than continue the takeoff and regret it at a higher speed or in the air.When we got back to the gate; I called Dispatch and was put through to Maintenance. At this point; the situation went from bad to worse. I thought I would be able to get some more eyes on the problem and maybe get a resolution; or maybe someone would say; 'Hey; the T.O. Inhibit is supposed to be magenta'. But instead; they kept thinking 'configuration warning'; and the conversation veered off course a little.The following morning; we went out and made a high speed taxi run to verify that the ECAM present was in fact; the correct one for the situation.I think the environment also contributed to my confusion. It was dark; I was looking across the cockpit at the message while steering the aircraft down the runway and accelerating; and my eyes were straining to look thru one of three different lenses on my eyewear to read the message.I guess my first suggestion; which of course; gets tossed right away; modify the message presentation on ECAM so (nearly) red messages don't flash up during takeoff! Why would they do that?! Airbus supposedly spent so much effort to create a 'lights out' environment for takeoff; and then have an almost red message appear halfway through takeoff? That's just dumb.My second suggestion; and this is just for me; is to be more specifically aware of exactly what will be presented at every phase of flight. I swear; in that moment; I thought the T.O. Inhibit would come up in green along with the other messages which were already present.A couple months ago; I patted myself on the back for catching EGT indications more than 200 degrees apart; early on a takeoff run. Wasn't an ECAM; but clearly something amiss. I guess engine indications are where I tend to focus most of my inside attention during takeoff. Seeing a magenta ECAM caught me by surprise this time; although it presents on every takeoff.

A320 Captain reported unnecessarily rejecting the takeoff when the standard message 'T.O. Inhibit' was displayed on the ECAM.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were operating from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was the pilot flying and the FO (First Officer) was pilot monitoring. We were performing a normal takeoff when shortly after the 'thrust set' callout; we noticed that our two primary airspeed indicators came alive at different stages. My airspeed indicator came alive at around 35 KIAS while the FO's airspeed indicator at around 65 KIAS. The two primary airspeed indicators then maintained about a 20 KIAS difference between each other.Moments thereafter we also received an 'SPS ADVANCED' EICAS caution message along with yellow IAS [mismatch] on the PFDs (Primary Flight Display). We safely performed a rejected takeoff below 80 KIAS as per AOM; notified ATC; notified the Flight Attendant (FA) and passengers; and monitored our brake temperatures. We safely vacated the runway and notified Company. After discussions with Company; we determined that the issue would require that we return to the gate. So we coordinated with Company and Operations and safely taxied back to the gate. Incidentally; we already had mechanics on board our airplane. So after returning to the gate I wrote up the aircraft and the mechanics immediately began to troubleshoot the problem. A few hours later; Maintenance signed off the issue after determining that they had resolved the problem. We subsequently contacted Dispatch; received an amended release; and taxied back to the runway for our second takeoff attempt. Unfortunately; we then had to perform a rejected takeoff below 80 KIAS yet again due to similar circumstances regarding our varied airspeed indicator values and 'SPS ADVANCED' EICAS message. We also received a transient red EICAS message; but it disappeared before we were able to read the message. We again safely performed a rejected takeoff below 80 KIAS as per AOM; notified ATC; notified the Flight Attendant and passengers; and monitored our brake temperatures. We safely vacated the runway and notified Company. We also coordinated with Company and Operations and safely taxied back to the gate for the second and final time. The flight was subsequently cancelled and the crew and myself felt it was safest that we not continue flying that day due to the stressful nature of having performed two back-to-back rejected takeoffs in one day.I suggest we incorporate an 'airspeed alive' callout so that we can catch divergent airspeed indicator values sooner rather than later. In this case; we quickly caught the erroneous airspeed indications early enough to initiate the abort at low speed; below 80 KIAS.This event also made me realize how short the amount of time is between the moment the airspeed indicators come 'alive' to when we approach 80 KIAS. This doesn't leave a lot of time to catch potential air data computer issues before entering into the high speed phase of the takeoff roll. This requires a very quick and accurate scan of the all three airspeed indicators in order to identify a problem and perform a rejected takeoff below 80 KIAS; i.e.; in the low speed takeoff phase.

Report narrative contained no additional information.

EMB145 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff roll twice due to unreliable airspeed indicators.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was flying the VFR closed traffic pattern for Runway 9R at Sanford International; and had requested a full stop landing while on the downwind leg from ATC. I was cleared to land; I do not recall if I was cleared number one; or cleared to land following traffic in the pattern. I began to descend from pattern altitude; and then began my turn to the base leg. Shortly after my turn from downwind to base; I saw traffic on final for Runway 9R at my 11 o'clock; moving from left to right. The traffic was approximately 100 feet below me; and 600 feet at my 11 o'clock; moving through 12 o'clock. I made a sharp left turn back in the direction I was flying on downwind and added full power to maintain altitude and airspeed. Simultaneously; the tower controller told me to extend my downwind leg. A second controller came on frequency told me to immediately climb to 1;500 feet. Once it was established traffic was no longer a factor; I was cleared to land; and the rest of the approach was flown normally.The problem either arose from my own distractedness; and I missed the instruction to follow traffic; or the tower controller failed to advise me of the traffic. I was distracted because I was talking to a passenger; and was not practicing sterile cockpit procedures.

A distracted pilot made a turn for a SFB Runway 9R base but took evasive action at the same time ATC called to issue a turn and climb because of traffic already on final for 9R.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

After takeoff on the WYLSN5 out of HOU; we were switched to Houston departure. Checked in leaving 3800 feet for 16;000 feet. ATC queried us on the altitude cleared to; we said 16;000 feet. ATC returned and said we were only cleared to 5000 feet. After being told we were cleared to 5000 ft; I set 5000 ft in the alerter leaving approximately 4100 for 5000 feet. We leveled off at 5000 ft. ATC stated that direct to 16;000 feet clearances are never given; usually stop at five. He asked if 5000 was in our Clearance; we stated we received it PDC and only saw the 16;000 ft clearance limit of the departure. He said they have been having problems with PDC clearances out of Hobby with this same exact instance with pilots not seeing the 5000 ft limit. He said he would make note of this and review the PDC. We continued the flight and approximately 15 minutes later was asked to call an 800 number when we landed for a possible navigation deviation. We called after landing and explained the situation we were told that no deviation occurred; but the PDC was apparently incorrectly copied.We were rushed and sidetracked as a crew in HOU with a passenger trip; and both apparently did not see the except maintain 5000 ft in the notes at the end of the PDC after both confirming 16000 ft. We only saw the 16000 ft altitude given as the top of the departure. As a crew we need to slow down and make sure every word has been read on the PDC and copied and entered correctly. It would also be beneficial if ATC reformatted the PDC clearances and standardized them including any changes to a departure altitude towards the top of the clearance where the departure is given so it can be understood easily.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Business jet flight crew reported difficulty catching altitude restriction departing HOU on the PDC print out.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I released Aircraft X from IDA shortly after the departure of a preceding aircraft. I had stopped Aircraft X at 080 thinking Aircraft X was proceeding to ZZZ and failed to notice that they were direct ZZZ1. I failed to enter the interim alt in the data block and did not correctly hear him check on climbing to 080. 20 MI south of IDA Aircraft X requested higher. I issued a climb to 170 but by then the aircraft had penetrated an 085 polygon and was several miles into the 089 polygon. Make sure to enter the interim in the data block and verify the departure's routing.

SLC ARTCC Controller reported that an error occurred because he did not enter the interim altitude in the data block of a departure that then entered a lower MOCA/MVA/MIA/MSA/MEA.


Flight Crew Total 8079; Flight Crew Type 1406

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On final 28R; First Officer called gear down; flaps 15; [and] landing check. Approach sent us over to tower. Wing body overheat light on left side illuminated. Completed normal landing procedures then got out QRH for wing body overheat. Accomplished QRH procedure by 500 feet. Landed 28R. After clearing the runway; we realized that we never switched over to tower frequency. [We] called tower; [and] they said they cleared us to land and gave us a green light.

B737 flight crew reported neglecting to call the tower for landing clearance while distracted on final approach by a wing body overheat warning.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

DFW Ground cleared us to taxi to Runway 17R via the standard taxi route. The FO read back the clearance and since we didn't have that page pulled up on our iPads; we did not start our taxi until the FO pulled up the page and we both verified the taxi route. All told; this took us about 30 to 45 seconds for the FO to search for the correct page on his iPad and verify the correct taxi route before we started the taxi. During this time of having this process completed; I saw a Regional Jet taxiing eastbound on the bridge towards our direction and I voiced my concern about having a taxiing conflict with the oncoming aircraft. Checking my right one more time before I started to taxi I released the brakes and started taxiing while focusing on the aircraft towards my left that was now approaching the intersection. From releasing the brakes; adding power and our airplane finally moving; it took about 5-10 seconds. Moving no more than 20 feet the FO yelled to stop. I immediately stopped the aircraft and looking to my right I saw [another aircraft] that was quickly approaching us that was westbound on the taxiway. The FO notified ground that we stopped our taxi due to the [other aircraft] that was crossing in front of us. Ground Control informed us that since he didn't see us taxiing; he cleared the [other aircraft] to continue his taxi. To paraphrase the FO's reply; he said that it took us some time to locate the page with the taxi instructions before we were to start our taxi. At no time did Ground Control revise our clearance to give way to the oncoming traffic prior to taxiing; nor did we ever hear a previous clearance for the [other aircraft] to initially give way to us when we were cleared to taxi. This was probably due to the fact that the [other aircraft] was so far away when he cleared us to taxi that Ground Control didn't anticipate seeing a conflict. Bravo Zulu to the FO for seeing a potential ground collision and being aggressive in having me stop the aircraft.While we did the right thing of ensuring we completely understood the taxi clearance by having the right page up before starting our taxi; I should have ensured that prior to gate departure that we had the standard taxi routes readily available. Also; I should have been more vigilant of keeping an active scan prior to and during taxiing (head on a swivel). While I didn't initially see the [other aircraft] on my right; I shouldn't have fixated on the other aircraft; or at least asked Ground Control about who; between us; were to give way to the other. Crew communication worked as planned with having the FO being vocal about a potential conflict.Ground Control noting our taxiing delay should have inquired us about his clearance for us to taxi. As a minimum he should have revised our taxi clearance for us to hold for the [other aircraft].In my experience; [DFW] Ground Control more often than not typically gives a full route taxi instruction from the terminal to the runway. To the point that using the standard taxi routes is the exception and not the norm. Maybe complacency on our part; but when given these standard taxi routes; we typically have to search our iPads (which isn't always the easiest to navigate) for the correct page (there are 3 of them) and verify the correct taxi route. Finding the correct page and verifying the route can take some time before starting our taxi. A simple recommendation is either to use the standard taxi routes all the time so flight crews get in the practice of using them or don't use them at all. If they are only to be used during increased ground operations; then state so on the departure ATIS so crews will be well prepared.

Taxing out at DFW we were given the clearance taxi to Runway 17R full length. We then looked up 17R full length in our Jeppesen charts and proceed to taxi as per its instructions. The Captain upon taxing looked to his left and saw a Regional Jet not holding short and coming down the taxiway. He proceeded slowly so as to pass behind the Regional Jet when I looked up and saw [another aircraft] from our right and not holding short for us. We came much too close to colliding with the [other aircraft]. We asked ATC if they wanted us to hold short for these two aircraft and ATC stated that we had taken too long to taxi and should have been out of those two airplanes way.The rest of the flight was uneventful yet the captain and I were both shaken and bothered by the near collision on the taxi out. Apparently it took us too long to taxi as per ATC instructions. I did not feel we took too long at all given the expectations of looking up and following the standard taxi instructions.When given the instructions to taxi to 17R we went to our Jeppesen charts page 60-9 and found [our location] on the map. We then had to scroll to find the DFW departure taxi routes. Of which there are 3 pages. 60-7c-4; 60-7c-3; and 60-7c-2. I was able to eliminate that it was not 60-7c-4 as we were not north flow. I then looked up 60-7c-3 and read through and saw that Runway 17R was not on that page. I then went back to the main menu; which starts from the top when you leave one page and begin to scroll for another and I then went and had to scroll down again to find page 60-7c-2 and found toward the middle bottom of the page the taxi instructions for RWY 17R Full length which are Y; K; EG. I wrote these down on my note pad and then proceeded to load page 60-9 again then proceeded to scroll in again found the route and informed the captain of the route we should take. At that point we proceeded to taxi and saw the conflicting traffic not holding short and asked ATC if we were to hold short for said traffic.I think ATC uses standard taxi routes when they and or the airport is busy. However using such standard taxi ROUTES takes time for the aircrew to go from the 60-9 page (airport diagram) then to scroll and look up on another page and write downtime correct routing and then go back and confirm on another page the correct routing to take. This takes time to do correctly and safely. Yet ATC has apparently given us only a set time to do all this and begin taxing.

After some delay in interpreting a 'Standard Taxi Route' clearance at DFW; the crew began to taxi; but had to made a sudden stop for conflicting traffic.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

This event occurred on a go around. Because the aircraft speed was higher than normal during the initiation of the go around; there was a smaller window to retract the gear. The gear speed limitation was exceeded.This go around was initiated because of an unstable approach. Factors were a change in the arrival runway at the last minute; ATC assigning us 310 knots or better on the arrival; and a tailwind before turning final. [This could have been avoided with] better planning on the arrival to slow and descend; asking ATC for a vector for more space; aborting the approach earlier before go around is needed; and better go around planning.

We were high and I extended the speed brakes. We were instructed to join the localizer. We joined the localizer and discussed the possibility/probability of a go around. [The First Officer] called go around and I initiated thrust levers to TOGA. I initiated a soft go around by bringing the thrust levers to climb. There was momentary confusion with which go around was being conducted combined with instructions from Tower. The autopilot disengaged at some point and the airspeed increased before the gear was fully retracted. The auto thrust also disengaged. We noticed the L/G GEAR DOOR NOT UPLOCKED ECAM but still were not slowed down and at the heading and altitude given by Tower. Once on speed heading and attitude I put auto throttles and autopilot back on. [The FO] ran the ECAM and looked it up in the QRH. We discussed what we saw. I gave him the aircraft and radio and called the flight attendants to let them know what happened and that we were coming back to land. [The FO] and I discussed what we saw on the ECAM and that we were comfortable to continue to land.I landed uneventfully and talked to maintenance after we were parked at the gate. There was confusion about which direction controllers were having the aircraft land. There was some communication confusion about the type of go around we implemented combined with the AP and auto thrust disengagement. There was a communication lag with Tower. [Some things that could help would be:]-	Being more proactive with controllers at that time of the night/morning.-	Reviewing the new soft go around procedure versus the full go around procedure.-	Saying more loudly and clearly when either pilot notices the autopilot or auto throttle disengaged.

A321 flight crew reported exceeding the landing gear retract speed limit on a go around.


Flight Crew Total 8300; Flight Crew Type 340

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

This was the last leg of a 3 day trip with show times at or before 0500 local. While descending on the Ironman arrival into LAX; we were vectored off the arrival and instructed to descend to FL240 for traffic. Shortly after beginning the descent and turning to the assigned heading; we were cleared to a further fix on the arrival and told to resume the Ironman arrival.  Because we were lower than normal as a result of the early descent clearance; we discussed vertical navigation options and elected to do a 'vertical direct to' the assigned point. The non-flying pilot entered the 'vertical direct to' and we both went through the points in the FMS to ensure all projected crossing altitudes were within STAR restrictions and agreed that they were. In hindsight; I did notice that all the normally visible waypoint altitude depictions on my vertical profile went away but was either too busy or tired to question it. The aircraft intercepted its calculated descent profile and begin descending on profile. Shortly afterwards; a new ATC sector asked about our altitude and questioned our descent profile; instructing us to level at FL190 until intercepting the Ironman arrival. We quickly assessed the situation and reloaded the arrival to ensure everything was reset; then intercepted the new descent profile and continued without incident.Fatigue and complacency strike once again. As Flying Pilot; I should have been carefully comparing our actual altitude to the STAR and not relying so much on a depicted FMS vertical profile. Being relatively new to the airplane; I am still intently watching the automation to further my understanding of its capabilities and limitations but that can't be done at the expense of the basics.

EMB-175 First Officer reported overshooting a crossing restriction on arrival to LAX.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 125; Flight Crew Type 90

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 995; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We did an in depth pre-flight of the aircraft prior to takeoff. [During] the taxi out; we felt no shakes or rattling of the gear on the airplane. We did our run up before takeoff and everything there seemed normal also. We took off normally and got vectored for our first practice approach. Upon intercepting the approach course we started the approach. Before we crossed the final approach fix we did our pre-landing checklist; upon putting the first notch of flaps in we heard a bang. My instructor then took the controls and dropped the flaps thinking it was a flap issue. We kept hearing the bang and looked out the right window of the cockpit to see our right main gear flapping in the wind and hitting the flap. My instructor [urgently notified] tower and took us in for a landing. He put it down on the runway and rode it out as far as he could on the two remaining wheels until we were yawed into the grass off the runway. The aircraft skidded and came to a stop in the grass.

It was a typical instrument training flight and the plan was to simply stay in the area and do some practice approaches. The preflight; taxi; and takeoff were typical and uneventful and the plane appeared to be airworthy and ready for flight. However; while starting our pre-landing checklist right before reaching the FAF during the ILS we encountered a major problem. Once we were slow enough to put down 10 degrees of flaps my student and I heard a loud bang and I immediately took the controls and brought the flaps back up since it seemed like it may have been a problem with the flap system. The 'banging' sound continued and upon further inspection I noticed that the entire right main landing gear had disconnected from underneath the wing and was now banging into the bottom of the right flap as well as the right side of the fuselage. I immediately notified ATC. Once we were cleared to land I touched down on the left main gear and kept the plane on that one gear until all of the lift had dissipated. At this point the right wing started to drop towards the ground since the right gear was completely separated from the rest of the plane except for the few brake lines that were keeping it from disconnecting entirely. The airplane slid off the runway and into the grass where it came to a complete stop. No one was hurt and both ATC and the emergency response team commended me on a job well done of being able to safely land the airplane in the condition that it was in. I would have done nothing different in this situation and feel grateful that I was trained and prepared to deal with it when the time arose.

PA28 instructor with student experience a loud bang when the first increment of flaps is selected during approach. The instructor takes control and retracts the flaps but the banging continues. It is then noticed that the right main gear is hanging by its brake line. The approach is continued to landing and the aircraft skids off the runway when the right wing can no longer be held up.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I only witnessed this event. I did not play a role in the event. I was not on position at the time the event occurred. I was waiting to take the position the event happened on. The local controller cleared Aircraft X for takeoff [on a parallel runway] with a heading 030. While Aircraft X was rolling; the local controller cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff [on the adjacent runway] with a heading of 310. The local controller told Aircraft Y traffic was departing the parallel runway and to maintain visual separation. The local controller never got confirmation that Aircraft Y had Aircraft X in sight. Additionally; Aircraft Y is considerably faster than Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was going to takeoff and fly right into Aircraft X because Aircraft X was instructed to turn straight in front of Aircraft Y. The only thing that stopped a NMAC or mid-air collision from occurring was Aircraft Y saw the problem unfolding and told the local controller that he would wait a few seconds before starting takeoff roll because of the other aircraft about to cross his upwind path. The local controller in question was certified [recently] without a recommendation from [the] trainers and against the [local] recommendations. I did not try to correct the situation because the Front Line Manager (FLM) at my facility undermines the trainers and gives the developmental the benefit of the doubt; which has made our opinions and recommendations worthless. The Controller in Charge (CIC) on duty was working Ground Control (GC) and Clearance Delivery (CD) combined during this event and was issuing clearances and was unable to listen or hear what headings or instructions the local controller had issued.I would recommend that FAA management; listen and contemplate input from trainers before arbitrarily signing developmental off without recommendations. I would recommend that the local controller in question be given SET training. [This individual] is not nearly ready to be a CPC and honestly has little to no clue what Air Traffic Control is.

Tower Controller reported a newly certified Local Controller cleared a faster aircraft behind a slower aircraft to depart. The pilot of the faster aircraft decided to wait longer to depart; in order to avoid a Near Mid Air Collision.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

During Inflight main cabin meal service Flight Attendant Y told me the passenger wanted the Purser. I approached them. Screens were down. Tried numerous times to reset. They asked for two seats together. I got them the last row aircraft left. Shortly; they were reported filming the crew! I asked them about it and they denied doing it. I asked them to stop as it's against company policy. We had no passenger misconduct sheets in our kits to tear off and hand them the bottom warning section. I also do not see them anywhere online. They interfered with our duties most of the flight.In the recent events being posted online we need clearer policy on how to handle these situations as they will become more common; especially as we shrink the cabins increasing the likely of more confrontations!

A Flight Attendant reported a passenger misconduct incident involving the unauthorized filming of the flight crew performing their duties.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

I was working at the sector and noticed an alert on my display on three aircraft coming from the adjacent Center. It indicated that Aircraft X; who was level at 35000 feet was in conflict with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z both climbing to 35000 feet all coming from the same adjacent Center sector.  Their 'controller' ended up stopping both Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z at 33000 feet. The problem was Aircraft Z was behind Aircraft Y and 160 knots faster. I alerted the underlying Sector controllers to the large overtake. As soon as Aircraft Y came over; the underlying sector controller stopped Aircraft Y's climb at 31000 feet. If we had not noticed the overtake; separation would have been lost approximately 10 to 15 miles outside the other ARTCC airspace. Retrain Center controllers and hold them accountable for their mistakes.

ZMP Center Controller reported the adjacent Center was handing three aircraft off that were on conflicting headings and in an overtake situation.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was an IFR overflight requesting a practice approach. I had a handful of other aircraft at the time but traffic volume was not a factor. While I had Aircraft X on a downwind heading I was also checking a full route clearance for another aircraft to ensure it was good. This resulted in a late turn to base. I realized I had an MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) issue; so I climbed Aircraft X to 8;000 ft. After doing to the low altitude alarm went off; but because I had already issued a climb I did not issue a low altitude alert. Because there is terrain along the final approach course that requires precise altitude control and base turns; I should avoid getting caught up in other duties until I have turned aircraft base; especially for fast moving aircraft.

TRACON Controller reported they were late vectoring an aircraft from downwind to base leg and the aircraft flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Outbound running about 30 minutes behind before pushback due to late inbound aircraft. Passengers loaded; entry door closed. Forward cargo door still open. First Officer notices out his window 5 rampers struggling to load an extremely large passenger mobility device. It's so big and heavy; it takes another 30 minutes to load. Delay public addresses made every 10 minutes. Operations calls us looking for an actual weight of the device from the owner of the unit. Flight Attendant relays to us 480 lbs. Operations tells us that's seriously above the weight the passenger disclosed at the gate. Nobody really knows what this thing weighs. Forward cargo door closed; tug driver checks in with me on the headset. He says they're ready for push. Considering the size of this unit; I request from him info on the device battery. He's unsure of the type; and says the battery has been removed and is sitting unpackaged next to the unit on the floor in the forward cargo. I explain that is unacceptable; that the battery needs to be in a special battery box if it's been removed. He says he'll look into it with his manager. Another 30 minutes pass.All the while; myself and the First Officer are in books looking up the exact requirements in the FOM regarding mobility devices and batteries. Tug driver checks back in and says he was wrong; that the battery is still in the unit; and that they are going to remove it. I ask what type of battery it is. He doesn't know and they're trying to find out. Based on my public addresses; the owner of the unit senses what's happening and discloses to the flight attendants that it's a non-spillable/gel battery. With this info we reference FOM 3D-XX which states: 'The battery may remain in the unit; but the unit must be upright; secured in the cargo compartment; and protected from accidental activation' (amongst a few other items).At this point; still at the gate; several passengers want off as they were going to mis-connect the last flights of the night in ZZZ1. Agent returns; bridge reconnected. Several folks deplane. I go outside to discuss situation with Crew Chief and Manager. I explain we've been informed by owner of the battery type; and that they can leave it installed if FOM 3D-XX is complied with. I observe in forward cargo; unit is upright; but not secured in place. I ask about securing unit. Chief tells me not possible; they 'never' do that and all they can do [is] put up the compartment separation nets. I ask them to do that. I then ask about accidental activation of the unit. Nobody really has a good answer.I return to the cockpit. Flight Attendant closes door. Agent pulls bridge. We push back. On taxi-out I inquire to First Officer if weight and balance is listed on the close out as required in FOM 4D-X. He says no.Enroute to ZZZ1; my First Officer finds another reference in the FOM with regards to our ordeal. Page 3D-XY; which states that a non-spillable gel battery 'must' be removed from device and packaged in a battery box. This directly conflicts with page 3D-XX. With these two conflicting references; I am quite unsure if we were legal or not regarding leaving the battery installed. I also feel I really stretched the rules regarding device security by accepting the Chief's explanation that all they had were the dividing nets; and no way to tie this thing down. And as far as 'accidental activation;' this is vague and very unclear how to comply. I also should not have departed without weight and balance on the close out; but felt covered because I was aware of the battery onboard.

Passenger had a large wheelchair/scooter to check. Ramp had difficulty loading due to weight (480 lbs). When all doors closed; Captain asked about compliance with policy on wheelchair batteries. Ramp did not know compliance. Flight crew looked and initially found that the non-spillable wet batteries can be kept in the device provided that the terminals were disconnected or device is made not to accidentally operate. It was later in flight that we looked harder and found that the initial document was the Operations Manual 1 (OM1) and in the FOM; it states that all batteries must be removed and stored in a separate rigid box. Ramp was unaware of this; so was Supervisor; and ZZZ Operations. HAZMAT phone number would not help since it wasn't cargo; and transferred us to customer service.ZZZ Operations and flight crew did not know the policy for this device. Flight crew tried to expedite the search and ended up using the wrong document (OM1 versus FOM). When OM1 is no longer in use; remove it from [the EFB]. Also; ramp and Operations should be trained and familiar with cargo operations more that the flight crews.

B737-800 flight crew reported communication breakdown between flight crew and Dispatch/Ground Personnel regarding battery powered mobility device transport configuration.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 206; Flight Crew Type 8500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

As we taxied out to our assigned spot the First Officer contacted DEN Ground Control who cleared us to taxi to Runway 17R via Mike. We proceeded out the ramp and made a right turn southbound onto Taxiway Mike. During the turn onto Mike the Ground Controller told us to monitor Tower. As the First Officer was making the switch to Tower; I heard the Ground Controller say our Company name and the first number of our call sign. I asked the First Officer to return to the Ground and query the Controller. At this time; we were already southbound on Taxiway Mike. I noticed an aircraft approaching opposite direction on the same taxiway we were on (Mike). I slowed the aircraft; brought it to a stop; and set the parking brake. The First Officer had; by then; made contact with the Ground Controller who said she had issued the wrong taxi instructions and had tried to correct herself after telling us to monitor the Tower frequency. We had heard the very beginning of this transmission as referenced above. The result was two aircraft facing each other on Taxiway Mike with no exit options. The Controller asked if either of us could make a 180 on the taxiway. I declined as there was not adequate room to do so. The other aircraft declined as well. We ended up coordinating with Ground; Airport Operations; and Company for a tug to come out a push us back north of CN so the other aircraft could taxi past and we could proceed. All procedures and checklists were followed per Company standard and the push operation completed. The flight proceeded without further incident. It should be noted that the other carrier involved in the incursion placed blame for the situation on us. This is incorrect and the pilots of the other aircraft did not have all the facts. My First Officer attempted to correct their assertion but was unsuccessful.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

An error by the Ground Controller; followed up by a correction transmitted after the outbound B737NG flight crew had switched to Tower frequency as cleared; resulted in a nose to nose condition with an inbound B757 with no available intersection on which to exit. A tug was dispatched to push the reporters' aircraft beyond their outbound crossing taxiway to allow the inbound to proceed.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

When I was given command of the aircraft; it was below Class A airspace on a VFR flight plan at 15;000 MSL. The altimeter setting was set as appropriate for the airspace and altitude it was in. I decided to climb to FL190 and activate our IFR flight plan. After reaching FL190 I forgot to reset my altimeter setting to 29.92. The effect of this was that the aircraft was flying approximately 300 feet lower than indicated by my altimeter. I did not notice this until questioned about it by the Center Controller approximately 20 minutes after reaching FL190. I corrected my error and the aircraft resumed flight at the correct altitude.

A UAV pilot failed to reset the altimeter when the aircraft was climbed to FL190 from 15;000 MSL. ATC questioned the altitude readout and the error was corrected.


Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[While working the] pre-installation inspection; we found the left-hand main landing gear harness misrouted. The wiring to anti-skid transducers was reversed. The inboard wheel harness was routed to the outboard and vice versa. Connector 7GV-B routed to inboard position and connector 9GV-B to outboard position. We had to correct wiring routing to the correct sides. There needs to be better quality control at the landing gear vendor or bring back the work in-house.

Before installing the new left-hand main landing gear; Inspection noticed the anti skid transducer wiring harnesses were reversed with harness connector 7GV-B routed to inboard position and 9GV-B routed to outboard position. We had to reroute the harnesses to the correct sides. The overhaul vendor quality assurance needs to be improved.

Maintenance personnel indentified improperly routed antiskid wiring harnessess during pre-installation checks following vendor overhaul of main landing gear assemblies


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Right downwind ORD 27R descending in heavy icing conditions. Aircraft encountered heavy ice in the descent between 8000 and 4000 ft. Engine and Wing anti-ice had been selected 'on' before entering icing conditions appoximately 5 minutes prior to event. Tail deice had not been activated at this point. Aircraft was level at 4000 ft and 250 kts.ATC issued us to slow to 210 kts and a 90 degree right turn to heading 180. The combination of flaps being extended; a 25 degree bank turn and ice on tail prevented the slow speed trim from keeping up with nose down tendencies. Aircraft started to sink rapidly in the turn.  Upon realization that the autopilot was not satisfactorily flying the airplane; the autopilot was disconnected as well as autothrottles. The aircraft was in a extreme out of trim nose down situation.Corrective inputs were applied and required aggressive correction to stop the sink. By the time the aircraft was recovered and climbing; we had lost 400 ft. The tail deice was applied and the autopilot was engaged for a normal ILS approach. In heavy icing conditions; the tail deice needs to be run more often.

MD-83 flight crew reported encountering tail ice on approach to ORD resulting in a 400 FT altitude deviation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

C FA (Flight Attendant) approached me when while the D and I were doing the entertainment tablet cart. He told me to follow him in the back galley and asked me if I smelled any gasoline type of smell. I told him I did. It smelled like some type of gas scent when turning on a burner and the gas doesn't produce a fire but a gasoline smell. We checked the lavatories or looked at any equipment to see if anything was producing a stronger scent but we could not find anything. C FA then proceeded to call the pilots and the pilots asked us to ask a deadheading Captain we had on board to see if there was anything unfamiliar to him. C FA handled the rest of the situation. This was a scary situation and granted we did not feel any medical effects but slight headaches but hopefully nothing too serious may come from this.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported a fume event occurred during cruise and was unable to determine the source of the odor.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Departed ZZZ enroute to ZZZ2. As we were climbing through FL250; we heard a loud bang and noticed that the Right-Side B Panel Window was shattered. In less than 40 seconds; the window let go and we experienced an explosive decompression. Immediately began an emergency descent with intentions of diverting to ZZZ1. During the emergency descent; ATC was unable to hear our radio calls [requesting priority handling] until we reached a lower altitude when there was less wind noise in the flight deck. It was also hard to hear crew-to-crew communication. We were able to communicate with each other utilizing hand signals. Besides glass; the only known objects that departed through the window were: Oakley Conductor 8 sunglasses and case; Clarity Aloft Headset Case; 6 ft. charging cable for Apple products; aircraft cupholder; tinted sunshade visor; energy drink; plastic Fiji water bottle; and a can of Copenhagen Mint smokeless tobacco.

Approximately 15 minutes after departing ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1 while climbing through 25;000 ft.; we heard a loud pop and determined that part of the copilot side aft window had cracked. We slowed our climb rate and within 30 seconds the rest of the window gave way and we experienced an explosive decompression. We immediately executed an emergency descent. Crew was transmitting our intentions but with excessive wind noise; could not establish communication with ATC. After descending to [a] safe altitude and slowing [the] aircraft to minimize wind noise; we were able to establish communication with ATC and were issued a clearance to land on a visual approach to Runway XX at ZZZ1. We landed and taxied in with no further issues. Emergency and medical personnel were waiting when we arrived...

Hawker 4000 flight crew reported the cockpit window breaking away inflight resulted in an explosive decompression. The flight crew performed a successful diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 186; Flight Crew Type 7000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

The incident occurred enroute at FL350. Left center tank fuel pump was MEL inop. We took off with 1800 pounds in center tank. After center tank drained; had approximately a 1700-pound fuel imbalance with right side heavier. We transferred fuel; and had both tanks stable at about 6500 pounds each. Right main fuel tank quantity indicator intermittently went to zero many times at cruise; then remained at zero. We wrote up discrepancy in the logbook; and were in process of sending Maintenance message describing condition when left main fuel tank quantity indicator began to intermittently show zero. While attempting to verify fuel on board in FMC; I noticed the FMC fuel onboard total drop from 10.3 to 4.3 in less than one minute. I verified FMC routing to eliminate a routing discrepancy causing the FMC fuel reading to possibly be erroneous. No discrepancy existed; and the total fuel on board number in the FMC continued to rapidly decrease. Without reliable main fuel tank quantity indicators; and with the FMC fuel quantity rapidly decreasing; I made the decision to initiate a rapid descent; and requested nearest suitable airport from ATC. My concern was a fuel leak; and I had no way of verifying fuel on board. No caution or warning; or low pressure lights illuminated. I flew aircraft; communicated with ATC; and communicated with the Flight Attendants and Passengers; while First Officer prepared landing data and communicated with Dispatch.  We performed an uneventful flaps 40 landing.I feel the main contributing factor in this situation is the aging condition of the 737-Classic series fleet. It is not uncommon to have multiple MELs on these aircraft for major components like fuel pumps and gauges.

B737 Captain reported a loss of fuel quantity indication at FL350 with the FMC showing decreasing fuel. Fearing a possible fuel leak the Captain elected to divert to a suitable alternate.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

During cruise flight; at FL330; the Flight Attendants called the Flight Deck and informed myself and the First Officer that there was a noticeable odor in the cabin; and the odor appeared to be getting stronger. The First Officer and I began reviewing the Cabin Fire/Smoke Checklist. The Lead Flight Attendant called the Flight Deck again and stated that the cabin lights had been turned off; and the odor had dissipated rapidly. The Cabin Crew suspected that there might be a problem with one of the ballasts. The odor never returned during the rest of the flight.After some time had passed; we were informed by the Cabin Crew that the aft left lavatory was very hot; and the walls and floor of the airplane in that area were too hot to even touch. They advised that they could feel the heat of the floor through their shoes. After receiving this information; I told the Flight Attendants to keep me advised of any changes; I transferred controls to the First Officer; and then I declared an emergency with ATC and asked for their help in finding a nearby suitable diversion airfield. I then made a PA to the passengers that we would be executing a landing in [a nearby airport]; and to follow the instructions of the crewmembers. We descended and landed normally; and we had [emergency services] inspect the exterior of the aircraft. The [emergency services] Captain advised me that through infrared he could see large heat signatures in the back of the aircraft; in particular; he advised that the bags in the aft cargo compartment appeared to be glowing. Once [emergency services] advised that the aircraft was cleared; and the Flight attendants reported that there were no adverse changes in the cabin; we proceeded to the north transient ramp and deplaned via the forward stairs; with [emergency services] continuously standing by and monitoring. More effective aircraft maintenance and inspection procedures.

MD-80 Captain reported diverting to an alternate after heat and odor were noticed in the cabin.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were taxiing to the runway. I opened my tablet to access the safety PA and it was not there. I notified the Captain that my PAs were not on my tablet. We were nearing take-off so I gave the safety PA by memory. After take-off; the #2; #4 and I realized we could not find our PAs or our manuals on our tablet. I spoke with the FO and he informed me that there was a systemwide outage of the Safety Manual.

Noticed after takeoff that my in flight manual was not downloading to my tablet.

Flight Attendants reported a system wide failure of the Safety Manual required them to recite safety announcements from memory.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After arriving at the aircraft my First Officer (FO) informed me we would need to de-ice after completing his walk around.  The FO contacted dispatch to coordinate the de-icing prior to push back.  We were informed we would be de-iced after push back prior to taxi.  All checklists and procedures up to and including the Engines on APU Off de-ice checklist were accomplished without issue.  The de-ice supervisor approached the aircraft on foot and connected his headset to the forward mechanic call communication jack at the right forward nose of the aircraft. The FO informed the supervisor we were configured 'engine's on APU off; type one only'.  The deice crew brought two trucks over; one person exited one truck climbed into the bucket of the other truck.  I noticed the exhaust from the deice engine on the truck start and they began deicing the left wing.  I noticed the fluid exiting the truck was cold; no steam coming from the fluid or emitting from the wing once applied.  I flashed the wing taxi lights at the truck to obtain their attention as they were not communicating with us.  The supervisor reattached via the mechanic call connection on the nose of the aircraft.We informed him the fluid coming from the truck was cold.  The supervisor made contact with the de-ice crew who stopped deicing.  Another truck soon showed up and they restarted the deicing procedure at the left wing.  Once the deicing truck moved to the right wing the deice supervisor once again connected to the mechanic call jack and informed us deicing was complete.  We asked him who performed the tactile check to which he replied he did.  This was impossible as the wing was still being deiced. We contacted Operations to warn another company aircraft who was waiting in the hardstand area to reposition there aircraft to our gate who would also need to be deiced.  They said they too saw no steam coming from our aircraft or the deice fluid and thanked us for the heads up.Deice crews appeared to be ill prepared to start deicing procedures at 0600 local time and/or lacked properly working equipment and/or training.

After configuring the aircraft and checking in with the de-ice supervisor; a CRJ200 Captain notes that no steam is rising from the Type I fluid as it is being applied. The process is stopped and another truck is summoned with heated fluid. It is also noted that a tactile check is not accomplished when the Supervisor reports the process complete.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

I and my Developmental were starting a pre-brief to assume the A-AR position for training.  It was moderately busy; but somewhat chaotic due to recently certified controllers on the positions involved.  The A-AR 'Controller' had just begun the position relief briefing when I noticed Aircraft X at 8;000 FT; on a converging course nose to nose; with Aircraft Y; descending out of 9;000 feet.  It was probably too late to avert an OE at this point.  I tried to coordinate verbally with the E-AR Controller to formulate a plan to maintain/re-establish separation between the aircraft; but could not get a response.  At this point it was becoming a critical safety situation; so I basically told the A-AR Controller to 'do something; anything.'  The most frightening part of this incident was that both 'controllers' were frozen; with the E-AR Controller doing nothing to fix the impending problem and not communicating that he was even aware of the problem; and the A-AR Controller was too busy complaining and yelling across the room to take action to avert it.I don't know how you fix this.  The last ATM brought in and overwhelmed the facility with 15 developmentals with no formal training program in place.  We have a million dollar ETG lab that sat unused due to lack of personnel/staffing/expertise.  There was no cadre of professional OJTI's.  Due to the number of developmentals; everyone trained these people.  This is a complex facility; and it requires nuanced training by experienced controllers to make new controllers successful.  Instead; we had freshly minted CPC's training developmentals.  We now have a majority of controllers here with low CPC time; and no other FAA experience.  Yet the Memphis hub believes now is the time to cut staffing at P31 by 20-25%.

P31 Controller describes head on situation where controllers talking to the two aircraft do nothing to stop the operational error or fix the situation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Total 2245; Flight Crew Type 2245

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Pushing back from [gate] in ZZZ. We were anticipating a taxi to Runway XXL and the FMGC was set up to reflect that. Called for pushback clearance was told to push tail south to the grass and expect Runway XY for departure. Being a ZZZ1 based crew these instructions were a little foreign to us; but were relayed to the ground crew and pushback began. Communication with our ground personnel was a little strained as the tug drive had a little bit of an accent and was hard to make out. The instructions to expect Runway XY required us to revise our pre-departure plan to now include the starting of the second motor due to the short taxi. During the pushback; I was heads down resetting the box and loading the data for our new runway of departure. I was listening in on intercom but wasn't giving it my fully attention; as I was starting the engines. The pushback was complete right around the same time as I verified the need to start the second motor with the Captain. I do not recall ever hearing 'pushback complete; set brake' from the ground crew; but it may have been stated as all other procedure from there seemed to occur normally. The tug driver disconnected and ground personnel released us.The Captain was heads down verifying our new speeds and departure procedure in the FMGC as I finished my after start flow and shutdown the APU. It was about this time that we both looked up as the aircraft was slowly rolling forward and gaining a little speed. The Captain and I both got on the brakes and brought the aircraft to a stop a little abruptly; but not violently. We estimate that we probably rolled about 10-20 ft. forward unaware. We did not come into contact with anything and after verifying that the flight attendants we all ok from our sudden stop; we continued on our way.

A320 Captain reported non-standard communication with ground crew during pushback caused the aircraft to roll forward after being disconnected.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Encountered severe gyro magnetic compass precession while positioned on the roof top helicopter pad at a Hospital. Following the patient drop off leg; I completed the start and before takeoff checklist. Prior to lift off I completed an instrument operational check and noted that the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) had precessed from 310 degrees to 212 degrees in a matter of 27 minutes while the aircraft was parked on the roof top pad. While this anomaly can be attributed to Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) equipment; in this case the MRI is located many floors beneath the helicopter landing pad. Numerous exhaust turbines; and intake turbines are located on the roof top pad; which may contribute to magnetic anomalies. Normally the precession can be corrected by manually slewing the HSI through the gyro magnetic compass control synchronization switch control panel. Aircraft DOES NOT have this panel installed; and the HSI cannot be manually controlled between Magnetic mode (MAG-the gyro slewed to the flux valve heading) or DG mode; operating the gyro as a free (uncontrolled) gyroscope; essentially rendering the HSI useless. This presents a significant safety issue. Both in not being able to manually control the HSI to make compass corrections; it creates a significant inability to fly accurate navigation heading and routes. There is no capability to fly IFR at this point. Furthermore; if the pilot was to encounter an Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IIMC) the precession of the gyro could induce a loss of situational awareness. This base is an IFR capable base; however with an inability to manually slew the HSI; and input corrections; this capability and the safety of flight is severely compromised Install gyro magnetic compass control synchronization switch control panel. Enabling the pilot to manually slew the gyro magnetic (HSI) compass.

An ECD-EC135 helicopter compass precessed nearly ninety degrees while parked on a hospital roof for 27 minutes but because this particular aircraft had no compass slew installed to correct the heading error; the aircraft was rendered non-IFR capable.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

The Final Approach Controller in ATL was frustrated with our descent rate. We were inbound from the west on the WARRR1 RNAV Arrival; landing Runway 28. We were given the descent from 12;000 feet to 7;000 feet and did so in level (LVL) change (CHG) at 210 knots. Then there were two large buildups that we had to fly through; generating a period of moderate turbulence. After passing through this area of weather; we extended flaps to two. When we were handed off to the Final Controller; we were given a descent to 3;000 feet; our cue to be ready for the approach; so we extended flaps to five; still in LVL CHG at 210 knots. Shortly thereafter he called; frustrated with our descent rate. At 210 knots; the only thing left was to lower the landing gear; which we did while still on downwind. I know we need to descend quickly and I thought we were configuring appropriately. During the period of moderate turbulence; I believe our descent rate was reduced and situational awareness can be less in a cloud. I believe these were both contributing factors.

We then got a descent clearance; knowing we had to expedite; the FO selected Level Change on the MCP (we were slowed to 210 knots by ATC); then we entered another buildup with moderate turbulence and updrafts. The FO pushed the power up a little and I questioned that action. He stated he didn't want the aircraft to slow below 210 knots; I then explained that it wouldn't; the MCP would use pitch to maintain the airspeed. We exited the buildup and the turbulence; extended flaps to assist with the descent rate. The controller was not happy and yelled at us to descend faster. I responded that we were doing the best we could. We then extended the gear to get the aircraft down faster maintaining our assigned airspeed of 210 knots. We both understood the need for an expeditious descent on the arrival and were trying to accommodate the best we could. The weather and the aircraft type played a large role in our difficulty with getting descended faster. The older model aircraft are more speed restricted on the flaps; and the updrafts of the buildups compounded the situation. Without flaps the best descent rate is 1;000 FPM at 210 knots. With the history of spindle failures I am reluctant to maintain 210 knots with flaps extended; but at ATL there isn't a choice. The controller's demeanor was intimidating and unnecessary. I understand his arrival demand but with our current procedures we were doing the best we could.

A B737 crew on the ATL WARRR1 RNAV STAR were descending slower than expected due to weather which caused the TRACON Controller grief as it was conflicting with their outbound aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After engine shutdown and completion of parking checklist at the arrival gate in ZZZZ; the Aft Cargo Bay Smoke Warning Light illuminated with ECAM warning. The aft cargo bay was still closed and the jet bridge was connected. However; the cabin door had not been opened nor [was] deplaning commenced; for unknown reason. The flight crew complied with the Aft Cargo Smoke Warning ECAM to include securing the cabin fans and activating the AGENT 1 discharge into the aft cargo bin. Unfortunately; flight crew could not communicate the smoke indication to the ground crew quick enough and the aft cargo bin was opened 1-2 minutes after the agent was discharged.Captain notified Tower of the aft cargo bay smoke indications and the fire trucks and personnel were needed at the aircraft. Inflight was notified and no obvious signs of smoke were evident in the cabin. The Captain could not contact Operations or the Ramp on the radio or intercom and gate personnel had still not opened the cabin door; so the Captain elected to open the cabin door. The First Officer went down to the ramp to notify ground personnel. He noted no obvious signs of fire or smoke at that time.The Captain was still unable to find gate agents [and] so ordered an orderly deplaning of the customers after notifying them that we had indications of smoke in the aft cargo bin but saw no signs at that time of smoke or fire in cabin or cargo bins. Captain tried to communicate to station firefighters of the situation and that the agent/Halon bottle had been emptied into the aft cargo bin. After deplaning and seeing no obvious signs of smoke or fire; the Captain called Dispatch/Maintenance on SATCOM to notify them of the agent discharge and the subsequent logbook write-up. Firefighting personnel indicated to the Captain that the situation was under control. Maintenance personnel arrived and Captain briefed them on the cargo smoke indication and logbook write-up. Captain notified inflight that the aircraft would have to be serviced before their return flight to ZZZ and that there would probably be a lengthy delay and that they should contact crew services. Flight crew departed the aircraft.

A321 Captain reported a communication breakdown with Ground Control while figuring out an issue with the aft cargo compartment smoke warning light and ECAM message.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

From a brief conversation with the MX personnel he ran test and noted that all systems check good. He mentioned to us that the message could have come up as a result of a faulty indicator but was not sure.At Cruise altitude about 30 minutes from landing we were preparing for approach to landing. Preparing landing data and briefing the approach when we received a R BLEED DUCT warning message. We conducted the immediate action checklist. As we finished the checklist from memory; both valves closed within about 10 seconds. At this time we verified our work since it happened so fast to ensure we did the procedure from memory correctly and we had. As this was happening; the cabin was already loosing pressure at a rate of about 4700 FPM. We initiated a descent to 10;000 feet and declared an emergency. As this is happening we simultaneously conducted the immediate action checklist for loss of cabin pressure. Once that checklist was completed and we are making our emergency descent we proceeded to do the QRH for R Bleed Duct. When descending through approximately 20;000 feet the passenger oxygen mask deployed. At the same time we determined that the nearest suitable airport was the departure airport and decided to divert. On the ground we entered the discrepancy for R Bleed Duct warning and for oxygen mask deployed.We conducted the memory items from the immediate action checklist but we do believe that the 30 seconds mentioned in the QRH for the bleed to close was closer to about 5-7 seconds. We were left with no time to react to the situation on hand and made the decision to do an emergency descent based on the loss of cabin pressure.

A CRJ-700 EICAS alerted R BLEED DUCT at cruise altitude. The crew completed the immediate action checklist which closed both bleed valves and depressurized the cabin. The cabin oxygen masks deployed during descent to 10;000 feet and diversion to a nearby airport.


Number two engine did not accelerate past 53 percent on takeoff roll. First Officer called for an abort. I aborted at slow speed and cleared the runway. After further evaluation and discussion with Maintenance; we returned to the gate.

A B737 Captain reported aborting takeoff when number 2 engine did not accelerate past 53 percent. The crew returned to the gate.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

During cruise flight; the fuel selector handle on my Beech Bonanza V35B was moved from the RH tank position where it had been since takeoff to the LH position. This aircraft has four positions; as it has tip tanks. In order; they are Left Tip; LH Main; RH Main; and Right Tip. Each position has a detent. In reconstructing what happened; I believe that the fuel selector didn't quite make it into the detent position when I switched to LH. If it is not in the detent; it is effectively OFF. About two minutes after the switch; we had a complete engine failure. I contacted Approach and as we were nearly over an airport; said I intended to land there. After quickly switching tanks back to the original tank; the engine came back to life and we made a normal landing with emergency equipment standing by.On this day; I deviated from my normal procedure of always starting on the Left Main; and then switching to the Right Main after 30 minutes. I started on the Right Main and therefore was turning the lever in the opposite direction than that which I'm accustomed to. I believe this contributed to the incident as it was not my normal motion. I would add that it is very difficult in this model Bonanza to visually verify the selector position while the seat is pulled forward to the position occupied in flight.Lesson learned is that always do it the same way; and visually verify the position even if it means sliding the seat back for a moment or two.

A Bonanza V35B pilot failed to place his fuel tank selector completely in the right main tank detent which starved the engine of fuel. He diverted to a nearby airport but the engine had restarted before landing with the tank selector fully in the detent.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Preflight; taxi; and takeoff were uneventful; and followed SOP (Standard Operating Procedures). Approximately 1 hour into cruise; and under radar control with Center; we passed over a waypoint and noted our time and fuel remaining for the FPR [Flight Plan Route]. In addition; we selected the full engine display and immediately noted the left engine oil quantity indicated 10 quarts. The right engine indicated 18 (normal). The Captain and I concurred that 10 was not normal. Within 5 minutes; it indicated 9. The Captain sent an ACARS message to our Dispatcher. I suggested a SAT phone call to [Operations Control] which included Tech/Maintenance; which was done. We all concurred that if the left engine oil quantity dropped to 8; we would return to ZZZ. Within minutes; the oil quantity indicated 8. The Captain passed control of the aircraft to me and began coordinating our return; calling our [Relief Pilot] off break; advising our flight attendants; and informing the passengers. I contacted Center; requested and received immediate clearance to ZZZ. With the Captain concurrence; I reduced the left engine to idle; and descended to FL210; selecting 270 knots (avoided the need for max N1 on the right engine). The Captain continued to coordinate with Dispatch (desk 81) requesting ARFF as a precaution; as well as the required information for HAZMAT loaded in the forward cargo. The Captain resumed his role as Pilot Flying for the remainder of the flight. We [requested priority handling] with Approach Control; and made an uneventful (overweight) approach and landing on Runway XXR. Our debrief was simple: It was a textbook R9; with a few lessons learned along the way.Apparent oil leak on a high-pressure oil line (per Maintenance).

Flight Crew encountered engine oil leak and landed uneventfully.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 247; Flight Crew Type 13500

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Type 800

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon main gear touchdown and thrust reverser deployment; Tower asked us which gate we were going to. The First Officer hesitated a moment as the radio call during that phase of flight is highly unusual and distracting. It surprised both of us. He responded 'Gate X'; Tower said to use Taxiway N and said something about whether to contact Ground or not. When we cleared at N; I asked the First Officer if we were supposed to contact Ground or stay with Tower. This is where I normally start the clock to monitor engine cooling time; this also serves as a double check that the engine is still running. We were told to contact Ground. I was watching the construction area to our right as the First Officer contacted Ground and followed the circuitous route to Gate; a pretty short taxi. I entered the safety zone thinking I had shut down the right engine; stopped the aircraft; shut down the Number 1 Engine; and got the chocks in signal. No Ramp Personnel entered the safety zone; and they contacted me to let me know that the Number 2 Engine was still running. I secured the engine and completed the Parking Checklist. I must visually verify the position of each start lever and assume nothing. The system worked in that the ramp personnel did not enter the safety zone with the engine running except to install the chocks. The Marshaller does not have the optimum position to see if the Number 2 Engine is running. If ATC wants us to use a certain taxiway; tell us on final; not as soon as the tires touch the runway! This distraction added to a dynamic phase of flight; a short taxi and making sure we were clear of a construction area. We got out of our flow and this distraction helped set in motion a chain of events that could have ended quite differently. Our Ramp personnel; by following proper procedures; stopped the chain of errors that posed a threat. They are to be commended for this. Verifying the status of a given aircraft system is essential to prevent this from happening again.

...due to Company Project work; I had not flown in two months and [had already] noticed I was not performing my flows routinely......I; as pilot not flying; failed. Checklists are there for a reason. I should have caught that the start lever was not in correct position when reading the [Shutdown] Checklist.

Distracted by an inappropriate ATC communication as they touched down and a circuitous routing to the nearby gate due to construction; the flight crew of a B737-500 failed to shut down the right engine during the taxi-in as planned and then failed to note it was still running after gate arrival until advised by ramp personnel.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 3420; Flight Crew Type 325

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing

Departing Runway 1; given initial heading 330; climb to 2;000. Tower handed off to PHL Approach. Approach cleared me to 9;000. Approach then called Traffic Alert one o'clock turn immediately to 270 degrees. After I did not respond immediately; Approach said 'radio check' turn immediately to 270 degrees. I responded; turned and continued my climb. Traffic (I never saw) passed behind me. Several factors contributed:1. Other aircraft was in ILG Class D airspace apparently not in contact with ILG Tower or Approach.2. ILG Tower Controller may have been 'in training.'3. PHL Approach Controller was incredibly busy; potentially missing the potential conflict until he received a traffic alert. As the country is 'opening up' post COVID; anticipated level of weekend air traffic appeared to be underestimated.4. Controller called the traffic at 1 O'clock; turn left. Natural tendency to want to look for the traffic; which would be blocked by the engine/wing in the turn. This delayed my action. Suggestion: Controller state 'Traffic Alert' make immediate turn to XXX. Do not state the location of the traffic. If it's that urgent; it's too late to start looking.5. My avionics unit was in flight plan mode (anticipating getting a 'cleared direct to' (which I received almost immediately after the incident)); not traffic mode. Even though I was in Class D airspace; overlaid by Class B; on an IFR clearance and given a Radar Vector; it was VMC. Having the avionics unit set to traffic would have potentially provided an additional traffic alert. Difficult to say as this all happened in the first 60-90 seconds after takeoff when workload is at the highest.

Pilot reported receiving a traffic alert shortly after takeoff requiring immediate evasive action. Pilot noted that the PHL TRACON Controller seemed incredibly busy; thereby potentially missing the conflict.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On VOR-A approach just short of the VOR passage at a 2800; VOR 1 DME became erroneous. This distracted us for a moment and PIC switched his screen to VOR/ILS system 2 to read correct DME. VOR2 DME seemed to be working. Because we were so close to station passage and the next step down altitude was after VOR passage; we descended to the next step down altitude too soon. When we left 2800 ft. the airport was in sight and was VMC. We were then aware that we descended early by a mile or two prior to the VOR and received a cautionary TAWS (Terrain Avoidance and Warning System) once but at that point we arrested the descent and adjusted the flight path and the alert had gone away and by then we had crossed the VOR and were at the altitude we were supposed to be at. The circle approach and landing were normal.10 minutes after landing DME 1 corrected itself and we contacted Maintenance control to let them know about DME 1and they informed us nothing was wrong with the plane.

ATR 42-500 pilot crew reported the #1 DME was malfunctioning and receiving a CFTT alert.