Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 270

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On the SADDE arrival we were given 'cross SMO at 7;000; depart heading 070' Approaching SMO we got a 'traffic' advisory and saw an RJ ahead and well below crossing in front north bound; well de-conflicted. After we had passed; (and what I perceived as us separating) we got the red box on the PFD and a command to climb. I disconnected the autopilot; started to pitch up; and almost as soon as the RA advisory popped up; it then cleared. The whole even was maybe 2 seconds; and we resumed the descent to 7;000.

A B737 First Officer reported taking evasive action to a TCAS TRAFFIC advisory from a departing jet at 7;000 FT near SMO on the LAX SADDE STAR.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On departure from FXE the tower did not hand me off to departure in time to contact Miami Departure and thus I entered the outer ring of the Class Charlie airspace of FLL (which overhangs FXE) and they informed me of an airspace violation. It was never the intent to enter the airspace; but when I climb at 3700 FPM; I entered the airspace at 1200 MSL quickly; and faster than the controllers could switch me over. Next time I will hold 1200 ft until I am switched.

Pilot reported an airspace violation he attributed to ATC not switching him soon enough to get clearance to enter Class Charlie airspace.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 25500; Flight Crew Type 6800

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On very short final for a landing on runway XX with a landing clearance; we were ordered to go around by ZZZ Tower. My humble estimate was that we were at about 50 feet altitude. Aircraft Y crossed runway XX at taxiway 1 heading east bound and was directly in front of us on the runway. A go around was executed and we were cleared to 4;000 feet and took radar vectors for a landing on runway XY. The rest of the flight and landing was uneventful. First Officer was the pilot flying and did an excellent job. I highly commend the tower controller for their quick actions and decision making in making the immediate call for us to execute a go around. Had the timing been just seconds later; this incident could have had a very different outcome as we would have touched down.

Captain reported ATC issued a go around instruction at approximately 50 feet due to an aircraft crossing the active runway and complied with instructions.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

During the RNAV Arrival; Engine Warning indicated that #2 engine oil pressure was low; crew determined that the engine needed to be shut down. The flight was given priority landing. Aircraft landed without incident and taxied to the gate. Loss of oil pressure; caused a shutdown of engine and single engine landing.

EMB-145 First Officer reported an in flight engine shut-down due to low oil pressure during arrival.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 800

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flaps were oversped while complying with Resolution Advisory (RA) maneuver. Descending at Flaps 5 and 250 KIAS at 1;500 feet; I advised the Captain of the TCAS; and told him about our altitude. He reduced the thrust to stop the over speed and pulled up to arrest our descent. He did not add thrust when our pitch increased and we got a low speed stick shaker at 1;500-2;000 feet MSL. We eventually restored our flight to a normal SOP. It was very confusing receiving this TCAS RA so low with only one set of instruments indicating a possible traffic conflict. The TCAS had been written up the day before both on a departure and on an arrival. Maintenance could not duplicate on the ground. It was released back into service. We advised ATC of our conflict resolution; and asked about the location of any other possible aircraft nearby. ATC advised of no other aircraft nearby.

B757 First Officer experiences a TCAS RA at 1;500. The flying Captain responds by descending which causes a flap overspeed. Thrust is reduced and the nose is raised to stop the descent and overspeed. Stick shaker was induced before climb thrust could be reestablished. The RA was apparently false and the aircraft had a history of similar events.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 9674; Flight Crew Type 6114

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Icing; rain 5sm Brkn 007; OVC 012. Night operations poor visibility. Normal approach; normal landing. ILS 4R. Exited RWY P4. Tower clearance 'TAXI P; Y; Cleared to cross 4L Contact Ramp' Poor visibility with icing; and rain; when clear of 4L; First Officer contacted Ramp; Captain remained with Ground (Split radios). Confusing taxi instructions from ramp 'RK' Captain turned right at Taxiway R from Y and in error crossed Runway 11/29 on R; cleared runway turned left on Z stopped aircraft at Z and S. Captain set brakes and confirmed with crew that we were in the wrong position; ensured Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring on same frequency. First Officer called Ground to identify position and get additional taxi instructions. Ground cleared us to 'taxi Z; U; RK cleared to cross runway 11/29 contact ramp.' After discussion and confirmation we taxied to [the gate] without further incident. Crew fully debriefed at the gate.Contributing factors: Poor communications in understanding Ramp Clearance (split radios) Captain on Ground; First Officer on Ramp; night time Winter Ops (with poor visibility icing; rain and mist); need additional taxiway signage in that area (very confusing low visibility); long crew day.

B767 Captain reported a taxiway incursion at EWR airport.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ZZZ

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 18

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Helicopter checked in the over the freeway interchange to transition VFR at 1;500 FT MSL westbound. I misheard his words VFR as a SVFR request since the field was reporting IFR. I also missed the ATIS code. I gave him a clearance through Class Delta SVFR. My Local Approach 1 (LA1) said he's VFR. I advised the helicopter about the traffic inbound from the north; a Challenger; and instructed the helicopter to hold over the freeway interchange (approx 1.2 miles from the ILS/freeway intersection). I advised the Challenger about traffic; 11 O'clock; [and] 2 miles holding over the interchange; no factor (the pilot mumbled something [and] said he's in IMC). As the Challenger passed the freeway intersection I told helicopter the Challenger passed the freeway transition; approved westbound and caution wake turbulence; ZZZ airport wind calm. The helicopter was westbound at 1;500 FT MSL and the Challenger southbound on about 2 mile final at 1;800 FT MSL. The Challenger advised he was responding to an RA and climbing but has the field insight. I instructed the Challenger to continue runway heading and say intentions as my LA1 was coordinating with overlying TRACON. The Challenger said he has the field in sight and continue the approach to land. I cleared the Challenger to land again. At the time the Challenger said he responded to an RA he was at 1;800 FT MSL the helicopter was at his 8-7 o'clock position 1-2 miles; 1;500 FT MSL and had the Challenger in site.I advise that the CIC and FD/CD should not be combined on weather conditions like this. Local Controller 1 (LC1) and LA1 both missed the ATIS code. I also recommend that the Tower as a team talks about SVFR and different scenarios on days that weather keeps changing. Controllers should have a better understanding how RA's work. The traffic was behind so I didn't think it was still a factor.

Challenger aircraft had a TCAS RA in IMC; after Tower Controller allowed a VFR helicopter into the Class D airspace.


Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

On the night of July XX; the lavatories stopped working. I made the decision to divert the aircraft to ZZZ to get the lavs serviced. Once on the ground in ZZZ I was contacted by NAME and the manager on duty of Operations Control. NAME was not professional during the call; placing all of the blame on me for the situation. I unfortunately had to deal with the situation because the lavatories were never serviced in ZZZ1. I was upset; annoyed; and disappointed by the attitude of the director of Operations Control. I was berated and interrogated by him for the decision to divert. What was needed in this situation was assistance from Operations Control and Dispatch so the flight could continue. Due to the unprofessional attitude from Management and the blame being placed on me for the situation I was unable to sleep soundly when arriving in ZZZ2. when we departed ZZZ2 I felt fine; but as the flight continued I started to become fatigued. When I landed in ZZZ1 I called Crew Scheduling and told them I was fatigued for Flight XXXX to ZZZ3; and removed myself form the flight for the safety of the passengers. This was caused by ZZZ not servicing the LAV; leading to a diversion; and the lack of professionalism from Operations Control leading to lack of sleep.

EMB-175 Captain reported hostility and unprofessional communication when contacting Dispatch and the MOD after a decision to divert for lavatory servicing caused by departure airport ground agents not servicing lavatories before departure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Flight called enroute with a DC ESS BUS 1 failure. After review of the QRH with maintenance and the crew it was determined that they should continue to destination which was 260 miles away at that time. The QRH stated to land as soon as possible.During the communication via ACARS and radio the crew informed Dispatch that they had turned the battery off and that they had not lost any systems due to the DC ESS BUS fail. The QRH did say to land as soon as possible; however; after discussion between Maintenance; the Crew and Dispatch it was decided to continue to destination. The nearest alternative was an unfamiliar airport not in our OP specs and an airport which we had not been to. Although the [aircraft] had not lost any of the listed systems in the QRH; if any or all had been lost it was felt it was felt the safer action would be to land at the destination.

An Embraer ERJ Crew with a DC Essential Bus 1 failure at night; after consulting with Maintenance Control and Dispatch; continues to theirs destination instead of landing at an unfamiliar alternate airport.


Dispatch Dispatcher; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8.9; Flight Crew Total 763; Flight Crew Type 144

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I went up with my tailwheel instructor CFI to get current and proficient in the tail dragger after a 5 month absence from flying a conventional gear airplane. On my last landing (which was a 3 point landing dead on center-line) during the roll-out I failed to maintain directional control using left rudder to counteract weathervaning which caused the plane to ground loop. The winds were coming from the west at 280/13 KTS and the airport was landing aircraft on 180. This was a direct crosswind. I have done training before with winds much higher than this. However; after 5 months absence my skill level declined and I was not quick enough to respond to the relative high crosswinds. (However; the Cessna 120 does not have a designated crosswind limit since it was manufactured in the 1940s) In the future; I will retrain with winds more benign than the ones that were present on the day of this incident.Very minor damage occurred to the L wing tip and no bodily injuries occurred. We were very fortunate and I learned a very valuable lesson with regard to my own personal limitations in flying a tailwheel airplane.

A C-120 pilot with his instructor training for recurrency; ground looped the aircraft in a crosswind because he had not flown in a while and reacted inappropriately to the winds.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Acting as Pilot Monitoring (PM) on the SAT to ZZZ leg. Multiple constructions zones at the SAT airport combined with an intersection departure on a 'nonstandard' runway (to us) for departure. Beautiful weather. Quick turnaround time. Short taxi from gate to an intersection takeoff on Rwy 04. [Performance data] called for flaps 5 takeoff. FMC loaded flaps 5. I selected flaps 1. Completed our Before Takeoff Check and a review of the [performance data] and close out. Both of us called out '1. Green light' versus 5 Green light. Took off. Discovered our error once airborne. Complacent? Obviously but had no idea and would not have agreed with that assessment if you had told me. Rushed? Somewhat but my experience level should have caught that error. Disappointed with myself to say the least! Lesson learned. Will not repeat this mistake.As stated above; somewhat rushed; construction areas dictated taxi routes which took up brain bytes; short turn time; a nonstandard runway and an intersection departure to boot.I did not do my usual close review of the [performance data]. Usually I circle the runway and flap setting on the [performance data]. This time [I] did not. Have no idea why.

During preflight set-up; [performance data] was reviewed for intersection Take Off [TO] on rwy 04 at N2 per NOTAMs. TO was briefed as flap 5 but after push and start when ready to taxi; I called for 'flaps 1; taxi' and the flaps were set at 1; not 5. Speeds were very nearly identical and TO power setting differed by .03 N1 So the error was not trapped until 1000 FT call for 'VNAV' and speed tape bugs were correct for flap 5; but we were (erroneously; of course) already at flaps 1 config.We were fortunate that conditions were fair; I tend to rotate a bit too slowly due to being new to the aircraft type; and the performance data between our planned and actual (erroneous) TO was negligible in this case. In other conditions the same error might not have been without consequence. A very profound lesson regarding review of [performance data]; Closeout; and actual configurations and settings.We were very surprised and humbled that the error was not caught pre-takeoff. In future; I will ALWAYS have [performance] data; and closeout in front of me during First Officer pre-takeoff/closeout brief; and ensure correct thrust; as well as flap settings as shown.

A B737-800 flight crew; to include a check airmen in the jump seat; reported departing SAT with flaps 1 instead of the correct setting of flaps 5.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 1800

4 aircraft flying together - Mode S Squawk. Evasive action had to be taken to avoid Sikorsky helicopter flying in opposite direction.

A flight of four aircraft including the reporter's BE-36 took evasive action to avoid an opposite direction helicopter.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X was vectored to final for full stop on ILS RWY 14 at ZZZ by West Controller. Aircraft X reported on east frequency; climbing to 040 runway heading for another ILS to RWY 14. ZZZ Tower did not coordinate a go-around; nor did Aircraft X say he wanted an option back to radar. I radar contacted him and climbed him to 050 and vectored him to the north for ILS RWY 14 approach full-stop. Before the base turn; I descended him to 042. Once he was at 042; I based him and descended him to 040 to protect for the MVA to the east of final. The winds were pushing Aircraft X to the northeast and it appeared his track; with his slow turn rate; pushed him to a 060-055 track and he might have clipped the point of the 042 MVA that meets the 040; 036; and 034 MVA. The only reason why I descended him was because of the weather the last couple of days and having multiple heavy aircraft go around short final at ZZZ due to the winds and weather. I was attempting to get him as low as I could; and issue a 20 degree intercept to assist with the approach intercept and make it a little easier for the flight crew.  Stay with my original plan to keep him at 042 until established on final or well away from the higher MVA or vector him farther out if other traffic wasn't a conflict.

FAI Controller reported strong wind aloft resulting in a military transport aircraft on vector to enter a higher MVA.


Flight was planned on a northerly routing to EWR for weather avoidance. Flight got an extensive reroute; which I notice on my display. I was able to determine the discrepancies that the flight got and started preparing a new release; but was unable to complete it prior to the flight taking off. I sent the new release after they were airborne. Flight did have sufficient fuel on board for the reroute; however; it was a fairly significant change in both distance from the original route and total length of flight. It used up over 20 minutes of the extra fuel I had planned on the original release.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported having difficulty in sending a new release to a flight before departure. The flight had to alter their route due to weather; but had sufficient fuel.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 200

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

On final vector into SMO I was given a quick vector to intercept final; descend from 6000 feet to 4000 feet and cleared for the approach. As a result; I crossed BEVEY about 800 feet high and fast. As I descended I went to full flaps and noticed my vacuum compass was 20 to 30 degrees off (probably due to the low power setting). More time was wasted confirming my lateral position. Upon contacting tower I was cleared for the straight in approach and cleared to land. Runway was in sight. A short time later tower gave me a low altitude alert and indicated that I was supposed to cross CULVE at 1120 feet. It is impossible to cross CULVE at 1120 feet (circling MDA) and land straight in. I was lower than I wanted to be when I got the alert from tower. Distraction due to high rate of descent and compass error did not help. ATC has to find a better way to bring in traffic without the ram dump approach. It would also help if an LPV approach was available.

C182 pilot reported being admonished by the SMO Tower Controller for crossing CULVE below 1120 feet during the VOR Approach to SMO in VMC. The VOR Approach is a circle to land only approach with an MDA of 680 feet.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 7513; Flight Crew Type 4500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We landed at FLL airport Runway 9L; in VFR Conditions. Exited the runway and were cleared to taxi B; S; Q; hold short of Runway 13. As we continued the taxi with Ground Control; and the after landing checks; and taxing slowly; we came upon the hold short line at 13. The Ground Control came on and said 'STOP'; I hit the brakes and we were about half a plane over the line from what I could tell. I have already implemented corrective action into our training program to make sure both crew members [are paying attention] while aircraft is moving and that their heads are up and looking outside. Making sure this doesn't happen again to us. We were advised to call the Tower Supervisor; which I did once the passengers were off; and had a nice conversation explaining the situation. He explained the information had automatically been sent to the FSDO. We also spoke with the FLL airport supervisor on duty; and they saw minimal issues.

Corporate jet Captain reports a runway incursion at FLL on Taxiway Q at Runway 13.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

On Approach into ZZZ [airport] at night on the ZZZZZ arrival requested Runway XX for landing from ZZZ Approach. ZZZ Approach then instructed a 180 heading for the Runway XX. We could see we were getting on descent that was already going to be high to start with and requested a descent from ZZZ Approach. ZZZ let us down to 5;200 feet due to terrain in the area. This was not how we had briefed or planned to enter the visual approach. We had discussed and gone over the pages enroute and decided based on weather and winds and go-around factors that the coded visual to 15 would be the wisest choice. However; we thought that would start from ZZZZZ1. The vector ATC gave us pointed the plane toward the final approach fix for the Coded Visual Approach ZZZZZ2 bypassing the rest of the waypoints on the approach. The FO was flying the approach and used a high rate of descent to get down. Got a descent rate call on the approach but that was also expected due to the 3.2 degree glide slope. At 1;000 feet AGL I was 10 knots fast right at the edge of the stable and decent rate was 1350 ft/min. I thought I had til 500 feet to get stable since it was a visual approach. I should have either gone around; requested Runway Y or maybe executed an S-Turn. The plane landed uneventfully in about 3;500 feet using a Flaps 40 landing.This was my first time flying into ZZZ and the Captain had only flown in there once before in the previous year also has not flown much during the year due to leave. ATC gave us a vector toward the Final Approach Fix on the Coded Visual Approach which was not expected from reading the pages. Also; the Captain and I were under the belief we had until 500 feet to be stable due to the old SOPs. Furthermore; on the descent into ZZZ using the ZZZZZ3 arrival you are on with ZZZ1 Approach and do not get handed off to ZZZ Approach until 6;000 feet so you don't get a runway assignment very far out. Being at night first time into a short field with mountainous terrain was a cause as well.I think on the company pages it would help to paint a better picture if there were notes to not accept a vector to the visual and proceed direct to ZZZZZ for the visual approach to Runway X if that is the runway of choice. If entering on the ZZZZZ3 arrival a note letting the crew know they won't talk to ZZZ Approach til below 10;000 feet. Perhaps at night to not accept a visual approach to Runway X and use the ILS to Runway Z.

Air carrier First Officer reported an unstable approach and stated they should have executed a go-around.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

In the right turn to final (approx. 2.5 NM final RWY21 at KGYR); crew saw a white UAS slightly left and below the aircraft. The approximate distance to the UAS/drone was 100 feet. Crew continued the approach and informed ATC.

Flight Instructor reported experiencing a close airborne conflict with a drone.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Type 3375

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

In recent weeks; I have noticed a significant reduction in planned fuel loads. This was particularly apparent on [this] flight where REMF was planned 4636; or 1:07. This extremely low fuel figure included what the Dispatcher said in the flight plan comments; 'XTRA FUEL FOR RTE.' I asked the Dispatcher where this 'extra' fuel was located because I didn't see it in the fuel ladder and she referenced it as the 7 minutes over 60 minute policy fuel for REMF. I recognize that this flight was an [aircraft] with a low ZFW (Zero-Fuel Weight) on a day forecasted to have good weather across the route. I also recognize efficiency is a major tenet of the [company] policy; which is just one of many reasons I utilize single engine taxi on a high percentage of my flights. However; such a low fuel load leaves virtually no margin for error to deal with even a minor routing change or in flight disruption or issue let alone a lengthy maintenance issue or outside event such as an accident on the airfield. Furthermore; even if the flight proceeds perfectly as planned; the low fuel figure would likely create an unnecessary distraction for the crew by requiring greater than normal attention to fuel progress. With safety as the supposed top priority for [the company policy] and the cost of an extra 1000 lbs of fuel; as an example; listed as XX dollars on the [Flight Plan]; why would [the Company] want to take that risk or place that burden on the crew? Why should the Captain be the one forced to say no; this does not provide adequate buffer for our flight so I'll add fuel? Isn't the cost of a small buffer worth the risk of an unnecessary diversion whose fuel alone would be much more than XX dollars and whose hidden costs from missed passenger and crew connections would be even greater still?Yes; we must be efficient and seek gains where possible. It is sound business sense to do so. But we should also recognize the hidden costs and pressures to safety such an extreme adherence to 'policy fuel' creates in moments like these.

B737 Captain reported that the planned fuel load for a flight did not provide an adequate buffer for unforeseen situations that may arise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 147; Flight Crew Type 7728

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 147; Flight Crew Type 1857

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

FO leg. Got ATIS multiple times enroute. Not great; but certainly not horrible. Runway [was reported] 90% clear and damp; 5% treated; 5% packed. Remember remarking how much better these guys are equipped and efficient with their winter weather operations and reporting. Had other runways conditions also broken down by percentages. Discussed the approach and landing and taxi plan at length. Uneventful descent; approach; touchdown. Winds slight left to right I believe. RJ landed in front of us. Tower tells us braking reported good.During rollout; after my 80 knot call; we swap controls. FO passes letting me know that the brakes are still on. I roger that and apply pressure to release and now can check for myself the braking. The runway certainly did not look 90% damp and clear; but we were in good shape. Braking initially did; in fact feel good and responsive. I remember seeing a 90 degree turnoff and thinking that I could have made that; but why? There is our briefed and easy high-speed ahead.Continued to brake and now pump and steer to exit. Things begin to not go as planned quickly. I am now unable to turn or stop. Straddling the turnoff and runway; I vividly remember that I now must commit to taxiway or back to runway. I made the decision to continue with my turnoff since all of my effort was going in that direction. I am now furiously working with feet and nose wheel to get this thing going in the right direction. At the very last; the aircraft responded to the right. Perhaps a dry patch from ice. Do not know. My dilemma was not over. With full nose wheel (I think) and rudder; the craft now just could not respond to the immediate left that I so desperately needed now to right itself on the high-speed.I continued the struggle for my full left; finally getting response; but not until we had departed on the right side of the taxiway. We trundled along; my steering gaining purchase finally; and barely; until we came to rest facing east; or close to it; on an intersecting taxiway.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 Captain reported departing the high speed taxiway after clearing the runway due to ice and snow on the surface.


Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X sent dispatch this ACARS 'BE ADVISED. WE HAD A TC AS RA COMING OUT OF LGA. WE WERE LEVEL AT 15;000 ft. AND CONVERGING TRAFFIC KEPT DESCENDING. MISSED BY ABOUT 300 FEET. NY DEPT FREQ 120.85/1857Z ATC NOTIFIED' Per DPM; Dispatch is required to notify the bridge and fill out a Dispatch Event Report (DER). Bridge was notified. I attempted to fill out a report; however there was no option available for Near Miss or TCAS RA and I was unable to fill out the report. Update the CERs report to either list near miss as an option; or add an 'Other' option with free text to allow Dispatch to fill it in as situation requires.

Airline Dispatcher reported the company event form for reporting a NMAC is missing necessary information.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft; Staffing; Procedure

The inbound crew wrote up a Bleed two leak. We waited about 1.5 hours for Maintenance to show up; but then they didn't have the right tools. After about five hours of a delay; we boarded and pushed back.Start #2 engine; hot start; abort; QRH; dry motor; etc. Again we attempted #2 engine start; and again hot start. A little fishy since Contract Maintenance was just working on that engine's bleed system. Called Maintenance Control; returned to gate; and deplaned.Called Contract Maintenance back. It takes them about 45 minutes to return (as it is after normal business hours now). They said that Maintenance Control didn't specify which valves to close; so they did more than one. Anyway; they reversed what they did and did some other maintenance stuff and we started the engine at the gate and it seemed ok; so then we re-boarded about fifty angry passengers and headed out. #2 engine starts normally this time.We depart the rather short runway and no sooner do we get the wheels in the wells; that the EICAS lights up with multiple messages; with the most concerning being Bleed two Overpressure (showed about 130 PSI on synoptic page). Also; got Bleed 2 fail (which was concerning; because per the MEL it was already off and supposedly isolated). Headed to the south; I flew; Captain ran the QRH. Leveled off and told ATC. Finished the procedure and at this time we are only about 45 miles north of ZZZ; so we decided to divert to for the longer runways; better crash/fire rescue; and Maintenance with more airline experience. Landed at ZZZ [and it] takes 30 minutes to determine what gate we are headed for; as Company had no heads up that we were coming. Got to gate; deplaned; and called Maintenance.Contract MX came out and; lucky for us; they work on [another Air Carrier] and are well versed on the E190. They took a look and noted that the Maintenance procedure done in ZZZ1 was done incorrectly. Later; the ZZZ Maintenance wrote in the Logbook; 'Inspection and found bleed valve to be in incorrect configuration to comply with MEL 36-21-00-2.'When we left the ramp in ZZZ1 we had no open write ups; had the MEL noted; and the logbook signed off. We were not aware of any maintenance discrepancy until we rotated and got the EICAS messages concerning Bleed Fail and Over-pressure. We were not aware of the improper maintenance until we had diverted to ZZZ and talked to the mechanics there.This event is difficult to classify. It is; at the very least; a plea to the Company and the FAA to look into this Contract Maintenance Company that we use in ZZZ1. I started to feel concerned when the Mechanic got on the aircraft; and it took him five minutes to find the air conditioning panel. They didn't have the right tools for our aircraft. Later they came up to the cockpit at were searching for some 'toolbox' in there; and then wanted to look behind the aft galley carts and wheelchair for this mysterious toolbox. They had the engine cowling open for an hour before they could locate the 'valve' on which they needed to work on. The main point is that we learned after the fact; that they did improper maintenance work on our aircraft twice in one day.

An E-190 First Officer believed incompetent and/or improperly trained contract maintenance personal failed; in two separate attempts; to properly comply with MEL requirements to defer a pneumatic bleed valve problem which had been reported on the inbound flight.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 150

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were climbing to cruise at 3500 FT; suddenly saw a airplane climbing to us from 10 o'clock down position; I immediately took over control from student; climbing right turn to avoid him. It seemed like that airplane didn't see us; he passed by and climbing left turned around; then it became that airplane was chasing my airplane tail climbing; we have to keep climbing; and hope he could see us; finally that airplane suddenly turned away from us; it seemed like he found us. We felt relief a little bit (half minute?); but suddenly I realized I already climb to 4500 FT; entered Class B (floor 4000 FT); I dived down immediately. Two airplanes passed by close. It was evening time; visibility plus 10. My airplane has no TCAS. If the airplane equipped with TCAS; it would be really helpful. Hope nobody call me for breaking into class B. If airplane equipped with some kind of airspace warning system; that would be great for training flight and VFR flight.

C172 Instructor pilot reports inadvertently entering DFW Class B while trying to avoid another aircraft in close proximity.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I released Aircraft X. Aircraft X checked on my frequency with altitude leaving and that he was in a left turn to avoid the traffic. It was so obvious that I had expected the Tower to hold onto Aircraft X until they cleared the traffic which is normal. When he said he was in a left turn to avoid the traffic I asked if he had the traffic in sight and he did not. I then gave him a left heading in an effort to assist him in both traffic and terrain avoidance. I did not know what heading he was turning to; but I know anything north of a 090 heading goes to high MVA's; I did not want him to turn to a 020 heading and re-endangering himself.I gave him an immediate left turn heading 090; and expedite the climb to 14;000 feet which was assigned by the Tower as normal. I gave the 090 heading because in the moment I determined two things were an imminent danger to the aircraft. Either test the big sky theory and let him continue toward the VFR aircraft or let him fly whatever heading he wanted to the north east. I felt that the heading I gave him would avoid both. In doing so I put the aircraft into a Minimum Vectoring Altitude that he had not climbed above. I also knew that 'mountainous terrain' has 2;000 feet of clearance and I felt the traffic was the larger threat.The Tower never called traffic to Aircraft X and he was in the turn when I got him! I really believe that what I did was best for both aircraft involved. IFR/VFR continues to be an issue; but the TRACON seems to be focused on the issue when it appears other facilities are not yet on board. I was told I endangered the aircraft when I gave the heading east; I feel I fixed an already potentially fatal situation that the Tower could have prevented.

D01 Departure Controller reported vectoring a departing aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude to avoid unidentified VFR traffic.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 250

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Nose gear shimmy due to poor runway condition; nosegear broke loose from the aircraft; no propeller strike.

A lot of things went wrong [on] this flight; included; but not limited to the nosewheel shimmied uncontrollably and separated the strut from the firewall. The pilot in command did not renew his pilot license; he had the old pilot license. I do not feel this was material to this incident.

During taxi; Cessna nose wheel shimmied and caused the nose landing gear strut to separate from aircraft firewall. Pilot's license had expired.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 6400; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We had to descend immediately after the door and window blew out. We were able to descend and land. The wind noise did not allow us to have communication with Center while we came down from 21;000 feet.

During cruise flight at FL210 the pilot of a kit built high performance aircraft experienced a door/window unit failure and a subsequent rapid decompression.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

During cruise at 17;000 FT; the CABIN PRESS warning light came on. We initiated the emergency descent down to 10;000 FT; advising ATC of our descent and declaring an emergency (as we had to squawk 7700 per the checklist). We ran the CABIN PRESS Checklist; followed by the Manual Pressurization Checklist and Cabin Pressurization Fail Checklist due to the pressurization issue not being remedied with the checklists. Per the checklists; we were able to depressurize the cabin; allowing us to continue the flight but at a much lower altitude. Because of the new altitude; I contacted Dispatch during the flight to update our fuel numbers and see if we could continue to our original destination. After Dispatch confirmed we could continue the flight with excess fuel; we did an amended release to change the fuel numbers and alternate airport. The flight continued uninterrupted to the original destination with no issues.

DHC8-200 Captain reports a CABIN PRESS warning light during cruise at 17;000 FT and initiates an emergency descent to 10;000 FT. The crew is able to continue to destination unpressurized.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 50

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Equipment / Tooling; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

I was safety pilot for an IFR rated pilot doing an instrument approach in IMC. Aircraft was equipped with a KLN94 IFR approved GPS. The data base was current at the time of the deviation. We were cleared to the approach and crossed the FAF at 3000 MSL. The GPS did not have the step down fixes identified on the database. It only showed the MAP. Looking at the chart the minimum altitudes have an asterisk indicating LNAV only. I interpreted this as minimum altitudes to abide by if you had the fixes in the database. Since our plan was a circling approach; I thought we were not required to stay above those altitudes. I recommended to the Pilot In Command (PIC) that we descend down to the MDA. The PIC agreed and began a descent at approximately 500 feet per minute.Upon descent below 2000 we received a call from the controller. He relayed an altitude alert and asked us to verify altitude. The PIC leveled off and said our indicated altitude was 1900 MSL. The controller acknowledged and did not comment further. The PIC decided to stay at 1900 and attempt to identify the step down fixes using fore flight with Geo referenced instrument approach plates.We finished the approach at the MAP and identified the runway environment. We went missed and continued our flight to our destination without further incident.There was a training deficiency on both our parts. We are both IFR rated and current; but we owe some additional training on some of the quirks of older RNAV systems such as the KLN94. Since many aircraft in our fleet are older airframes with Legacy avionics; the solution is to increase training to ensure we know the ins and outs of how each GPS system gives information.

C182 pilot deviated from published altitudes during RNAV approach.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We were operating into GSP.  We were on a vectored downwind at 3;000 feet in between the FAF and the preceding approach fix when I noticed a green laser activate at the 1-2 o'clock position about 2 miles from the aircraft.  I told the captain and he reported it to ATC.  As he was reporting the position of the laser; it 'found the aircraft' and made direct contact with my field of vision causing a total 'green out' in my left eye for a second or two.  I reached up and turned off the landing lights to help conceal the aircraft's position. When we turned final; I disconnected the autopilot at roughly 1;000 feet AGL.  As we flew closer to the airport I experienced 'streaming' of the runway lights with the centerline lights streaming almost to the edge of the runway.  I considered giving control of the aircraft to the captain; but did not want to make such a change in a critical phase of flight.  On the ground; I experienced sensitivity to light; minor aching of the eye; and 'starbursts' from light.  As of the following morning I can see; but I have eye irritation and minor light sensitivity.  I will get my eye checked out when home just to be on the safe side.

Air carrier First Officer reports being zapped by a green laser during approach to GSP causing some eye irritation and blurred vision.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 230

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Upon descent and after cancelling an IFR flight plan with Approach; an elevator trim issue was encountered. While performing a maintenance flight on the aircraft up to FL 280; the Pilot Flying (PF) climbed up to FL 280 using manual controls including trim actuation. After the flight test; the PF was descending with the autopilot on from FL280 to 15;000 and then from 15;000 to 8;000. While in the descent the PF and Pilot Not Flying (PNF) were being told to trim down by the autopilot voice for the latter half of the descent. The PF had been trimming the airplane.Before the plane leveled off at the scheduled 8;000; the plane abruptly pitched up. When the (PNF) grabbed the controls he was able to push the nose down but it was very heavy. The PNF then said 'my airplane' and took control of the airplane. (the PF had less than 2 hours in the plane) The now new PF simultaneously tried to trim the nose down when pushing forward but the trim was not working. The PF then turned the trim switch off. The PF landed the airplane. On the way to landing the PF pulled the breaker for the trim upon the suggestion from the previous PF now PNF. The trim situation never got worse from the initial pitch up. After the initial pitch up; engine and control monitor was indicating full right Aileron trim (all the way down the trim indicator) all the way nose down elevator trim was indicated as well. The PF and PNF did not have an aileron trim problem in the controls.The PF and PNF worked together to run checklists and to relieve each other of the opposing elevator control.After landing; the trim and trim switch were reset. [The engine and control monitor] then indicated normal aileron trim and elevator trim where it should have been for what the PF and PNF felt which was full nose up; the trim also worked again after was reset.There were no injuries or damage.

The electric trim ran nose up with autopilot on. The aircrew overrode the system by disconnecting it.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Descended 1;000 ft. then climb to 1;600 ft. to cross final approach fix.

Air carrier Captain reported an altitude excursion during approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During boarding First Officer and I smelled an acrid odor.  It started to get stronger and the flight attendants called and let us know they smelled it as well.  Since the odor was getting stronger and we didn't have any immediate indication as to what was causing it; I chose to expeditiously deplane the aircraft through the main cabin door.  While exiting the aircraft; one of the customers remarked that he thought the smell 'was electrical in nature.'  After deplaning we called Maintenance out to look at the jet.  After some back and forth about possible causes; Maintenance decided to take the jet out of service to do a deeper dive.  We swapped aircraft and completed the flight with a different tail number.

Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event during boarding. Maintenance removed the aircraft from service and another was assigned.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft's right engine driven generator was deferred earlier in the day. The APU was running and supplying electrical power to the right a/c bus. At approximately 40 KTS on the takeoff roll the APU shut down. Given that we were assigned a complex RNAV departure in busy airspace and having only one source of power; I rejected the takeoff. The reject was performed before the throttles had clamped.I taxied clear of the runway and restarted the APU. I contacted Dispatch; Maintenance; and the duty pilot. The APU was running and stable. We agreed to continue with the flight. The next takeoff was uneventful and the APU stayed running for the remainder of the flight. A review of the item in the logbook; a few days later; showed that Maintenance found the APU oil low.

Dispatched with the right generator deferred inoperative the flight crew of an MD-83 rejected their takeoff when the APU failed. A subsequent relight of the APU was followed by a second takeoff attempt and a completed flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 148; Flight Crew Total 6958; Flight Crew Type 2608

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

A tent was being constructed near the taxiway for an event requiring the airport to be closed the following day. Construction vehicles and personnel were moving in the area and a truck was improperly parked very close to the taxiway on the side opposite to where the tent was being erected. The Airport Manager and those assisting in coordinating the setup for the next day's events were in the vicinity of the construction activity. No NOTAM; barricades; or personnel were providing information relative to the construction that was occurring and no assistance was provided by airport personnel to aid in avoiding a collision with personnel or vehicles in the area.I was taxing out with a new student and was explaining the importance of remaining on the yellow center line to avoid collision with planes and other things that might be along the sides of the taxiway. We were on the centerline; at engine idle and slowed to walking speed as we noticed all the activity ahead to our left. I misjudged the location of the improperly parked truck on the right resulting in the tip of the right wing striking the vehicle resulting in damage to the aircraft. I spoke with several people after the event. One had taxied through the area about 30 minutes prior to our event. He spoke to a person removing tools from the truck and commented about the inappropriate place the truck was parked and asked him [to] move it. This pilot indicated he had a very difficult time maneuvering around on the taxiway to avoid the truck and the personnel and equipment involved in the tent construction on the other side. The other person I spoke with was assisting the airport manager in coordinating events relative to the tent construction. He indicated that the truck was clearly inappropriately parked and should not have been parked there. (If he had noticed this before our event; I wonder why he did not take the appropriate action and get it moved; or inform the airport manager of the situation?)I feel my initial decisions were correct; in that we were focused on taxiing on the yellow line; moving forward at a slow walk pace with the engine at idle. The construction; vehicle and human movement activity to my left distracted me for just a few seconds at a time that caused me to misjudge the proximity of the truck to the taxiway and ultimately to my right wingtip. I feel that the airport management should take a more aggressive role in evaluating the potential hazards associated with seemingly simple projects on the airport and post appropriate NOTAM's; barricades and/or have personnel at those locations to aid in moving aircraft safely through that area.

C172 instructor reports striking a pickup truck parked in close proximity to the main taxiway causing damage to the wing tip during slow taxing. The aircraft nose wheel was on the taxiway center line.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While doing the originating checks in the morning; my First Officer pulled his oxygen mask to check it and the pin that holds the strap to hang the mask came off. Since it was an originator in a Maintenance Base the mechanics happened to be there next to the plane as always to make sure everything is ok. We informed one of them that the pin came off and he proceeded to look for the pin and reinstalled it. I asked him if I needed to make a write-up in the logbook and he said no; it is fine. I agreed with him since he wasn't actually fixing or changing any part on the airplane I didn't see the need to put this on the logbook as well. [I did] not follow company SOPs and [did] not contact Maintenance Control since I believed this didn't require an actual write up. [In the future I should] contact my Dispatcher and Maintenance Control to clarify and clear any time maintenance personnel are on board of the airplane.

DHC8-300 Captain reports having an oxygen mask strap repaired prior to departure and not making a logbook entry. He is informed after the fact that an entry and maintenance sign off should have occurred.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169; Flight Crew Type 358

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

We were on a visual approach to Runway 27 backed up with the RNAV (GPS) 27; using LNAV and VNAV. With our landing clearance received; we suddenly had a TCAS advisory at about 1300 ft which was immediately followed by an RA commanding a descent. The F/O; being the PF; was already hand flying the aircraft at the time and promptly responded to the RA with a steep descent. In order to respond; we had to go below the [glide] path. At about 700 ft; I asked him to get back on the [glide] path because of the proximity to buildings; even though the RA never advised us that we were 'Clear of Conflict'. At 500 ft we were stabilized. At that stage the target on the screen showed 300 ft right above us; but we never had visual contact. When we asked the Tower about the traffic they stated that they did not see any traffic on short final.San Diego Tower claimed that there was absolutely no traffic seen within two and a half miles of our position. They offered the explanation that there could be a TCAS malfunction called TCAS MIRRORING that happened to us. Since I have never heard of that term; nor was I aware of the possibility that the TCAS could malfunction to indicate a traffic conflict at 1300 ft; with none being there; this incident needs to be researched and the pilot group needs to be educated about this issue. The margins on an approach this low to the ground are tight with a DESCEND RA; especially in SAN. While I understand that there is a lower limit in which the RA function is turned off; this situation would have been bad in IMC conditions; since we are trained to respond to an RA.

The Crew received an ACARS message on the subsequent flight from the Company stating that it could have been TCAS Mirroring that caused the event. This is something that I am not familiar with in 30 years of 121 experience. I feel the Crew handled the situation properly and by Company standards and policy. If this were an actual aircraft conflict we performed to avert such an event. If this is 'TCAS Mirroring' as it was referred to; I would like to see information on its causes; frequency of taking place; and notification to pilots to make them aware of this anomaly. Had we been in IMC conditions on approach to SAN I feel there would have been a greater sense of uncertainty and a higher level of threat with most likely a go-around concern with unknown traffic less than 300 ft above us.

B737 flight crew reported responding to an RA on approach to SAN that took them below desired vertical path. Tower reported no traffic in the vicinity.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 300

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft Y landed on Runway 22L; I told him to contact ground. Aircraft Z was trailing behind and cleared to land 22R. I hear ground control give instructions to hold short 22R at B for Aircraft Y. About a minute later I hear ground control talking to another aircraft; Aircraft X to taxi and hold short 22R at Runway 11. I see Aircraft Y hold short Runway 22R. As I am watching Aircraft Z land; and during his landing roll; I hear the supervisor behind me say 'Tell him to stop' to ground control.I look and see Aircraft X still rolling at Runway 11 past the hold short line for Runway 22R. At this point I can't do anything. Aircraft Z is a student pilot; he is already slowed down too much to take back off and Aircraft Y is on his left. Aircraft X was just about to get on the runway; but stopped right before. Aircraft Z pass the other aircraft and rolls to the end. If ground control didn't yell at the pilot to stop; the two aircraft would of hit.Hold short was given to all the aircraft; I don't know if they read back all holding. But; I do know that the holdings were given. This was just a pilot that I don't think was paying attention even though he was given the correct instructions.

Was taxiing from north ramp area to Runway 22L. The quickest route via Taxiway L was NOTAM'd closed (among others) due to construction. Cleared to taxi on Taxiway F hold short of B. There was Aircraft Y on B holding short of 22R on the other side of 22R; which blocked that taxi route to 22L. Approaching B recleared to cross B on to closed Runway 29; left turn; hold short (non-standard marking) of 22R for eventual taxi continuation to 22L. Approaching 29 on F; I looked left; then right; to make sure no conflicting traffic; then made left turn on to 29. As I made the turn; I looked up and to my left to check for traffic landing on 22R. I saw Aircraft Z on about a half-mile final for 22R. Ground said Aircraft X stop at the same time I saw Aircraft Z. I came to an immediate stop and saw that I had crossed the temporary hold-short marking for 22R on 29.About 15-20 seconds later Aircraft Z landed on 22R and crossed in front of me. I couldn't remember if I had read back hold short of 22R or hold short of 22L. After a few seconds; I was informed of a possible pilot deviation and told to be ready to copy a phone number for the tower. I replied that I was in a critical phase of flight and would call back for the number before takeoff. I also needed time to settle down from all of this. I received further clearance to cross 22R on 29; turn left on J; taxi to 22L. This was done without further problems. I reached the run-up area for 22L; pulled over; and contacted ground for the phone number. I also asked how long I had to call since I was ending up in [destination] and this would be a long day. The reply was as soon as possible.Contributing factors were numerous taxiway and runway closures due to construction. This has been going on for an extended period of time. I listened to ATIS and copied the closures and other NOTAMS. This is my home airport; so the construction was not new to me. Also the flight was going to be long with a fuel stop; and arrival weather considerations in [destination state]. This possibly distracted me from the non-standard taxi to 22L and ending up thinking hold short of 22L instead of 22R. I don't feel I was being rushed; but was taking an adequate amount of time while taxiing.Holding short of a runway while on a closed runway was definitely non-standard. I probably should have held short of B as originally cleared; as this would have kept me off of 29 which would definitely have kept me short of 22R. Also in approaching 29; I was more concerned with looking up for possible traffic conflicts; than looking down for non-standard markings. Seemingly small things; but they added up. Maybe I was starting to get overloaded and should have taken smaller steps in the taxi process.

Lafayette Tower Controller and taxiing aircraft pilot reported a runway incursion because the taxiing aircraft went over the hold line.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Runway incursion requiring aborted take-off ground roll. Clear Skies; Clear ground; full length runway visibility. I made two unicom announcements. 'ZZZ; [call sign] ready for 26.' Crossed hold short; lined up; '[call sign] departing 26 on the roll; ZZZ' at about 40kts and 1000 ft down 26; [the other aircraft] announces '[call sign] departing 8' Actions taken: Immediate abort take off to full stop; full reverse/beta. '[I] was rolling on 26 what are you doing?' [The other aircraft] then made a 180 at the 8 and taxied off saying 'oh; ok; you go ahead' Witness at the west end saw and heard the incident and commented to me later during fueling. This is the third incident (first for me). This same incident has happened [to other pilots]. No injuries.Previous attempts to communicate with [the pilot of the other aircraft] post flight on the ground are ineffective; he quickly becomes angry; denies any wrong doing and resorts to violence.

C208B pilot reported rejecting the takeoff when another aircraft announced departure on the opposite direction runway.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise flight at FL350; we started a descent to FL330; I deployed the flight spoilers. Immediately after deploying the flight spoilers; we experienced an uncommanded and abrupt left turn.  I disconnected the autopilot and stowed the flight spoilers. Two EICAS cautions messages presented; OB SPOILERONS and FLT SPOILERS.  We ran the QRH checklist and no further action was required.  We were concerned that we may get another uncommanded left roll during the approach and landing; we [advised ATC] and asked for the ARFF (Aircraft Rescue Firefighting) to meet us at the runway.We landed without incident.

A CRJ-900 Captain reported an uncommanded left turn when he deployed the flight spoilers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During landing gear retraction the Green Hydraulic System failed. The Pilot Monitoring secured the PTU and the engine pump as per ECAM; but the System Display indicated a total loss of fluid. We continued climb out to cruise. We discussed the problem with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; during which we decided to divert to a nearby airport. An emergency was declared. We selected the diversion airport based on its long runway; good weather; pilot familiarity; excellent facilities; and available Company Maintenance. We debated whether an overweight landing should be accomplished; but considered doing so prudent and the safest course of action. We configured early and had to use the landing gear gravity extension procedure. The overweight landing at 154;000 pounds was uneventful. We stopped straight ahead on the runway and were towed to the gate. A deadheading pilot; who was invited to the flight deck for the remainder of the flight for possible additional input; reported loud squealing sounds on takeoff during gear and flap retraction. The passengers and cabin crew were briefed several times en route to our diversion airport.

After suffering a Green Hydraulic System failure after gear and flap retraction the flight crew of an Airbus; after consultation with Dispatch and Maintenance; elected to divert to a nearby airport where an emergency was declared and an uneventful overweight landing resulted.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

DG [Dangerous Goods] was planned and loaded without enough mail / bags / ballast. I realized my mistake once I noticed most of my weight in the AFT was cargo and not enough mail / bags as I couldn't close the flight. I also didn't receive a notification prior to closing out the flight. Aircraft pushed early and was returned to the gate as I was contacted by load planning and realized my mistake. DG was removed from pit 4 and placed to pit 3 and secured with bags. Once DG was secured load planner was contacted for pilot notification to be sent.

DG (Dangerous Goods) was planned by Ramp Lead without enough weight to secure it. Load Planner called station to stop push because DG was not secured with adequate amount of weight. Lead had to move DG item #1 from pit 4 to pit 3 to secure DG.

Air carrier ground crew reported a ground gate return to correct a DG loading configuration error and provide flight crew updated DG documents.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was working the feeder east position. I had literally just took over the position about a minute or two ago. Before leaving the other controller had issue traffic to an A319 on a VFR that had been operating with the Departure position level at 11;600 (C182). The A319 had been level at 11;000 FT on the arrival. These aircraft were separated by 500-700 FT. This aircraft was showing 11;600 FT. I made a few transmissions to other aircraft when the A319 said he was descending due to an RA with the VFR aircraft. At this time there was a departure at his 2 o'clock 2 miles level at 10;000 FT. I issued traffic and told him he was at 10;000 FT. The A319 descended to approximately 10;600 FT before returning to his altitude later. I do not know if traffic was issued to the other aircraft involved (I was only talking to the A319. The pilot reported that this was a dangerous situation and that the other aircraft should not have been allowed to be operating right over the main arrival path like that. I advised the supervisor of the pilots' comments and he said that there was nothing we could do because the C182 was outside of the class bravo. Expand the Bravo 1;000 FT above the arrival routes (IE. the top would be 12;000 FT if the arrivals were at 11;000 FT.) This would give control to the FAA to approve or disapprove an operation such as this over a busy arrival route.

We immediately searched for the traffic and had it in sight (Civilian single-engine 500 feet above us) when we then got the TCAS RA to descend. The Captain turned off the autopilot and smoothly descended and complied with the RA. We notified ATC and once the traffic was clear the Captain climbed back up to our assigned altitude of 11;000 FT. During the descent ATC advised us of MD-80 1;000 FT below us. We acknowledged we had the MD-80 in sight was climbing back up to 11;000 FT. We only descended to 10;700 FT before climbing back up to altitude. We continued on the arrival and landed without incident.

An A319 on the DFW BYP6 Arrival at 11;000 FT in Class B took evasive action following a TCAS RA DESCEND from a single engine aircraft at 11;500 FT outside of Class B and during the descent came with 700 FT of an another Air Carrier below him also in Class B.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

A Sky Hawk had landed on Runway 4R and was clearing at Taxiway F. A Caravan was on right traffic from the Freeway 2 arrival for Runway 4L on a short approach. The Caravan was on a dog-leg and almost directly over the HNL VORTAC when the ASDE-X alarmed for OCCUPIED Runway 4R. The ASDE-X indicated his target in conflict with the Sky Hawk; who was observed clear of the runway edge line and moving toward Taxiway C. Before I was able to key up on frequency; the Caravan cleared the Runway 4R final and the hold bars immediately illuminated on Runway 4L. No go-around was issued. ASDE-X nuisance alarm forms and an MOR was submitted by FLM. This has been a re-occurrence with ASDE-X safety logic which is responding as designed. However; because of the flexibility of the use of the parallels with our small aircraft and the helicopter operations very unique to this airport; this continues to be a problem. Our OS offered a solution to issue a point to turn base leg; i.e.; turn a one mile final. I don't know if our student pilots can navigate an ILS/DME or visualize a point in space. This is viable; however; in order to expedite traffic for efficiency or for LAHSO/No LAHSO operations; or to minimize conflictions with the diverse types of aircraft. Prior to ASDE-X; we did not have these issues. Another other possible solution is to lengthen Runway 4L and make it even with Runway 4R.

HCF Tower ASDE-X nuisance 'false' alarms are recurring. A number of recent suggestions provided at the facility level that might provide some relief are provided.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated

We started the engines normally and turned off the DC ground power and indicated to the ground crew to remove the ground power cord. After the power was turned off and removed; the DC Bus light illuminated along with the loss of several cockpit lighting sources. I tried to reset the system with the bus reset switch and was unsuccessful. In preparation of shutting the engines down; I had the ramp personnel reconnect ground power. I turned the ground power switch on and moved the condition levers to fuel off; shutting down the engines. As the engines were spooling down; the ramp personnel were waving their arms to get our attention and they were pointing at the #1 Engine. I turned to look at the engine and saw heavy smoke and occasional sparks emanating from a vent on the inboard cowling of the #1 engine. My first officer and I decided that an evacuation out of the right side emergency exits was the best course of action and instructed him to enter the cabin and inform the flight attendant to commence with evacuation procedures out of the right side exits. With the presence of smoke coming out of the engine; I decided to empty the fire bottles into the engine as a safety precaution. After using the forward bottle and waiting 30 seconds; the smoke was still present so I used the aft bottle as well. I also informed ramp control to send the fire trucks as an added precaution. I then exited the flight deck into the cabin to assist with the orderly evacuation of the airplane. There was no pushing or running for the exits which was not needed as the only reason I decided to use the emergency exits was to keep the passengers away from the smoke coming out of the #1 engine. The first officer had already removed both right side emergency exits and was outside the right side forward exit assisting passengers out along with ramp personnel. Everyone evacuated safely out of the forward right side exit and proceeded into the terminal. The crew and I also exited the aircraft but stayed on the ramp as the smoke had all but stopped by the time everyone was out of the airplane. Hopefully it didn't exacerbate the problem; but the only item I would have done differently was not re-connect ground power when facing an electrical malfunction at the gate before shutting down the engines.

When inappropriate electrical anomalies resulted from the removal of ground power after engine start the Captain of a DHC-8 asked that ground power be restored.  When ramp personnel alerted the flight deck to smoke and sparks emanating from the left engine the engines were shut down; the passengers evacuated and both fire bottles were emptied into the left engine as a precaution.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While [we were] in New York Center airspace FL340 50 north northeast of MRB VOR. We were on a direct course to PECK then LIT. I requested a deviation of up to 10 degrees to the right or north due to weather ahead. ATC said denied and we stated again that we needed it for weather 40 miles ahead and we may only need 5 degrees. This time the Controller came back accusing us of wanting a more direct route (we were already on a direct route to LIT via PECK) I stated again it was for weather. Then he came back and said turn direct MRD then LIT. That route took us about 30 degrees left; right through the overhang we trying to avoid so I stated that we couldn't accept that clearance. Then the Controller said thirty other aircraft were over MRD with no problems. I then declared an emergency to stay on the route we were first on direct PECK then LIT. The Controller gave us a number to call but when he handed us off to INDY Center he said disregard the call. I felt I had declared an emergency so I should file this report.

Air Carrier with ZNY was denied a weather deviation resulting in an emergency declaration to avoid build ups.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

When cleared to taxi into position and hold Runway 25R we received a #2 engine fire indication. We complied with the QRH including firing a fire bottle. We also called for CFR as an added precaution. The #2 engine fire system had an MEL for LOOP B INOP and the switch was in the proper position locking out LOOP B per MEL. As a result there was only had one operable loop on that engine. After the bottle was dispensed and the FIRE light extinguished we tested the FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM and it tested OK for all engines with the exception of the locked out loop. CFR scanned the engine with a heat signature device of some sort and confirmed there was no fire. Several minutes later we received a second fire warning on #2. Fire Indications remained on even with maintenance on board at the gate.

A DC-10 flight crew took appropriate QRH actions when they received a fire warning on the number two engine as they taxied into position for takeoff. The warning was ultimately determined to have been false.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

While the First Officer was just beginning the takeoff roll he noticed that the nose wheel steering was not responding to rudder pedal movement. This determination was made at a speed of about 50 KTS. The takeoff was subsequently rejected. After consultation the airplane returned to the gate for maintenance. Maintenance used an MEL to allow the airplane to operate without rudder pedal steering. Returning to the gate was warranted because of required MEL maintenance procedures.

A B737-400 takeoff was rejected at about 50 KTS because the nose wheel steering was found to be inoperative.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 346

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On the initial climb; right after rotation; [we] started smelling a strange odor in the cockpit. We pointed it out and got back to it after we finished our after takeoff checklist to troubleshoot. At the same time; we notified ATC of the issue that we might be returning back to the field so they gave us a heading that keeps us around the airport. While we were trying to find the electrical burning type odor smell; we called the flight attendant and he also confirmed the that he smells the same electrical burning type odor and he had never smelled such a thing before and neither me and my First Officer did in the past of our career time.We decided to return to the field. Right after we decided to return to the field and started the preparation for it; the smell started to dissipate; so we chose not to notify it to ATC as an emergency to see if it going to go away; and it did. We landed back in our departure Airport and made a maintenance write up about it for company to inspect it the issue. We noticed that there were no caution or master lights while the smell was in the environment neither circuit breakers were pulled.

EMB-145 Captain reported they started smelling an electrical burning type odor in the cockpit after takeoff.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

A night visual approach was planned for Runway 26 into LCI. The conditions at the time of the arrival were VMC with winds out of the west at 12 KTS. Approximately 30-40 miles southwest of the airport we requested direct to DOJEN for RNAV 26. The plan was to use the RNAV 26 solely as electronic back up for Runway 26 and cancel IFR when the airport was in sight and the ski area and corresponding terrain to the south of the airport were safely out of the way.About 6-7 miles east southeast of the airport; we picked up the runway and canceled IFR. From there; we squared up and proceeded towards the final approach course outside REZDI; but slightly inside ZUROT; which is where we intercepted and proceeded inbound to Runway 26. The airplane was configured for landing at REZDI and the before landing checklist was then completed.The PAPI lights for Runway 26 were out so we elected to follow the electronic glide slope to the runway. At about 2 miles from the runway threshold the 'Terrain; Pull UP' warning first sounded. The aircraft was briefly leveled off and the warning went away. With the runway in sight; the approach was continued. Shortly after; at about 1 mile from the threshold; 'Terrain; Pull up' sounded again. The aircraft was again leveled off and the warning went away. From that point; the approach was continued and a safe landing was executed.Suggestions: When using electronic guidance for VFR approaches to unfamiliar; or in this case; less frequently used airports; a closer review of the approach itself; RNAV 26 would have revealed that using that approach at night stated; 'Landings to Runway 26 at night not authorized.' This of course only applies to IFR operations and not Visual Approaches done under VFR. Upon closer inspection of additional information; the differing glideslope angles (4 degree PAPI and 3-degree electronic glideslope) would have been noticed and diversion to another airport carried out; since the 3 degree; electronic glideslope does not provide a way to make an approach to Runway 26 without encroaching terrain clearance criteria.

We were approaching LCI at night; and having both been there many times; we elected to ask to proceed to an IAF for 26 to execute our visual approach. We loaded the RNAV 26 (we noticed the PAPI for 26 was under service in the NOTAMs prior to departure) and had canceled the IFR by the time we reached the vicinity of the IAF for 26 and proceeded visually inbound while keeping the approach loaded as a backup.Prior to reaching the runway (I do not recall the exact position but it was within 3 miles of the airport); we received a GPWS aural 'Caution Obstacle' followed by a 'Pull-Up.' Likely; due to our familiarity with the airport the pilot flying leveled out while we were processing what was going on; as we believed we had knowledge of the area terrain as well as had continuous full sight of the runway environment. The level-out and/or forward progress was enough for the warning to cease and the landing continued without incident. During the entire time; we were lined up with the runway and at or above the electronic glide path.After landing; we reviewed the approach plate in more detail and discovered the notes 'night landing 26 NA' and 'visual segment-obstacles.' As we were only using the approach as a backup to our visual arrival (VFR in VMC); the approach plate did not get the full attention it needed in this case and there is no advisory/restriction in the chart supplement for night VFR arrivals to 26.I believe we encountered a 'catch 22' as we were not officially on the instrument approach but were using it to aid our nighttime visual arrival; especially with the PAPI out; which ended up contributing to the occurrence of the event (IAP restrictions and 3deg Glide path for the IAP and 4deg Glide path for the PAPI). Having been familiar with the airport checked our restricted airport list (no restriction for PAPI out) and discussed the obstacles; (the ski area in part but most importantly the hill that is located just off the left of the final approach [there is a tower on the hill as well]). I believe the surprise of GPWS activation was enough to delay the execution of the full GPWS escape maneuver; when it shouldn't have.I believe given an unfamiliar airport or area; I would have called for the execution without thought; however in this case the processing time (and pitch correction by the pilot flying) was enough for the warning to cease. I am not positive which obstacle triggered it; but I believe it was the hill off the left side of the aircraft (with tower atop); but I cannot be 100% sure. In my opinion; the PAPI for 26 is safety critical equipment at night and should be mandatory for a night arrival on 26; regardless of aircraft type. Other crews may do the same as we did and load the approach for back up to comply with SOP; not realizing that the FMS calculated glide path is shallower than the PAPI (info only contained in the Chart Supplement).

Flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning twice on a night visual approach to LCI airport after failing to notice a steeper glide slope angle was required to avoid terrain.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

The ATL inbound was level at 13;000 FT. The VFR aircraft was at 15;500 FT and began an unexpected descent into the inbound. The inbound then responded to an RA and descended to 12;500. I did not call traffic due to the 2;500 FT altitude difference. I do feel the VFR aircraft had veered too close to the ATL inbound stream. I feel the VFR Jump planes should be on the DALAS frequency. Also increased training for the VFR pilots operating in that airspace.

I took a briefing from the Controller at R1 and was informed that I had a jump plane on frequency and I was waiting for him to ask for advisories. It appeared to be level flight at 155. Sector 5 had an arrival at 130 flying underneath the jump plane. The jump plane then descended right on top of the B737. The B737 reported a RA and descended without incident. The jump plane process should be re-evaluated and maybe DALAS Sector should talk to the jump planes or the flight path of the jump planes should be further South/West of the ERLIN corridor.

ZTL Controller described a TCAS RA event between an ATL Air Carrier arrival and a parachute jump aircraft operating near the arrival route; the reporter suggesting the jump aircraft be assigned a different frequency and provided with more awareness training.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 530; Flight Crew Type 11

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Airspace Structure; Staffing; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

I was operating in the traffic pattern with a student at the end of a local training flight. The Control Tower was closed and we were announcing our position on CTAF. There were 3 or 4 other aircraft operating in the pattern and we made an entry into the left downwind for XXL. While in the downwind; Aircraft Y called a 5 mile straight in final for XXL. As we began our base to follow Aircraft Y; approximately 2.5 miles out; Aircraft Z called a 6 mile final. We were descending from pattern altitude and made a call that we were on base and following Aircraft Y. We made a call as we were intercepting final; however; Aircraft Z continued and began to overtake us from 200 feet above as we were on an approximately 1 mile final and at 600 feet. I lost sight of Aircraft Z and began an evasive descending left turn which I announced on CTAF. At around the same time; Aircraft Z also made an evasive right 360. We reestablished in the downwind and announced that we would follow Aircraft Z. Once we established adequate separation from Aircraft Z; we began a left base and made an announcement on CTAF; at which point; Aircraft A in the left downwind announced and began base turn inside of us. We once again made an evasive maneuver and re-intercepted final after a 360 turn.There are a few reasons the problem arose. Firstly; with no Control Tower and multiple airplanes in a closed pattern; the two straight in approaches caused a significant disruption to the flow of traffic. This was further exaggerated by the difference in performance/final approach speed of our aircraft compared to Aircraft Z. Secondly; the temporary shortening of ZZZ's Tower hours poses a safety risk as the volume of traffic after XA:00 local time would still justify control tower operations. In addition; many of the aircraft that operate out of ZZZ are less familiar with uncontrolled pattern operations and fail to follow prescribed procedures/right of way rules or use good judgment when approaching a busy pattern with multiple aircraft already operating.

Pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft while attempting to land at an airport where the tower was closed due to COVID-19 staffing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 236.18; Flight Crew Total 33600; Flight Crew Type 10390.87

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During cruise flight in Russian airspace on a clear moonless night with no turbulence or wind shear; the auto throttle system very slowly and imperceptibly began to retard the thrust levers over a period of at least a minute or two. No warnings or status messages indicated a failure of any kind. I was shocked to look up and see our airspeed 20 knots below the indicated target speed bug (cruise was .82 Mach and about 280 knots indicated) and decreasing and the thrust levers half way to the idle position. I grabbed the thrust levers and pushed them forward; having to resist the force of the auto throttle which [was] trying to retard them at the same time. I turned off the auto throttle arm switches and set the thrust levers manually to return to normal cruise speed. We could find no reason for the auto throttle to depart from holding the cruise airspeed as they had since the beginning of the flight. I reengaged the auto throttle system; carefully monitoring the indicated airspeed hold and Mach hold functions; which operated normally for the remainder of the flight. The failure was entered into the aircraft logbook and a text message sent to maintenance. Maintenance responded to the text message that there was no previous write-ups on the auto throttle system; and that it would be looked at on the ground. I do not know if maintenance discovered a fault with the system in their post flight inspection.  In my 10;000 hours as a 777 captain I have never seen the auto throttle system fail to maintain cruise flying airspeed unless associated with turbulence or wind shear; none of which appeared was a factor this night; nor have I seen the auto throttle system react opposite to an airspeed excursion.. I am quite certain that the aircraft would have stalled or come close to doing so had I not physically intervened and would like to know the outcome of the post flight inspection by maintenance. It would be extremely disturbing to me if they did not find a problem with this particular aircrafts auto throttle system; because we clearly came close to having a major jet upset incident and I believe the problem should be researched to determine if it might happen again. I consider myself very lucky to have caught this incipient failure in a timely manner during what was otherwise a very quiet and lulling portion of cruise flight where the problem could [have] gone unnoticed and caused a significant departure from cruise flight.

A B777 flight crew; while in cruise; detected that the autothrottles were not maintaining .82 Mach and were retarding further even as airspeed was decreasing. The Captain disengaged the autothrottle system and manually set the throttles to maintain Mach .82. He then reengaged the autothrottle system and it operated normally for the remainder of the flight.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

In Cruise approaching the descent phase into ZZZ; the FO inadvertently discharged the forward fire bottle by rotating his sun visor. He immediately pointed out that he did this when the warning chime went off. I canceled the CDC; and we briefly spoke about what happened. I then contacted dispatch and maintenance for a conference call as to what had happened and what our intentions should be. At this point we had started our descent phase into ZZZ. As we were positive about the inadvertent triggering of the fire bottle; we decided that ZZZ would be the landing point; and maintenance would meet us there to deal with the situation. We then advise the ZZZ station as to the situation. We landed in ZZZ without further incident and parked at the gate.At this point we again looked at the sun visors on both the first officers and Captain side. We carefully rotated the shades to close proximity to the overhead panel to see which switches they could actually come in contact with. Obviously; on the first officer side this was the forward fire bottle red guarded switch. Then on the captain side; the sunshade when rotated and upwards comes in contact with the RAT (Ram Air Turbine) deployment red guarding switch. Because these two red guarded switches have the hinges at the upper side (12 o'clock position); the sunshade is capable of lifting the red guards; moving underneath and manipulating the buttons. Both of these guarded switches are protected from rotation but I'm about to buy other non-emergency switches or knobs. We both view this as a situation that could possibly occur again and with greater consequence. I believe both of these red guarded lift to push guards could be inverted so that the hinges were on the 6 o'clock position which would guard them from manipulation by the sunshades.

An A319 flight crew reported the inadvertent discharge of the forward cargo fire bottle. This was due to the rotation of the First Officer's sun visor in such a manner that it triggered the fire bottle discharge switch. The flight crew expressed concern that this event could be repeated.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

After takeoff; in our climb; smoke was detected in the cockpit. The smoke was coming from the First Officer's yoke. We also started to have BAT DISCHARGE caution light come on multiple times. Followed appropriate check list and QRH procedures. Decided to go back to the airport. We got clearance to go directly to the airport and got vectors for ILS. All the appropriate procedures and check list were completed before landing; with verification of speeds and weight. After an uneventful landing; we did not need any further assistance; and went to our parking spot.

Advised ATC due to smoke in cockpit. Returned to [departure airport]. QRH was read; approach was briefed and setup. Checklists were followed. Uneventful landing was made under maximum weight. Battery discharge light annunciated several times during the event. First Officer smelled electric burning; then noticed smoke. Caution light annunciation and battery discharge light noticed during normal scan. I should have waited and asked ATC to standby before announcing the aircraft condition. This would have given time for the crew to evaluate all resources and outcomes before making a decision.

B737-800 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing smoke from the First Officer yoke and a battery discharge annunciation.