Testing; Repair; Installation; Work Cards; Inspection

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Issue: Serious potential risk of engine failure on the Cirrus SR22T post Continental Service Bulletin (CSB). Maintenance work by Cirrus certified Aircraft Repair Station X in ZZZZ. After a Cirrus Ballistic Recovery System (BRS) [parachute] incident in USA; Continental [Engines] issued CSB 15-7A to replace an Oil Cooler Cross fitting; since one had fractured in the USA incident resulting in a total engine failure. The replacement part from Continental was replaced by Aircraft Repair Station X in November 2015 at ZZZZ where the plane was in a Hangar. On a flight four days later from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1; I flew at F210 and flight time was 1-hour 10-minutes with most of the flight at night. Night landing. After landing I noticed a significant oil leak with oil on the underside of the aircraft and on the bottom six inches of the tail. Repair Station X Engineer visited the plane and found that the [Oil Cooler Cross fitting] replacement part was loose and leaking; this being the cause of the oil leak. On landing my oil level had gone from six to two. Repair Station X say the leak was just seepage and the oil was 5.5 when the engine was cold. This is not correct. The Continental Service Bulletin (CSB) says that the part cannot be retightened which is what they have done.Discussions with Cirrus Representative from Cirrus USA and Representative from Continental Engines have advised me that the failure was with Aircraft Repair Station X not installing the replacement part correctly and according to the CSB. They did not want to make any changes and after my demands to replace all the components they have now agreed to do so. Both Continental and Cirrus have confirmed that I was very likely to have had a total engine failure with a BRS [parachute] pull or emergency landing at night if flight had continued for longer. Overall this was a major failure post workshop; for a CSB that failed. Repair Station X denies any failures and do not want this episode reported. I am concerned that another Cirrus SR22T aircraft will have a failure and an emergency landing.

Reporter stated he has a Continental IO-550-K Engine in his Cirrus SR22T aircraft. His report was about the first incident where a new Inter Cooler; oil cooler Cross fitting was installed by certified Repair Station X. After his first flight following the cross fitting replacement; he noticed that a substantial amount of oil had leaked from the engine compartment that ran under the belly and tail. After that incident; Repair Station X did in fact retightened the original; improperly installed; failed new fitting that had loosened up causing the excessive oil leak. He believes the reinstallation and retightening of that same failed part was not an approved method. But Repair Station X insisted that the procedure was acceptable. Reporter stated that on another one hour flight following the retightening of the fitting; his Oil Quantity had again dropped from six to two quarts and the engine was quite hot. Oil was everywhere on the bottom of the fuselage and tail. After that second incident; he hired the services of another Aircraft Repair Station (Repair Station Y); that came out to his ZZZZ location and installed new parts with an old type sealant originally used by Continental. No further issues since then.  He was later informed by Repair Station Y that the torque applied to the Oil Cooler cross fitting mounting hardware by Repair Station X was not high enough and the Red sealant applied to the fitting per the Continental Service Bulletin (CSB) had not been allowed to cure for the required 72-hours before starting the engine. Repair Station X had started-up the engine right after retightening the fitting. Continental has since gone back to the old type sealant previously used on the cross fitting installation. Reporter stated that his primary concern was about the improper maintenance practices at Repair Station X during replacement of the Inter Cooler; oil cooler cross fitting that could have easily ended up with his having had an inflight engine failure in crosswinds where he would not have been able to deploy the Cirrus parachute. He believes the Repair Station should be investigated and does not want to see other Cirrus operators having the same experience.

Pilot of a Cirrus SR22T aircraft reports about the improper maintenance practices of a certified Aircraft Repair Station that contributed to an excessive oil loss from his Continental IO-550-K Engine. Repair Station had twice failed to follow procedures in Continental Service Bulletin (CSB) 15-7A for replacement of an Inter Cooler; oil cooler cross fitting.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4300; Flight Crew Type 125

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing

There was moderate turbulence all altitudes. I asked the prior controller to let me know when turbulence had lessened at higher altitudes so I could climb as I was at FL280. The next Controller cleared me to Flight Level 400. I confirmed the climb to 400. At about 36;600 feet I was asked by that Controller on frequency XYY.Z whether I wanted FL400 or FL360 or similar words. I remarked back that I was already cleared to FL400. He didn't respond. This Controller was very busy because everyone was asking for a different altitude. I confirmed the altitude assignment and before he even cleared me there he asked if I wanted that altitude. It was the only smooth altitude at that time.I think the best way to correct this is for the Government to get back to work and live with COVID. They were short staffed.

High Performance Aircraft Single pilot reported receiving confusing instructions from the Controller and believes COVID-19 ATC staffing issues were a factor.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

LHD strip is closed; so all the operators from LHD are arriving/departing ANC. ANCs configuration was landing Runway 15; Departing Runway 15 and Runway 25L. The winds were strong out of the southeast. I was conducting OJT on Local Control. Ground Control informed us that Aircraft X was extremely unfamiliar and to make it simple he taxied the aircraft for departure from Runway 7L at Taxiway Echo with an expectation to turn left into LHD's Class D and then continue northbound.Aircraft X called ready; my trainee cleared him for takeoff. The pilot didn't respond. My Trainee tells him to make a left downwind departure. He doesn't respond. My Trainee keeps working the other aircraft. He cleared a departure from Runway 25L. He cleared a Heavy jet for takeoff Runway 15. Aircraft X asked about his left downwind; and says he's 'ready to go 7.' My Trainee clears him for takeoff with a more specific instructions to make a left turn into LHD's airspace. As he spooled up to takeoff; it looked like he was going to takeoff Runway 25R. I glance at my Trainee and see that he is looking away. I saw the heavy jet beginning to rotate just past midfield so there's no stopping him. I glanced back to Aircraft X and my suspicions were confirmed. I took the frequency and tried everything possible to tell Aircraft X to stop. He never responds to any of my transmissions and; being a small aircraft; is airborne within less than 100 feet from the intersection flying directly into the flight path of the Heavy jet departure we haven't told him about. I keep reiterating 'turn left turn left turn left' because at no time does his aircraft seem to be taking that instruction; and I think it is the absolute most basic way to attempt some sort of separation. He was issued the brasher statement.

ANC Tower Controller observed an aircraft departing the opposite direction runway it was supposed to depart from.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 800

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

[We were] cleared FMS Bridge Visual into San Francisco; Runway 28R. Approximately 7;000 FT began experiencing significant wake turbulence such that I disconnected autopilot and offset right of course and began slowing to achieve greater separation from preceding aircraft. To complicate matters we were assigned 250 KTS which is problematic and has a tendency to lead to an unstable approach. So rather than being high and fast I offset and reduced airspeed and tried to drop down to get out of the wake. Unfortunately I went below the 6;000 FT altitude restriction. We advised ATC that we were experiencing wake turbulence and that we were slowing and offsetting. The Controller sounded very skeptical stating that the other aircraft was an Airbus 319. We reiterated and he assigned us the offset and 180 KTS to the marker.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

B737 flight crew experienced wake turbulence on arrival to SFO following an A319. They took evasive action and missed a crossing restriction as a result.


Installation; Repair; Testing; Inspection

Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Repairman

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Software and Automation; Procedure; Manuals; Chart Or Publication

On Aircraft X [a Boeing 737-900ER] I installed two serviceable Flight Control Computers (FCCs) and performed the Line Replacement Unit (LRU) replacement test in [the] Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) bite in accordance with the manual. While finding the correct software for the FCCs the mechanics ran a test on the elevator tab control.  The test failed step 5 resulting in the trim tabs split when pushing the control forward or aft instead of them going the same direction like the test calls out for. All breakers were in and no flight deck effect showed. I found out that the preloaded software was 737 MAX. As soon as I installed the correct software the tabs worked correctly in accordance with the test. My concern is that if someone misses loading the software like the manual tells them to do that there might be a safety of flight issue that could result in loss of life. I know its not supposed to happen because the manual tells you to check it but in a high pressure situation or with low experience it could and I don't want to see something like that happen.

Maintenance technician conducting a line replacement test after installing two Flight Control Computers on a Boeing 737-900 discovered that the installed software was for the B-737 MAX.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While taxiing from the ramp to Runway 34L; I accidentally passed Taxiway A13; the turn off to the runway. Taxiway A turns into Taxiway G1; but it's still a straight taxiway. We'd already switched and talked to Tower at that time. We realized what had happened about the same time Tower called us. He said we were on G1; that it may not be strong enough for our weight and that we would need to do a 180. The First Officer asked if that could be accomplished on the General Aviation ramp; which he said we could. During the turn toward the General Aviation ramp; our left main gear departed the taxiway briefly; but at the time; we didn't know. After turning around on that ramp; we continued up Taxiway G2 to the regular taxiway; and followed instructions to Taxiway A13. We were cleared for takeoff; but due to a fuel system alert; and probably better decision making; by then; we taxied back to the gate; where maintenance personnel inspected the gear; and worked through the alert. Unfortunately; this was human error. I was looking straight down the taxiway; which continues past the turnoff to the runway. It's pretty dark on that taxiway; and the only sign for Taxiway A13 is on the left; which is opposite the turn direction; and is one of 3 small signs all together; and I accidentally missed it. My first thought; once we realized where we were was to stop and get towed; but it was about then that the controller spoke to us and said we needed to do the 180. To prevent another event like this; I would suggest a couple things. First; for me personally; is to obviously pay even closer attention; both to the chart and taxiways. That sign for the A13 turnoff is there; although it's not very prominent. Like the First Officer and I discussed; we have to be 100% on; 100% of the time. I know we're all human and that's not realistic; but that's the aviation industry. I have to absolutely be certain at all times where I am. Having said that; I would also suggest some improvement to that area in the way of better signs. I feel there should be something pretty distinct at that intersection indicating 'You're at the end of the runway.' Hindsight being 20/20; I would have told the controller that we were going to stop; even though we were told otherwise.

Air Carrier Captain reported experiencing a taxiway incursion at SMF airport. Then while turning the aircraft around; the left main gear went off the taxiway.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 90

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

The FB-1A is an amateur built experimental airplane; which by original design; is an open-cockpit airplane. This particular airplane has a canopy which fully encloses the cockpit. The canopy rotates 90 degrees towards the right wing to open. It is secured by two front latches which must be manually engaged and a rear latch which automatically engages. Shortly after takeoff the canopy; at roughly 150 feet AGL; departed the airplane. The front of the canopy lifted up; it rotated 90 degrees to the right; and the wind then ripped it off the hinge. It left the airplane cleanly and did no damage. Since the airplane is by design open-cockpit the airplane still handled properly. I advised the inbound jump plane that my canopy had departed the airplane and there is on Runway XX. The wind was gusting to roughly 25 knots straight down the runway which made Runway XX the only viable runway. The jump plane advised me they had limited fuel and could not wait long to land. I asked the Skydive plane if they could delay their landing by roughly 5 minutes and they could. I was able to identify the canopy's location on the runway and told the Skydive plane that I would land and clear the debris which I did. The Skydive plane then landed without incident.The canopy departed the airplane because I failed to latch the front latches of the canopy. Verifying that the canopy is properly secured is on the Pre-Takeoff Checklist which I did perform but missed the item. Maintenance was recently performed on the brakes so I put an extra focus on verifying they were working properly (which they were). I ran the pre-takeoff checklist and when I set the power to 1;000 RPM I thought the throttle felt a little different. I then spent a few minutes checking the throttle and the engine at various power settings to ensure there was not a problem with the throttle. While I was testing the throttle the local jump plane announced that jumpers were away at 11;000 feet over the airport. The distraction of the extra focus on the throttle and the sudden added task of looking for the skydivers in the sky caused me to forget that I had not completed the entire checklist and the last item (verifying the seatbelts and canopy) had not been performed. The canopy departing the airplane was caused by my inaction to properly run and verify the Pre-Takeoff Checklist. I will put a stronger focus on the checklist and will be designing a new canopy that will be less prone to human error.

Experimental aircraft pilot reports forgetting to latch his canopy prior to takeoff; then losing it shortly after becoming airborne. The canopy lands on the runway and must be retrieved so that a skydive plane can land.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X called to depart Runway 21. I asked direction of flight. He answered something I did not recognize with a heavy accent so I approved him for standard right turn at the shoreline. He asked for frequency change. I did not observe his target but saw target on edge of Class B; slightly offshore and about to fly in front of departures off LAX in Class B (he had turned left and we are only 2 miles from Bravo offshore).  I issued an immediate left turn and suggested heading and told Ground Control to point out to LAX. After asking him several questions; it turns out his plan was to 'go out a bit and fly direct to SLI.' I suggested he return to the airport and [re-plan] his flight when it became apparent he had no idea how to get to the other side of Class B. I then had to help him enter the pattern and land because he flew the wrong way when instructed to make right traffic; (opposite direction on the downwind).We actually called the FBO where the aircraft is based and relayed info. They said he just bought aircraft; hopefully flight standards can help him.

Reporter describes an aircraft departing the airport and can't understand the aircraft; assumes what the pilot wants; then has to react as the aircraft almost violates the LAX Class Bravo.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Other ATP

Air Traffic Control Military 20; Air Traffic Control Non Radar 20; Air Traffic Control Radar 50; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

The HND ATIS for Henderson is not receivable by aircraft arriving to Henderson in the Southeast to East quadrant because of the mountain range just 3 miles east of Henderson; NV airport.  The antenna for the ATIS for HND must be relocated to the top of the mountain range.You will expect an air traffic accident because aircraft cannot get the information when Las Vegas approach is so busy that they cannot relay all the information to arriving VMC and Flight following aircraft.Please advise the authorities to take action. This is a hazardous situation.

Pilot reported the HND ATIS for Henderson is not receivable by aircraft arriving to Henderson in the Southeast to East quadrant because of the mountain range just 3 miles east of Henderson; NV airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

[We] diverted due to thunderstorms closing [our destination]. Since this was an international flight; no Customs could be done. I informed Dispatch to make sure the on time was annotated but not to put an in time to insure the crew computer reflected flight time since all crew were to remain on flight duty. The computer did reflect an in time. We were on the ground for 51 minutes and not reflected as FAR 117 flight time. (I need clarification on this issue and guidance as to divert ground time on an international flight counting toward flight time or just duty time). Subsequently departed for [our destination]; landed and cleared Customs. The next leg was cancelled. We immediately attempted to contact Crew Scheduling; were placed on hold and subsequently dropped. Scheduling finally called me at 1 hour 20 minutes after block-in and I was informed a message was sent to hotel accommodations. We watched for a change on our trip and tried to call Hotel Desk only to be placed on hold and subsequently dropped. I called the Duty Manager; left a message. He called me back and connected me directly with the Hotel Desk Supervisor. The Supervisor said 'we are working on it' and he will call me back. An hour later I got a call from Hotel Desk sending us to Hotel X with voucher XY. When we got to the hotel; we were informed all 'extra' crew were voucher XY and our inbound flight number had to be faxed or emailed and specifically tagged to rooms. No fax was sent. The Hotel Desk Supervisor called Hotel Desk and remained on hold. We; also; called and were on hold and after another hour of waiting I decided to find a hotel with rooms (the Hotel X was full except for voucher XY rooms specifically tagged to other inbound flights). I expensed a room at a nearby hotel almost 5 hours after block in time. I was still unable to contact Crew Scheduling to have them change our duty time in the crew computer for proper FAR 117 calculations (based on the fact we were waiting for a hotel assignment) until the next morning. Crew Scheduling informed me they could not change it and I had to call the Duty Manager to get it changed. I did this and had to leave a message. Duty Manager never returned my call so crew computer never properly reflected correct duty time and therefore all subsequent FAR 117 calculations were in error. Based on my personal calculations; I don't believe there were any FAR 117 violations; but am not 100% sure due to what happens next. [The next day] the plan was deadhead to pick up the balance of our trip. After flight planning; briefing the crew; loading the passengers; closing the doors; pulling the jetway; completing the Preflight Checklist; arming the slides and waiting for the last cargo door to close; the Gate Agent reconnected the jetway; knocked on the door and opened 1L. After seeing the door opened at 1L open; I asked the First Officer to determine what was happening. He returned and informed me the crew was supposed to call the Crew Scheduling. I told the Gate Agent to close the door we were sterile cockpit. My thinking was no sane operation would interrupt a flight that far along with a major change and I would deal with what I thought to be a minor problem when I got on the ground in [our destination]. I was wrong! When we called for push Ramp informed us we could not push and we needed to call Crew Scheduling. I did; breaking sterile cockpit; to be informed we were being reassigned to fly to [another location]. I told the Scheduler it made no sense based on where the flight was in terms of nearing pushback but he persisted. I told him to connect me with the Duty Manager. I spoke to the Duty Manager explaining how ridiculous it was from a safety point of view to take a crew at pushback and move them to another flight. He said he understood but it was contractually legal and therefore it had to be done. I continued to stress it might be legal but not smart. I also emphasized Crew Scheduling may not [be] working with correct flight and duty time calculations. This fell on somewhat sympathetic but deaf ears. I asked for an 'ordered to fly' annotation in the record. I then told the First Officer to run the Parking Checklist while I informed the passengers and then slink away. I sent the First Officer to the next aircraft while I went to the planning room [and] took care of paperwork. When I pulled up our new trip I noticed we were being flown into days off; legal; yes but absolutely infuriating. During Pre-Departure Checks we discussed the need to let go of the emotion and focus on the task at hand to prevent bent metal and/or violation. It was not easy. I remain baffled why we as a company would take such a safety risk so last minute. I believe this problem could have been addressed at least 2 hours prior. To deal with this at pushback is not intelligent business or a safe practice.

A320 Captain describes a trip paring disrupted by weather diversions and the inability to communicate with the company due to the number of crews out of position.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 19000

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On approach in to ZZZ; we were cleared direct ZZZZZ intersection and to descend to 3;000 feet There was a thunderstorm cell between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 (Final Approach Fix) on the approach to Runway XXR to ZZZ. We asked ZZZ TRACON (Approach Control) for direct ZZZZZ1 to avoid the thunderstorm cell. We were anticipating a visual approach to Runway XXR because the most recent ATIS (weather report) was reporting only Few and Scattered clouds at the airport with adequate visibility for a visual approach. The TRACON Controller asked if we would be able to 'get the airport?'My First Officer and I were slightly confused by his phraseology and tried to discuss what the Controller meant. At that time; we were within a few miles from ZZZZZ and just about to level off at 3;000 feet. The Autopilot Mode Control panel was in Vertical Speed (Altitude Acquire) and LNAV to ZZZZZ. I was anticipating going to ZZZZZ1 and was ready to change the altitude to 2;800 feet in MCP for the autopilot. We were then cleared on a 160 degree heading to join the final approach course of 128; and cleared for the approach. I didn't hear the Controller say 'maintain 3;000 feet until established.' I selected VOR/LOC and dialed 2;800 feet into the autopilot Mode Control Panel. Because we were in a descent and in Altitude Acquire; the autopilot continued to descend towards 2;800 feet.My First Officer said we were supposed to maintain 3;000 feet. I had missed that part of the clearance so I dialed 3;000 feet into the Mode Control Panel; but by that point the aircraft had descended below 3;000 feet and was continuing to descend and would not ever capture 3;000 feet. I was also trying to slow the aircraft and get it to capture the localizer. Seeing that we weren't going to level off; I tried to use Vertical Speed to make the aircraft climb back to 3;000 feet; but it was continuing to descend. Our descent was exacerbated by the fact that I still had the speedbrakes deployed almost to the flight [descent]. ZZZ TRACON (Approach Control) said he he had a low altitude alert and his MVA [Min Vector Altitude] was 2;800 feet. We were now at about 2;300 feet. I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles; started a climb and we decided to go missed approach. I finally stowed the speedbrakes; climbed to our clearance altitude and we then got re-vectored by ZZZ TRACON for another approach to Runway XXR and landed safely.

We were being vectored around some weather coming into ZZZ and were given a descent to 3;000 feet and direct ZZZZZ outside of ZZZZZ1 on the ILS XXX. There was some confusion as ATC asked if we would be able to get the airport. I wasn't sure if he meant visually or altitude wise. After a pause; as I pondered his meaning; I responded that we were IMC. At the time; I didn't think we were high; so I assumed he meant visually. Just a couple miles outside of ZZZZZ; Captain asked for a turn to ZZZZZ1. I paused because I was anticipating a vector shortly to intercept the final approach course. I then asked ATC for the turn inbound; and ATC responded that he was just about to give us a vector and then provided the clearance. We were given a 160 heading to join and maintain 3;000 feet until established and cleared for the ILS to [Runway] XXR. This extra communication ultimately caused a delay in getting turned in. Because it all got really busy; I didn't see that Captain dialed in 2;800 feet. So; I don't think it acquired 3;000 feet and was now descending below it. Then I think 3;000 feet was reset into the MCP and yet the aircraft was still descending. All of this was happening while I was replying to ATC and I didn't realize what happened until after we talked about it later. We triggered a low altitude alert; and ATC informed us that we were to maintain 3;000 feet until established. I responded that we were correcting. Captain was climbing back up to 3;000 feet and we were slightly south of the localizer. I figured by the time we got back to 3;000 feet; we would then be high for the approach and not being established on the localizer; I said we should go-around. Captain agreed; and we did. This whole thing took me out of the Green; made me feel rushed and got behind in my responsibilities. A go-around was the best decision.

B737-800 flight crew reported a CFIT event during approach resulting in a go-around. A communications breakdown between flight crew and ATC was cited as a contributing factor.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Training in progress; R side trainee. Started briefing with Aircraft X cleared off of ZZZ with climb to 280. Aircraft X checks on out of 3;000 ft. Aircraft X is seen on radar with Mode C correlated to Alt leaving; but Aircraft X was not told he was radar identified. Trainee clears Aircraft X direct to ZZZZZ [fix] (less than 5 degree turn from filed and current course). Aircraft X was at approximately 3;800 ft. when trainee finished issuing clearance. Aircraft X was in a 4;000 foot Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA). Aircraft X continued on course without incident. Talked with trainee about not changing how he works during a briefing. Seemed like he felt rushed to get the briefing done and let the next controller in to work.

ZAN Controller reported developmental issued IFR clearance below the MVA.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

We were vectored for an ILS 22L; held up and asked to hold 180 knots to the marker. The final vector put us between GIMEE (D7.8; 2;500 feet) and BUZZD (D4.6; 1;500 feet) at 2;500 feet. We were cleared 190 heading; 2;500 feet until established; 180 knots until BUZZD; cleared ILS 22L. Just prior to LOC capture we were cleared the visual to 22L (high and fast). At the 500 foot call we were on LOC and glideslope; a little fast but correcting. Crossing the threshold we were stabilized; on airspeed. Weather was VFR.

We were being vectored for the ILS 22L at EWR by NY Approach with lots of other traffic and asked to keep 210 knots for a great deal of the vectoring. Approximately 14 miles out; we were cleared to maintain 2;500 feet until intercepting the LOC; 180 knots to BUZZD; cleared for the ILS 22L and told to contact the Tower. This left us high and fast. We used speed brakes and configured the aircraft as we slowed; but at 500 feet; we were still about 15 knots above Vappr. The Tower had asked us to roll out past the usual turn-off at N or P2 and to use V to avoid getting caught behind the B757 that had landed prior to us. Because of this thinking; I chose not to call for a go-around. I believed; at that point; that going around and re-entering the busy NY airspace with another aircraft just departing 22R; was less safe than continuing to the landing. We crossed the threshold on speed with engines spooled up appropriately; and the remainder of the operation was uneventful. We tried too hard to meet the controller's airspeed and altitude instructions. We should not have accepted the turn inside of GIMEE unless we were farther away or already at 1;500 feet. The requirement to slow 30 to 40 knots and lose 1;000 feet of altitude that close in made it very difficult to meet the stabilized approach criteria. Had we dropped the gear first; before going to flaps 20; we might have made it easier on ourselves; but that changes our usual procedures; and I have found that particular change can lead to 'forgetting' the Before Landing Checklist.

A300 flight crew describes being vectored for the ILS 22L at EWR and kept high and fast; resulting in an unstabilized approach. The Captain elects to continue the approach rather than go-around due to traffic departing on the right runway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During deice; due to the conditions we requested type 1 and 4 on wings and tail. 'Iceman' confirmed and they began spraying the aircraft. After circling the aircraft twice (what we thought was type 1 and then 4); 'Iceman' told us we were complete and gave us the times. I looked at the wing which did not appear green in color (consistent with type 4 fluid). He stated the start and stop times of both type 1 and 4 but not the type of fluid. We were told it was Polar Plus LT; which we didn't have specific data on so we used the generic type 4 times for the conditions at hand. Upon further research; Polar Plus LT is a type 1 fluid and I believe that we never received type 4 at all. This station has a tough time keeping employees and they were trying to push out/deice 3 aircraft within a short time frame. They are always shorthanded and seem to struggle with basic aircraft ramping operations; let alone deicing. Perhaps lack of training or experience. I also should have put my foot down when I saw the lack of green hue on the wings consistent with type 4. Retrain the operations personnel on proper deicing methods and the importance that the correct fluids are applied.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported they requested to be deiced with Type 1 and Type 4; but were only serviced with Type 1.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 710

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I departed Runway XX with a student for a flight lesson. We turned left and Tower assigned heading of 030 and [to] contact Departure. Shortly thereafter; for unknown reasons; the engine dropped from full power ~2300RPM to ~1500RPM for about 5 seconds. I immediately pushed the nose down; took controls from my student with a 3 way handoff; turned toward the field; and [requested priority handling] in the turn back to the airport. At this point the engine smoothed out and seemed to be operating normally; however I was not taking any chances. Another aircraft that was not involved requested the controller to repeat an instruction; and with my close proximity to to the field; being less than a mile; flying toward departing traffic; I decided to switch to Tower and not repeat myself on approach frequency. After switching; Tower says 'Aircraft X what are you doing?' In an obviously concerned voice. I stated I was [requesting priority handling] and landing Runway XY. He pointed out the traffic on the departure end of Runway XX. I had the traffic in sight before he said that. I called visual with the traffic and stated I was landing XY; which then; Tower cleared me to land. I made an uneventful landing on Runway XY and taxied back to the ramp to park.

C-152 Instructor reported an air return due to engine power loss on initial climb.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

We were set up to fly a visual approach on one runway; but the wind spread increased and was reported gusting. So we elected to fly a visual to a runway more aligned with the wind. ATC said to advise the field in sight; but we were still IMC so I said we would advise when were able. We came out of the clouds and called the field in sight; and were immediately cleared for a visual and told to contact Tower. However; when we came out of the clouds; there was a group of towers at our 12 o'clock; and I verbalized to the other pilot that we were headed for them. We started to descend and I could tell we were getting closer to the towers and once he saw them; he started a turn away from the towers. At this time [we] received a 'Caution Obstacle' aural message. The flying pilot disconnected the autopilot and climbed away from the towers and the message quickly cleared While still VMC; the clouds were approximately 1;000 - 1;200 ft. above the highest obstacle; which meant that the time available to see and avoid obstacles was very short after coming out of the clouds. ATC vectoring us towards the towers in IMC and then quickly clearing us for a visual approach once we were in VMC exacerbated the issue. During our approach briefing; identifying the highest obstacle on the approach chart would have also helped to mitigate this threat.A more thorough approach briefing including a notation of the highest obstacles in the area would have been appropriate for this approach. A slightly different vector from ATC; or at least a communication of the obstacles would; while not entirely necessary; have helped to enhance situational awareness.

CRJ-200 Captain reported an inflight near miss with a group of towers during a visual approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

The ramp gave us a cargo load report that indicated all of the baggage and cargo were in the forward pit with a total weight of 2;818 LBS. After takeoff we received a message from Dispatch that indicated that the cargo was split between the forward and aft pit. 1;530 LBS of bags were actually placed in the aft compartment and 1;288 LBS of mail was put in the forward cargo pit. This configuration put us out of our aft CG limits for takeoff with a GTOW (Gross Takeoff Weight) 78;493 LBS and an actual CG 24.7% of our MAC. There was a CG calculated due to the error which showed us at 17.6% of MAC with the same GTOW. The preflight calculations showed us within limits. As far [as] we knew the airplane was within CG limits. We felt that the airplane pitched up more steeply than usual and seemed to rotate more aggressively than usual. The trim was not set correctly either due the bad data we were given.Miscommunication and inattention by baggage loading personnel. Better training for baggage loaders and verification of actual cargo loading configuration by a trained supervisor to prevent such errors. Also requiring two people to both visually verify where cargo is placed versus the weight.

The [load report] indicated fifty standard bags; one planeside checked bag; and 1;288 LBS of mail; all loaded in the forward cargo compartment. We completed our weight and balance manifest; and departed the gate. We took off; and I noticed at rotation that the nose came up abruptly. I stopped the rotation at 10 degrees nose up and after breaking ground continued to pitch up to follow the flight director. We received an ACARS message from Dispatch indicating that the [load report] had been completed in error; with the fifty standard and one planeside bag having been loaded in the aft cargo compartment instead of the forward compartment.We computed the corrected takeoff data which yielded a takeoff CG of 24.7% of MAC and trim of 2.5 nose up; instead of 17.6% of MAC and 3.9 nose up that we departed with. Consulting the flight envelope we noted that the takeoff CG was outside the range for takeoff to the aft end.Ramp personnel feeling rushed is a likely cause of the input error. A suggestion would be that ramp personnel report verbally what they loaded without reading it off the sheet when we accept it; preferably by someone other than completed the [load report]. In this case the person recalling the load would have known the forward cargo hold was full of mail; and that the bags had gone in the back.

ERJ-175 flight crew reported they departed with CG out of limits because of an incorrect load report.


Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

State X has issued a 14 day quarantine for anyone entering the state from certain locations. We have had several co workers who have traveled out of the state. It has been brought to management's attention that these employees are in the breakroom without masks and are not adhering to the quarantine rules. These agents are putting other co workers and our customers in jeopardy by being on property.  The supervisors; leads and the travelers themselves all said that it was approved by our upper management. Per the state websites essential workers must get prior written approval from the state before travel. Upper management told select people and never put this policy in writing. They say we are essential workers; which is true but our job does not require travel. The essential worker status is just to come to work when we were on the stay at home order.

Ground employee reported that co-workers are not adhering to quarantine rules and are not wearing COVID-19 protective masks.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 121; Flight Crew Type 6000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

I was Pilot Flying on a vectored heading to intercept localizer final; level at 2500. The autopilot was on and holding altitude. Just prior to course intercept; we got a Stab out of Trim warning. I looked back at my instruments and the aircraft was descending and about 100 feet low with the autopilot on. I immediately disconnected the autopilot to manually climb back up to altitude while intercepting the Localizer. The trim was heavy nose down; and electric trim was inop while the aircraft continued to descend until I could get enough muscle on the controls; and manual trim; to climb back to altitude. We were about 400 feet low and Approach called us and notified us he had a Low Altitude Alert on us; and gave the min vectoring altitude 2100 MSL for our location. We maintained localizer; climbed back up to 2500 MSL; captured the glideslope; ran the QRH and continued the approach using manual trim. We talked about a missed approach; but decided it would be safer to continue and land. We broke out at about 700 ft to a normal landing using manual trim. After clearing the runway; the Captain tried his electric trim and it was operational; so I tried mine and now it worked. The Captain wrote up the trim; Contract Maintenance came out; we ran the trim but it would just stop on its own. Maintenance determined the trim motor was going bad and the trim was intermittent.I don't know of anything that we could change to keep this from happening again. We don't use manual trim very often; and there is learning curve on how much you have to spin the wheel and how much force is required to move it.

B737-NG First Officer reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on approach when the stab trim failed leaving them with manual trim only.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Chart Or Publication; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Human Factors

While the APU was suspended in the lifting sling; it 'flipped over' to an upside down position. High center of gravity while APU is in cradle/sling. Cradle/sling assembly is allowed to pivot; therefore allowing APU to flip over. Sling pivot points should not be able to move. Hangar. APU removal/installation sling.

Reporter stated the APU cradle is mounted to four attach points on the Honeywell RE220 APU and two cables on each side form an 'A' shape that connect to a single point above the APU at the CRJ-900's internal structure. There are also two hand crank assemblies; one on each side that are used to lower the APU from it's compartment. There are four turnbarrels to level the APU as the Honeywell unit is lowered from the APU compartment. The APU tends to be nose heavy due to components on the forward end. As they were adjusting the turnbarrels to maintain a level position; the APU suddenly rotated nose down at the two side pivot points and flipped 180-degrees; basically turning upside down without anyone pushing on the unit. Reporter stated that because of the APUs weight and the Center of Gravity (CG); if the APU starts to flip; he doesn't think anyone can stop the movement. There was discussion afterwards about attaching a third cable for the third Mechanic to help guide and maintain a balancing effect; but mechanics feel that procedure would only mask the real issue which is a design problem that Bombardier has yet to improve. The CRJ-700 uses similar equipment and procedures to Remove and Replace (R/R) that aircraft's APU. Reporter believes a design change is necessary to prevent serious injury or death of technicians.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports that a Honeywell RE 220 APU unit 'flipped over' to an upside down position as the unit was being lowered from the APU compartment of a CRJ-900 aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

CRJ-200 aircraft departed with passengers and three crew members. Flight was 90 miles north of [our next fix] and was flying direct to [it] per ATC. The aircraft was on autopilot and was climbing at 290 KTS IAS through FL250 up to FL280. The flight conditions at the time were VMC and no turbulence. As the aircraft climbed to final cruise altitude; the crew observed the aircraft slightly yaw in both directions; it felt like a 'kick'. The aircraft then self-corrected back to wings level. This occurred two more times within a few minutes of each other. The crew verified that the hydraulics were all in the 'Normal' operating range. The Captain instructed the Flight Attendant to suspend cabin service and return to her seat. The seat belt sign was still on at the time. The aircraft was now at FL280. The rudder pedals were 'guarded' by both crew members as a precaution while they monitored the aircraft and the Flight Control Page for any abnormalities. Moments later the aircraft once again began a yawing moment in both directions. This time the yawing was more pronounced and the aircraft entered a 'Dutch Roll'. The Captain immediately took control of the aircraft; disconnected the autopilot and flight director and corrected the aircraft attitude. The Captain felt intermittent oscillation of 'bumps' in the rudder pedals and needed to apply control inputs to the rudder pedals to counteract the rudder pedals from yawing the aircraft. The QRH for Uncommanded Yawing Emergency Procedure was completed. The aircraft diverted to [a nearby airport]; conducted an ILS approach and landed. During the descent to landing; the Captain felt intermittent oscillations in the rudder pedals followed by slight yawing in both directions but was manageable. The aircraft landed at 45;400 LBS and taxied to the gate without incident.

Reporter stated rudder movement continued to be indicated on their EICAS Flight Control Page throughout the flight and was also felt in the aircraft's movement.  Initially; he and the First Officer (F/O) were not sure if they were being hit by strong crosswinds during their climb. But when the 'Dutch Roll' occurred; he immediately disconnected the Auto-Pilot; Flight Director and Yaw Damper to take control of the upset and followed the remainder of their QRH for 'Uncommanded Yawing Emergency Procedures;' those procedures also instructs pilots to place both feet on the rudder pedals.Reporter stated a stronger 'kick' in the sudden yaw oscillations were noticed along with wings dropping after the Yaw Damper was turned 'Off' and continued until they landed. He has experienced unusual upsets in the past and trained in simulators for certain upsets; but this event included a continued intermittent and pulsating yawing.  Both rudder pedals were moving with the yaw oscillations and he had to apply greater force to counter the uncommanded yaw input.  He remembered the two previous B737 aircraft that had crashed due to uncommanded rudder movements and felt they should get their CRJ-200 aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible. He continued to adjust flap settings on approach and landed with Flaps-45 without any problems.

A Captain reports experiencing uncommanded yawing oscillations and rudder pedal movement in a CRJ-200 aircraft during climb to final cruise altitude. When the CRJ entered a 'Dutch Roll'; the pilot disconnected the autopilot and flight director to correct the aircraft attitude. Flight diverted. During descent; oscillations continued to be felt in pedals with yaw in both directions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Today I taxied to the ZZZ strip with ATIS weather to ZZZ Runway XX. I noticed 4 or 3 maybe snow removal vehicles working around but not yet on the runway. I called in to the Tower and I introduced my airplane numbers and request for takeoff. The Tower asked me to repeat my call sign and I did.  The Tower told me to wait. I heard quite a bit (of half) the Tower radio traffic communication.  The Tower then told me I was cleared for takeoff and I confirmed.  I noticed that the snow removal vehicles all had backed off and so I took off successfully; without incident.  One of the snow removal drivers called into the Tower and told them I took off the strip.  I verified this and was told to call into the Tower later.  I called in and told the Tower how it happen from my prospective after my flight. They say they are passing the incident on. There was a southeast wind and in reflection; the Tower may have told me I was clear to take off southeast; which is from the lake; not the strip.  I should have reiterated my position on the runway when he asked me to repeat my tail numbers.  I do not believe I called for a southeast take off; but there was a southeast wind that I was in my mind.  I was also watching the snow removal equipment but believed he must have told them to back off on a different frequency. There was no other radio traffic until I was 8 to 10 miles away. The lake was empty and the Southeast water lane; frozen; is right in front of the Tower. He could have helped the situation if he said he could not see me. He did not see me take off at all. It was the snow worker that saw me. When I returned about an hour later the ATIS changed to MIKE and the strip was closed.  I had no issue landing on the lake to the southeast. I have flown out of ZZZ since I was a training pilot. I use the lake in the summer and occasionally in the winter. I regret this happened today; regardless that all was safe and there was no chance of any collision with truck or another plane.  It was my intention to follow ATC control; I am sorry if I heard/misinterpreted; or even possibly asked for the incorrect runway. I will certainly talk more to the Tower when they are short and listen more acutely.  I will be more certain of the runway as well and add it to my checklist as I am with wheels and skis. I have caught miscommunication from the Tower in the past coming in on floats but was able to talk it out.

A pilot departing from an airport with a hard surface runway and water lanes reported he took off from the runway but found out ATC had cleared him for takeoff from the water lane as the runway was closed for snow removal.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

We were CPDLC testing and had many people in our area from all over the country for the testing. I was working out highs as an R side for about an hour when I was told to close my sector and run the list. The highs were combined to one sector and weren't really busy at all. I ran the list and ended up getting out a controller on the D side to our ultra high; D97/Lockborne. Her briefing just mentioned that CPDLC was on and nothing more on this subject. The R side working had been in for at or more than an hour. We had a full page on URET [User Request Evaluation Tool] and were red. After about 1-2 minutes of sitting; really just getting signed in and my settings adjusted; I had a CPDLC Subject Matter Expert (SME) plug in with me on the D. Two more SME's stood right behind my R side as one was helping him with an aircraft that had a red X. I never really got the picture of the scope when my SME told me that the aircraft we had near APE; Aircraft X; was a ZID CPDLC test flight and since we were the last ZID sector that we need to send him as many commands as possible. I had to answer a line; got back to my SME; and he was telling me I needed to give the plane a command but he will not act on it. We were simply seeing if the messages were going through. I confirmed what he said and asked 'Are you sure he won't change altitude or his route?' To which a man's voice behind or beside me (I cannot pinpoint who said it) said everyone knows he's a test flight it's in the remarks. To which I replied; OK! Being my R side had been there at least an hour this assured me he knew the aircraft was a test flight. He was spacing to multiple airports as well and was very busy so I didn't want to bother him with something he already knew. My SME and I agreed on an altitude change uplink so I told him to climb to FL410; out of FL390. After I sent it; my SME asked me to pull up my message output box for CPDLC. As he was telling me how to open it; I hear my R side say Traffic Alert. I turned to look; and it was the test aircraft in confliction with another aircraft at FL400; head on! I had to tell him; no! He's a test flight he's not climbing! To which the R side asked for everyone to leave or backup to give him space as he had at least 3-4 SMEs behind us. The R side did give an evasive turn to the aircraft as well. There were so many issues leading up to this that could've been prevented. One; we should have been briefed! I cannot believe this was not a briefing item for this reason alone! Two; he should've been descended into our much less busy high stratum and let them deal with him. Lastly; it should have never been assumed everyone knew he was a test flight and would not act on commands just because of the remarks section. At minimum; this needed to be on our restriction board for all affected areas.

Indianapolis Center Controller reported that a test CPDLC aircraft was sent a test message to climb; and climbed; causing an airborne conflict. Test aircraft was to receive messages; not act on them.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On final at the final approach fix for Runway XXR at 170 knots we configured aircraft with gear and final flaps of 25. We received and EICAS message of TE Flap Disagree"; the flap indicator was between 20 and 25. We evaluated the situation and discussed how the go around would be executed; then informed ATC and performed a go around without flap retraction not exceeding 137 KTS. We successfully ran the QRH and were vectored back to [Runway] XXC to an uneventful landing with a reference speed of 127 KTS and taxied to the gate. We notified ATC knowing we would be in a non-normal landing configuration. Emergency vehicles were not requested but present for the landing."

On Runway XXR at the final approach fix at 170 KTS we configured aircraft with gear and final flaps 25.  We received an EICAS message of TE FLAP DISAGREE" the flap indicator read between 20 and 25 degrees.  We evaluated the situation; discussed how the go around would be performed not exceeding 137 KTS.  While being vectored back to land we ran QRH successfully and were vectored back to [Runway] XXC to an uneventful landing with a reference speed of 127 KTS and taxied to park.  We did notify ATC knowing that we would be in an abnormal flap configuration.  Emergency vehicles were not requested but present."

Flight Crew reported a Go Around after the Trailing Edge Flaps did not extend due to flap assymetry.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

While on the MANSEC leg of the JFRYE3 STAR into ADS yesterday afternoon; we were issued a traffic call.  The ATC advisory informed traffic was at 1 to 2 O' Clock at 5;500 feet. We were on a heading of 090 and level at 6;000 feet as signed by ATC.  Upon visually scanning for traffic; which was also indicated on TCAS; I spotted the traffic at 1 to 1:30 and headed north; to cross our flight path right to left. The traffic looked to be closer in altitude than 500 feet; but at low altitudes it is often difficult to tell.  I informed the customer pilot in the right seat; who was working the radios that the traffic was in sight. He also confirmed a visual on the advisory target.  Approximately 10 seconds after the visual sighting a TCAS RA was issued to 'Monitor Vertical Speed'.  Within 5 seconds after that ATC issued a clearance to descend and maintain 3;000 feet. As that instruction was being issued an additional RA to 'Climb' was issued. Guidance was approximately 15 degrees nose up and traffic was indicated less than 300 feet below our aircraft.  I executed the RA instruction and informed ATC. ATC simply responded 'Okay; descend to 3;000 when able'. After receiving the 'Clear of Conflict' acknowledgment from the TCAS II system on the aircraft; the descent to 3;000 feet was initiated.

Corporate jet Captain reported a NMAC in the D10 TRACON area while on the JFRYE 3 arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 25

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

This event occurred during a first time solo flight. Two successful takeoffs and landings occurred before the incident. After the second full stop landing; I taxied back and prepared to takeoff again. During takeoff roll; the aircraft began to fishtail and abruptly became airborne at a slower than usual airspeed. In an attempt to regain control; power was removed and the plane eventually landed in the grass to the left of [the] runway. The aircraft rolled onto [an adjacent] runway before coming to a complete stop. The aircraft was not damaged during the incident. Upon further inspection it became obvious that the failed takeoff occurred because the flaps had not been stowed before make the third takeoff attempt. This could have been avoided by ensuring the pre-takeoff inspection had been completed.

C172 student pilot reported losing control of aircraft on takeoff roll because the flaps had not been retracted following previous landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 1400

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Human Factors

Actions by Teterboro Airport Operations Personnel; Teterboro Tower and NY TRACON created hazardous approach and landing conditions at Teterboro due to the evident lack of any coordination among the parties. The airport closed Runway 6; turned off the ILS and turned off runway lighting while aircraft were inbound and being instructed by NY Approach to fly the ILS approach. The specific sequence of events in my case was as follows. Obtained Teterboro current ATIS; ILS 6 approach reported in use. I was monitoring Teterboro Tower frequency while communicating with NY TRACON and heard airport Operations Personnel state to the Tower that they wanted to close Runway 6 for undisclosed reasons. Later NY TRACON announced on frequency; 'All aircraft landing Teterboro now expect ILS 6 circle to land Runway 1.' I was vectored heading 090 to intercept the ILS inside VINGS and was cleared for the ILS 6 circle. I advised NY TRACON that I was not receiving I-TEB localizer signal; he responded; 'Yes I am just hearing that now fly heading 060. Let me know if the localizer comes back up they might be putting it back up;' with no other communication as to what ATC's plan was. I now had an instrument approach briefed and set up; was 3 minutes from the airport at 2;000 feet flying a heading with no indication as to what TRACON and Tower expected me to do. At this point in other airspace I would have rejected the approach entirely; however; knowing NY TRACON's frequent belligerence and frankly punitive attitude I knew that this would result in a possible long delay in landing. Trying to salvage the approach I asked the TRACON Controller if I should fly GPS direct to DANDY; cross DANDY at 1;500 feet (knowing that crossing DANDY above 1;500 creates possible less of separation with EWR traffic) and attempt to fly a visual approach from DANDY; to which the Controller responded with something like 'Yes; do that let me know if you get the field.' At DANDY; based on fortunate high familiarity with the airport and its surroundings; I observed that Teterboro had also turned off Runway 6 lights entirely; due to terrain and ground clutter; the airport is almost impossible to see from that location and altitude (Runway 1 lights are not visible due to orientation; terrain and buildings); and I was able to see the beacon only due to my familiarity with the area. I advised the TRACON Controller that I had the airport in sight and was cleared for a visual approach to Runway 1 and landed without incident. I note based on later review that both RNAV/GPS approaches to Runway 6 prohibit night circle to land maneuvers. After landing I queried the Teterboro Tower Controller as to what had happened with the uncoordinated runway closure; disabling of the ILS and decision to shut down lights and the controller responded along the lines of; 'This all just happened like a whirlwind; the runway closed and then they took the glideslope from us.'

IFR arrival to TEB described a very confusing event when the status of the landing runway and the associated ILS was uncertain; the reporter claiming ATC's handling created a hazardous situation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Approaching FAF for the ILS; FO (First Officer) is PF (Pilot Flying); intercom phone rang repeatedly. Captain picked up and [a flight attendant] answers asking if we're close to landing. Captain explains yes; with landing gear about to be deployed (!). [Flight Attendant] frantically states the Seatbelt Sign is not on and she needs to rush to get things completed. Captain tried sign and [the Flight Attendant] confirms no sign and no chime. No chime was heard while climbing through/descending 10;000 feet either; though this isn't always audible in the Flight Station and nothing was commented to pilots otherwise. Seat belt sign (along with PA) was used for turbulence once during transit; but again; nothing conveyed to forward crew. On taxi in and while inspecting circuit breakers; Captain found Seat Belt and Lavatory Smoke breakers out. Captain preflighted all breakers before doing external walk around; with everything secured at that time. While he was outside; a new flight bag with current Jeppesen changes was installed by his seat; with the FO present during this. He now believes that in their haste to install it; they must have knocked the breakers loose (breaking the head off the Seat Belt one). Fixed and worked properly [by Maintenance personnel].

B737 Captain reported two circuit breakers were damaged after maintenance work in the cockpit.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

B737-700 aircraft; in cruise at FL400; Center directed a descent to FL360. Shortly after initiating the descent; I noticed the cabin altitude climbing at 1;500 FPM. The Captain and I began scanning for reasons for this loss of pressurization; however all indications seemed normal (Bleed pointers sensed; outflow valve closed; pressurization controller in alternate per MEL). I donned my mask in anticipation of receiving the Cabin Altitude (Alt) Horn and got the QRH ready. Before the cabin exceeded 10;000 FT; the aircraft leveled off at our assigned altitude of FL360. The resulting increase in thrust immediately restored control of our cabin. We asked ATC for a constant descent at a reduced rate so that we could keep thrust on the engines; and had an uneventful approach and landing. The ALT Warning horn never went off. Maintenance later identified the cause of the failure to be a loose clamp in the AFT pressure bulkhead. System malfunction.

Reporter stated the APU was 'Off'; not operating. Only engine bleeds were being used for the air conditioning packs. He felt a pressure change in his ears shortly after they started their descent from FL400. That's when he looked up at the overhead P-5 panel expecting to see some indication for what he felt in his ears. But all indications were normal; except for the 1;500 FPM cabin rate of climb. Both engines were at flight idle when they were descending. When the B737-700 leveled off at FL360 and the thrust increased; cabin control was restored.Reporter stated the auto mode for the cabin pressure controller was previously deferred (MEL'd); so they were using the Alternate (ALT) Mode per their MEL. On the ground; Maintenance pressurized the aircraft during a two-hour layover and said the APU body fuselage duct was leaking at a clamp where an APU duct shroud is located at the aft pressure bulkhead.

Pilot reports that shortly after initiating descent from FL400; he noticed the cabin altitude climbing at 1;500 FPM on their Next Gen B737-700 aircraft. Before the cabin altitude exceeded 10;000 FT; the aircraft leveled off at FL360 with an increase in thrust that immediately restored control of the cabin. Maintenance found a loose clamp in aft pressure bulkhead.


Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

On initial climb a Twin Cessna which had taken off behind me came quite close to a collision with my aircraft. I was direct westbound; but must have drifted slightly south during my climb (A slight left-hand turn is required at our airport during the climb). The Twin Cessna was turning slightly southwest bound when it passed me on the right side and crossed in front of me. No evasive action was necessary to avoid collision; but the aircraft was very close.

A pilot departing a non towered airport reported a NMAC.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working Middletown radar sector; and it was combined at the time with Xenia sector and Urbana sector. Aircraft X was an arrival from the south and I was vectoring him northbound for a visual approach to DAY. As Aircraft X was northbound about 8 miles east of DAY I turned him to a 270 heading to intercept the localizer. After my transmission; someone keyed up without using a callsign and just said 'Hang on'. The read back sounded like multiple transmissions were made over top of each other so I repeated my instructions to Aircraft X and he read back the instructions but also advised me that he saw traffic. He just said something to the effect of 'We have traffic out here about 1;000 feet.' I saw traffic after Aircraft X turned to the localizer; it was a primary radar return with no transponder. I asked Aircraft X to verify the traffic was 1;000 feet below him. Aircraft X said traffic was closer than 1;000 feet. I asked Aircraft X to say the estimated altitude of the traffic. Aircraft X said the traffic was at about 2;500. At the area the traffic was at the time; he was under the edge of DAY's class C airspace shelf; which is a minimum altitude of 2;400 feet between 5 and 10 miles from the airport. Aircraft X was still descending at the time; and I saw his altitude at 3;200 when he reported the traffic. I cleared Aircraft X for the approach and then switched him to DAY tower; and then just after I switched him I tried to catch him just to ask him if he had to do any evasive maneuvers for the traffic. Aircraft X had already switched; so I called DAY tower to have the pilot call us so we could ask him about the traffic. DAY local controller said he would ask; and also have the pilot call us. A minute or two later DAY local controller called and told me that Aircraft X reported that he did not have to make any maneuvers to miss the traffic. Aircraft X called later and assured the supervisor he did not wish to report any NMAC. So since I didn't notice any maneuvers on the scope from Aircraft X; the traffic was reported as at least 500 feet below Aircraft X at the time; and he also advised DAY he had to make no maneuvers to miss traffic; I felt it was not a significantly unsafe situation.The next day I was made aware that DAY had filed a report describing the situation as a Significant Event; and according to the report that the pilot told DAY he DID have to turn off his auto pilot and turn to miss the aircraft. That information was never passed to me from either the pilot or the DAY local controller. At some point the story seems to have changed. However; according to the data available and after listening to the recordings again; I saw nothing that would point to a NMAC or maneuvers to miss traffic. The recordings between myself and the pilot; as well as myself and DAY tower; also seemed to indicate the VFR traffic was at least 500 feet below Aircraft X; and at an altitude would even put the VFR aircraft below the Class C shelf. The traffic appeared to have just departed the New Carlisle; about 6 miles north of Aircraft X located about 8 miles east of DAY. I was actually coordinating and vectoring a few other aircraft at the time; and I did not see the VFR target pop up.With all the information available; it seems as though everyone was legally where they should have been at the time. There is also a LOA (Letter of Agreement) for a flying club for that area that spells out altitudes and restrictions when flying in that area; although I do not know if the VFR is part of that flying club or not. I would say the only recommendation would be for me to have seen the traffic sooner and call the traffic to Aircraft X. It seems like Aircraft X was spooked by seeing traffic he wasn't expecting. Also if the traffic was climbing to an altitude that would be 500 feet below Aircraft X; as Aircraft X was descending; I can see how traffic could surprise the pilot and look as though it is going to continue climbing. There is also thepossibility the VFR pilot had violated Class C airspace and was higher than Aircraft X reported; and if that was the case then I would recommend education for the VFR pilot; although he was low altitude with no transponder and we lost radar on him as he flew further northeast. So we have no way of knowing who the VFR pilot was. Another recommendation would be possibly something published on VFR charts to advise pilots in the area that multiple airliners are expected in the area descending to 3;000 feet and to use caution; if something similar is not already published there.

While being vectored on the downwind to runway 24L for a visual approach in DAY at 3000 feet we were getting ready for our base turn and I was looking out the left side window keeping the runway in sight; the First Officer announced 'airplane!' I looked back towards the front of the aircraft and saw a light colored high wing fabric tail dragger filling most of the windscreen on the right side of the aircraft. He was in a nose high attitude and appeared to be climbing into our flight path. At this time I switch off the automation and began an immediate left turn towards the final for runway 24L in Dayton.At some point shortly after I started the turn ATC issued us a turn to base and a descent and were told to 'standby.' I was not concerned at the time with ATC instructions and wanted to create more space between myself and the second aircraft. After it was clear that the other aircraft was no longer a threat I complied with the ATC instructions which happened to be identical to the direction that I chose to fly to avoid the other aircraft; I asked the controller where in the world this other aircraft had come from. He seemed puzzled by the question and then said that he could now see a primary only target; my guess being that it was no longer masked by our target on his screen.We joined the final and landed at DAY without further issue. On the taxi in Dayton control tower provided me with a phone number if I wanted to talk to Columbus approach. I called the number before I drove home after the trip and spoke to the manager there; and I cannot at this time recall his name. He spoke at length about what had happened and both concluded that there was no errors per se that caused this to happen. He stated that they have had issues before with NORDO aircraft departing a little satellite airport and skirting out under the airspace before. I asked about a 30 mile 'mode c' ring that I remembered being around airports the size of Dayton and asked if that was still a thing; as it has been many years since I have looked at any VFR Sectional charts. He indicated that there was no such ring around Dayton. Hole in ATC System as a whole; coupled with a NORDO aircraft departing from a smaller airport; and our flight being extended on a downwind due to another arriving aircraft from the north.I do not want to attempt to place numbers on how close to the other aircraft we were; but I will say that it was uncomfortable at best and I was not willing to allow my aircraft to get any closer than we already were; so I took action to not allow the situation to degrade any further than what it had. I do not feel that there were any errors committed by ATC; our aircraft; or the second aircraft; Its simple a 'hole in the system' I know that the FAA/ATC at different smaller airports that are in close proximity to other high traffic area will develop Notices or flyers to be placed at the smaller field pointing out where the faster higher volume traffic is coming from and to draw attention to it.

An air carrier being vectored onto the final approach to DAY took evasive action to avoid a VFR aircraft not displaying a transponder or in communication with TRACON.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On descent into CLT; while in speed mode set for 235 knots at a descent rate of 1000 ft per minute; there was an instant raise in airspeed to 251 knots for 1 second. The high speed; red chime came on. The airspeed immediately returned to normal. The aircraft was written up for inspection. Possible wake turbulence encounter. Corrected immediately. No proper amount of time to avoid and detect due to instant nature of speed increase.

EMB-145 First Officer reported a momentary flap speed limit exceedance following a possible wake turbulence encounter.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was training on a combined sector. A CRJ-200 departed ahead of the C680. The Air Carrier was a CRJ-200 series and was not climbing very well. The C680 was a Citation climbing much better and was gaining speed on the CRJ-200. As per the Automated Information Transfer (AIT); I flashed the C680 then the CRJ-200 to our high sector. The high sector put in FL310 for the C680 and later FL290 for the CRJ-200. I was scanning; and possibly coordinating point outs for the CRJ-200; when the 310 was put into the data block for the C680. The high sector called me and asked me if it will work out between the C680 and the CRJ-200 and if they had speeds. I went to my R-Side and asked do they have speeds. He said no and I coordinated that. The high sector said to stop the CRJ-200 at 270 and the C680 at 290. I say OK and turned to my R-Side and say stop (pointing at the CRJ-200 at 270 then pointing the C680 at 290). I didn't verbally say the call signs as I was pointing to them on the scope. I do not recall seeing the 310 in the data block ever; only the 290. When my R-Side asked did you tell me to stop him at 290; I said it was in the data block so no; thinking that was the only altitude that was put in there. As the C680 kept climbing through 290; the high sector asked what is he going to and my R-Side said 310 because no one told me to stop him. My R-Side told the C680 to descend to 290 then the high sector said no keep him going to 310 is OK. The data block was already handed off to Center and we could not change it. I did not call the Center to coordinate what he was climbing to. Miscommunication was key here. The high sector put in an altitude of 310 and my R-Side immediately said 310. I think the error occurred between me and my R-Side. My R-Side must not have understood what I was meaning when I pointed at the scope at the two aircraft and said 270 and 290 respectively. I should have gotten a more clear acknowledgment from my R-Side.

Enroute Developmental Controller described a mis-communications event between him and the R-Side Controller eventually leading to an airspace incursion.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Descending into ZZZ on a visual approach to Runway XXL; but following the guidance of the ILS.  A stable and uneventful approach. Upon landing we had a 6-7 knot tailwind. We landed longer than normal. I wouldn't say that we were outside of the touchdown zone; but it was very close. From my perspective the main wheels touched down prior to the end of the touchdown zone. We had floated a bit and I had to wait for the aircraft to lose that lift and start sinking into the runway before executing my landing flare. Elected not to go around and continue because nothing was unsafe we had a 10;996 foot runway and I elected to use max thrust reversers upon landing to slow us down safely.There was a few contributing factors. The main one being the tailwind on landing. Second was because of less travel due to COVID we sometimes have very light airplanes. Our landing weight was under 36;000 lbs being very light for the aircraft. So the lightweight along with the tailwind wasn't ideal. Lastly; company has recently within the last year or so updated our procedures where we add X knots to our straight in landing speeds regardless of the situation. Not having to add that extra X knots would have helped us carry less momentum into our final approach. We do bleed off the airspeed before touching down; although it's never perfect.The airport should have been landing in the other direction with the wind favoring the other runway; and it would also be more safe because of less terrain that we can't see at night. Also I should have thought about our extra light airplane and possibly requested the other runway. Also; It has been my opinion since it has started that airline go back to the normal landing numbers without adding extra 5 knots. And let the pilots decide when the extra airspeed is necessary depending on environmental factors.

Air carrier First Officer reported a long landing possibly outside of the landing zone.  Reporter attributed discrepancy to possible company policy of adding speed to straight in landings and the aircraft being light in weight.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 400

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were on initial climbout of our home airport with a commercial student and had just cleared our Class D airspace. Had changed frequencies and made a traffic call on our air to air frequency. We were at 3;800 MSL and climbing when I saw a Pilatus immediately in front of our Piper which appeared to be on a head on course with our aircraft. I made an immediate right descending bank and the Pilatus flew past us within 2 seconds. We had been looking for traffic the entire time but saw the Pilatus very late as there was no apparent motion to our aircraft and it appeared that he was traveling at a relatively high airspeed.When we got back I telephoned our Tower to see if a Pilatus had landed at our airport; which it had not. After being put in touch with the Manager of the area TRACON I was informed that the Pilatus had landed at a nearby airport. The TRACON Manager also informed me that the unverified radar showed that the two aircraft converged at 3;800 and 4;000 FT MSL; our Piper being at 3;800 FT and climbing. He also stated that the Pilatus had been given a traffic alert five miles before encountering our aircraft and been given a suggested heading of 280 which the pilot declined stating he had our aircraft in sight. The Pilatus made no visible effort to avoid our aircraft.

Instructor and student pilot aboard a PA-28 climbing out of a Class D area experienced a NMAC with an opposite direction Pilatus inbound to a nearby airport.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

DFW in South flow daily runway inspections in progress.  Air Carrier X had landed Runway 17L and was taxiing via Taxiway ER restricted short of Runway 17C. Runway 17C was closed for inspection and I had depicted it as such on the ASDE-X. Immediately after I cleared  Air Carrier X to cross Runway 17C; hold short Runway 17R the pilot responded that he had red lights (RWSL) in front of him so I instructed Air Carrier X to hold short of Runway 17C and advised that I would look into it (the reason for the lights). Next; I notified the FLM of the incident and as I did so I was scanning the runway and ASDE-X display. During my scan the only thing I detected was an airport vehicle (part of the runway inspection team) proceeding southbound on Runway 17C. Even before I had finished coordinating with the FLM; Air Carrier X reported that the lights had gone out and I issued a clearance to cross Runway 17C hold short Runway 17R. The FLM called the prototype RWSL system representative at DFW and relayed the following information to me: Even when a runway is closed in ASDE-X; RWSL runway entrance lights (RELs) will illuminate if a primary target is detected proceeding down the runway at greater than 40 knots. Essentially the RWSL system considers this target as a departing aircraft even though the ASDE-X does not. The representative also told the FLM that if I had manually tagged; the primary as a vehicle; the system would not have activated. This programming logic is not acceptable. Vehicles performing runway inspections enter and exit the runway safety area repeatedly during inspections and it is not feasible to continually put data tags on them. DFW uses 5 vehicles to perform runway inspections on 7 runways every morning and just keeping them tagged would be a full time job. The RWSL should be programmed to not alert on primary targets operating on closed runways. The ASDE-X rightly didn't alert. The RWSL introduced confusion to a situation that was completely under control. A similar situation occurred at MCO this past June and the RWSL program office suggested that the airport vehicles should be restricted; by LOA; to less than 35 or 40 KTS unless the tower was going to tag the targets. Of course the system at DFW is a prototype and not identical to the system in MCO. Regardless; this type of event is not acceptable.

DFW Controller described an apparent 'Runway Status Light (RWSL)' system anomaly; noting the ASDE-X and RWSL systems should be more closely aligned.


We were at assigned altitude of 13;000 FT. An aircraft began a fast descent towards us. At 500 FT away from us; we got an RA to climb. We began a climbing/ fairly steep turn to miss him. It was close enough that we saw his lights even though IMC. After calling ATC on the ground; we were told that he was given an approach clearance into a satellite airport. This should not have happened.

A320 Captain reported an NMAC with another aircraft in the vicinity of PDX airport.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

The event occurred almost immediately after climbing through 10;000 MSL to a higher ATC assigned altitude.  I heard what I would describe as a moderately loud 'poof' sound.  The aircraft lurched a bit and there was a definite vibration.  In a few seconds I smelled a somewhat noxious and certainly unusual odor.  The Captain called out the abnormal indications on the EICAS which included the left engine's N2 vibe icon and red ITT indications.  The vibration was reduced by retarding the left thrust lever.  We referenced the QRH and the Captain and I decided against a full shut down given the EICAS indications and that the vibration was very insignificant at about idle.  The Captain informed Dispatch and the Flight Attendant of our return.  ATC was advised of our need to return and an emergency was declared.  We landed safely and without further incident.  We promptly got the passengers off the airplane at a gate.

CRJ-200 First Officer reports a compressor stall climbing through 10;000 feet that results in high N2 vibration and high ITT.  The thrust is reduced to idle and the flight returns to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 210

Tonight while level at 4;500 FT; we (Student and Instructor) were blinded for 3-4 seconds by a green laser approximately 10 miles south/southeast of SGJ. The laser came from a residential community immediately west of the main beach road on the beach side of St. Augustine. The laser illuminated; found our aircraft; and then remained trained on our aircraft for 3-4 seconds. While we were not harmed; we were blinded and our night vision remained obscured for a short while after. It took a few minutes to become fully acclimated to night flying again.

An Instructor pilot and his Student were momentarily blinded by a green laser while in level flight at 4;500 MSL.


Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

This event occurred during a training session (in which I was training--my instructor filed a report for this incident as well).Air Carrier X; while on short final; went around (on its own) due to an 'unstable approach'. A heading and altitude were issued to keep this aircraft laterally separated from Air Carrier Y; which had already been cleared for takeoff and had started its departure roll. Air Carrier Y reported Air Carrier X in sight and stated that it would maintain visual separation (which was authorized by ATC). A subsequent departure; Air Carrier Z; was erroneously issued a takeoff clearance rather than a Line-Up-And-Wait (LUAW) clearance; so this aircraft was unfortunately 'thrown into the mix'. Air Carrier Z was assigned a heading and altitude below Air Carrier Y; so separation was never lost between any of the aircraft noted in this report. However; when Air Carrier Z was stopped at 2;000 FT.; this aircraft eventually conflicted with a TEB arrival (being handled by N90) descending out of 2;000 FT.; without the required 3 NM lateral separation.In the event of go-around; EWR Tower has a missed approach procedure that conflicts with its standard departure procedure. This is because of airspace limitations: TEB traffic is descending to the west and LaGuardia airspace is to the east. There is very little room to separate aircraft in this narrow corridor of airspace (EWR's NE Flow: Arriving Runway 4R; Departing Runway 4L). Airspace changes should definitely be made to ensure a safer flow of traffic--at the MINIMUM; the SID and the missed approach procedure should NOT be in conflict!

EWR Tower Developmental reports about SID and Airspace conflictions and the need to change airspace or SID due to conflictions.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Inadvertently taxied through 'taxiway island'.  While taxiing in toward gate; we taxied through the south 'island/no taxi' area between taxiways J3 & J4. It was late night; and I had turned off taxi light as courtesy to opposite direction aircraft on taxiway J; and marshallers in gate area. When I turned toward gate; I proceed through the UNLIT 'no taxi' area. As we passed by BLACK vertical marker the FO (First Officer) noticed we had taxied through the 'no taxi' island. If airports feel it's important enough to mark an area unavailable for aircraft movement during daylight hours; maybe it would be wise to illuminate it during hour of darkness.

Taxiing into gate in MCO we were cleared to enter the ramp on J3. As we turned into J3 we proceeded into our gate. After shutdown we realized we may have taxied through the edge of the south most green panted area between J3 and J4. This area does not have any lighting.

Air carrier flight crew reported inadvertently taxiing through a 'no taxi' area at MCO; noting that the area is not lit at night.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were given taxi instructions from the gate at GSO to Runway 23L via Kilo; K6; with expected delays due to traffic into ZZZ. We taxied down Kilo; but the sign for K6 was located 'after' the intersection of Kilo and K6 (not before); so we continued past the intersection; and then saw the late sign for K6. We stopped and asked ATC if we had in fact gone past K6; which they confirmed but said 'no problem'. We asked and received permission to taxi forward on Kilo and execute a 180 degree turn at the taxiway near the entrance to the cargo ramp; which GSO Ground approved; then taxied down Kilo again to K6; and waited for our flow time to ZZZ. The problem could have been easily avoided if the taxi intersection sign had been placed ahead of the K6 intersection (facing towards K5 vs. the cargo ramp); instead of after the intersection.I would suggest that the taxiway K6 sign be placed 'before' the intersection of Kilo and K6; so that a pilot taxiing down Kilo and looking for K6 would actually see it. Where it sits currently; past the actual K6 intersection; does no good to anyone; and is conducive to other pilots missing this intersection. A sign is cheap; compared to the potential problems.

During taxi at GSO we were taxiing to Runway 23L from the terminal via J3; K; and K6. We had passed taxiway K6 and continued straight on taxiway K. During the time we passed it; I was running the before takeoff checklist where I tried being outside of the airplane but the entire checklist is verifying the inside components are set and completed. The sun was also glaring in from my right side due to its position where I was partially blinded through the whole taxi even with sunglasses on. When I completed the checklist I looked up and saw the approach light systems for Runway 23L and looked behind and saw we missed K6. I advised Ground that we missed K6 and asked if we'd be able to make the turnaround we told them we'd have to wait until we were at the end and the Captain said we were able to so they said continue back K to K6 hold short Runway 23L. The Captain told me the sign for K6 is also after the taxiway and if you don't see that there isn't a taxiway past the sign it's already too late because you have to continue straight on K. When we taxied back; I wasn't able to confirm what sign was before K6 intersection. [Causes of the incident include] running the before takeoff checklist; sun glare on my side of cockpit; and the possibility that the K6 sign is after the taxiway. This was the last leg of a 4 day trip.

Air carrier flight crew reported the positioning and location of a taxiway sign K/K6 was confusing; which resulted in a taxiway incursion at GSO airport.