Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

After departure from ZZZZ [Airport]; while enroute; ZZZ Center announced a closure from XA:Y0z-XC:Y0z. The NOTAM announcing the closure did provide routing through ZZZ Center during the closure. Flight AB approached the northern border of ZZZ Center at XB:Y0z and was placed into holding to allow 10 nm of separation between aircraft in a non-radar environment. Flight AB was informed to expect further clearance at XA:X0Z. Because the closure was not known at the time Dispatch prepared the release; the additional fuel needed was not planned.  Flight AB was released with 17 min RPF fuel and no contingency fuel. The Captain called Dispatch on SATCOM at XB:Y5z and briefed the enroute delay. Captain was not comfortable delaying until XA:X0Z and diverted into ZZZ [Airport].   ATC Center COVID cleanings come with relatively short notice i.e.; no more than 6 hours. For lengthy flights such as this one; additional contingency fuel even with excellent destination weather would have provided more options.

Dispatcher reported the information regarding an ATC Zero event was not received in time to change the aircraft's fuel load and prevent a diversion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Object

I planned to reposition my 85-hp Piper Cub from its t-hangar at the south end of [the] airport to [another hangar] on the airport. I had installed a tie-down ring sunk in a concrete pad outside the t-hangar. After pre-flighting the Cub; I secured the tail using a heavy duty nylon rope and 2 carabiners (one attached to the tie-down ring; the other to the tailwheel assembly). I primed the engine; pulled the prop through several times; cracked the throttle and turned the magneto switch to 'both.' There was no one at the controls. The engine caught on the first pull and the Cub surged forward; the tail attach point failed and the carabiner and rope were torn loose. I ran back and grabbed the right wing strut; trying to reach the throttle; but the airplane pulled me forward out onto a large hard-surface ramp. I hung on; trying to reach the throttle. My weight on the strut caused the tailwheel to caster and the airplane rotated clockwise with me hanging on; trying to reach the throttle. As it picked up speed in the rotation I was losing my grip and; after several 360's; when I thought it was 'aimed' in a direction that would cause the least damage; I had to let go. By now I was being dragged over the asphalt on my heels (my shoes had come off) and my 'butt.' The airplane impacted the edge of a t-hangar and a Cessna 150 tied down in the grass next to the hangar. There was damage to the right wingtip of the Cessna and considerable damage to the Cub - left wing; fuselage; propeller and sudden engine stoppage.

J-3 Cub pilot reported the aircraft was damaged after breaking loose from its tie-downs following an empty-cockpit hand-prop start.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X departed VFR and called me airborne for his IFR clearance. He filed a good route but I needed to amend his altitude from 10000 feet to 13000 feet for the MEA (Minimum Enroute Altitude). He was filed ALS-V368. I cleared him as filed but amended his altitude to 13000 feet.I would pick him up on radar at the western edge of my airspace so I made sure to have him report level at 13000 feet. I also asked for a report passing WAPRE intersection but he said he couldn't find the fix so I thought maybe he was already past it. I then told him to report 35 miles southwest of ALS and I asked him for his current location so I knew where he was on V368. I think he reported 25 miles from ALS. I coordinated with the next sector and told them he would contact them at the boundary.The pilot reported level at 13000 and a couple minutes later he asked if that was a good altitude for his location. I informed him that the MEA on V368 was 13000 and it was a good altitude. The question concerned me so I verified he was on V368. He said negative we are direct DRO VOR. Based off of his distance from ALS and the direction to DRO I estimated he was right in a 15300 foot MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude). I told him about the MIA and gave him a low altitude alert. I got him on radar a minute or 2 later and he was right in the center of the 15300 foot MIA. I asked him if he could provide his own terrain and obstruction avoidance through 15300 feet and climbed him to 16000 feet.I changed his route to direct DRO direct GCN. I coordinated again with sector 36 and tried to quickly explain the situation. I then questioned the pilot about the confusion. He thought he filed direct DRO and not the route I had in the system. He apologized and realized he made a mistake. It's just a good thing it was VFR.

ZDV Center Controller reported an aircraft was cleared 'as filed' yet it departed on a different route and was below the MIA.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

During preflight the aft bulk cargo door was open and I noticed that boxes of lithium batteries were being loaded in the compartment. I climbed up the belt loader to investigate and found multiple boxes of lithium batteries thrown and stacked in the aft bulk cargo. Some of the boxes were damaged and some were upside down. I asked the ramp to stop loading and informed the Captain of the situation. When I informed the ramp this was not a proper storage for lithium batteries he told me it was fine and they were going to tie them down. The ramp then got some twine and were attempting the tie the boxes down with unapproved tie downs; they were using the cargo curtain clam shell holders to anchor the boxes to the floor of the plane. I informed the ramp that twine is not secure enough and why weren't they using a cargo net; again I was told everything is fine. Upon further investigation the boxes of lithium batteries were stacked and thrown on top of two cases of engine oil. After meeting with the crew we agreed this was not safe (there have been multiple aircraft fires involving lithium batteries) and the batteries needed to be removed from the airplane. When I informed the lead ramper to please remove the batteries he began to argue with me saying it was fine and the batteries would be shipped on the plane. After trying multiple times to inform the lead agent this was not safe he took my name down and recorded it trying to intimidate me and force the issue that the batteries were going on the aircraft. The crew agreed if the batteries were on the plane the flight wouldn't depart until they were in a secure container in a proper compartment on the aircraft. The lead ramper finally removed the batteries after multiple conversations and arguments. I understand we haul lithium batteries but they should be properly secured in an approved container in the correct compartment on the aircraft to mitigate all possible fire risks to the crew and aircraft. If those batteries would have caught on fire; sitting on top of two cases of oil and next to two full size main wheel tires I don't know if we would have been able to stop the fire in flight. HKG also stated they have an exemption from having to note lithium batteries on any paperwork to the crew. If I didn't see the ground ops loading lithium batteries on the plane we would have never [have] known they were on board the aircraft.

B747 First Officer reported he noticed ground crew improperly loading lithium batteries in the bulk cargo pit.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was Pilot Flying in left seat. We were on our flight planned route flying south bound at 33;000 feet at Mach .84 with a 1 mile right offset. I had relieved the Captain 5 minutes before the event. The Captain had requested climb from ATC from 33;000 feet to 35;000 feet and was told to stand by before departing flight deck. ATC cleared us to 'climb and maintain FL350.' After the First Officer confirmed clearance with ATC I set 35;000 in altitude window; confirmed '350' with the First Officer and selected the new altitude. The aircraft commenced climb on autopilot and approaching 33;500 feet we received a TCAS traffic advisory followed immediately by TCAS resolution advisory 'DESCEND; DESCEND NOW.' I disengaged autopilot and leveled airplane momentarily before starting descent.After several seconds and barely 100 feet of descent the conflict resolved as the other aircraft passed behind us at 34;000 feet. After re-engaging autopilot and commencing climb to 35;000 feet we heard the other aircraft query ATC about traffic. The First Officer asked ATC to confirm that they cleared us to 35;000 feet which ATC confirmed by saying 'correct.' ATC had no comment regarding traffic conflict. We never acquired the other aircraft visually as we were in IMC. This event occurred because ATC cleared us to climb from 33;000 feet to 35;000 feet with opposing traffic in close proximity at 34;000 feet.

[Narrative contained no additional information.]

B777 flight crew reported a traffic advisory for converging traffic while in cruise.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 5920; Flight Crew Type 1640

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 6750; Flight Crew Type 4500

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Manuals

The Captain worked on the flight plan and fuel order while I got the inside of the aircraft ready and took care of the pre-flight checks. I read through the aircraft logbook to make sure there were no open write ups. The baggage door annunciator had been written up the previous night. The baggage door had been worked on and signed off as ops check good.Upon closing the baggage door after connecting the battery I noticed the annunciation was extinguished. The pre-flight checks were completed and the baggage door was opened to place crew bags inside. Upon closing the baggage door I entered the cockpit to check the baggage door annunciator. It was now illuminated. The Captain and I opened the baggage door and found the forward micro switch pin was stuck in the depressed position. The Captain then called Maintenance Control to have the Mechanic return to the aircraft to check this out.The pin and switch were cleaned and when the baggage door was closed the annunciator extinguished. I then opened and closed the door a few times to make sure the annunciator remained extinguished when the door was closed.  We then proceeded with our trip. About 20 minutes into the flight the baggage door [light] came on intermittently. The Captain flew the plane and worked the radios while I read the checklist. The Captain then transferred the radios and the controls to me and made a phone call to Maintenance Control. We were asked to return to our departure airport by Maintenance Control. I contacted Center and made this request. The airplane controls were then transferred back to the Captain and I continued my duties as pilot not flying.We decided it was best to keep the left engine running due to the previous history of the baggage door annunciator intermittently turning on and off. No emergency was declared. The other purpose for keeping the left engine running was due to a high terrain environment; high altitude airport; high temperature; and the possibility of needing full power on a go around should the need arise. The speed of the aircraft was reduced and the altitude was reduced when cleared to do so. A normal landing was made in APA.

Preflight revealed an ongoing previous days issue with regard to the Baggage Door Red Annunciator. Maintenance was called and arrived to clear the discrepancy. Previous days operation had indicated that the switch wasn't making full contact with the pin of the forward door switch. This was observed on the ground only. Departure 17L to FL320 was normal. In cruise; the Red Bag Door Light illuminated prompting a return per Aircraft Checklist. Checklist was consulted. After brief deliberation; the second in command and I elected to forego the engine securing checklist due to many appropriate concerns regarding but not limited to: pilot in command emergency authority; return airport density altitude; return airport landing runway; traffic; abnormality's validity and authenticity; age of the aircraft; previous multiple days' experience with the issue; previous experience with the same issue on other company aircraft; previous knowledge of bag door departure; safety of crew; previous experience with similar issued related to sensors on the Piaggio; 4500 hours in type. Observed the fix in its entirety on multiple occasions. Being a responsible crew and looking past the obvious on how it might have adversely affected the outcome. Return was normal to find the abnormality was indeed a faulty switch making improper contact. Maintenance performed a complete bag door re-alignment in accordance with the Piaggio Maintenance Manual. This re-alignment cleared the issue. Piaggio Aero has made available a new kit that upgrades the door sensor system that should minimize this occurrence. Either due to unavailability or unwillingness to retrofit older aircraft; the new kit was not installed. It is my belief that an improper maintenance procedure was used to fix the switch initially due to its intermittent nature. During the third attempt in maintenance; the entire procedure was followed which ultimately cleared the discrepancy. An emergency was not declared. No pilot deviation occurred.

Despite repeated maintenance attention to the cargo door warning micro switch prior to departure; the P-180 Flight Crew received a cargo door warning light 20 minutes after takeoff from a high altitude airport.  After consultation with Maintenance they returned to their departure airport; opting to not comply with the checklist requirement that the aft mounted left engine be shut down due to its propiquity to the door.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 8225; Flight Crew Type 5097

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

VMC flight ZZZ1 to SFO. Very busy arrival with runway change to 28R. Numerous headings airspeed and altitude changes on downwind. On RWY 28R in trail of 777. This was no factor. We were paired up with a heavy Airbus who was landing on 28L. Assigned speed 180 kts and heavy airplane was ahead of our aircraft. Winds 250/10 kts put that aircraft's wake turbulence directly on our path. Mitigated by flying high on the approach but still got some turbulence on final. Landing made in first 3000 ft of runway available.

A319 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence on final approach into SFO from an Airbus on the parallel runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

[Operations were] uneventful until shortly after reaching cruise altitude. Meteorological conditions were clear skies and night. Noted that the right engine [oil quantity] was indicating two quarts lower since takeoff and the engine vibration indication on secondary EICAS display was slowly creeping upward toward 2.0. Pointed out my observation to the First Officer (FO) and asked him to consult the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). About the same time he located a procedure; the vibration indicator (right engine) turned amber. Ran the ENGINE VIBRATION checklist. Made two slight power reductions which seemed to stabilize the vibration for a time but each time [vibration levels] began slowly creeping toward the amber limit. At this point; I asked the FO to contact our dispatcher. I gave the dispatcher a quick brief on our situation and noted that if I ended up retarding the thrust lever to idle with vibration remaining in the amber band; the checklist called for the ENGINE FAILURE/SHUTDOWN procedure. Dispatcher and I agreed a diversion to [a nearby airport] might be prudent. Made the quick coordination with Air Traffic Control; descended normally and landed uneventfully. Engine vibration indications were normal (no amber alert) for the balance of flight. Both thrust levers were at idle for most of the descent.

B757-200 Captain reported diverting to a nearby alternate airport after experiencing high vibration levels in the right engine.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 520; Flight Crew Type 77

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was practicing touch-n-gos early afternoon; flying solo. After a handful of power-off 180 accuracy landings; the tower requested that I extend my down wind for landing traffic on [an intersecting runway]. At this point; I decided I should setup to practice a short field landing (since I was not authorized for a short approach). For some reason; and I don't have an exact reason; I did not ever put the gear down. The tower had to tell me to go around. I don't recall exactly how close it was. It was close enough to provoke a fair amount of anxiety and embarrassment. The descent was arrested before I descended below 50 feet. I may have been thinking that I did not want to drag the gear around for an extended downwind. That's really just a guess. One cause of the problem was certainly poor and inadequate instruction. We know we should have a consistent procedure in place that is simple and yet rigorous to account for distracted moments and outright errors. Lip service is paid to this all too often; though. Nobody seems to know how ensure that checks for the flags; engine; and gear are efficiently worked into the approach at all the points they are needed. So; apart from being forgetful; it really is an instruction issue in this case. My new procedure will be to check these things at every leg in the pattern. Possibly also; always check airspeed and consider gear position before adjusting flaps.

PA-28 commercial rated pilot reported forgetting to extend the landing gear during approach after being asked by the Tower to extend the downwind for traffic on an intersecting runway. The Tower Controller detected that the gear is up at a low altitude and issued a go around. Poor and inadequate instruction was cited as a factor in the incident.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Fatigue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was assigned along with one other coworker to complete a periodic service check (11 hours) along with a battery change (3 hours) and an MEL for Fuel Flow indication (2 hours) at roughly XA:30. The flight was scheduled to depart at XB:30. My coworker and I decided to split up and tackle the tasks as follows; he would do the tasks inside the airplane and I would tackle the tasks outside the plane. I began to complete my inspection of the airplane with a walk of the exterior; which did not indicate any immediate damage. I proceeded to do a check of the accumulators which indicated that they were all low and needed to be serviced; after servicing the accumulators I proceeded to check hydraulic fluids which were also low and needed servicing; followed by wiping of the struts and checking tire pressures. I completed wiping of the nose strut and checking of the nose tire pressure and condition inspection and proceeded to the left main gear which is when I noticed that the Number 2 main tire had several lacerations which rendered it unserviceable and would require change. Because of the workload and lack of manpower for that night (sick call out of 2 employees); I was aware that we were short staffed and didn't readily have extra bodies to aide me; I immediately proceeded to tackling the tire which I knew would be very time consuming by myself. After spending a lot of time changing the tire; I proceeded to completing several other tasks and encountered more issues with the airplane (APU discrepancy of hours) which upon talking to Maintenance Control needed more troubleshooting. All while being aware that I was running out of time to complete the check because of the early departure of the airplane. I hastily completed wiping of the remaining struts and checking of tire pressures.The aircraft Number was incorrectly entered. The issue occurred on Aircraft X.Again; I apologize for this lapse in attention to detail.The event occurred due to my fatigue level; tight time constraints; coupled with several discrepancies discovered on the airplane that required more time to complete which caused me to become distracted and be rushed to completing the tasks at hand to the best of my ability.I take full responsibility for my actions an realize it was my job to relay to my supervisor the lack of time; and the requirement for additional aid. I also realize that even though I was rushed for time and under a lot of pressure to complete the task that I still needed to do each job to the best of my ability and not just rush through it. I believe that I could have had better communication with my lead to get certain issues discovered deferred; freeing up time to focus on the tasks I could complete.

Technician reported fatigue and workload resulted in an erroneous logbook entry.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While communicating with Norcal Approach; I was the Pilot Monitoring while we were cleared for the Tip Toe Visual approach into SFO; Runway 28L. Once on the heading portion of the published approach; ATC called out traffic on a right downwind which was about to turn right base. After questioning again the position of the aircraft; I called the traffic in sight. I cannot remember whether he said that traffic was for the right or left side; but he said to maintain visual separation with the traffic; follow the traffic; and maintain 210 KTS. I questioned ATC about the speed; since it looked like we were converging quite rapidly; and the communication was blocked. We were coincidentally assigned 180 KTS to the San Mateo bridge by ATC and told to switch to Tower. The First Officer and I were in constant discussion about the close proximity of the aircraft we were following on the right base leg. I felt we were getting entirely too close; and we had not even intercepted the localizer for 28L yet. We then were unsure which runway this aircraft was landing that we were following; and as we were debating a turn off of course to the left to go around; we received a TCAS RA 'descend' command which we complied with for a short time. Once satisfied that we were no in a collision danger; I instructed the First Officer to go around; and climb while turning left away from the traffic. I told Tower of our situation and asked for missed approach instructions; which we complied with. Cause; I believe the aircraft on right base overshot final due to a 30 KTS crosswind from the northwest; blowing him into our center line. We were however confused about which runway he was landing; and had inadequate time to query ATC as the event occurred quickly. ATC in SFO issued 'follow' instructions for aircraft landing the parallel runway; which is extremely confusing; and non-standard. Usually; 'follow' instructions are issued when following an aircraft to the same runway and not the parallel. This even was further complicated by the time of day; which was night time. Suggestions; I believe the other aircraft most likely overshot final; and that we should have been assigned a slower speed so that we were not both turning into each other while turning onto the localizer. Since we never even intercepted the localizer; I see no fault on our part.

Air Carrier inbound to SFO via the Tip Toe to Runway 28L executed a go around when traffic for the parallel runway apparently over flew the final. The reporter expressed concern regarding the ATC term 'follow' which was less than clear.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Before boarding flight; the cabin crew was informed of the maintenance issue so we were delayed over an hour. In the midst of Maintenance trying to fix the problem; there was a shift change in Maintenance. The cabin crew was informed that one of the engines had an ignition problem. After we thought the issue was fixed; we boarded and taxied out. I; Flight Attendant 2 and customers in rear cabin noticed a strong fuel odor that shortly permeated the cabin; causing me to feel ill! Flight Attendant 4 started feeling ill as well. I called the Captain immediately and we taxied back to the gate. Some of the passengers started getting disturbed and angry! Some passengers stated that they will file a complaint! After putting on a new part; we departed and shortly thereafter; a first class passenger passed out in the lavatory. He did refuse medical attention and stated that he didn't know what happened and didn't think it was from the fuel odor; but wasn't sure. I felt nauseous the rest of the evening and had only 3 hours of rest. The Agent and Manager did not handle the situation appropriately when we returned to the gate by not letting passengers deplane to get fresh air. [They did not] act concerned about the situation; only about just closing the door as soon as possible. [They were] not even concerned when I stated I felt sick. There was a lot of unprofessional decisions that night and safety was definitely not a first priority from Maintenance to ground personnel. The pilots were close to timing out; so I am sure their fatigue was part of bad decision making. Communication and safety needs to take first priority! My safety; I feel; as well as the passengers; was not even a concern and caused me to feel very uncomfortable and disturbed.

A321 Flight Attendant reported strong fuel odor permeated passenger cabin on taxi out. Captain was notified resulting in gate return.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46.8; Flight Crew Total 4608.7; Flight Crew Type 3724.3

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While on a VFR flight; I decreased altitude to maintain visual conditions and inadvertently lost visual contact with the ground for a couple of seconds as I entered a low cloud. I brushed the left wing on a tree or brush top before I was able to ascend and enter visual conditions. I returned back to ZZZ and landed uneventfully. Once back in my hangar; I noticed a few dents on the bottom side of the left outboard section of the wing and a slight bend in 1 prop blade. There was no damage to any other property or injury to any others and no injury to me. The incident occurred in a remote location.

M20 pilot reports inadvertently entering IMC on a VFR flight at low altitude and contacting trees or brush with his left wing before climbing to VMC. Dents in the left wing and a damaged propeller blade are detected on post flight.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While being vectored to join the localizer on the ILS for runway 24R in LAX; we were given a tight vector to join final and the FO (First Officer) felt it would be smoother/better to join final in NAV (magenta). The only problem was Vectors had not been activated in the FMS and the aircraft was unable to capture the final approach course so the aircraft flew through the 25L inbound course on the last assigned 220 heading at 2;100 feet. Realizing we were about to fly through the course but not knowing why exactly; I told the FO to keep turning the airplane in heading mode to rejoin while I glanced down at the box to double check we were tuned to the correct localizer frequency as well had loaded the correct approach in the FMS just to remove any doubt since we couldn't quite see the airport yet due to a scattered layer of clouds. Both of these things were correct.The FO had begun to turn us back north into the localizer but it wasn't enough so I took the aircraft from him and turned off the autopilot and began turning the aircraft immediately back into the localizer. It was at this time ATC asked us to turn 10 degrees right to rejoin the localizer and we told the Controller that we were in the process as well that we now had the runway in sight. ATC then cleared us the visual approach to runway 24R and the Controller asked if we were having issues picking up the localizer frequency. We told him no; but the aircraft did not capture it for some reason (at that point I hadn't realized the FO had tried to join the course in NAV mode) I hand flew the aircraft back over to the course and got it established. It was at this point I realized that LOC and GS were not armed on the FMA. I asked to FO to press the APP button and then the aircraft captured both localizer and glideslope I then transferred controls back to my FO. ATC told us to switch to LAX Tower and to have a good day from there; I believe all this happened within the span of about 30 seconds. We landed the aircraft normally without any other issues.If I had asked the FO on our downwind if he wanted me to activate vectors then the aircraft would have captured the course and we would not have gone through it. At the same time if the FO had armed APP instead of NAV we wouldn't have gone through it. I should have been more vigilant on checking which mode he was arming as well as double checking it had been successfully armed on the FMA; a habit I normally practice but must have been distracted with radio calls and searching for the runway outside in order to call the visual approach. Going forward; I will do 2 things to prevent this in the future. First; I will do my best to remember to always activate vectors so that it mitigates any chance of passing through the localizer course either in NAV or APP. Second; I will be more vigilant about checking the FMA to ensure myself as well as my FO's have armed the appropriate modes.

EMB-175 Captain reported overshooting the final approach course to LAX due to improper mode selection during FMS setup.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Upon departure from ZZZ we had a gear disagreement and gear doors; we proceeded to set flaps one speed and advise ATC of our problem. The Captain called for the QRH and we proceeded to do both items gear disagreement and gear door. We told ATC of our problem and told the company about our situation; Maintenance Control told us to come back to ZZZ. Upon performing all the required checklist for our phase of flight we perform the alternate gear extension procedure; we notice it took approximately 8 to nine miles for the gear to show three green. We discussed this and decided to do a flyby to verify that the gear was locked; we notify the tower of our intentions; they gladly gave us vectors to perform our maneuver. Upon having verbal confirmation that the gear was down we told them that we had two souls on board; negative Hazmat and 180 minutes of fuel. We performed our landing uneventfully and taxied to [Company] ramp.

B767 First Officer reported a land gear malfunction/warning after takeoff.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

I was working the South Departure/Feeder position on a west operation. There was some weather in the area causing various deviations and increasing traffic complexity. Tower had turned a departure headed to a destination to the south; northbound. The North Departure was working this aircraft back west and south. They had left the aircraft at 3000 feet in order to top him with other departures and 3000 feet was the normal altitude for the aircraft's destination airport. The Tower then released Aircraft X. The departure strip scanned a 260 heading which is a standard heading for his departure transition area and type aircraft. SR22s climb and maintain 1500 feet on departure.I had issued a climb to 2000 feet reference the crossing traffic about 7 miles ahead of him at 3000 feet and issue the traffic. After a while I noticed his course of flight had him much further south than a 260 heading. As I began to inquire about the tower assigned heading the Local controller keyed up the override and informed me he actually assigned a 240 heading; not a 260. I immediately turned Aircraft X to a 270 heading because he had drifted into a 2600 MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) for antennas but I was unable to climb due to the 3000 foot IFR traffic. Once I had determined I had positive lateral separation with the traffic I issued a climb to above the MVA. The approved tower assigned headings are 280; 260; or 190 so that aircraft do not depart into the 2600 foot MVA and have to stop at 1500 feet. The tower deviation from standard operating procedures and traffic limitations resulted in an aircraft coming in proximity to terrain.Recommend controllers adhere to published SOP in order to not depart IFR aircraft into an MVA above their initial altitude assuming the departure controller will be able to issue a climb above the MVA in a timely manner.

A Departure Controller received a departing aircraft on a heading which placed the aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1007; Flight Crew Type 357

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was performing a test flight after recent maintenance. While circling [the airport] at approximately 2500 feet MSL; the engine ran rough for a brief second. I immediately throttled back and upon realizing that the engine was not developing power; turned off the mag switch. I was on an extended left downwind for runway XY at approximately 1800 feet AGL at this time. I turned off the fuel and preformed a successful on-field landing. Upon examining the aircraft discovered the propeller was missing and no further damage to the aircraft.

The pilot of a small airplane lost engine power in the pattern during a post maintenance test flight. He secured the engine and landed successfully.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

October 2013; late night; I was assigned to perform an engine wash with two other mechanics on an MD-82 aircraft. I prepared the #1 Engine for washing operation and after completion I reconnected the lines and removed the wash ring. The aircraft departed on time the next morning.  On the following day; the aircraft returns to ZZZ and I was assigned to perform an A-Check Inspection with Mechanic Y. I began the inspection with #1 Engine; followed by #2 Engine. After closing the cowling on #2 Engine; I was interrupted for an aircraft move; and a #2 main tire change. I thought that I had completed the #2 Engine Inlet Inspection. I must have missed it. I realize how easy it is to get distracted. From now on I will take the inspection paperwork with me and check the items as I perform them. Interruptions.

I [as Mechanic Y] was assigned the #2 Engine for Engine Wash Card 71-97-05.  I installed the nozzle with the line. Upon finish of the cycles; I serviced the truck with water until full.  When everything was done; I assumed my co-worker; [Mechanic X]; had  disconnected the nozzle when I saw the hose lying down on the ground; so I rolled the hose up. [I was informed] aproximately seven days later; about my mistake; I didn't visually check the engine myself. It's my responsibility to do job right; I forgot to disconnect the nozzle. For some reason I forgot to remove the ring. Whether it was [due to a] change in routine or whatever the cause; I forgot to remove the ring. Lack of communication. I assumed that my co-worker had removed the nozzle ring when I saw the hose lying on the ground. I didn't look in the engine myself.Never assume that another will accomplish the task without checking verbally or physically myself. Also; extend [wash] nozzle line pass engine inlet; to make it more visible from the ground.  Or; possibly [develope] a Tool Checklist as an addition to [Engine Wash Card] paperwork to remove ring and hose in one step at the same time. Complacency. Graveyard Shift.

Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) were informed that a wash nozzle had not been removed from the inlet of #2 Engine on an MD-82 aircraft; after completing an Engine Wash Card.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Attendants (FA) were originally scheduled for [Flight X]. Our crew was legal up to XA10. As we approached this time we were still fueling air craft. Two chief pilots told us that we're closing the aircraft door. They were going to continue fueling while the doors were armed. They told the Flight Attendants this was legal because the jetway was hooked up to plane. Paperwork came thru the window. The door was closed to prevent FA from going illegal with two minutes to spare. We continued to sit at gate while plane was refueling ; doors armed; paperwork thru window. I ask; along with my crew if this is safe. If there was a fire; door 2 is armed; jetway is filled with 2 chief pilots and 4 inflight supervisors. That slide would have been very dangerous.

The flight attendant questioned the wisdom of refueling with the cabin doors armed while still connected to the jetway; reportedly to keep the crew from going illegal.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 854; Flight Crew Type 696

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

After normal flight and landing; long rollout with aerodynamic braking was used. At low speed; I went to apply brakes; and inadvertently pressed the right rudder pedal to the floor; and did not apply any brake. Was unable to apply any pressure to left pedal. Departed the runway at low speed. I called on my passenger; also a pilot; to apply the brakes from the right seat. He did so; and the plane stopped on the grass with no damage. Probable cause: unfamiliar footwear. I normally fly in sneakers. On this day; due to cold weather; I was wearing hiking boots. On the rollout; I discovered I could not feel the pedals.Factors effecting human performance: I have been struggling with fear in the cockpit for > XX years; since a long flight in IMC in which I encountered prolonged strong downdrafts. I have retrained several times; trying to enjoy flying again. During Covid; I was not flying at all; and in the last month; had made a few flights to try to find peace and happiness in the cockpit again. So; I was nervous; and that probably kept me from being fully aware of the obvious; that these shoes have very large thick soles; that could interfere with manipulation of the pedals.

Pilot reported a runway excursion due to an inability to effectively manipulate the rudder pedals while wearing sub optimal footwear.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X departed LEX assigned 050 for crossing traffic that was pointed out to tower. Crossing traffic was aircraft Y.  Traffic was issued to both aircraft by radar east. Shortly after; aircraft Y reported the aircraft X in sight.  As legal class C separation of 500 feet vertical was being maintained; aircraft Y was not instructed to maintain visual separation as it was not required.  Aircraft X was advised aircraft Y had him in sight but aircraft X immediately reported he was responding to RA and descending.  The pilot of aircraft X stated that even he was confused why his TCAS was commanding an RA in this situation.  No loss of separation occurred.This is all too common an occurrence in Class C radar environments.  It's getting so that we either have to provide 3 miles or 1;000 feet between IFR/VFR aircraft or else the IFR will report they're responding to a TCAS RA for a non-event.  I honestly have no idea what could be done to fix the issue.  It's not like we want to go back to the days of giving the pilots an option to follow or not follow TCAS RAs; but perhaps there needs to be a system setting for Class C/D airspace and Class A/B airspace environments. Given that the pilot of the Aircraft X sounded perplexed as to why he was getting an RA; and the frequency at which this type of event occurs; it doesn't seem too farfetched to consider that maybe pilots are getting tired of such 'the boy yelled wolf!' scenarios.  At what point do such nuisance/unwarranted RAs cause pilots to lose faith in the RA system; or induce a false sense of complacency when responding to them?

A LEX Tower Controller reports of an airborne conflict that traffic has been issued to. One of the two aircraft sees the other. The other aircraft gets an RA and descends. Legal separation was continued but the Controller is reporting that this type of conflict happens all the time in the Class C environment. The Controller is concerned about the 'boy yelling wolf' scenario that pilots might lose faith in the RA System.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 313; Flight Crew Type 7000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft was fueled to 11.0; which was 400 pounds above minimum planned. We were advised five minutes prior to push of a wheels up time. Pushed on time and taxied single engine. Ground advised departure time extended. Started remaining engine and departed. First indication that I missed the fuel check was at level off when FMC indicated 'Using Reserve Fuel'. We landed with 5.9 of fuel. I normally recheck the fuel prior to departure. Since we were already 400 pounds over planned and taxied single engine; my expectation bias was that we were good on fuel. I will be more deliberate in my fuel check habit pattern.

An Air Carrier pilot reported departing with less than minimum takeoff fuel due to ATC delays while taxiing.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 850; Flight Crew Type 700

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Direct flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at 10;000 ft. Icing was projected from freezing level to 14;000 ft.; however headwinds were very strong so the plan was to fly at 10;000 ft. until visible moisture was encountered and then climb above the clouds. Immediately upon noticing frost forming; requested [a] climb to 14;000 ft. Within minutes ice buildup was so severe that even at full throttle [the] aircraft was unable to climb. Requested diversion to closest airport; ZZZ2; as the ice buildup was continuing and loss of control would have been imminent. Due to low ceiling and severe ice buildup making very shallow turns and several approaches were required to finally make a successful landing.

Pilot reported diverting due to severe icing and aircraft unable to climb out of icing conditions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 8400

On pushback we were cleared to start both engines. As second engine was starting; we suddenly got a 'fwd cargo door open' warning. Captain queried the tug driver and was told; 'They just need to throw on another bag.' Captain told them the Number 2 engine was turning. By the time the engine stabilized; the door was closing. This could easily have resulted in either serious personal injury or damage to the aircraft engine. Truly a first time experience for me.

A320 First Officer reports the forward cargo door opening while the engine on that side is being started. The ground crew is queried and the crew informed that a late bag is being loaded.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC assigned a deviation right of course and then a direct to a fix when clearing severe weather. After clearing the first major buildup on our current heading a build up on our current course appeared and we then turned left (still right of course by at least 20 miles) but we did so without advising ATC. I can't say how much time elapsed but I'd guess 2 to 5 minutes. ATC called us up and asked if we had changed our heading and we indicated that we had turned left to avoid a buildup in front of us. The Controller did not seem happy that we didn't notify him. The Captain seemed expressed that although we were still right of course and did move in the interest of safety that we should submit a report. Shortly after the conversation we cleared the weather and went direct to our next fix and ATC did not say anything else. Lack of communication. Advise ATC immediately if changing heading to avoid severe weather.

An Air Carrier pilot deviating right of course for weather reported ATC questioned them when they turned left for further deviations.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On short final; first officer was flying. An uncommanded Annunciation 'priority right' for the First Officer side stick occurred; immediately followed by another annunciation of the same and an uncommanded increase in thrust. I took control of the aircraft at this time; assigned side stick priority to my side; disconnected auto thrust; and executed a go-around as the approach was no longer stable per company policy. The aircraft then functioned normally and a normal approach and landing was accomplished and maintenance informed of the anomaly.

A321 Captain reported a priority right side stick anomaly during approach and elected to perform a go-around. The Captain disconnected autothrust and autopilot and re-tried the approach and landing after assigning side stick priority to the Captain's side.


Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Flight was day two of a three-day pairing; last leg. The flight was delayed approximately one hour and 20 minutes due to an unscheduled aircraft swap. The First Officer was pilot flying. Right at rotation; the left engine compressor stalled with the associated loud bang. We initially thought it was a blown tire until the engine stalled several more times during the initial climb out. The First Officer continued to fly as we accomplished the immediate action items for the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall Checklist and the compressor stalls ceased with the throttle at mid range. We told Tower we were an immediate return with an engine malfunction and requested an easterly heading and climb. Tower advised they saw what appeared to be fire/flame from the right engine area. However; I was convinced the #1 engine was the culprit. As the pilot not flying; I never saw an engine over temperature or rollback. The fire and overheat circuits checked good and we elected to leave the engine running in idle and make a single engine landing per the QRH. ATC accommodated a return to Runway 25R since it was the longest runway available. Winds were out of the north at eight knots and we were fairly light. I made several PAs to the passengers about securing the engine and our intentions to return. The First Officer set up for a flaps 15 visual and made a nice approach and landing. Total airborne time was 16 minutes. After landing; I shut down the engine and had the emergency crews check for aircraft damage. No damage was discovered and we taxied to the gate where the passengers deplaned normally.There were several lessons I learned from this event. First; it was very similar to a V1 cut during a PC; night; right at rotation; loud bang etc. However; we weren't in that PC mindset. We were relaxed; last leg; day two; comfortable flying together and definitely not expecting anything unusual. When the bang occurred right at rotation; we thought we had blown a tire. The First Officer had recently experienced a blown tire on takeoff and didn't call for the gear; which seemed like the right thing to do at the time. Once we were certain it was an engine problem; we raised the gear. Second; Tower's radio call that they saw fire/flame from the right engine added to the initial confusion as to what had happened. When the engine banged a second and third time; I could see a glow from my left window that convinced me we at least had a #1 engine problem; but did we have a dual engine stall or possible FOD? There was a small helmet fire starting in the left seat but the First Officer was doing just what he should maintaining aircraft control. We were climbing; so we went with what we knew and took the proper action from there. We ran the checklist for the engine stall and elected to leave the engine running since it was in limits and running. Third; the First Officer is experienced and was doing a great job so I let him fly. The FOM says the Captain will land if an engine is shut down; however; the engine was running in idle. The First Officer had everything under control; so I elected to let him continue with the approach and landing. Fourth; communicate with the cabin. We were busy! Right after takeoff a flight attendant rang the cockpit four times wanting to know what was happening. I elected to pass information to the flight attendants and passengers via the PA to save time and brain bites. During my debrief with the flight attendants; I asked them if they felt comfortable and informed with the way I handled the situation; and they said yes. However; this is now something I include in my briefing to them; i.e. how they can expect to get information in a time crunch situation such as right after takeoff.Finally; be ready for the unexpected. I found I probably wasn't at the top of my game after a long airport sit before the last leg of the day. It's easy to get complacent. This is the first engine problem I've had outside the simulator after 14 years on line. Analyze the situation/problem. Even though ATC may try and help too much; go with what you know after a thorough discussion with the other pilot; and then take the appropriate action.

A B737-300 flight crew encountered some confusion and distraction when an engine experienced compressor stalls right at rotation at night. Well intentioned but flawed observations from the Tower Controller contributed to the complexity of resolving the issues as they suggested there may have been problems with both engines.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

About 35 minutes out of [departure] we were in the aisle serving drinks and food. The Captain called the purser and the purser said over the PA to be seated. I sat on the floor and then was told it might be 20 minutes of turbulence; so the other Flight Attendant and I took the carts to the back galley and put them away. About 15 minutes later the Captain called and said we can get up; but don't take the carts out in the aisle. I questioned the Captain; with the Purser on the phone; asking if he was saying we can get up. He said yes; so the other Flight Attendant and I started to stock the liquor cart and the food cart. Five minutes later severe turbulence hit us while we were in the back galley. I was facing the back of the 737-900 and was thrown in the air along with the food cart; there are not any handles in the back to hold onto. I landed on my right knee and hit my left hand on a screw hanging from the food cart; the screw punctured my left wrist. I hit the right side of my head on the cart; and I wrenched my back. When we were able to get off the floor we called the purser to tell her we were hurt. The pilot got information from us and asked if we needed to land; and they also called Medlink. The other Flight Attendant and I felt that we could make it to destination; but we needed to be seen by paramedics. The paramedic met us at the plane and felt we should go to the hospital to have x-rays and to find out what our injuries were. The ambulance took us to the Hospital. They took x-rays and found a fractured Tibia Plateau. The other Flight Attendant and I did not leave the hospital until 7 hours later when we took a taxi to the hotel. The hospital gave me crutches and a leg brace. We flew home the next day.

B737-900 Flight Attendant described injuries received during a severe turbulence encounter.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Weather; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On departure we experienced a compressor stall on the right engine at 800 FT AGL. We controlled the aircraft; declared an emergency; climbed to a safe altitude; and received vectors back for landing. Uneventful landing and had ARFF follow us to gate and stated both engines were same temperature. The nose bullet was hanging on with 1 bolt and was crushed. I'm not sure why the compressor stall occurred...could have been the nose bullet malfunction or the gusty winds on takeoff...or a combination of both.

MD83 pilot experiences a compressor stall shortly after takeoff and elects to return after declaring an emergency. Post flight reveals that the bullet nose is damaged and hanging by one bolt.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 2500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict NMAC

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

This flight had an approximate flight time of 11 hours and 30 minutes. In this flight we operate with augmented crews and we further divide the flight between the pilots to rest accordingly. We came to the cockpit from a 5 hour break very fresh and rested; and about 30 minutes after being in the cockpit we approached some weather on airway UM527 in Brazilian airspace. We were at FL360 with a heading of 240 approximately and requested a heading of 190 for 20 miles to deviate. In the process of the deviation I saw two [targets] at our 10 o' clock approximately 30 miles or so. I told the Captain that we had two [targets]; one at FL360 (same level) and one at FL380. We deviated to a 190 heading but immediately turned to our original heading of 240 because we were head on with the other conflicting aircraft. In the process we realized that they were on an apparent heading of 330. Since the traffic was closing in very rapidly I questioned ATC about traffic at 10 o' clock same level. ATC responded 'XXX descend to FL350 NOW' to which I respond and complied; and then ATC issued another instruction to the conflicting aircraft: 'XXX maintain FL360'; which then responds (OK; maintaining 360). Before even having a TA we left FL360 and started a descent to FL350 (autopilot was engaged) using V/S. When descending we had a TA (Traffic; traffic); we noted that the other aircraft had LEFT FL360 and started a descent to FL350 WITHOUT ATC CLEARANCE and BEFORE the TCAS TA (In this moment we turned all of our lights on). In no time we got the RA; to which we were instructed to DESCEND AURALLY BUT the ADI instructions told us to climb which created confusion!! (Per manufacturer procedures the autopilot and autothrottles were disconnected); we increased pitch (THE TCAS then ISSUES A CLB) accordingly (since we were descending) and when we were about to get out of the RED ADI TCAS AREA; we got a DESCEND command to which we tried to accommodate and then; in less then 1 second we got a CLIMB command again. Given the amount of conflicting TCAS commands then we started a climbing turn to which we got the BANK ANGLE advisory. In the mean time we saw (We were in IMC and icing conditions) the conflicting aircraft strobe lights VERY CLOSE. Approximate miss distance 100 FT vertical and 100 FT lateral. Once we got the clear of conflict advisory; I called ATC told them 'XXX we had a TCAS RA; CLEAR OF CONFLICT; resuming FL350'; ATC then cleared us to climb to FL360. We engaged the autopilot and autothrottles and resumed FL360. The ATC Control told us 'I'm sorry' and the conflicting aircraft didn't even report having an RA. I believe the contributing factors to this incident were:1. Having two intersecting airways (conflicting direction) which require pilots to maintain the same FL (either even or odd). In this case we where on a 240 heading and the other aircraft was on a 330 heading (we were both required to maintain EVEN FL).2. Possibly due to the time of the day (morning); ATC was tired and missed the fact that he had two aircraft at the same level; on collision course.3. The weather enroute placed especial difficulty in visually identifying the traffic (IMC conditions).4. The fact that the conflicting aircraft never contacted ATC to inform that they had an aircraft at the same level (we were the only ones questioning ATC).5. The fact that the other aircraft left FL360 for FL350 WITHOUT ATC clearance AFTER being instructed to maintain FL360.6. The fact that we were already in a descent and then got a DESCEND aural command; BUT the ADI showed that we needed to CLIMB. We decided to follow the ADI commands (after approximately of 1 second of confusion).7. The lack of airmanship from the other aircraft to try to evade our aircraft and communicate the incident to the corresponding ATC frequency.8. The multiple RA commands (climb and descend) in a short period of time; due to the possibility that the other aircraft was also trying to accommodateto conflicting RA's as well.

B767 First Officer reports a NMAC at FL350 near ROLUT in Brazilian airspace. The approaching target was detected by the reporter at FL360 and ATC was queried. The reporter is issued a descent to FL350 and the other aircraft is instructed to remain at FL360 but descends. The TCAS RA showed conflicting information initially; with the voice calling for a descent and the  display indicating a climb. Several RA reversals occur resulting in the NMAC. The Controller involved accepted responsibility for the initial conflict.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On the DIRTY2 arrival level at 12;000 FT and 250 KTS we felt a few bumps on what had been a smooth ride up until then. A few more bumps occurred that were comparable to light chop. We queried ATC if there was an aircraft in front of us. They told us there was a B737 [or B757] ahead at the same altitude. About the same time the aircraft rolled about 10 degrees or so to the left and came back to level. Then about 20 degrees or so right bank and corrected. Another roll brought us even further over; I'm guessing over 30 degrees to the right and corrected. The autopilot was engaged and was making very rapid control movement beyond what I have seen before. I disconnected the autopilot at that time and hand flew through another roll or two while the pilot not flying requested a heading off of the arrival to get out of the wake turbulence. During the hand flying in the turbulence and [while in the] 20 [degrees] right [turn] ATC heading the aircraft got off altitude 100 FT high. This was quickly corrected and automation was re-established. The ride improved as soon as we were vectored off the arrival course. ATC then brought us back to the arrival and we landed without further incident.

First Officer returned to assigned altitude and pilot not flying reengaged autopilot.The preceding aircraft's turbulence was a threat; and pilot not flying should have been quicker to notify ATC. There was some frequency congestion; but deviating off the assigned altitude by 100 FT was an error both by pilot flying and pilot not flying. Pilot not flying should have been more vigilant; but was distracted making the call to ATC.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence that resulted in rolls to left and right while in trail of a narrow body Boeing during arrival to ATL. ATC provided a turn off course.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

A Heavy was inbound from the southwest to Runway 6. An MD80 was inbound from the northwest to Runway 6. The Heavy was number one; while the MD80 was about 7-10 miles in trail; but the Heavy said he needed a 360 to loose more altitude for the approach. I turned the Heavy right to a 090 heading off of the approach to let the MD80 be number one. I then turned the Heavy again right to 330 heading. I meant to turn the Heavy to a 150 heading (a 330 heading is the opposite heading for the base turn for Runway 6). I noticed my mistake when the Heavy went through the 150 heading; I thought I had given him; when he was on an approximate 220 heading. I then said fly heading 150. While expecting the Heavy to turn back left to a 150 heading; because of the approximate 220 heading he was on; he kept going right to a 150 heading which made him a factor with the MD80. If the Heavy had turned back left to a 150 heading like he was supposed to it would have been no factor. However; when he continued the right turn it appeared separation could have been lost with the MD80. I was able to get the Heavy to turn left to a 150 heading and very well could have had divergence. [Do] not use 'fly heading'; but actually use 'turn left/right heading' most of the time.

TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event when using the phrase 'fly headings' in lieu of the more precise 'turn left/right etc' resulting in the conflict.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5400; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

On departure while climbing through FL230 (autopilot & autothrottles engaged) I hear a loud bang and observed the left engine instruments symmetrically decline below that of the other engine. I also observed the L GEN OFF and L CSD OIL PRESS LOW light illuminate on the OAP. The Captain immediately called out that the left engine was rolling back and I disconnected the autothrottles and brought the left throttle back to the idle position. At this time the engine instruments appeared to respond normally as the throttle was brought back and fluid levels and pressures were normal. Due to the loss of thrust we requested to discontinue our climb and I received clearance from ATC to descend back down to FL230. The Captain directed me to continue to fly the airplane and later to coordinate our return to departure airport while he got out the QRH and worked the problem. At this time we discussed in more detail what we thought the problem was. From previous experience on other jet aircraft I relayed that the bang sounded like a loud compressor stall. We both again scanned the instruments and observed that the left engine was running normally in the idle position. We also observed that the left generator freq/volts were low and out of limits. While flying with the left engine at idle all appeared very normal with no strange sounds or vibrations of any kind. After discussing the events we elected to address the situation prioritizing the engine issue first and then exploring the electrical issues next. Due to the fact that the sound immediately stopped following pulling-back the throttle and that the engine instruments now appeared normal (no erratic readings or losses of fluid); we elected to run the ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALL checklist. The checklist was completed and when reaching the section which offered the use of the engine at levels below where the compressor stall occurs; we elected to leave the engine at idle as it was operating normally and we did not want to potentially aggravate the situation further. Upon completion of the checklist it referred us to the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE/REDUCED THRUST LANDING CHECKLIST which was run up to the Descent deferred items. I declared an emergency and continued to fly the aircraft while the Captain communicated with the flight attendants; passengers and Dispatcher. At some point the APU was started; which caused a momentary power interruption. With the engine situation stabilized we turned our attention to the Annunciator Panel lights and ran the CSD OIL PRESS LOW checklist. Per the checklist we disconnected the CSD after multiple confirmations that we had the correct one (I think I even guarded the other one with my hand). Shortly following the completion of this checklist we noticed the L OIL PRESS LOW message had illuminated which prompted us to complete the OIL PRESS LOW CHECKLIST. Referring back to the engine instruments revealed that the left engine oil pressure was below 10 and the oil quantity was near zero. Following the checklist guidance we were directed to the ENGINE FAILURE OR SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST which was completed and again referred us to the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE/REDUCED LANDING CHECKLIST. During the arrival; and in accordance with the checklist; we balanced the fuel as a 600 pound balance had developed. We again updated ATC of our situation and requested to have emergency response vehicles available to look us over once we had landed. I coordinated our arrival with Approach and was told to expect an ILS. I briefed the approach and we finished the descent; approach and landing checklists contained in the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE/REDUCED LANDING CHECKLIST. During the approach we verbally reviewed Single-Engine Go-Around procedures and discussed potential landing rollout controllability issues using a single thrust reverser. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. We taxied clear of the runway and allowed the Fire Chief an opportunity to inspect our left engine. He advised us of a hole in the side of our left engine and confirmed that we were not visibly leaking fuel from the engine. Due to a small amount of hydraulic fluid under the engine we pulled the fire handle to isolate any leak that may exist. The Captain made an additional call to Maintenance to get their input on any issues that would affect us taxiing back to the gate.  We were released by the Fire Chief and taxied uneventfully back to the gate.

MD88 First Officer reports a loud bang from the left engine climbing through FL230. The left engine thrust is retarded and the engine appears normal except for the CSD and generator off line. The left CSD is disconnected and eventually the left engine oil pressure and quantity go to zero and the engine is shut down. Flight returns to departure airport where post flight reveals a hole in the side of the left engine cowl.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 9; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I had just taken the Radar Control position. One of the first things I did was call Aircraft Y to Aircraft X since Aircraft X was level at FL180 and Aircraft Y was at FL190 on a converging course. After Aircraft X acknowledged the traffic call I noticed that Aircraft Y was showing FL187 in his altitude readout. Before calling the traffic to him I asked him to verify that he was level at FL190. He responded by saying that he thought his altitude was FL180 and he was still descending. The aircraft were about 5 or 6 miles apart at this point. I made it a priority to attempt to separate the aircraft before issuing the traffic alert. I told Aircraft Y to climb to FL190 and then told Aircraft X to descend to 170. I got a read back from the Aircraft Y to climb to 190; but the next few transmissions by both pilots were either blocked by each other or me issuing the traffic alerts. Immediately after giving the descent and climb I issued traffic alerts to both aircraft. I observed via Mode C that Aircraft X was responding to an RA by both climbing and descending while Aircraft Y dropped to as low as FL183 I believe before climbing back to his assigned altitude of FL190. As the replay will show; the targets nearly merged and there was little altitude separation. Once I observed the aircraft doing a TCAS maneuver and the targets passing each other I discontinued advisories.Once the aircraft were clear I descended Aircraft Y and told him to call the front desk when he landed. Aircraft X wanted to verify before the frequency change that they did nothing wrong and made sure that I knew they were responding to TCAS. I told him that I did not hear the transmission because it was blocked; but saw that he was doing a TCAS maneuver based on his Mode C and that he was at his assigned altitude and not at fault in any way.There is nothing I would recommend to prevent this event. Since I did not give the initial descent clearance to Aircraft Y; I was initially unsure if a read back was missed; but after listening to the replay the pilot clearly stated FL190 as his assigned altitude and simply descended to an altitude he wasn't assigned. The situation was scary and unfortunate; but I don't think the incident was preventable from an ATC standpoint.

ZTL ARTCC Controller reported an aircraft descended below its assigned and acknowledged altitude assignment head on in to opposite direction traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 120; Flight Crew Type 120

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was approaching the DC SFRA on approach to Leesburg. I had a discreet squawk code for my VFR flight plan from ZZZ to JYO. I approached the SFRA from the south and was instructed 'proceed on course under own navigation; and squawk XYYZ. I was also instructed to contact Leesburg Tower and depart the TRACON frequency. A few minutes later I heard calls on guard that an aircraft was violating the SFRA/Restricted airspace. I was in contact with Tower at this point and asked Tower if they were referring to me. I believe there was a lack of clarity in the procedures for the SFRA and the communications from the controllers to me. Also; as a new pilot; this is a difficult area to fly in because of the SFRA and it is fairly easy to get a pilot deviation because of it. Controller instructed me to proceed on course. This was confusing - am I cleared to enter SFRA? I have a flight plan on file showing destination Leesburg; I am squawking the appropriate code and am in communication with ATC and Tower at Leesburg. Is this a violation of the SFRA? All along that sector; there is a 1;500 FT obstacle to exit the SFRA if you are on the eastern side. You have to violate Bravo airspace to leave the SFRA in that zone.

GA pilot reported a possible airspace violation in the DC SFRA area due to confusion and miscommunication.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 472; Flight Crew Type 136

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft went off downwind side of runway during landing roll-out at ZZZ. A Wx briefing was received via CSC DUATS with the flight departing on an IFR flight plan. In addition the hourly weather for nearby LOU was checked via the National Weather Service web-site. Expected winds at the time of arrival were to have peak gust at or below 30 kts and within 40 degrees of the runway heading. The aircraft has a G1000 avionics suite which provides in-flight weather. METAR were monitored during the flight and the reported winds were consistent with forecast. Within 20 NM of ZZZ the AWOS-3 was checked and winds were approximately 220@16G24. Aircraft was provided vectors to GPS XX approach and was established on LPV approach. IFR clearance was canceled at approximately 3000 MSL (2500 AGL) with the aircraft in VMC and runway visible. The aircraft position was announced multiple times on CTAF and was acknowledged by a departing helicopter. Moderate turbulence was encountered between approximately 1500 and 200 AGL but the aircraft was able to maintain runway centerline in a right wind down slip; without exceptional effort. Only 20 deg flap setting was used due to relatively high power setting (23 to 24 inches manifold) required to maintain flight path.During the flare the aircraft ballooned slightly but remained under control and on centerline and the pitch attitude was held while slight power was used to control the descent. After touchdown the aircraft experienced significant buffeting and significant effort was required to maintain a proper landing attitude and to keep the nose pointed approximately down the runway heading. When the nose was lowered the aircraft was approx. 10 feet from the left (downwind) side of the runway and the ground path was angled toward the runway edge. Right rudder was applied to point the aircraft back to center but the pilot avoided aggressive rudder usage due to concerns about tipping the aircraft in the winds. The pilot was able to mostly straighten the aircraft but it continued to pull to the left. It was later noted that the left main had gone onto the grass and the ground was soft. The pilot noted that the aircraft would not steer back to the runway and in order to avoid a runway light; the aircraft was steered to the left into the open grass area. The aircraft became stuck in the soft ground approx. 20 feet lateral from the edge of the runway. FBO staff assisted in extricating the aircraft and there was no damage. No runway lights were damaged.While the aircraft was being extricated; several witnesses noted periodic strong wind gusts that were angled more across the runway (i.e. cross wind component) than the wind reported on AWOS. Only one of the two FBO (the 'transmitting FBO') at ZZZ has the ability to transmit via CTAF. An observation was made that the desk attendant at the transmitting FBO was inexperienced. The more experienced desk attendant at the non-transmitting FBO noted to the pilot that she would have warned him of the high; lateral wind gusts; if able. The front seat passenger; who was a student pilot; noted that they believed the pilot did not maintain a significant right roll input while he was keeping the aircraft pitch steady. It is likely that a full aileron input; into the wind; would have allowed the aircraft directional control to have been maintained before it departed the side of the runway.Advance warning of the wind conditions would have likely allowed the pilot to divert. The pilot was very cautious of winds and had departed from the home base a day later than planned due to wind gusts exceeding the pilot's personal 30 kts planning limit. The pilot had a vague plan that if the winds didn't allow him to maintain runway centerline during the approach or if a balked approach was required due to surface winds he would exit the airspace to the north under VFR and contact flight services to find a suitable alternate. The pilot had planned to arrive at the destination (ZZZ) with at least 2 hrs of fuel reserves to allow for a possible alternate. However the pilot did not have a definite alternate selected which potentially could have affected his taking decisive action if he had been informed of potentially high crosswind gusts. The pilot had been involved in a PIO (pilot induced oscillation) several years previous and was particularly conscious of proper pitch control.Significant factors were:1) Lack of accurate and timely weather information; specifically strength and direction of wind gusts;2) Pilot's focus on pitch control may have contributed to insufficient roll input to maintain lateral position on the runway;3) Lack of a definite alternate plan which may have resulted in the pilot persisting to continue the approach under marginal conditionsFactors which help prevent damage and/or injury:1) The pilot's careful attention to pitch and airspeed control prevented a PIO or prop strike.2) The pilot's directional control with the rudder minimized the chance of ground looping.3) The pilot's decision to steer into the grass prevented damage to runway lights and the aircraft4) The pilot's use of 20 degrees of flaps and higher approach speed allowed for better stability and control during landing.

Small aircraft pilot reported a runway excursion while landing with gusty crosswinds.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was the D-Side for approximately 1-1.5hrs when ZZZ Approach went ATC Limited with Tower only open from 1800-2000 local time for COVID cleaning. It was clear from before ZZZ went limited that the contingency plan was lacking; and controllers were brainstorming on the fly how we would handle the situation. In the period of 2 hours; I would estimate we had 15 arrivals into ZZZ1/ZZZ2/ZZZ3. It seemed like an abnormally busy time. I do not believe there were any losses; however there seemed to be a complete failure of planning/explanation/preparation provided to us controllers on how to best handle the situation and what we could expect. Many aircraft experience lengthy delays with several getting low on fuel. I would recommend for better contingency plans and better preparation for controllers when such an event is to occur.

Center Developmental Controller reported a Tower went ATC Limited and the confusion that ensued with determining how to handle the situation. Controller cited lack of planning; explanation and preparation as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 93; Flight Crew Total 15753; Flight Crew Type 3500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We where cleared via the STAR JIIMS TWO; 'cross JIIMS at 8;000' by Philadelphia Approach Control. Prior to reaching JIIMS intersection we where given a last minute clearance to hold at JIIMS as published. Immediately I disconnected the auto throttles reduced power to slow down to 200 knots and set 200 knots in the speed control on the flight guidance control panel; let the speed bleed off and re-activated the system as the aircraft approached 200 knots. While slowing down I simultaneously selected the hold page on the left FMS display; while slowing down the aircraft; I reviewed the holding parameters at JIIMS; and asked the First Officer to confirm the direction and inbound course to the assigned fix; he read out Left 046; I typed the information into my FMS and activated the hold; and let the auto-pilot fly the holding pattern. Upon crossing JIIMS Intersection; I turned the heading selector to the left and dialed in 226; the out bound heading from the holding fix; watching the L-NAV display we appeared to be in the holding pattern at 8;000 feet. Shortly after the aircraft entered into the left turn for the outbound leg of the holding pattern; the holding fix JIIMS waypoint disappeared from our NAV Displays; this caught our attention. I asked the First Officer to; 'Re-insert the holding fix JIIMS;' I glanced over to my FMS and watched the holding fix parameters disappear after the First Officer re-entered the scratch pad information 046/L into the FMS holding page. At this point we where both heads down momentarily. I realized we might have a navigation data problem and that we would have to use raw data to fly the holding pattern.When I looked up to the flight guidance control to select heading mode; and attempt to remain in the holding pattern. I was shocked by what I saw of my flight display: nose up attitude of over 30 degrees; left turn 20 degree bank and speed of 140 knots. Immediately I applied full power; tried to level the wings and lower the nose; while pushing the auto pilot disconnect button; auto-pilot disconnect did not work; pitch sync did not work. I could not lower the nose immediately and had great difficulty leveling the wings; I tried all buttons; that did not work; finally I tried the pitch trim switch and held it in the full down position. At this point we had climbed rapidly to about 8;800 feet; I continued fighting with the pitch trim and descended to 7;700 feet; and then managed to regain our assigned altitude of 8;000 feet; and got back to 200 knots in the holding pattern. Air traffic control did not make any comments; or ask about our altitude deviations; the whole process lasted 10 to 15 seconds. This aircraft has had a history of auto throttle problems; navigation computer problems; flight guidance computer problems and intermittent HUD display problems.

G-IV Captain describes autopilot; auto thrust; and FMS malfunctions resulting in airspeed and altitude deviations while attempting to enter holding at 8;000 feet.


Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

I was on Tower CIC and Flight Data; and another controller was on LC/GC. E/AP issued a point out for an IFR enroute aircraft (Aircraft Z) crossing the departure corridor about 5 NM from the field (northeast to southwest at 4;000 feet MSL). Aircraft Y called about 10 NM northwest of the field inbound for a touch and go at 4;000 feet MSL descending to 3;000 feet MSL. Aircraft X called up ready to depart off Runway XX. LC coordinated with E/AP for a left turn on course to avoid a loss of separation between Aircraft X; Aircraft Y; and Aircraft Z; which was approved. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff with a left turn on course; but took a little longer than expected to start his roll. When the aircraft did not execute a turn off the departure end as we thought he might; LC asked Aircraft X to start turn on course now. Aircraft X was climbing to 2;800 feet MSL when LC started issuing the traffic. In response to his TCAS; Aircraft X descended on his own to 2;500 feet MSL until he had the VFR traffic in sight. Traffic was never issued to Aircraft Y about the departing jet. When the traffic was in sight and no factor; Airrcaft X climbed and maintained 3;000 feet MSL until the IFR Cessna was in sight; who was now about 4 NM W/NW of the field at 4;000 feet MSL. Recommendation; 1. If Plan A doesn't work; recognize it ASAP and use/have a Plan B ready. There are many things we could've done to avoid the loss of separation; but we did not act in a timely enough manner. You can tell on the tapes how quickly LC got flustered when Aircraft X didn't depart; climb; and turn as fast as we thought Aircraft X could. The Plan A COULD have worked; but it didn't. We needed Plan B ready much quicker than we had. 2. Issue traffic to everyone. LC was talking non-stop which inhibited his ability to issue traffic to Aircraft Y; but it could've been called much sooner. 3. Let the departing traffic know why you need a quick turn out. If LC had issued 'Traffic; Cessna 5 miles northwest inbound on downwind for Runway 32 at 3;000 feet' Aircraft X may have been able to get the turn done quicker; or they could've requested to hold. 4. E/AP should not have approved the turn on course if he didn't think it would work especially with the point out aircraft crossing the departure end. 5. As TCIC; I should've been quicker to react and assist LC in handling the situation in a timely manner and make suggestions. 6. Also develop Plans C; D; and E7. We need to (and will) try to imagine how a situation will develop and be ready for when something doesn't happen the way we planned.

Departed ZZZ with take off clearance Runway XX to 4;000 feet; left turn direct [to a certain fix]. Initial climb we were advised of traffic one 1 o'clock at 3;400 and a second target at 4;000. We immediately realized that there was going to be loss of traffic separation issue unless we took action. Pilot Flying disengaged the autopilot and decided to level off at 2;700 until traffic had passed. At that time we climbed to 3;000 and got recleared 3;000 because of more traffic at 4;000 on our flight path. Aircraft issued TA but situation resolved without an RA.

Tower Controller described a conflict event between an IFR and VFR aircraft; the reporter noting multiple chances were available to the controller to prevent this event but none were taken.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were getting vectored for an ILS approach in IMC conditions. As the pilot flying; I had commanded an inadequate descent rate which resulted in going above the glide slope prior to intercepting the localizer. Upon recognizing this and now on course; I then commanded a greater vertical speed from the autopilot which resulted in us going below the glide slope without the autopilot capturing just prior to the final approach fix. The Captain recognized the error and our unstabilized condition; took the controls and executed a missed approach. During the missed approach maneuver; ATC issued an altitude alert for our sink rate. The EGPWS warning for glideslope was also heard. The missed approach and subsequent ILS approach was completed uneventfully.The primary cause of this event was my errors in decision making resulting in me putting the aircraft in a high and fast situation for which I over corrected. The contributing factors was my lack of experience in this type of aircraft. This situation could have been avoided by slowing down and descending much earlier. When allowed to fly an airspeed at our discretion and expecting short vectors to final; I should have slowed down much earlier.

CRJ-700 First Officer reported over-correcting during an ILS approach; resulting in an unstabilized approach and go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 2585

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

RDM Tower cleared us for takeoff from Runway 5 with a right turn to 110 degrees. At 400 feet I started the turn and saw an aircraft at 1;000 feet agl on a converging inbound course of about 290 degrees; pointing right at us. ATC pointed the traffic out; and to avoid collision we initiated a left turn back to runway heading until clear of conflict. We heard 'Traffic; Traffic;' but our turn preempted an RA. Closest separation was about two miles.

Air Carrier First Officer reported experiencing an airborne conflict after takeoff from RDM airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

APU fire Warning; CAS (Crew Alert System) message; triple chime. Aircraft Warning system; CAS message; very slight odor. Cause unknown; possible APU fire. I called for emergency memory items for APU fire warning; maintained control of aircraft; and took control of radios

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CL-300 flight crew reported receiving an APU fire warning on descent into their destination.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

About 35 minutes into the flight; we noticed #1 engine oil pressure fluctuating. With each fluctuation the pressure was getting lower. We discussed what we would do if this continued; and decided to divert if the pressure continued to drop. We reviewed the emergency checklist and picked out a diversion airport. The pressure went into the yellow and we completed that checklist; briefed the passenger; and diverted. As the pilot flying; I flew the airplane and monitored radios while my co-pilot completed the checklists. The pressure then dropped into the red; giving us a master warning and low pressure annunciator. We secured the engine per the checklist and continued our descent to our diversion airfield. We declared an emergency and did a visual approach with no further incidents. Note: this engine had just been worked on for an oil leak; and was signed off prior to our flight.

[No substantive additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]

A CE-560XLS flight crew shut down the left engine when the oil pressure fell into the red and diverted to the nearest suitable airport.