Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During cruise at FL340; First Officer was in First Officer's seat. Autopilot 'B' engaged. I went to the bathroom. Aircraft entered moderate turbulence. I notice as I returned to my seat that aircraft was in a 30 degree bank turn to right. First Officer was hand-flying airplane while autopilot 'B' still engaged in command. First Officer told me the aircraft rolled by itself left. At first; First Officer selected Heading Mode to correct deviation. There was no response; aircraft continued to roll left. He recovered from the impending upset and returned the aircraft back to course hand flying it. Altitude remained at FL340 +/- 50 FT. There was no warning: (WAILER or LIGHT). All GPS parameters were normal; Hydraulic System #2 (power to autopilot B) normal. ATC asked us if all was OK; we told them yes. First Officer engaged autopilot 'A' and we proceeded with out incidence. There was no warning: (WAILER or LIGHT). All GPS parameters were normal; Hydraulic System #2 (power to Autopilot B) normal.

A B747-200 autopilot 'B' entered an uncommanded left turn and did not respond to Heading Mode inputs so autopilot 'A' was selected which corrected the deviation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

At cruise altitude had a very strong burning smell in cockpit and cabin. Notified ATC; descended and returned to ZZZ.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

EMB-145 flight crew reported executing a return to the departure airport after noticing a strong burning odor throughout the aircraft.


GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 34L

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While on a visual approach (monitoring the ILS glideslope as backup) to 34L at RNO; the flight crew noticed a discrepancy in altitude at the appropriate 'crosscheck' altitude point. The 'crosscheck' altitude at EPOSE is 8300' MSL. While visual with the runway and passing EPOSE; the aircraft was on the ILS glidepath; however; the altitude displayed on both PFDs indicated a lower altitude than the expected 8300' MSL at EPOSE. We (the flight crew) verified between each other and confirmed that the same and correct altimeter setting (30.06) was set. We also verified altimeter setting and altitude at EPOSE with Tower. Additionally; altitude readouts were verified within tolerance pre and post flight on the ground. This is a Safety concern; because all systems (aircraft and airfield) seemed to be working properly; yet the altitude was off at the crosscheck point. Additionally; on a previous occasion; a similar situation was experienced; as well as hearing the same from another aircraft from another carrier on the same day.

Reporter stated that with the verified altimeter there was a 200' discrepancy. The historic altimeter settings for that day; from NWS; indicated pressures of 2995-2986 were discussed.  Reporter stated there was a significant pressure difference from nearby departure airport to RNO. There were no aircraft issues prior to; or after this event.

B737 pilot reported the altitude displayed on both PFDs indicated a lower altitude than the expected at FAF.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was on a SCT North Sector data block and was on a visual approach while Aircraft Y was on SCT East Sector data block on an RNAV approach; SCT did not coordinate with MYF Tower to provide visual separation with these two aircraft. I was training a student on Local.  We were already in communication with Aircraft Y when Aircraft X checked in; and I asked our Local Assist if SCT had coordinated with us to provide visual separation. Local Assist responded negative. I immediately notified the OS [Operational Supervisor] of the situation and told him there was going to be a LoSS [Loss of Standard Separation] very soon. Aircraft X made it to the Runway 28R final approach course about 1 mile in front of Aircraft Y at approximately same altitude. After PRB [Position Relief Briefing]; I asked the OS [Operational Supervisor] if he had the info he needed for the report. He seemed reluctant to file a report; and I was interviewed by the ATM [Air Traffic Manager] shortly after.  The ATM [Air Traffic Manager] stated that since I had observed the aircraft [and] was providing visual separation; no loss had occurred. I disagree with this assessment since it is SCT's job to provide separation between IFR aircraft and they did not properly apply visual separation. The MYF ATM [Air Traffic Manager] directed the OS not to file a report.North and East sectors need to improve their required coordination.

MYF Tower Controller reported an unsafe operation by the overlying TRACON not asking Tower to provide visual separation.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Training on Sector X when the CIC told me there was an emergency at [Sector Y] and my pilot skills might be needed. I immediately terminated training and proceeded to Sector Y; where I plugged in with the Radar Controller and offered to assist. The previous sector had coordinated a malfunctioning heater. However; it was quickly apparent that we had a small aircraft that was icing up; at MIA; and could not hold altitude. Over the next 45 minutes; the Radar Controller; CIC; OM; Radar Associate; CWSU meteorologist; and myself worked the aircraft north and west toward lower MIA's and better weather. On several occasions the aircraft entered turns and descents without instruction to do so; and each time the Radar Controller provided simple; pertinent instructions that helped the pilot regain/maintain control of the aircraft. Another Controller team came back and took the airspace and other frequencies; so our team could concentrate solely on assisting the emergency aircraft. The aircraft was below MIA the entire time; and with no obstructions depicted I obtained a sectional chart and spent most of the emergency tracking the aircraft on the chart and calling out obstructions to the Radar Controller; who relayed that information to the pilot. Eventually the aircraft dropped out of communication and radar coverage; so we placed another aircraft on the frequency to act as a relay. Wheeler-Sack Airbase also called several times with position updates; as their radar could see him while ours could not. Eventually we were able to get confirmation that the aircraft had safely landed. We only then discovered that the aircraft was a small aircraft [type X]; not a small aircraft [type Y] as the flight plan indicated.This incident happened because the aircraft flew into icing conditions. Our job was made significantly more difficult by the lack of depicted obstructions on our video maps.An Emergency Obstruction Video Map needs to be created for the facility.

Center Controller reported an aircraft had a heater problem; aircraft was icing up; and could not hold altitude.


Beechcraft / Beech Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

After a normal preflight and startup procedure; I taxied up to and held short of the movement line at the C9 cargo ramp at DFW International Airport. Visibility was low due to fog surrounding the airport. My First Officer (English is not his first language) called the west ground control on 121.85; informing the controller that we were at C9 ready to taxi with the current ATIS. We had a transponder set correctly; and had it set to ALT. The controller replied: '[Flight ABCD]; DFW Ground; taxi via Charlie; hold short of runway 18R at Yankee. You can expect 17...correction; 17R for departure.' The First Officer read back the instructions to which ATC replied again 'And; just want to confirm; hold short of 18R at Yankee.' This was read back once again by the First Officer.At this time; we slowly taxied forward onto taxiway Charlie from C9; and made a left turn to head down Charlie towards taxiway Yankee. As soon as we were centered on taxiway Charlie headed Northbound; I saw in front of us a very faint pair of white lights through the fog; in the middle of the taxiway. A few seconds later a large jet appeared suddenly out of the fog. Both myself and [the air carrier] appeared to be taxiing very slowly due to the low visibility; and we both quickly came to a stop a few hundred feet away. Sometime between seeing the [other aircraft]; and us both coming to a stop; ATC came on stating '[Flight ABCD] turn right on Charlie; Right on Charlie!' followed shortly by '[Flight ABCD]; do you see the little aircraft ahead of you? Stop; stop stop!' By this point; we had both come to a complete stop; but ATC could not see that from the tower. After a brief pause; ATC came back on saying '[Flight ABCD]; turn right.' At this time I personally took the radios; and read back the instruction. Both aircraft had stopped with enough room that allowed me to safely make a U-turn on taxiway Charlie to head south. ATC then instructed '[Flight ABCD]; hold short of 18R at Whiskey Lima' The instruction was read back; and the taxi and flight continued without further incident.I believe it is possible; that the ground controller thought we were at the north end of the field; where a majority of [our] operations occur. It is possible that due to a language barrier between the First Officer and the Controller; that he misunderstood or misheard the initial position call.

Beech aircraft air taxi Captain reported a ground conflict with an air carrier aircraft during low visibility operations at DFW.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 27L

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

First Officer was pilot flying during IOE. We were in clear VMC at 3;000 ft. Flaps were selected to 20 at 200 kts. on a visual approach to Runway XX. EICAS indicated flaps deployed to 20. Cleared for the visual; approximately 3 miles from ZZZZZ; gear was selected down and flaps selected 30. Airspeed upon selecting flaps 30 was 175 kts. I noticed the flaps not moving on EICAS; as well as not feeling any change in the flight characteristics of the aircraft. FLAPS FAIL caution was annunciated. We coordinated a go around with ZZZ approach. They gave us delay vectors while we ran the QRH. We completed the QRH procedure and a landing with flaps 20 and a Vref speed of 137 kts. ATC vectored us to another visual approach to Runway XX and cleared us. In the turn to final the winds picked up a bit and the First Officer got behind the airplane. I took the flight controls and the landing was normal.

CRJ-200 Captain reported a failure of the flap system on approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

[The] flight had a possible pilot deviation on the BONZZ 2 arrival into DTW. PDC was 'cleared as filed' which included the KLYNK 3 arrival into DTW as well as the rest of the flight plan. I loaded the FMS per the company flight plan and all points and mileage were verified by the Captain prior to departure. Taxi; departure; and cruise were all uneventful. Prior to the arrival phase the Captain directed the review of the KLYNK 3 arrival and all points were dual verified.As the aircraft was directed to leave cruise altitude ATC cleared us direct to BONZZ by passing the majority of the arrival. This waypoint is also a fix on both the BONZZ 2 and KLYNK 3 arrival. Enroute to BONZZ we were given; 'Descend via the BONZZ 2 arrival landing north; expect Runway 22R.' I read back the clearance as the Captain set the bottom altitude for the KYLNK 3 arrival which I verified. ATC made no mention of any changes of or the use of an arrival other than our original clearance. Being that both arrivals shared the same points in the FMS neither pilot caught that ATC had changed our arrival. As the aircraft neared BONZZ ATC queried us as to our current altitude and what our charts said. ATC directed a level off at 11;000 feet and vectors. This was followed by being advised of a possible pilot deviation. Vectors continued until final for the visual to 22R. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.ATC detected the error and advised the generation of this report. Confusing directions from Air Traffic Control; extremely similar arrivals; and crew experience all played factors. Captain had only operated to this airfield 3 times with [the Company] and this was the first trip for the First Officer. ATC admitted they had assumed that we were familiar enough to know to alter our arrival due to the runways in use being different than the flight plan from the release. Aircraft was leveled and vectored to final. No incident or effect to flight operations. This incident could have been avoided with a single radio call from Air Traffic Control stating that we were no longer cleared for the KLYNK and now on the BONZZ arrival. Air Traffic Control was busy and this was a more workload heavy portion of the flight so when the FO read back 'cleared for the BONZZ arrival' while already proceeding direct to the 'BONZZ' waypoint both pilots incorrectly assumed that they were on the correct arrival. Upon closer inspection of the charts there was fine print also stating which arrivals were to be expected for which runways so pilot familiarity would have also aided in avoiding this possible deviation.

Air carrier First Officer reported ATC's arrival instructions were unclear regarding the SID in use out of DTW airport.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I was informed of a wake remnant error between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y by my supervisor. After reviewing the replay it appeared that there was an erroneous track hit by TARP [Traffic Analysis and Review Program] that caused it to flag a wake remnant error. The track was steady on about a 190 heading and then stitched east for about 1 hit and then corrected itself back to the previous track. If not for this one erroneous stitching issue from the Fusion radar I don't believe it would have been a wake remnant issue. There are multiple issues here. The first being we as controllers have no way to track wake remnant. TARP can but STARS (Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System) can't? How can we be expected to run a safe and efficient operation without the proper tools to track something like this? You would think the 'most advanced' air traffic system in the world would be able to fix this issue. Second; is every stitching (Fusion radar jumping and then coming back to primary location) issue with Fusion radar being treated the same way? If a target established on final stitches across final and is below minimum separation with another aircraft on an adjacent final is that a loss of separation? We've been told that it is not. Why is my situation different? P80 only has one ASR (Airport Surveillance Radar) feeding into Fusion. They also have one ASR and the rest are long range radars. Are other facilities with more ASR's feeding into fusion having these same issues? Single site radar should not be more accurate than Fusion but that's the way it seems. It's coming to the point where controllers may start saying their equipment is unusable and refuse to take position because they can't trust the reliability of said equipment. Give controllers some way to track wake remnant on their scope. Define wake remnant in the 7110.65. Give QA (Quality Assurance) some room to use common sense and disregard erroneous TARP hits due to stitching and poor radar coverage or at least annotate that the loss of separation could be erroneous. Clarify why some TARP hits due to radar stitching are errors and others are not. Put another ASR in the P80 airspace to allow fusion to function more properly. I understand this will never happen but the way we are using Fusion at P80 is not the way it was intended.

P80 Controller reported a wake turbulence remnant issue. Controller reviewed a replay that appeared to be a fusion radar stitch. Controller wondered how he could be charged with an operational error when he had no tool available to verify wake remnant.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[I was working my] first FPL mid-shift. Weather in the area and abnormal runway configurations at all of our airports. At the beginning of the shift the CIC (another controller; not FLM) asked me how I wanted to work the shift. I said that I didn't care; but that I wasn't going to get left in the room with 2 bays of strips by myself. When I returned [from my break]; he gave me a brief and I took the position. He then walked out of the room and I didn't see him again for about 2 hours. I was left with the 2 bays of strips and no help. I had to put aircraft in holding at ZZZZ and one went missed approach due to poor weather in and around the area. I worked the other overflights and inbounds to the other airports as well.I would like someone to pull the tape and radar data and ask themselves if it would be generally a good idea to work that volume of traffic and complexity without a D side or any other help. I will share my thoughts regarding my CIC's behavior when I see a member of management. This splitting of the position in this manner is commonplace in this facility and I feel is unsafe and unwise to put anyone in that situation. Culture change regarding several things needs to occur in this facility. This culture change will not occur from inside these walls. Several of us push for it; but have gotten nowhere. The CIC should stay in the operating quarters with the exception of short restroom breaks at all times and pay attention to the operation.

ZZZ Center Controller reported the shift Controller in Charge left the operation for 2 hours on a mid-shift.


Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working Local Control. There were several aircraft in the VFR traffic pattern. A PA28 was told to enter a midfield left downwind and follow Cessna traffic. The PA28 entered the pattern correctly. Moments later I instructed the PA28 to follow Cessna traffic. The PA28 responded I have the Cessna traffic insight. The PA28 turned final in front of two aircraft on final causing the C172 to abort the approach and fly west for pattern reentry. The PA28 did not follow the Cessna traffic that was pointed out to him causing the C172 to abort his approach. In hindsight I believe the PA28 did not have the correct traffic insight that he was instructed to follow. During that time of day (angle of the sun) and runway configuration it is very difficult to see aircraft turning base to final. Adding to an already difficult situation is the pull down sun shades in the tower cab. The shades help with blocking the brightness of the sun but due to the condition; (multiple scratches); of the shades it makes it extremely difficult to see aircraft. With a better sun shade setup I believe it will be easier for the Controller to see aircraft out the window and ensure that control instructions are followed.

APA Controller described a pattern conflict event when traffic cut out another aircraft; the reporter indicating the sun glare and shade problems may have contributed to the issuance of incorrect aircraft locations.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

On approach; approach control gave us descend and maintain 10;000 feet and fly heading 020 degrees to intercept the localizer for the approaching runway. We were given a speed reduction to 170 kts followed by approach clearance. The approach controller issued cross a fix at 10;000 feet and clearance ILS approach. The charts depict a previous fix that says mandatory to cross  at 12;000 feet; yet when vectored we were assigned descend and maintain 10;000. We descended to our assigned altitude as instructed. Try to comply with fixes unless given a descend and maintain clearance.

CRJ200 First Officer was issued an approach clearance with a vector to intercept the localizer and a 10000 ft crossing restriction. The pilot is not sure if they violated a crossing restriction published on the approach procedure. A vector to the approach course with an ATC assigned crossing and altitude restriction deletes the published restrictions. The pilot did nothing wrong.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

There was some initial confusion on our cleared routing from clearance delivery. We were not cleared as filed; but rather via [Route 1]. Prior to engine start; we clarified with ATC that our routing was [Route 1 to LAX]. Initially after departure; Los Angeles Center cleared us direct to ZZZZZ. ZZZZZ was not one of the waypoints on our cleared route which we queried Center about. They seemed confused that ZZZZZ waypoint was not on our flight plan and said they would check with SoCal to find out what routing they would prefer for our arrival. Eventually they called us back and cleared us to LAX via SADDE8. This arrival is what we were originally filed to fly. Passing 11;000; ATC requested that we level off at 11;000 which we momentarily went above because we had been cleared higher and then descended back down to 11;000 complying with ATC's instructions. We entered the new arrival/routing information into the FMS and verified the accuracy. The waypoints on the arrival are the same fixes as the [Route 1] routing we had. A FMS discontinuity was where we expected it to be after SMO and confirmed. We continued to fly the assigned routing. Approach assigned us a 040 degree heading along with a continued descent into LAX. Approach queried us on what our heading was departing SMO. It appeared as if the FMS reverted to dead reckoning mode and we actually flew closer to 080 heading instead of what should've been a 070 heading departing SMO for that arrival procedure. The rest of the flight was continued as would be expected for our arrival into LAX runway 24R.ATC provided us with clearances normally associated with RNAV routing [for this flight leg]. It appeared as if the controllers were expecting us to arrive LAX via different routing (we were using non-RNAV routing). Additionally; our routing was changed repeatedly over the course of an already very short leg. Numerous changes/requests by LA Center over a very short period of time further compressed the crew's time and ability to manage tasks in the cockpit for an arrival into the highly saturated airspace of LAX. Reducing the amount of reroutes/changes in flight within the final 15 minutes from landing would have provided the crew better ability to manage their arrival/tasks into LAX.

While on the ground in ZZZ; we were issued a clearance for ZZZ via [Route 1 to LAX]. We clarified with ATC to be [Route 1]. After departure; Center cleared us direct to ZZZZZ. It wasn't in our route due to having an airplane with a deferred GPS; so I queried Center about it. He reassigned us direct to ZZZ1. I again clarified our routing after ZZZ1 to make sure we understood where we were expected to go next. Center said he would check if there was another routing SOCAL would prefer; and eventually returned to clear us to LAX via SADDE8 (ironically the route we'd been filed with to start with...). We accepted that clearance and were given an altitude assignment of 11;000 until further advised. I advised him we were crossing 11;000 and would go back down to it momentarily.I entered the new arrival; and I verified the waypoint accuracy. Unfortunately; what I missed was that the FMS added it after the existing routing we had to as far as the SMO VOR. It turns out the waypoints on that arrival are exactly the same fixes as the waypoints along [Route 1] we had previously used; so I didn't see the difference. Also; at that point; the pagination of the FMS had a discontinuity where I expected it to be after SMO. We continued on our course; then Approach called to make sure we were descending via the arrival. We had not been cleared for that; so approach assigned us an altitude. A few moments later; approach gave us a 040 degree heading and further descent. I read it back; then he asked what heading we'd left SMO with. I wasn't sure but said I thought it was about 070. I think the FMS had gone into dead reckoning mode and actually flew 080 due to the incorrect placement of the arrival. This is when I realized we had extra fixes in the FMS after the SMO with the FMS attempting to resequence us to the start of the arrival. Approach gave us some additional headings; descents; and an airspeed of 180 kts to get more accurately placed onto the downwind vector for 24R. Next; I got the FMS straightened out for the approach and we continued the approach and completed the flight.If this whole thing sounds confusing; it's because it was. I felt like ATC kept thinking we were on a different routing; altitude; and airspeed than we'd actually been assigned. A major contributor to the poor communication was the numerous changes to routing that we kept getting from ATC. We had several changes to the routing during a very short; task saturated flight. The routing changes were due to the plane having a deferred GPS; we were unable to accept any RNAV SIDs or STARs. The controllers seemed to be issuing instructions from habit; often consistent with typical clearances I've seen while flying the ZZZZZ arrival (hence the clearance to ZZZZZ and uncertainty why we hadn't descended as we neared SMO). It would have been helpful not to have a reroute in flight when we were only 15 minutes away from landing. Also; going through to the last page in the FMS would have helped me notice the re-sequence and extra discontinuity in the FMS. I didn't count pages; I just saw that it went to the right fixes; then had a discontinuity for vectors to the approach at the right place.

Air Carrier flight crew reported confusion with ATC and receiving multiple reroutes on short flight resulting in increased workload.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 7900; Flight Crew Type 3586

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After takeoff climbing through approximately 3000 ft. received a level 1 Hydraulic 2 Off alert. Passing through 15000 ft. with autopilot engaged. QRH procedures were executed by First Officer. Then I made a sat-com call to Dispatch and Maintenance to discuss problem and if we should continue to ZZZ1.  During call Hydraulic quantity in system 2 continue to decrease. At approximately 1.3 gallons we received a level 2 Hydraulic 2 Fail alert. QRH procedures were followed. Afterwards I made the decision to return to ZZZ. [Requested priority handling] and we landed in ZZZ uneventfully.

MD-11 Captain reported a loss of the #2 hydraulic system quantity; which resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1749; Flight Crew Type 1300

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Doing slow flight with a student. During maneuver we started to decrease throttle and our rpm went to max rpm. I immediately took control of plane and started reducing fuel flow to starve engine; once the situation seemed to be under control we called Approach and let them know what was going on. 1.5-2.0 miles south of runway XX the runway was assured. I started cutting the mixture idle cut off. I knew I had plenty of speed to kill before I could deploy flaps. We landed safely on Runway XX and taxied off at Foxtrot still blocking the runway.

C712 Instructor reported uncontrollable engine RPM on short final.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

The lead on for this flight thought because the manual said exempt for item 1 that it wasn't dangerous goods. In fact she planned item 2 in pit 3 with 30 bags but planned item 1 in pit 4 with no bags. She then stated on the phone there were no dangerous goods in pit 4 but did confirm that she loaded item 1 which she believed did not contain any dangerous goods. The lead then called back later to question me as to why the computer program would allow her to plan the flight the way she did if item 1 was in fact dangerous goods. Please pull the phone logs I was sitting at desk XXXX she was like a dear in headlights in terms of knowledge as it pertains to dangerous goods.

Air Carrier personnel reported Dangerous Goods were incorrectly loaded due to the Load Planner's lack of knowledge.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

While intercepting the localizer course for ILS Runway 10 BWI Approach from the north and just outside of the final approach fix; VOR/LOC captured and then the aircraft made an abrupt continuous right turn away from the inbound course. The localizer was rapidly moving through half scale deflection to the left and the First Officer disengaged the autopilot to begin a go-around. At that time; assuming because of the aircraft position; the Approach Controller asked if we would like to be vectored back around for another ILS. We said we would and proceeded to come around for another approach. On our second attempt at the ILS 10 BWI Approach; upon VOR/LOC capture the same automation error occurred with the same abrupt right turn. The PF went around; and during the maneuver the aircraft crossed over the final approach course to the north and we were given radar vectors by ATC for the remainder of the missed approach. The crew then made the decision to proceed to our alternate; which was VFR; due to the weather conditions in BWI and the unexpected behavior of the aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported diverting to a VFR alternate after their autoflight system malfunctioned twice on the BWI Runway 10 ILS.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Just reporting the PAPI lights for Runway X are out of service in ZZZZ. Due to the low visibility in rain showers; at night; we chose to land on Runway YY with a slight tailwind; with operable PAPI lights; only because we were in an empty type X Aircraft. If we were in a heavy type Y Aircraft we would be forced to use Runway X with no PAPI lights at night in the weather. Especially due to COVID; pilots are not as proficient flying; we should have all resources available to conduct a safe operation. And just because ZZZZ airport has so few flights (we were the first flight in 2 months); does not mean they can allow those items to slide.

Air carrier Captain reported non functional PAPI lights at airport for a specific runway and the safety hazards it could pose in weather conditions; especially when crews are not flying as often due to the COVID-19 pandemic.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Prior to push back the APU failed. APU was then MEL'd. Both engines were started in the Blocks due to APU failure and Pneumatic air start of both. As we started the pushback; the First Officer was cleaning up the Pneumatic start checklist and Number 2 Bleed Fault. We stopped the push and immediately informed MX (Maintenance) that the number 2 Bleed faulted. We complied with the ECAM instructions and shut off Number 2 Bleed. With the A/C stopped and parking brake set; I called the Dispatcher to inform him of the problem while MX was researching the problem with Maintenance Control and working the release document process. I confirmed with the FO (First Officer) that there was no associated Bleed Leak. MX asked if we had a Bleed Leak and we told him 'no.' MX then informed us that MEL 36-11-01-A was the applicable MEL. Because there was no associated Bleed Leak; there was no MX action to be performed; the valve was failed to the closed position. We shut down the number one engine to save fuel and realized we couldn't restart due to the number 2 Bleed valve and APU failed. I had MX pull us back into the Blocks for another pneumatic start of number 1 engine. We filled out the log and got the release document number as well as the MEL from MX (via Maintenance Control). After all the paperwork was completed; we started number 1 on pneumatics and then continued the push. MEL is incorrect for being a Flagged item if there is no associated Bleed Air Leak. No MX action is required without a Bleed Air Leak.

Crew notified me that they were having an issue with no. 2 bleed air supply and would probably have to defer it under MEL 36-11-01-a. I looked up the Mel and noticed that it had a FL310 restriction and also that the aircraft could not be operated into known/forecast icing. I checked icing maps and saw nothing to indicate icing other than the forecast scattered TS (thunder storm) activity in the area. I discussed this with the crew and we decided that we could remain clear of icing. I sent a new set of fuel burn numbers based on FL300 per the MEL. The MEL was added as a release document. During this period; I failed to notice that this was a flag item Mel and was thus not eligible to be added by release document procedure. After takeoff; I provided several updates to the crew via ACARS of TS locations to make sure that they were aware and able to remain clear of them.Proper release document procedure has the crew; myself; and a maintenance rep on a conference call. If this had been followed; the fact that this was a flag item may have been realized. I will pay more attention when it comes to identifying flag item MELs.

Pilots; dispatcher and maintenance controller reported that prior to push-back; an A300 APU failed and was deferred. After starting both engines using an air cart; the #2 engine bleed valve failed closed.


Service; Safety Related Duties; Boarding

Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During boarding; all of a sudden Flight Attendant 1 (FA-1) and Flight Attendant 3 (FA-3); in the front galley; [and] I smelled like a scorched cloth smell when you turn on an oxygen bottle; or a burnt crayon smell. The smell spread in the first-class cabin. I experienced this smell before and knew right away that it was a fumes/cabin odor event. Most likely; the aircraft has an oil leak in or close to the engine. I informed the Captain immediately; and he smelled it; too. After a few minutes; my throat became scratchy; and I started getting lightheaded. When I turned my head; I felt as if my eyes caught up with my head with a slight delay. (said she smelled it; but that she was OK. I went on the jetway as the smell was really getting to me. My heartbeat became faster; and my speech even became slurred: my words were not coming out as fast as they were usually. I started losing the ability to function; almost. Name FA-3 kind of took over and made some announcements or was listening to the Captain; when he was calling me. The Captain reported the fumes/odor; and a mechanic came onboard. The boarding was complete; but the Captain notified the agents of the problem. I needed some fresh air; so I went to the jet way door; opened it; and took a few breaths; but a customer service supervisor; I think; told me to close the door immediately; as in a few minutes some machine was going to be turned on; 2 gates away from ours; and the smell would have come to the jet way from the open door. I did not smell anything outside; but I closed the door immediately; as I was instructed; well before the machine 2 gates away; was turned on; so there was no way that any smell/fumes could have come in through the door. The Captain made an announcement that the passengers needed to deplane; and everybody deplaned. We deplaned as well. I immediately went to sit down; as I felt dizzy. I took a bottle of water with me; to keep me hydrated. After the flight kept being delayed further and further; it was finally delayed until the next morning; to allow the mechanics to work on the plane. The Captains were given the name of the hotel where they were going to layover; but it took over an hour for the Hotels and Limo department to work on our hotel stay. We waited and waited and finally decided to go with the Captains; hoping that Company would put us in the same hotel. When we went outside; still not knowing where we were staying; a van driver flagged us and told us we were going to stay at the hotel with the Captains. As we were driving; I received a phone call from ZZZ Flight Service; Name; confirming that we were staying at the hotel. After a good night sleep; the next morning; I felt much better; however; both of my hands were shaking; and; when I put my contacts back on; I realized that they were foggy. The driver who took us to the airport told us that the plane was fixed by the mechanics. The plane we boarded was; in fact; the same plane we had the day before. When I looked in the logbook; I read that the mechanics could not reproduce the problem; and that; therefore; nothing was done to the plane. They wrote that it could have been a smell/fumes coming from outside and reaching the plane from a door left open. As I described above; the fumes/odor started on the plane long before anybody operated any machine or equipment outside. There were no fumes/smoke/smells outside. In the morning; though; I did not smell the smell from the day prior. However; I felt the presence of the fumes; as by the time we were taking off my throat became scratchy again. Name FA-3 didn't look that good; either. As soon as she came onboard; she did not have the energy she displayed the day prior and sat down immediately in a first class seat. I asked her if she was feeling OK; and she said she felt tired. She did not feel like herself. She said she could not sleep well; as she felt heaviness on her chest. She thought that maybe she ate too much food during the flight; but that now she realized that it was not what she ate. I told her that it could definitely be an increase in blood pressure or other symptom related to the fumes. As the flight progressed; she went to the back. I continued to serve in first class; and; twice; I couldn't even speak; as my throat became really scratchy. I went to the galley to drink some water and felt better. When we arrived in ZZZ; I felt better; but; at night; I had headache; so I had to call sick for the trip I had the next day. After a good night sleep; I felt much better. I thank the Captain for reporting the problem; however; I don't think that the plane is fixed. The problem was not fumes or smell coming from outside but something wrong with the plane; probably an oil leak causing toxic fumes and odor to come in the cabin. It would be nice if they could check and try to find the leak. I do not feel safe flying on this airplane. As far as the operations went; there was a lot of confusion with our hotel accommodations and with communication from the Company to us. The next day; there was also a lot of confusion regarding the new departure time; as the flight info on our tablet; Company; and the information the Captain's had showed all different departure times. Communication between the Company and the crews really needs to improve. Scheduling should contact us directly; instead of relying on automated methods of communication.

A321 Flight Attendant in Charge reported a fume event during boarding.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

A B757-200 was departing SAN on the POGGI2 departure climbing to FL230. A Cessna Caravan was climbing VFR to 13;500 for OTAY jump zone just north of the B757-200's route. The C-130 was VFR level at 13;000; heading westbound to the TRIDENT jump zone south of the B757-200's flight path. If you don't climb above the jump plane going into OTAY; you have to vector the aircraft around the jump zone because the SID routing is near the southern edge of the jump zone. The TRIDENT jump zone is approximately 2 miles south of the SID routing and the jump planes are generally never a factor. I was worried about the B757-200's rate of climb; because the Caravan was climbing at the same rate. I stopped the Caravan's climb at 11;700 and verified that the B757-200 was climbing through 12;500 to ensure separation. I switched the B757-200 to Center and instead of responding with the frequency; the pilot stated that they were descending because of an RA. As he said this; I realized that the C-130 had turned northbound from the TRIDENT jump zone (level at 13;000 VFR). I told the C-130 to turn right heading 090 immediately. Once the B757-200 was clear of the C-130; the B757-200 was level at 12;000. The Caravan was at the B757-200's 11 o'clock flying northbound and I told the Caravan to continue northbound for traffic. I knew the B757-200 would pass south of the Caravan and had him climb back to 14;000; then FL230. I think I had only worked 30 minutes total and it wasn't busy. I'm so disappointed in myself for not restricting the C-130 to a heading and that I didn't notice the C-130's route of flight before switching the B757-200. It makes you feel bad when an airplane is responding to an RA that you could have prevented. How could I have let that happen and be so confident about the C-130's route of flight? One heading and nothing would have happened. I have worked C-130s in that jump zone before and every time they have flown through the jump zone; gone westbound a few miles then turned back to the east. I should never have assumed that this C-130 would do the same thing. I'm always really vigilant about the north jump zone; because the aircraft working that area always climb high and generally always conflict with the airliners on the departure. I never issued traffic to the C-130 about the B757-200; or the B757-200 about the C-130. I just told the B757-200 about the Caravan because the Caravan was directly in his path. I should never have assumed that the C-130 was going to stay on course but I had given him no instructions. Recommendation; the only thing I can recommend for myself is to never assume what's going to happen. It doesn't make sense to me that I would assume he would fly through the jump zone; even though they typically always do that; but his altitude should have been a big red flag for me. I should have ensured that the B757-200 was above both aircraft before trying to give him a frequency change and I should have ensured the C-130's heading and given each other traffic advisories. I'm generally always giving VFR aircraft headings or instructions to keep them away from other aircraft so the fact that I didn't this time still baffles me. All I can do is thank the pilots for their immediate responses.

SCT Controller described a TCAS RA event between an air carrier departure and a Military 'jump' aircraft operating to a jump zone; the reporter acknowledging his/her assumptions led to the occurrence.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 1562; Flight Crew Type 961

Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The flight was to BGF. Cleared as filed ..AYS VNA LGC. Filed 9000 ft. Given 8;000 feet. Flight plan was intended to avoid MOA's. ZJX center tried to be helpful before AYS and offered direct. From past experience of multiple reroutes near Moody MOA and Atlanta Class B; I declined initial offer; but was offered direct LGC and took that. Then flew into an area where Jacksonville Center radar was down. New route clearance given using airways and VORs with reporting points. At 8;000 feet I was on top of clouds. In the approximate vicinity of PECAN; was told to descend to 6;000 feet. That put us into the tops of frontal clouds and we began to experience moderate turbulence. I slowed to turbulence speed and I requested from Jacksonville a return to 8;000 feet to get out of the tops. I was not clear on why they had brought us down. Jacksonville Center told me to contact Atlanta with request. I tried repeatedly to get a hold of Atlanta; I could hear them; but they could not hear us. At the same time the turbulence went from moderate to occasional severe. Passengers were distressed and I was trying to focus on getting through to Atlanta to at least get a block altitude. Another aircraft heard me trying to reach Atlanta and relayed. I could hear the Atlanta controller say; 'I don't know who that is; I don't have them'. Then came back with a relay to give us [a different frequency]. All this happened over about 3-5 minutes. As I got Atlanta [with the new frequency] on the radio; I observed that the autopilot had disconnected in the turbulence and I was off both course and altitude. I was about 1;000 feet high; but still IMC and in turbulence. Seeing that; I asked the controller if I could get to 8;000 again. He denied request in a very angry voice because of traffic between us and LGC and yelled at me about the altitude deviation. I told him I would get it back down-explained that turbulence was knocking us around and I asked to try 4;000. He cleared us to 4;000 and that did not help much. Asked again for higher and if possible 8;000. He was really annoyed 'because not enough time to LGC'. Finally; he asked me what approach we wanted at LGC. I informed him that our destination was BGF-Winchester TN. He said he only had us cleared to LGC! I had to repeat that our clearance was to BGF. But with the correct destination; he was able to clear us back up on top and direct to BGF.Contributing factors to the altitude deviation; ATC lost the flight plan; Center radar was down; ATC had me descend into turbulence because they had the wrong destination; ATC gave the wrong frequency for handoff; I was distracted by being unable to reach ATC and knowing I was in a no radar environment as well as by my distressed passengers in bad turbulence. Also contributing was that I had never seen the autopilot disengage in the 15 years I have flown this aircraft. Not sure if I banged the disconnect button in the bumps or it did it automatically and I will investigate with the technician. Once I realized it and was back in touch with ATC; I hand flew the aircraft until we were again on top and enroute. I did not argue with the controller when he was yelling about the altitude deviation because everyone was upset already. I don't know exactly how they lost my flight plan; but I am guessing that the helpful controller at ZJX center from earlier in the flight who tried to clear me direct was the start of the chain. However; at the end of the day; it was my responsibility to monitor the course and altitude even with all the other contributing factors and not to trust the autopilot as much as I did.

BE-55 pilot reported that their autopilot disconnected inadvertently in turbulence which resulted in an altitude and course deviation. Contributing factors included Center radar down; ATC confusion on destination flight plan; a frequency change; and moderate to occasionally severe turbulence which created distressed passengers.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On departure out of ZZZ between 1;000 and 2;000 feet AGL; we received 'L 10th STAGE DUCT' Warning message followed by 'L JETPIPE OVHT' Warning message. I was Pilot Monitoring. We reduced the thrust on the affected engine and the message went away after a few seconds. Due to our proximity to the airport of departure and the potential severity of this malfunction; we decided to immediately return to ZZZ. We were cleared for and performed a visual approach to Runway XX.

CRJ-200 Captain reported a duct overheat on departure and elected to return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 58; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 375

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

About an hour into the flight the alternate air door light went on. After briefly discussing the situation; we decided to make a precautionary landing. We informed ATC and got an amended clearance. Very shortly after that; the engine monitor showed a cylinder with an overtemp indication. We then got priority routing and descent. As we descended; we reduced power significantly due to high temp or missing indications on many cylinders. The alt air door light then went out; and the engine occasionally seemed to lose power. We sighted the field and decided to land straight in. Once we were able to glide to the field; we shut off the fuel to the engine; and landed without power uneventfully. There were no injuries; and there was no in-flight fire.

Beech BE36 pilot reporting diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing issues with the alternate air door; and then engine problems that led to an inflight shutdown after landing was assured.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were on the RYYMN 2 RNAV Arrival into BNA. As we were crossing JNKNS waypoint we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft. The aircraft rolled and the autopilot disconnected as we were starting our turn at JNKNS. Because of the wake turbulence and autopilot disengagement we did not turn immediately crossing JNKNS but we did very shortly thereafter. ATC never questioned or queried us about our track and the remainder of flight was normal and uneventful.As long as there are aircraft flying on the same arrival; there is always the risk of a wake turbulence encounter. It is and will always be important for the crew to be aware of the potential risk of such an encounter no matter how small.

B737-700 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into BNA.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

During an emergency situation I was vectoring a Lifeguard for a Class D airport adjacent to a Class C Airport. The Lifeguard said that he could take a small delay for the Emergency Aircraft. I anticipated the descent of a B737 going into the Class C also. After working out the sequence with the emergency and the Lifeguard I recognized that the B737 had descended more rapidly than anticipated and went thru the 4;700 FT MVA. The next lowest MVA is 3;000 and I did not say anything because he would be in the MVA in less then a mile. During the complex situation I should not have anticipated the descent of the aircraft.

TRACON Controller trying to accommodate an emergency and Lifeguard aircraft; allowed an inbound to momentarily descend below the MVA during sequencing into the same airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

I was working north; south sector combined as a Tower Radar; as well as Controller in Charge for the Tower. There was a Cessna doing survey work 7 to 9 miles off the departure end of the runway at 3;200 feet; coordinated with the Local Control. I turned Aircraft X to a northwest heading and gave a descent to 2;500 feet as it was the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) around the airport. My plan was to turn him to a 270 heading for his base turn to 1;300 feet before the MVA in front of him which was 2;800 feet. I used the shout line to talk to the adjacent Approach to make sure they knew I had called traffic for Aircraft Y who was VFR still in my airspace and didn't have the other VFR traffic in sight and was becoming more of a conflict than originally thought. I then was called by a Departure that needed a turn as to not be a conflict with the survey Cessna. As I finished my scan; I saw Aircraft X was entering the MVA of 2;800 feet at 2;800 feet and still in his descent. I told Aircraft X to maintain 3;000 [feet]. The pilot said they were below that; leveling off at 2;500 feet. I then told the aircraft to climb to 3;000 feet. The aircraft was never in danger of hitting the antenna that was at 1;800 feet. Having a Supervisor in the operation may have helped the operation as it would have been an extra pair of eyes. Next time; I will descend to 3;000 feet in case my attention is brought elsewhere.

A Tower Controller working Approach from the Tower Radar became distracted and descended an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While performing duties as Pilot Flying (PF); flight was being vectored by Eglin Approach for a Visual Approach to Runway 19 at VPS (Fort Walton Beach; Florida). Eglin Approach instructed our flight to descend to 6000 ft MSL in the vicinity of CITEY intersection on the ILS W 19 Approach near Duke Field at the Eglin Air Force Base (approximately 10 NM NORTH of VPS). As the flight descended thru 6600-6700 ft MSL; Eglin Approach instructed the flight to climb back to 7000 ft MSL. The aircraft leveled off at 6200 ft MSL before resuming climb back up to 7000 ft MSL. While climbing back up to 7000 ft MSL; the flight received a 'TA' alert from the TCAS on a [military fighter jet] that was closing in fast on our flight at 6000 ft MSL. ATC then notified the flight of the traffic alert on the [fighter] that was quickly closing in on this flight and came within 1-2 NM horizontally and 200 ft vertically just as the TCAS TA alert sounded. As the [fighter] passed the flight; the TCAS gave the 'Clear of Conflict' aural message. After the [fighter] cleared; the flight was then cleared to descend for the visual approach to Runway 19 at VPS. Flight landed safely at VPS with no further incident. Flight crew contacted the Eglin Air Force Base Air Traffic Supervisor to inquire about this event upon completion of flight duties at the gate. Per the Air Traffic Supervisor he was supervising and training a new Controller and observed this event. The Supervisor noted that the [fighter] was operating under VFR flight rules and was on a practice 'High' ILS Approach to Runway 36 at Duke Field which is north of VPS. ATC instructed the [fighter] to descend in VFR conditions for his approach to 3000 ft MSL. However; the [fighter] did not descend per ATC instructions. It should be also noted that the airspace around Fort Walton Beach; FL and at Eglin Air Force Base is controlled by the US Air Force and is 'Restricted' airspace for military operations. Flight leveled off the aircraft and climbed back to 7000 after ATC issued a climb clearance rather late. The rate of closure between the flight and the [fighter jet] was so fast that by the time the TCAS TA alert sounded; the [fighter] had passed and the conflict was clear in less than 3-5 seconds. The only action taken was to climb back to 7000 ft MSL but as soon as the [fighter] passed; ATC issued a Visual Approach clearance. After talking with the Eglin Air Force Base Air Traffic Supervisor on duty; the Supervisor acknowledged that he was training a new controller that was handling the flight and the combination of the [fighter] not descending fast enough and controller training were the main factors in the deviation and confusion of ATC instructions. The Supervisor acknowledged that this event was the result of high controller workload and training and that ATC should have acted much sooner to avoid this event. The Supervisor also noted that the flight crew for this flight did nothing wrong and this was entirely an ATC [issue]. The Supervisor was apologetic and even offered to have the flight crew call back later with any other questions in regards to this event.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported an airborne conflict with a VFR fighter jet in the vicinity of EGI.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were proceeding directly to LIPTE intersection maintaining 6;000 feet to join the ILS 11L arrival. At 4 miles prior to LIPTE I (pilot flying) selected HDG mode for the switch to green needles. I inadvertently hit the 1/2 button causing the ILS frequency to disappear in the Comm one standby box. I was distracted by this [and] I tried to fix it. During this time the autopilot disconnected. I was fixated on frequency and did not recognize the autopilot disconnected. The pilot not flying asked what was wrong. I got the right frequency and looked up to see we were low for the approach and the GPWS 'TOO LOW TERRAIN' alert went off. I applied max thrust and started to climb. ATC also said that they were getting a Low Altitude alert as well and suggested 6;000 FT per minute vectoring altitude in that sector. We climbed back through 6;000 FT; leveled off and continued to intercept the ILS 11L and continued inbound on the approach. The day was long with weather in the entire southwest. 5 legs; delayed almost every leg. What was a routine ILS was hampered by fatigue and an inadvertent hitting of the wrong button on the Comm 1 followed by a fixation on the problem. Fatigue being the cause; a solution is to avoid and recognize it before it hampers safety.

We were given direct LIPTE intersection and cleared for the ILS 11L approach. The Captain (pilot flying) switched to heading mode; green needles and I thought approach mode. I then heard the autopilot disconnect; at which point I asked what he was doing - I noticed the FCP wasn't configured for an approach; and I also thought hand flying an approach in IMC; after a 5 leg day where we had experienced delays on every single leg; probably wasn't the best idea when we were both extremely tired. While configuring for the approach; the GPWS went off stating; 'Too Low Terrain'. The Captain immediately initiated a full power climb back to 6;000; our last assigned altitude. Right after that ATC called and informed us that the MVA was 6;000 FT and suggested we return to that altitude; which we already had. We re-engaged the autopilot and executed a normal; safe ILS to landing. The day started off with weather delays; and continued for every single leg. The uncommon weather conditions; turbulence throughout every flight; and long delays most likely contributed to our being fatigued. Upon reflection; it appears that fatigue and fixation on a comm problem was the cause. A solution to fatigue would be to recognize it.

CRJ flight crew reports an inadvertent button push while attempting to select heading on the FCP resulting in autopilot disconnect and the loss of 700 FT. GPWS and ATC both announce the deviation and the Captain returns to 6;000 FT. Both pilots cited a long fatiguing day as contributing to the error.


Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

During inflight A Flight Attendant informed B and C that there a strange ordor in forward cabin and asked us to confirm and identify what we smelled...I identified the smell as a dirty gym or dirty towels like smell. All three of us smelled the dirty musty smell.

Flight attendants reported a 'dirty socks' odor during cruise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 750

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While enroute at FL360 we noticed the Number 2 Engine oil quantity was at 40%. As we monitored it; it continued to decrease. The Captain initiated a dialogue with Dispatch and Maintenance and all agreed to keep monitoring it and let them know if we diverted. The oil quantity decreased to 25% and we decided to declare an emergency and divert. At this point we were coming up on the front range and the weather in [our divert airport] was clear. We advised the flight attendants and passengers and landed without incident. We could not find a checklist for low oil quantity; only for low oil pressure which we never got (but probably would have if we continued). We did not shut the engine down.

Oil quantity had gone from 72 to 25. All appropriate departments and ATC were notified while enroute.

When the right engine oil quantity continually decreased to only 25% the flight crew of a B737 elected to declare and emergency and divert to a nearby airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Maintenance had replaced crew O2 bottle and First Officer Mask Regulator in ZZZ. [We were] approaching an intersection; arranged for a bathroom break. First Officer found his oxygen inoperative and the crew bottle at zero. Coordinated for a descent and ran QRH. Procedure is under MISC and is not in index [of QRH]. Suggest it be added to [QRH] index under 'O': Oxygen System malfunction. Declared an emergency and we were cleared direct to ZZZ1. Landed without incident; cancelled Emergency on landing. Taxiied to gate. Aircraft Out of Service (OTS). Leak was slow enough it was not possible for crew to detect before takeoff. If crew O2 bottle has been replaced two days in a row. Delay departure for a period of time before release for Crew O2 Leak Check. Airline Transport Pilot (ATP).

In cruise; FL300; approximately 150 miles east of ZZZ; I noticed the crew O2 supply was depleted. Informed Captain who declared an emergency; we executed QRH actions. Landed safely at ZZZ.

The crew O2 bottle is located just behind and to the right of his First Officer's seat and the bottle shut-off handle and pressure gauge is also mounted on the bottle. The O2 bottle looks like a standard 'old' green steel bottle. He does not believe the bottle was a composite type.  He had performed a triple check of his O2 Mask and bottle pressure prior to departure because Maintenance had been working on the Crew O2 System and had also replaced his O2 mask/regulator foe leaking. The MD-83 aircraft was removed from service after they landed; but he does not know what actually contributed to the loss of the crew O2 bottle pressure.

A Captain and First Officer report about the loss of their crew O2 bottle pressure that read 'Zero' in cruise at FL300. Maintenance had replaced the crew O2 bottle and First Officer's oxygen mask regulator on their MD-83 aircraft prior to departure.


Time Pressure; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Unanticipated GPWS warning on approach requiring crew action. We were flying the freighter (tail); second leg ZZZ-ZZZ1 (1.5 hr delayed at start of day); 5-6 hours into the flight duty period (~XA:00 pm local time). Night IMC w/moderate to heavy rain showers in vicinity. I was Pilot Flying PF (Captain).Clearance was ZZZ...ZZZ1. On the ground at ZZZ we planned and briefed the departure and RNAV (RNP) Rwy XX from the ZZZZZ1 transition. De-iced; taxied; departed; climbed to cruise at FL280.Enroute to ZZZZZ1 at cruise; Center warned of areas of moderate to extreme precipitation from ZZZZZ1 fix to the airport and advised of better weather to the Northeast. After discussing a change to the arrival; we both agreed to request radar vectors to the approach segment from ZZZZZ (IAF). Center agreed to vector us around and down to put us on the published portion of the arrival with the stated intention of joining us to the approach path at ZZZZZ2. FO (First Officer) made the changes in the FMS and we briefed and then ran the Decent Checklist Change Triangles.Radar vectors included a descent and vectors resulting in established on published segment near ZZZZZ2 at 5000 and given approach clearance from center (I had directed PM to reset FMS Cruise Alt to 8;000 feet when we were on vectors). Once established near ZZZZZ2 at 5;000 cleared us for the approach. I engaged LNAV/VNAV and set airport elevation; but was high on the vertical path. I continued to slow to final configuration (gear down; Flaps 40) by ZZZZZ1; stable; but still 1;400 feet above the path in VNAV SPD (vertical navigation speed). After the turn at ZZZZZ1 I set 1;600 feet in the MCP ALT window (FAP 1;600 MSL) and at approximately 2;300 MSL; engaged Vertical Speed down in order to regain the VNAV Path before the FAP. As I approached the path; I reset MCP altitude to airfield elevation and engaged VNAV while pitch mode was in ALT ACQ (altitude acquire); resulting in an unrecognized mode change to V/S (2;100 ft/min) and projected vertical path well before the airport. It was at this point; we received a GPWS 'Caution Terrain' followed shortly by GPWS Warning 'Terrain Fly UP.'  I immediately executed an escape maneuver/go-around; climbing and flying the go-around flight path to ZZZ2 and mistakenly climbed to 5;000 MSL (missed approach alt 3;000 MSL); entering the hold as published. I requested and was given a descent to 3;000 MSL in holding.We then built and briefed the RNAV (RNP) Rwy XX from ZZZ2; ran the Descent Change Triangles; received our approach clearance; and executed the approach to landing uneventfully. The FO and I thoroughly debriefed the events of the flight. I then called the Duty Pilot and DISPATCH to report the incident. I should have requested radar vectors ZZZZZ1 for the best opportunity to acquire the VNAV path. I allowed the Controller to compress and to keep me high on my approach; and reducing my situational awareness. I configured very early; but it still wasn't enough to regain the VNAV path. In the future; I will not allow the ATC Controller to dictate the terms of my energy management and will give myself the Flight Handbook recommended 3 miles per 1;000 descent planning as a minimum starting point.Because we compressed our arrival and ended up high above the VNAV path I attempted to use the Vertical Speed method on LNAV/VNAV Approach rules to regain VNAV path prior to the FAP. Had I cross-checked my FMA after selecting VNAV; I would have noticed the V/S mode and perhaps executed an uneventful go-around. In the future; I will make sure to always verify my FMA mode on the PFD after making a selection on the MCP.Lastly; after fully configuring and still not descending to the path; I might have been able to acquire VNAV path prior to the FAP using Speed Intervention. There was chance we were light enough (low Ref Speed) to accelerate the idle pitch descent to regain the path; ensuring the pitch FMA remained in VNAV and avoiding the unrecognized and inadvertent V/S mode descent that caused the GPWS Warning. Recommend expanding the understanding of VNAV speed during initial and continuing qualification training in the B737.

Escape Maneuver occurred at approximately (time) local time on (date). Flight conditions at the time were night; IMC; rain; light turbulence.Leg 2 of a planned 4 leg day. Leg 1 was delayed 1 hours due to cargo loading. The flight was uneventful. Deiced in ZZZ after aircraft pushback. Filed route was ZZZ...ZZZ1. We planned and briefed the RNAV Rwy XX from ZZZZZ. Cruise was at FL280. PF (pilot flying) MFD was in WX Radar mode due to significant weather in the area. PM (pilot monitoring) was in TERR (terrain) mode with VSD (vertical speed) displayed. Cruise was at dusk. Shortly after starting the descent; ATC notified us that he saw an area of Moderate to Extreme precipitation ahead of us. ATC said it looked clearer to the north and asked if we would like vectors to the north for an approach via ZZZZZ1. We responded yes and he started vectoring us north. PF flew while PM loaded the arrival from ZZZZZ1 (via IAF ZZZZZ1). PM briefed the new approach and called for change triangles; which we accomplished. ATC had us do intermediate level-offs at 8;000 feet; then 7;000 feet. PF asked PM to reset the cruise altitude to provide an accurate flight path. In anticipation of being high on flight path; PF configured early to flaps 40. PM was actively monitoring the VSD and flight path; and requested lower when able from ATC. ATC said he would give us lower in a few miles. He then gave us a short vector prior to ZZZZZ2 with a descent to 6;500 feet. At approx 0.5 miles before ZZZZZ2 at 6;500 feet; ATC cleared us 'to cross ZZZZZ2 at or above 5;000 feet; cleared RNAV Rwy XX at ZZZ1'. When cleared for the approach over ZZZZZ2; PF dialed in field elevation in the MCP and descended towards the flight path. Flight conditions were night; IMC; rain; light turbulence. Approximately 1 mile prior to ZZZZZ3; we were still high on flight path so PF verbalized and set Vertical Speed down and reset MCP to 1;600 feet. PM saw the downward vector on the VSD and monitored it for approaching the flight path. Almost immediately thereafter; we received a 'Caution; Terrain' and the depicted island terrain went yellow on PM's MFD. This was quickly followed by a 'Terrain; Pull up' and the depicted terrain on the MFD went red. PF called for go-around and executed the escape maneuver. After aircraft was climbing; PF asked PM to reset MCP for missed approach altitude of 3;000 feet. PF initially had difficulty verifying the missed approach altitude on the EFB due to turbulence; transition to nighttime; and prioritizing monitoring the aircraft state while performing aircraft cleanup. PF put and verbalized 5;000 feet in the MCP window; thinking 5;000 feet was better in case 3;000 feet was incorrect. PMs intent was to devote more brain cells to performing the aircraft cleanup items and monitoring the safe aircraft state as we climbed. Aircraft was cleaned up; leveled at 5;000 feet and continued to holding at ZZZ2. We then queried ATC for a descent to 3;000 feet; setup the RNAV Rwy XX from ZZZ2. Approach was briefed by Captain; flown; and landed uneventfully. Once the aircraft reached parking and shutdown at ZZZ1; Captain and FO debriefed the events. Captain called and briefed Duty Officer; who approved continuing to the remaining 2 destinations. Captain also called and spoke with Dispatch. The remaining flights to were flown with minimal changes. Post flight; the Captain called Quality Assurance to see what they could tell us; so that we could learn further from this experience.Stay on the magenta line; and if vectored off; get back on it as early as possible. Even though the controller had plans to vector us back onto the RNP approach; a better outcome likely would have resulted if we started at the IAP. This way we would have been able to descend on a normal flight path; with adequate time and pacing; vs. having to stay higher due to the controllers higher vectoring altitudes. Request the IAP next time.At nighttime in IMC; I need to have a faster response timecalling for the escape maneuver/go-around. I should clarify this maneuver more; particularly the triggers. I should have been the first to call for it since the Captain was the PF. Instead of trying to salvage a bad or difficult approach; make the decision to go-around earlier. Memorize the missed approach altitude prior to each approach; or ensure my EFB chart is not zoomed-in so far that I cannot see it without a quick glance.Clarify various 'what-if scenarios' on RNP approaches; Escape Maneuvers; Go-Arounds. If I haven't flown as much recently; spend extra time clarifying. Communicate with Center that 6;500 feet at ZZZZZ2 creates a very difficult approach to accomplish. Recommend to them that vectoring to the IAF is likely a better option.

B737-700 flight crew reported executing an escape maneuver due to a CFIT event resulting from a compressed approach clearance. Crew completed subsequent approach in an uneventful landing.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While practicing take off and landings on the downwind we brought the gear handle in the down position and didn't get a green indication on the right main wheel. I took the controls and recycled the gear without any success. After that; I contacted the Tower and advised them that I was going to leave the airspace to the southwest and climbed to 3;500 ft. and executed the emergency gear extension procedure with the use of the checklist and still no indication of gear deployed on the right gear. Applied some G-force on the plane to see if it comes down by gravity. After that I proceeded to fly back to the airport.I contacted the Tower and told them about the problem and that I would like to execute a low approach to have visual confirmation that the landing gear is down. During the low approach; Tower verified that landing gear was down but without any confirmation that it will hold the down position after touch down. I proceeded to [request priority handling]; executed a go-around climb back to traffic pattern altitude to execute the landing. During this portion of the flight I briefed my student with the steps to be followed in case landing gear collapsed; during the approach to final I performed a soft landing and trying to reduce as much load as possible on the right main gear while being ready to shut down the engine to protect it in case of the landing gear collapse. After I brought the plane to a full stop; emergency services verified that everything was alright and we proceeded to taxi back to the academy ramp. I then squawked the aircraft and briefed the mechanics regarding the malfunction.

Flight Instructor reported a landing gear light did not indicate down and locked prior to landing and resulted in a precautionary landing.


Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Cylinders were removed and sent out for inspection. Upon return; cylinders were preassembled; rocker arms had been installed. Cylinders were installed onto crankcase and rocker arms were removed one at a time to install push rods; tappet plunger assemblies; pushrod tubes and seals. Dry Tappet Clearance Check was performed and found within limits. Engine run-up; Leak Check and Break-in all appeared normal. After 25-hours; the oil was drained and the filter and suction screen were inspected. No contamination was noted; therefore; the rocker covers were not removed. I found upon inspection after an emergency landing; the rocker arms on the # 2 and # 3 cylinders to be improperly assembled. The # 2 cylinder had two exhaust rocker arms installed and the # 3 cylinder had two intake rocker arms. The Part Numbers (P/N) were hard to read on some of the rocker arms. Because the rocker arms were improperly assembled; there was contact between the pushrod and the rocker arm during operation that wore away pushrod material to the point of failure on the # 3 cylinder. The # 3 cylinder was removed and inspected. All rocker arms were replaced and damaged rods were also replaced. Dry Tappet Clearance [Check] was redone on all cylinders. Engine run up and Leak Check will be completed. A test flight will also be completed.

Reporter stated he performed the cylinder installations on the turbo-charged Lycoming IO-360 engine approximately three months prior to his January 2014 in-flight Emergency. He was at 6;500 FT; night time VFR when the # 3 cylinder exhaust pushrod tip end broke and closed the exhaust valve. The effect was immediate on the aircraft. He thought someone had slammed on the brakes in flight. That was the effect of losing just one cylinder.  Even though air and fuel was going into the cylinder and ignition was occurring; the # 3 cylinder was dead; but the vibration was quite strong. He decided to cut the turbocharger to see if the vibration could be reduced and power went down; requiring moving the throttles up; while trying to balance the engine vibration.Reporter stated he extended the electric landing gear and declared an emergency. He noticed how quite the comm radio became after he declared his emergency.  ATC's response was immediate and their help was continuous. He can't thank them enough for directing him to another airport after the first alternate airport's pilot controlled runway lighting did not respond and he had to divert to a second alternate. The engine never overtemped.Reporter stated inspection of the engine showed metal chips in the rocker cover. The # 3 cylinder stayed on the engine. Although the exhaust push rod had failed; the rod remained inside the tube. An intake rocker arm had been installed where the exhaust rocker arm should have been. # 2 cylinder had an exhaust rocker arm at the intake rocker arm position. He doesn't remember if he re-installed the rocker arms and push rods as received from the cylinder repair facility; or if he; had actually mixed-up the intake and exhaust rocker arms. He does remember the difficulty in determining the part markings on some of the exhaust and intake rocker arms.

Three months after installing repaired cylinders on a turbocharged IO-360 Lycoming engine; pilot experiences loss of # 3 cylinder and strong engine vibrations at 6;500 FT; night time VFR. Emergency declared and pilot notes that ATC's help and support was wonderful in getting the Mooney M20F aircraft to an alternate airport. An exhaust push rod had failed due to an intake rocker arm had been installed at the # 3 cylinder exhaust rocker arm position.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Time Pressure; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were taxiing out on taxiway B for departure on 27. We noticed an aircraft too high to land on 27 and heard them accept a landing on 36 from Tower. We heard them cleared to land on 36 from Tower. Tower asked us if we were ready for an immediate takeoff on 27; we said yes. Tower issued our takeoff clearance with some words to the effect of 'no delay; traffic on 2 mile final.' I took the runway and did not delay the takeoff. I lined up on the runway heading and kept the plane rolling and gave controls to the FO (First Officer) who was the flying pilot. He immediately added power and we took off. Meanwhile; the aircraft landing 36 was going to be in conflict with us; as our runway crosses theirs. Tower had the other aircraft go-around to avoid us. The other aircraft came within close proximity of us (we were both airborne; maybe 200 feet AGL); in my estimation 2000 feet horizontally; same altitude. We were barely airborne and didn't have the ability to maneuver. The other aircraft maneuvered to their right to miss us. The FO and I debriefed and also debriefed the flight attendants in case any passengers saw this.Tower issued our takeoff clearance and landing clearance to a crossing runway without adequate spacing. As far as the crew goes; we had disrupted sleep the night before but we were rested and I don't consider it a contributing factor. We delayed the departure of this flight so that we could get our rest.Although it was a Tower error; I will comment how we as crewmembers can avoid this situation. When I heard the tower issue our takeoff clearance and to expedite; I could have evaluated the situation better; perhaps refused the takeoff clearance. I thought we did as well as we could to expedite the takeoff. As we were rolling for takeoff; I saw the other aircraft on short final and decided that aborting our takeoff at that point would be more unsafe than continuing as we would have been crossing his runway as he was landing. It's a difficult decision to make when the Tower asks you to expedite a takeoff because you want to help them out as well as not delay yourself; and you assume they have adequate distance built in to ensure this happens safely. I personally will not accept these any more after this incident without thoroughly understanding the situation.

The event that occurred was a loss of separation by ATC of two company aircraft; one that was landing; and our aircraft that was departing. The aircraft were operating on intersecting runways. While eastbound on taxiway Bravo; I heard Tower notify an arriving company aircraft that they could have runway 18; or 36 for landing. Arriving aircraft accepted runway 36; and was then given instructions. As we approached the end of taxiway Bravo; short of 27L Tower contacted us and said if we were ready; we could have an immediate departure on 27L. I quickly spoke to the Captain asking if he was OK with the immediate clearance; and he agreed that we were ready to go. I proceeded to tell Tower we were ready. Tower queried back asking to repeat what I said; I again told Tower we were ready for an immediate departure on 27L. Tower cleared us for immediate takeoff on 27L; and notified us that company traffic was landing runway 36 and on a 2 mile final. The Captain gave me the controls while on the roll and I advanced to takeoff power. While on the roll I did take note of the arriving aircraft on short final for 36. The moments leading up to the loss of separation appeared to happen very quickly. I recall the Captain calling V1 very near the same time Tower issued an immediate 'Go Around' command to the aircraft landing on 36. At this point I believe we were nearing the runway intersections while rotating/lifting off. I recall momentarily glancing to the left to see where the arriving aircraft was in relation to us. I noted it was in a nose up position at or near our current altitude; and approaching the runway intersection as well. I retained control of the aircraft during the entirety of the event; and tried to maintain company profile for a normal takeoff. Due to the proximity of the arrival aircraft; the rate at which it was approaching our position at the runway intersection; and their own go-around maneuver; I believe I initially under-rotated the aircraft when lifting off the runway; believing that we would end up in their flight path if I over-rotated; and then returned to a normal company profile. Normal procedures were followed after the event (gear up/flaps/auto pilot) and just prior to contacting Departure Control; the Captain requested a phone number from the Tower Controller.The root cause seemed to be ATC error/loss of separation. Contributing factors were failure to maintain adequate situational awareness of intersecting runway traffic; a feeling of needing to rush because of a 2+hr flight delay with a tight connection on the other side; and possible fatigue. The previous night the Captain and I were both awakened by hotel fire alarms and had our sleep interrupted. We were given additional rest by the company; however having not gotten a solid night's sleep may have contributed to the decision making that day. Suggestions for avoiding a recurrence would be to maintain proper situational awareness; and think twice about accepting a rushed 'immediate departure' clearance. ATC had cleared an arriving aircraft to land on an intersecting runway while simultaneously clearing us for takeoff. Even though ATC informed us and was aware of the arriving aircraft; taking an extra moment to clarify and confirm that the area was safe for departure could have helped prevent this situation.

A CRJ taking off on one runway had a potential near-miss/conflict with a CRJ landing on an intersecting runway. The landing aircraft was instructed by the Tower to go-around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When off-loading freight; the ramp agent informed us that the can in position 1R contained hazmat (corrosives); but was not connected to the fire hose. Upon inspection of the paperwork; it looks like the hazmat was also not declared on a Unit Load Device (ULD) Dangerous Goods (DG) manifest; although it was listed on the DG position summary. The First Officer was not briefed on this hazmat and did not know it was there until the ramp agent told us about it. He was only briefed on and inspected the can in 1L prior to departure. Additionally; the ramp agent told us that the [departure station] crew has been doing this on weekend morning flights at least 50% of the time. In violation of SOP; There was also overnight freight in front of the corrosives. The crew loading the hazmat is being careless; or just negligent. Hold the DG agent responsible for errors like this.

A300 Captain is informed during unloading that the container in position 1R contains a hazmat which the crew was not informed of and was not connected to the fire suppression system.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

I was working the Traffic Management position.  I saw that we were going to have a couple of hours of high volume in the Center; as is normal on a day shift.  I received a briefing from my fellow Traffic Management Coordinator (TMC) in which he relayed that the Central Weather Service Unit (CWSU) had informed him we could expect to lose the East Coast routings through the state of Florida by XA:00Z.  The Atlantic Routes; which normally service much of our volume between the Northeast and South Florida were closed due to weather.  Sealord was planning to activate all airspace to FL500 and the Joint Air Traffic Operations Command Center (JATOCC) was planning to activate W470 to FL600.  This would mean we would be left with one hole through which we would be forced to route all aircraft.  I called the Severe Weather line at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) and voiced my concerns and that I thought our best option would be to put an Airspace Flow Program in place to slow the volume through ZJX due to the lack of available airspace and the increased complexity caused by the weather.  I was told we didn't need that because there was not enough volume.  The weather built up; much as anticipated.  Planes were deviating all over the sky.  I received a phone call from Severe Weather wanting to put out a playbook routing for ATL landing traffic in response to my request to ZMA via the National Traffic Management Log (NTML) to route all aircraft on the HOBTT Arrival to keep them off of the east coast.  I told them that at this point it was better to handle it tactically and reiterated that if they had helped me slow the volume on the East Coast earlier; we wouldn't have to ask ZMA to reroute aircraft.  This was disregarded.  To my understanding; the East Area got absolutely overwhelmed and had sectors so inundated with aircraft that they were almost out of control.  We also have repeated issues with ZTL either refusing to comply with requests they have accepted or flat out refusing to accept them at all and arguing with us.  Lately they have begun to send retaliatory restrictions that they don't actually need in response to our requests to tuck aircraft due to tunnel procedures necessitated by severe weather.I would recommend that the FAA and ATCSCC realize that the traffic flowing through ZJX has increased drastically and our Controllers are consistently working Level 12 traffic day in and day out.  We have severe weather literally every day between May and October which shuts off routings.  Most days; unless it is a holiday; military airspace is active on both sides of our airspace; making much of our airspace unusable. Many days we are unable to split sectors off or provide a radar associate or tracker to assist the controllers.  Every single time we call the ATCSCC for assistance we are denied.  It is a rare occasion that an Airspace Flow Program (AFP) or structured routing is actually issued to help us as we attempt to funnel over 100 aircraft per hour through holes in thunderstorms and active military airspace.  We are seeing increasing reports of severe turbulence as we force aircraft full of people through small holes in between severe weather cells. Our facility has been subject to numerous Corrective Action Plans regarding severe weather events as a result of us sending them through severe weather.  Controllers are expected to call depicted weather to each and every aircraft; and are reprimanded when they are unable to; however their workload is completely absurd at this point and when we try to help slow the volume to provide them with more time for additional duties beyond separating the aircraft deviating to avoid weather we are denied!  Sealord calls their airspace active to FL500 early most days and keeps it active until well into the evening; as do the military squadrons who utilize the warning and restricted areas on the Gulf Coast.  As a TMC I am forced to watch sectors become saturated to the point Controllers are overwhelmed after I have initiated the Traffic Management Initiative (TMIs) at my disposal to slow it.  This situation in unacceptable and has to change.  I have been a Controller for XX years; X of those as a TMC; and I have never seen it so bad.  People are working this intense traffic 6 days a week every week; often 10 hours a day; and they are burned out.  They don't have any more to give and the system is failing them as they continue to work under adverse conditions to maintain the world's safest and most efficient system that the FAA and NATCA are so proud of.

Jacksonville Center Traffic Management Coordinator reported asking the Command Center for help and was denied.  This resulted in the East Area getting overwhelmed and sectors becoming so inundated with aircraft that they were almost out of control.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The DFW 17C/35C Glideslope on the ILS and the VNAV on the RNAV is not reliable! Both approaches for both runways; are showing aircraft 100 to 300 feet low all the way down final including the FAF (Final Approach Fix)! Management says it's been flight checked; and it checks out fine. Company said it was something to do with certain aircraft with a FMS update. All aircraft are low on the final. I don't want to be working aircraft down those runway finals during IMC weather when an aircraft is too low to the runway.Even though Management knows it's an issue; they say it's not an issue. They say continue using the approaches; but they want us to take aircraft out further on final; so we don't lose vertical separation with the aircraft next to them. I don't understand how that's an issue if there's 'not an issue.'First; I recommend no Instrument Approaches should be conducted to these two runways ASAP! I know this will delay the airlines; but this is a safety issue! I also recommend the equipment Maintenance Tech get out to the ILS/RNAV equipment; and find out what the problem is. It has to be an equipment issue. It's unsafe and needs to be fixed ASAP!

D10 TRACON Controller reported problems with aircraft being too low on the approach to DFW 17C/35C with possible glide slope issues.