Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 1120; Flight Crew Type 1022

Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I went for a short flight; weather came up much faster and worse than forecast; and I ended up in weather I shouldn't have been in. ROA ATC helped me a lot; and I really appreciate it. I checked weather radar and DUATS late morning including TAFs for ROA and BCB; which is near the beginning of the LDA 6 into ROA. Storms were not forecast until late afternoon; ceiling was 2;300 at and 6;000 at BCB; so I headed to the ROA airport to fly my aircraft since it had been sitting unused for almost two weeks. I decided to eat lunch first; so it was afternoon before I was ready for takeoff. It started raining but was good VFR. Instead of doing touch and goes I decided to ask for an IFR clearance for an LDA 6 in case the visibility lowered due to the rain. Heading out Departure told me of light to moderate rain but no reports of a bad ride. A few minutes later planes on the approach were asking for vectors around a storm and I was seeing the clouds around me light up. I realized that; had I been planning a trip; I would have postponed it for weather half this bad. I was third for the approach and the strikefinder and communications of other aircraft indicated that the lightning was ahead so I slowed down. I had strong up and down drafts; which are normal with the wind and the mountains; but I also got my first carb ice ever. I was IMC and it took me a while to notice the loss of engine power; mistaking it for a downdraft at first; but I put on the carb heat in time with classic symptoms of a rough engine then it returned to full power. ROA Approach gave me vectors away from the storm and I commented that I wished I hadn't taken this flight. I think Approach could tell that I was feeling a bit worried. I lost track of the first plane on the approach; but the second diverted to a hold. Then Approach put me in front of him despite my 50 KT ground speed while heading outbound to the IAF. I never encountered much turbulence. I asked for a tight turn onto the LDA in part to stay away from the storm and in part because I was feeling bad that I was in the way of pilots hauling passengers. The approach went well; but the deep puddles on the ground during taxi surprised me. The weather was a LOT worse than I had expected. I cannot say enough about the ROA Approach Controller. I was a bit confused as to exactly where the storm was. ATC gave me enough information and offered vectors around the storm; but also gave me time to concentrate on flying the plane. I think he put me on the approach in front of another plane because he sensed I was nervous. I could have flown outbound faster and caused less of a traffic jam; but I was flying slow on purpose since I thought I was still waiting my turn at the approach. Maybe the Controller could have asked me to speed up; but maybe he was keeping my workload down by not bothering me. In the future I will double check the weather as close to takeoff time as I can. I do this for long trips but let my guard down for a local flight. Filing IFR seemed safer when I did it; but only getting in a few touch and goes before calling it quits due to weather would have been better.

A solo single engine pilot departed ROA on an IFR training flight and was unexpectedly caught in a weather system which arrived in airport vicinity hours earlier than forecast so he requested ATC's assistance for an immediate return.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I am filling out this form due to a possible pilot deviation call we received from ATC on our change of destination. We were on an IFR flight plan originating from home station. A line of storms stretching from [across the coast]; was preventing departure clearance from clearing us IFR through normal routing to our destination; as all the gates were closed. We were told the only IFR option was at low altitude. To make this possible we contacted our flight follower through ARINC and proposed a flight plan to a mid-Atlantic airport using the escape route and also filed another flight plan. This was in hopes of flying south to get around the storms to the west and finally proceeding to our final destination. We were under the impression that this was the only way to get out of the departure airport without waiting possibly 3-5 hours for the storms to pass. We were able to pick up the clearance south and flew the escape route and once we got to the point where there was a gap in the storms (further south) we requested a change of destination to a Midwest airport. Center then handed us off to approach who accommodated our request; after first being assured that we did indeed have a flight plan on file. Approach cleared us through to our intermediate fuel stop and gave us a climb to FL230. Passing approximately FL200; Approach informed us Center wouldn't be able to take us and gave us a right 90 degree turn. Approximately 30 degrees into the turn Approach told us that Center did take the handoff and turned us back left on course. We were eventually handed off to Center. We were given a new altitude of FL340 and were climbing from FL230-340 when we received a call from Center to copy down a number for possible pilot deviation. We were quite surprised by this call and were in communication with our company aircraft who had accomplished the same change of destination about 5-10 minutes ahead of us and had received the same possible deviation call from ATC. They headed on uneventfully to our destination and we made a fuel stop and then onto our final destination; where we completed our flying for the day. Once on the ground; we called ATC on the number; and were told no need for further explanation; that they were in contact with another pilot on the aircraft ahead of us; who could explain the issue. We were told by our colleague in the other aircraft that there were no flight deviations or regulatory breaches but that we had a created an undue workload and upset the normal operations of Center on a busy day with convective weather complications.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A corporate flight crew reported ATC would not issue an IFR clearance because weather had closed all desired IFR gateways. The crew elected to deviate and continue; their actions disrupted ATC operations.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft X was on the SILCN 4 arrival landing RWY 12R. He was instructed; 'After EDMND maintain 030.' After Aircraft X reached that fix he started to descend rapidly. The developmental; without observing the rapid descent told the aircraft to descend to 020. The aircraft was at the 040 ft MVA when he issued this instruction. I told the developmental to tell Aircraft X to maintain 030. The aircraft was at 032 when he was instructed to maintain 030 but he continued descending to 023 before he climbed back up again. This was an unusually fast descent. The aircraft hit the 030 ft MVA at 023. I'm going to override his transmissions whenever he does or says something that I don't like instead of telling him to fix it. I'm also going to ask for a training team meeting whenever I see my supervisor and discuss possibly SET (Special Enhanced Training) training for MVAs.

TRACON Instructor reported a developmental issued an altitude below the MVA; and the aircraft descended rapidly below the MVA.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 408; Flight Crew Type 23500

With the new program of pushing early; I feel the agents are under undue pressure to push early and this pressure is passed on to the flight crews. Today I had two open maintenance write-ups and needed to amend the release; but Operations just kept trying to hurry me; so we could push early. Under these conditions; I feel it would be really easy to rush and make a mistake. I feel that top Leadership has put too much emphasis on pushing early at the expense of safety. I feel the next incident at our Company will be caused by rushing the crews to push early. Quit putting so much pressure on employees to push early; slow down; and make safety a priority.

Air Carrier Captain laments his company's policy to pushback early whenever possible; believing that it puts too much pressure on all of the employees involved and will lead to mistakes.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Flight was cleared for approach into Runway XX at ZZZ. After noticing the approach was too high; the flight crew executed a go-around and missed approach. The flight crew then tried to re-establish contact with ATC but was not successful. After reaching missed approach altitude the flight crew decided to turn and make left hand traffic for Runway XX; where we made a visual approach and landing while making position reports on the local CTAF frequency. After landing; it was realized that the flight crew could have potentially violated the proper missed approach procedure or additional approach clearances into ZZZ after not being able to contact ATC. After parking at gate; Captain called ATC via phone to cancel IFR.One possible cause could be the relatively rare experience of flying into an uncontrolled field at night and the procedures that are associated with that. There was also some confusion about the type of approach the flight was cleared to execute; in this case; RNAV or visual approach into Runway XX. We believed we were cleared for the visual approach. However; being unable to contact ATC added confusion and doubt to the situation after landing. Flight delays most likely added stress as well.The first suggestion for future experiences would be to be more mindful and diligent about confirming the type of approach we are cleared to execute. This would have clarified the proper procedure when executing a go-around. A second potential solution would have been to gain altitude in order to try and contact ATC. As for the approach; the flight crew could have requested vectors to leave and then rejoin the approach when the aircraft was at a more appropriate altitude before needing to execute the go-around.

After executing the go around; [we] climbed to pattern altitude to make a left traffic pattern instead of executing the published missed approach. [We were] unable to re establish contact with ATC after the go around. [We] did a visual approach to a landing. Crew believed ATC cleared for visual approach; therefore not requiring the published missed approach. [We should] clarify approach clearance with ATC [next time].

Air carrier flight crew reported; after an unstable approach at night to an uncontrolled airport; not executing the published missed approach.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft

I was replacing the Fuel Sump Water Drain Valve because it was leaking. Than; during replacement; the retainer clip failed; allowing fuel to exit the wing; leading up to a minor fuel spill that we were able to contained.

A Mechanic reports that during replacement of a Fuel Sump Drain Valve on an A319 aircraft; the valve retainer clip failed; and allowing fuel to exit the wing. A minor fuel spill occurred in their hangar.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Approximately 5 minutes after level off at FL330; an intermittent [cabin altitude] warning horn sounded. QRC items were accomplished; but unable to control cabin altitude in standby. Cabin altitude [was] at approximately 11;000 FT.Informed ATC of problem and requested descent to 10;000 FT and were told to stand by. We were able to see the mountain visually in the sunrise and on our terrain display well to the south; so we requested and were denied descent again.Since we could observe no traffic below us on TCAS we declared an emergency and commenced emergency descent to 10;000 FT. We regained control of the cabin after leveling at 10;000 FT in manual AC mode. Flight attendants notified and reported feeling light headed. We decided to return to our departure airport where we made a normal landing.

[Narrative #2 had no additional information.]

When ATC failed to clear them for their requested descent to 10;000 FT; the flight crew of a B737-400; unable to control their pressurization; declared an emergency and initiated their descent.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 132; Flight Crew Total 12595; Flight Crew Type 9607

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

We flew the airplane in from ZZZ1 on Flight ABC; arriving late at XA:05L. We were late due to the previous flight arriving late into ZZZ1 and then circuitous ATC routing for an arrival from the NE (ZZZZZ Intersection; ZZZZZ1 STAR). Because of our late arrival our outbound flight was designated a quick turn. During this Pandemic; NO flight should be designated a quick turn or the time required to accomplish a quick turn should be greatly increased. During this Pandemic; designating a flight a quick turn leads to all the well-intentioned folks on the ground becoming rushed. Operations designates blame if the quick turn is not accomplished in the allotted time and this further complicates and rushes activities. Cleaning is rushed or inadequate; time required to spray the aircraft is not accounted for in the quick turn time. Catering is rushed; deplaning and boarding take much longer during the Pandemic; gate agents become rushed and mechanics are rushed to fix or defer any maintenance issues. This rushing leads to intense time pressure; mistakes in judgment and errors in execution; all of which could lead to an accident or incident. Fortunately; there was not an accident or an incident on this flight. There were a few errors; however. During the Pandemic; ZZZ Catering has not been boarding any special meals; so the Captain had to leave the airplane to obtain a meal that he could eat. This takes some time to accomplish in a crowded ZZZ Airport around dinner time.During the Pandemic; I (the Captain) accomplish a short pre-flight safety briefing to the passengers with special emphasis on seat belt usage during climbout; descent or during any en-route turbulence and proper mask wear throughout the flight to prevent the spread of COVID. Boarding had been completed; catering was finishing up as I started my PA with the cockpit door closed. The Gate Agent opened the cockpit door and without waiting a beat; announced loudly; 'You got everything you need?'  When I held up my hand to silence the Gate Agent because I was in the middle of making a PA; the Gate Agent turned to the FO and asked him loudly; 'Well; do you got everything you need?'  I stopped making my safety PA; put on my mask and told the Agent that 'I'll be done in a minute; I'd like you to leave the cockpit; so that I can finish making my PA. I'll come let you know when I'm done; please shut the door on your way out.' The Gate Agent turned and left the cockpit; but did not close the cockpit. I got up; slammed the cockpit door shut and made a few loud choice remarks to myself. The choice comments were definitely an error on my part. I composed myself and then finished making my safety PA. Shortly thereafter; I put my mask back on; exited the cockpit and told the Gate Agent that we had everything we needed and the Gate Agent could close the Cabin Door. The Gate Agent closed the cabin door; I returned to the cockpit and we accomplished the Before Push Checklist.I checked in with the ground crew and she told me that catering had noticed some large scratches around Door 1R and that the Mechanic was telling her not to push. I asked to speak with the Mechanic and she promptly put him on the headset. The Mechanic had invalidated our current maintenance release and explained that catering had noticed several large scratches around Door 1R. He would need to measure the scratches and then go check the aircraft maintenance history to see if they had previously been noted and properly recorded. I told the FAs; made an announcement about the delay and turned the seat belt sign off. I asked the FO to call Operations and have them bring the jetway back to the airplane. In a couple of minutes; the Agent returned the jetway to the aircraft and Door 1L was opened. During a Pandemic; it is not the time to keep passengers wearing masks; trapped on an airplane. Just having an opportunity to leave the airplane actually reduces the stress and anxiety to feel the need to do so. 15 minutesinto the delay; a Maintenance Supervisor got on the headset and said we'd have a new maintenance release in 7 - 10 minutes. We got a new maintenance release in about 8 minutes; closed Door 1L; turned on the seat belt sign and pushed back 38 minutes late. We arrived safely in ZZZ3; only 14 minutes late.Before departing; I quickly reviewed the new maintenance release; which looked OK in spite of it not showing a new write-up or a new / previously inspected / signed-off of the scratches around Door 1R. If it's important enough to delay an already late flight by another 25 minutes; it's important enough to write up the scratches or notate that those scratches were previously recorded and within limits. I don't believe there's anything wrong with adding a 2nd written sign-off to a previously recorded or to a verbally added maintenance gripe; but it would be helpful if the flight crew knew about it. Whenever pilots call in a maintenance gripe we are always advised to follow it up. If the rampers or catering verbally reports a maintenance gripe to a mechanic; then that mechanic should likewise have to make a written report of the gripe. He can then appropriately sign it off; defer it or notate as previously inspected. Verbally noting; recording and signing off of a valid maintenance gripe leaves much to be desired. I'll say it again; if it's important enough to delay an already late flight by another 25 minutes; it's important enough to write it up.

Air carrier Captain reported concerns relating to a quick turn of an aircraft and the flight being delayed due to scratches found on a door requiring a new maintenance release.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

While working dayshift C-Check overtime; I was assigned wheel wells/struts. One of the non-routines [(write-ups)] was that the #3 brake was worn. After viewing the indication pin on the brake; there was obviously well over the allowed pin length remaining before a brake change would be needed. The only way to accurately measure this length is to turn hydraulics on and set the brakes. After clearing (notifying) the mechanics working on the trailing edge right wing; I cleared the mechanics working on the tail. Then walked around the left wing where no one was working and after yelling 'HYDRAULICS;' proceeded up to the flight deck.I checked the flap handle position to ensure it was at 40-units; and turned flight controls off. I removed the guard on the hydraulic switches; which I assumed were locked out from the mechanics working on the trailing edge wings and turned on the 'B' System Hydraulic power. I immediately heard a loud noise and turned off hydraulic power. The leading edge Krueger flaps had been retracted and the #2 Engine inboard thrust reverser was open and when hydraulic power was applied; the Krueger flaps extended which caught the thrust reverser sleeve causing damage to the sleeve and the hold open rod. I realized that I had cleared the mechanics working the wings; but had not looked at the position of the leading edge and #2 inboard thrust reverser.

A Mechanic reports that he heard a loud noise when he turned on the the 'B' System Hydraulic pressure on a B737-300 aircraft to check brake wear on the right main gear; during a dayshift C-Check overtime. The leading edge Krueger flaps had extended; damaging the opened #2 Engine inboard thrust reverser sleeve and hold-open rod.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Enroute from ZZZ to ZZZ1; shortly after leveling off at cruise altitude; we received an IMBAL (imbalance) message and saw that our right fuel tank had 1;000 lbs less than the left tank. We had just turned off our center fuel pumps a few minutes prior. We performed the IMBAL checklist which then led us to the Fuel Leak Engine checklist. By this point it was decided that the safest course of action was to return to ZZZ. We requested priority handling and were cleared direct to ZZZ and were given a descent clearance. We shut down the #2 engine per the Fuel Leak Engine checklist. We also performed the One Engine Inoperative Landing checklist; the Non-Routine Landing Considerations checklist; and the Overweight Landing checklist. I was the Pilot Flying until downwind; at which time the Captain took the controls and landed the aircraft. We stopped on the runway and had the firefighters check out the aircraft. Everything looked ok to them and we were cleared to taxi to the gate. The Captain made an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) entry for the suspected fuel leak and overweight landing.The only causal factor was the mechanical irregularity of the right fuel tank showing 1;000 lbs less than the left; which gave us the IMBAL message.

B737-800 First Officer reported a fuel imbalance message in flight; causing an in-flight shut down of the #2 engine and a return to the departure airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

This event played out over the course of about 45 minutes. It started with one of the Flight Attendants calling the cockpit saying a Passenger had grabbed her by the lapel of her shirt and pulled her towards him demanding to know if the American Flag pin on her collar was an ICE (Immigrations and Customs Service) pin. The suspect was aggressive towards the Flight Attendant. After she called; we went in lockdown and I made the assumption and told the FAs and FO that this was a Level 1 Threat. I notified Dispatch and began coordinating our arrival to ZZZ. After several minutes; and after looking at the Ops Binder; I realized that it was in fact a Level 2 Threat. The suspect continued to use aggressive language towards both female Flight Attendants but did not become more physically aggressive after the initial confrontation. The FAs told me that two Company Ramp Personnel were seated in front of the suspect and they had offered any and all assistance in case the suspect became more aggressive.We were only about 30 minutes from ZZZ when this started; the FO continued his flying duties and I coordinated with the FAs; Dispatch; Center and Ground Operations at ZZZ. It was a busy time for both of us and there was weather in the area to deviate around that added to the conditions at hand. The FO did a masterful job flying and talking with ATC; but I felt as though we were in and out of the green and yellow a number of times. In the descent; we decided to [advise ATC of the situation]. This really reduced the workload and distraction as ATC gave us direct ZZZ with deviations as necessary.Operating on the edge of the green and yellow; over a period of time; has a physiological effect that I never saw before. First off; there was an increased level of stress; not knowing if this guy was going to lose it and become combative; in which case would have meant an immediate divert; and in that case; would we then be intercepted and escorted to our destination. This along with the coordination quite obviously gets the adrenaline going. With that said; the one error that I know I made was taxiing about half-way into the Safety Zone before I realized there was no Marshaller in place to guide us in. I stopped; waited for him to come and the rest of the taxi in was uneventful.

B737 Captain reported a Flight Attendant had been grabbed by her shirt by an aggressive passenger. The Captain followed the procedures for a level 2 threat.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Bonanza 36 departed ZZZ IFR climbing to 3;000 [feet] on a coordinated 040 heading. Upon reaching 3;000 [feet]; the pilot requested higher stating he wanted to get out of the clouds. I told him I could send him direct at 3;000 [feet]; or turn him east and climb him to 4;000 [feet] shortly. He chose to fly the 040 heading and stay at 3;000 [feet]. At this point; I noticed on the STARS he had turned to a northerly heading and was correcting back to 040. I also noticed his altitude was high. A B737-800; a departure off ZZZ1 was level at 4;000 [feet]; talking to Departure South. Departure climbed the aircraft to 5;000 [feet] which is normal practice for some. At this point; I noticed the Bonanza in a right turn northwest bound and climbing; conflicting with the B737-800. I told the pilot to descend back to 3;000 [feet] and turn back to the right. That is when the pilot told me he was having problems with his auto pilot. I informed Departure South of the aircraft and they began working 'around' me. I told the pilot the only tops report I had which was 80 miles east of 8;000 [feet] and he said he wanted to go there. I issued a 090 heading and climbed the Bonanza to 8;000 [feet]; coordinating with other sectors.  The pilot continued a left turn back toward ZZZ1; so I stopped all departures off ZZZ1. I asked the pilot if was having problems with the directional gyro or the auto pilot. He restated the auto pilot; however he would not maintain an altitude; nor even a constant climb or descent. I asked if he wanted no-gyro vectors and he said yes. I issued a right turn; but he continued left. Assuming the pilot had spatial disorientation; I told the pilot to level the wings; and not look out the window. I told him once he was flying straight to see if his directional gyro and compass were aligned; which he said they were. We started to discuss options about returning to the airport; or any airport and the pilot agreed. However; he was still flying erratically. I got him level on a southwesterly heading and told him to descend; and that the bases would be about 3;000 [feet] or so; and that the highest obstruction was about 1;500 [feet] over downtown. With the help of a fellow pilot/controller; I told him to lower his gear and reduced manifold pressure to 18 (1800) to establish a gentle decent. About 7 miles north of ZZZ; he broke out of the clouds and I told him to fly southbound for a downwind to Runway 4. At that point; the pilot asked if he could turn on course to ZZZ2 VFR! I told him he could; however; there was a line of storms extending [through the South] with low IFR ceilings and suggested he land at ZZZ to examine his options. He said he was fine and would continue on to ZZZ2. I told him to maintain VFR and fly on course. He was handed off to Satellite.  While I did everything I could think of to assist the pilot; and enjoyed the assistance of several other team members helping me and providing advice; this ultimately rests on the pilot. He was apparently capable of IFR flight; but when he realized he had an issue; he should have put the aircraft on the ground; reassessed his options; and determined if flying that day was appropriate. I am not sure there is anything else we as controllers could have done to assist him.

TRACON Controller described a pilot disorientation event when the pilot requested to get out of the clouds; was assisted to VMC conditions and then requested VFR to his destination.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

October 2013; we had an A-7 Inspection Check; so both wing panels; N542AT and N642AT (on top of the wing); were open for landing gear lube; to work on a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) (verifying modification on Retract Actuator) and Airworthiness Directive (A/D) for Retract Actuator Corrosion Check. After I checked for modification; Mechanic X put the cover in position [but not attached]; so no FOD entered (and the screws piled on top of it) and we proceeded to work on the Right-Hand (RH) Landing Gear actuator change. I was concentrating on the RH actuator change. I verified all the cotter pins; operation of the actuator and installation of the RH wing [upper] panel. In the meantime; I went to check the other airplane which had to be released for XA:00 am flight. At that time we all were rushing to get the aircraft ready for morning departure without making any delays. By the time Mechanic X handed me a signed copy of the FCD Card; which required an RII Inspection; the aircraft was already pushed out of the hangar. When I went to do the RII; the engine was already running. I did a walk around and checked the panel on its place; it is XA:00 am in the morning and still dark. The Left-Hand (LH) wing was on the other side of the hangar which affected the visibility. Since the engine was running; I tried to use my flashlight and look at the panels from a safe distance. I did not see any panel out of position or missing or any loose screws on the top of the wing. When verifying the panel; I was not close enough as I usually [am]; because the engine was running. When I [returned] the next night to work; I was told that the CRJ-700 aircraft I released for service; the LH Actuator inspection panel came off and fell to the ground during aircraft taxiing. This incident happened because we were all in rush to prepare the aircraft for flight on time. The finding of corrosion on the RH actuator [was] cause to be replaced and needed extra time to accomplish the work. This creates time constraints to finish [work] on the same limited time. The Lead Mechanic ordered all the mechanics to finish their paperwork while they were in the middle of the work. That makes the Mechanic to sign-off before finishing what he has started. The Inspector; (me); couldn't get to the problem because the engine was running while walking the plane; and couldn't be close enough to assure the screws are tightened or not. Since the loose screws were not shown on the top of the wing; I thought it was tightened and flushed with the [aircraft] skin; since I [had already] seen Mechanic X tightening the RH wing panel. Routine Overnight Maintenance (RON). A-Check. Stress. Graveyard.

An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector describes a rushed work environment in their Maintenance hangar during an overnight A-Check that contributed to a wing access panel not being resecured above the Left Landing Gear retract actuator on a CRJ-700 aircraft. Panel had fallen off during taxi-out after being released for service.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

I was the only company employee involved who witnessed the fueling truck impact the belt loader and the engine cowling. There were four other co-workers assigned to the crew that I was on. However; none of them were in the vicinity of the incident. I was in the front pit of the Embraer 170. I was sitting in the doorway of the pit and heard a loud metallic crunch (similar to a crushing pop can); which upon that loud sound the belt loader started moving as it was impacted by the fuel truck on it's left rear quarter. At this point; I noticed the shape of the fuel truck infringing on the right engine of the aircraft and as I reacted I leaned more to the left and witnessed the truck impact the engine cowling with the black bumper of the truck. I was unsure if the truck was actually stopping at this point; as I couldn't tell if it was acting on its own drive; or if it was being pushed by another (possibly larger) vehicle; or if it was moving without an operator for some reason. The truck eventually came to a stop and I noticed that there was an operator in the vehicle. He appeared to be jockeying with something by his right knee. A couple seconds passed; I had crawled to the doorway of the pit; and he immediately began to back his truck up and position it a few feet away from the engine. I immediately crawled out and alerted my Lead who was approaching the front of the aircraft from the direction of the jetway stairs. Management was then notified and Operations called the authorities. Two supervisors; showed up shortly and began investigating and taking pictures; and I was asked if I witnessed it and what had happened. The police arrived and investigated; questioned the driver. I was never questioned by the police or asked to give a statement. Various other departments arrived on scene to assist and conduct investigations. I was not asked if I was alright; no one asked if anyone was hurt; there were no inquiries into the well being of the employees. I had to work a flight shortly after. While working the next two flights I realized that I was crashing from an adrenaline spike and felt unsettled. I was not asked by management to compose a statement until I notified them of my discomfort. As the afternoon progressed; I noticed that I was experiencing soreness and a slight headache. I thought it best that I visit a medical professional as a precautionary measure.

Ramp employee reports witnessing a fuel truck back into the number two engine of the EMB170 he is sitting in.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 35

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

I descended to my pattern altitude and flew a modified downwind to base leg when I had determined the airstrip was in sight. As I was turning my final approach; around a 150 heading; the sun was coming up on the horizon at this time. I had been to this airstrip prior to this trip so; I was familiar with the direction; approximate length and width of the runway. Unknown to me; the owner of the ranch and aircraft had tilled a field parallel and butting up with the airstrip the exact same width and length as the runway. This discoloration of the freshly moved dirt stuck out as the runway in relation to the rest of the pasture which was predominately dead grass and shrub. I slowed the aircraft to my final approach speed 65-70 KTS for a short; soft field landing. As I neared my flaring altitude; with the sun still in my eyes; I reduced the power and softly set the main wheels down. I then noticed that the strip seemed much softer than I recalled and I maintained the nose wheel off the ground as best as I could. As my airspeed continued to bleed off and [with] the extra drag from the soft dirt; the nose wheels set down and dug into the soft dirt. The aircraft flipped over on its back. I immediately turned off the fuel; pulled the mixture to cut-off; turned off the avionics; the master; and the ignition. I then removed my seat-belt and exited the aircraft out of the side door. The owner of the aircraft and one of his workers had witnessed this happen and were pulling up in a truck as I was climbing out. The first thing that the owner said to me after asking if I was alright was; I should have told you that I had plowed that field. That is my fault. I sustained no injuries of any kind. I then realized that the strip I had intended to land on; had vegetation and growth on it and was not clearly marked so I had mistaken it for part of the pasture. The aircraft fuselage and landing gear did not sustain any noticeable damage. The right wing; propeller and vertical stabilizer did sustain damage.

The pilot of a Cessna 206 mistook a freshly plowed field adjacent to a private airstrip as the runway. His landing was successful but the nose wheel dug into the soft ground and caused the aircraft to flip over. The pilot was uninjured but the aircraft received some damage.


General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

This aircraft had been written up by the previous crew for having a very heavy control wheel feel. Maintenance personnel had come to the aircraft and cleared the discrepancy claiming it was within tolerances. When my crew took the aircraft; we noticed the same strong resistance on the control wheel. I noted that I could not pull the wheel back to full up or push the wheel full forward; turn the wheel left or right with one arm. It took two arms to do it. That is not within any tolerance; written or not written. My FO noted the same thing. Maintenance tech came to the aircraft and showed us his test which we did. He said it passed his written test procedures. However; nowhere on the test does it indicate how much force is normal; nor how to even measure it. I do know that with nearly 10;000 [hours] of PIC in these planes that the forces needed to move that control wheel were excessive. In my professional judgment; I deemed the aircraft to have an issue that needed attention and that the aircraft was not safe to operate.The threat was that I did not feel safe flying an airplane which I could not freely and safely manipulate the flight controls. In addition; the Chief Pilot on call told me that the reason the aircraft was going to airport ZZZ was to address this issue. I felt like he was trying to get me to accept the aircraft and get the flight out. I did not think it safe to continue. Why didn't maintenance personnel even inspect the tail assembly? It came out of maintenance; isn't it possible that something could have been binding or not put in properly?

CRJ-700 Captain is assigned an aircraft that had been written up by the previous crew for having a very heavy control wheel feel and Maintenance Personnel had cleared the discrepancy claiming it was within tolerances. The Captain finds the pitch and roll forces to be beyond his tolerances and refuses the aircraft.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 600

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft X flying a primary student training mission at the non-towered field MQJ. The entire flight took place in the RWY 25 pattern and we had completed 3 TOL's [Take Off and Landings]. On the 4th approach; we were on short final at approximately 400' AGL and 1/4 to 1/2 NM from the threshold on what I would characterize as a stable approach. A second aircraft that I believe was Aircraft Y intercepted the final approach at a 45 degree angle from our left and approximately 200' below us (200' AGL). The second aircraft made no radio calls on the CTAF. I took the controls from the student and made a sharp turn to the right (away from the 2nd aircraft) and a slight climb. I called the 2nd aircraft on CTAF but received no response. We climbed away from the pattern; returned and made an uneventful landing. The student was bothered by the incident enough that we called it a day for training.A second trainer aircraft turning downwind to base and a Bonanza waiting to depart on 25 witnessed the encounter. Both commented on the CTAF about the near miss.Someone at the FBO asked the pilot of the 2nd aircraft about the encounter and he showed them his ForeFlight Sectional map that indicated the CTAF frequency was 122.70. His Sectional was current. (I verified his statement on my copy of ForeFlight). He indicated he made appropriate radio calls on that frequency. The MQJ CTAF frequency was changed from 122.70 to 122.97 approximately three months ago and was reasonably well publicized. Transition to the new frequency has been mostly trouble free. The fact that the old frequency was still shown on a very popular electronic source is troubling.I would strongly suggest that frequency changes be coordinated with Sectional updates. In this case; a transient pilot would have no way of knowing about the frequency change without looking up old; canceled NOTAM's. I would also suggest that a voice recording be added to the end of the AWOS transmission noting a frequency change. This should be left in place for several months.

Small aircraft instructor reported a NMAC on final due to the second aircraft not having the correct frequency for CTAF. The second pilot was using a sectional chart that displayed the incorrect frequency.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Charlotte International Airport started new procedures with a dual flow departure into ZDC ARTCC. Automation Adapted Departure Arrival Routes (ADARs) were put in; where if a dispatcher filed a wrong route; the automation piece would capture it and the tower (CLT) would issue the proper routing. Aircraft X had [Route X] in the computer; which is the proper routing. However; at the RDU VORTAC; the aircraft took a turn towards FKN VORTAC. I asked him what his FMS had; it was RDU [Route Y]; which is the old preferred routing [to destination].There was no loss of separation with any aircraft or airspace. However this could be a problem in the future. I'm filing to see where the lapse was. CLT tower should've issued the preferred routing. Or the pilots or dispatch put it wrong into the aircraft's FMS. This needs to be addressed. There are over 160 departures daily with these new SIDs and the new routing afterwards.

We entered our filed route in the FMC and confirmed the route via a careful read back per company policy; with emphasis on the new SID that was recently implemented and neither of us had flown. Unfortunately; during the course of cross checking our planned route; we missed the revised segment on the clearance that changed our route after the final fix on the SID (RDU). We proceeded via the filed jet route; which we have used for some time rather than direct to the new fix/route per the revised segment. We were corrected by the controller; who commented that we were not supposed to use the 'old' route anymore. No TCAS or traffic conflict occurred to the best of my knowledge.This was a simple human error - we both missed the revised segment on the PDC printout. Contributing to the error was our effort in diligently checking the new departure procedure therefore failing to notice the revised routing AFTER the SID.We frequently receive 'revised segments' that contain NO change to the filed route - sort of an electronic version of 'crying wolf.' Also; we have been inundated with changes in navigation procedures (some poorly designed) in and out of our hub; including significant lateral and vertical profile changes. Staying abreast of all the navigation procedure changed has been challenging.

ATC controller reported an aircraft flying the wrong departure route; and the pilot reported that they had not noticed the revised routing and failed to enter it into their FMC.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On climbout; while leaving approximately 12;000 feet and climbing to 14;000 feet per ATC; we received a master caution HYD light. We looked up and on the overhead panel saw the HYD A Elec 2 Low Pressure light illuminated. At that time; ATC called to give us a higher altitude; but we requested an altitude of 14;000 feet to work on an issue. They granted our request. We then went to the HYDRAULIC PUMP LOW PRESSURE QRH (we agreed it was the correct checklist and switch) which simply stated:1 HYD PUMP switch (affected side) ...........OFF...so the First Officer turned off the appropriate switch while the Captain continued to fly.Next; we pressed the MFD SYS button and noticed the HYD A QTY % around a guesstimate of 73%. (Often times normal HYD A press in flight is 77-78 %.) We would soon realize the A HYD quantity was decreasing approximately 2-3% per minute.After discussion between the pilots; we decided to head back to [departure airport]. I'm guessing we were approximately 50nm from [departure airport] at that time. ATC gave us direct to [an enroute waypoint] but then we decided the best and quicker course of action was to ask for a more direct route via a heading to [departure airport]. ATC complied giving us a heading closer to [departure airport].We called and spoke with Maintenance and told them we turned off the HYD A ELEC 2 switch. They did not add any suggestions but they told Operations that we were returning so a gate would be ready for us. Our next move was to talk to the flight attendants and then speak to the passengers. We received a message from Dispatch at that time asking if we were diverting. This was a very high workload environment so we simply hit the divert button in ACARS and said 'yes.'ATC had us at 270 knots originally so we asked to speed up to 300 knots to shorten the time. Approach cleared us for the visual and then told us to contact Tower. We called that frequency but they never answered. This was beyond frustrating as we were on Final Approach in an extremely high workload environment. Soon after; they called and we were cleared to land. The landing and taxi was uneventful. Maintenance came to the cockpit and said they found an internal leak and although we were at about 30% HYD A quantity % when we blocked in; we soon after had zero and an RF next to the quantity.

B737NG First Officer reported returning to departure airport after loss of hydraulic system A.


Luscombe (Silvaire) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 30; Flight Crew Type 30

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Upon rollout on runway 14; engine quit due to carburetor ice. To prevent a recurrence; I will ensure application of carburetor heat.

The pilot of a small aircraft experienced a loss of engine power during landing rollout due to carburetor ice.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While running predeparture flows; I entered the incorrect fuel on board number into the ACARS weight and balance program. The fueler had arrived late; and my guess is that I entered a fuel number off of the Multi-Function Display (MFD) while we were still being fueled. The number entered was 5;480 while the actual fuel on board at brake release was 7;100. I normally check to make sure our weight in the performance unit page matches our takeoff data message weight with the only difference being the taxi burn. We were also coordinating late arriving bags with the ramp and I may have been distracted. I also failed to notice that the takeoff data message warned us that fuel was below release by 640 pounds. The aircraft was properly fueled.  The incorrect fuel input caused our weight and balance and speeds to be incorrect. I estimated that our V2 speed was incorrect by at least 3 knots. I realized my error when the Pilot Monitoring went to pull up our landing data during the flight. The request page showed our expected fuel on arrival to be 1;600 pounds which was incorrect. He wondered why this was. I pulled up the takeoff data message and saw that our Fuel on Board (FOB) was off by over 1;500 pounds from what we had actually taken off with. The only explanation is that I entered the wrong fuel and failed to catch my error despite several opportunities to do so.The threat was that our takeoff speeds were incorrect. While we were still within weight limits for our departure runway; in a different situation; we could have been overweight for takeoff and not known it.Maintain vigilance for errors and cross check fuel numbers. Also; slow down when going through the takeoff data message and thoroughly read any warning messages before going to the speeds page. I am normally very good about doing this; but I am not sure why this situation was different. I had numerous opportunities to catch this error but failed to do so.

An EMB-145XR First Officer reported taking off with incorrect V speeds because of an inaccurate fuel data input.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

Approaching RAP VOR we were advised a re-route for active military airspace. Then [received] transponder L EICAS message.  We switched to R transponder and also got an associated R transponder EICAS message. We asked ATC if they still had us on radar and they said yes they did. ATC advised it was most likely military jamming. Next we got a FMC verify position. Then unable RNP. I noticed both GPS L and R were way off and causing FMC position updating to be off RNP 2 ANP was 20. We advised ATC of navigation issues due to GPS jamming and asked for vectors. ATC advised this was not a problem and had been happening in the area. We decided to inhibit the GPS NAV and see if it would correct itself by radio NAVAID. This did seem to be working as the Actual Navigation Performance (ANP) was getting better but as we were getting close to [top of descent] and ready for an RNAV arrival and RNAV approach we decided to just ask for vectors to an ILS with a slight tailwind due to ANP would not be acceptable for an RNAV approach. If we had had more time before descent to advise Maintenance and possibly reset breaker GPS L might have fixed the issue.

B747 Captain reported possible GPS jamming near active military airspace.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 2450; Flight Crew Type 120

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was enroute from HEC VOR to PGA VOR. While enroute I was over broken to scattered clouds several thousand feet below me. As I proceeded; the clouds became overcast still below me. My weather program showed a narrow band of clouds in my path about 30 miles west of PGA with tops less than 17;500 FT; which I was flying. As I approached the clouds; they were rising and higher than 17;500 FT. I could have reversed course but since they were rising I would still have to climb above 18;000 FT. I climbed to 19;000 FT and within 5 minutes was able to descend clear of clouds. Lesson learned: file IFR if there is weather that could possibly be worse than forecast.

General aviation pilot anticipates being able to clear clouds at his cruise altitude of 17;500 FT according to his on board weather program; but finds the tops to be higher. Reporter elects to climb to 19;000 FT until clear of clouds and continues to destination.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Type 15000

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

While in a descent to cross CSN at FL190; we encountered wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead of us. After considerable rolls from side to side and yawing; I clicked off the autopilot and leveled off to stabilize the aircraft and then continued the descent. This caused us to be about 500/700 feet high at CSN. There were no traffic conflicts and ATC did not mention it. We should have had a little more spacing with the aircraft in front due to the quartering tailwind.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information]

B737-700 reported encountering wake vortex on arrival to BWI; resulting in roll and yaw issues that resulted in their failure to make a crossing restriction.


We were cleared to 'line up and wait' on Runway 35L. Since a Heavy cargo jet was departing 35C I knew we would have an approximately 2 minute spacing delay so I taxied slowly across the hold line to avoid a prolonged wait in position at night. While doing so I looked out the First Officer window and saw that the aircraft cleared for the approach and landing to Runway 35C seemed to be lined up with our (Runway 35L) instead. I stopped the aircraft and asked the First Officer 'are they landing on OUR runway?' Without skipping a beat; the First Officer picked up the microphone and asked the Tower which runway the approaching aircraft was going to use for landing. One second later; the Tower Controller asked the flight which runway they were using for landing. One second later they replied 'Runway 35C.' Two seconds later Tower told them to go around which they did. The airplane over flew us about 300 FT (according to our TCAS readout.) We then continued to taxi onto Runway 35L centerline to 'line up and wait.' About a minute later Tower cleared us for takeoff. The remainder of the flight proceeded without incident. I saw the charred wreckage of the B737 that landed on Runway 24L at LAX at night; unfortunately landing on top of a Commuter aircraft. That was some 20 years ago. I have since been reluctant to be quick about taxiing onto a runway at night and just waiting there. When I taxied onto the runway I went straight out so I could put the nose wheel slightly across the centerline and then make a smooth left turn back to the centerline to avoid wasting concrete. Yeah; I know there are two miles of it out there - it's just a habit of mine. When I saw this possible conflict; I was beginning to turn left back to the centerline. When I stopped; I was at a 45 degree angle to the centerline and turned both landing lights and nose light to bright. I did that because I thought the asymmetry of our aircraft and the lights shining ACROSS the runway at an angle would make us an easier object to spot. It apparently did not. It would have been nice if the TCAS alert could have been a help. It of course gave no warning.

Air Carrier Captain reports being instructed by the Tower to line up and wait on Runway 35L and notices that the aircraft on final appears to be lined up with that runway. The Tower is queried and the aircraft on final is sent around.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was Pilot Flying. We were assigned to descend via the JFUND2/Runway 04R transition. We had separately confirmed all constraints in the FMC; and I had briefed the arrival. We had left FL270 prior to the first altitude restriction using managed descent. The first constraint was at or above FL240 at MNSTA. We were in both managed airspeed and managed vertical path. I was reviewing the taxi plan and gate information when we noticed the aircraft had descended below FL240 about 800 feet prior to the fix. I immediately selected VS (Vertical Speed) and then initiated a short climb to FL240. We continued to used managed descent and the aircraft met all [other] constraints. I have no idea why the aircraft did not perform as expected and desired. This was the way we were trained to fly the Airbus. We were tired and that could have contributed to the problem. Pilots should be trained not to trust the managed descent mode or not use it.

I'm aware of some of the weaknesses of the A320 [series] aircraft in managed descent; but I had never seen this happen. However; pilots I've flown with who have much more time on it than I have warned me of this potential. When we left FL270 'ALT CNST' was armed; and we both fully expected the aircraft to honor the FL240 restriction. I do not understand why it did not; but I know why I missed it. Divided attention; combined with fatigue at the end of a trip; and the timing of a frequency change took us both a step further out of the loop of careful monitoring. We both caught it quickly; and the rest of the arrival the managed descent mode behaved as expected; so it did not appear to be a maintenance problem. A more careful selection of the time for me to check back for write-ups; while we were still level; would have most likely avoided this problem. Divided attention; especially when tired and already a little slower; created the situation where my monitoring was not up to the requirements. As for the aircraft/PF (pilot flying) interface; I've seen the technique of using VS (Vertical Speed) and setting each individual altitude for at or above restrictions; but that is not the primary method taught on this fleet. I'm still unsure of the technical part of why the aircraft continued below the restriction.

A321 flight crew reported the aircraft failed to honor a properly programmed altitude constraint on descent in managed speed and managed vertical path mode.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During this trip; we have been slam dunked into two airports required quick configuration of the aircraft. In both case I happened to be pilot monitoring. As we quickly configured the aircraft with gear down we went right into flaps 30 and flaps 45 as soon as we achieved our appropriate flap speeds. Normally with the gear down call the PM initiates our flow which clues arming the thrust reversers and chiming the flight attendant. Given the rapid configuring and slowing of the aircraft I gave priority to selecting flaps immediately versus doing the flow because in my judgment and experience we absolutely; positively need stall margin and correct flap configuration at that point in terms of low altitude and low speed/stabilized approach criteria. With that said; I should have remembered to immediately follow up with my landing flow. Once the landing check was initiated I realized my error and selected reversers to armed and chimed the flight attendant. I have been reading flight safety updates and I noticed their recent emphasis on really reading the checklist and looking at associated items. So I have emphasized that with myself; and I think that those actions helped trap potential errors.

CRJ-200 Captain reported that the frequent 'slam dunk' arrivals assigned by ATC at multiple airports increase workload and can lead to procedural errors.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Landing; Initial Approach; Final Approach

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 4771; Flight Crew Type 1006

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

An instrument student was at the controls of our aircraft flying the ILS RWY 32 approach at OKV. As there were other aircraft in the pattern; I was making position reports every mile from the FAF. When approximately 2 miles from Runway 32; another aircraft was observed on downwind. With the other aircraft still on downwind we continued our approach and I made a one mile final RWY 32 call. I then observed the other aircraft turning onto base. I advised of our position relative to their aircraft and the instructor advised they did not have us in sight. The aircraft continued to turn onto base leg. I took the controls of our aircraft and executed a missed approach to the right. I took this action since we did not know what actions the other aircraft was going to take. A collision was not imminent; but I felt it was the safe thing to do. We proceeded back to attempt a second ILS approach. The other aircraft was doing closed traffic practicing takeoff and landings. They were not keeping up with traffic location. When an aircraft is on short final; an aircraft on downwind should have that traffic in sight prior to turning onto base leg. This would have prevented our incident.On the second approach; as we were near decision altitude; another aircraft; not making radio calls; entered the runway at Taxiway D. The aircraft made a couple of 360 degree turns and returned to Taxiway D; but only clear of the runway edge marking (still on the runway side of the hold short line). I advised the student to execute a go-around. The aircraft was then observed taking off on Runway 32 and proceeded to make right traffic (OKV is left traffic on both runways). We continued closed traffic and landed on Runway 32. As we cleared the runway and began our taxi to the ramp; the no radio aircraft was observed on short final. The aircraft had turned final in front of another aircraft; causing them to go around also. This incident could have been prevented if the no radio aircraft would have ensured that no other aircraft was on final prior to entering the runway and when exiting; clear the runway past the hold short line.Both incidents are just the latest of similar incidences experienced flying out of OKV. When discussing traffic pattern procedures with other pilots; many advise the AIM is only advisory and that they can do whatever they wish since OKV is 'uncontrolled'. OKV is non-towered; but not uncontrolled; when all aircraft use standard procedures when departing and arriving at airports. I feel the lack of standards and attitudes indicate a failure in the training process. CFIs are not teaching or impressing the importance of SOPs in conducting safe flights. I fear the attitude that some pilots have toward airport traffic operations at non-towered airports is going to result in a collision at OKV. I place emphasis on proper procedures and traffic avoidance on each and every flight with my students.

An instructor with a student at OKV observed nonstandard pilot behavior at this airport; while flying the ILS RWY 32 Approach. In discussion with other pilots; the instructor discovered an attitude that the AIM is just advisory and that their flight and ground pilotage did not require adherence.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Fatigue; Training / Qualification

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I made an error in not verifying that all 3 ADIRS were aligned before departure after having the preflight flow interrupted by the passenger disturbance at the gate. I tried to be deliberate and methodical in reviewing the manual after discovering the error before performing the alignment and thought I had found the only pertinent caution; the flaps/slats. The format of the manual made it appear to me that the section was complete on page X. Only suggestion would be to keep all cautions and warnings for a given section grouped together in the text; instead of having one at the start of the section and another at the end of the section (in this case on the next page).The First Officer (FO) and I discussed the threats and errors that occurred on this morning and the opportunities that I missed to capture those errors. We additionally thoroughly reviewed the system. I take away a number of lessons learned from this morning and will be more vigilant when I recognize when my habit patterns are interrupted.Other potential considerations:My FO and I had briefed the entire trip that he was low time (just over 100 hours) and I had not flown in 5 weeks.  While I felt rested and alert; this was day 4 of a 23 hour trip with all early morning shows which may have also contributed to a decreased capacity.  My cockpit preparation flow was interrupted when a passenger; who had refused to pay for his carry-on bag; breached the gate in ZZZ and caused a disturbance at the forward door. I got out of my seat to see what was going on and prepare to close the door should things escalate. When I returned; I thought I had finished my flow completely but after pushback and engine start realized I had not turned on IRS3 when we got an ADR3 fault caution message.Knowing that there were warnings and conditions about aligning IRS's outside of the normal preflight I opened page X which has the ADIRS preflight information. The caution on that page said to make sure the flaps and slats were retracted before aligning; which was confirmed before I turned on IRS3. Since there was a GPS outage in our area; and we had moved in the pushback after aligning IRS1 and IRS2 I also decided to do another full alignment of those. When I selected all of the ADIRS off we got a master warning for the ADIRS 1+2+3 fail and other cautions which all resolved after I turned them on to align again. Knowing we had gotten out of our normal flow; and recognizing that I had gotten distracted with gate issue; during the alignment the FO and I went through the preflight items and reviewed our previous work to confirm we had not missed anything else. After the alignment was complete and all systems normal we departed for an otherwise uneventful flight. Once in cruise; I went back to review the manual and found on the next page Y a continuation of the ADIRS section with an additional second bullet point; one that said not to align the ADIRS with the engines running.

Air carrier Captain reported making a procedural error during preflight and cited a distraction and lack of recent flying as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 20

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I would like to convey an incident that happened as I was set to takeoff. Engine maintenance had been performed earlier in the day to correct an oil leak emanating from a few of the cylinder push rod tubes. I planned to stay in the pattern for safety reasons; which is prudent any time after major maintenance has been performed on an aircraft engine. As I entered runway TWO-ZERO; [another] aircraft (local parachute jumping operator) also entered the runway immediately behind and slightly to my left. Mind you; cylinders had just been dissembled on my aircraft and there was an increased chance that I may abort my takeoff if everything wasn't perfect on the takeoff roll. Assuming that the skydive aircraft was intending to maintain the formation position and start a takeoff roll as soon as I started my takeoff roll; I elected to taxi straight ahead and exit the runway at taxiway 'C'. No prior agreement had been made regarding both aircraft being on the runway at the same time. I made the radio call that I was taxiing forward and exiting the runway as a Beechcraft was turning final for runway TWO-ZERO. There was much apprehension in the voice of the Beechcraft pilot as he was trying to figure out if he had time to make a safe approach and landing with two aircraft on the runway. I was not comfortable executing an immediate rolling takeoff; so that there was sufficient time for the skydive aircraft to also takeoff; before the Beechcraft touched down. It was absolutely an unsafe situation. The FAA website shows the definition of a runway incursion as: Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft; vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft. The FAA goes on to categorize the varying levels of severity as it relates to a runway incursion. Had I started my takeoff roll; I would have not had sufficient time to avoid a collision of an aircraft commencing a takeoff in a trailing formation position.

GA pilot reported exiting the runway after a skydive aircraft entered the runway behind him in an apparent attempt to expedite takeoff while another aircraft was also on final approach.


Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

[I] entered downwind making all the normal callouts for Runway 35 with one other single engine aircraft reporting in the pattern. That aircraft landed as I began my descending turn to base. As we were turning to base we got a TA alert followed by an RA climb. I commenced a wings level climb to comply with the RA. The Captain spotted the unannounced aircraft closing on us from below and to the left. The distance on the TCAS indicated 200 FT at the closest readout. As the RA cleared and I leveled off at pattern altitude I looked to our left and also spotted the aircraft as it made a left circle and then departed the pattern to the southwest very quickly. After landing; the Captain closed the flight plan with Potomac Approach and inquired about the other aircraft causing a TA/RA and asked if the aircraft might have been a UAV given our proximity to Washington. A Supervisor came on line to answer questions and only acknowledge that they were tracking via radar a VFR target but didn't say where it was. The aircraft we saw was gray in color with a twin boom and a long wing. Different than any normal GA light aircraft I have ever seen. I believe it was a UAV. If; in fact; this was a UAV then the obvious solution is to keep UAVs out of civilian airspace.

A Corporate Jet took evasive action from a TCAS RA target which appeared to be a UAV in the JYO CTAF landing pattern; but PCT had no information about the aircraft when questioned.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 377; Flight Crew Type 16

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Wheeled landing gear down during water landing. Pusher seaplane flipped over nose during rollout of water landing stopped inverted. Single occupant pilot was uninjured. Aircraft was inspected by pilot who found no visible damage after landing and inversion; aircraft was later substantially damaged during water towing and recovery efforts.

Amphibian Pilot reported executing a water landing with landing gear extended resulting in an inversion.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

This is a wake turbulence encounter at FL428. It occurred 102 north of JENKS. We were at FL410 and had requested FL430 but ATC was waiting for aircraft above us at FL430 to pass overhead. ATC issued a climb once the aircraft passed over us and was 10 miles in front of us. We looked at our fuel and thought it was adequate so we asked to stay at FL410. We were told to go to FL430 or down to FL400 - so we chose the climb for fuel conservation. We had been battling a 65 kt headwind that just slightly quartered our right nose. We started a fairly slow climb and the air got 'burbly' at FL425. We then experienced a roll to the left and I disengaged the autopilot. Shortly after we got the snap to the right. We ended up going to FL428 before leveling off at FL430. We immediately inquired about the well-being of passengers - they were ok. The copilot offset the route by 2 miles right of course (west). Later we found out that [it] was an A350 that passed overhead.10 miles was probably not enough room for wake separation. I will offset before climbing and note headwind if it is directly ahead of you because vortices will sink straight down.

While climbing through FL425; we started experiencing mild wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead at FL430. Shortly thereafter; the aircraft abruptly rolled left and then right. We regained control of the aircraft at FL438. We descended immediately back to our assigned altitude of FL430. No injuries occurred to the passengers or crewmembers. I asked how much distance was between us and the traffic ahead. ATC advised there was 10 nm between us. I asked ATC for a 2 nm offset right of our course to prevent any further chances of flying into more wake turbulence. ATC asked if we were experiencing wake turbulence from the heavy Airbus 350. I replied that we were experiencing some wake turbulence. ATC approved to 2 nm offset to the right. We continued to our destination with further incident.ATC never advised the type of aircraft we were following during the climb. If ATC had advised we were climbing into the path of a heavy jet aircraft; we would have offset our course preventing us to encounter the wake turbulence during our climb to FL430.

EMB-505 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence 10 miles in trail of an A350 at FL425.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 31000; Flight Crew Type 16000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

I am not satisfied with the findings and explanation of a very serious situation. My airplane was loaded with an 18135 lbs. pallet over the nose. It was not supposed to have been loaded. The only fix I see is finger pointing as to who was wrong and nowhere do I see a prevention from it happening again. Outsourcing and communication on the part of [Company] load planning caused this mistake. I would like something more done and a better explanation as to how we will prevent this from occurring again. The closure of the report does nothing but sweep it under a rug.

A320 Captain reported cargo was loaded in error on the aircraft and Dispatch was unaware of the weight and balance discrepancy.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Airport; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

Aircraft X was trying to land at CYES (an uncontrolled airport without an instrument approach). I descended him to 050 for arrival. I advised him of moderate rime icing in the vicinity from a PQI departure with the altitudes and temperature. I advised him that no weather was available for CYES and offered him the FVE weather since it was the closest airport. I provided him the FVE special observation and advised him to contact FSS for the current NOTAMS. He advised that his intentions were to land at CYES visually and advised that his plan was to fly the RNAV approach into FVE via the IAF if he was unable to get the field in sight. He asked for a lower altitude to get ground contact.I descended him to 031 which is the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) around PQI. Montreal center called to get an updated departure time for Aircraft X and advised that they were blocking the airspace for him. By this time the complexity of the sectors was rapidly increasing due to weather and increased traffic. I provided Aircraft X with the updated weather at FVE and asked his intentions. He wanted to continue and try to get the field in sight. The PQI departure that had reported moderate rime icing was now reporting severe icing and requesting a climb to avoid.I called the Controller in Charge (CIC) over to report the severe icing while getting further reports from [the PQI departure]. A D side was provided at this time and while they were being briefed; I noticed that Aircraft X had entered the 035 MIA. I told Aircraft X that if he didn't have the field in sight that he needed to climb to 035. He advised that he did not have the field and was climbing. He stated that he couldn't get the field in sight and wanted to fly the RNAV for FVE. He was issued a right turn to 110 to avoid a higher MVA. While this was occurring; a BGR departure (which I leveled at 100 due to a BGR arrival at 110) reported moderate rime icing at 100. This report was passed to an ALTRAV that was entering the sector that was also landing BGR. I asked the CIC to split the sectors due to complexity and Surry Sector was split off. Any time that an aircraft is going to enter uncontrolled airspace an MSAW alert goes off due to the fact that the MIA is listed as 128. An MSAW alert would be expected and would be looked over. I recommend that there be an instrument approach into CYES.

I was returning from my break and began running the list to see which Certified Professional Controller (CPC) was ready for a break. The CIC at the time asked me to open up 15/16 D-Side; to assist the radar controller; because there was weather and icing in the Surry sector. As I was opening up the D-side; and getting myself caught up on the traffic situation; the radar controller announced to me that he had mistakenly descended an aircraft below the MIA at 031 in a 035 feet shelf. The aircraft call sign was Aircraft X and it was inbound to CYES; which is an airport in uncontrolled airspace just outside our airspace. The weather conditions were very IFR at CYES. I am not sure why the radar controller descended the aircraft below the MIA; since it happened right as I was sitting down. I am thinking that he was trying to use the TAA [Terminal Arrival Area] for the RNAV 32 approach into the neighboring airport FVE in hopes that the aircraft would get CYES in sight and be able to proceed visually. Unfortunately; I do not know further details about how or why the aircraft was below the MIA. The radar controller was actively working with the CIC to remedy the situation at the time; and then the CIC quickly split the sectors as the next controller was walking into the control room right at that time. There is a lot of ambiguity surrounding aircraft landing at CYES; since it is in uncontrolled airspace and is in Canada. There are no instrument approaches going into that airport; so many times controllers are able to successfully use the approach into FVE to get the aircraft to get CYES in sight. Unfortunately; there is no other way to allow the aircraft to descend below 035 without using that to be able to get low enough to get the airport in sight. It would be very helpful to have an airway that went from PQI to YYY VOR that would allow an aircraft to descend below the 035 MIA; or better yet; an instrument approach going into CYES airport.

ZBW Controllers reported that an aircraft was descended below the Minimum IFR Altitude in error to get it below clouds to see the airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

The First Officer was flying on the leg from ZZZ. On the climbout from ZZZ; PTRIM main inop and PTRIM backup inop warnings illuminated. We continued the climb; finished the After Takeoff Checklist and then ran the QRH. The QRH led us to the cutouts for both trims. When we selected the backup trim the warning disappeared and I quickly tried to trim down but it stopped and the warning illuminated again. I finished the QRH; which suggested to consider nearest suitable airport. We discussed continuing to [destination] and continued our climb. We reached level off altitude and as the airspeed increased it became apparent that continuing at normal speed to [destination] would be a difficult task. The First Officer then pulled the power back to help alleviate some of the pressure. As I was trying to formulate a plan and decide our next step; I noticed the First Officer having trouble holding altitude level; I advised the First Officer we were high; he started the correction. At this time; we considered airports nearby and ZZZ1 was directly in front of us. I [told] ATC that we had a control malfunction and were correcting altitude. We [advised ATC] and got direct ZZZ1. I decided to swap controls to give the First Officer a break and because I wanted to be able to feel the control inputs. At our altitude; it seemed ZZZ1 would make a good choice and give us time to run checklists. The timing worked out well and we landed safely at ZZZ1 with no further issues. PTRIM main and PTRIM backup warning messages; plus the inability to control pitch trim.

Air carrier Captain reported pitch trim failure with limited controllability.


Grumman American Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

[I was] flying a practice GPS approach to Runway 18 at L18. [I] heard a Cessna 172 aircraft in pattern. Pilot was announcing position on CTAF; but not every leg of the pattern. I was proceeding straight in and announced my position at 10; 5; 3; and 1 miles relative to a straight in final. Was looking for the C172 but did not have them visually. I picked up relative movement in my peripheral vision and saw the C172 in the turn from left base to final at my altitude. They were about 200 FT in front of me but my speed was 90 KTS; much faster than their speed. As we were both descending I made a hard right climbing turn to avoid contact. As I climbed out I called to ask if they had in fact been broadcasting their position the whole time while in the pattern. No response. Upon further investigation it appears that my #1 comm radio; which was in use at the time; is cutting out after I transmit. It returns to normal after several seconds. This transmit problem seems to be happening intermittently therefore make it difficult to diagnose. I have service scheduled for this unit.

GA7 pilot reports a NMAC at L18 during a practice GPS approach to Runway 18. A C172 was heard in the pattern on CTAF but was apparently not announcing each leg so the reporter was not aware of his position until coming into very close proximity. It turns out the reporter's radio was malfunctioning.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 110

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Total electrical failure on initial approach.  Landed in VMC without radios or flaps. I did not see any light signals from the tower when entering the landing traffic pattern. After landing; airport personnel asked me to contact the tower. I complied and called the tower by telephone prior to leaving the airport.

Grumman AA5A pilot reported landing without ATC radio contact or light gun signals after experiencing complete electrical failure during approach.


Initial Approach; Final Approach; Landing

As the A Flight Attendant (FA) I heard the landing gear being recycled during our approach. After hearing the 'abnormal' sound we aborted our landing. At that time; I made the aborted landing announcement and took my [electronic reference guide] out of my pocket. Following my instincts I began reviewing emergency procedures and the possible checklists we would need to follow if called upon. The manual was easy to search and without a doubt; I found the emergency procedure checklists in less time than it would have taken with my paper manual. The Captain called back and briefed us on the situation and said he may need to come out of the Flight Deck (FD) and view the landing gear at mid cabin. Once our holding pattern was established; the Captain came out of the FD to view the landing gear. After the Captain viewed the landing gear through the porthole he advised me that we should prepare the cabin for a precautionary emergency landing. He and I had a briefing giving us 10 minutes to prepare the cabin for an emergency landing. The Captain said he would give the brace command through an interphone call about 2 minutes before touchdown. He gave us 10 minutes to prepare the cabin and offered more time if needed. We declined the extra time; as we were confident we could prepare the cabin in 10 minutes. The total time ended up being about 20-25 minutes until touchdown. I checked my watch and made a mental note of the time. The Captain kept us in the loop the entire incident of how much time we had until touchdown. After the [Captain's] briefing; I briefed the rest of the crew and we began the [evacuation] demo. I used my [device] for the announcements. FA's demoed evacuation procedures and brace positions. After the demo was complete; each FA picked out their respective Able Bodied Person's (ABP) and briefed all ABP's on their exit assignments. We all used the safety information card for our ABP briefings. Once our ABP's were briefed and reseated closer to their respective exit assignments; we checked our cabin areas of responsibility and took our jump seats for landing. The Captain called about 2 minutes before touchdown to give us our brace commands. I then made a PA announcing we would begin shouting our commands and to not be alarmed as all of our preparation was precautionary. Approximately ten seconds later we began shouting our planned commands. We shouted our commands for [several] minutes. All passengers braced and we landed without incident. Once the aircraft came to a stop and we knew the landing gear functioned properly; we stopped shouting our commands. The C FA reported she could hear the shouted commands from the A FA. The A FA faintly heard commands from the B and C FA's. The commands were delivered slow and methodical. Our passengers seemed to appreciate the 'calmness' of the commands. Once all passengers deplaned; the FA's took the beverage and food carts into the terminal and gave out all of the picnic packs and beef jerky. No alcohol was served in the terminal; just non-alcoholic beverages.

B737 Flight Attendant reported preparing the cabin for evacuation after being briefed by the Captain about a problem with the landing gear.


Time Pressure; Workload; Physiological - Other

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

After reaching our cruise altitude of FL190; both the Captain and I felt a sharp pressure change; we noted that the cabin altitude was increasing rapidly. We then executed the required loss of cabin pressure procedures. ATC was notified of our descent and a new altitude clearance was issued. After reaching a safe altitude; we contacted Dispatch Control and determined it best to continue to the destination airport. The flight was completed without further incident.

A DHC-8-300 began loosing pressurization at FL190; so the crew declared an emergency; began a descent; completed the QRH and continued to the filed destination.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

Jetway gap too big. Arrived at the gate. The Agent opened the aircraft door and I noticed a large gap about 4-5 inches between the jetway and the aircraft and ice on the rubber part of the jetway. I told the agent that the gap was too big and was unsafe for deplaning and that they would have to adjust the jetway. Agent responded with; 'I have moved the jetway twice and that was the best [I] could get it.'I asked the Captain to look at the gap and he responded; if the Agent thinks it's OK then that's fine. The Agent went back up into the terminal. Near the end of deplaning 2 young children walked off the plane with their parents. The young boy turned around and tried to walk back on the plane. He slid on the rubber part of the jetway and slid down between the aircraft and jetway. The father quickly turned around and grabbed the little boy by his jacket and pulled him back up.

An A319 Flight Attendant observed an excessive gap between the aircraft which the Gate failed to close. A young boy slipped on the icy rubber boot and was caught by his father before he fell through.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related

Upon takeoff on XXR at ZZZ; we were flying the ZZZZZ's 3 departure procedure. Usually Tower promptly switches us to Departure but there was a delay and the PM queried the Tower Controller for a switch. Tower did not immediately respond; roughly 10 seconds later Tower issues us a change to a departure frequency that was not what was in our clearance. The PM switched to that frequency but it turned out to be a Local Tower; we then immediately switched to what was issued in our clearance which turned out to be the correct one. Approach asked us why it took so long for us to switch and that they were looking for us on guard as well. Nothing else was asked and the flight continued uneventfully.The ZZZ Controller was working both Tower and Ground at the time of our departure and it was moderately busy. I think Controller became confused and issued us the wrong frequency. I assumed it was a last minute change by Approach.Make sure local towers have 2 controllers on duty to split up Tower and Ground frequencies. The return of air traffic is happening quicker than the FAA realizes and they need to staff accordingly. We should have asked Controller to confirm the new frequency but the Tower frequency was quickly becoming congested and hard to get a word in without delaying our switch to Approach even longer.

After takeoff; there was a delay in Tower sending us to departure frequency. It was clear Tower was working more than one frequency. When I could; I queried Tower if they wanted us to contact Departure; but received no reply. Approaching 4;000 feet (our initial level off); Tower directed us to contact Departure on XYZ.A; rather than the XYB.CD on our PDC. While I was inputting the frequency; I heard someone calling us on guard and I missed the last digit of the frequency. I checked in on XYZ.E; then immediately switched to XYZ.A and checked in. It was approximately 5-10 seconds after Tower giving us the switch until the check in. Two issues: 1) ATCT was working more than one frequency causing delays and distractions; 2) The departure frequency in our PDC was different than that depicted on our assigned departure.While in cruise I reviewed the ZZZZZ3 departure (which we were assigned) and noticed that frequency is reflected as the departure frequency. If I had noted the discrepancy prior to departure; I could have verified which ATC was expecting (depicted or cleared via PDC).

Flight crew reported that during takeoff they dialed in an incorrect frequency while trying to contact Departure.  The crew attributed the error in part; to the Tower Controller working both Local and Ground positions.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Enroute we received a RH OIL PRESSURE master warning message. I was the flying pilot and First Officer ran the QRH for the warning. The oil temp was in the normal range but the oil pressure was fluctuating from 50-25 PSI. The left side was around 70 PSI. After running the QRH for the low oil pressure message we were directed to perform the intentional shutdown of the right engine since the oil pressure was continuing to slowly drop lower. We advised ATC of the situation and that we would be diverting to [a nearby alternate]; since it was the closest usable airport. After advising the flight attendant; passengers and company of the situation we requested vectors to the longest runway available and asked to have emergency equipment standing by just in case. We landed single engine without further incident.

CRJ-200 Captain reported an inflight shutdown of right hand engine after receiving a low oil pressure warning message.