Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Cruising at 2;500 feet MSL on a cross-country flight; the instructor was writing down ATIS at ZZZ while the student continued straight and level eastbound. The instructor; once finished copying the ATIS; looked up and noticed movement in their right peripheral vision. The instructor started a scan at 3 o'clock moving towards 12 o'clock looking for the suspected traffic. When the instructor's scan got to 1 o'clock there was an ultra-light aircraft in a slight descending turn to the left towards the instructor's aircraft. The ultralight was almost head on with the aircraft in its left turn. The instructor took control and pulled up to increased separation between the aircraft and the ultralight to approximately 150 feet and flew directly over the ultralight. This traffic was noticed approximately 3-4 seconds before the aircraft converged.The Cessna 172 windshield/door post might have blocked the ultralight from being acquired earlier by the instructor and moving head left or right may have helped. More heads-up time by the instructor might have led to earlier acquisition of the traffic. The ultralight was flying almost directly westbound into the setting sun which might have made the instructors aircraft difficult or impossible to acquire. More time spent discussing visual scanning and avoidance with the pilot under instruction may have led to earlier acquisition.

Cessna 172 flight instructor reported a near mid air collision with an ultralight aircraft.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff; we immediately noticed that the aircraft was not pressurizing. As a result of that and multiple ATC calls pointing out traffic and weather below acceleration height; I got distracted and missed the callout for acceleration height. As a result; we never raised the flaps on departure; and when we caught the error we saw 195 KIAS with a Flap 10 setting. I immediately raised the flaps; then ran the 'after takeoff checklist' and the 'failure to pressurize' checklist. On takeoff and throughout the initial climb; the cabin was climbing at the same rate as the aircraft; with associated ear pain. Upon reaching the step in the checklist of 'Bleeds MAX'; the cabin rate trend reversed and we began to pressurize; as noted by a negative rate trend and a decreasing cabin pressure. At this point; the Captain contacted Maintenance Control to discuss the pressure issue as well as the flap overspeed. Since our destination was a major maintenance base; we wanted to ensure ample discussion was had prior to getting too far into our route. Maintenance Control told us to continue as the mechanics there could deal with both issues. As we continued the climb ATC had us level at 15;000 feet for a few minutes; then assigned FL230. During this second climb as we passed 18;500 feet we got the 'Cabin Press Warning' and we noted the cabin at 9;800 feet. At this point we donned our masks and initiated an immediate descent with ATC. At the same time; the Captain made the command decision to return to the departure airport and we started heading in that direction. As I ran the checklist for the second time; the pressurization did not respond at all: at 10;000 feet the cabin indicated 8;500 feet or so; then as we descended the cabin matched the aircraft altitude. It should be noted that the cabin pressure never got above 9;800 feet so the pressurization was working to a degree - but not enough to continue flight above 10;000 feet -  unrealistic considering our destination. As we descended to our departure airport; the Captain and I discussed the possibility of an overweight landing; a question he then put to Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control told him to go ahead and land overweight; and to keep the vertical speed at touchdown to a minimum. Neither one of us  realized it at the time; but apparently an overweight landing was to be conducted only in an emergency; and we had not declared one. The Captain and I discussed the possibility of holding for a few minutes and burn off the 500 LBS we needed to reach our max landing weight of 62;000 lbs; but the captain stated that Maintenance Control wanted us to 'just go ahead and land.' We touched down gently at a weight of 62;500 LBS at a  rate of less than 100 FPM. The flight concluded without incident. Note - during our preflight review of the logbook we noted that two days prior the aircraft had similar pressurization failure at 23;000 feet. The actions after that event consisted of replacing the aft outflow valve; and two other work orders that were non-descriptive. We also had performed a thorough preflight; and noted no  abnormal (non-MEL) open circuit breakers. Finally; after the flight; the Captain and I remained on the aircraft and gave a very detailed report of the events to the maintenance personnel that arrived. The issues in the event were: pressurization failure; functionality returned then a subsequent additional failure. Task saturation; confusing instructions at a critical phase of flight. My failure to prioritize tasking. Lack of a flap configuration/speed warning system. Instructions from Maintenance Control that may not have been in line with SOP. Confusing SOP - the requirement about an overweight landing is not intuitive to the flight crew when we might need that information.

A Q400 pressurization malfunctioned during climb after takeoff and then failed climbing through FL185 so the crew descended and returned to the departure airport. While addressing this issue after takeoff the flaps remained at 10 were until 195 KTS.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Declared Emergency

During approach aircraft right engine rolled back with Engine Failure EICAS messages. Declared an emergency with Tower and requested CFR equipment. Began Right Engine Failure checklist; but engine restarted and remained normal throughout remainder of approach and landing. After landing; taxied to gate with emergency equipment following.

B777 Captain reports right engine rolling back with Engine Failure EICAS message during approach. An emergency is declared; but before the engine failure checklist can be accomplished the engine restarts and is normal for the remainder of the approach and landing.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Checked NOTAM for BRD preflight. I got local weather and requested to approach RNAV Runway 34 into KBRD. Was cleared for RNAV Runway 34 following another airplane on the same approach and Runway. Was switched CTAF. Made call 11 miles south inbound to land Runway 34. Clicked pilot operated lights on. After passing the FAF heard BRD airport Maintenance contact [FBO] on and tell them they shut down Runway 34/16 and turned the lights off. Informed them I was short final IMC Runway 34 and I needed the lights on. They asked me if I could circle Runway 23 and land. I informed them probably not. After departing IMC at about 700 feet AGL I determined I could safely circle to land Runway 23. I made radio calls as such. After landing I was thanked by the operations crew. When I went in to order fuel at [FBO] the desk clerk stated she noticed the airport had just put the NOTAM on and wondered why they didn't check flight aware or make a radio call prior to shutting the runway down. I checked NOTAMs and saw the runway NOTAM.Airports should be more aware of who is coming IFR and work to accommodate and or communicate before shutting runways down for routine Maintenance. Further; there should be a buffer time between NOTAM placing and effectively shutting down if there isn't already one.

Small Transport pilot reported the poor issuing of a NOTAMed runway closing for Maintenance.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

I was attempting to chock aircraft according to procedures; had chocks and cones on golf cart. After setting the brakes on the cart I took a pair of chocks from the cart and was heading towards the back wheels; then the cones fell on the gas pedal and the golf went racing towards the aircraft; I attempted to stop the cart but it was coming too fast and had to step out of the way and the cart hit the wing of the aircraft.

Ramp person reports traffic cones aboard a golf cart he drove to the aircraft; falling on the gas pedal after he has left the cart to install chocks. The cart collides with the wing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

While departing from the terminal area I had just climbed and maintained 10;000 feet MSL as assigned on my IFR clearance. I was still in the cruise climb configuration while I was in level off attempting to gain airspeed when a large deep surge happened on the left engine feeling like it was tugging the structure of the aircraft left yaw about 5-10 degrees. I looked outside immediately to identify if there was any signs of failure after outside inspection I referenced the engine instruments for both engines and found nothing wrong. I referenced my position and notified Operations Control of the abnormality and asked for a suggestion based off the situation. They said that they would not be able to send anyone out to inspect due to shortage of flight crew and that if there was going to be a mechanical write up the aircraft should be returned to ZZZ. I notified ATC that I would need to divert to ZZZ due to a mechanical irregularity and that I did not need any assistance as the engine was preforming normally for now. With initial contact with Tower I advised them that I was doing a precautionary return for a mechanical irregularity of the left engine. While I was in descent I noticed a surge again on the left engine but far less pronounced then from before. At this point I elected to cancel IFR and proceed straight in. I applied full cruise climb power to increase available power and advanced mixtures to full as the left engine was producing less than normal fuel flow and was approximately 15-24 pounds different from the right on the fuel flow indicator. I grabbed the QRH and flipped to the engine failure in flight page and briefed myself on the procedures while I was proceeding for the airport to be fully prepared for a left engine failure. I set the QRH down to my right in the empty seat so I could reference it quickly should the engine fail. When I reduced engine power to go in range I noticed a grinding feeling coming out of the left engine as the power was reduced. When I landed I requested to taxi to the maintenance hangar where I was followed by a fire truck and spoke with airport rescue and firefighting and helped them fill out a report of the situation. I called Operations Control; Maintenance Control and spoke with the Duty Manager about the situation as well as debriefed Maintenance about the abnormality. I wrote up the airplane and was relieved of flying for the rest of the day due to two engine abnormality for the flight day to comply with IMSAFE checklist. After speaking with the Duty Manager and Maintenance is was likely a fuel contamination leading so surging and rough running due to fuel abnormalities. Closer inspection of fuel sumps for possible contamination of fuel line.

C402C Captain reported a left engine surge requiring a return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Arrived at aircraft. I reviewed the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook (AML) to verify what I had already reviewed on my IPAD. The aircraft had three MEL's: Auto-brakes inoperative; Auto speed brakes inoperative; and External power inoperative. I then found an open write up for the Anti-skid system; and called maintenance to address the issue. (This was the first flight of the day; aircraft was in ZZZ all the previous night).Maintenance arrived; and I showed them the open write-up and gave them the logbook. I then discovered that the B system hydraulic was at 69% with RF displayed. I again called maintenance to address this issue. The technician showed up and filled the system to 88%. I told the technician that I did not put the discrepancy in the AML; and if he wanted me to; I would get the AML from the other maintenance technicians and make an appropriate entry. He said; it's okay. We then pressed on with the other issues. I never made a HYD B low" entry into the AML. Upon landing ZZZ1 and accomplishing our post flight duties; I again noticed that hydraulic system B was at 69% with the RF displayed. I made an AML entry and called Maintenance Control regarding the issue. I then left the aircraft and debriefed the oncoming Captain on all of the above issues. I later called the oncoming Captain and was told that during trouble shooting in ZZZ1; a hydraulic leak was discovered in one of the wings.With the many MEL's and the newly discovered maintenance issues; I failed to make an AML entry regarding the low system B hydraulic quantity prior to having it serviced. I also allowed it to be serviced without an AML entry.Suggestions: Maintenance could clear MEL's on overnights and service low fluid quantities. They could also investigate low fluid quantities that are out of the ordinary."

B737-800 Pilot reported failing to make proper AML entries for hydraulic system maintenance event.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 4953; Flight Crew Type 3200

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Cleared for a visual approach at UMP from the east; I announced my intention to land on runway 15. 25 or 30 miles out I was urged by approach to 'keep your speed up; you're number one for landing.' I noted traffic behind me on the TIS (Traffic Information Service)/ADS-B display as well as one aircraft in the pattern; which subsequently disappeared. I announced on CTAF that I was on a six mile right base for 15; then a three mile right base for 15. Only upon turning final did I realize that I had been setting myself up to land on runway 33. Prior to turning final my traffic display announced another aircraft at my six o'clock; same altitude; one mile. This was a ghost warning for my own aircraft. Upon turning final; I received another traffic warning for an aircraft at my twelve o'clock. At that moment I saw the traffic pass overhead 200 feet above me. Winds had been reported on ASOS as 060 at five knots; so I continued landing on runway 33.The hazardous situation was caused by my confusion as to which runway I was planning to land on. This was a thought error and could have been mitigated by double checking in my mind the runway I intended to land on and the pattern I would fly. I find it is easy to confuse a runway and its reciprocal; east and west; and so I need to triple check my thinking when planning an approach and landing. Articulating the plan for landing verbally might have caught the error in thinking; and should be incorporated in my approach briefing. A formal approach briefing should be conducted even for visual approaches. Had I done this; the situation could have been avoided.A second error was failure to fly a standard pattern. Although not required; it is recommended. Had I flown a standard pattern; the hazardous situation could have been avoided.Better see and avoid vigilance might have allowed me to spot the aircraft on takeoff roll. My eyes were not sufficiently out of the cockpit; in part because of the false traffic warning followed by the true traffic warning from the traffic display.I did not hear any calls from the departing aircraft. My switch to the UNICOM frequency occurred late because approach was late in switching me to UNICOM. I could have monitored the UNICOM frequency before being switched to UNICOM for better situational awareness prior to approaching the airport.Approach's request to 'keep your speed up' led me to approach the airport with an unnecessary and inappropriate sense of urgency. This was self-imposed and approach was certainly not asking me to prioritize haste over safety.

BE36 pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft on a visual approach to UMP when he became disoriented and flew a track to the wrong runway.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were on a visual to runway 22 and were cleared for the visual on a right downwind to runway 22. The captain called for flaps 8 and flaps 20 on the downwind leg and started the descent down. On base; we were descending to 2800; which is the final approach fix altitude and started making the turn to intercept. The captain then called for gear down flaps 30 and then flaps 45 before landing. As I was doing this; I glanced outside and noticed we had shot right through the course and I stated that out loud. The captain elected to try to correct and get back on course. I was too busy focused on looking to see if we were going to get back on course and I didn't even notice that we were extremely low. When I noticed I was uncomfortable with the situation and I said that we are low out loud and that is when we got the first sink rate warning because the captain was coming down too fast. The captain tried to correct but it was not enough and then we got the terrain pull up message. I then immediately called for a go around and the captain executed the maneuver and started the climb. The go around was very lackluster and I stated that we needed to climb. After clearing the terrain and getting to a safe altitude; the captain at this time said that he saw the runway and wanted to continue. I knew this was a terrible decision and immediately told the captain NO and that we needed to go around and do this approach again. At this time; I told tower we were going around and they gave us runway heading and 4000 feet to do another right base for runway 22. I wanted to pull the gear up but the captain told me that he was going to stay below 200kts so he told me to leave it down; I left it down but after about 2 minutes; the captain requested it up so I brought up the gear. On climb out the captain kept messing with the autopilot to make the airplane climb and I kept prompting him to go up to 4000 because we were barely climbing at all; and that is what we were cleared for. After we turned crosswind we finally made it to 4000. I reentered the approach for the captain and made sure to check all frequencies and altitudes were set again for the captain. This time on downwind I was more vocal and strongly advised adding a lot of crosswind correction because we had a 36 knot crosswind at altitude that was pushing us towards the runway and I knew that if the captain just paralleled the runway heading that we were going to over shoot again. The captain then added in the wind correction and it made it a little better. The captain stated that he wanted to make it a longer downwind to make sure we were on path and course this time and I agreed. We went out maybe about 3 miles further on downwind before executing the turn. As we started the turn and descended to 2800 the second time I recommended that we swing it all the way over or just turn the auto pilot off and fly it. The captain ended up keeping the autopilot on and started the turn. I knew that the best way to fly the pattern would have been to do it hand flown but the captain made the decision to use the autopilot. The captain started to go through the course again because the autopilot was just to slow on the turn and that's when I told him to disengage and fly the plane. The captain then disengaged the autopilot and hand flew the plane; and promptly got back on course. This time I was constantly monitoring and telling the captain to correct on path because he was getting low again; about a dot to a dot and a half off the glide slope. I kept saying 'v-path' 'v-path' and he corrected well before the final approach fix this time and was stable this time at altitude. From the final approach fix to the runway; I was constantly monitoring and calling corrections for the crosswind landing approach. We ended up being stable at 1000 and continued to a normal landing. I tried to mitigate this as much as I could. I spoke up and tried to give instructions on what to do to make it a betterapproach. I voiced my concern about being too low and then I also called for the go around and did not budge when the captain wanted to save the landing. I knew that was a bad decision and that we are taught never to save a landing especially when we are nowhere near being stable. We needed to execute a go around immediately. I was setting up frequencies; talking to tower; trying to make sure that we were still on course; calling corrections for the captain the whole time; trying to look outside and inside the plane to check that everything was ok; and trying to get all my calls out at the correct time. At that point I was over saturated and doing both my job and the captains. He is a fully qualified captain and I treated him as such. The Captain knew he was extremely off course and was not stable at the time and did not execute the go around earlier. I fully believed that the captain would be able to do a visual approach with a crosswind landing.

Bombardier CRJ First Officer reported a go around due to an unstable approach.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 34L

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Abeam the field for a left downwind to runway 34L at 8;000 feet; approach queried if we had the field in sight. We reported we did and were cleared for the visual approach to runway 34L. (Sequence was number 1).  We were west of the 34L LOC course at 8;000 between DUNLP (8;000) and FLLAG (6;100).  We made a left turn to intercept the ILS 34L on a 45 degree intercept and commenced a descent to 6;100 feet to arrive just outside of FLLAG on the ILS. We were VMC and clear of all terrain. Passing 6;600 feet and .5 miles from intercept of LOC; SLC approach gave us a 'Low Altitude Alert; below Minimum Safe Vectoring Altitude'. We leveled off and replied we were on the visual; clear of terrain; and intercepting the LOC. Intercepted ILS 34L just outside of FLLAG at 6;200 feet. Landed uneventfully. Submitting report for information. Do not feel any violation or safety concern occurred. We do appreciate the controller looking out for us. Heads up on his part; however in this case it was DAY VMC and we were well within parameters for visual approach maneuvering. Again; though; we appreciate the information from ATC. [Suggest] a refusal visual approaches? Not always feasible; but will certainly play a larger role in my decision matrix from now on.

Air carrier First Officer reported ATC issued a low altitude alert to them on a visual approach to SLC.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56; Flight Crew Total 1888; Flight Crew Type 745

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

While flying back with a student we were transitioning from the Lake Mead area which is 20 miles east of LAS and just north of BVU down to the solar panel farm just south of BVU to cross over back to HND. While headed towards the BVU airport CTAF was tuned in to check for traffic and possible skydiving in action. On the trip north there had been skydiving in progress but this time no one had made any reports when we asked for advisory. Though we could see and hear helicopter traffic on the ground and low levels no one else fixed wing had reported. As we got about 2-3 miles to the north I could see what looked like a possible aircraft at the same altitude headed in an unknown direction but could not make a positive ID on them due to the size. It looked too small to be an airplane and was hard to keep an eye on. At that point I diverted to the right slightly to be safe. As we were headed SW to pass about a mile NW of the airport the target continued to get closer and we had yet to hear them report; I continued to turn right to remain clear. During this time I wanted to climb back up to get ready to cross the ridge but if so would not have been able to see as well due to the increased pitch so I was stuck at 4000 and since the 172 is a high wing plane I did not want to descend due to the loss of traffic visibility and having no idea of the other aircraft's intentions. At this point I noticed the other Aircraft; hang glider or drone was only coming closer. I immediately made a descending left hand turn hoping that there would not be a collision. From our point of view it looked as if we came within 50 feet of each other. The closest I have ever come to anything so far with flying. I could not believe on a completely clear day with great weather that I would have a close of a call as this. I hope that the implementation of ADSB becomes mandatory as soon as possible. At least so one of the pilots has the ability to detect the other traffic. If neither of us would have seen each other today it could have ended up much worse.

C172 instructor pilot reported having to take evasive action to avoid an object near BVU. He described the object as either another aircraft; a hang glider; or a drone.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was working Sector 29 by myself at a level of traffic that I wouldn't need a D-side. A call comes in blocking an aircraft checking on. There is an aircraft on the SUTTR arrival into SMF level at FL190 but descending via; far as I know. I was not talking to the second aircraft. Aircraft X attempted to check on when I was coordinating he leveled at FL190. He then checks on again telling me he sees traffic at his altitude and needs to climb. Norcal approach shipped the aircraft late or he attempted to check on multiple times while being stepped on or not heard due to coordination. Would having a D side made the situation better yes of course did I need one; I would say not. Aircraft X finally checks on I immediately climb and turn the aircraft seeing it will be really close to or less than 3 miles. The turn and the immediate climb saved the loss of separation; the aircraft reported out of FL200 before he hit the 3 mile ring. Norcal approach should maybe have asked for higher in this situation or descended the SUTTR arrival in the event the aircraft couldn't check on; which is what ended up happening. After watching the falcon no loss was seen; and when I was working the plane reported out of FL200 outside of the 3 mile ring. Norcal should or could've asked for higher. The pilot was definitely not happy about be so close to the other plane and climbed and reported out of FL200 very rapidly. Should those airplanes on the SUTTR level at FL190 when departures are climbing out and possibly losing communication at FL190 probably not.

ZOA Center Controller reported an unsafe situation when an aircraft was switched over from NCT TRACON and the pilot took it upon himself to climb to avoid traffic at the same altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

MSP/M98/ZMP OS (Operations Supervisor); OM (Operations Manager) and TMU (Traffic Management Unit) personnel made the decision to be on a 12/17 configuration after the weather briefing (light surface winds and winds aloft were out of the northwest from 20-28kt). Right at the beginning of the arrival bank; the TMU personnel said we were going to switch to 30/17 (wind 210/10) and that the Tower was done departing Runway 12's and would only be straight out off of Runway 17 with departure traffic. At the time there was a TMU; OM and 2 OS in the room with only one feeder position open and 2 finals. Someone came in to give me a break as I had been at another position for an hour prior to splitting approach and I suggested that another feeder be open or an [Assist] for coordination with the runway change as we had way too many aircraft in our airspace at the time with 4 gates full of traffic inbound. ZMP was calling on the line from every gate as we were unable to take hand offs due to the number of aircraft already in our airspace and the complexity that this created for the entire room. TMU and/or the OS/OM had not coordinated with ZMP to slow the traffic down or spin aircraft due to the runway change. The Tower departed a [carrier] on 12L straight out into the 30's ACDA (Advanced Continuous Descent Approach) after we were told over 10 minutes prior that there were no more 12's departures. At that point; the north Approach Controller asked for the departures to be stopped but none of the management personnel or TMU did anything so I called up and stopped all departures to alleviate some of the complexity that was escalating without help from management or TMU. The situation that was unnecessarily created by the TMU/OS/OM making the decisions and therefore created a safety event/concern for the Controllers; especially those at M98 and ZMP.The SOP/LOA regarding runway changes needs to be followed and the TMU/OS/OM personnel need to make better decisions in regards to choosing runways and the timing of runway changes if it is not imminent. These same individuals need to be held accountable and if they are going to put everyone in this position; they also need to assist with the coordination and communication instead of putting it all on the controllers.

M98 TRACON Controller reported Management creating a configuration change that unnecessarily increased Approach and Center's workload.


Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Downwind to Runway 4 at HOU on the ROKIT Arrival via the Runway 4 transition; the First Officer (pilot not flying) says; 'Parachutist at 12 o'clock.' I disconnected the autopilot and turned right. Two more parachutists appeared deploying their chutes and passed extremely close to our airplane. We informed ATC and they had no idea there was jumping in that area. Obviously; we need to be aware of parachute jumping close to our arrival area.

Air carrier Captain reports a NMAC with parachutists while on the downwind segment of the ROKIT 1 arrival to Runway 4 at HOU. Evasive action is taken and the incident is reported to ATC.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 100

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 5800; Flight Crew Type 3400

Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The events described here are recalled to the best of our ability.  The situation was very dynamic; and communication was often difficult.  On date; on a flight initially planned from ZZZ to ZZZ1 we were flying in a type X aircraft between FL360 and FL400.  Everything was proceeding normally until a reroute that would have taken us to toward the west side of State Y and State X; then to ZZZ2 on the east side of State X; then back to ZZZ1 in central State X.  This is unusual; but we assumed it was due to weather in central State X.  We also thought there was a good chance the route would be changed; so we were not overly concerned.  As we were approaching the southern limit of ZZZ Center's airspace; we received another relatively complex re-route taking us to ZZZ3 then northeast back to ZZZ1.  At approximately that time we started hearing reports about airports in north and central State X being closed.  While we could see some weather on NEXRAD radar; it did not seem to be severe enough to close so many airports.  However we had received no other explanation for the situation.  After evaluating the new routing and analyzing the situation with the closed airports we determined it would be unwise to continue on that route to ZZZ1.  We initially requested and received clearance to change the destination to ZZZ4.   Also; at about that time we received instructions to contact ZZZ1 Center at a point some distance ahead (however the exact location is now forgotten).As we programed in the new destination and continued to hear reports of all or most airports in central and north State X now closed; (most likely not actually closed but unavailable in a non-radar environment already overloaded with traffic) we determined we were approaching minimum fuel and continuing on into an unknown situation would be unwise.  We then requested a diversion to ZZZ5 and declared minimum fuel.   We were told ZZZ5 was also closed.  Our minimum fuel status was never acknowledged; even though we stated 'minimum fuel' twice.  At about this time we were told to hold at ZZZZZ waypoint.  We were not given an EFC time and as we started the hold; we lost contact with ZZZ Center.  At this point we were on the verge of declaring an emergency; but an airline flight began relaying messages between us and ZZZ Center.  We stated we wished to divert to ZZZ6 and were told that was approved but we needed to do so VFR; even though we were at FL270.  Shortly thereafter we were told to contact ZZZ Approach even though we were still in the flight levels.  Since we were basically over ZZZ6 we did a rapid descent and contacted approach while doing so.  Eventually we were vectored for an approach and landed at ZZZ6.It should be noted that we were never informed that we were no longer in radar coverage; or that we would lose communication with ZZZ center before establishing contact with ZZZ1 Center.  We were also never informed that ZZZ2 Center had gone to ATC Zero.  We had also been cleared to lower altitudes; significantly increasing our fuel burn. We later learned during a phone call with ZZZ Center that ATC kept the ZZZ2 Center airspace open even though the center had gone ATC Zero.  The methodology FAA Air Traffic Control Centers are using to deal with COVID related ATC Zero situations is extremely confusing and dangerous; especially when attempting to route traffic through a non-radar environment. It requires the use of complex routes that include waypoint names that are difficult and time consuming to say and spell.  Had we been informed that ZZZ2 Center was ATC Zero we would have diverted before ever reaching ZZZ2 Center airspace; added fuel and waited for the center to re-open.  Had we been informed of the lower altitudes we would be required to fly or of the extended routes required we would also have made other plans.As it was; we remained in a reactionary mode for much of the flight.  We were unaware of the situation with ZZZ2 Center until after landing.  While we never failed to comply with an ATC clearance; we were apparently still expected by ZZZ1 Center in spite of being cleared by ZZZ (as best we can tell) to divert to ZZZ6.We have the highest respect for air traffic controllers.  But on date the ATC system itself severely failed.  In addition to the primary events of this particular report; at various times during today's flights numerous other ATC irregularities (to be generous) occurred.  For example; after receiving an IFR clearance on the ground at ZZZ6 we were cleared for a VFR takeoff and told to contact Approach in the air; that they were expecting us.  Upon contacting approach; who did not seem to be expecting us; they instructed us to climb to 3;000 feet.  We were then just left there; in some strange limbo state; not knowing if we were VFR or IFR; at night; at 3;000 feet; in a jet at 250 knots.  After prodding approach; we eventually received our IFR clearance; the same one we were given before takeoff.  We have no explanation for this.Furthermore; when arriving at ZZZ4 we; and several other aircraft; were instructed to hold as published at ZZZZZ1 Intersection while we were stacked up for the RNAV Runway X approach.  However; there is no published hold on the RNAV Runway X approach at ZZZZZ1.  There is a hold in the same physical location on the ILS X approach; but the name of the fix is ZZZZZ2; not ZZZZZ1.It was not a good day for us or ATC.

Our flight began and proceeded normally. Clearance was issued without any indication of flow problems in route. However; approximately halfway into the flight; reroutes were issued encompassing routing to ZZZ7 and ZZZ3. Multiple changes ensued and it is difficult to recall them all at this point. We surmised that we were operating as in a non-radar environment. However; we were never told that was the case. We complied with instructions. In the process of calculating and verifying routing and ETA's; additional instructions were given. Bear in mind some of this rerouting required headings; in some cases; 120 degrees off course. Additionally; we also had 120 plus knot headwind. Both of these factors combined were a bit unusual and prompted me to apply additional focus on to verify ETA's. We were ultimately informed that we would not be able to land at our destination; ZZZ1. Other requested nearby alternates were denied. We requested reroute to our next filed destination; ZZZ4. However; upon quickly re-calculating our fuel we determined we could not safely make that destination.At one point we were instructed to hold at ZZZZZ waypoint. We complied with instructions and held at ZZZZZ. In the hold we requested landing at ZZZ5 and were informed it was closed as well. At this point I remember discussing the possibility of declaring an emergency and landing before getting into a fuel critical situation. We were very close to ZZZ6 and requested landing there. Near this time; we realized that ATC did not hear us. Another airline flight crew relayed a VFR clearance from ATC to descend from FL270 to ZZZ6. In close proximity to ZZZ6; I initiated a relatively rapid descent approximately 4;000 FPM. Upon establishing communication with the local controllers at ZZZ6; the flight proceeded more or less normally until landing.On the ground at ZZZ6 we were informed that ATC would be back to normal at XAX0Z. We took on extra fuel as a precaution; filed and took off for ZZZ4. Upon receiving clearance to ZZZ4; ZZZZ6 Tower gave us the unusual clearance of proceeding VFR with the assurance that ATC was 'expecting' us. We took off VFR originally cleared to 2;100 feet. We continued to prompt for higher altitude and were cleared to 3;000 feet. For the initial part of the flight we were in limbo regarding when we would receive an IFR clearance. We were also relayed a phone number for ZZZ Center and instructed to call them when we landed in ZZZ4.Due to all the confusion and delays we arrived at ZZZ4 later than normal for us. We arrived at the time the tower was closing with multiple airplanes landing ZZZ4. We received; what seemed to me; a rather nebulous holding instruction for a fix a bit hard to identify given approach outages at ZZZ4. However; it was manageable and after descending in sequence through the holding pattern we landed safely at ZZZ4. I do not know if this situation is normal at the time of cessation of Tower operation at ZZZ4; however; it was very cumbersome. Upon landing at ZZZ4; we contacted ZZZ Center as instructed. It was a cordial conversation on both sides attempting to fully understand what had occurred. I realize COVID-19 has been a challenge to us all; however I would strongly suggest a different approach to the ATC Zero situation we have now. Such a distraction of multiple clearances with little time to verify and stabilize orientation before another one is issued; coupled with calculations for diverting; and lack of communication is a challenge and potentially dangerous for one aircraft. When that is multiplied by tens of aircraft; it seems to me that has to be detrimental to safety.  I was as close to declaring an emergency as I have ever been. Again; I realize COVID has been a challenge to us all. I also realize yesterday was an equally frustrating challenge for ATC personnel; and it is certainly not my intention to impugn them in any way.  If I can further help or facilitate a better solution for pilots and ATC; I would be more than happy to help. I hope this account from a pilot perspective is useful.

Corporate flight crew reported communication issues with ATC resulting in a minimum fuel situation due to a Center going ATC Zero.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 4500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Fatigue; Workload

We began our trip with a normal morning flight.  Our report time was XC00 and I was able to get a full night sleep at home prior to going to work.  Upon arriving in ZZZ; we were supposed to then rest at some point during the 13 hours we were in the hotel before departing again that night for a redeye segment that left at what would be XA:00am on our body clocks (Eastern Time).  It was simply not possible to get adequate rest given my inability to just fall asleep at any time during a day.  I was able to get about 2 hours of sleep prior to this ANF segment.Upon reporting for duty; the captain and I agreed that we were OK to fly what was a relatively short segment to ZZZ1.  When we arrived at ZZZ1; we were both exhausted.  I was able to fall asleep for about 2 hours upon reaching my hotel room that morning; which ended up being approx XG00-XI00 eastern time.  I was unable to force myself to sleep any further that day prior to our report time that evening.About half way from ZZZ1 toZZZ2 I realized that I was nodding off; making mistakes on ATC communications; and was generally unable to function at an appropriate level due to fatigue resulting from the unworkable rest periods leading up to this segment.  My situation degraded further as the flight continued and we entered the descent approach phase; which was approx XT00 eastern time.  I made multiple mistakes communicating with ATC.  I had a very difficult time remaining alert at even a basic level.  Complicating the situation was the fact that it was night time; we were landing in ZZZ2 where there are special procedures; short runways; prohibited areas and it was quite windy.

A B-737 First Officer was unable to adjust to the demands of his schedule which required him to sleep during the day before departing for flights during the night. He reported fatigue resulting from the unworkable rest periods making mistakes on ATC communications. He was also nodding off.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 1400

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

My student and I were on an IFR clearance; on course and glide path for the BLI ILS RWY 16 final approach segment in simulated IFR conditions; in hazy VMC; overcast at approximately 5;000. There were two VFR airplanes in the vicinity; under control of the BLI tower. Victoria Terminal instructed my student (pilot flying) to contact Bellingham tower; he changed frequency and reported that we were inbound on the ILS 16. Tower asked us for our distance from the runway; I signaled my student that we were four miles out (GPS distance was a little more than 4 NM). The tower then issued instructions to the other two airplanes that seemed to me intended to provide separation before he cleared them behind us. Initially it seemed to me that he was considering sending one of them in front of us; considering our distance from the runway; tower had also asked my student for our speed; if I recall correctly. One of the VFR airplanes was instructed to execute a 'tight 360' and re-enter the base leg for Runway 16. Victoria Terminal had instructed us to execute the published missed approach; PF told Victoria Terminal that after the missed approach we wanted vectors to return to ZZZ; the next destination on our IFR clearance following BLI. We were not instructed to execute the KIENO Five DP; but assumed vectoring during execution of the missed approach that would send us if not to the KIENO intersection; then to the Penn Cove (CVV) VOR.On short final; the tower told us to 'start your turn over the numbers'; which we interpreted to mean to initiate the missed approach turn to 275 at the MAP instead of climbing to 700 ft before starting the turn. I assumed that the tower wanted to get us out of the way of the other traffic that wanted to land at BLI. We executed the turn as instructed; expecting a subsequent instruction to contact Victoria Terminal on reporting execution of the missed approach; climbing and turning to 275. After a short period; we were told by the tower to fly runway heading and we turned to 160; continuing the climb. I assumed that the tower was having us fly in a direction that would enable interception of the published missed course of 275; having achieved an offset to the west that provided separation for the landing traffic. I was expecting a 'hand off' to Victoria Terminal for the vectors that would get us back onto the published missed approach when the tower asked us if we wanted to continue or be handed back to Victoria Terminal. My student responded (incorrectly) that we wanted to return to ZZZ. Because we were still on an IFR clearance; he should have told the tower we wanted to be handed-off to Victoria Terminal. The tower then told us to turn 'south east which will pass you across the extended centerline for runway 16' (a paraphrase). My student interpreted this to mean that we were cleared to proceed direct to ZZZ. I was still expecting the handoff to Terminal. The tower then became concerned about our course; directed us to turn to 250; then 270; and to contact Victoria Terminal. We had been climbing throughout these maneuvers on the way to 5;000 ft. I can't recall if the tower issued the altitude instruction or if Victoria Terminal made the assignment when we checked in; Terminal may have also made the assignment to 270. Victoria Terminal asked if we had a moment 'to talk'. At that point we were stabilized in a climb to 5;000 on the assigned course of 270; effectively back on the missed approach. Victoria Terminal asked us to explain what had just happened. I said that we'd been instructed to start our turn over the numbers; then had been issued vectors by the tower for traffic avoidance; and then were instructed to fly 250 (and I think 270; but that may have been the initial vector after contacting Victoria Terminal). Victoria Terminal told us we had been instructed to fly the published missed approach and that the tower was listening to my explanation. VT subsequently said that we should haverequested clarification when we received the vectors that modified its original instruction to fly the published missed approach. I agreed and apologized for any confusion on our part.I was never told whether we had responded to instructions intended for or issued to other traffic or had misunderstood the vectors that had been issued to us. My student promptly read back all vectors that we thought were issued to our flight. We weren't corrected after any read back. I'd hoped to listen to a recording of the radio traffic on LiveATC.net to review what I thought we'd been told and determine how we might have misunderstood the vectors; but BLI traffic isn't recorded by this service.The major lesson learned for me is to request clarification or confirmation (even after a read back) for any instruction that modifies a missed approach procedure after initiating execution. While we did not see the other traffic; I don't believe that there was a conflict. It seemed to me that the other traffic was behind us; in the course of receiving vectors to join the pattern as VFR traffic. The day was hazy with an overcast.

C172 instructor reported confusion with their clearance while initiating the missed approach on the BLI Runway 16 ILS. After BLI Tower handed them off to Victoria Terminal; they are questioned on why they did not fly the published missed approach as earlier instructed by Victoria Terminal.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 1.5; Flight Attendant Total 1.5

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

During the main cabin beverage service the Flight Attendant (FA) B and I noticed a second lap child that we didn't account for during weight and balance. The child was sitting on the woman's lap in seat 10A. After the beverage service we looked over the paperwork and there was only supposed to be one lap child in 16D; which was the only one we had accounted for during weight and balance. The B-FA and I approached the father of the family who was sitting in seat 9C; since the woman in 10A didn't speak English for us to ask her about the child. During the weight and balance and final compliance check before take-off we had not seen the lap child at all in seat 10A. The woman with the lap child was Middle Eastern and had a burkha and a lot of dressing covering the lap child under her burkha; therefore; we decided that the child was hidden during this time and that's why we didn't catch it.Further into our investigation we asked the father in seat 9C how old the child was. He told the B-FA and myself that the child was 3. We asked the father why the child wasn't in their ticketed seat since she isn't a lap child and had her own seat. The father replied that the child was sick so the mother was holding her. Very confused at the situation and where the child came from we proceeded to collect all of their boarding passes to try and figure it out. He handed the B-FA and myself 10 boarding passes total; for him and his group of 10. Each boarding pass had a ticketed seat that included no lap children. This family was scattered throughout the cabin and many of them were not in their correct ticketed seats making it even more challenging to solve. We noticed on the paper work that there was a non-revenue passenger assigned to seat 17D; who was actually sitting in 5F (the seat that belonged to the family of 10). Because the family was scattered all over the aircraft and not sitting in their correct seats we are unsure how the non-rev ended up in 5F and why there was another passenger in 17D.We notified the captain about the issue and we were all very confused how the gate agent boarded 70 people on a 69-seat aircraft. In conclusion we believe the gate agent forgot to scan one of the boarding passes for the family of ten; therefore she assigned a seat to a non-revenue passenger on a full flight. Had the woman not had been wearing a burkha and excessive dressings that covered the child-- the child would have most likely been noticed before take-off.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported customer service boarded 70 passengers on their 69-seat aircraft and no one caught the error.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 75

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

[Shortly after takeoff] engine started running rough; landed at RDM. [I was] unable to contact RDM. [I] landed safely with out any problems. Engine cleared out; carbon.

Mooney pilot reports a rough running engine shortly after takeoff and elects to land at RDM but is unable to contact the Tower prior to landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 2392

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Our flight was quite normal until the descent. We were cleared direct ZZZZZ for the RNAV [approach]. We were planning a short hold due to traffic. Descending through FL190 we set flaps 1 as we slowed to enter the hold. A slats locked ECAM was generated. The FO (First Officer) ran the ECAM; I took ATC and entered the hold. Quickly we realized the slats were stuck between 0 and 1; immediate concerns were the effect on landing distance; descent rate; direct law; fuel burn; rwy conditions. We went to the QRH and went first to the performance chart and the fuel burn factors. Landing was possible but less than ideal due to mountainous terrain; steep RNAV approach; runway conditions (reported swept and good; but I feared less than good [braking] with snow or ice; especially at the end of the runway; taxiways were reported poor). Fuel burn factors confirmed [a nearby alternate] was a safe option for fuel; FOB (Fuel on Board) approximately 11;000. [Weather at the alternate] was VFR. We diverted; max alt FL190 and 220 kts. We completed the QRH procedure enroute; there was some confusion on QRH procedures requiring a reread and discussion; but time was ample to verify we were reading the QRH correctly; advised Dispatch; briefed the flight attendants; and made an announcement to the passengers. After further crew discussion I decided [that since we would be dealing with] degraded flight control (direct law); unusual landing configuration; and high approach speed (hot brakes); we [would] request a 10 mile final to get stabilized before dropping the gear and being forced into direct law. Visual backed up by ILS was conducted normally; approach was hand flown to give me a few minutes of direct law flight experience before the flare. Landing was in the touchdown zone and we had selected auto brakes 1 for a gentle deceleration. We had a normal taxi to the gate. After gate arrival brakes maxed out at 350 deg.We were met by [Flight] Manager and went through the protocol. My First Officer was a great asset and performed very well. I thought we worked well together.

A319 Captain reported diverting after experiencing a 'Slats Locked' ECAM on descent.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft was marshaled to lead line A and this brought engine directly under jet bridge. I had to raise bridge. If bridge had been any lower this would have been a very bad incident and myself and vendor would have been injured. I was unable to safely pull forward; I turned wheels to left limit to attempt to pull away from engine. I stopped and went down bridge to view engine/bridge proximity. I was now going to turn wheels to right limit to attempt to pull sideways along the fuselage to get to the door. The ramp agents realized they had parked on the wrong stop and they stopped me as they were going to push the aircraft back to the correct stop.

A gate agent operating a jet bridge reported the inbound aircraft nearly contacted the bridge because ramp personnel had used the wrong stop line.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On climbout; received Master Caution; Level 2 'electrical alerts;' Level 1 SEL Electrical MAN; and GEN 3 out indication.  After running QRH procedures; electrical synoptic stated that 1-elec system alerts may be INOP 2-elec panel may be partially INOP 3-system display may be incomplete. (ELEC controller in MAN)  The QRH directed us to reference electrical panel if additional equipment failure occurred. We called Maintenance to see if they had additional guidance (none). We contacted Dispatch via ACARS to see if they had additional guidance.(none)  After considering destination; Maintenance history (recent GEN 3 r+r); equipment failures and QRH guidance; we decided a return was the safest course of action.

Shortly after takeoff; we got a Level 2 ELEC alert; and a Level 1 SEL ELEC SYS MAN. We also had a GEN 3 OFF light on the electrical panel; and our electrical synoptic had parts of normally displayed items (DC Tie 3; AC Tie 3; Gen 3) that were completely missing. Additionally; the Number 3 Generator had recently been replaced. After running the checklists for these alerts; we called maintenance to see if they had any additional information regarding the alerts and checklists we were presented with. Maintenance had no additional information. The QRH directed us to reference the electrical panel if additional equipment failures occurred; and also states that the ELEC PANEL MAY BE PARTIALLY INOP. After considering the QRH; our current alerts; maintenance history; and our destination; we made the decision to return.

MD11 flight crew reports a Number 3 Generator failure during climb. The generator had recently been replaced by Maintenance and the crew elects to return to the departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I was training a developmental on his first sector in our area. Aircraft X was on a left downwind at 5100 feet. There was an aircraft on an RNAV Arrival that was going to be second. The developmental turned Aircraft X on a base and descended him to 3000 feet because he was anticipating that Aircraft X wasn't going to descend into the 4700 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA). Aircraft X descended quite rapidly and clipped the 4700 foot MVA at around 4400 feet. I didn't expect Aircraft X to descend so quickly. I will make sure the developmental uses the appropriate altitudes and not use anticipation.

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended quicker than anticipated and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

For the past few weeks I have been flying with a new First Officer and we have been reviewing a variety of things to help gain knowledge on systems and procedures. While cruising at FL320 and reviewing the emergency descent procedure I pointed out the passenger O2 guarded switch and while flicking the front part of the plastic cover the Passenger Oxygen Caution message appeared. I immediately called the Flight Attendant and assured her that we didn't have any kind of pressurization problem and that I would make a PA announcement. I reassured to passengers via a PA announcement that the plane was perfectly fine and that the dropping of the masks was not related to a pressurization problem. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch and another one to Maintenance describing the problem. I made another call to the Flight Attendant and she told me the passengers were fine; she had made another announcement reiterating what I had said. We continued to [our destination] where all the passengers deplaned without incident. Maintenance met the aircraft and secured the masks. I can't stress enough that the guard on the switch was never fully pulled up and the button never pressed in.The root cause was reviewing an emergency procedure and the main contributing factor was a very sensitive switch. Explicit communication with the entire pilot group that the switch is not to be touched; bumped [or] even grazed in flight.

CRJ-200 Captain reported inadvertently deploying the passenger O2 masks when he touched the guarded emergency oxygen switch cover.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Mild turbulence unstable liquor beverage cart.Liquor cart parked with brakes on.  Turbulence jolt caused cart wheels to turn sideways. Liquor cart fell on its side; corner edge of cart fell on flight attendants leg; leg pinned under fallen cart until 2 flight attendants lifted cart off of her and upright. Iced leg immediately.Leg severely swollen with large area of swelling around shin and towards ankle mentioned some soreness felt in her back as well. Rested leg upright with ice applied to leg shin and ankle areas.RN (Registered Nurse); advised such was appropriate and monitored her throughout flight.Allergy to some medications therefore no medication was given. Wheelchair ordered to escort flight attendant for deplaning. Supervisor met the flight.

After a B777 encountered a sudden turbulence jolt at FL340; a parked galley cart with its brakes on fell on a flight attendant's ankle and shin pinning her. Two Flight Attendants removed the cart. After landing; she required wheelchair assistance.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

We got to the aircraft to find Maintenance already on board. The inbound crew had an ANTI-ICE DUCT caution message that came on after they had landed. Maintenance said they had found no issues and reset the system and that is was good for dispatch. After Maintenance signed off and cleared the aircraft for service we loaded up and departed. The weather was overcast and we entered the clouds at about 10;000 FT or so and encountered light icing. Passing through about 12;000 FT we received an ANTI-ICE DUCT warning message that quickly extinguished and was replaced by an ANTI-ICE DUCT caution message. As the First Officer was going through the appropriate QRH procedure; I made the decision that we would need to quickly get a lower altitude and return to the airport; due to the fact that we now were without icing protection on the wings. I did not think that it warranted declaring an emergency; but I did notify the Controller that we needed to return without undue delay. This also required that we would have to land over max landing weight. Due to the conditions we were flying in; with the high potential for icing; the First Officer and I decided that this was the best course of action. We landed without incident and returned to the gate. Maintenance pulled the aircraft out of service for repairs and we received a new aircraft with which to continue the flight.The aircraft had already had issues with the anti-ice system prior to use taking it. I think that the problem that was encountered by the previous crew should have made Maintenance dig a little deeper into the problem and take the aircraft off line. I am not saying that our Maintenance does a bad job by any means....I think they do an awesome job. I sometimes think that there is tremendous pressure put on them to simply 'clear' or 'reset' a system; just to get a flight out. I have had similar issues in the past that have resulted in returns to field; and or diversions that might have otherwise been avoided.

CRJ900 Captain reports being dispatched in an aircraft that had previously been written up for an ANTI-ICE DUCT caution message. Maintenance could find no faults and reset the system. Upon activating wing anti ice after departure the caution returned and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Eleven miles in trail behind an A380; co-altitude (11;000 feet); encountered its (surprisingly violent) wake turbulence. ATC was immediately informed of situation and that we were slowing from our assigned '300 Knots or greater' to 275 knots. ATC vectored us off the Boove1 and changed our assigned runway. I was surprised; as we are taught that wake turbulence spreads and descends. I was flying; the Captain did a very good job and was keeping an eye on the A380 even before this.On the ground I asked the Flight Attendant if she or the PAX had any issues with it; she said no; but it got her attention.Research incident; verify/correct existing Wake Turbulence data. Recommend increasing spacing behind Super-heavy aircraft.

Reporter stated they were above the A380 (since it had started its descent); 11 miles in trail; and still got 'rocked really good.'

CRJ-200 First Officer reported 'surprisingly violent' wake turbulence encounter in trail of an A380 on approach to DFW at 11;000 feet


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164.12; Flight Crew Type 2602.27

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

[I] have wanted to write this up many times but always forget by the time I get to the hotel. Did the visual 18R approach into MCO tonight. The controller demanded that aircraft stay at 2;500 feet until crossing the VOR before descending. Doing so puts you extremely high on both instrument and visual glide path; creating an extreme unstable approach just to get back on glide path. This ALWAYS causes full glide slope deflection and 4 white on the VASI. Knowing that we are put into this situation deliberately by ATC is extremely irresponsible. This is an absolute safety hazard and should not be happening and not be tolerated. I presume this is being done to provide separation with the small GA airport under the approach path. Making hundreds of transport carrier commercial flights a day deliberately perform very unstabilized approaches for the benefit of a small GA airport is crazy. Perhaps make those operating from that small field stay low instead of us staying high. I had full scale deflection and was fully configured yet still had to descend at nearly 2000 FPM from 2500 ft. to 1000 ft. just to catch the glide slope from above. Simply unsafe. By the way; as I'm sure you know; TPA plays the same crazy game landing to the north with McDill under the approach path.

B737 Captain raised concerns about ATC procedures into MCO that forces pilots to fly an unstabilized approach.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 550

Right base entry for VFR landing Runway XXL ZZZ. Cleared to land. Conflict high wing aircraft assigned #2 by Tower instructed to follow us. Conflict aircraft approached us in a right downwind. We received ADS-B and ATC traffic alert for conflict aircraft. Conflicting traffic was visually acquired; reported to ATC; and no evasive action was necessary. Conflict aircraft passed below approx. -150 ft.; approximately zero lateral separation. Conflicting aircraft was not required to take evasive action either.

Pilot reported another aircraft under flew them and missed their aircraft by 150 feet before any evasive action could be taken.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I was flying the last day of a three-day. That last day involved four legs. Three of those airports involved approaches to minimums as a bonus; LGA in the pouring rain. That day; I experienced the worst weather; I've seen this entire year. Approaches to low visibility; turbulence; holding and high winds were abundant.We reported in at XA20. We finished at XO10. That is a 13 hour and 50 minute Duty Day. It was a very long day. On the first flight of the morning; after we barely got into [the airport]; we then had to swap aircraft; ground time. We flew [the next leg]; shot the approach; landed and then learned of our three-hour delay to LGA. My First Officer stated to me 'I don't think I'm going to make it if we get that late'. I actually felt fine at that time and hoped we could continue past LGA. We were concerned that we would in fact be too tired; exhausted; whipped; beat or sorry 'fatigued'; to complete final leg of the trip LGA-ZZZ. I called Crew Scheduling as we were concerned about NOT being able to complete the trip past LGA. A Scheduler (unknown) had put max block in time under the remarks section of our schedule of XO50. This time was totally false; wrong; I find it ridiculous; that we get false information from folks sitting in front of a computer in an office; while we hang out in a terminal counting duty time on our fingers. By the way; I find the paperwork given to us at block-out with Tables giving worthless information and presented in a horrible format; as Company will push every Crew they can to the federal limit. Why waste time with all these tables when Scheduling will 'sell' the federal limit? Back to my ASAP event; I told the Scheduler on the phone I was concerned about the trend of our day and asked him about this bogus 'MAX BI XO50' on our board. He was great and corrected it he stated our max block in time was XM20; and XO50 if we accepted extension. It should have been correct the first time. Pilots should have correct information.Landing in LGA. During that flight; holding to a near divert then an approach to minimums in pouring rain. We arrived at the gate in LGA; took a deep breath and both of us were not sure if we were fit to fly; tired; whipped; exhausted; beat or sorry 'fatigued' for the next leg. We were 10:36 hours into our duty day. I walked off to get coffee for both of us. I returned and we talked about the next leg to ZZZ; through weather; if wheels up time could be met; any delays and arrival time could be met. We were bombarded with no less than three calls from Scheduling; which I did not answer as I didn't want any additional pressures added to us. The aircraft was loading up fast with Passengers; nothing was said to us by the Agent. In fact; I think he knew nothing of how close we were to timing out. The flight was not going unless we accepted the extension. Operational pressures.We tried to manage our expectations of get home-itis; finish the task; getting home; or letting down 143 Passengers. I wanted to make the right decision and limit influence from anybody outside of the First Officer and me. After we talked a few minutes we both decided that we could accept our extensions and fly the final leg to ZZZ. I picked up the phone and called scheduling back; as they had left three messages on my phone. It's almost as if they thought we would sneak away. I started talking to a Scheduler who answered the phone. I asked if they had been looking for us. This Scheduler informed me of a JA (Junior Available) trip that I have been assigned for the next day. I am suddenly; shocked; blindsided; sad; mad and in disbelief. I informed the Scheduler that we hadn't even made it back into ZZZ yet. Due to the weather in between LGA-ZZZ; who knows? I basically argued with her over a trip assigned to me; for the next day. Unbelievable. The flight was going to be challenging enough; I did not need the Company adding distractions to me. The FAA has an 'I'm Safe' self-check. Company doesn't agree. You are either sick or fatigued and make sure you say the correct term. Company has Green; Yellow and Red with the goal of staying in the Green and how to notice the effects/symptoms of leaving the Green. In this case Company had just added a bunch of stress to my life and pushed me into the Yellow. Only after arguing with me over; my new scheduler shifted gears and wanted to talk about our ZULU BI (Block In) time. I informed her that we understand. We are asked if we are going to push the button to extend our day. I don't remember what I said; maybe yeah or we will. She stated; 'I'll show you notified for your trip tomorrow'. I say 'No; I'm not notified and I will call you in ZZZ; and I would talk to a Supervisor; I have a flight to fly'. I hung up the phone and was extremely upset; so much that my flying partner noticed it; he brought my focus back to the task at hand; and asked if I was ok; he told me to take my time and asked if I thought I could fly the leg. Then the Agent came into cockpit and told me Scheduling was on the phone in the jet way; really! Just someone else trying to tell us about ZULU BI time or pushing the button; I said; 'I've already talked to them!' We took off and flew to ZZZ. I tried to limit the effects of the distractions that had just been introduced unnecessarily by my Company. I tried my best; but I can't help but think about my disappointment and Family the entire flight time; this is not safe.In hindsight; I should have walked off the aircraft in LGA. It would have been because the distraction introduced onto me by the Company Schedulers. Looking back; I thought I could block it out of my mind; but I was unable to. It's not worth making a mistake I can't take back. Although; I am extremely upset about being forced to work on my days off; I'm more upset on the timing of the JA assignment (before; I was to finish a 13h 50m day). I find; bad math (BI Time); multiple calls from Scheduling; fast loading of the aircraft and JA assignment all added pressures by my Company that I don't appreciate; one bit. I felt once I was assigned JA trip; any decision I made would be under a microscope and I might end up being Monday-Morning Quarterbacked by someone. It will not happen again to this Pilot!Scheduling could have JA'd me on my arrival into ZZZ. I'd still be angry but it wouldn't be as distracting as flying a leg after receiving bad news. My Passengers deserve my full attention and my Company needs to practice what they preach.

B737 Captain laments a grueling duty day; in bad weather; during which he is badgered by scheduling to accept a duty day extension and a trip assignment on his day off as the junior Captain available.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 250

The nearmiss event occurred shortly after departing Runway 36L at New Orleans Lakefront (NEW) at an altitude of approximately 15;00 FT MSL; in a Cessna 525B (CJ3). The weather was VMC conditions with unlimited ceilings and flight visibility. The target aircraft was never visually identified in-flight from the cockpit. I was cleared for a 'no delay' takeoff on Runway 36L and instructed to climb on runway heading to 2;000 FT. I promptly flew the clearance as instructed until; at approximately 1;500 FT MSL; I received a TCAS II prompted Resolution Advisory (RA) to 'Climb; Climb' immediately followed by a 'Maintain Vertical Speed' of approximately 4;000 FPM. At 2;200 FT MSL; I received a 'clear of conflict' announcement and quickly descended back down to my assigned altitude of 2;000 FT MSL. Almost simultaneously to the initial RA; I was told to contact New Orleans Approach. As soon as I was able to clear the conflict; I was able to contact and notified New Orleans Approach of the Resolution Advisory and informed them that I was leveling off at 2;000 FT MSL. According to the indications of the TCAS; which is overlaid on the PFD; estimated horizontal distance was incalculable or undeterminable and the estimated vertical distance was at or within 400 FT separation of the target aircraft. It is my belief that the target aircraft was cruising or maneuvering at 1;500 MSL off the departure end of 36L. I was cleared for a 'no delay' departure for reasons I am not sure of. After reflecting on the event; I feel confident that I flew the clearance as instructed with no deviations until the RA was received. I then promptly notified ATC of the RA while simultaneously returning to my cleared altitude once the conflict was cleared. Overall; I am not sure what I could have done differently to completely avoid the conflict.

Corporate departure from Runway 36L at NEW experienced a near miss from an unobserved and unreported target shortly after takeoff resulting in a climb above assigned altitude.


Told a family with 3 young kids that I would allow them in the cockpit after the flight since we were short on time leaving.  Landed with a request for two wheelchairs; and meet and assist for vision impaired.  After being marshalled in I asked for GPU power.  I set the brake; chocks were installed; stairs were placed on the aircraft; and we were given a signal to open the door.  We began deplaning while I was on the radio calling for a second wheelchair (there was only one outside); and requesting the meet and assist come to the aircraft (Ops told me they were waiting at the gate; but how is a vision impaired to make it from the plane to the top of the jet way with two sets of stairs?).  After 2-3 min with no GPU I started the APU.  Soon after the kids I had promised to show the flight deck to stopped at the flight deck door.  I got up to allow the kids to sit in my seat.  There were three; so my First Officer got up to allow all three in the cockpit.  My First Officer exited the flight deck and I stayed hunched over the center console in the flight deck to answer their questions.  As soon as the First Officer began doing his walk around he realized engine 2 was still running; he signaled to me.  I shut it down immediately; and then we completed the parking checklist.  While my intentions were good (wheelchair for passenger; guide for passenger; GPU for cost savings; and entertaining the children) they caused me to be distracted and I deviated from SOP and common sense inadvertently.  Not completing the Parking checklist before exiting the flight deck.  Ramp placing stairs on the plane and signaling ok to open with beacon running.  Engine running with three kids and a pilot in flight deck! Use increased awareness during high workload situations and distractions.  Strict adherence to checklist policy.  Standardization among ground crew.  GPU should be provided when available.  Ground crew said they sent for it after I asked for it; but I asked for it in range.  Ground crew should not approach the aircraft while an engine is running.  This rule is broken 99% of the time and needs to be addressed.  This situation made the importance of such a rule very obvious.  If the rule were followed; the door never would have been opened and the undesired aircraft state would have been avoided.  Ultimately; it is the crew's responsibility to ensure safe operation of the aircraft; but this broken link could have prevented the situation from ever happening.   Lastly; please forgive my typos.  I'm typing on an iPad as fast as possible before my password times out and I lose all data!

EMB-145 Captain reports forgetting to shut down the second engine after gate arrival due to multiple distractions. The running engine is detected by the First Officer during his walk around.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 112; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 197

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During flight I observed the electronic instruments begin to fail. I was under an IFR flight plan at the time. The weather was severe clear so I decided to cancel IFR and climb to 10;500 and continue VFR while troubleshooting the odd indications of the instruments. After about an hour a couple other instruments began to fail and the AMP meter started to show a discharge when it should show a charge. At that time I suspected an alternator failure. At that time my transponder failed. I realized my route of flight was going to take me directly into Class B airspace so I elected to divert outside the mode C veil and continue to land at my destination.After referencing the pilot operating handbook I determined I would have to crank the gear down manually. I had a couple other airports that I could have diverted to but I elected to continue since I had family members on the ground at my destination that I could reach on the cell phone and utilize to make calls on the Unicom frequency and ensure I would not be a hazard arriving in the traffic pattern NORDO. Approximately 5 miles from the field I began to manually lower the landing gear and was able to talk directly to the FBO via a phone relay with my wife through my blue tooth headphones. I made a pass over the runway utilizing the non-standard comm path to verify my gear was down. The personnel on the ground confirmed that the gear was down. I turned my battery on briefly to see if I could see the gear down light No light or instruments illuminated. I continued the approach based on mechanical and visual indications. Moments after touchdown the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to a stop about 100 yards passed the touch down point.

BE35 pilot experiences an alternator failure enroute and elects to continue to destination. The gear is cranked down and a low pass is made for ground observers to verify the gear was down; which it was. Upon landing the nose gear collapses.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Early morning; approximately one hour before departure; I was told by the Shift Manager that Maintenance had reached out to him asking if we had heard anything about a potential severe turbulence that had happened on Aircraft X the night before on the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. When advised that we hadn't heard anything about it; I was asked by the Shift Manager to reach out to the Captain and inquire about what had happened the night before. The crew that brought the aircraft in the night before was the same crew taking it out the next morning; so after being asked; I reached out and did not reach the CA (Captain) the first time. I left a message; stating (paraphrased) that we had heard about a potential severe turbulence encounter from Flight Ops and since the mandatory reporting process regarding such an encounter were not filed; we were reaching out due to the unknown nature of the status of the aircraft; as well as to ask why it didn't happen. CA called back just a couple minutes later stating that he had received my message and to walk through the process with him. When describing the turbulence; CA stated that the turbulence at one point 'kicked off the autopilot;' but nothing further was said; and that the crew did a thorough walkaround when they got on the ground in ZZZ1 and stated that there was no apparent damage. I told him that his Ops Report and using the word 'severe' in a turbulence report per company policy requires notification to Dispatch and Maintenance as there are things that have to be done to make sure the aircraft is airworthy and not damaged. He was apologetic it seemed like on the phone and it appeared like he understood what I was saying and apologized for not notifying us the night before. At that point; I told him to reach out to Maintenance to go over the process and walk through the definition of severe turbulence to check on the threshold and to see whether they thought that it met the threshold. Soon after; an ACARS (Aircraft Communications And Reporting System) was sent from the aircraft stating that he and Maintenance had determined that it did not meet the definition provided in the FOM. After that; Flight Ops Management reached out directly to Operations Management and advised the aircraft was grounded and was not going anywhere. A rescue aircraft from ZZZ2 was put together; departed without much delay and picked up the flying in ZZZ1. An FDR (Flight Data Recorder) download was done later that night and by the FDR; it was determined that the turbulence was in fact severe; and the aircraft required inspection. The root cause of the confusion was from the lack of mandatory reporting from the flight crew to Maintenance and Dispatch the night before on the possible severe turbulence. Most of the problems could have been avoided; maintenance potentially would have been able to send a road trip overnight for an FDR download on the aircraft and the aircraft could have potentially been signed off in the morning before the first flight of the day with no rescue flight and no delay to the revenue flying.

Dispatcher reported a severe turbulence encounter that resulted in an aircraft removed from service.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

We reached aircraft early; as it arrived; an hour before departure; as F/O (First Officer) had two months experience on 737's. To get ahead; he conducted walk-around while passengers deplaned. All tires and other items appeared normal during exterior preflight. The aircraft mechanic later confirmed with me; during post flight; that he also checked the tires; with no issues noted. During preflight the F/O wrote down the hydraulic quantities of 92% A; and 87% B. We were near our max structural take-off weight. Load Planning confirmed with me that we could not take an off-line pilot jumpseater; and closely monitored the weight of the last bags; the jetway was even brought back to the aircraft to remove a standby passenger to lower our weight. We needed to burn (at least) 400 lbs of fuel to lower our weight during taxi. We began taxiing with 44.2k lbs; and requested a delay near the end of the runway to reach 43.8k lbs. Our weight at the beginning of the take-off roll was 174.1k lbs.During the take-off roll; Runway XR seemed rough to me; as if it needed repair; especially along the blackened center area during the first third of the runway. No asymmetry noted. I did note a very small; slightly abrupt jolt; upon lift-off. After lift-off we heard the next aircraft tell Tower that they were unable to take-off due to FOD (Foreign Object Damage) on 1R. We had noticed none. A couple minutes later; Departure told us that there were tire pieces on the runway; probably from us. They asked our intentions; whether we wanted to return to ZZZ. With autopilot on; I remained PF (Pilot Flying). The F/O and I discussed our lack of secondary indications; and the seemingly normal take-off. As we were overweight; I was not in a hurry to land unnecessarily. We had many landing options enroute ZZZ1; and could also ask ZZZ1 for assistance if needed; upon arrival. We told [Tracon] we would continue. Within a minute; the ENG1 LOW PRESSURE light; on the A side of the Hydraulic panel; illuminated. We assumed it was related to tire damage.The F/O ran the HYDRAULIC PUMP LOW PRESSURE QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist; and we secured the ENG1 pump. Upon checking the hydraulic system; the copilot first saw 18%; and I saw 14% quantity. Pressure still indicated normal (2900+); but we doubted that would remain within limits for long. We told Approach we would be returning to ZZZ; and began reviewing Loss of Hydraulic System A QRH. A system pressure began dropping within a couple minutes. The F/O ran the LOSS OF SYSTEM A QRH. He also ensured an emergency was declared with ATC. I briefly notified the flight attendants; to not begin service; we would return to ZZZ within 30 minutes; we had a tire and hydraulic problem; and that I would most likely ask them to prep for Evac (Evacuation). Weather was perfect at ZZZ (VMC); winds 290/8; BKN70); and XR and XC were both 11;500 ft. We did not want XR; due to FOD; and planned/requested XC. F/O set up FMC (Flight Management Computer). F/O ensured that Approach knew we wanted emergency vehicles upon landing. I asked F/O to reiterate significant checklist items that would affect landing; and said we still needed approach brief; descent & approach checklists; and time for a PA announcement. He reminded me of the timing of the manual gear extension checklist as well. I also asked him to check FM (Flight Manual) for any guidance on overweight landings; and we found none. Instead; we calculated landing ground roll per emergency checklist (5-6;000ft); and discussed higher speeds (165kts for approach) in comparison to flap speeds. Dispatch additionally volunteered that XL landing would be 5000ft. I gave PA announcement to passengers; explaining problem briefly; plans to safely prep for all contingencies in back; and emphasized that they needed to listen to their very well trained flight attendants. F/O took control of plane while I briefed approach. We ran remaining checklists; reviewed evacuation checklist; and successfully extended gear manually.  F/O emphasized that gear would not retract during go-around. I discussed importance of F/O's 'remain seated' call during landing roll-out; as back of aircraft was thinking extensively about evacuation. We decided we would be spring-loaded to initially say this; and it could be changed later. I had F/O talk directly with F/A's to clarify how he would communicate with them (which he did exceptionally well.) Approach volunteered glideslope was out for XC ILS and offered visual. I requested LOC G/S out; to keep us matched more closely to planned approach. F/O also had box programmed for VNAV vertical guidance. Even though G/S indications were still received; and appeared correct; we referenced step-down altitudes on approach as well. About 3;000 feet; I disconnected autopilot and auto-throttle; and flew manually; to preclude excess automation programming on a VMC day; and focus upon approach speeds. PAPI 3-1 back-up; VNAV profile on FDI (flight Director Indicator); and step-down altitudes provided more than enough guidance. (Plus; we had emergency declared.) I touched down about 2;500-3;000 feet down runway. I sacrificed earlier touchdown; to prioritize rate of descent and a smooth touchdown; to minimize gear impact. Touchdown was very smooth; I used reverse during first 5;000 ft of roll-out; with no asymmetry noted; and brakes during last 3;000 of roll-out. As there was no asymmetry; minimal roughness; and aircraft did respond well to initial use of (alternate) nose-wheel steering; I elected to turn onto taxiway XX; and then stop immediately after hold-short. Approximately 5-10 emergency vehicles were waiting. I started APU immediately. F/O decided to leave flaps in down position. Fire Rescue gave us a contact frequency; and we spelled out we wanted tire inspection; check for smoke; excess heat; and leakage. They found significant tire damage; no smoke; temperatures of left and right brakes at 350F; and leakage. I had them clarify whether leakage was fuel or hydraulic; and it was hydraulic. They also found damage to underside of left wing; and we again asked for clarification on any fuel leakage from wing (there was none.)I was surprised that no tow vehicles were present. As we needed to stay on ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) and Ground frequencies; I ACARs'd Dispatch to request towing. It took 15 more minutes for tow tug to arrive. Beyond that; it took another 20 minutes; for ARFF to finish inspection; and clear out the 50+ people and 10+ vehicles. We made about 4 PA announcements; keeping passengers informed of fire inspection; request for tow equipment; arrival of tow equipment; and arrival gate. I additionally checked with F/A's (Flight Attendants) as to how they were doing; and how passengers were doing. They said all passengers were doing very well; which I believe is due to the excellent job our F/A's did; and the 20+ years experience they had. We were towed to gate X. The tow team requested that we initially request taxi. This led to confusion as to who was communication with Ground throughout the remainder of the towing operation; especially when we entered the ramp. It would be better to just have the tow operator communicate with Ground/Ramp; per their usual procedures; rather than add pilots into the mix. We can easily just monitor the same frequencies. Passengers deplaned uneventfully. Even though F/O did a phenomenal job with every step of this event; he and I decided that we did not want to fly any more until the following day. Chance of distraction was too great; and we needed a break.  I talked with Flight Manager and ALPA (Airline Pilots Association) Incident Hotline.

The Captain and I met early in the [pilots office]. After downloading all flight planning information; we discussed the dynamics of the flight to ZZZ1. Once at the airplane; I performed the walk around while the aircraft was deplaning. After all preflight flows and FMC (Flight Management Computer) loading; the Captain and I briefed the departure where the preliminary takeoff data for Runway XX was obtained. Once all briefings were complete; we completed the checklists (Preflight and Before Push) and were cleared to push from [gate] to expect Runway XR. On the push back; we started both engines. Upon completing the After Start checklist; we received an ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) message stating that our weights were invalid and we soon got new weights. I then got takeoff data for Runway XR. We taxied slow to Runway XR since we needed to burn 400 pounds from 44.2 to 43.8 to be at max takeoff weight. Seeing that we needed more time to burn taxi fuel; I requested to pull off in the run up pad of XR. After burning the 400 pounds; we told ground that we were ready for departure and ground told us to contact Tower. After 2 arrivals; we were cleared to line up and wait on XR and then cleared for takeoff. During the takeoff roll; nothing seemed out of normal. Upon rotation and the positive rate gear up call; I raised the gear and flaps as commanded and on schedule. Before being handed off to Departure; we heard an aircraft tell Tower that there was FOD (Foreign Object Damage) about 2000 feet down the runway. We checked in with Departure and were cleared to 7000 and direct to HAYGR on the MCRAY2 Departure. Subsequently; we were cleared to 11000 and then notified that the airplane to takeoff behind us reported FOD on the runway. [TRACON] then asked if we wanted to return to ZZZ. Since we had no indication at that moment we had a problem; the Captain and I discussed continuing. In due time; we got the LOW PRESS light above the ENG 1 hydraulic switch. I completed the QRH (Quick Reference handbook) for that light and brought up the SYS page on the lower DU (Display Unit) where I noticed that the hydraulic quantity on the A system was at 18 and dropping quickly (it started at 92). This eventually led to the LOSS OF SYSTEM A which the Captain and I were already discussing. We then [notified ATC] with [TRACON] and got delayed vectors to complete the QRH; prepare for the XC approach; TEST the flight attendants; and attempt to look up overweight landing procedure. We completed the XC approach to a safe landing where we exited at X1. ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) met us and we discussed at length if there was any possibility of fire. They thoroughly checked out the aircraft and we eventually got towed back to gate XX.

B737 Flight Crew encountered tire tread failure during takeoff.