Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was first officer on flight. The flight was dispatched from a maintenance base with an inoperative Primary Flight Display Unit (PFDU) on the first officer's side.  I was extremely concerned about the operation of this aircraft with an inoperative PFD. In over 13000 hours of aviation experience I have never been put in the position of being dispatched to fly a revenue; part 121 flight; 'partial panel.'The EFIS displays are comprised of the captain's and co-pilot's Primary Flight Displays and Navigation Displays. The PFDs present the pilots with the basic information required to fly the aircraft; such as aircraft attitude; airspeed; flight envelope data; vertical speed and altitude. The PFD also presents the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) and the flight director. The NDs (Navigation Displays) present flight plan information; aircraft position and flight path; navigation features (airfields; navaids; waypoints; etc); weather radar; flight plan vertical and speed constraints; TCAS information; and terrain.Prior to departure I discussed this MEL with the captain and a check airman. I expressed my concern about operating without a PFD. Everyone was in agreement that this MEL caused the airplane to be operated with a reduced margin of safety. There were no notes or operational procedures in the MEL providing guidance on how the pilots should deal with the loss of this display.  It is not possible to view attitude and airspeed simultaneously with navigation data. I had to choose one or the other. The pilot must press the PFD/ND XFR switch frequently. It is not possible to view terrain and attitude information simultaneously. It is not possible to view TCAS and attitude information simultaneously. Situational awareness is diminished.FMA changes that are required callouts are often out of view. Altitude displays that are required for callouts are often out of view. The AOM (Aircraft Operations Manual) calls for the pilot to view terrain information on the ND in the terminal area in the approach and departure phase of flight. In order to comply with that procedure the pilot must select ND. When ND is selected the FMA is not in view and neither is altitude information. This denies the pilot of displays that are required for altitude callouts and FMA annunciations.  It is also necessary to press the TERR button when radar data is needed. The workload of the first officer increases dramatically with this deferral and his attention becomes entirely 'heads down.' The TCAS information that is normally available is hidden.  RNAV arrivals and departures would be extremely difficult; particularly in convective weather. The pilot would have to switch between ND and PFD; TERR on then off; while trying to comply with multiple speed and altitude restrictions. It is also impossible to see the 'brick' or 'blue stick' on the PFD when the ND is displayed.  AOM advises pilots to set up ND to provide raw data. The pilot is deprived of attitude and airspeed information while viewing this data.  This MEL should only be used to return an aircraft to a maintenance station for repairs. The first officer is deprived of basic safety information and instruments. This reduces situational awareness; makes it easy to miss required callouts; and erodes general flight safety.

Aircraft was dispatched at night with First Officer's display inoperative per MEL.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had a meeting with [Name X] from flight safety regarding a report I filed for Aircraft X. During the meeting; I mentioned that I had to write a statement for the company [five days prior]. Supervisor told me that statement I wrote on the report was not detailed enough; so he wanted me to write another one.Union steward was with me during the time. At the time; Supervisor had copies of the report; log pages; job cards and reference that was for Aircraft X. I asked Supervisor for the copies of all the documents he had so I can write the statement for him since event occurred about one month ago and I didn't want to miss any detail of the event. [Name X] wanted me to write another report regarding the statement. Next day I gave a copy of my statement to [Name Y].

Technician reported that the company requested a rewrite of his safety report.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 171; Flight Crew Total 12069; Flight Crew Type 2532

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

An hour prior to arrival in Houston I called door 2L and asked the flight attendant to wake the flying First Officer. A couple minutes later the Captain's dinner came up and I was able to see that the flying First Officer was awake with the crew rest curtain put away. At this time to TTORO3 RNAV was loaded in the box with all the correct airspeeds and altitude restrictions double checked. The 8R approach was also loaded but with no transition from TTORO to 8R as TTORO was presently our clearance limit. Approximately 34 minutes prior to touchdown the Captain and I both expressed concern that the other First Officer had not returned to the flight deck. At this time Houston Center instructed us to descend from FL390 to FL330. At this time the Captain called door 1L and asked where the other First Officer was. A couple minutes later he returned to the flight deck and stated he had never received his wake up call. Later I discovered the flight attendant did not give it to him as he was already awake with the curtain put away. At this point I went to the bathroom and upon my return I discovered the PF (flying First Officer) was attempting to verify the MSCOT4 RNAV arrival and I pointed out we were cleared for the TTORO3 RNAV. It appears that during my time in the back either someone changed the box or it had a glitch as now only the first restriction was entered. Once the 2nd restriction was entered it was clear we were over 3;000 plus feet high and needed the speed brake deployed immediately. The Captain told the PF he needed to fly the plane immediately and that he and I would worry about the box. After entering another restriction we realized that the airplane had entered VNAV path and that the PF had left the speedbrakes out. I noticed the plane was 30 knots slow and told the PF to accelerate. At this point the Captain stated that he was going to reboot the arrival and he reselected the approach and runway and immediately hit enter. This left us with the active waypoint 3 miles in front of us and a discontinuity. The Captain went to close the discontinuity and I told him that we were now missing 2 points and read him the next point to enter. At this time we crossed over the active point and went into HDG. After entering the point the Captain hit enter and told the PF he could LNAV to the point. I then gave the Captain the next point and its restrictions. At this time both the Captain and I noticed we were left of course and realized we were still in HDG. We told the PF to go to LNAV and we ended up 1.7 miles left of course before correcting. As we continued the approach I realized that someone had entered the TTORO transition. It is my guess that while I was in the lavatory the TTORO transition was entered and no one checked the arrival restrictions.

Air carrier flight crew describes a track deviation during arrival when the flying First Officer arrives late to the cockpit; stating that he did not receive his wake up call. The cleared arrival had been entered into the FMC previously; but the flying First Officer attempts to enter the flight planned arrival and the deviation occurs.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

As I was coming in to land on 4L in BOS; there was a B-767 landing on the parallel side. Just as I was about to flare got hit by a sudden gust of wind; which I thought was the wake turbulence; and instantly added some power to get better control of the airplane. However by then was almost in the flare and airplane touched down with higher speed than planned for; because of which I hit brakes right as I touched.  As a result the main gear [tires] on both sides got burned out and lost a lot of rubber at a spot on each of them.

Cessna reported flat-spotting the main gear tires after applying brakes with too much force following a wake turbulence encounter from a B767 landing on a parallel runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I'm with a student; doing touch and goes on Runway 32 at ZZZ. The day was busy with multiple airplanes in pattern and a white helicopter all doing [charity flights]. The helicopter pilot was taking off from the helicopter pads and departing to the east as he should be during most of the morning. Someone holding short for 32 started yapping on the radio about deer on the runway. The pilots in the traffic pattern acknowledged it and continued flying. At this point I had just departed. The helicopter pilot at that time decided to fly to the west side of 32 and chase the deer around. I reported that I was on downwind for 32. I observed the helicopter circling to the west side of 32 at an approximate altitude of 20ft. I continued the base and final turn; my student flying; and me on the radio calls. I made a final call about a 3/4's of a mile down the extended center-line on 32. I observed the helicopter still circling but keeping over the grass. When my student was getting into the flare; and were touching down; the helicopter turned to the east and crossed right in front and over us. I began asking for the pilot to acknowledge me on the radio; which he did not immediately do. I asked for a radio check and another plane called out immediately that he could hear me loud and clear. I kept trying to get the helicopter pilot on the radio. He had just landed and had picked up more kids; and made a radio call that he was departing again. He then heard me squeaking at him and I asked him to write my phone number down; he said he cannot while he is flying; I asked him to ping me when he lands. 10 minutes later or so he came back on the radio and asked for the pilot that wanted to give him a phone number. I gave him my number and asked him to call me when he is done flying for the day. I got a call from him that afternoon. He identified himself [and] I introduced myself; and explained what the situation was. Had my student or I decided to do a go-around for any reason; we would have almost certainly ended up having a midair collision. I asked him to not chase deer around the runway and to keep an extra lookout when the traffic pattern is busy. He apologized about the situation and advised me that he will be extra vigilant when looking for traffic.

C172 flight instructor reported a severe conflict with a helicopter at non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 26000

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

At FL400 we encountered a left engine failure accompanied with slight vibration and an over temp of 900 plus degrees. We asked for an immediate descent; and started a right turn. We ran the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation Checklist and the engine was shut down. EGT eventually reduced and no fire indications were present. Last I remember seeing was N1 rotation around 24 percent. It was decided that ZZZ was the closest suitable airport to divert to. I flew the aircraft while the Captain coordinated with Flight Attendants; Dispatch and informed the Passengers. We had good CRM which helped us stay in the Yellow/Green and maintain good situational awareness. We ran all pertinent checklists in QRH. I flew the aircraft near ZZZ and Captain took over and performed an uneventful single-engine landing. Fire Rescue met us; checked us over; and cleared us to taxi to gate. Brake cooling was checked with no issues.

I had confusion [regarding the] proper assessment of engine condition based on my training. Autothrottles disconnected initially indicating an engine malfunction. Next was a rise in EGT prompting the QRH and initially retarding the throttle and requesting a lower altitude. No Engine Fire warning was present and a quick test of Fire Warning System proved all was functional. Engine Failure and Shutdown Checklist was accomplished. We now were indicating adequate N1 and N2 rotation; acceptable EGT; and a Crossbleed indication drawing me to a restart situation. My assessment was that was a bad idea considering such a high EGT indication on our initial problem.

B737 flight crew reported that the left engine was shut down due to an overtemp and vibration. The flight diverted to the nearest suitable field.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We took off into a severe thunderstorm out of ATL. We got the ding for departure check; then the Captain immediately said over the PA for the Flight Attendants (FA) to remain seated. We hit the worst turbulence I have ever experienced. We took a lightning strike to the right wing. We had even worse turbulence with huge drops. I have never heard Passenger scream like that. Everyone was terrified and we were trying to reassure people and keep our composure while we were scared ourselves. We took another lightning strike to the left wing. There was absolutely no communication from the flight deck. They eventually called to say we could get up; even though it was still very bumpy. The A informed him we had taken a lightning strike and he told her we didn't later; after the First Officer (FO) confirmed it; he agreed that we had. They never checked on us; never checked on the Passenger or made specific announcements about the incident. They weren't even out for view during deplaning.

737 flight attendant reported the aircraft encounter turbulence; with two lightning strikes and passengers were emotionally upset; but there was no communication from the flight deck crew.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 1512; Flight Crew Type 1380

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was on the ARSNL4.MRB departure off Rwy 34R at HEF. I was hand flying the aircraft. I was just starting to merge onto the CSN 056 radial and still climbing to 2000 ft (about 2 minutes off the runway. The controller told me to turn to heading 320 and climb maintain 3000 ft; then to expect the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 5 at FDK. He then told me to go to heading 020 and climb and maintain 4000 ft. He asked me to tell him when I had the weather at FDK (I was too low/far away to receive it at the moment.) He then asked me what fix I wanted to start the approach from; I ask him to standby. All of this happened within about 60 seconds. I was bringing the approach up on the Garmin 430W GPS and at the Transition window I had a choice of Vectors or JOVUR. I requested JOVUR as the IAF. The controller came back with PHILB which even though it is the next fix on the approach does not appear on the Garmin menu because it is an IF; not and IAF. I told him it was not on my list of fixes so he spelled it and I entered it as a direct to into the GPS. Sometime in the process of dialing in the five character fix I passed through my assigned altitude of 4000 ft to approximately 4600 ft before I noticed.The normal ARSNL4.MRB SID would take close to 30 minutes to arrive at MRB and would have given me plenty of time to get the weather at FDK including the runway/approach in use and bring it up on the GPS. Even just the portion to CSN would have been enough time to accomplish the above tasks. From my weather briefing before flight I knew that the winds at FDK were favoring Rwy 5; but they were light at 3-4 knots; and winds had been shifting with the weather system passage. I had printed out the most likely approaches including RNAV (GPS) Rwy 5 at FDK and they were in the seat next to mine; but I did not have time to look at them until after I had entered PHILB into the GPS (and missed my altitude). I had entered the FDK ATIS frequency in radio 2 before takeoff.The controller was doing me a favor - he cut a 53 minute flight plan ETE to 23 minutes. However; the multiple headings; altitudes; questions; and in particular selecting a fix which was not an IAF on the approach all during my initial climb created a heavy workload for someone who was hand flying the aircraft. I think it would help if controllers were more aware of the workload their instructions can cause; especially for single pilot IFR in IMC. If he had left me on the 020 heading for a minute without querying about approach fixes I would have had time to get the approach up and respond smartly to his instructions/questions. I had reviewed the approaches at FDK; but did not remember PHILB. I should have guessed the Rwy 5 approach and loaded it in the GPS before takeoff. I wrongly assumed that I would have time to do this during the normal departure procedure.

The pilot of a Cirrus reported an increase in single pilot IFR workload when ATC attempted to shorten the planned route of flight.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

We were given clearance to take off Runway 15 and given notification of traffic 2 miles final Runway 19 into DCA. At around 80 knots we received the EICAS master warning message DOOR CRG FWD OPEN. We rejected the takeoff and began to slow on centerline while maintaining control of the aircraft. We notified Tower and were given instructions to turn right onto Taxiway M and hold short Runway 19. We exited Runway 15 at about 20-25 knots. Given those instructions it was my understanding that there was ample room on Taxiway M to exit the active Runway 15. I planned to exit the runway; stop on M; and handle the situation. However; there is no room on Taxiway M in between Runway 15 and Runway 19 to stop while remaining clear of both active runways. By the time this was realized while turning the aircraft and noticing the poor runway markings; we came to a stop with our nose approximately five feet over the hold-short line for Runway 19. Tower instructed the landing aircraft to go around and we were given clearance to cross Runway 19. Ground gave me a phone number to call and while talking with the individual I expressed my concern with how that instruction was almost impossible to comply with. Given that we need to clear the threshold of 15 to be clear of the active runway there; it is impossible to be clear of both active runways at Taxiway M. The situation was made even more difficult given it was a rejected takeoff; creating a high-stress workload. The individual on the phone stated he understood that it is hard to do and that they have known that for some time. I accepted responsibility for the mistake. The cause of the incursion was a high-stress workload caused by a rejected takeoff and possible emergency situation. This combined with ambiguous instructions from Tower and poorly labeled runway markings created enough confusion for me to cross over the hold-short line for Runway 19. Looking back; it would have been much easier; either through ATC instruction or by crew suggestion; to instead roll to the end of Runway 15 (about 1500-2000 feet beyond Taxiway M) and exit at F. There is ample room there and even a runup pad to pull to the side. The short distance at Taxiway M does not provide enough room for an aircraft to clear Runway 15 and be compliant; while simultaneously holding short of Runway 19. Exiting the runway a bit slower (despite the high-speed cutaway) would have given me more time to assess the given distance.

Both runways 15 and 19 were in use for takeoffs. Were we waiting for our space in the queue for takeoff. We were given takeoff clearance for 15. At around 80 kts during the takeoff roll; the DOOR CRG FWD OPEN warning appeared on the EICAS. Both pilots recognized the condition. The flying pilot immediately rejected the takeoff and maintained control of the aircraft during the rejection. During the rejection; I made a call to Tower that we were rejecting. Tower asked for the reason. I replied with the warning we saw. Tower gave us instruction at that point to turn right on Taxiway M and hold short Runway 19. We both called out Taxiway M. The Captain began the turnoff and I looked to verify the warning and make sure there were no other serious indications that needed immediate attention. Based on the angle of turnoff from Runway 15 to M; I did not recognize the normal runway/holdshort markings for Runway 19. I noticed out of the corner of my eye that we were getting close to Runway 19 and called out 'Hold; Hold; Hold.' The Captain immediately stopped and that was when we recognized that our nose was over the Runway 19 hold short line by about 5 feet. Based on the clearance received; the Captain was attempting to clear the active Runway 15 onto Taxiway M and hold short Runway 19. However; there is not enough space to exit Runway 15 on M and hold short of Runway 19 while remaining clear of both active runways. This was realized too late as our nose had already crossed the Runway 19 holdshort. Tower directed the aircraft on short final to Runway 19 to Go-Around. When clear; we were given clearance to cross Runway 19. On the other side of Runway 19; we informed Ground we needed to return to the ramp area to have our doors checked. On the taxi back; Ground gave us a number to call and the Captain talked to Tower. The Captain expressed his concerns over the situation to Tower and Tower acknowledged it is a difficult/complicated situation because of the very short Taxiway M section between Runways 15 and 19. The crew was immediately placed into a high-stress/high-workload situation having just rejected a takeoff because of a warning and possible emergency situation. The combination of the limited distance on M between 15 and 19; the belief that we needed to clear Runway 15 while complying with the given instruction; and the stress of the rejected takeoff; created enough confusion that lead to the nose of the aircraft crossing over the holdshort for Runway 19. Because of the warning and possible emergency; it would've been better to take things a little slower. As a crew; we could've continued the roll on Runway 15 to the next turnoff rather than quickly trying to clear the active runway with the given instruction from Tower. There was nobody behind us who had received takeoff clearance so the extra 20 seconds to rollout to the next turnoff would have been beneficial for many reasons. Since most crews; like us; are probably unaware of the short distance between Runway 15 and 19 on Taxiway M; heads-up from Tower that you can't clear Runway 15 while turning off on Taxiway M and hold short of Runway 19 would have been helpful. I would suggest that the area on M between Runway 15 and 19 is marked as a hotspot on the airport diagram with a writeup stating that it is not possible to clear one of those runways on to Taxiway M and hold short of the other runway.

Air carrier flight crew reported a runway incursion after a rejected takeoff. Flight crew stated poorly labeled runway markings at DCA airport contributed to the event.


Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During descent we received a PITCH MISTRIM message on the PFD. The Captain then disconnected the autopilot to fix the problem. He stated that the elevator trim was stuck and would not move. He then called for an emergency checklist. I then ran the emergency check for Jammed Elevator Trim. We declared an emergency with ATC; notified the passengers of the situation; and then landed uneventfully at our destination. Passengers left and we wrote up the aircraft.

Monitoring pilot ran the appropriate emergency checklist which resulted in autopilot being turned off. At that time; I (pilot flying) was unable to move the elevator trim. It was frozen in a nose down position. At all times; the aircraft was under control and stable. We then proceeded to notify ATC and declared an emergency. We landed uneventfully and upon shutdown; we were met by Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters and debriefed them of the reason for the emergency.

A CE560XL PFD alerted PITCH MIS-TRIM so the emergency checklist was completed; an emergency declared and; with the aircraft stable and in control; a landing was completed.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We departed LGB today on a Part 121 passenger flight. Our aircraft was facing north. Our taxi clearance for departure was to taxi to runway 30 via E2 and E taxiway and hold short of J. Our Jeppesen taxiway diagram which is dated 25 June did not have E2 nor E on it. It showed a taxiway closed with X X X on it. We did see the yellow and black taxiway signs of E2 and E. I knew my Jeppesen charts in my iPad were current and up to date with the most recent update. Several hours later and done with my flying; I found the current and up to date taxiway diagram on the FAA NOS website. I downloaded the taxi chart and reviewed it. The NOS FAA chart just like the Jeppesen chart did not show an E2 nor E taxiway. I am confused why a taxiway was commissioned before it was released in charting. I did ask the Tower Controller; who was also controlling Ground; how long the E2 and E taxiway has been commissioned. And if I recall correctly; He said for 2 weeks. I would assume this is adequate time to get updated info to pilots who operate on the field. I also referenced LGB NOTAMS and there was nothing about E2 nor E. Make sure charts are available to pilots that are up to date. When a new taxiway is commissioned it should be charted or NOTAMed.

Air Carrier pilot reported LGB charts did not show the taxiways they were assigned.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Type 30

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

At ZZZ; Human Remains were added in cargo but not included in Manifest. The flight crew did not have any knowledge of this until after shutdown in ZZZ1.

Air Carrier Captain reported the undocumented transport of dangerous goods due to the flight crew not issued the required departure HazMat documents.


The following event is an example of a trend of events I have noticed. While no regulatory or operational violation occurred; the margin for safety in maintaining those regulations was compromised. There have been a trend of dispatch flight plans that I have observed and that has been observed by my peers that resemble this situation.During my preflight in Memphis I noticed that our FMS displayed 'check reserve fuel.' This message is commonly displayed during the preflight planning phase and is usually caused by additional points on the arrival that will not be reached. The fuel displayed at the destination was still within acceptable FAA limits. I did not feel uncomfortable with the fuel situation at that time. Upon reaching cruise altitude we leveled off and I reviewed the flight plan once again. I looked at the fuel over the destination in the FMS and saw we would land with only 1;700lbs; 200lbs below the legal reserve of 1;886 lbs. I checked the initialization speed and saw 'max speed' was selected. After cross checking the flight plan; I noticed that the cruise speed planned was .61 Mach or 203KIAS after the top of climb. As the plan progressed the cruise speed was progressively lowered to .59 Mach or 194 KIAS. I informed the Captain that we were going to have to slow down if we wanted to make it to our destination with sufficient fuel. Our current fuel situation at the top of climb was 160lbs more than planned.My captain and I felt uncomfortable with the situation. My captain stated that he did not feel comfortable flying that slow. I was uncomfortable landing with less than the legal reserve. I changed the FMS cruise speed to plan for a slightly higher speed of .70 mach and the FMS showed that we would land with 1900lbs. Just above the legal reserve. The captain and I discussed the possibility of diverting with each other and dispatch if the fuel became an issue. The captain and I both agreed we were in a 'minimum fuel' situation. Around GVE VOR; ATC asked if we could give them our best forward speed at which point we informed them that we were unable to accept due to our fuel situation. ATC was able to accommodate us by climbing us to FL370 from FL350. We continued to our destination utilizing a thrust idle descent to conserve fuel. We landed in Newark with 2;260lbs of fuel almost exactly as planned by the dispatch release.The trend I am seeing from dispatch is that the fuel being given is only just enough to reach our destination and is being planned at long range cruise speeds or lower. This does not take into account ATC requests for faster speeds or unforecasted weather. Dispatch is intentionally planning lower speeds in our flight plan to force pilots to slow down in order to reach our destination with enough fuel. The cost index program should not force pilots to reduce their speed. Dispatch should not be giving pilots flight plans that do not allow for contingencies such as unforecasted weather and ATC instructions. The trends I am seeing in our company flight plans are frequently providing pilots with insufficient contingency fuel. While the pilot in command always has the option to add more fuel to the aircraft at the gate; he/she should not consistently need to do this. The minimum fuel and minimum speed planning is removing options from the cockpit of our flight crews. I believe the company is fully aware of the extent that this is occurring and many pilots feel this concern needs to be addressed before this policy leads to an accident.Threats: Company cost saving policyErrors: Flight crew's insufficient review of flight planningUndesired aircraft state: The aircraft was insufficiently fuel to accept an ATC speed requestAs always; thoroughly reviewing the dispatch release prior to departure is required for safety of flight. It's the flight crews responsibility to ensure the aircraft is properly fuel prior to each flight. The company needs to review it's fuel policies to ensure aircraft are dispatched with sufficient fuel that includes contingencies for unforecasted weather; ATC delays and emergencies.

An EMB-145XR First Officer reported it is becoming quite common to be released with a minimum fuel flight plan and stated he considered this potentially dangerous.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

When retracting the canopy before pulling the jetbridge; the right side of the canopy would not retract. I called [Maintenance] to advise. The ramp service man came up to the bridge and advised there is a known problem with the retractor at this specific gate but will be able to retract the canopy back after the bridge is pulled back a few inches from the aircraft. I was not comfortable so notified zone to advise. Zone agreed to not move the jetbridge until [Maintenance] arrived. When they did; they pulled the bridge back with the right side of the canopy down. I observed the canopy slid to the left of the aircraft before pulling completely away from the aircraft. He then was able to retract the canopy as the ramp service man mentioned. I asked him what the issue was and he said this was SOP and was ok to pull the bridge with the canopy down. I challenged him as I knew this was completely inaccurate procedure. He advised me he has been doing this job for 24 years and this was SOP. I advised him perhaps he needed to reach out to the Jet bridge trainers for clarification. I notified Supervisors. Should this of happened to a new hire; the direction given by the mechanic would lead the agent to think it is ok to pull a jet bridge with retracting the canopy. I also learned shortly after the incident for this specific jet bridge; if the canopy is lowered too much on the right side; it will not retract. The work around is to pull the bridge back a few inches; then retract the canopy. This workaround is unacceptable as clearly you are at risk of damaging the aircraft and goes completely against SOP.

A Customer Service Gate Agent reported a known fault with a jetbridge requires using non standard procedures to operate correctly.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

After receiving clearance from DFW Tower to line up and wait on Runway 35L; we performed the Before Takeoff Checklist and aligned the airplane with the runway.We received the clearance for takeoff; applied the required flex thrust and commenced the takeoff run. At 80 KTS we performed our cross checks; then at about 115 KTS; Tower cancels our takeoff clearance due to an incursion of another plane down the runway.We performed the rejected takeoff maneuver and vacated the runway.Then; we asked Tower to hold position and we contacted Dispatch and Maintenance; and after discussing with them; we agreed to continue the flight after waiting for the brakes to cool down.After we got a green indication on the brake system; we obtained a new take off clearance and we continued the flight with no further problem.

CRJ Captain reported an aborted takeoff due to a runway incursion by another aircraft.


Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Single engine taxi out to Runway XXL for departure; 40 seconds after #1 engine start rollback; we got a 'Source Off LT and Gen Offline LT.'  20 seconds after that; Tower notifies us we have a fire in one of our engines. Simultaneously; a passenger on the Captain's side tells our flight attendants 'he sees a fire on the #1 engine'; and the flight attendants are passing that info to us in the cockpit via 4 dings and through the headphone.  By now; we also have an 'ENG FAIL' warning for #1.  Max EGT seen on #1 was 450.  EGT at the ENG Fail was approximately 350.  No fire or OVHT light appeared; however the Tower and another aircraft were still screaming that we were on fire.  We executed the Engine Fire Emergency procedures for the #1 engine; established communication with the Fire Chief; who stated that the fire looked to be from the rear of the engine only and he saw no visible damage to the aircraft.  Normal shutdown and completion of checklist items for the emergency.  All checklist items completed and uneventful exit from the aircraft at the gate.  Maintenance was already on hand and found a few initial assessments via their BIT examination.  During the initial fire; our B Flight Attendant and a few passengers also stated they heard a bang and saw several long flames come from the back of the engine.  Captain; First Officer and flight attendants all debriefed each other; and we completed the rest of our day with three more legs.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]

A B737-700 Left Engine shutdown about 40 seconds after start and passengers began reporting a fire so the crew shut the engine down with Engine Fire Checklist while the airport fire crew stood by. At the gate Maintenance determined was a tail pipe fire because of a fuel control issue.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

On beginning of takeoff roll plane veered to left. Aborted takeoff; got back to center of runway; attempted takeoff again. Nose wheel steering off; nose wheel centered; advance power; plane veered left again; aborted a second time. Returned plane to center of runway; lined up again; held brakes advanced power to the same torque; around 50%; released brakes; plane veered left again. Aborted takeoff; returned to hangar. Wrote up 'plane will veer hard left at beginning of takeoff roll'.I have flown this plane before and it did veer left but was manageable. This time the FO and I could [not] get plane to not veer left. I believe with the same torque on both engines the blade angle on the right engine is greater than the blade angle of the left engine. Would take a lot of throttle stagger to match the blade angles together on takeoff roll. What could be done is set the torque even use some sort stroboscope to calibrate the pitch angle to compare the two engines. There must be some way to measure the pitch of the prop at any given power setting. I believe the difference in pitch at given power settings causes asymmetric thrust. It's a combination throttle alignment and blade angle that causes the plane to veer left.

SA-227AC Captain reported multiple attempts to takeoff; but each was rejected because of directional control issues.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Type 8961

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Excursion Taxiway

During taxi out for takeoff holding in line for departure at runway 23R with thunderstorms in vicinity and rain having just passed over airport; we were instructed to follow the aircraft in front of us onto 23R and back taxi. We queried controller if  the airport was being turned around for a 05L departure and ground said yes.  Aircraft we were following was going much faster and we saw him turn off to right near the end of the runway and tower then told us continue to follow him and turn off at taxiway B2. There was a lot of standing water on runway and taxiways and as we approached signage for B2 we agreed that this was our turnoff. I initiated a slow right turn and could not see any paint markings but this was not unusual for MEX as they have ungrooved runways and there is always standing water after it rains. As I was about to turn left onto taxiway B to continue to 05L I realized we had crossed to taxiway B on an island not B2. There were no obstructions on the island and I only saw one yellow light off my left side. The taxi was smooth and nothing abnormal was felt or seen. The striped yellow paint of the island was not visible until we were looking at it from a different angle.

A319 Captain reported being cleared to back taxi on Runway 23R at MMMX and exit at Taxiway B2. Standing water from a recent thunderstorm made taxiway lines invisible and the aircraft was inadvertently taxied across an 'island' on the way to Taxiway B.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

My student and I were in the pattern at VTI practicing takeoffs and landings; initially using Runway 27 (winds were 330 at 6 knots). After 4 takeoffs and landings; we decided to switch to Runway 34 since the winds were favoring 34. There was no traffic at the airport up to this point; and there had been no radio communication from other pilots in the area; although we continued to make radio calls while in the pattern.On our second landing on Runway 34; just as we were rolling out on the runway after landing; we spotted an aircraft rolling down Runway 9 at high speed toward the intersection with Runway 34. We were clearly on a collision course; and I determined that we were unable to stop without hitting the [other aircraft]. I immediately took the controls and veered off the runway to the right into the grass to avoid hitting the other aircraft. At this point I determined that we would not be able to stop safely prior to reaching the edge of the airport boundary; so I applied full power and quickly lifted off. At that point we decided to leave the airport and head back to base.Key contributors to this event:1.) The other pilot made no radio calls; even though he was monitoring the traffic frequency (he did talk on the radio afterwards saying 'oh relax' to my inquiry about not making position reports).2.) The pilot of the [other aircraft] landed Runway 9 downwind in opposite direction of traffic (again without any radio calls); thus he was in a position where we were not expecting traffic.3.) The left corner of the intersection of Runway 34 and 9 (as viewed from Runway 34) is obscured by tall trees; thus we were unable to spot the traffic until it was almost too late.

C172 instructor pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft while landing at VTI airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 28000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

My aircraft was on final approach; landing under visual flight conditions.  We were instructed to 'go-around' by the Tower Controller due to traffic congestion.  During the go-around procedure; the nose landing gear on our aircraft would not retract.  We asked ATC to give us delay vectors to give us time to evaluate the situation and complete the necessary check list procedures.  We were unable to retract the nose landing gear and elected to divert our flight to an airport where the runways were longer and repair facilities were available.  The landing gear position indicators were indicating that the landing gear was down and locked into the down position and a normal approach and landing was completed.  The emergency equipment was requested to standby as a precaution.

A CE-560 nose gear failed to retract after a go-around at ATC direction.  The crew diverted to a nearby alternate where maintenance was available.


Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Upon arriving the 'A' Flight Attendant said she had a passenger ask her if the seat bottom cushions were actually flotation devices like she said during the takeoff announcement. She immediately realized her mistake and told him he was right; they weren't on this aircraft. Since none of us noticed it during the demo...well; I'd like to know since when the passenger actually start listening to the demos? We were surprised to see the new aircraft as we expected a different aircraft. I just didn't listen that close to the demo announcement and didn't notice her mentioning the seat bottom cushions were flotation devices. We all missed it. I would suggest have an extra copy of the preflight bulletin in all our announcements books so it isn't missed. She used her announcement book; just didn't add the new part from the bulletin.

A Flight Attendant reported that their B737-900 seat bottoms cushions were not flotation devices but a passenger noted that the pre-takeoff PA announcement stated that the seat cushions were flotation devices.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 16200; Flight Crew Type 2000

Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

This flight departed in VFR conditions. It was an instrument training flight. The student pilot was initially in control of the aircraft. Navigation mode was GPS to Runway 28 at ROC. When we were cleared for the approach weather was VFR. Shortly thereafter; it went IFR and an IFR flight was filed in the air and we were cleared to the ROC airport and I requested ILS Runway 28 instead of GPS Runway 28. The instrument trainee was still in control of the aircraft. As we were being vectored conditions went to complete IFR. The trainee was having a difficult time with both heading and altitude. I was directing him but he was slow to respond. He was going below the assigned altitude on final. I finally took control of the aircraft. We were given altitude alerts by ATC. At some point we were cleared to land. The runway threshold came in sight and we landed. The low altitude issue would have been avoided had I; as the instructor; taken control of the aircraft as soon as we entered IFR conditions. This was not a deliberate action on my part but under the circumstances I acted too late. The flight was becoming uncontrollable. The Tower requested I call them upon shutdown. The lesson is as an instructor; take control immediately.

An instructor pilot reported that his instrument student pilot had difficulty controlling the aircraft on an ILS approach but he did not take control of the aircraft after ATC issued low altitude alerts.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On Takeoff roll; the First Officer (FO) and I noticed an 'air whooshing' sound around Vr. We both instinctively pushed forward on our window handles; and he said 'that's an odd sound'. With no warning lights; we continued into the air and cleaned up the configuration of the aircraft. The After Takeoff Checklist showed no abnormalities and the pressurization was working normally. We continued on to FL 350.About 10 minutes prior to Top of Descent (TOD); at FL 350; FO and I decided to coordinate a bathroom break with the flight attendants. As FO was getting ready to leave the flight deck; I pulled out my O2 mask and noticed the secure straps would not inflate and there was no flow sound when I pulled out my mask. It was then that I realized what the 'air whooshing' noise was on takeoff. We checked the flight deck O2 and the gauge read zero. We decided to start a slow descent to FL 250 while we looked up any guidance from the QRH and MEL. We also sent dispatch a message that 'Flight Deck O2 quantity indicated Zero and we were descending to FL 250. Do you know of anything else we should consider?'As we were leveling at FL250; ATC told us to continue to FL 240. Dispatch sent a message telling us there was no guidance or checklist for this situation. Within a couple of minutes; we got cleared to descend and continued our descent to below 10;000 feet to 5;000 feet.During the descent; we notified the flight attendants of our lack of O2 in the flight deck and asked if we could place a Portable O2 bottle with two mask in the flight deck to be prepared; in the case we had a rapid depressurization or smoke/fumes.  I contacted [personnel in flight operations] and advised him of the incident and asked if he would let me know what maintenance found with the O2. He contacted me with the info that the O2 flight deck bottle had been removed and replaced and the aircraft continued to [the next destination] with the next crew. Some considerations for this incident:There is NO checklist for flight deck O2 going to zero in flight (it has always been checked on the ground and if it were zero at that time; we would not go anywhere)If this situation had been noticed earlier in flight; according to the FARs; we would have had to descend right away. It was a clear VFR day and we had no alternate fuel. The lower altitude would have a much higher fuel burn; which would have necessitated a divert. This situation could have worse fuel consequences if on [oceanic route] or Trans-continental flight.After realizing we had no O2 in the flight deck; we asked the flight attendants to bring us a portable bottle with 2 mask in the event we had a rapid depressurization. With the new full face O2 mask; smoke goggles have been removed. We realized that if a smoke/fumes situation would have developed; the portable O2 bottle with 2 mask would not have been a good situation.

On takeoff; we both noticed a strange airflow noise at about 200 ft AGL. We both checked that our windows were closed and locked; and confirmed that the aircraft was pressurizing. Our primary focus shifted back to flying/monitoring the aircraft on the published departure. In a short time the noise diminished and went away. We continued our climb to cruise at FL360. Shortly before the top of descent; we arranged for a relief break. When I tried to pull my oxygen mask out; it wouldn't inflate. Looking up; I saw that crew oxygen was at 0 psi. We requested a descent to FL240 and began looking for guidance in our supplements. We also sent dispatch a message; advising them of the situation and asking them to advise us if we needed to descend further. We asked the flight attendant to bring the portable oxygen bottle to the cockpit; with two masks. We felt that this would provide us with some supplemental oxygen in case of a pressurization problem or smoke/fumes situation. We found that there is no guidance in either the aircraft Quick Reference Handbook or the company publications. Dispatch responded that they could not find any guidance either. During this time; we were cleared to descend via the arrival into our destination and descended as published below 10;000 ft MSL. I am submitting this report to record what happened and point out that there is no guidance readily available to crews in this situation. I feel that we did the best we could to comply with FAR supplemental oxygen requirements and to ensure the safety of our passengers in case of an emergency.

B737-900 flight crew reported that while in flight the Crew Oxygen had lost all its pressure.  He mentioned he and FO did notice an air wooshing sound on takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted

Crew notified Dispatch that they had contacted Tower for evidence of blown tire. Flight Attendant heard and felt light bump aircraft right. Aircraft systems 1 normal. No cargo shift; no bird strike. Possible tail strike per crew. ZZZ responded after inspection with no evidence of blown tire. Crew reported again [that] he suspected a tail strike. I pulled position report; crew was at FL360. [He] said he would like to return to ZZZ unless we felt comfortable continuing. I called [Maintenance Control] and [Chief Pilot]. They both say he was not sure of tail strike; continue for now and we will do conference call. Took approximately 30 minutes to connect with ARINC. I then connected [Chief Pilot] and [Maintenance Control] into conference call. Captain says aircraft pitch was at 11.1/11.2 and tail strike pitch was 11.0. Captain said that he erroneously enter numbers 30;000 pounds off at departure and reconfirmed Flight Attendant felt and heard light bump. [Chief Pilot] put us on hold to speak with Fleet Manager. I pulled tail strike in QRH; which says not to pressurize the aircraft; Flight Attendant confirms bump and to land at nearest suitable. All others on phone said they felt safe to continue to ZZZ1 as pressurization was normal and they were not sure it was a tail strike. Conference call dropped so Dispatch sent ACARS expressing my opinion that I disagreed and we needed to land at nearest suitable which by this time was ZZZ2. Captain said he agreed with Fleet [Manager] and was continuing to ZZZ1 to burn fuel and reduce weight. I said 'Copy you will be using your emergency authority'. Captain said he was diverting to ZZZ2. I received position report; entered into SABRE and ran flight plan to new station ZZZ. I advised Captain release in system and advised showed to be 1000 pounds above structural landing weight. Advised [Maintenance Control] of possible overweight arrival. Structural was 146.3 planned showed to be 147426 on landing weight. Actual landing weight was 145176. Tail strike was confirmed in ZZZ.

Dispatcher reported that flight crew reported possible tail strike on takeoff; resulting in confusion between maintenance and flight crew resulted in a diversion and precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 153; Flight Crew Total 17200; Flight Crew Type 5853

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Climbing out of 14;000 ft. we heard a loud bang. While investigating what it was there was a second bang and this time I saw glass shards coming off window 3L and saw the windows inner pane had completely shattered.  We leveled off at 16;000 ft. assessed the situation and decided to turn to ZZZ. Dispatch was notified and with no pressurization; controllability; or overweight landing issues no emergency was declared. Approach and landing were uneventful.

Captain reported cockpit window 3L shattered during climb and elected to perform an air turn back to a safe precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 9135; Flight Crew Type 4281

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On arrival into LBB; we needed to work an issue due to a flap fault. Decided to not proceed with the approach and climbed from 4700 MSL to 6000 MSL; get vectors so we could handle the problem. Vectors took us west; then to the south and west of the airport. Checklist was finished and all data rechecked; told approach that were ready to head back to the airport. At this time; we were about 15 miles to the southwest of the field and starting to get configured and running checklists. From our current position; we were cleared for the visual approach to 35L. We saw some tall towers below us and to the left of our heading to intercept the final and at least one to the right of course; so we decided to stay on a heading to intercept the extended final outside of FRIER for 35L; which would than maintain the towers in sight to the left and right of our course. As the final approach altitude was 4700 MSL; we descended from 6000 to 4700 MSL so as to be on altitude at the FAF at about 9 miles from the field (There is a note in the airport briefing guides to be alert for close in FAF and less altitude to get stabilized by). Once we checked in with tower; they told they were getting a low altitude alert for us; told them we were climbing back to 5200 MSL until on the extended centerline and clear of towers. Once on final; we went back down to 4700 and had a normal approach. Looking back; I probably should have been more directive in the location of where we needed to get vectors to so as not to be in a spot where; when cleared for the approach; it would put in in the area of tall towers. While all the towers were in sight; I should have recognized that they were a potential hazard to our route of flight to commence the approach. I talked with the First Officer about our flight and we decided to put in a report. After looking closer at the approach chart; there are quite a few towers; with some good height to them; to the south of the field; and very near the extended center line for runway 35L. It might be a good idea to state something about the towers and their proximity to the final of 35L in the airport briefing guide.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC while on a night approach to LBB.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure

I was working combined sectors during a slow period. Not much was happening; when [another] Sector Controller asked me if I knew anything about the Mode C intruder; labeled Aircraft X. I didn't; and noticed that it was at 35;000 ft. heading northwest bound. There was no flight plan information on this aircraft; so I called the [adjacent Center Sector] and asked them about it. They were unsure of what had happened; and since entering remove strip messages of the wrong aircraft has been common recently; I assumed that is what had happened.There is a good possibility that I saw the target and the data block; but did not register that the flight plan had been removed. This is a common corner of the Sector to 'flash through' aircraft that just clip the corner. If there would have been traffic at 35;000 ft. I'm rather certain I would have seen this target. We also have frequent 'bad radar hits' in the sector where this event took place. It's common to see Mode C Intruders in the flight levels for a few hits before they disappear.I'm only a novice computer programmer; but it seems extremely simple to include in the code of the next ERAM (En Route Automation Modernization) update an 'IF statement' that does not allow a target to be removed if the MODE C or Assigned Altitude is above 18;000 ft. Humans make mistakes. This appears to be a systemic issue that could easily be solved with a few lines of code.

Center Controller reported that an aircraft that did not display a radar data block flew through a corner of the airspace without coordination.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The pilot flying has already reported this incident. This is just a backup and second opinion. On our cruise flight the engine stopped running. We declared emergency and glided to the next field. Before landing the engine started again. We supposed the engine had stopped running because of the outside air temperature below -30C. We had the mechanic look at the engine. He could not find any problems and joined us for a run up. He suggested flying some traffic patterns. We did this. We also asked Malibu experts and they confirmed that this problem happens from time to time if you are flying below -30C. The next day we added Isopropyl alcohol and could continue our flight without event even at lower temperatures than -35C.

The pilot/passenger not flying reports engine failure at cruise altitude. An emergency was declared.  During the descent the engine restarted and a successful landing was accomplished.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Dispatch and flight crew failed to notice that PMDY was no longer a suitable ETOPS alternate based on the information provided.

Air carrier crew flew an oceanic flight with PMDY as an ETOPS alternate; but it was not legal because of inadequate weather information.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

On descent in to SUN; passing approximately FL180; ATIS was obtained. I checked in with Salt Lake Center; advised them we had the ATIS; and requested the RNAV/GPS 31 W MENIN transition. We were cleared down to 11;000. Passing approximately 13;000 we were cleared for the RNAV/GPS 31 W; routing only; maintain 11;000. Inside of OREYE we were cleared to 9;000. We called the field in sight and were cleared for the Visual Approach to 31. ATC advised us that a Metroliner was not talking to him but said Tower was; was off to our left and would follow us. We both looked at the TCAS and saw the target at about our 10 o'clock position and 5 miles. Descending through 10;000 we received a TA immediately followed by a RA. The pilot flying complied with the RA and I advised Center we were in a 'TCAS CLIMB.' Center asked us if we could continue the approach and I said no. We were then cleared back to 11;000 and to make a left 360 to re-acquire to field for a visual. Rolling out on a 350 heading we called the field again and were cleared for a Visual Approach to 31. Center switched us over to Tower. We checked in with Tower and were asked for our DME from the field which I reported as 12. He asked us to report a 5 mile final. He then asked the Metroliner to report his DME; I believe it was 12 or 13. At this time the target on our TCAS went back to amber. Tower then initially used our call sign; he later corrected it to the Metroliner; to instruct the Metroliner to 'slow to minimum approach speed for separation from the Citation and report the traffic in sight.' The Metro said he didn't have the traffic in sight and was asked to execute a right 360. Only then did the target on our TCAS turn back to CYAN. At no time during this event did we visually acquire the traffic. At approximately 6 DME the Tower cleared us to land. On the roll out we were asked to expedite to B4 as the Metroliner was on a two mile final. We cleared the runway at B4 and taxied to the ramp uneventfully. Coordination between Center and Tower is critical. This is even more critical at mountainous airports located in tight valleys with little room to work with. This lack of communication put two aircraft at the same point; at the same time. Without TCAS this could have been a very bad situation.

Corporate traffic inbound to SUN described a TCAS RA event with pattern traffic; the reporter noting the event was apparently triggered because of a breakdown of communication between the Center (ZLC) and SUN Tower.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

We landed on runway 16R; was told to cross 16C on taxiway N and hold short of 16L.  We were number two behind another aircraft in the wait to cross 16L. [Aircraft Y] was told to line up and wait on 16L and was informed there would be crossing traffic. After the tower controller told a departing aircraft to switch to departure; he told the aircraft in front of us to cross 16L; then told us to cross 16L and to contact ground.  In his radio call he also informed us that traffic was holding.  It seemed like it was taking a few seconds longer for us to get moving when an EICAS message appeared indicating emergency brake malfunction.  The captain recycled the brake and the EICAS message disappeared and we began our taxi roll onto the runway. There had been radio silence on the tower frequency during this time. As we were entering the runway; the taxiway we were on was angled away from the approach end of the runway; restricting my view of the Aircraft Y holding on the runway that we were crossing.  My captain cleared left; reminding me of the aircraft holding; and I verbalized that the right was also cleared. While crossing the runway; I switched frequencies to ground control after instructed to do so by my captain as to coordinate gate holding instructions.  As we had just entered the active runway to cross; Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff. They aborted the takeoff seconds later.  There seemed to be confusion from the tower after that as to why Aircraft Y decided to abort; and Aircraft Y seemed confused as to why there was an aircraft crossing down the field.  When Aircraft Y asked the tower controller if he was aware of the crossing; tower said he was not; but believed we were cleared to cross.The root cause of this event would be the tower controller not realizing or verifying that our aircraft was clear of the runway before he cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. Contributing factors would be multiple aircraft being told to cross the runway; Aircraft Y not realizing that the second aircraft told to cross was not clear of the runway; due to the angle of the taxiway that we were crossing on only the captain could see the aircraft holding; that taxiway was more than a mile down the filed from the traffic holding on the runway which made it difficult to see if the aircraft had started his takeoff roll; a slight delay in our taxi across the runway due to a temporary emergency brake issue; and not waiting until completely clear of the runway to switch to ground frequency.Tower should pay better attention to the location status of all aircraft they are controlling and give clearances to. Aircraft should be completely cleared of the runway before a takeoff clearance is given. An aircraft holding on the runway should verify the runway is clear off all aircraft before starting the takeoff roll.  Any delay of movement from an aircraft cleared for movement should be communicated; no matter how short the delay time may seem.  Not switching from tower frequency until completely cleared of the runway.

This morning we received clearance to cross runway 16L; traffic is holding; then go to ground.  I pushed the power up waited a second and we didn't move.  So I pulled the power back cycled the parking brake and continued to cross 16L as instructed.  This action maybe took an extra 5 seconds.  Half way across the runway we swapped over to ground; finished crossing the runway; and taxied into the ramp.  Right after we swapped onto ground; Tower cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff.  Aircraft Y started their Takeoff roll then rejected the takeoff because of an aircraft on the runway.  We had no knowledge of Aircraft Y rolling until ATC gave us a number to call and we listened to our radio transmissions [from a website]. ATC launched an aircraft before we were safely across 16L.To avoid this event; we could taxi more expeditiously and avoid swapping frequencies before we have completely crossed the runway.

Pilots report of being told to cross and having a short delay in doing so. The Tower Controller then clears a departure for takeoff while aircraft is slowly crossing downfield. The departing aircraft aborts takeoff and Tower has crossing traffic call for a possible deviation.


Aircraft X was planned and filed on route X in our database. Approximately 10 minutes before the crew was ready to depart they called for lower fuel release due to fuel onboard. I ran the data and was going to update the release with the internal release and it bounced back at me saying invalid route; route blocked. The only way to make it work was to ignore the check blocks. I called Center and had them remove the filing. I had the flight crew call me and then proceeded to refile a new route with ATC and advised the crew of the new fuel burn numbers and the corrected route.This situation happens because blocking data for warning areas goes active after we have filed with ATC. There are no alerts that come back to the dispatcher to advise we are filed on a route that now has an active block. The only way we become aware of the situation is to run a new informational flight plan and get a rejection. The dispatch flight planning program should capture a route that has been filed and the time it is expected to be flown. This includes any delays or changes to the departure time that now affects and active flight. The flight planning system should generate and alert to the dispatcher handling the flight. Whether preflight or enroute the dispatcher could than contact the flight to advise of the situation. If the flight is enroute the dispatcher could then coordinate with the ATC coordinator to get and answer on how ATC wants to reroute the flight around the active area and in turn relay this information to the flight crew. Everyone would then be aware of the problem so that if there was radio failure the dispatcher; ATC; and the flight crew would all be working on the same conclusion rather than a flight possibly proceeding thru a warning area that has gone hot.

A Dispatcher reported that their flight planning program can have routes filed blocked as warning areas become active. There is no indication to dispatchers of warning areas going active in regards to conflicts with flights that have already been filed through that airspace before the activation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On climbout from LAS on the COWBY5 I coupled Auto Pilot at 1200 FT AGL and on the way from FIXIX to ROPPR we were given direct CEASR and resume SID; about 5 miles prior to CEASR the line being drawn on the NAV display seemed like it was going to turn early but with about a 120 degree left turn I thought it could be acceptable.  It started to turn at 3 miles prior and almost immediately ATC questioned where we were going.  I disconnected NAV and went to heading mode and turned back toward CEASR. This happened to me 4 months ago (Report filed) and as in this case we did not receive any indication from the FMS of being off course; which leads me to believe that the flight director believed it was on course.  In my opinion this aircraft should not be used on RNAV departures without an overhaul to the software.

A300 Captain departing LAS is given a shortcut to CEASR on the COWBY5 which required a 120 degree heading change over CEASR. The FMGC leads this turn by three miles causing ATC to question the crew as to where they are going.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was notified this morning of undeclared dangerous goods being transported aboard flight from ZZZZ. A fuel pump was removed from the aircraft in ZZZZ and then put in the [aircraft] for transport back to the US.

Technician reported undeclared Dangerous Goods were transported on passenger flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 230; Flight Crew Type 120

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on a left downwind for Runway 25 a formation flight of two vintage war planes performed a low approach for Runway 25. While the other two airplanes were on about a one mile final I reported them in sight and said I would land after behind them on the low approach. I turned to left base as they flew over the runway. As I turned to about a one and one-half mile final; both planes made a climbing left turn around to what I thought was a left downwind. Instead one plane kept turning around to enter a short final in front of me. I assume that this airplane did not realize I was already on final; even though I had made radio calls for each leg of the pattern.Meanwhile the second airplane; which was going to follow; must have seen me and entered a left base instead of turning to final. He was at my altitude on a collision course; probably 2;000 feet to my left. While I was trying to figure out what the airplanes were doing; the second airplane (on left base) radioed and asked if I was landing and if he was going to have to go around. Before I could respond; the first airplane; already on the ground at this point; radioed and said; quote; 'No! Wingman; you do not go around. You land.' At this time; I came on the radio and said I was going around. The second airplane turned to final and descended while I climbed out on final. I flew a normal pattern; came around; and performed a normal touch-and-go landing without incident.All-in-all; this was a miscommunication on both sides. I did not realize that after they performed a low approach that they would immediately climb out to the left and enter a very short final. At the same time; they misunderstood me when I said I would land after they did the low approach. They must have thought I meant that would land after they landed.

A general aviation pilot reported an airborne conflict with two vintage military aircraft that performed a low approach and break maneuver to a landing without clear coordination with other traffic at a non-towered airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 240

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

I as the Local Controller departed aircraft X to the north off of Runway 32L. He was slightly unfamiliar with the 32 Runways; but I recognized the call sign as a fairly frequent flyer at CCR. I gave him instructions to depart; and later he called back inbound from the north with negative ATIS. I gave aircraft X the current altimeter and surface winds at CCR. He proceeded inbound with the instruction to enter a 2 mile right traffic entry for Runway 32R; and told to report a 2 mile 45.I saw aircraft X inbound 3 miles north of the field and cleared him to land number 3 to follow aircraft Z who was midfield right downwind. As aircraft X continued inbound; he entered more of a base entry when I saw him out the window again approximately a mile northeast of the field. Then aircraft X turned right downwind. Aircraft X never reported aircraft Z in sight so I updated aircraft X on the traffic to follow; which was now on short final. Aircraft X responded with 'in sight.' 3 minutes later aircraft X asked; 'Am I on the right track for the runway?' I had lost sight of aircraft X somewhere after turning base to final about a mile and a half south east of the field due to the sun and slight haze in the east area where he was. I informed him stating 'Not in sight; and the 32s point northwest bound; are you headed northwest bound?' Aircraft X immediately after I said that; then said: 'turning final now.'At this point; I also had aircraft Y on about a 1 mile final for Runway 32L who did report on final. I cleared aircraft Y to land on Runway 32L. I again cleared aircraft X to land on Runway 32R. I still did not see aircraft X; and asked him to say his altitude. He responded and I did not understand what he said. I asked him to clarify if he said 1;600 feet AGL or 300 feet AGL. Aircraft X then spoke up saying; 'I'm landing on 1L.' I immediately issued a go around to aircraft X because of 3 reasons. First I did not have control of Runway 1L as it was ground controls; second because vehicles were maneuvering on the runway and a mower was just east of the runway edge; and 3rd because aircraft Y was on very short final now for the active Runway 32L.There was no response from aircraft X. Approximately 2 seconds later; I keyed up again to say go around; but only stuttered 'go' before I noticed aircraft X was not going to comply and was just going to land on the inactive Runway 1L. I quickly issued a go around to aircraft Y; who did comply with the instruction. As aircraft X was rolling out; I asked how he heard my radio. He responded with 'loud and clear' and then proceeded to say 'I really messed up there; I'm sorry.'There wasn't any time to get control of runway 1L; even though I did attempt to get control of the runway; but Ground Control could not give me the runway because of the vehicles approved on the runway. I would recommend keeping a better eye on traffic that may be unfamiliar with our airport; even when they may seem like a frequent flyer. Because there is always training going on. I thought I did a good job asking if aircraft X was going northwest bound to be on final for the 32s; but I could clarify better on that. I also could have paid slightly more attention to the inactive runway with vehicles on it. The go around could have been issued earlier when I did not have him in sight; but expected him to be about a 1/2 mile. I should have known he wasn't lined up for 32R.

I landed on the wrong runway. I had taken off from Buchanan field Runway 32L. This was not the usual runway used at Buchanan. Runway 19R/1L is the runway used most of the time. The flight was quite ordinary and the return to the field was without event. I was on flight following which was discontinued as I approached Buchanan. I contacted Buchanan Tower; told them I was negative ATIS. They gave me the ATIS info and told me to make right traffic for 32R and to enter on the 45. I understood these instructions and proceeded to comply.As I entered the downwind; I was informed that I would be number 3 to land and asked if I saw the traffic. I saw one plane; making final quite low and in my mind calculated my position and turn towards that aircraft as the final leg. I did note that the plane seemed very low when making its base to final since I was at about 1;500 ft. It did not make sense visually; but I was more concerned in flying my aircraft to analyze it in more detail at that moment.As I came towards the end of what would be the downwind; I started to question whether I was understanding the layout of the runways. Buchanan has 4 runways in a set of two that are 30 degrees different from each other. It is a very confusing airport. As I made base; I had the visual of where that other plane was; and in my mind I was flying to emulate that pattern. But something did not seem right. Somewhere at that time; as I was about to turn final; I contacted the Tower and I asked them if I was on the right path towards my runway. By this time I had finished my turn to final; or close to that; but I did not get a response. I actually never heard a response.Then in a few more moments I saw that I was on final to the wrong runway; Runway 1L which is a similar length and width runway to 32R where I should have been. But at this time I was about to land; and then landed on Runway 1L. I believe I told the Tower what I did; that is landed on the wrong runway; but I didn't hear anything from them until I asked to turn at taxiway J; which they told me to do and to contact ground. I contacted ground; got clearance to taxi away; and they told me to contact them for a phone number to talk to them. After I shut down; I talked to Ground and explained what had happened.I was quite rattled by this whole incident. I could not understand what had just happened and why I had ended up on the wrong runway. Later in the day went through it with some charts; and maps and airport diagrams. What I believed happened was this. First; I am new to Buchanan.[Over the last few months]; I continued to fly with my instructor doing landings and flight instruction since I was getting my complex endorsement. All the takeoffs and landings were on Runway 1L/19R. I had a clear understanding of landmarks for this runway; the pond on the north and the hills on the south. After I got my endorsement; I sent the plane in for maintenance and some cosmetic work. The weather in those few months since has been very poor; and I did not or could not fly the plane during that time either because of maintenance or weather.That day I did fly; on returning from my flight to the north; I was flying south with the pond as my visual. As I entered the downwind the Tower told me I was number 3 and that one plane was near the numbers for the runway. I saw that plane and in my mind was positioning myself for the runway. In hindsight; where that plane was; was where I was aiming for. It still doesn't make sense to me today because it seemed to me that that plane was landing too far west and if I look at an airport diagram that would mean it was landing on 1L. But on what he landed is hindsight. At the time; I put in my mind that I was to follow him and thus aimed for that as being my final.In hindsight; I do not remember seeing the second big long runway; the one that is Runway 32R. Perhaps I was flying too close to the airport on the downwind. I remember seeing the greenbeltto the east of the airport as my downwind leg; but I see from some aerials that this may have been too close in to Runway 32R and I may have not seen Runway 32R under my right wing. But I did see the aircraft turning final off to the west; so it didn't occur to me that I was on the wrong trajectory for landing.And yet it did not feel right. At some point on the base to final; I contacted the Tower because I was afraid I was not on the right pathway. At that time; paying attention to flying was critical. I did not get a response from the Tower. I really needed to know if I was flying to the correct runway; but I also needed to make sure I flew the plane and did not have a flying mishap so close to the ground. If I had heard from the Tower that I was on the wrong trajectory; I would have expected them to tell me so; and to have me go around. On turning to final; and starting final; I still had plenty of time to put on full power and go around. But I got no such response.I was now flying final; working on getting my plane to attain the correct landing configuration and speed; making sure that my gear was down; mixture full; prop full forward. With all that checked; I was about 100-200 feet off the ground and then I saw the markings on the runway and realized I had flown to the wrong runway. At that point I felt that I had to commit to landing because I did not think I could execute a go-around. As it turned out; it was good that I did. As the plane came to a stop; I noticed that a plane on what was 32R had taken off and had crossed the intersection at about 100 feet above the ground. I had stopped maybe 1;000 feet before the intersection so I was no factor; but I wondered why the Tower had let that plane takeoff if they knew I was landing on the wrong runway. There was no guarantee that I would stop short of the intersection; that I would execute a go-around or that the other plane would fly above me if I were at the intersection.I believe the Tower advising me that I was not heading in the right direction could have corrected this error on my part easily. I believe the Tower should have responded to my request for help. But they did not. Now it's possible they did; but I did not hear it; and they also did not hold the other plane in position knowing that I was going to land on the wrong runway. Basically; they allowed the aircraft to be on the runways at the same time allowing them to maneuver in the same airspace and ground space.So in the end; everyone is safe; which is the most important; but even though I landed on the wrong runway; it could have been avoided if the Tower would have responded to my request for help at a very critical time. Hearing my request for help; and seeing that I was on the wrong runway; they should have held the other aircraft on 32R to avoid any issues with me. With their response; I would have done a go-around; evaluated the runways clearly and set up and landed on the correct runway.

Tower Local Controller reported not observing that an aircraft was landing on the wrong runway until it was over the landing threshold. The Controller issued go-around instructions which the pilot did not comply with.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Ferry Permit required aircraft to be flown with flaps 20 at 15000 ft or below. After takeoff; Captain instinctively and without call began to retract flaps to 8. I signaled him to stop but they were already being retracted. Once at the 8 position I suggested they remain at 8 degrees since they were not supposed to be moved at all. Captain wanted to be in compliance with the Ferry Permit which required flaps to be at the 20 position so he extended the flaps back to 20. Moments later we received a Flaps Fail caution message. The rest of the flight went without incident. Flaps should be disabled for ferry requiring them to remain in position. That is the only solution to guard against the human factor. Muscle memory compels us to do many things in the flight deck.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported they were released for a ferry flight with flaps to be left at position 20; but they inadvertently retracted them to position 8.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 439; Flight Crew Type 250

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

This flight was on and IFR flight plan in support of a search and rescue flight. The flight was planned; filed; and anticipated to take approximately 4 hours. The departure and destination airports were the same. I had an area of interest to orbit; which was accounted for by fixes used in the flight plan. This report is related to being off an assigned altitude during that flight. Weather over the route of flight was predominantly scattered cumulus. These conditions prevailed over most of the state. VFR conditions prevailed. Bases were around 030-045 MSL and tops averaged from (I'd guess) 100 FT MSL to 160 FT MSL. At the time of loss of altitude I was heading east; there was a perpendicular (northeast-southeast) line of convective activity 30-50 NM ahead of me and slowly moving to the east at 25-35 KTS. I knew about this line and had been monitoring it before my departure. Bases in and around the buildups were between 010-020 FT MSL. Tops for those were over FL250; and were clearly visible. For the most part; NEXRAD was indicating everything I was visually seeing; and like always I was only using NEXRAD for situational awareness. I visually remained clear of any buildups and remained vigilant to not put myself in a position with no outs (in front of a cell; for example.) Enroute I was in and out of the clouds and had a clearance of 090 FT MSL and did not experience any disruptive/convective activity to upset the aircraft attitude beyond normal light chop normally experienced through these types of clouds. I would say 80% of enroute was VMC; 20% was in/out of clouds IMC. As I got closer to significant weather; I requested a deviation from ATC to get around and a better view. I was cleared as requested. After another 20-30 NM; I could then see I was not going to make my intended filed fix (for the orbit) as the weather was still slowly moving out in front of me. This time I requested a hold; and again the request was granted. I flew a standard hold at that position (IFR/VMC) for approximately 30 minutes. As the weather had continued to move out; conditions were looking better to my east. I then requested a clearance and hold at the next fix I had flight planned. Again ATC cleared me to the fix; hold; and provided another further clearance time of +30 minutes. As I was 10 NM from the fix; it could see clouds; but nothing towering or ominous. NEXRAD was also as current (as it can be); and was not indicating any precipitation in front of me. It appeared the next hold would be in and out of some clouds for a brief period. Again; the clouds looked fair at this point. Upon entering the clouds; the aircraft was rocked quite hard. I immediately disengaged the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft for wings level. It was at least moderate chop with significant seat harness pressures; but there was also apparently a significant down flow in the cloud; as I had lost a couple hundred feet in only a couple of seconds. There was no rain or significant moisture (which is why radar had nothing). I then initiated a right standard rate turn back to the west; and reconfigured the aircraft for full prop; full throttle; and slight climb to get back to 090 FT MSL. I then contacted ATC and informed them I was deviating back to the west because of weather. The Controller then stated he/she saw I was off altitude and I informed the controller I was working to get back to 090 FT MSL but was getting rocked around pretty hard. Within 15-30 seconds I was back at 090 FT MSL; but was still in IMC; and experiencing significant upset attitudes. I also requested a block altitude at this point; but ATC could not provide that. I again experienced another down flow (probably the same one I flew through initially); which dropped be back to 085 FT MSL. Again; I configured for a climb and probably only after another few seconds I was back in VMC and out of the convective air; level 090 FT MSL. I then obtained a clearance to another fix back to the west and did onehold there; while myself and crew reassessed our options. At that point; I canceled IFR but maintained flight following. We remained VFR/VMC and were able to get back to 035 FT MSL for the duration of the flight. The flight could have entirely been conducted under VFR conditions. However; with the anticipated increase in GA aircraft coming to the fly-in; my preference was to be IFR/VMC; IFR/IMC; or VFR-on-Top to mitigate risking a near air encounter with another aircraft. I felt with potential ceilings of 030 FT MSL it would be too conducive to many GA aircraft flying at the same altitudes in the same area and considered that in my preflight risk assessment. I still feel that was the right choice (IFR); however; it is very clear that convective conditions are not all that clear; or that cloud conditions can vary significantly; despite their 'look.' I feel I made the right decision to turn back; report my deviation; and to return to known better flight conditions. There was probably no real need for me to press on when I did; after the first hold. I feel I could have made a better decision there. External pressures and weather I feel were factors; but clearly deciding to continue east; was [ill advised.] I certainly never had the intentions of taking on a thunderstorm; or anything remotely close. I am very grateful I can write and share my experience with others.

C182 pilot reports encountering a strong downdraft upon entering a cloud; resulting in the loss of several hundred feet. The reporter elects to make a 180 degree turn while climbing back to 9;000 FT and advises ATC after the fact.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

FO (First Officer) and I both believed with confidence that ATC had instructed us to turn right to a heading upon reaching CLUSO. Neither of us had any doubt about the matter. When we turned at CLUSO; however; ORD TRACON advised us that we were supposed to turn at KAYTO instead. This came as a surprise to both of us. That was the first instance we had any doubt about what our clearance had been. At that point; second-guessing ourselves; the FO and I began to wonder whether we had read back 'KAYTO' or 'CLUSO' when first given the heading clearance. Both waypoints sound similar when pronounced; and this similarity may have contributed to this new doubt. So; we were not sure if the error was ours or ATC's. In any case; ATC informed us that there was 'no problem' with the turn and then gave us further vectors. There was no traffic conflict.In retrospect; the only thing that may have played a role in any confusion that may have occurred with either ATC or with us is that 'KAYTO' and 'CLUSO' can sound similar; causing the wrong term to be ensconced in memory.Consider not having waypoints in close proximity to each other that may sound similar when pronounced.

Air carrier Captain reported a track deviation during arrival to ORD after turning left at CLUSO Intersection rather than KAYTO Intersection as cleared. Captain stated CLUSO and KAYTO can be similarly pronounced and therefore confused by crews.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC cleared us for takeoff; and prior to 80 knots; on the takeoff roll; they cancelled our takeoff clearance. As we were coming to a stop; we had to ask them what they wanted us to do. We were told to clear the runway. We went through our procedures and checklists to prepare for another takeoff. I queried ATC as to what the reason was for the canceled takeoff; and the Tower told us '[another aircraft] was on top of us and he thought it would be safer to keep us on the ground.' We got no further communication from ATC about the incident and took off without any further issue.

B737 Captain reported ATC cancelled their takeoff clearance after they had begun takeoff roll due to another aircraft overflying them.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 155; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

While cruising at FL340 the B Flight Attendant called the flight deck and reported the aft lavatory smoke alarm was going off and there was a burnt electrical smell coming from the same area. We immediately donned our oxygen masks and established communications. In rapid succession we determined our location; the nearest airport; and told Center we needed to divert immediately. Center coordinated our turn to [divert airport] and descent with other aircraft in the area and we started down. We started the Smoke; Fire and Fumes Checklist in the QRH. The Captain flew the aircraft while the First Officer (FO) completed the checklist and communicated with the Flight Attendants. The Flight Attendants communicated with the Passengers about what was occurring. We [flew a] visual approach. We turned off the runway and had the Fire Department check the aircraft for any signs of a fire. The Captain made an announcement to the people about what was happening and what would happen next. The Fire Department determined there were no signs of a fire and cleared us to taxi to the gate. The FO called Ops to get a gate and we proceeded to the gate after receiving clearance from Ground Control. Once at the gate the Fire Department came onto the aircraft and checked for any signs of a fire. Once that was complete and the passengers were deplaned we called Dispatch and then Contract Maintenance. Upon talking with the Flight Attendants on the ground; the burnt electrical smell was evident anytime the aft closet was opened. Also; we learned the Flight Attendants searched through all of the trash and compartments looking for a fire source but did not find anything. The circuit breaker to the smoke detector was pulled once we were on the ground and cancelled the alarm. Contract Maintenance reset the circuit breaker and the alarm did not continue. The Contract Maintainer did not notice a burnt electrical smell until several of the ceiling panels in the aft galley were removed and he investigated in the ceiling area. The aircraft was turned over to Maintenance at this point to determine the issue. It was only 15 minutes from the time the alarm was reported to the time we landed. In that time we started the QRH Checklist and the FO reviewed all the items but there was not enough time to fully and completely finish the Smoke; Fire and Fumes Checklist. Trying to complete that checklist while trying to coordinate with ATC; change destination; get ATIS; set up approach; complete normal descent and approach checklist and communicate with the cabin just was not possible in that short a time.

A B737 Captain reported diverting to a nearby airport after a burning electrical smell was reported by a Flight Attendant.