Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working sector 21/01 by myself.  It was a very slow period.  Aircraft X who was at the time direct PERMT climbing to his requested final altitude keys up asking if there was any known drone activity in the area.  The pilot sounded very shaken up.  I said not that I was aware of and called my Supervisor over to verify.  My Supervisor calls the DEN [Domestic Event Network] to confirm and the OM came down asking for the pilot to give as much detail of the drone as the pilot could remember. Aircraft X informed us that he saw the suspected drone when he was climbing out of FL250.  He said the drone was southbound; large; and moving rapidly.  Aircraft X also determined the drone to be white with wings.  There was never a primary target observed on the radar scope.  I then asked my Supervisor what steps I should follow concerning the drone and he said nothing else was required.  I didn't feel comfortable with this and knew the sector to the west of mine works a lot of Miami arrival traffic descending in that area so I called to inform them and also continued to call the last known position altitude and direction of flight of the drone until I had several aircraft report not seeing it. When asked if I needed to fill out any reports my supervisor told me no.  Also when I asked for how long I should call the drone and if the supervisor reported it to the Carr area since the drone was last reported southbound and that would be the next area it would violate if still on that heading the supervisor reported no since we did not know where the drone was.  In my opinion that would be the exact reason why we would want to inform the aircraft and other controllers in the vicinity so that the pilots could be more diligent scanning their surroundings. It was suspected that the occurrence was military based on the altitude and position so far from land of the drone.  I wasn't made privy if that was in fact what happened.  But if so I hope the military would be more diligent in keeping us informed of possible drone activity especially in a position where we have dense traffic periods.  Also I believe we need to have better standard procedures in place for dealing with an unmanned aircraft as far as what the pilot needs to report and if we need to call other sectors or inform other pilots in the area.

ZMA Controller while working a combined position is asked by a pilot of any known drone activity in the area. Pilot reports to Controller of observing a drone. Controller advises superiors and wonders what to do next.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was the Pilot-in-Command and; shortly after departing; we were told by ATC to expect 8000 feet as a final altitude for the duration of the flight. Our dispatch flight release planned cruise altitude was 20;000 feet; so we were concerned 8000 feet would be problematic. We contacted dispatch to obtain new performance information; including updated fuel burn data for cruise flight at 8000 feet. While waiting for this information; ATC then instructed our flight to descend to 6000 feet. We notified ATC that we were still calculating our new performance numbers but did not believe the lower altitude would help our situation. ATC was insistent on the descent to a lower altitude. Still waiting for our dispatcher to finish the calculations and without having appropriate performance data readily available in the cockpit; we declared 'minimum fuel' with ATC. As a result; ATC was able to give us 16;000 feet as a final altitude and an enroute short-cut; two factors that significantly improved our fuel burn performance. We also notified our dispatcher of our 'minimum fuel' declaration. The flight continued normally and landed safely. Our arrival fuel at touchdown was 3160lbs.[Company] EMB145 pilots do not have appropriate performance data; as it pertains to low-level fuel burn; readily available to them in the cockpit. Because of the time it can take [Operations Control] to calculate this performance data; it would increase situational awareness and improve pilot knowledge if appropriate performance data was made readily available to pilots in the cockpit.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-145 flight crew reported ATC cleared them for a final altitude that was lower than planned and revised performance information was not readily available.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X was IAFDOF (Inappropriate Altitude for Direction of Flight) at 120 eastbound and there was traffic opposite direction at 120. I had addressed the situation with the R-side who had just sat down. The MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) in the area was 110. The decision was made to descend Aircraft X to 110. I am not sure if I was on the line coordinating or working on another situation but I did not hear the clearance to descend nor the read back but Aircraft X descended below 110 and was through 106 when the R-side verified the altitude restriction. Aircraft X was issued a clearance to climb and maintain 110 which he stated he thought the original clearance was to 100.

ZLC Controller reported a PA28 descended below Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 1400

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Shortly after leveling off at FL410; and while still accelerating to cruise speed; I turned off the nacelle heat switches that had been used on the initial climb. This caused an increase in EPR; which resulted in an immediate right engine flameout due to the internal pressure change in the engine. We requested descent to FL200 for the engine re-start procedure. Center granted this request. We descended to below FL250; restarted the engine in accordance with the checklist procedure. We then requested climb to cruise altitude and completed the flight normally from that point. The aircraft remained in full control at all times.

When a Lear 25 pilot turned the right engine nacelle heat OFF after leveling and accelerating at FL410 it flamed out so during descent toward FL200 he restarted the engine and returned to FL410.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

During a SID departure (BULRN1 RNAV) we lost FMS/GPS Navigation capability. We were unable to navigate VIA FMS/GPS immediately after departure. ATC was notified. Unable to find information in the QRH to resolve the issue. ATC issued radar vectors to the next intersection on the RNAV departure. ATC then issued radar vectors to a VOR along the course of flight. Due to the distance from SOT VOR we were unable to navigate to the VOR. ATC was advised and we continued to with radar vectors to the VOR. After about 30 minutes the non-pilot flying was able to reset the GPS and reinitialize our position. We had no further issues with GPS navigation for the duration of the flight.

HS125 Captain experiences loss of FMS/GPS navigation capability shortly after takeoff from IAD. Radar vectors are requested from PCT. Thirty minutes after takeoff full navigation capability is regained.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working the radar position at Sector XX without a D-side. Traffic volume was high and increasing throughout my time at [Sector] XX. At the time; I had numerous aircraft transitioning my airspace southwest bound requiring a point out or hand off to sector(s) XX; XY; and YY. In addition to the high traffic volume we had flow restrictions going into ZZZ that added to my workload. When I saw the PVD indicator in the data blocks of the aircraft transitioning my airspace southwest bound I assumed that Sector YX had a data block. I was correct on all but Aircraft Y; who was not PVD'd to YX for reasons unknown to me. Maybe I mistyped the sector number? I don't know. But I did not catch it because I was busy and did not verify that YX had accepted the Point Out by clicking on the PVD indicator or checking the URET (User Request Evaluation Tool).Ultimately; the data block popped at Sector XX's boundary and began flashing with Aircraft X who had been issued FL290. Aircraft X was climbing through FL240 at the time and the radar controller issued an amended altitude clearance of FL270. A traffic call was issued to both aircraft.Our staffing is not adequate to provide the support we need on position in the form of D-sides or trackers. We are not afforded enough break time in between being on position. We do not have enough CPC's to properly staff the area.Management and TMU (Traffic Management Unit) are not doing their jobs by slowing traffic down to manageable levels for the amount of staffing in the area.Our low staffing has also resulted in excessive overtime assignments in the area leading to burnout and/or work fatigue.

Center Controller reported an airspace violation associated with presumed equipment issues.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Captain Pilot Monitoring (PM); First Officer (FO) pilot flying. Discussed LEETZ4 departure and the crossing and speed restrictions for departure. PDC was climb via SID maintain 10;000 feet. Approaching ZEETA intersection ATC issued 'delete speed climb to FL230'. At this time of clearance we were very close to the ZEETA fix. I looked down at the SID plate knowing that 10;000 feet was still set in the altitude window. While I looked at the plate the FO reset the altitude to 230 without saying that had been done. When I looked up the plane was going past 10;000 feet prior to ZEETA intersection. I told the FO he still had to comply with the altitude restrictions and was only cleared to deviate charted speed restrictions. Plane leveled off at 10;300 feet in which ATC then cleared us direct to AINTT intersection; and we continued climb to FL230.I really feel that our company procedure as to who sets the altitude contributed to this possible deviation. In this case had the PM been responsible for setting the altitude; I would have made the comment of 'we're cleared to FL230 but I'm leaving 10;000 set till we cross the fix...' The departure was briefed very explicitly due to the number of restrictions associated with it. Plus the revised clearance was issued so close to the fix that the FO was distracted by the revised clearance and did not completely understand what the instructions were; and how it pertained to the SID. Of course when I went heads down for less than 30 seconds to double check; is when the altitude was reset on the DFGS...by then it was too late as we were in such close proximity of the fix.Contributing factors:FO misunderstanding the ATC clearance. ATC re-issue of clearance to close to the fix not giving crew enough time to coordinate the new restrictions. Failure of communication regarding of re-setting the altitude in the DFGS. PM not being responsible for re-setting the revised altitude.

Departed SLC on the LEETZ4 SID. 10;000 feet Max Crossing Restriction at ZEETA. Prior to reaching ZEETA with 10;000 feet set in Altitude Window; received a Departure Control radio call 'Ignore Speed Restrictions and Climb to FL230.' I was the Pilot Flying; I set FL230 in the Altitude Window and rolled the IAS to 250 knots. We passed over ZEETA intersection at 10;300 feet.QUESTION: Did I make a mistake by crossing ZEETA above the 10;000 feet Crossing Restriction?

Air carrier flight crew reported climbing through a crossing restriction departing SLC when the flying pilot became confused about the specifics of the clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On climbout the aircraft was struck by lightning. The First Officer immediately lost all airspeed and attitude information and it returned in approximately 60 seconds. Additionally the autopilot number 1 temporarily disconnected. The number 2 yaw damper also failed at the time of the strike. The First Officer lost the instruments again about 3 minutes later; and they did not return. We followed ECAM procedures and immediately contacted Dispatch about proceeding to [the nearest airport] (non maintenance) or [a second airport] which was nearly equidistant at this point. Dispatch relayed they wanted aircraft in [the first airport]. I then asked my Dispatcher to remind Planning that a very heavy winter storm was just outside of the [divert] area and would arrive before any Maintenance Contract or other could arrive. I want to mention at this point that the weather and aircraft status for both fields were compatible and there was no safety of flight issues driving us in picking one over the other. Unfortunately Planning did not seem to use any of the inputs the crew had offered in their decision matrix. They unwisely choose to send us to [the first airport].

A300 Captain reports a lightning strike that knocks out several aircraft systems; including the First Officer's airspeed and attitude information. Dispatch is contacted and a diversion is suggested for the required maintenance but the planners do not agree and the flight continues to destination.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After I completed my walk around... approximately 10 minutes later it began to lightly snow with the sun still shining at -12C.  When I called to verify our identifier with Clearance Delivery; the Controller asked if we would need to be de-iced.  I answered in the affirmative and was told to expect RWY XXR.  The Captain then stated that his plan was to ask for a tactile check at the de-ice pad; and only de-ice if needed.  Once at the de-ice pad; I asked the iceman to perform a tactile check.  The iceman replied that we were in fact contaminated with ice.  He asked if we needed Type IV and the Captain stated that we did not need type IV; even though it was still snowing.  I queried him and he stated that we did not need to anti-ice.  He then told the iceman that we would only need Type 1. He appeared to be in a rush to depart; despite the fact we were already delayed due to the inbound flight. He began partially configuring the aircraft; even though I had the QRH and was attempting to read through the procedure and work through the triple bordered checklist. He stated he knew the configuration and was just moving it along and that he didn't want me to think he was just pulling it out of thin air.  There was then confusion as I was trying to work through the checklist because of some wording.  He stated we were configured before I could verify the checklist.  During this time; the ice pad informed us that we would need to contact Clearance Delivery for new routing.  I contacted Clearance and was informed to expect RWY XX.  The snowfall began to intensify; with the sun intermittently coming out.  I asked the Captain again about Type IV and he stated that we were fine; even after pointing out the increasing intensity of snowfall.  The iceman told us that deice was complete with Safeway Type 1 and holdover began at XX21 local.  The Captain stated we were ready to taxi and began to taxi to RWY XX.  I noticed that the 14th stage valves were in fact open; and not closed as directed in the QRH since I could not figure out where the Captain had stopped on the checklist.  As we were taxiing; I noted that the temperature had dropped to -15C; the sun was no longer out; and I became increasingly agitated at not having Type IV fluid.  Once we were number 3 in line for departure; the Captain told me to make my PA for the Flight Attendant to prepare the cabin for takeoff. I made the PA and the Flight Attendant stated that it had started snowing pretty heavily. I told him that I would take care of us.  I pulled out the QRH and began looking at the holdover times and noted that the holdover time for light snow at any temperature below -10C was 2-4 minutes. It was now XX44 local. ATC then informed us that there would be there would be a slight delay to depart.... The Captain asked what I was doing with the QRH and what my thoughts were. I stated that we would not be taking off.   He then stated that if we went back; we would have to get more fuel and he didn't know how long it would take.  I told him that I would rather be safe.  We told Ground Control that we would need to return to the gate for more fuel and to de-ice again.  I'm not sure what the Captain meant by this; but he stated that he had tried to do the right thing; and that if ATC had just left us on RWY XXR as originally planned; we would have been fine for takeoff; but they changed runways on us after we had de-iced and were taxiing; and that this was the reason for the holdover time not working.  He asked me to confirm this version.  I stated that it was one way of looking at it.  He persisted and I stated that it was a 'good' story.  He asked a third time to confirm this version and I stated it was a good version. He then stated that he was about to ask me to pull the QRH out when he saw that I was already doing so because he was concerned about our holdover time. We taxied to gate X; where we waited for the ramp crew to park us. There was no checklist called for when we parked at the gate. I took it upon myself to complete an After Landing checklist. Once we blocked in; I went out to speak to the fueler and noticed that we had a significant buildup of frost and ice on the wings. My great concern was the Captain's refusal in requesting Type IV application and the disregard for proper deicing procedures. It was rushed with no checklist usage resulting in improper configuration of the bleed valves.  He did not seem to be cognizant of; or ignored; the fact that there was precipitation in freezing conditions. I am extremely worried that a brand new first officer or a shy first officer would be hesitant to speak up and could find themselves in an extremely dangerous situation; which is easily avoidable if the SOP is followed.Hesitation in refusing to let the aircraft leave the deicing pad was an error on my part....

CRJ-200 First Officer questioned Captain's de-icing procedures and ultimately prevailed in return to gate for refuel and proper de-icing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2540; Flight Crew Type 600

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was doing stop and go's in the pattern at ORK for night currency.  We departed ORK and upon climbing on departure our ADSB gave an alert for traffic. We noted a fast moving aircraft from our rear; stopped our climb at 300 feet AGL and watched a B757 pass right over us as we crossed the departure end of RWY 5 at ORK.  ADSB indicated the B757 aircraft was 700 feet above us; placing them in the traffic pattern for ORK. The B757 then turned towards LIT as if on a visual approach.  This felt very unsafe as we felt wake turbulence when we continued our climb out towards the track of the B757.  I was startled a B757 would be so low and at traffic pattern altitude over a non-towered airport.

C172 Instructor Pilot reported encountering wake turbulence while departing ORK from a B757 inbound to LIT.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 6R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Weather

After reaching cruise altitude VNAV disengaged and the aircraft reverted to Control Wheel Steering (CWS) pitch mode. We investigated the problem by referring to the QRH; the MEL and through crew discussion. Unable to find a solution we contacted dispatch through SATCOM and got patched in to maintenance. After discussion with operations we decided to continue to our destination. The airport was using the west runways which only have RNAV approaches available so we began to discuss completing an approach with the use of the vertical speed mode and the Pilot Direction Indicator (PDI). On the descent we lost LNAV and the aircraft reverted to CWS roll mode. We were unable to reconnect LNAV or VNAV and decided to request an ILS to runway 6R with a slight tailwind. Approaching to the airport both LNAV and VNAV became active again. While on arrival approach control asked if we would be able to fly the ILS to 6L to check the glideslope. We accepted and briefed the ILS to 6L. Just a few miles from the turn to final; we were cleared for the localizer to 6L which was unexpected. We flew through the localizer course and corrected back on. I noticed we were high on the PDI and determined that we needed to start down. I requested a lower altitude be set in the MCP and deactivated the autopilot to start down. Instead of flying a VNAV glidepath I attempted to 'dive and drive' to the MDA. Having not briefed the localizer approach we both felt uncomfortable with continuing any further and executed a missed approach. We received vectors to an RNAV Y to 24R since we had re-established LNAV and VNAV and successfully landed from that approach.We never should have put ourselves in a position of flying an approach that we were not adequately prepared for. The combination of aircraft system malfunctions; a late flight and an unusual clearance led us down a path that could have resulted in an undesired aircraft state. I believe that we recognized this and recovered adequately. We could easily have avoided this event if we had flown the approach that was originally briefed or requested time to set up for and brief the localizer approach then utilized LNAV and VNAV procedures.

It was very uncomfortable; and a bit of a 'Cluster'; however; we were able to get the aircraft out of Takeoff Go-Around (TOGA) by cycling the Flight Director switches. We got cleaned up and now became number 5 behind all the traffic on the 24s.We should have never accepted the clearance to 6L. This really created more of a compound problem on top of a problem. We were not sure if ATC was aware of the mis-information when giving us 6L.

A B737NG with LNAV/VNAV anomalies was cleared for an ILS following a storm but the ILS was inoperative. The crew continued on the LOC but executed a go-around because of nearby terrain in night IMC. The aircraft autoflight returned to normal so a RNAV was flown to the opposite runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 236

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I was the pilot monitoring during the event. The aircraft was descending through 9000 ft to a level off of 6000 ft and instructed to hold 210 kts until further advised by ATC while being vectored. The Aircraft experienced an uncommanded gear extension with the gear handle in the off position. Given the amount of noise in the cockpit and the additional pitch over while in level change mode; I suspected the gear had extended with the lever in the 'OFF' position. I completed the QRH procedure for 'gear disagree' shortly after level off. When the gear handle was placed to down position; the red gear unsafe lights instantaneously went to green. No further action was taken. The flight landed safely and without incident.

A B737-400 landing gear extended uncommanded during descent through 9;000 ft as the aircraft was slowing to 210 kts. Safe indications resulted with the QRH execution.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During the last few weeks in BWI; I have noticed an increased amount of FOD on the ramp; flight line; near the terminal; on the taxiways; grassy areas adjacent to the taxiways; runway; etc. The question was 'where is all this FOD coming from?' I have reported the FOD to BWI Ground Operations; and it seems as if the FOD is never picked up (look at the abundance of FOD in the grassy areas next to the taxiways and runways). During the preflight today; we noticed massive amounts of FOD in and around the BWI Gate area. Specifically; it appeared that a trash dumpster had been emptied in the vehicle storage area under the terminal. There were a large number of plastic bags; cans; cups; etc. which had collected in this area. It looked as if the FOD had collected over a period of several weeks.It looked as if nobody noticed the FOD; and nobody was picking it up. In fact; while we sat at the gate; a BWI Ramp Supervisor was standing amongst the pile of trash and FOD smoking a cigarette. He did not pick up any of the FOD. The wind was blowing hard; and FOD was being blown from this area onto the flight line. A coffee cup was approaching the aircraft as we taxied into the gate. I called BWI Operations several times to have the FOD removed with no response. Finally; the Manager of Operations showed up. His response to the FOD problem was 'It's windy today; and that is why the FOD is there.' I answered; 'The wind did not create the FOD. The wind is only blowing the FOD back onto the flight line.' I asked him who was responsible for ensuring that the flight line is FOD free.He reluctantly responded that he was the one responsible. He gave me the usual answers as to why it the FOD was still there. 'I just started my shift; the wind is blowing; etc.' There was a large grey trash bag blowing around in the area (one similar to the one I recently ingested in my #1 engine just before takeoff causing us to shut down the engine; return to the gate; and have Maintenance remove the pieces of bag from the engine). BWI is not taking the FOD program seriously. Ramp Agents; Ramp Supervisors; etc. walk right by FOD without picking it up. The answer I get to this is that the 'vacuum' is deployed every once in a while; and the 'vacuum' is responsible for retrieving FOD; not the individuals who work on the ramp.Vice President of Ground Operations needs to re-emphasize the importance of FOD awareness in BWI (and system-wide). BWI Station Manager needs to 'tour' the BWI flight line daily to ensure that the Managers of Ramp and Operations (MROs) are enforcing the FOD Awareness Program. There are several dumpsters on the BWI flight line which are often left open; are often overflowing with trash; and nobody seems to notice. Dumpster doors need to be secured when not in use; and dumpsters need to be emptied more often. MROs; Ramp Supervisors; and Ramp Agents need to act more responsibly. If you see FOD; take immediate action. Pick it up and dispose of it properly. Don't wait for someone else (the 'vacuum') to pick up the FOD. Take personal initiative and pick up the FOD without waiting to be told to do so. The leadership on this issue starts from the top. FOD can be picked up between flights. Rather than going to the break room; get out to the ramp; and pick up the FOD. The wind does blow the FOD around; but it does not create the FOD. When it is windy; it is even more important to retrieve the FOD to prevent FOD from being ingested in the aircraft engines. I sent photos of the BWI FOD issue to [name]; Ground Operations; at Headquarters.

Air carrier Captain reported that a trend of excessive FOD on the ramp and airport environment resulted in a hazardous situation to taxiing aircraft.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

BWI was in an abnormal configuration departing Runways 10 and 15L and arriving Runways 10 and 15L. Training on Local Control; the trainee instructed the SR22 to LUAW on Runway 15L. The trainee then changed his/her mind and instructed the aircraft to taxi across the runway and hold short on the other side. There were no aircraft on final. The trainee wanted to depart aircraft from Runway 10 and did not want to hold the aircraft in position for a long amount of time. After the aircraft taxied across the runway; the ASDE-X target did not fully clear the runway. Discussion occurred in the Tower about the status of the aircraft and it was visually confirmed that the aircraft was holding short of the runway. The ASDE-X's target for the aircraft kept jumping. It would jump from clear of the runway to the ICON being just on the runway. The C525 checked in on final for Runway 15L and was cleared to land. On a 1/2 mile final; the ASDE-X alerted and said 'Runway 15L occupied; go around;' the aircraft was not instructed to go around and again; the aircraft that was holding short was on the correct side of the hold short line. We submitted paperwork to the ASDE-X office of a false alert. [We] should have sent the aircraft around per the .65.

[Narative #2 had no additional information.]

BWI Controller described a ASDE-X Alarm indicating an aircraft on Runway 15L; the reporter noting a taxiing aircraft was observed by Tower personnel as clear of the runway so a landing clearance was issued contrary to procedures.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107.25; Flight Crew Total 2508.17; Flight Crew Type 1110.47

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

After takeoff we received a message from Dispatch to return to gate so the ramp could secure dangerous goods/Hazmat that was loaded . We advised that we were already airborne and discussed with dispatch a plan. The Dispatcher at the time did some research and advised that the ramp personnel that loaded the aircraft advised that the Hazmat/dangerous goods that was loaded correctly and secured. The DG sheet we received on preflight showed to misc Hazmat may with a weight of 257 LBS. Load planning and dispatch advised after we departed that the weight was actually 500 LBS; 250 LBS over what our initial sheet showed. The load planning and final weights seems to be correct; but the DG sheet we received from ACARS did not match that number. We continued the flight normally.

A320 Captain reported receiving Dispatch message stating Hazmat cargo weight was erroneously under reported by 250 lbs.


Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After my four-day trip and prior to my commute home; the Chief Pilot approached me in the Crew Room and informed me that an aircraft which I had flown several day before had been identified with an oxygen problem. He explained that the oxygen bottle had been turned off at some point. I explained that I performed all of my normal oxygen tests per the AOM as I always do and noticed nothing abnormal. My Process: On every flight; I accomplish a F.I.G. Test (Flow; Intercom; O2 Gauge level) as part of my flow when I get to the oxygen system. I hold the intercom switch and depress the oxygen for five to six seconds to check for a drop in the oxygen gauge. Since we were scheduled to have the aircraft for five flights; I remember checking the level at 1400+; which would last us all day. I had no significant drop in the oxygen level when tested on that flight and no issues on each of the subsequent four flights. The only thing I can offer is: Change the test (if data supports) it from five seconds to ten seconds or possibly both Captain and First Officer test the O2 at the same time to put more demand on it in the current five second recommended test procedure.

The Reporter stated that his personal oxygen preflight test is slightly more extensive than his Company's published preflight procedure. Because the oxygen bottle and valve are located in the forward baggage compartment; there is no way to access it and physically check the valve's position. So to ensure the oxygen is available; he holds the oxygen mask test for at least seven seconds while looking directly at the gauge to ensure pressure is maintained and at the same time tests the mask's micophone. The Chief Pilot's statement that the oxygen was in fact OFF has the Reporter puzzled because he remembers testing the oxygen in his usual manner that day.

A B737-700 First Officer reported a series of flight crews flew an aircraft with the crew oxygen system not energized but he is certain that he successfully tested the oxygen system prior to his first flight on that aircraft.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Encountered Severe Turbulence during Descent in SDF just west of BWG VOR at FL280 to FL260. Aircraft was at 290 knots (Vb speed) after having been briefed by Dispatcher prior to departure. Load Master was in back and was not injured. Event duration was approximately 3-5 minutes in length. Reported to ATC. No visible issues with aircraft on post flight; but event was written up and [Company] Maintenance Control was advised as well at mechanics on ground in SDF.

Boeing aircraft flight crew reported severe turbulence on descent into SDF.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 50

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

On IFR flight to ZZZ via radar vectors in Class B airspace (vfr conditions). Received descent from 3;000 to 2700 msl. Approximately 8 miles south of airport; Approach turned us from heading 160 to 090 (extended left base) for runway 34 at ZZZ and told us to contact tower. About 2 seconds later we received a TA at our 9 to 10 o'clock position (target aircraft was showing -300 feet and climbing directly at us approximately 1/2 to 1 mile away); I visually acquired aircraft in a few seconds; and then a few seconds later we got an RA for a climb. I initiated a 2000 ft/min climb to avoid aircraft. The aircraft appeared to be on a right downwind departing the pattern to the south from ZZZ. Once the aircraft past; we descended; reported the RA to approach control and then contacted tower and completed the visual approach.This is not the first time; from this facility; that a controller gave us a heading turn into the path of a conflicting aircraft departing this airport. There was no traffic report from the approach controller and it was clear to us that the approach controller was trying to 'hurry us off his frequency' so as not to have to deal with this traffic situation. The controller should have done one a few items:1) Kept us on his frequency; given us the traffic advisory until the aircraft was well clear; then cleared us for the visual; OR2) Kept us on the 160 heading and coordinated with the tower controller on the traffic before clearing us for the visual;OR3) Advised us of the conflicting traffic and given us the choice to turn on not until we picked up the traffic and used visual separation to remain safe;OR4) Given us a climb back into Class B airspace (@ 4000 msl) to ensure safe separation.This particular location where the problem occurred was below Class B shelf and outside ZZZ Delta airspace; i.e no-man's land with us being put in a vulnerable position.This is a recurring problem in this airspace and this is the 3rd time (in 3 months) we have been put in a conflicting position requiring RA maneuvers to avoid traffic. Unless addressed; this may result in an accident in the future. There needs to be better coordination between approach control and tower controllers (or departure procedures) out of ZZZ to provide better coordination of arriving and departing traffic.

A BE40 air crew received a vector while on approach; were given a vector in front of another aircraft resulting in an RA. They complied with the RA; reported it to approach control and completed the visual approach.


The new X app does not include the FOM [Quick Reference Checklist] in Featured Content. Crews have been accustomed to quick access to the [Quick Reference Checklist] without need to navigate through the FOM index. In a time sensitive situation; quick access to the FOM [Quick Reference Checklist] is essential and pilots' brains are already biased to look for the [Quick Reference Checklist] in the Featured Content section. This can cause confusion and frustration; both of which contribute to errors.

B777 First Officer reported that a company-issued app used by pilots on their iPads is confusing to use.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 129; Flight Crew Type 58

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Staffing

I entered the southbound Bravo surface transition at SFO along Highway 101 for San Carlos (SQL).  I knew that SQL tower closes normally at XA pm local and that staffing has been very limited due to [Company] under staffing.  The Tower recently was forced to close on certain days at XA45 pm and pattern work is rarely approved.  I had checked for NOTAMs for a closure on the [date] and hadn't found one during preflight.Along the transition I picked up San Carlos information Tango which indicated that the airport was open and the runway in use.Unbeknown to me; as I was still with SFO Tower; SQL Tower announced 'Attention all aircraft San Carlos tower will be closing in five minutes.'Two minutes later; I was told by SFO Tower to contact San Carlos Tower; keep the code.  I changed to 119.0 and called 'San Carlos Tower [call sign]; southbound transition; inbound; full stop; tango' and received no reply.  I called 2 more times while turning evasively to avoid the Delta and tried calling on COM 2 as well.I considered that I could ask SFO Tower; but they were busy with managing their surfaces.  I considered contacting NCT approach.  As it was night and I saw no traffic at the airport or in the vicinity visually or on ADS-B and none was called out to me by SFO Tower and I knew that the Tower staffing was constrained and may have gone home early; I elected to continue predictably on the normal path (overhead midfield 1200; enter right downwind 30) with CTAF calls; while looking for light gun signals; landing just after the normal Tower closure time.I'm concerned that:- SQL Tower closed before their published closure time (announcing 5 minutes at 7 minutes til the hour).- Clearly left their position 2 minutes after their '5 minutes' call; leaving the airport unattended while technically still controlled.- Failed to communicate this with nearby controllers.In retrospect; I should have orbited outside of the Delta for a few minutes and waited until I was certain the airspace was no longer controlled and then entered.I am concerned that the chronic strain on the controllers at San Carlos is leading to errors and shortcuts that will cause an accident.

GA pilot reported confusion when SQL Tower controllers closed Tower Control earlier than NOTAMed due to Controller Staffing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 1939; Flight Crew Type 944

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I received a VFR departure clearance from VGT ground: After departure; heading 220; departure on 133.95; squawk XXXX. Upon departure contact I must have missed 'remain clear of Class B'. In my defense; I was very conscious of the Class B airspace since by my chart the 220 heading already had me in Class B. During the climb departure gave me further instructions to go no further south than 210; I was on a 220-225 heading at the time. This reinforced the feeling that I was cleared through Class B with positive control. During the climb I heard the same controller clear a Heavy departing LAS (26R I believe) and then followed with a clearance from 4000 to 8000 and a turn northeast. The controller then asked me when I intended to turn on my intended course (213). I responded that I would turn once clear of the Class B airspace; she replied I was already in Class B. While she was talking I had been watching the heavy turn directly into my path and; realizing we would be on a converging course initiated an aggressive dive. I heard the Heavy pilot state that they would be filling a 'proximity' report; after which the controller came on the frequency and stated that she had told me to remain clear of the Class B.My failures were approaching the departure in the immediate vicinity of a Class B airspace much too cavalierly. I would have benefited with a 5 minute evaluation of the LAS departure procedures to give me a better situational awareness. My aircraft is having an engine replaced. This was a rental; I did not fully know how to show the Class B airspace on the Garmin 430. I also made no effort to monitor my DME position from the LAS VORTAC. Finally I should have been listening intently for the 'remain clear' instructions; if those were made. I do believe that ATC contributed to confusion; first by a departure turn that already had me in the Class B airspace; and; if giving supplemental heading advice; to also call out an altitude limit. Certainly not a requirement as far as the letter of the law; but would have reduced confusion. My transponder was reporting altitude and position. The developing conflict should have been as readily apparent on the radar screen as it was to my own two eyes. In the future I will be exceptionally cautious on departures near any active airspace; and certainly Class B.

Cessna 172 pilot reported a Class Bravo intrusion along with an airborne conflict.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 40

Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 2300

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication

Upon receiving takeoff clearance for runway 1R at intersection Bravo; the Captain (and pilot flying) taxied onto the runway and turned left to line up on the centerline. All lights on the airplane were in the ON position and operable. It appeared we were lined up with the runway centerline. PF advanced the power levers and the airplane began to accelerate. I heard a few (3 or 4) loud thuds that sounded like the nose wheel going over an in-ground runway centerline light. I glanced at the instruments and back outside in order to make the appropriate call-outs. Once I realized we were lined up on the right edge of the runway; the PF began correcting to the left to get toward the center of the runway. The PF continued the takeoff and the flight continued without incident.The intersection did not have lead on lights (green) to enhance crew situational awareness to assure proper line up with the runway centerline.

We were assigned an intersection B departure off of runway 1L. We taxied via taxiway H and held short of runway 1L at B. We were then assigned an intersection B departure from runway 1R. We taxied across runway 1L and lined up on what I thought was the centerline of runway 1R. During the takeoff roll I felt my tires striking something and realized it was the right side edge lights of runway 1R. I corrected to the left to get back to the center of the runway and continued the takeoff and landed with no issues or perceived damage to the aircraft. After discussing the event; my copilot and I both wondered if the runway centerline lights were either very dim or not functioning. There were no green lead in lights to the runway centerline and no perceived centerline once on runway. After correcting to get back to the centerline; we still did not see a centerline. The only runway lights we saw were the runway edge lights and some green lights further down the runway leading from the centerline to one of the taxiways.

Corporate aircraft flight crew reported lining up and beginning their takeoff roll on the right edge of the runway. They quickly realized their error; corrected to centerline; and continued the takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was one of the relief pilots on this flight. Approx. 2 hr's after push back; myself and the other relief pilot was awoken from our required rest. After entering the cockpit we were informed that the First Officer's Air Data Computer (ADC) failed and we were returning. We were informed of what the flying pilots had done and we discussed what else we needed to do. We informed ATC we needed to jettision fuel to land. We were given clearance from ATC to dump fuel. We informed ATC we would be dumping for 20-30 min. We were given holding instructions to dump. At completion of dumping we contacted ATC; and received a clearance to the departure airport. We finished all required check lists and landed uneventfully.

B747 Relief pilot reported being summoned from the bunk room after the flying First Officers ADC fails; about two hours after departure. Fuel is dumped and the flight returned to the departure airport.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 17L

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Arriving in DFW we there informed by approach to expect the Visual to 17L. Once we passed DIETZ and began the downwind; Approach switched our runway to 17C. Up until this point; 17C was being used for departures because of construction on 17R. We were given a descent to 8000 which came later on the downwind than usual and flying the last published speed of 220 KIAS. We were given a descent to 5000 and a turn to 270 as a base leg. We crossed over traffic for 17L and were given a turn to 210 to join the localizer. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) pointed out to the Pilot Flying (PF) that this was how unstable approaches began. Our intercept was between PENNY and ZINGG; approximately 12 DME. It was apparent to us that the turn was given too late and we were going to go through the localizer while still in the turn. We continued our turn back toward the localizer. Approach give us a heading of 150 to re-intercept the localizer. We were given a descent to 3000 and then cleared for the visual and told to contact Tower. At this point we initiated a descent and deceleration with the PF using the Flight Spoilers to get back on profile. When the PM contacted tower; we were inside ZINGG above 4000 feet and slowing to 200 KIAS to configure. When we checked in with Tower; they requested we slow to accommodate two departures prior to our arrival. We got the aircraft below 200 KIAS and the PF called for Flaps 8 and Flaps 20. With airspeed slowing; the PF began to concentrate on altitude (we were still 1000 feet high). Tower stated; 'You must slow down.' To which the PM responded; 'We are trying; sir.' The PF called for the Gear Down and Flaps 30. We had to wait for the aircraft to slow 10 knots to move the flaps to 30. The aircraft began to decelerate more and was approaching glideslope. The PF called for Flaps 45 and began to add power to reduce the descent rate and maintain glideslope. As we hit 1000 AGL; the PF called 'Stable' and then 'Sink Rate' was announced by the GPWS. The PF executed the correct response by pitching up and adding power. This was followed by the stick shaker activating and the PM noticing a descent rate of 2100 FPM. The PM called for a go around and the PF began the call outs and required maneuvers. The PM called tower with notification of the go-around. Tower issued instructions for a turn to 130 and a climb to 2000. As the PM was following up the go-around instructions; he pushed the Flight Spoilers from Full to Zero. The PM got the Flight Computer Plan set up and autopilot re-engaged. On the climb; the aircraft climbed to 2400 feet before it returned back to 2000. We were given further vectors and landed without incident on 17L.The first threat was DFW airport in a non-standard runway operation due to construction. The second threat was being given a runway change while established on the downwind. The third threat was Approach's attempt to 'stuff' us in on 17C while still launching aircraft off of that runway. The fourth threat was delayed and ineffective instructions by approach. The fifth threat was having a first trip IOE trainee attempt to salvage an approach that was already outside normal parameters.Don't let ATC push one into an approach that hasn't been briefed. Notice much earlier when things begin to turn for the worse and execute an escape action much sooner.

CRJ-200 Captain reported receiving a late runway change from ATC during arrival to DFW that resulted in an unstable approach and a go-around.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Excursion Runway

At the time there was a tower tour going on and we were distracted by conversations; and explanations from the tour; we had just previously changed runway configurations; and I as a ground controller taxied the aircraft to the previous (wrong) runway and allowed the local controller to depart the aircraft into the incorrect airspace. The individual giving the tour shall instruct the tourist not to talk to any controller on position.

Change from runway 18 to 36. Tower tour in the tower. Aircraft X was taxied by ground control to 18C instead of newly activated 36C. I cleared Aircraft X for departure. Aircraft Y checked in on a left base for RWY 36L. I recognized what happened and turned Aircraft Y west and Aircraft X eastbound to maintain separation. Tower tour guides instruct tourists to not communicate with air traffic controllers working on position.

MEM Tower controllers reported a Tower tour distracted the Ground Controller allowing an aircraft to taxi to the wrong runway and Local departed traffic off that runway. Departure was in conflict with arrival traffic; so the Local Controller vectored the departure and sent the arrival around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On approach we were advised by ATC of a low level alert. At the time we were on a visual approach and trying to maintain a safe distance behind traffic ahead. We allowed ourselves to get one dot low on the glide slope at approximately 1500 ft MSL. We immediately leveled off and captured the glideslope for remainder of approach. Being more situationally aware and better use of the automation on board the aircraft to [mitigate] increased work load. Late change to arrival and runway due to our request because of winds other than originally planned.

Widebody air carrier Captain reported ATC issued a low altitude alert during an ILS approach when they inadvertently descended below the glide slope.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.4

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Working satellite sectors combined; moderate workload and volume; relief briefing in progress. As I vectored Aircraft X on a base leg heading for the ILS approach; I noticed VFR traffic just northeast of the aircraft's localizer climbing through 2000 feet. As VFR aircraft in this area often conflict with our IFR arrivals; as soon as I noticed the target I issued Aircraft X a heading of 130 to parallel the localizer until the traffic was clear. Aircraft X cleared the traffic and was reissued a heading to join and an approach clearance. Aircraft X subsequently landed without incident.This is another report of a continued problem within our airspace. Please reference my previous reports.Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solutions are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

S46 TRACON Controller reported an aircraft being vectored for an ILS Approach had conflicting VFR traffic climbing through the localizer course. The Controller had to vector the ILS aircraft off the approach to maintain separation.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

On approach into CAK I selected approach mode on the flight director but it somehow went to roll mode and I missed it. I had begun the approach high and allowed the workload to overwhelm me; thus missing the roll mode indication. While correcting back to the localizer I allowed the aircraft to descend below the glideslope. As I began to climb Tower advised us of a low altitude alert. Once on the glideslope we continued the approach and were stabilized by 1;000 FT. Landing was uneventful.

When the Captain of a CRJ-700 inadvertently selected roll mode vice approach mode after being cleared for an ILS the aircraft descended below the glideslope and triggered a low altitude alert from the Tower.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

B757-200 arrived ZZZ inbound with pilot write-up [referencing] Chapter 34-41; Weather Radar failed enroute. My partner and I reviewed the history before arriving at the aircraft. We noted several Weather Radar discrepancies within last 90 days. Began Troubleshooting (T/S) with Operational (Ops) Check and noted Weather Radar (Wx Rdr) did not perform full sweep in Test Mode. The sweep was only about 30-degrees of display on the right side of the display. Annunciations were: initially; Wx Rdr Test; followed by Wx Rdr fail. My partner went down to BITE Test the Radar Receiver/Transmitter (R/T) and noted that the BITE Test was inconclusive. There were no LEDs illuminated when he first viewed the front face of the R/T. The BITE function only tests the operation of the front face LEDs. At that time we ordered a Wx Rdr R/T. My partner swapped the R/T. Wx Rdr still failed the Ops Check. We ordered Wx Rdr Control panel since that is the only part that hasn't been changed and seemed logical due to Mode issues and Tilt issues in the aircraft's history. While waiting on control panel to arrive; we discussed reinstalling the original R/T which I then did. This led to a discussion about the history of the R/Ts; since several had been changed within the last 90 days. We proceeded back to the flight deck to review the history again; to verify the part number history of the installed R/T. The Control panel arrived; I went down and retrieved the control panel and went back to the flight deck to change it. We Ops tested the Wx Rdr again with no improvement in the discrepancy. I swapped the control panels back so that the original panel was reinstalled. We then decided to MEL the Wx Radar System due to lack of time to continue T/S. My partner called Maintenance Control and obtained MEL. Applied the MEL sticker; completed the aircraft logbook exception and left the MEL and the logbook open; on the First Officer's glareshield so the crew could review the logbook and MEL during their preflight. We turned the IRUs off and checked the flight deck; and walked back down to the truck to secure our tools and the parts we had ordered. We then called the Lead [Mechanic's] Office to inform them of what had occurred. The Lead Office acknowledged and informed us to return to the [Maintenance] Shop. While attempting to repair a broken Wx Rdr System with history; my partner and I were distracted by several factors: the area illumination light in the Forward Nose Compartment was out. We had to work by secondary lighting (headlamps). The Aircraft Service Attendant had issues closing the Lavatory Service Door and distracted my partner; asking him to assist in closing the door. This resulted in my partner advising him to call Line Maintenance to close the door. Also worth noting; the Door Indication System on the aircraft has a faulty nose compartment door switch. The flight deck indication was absent for this door being open. The Door Indication System was deferred after the aircraft returned to the gate. These are the conditions which I feel contributed to my involvement in this incident. However; I cannot account for the flight crew walk around or the pushback crew dispatching the aircraft. Looking back; I feel these were contributing factors leading to my distraction. I realize it was a major oversight to leave an access door open. It is not my intention to Dispatch an aircraft in an un-airworthy condition. [Recommend] focus on the task at hand. Avoid distractions to the extent possible. Use the Maintenance Manual (M/M) as a checklist and ensure all steps are addressed/checked-off before departing the aircraft. Air turnback.

An Avionics Technician describes some of the factors that contributed to a B757-200 air turnback with the Forward Nose Compartment access door still open. He had been troubleshooting the Weather Radar System and no one realized the Nose Compartment Door Indication System switch had failed prior to departure.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47; Flight Crew Total 156; Flight Crew Type 116

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I departed on a flight to DWH. Picked up Houston Center and requested VFR Flight Following. Was cleared into class B airspace. While enroute; I had attempted several times to pick up ATIS; but could not. ATC (Approach I believe) asked if I had current ATIS to which I replied no. but was trying. After trying several more times; I notified ATC that I could not pick up ATIS; and was limited to XM weather that I had on board. ATC replied that they would give me the weather; and he did. (Wind/Alt./ Setting/Runway). Was then switched over to tower. I announced my position and intentions to enter Right Downwind for runway 35L. Tower responded and confirmed right downwind for 35L; and that he would call my base. Tower called my base. Upon needing to turn final; I asked tower if I could turn final and then asked for clearance to land 35L. Upon landing; I used the length of the runway. Near the end of the runway; tower asked where I was parking; to which I replied 'to the FBO'. Tower replied that I had gone too far and instructed a 180 and back taxi. Tower then initiated a 'go-around' for inbound traffic. (Helicopter). Tower had a brief conversation with helicopter trying to determine whether a go-around was actually needed. It appeared as though the go around was not initiated. Tower then addressed me and asked that I exit [taxiway] E and go to ground. After departing the runway and exiting [taxiway] E; I switched to ground and announced my decision.At least two attempts were made to reach ground whereby I stated my position and destination to which there was no reply. As I determined whether or not to go back to tower frequency to get help; a lady began speaking to other traffic. She then calls me? I responded and let her know that I was on Echo headed to the FBO. She then let me know that she needed to give me the phone number to contact tower for a possible pilot deviation. Upon parking; I immediately called the tower. Tower said that I was instructed to exit E; STOP; contact ground; wait for further instruction. I let him know that I had not heard that command; but would be certain to comply hereafter. His response was that they were essentially locking down on everyone and were reporting 100%. He said that they were doing the 'exit; stop; go to ground; wait for progressive' was for the hot zones on the East side of the runway (end of 35R). I was taxiing on the west. I immediately called a mentor to get advice and instruction on how I should handle. He recommended that I wait a few hours to let things 'cool off' and then reach out to the tower again. I called the tower again in hopes of researching all aspects of the event to clarify the role that I played in the incident. When I called the tower back; I spoke with a different gentleman (who seemed to be a manager). He asked for a moment to review the file. While he was reading the file aloud; I concluded that the report being filed was not completely accurate. The report indicated that I was given the command to 'Land 35L; Exit Taxiway Echo; Stop; and Go to ground.' This could not be the case as I had already landed; and was well beyond Echo before the Tower asked where I was parking. It did not appear as though he included the 180 / back taxi command in his report. Or the communications back and forth between me; the tower and the helicopter he was initiating a go-around with. I cannot recall the command to STOP after exiting Echo. After conversing the second time with the tower; he also mentioned that it was my job to pick up ATIS before landing to attain all relevant information. It was at this time that I notified him that I was unable to pick up ATIS; and that ATC had given me the numbers. He said that he would add this to the report for me.On this second call; he also said that they were trying to create a new culture whereby everyone would stop after exiting; go to ground; and then get progressive instruction. He mentioned that it was causing confusion and that there was really no aviation terminology for what they were desiring to happen. He also mentioned that this was the second of such efforts. Initially; they were advising pilots to 'Land 35L; hold short Taxiway E'. This was causing too much confusion because most pilots had no way of determining the distance to Taxiway E. so it was a recent change to initiate the new 'Exit runway/STOP/Go to ground/wait for progressive.' One last thought. If this tower/airport is changing to a modified sequence for real safety measures; and creating a new culture; one would think that they would be sure to re-iterate and verify compliance upon contact. 'Enter right downwind for 35L. Are you familiar with our runway exit procedures?'

BE35 pilot experiences confusion after landing full length Runway 35L at DWH with a destination on the west side of the field. A back taxi is required to taxiway E with instructions to stop upon exiting and contact ground; which are not heard. The Tower Controller is upset.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 1800

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

While climbing through FL190; I experienced an engine failure; left side. Prior to this; I had a normal VFR departure; picked up my IFR flight plan; and was cleared radar vectors; then direct to my destination. I had been cleared first to 3;000 then to 5;000; then to 8;000 then to FL230 then to FL240 with a request from ATC to expedite my climb from 8;000 to 13;000; which I did. I then shallowed by climb and continued. Soon after climbing through FL190; there was a loud bang. The inboard cowl door on the left engine was torn from the hinges below and I could see the valve cover for cylinder number 2 on the left engine. The forward portion of the cowl door was folded back acting like an air-scoop.I turned off the autopilot; notified ATC and declared an emergency. I requested vectors my departure airport. I was assigned a heading and cleared to 14;000 FT. A second ATC Controller then got on the radio while we discussed best options. I was; at the same time; attempting to feather the left prop and secure the left engine. ATC then asked me to describe the situation. I describe the appearance of the left engine cowl and door.I realized that with full rudder; and appropriate aileron input; I had trouble maintaining a heading. I continue to adjust until I was able to do so. I discovered that maintaining 14;000 FT was difficult without slowing to a speed where the controls felt sluggish and directional control was more difficult. I asked to continue my descent. I communicated with ATC that I was unable to maintain 14;000 without slowing to an airspeed where control input was degrading. ATC recommended with my described situation that I land closer and suggested ZZZ. I agreed. ATC asked if I preferred right or left turns. I stated left turns.I continued a descent at about 800 to 1;000 FT per minute. This allowed me to maintain 120 KIAS where controls continued to be responsive. As I neared ZZZ; I requested CTAF frequency; runway length and airport altitude. ATC cleared me to CTAF and I transmitted; engine out; emergency landing; 23. I approach ZZZ at about 5;000 FT on a downwind to Runway 23. I executed a left turn to base about 3 NM northeast of the field. I then went to gear down and full flaps; and cut power for a dead-stick landing. I crossed the numbers at about 120 KIAS ballooned after touchdown and completed the landing. The FBO was ready with cars and tugs. There was no Crash Fire-Rescue equipment visible to me. Overhead jet traffic confirmed that I was on the ground; gave me a phone number for Center. I called Center after shutting down the right engine.I was the only soul on board. There was no further damage to the airplane; and no injuries.

BE60 pilot experiences an engine failure climbing through FL190 resulting in cowl damage and a significant increase in drag. After declaring an emergency and requesting vectors to the departure airport; ATC suggests landing at the nearest suitable airport which is accepted. A safe landing ensues.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Descending into ZZZ we started to smell a hot electrical smell. As we descended on the arrival the smell did not go away and the stab trim started trimming 2 rotations nose down; two rotations nose up. The trim always returned back to its original position. Once we configured flaps 5 the aircraft stopped trimming. There was no abnormality to the way the aircraft was flying. We did not exercise Priority Authority and landed without event. We wrote up issue up and explained to the mechanics what had taken place.

B737-800 Captain reported an electrical smell in the cockpit during descent. The Captain reported the stabilizer trim began to make uncommanded trim inputs until flaps were lowered to 5 degrees. The Captain elected to continue the approach to landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Shortly after reaching our cruising altitude; the Captain noticed an imbalance between the main tanks and he corrected the situation. About 30 minutes later; we noticed we were using more fuel out of main tank 1; creating an imbalance between the main tanks again. When we rechecked the fuel burn; we noticed we over-burned our fuel by 800-1;000 LBS. The captain (PM) contacted Maintenance and the Flight Operations Duty Officer (FODO) to determine if our issue was due to faulty gauges or an actual fuel leak. We could not confirm the actual fuel leak and we all agreed it was the best option to continue on to our destination with [nearby airports] as alternates. We landed uneventfully with 5;300 LBS of fuel. When we taxied onto the gate; one of our mechanics signaled us to shut the engines. The mechanic informed us there was a visible fuel leak from the number one engine. We deplaned without incident and later continued on in a new aircraft.

B737-800 FO reported that after an abnormal inflight fuel burn the Mechanic on the ground at the gate noticed a visible fuel leak.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Taxi to gate from hangar. Taxi into gate with the use of the Auto Park/ DGS (Digital Guidance System). DGS indicated feet to stop point; after it reached 11 ft. it suddenly went to stop and then displayed too far. When departing aircraft observed that nose wheel had gone past the stop point by approximately 3 ft.The guidance system is unreliable and could cause damage/harm to aircraft; personnel; and equipment. Must be out of calibration that it displayed 11 ft. and then suddenly stop / too far. Prior to the 11 ft. the system was indicating count down of feet normally. Calibrate the DGS system on a schedule and inspect for calibration.

Aircraft Technician noted guidance system used to marshal aircraft into the gate is unreliable.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

The following scenario occurred as a result of Aurora ATCT being severely understaffed.  Presently; there are only 4 qualified/ Certified Professional Controller's (CPC) total and only 3 CPC's were scheduled to work the entire; following day (well below our minimum staffing requirements).[Date removed] was scheduled with 1 CPC opening; me as the CPC on a middle shift and being held over for a mandatory 2 hours of overtime; and 1 CPC on the closing shift.  With the staffing below our minimum staffing requirements; the Controllers In Charge (CIC) were focused on maintaining safety and allowing sufficient breaks to ensure if/when traffic was heavy and complex; we would be able to staff the positions properly.  Breaks were shortened to 45 minutes long for the CPC's.  Training was an after thought behind maintaining safety due to staffing being at dangerous levels.The traffic became very complex and heavy in the morning.  With as few CPC's and many job tasks being required including phone calls from Chicago TRACON supervisors; controllers; helping to find aircraft/tag aircraft on the radar; assisting the very busy local controller; as well as staffing the operational positions; training was not performed during the first part of the morning shift.  Once the CPC arrived for his shift; training was able to be more of a priority with sufficient staffing and safety having been the focus of the CPC's during the morning.I was made aware this afternoon that ARR ATCT management had deemed the shift was run poorly; training should have been the priority; and that even shorter breaks should have been enforced to accomplish training thus possibly compromising safety.  ARR ATCT management was not present during this morning shift and was not aware or understanding of all of the complexities; concerns; and events of the morning.  When the supervisor arrived; the CPC's explained what had happened that morning and expressed our concerns about being below minimum staffing requirements.  Training was accomplished for all 3 of the trainees at some point during their shifts as well. A supervisor;  who did not work on [date removed]; issued a false and misrepresentative Performance Record of Conference this afternoon stating that the CIC's had 'poor management of resources; fails to provide for the OJT needs of the facility; and reduces the margin of safety in order to provide long breaks.'  The longest break any controller received all day was 46 minutes; an appropriate break amount even stated so by ARR ATCT management.Safety; efficiency; and proper staffing should; in my opinion; be the foremost concerns at Aurora ATCT.  Evidently; this is not the case.  I received a total of 2 hours and 10 minutes of break time during my entire 10 hour shift but was told breaks should be shorter; thus fatiguing controllers working (with some on overtime); and quite possibly compromising the safety of the operation.Staffing is at dangerously low levels and have reached a critical tipping point at Aurora.  Aurora ATCT management should; in my opinion; have a focus on safety instead of trying to focus solely on training.   We do not have the proper personnel to accomplish training all of the time; and though I recognize training is important to help alleviate our staffing shortage; I do not believe it should be enforced to a level that compromises safety and introduces risk into the ARR ATCT operation.

An ARR Tower Controller reports of staffing issues at the Tower. Reporter sites a specific day where he thought they did a good job with the short staffing; but management thinks they did not.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 13300; Flight Crew Type 1800

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

While taxiing out departing ZZZ; ATC advised that a Lear Jet had just reported moderate turbulence along our route.  We acknowledged and briefly discussed the topic and after looking at radar; decided we were safe to depart since our returns showed only moderate rain. After take off and while climbing through 2;000 ft to level at 3;000 ft.; we encountered severe turbulence. The aircraft was at 230 knots and began to shake rapidly and violently.  Items in the cabin that were not secured moved about freely and our passengers voiced concern. I reduced power to idle to attempt to slow to maneuvering speed as the airplane violently became marginally controllable. We were assigned a level off at 3;000 ft.; however; this seemed an unlikely event as I had tried to level from our turn and pushed forward on the elevator; but the plane continued to climb at idle power with the elevator forward.  When we recovered; we were at 3;900 ft and immediately began our descent back to 3;000 ft as we advised center. The radar only painted green returns and although yellow returns were also adjacent to us; we were at least 10 miles from any of those yellow returns. We were given climb instructions as we leveled at 3;000 and given a controller change.  As we climbed and began to top some of the clouds 9;000 feet we encountered a similar event in essentially clear air just at the tops of the clouds in level flight. Again; I reduced power to idle and tried to maintain wings level and altitude; but the aircraft was only marginally controllable and violently being pitched and rolled. Both events lasted approximately 10-20 seconds and we then reported both events to ATC center as severe turbulence.  Again; radar showed nothing significant on our second encounter.  Once on the ground; the aircraft was inspected for damage and none was found.

Flight Crew flying CE-525 aircraft report severe turbulence after takeoff.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 13400; Flight Crew Type 7340

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

LAS forecast to be VFR with gusty winds. We departed with a normal fuel load; no alternate or contingency fuel. On arrival to LAS we began the ILS 25L approach. During the approach; Tower announced a microburst alert; 30 KTS for Runway 25L. We discontinued the approach. Tower asked if we would like an approach to Runway 01 as they did not have any alerts for that runway. We agree and got a vector to Runway 01. While proceeding to 01; Tower announced a microburst alert of 30 KTS for Runway 01. We requested holding to evaluate the situation. [We were] cleared to hold at BLD as published. In holding; called Dispatch and requested alternate information; given PHX or ONT for alternates. During the hold; Tower informed us there were no alerts for 25L. Informed Dispatch we were departing the hold for 25L and if we didn't get in; we were diverting to PHX. Dispatch said he would ACARS time and burns if needed. On final to 25L Tower announced another microburst alert; 30 KTS for 25L. We executed a missed approach. When handed off to Departure we informed them of our intent to divert to PHX and declared minimum fuel. Initially [we] received easterly vector to intercept a LAS departure to an arrival into PHX. Declared an emergency and informed ATC we were direct PHX. Proceeded direct PHX to a five mile VFR final to Runway 26. We landed with approximately 1;900 LBS of fuel remaining.

The Captain and I were very aware of our fuel situation and we knew if we were going to divert; it had to be ASAP because we were already eating into our reserve. With the possible divert options of PHX; ONT or even RNO; we were in a fairly critical fuel state from the beginning due to no fuel planned for a divert (no designated alternate). Just prior to departing holding we agreed that if this approach was unsuccessful; we were immediately diverting to PHX.With other aircraft diverting behind us; it became evident that our fuel status was going to dictate traffic priority which didn't seem to be happening as Center started giving us vectors for traffic separation into PHX. We declared an emergency and requested direct to the airfield for a landing on Runway 08. Phoenix Approach informed us that 8/26 was closed. They then informed us the runway was open but expect landing on 26. We set up for a short visual final to Runway 26. Landing and taxi in was uneventful other than landing with approximately 1;800 LBS of fuel. Following landing; #2 engine was shut down and we taxied in single engine. [We] arrived in the blocks with 1;500 LBS of fuel.

Dispatched to LAS with neither alternate nor contingency fuel; an Airbus flight crew declared a fuel emergency and proceeded direct to PHX when microburst alerts at LAS precluded landing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 930; Flight Crew Type 850

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The following occurred at AVQ. It involved two aircraft: Aircraft X (me) and Aircraft Y (student solo). My student and I were flying the GPS 21 practice approach; circle-to-land Runway 12 at AVQ. Aircraft Y was inbound for a landing; planning on making a 45 degree entry to the left downwind for Runway 12. We passed below Aircraft Y by approximately 800 feet while over the highway about 3.5 nm northeast of the airport. We were between the FIMTU and DUYED way point on the approach and Aircraft Y was southbound towards the Cement Plant VFR way point. Both aircraft reported the other in sight and planned for Aircraft Y to follow behind [us] when making their entry. Both aircraft reported entering the downwind at the same time. [We were] at circling minimums; 2640 feet MSL. On TIS (Traffic Information Service); Aircraft Y appeared to be at the same altitude. Aircraft Y reported having [us] in sight and slightly above and behind; and planned to extend downwind to make proper spacing. We reported starting to make a base turn early to help with spacing. As we began the turn towards base; we saw Aircraft Y at the same altitude approximately 100-200 feet directly abeam us to our right. I took the controls from my student and continued the turn towards the base as Aircraft Y turned right and reported that they were exiting the pattern to try again. Aircraft Y reported unsuccessfully entering the pattern again as we completed our touch-and-go. As we were departing the traffic pattern; Aircraft Y reported to be maneuvering again to try and enter the traffic pattern. Aircraft Y did not identify as a solo student until after the near miss when queried by the CFI on Aircraft X.

C172 flight instructor reported a traffic pattern conflict with a solo student pilot at AVQ; a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1.5; Flight Crew Total 1060; Flight Crew Type 750

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was flying with a CFII doing a bi-annual on a RR (Round-Robin) between ZZZ and ZZZ1. We departed ZZZ1 flying direct to ZZZ at 1700 foot. Note that we departed ZZZ with 3.5 hours of fuel. Shortly before the midpoint of the return leg the engine suddenly/instantaneously was running rough. The CFII immediately asked for the controls and I granted them. We tried carb heat; switched the mags. The engine continued to run with a max RPM estimated at 1200. Applying throttle would cause the engine to immediately lose RPM and begin windmilling. We were in a rural area with no close airports and the CFII made the correct decision to set the plane down instead of trying to nurse an engine with 1/4 power. We had a few field options; chose one and set down with no issues for the passengers or aircraft.

C172 pilot reported engine operating at low power resulted in an off airport landing.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

This is the third write up for this particular issue. I have seen this issue almost consistently over the last nine years. The glide slope for ILS Runway 10 at BWI oscillates up and down. It is very noticeable very far out (more than 20 miles). As you get closer the total deviation is smaller (approximately one 'dot' amplitude cycle every one second at around 12 miles). However; even lined up with the localizer; the deviations are still apparent and the flight director's command nose up and down movements in sync with the glide path. Had we had the autopilot on; it would have moved the nose up and down and probably would have kicked the autopilot off. It's as if there is a harmonic effect from interference; or an installation problem; or maybe something emitting near the airport that affects the glide slope. My big concern is that this approach is the only CAT II/III approach at BWI; and is frankly unusable as a CAT I ILS. I certainly don't trust it. BWI used Runway 33L ILS approaches the vast majority of the time.

Air Carrier landing BWI experienced glideslope oscillations while on the ILS Runway 10 approach.  The reporter noted this anomaly had been experienced on a number of other occasions.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

First aircraft inbound for ZZZ; we're on a north operation.  Aircraft X comes from the SW; checks on with correct ATIS; I assign him Runway XXL tell him to expect radar vectors for a visual approach; second aircraft; Aircraft Y checks on with correct ATIS from NE I assign him radar vectors VA XX L; third aircraft checks on from SW Aircraft Z; checks on with correct ATIS tell him to expect visual approach XXL and I give him a caution wake turbulence because he'll be following Aircraft Y.  Since Aircraft X was my first aircraft it's customary for me to get flight conditions; winds bases etc.I wasn't very busy; some departures from ZZZ and nearby satellites; got one VFR for flight following.  I know something had gone wrong at some point with our radar; something with ASR and I think some shout lines also OTS (Out of Service) which I believe Supervisor was working on due to phone calls in background.  CIC was watching the satellite sector he seemed to be getting busy.  I vector Aircraft X to the back of the box; for a straight in visual approach approximately 15 miles; I get the last of the PIREP; I clear him and switch.  I slowed Aircraft Y on downwind to follow; and I had vectored Aircraft Z towards final.  Aircraft Y calls field in sight; I withhold clearance to give Aircraft X room to get off runway.  Finally give a turn and clearance to Aircraft Y and switch to Tower.  Then I hook Aircraft Z to join the final approach course and advise field when I notice go-around; and Aircraft Y going to XXL; I assumed FOD on runway; I immediately change the runway on Aircraft Z; tell him to plan on a VA app; and told him to stand by while I find the localizer frequency; he says he has field in sight so I clear him to XXL; at some point I switch him. Aircraft X comes off; I start my point out with my satellite; climb him to 4;000; and turn him.  I asked him if he went around due to FOD; I don't think he understood my questions; I asked him if he went around due to FOD; what was reason for go-around and he said runway was closed; he went around when he saw the flashing 'X' on runway then he asked the tower controller if runway closed. That's when I realized I had been vectoring to wrong runway and forgotten west complex [was] closed.  I had been previously distracted prior to taking position from union forcing us to no longer social distance and having to train; so that had been something I was discussing with my peers and the possibility of changing schedules for a sixth time this year that had definitely been a major distraction when I came to work today.  In the end it's on me; I'd like to know if ATIS was correct because I had three pilots all check in with current ATIS and no one balked at XXL.  Also straight in; over 15 miles; tagged for the wrong runway; and tower didn't look at the scope or out the window and cleared for the wrong runway.  Just a lot of Swiss cheese [stuff] went down. A lot of things went wrong; involving a lot of people; maybe I should have taken sick leave today.

Approach Controller reported vectoring three aircraft to a closed runway and not realizing it until the first aircraft went around.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

After a lengthy delay of 4 hours in ZZZ1 due to weather and COVID in ZZZ we departed and the flight was normal and uneventful until descent on the ZZZZZ STAR into ZZZ. I was PM; so I was on the radio and ZZZ Center gave us cross ZZZZZ1 [Intersection] at 11;000 and 250 knots. I repeated the clearance then verified it with my Captain who began putting it into the MCDU and set 11;000 in the altitude selector. I glanced down and confirmed and then returned to looking for ice buildup. Within a half mile of ZZZZZ1 ATC called and re-cleared is to descend and maintain 11;000 and maintain 250 knots. I repeated the new clearance and then my Captain and I noticed that our initial clearance for ZZZZZ1 was inadvertently selected on the next fix ZZZZZ2 which is 7 miles from ZZZZZ1 and has 11;000 feet restriction on the STAR. While there was an error I do not believe an FAR was violated because ATC was diligent and noticed we were not going to make the assigned restriction and re-cleared us before the restriction. Furthermore when I apologized to ATC they said no worries have a good night and they shipped us to the next Controller. I believe this could have been avoided if my Captain and I spent an extra second looking at the MCDU before ZZZZZ3 it. I believe factors that played into this were two long legs with a 4 hour delay in ZZZ1. To reiterate I do not believe an FAR or clearance was violated; but it was close so my Captain and I decided to write a report.

Air carrier First Officer reported not making a crossing restriction during descent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 141; Flight Crew Type 42

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was conducting a routine cross-country flight to ZZZ1; then back to my departure location ZZZ. The flight to ZZZ1 went as planned. We landed on Runway XX and were asked to back-taxi on the runway by ATC in order for us to depart back to ZZZ. We departed from Runway XX and headed back southwest. We climbed to 4500 MSL enroute back to ZZZ. Approximately 20 miles out I began my initial descent. As I began this descent; I also tuned into the CTAF frequency as Tower was closed at this time. Approximately 10 miles out I made my first position report. I made a secondary one at 6 miles. Upon reporting at 6 miles; I was under the impression that I was the only one in the airspace as there was no other plane making reports. Upon this; I began to set up for a 6-mile final straight into Runway XX at ZZZ. I made another position report at 4 miles and then another 2 miles. Once I reached 1 mile out; I made the announcement that I was on short final. I continued my descent until I had reached the numbers and started my round out. Upon doing this; my ADS-B announced that there was traffic on short final at 6 o'clock. This traffic had not made any position reports and gave nobody in the airspace an indication for what he was doing. Upon hearing this; I made the decision to land in order to avoid a possible midair collision with this traffic.Continuing my flare; I was dealing with a 15 kt. headwind which I had flown with through my entire approach. Upon flaring; I decreased power and the wind shifted from a headwind to a crosswind that became in excess of 17 kt. As a result of this; I side-loaded my right main landing gear. As an attempt to keep the nose gear off for as long as possible; I increased power to aid in my attempt. After doing this the crosswind sheared to a tailwind; which as result forced my nose straight into the ground. With the increase in power and the direct nose impact; this resulted in the aircraft bouncing. As a result of the bounce; I initiated go-around procedures. As a I began to gain altitude; the aircraft who was not talking to anyone came to a stop on Runway XY. As a precautionary measure I flew 10 miles out and climbed up to 2500 ft. I soon turned towards the airfield and began making position reports every mile as an attempt to make contact with this aircraft. Unable to make any sort of communication with this aircraft; I overflew the field to try and see his exact position. I observed that he was off the active runway and on a taxiway. Upon noticing this; I made the decision to go in and land. This decision was based upon the fact that I was unaware of any possible damage to the aircraft and I had no exact way of telling what this other aircraft's intentions were. Upon making my base to final turn for Runway XX; this aircraft turned off the taxiway and departed Runway XY. I made a landing on XX and was able to taxi back to the hangar.As I taxied up to my hangar; this aircraft was finally able to make contact with me as he reported radio difficulties. Upon performing a normal shutdown; I got out and examined the aircraft and the only direct observation that could be made was that the tube of the front nose gear tire had gone flat. It was only once the cowling was removed that the damage to the firewall was observed. A learning experience that I will take away from this is to be more aware of potential traffic surrounding me and in my airspace. The most important one I believe is to be more aware of the possibility of windshear on final. This better preparation and awareness I believe; would help me to respond better if a situation like this were to occur again and I was called upon to take action. Having this type of experience will benefit me as before; I did not have the chance to be forced to react in a situation like this. Having gone through this will help me to learn from my mistakes and allow me to correct them and perform an appropriate response to these less-than-ideal landing conditions in the future. I also believe that I need to learn to be more hesitant about adding power in a situation like this and learn to make more accurate or precise adjustments that might be necessary.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC event with another aircraft while trying to land at the airport and bouncing on the landing; and proceeded to perform a go-around procedure.