Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Manuals

Aircraft X was descending towards Greenville Downtown airport. When Aircraft X was 10 miles out the pilot reported the airport in sight and was cleared for the Visual Approach. At that moment a VFR target appeared off the airport next to GMU which is GYH. The VFR target appeared to make a right downwind departure as if to stay in the traffic pattern and leveled off at 1600 feet. Aircraft X was switched to GMU tower. The VFR target having reached the edge of the class C climbed rapidly and turned back into the face of Aircraft X which the shape of the Class C lets them do. The only action the controller could take would have been to call GMU tower and have them call the traffic which by then the conflict would have already happened. By the controllers judgment the two planes were at the same altitude within a half mile with a closing speed over 250 knots. A Very High risk of collision. The configuration of our 3 major airports (GSP;GMU; and GYH) is very unique and complex; and yet the airspace that is around them is a traditional simple design that does NOT protect the airports. There is a very HIGH risk of collision on a daily basis and we keep asking and pleading with anyone who will listen that somebody is likely to get killed if this problem is not fixed. At GSP there can be VFR aircraft that we are not talking to within 400 feet of aircraft on the ILS into GSP setting off evasive TCAS RA's during a critical stage of flight. This is the airport that the Class C is 'supposed' to protect. Donaldson and GMU can launch VFR's into the face of the others traffic with no coordination required. Donaldson is doing this without having a Tower Radar display meaning they have no 'picture' of who else is out there. We have been trying to get them one for a long time and keep getting rejected adding to the safety risk. Donaldson also doesn't have any VFR departure procedures meaning without knowing what IFR traffic is directly above them landing GMU or GSP they can launch a VFR at their discretion. The incident described above caused a near midair collision and everybody was legal in what they did.The airspace and the procedures need to be changed urgently! The Class C has to be reshaped. Having to break IFR aircraft out of the primary airport to avoid a collision with an unknown VFR is a terrible operating procedure. The Class C has to protect the final of GMU and GSP better. Another fix would be to get Donaldson a Tower radar display. If they had seen the IFR aircraft approaching GMU they could have vectored the VFR behind and clear of conflict. We have tried to get VFR departure procedures with GMU and GYH but nothing official has been accomplished. Even something as simple as remain below 1800 feet until outside of the Class D would help. Any of these changes would greatly reduce the risk of IFR/VFR separation loss which is a major safety issue.

A TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on a Visual Approach was handed off to the tower while a VFR aircraft departed an adjacent airport and flew into the the path of the Visual Appproach.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Weather; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure

Leading Edge Flap Transit light on approach into a foreign city. Rushed through new QRH to stay on profile. Unfamiliarity with new QRH led to missed steps and we received a GPWS Warning on approach.Mountainous terrain; weather; traffic congestion and minimum fuel led to rushing to stay on profile. The new Boeing QRH flows nothing like our old QRH did; so we misinterpreted the term 'checklist complete except for deferred items' to mean we were done except for the MEL procedure of deferring the defective item. We failed to turn the page and complete the checklist by inhibiting the GPWS and flap inhibit switches. We need to point these differences out to the crew members. We also no longer issue paper copies of these checklists for the crews to practice and study and we need to. Reading it from the iPad just isn't the same.

During descent a B737 Leading Edge Flap Transit light illuminated. The rushed crew failed to complete a new iPad Boeing QRH procedure requiring they inhibit the GPWS and Flap Inhibit. The GPWS Warning sounded on final.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.0

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Aircraft X started calling me saying he had my frequency just in case of loss communications. It took me a while to get to him since I was very busy at the time and didn't know exactly where he was. Initially I thought it was just an aircraft trying to request flight following or an aircraft on the wrong frequency. Well; Aircraft X was an IFR aircraft right over the RSW VORTAC that had departed KEYW about 45 minutes prior. Aircraft X was given an IFR clearance from KEYW Tower; shipped to NQX Approach; then lost communications with NQX Approach. Aircraft X was never handed off to Miami Center. Therefore; he flew through Miami Center for about 95 miles; approximately 40 minutes without Miami Center having any type of Data Block; Flight Plan Information; Radar Identification; etc. Aircraft X was level at 110 the whole time he flew through Miami Center. We know this because we looked up the original Beacon Code he was assigned in Falcon. I tried to look up his flight plan through his call sign and through his beacon code but we had absolutely nothing on this aircraft. I immediately called for a D-Side so they could help me out with this situation. Once I was able to radar identify him; I noticed he had already entered R67's Airspace. I immediately called R67 and told them that Aircraft X was an IFR Aircraft at 110 in which we had no information on. The R67 controller immediately stopped an aircraft at 100 that was climbing high right underneath Aircraft X. I proceeded to give Aircraft X an official Miami Center Clearance to [destination airport]. I made sure to ask him who gave him his initial clearance and who was the last controller he spoke too. I made Aircraft X give me his Search and Rescue information on the frequency and shipped him to R67. I'm not sure who gave him loss communications to 132.4. I'm guessing he tried several Miami Center frequency's and one of the Miami Center Controllers were able to give him my frequency based on his location. In my opinion; this was an extremely dangerous and unsafe situation. I'm not sure if Aircraft X was ever in conflict with any other aircraft or if we loss standard separation on the course of his flight prior to the RSW VORTAC. I know that my sector was very busy at the time in which he called and it's a very high possibility that I might have descended or climbed one of my aircraft right through him. All I ever saw was a mode c intruder with no altitude. I hope this unsafe event gets investigated so we can fix the problem and prevent this from happening again.I'm not sure what type of NORDO procedures are used in NQX but I recommend that they start using one if they aren't doing so already. Aircraft X flew through 3 Miami Center Sectors on an IFR Clearance at 110 Feet and nobody ever knew that he was there.

An IFR aircraft was NORDO and their Radar Data tag was not displayed on ATC radar displays at the ARTCC. The aircraft flew through three ARTCC sectors without the controllers knowledge.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

I was training a trainee on Local Control West and East. A PA28 called inbound VFR from the west and given entry instructions of 'enter right traffic for 13R report the reservoir'. When he got closer in; in order to depart 2 IFR aircraft that had been holding for release; he was given instructions to 'change to Runway 13L cleared to land'. Which he repeated back correctly; a minute or two later; he called back and asked for us to repeat instructions. He was again given 13L cleared to land; which he again repeated back correctly. Trainee then continued controlling other aircraft; along with many other instructions and clearances. A Commander; IFR; was cleared for take off 13R. After the Commander was off the end of the runway they called us on frequency and said they had an opposite direction on take off. At which point I looked to departure end of Runway 13R and found the PA28 rolling out having landed on 31L instead of 13L. I then keyed up and informed him he was supposed to land on 13L and that he needed to call the Tower. When he called he was given the brasher statement. Upon listening to tapes; we confirmed that all instructions were given and read back correctly. So the situation was a pilot deviation that I did not catch to stop.

Tower Controller described an opposite direction landing and takeoff event when traffic incorrectly landed on the wrong runway; a clear pilot deviation.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was in the local traffic pattern conducting touch and go's. On the downwind; I instructed the pilot to extend and expect a long downwind to follow aircraft on a 6 mile final. I had prior knowledge that this pilot was a student pilot and I simplified the instruction to include that; 'I will call your base turn'. On a 5 mile downwind I instructed the pilot to 'turn base' and cleared it to land Runway 9L. The pilot acknowledged [but there was traffic on] 9R finals causing an NMAC with an aircraft on the 9R final. I instructed the pilot to continue southbound to avoid conflict with the aircraft; after attempts to have the pilot comply with my instructions to had to hand off the aircraft to the Controller whose airspace the pilot was in. The level of knowledge of ATC procedures should be set higher for pilots conducting first solos or flying in controlled airspace. Language barriers and lack of procedures allowed this pilot to put itself and other aircraft in immediate danger. This issue has been discussed routinely with the flight schools yet there is no accountability by the schools or the FAA Management. I recommend less student traffic during high volume periods; more understanding of ATC phraseology; and knowing a higher level of basic English. This airport is highly volatile and unsafe due to communication issues.

TMB Tower Controller reports of a NMAC with a student pilot and an aircraft on final for a parallel runway. Language barrier was also stated to be a factor.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 815; Flight Crew Type 300

I fly an aircraft with an IFR-certified Garmin GNC300XL; which is a non-WAAS GPS receiver. We have been noticing lately that this unit is drawing incorrect courses from our present position direct to GPS waypoints. Sometimes the unit will draw the correct course; and while we are enroute on that course; it will completely re-draw an incorrect route to the same waypoint. Sometimes the unit will completely delete all waypoint information and leave us with no course to follow whatsoever; as though the unit has just been initialized and is waiting for us to input information.While enroute to our destination airport on a VFR training flight; the unit erased our course and waypoint while we were 15 miles southwest of the destination. We simply reverted to pilotage to continue to our destination airport.This could; however; present a real problem to GNC300XL operators; especially during IFR conditions; hence the reason for this report. While searching for the solution to this problem; we are limiting the unit for use during VFR operations only.

An IFR-certified Garmin GNC300XL installed in a C150 began giving faulty information related to courses and waypoints.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 645; Flight Crew Type 77

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

I was attempting to make a landing at an off airport facility. This facility is paved and meets all the takeoff and landing minimums for the SR22. I performed extensive preflight planning reviews and the day of the flight was clear with no significant wind so I decided to proceed. Upon arrival; other airplanes were landing at this facility and as I turned onto final the pilot that landed prior to me radioed that he needed more time to back taxi to a parking area. At that point I made the decision to perform a 360 degree turn while on final. During this maneuver I lost some altitude and speed. Once I completed the turn I continued on final (after verifying the other plane had successfully back taxied to the parking area). About 30 feet in front of the approach end of the runway are power lines. As I approached these power lines I pulled back on the stick and raised the nose slightly; again causing me to lose airspeed. As I approached the runway I flared a little too high; losing more airspeed and causing the aircraft to stall and hit the runway hard. The main landing gear collapsed and the propeller hit the pavement. The plane came to rest a couple hundred feet down the runway in a grassy area on the right side of the runway. My 2 passengers and I were fine with no significant injuries.In retrospect as soon as I knew that there was going to be a delay with the airplane in front of me in leaving the runway I should have executed a go around. Not being on a stabilized final approach was the major contributing factor to this incident.

SR22 pilot reported becoming destabilized while maneuvering for an approach. This led to a decay in airspeed which resulted in a hard landing; gear collapse; and a propeller strike.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

During cruise flight at FL350; received a 'Brake OVHT' warning message. I told the First Officer that it was probably nothing; but that I had the controls and radios; you read the QRH. A couple seconds later; we then received a 'Flaps Halfspeed' status message. At this point; I reconsidered that it was just a faulty indication. I knew the flap PDUs were located somewhere in the vicinity of the wheel wells; and so I was concerned that there might be a real overheat or even fire situation. The QRH commanded to slow to 220 knots and lower the gear. The First Officer read ahead for me; and let me know that once the gear were down; if the message extinguished then we were good to continue; but if it persisted we needed to land immediately at the nearest airport. I looked at the maneuvering speed for our weight; which would allow for 220 knots; but I was concerned about whether we could lower the gear at altitude; and what speed would be a safe speed for such an operation. I knew this was way outside our normal operating envelope; but I was concerned that we could have an actual overheat or fire; and we needed to take care of the problem as soon as possible. So I referenced the 'green line' on the airspeed indicator; and gradually slowed to 219 knots. Since we were still about 10 knots above the green line; I decided to call for gear down; hoping that we could execute the procedure quickly. As soon as the gear came down I realized this was the wrong decision; as the airspeed (at this point obviously) started to bleed off very quickly; and so I went to max power. The overheat warning message did extinguish immediately; so I quickly called for gear up; and commanded the First officer to tell ATC we need lower immediately. The airspeed stabilized; but I was concerned I would not be able to accelerate; so I briefly went to full power for a few seconds until receiving our descent clearance. At this point I was able to accelerate back to normal speed and normal conditions. I then contacted the Dispatcher and Maintenance Control; to advise them of the situation. We all agreed; that since the overheat condition no longer existed; that it was safe to continue to our destination. I then notified the flight attendants and made a PA to let the passengers know what had just happened. We completed the flight with no further incidents. The main threat was that I believed we may have had a fire or overheat situation; and that time was critical to accomplish an action that would mitigate the problem. A secondary threat was that the QRH (and my training) did not let me know what was a safe altitude [and] airspeed combination to perform this procedure. I made a huge error in not simply considering the effect of adding a huge amount of drag to the aircraft in a marginal performance environment. This resulted in an undesired state of being far behind the power curve for such a configuration. I would have descended with or without ATC's blessing had the speed bled off further if necessary; to avoid an impending stall; but that would have been an undesired aircraft state as well. From the comfort of this computer desk I can now clearly see that my fixation on reacting to a possible fire clouded my ability to think about basic airmanship in considering whether following a QRH procedure was prudent. I think it would be helpful if the QRH contained a single line perhaps warning that above such-and-such an altitude; continued level flight may not be possible during this procedure. I would react much better if the situation were to repeat; however; I still believe we could use more guidance in knowing what are the safest slow speeds at different altitudes; and especially what altitude [and] speed combinations are safe to lower the gear.

At cruise altitude; crew noticed a 'Brake OVHT' warning message. QRH procedure called for landing gear extension; which was done and resulted in rapid loss of airspeed. The warning message was extinguished and the crew retracted the landing gear. The flight was completed without further incident.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Encountered short term aircraft wake turbulence during vectors for approach that caused a roll rate requiring momentary manual autopilot disconnect to fly out of. ATC frequency was too congested to make a notification. Landing was uneventful.

A319 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into DFW.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 2930; Flight Crew Type 400

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I departed McClellan airport (MCC) Runway 34. I took off and flew runway heading. The airport is an ex-military field with a rather long runway because of this I waited until I got to pattern altitude before turning crosswind which would give me proper displacement in the traffic pattern. At the departure end I started a gradual left crosswind turn.  I had heard a helicopter making traffic calls on the radio on a left downwind leg for Runway 34. I did not have visual contact with the helicopter when I took off. As I started the left crosswind leg; I got a visual contact with the helicopter low and to my left with about 400 feet vertical separation and about 100 feet horizontal separation. I pulled the nose up abruptly for separation which caused me to pop through the floor of the overlying class C airspace which is 1;600 feet. I reached a maximum altitude of 2;000 feet MSL and I immediately pushed the nose down to get back down out of the Class C airspace. Total time of the altitude deviation was less than 30 seconds. MCC is uncontrolled and I wasn't talking to ATC. I exited the area to the southeast and then had to immediately climb above 2;600 feet MSL to avoid Mather's (MHR) Class D airspace which is nearby. I should have reviewed the altitudes of the Class C again before departure. I should have exited the pattern with a right turn and cleared the pattern and Class C sooner. The traffic conflict in the pattern made the only option was to climb and that put me at risk for an altitude deviation. I deviated in the interest of safety and corrected as quickly as possible.

GA pilot reported taking evasive action for an NMAC with a helicopter during climb from MCC Airport resulted in an airspace violation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1968; Flight Crew Type 1968

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While flying the line selectable VOR DME 25 into LIR; we noticed that the displayed course did not match the course depicted on the approach plate. After flying outbound on the LIB 088 radial to D 10.0; the FMC course continued outbound for approximately 10 more miles prior to the teardrop turn back to the inbound leg. Since it was VMC and the approach plate depicted the left turn at D 10.0; we agreed that Heading Select would be used to conduct the turn to intercept the inbound leg of the approach. This error is a threat since it could potentially take the aircraft too close to rising terrain.

Air Carrier Captain reported the course; as depicted on this approach; gets too close to terrain.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While boarding; just before door closure; light visible smoke and a strong burning plastic odor was noted in the cabin. I notified the Captain and confirmed the cabin was in fact filling with smoke. The Captain instructed me that the passengers would need to deplane the aircraft and asked me to put him on the public address. While he was addressing the passengers; I noticed the yellow safety step had been removed from the main cabin stairs and was just a few feet away. I exited the aircraft and replaced the safety step. I got the attention of two nearby ground agents and informed them of the situation; instructing them to keep the passengers contained to the area around the aircraft nose and call for help. I re-entered the aircraft and began instructing the passengers to exit the aircraft without delay leaving their belongings behind. Approximately 10 passengers had exited the aircraft before I was able to re-board and continue my duties. All passengers deplaned without issue within approximately 90 seconds of the Captain's instruction. Additional ground agents and supervisors were on the [scene] within minutes of the event. Maintenance and ZZZ Airport Fire responded promptly and [confirmed] the aircraft was not on fire and no further hazard existed to passengers or Company [personnel]. Passengers were directed to return inside the airport while a plan was devised to reunite them with their belongings. [Flight] was operated on a different aircraft with the same crew after approximately 2 hour delay.I considered the missing safety step to be a serious and unnecessary hazard to expeditious deplaning and therefore made the discussion to get it back in position. We had several passengers with mobility issues and I knew the missing step would be a problem for them. In my opinion; the whole event was orderly; expeditious and safe. Ground [personnel] responded promptly and effectively. Supervisors are to be commended on their efforts to minimize passengers' inconvenience [and] maximize safety and order. My many thanks to them and the entire ZZZ ground crew involved in this event.

Dash 8 Series Flight Attendant reported smoke and burning plastic odor in cabin during boarding. The aircraft was deplaned.


Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I cannot safely fly the 737 with the new [iPad Mount] tray installed. At my normal sitting height; my normal arm position has my left forearm (from the Captain's seat) sitting just below the base of the [iPad Mount] and my normal flying arm movement is totally blocked from any upward movement of the control yoke (i.e.; right turns). It doesn't matter if I have the armrests down or up; as my arm usually is off the armrest when I'm hand flying.At this time; to safely and legally fly the airplane; I have to remove the [iPad Mount] and use paper charts. If the paper charts are removed in the future; I will no longer be able to safely and legally fly this aircraft; as I cannot hand fly with my left arm (from the Captain's seat) without my arm being blocked by the [iPad Mount] mount.Leaving the mount on for the First Officer's legs; my arm also was rubbing against the mount while taxiing the aircraft using Nose Wheel Steering. Although not blocked or overly unsafe; it was an annoyance.I'm by far not the broadest shouldered pilot flying this aircraft; so I imagine others are having this problem too. On my first leg with the [iPad Mount]; my First Officer's arm also annoyingly rubbed against it with his normal flying arm position. Not blocked like mine; but still noticeable and annoying.With the Ram Mounts; at least you were able to move them to different positions depending on pilot preference. While it's nice to be able to now close the sun shade without the suction cups blocking them; the trade off in my case is far from acceptable. With the [iPad Mount] as installed; my only option; other than removing them; would be to totally change how I have flown aircraft for many years; including sitting much further back; sitting higher or lower and flying with a fully extended straightened arm; vice the comfortable bend that most pilots usually fly with. This isn't an option as I don't feel it's a proper position to safely fly the aircraft from.

B737 pilot could not fly the aircraft with new mounting equipment for the iPad.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During boarding in ZZZ. The First Officer and I were running the before start checklist. When we got to the fuel. We noted that the aircraft was in fact being fueled. And agreed that we would come back to the fuel. At departure time we still did not have the bag sheet and began to inquire as to where that was. In that time we got distracted and did not come back to the fuel. We did notice that fueling was complete because the auto cross flow inhibit status message was gone. In the time looking for the bag sheet I did not check the fuel load against the release. I took for granted that the fueler had the right load. I have since learned that he was giving the wrong fuel load. I let myself get distracted with trying to get out on time. And did not come back to confirming the fuel. I sent Dispatch a message as to our late door closure due to the late bag sheet. Which must have added to my distraction. About 100 miles from ZZZ1 we got the low fuel caution We [advised ATC] and requested direct to ZZZ2 landing Runway XXR. A gradual decent was started at flight idle in an effort to minimize throttle and make the necessary altitude crossings on the approach to Runway XXR. We landed without further incident and taxied to the gate.I let myself get distracted with getting the flight out on time. I should have restarted the checklist after the fuel was done instead of planning on coming back to it. Which I did not do. I did not sleep that well the night before. So I was possibly more tired than I thought I was. I assumed that the fueler had the correct fuel load Which he did not. I know I looked at the fuel; but I clearly did not notice that it was incorrect. Why it did not register with me to check against the release I am unsure. Or if I simply saw a number that looked right. But I should have not let myself get distracted with the other factors and focused on completing the checklist properly. And should have admittedly myself that I may have been more tired than I thought and taken a moment to double check everything. It is something that I will never forget. And never let happen again.

CRJ-900 Captain reported deviating from the before start checklist fuel section resulting in a Low Fuel warning and a diversion.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16.1

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X; a RECAT Category D aircraft; departed RWY 9R. The CIC-IT I was instructing departed Aircraft Y; a RECAT Category F aircraft; behind Aircraft X without waiting for the required 4 mile wake turbulence distance. I did not notice the error until Aircraft Y was lifting off; because I allowed myself to be distracted trying to coordinate a release on another aircraft.I do not have a recommendation to prevent this type of event. I simply did not pay attention as closely as I should have; possibly because I made an assumption about what the person in training was going to do and the assumption did not meet the action.I would like clarification about the RECAT rule. This same operation would not have been an error if it had occurred at an airport that does not use RECAT. I fail to understand how these two conflicting standards can be allowed to coexist in the NAS. If departing a [corporate jet] too close behind an [air carrier] is deemed unsafe at one airport; how can it be considered safe at another? I also believe having these two standards coexisting is confusing and dangerous to the pilots. If there were one standard throughout the NAS; and the pilots were aware of it; then they might correct an error like this by inquiring if the distance is acceptable. With two standards in play; a pilot would possibly think; 'This must be an airport where this wake turbulence distance is acceptable'. It is not really possible for the pilots to memorize which airports apply RECAT and which do not. If 6000 ft and airborne between these two planes is considered safe at most airports; it should be considered safe at all of them.

ORD Tower Controller reported of a loss of separation that was caused by the Developmental Controller releasing the aircraft with less than standard separation. Reporter questioned RECAT wake turbulence.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 7352; Flight Crew Type 1110

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Arriving the terminal area at KOKC I was receiving radar vectors for the ILS Rwy 17L approach and was on a downwind in IMC descending to 5;000 feet MSL. The controller subsequently vectored me to a heading of 310 and a descent to 4;000 feet. During the descent and while monitoring the heading I noticed that the flight director started commanding a turn to the right. I disconnected the Autopilot (AP) and hand flew with raw data while cycling the AP. During this troubleshooting it was busy because I was receiving descents and vectors for the ILS and configuring the aircraft for the approach; which included significant speed reduction. As the approach continued I lost the #1 Nav data; the pilot artificial horizon showed a left bank while the copilot artificial horizon showed a bank to the right; and I started getting altitude flags on the pilot altimeter with rapid changes in the indicated altitude. The copilot instruments were indicating correct information; however; it was impossible to see the glideslope indicator on the copilot HSI without leaning across the cockpit because it was hidden from view by parallax. I advised ATC that I was experiencing multiple problems on the pilot instruments with conflicting information being presented; and was flying using right side (copilot) instruments. I continued the approach and experienced a great deal of over-control issues due to the high workload introduced at a critical time in flight. I experienced substantial course deviations during the approach but did not have a full scale deflection of the copilot course indicator at any time during the approach. I maintained a higher than normal airspeed and altitude on the ILS to insure that I did not descend below the glideslope for the approach and make it less difficult to perform an abort of the ILS. I broke out slightly to the left of course at approximately 1/4 mile from the runway and about 200 feet higher than normal. There was more than adequate runway to land from this position so I landed slightly long after being cleared for the visual approach and cleared to land at that point. The Approach Controller did a superb job of assisting me on the approach and switched me to tower during the roll out phase. Taxi in was non-eventful.A better decision on my part would have been to ask for vectors for another approach during which time I could have configured the aircraft at a more normal pace and been much more prepared to fly a partial panel approach instead of trying to sort out technical problems and aircraft configuration changes while flying single pilot. This would have provided for a less stressful and more stable approach with increased safety.

BE20 pilot reported losing multiple flight instruments on approach to OKC.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

'A' System Electric Hydraulic Pump removed and replaced on a B737-700 aircraft; job completed working with Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) 'Y'. AMT Y performed the pump replacement and cleanup of the work area after job completion. I assisted with tools; parts support and signing-off the logbook after job completion. Approximately four flight legs later; the crew reported having an 'A' System Electric low pressure light and a Circuit Breaker (C/B) popped. Contract Maintenance was called and re-secured the supply line from the reservoir to the pump and reset the C/B. Pump operated normal and aircraft continued. Possible [lack of] attention to detail. We were not under pressure or in a hurry; were given plenty of time. [Recommend] triple/quadruple check all connections.

Myself and fellow Mechanic X; had removed/replaced the 'A' System electric driven Hydraulic Pump on a B737-700 aircraft. I was informed that after five [flight] legs; the aircraft lost 'A' System Electric Hydraulic pressure at the gate and that Maintenance reseated the supply line from the reservoir and an Operational Check was good.

Two Line Mechanics were informed about a B737-700 aircraft that had lost 'A' System Electric Hydraulic pressure at a gate. Aircraft had flown only five flights since they had replaced the 'A' System Electric Hydraulic Pump.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 250

On left base to SAV Runway 10; Garmin G3X touch gave a message 'Savannah Class D within 10 minutes.' I was already in SAV Class D (inner part of Class C; maybe?) or perhaps the system suddenly decided I was headed to SVN -- which is universally known as Hunter (Army Air Field); but which some Fed decided should be called Savannah on the charts -- greatly adding to potential confusion; not only on this message but also when searching for nearest airport. The message did not say exactly which airport; only an airport name -- which was ambiguous. Garmin has been advised of the potential ambiguity; and the ludicrousness of this message (500 feet AGL descending and I get a message about Class D?). The naming ambiguity has been previously reported. No point in waiting to fix it till somebody gets a pilot deviation because the airport names are similar/ misleading/confusing.

Pilot reported his Garmin G3X gave an airspace warning for Savannah Class D when he was already well within that airspace. Pilot asked if it was possible the warning was for SVN airport; which could be a confusing scenario for pilots.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 1323; Flight Crew Type 502

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Was climbing out of Runway ZZR and extending upwind as instructed by Tower. Started having engine roughness and pulled carb heat on. Immediately lost power to 1200-1500 RPM at full power with firing noise out of exhaust and little smoke smell reported by student. Decided to turn around and informed power of imminent engine failure and intentions. Tower instructed to make right traffic. Made left turn while squawking 7700 and [Requesting Priority Handling] and informed was coming back to the airport. Cleared to land Runway XYR; held altitude and pitched for best glide until had runway made and descended for safe landing and taxi back to ZZZ. During run-up and flight on local practice area everything was normal.

C152 Instructor reported returning to departure airport due to rough running engine.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was attempting to complete my preflight security check but had to stop because boarding had commenced. The right overhead equipment and overhead bins had been checked along with the emergency cards at the exit row; but I could not continue checking under the seats. I was asked to sign off on the preflight checklist; and I wrote that I was able to complete only half due to boarding. Once boarding was complete; a man I believe was a supervisor asked about the notation and I said I couldn't completely sign off because the check had not been completed. He told me we were going to take a delay because of it. I notified the Captain of the situation. I was met at the jetway just outside the aircraft by two women; one of whom I thought was a manager. I started to explain what had happened; and she said she already knew about it. She asked if I could complete the check and I said I would do whatever she wanted me to; but that there were now passengers onboard with their bags and other items in their seat back pockets. She offered to help check. I said I would do it but I made it clear that this was her decision to complete the check this way. The other woman in the jetway said the only alternative was to deplane passengers. They didn't want to do this so I did as I was told. I went in; she followed me and we checked under the seats from the exit row forward.

B737 Flight Attendant reports passenger boarding commencing before her safety and security checks have been completed. When asked to sign the preflight checklist; it is signed as half complete. This results in a delay as the Flight Attendant involved is asked to do the security checks that were not completed with passengers on board.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Software and Automation; Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

While flying I failed to fully configure by 1;000 feet AGL. Approach was a Visual Approach. Conditions were clear; 10-mile visibility; and light winds.When landing on Runway XX; TRACON had a restriction to cross a point at 2;600 feet. Configuration at that point was Gear and Flaps 15. Began the descent but had trouble initiating the descent due to automation configuration. During this phase of the approach for some reason I thought I had until 500 feet AGL for final configuration during a Visual Approach. Final configuration was accomplished by 700 feet. Later I referred to the Operating Manual and realized my mistake.Causal factors [included] a lack of recent flying. Aircraft was a B737 MAX and this was the first time I flew one in over X years. This aircraft does not slow down and go down like the B737 NG thus adding to configuration delay. Failure to remember that ALL approaches require final configuration by 1;000 feet. Pairing had a XC:10 Sign-In requiring me to get up at XA:30.  Although this occurred at approximately XI:00  I had already been awake for 9 hours; some of it on the back side of the clock. Perhaps have the same criteria for both IMC and VMC as far as being 'in the slot' this would eliminate any confusion at all. Bottom line; I confused the issue and will not allow that to happen again.

Approach Control told us to maintain 2;600 feet until north of a point.  The Final Approach Fix is south of this point and the altitude is 2;600 feet. The requirement to maintain 2;600 feet caused us to be high on approach. Passing 1;000 feet we were not stable and should have gone around. I felt Approach Control had set us up for failure. The Captain had a lack of recent flying experience and hadn't flown the MAX in two years. He thought being configured by 500 feet on a Visual Approach was acceptable. After landing we checked the manual and realized being stable by 1;000 feet is a requirement for all approaches. It's difficult to be stable by 1;000 feet with the restriction approach control gave us. This restriction is impractical and makes our job difficult.

Air carrier flight crew reported final configuration was not accomplished until 700 feet which is not in accordance with the manual.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During climb; ATC asked where we were navigating to. The First Officer said GVE. We were told that wasn't on our route. ATC then cleared us to VXV and asked what our filed route was. The flight continued without any other inquiries from ATC. I then looked at the PDC and noticed a change from our filed route. The change was -FLUKY DCA246 PAUKI MOL- Whereas we were filed -GVE J42 MOL. I; the Captain; need to verify and cross check everything. Just because I'm on reduced rest doesn't excuse me of this important step. As a crew; we could have done a better job of communicating the changes to the PDC.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

EMB-145 flight crew deviated from cleared routing because they both missed a revised routing notice on PDC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This was a first leg in a first pairing with an LDS (Large Display Screen) aircraft. This was my third leg in an LDS and the CA's third leg as well. The flight progressed uneventfully during taxi; takeoff and encountered. During arrival; we set up for the ILS at ZZZ (CA was PF [Captain was Pilot Flying]). Due to both; the CA's and my own unfamiliarity with the LDS; that was a large part of the focus. In addition to the LDS there were several procedures that the CA and I had discussed prior to flight and enroute; regarding recent changes to [company] procedures; which would later contribute to missing things due to changes in habit patterns.The approach was flown uneventfully; and as we came down final; I continued to do a safety check to ensure both the gear and flaps were correctly set (flaps 25 per the new procedures). Because off the different call outs and speeds involved with the LDS and the new focus on different landing flap settings; things got missed. As the CA had called for gear down and flaps 20; I was focused on ensuring he set the appropriate speeds in the MCP (Mode Control Panel); and forgot to arm the speed brakes. We continued to configure to flaps 25 and land from the approach. Again; due to the call outs that were out of our habit patterns; (the CA would normally call out flaps 30; landing checklist); as the CA called for flaps 25; he neglected to call for the Landing Checklist. As I was focused on the correct LDS procedures being followed; I missed that he had not called for and we did not accomplish the Landing Checklist. As we touched down; the speed brake did not come up; and I made the call; as such. At that moment; I realized that we had not run a Landing Checklist. The CA extended the speed brakes and stopped the aircraft at the pre-briefed exit point. We debriefed the events that led up to us both missing the completion of the landing checklist.In hind sight; with this being the first pairing together; early in the morning on aircraft that we were unfamiliar with and procedures that neither of us had performed; extreme vigilance to avoid a mistake should have been taken. A more thorough cross check by both pilots could have possibly prevented the mistake and being that it was the first time for either of us to shoot the approach; we should have talked more thoroughly about the procedural changes and the CRM changes that would go along with them.

B767 First Officer reported landing without completing the landing checklist due to new approach/landing procedures and first flight pairing of flight crew.


General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Because the aircraft I was to ferry the next evening empty and then with passengers to ZZZ; [which has] a short narrow runway; was written up with discrepancies that would preclude this flight to this runway; I requested that I be able to use another airplane tail for this trip.  Another crew had been dispatched to bring [an aircraft down]; but when this crew picked up this airplane it had a 2;500 pound Fuel Imbalance and they didn't investigate the problem except to transfer fuel to correct the imbalance.  This crew did not refuel and when the aircraft arrived; the First Officer stood by while refueling took place and during this refueling; approximately 10 gallons of fuel spilled on the ramp through the left wing over pressure valve on the underside of the wing and he directed that fueling be stoped.  When I arrived; I conducted a pre-check of the fuel valves at the Single Point Refueling Panel while the truck again pumped fuel and found the valves were not sequencing properly and didn't shut fuel off from the fueling truck.  Maintenance was then called and I spoke with Maintenance Control.  He secured Maintenance on the field but they were unable to correct the problem; and they were also not knowledgeable of the Citation X Systems.  Maintenance Control stated that we could complete our mission if we  went over wing with the fuel hose and pulled the 'T' Handle under the fuselage to fuel the center tank.  I told him I wouldn't conduct the mission this way and to have the aircraft fixed before we flew it.  Maintenance Control instructed us to fly the ferry leg to where he said he felt better about maintenance and to try the refueling operation again there; which ended in the same result.   Dispatch recommended we fly the aircraft to BHM; a 1 hour and 24 minute flight which would consume 3;100 pounds of fuel.  The First Officer and I discussed the fact that we recommended that the airplane be taken to the Citation Service Center (CCSC) in MCO because it was a 36 minute flight and would only consume 1;070 pounds of fuel.  More importantly; since no one knew the extent of the discrepancy it would expose the crew and the non-flying public over which the aircraft would traverse to less danger if it were brought to the closer maintenance facility; a Cessna Citation Service Center in MCO.  Dispatch personnel agreed with our assessment but said someone in management instructed that it be taken to BHM anyway.  I again prompted Dispatch that we could save $2;000 in Fuel costs and one hour of flight time on the aircraft and it would be safer; but was instructed that we take the airplane to BHM because they said the CCSC charges $30 an hour more for labor.  This fuel savings would equate to 66 hours of labor on the airplane at the CCSC in MCO.  The flight was canceled that evening; but another crew made the flight to BHM the next morning.  An attempt was made to contact the Assistant Chief pilot to discuss this issue but he did not answer his phone.The aircraft Commander's authority as final authority for safety of the flight should not be usurped. Additionally; an aircraft with an unknown discrepancy should not be repositioned until it is determined by properly trained personnel that it is safe to do so and more importantly; that it should be flown to the 'nearest' maintenance facility with maintenance personnel who have expertise in this aircraft type; not to where its cheaper to complete the maintenance.  This approach should be taken so as to reduce the exposure to the crew and the non-flying public to a possible off field emergency landing should the fuel lines become clogged with FOD in the case of a fuel system problem.  If I had this to do over again; I would not have flown the empty leg because of pressure being forced on me by Management.  I should have stuck with my first decision to have it fixed as I originally recommended to Maintenance Control.

CE750 Captain reports refusing two aircraft for a revenue flight.  The second aircraft was refused for a fueling valve fault that allowed fuel to spill during refueling.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 58; Flight Crew Total 2366; Flight Crew Type 2366

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Company Policy

Flight Attendant informed me that passengers in Row XX were told by flight attendants numerous times to wear face covering.

Captain reported that the Flight Attendant told them that passengers in a specific row were not wearing face masks and were instructed to do so.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 81; Flight Crew Type 387

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

[We were] cleared into DEN on the ZPLYN3 Arrival. The active modes were LNAV/VNAV. The crew was expecting and briefed RNAV Z 16L which was installed. At approximately 10-11000 FT; the crew was cleared for RNAV Z 17R. The R/W; approach with QWIKE transition; and arrival were installed. The arc turn beginning at STAAM was present and visible on the ND. As fix QWIKE was captured; the turn fix STAAM was no longer on the ND or fix page and new active waypoint became ROOOL (a fix on the arrival but not on the approach). Still in LNAV; the aircraft was proceeding to ROOOL even though the procedure arc was still present. The aircraft did not turn at STAAM. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring [PM]) directed the First Officer (Pilot Flying [PF]) to start the turnout of LNAV which he did in Heading Select. The Captain re-installed the approach with the goal of re-engaging LNAV. During this; the First Officer was flying the aircraft on [HDG] SEL back onto the arc which had remained visible during the entire event. Approach radioed the first correction call at the exact time the crew had started the [HDG] SEL turn having recognized the turn had not commenced. PM reported [we were] in a turn. A second ATC radio call was made despite the response which was again answered. At this point Approach canceled approach clearance and directed [us] to turn right 340 degrees and descend to 8000 FT. Once again the crew responded in compliance but ATC repeated the instructions. PM responded again. A third ATC radio call instructed [us] to turn left 260 degrees and descend to 7000 FT and cleared for visual approach. For the third time; PM responded however the radio call was repeated and acknowledged. [We were] switched to Tower and cleared to land and taxi to gate with no radio problems. On debriefing; the crew discussed the re-emerging of STAR fix ROOOL as the active fix after QWIKE capture. We discussed the possibility of the aircraft not turning because the jet had an un-modifiable active waypoint (ROOOL) at the moment the new approach was selected and activated. Approach requested to be contacted. The Captain spoke with Supervisor to discuss the event. [Supervisor] advised that DEN was having '2 to 3 deviations daily' on the Z RNAV Approaches. They were filling out internal deviation reports and debriefing with the crews. He asked for input on possible causes. The Captain mentioned the described navigation anomaly; the late approach clearance (just outside QWIKE) along with possible controller Comm problems (three separate repeated and acknowledged controller instructions) as potential causal factors. Crew recommends simulator re-enactment to investigate LNAV functionality with regards to RNAV Z 17R being activated at the critical point of just outside IAF capture.

B757 Captain reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 17R Approach in DEN; following a late clearance change and an FMC anomaly.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight departed and customer service entity reopened passenger manifest and reseated 9 passengers from coach into first-class cabin without updating [anyone]. Weights invalidated and passengers revised generating a percent Mean Aerodynamic Chord (MAC) of 4.0 (nose heavy).

Load planer reported discovering after departure that Customer Service had reseated 9 passengers from coach into first-class cabin producing a nose heavy condition.


Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During cruise we noticed the aircraft yaw to the left twice for no [apparent] reason. As we looked for any clues on the third time it yawed the Captain noticed that the N1 on Engine 1 surged to about 70%; and the thrust levers were set in the detent in the cruise thrust setting; around 90%. We noticed this the third and fourth time it happened; and also noticed that the ignition kicked on momentarily; and then the N1 returned to the FADEC calculated setting in the cruise setting. These events lasted for about 5 seconds each. On the fifth surging event; the N1 decreased significantly; the ignition did not kick on; and the FADEC alternated from B to A. At this point; we were already contacting Dispatch and Maintenance. We briefed for a single engine approach and landing and discussed alternates. Dispatch advised us to proceed to a diversion airport that suited them; so we declared an emergency and deviated there. We did not end up shutting down the engine. We briefed the approach and landing and there were no further disruptions or Engine 1 events during the rest of the flight. On the landing; EICAS message 'E1-2 No Dispatched' and 'E1 Short Dispatch' appeared.The threats of this event included task saturation (executing an unplanned emergency landing and diversion) as well as trying to figure out the best course of action to respond to this engine abnormality. I believe the Captain and I did a good job executing this diversion and emergency landing. When we landed; Maintenance told us that this aircraft has had a history of FADEC issues; and that there have been unavailable parts. If this is true; I would highly recommend to the company that we fix the underlying problems with FADECs the first time whenever possible rather than simply 'defer' them or 'clear' them. I also appreciate very much our Dispatcher and his rapid response and coordination with this event.

When their left engine initiated repeated surges of lowered N1 the flight crew of an EMB-145 conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance and opted to declare an emergency and divert for maintenance attention.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

We initially had to return to the gate before takeoff because there was a computer reset mechanical. Upon returning to the gate; while waiting for mechanics to fix the issue; a passenger told me; Flight Attendant B; that she had a headache and was feeling lightheaded and a few passengers were feeling the same way around her (Row 16). I went to Row 16 to ask people how they were feeling and to see if I smelled anything unusual. A few passengers nearby claimed to feel lightheaded and one said that he had a headache but did not know why. One of the passengers said that she felt like that because of the air vent; claimed she could smell the exhaust and fumes through the air vent. I could not smell anything and Flight Attendant C and D could not smell anything either when they walked by. I told the Captain about it and he went into the cabin to see if he could smell anything and he said he could not. After the computer reset mechanical issue was fixed; we closed the main cabin door.Then; we got the release to push back again. Then the D Flight Attendant called the front to report the strong fume odor in the aft of the cabin. The A asked the C Flight Attendant and the B Flight Attendant if we could walk through the cabin to verify the smell and as we approached Row 17 we noticed the burning acrid smell; metallic like dirty socks. The further back that we approached the stronger the smell was. The smell in the aft galley was intolerable and the D flight Attendant started vomiting. Flight Attendant C and myself started to feel nauseous; lightheaded; dizzy; itchy throat and eyes.The C Flight Attendant called the Captain and informed the issue and we headed back to the gate. When the C Flight Attendant went back to take his position to disarm doors; the same smell in the front galley was strong too. Passengers in the front of the aircraft started to complain about it and passenger seated in 1 C started to feel very nauseous but she declined medical attention. Main cabin door was opened and we deplaned passengers EMT's were waiting in the gate for any passengers that needed help. We were checked out by EMT's and transported to the hospital for a further check out.

A320 Flight Attendant crew reported being notified by passengers of 'burning acrid dirty socks' odor during ground delay. Fumes gradually intensified resulting in health issues among cabin crew and passengers.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During the preflight brief by the Captain; specially as he completed the 'T' Brief; I observed the CYAN WX-A on his nav display; indicating that his radar was on.  I quickly looked to see if my radar was on also; it was not.  I know for certain his radar was not on prior to this as I cross checked altimeters and field elevation during my cockpit preflight and glanced at his Nav Display.  I am constantly looking to assure that the CYN WX-A is not displayed on the NDs this issue a big pet peeve of mine.  I believe this event occurred during the power transfer from GPU to APU as it occurred shortly prior to push and shortly after starting the APU and is a well known anomaly on the LDS (large display system) 767.  Further; on this day; the airplane had a bird strike on the nose cone which I noticed on the preflight.  The mechanic was working directly in front of the nose cone.  I'm glad that the radar didn't power on while he was inspecting the nose cone.  I have no reasonable assurance that a scenario like that can't happen as the radar powers on at various times when there is a power transfer.  As a matter of fact and ironically; I had that exact thought earlier as I completed my preflight and saw the mechanic on a ladder in front of the nose cone. I can't tell you how relieved I am to know that the radar didn't power on with the mechanic in front of it.  A known anomaly on the LDS Boeing 767 [is] the radar powers on at various times; which the technician believes is predominately tied to power transfers.  Further; the issue appears to be tied to whether or not the parking brake is set or not.  The design assumption of the radar assumes the parking brake is going to be set at the gate.  If the brake is set; supposedly the radar will not power on.   However; at my company; that is not the case as we release the parking brake once the airplane chocks are in place.  There is a belief by those in Flight Management that the Flight Manual has addressed this issue with a change to the Interior Safety Check and Power Application.  The change in the flight manual was a note stating that this power on anomaly can occur and the Captains should be looking for it.   However; the problem with that is that the radar powers on at various times.  I have seen it occur with a simple power transfer from GPU to APU; when the IRS selectors are moved from Off to Align with the APU already running and no power transfer occurring by the flight crew and I've seen the issue occur during a pushback following a pneumatic ground start as the generators come online.  I've also seen the Cyan WX-A displayed on one ND and not the other; and sometimes it is displayed on both NDs.  Further and a separate issue entirely; I'm not entirely certain the WXR button location isn't an issue itself.  It is a very easy button to toggle on/off.  The location is also very poor and is in a position that could be accidentally bumped by those installing the sun shades in the summer; those cleaning the windshields and by someone getting into or out of the seat.This anomaly needs to be corrected as soon as possible.  I've been on the 767 for nearly X years and this issue has been on going.  I have had discussions regarding this issue with many people over the course of several years; Standards; LCAs and most recently Fleet Captains.  There is a fix; LDS Software Update; which will correct the issue.  However; unfortunately; they are looking at a need to do a wiring change and at present time it appears that that will take 2 years to complete.  To make matters worse however; I have noticed this phenomenon is occurring on brand new 767s that we have just taken from the factory; like [another] aircraft which is a very new airplane.  It is unacceptable that we are taking new airplanes from the factory with this issue; knowing that the fix will not take place until Heavy Checks.  I feel this is irresponsible to all people on the ramp who are exposed to a radar in operation while parked at a gate.  We have pilots; crew bus drivers; ramp load teams; mechanics; fuelers; caters; lavatory service techs all being exposed to an operating radar when this event occurs.  I can't tell you how frustrating it is to complete the walk around; sit down in my seat and see the radar has been on because the Captain missed it or it occurred at sometime that he wasn't aware of.  This needs to be fixed quicker than a few years and some sort of procedure needs to be established soon to provide a safe/healthy work environment to all those I previously listed.  This really is not OK.

First Officer reported concerns with radar operation on the ground causing injury to personnel.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft X checked in descending via the STAR landing north and reported their altitude as 18;500 feet; which matched the Mode C readout. This appeared to be a very high altitude and they had a crossing restriction coming up which was 12000-11000 feet. While the aircraft was over [fix]; the mode C showed 14500 feet. I asked Aircraft X to say altitude; and the pilot reported '12;000 feet. At that point the Mode C disappeared off the screen and they became transponder only. The pilot then said 'Uh we're having some issues with our Mode C; we'll try another one'. The aircraft continued to track the arrival with no altitude readouts. There was another crossing restriction of 9;000 feet coming up as well. After they passed that fix; their Mode C became active again and showed 9;000 feet.I suggested that local management needed to follow up via a brasher warning; to which they declined. We had a verified Mode C readout that was 2;500 feet high on the arrival when the Mode C disappeared; which would be seem to be a pilot deviation.

CLT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft's Mode C quit working after it appeared it would not make a crossing restriction.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Enroute at FL400 received an 'R OIL FILTER' EICAS alert. This indication was initially intermittent; but became continuous as we performed the 767 QRH procedure and coordinated our divert. After performing the precautionary engine shutdown procedure; we declared an emergency and proceeded to an uneventful approach and landing.

[This Report contains no additional information.]

A B767-300 EICAS alerted R OIL FILTER so the crew complied with the QRH; shut the engine down; declared an emergency and diverted to an enroute airport.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Upon takeoff we got an EICAS message; Pitch Trim Main; fail. As the Non Flying Pilot I finished the After Takeoff checklist which I was in the middle of doing and reached for the QRH. I then followed the instructions while communicating with ATC about the situation. The First Officer notified me that there was a nose pitch up tendency and it was hard to control. After following all the procedures I declared an emergency and headed back. We landed without further incident and were escorted to the gate by the fire trucks. Continue to look over emergency situations. Company can make sure all items are fixed properly if it had a history over recent days.

During takeoff phase of flight just after positive rate; PITCH TRIM MAIN FAIL appeared on EICAS. The trim was inoperative and stuck at 8 degrees up. I continued to fly the airplane while the Pilot Monitoring contacted ATC and advised them we had a problem to work out. At a safe altitude we ran the QRH checklist for the problem. After no change of the present problem; we declared an emergency and returned. Fire trucks were waiting as we landed safely with no incident. The fire marshals did a look over the outside of our aircraft on the taxiway and gave us the all clear to taxi back to the gate. Continue to apply training given in the flight sim.

EMB145 flight crew experiences a MAIN PITCH TRIM failure at rotation. After climbing to a safe altitude QRH procedures are complied with and the flight returns to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 1000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

While taking off from Runway X at ZZZ airport on up wind leg about 600 ft. AGL; a Cirrus flew roughly from my right side close to right angles to my flight path and about 50 ft. below me.  The Cirrus was about 310 degrees while my path was about 20 degrees.  Did not see the Cirrus until he was passing me. He passed about 100 ft. in front of me.  My student and I were in the traffic pattern at ZZZ Airport for the previous half hour announcing our positions.  We were not expecting an aircraft to be in our departure path 400 ft. below the pattern altitude near where we would be turning cross wind.  When we informed the Cirrus pilot of the near miss he said that he reported his position previously.  However that did not give him the right to basically enter the pattern on a cross wind 400 ft. below the pattern altitude.  By passing in front of us from our 'blind spot' he committed an act of reckless endangerment.  Either deliberately or by failing to pay attention to the aircraft in the traffic pattern and follow them in per AIM procedures.  I believe the Cirrus eventually landed on Runway XY at ZZZ.  With two intersecting runways and traffic often landing on both runways; plus traffic making instrument approaches at ZZZ; I believe that providing ZZZ with a control tower would greatly improve safety.

Cessna 172 Instructor reported a NMAC at 600 ft. during takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Type 924

Did not realize how tired and fatigued I was after agreeing to a 30 minute FDP (Flight Duty Period) extension until we were on the takeoff roll above 100 knots and I had called 'V1' and then I started to call 'Rotate' as the airplane passed through the V1 bug a full 10 knots below our planned rotation speed that was bugged at 139 knots. I had briefed the speeds with the Captain on the before takeoff checklist not two minutes prior. I also failed to catch that the approach mode was not armed for the approach as we flew through the glide slope intercept.

A320 First Officer reported several deviations from Standard Operating Procedure; as a result of fatigue.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6300; Flight Crew Type 2000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I was on an IFR flight plan. After cancelling my IFR flight plan with ATC; I elected to track the RNAV Approach. Winds were 040 at 7 kts.; a direct crosswind. During the descent into I did not hear anyone on the CTAF so I elected to continue the RNAV Approach intending to land. I announced I was on the RNAV Approach ( approximately 10 miles out)and to which runway on the CTAF frequency. At 4 miles out I heard a Cherokee report downwind for the opposite direction runway. I then transmitted to that aircraft. 'I'm a Navajo on a 4 mile; would it be ok if I land ahead of you; if not I can follow you in'. The Cherokee responded 'that's fine I'll extend my downwind'. I continued my straight in Approach to Runway 14; I then reported 'short final ... full stop'. I did not hear anyone else on the CTAF. After a normal landing; I noticed another single engine low wing aircraft rolling toward me from the opposite direction. We never got close to each other. The aircraft exited the runway midway down the runway. I exited on the same taxiway. The Cherokee I talked to was still in the air reporting base to final.I don't know if the-aircraft on the ground landed [in the] opposite direction or was on an aborted take off roll. I'm not the kind of pilot that would ever cut anyone out of a traffic pattern or continue a straight in Approach to an uncontrolled airport if other airplanes are in the pattern. I always listen to CTAF on the standby radio a long way out so I can get in line with the other aircraft when winds are calm or direct crosswinds. This airport does not have a calm wind runway.This was not a near miss; neither of us were in danger of colliding. The potential for a collision could have been there if we weren't looking down the runway after the landing roll out. I felt I made plenty of position reports for a safe Approach to landing. I also monitored the CTAF so I would know if other aircraft were in the vicinity of the airport.

A Pilot landing at a non towered airport reported after landing encountering another aircraft on the opposite direction runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Type 4476

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

During descent on the arrival while speed brakes were deployed; the speed trim amber light illuminated. The master caution light also illuminated and a flight control light on the system annunciation panel also illuminated. Accomplished the QRH non-normal and proceeded to ZZZ with no further issues. Remained on auto pilot remainder of flight and successfully performed a CAT 2 auto land approach onto [Runway] 4L due to low visibility.

B737 Captain reported that during arrival the Speed Trim Configuration Warning light illuminated and the QRH non-normal checklist was completed prior to landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 3693

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Line up and wait on Runway 30. Parking brake set. First Officer has the flight controls. Captain has the radios. Cleared for takeoff. At about 60 knots; Dulles tower told someone [company but different callsign] to cancel takeoff clearance. No runway was stated. Another aircraft queried who that was for. At 80-90 knots; I thought I heard tower say '[our callsign]; cancel takeoff clearance'. I queried 'was that for [callsign]' just prior to the 100 knot call. A supervisor; with an older voice; came over the Tower frequency and said 'disregard '. The younger voice controller then came back on a couple of seconds later and told a [company] aircraft on final to 1C to go around. Prior to switching to departure frequency; I asked tower if they were talking to us to cancel takeoff clearance. The supervisor said 'don't worry about it.'

First Officer was Pilot Flying. Received takeoff clearance with 'no delay'. After power advanced to reduced take off power; I heard '[Company]; (not our call sign); cancel takeoff clearance'; Followed by a query for who was that for by another aircraft. Approaching 100kts; heard '[Company]; cancel takeoff clearance'; PM immediately queried 'Who was that for!?!?'; Tower Supervisor then responded with 'Disregard'; followed by [Company] flight XXX go around. This was a flight cleared to land on 01C while we were simultaneously cleared for takeoff on 30.Once airborne Captain queried controllers on if we were asked to stop takeoff roll. Response; 'Yes; but don't worry about it'.There was confusion in our cockpit as well as I think other aircraft as to who the call was made to.

Air carrier flight crew reported a communication breakdown with ATC in regard to a potential cancellation of takeoff clearance during takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Very faint smoke smell reported by flight attendants and passengers at row 15-18. QRC and QRH complied with. Smell dissipated immediately; Maintenance Control and Dispatch notified; and [requested priority handling from ATC]. Returned to ZZZ and landed uneventful.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported flight attendant notification of 'faint smoke smell' in cabin. Flight crew completed a safe air return.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 277; Flight Crew Type 0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

The issue occurred during my first training flight in the Cirrus SR20 as a new hire instructor. During the portion of the flight leading up to the incipient spin event; I was demonstrating stalls to the chief pilot. However; I was making inadvertent control inputs on the sidestick and thus the stall demonstrations tended to have some wing drop.At this point; the chief pilot took over flight controls to demonstrate a falling leaf. During the incident; I was not on the controls and made no inputs to contribute to the event in question. Over the course of the falling leaf demonstration; the chief pilot made drastic control input and the aircraft entered an incipient spin.Data recovered from the aircraft indicated a maximum roll of 164 degrees and 85 degrees nose pitch down were reached over the course of the event. The telemetry also revealed the aircraft hit a maximum vertical speed of -10;000 FPM.The chief pilot used spin recovery techniques and a developed spin was averted. Following the recovery the chief pilot said; 'I wanted to see how close I could get and recover'. The chief pilot also asked if he had scared me or shaken me in an aggressive and intimidating tone.Following the flight; the chief pilot made no report of the event to dispatch or maintenance. The event was only recognized after I went to Human Resources and filed a complaint against the individual; which contained details of this incident as well as other harassment related issues.

SR20 flight instructor reported the flight school chief instructor demonstrated excessive aircraft flight control input and did not report unnecessary stress that was placed upon the airframe.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working Departure position. Aircraft X checked in climbing to 2;000 feet which is an unusual altitude since departures are issued 5;000 feet unless otherwise coordinated. I climbed the aircraft to 7;000 feet to remain within my airspace. Aircraft Y was on a limited data tower (T) tag heading northbound. The Conflict Alert went off and I issued traffic to Aircraft X who was about to merge with Aircraft Y that appeared to be on a southbound heading.I had no knowledge that Aircraft Y was operating within the confines of the departure corridor at 2;600 feet. No coordination was ever done with me about the aircraft or that departures would be climbing to 2;000 feet only. I did not see the aircraft operating in the departure corridor at an altitude that; in my opinion; is unsafe. T (Tower) tags are seen constantly throughout the day because numerous helicopters; state police; Miami police; and emergency aircraft operate within the Tower Area 500 feet or below. Any other unusual situation or aircraft that would be operating at a different altitude is coordinated with appropriate sectors; however; this was not done with me.After the event it was brought to my knowledge that the other Departure Controller coordinated with the Local Controller in the tower for Aircraft Y to be in the area doing survey/photo air work. The Supervisor in the TRACON verbally coordinated with the approach controllers about the aircraft as he ventured into the approach airspace as well. No coordination verbally; or a point-out was ever done with me. Aircraft Y also had 18 TARP (Traffic Analysis and Review Tool) hits on him which shows that he was in an unsafe area to be working.It is unsafe to be issuing departing aircraft 2;000 because they could become a conflict with low level IFR aircraft that operate 10 miles from MIA at 2;000 feet. Aircraft should not be allowed to operate at the altitude in such close proximity to the airport especially at times of arrival or departure banks. Coordination/Communication needs to be done with all sectors prior to allowing an unusual situation to occur. The controller that is initially coordinating and approving air work to be done needs to communicate with all other sectors and controllers that will be impacted. They must 'close the loop' and not leave sectors in the dark or without information that is going to impact their operation.Aircraft doing air work in the departure corridor should be speaking with a Departure Controller or if they are on the Tower frequency then departure aircraft should not be switched to the departure controller until they are not a factor with the other aircraft on the Tower frequency. Traffic should be issued to the Departing aircraft by the Local controller if he has both aircraft on his frequency. We should not jeopardize the safety of the operation and multiple passenger airlines for someone who wants to take pictures during busy times of the day. It is not unusual for controllers to feel pressured by the supervisor in charge to accommodate these photo missions or aircraft doing survey work even at times when the controllers feel it is unsafe to be allowing it. The dynamic needs to be changed. If a controller feels that an aircraft working in a location is going to impact the operation or the safety of the operation they should be supported by the supervisor not pressured to be put in an uncomfortable working environment. The supervisor also needs to be making sure that ALL CONTROLLER AND SECTORS that will be impacted are informed; coordinated with and on board with the unusual situation that will be occurring.

I was the First Officer and PF on Aircraft X. We were instructed to line up and wait. Our clearance was to climb to 5;000 feet via an ATC assigned heading. The previous departure was told to level off at 2;000 feet so we had the discussion to be aware this could also receive a similar change in clearance. We were cleared to take off; assigned heading 270. Once airborne we were instructed to level off at 2;000 feet. We did. As we were cleaning up; we were instructed to climb to 7;000 feet from Departure Control. I initiated a climb; with autopilot on. Climbing through approximately 3;500 feet; we received a 'TRAFFIC TRAFFIC' alert from TCAS. I remained on instruments while the Captain looked for the traffic. As he pointed to the traffic; I looked up at the window to my right and saw a light twin at same altitude in a very sharp to its right; and a shallow climb in extremely close proximity to us and our flight path.We had a pretty good climb rate going at the time but didn't feel that it was sufficient to maintain safe separation from the light twin. As I was in transition back to instruments and about to disconnect the autopilot; I heard the TCAS advise 'MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPPEED'. Simultaneously I elected to go to TOGA (maximum available power) to get a better climb rate going as TCAS commanded 'INCREASE CLIMB'. Again; I had the initial feeling that since we were already at CLIMB POWER and at max climb for that power setting; TOGA was needed to get the initial climb we needed to stay clear of that traffic. Once I heard 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' and the Captain confirmed; I returned to normal climb profile and climb power; reengaged the AP and confirmed that the aircraft was in proper configuration for that phase of flight and the FMC was indicating desired autopilot functions to continue with ATC instructions.The Captain notified ATC of the conflict; RA; and recovery and that we were going to file a report on this event. The Controller replied that they had already notified their supervisor. I don't believe that the light twin was being controlled on our frequency because we didn't hear any transmissions to or from that aircraft.

MIA Departure Controller and flight crew reported a NMAC with a VFR aircraft operating in the departure corridor.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

When I went to test the Emergency Exit Lights; in the cabin at the Emergency Exit Door behind seat 2R; the two lights that illuminate the Emergency Exit handle did not illuminate. Taking note of this I went to look up the MEL for this item. In the process; I turned on the cabin Sidewall Lights that illuminate the lights in the cabin between the windows. Between every window in the cabin for the passengers; on the sidewall is a light that when selected; illuminates all the Sidewall Lights. Well; when I did this; the Emergency Exit Lights for the door behind Seat 2R illuminated. The side wall light that is located on the door; however; did not illuminate. I found this to be quite interesting as I had never seen this. I called into maintenance control and it was decided due to the wiring issue that the airplane would be left grounded and not to MEL the Emergency lights.However; when looking at the previous closed discrepancies; there was an entry from about 7 days earlier that stated the Transfer/X-Feed lever would freeze at altitude. The fix was that upon removing the Emergency Exit Door behind Seat 2R; moisture was found on the floor and cleaned out. Then the door was reinstalled and the discrepancy was signed off. It made me wonder if when the Emergency Exit Door was removed and then reinstalled that maybe the electrical plugs where incorrectly installed. It made me wonder if the electrical plug for the Emergency Exit Door Light and the Sidewall Light were the same type of plug allowing for this to happen. Also; it makes you wonder if the Emergency Exit Door is indeed removed; if an operational check is required of the Emergency Exit Light and Sidewall light. Also was the fact that this airplane had flown for a few legs and if indeed the electrical plugs were installed improperly; then crews did not catch this when checking the Emergency Exit Lights.Anytime the Emergency Exit Door behind Seat 2R is removed and then reinstalled; that the Emergency Exit Lights and Sidewall Lights are checked for functionality. Also; the electrical plug for these lights be of different type to prevent them from being installed improperly.

The two lights that illuminate the emergency exit handle behind seat 2R did not illuminate when tested. Emergency exit lights for the door behind seat 2R did illuminate when cabin sidewall lights were turned on.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 9900; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

[On] climb out our aircraft failed to pressurize. We discovered that the right rear service door had not been closed properly and was allowing the air to escape. We did not declare an emergency and elected to divert to [a larger nearby airport]. Maintenance came out and re-closed the door; signed off our log book and sent us on our way back to [destination]. The whole situation transpired so fast that only later was I troubled by several factors: 1) We should have declared an emergency since we were in [a] special flight area; and were being vectored around for close to an hour while we troubleshot the problem. 2) How is it that a caterer can improperly close the door on a brand new 737 and there not be an indicator light come on in the cockpit; even in flight with a huge gap showing around the door seal with all the air rushing out!3) After we took off the second time; I began to worry that we might not have all the paperwork required to dispatch legally. I was on OE after only recently being hired by the airline and only had about 25 hours at that point. I STILL am not sure; because the requirements are so convoluted and there isn't a single list of required items in the flight manual...there ought to be.

A B737 aircraft failed to pressurize after takeoff. A rear service door was found to be improperly closed. They did not have a warning light in the cockpit.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Type 8800

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

After landing on Runway 19R in MCI; I took control of the aircraft at approximately 60 knots from the First Officer. I was aware of another aircraft close behind us that had also been cleared to land on 19R. Tower asked us to expedite off of the runway for that aircraft just after I took control of the airplane. In order to facilitate our exit; I chose to turn off Taxiway A7. While exiting at approximately 20 knots; I saw some patchy snow and ice on Taxiway A7 but nothing unsafe to exit onto. After exiting onto A7; Tower informed us that Taxiway A7 was closed.The ATIS for the approach and landing on 19R by the First Officer was:MCI D-ATIS [VFR] ARRIVALS EXPECT ILS 19L; ILS RWY 19R.NOTAMS... TWY E CLSD NORTH OF TWY D; AND SOUTH OF RWY 9 27. RWY 1L AVAILABLE EXITS ARE A ELEVEN; A TEN; A 4; A 1. RWY 1R AVAILABLE EXITS ARE E 8; E 6; C; D; E 4; E 1. RWY 9 AVAILABLE EXITS ARE C 9; F; E; C 3; C 1. KANSAS CITY VOR HIWAS OTS. ...ADVS YOU HAVE INFO [ATIS].We briefed that we would exit 19R on A10 to taxi onto M and into our ramp and Gate XY. With the 60 knot call; the slow rollout speed and the expedite request from Tower; I chose to exit on A7. Normally; closed taxiways are noted in the ATIS; not 'AVAILABLE EXITS.' Normally I mark closed taxiways on my EFB 10-9 page to remind myself of the closures. Additionally the 'AVAILABLE EXITS' were noted for only Runways 1L; 1R; and 9; not 19R.I believe the ATIS wording and runway delineations led me to believe A7 was not closed. There were no markings; lights or cones to show Taxiway A7 was closed.After exiting slowly and safely on A7 and after clearing Runway 19R; the F/O called ground for taxi to [the] gate. I turned south on Taxiway A and followed our clearance into the ramp and gate with no further issues.

The issue and confusion here we believe was in the wording of the ATIS regarding taxiways. The ATIS stated that Taxiways A-1; A-2; A-10; and A-11 (were available) on Runway 1L. Unlike most ATIS reports which list closures; this ATIS did not use that language. What it did have was listed for the opposite orientation of the runway we were landing on 19R. A review of the MCI [airport diagram] shows that Taxiways A-5; 7 and 10 are oriented as high speeds from 19R. While they could be considered as departure points from Runway 1L; it is not likely. So under the letter of the law; confusion notwithstanding; we were not supposed to exit the runway at A-7. In reality; it was not like a construction going on -10' drop off into dirt and rebar while running over barriers and flashing lights along the way closure. It was more like a Taxiway A-7 being kinda; sorta not really 'available' at that moment in time 'closure.' It appears that they had not yet completely cleared these 'unavailable' high speeds even though there was not; nor had there been any active precipitation for a long time. Runway 19R was clear and dry; its associated exit points should have all been the same if it was (one of) the active runways. It's not as though they were trying to keep up with an active storm. I'm glad it all worked out safely; I'm glad we didn't cause a go-around; and I'll pay closer attention from now on.

B737-700 flight crew reported exiting the runway at MCI on a closed taxiway; citing confusion with the ATIS presentation as contributing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During a helicopter training exercise (2 pilots) on a 45 degree to runway short final Runway 17. Landing with a simulated hydraulic system failure. We made a last minute check to make sure no one was landing on the runway. Upon looking to the north saw a light twin on very short final for Runway 17. Both aircraft were closing in on the approach end of the runway at the same height and distance for landing. The twin was to our right and slightly behind our field of vision about 200 FT and closing. Once the other aircraft was spotted we terminated the approach to a high hover and the Twin continued with its landing. There was no further incident. Communications would be the main contributing factor. The airport was very quiet and we had been monitoring Approach Control and the local CTAF frequency as well as making our own traffic calls. We never heard any radio calls from the twin until just before he departed the airfield. I also believe TCAS in either aircraft would have been helpful in preventing this. The fact that Texas Gulf Coast Regional (LBX) and Houston Southwest (AXH) share the same frequency and are very close to each other and the high amount of radio calls at Houston Southwest may have contributed to the confusion.

A helicopter pilot took evasive action from a light twin near LBX Runway 17 while both aircraft were on short final and no prior CTAF communications were heard.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 705

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

After a normal visual approach and touchdown on runway; my aircraft departed the paved runway surface on the right side of the runway. This departure from the runway paved surface was caused by a gust of wind that overpowered the RV-8 (tail dragger) rudder and tailwheel which did not have sufficient steering authority to keep the aircraft moving in a straight line down the runway. I used full rudder and full wheel braking to try to stay on the runway; but it quickly became apparent that I could not maintain directional control and the airplane left the pavement at approximately 20 knots ground speed.I brought the aircraft to a stop and shut down the engine between Runway 3 and Taxiway A; about halfway between the runway approach end and Taxiway A8. There was no damage to the airplane and I sustained no injuries. Airport personnel assisted in moving the aircraft back to my hangar. I telephoned the Tower to inform them that the aircraft was not damaged and that there were no injuries.Immediately after the incident; I thought the cause had to be a tailwheel malfunction. I spoke with the Tower controller on the phone and told him that I thought it was a tailwheel problem. However; after getting the airplane back to my hangar; I carefully inspected the tailwheel and found it to be operating normally.Upon further consideration; I believe that contributing factors in this incident were the wind; and my initial surprise at the gust since no gust factor was reported on ATIS or by tower. Another contributing factor was my inattention and complacence as I assumed that the landing weather conditions would be just like every other time I landed at ZZZ. In hindsight; I might have recognized the dangerous situation earlier on landing rollout and executed a go-around; since there was plenty of runway surface remaining for a go-around.

RV-8 pilot reported a loss of directional control and runway excursion due to a gust of wind.