Laptop Computer (performance; planning; etc.)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At the time the runway showed a Notam shortening the runway by 1296 feet of the west end.  Our Performance data system is supposed to preload the Notam into the system and NOT allow a pilot to manually select the full length runway without putting in the code FULL.  Our system should catch the selection of the runway and not give take off data for this reason.  For example if we selected Runway 12 for departure the Performance data system should not give us numbers for this runway.  The only way to receive numbers for full length with a Notam present is for the pilot to select Runway 12/FULL.  This tells the system that the pilot is consciously making this selection.  Our procedures are for the First Officer to load and obtain the takeoff data for the runway for departure.  Assuming the system was working correctly; I loaded the takeoff data for the runway that came back as valid data for Runway 12.  It was only after departure that I realized that the system was not catching the shortening of the runway.  Our system should not allow the selection of the full length of the runway; but in this case it did.  Takeoff was made uneventfully.

EMB-190 Captain reports using the published runway length for takeoff performance calculations with a NOTAM in effect shortening the runway by approximately 1;300 feet.  This NOTAM should have been in the performance data base and the full runway length selection should not have been allowed.  The takeoff was uneventful and the error was detected airborne.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

As we were starting descent from FL400; with the autopilot and autothrottle on; the left thrust lever moved a little but then got stuck near cruise power setting and the autothrottle motor tried but was unable to move it back immediately causing an asymmetric thrust situation. The right thrust lever moved correctly and the Captain immediately noticed the problem. He attempted to disconnect the autothrottle using the button on the thrust lever and the switch on the MCP then manually tried pulling the left thrust lever; none of which fixed the problem. He asked me to try and it felt like the lever was moving slightly about an inch but would then spring back to the stuck position. Any movement of the thrust lever did affect the engine power however. I pulled harder and the thrust lever slammed to the idle position and had normal freedom of movement the remainder of the flight.The Mechanic found a notepad had fallen into the throttle quadrant and was interfering with the clutch microswitch and the clutch for the autothrottle.

When the left thrust lever of their B757-200 appeared to stick in place at cruise thrust as they started their descent the flight crew applied increasing leverage until it broke loose and functioned normally thereafter.  Maintenance found a notepad had slipped into the pedestal.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

This occurred on our second passenger leg. We had 10 passengers and no flight attendant. Our Flight Attendant flew the prior passenger leg with us and offered to extend in order to cover the next passenger leg. Her request was denied by scheduling and she was sent home. This was a FAR 135 trip. I conducted the passenger briefing in accordance with the fleet memo. I also received an email telling me to turn off the galley power prior to the flight. Doing so shuts off all power to the convection oven; hot cup; coffee makers and lavatory faucet; but does NOT disable the microwave. To disable the microwave requires pulling its circuit breaker located in the baggage area. In the interest of safety I elected to pull that breaker even though our company does not have a procedure for doing so without a maintenance write-up. At the end of the flight I discovered that the passenger had served themselves alcohol from the galley; which is illegal under FAR 135. I also have serious safety concerns regarding the use of the crystal glasses and stemware as well as the china. We carry a full set of silverware to include chef's knives that could very easily hurt someone. We were unable to ensure that we had a secured cabin prior to landing on this short and crowded flight. Until there is an approved procedure for disabling the microwave oven and securing the breakable china and crystal as well as the silverware and alcohol; we should no longer conduct passenger flights in this fleet without a flight attendant on board for obvious safety and legal concerns. This puts the pilots in a potentially dangerous situation and also puts our airman certificates at risk; not to mention exposing the company to potential risk. Since these flights are being conducted with increasing frequency I have decided to refuse any future passenger leg without a flight attendant as I have serious concerns for my safety and my airman certificate.

G-IV Captain reports flying ten passengers under FAR 135 without a flight attendant on board. After landing the reporter discovers that the passengers helped themselves to some of the amenities on board and had access to knives in the galley.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

I was pilot not flying on a day VFR flight. Normal flight through FL220 then both Pitch Trim channels failed. This was our second leg with this aircraft and we encountered a similar malfunction during the previous leg. We ran appropriate QRH procedure to reset the Pitch Trim channels. We were unable to recover either channel so after a brief conversation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control via ACARS we decided to divert. We chose the divert airport because it was 50 miles away as we were in a nose-down pitch setting and uncertain of the condition of our horizontal stabilizer because of some poorly explained stabilizer faults on the CMC by Line Maintenance in the previous station who 'ops checked good' the same malfunction during our previous flight. Declared emergency and set up for a visual to [Runway] 18C. Pilot flying did an excellent job flying the approach and taxied to gate without incident.Loss of pitch trim was our threat which compounded into other threats. No autopilot; no pitch trim; no speedbrakes; very high Vref speeds per QRH; Excessive back pressure required to remain stable as we slowed to approach speed.

The reporter stated that the Pitch Trim Control Unit was replaced which returned that aircraft to service. There were no previous similar discrepancy in the logbook which he had available.

An EMB-145 CAS alerted both PITCH TRIM channels failed so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted. The crew had no autopilot; pitch trim or speedbrakes; and excessive back pressure was required to remain stable as they slowed to a very high Vref speed.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

While at cruise the Lead Flight Attendant called and said; 'I just want to keep you in the loop in case it gets worse; we have a passenger who is lying down in the aft galley in a ball. She is incoherent and mumbling.' I told the Lead Flight Attendant that I intended to call Medlink. She then said that we did not need to do that and she would let me know if things got worse. I repeated that I intended to call Medlink and asked her to find out her name; age and if she had taken any drugs or alcohol. I found the appropriate frequency for AIRINC and had them patch me through to dispatch. I then explained our situation to our dispatcher and requested a patch to Medlink. This communication was very broken. We were dropped a few times and dispatch and Medlink had a hard time understanding us. While I was talking to Medlink I called the Lead Flight Attendant back and attempted to get the information and requested she locate a Medlink checklist that past flight attendants have given to me. She said that the lady was now on oxygen and had taken a Motrin and a glass of wine and would be alright and I did not need to contact Medlink. I told her that I was already talking to them and requested the info I had requested earlier. She then stated that there was a language barrier and she could not understand the woman; but she was doing better. I again asked her if she could find out her name and age. The flight attendant then asked if I wanted her to rummage through the passengers belongings. I said no just do the best you can and ask her. She then said that the passenger just wanted to be left alone and was tired. I again asked her to do the best she could and find out the information that Medlink was requesting. She then said 'Here talk to Flight Attendant B' and would not coordinate with me anymore. This flight attendant gave me the seat number and estimated her age. He stated that the passenger was acting like she was really drunk and about to pass out. I asked him if he smelled alcohol on her and he replied no. I relayed this information to Medlink finally. The Medlink Dr. requested that we have the passenger lay on the floor with her feet up.Upon landing I asked our Lead Flight Attendant to debrief our flight with us as I felt that we had a communication breakdown. She said we did have a communication breakdown because she did not want me to call Medlink and I did anyway. I informed her that my calling of Medlink was not her decision to make and that getting the opinion of a trained doctor was the safest course to take as well as relieving us from liability for not seeking out medical help for a sick person. She stated that she has medical training as a flight attendant and that in the future she will not call the pilots until it is a dire emergency and she wanted us to call for help and we will just be out of the loop. I feel this is an unacceptable and dangerous attitude. Medlink is not just for dire emergencies and waiting until someone becomes very sick could have grave consequences for a sick passenger someday.

B737 Captain was informed by the Lead Flight Attendant that a passenger is down in the aft galley; but it is not necessary to contact Medlink at this time. The Captain disagrees and contacts Medlink; which upsets the lead Flight Attendant.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 02

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Prior to initial descent we had planned on an ILS Z approach to runway 02; MGGT.  After reviewing the arrival angles; (we were arriving from the SW; and the course reversal turn would be greater than 170 degrees) I; Pilot Not Flying (PNF) advised that it would be easier to fly the ILS Y.  The Pilot flying (PF) agreed and we reprogrammed and reviewed the differences for this approach.  When we were turned over to the local controller we requested the ILS Y. ATC advised that it was not available due to local VFR traffic and we were then assigned a delaying vector downwind; slowed to 210 kts; and advised us of traffic at 10 o'clock and X miles.  During this vector we rebuilt for the ILS Z approach and visibly acquired the traffic passing to [our] left.  A few moments later we were cleared direct the AUR VOR and the ILS Z approach. We crossed the AUR VOR (initial approach fix) at 9;000 feet autopilot on; LNAV; VNAV engaged; and selected 6;300 feet in the MCP.  The approach was monitored using the automation and raw data; with no anomalies noted.  The aircraft was set to join the LOC just outside the FAF at an altitude of 6;300 feet.  The autopilot started the turn just prior to the 5 DME fix listed on the approach; observed at about 4.9 miles from the AUR VOR via raw data.  As we rolled through about 90 degrees to the final we; both PF and PNF; observed a B737 on final in front and below us.  We advised ATC that we were going missed approach and initiated the procedure. During the missed approach procedure we received a climb TCAS RA.  We advised ATC and the B737 that we had them in sight and were climbing to 9;000 feet; the MAP altitude; and rolled wings level.After the TCAS RA was resolved we began a right turn direct to the AUR VOR; away from the high terrain we had briefed; and along the missed approach path. While in the turn the bank angle increased beyond 30 degrees and we received an aural 'Bank Angle' warning.  The bank angle was never observed over 40 degrees and was corrected immediately to below 30 degrees. After passing the AUR VOR; ATC then cleared us back for another uneventful approach and landing.At no time were we instructed to follow the B737; advised of spacing; or given a speed to maintain during the approach. We were under the impression that the B737 was not a factor and that aircraft was already on the ground.  The only time we were contacted by ATC; after being cleared for the approach; was after we advised them that we were going missed approach. After we were in the gate we contacted the B737 crew and informed them that we had received a TCAS RA; but that we had a visual on them just prior to the warning.  They said they had also had received a TCAS descending RA and had descended only a few hundred feet.  ATC did not comment on the event.Upon block in we did notice a map shift [between the FMC position and Gate position].

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A B767 flight crew; flying the ILS Z RWY 2 at MGGT; experiences a TCAS RA with a B737 flying the ILS Y. The B767 crew may have performed the course reversal early due to a small IRS error; but ATC never advised the crew of the B737 traffic. A go-around is initiated by the B767 crew. During the go-around; a 30 degrees bank angle is exceeded momentarily triggering a bank angle warning.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Tower opened and I called to resume approach frequencies from TRACON. I was monitoring the frequencies and had heard TRACON switch the BE90 to Tower; as soon as I took the frequency. The BE90 calls up 9 NM northwest of [the airport] requesting his IFR clearance to [the main airport] climbing to 100 as final instead of 140 and going direct [the intersection]. I gave him his flight plan; [told him to] Squawk XXXX and proceeded to RADAR identify him at 14 NM northwest; I then gave him a heading of 340 for the MVA's and a climb to 100. Pilot didn't read back; so I did a radio check; and by that time I RADAR identified him the second time he was clear of my 080 MVA and gave him on course cleared to [the main airport] via direct [the intersection] climb and maintain 100. The only reason I gave the pilot direct [the intersection] was because he said he was direct [the intersection] which caused confusion as to if he got that cleared or if that was a request. I handed him off to Center coordinating the new final altitude but did not verbally coordinate the direct [the intersection] routing (I used automation to type in -XX in the scratch pad as well as the 100 as final). My low altitude alarm went off and Center called about the BE90 clearing my MVA's or not. I thought he would be outside of my 158 MVA; but he went about 1/4-1/2 mile inside of the north side of that MVA as [TRACON] called me. If a Controller is dealing with something that doesn't normally occur (aircraft proceeding direct [the intersection] from; so early in the climb) then they should be more aware that something may not be right and be more adamant about coordinating more carefully or clearing up any confusion that could occur such as why the aircraft was headed direct [the intersection] in the first place. Also if your gut is to give a heading then you should stick with it. And pilots shouldn't say they are direct a fix if it wasn't a clearance that was given to them to eliminate confusion a heading would've been better. Or if the aircraft had gotten his IFR clearance on the ground it would save a lot of unnecessary coordination while he is already enroute especially if there was no apparent reason why they waited to get it in the air. Next time something out of the ordinary happens verify if it's a clearance or a request.

TRACON Controller experienced an MVA infraction when confused regarding a pilot's request for a clearance.


Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency

I was the jumpseat rider on the flight. Uneventful flight until visual approach; we had a runaway stabilizer full nose down on approximately 10-15 mile final. Captain executed a go-around and flew another approach to a visual landing. Due to excessive forward stick pressures; I assisted by pulling back on the Captain's yolk during the go-around; pattern and approach and landing to allow the Captain to maintain aircraft control. I also assisted with QRH checklist items and with briefing the flight attendants.

On final at 1;800 FT a MD-80 Horizontal Stabilizer motor ran full nose down; so a jumpseat rider assisted the Captain pulling the yoke during the go-around and to another approach and landing. An emergency was declared and the QRH completed.


Work Cards; Testing; Inspection; Installation

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Manuals

Aircraft was leaving from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and aircraft did not pressurize. Crew returned to field. Aircraft was in maintenance overnight with a double windshield change which requires [aircraft] to be pressurized to verify no leaks. Manual switch on the avionics ventilation overboard extract valve was missing labels for on\off position. Add perform a bite check of the avionics extract fan ventilation system; to verify proper operation of closing and opening of the valve.

Technician reported an improper windshield change lead to aircraft's inability to pressurize.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

We were taxiing for takeoff; when we received 6 chimes from the lead flight attendant. I picked up the interphone; as the captain was driving the airplane. The lead FA informed me that there was smoke coming from an overhead bin; and that they were investigating. I told her that we would stop on the taxiway and she should call us back immediately with any new information. She called us back moments later to let us know that the smoke seemed to be coming from underneath the baggage bin; from either the vents or the passenger service unit. They informed us that they were moving passengers away from that area; and that they were going to discharge halon extinguishers into the overhead area where the smoke was coming from. I asked the lead FA to stay on the interphone and keep us updated as to what was going on. She then said that the extinguishing agent seemed to diminish the smoke and that it was dissipating. I told her that we would return to the gate immediately; and asked her to please inform us immediately if there was any further problems or changes in the situation. We coordinated with ground control and ops to return to the gate; and began taxiing. We turned left onto a taxiway and just as we made the turn; we again received 6 chimes from the cabin. When I picked up the interphone; our lead FA said the smoke had returned; it was worse than before and was spreading. Her voice was quavering; and she said that passengers were beginning to panic. At this point another FA in the rear of the plane got on the interphone as well. I asked them both if they thought we needed to evacuate. They both answered affirmatively. The captain; upon hearing this; stopped the plane; set the parking brake; and told ground control that we were evacuating on the taxiway; and to please have emergency equipment dispatched immediately. The captain and I ran the Evacuation Checklist on the back of the QRH; and then we exited the cockpit to assist in the evacuation. I went out the galley door/slide; and helped people at the bottom coming off of the slide; until no more passengers emerged from that exit. I then made my way to the left wing; as I did not witness any passengers on the right wing. Passengers were coming off of both the front and aft part of the wing. I instructed some of the elderly passengers to exit the rear of the wing; and some complied; but many passengers continued to slide down the front of the wing. The entire evacuation took approximately 2 minutes; and was handled very well by our cabin crew.

During taxi for takeoff; a Flight Attendant notified the flight crew of smoke coming from an overhead bin. After receiving updates from the flight attendants about the smoke continuing to intensify even after fire bottle discharge; crew requested fire equipment and evacuated the aircraft on the taxiway.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

It was a routine departure with a left turn to 270 degrees; and a climb to 5;000 FT. Once we made 5;000 FT; I went to cruise mode of flight. We did some climbing turns; and descents. We also checked the autopilot. I then performed the in-range flow to start slowing the airplane down. Our goal here was to operate the aircraft with gear down; and flaps to various degrees to check for controllability; and monitor systems. As I brought the gear handle down; I waited for the standard three green lights. This time; however; all we saw was the nose gear light; the left main light; and the red gear unlocked light switch. The annunciator panel was also showing the hydraulic pressure light. I pushed the test button to see if it was a light bulb. It was not a defective bulb. The light shone brightly once pushing the test button. I cycled the gear to relieve the pressure. The results were exactly the same. I tried cycling the gear two more times; hoping the right gear uplock switch would allow the gear to swing free. It did not so I consulted the QRH for the Emergency Gear Extension Checklist. I put the gear handle down; pulled the hydraulic circuit breaker; and pulled the T-handle to blow down the landing gear. The results were exactly the same; two greens; and one red. I called Approach to ask for vectors for a low approach to see if the Tower could verify the problem of only having two down and locked landing gear. Approach referred me to another airport nearby. Approach vectored me for a left downwind; and switched me to Tower. I completed the low approach; and Tower confirmed the right main gear was not down and locked. We stayed in the pattern at the airport to burn some fuel; and I was talking with Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control advised to try cycling the gear one last time. I did; but our situation was not any different. At this point; I had one hour left of fuel. I declared an emergency with Approach. Approach gave me vectors and I asked to roll emergency equipment so those services would be available once we made the runway. At the point I knew I would land on the runway; I shut down the right engine; and feathered the propeller. About 200 FT off the ground; I shut down the left engine; and also feathered the propeller. I did not use landing lights; and only 10 degrees of flaps. Before touchdown; all electrical systems were off; fuel selectors were in the off position; and the crossfeed was closed. I landed on the left main; and kept control inputs in for as long as possible to keep the airplane balanced on the left main gear. Once the energy dissipated; the right wing started to slowly dip. It eventually began sliding on the runway causing the plane to veer to the right. I applied the brakes; and we came to rest on the right side of the runway. We exited the airplane quickly; and we were met with the airport fire trucks who gave us assistance.

C402 Captain reports discovering during a post maintenance test flight that the right landing gear will not extend. All attempts to get the right gear to extend are unsuccessful and a partial gear up landing ensues.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

On a straight in visual approach to Runway 31 in BIS; we received a gear horn aural. We were not yet fully configured but did notice we were 4 or 5 miles from the runway. We immediately configured the aircraft to full configuration. I noticed then that the radar altimeter was roughly 880 feet while we were still a few miles from the runway. I was aware of the terrain surrounding the southeast side of the airport and knew it was higher than at the airport and felt we were still in a safe condition and safe altitude above field elevation to land. We continued the approach; kept it stabilized and safely landed the aircraft in the touchdown zone on centerline.The primary cause was a combination of a slight loss of situational awareness as well as the differing terrain in the environment. We had discussed the terrain on the approach briefing; and as always would have the aircraft stabilized to meet the stabilized criteria. One primary factor that caused me to configure late was the failure of the FMS to sequence to the final segment. I believed we were 6 miles (from FMS info) from the airport when we actually about 4. The terrain in the area is slightly higher than that at the field so our radar altimeters sensed we were too low to not be fully configured. Typically hearing the gear horn would cause me to go around but we felt we were at a safe altitude above field elevation and as well as distance from the field. I should have briefed that this was a threat because I had encountered it before. I failed to have a proper mitigation tactic; such as configuring earlier than normal to avoid startling either pilot. I also failed to realize the FMS did not sequence properly and was giving us false information on our distance from the runway. A go-around could have been executed; but as stated earlier; both pilots felt we were still at a safe distance and altitude to become fully configured and safely continue the approach.

CRJ200 Captain reported gear horn warning due to passing higher terrain on visual approach.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Declared Emergency

The First Officer was flying at FL360 in IMC when we got an IAS speed flag and noticed my side had a discrepency. We referenced the QRH; selected ADC1 and descended to FL240 to get out of RVSM airspace. While descending the First Officer's airspeed bled off; so we deemed unreliable and used the standby airspeed indicator. We declared an emergency and contacted the company for alternates but all suitable airports had low visibilities and ceilings. Once at FL240; however; all airspeed indicators began to match up with the standby. We reviewed all weather options and decided to continue to our destination because weather was improving and I felt it was a safe and practical decision.I felt we worked very well together. I invited his thoughts and opinions on what was going on so that I would have not just my own view but would get someone elses take as well. I felt our teamwork produced the safest and most practical decision making for the scenario.

When their airspeed indicators became unusable due to frozen moisture in the pitot system lines the flight crew of an EMB-145 descended out of IMC and below RVSM airspace where the blockage dissipated and they were able to continue to their destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 150

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Caught tail wheel on runway end light. No damage to aircraft [but] broke light. Wake turbulence from 737 on approach.

Cessna 185 pilot reported landing short and damaging a runway end light at PVD after encountering wake turbulence from preceding B737.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

ZZZ Operations delayed flight without Dispatcher contact.  Delay Operations posted was 7 minutes after the exit.

Dispatcher reported that a flight was delayed without Dispatch being notified.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Lack of digital ATIS in JNU. Due to terrain features so close in to JNU; it is almost impossible to receive the current ATIS via VHF until we are already in the descent to JNU. ATC usually has asked us if we have the current ATIS before we're capable of picking it up.  Even using the TEST button to break squelch doesn't give pilots a complete uninterrupted opportunity to copy ATIS. Frequently you must listen multiple times to get all the pertinent information.    Please pass this on to convince the FAA to install digital ATIS in JNU. This would be a great improvement to safety for crews actually being able to get ATIS information well before the descent.

Air carrier Captain reported difficulty receiving ATIS in a timely manner at JNU airport and requested that Digital ATIS be installed.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Just after rotation on runway 28L in SFO; the aircraft rapidly accelerated and climbed much faster than a normal profile takeoff. There were tower reports of speed gains 15 plus knots on rotation. The winds were 260 at 28 gusting 33. I elected to go flaps 5; max blast due to windshear concerns. We had a slightly slower than normal rotation rate. Vr was 155; and at about 200 ft; I saw my speed at 177 and accelerating. I pitched the nose up higher but the speed kept accelerating. I do not know what our climb rate was. The pitch bars were trying to command a 24+ degree nose up. My FO called out the speed and next I looked; we were close to an overspeed with the airspeed trend indicator screaming up into the red. I called for flaps up to 1; and we started our right turn. This all happened so quickly; that we were already at 800 ft by the time we started our turn. There were no other indications of a microburst; but the plane was acting and it felt like we had taken off into the increasing performance side of a burst. We continued to clean up the plane and climb out. After dodging some thunderstorms and getting above the weather; we discussed if we had overspeed the flaps. Neither of us actually saw an overspeed; but we think we might have gotten close so to err on the side of caution; we sent in a maintenance report.

B757 Captain reported an increasing performance windshear event on departure from SFO which resulted in a near overspeed of the flaps during the initial climb out.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 3375

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

I was the PIC of the BK117; shutdown on top of the ZZZ helipad. I began my overnight shift at XA:00 that evening. After delivering a patient to the hospital; I was awaiting the medical crew's return from delivering the patient to the hospital. Two of the medical crew had returned to the helicopter to configure the medical equipment for the return flight to our home base of ZZZ1. As I was waiting for the crew to finish; I noticed an approaching helicopter from the southeast direction. It has been confirmed this helicopter is operated by Company X. I checked my company pilot phone to see if I had missed a call from our organic dispatch/communications (comm) center alerting me to an incoming Air Ambulance. This is common practice amongst the dispatch/communication centers of Air Ambulance companies in order to alert pilots of incoming aircraft in order to vacate the helipad and reposition to either an airborne holding area or to a ground holding area at ZZZ2. I did not have a missed call so I called [my company] comm center to inquire about the helicopter approaching and now in a downwind leg (south to north) to the helipad. [They] had no knowledge of the approaching helicopter.This is the first breakdown in the chain of events and the primary contributing factor. The Company X dispatch failed to alert [my] communications center of the inbound aircraft to the ZZZ Helipad.Additional contributing factor: a helipad camera exists at the hospital entrance doors adjacent to the helipad always focused on the helipad. Typically; ZZZ hospital Security personnel monitor the helipad camera when helicopters are inbound and/or shutdown on the helipad. Reportedly; the ZZZ Hospital Security team was not alerted to the inbound H135 Air Ambulance.During my phone call to [my company] comm center; the H135 continued it's approach from downwind to base leg and to final approach. It became quite apparent that the PIC did not see the helicopter shutdown on the pad. As the helicopter continued the approach; I began to quickly move from the helipad to the catwalk connecting the pad to the hospital and yelled at the two medical crew-members to get off the helipad. The H135 continued it's final approach for landing as the medical crew also quickly vacated the helipad. [My company] comm center phone calls are recorded; without exception for this phone call. The urgency in my voice alerting the medical crew can clearly be heard on the recording as I believed our safety was compromised.The H135 began a wave-off maneuver at approximately 300 meters north of the helipad and 50-75 above helipad elevation (100 feet AGL). As the H135 continued it's wave-off; the PIC side-stepped to the east to avoid low overflight of my shutdown helicopter on the helipad. The H135 PIC continued the wave-off over the adjacent hospital building and established an airborne holding area to the southeast.It is unknown if the H135 PIC was aided with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) at this point in the evening. Official sunset had occurred at approximately XA:15 that evening and end of evening civil or nautical twilight had not yet occurred. I also do not know the typical procedures for this specific PIC or operator concerning NVG practices flying into/out of metropolitan areas. In my experience; I remain aided when landing to metropolitan hospital helipads as an aid to identifying hazards that I may not be able to visually acquire unaided.An additional unknown element is whether or not ZZZ2 ATC tower advised the H135 PIC of the presence of a helicopter shutdown on the ZZZ Hospital helipad. In my experience; the ZZZ2 Tower frequently advises me if a helicopter is on the helipad after my initial Tower check-in. I do know; however; that there was communication between the H135 PIC and the ZZZ2 Tower at some point during the incident. Upon powering on my avionics during my start sequence; I overheard the H135 PIC communicating with the ZZZ2 Tower of my presence on the helipad.Finally; though this appears to be a communication breakdown in normal operating procedures; I believe this incident could have been avoided even with the multiple occurrences of communication breakdown if the helipad had Pilot Controlled Lighting (PCL) available for incoming Air Ambulance Helicopters. Currently; the lighting system is only controlled by a rheostat (timing only; not intensity) from inside the hospital on the helipad floor leading to the helipad.

Air ambulance helicopter pilot reported that prior to engine start and while waiting to depart the hospital helipad; a critical ground conflict occurred when another helicopter attempted to land at the same location. The pilot eventually aborted the approach and entered holding. The reporter cited as contributing that dispatch had not notified the crew on the ground of the inbound helicopter


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While on arrival into ZZZ the aircraft was descending to 3000 on a 360 heading base leg to Runway XX. Just prior to capturing altitude; ATC issued a heading to intercept the localizer; maintain 3000 until established and cleared us for the ILS 28. The Captain; as PF; reached up and spun what they believed to be the heading bug and was reaching for the approach button. I realized as we descended through 2800 that the knob spun was the altitude alerter set knob. I took the controls momentarily; used TCS to override the autopilot as we reset 3000. We descended to 2700 as this was happening and climbed back up. About this time; ZZZ Approach saw that we were low; and advised us to maintain 3000. I replied that we were returning to the assigned altitude. We leveled at 3000; armed the approach and completed the ILS to landing. I believe the threat occurred due to the 'muscle memory' of the Capt. We were in a familiar location as they had been flying out of ZZZ for their entire career with the last bunch of years being on the CRJ. As we were cleared to turn and intercept the localizer; the Capt's hand went to where the heading bug has 'always' been. In the new aircraft; this is approximately the location of the altitude selector knob. By spinning the knob left for a turn; they selected a lower altitude prior to the aircraft capturing the previous selection. While I was busy talking with ATC; I do not believe that I was task saturated but it did take a moment for me to recognize what had been changed and be able to override and fix it. After landing; the Capt and I thoroughly discussed what happened and steps that could be taken to preclude this type of event from happening with the first thing being that with the new aircraft; everything needs to be done at a deliberate pace. Look before acting. As an LCP [Line Check Pilot]; I am very aware that pilot's fall into habits and routines. In most instances; this is a good thing as this helps free up cognitive abilities so we can concentrate on larger tasks. I do brief pilots; especially now that we are transitioning to a new; unfamiliar aircraft that we need to be methodical and deliberate when we are making changes. Look at where your hand is before making a selection. This will help when we are in that 'same old; normal position' in space and time when our old habits kick in and can cause errors.

EMB-175LL Check Airman reported altitude deviation due to PF selecting altitude knob in what was heading knob on older aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were to ferry aircraft from ZZZ to ZZZ1 after engine replacement due to engine fire along with the mechanic who replaced the engine. After leveling at cruise; I noticed a crack in my side window and brought it to the mechanics attention. He had me mark the beginning and end of the crack with his marker. The crack continued to grow and a second crack appeared. I called Dispatch on my iPad and informed him of our situation along with asking him to provide us with possible diversion airports if the situation got worse; which he did. Approximately 30 minutes later; 2 more small cracks began to appear and the mechanic suggested we might want to divert due to possible window failure which we all agreed. Also remnants of Hurricane Sally were moving through ZZZ. I called Dispatch again and we decided ZZZ2 would be a good option. We landed in ZZZ2 with a normal landing. after arriving at the gate we counted 6 small cracks and 2 possible cracks on the inner pane. It was helpful to have an experienced company mechanic onboard along with help from our Dispatcher.

A320 flight crew reported they detected the side window cracking in flight; causing a diversion to a precautionary landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Runway 28L has a significant downslope in the touchdown zone that is not addressed in the 10-7 documentation or on the associated approach charts. The documentation notes that when landing Runway 10R the upslope at the far end of the runway can give the illusion of being high. There is no mention of the illusion when landing Runway 28L. The downslope is almost entirely within the 28L landing zone; where the runway drops 55 feet. The effect on the flare at 5-10 feet is not unlike a ski jump hill; where the ground continually falls away as the aircraft attempts to settle; extending the glide prior to touchdown. Additionally the winds were robust and gusting out of the northwest on this particular day. This added the additional difficulty as the wind burbled over the airport structures then blew up the slope on the north side of the landing zone; further exacerbating the floating tendency. There should be a note on all Jepp pages associated with Runway 28L that the runway has a significant downslope in the touchdown zone which can lead to significant float. Additionally; upslope winds from either side of the runway due to its elevated nature can cause updrafts in the landing area when crosswinds are present. On my landing we crossed the threshold at 50 feet and I was just able to touch down prior to the end of the touchdown zone. We watched a B737 landing behind us float a significant distance 5 feet above the downslope and that aircraft executed a missed approach. I personally had never previously landed on Runway 28L and was not aware of any issue with the runway. The documentation is inadequate to the hazard that is present.

Air carrier Captain reported the aircraft floated during landing due to wind conditions and a significant runway downslope at FLL airport that is not documented in the associated charts.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

B FA (Flight Attendant) was injured and completely incapacitated on aft galley floor. Captain and A FA requested paramedics and to stop boarding. Operations refused to stop and argued about procedures saying 'you only need two FA's.' All crew members knew this was not OK but operations continued to say they didn't understand why. Operations boarded all passengers against crew member's request with one incapacitated crew member; one crew member administering medical assistance and only two crew members in the cabin. Operations agents and Supervisors should not usurp the authority of crew members when they are not familiar/ misinformed with FAR's; crew member requirements for boarding and emergency medical procedures. Authority of operations should be clearly defined as to who is in charge. I.e. Captain or Operations so that there is no question and/or argument/disagreement during critical time sensitive issues/emergencies. The pressure put on operations and incentives offered should never be so great that on time performance outweighs a person's health; physical well-being or common sense and human decency.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported Operations wouldn't stop boarding for medical emergency.


Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Unmanned aircraft lost connection and flew away.

Operator stated that control of the small UAV was lost while it was within control range and at less than 200 feet altitude. The UAV crashed into a wooded area.

UAV Operator reported losing control input to the UAV which crashed in a wooded area.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 600

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During a sightseeing flight up the New York Special Flight Rules Area/Hudson River Corridor I observed what I consider to be a couple major safety concerns; both involving helicopter traffic. The first and less serious problem was excessive voice traffic on frequency 123.05 as someone appeared to be controlling multiple sight-seeing helicopter arrivals and departures on the frequency; making it difficult to separate out the mandatory position report calls in the corridor. There was also non-professional chatter on the frequency that appeared to come from the helicopter operators. The second problem; and in my opinion a critical safety issue is the flow of helicopter traffic in the corridor. It appears that helicopters flow into the area of the Statue of Liberty at low altitude and then climb to 1300 feet when they leave the area. This causes them to climb vertically through the fixed wing traffic transiting the corridor; many of whom were between 1000 feet and 1300 feet. I recall the accident several years ago that led to the current rules controlling this Special Flight Rules Area. It involved a helicopter climbing vertically and impacting a fixed wing aircraft from below. There is a high probability that this type accident will happen again due to way the sight-seeing helicopters are currently operating!!!I believe 2 steps can be taken to lessen the chances of a similar accident. First; helicopter control transmissions should be done on a discreet frequency; not 123.05. Most important; sightseeing helicopters should NOT routinely climb through the 1000 feet to 1300 feet altitude block since this is the block recommended for aircraft transiting the corridor from one end to the other!

A BE-36 pilot expressed concern about helicopter operations within the New York Special Flight Rules Area (Hudson River transit and sight-seeing corridor). Citing in particular; CTAF frequency congestion and the hazard to traffic watch effects. The use of vertical climbs and descents; from landing and sightseeing sites; into the transient traffic corridor; poses as a potential hazard into the paths of conventional transitory traffic.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

When the seatbelt sign went off I got up and as trained; looked out the window for the presence of an ops agent and for movement of the jetbridge. There was not an ops agent present so in order for both the passengers and the FAs in the back to know what was happening I made an announcement advising all that we were waiting for an ops agent. I turned to the C FA and asked her to wait to disarm the service galley door until I make the announcement. As I turned back and looked out the window the ops agent was present; the jetbridge was moving and I made the disarming announcement.  As I turned to cross check the service galley door (C FA) I observed the flag in the proper disarmed location (across top of window) and the door was cracked. I was not able to cross check C FA door before the C FA cracked the door.  I then turned back; opened my door and the passengers started to deplane. I got distracted with passengers deplaning (seven wheelchairs) and didn't properly cross check C FA door. After all the passengers were deplaned I stayed onboard during our ground time to wait for Provo. As Provo came to the door I heard her yell; the bar. I jumped up and said wait it must have fallen off. As I approached the door I realized the girt bar was still armed. I shut the door; disarmed the slide and opened the service door without incident.

B737 flight attendants reported that after block in the service galley door flag was in the disarmed location; but the door was still armed. The door was closed and the slide disarmed before the service door was opened.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

We were reassigned to the ANCHR 4 RNAV arrival and confirmed that all altitude and speed restrictions were depicted on the CDU. The approach to be conducted was the ILS to 35R and for situational awareness purposes we also loaded the PURRL transition. When we approached DOGGG we did not meet our altitude and speed restriction because it got involuntarily deleted. I informed ATC and they cleared us to 9;000 feet with speed at our discretion. I believe this occurred because we loaded the PURRL transition which deleted the DOGGG restrictions as this exact scenario happened to us on [a] flight the next day.

B757 Captain reported missing a profile restriction during descent.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Enroute; we were issued an amended clearance to proceed to BUCKO; and then via the FRDMM1 RNAV arrival. This is a new procedure and this was the first time either of us had flown this arrival. The arrival is a very tedious affair. There are multiple limitations over nearly every fix on the arrival; to include minimum and maximum crossing altitudes; as well as varying speeds. This is a very high workload arrival; made more so by the fact that our FMS doesn't show the bracketed altitudes in the FMS; you have to scroll to the smallest scale on the DU; and verify on the DU that the brackets are correct. Additionally; we don't have the capability to program a bracket altitude into our FMS. We have to put in one side or the other. The arrival crossing restrictions were populated correctly; but this is a very high workload; heads down time to go through all the fixes and verify the FMS is accurate. Once we were established and descending via the arrival; we were handed off to Potomac Approach. The last 2 altitude crossing restrictions on the arrival are between 9;000 and 8;000 at FRDMM; then 6;000 at STAND for the Runway 19 transition. Shortly after checking in with Potomac; and while descending to meet the FRDMM restriction; ATC amended our clearance and issued after FRDMM; proceed direct to FERGI. This eliminated STAND from our flight plan; and its associated 6;000 FT crossing restriction. I asked ATC what altitude they wanted us to descend to; and they were completely confused; and commented we were just to continue descending via the arrival. I clarified the question; and they issued a clearance to 5;000 after FRDMM. This is a situation that leads to confusion. Additionally; the night before we were issued the TRUPS1 RNAV arrival into DCA; it is also a new arrival; and has the same transition from FRDMM to Runway 19. The exact same issue happened on that arrival; where they removed STAND; and its associated crossing altitude.

An MD80; cleared via the FRDMM RNAV STAR to DCA experienced excessive workload due to the complexity of the multiple airspeed and altitude restrictions required by the STAR. The workload was exacerbated by the inability of their FMS to both display and comply with the restrictions because it lacked the ability to program crossing altitude 'windows.' In addition; after having cleared them 'via' the arrival; Approach later cleared them direct to a waypoint beyond the waypoint whose altitude restriction constituted the flight's 'cleared' altitude. The Controller seemed unaware of their problem until precious comm time was taken to explain the fact they no longer had a cleared altitude.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 1970; Flight Crew Type 160

This report does not depict a specific; single event; but rather a set of conditions that I think need to be considered sooner or later. I was hired by an Aerial Survey company as a pilot. I have 1000 hours of previous experience flying Aerial Survey; 1800 total time. I had training of three days of flight training; including an IPC and Flight Review; and I was asked the next day (day four of my employment) if I was willing to get underway and start flying 'the line.' I responded that I was indeed ready. I have flown every day now for four weeks; averaging about six to seven hours per day; including weekends and an intervening holiday. The airplane has undergone two rapid fire 50 hour events; and one 100 hour event. The maintenance is not the issue on this plane; thankfully. At the conclusion of a 7.5 hour flight; part of a 14-hour day; I was told to be at work early the next morning; less than seven hours in the future. I live one hour away. Therefore; the 7 hour rest became 5 hours; including time to eat; shower; get ready; etc. I am already fatigued because I have flown for 27 days straight - every single day; as described. Upon waking up; I was still groggy; sleepy; and still very tired. Clearly this was a case of long-term and now short-term fatigue. I mentioned this to the individual I was working with and he pointed out that because we are a Part 91 Operator; that no rest requirements exist. And further; because I am the 'new guy' I would do better to keep to myself. I have enough time and experience now to know that this is excessive; and that I was operating at less than optimal due to lack of sleep and aggregate fatigue. I know that no time limits other than for flight instruction exist in Part 91; but as an Aerial Survey operator; I feel that this is an oversight on the part of the regulations. I understand that we don't need to add layer on layer of laws and rules; and in the spirit of the IM SAFE checklist; I failed said checklist; but when a company calls the shots; and makes the rules; and the written law doesn't provide protection regarding rest; then for continued employment; I should keep going - operating at less than optimal. I don't mind continuing to work hard for a company and 'paying my dues' as I work toward a better; higher paying job in either a part 135 or 121 company; but this particular day was an abuse of the lack of rules; and an abuse of an employment situation. The bosses aren't pilots and don't understand that concept of fatigue; and being tired while flying and how the effects of it are cumulative. And yet; from my FAA training; I do understand this and certainly my body can feel it. The notion of a 7-hour rest that includes two-hours of freeway driving; plus eating; time to shower and dress and get back in the game; even the CFR's cut that one kinda close. Further; there is no protection under the law that says that in every 7 days; a 24 hour 'golden day' needs to be interjected. I've flown for 28 straight days now; living in hotels; and for the most part; working hard to get enough rest and sleep because I want to keep doing this. But at the same time; this directive of the shortened rest period wasn't issued in the spirit of 'we will give him a day off in the next 24 hours to compensate for the reduced rest period.' The law doesn't call for it; and therefore; we don't enjoy the protection under the law. That said; we still operate in Class B airspace; on long days of hands-on flying; going into and out of airports across the country with big planes; and interacting with controllers; and other pilots and in effect; having just as much at stake if something goes wrong as any other operator. So I am writing this report to raise an issue that I am certain will come up again because there is no law that says it can't come up again; and further; the non-pilot bosses who call the shots get to crawl into their own beds at night and return to an office that sits on the ground where they can come and go from the coffee pot and not endanger anyone if they show signs of fatigue from having worked 28 days straight including weekends and holidays. The bosses are great; and do what they know; but unless it's in the law; there is nothing to assure us that we are operating safely. I am not upset at the bosses in an 'us and them' approach; rather; I want to point out that these guys are not pilots and may not understand all of the elements that we do (as I'm sure I don't understand all the elements of what they go through as well.) This is not the point. Gratefully; nothing untoward occurred and I somehow drove home on the Interstate at the end of another 7.5 hour flying day; with 4 hours of book work included; rolling down my window to keep awake and singing along with the radio; with nothing that says I don't have to do it again the next morning. I just hope this issue of rest for 91 operators starts to receive some attention before someone gets hurt seriously; or killed.

C206 pilot laments the lack of flight time or duty time regulations for Part 91 commercial pilots and offers his recent experience as an example.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

A320 entered gate and came to a stop. We started to unload both FWD and AFT cargo compartments. Ramp serviceman noticed the nose gear beginning to rise. We immediately stop all FWD unloading and increased our unloading of the AFT compartment. The nose gear rose a total of 1/2 inch off the ground during this time.

While unloading bags from an A320; ramp crew noticed that the nose of the aircraft started to rise. They stopped unloading from the forward cargo bay until the aft bay was unloaded.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1528; Flight Crew Type 1220

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

About 50 minutes after taking off for a single-pilot night IFR flight; my aircraft lost all electrical power. After some unsuccessful attempts to resolve the problem; I attempted to re-energize the transponder to at least briefly squawk an emergency code and to contact ATC via a handheld NavCom device. The success of either action remained unknown. If I would have continued my flight to its original destination in accordance with FAR 91.185 I would have had to fly my aircraft into the busy airspace of a commercial airport not just without communication but also without transponder; anti-collision lights; and landing lights. My aircraft would have been invisible to any TCAS of any larger aircraft operating in that airspace while ATC would have seen the flight as a passive target with unknown altitude.Furthermore I had only handheld devices with limited battery life left available for navigation; so I decided to treat the situation not just as a loss of communication but as an emergency.I made another attempt to contact ATC using the handheld NavCom; declaring an emergency and stating my situation and intentions. I received no readable response from ATC or otherwise. Upon reaching VFR conditions; I landed without further issues at a nearby non-towered airport thus deviating from my clearance.

A PA28 pilot on a night IFR flight suffered the loss of all electrical and; thus; communications and navigation capability. Rather than proceeding to his destination using lost comm procedures he opted to take emergency measures and diverted to a VFR airport for a safe landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 108; Flight Crew Type 108

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was departing Runway 12R; and while I was aware the runway is a right pattern; I was fairly certain that Tower told me to continue on course. After I took off; at about 800 ft.; I began my turn to the northwest to my destination. There was another plane departing Runway 12L [that] passed very close underneath me on the left side of my plane. At about the same time I saw the other plane; the Tower Controller asked if I could see the traffic. I told him I could; and that it should be no factor. There was no contact; and I continued to my destination without further incident.

C172 pilot reported that an ATC error resulted in a NMAC.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

I was standing behind the adjacent sector (R68) in my capacity as supervisor. I observed conflict alert initiate on R67.  I investigated and observed a 5 mile hoop around one of the aircraft and observed that less than standard separation was being provided.  It appeared vectors had been issued because both aircraft appeared to be in slight turns.  Aircraft X was descending southbound from FL400 to FL340 to comply with the SOP for traffic landing at his airport.  Aircraft Y was in level flight at FL370.  Aircraft X descended through the altitude of Aircraft Y.  I was not advised of any TCAS RA.The sector was busy with high volume.  The sector was restricted with a lot of Warning airspace released to the military. Additionally; weather in some other sectors had caused traffic to be rerouted into this sector.  It was not unusually busy.  I believe this was the CPC's (Certified Professional Controller) first session of the day. A Radar Associate (D-Side) was assigned. He said he was unaware that a suspected loss had happened.  One reason being; the radar controllers map and target settings were to dim for him to see the scope clearly.A lowering of the Sector MAP [Monitor Alert Parameter] numbers when warning airspace is released.  When a sector is basically cut in half with most of the airspace released to the military; the MAP numbers should reflect that.  This would trigger TMU to initiate procedures that would reduce the traffic volume in an airspace restricted sector.

I was the D-side at Hunter and it was somewhat busy.  Aircraft X came over at a very high altitude around FL430 or something.  We eventually have to get that aircraft to FL340. The radar controller waited a little too long to descend him in my opinion and then Aircraft Y showed up at FL370 going northbound opposite direction of Aircraft X. The radar controller descended Aircraft X to FL340 from FL400.  About 20 seconds later the conflict alert went off.  The R-side turned Aircraft Y 15 degrees right; northbound.  Then a little later turned Aircraft X 15 degrees right; southbound.  I thought that this would be enough divergence to maintain standard separation; but apparently not because they were like 4.2 miles or so.  The R-side uses a very small data block (it could be the smallest setting).  I could not clearly read the data blocks even moving very close to the scope.  Also; it was even more difficult to see the actual target of the aircraft.  The supervisor told me that there was a deal; is how I found out. Somebody could get the R-side to make his data blocks bigger so the D-side can read them more clearly; but maybe the R-side is not comfortable with that for his vision.  The R-side should have stopped Aircraft X at FL380 and then on the other side descend him to FL340 and just point out the aircraft to the next high sector descending.

Front Line Manager reports of a loss of separation due to an aircraft descending through another aircraft's altitude. The D-Side was unaware of the loss of separation; due to the R-Side's dimly lit map and targets. The reporter also suggests the Monitor Alert Parameters MAP be lowered when military airspace is given away.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

JFK [and] LGA were both landing ILS 13; and coordinating to change approaches to both land ILS 22. Because of the close proximity of these airports; these are not easy runway changes; and require a lot of coordination between the two sectors. I heard the LGA Supervisor; give the Belmont airspace to JFK. This allowed JFK to start landing ILS 22. Unfortunately; LGA still had 5 aircraft being vectored for ILS 13 approach. JFK cannot land ILS 22 in the Belmont airspace when LGA is landing ILS 13. The ILS 13 go-around procedure is runway heading climb to 2;000 feet; which goes right into the Belmont airspace. I advised my Supervisor of his mistake and told him to keep the airspace until the last LGA 13 arrival had landed. He responded 'don't worry about it'. I was then instructed to relieve the Final Controller; and I personally had to clear the last of the LGA arrivals to Runway 13 with absolutely no protection for a go-around. LGA was in IFR conditions; and windshear had been an issue all day; the likelihood of a go-around was very high. A supervisor having such disregard for aircraft safety is absolutely frightening. I recommend everyone be briefed on all conditional airspace in our facility; and be reminded why airspace delegation is so critical. We are lucky none of the LGA arrivals went around; I'm afraid of what may happen next time someone is so negligent.

N90 Controller describes airport configuration change that he feels is unsafe.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 11000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 4000

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

From the Arrival; we requested and were cleared the visual 19R with a right base a beam [a Tower]. The First Officer (FO) turned to a dogleg a little earlier than usual which brought us closer to the [Tower] than normal. We received an 'OBSTACLE; PULL UP' alert; which he immediately complied with by rolling wings level; pulling the nose up and adding power. The alert stopped quickly after that and we saw that we were still in a position to safely resume the approach. We landed with no further incident.On the right base to visual 19R; we should square the turn to final to maintain separation from the Tower. As the Pilot Monitoring; I should have noticed the situation developing and directed a correction. I don't see a need to change the procedure; we could have prevented the situation by complying fully with the existing procedure.

We were cleared for the 19R visual and briefed this event. I had not done this visual in a while; and did not maintain 3;500 FT long enough and did not fly a long enough final. When abeam the [Tower] I realized I was closer and lower than 'normal' and received; what I initially thought was a bank angle indication. I started to roll out as the Captain mentioned to follow the Guidance (GPWS). I started to push up the power and follow the commands. I was now in level flight and the GPWS guidance stopped. I was able to intercept the final and land uneventfully.I drew a 3.0 arc; but I did not stay outside of it nor did I stay at 3;500 FT long enough. I needed to be higher and wider around the [Tower]. We should have went around and landed on 26L.

B737-700 flight crew reported that they got an 'OBSTACLE; PULL UP' alert when they turned base early.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Type 3500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

The Captain taxied on [taxiway] at the direction of Ground Control. We were on centerline and the right main hit an unseen snow drift causing the aircraft to slide right and stop. The engine shut down on its own; shut down by snow ingestion.

B737 First Officer reports hitting an unseen snow drift during taxi out causing the aircraft to slide right and the right engine to shut down due to snow ingestion.


Approach; Departure; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground; Local

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Weather

I was working alone in the tower cab; all combined tower and approach positions; at the beginning of a midshift. Weather had been moving through the area with gusty winds and precipitation in the area. I had one other aircraft on approach on another frequency. First in sequence Aircraft X checked on descending via the SADYL and immediately reported moderate turbulence. The radar depicted that weather may be better with a slight vector to the west; and such a vector would also provide the appropriate sequence to make Aircraft X follow the first aircraft.I issued a clearance to the fix JIMMI as a vector for sequence; with a descent to 9000 feet. The instruction was read back correctly and I observed Aircraft X turn left toward the fix and continued descending. I obtained some additional information from Aircraft X concerning the turbulence. At that point I went to the computer in the back of the room and logged on to the AISR website to enter a PIREP for the moderate turbulence. After successfully logging on; no more than 30 seconds; I walked back to the radar scope and observed Aircraft X descending through 8000 feet. I instructed them to climb to 9000 feet. The pilot replied they were descending to 6000 feet. I again instructed them to climb to 9000 feet and informed them that they were in a 9000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude Area (MVA). They began climbing and reached around 8400 feet before they crossed into a 7000 foot MVA. The 6000 altitude is the final altitude on the arrival; and I suspect they missed entering the new altitude into the FMS. A minute later they apologized for missing the altitude and said that it was due to workload in the cockpit as a result of the moderate turbulence. They landed without incident and I issued a BRASHER warning after they landed and informed them that I would need to file the associated paperwork. The responsibility to enter the PIREP into AISR instead of transmitting it verbally to FSS resulted in my being away from the radar scope as the aircraft descended through their assigned altitude. I also did not use the 'Low Altitude Alert' phraseology; but instead immediately issued the correct assigned altitude; as it felt quicker to avoid continued descent and it was the natural muscle-memory altitude instruction. In hindsight; the 'Low Altitude Alert' phraseology may have resulted in the pilots not questioning the new altitude and beginning a climb sooner.Return the responsibility of computer based PIREP entry to FSS to allow controllers and to focus on the operation.

A Controller working alone on a mid shift reported leaving their radar position to enter a PIREP in to a computer and did not notice an aircraft descending below its assigned altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

[I] was following a B767 to land at ZZZ on Runway XXL. I was PF. ATC notified us of wake turbulence and issued vectors and speed reduction. B767 was clear of the runway and taxiing back when we were on approach. At 200 AGL [we] began to feel the wake turbulence of the 767. At 100 AGL the aircraft began to roll to the right [and] I applied full left aileron to counteract the roll and the aircraft continued to roll right. I executed a go around [and] continued around to another approach to XXL.We had appropriate wake turbulence clearance; but an aloft tailwind condition lead to the drift and continuation of wake turbulence; [it] was a good decision to go around and try another approach. No other deviations were observed.

ATR-72 Captain reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence at 200 AGL on approach in trail of a B767.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

During our climbout of New York airspace; we were given altitudes and vectors instead of a departure procedure. Eventually we were given direct to a fix. The Controller told us 'direct to COATE.' I (PNF) responded 'direct to COPES;' line-selected it on the CDU; confirmed with the PF; and executed the command. Proceeding to COPES would result in a left turn of about 45 degrees. Direct to COPES may have resulted in no turn at all due to the vectors. A couple minutes later a different Controller took over and said we were supposed to be flying to COATE; and to turn now to 315 degrees. We took the vector and assured him we were direct to COPES (still not noticing the difference in the fix names he was pronouncing). In the meantime the PF and I were discussing what the confusion could have been; and realized it was a confusion between COATE and COPES; so when the Controller again gave us direct to COATE a minute later; I responded 'direct to COATE Charlie-Oscar-Papa-Echo-Sierra.' The Controller didn't seem to think it was that bad of an error; but we thought it prudent to file this report. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We needed to listen more carefully.

First Officer reported a track deviation during departure from JFK airport.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After being vectored off the SILCN 4 arrival into San Jose; we were given direct to the fix GGUGL and instructed to descend via the SILCN 4 for Runway 12R. The next Controller cleared us to descend to 5;100 feet and shortly after reaching that altitude; we responded to a EGPWS warning 'Terrain Terrain Pull Up' The first officer told ATC that we were responding to a terrain warning and after we'd climbed about 1;500 feet; we were out of the clouds and could see we were above any possible obstacles. Out of an abundance of caution and because it took awhile to put the aircraft back into a more normal posture; we climbed to 10;000 feet before getting on vectors for the approach. After landing; I talked about the event with the TRACON supervisor.Task saturation was definitely a factor in why this happened. Halfway into our arrival the San Jose Airport switched from landing west to east and the controllers were consequently scrambling. The First Officer and I were unusually busy since we had to keep setting up for different approaches. First we were told to expect the RNAV (GPS) to Runway 30L; then the RNAV (GPS) to Runway 12R; then the ILS to 12R. All these changes took place within about 10 minutes. Perhaps because the controllers were so busy with turning the airport around and the FO and I [were] so busy with setting things up; no one caught the unsafe altitude.If our aircraft had the updated EGPWS system we would have seen the high terrain coming on our nav displays and avoided the entire situation.

Air carrier Captain reported a CFTT event during approach to SJC airport. The crew immediately climbed to avoid the terrain and ATC re-vectored them for landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 8300; Flight Crew Type 7000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On initial call up before taxi requests was made to ground controller for special VFR out of the zone through ZZZ airspace which was VFR at the time and then continue South Bound out of the zone. I was told to make my request when ready for take off; making me believe that the request was being processed. When I was ready to depart; I was told to make a completely different departure transition. I had no time to study the weather or anything else. On departure it became very clear that I could not [fly] this route and had to make immediate course corrections to remain VFR. At this point I asked to return to field and was told to circle in areas that were not possible to circle because of obstructions and low clouds and was informed that it would take 5 minutes before I could return to the field. Luckily the weather improved to the south where I could depart the area. [I wish that ATC would have] advised a pilot if their request is not possible and [suggest] options before the end of the runway ready for take off. On my part it would have been easier and safer to have filed for IFR on top.

The pilot of a C180 made a departure request upon contact with ATC for taxi; but was advised to make the request when ready for takeoff. The pilot did not make the request again; thinking that it was being processed. Instead he was given a departure route that he was unable to fly due to weather.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Upon entering the DLG area the weather was reported as 1600 broken with 15 miles. The wind was 330 at 8 with gusts to 15 and light rain. Center cleared us for the VOR 1 approach and told us to contact the FSS. As we approached the VOR; I announced over the CTAF that we were over the VOR turning out for the VOR 1 via the procedure turn. The first officer was flying. The FSS told us that one aircraft had just departed the airport eastbound and one aircraft had reported west of the VOR inbound for landing. An aircraft called in saying that he would circle around and follow us for landing on runway 1. I announced the procedure turn outbound and inbound. I then called turning final six miles west of the VOR. As we crossed over the VOR at 1000 feet we were in and out of the clouds. I called the VOR final approach fix inbound. At 700 feet we were clear of the clouds. I called a two mile final for runway 1. That is when we heard an aircraft call on downwind planning number 2 for landing. At one mile we saw an aircraft pass us. He said that he was turning base behind the [our aircraft]. My first officer and I commented to each other that he wasn't leaving himself much room. Just as we touched down the FSS asked the aircraft his position. He said that he was on short final. My first officer made an effort to slow down as quickly as possible and still make a smooth roll out. I took the controls at 80 knots and was able to make the stop at approximately 1000 feet beyond taxiway Bravo. As I made the turn; my first officer announced that we were making the 180 to back taxi and exit at Bravo. After I completed the turn; we both saw the aircraft starting his flair for landing. My first officer again said that we were still back taxiing and had not cleared the runway. We were still approximately 100 feet from taxiway Bravo when he touched down. I increased my taxi speed in order to exit the runway as quickly as possible. After we exited the runway I asked the pilot for his name and tail number. His only comment was the he would talk to me later. He then taxied over to the far southwest corner of the ramp while I went to our parking spot. After we deplaned and went into ops; I called the FSS. I asked them if they knew the name of the pilot and his tail number. They told me that they did not know his name but did provide the tail number of the Cessna. I looked around the terminal hoping to spot someone looking for a uniformed pilot but did not see anyone. When we went out to our aircraft for our return flight I noticed that the offending airplane was no longer around. We returned to base without further incident.

The crew of a commuter aircraft landing and back taxiing on Runway 1 to the closest runway exit at DLG were faced by a Cessna 150 in the landing flare to the same runway on which he was still taxiing. A request for an explanation was met only with a flippant response.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 130

The ILS Approach system was being used for approaches to the runway 10L at FLL; so I held short of Runway 10L at the ILS HOLD line.  Ground asked me to contact tower and I called ready for takeoff at Runway 10L.  There was an aircraft landing at the time; and tower said to me to Taxi up to the runway and hold short.  He did NOT say taxi up [to] the hold short line; so I moved up past the HOLD SHORT line; but a good 75 feet from the runway edge and Held there.  [At my home] airport we get told all the time to taxi up to the runway and hold short; and they mean exactly that.  You can check the tapes; but he clearly said taxi up to the runway and hold short.

Single engine pilot reported that a miscommunication with ATC led to a runway incursion.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

A student and I were conducting flight training and after approximately an hour and a half of flying; we headed back towards ZZZ. We contacted [Approach] and established radar contact with the assigned squawk code. We had our instructions to enter via VFR approach reporting points from the south east of the field and proceed to runway XXL. Before being passed on to ZZZ Tower; we had a complete loss of all communication equipment and the vast majority of our electrical equipment. At that point; we squawked 7600 and began to flash our landing light and rock our wings. Tower recognized the situation that we were in and proceeded to issue light signals to us with a steady green light telling us that we were cleared to land. After taxiing off the runway; a flashing green light signaled us that we were able to continue taxiing. Prior to continuing the taxi; I called Tower on my phone and we were given instructions on how to proceed with our taxi back to the ramp. The folks in the tower were extremely helpful and polite which lead to the uneventful landing.

C172  flight instructor reported an electrical failure resulted in NORDO condition.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 234; Flight Crew Type 234

After listening to the Tower frequency for approximately 20 SM with no observed traffic; I contacted MHK approximately 12 miles out on a heading of 207 degrees toward midfield. As I approached the field in a decent; I was instructed to report midfield on a right downwind for 03. From my position I turned to approximately 130 degrees to position for a right downwind for Runway 03. I was north of MHK and would cross the runway approximately 5 miles off the east end of 21-03. While scanning toward the field; checking for any traffic and scanning ahead of me I observed a Cessna coming head-on. I diverted to the left and after I started my diversion the approaching plane diverted to his left. The planes passed approximately 100 FT apart. After being contacted by KC Center operations; I was informed that the Cessna was talking to Center and I was talking to MHK Tower. There was no communication on the Tower frequency from the Cessna. I was not aware of his presence in the area. I believe that if the Cessna was in communications with the local airport that I would have known that he was there and the tower would have advised me of the traffic. I think that if I had been using Center for flight following; they would have made me aware of the traffic. If the Cessna was with the Center; he should have been notified that I was in the vicinity.

PA28 pilot arriving MHK reports a NMAC with a Cessna departing the area. The Tower made no notification to either pilot.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1305; Flight Crew Type 177

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The purpose of this report is to give awareness of the possibility of strong wake vortex and turbulence encounter over large distances at high altitude. This is especially applicable to light and very light jets. In VFR conditions; wake turbulence was encountered from a heavy B777 at a distance of about 25 miles at an altitude of about 30;000 ft. in a BE400XP of about 14;000 lbs. at the time of the encounter. The BE400XP was within 1;000 ft. of the altitude of the heavy B777 25 miles ahead and we were climbing to a higher cruise altitude above the B777. The encounter resulted in temporary turbulence between moderate and severe and the aircraft tried to roll beyond 45-50 degrees twice with uncommanded input from an initial attitude of a wings level climb of about 1;000 fpm. No autopilot was yet engaged. The aircraft was being flown by hand (the autopilot about to be engage as we just entered RVSM airspace) and the upset recovery was immediate but required very large roll corrections to keep the aircraft upright. At the time of the encounter; the heavy B777 was ahead and to the left at about 25 miles and winds were a quartering tailwind of about 78 kts. Given the distance of separation and the amount of wind movement at that altitude; the wake vortex encounter was not expected and a complete surprise. There was no visible contrail from the B777. We thought the vortex would have dissipated well ahead of our point of encounter. Instead; it appears the vortex was strong enough to still be very significant at that distance and was blown across our route with the prevailing winds. The entire event lasted about 5-10 seconds. ATC was then notified and concurred it was most likely the wake of the heavy aircraft 25 miles ahead. Initially; both aircraft had been on a similar flight route. They also initially had closer separation and both paths had crossed at an earlier point in flight with the BE400XP below the heavy B777 flight path with no issue. At the stage of closer separation and route intersection ATC had given us an advisory of the aircraft. I am the FO (First Officer) and I was the pilot flying from the left seat. The CA (Captain) was the pilot monitoring and both of us discussed the possibility of wake vortex encounter with closer separation. We both visually identified the aircraft when in sight distance; and we were careful to avoid known problem areas relative to the B777 where wake vortex would be an issue. As the flight progressed; we moved to a relative position in trail of the heavy B777 with the distance between us and them continually increasing. Eventually we were well beyond any close separation where a wake vortex encounter is normally thought to occur. However; at about 25 miles of separation and within 1;000 ft. of the altitude of the heavy B777; we encountered strong wake vortex as we climbed to a higher altitude. No significant naturally occurring turbulence had been forecast (a large high pressure system was over this area) and none was encountered prior to or after the wake turbulence event. In addition; no other traffic was within 50 miles; this and the B777 distance were re-verified after the vortex encounter.In retrospect; I am not sure there is anything different either the flight crew or ATC could have done to avoid the wake vortex encounter. However; if I had a choice in policy design; I would recommend that all flight crews hand fly the aircraft to cruise altitude even in RVSM airspace. I realize an autopilot is an FAA requirement for operating in RVSM. In addition; many flight departments and large carriers require the autopilot to be engaged more or less right after takeoff. This policy can unintentionally degrade stick and rudder skills as a pilot needs to have a feel and understanding of actual aircraft performance. This is critical at high altitude as aircraft control is more sensitive. An autopilot is not a substitute for actual stick and rudder skills even at high altitude. (Autopilots canfail.) Upset recovery has happened in the real world at high altitude. This is an example of a well-trained; competent; and alert flight crew encountering an unusual attitude event in circumstances one would not expect the event to occur. I also question whether an autopilot would have impeded the recovery time as the 'startle effect' could be more pronounced. In addition; I think that being in RVSM airspace can give a false sense of safety as heavy aircraft are routinely on route in very close proximity to light aircraft. I see this as not only an awareness issue for flight crews but system stakeholders in general (ATC; FAA policy teams; flight departments; etc).

Reporter stated the risk of upset is great with a small jet in trail of a heavy.

BE-400 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence climbing through FL300 25 miles in trail of a B777 that resulted in a loss of aircraft control.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Distraction; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

On our training flight we went out north to a practice area X. We were at about 5;000 feet MSL heading North when a CO level warning came on. My student quickly canceled the message but I was able to catch a quick glimpse of the message. At this point I decided to turn back to ZZZ and conclude the lesson. I had opened the storm window and shut off the heat/defrost.  I took flight controls and started a descent down to 2;500. The descent was steep but nothing out of the usual (taking into consideration the rate of descent during a simulated emergency descent). However; on this descent my student bent over and grabbed his eye and started complaining of severe pain behind his eye. I contacted approach an informed them about the high CO level warning and that my student was in considerable pain. I requested priority for landing and a straight in approach for the RNAV XXR. We leveled off at 2;800 and proceeded towards the Initial Approach fix. During this time period I was in constant communication with my student. He remained responsive but continued to experience sever pain. I told him I would keep talking for the remainder of the approach discussing items related to the approach. I told him to listen to me to make sure I was making sense when I was talking just in case I started succumbing to the 'CO' without knowing I was. During the flight inbound we both noticed a chemical smell in the cockpit. We landed the aircraft and were escorted by the firetruck and ambulance. I asked to taxi on XYL to taxiway X onto ramp. Once we were there I shutdown and had my student go into the ambulance to get checked over. They said he should go to the doctor the following day.I believe there was a leak from the exhaust into the cabin. I did have the heat/defrost on which utilizes the heat from the exhaust. I assume there might have been a crack in the exhaust system that resulted in CO coming into the cabin.Our aircraft are usually kept to a very high maintenance standard so I would not recommend anything  on their part. However; I would  recommend a possible redesign of the heating system/exhaust systems from the manufacturers that would make it harder for CO to get into the cabin.

Flight Instructor reported a CO level warning came on during cruise and the instructor initiated an immediate return to departure airport. Instructor stated the student had physiological reactions requiring medical attention.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

We were waiting short of the runway for our release from ATC at an uncontrolled airport for approximately 20 minutes; at the runway with a 4-8kt headwind which was required for our performance due to high DA and winds. All aircraft were using the favorable wind runway except the firefighting aircraft which appeared to be due to their base location. We would make a radio call every 5 minutes or so and continuously monitored the traffic advisory frequency. After we received our release from ATC we made 1 more radio call that we were holding short of the runway while we completed our before takeoff check. We heard an aircraft call in from 20 miles away inbound for landing; and heard him make 1-2 more subsequent radio calls. He was the only traffic radio call we heard in the vicinity at that time or for the previous 5-10 minutes. There were firefighting exercises with multiple single engine firefighting airplanes in and out of the airport and we had thoroughly briefed the threat to include making more radio calls; continuously monitor CTAF if we had to communicate with ATC; and to take an extra search for aircraft opposite us before we departed. After we made a radio call that we were taking the runway for departure; I asked the FO (First Officer) to look again at the opposite end of the runway where the firefighting airplanes seemed to be parking and departing. Myself and the FO spent at least 10 sec searching to make sure no airplane was at the other end of the runway. As I began to taxi; I had the FO make one more radio call just to be sure. As he made the radio call; I looked one more time at the opposite end of the runway and saw landing lights turn on. I stopped immediately and had crossed the hold short line by maybe 10-15 ft. As the airplane passed we made another radio call with no response from them. I checked to make sure we were on the correct frequency and radio; which we were. The airplane passed maybe 400-500 in the air and we were again about 10-15 ft beyond the hold short line. After again looking at the departure end of the runway; we then departed and when airborne we were able to contact the aircraft. Although we never heard a single radio transmission from them; they claimed they made radio calls and also claimed they never heard our radio calls. We had monitored CTAF the entire time; using both radios at times when communication with ATC required Comm 1 but only during those short periods of time and we transmitted on comm1 as well as comm2 multiple times while we were holding short of the runway and had no issues communicating with or hearing other traffic on either radio. The traffic also informed us that he saw us crossing the hold short line during his takeoff; but continued the departure anyway.The cause of the event was two main factors; either the other aircrafts lack of radio usage; or failure either partially or fully on either theirs or ours parts; although our radio exhibited zero signs of malfunction. The other contributing factor is the layout of the airport seemed to almost have a slight crown in the middle; possibly causing interference with radios and definitely contributed to not seeing the aircraft when we spent a very adequate amount of time looking at the opposite end of the runway for traffic.I have thought about what else we could have mitigated this threat; and I feel the FO and myself did everything we could have leading up to; and took prompt and effective actions to avoid any further incident. We used both radios; made more than normal radio communications; took extra time to look for traffic prior to departure; departed the runway with a significant headwind; and briefed the threat of the firefighting aircraft using the opposite runway. The only thing I can think of is in the future I will establish communication with any firefighting airplane in the pattern or area and ask if they have any aircraft close to departing as to minimize any radio issues with two aircraft on opposite ends of a runway.

CRJ Captain reported as they entered the runway to depart a non-towered airport they observed an aircraft taking off from the opposite direction.