Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1020; Flight Crew Type 600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Contacted Norfolk Approach to request GPS Rwy 2 approach to PHF on instrument currency/practice flight with CFII. Approach provided a transponder code and we began [the] approach but Approach was busy and never confirmed radar contact. I; the pilot in command; asked if I should continue but CFII seemed unconcerned so PIC continued approach. Finally upon another request to approach; ORF Approach requested we ident as approach had previously done but could not see us on radar. Did not see transponder interrogation and assumed transponder inoperative Tower requested we do 360's to avoid incoming traffic when we saw and reported other traffic on approach to Runway 7 and warned us. Upon landing at home field the avionics shop determined transponder inoperative and repaired. Lesson learned! Approach Control did not handle us appropriately due to busyness of other traffic; requesting we contact Tower without indicating an inoperative transponder to us; resulting in a potential near mid-air with a Aircraft Y on approach to RWY 7. PHF Tower gave us warning to not enter airspace without approval that I believed was already granted.

GA pilot reported an inoperative transponder and busy ATC situation resulted in a near midair collision while on approach.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Ramp loaded hazmat without any bags; when I saw the message; I called right of way and notifying my lead/supervisor; Operations and then the dispatcher. Shortly after the lead called because he couldn't final the system; so I explained why and he said he had taken the hazmat box out of the shipment which was seating on a wooden pallet in pit 4 and put the hazmat box in pit 3 with the bags. I advised he could not split the shipment that he has to keep it together with the 15 bags around then he hung up.

Ground Personnel reported a communication breakdown with other ramp personnel regarding Hazmat loading configuration errors.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 715; Flight Crew Type 16

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was flying to IMM on a pleasure flight and to purchase fuel at Immokalee Regional Airport as it is the cheapest fuel near my home airport. As there was a TFR in effect close to my home airport; I made sure to check and make sure that my route of flight would keep me out of the TFR. After leaving; about 3/4 of the way through my flight; I noticed a light twin engine aircraft at my altitude coming at me very rapidly from my 8 o'clock position. Fearing that the aircraft was going to impact me; I was preparing to take evasive action when it suddenly veered sharp left and pulled up alongside of me for what seemed to be about 3-4 seconds. It then executed a sharp descending left bank and disappeared. A few minutes later I landed without incident at IMM a little shaken and wondering what the heck just happened. I knew that I could not have been anywhere near the TFR and that had this had been a military or government aircraft; it would have tried to establish communication with me by rocking its wings; but it did nothing of the kind. I went to a computer to confirm that I was nowhere near the TFR and noticed that I may have clipped the northeast corner a firefighting TFR. Being so preoccupied with not violating the big TFR; I overlooked the possibility that there could be another TFR in the same general area and being familiar with that area; knew that there were no other permanent flight restrictions. Especially since this is a remote area in the middle of the Everglades.

GA pilot reported a firefighting TFR incursion while trying to avoid another TFR in the area. When the pilot was in the TFR another aircraft formed up on him without communication; then departed after a few seconds.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

CRJ-900 Flight Attendant reported an odor onboard the aircraft.


Grumman Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 2805; Flight Crew Type 1400

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 210; Flight Crew Type 50

While on final to [Runway] XXL to full stop landing; both the my student and I became aware of an aircraft in close in and behind us when tower cleared Aircraft Y to land [Runway] XXL and the plane called [Runway] XXL short approach.  At that time; we were probably 1/8 of a mile from the threshold and 150 AGL.  I announced that we were short approach [Runway] XXL.  At that time; Tower told the Aircraft Y to go around side step left.  I witnessed two aircraft shadows of approximately the same size and merging. I called 'MY PLANE' taking the controls and nosing down lower as Aircraft Y went over the top of us; missing by 50-75 estimated.  I queried the Tower whether I was still cleared to land [Runway] XXL.  Tower replied confirmed we were; so I continued the landing on [Runway] XXL and taxied in to the ramp.After securing the aircraft; we saw the CFI and student pilot of Aircraft Y; asking them if they were the Aircraft Y who had told to go around on [Runway] XXL to which they confirmed.  I asked them if they had seen us on short final to which the student pilot said 'No' they had not.A subsequent call to the Tower indicated that it had been a very close near miss.

I was in ZZZ's traffic pattern with my Instructor in the downwind leg of a traffic pattern; ZZZ Tower gave us traffic to follow who turned base and side stepped to the parallel runway; I didn't see any traffic on base or final and confirmed verbally by saying 'base and final are clear' before turning left base for Runway XXL and then about a mile final for Runway XXL. I asked my Instructor if we were cleared to land and right as I finished speaking; another aircraft on final asked Tower about the traffic in front of them. Tower confirmed our positions and told me to go around and side-step left.  After executing a go around; we were extra; extra cautious and made our last landing a full stop.  After speaking with the other pilot of Aircraft X; who we never were able to see; it appears as my low wing aircraft and his high wing aircraft were in each-others blind spots; him being below me in the Aircraft Y. After he had me in sight he reported about a 200 ft. distance between us.

Pilots reported loss of situational awareness caused a Near Mid Air Collision.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 233; Flight Crew Total 15276; Flight Crew Type 4700

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure

We had a carry forward item on this MRD. It required an inspection every 7 days. The last line of the carry forward entry indicated that the item had to be repaired by XA/31/XX (which is a separate issue). We flew on XB/14/XX. According to the MRD; the plane is grounded for failure to repair the item according to the FAR.Upon inquiry to [Maintenance Control]; we discovered that the completion date had been changed to XC/31/XX (again; a nonexistent date). The writeup on the MRD however showed no such thing. It turns out that only seven separate items can be entered under a carry forward item number. This item therefore had an unknown number of entries which were not available to the cockpit. While [Maintenance Control] can see the entire paper trail; the crew cannot. This is unacceptable. At the very least; the latest entries regarding a maintenance item must be available to the crew. Preferably; ALL entries should be available to the crew.This is a failure of the MRD format.

B777 Captain reported various Maintenance documentation errors and procedural/policy deficiencies.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After through preflight and run up per Mooney checklist we departed Runway 07 at HEG. Shortly after raising the gear we had an sudden; immediate; full loss of engine power. I announced to my co pilot 'I've lost power; I've lost power'. Because we were so low I told my co pilot I would land straight ahead and asked him to switch the fuel selector to the other tank hoping our windmilling prop would restore engine power. I quickly scanned the area ahead aimed for the clearing slightly left of the 07 departure while pitching for best glide. I then selected gear down and attempted land off airport in the grass and sand. Upon touchdown the nosegear and left main gear collapsed and the windmilling prop struck the ground. I asked my copilot if he was ok and we evacuated the airplane.

Mooney pilot reported engine failure on departure and having to land off airport; causing damage to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 242; Flight Crew Total 5242; Flight Crew Type 5242

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was Captain of Flight XXX; ZZZ-ZZZ1. Normal takeoff and climb to FL340. At XA40Z the #2 engine driven hydraulic pump low pressure light illuminated. Hydraulic pressure system B slowly dropped to a very low indication with the system B pressure showing 2;980 PSI. The QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) was ran. Dispatch was contacted via frequency and a patch with Maintenance Control was initiated. B system quantity was showing 106 with pressure holding around 3;000 PSI. It was decided that the indicator failed and we (Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and Flight Crew) decided that it was fine to continue to ZZZ1. The FO (First Officer) and I decided to closely monitor the hydraulic systems as we continued. Approximately 6 to 8 minutes later; we saw the B system pressure drop to 100 psi with a zero quantity indicated. We ran the Hydraulic System B failure checklist in the QRH; contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. We decided to return to ZZZ. We requested priority handling and returned to ZZZ with an uneventful landing on RWY XXL per the QRH.

B737 flight crew reported hydraulic failure in cruise resulting in a return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 13000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was pilot flying and well prior to TOD; my FO and I briefed the SEAVU arrival with runway 25L. We also briefed the usual LAST SECOND runway change to 24R. We completed the Approach Descent Checklist well prior to TOD. We were cleared to cross KONZL at 17;000 at 280 knots. We started down early and were planning to arrive at 17;000 @ 2 miles early. We were prepared. LA Center handed us off to SOCAL and passing 18;000 CHANGED our runway to 24R AND gave us a speed reduction to 250. I had to click off the autopilot; use full speed brakes and really push it to make the restriction. We crossed KONZL 300 feet high. ATC said nothing to us and we landed uneventfully.We understand that our work environment is fluid; and that there are other flights involved; but enough of this. While we pilots appreciate our new arrivals and departures; it would be nice for ATC to leave us ALONE to do our job; it is frustrating when ATC assigns us one arrival and runway; and a crossing altitude; THEN changes the arrival; runway; and gives us a speed reduction; JUST prior to the crossing altitude! Does this make any sense? Yes; I take responsibility for this; and yes; I could have told ATC unable; but as pilots we try to get the job done. Is there ANY possible way that you could have a serious CHAT with LA Center; SOCAL; AND DEN Center/Approach? LA is bad; but DEN is far WORSE! PLEASE? Do this for us? I would like to know what their responses are to your questions.

B757 Captain was issued a speed restriction and runway change just prior to KONZL on the SEAVU2 arrival to LAX and is unable to comply; crossing KONZL 300 feet high.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While preparing for takeoff; the Gust Lock would not completely disengage in the Thrust Lever Quadrant; jammed mechanical linkage. Told ATC we would need a minute or so in position and was told to taxi clear of the runway. Maintenance problem; probably unavoidable. Rejected Takeoff (RTO). Flight was delayed.

Reporter stated the Gust Lock control handle only disconnected about half way forward; would not fully disconnect; jamming Thrust lever movements. The Gust Lock did release elevators; but would not disengage in the Thrust column.

A Captain reports the Gust Lock on an EMB-145 aircraft would not completely disengage at the Thrust Lever Quadrant while preparing for takeoff. Crew cleared the runway due to jammed mechanical linkage.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 6000

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During radar vectors (southwest of field) to ILS 34 approach cleared to 1;600 feet MSL. As we flew over an island (VMC; level flight) the GPWS gave a brief 'Terrain' annunciation. Pilot Flying (PF) cleared area visually and elected to remain in level flight. Approach continued with no further issues. ATC gave too low of an altitude assignment for the minimum safe altitude. Flight crew failed to catch this and accepted the clearance. PF and all Pilot Monitoring (PM) need to more closely monitor MSA ARP and challenge such a clearance.

B747-400 Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on approach to RKSI after an inappropriate clearance from ATC.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1950; Flight Crew Type 400

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were flying to F45.  We had filed (and had been cleared) IFR for 8;000 and a route of SABOT PHK F45.  We had departed to the east; eventually being cleared direct PHK.  We had been cruising direct to PHK with the Departure Controller.  He turned us over to a ZMA Controller on 132.25.  As soon as we checked on; we noticed it start to get busy.  We even remarked (internally) about how busy it was and the lack of English comprehension some of the trainees seem to have in and around the TRV/VRB area.  There were numerous airplanes requesting practice approaches; along with multiple missed calls; etc.  While still roughly 60-70 miles north of PHK; we were instructed to descend to 4;000.  We found it odd; as that normally doesn't happen until further along the route (closer to PHK).  Normally; we like to stay high to avoid the 'bee hive' of traffic below.  In any case; roughly 47-48 miles NE of PHK [estimated] we got an onboard traffic advisory from the installed ADS-B (Garmin's GDL-88).  When it first appeared; the traffic was 600 FT below our present altitude and climbing; as we were descending.  It was approaching from our 11 o'clock position.  I watched the trend and we (the two pilots on our plane) decided to shallow our descent.  Had we not done this; we feel as if a collision was likely.  When we flew over the other aircraft; we estimate we were 300-400 FT vertically and 100 feet horizontally.  Once the conflict cleared; we continued the descent to 4;000.  We tried once to contact the ZMA Controller after this and were unsuccessful.  The frequency utilization was nearly 100% for the 3-4 minutes prior and 5 minutes after the incident.  There were numerous VFR aircraft being denied services during our time on frequency and several IFR-pickups not being replied to.  Ultimately; we feel as if the other aircraft involved was VFR and unaware we were there.  The Controller didn't provide a traffic advisory to us and we feel that was because he was dealing with too much other traffic.  That sector is consistently busy with practice approaches; conducted by pilots with limited English skills.  The Sector is also very large from what we can tell by routinely flying through it.  A good fix to avoid this in the future would be to split the approaches at VRB and FPR into another sector.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A light twin approaching PHK IFR had a near miss with a VFR aircraft while ZMA was extremely busy with English as a second language pilots on training missions.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

I was working arrivals and departures off runway XX. Aircraft X was inbound and I was maneuvering them east of the airport for a sequence with my arrivals and departures. The departure sequence was adjusted with my departure and those off other runways which changed my plan for when Aircraft X would come in. As I quickly adjusted my plan I briefly ended up with Aircraft X in an area below the Minimum Safe Altitude and corrected that. As the departure plan changed I was in a hurry to bring Aircraft X right in and accidentally clipped a higher MSA within the bravo airspace. I was too focused on the departure plan and didn't immediately recognize Aircraft X would pass into a higher Minimum Safe Altitude. I will be more cognizant of that next time when I'm giving instructions to VFR aircraft. I will also put their altitude assignment in their scratchpad as an extra indicator of what I assigned them.

A Tower Controller reported they had issued instructions to a VFR aircraft in the pattern which resulted in flight below the minimum safe altitude.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was on my frequency departing to the north squawking 1200. I restricted Aircraft X to maintain at/or below 2;000 feet for inbound traffic from the northeast; a VFR [aircraft] worked by Approach at 2;500 feet. I noticed there could be potential additional traffic from the northeast traveling southwest bound to intercept the final; Aircraft Y at 2;500 feet still talking with Approach. I issued traffic to Aircraft X regarding Aircraft Y; then I noticed Aircraft Y descending from 2;500 feet to 2;300 feet then to 2;200 feet. I told Aircraft X about the traffic and immediately suggested a right turn to avoid the traffic. Then I saw Aircraft Y changing heading from southwest to southeast right into Aircraft X. I tried to reach for Aircraft Y; but he wasn't on my frequency. At that point the 2 aircraft were about 1 1/2 miles apart and I issued a traffic alert to Aircraft X and Aircraft X reported Aircraft Y in sight. I saw the targets merging on radar at the same altitude of 2;000 feet.The recommendation would be to restrict descend on an arriving aircraft until passing any VFR aircraft below that could become a conflict.

A Local Controller reported an inbound aircraft still on Approach Control frequency descended through the altitude of a VFR departure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 1313; Flight Crew Type 1179

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

SFO flight was final leg of two day trip. We agreed upon letting [First Officer] fly the next two legs with VFR conditions and light winds; etc. Neither of us thought of the restriction in SFO requiring 100 hours for a new First Officer. The SFO approach should have been flown by myself. The First Officer was very experienced flying into SFO being based there as a [Company] Captain for many years before [us]. With the operational challenges and comfort with SFO; we both missed it.	The flight to SFO was expected to be challenging enroute due to moderate turbulence much of the way across the U.S. As it turned out; starting off at 30;000 feet and then climbing to 38;000 feet resulted in a very comfortable and uneventful flight. We briefed the DYAMD 4 and FMS 28R BRIDGE Visual early and in great detail with a robust conversation on techniques for the BRIDGE Visual. I recommended not attempting to try things such as switching to APP at end game; just use LNAV and VNAV (and the PAPI) for the entire approach which we agreed upon doing. We were given a 'Descend VIA' clearance on the DYAMD 4 with course only after ARCHI which is pretty standard. Visibility was outstanding and we could see the runways well outside of ARCHI. After ARCHI we were given two descents and two or three speed restrictions. At the same time; we were notified of approaching traffic for Runway 28L and to maintain visual separation with the traffic. This traffic was back at our 8 to 7 o'clock position and required some effort to monitor. As it turns out; the traffic was actually trying to go to OAK. During the resultant turn off and away from Runway 28L and across our 6 o'clock; I got a good dose of landing lights and diverted my attention back out of the flight deck to watch the traffic. When I returned inside I was tasked with gear; flaps; checklist; etc. What I failed to notice immediately is that LVL CHG was still selected to aid in controlling speed and without asking for the altitude window to be reset to the next lowest altitude. The aircraft did not have the Speed Intervene button and the First Officer chose this method vs. returning to VNAV and using manual throttles after the second level off as I was expecting.Consequently; the aircraft started to descend below the normal path crossing SAMUL as final flaps were selected; and I was busy inside with the checklist; tower call; etc. The First Officer clicked off the autopilot and started to correct for the steeper than normal descent. As I looked out to crosscheck; I saw the PAPI lights going towards all red. Tower called us at this time to notify that we were low on path. The First Officer was shallowing the descent with perhaps a bit too much emphasis on being smooth. Tower called a second time to tell us that we were triggering a low altitude alert. I assured them that we were already correcting. We intercepted the normal glidepath at 800 feet and landed uneventfully. Once at the gate; we debriefed the sequence of events; errors made; and how VNAV would have been the proper mode to be in with TDZ set and the requirement to reset the altitude window with use of LVL CHG and the restriction that it cannot be used below 1;000 feet. Even though I felt it was a perfect night with easy conditions and a straightforward arrival/approach; I failed to realize how challenging the approach could be as a crew with just a simple distraction or two at an untimely moment and our differing experience levels in the mix. Ultimately; the SOPs work to include SFO's Special Qualification status.

B737 Captain reported the First Officer who did not meet the special SFO requirement of 100 hours flew an approach into SFO and descended below the glidepath.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 186; Flight Crew Total 19443; Flight Crew Type 17237

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103; Flight Crew Total 11604; Flight Crew Type 8589

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC called traffic with a 20 degree left turn to avoid; traffic was 400 feet below. In the turn we got a Traffic Advisory (TA) followed by a Resolution Advisory (RA) to descend. Traffic showed 100 feet below. Made visual contact; passed within 100 feet vertical and 50 yards lateral. We had descended to about 4;300 feet; ATC instructed us to climb back to 5;000 feet. We complied and reported the RA to the controller; which at this point was a different controller.

The Captain was able to obtain visual contact with the Cessna slightly to the right of our nose and almost the same altitude as we were. I continued to follow the Resolution Advisory (RA) descending as we passed what looked like a Cessna off our right wing that seemed to be about 150 feet away and 100 feet above. ATC called us to climb to and maintain 5;000 feet. The Captain told them we had responded to an RA and that we were clear of the traffic and will climb back to 5;000 feet.

B737 flight crew reported an NMAC with a light aircraft on arrival into EWR.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

After leveling in cruise Hydraulic System 1 Overheat was presented on the EICAS. We ran the QRH and we were supposed to cycle the system once every 15 minutes for 1 minute until we landed with the system on. We declared an emergency. The second time we tried to pressurize and cycle the system it would not pressurize. We then ran the Hydraulic system 1 Failure Checklist and confirmed with Maintenance Control that we had a Hydraulic System 1 failure. We made the decision with Dispatch and Maintenance to continue the flight to destination. We went as far as to run a practice Gear Extension Checklist in cruise since neither of us had done this procedure making sure we both understood how it would occur when preparing to land. Nothing could be done to prevent the mechanical failure but I feel the techniques and skills we have developed though training helped ensure a positive outcome.

EMB145 First Officer experiences a hydraulic system 1 overheat after leveling at cruise altitude. QRH procedures require the pump to be turned off and cycled on for one minute every 15 minutes. On the second cycle the system will not pressurize and QRH procedures for a failed hydraulic system 1 are complied with. Flight continues to destination.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was conducting a Part 135.293 flight evaluation. The flight had progressed smoothly for approximately 2 hours and we had already flown all required maneuvers as well as two instrument approaches. We were just about finished with the practice approach for the VOR-A circle to land. We had descended to our circling minimums of 980 ft. as we began the circle to the east for a right downwind. [We were] visual at this point at about 100 kts. and flaps set to 'Approach' when he initiated his base-to-final turn. It was evident that he was going to overshoot the runway and I asked him what he thought to which he did not immediately verbally answer but in turn steepened the bank to try and make it. It was at this point that I announced 'Go-Around' and [Pilot Flying] aggressively pushed the power lever forward without immediately pulling the airplane out of its descending turn. It became evident that I had to take controls and as I was pulling back on the yoke and leveling the aircraft the power had already risen to 2615 torque which I immediately and aggressively pulled back to compensate. We completed the positive exchange of controls as we were climbing out to the west of the tower up to the pattern altitude of about 1500 ft. Keep in mind; all of this happened in a mere 2-3 second time period between us both realizing the unstable turn and the go-around maneuver. Upon re-establishing the aircraft and configuring it for the next approach; the yellow 'ETM EXCEED' annunciation popped up in the panel. I knew that the annunciator had something to do with the engine briefly being outside of its rated limits; but my training and experience has taught me that if the engine is in fact in an over torqued state; a red 'TORQUE EXCEED' annunciator comes on and immediate landing is required. With it only being the 'ETM EXCEED' light being Engine Trend Monitor light; I conducted the rest of the flight as usual. We re-flew the circle to land maneuver; which he excelled at on the second try and went about the rest of the Check Ride (touch and go's and one final practice ILS). As the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and Check Airman; it was my duty and responsibility to keep an eye on all factors going on at all times. It was a VMC day with a lot of traffic (two other aircraft in the pattern); I was monitoring the airspeed and aircraft attitude; the very actions and explanations and engine instruments along with an electrical issue that maintenance had made me aware of prior that day. My work load was extremely high that morning; but I noticed the addition of too much power within mere fractions of a second and the torque gauge had not stabilized to a specific setting yet when I already reacted to counter the situation. The First Officer training consists of one week theory training in a classroom setting and one three hour flight which may be extended to another three hour flight if training records indicate. The pilot was explained to me as a good pilot whom did well during his training in both ground class as well as inflight. Up to the incident; nothing that pilot did indicated to me that there was a major discrepancy on theoretical knowledge of the procedures and the only shortcoming was the lack of time spent in aircraft. His flight training was conducted in one of our Legacy 208B aircraft and the check ride was conducted in the newer and glass panel avionics suite-equipped EX aircraft which has drastically different gauges and system knowledge requirements. The pilot had never flown such an aircraft before and there was some general coaching going on about the various digital indications and procedures and I did tell him during the first take off briefing that the digital torque gauge in the EX display panel has a major and very noticeable lag to it and he should set the takeoff power using the analog torque gauge which sits low and very out of sight on the instrument panel of the aircraft. However; pilot had already successfully flown two previous missed approaches with proper torque setting and call outs for the takeoff power to be set by the pilot monitoring. He had also recovered from two different stall maneuvers earlier in the evaluation; both with no major deficiencies. He acted as a professional and knowledgeable pilot up until the incident where he panicked and rushed the power forward more so than he should have. My reaction was to take control of the aircraft and correct the excessive torque setting back to a more appropriate setting for the flight condition at hand. [I suggest to] add more thorough training on take-off procedures and go-around procedures. Especially on the roles of Pilot Flying as well as Pilot Monitoring. Many new hire applicants for the First Officer role have no experience with this and it is in their old habit to do all of the power changes and flap setting adjustments. It is crucial that they do not ever just jam the power lever full forward without asking for the proper take off power to be set.

C208 check pilot reported the pilot flying over-torqued turbine engine on a go-around maneuver.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1178; Flight Crew Type 330

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

My student was on his solo cross country flight from ZZZ; ZZZ1; ZZZ. Upon returning to ZZZ; student experienced a gust on crosswind after touchdown; his wing lifted and airplane ran off the runway into the grass. ZZZ ATC checked in with my student and asked if he was OK or any damage. Student reported OK and no known damage. Received instructions to taxi back to FBO and was able to do so under own power. I called the airport Tower to check in after (as I was on another flight in the general area) and also debriefed and filed report with student. Student was understandably a little shaken up; but is OK.

C172 flight instructor reported his student experienced a runway excursion during a solo flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Type 11700

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Three separate events of vehicles ignoring our aircraft movement caused me to have to abruptly stop our attempt to begin taxiing. Our flight attendants were almost knocked off their feet during our stops.  One catering truck would have collided with our wing. One mechanic towing an O2 cart would have hit the right engine; and a tug baggage cart came dangerously close [to] the operating right engine.

A B757 Captain reported three separate occasions of having to stop during taxi out at ORD; to avoid vehicles that failed to yield to his aircraft.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 300

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

I was doing a training flight with my student in the south training area of GPM. This is where we normally go to conduct VFR training flights while at 3;500 [feet] 25 SSW of GPM; over Lake Alvarado; East Side of I-35. We were doing steep turns when I saw a drone almost a size of a computer (Red and White in Color); pass underneath us about 200 ft. low; half a mile of horizontal separation. Since we were already in a steep turn; we didn't have to take any evasive action; but that was definitely a bit alarming. The aircraft is equipped with ADS-B in/out and also I was flying with a potable ADS-B; we didn't receive any transponder signal from the drone.  The drone was on a north heading; and if it had continued that way (which I didn't see after the completion of my steep turn) he would have probably ended up in DFW Class B in another 10 miles or so at that altitude. We call GPM Tower; and reported the incident. Upon landing at GPM; GPM Tower further asked more about the incident and the report is being filed.

CFI reported encountering a drone at 3;500 feet altitude while conducting a training flight.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

I worked four flights on aircraft X on Date as the A flight attendant. Shortly after take off; both C and I noticed there was a very loud noise coming from the left side front entry door next to my right ear sitting at the jump seat. Once we reached 10;000 feet; I asked C to request assistance from one of our deadheading captains to access if the door seal is intact. That deadheading Captain heard the noise and access the door seal to be safe. I called flight deck and inform our Captain of the situation and he said the door look safe from their indicators too and would call for maintenance to meet us in ZZZ.Once we landed in ZZZ; the Captain showed me a piece of metal that maintenance confirmed belongs on the outside of the door hinge area. Maintenance told us he couldn't do the repair and it must wait until end of day at ZZZ1. That noise got louder with each flight and by the third flight; I was unable to hear the accent 10;000 foot chime and was able to make the PA only because I visually saw the light. I warned B of this so when both C and I couldn't hear the 10;000 foot chime on the fourth flight; B made the PA from the back for us. B and C used their apple watches and were able to record the noise level at up to 107 decibels during cruise. I have pictures of this. Half way through the work day I developed a severe headache and by the end of the day my hearing; especially my right; feels compromised like it has a cotton ball in it. I have learned from crew working on that same aircraft today that the noise problem is still there today.

Flight attendant reported excessive noise from a main cabin door in flight. The measure decibel level was or 107Db and was causing pain to the Flight Attendant.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

SLAT Fail on selection of Flaps 1; ran QRH; and landed without slats and flaps.

EMB170 Captain experiences a Slat Fail during approach and lands without slats or flaps.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had just taken over as [Sector] Controller 2 minutes prior to this event. Aircraft X was talking to ZZZ Approach on the ZZZZZ arrival. The previous [Sector] Controller had coordinated this aircraft stopped at 14;000 due to another emergency aircraft he had worked earlier. ZZZZZ aircraft; by procedure are already issued an OPD (Optimal Profile Descent) except maintain 14;000. Aircraft Y was descending via the ZZZZZ1 arrival. The aircraft neared the ZZZ approach boundary and I had to call Approach for a hand off. The Controller asked if Aircraft Y was descending OPD  to which I replied yes and asked if the aircraft was radar contact. She replied no because the aircraft was not separated from Aircraft X. These aircraft are procedurally separated. I was forced to turn Aircraft Y but as I issued the turn away from approach; the Controller accepted the hand off. As a result of this I violated ZZZ approaches airspace without a hand off. I expedited Aircraft Y to 11;000 and shipped the aircraft to ZZZ Approach. The CIC spoke to the ZZZ Approach Supervisor who stated the Controller was new to the procedures. I don't believe this alleviates the need to know basic procedures of separation before plugging in and controlling traffic. The ZZZ Controller created an unsafe situation for no reason by forcing me to turn out Aircraft Y.The procedures work fine as long as the Controller knows how to use them.

Center Controller reported an airspace deviation associated with a procedure that the receiving Controller may not have been understood.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Passing 12;000' after Takeoff was struck by 2 small and then one very large lightning strikes/static discharges.  All appeared to emanate from the radome; up and forward. Very loud and could be felt strongly through the airframe. Captain RA and altimeter fluctuated greatly for several seconds. Then returned to normal. Due the intensity of the strike off of the nose; the structural integrity of the radome and other 'plastic' aircraft parts was of concern; as well as the integrity of the radar and flight instruments.[We] diverted; as I was not going to return back to [departure airport] due the requirement to fly into marginal weather with potentially damaged flight instruments. Landed normally and made maintenance log entry. Numerous damaged areas on airframe and plane was ferried and is still there being repaired. Weather was light to moderate rain and no more than yellow returns on the radar. Light chop.....Note; we waited for 2 hours for weather to clear before taking off and ATC as well indicated the area looked ok to fly through. I was informed [another aircraft]; had a lightning strike several minutes before us in the same area.

The Captain of a Boeing 737 reported that during climb they encountered several lightning strikes and diverted.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Captain called Dispatch after receiving the Sabre flight plan. On his flight plan it shows on page one that M1 CLEARS TERRAIN. However; on page five of the same flight plan it shows M1 DOES NOT CLEAR TERRAIN; and continues to show one engine out procedures to reverse course back to the departure airport. On Dispatch side; Sabre and Dispatch View both show method one clears terrain. I pulled up the flight to look at Captain's flight plan and verified it contradicted itself on page one and five and that it contained differing information than the Dispatcher's version of the flight plan. We concluded that M1 did clear terrain and were ok to depart without a new flight plan.

Another Dispatcher report describing deficiencies in their new and improved dispatch computer programs.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Type 10505

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 246; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Enroute to SAT during descent; we encountered turbulence bordering on severe. The only turbulence forecast for route of flight was for the [departure] area. As part of preflight briefing; I instructed the flight attendants that while previous pilots had informed us there was a smooth ride into [departure airport]; they should remain seated until I gave them a call. I also used [weather forecast] to brief the FO on weather along our route of flight. [Weather forecast] displayed the briefed turbulence over [departure airport]; some significant weather well east of our route of flight and a possible (very thin line) of rain showers around Abilene.We let the flight attendants up at FL 330. Enroute to SAT north of Abilene; I switched the radar on (we could see the storms off to the east (75 miles). During the descent passing FL 290; I observed ground obscuration of indeterminate height and we asked ATC about the rides in the descent. We were told there were no adverse reports. Believing the obscuration to be associated with the low ceiling I told the flight attendants we were concerned about the lower clouds and that we were at FL270 and 109 miles from the airport and that they should clean the cabin and sit down and we would ding them again at 10;000 feet for the 10;000 feet announcement. Passing 250 we began to encounter clouds and light turbulence; so I called the flight attendants again; apologized told them they better take their seats and we would try to find time to clean the cabin on the other side of the clouds. The FA A announced 'flight attendants take your seats'.We leveled at 240; for a short period the ride smoothed out then we were cleared to STONEWALL ONE at 10;000 feet. At this time descent speed was set for 280 and I was maintaining approximately 270 knots. We were also still using the radar adjusting angle for elevation with radar now set to the 80 mile scale. Passing FL190 we observed more clouds along our route of flight and now small cells started to pop up on our radar with several 10 miles left and one cell four miles right of our route of flight. We asked ATC for a deviation left of course of five degrees; radar scale was now reduced to 20-40 miles with angle between minus .5 to plus1; passing 17;000 feet a very small cell (1/4 mile in diameter) popped up on radar directly in front of our route of flight and 1/2 mile ahead. Entering the clouds we encountered a couple of bumps of light turbulence followed a few seconds later by moderate and occasional turbulence bordering on severe lasting five to eight seconds.We exited the cloud and I called to ask the flight attendants if everything was okay. The B and C informed me that they were not okay and that the C had hit her head and they were assessing the situation. We informed ATC of the turbulence waited two minutes then asked the flight attendants about their condition. They informed us they were okay (with the head bump) we asked if there were any issues/injuries in the cabin and were again informed no. We asked if they wanted to have the paramedics meet them (the flight attendants) and were informed no. We spoke with the flight attendants one more time during the descent prior to 10;000 feet. Subsequently; the flight attendants notified us that they would like the paramedics to meet them at the aircraft. The paramedics evaluated the B and C flight attendants and determined that an immediate hospital visit was not required. The C reported that she had hit her head and the B stated she had injured her back when she fell out of her seat. At the hotel; I provided both flight attendants with my contact information and asked them to let me know if they required additional medical assistance.

While descending into SAT; the B737 crew reported occasional turbulence bordering on severe which resulted in two flight attendants with undetermined injuries. The flight attendants had been told to take their seats; and apparently were seated but were not completely strapped in.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 106; Flight Crew Total 2745; Flight Crew Type 1516

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

As the flying pilot departing on the [Departure] out of ZZZ Airport I exceeded the crossing altitude at the ZZZZZ waypoint by 200 feet. The crossing restriction is to cross ZZZZZ below 6000 feet MSL. I crossed it at 6200 feet and as I was leveling off and returning to 6000 feet ATC gave us a climb to 14000 feet. Neither ATC or the crew mentioned the altitude deviation.I departed runway XXR in LNAV/VNAV. I followed the SID laterally with the autopilot off and prior to ZZZZZ the airspeed bug accelerated to the Econ climb speed of plus 300 knots. The command bars did not command me to level off at 6000 feet as I approached ZZZZZ. The pitch bar rose to the top of the attitude indicator. At this point the Captain opened my airspeed window via airspeed intervention and dialed my speed back to 250 knots. Prior to departure I programmed the FMC at the gate for (a different departure) with an L3 climb. Looking back on what could have gone wrong I think I may have entered this data incorrectly. I entered 1599 feet at L3 with the proper clean maneuvering speed for our weight; but I may have not entered the L2 data correctly. 250 knots to 10000 feet. This would explain why the VNAV accelerated to Econ climb speed passing 800 feet AGL. If this is true then I think the reason it happened is because I was rushing to get everything done prior to pushback. I was trying to do it all so all the Captain had to do was double check my work. This is not good CRM on my part and I must stop it.

B737 First Officer reported overshooting altitude and climb speed on departure due to FMC programming mistakes.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 1500

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I pulled out for takeoff in front of a solo student on Final in another 172. I was conducting a first flight introductory ride in a Cessna 172.  After joining two other 172s in the pattern and landing; my student asked 'Can we take off again?  I want to do it!'  I checked my watch; aware I had another lesson soon. Time permitted one quick trip around the patch so we taxied back to the runway. Our airport has a 1500 ft. displaced threshold; so we can't see traffic on base when at the end of the threshold: a C172 will typically turn Final just inside the end of the Threshold. As we reached the hold line another company 172 was just climbing out from a Touch and Go; and I heard the competition's 172 call Base. I had been sharing the sky all day with that airplane and my counterpart; a solid airman and good friend. I queried '... do we have room to skoot out in front of you?'  I knew [my friend] would be able to handle such a request like the gentleman he is.  I heard a response I understood to be in the affirmative; but my student spoke up over him. I announced and rolled.  Immediately after liftoff I saw the shadow of [an aircraft] just to my right; and heard the pilot announce a go-around. As I followed him up the Departure Leg I apologized. We landed behind him; and immediately upon parking I went over apologize again. Discovered [my friend] was in the office; that was his student pilot; flying solo; whom I had cut off. I knew the spacing was tight; my schedule was tight; and I knew [my friend] could handle it.  I did NOT know [my friend] had already left the airplane. My actions would've been considerably different had I known that was a student pilot solo.

Due to time pressure and a communication error; an experienced flight instructor entered the active runway and took off while a soloing student pilot was on final approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 500

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

After landing on Runway XX on speed and centerline and slowing at brake application aircraft veered right while trying to correct; aircraft veered to left and departed runway surface on to packed snow. During exit; clipped taxiway sign. After taxiing to ramp there is no visible damage to aircraft. There are no other persons involved or anyone who witnessed the incident.

The reported indicated that the brakes on right side locked up; then  unlocked. Pilot was applying left brake at the time making the aircraft turn left and depart the runway.

C750 Captain reported losing control of aircraft after landing; hitting a taxiway sign and then continuing to the ramp.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Shortly after sterile light went off; FA (Flight Attendant) called the flight deck to let them know we needed two wheelchairs instead of one. The Captain then said the flaps were not operational during takeoff; the ZZZ1 airport runway was not long enough to land with no flaps; so we were returning to ZZZ to land. He [requested priority handling] and said we would be circling for a while to burn off some fuel. We would be landing in about 25 minutes and he would make an announcement shortly. He made an announcement; we circled for a while and landed safely back in ZZZ. Emergency vehicles met the aircraft and all passengers deplaned without incident.

EMB-175 Flight Attendant reported being notified by the Captain of an air return due to the flaps not being operational during takeoff.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

We were told that our assigned aircraft had changed. We now had Aircraft X [on the ground] and [an inspection aircraft] still scheduled to arrive [a few hours later]. We went to Aircraft X and started with completing the Maintenance Visit inspection before starting the FIM [Fault Identification Manual] for brakes dragging. During the inspection we found the L/H aft Position light inop and an MEL for galley drawer we needed parts for. We went to grab parts for Mel and light. During this time [another aircraft] returned to a gate for PSEU [Proximity Switch Electronic Unit] light on. The Lead asked for anyone available to answer the call. After the second request AMT2 [Aircraft Maintenance Tech 2] and I decided to answer the gate return. We were able to fix the PSEU light and [the] aircraft was able to continue its flight though it took a little longer than planned. We got back to Aircraft X; we fixed the L/H position light and galley MEL and began working the FIM. The FIM asked us to apply brakes and observe the piston actuation and retractions if no problems were observed the fault was transitory. We called Maintenance Control to clear the MEL and report our findings on the brake dragging. Maintenance Control asked us to perform an additional task of jacking both gears of the aircraft and physically spin all 4 Main Landing Gear tires. So we went to get the landing gear jack and brought it to the aircraft and jacked the R/H landing gear first. While spinning the wheels we found the #3 grinding and not spinning freely. I started to prep for tire and brake removal. AMT2 went to go get the torque wrenches and thread/axle protectors we would need to change the #3 brakes. We felt we had to have the brake changed and aircraft ready to fly before our [next] check aircraft arrived because we did not know how long it would take to complete the check and if we could make it back out to Aircraft X. We changed the brake [about 10 minutes before the next aircraft was scheduled to arrive] and when we torqued the tire back on and we still needed to jack the LH side as soon as the tire was on and secured. We lowered the gear and I went to jack the left side while AMT2 installed dust cover. I jacked and spun the left gear and found them spinning freely. Over the radio we heard that [our next assigned aircraft] was on the ground and taxiing to [the] gate. I remember worrying about making it to debrief the crew and completing the check package before morning launch. I lowered the left gear while AMT2 picked up the old brake and filled out PCT [Parts Control Tag]. AMT2 loaded the tire cart while I set the brakes and grabbed the log book. We split up; AMT2 went to finish the log book and turn in the tire equipment while I met [the next] aircraft and started the check. The rest of the night proceeded normally from there. Completing the inspection and the remainder of the shift.[Later] during my fact finding I was informed that the brake hydraulic line was not installed and was found after 3 flight legs.If assigned a high stress job like Aircraft X; the team members should not be assigned another high stress job like completing a check before first launch on a late landing aircraft. I will focus more on the job I am currently working instead of worrying about the next job.

Technician reported not installing a main wheel brake hydraulic line after troubleshooting a dragging brake and replacing the brake assembly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67.88; Flight Crew Total 6672.32; Flight Crew Type 4994.95

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Taxiing to [Runway] 8R in Miami. Runway 12 closed. No aircraft in front of us and no aircraft on final. The triangular shape hold bars are confusing and difficult to see. We stopped in the middle of the triangle before proceeding with our takeoff clearance.

Air carrier First Officer reported a runway incursion at MIA occurred in part because the Runway 8R hold bars are confusing and hard to see.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10.5; Flight Crew Total 547; Flight Crew Type 386

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport

Night landing on Runway XX bounced and as recovering from second bounce received call from TWR (Tower) to exit left onto Taxiway XX. Stopped plane on RWY (Runway) and called TWR for directions to [Taxiway] XX. Told to proceed down RWY. Next call from TWR was to exit left on [Taxiways] XY2; XY and hold short [Taxiway] XX. Turned off at [Taxiway] XY2 and started down [Taxiway] XY looking for sign for [Taxiway] XX. Saw sign for [Taxiways] XX/XY. Before coming to complete stop; noticed plane approaching from left on Taxiway XX. Accelerated to get out of way and inadvertently crossed Runway XX. Too late saw runway hold lines. TWR called and requested telephone call for possible runway incursion.Factors:1. kept speed up because other planes in pattern; resulting in bounce.2. landing longer than planned.3. received taxi instruction from TWR while in active landing phase.3. loss of situational awareness of position on runway; called TWR for direction.4. should have asked for more specific information from TWR.5. Should have reviewed airport diagram in more detail for names and positions of taxiwaysin cause of landing long.6. In hindsight; should have stopped as soon as turned from [Taxiway] XY2 to XY and asked TWRfor further instructions when didn't see edge of Taxiway XX.Corrective Actions:1. Review Airport diagram2. Review Airport signage from Wings/FAA programs3. Fly with instructor and work on taxiing.

Pilot reported confusion over airport layout and entered an active runway with landing traffic; causing critical ground conflict.


Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

The North Final Controller and I were working the finals. It was a slow period of traffic volume. The supervisor at the time was having a conversation with both of us while we were on position. The North Final's Conflict Alert (CA) started to go off which caught our attention. His aircraft responded to an RA; but didn't see the other aircraft who was VFR not talking to any Controller. It was a Class B violator at 9;500 FT MSL. Once I heard the CA go off on his aircraft; I told my aircraft who was staggered behind and to the left on the South Final to expedite his decent thinking he could get below the target. He then replied he was responding to an RA. He did see the aircraft. He then filed a near mid air when he landed. The East Feeder sector also never saw the target. The [previous] Controller was controlling both the north and south final aircraft. I would recommend a better alert/awareness during periods of slow traffic. Meaning both management and the controllers involved; which I believe were all three controllers and the supervisor. The Feeder Controller missed the Class B violator; the North Final Controller; me; and the supervisor who was standing around us

TRACON Controller described a TCAS RA event when IFR traffic inbound to the airport responded to unknown VFR traffic identified as a Class B violator.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107; Flight Crew Total 401; Flight Crew Type 302

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

During take off; the decision was made by the PIC(self) to abort owing to a bang and the aircraft pulling left requiring extreme right rudder use.  It was later determined by the PIC this was due to the spring loaded rudder trim jumping to the left from the right. It had previously been advised by the other flight instructors at the school to leave the rudder trim in the right side position during all phases of flight; owing to a extreme left turning tendency. However; by doing this it put undue stress on the rudder trim spring and when left rudder was used during take off the spring gave way and released the trim fully left. At the time this cause was not known to the PIC; hence the decision to abort the flight. Later it was advised that this should be in neutral; as per the POH; however incorrect local guidelines had been advised.  PIC will revert to the POH for all future use in Aircraft X.

Pilot reported a Rejected Take Off after hearing a loud bang.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 1325; Flight Crew Type 320

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I was training a primary student.  We received clearance from the ground controller to taxi to the runway and contact tower.  As we taxied onto the taxiway; Aircraft Y with an elderly gentleman operating single-pilot at the controls was parked facing the taxiway at a perpendicular angle in the run-up area.As we neared this airplane while taxiing down the taxiway toward [Runway] XXR abeam intersection 1; he started moving forward while looking to the left.  We got within 20-feet of each other and he never noticed because he failed to clear to his right prior to taxiing onto the taxiway.  This other pilot failed to request a taxi on ground from the run-up area as is our local procedure.We slammed on our brakes; coming to an abrupt stop and avoided the collision.

Instructor Pilot reported braking hard to avoid a collision with another aircraft during taxi.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I was recently informed that several months ago I flew an aircraft that had an MEL item requirement that was not properly completed by Maintenance. Since there is a note in a portion of the MEL Remarks/Exceptions section that says an EICAS message of E1(2) [Engine one or two] REV INHIBIT will be displayed continuously. I did not notice that this message was not displayed; and that meant the TR was not properly inhibited.There are notes in both the Remarks/Exceptions column of the MEL as well as in the Flight Crew Operation Procedures. Usually the Remarks/Exceptions column is used in the application of the MEL as I understand it. Putting the note in the Flight Crew Operating Procedures column of the MEL would allow us to more easily serve as a backup for maintenance properly complying with this MEL. Other MELs have notes about EICAS messages being displayed; and the lack of consistency could cause confusion.

An ERJ Captain was advised he had failed to comply with the requirements of an MEL item on an aircraft he had flown several months prior to his notification.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X was ready Runway 28L and I had a regional jet ready to depart the parallel and I looked at Aircraft's strip noticing he was going ZZZ. That is north and cleared him for takeoff and told him to proceed on course. I waited until Aircraft X was about departure end and cleared the regional jet for takeoff and told him the upwind traffic will be in a right hand turn. Aircraft X started his turn and I thought nothing of it and shipped him to Departure then shipped the regional jet to Departure. Then the Radar Controller made us aware that he had taken corrective action because Aircraft X was not VFR as I had mistakenly thought.  He was IFR and was not turned within the DVA (Diverse Vector Area). This may have caused a loss of separation with the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). The only reason I bring up the regional jet is because getting Aircraft X going and out of the way contributed to me making a quick judgment to turn Aircraft X on course. Aircraft X ended up telling Radar that he had the terrain and wanted a VFR climb.I will be more diligent in the future to notice the full strip indicating IFR and not be trapped by the single fix flight plan as being VFR. The vast majority of IFR flight plans at BOI get a PDR (Preferred Departure Routing) so the strips have a look to them and it can trick you if you aren't careful when you get one that is ZZZ [destination] for a route on the strip. The half strip for VFR aircraft is relatively new in our order and maybe I just haven't adjusted yet.  I don't recommend any change it was my mistake and I won't make it again.

BOI Tower Controller reported issuing an IFR BE20 a turn; not in compliance with Minimum Vectoring Altitude procedures.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1480; Flight Crew Type 850

While approaching [the airport] I monitored the frequency from 30 miles out. There were multiple [flight school] aircraft training in the pattern doing closed circuit work. It was clear that the students were not fully familiar with the English language; however; the instructors were not on the radios except to occasionally speak with each other. Given the difficulty the student pilots had with the language; it was very difficult for me to get situational awareness as to how many planes were in the pattern. I called my intentions to join the right pattern for runway 28; which was currently in use; at 15 NM; 10 NM; and 5 NM out. I then called a 45-to-right-downwind; listening for and looking for traffic. When I turned downwind a [flight school] aircraft was approximately 150 feet off my right wingtip and at the same 1000 foot altitude. I called an immediate left 360-degree turn; performed the turn; and re-entered the pattern. Upon re-entering I saw a plane on final and another turning base. I asked if the plane I had had the near miss with had seen me. An English-speaking instructor came on the frequency and stated he had seen me and heard me call my positions and intentions. Neither he nor his student were transmitting position reports on that circuit of the pattern. I landed behind that plane; which did a touch-and-go and departed the pattern.

The pilot of a small experimental aircraft reported a near midair collision at a non-towered airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

For approximately 3 hours during this shift Area 4 ZOB was extremely busy to the point of being unsafe. There was a large amount of weather just south of Area 4 airspace in ZID. During the busy traffic Area 4 was working 'red' sectors with aircraft from every direction that had routes to try to avoid the weather and the weather was building so the routes were crumbling and creating excessive deviations. There was no specific situation that I recall as being unsafe; just the fact that everything was pointed at one sector while the weather was increasing and making the scenario more and more unsafe. I don't believe anything was done to lessen the amount of traffic burdening Area 4. I believe that the TMU (Traffic Management Unit) play-books that were in effect actually created the issue. This is purely speculation on my part because TMU runs play-books all day every day and even though I have asked to be more informed about these play-books nobody will include it in any aspect of my job. I get told to work the traffic and 'let them deviate.'During busy points [another sector] was opened which is a reasonable idea except that this sector is rarely if ever open. I can't recall the sector open at all in 2019 while I was working. This adds to complexity because of the unusual situation.Controllers were asking the Supervisor to get MIT (Miles in Trail) restrictions in place or slow down traffic to the sectors but it wasn't happening. The Supervisor that was assigned to Area 4 that shift normally works in [another area] and in my opinion isn't very familiar with Area 4 since he has never work an actual sector in Area 4.Due to the weather I encountered a frequency issue at high altitude in my sector that created extra workload during an already buy session. It was never reported to maintenance that I know of. 1) TMU needs to get better at analyzing weather and its impact on sectors and areas. The plans that TMU makes need to be actually communicated to areas and sectors so that if something changes everybody (to include TMU) can adapt to and make changes. I don't feel that TMU is useful at ZOB. When I talk to TMU about how useless they are they tell me lip service about Command Center. 2) If sectors like [the one that was opened] exist they shouldn't only be opened for check rides and busy days. They need to open and have people be proficient at them.3) Supervisors should know about the area they are working in so they can actually help.4) I would love for one of my reports to actually change something since I bring up safety and the uselessness of TMU in all my reports. I am losing faith in [the ATC reporting system] just like the FAA because nothing ever gets fixed. When something goes wrong on a day like today it isn't going to be pleasant for anybody. I hope to not be involved.

ZOB Center Controller reported sectors in their area were unsafe during weather deviations due to insufficient flow control and lack of Supervisor's proficiency.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172.68; Flight Crew Type 2600.53

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were on descent [on an] RNAV arrival into LAS. ATC was attempting to create separation [with] a heavy aircraft we were following. The autopilot was engaged and [we] encountered a rapid roll to the left which created an upset that required full aileron flight control deflection to stabilize the aircraft in level flight. After the aircraft was stabilized I was in contact with the flight attendants and was informed by the purser that one crew member was down in the aft galley. I landed without further event in LAS. Paramedics met the flight and evaluated the cabin crew. There were no passenger injuries [since] they were all in their seats with the seat belt sign on. The flight attendants were up in the cabin performing their final cabin checks. The event took place at 14;000 feet. Both LAX Center and Vegas Approach Control were trying to create separation for [us] right after departure from LAX. When I informed Vegas Approach that we had an upset he asked if [it] was wake turbulence from the heavy we were following.

B737NG Captain reported an injury to a Flight Attendant resulting from an upset in a wake turbulence encounter on arrival into LAS.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft X had an APU on MEL. We arrived and were met by the ramp crew and jetway driver as normal. Shut down #2 engine and kept #1 running for electric until jetway power plugged in. Cargo doors and boarding door were opened and passengers began to deplane.Several minutes later I received a signal from a ramp person asking about external power availability and gave them the thumbs down that it was not available on the overhead. I waited for several more minutes and then called Operations to advise of the situation. I was informed that the city had been advised of the jetway power issue; and I asked about an external power cart. I was told this was in the works as well.About 5 min later when the aircraft was almost completely deplaned; I noticed the refueling message on ECAM. I advised Operations that a fuel truck had hooked up to the aircraft with the #1 engine still running. I immediately proceeded to shut down the engine and depower the aircraft. The next flight crew was in the boarding area and they were advised of the situation.

A320 Captain reported that ground personnel began refueling the aircraft while the #1 engine was still running.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 600

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

While enroute a depressurization was experienced at FL410; approximately 60 miles west of ZZZ. An emergency descent was conducted to 13;000 FT. ATC was notified and 7700 was squawked. The aircraft diverted to ZZZ without further incident.

CL300 Captain reports a loss of cabin pressurization at FL410 and the resulting emergency descent and diversion to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 18000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Having just finished reading an article about a wake turbulence accident; I felt the need to raise a safety concern regarding 'Super' aircraft. An accident involving an Airbus 380 and a Bombardier Challenger 604 caused me to rethink our wake turbulence encounter and [I] felt the need for it to be reported.Just as in the accident/incident; we were separated by 1000 ft in approximately 10 to 15 miles separation. The accident scenario was more of a head on flight where ours was crossing the wake of the A380 at approximately a 70 degree angle. The bump we encountered was nothing more than moderate chop for less than one second. Upon initial contact with Havana Center; we were held down below our planned cruise altitude.  Later the Controller pointed out an aircraft as they were approximately 80 miles away 1000 ft above us. We were intending to climb above that altitude and the FO and I mentioned to each other that at that distance we certainly had room to climb now. Visual contact was made on the Airbus approximately 2 o'clock and 20 miles away.  As we crossed their wake; they were around our 10 o'clock position and 10 miles. Up until that point; winds were very light and the ride was extremely smooth.  There was no wake turbulence encounter expected on our part with such a great distance between the two aircraft. I know without a doubt that hundreds of unreported wake turbulence encounters are experienced daily; mostly on departure with a minimum spacing between the aircraft ahead. I strongly feel that the wake produced by the A380 aircraft needs to be explored more and most likely different spacing requirements supplied.  It is almost an impossibility with airspace constraints on arrival and departure to have a fixed plan for every scenario.  At least during cruise; more spacing is likely necessary. We are all [aware that] the most severe wake turbulence is at slow speed; high lift configurations. I also believe we have all encountered slight wake turbulence encounters crossing the wake from an aircraft above us; but as the Challenger accident shows; loss of aircraft can occur; thus more research is necessary.

B737 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence at FL350 from an A380 10 miles away and 1;000 ft above them.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I discovered a cart with 630 LBS of freight on gate; when checking for a hold off code in my scanner the freight was listed as on the flight in pit 3. I know this is a violation of company and FAA rules. I have seen this problem occur numerous times. The leads and supervisors need to address this issue.

Ramp person reported finding a cart with 630 pounds of cargo that his scanner indicated was on a flight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I believe the 7110.65 has been misinterpreted at DSM which has resulted in many instances of IFR aircraft becoming too close to obstructions on departure.In this particular instance; Aircraft X was cleared as filed.  This puts his route through a 4;000 foot MVA.Before the aircraft entered the MVA at around 2;000 feet; I told the developmental that Aircraft X was about to enter the higher MVA; the OJTI (On the Job Training Instructor) obviously didn't agree with me but instructed the developmental to turn the aircraft 15 degrees right; which still wasn't enough to clear the MVA but at least it was something.7110.65 4-3-2 paragraph c states:' c Departure Procedures          1. Specify direction of takeoff/or initial heading to be flown after takeoff as follows:             a. Locations with Airport Traffic Control Service-Specify direction of takeoff/turn or initial heading as necessary;  consistent with published:                                 1. Departure Procedures (DP).  If an aircraft is vectored off a published Standard Departure (SID) or Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP); that vector cancels the DP and ATC becomes responsible for separation from terrain and/or obstructions. IFR aircraft must be assigned an altitude.                                 2. Diverse Vector Areas (DVA). The assignment of an initial heading using a DVA can be given to the pilot as part of the initial clearance; but must be given no later than with the takeoff clearance.  Once airborne; and aircraft assigned headings within the DVA can be vectored below the MVA/MIA.  Controllers cannot interrupt an aircraft's climb in the DVA until the aircraft is at or above the MVA.'I believe the above paragraph is being misinterpreted to apply to satellite airport departures instead of the primary airport because it states that it only applies to locations with Air Traffic Control Service.  Also; the assignment of an initial heading using a DVA must be given no later than with the takeoff clearance.  Obviously; we do not clear aircraft for takeoff at satellite airports.  Furthermore; aircraft are not being cleared consistent with published Departure Procedures or Diverse Vector Areas.The 7110.65 further clarifies in paragraph b that (b) Locations without Airport Traffic Control Service; but within a Class E surface area specify direction of takeoff and turn or initial heading if necessary. Obtain [or] solicit the pilot's concurrence concerning a turn or heading before issuing them in a clearance. If we would do that; I have no problem letting the aircraft enter the MVA if they concur; however it is many times unreasonable to expect the pilot to actually be able to comply if we are IFR.The DSM 7110.C Section 3 Satellite Airport Procedures Paragraph 4-3-4 Vectors Below Minimum Altitude states that:'For the purpose of applying FAA 7110.65 procedures which allow satellite departure and missed approach aircraft to be vectored below the minimum altitude required for IFR operations; prominent obstructions are depicted on the video map utilizing Digital Map Marks.  Obstruction heights in MSL are depicted on the Emergency Video Map.The purpose of the ATC system is to prevent collisions between aircraft and terrain [or] obstacles; and other aircraft.  The way these procedures are being applied I feel are contrary to that goal.I would just like clarification of the rules so we can apply them correctly at DSM.Can we clear IFR aircraft off of Satellite Airports through a 4;000 foot MVA without doing anything to ensure separation from obstructions?  Because that is what is happening.It is so easy to issue a vector or ODP (Obstacle Departure Procedure) but our current SOP; along with misinterpretations of the .65 are being used to justify not having to provide separation from obstacles.

DSM Controller reported possible misinterpreted Diverse Vectoring rules along with Minimum Vectoring Area violations.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During return trip to home base; after dropping off patient; transmission chip light came on. Power was immediately reduced and a landing area was selected. The only suitable landing area was a military airfield. I informed Approach I had a mechanical problem and requested to divert into the military airfield. I was told to change over to the Tower. I informed them I had a mechanical problem; and was told I could not land without a Prior Permission Request (PPR); or declaring an emergency. I choose to declare an emergency. During the descent into the airfield I monitored the transmission temperatures and pressures; both seemed to hold steady during the descent. After landing aircraft was shutdown and Mechanic was notified. No further incident occurred. After further inspection of the aircraft the Mechanic noticed that the compressor shaft on the air conditioning unit had sheared off. The oil sample taken showed that the metal on the chip detector was consistent with the metal on the sheared shaft; and not the transmission gears.

An EC135 transmission chip light illuminated so the pilot declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby military airfield where it was later determined that a failed air conditioning shaft caused metal in the oil.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Maintenance Inspector 26; Maintenance Lead Technician 21; Maintenance Technician 31

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

Previous maintenance performed on the aircraft partially completed items in the required 12 year inspection.  When the work cards were turned in; the 12 year inspection was incorrectly determined to have been completed in its entirety and was marked completed in the tracking system; resetting its due date.  With the due date reset; the 12 year inspection no longer showed on the aircraft 'to do' list populated by the tracking system. During a pre-purchase inspection; the error was discovered due to the aircraft logbook having no recent record of a completed 12 year inspection and review of the work cards indicated the inspection had only been partially completed. The aircraft was immediately grounded until the 12 year inspection could be completed. This recording error was caused by a misunderstanding between the technicians and the individual updating the tracking system.  Future errors of this nature could be avoided by having a status sheet of major events/inspections incorporated into the aircraft maintenance due list.

Maintenance inspection on light transport aircraft was incorrectly recorded as being completed.


Beechcraft King Air Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1970; Flight Crew Type 1226

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

I was flying practice approaches for currency in and around ZZZ airport. I was briefed and was aware of the TFR over ZZZ1 for an air show. I was flying a practice GPS XX approach. I selected the GPS XX approach as it was on the opposite side of the airport from the TFR. I was communicating and monitoring the UNICOM frequency. I announced my position multiple times. When I was on short final; a King Air suddenly appeared on downwind for Runway XY [opposite direction] and announced his intention to land on XY; despite me having announced multiple times that I was on short final for XX. My attention was on the King Air when I glanced up and saw a windshield full of skydivers. I immediately began evasive action; turning first to the left so as to pass behind the King Air. However; I realized that turning left limited my visibility of the skydivers; so I then proceeded to turn back right parallel to the runway so I could see the skydivers. I also began a climb. I was very shaken by the event. By the time I composed myself and stopped looking for skydivers; I looked at my MFD and realized I had penetrated the TFR. I immediately executed a steep turn to the right to exit the TFR space. At the same time I switched from the UNICOM frequency to 121.5. About 20 seconds later I got a call on 121.5 from ATC. I described the situation to him; and was given a number to call.My penetration of the TFR was inadvertent and a result of the emergency situation with the skydivers. I believe my actions were justified; as avoiding contact with a skydiver was my priority during the emergency. I believe the King Air that appeared had been carrying the skydivers and made no attempt on UNICOM to inform me of their presence. I exited the TFR promptly on my own volition once the emergency situation had resolved itself.

Lancair ES pilot reported penetrating a TFR resulting in an airborne conflict with skydivers.


GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 07

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Type 1180

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

Inbound to MSLP we were assigned ATUMA 1K Arrival with ILS DME Z RWY 07 transition. The common fix at the transition point is ASTOR. The STAR shows ASTOR at 2;000 [feet]; but this ILS has ASTOR at 3;000 [feet]. We manually changed the approach to match the STAR with ASTOR at 2;000; believing this was ok as ASTOR is over the ocean. Prior to passing 10;000; we inquired about the ASTOR altitude and ATC informed us that ASTOR was to be crossed at 3;000. We had time to re-enter the approach and modify the STAR altitude well before it became an issue; but it was a fair bit of FMC programming to be doing in sterile cockpit. Not ideal when descending to an airport neither of us were very familiar with. Note that both the ATUMA 1K and ATUMA 1L show ASTOR at 2;000. ILS DME Z has ASTOR at 3;000; and the ILS DME Y has ASTOR at 2;300. None of these combinations match up at ASTOR.

Air carrier Captain reported noticing a discrepancy on a GPS point that has different altitudes on MSLP airport STAR and approach plates.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We took off with 4;000 LBS of fuel when our dispatch release and weight and balance was calculated at 3;000 LBS of fuel. So our numbers for weight and balance fuel load was severely incorrect. We were not overweight for takeoff even with this error. We still had about 600 LBS under the maximum gross takeoff weight of 17;120 LBS. I was not aware that there was 1;000 LBS of fuel in the auxiliary tanks. For some reason I did not hit the switch during prefight or before taxi. I usually will check for sure both main and auxiliary fuel gauges on the before taxi checklist; but for some reason I did not. I discovered this in flight when I happen to check to see if anything was still in the auxiliary tanks. I turned on the auxiliary pumps to see if there was anything and there was no master caution for them and no drain on the main tanks. I advised arrival operations to start finding 5 passengers to volunteer to take another flight to insure we have good weight and balance for the next flight. I also had them call Dispatch to see if they want us to hold over the airport for sometime to burn the excess fuel; but they advised not to and call them on ground. I did burn up all the fuel in the auxiliary tank before landing. This aircraft just came from two test flights. How did both crews before this flight find out that there was fuel in the auxiliary tank? The logbook fuel gallons did not reflect fuel in the auxiliary tanks only the mains. They both must have not check the auxiliary tank too. I did overhear a conversation to a dispatcher of the fuel load in the aircraft before today's test flight before mine of the fuel load and they seamed to be only aware of what the fuel load was in the mains. The fuel receipt that I got from the fuelers did reflect only adding fuel to the mains. I will not make this mistake of not checking the auxiliary tank fuel gauges again. The only thing I can think of to eliminate the problem is to reduce the checklist to separate each tank in a new line and not one. So instead of fuel total Main; Auxiliary. It could be total fuel main tanks; then total fuel auxiliary tanks on two separate lines.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

Beech 1900 flight crew operated aircraft unaware of 1;000 LBS of additional fuel in the auxiliary fuel tanks.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 228; Flight Crew Type 228

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

[In cruise flight at 4;500 FT I] heard engine sputter. [I] increased mixture and added power. Engine seemed to have stopped. Contacted [ATC] and informed them I believed I ran out of fuel and would be making an emergency landing and asked what my options were. [ATC] informed me [nearest airport] was 19 miles away and I replied unable. I looked for roads as possible landing locations and all had power lines on one or both sides. Another aircraft offered to come and assist; but they were 30 miles away. I found a field and informed [ATC] that I would be landing in it. I received no reply but heard the other aircraft attempt to make contact with them. I followed appropriate actions to make the soft field landing and once the airplane came to a stop; I radioed over [ATC frequency] that if anyone could hear me; I was okay and abandoning the airplane. I then called my flight instructor.

A C172 pilot reported running out of fuel and landing safely in a field.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Flight Attendant Y informed me of a passenger in [seat] XX3 not complying with CDC mask regulations. She told me he told him 3 times. I was picking up garbage and I passed by [seat] XX3 and he had his mask off and didn't want to talk to me or put on his mask after I gave him the [mask compliance policy] and a mask. The Captain was informed and actions were taken to meet the passenger in ZZZ.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

While on arrival into Nashville; we were being vectored by Approach.  We were just assigned vectors outside of the arrival.  We were notified by the controlling agency that we could expect moderate turbulence between 9;000 and 12;000 feet in the descent; which we did encounter.  Upon reaching 5;000 feet; we were still encountering moderate turbulence.  As we accepted our vector to heading 010; we encountered a pocket of severe turbulence which sent the airplane into an upsetting unusual attitude.  My Captain immediately recognized the issue; as the autopilot kicked itself off; he initiated the proper recovery procedure.  As that happened; we encountered a second pocket of severe turbulence which further upset the aircraft attitude and resulted in additional altitude loss.  My Captain went full thrust and maximum nose up attitude to recover.  We experienced moderate turbulence all the way to the ground that day; but were able to land safely.

Corporate First Officer reported a severe turbulence encounter during approach to BNA airport resulting in an altitude excursion and momentary loss of aircraft control.


PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

I noticed on the computer weather was good at destination but reported Minus 57 temperature. During the flight the weather was again good but minus 43 showed on temperature. During the flight we checked two more times and temperature was dropped from weather report. I figured the station realized it and [deleted the] temperature. ATIS on radio said 30 C; and ATIS on the ground said 29 C. The flight plan was handed to me by ops personnel and checked weather on iPhone since coverage was available for Miami. Loaded FMS with flight plan and TPS [Takeoff Performance System] and checked. During taxi out we uploaded numbers and we were below weight and assumed temperature. TPS computed N1 of 84.5 which was a bit low but it was clear with 10;000 foot runway. As we did a rolling takeoff and hit TOGA noticed we didn't get the normal push with thrust but the airplane accelerated normally until about 120. That is when I thought this isn't right and checked again the takeoff weight which was 151;000 and realized this wasn't a normal power setting. I thought of either aborting or taking control and pushing power up manually but we were accelerating and rotated about with 2;000 FT remaining and took off. During the climbout after 10;000 FT I knew we were either well above planned weight or something else was wrong on TPS so I started looking. I looked at planned temperature which we thought said 28 C but we then noticed it was -28 C. I guess with all those earlier wrong temperatures showing up it was loaded into our TPS wrong as well. Thinking outside temperature was 29 C and we were below assumed 30 C we thought at the time it was correct. Obviously we will look at temperatures much closer in the future; and never assume anything. In hindsight either an abort or manually pushing power way up would have been the best options. At the time with length of runway and weather conditions we did neither.

Captain reviewed TPS numbers; [which] showed 22K standard takeoff assumed temperature 34 degrees C. ATIS showed temperature 29 degrees C. Began takeoff roll.  Aircraft seemed sluggish however [it] accelerated and [we were] able to takeoff with 2;000 FT of runway remaining. After cleanup discussed with the Captain the lack of acceleration of the aircraft. Reviewed the TPS and found closeout numbers used a minus 28 degrees C.

B737-800 flight crew experiences a sluggish takeoff from a 10;000 foot runway with an OAT of 29 C and a reduced thrust of an assumed temperature of 34 C. Once safely airborne it is found that the performance calculations were made using an actual OAT of -28 C. The crew believes this error caused the poor performance.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 5692; Flight Crew Type 1003

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

While on Autopilot and being vectored by ATC (Potomac Approach) in VFR conditions level 7;000 ft; ATC pointed out VFR traffic across the river 1;000 ft below our altitude. We had the traffic on TCAS; but no visual contact. The VFR traffic began a climb at our 12 o'clock position; ATC then issued a 20 degree turn left of course; as we were complying with the instructions; the VFR traffic rapidly climbed to within 500 ft. This resulted in a TCAS RA 'CLIMB CLIMB.' We performed the traffic collision avoidance maneuver. TCAS 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' occurred at 7;350 ft. ATC was notified of the RA climb. Reconfigured and continued with ATC vectoring to RWY 19C to a landing.

While being vectored for arrival at IAD; flight crew received an RA and responded accordingly.