Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1685

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approaching cruise altitude; I noticed an intermittent flashing near the flap position indicator on the E/WD. It flashed in amber Flap - F above and F-Locked below the symbol. It then alternated to flash Flap - S and S-Locked. There was no associated ECAM to confirm a failure or fault of the system. No C/B's had popped. I checked the F/CTL system display page. All was normal. I disconnected the autopilot to confirm that there were no flight control abnormalities. There were none. The flap position indicator showed everything stowed; and I confirmed that. The flashing persisted. We then got an ECAM with aural chime for COND AFT CRG ISOL VALVE. It; too; was intermittent. The system display page showed both valves continuously closing and opening. We were unable to clear the intermittent ECAM normally or silence the chime using the emergency cancel button. The two problems; although completely separate systems; were both randomly flashing with the one ECAM chiming. This made us wonder if there was an underlying related electrical issue even though all other system pages showed normal operation. I had earlier sent a message briefly describing the problem to Maintenance Control through ACARS; but eventually I determined the need to speak directly. I requested a phone patch to Maintenance Control. I had been PF; so I gave control of the aircraft and ATC radios to the First Officer. I talked through the problems we were experiencing so far with Maintenance Control. He took several moments to reference the systems. There was a discussion to determine whether the flaps/slats had locked up; but without a corresponding ECAM failure or fault and nothing highlighted as a fault on his end. It was agreed that it was more likely an indication problem. For now; the COND AFT CRG ISOL VALVE was considered to be a separate issue with the only action of crew awareness. We referenced the flight control system flap/slat chapter of the Flight Manual; but there was no information regarding this scenario of flashing lights. Maintenance Control guided me to cycle flap/slat control CB's to clear the flashing indication. I was somewhat distracted by the continuous chime and flashing; but at the time; this seemed a reasonable course of action as I had confirmed the flaps were up. I proceeded to cycle the C/Bs using Maintenance Control's instructions and my Captain's Emergency Authority in attempt to silence the warnings as I felt a sense of urgency with the two issues occurring simultaneously. It did not correct the flashing. Maintenance Control continued to reference the Flight Manual. Meanwhile; I became even more concerned that there could be some connection between the two issues and some larger underlying problem. The first officer agreed. She requested a lower altitude with ATC while I considered diversion airports to give us options in light of the situation and in the event the situation deteriorated. During this time; we had to transfer us to another frequency due to a medical emergency for another aircraft. After several minutes; I reconnected with Dispatch/Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control came back on the radio suggesting that it might be one of the Flight Warning Computers. While this discussion was going on; other systems then started to intermittently flash and chime. The ones that I remember included: nose wheel steering disconnect message; a BRAKES HOT; and an AIR PACK 1 OVHT ECAM. There was no supporting information that corroborated these ECAMS or messages on the system pages. They were intermittent except for the AIR PACK 1 OVHT. It stayed on; so I completed the ECAM and shut off Pack 1 per procedure. I relayed this new information to Maintenance Control. The suspicion that we had issues with the FWC's seemed more plausible. My sense of urgency to understand the problem before deciding with the F/O to divert due to electrical issues continued; but by now we were well into the arrival; making our destination the most suitable airport. I wanted a long runway to land with zero flaps/slats if that scenario were to present itself. We continued to work to understand the problem. Maintenance Control gave me reference to the FWS FWC 1(2) FAULT procedure. Per this procedure and Maintenance Control guidance; I cycled the FWC C/Bs separately. This resolved the additional random issues; but the original flashing of the flaps/slats and the AFT CARGO intermittent ECAM remained. It was at this point I returned our attention to the flap/slat issue. Even though we felt it an indication problem; we discussed the possibility of a no flap/slat landing. I had acknowledged and discussed this possibility with Maintenance Control. The First Officer pulled out the expected non-normal procedure; F/CTL FLAPS FAULT/LOCKED; to review in case that ECAM should occur. There was nothing left to address further with Maintenance Control; so we both signed off. I continued the conversation with Dispatch. Dispatch was able; with our ATC coordinator; to forward our request for the long runway. If we had issues with flaps/slats on approach; I would elect to declare an emergency then and request appropriate assistance. Upon switching to Approach Control; I requested to slow early to extend flaps/slats. Flaps/Slats extended normally; and we landed without incident. After the flight I further reviewed the Flight Manual and found that the flap/slat control CBs were not to be cycled in flight. I was unaware of that restriction at the time Maintenance Control advised me to cycle them. There was never a defined ECAM or unannunciated procedure to follow. There was a sense of urgency to silence the warnings yet mindful consideration to understand the cause of the random indications. In hindsight; it was an unintentional failure on my part to not question the guidance/direction to cycle flap/slat control C/Bs. A flag went up in my mind at the time; but it was not immediately apparent to me that these were of prohibited status in regards to cycling while in flight. At the time; I relied on and trusted my resources with that information to make a judgment call when I exercised my Captain's Emergency Authority to cycle those C/Bs. Maybe those C/Bs should be highlighted in some way on the CB panel and/or within Maintenance Control procedures to alert us to their prohibited status in flight. I talked with Maintenance Control directly on the phone after the flight to explore further his thought process for this guidance. He mentioned that he thought we were on the ground when he suggested we cycle those C/Bs. This concerned me as I had assumed he knew that we were airborne based upon my initial contact and phone patch through Dispatch and lengthy discussions. It's clear there was a misunderstanding and communication error here.

An A320 had an intermittent Flap/Slat Locked indication in cruise; followed shortly by an intermittent COND AFT CRG ISOL VALVE warning. Maintenance Control suggested cycling the flap/slat control circuit breakers; to no avail. New ECAM's appeared; including nose wheel steering disconnect message; a BRAKES HOT; and an AIR PACK 1 OVHT. The AIR PACK 1 OVHT ECAM was complied with and the others were cleared by cycling the FWC (Flight Warning Computer) circuit breakers. A landing at destination with normal flap operation was made.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On arrival to BWI we were cleared to descend via the ANTHM 3 RNAV arrival; landing east. As the PF I selected 4;000 (the bottom altitude at STARZ) and managed descent. Prior to EAGLL we were given a revised clearance to descend to 11;000 feet for traffic. EAGLL has a crossing restriction of below 13;000 and above 12;000. As the PF I selected 11;000 and selected open descent. Several minutes later; but still prior to EAGLL; ATC gave us yet another revised vertical clearance; to descend to 11;000; then descend VIA the ANTHM 3 RNAV arrival; landing east. So as the PF I again selected 4;000 (the bottom altitude at STARZ) and managed descent. The plane slowed its descent to 1;000 FPM as we were now below the planned descent path. The PM who was distracted with other tasks looked up and queried whether we should still be descending at a faster rate to 11;000; and suggested we do so. The clearance was a bit confusing - we were not told 'best rate' (or anything like that) to 11;000; but it seemed plausible since it was 'for traffic' so I went back out of managed descent to increase the rate of descent; planning to again switch to managed at 11;000 for the further crossing restrictions after EAGLL. At 11;000 I selected managed descent again. Between 11;000 and 10;000 (as the plane was slowing its descent rate in the transition back managed) ATC queried us if we were descending on the ANTHM 3. At that point both the PM and I noticed that there was a crossing restriction of 11;000 at ROKTT; two fixes after EAGLL. Unsure if we should climb back up to 11;000; ATC gave us a new clearance to maintain 10;000; then descend via the ANTHM 3. Personally; next time there is a confusion about a clearance I will stop all other tasks so I am not distracted. If necessary I will query ATC. Externally; ATC should not give confusing altitude clearances in a terminal environment with a high volume of traffic.

Air carrier pilot reported confusion attributed to not understanding ATC clearance; and ATC altitude changes from the procedure while on the ANTHM 3 RNAV arrival to BWI airport.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

I was the pilot flying into ROA at night. We were at 6;000 abeam the airport on a left downwind for Runway 6. We were cleared for the visual approach and I asked for 3;000 feet to be set into the FCP (Flight Control Panel). I was aware there was a ridge we would need to cross on our left base turn; charted at 2;000 feet on the RNAV (GPS) Y approach plate. I planned to descend to 3;000 while turning base and turn onto final at HIVLU; charted at 2;700 on the vertical profile of the approach plate. I began a descent at 2;000 FPM just prior to turning base. On the base leg; I believe due to the rate of descent; a GPWS terrain warning occurred. I immediately increased the power; increased pitch; and arrested the descent. The warning stopped. The ridge was visible throughout the event and the aircraft did not descend below 3;000 until past the ridge and beginning a turn to intercept the final approach course. We continued and made a normal landing.Being unfamiliar with this approach I should have communicated my plan to the Captain and asked if he agreed. After landing we discussed the approach and he explained that we could have descended on downwind to 5;200; continued past the ridge; turned base at or just inside DIXXY; and then followed the descent profile on the approach plate. I agree with his assessment; that would have been a better course of action. In the future I will verbalize my intentions; particularly on approaches I am unfamiliar with; and have a discussion to collaboratively determine the best course of action.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving GPWS alert during approach to land at ROA airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 227; Flight Crew Total 1425; Flight Crew Type 640

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was conducting an instructional flight. We were getting ready to enter the runway. Advisory had advised there was an aircraft on final approach; although I don't remember exactly how far out the aircraft was. I remember hearing at least 1 mile.We did our visual check to look for aircraft on base and final before entering the runway; and did not see anyone on final. The view from where the departure end of the runway makes it hard to see low flying aircraft because it sits below a berm; and then there is a building not far from the edge of the berm.Because we did not see the approaching aircraft; and thought he was at least 1 mile out; we entered the runway and began the takeoff roll at which point the aircraft on final radioed that he was going around and executing a 180 degree climbing turn; and became very irate on the radio and requesting our tail number from Advisory so he could report us. Advisory told him that they were not responsible for aircraft separation; and gave him the number for Tower; and then I heard nothing else on the radio because we were well beyond the airspace for [the] airport.The traffic control system worked and we were advised about the aircraft; but having a less than desirable line of sight from the end of the runway to see low traffic was the cause of this incident.

An instructor pilot reported entering the runway to depart causing an arriving aircraft on short final to go around.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft X departed EKM airport heading towards ZZZ1 airport. About 9 minutes after departure; the pilot informed me that he was having an electrical issue and wanted to divert to ZZZ. I assigned a vector and descent for the ILS XX approach; the field at the time was IFR with an overcast ceiling of 1;400 feet and 1 1/2 SM visibility. I issued the pilot the approach clearance; but he was unable to fly the approach because he was running on battery only and had no idea where the localizer was. The pilot informed me that the heading indicator was not working; so I informed the pilot that the vectors will be no gyro. I instructed the pilot to start a right turn.A few minutes later; he [requested priority handling]. The pilot had four souls on board and 3 hours of fuel remaining; he also advised he wanted vehicles standing by. For the next few minutes; the pilot struggled to maintain a steady heading; since he lost his instruments and was relying on a compass and myself. Once he was able to maintain a steady heading; I advised him to start a right turn; and successfully turned the pilot on to the localizer. Once he was established; I cleared him to land on XX and advised to contact tower once he was on the ground. The pilot did not start a descent and was a little high for the approach; and went around. I instructed him to climb and maintain 3;000 feet and to remain on his present heading. The pilot informed he was unable to climb and wanted to stay at 1;500 feet. I advised him I couldn't vector him for the approach at 1;500 feet because he was below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). The pilot then told me his battery was running out and needed to land; so I approved for him to stay at 1;500 feet and instructed him to start a left turn. The pilot requested to stay close to the airport and set him up for a 2 mile final. I instructed the pilot to continue the left turn and then told him to stop turn once he was lined up for the runway. The pilot reported the runway insight; and I instructed him to continue a slow descent. Aircraft X landed safely. The pilot informed me he landed and explained that he had a dual alternator failure and was running on the battery only and a compass.

SBN TRACON Controller reported assisting an aircraft with an equipment problem to a safe landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Type 6400

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 131; Flight Crew Type 12400

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the originating preflight; the First Officer seat is saturated with tasks that prevent a thorough examination of the logbook. If there are discrepancies the Captain's seat many times becomes saturated. There is a level of trust that has to be maintained between the crew members that tasks are being accomplished. Often various tasks are not verified between the crew members that tasks due to lack of time. We both missed an open writeup left from the terminating Crew the night before. Apparently there was no Maintenance available when the writeup was made and also the Captain who wrote up the discrepancy never followed through with Maintenance Control after writing up the discrepancy. We failed to catch the open writeup during our preflight.I feel like there could be a better distribution of preflight tasks divided between Crew Members to facilitate better checks and balances of tasks.

We flew the aircraft with an open write-up in logbook. It was the originating flight. Terminating Captain from the night before wrote up an issue with the APU and contacted Dispatch and MX Control. MX Control advised the Captain to call local MX to take care of the issue. Captain was unable to contact local MX on the radio or by phone. Terminating Captain wrote up the intermittent light on APU; but did not coordinate with local MX and left. There was no MEL; tracking number; or corrective action documented. Local MX was not aware of the issue. We showed up the next morning on the aircraft with four MELs. Reviewing the MEL restrictions on these MELs took extra time during preflight duties. My FO and I both commented about the APU write-up; but did not catch the fact it was not MEL'd or fixed. The Crew taking the aircraft from us caught the error.I need to carefully look through all write-ups in the logbook. They might have been written up weeks or months earlier and not been caught by anyone's review. Captains writing up an aircraft MUST complete the loop. If at a MX Station; MX should be contacted. If at a Contract Location; Contract MX should be contacted. If you can't contact Local or Contract MX; the write-up MUST be coordinated with MX Control. If not; no one will work the issue and the flight will probably be delayed or taken out of service later. MX Control will be unaware of the problem. Worse yet; the outbound Crew and subsequent Crews may fly the aircraft without catching the write-up; and there is no one to back them up. Bottom line; my fault; I should have caught the open write-up and did not.

B737 crew flew with an open maintenance write-up left from the terminating crew the night before.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Descending into ZZZ; scattered cloud deck around 4;300 feet. Winds gusty and variable out of the south over close terrain. Cleared for the visual approach from Center and started a left pattern for Runway XX backed up by the RNAV XX for reference. Terrain page active on CA (Captain) side MFD. On base turn; aircraft was still descending resulting in a level off at 1;000 feet while on base. Ground track was toward terrain even though in VMC. On base to final turn to line up with runway; 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up' sounded resulting in an immediate go-around per company procedures. Subsequent approach was conducted from the initial approach fix to runway XX resulting in a successful approach and landing.

EMB-145 First Officer reported executing a go-around after receiving a GPWS terrain alert on a visual approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 210; Flight Crew Type 25

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Arrived at airport to fly my Comanche 260 after a complete pre-flight inspection I proceed to load my 2 passengers and gear and moved onto the pre-start check list. Once I arrived at the 'Turn on Master Switch' I notice the master switch was left on by another pilot. The Comanche 260 has an external jump port for a tug which was brought over by airport staff and attempted to start the plane with it. Then with the assistance of a jump pack the plane finally started. The line staff notified me to let the plane run for 15 minutes on the ground until the battery charged up enough and then fly. I waited approximately 15 minutes then moved down to the takeoff area to do my pre-flight run up and spent another 15 minutes doing a slow run up to let the battery charge longer. Then proceed to depart; rotated around 80 mph; then upon passing the end of the runway selected the gear up switch which resulted in a total power failure in the aircraft seconds later. I continued my climb out; and instructed my passenger to open the checklist to emergency failure list; and had the second passenger call the airport the get someone to check my gear position. I also had him call the nearest tower and inform them of our situation. We completed the emergency check list for electrical failure at 2500 feet; above the traffic pattern which was 1500 feet in case we had an engine failure or other traffic entered the pattern; with no success. We then proceeded to make a 500 foot pass over the field for someone to inspect the gear from the ground; the report back was that the gear was stuck half-way up. I climbed back out and proceeded to the emergency gear extension; checklist and we did it exactly by the numbers and got the gear locked into place manually. We spoke with ground via cell phone and did one more low pass to confirm gear was actually down. And proceeded in for a soft field landing in case the gear was not locked. In the process electrical power seemed to return to the aircraft; and we were able to use flaps again and radios. We landed without any issues. Take aways; from this. Buying a portable radio ASAP! Never flying on a dead battery; we should have removed the battery from the plane and charged it on a trickle charger for 24 hours and verified it was good with a tester before flying again. What we discovered post incident: On the Comanche 260 Aircraft it is a 2 position selector switch that is either going up or down that puts a massive draw on the alternator; thus requiring a fully charged battery to retract and drop the gear on the aircraft. When the alternator became overloaded in flight it stopped charging the battery and the battery lost all the juice it had and the plane's electrical system went dead due to the constant draw of electrical power on the motor that was stuck in the middle of retraction with no way to shut the motor off. The breaker for the landing gear cannot be manual pulled and turning off the master also cuts the charging power of the alternator in theory due to the design of the charging system leaving the one option of emergency gear extension. Once the motor was disconnected from the landing gear and the gear actually locked into place the gear motor stopped running because it was being told the landing gear was actually down and allowed the alternator to send power to the avionics again and charge the battery. Result was a successful landing; one destroyed battery due to being left on; brand new battery on order and electrical system will be inspected by A and P before returning to service. Contributing factors was my decision to fly the aircraft after jump starting. Never fly an aircraft after a jump start. Charge the battery properly first. And do not listen to the advice of others that goes against better judgment. Not meeting or flight is worth your life.

Piper Comanche pilot reported a loss of electrical power resulted in a manual gear extension and return to the departure airport.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Left thrust reverser deferred. Assigned a runway; wind approximately 170/17. [I] asked First Officer to request the longer runway if possible. Tower approved request and about 30 seconds later asked for fuel and souls on board. I stated this was in no way an emergency or a request for priority handling and can take any runway. Tower stated he was doing as told. I stated to ATC that we do not have an emergency. Landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate. Emergency equipment was called but I do not believe followed aircraft to gate.

Air Carrier inbound with Left Thrust Reverser deferred; was handled as a emergency by ATC when no such declaration was initiated by the flight crew.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

The flight was from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Our company scheduled departure was for XB:00Z. The departure time on the filed flight plan was XA:30Z. Our engine start was at approximately XA:05Z. My FO (First Officer) copied our IFR clearance. I watched and listened as he wrote it for verification. I have photo of the initial clearance as it was copied. After the FO had read back the first clearance; the clearance controller indicated that the read back was correct. The initial clearance given has a great bearing upon; and is a root cause element of our deviation.Our actual takeoff time was XB:13Z; more than an hour after engine start; which also affected cause for our deviation; the clearance was re-issued; but without a full read. We were told we would be about number 35 for takeoff as we began our taxi. During our taxi; we were lead to various parking positions as other traffic taxied around us. We were directed to switch to clearance twice for rerouting while waiting in the various parking positions; and to return to Ground frequency; with no need to monitor the Ground frequency while accepting new clearances. When receiving the last (third) clearance; the Controller told us that it was the same as our first clearance issued. He **did not read** the full original clearance; and did not ask for it to be read back in full. He did say the clearance was the same as the original clearance and contained the Woodstown (OOD) VOR fix. If the original route clearance; ZZZ-OOD-HAYDO-TEBEE-SBY-ZZZ1; is copied and mapped; it would require about a 180 degree turn at HAYDO; and another turn of close to 180 degrees at TEBEE. I believe with some certainty that the clearance should have been ZZZ-OOD-TEBEE-HAYDO-SBY-ZZZ1.Up until a few seconds shy of the time of the deviation; our aircraft was under autopilot and flight director control. We had just been cleared for a short climb; 16;000 ft to 17;000 ft. After the climb clearance; 17;000 ft was selected in the altitude selector. As we neared to 17;000 ft; my PFD (Primary Flight Display) HIS (Heading Situation Indicator) indicated to me that a turn of about 180 degrees was about to commence. Alarmed at this; I disengaged the autopilot; without time to respond to the level off at 17;000 ft. I quickly figured out from our MFD (Multi-Function Display) map that our clearance route points had been reversed. Soon after we received an RA (Resolution Advisory) due to the excessive climb. Almost simultaneously; our Center Controller again instructed us to level off at 17;000 ft. We were just shy of 17;800 ft before returning to 17;000 ft. The autopilot/FMS/FD was commanding a turn of near to 180 degrees at HAYDO to return to TEBEE.Had the routing TEBEE-HAYDO sequence not been reversed; there would have been no issue; and the flight would have continued without consequence. Possibly; had the clearance Controller read the full third clearance and/or had us do another read back; the issue could have also been mitigated so no altitude deviation occurred.

Air taxi Captain reported ATC issuance of incorrect routing and an altitude deviation.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While cruising at FL310; we were alerted to a L HYD ELEC PUMP message. We noticed the hydraulic quantity on the status page was rapidly decreasing and the L Electric Pump PRESS light on the overhead panel was flashing. The Left Autopilot was engaged; so the Pilot Flying engaged the Right Autopilot as I referenced the QRH. Within about 1 minute; we received the L HYD SYS PRESS; RUDDER RATIO and L HYD QTY messages. Hydraulic quantity on the left side indicated .11. We completed the L HYD SYS PRESS checklist and discussed our options as a crew and with [Maintenance Control]. Pressure on the left hydraulic system indicated 3;000 psi on the status page indicating that the PTU was operating normally and we could expect Flaps; Slats; Landing Gear and Nosewheel Steering to operate. ZZZ was VMC; dry runway and light winds- Runway XX (11;500 ft.) was selected. We [advised ATC] and continued on the filed arrival and a 10 nm base in order to land below 198K. We selected Flaps 1 on downwind to validate PTU operation and configured conservatively on the visual/ILS to Runway XX. We executed a Flaps 20 landing with light manual braking; right thrust reverser and exited on [taxiway] where we were inspected by CFR (Crash Fire Rescue). CFR did not note anything unusual and followed us to [Gate] for shutdown. Upon engine shutdown at the gate; a large amount of hydraulic fluid drained from the landing gear doors onto the ramp. CFR assisted maintenance with cleanup and Fire Marshall discussed [event] with crew.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757-200 flight crew reported a hydraulic system failure that resulted in a precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 10

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

[It occurred] during [the] landing roll [while] performing a wheel landing [with the] Instructor in [the] back seat [and the] student in [the] front. Upon reducing power and letting the tail come down to the runway and slowing down to clear Runway XX at Taxiway XX; the nose of the aircraft started to track to the right and we ended up doing a 180 degree turn near the intersection of Taxiway XY and Runway XX. [We] contacted Tower to continue [the] taxi and clear at Taxiway XX; [and] fire trucks met us at [the] aircraft once [we were] clear of [the] runway to check out the aircraft. We were cleared to taxi back to the Ramp under aircraft power. [There was] no aircraft damage and personal injuries.

Pilot reported a loss of control after landing as the aircraft ground looped.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Due to the COVID-19 slow down our department has flown our aircraft every X weeks to keep the plane and crew flight ready for our corporation.  On this particular flight I the Captain; and the Second in Command were briefing the approach into ZZZ airport.  While briefing we were headed direct to ZZZZZ intersection for the ZZZZZ6 arrival.  The plane had not flown for two weeks and due to a cancelled trip I had not flown for 56 days.  The Second in Command had flown a trip 2 weeks prior to this flight.  On receiving the ATIS the approach advertised was different than what was usual and anticipated.  So we as a crew briefed the approach thoroughly (it was noted it had some updated information).  During this briefing I noticed we were below 10;000 feet; around 8;000 feet and traveling at 270 knots indicated airspeed.  Upon this observation I slowed the aircraft to below 250 knots.  The Controller never mentioned anything and there was no traffic noted on the TCAS or visually.  The procedure I should have done differently/better was to transfer control or to have the Second in Command brief the approach.

Corporate Captain reported a speed deviation and cited lack of flying during the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was taking Local 1 and was in a relief briefing when the prior coordination was not correct. A B737 was on a 7 mile final going 190 KTS and an MD80 was one half mile in trail going 250 KTS. Final coordinated with Local 1 to put the B737 on Runway 25R. When I took the position; and the B737 checked in for Runway 25L; I asked the pilot to verify they were for the left and not the right side. The B737 said they were for Runway 25L. I asked the previous Controller and they said; The MD80 was for the right. The MD80 [was] still on Final frequency was vectored to the south then back to the north directly over top of the B737 by 400 FT estimated. The B737 said they had an RA; I issued the traffic again for the second time and verified the B737 still wanted to land. Final said the B737 was suppose to be on Runway 25R but it would have been worst in my opinion if they were since the aircraft has to slow down to sidestep runways. The MD80 should have been broke out from the beginning. Also; TRACON normally calls and asks if they can put someone on the right and not the other way around. I feel this might have confused the control. If the first guy is too slow then you shouldn't slow them down more by sidestepping them. I recommend that assist one be open during traffic hours for coordinating reasons. Training was in progress on Final and the trainer should have maybe stepped in earlier.

While on final Runway 25L; another carrier's MD80 was behind us and cleared to do S-turns for separation. Approaching 1;200 FT AGL; we received a TCAS RA to descend. While complying; we noticed the traffic high to the left overtaking us. We advised Tower that we were complying with the RA and he advised us the other carrier's jet was breaking out to the south. It was a different Tower Controller than had originally cleared us to land. He asked us if we were cleared on the right or left. We advised him the left. He asked us if we would continue to complete the landing. We advised him yes; we would continue. [We] landed safely with no further incidence. A close one for sure. The Controller swap or training that was going on contributed to the event but the aircraft that are not maintaining separation should be made to discontinue their approach early so safe separation is not lost.

Local Controller described a pilot declared NMAC when the TRACON failed to establish appropriate speed assignments causing an overtake situation between two arrival aircraft.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was flying in IMC conditions for over an hour in the plane and had about 4 hrs more given the stronger than expected headwinds. I decided to land at ZZZ to refuel as it was reporting marginal VFR at the time. All around and further down my flight path things were IFR. When I informed ATC of my decision to land at ZZZ; they reported IFR conditions and I set up for the ILS.I have flown this plane in IFR conditions before but have not flown the ILS in it. I have about 17 years experience with flying IFR in other planes and am comfortable and current with flying ILS approaches; but not in this plane. During the approach; the Tower Controller got a low altitude alert which I was able to correct. The reason was my unfamiliarity with the ILS characteristics of this plane.

LA-4 A/B Buccaneer single pilot executing an instrument approach reported that Tower received a low altitude alert warning.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

In cruise at FL300; with a previous malfunction causing the loss of hydraulic system 3; the aircraft had a FCC [Flight Control Computer] 2b and a DEU [Display Electronic Unit] #2 failure. The failures caused the autopilot to disengage; the throttles to retard to idle and the airspeed envelope to close causing an over speed warning. Pilot Flying immediately lowered the nose and advanced the throttles to prevent a stall condition. Aircraft lost approximately 1;000 feet prior to the pilot returning aircraft to its assigned altitude. Notified ATC of the situation and ran appropriate checklist to recover systems. We then requested clearance to return to ZZZ. On return; we [advised ATC] and dumped approximately 65;000 lbs. of [fuel] to bring aircraft below maximum landing weight. Captain made an uneventful landing to Runway XXR; we then proceeded to taxi aircraft to the [Company] ramp. Loss of multiple systems; FCC 2b; DEU (Display Electronic Unit) #2; Hyd (Hydraulic) #3 with multiple secondary alerts.

Air carrier pilot reported loss of multiple systems while in cruise.  Flight crew advised ATC and returned to departure airport.


Time Pressure; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During the takeoff roll at a speed of approximately 45 knots I noticed the right hand upper engine cowling shaking and beginning to lift. Realizing that the cowling was not properly latched; I reduced the throttle to idle and performed a rejected takeoff. I notified the Tower Controller and exited the runway. I explained to the Tower Controller the reason for discontinuing the takeoff and he asked if I needed to return to the gate. After considering this I told him that I didn't believe that it was necessary but that I would like to proceed to the run up pad for where; with his permission; I would like to shut down in order to properly close and latch the cowling and inspect for any damage. The Controller asked how long this would take and I responded; 'Only 2 or 3 minutes.' I was then cleared to taxi to the run up pad where I shut down the engine; set the parking brake; and proceeded to inspect the engine cowl. The engine cowl was resting in its normal position and all three latches were in the open position. Using a flashlight; I looked over the cowling both inside and out before attempting to close and latch the cowl. No damage was noticed so I latched the cowl closed and returned to the flight deck. After completing the engine start and appropriate preflight checks; I notified the Tower Controller that I was ready for takeoff. The remainder of the flight was completed uneventfully. Two abnormal events occurred during the preflight and loading of the aircraft that contributed to this event:1. After connecting the battery; during my visual inspection of the right hand engine compartment (engine cowl open) another Company pilot walked over to me and asked questions regarding some policies/procedures. Since this pilot was new to the company I took the time to interrupt my preflight to provide detailed answers to the questions. This required that I retrieve my cell phone from the flight deck and since I had been holding the engine cowl open with my hand instead of using the rod/bracket designed to hold the cowl open the cowl returned to its closed position when I stepped away. I had intended to return to latch the cowl. 2. Immediately after answering the other pilots questions; now standing on the left side of the aircraft near the pilots door; the Ramp Agent handed me the loading control document and indicated that there was a piece of freight that was about to be loaded on my plane that was not included in the paperwork. Working to understand and resolve this issue distracted me from returning to the unlatched engine cowl. With the engine cowl resting in its closed position I failed to notice and to remember that the three cowl latches had not been properly secured. I could suggest that pilots not allow themselves to become distracted while performing their preflight duties but given that this a single pilot operation and the Pilot in Command has many tasks to perform in a limited amount of time and given that; despite much standardization; variations of routine in loading; completing paperwork; communication; and just about everything that occurs in the hour prior to block out can and do occur; any suggestion must be explicit and actionable. Therefore; in order to prevent pilots of the C208 from forgetting to properly close and latch the engine cowl I suggest the following: 1. Whenever the engine cowl is opened employ the hold open rod/bracket designed for this purpose instead of holding the cowl open with one's hand. This way the open cowl will be obvious to the pilot while he/she is seated in the pilot seat. 2. Prior to boarding the airplane for departure the pilot should walk completely around the airplane; perhaps touching with his/her fingers each and every door; hatch; cowl; etc. to ensure these items are in the correct position for flight.

A rejected takeoff was the result of distractions during preflight which caused the pilot of a C-208 to fail to fasten engine cowling latches which were open at the time of the distractions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 169; Flight Crew Type 129

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Landing for the first time from the right seat; I realized I was low and slow on final. Added power to clear trees and reduced power again. Still low and slow; added power and airplane ballooned. Instead of correcting with the yoke; I reduced power. The airplane; already near stall speed; stalled and impacted the ground from about 30 feet in the air; resulting in a hard landing bending the right axle. No personal injuries.

The pilot was landing his Aeronca 65LA from the right seat for the first time; he got low and slow and then stalled at a reported 30 feet AGL.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 3000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Flying into YSSY we were vectored off of the CAPS One arrival and given headings; airspeed and descents by the Sydney Controller. We were then given an airspeed of 275 knots and given direct to MARLN and continue the MARLN One arrival. After passing MARLN we were given a descent to 8;000 feet. Between MARLN and WHALE we leveled off at 8;000 feet and were given a frequency change. Near WHALE the new controller; whom we had just checked in with gave us a descent to 6;000 feet. The Captain read back the clearance 'Departing 8;000 feet for 6;000 feet' and I started a 1;000 FPM descent with the vertical speed. Passing about 6;800 feet MSL the controller stated the bottom of his control area was 7;500 feet; climb and maintain 8;000 feet. The Captain replied to the controller that the controller had told us to descend and maintain 6;000 feet and that he had replied 'Departing 8;000 feet for 6;000 feet'. The controller said 'Yeah; but I didn't know you were going to do it'. We climbed and maintained 8;000 feet. The rest of the STAR; approach and landing was uneventful. I thought this occurrence was possibly the controller's mistake; but bizarre to say the least.

Large Transport flight crew; given a descent from 8000 feet to 6000 feet by Approach Control; were told at 6800 feet that they were supposed to be at 8000 feet.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 350

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While being vectored to ILS runway 24R at LAX; the So Cal controller asked us to follow another Heavy. At the time; there was a thick layer of smoke from the fire to the west between our altitude (3000 MSL) and airport; and while LAX was reporting 10 SM vis; the inflight visibility was 1-2 SM. Turning right base; we had the traffic to follow in sight; but he soon entered the smoke and we lost sight. The controller asked us multiple times if we had the airport in sight; which we did not due to the heavy layer of smoke. Due to the distraction of trying to follow an aircraft we could no longer see; as well as trying to locate the airport through the smoke; we undershot the localizer and the controller appropriately broke us out and re-vectored us. The second time we concentrated on capturing and flying the localizer. Once we got 4-5 miles from the runway; the visibility was fine and we continued the approach mostly via visual references.The use of a visual approach and directions to follow traffic in front may not have been appropriate; as the inflight visibility didn't support visual flight conditions until much lower and closer to the airport. The LAX ATIS didn't really indicate the impact of the smoke; as the visibility was 8-10 miles below the smoke layer. I was Pilot Flying; in retrospect I should have directed the Pilot Not Flying to tell the approach controller that the flight visibility didn't support visual approaches.

The Captain of a transport aircraft on a training flight reported that smoke from nearby fire obscured portions of the final approach segments even though the airport was reporting VFR visibilities.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Making our approach into ZZZ we encountered severe turbulence due to high winds and convective weather. During our decent below 10;000 feet the aircraft was unable to maintain below 250 even though the captain as the PF (Pilot Flying) was slowing to approximately 220-230 kts steady below. The wind turbulence was severe enough to where we decided to let maintenance know of the issue and ground the plane for inspection. As the PM (Pilot Monitoring) I made calls out to the captain to inform him of altitude changes while he made changes in power to control the event. After approximately 5;000 feet we got out of the turbulence and started to regain control of our speed and landed with no other events.Maintained good CRM while I as the PM was calling out speeds and altitude fluctuations the captain as the PF was making corrective actions to try and control the wind shift and not push the plane past the turbulence penetration speed. [I suggest asking] Center for more advisable routes to avoid severe turbulence. We used our radar to avoid heavy precipitation and took an alternate route compared to the aircraft that went in front of us but was still unable to find smoother air.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 feet due to severe turbulence.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 28000; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

At takeoff clearance; given turn left 040; then on roll given runway heading 127 as previous traffic was turned northeast. Climbing off airport boundary given turn left 060. AP (Autopilot) on so commanded turn to 060. Then AP chimes off so I re-engage. I missed resetting heading bug so AP continued turning left thru assigned 060 before I recognized error. Immediately turned off AP and hand flew back to 060. Departure called and inquired heading as I re-established heading. At this moment got a RA (Resolution Advisory) to climb 2000+ to solve conflict. I was already doing near this amount of rate of climb. My estimate was I passed over traffic 300 ft. At the moment did not get a good recollection of the actual altitude.I got behind airplane with heading changes; AP failing off at inopportune time; and slow recognition response. I have not flown this aircraft in 30 days and it showed. Rest of the day went well. Called SAT TRACON upon arrival at destination and was told nothing came up post event. No excuses; I just was behind the departure and airplane at this moment.

BE-300 Captain reported near mid-air collision after takeoff.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 19R

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 81; Flight Crew Total 1043; Flight Crew Type 147

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We used type 1 and 4 deicing before taking off so icing was no issue during all of the flight. No turbulence or wind shear. We briefed the approach early and verified it on EFMS (Experimental Flight Management System). We were given vectors to intercept MKE ILS 19R just after the IAF (Initial Approach Fix) ADELE at 2;800 feet. When we were cleared for the approach I reiterated to the Captain 'we are cleared for the approach and to maintain 2;800 feet until glide slope intercept at OMOGE.' Approach mode did not activate correctly and I noted it was still on GPS; not localizer green needle. Captain confirmed approach mode on autopilot did not activate. I asked what to hit on EFMS or if I should try hitting approach mode. By then we were at OMOGE at 2;800 feet. Captain decided best course of action was to use the descent wheel. I notified him we hit FAF (Final Approach Fix) at 2;800 feet; our minimums are 872 and I bugged 900 feet on the altimeter. Captain asked for flaps and gear. I verified flap settings and gear down while confirming localizer is in nav. I advised and confirm [our] climb.I looked back up when I heard Tower say something; however I did not hear them over the Captain and neither did he. I asked him to be quiet and I noticed he had been descending at 2;000 FPM and we were still on GPS with no vertical guidance. I noted on the chart and to the Captain where we were on the approach and that we are so far below even minimums. I told him our minimums were 872 feet and we were at 700 feet something not close to the runway. Our Proline 21 started giving us terrain warning and pull up.ATC said 'climb now.' We saw [a] building right in front and slightly right of us. I advised to Captain and ATC climbing. Captain began a climb to minimums. I told him no we were going missed we can just try this again. I didn't wait for Captain's response and told ATC we are going missed. I set climb altitude and put flaps and gear back up. We then followed Tower's instructions and they asked if we would like to shoot the approach again because there are now reports of icing.I advised we are not getting icing and would like to set up for approach again. Captain and I started to talk about what went wrong; then I advised that we can talk on the ground and should focus on doing the approach. I re-entered ILS 19R and we did the approach again. When we transferred back to approach they asked for the reason we went missed. I asked the Captain should we say it was our EFMS and we descended too fast? He says no tell them it was icing and wind shear or turbulence from other planes. I told him no and I don't want to mess this up so he can tell them what he wants. He advised that we went missed because we didn't see the runway.After our flight we discussed what we should do next time. He says he will now start using his iPad during flight and will try not to fixate. We also decided that the descent wheel should never be used during an approach since it is not [VNAV] and he would have to make sure he leveled the plane off himself. We also decided to have a more sterile cockpit so I can hear ATC and make the standard call outs. If we are rushed and no call outs are made or an unstable descent is noted we will go missed immediately.

BE400 First Officer reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning during an unstabilized approach to MKE.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 7100; Flight Crew Type 700

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Straight & level at 17;000 [feet]; IMC on autopilot in NAV/ALT mode; light-mod turbulence. In mod turbulence with updraft; autopilot failed and disconnected; aircraft climbed approx 400 feet.  ATC noted altitude change; provided altitude readout and altimeter setting; we responded that autopilot failed in turbulence and correcting. Autopilot was reset and performed normally for the remainder of the flight. The autopilot has had similar failures over the past few weeks; all reported to Chief Pilot and [Maintenance/Management]. He responded on most reports that 'we'll get someone to look at it' but crew was not informed if any maintenance checks; and scheduled flights continued despite reports.  After the above instance was reported with mention of ATC comment; maintenance was scheduled and 3 more legs were flown before delivering the aircraft to the shop on the evening of DATE. I am concerned that [Maintenance/Management] is reluctant to take the aircraft out of service for pilot squawks. We have had previous conversations where our ability to recognise situations indicating a need for maintenance  were questioned; we were threatened for 'challenging' him; advised that he had hired us and he could fire us.

PC-12 flight crew reported the aircraft autopilot malfunctioned. They reported encountering resistance from Management to address maintenance issues.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

This is actually 2 events. First; on the departure off ZZZ1 there were 3 aircraft in trail climbing out: Air Carrier W; then Air Carrier X (aircraft 1); then Air Carrier Y (aircraft 2). ZZZ1 Approach issued Air Carrier Y 250 KTS to keep in trail spacing behind Air Carrier X. Air Carrier Y overtook Air Carrier X despite the speed restriction of 250 KTS. I was training an R-Side Developmental at the time. He issued 270 KTS to Air Carrier X and then I keyed up and issued Air Carrier Y 30 degrees left. We also stopped the Air Carrier Y at FL180; and requested a report out of FL190 on Air Carrier X. It seems that either Air Carrier Y was going faster than 250 KTS or Air Carrier X was climbing at a reduced rate of 220 KTS or maybe even less. We did not ask the pilot of Air Carrier X his climbing speed. Separation was about 5 miles or 1;000 FT; but it was close to being a loss of separation. Meanwhile; another sector called to point out an Emergency aircraft that was descending at a rapid rate. They said he was descending to 16;000 FT. I informed him of traffic; Air Carrier Y at FL180. The emergency aircraft was descending so quickly that the altitude was XXX'ed out. He said that a different Sector was actually talking to him. Called traffic to the Air Carrier Y; informing him that the emergency would be descending through his altitude. The other sector called back to say that the emergency was through 13;000 FT. Air Carrier Y never reported the Emergency aircraft in sight. Be aware of reduced rates of speed during the climbing portion of the flight.

Enroute Controller providing OJT described a near loss of separation event when two in trail departure aircraft varied from expected speeds. The situation was complicated by an emergency aircraft descending at a very rapid rate.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Supervisor / CIC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was training on Local Control; during a busy VFR Friday afternoon. I started falling behind and the On the Job Training Instructor took over the frequency. I continued to assist by managing the strip-board and making rolling calls. Aircraft Y was landing RWY 11; with Aircraft X landing shortly thereafter on RWY 16. Aircraft Y types are normally very slow; with short landing distances; usually able to exit TWY F (1;200 feet); and at most to reach taxi speed and hold short of RWY 16 (2;500 feet). With this preceding experience; it was anticipated that Aircraft Y would be clear of RWY 11 or given taxi-speed hold instructions prior to Aircraft X occupying RWY 16. While Aircraft Y's approach and touchdown appeared normal; it continued down the runway at a higher than expected speed. Aircraft Y advised it was unable to make TWY L (2;500 feet; just prior to the RWY 16 hold line). Aircraft X was able to slow and exit before the RWY intersection. Aircraft Y was able to exit TWY H; inside the RWY intersection.Always have a plan in the event aircraft to not perform the way you expect them to; which still ensures separation. Land and Hold Short Operations; go-around; turns for re-sequencing are a few of the tools one could use.

I was working Clearance/Flight Data and Controller In Charge when the incident occurred. The tower controller gave Aircraft Y a landing clearance with hold short instructions for Runway 11. Aircraft Y accepted the landing clearance but never read back the hold short instructions. During that time the volume of traffic was high and pilots were stepping on each other to either check in or to ask about their sequence. Aircraft X was on final for runway 16. Both aircraft landed and Aircraft Y on runway 11 and Aircraft X on runway 16. Once Aircraft Y was on taxi speed the controller instructed to hold short of the other runway where Aircraft X was also at taxi speed. Aircraft Y replied unable and went passed the hold short lines and immediately the controller asked Aircraft X if he was able to hold short of Runway 11. Aircraft X was able to exit the runway before the intersection. Unfortunately we work at an airport that people are not accustomed to waiting therefore are constantly asking why the delays; what sequence are they in regards to other airplanes either in front or at the adjacent taxiway etc. complicating and increasing the work load because we now have to give an estimate of time while there are other VFR pilots inbound that need to be radar identified.

HPN controllers reported an unsafe operation when a landing aircraft was asked to hold short of an intersecting runway and could not resulting in a ground conflict.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft X departed and checked in with approach climbing to 5;000 feet. Aircraft X was radar identified but I was unable to pick up his Mode C right away. When I did pick up his Mode C it was reading between 1;800 feet to 2;000 feet. I immediately advised him of his altitude and told him the MVA was 4;900 feet. A moment later he [notified] his cargo door opening. I asked him if he needed any assistance and to advise having airport in sight. He was having a hard time communicating with me due to his low altitude so he was cutting in and out. He did get airport in sight and I terminated his radar and switched him over to Flight Service Station (FSS). I called FSS airport to verify that he did make it safely on the ground.It all happened so quickly that my main thought was to help him get on the ground as quickly and safely as possible that I had forgotten to re-clear him to the airport and issue a Visual Approach clearance. For future reference; I will remember to reclear aircraft and issue his approach clearance.

CKB Controller reported an aircraft returned to the airport due to an opened cargo door. The Controller forgot to issue an approach clearance back to the airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 800

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I leveled off at approximately 800 feet approximately 3 to 4 minutes into a part 91 tour at which point I noticed my engine tachometer had dropped to zero and a sputtering sound was coming from the engine. Immediately by low RPM warning horn came on for the main rotor. I reduced collective and tried to maintain rotor RPM and initiated 180deg auto rotation. I informed my passenger that we would be making an emergency landing. I approached the landing area at approximately 65 knots and put in aft cyclic to induce a flare at approximately 25 feet AGL in an unimproved grass field; started to pull collective to cushion impact. I leveled the aircraft and continue to raise the collective until impacting. The helicopter bounced approximately 15 feet and settled into the grass. I checked my passenger to ensure he was OK; then applied the rotor brake to stop the main rotor. Once main rotor was stop I got out of the helicopter and check for damage. No visible damage was found. I contacted the Company operation center to coordinate a helicopter to pick up my passenger. After approximately 20 minutes I conducted a thorough preflight inspection of the aircraft to include all fluids finding nothing I attempted to restart the aircraft. I was able to restart the aircraft but the engine was not operating correctly to warrant flight. It would start but continually tried to die. I was picked up by an additional company aircraft and my aircraft remains in the field waiting for further guidance from the company.

The Pilot of a R44 experienced an engine malfunction that resulted in an off airport landing.


Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

An unforecast thunderstorm left us making decisions with less fuel than we often would have had in this situation. Had we more fuel; holding and waiting for the weather to pass and knowing we could still divert if it didn't would have been ideal. That is not the situation in which we found ourselves. We had enough fuel for one approach; a missed; and a diversion. I feel that under the circumstances; our decision-making was appropriate. Our timing was unfortunate. Gusty; shifting; changeable winds in the flare are an extreme hazard. By the time its extent was apparent; we were well past the point at which a go around would have been safe or even successful.There was no alternate for [the] flight; as current and forecast conditions at our time of departure were excellent. The fuel planning was adequate for the expected conditions. The flight was routine and uneventful until we spotted lightning while inbound. We immediately turned on the radar; revealing several cells northwest and moving towards the airport. The ATIS still showed calm winds at the surface. While the FO (First Officer) continued to analyze the TWIPS and the radar images; I assessed our fuel situation; including ability to hold and/or divert; and seated the flight attendants with the advice that it may be rough ahead. As no alternate was planned; our fuel situation would not allow for holding long enough to be confident that the weather would have passed. I determined that an approach; a missed; and the necessary diversion around the weather (which was between us and our impromptu planned diversion airport) was possible; though we would arrive with minimum fuel. As we continued inbound; the storms also continued their advance. I queried approach about the surface winds; and finding them insignificant (less than 10 knots;) requested landing on the Runway XX instead; thus saving us the requisite time to fly a downwind and getting us on the ground with a greater distance between us and the oncoming weather. The request was denied due to traffic considerations. The FO and I briefed the new plan and potential go around.We continued inbound; now via vectors. We remained in VFR conditions throughout. We called the field in sight approximately abeam it; and were cleared for the approach with instructions to follow the preceding aircraft. As anticipated; the FO kept the speed up until the base turn. We were busy configuring and turning and triple checking everything. On the base turn; we began to experience light turbulence. The Tower Controller gave us an imprecise wind update; something along the lines of feeling the wind increase. I had to ask him to say again due to workload. We turned approximately a 3 mile final with the storm approximately 6 miles from the field. The FO rolled out right on localizer and glideslope. We were cleared to land with all checklists complete and increasing turbulence; plus and minus 5 knots. The FO flew it well; maintaining pitch and airspeed admirably under the circumstances; and I added occasional advice about power settings and speed maintenance due to the challenging conditions and my strong interest in making sure that he continued to fly it well. I followed him on the controls in case I needed to take them at any point; but at no point did I take the controls or did he think that I had. We were alert to the possibility of; and ready for; a windshear caution or warning; but there was none. As he entered the flare; a sustained gust pushed us a bit high and elongated the flare. As the aircraft slowed and the ailerons became less effective; greater control movements were made to maintain control. Quickly shifting winds as the aircraft slowed induced a right roll and contact between the surface and right wingtip just before touchdown.We landed at approximately 69;000 lbs. with 3;700 lbs. of fuel on board; almost exactly what the flight was planned to land with. We were advised that on landing; the storm was approximately 4 miles from the field.I know weight and fuel savings are an important consideration when running an airline; but a slightly greater fuel buffer might offer pilots more options; particularly as we head into the summer months when storms; including the unforecast variety; will be more frequent.

CRJ-900 Captain reported that a gust from a nearby thunderstorm caused a right roll during the landing flare; which resulted in a wingtip contacting the runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 74.4; Flight Crew Total 356.5; Flight Crew Type 138.8

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

This was my first trip to the North Las Vegas Airport and I had requested progressive taxi instructions upon arrival the prior day and again for my departure on the day of the incident. I was assisted to the engine runup area near Runway 7 (RWY 7 RUNUP AREA as labeled on the VGT Airport Diagram). After engine runup; I left the runup area and proceeded around another aircraft that was in the runup area and then onto Taxiway Gulf as instructed. While making sure my left wing stayed clear of the aircraft still in the runup area; I proceeded to Taxiway Gulf. I stayed looking at my clearance from the aircraft in the runup area too long; because when I returned to looking towards Taxiway G for the hold short line; I realized that I was already on it. The nose of my aircraft from the front windshield forward to the propeller had crossed the hold short line. I immediately called the Tower and ask for guidance only to realize that I was still on Ground Control's frequency. Ground Control had me switch to Tower immediately where they had me pull through to the run up area between Runway 7 and 12R and then call the Tower on a land line.The cause of the problem was a combination of lack of familiarity with the airport's hold short lines and fatigue from insufficient sleep due to being in Las Vegas; NV. I was up until almost midnight and then got up for an early departure.In the future; the key to preventing incidents like this are to: 1. Increase my level of rest before flying. As we all know; fatigue is very dangerous in the high demand environment of aviation. 2. Avoid fixation on any one task to keep greater situational awareness. By temporarily focusing on my clearance from another aircraft; I did not fully grasp the already unfamiliar environment in which I was operating. 3. I must increase my familiarity with airports prior to arrival or departure. I had reviewed the Airport Diagram prior to arrival and departure; but clearly did not realize the position of the hold short lines. If I had leveraged a tool like Google Maps; I could have had a heightened awareness of the airport hold short markings. Of course; it is important to realize that Google Maps can be several years old; but it may have made me more aware that the hold short lines were adjacent to the runup area.

When a PA-28 pilot concentrated excessively on clearance from another aircraft when exiting the runup area for Runway 07 at VGT it unwittingly crossed the hold short lines for the runway. ATC cleared him to cross and then discussed the trangression with the pilot prior to takeoff. The reporter believed lack of sleep due to being in Las Vegas over night was a contributing factor.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

About 1 hour into the flight; aircraft began altitude oscillations similar to mountain wave; one oscillation exceeded 200ft and was reported to center. Center queried other aircraft in our area with no mountain wave reported by other aircraft. I closely monitored the controls and held the yoke; approximately 5 minutes later; oscillations began; and I could feel ratcheting and jerking in the yoke; and disengaged the autopilot when the altitude deviation reached 200. Leveled the plane. There were no warning annunciators or failure flags in the cockpit. I switched the plane from the right AFCS to the left. We Advised Center that our auto pilot had malfunctioned and that we had switched to the second system. Center told us there were no aircraft above or below us and we were good to continue. The airplane operated correctly for about 15 minutes before the oscillations began again. We told Center our autopilot was malfunctioning and we were unable RVSM. We were descended to FL 280 and we continued the flight to [our destination]. While hand flying and hand trimming the plane I could feel binding and release in the elevator trim wheel. I wrote this up with maintenance.

While cruising at FL400; Our Hawker 800XP started altitude/pitch oscillations. Since we were in Center's airspace; we thought it to be mountain wave action. Moments later a similar event occurred. No warnings or Flags were in view. AFCS were switched to no avail; as the same altitude/pitch oscillations occurred. The Captain reported to me that while hand-flying the airplane; he felt the elevator control to be stiff and notching/ratcheting where elevator control should be fluid and smooth. We immediately notified ATC and were told no other aircraft in the vicinity had been experiencing any mountain waves. We requested and were granted lower altitude as we were unable to maintain RVSM Airspace. We continued the trip to an uneventful and safe landing at [our destination].

BAE-125-850XP flight crew reported experiencing oscillations in the aircraft pitch mode while in cruise flight. These oscillations were determined to be caused by a malfunctioning autopilot system. The autopilot was disengaged; air traffic control notified; and the flight continued safely to its destination.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

On BOOVE1 arrival at DFW. Given vectors for spacing. Observed a large aircraft joining the arrival ahead of us. TCAS indicated 10 miles spacing behind the large aircraft. Day VMC conditions. Vectored to rejoin the arrival. While descending via the arrival profile we encountered light turbulence. About a minute later we encountered rapid onset of light chop followed by a sharp rolling force associated with wake turbulence. Total roll about 25 degrees. Disconnected the autopilot and climbed above the vertical track. The First Officer (FO) inquired as to the type of aircraft we were following. We were advised it was an Airbus A380. FO advised we would be offsetting slightly for wake turbulence. I noted the wind was generally 220/20; a slight quartering tailwind along the route. We ascertained that probably our vertical profile crossed that of the A380. Flew the track but stayed above our vertical track. No more encounters with wake turbulence. During the post flight at the gate the number 1 flight attendant inquired as to what type of turbulence we had encountered. She was in the First Class cabin and was thrown into a passenger who was seated at the time. Luckily she reported no injuries to herself or the passenger. We were never closer than 10 miles to the A380.Suggestions: Review the operational impact of a lateral offset of 1 mile on arrivals. This is within the capabilities of most of our aircraft. This won't address the problem of following a Super Heavy on the final approach to the runway. An advisory for caution to all crews might be appropriate.

A319 First Officer reported encountering wake on arrival to DFW in 10-mile trail of an A380 that resulted in a 25-degree bank.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Departed runway; was assigned 2;000 feet; runway heading and expect vectors.Upon departure experienced trim pulling to the right and difficulty in controlling heading and altitude. Suspected trim malfunction and disengaged autopilot. Tried to assess cause; when unable to identify; requested return to airport. Flew heading and altitude assigned as best as possible and returned to airport.Retested the autopilot; trim; heading etc. once on ground power to try to recreate the malfunction and was unable.After complete check out of FMS; Autopilot and Flight Director; relaunched and flew flight filed for with no issues.

The pilot of a C525 reported control issues suspected to be due to a trim malfunction. After returning to the field; and test of the systems; no issues were identified. The aircraft departed again with no further problems.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 234; Flight Crew Total 9786; Flight Crew Type 9786

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were given pushback clearance by ZZZ Tower and told push crew cleared to push. ZZZ is small airport and we were the only aircraft moving on the ground that I heard. Tower controls air; ground and clearance. The English spoken was very good and at no time did I think the communications were not understood by anyone. During pushback the ground crew told us cleared to start both engines. The Captain called for start of both engines 2 then 1. We needed 5 minutes warmup and it was a short taxi to Runway 10 for departure. During second engine start I hear something like 'brakes brakes set parking brake.' I look down and parking brake was not set then outside and I didn't see the aircraft moving. The Captain set the parking brake and asked if everything was ok? We were told it was and that the tow bar was disconnected and bypass pin removed. The Captain again asked if everything was ok. We were told yes. Captain told crew cleared off headset. We received a salute. Second engine was fully started. Everything did not feel ok. Had we missed set parking brake instructions? Had the Captain missed setting the parking brake? I could not recall hearing to set parking brake. Neither can I recall hearing Captain saying parking brake set. The Captain did not recall this either. I was starting the engines but am pretty good at multitasking and I am good at when Captain says parking brake set verifying parking brake red light on and pressure normal. Something was not as normal. It was like the ground crew never told us to set parking brake after pushback completed? Or the Captain never set the parking brake when told to do so? We never saw the aircraft move or felt it move during this undesired moment. No one was hurt. No equipment was damaged. Something somewhere was not right. We just don't know what. We took a quick breather. I never felt rushed. I thought everyone understood all communications spoken. We followed SOP. Still we had a moment that could have been disaster in one or more ways. It left a sour feeling with both of us. Then we snapped out of that feeling and proceeded with the after start checklist and on to ZZZ1.

Flight Crew reported communications breakdown during pushback.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 650

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

[In the] morning; I was taking another certificated pilot for a familiarization ride in Aircraft X. He was a private pilot with a few hours in high performance aircraft and wanted to see how Aircraft X performed on a relatively hot summer day at altitude. After departing Runway 30R I requested closed pattern for touch-and-go landings. Due to the extreme smoke and haze conditions from the many forest fires across Colorado; and the number of aircraft in the traffic pattern at the same time; Tower requested that I fly runway heading until advised to turn crosswind. I was cleared to turn left and enter left downwind for Runway 30L. Being so far west of the airport; the runway was no longer visible from pattern altitude as I turned back towards BJC.As I entered downwind; Tower began calling traffic and I was unable to see many of the other aircraft. Tower advised that; due to poor visibility and heavy traffic; they would call my base. By the time Tower cleared me to turn base; I was well east of the normal 'key' position in the pattern. Tower cleared me for the option on Runway 30L; but as I turned to final; all I could see was Runway 30R. The threshold for Runway 30L is displaced quite a ways west of the threshold for Runway 30R. Runway 30L is also considerably shorter and narrower than Runway 30R; and in the smoke and haze; Runway 30L was not even in my field of view on final approach. I did not even realize that I had landed on the wrong runway until after takeoff when Tower asked me if I remembered being cleared for landing on Runway 30L. Another Tower Controller gave me a phone number to call and I called the Tower immediately after I landed.

Pilot Flying reported smoke obscuring flight whilst in the pattern; leading to a landing on the wrong runway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Left oil temp started fluctuating. Left wing tank fuel temp approximately 32 [degrees] Celsius. [I] thought that a fuel heat valve was possibly cycling without illuminating. Left engine oil quantity indicated 13 quarts with no fluctuation. Pulled up the 'oil temperature high' QRH procedure just in case we started having a high oil temperature indication. After navigating to the 'oil temperature high' QRH procedure; the oil temperature made its first excursion to approximately 135 [degrees] Celsius. We executed the 'oil temperature high' QRH procedure and initially thought we were regaining control of the oil temperature. Then during the execution of the procedure the oil temp spiked through 165 [degrees] Celsius and then became erratic eventually indicating somewhere between 193 [degrees] Celsius to 199 [degrees] Celsius. We went to step 2 of the 'oil temperature high QRH' and executed the 'oil temperature exceeds 165 [degrees] Celsius at any time' portion of the checklist. This directed us to the 'in-flight shutdown checklist.' The Captain requested a descent to 10;000 ft. after determining that there were no significant obstruction or terrain threats. We completed the 'Single Engine Operation Checklist' and then were directed to the 'Non-routine Landing Considerations Checklist.' We were able to contact Dispatch; Operations; and informed the flight attendants and passengers that we would be making a 'precautionary landing' as per the non-routine landing considerations. We acquired a discrete ARFF frequency from Center to use upon landing. The single engine approach and landing was completed uneventfully. After landing; the Captain set the parking brake; stowed the spoilers; and made a PA to the passengers to remain seated while I coordinated an inspection from ARFF. ARFF vehicles inspected our left engine for smoke/fire/fluid leakage and reported no anomalies. We were escorted to the gate by ground vehicles. Operations personnel were in place and ready to accept the aircraft and passengers upon arrival.

MD-83 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after an inflight shutdown related to high oil temperature in the left engine.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

After landing on Runway 12R; Tower instructed us to exit the runway at Taxiway C3; hold short of Taxiway C (parallel taxiway) and contact ground on 121.7. As we approached Taxiway C3; I saw an Aircraft Y taxiing northwest on Taxiway C with moderate speed. The Aircraft Y was approaching Taxiway C3 and it appeared that we had been instructed to hold short of Taxiway C so the Aircraft Y could pass in front of us right to left. As the CA (Captain) made the ninety-degree left turn to exit the runway onto Taxiway C3; I switched to ground control frequency 121.7 as instructed. The CA then stopped with the nose of our aircraft near the runway holding position marking on Taxiway C3. This left the aft end of our aircraft on the runway. The Aircraft Y then stopped short of Taxiway C3. As I was about to ask for clarifying instructions after switching frequencies; Ground Control instructed the Aircraft Y to continue taxiing and then asked if we were on his frequency. I responded that we were and then Ground Control instructed us to turn right on Taxiway C (behind the Aircraft Y that had by this point passed through the intersection) and then left on Taxiway B4 to our gate. As we taxied southeast on Taxiway C Ground Control advised us that we had created a dangerous situation by not fully exiting the runway. He informed us that a light general aviation aircraft had taken off while part of our aircraft was still on the runway. At the time it happened; I agreed with the CA's decision to stop the aircraft since we were unaware of the Aircraft Y's taxi instructions (we had just switched to Ground); and the appearance that the Aircraft Y may taxi through the intersection due to its rate of speed and remaining distance to C3. I also wondered why tower control had cleared an aircraft to take off while we still occupied the runway. On the taxi out for our return leg; we observed that there was a taxiway hold short line further ahead on C3 that would have allowed us to pull further forward; but our tail would still likely have been over the runway hold short line.Limited distance between the runway and Taxiway C. Lack of communication at a critical juncture: we were unaware of the Aircraft Y's taxi instructions as we had just switched to ground; and Tower didn't advise us of them when issuing us our initial taxi instructions (ie '... Aircraft Y will hold short.') The Tower Controller cleared an aircraft to take off while part of our aircraft was still within the boundary of the runway. The Ground Controller did not instruct the Aircraft Y to continue taxiing with a sense of urgency. Better communication from ATC. Better awareness of the location of taxiway hold short lines (of possible runway turn-offs) as a part of our approach brief.

After landing on Runway 12R; tower instructed us to exit the runway at Taxiway C3; hold short of Taxiway C (parallel taxiway) and contact Ground on 121.7. As we approached Taxiway C3; I observed an Aircraft Y taxiing northwest on Taxiway C with moderate speed. The Aircraft Y was approaching Taxiway C3 and it appeared that we had been instructed to hold short of Taxiway C so the Aircraft Y could pass in front of us right to left. As I made the ninety-degree left turn to exit the runway onto Taxiway C3 at less than 12 knots of ground speed; the FO switched to ground control frequency 121.7 as instructed. I stopped with the nose of our aircraft near the runway holding position marking on Taxiway C3 because of the short distance to Taxiway C in front of us. This left the aft end of our aircraft on the runway. The Aircraft Y then stopped short of Taxiway C3. Ground Control instructed the Aircraft Y to continue taxiing. After the Aircraft Y passed Taxiway C3; Ground Control asked if we were on his frequency. When the FO responded in the affirmative; ground control instructed us to turn right on Taxiway C then left on Taxiway B4 to our gate. As we taxied southeast on Taxiway C Ground Control advised us that we had created a dangerous situation by not fully exiting the runway. He told us that a light general aviation aircraft had taken off while part of our aircraft was still on the runway. At the time; I felt that I could not have fully exited the runway considering the limited distance available to me on Taxiway C3. I also wondered why Tower Control had cleared an aircraft to take off while we still occupied the runway. On the next flight; we taxied out on Taxiway C. As we passed Taxiway C3 I noticed a taxiway holding position marking on Taxiway C3 that I had not observed on the inbound flight. Although the taxiway holding position marking appeared too close to Taxiway C; I could have taxied farther onto Taxiway C3 after exiting the runway on the inbound flight. If I had taxied to what I considered a safe distance from Taxiway C; our tail probably would not have been within the lateral boundaries of the runway; but it would have been on the runway side of the runway holding position marking on Taxiway C3. Limited distance between the runway and Taxiway C prevented us from fully vacating the runway while complying with the instruction to hold short of Taxiway C. The Tower Controller cleared an aircraft to take off while part of our aircraft was still within the boundary of the runway. The Ground Controller did not instruct the Aircraft Y to continue taxiing with a sense of urgency. When instructed to hold short of a taxiway after vacating a runway; stop the aircraft as close as safely possible to the restricting taxiway. Even if your aircraft is not completely clear of the runway; risk will be diminished by reducing the amount of your aircraft remaining within the runway boundary.

Air carrier flight crew reported lack of communication from ATC during taxi at MMUN airport resulted in a ground conflict.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During descent; aircraft displayed the following ECAM: DOOR R FWD EMER EXIT. The cabin pressure was normal and the ECAM actions were followed. The condition disappeared prior to landing. The day prior; the door seal of the right forward overwing emergency exit was cleaned by Maintenance after Flight Attendants (FA) reported that the emergency exit was making a loud squealing sound. Upon landing; I made a logbook entry to document the ECAM received during the flight. LAS Maintenance deferred the discrepancy using MEL - ECAM DOOR Page Indications - Over wing Emergency Exits. Upon reviewing the MEL; I noted that this MEL is Repetitive in nature. The FIRST error I observed and had corrected was that Maintenance had placed a yellow deferral sticker on the outside of the logbook vice an orange repetitive deferral sticker as required by MEL. The SECOND error I observed and had corrected was related to the Corrective Action block of the discrepancy in the Logbook. Under the Corrective Action there was no entry documenting that the repetitive Maintenance (Mx) actions of the deferral were complied with. And finally; when I asked Maintenance what the plan was to complete the (M) &(R) items upon landing at my next destination (non-maintenance base); they had not recognized the requirement for a repetitive (Mx) action every leg; and had not devised a plan.It seems; all to often; it is the Captain who is required to catch the errors committed by others. This ASAP report is submitted with the goal to educate Maintenance to always utilize the color X deferral sticker when appropriate.

A319 Captain described oversights by Maintenance after he had made a log entry for an ECAM for DOOR R FWD EMER EXIT.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 610

Took student to practice area. After steep turns we configured for slow flight. Student reported that he couldn't retard power any more for the maneuver. I took command of the airplane and could advance throttle but not pull back to idle at all. It was catching on something. At this point I could force it but what if it broke. I immediately headed towards ZZZ. Along the way I tried to baby it back but nothing. So knew I would have to set up for a power off landing. With ZZZ being 3800 ft runway and now with a REAL world situation I knew it had to be perfect for a zero overrun. With that in mind I decided to [advise] and head to ZZZ1. I called tower and did thus so. Abeam the numbers I cut the mixture and cut mags and did a successful landing.

PA-28 flight instructor reported a throttle malfunction that prevented the power from being reduced.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

I was working LC (Local Control) with aircraft backing up on both the north and south parallel taxiways for Runway 10L. We were using alternate jet headings. Training was in progress on both GC (Ground Control) and CD (Clearance Delivery). I departed a C208 on a 160 heading; APPREQ'd (Approval Request) by the CIC (Controller in Charge); from Runway 10L followed by Aircraft X runway heading climbing to 4;000. Aircraft Z did a good job slowing on final for Runway 10L and I tried to squeeze out another departure as to not go into delays towards the back of the line. Aircraft Y was told to LUAW (Line Up and Wait) Runway 10L initially but I then cleared them on a 120 heading climbing to 4;000 once I saw I would have runway separation. I told Aircraft Y about the traffic on final and to keep their momentum turning the corner onto the runway. I cleared Aircraft Z to land Runway 10L. Aircraft Y got onto the runway and stopped. Aircraft Z replied back 'There is still an aircraft on the runway.' I sent Aircraft Z around. Aircraft Y had already started their takeoff roll by the time I was going to cancel their clearance and they were at a speed I felt was unsafe to have them abort the takeoff. At this time the CIC was telling me to turn Aircraft Z; the go around aircraft; to a 120 heading. I had cleared Aircraft Y on a 120 heading and told Aircraft Z to fly runway heading for divergence. Multiple people in the tower cab were shouting out headings; presumably trying to help me out; which briefly confused me as to what heading I had actually given Aircraft Y. I glanced down at my strip and I had written 120 which reminded me I cleared them on the 120 heading. I told Aircraft Z to fly runway heading and maintain 1;500. The CIC told me to turn Aircraft Z to a 120 heading and I obliged. I told Aircraft Y who was in their climb to fly runway heading because Aircraft Z was turning to a 120 heading. Aircraft X who preceded Aircraft Y was also on runway heading. As this was going on the controller in training on GC was asking me to cross Runway 10R as well as Runway 14. Runway 14 was not in use at the time and given to GC for crossings. Being asked to cross Runway 14 when it was given to GC diverted my attention to scan Runway 14 thinking that in the chaos that ensued with the go around I had missed something on Runway 14. I did not notice that by putting Aircraft Y on runway heading I had negated the divergence I would have initially had if they would have been on the 120 heading and lost separation with Aircraft X. If I could do this all over again; I would not have tried to get the third aircraft; Aircraft Y; out in front of Aircraft Z. By doing this I caused a chaotic chain reaction that resulted in a loss of separation. Delays are a big deal at PBI and I did not want to be a contributing factor to the delays but in hindsight delaying a few aircraft would have been a lot easier to explain to the supervisors and my coworkers as well as being safer.

PBI Tower Controller reported a loss of separation due to an aircraft on the runway; coordination from others trying to help and putting departing and go around aircraft on the same heading.