Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Severe unexpected turbulence and resulting injury to FA-B. Aircraft was hit with unexpected severe turbulence approximately 25 minutes before landing; during initial descent. FA-B was injured as a result of the turbulence by being thrown out of her jumpseat; at which time her back was slammed into the seat on her way down incurring a road rash like burn and bruising (especially apparent on her left side) and also subsequently hit the right side of her head. FA-B is unsure as to what or when her head it. FA-B had a temporary loss of consciousness. Approximately 30 minutes before arrival; the CA announced over the PA to the PAX that the plane had just begun it's descent. During announcement; the CA mentioned 'there may be slight bumpiness'. The CA did not state; 'flight attendants prepare cabin' so FA-A contacted the flight deck and spoke to FO to inquire if that announcement was her 'prepare cabin announcement' (since that is often when it is given). FO stated it wasn't quite that time yet; however he stated we could go ahead and make that announcement early and start cleaning up; as there was a possibility of upcoming turbulence. FA-A made the initial descent announcement and followed up by conveying the information to FA-B. Both flight attendants began clean up/compliance/securing the cabin/galley. FA-B gave FA-A a thumbs up from the back of the cabin indicating all was secure in the main cabin as well as all compliance necessary for landing. FA-A contacted FA-B via phone; and stated that even though we still had one more announcement and final walk through to do after sterile; that FA-B should go ahead and be seated as a precautionary measure since she had completed her compliance (her galley was secure; all open containers emptied/restocked; no one in the restroom and the main cabin was also compliant). It was agreed upon that after sterile; if there was no unsafe turbulence we could walk the cabin one last time; if necessary. At that time the turbulence was light and sporadic. Additionally; no unsafe turbulence was anticipated; we were all just working to make for an easier and safer descent by cleaning up and getting seated early. FA-B then attempted to get into her jump seat. During FA-B''s attempt to buckle her seat belt (both arms were in the straps already) the plane began to experience severe turbulence. The jerking of the plane locked the straps preventing FA-B from snapping the seatbelt closed. Again; FA-B attempted to snap the seat belt together but the turbulence again locked the straps preventing her from locking the seat belt. Upon her third attempt to lock the seat belt a jolt of turbulence launched FA-B upward and out of her seat (including her arms being pulled out of the straps). It is believed (no witness) that as FA-B was launched upward the jump seat bottom closed partially upward so that as her body came down her back was thrown violently into the metal bar of the seat bottom. The next thing FA-B recalls is passengers in the back rows of the plane asking her if she was okay. She was initially disoriented at this point; had definitely had the wind knocked out of her and was concerned if she would even be able to walk as it felt like she may have broken her back or something severe like that due to the extreme pain. The passengers assisted FA-B to an actual cabin seat as she crawled slowly toward them and they reached out their hands to help pull her forward. She eventually was able to get into a seat (row 21 she believes) with their assistance. A PAX actually bucked FA-B as she was that weak and in that much pain. All of this occurred before the plane entered sterile.Note: FA-A was unaware of what had happened to FA-B until after the doors were disarmed because while FA-B was attempting to get into her jump seat and the severe turbulence began; FA-A was getting her paperwork with the arrival announcement; as well as the report which stated the arrival gate and baggage claim info. When theturbulence hit; FA-A still had a cabinet open where the papers were and immediately had to deal with keeping herself safe as she was too far from her jump seat to even try to sit down. FA-A did at one point see FA-B appear to be sitting on the floor in the last two rows of the cabin (in the aisle) when there was a momentary slowing of the turbulence (FA-A was attempting to get an assessment of the cabin as well as an assessment of 'how can I get to my jump seat [or to] safety' especially since there really was nothing on the floor for FA-A to hold onto if she tried to sit down) FA-A (me) believed that FA-B was following protocol for severe turbulence while in cabin; immediately sit and if necessary have PAX assist by holding on to you. By the time FA-A was able to get down and crawl safely to her jump seat FA-B was no longer on the main cabin aisle floor. FA-A assumed FA-B was in her jump seat as well. After the doors were both disarmed and crosschecked FA-B called FA-A and confirmed disarming/crosschecking. As PAX began to deplane; FA-B called and told FA-A that she was hurt but with no specific details. FA-A immediately notified the CA. The CA inquired to the severity and inquired if paramedics would be needed; and FA-A stated it was unknown. The CA immediately made his way through the remaining PAX to get to FA-B and assess the situation. Ultimately; the paramedics were called to assess FA-B and then it was decided FA-B needed to be taken to the hospital for further evaluation. FA-A accompanied FA-B to the hospital and remained with FA-B until all tests were completed and FA-B was released from the hospital. Also; please note that I FA-A was tossed around like a ragdoll (or as FA-B said I looked like 'a monkey swinging in the air'). FA-A did hit head several times on the ceiling as she was lifted and completely airborne; but did not incur any pain.Unfortunately due to the nature of the unexpected severe turbulence I believe it was handled as best as possible. The FO did notify the FAs of possible turbulence and suggested early compliance as a precaution. Both FAs did exactly as suggested by the FO immediately and were ready to be seated quite early; even with turbulence they were still in seat before sterile flight deck. As for acquiring witnesses and witness accounts unfortunately due to the timing of occurrence and the time FA-A became aware of said situation it was no longer an option to get said info. Additionally; based on evaluation following the incident; it is apparent FA-B was in shock and so it would be unrealistic to expect FA-B to have had the wherewithal to ask for witness info and/or for them to stay for a report.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported severe turbulence during descent resulting in injury to one of the flight attendants.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 250

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While enroute to LWC; about 15 minutes before landing; ATC (ZKC) advised me of the current NOTAMS at LWC; which consisted of a crane located 1.8 miles south of the airport and a few unlighted towers which were consistent with the my briefing. 10 miles south of LWC I cancelled IFR and proceeded visually to airport; with a planned approach and landing on RWY 33. Approximately 1 mile from the runway I could see flashing yellow lights at the approach end of 33 not consistent with airport lighting. Approximately 1/2 mile from the approach end of RWY 33; I could see that a vehicle was on the runway at the approach end and a red X was placed at the threshold of the runway. I immediately abandoned the approach for 33 and circled to land on runway 19. On final approach to 19; I noticed a vehicle at the east edge of 19 at the intersection of 33 but clear of runway 19 and I performed a normal landing without further incident. No NOTAMs was issued for the closed runway; and airport vehicles were in hazardous areas for both 33 and 19. After landing I contacted; Kansas City Center and advise him of the closed runway. The controller was still unaware of the closure.

BE-33 pilot reported noticing on short final to LWC that his intended runway was closed; but it was not mentioned on NOTAMs; and ATC was unaware of the closure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

I was flying a direct route from our base in ZZZ to pick-up a patient at the hospital in ZZZ1.  I was at 1;000 feet MSL with autopilot engaged.  I had noticed that there was another aircraft on TCAS about 10 NM from me but did not have a visual.  Their direction indicated that they were east of us and flying west (we were headed in a generally southern heading).  At 5 NM I alerted my crew that there was an aircraft out around the 10-11 o'clock position and that I did not have them in sight yet.  There was no response on frequency (a general helicopter frequency for avoidance and awareness).  We did finally get a visual confirmation at approximately 1 mile or so of separation (with them at our 10 o'clock position) and it appeared that we had converging vectors.  Still; nothing on the radio and they did appear to be maneuvering to avoid us. Turning would not have been sufficient to separate the aircraft so I began a rapid climb (over 500 FPM) and the aircraft passed directly underneath us with about 300 feet or so of vertical separation (we were rapidly climbing past 1;300 feet MSL).  Afterwards we still got no communication or acknowledgment from the other aircraft.

Pilot reported a NAMC with another aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure

During preflight walkaround inspection; found that the left leading edge of wing had two extra vortilons. Called Maintenance and they couldn't find the original documentation of approval to operate with extra vortilons. The extra vortilons were from installation of a MAX leading edge.There should be a logbook note in the aircraft to give future Crews notice of this engineering authorization to operate in this configuration.

During pre-flight; FO (First Officer) noticed one wing had more vortilons than the other. We called Maintenance for further inspection. Maintenance concluded that a MAX slat was on an -800 NG. Maintenance was going to clear the aircraft on CDL (Configure Deviation List) for missing Vortilons. I was not comfortable with that assessment. I called Chief Pilot on call for further input. The Chief seemed as concerned as me and said he would investigate further. At this point there was no documentation proving that it was ok to have a different model slat or if this was a oversight by Maintenance. I decided; after discussing with FO that we wanted Company engineering to provide documentation as to the airworthiness of this -800 NG with a MAX slat; or provide us a different aircraft. Engineering cleared the aircraft (approximately one hour) and we reloaded Passengers. Airborne without further incident. Preventative Measures: Provide Maintenance info sticker inside logbook. This would mitigate confusion over an unusual aircraft configuration.

Flight Crew reported confusion when they discovered on preflight walk around that a MAX leading edge slat had been installed on a -800 aircraft. It was concluded to be an authorized part for service per the Boeing IPC.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

At cruise; we noticed that the center tank was not feeding. Accomplished QRH that showed that the center tank pumps were not producing enough pressure to put out the fuel pressure lights. A hub airport was in front of us with the best weather around; so we diverted there. Not overweight; plenty of fuel remaining in the mains- no emergency declared.The last I heard; Maintenance could not determine the problem- the center tank pumps were working; just not enough pressure to feed fuel at anything close to a normal rate.

An MD-80 diverted to a nearby airport when the flight crew determined they were unable to access fuel in the center fuel tank due to low fuel pump pressure.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Shortly after takeoff; we were struck by lightning. This was immediately followed by an engine exceedance level 1 alert on the Number 2 Engine and a FADEC maintenance alert. We reference the required publications/procedures. All engine indications were normal and we determined that we were safe to continue. Just prior to level off we got the level 2 Oil Filter Bypass alert. Again we ran the QRH procedures. The procedures resulted in the engine safely running at 47% N1. We discussed the situation and felt we were safe to continue to destination. During the cruise; we noticed that the Number 2 oil quantity was slowly decreasing. We again referenced the QRH and felt we were safe and legal to continue. As we were approaching the top of descent; we elected to do a precautionary shutdown - We thought there was enough oil to continue to landing; but didn't want a distraction during the landing phase if the oil completely depleted. We declared an emergency and Captain executed an ILS. [We] taxied to gate after landing. It looks like the lightning strike might have caused the FADEC to fail and the engine to exceed limitations. The exceedance caused physical damage to the engine and the gradual loss of oil quantity. Any thing I submit here would be a complete guess. I've never seen lightning cause this type of damage to an engine.

MD11 First Officer experiences a lightning strike during climb out causing an engine exceedance and a FADEC maintenance alert. At level off an Oil Filter Bypass alert is received and the engine thrust is reduced in compliance with QRH procedures. Engine oil quantity slowly decreases during cruise and the engine is shut down at the top of descent as a precaution. A two engine landing ensues.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Upon approaching Runway for departure; completed a configuration scan ('flaps; gas; trim; speedbrake'- flaps 1; stab trim 6.5); successful takeoff Warning Horn check and Takeoff Checklist. Captain was the Pilot Flying. Upon reaching approximately 130 knots (V1 137 knots) we received a Takeoff Configuration Warning light and horn. Rejected the takeoff in accordance with flight operations manual guidance; 'aircraft unsafe/unable to fly'. Alerted ATC; passengers and FAs. Upon clearing the runway completed the Takeoff Configuration Warning Checklist (aircraft was properly configured for takeoff) and reviewed the Rejected Takeoff QRH guidance. Contacted Dispatch/Maintenance. Complied with brake cooling requirements and returned to the gate. Maintenance performed the necessary inspections and sign-offs. Departed uneventfully. Two other takeoffs were subsequently performed in said aircraft without incident.

B737 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff at 130 kts when they received a Takeoff Configuration Warning. The aircraft was properly configured and no faults were found by Maintenance.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Just after takeoff; on the initial climb at about 2;000 FT we smelled and saw a thick smoke coming from inside the cockpit. I asked the pilot not flying if he felt the same thing and when he answered that he did we started doing the 'smoke in the cockpit' emergency items. After declaring an emergency we returned to [departure] airport where an overweight landing was made. We had also a problem of communication between the pilot flying and the pilot not flying and also the Flight Attendant because the mic on the oxygen mask of the pilot not flying was not working properly. So the pilot flying had to fly the airplane and do the radio communication at the same time. Also we were only able to notify the Flight Attendant about an emergency and that we were returning to the airport but further communications were difficult due to the mic problem. After landing we taxied back to the gate under fire fighters escort. We then deplaned the passenger and a normal shutdown was done. The smoke in the cockpit was at first very thick but slowly dissipated as we were turning on final which made the landing uneventful. Also after landing we tried to get in contact with Operations but were unable to get in touch with them. Training and proficiency of crew member made this emergency very easy to handle. After finding out that the oxygen mask mic of the pilot not flying was not working we immediately came up with other means of communication as for example hand signal and as the smoke cleared up we were lifting our oxygen mask a little bit to be able to communicate.

EMB-145XR First Officer described seeing and smelling thick smoke on initial climb. Flight declared an emergency and returned to departure airport.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

After landing on Runway 4R and taxiing across 4L on Taxiway J; we contacted Ground for further taxi instructions. Ground asked if we could still make a hard left onto Taxiway R. I immediately began a left turn and the First Officer responded that we could. As the aircraft began to turn the nosewheel began to slide on the ice covered taxiway. This resulted in a wider than normal turn radius and caused us to taxi over a patch of unplowed snow in the intersection of J and R. The snow was about 5 inches deep and looked to be soft enough to continue. As the aircraft continued the turn it became clear that there were hard ice blocks under the top layer of new snow. The aircraft came to a stop (while still on taxiway J and R) and; not wanting to cause any damage to the aircraft by powering out; I called Ground and explained that we would need assistance to continue. I set the parking break and we waited for the Port Authority to arrive and plow; shovel and deice the area around us. A tug was called and eventually we were pulled out of the snow.The taxiways were plowed; however; not to the entire width. This resulted; especially in intersections; in unplowed areas in the corners. Due to several snow storms in the weeks prior; there were hard ice blocks under the fresh new snow. The plowed portions of the taxiways were very icy; in fact; upon exiting Runway 4R I told Tower that the breaking action was poor on the high-speed taxiway. Since we were a ferry flight the aircraft was extremely light which did not help with traction. Clearly my error was to attempt a sharp turn under those conditions.The error was mine alone. Under very tricky taxiing conditions in a light aircraft I should not have attempted a maneuver that is normally done. Even though the aircraft never left a taxiway; I should be more wary of going over any snow covered areas.

The aircraft continued to slide into about 3-5 inches of unplowed snow on the Taxiway (R). The Captain came to a complete stop on Taxiway R and told Ground that we would need some assistance. We were able to get help from the Port Authority by salting; removing unplowed snow and putting sand on the ground to allow the tug to take us out of the snow; then after the super tug came and towed the aircraft to Terminal A. Maintenance was there to also assist us as well.Because of the quick action of the Captain the aircraft was able to come to a complete stop on the taxiway which prevents any visual damage to the aircraft.

After landing on EWR Runway 4R and crossing 4L; the crew attempted to transition from Taxiway J to R but slid off the taxiway. The aircraft was towed to the gate after authorities cleared the obstructing ice and snow.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2900

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After being cleared direct to AVDIH the RNAV (GPS) Z Runway 2 IF at GPI by Salt Lake Center we were cleared from 10;000 MSL to maintain 9;000 MSL until AVDIH; report established; cleared RNAV (GPS) Z Runway 2 approach. We opted to use the IF vs making a 180 degree course reversal over the IAF KILLY due to higher terrain over KILLY and the complexity of the course reversal. We did not anticipate the 9;000 MSL altitude assignment over AVDIH (published at 7;000 MSL); however; we had ample time/distance to safely get to the LPV Glide Path altitude of 5;200 MSL over BINGQ the FAF.The pilot flying (PF) acknowledged 9;000 was set in the altitude pre-selector. I; as pilot monitoring (PM); went heads down to insure the FMS was properly programed for the straight in approach both laterally and vertically. We were in heading mode with LNAV armed; altitude captured at 10;000 with the autopilot on. PF disconnected the autopilot while I was heads down and unintentionally ballooned to 10;400. I called out the altitude deviation and commanded him to descend to 9;000 while nudging the yoke forward to prevent further altitude gain. We had to slow down and make configuration changes (flap/landing gear) during the descent to 9;000. While still hand flying; the PF failed to maintain 9;000 until AVDIH but descended to 8;800 initially. Again; I called out the deviation and commanded him to maintain 9;000. We intercepted the final approach course outside of AVDIH and LNAV later guidance was captured/used.After crossing AVDIH; we then descended to intercept the VGP and crossed the FAF at the appropriate altitude. The rest of the approach continued normally.There were no terrain or traffic conflicts.Contributing factors: PF was using the synthetic vision system display. Although he had completed simulator training with the equipment within the previous 6 months; he did not have a lot of actual experience using the equipment in the plane. We did not anticipate being 2;000 feet above the IF altitude when we were cleared for the approach. The arrival direction would have made the IAF to IF course reversal difficult; but would have given us more time to descend to the IF altitude. PF did not have the correct vertical situational awareness for the ATC clearance issued. PF admitted to being confused/distracted by the conformal nature of the SVS display leading to further loss of situational awareness. PM went heads down before insuring the descent from 10;000 to 9;000 was properly initiated by the PF.Human performance factors: The crew was well rested and flying during normal daylight wakeful hours. Both pilots have been with the company less than 1 year. PF has little flying experience outside of USAF operations and is still adjusting to civilian operations/procedures. Task saturation diminished situational awareness for both PF and PM.The event is being reviewed within our [company safety department]. Procedures will be reviewed and corrective actions will be taken to increase situational awareness and decrease workload during approaches.

A GLF5 First Officer (FO) reported the Captain experienced several altitude deviations on approach that the FO felt were caused at least in part by the use of a synthetic vision system.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Aircraft X was on a visual approach to RWY 4 from the south east of ELP. I stopped Aircraft's descent at 060 due to a VFR aircraft that departed ELP and was on the same course as Aircraft X. I separated the two and canceled Aircraft X visual approach clearance. I gave Aircraft X a heading to fly but not an altitude to maintain and he flew in to a MVA that was higher than his altitude. Shortly after I issued Aircraft X an altitude to maintain that was above the MVA. Have to remember to issue an altitude and a heading when you take them off a approach.

ELP Controller sees a conflict between two aircraft and cancels approach clearance on one of the aircraft. The Controller then assigns the aircraft a heading that led the aircraft into an area with a higher MVA than the aircraft's current altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1025; Flight Crew Type 1025

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors; Airport

I departed on an IFR flight plan with the intention of canceling my IFR flight plan and picking up VFR flight following and diverting to my destination; a private strip; which I did. I cancelled VFR flight following when I started my descent for the strip. VFR conditions were present at both the departure airport and the destination.Upon arrival at the airstrip I flared and touched down. At this point a gust of wind hit me and pushed the plane back into the air. The plane then came back down; touched down firmly and 'porpoise' back into the air. It came down firmly a second time and I then 'held the airplane up' and let it settle back to the landing strip. At this point the wind had pushed me to the right side of the airstrip. The right main landing gear went off the airstrip into the adjacent grain field which had recently been plowed. At this point the soft dirt of the grain field 'sucked' or pulled me farther to the right of the airstrip into the grain field. We proceeded for approximately 150 feet in the grain field where the nose wheel finally 'dug in' and the airplane nosed over striking the left wingtip first then coming to rest on its top. My third class medical is current as well as the airworthiness and weight and balance for the airplane. As far as I am aware I was in no violation and was operating within the limits of the aircraft.

The pilot of a C-206T lost control after a firm; porpoise touchdown on a rural grass airstrip and ran off the side into plowed earth; ultimately rolling the aircraft onto its back.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 300

I pulled onto Granbury; TX (GDJ) runway 14; stopped and set the directional gyro. Just as I started my takeoff roll I saw a plane shadow come by followed by a yellow or orange cub or Aeronca that flew over and landed in front of me and stayed on the entire length of the runway.   I was monitoring the radio and had announced my intentions. The only thing I heard was while I was taxiing a helicopter announced entering a left downwind. I was watching for him. The helicopter came over the runway low and slow about the time I reached the taxi end. I did not hear a transmission from the cub or aeronca and I did not see him when I scanned the approach. He could have made a left base (right traffic) or whatever but I did not see or hear him. He flew directly over me some 25 feet above.I reported this to the Airport Manager and another airport employee. The other employee said there had been a Chief or Champ landing there with no radios.

C-170 pilot reported another aircraft flew over him with about 25 feet of clearance when he was in position on the runway at GDJ; a non-tower airport. The other aircraft reportedly was not equipped with a radio.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 250

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Diverted

Approximately 300 nm ENE of ZZZ at about XA30Z we were at FL430 enroute.  We had established ourselves level at .70 and had then set the power to 93.0%; in line with the altitude and temp (ISA -2c) for long range cruise according to the book.  We were expecting .70 mach and fuel flow of 750 lbs/hour.The flight profile from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 was doable on the Long Range profile per the book with the fuel load we took; but we were closely monitoring the remaining fuel at destination and the nm/gal fuel.The plane began to slowly react to the 93.0 power setting with pitch increasing and speed slowing.  This was quite gradual; perhaps a  IAS/minute.  At 8 degree nose up pitch; 160 IAS and about .62 mach the autopilot disengaged.  This was followed by a stick shaker.  I pitched level and added full power.  The PIC took aircraft controls at this point.  In this recovery we lost 1;000 feet and recovered positive control at 420.We were unsurprisingly busy during this roughly 1 minute period and did not advise ATC that we were having an in flight emergency and descending.  ATC called as we reestablished altitude control and warned us to return to 430.  At that time I advised that we had an in-flight emergency due to a stick shaker and were now stable at 420 but unable to climb. ATC urged us to climb due to an approaching aircraft at 410. We were unable to do so; advised ATC and told them were were turning right to avoid.  At the same time ATC turned the conflict traffic left.  Shortly thereafter both aircraft received an A.  We advised ATC we were unable to respond to our RA with a climb; the other aircraft did respond to theirs with a descent.  Of note; while the RA needed to be addressed; we were level at 420 and there was no common altitude at any time closer than 1;000 feet.After the conflict resolution; we requested/descended to 400.  We subsequently decided to divert to ZZZ for fuel.  The balance of the flight was without incident.We were asked to call Center and did so after the flight was completed.  The Center Supervisor (not sure of his title) said he would not record this as a pilot deviation as we were responding to an in flight emergency.  This was backed up by our radio transmissions at the time.We were monitoring performance the entire time and were discussing whether to add power or to see if the plane could accelerate back to book numbers on its own.  During the subsequent week we monitored fuel levels in the aircraft vs indicated; and now believe that we may have been overweight by about 400 lbs.  This would explain the performance issue.The Company is looking into this possible gauge discrepancy.  In the meantime; we are using the estimated higher weight in all WB and performance calculations; but the lower indicated amount for flight duration; essentially adding 400 lbs to BOW until the gauges are re calibrated.

Beechcraft 400 First Officer reported an airspeed degradation while flying a Long Range Cruise profile at FL430; resulting in an inability to maintain assigned altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Workload; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Aircraft X checked in on frequency off of DTW as a jet level at 11000 feet. The radar controller climbed the aircraft to a higher altitude.  The radar controller and I mistakenly thought we had control to climb on contact with respect to other departures. No separation was lost. I was later told that there are different sectors within DTW airspace which requires coordination prior to climbing. Due to lack of training for the newly implemented Metroplex procedures; I was not aware of this. At the time of this airspace violation; SKY/PAN sectors went red on the monitor. The supervisor was unaware of this and did not offer to split the sectors. He did not become aware of this until another controller came back from break and by this time it was way too busy to split. This resulted in an unusually high workload which could have easily been prevented.

Cleveland Center Controller reported issuing an authorized climb due to lack of training following the Metroplex airspace change.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

The flight was being conducted IFR. The cloud tops were at approx. 7500 feet. When I was cleared for the approach by Center I requested a climb to 8000 ft; instead of the published 2000 ft; in the event of a missed approach; because I knew that I would be unable to communicate with Center at 2000 ft. While descending for the approach I noticed that I was accumulating a large amount of ice on the airframe; at an unusually fast speed; and that it was moving behind the boots. I 'blew the boots' in an effort to clear the wings. The boots were not able to keep up with the accumulation of ice and I could not clear the wings. I believed that the situation was becoming dangerous; and that I needed to get out of the icing layer as fast as possible. I decided to execute a missed approach. I was unable to communicate with Center to inform them of my going missed; so I contacted ZZZ Radio on the Remote Communications Outlet (RCO) frequency of. The RCO is only good for about a 5 mile radius of [my position]; so I knew I didn't have a lot of time. I told ZZZ radio that I was going missed and requested to go direct to ZZZ at 8000 ft due to heavy icing. This request was denied; and I was instructed to fly the published missed at 8000 ft. I then lost comms with ZZZ Radio. While trying to climb to 8000 ft I began to accumulate ice on the airplane at an even faster rate. The windshield was completely covered and I was quickly losing airspeed. All anti-ice and de-ice equipment was ON. At 4000 ft I was unable to climb anymore and my airspeed was still decaying. I was still unable to communicate with Center or ZZZ Radio. I scanned my ADSB and noticed that [another company pilot] was in my area. I contacted him. Communication with him was spotty and difficult. I asked him to relay to Center that I was unable to climb; was in severe icing conditions; and was in an emergency. I also requested a descent to 1000 ft; and a course deviation towards the shoreline so I could maintain over-water gliding distance. This request was granted by Center. I descended; and broke out of the layer at about 1500 over the shoreline. The temp was +2C at that altitude. Most of the ice sublimated off of the airplane while returning to ZZZ; and I was able to safely land in ZZZ with ice free wings. After landing; I called ZZZ Radio and Center. I thanked them for the help and asked if they needed any information regarding the incident. They both responded that no additional information was needed.Lack of radio coverage in the area made this incident more difficult to deal with. A more powerful RCO would have helped also.

C208 pilot reported a missed approach when the aircraft iced up on approach to the destination airport; was unable to climb above 4000 feet; requested a descent and returned to departure airport.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was the Captain and pilot flying. We were descending via the arrival when we were cleared for the ILS approach. We were descending in VMC conditions. When we were cleared for the approach I set 2;000 feet at a waypoint on the ILS; and selected a vertical direct descent to that fix. As we were descending I realized I was too low for that phase of the descent [and] ATC brought it to our attention. We climbed back up to 3;000 feet and were cleared the visual [approach]. The mistakes I made were misreading and misunderstanding the arrival and approach; and failing to maintain good situational awareness during the descent phase of flight. The aircraft landed safety with no further incident. I should have descended via the arrival and kept the aircraft descending in LNAV and VNAV; instead of descending in green vertical direct.

ERJ-170 Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on an ILS approach in visual conditions when he deviated from the charted procedure.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 300

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

This encounter is a normal setup and an ongoing problem. The fixed wing pattern for MYF Runway 28L; using AIM criteria; coupled with the standard arrival for helicopters to a landing roughly 200 ft south of that runway; [results in] a conflict point for both when a fixed wing aircraft is on base leg. The tower is not required to separate helicopters from fixed-wing aircraft. Occasionally they will attempt some separation; usually by altering the course of the fixed-wing to avoid the 'flow' of helicopter traffic; but in this particular scenario; the tower simply attempted to alert us - we got the call when on downwind: 'traffic 12 o'clock one-half mile'. This was not what I would call a 'near miss' - we saw him in time to avoid a collision; thanks to the alert from the tower. It is just a situation begging for an accident.The way to fix this is to treat helicopters as if they were fixed wings. Normally the tower will not let us turn base until we have the preceding fixed wing in sight. They should do this for helicopters as well - the potential for a fatal midair is actually higher with a helicopter. Most helicopters are painted black or dark red. These aircraft; when they are lower; are almost impossible to see. This reporter has tried to discuss these issues with helicopter operators. He has been met with sufficient hostility that such discussions are now an impossibility. There has to be a better way to mix helicopters and fixed wings than to simply allow helicopters to go where they want.

PA-18 pilot reported numerous airborne conflicts with helicopters at MYF.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

I have seen too many could not duplicate/ops check good where the item in question is still inop over the last year. This morning is a blatant example. We had an early morning departure. With the APU running and the bleed on for a couple of minutes I preflighted the aft service bay. Water was literally pouring out of the ACM ducting; pooling on a cover below and eventually flowing out of the airplane. When placing the write up in the log book I noticed a prior write up from two days prior. The write up was for no cabin airflow/unable to cool. It was signed off as could not duplicate. When the drain is clogged and water backs up in the system it freezes and cuts off the airflow. I honestly don't know how it would be possible for the mechanic to miss this. I sent a video of the water pouring out to Maintenance Control; and I have a copy of it in my iPhone.

An HS-125-800 Captain reported an air cycle machine producing a great deal of water which pooled in the aft service bay. When the drain is clogged and freezes over; cabin conditioned airflow is blocked. This anomaly was previously recorded but not repaired.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.0

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Police / Security Involved

I was working controller in charge when the local controller advised me that Aircraft X had reported losing oil pressure about 5nm west of the airport. The local controller immediately issued the wind and altimeter setting and cleared them to land on the closest runway. I advised local control to ask Aircraft X if they required any assistance. They told local control to standby. Aircraft X's next transmission was that they were landing in a field. I immediately dispatched fire and rescue to the location on the radar display where the data tag was last observed and started contacting all appropriate notifications. FIRECOM (Fire Communications) reported that the aircraft landed gear down no damage and no injuries.It was later found out from the aircraft operator that the aircraft landed at an airport on a grass strip there. Great job to everyone involved.

A Tower Controller in charge reported an aircraft lost oil pressure and landed safely on a grass strip airfield.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft was not provisioned with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to clean cockpit (the bag with masks; gloves; cleaning wipes). This flight should have been provisioned for the round trip. Not sure where the cleaning provisions went; but clearly thorough provisioning is not working. Fortunately I had a few wipes I had brought from home.

Air carrier First Officer reported no Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) or sanitizing equipment were provided for a round trip flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

As Captain; I was the Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer was the Pilot Flying for this flight. On the take off roll at approximately 90 to 100kts; I hear the First Officer make the comment 'There seems to be a lot of airflow through this window'. I glanced over and to see from my point of view that the window appears to be closed. I shift my eyes back to the runway centerline; airspeed and engine instruments while thinking about what he said. At approximately 110kts; it becomes loud with high airflow into the flight deck. The First Officer shouts 'My window is open'. I quickly glance over to his side to see he has his left hand on the control wheel and is holding the R 2 flight deck window closed by the window lock lever with his right hand. I immediately took the controls. At this time we are approximately 120kts just prior to V1 (129). I took a quick glance at my First Officer and back to my instruments; I saw that we were Vr + 8 to 9kts. I then rotated. I saw a positive rate of climb and shout 'gear up'. The First Officer assumed pilot monitoring and raised the landing gear. I shouted 'Can you crank the window closed at all?' He responded 'No; it won't close'. At this point; Tower had advised us to contact Departure. I selected the Center Autopilot; VNAV & Heading Select with a heading of 360 as assigned. I opened the speed window and remained at Flaps 5 to prevent the airplane from accelerating. I figured the faster we would go; the louder the flight deck would be and the more the First Officer would struggle to hold the window in position. The First Officer shouts 'I can't hear anything from ATC.' Around 3;400 ft. I contacted Departure and informed them that we need to stop climb and return to the airport because we have a flight deck window opened. We were given a left heading of 270 and to maintain 4;000. We performed the after takeoff checklist. My First Officer states 'I can't hear anything from ATC but what do you need from me?' I responded 'ATC is giving us vectors back to ILS RWY XX. If you can; get flight deck performance for Runway XX and set us up for the ILS RWY XX; I'll do a quick brief; then we will do our Descent and Approach checklist.' With one hand still on the window crank; the First Officer did just that and along with his flow. ATC gave us another vector and asked if we need more time. I told ATC that we were not ready and asked to continue heading at 270 and 4;000. Once we were set up; briefings and checklist were complete; I advised ATC we were ready for the approach. Since I was flying while doing the radios myself and the First Officer with only one free hand available; I decided it would not be prudent to be heads down and message Dispatch through ACARS. I felt the priority was to fly the plane and get us safely on the ground. I informed ATC 'We [request priority]; 2 souls on board and approximately 4 and half hours fuel on board'. ATC asked the nature of the [situation] and I replied 'We have a flight window cracked'. I meant to say cracked open; however; the noise from the airflow was a little distracting. ATC gives us an intercept heading of 100 and clears us for the approach. We were stable; fully configured; and all checklists were complete prior to the final approach fix. At 800 feet AGL we broke out of the clouds. I had the airport in sight and disengaged the autopilot. A normal landing was made at approximately 265;000 lb. We informed Tower that we did not need assistance and taxied to parking. Upon taxi in; I do not know if the First Officer closed the window or left it in its previous condition from flight; opened. Perhaps he left it alone so that Maintenance could inspect. I wrote up that the First Officer R2 flight deck window opened on takeoff/climb and I waited for them to inspect. There was no damage or defects noted.I honestly do not know if it was a Flight Deck Window malfunction or if it was ever truly locked. Both of us had opened our Flight Deck Windows on the ground during preflight because the APU was off and the temperature was in the 70's. About 30 minutes prior to block out; I started the APU and we closed our windows. In the Before Start portion of the checklist; I verified my flight window was closed and locked with strut at a 90 degree position. I heard the First Officer respond 'Closed and locked'. I could see his Window Lock Lever was in the forward and locked position; however; I could not verify if his decal showed 'CLOSED' nor if the strut was at a 90 angle simply because of the angle from where I was sitting in the Captain's seatI think that in the moment; the First Officer did a great job of prioritizing aircraft control in such a critical phase of flight. To be in the high speed regime of takeoff; so close to V1 and to keep 'aviating' while a huge startling distraction occurred was commendable. He also; kept his head in the game and jumped to the pilot monitoring duties without delay. He prompted me for the after takeoff checklist as we were about to level off at 4;000. If I could have done one thing over; I would have shouted 'My controls' in a louder voice. I didn't take into consideration that the First Officer could not hear well at that point.I'm also appreciative of our Company training video made by Boeing of a flight with the flight deck window opened. I'm glad that I was shown to me during my 767 upgrade training. I never thought I would be in that situation but thankfully I had some idea of what to expect. The plane will be extremely loud and distracting but it will safely fly.

During takeoff my window opened immediately after the CA (Captain) called '80 knots; thrust set.' I was PF and saw the window rolling aft. I grabbed the window handle with my right hand while continuing to fly. I maintained runway centerline and described what happened by shouting cross cockpit to allow the CA to have the information and make an appropriate reject decision. About 10 knots before V1 the CA took the aircraft. I couldn't hear him verbally call V1 due to the cockpit noise and open window. Perhaps I didn't hear him call V1 because he had already taken the aircraft. Regardless it was loud and my audio panel wasn't set up to compensate for the noise.When the aircraft rotated I immediately assumed the role of Pilot Monitoring. He shouted to raise the landing gear and I did. The CA flew and took the radios because I had shouted cross cockpit that I couldn't hear ATC well enough to communicate. Both of us had to compensate because of the noise. The CA selected heading select and turned left to our assigned heading of 360 and elected to select VNAV and Center Autopilot Command almost simultaneously.The CA requested to stop climb around 5;100 MSL and informed me that we would return to ZZZ. Around this time I had determined that as long as I held the window with a good amount of strength it wouldn't roll open. I adjusted my interphone and ATC freq to Max volume so that I could hear. I then asked the CA if he was ready to run the After Takeoff Checklist and we did. Everything from that point forward was standard and in order except that the CA had to turn the Standby Attitude Indicator to ILS mode because I had one hand holding the window; the CA [advised ATC]; and did the radios. After we landed all roles were normal and the taxi in was standard.This situation is dynamic. I think perhaps a better verbal transfer of aircraft control on takeoff roll but we effectively handled the situation. I thought the CA was going to reject the takeoff. By the time he processed what was going on he decided it was safer to continue the takeoff. It was loud and we coordinated the best we could in this situation.

Flight Crew reported the First Officer's sliding window opened on takeoff roll; causing an air turn back and a precautionary landing.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other A&P

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 6300; Flight Crew Type 21

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

The flight was conducted by an experienced ATP-AMEL owner as PIC and training Captain and an experienced commercial AMEL pilot as Trainee. No passengers were on board. The purpose of the flight was a training mission from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and back to ZZZ and for aircraft familiarization and to run an errand in ZZZ3. The flight landed ZZZ1 uneventfully after about 2.0 hours and estimated 28 gallons of fuel burn. Fuel on board at departure from ZZZ was 70 gallons of 84 gallons maximum usable and flight on only the main tanks (48 gal avail; 28 required) was planned. The two pilots parked at the FBO and requested fuel to be topped then proceeded to take the crew car to town for a couple hours to take care of some business in town and get lunch.Upon return to the FBO line service had already serviced the aircraft and a receipt for 26 gallons of fuel was provided. The pilots performed the pre-flight on the aircraft. The ATP checked the fuel quantity visually on the left side and the commercial pilot checked fuel visually on the right side. By verbal agreement the fuel was observed full in all 4 tanks left and right. The receipt for fuel purchase showed approximately the expected amount of 26 gallons burned on the previous flight.Approximately halfway back to ZZZ from ZZZ1; at about 1.3 hours flight time; the right engine failed. The ATP took over controlling the aircraft and completed all of the memorized and checklist emergency procedures and diverted to ZZZ2 in visual conditions. The landing was uneventful with no damage to the aircraft; no injury to the pilots and no passengers nor ground personnel were involved.Upon inspection of the aircraft the problem was determined to be the right main fuel tank was empty. This should not have been the case because it held 27 gallons usable and the 1.3 hour flight should've only burned 8-9 gallons on the right side; flown entirely on the main tanks. The aircraft was fueled at ZZZ2 and the left main took 8.5 gallons commensurate with fuel burn estimates. The fuel selector valves and fuel strainers were tested repeatedly and found to be in working condition. There were no evidences of fuel leakage and the tanks all held fuel properly after refuel. The inescapable conclusion is that the FBO failed to fuel the right main tank. One can account for the volume of fuel added at ZZZ1 prior to departure because auxiliary tanks and main tanks were not full at original departure. This made the quantity placed on board commensurate with the quantity used yet it is inexplicable why the Fueler would have not fueled the right main tank. The right main tank would have had 10 gallons in it. This is commensurate with the one 1.3 hour flight to the point of failure. The pilot in training who checked the right main tank either saw what he expected or saw a glare but didn't properly check fuel quantity on the right main tank. Corrective actions for the future: The PIC should always supervise the personnel during fueling to alleviate any confusion about where the fuel is to be placed. Secondly; the PIC should always check fuel tanks visually himself never trust even another experienced pilot to do that for you. Also; while fuel gauges are properly never to be trusted as a reliable fuel assessment or fuel planning tool and many pilots properly rely on visual checks of fuel and fuel burn calculations; a gauge that show a grossly different from what was visually checked should indicate that a visual recheck is required. Also; stay current on emergency procedures. In this case being absolutely current on engine failure procedures and knowing where VMC alternate were made for an uneventful approach and landing.

Twin Engine Instructor Pilot reported an engine failure in flight due to fuel starvation. One main wing tank ran dry after not being serviced at the FBO.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 7140; Flight Crew Type 140

Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

[This was a] VFR flight after maintenance. [In the] post maintenance preflight; no water or contaminates were seen in fuel samples. The engine failed after 1.2 hours of operation. Engaged carb heat; engine returned to cruise RPM. Engine failed again; contacted Tower on (approximately 10 miles away) and requested priority handling. Engine failed again and returned to limited power 2 more times prior to touchdown. Prepared to make an off airport landing on a hay field but turned east and landed into the wind and uphill on a grass strip with farm buildings. Once stopped contact was made with another aircraft on the Tower frequency who relayed that there was no damage or injuries. Tied aircraft down. Aircraft grounded until released by maintenance. Atmospheric conditions were conducive for carb ice development however actual cause of failure has not yet been determined.

Bellanca pilot reported an engine failure during post maintenance flight. After troubleshooting the engine multiple times the engine failed completely. Requested ATC assistance and executed a safe off airport landing with no aircraft damage or injuries.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Yet again the center of the country was hit with a significant weather event that left many airports covered with snow and ice. And yet again many of these smaller airfields had no NOTAMs to indicate the airport was closed or unsafe. Given the absence of a NOTAM the pilot planning a flight has no way to distinguish between an airport that is closed/unsafe and just not reporting against an airport that is open with no adverse conditions. Calling the airport remains the only way to be sure of the conditions; and then only during staffed business hours. Pilots planning or departing on flights outside these hours have no way to know if the destination is safe. An unknowing pilot might plan a flight with fuel reserves based on the expected interpretation that no NOTAMs means the field is open. The pilot could quite likely end up in a fuel starvation event when they find every airport within remaining fuel range of the intended destination is similarly closed from one of these storms.I ended up selecting a larger airport that was reporting conditions. But as I flew over many of the smaller airports I was able to confirm the majority of those airports were closed or had adverse conditions yet the NOTAM system was not reporting any of these facts.

GA pilot reported during last snow and ice event in the Midwest many smaller airports were not listed as closed on the NOTAM list even though flying over many he confirmed they were indeed closed. The pilot reported selecting a larger airport that was reporting conditions.


Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

When we left ZZZ we had to MEL Pack 1 due to abnormal shutdown. Flight was conducted at FL250 to comply with the MEL. When we leveled off at FL250; Captain and I smelled smoke like wires were burning and saw that smoke a white/gray smoke was coming through the vents. At about that time [the] flight attendant called up and said there was smoke coming from the back of the plane and a loud noise from the pack. Captain and I followed the memory items for smoke/fire/fumes. We then contacted ATC; [requested priority] to descent to the nearest station of ZZZ1. While running the checklist we isolated the problem and the smoke went away. Landed safely in ZZZ1. Flight Attendant did a very good job with handling the situation in the back. The Maintenance met us at the gate and told us that Pack 2 had failed.

EMB-145 First Officer reported smoke and odor operating at FL250 in both the flight deck and passenger cabin with one Air Conditioning Pack already inoperative per MEL. Crew diverted to a nearby airport where maintenance reported the remaining Air Conditioning Pack had also failed.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

PDC Amended clearance read ******NOTICE ROUTE CHANGE****** -SUMMA7 BKE KU90I - . Inserted new routing into FMS but did not check FP in PLAN mode. Did not see that KU90I was west (behind) BKE until sequencing BKE and aircraft began to turn towards TO WYPT in accordance with filed route. Returned aircraft in heading mode to next subsequent waypoint KU27M. ATC shortly after queried if we were heading to KU27M (next point in the clearance after KU90I). I answered that KU90I was behind us and that we were heading to the next filed point; KU27M. We verified with ATC the new routing (direct to KU27M; then as filed). ATC did not ask for further clarification even after questioned if everything was okay.ATC cleared the flight in a manner that was not logical but not easily identified by the aircrew. Avoid requesting high altitude redesign waypoints within 200-250 miles of departure airports.

PDC Amended clearance read SUMMA7 BKE KU90I flight planned route. We failed to realize KU90I was west of BKE until airborne and aircraft attempted to execute filed route IAW clearance and FMS; instead we turned direct to KU27M (next point in the clearance after KU90I) to avoid making the u turn to KU90I and flying 50 NM out of the way. ATC then asked (after BKE) if we were still direct to KU90I. We said no and explained that KU90I was behind us. We verified with ATC the new routing (direct to KU27M; then as filed) with no issues reported by ATC.

Air Carrier flight crew reports receiving an amended PDC stating SUMMA7 BKE KU90I- which would have required a course reversal to accomplish but was not detected until the aircraft made the turn at BKE.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Local; Ground

Air Traffic Control Military 5; Air Traffic Control Non Radar 12; Air Traffic Control Radar 5; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

We at the Control Tower here at LAN have continually reported the lack of a runway exit to Taxiway 'C'. This taxiway is abeam and less 500 FT from an intersecting runway. Repeatedly we have aircraft landing Runway 10R and instructed to exit on Taxiway 'C' and they say they can't find or see Taxiway 'C' and nearly turn onto the intersecting runway. We have been told by the airport they have no obligation to put a sign out because of the angle at which the taxiway exits Runway 10R; and they haven't. We have been making this an issue for over 2 years. This is a highly critical active area of the airport due to its location and typical roll out distance for general aviation. I can only assume that it is not a priority for the airport because they have no money and what little they have they refuse to put into something that 'isn't required'. Some sort of attention need to be brought up to this critical runway safety issue and highly potential runway incursion area.

LAN Controller voiced concern regarding the lack of taxiway signage at Taxiway 'Charlie.' The reporter noted that this concern has been elevated to the airport for two years with no action taken.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While on a visual approach with an ILS backup to Runway 06 at BDL; we had a momentary EGPWS event. The weather was VFR with 20+ miles visibility. We were approximately 5 miles from HUNEE (FAF for the ILS 06); slowing to 210 KTS on a 090 heading to intercept the localizer just outside of HUNEE. We were descending thru 2;500 FT MSL to cross HUNEE at 1;800 FT MSL. Our vertical descent rate was approximately 1;000 FT per minute. Once we received the EGPWS alert; we immediately initiated the CFIT recovery maneuver. The warning was brief and ceased as soon as we initiated the CFIT recovery maneuver. Once we completed the maneuver; we continued for an uneventful; stable; visual approach with an ILS backup to Runway 06 at BDL.

We were on a dogleg to final; and were cleared for the visual for Runway 06 at BDL. I was the pilot flying and had HDG hold and FLCH engaged with the autopilot. I was on heading 090 to intercept the localizer as a backup for the visual approach. We had 1;900 in the altitude window; which was the glideslope intercept altitude at the FAF (HUNEE); and were descending out of 2;500 MSL approximately 5 miles from the FAF. The aircraft was slowing to 210 KTS and we had a descent rate of approximately 1;000 FPM. We received a Sink Rate warning at this time; in which case I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle and arrested the sink rate. After leveling off and assessing the situation; we continued the approach to an uneventful landing.

A B757-200 flight crew experienced a momentary EGPWS terrain warning when in a controlled descent to intercept their cleared ILS final approach.  The warning extinguished upon initiating the associated recovery maneuver and the approach continued to an uneventful landing.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

End of the first meal service. I was the galley FA. I had 2 carts in the galley that I was in the process of breaking down and putting away. There were 2 inserts on each cart and about 4 inserts on the counter. We (our bodies) suddenly went down to the floor; then up in the air; then down again. There was nothing to hold on to since there aren't enough handholds in the galley. I was slammed down onto the galley floor. I felt pain in my back and I must have hit my head; because I immediately got a headache. I fell between the 2 beverage carts and then all the inserts fell down around me. I don't remember any of the inserts hitting me. Because of the back pain; I couldn't move for about a minute or two. I crawled to the middle jumpseat and strapped in. We stayed strapped in for at least 20 minutes. When it was safe to get up; we started cleaning up the mess and my coworkers made me go up to [first class] to sit down and ice my back. I took 2 [pain relievers] and iced my back for 1 hour. After an hour; I got up and continued working. My back still hurt. The pilots never called to see if anyone was hurt.TurbulenceGalley handholds not in a good locationNot enough jumpseatsNo cockpit to crew communicationAdd galley handholds near the entrance of the galley (where the curtains are; near the jumpseats).Add 2 jumpseats across from the current jumpseats at 4LR (where the 2 compartments currently are). One compartment contains oxygen that could be moved to an overhead bin and the other compartment contains 2 baby bassinets that could be moved elsewhere. If the captain is truly in command of the flight; and is responsible for the ship; crew and passengers; he should ask to be sure no one was injured.The last row of coach; row 30; in the center should be blocked for us for safety. Luckily; they were available to us on this flight and the number 3 was able to get into one and strap in during this crazy turbulence.

A B787-8 Flight Attendant reported suffering injuries in a turbulence event; stating there are not enough handholds in the galley area of the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The incident described below is only one of an ongoing series of similar events that have occurred on the east end of the south ramp at the ZZZ. A number of these events have been reported; in detail; to the ZZZ FAA FSDO (Flight Standards District Office) without acknowledgement or resolution. The fundamental issue is the congested use of the ramp for the basing/parking of a mixture of fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft; conducting taxi/air-taxi departure and arrival operations. In the majority of cases a helicopter air-taxiing for departure or arrival surprises or startles the pilots of a fixed-wing aircraft taxiing from or onto its ramp area. Because they are technically airborne at during the reported events; the helicopter pilots are communicating on the TWR frequency while the fixed-wing pilots are using GRND Control while taxiing. In some cases; the air-taxiing helicopters; mostly passenger tour flights; have passed close to or over the fixed-wing aircraft within separation distances that create significant concern for the fixed-wing pilots.  In the one case; was taxiing my aircraft along a taxiway near my ramp when an air-taxiing tour helicopter surprised me by approaching from my right ahead of me. I had no way of knowing of its proximity until I was within 70-80 feet of it. The helicopter hesitated a moment as it approached the taxiway; then proceeded to cross over the taxiway immediately in front of my aircraft causing me to quickly stop to avoid a close encounter. I reported the event to the GRND controller. If I had been advised of the helicoper's approach by GRND Control; I would have been able to avoid being startled and having to stop quickly.

Flight crew reports conflicts with helicopter arrivals and departures during aircraft taxi in airport ramp area.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 150

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

While being vectored for the RNAV XXR approach; I was instructed to descend to 6;000 feet. During the descent I got a saw a potential conflict on my ADS-B traffic display. ATC also called the traffic; but I was unable to make visual contact. The traffic was approximately 12 o'clock at 2 miles; maintaining altitude about 400 ft below us. I stopped my descent at about 6;200 feet. I still didn't have visual contact and informed ATC. The traffic began to climb directly toward us (according to the ADS-B display; which then issues a conflict alert). I took evasive action by turning right and initiating a climb.Strangely; the traffic turned in the same direction and continued to climb directly toward us. ADS-B showed 100 feet separation; directly below us. I went to a full-power climb and continued into a 360 degree turn. I informed ATC I was doing so. Thankfully the traffic broke off its turn and the conflict was resolved without incident. I never saw the traffic (and assume [they] never saw me).I resumed the approach and landed without incident. I was surprised that other than an initial traffic call; ATC provided no assistance in resolving the conflict. I believe I was in Class B airspace at the time; but did not hear the controller talking to the aircraft I was in conflict with. I'm a bit puzzled that ATC provided no assistance in the conflict resolution.From a pilot perspective; I could have taken action earlier to avoid a potential conflict. I could have asked ATC if they were talking to the other aircraft. I could have possibly looked more diligently for the other aircraft before it was in a position blocked by my own plane.The real cause was that either ATC was not talking to the conflicting aircraft (though I believe it was in class B airspace); or if a different controller than mine was; the controllers were not communicating with each other. Also; my controller didn't offer any revised vectors to avoid a conflict.

PA-28 pilot reported an NMAC that required significant evasive maneuvering.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Throughout the flight the fuel score on the master flight plan was trending down. Approximately 1 hour into the flight we were down 1;000 lbs. on the fuel score. Winds were as forecasted. We then checked prog P2 and totalizer was 1.4 below calculated with a continuing trend down. We called the onboard mechanics up to discuss the issue. A call was also made to dispatch and maintenance control. No resolution was identified. No ICAS message had yet appeared but decided to run the 'FUEL CONFIGURATION' checklist from the QRH which led us to the 'FUEL LEAK ENGINE' checklist. Neither led to a satisfactory resolution. We discussed a pressure switch that was replaced in ZZZ with the onboard mechanic and decided to turn off the left center pump. This stopped the continuing fuel loss on the totalizer at 1.9. However with the right center pump providing fuel to the right engine we needed to keep it balanced by opening the transfer valves and turning off the left engine fuel pumps. (there was no fuel migration until this point from center to ether main tanks) After once again contacting dispatch and maintenance control with no resolution available and operating the fuel system in a non normal configuration I made the decision to return to ZZZ. The remainder of the flight continued normally and landed in ZZZ with approximately 70.0 Ibs of fuel and 2.5 low on the totalizer. I want to ad that the operating First Officer and the onboard mechanics were a tremendous help in trouble shooting and a satisfactory outcome. Also the other 2 crew members were brought into the decision making process.

Captain reported an air turnback after fuel score indicated a possible loss of fuel.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 200

On this date I was the IRO of this flight.  I have been made aware that QRH's were for the wrong engine type.  My duties did not include preflighting the QRH's.  I do not know flight publications procedures for updating and placing publications in the aircraft.  I would recommend a review of the their procedures.  The flight was in no danger due to there being three kits on the aircraft which had AOM's; which include proper procedures for each engine type.  None of the crew had ever heard of this happening before. I believe that this may have led to complacency in checking the QRH.  I recommend different color covers to help distinguish the QRH and more vigilance by crews.

Air carrier First Officer is informed after the fact that he operated a flight with QRH's specific to an aircraft with a different engine type.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10200; Flight Crew Type 6500

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were flying a Visual Approach to Runway 19 at MSY; New Orleans. We had a localizer only; no glideslope. The First Officer; who had just finished IOE; was flying. We were about 10 or 15 miles north of the airport; going straight in for Runway 19 on a visual approach; descending out of around 4;000 FT. The First Officer selected about 1700 FPM down on the vertical speed selector. I noticed we were going to be low and told him to shallow out the descent. He delayed; so passing through about 2;000 FT I reached up and selected myself a 100 FPM descent and told him what I was doing and that we were too low and needed to level off. Shortly after this; ATC advised we had a low altitude alert. We were at about 1;400 MSL over Lake Ponchartrain and still 5 to 10 miles out from landing. I believe we were below the Class B airspace. I advised ATC we were correcting and had leveled off. The rest of the flight and landing was uneventful.I should have monitored the descent more closely.

On a visual approach to Runway 19 at MSY the recently qualified First Officer of a CRJ-700 descended early and too aggressively triggering a low altitude alert from ATC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 203; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 225

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

I was acting CFI performing a training flight in pattern with a primary student. The student was the flying pilot and a touch and go was briefed for this particular landing. The touchdown would be described as a firm to hard. Upon touchdown the copilot side window opened causing a distraction during the landing rollout. While preparing for subsequent takeoff; we experienced strong vibration and loss of directional control. I took control of the aircraft and performed reject/abort. During this time I was able to quickly assess we had a tire failure. Maintaining directional control and [with] braking action limited; I slowed the aircraft to the best of my ability. The aircraft exited the paved surface and came to a stop in the grass; approximately 20 feet off the runway. No injuries were reported; no aircraft damage occurred and there was no damage to the airport property or facilities.

C172 Flight Instructor reported a loss of directional control on landing roll after a tire failed; possibly as a result of a hard landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Descending into ZZZ via the ZZZZZ2 it appears there was confusion caused by similar sounding call-signs.  Although our controller did not specifically identify whether he or I made the mistake; it seemed like our flight ended up on a heading and descending to an altitude that was not intended.We were operating Flight ABCD.  The flight had been uneventful and we were 'DESCENDING VIA' the ZZZZZ2 from the ZZZZZ transition into ZZZ.  We were handed off to ZZZ Approach who appeared to be moderately busy on our frequency.  Both the FO and I heard ABDC also on the frequency.  At approximately ZZZZZ1; the Controller issued us a clearance to 11;000 feet at 230 knots.  I acknowledged the clearance. The FO remarked that was a 'different' speed and altitude than we typically received on this arrival.  Shortly thereafter; we both thought we heard the Controller issue us; ABCD; a left turn to a heading of 330 and a descent to 8;000 feet.  I acknowledged the clearance and we executed the clearance.  Within a minute; the Controller came onto the frequency and I believe he said (without a mentioning a callsign) 'you took the other's call;' then told us to stop descent at 11;000 feet - which we were just descending through.  The FO; without hesitation; disabled the Autopilot and stopped the descent and maintained 11;000 feet.  The Controller then issued a turn back to 090.  We made the turn and reset the automation.  Shortly thereafter; we were cleared direct to ZZZZZ2 and we continued the flight without further event.  We both did notice that every subsequent Controller seemed to excessively emphasize our callsign for the remainder of the flight which makes me suspect that perhaps I did 'take' ABDC's call (330 Heading / 8000 feet MSL).  However; the FO and I both felt relatively sure that we had heard our callsign.     Initially I thought it may have been poor planning; that put two similar sounding call-signs into the same airport at the same time without some mitigating tool like an 'A' designator after the normal call-sign.  However; some after-the-fact research seems to indicate that ABDC had incurred a long delay that put our flights in proximity.  These flights would not normally operate in the approach environment at the same time.  With the COVID-19 pandemic; we have seen FAA ATC consolidate many sectors.  In this case; the Approach Controller was - at the very least - working arrivals from both the southwest and southeast.  As flight schedules have increased a bit in July and August; I have had several experiences where Controller - and particularly frequency - saturation have occurred. Perhaps increasing ATC staffing levels - particularly in the approach environment would be appropriate.

Air Carrier Captain reported taking an ATC clearance for a similar sounding aircraft on the same frequency. The Captain reported the Controller was working multiple sectors at the time.


Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

At level off I was advised by flight attendants of fumes in the cabin we did all necessary procedures QRH; etc. I then notified Dispatch and then asked flight attendants if any change. I was told no better maybe worse and that were all getting sick. At that point I diverted. Persons involved all of crew and some passengers.

We were flying a scheduled ferry flight which was made into a live flight at the last minute. Seven passengers were boarded. Five non-rev and two paying passengers. All passengers were seated in the first class cabin. After takeoff three flight attendants were sitting in Row 23. We were approximately 20 minutes into the flight when an unbearable odor and haze took over the cabin. Two of us got up and ran to the back of the cabin and the third Flight Attendant ran to the front to try and escape the odor. When he reached the galley he called the flight deck and told them what was happening in the cabin. I covered my mouth and went forward to follow. Another Flight Attendant headed toward the back of the cabin to see what was happening. When she reached the lav at Row 22 she vomited. The flight deck called to tell us we were making an emergency landing. The odor was causing us to be dizzy; have a headache; irritation in the throat; nausea; pressure in our chest and stomach; weakness and confusion. When we landed we were taken to the boarding area to have our vital signs checked by the fireman. All of our vitals were normal. The fireman strongly recommended we go in the ambulance to the hospital. The Captain said I just want all of my crew to remain together. An In-flight Supervisor was on the phone with upper management and she said the company wanted us to go to the clinic so we wouldn't have to wait 5 hours in the hospital. She was asking if the clinic would be able to provide blood work to check for carbon monoxide (CO) and she said yes. We as a crew said that was fine as long as blood work could be done. When we arrived at the clinic I was on the phone with a Union Safety Representative. She wanted me to get the fax number to the clinic so she could fax a document to the doctors on the recommended blood work that should be done when exposed to fumes on the aircraft. The clinic said they did not do blood work. A woman from Risk Management showed up and asks; 'What the problem was.' We said we needed to get to the hospital to have a time sensitive blood work done. The woman from Risk Management said; 'it isn't something the company requires. It is something your union suggests.' We said we want to get to the hospital now. She was of no help to us. She asked us what hospital we wanted to go to. How would we know? The girl at the front desk said to take us to a local hospital. When we arrived at the hospital the clerk gave us the fax number and the papers were faxed to the Doctor. We were all taken back and put on oxygen and all had blood work to test for carbon monoxide. My blood work was done and after being on oxygen approximately 30 minutes. My results came back higher than the normal level. The Doctor said it needed to work its way out of our system and everyone's system is different. Told us to follow up with your Primary Care Physician (PCP). First Officer's level was still very high and he needed to stay behind and receive more oxygen. The Captain was told to call management and she would make all of our arrangements to get us home. He called three times with no response. He called the Chief Pilot to get his crew home and I called my base in-flight services. While on my flight home I noticed my joints were all starting to hurt. I was a little short of breath walking to the car and when I got in the car and started it I couldn't figure out how to clean the windows. I sat for a few minutes looking at the dash like I had never been in the car I have owned for six years. When I got home I couldn't figure out which of the 3 keys I have opened the door. I went to bed hoping to feel better this morning. When I woke up I had a headache. All still symptoms of CO exposure. After speaking with my PCP today he said I should not have been put on a plane so soon after the exposure unless I was tested again and my levels were normal. The cabin altitude could have caused me to have the symptoms I was having after I got home.The company and the mechanics need to listen to us when we are telling them there is a smell or we are having effects from the aircraft. The company is more worried about getting the plane off the gate on time than about our health. If we wouldn't have had an odor we could have all died; because the flight deck didn't have any indication of a problem. There needs to be some type of program in place that when an incident does happen the crew should be taken to the hospital not a clinic. Your vitals will always be fine with CO exposure unless you are near death or dead. Don't treat these fumes as a joke and that the crews are just looking for something to complain about. It is a very serious matter. You may not think so till it happens to you or your loved one. Now questions I have 1) We were told the night before that there were no parts in the US to fix the problem with the aircraft and the parts needed to come from a foreign country. The Mechanic was trying to get a maintenance ferry certificate. We were called in the morning and told we were doing a ferry flight. 2) How did they come up with the parts they didn't have to fix the aircraft to make it a live flight? 3) Can a ferry flight be made into a live flight with numbers?

The Reporter stated that she is feeling normal now; but was not well for several days after the event. Elevated CO levels were confirmed by the hospital and she heard the First Officer is not back at work five days after the event. One Flight Attendant had extremely high blood pressure upon arrival at the hospital.

An A321 diverted after an unbearable odor was detected in the cabin making the entire crew ill and requiring hospital emergency care treatment because of carbon monoxide poisoning.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were cleared to descend via the NITZR 2 RNAV Arrival runway 12R transition going into MSP. I was pilot flying and I loaded runway 12L prior to leaving the ground. After we were given the runway assignment of 12R; I reloaded the 12R approach. When the approach is loaded it changes the waypoints. I failed to look down at the FMS and bring up the proper waypoint to clean things up in the FMS. Over GDNEE the aircraft did not execute a turn and I was trying to figure what was the problem. I then reached up and hit heading mode and spun the heading bug to intercept the course. ATC asked after things did not look correct if we [were] on course and they showed us about 2 mile of course. I then looked at the FMS and found the error and clean things up in the FMS. I went direct to the fix and was able to get the ACFT back on the proper course. Side note...NITZR 2 is not on the choice of STARs in the geographic location. I was unable to choose it for this report.We were on time leaving and on taxi out we were given flow to MSP of about 25-30 mins. I wanted to keep the passengers on time so I was concerned about on time arrival. We were given at one point a 60 degree off course heading for about 8 mins for spacing. Other aircraft after us were given holding. I was looking at fuel planning and time of arrival. When we were given 12R I failed to clean up the FMS and make sure that things were correct by checking that we did not have any errors. This was the last leg of a long 4 day that had 16 legs and about 22.2 hours of block. To add to my work load I had a new First Officer and Flight Attendant. Both did a good job. I was having to keep the operation tempo at a lower level and take on more work to keep them from becoming over saturated. Day 3 was full of delays and we arrived late in the overnight. I was still tired on the morning of day after the events of day 3. I should have waited to load the approach into the FMS until we were given the descend via with runway transition. I should have slowed the operations tempo down even more on the last leg of a long trip so not to miss anything as I knew that I was starting to feel some fatigue.

We were on-time with the block out; however; ATC gave us a flow delay of approximately 28 minutes after our scheduled departure time. En route to MSP; we were vectored nearly 60 degrees off course for nearly 10 minutes due to flow into MSP. In addition; we had several airspeed reductions assigned by ATC. The radios were very congested and it was extremely busy getting into Minneapolis. This was day 4 of a four day trip. The night prior ended up being a relatively short layover due to the fact that we were running behind all day playing catch-up because we had a late start first thing that day. In addition to all of this; I am a new FO and although I am learning diligently; I am certainly not the fastest at my job. I'm sure this elevated my captains stress level to a certain degree. I'm sure all of these factors contributed to the occurrence.Flying is a very dynamic environment. Delays will occur; rerouting will occur; and changes to the best laid plans will occur. All of these threats will occur every day a hundreds of times over. It is up to us as professionals to recognize and mitigate/eliminate such threats. For me; I need to not let distractions monopolize my attention. When critical actions are required; such as FMS programming; I need to give it my full attention and ensure everything in it is correct for the maneuver/route to be flown. I think minimizing distractions; delegate if necessary; and double checking accuracy of automation and my actions are going to be the primary means of avoiding recurrence of this event.

A fatigued Captain loaded the MSP NITZR 2 RNAV arrival Runway 12L prior to departure. MSP TRACON assigned Runway 12R; but a track deviation resulted after the Captain selected the new runway but did not clean up the FMS route.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

About three miles or more out I called the runway in sight and landing. As we proceeded inbound; I felt like there wasn't enough lights on. I clicked the mic switch seven times to make sure the lights were on. I didn't see much if anything change. I was looking through the HUD at the time and I moved my head to the side to see if maybe the HUD was somehow obscuring my view of the lights. I didn't see anything different so I thought I must just not be seeing absolutely everything but believed it would be more clearly seen as we got closer. As we proceeded; in the back of my mind; I felt that I should be seeing more lighting and I tried once maybe two times more with the mic switch to see if either I had inadvertently turned the lights down low or what was going on. At the same time I am seeing the PAPI and also the blue lights of the taxiway and I am thinking I should be seeing more lights. As we came closer to what I thought was the runway; I started to pick up more of the pavement to our left then in front of us where we were lined up to land. This is happening very fast obviously and we are getting closer to where the runway should be but I am not seeing it where I think I should be. I am seeing pavement to our left and in the last moments my mind says there is pavement over there and lights on either side; go land there because you don't want to land in the dirt and you must have mistaken what you thought was where the runway was going to be and you had lined up to the right of the runway so slide a little left and land on the runway (again this is what my mind is thinking). And yes the 'runway' seemed a little smaller. Just as the main landing gear was touching the pavement my FO said 'This is the taxiway' and by that time the plane was on the ground and it made more sense to slow the plane down and assess what just happened than try to go around. We then taxied to the end of the taxiway and turned on the runway. There was no other way to turn around to go to the ramp area other than this. So we proceeded on the runway and exited; then proceeded to the ramp where we parked.

Q400 Captain reported mistakenly landing on the taxiway at a non-towered airport after being unable to increase the pilot controlled runway lighting.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; MEL

Flight was scheduled to depart on time but ended up being late. As stated in previous write-ups; the aircraft's APU was placarded inoperative due to random non-commanded shutdowns. The parts for repair were ordered. I lost count but either four or five air start carts were brought to the airplane for engine start. Some could not be started and others ran for short periods of time then ceased operating. What I was told was all available air start carts at the airport were now inoperative because of fuel freezing. Unless something else was done the flight probably would have cancelled.I thought I would ask maintenance if a mechanic would come to the airplane for a supervised start of the APU long enough to get an engine running. The mechanic who placarded the APU on the overnight thought it would be okay. He ran the APU for about two hours during overnight maintenance before it shut itself down. He came to the airplane to supervise the start. Thanks to maintenance the engine was started and we went on our way. What I learned later through the flight department and through legal advice from the pilots union that what we did was wrong. We operated the APU while on placard. Both departments highly suggested that a report be filed.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew elected to start a placarded component; the APU; in order to start engines. All available ground carts were inoperative due to extreme cold weather.