ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The Captain advised me he was diverting to ABQ; with FOB (fuel onboard) of 7.0. I advised ABQ burn of 4;296 LBS with reserve of 3;652 LBS; and suggested LAS as being less burn since I observed he was using reserve fuel to divert to ABQ. I made sure he declared minimum fuel with ZAB. I also repeatedly queried his current FOB and fuel over destination to verify I was calculating fuel correctly.Erroneous ATC communication about TUS closure; irregular operations with dust storm at PHX. My desk had 4 PHX arrivals at the same time during a dust storm; this was not an optimum workload.Aircraft attempted to land PHX with 2 SM visibility; Captain at that point felt weather conditions were unsafe; asked to divert to listed alternate of TUS. ATC advised TUS was closed; which was incorrect. Captain advised he was diverting to ABQ. I feel the cause of this low fuel arrival was communications. I was unaware of the fact that ATC had advised the Captain that TUS was closed. There were a few scattered cells in TUS area; which was why I thought he chose ABQ instead.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported high work load and ATC confusion about airport conditions contributed to a less than optimum diversion plan.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 27000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

We got the current ATIS information; which was reporting low overcast skies and winds 190/27 gusting to 42 KTS; the ILS to 19 was in use. We briefed the approach and added a wind additive of 20 KTS to VREF. I called the flight attendants and told them that I wanted them to secure the cabin early and take their seats as I was expecting a rough ride in. Shortly thereafter we began being vectored for the approach. We asked ATC if other aircraft were getting in OK; they said that they had not had anyone land recently but the last aircraft (about 1 hour earlier) did land OK. On the approach we encountered moderate turbulence and at approximately 800 FT we heard 'Go-Around Windshear Ahead; Go-Around Windshear Ahead'; on the overhead speakers; I immediately executed a go-around and we encountered a very aggressive windsheer. It was violent; at that point we encountered severe turbulence as well. Once we were clear of the windsheer we cleaned up the aircraft and notified ATC of our encounter and go-around.ATC began to vector us and asked what our intentions were. I told the co-pilot to tell them we were not going to do another approach into ZZZ; we asked them what ZZZ1 weather was; just then another flight checked on to the frequency and said they had just gone around in ZZZ1 due to windshear. ZZZ1 was out of the question in my mind as an alternate at that point. We asked for the weather in ZZZ2; it was about the same as ZZZ but no windsheer had been reported so we requested to divert to ZZZ2. Enroute; I called back to the flight attendants to make sure everyone was OK and quickly explained what had happened and where we were going. I told them that we were OK and that we would be on the ground in about 10 minutes; I also told them to stay in their seats. I then made a quick PA to the passengers advising them of the situation and our intentions. My copilot sent a divert message via ACARS to the Company. We received a few vectors then landed into ZZZ2 without incident. Once on the ground and clear of the runway in ZZZ2 I stopped the aircraft called back to the flight attendants to again make sure everyone was OK; evidently the two flight attendants in the back were getting sick and were pretty upset. I made a PA to the passengers and told them that we were on the ground in ZZZ2 and would have them to the gate shortly where customer service would be able to give them more details on getting them back to ZZZ. Once at the gate we finally were able to get the passengers off the plane. I was told by OPS that the weather should push through in 3 to 4 hours then we could be underway. I decided to gather my crew in first class to see how everyone was doing. The general consensus was Not Good. The flight attendants were all pretty upset; I was told that the two in the back were pretty sick; and very scared. The two up front were notably concerned and shaken. My co-pilot indicated that he felt shaken and did not feel comfortable with continuing. I agreed. The human factor and fatigue issues clearly made this aircraft unsafe to operate in our eyes. I voiced my concerns with my Chief Pilot and he was very supportive. I informed him that my crew and I had experienced very difficult event and were going to shut the flight down due to crew fatigue. I asked for some hotel rooms my crew and myself which the duty manager and his team kindly provided us. We then left the airport for the hotel to get some much-needed rest and to decompress. Upon returning; about 9 hours later; we got the aircraft ready to go and boarded the remaining passengers to take back to ZZZ. As we taxied out for takeoff the WINGBODY OVERHEAT light illuminated. After running the QRH we spoke to Maintenance Control and was instructed to return to the gate. After about an hour; Maintenance placarded the left bleed and pack INOP and released us to ZZZ. Once again we taxied out; and this time took off. After takeoff we were cleared to climb to 15;000 FT; as we passed through about 7;000 FT my ears didn't feel right; I look up at the pressurization panel and saw that the AUTO and ALTN pressurization modes had failed. I told my co-pilot to tell ATC that we wanted to level at 10;000 FT while we dealt with the pressurization issue. My co-pilot ran the QRH and controlled the out flow valve manually. We continued to ZZZ and landed uneventfully. Once at the gate and; after a hand full of write-ups we handed the aircraft over to Maintenance. My co-pilot and I were still scheduled to fly another leg; which was already boarded and waiting on us so we ran for our next flight; which was uneventful. My co-pilot and crew did an excellent job under very difficult circumstances and should be commended for their professionalism.

B737 Captain reports receiving a windshear warning at 800 FT during approach and goes around. Severe turbulence and windshear are encountered during the go around. With nearby airports also reporting windshear the crew elects to divert to an airport not reporting windshear and take crew rest. After resting pressurization faults are reported on the short flight to the original destination.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After takeoff we received an ECAM message 'Brakes Sys 2 Fault'. Cleared ECAM and Status using challenge and response as there were no procedures to accomplish. At about 9000 ft. during climbout we received a call from the Lead Flight Attendant that there were fumes in the cabin causing eye; throat and nose irritation. Minimal effects in the cockpit; but noticeable as we did don our masks early in the event.Commenced checklist for Smoke and Fumes and after a second verbal check with the flight attendants; determined an immediate return to ZZZ was in order because symptoms were worsening. Immediately [advised ATC] and commenced a left turn back to the field at 16000 ft. ATC was helpful while acting swiftly and professionally to ensure we landed with no delay. We landed below max landing weight at about 380;000 lbs with a 100 to 200 fpm touchdown. We were unable to finish the Smoke and Fumes checklist.Cockpit ambient noise in flight did not allow any of the three pilots to communicate using the interphone with the mask. We had to raise the mask and announce what we needed to say in order to communicate within the cockpit. This was with both speakers loud enough to hear ATC; but unable to speak amongst cockpit crewmembers using the interphone. ATC comm worked great. Once on the ground; ambient noise was low enough to hear the interphone communications as well as ATC with no adjustments to volume.All flight attendants who went to the hospital were diagnosed with elevated carbon monoxide levels.

A330 Pilot reported Flight Attendants alerted them to fumes in the cabin after a systems failure after takeoff causing a return to the departure airport.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 20

Inbound to HHR airport from the north through the Los Angeles Special Flight Rules area (3;500 FT MSL south-eastbound); we checked ATIS for HHR and transitioned the SFRA at 3;500 FT MSL over LAX; in a C172. Exiting south of the SFRA; we contacted Hawthorne Tower and stated our position exiting the SFRA and requested landing with the information.  Hawthorne Tower directed us to descend and report left downwind for Runway 25. We began a left turn and descended into Hawthorne Class D airspace. At approximately 2;200 FT during our descent (HHR Class D airspace goes up to 2;500 FT) and about 2 miles for the runway; and in HHR Class D airspace; we were crossed right to left by another Cessna that passed in front of us at the same altitude 50-100 FT away right in front of us. We had not seen the other traffic in our descent and Hawthorne Tower had not given us any traffic advisories. We notified Tower on the radio of our close call; and Tower confirmed that they had just handed off that traffic to LAX Tower for the Northbound Mini Route transition (which is at 2;500 FT even though this traffic crossed us closer to 2;200 FT). Tower ATC said that he had not thought there was any conflict even though he was providing our aircraft and the other aircraft with ATC services at the time. He advised us to 'maintain VFR' and then invited us into the Tower to discuss what happened. We accepted the invitation and visited with him in the Tower. He was the only person in the Tower at the time and we learned later that it was a 'Contract Tower'; which could have explained the low staff level (1 person); and which may or may not have directly affected HHR Tower's ability to give good traffic advisories in this very busy airspace transition area. Tower ATC reminded us that it was our responsibility to 'see and avoid' traffic in VFR; which we of course knew; but we were surprised that there was only 1 person in the Tower and that it was not a priority for HHR Tower to separate traffic inside its airspace; with particular respect to the many transition routes in the area (that transition LAX Class B). The lesson for me was that some Towers appear to be understaffed and that I have had a false sense of security operating in Class D airspace. I recognized that I normally relax slightly when entering Class D airspace with respect to VFR 'see and avoid'; because I have had the impression that Tower is providing me with traffic advisories. This experience demonstrated that it is almost more important to look for traffic when in Class D airspace; since it is more congested with traffic than Class E airspace (for example); and that a reasonable expectation of traffic advisories may be misplaced when operating near a Class D Control Tower and inside Class D airspace.

General Aviation pilot entering downwind at HHR experienced a NMAC with VFR traffic transitioning Class D toward the LAX Mini Route; no traffic information was provided by ATC.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During takeoff roll; prior to V1; a very strong odor (similar to dirty socks) could be smelled in the cockpit.  As soon as we completed the after takeoff checklist; I called the Flight Attendants (FAs) to verify if they could smell it in the main cabin.  Both FAs said that they could and that it was very strong.I told [the] First Officer (FO) to request a level off so that I could run the QRH and for us to don the oxygen masks.  I called the FAs again and they told me that the smell of becoming even stronger. We were given delay vectors so that we could descend and perform the QRH procedures.I read QRH (Fumes/Odor Isolation Chart) and determined that it was category A (Oil).Since both FAs told me that the smell was overwhelming; I turned off the recirculation fans; turned off both bleeds and packs and dumped the cabin to help evacuate the odor.I reprogrammed the FMS for a return to field and set the ILS frequency and inbound course on both Primary Flight Display (PFD) and did a quick brief to FO.I performed the overweight QRH procedure; a descent and approach checklist; as well as the landing checklist.After a normal landing; we stopped on [the] runway.  I made a PA for passengers to remain seated while Fire / Rescue Department could inspect the outside of the aircraft for any hydraulic/oil/fuel leaks.We were escorted to the gate by fire trucks.Firemen came onboard to check on the crew and passengers to verify if anyone needed medical assistance.Passengers were deplaned.I called Dispatch and answered all of our dispatcher questions.I filled out the Odor Event Sheet and handed both the report and the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) to the maintenance manager.A logbook entry was entered for the fume event and another one for the overweight landing.No EICAS messages were ever received.  This was a TO-1; no flex; takeoff (max thrust takeoff).Fumes in the pressurization/air conditioning system during takeoff roll and climb.

An ERJ-190 Captain reported returning to departure airport after noticing a strong dirty sock odor in the aircraft.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight returned to the gate for because number 1 engine could not be started. The gate crew were notified to hook up air [hose] and ground power. [There] were also bags on the list. The crew and I started pulling those bags. Maintenance notified us they were going to run the number 1 engine; then; they told us 30 seconds later number engine was running with the cargo loader and air [hose] still connected to the airplane. My crew and I had zero time to react to the possible deadly situation.

Ramp employee reported the flight crew started the engine at the gate without coordination; with workers and equipment nearby.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 203; Flight Crew Total 1405; Flight Crew Type 830

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 17422; Flight Crew Type 11

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

I was giving aircraft familiarization training to a new owner in his aircraft. We were taxiing from the FBO to Runway XX. Per taxi instructions given by Ground we were to taxi south on Taxiway XX and hold short of Taxiway XY. Upon reaching Taxiway XY; Tower instructed us to hold short of Runway XX. We then proceeded across the hold short line at Taxiway XY to cross the under-construction runway expecting to see an additional hold short line at the actual active runway. As soon as we realized that we had crossed the only hold short line we immediately stopped and contacted Tower asking for further instruction. The other single engine aircraft on final was instructed to go around and we were given a takeoff clearance after receiving a phone number to contact from Tower.We did listen to the ATIS during our run-up and discussed the possibility of 'non-standard' hold short lines. In hindsight; we should not have crossed the hold short lines at Taxiway XY without being 100% certain that we were authorized to do so. Knowing that the main runway at ZZZ was under-construction we should have been exercising extreme caution to avoid this type of situation. I think the main contributing factors to this occurrence was the unusual taxi and airport environments due to the construction. I have not seen a hold short line as far from the active runway as it is at ZZZ. Another confusing factor was the change in instruction/language between the Ground Controller and Tower Controller. Ground instructed us to hold short of Taxiway XY which was in essence the correct spot to hold for the active runway. When switching to Tower we were instructed to hold short of Runway XX. This made us believe we were to proceed to a different location.  Of course; both of us as experienced pilots should have caught this and the blame falls solely on us. I understand the importance of safety of ground operations and will use this as a valuable lesson in my personal flying as well as when instructing in the future.

I was receiving transition training in my new airplane. My Instructor and I were taxing onto Taxiway XX to hold short of Taxiway XY for departure on Runway XX at ZZZ. Once we were holding short of Taxiway XY; Ground instructed us to contact Tower. We contacted the Tower and were told to hold short of Runway XX. ZZZ's main runway is under construction and is closed to operations; it has large X's on that runway. There is a hold short line at the intersection of Taxiway XY and the closed runway. The ATIS notes there are 'non-standard markings' for the runway.My Instructor had been to ZZZ [a month ago]. We discussed the 'non-standard markings' and thought there would be another set of hold short lines just before the active; not under construction Runway XX. After crossing the previously mentioned hold short line; we were looking ahead towards the open Runway XX and did not see any hold short lines. We then immediately stopped and were at the intersection of Taxiway XY and the approach end of the under construction; closed Runway XX. We then asked the Tower if we were ok stopping in our present position; and he said no and that we should have stopped at the hold short lines behind us. We continued to hold our position and Tower instructed an aircraft on final for Runway XX to go around. We were still several hundred ft. from the active Runway XX. In retrospect; we should have asked the Tower exactly where the hold short lines were for Runway XX. The term 'non-standard markings' is a bit vague and our interpretation of that was that there were hold short lines for the closed Runway XX and also hold short lines for the open and active Runway XX. I'm not excusing our actions; but I think it would be very helpful to have the ATIS remark that the hold short lines at the intersection of Taxiway XY and the closed; under construction runway are the ones to be used for all operations. Thank You.

Flight Instructor and Student reported experiencing confusion with instructions from ATC and crossed past the hold short line without clearance.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Climbing through the mid 20's; we got a chime and a 'HYD 2 LOW PRESS' message. I took the radios and controls; captain went through the QRH for the appropriate procedure. Due to the indication of 5% hydraulic fluid and positive pressure in the accumulator; we did not immediately shut down the EDP or declare an emergency. However; a few seconds later the rest of the pressure bled out of the system and we informed ATC that we needed to divert to the nearest suitable. We declared an emergency and handled everything according to procedure and training. We decided that although I was PF; he had much more time in the aircraft and if there was a possibility of directional control issues we would have fewer questions to answer if he took the landing. We landed and taxied in without incident. Obviously the failure of a system takes you out of your routine; and there is a tendency for both pilots to focus on one problem. However we divided the duties effectively and did our respective jobs; making sure that all checklists were completed and we had accomplished all procedures according to the QRH. I can't say for sure that no errors were made; but it seemed that everything was done safely and properly.

CRJ200 First Officer reports loss of number 2 hydraulic system during climb and diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Total 1984; Flight Crew Type 374

After rotation and positive rate was called; 'gear up' was called and the gear handle selected up. At 350 ft AGL; an excessive rattle was felt and heard in the nose gear area with red nose gear unsafe light remaining illuminated. At 800 ft AGL; the crew cycled the gear handle down; three green gear safe lights and no amber door lights indicated. The crew then attempted to retract the gear a second time with the same indications as before to include the noise and shaking. Next; the crew then selected the gear selector down and three green gear safe lights illuminated with no amber door lights. ATC was advised of the issue; crew was given a clearance maintain 3000; radar vectors returning back to ZZZ; per crew request. Landing gear malfunction checklist was called for. While in the course of running the checklist; a lesser rattle continued to be felt in the rudder pedals. 138 knots was maintained throughout climb and level flight. Upon reading checklist heading; 'All landing gear fail to retract'; it was determined that it was the inappropriate checklist; then; correct checklist 'illumination of red landing gear unsafe light(s)' was identified. Aircraft was 5 miles northwest of the airport on a right downwind at 3000 ft. FO was delegated to communicate with the FA and company; CA (Flying Pilot) assumed ATC communications. ATC queried for necessity of alert for fire equipment and advised a normal landing with standby only equipment required. FO contacted FA; and advised on the type of situation; returning back to the field; no need to brace. Also; the FO spoke with the passengers and advised that a return back to the field was needed due to a gear indication in the cockpit.Once communication with cabin and ground equipment was completed; CA advised a rattle feeling in the rudder pedals and asked for confirmation from the FO and elected to begin normal landing procedures; no emergency was declared.  Normal landing was accomplished; from a 10 mile final with appropriate callouts and checklists. At no time during final approach did airspeed exceed 148 kts. Upon landing; crew advised ATC that they would need a few moments on the runway to assess the situation. After a complete stop; CA determined the aircraft safe to taxi clear of the active runway and return to the gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Dash 8 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after experiencing a landing gear malfunction upon gear retraction.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Dispatch put us on route G913 from Rutin in Russia. The route involves course definition in true or magnetic numbers since part of the flight is oceanic in the Arctic Ocean with defined true courses. Dispatch put us on a route for which we have no enroute chart indicating the course G913 to exist and no way to audit the flight plan and FMC alleged courses vs the onboard paper charts required for navigation. Eurasia HL Chart 11-12; Effective XA Apr XB is current per the Jeppesen web site; no G913 from Rutin is published on this chart. No Jeppesen Chart Change Notices published reference this issue in the current Jepp Change Notice dated XC July XB. No Jeppesen Production Notices and Alerts published reference this issue. Aircraft are being filed on routes in hostile Russian airspace with no charts in the nav bag to audit courses. Coupled with 20-year old magnetic variation data errors the airline refuses to update in the steering IRS. The situation puts us in potential harm when entering and flying routes in a country that shoots down airliners. A poor dispatch flight plan for use in hostile territories.

B747 Captain notes that certain foreign airspace charts are using out-of-date magnetic variation data.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

I was on break when asked to come to the flight deck due to a possible fuel leak situation. When I entered the flight deck the captain and the first officer were in the process of running the level 2 suspected fuel leak checklist. I looked at the release and [checklist] to bring myself into the loop to the situation. At the completion of the checklist the captain brought me into the loop prior to contacting dispatch. At that point I began fuel burn check and compared it to our [flight plan]. The captain indicated they had noticed the fuel 600 pounds down; then 1500 pounds; and our next point was indicating more than that. After running my fuel check it indicated we were losing almost 700 pounds in 7 minutes due to either an over burn or fuel leak (calculated burn based on FF at 2300 lbs vs 3000 actual). The trend was we were soon going to have more than 5000 pounds of fuel less than the flight plan planned for; and based on fuel flows should have. The captain was at this time communicating to dispatch; and the FO was communicating with ATC and monitoring the aircraft flight path. At he completion of the call to dispatch; Maintenance; and company it was determined to discontinue the flight and per the checklist 'land at the nearest suitable airport'. We consulted the [checklist]; FOM; and dispatch/company to determine where the 'nearest suitable' airport was. We then contacted ATC and instructed them we were reversing course and heading to [alternate] due to a suspected fuel leak. The captain flew the aircraft; the FO communicated to ATC; and I obtained the weather and diversionary performance numbers. Due to our aircraft gross weight we needed to burn extra fuel to insure we arrived at our landing weight. The captain then requested lower to assist in increasing our fuel burn; and also a place close to [alternate] to hold. We elected not to dump fuel as we were not sure of the location of the suspected leak. Ounce we were satisfied with the aircraft weight; airfield performance numbers; and weather we proceeded to [alternate]. We requested upon landing that CFR visually inspect the aircraft for any signs of fuel being vented prior to taxiing to any ramp. After landing CFR communicated to us via radio there appeared to be no signs of fuel leaking. We then taxied to the designated ramp and shutdown and communicated with dispatch; maintenance; [and] company.

MD-11 Relief Pilot reported the flight diverted after detecting a probable fuel leak.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 336; Flight Crew Type 12000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Enroute at FL380; we experienced a gradual failure of the right IRS/IRU while the First Officer was the pilot flying. Initially; we observed the aircraft begin to deviate to left heading with rapidly increasing left crosswind at 180/200+ knots and increasing. Next; we observed autopilot trying to correct and aircraft was deviating south of course. At this point; we began crosscheck with other instruments and communicated to each other what we observed. As we were trying to determine who had good data; the right IRS Fault light illuminated; and I took command of the aircraft; as the First Officer's CDU lost attitude and altitude data. I was suddenly hand flying at FL380 as First Officer pulled QRH to begin checklist. We were in clear air and I stabilized heading and altitude while we communicated with ATC that we needed a heading. I was hand flying at FL380 for first time; probably ever; in my career. It's a real different experience than hand flying below 10;000 feet.As I tried to follow with back up the First Officer as he read and executed the QRH; I unintentionally allowed the aircraft to climb to 38;320 feet; momentarily; before correcting back to FL380. CLE Center asked us our altitude and we acknowledged that we had briefly been at 38;300 feet; but had corrected to FL380. We told them we were having to hand fly the aircraft and had a systems malfunction we were trying to diagnose and to stand by. Once we completed QRH; we told them we could not use autopilot and would have to leave RVSM airspace; which we did. Later; after communication with Dispatch; we diverted flight for maintenance and fuel.

A B737-700 flight crew; level at FL380; experienced a malfunctioning IRS causing the First Officer to lose altitude and attitude data. When the Captain assumed control with the autopilot off a modest altitude deviation occurred in part due to lack of experience with hand flying at altitude.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were cleared for ILS approach and given frequency to contact Tower. Was distracted by large amount of rime ice accumulation after passing through moderate icing conditions. Talked about increasing Vref for ice and other considerations. Did not switch to Tower and landed without clearance while still on Approach frequency. Contacted Tower after rollout. Normal taxi to gate.

Air carrier flight crew landed without clearance from Tower. Crew reported being distracted by moderate icing conditions on final.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

We were handed off to New York Approach and they began vectoring us to the ILS Runway 4R into EWR. After several vectors we were less than 10 miles from the localizer of Runway 4R; 90 degrees from the localizer inbound heading (130 degree heading); and traveling at 220 KTS assigned. Approach at this point gave us a frequency change to 128.80. After switching; we heard the aircraft ahead of us attempting to contact the same frequency with no luck. We also attempted to make contact with the Approach with no success. We returned to our last frequency and heard the first aircraft inform ATC that there was no reply. Approach gave him instructions and continued to give other aircraft instructions without taking a breath. We attempted several times to inform him that we were unable to contact the new frequency; but the channel was very congested and we were 'stepped on' every time. By this point we were well past the localizer and still on our 130 heading. I began slowing so that we would not get to much farther out and interfere with LGA or JFK traffic. When he finally did understand that we were back with him; he issued us a heading to intercept the localizer from the now east side; and told us to fly at 230 KTS. He then gave us another frequency for the next approach control of 125.50. We contacted them; intercepted the LOC; and concluded the flight uneventfully. The choice by ATC to change our frequency so close to the localizer; traveling at a speed that put us through it with a quickness; without instructions that included we should intercept the localizer was not a good one. We could have easily strayed into the flow of traffic for another large airport. I was about 10 seconds from turning towards EWR without clearance and squawking 7600; which would have required a whole other bunch of paperwork; and no one wants that.

An air carrier inbound to EWR ILS 4R lost contact with ATC and flew through the LOC; eventually re-establishing contact with ATC; a high and fast vector by ATC only added to the LOC transition.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 659; Flight Crew Type 659

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure

This was the last day of a four day trip. Preflight was going as planned until we were informed about a GDP for our destination. Our Destination airport had to switch to runways that are rarely used and it was creating some issues. The Captain and I took the extra time to discuss how this would affect our flight and kept a good line of communication with the Dispatcher. One of the threats that we were trying to mitigate early was the filed STAR was not used for the runways in use at our Destination. The Captain and I located two STARS that utilize the in use runway and planned on having our current STAR changed enroute.During the flight; I asked the Dispatcher if she noticed any flights having their STARS changed but she said that we were the first aircraft approaching our destination from the north. Shortly thereafter ATC changed our STAR and I attempted to load the new arrival into the box but was unable to since the computer did not associate the STAR with the assigned runway. After several failed attempts at programming the box; I requested ATC to assigned us a different STAR that was associated with the runway to mitigate the obvious threat at hand but they informed me that we would descend via the assigned STAR before receiving vectors for the assigned runway. While the Captain and I discussed the situation along with how to mitigate the threat; we heard two other aircraft having the same issue and requesting different STARs (one was definitely an Airbus).I set up the box as best I could with the assigned STAR and asked for a heading to allow me time to enter the approach when switched to the final controller. At one point during the flight; I asked the dispatcher about the STAR issue in the hopes that he could talk to the ATC desk or other dispatchers to proactively help other flights. The Dispatcher replied that there is not much they can do and we always have the ability to say 'unable'. The Captain and I discussed what the dispatcher said and could not find a good reason to deny ATC's assignment. Safety of flight was never compromised and we were able to discuss every way to mitigate the threat we perceived. The only thing the Captain and I want to know is how to get FIF to accept a Runway/STAR combination like this without having to manually insert each fix and altitude manually.

First Officer reported difficulty with instructions from ATC for STAR changes on approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Arrived at the aircraft and performed preflight duties routinely. Captain noted there were two new tires on the aircraft - Captain also showed me all four applicable logbook signatures and pages. Approximately 30 after takeoff; the Captain looked at the log book again and noted a discrepancy. The page for our current flight; was normal; to include Airworthiness Release. The previous page detailed the two tire changes. One entry showed the following discrepancy. Discrepancy: Main Landing Gear Tire 9; worn beyond limits. Corrective Action: Remove and Replace Tire 10. The tire described as worn was not the one documented as replaced. We missed this discrepancy in the entries for previous flight.

Pilot reported a missing logbook entry was discovered after takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 214; Flight Crew Type 12000

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On the climbout on the SID; Center cleared us direct JOGEN when able. I had been deviating around weather at the time. The First Officer was very new and was having problems understanding the clearance; so I read it back to Center as I entered what I thought was JOGEN on line one on the LEGS page of the CDU. Without realizing it I actually entered the fix after JOGEN and selected to line one and executed. This fix's name; (though I don't remember it now) also starts with J and is very close to JOGEN. In fact there are several points on that SID that start with J. After about five minutes; Center asked us where we were going direct to. I admitted to him I had entered the wrong fix and we would now proceed direct JOGEN. All he said was 'Roger.'

On climbout; ATC gave us direct to JOGEN while climbing through 10;000 feet. Captain had to maneuver to avoid weather for approximately one minute. After maneuvering for weather; the Captain accidentally selected JUNEJ instead of JOGEN in the FMC (due to similar spelling). After ATC queried; we realized the error and selected the correct waypoint.

B737 flight crew reported of confusing intersection names. Captain accidently entered the wrong fix into the CDU and the aircraft was off course.  ATC questioned the crew and they corrected the intersection.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

ILS approach into ZZZ. I briefed the approach with course and frequency and confirmed the points in the FMS. Vectors to final were activated and I missed the course was not set on the inbound and I think when I briefed the frequency I was reading the frequency from NAV 2. We turned inbound and not seeing the errors I told the PNF that he had control; but this time we were well above the GS. We notified ATC that we were going to go missed and were given new instructions. After the missed; I reset the inbound course and reset the frequency. I then told the PNF that I had control and the next approach was done to a safe landing.I haven't flown in several months and the other pilot was his second flight in this type aircraft. I believe was a contributing factor on this approach.

While being vectored to the ILS for Runway XX; the crew noticed that the localizer failed to auto-tune when the approach was armed. When it was determined that the course was not going to be captured the pilot transferred the auto pilot to the pilot monitoring side where the localizer did tune correctly. However; by this time the aircraft had flown through the course. The autopilot attempted to capture the course; but completed one or two 'S' turns. The crew agreed that the approach was not stabilized and we indicated to ATC that we intended to go-around and try the approach again. We were given vectors and an altitude and were cleared for the approach again. The following approach to landing was completed without issue.  Crew should have been more vigilant to ensure that the correct NAV frequency was tuned and the decision to transfer the coupled side autopilot could have been made earlier.

Corporate flight crew reported an unstabilized approach resulting in a missed approach/go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 14000

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As Captain of the flight I accept responsibility for these issues and wish to bring some of them to light. I back up my flight attendants fully. There are some items that the [company] must share with [our flight attendants]. I have witnessed a vast number of new hires. I appreciate our flight attendants and am not pointing fingers; but we need to discuss some things.First; when the pilots need food; coffee; and restroom breaks; they are needed then; not in 2 hours or more.We were in cruise; 1 hour out; briefed the arrival and completed the checklist. This was day 5 of 6 for me and I was tired; so I drank 2 cups of coffee prior to TOD. I asked for a restroom break well prior to TOD; and got it just prior to TOD; because the flight attendants were busy. I left quickly and when I was gone my experienced FO started down. I returned to the cockpit and we were going high at SLT. I announced this and he clicked the AP off and manually flew down to FL180. We crossed 400 feet high and nothing was said by ATC. We landed uneventfully.Problems encountered: VNAV has been very slow lately and I tell my FOs to put a fix 3 miles prior to the crossing altitude so we don't get ALTCAP and bust the altitude. This usually works. I don't understand why the VNAVs are acting up like this? We wrote up the VNAV. I've flown this airplane for [many] years and this is bugging me. Can you shed some light on this? Please; make a bulletin and share this with [flight attendants]? I will not leave the flight deck with an inexperienced FO; at TOD.

B757 Captain reported failure to meet a crossing restriction; with a last minute restroom break cited as contributing.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

About 30 minutes after takeoff we got a Right Generator Warning with R GEN CONT light. The Captain ordered that I continue flying and talk to ATC and then started the APU and took the QRH. He read the name of the checklist and about that time; when the APU took over the associated bus; we had an auto pilot disconnect. I switched to hand flying and connected to another autopilot. After that distraction--which caused the Captain to look up and then go back to the QRH--he went to the other checklist on that page--the one for generator drive disconnect--and started doing the items from that list. The moment he disconnected the generator drive he realized the mistake; but the generator was already disconnected. We continued with one [engine driven] generator and [the APU generator]. Our destination weather was clear. [We] landed with 13;600 LBS of fuel. The R GEN light was on all the time until it was disconnected; so we definitely had a generator problem.There is one very important lesson to learn from this experience: ALWAYS match the EICAS annunciation with the title of the checklist in the QRH to avoid unnecessary mistakes like this one.

[No substantive additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.]

Following accessing the appropriate QRH in response to an EICAS R GEN warning and an illuminated R GEN CONT light; the Captain of a B767-300ER was distracted by a momentary autopilot disconnect and then performed the wrong QRH procedure found on the same page; the generator disconnect checklist. After realizing the error they elected to continue to destination operating with the left engine driven generator and the APU generator.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Maintenance; Person Passenger

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After pushback; the #2 engine of the 757 had noticeably more smoke than usual at startup; so much so that it was noted by passengers and crew. Shortly after; our APU went out. The cabin was dark except for Emergency Lights. At my jumpseat 2L; passengers began complaining of the smell of smoke and many began to cough. The Captain was alerted and he made an announcement that we would be returning to Gate XX. It was several minutes before we arrived back at the gate.When we arrived at the gate; the cabin lights came back on. Once on; it was very clear that there was moderate smoke/haze throughout the aircraft. We disarmed our cabin doors and the Gate Agent opened door 2L. Once the door was open; the Captain rushed off and the Agent returned to the podium.More passengers began coughing and complaining that it was hard to breathe. One passenger came up to [door] 2L and alerted me she suffered from asthma and could not breathe. With the Captain and Gate Agent not available; I stepped off the jet bridge to call the Gate Podium to alert them of the severity of the cabin conditions. The phone rang; but there was no answer. I stepped off the aircraft; violating FAR Flight Attendant Mins and ran up the jet bridge. The Gate Agent was on the phone with [Operations Control]. I quickly/urgently notified them of the severity and passengers needed to deplane ASAP. I was given the ok to make an announcement to have passengers deplane. I then quickly ran back down the jet bridge and made the announcement. No more than 3 words into my announcement; passengers began rushing off so quickly; that it almost seemed like an actual evacuation. The smoke alarm at lavatory 2L soon activated; which made the passengers deplane even quicker.With the passengers now safely off the aircraft; a mechanic was soon onboard; opening doors 2R; 1L and 1R to air out the aircraft. He advised us that we needed to deplane quickly as well as it was not safe to be on the aircraft.When we arrived in the gate area; smoke could be seen; not just in the jet bridge; but lingering into the gate area as well.A new 757 aircraft was used and after a 3hr delay; we were finally on our way ZZZ-ZZZ1 from Gate XY.Myself and other crew members began to complain of labored breathing; scratchy/red eyes. Upon my arrival into ZZZ1 the following evening; I visited [Medical] to have my eyes checked out as they were burning throughout the day. I regret the fact that I had to leave the aircraft to notify [Company] personnel of the severity of the conditions onboard the aircraft that evening; but the fact was *every second counted* getting passengers off that aircraft. Even just waiting a couple of minutes would have been very harmful and may have resulted in further damaging what was becoming a very serious situation. My absence on the aircraft was maybe one minute at the most. However; it was for safety reasons and for that; I believe it was justified.Lastly; please note the Nose# [Aircraft Tail Number] listed may/may not be the original aircraft used and explained in this incident as a replacement aircraft was used later for this flight.

B757 Flight Attendant reported notifying Captain of fumes during taxi accompanied with loss of cabin lighting. Health symptoms were experienced by passengers and cabin crew.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

We were cleared to climb to FL410; around FL360 we got a VNAV disconnect. The Captain was flying and tried to reconnect the VNAV; it would not work. The Captain tried other vertical guidance (Level Change; VSI) and they would not work. He switched it to Autopilot B to see if that would work; and it did not. Soon after that the autopilot disconnected and would not stay engaged. I asked ATC to level at FL370 and they gave us FL390. When we both realized that both autopilots were down we notified ATC that we need to get out of RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum) airspace. ATC gave us FL270. On the descent the Captain asked me to take the flight controls and fly the aircraft.We were trying to decided what QRH to run; but couldn't find one that covered what we were experiencing. We also noted that we didn't have any true airspeed readout on the MFD (Multi-function Flight Display) or any air data on the Engine DU (Display Unit). Also the digital engine read outs were blank as well. We did have lateral guidance with the flight directors as long as it was in LNAV; but in heading select it was just raw data. The Captain then asked ATC for a block of FL270 to FL250; so I leveled off at FL260 to give me a buffer. He was contacting Dispatch to see what type of game plan to come up with. We looked at diverting to [a nearby alternate]; but it was snowing and low ceilings. We didn't want to try to shoot an approach with just raw data if we didn't have to. We decided the best action was to continue to [original destination] because it was VFR.We did notify ATC that we could follow the RNAV arrival; but couldn't descend VIA. ATC eventually gave us radar vectors and we intercepted the LOC to [the] runway. It was visual and we could see the runway and we also did have our flight directors when we armed the approach mode. We landed without further incident. On the ground the Captain was talking to Maintenance Control and they asked him to check a code on the IRS (Inertia Reference System) box. He said it looked like there was a failed sensor with the code we gave him. We queried about what QRH we should have run and he said there wasn't one.I do think there should be some QRH or abnormal checklist for us as a crew to troubleshoot this so we know what we are dealing with.

B737-700 flight crew reported multiple autoflight system anomalies related to a failed sensor in the IRS.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 100

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

After landing on runway 34 I exited right on Taxiway Charlie. I cleared the runway hold short line while contacting ground control and continued rolling toward Taxiway Alpha (The taxiway parallel to runway 34). I heard the controller tell an aircraft to stop (or something like that) and at that point I saw a low-wing single engine aircraft swerve to the left while southbound on taxiway Alpha in order to give his aircraft and mine a wider separation margin. The controller told that pilot that she had expected me to stop after exiting the runway. At this point I was stopped and after being cleared to my destination on the field I explained that I was just trying to get clear of the runway. There was approximately 100 feet of distance between the runway hold short line and the edge of taxiway alpha so I should have had plenty of distance between myself and that taxiway. I just didn't see the other aircraft and should have stopped sooner. I called the controller on the phone and discussed it.

C152 pilot reported another aircraft had to take evasive action to avoid a collision with his aircraft on the ground at FTW.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

My First Officer was flying [the] approach. Tower directed a go-around at approximately 2;000 FT. When the landing gear was raised we got an EICAS message 'L HYD QTY.' While cleaning up and headed for a downwind I read the QRH quickly and found page 13.2 and it was just informational. I called up the status page during this and found we had .21 on the left system. I told my First Officer (who was still flying) to put the gear down and configure for landing on downwind. We continued on short final with Tower. I told them we may have a hydraulic leak of some kind and to check the runway after we land. On landing roll Tower told us we had a lot of smoke coming from the right main gear. I declared an emergency and took control of the aircraft at taxi speed and cleared the hi-speed holding short of Runway XX. I instructed my First Officer to call Maintenance while we were waiting for Fire Rescue; I told the flight attendants and the passengers to remain seated. Fire Rescue showed up quickly (around a minute) and instructed us to shut down the right engine. On inspection (ARFF) told us we had a hydraulic leak on the right main gear and that there was no fire but they would follow us to the gate. Maintenance said they would come and tow the aircraft to the gate; which they did. I told the flight attendants and passengers what the problem was and we had no worries other than to wait for the tow. We arrived at the gate and Maintenance had already found the leak; it was a loose brake line fitting on the gear. My First Officer did an outstanding job of continuing to fly the approach while I handled the emergency and our crew coordination made everything flow very smooth.  The flight attendants and passengers were kept informed the entire procedure which took about one hour from the declaration of the emergency to arrival at the gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

A B757 main landing gear brake line fitting developed a leak when the gear was raised during Tower commanded go-around; so the crew completed the QRH for the EICAS alert 'L HYD QTY;' declared an emergency and landed uneventfully.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While working local control I observed a phantom target approximately 1NM west of Palo Alto airport moving west bound at 005 indicated. The target had a discreet code; but was not tagged up. I then observed Aircraft X in the San Francisco Class B airspace on an opposite heading approximately 15NM apart. This type phantom target is a repeating problem that is regularly observed. I was able to use the track printout feature on the phantom target to try and document the occurrence for further evaluation. There appears to be some issue with the automation that causes phantom targets of low level aircraft in the San Francisco Class B airspace to appear as a phantom around Palo Alto. Further scrutiny of the software is needed to identify and resolve the issue. Permission granted to share this report and any automation data associated with this report.

Palo Alto Tower Controller reported phantom target issue.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

On takeoff the copilot's window opened at approximately 65 knots. Due to the noise and confusion; I took control and rejected the takeoff and turned off the auto brakes. With approximately 6;000 feet of runway left; the aircraft decelerated with minimal braking. I exited prior to the end of the runway and made a PA informing the passengers and instructing them to remain in their seats. Because of the short brake application and slow speed involved; I did not feel any inspection was necessary. I taxied back; referred to the brake cooling chart; checked minimum takeoff fuel and departed.The landing was normal except for a small vibration at about 70 knots on rollout. On the short taxi I noticed the hydraulic A quantity zero EICAS message and suspected a blown tire had ruptured the line. While calling maintenance; a crew chief called to report 4 blown tires on the left main strut. Maintenance was requested and the log book completed.Because this was not a heavy weight/ high speed event; I did not consider this an emergency. This flight had several unusual problems to solve before leaving the gate. Although not rushed; the before starting engines checklist was completed quickly and apparently I missed the visual cross check of the copilots window even though the handle was in the correct position. When the window opened early on the takeoff roll; I handled it quickly to avoid continuing the takeoff with the confusion of transferring controls in the increasing wind noise. Since I rejected the takeoff below 80 knots with so much runway to slow the aircraft; I concentrated on informing the passengers and crew and continuing the flight with the fuel on board. I did not assign the proper priority to the rejected takeoff and considered it another problem solved. Therefore I did not reference the QRH. Had I done that even though it occurred at a slow speed; we may have determined that it required an inspection.I consider myself highly trained and experienced. This is the 3rd rejected takeoff in well over 10;000 hours on this aircraft and all of them occurred at low speed. Had I thought of this as an emergency and referenced the QRH; the notes would have been reviewed for post reject inspection criteria. Recommend this should be re-emphasized at training.

B767-300ER Crew reported rejecting a takeoff at 65 knots with a slow taxi back for another takeoff. After landing at their destination they reported a vibration and loss of the A hydraulic system. Maintenance crew reported 4 blown tires on the left main strut.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Company Maintenance Control was contacted by ZZZ Line Maintenance; stating #2 Engine Thrust Reverser outboard reverser actuator return line was leaking. They were instructed to [decommission] the Reverser per MEL 78-31-00 and; if need be; to keep fluid from draining onto the engine; to cap the fitting at the firewall. ETOPS aircraft.

A Maintenance Controller reports that he instructed Line Maintenance personnel at Station ZZZ to decommission the #2 Engine Thrust Reverser per MEL 78-31 on a B757-200 ETOPS aircraft by capping the hydraulic actuator return line fitting at the engine firewall.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Airport; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

After run-up; I requested 'St George traffic; how do you read me.' No response heard. I stated intentions for immediate takeoff and intended route of flight to the east of airport for maneuvering. After clearing for incoming traffic; I proceeded onto Runway 19 and initiated an immediate departure. No other aircraft were in the pattern at the time. At lift off (about 450 ft. down runway) Pilot noticed large aircraft landing lights at far end of Runway 01 (approximately 8;500 ft. away) and made an immediate turn to left at about 300 ft. altitude and 600 ft. east of runway then proceeded south along Runway 19/01 gaining altitude at about 1;000 ft. per minute. Communications were established with aircraft located near the opposite end of runway. The large aircraft then proceeded to the next taxiway and returned to the run-up area to reinitiate its normal departure procedure. Communications were maintained between both aircraft after my departure. This does not mean that the large aircraft did not communicate its intention; but rather that the departing air craft did not receive the communication.Moral of story: Pilot of small aircraft should look both ways before taking the 'active runway' especially in no wind conditions at non-towered airports.

A solo pilot made his CTAF communications before departing SGU then after takeoff noticed a large aircraft taxiing off the far end of the runway. He had not heard a response from that aircraft which apparently did not hear him either.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3650; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During cruise at FL410 there was an uncommanded disconnect of the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS). Loss of Autopilot (AP); Yaw Dampener (YD); and Auto Throttles (AT). Dutch Roll developed becoming divergent. Attempts were made to reengage the YD. Switching AFCS channels initially unsuccessful. As the Dutch Roll was increasing in amplitude; continued manual flight was proving difficult. Crew elected to initiate immediate descent to FL370 and inform ATC. AFCS restored as aircraft descended out of FL410. Descent continued to FL370. Operations normal; QRH consulted - continued flight on one remaining AFCS channel.

Global 5000 (Bombardier) Captain reported a malfunction of the Automatic Flight Control System; which resulted in uncontrollable Dutch Roll until arriving at a lower altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

On descent into ZZZ; I was the pilot monitoring; on the way we were cleared from 17;000 ft to 5;300 ft to commence our approach into ZZZ. Leaving 16;000 the plane experienced a loss of oil pressure in our #2 engine. After taking a few moments to assess the situation I had confirmed the warning message with the supporting oil pressure gauge on ED1 as it read 7 psi. From there I handed the radios over to the Captain as I proceeded to the appropriate QRH procedure for R ENG OIL PRESS. Following the steps of this procedure very carefully; I was led to shut down our #2 engine in flight through the In-flight engine shut down procedure. After which I then completed the single engine approach and landing procedure. During this time the Captain; flew and maintained control of the aircraft; alerted ATC; as well as alerting the flight attendant of the situation. We landed safely in ZZZ where we were cleared by ARFF and taxied to the gate.

Air carrier First Officer reported inflight engine shutdown on descent due to loss of oil pressure.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

These two aircraft were actually involved on two separate days with the same exact problem that I have previously filed a report on without any resolution. These are two more accounts of a problem that has existed for years in this facility but has not been addressed by management. After experiencing this same situation happen again on two successive evenings; I feel compelled to report this again in the hopes that this will finally be addressed.Aircraft X called for release off of LIH airport. The controller had coordinated that this aircraft had been issued a clearance with a Hold For Release. The LOA between LIH and HCF states that the LIH tower controller will issue a clearance to an aircraft utilizing the OFDPS [Offshore Flight Data Processing System] generated strip. When Aircraft X called for release; I released the aircraft on course and issued the aircraft a void time. When the aircraft departed; the aircraft checked in 'on runway heading' climbing to FL340. This aircraft was not climbing on his filed/precoordinated route of flight.[The next day two hours earlier] LIH tower called for a clearance on Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y had filed an incorrect flight plan with a departure point of LIG which resulted in no strip being generated for LIH tower. I verbally issued a clearance to LIH tower and then proceeded to correct the erroneous flight plan that was filed. About 5 minutes later the LIH tower controller called for release of Aircraft Y. Once again I simply told the LIH tower controller 'Aircraft Y released'. And yet again; Aircraft Y checked in on frequency 'runway heading; climbing to 130'. Except this time; this aircraft departed runway 35 and this runway heading was taking this aircraft into terrain. Do not just simply put this information into your database and have this facility continue to ignore this problem. Something needs to be done about this. Departure procedures need to be developed for aircraft to be able to transition from the LIH terminal environment into the HCF enroute structure. These DP's [Departure Procedures] must be developed to allow aircraft to depart LIH and proceed on course V15 or to transition to the oceanic egress fixes - ZIGIE; APACK; CLUTS; EBBER; FITES; SCOON; THOMA; DANNO; KATHS; CHOKO; CARRP.

HCF Controller reports of departure procedures off of Lihue Airport that need to be corrected. Aircraft are departing and flying into low terrain areas.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Aircraft X departed Runway 10 SJU IFR heading 095 degrees climbing to 5;000 feet. Aircraft Z departed Runway 10 SJU IFR heading 095 degrees climbing to 5;000 feet. Aircraft Z was within 1 NM in trail of aircraft X. When I saw that no IFR separation had been provided; I called the Tower on the coordination line and said something to the effect of 'He's IFR; I'm turning him.' I was not specific in the coordination. I turned aircraft Z left heading 010. The Tower came over the shout line to tell me that aircraft Z was VFR. The Tower's information contradicted all the information before me. The radar tag and flight progress strip indicated he was IFR. Meanwhile; aircraft Y departed Runway 8 turning left heading 350 climbing to 5;000 feet. Radar separation did not exist between aircraft Y and aircraft Z; perhaps the Tower provided visual separation until aircraft Y was established on the diverging course. As soon as I saw aircraft Y depart I turned aircraft Z right heading 070. Aircraft Y was being worked by [a different sector].The Local Controller believed aircraft Z was VFR. I don't work in the Tower; and so I cannot provide any recommendations to correct that. The next problem was the communications. I could have/should have been more specific in my coordination; even though what I was doing seemed to be well understood by the Tower. Unfortunately the breakdown in communication continued. The Tower argued with me that aircraft Z was VFR. VFR or IFR was inconsequential at that point; I had turned him to gain IFR spacing between him and the aircraft X in front. The important piece of information that I was missing was that aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff/going to be cleared/rolling on Runway 8. As soon as aircraft Y departed it was an immediate conflict with aircraft Z. Granted I could have stopped departures after the loss of separation between aircraft X and aircraft Z; but I expected the Tower to avoid putting departures in conflict with aircraft Z when I informed them that he was turning to avert the first conflict.

Two aircraft departed the same runway on the same route with one mile separation. The Tower Controller thought the second departure was on a VFR flight plan. The radar departure Controller's information indicated the second aircraft was on an IFR flight plan. The departure Controller turned the second aircraft left to achieve IFR separation. Tower cleared an aircraft for takeoff from an adjacent runway into the path of the aircraft that the departure Controller turned.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 959; Flight Crew Type 858

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While entering the downwind pattern leg for landing at HND; cockpit workload increased dramatically and while focused on traffic and airspace the aircraft slipped below pattern altitude. The Tower Controller notified me of the lower than acceptable altitude so I pulled up; gained altitude and continued on downwind.

C182 pilot reported flying below traffic pattern altitude on downwind.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working on aircraft cabin items at one of my assigned gates; there was a call out requesting maintenance at another aircraft at another gate for an undetermined amount of life vest pouch replacements. Work at the current aircraft was finished and we quickly headed to the shop to pick up supplies for the life vest pouch call out. As I arrived at the gate and tried to enter the aircraft; the door way was blocked by a person with their back to me. This person appeared to be talking with flight attendants standing in the front galley. As I tried to pass by to get to the cockpit and talk with the captain about the life vest pouch write ups; the person in the door way turned their head and saw that I was maintenance and said; 'Oh let me ask maintenance'. I then saw that the person had one of the forward flight attendant seats shoulder harness belts pulled out in their hand and ask if I knew what the limits were on frayed belts. I replied I did not know the exact limits and that I would have to go and look them up in the maintenance manual. Then looking at the belt and seeing that it was not frayed and feeling that it was clearly serviceable and only had a short span of slight edge fusing I removed the fusing with a quick pass of a cigarette lighter and then continued to the cockpit to talk with the captain about the write ups.I believe with whole heart the cause of this event is that while trying to maintain an on time performance I did not think and take the time to go and look up the limits for the belts that looked to me to be in limits and I used the lighter to remove the slight fusing from the belt edge that were later found to be within limits per the [manual].Had I taken the time to look up the [manual] limits once the question was asked; the belt would have been shown to be within limits and the fusing would have been left alone.

Performed unnecessary maintenance on a Flight Attendants shoulder harness that was serviceable.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 630; Flight Crew Type 500

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was training a student in the pattern at ZZZ in Aircraft X. During our 3rd circuit; soon after leveling off and turning left downwind for runway ZZ at 1;000 feet AGL; an airplane; Aircraft Y; suddenly appeared in front of us; from below; no more than 300 feet in front at the same altitude. This airplane I had heard cleared for takeoff after we had completed our most recent touch-and-go. I immediately took control of the airplane from my student; slowed down and notified tower that an airplane was directly ahead of us a few hundred feet away. Tower notified Aircraft Y that they had turned crosswind too early and to make a right 360; to which they complied. We completed our circuit with a touch-and-go and departed the pattern to the south. As we were departing; I overheard what I assume was an instructor in Aircraft Y notify tower that they'd be exiting the airplane and that a first time solo student would be taking back off.

C152 instructor reported a NMAC on downwind.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We were descending on the FRDMM ONE RNAV STAR into DCA prior to WLLLL waypoint; were nearly finished getting set up for the approach; and had just passed below FL180 and completed the descent check. I was the PF and was working to ensure we were complying with all the altitude restrictions on that arrival.We were in and out of icing conditions which meant more frequent corrections to power settings and vertical speed commands. The First Officer was setting up the radio frequencies; loading the approach into the FMS; briefing the approach; calling in-range; and monitoring our descent.Between waypoints; several miles prior to WLLLL I had to put the automation into HDG mode so I could tune the final approach course for the LDA 19 approach into DCA. After setting the course; I reselected FMS NAV; re-engaged LNAV; and confirmed that the flight guidance captured LNAV mode. While the First Officer was briefing the approach; right around WLLLL; ATC said advised 'it looks like you are off the arrival. Proceed direct FORGT and maintain 12;000 FT.' I took a closer look and my CDI needle and noticed it was approximately one needle-width to the left. The First Officer's MFD indicated we were 0.9NM south of course.The LNAV was indeed still engaged as I had confirmed earlier; but for some reason was not tracking the course accurately enough. The winds aloft were from the south; so I don't know if the autopilot/flight guidance was overcorrecting; or if it never actually made an effort to stay on course after re-engaging LNAV; or what; but the automation was certainly set up correctly; it just wasn't tracking the course very accurately. I had the First Officer program ATC's requested course correction and the flight continued without incident.I don't like that FRDMM1 arrival; which I'm sorry to say because I pride myself on being able to handle the challenges we face; I like doing complex procedures; and I was determined not to be one of the people who bitch and moan about an arrival that requires a little bit of effort on our part. I've now flown that arrival 4 times; which isn't much; but it is enough to know it is too much workload for the limited automation we have on the 145. It requires almost constant fixation by the PF on the descent rate and airspeed; mainly because the waypoints are so close together; and the upper limit of the next waypoint is often already lower than the lower limit of the previous one.It also task saturates the PM because he must double check the PFs altitude in addition to all his or her other tasks in that phase of flight. A course deviation of a single needle-width; less than a mile; (which looks completely normal on the MFD map by the way); is obviously easy to overlook under these conditions. In the winter time; we are going to be doing this arrival with 100 KTS tailwinds; in and out of icing conditions; while possibly checking landing performance if the runways are contaminated.While the aircraft is RNAV capable and has VNAV data in the FMS; I do not believe it is safe for us to do this arrival; as an aircraft doing this arrival with full VNAV automation needs only to be monitored closely; not continuously 'flown' with the flight guidance panel and/or thrust levers and spoilers like we need to do. I may change my mind after I've flown this arrival 40 times instead of 4; but for now I recommend we either discontinue doing the arrival; or be authorized to refuse it from ATC if we believe the environmental factors or human factors (new First Officer/both pilots new to the arrival/etc.) would pose a hazard. There are too many chances to bust an altitude and cause loss of separation; and the pilot workload is too high; and something more important than being less than a mile off course could be overlooked.

The Captain of an ERJ 145 expressed his belief that his aircraft hasn't the VNAV sophistication required to perform the complex RNAV STARs such as the FRDMM ONE to DCA. He believes flight crew workload required to comply with crossing restrictions without full functioning VNAV/autoflight/autothrottle capability is excessive under the best of conditions. Under adverse weather and or tailwind conditions he believes compliance will require complete disregard of other flight safety considerations and may well simply overwhelm the flight crew's and aircraft's capacities.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 4385; Flight Crew Type 3774

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

On left down wind in IMC at 3000' to land at DAL. Advised runway would be 13L. Using iPAD; I was trying to find chart for 13L while being given rapid succession instructions by a very fast-talking controller. I was having trouble locating the ILS 13L chart from a long list on the iPAD while executing rapid-succession instructions and responding. Later; I counted 18 approaches in the list. When I did not get lined up on the localizer; controller instructed me to break off approach and climb to 3000'. I did not do so quickly enough to satisfy the controller.Second approach was made with a different controller who spoke slowly enough for me to understand and follow each instruction. By then I had opened the chart for ILS 13L on the iPAD and completed the approach and landing with no problem.As an aside; the next morning in preparing to leave; the person who was giving me my clearance appeared to be the first controller from the previous day. Again; she spoke so fast that in the dark I could not write the clearance as fast as she was speaking. It took 3 attempts.New SIDs; STARs and approaches had been put into effect for the whole Dallas-Ft Worth region just a few hours prior.

A Twin Comanche pilot became task saturated during an IMC arrival to DAL and was directed to go-around by ATC when he failed to capture the 13L localizer as cleared. Heavy radio traffic; a fast talking controller and difficulty accessing the correct approach page from his electronic tablet were cited as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 312; Flight Crew Type 253

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The student and I jointly obtained a preflight weather briefing to determine the viability of performing practice instrument approaches on this particular MVFR night. Weather reports indicated that maintaining VFR; outside of potential icing conditions; was possible. At the time; no icing; precipitation; or reduced visibility was reported by a weather station or aircraft below the overcast ceiling at 2;600 feet AGL. We filed IFR for 3;000 feet MSL (600 feet below the ceiling in this geographic location); and set off.Three miles from the FAF on the first approach; I noticed snow when the strobe lights blinked. Immediately; I noted the outside air temperature; ensured all anti- and deicing measures were taken; and took a look at the wing. We were accumulating trace rime on the leading edge. At this point in time; we were about to begin descending on the approach; so I only provided a pilot report to the approach controller. No request was made for a lower altitude or vector out of the conditions. The snow was no longer falling a few hundred feet down the glide path; and the ice which had accumulated on the wings was gone prior to touchdown.A touch-and-go landing was performed and vectors received and accepted for an approach back into the home airport. Vectors for the approach brought us through the same icing conditions four miles prior to intercepting the final approach course. Trace-light rime ice was accumulating on the leading edge of the wings. ATC was notified; but unable to provide a lower vectoring altitude out of the icing conditions. The student and I discussed our options and decided to continue with the approach; by this time the most direct route to the nearest airport. Additionally; this approach contained a step-down altitude which would bring us below the icing conditions to an altitude still protected from obstacles on the ground (can't see them well at night). Icing conditions ceased by the time the step-down altitude was reached; and a full stop landing was performed without further incident.I believe the two major contributing factors to this occurrence are a lack of experience and get-home-itis. Neither the student nor I had ever been in icing conditions before. Prior to this flight; we never had the chance to make connections between what was learned in the classroom and how to apply it in the airplane. The decision to perform a touch-and-go instead of a full-stop was unnecessarily risky and dangerous. Due to the novelty of the situation; a landing brief did not take place; so the pilot flying performed what he believed was expected. A full-stop landing should have been completed to avoid the risk of departure with unseen contamination and assess the situation appropriately without excessive time pressures. Once airborne and receiving vectors; it seemed logical (though clearly it wasn't) to return to home base. Home is home; and feels synonymous with 'safe haven.' At this point; it was considerably safer to enter the pattern at the intermediate airport and land to evaluate the next course of action.In the future; several steps can be taken to avoid a recurrence. 1) Continue obtaining thorough preflight weather briefings and use the information more effectively. 2) Upon entering icing conditions; do not wait. Promptly take corrective action in the cockpit to combat the situation and exit the area safely with haste. 3) If returning to home base is a factor; stop at the first point of landing and/or reduce the workload upon exiting the adverse conditions. Take the time to determine the next course of action. 4) Ask ATC for assistance; e.g. by requesting a new altitude; vector and/or approach. 5) Do not hesitate to declare an urgent situation; and do so before things are beyond pilot control.

A flight instructor reported that he and an instrument student experienced icing conditions while practicing instrument approaches at night in what was expected to be only marginal VFR weather. The instructor later recognized that greater safety considerations should have been taken.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 4280; Flight Crew Type 70

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure; Airport

I was making...a short 7 nm flight in visual conditions. A Gulfstream corporate jet...was holding in position short of the hold-short line for Runway 7. I taxied toward the jet; making a series of radio calls on the CTAF which went unanswered by the Gulfstream. The local FBO acknowledged my calls and we responded back to them on CTAF; but did not hear from the Gulfstream. After a couple of minutes and receiving no response from the Gulfstream; I elected to taxi back to the next taxiway / runway intersection to access the runway. I made a radio call on CTAF announcing I was taxiing to the next intersection and that I would be back-taxiing the full length of Runway 7. After visually checking the approach & departure ends of the runway; I again made a radio call on CTAF to advise I was taking the active runway and back-taxiing runway 7 (several hundred feet). I received no response by the Gulfstream or any other traffic. Close to the conclusion of my back taxi; I observed landing lights in the distance. From the spacing; I surmised it was probably [a] commuter flight inbound. As the Gulfstream was positioned well back from the hold short line; I elected to vacate the runway rather than rush the takeoff; possibly causing the [commuter] to go-around. When the Gulfstream saw my attempt to vacate the runway at his taxiway; he turned a little laterally to give me some more room. I successfully vacated the runway; except for a short portion of the left wing that extended past the hold short line. The commuter jet successfully landed on the runway. However; they did not respond to any calls on the CTAF frequency; even after landing; nor were any transmissions heard on the CTAF as they exited the runway and taxied to the terminal gate. I took off after the commuter cleared the runway (observed visually since they were announcing).After landing; I made a phone to the [departure field] FBO...and spoke with [name] who confirmed hearing all of our radio calls on CTAF and confirming that he never heard any CTAF calls by either the Gulfstream or the commuter. He further advised that '90% of the commuters call in; but occasionally they stay with Center all the way in and never use CTAF.' Center is the controlling agency for obtaining IFR clearances and is available on the ground. It is my experience that many transient aircraft stay on Center frequency without monitoring or using CTAF. I believe this is what happened for both the Gulfstream and the commuter jets. Based on this experience and [the FBO's] statements; I relayed this information to the Airport Authority.... I also requested that signage be installed at both ends of the runway / taxiways advising aircraft to monitor the CTAF for local traffic advisories.In the future; I will also monitor Center during taxiing and ground operations; even when I'm not using the system for a short VFR flight; in order to be able to contact other aircraft on the ground that should be monitoring CTAF.

PA31 pilot and local FBO at a non-towered airport heard no transmissions on CTAF by a Gulfstream V aircraft holding short of the runway nor from a landing commuter jet. Reporter expressed concern with the practice of corporate and commuter aircraft communicating only with the local ATC Center and not utilizing CTAF.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On approach; noticed aircraft was hard to slow down when flaps selected to 1 and then 5; slowing to 180 KTS. Noticed the stall indication (red zipper) slowly come up 10-15 KTS below our airspeed around currently 190 KTS. [I] noticed that the flap indication showed flaps at zero. I believe the flaps were at zero; however; we never received an EICAS indication of a flap failure. We advised Approach and were vectored north to deal with problem. Due to low fuel (7.3) and without an actual EICAS indication; the Captain decided to do a flap zero landing and ran an All Flaps and Slats Up Landing even though the checklist advised to only run with a LE or TE Slat/Flap Asymmetry EICAS indication. Vectored to longest runway available; transferred controls and the Captain landed without incident. Also checked brake cooling chart after the 'After Landing Checklist'. Maintenance should look into why no EICAS indication was given when flaps did not extend. Maintenance close out found that '#1 FSEU with no power'. Could have [turned] into a stall at low altitude very easily had we not noticed the zero indication.

B757-200 First Officer reported loss of leading and trailing edge flaps on approach with no EICAS alert. Flight made a safe zero-flap landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Flight had to hold a short period due to thunderstorms near the area. Released from holding after three other arrivals were issued STARS. Got vectored for an ILS. On approach experienced a 50 knot tailwind which made the approach unstable so we went around.Got ATC vector for a different runway where Approach Control had two other aircraft approaching. All three of us went around because of impending wind shear. Now getting near min fuel so we diverted to a nearby airport and got vectored for an ILS. Tower advised us of a headwind. We had a strong headwind on final until 200 feet AGL. I looked at my primary flight display and noticed a quartering tailwind at 16 knots. We landed uneventfully; but suspected we were approximately 2 to 4 knots over our tailwind limitation.

Due to adverse winds on approach; flight executed a go around. Due to low fuel amounts then diverted to another airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On approach into ZZZ we were given the visual approach to runway 24. The First Officer was PF (Pilot Flying) at the time and I briefed  him on the terrain that surrounds the airport and how we should be configured and slowed in order to be able to maneuver in the valley to set up for landing. We entered a downwind at 220kts and 8000ft MSL while still on autopilot control. The FO (First Officer) began a slow descent while trying to slow the aircraft to configure flaps. We continued on downwind and selected flaps 8 and 20 and began a base turn around 9 miles from the airport. The autopilot was selected off at this time and we continued descent on the base leg. I instructed the FO to begin turning final and he put the aircraft in about a 15 degree banks without adding power. This increased our descent rate. Around this time we received a CAUTION TERRAIN message from EGWPS. Immediately after that came a single TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP warning message. I took control of the aircraft; increased power; leveled the descent and increased bank to 30 degrees which stopped the EGPWS warnings after a single message. I aligned the aircraft on a 6 miles final on glide path and returned controls to the first officer; who completed a stabilized approach by 1000 ft AGL and a normal landing. We both became task saturated trying to maneuver the aircraft in the valley while configuring the aircraft for landing. I diverted my attention away from the terrain and altitude to look at the airport and instruct the First Officer on lining up the plane on final.  In future landings at this airport; I will be requesting vectors for the ILS approach which will ensure all terrain separation. In times where a visual approach is being made I will be better at scanning inside and outside the cockpit to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft at all times.

Air Carrier Captain reported that the First Officer failed to add power while initiating a turn onto final resulting in a EGPWS warning.


Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Chart Or Publication; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

It started off with a routine flight from to SUN (Sun Valley Idaho). We were aware that the weather was down and from what I can remember we would be the 3rd [company] flight to try and get in that day. There were multiple passengers while boarding that questioned whether or not we would be able to get in. I responded that the weather was improving and we would do everything we could within the realm of safety. Knowing there would be some external and internal pressures associated with the route we made sure we briefed early and went over all the possible scenarios including the fms failure; balked landing procedure; and the missed approach procedure. As we approached our destination I got the latest atis and we had good enough weather to shoot the approach. As my captain briefed the GPS X rwy31 approach he mistakenly briefed 12500ft for the missed and neither him or I caught where it says 'when authorized by ATC; climb in hold to 12;500ft' The proper brief should of been to an altitude of 8;700ft then if we are authorized by ATC up to 12;500ft in the hold. As we approached our minimums I called missed approach as I had no runway in sight. After our call outs I told tower we were going missed and he told us to contact center. As I called center I stated we were executing the published missed out of Sun Valley and climbing to 12500ft. I did not get a response until the 3rd or 4th attempt to reach them. After we established radio contact he said; 'Look at your approach plate and tell me what altitude it says on the missed.' That's when I instantly looked and noticed it said 12;500 WITH ATC AUTHORIZATION! I apologized for it and explained we overlooked the 12;500ft. He kindly explained and said they protect the airspace to 8;700ft. I acknowledged and he said it was fine because there was no other traffic in the area and approved us to climb to 13;000ft while we entered the hold. I think there were a number of contributing factors that led to the altitude deviation. First off; we were planning on having a thorough briefing on the ground before even getting airborne to Sun Valley. We did this however; we were delayed getting to [our intermediate stop] because of our late arriving aircraft. This meant that we would have little time in Salt Lake to brief before heading to Sun Valley. I also believe that our emphasis on all the company procedural information going into there led to us overlooking a simple thing. I think safety is always on our mind and I do believe that there are stringent procedures that we must essentially memorize prior to even commencing an approach into an unforgiving place such as Sun Valley. I feel we focused more on the worst case scenario procedures and omitted something because of it.I have two suggestions that I think will help other air crews avoid a similar situation. Being the unforgiving airport Sun Valley is; having adequate time to brief is crucial. I feel having a crew that is arriving late and that has to do a quick turn to a place like this needs adequate time to prepare especially when weather is down.My last and most important suggestion to help avoid this in the future is to have one of the altitudes on the missed approach procedure deleted. In my personal opinion I think the 8;700ft should be reconsidered. I feel that if ATC can protect the airspace to 12;500ft it will allow the crews to have one less thing on the missed procedure and will provide much greater protection from surrounding terrain. The missed approach procedure brings you over terrain as high as 7;299ft; meaning you're only clearing it by 1401ft.

I briefed the RNAV GPS RWY 31 approach into SUN including the missed approach altitude of 12500. I also briefed the balked landing; missed approach; and FMS failure procedure.I mistook that altitude as part of the missed approach procedure and so did the PNF both times we referenced it.The root cause is the inclusion of an irrelevant altitude in the missed approach procedure. Contributing is when descending to DMDA into SUN there are 4 different possible outcomes when reaching DMDA and each procedure is unique. i.e.:  1. Normal landing2. Missed approach.3. Balked landing4. Balked landing with FMS failure.That is a lot of stuff to cram into short term memory.[I believe the] phrase 'When authorized by ATC; climb-in-hold to 12500 FT should be removed from the missed approach procedure because it is not part of the missed approach procedure.

A commercial fixed wing flight into SUN conducted a GPS X Runway 31 approach to decision height with no contact and went around; climbing to 12;500 FT per the MAP. When in contact with ATC they were advised the actual MAP altitude was only 8;700 FT with a requirement to obtain ATC authorization to continue the climb to 12;500. The reporters cited an excess of options at decision height and the decision to place the 12;500 altitude in the MAP description as contributing factors.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A quick heads-up for Renton; WA. If you are a few miles final at Renton; Runway 34; you are ALSO on or crossing the ILS Runway 31L BFI. We were vectored all over the place and then cleared for the visual to 34 RNT from a HIGH Right Base; maybe 8 miles out. We had RNT clearly in view; the visual loaded and were intercepting final at about the 5 NM point. RNT Tower said we were lined up for the wrong airport and were on final for BFI and to confirm RNT. We were correctly lining up for 34 RNT and NEVER lining up for BFI. We double checked everything and continued for 34. The gotcha and surprise; though it shouldn't have been; is that if we were looking right down the barrel of BFI 31L as we were rolling final RWY 34 RNT. As approach cleared us and we swapped over to tower; we were also focusing on the usual myriad of bug smashers. At any rate; there isn't an instrument app to RNT 34; only a visual in the box. The visual has the standard 5 nm final. That pattern should be tighter; though I'm not sure how tight. Crews need to be aware of potential conflict with BFI. RNT Tower said BFI is on the warpath for that conflict. A better vector and setup from Approach with a heads-up about what kind of final they needed would have helped. At any rate; no harm. No foul. Approach should have advised us to make the base to final turn at perhaps 3 nm. When checking in with tower they should have advised the same thing. A normal base to final at Renton is a CONFLICT with Boeing.

Business jet Captain reported that while on a long; high right base to landing at RNT the crew was also lined up during the turn for Runway 31L at BFI.