Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

After landing in ZZZ while taxiing to the gate we turned on the APU. We left the APU on after engine shutdown to keep the cabin warm due to the below zero temps in ZZZ. We discharged the passengers; fueled up; loaded up; closed the doors and pushed back from the gate.During the pushback we started the engines as normal. After the engine were started and the tug was disconnected we ran our after start checklist and began taxiing out to Runway XX. We left the APU on since the takeoff performance required the ECS (Environmental Control Systems) to be off and I wanted to keep the cabin warm due to the cold temps.About 30 seconds into the taxi I started to notice some sort of burning smell. I couldn't quite place it; it didn't seem to be exhaust; it wasn't an electrical fire smell or smoke; it almost smelled like burning brakes or clutch from a car. It was a strong smell and caused me to be concerned.I asked the First Officer if they smelled anything and he said he and described it like brining brakes or cat clutch. I stopped the taxi; set the brakes; and contacted the Flight Attendants to see if they smelled anything and/or saw anything. They said that they smelled the same thing we did but didn't see anything.I then contacted maintenance to see if they had any insight. They said they didn't know what the smell could be and recommended to turn the APU. We turned the APU off and waited to see if the smell dissipated. The smell didn't increase but didn't really dissipate either. I checked with the Flight Attendants to see what they thought. They agreed that it didn't increase but didn't really dissipate.I relayed this info to maintenance on the phone and they said either way we had to return to the gate. So I hung up; had the First Officer contact the station to let them know we were returning to the gate. Given where we were on the ground in ZZZ our only option to taxi back would be to back taxi on Runway XX. However there was a CRJ on approach and due to the airport being un-towered we thought it best to wait until after the CRJ landed. We held short of Runway XX at taxiway A6.While waiting I started to feel a little light headed; nauseous; and some tingling in my fingers and toes. It dawned on me that we could be inhaling carbon monoxide and these were symptoms of carbon monoxide. We donned our O2 masks and I called the Flight Attendants to see how they were feeling. They reported similar symptoms to what I was feeling. After the CRJ landed we back taxied on 10; and then A5 to the gate. However at this point we couldn't hail operations on the radio and could see that they were doing some sort of huddle on our gate spot. We tried several times to get them on the radio and tried getting their attention by flashing lights to no joy. We then assumed they weren't doing anything due to the CRJ parked next to our spot deplaning and passengers walking into the terminal.Eventually; whoever was working the UNICOM frequency relayed what we needed to our station operations. We specifically said that we needed to get the GPU plugged in right away so we get the engines shut off. I was planning on turning the APU back on temporarily to get the engines off without losing power and to allow them to plug in the GPU after which the APU would come off. I chose to do this since we didn't know what the source of the smell was.After maybe 10-15 minutes we finally got waved into the gate and turned on the APU while taxiing in. After stopping; setting brakes; and turning off the engines I again tried to get the ramp to plug in the GPU. At this point we took our O2 masks off and noticed the smell was even worse and my symptoms increased.They either misunderstood or were just being slow at getting the GPU in. I opened the window and told them several times to get it done. I don't know if they were having problems; training; or were taking care of other things but it took about 5 minutes to get the GPU plugged.Once the GPU was plugged in we turned the APU off and had passengers deplane. I contacted maintenance and they informed me that on call maintenance was coming to help resolve the issue. I contacted dispatch to advice of the situation.Maintenance showed up; we informed them what happened and they said that our maintenance wanted to talk to me. I called back and they said that they wanted us to help do engine runs to help isolate the source of the smell/fumes and to fill out a fumes/odor form.I filled out the form with the crew. After that I noticed I was still feeling lightheaded; nauseous; and tingling in my fingers. I decided that helping with engine runs was not a good idea and contacted Medlink to get a medical opinion. After a lengthy conversation I was advised by Medlink that I should not operate the aircraft until getting a medical checkout.I notified Maintenance; Dispatch; and then crew scheduling that I was out due to medical. While waiting for Medlink to call me back to let me know which local area hospital that I could go to get checked out I advised the rest of the crew to call Medlink if they were still feeling symptomatic. The Flight Attendants and the First Officer did. The Flight Attendants got cleared but the First officer did not.After some time getting the hotel and hospital organized we got on the hotel van to the hotel; organized a ride to the hospital; and got our procedures and tests done. We got cleared; we returned to the hotel; reconvened in the morning to determine if we felt OK to work. We agreed that we did and got all additional clearances from Medlink to operate.We should have donned our O2 masks sooner. Since we were on the ground and not in flight it just didn't cross my mind due to everything else that were taking care of. Also looking back shouldn't have turned the APU back on and just had the GPU plugged in before engine shutdown.

EMB-175 Captain reported a 'burning odor' noticed by entire flight crew resulting in a ground gate return; flight cancellation as well as flight crew receiving medical treatment.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 435; Flight Crew Type 372

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After a great flight; I had a scare upon landing in the Silent 2 Electro Motorglider. Takeoff was by tow to 2500 ft and the flight was a little over two hours with a high close to 7000 ft. I returned to the field from the north at about 2500 ft and lingered at that altitude until two gliders landed and I believed that they were safely off the field. My entry into the pattern was on a 45 degree to the downwind leg after I believed that I had cleared the runway for obstacles and airplanes being towed on the runway. I turned into the downwind leg of the pattern at midfield announcing the entry on the radio. My sight picture at the time of my entry to the downwind was that both gliders had landed and were turned to the east and either on or close to the taxiway. In speaking with another aircraft; they landed; stayed on the runway; turned 180 and then proceeded down the runway. I must have observed them as they were turning the glider and assumed that they were stopped and pointing to the east. I announced on the 45 to downwind and made my entry believing that both gliders were pointing east and not being towed to the north.Wind at this point was 17 kts from the southwest about 200 to 220. I shortened my downwind substantially to account for the higher wind on final and turned to base shorter than usual and much to my surprise there was a golf cart towing the glider in the dead middle of the runway almost to the threshold markers with a wing walker on the west side of the sailplane. Wing walkers should be on the east side of the airplane; away from landing traffic. Basically no pedestrians should be on the runway at any time except to enter or exit an aircraft or to help with the movement off of the active runway and taxi of an aircraft. I made a radio calls on my turn to base before my turn to final and during my turn to final to get them off the active runway! The instructor was walking the wing with his student driving the cart and not listening to his radio or watching for traffic entering the landing pattern.With the wind at 17 and my landing speed at 55 +1/2 the wind or 8; I was landing at 65 kts and sinking very quickly approaching the golf cart head-on with the sailplane behind it. At that point; I had no options. I would collide in the center or hit the walker and the wing if I flew to the west. There was no room with the sailplane being towed in the center of the runway. Finally they saw me and slowly began to pull to the east avoiding the collision. The new student driving the cart did not understand the urgency and had not been trained on runway procedures. The instructor told me that he thought he knew all of the sailplanes that were in the air and was not listening to his radio. His student was not at fault as the instructor was fully in charge of the taxi operation and walking the wing on the wrong side of the sailplane. I believe that this incident speaks loudly for ground safety officer controlling takeoffs; taxi operations and maintaining an awareness of airplanes or sailplanes in or close to entering the traffic pattern. No one should be on the active runway without monitoring the radio.From Ops Manual:TAXIING: All equipment shall be towed on the far east side of the field to the staging area; keeping as far to the east as possible; east of the pylons if possible. Do not drive cars on the runway when it is wet or soft; even when towing sailplanes. Move them by hand; or don't fly. And remember; THE WEST SIDE OF THE FIELD MUST BE KEPT OPEN AT ALL TIMES FOR LANDING TRAFFIC! ON THE FIELD: One of the most important safety considerations is that THE WEST SIDE OF THE FIELD MUST BE KEPT OPEN AT ALL TIMES FOR LANDING TRAFFIC. Additionally; it is necessary to keep cars; kids; dogs; and friends away from the operations area. Don't taxi the tow planes or sailplanes in close quarters; get out and push. And make sure your wing runner is watching for traffic from both directions. After safely landing;I went to the north end of the field and confronted the instructor about completely blocking the runway. He fully admitted his mistake and apologized on the field as well in a subsequent email. I believe that this was an important learning experience for all involved.

Glider pilot reported a critical ground conflict while landing with another glider on the runway. The errant crew was able to clear the glider from the runway before any collision.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were climbing through some weather (rain) and the Captain asked me to call the flight attendants after I preformed the climb checklist to inform them to remain seated. The flight attendants acknowledged and said a passenger was ringing the call button over and over; they stayed seated but asked us to make a PA. After making the PA; the flight attendants called us a few minutes later to inform us the frantic passenger had gate checked a bag containing a Lithium Ion battery built into a portable breast pump. We informed Dispatch and continued operations. Just in case we reviewed the QRH for a cargo fire and also reviewed diversion airports and weather there along our route if needed. We landed without incident.Gate agents should remind pax about the dangers of such things when gate checking a bag.

EMB-175 First Officer reported a passenger informed the Flight Attendant that she had gate checked a bag containing a Lithium-Ion battery.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Working satellite and departure combined in the midst of busy season; middle of the day; good VFR weather.  At the time of the event I had 19 airplanes; which is quite busy for this sector and typically would permit a handoff; which I did not have until I asked for one; after it was too late.  Aircraft X departed VNC requesting northbound along the coast.  I assigned AOB 3000 VFR.  Aircraft Y departed SRQ VFR.  I issued climb to 5500; but then amended to 3000 for traffic at 4000 IFR; and additional traffic at 3500 VFR.  I then assigned 3000 to Aircraft X for traffic at 2000 opposite direction.  In the area where the event occurred; there were 5 data blocks overlying each other.  I became distracted with other traffic and missed the CA [Conflict Alert] until after it had happened; at which point Aircraft Y informed me an aircraft just passed by what he assumed to be 500 feet laterally at the same altitude. I don't have a recommendation because during the busy season handoff is often staffed on this sector; but this time the supervisor just didn't realize how busy I'd become.

TPA Controller describes a loss of separation due to data tag overlap and amount of traffic during the session.


Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

C172 called over Vancouver Lake inbound to VUO on the VUO CTAF. I issued traffic on a heavy inbound for PDX. I found out today that a helicopter was northbound head-on with C172. I don't recall seeing the target. On the replay it looked liked they both turned to avoid each other. I believe fatigue was an issue as well. I should have seen and called traffic. Even though neither was RADAR identified; I can guess where C172 might be and at least give him something to look for. If there is traffic on my scope; I should see it and take appropriate action; whether I'm specifically required to or not. Having said that; it was two VFR aircraft; neither RADAR identified; outside Class C and Class D airspace. I had no communication with one aircraft; and the other was transiting to an uncontrolled airport (VUO) on a Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF). The Pearson Advisory position was created to issue PDX traffic overflying VUO on the VUO CTAF. ATC should not be on a CTAF at an uncontrolled airport. It confuses many of the pilots. A CTAF is for pilots to talk to each other and separate themselves. When a pilot hears ATC on frequency; doesn't he expect us to provide more service than we are giving? Pilots frequently withhold their pattern calls because ATC is on frequency. They probably think we are controlling the pattern. The current VUO procedures are a joke. The Pearson Advisory position is a joke. Pearson Advisory is not a RADAR position; nor a tower position. I guess it's more of a flight service position? Whatever it is; it's half-baked and dangerous. Due to proximity to PDX; there needs be a tower at VUO; with RADAR capabilities; staffed by PDX controllers.

PDX Controller described a VFR conflict event between two unidentified targets; noting the current procedures covering transiting aircraft are in need of revision.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Type 12000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

In an effort to use all the center tank fuel; I turned on one pump and opened the crossfire valve. I subsequently failed to close the valve. The differential main pump pressure caused a 3;000 pound imbalance between the main tanks. The First Officer (Pilot Flying) noticed the imbalance on final approach. We landed with the imbalance. I notified Maintenance of the discrepancy and; after consultation with Maintenance Control and the inspection procedures; the decision was made to remove the aircraft from service.

A 737 flight crew inadvertently left a fuel cross feed valve open. This resulted in a significant fuel imbalance; which was discovered during final approach. The crew elected to land with the imbalance; resulting in a post flight inspection and maintenance action.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 1300

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 297; Flight Crew Type 180

[I was] returning to TTD en route at 2;500 MSL 4 NM north of UAO. [I] started a descent to avoid Class C PDX airspace when a plane called that said they were 5 miles east of UAO. While passing through 2;250 MSL in a descent spotted an aircraft at our 11 o'clock turning to the left. I took the controls and immediately started a climb avoiding the aircraft by a few hundred feet at most. I suspect the aircraft that I avoided was the same aircraft that reported to the east of UAO. If [that] was the aircraft that reported to the east he was not in the vicinity of where he believed he was and his position call was pointless since he had no idea where he was. Giving no help to other aircraft that were in that area also in the proper maneuver to avoid another airplane head on he failed to execute the proper technique since he was turning left and not to the right.

Returning to base at 2;500 MSL 4 NM north of UAO. Started a descent to avoid class C PDX airspace when a plane called that said they where 5 miles east of UAO. While passing through 2;250 MSL in a descent spotted an aircraft at our 11 o'clock turning to the left. My instructor took the controls and immediately started a climb avoiding the aircraft by a few hundred feet at most. I suspect the aircraft that my instructor avoided was the same aircraft that reported to the east of UAO; a Cessna 172. If this was the aircraft that reported to the east he was not in the vicinity of where he believed he was and his position call was pointless since he had no idea where he was. Giving no help to other aircraft that were in that area. Also the proper maneuver to avoid another airplane in a head on situation is to turn right which the other aircraft did not do and instead turned left.

C172 instructor pilot and trainee reported NMAC with another small aircraft in the vicinity of UAO. Reporter stated the other aircraft did not follow proper procedures.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A company owned Sikorsky S76B helicopter was brought into the maintenance hangar on to begin a 100 hr / calendar inspection. The aircraft was opened and the inspection was started. Later that day; management informed the Director of Maintenance (DOM) the aircraft was needed for a charter the next morning. The inspection was stopped and the aircraft was placed back in service. It was used on the flightline [after inspection]. It was returned to the hangar to continue the inspection. [After]; it was found that some areas of skin joints had 'BONDO' applied to provide a smooth surface for the previous paint application. As the 'BONDO' was removed; there was evidence of severe skin corrosion to the point where a lap joint had separated and rivets had popped. Again management informed the DOM that the aircraft was needed for a charter over the weekend. The DOM directed a non-licensed technician to repaint the corroded areas with 'RUSTOLEUM' spray paint to cover the damage. The aircraft was returned to service without a complete inspection performed and with out of limit skin damage. The return to service of an aircraft with obvious skin damage does not follow the repair station procedures as outlined in the quality control manual. It also was not in accordance with the S76 series Sikorsky structural repair manual limits and repair procedures. There was no repair attempted and no reference to AC43.13-1B CH 4 and 6 inspection and repair guidelines was entered into the aircraft records. The flight crews continue to fly the aircraft with the visibly obvious skin lap joint damaged.

It was reported that a Sikorsky S76B Helicopter had evidence of severe skin corrosion where a lap joint had separated and rivets popped. This area was covered with 'Bondo'; painted and the aircraft was put back into service.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104; Flight Crew Total 18600; Flight Crew Type 9310

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Received taxi clearance; 'Runway 9; Taxi via B; E; hold short 4L.' Switched to Tower frequency while taxiing on B approaching E. First Officer advised Tower that we were waiting on weights. Taxi clearance changed to; 'B; M; cleared to cross 4L approach; will bring you in the other side.' Received weights; but they disagreed with reconciliation card from the Gate Agent. First Officer sent message of passenger count from card. While waiting on response; and as I was taxiing; I was instructed by Tower to expedite through the 4L approach as traffic was on 3 mile final. Rounding the bend on B; we had the traffic in sight. The east side of B had little room to clear the 4L approach area and signage was poor. I saw the M sign for the right turn; but missed the M sign for the left turn toward Runway 9 as it was greater than 90 degrees behind to the left and I was splitting my attention with the traffic on final. I started a right turn on M instead of a left turn and was instructed by Tower to hold short of Runway 14; but there are no pavement hold short lines for the runway or on the taxi chart. Tower then told us to continue taxi on Runway 14 to hold short of Runway 4R for a 4R departure. The runway signage was not visible until the turn was started on M towards Runway 14.There was a possible runway encroachment to a runway not in use. Contributing factors: 1. Reconciliation of weights with new procedure. 2. Change in taxi instructions with busy Tower frequency due to late weights. 3. Complex taxi instructions with expedite due to traffic (Tower was busy; but would have been better with clearance to say B; left on M to Runway 9).4. Signage at the taxi B and M intersection location with no pavement markings for Runway 14.

B757 Captain reports being confused after being issued taxi instructions to taxi via B and M to hold short of Runway 4L and expedite through the 4L approach. A right turn is initiated at M resulting in a possible runway incursion. Poor signage is cited as a factor.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

First Officer flying through FL200 on way to FL270; in IFR conditions. First Officer and Captain's airspeed indicators [were] unreliable. Standby airspeed indicator correct. Captain's airspeed indicator came back; but First Officer's out for 5 minutes and EEC (Electronic Engine Control) Systems went to Standby. QRC and QRH procedures accomplished as well as followup procedures. Anti-icing systems working; Engine and wing heat on. Stayed as much out of weather; ZZZ closed; ZZZ1 still in VFR weather and location of heavy maintenance for the B-737. Briefed flight attendants and passengers. Captain flew to ZZZ1; safety vehicles checked out aircraft.Good crew coordination of verification of the unreliable airspeed indicators.Don't fly into clouds with icing conditions. May have been multiple problems that happened at the same time. EEC Systems went to standby while in heavy thick clouds; on climb out; through the freezing level.

Captain reported diverting after airspeed indications became unreliable in IMC conditions and the destination airport closed.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Approaching [our destination] ATC advised us to expect a visual approach to runway XX. Upon checking the runway length it was determine to be too short for landing. We ask for RWY YY. ATC replied unable there is a disabled aircraft on runway YY. Flight crew advised the passengers and decided to go to our alternate TEB. ATC instructed us to turn right heading 040 and descend to 2000 ft. We read back clearance and advised ATC of our intentions to divert. Sometime later a new controller comes on the frequency and advises us to return to 3000 feet while we were descending through 2500 ft. We advised him that we were cleared to 2000 ft and he said that 3000 ft was their minimum vectoring altitude in our sector. Turned the autopilot off and began a climb back to 3000 ft.Approach radar caught us descending below 3000 feet.Too many things going on with [our intended destination] runway closure; attempting to get aircraft to fly the quiet visual approach to 19 at Teterboro. Multiple pilots/aircraft not accepting the quiet visual approach overloading ATC. ATC then changed the approach to the ILS 19. Approach control had many unusual events happening on a busy Sunday afternoon. The runway closure at [our intended destination]; pilots not accepting the Quiet Visual Approach to RWY 19 at Teterboro; plus the volume of traffic.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A Fractional Flight Crew reported descending below 3;000 ft; the floor of the Class B airspace; while on approach to TEB.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107; Flight Crew Type 366

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 118; Flight Crew Type 11055

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

With a L-Pack deferred; we had a R-Pack Trip Off during climbout. We requested to level off (FL 180); and started the QRH procedure for a -700 Pack Trip Off. The procedure calls for increasing pack temperature to reduce load; which was unresponsive in both auto and manual modes; and a reset of the pack was also unsuccessful. During the reset attempts; cabin pressure began climbing; and a further descent was requested (10;000 feet). The Captain began an assertive descent; when around 12;000 feet MSL; the cabin altitude alarm sounded. We followed the memory items to don masks and establish communications; and leveled at 10;000 feet shortly thereafter. Since masks were no longer required; we took them off; elected to return to our departure airport; and landed without further incident. Being a very dynamic situation with limited time and procedures complicated due to an already deferred pack; some of the procedures and communications could have been better to facilitate CRM and lessen distraction and confusion during the event.

We departed ZZZ with MEL 21-1-XX; Left AC pack inoperative. Passing through approximately 16;500 feet; I noticed the cabin rate was climbing and the cabin pressure was approaching 8000 feet. We asked for a level off at FL 180. At level off; the Right Pack Trip Off light illuminated and I asked the FO (First Officer) for the Pack Trip Off Checklist. The cabin pressure continued to rise and we asked for (and were granted) a descent to 10;000 feet. As the Pilot Flying; I lowered the nose using Vertical Speed mode and the speedbrake to get the aircraft down to a safer cabin altitude. Passing through approximately 14;000 feet; the Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded and the Cabin Altitude light illuminated. We immediately performed our QRC memory items; donning our oxygen masks with regulators set to 100% and commencing to establish Crew communications. After leveling off at 10;000 feet; I noticed the Cabin Altitude light extinguished and the cabin pressure altitude was at a safe level to remove our masks. We continued with all of our checklist procedures and the Right Pack would not reset. After requesting a return to ZZZ; we were given the ZZZZZ Arrival direct to ZZZ1; and subsequently ATC said they would be giving us vectors back to ZZZ. As we continued completing our checklists; I didn't come back and ask if the headings were given because of any navigational errors. ATC asked if we were [advising] and we told them 'No'. Landing and taxi to the gate were uneventful and the masks did not drop in the Passenger cabin. The flight attendants and First Officer confirmed they were doing fine; and I am not aware of any medical issues from the passengers after our return to the gate.Even though it was not the middle of summer in ZZZ; I am not sure it is good Customer Service to fly Revenue Passengers on a flight with only one operating AC Pack when considering passenger comfort. Taxiing out; I noticed the aircraft was not as cool as normal. As the Captain; I felt I gave a thorough Captains brief with the FO during our preflight briefings. Using both of our EFBs; we went over the entire MEL and Pressurized Flight with One Pack Inoperative. I noticed during climbout the cabin pressure was higher than normal; but attributed this to having the use of only one operating AC pack. In retrospect; it would have been a better idea to have asked immediately for a lower altitude the first time I noticed the cabin pressure increasing; instead of just asking to level off. Additionally; over the past few years we have had increased training using our oxygen masks in the simulator. Even with training; we initially had difficulty talking with the mask; so I recommend continuing to emphasize this training with our Aircrews.

737 flight crew reported a return to departure airport due to a loss of pressurization.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 2500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On or about eight months ago a new runway was opened up for service at MLY; Manley Hot Springs. NOTAM's were issued that have very limited information. In eight months the FAA has been late in updating the ALASKA SUPPLEMENT handbook used for pre flight. It still has the old runway in it which has been closed for eight months. This Alaska Supplement is very important to prefight for that runway. FAA cannot ask every pilot to review any and all info prior to flight on one hand while on the other hand not update the available information FAA puts out for 9 months.

Small aircraft pilot reports that MLY has new Runway 18/36 and the old Runway 02/20 is closed; but the Alaska Supplement and AFD have yet to be updated by the FAA.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft X was being vectored for a visual approach to ZZZ; a satellite airport in the Bozeman sector. He was level at 13000 [ft]. My airspace boundary map and my MVA map were set at the same intensity so I mistakenly thought he was in a 12000 MVA so I assigned 12000. 30 seconds later I realized that he was still in a 13000 MVA so I reassigned 13000 but he had already started a descent. Instead of climbing back to 13000 (he was about 12500) he called the airport in sight and I cleared him for a visual approach. I am going to change the intensity settings on my MVA map and my airspace boundary map so that the lines don't look the same and it will be clearer what the MVA is.

BOI controller reported a BE20 was descended into a higher MVA.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 178

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) [for our arrival] in IMC light rain. The runway was wet and the overcast was roughly 500-700 ft. We had a normal descent; arrival; approach and landing. Upon landing the Captain stowed the speed brakes and used very little if any brakes. When we approached [the] taxiway we made a turn off which seemed to go at a reasonable speed. The taxiway which was angled which gave the appearance of a high speed turn off. Upon getting farther in the turn it was obvious it was not a high speed and required a hard right turn. This was my first time learning that the nose wheel can skid easily in the A320. We skidded around 45 degrees with a clear indication we would exit the taxiway and recovered only to be going 45 degrees to the grass on the right side of the taxiway. The Captain recovered on the taxiway and the Tower asked if there was standing water or if there was a problem in that area. I responded that there did not appear to be standing water but it was rather slick. It should be noted that in my limited experience in the A320 the taxi speed did not appear to be too fast. I was shocked to see the lack of maneuverability of the nose wheel with wet conditions in a turn.We both felt this did not require any maintenance action. We debriefed the situation and gave an explanation to the passengers at this gate.

A320 First Officer momentarily lost control exiting the runway on a wet surface when the nose wheel skidded in the turn.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 8L

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On the descent on the GUSHR 3 RNAV arrival approximately leaving 17;000 feet we got the frequency change to approach; approach advised us to expect RWY 08L. Approach Controller gave us a heading vectors for RWY 8L to about 35 mile final; after that he switched us to another Approach Controller [who] gave us couple of headings and step down altitudes and speed of 170; until at one point he gave us a clearance at 7;000 feet left turn heading 120 maintain 7;000 cleared ILS 8L approach. The Captain read back the clearance as left turn 120; maintain 7;000 until established; cleared ILS 8L approach. After we intercepted RWY 08L localizer and I started descending to 3;000 feet he gave us another clearance as 160 KTS until EELPO; contact Tower; and the Captain read back the clearance 160 KTS until EELPO contact tower. The Captain tried to call Tower but Tower was busy and then he said that doesn't make sense where is EELPO? At that point we have realized that we are on the wrong approach; and then we got a call from 'Final Monitor.' The Captain responded with our call sign and ILS 08L. Final Monitor responded you should be on the 08R ILS; fly heading 120; intercept RWY 08R localizer; maintain 6;000 feet. He gave us ILS08R RWY LOC frequency and the Captain read back all of that and at that point we were 5;900 feet; so I climbed back up to 6;000 feet; then Final Monitor gave us a speed of 180 KTS. Then we quickly briefed the approach and the Captain tried to confirm that we were intercepting 08R LOC and Final Monitor came back with the same previous instructions with heading 060; and then we intercepted normally without the clearance for the approach until Final Monitor got on the frequency and said 1 mile from JELLI cleared ILS08R then Tower cleared us to land at 08R. I wanted to brief it again just to confirm and the Captain suggested to brief it again while I fly and he did and we both felt comfortable to continue since we had enough distance from the FAF - almost 12 NM - and we landed with no further problems.I don't understand if it was us at fault or the Controller gave us the wrong approach clearance but it was definitely a miscommunication.If it's our fault that we missed the clearance then we should have given more attention to the clearance and confirmed it.

CRJ First Officer reported a track deviation on arrival into IAH resulted when an ATC clearance was misunderstood.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 16670; Flight Crew Type 900

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This was a flight [to] ZZZ for pickup of an item. I monitored the AWOS and listened to UNICOM for traffic. I announced my intention to enter the traffic pattern for Runway XX and land at ZZZ with a FULL STOP. It was observing that several aircraft were in the pattern in close spacing on the downwind with an estimated speed of approximately 70 Knots. My pattern entry speed was reduced to 130 KIAS for landing gear deployment and spaced about a 1;000 feet to right; outside of these aircraft. Again; I announced my intention to make a Full Stop landing without interfering with the numerous aircraft doing Touch & Go landings. I reduced the speed 110 Knots on base and 100 Knots on Final Approach. Expecting these aircraft to extend downwind about 30 seconds to give me room; I was surprised when one of them continued on a tight base and turn to final directly in front my plane. At 100 Knots approach speed; I easily overtook the 70-knot aircraft and passed successfully at about 500 feet right of ZZZ Runway XX centerline. I accelerated my plane while retracting the gear and flaps and maintained 180 knots for the climb and turn to crosswind. Again; I observed several aircraft on close spacing downwind and I entered a downwind slightly outside the pattern. For the fourth time; I announced my intention to make a Full Stop landing and turned the normal base for my plane's speed. For a second time; an aircraft made a turn to base and turned to final directly in front of me instead of extending their downwind about 30 second to allow much-faster airplanes to make a Full Stop. On this pattern; I was grateful the other aircraft decided to go-around when the pilot observed the rapid CLOSURE from behind. I said 'Thanks' on the radio and completed a safe Full Stop Landing.After my safe landing; I proceeded to the FBO to pick up the item. Upon reaching the FBO desk; I heard on the FBO radio that Runway XX is now CLOSED for an airplane stopped on the runway. From the FBO windows; it appeared to be an aircraft was sitting on Runway XX without its Landing Gear. The poor soul and retractable aircraft were still out there when I departed. If these aircraft belong to a Flight school; perhaps the instructors should talk to their students about allowing faster; dissimilar airplanes into the traffic pattern for a single full stop landing. There are MANY corporate airplanes that land at ZZZ Airport with approach speed in the 100 - 120 knots range. This would be appreciated by many and certainly may save unwanted distraction during landing. Perhaps the instructor input may save some distracted soul from making a gear-up landing.

GA pilot reported an NMAC at non-towered airport.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Ground told us to 'hustle up' in order to make our flow time in one minute; void in 4. We expedited our taxi and called ready at 1R hold short and were given immediate 'cleared for takeoff' (1 minute prior to void time). We rogered the call; cleared final that traffic at approximately 3 mi was heading for the left (1L); and crossed the hold short line. As we crossed the hold short; there was an '[company]' call; which was cut short as we turned to align with 1R. I looked up to see an aircraft at approximately 500 feet and lined up for our runway. Tower called for an immediate 'Go Around' and around 10 seconds later; we saw the MD-80 on the Go. Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance; told us to 'line up and wait'. Approximately 4-5 minutes later; we were cleared for takeoff. Meeting a flow time seemed to be a causal factor in this event. We did not feel rushed at all; but did expedite our taxi speed when asked to 'hustle up'.  When Tower cleared us as we called 'ready for Takeoff'; nothing seemed to be out of the ordinary. I normally fly to Hawaii where there are seldom 'flow issues'; and it seems that controllers domestically are under a lot of pressure; which can lead to mistakes.Another factor was the landing traffic. As we were paralleling the runway while taxiing to the approach end of 1R; I noticed 2-3 contacts on the TCAS display in the cockpit and they all seemed to be lined up for 1L (where we had landed 1 hour before). Visually ascertaining which runway an aircraft is lined up for is not an exact science. Winds aloft; coupled vs hand flown approaches; nose to tail distance are just a few factors that can influence one's perception as to which runway is being lined up on. In normal ops; we normally have time to follow on tower frequency who's checking in; and what runway they are cleared for. Again; pressing to get a flight out to shave a minute for flow can compress the safety margins to where a tragedy could occur. Kudos to the person in the Tower that recognized the situation and took corrective action.

A321 Captain reported his takeoff clearance was cancelled by ATC because of conflicting traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 550; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was the Pilot Monitoring on this leg. At approximately FL270 on the Anchr4 arrival the pressurization page popped up on the systems display page with a cabin altitude warning in red; with the cabin altitude between 9700 to 9800 feet and climbing rapidly. We turned off the manual pressure mode selector for 10 seconds in order to switch auto mode controllers; the other auto controller was still not controlling the cabin sufficiently. We resorted to controlling the cabin pressure with the manual toggle switch to control the outflow valve. This was demanding and very distracting in trying to maintain an adequate rate of descent and cabin altitude during the descent. This was the major contributing factor in us crossing the LANDR fix on the arrival 800-1000 feet high.

In cruise flight at FL270 approximately 150 mi east of Denver our cabin altitude began climbing. At approx. 8900 ft cabin altitude we forced a transfer of the auto controller to system 2 by selecting manual for 10 sec. then returning to auto control. Cabin continued to climb with system 2 controlling. At approx. 9800 ft cabin altitude we re-selected manual control and closed the outflow valve; stopping the cabin climb before Cabin Pressure ECAM. In the process of stabilizing the cabin we were cleared to descend via the ANCHR 4 arrival. We set lowest constraint altitude of 11000 in the FCU (Flight Control Unit) alt. window. I was the pilot flying and noted the TD (Top of Descent) arrow on the ND (Navigation Display) was well ahead of us and intended to start down when we reached it. Before we reached the TD arrow the controller queried if we would make the restriction at LANDR. It wasn't until then I realized the TD arrow was inaccurate and we were high. I deployed full SB (Speed brakes) but crossed LANDR at approx. FL230 about 1000 ft above the top of the constraint window. The FMGC did not show an amber ring around LANDR nor an amber asterisk on the FLT PLN page or any other indication of being high. Actual winds were about 300/50 (headwind). I should've been more diligent about checking 3:1 math approaching LANDR; I know better. I realize I was distracted by the cabin altitude malfunction and should've payed closer attention to PF (Pilot Flying) duties.

A319 Flight Crew reported a pressurization controller malfunction at FL270. While maintaining cabin pressure manually; an arrival fix was crossed above the published altitude.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

On approach to OKC; Tower asked us to switch to Runway 17R for helicopter traffic over the interstate. We complied and were established by 1;000 feet. We saw one helicopter we avoided. Then we got an RA to descend at around 700 feet AGL. We complied. I flew the RA guidance after a momentary hesitation to descend below GS. We never saw the aircraft. The Captain saw the traffic on our TCAS [and] it showed 0 feet separation on top of us. The event was in Tower's airspace. They did not point out the traffic to us. We also did not hear them give any advisories to the helicopters. The level of safety they provided was unacceptable.Tower should have kept the helicopters away from our final approach course and advised us more exactly of their location.

ERJ-170 First Officer reported an NMAC with a helicopter on final approach to OKC that featured an RA command to descend below the glideslope at 700 feet AGL.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 13250; Flight Crew Type 7100

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Following Captain and First Officer's last break; turnover was accomplished and aircraft autopilot was on in LNAV/VNAV modes. Approximately 20 minutes after crew changeover; as aircraft was approximately 80 NM miles north of TZH; Captain noticed that the aircraft had reverted to Heading Select mode. Aircraft was still on the magenta track line and LNAV was reengaged. Captain took control of aircraft while First Officer briefed approach and landing. First Officer finished his approach briefing and control of aircraft was turned over to First Officer.  We had been given a descent to 11;600 meters and we were assigned the STAR KM 7B vice the KM 7A which Control had told us to expect.  Approx 3 NM prior to TZH; Captain again determined that the aircraft had reverted to Heading Select Mode. Aircraft was still on the magenta track line and LNAV was reengaged.  Aircraft began turn to KM as programmed; but rate of turn was somewhat slow. First Officer reengaged Heading Select mode and increased AOB to 25 degrees.  ATC instructed us to fly heading 070 and then subsequently told us to fly direct to KM.  Approach and landing were normal without any further instance of aircraft reverting to Heading Select mode without command.  Following landing; crew discussed possible causes. I had been watching all FMA changes while I was backing up correct meters to feet calculations and did not see anyone engage Heading Select.  We wrote a FRM report on a possible faulty Heading Select Switch and briefed Maintenance personnel in ZBAA of the possible issue.

I was the pilot flying First Officer on this flight to ZBAA. The Captain and I were both back from our last break and had received a complete crew change briefing. Both the Captain and I had verified the briefed information and aircraft status to include altitude clearance and settings using meters conversion and the FMA modes engaged of LNAV and VNAV. The autopilot was on and speed was 280 knots. Roughly 80 NM north of TZH on B458; the Captain noticed the aircraft was now in heading select mode. Neither I nor the Captain had selected this mode. LNAV was reselected. The approach briefing was completed and all FMC and mode control panel settings verified. At approximately 3 NM prior to TZH with the ensuing point KM requiring a turn to the east; we noticed the airplane was again in heading select instead of LNAV. I did not see a lead turn magenta line painted on the nav display and immediately initiated a turn to the east toward KM. As we were completing that turn we were given a heading of 070 degrees and then a direct KM clearance. We continued a normal descent to a right downwind east of the airport and landed on Runway 01. All four pilots discussed the issue after the flight. None recall any evidence of inadvertent pushing of the heading select knob button. We all agreed it is a common practice to slew the heading bug to current heading. It was speculated that the heading select switch may have malfunctioned due to wear or improper adjustment or loosening and commanded heading select mode change (push function) instead of the pilot input heading slew (rotate function). It is also possible that programming error in the FMC may have been a factor (i.e. flyover vs. lead turn or active waypoint issue causing heading select reversion; etc.). We wrote up the switch and discussed the issue with ZBAA Maintenance to facilitate troubleshooting.

During the last portion of a flight to ZBAA B777 flight crew notices that the aircraft has come out of LNAV and is in heading select although still on the magenta line. LNAV is reengaged but 80 NM later it is noted in heading select again and again LNAV is reselected and seems to operate normally for the remainder of the descent and approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198.45; Flight Crew Total 13042.08; Flight Crew Type 2746.85

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure

We encountered moderate; approaching severe turbulence at 39;000 feet. There was was a SIGMET for the area to our south for turbulence 32;000 feet to 40;000 feet; I requested 30;000 feet and received clearance to 30;000 feet. We began a descent and the turbulence stopped completely at 38;500 feet. I slowed the descent and requested 36;000 feet. We had no response and continued a slow descent. PANZ then queried if we were still descending to 30;000 feet. I asked again for 36;000 feet and we were cleared to 36;000 feet. At 34;500 feet we began a climb to 36;000 feet. About that time ATC contacted us on VHF and clarified why we were descending so slowly. I responded that I made 2 requests for 36;000 feet and also tried on VHF. There is a VHF dead zone of about 180 miles between 2 remote transmitters and we were unable to make contact at the initial descent.

Air Carrier Captain reported an VHF radio dead zone.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167.5; Flight Crew Total 1752.8; Flight Crew Type 308.6

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was conducting a Multi-Engine Commercial End of Course Stage Check when we had a near mid-air collision with another aircraft that was on the ILS at the same time as us. The sequence of events began with me vectoring the student onto the ILS at 3;500 FT. I told her to proceed direct to the IAF at 3;500 FT so we could practice a hold entry. At this point we were south of final approach course. She proceeded direct to the IAF and entered the hold. From there we attempted to intercept the glideslope and follow it down. We were approximately 3/4 scale VDI deflection low (above the glideslope) and about 1/4 scale CDI deflected left at this point. I was monitoring CTAF and heard two airplanes: one who was also on the ILS and another in closed traffic for Runway [opposite direction]. I immediately began looking for both of them. I might have made one radio call outside the FAF; unfortunately I don't recall where. A few minutes later; we were about 1 NM past the FAF and still slightly above glideslope when we received a radio call from the other aircraft on the ILS what our intentions were (his exact words were; 'Twin prop at ZZZ; what's your plan'). I said that we were going to do the ILS to a missed approach. At the time I believed that the aircraft talking to me was the aircraft in closed traffic. I still had not seen the other aircraft on the ILS yet. He then informed me that we had overtaken him on the ILS. His exact words were 'You basically dropped in on top of us on the ILS.' In his later phone conversation with a Chief Instructor; the other pilot estimated that we had passed approximately 200 FT above him on the ILS; a distance estimate I was made aware of during a conversation with that same Chief Instructor. After hearing the call over the radio; I decided to not descend below pattern altitude on the ILS (I wanted to avoid further danger from the aircraft in closed traffic for the opposite direction runway) and informed the student to make her DA 1;000 MSL and start the missed approach then. She complied and we flew back. I could've avoided this situation by being much more proactive on the radio than I was. This situation could've easily been avoided by better use of radios on CTAF to coordinate spacing on the approach and better situational awareness between the two pilots.

PA44 instructor pilot is informed by a C172 pilot that a NMAC occurred while both aircraft were practicing an ILS with the PA44 overtaking from above. The reporter never saw the other aircraft and states that his CTAF communications may have been lacking.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

I performed a Defueling Task on an EMB-120 aircraft in preparation for C-Check. I used the equipment provided by the company to defuel the aircraft; not knowing that it was not the proper equipment stated in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). After the work was performed; I signed off the right and left wing Defueling Card blocks saying I performed it in accordance to the AMM. It was the FAA that found out about the problem due to a call from some who said we weren't performing the proper procedure and using the proper equipment when defueling aircraft. The reason to why this equipment was used instead of the one required in the AMM Manual; was because that's the way I was trained to do it and everyone who performed the task before me have done it many times and [that] became the 'new way of doing it.' Being the first time performing the task; the [defueling] equipment was set up and ready to go. And the Crew Leader fearing that the next shift was going to be upset for not defueling the aircraft when they got there; asked me to do it. In a way I would say there was pressure on me to complete it as fast as I could. So I jumped on the task right away without wasting time. It is my fault for not following the AMM at the time. If I would have just stopped for a moment and pulled the [Manual] out this incident would have been addressed and fixed properly. An FAA Inspector came to the Base [two months later]; to talk to me about the issue. I was not notified about the violation by anyone; only by the FAA Inspector.  I would suggest for the Leader of the crew; not to rush the mechanics on performing a task and expecting an unrealistic time for it to be done. It seems to me; and it happened before; when I'm about to perform a job and; the leaders want you to start on it right away; and they seem to get upset when your in a computer pulling out references for the job. It happens a lot so; I think it should stop. The required equipment should be in the facility for tasks that are performed often.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed by an FAA Inspector that he did not use the proper equipment when he had defueled an EMB-120 aircraft. Technician noted that he; and others before him and after him; had been trained to use the same equipment.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Full tanks for flight to LAX. Projected landing 6.6. Due to rides planned cruise altitude not acceptable so we used FL300. Later in flight that was unacceptable and FL280 the only reasonable ride. Planned landing fuel in FMC 5.7 at that time. Not great; but not bad. When fuel in center tanks burned out our FMC planned landing fuel dropped significantly - now 4.9. ATC sends us lower and drops speed to 250 KIAS fuel burn suffers. LAX turns around airport landing to the East now and fuel burn suffers. Long story short we find ourselves on final with 3600 lbs of fuel and not happy about it since FMC guidance led us to be mostly happy with our progress for 5 hours of a 6 hour flight. Real exciting in the last hour! Hugely unsafe? No; but not optimal by any means. Nothing heard from Dispatch about our burn progress throughout entire flight despite Dispatch asking me to call prior to flight about full tanks and lower than optimal fuel for landing. I'd have probably stopped in PHX or LAS if we'd had a discussion about it. That's not a good thing I'm the Captain and I'd not have it any other way; but it's nice to feel like Dispatch has your back and we do NOT feel that way today due to multiple reasons (mostly high Dispatch turnover) as discussed in recent School class sponsored by company. This is the lowest fuel I have ever blocked in with. I don't know what the Review Committee feels about that quantity of fuel on a stormy night in LA with heavy rains and the airport configured to non-standard; but I'd love to hear from someone about it. After all; the only Captain I generally fly with is me.

B737 Captain reports landing in LAX with 3600 pounds of fuel due to a variety of factors; after expecting to land with 6600 pounds.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Maintenance

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

My partner and I are [company] employees who finished securing Aircraft X on Gate XX. We were about to call for deadhead when my partner noticed that the wing of Aircraft Y; being pushed out by [company] from Gate XY; was coming very close to our aircraft's tail and Number 1 side rear stabilizer. I got out of our Supertug to signal an 'X' with my arms (to stop the aircraft); but the pushback driver did not stop. Only after my partner called Ramp to tell the pilots to stop the pushback process did the mechanics stop the push. The pushback driver stopped the push for a brief period of time before continuing and finishing the push. There were also no wing-walkers utilized during the pushback of Aircraft Y by [company].

Ground Crew reported company mechanics pushing back an aircraft without wing-walkers that came close to touching the reporter's aircraft.


Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Prior to departure we thoroughly briefed the SID. However; upon departure we leveled for a crossing restriction and failed to initiate the prescribed climb after meeting the crossing. Our lateral navigation was complied with however; which consisted of a vector after the crossing restriction. Conditions were 'clear and a million' so we were able to see the approaching terrain; prompting us to realize our mistake. We began an immediate climb to comply with the SID. Shortly thereafter; ATC advised us to begin a climbing turn away from the terrain; also issuing a terrain alert. At no time was the terrain an imminent threat but even still this event served as a great reminder to diligently brief and follow published procedures; something I always strive for and have a renewed vigor towards.

Hawker 125 First Officer reported ATC issued a terrain alert when they failed to climb as charted on departure from VNY.


I have been trying to find out what the correct procedures are at MKK Airport; and if we consider them a NON-RADAR airport; or apply opposite direction procedures that we are all unclear about. I have been persistently hounding the facility to tell me how to handle MKK Airport operations. Finally; one Supervisor said that he; personally; would just 'Hold For Release (HFR); and send one in; one out; to ensure safety. I asked other than personal techniques; what everyone can do by the rules to ensure safety. I could tell the Supervisor really didn't know; and felt bad that the facility put him in that position. Later; I was providing OJT and had an ATR 72 on a VOR-A Approach; this is a circling approach and about 10 percent of the aircraft will circle to the opposite direction runway. I heard the D-Side trainee get a call from MKK and heard him/her say 'After ATR 72 lands; release Caravan 208A.' I then heard further discussion by the instructor; and some back and forth with MKK Tower. Finally; the trainer said; just call the Supervisor. MKK Tower was trying to get us to approve 'Subject Your Discretion (SYD) because the inbound decided to do an opposite direction circling approach and it would mean that the departure may have to wait and extra minute or two. If I had not been talking about this issue to people around me while I'm working; they would have just approved SYD. It's not that I think SYD is not safe; but I do not believe that MKK Tower knows the correct application of SYD and the facility has just found some Notice that no one knows about; that indicates SYD is not to be used there. Apparently MKK Tower and their controllers do not know of this Notice either. The Supervisor was informed and when he tried to call them to discuss it; MKK hung up on him.

HCF Controller voiced concern regarding the facilities 'unclear' method of handling traffic operating at MKK Airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On nearly every one of my recent flights with Dangerous Goods; the other pilots have gone to throw away the 'Planned Dangerous Goods' paperwork once the 'Final Dangerous Goods Summary' has been received. These two ACARS messages are two parts of one form; however; with all of the information on both the planned and final messages required by 49 CFR 175.33 and ICAO. The final form does not replace the planned form; both forms must be retained by the crew and should be used to provide information to ATC and first responders in the event of an accident or incident.

Air Carrier First Officer reported flight crew members often discard Hazmat documents that are required to be kept until flight completion per CFR.175.33 and ICAO regulations.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Staffing; Weather; Human Factors

Prior to reaching top of climb; while reviewing my flights in the air; I realized that I had missed an alternate on this flight. The TAF had changed after dispatch; but prior to departure. I advised the crew via ACARS; and ran numbers with the current projected fuel at his next fix (CA stated 6000 lbs; FL290). I was unable to add ZZZ as an alternate until I ran numbers with the actual payload of 9300 lbs (rounded up 200 lbs for any margin of error) I sent ZZZ weather via ACARS and amended the flight prior to top of climb.The reason this was missed by me was that I was becoming increasingly ill with a stomach virus since the late evening hours. I was actually feeling very nauseous and was trying my best to complete my shift. I have heard that we receive a negative attendance hit for leaving early due to 'failure to complete shift;' and I did not want to risk receiving this.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported missing an alternate airport requirement; attributing the error to being ill and not wanting to leave due to a company 'negative attendance' policy.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft

With a light load (XX passengers); Tower cleared for an expedited takeoff Runway XXL; Runway heading. Takeoff without incident; with a high climb rate due to weight. Configured and continued climb hand flying. Reaching 3;200 feet; at 200 knots; climb rate was 4;000 FPM+; leveled a bit to slow climb and increase speed to 250 knots.  Captain was completing after takeoff checklist; and made 1;000 foot call. Reached 250 knots at 4;200 feet; and proceeded to slow and increase climb simultaneously; while ATC was giving further clearance. In my mind I expected a further climb; but we only received direct ZZZZZ. Realizing we were not getting cleared higher; and at 4;600 feet with an increasing climb rate currently at 3;500 FPM; I immediately began correcting with pitch and power. Captain said watch your altitude; and I advised correcting. ATC advised maintain 5;000 feet; Captain responded correcting. The stable correction required a top altitude of 5;300 feet. ATC advised no problem; and that there was overhead traffic. There was no disruption to traffic or flight due to this 300 feet deviation. The rest of the flight was conducted without incident.I believe I slowed my deceleration in order to level at 5;000 feet when I heard ATC begin giving further clearance because I just expected higher to be given also. Obviously each clearance is specific; regardless of expectations; so pitch and power accordingly; and a correction won't be necessary. It didn't help that the climb rate was very high due to light load; adding hand flying to it just increased the workload. At light loads; in the busy ZZZ environment; probably best to utilize the automation a bit more to lighten the workload.

During initial climb via the ZZZZZ departure as I was completing the after takeoff checklist I noticed we were at a very high rate of climb as we were approaching our top altitude (maybe 4;800 feet) and reminded name (FO) of our 5;000 assigned altitude he immediately started correcting. As a result of the rate of climb we climbed through 5;000 feet to 5;300 feet and then back down to 5;000 feet. This happened during a busy time I was running checklist and communicating with ATC while the FO was hand flying. I feel that I could have paused the checklist from the 1;000 feet horn and call until our altitude was captured to make sure we wouldn't climb through.

Air carrier flight crew reported an overshoot of altitude on departure and made reference to the aircraft being light in weight.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight plan release indicated that the IFE System was on MEL 23-10 inop. Called Maintenance as the IFE Contractor had put an entry in the logbook as accomplished work card 23-32-00 (ops check system normal). RJAA Maintenance arrived at the gate and I asked him if he could remove the system placard. He called the IFE Technician to the plane who then told me that the system worked but needed further troubleshooting. Logbook items 12; 13; 14 & 16 all addressed parts of the IFE system. Local Maintenance did not clear the IFE placard. Per the MEL 23-10 and NEF 23-33b; I instructed the Purser not to use the IFE system for any of the required passenger safety briefings; or other pre-recorded announcements. After departure; I was made aware that the IFE system was used for the passenger safety demo. Apparently; the Purser decided to use the system after being instructed by me (Captain) not to use this equipment.  AFTER GATE ARRIVAL THE PURSER CAME TO COCKPIT; I DISCUSSED WITH HER THE VIOLATION OF POLICY AND POSSIBLE FAR'S REGARDING USE OF AN AIRCRAFT SYSTEM THAT WAS ON MEL PLACARD; AND THAT THE FINAL AUTHORITY FOR OPERATION OF COMPANY EQUIPMENT RESTS WITH THE CAPTAIN DESIGNATED ON THE FLIGHT RELEASE.  SHE TOLD ME THAT THE MECHANICS; AS THEY LEFT THE AIRCRAFT IN TOKYO; TOLD HER THE SYSTEM WAS FULLY FUNCTIONAL AND TO USE IT.  I POINTED OUT THAT THE CAPTAIN HAS THE LAST SAY REGARDING USE OF EQUIPMENT ON COMPANY AIRCRAFT AND THAT SHE SHOULD HAVE COORDINATED WHAT SHE BELIEVED PROPER USE WITH THE CAPTAIN AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD HER SPECIFICALLY NOT TO USE THE PRE-RECORDED PORTION OF THE IFE SYSTEM AS IT WAS PLACARDED INOP.

Captain reviewed the logbook items and spoke to both the Narita Mechanic and two tech reps about the issue. [Captain] then declared that the IFE system would not be used by crew. In the course of the flight; it was discovered that the cabin crew made an attempt to utilize the IFE system which proved unsuccessful. Considering the consequences of an MD-11 accident and other experiences with IFE malfunctions and fires; adherence to Captain's directive needs to trump cabin crew intuition. Additionally; MEL/CDL/NEF guidance concerning placarding is vague and needs to be reduced to plain language with the mutual consent of the company and the FAA. This is the second time I've witnessed a problem involving crews and Maintenance personnel not understanding placarding procedures. This entire situation might've been averted if placarding guidance had clearly stated that an INOP sticker needed to be placed on the ON/OFF switch at the IFE control console.Remind cabin crew of Captain's authority. Simplify guidance for installing INOP stickers for MEL/CDU/NEF items; particularly those in the cabin.

B777 Captain is informed after the fact that the Purser attempted to use the IFE system for passenger briefing after being advised that it was inoperative on MEL and not to be used.


Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; MEL

There had been a ground stop for passing storms to the east; which were now 1/3 of the way between ZZZ and ZZZ1. The Captain gave a briefing and asked the Flight Attendants to remain seated the entire flight due to the cells we'd be flying around and the potential for turbulence. He also made this part of his welcome aboard announcement.We took off and were given a 090 heading; transitioning north of the group of cells. This group of cells gave us a small option north toward ZZZ2 VOR and a small option south between cells. Neither path had a significant advantage over the other.Once we were abeam the northern track; ATC gave us a hole they depicted on their radar to our 1 o'clock position. We opted to continue straight; but ATC said straight looked worse to them. We conversed back and forth with them and the hole appeared to our right and clear skies on the back side. We maneuvered right; then left to make a perpendicular path through the hole. The bottom of the hole was higher than our altitude and we were given a climb from 17;000 to FL210. We tried to establish this climb at 250 kts. to stay slow for possible turbulence. This was made difficult by the fact we had an MEL for the speed bug. The speed bug jumped from the upper 200s into the lower 300s; back and forth throughout the flight. It was distracting and was the first time either of us had experienced this particular anomaly in nearly four years. Just prior to penetration; we could see heavy lightning coming from the cells immediately left of our path; extending toward the area we were originally going toward.As we climbed to FL210; we penetrated the lower portion of the hole and into IMC. Throughout the encounter; we had moderate turbulence and heavy to extreme rain. Our ice detection caution message activated; as well.We estimate the pass took 30 to 45 seconds to transition. I tried to transmit to ATC not to send anyone behind us; but never received a response.Once in clear air; I tried ATC again and they said they'd been trying to reach us to say the hole had closed up on their scope. We never their transmission either.In discussion after passing into clear air; neither of us felt we'd encountered hail. The sound of the rain striking the window and body of the aircraft were consistent with heavy to extreme rain.I checked on the Flight Attendants to make sure they were ok and to make sure the passengers were ok; and everyone was. We landed without incident and discovered damage during the walk around.The first area I noticed was the radome. There were extensive areas where the paint had been removed and the composite material underneath was exposed. There were three areas where horizontal slices in the composite material were visible. There was at least one area where a circular area was compromised. Most of the damaged paint and material were on the upper half of the radome. There was one hole that was previously covered during the preflight inspection that was now exposed due to speed tape coming off the aircraft. We conducted numerous; slow and methodical visual inspections of the exterior of the aircraft over the course of the next two hours. The only other damage was an unidentified antenna on the top of the aircraft. It was located aft of the VHF 1 antenna and forward of the upper beacon. POH and PRM (Pilot's Reference Manual) searches failed to produce an identity to this antenna; and might possibly be a wifi antenna installed after manufacturer documents were printed.The Captain notified [Maintenance Control]; the Chief Pilots; and Dispatch and briefed them on the incident and the status of the aircraft. Our Contract Maintenance arrived about an hour later and began making an evaluation of the damage. Our return flight was eventually cancelled and we rode the brakes for Ground Personnel while they repositioned the aircraft. We left the aircraft with Maintenance and proceeded to the hotel. After the flight; the Captain and I debriefed our flight and the incident. The flight attendants and the passengers were secured at the time due to crew briefings and the announcement that the seat belt sign would stay on and the flight attendants would remain seated throughout the flight. As previously noted; we had north and south options that were basically equal. Since our radar conflicted somewhat with ATC; we applied their observations into our decision making process in accordance with good CRM procedures. We had convection on our left and right sides and clear blue skies ahead. Our ability to climb over the IMC we entered could have been better facilitated if we began our climb sooner; however there was a small layer that obstructed our view and we were too close to the hole when the height of that IMC was determined. Again; this was further complicated by not having our heading bug to help with pitch reference and avoid a lower than desired speed or increasing over the turbulence penetration speed.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported numerous diversions and deviations while navigating through severe weather; exacerbated by an MELed speed bug resulting in hail damage when finally reaching destination airport.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During taxi-in there was some degree of confusion as to what gate we were assigned to. It began with Tower; as they contradicted their own taxi instructions on Taxiway Papa after turning off Runway 4R. After being cleared to cross Runway 4L and contacting Ground; Ground contradicted us as to which gate they showed us parking at. We assured them we had a gate assignment from operations. We took taxi instruction from Ground and contacted Operations. The First Officer spoke to Operations while I taxied the aircraft. The follow minutes were so confusing I cannot pass on a completely accurate description after the fact. The basic gist of it is that we were repeatedly issued contradictory taxi instructions because Operations and Ground could not agree on what gate we were being sent to (We would tell Ground what Operations had said; and they would contradict us). We were essentially taxiing in circles for approximately ten to fifteen minutes up and down the stretch of Taxiways A and B on the east side of the airport just west of Runway 4L. At one point; I did miss a turn to rejoin A and continued on B momentarily; but Ground noticed my mistake and issued an amended taxi clearance without further interest or inquiry. Finally; at one point; Ground told us to stop and contact Ramp to correct the situation and we would be given instructions to taxi afterwards. At this point I keyed up on Comm 2 to speak to Operations and told them we were Aircraft X. They proceeded to ARGUE WITH ME about which flight number and tail number airplane I was operating. I became somewhat annoyed; keyed up; and repeated that we were definitely in Aircraft X; were the continuation of the flight that had diverted to ZZZ the day prior; and they need to figure out where to park Aircraft X immediately; regardless of whoever they thought we were.We then contacted Ground and began taxiing to terminal A; as we believed that was the correct destination. Upon reaching the ramp area once again; Operations began attempting to confuse the issue yet again; so we informed Ground that we needed a minute. We were then instructed to taxi across the ramp from RB to RC and hold short of Taxiway A; and did so. Upon reaching; we finally got in touch with Operations; and they admitted that they had confused us with the flight number that had been assigned to [Aircraft] when it flew from ZZZ1 to ZZZ to initiate the recovery operation. Because at some point local EWR Operations had become confused about which flight and tail we were; contradictory information had been sent to ATC; the [Company] application; and local Operations at EWR; resulting in a series of extremely confusing and contradictory taxi instructions. Once this was all clarified; Operations instructed us to taxi to [gate]. Prior to requesting our new taxi instructions; I keyed the mike and spoke to Ground; and apologized for our Operations department and the resulting confusion they had caused. I then received taxi instructions from Ground to [gate]; taxied to that parking location; and parked and shutdown the aircraft. The flight concluded without further incident.Later the following day; this came up in casual conversation in the EWR crew room with several other pilots and Chief Pilot. Apparently; such gate assignment and resulting taxi confusion is not only not an isolated event but is considered somewhat common among EWR based pilots. I strongly recommend that an audit of whatever operational process governs this is conducted and this situation remedied. In the event of a low visibility; high workload; or other potentially distracting situation; such additional complication could prove potentially disastrous. While all taxiways encountered in my event were west of the active runways; the potential to turn left at the wrong place and have a runway incursion exists; as well as potentially a loss of separation with other aircraft crossing or exiting Runway 4L/22R. Additional training of Ops personnel may be required. I would also note that this sort of event is confusing; tiring; demoralizing; and embarrassing for flight crews as well as potentially for the company as a whole.

ERJ Captain reported that ATC confused them with a different aircraft and caused them to taxi around in circles.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

While de-icing at the gate F/A (Flight Attendant) C and B sitting in their aft jumpseats. Received an excessive amount of fumes which forced them to cover their faces and forced C FA into the Lav where she began to dry heave. It wasn't until after the first service in the main cabin did both F/A's start feeling symptoms. Captain was contacted and Medlink was notified. A doctor on board was requested. I asked that C FA sit in a different jumpseat so as to be closer to the doctor seating in FC and for the paramedics to meet her as soon as the door opened.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported experiencing physiological symptoms which started shortly after the aircraft was deiced.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

Taxiing out for Cokem 7 RNAV departure Runway 26L in ATL.  First officer's leg.  On first contact with Ground Control informed of runway change to  8R.  We assumed the change was due to rapidly developing thunderstorms that we could see off the departure end of rwy 26L.  Plenty of time to get everything set up for new departure runway.  We were the third airplane to depart from 8R.  Climbing out weather radar depicted a  well  defined large cell (with a nice patch of red in the center) over the first RNAV fix 'RONII'.  I asked the Tower for a deviation left to avoid weather and he responded that he couldn't authorize that and we would have to wait until switched to Departure Control at 2 miles.  First Officer started a left deviation as we were rapidly approaching what the radar showed as a dangerous storm.  That put us on a parallel course to the RNAV course.  When we switched to Departure Control I asked for a left deviation for weather.  He replied 'unable due to departing traffic'.  I responded that we were deviating left.  He then said that they had stopped departures and gave us a left turn heading of 360 degrees which took us well away from the thunderstorm although we did catch the edge of it in the turn.I was very surprised that Departure would not give us an immediate turn as the RNAV route would have taken us into the middle of what our radar depicted as a strong thunderstorm.  I fully back up the First Officer's turn with my emergency authority for the safety of the airplane. I did not take our deviation lightly but that it was  necessary to avoid a dangerous storm. The event was the result of weather and the lack of timely clearance to avoid it.

Despite the increased workload and threat that this presented; we had ample time to preform all associated duties and I don't believe this was a contributing factor. As we taxied to 8R we could see a developing thunderstorm developing off the departure end of our original Runway (26L). We were the third aircraft to depart in the new direction and as far as I could tell; the first to depart via the COKEM 7 RNAV DEP with a RONII BEDRK routing. As we lined up with the runway I looked in the sky ahead and at the Captain's radar display. While I could see weather to the east; it looked to me that we would be turning north well before we encountered it. I didn't see any weather of concern on the radar. After rotation; I called for gear up and established the proper pitch attitude then looked ahead at the weather and again at the Captain's radar display. By then; the situation had dramatically changed; there was a large developing cell centered over our first fix of RONII. The cell was painting sharp; well defined edges going quickly from green to amber to a sizable portion of red surrounding RONII and extending four to five miles from it. At about 500 feet AGL I told the Captain that I would need an early turn to the north and he then informed Tower. Tower replied that he'd be handing us to departure in another two miles. This comment and the fact that we couldn't imaging a Controller vectoring us through the cell ahead left both of us with the impression that a turn would be approved. Once we were given the hand off I started a slow turn to the north while the captain said; 'We'd like an early turn due to weather.' Departure replied; 'Unable due to traffic.' This initiated some conversation between the Captain and the Controller about the urgency of our need to avoid the cell. On my part; 23 years of experience; 11 of which based in the Midwest and Florida; was telling me not to fly into that storm. I turned back to the East but did not completely join the RNAV track but instead paralleled it. Shortly there after Departure approved a turn to the north which allowed me to avoid the worst of the cell. Sometime during this conversation another air carrier flight radioed to tell Tower that; 'Departures to the East aren't going to work either.' Departure called us and said asked if we'd started a turn prior to the handoff to departure. The Captain replied; yes that we had told Tower that we needed to turn. My memory is that I waited until the hand off; fully expecting Departure to approve a weather deviation. Causes leading to this event were: a dynamic and rapidly changing weather environment. Perhaps; confusion on the part of ATC of the urgency of our need to deviate. I don't know why the cell was not painted on the radar while we were on the runway. Had it been; I never would have taken off.

An Air Carrier departed ATL on the COKEM 7 RNAV and immediately detected a large cell over RONII. ALT Tower would not approve a deviation; so upon contact with the TRACON; the First Officer turned even though it was not approved using the Captain's emergency authority.


Dispatcher came in for scheduled shift to a desk that is normally a turnover desk for the midnight dispatcher. The dispatcher who worked the overnight shift was sent home 1 hour early due to rest requirements so they could work their assigned shift on the same day starting at XA45. A relief dispatcher was watching over the desk but was never given a proper pass-down - they were just informed by the overnight dispatcher that 'everything looked good'.Once the assigned dispatcher signed into the dispatch monitor; they noticed an abnormally high number for flights allocated for the desk for that day. The dispatcher realized that he had numerous flights in the air; as well as; some waiting for deicing procedures in hubs and outstation locations. Sabre Plot was updated with estimated off time information for these flight that were in the air or on the taxiways. Dispatcher allocation for flights on that specific desk showed unrealistic number of flights. Total amount of flights allocated for this desk was 83. 24 flights were in the air at the time the scheduled dispatcher was signing into the computer system.Operational control was reestablished / maintained once dispatcher was fully signed in to the computer systems and briefed on the day's weather events. Flights waiting for fuel load changes were done after dispatcher familiarization was complete. Daily flight allocation should be completed by someone who has worked the overnight shift before; and not just once in their time while working at this company. Workload on 80 plus flights is extremely tough to manage. Positive operational control should have been maintained / not compromised by not sending the overnight dispatcher home early to be legal for next scheduled shift.

Dispatcher reports being assigned a desk that is being 'watched over' by another Dispatcher that has not received a proper turnover; due to the originally assigned Dispatcher being sent home early to be legal for his next shift. Upon signing in it is noticed that the desk is monitoring over 80 flights; both in the air and on the ground. Operational control was reestablished.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

We had an extensive delay departing due to a deferral that requires the aircraft to be overwing fueled. In addition; due to a fuel distribution issue; operations and the on-call chief pilot were contacted for further assistance. Also a takeoff alternate had to be added to the release due to the low visibility. Once resolved we departed an hour and a half late. After reaching 10;000 feet the flight attendant called the flight deck and informed me that there was a passenger who noticed a 'contrail' coming from the left wing. I checked the fuel and it was well balanced and we were showing the planned fuel amount for that point of the flight. I then called the FA back and asked her to take a look at the left wing and report to me what she saw. She called back and confirmed that there seemed to be fuel coming from the top of the left wing. Nearing cruise altitude I made arrangements with the FO and FA to exit the flight deck and inspect the left wing as I could not see from my seat anything unusual; partially because of the position of the sun. Upon reaching the exit row I observed out a passenger window an unsecure fuel cap with fuel 'venting' out of the over-wing filler port.Upon returning to the flight deck I conferred with the FO and subsequently made the decision to divert to [a nearby airport]. We had just overflown that airport and noticed it was in the clear and the long runways would be ideal for accommodating an overweight landing. We advised ATC due to the nature of the issue but there was no immediate threat. The FO was the pilot flying and he made the visual descent and subsequent visual approach to a smooth landing as I communicated the event to our Dispatcher and set up the diversion. Upon landing we were met by airport fire and rescue trucks who followed us to the gate. A gentleman boarded the aircraft to make sure the crew and passengers were ok and advised us of a strong fuel odor that trailed us on taxi but was dissipating. Due to the overweight landing maintenance control decided to inspect the aircraft before returning it to service so a spare was flown in to accommodate the passengers. I then communicated with our Dispatcher and two chief pilots.The most prominent threat was the refuel SOV deferral. The possible error that stands out is that it is conceivable that the fuel cap was not secured properly before departure. The fuel leaking from the left wing tank was certainly an undesired aircraft state and could only be corrected by landing at the nearest suitable airport. Which we did.As a new Captain and having dealt with this unusual situation I will certainly make it a priority to personally inspect or have another flight or ground crewmember double check that the fuel caps are properly secured any time we are over-wing fueled. From a company standpoint I would try to keep aircraft with this deferral closer to base. It may not have prevented the diversion but the large amount of fuel and subsequent balancing/structural limit issues may be mitigated.

CRJ-200 reported diverting to a nearby airport when a passenger noticed fuel streaming from an improperly secured over wing fuel cap.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 155

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

The Captain and I were making a reposition flight. When I picked up our IFR clearance from Ground; one of the fixes in our route was BUZZI intersection. I however mistakenly put BUZZY intersection and was not aware of this till later.After we departed; I believe we were either in the last segment of our climb or had just leveled off at our final altitude when Center instructed us to fly to 'BUZZI'. So in our GPS we selected the fix that I had put in there and selected direct to. Center noticed we were not flying the direction we were supposed to be and that is when we figured out our mistake and took corrective action.

First Officer reported that they entered the incorrect spelling of a fix and started to fly to the incorrect way point and were challenged by ATC about being off course. Pilots then realized their mistake and corrected the course.