Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was sent to MMMX as an observer in the jumpseat during this event. During the arrival; GPS-L INVALID and GPS-R INVALID enunciated repeatedly in the vicinity of MAVEK. The working crew advised this is a usual event and took no action. It seemed odd that no notice to the crew; no message; nothing in the company pages with regards to MMMX spoke of this issue. Once I arrived at the hotel for the layover; I investigated actions required in the event of an invalid GPS signal. There is nothing in the QRH; but there is a procedure in the ops manual. It's a pretty lengthy procedure that; in the end; requires monitoring your position using raw data or monitoring the POS REF page of the CDU (Control Display Panel) for accuracy. I recall back about six years ago the approach we used connected the enroute; arrival and approach across the SMO VOR. That approach; now the ILS DME 1 05R; changed from tracking the 160R from SMO to tracking the 164R from SMO. The first time we flew that approach; we were faced with a NAV failure. The fleet immediately issued a notice advising crews of this issue and reminded crews of the procedural requirement to tune; identify and track ground-based NAVAIDS during all phases of flight. With this in place; we weren't surprised by the failure nor unable to cope with the loss of NAV. There appears to be no notice in place to advise crews of this anomaly during the approach. Nor does there appear to be a procedure in place to accommodate this failure other than to return to the ops manual and work through the FMC Navigation Check - a lengthy process during a pretty critical phase of flight when distractions need to be kept to a minimum. Apparently; when the change in ILS procedure was made to place arriving aircraft close to a military installation that routinely jams GPS signals; GPS/NAV failures onboard aircraft arriving into MMMX became common. I would recommend filing the AVSAR 4A and requesting the ILS/DME1 05R so that crews have ground-based NAVAIDS that can be used to back-up their position. As well; I would suggest a message to crews advising them that during the arrival into MMMX; ground-based NAVAIDS must be tuned; identified; used and tracked so that when the GPS becomes invalid; the flight can continue safely in this mountainous area. The other option would be to advise crews of this issue during the arrival and require that one pilot monitor the POS REF page of the CDU. According to our procedures; if the two IRS positions are in agreement and the FMC position is not significantly different; the FMC position is probably reliable. Although this procedure is published in the ops manual; it's hard to find and might not be at the tip of your fingers; so to speak; during this critical phase. A notice indicating this loss should be expected and the procedure available to counteract the failure; would be most helpful.

Reporter has recommended to the Company Ops. Dept. that all flights into Rwy 5 at MMMX be filed for an ILS/DME approach and that crews be reminded of the requirement in the general operating manual to have all preparations completed to be able to transition to a non-GPS approach when flying an RNAV approach.

B737 observer pilot reported experiencing intermittent GPS reception issues while observing the flight crew on approach to MMMX.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During climb my 'Cabin ALT' annunciator was activated. My cabin pressure had increased to approximately 10;000 FT. Under normal operations my cabin altitude should have been below 8;000 FT.I was already using the supplemental O2 system.I declared an emergency and requested an immediate descent which was approved along with a turn back toward my departure airport when able. I began an emergency descent then turned to the heading given by ATC. At that time I was unsure as to the cause of the sudden rise in cabin pressure and was focused on making a controlled descent while on supplemental O2. I then requested a return to the Cessna Citation Service Center airport where my airplane had just completed routine scheduled maintenance. It had not been flown since the maintenance was completed other than a short flight back to my own airport.After landing I began trouble shooting the probable causes associated with a 'Cabin ALT' annunciator and determined that the 'Air Source Select Knob' had been set to the 'OFF' position. I then confirmed with the Service Center that switching the Air Source Select Knob to 'OFF' would result in a lack of pressurization consistent with what I had experienced. I have since flown the aircraft at flight levels without incident.Normal operation of the aircraft dictates the Air Source Select Knob always is in the 'Both' position; although the Cessna approved checklist indicates that the knob be set 'AS REQUIRED.' I believe the Air Source Select Knob was turned off during the recent maintenance at the Cessna Citation Service Center by the avionics technician - probably while he was completing an RVSM documentation that was due. I feel declaring an emergency was an appropriate action.I have added the word 'BOTH' next to the 'AS REQUIRED' on my checklist.

A Citation Single pilot experienced a cabin altitude warning during his climb; declared an emergency; descended and returned the aircraft to the service center where it had recently undergone routine maintenance service. After a safe landing the pilot discovered the Air Source Select knob had been placed in the 'OFF' position; possibly during the previous maintenance visit; thus depriving the system of the air required to control cabin altitude. Subsequent flights with the knob in the 'BOTH' [sources] position have proven trouble free.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I had an aircraft filed IFR to NUQ airport. I asked the pilot if they were actually landing NUQ because that requires a PPR (Prior Permission Required) and its unusual for an Aircraft X to land at NUQ. The pilot; or who I assume was the instructor informed me that they wanted to fly the ILS Approach and break off the approach; cancel IFR and fly VFR to SQL. What I failed to notice was that the ILS for NUQ was out of service. I transferred control to the Arrival Sector who then cleared the aircraft for the ILS. The aircraft somehow descended on a nonexistent glideslope and had a MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) violation. Tower informed Arrival Control about the issue and then re-sequenced the aircraft. I wasn't aware about the MVA violation until I was informed by the supervisor the next day. The status information display is full of information and I missed the ILS being out.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Controller cleared an aircraft for an ILS; not aware that the ILS was out of service.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft Z was climbing out of 8;000 feet for 10;000 feet and higher with the Center. Aircraft X was switched to Center frequency north of HSV airport. Aircraft Y was climbing to 10;000 [feet] westbound. Aircraft X apparently heard the wrong Center frequency and subsequently never got a higher altitude. A few minutes later; Aircraft X called back to verify the frequency and was re-given the correct center frequency. At the time; Aircraft Z was inbound at 11;000 [feet] from the west so the Center could not climb Aircraft X since his communications switch was delayed due to the wrong frequency. Since Aircraft X never got his climb; Aircraft Y was on a conflicting heading with Aircraft X; now level at 10;000 [feet]. Center called to ask what was going on. I immediately issued a 180 degree turn and called traffic to Aircraft Y to increase separation. I am unsure of the distance between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y when the turn was given; it appeared to be less than 5 NM. The volume of traffic was high and the complexity was avg. There were numerous VFR pop up aircraft and military practice approaches at the time of the event. The airspace at HSV should be split off (east radar and west radar) more often but we cannot due to staffing. Our minds are not 100% where they should be because we are having to worry about money. We are not being paid this week and I have numerous bills. I am check to check and this added stress could be a factor to me not seeing the conflict.

Huntsville TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation due to one aircraft not hearing the climb clearance.  Reporter also stated position should be split; and was worried about money during the government shutdown.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

A snow team had cleared snow from an intersecting runway and taxiway and had left snow on the runway. I asked the city vehicle about the snow on the runway and if it was safe for aircraft to depart. The city vehicle said the snow was 'just a dusting'. Two aircraft departed without incident. The snow team did another pass on the intersecting runway. After that; another aircraft started departure roll and then aborted the takeoff after hitting a snow bank. The pilot said it was about 2 feet deep and felt like hitting a herd of deer. The airport needs a vast improvement in their snow removal operation overall; and they need to be aware of snow that gets left on active runways.

Tower Local Controller reported snow removal vehicles reported clearing the runway before a departing aircraft hit a snow bank and rejected takeoff.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Type 45

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 373; Flight Crew Type 12

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

The flight was from ZZZ to ZZZ1 back to ZZZ. we departed around XApm; landed ZZZ1 around XC:15pm. on the return flight back to ZZZ near by ZZZ2; the engine was rough and partially lost power and we [requested priority handling] right away with ZZZ3 Approach. We did our best to land aircraft safely at ZZZ2 and no one was injured. Before the flight; we did the flight plan; based on the POH (Pilot Owner's Handbook); we calculated the fuel burn. Total route is 298 NM; which will cost 3.5 hours. So we should have had remaining 1 hour fuel. I believe low fuel caused the problem. In the future I will pay more attention to the fuel; do not trust fuel indicator; give myself a bigger fuel margin.

On a 298 NM flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and back to ZZZ in a Cessna 152; the PIC calculated fuel burn over the flight based on the POH and fell within the expected reserve requirement.  The plane took off at XA:00 with verified completely full fuel tanks.  When we landed at ZZZ1 at XC:15 and the fuel gauge appeared to show a fuel level in line with calculations to make the return flight.  On the return trip; approximately 20 NM from ZZZ at around XD:45; the engine was rough and lost partial power.  I immediately radioed in and [requested priority handling] with ZZZ3 Approach and the tower requested that I remain on frequency and cleared our aircraft for immediate landing at ZZZ2.  The PIC landed the plane safely without power; there was no damage; and no one was injured.   Between the timing of the failure and calculated fuel burn; the numbers did not align. We followed every altitude assigned by ATC along the flight; leaned the fuel mixture and kept appropriate power as calculated but margin was insufficient.  In the future I will take an even more conservative approach to my own fuel calculations after this impactful experience.

Flight crew reported partial engine power loss during cruise. The flight crew elected to divert and make a precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Approximately 30 minutes into the flight; at cruise; we received an ATC FAULT message and complied with the QRH. We switched from the left to the right transponder with no resolution to the defect. We asked ATC if they were still receiving our information and they said they were. About five minutes later we received TERR POS; GPS; RUNWAY SYS; and UNABLE RNP messages. We complied with the QRH for the messages. We worked with Ground Operations and ATC to verify appropriate equipment code; and determined we could proceed to destination. [Operations] SATCOM patched to us for coordination; this was helpful and timely. Approximately 30 minutes later all the messages went away. We landed uneventfully at destination. Caused by apparent failure of the GPS system. This aircraft has multiple events in its history of related problems.

B767 Captain reported that the aircraft GPS system failed; causing multiple fault messages.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

VFR instrument currency flight at ZZZ on RNAV GPS Runway XX with safety pilot.  When outbound to ZZZZZ IAF at 3;300 MSL and entering the course reversal saw airspace indicated on GNS 530.  I realized the floor of ZZZ C airspace was 2;X00 MSL and penetrated airspace.  I Immediately descended to 2;Y00 MSL and continued the course reversal at that elevation and completed the practice approach.  Traffic display from ADS-B did not show any traffic conflict while at 3;300 in ZZZ C airspace. Lack of flying in past 6 months due to COVID limits contributed to reduced situational awareness and unfamiliar with this area and airspace.  Flying more and better use of EFB charts would have corrected this situation.

GA pilot reported having an airspace incursion while on an instrument currency flight and cited lack of recent flying due to COVID-19 and unfamiliarity with the airspace as contributing factors.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

During pre-flight we found multiple system switches in the wrong position.1. Aircraft sat for X days prior to this flight. 2. Two mechanics stated they place these switches in these positions after X days without flying.Can we change the storage maintenance procedure when the aircraft is prepared for flight to place all switches in the expected position. This will greatly reduce the possibility of pilot error. This is far from the first time during pre-flight after maintenance we have found switches in what pilots would consider the wrong/unsafe position. Yes; it's the pilot's pre-flight responsibility; but we are all on the same team; no one is out there to enable grave pilot errors on purpose.

Air carrier Captain reported multiple system switches are set in the wrong position on aircraft coming out of storage.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 800

I was with a student ready to go for a lesson. We were holding short of runway [4;400 FT remaining] at the intersection. We got a 'no delay' takeoff clearance as there was a business jet on 3 mile final. I took the flight controls from the student; accepted the clearance and proceeded to takeoff immediately. The airplane accelerated uneventfully to rotation speed and I rotated. Our wheels left the ground; but the plane did not climb out of ground effect as it normally does even though we were at normal climb attitude and airspeed. As the end of the runway was approaching fast and the plane still seemed unable to climb; I decided in the interest of safety to abort the takeoff and land straight ahead. I was able to stop the plane just barely before the end of the pavement. At that point I told Tower that I was still on the runway and that I needed to get off. I heard that the business jet had landed and they got instructed to roll to A9 and get off. Tower instructed me to get off using my choice of either A11 or B10. I turned the airplane around and taxied to A11. I left the runway at that point.

C172 instructor pilot discovers that her aircraft will not climb after rotation. The aircraft is placed back on the runway and the takeoff rejected. A business jet is allowed to land while this is occurring.


Distraction; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

During the Maintenance Check Flight [we] noticed a fuel imbalance on the left tank of 200 pounds less than the one indicated on the right tank on the initial climb out.  The flight crew decided to turn back and land at the airport. The unbalance increased to 400 pounds during cruise flight. We; the flight crew; decided to transfer fuel from the right to the left tank for balance purposes.  The transfer process was stopped during the descent and [we] continued to monitor the fuel gauges. The fuel unbalance was stabilized at the same 400 pounds during the initial descent all the way down until the landing.  We; the crew; nor the Mechanic on board who was assigned to monitor the left tank during the flight noticed any leak. While on the approach Tower was advised by another aircraft on the ground that while our aircraft was on short final [they] noticed something hanging or coming out from our left wing. The maintenance flight was completed unsatisfactory and the aircraft was written up for fuel unbalanced during flight.

A DHC-8-200 on a test flight developed a fuel imbalance which the Mechanic on board could not balance and so on return to the airport a ground observer commented that something was hang from or coming from the left wing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Flight crew noted a slight rumbling vibration on climb out.  The vibration increased with airspeed and as we reach cruise at FL300 and increased speed we noted the increased vibration and that there was a control yoke displacement of approximately 2 units right in straight and level flight with all other trim neutral.  After discussing the situation as a crew; we decided to contact [Operations and Maintenance] for further discussion and possible solutions.  Due to a known history and MEL addition affecting spoilers; we selected the flight control schematic page and noted that the right flaperon indicated a near full upward deflection in level flight. Through our discussion with [a] tech pilot; it was suggested that we try utilizing rudder trim to determine how much was needed to neutralize the control yoke; and we determined that 4 units of rudder trim was required.  Without being able to fully determine what was causing the vibration we decided that a 13 1/2 hour flight and oceanic crossing would not be prudent; and most likely would not be possible due to fuel over burn.  We discussed possible alternate airports and [Operations] ultimately requested that we return to ZZZ.  We were North West of ZZZ1 when we coordinated with ZZZ2 Center for our return to ZZZ.  We coordinated with ZZZ1 Center to jettison fuel in order to be below max landing weight.  The fuel jettison of 78;400 lbs. was accomplished just south east of ZZZ3 VOR at FL200.  Arriving back into the ZZZ area; we coordinated for runway 36C.  As we configured the aircraft for landing; we noted a drastic increase in vibration as the flaps were extended from 20 to the planned setting of 30.  We adjusted to flap 25 for landing and flap 25 speed.  Although the vibrations and roll control were abnormal on final; the landing was uneventful.  After landing we elected to leave the flaps at 25 until mechanics at the gate could verify that retraction would not cause further damage.  After block in it was discovered that the number 6 spoiler was up.  We could not see indications for the number 6 spoiler on the flight control page due to the MEL deactivation.  Initial indications are that the number 6 spoiler which was deactivated under MEL was 'floating' or extended when it should have been down.

On taxi out; during the control check a 'spoilers' EICAS message displayed. PDM (Programmed Depot Maintenance) procedures were attempted; but we had to return to the gate for maintenance; as it was a 'flagged' item.  Spoilers were MELed.  After takeoff; we felt airframe vibrations that got worse at higher altitudes and airspeeds. We found the right flaperon was indicating all the way up; the left flaperon was indicating slightly down.  Additionally; the control wheel was right wing down about 2 degrees.  After consulting Maintenance and [Operations]; everyone decided that the best course of action was to RTB (Return to Base) ZZZ.  Fuel jettison checklist was executed in order to land on 36C.  Due to excessive airframe vibrations at flaps 30; a flaps 25 landing was made.Uncommanded asymmetric spoiler deployment.

B777 flight crew reported uncommanded asymmetric spoiler deployment in flight.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was on the pushback; Captain said push to spot Tango. I started the push pushing straight back tail toward the service road; stopped; and put the [tug] in reverse and started to turn towards the spot going counterclockwise. Mid-way through the push the wing walker on my left side threw up the stop signal and we stopped there for about 2 minutes.  Then the wing walker on my left side gave me the all clear by this time the Number 2 engine was going.  About 7 seconds after he gave me the clear he gave the stop signal again. During those 7 seconds I turned my head for a moment since I was going in reverse.  I stopped but by then it was too late and I was notified that the left winglet of the aircraft I was pushing rubbed up against the aft wing of the parked aircraft on the next gate.

Tug driver reports the left winglet of the aircraft he is pushing back contacting the horizontal stabilizer of a parked aircraft at the adjacent gate. The wing walker had signaled stop but was not noticed until too late.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 3320; Flight Crew Type 375

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31.7; Flight Crew Total 45.1; Flight Crew Type 13.5

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Student was on a solo cross country flight. Flight was to visit two airports then return. On the last leg; he started to have engine trouble; and went through the engine out procedure. Once he diagnosed the issue was that the right fuel tank was indicating 0; he switched tanks in an attempt to restart but the engine failed to start. Once he reached 2;000 feet MSL; he then executed an engine out emergency landing in a harvested corn field. He successfully landed the aircraft without damage or injury to himself. To prevent a future occurrence of fuel mismanagement; the student will undergo ground and flight training on fuel management and system operation.

I was on a solo cross country flight as a student pilot. On the last leg; I started to have engine trouble; and went through the engine out procedure. Once I diagnosed the issue was that the right fuel tank was indicating 0; I switched tanks in an attempt to restart but the engine failed to start. Once I reached 2;000 feet MSL; I then executed an engine out emergency landing in a harvested corn field. I successfully landed the aircraft without damage or injury to myself or the plane. To prevent a future occurrence of fuel mismanagement; I will undergo ground and flight training on fuel management and system operation.

A PA28 student pilot on a solo cross country flight and his supervising instructor report a fuel mismanagement problem resulting in engine stoppage and an off airport landing without injuries or damage.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Departing Albany; the flight was on an IFR flight plan. On climb out; nearing 7000 MSL we were advised of traffic at our 11 o'clock in 4 miles and headed westbound at 7500 FT MSL. ATC advised us to level at 7000 FT until the traffic was clear. We leveled at 7000 FT headed north and looking for traffic. We had the traffic on our TCAS; which our Garmin was equipped. The traffic turned east. TCAS and ATC advised us of the updated traffic. The traffic call was now 11 o'clock and 4 miles and descending. We were still looking to no avail. TCAS alerted the traffic 100 feet above us. ATC said that the traffic was less than a mile and closing on our altitude and suggested immediate descent. The FO turned off the autopilot and nosed the aircraft over. I; the PIC; took control of the aircraft and performed an Emergency Descent flow for smooth air. The plane was in a 3500 FPM descent at 220 knots. At 5500 FT we were clear of the traffic and it was evident that the traffic was flying VFR in IFR conditions. I handed the controls back over to the First Officer. We were told to climb to 9000 FT and contact the Center controller. TCAS in this narrative is traffic avoidance provided through the transponder.

A small transport aircraft departed ALB and while climbing IMC near 7;000 FT took evasive action from a VFR traffic at 7;500 FT also in IMC conditions.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

A Manager is coercing me to sign off work too quickly. This would mean work in a reckless; un-safe and illegal manner. It's an atmosphere of tension and pressure. Clearly it violates the company policy. The policy is designed to prevent accidents. Signing off work prematurely is a violation of FAR's and the Company [Procedures Manual] General Policy and Procedure Manual. Driving too fast violates airport regulations. I received a disciplinary letter threatening termination. It claims I took too long to accomplish a task. The flight wasn't delayed and was completed before my quitting time. The letter contains inaccuracies. Most of the delay was in the hands of the Inspection Department. Part of the delay was running the engines; then waiting for the fuel to settle. The delays were outside my control. I was never offered help. Manager never questioned Inspection Department about the delay. I have no idea why I am being pressured into signing off work faster. I completed the task before quitting time and the flight wasn't delayed. I have never received a verbal warning about my job performance. Have Management actually use the policy. Have Management provide more training. If the Mechanic and Inspector are issued a newly published job card that they have never seen; have someone coach them on the new card. Don't issue fuel sampling/test work cards unless there is a diagram labeling which tank is which. Train all the inspectors on how to do fuel bio test. That way they won't be loading pressure on the only Inspector authorized to preform test. Before mailing disciplinary letter; conduct an investigation regarding the work. Actually speak to the Mechanic getting the letter and speak to all people involved. It will eliminate falsely accusing a Mechanic of working too slow because accidents happen when he goes too fast. Don't demand work [to] be signed off until it's ready.The Job Card didn't have diagrams showing and labeling which fuel tank was which.

Technician reported concerns over Manager ignoring company policies and pressuring an unsafe; expedited Job Card completion.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

The Perf Init (FMS page) was routinely programmed with a Vmo/Mmo/3.0 descent; the standard configuration. Upon descent we were cleared to cross WYNDE at 10;000 [FT]. I verified the correct TOD with the information in the FMS progress page as well as the VN (Vertical Navigation) Data page; and began an early descent. Throughout; the descent I monitored our progress on the VN Data page which consistently showed around -2;000 FT; as well as the PFD V-path indicator (showing below the required path for WYNDE). These (incorrect) indications continued all the way until we crossed WYNDE at 12;000 [FT]; which is 2;000 FT above the requirement. By the time the crew realized both indications; the VN Data page and the PFD VPI; were false; there was insufficient time to make complete corrections; and we crossed at 12;000 [FT]. With increased use of OPDs and other heavily FMS dependent descents; I must seriously question the reliability of our equipment. The FMS is supposed to help manage the flight; it is now becoming a threat. FMSs have lied to the crews before. If this continues; flight crews will be forced to advise ATC that they are unable RNAV descents; because of FMS unreliability.

Despite having insured proper FMS programming and monitoring available vertical path guidance; an E-145 flight crew failed to comply with the 10;000 FT crossing restriction at WYNDE waypoint while flying the WYNDE RNAV STAR to ORD.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

As I was securing up the aft galley; the smoke detector started to sound. I knocked on the aft lavatory; as there was a passenger using it.  'Are you ok?' I asked.  ' Yes. But what's that sound?' She replied as a big plume of smoke/vapor came toward me when she opened the door.[I pointed out that] smoking on an aircraft is a federal offense. So you really don't want to do that. I checked the waste receptacle and the shelves above it. As well as the toilet bowl; sink; and the little cupboard that holds the toilet paper and Kleenex. All clear. It didn't smell like tobacco.I asked the passenger if it was an e-cigarette; she said yes. I let the CA know what happened so he could handle it on his end. The passenger seemed totally taken aback that smoking wasn't allowed on planes and kept repeating that she didn't know it wasn't allowed. Also wearing the personal; disposable face mask made it hard to smell the smoke/vapor plumage that came out of the bathroom. That's why I asked her if it was an e-cigarette. Since I didn't see any smoking device/paraphernalia.As helpful as the personal face masks are for filtering out bacteria and viruses; it's difficult to make out scents fully. But since it was an exhalation of vapor from an e-cigarette it's not like I want to take off the mask to be able to identify the smell due to COVID concerns. That's why a thorough search for any burning or foreign material was done along with asking what she was using.

Flight Attendant reported that the smoke detector alarm was triggered by a passenger smoking an e-cigarette in a lavatory. Flight Attendant stated that wearing a personal face mask made it hard to smell the smoke/vapor plumage to determine whether the smell was due to an e-cigarette or other burning material.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Company Policy; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was serving as First Officer when our winglet tip hit a fuel truck mirror that was next to the plane. Background - Prior to starting the engine the Captain and I discussed that this would be an engine start in place before movement as it was a power out gate as well as noting the fuel trucks position as we usually do in DC in similar situations where fuel trucks stay parked next to our aircraft and that coordination with the marshalers will take place. After engine start and the Captain giving clearance that we were ready for directions to the marshalers he looked/cleared left and I looked/cleared right and continued monitoring the right side of the plane making sure clearance with the fuel truck from my angle. As the marshallers signaled the Captain we started moving and after a few moments the Captain got my attention 'asking what's he was doing?' Referring to the lead marshaller as I looked briefly to the monitor the front from my side and saw the lead marshaler was bringing his hands down from an energetic motion and finally bringing his wand signal to an X I said 'stop' and the Captain said that as well. Turning my body back around and bringing my attention back to the back right side of the plane to the best angle I could see while stopping I did not notice we hit anything and it was only after a minute or 2 of being stopped I finally recognized that there was an extended mirror from the fuel truck that was touching the winglet. I also took note that the fuel truck was on and had a driver in it and that the door that was connected to the mirror was open which I do not remember being the case prior to movement so I'm not sure if he was moving the truck or opening the door at that moment. Once recognition the Captain and I discussed and notified correct personnel. Passengers were de-boarded.Potential movement of fuel truck or fueler opening of fuel truck door.  As well as a potential lapse of wing walker observation.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported hitting a fuel truck during pushback.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft dispatched to ZZZ with inoperative APU. Heavy load factor; slow boarding process; substandard condoned air capabilities; delayed engine start with very high cabin temps contributed to a passenger having seizure climbing through approximately 10;000 ft departing ZZZ. Crew informed ATC; Dispatch and company and immediately returned to ZZZ to be met by paramedics at the gate. Inoperative APU and insufficient conditioned air capability led to uncomfortably and dangerously high cabin temps before engines could be started. Do not allow aircraft to be dispatched to typically (or known) warm weather destinations due to the risk of overheating to our passengers and crew.

A-321 Captain reported a passenger had a seizure during climb due to excessive heat in the cabin from an inoperative APU.


Inspection; Work Cards; Testing; Installation

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This happened in an overnight at ZZZ on Aircraft X during a borescope inspection on #2 ENG where second shift began the job card and removed the borescope ports. Technician Y and I came in on 3rd shift and after inspections cleared the engine heat level to borescope it around XA00 on DATE 2; we finished the borescope inspection. We installed all the borescope and igniters which we found bagged and tagged which made it easy to see; but we missed 1 that wasn't bagged and easy to see nearly eye level because it wasn't bagged or tagged.The event occurred because we ourselves did not remove the plugs. We made the mistake of paying attention to the ports that were bagged and removed and failed to verify exactly what ports were removed by the previous shift. The missing plug was nearly eye level @ the 10 O'clock position; but since it was not clearly bagged or tagged we failed to install it. I was unfamiliar with the Job Card and made the mistake of assuming only the bagged hardware was removed.I think the best suggestion I can make would be to put in Job Card to attach streamers that could be easily seen on the hardware or near the plug holes while doing the borescope inspection. Had we seen the hardware or plug hole clearly bagged or streamed this would have never happened. I also think that a better overlap between shifts would also have never allowed something like this to happen. If we had a better overlap between shifts at the aircraft things like this would be greatly reduced.

We were issued Aircraft X on third shift on DATE 1 borescope # 2 engine inspection was started by second shift. We received the job card and borescope ports were already removed. Inspection said engine was hot and entered with device around XA00 DATE 2. All the plugs were in bags and were put back from where they came from except 1. One plug was missed and not seen; no bag around the open port was seen; no tape; no bag; this port was missed. Every port open had a bagThis incident happened because we didn't remove any of the plugs ourselves; we put back the hardware that were in bags but the mistake we made was not to verify what plugs were removed by second shift. The plug missing was not bagged taped or marked; this plug was not installed. I was unfamiliar with the job card and made the mistake of assuming only the plugs in the bags were removedI think tape should be used or blank plugs with streamers to put in or on the engine case. Streamers that are long and easy to see. More effective turnovers with what was done and where parts are. This would have never happened if better communication was used.

Technicians reported an engine borescope plug was left uninstalled and was discovered post maintenance.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

I was working Local Control West during an arrival bank. I had a small aircraft check in following a large aircraft in front; a B737. I issued caution wake turbulence you're following a B737 X miles ahead Runway 34L cleared to land. I asked him to slow down at some point worried I may not have runway separation. When the small aircraft was about a 3 mile final he asked if he was cleared to land. I issued caution wake turbulence and cleared him to land again the preceding aircraft I believe was off the runway at this point. When the small aircraft was at a safe speed to receive further instruction I told him to turn right at A6 and contact ground 123.77. He responded with 'got beat up pretty bad'. I asked was it turbulence or wind shear? He responded with 'It was turbulence; and it about flipped us'. I don't think I said anything after that. I then reported it to the FLM in charge.

Local Controller described a 'wake turbulence' event when a 'small' aircraft following a 'large' aircraft indicated that the encounter 'almost flipped us'.


Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We were on approach to our destination with the Captain flying; cleared to descend to 7;000 FT. Approach asked the aircraft ahead of us about conditions during their approach. They responded that they started picking up light to moderate rime ice at around 5;500 FT but accumulation stopped at around 3;500 FT. We were still quite a ways from the airport; so we kept our speed at 250 KTS. As we got closer to the airport; we started to pick up moderate amounts of ice on the windshield wipers. We had already configured anti-ice systems with the APU operating; so we continued while monitoring the rate of accumulation. Approach vectored us into a base turn approximately ten miles from the airport; so we began to slow and configure the airplane. As we were vectored onto final; at flaps 20 and 200 KTS; the aircraft began to display unusual airspeed increases; reacted very slowly to control inputs; and a yellow flag began to flash on our MFDs. We realized that we were not in a desired state; so the Captain immediately commanded a go-around and we broke off the approach. We requested and received a climb above the clouds and vectors for another approach. We discussed the possibility of ice accumulation causing the strange handling so we decided to try another approach with a faster descent through the clouds and a more straight in approach. We gave the ice time to melt and then requested another approach clearance. During the second attempt; we had a difficult time slowing using normal configuration procedures; even lowering the gear early to try to slow. As we slowed from 220 to 200 KTS; the yellow flag reappeared and we again began to mush around to control inputs. Approach Control felt that we were getting too close to a preceding arrival so we again broke off the approach and climbed above the clouds. We discussed our options and contacted Dispatch about the possibility of finding an airport with VFR conditions and no icing. The Dispatcher advised ZZZ was probably our best option. We had 3;300 LBS of fuel at the time; so we decided to try one more approach and then divert if the approach was unsuccessful. The Captain performed a few banks and pitches at 250 KTS to check the handling and it felt normal; so we tried a third approach. But the results were the same as before; so we elected to divert. We had [approximately] 3;000 LBS of fuel; which was marginal for the flight to ZZZ; so we declared minimum fuel. We received clearance to the final approach fix for ZZZ. To the best of our knowledge; all the ice had melted from the jet and it was performing normally when we began the approach into ZZZ. We discussed the handling problems again and began to configure early for landing. On approach; however; the aircraft again began to handle erratically; displayed the flag and showed unusual speed variations. We then; due to our low fuel state and concerns about the condition of the aircraft; declared an emergency. We landed and taxied to a gate; where we contacted Maintenance. They advised that the yellow flag indicated an autopilot aileron trim disagree.

While flying approaches in icing conditions the flight crew of a CRJ-200 suffered anomalous flight control response and received a yellow warning flag; the purpose of which they were unaware. Three approaches were abandoned at their destination and; although the symptoms returned again; a final and successful approach and landing were accomplished at a diversion airport.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

We were getting vectors to the GPS Rwy 8 at ZZZ1 in IMC conditions and active icing (Ice light illuminated)  when we got the Horizontal Stabilizer (HStab) Ice Fail annunciator. As we were near the airport and knew that the cloud bases were fairly high; we felt the best course of action to exit the icing conditions would be to continue descent to the airport.  We accomplished the Emergency procedure for an HStab Ice Fail light and continued to a Flaps-10 landing as called for in the procedure. Approach and landing was without incident.  This was the aircraft's first encounter with icing conditions since it had come out of Maintenance in ZZZ for troubleshooting of an HStab Ice Fail annunciation. Maintenance in ZZZ had run the Ground Test of the system and found no anomalies; but noted some areas on the HStab that needed additional sealant which they applied.  Our incident thus makes this the second consecutive icing encounter and subsequent HStab Ice Fail. (We  had also tested the system prior to takeoff and found no faults).  After landing at ZZZ1; and at the direction of Maintenance Control; we were asked to push in the pulled circuit breaker (C/B) and retest the system. We accomplished this and found no fault.  With two consecutive icing encounters and two consecutive HStab Ice Fails; and all the while the Ground Test passes; it is obvious that the normal Ground Test is not robust enough to find the cause of this system failure.  Maintenance should be required to escalate the troubleshooting of this system beyond a normal Ground Test and sign-off; before this aircraft is allowed to re-enter icing conditions!

Reporter stated the Circuit Breaker (C/B) they pull removes power from the Horizontal Stab (HStab) De-ice Heater Controller. Opening the C/B is part of their Abnormal Procedures to prevent a possible thermal runaway of the Controller or heating mats that are bonded to the HStab leading edge and Elevator horns. Reporter stated that part of the problem with identfying the cause of a HStab Ice Fail annunciation is finding a Maintenance facility that is familiar with the Beechjet BE-400XP De-Ice System and will do adequate troubleshooting. Until recently; he was not aware there are two procedures: an electrical Continuity and Resistance Check and a Pitot Static Check that should be accomplished by Maintenance before an HStab Ice Fail write-up is signed-off in the Logbook. The previous incident only had one test accomplished.  After his second HStab De-Ice failure; Technicians from a different Maintenance facility performed both tests and also used a 'cold' spray and ice packs on various sensors to simulate a cold environment. That's when the Speed sensor failures seem to occur. The same technicians also noted that without the 'cold' tests; the warmer ground environment does not seem to find the sensors that are known to fail in a cold environment. One of the Speed sensors was replaced and seems to have corrected the problem.Reporter stated he has already experienced four HStab Ice Fail annunciations this winter on BE-400XP aircraft requiring Abnormal Procedures and landing with 10-degree Flaps instead of 30-degree flaps. Two of the HStab Ice Fails occurred in icing conditions and two after exiting icing conditions when he shut-off the HStab Anti/De-Ice switch. The HStab De-Ice System does go through one final heat cycle after the De-Ice switch is shut-off. Either way; Flight crews must still perform an Abnormal Procedures Check whenever the HStab Ice Fails annunciator illuminates and red light flashes. Ice on the Horizontal Stab could lead to a tail stall; made worse if flaps were extended more than 10-degrees.

A Captain notes that after two consecutive icing encounters and two consecutive Horizontal Stab (HStab) Ice Fail annunciations on two different flights; the normal Ground Test used by Maintenance is not 'robust enough' to find the cause of the HSTAB Ice Fails that have occurred in flight; on a Beechjet BE-400XP aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were arriving into DEN on the Molten3. When we checked on with Approach they told us Runway 35L. We had initially planned for Runway 34R. We then re-briefed Runway 35L. I was happy when I heard this as it would be a short taxi to the gate. We when checked on with the next Approach Controller; on check on I stated our clearance to descend via and for stated for Runway 35L. Controller said roger; 35L. On that frequency we heard [another] flight changed from Runway 35L to Runway 34R. We were not given a Runway change.We were then switched to final Controller. On check in I advised our descend via and for Runway 35L. Controller said;Runway 35L. On downwind were given descend to 9000 ft. and turn to heading 080. In the turn [Controller asked] 'advise the airport in sight'. I said it was in sight. Controller cleared us for what we thought was the visual for Runway 35L on heading of 020 to join the final approach course.At this point I am unclear if the Controller said Runway 34R or Runway 35L visual as both pilots still thought Runway 35L as it had not been changed for 3 Approach Controllers. I am not even sure if I read back Runway 34R or Runway 35L. On the heading of 020 we were on a heading to join the final approach course just over the final approach fix. While on the 020 heading the Approach Controller said traffic 3 o-clock and you are going through the course. I responded we have not intercepted the course for Runway 35L. The Controller said I have you down for Runway 34R.At that point he said 'traffic Alert; turn left 260 and climb 9000 ft.'. We executed the instructions and completed a missed approach. Once on the downwind I advised the Controller that we had been told Runway 35L from our first check on with approach. He said we will figure it out and turn left to 180 and expect visual Runway 34R. I loaded up the FMS for Runway 34R ILS and re-briefed the visual. We then received vectors for the visual Runway 34R and landed the aircraft on Runway 34R without further incident and taxied to gate. I believe the main cause was the conflicting clearance from the first check on with Denver Approach. I was completely confused and startled when the Approach Controller called the traffic and said we were going through the course and we had not even joined the course yet.    I think I could have verified the clearance one more time. I thought I had verified we were on the correct runway 3 times. I am not sure what else I could have done but I am more than open to suggestions.

Captain reported executing an ATC-commanded go-around after lining up for the wrong runway at DEN following a communication breakdown.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft X Departed TNCM and was looking for higher altitude. I climbed him to FL320. Ask him to say the SOCCO estimate; Mach number and altitude request. He requested FL370 M.75 and gave an estimate of SOCCO at XA28Z. My D-Side told me that FL370 was not available and to stop him at FL340. I did and the pilot stated that he was a medical flight and that at FL340 he would not reach his destination. D-side informed me that next available was FL390. I asked if he was able and he said yes. I climbed him and told him to give me a good rate of climb for traffic cause he was climbing good and continued working the outbound push out of SJU; STT; TNCM and COY. Sector 6 was very busy but it was do able; when I continued my scan I saw Aircraft X slowing his rate of climb. I did my calculations and knew it was going to be a factor with Aircraft Y. I called him and assign a 360 heading with no reply from him. Told him to expedite; no reply. At this time he was floating FL361; next hit; FL362. My scope was filled with targets and he wasn't responding. When he finally responded was questioning if the heading assignment was for him. Sector 6 was getting busier by the minute and this guy wasn't responding. He was already in ZNY's airspace when I saw him turn leaving 366. I called the Aircraft Y to verify his position; no luck. Told the D-side to contact commercial radio to put him on our frequency. Nothing. I continued working and never got a read back that the aircraft was leveled at FL390. I transmitted on the blind; no answer. I continued to call Aircraft Y with no luck. He finally came on frequency 80 miles after. I radar identified him and kept working when he asked if he had traffic approaching SOCCO. I explained to him that I had lost communications with him and that's when he told me that he had responded to a RA (resolution advisory). I never saw how close they got since it happened on non-radar. Our frequencies over the ocean are bad. We transmit constantly with no answer. Transmitters and receivers are constantly malfunctioning and is a daily headache. This situation could have been avoided with good frequencies.

I was given a quick briefing. I took the position (D4D6) and it was super busy with a lot of aircraft on the boards and on the scope. My reliever had to stay and help. Lots of information to get coordinated; missing flight plans; printer wouldn't stop printing; and a few calls. Don't know how long I was on position but ZNY called me up to tell me Aircraft Y had to respond to a resolution advisory (RA). I replied roger and that was it. Kept working because it was too busy. I yelled out for at least a tracker for my radar man but there wasn't anybody. I really didn't know who Aircraft Y was in conflict with; until now. Frequencies were congested and were not working properly for what I could hear from the R-side. Frequencies need much better coverage/range. Staffing needs to improve drastically. We need the TMU (traffic management unit) up and running as soon as possible. They could have seen this coming. Supervisor needs to be more attentive to what's going on each sector and how are they going to be impacted. If R6 gets slammed by traffic; R2 is going to get it very soon. Departures should have been stop when it got busy; way before the sector got 'out of control.'Co-workers seemed to not want to ask for help. We need a briefing on this; something that lets people understand that they are not super human; we all need help at some point. D-sides seem to have to ask for help (A-side). It's the season; A-sides should be scheduled too! Managers need to plan the day better. Extra bodies and overtime would be a great help.

ZSU Controllers report of a loss of separation over the ocean due to poor radio coverage and an aircraft not climbing with a good rate for traffic.


Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight on final to Runway 28C. On profile until last 50 ft. The First Officer was flying. At 50 ft. aircraft began to drift up. Captain called dot high on glide slope. At 30 ft. FO (First Officer) began to flare and aircraft started to float. The First Officer left the power in a little too long which caused the aircraft to continue to float. The aircraft was at 10 ft. and at idle power; and the Captain determined that it was safer to land long on a 13;000 ft. runway than to go around from 10 ft. at idle power. Aircraft landed without incident.The event occurred because the Pilot Flying did not recognize the aircraft drifting up in the flare and did not take proper corrective action. The Captain was giving instruction on how to remedy the situation; but the FO was just too far behind the situation to fix the problem.Long landings are insidious by nature. In [XX] years on the Airbus I have never seen an aircraft float like that. The obvious answer having sat and thought about it would be to go around; but when you are flying in real time it's not that clear. We knew we had 13;000 ft. of runway to use.

A-321 Captain reported he allowed the First Officer to land long from an unstable approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Slow leak in center hydraulic system. Diverted to the nearest suitable airport. [We] landed overweight. [We] followed SOP and checklists; a non-event. Upon landing; leak was isolated to right landing gear. We never lost system pressure; however; hydraulic quantity was nearly depleted when we reached the gate.

An air carrier flight crew diverted to the nearest suitable aiport when their center hydraulic system developed a leak.


Flight Crew Total 6880; Flight Crew Type 5420

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We arrived at the airport [45 minutes before] departure. Weather was 002 OVC; calm winds; with fog. Our departure would be night; IMC. ZZZ is surrounded by significant terrain hazards (see Ops Alert ZZZ Terrain Hazards). For best terrain avoidance; we requested to depart runway XX with the ZZZ SID. FMGC was programed with runway XX; ZZZ; direct ZZZZZ. Both pilots checked the route; and agreed that it was correct. We also built the engine failure procedure in the fix page. Preflight briefing included a detailed discussion of the T procedure and terrain avoidance. The [SID] departure on runway XX requires a runway heading to intercept the 155 radial inbound to ZZZ (VOR). Taxied out and took off on runway XX. At about 800 feet AGL the flight director commanded a left turn. FO was flying and initially turned to the left and then said; 'this isn't right; we should be going to ZZZ (VOR)'; and rolled out of bank. The FMGC showed ZZZ (VOR) as the 'from' point; and ZZZZZ as the 'to' point even though we were approximately 5 miles south of ZZZ (VOR). I programmed the FMGC to proceed direct to ZZZ (VOR). Center called and asked if we were on the SID; and I replied that we were direct ZZZ (VOR). Climbing through 7000 feet we were cleared direct ZZZZZ.The reason for this report is that I am concerned that there may be an anomaly in the FMGC database for this airfield (this aircraft is [from a foreign air carrier]). I am virtually certain that we programmed the FMGC correctly. The FMGC directed us to turn miles prior to the first fix on the departure in mountainous terrain in IMC conditions; and I am not certain that we would have had terrain clearance if we followed the Flight director. Quick recognition from FO kept us from following the erroneous flight director commands. I am hoping that someone 'a lot smarter than me' could look into the data base; and possibly fly this departure in the simulator. It may save some other crew from making a hard left turn into terrain during night IMC conditions at ZZZ.

The reporter stated generally the FMC is dead on with very little variation. The reporter stated that in IMC conditions they wanted to avoid terrain so they chose to use the TAKEOFF MINIMUMS; (OBSTACLE) DEPARTURE PROCEDURES. The reporter stated that after takeoff the FMC wanted to take them in the opposite direction from the procedures so they reprogrammed the FMC to take them to a waypoint in the opposite direction to avoid terrain and proceeded without further disruption. The reporter also stated that he feels this may only be an anomaly for this airport and would like to fly this procedure in the simulator to ensure this procedure is programed correctly. The reporter also stated he would not like to see someone else fly this in IMC conditions; not knowing the area; and getting in terrain trouble. The reporter stated that very often if someone is taking off North and heading South; the FMC is programed to take the shortest route without regards to terrain to take you to your destination.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A320 flight crew reported the FMC directed the aircraft's autopilot to turn in the wrong direction.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

On arrival over AWDAD Intersection level at 11;000 with autopilot on; advised of VFR traffic at 10;500 at 1 o'clock position. About 5 seconds later traffic popped up on TCAS as a TA. Aircraft began left turn over AWDAD and then we received a climb RA. I turned off autopilot and began climb while leaving airplane in the turn. Captain reported RA climb. We climbed to about 11;400 and got clear of conflict. I never saw him visually and last I saw on TCAS was traffic -400. We returned to 11;000 and resumed the arrival.

A320 First Officer experiences a TCAS RA at 11;000 FT with VFR traffic 500 FT below. The traffic was reported by ATC and the crew was clear of conflict at 11;400 FT.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.9

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Declared Emergency

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

When I got onto the Approach position; The aircraft was at 5000 feet 5 NM south of the airport as reported by him but not on primary radar or secondary radar.  With the previous controller he tried an RNAV approach at a satellite uncontrolled airport and deviated to our airport.  There was no primary or secondary radar on him until a couple minutes into my session and he was 5 south of the airport and then it went away again immediately.  The radar was intermittent the entire time. I descended him to 4000 which is a safe altitude throughout the airspace where he was. He declared an emergency and his attitude indicator was not working and he was unable to pick up the localizer and was requesting help.  I asked him how much fuel he had on board and looked at several of the airports around our facility to check the ceiling.  BGM reported 400 [foot ceiling] and PEO was very low as well.  I tried to find somewhere I could have him go for a visual approach but the ceiling was OVC with poor weather.  I put him on a 060 heading because the altitude was safe and the terrain is a lot lower NE of the airport. I turned on the EOVM [Emergency Obstruction Video Map] map and was able to pick up his primary.  I did not say on the frequency that he was radar contact but I had him on radar and he was radar contact.  I descended him using his primary for position and brought him into the arrival corridor below the MVA and did not say at his discretion but I was using the EOVM map the entire time. He was able to get ground contact and then the airport in sight.  The aircraft landed without incident and normal operations resumed. The Elmira airport needs their radar fixed.  Without proper radar or radar coverage it makes the job much more difficult.  The aircraft was 30NM SW at 5000 and he was able to fly all the way to Elmira airport without any primary or secondary radar on him.  His equipment was failing but that would not affect the primary radar. While I was on position his radar was intermittent and I was unable to bring him into the approach corridor until I had a primary target on him.  I also will review emergency procedures in case this or any other emergency happens again.  I know when you descend someone it is at his discretion and you can not assign a hard altitude below the MVA and during operations you can't assign an altitude at all below the MVA.

ELM Approach Controller cannot identify an aircraft but sees an intermittent target and assists the aircraft into a landing at ELM airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 115; Flight Crew Type 40

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 50

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

My CFI and I were on a training flight in my airplane practicing short field take off and landings. We had been on sight at Scappoose Regional (SPB) with two other Cessna's in the pattern for about 25 minutes. The wind was calm and we were using Runway 15 as is local practice in calm conditions. As we were taxiing back to take off after our third landing; a pilot announced 'Over the river for 45 degree entry to Runway 33.' One of the Cessna's announced there are two others of us in the pattern and we are using Runway 15. The original announcer confirmed 15. As we were taxiing; I heard a call from a pilot announcing 'Two and a half miles out on left base for 33.' I am not sure if it was the same or a different airplane. My CFI and I talked about who and where that call came from it did not seem to make logical sense. We could not see the announcer's plane. After clearing for traffic; I announced from the hold short line; departing on Runway 15 and proceeded to roll for takeoff. At about 60 mph when I was ready to rotate; I could see a plane about 50-100 feet on short final for 33 coming right at me (Aircraft Y). My CFI said 'I have the airplane;' I confirmed; and he took control and rotated and immediately and turned right to be clear of the runway and continued to climb out. As this was occurring one of the Cessna's in the pattern asked where Aircraft Y was whereupon a pilot responded 'On short final for 33.'

Student Pilot and I had just completed a full stop landing on Runway 15 at SPB and were taxiing back for takeoff. While on the taxiway; we heard Aircraft Y on the CTAF announce their intention to enter a straight in for Runway 33 (right pattern is depicted on the chart for Runway 33). Another aircraft (tail number unknown) positioned at the Hold Short Line for Runway 15 announced that multiple aircraft were using Runway 15 and they taxied onto Runway 15 and departed. While still on the taxiway; we heard Aircraft Y on the CTAF announce their intention to enter a left base for Runway 33. As we approached the Hold Short Line for Runway 15 we cleared for traffic; announced our intention to takeoff on Runway 15; and lined up on Runway 15. During our takeoff roll; another aircraft requested the position of Aircraft Y who announced that they were on Short Final for Runway 33. We noticed them at the same time as our rotation; cleaned up the airplane and steered to the right to offset ourselves from the runway. We passed abeam Aircraft Y at the departure end of Runway 15 with about 300 feet separation. Aircraft Y executed a full stop landing on Runway 33.

Instructor pilot and student pilot reported a NMAC while departing with opposite direction arrival.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon arrival at gate; a Passenger came to the cockpit and reported seeing an aerial drone near the left wing of aircraft on short final to Runway 7R. Neither the Pilot Flying nor I saw anything on short final. A phone call was made to LAX Tower to report the alleged sighting.

A B737 Passenger reported seeing a UAS on short final to LAX Runway 7R. The Pilots did not see the object.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I was being relieved from the CIC position and opened the X Sector which was combined with the Y and Z Sectors due to volume.  At the time of the incident; Henderson Tower requested a release on Aircraft Y on the SCAMR SID with the RASLR transition.  They advised they could provide visual separation with the inbound IFR which I approved.  At the same time I had a flight overflying HND enroute to VGT and another inbound to HND. Upon departure; I pointed out Aircraft Y to the Y Sector observing Aircraft X on the NIITZ Departure so I could maneuver around inbound and overflight traffic.  I observed Aircraft Y above my existing traffic and what appeared to be safely behind Aircraft X as they were approximately 8 miles and 50 KIAS slower than Aircraft X.  I shipped Aircraft Y to ZLA just prior to them reaching 12;000 MSL.  From replays I observed; the loss appeared to have occurred approximately 15-20 miles down line.We are now approximately 30 days into new Metroplex airspace and this procedure is designed to 'blend in' LAS SIDS.  This particular one causes aircraft to unnecessarily fly into each other.  ZLA also has control of these aircraft by LOA at 15;000 MSL.  A simple turn to the RASLR Fix could have avoided this.  I also mentioned the inefficiencies of the new design to our Metroplex team prior to implementation. .

L30 TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation and cited SID design as a contributing factor.


Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I was the First Officer and Pilot Monitoring for our flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. After an uneventful departure and climb we established our cruise at FL360. Approximately 15 minutes into our cruise the Captain noticed a bright light near the top of his side view window. He brought my attention to the window heat unit which was glowing. From my vantage point I initially thought the unit itself was aflame but after several seconds it became apparent that a short existed which was contained within the window panes. A glowing line similar to a light bulb's filament began snaking downwards from the heat unit between the window panes. The Captain tapped the window several times which managed to briefly extinguish the light. We both acknowledged the need to descend as soon as possible and I requested a lower altitude with ATC. ATC mentioned traffic directly in front of us and stated he would try to give us a descent after the traffic passed. During this time; around 10 seconds after the Captain tapped the glass; the short reignited and continued to grow. The Captain noted an acrid smell; unusually high heat emanating from his window; and again expressed the need to descend. I pointed out the traffic; now visible to us; at our 12 o'clock and stated that we can descend shorty after they passed underneath us. For a third time I requested a lower altitude with ATC. The window failed shortly thereafter. The Captain's side view window let out a loud bang and fractures spider-webbed its entirety. For the first time since this incident began we received a L WSHIELD HEAT EICAS message followed by another L WINDOW HEAT EICAS message.Considering the potential for smoke/fumes and loss of cabin pressure we both immediately donned our oxygen masks; ensured they were at 100%; and established communications between ourselves and ATC. As I was donning the mask I saw the previously mentioned traffic pass safely below us. I relayed this to the Captain who began an emergency descent and told me to notify ATC. I [advised ATC] and let the controller know we were beginning a descent. As the Captain was flying our descent I sent an ACARS to Dispatch notifying them of the L WINDOW failure and that we would need a diversion. The Captain noted that we were close to ZZZ2. I plugged ZZZ2 into the fixes page; identifying that we were 55 miles away and subsequently plugged ZZZ3 into the fixes page; identifying us to be 90 miles away. Our first thought was to proceed to ZZZ2 as it was so close. I requested a heading from ATC as the airplane was about to turn north towards ZZZ1 along our original route and that we would likely be diverting to ZZZ2 but were still weighing our options. ATC gave us a heading which we accepted. As we were established in our descent I told the Captain I'd notify the flight attendants. He continued to fly the airplane as I called the FAs. I provided them a brief note of what had happened; that we were diverting; and that we would make an announcement to the passengers when we knew where we were going. They were professional and calm throughout the notification. The Captain handed control of the airplane to me so he could run the QRC and QRH. I accepted the aircraft and he quickly and effectively ran both checklists to their completion. By the end of his checklists we received a message from dispatch identifying ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 as good diversions. We were closer to ZZZ2 but still in the flight levels. We discussed our options. Considering ZZZ3 was a crew base; maintenance base; and nearly perfect to descend to from our present position we elected to proceed to ZZZ3. After establishing ourselves at 10;000 feet we removed the oxygen masks and donned our normal headsets for easier communication. The Captain gave the flight attendants a full briefing and updated the passengers on what had happened and why we were going to ZZZ3. I flew the airplane with autopilot engaged; managed ATC communications; notified dispatch that we were an [priority] aircraft and going to ZZZ3; and proceeded to obtain ZZZ3 weather; performance numbers; and set up the approach in the FMS. By the time the Captain completed his duties we were at 5;000 feet and on delaying vectors for Runway XXL into ZZZ3. We discussed what both of us had done ensuring we had not missed any items seeking immediate attention. Satisfied; he briefed the approach; we ran the descent checklist; I transferred the aircraft controls back to him; and I notified ATC that we were ready to proceed to the airport. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully. I called Ops to ensure we had a gate; we shot the approach; several emergency vehicles followed us after landing; and we canceled [with ATC] while taxiing in.The Captain detected a light in his peripheral vision. He discovered a short working its way through the window pane.Repeated cycling of the windshield heat in a prior checklist revision likely led to the unit's failure and short. We knew it was likely a matter of time until the window failed. We immediately began planning our descent and diversion choices.I was surprised at how challenging it was to hear ATC and/or the FAs with the oxygen masks on. Our breathing was very loud over the intercom/speaker which made it very hard to hear other voices. It might be worth noting in sim sessions.

First Officer reported that the Captain's side window experienced a short in the window heat system; requiring an emergency descent and a diversion to a precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 703; Flight Crew Type 259

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

During a training flight; in preparation for a checkride; student applied takeoff power for takeoff. During the takeoff roll; 5 kts below the rotation speed; student lost control of the aircraft; resulting in the aircraft veering off the runway. There were no injuries to personal or damage to the aircraft.

PA30 instructor reported student lost control of the aircraft on takeoff resulting in a runway excursion.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 20

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

I was flying touch and goes in a Cessna Skycatcher 162 [on a turf runway]. After making two touch and goes in which the nose wheel never touched the ground I came in flying right traffic and was cleared for the option. On downwind something seemed different about the engine as I reduced power and after being cleared for the option I decided it would be a full stop. On short final flaps were set to full and power was set to idle. All speeds throughout the approach were normal and glide path was normal. Airplane was trimmed for a normal landing with minimal flare (as had been instructed to do by club CFI's). Recall stick slipping forward; unsure if it was just before touchdown or when mains touched down on the grass. Nose-wheel dug into the ground and heard it snap backwards. Held nose up as long as possible and then it settled down into the turf. Engine was still running as nose contacted the ground. I turned off the master and the fuel immediately and stepped out of the airplane. Walked back to the club office in the hangars and called the Tower on the landline. Stated I would walk out to meet with responders and be in contact with them later. Having a way for the Tower to communicate to pilots the actual state of the grass runway (how soft it is) could have helped to prevent this from occurring.

C162 pilot landing on a turf runway; makes two touch and go's during which the nose wheel never touches down. On the third landing (planned full stop) the aircraft nose pitches down on landing and the tire digs into the turf causing nose gear failure.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Bleeds off TO. After starting engines; I turned off APU switch - IAW Normal after start flow. I should have left APU switch on IAW OM XXX.6 (Bleeds off/APU on TO). We did; however; carefully configure bleeds/packs IAW OM XXX.6. We did not subsequently catch that APU switch was off before takeoff. After departure; First Officer reconfigured bleeds/packs IAW with XXX.6 and continued normal flight to ZZZ.This was the 4th line trip I've flown at airline since April 2020. A lack of recency flying into ZZZZ1 and a reliance on the muscle memory/normal after start flows contributed to my error in turning the APU off prematurely. Both the First Officer and I were very aware of the bleeds/packs configuration as we had previously emphasized this TO briefing item at the gate prior to departure. Ultimately; by accurately following the pre-briefed OM 120.6 to reintroduce bleeds/packs after TO we trapped my error and the threat was mitigated.We received ACARS msg and SELCAL warning bleeds/packs off on climbout as First Officer was restoring the bleeds/packs per OM XXX.6. The SELCAL was a helpful reminder/backup to the crew.

Air carrier Captain reported a lack of recency flying and a reliance on the muscle memory/normal after start flows contributed to an error in turning the APU off prematurely.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Total 21630; Flight Crew Type 3538

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Taxiway F in SFO to Runways 28L and 28R; particularly where F crosses Runways 1L and 1R; has undesirable dips and uneven pavement. Pilots unfamiliar with SFO and taxiing within acceptable taxi speeds might endure such abrupt vertical drops and rises that standing flight attendants suffer injury. This pavement is a hazard. It either needs to be fixed; notated on the airport information pages; or identified by taxiway signage noting significant dips ahead.

B737 Captain reported Taxiway F at SFO airport has dips and uneven pavement. The Captain is concerned about standing Flight Attendant's safety.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Local. I told Air Carrier Y to XXXX after traffic had crossed threshold. After traffic exited; I inadvertently cleared Air Carrier X to land instead of Air Carrier Y to takeoff. I did not notice my error. After a bit of time I became concerned Air Carrier Y was not rolling and it was getting close. Ground Controller questioned whether I had in fact cleared Air Carrier Y to takeoff. I cleared him for immediate. Distance was not sufficient for takeoff so I cancelled takeoff clearance and sent Air Carrier X around. I did not think I was capable of such a wrong transmission in the first place.

Tower Controller described a runway conflict when failing to note that incorrect clearances were issued to the landing and departing aircraft.


Fairchild Swearingen Undifferentiated or Other Model

Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

I was the IOE Instructor captain in the right seat. The IOE pilot was flying from the left seat and was manipulating the controls during all phases of flight. During taxi to the runway IOE pilot mentioned that the right power lever was difficult to bring over the gate into the reverse position.While taxiing we received clearance to takeoff. The IOE pilot did his pre-takeoff checklist and then taxied onto runway XX. He lined the aircraft up with the centerline of the runway and came to a stop. ATC did advise that there was arriving traffic on a 5 mile final. The IOE pilot advanced the power levers slowly. The aircraft began to drift left of centerline. The IOE pilot applied some right brake and slowly advanced the left power lever to bring the aircraft back to the centerline. However; the aircraft continued to move to the left towards the left side of the runway. I said to bring the aircraft back to the right. I then instructed the IOE pilot to bring both power levers into reverse and abort the takeoff. The IOE pilot was attempting to bring both power levers into reverse even as I instructed him to do so. The right power lever did not get positioned into reverse due partially the difficulty mentioned earlier as well as the pilot's heightened anxiety pulling the lever harder against the stop.The aircraft continued left off the runway and came to a stop. Meanwhile; we pulled the Stop and Feather levers full out to stop the engines. Then we turned off the batteries. We then inspected the aircraft exterior and the runway edge lights. No damage occurred.There was some 'rush' created by ATC when they announced another aircraft on a 5 mile final. There are 2 choices in this case. The first is to not accept the takeoff clearance. The second is to proceed somewhat normally and if the arriving aircraft needs to go-around then that is to be accepted.When a situation gets critical; it is normal for people to tense up. In this case; that might have made it even more difficult to position the right power lever into the reverse position. It is important to try to stay less tense and apply normal pressure in order to achieve the desired result.In all twin engine aircraft; it important to be prepared for (almost expecting) an issue on takeoff; the most critical phase of flight in a twin. Therefore; when a deviation occurs the pilot is mentally prepared to abort if the situation warrants.

Check Airman on a Metroliner reported that the IOE pilot lost control of the aircraft on takeoff resulting in a runway excursion.


Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Physiological - Other; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Shortly after take-off I smelled a funny odor. I was the A Flight Attendant (FA) so I made an all call to the crew to see if they smelled it also. All flight attendants smelled a strange odor. The front smelled like musty socks and the back smelled like parmesan cheese. I called the captain to tell him about the smell and he said they smelled it as well but they were climbing higher and thought it would dissipate. The D-E-H were all sitting in the forward galley with me. We all had headaches and distorted vision. Soon afterwards; I called the back galley to see if the odor dissipated; it didn't and was informed that our one pregnant (F) Flight attendant was being put on Oxygen. I called the captain to tell him that (F) was on oxygen and while I was on the phone I was informed B-C-F were all on Oxygen. I told the captain we didn't feel safe continuing. He said they were turning the plane around. I got up to go check on the FA's in the back and immediately felt light-headed and caught myself on the jumpseat. The E flight attendant told me to sit down and we got the oxygen bottles down and we were sharing the two bottles between the four of us. We were in the air for about 50 mins total. We landed at XA:14. Upon landing no one in inflight met our aircraft. The 'B' FA called crew service center and within 15 minutes inflight showed up to check on us. We told the inflight supervisors that we wanted to have blood tests run for Carbon Monoxide poisoning. They arranged for transportation to see a company doctor. We arrived there at XC:00. The company doctor said that he couldn't do the blood test. We were involved in many company calls through-out this ordeal and taxis were arranged for us to go to the hospital to get the blood test done. I was never seen by the company doctor since the taxis were on their way to take us to the Emergency Room (ER). A Manager showed up and about an hour later the taxis came. We arrived at the Hospital [5 hours after landing]. We saw the gate agent; who met our flight; in the ER waiting room; who didn't feel well; and we were informed also that three of our passengers needed treatment. The ER process was very fast and had blood drawn to check our CO levels. The doctor informed us that we should have been admitted soon after getting off the airplane. The test results will be forwarded to the company. According to Station Maintenance they washed the left engine the night before and were supposed to let it run for 10-20 minutes as procedure dictated; but the proper time wasn't allotted.I suggest during a fume incident that it should be company policy that you go straight to the ER for CO testing.I suggest that maintenance not take shortcuts when it comes to crew & passenger safety.

We opened the auxiliary kit and put on masks. It was decided that the F needed to go on oxygen immediately as she is 5 months pregnant and we did not know what kind of fumes we were inhaling. Within 10 minutes from the beginning of the smell; we had 2 more bottles of oxygen between the other 3 of us in the back (B; C and G). The G decided not to use oxygen.Upon landing and deplaning we were not met by any manager; supervisor or paramedic. We had to call to ask someone to meet us. We were told by our pilots (who received information from the engineers); that the planes left engine had been cleaned the night before and 'may' not have had the engine run for 10-20 minutes to burn off chemicals; even though that is protocol after engines are cleaned.At this point; I was extremely disoriented; my eyes burned and I had a splitting headache. We all wanted to see a doctor and have our CO levels tested. Shayna began making calls and arranged for [medical] to pick us all up. It took over an hour between getting off the plane and being picked up to be checked out by the company doctor.We found out shortly after arriving at clinic that they would be unable to perform the blood test we needed done. At this point we were trying to get [ground] to take us someplace that could do the test. A Manager showed up and said taxis were on their way. It took about an hour and a half to be shuttled to the hospital.Once at the hospital; we were all admitted extremely quickly. Once I met with the doctor; my blood was drawn and tested for CO levels. The doctor told me it was most likely to come back with normal levels because of how long it had been since our exposure to the toxic fumes and that we should have been tested within a few hours. The test results will be forwarded to the company.There needs to be a very specific protocol for when there is a toxic fume event. We should NOT have been sent to [company medical provider]. They were extremely unprofessional and were unable to perform the test we needed done. Hours were lost spending time there and getting transportation to a location that was able to do the test.

After takeoff; A330 flight attendants detected a strong chemical odor similar to 'spoiled eggs and vomit' which physiologically affected the crew and passengers. The flight returned to the departure airport. Post flight medical examinations revealed physiological symptoms; but blood tests samples were hours delayed and inconclusive.


Workload; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Filed to fly the SUNSS RNAV STAR into PHX. ABQ Center cleared us to cross ITEMM at FL240 and then descend via the KOOLY STAR. Per company directive the Captain (pilot not flying) told the Controller we were unable the KOOLY and had to remain on flight plan. The Controller than gave us ITEMM direct SQUES 'descend via' the SUNSS STAR which had us crossing SUNSS at 11;000 FT and 250 KTS. As we began our descent to cross SUNSS the Controller asked our altitude we stopped at 20;500 FT and the Captain relayed our understanding of the clearance. He indicated he had not given the via instruction that we had understood. The Controller then cleared us to cross SQUES at 12;000 FT and 250 KTS which is actually part of the KOOLY STAR. I am not sure what the problem with the MD 80 fleet and the arrivals into PHX are but the confusion on the Controllers' part as well as our own is making the situation more difficult to manage than I believe is necessary. If we are going to continue to be restricted not to fly the PHX arrivals then ALL of the ABQ Center controllers need to be aware of this. They should not clear us for a procedure we are not able to do. It just leads to too much confusion for all.

[No substantive additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]

Confusion reigned when ATC and the MD-82 flight crew struggled with ATC desire to clear them via the KOOLY RNAV STAR and the flight crew advised they had been directed by company bulletins to only accept the RNAV STAR by which they had been flight planned; in this case the SUNSS RNAV STAR.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 250; Flight Crew Type 75

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Upon initial climb out of ZZZ; front seat non-pilot passenger reporting seeing 'flashes of light' from behind instrument panel; at the top right corner where the panel meets the glare shield. Flashes were sporadic and intermittent. I; as pilot; was unable to see them due to my angle. Passenger then reported possibility of smelling something burning; which I did not smell. Continued climb; assessed situation; and found nothing apparently wrong. No breakers had tripped. All instruments were fine. No smoke. A few minutes later; flashing resumed and we both got a strong whiff of burning in the cabin. I was already in contact with Approach and requested immediate diversion to ZZZ1; which was granted. Landed without incident with great support from ZZZ1 Approach and Tower.Had plane checked by mechanic the next day and they found a piece of metal insulation (looked like thick aluminum foil with adhesive on the back) that had started to fall behind the panel and was shorting across the terminals on the back of the Hobbs meter. The metal piece exhibited signs of burning on its corner. I was not present when the piece was removed; but I believe it came from under the glare shield. I do have photos of the piece after removal if interested. Piece removed and plane made subsequent flight without incident.Plane typically sits in hangar but was on the ramp that weekend due to travel. I suspect the sun/heat caused the metal piece to lose adhesiveness and start to separate; but again I was not present at the time of its removal.

C182 pilot reported flashes of light appeared from behind the instrument panel accompanied by a burning odor.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 28

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

This is an unknown event but was reported to the Management team as part of a monthly audit.  The results of the audit cannot be used for IPM.  One mid shift per month is audited looking for compliance with procedures such as opposite direction ops; vehicles on runways/closed runways safe practices; and compliance with midnight shift coordination procedures; among other items.  On this July midnight shift; coordination procedures were not done as per PCT/IAD LOA.  Between the hours of XX00 and XF00Z eleven arrivals were not handed off or otherwise coordinated by PCT and seven departures were not coordinated by LC3.  There were no land line coordinations between PCT and IAD suspending or resuming midnight coordination procedures nor was there a log entry stating the same.  It was not mentioned in the relief briefing at XD55Z.  This is the second mid shift audited during successive months where this occurred.  There were no losses of separation. Additionally; the mid shift CIC issued LUAW clearances throughout the shift when all positions were combined at LC3; contrary to directives.  Mandated by National Directive; midnight coordination procedures were agreed upon by both the Tower and TRACON to try to mitigate lapses in two-way communication between controllers and pilots.  TRACON would not switch airplanes to the Tower until the handoff was accepted and Tower would not allow an aircraft to roll unless they coordinated the release.  What happened on this shift is a blatant disregard of required procedures.  However; it is no surprise to me because this particular Controller disregarded the previous midnight controller procedures that existed for over a year.  In addition to being reported via memo to the ATM; these mid shifts were entered in CEDAR.  Since this important safety procedure was ignored twice; this event was also entered in CEDAR as a possible systemic issue. I repeat what I said in my previous report on this subject: NATCA Local has already gotten wind of prior occurrences of these off-the-record mutual agreements between PCT and its associated Towers.  They warned controllers to stop.  I am frankly astounded that it's being done; just like I was astounded a week ago to find out that mid shift controllers are taking their fatigue mitigation rest periods in their private vehicles in the parking lot!  It has gotten out of hand.  What is needed is more Management oversight of all mid shift procedures and more compliance enforcement.

IAD Support Specialist describes mid-shift where controllers working at IAD and PCT are not following the LOA and SOP for each of the facilities causing potential communication problems relating to losses of separation.