Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Dispatch

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Weather; Procedure; Airport

Vectors on approach to LAS; I picked up the ATIS; winds were reported V4 (variable at 4 KTS.) Vegas Approach Control; who had us on a vector to later intercept the LOC; reported winds at 230 at 19 KTS gust to 23 KTS. I questioned the Controller about the discrepancy in wind reporting. His response was similar to 'No one would like more accurate ATIS than me.' We landed; taxied in; prepared to depart.I picked up ATIS during preflight and the winds were listed on ATIS as 'V3' (variable at 3 KTS) but the temperature was 46 degrees C. In checking performance for 46 degrees; our flight planning showed we could only take-off from RWY 07L. I called Ground Control to query the winds and ask about using 07L for takeoff. Ground Control reported winds to be something like 250 at 12 KTS. Much different than ATIS reporting V3 KTS. For any of the actual wind reports that were human reported; all wind checks reporting a greater than 10 KT wind out of west; which exceeds the tailwind limitation from Airbus. For the next 2 hours our Dispatcher who was reading the inaccurate winds in METARs; via ATIS; put pressure on pilots to depart from 07L; regardless of our wind readouts from Ground Control over the radio. The Dispatcher put pressure on LAS station crew to get us to depart also; even though the actual winds exceeded an aircraft limitation.We would not have had undue pressure to depart if LAS ATC had listed accurate winds on ATIS. The afternoon winds in LAS are always gusty; from the west. I hope someone will correct this error to keep from pilot-pushing to occur.

The reporter stated because METAR is legal weather; the flight's dispatchers attempted to force the crew to depart on Runway 07L. The crew checked METAR and Ground Control weather regularly but refused to depart until after a 6 hour ground delay for acceptable temperature. At 13;000 pounds overweight for Runway 07L; Dispatch pressure was unacceptable. The entire issue resulted from METAR inaccuracy; 10 knots or more difference and an actual tailwind. This report was not submitted through the reporter's company to ensure the issue made public which may not always otherwise be the case.

Airbus First Officer reported LAS temperature at 46C with winds 230 at 12 kts. The crew could only accept Runway 07L. Dispatch had METAR winds variable at 3kts; so was forceful about a legal 07L departure but the crew refused a tailwind departure.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 450

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Practicing emergency landings at the airport and had so informed Tower. To facilitate; they agreed to work with us to clear landing on any one of the four runways available; traffic permitting. After doing about 4 of these on different runways; and calling Tower to ask for clearance to turn back; I quipped that I appreciated them letting us land on all these different runways given all the trouble we were having with our pesky engine that day (referring to all the emergency landings we were simulating). They inquired; are you having engine trouble? And we immediately said no; we were making a quip given the repeated practice emergency landings we had discussed with them. They said OK; but be careful with that; we're all on tape. So the lesson is; even if you think Tower knows what is going on (here; practice emergency landings); there is zero room to make a quip about an emergency unless it's the real thing. Stick to business in transmissions; nothing else. Lesson learned.

J-3 Cub instructor providing training in emergency landings was admonished by the Local Controller for making a remark in jest about having engine problems.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

I was the Pilot Flying and Captain on flight to ZZZ. We were on the ILS to Runway XX at ZZZ. At approximately 600 feet AGL; we received two EICAS messages -- LH and RH Brake Fault. The autobrakes that were set to MED for landing also kicked off. We executed a go-around and climbed via the Tower assigned heading to 2;000 feet. We asked Approach for vectors while we ran the QRH procedure.While running the checklist procedure; we attempted to contact Dispatch via ACARS; however; the ACARS had also failed at some point during flight or the go-around and it was hard failure that could not be reset. We made several attempts to contact Dispatch [on several frequencies]. None of the frequencies in that area worked including the frequency listed for [the] airport. We eventually were able to make contact with Dispatch via a phone patch through ZZZ Operations. After discussing the QRH procedure and Non-Normal Landing Distance with the First Officer and the Dispatcher; we made the decision to land [at destination airport].I advised the flight attendants and passengers of the precautionary landing via our QRH Checklist and we proceeded to fly another ILS approach. After landing and clearing the runway; it was evident that both the outboard brakes had failed. The outboard brake temperatures were reading ambient air temperature and the inboard brake temperatures were excessively hot. [After inspection]; we proceeded to the gate and deplaned the aircraft with any further issues.The outboard brakes on both main landing gear failed triggering the EICAS messages prior to landing.In hindsight; it probably would have been a safer and more conservative course of action to land at [a nearby alternate] with a longer runway. However; the QRH procedure for the calculation of the non-normal landing distance indicated we had plenty of runway at [destination] and the Dispatcher we spoke with concurred. One item that complicated matters while trying to troubleshoot the problem and create a plan of action was the difficulty in contacting Dispatch. The ACARS Datalink Timeout we had is a common problem on the 190 and has been for some time and has been for some time. However; this was further complicated with the ZZZ Dispatch Direct VHF frequency not working for us. I have attempted to use this frequency on more than one occasion on the ground and in the air with no luck. I am not sure if the frequency does not work or if Dispatch is just not monitoring it. It would be great if we could ensure these frequencies are working and monitored for situations like ours.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

ERJ-190 flight crew reported a normal landing after failure of outboard brakes on both main landing gear.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were cruising at FL350 and had just turned North around some convective activity. About 50 miles later we saw some build ups ahead around our altitude so we got clearance to climb to FL370. Truthfully they didn't look menacing at all. They were barely painting green on the radar at all angles; and there was no lightning or anything worrying visible. Either way I called the FAs and told them to be seated as it might get bumpy for a bit. Once we started the climb we noticed a larger build up in front of us so I requested a turn to the right to avoid the worst of it. When we entered it we encountered some moderate turbulence. We got airspeed fluctuations and the FO clicked off the autopilot and went to max power to maintain airspeed; but he didn't make the callout. Believing the autopilot and auto throttles had turned off on their own; I attempted to reselect them but they were clicked off again without a callout. As we were approaching level off; we encountered a large updraft that increased our climb. Due to this we went through our altitude by around 300 feet. As soon as I was able I advised ATC of the situation and they said not to worry and to return down as soon as we could. After the fact there were no injuries or any issues in the cabin or found on the walk around. I wrote the aircraft up for a turbulence inspection upon arrival.Even though the FO did an excellent job at keeping the aircraft under control; I advised him to let the autopilot handle situations such as this especially in the flight levels unless it gets really bad. I also advised him that if he is going to turn off the automation he must make the other pilot aware by at least some means. As for the weather; avoiding it is always the obvious solution; however due to ATC constraints it is sometimes easier said than done. In the future both of us will be more diligent at getting clearance to avoid weather earlier and be more cautious with build ups.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported encountering convective activity with an altitude gain of 300 feet at level off and communication issues between the crew members.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Deice and anti-ice in blocks. Push back and engine start then called for 'after engine start check list'. FO asked for engine anti ice 'on'; and I called for it to be 'on'. ATC happened to call us for a runway change at that very same time. FO answered ATC and we proceeded to reconfigure the FCP and FMS flight plan. Taxi; take off; and climb were normal. Just as we leveled at FL310; we received an ECAM alert; 'Pack #1 and Pack #2 fault'; which requires us to turn both packs off. Followed ECAM and realized we would depressurize; asked ATC for lower altitude of 10;000 ft and to return to ZZZZ. Started our descent and a turn back to ZZZZ. Passing around FL220; I scanned the overhead panel; while the FO worked the FMS; and noticed the APU and APU bleed air valve were still 'on'. I turned the APU bleed air valve off and the aircraft pressurized back to normal. Requested ATC to level off at FL200; checked fuel status; and we decided to continue to [destination]. ATC granted us clearance back on route and a climb back up to altitude. No emergency was declared and ATC was very helpful. As I described the event above; our normal flow pattern was interrupted and we missed some key items on the 'after start check list'.This was a situation with an easy fix. It could have turned out much different. Checklists are important; not only for normal operation of aircraft systems; but for safety itself. I am just as much to blame for not scanning the overhead panel before takeoff and assuming check lists [and] switches are complied with and not confirming that they are. I will have to make an effort make sure I scan the ECAM MEMO page and overhead panels before each take off. I wouldn't be surprised if this scenario showed up in one of our [training] events.

A300 flight crew reported experiencing a pressurization anomaly just after reaching cruise as a result of not fully configuring the system because of distractions during preflight.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 1

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Runways 27R/27L advertised and runway 35L for instrument arrivals unable to accept runway 27R due to operational need.  **NOTE - I personally was on break but came up to relieve the controller in position shortly after the event occurred; therefore events noted further are primarily based on recorded tapes.  During the time of the event; the Certified Professional Controller (CPC) working was combined local; working all runways (27R/L & 35L - this intersecting operation is a recurring systemic issue that has been reported with no resolution); with Aircraft X operating closed traffic on runway 27L.  In between gaps on the upwind of runway 27L; Aircraft Y landed runway 35L and the next time through the pattern Aircraft X was instructed to remain on the downwind.  Followed by Aircraft Y on approach to runway 35L is Aircraft Z.  During this time there is traffic operating on runway 27R; Aircraft Y landing roll runway 35L; Aircraft A departing runway 27L and a helicopter operating closed traffic on VICTOR SOD.  Additionally there are numerous vehicles operating on Local's frequency culminating in an extremely complex situation.  As Aircraft Y is told to exit runway 35L and 'taxi south runway correction taxiway alpha hold short.'  At this moment it is quite apparent the controller is very behind and the Controller in Charge (CIC) has done nothing to remedy the situation.  Had the CIC been monitoring where the local controller was not looking; the next event would not have occurred.  As it appears on the tape and based on direct witness statements; Aircraft X said 'Aircraft A but [Aircraft X's numbers] going around'....'Aircraft X'.  Around 30 seconds later; the controller notices the near midair with Aircraft Z and Aircraft X and instructs Aircraft X to 'climb as high as you can.'First recommendation - Make Grand Forks Regional Airport Authority conduct maintenance operations during low to no traffic times; i.e.; at night.  It is cheaper to pay the overtime than to go to court for the worst case scenario that no one wants to see.Second recommendation - Construct runway 27R to allow heavy aircraft operations in order to eliminate the intersecting operation we so often find ourselves being forced to work through every time we are in an east or west configuration.Third recommendation - Remove the CIC from the tower cab as this particular individual is tied to a few incidents now; one of which has gone to a national level for a procedural drift caused by this individual's actions (or lack thereof).  Had this person been scanning where local was not; and recognized that the controller was falling behind; they could have and should have taken appropriate action to get assistance up to the tower in order to eliminate the over load this controller was experiencing.  Understanding that the responsibility relies mostly on the controller to speak up when they need help; sometimes it may be too late and in this case I believe this is where the controller was; making it now the prerogative of CIC to ensure the position is either split or relief is brought up immediately to help the controller out.  This event could have been prevented.

A GFK Controller reports of a near midair caused by traffic using the wrong call sign and one that is similar to an aircraft in the pattern. This causes the Controller working local to become more confused. Additionally; the Controller was working combined locals.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

There was a runway encroachment incident involving a ground vehicle and an aircraft. The aircraft had lined up on Runway 17 for takeoff and announced that he was taking the runway for takeoff. The aircraft was on the roll when the announcement was made that the vehicle was crossing the approach end of runway 35; however the vehicle had yet to even reach the end of the runway when the crossing call was made then the vehicle did not stop at the hold short line and wait for the aircraft to pass. The vehicle passed under the aircraft while the aircraft still had use of the runway. The aircraft passed over the ground vehicle at roughly 100 to 150 feet.

Ramp Specialist reported a vehicle crossed the departure end of Runway 17 at JKA while a general aviation aircraft was taking off.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At the start of shift; I began familiarizing myself with the current weather and its patterns; known ATC issues; taking pass-down briefings and analyzing future workload for the morning shift I was responsible for. Due to forecasted TS from the Ohio Valley thru the Tennessee basin and an excessively high workload on desks; I submitted a help message to my supervisors. The chief dispatcher on duty personally visited my desk to relay a message from the Director: He was personally busy; and would not be able to respond to the messages at this time. However; only 1 person was on the callout list. A mass broadcast to all employees could not be accomplished until 75 minutes prior to a desk being open (A desk was never opened).[My] desk had 18 flights departing in the [scheduled] hour. The majority of these flights were either to stations with weather directly impacting/forecasted to impact; or were scheduled to cross the line of weather. [Three hours before]; I called the Director to talk about the morning operations. He stated that he was still busy and had no one to call in for help. I relayed to him that I had a plan; and he said he would be down to talk to me about it. More than 2 hours went by; and I felt compelled to place the plan into action by delaying 14 flights in order to maintain operation control and safety. [The Director] immediately came to my desk; and sat directly behind me. I had a high volume of phone calls due to pilots wanting weather briefings; releases and stations trying to get fuel loads for uncompleted releases. Once I had a small break between phone calls; [he] started lecturing that I was in the wrong and violated the Dispatch Manual by not coordinating delays over 45 minutes with management. He threatened that a meeting will be in my future; and to not delay any flights without talking to my supervisors. This conversation took place at my desk while trying to release flights; flight follow and handle an extremely high workload with numerous phone calls. Our Safety Management System is in place; and I felt that I operated in the yellow margin for most of the night.Workload on dispatchers in the office is encroaching on the safe operations of the hundreds of flights we are expected to release and follow. [One] desk had 54 flights to release and follow; [another] had 57 flight and [a third] had 58 flights. Seventy-five percent flights traversed or landed in the areas with major weather concerns. Lower the workload to a more manageable and safe load.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported a very high workload and management pressure interfered with his duties.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight ready early. Pushed back 15 mins early with OPS Controller approval. Also notified controller of 2;000 lb extra fuel. Preflight push back and taxi went smoothly. After accepting takeoff clearance we received a ACARS message from OPS asking if we had received DG (Dangerous Goods) paperwork. First Officer and I agreed we thought we did. Uneventful flight and landing.  After level at cruise we inspected DG envelope and found it to be empty. We did have DG manifest signed with employee numbers and DG position summary showing Lithium Ion [Battery] at 12L. ACARS this info to Operations Center and he asked us to complete an ASAP. In summary everything was running super smoothly. Inaccessible DG seems to be every flight and we just assumed ULD DG manifest was in envelope we were given. Will check from now on! The cause of the event Assumed required paperwork was in DG envelope we were handed [was empty.]

Uneventful and smooth preflight; startup; and taxi to Runway XX at ZZZ. After receiving takeoff clearance and approaching the runway threshold we received an ACARS message asking if we had received the DG (Dangerous Goods) paperwork. We both agreed we had and continued to take off. At cruise we discovered that the DG envelope was empty and did not have the Aircraft ULD DG Manifest. We did have the signed Aircraft DG Manifest and the Aircraft DG Position Summary showing lithium battery in position 12L. The ramp agent had placed the DG envelope in the yellow pouch. Poor coordination between flight crew and ramp agent with DG paperwork. [Going forward have] all eyes; flight crew and ramp agent or DG Specialist; must see and account for all DG paperwork.

Flight crew reported a communications breakdown between flight crew and ground personnel resulted in transporting Dangerous Goods [DG] cargo without required DG documents on board.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

While on approach to Runway 28C; ORD about 1 mile to SEIKA (FAF); noticed object move rapidly through my field of vision from the front to the left as we went past it. Object appeared to be a quadcopter UAV and was at our altitude (approximately 2;500 ft MSL). It happened very rapidly and I did not have time to react to the object until it was past the left wing.

On approach to ORD Runway 28C just outside SEIKA; I noticed what appeared to be a party balloon at our altitude. The Captain looked out left to the rear and said he saw a quadcopter drone. I reported it to tower. After we landed we gave ground a description of the drone; the altitude; and the location. On the post-flight walk-around I looked carefully for evidence of impact; and found none.

Flight crew reported an uneventful airborne conflict with a drone during initial approach.


Inspection; Testing; Repair; Installation

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Attendant; Person Maintenance

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Avionics Technician Y; [and I]; were sent to ZZZ to work Aircraft X. Midnight Shift had written up the emergency lights inoperative at seat row 22ABC to 26ABC. When we arrived; we powered up the aircraft and turned on the emergency lights. Technician Y noticed that first class emergency lights were also inoperative and the aft cabin emergency lights were inoperative from row 32ABC to the aft cabin. At the same time I noticed the seat row 20ABC and 21ABC red emergency light lens were broken. The representative from ZZZ was right next to me. He found one of the lens; but it was broken in two pieces and unusable. I initiated log items to document what we found. Technician Y was troubleshooting the aft cabin as I documented the defects. all of a sudden; Technician Y's phone rings and over the speaker says we just arrived and we must return back to ZZZ because we are writing too many things up. Maintenance Control spoke to us on the vendors phone and told us the same thing. This is outrageous that we should be punished for doing our job. Had we looked the other way it would have be OK and we would have gotten the overtime required to finish the log item written up by Midnight Shift. Later; Technician Y called Maintenance Control and now he denied that we were being sent home for the write ups; but said ZZZ was not a maintenance station where we change parts. That is what he said. You can speak with Technician Y. This is harassment and punishment for doing our job.

While on a road trip to an out station; Technician reported being ordered to return to home station because they were writing too many things up.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was the Pilot Monitoring on this leg; approximately after 30 min of TOC; the lower display popped up showing Eng 2 low oil qty (3 qts); the Captain asked me to pull the QRH and look if there was a NNC (Non Normal Checklist); and we found out that there is no NNC for low oil quantity; upon searching our manuals we found information regarding this situation; explaining that there is not a min oil qty per se; but that oil temp and oil press are governing; and both indications we normal matching Eng 1. The Captain and I discussed the previous write up that the airplane had regarding low oil qty upon TOD; and how Maintenance personnel had previously drained the oil tank; filled it up again and checked for leaks. Since oil temperature and pressure indications were normal on Eng 2; we assumed it was an oil qty indication issue and decided to continue the flight closely monitoring Eng 2 oil temperature and pressure indications. In the following 10 to 15 mins the oil qty dropped to 0; but all other indications remained normal. Approximately 30 mins after the oil qty indication had shown 0 the Eng 2 oil pressure started to oscillate down and back up in a normal range; gradually getting lower every time; once it remained in the amber range the Captain and I started to anticipate a precautionary engine shutdown. Once the Eng 2 oil pressure indication entered the red range at approximately 14 PSI; the Captain called for the LOW OIL PRESS QRH NNC; we followed the NNC and proceeded to the ENG SHUTDOWN QRH NNC; we informed ATC and Dispatch of our mayday status and proceeded to ZZZ. After completing the ENG SHUTDOWN QRH; we proceeded to the ONE ENG INOPERATIVE NNC; dispatch sent us the landing data for ZZZ RWY XX We landed in ZZZ without further incident; stopping on the RWY and being towed to the ramp.The engine had developed an oil leak that went undetected.I understand the ZZZ1 Maintenance refilled the oil and perform an engine dry run; and then checked for leaks; perhaps the leak would have been discovered if the engine had been started and ran for several minutes.

B737 First Officer reported decreasing oil quantity followed by total loss of oil pressure caused an inflight shut down and a precautionary landing at destination airport.


Flight Crew Total 2828; Flight Crew Type 1926

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On the extended ILS 34R approach into DEN during an unusual amount of controller changes; accompanied by excessive airspeed changes and awkward clearances; the First Officer did not arm the localizer when cleared the approach. I failed; as pilot monitoring and Captain; to rectify the situation in a timely manner.I believe; on downwind we were slowed to 210 knots and then accelerated to 220 knots which required a configuration change to comply; followed by a slow to 190 knots. We were then handed off to the next controller who vectored us to intercept the localizer with the clearance to accelerate back to 210 knots to BOENG and then 170 knots to CORDE. It was then; that I realized I had missed that the LOC had not been armed by the pilot flying. I intervened; and armed the LOC prior localizer intercept. We overshot the localizer and the pilot flying opted to go to heading select mode to rejoin. We overshot the localizer by maybe one dot and corrected back. We were then handed off to the next controller; who I queried to clarify our clearance; and who responded that he knew nothing of the airspeed clearances we had received previously. Then; and I'm not sure; but another controller may have broke in. Regardless; we were then instructed to just slow to 170 knots until CORDE. We continued the approach and landed without further indecent.

A319 crew reported they flew through the localizer on approach to DEN with multiple speed and controller changes.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

On final approach to Runway 25 at MTH the PAPI was unreliable.  It went from four white to white red white red (which it should never show)  and skipped white red red red.  We noticed the improper guidance and adjusted our descent angle accordingly and landed without incident.  Evaluate the PAPI for correct information.

BE400 Captain reports a misaligned PAPI for Runway 25 at MTH.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During approach to ZZZ; experienced numerous warning messages: SHED BUS OFF 1 & 2; BLEED 1 FX; AMS Control FX; A/P FX; YD FX; SWPS FX; probably a few more. Landing performance per checklist increased 1.20 and did not have the numbers for ZZZ. PFD (Primary Flight Display) and MFDs (Multi-Function Flight Displays) we're beginning to flicker. ZZZ1 had adequate length; elected to divert there. Partner wanted to go to ZZZ2 because ZZZ1 did not have a vertical guidance approach. I did not want to risk over flying a suitable landing field with multiple electronic and instrument issues to fly 65 miles to another airport and risk losing all PFD and MFD.Once the decision was made to divert to ZZZ1; we should have concentrated on diverting to that field instead of wasting precious resources and time on 'feeling' for better options. I think it became inherent that when you crew two PICs together you get two different ways of thought. We had multiple failures occurring and I believed the more time we spent on ZZZ2 interfered with our approach into ZZZ1. It is nice to have long runways and vertical and lateral guidance but sometimes you just have to fly the plane and get it on the ground. Thoughts of that aircraft that went into the Everglades because the crew fixated on a burnt out landing gear indicator came to mind. Over reliance on the gadgets is a bad thing. When in doubt; get it on the ground now and you can armchair quarterback it afterward.

EMB-505 Captain reported a lack of consensus during a diversion due to multiple electrical and instrument issues.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 63; Flight Crew Total 6200; Flight Crew Type 2736

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 72; Flight Crew Total 9700; Flight Crew Type 2100

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

We took off for a passenger flight. We departed VFR and picked up our IFR clearance with Center out of 9;000 feet. We were given a clearance to 28;000 and routing around military airspace. Center handed us off to [another frequency] and upon contact we were cleared up to 40;000. The flight progressed normally with radio chatter that didn't seem out of the ordinary. Upon reaching the mountain range we started wondering why we hadn't been handed off to the next Center and attempted to query Center. We transmitted but got no answer. At that moment we observed that the number one radio tuning unit was on a frequency we didn't recognize. The number two radio tuning unit was no longer on 121.5. We tuned to 121.5 and transmitted and were given a frequency to contact Center. The next Center gave us a phone number for possible pilot deviation. At that time we were unaware of any problems with the aircraft and assumed we had missed a frequency. We were handed off to the next Center; we contacted them and immediately lost contact again. Again we contacted 121.5 and were re-issued the frequency. At that time we observed our number one radio tuning unit cycling through random frequencies. We also observed our clearance delivery radio flashing a test pattern. Our number two radio tuning unit had switched from 121.5 to the secondary (flip-flop) position. During the remainder of the flight we had to monitor all three radio tuning units closely because they wouldn't stay on the frequencies that were set.This turned out to be a very insidious failure due to the fact that the radios didn't fail all together. We still heard normal radio traffic but were out of radio contact with our intended Center for approximately one hour. Because the problem was discovered during a high work-load phase of flight it took a great deal of cockpit resources to recognize and manage the situation.There was a factor that affected the quality of crew performance. When a crew is given a phone number to call for a possible pilot deviation; it affects the crews focus on the task at hand. I personally think this is a lousy policy. There are enough resources available to the FAA for them to be able to contact the crew once they're safely on the ground. We were really beating ourselves up because until we realized there had been a failure of an aircraft system; we thought we were at fault for the loss of communication. It was an added drag on our performance and delayed our becoming aware that there was a systems failure and not a crew failure. Ultimately; it had an adverse impact on the safety of the flight. The only procedure I could come up with to recognize a failure like this in the future is to include in your scan; 121.5 still being in #2 primary. In our case it had moved to #2 secondary (flip-flop) and neither of us had caught it. You won't always (read; very rarely) remember the last Center frequency but Guard being in #2 primary is something that can be recognizable at a glance.

When we got back to our home base; our Mechanic informed us that our Clearance Delivery radio head had malfunctioned and was causing our communication issues.The cause of this incident was an equipment malfunction combined with the crew losing track of the length of time between radio transmissions with ATC.The best way to prevent a future occurrence of this incident is to be vigilant about a periodic scan of the radios and especially confirm that the #2 radio is consistently tuned to 121.5.

After about one hour of silence; a LR-45 crew attempted ATC communications and discovered a VHF system malfunction which caused both radios to autotune random frequencies without the crew's input. Careful monitoring was then required.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

An improperly secured pallet was found in position RS. Loading personnel were made aware of the issue and asked to correct it. Flight was delayed and dispatch was notified. According to the CA (Captain); loading personnel said that the pallet had special instructions for loading and securing but those were not followed. As a suggestion; these 'special' instructions should be part of the paperwork given to the crew; or at least the crew should be made aware of them; otherwise how are supposed to know what we are checking during a Main Deck walk around? Or even more important; what is the point of a Deck walk around if we are unaware of these special loads and the way they are supposed to be secured?

Cargo not properly secured; especially when it's like this at the very aft position (tail). At rotation this can slide back and puncture the skin. That piece of cargo was removed before flight. I believe shipper needs to be educated on how to pack. Load Master needs to examine each pallet carefully.

B747-400 flight crew reported noting an improperly secured pallet that was corrected before departure.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 112; Flight Crew Total 577

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Student pilot had previously been flying with another instructor and had completed his initial student solo. I began flying with the student and had endorsed him for solos as well. We completed a couple of cross country flights together and then I endorsed the student for a student-pilot solo cross-country flight. After taking a couple of weeks off from flying after his student-pilot solo cross-country; the student and I flew together and I deemed he was not ready to solo again. I flew with him two more times and he flew with another instructor once following the time off. I felt comfortable with him completing a student pilot solo cross-country again.On the day of the runway excursion; the student showed up prepared; having completed his planning which I reviewed and approved. I provided the student with the necessary endorsements and he departed with 30 gallons of fuel with an estimated fuel burn of 15 gallons.Upon departure; I heard over the radio; the Tower Controller try to contact the student after his departure regarding the transponder; in which the student was slow to respond and confused about what Tower was asking of him ('squawk VFR'). The student completed the rest of his cross-country flight and upon arriving at the point of return; the student had a runway excursion on landing. When I asked the student what happened; he was unsure; and only stated that he lost control of the aircraft. The plane left the runway and rolled into the grass adjacent of the runway; taking out one runway light in the process.It was discovered when retrieving the airplane that the low fuel annunciator lights were on. It is unclear if the student was aware of the annunciator lights or not. The actual quantity of fuel is unknown at this time. The winds at the time of landing were reported at approximately 30deg off the runway at 8 knots. In the past; the student had shown difficulty correcting for crosswinds on landing. I believe the student may have landed the airplane with a slight crab angle. When wheels contacted the surface; it may have caused the airplane to deviate from the runway into the grass. The added stress from the low fuel annunciators (maybe the student was aware; maybe not) could have added to the stress of the crosswind landing and ultimately loss of control of the airplane.

Flight instructor reported that a student pilot had a runway excursion during solo cross country flight.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 500

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

In departing from the Big Bear airport; I inadvertently entered the firefighting TFR south of Big Bear airport. For a pre-flight briefing; I had used an EFB program that had not downloaded the graphical TFR boundaries in the morning when I consulted the EFB graphical representation. In the future; I can obtain a briefing directly from the FAA or consult a service known to be online and linked to FAA information.

A pilot reported inadvertently penetrating a Firefighting TFR due to the boundaries not being updated in his EFB software.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passenger sitting in 1X was asked several times by myself and two other flight attendants to please wear his mask. Passenger refused to comply and was given a reminder form from the mask kit which he proceeded to throw into my jumpseat at 1Y.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a mask.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Both [C Flight Attendant] and I smelled a strong smell of marijuana when passenger exited aft lavatory. Shortly after; we both felt our throats burning. C Flight Attendant said she also saw smoke inside the lavatory. passenger also seemed paranoid. We called the Captain and notified him of the events.Police met the aircraft and questioned the passenger. Initially passenger lied to the police saying he didn't do anything. Police Officers and TSA came onto the plane looking for evidence and could not find anything. When we deplaned the aircraft we stayed in the gate area while on the phone with Operations. In the gate area; we noticed the passenger shaking the police officers hand and walking away. As he was walking away; he dropped the vape pen on the ground and picked it up. We notified the police and they detained him. The police tested the vape pen and it tested positive for THC (marijuana). The passenger then confessed to smoking in the back lavatory and in the cabin among other passenger. At the time of writing this; my throat is still burning and I have a headache. I do feel a little off and not sure if it is the stress of the event or effects of the THC.

Passenger came onboard; confused about seating. We explained to him we have an opening seating policy. When I came around to take his order; he; confusingly reading the menu; asked for items we didn't have on the menu. He then orders a Jack and Coke. I checked his ID to make sure he was of age and said no problem. As I was taking the next rows order; he interrupts me asking where to buy the snacks. I explained to him we'd be around shortly with pretzels as our snack option. As I went back to taking orders; he interrupts me again asking if he could use the lavatory. I explained to him the seatbelt sign was on and I was not able to give him permission as long as the seatbelt sign was illuminated. At this point; I finished taking orders and waited behind the B Flight Attendant as she finished taking her last row of orders. Passenger apparently got up right after I informed him the seatbelt sign was on because I felt a hard tap on my shoulder of him explaining he had to use the bathroom. I told him politely that we both needed to wait until she was done taking her last order. At this point; I informed the B of unusually behavior from him. As I was pouring drinks and the B was putting pretzels in the snack basket; the passenger came bolting out of the lavatory; leaving the door wide open. As I went to close the door; the B and I both realized he smelled strongly of marijuana. I walked into the lavatory and smelled an even greater odor of marijuana. There is no doubt in my mind at this point; that the passenger was smoking weed in the bathroom. We went up to talk to the A; called the Captain and all decided that we needed police assistance upon landing. We also decided to monitor the passenger. Passenger appeared paranoid and edgy as he watched us call the Captain and watched each of us every time we walked by. Upon landing; police met him and questioned him. He admitted to using a vape pen but said it was not marijuana. He said he could not find said vape pen. Ultimately he had to be let go for no evidence. As passenger was walking away; he [waved] good bye to police and the vape pen fell out of his pants. He was taken into custody and I wrote a police report. The vape pen was tested positive for marijuana. Passenger also admitted to smoking in the cabin during his interrogation.

Flight attendants reported misconduct by a passenger who was vaping marijuana on a flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Missed crossing restriction at the...intersection by 6;000 FT. We were given a clearance to cross...at 14;000 FT. The Captain entered the altitude in the Altitude Window but failed to put the restriction into the FMS.

MD88 Captain failed to set intersection crossing altitude restriction into the FMS and flight crew missed restriction by 6;000 FT.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Training on both departure sectors combined; trainee is a Certified Professional Controller in Training CPC-IT supervisor with years of air traffic experience. South flow; MVFR; multiple layers with bases around 2;000' and tops around 10;000'.The trainee released multiple aircraft off BFI; which combined with SEA departures to create a complex situation which was beyond their capability. I had to take over the position with numerous situations developing; the first of which was Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.  Aircraft X was a BFI departure to BFI; but needed to climb to 15;000' to check a system before returning. Aircraft Y's SID off SEA includes an automatic turn to the East; which brought him in conflict with Aircraft X who had been left runway heading off BFI. After taking over; I determined Aircraft X's intentions and initiated a turn away from Aircraft Y and a climb; but it was too late to maintain separation. This led into the next portion of the incident; because I did not climb Aircraft Y. I was attempting to recover from the loss with Aircraft X. A few moments later; I became aware that Aircraft Y was at 5;000' and about to enter a 5;700' MVA.  I instructed Aircraft Y to turn and climb; but it was too late to avoid the higher MVA. The final portion of the incident was in all of this I had turned a subsequent BFI departure; Aircraft Z; to the East as well. I did not climb Aircraft Z and by the time I was aware of it the aircraft was at 3;000' in a 5;000' MVA.  I issued instructions for Aircraft Z to make a left turn to the Northwest; which I knew would parallel terrain in the area; and climb immediately.To my knowledge; all aircraft involved subsequently proceeded without further incident. Management was immediately aware of the incidents.The root cause of the incident(s) is my failure as an On the Job Training Instructor (OJTI) to keep the situation under positive control. I should not have allowed the trainee to release so many BFI departures. My intention was to allow the releases to add some complexity and increase the workload slightly; which would provide an opportunity for me to discuss with the trainee later how it can be smarter to allow fewer releases and have the traffic be more manageable instead. Each release adds complexity to the situation and I was not as aware as I should have been of the specifics of each aircraft the trainee released. Specifically; I would not have released Aircraft X without asking the BFI controller if they were aware of the aircraft's intentions. Knowing ahead of time that Aircraft X wanted to maneuver in the airspace at 15;000' would have allowed better planning. I also should have taken over the position much sooner. I was overconfident in both my ability to recover the sector; as well as the trainee's ability to work the traffic. I was lulled into a false sense of security by the trainee's previous experience and overall performance on the previous training session. I was not aware that the trainee had only a few hours on either departure sector. Had I been aware of that fact; I should have requested the departure sectors be split instead of training on both sectors combined.

Seattle TRACON Controller reported that while instructing; the sector became overloaded and aircraft where in Minimum Vectoring Areas below the required altitudes.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Procedure

During an RNAV arrival into DIA we received an arrival change just prior to top of descent. This occurs quite often. We reprogrammed the new arrival and began descent. Just prior to the final fix on the RNAV arrival we were cleared for the transition to the runway. Because we hadn't anticipated this clearance we were then quite busy programming the change. This all happened while receiving late descent clearance for a visual to 16L. A high descent rate then caused a TCAS RA and a level off for the parallel aircraft on 16R. This further delayed our descent. The recovery went well. All of this would never have happened in the pre-RNAV approaches. I believe the new RNAV arrivals are very problematic with all the speed and altitude restrictions. The lateral NAV is not a problem. However; the designers need to limit the altitude and speed restrictions to the minimum necessary.

Late and untimely changes to RNAV STAR assignments inbound to DIA contributed to expedited descent rates and a TCAS RA response with conflicting traffic for a B757 flight crew. The reporter commented that; while the demands of lateral nav is acceptable; the multiple airspeed and altitude constraints common to many of the RNAV STARs are distracting and require excessive flight crew attention.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

During inspection for a PIREP for a 'grinding noise and feel' in the [Landing] gear handle after a Functional Check Flight (FCF) (previous PIREPs also); I found the landing gear control cables; in the forward cargo [pit] ceiling outboard side at approximately [frame] station 300; to be wrapped around each other. This was causing the stiff [gear] handle and grinding noise. Cables were inspected per Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) and rerouted; re-rigged per AMM and all operational checks were normal. It appears that a floor beam repair had been accomplished recently; the cables removed during that process. [Contributing factor] Failure to properly inspect cable installation. [Recommend] proper [clearance] 'clear to close' and inspection of routing of control cables when disconnected.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports finding the landing gear control cables in the forward cargo pit ceiling wrapped around each other at approximately frame station 300 on a B767-300 aircraft. Pilots had made several previous write-ups for a stiff gear handle with a 'grinding noise and feel.' A floor beam repair had recently been accomplished that removed the cables. 'Clearance to Close' panels also an issue.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Enroute to DEN we got holding at ZPLYN intersection on the BOSSS arrival. Sometime into holding ATC offered the PEEKK arrival with 'minimum' delays. We looked at the option; consulted with dispatch and agreed to stay in holding. While holding; we agreed to change our alternate to CYS. Next was a discussion as to how we could or could not handle an MEL item if diverted to CYS with regards to dispatching CYS-DEN. Then we agreed on a 'bingo' fuel to divert. Upon getting an extended EFC we decided to just go to CYS and refuel. Descending into CYS DEN center said 'Your company does not want you to land in CYS but to return to DIA.' We asked if that meant direct with no delays; they could not guarantee that so I said we'll continue. There actually was some hesitancy on their part. Eventually handed over to CYS approach. They too said it again; [company] does not want you to land at CYS. Conferring with my FO we assumed a problem with the deferral and redispatching out of CYS. Asked again if any delays. In the meantime looking at burn to DEN; weather; etc. CYS app said DEN center offered direct; no delays; no vectors. We switched to DEN center; went direct; declared minimum fuel and landed VFR with FAR reserves plus some.

After holding for another 10-20 minutes the crew advised me they were diverting to CYS. As they were arriving at CYS I noticed their ground track had looped back around towards DEN. I asked the crew are they still planning on going to CYS and they said negative going to DEN. I couldn't imagine why they would do this as we used all of our alternate fuel to get to CYS and now they were flying back to DEN. In the meantime I had a couple people who I did not recognize come to my desk as well as getting multiple phone calls from people I do not know who they were asking what the flight was doing. I do recall one call from [name omitted] at the ATC desk saying 'they requested with DEN center if there was anything they could do to help get the flight into DEN'. After the flight landed with 4;100 pounds remaining the Captain called me; he informed me that during his diversion DEN center told him he was not allowed to land in CYS per company. The Captain said he told them its ok we're continuing to CYS; his next hand off was to Approach who again told him he was not allowed to land in CYS per company so he told me he had to make a tactical decision to divert. I don't blame the captain for making the decision to divert again considering it very well could have been an emergency situation if Dispatch could not get a hold of a flight but in this case he should have verified with me. The issue lies in who called ATC telling them not to let my flight land in CYS. I have heard a manager has tried things like this in the past but this is just word of mouth. If this was in fact a manager making calls like this to ATC they have severely overstepped their boundaries undermining the Captains and my authority over the flight.

Air carrier Captain reported diverting from DEN to CYS because of weather; but was told enroute his company did not want the aircraft to land at CYS. The pilot; without communicating with Dispatch; returned to DEN and landed with fuel above FAR minimum reserves. The flight's Dispatcher did not redirect the flight to DEN. The order back to DEN was issued by an unknown authority within the company.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Instructed by approach to maintain 170 knots to FOGLA and contact tower. Called tower at FOLGA and received clearance to land and advised one aircraft in position. First Officer (FO) flying aircraft. Normal approach and stabilized and on speed at 1000 feet. At approximately 500 feet we observed one aircraft on takeoff roll and another aircraft lining up in position. The aircraft lining up was cleared to takeoff just as aircraft on the roll was lifting off. At this time we realized that it was going to be very close between our landing and aircraft taking off. We considered a go around but decided that with one aircraft lifting off and one aircraft rolling our safest action would be to land. Had we executed a go around we thought we would have a direct conflict with the aircraft on the roll. We ended up landing just as the proceeding aircraft lifted off. In my opinion; this is an unsafe practice. We are concerned that our option to maneuver safely was limited by the reduced interval.Because of the closure of 25L at LAX we are landing and departing 25R. It is imperative that safe separation is maintained.

On visual approach to RW 25R; we were cleared to land as we were well past the FAF (FOGLA waypoint). ATC advised that there would be one departure prior to our arrival. This is a normal procedure at LAX; especially now that 25L is closed for construction. However; this time; the departing aircraft was slow to take the runway and then ATC was slow to clear them for takeoff. The departing aircraft was slow to initiate takeoff roll and we ended up landing extremely close to their departure from the runway - although they were airborne before we touched down. The problem was that by the time tower cleared them to take off and the time they actually did take off; the Captain (CA) and I felt we had insufficient room to execute a go around. We would have been in conflict with the departing aircraft and would have had to take evasive action while in a go around configuration. In other words: We felt that ATC left us with no good options. Neither the CA nor I liked the event or our proximity to the departing aircraft. Upon clearing the runway; CA called LAX ground and asked them to advise LAX Tower that we were not comfortable with the separation on our landing. He advised us he'd relay our message. Nothing further was said by either party. No action was taken by ATC or requested of us by ATC after the flight concluded.  ATC needs to give arriving aircraft more spacing. I realize they're doing their best to keep up a decent traffic flow during r/w construction; but we felt unsafe with our situation; since we felt we didn't have a legitimate go around option. Perhaps ATC should have had the departing aircraft clear the runway once they realized how close we were. Or held them short until we landed. Again - we felt we had no good options on go around once we realized how slow the aircraft in front of us was departing.

A B737-800 flight crew reported they were uncomfortable with ATC spacing on approach to LAX and felt they had no viable go-around option.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

A gentleman walked on the aircraft without a mask; I nicely asked him if he had a mask and if not; I would supply one for him. He said he did have a mask; but just needed to find it. He made his way to his seat in X6 and was putting his seatbelt on. I told him since he was in the bulkhead he'd have to stow his bags above him in the overhead bin. He is now moving around; bending down close to the gentleman beside him; who clearly looked uncomfortable. I then handed him a mask and told him he needed to put it on. He said once again; he has one. My B-FA then comes up and I inform him of the situation. B FA says to the gentleman he needs to put his mask on and the man loudly and rudely says; 'Oh would you just shut your mouth!!' Now; I inform our Captain on what is happening in the back and he said; 'He can't talk to you guys like that; get him off.' So I tell the gate agent; she gets her manager and the security coordinator and the man is escorted off.

Air carrier Flight Attendant in Charge reported a passenger became belligerent about the face mask policy and was removed from the flight.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

The event occurred on the visual approach to XXR. We were turned in a bit tight to intercept the final and I was slow in getting a rate of descent established sufficient enough to capture the glide slope. We turned the flight directors off and autopilot off and continued. We were stable by 500 feet but exceeded 1;000 FPM below 1;000 feet AGL. I think I reached 1;300 FPM during the correction to capture the glide slope. The landing and taxi in was uneventful. First leg of a three day trip after being off for a few days may have played a role. I haven't done a whole lot of flying since being off for 2 months.My proficiency is coming back to pre-coronavirus time off slowly but surely.

We were on visual approach to XXR at ZZZ.  PF was late starting down to catch the glide path.  Configured and approximately one dot high and ten knots fast at 1;000 feet; unstable but correcting.  Stable by 500 feet but had inadvertently reached a VVI of about 1;300 FPM for a short period below 1;000 feet in the process.  Landing was uneventful.Cause: A lapse in monitoring the descent rate by both pilots. An earlier recognition of developing circumstances that could lead to instability would have likely mitigated this occurrence.

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach; disconnected the autopilot and stabilized at 500 feet and landed uneventfully.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft had odd odor upon walking onto flight deck. Packs were off; and no GSE was exhausting in to the airplane/ pack inlets... we tried each pack independently to isolate; but smell remained; a few pax boarded and immediately complained of smell and got nauseous; deplaned; called Maintenance and Ops; wrote it up as a fume event; local Maintenance took aircraft out of service and we swapped aircraft.

A321 flight crew reported a fumes event during pre-flight resulting in passengers experiencing physiological symptoms.


Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Weather; Procedure

Aircraft had a little residual ice on the outboard leading edge and needed de-icing. The F/O and I agreed on de-ice only as the weather was becoming partly cloudy. When [de-ice crew] came on the frequency I asked for 'de-ice only'; yet [de-ice crew] replied that they understood we wanted only a one step then. I corrected them and repeated my request for 'de-ice only'. After some confusing back and forth; we finally all agreed and got what we wanted. This report seems to become my annual 'no one here has a clue about de-icing.' Case in point: I had to explain to my X-year F/O the difference between de-ice only; one-step and two-step. Even he did not know or understand what one-step is. Even though the verbiage in the FOM and on the laminated cockpit cards has vastly improved; I believe there exists still way too much confusion and lack of knowledge on the three different ways we de-ice here. Being [cold weather] based; one would be surprised what exotic request one hears on the [de-ice crew] frequency; from both sides; even when we spell out what needs to be said verbatim to avoid potentially dangerous misunderstandings and to have everyone involved to have that shared mental model.

B737 Captain reported deice terminology confusion.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

After arriving from Mexico scheduling advised they wanted me to operate a sequence to two leg sequence departing 3:15 later. To accomplish this sequence I would have been up for approximately 25 hours on arrival at the final destination. The departure for my original pairing had an actual pick-up time two hours prior to departure so; regardless of how the company defines the duty period; we were effectively on duty starting at that pick up time. In addition; the more demanding environment of Mexico to operate out of increased fatigue. I advised Scheduling that the assignment was excessive and of course the response was that it was contractual. I stated that if the assignment were of shorter duration I could make myself available but; as the only link in the safety chain in regards to fatigue; I could not accept the assignment. Our Airline's chronic under-manning of fleets; in particular reserves; and its optimization of schedules without regard to the human element is the root of the problem. Turning/rescheduling a reserve crew member out to unanticipated assignments should only be allowed for deadheading to the next assignment. Only external pressures or accidents will force the company to come to terms with this so it is moot to discuss it. Committees to 'address' the problem seem to have had no impact on safe scheduling and it is only the individual crew member; facing loss of pay or 'Counseling;' that upholds safety in this regard. Irregular sleep patterns generated on reserve result in cumulative fatigue and sometimes inability to sleep on demand. Schedules should also reflect the actual pick-up/duty time if it is greater than 1+30 from departure time.

An air carrier reserve Captain related his reasons for refusing a re-assignment due to excessive duty times and fatigue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Incident occurred during cruise flight at FL370 approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes into a scheduled 4 hour and 12 minute flight. Audible 'bang' noises were heard in the cockpit; emanating from the right side of the aircraft; in the vicinity of the #2 engine. The N1 indication for the motor was then observed to drop to approximately 70%; without a commensurate movement of the #2 thrust lever. The N1 indication then proceeded to increase to the normal cruise operating range; of roughly 90-92%; within approximately 10-15 seconds of the onset of the engine anomaly. After 'stabilizing' for 5-10 seconds; there was a subsequent occurrence - much like the first; after which we assessed that the #2 motor was compressor stalling. The Captain; the Flying Pilot; then directed the initiation of the Engine Failure Checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The checklist items were accomplished in accordance with the QRH; which included the shutdown of the #2 engine. An emergency divert was then coordinated with Air Traffic Control to the nearest suitable landing facility. Single-engine Approach and Landing checklists were accomplished as directed by the QRH. An uneventful single-engine visual approach and landing was performed in visual conditions to the landing runway.

B737 First Officer reported they experienced several compressor stalls in right engine at FL370. Crew shut down the engine in accordance with procedure and diverted to nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was the FO and Pilot Monitoring on this flight; and the Captain was the pilot flying. He is highly experienced but had not flown much in the last couple months. We have both flown this route dozens of times or more; and the flight was non-eventful until the approach. We were given a standard descent clearance that left us ample time to descend for the visual to Runway XX. The Captain previously did not brief or plan any specifics for how he was just going to descend; we briefed just the approach and the taxi in and airport details. After our descent clearance; the Captain selected a very shallow descent than left us 20 miles out at around 15;000 feet on a straight in approach; much higher than our typical 3 degrees. The descent rate was then increased but by then it was too late to salvage the approach; but he continued towards the runway. Approximately 7 miles out and on a 30 degree angle to intercept the localizer course we were flaps 20; gear down and around two thousand feet high by my best guess. At this point the Captain abruptly turned off the autopilot and quickly banked to the right in what was a poor attempt to lose altitude; which quickly exceeded 30 degrees of bank. I called 'watch the bank' just before we exceeded 45 degrees of bank and the aural BANK ANGLE was heard. The Captain corrected back to the left but rapidly over corrected and I believe we had a bank angle aural that direction too. I believe we experienced a flap over speed briefly as well. We were rapidly approaching 1;000 feet at this point still over 200 knots and I called a go-around and notified ATC. On the go-around the Captain was hesitant to employ any automation which led to another flap over speed as they retracted; despite numerous calls by me to monitor the speed. After we cleaned up we ran all the appropriate checklists and made a traffic pattern for a normal landing. I don't believe the Captain made appropriate entries into the maintenance log for the flap over speeds or the go-around. Both overspeeds were less than 10 knots over the placarded speed. Fundamentally this was caused by poor planning. No descent plan was briefed or employed; and the initial descent rate was inadequate for us to fly a stable approach. I believe the Captain had tunnel vision; and was hesitant to use me or ATC to help remedy the situation. The bank issues after disconnecting the autopilot were caused by faulty airplane handling skills and made it more difficult for me to assist or provide direction as the demand of hand flying further increased the tunnel vision effect; this tunnel vision and lack of automation use continued into the go-around and led to our flap over speed there. In addition I believe pride led to improper maintenance procedures being followed after the flight. All of this could have been avoided with proper planning; and good communication with me as the PM and ATC to help us descend. With just a few minutes of delay vector we could have easily flown a stable approach the first time; even with the late descent. I should have been more forceful when I noticed the descent planning; and I should questioned the Captain's plan even though he was highly experienced.

Air carrier First Officer reported that while attempting to lose altitude on an unstable approach the Captain exceeded a 45-degree bank angle and a flap overspeed occurred. A second overspeed occurred during the subsequent go-around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Working a line aircraft performing maintenance on the #2 engine upon closing of the [Engine] T/R (Thrust Reverser) halves no help was available and unable to close them on my own I used locking pair of vise grips to hold the T/R closed so I could latch them. After latching the T/R and fan cowls I forgot the pliers on the aft section of the T/R. It was within an hour of dispatch time I was under pressure to finish up and get the paperwork in for an on time departure. The aircraft flew to ZZZ where the oncoming crew found the pliers and removed them. More man power; every night we work short-handed with a heavy work load and pressure to get it done. The aircraft comes in late and leaves early which adds more stress and less time.

Air carrier Maintenance Technician reported forgetting to remove tools from engine exhaust prior to departure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

During my preflight; I had confirmed that the Crew Oxygen level was at 1200 PSI. Enroute I wrote up the Captain's O2 Mask Housing needs [to be] secured. Maintenance corrected the housing [at our enroute stop]. I noted that the O2 level had decreased below 1000 PSI. Enroute to [next destination]; at FL320 I noted that the O2 level had decreased to below 500 PSI. Checking the limitations section of the FM; I saw that the level was below that required for Dispatch. I notified [Maintenance] on ACARS and submitted a [maintenance] code for low Crew Oxygen pressure. My FO and I discussed possibly flying at a lower altitude due to the depleting Oxygen supply. We brought [Dispatch] into the conversation. The [Flight Operations Manager] immediately joined the conversation. Together we agreed that the best course of action was a diversion to land [at a nearby alternate]. We notified ATC and received a clearance [to the alternate]. I notified the flight attendants and the passengers. We landed uneventfully.Coincidentally; this is my second B737 Crew Oxygen issue in a month. I started a trip earlier in the month and found an airplane with [zero] Crew Oxygen pressure.

B737 NG Captain reported diverting to an alternate when the crew oxygen pressure dropped below 500 PSI while enroute.


Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

No dispatch view available because another Dispatcher was signed in to my Sector when I came to work today. I see this as a loss of operational control because over the first two hours of my shift today I was unable to communicate through ACARS with my flights. I notified the Dispatch Manager and the IT Department about this issue and; almost two hours later there is still no dispatch view is available.

A Dispatcher discovered that he was unable to receive communications from flights that he was responsible for due to another Dispatcher being signed in to receive those communications.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Both engines of aircraft were started and a medical staff member disconnected GPU. Co-pilot engaged generators. I (PIC) began to roll up the throttles to 100 percent when aircraft began to spin counter-clockwise. I added right pedal and made sure collective was full down. [I] continued to add pedal until at full stops and spin continued. [I] rolled off the throttles. Medic was knocked to the ground by aircraft; no injuries other than scraped knee. Aircraft came to rest after spinning 270 degrees. Aircraft was 0.8 hours out of major maintenance. Aircraft struck a plastic pillar on side of pad with tail boom and co-pilot's chin bubble; minimal damage. Aircraft was trucked to a maintenance facility for further inspection. Both co-pilot and PIC were in agreement that no left pedal was in due to prestart check and that the collective was full down. Aircraft left deep scars in the concrete through whole spin.

Bell 412; recently out of maintenance; started counterclockwise spin on startup as soon as pilot rolled RPM up toward 100%. Full right pedal; full down collective; and RPM roll back stopped spin at 270 degrees. Minor injury to ground assistant and minor damage to aircraft.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

You will fly with one Captain and they are on one side of the vaccine mandate and go off on why they are right for hours; then land; swap Crews and the next one is on the other side of the fence and rambles for hours.  Usually it's not a problem; but it's getting more aggressive as time goes on; and I'm getting tired of hearing about it. It's a distraction to the flight; makes me lose focus; causes fatigue. I'm starting to question if after XX years in the airline industry if I should go to do something more professional.

Air carrier First Officer reported vaccine mandate conversations in the cockpit during flight are becoming a distraction and resulting in loss of focus and fatigue.


Flight Crew Total 80; Flight Crew Type 75

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Checked NOTAMs for DTL; read there was PJE (Parachute Jumping Exercise) within 3 mile radius of airport. Took runway intersection and took off. Upon return to the airport I saw there were yellow 'Xs' put over numbers of the airport. I was unable to see them when I took off due to the intersection takeoff. I thought that they had something to do with the PJEs since there was nothing about the runaways being closed in the NOTAMs.

PA-28 pilot reports departing DTL from a runway intersection; with only Parachute Jumping Exercise (PJE) as an airport NOTAM. Upon return to the airport; yellow Xs are noted over the runway numbers.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Citation Excel was on the SAMMR Arrival which descends to 080 at the end of it at SARRT. I instructed the Excel to depart SAMMR heading 345 degrees. He read back 345 degrees. I should have caught the hearback readback because I meant to issue 245 degrees off of SAMMR. The Excel did as instructed and turned north heading 345 degrees off of SAMMR which put him in a 085 MVA at 080. I turned him back southbound and climbed him to 085. During this time I had 4-5 people trying to talk to me at the same time and was distracted. Recommendation; tell people that aren't important and distracting to shut up. The arrival itself descends through a 085 MVA to 080. So if there is a mistake like mine or a pilot deviation and the pilot turns north he is already below the 085 MVA. Also if we are on long range RADAR that MVA becomes 090 and the STAR descends to 080 right through it. Recommend that the arrival descend to 085 instead of 080.

ELP Controller described an MVA infraction when failing to note an incorrect read back on an altitude assignment.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I flew to OAK at night and have the following issues. When arriving from the east and when OAK is landing runway 12 we fly the BANND One RNAV arrival Jepp page 10-2A. This arrival procedure has aircraft crossing LOHGN intersection at a speed of 230 knots and to cross at or above 6;000 feet. This is a legal clearance because LOHGN is just outside of the lateral limits of the SFO Class B airspace (by only about two miles). However; the next two points on the arrival are WHYEE at or above 5;000 feet and HIRMO at 4;000 feet. These two points are in the lateral limits of the SFO Class B airspace; and below the published vertical limits of the Class B for that sector of 10;000 feet to 6;000 feet requiring a speed of 200 knots. My biggest concern is that the BANND One arrival is designed to put you below the Class B airspace at 230 knots. I would be happy to fly this procedure as published but I know that could lead to possible problems with violating an FAR speed restriction. Is it legal to fly at 230 knots below the floor of the SFO Class B airspace on this arrival procedure? Calling into question the legality and design of the BANND One Arrival Rwy 12 into OAK. Clarification from the FAA or the Arrival design group as to the legality of the published speed for this procedure into OAK.

Air carrier Captain flying the OAK BANND ONE RNAV Arrival to Runway 12 noted the procedure design requires crossing the WHYEE and HIRMO waypoints below SFO Class B at or above 5;000 and 4;000 feet respectively at 230 kts which is above the 200 kts speed constraint.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

While climbing out through 37;000 feet we received a hydraulic pressure low right EICAS message several times; shortly thereafter we received a hydraulic volume low message. The climb was arrested and the appropriate checklists were initiated. We determined it would be necessary to divert to a suitable airport and initially I chose ZZZ because it was directly off the left wing and the weather appeared to be good. ATC issued us a clearance to head toward ZZZ. During descent it was realized that the aircraft was over maximum landing weight so after speaking to dispatch and a chief pilot; I made the decision to proceed to ZZZ1. Upon arrival we requested a hold over ZZZ2 VOR to continue reducing the fuel load; review and complete checklists; complete briefing the passengers and securing the cabin for landing.After holding for approximately 25 minutes we configured the aircraft and proceeded to execute a visual approach to runway XXL. On the base leg as I slowed to approximately 135 kts I noticed the autopilot was holding the control yoke to the right approximately 45 degrees. I believe at some point we did receive a message to trim the wing to the right. I brought the condition to the attention of [the First Officer] who was now the pilot monitoring. I disconnected the autopilot and the aircraft began to turn left uncontrollably with the control yoke pulsing to the left as both of us tried to hold a right input that would slow down our left turn. Not knowing what had caused our hydraulic issue and now our left turning problem I asked the PNF (Pilot Not Flying) to disconnect the flight controls.This action did resolve the pulsing issue although the aircraft still had a tendency to turn to the left it was manageable if we kept the airspeed around 130 knots. The PNF managed the throttles while I flew the aircraft.The landing itself was uneventful; I used the emergency braking system to bring the aircraft to a stop. The PNF opened the door and coordinated with [ground personnel] to chock the aircraft as well as helping the passengers evacuate. After speaking with [ground personnel] and inspecting the aircraft it was decided to load up the passengers; start the APU and have a tug tow us to [the FBO.]Suggestions: I feel that everything up until the flight control issue was handled very well and felt very much like situations we train for in the simulator. In hindsight knowing that the flight controls on the Latitude are not hydraulic the only thing I can think of that might have caused our turning issue may have been the spoilers floating with no hydraulic load and possibly the pulsing we fought was feedback through the spoiler mixing box. I do not recall any checklist cautioning or bringing attention to this type of condition. I do believe the fuel was fairly balanced upon landing.

CE-680 Captain reported a hydraulic system malfunction during cruise and subsequent diversion.


Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Workload; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

During arrival into LAX; our flight deviated 600 ft below assigned altitude and overflew SADDE intersection. The ultimate reason for the altitude and course deviation was a disconnected autopilot that I thought had been disconnected intentionally; but did not verbally verify with the Pilot Flying. We were on the SADDE 6 Arrival for LAX. The arrival and approach had all been properly briefed and the flight was going as planned until ATC gave us a clearance to fly a 070 heading after SANTA MONICA VOR for Runway 24R. The clearance was given prior to crossing SYMON intersection. We had also been given a clearance to descend to 10;000 ft prior to SYMON intersection. The heading assignment at SMO is a standard ATC practice that SOCAL Approach gives to arriving aircraft; but the altitude is different from the expected altitude at SYMON. After we crossed SYMON intersection; I noticed that the First Officer had started a turn in Heading Select to the 070 heading; which was the assigned turn after SMO. I verbalized that we were turning early and that our clearance was to fly the arrival until SMO and not SYMON. The First Officer acknowledged my input to the situation; corrected the error; and placed the autopilot MCP back in LNAV and the aircraft began correcting back to the STAR. After rejoining the STAR our workload began to increase rapidly because we still were not relieved of the speed restriction at SYMON; I was attempting [to] verify that the aircraft was on the correct flight path and the First Officer was making the correct inputs into the MCP. Somewhere between SYMON and SADDE intersection I heard the autopilot disconnect and I thought that the First Officer had intentionally disconnected to make the 10;000 ft altitude assignment and speed restriction. I did not verbalize the fact that I had heard the autopilot disconnect due being distracted by ATC radio calls and I was still making sure that we were flying the arrival properly. I did not know that the First Officer did hear the autopilot disconnect alert and was not aware that the autopilot was disconnected. As we rapidly approached 10;000 ft; I noticed that we were not leveling off and I stated 'altitude!' The First Officer started to recover our lost altitude but we had leveled at 9400 ft before we made a quick recovery back to assigned altitude. We had also slightly overflown the SADDE intersection. SOCAL Approach told us to turn left to a new heading of 078 and squawk ident. I read back the clearance; started to push the ident button; and noticed that the transponder had been turned to Standby. I asked the First Officer what happened to the transponder and she replied that she had turned it to Standby. This was done without my knowledge. This temporarily put me in the red. After taking a deep breath; I checked the flight instruments; observed that we were turning back to BAYST and we were back/close to the assigned altitude. I turned the transponder back to ALT at the same time; trying to respond to calls from SOCAL Approach. Somewhere during all of the confusion; the autopilot was re-engaged and things started to settle down. After rejoining the arrival we continued the approach and landed in LAX.I was wrong to assume that autopilot had been disconnected by the Pilot Flying. I always verbalize whenever I disconnect the autopilot; and autothrottles; when I am the Pilot Flying. I will now verbalize this whenever I hear the disconnect warning when I am Pilot Monitoring no matter how busy I may be. I also need to stop helping the Pilot Flying with inputs to the FMC when I am the Pilot Monitoring. I have a desire to want to be helpful but this sometimes comes across as micromanaging. I need to do a better job of monitoring; verbalizing and intervening when the situation becomes critical.

As the PF; we were on the SADDE 6 into LAX with the autopilot coupled to the B side. The altitude and speeds given did not all match the STAR. Prior to SYMON; we were given a speed of 280 knots and a descent to 10;000 ft; with a heading at SMO of 270. I confused the heading at SMO for a heading at SYMON; immediately the PM (Captain) corrected me and after engaging heading; I immediately engaged LNAV and avoided any deviations. That seemed to distract us both and evolved into a discussion about assigned airspeed versus published. As we approached the 70 degree turn at SADDE; I asked for clarification on airspeed; published versus assigned. The Captain and I went heads down (at the same time) to verify the programmed speed. About the time the LEGS page cycled and we both noticed we weren't turning and in a steep descent; the autopilot was no longer engaged. I immediately started recovering from the steep descent; it was recognized at 9700 ft MSL; and we recovered around 9300 ft MSL and returned to 10;000 ft. ATC immediately assigned us a heading and asked for altitude verification.As the PF; I at no time disconnected or recognized the autopilot had been disengaged. The Captain said he did; but failed bring it to my attention. This was the third time in two legs the autopilot had been disconnected without Pilot input. I do not recall hearing the disconnect and asked the Captain why he didn't point it out if he did. I'm still uncertain if we ever got the audio warning; and when it happened; there was a lot of ATC chatter and flight deck chatter and confusion.

A B737 First Officer flying the LAX SADDE 6 Arrival failed to see or hear the autopilot disconnect and as the aircraft turned at SADDE it continued descending to 9;400 ft before the Captain called 'altitude.' As the flight climbed back to 10;000 ft; ATC asked them to ident at which time the Captain found the First Officer had turn the transponder OFF.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

I turned Aircraft X on a 200 heading to intercept the localizer. As they're in the turn there's a VFR data block crossing the final 3 miles ahead of them. I give them traffic. They say they have traffic in sight. They began to descend 200 feet even they were not cleared on the approach. I keyed up to give the approach clearance. I said their call sign but my instructor told me to give a low altitude alert; so I gave them a low altitude alert and advised they climb. They said they should've told me they were descending for the traffic they had in sight and began their climb. I cleared them on the approach below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) when I should've waited until they were at least at 8900 feet. I think we should extend the Class Charlie airspace out to a point where we can vector aircraft to final for an instrument approach without having to run into conflict like this because of VFRs crossing over the final at that exact point.

COS TRACON Trainee reported they vectored an aircraft that had descended to avoid VFR traffic below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 330; Flight Crew Type 334

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft

On final; I was lined up for [Runway] 4L. I lost GPS which immediately resulted in TAWS warnings (pull up; pull up; etc) with the MFD map showing the wrong airport. This is my home airport; I knew where I was. While lined up for [Runway] 4L; Tower asked me to confirm I was lined up for [Runway] 4L; the correct runway. I confirmed I was lined up; the MFD showing the wrong airport; asked to ident; and then I panicked and thought I must be at one of the other nearby airports. I asked if Tower could see me and with the delayed response; I deviated from approach assuming they could not see me; which caused the issue with landing traffic.

SR22 pilot reported the loss of GPS information led to incorrect airport information; a false terrain warning; and an airborne traffic conflict.