Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 was the third leg of our day. We had landed at XA00Z which was an hour advance of planned passenger's arrival. Our passengers soon notified us of late arrival upon which I checked to ensure we would not be affected by EDCT (Estimated Departure Time Clearance) and that weather wouldn't be a factor. I then obtained our flight clearance which included a full route meaning we weren't getting our shorter overwater route. That route would also avoid any of the approaching weather by a wide margin. I re-ran our flight plan to ensure we had adequate fuel as the new one was 110 NM longer and would slightly change winds. The original route required 3;570 lbs total including enroute burn; 45 min reserve; and alternate based on cruise altitude of FL400. No alternate was required though as destination weather was > 5000/5 for the entire day and projected to remain so. Still; we plan and carry alternate fuel anytime we have the ability to do so. I had rounded the final fuel load up to 4;000 lbs total as it's all too common flying in or out of ZZZ3 airspace and suddenly getting significantly different routing or held down below cruise altitude for a bit. That decision would prove critical in preventing a divert later in flight. We boarded passengers at XB30Z and were given taxi clearance to 30. Upon nearing the runway; we were told to taxi to the holding area and would start taxi again at XB50Z for a XB54Z release. Approaching XC00Z; we were cleared to taxi and then into position and hold where we sat for approximately 3 minutes before being cleared for takeoff. Shortly after checking in with departure; we were given a 250 kt speed restriction and then given multiple vectors 90 degrees off of route. During most of this we were held below 15;000 ft. After being cleared back onto our flight plan; we were step climbed 6 times until we reached FL 330 about 30 minutes into the flight. During this time we also had to request deviations for weather. A slight left deviation would've allowed us to safely clear all the weather even at the lower altitude; but all aircraft were being directed that right was the only choice. Based on what traffic we had directly in view and on TCAS; it didn't make sense as it looked clear with all possible conflicts being to the west. We attempted to work right but even with significant deviations directly westward we were going to be boxed in by cells. Both NEXRAD and our onboard radar indicated yellow to red echoes well above our current altitude. We and other aircraft at higher altitudes continued to request eastward deviations and were denied. We also repeatedly requested higher as that would've been a satisfactory way of being able to comply with what they needed; but again were denied. At this point; I told the ZZZ3 Center controller that we had no choice but to go left as there was no place we could safely penetrate the weather. They finally relented and after a short deviation that was within 2-3 NM east of the course line; we were around it and back on flight plan. I was prepared to declare pilot authority to deviate for safety of aircraft; passengers and crew had they not. Between the additional ground time; ATC vectors; deviations; and hold down; we had eaten significantly into the additional fuel and were showing below a 45 min reserve if we remained at the lower altitude. This was even after seeing the deteriorating fuel state early and slowing down significantly from cruise speed to M.65. After again requesting further climb and being denied; I declared minimum fuel. Instead of the controller acknowledging; we were shifted to the next controller. Upon checking in; we were still held down and told to expect some time before climb. I again interjected on the radio that we were minimum fuel which was acknowledged by the new controller by him stating; 'uh..ah...well; ok.' He then stated we wouldn't get any further climb until with ZZZ4 Center. By that time we would be over State andstill at FL330 just over an hour into flight. The PM and I evaluated the fuel state and knowing the potential ATC delays we could face in ZZZ1 area airspace despite the great weather that we may be facing a divert. I kept our home base of ZZZ5 and ZZZ6 in mind should that be required. We set 1;000 lbs as an acceptable; safe fuel state needed to both put us above minimum fuel and give us some additional in the event of further delays. After ensuring ZZZ4 Center knew of our fuel state; we were held down for nearly another 10 minutes and then stepped 4 times from FL330 to FL400. After reaching FL400; we pulled back to M.67 and finally saw 1;100 lbs overhead destination and decided to continue. I considered requesting FL430; but based on less tailwind and the increased burn to climb I decided it wouldn't be beneficial. Fuel state improved to 1;280 lbs as the winds shifted and thanks to a small shortcut by Center. During decent with ZZZ4 Center; we were turned roughly 120 degrees off the arrival and it wasn't until questioning the controller if he knew that we had declared that he stated no and turned us back towards ZZZ1. Even though I had never rescinded the previous declaration; it apparently had not been passed to some of the subsequent ATC sectors. I told the controller that we were currently above min fuel but would not continue to be with continued vectors away from destination. We were shortly passed off to the approach controller and landed uneventfully from the RNAV XX. Final fuel state at shutdown was 1;145 lbs.Our passengers being on time might have alleviated some of this as weather had not moved onto our route at that time. More fuel would've have also created more pad; but the additional alternate fuel that wasn't required by regulation or the situation plus additional contingency fuel should've been more than sufficient to prevent it. Getting held down well below planned cruise altitude until almost halfway through a 2.5hr flight is pretty uncommon but played the biggest role in this.

EMB-505 Captain reported being denied shorter weather avoidance route and ATC's denial to climb or deviate for weather; resulted in unplanned minimum fuel situation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 14100; Flight Crew Type 2572

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Early in the Cruise Phase; First Officer was pilot flying. It was brought to my attention by the First Officer that his ND was displaying 'Map Not Available' in red color; no map was displayed on the number 2 ND. Seconds later a level 2 ECAM (single chime) with the message of CAB PR LDG ELEV FAULT; which was then accompanied by another fault; the lower ECAM GW display was amber XX LBS. As the pilot not flying I began to troubleshoot what seemed to be the most critical aspect of the multiple failures. At the time it seemed that the Cabin Pressurization was the most critical; not to mention; it was that problem that triggered the Level 2 caution. Once I determined that the integrity of the pressurization system was not compromised; I moved on to the other issue; the lack of the map display on the First Officer side. It seemed that the number 2 FMGC had failed; however; the PFD indications were consistent with no failures. FMA's displayed MACH ALT CRZ NAV all in green; no mode reversions had occurred. Even the FD mode was 1FD2. Yet; as I scanned over to my display; I realized the aircraft failed to make a turn upon passing the previous fix so I immediately went to HEADING Mode turning the aircraft back to re-intercept the course and engage AP1. The deviation was 6.1 NM left of course. At that moment; ATC had queried our position and asked what our next FIX was; I told ATC what our next fix was. I then requested DIRECT; and was cleared direct. This lateral deviation would have been avoided had the aircraft been equipped with a lateral deviation alert similar to altitude deviation alerts that most aircraft are equipped with. Although flying the airplane is the priority at all times; it was very deceiving to the pilots when the aircraft indicated that it is flying based on what the PFD FMA's were displaying. As a former instructor on this airplane; I always used to tell my students to believe what the FMA displays. In this case; it lied about its NAV capability; even though it displayed a normal green NAV display; it wasn't. There must be a communication link between the ND and the PFD.

The Reporter stated that the disparity between the green FMA status indications and the FMGC failure to correctly guide the autopilot could not be reconciled. The FMGC faults should have triggered a transition to the default heading mode along with an appropriate FMA change. The only indication the crew saw; other than the ECAM; was the ND2's MAP display fault and on further investigation both FMGC's displayed amber INDEPENDENT OPERATION in small letters at the bottom of the screen. The autopilot was selected to number one and functioned normally to landing. All systems were operating normally even with the FMGC anomalies. After landing the systems reset and operated normally.

An A320 number 2 ND MAP failed and the autopilot did not track correctly causing a track deviation although the FMA indications remained green and the FMGCs entered independent operations.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

In circumstances like this there is only so much that can be done; and I believe that we as a crew did the right thing in the interest of safety of the crew and passengers.

A319 First Officer reported odor in cockpit resulting in a diversion.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and my FO (First Officer) was the PF (Pilot Flying). On taxi out; after being deiced; we received an intermittent L JET OVHT FAIL caution message. The message went away as quickly as it showed up on ED1. We complied with the QRH and considered it a transient anomaly and continued with the flight. On climb out; we received several more of the L JET OVHT FAIL caution messages. Once again the messages went away as soon as they appeared. As we continued the climb out of 10;000 to 12;000 ft.; we received an L JETPIPE OVHT warning message; which went away as quickly as it showed up on ED1. As a precaution; we ran the QRH for the warning message and reduced the thrust enough to maintain the climb and to reduce the risk of getting another warning message. We continued our climb to FL270 and still had a few recurring L JET OVHT FAIL caution and L JETPIPE OVHT warning messages; but not as frequently as we had before we reduced the thrust on the engines.When we reached the cruise phase of the flight; we decided to slow the aircraft down to 250 kts. to reduce the ITT on the engines (around 667 C). Once the thrust levers were pulled back all intermittent indications L JETPIPE OVHT warning messages stopped. We were then given a clearance to descend to FL240 and; upon reaching that altitude; we once again received an L JETPIPE OVHT warning message; but this time it stayed on. I noticed that my FO had added power to maintain airspeed (around 84% N1) and this took the ITTs above 700 C. I instructed my FO to reduce the thrust on the left engine and he said that it was at idle.The L JETPIPE OVHT warning message persisted and I was very concerned that the JETPIPE of the left engine was overheating when the ITT was above 700 C. We ran the QRH again and it led us to make the decision to shut the engine down. I decided that shutting the left engine was the safest thing to do because of the indications we saw when the thrust on the L engine was increased for normal flight. The QRH specifically states to Complete 'In Flight Engine Shutdown / Engine Failure' if the L JETPIPE OVHT warning message persists.We completed the In Flight Engine Shutdown followed by the Single Engine Approach and Landing checklist. I then notified ATC of the nature of the problem; souls on board; the amount of fuel remaining and that we would like [airport rescue and fire fighting] to stand by. I gave my FA (Flight Attendant) a brief and told him that we had a Yellow Emergency and to expect a normal landing and no evacuation.We were given direct [to the airport] where we made a visual approach to landing without incident. I took the controls about 10 miles out to make the landing. After clearing the runway; we requested [airport rescue and fire fighting] to inspect the left engine and all indications came back normal from their visual and instrument observations. We continued to the gate; deplaned the aircraft and made the necessary write-up.I want to commend my First Officer for remaining calm and doing an excellent job in this situation. He has a great attitude; works very hard; and is eager to learn.I believe excessive deicing fluid contaminated the L Jet Pipe loops. This contamination generated an L JET OVHT FAIL Caution Message that was very intermittent and was considered a transient anomaly.On climb out; we had a L JETPIPE OVHT Warning message that was thought to be erroneous due to the brevity of the EICAS message. We did run the QRH and reduced the thrust enough to slow the frequency of the EICAS warnings.In the cruise phase of flight we decided to slow the aircraft to 250 kts. as a precaution to keep the ITT down on the left engine. This action quieted the Caution and Warning messages for the duration of the cruise phase of flight. My thinking was if we kept the ITT down on the left engine we could continue the flight safely on both engines and address the maintenance concerns on the ground.We were given an initial descent down to FL240 and upon reaching that altitude we received a continuous L JETPIPE OVHT Warning message. I initially thought the EICAS message would go away but this time it stayed on and seemed to come on above 700 C. My concern at that point was that something was very wrong with the engine to generate a continuous OVHT Warning message every time the ITT on that engine was above 700 C. This new information along with the guidance of the QRH influenced my decision to shut down the left engine in flight.In my judgment; the safest course of action was to shut the engine down at altitude and continue to the destination single engine where we could plan on and execute a stable approach to landing at the destination airport. I wanted to reduce the risk of having an in flight fire or dealing with multiple threats of fire; go around; and possible engine loss close to the ground. None of our decisions were rushed and were made in a controlled and calculated effort that enhanced safety; managed the threat; and kept the aircraft from entering into an undesirable aircraft state.I have nothing to add at this time until the root cause is identified.

[The] only abnormal [condition] for the flight was a bit of frost on the aircraft. As a safety precaution my Captain and I decided it was best to de-ice the aircraft with type 1 fluid. After we were finished deicing we continued out to the runway where we received our first L jet ovht fail caution message. I proceeded to get out the QRH; confirmed it with my Captain and complied with it. At the end of the checklist we both determined we are safe to continue with the flight per the steps in the QRH. After taking off around 10;000 ft. we got our first L jetpipe ovht warning message.At this point I was the pilot flying and the Captain took out the QRH and began the procedure. The first step was to reduce the thrust levers for a lower ITT and the warning message went away. So we continued the flight and decided it would be best to keep the speed at 250 with a low power setting to keep our ITT lower. Once we started our initial descent out of FL270 for FL240; in the descent the jetpipe ovht warning message came back and my Captain told me to reduce power as he got out the QRH at which point I informed him I was at flight idle.From that point he continued with the in-flight engine shutdown QRH and then the single engine approach and landing QRH and prepared and briefed the single engine landing at which point we talked about I would continue to fly the plane until we got close to the airport at which point he would take over the aircraft and land the plane. He execute the single engine landing and Airport Fire and Rescue met us off the runway and confirmed we were clear and we continued taxi to the gate and deplaned as normal.My best guess at the cause would be some de-ice fluid made its way into the aircraft's engine housing and caused faulty indications.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported landing safely after shutting down the left engine for high ITT. Flight crew stated the overheat was possibly related to de-ice procedures at departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19.9; Flight Crew Total 575; Flight Crew Type 300

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

During a flight to ZZZ my vacuum system failed with no warning. Originally I filed IFR to ZZZ1 due to weather conditions at my destination of ZZZ. My plan was to stop at ZZZ1 and wait for weather to improve before heading to ZZZ. This occurred roughly halfway through the flight. The conditions during the failure were solid IFR in the clouds at 8000 ft. I quickly noticed the attitude indicator seemed to be differing from the other instruments in a subtle way. I glanced at the suction gauge and saw it was zero. I already had the Century autopilot engaged for heading only (no attitude hold available) linked to multiple waypoints. I immediately reported the equipment failure to ATC. Soon after I requested a descent to an altitude to provide some view of terrain. I think was initially 6000; then 4000 later. Even at 4000 I ended up in solid IFR conditions later in the flight. As my initial destination of ZZZ1 was approaching; I saw that moderate rain (shown on Foreflight through Stratus) was near ZZZ1 and conditions there were deteriorating. I also saw that conditions at ZZZ were improving and were moderately VFR. Because I am so familiar with ZZZ and weather was deteriorating at ZZZ1; I requested an amendment of my final destination to ZZZ. Also; I couldn't find any larger airports with approaches and not in bad weather along my route of flight. The vacuum system failure resulted in the loss of my attitude indicator and DG (directional gyro). My main source of navigation and control was my Garmin 430 coupled with an older model Century autopilot in addition to the altimeter; vertical airspeed indicator and turn coordinator. I found the compass of nearly no use because it was extremely difficult to look up to the compass while maintaining a scan on the primary instruments. Additionally; I had a dash mounted iPad with Foreflight couple with Stratus II unit- I enabled the attitude and heading capability but didn't use it too much - it was great to have as a backup in case something else went wrong.I had just completed multiple ATC assisted navigation around moderate rain cells (Stratus worked well too; but has delays). These cells were not dangerous; but added to the challenge of maintaining full and steady control. At that point I reestablished a direct heading using the autopilot. For reasons I still don't understand; the autopilot put me in a turn. This autopilot only works if the current heading is close to the intended heading. I don't know if my heading was off when I engaged the autopilot; or if I unintentionally pulled the autopilot knob out which has the autopilot automatically do a turn at a selected bank. So; what happened was I ended up in a bank and noticed I started a 180 degree turn. I immediately reported this to the controller; disengage the autopilot and continued the bank until I was back on course. I maintained altitude the whole time; but obviously this was unnerving as I was in solid IFR. I re engaged the autopilot moments later and the same thing started happening again so I disengaged the slave of the autopilot; reestablished course and only used the autopilot to manually back and maintain level wings. The rest of the flight completed without issue. ATC (multiple facilities) were great at helping me through this. My main concern was that I lost directional control when I did the 360. Looking at the tracks I don't think my course was off by more than 1 nm. Afterwards I called ATC and asked if there were any issues I should be concerned with and they said no.In summary:-Flying with an attitude indicator and directional gyro is extremely challenging. I am very proud of how well I maintained control of the flight and the many decisions I made. -ATC controllers were very professional and did all the right things to get me home safely.-The autopilot issues are a real mystery to me. I know the autopilot well and use it a lot. I will need to check it out soon to make sure it is working right.-The Foreflight software with weather and ARHS is an unbelievable backup resource. Interestingly; however; twice the app quit and I had to restart it. This never happens. So I wouldn't want this to be my sole source of maintaining control.

Grumman AA5 pilot reported the vacuum pump failed while IMC so the pilot's iPad; Garmin 430; and Stratus II provided IMC navigation capabilities. The autopilot functionality decreased greatly.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14.1; Flight Crew Total 68.6; Flight Crew Type 68.6

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight was from ZZZ to ZZZ2 with a stop to pick up a passenger at ZZZ1. ZZZ Approach provided flight following all the way to ZZZ1 as I was unfamiliar with the airport and had difficulty identifying it from the air. After overflying the field at 2;000 ft (Approach assigned flight following altitude) a frequency change to the CTAF was approved and made. I descended to pattern altitude and crossed midfield before entering downwind leg for runway XX. Crossing midfield; turning to downwind; base and final; position reports were made on the CTAF. No other aircraft operating at ZZZ1 were heard on frequency. Landing XX; proceeded to back taxi to the end of the runway. At the XY threshold; my passenger saw me and began approaching the aircraft. So as to not create an undue hazard to my passenger; I exited the runway onto the available taxiway and turned parallel to XY. At this point; my left wingtip was impinging on the runway.I continued to hear no other aircraft on frequency as I performed a safety briefing for my passenger and ensured he was ready to fly. Shortly thereafter; another aircraft landed on runway 19. This aircraft proceeded to back taxi on XY and then made contact on CTAF. The other aircraft pilot reported to have been making calls on CTAF and attempting to reach me prior to landing; but I did not hear him. The other aircraft pilot reported landing left of center due to the runway incursion. On resuming flight towards ZZZ2 another aerodrome on the same CTAF frequency performed a radio check with me and assured that they could receive me loud and clear.

Pilot reported that after exiting the runway their wing tip remained over the runway while another aircraft landed off centerline due to the runway incursion. Pilot reported not hearing any communication from the landing aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

During estimated time as the Coordinator for Departure Control I was so busy on the land line with other sectors within the TRACON and other facilities dealing with the chaos that the Radar controller created that in my professional opinion all aircraft were safer on the ground. I held all departures for the fear of what could happen if they were to become airborne. I've been worried or greatly concerned about situations before but for the first time in my ATC career I was scared. I felt I couldn't help the situation because my Radar controller was unpredictable and is not capable of this level of traffic.Move said Radar employee to another facility with less complex traffic. This CPCIT (Certified Professional Controller in Training) is not fully certified and shouldn't be!

TRACON Coordinator reported unsafe operational conditions because the Departure Controller was doing an unsatisfactory job.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Night landing LAX 25L. Following heavy 767. Winds essentially calm. Cleared to land. A380 cleared for takeoff prior to our touchdown. Separation decreased due to 767 rollout and what seemed like a very slow takeoff roll on the 380. At approximately 150 ft we encountered wake turbulence. We agreed that we should go around. A normal go around was executed. ATC vectored us downwind for another approach. As soon as we were stabilized on the missed approach I made a passenger PA and we returned for an uneventful landing. The flight attendants reassured the passengers and reported no undue concern on their part. The FO was the pilot flying and showed good judgement in the initial decision to go around and in the execution of the missed approach.We were assigned 170 kts on final to the marker and flew it. The 767 spacing looked OK but an A380 was cleared for takeoff prior to our landing. The 380 was heavy and slow accelerating. At about 150 ft AGL with minimum spacing on the departing aircraft we encountered wake turbulence. The decision was made to go around.

A321 Captain reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence at 150 ft AGL in trail of a B767 on approach to LAX.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I was the RADAR Controller. I did a route read out on my scope of this flight; and his route looked good so I descended him to 170 per the SOP and handed him off to Sector 05. After the aircraft passed the VOR he turned right into ZNY airspace. I pointed him out to ZNY and talked to the Controller at Sector 05; he gave him the correct routing. Turns out the aircraft didn't have the PAR route and the route read out was incorrect. I think the route read out on the scope should accurately depict the route the aircraft actually has; and not the route that URET wants him to have.

ZBW Controller described an airspace incursion event when the route read out provided on the display did not match up with that provided by URET.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 185; Flight Crew Total 15821; Flight Crew Type 8223

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 205; Flight Crew Total 21206; Flight Crew Type 10224

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Approximately 300 plus miles west of ZZZZZ [intersection]; experienced total loss of oil quantity on left engine. Shortly thereafter; observed fluctuating and declining oil pressure. Oil pressure eventually declined into yellow caution zone; followed by EICAS alert. Pulled left engine throttle to idle. Coordinated with ATC for a return to . Once approved; we departed the track to the North; then proceeded direct to ZZZ; [notified ATC of the situation]; announced [intentions] on guard and common freqs; and descended from FL310 to FL260. Continued as flying pilot; while Captain and International Relief Officer (IRO); initiated QRH checklists; coordinated plan of action with ATC and Flight Attendants. Ran the fuel dump; loss of oil quantity; engine shutdown checklists. Continued a slow descent from FL260 to 10;000 feet to help burn off more fuel as we approached a couple hundred miles out of ZZZ. Transferred aircraft control to Captain and assumed Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties. Set up for a single engine approach; 20 Flaps; runway 8L; and briefed contingencies; (go around; hot brakes; etc). Landed heavyweight at 368 [K] lbs; speed 171 ref plus 5kts as target. Used Autobrakes 4; transitioning to manual brakes for complete stop. Turned off runway; chocked tires; and noted warm brakes on 3 tires of the right truck. Caution zone reached with levels above 6.0 on the right truck. Advised Fire squad on scene of possibility of fuse plug melt and they assisted with fans to cool the tires. Eventually; tires cooled below 5.0; and maintenance was permitted to approach aircraft with tug and we then were towed into gate. Textbook simulator profile; with fairly controlled pacing; step by step prioritization of tasks; accompanied by a safe and uneventful landing. Our most significant threat and distraction was trying to obtain assistance inflight from company. Extremely difficult in reaching Dispatch via SATCOM; for follow on coordination with maintenance. Was placed on hold; music in background; and we were cutoff at one point. Comm was very inadequate and inaccessible. We were left with the impression that there was little sense of urgency or prioritization of our situation. We found inflight company guidance and/or assistance nearly absent; useful or relevant.

In cruise flight FL310 1+30 after take off number 1 engine oil qty dropped to zero followed by a slow loss of oil pressure. requested clearance back to ZZZ. Followed QRH leading to the shutdown of the number 1 engine. Performed single engine landing on Runway 8L at ZZZ. Although we dumped fuel we landed at 368k 18K overweight. After landing brakes began to heat above safe limits. Emergency crew provided brake cooling. After brakes cooled to safe levels we were towed to gate.

The flight crew of a 767 aircraft reported a total loss of oil quantity; followed by a loss of oil pressure on one engine. The QRH checklist directed them to shut down the engine; resulting in a return to the departure airport. A successful overweight landing was accomplished.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 20

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 28550; Flight Crew Type 42

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

We had transited airport ZZZ airspace approximately 5 minutes prior and had just started a climb as the Class B airspace overhead allowed. I detected smoke accumulating in the cabin and discovered the #2 engine was trailing heavy smoke from the vicinity of the cowling and cowl flaps. The Pilot Flying (PF) began an immediate turn back towards ZZZ while I; Pilot Not Flying (PNF); contacted the Tower; [requested priority handling]; and requested a straight-in landing opposite to the direction of traffic. We flew direct to the approach end.The engine was still making some power and the decision was made to continue operating it at reduced power. We ran the engine failure checklist to the point of feathering and securing the engine.As we approached ZZZ; the #2 engine began to run rough and the propeller RPM made an uncommanded and abrupt increase. A portion of the #2 engine cowling departed the nacelle and oil and fuel were streaming from the now un-cowled portion of the engine. I brought this to the PF's attention and asked if he wanted the engine shut down. A fire developed and I immediately shut down the #2 engine and feathered the propeller. The fire extinguished as soon as the engine was shut down. I advised Tower that the #2 engine was shut down and that we had had a fire that now appeared to be out; but requested that the fire vehicles be standing by upon landing.A normal; one engine landing was made and we exited midfield. No further fire existed and after being cleared by the fire response crew; we had the aircraft towed to a parking pad.

While ferrying an aircraft; approximately 45 minutes after takeoff we experienced smoke in the aircraft and noted oil streaming from inboard of right engine along with engine RPM increase; shortly thereafter [copilot] noticed what appeared like flames within engine compartment. At this point it was prudent to advise ZZZ Tower that we [need priority handling] due to an engine fire and clearance to [the] runway which was opposite of current traffic flow to expedite a landing. Engine was feathered and landing was uneventful. Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responded according and when no fire indicated we egressed the aircraft. I was able exit active runway with left engine and stopped aircraft on taxiway. Later we obtained a tug and parked aircraft clear of active movement areas.

The flight crew of a North American B-25 reported observing indications of impending engine failure - oil steaming from the cowling; followed by visible flames. The engine was shut down; the propeller feathered; and an emergency single engine approach and landing was successfully accomplished.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working Sector x. Aircraft X called me for traffic advisories. Aircraft Y was descending on the arrival. TRACON has a LOA with Aircraft X operations for skydiving activity in the vicinity of ZZZ. Aircraft X was in a spiraling climb to FL135; Aircraft Y was descending via the STAR. ZZZ and the STAR are in close proximity (roughly 2 miles apart). I issued traffic to both aircraft when they were 5 miles apart. Aircraft X began climing northwest bound; in direct conflict with Aircraft Y; both laterally and vertically. I issued a turn to Aircraft X away from the traffic. Aircraft X questioned the turn on 2 different transmissions before they finally turned away from traffic on the 3rd transmission. Once the traffic was separated; I told Aircraft X to resume own navigation and they informed me that they had to realign for the jump and had a question when I was able to answer. Aircraft X asked if there had been a change to our LOA with them precluding them from jumping 0.5 miles West of ZZZ. They asked me this twice because the 1st transmission was garbled. The second transmission carried a lot more sarcasm. I told Aircraft X that the LOA had not been changed or altered and that 'I am not going to let two airplanes come together because of a piece of paper.' Aircraft X changed to advisories and once they were on the ground; the owner personally called the Tracon. The owner asked the Controller in Charge (CIC) if I was new to the facility and the CIC responed 'He's been here awhile'. The owner went on to say the operation was ridiculous several times and that I needed to be 'Tuned-up'. I'm not sure what the owner meant personally by 'Tuned-up'; but where I am from that means assaulted physically. We have had many issues with this company in the past. The general consensus is that this company thinks they own the airspace because the have an LOA. One of this companies slogans [implies jumping around jets]; a practice that they seem to take serious enough to get close to other airplanes. I recommend that this company either move to an airport away from the main arrival route or get used to turning for traffic. It's utterly ridiculous that an aircraft operator or pilot for that matter is so upset about turning for conflicting traffic.

Controller reports of a VFR pilot who didn't initially turn as instructed away from another aircraft that was IFR. Pilot took turn and then questioned Controller as to why they had to turn. Controller advised it was for traffic. Pilot questioned if something had changed to the LOA. Controller advised no; they were turned for traffic. Company owner called TRACON and wanted the Controller 'tuned up.'


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1460; Flight Crew Type 1460

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I had a weather briefing and XM weather in the plane. The weather was clear at departure and arrival airports with scattered clouds in the New York City area. I believe the broken or scattered layer was said to be at 5;000 FT. Icing conditions existed from PIREPs as low as 7;000 FT and I think as low as 3;000 by AIRMET. Flying VFR with advisories from LOM to ZZZ direct and cleared into the New York Bravo at 5;500. I requested lower to maintain VFR and was cleared to 4;500. I saw more clouds ahead but they were scattered at roughly my altitude. N90 TRACON advised me of Airbus traffic coming down the Hudson at 4;000 and 11 o'clock. No contact. A second traffic awareness call was made notifying me of traffic now at 10 o'clock (can't remember a distance.) That time I spotted the aircraft at my 9 o'clock. At the same time I had to deal with the clouds now right in front of me. I could tell the situation was developing and there was no other option to maintain VFR. I asked for lower to maintain VFR again. I needed about another 300 FT to maintain clear of clouds. I descended to 4;200 FT maintaining visual separation from the traffic. N90 TRACON asked me to call them from the ground when I arrived at my destination. I called them and talked through the scenario with them. The other aircraft turned out to be a Boeing 767 I believe. I am not sure what I could have done differently. N90 TRACON said that the aircraft TCAS went off in the cockpit and he was startled. I do not know if he ever saw me but I watched him the entire time pass behind me. Maybe there was another option but turning away from the traffic I would not be able to see him; turning toward the traffic would have closed the gap. I did not start a descent until I was sure I saw the traffic because we were only vertically separated by 500 FT. Once I saw him I knew it was clear to descend and stay out of the clouds. I believe the other pilot was shaken up and I am not sure what could have been done more safely.

Private pilot reports encountering unforecast clouds at his level during an east bound flight through the New York Class B at 5;500 FT. A clearance to 4;500 FT is obtained but lower clouds necessitate a further descent to 4;200 FT causing a TCAS event with a B767 on arrival.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was about to switch Aircraft X to Atlanta approach Macon sector but before I did that; there were two pieces of traffic that I decided to call to the pilot.  The first was an aircraft on the boundary with my sector and ATL approach that was at 070 that I believe I was talking to and the second aircraft was a VFR target just inside Atlanta approaches airspace over the VNA VOR converging with Aircraft X indicating about 064.  My intention was to call the traffic and then switch the aircraft to the next sector who had the hand off so they they could have enough time to call traffic since the conflict was slightly inside their airspace.  So that's what I did; I called both pieces of traffic to the pilot and then switched him but the pilot asked again about where the traffic was and seemed confused so I had to spend more time to explain where the traffic was to the pilot.  As the situation developed I decided it would be more prudent to call Atl Approach and coordinate something so that this aircraft won't hit this VFR aircraft that I see out there.  When I called the ATL controller to work something out; the other controller said something along the lines of; 'Just ship him to me; I'll call the traffic to him again; that aircraft is VFR anyway.'   I said I'm going to turn Aircraft X 15L so the two aircraft don't hit.'  The other controller said; 'That's fine; do what you want.'  I turned Aircraft X 15L to avoid the VFR traffic.  In the mean time; the VFR target started a descent from 064 passed through 060; the same altitude as Aircraft X.  I my opinion; the 15L I gave Aircraft X possibly avoided a collision.    This situation was frustrating to me because we are constantly briefed here at ZJX that VFR aircraft are airplanes too; an although there is no specific separation minima between a VFR and a IFR; we still have an obligation to separate them to avoid a collision.  The controller at ATL Approach had an indifferent; attitude about separating the IFR aircraft from the VFR aircraft.  I'm sure that controller would have preferred to have been talking to Aircraft X sooner but I was delayed shipping him because he kept asking questions about where the traffic I called was; so I decided to take matters into my own hands to avoid a collision even though the event happened just inside their airspace.  That controller had the 'old school' mentality of; 'We'll he's VFR'.

ZJX Controller describes a situation with tow aircraft that are at the same altitude and he needs to ship one to the next facility.  He issues a 15 degree turn to the left and then ships the aircraft.  Controller states the turn did help because the other aircraft descended to the turned aircraft's altitude.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

A routine check at cruise alt indicated crew oxygen pressure was zero. ATC was advised we would need to descend and divert. Dispatch was contacted and after a short discussion we agreed on diverting. ATC; FA (Flight Attendants); passengers all notified; QRH; overweight landing procedures complied with followed by a normal approach landing rollout and taxi-in. Station operations did an outstanding job of taking care of our passengers in the middle of the night! Contract maintenance was unable to service our O2 bottle or complete an overweight landing inspection. Flt crew was released to hotel.

A321 Captain reported a depleted oxygen system led to a diversion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

This was very much a convective weather day. Our flight had been impacted with multiple re-routes and holding; and substantial deviation around cells close to the airport to get us to final approach on runway 7. The approach was stable until short final when a substantial sink rate developed. I had to aggressively add power and back pressure to arrest the sink. These control inputs did not prevent runway contact; but did result in a bounce. Back in the air; I realized that in my attempt to arrest the sink; I had not pulled the power off before contacting the runway. Still; seeing adequate runway remaining; and knowing that there was weather very close to the field and getting closer; I decided to re-enter the landing maneuver; pulled the power; and re-established the landing attitude; which was a mistake. With the engines still spooled; I should have gone around. But I didn't. When I pulled the power; the spoilers deployed; and this time the landing was 'hard'; but the landing stuck; and we rolled out and taxied to the gate normally. If I had it to do over again; I wouldn't bother with the second landing attempt. I'd just go around.

A Boeing 777 captain reported a hard landing following an initial bounce after touching down.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Tail Rotor assembly was replaced on Aircraft X with a freshly rebuilt assy. Entry number 5 on maintenance worksheet log page entered and signed off by local mechanics.  After pulling a short term due list the tail rotor TT straps indicated they had minimal time left on them. I and the day pilot both questioned the remaining time to both mechanics and was reassured that there was a glitch in software and there was adequate time remaining.  The previous short term due list had hand written 'CW' indicating the inspections were complied with.  This was also reflected as signed off with an RII sign off; in Form XXXX in the maintenance log.  We were informed that software was the issue on clearing the inspection item off of the short term due list.  This was again questioned the following day by myself and pilot; we were reassured that the issue was in software. This questioning continued for three days at XA:36 I received a call from Mr. X to immediately take the aircraft out of service. He then explained to me that there was an issue with the TT straps and the likelihood that they had been overflown.All log book paperwork and maintenance entries appeared in order and the continued reassurance by both mechanics; one the area lead mechanic; we continued to perform our duties and fly dispatched flights.To have a better maintenance tracking procedure especially when using swapped aircraft components.

Helicopter pilot reported that Maintenance personnel advised him to immediately take the aircraft out of service due to time sensitive parts that may have been overflown.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10.4; Flight Crew Total 23.6

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

It was a clear day and the wind was calm with temperature around 80 degrees F. I first did three normal takeoffs and landings on Runway 14; and then we did a short field takeoff. After we landed the plane; my flight instructor asked me if I felt ready to fly solo; and I replied yes. After we taxied back to the ramp area; he got out; and I was by myself in the plane. I made the radio call to traffic; and then taxied to Runway 14. After I made another radio call; I departed from Runway 14 and rotated when the airspeed indicator showed 60. I maintained climb out speed of 80. When the airplane was near the landmark (an area with a cluster of trees); I turned left to crosswind; and made another radio call. When I saw the airplane was about 45 degrees from the runway; I made another radio call; and turned left to downwind. I continued to climb in the downwind leg. As my flight instructor cautioned me before he left the airplane; and now I experienced it for the first time; the difference in flight characteristics of the airplane with just one person in the airplane. The plane climbed to traffic pattern altitude way before it reached mid-length of the runway. I leveled off the airplane and reduced engine power to 2;300 RPM and maintained an airspeed of 90. When the airplane was abeam the 1;000 FT mark; I turned the carburetor heat on; reduced engine RPM to 1;700; and then extended the flaps to 10%. When the airplane was about 45% from end of Runway 14; I turned left to base and made a radio call. I believed I had extended the flaps to 20% after the turn. When the airplane was over the landmark; I turned left to final; and made another radio call. I don't believe I had extended the flaps to 30%. I lineup the airplane for landing; when the airplane passed over the end of Runway 14; I noticed the airspeed indicator showed 70; and the airplane seemed to be higher above the ground than normal. I reduced the power to idle and then flared. The plane landed hard on the runway; bounced off the ground and landed again. At that moment; I panicked and applied the brakes. The airplane seemed to have hit something right after that and made some kind of noise. I kept the brakes on; not knowing what was happening. Then the airplane shuddered; and began to make a different kind of noise; the nose seemed to be going lower. When the airplane finally stopped and the propeller stopped spinning; I noticed the airplane nose was pointing to the ground. At that moment I called CTAF and advised them of the accident.I think these were the reasons for the mishap:1. The airplane was too fast during touch down. I believed that had I extended the flaps to 30 degrees; the increased drag would have slowed the airplane down to 65.2. I did not flare enough before the moment of touchdown; and probably caused the nose wheel to come into contact with the ground before the main wheels. This might be the reason that the airplane bounded back into the air.3. I panicked and applied the brakes hard; and this probably caused the nose to tip downward; and the propeller to strike the runway. Lessons learned:1. Extend flaps to 30 degrees on final to slow the airplane further; and to increase angle of descent.2. Execute flare early enough for the airplane to have the proper attitude at touchdown.

C150 student pilot describes a bounced landing resulting in damage to the aircraft during his first solo flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64.3; Flight Crew Total 11234; Flight Crew Type 3267

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

After reporting at XA:15 for a XB:45 pushback to ZZZZ; we were delayed for a maintenance issue.  Our CCO time was XD:28; we waived and agreed to extend for 2 hours until XF:28.  The time ran out and we were delayed because of legality issues.  It took us 1 hour to get to the hotel; because of late night and COVID-19 procedures.  I entered my room at XG:30.  I tried to find some food because the intention was to complete the 15 hour flight to ZZZZ.  I found no food so elected to try to rest.  I rolled around trying to decompress and unwind from the on again off again rolling delay of the maintenance issue.  I finally fell asleep around XJ:00.  At XK:00; the hotel started to come alive.  There were numerous door openings and closings.  They were obviously crew members leaving for work.  Not 45 minutes after numerous crew members departed for work housekeeping arrived to clean and disinfect the rooms.  It seemed like due to COVID-19 the process took longer and was much louder than it should have been.  By that time it was XN:00 and I had slept for maybe 60 minutes.  I decided I was not fit to fly due to operational caused fatigue and informed the crew desk at XO:00.

Air carrier First Officer reported a maintenance delay combined with COVID-19 procedures resulted in being unfit to fly due to fatigue.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While descending via the HYPER 4 arrival the FMS went into sequence inhibit mode (uncommanded) after MOWAT level at 5;000 FT. This caused confusion between the FMS map and our situational awareness which told us to descend down to 4;000 FT for the HUSEL restriction and the FMS which was telling us to stay at 5;000 FT. I had started to descend after MOWAT but as a result of the confusion quickly leveled off due to the FMS indicating 5;000 FT at the next fix. After a few seconds I determined the error with the FMS and had to do a rapid descent to make the HUSEL restriction; however this restriction was complied with. I am still unsure why the FMS went into sequence inhibit. Additionally and unrelated to the first automation error; during the visual approach into Runway 1R the autopilot had difficulty capturing the localizer due to a strong tailwind on base. This resulted in a significant deviation (half scale) towards the parallel runway before the deviation was corrected. The FMS error may have been caused by an error a few minutes prior where when attempting to sync the heading bug the heading mode on the FCP was hit instead; however this error was immediately noticed and corrected with no deviation from the desired flight path. This was the only abnormal event that occurred before the FMS error; but doesn't seem to explain what happened. The localizer capture error was caused by a strong crosswind on the final approach course. This type of error seems to occur on a regular basis if the autopilot is allowed to capture on its own.

CRJ200 First Officer describes some auto flight anomalies that are common and may be attributed to FMS and or autopilot design.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

We were departing on the last of 4 legs of [our trip]. We were set up for a Runway XX departure with traffic flow; but on taxi out; Tower offered Runway XY. There was a bit of tailwind so the takeoff data was now full power. We accepted and did all the applicable checklists. The First Officer was flying and I believe during or right after my 80 kts. call; we saw a Master Caution light. I quickly saw that it was an aft service door. At that point in time I aborted the takeoff. What I did not take into account was the pace of acceleration due to full power and a very light aircraft. By the time I took control of the aircraft and reduced power to idle; the RTO took effect and we were stopped by probably mid field. It was fairly uneventful and we taxied back to have Maintenance check out the aircraft and I spoke with Dispatch and the [Chief Pilot] via telephone. We got all signed off and flew home with no further problems.It really reinforced the mindset of being prepared for any takeoff to be an abort. As for learning; I think a discussion of different scenarios 'around 80kts' could be helpful. This abort turned out OK; but one leg earlier departing with a heavier aircraft could have turned out differently.

Air carrier Captain reported a service door warning during takeoff roll; resulting in a rejected takeoff.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I instructed the aircraft to descend to 3;000 and I thought I heard him read back descending to 3;000. I was verifying with another aircraft that he had the new ATIS showing the new landing runway when I should have been turning the A319 to join the localizer. The A319 went across the localizer and as I was turning him back to join from the other side I noticed his altitude was below 3;000 and issued him a climb to 2;600; gave a low altitude alert and a leaving the Bravo advisory. I failed to issue a reentering the bravo airspace advisory. The low altitude alert goes off a lot when it is not a factor but never went off even when the aircraft was 600 FT below the MVA.

CLE Controller described a below MVA event when traffic vectored to the localizer failed to intercept as expected. The reporter also listed a failure to provide exit/entering Class B information during the occurrence.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Very windy in ORD so we had a high Vref+wind (163). As we descended below 500 feet the airspeed reached 175; causing the flaps to 'blow up' to 25; and we received the 'too low terrain' warning. I recognized the situation and immediately advised the OE pilot to manage the speed better. It was still barely daylight and I mistakenly thought approach could be continued because it was daylight; the situation was identified and being corrected. At the time of touchdown the flaps deployed to the landing position. I subsequently reviewed the SOP and recognize a go-round is mandatory below 500 feet; period. I debriefed the student appropriately and take full responsibility for not directing the go-around.

B737 Captain reported failure to execute a go-around during an unstabilized approach to ORD in windy conditions.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On takeoff out Runway 16R; at approximately 90 knots an aural alert of windshear ahead was sounded followed by a windshear alert on the FMA. Captain called for a reject and initiated the reject at 100 knots. He taxied the aircraft off the runway and we complied with the appropriate QRH checklists. Also; the FOM was referenced as well. The aircraft and the weather was deemed acceptable by all 3 of us to attempt another takeoff after about 15-20 minutes and we subsequently took off uneventfully.Wind gusts were the probable cause; the aircraft was fully functional and no other factors contributed to this event.Aircraft worked as advertised. ATC was helpful. The crew referenced the appropriate checklist and company issued manuals. Weather was the causal factor in this case.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

A heavy freight aircraft crew rejected their takeoff at about 100 knots complying with a windshear alert. The QRH was completed and a successful takeoff followed.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Weather; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Aircraft

We were flying to LGA. We got cleared to DIALS and 2;500ft for the Expressway Visual 31. The current weather was sustained winds above 20 knots with gusts going over 30 knots. There was also LLWS advisories for the field. We had been getting constant light turbulence with the occasional moderate chop potentially from about 5;000 all the way to the surface as well. The autopilot was turned off and we made the turn to go up the expressway and everything was going fine; just minor deviations. The Pilot Flying (PF) had to fight the weather conditions pretty thoroughly throughout the whole approach. We were a little high; so the Captain (PF) was making the corrections. When we wrapped around Shae Stadium; we were set up; slightly high and so adjustments were being made. When we wrapped around the stadium; the winds shifted from a tail wind to a headwind; and I think this gave us some issues. At one point I think we may have gotten slow for our set speed but the deviations may have been due to the wind shifts and gusts as well as wind shearing. We were focused on flying and I did not catch the speed exactly but I made a call about the deviation and PF made necessary adjustments. We landed smoothly like any other landing but I felt uncomfortable on the ground because I feel we may have gotten slower than expected. We had gone through a cloud earlier in the flight that gave us ICE PROT Speeds; even though the icing condition only lasted maybe a few seconds. We also added a few knots for the gusts. I think due to the wind shift and high energy speeds; the wrap around Shae Stadium was what ended up hurting us the most on the approach combined with it being a more advanced visual and the weather conditions on the field.

First Officer reported concerns about low speed on a night Expressway Visual 31 approach to LGA.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Our airline's new automated dispatch generator system recommended NO Alternate for one of my flights based on unreliable and inadequate information. The program recommended NO alternate for the flight but apparently had not read the current forecast of light rain and snow; three miles visibility and broken clouds at 800 AGL. I caught the event prior to departure time and assigned an appropriate alternate based on FARs; company training and experience. This automated system dispatches flights in direct contradiction to FAR 121.619 and other approved; proven regulations; company policies and back up procedures. DISPATCH NOTE: This flight was written with legal alternate by the morning Dispatcher and the automated system's recommendations came to the evening Dispatcher.This program is unreliable; unsafe and has a high error rate which; during high tempo workloads; could INCREASE chances of illegal releases and possible illegal flights if not caught by the flight crew. It also has a high potential of causing potential flight delays due to last minute fuel increases for alternates the program did not recommend or illegal flights if not caught by flight crews and Dispatch before departure time.

An air carrier Dispatcher believes the newly implemented computerized dispatch program is inadequate or unable to provide consistently legal and timely flight releases.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On final approach; aircraft started a violent uncommanded right roll. The autopilot disengaged and we got an 'autopilot fail' caution message. Captain and First Officer both grabbed the controls before the Captain called 'My aircraft'. Captain reestablished control and hit the auto pilot disconnect to silence the alarm. With the aircraft under control and well above 1;000 feet; Captain continued the approach by hand; staying above glide path on approach. [We] asked ATC if were following a heavy. ATC confirmed we were 7 miles in trail of a B777.Sudden right roll detective by outside reference and instrument scan. Autopilot disconnecting by master warning and autopilot aural warning. Wake turbulence from a B777 7 miles ahead. Regained manual control and stayed high of glide slope to avoided further wake encounters. ATC should have warned us we were following a heavy. Also ATC and the other aircraft were conversing in French so we were not even aware of a heavy on freq. All aircraft and ATC conversing in one language would have reduced the possibility of this happening.

Embraer regional jet flight crew reported experiencing a 'violent' roll to the right on approach to CYUL 7 miles in trail of a B777.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Departing [on] RNAV Departure. At the positive rate callout I called for gear up; speed; and nav. I was following the Flight Director through 300-500 when I realized the NAV mode hadn't captured and we were still in heading mode. I disregarded the Flight Director and turned to the left back to our course. The Captain had tried three times throughout the departure to arm the NAV mode to no avail. By the time I noticed the deviation and turned on course we were approximately one dot to the right of our course. I believe we might have penetrated a Prohibited area. On the fourth attempt the lateral mode armed and I flew the remainder of the departure without incident. After several minutes we were given a phone number to call. [On arrival] I was being vectored to final for RWY XY. I switched to green needles and armed the NAV mode to intercept the LOC with autopilot engaged. The autopilot captured the LOC and almost immediately dropped the Lateral NAV mode and reverted to ROL mode. The Captain tried several times to rearm the Approach mode to no avail. I disconnected the autopilot and followed the PAPI to an uneventful landing using raw data.

EMB-145 First Officer reported that a malfunctioning Lateral Navigation mode caused a course deviation on departure and reversion to a raw data; hand-flown approach.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 4; Maintenance Lead Technician 8; Maintenance Technician 4

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Released aircraft for service with exceeded life limited structural major repair of the R/H aft wing attach fitting that was previously installed. The repair was unknown at the time because no record of it was entered in the aircraft maintenance logs nor was there a form 337 filed with the FAA. It wasn't until after the aircraft had been in operation for one season that a engineering order for the repair was discovered at the previous owners location during a records search. The engineering order placed a life limit of 500 cycles or 1 year whichever occurs sooner on the repair with 100HR recurring visual inspections in the interim. Since its discovery the repair has been evaluated with a damage tolerance assessment by a Structural Designated Engineering Representative and incorporated into our structural inspection program. FAR 91.417 states that any life limited item or item requiring recurring inspection shall be recorded in the aircraft maintenance records and 91.419 requires that owner operator who sells an aircraft to transfer the permanent aircraft records to the purchaser at the time of sale. I believe the failure to follow these rules by the previous owner/operator led to the problem we have today. Moving forward documenting maintenance in accordance with FAR 91.419(a) in the permanent records such as the maintenance log books and submitting a form 337 would appropriately mitigate this problem.

Inspector reported over flight of a major repair conducted by the previous owner concerning a wing attach fitting repair that was not documented correctly.


Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I am submitting this [report] per recommendation of the FOQA gatekeeper.[During cruise]; the #1 Flight Attendant notified me of an unresponsive passenger; that Flight Attendants had administered O2 and that 2 doctors were evaluating the passenger. I handed the plane the First Officer and asked him to plan a divert. I then spoke with the doctor in charge (an internist) who told me that the passenger was not doing well (minimal pulse and no blood pressure) and that he needed a hospital NOW and we should not continue. I told him it would be at least 20 minutes to land and he said; 'We'll do what we can for him.' I then contacted Dispatch and advised the divert to ZZZ. I asked #1 Flight Attendant for an update (no change). I rejoined the First Officer and we flew RNAV approach; which minimizes air and taxi time. During the first arc (right turn west to north) we had trouble getting the airspeed down [analysis- we had 35 kt. tailwind]. During the second arc (left turn- north to west) while lining up with the runway; I noted a 40 kt. tailwind on the ND [analysis- low level jet off mountain and ridge to east- etiology unknown]; 4 red on the VASI and the plane dropping with a nose rise. I commanded a go-around. The WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR (RED) aural warning sounded. First Officer did a go-around. Sometime during the go-around; I saw speed on the hook and I saw rapidly accelerating speed; which we recovered from. I coordinated vectors to Runway XX. At about 200 ft. we went high on path and landed slightly longer than GS intercept. (I believe we re-entered the low level jet from the east) and we landed and taxied to the gate.FOQA noted some irregularities during the go-around- indicating a possible procedural breakdown. I saw the hook; saw the increasing speed ( I raised flaps to 1); did not see the overspeed. But frankly; after hearing the wind shear warning; my training and instincts were to not hit the ground- overspeeds were secondary. Upon reflection; I believe we encountered 4 windshears as we transitioned between winds south at 35 and east at 40: Once on final; then one climbing out; then on approach and then again in the roundout flare. This may explain the airspeed variations. This windshear event was not like the scenario we have trained on for my entire career; and therefore somewhat confusing.Throughout I felt rushed by the medical condition but also wary of putting the entire aircraft in jeopardy. There was constant tension with each decision.Under pressure; I could not find contact information on the ipad that was in my trip book in the past. This was a distraction. [Company] training on the A320 is horribly insufficient- not enough repetitions; not enough actual error analysis by instructors; not enough sims; not enough emphasis on auto systems and how they work. I am not the only one who thinks this; in 6 weeks on line; the vast majority of pilots I've interfaced with say the same thing.

A321 Captain reported a wind shear event during a medical diversion that resulted in a go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3210; Flight Crew Type 15

Made an uneventful landing on RWY XX. As I was rolling out; I felt an abnormality with the right landing gear and reported to the tower a possible flat tire on the right main gear. Upon making the turn to exit the runway to the left; the right main gear collapsed.

A M20J pilot suffered a right main gear collapse while exiting the runway after landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

I was westbound at 3;500 FT over the town of Makawao 10 miles east of Kahului Airport speaking with HCF Approach. I requested a direct transition to Waikapu Valley from my current position; and was granted the transition.  HCF advised of two aircraft inbound for landing to Kahului over Maalaea shoreline.  I responded that I had both targets and maintaining visual.  Over the town of Waikapu; just south of the Tropical Plantation at 2;500 FT; 80 KTS; HCF advised there was a Stationair doing aerial survey five miles off my three o'clock and turning. (HCF did not say which direction they were turning.)  I acknowledged and was cleared to switch radio frequencies to common.  At this point I was just west and outside the 5 mile ring of Kahului's airspace.  Approximately 10 seconds later I looked right and saw the Stationair off my right door 50 feet below me and 50 feet to the right of me closing southbound.  I immediately climbed 100 FT to avoid any collision.  I switched back to HCF to see if the Stationair had me in sight and they replied that the Stationair was talking to Kahului Tower.  I asked Kahului Tower if the Stationair had me in sight and the pilot of the Stationair replied; 'No I didn't and that was close!'  There was no response from Kahului Tower.  I switched back to common and continued my flight. I later found out that the Tower had transmission problems telling the Stationair of my location; so he was unaware of my proximity.  The pilot of the Stationair advised the Tower that their transmissions were garbled.The Tower should have tried harder to contact the Stationair and advise him to climb or descend and advise him of conflicting traffic.  HCF should have held on to me until I had traffic in sight and advised me he was one mile away versus five miles away.  Both the Stationair pilot and myself should have been more diligent in seeing and avoiding.

General aviation pilot describes the circumstances leading up to a NMAC five miles west of PHOG at 2;500 feet.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Departing El Salvador on the JIBOA 3. ATC cleared us to maintain 8;000 by 10 DME. This restriction is not on the departure. With the language barrier I understood that he wanted us to maintain 8;000 until 10 DME. Expect FL380. After 10 DME. This was my first time into El Salvador. Neither the Check Airman nor I caught the ATC assigned restriction. I was informed of this error today; [many days later;] by the check airman. This was after his third trip in three days with three different pilots both First Officers and Captains.This clearly needs to be put on the F4 messages or somewhere on the 10-7 pages alerting pilots that ATC will assign a restriction that is not part of the published SID.

The crew misunderstood an ATC clearance on the MSLP JIBOA 3 departure which resulted in an altitude crossing restriction not being met.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

During the preflight inspection; we noticed in the logbook a couple of maintenance items concerning a noise emanating from the main cabin door during flight.  The door and its seal had been inspected by Maintenance and a leak check had been conducted; with 'ops checked good' (or words to that effect) in the corrective action.  If memory serves; the most recent write up described the above noise as a 'hum.' We departed and climbed away from ZZZ uneventfully.  While climbing through FL210 at a cabin PSID of 7.5 we heard the noise from the cabin door.  It was not a hum; rather a loud shout.  The Flight Attendant later described it as sounding like a 'chain saw.'  Indeed; when the forward Flight Attendant went to call us; he had to go to the back of the aircraft and use the aft interphone as it was virtually impossible to communicate with that racket going on.  We asked ATC for a level off and then a decent to try to make the noise less with a lower PSID.  A quick check of the cabin pressure and PSID revealed no issues there; the cabin pressure was working normally.  Indeed; checking the cabin alt vs aircraft alt in the QRH's manual pressurization schedule revealed that everything was fine.  I tried calling Maintenance in ZZZ as we should have still been within radio range; but I think that they may have gone home for the night.  I also ACARSed Dispatch and then called Maintenance Control on ARINC.  It took a while to get through to them due to COVID-19.  When I appraised them of the situation; they told us to return to ZZZ.  I talked to the flight attendants and talked the passengers to let them know what the situation was.  It was a bit frustrating for the latter as the roar from the door was a soft hum aft of row X.  To add insult to injury; a thunderstorm developed over ZZZ in our absence; so we had to hold...which was fine as Dispatch still had to round up operations agents; gate supervisors; ramp agents; fullers etc.  To add insult to injury; after we landed; the ramp was closed due to lightning.  After we blocked; I gave Maintenance a quick shout on the telephone and we offloaded the passengers and made our way over to the next aircraft for the flight to ZZZ1.  Changing the subject; I would mention that the FO (PF) did a fine job flying the aircraft and dealing with ATC whilst I was talking to the Maintenance/Dispatch/flight attendants/passengers and to the FAs for taking care of the passengers.Apparently there is something afoot with the door seal on aircraft XYZ.  I guess Maintenance's efforts as to try to rectify any hums/roars/squeals etc hadn't solved the problem.

Air carrier Captain reported a loud hum during climbout emanating from the door and having to return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

During approach to 9R ILS PRM into ATL we were established on final approach and cleared for the approach at 3000 feet. The localizer on both of our sides flagged red and disappeared. We reported this to ATC. They asked if we could maintain our course line inbound due to traffic. We said yes as we could fly the course from the FMS but not the approach. Our speed assigned was 210. Shortly after about 20 seconds we got the ILS back prior to glideslope intercept. The Controller was blocked on a communication and may have told us to slow to 180 but we were not sure. The monitor Controller then assigned us 'immediately slow to 150' so we deployed full boards and dropped gear to slow. For some reason the Controller did not hear our readback so he gave us another instruction to slow to 150. Once again he did not hear us and told us to respond with an ident. We did and responded on both main and monitor frequency. He assigned us a turn out 20 degrees to right which we complied with. We never heard a traffic alert message; only a vector off of the course and maintain the same altitude. At this point we did not know if we were being removed from the approach or not. We then got an instruction to turn again and vectors for the ILS to 10. I do not know if we had a traffic conflict. I do not know if we missed the speed earlier or not. There was a lot of stepping on errors with regard to voice communication. We returned to land on ILS 10; during which the monitor Controller checked us to see if we had communication on the primary and monitor frequency. Mechanical failure of some kind; perhaps a plane passing through localizer signal. This caused distraction and workload. Poor weather prevailed; low minimums almost cat 2. Several double communications from the primary and monitor Controller became hard to understand; and perhaps our readbacks being blocked by the urgency of the Controllers all contributed to an abandoned approach and possibly a conflict. I don't know if I have any suggestions. We were stable and prepared. The event was unusual with the loss of course. During triple PRM approaches the Center does not really have an escape route that is known. It was an exceptional event and have not encountered anything like it before doing PRM approaches in Atlanta many times. I do not have any reasonable explanation why our communications were not being heard except really poor timing with other instructions. The only thing that would have been better would have been for ATC to have taken immediate action to break us out after loss of course.

During approach to 9R ILS PRM in ATL and before the FAF; we were established on final and cleared for the PRM approach at 3000 feet. The localizer on each PFD flagged out and we lost the flight director briefly in approach mode. We reported this to ATC. They asked if we could maintain our course line inbound due to traffic; and we reported that we could fly the course line but not the approach on the FMS. Our assigned speed was 210. 20 seconds later; our localizer came back and we were able to navigate normally and reported this to ATC. At this point there was a lot of chatter on frequency. ATC cleared us back onto the approach; and they may have asked us to slow to 180 but either we didn't hear it or it was blocked by traffic. A few seconds later; the monitor controller came on and instructed us to slow immediately to 150 knots; and we read back the instructions on com1 while deploying flight spoilers and the landing gear to slow expeditiously. Both controllers began issuing instructions at this point; and eventually the monitor controller instructed us to turn 20 degrees left immediately and maintain 3000 feet (our current altitude). It quickly became clear that he was breaking us off the approach although a clear breakout phraseology was never used. We still had a hard time reading back the instructions to him due to the frequency being so jammed; and he had us acknowledge with an ident (which we did) and handed us off to another approach controller. The new approach controller gave us vectors for the ILS PRM 10; we set up the approach; briefed it; were vectored onto it; and executed it without issue. On the approach to 10; the monitoring controller queries whether we could hear him; and when we responded on com1; he had us respond again on com2 (monitor frequency). Equipment malfunction caused enough of a momentary delay in ATC communications that not only were they delayed in slowing us; but they were delayed in being able to communicate to the other aircraft on approach. The speed clearance from ATC to 180 knots was either never given or was blocked. Either way; it was not verified to have been read back. The 150 knot instruction was read back on both main and monitor frequency; but ATC behaved as if we were not responding. The 'breakout' issued was further complicated by the fact that it was issued simultaneously on both frequencies by different controllers without using standard breakout phraseology ('traffic alert...'); causing confusion both for us as we complied and for them as they sought our read back. I've never seen this equipment issue or such an issue with communicating with ATC. Without having gone back to the tapes; I'm unsure of the best suggestions for this event. The only thing I can think of is that if an ATC communications backlog like this can result from a momentary equipment issue; then a vector off the approach should have been issued.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported communication difficulties on the 9R ILS PRM approach into ATL resulted in a go-around.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

When signing into the aircraft; [we] noticed a faint odor on the aircraft. None of us thought much of it. As the flight progressed; I felt I smelled the odor still. None of the crew thought it was anything but galley smells. I was feeling a little off; but felt it was from coffee on an empty stomach. Talked to the crew and one Flight Attendant said she felt the same but also drank a lot of coffee on an all-night duty period. On arrival into ZZZ; the smell became very strong. The flight attendants also chimed us reporting the odor with passengers commenting on it. We donned our O2 masks and ran the QRC. We were basically on top of the airport; so decided to just continue and not complicate our workload with priority handling unless it looked like we weren't getting in immediately. We were already turning base; so workload was already high. On the ground; we asked for expedited handling and an immediate gate assignment. None of the passengers complained of symptoms and they departed the aircraft. None of the crew noted symptoms on the ground. Called Medical as a precaution and was cleared to go home. Procedures need to be developed to prevent these odor/fumes events.

On approach into ZZZ; a very strong odor of 'dirty socks' normally associated with atomized oil in the bleed air system entered the flight deck and cabin. We received a call from the flight attendants about it and subsequently donned our oxygen masks and accomplished the items on the Quick Action Card. I performed a normal landing and the aircraft was taxied to the gate without further incident. The Captain called Maintenance; made an entry into the AML and filled out report.

A320 flight crew reported a persistent mild odor during flight which intensified on arrival.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 2940

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

At XA:30 I was woken by noise and loud conversation in room next door. After about 20 minutes I got out of bed and got dressed and went to front desk to request a room change due to noise coming from next door room. I was told that the hotel was full and no other rooms were available. I advised that I would need to check out and go to another hotel if they were not able to accommodate me with a suitable quiet room.The hotel desk person then offered [another] room. I went to the room; unpacked; and went to bed at XB:30. At XF:00 I was woken by noise that sounded like a squeaky door being opened and closed repeatedly. I assumed it was the person in the room next door and that it would eventually cease upon their departure. The noise began at XF:00 (3 AM my body clock time) and ended up persisting into the afternoon.I tried to ignore the constant cadence of the noise that was occurring several times a minute. I was now completely awake; so I got up and went downstairs and had breakfast. I returned to my room and attempted to acquire some type of rest; but with the persistent noise; this was not possible.I made a call to the front desk complaining about the noise and that it was interrupting my sleep. I was told that they would look into the source of the noise.A few hours later; I got out of bed and went down to the front desk to inquire if they had any idea of what was causing the noise. As it turned out; my room was directly above the kitchen. Additionally; there was also an employee maid service door close by my room on the second floor; but I was not able to determine the source of the noise. The noise was clearly coming from some type of squeaky service door in the kitchen or elsewhere near my room where employees were constantly in and out through the door.I again returned to my room to try to gain rest; but the noise was still persisting; so about an hour later I had one of the hotel representatives come up to my room. [Hotel rep] brought a maintenance person with him and they both were able to hear the noise in the bedroom; but were unable to identify the source of the noise. They said they would look into it further; but the noise never subsided.I reported for my flight feeling somewhat compromised with not being able to get quality sleep. The flight was delayed due to ATC flow into ZZZ. We had been fueled to max tank fuel at the gate; but this still didn't allow adequate fuel to ZZZ due to enroute head winds combined with weather and delays at ZZZ. Additionally; the ZZZ forecast for our time of arrival showed a wind shift at ZZZ and that they would be landing south with forecast thunderstorms. I spoke with the Dispatcher and told her that the planned arrival fuel was not adequate and she concurred. A fuel stop was then planned and I advised I did not receive adequate rest to do a fuel stop and then continue to fly a second leg to ZZZ where there were delays and weather with landing RWY XXL. I spoke with a Dispatch; Operations Manager; and then later; Chief Pilot (s). Both Chief Pilots were in agreement to have me fly to ZZZ1 and then re-crew with a Captain. Upon arrival into ZZZ1; I called in fatigued and another Captain was placed on the next segment to ZZZ. The flight to ZZZ1 was busy with planning to get our landing weight below max gross and performance limits due to full tank fuel and a full plane of passengers. Initially we were planned to fly Cost Index 10 and to bump about 25 passengers; but this still did not allow adequate fuel upon arrival at ZZZ and we were still going to misconnect most of our passengers due to ATC flow. The preflight flight required multiple calls; with Dispatch on the ground trying to get numbers to work in order to be able to try to be able to operate the flight nonstop to ZZZ. Once that was determined to not be an option; we then looked at doing a fuel stop [at an alternate]; but that wouldn't work due to being over max gross landing weight because of the boarded max tank fuel. Then; [a second alternate] was looked at; but the flight wouldn't be able to be re-crewed with a new Captain; so ultimately ZZZ1 was chosen. I made a taxi error in where I turned on Taxiway E instead of F to get to C while taxiing to runway because of my being less than mentally sharp at that point. The taxi error did not result any conflict and we turned onto taxiway C and continued to [the] runway.We flew to ZZZ1 at FL220 to burn enough fuel to get below max landing weight. Multiple ACARS communications transpired with Dispatch regarding weights; routing; turbulence; and altitude.At top of descent; a Flight Attendant notified us that we had a passenger issue where passengers were complaining about smelling smoke in the cabin which turned out to be a passenger that was smoking in the lavatory on several different occasions during the flight; so that issue had to be addressed and resolved during the descent while at the same time we were trying to determine landing performance data because of encountering icing conditions in the descent along with setting up for a bleeds off landing due to being performance limited.By the time we arrived ZZZ1; I was very tired and not able to select Fit For Duty to continue the next leg.This was not an ordinary; everyday flight with all of the factors involved with it being a fuel stop with a 737-900ER where we had to make sure we were below max gross landing weight along with being below performance landing/go around limits.Another Captain was in the jet bridge waiting to take the flight to ZZZ; so there was no delay in re-crewing a new Captain; however; the next leg from to ZZZ incurred a flow delay on the ground in ZZZ1. I went to the hotel at ZZZ1 Airport; checked into a room exhausted and went to sleep. Thank you for your time in reviewing my Operational Fatigue report due to hotel conditions which created a fatigue situation where I was unfit to safely operate a second flight late into the night and early into the morning into ZZZ with weather constraints.

B737NG Captain reported calling in fatigued following a poor night's sleep in a noisy hotel.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure

A Medevac aircraft was flying; initially on a direct route; level at 21;000 feet. Because of weather along the route of flight; the Radar controller rerouted Aircraft X direct [to destination]. I called the TRACON at least 15 minutes prior to the aircraft estimated at the TRACON boundary to coordinate this priority routing at 16;000 feet. The controller denied my request without stating a reason or issuing an alternative (such as a higher altitude for possible traffic or a request for control). After a pause; I asked for a suggestion as to how to get the Medevac routing to [their destination]. The controller's response was to take the aircraft north or south over the arrival routing; which we were forced to do.We turned the aircraft to the northeast and issued the STAR. This routing added many miles and several minutes to the aircraft's flight. As Aircraft X approached our boundary with Denver Approach; only one aircraft departed out the west departure gate. Only one aircraft could have been a factor with the inbound medevac.Denying some sort of priority to a medevac flight is inconceivable! Especially in an instance of extremely low traffic flow and complexity. Every single controller at the TRACON should be capable of providing priority services and separation to aircraft requesting it; especially when it could involve someone's health. My recommendation is that the controllers at the TRACON be held accountable for their actions or inactions. Rerouting a Medevac as in this instance (and this is certainly not the first time this has occurred) does not meet our requirement of expeditious handling of aircraft.A possible tool to prevent unnecessary rerouting of Medevac aircraft would be to add/change the Letter Of Agreement with Denver Approach. Medevac flights and other aircraft requesting priority (such as emergencies) should not need TRACON approval; but coordinated in advance. If the receiving controller cannot take an aircraft on requested routing; then an alternate routing or altitude should be suggested/coordinated/assigned that does not take the aircraft on an extreme course change away from their destination airport.

ZDV Controller reported the D01 TRACON Controller would not allow an expedited routing for a Medevac Lifeguard aircraft.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 36; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 4; Flight Attendant Total 36; Flight Attendant Type 70

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

About 3 hours before landing business class Flight Attendants (FA) reported a strong chemical/electrical odor in their cabin. I was Inflight Purser; [and] I walked back on aircraft left and confirmed odor. Cockpit was immediately notified. Extinguishers were made ready; power ports were shut off. Business class lights were turned on to see smoke. No smoke was detected. Pilots turned off recirc fans and this seemed to help reduce the smell. About 20 min later a passenger seated behind business class center bulkhead reported that area around him was very hot. As we searched we found the low center wall of bulkhead very hot to the touch. Magazines were removed from rack and we looked behind business class center seats. We saw no smoke; no immediate odor; however observed a vent system behind the dog houses in front of center bulkhead behind business class; forward of seat. FAs were instructed to turn off the power to the VCC video system. After we did this the area got cooler and we kept both power ports and video system off for remainder off flight. PA informing the passengers was made by me and I assured them that every precaution was being taken to ensure their safety. Cockpit was continually appraised. Approximately 30 min before landing the strong odor returned; this time we could smell it in First class and cockpit as well. The cockpit turned off the gasper fans.We landed without incident. I remained on board and stayed and explained all the events in detail to the mechanics who met the flight. I was informed we had lithium ion batteries in cargo. The cause of strong electrical burning odor was never found; no emergency equipment was used and no one reported any injury to me. I ended up with a strong migraine post trip. Crew did everything to ensure safety and we remained vigilant through flight. Continual checks throughout area was maintained by entire crew.

B777 Flight Attendant reported a strong electrical/chemical odor in the cabin. The cause was never determined; but reporter was advised of the presence of lithium ion batteries in the cargo compartment.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

I; the Ramp Lead Outage Relief Employee; was working my pm shift. I was assigned to work on Gate XX. I had an arrival flight at XA:05. Upon marshalling in aircraft it was parked on wrong stop mark. E170/75W at the time chocks were placed on stop mark pre-arrival and were over E170 part only /75W was visible on the ground. I marshaled aircraft in and parked it on that stop and chocked it. Continued to proceed with aircraft download. Aircraft was being serviced when I realized there was an alternate dashed stop line on the gate painted with markings 57-2/2W/3/3W. Immediately notified supervisor on duty and halted the download on aircraft; took a belt loader and parked it behind the aircraft so it would divert traffic around aircraft since it was on the wrong stop mark and sticking out over clearance zone into ramp ally. We then removed all equipment and the Move Team came to reposition the aircraft on the correct stop line. As far as I have ever known a dashed lead in line is for wide body aircraft and solid lead in lines are for narrow body aircraft. I was unaware that here in EWR we have a few exception gates where dashed lead in lines are for 757 aircraft only. I did not receive a safety briefing at the start of my shift.

An EWR Ramp Agent became confused by the various gate lead-in and stop taxi parking spots and parked an E170 on an incorrect stop line outside the clearance zone.