Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 5285; Flight Crew Type 2175

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

I departed to head towards ZZZ to collect a colleague and return him to his base. As I departed; I requested and received VFR flight following from Departure. Once clear to the west of the Class Bravo; I was handed off to Center. As I approached ZZZ; I listened to the ASOS and I simply entered the setting into the baro window on the Garmin PFD. Center told me that ZZZ was 12 o'clock and to advise when I saw it. Approximately 12 miles from ZZZ; I saw the airport and advised Center as such. They replied: 'Radar service terminated; squawk 1200; switch to advisories'. They may or may not have said 'No known or observed traffic in the area of the airport'...I don't remember; however; that would be a common statement. They certainly did not say 'I see one in the pattern at ZZZ'; or similarI looked at the Comm #1 radio section on the PFD and confirmed it said [frequency]; and since the Garmin NXi system also displays the facility name; I confirmed that it said 'ZZZ Unicom'; which it did. At 10 miles to the East of ZZZ I called and self-announced 'ZZZ area traffic; Cirrus is 10 miles to the east; descending out of 3;500; setting up for left traffic to Runway 24; full stop landing 24; ZZZ.' (This is my standard CTAF radio call EVERY time at EVERY non-towered airport). At five miles out I repeated the call; modified with '5 miles to the east'. Between the 5-mile point and the traffic pattern; I made a call to the FBO to let them know I was in-bound to collect a passenger. They replied that he was waiting; which confirmed to me I was transmitting on the correct frequency for ZZZ.As I turned onto the left base to Runway 24; I was scanning for traffic and to judge my descent/approach to land. My focus was on the 24 end of the runway. Since runway 6/24 is over 6;800 feet long and the wind favored 24; the 6 end of the runway was not my primary focus. At this point I had not heard any other radio calls from any other aircraft. I was 'heads up' looking out; looking at my touch-down point when; as I turned final; I received an aural traffic alert. 'Traffic; 12 O'clock; same altitude; less than a mile'. The SR22 is equipped with both ADS-B In traffic alerting and Garmin GTX800 active TCAD. I do not know which system triggered as they both issue the same aural alert.I quickly scanned then I immediately looked up and saw the Cessna coming straight towards me and appearing to be turning to my left; so I banked to the right; away from the threat; to de-conflict. I could see only the Cessna's lower engine cowling; nose wheel and the underside of the wing. I could not see any windshield; which leads me to believe they could not see me. The evasive action I took was swift but not overly aggressive (as it might be with a near miss with a bird) and I did not have to maneuver aggressively to re-establish my final. I immediately called and expressed my concern that the other pilot was operating in a manner that was inconsiderate of other aircraft; was not using a standard pattern considering the winds; nor standard radio practices; and posed a serious danger of a conflict. It also suggests that the pilot(s) were not looking down the runway nor in the pattern; nor were they paying attention to the radio; before they started their downwind take off roll.Their response was demeaning; dismissive and accusatory and they tried to blame me for the conflict. I landed; rolled out; taxied to the FBO and collected my colleague. As I taxied back out to depart; I again announced on CTAF 'ZZZ area traffic Cirrus is taxiing from the FBO to the departure end of runway 24. This will be a right turn out to the northeast; ZZZ'. As we approached the end of Runway 24; the Cessna was once again taking off downwind from Runway 6. I held short of Runway 24 as they flew by. This time; once airborne; another voice; (female; who identified herself as a student pilot); did make a departure radio call. This was also incomplete and non-standard; and hence of limited value. I tried to point out that this incomplete and non-standard call was bad practice and again I was belittled by the male voice in the Cessna.I took Runway 24 and again announced 'ZZZ traffic Cirrus is departing Runway 24. This will be a right turn out to the northeast; ZZZ'. Once airborne; my colleague and I discussed what had happened and that he had heard it all both on the FBO radio and later in the cockpit once we'd departed. He was a witness to the entire interaction. Our last call was 'ZZZ area traffic. Cirrus is departing the area to the northeast; last call; ZZZ'. Having re-established radio contact with Center; on the same frequency I had been using on the way in I asked for and was given VFR flight following. I told the Controller I had had a near mid-air back at ZZZ. He was shocked and wanted to check that it wasn't while under his control. I assured him no; it was in the traffic pattern; and I asked for phone numbers for both Center and Approach so I could call and file a complaint when I landed. I placed a call to Center and reported my issue. The manager I spoke to expressed his concern; took my contact info and told me I'd hear from another manager within the next 24 to 48 hours.I find this 'rules don't apply to us' attitude at some of these non-towered airports to be both annoying and at times such as this; outright dangerous. Of especial concern is that a CFI is giving instruction to a student and not only teaches them to fly this way but also becomes belligerent on the radio when challenged about his actions. It caused me to have to take low-level evasive action. It also brings into question if either occupant of the Cessna had been listening to the radio or looking down the runway or in the pattern; before starting their take off roll. I see this very often and it concerns me since; apart from NOT being what should be taught and practiced; it creates poor situational awareness; confusion and doubt in the minds of the pilots and in the past has led to collisions that ended with fatalities. I am keen to know how we can improve this pervasive poor communication attitude to increase situational awareness and hence safety for ALL pilots; not just the locals who may or may not know 'how we do it around here'. The incident 'spooked' me and the worse part was the complete lack of awareness; or apology by the CFI on board the other aircraft.

A pilot flying into a non towered airport reported a NMAC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

(Flight) was assigned the ANJLL 4 Arrival with a modification to maintain 300 knots to CRCUS and 250 knots after for the ILS to Runway 25L. ATC asked if we had the airport in sight around FUELR. We called the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 25L and to maintain 250 knots. This led us to believe we were #1 for the runway. We replied that we would maintain 250 as long as possible. At 19 DME the Controller said to slow to 210 knots. Just then [another aircraft] joined the frequency on a high left base in front of us just inside of HUNDA. The Controller never advised us that we would be following a heavy 767 but we knew what type of aircraft it was from their call sign. We leveled off and dropped the gear to slow to 210 by GAATE. The Controller then told us to maintain at least 180 knots to LIMMA and contact Tower.At this point we could see that the 767 was about 5 miles in front of us and well above our flight path. We briefed to expect a wake encounter with a possible go around. Just after HUNDA we encountered some wake and experienced a 10 knot loss of airspeed. The 767 was rejoining the glideslope and appeared to be below our path. We determined that we could stay above their wake if we stayed slightly above glideslope. This would put us in the end of the touchdown zone but runway length and landing performance would not be an issue as long as we did not encounter any more wake. We were able to be stable by 1;000 feet but had to work unnecessarily hard to keep the aircraft within the touchdown zone.SoCal Approach did not provide any advance notice that we would be following a heavy. Had he done so I would have refused the maintain 250 knot instruction. Furthermore; aircraft on the OLAAA 1 Arrival are often kept too high and fast after SLI (as this 767 was) to join a visual final on the glideslope. Instructing a non-heavy to fly above standard STAR speeds to join behind a heavy is a setup for wake and unstable approaches.SFO Approach used to often turn aircraft on base high and fast for visual approaches. I have not seen it happen since the 777 accident. Just because an ATC procedure is legal does not mean it's in the best interest of safety.

B737 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to LAX in trail of a B767. Reporter was critical of arrival procedures that put aircraft at risk of wake turbulence encounters.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

1L door closed by agent with majority of overhead bins open; agent closed door prematurely because of intense pressure by management for on time performance. This creates undue stress (they are all afraid of losing their jobs if they have 3 late departures) and causes them to rush through important steps. I told Captain that I was going to open the door to inform agent that bins were not closed. I immediately realized this was not a permitted action and could pose a safety risk. Take away the pressure from agents! Slow down. Realize that our employees are not machines. Flight Attendant 1 opened door with permission of Captain to inform agent that bins were not closed.

B737-800 Purser reports Gate Agent closing the main cabin door before the doors on the overhead bins have been closed; in order to have an on time departure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120.2; Flight Crew Total 3056.40; Flight Crew Type 3056.40

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

On approach into [Runway] XXL we were the first of several aircraft to go around due to windshear. There was no visual or oral alarm; however; we could not slow the aircraft and went around; as did an Airbus next to us on approach to [Runway] XXR. We were given vectors to hold for the weather to pass. We calculated Bingo fuel; communicated with Dispatch; and discussed our options. At this time; Approach stated they were vectoring for Runway XY with a 24 kt crosswind. We agreed that if we went around; we would immediately divert to ZZZ1. Ten miles from the FAF (Final Approach Fix); and nearly at Bingo; we were given a vector off final without being given a reason. I told Approach we didn't have fuel for this; and was immediately cleared for the visual approach. On short final with weather to our right; in the direction of our alternate; and weather directly ahead we received a 'too low; terrain' warning. We both confirmed we were on glide slope; and PAPI; the gear was down and we could see no reason for the alert. Starting the flare; we received a 'too low; flaps' warning. At Bingo fuel; with storms ahead; and to the right we elected to continue the landing reasoning this was the safest course of action in the moment. On roll out; I looked down and saw the flaps were set at 25. This was my error; however; I feel we made the correct decision to land in this case.

B737 flight crew received Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Alert during approach in visual conditions.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During hazardous container inspection; found a corrosive 8.0 shipment that was not listed on the DG manifest. DG agent removed the corrosive and flight blocked out normally.

An A300 First Officer discovered a hazardous materials package that had not been logged as such. The package was removed.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During a normal takeoff; the right engine spooled back to idle at 1000 FT and became uncontrollable.  I called the Tower and informed them of our situation and declared an Emergency.  We then completed the Memory Items for a flame out and then ran the Emergency QRH checklist. We determined that we saw no reason for the idle engine.  All engine parameters indicated normal flight idle but the lack of controllability was indicative of  some kind of engine damage.  We elected to shut the engine down.  After completing all appropriate checklists to secure the engine; we contacted the company and notified the flight attendants of our situation.  We then landed the plane single engine taxied to the gate and the fire rescue determined the aircraft safe.

MD82 Captain experiences an engine malfunction shortly after takeoff; with thrust reducing to idle uncommanded. An emergency is declared and the engine is shut down before returning to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Shortly after reaching initial cruise altitude the Captain and I noticed a burning smell. Almost immediately we received a call from the flight attendant that there was smoke in the cabin. I was the pilot flying and continued to fly while the Captain spoke with the flight attendant. The Relief Pilot (FB) was on break in the cabin and helped locate the source of the smoke which was from a business class seat. While he was doing that; I initiated a course to return directly to [departure airport] and began descent for landing. We ran the 'Smoke and Fumes'; 'Emergency Landing;' and 'Overweight Landing' checklists and checked the landing legality charts. I gave our information to ATC and the Captain informed Dispatch through Ramp Control. I exceeded 250 KIAS below 10;000 feet to expedite out arrival. I went on oxygen for a short time out of an abundance of caution. About midway through our descent the smell began to dissipate. We performed an uneventful landing and taxied to the gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

Upon reaching cruise altitude; flight crew smelled fumes and received call from Flight Attendant alerting them to smoke in the cabin. Crew performed Smoke and Fumes Checklist and returned to departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 232.95; Flight Crew Total 815.23; Flight Crew Type 815.23

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We just leveled off at 30;000 feet and Flight Attendant informed us that there was a smell of smoke in the cabin. Shortly thereafter; they called again and said that other flight attendants smelled the electric smoke smell as did [the] passengers. We were a few miles north of ZZZ at the time and elected to divert. Both the Captain and I smelled an electric smell and donned our oxygen masks. The smell cleared in the cockpit and when we checked in with the flight attendants they said it had also cleared in the cabin. We [advised ATC] and asked for radar vectors to final approach to Runway XXR. We coordinated with the flight attendants deciding not to do an evacuation and unless we heard from them that the condition worsened; we would land normally and have the fire trucks follow us to the gate where we would deplane normally. We landed and taxied to the gate as we planned; and the smell never returned. The entire crew did a great job coordinating and executing this abnormal event.

After departing ZZZ1 and reaching our initial cruise altitude of 30;000 [feet; the flight attendants informed us that they had smelled electrical smoke. At the time we did not smell anything. The flight attendants called again and informed us that several flight attendants and passengers smelled smoke and that the rear of the cabin was 'hazy. 'Immediately after; the First Officer and myself smelled an electrical burning smell. We dawned our oxygen masks and [advised ATC]. ZZZ was the nearest airport. We proceeded to descend and set up for an approach to [Runway] XXR in ZZZ. The electrical smell cleared the cockpit. We were in communication several times with the flight attendants during the descent. During our final communication; the flight attendants informed us that the smell and smoke had dissipated. We landed without incident. We confirmed with the flight attendants once on the ground that the smoke and smell were no longer present. The airport fire and rescue did not observe any smoke or hot spots. We continued to the gate.

B737 flight crew reported a fume event during cruise resulting in an uneventful divert.


On departure we got a hydraulic quantity low Crew Alert System (CAS). There were no other indications of a problem and the weather was good so I elected to continue to our destination. When on a visual approach the flaps would not come down and [we] got hydraulic main low. I called for the gear down which was slow; but came down. At that point I thought the best action was to [divert to another airport] for a longer runway. I landed the aircraft with normal braking and had no problems taxiing to the ramp.We got a white CAS but didn't think it was a problem until we had trouble getting the landing gear down.We went to an airport with a longer runway in case we did not have hydraulics for brakes.

LR-45 Captain reported diverting to a suitable alternate when they got a CAS for low hydraulic quantity.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

While on visual approach; the Captain's radio altimeter became erratic from 440 FT AGL to touchdown and the amber message 'RAD ALT INVALID' displayed on both ADP's. I commanded the First Officer to reset to the ADP's. In the flare; the yaw damper failed and the tail swung a bit; but I was able to maintain centerline. At almost the exact same time; the Flight Director (FD) failed and an amber 'FD FAIL' message was displayed on both EADI's in the upper left corner. We landed safely and taxied to the gate. I contacted Dispatch and was transferred to Maintenance Control where we worked together to add MELs 33-6; 34-19; and 22-4(b). The onsite Mechanic began working to complete the maintenance action required to MEL the Captain's radio altimeter. If applied; this would mean that the EGPWS would be disabled. The First Officer and I discussed operating the flight to ZZZ1 at night; IMC; with mountainous terrain and decided that there were 'too many links in our error chain.' I consulted the Chief Pilot; via cell phone and he agreed that our concerns were legitimate and that he 'would back [us] with whatever decision [we] make.' I contacted Dispatch and declined the aircraft due to the MELs being added to the aircraft. There is no way to prevent this situation. I feel that we made a good decision to decline the aircraft and credit my training and experience thus far.

DHC 8-200 Captain experiences Radar Altimeter failure at low altitude during a visual approach. This causes the yaw damper to trip off and the Flight Directors to fail; each with their own failure indications. The approach continues to a safe landing; but the aircraft is refused for the next leg.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 99.5; Flight Crew Total 18905.30; Flight Crew Type 15922.95

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We pushed from the gate without the Final Dangerous Goods Summary. Dangerous goods were not loaded. We did not start the taxi until after receiving the Final Dangerous Goods Summary. We pushed late do to engine deicing at the gate . Weather was a distraction.

B737 Captain reported Final Dangerous Goods document not onboard. After pushback; flight crew requested and received Final Dangerous Goods summary and departed without further issues.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 206; Flight Crew Total 23390; Flight Crew Type 12907

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

PM (Pilot Monitoring) accidentally engaged Heading Select on MCP (Mode Control Panel) while returning flight plan clipboard to the glare shield.  The error occurred at W030 on the NAT's.  Several factors contributed to the error going unnoticed for about five minutes: 1) Ten degree course change resulting in a 15 to 20 degree heading change due to a strong left quartering tailwind. 2) Frequency changes from Gander to Shanwick. 3) Extended time for radio check in and SELCAL due to other radio traffic. 4) Automated CPDLC check in message from Shanwick. I used this first CPDLC message to explain the need to print all messages received so both pilots can read the entire message prior to accepting.  About this time the PF (Pilot Flying) noticed we were off course and turned sharply back towards course.  Shanwick called and asked if we were 'operations normal.'  PM stated; 'Affirmative; proceeding to N55W020.'  Moments later Shanwick called again and stated; 'ADS reports you are 15 miles right of course; state reason' PM replied; 'Roger; correcting back to course.  Reason: accidental engagement of Heading Select.'  As we were turning back on course at this time; just outside of the 80 mile circle; PM reported to Shanwick. 'Back on course to N55W020.'  A few minutes later Shanwick called again and stated; 'No traffic conflict and no report.' PM acknowledged.  After completing the crew change; we called Shanwick to confirm his message of 'no traffic conflict and no report to be filed.'  Shanwick replied. 'Standby; will call you back.'  After a few minutes Shanwick called and stated. 'There was no traffic conflict and no report to be filed.'   An audible tone with MCP changes out of LNAV or VNAV.  When distractions occur; even normal ones; remember to continue to cross check and not allow the distraction to focus all the attention on it.

B767 Captain described a track deviation on a North Atlantic Track when the MCP heading set knob was inadvertently pushed returning a clip board to the glare shield. The error went undetected for five minutes resulting in a fifteen mile track deviation.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

While practicing touch and go landings; another pilot flying Aircraft Y announced his intention to enter on a 45 degree entry to runway 20 at PWT. I continued in the pattern announcing my position at all phases of the pattern. While on the downwind I heard [the Aircraft Y pilot] say he was on the 45. I announced turning base and then final. I opted to go around and heard someone warn me about an opposite direction aircraft on final. I continued the go around. I then saw traffic directly opposite to me approaching runway 02. I avoided him while on the upwind at 300 feet AGL.I was on my 3rd circuit with others having been in the pattern. I announced my position and continued the go around avoiding the traffic and clearly continued to announce my position. The pilot executed a low approach to runway 02 and continued to fly northbound not talking on the radio. I continued in the pattern announcing my position at every phase of flight. I tried to talk with the pilot but no answer.

GA pilot experienced an airborne conflict with another aircraft that had announced entering the pattern for Runway 20; but wound up on approach to Runway 02 in conflict with the reporter. Evasive action was taken by the reporter and the NORDO pilot departed to the south without making radio contact.


Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Inbound to ZZZ 10 miles out I call my location and intent for left traffic for runway XX at ZZZ airport. I make my traffic pattern calls and as I call on final I hear a static on the radio and assume it is traffic at another airport on [the same frequency]. It was not till my landing flare that I see Aircraft Y rotating opposite direction on the runway approximately 2;000 FT in front of me. The aircraft sidesteps to my right and over flies my right wing at approximately 75 FT. I query the aircraft and he makes a statement that they called a right base to land XY but that I decided to land anyways. Assistant airport manager at ZZZ overheard the radio calls and stated to me he heard my radio calls; but none from Aircraft Y until I queried him. At no time did I hear any radio calls from Aircraft Y until I queried him.Lack of radio calls from Aircraft Y; and the decision to continue to land opposite runway after hearing my call on final.

C402 pilot reports ground conflict with traffic departing opposite direction while landing at a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 349; Flight Crew Type 17000

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Climbing through about FL355 for FL370 at approximately M.78 in VNAV; we noticed an uncommanded rise in airspeed along with the large increase in Vertical Speed. The airspeed trend arrow went up into the barber pole; (we never got the clacker) so the Captain reduced power; as the airspeed and Vertical Speed continued to increase very rapidly; the Captain continued to reduce power and increase the pitch in an attempt to prevent the aircraft from overspeeding. The airspeed and Vertical Speed increased at such a rapid rate that we were unable to level off the FL370; with the airspeed continuing to increase. We did not have any indications of mountain wave or windshear leading up to this point. I believe we were able to get the aircraft to slow down and level off at approximate FL380; with idle thrust. I immediately notified ATC of the severe updraft we had experienced and our deviation in altitude. The windshear event appeared to be over and we returned back to FL370 promptly. I called the Flight Attendants to check the status of the cabin; everyone was ok thankfully. We notified Dispatch of the severe updraft/windshear; and the Captain wrote the aircraft up when we got to ZZZ. Maintenance met the airplane in with a printed report of the flight data; showing a 7900 fpm climb during the peak of the windshear event. The rest of the flight was mostly light chop/turbulence. We didn't encounter any more mountain wave or windshear. There isn't anything that we could have done to prevent this event. I believe we handled it as well as possible; given the extreme nature of the windshear/turbulence.

Leveling off to cruise at FL370 climbing out in mostly smooth conditions we encountered severe turbulence in the form of a significant updraft. Pitch and thrust were managed as to not exceed aircraft limitations while maintaining positive aircraft control.

B737 flight crew reported an increase in airspeed and vertical speed that resulted in a max climb rate of 7;900 feet per minute and overshooting the assigned cruise altitude by approximately 1;000 feet.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

During descent into our destination the airspeed indicators showed a difference of more than 25 knots. The Autopilot failed. Engine control faults were cycling. The anti-ice had been on for a minimum of 15 minutes before entering into the precipitation. Due to conflicting airspeed indications and altitude indications; the first attempt at a landing was abandoned by me calling go around; as we were not established and stable. The second attempt was successful; but we lost communications with ATC due to the radio interference from the weather. I believe that this was a circumstantial event; and that maintenance was a large factor; but earlier recognition of the flights disparities would have eased the situation.

A C-680 on descent in heavy precipitation developed a 25 knot airspeed discrepancy along with autopilot and engine control malfunctions. A go-around was executed from an unstabilized approach with airspeed and altitude discrepancies.


We were on final to RWY 28R at PDX descending through 1;200 MSL when we saw a blue quad-copter drone pass off the left side of the aircraft. We saw the drone just as it passed and did not have to maneuver to avoid. I would estimate that it was within a wingspan distance; so roughly 100 from us at the same altitude. As passengers were deplaning; multiple passengers commented that they had seen the drone and wondered if we had seen it also. One passenger familiar with the area said that it was near the IKEA just east of PDX.

I was the flying pilot (FO) on flight to PDX. On final approach inside the marker I saw something blue on the left side (south) of the aircraft. We were about 3 miles from the runway and 900 ft. My first guess at the time was that the blue object was some balloons and I even brought that up during the approach. After landing and at the gate while the passengers were deplaning two passengers approached the cockpit absolutely convinced that a blue drone came really close to our aircraft during the approach. They themselves were familiar with drones and even stated the type (I believe they said it was a quadcopter). Because we saw something blue and they were convinced it was a drone and also stated the color blue my CA thought it wise to report the incident to Portland tower.

B737 flight crew reported a NMAC with a UAV on approach to PDX.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Nothing bad actually happened. All the taxi charts in PUW are currently not accurate. Just as more of a heads up. Taxied to the ramp Via A3; A; D. Lucky weather was good so finding the correct taxiways were easy. But there is little to no guidance that with A4 and closed and the construction maligning getting to the ramp via A1 impassable the only way to access ramp is via A3. Documentation kinda explains the ramp construction; but nothing about to how to get to the ramp with the taxiways closed.Add a taxi diagram with the new A3 and D taxiway and warn crew about if they land [Runway] 5 and exit on A1 their will be no way to the ramp. If a crew lands [Runway] 5 they will need to back taxi to A3 and WSI there. If landing [Runway] 23; A3 is the only way off with A4 closed.

Air carrier Captain reported the taxiways are incorrectly depicted in the charts for PUW airport due the closure of Taxiway A4 and construction activity.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 28; Air Traffic Control Radar 26; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 1

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

The local FSDO visited my facility recently regarding the frequency of pilot deviations as they relate to the Leesburg Maneuvering Area (LMA); a special use area near the SFRA of Washington DC. Specifically; aircraft must use code XXXX while VFR and entering/exiting the LMA. An old procedure that was eliminated in 2014 was to use XXXY inbound and XXXX outboard. Since 2014; it has only been XXXX. It was brought to my attention that FSS is briefing pilots with the old rules. This occurred again today and the pilot indicated that he specifically asked in his briefing about the code and the specialist stated that the rules haven't changed and that XXXY is used inbound. This must be corrected immediately. Any time an aircraft enters the LMA on an incorrect code; it is deemed a pilot deviation. If we can eliminate the poor information being provided to pilots; this issue should resolve itself.

7/5/2019Manager reported that another ATC division listened to a briefing from the FSS in question and did not hear inaccurate information. This ATC Manger recommends contacting the FSS to insure the correct information is indeed being disseminated.

Air Traffic Control Manger reported Flight Service Station is disseminating the wrong information regarding squawk codes used to enter / exit a practice area. Wrong codes could create a possible pilot deviation.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 833; Flight Crew Type 330

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

The Tower [was] closed. Our plan was to make six touch and goes on Runway 35L. A Remos small plane had started before the Tower closed and was using Runway 35L. He was talking when we synced our go around with his; then he landed and went to parking (but was still 'talking' on the radio). [There was] also; a helicopter four miles northeast [they were] 'talking' but was not going to land. There may have been a 4th voice; but it was low; quiet and nobody understood who he was or what he was doing.We were announcing 'downwind' left base for Runway 35L when another airplane appeared to takeoff on Runway 17R and quickly turned right under our DA-40 as we were turning final. We could see a red position light as he turned but no landing or white lights. He missed us by about 250 FT and obviously could see us as we had our strobes; landing and taxi lights on. There were green and red 'row' lights showing Runway 35L was preferred. ASOS report 240 degrees/3. He took off on Runway 17. Pretty scary.

A DA-40 private pilot just turning final to land on Runway 35L at HND suffered an NMAC with another unidentified aircraft taking off the opposite direction. The Tower was closed and CTAF communications were muddled.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was relieving the Radar Controller. Controller covered all required items including aircraft status. A B737 was on frequency with standard restriction to cross ZZZ at FL190. Briefing over; I sat down and observed the B737 crossing ZZZ level at FL230. At that moment; the B737 announced on frequency that they would not make the restriction at ZZZ; but that they would miss it by 3 or 4 miles. The Controller I relieved had not yet left the area; and confirmed that the B737 had checked on with the crossing restriction. The pilot of the B737 then made several transmissions asking if that had been a problem; are we all set here; are you going to file paperwork because if you are then we will; and so on. They missed the restriction by several more than just 3 or 4 miles.I read the recent briefing sheet that stated that crossing restrictions were the shared responsibility of pilots and controllers; and I disagree. A crossing restriction is issued by the controller to ensure that; at some future time or place; the altitude of a specific aircraft will be known; so that other tasks; such as concentrating on other separation scenarios developing in the sector; can be accomplished. Many pilots now 'hang it up' so they can perform 'flight idle descents' to an assigned crossing restriction; so it is not unusual for an aircraft to appear high; to a controller; for a particular restriction. Short of questioning each aircraft that has been issued a restriction if they are planning on complying with a restriction (and this does not assure compliance either); I do not see how a controller could manage a moderately busy sector; and thus; my opinion remains unchanged that an acknowledged crossing restriction; for which the controller has assured a good readback; is the sole responsibility of the flight crew. I have no recommendation on how to prevent a re-occurrence of this event. Until there are consequences for the offending flight crews; restrictions will continue to be ignored; and the results may prove to be ugly and newsworthy.

ARTCC Controller reported an air carrier missed a crossing restriction; then discussed who was responsible.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

When company announced the requirements for wearing a mask anytime we could not practice 6 feet of distance; I was happy and felt coming into work would be more safe. Problem is this policy has been in place and it seems like management is not enforcing employees to wear the mask. I haven't seen it myself but I've been told an entire shift doesn't wear mask except maybe two employees. I do feel like it's hard coming into work because I don't feel safe with co-workers who aren't following the new policy and management who allows it to happen.

Ground employee reported concerns about peers not wearing face masks.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 5950; Flight Crew Type 230

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5700; Flight Crew Type 20

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

After being cleared for the LOC DME E approach into ASE; we were notified that Aspen Radar was inoperative. We continued to fly the approach to DOYPE where it was briefed we would execute the published missed procedure at that point. At DOYPE we executed the published missed approach: climbed to 14;000 feet and began our turn to an initial heading 300 at CEYAG. While turning towards LINDZ; ATC asked if we were direct LINDZ. We answered 'yes' per the published missed approach. ATC stated that they had received a 'low altitude alert' and instructed a climb to 17;000. We continued with the missed procedure routing and requested a return to ZZZ. ATC gave us vectors to a visual descent and landing at ZZZ. Before the handoff to Denver Center; we were notified to contact Aspen Tower once we landed. After contacting Aspen Tower; we were notified again of the low altitude alert. I notified the tower controller that our aircraft terrain warning system seemed fully operational and [we] executed the missed approach procedure without event.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A CL-30 flight crew reported being advised by ATC of a low altitude alert during their approach to ASE airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Total 4914; Flight Crew Type 1701

During the layover I received a phone call from the crew desk because one of the IROs had called in sick and therefore the crew desk needed to reset my rest. The asinine notion of disrupting someone's rest by waking them up during an international layover; in order to tell them they need more rest and should go back to sleep is another matter and not main subject of this report.The ZZZZ-ZZZZ1-ZZZZ segment was conducted by 3 pilots.None of us 3 were able to get any meaningful rest on any of the 2 segments.On the last day of this pairing; as I was on my way for a pick up from the hotel to fly from ZZZZ to ZZZ; I received a call from the Crew Desk; issuing me a new assignment to fly to ZZZZ1 and return to ZZZZ on the same day.I reluctantly accepted the assignment. Apparently the Captain on the flights on date from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1 had called in sick the very last minute and Crew Desk was scrambling to find a replacement Captain. I was reluctant to accept this assignment; because I was heading home with plans and obligations to my very sick wife. However I decided to fly the trip in order to help the company. I took my originally scheduled van ride to the airport.I was the only passenger in the van; as the Crew Desk had indicated that the FO (First Officer) for the flight on date was on his way on his original scheduled ride to the airport.After clearing passport control at ZZZZ I proceeded to flight operations for flight planning. There was no sign of the FO. I proceeded to the airplane and started preparing the cabin - still no sign of the FO. I performed the walk around and started preparing the airplane; securing the galleys and overhead bins; loading the FMC and preparing the flight deck. I was expecting to see the FO at any minute.The crew desk called me while I was on the flight deck waiting; asking if I had heard from the FO. They had contacted the hotel and the hotel staff couldn't locate him. After another hour the crew desk contacted me once again to tell me that the hotel staff had gone into his room and his belongings were still in the hotel room; we were concerned about his well being at this point.About an hour later; I called the crew desk again and reminded them that the time limit will not allow us to fly regardless of when the FO shows up.At this point; the crew desk reassigned me once again to fly the same ZZZZ1 turn on date.The ZZZZ station was very helpful in walking me through passport control and customs in order to obtain my original shore pass. This is not a simple process.I took the van back to the layover hotel.We flew the ZZZZ-ZZZZ1-ZZZZZ turn on date +1 on the verge of exhaustion and with very little wiggle room with the time limit. Both of us made numerous mental errors on this day due to exhaustion. In retrospect; I should have turned down the assignment.I am home today after being gone 8 days on a trip that was long and grueling in the first place.Disruption of my rest on day two; after a Pacific crossing; followed by disruption of my sleep during my rest by the crew desk; followed by flying a grueling same day ZZZZ-ZZZZ2-ZZZZ (with 3 pilots instead of the scheduled 4); followed by reassignment to fly another same day ZZZZ-ZZZZ1-ZZZZ with a no show FO followed by yet another reassignment to fly ZZZZ-ZZZZ1-ZZZZZ day 7. On this trip I also had 8 van rides.I am exhausted and fatigued and will not be safe to fly until I get adequate rest. Also please correct my pay.

Air carrier Captain reported flying while fatigued due to multiple schedule changes during 8 day international rotation.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1005; Flight Crew Type 900

As I was returning from a recreational flight from the south of John Wayne Airport; SoCal on frequency 124.1 advised me to proceed direct to Signal Peak for the normal VFR pattern entry to John Wayne Airport.  I was handed off to the John Wayne Tower on frequency 119.9 and told to make left traffic for Runway 20L.   While downwind; I was cleared to land on Runway 20L and cautioned for wake turbulence from a 737 that was making a go around on Runway 20R.    As I proceeded downwind at around 100-110 kts with 50% flaps; I began a normal pattern descent and began my base turn.  I was just starting my base to final turn; between 90 to 100 knots and around 700 feet MSL (I was above 500 feet because my terrain warning of 500 feet had not yet sounded); when I saw a Cessna (believe it was a Cessna 172) coming straight toward me from the pilot's side window.  The Cessna was flying a pattern inside of me.  It appeared to be flying a downwind pattern; and was on a collision course with my base turning Cirrus. I steepened my angle of descent; and dove away from the Cessna.  It passed immediately behind my tail.  I did not have any time to observe the Cessna after I initially saw it and took evasive action.  I estimate it passed close behind my tail at my same altitude.I continued my descent and transitioned from base to final and landed without event on Runway 20L.  While on short final; I reported this near miss to the tower controller.  The controller confirmed I was number one and cleared to land; and that the Cessna was to follow me.

An SR22 pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at SNA.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During the LOC/DME Back Course [Runway] 22 approach at Homer Airport (HOM); the First Officer/pilot monitoring (PM) called the Leadoff Radial late while using the RMI as primary source of data. This resulted in loss of situational awareness; overshooting the LOC course; and a GPWS Alert requiring a second approach to land. While on the ground in HOM; First Officer/PM determined that the RMI had been selected to the ADF on both pointers; thus giving incorrect information of the Leadoff Radial. After going missed and on a safe course and altitude; having regained situational awareness; First Officer/PM contacted ATC to inform of the missed procedure. ATC said that Flight XYZ had a terrain warning and that the MSA in the area was in the 5;XXX MSL (not able to remember exact altitude at time of this statement); and thus since aircraft was above 6;XXX MSL (not able to remember exact alt at time of this statement); Captain/pilot flying (PF) leveled off aircraft while going direct to VOR. First Officer/PM asked Captain/PF if we were going to do the approach again and was told yes; so First Officer/PM briefed the Captain/PF the following: Direct VOR; fly outbound on the 003 radial to 11 DME to make a right hand turn at FOLAR; cross the leadoff radial and turn to 218 and fly the LOC inbound. First Officer/PM performed this brief to make sure First Officer/PM knew what the plan was because the Captain was the PF. Captain/PF agreed to the brief. ATC asked 'state intentions'. First Officer/PM requested LOC DME (BACK CRS RWY 22) as formerly briefed with the Captain/PF. ATC also asked if Flight XYZ had gotten the Localizer on the first try and First Officer/PM stated no (had flown past it). ATC cleared Flight XYZ for the approach; LOC DME (BACK CRS RWY 22); cleared aircraft to a lower altitude with stay on center until established on LOC; and gave us a phone number for crew to call when able. First Officer/PM repeated clearance and told ATC was not able to copy phone number at that time. Captain/PF flew the approach using the Captain's gauges; and First Officer/PM input the course needles to allow Captain/PF to fly. While Captain/PF was flying; First Officer/PM twisted VOR needle to count up to Lead-off Radial. First Officer/PM input the localizer course needle and verified with Captain/PF to point inbound needle to 038 degrees and not 218 degrees. First Officer/PM wanted to make sure he was pointing the needle correctly. Captain/PF agreed. Then Captain/PF called LOC alive. First Officer/PM made calls of fixes/distances/altitudes to descend to while inputting the step downs into the altitude alerter. First Officer/PM completed the Landing Checklist as requested by Captain/PF. Captain/PF landed normally in  HOM. After taxiing off the runway in  HOM; First Officer/PM radioed ATC to inform of safe on ground status and to close flight plan; First Officer/PM also asked ATC to repeat the phone number given in the air. After parking and deplaning; the Captain/PF called the number given by ATC and spoke with them. Captain/PF also called and spoke with Operations and the Assistant Chief Pilot. During this time; First Officer/PM noticed that the copilot side RMI was selected to dual ADF and not NAV as would have been required to be properly configured for calling Leadoff Radial. Other pertinent data: First Officer/PM attempted multiple times to hear the HOM weather report without success; despite repeatedly 'breaking squelch' on radio #2 to try to hear it starting 40 miles out from  HOM. ATC asked Flight XYZ whether we had received the weather report at  HOM; but First Officer/PM was not able to get HOM weather until approximately 5-6 miles from FOLAR (after 'breaking squelch' to get it; it came in abnormally weak and faint). This caused a delay in executing the descent to land checklist in the segment of flight just prior to approach to land procedures. When First Officer/PM contacted HOM local company frequency using radio #2 to give anupdate on landing time; company ground employee asked First Officer/PM to repeat data several times due to weak and broken transmission while Flight XYZ was on the approach. Company ground employee asked First Officer/PM about the weak and broken transmission once aircraft was on the ground. First Officer/PM is in high minimum status with less than 40 hours in type/121 crew environment/Alaska operations. Majority of prior duty times were on-call reserve status with multi-day gaps between flights. Consistent flying after a new type rating.

Air carrier X was cleared for LOC/BC RWY 22 Approach at HOM by the previous controller. A couple minutes after taking sector; I noticed aircraft was southeast bound past the localizer maintaining 3;600 feet. MSAW warning was active with aircraft below the terrain in a 4;400 MVA. I checked the weather at HOM to see if the aircraft was possibly on a visual approach. With the weather being marginal; I called out for air carrier X to see if the aircraft was on my frequency. I received no response. I called ENA FSS to see if aircraft was on frequency. As ENA FSS called out for the aircraft; I heard aircraft come up on my frequency. I issued a low altitude to aircraft; with no altitude to maintain as aircraft's target reacquired with their Mode-C at 5;500 feet and climbing. I did verify their altitude.  Pilot told me they were headed towards the HOM VOR and climbing. I did not issue a clearance to the VOR; however once established over the HOM VOR; I issued another [LOC/DME] BC RWY 22 Approach to HOM. I then asked Flight XYZ the reason they did not receive the localizer. Aircraft landed successfully. Stay attentive on sector.

First Officer describes a failed LOC/DME BC RWY 22 to HOM; caused partly by his inexperience and setting the RMI needles to ADF when at least one needed to be on VOR to define the lead in radial. The localizer is overshot toward high terrain causing ATC to issue a MSAW. The second attempt is successful with the RMI still improperly set.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 91.17; Flight Crew Total 9879.23; Flight Crew Type 9879.23

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On the RNAV Stadium Visual to runway 29 we were vectored behind an Airbus 321 on the ILS to 22R.  We joined the visual at GIMEE with the airport and the [A321] in sight.  We had been cleared to land prior to crossing GIMEE.  Tower reported winds calm; ATIS had winds 200/6.  Prior to SLIMR we were configured and slowing to approach speed.  At approximately 1;500 ft AGL I called for the landing check and called to the FO that [the A321] appeared to be crossing the numbers and spacing looked good.  Continued in LVAV/VNAV till the autopilot rolled us out on final at about 1;000 ft AGL.  At this point PAPI showed slightly high and corrected to visual glide path.  A rapid right roll was encountered just prior to touchdown causing contact of the right main. This slowed the roll but aircraft was still rolling right.  Immediate left aileron was applied along with deployment of the auto speed brakes quickly caused the left main to touch down.  Roll out was normal from this point.  Wing drop was so rapid that I thought the right gear leg had collapsed.  The event occurred so quickly that there was not even time to consider a go-around.  The application of power and lifting off again would likely only have exacerbated this situation placing us at a bank angle at low speed with an at the time unknown problem.  During debrief we determined that the event occurred just prior to the intersection with Runway 22R and was likely a wake turbulence event.  An ACARS generated report showed a max bank angle of 6.9 degrees with a predicted wing tip strike at a bank angle of 7.5 degrees.  The FO inspected the aircraft for possible damage; none was found.  The event was reported to Tower; but they did not seem concerned.  I contacted Clearance Delivery to get more information on the preceding aircraft.  CD took more interest and sounded like it would be reported.

Reporter stated intersecting runway wake encounter events were more unusual in his experience; but this one was quite severe.

B737NG Captain reported encountering wake turbulence shortly before touchdown on Runway 29 at EWR from an A321 on short final to Runway 22R.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Weather

I was training a trainee. Traffic was steady moderate for the first 30 minutes and then the sector became overloaded. I took over as the D-side (Assist) and Management called in an L-side (Extra Monitor) as well. There was weather west of our airspace moving eastward and we had deviations all over with adjacent sector routes now being forced through our sector. We consistently had a page of aircraft on the EDST (Enroute Decision Support Tool) with 54 in the ACL (Aircraft List) at its peak. At one point we had 2 other CPC's watching the scope and helping. This whole scenario was beyond safe. The sector was out of control and should have never been put in this situation to begin with. Unacceptable! TMU (Traffic Management Unit) and Management need to be more proactive. Instead of reacting; let's start slowing things down sooner and if it's not needed; we can reevaluate. Waiting until something like this happens is unacceptable.

ZDC Center Controller reported working an overloaded sector with weather deviations due to lack of traffic flow restrictions was unsafe.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ZZZ weather was forecast to be 300/05KT P6SM SCT050 BKN100 at +/- one hour from planned time of arrival. An alternate was not required at the time of dispatch; however it was added enroute when snow conditions began earlier than anticipated. Upon communicating with my dispatcher; he added ZZZ1 as our alternate being that it was the closest acceptable airport with the best weather and we had very little contingency fuel. At that time ZZZ1 reported calm winds; 1-3/4 SM visibility -SN BR BKN024 OVC033 M08/M11. After a few vectors from ATC and when the weather became acceptable we approached ZZZ for the ILS (to the only runway open at the time). The approach controller informed us shortly before the final approach fix that Runway XX was reporting 4500 RVR. As a Restricted Captain I was required to add 1/2SM to visibility in order to be in compliance with FM-1. *Note: The [reporting] system does not allow fractions to be added under the Cause/Weather section of this report; however it was 3/4 SM as reported in the ATIS.* The charted minima for ZZZ ILS XX requires 1/2SM and the weather was above that minima for CAT 1 at; however below the 1 SM/5000 RVR requirement that my restricted status imposed. We therefore abandoned the approach before the final approach fix and notified the approach controller immediately that we would have to divert to ZZZ1. Enroute to our diversion airport; ZZZ1 weather deteriorated to approximately the same conditions we found in ZZZ (4500 RVR for the only runway in use; Runway XY). As we had little other options with the fuel onboard; [ATC was advised] on approach to ZZZ1 Runway XY when the fuel level reached approximately 2100 pounds (near 30 minutes remaining). It was clear that [Captain's] authority was required to land below Restricted Captain Minima and that a go-around would be ill-advised.The cause of this event is attributed to the lack of fuel due to the early onset of snow conditions at the destination. As no alternate was filed or required at the time of dispatch; an alternate had to be added enroute when weather deteriorated at the destination. The situation became more constricted when the alternate weather also dropped below Restricted Captain Minima; directly driving the need to deviate from the higher minima to safely land the aircraft. At the time of planning; the flight was dispatched with adequate fuel; however preemptively adding an alternate - while not required initially - would have been prudent and given the crew more options for alternate airfields with better conditions.

EMB-175 Captain reported that because of weather conditions and low fuel on board the crew landed below restricted captain minima.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure

As we were taxiing west on Runway 27; we could see a radar return of a strong storm which was depicted red on our screen. The storm was directly west of the Memphis airport and appeared to be moving east toward us. As we turned south on Taxiway N; we could only see part of the storm to our right on the radar display. When we switched frequencies to Tower; we heard that there was windshear on a two mile final for our runway. As we approached the runway; we advised Tower that we would not takeoff. Tower reminded us that the windshear was two miles in the opposite direction from where we would be heading. It seemed like the cell was directly over the field at that time possibly centered a little north. I considered the fact that the FOM guides us not to get within 5 miles of a cell below FL200. Tower instructed us to taxi out of the way so that several other aircraft could takeoff while we waited a few minutes for the storm to pass.I feel that Tower was more concerned about getting airplanes on their way than wait a few minutes until it was safe. I also think [there is an] air carrier culture pressure to get the job done even if there is an increased risk. When one aircraft decides it is not safe to takeoff; perhaps Tower should inform the following aircraft that might not have been on frequency to get the same information. Although several aircraft took off away from the storm; they faced the possibility of getting a decreasing performance windshear on takeoff. I would also suggest more fatigue prevention measures since crews may have felt in a hurry to get to the next hotel room.

With weather depicted near MEM and a windshear alert issued; a flight crew declined takeoff clearance but felt pressure from ATC and the air carrier to not delay flight operations even with the increased risk.


[We] lost all hydraulic fluid on the #2 side during descent. Ran appropriate checklists for low hydraulic quantity and associated master cautions including an alternate gear extension. On landing; we had no nose wheel steering as the checklist specified and thus we attempted to use differential braking and power to turn aircraft off of runway. It was quickly obvious that this was not a safe course of action and [we] stopped short of clearing runway. A tug met the plane and we were tugged to the gate.

Q400 First Officer reported loss of #2 hydraulic system on descent. After running appropriate procedures a normal landing was made and the aircraft was towed to the gate.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 331; Flight Crew Type 250

My student and I were conducting a dual XC (cross-country) training flight and were coming inbound to E63 for a full stop; taxi back. We monitored CTAF and heard over that frequency that Runway 4 was in use. We planned at approximately 12 miles to the east-southeast that we would conduct a teardrop entry for left downwind Runway 4. We planned on crossing the Runway at 2100 feet; which is 500 feet above the TPA of 1600 feet. We made radio calls and broadcast our intentions every 2 miles until we were over the field.We made visual contact with another airplane (an instructor and student) that was conducting the same entry to the traffic pattern. When [we] were approximately 2 miles out; we announced over the CTAF that we had that plane in sight and were about 1 minute to entering the traffic pattern behind him. At the same time there was another airplane using the [same] call sign [as the other aircraft; but different flight number] had been announcing that he was north of the field and would be inbound for a full stop. While we were approaching the runway at 2100 feet we heard this student pilot announce that he was coming from the north and would be entering a midfield crossing at 2100 feet and doing a teardrop and make left traffic for Runway 4. We were trying to make visual contact and were confused as to why he would be making a teardrop entry while coming from the north. Nevertheless; at this time I took over radio control and kept asking the student what his position was from the field. The other airplane ([same] call sign); was in the teardrop entry for Runway 4 said 'He is headed right for you'. At [that] time we saw the student pilot at our same altitude approximately 75 feet to the left and he was turning left. We made an abrupt steep turn to the left to avoid traffic.After the near collision; I did announce over CTAF '[Expletive]; that was close'; in which the student pilot responded; 'My bad; [call sign]'. The student pilot continued to fly over the field at 2100 feet. He executed a 360 degree turn and flew back over the field at 2100 feet and then executed the teardrop entry for a left downwind on Runway 4. I made sure to keep visual and radio contact with Aircraft Y until my student and I were safe on the ground. We performed our landing; taxied back and departed from the area.

Cessna 172 instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in the pattern at E63.


While working Local Control 1; a C-152 requested a full stop landing while downwind north in right traffic for Runway 29R after completing numerous pattern operations with an instructor and student on board. After touchdown; the right main landing gear and its assembly separated from the aircraft's right strut rolling in the grass area south of Runway 29R slightly west of Taxiway H. The aircraft slid down the runway veering toward the north side of the runway coming to stop with what appeared to be the nose gear and left main gear remaining on the runway pavement but the right strut in the grass. The pilot(s) immediately re-established communications and advised of the situation requesting assistance from airport operations but declining other emergency services. With the help of a tow bar and airport operations' pick-up truck; the aircraft was towed off the runway.

Tower Controller described the loss of a landing gear on an inbound Cessna.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

After the flight was final a new flight plan and fuel increase of 5200 LBS was put in by dispatch. This put this flight overweight and illegal according to the smart load screen Zero-Fuel Weight (ZFW) and the weight manifest. Because this overweight condition happened after the weights were sent to the crew there was no Automatic notification of the illegal condition. As the load planner I received no notice of the Overweight condition and the color logic in smart load did not change from green to red. The Smart load color was all green with only the plus 1.75 ZFW indicating an overweight condition. The dispatch ran another flight plan that lowered the fuel to make the flight legal. This lower fuel was only noticed by the load planner by the ion fuel message. The fact that a flight could go overweight without any notification to the load planner causes confusion and is not safe. Some kind of automatic notification should be applied when the Flight is overweight after weights have been sent to the crew.

An air carrier Load Planner reported that there was no automatic notification of an illegal overweight condition prior to flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 20500; Flight Crew Type 1582

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Arrival into IAH was changed from LINKK to NNCEE. We were told to expect Runway 8R; but it would be decided by next controller. We left Runway 9 in the box with appropriate transition. Approaching KONZZ at 12;000 ft.; we were given 8R. We both discussed quickly putting in the Runway 8R with the assumption that we would go north to GOVVV after PRAYY. Flight director went to LVL CHG with the confusion and briefly we descended below 10;000 slightly above 250 kts. At PRAYY; within seconds of beginning a turn for GOVVV; the controller corrected us and vectored us for the south downwind.

Captain reported flying over 250 knots while descending below 10;000 feet due to confusion around a runway clearance change.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Received 1 piece of mail for [flight to] ZZZZ that was stopped at acceptance from the P.O. clearly marked as Lithium Battery just below the DNR tag. Mail was rejected back to the P.O.

Cargo agent reported rejecting USPS mail containing Hazmat not approved for shipment.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Aircraft was being flown in an extended upwind as advised by tower; once crosswind and downwind had commenced an aircraft that took off after us had begun an uninstructed crosswind turn resulting in us having to take evasive action to avoid them.

A C-172 pilot on downwind had to take evasive action after an aircraft that had taken off after them began to turn crosswind in front of them.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 26

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

We were conducting a training flight. After landing and decelerating below approximately 20 knots; the tail wheel tire blew out; causing a swerve to the left and subsequent departure from the runway; with a ground loop. There was no damage to the aircraft or other property. The Tower said nothing; and we taxied back on the runway and to the hangar.

Great Lakes instructor pilot reported the tail wheel tire blew out which caused a runway departure and ground loop. No damage.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors

After downloading and executing the [weight and balance] data; we received an FMC message 'UNABLE 280 KTS AT CHURO.' We discovered the cause to be the Cost Index of 20 set by the Dispatch release which commands a 261 knot descent after transition from mach. We had to spend time finding out the cause which is not optimal during the very busy time after [weight and balance] takeoff data arrives. As we all know; the moment the [weight and balance] takeoff data arrives is one of the busiest times of a flight so this is not inconsequential. This happened again on our very next flight as well; however this time we quickly discovered it was due to the same thing. The CI (Cost Index) set to below 40 is obviously to save fuel and accomplish our third operational priority of efficiency. But since this programming generates an airspeed that does not comply with a published STAR; it becomes a clear safety issue; greatly increasing the likelihood of pilot violations/deviations if the programming is not corrected. This policy therefore places our number one policy priority; Safety; below our third priority; efficiency.The variable cost index is a great tool for saving fuel; however it cannot be one-size-fits-all. It must be applied at the appropriate time and only where its use does not generate a conflict with the planned STAR at the arrival airport. Crews should not be expected to load an arrival that generates errors and subsequently have to rely on other RRM (Risk and Resource Management) blocks to then correct the planned input that caused the error. We should plan for success and not failure. The use of CI less than 40 should be carefully selected by the Dispatcher at airports where the planned STAR has no airspeed restrictions. However; we can take advantage of the variable cost index to save fuel if used properly. In the case where the airspeed restrictions are 280 knots; a cost index of 36 generates a perfect 280 knot transition. We can take advantage of the lower cost index and still comply with the speed requirements. Interestingly; all ZZZ STARS have a magenta box dictating a 280 knot transition. Why not use CI36 all the time on ZZZ arrivals? This puts us in compliance with this requirement the instant we load our [weight and balance] data at the gate. It requires no further action by the pilot; as opposed to now where we must modify the VNAV descent page to comply. This is setting up for success not failure. On STARS where there is a 270 knot restriction; a CI of 28 generates a 271 knot transition; which is the closest you get to 270 knots without getting slower. Again; we obtain the lower CI fuel savings and avoid having to reprogram our VNAV Descent page. It would take a little time to build the database to check on airspeed requirements for the different STARS; but this should be simple programming. Simply put; 'IF STAR=XXXXX; THEN CI MUST BE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 36'. Then repeat for the others in our system. Used smartly; this could be a great tool for saving fuel; but as we can see; blindly applying a lower CI is setting our crews up for likely violations and deviations and misplacing our operational priorities.

B737 Captain reported the cost index was set too low by Dispatch; so the aircraft could not meet the published speeds on the arrival.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On arrival into EWR one frequency was running what is usually 3 or 4. 128.55 was running all arrivals for all sectors and the departures from EWR. Frequency congestion was high and many aircraft were missing calls. We were at 8000 ft. on the PHILBO THREE having just passed DYLIN. Given instructions to descend to 4000ft. Pilot Monitoring read it back as 4000ft; I set it and verified altitude selected and started a decent. I happened to glance at the TCAS and the line of aircraft compared to my altitude were all leveled at 5000 ft. I stopped descent at 5000 and when able to get a word in queried to confirm 5000 for us. He responded yes; thank you. The rest of the arrival had additional issues including a late intercept to final and being left at 4000. Having other traffic not complying with instructions of ATC and being told to maintain 4000 after starting a decent after being told cleared the approach. We were able to stop at 3700. We were out of position for an ILS but I said I could accept a visual if we got it immediately and I could descend to keep clear of clouds. We were cleared the visual. After landing; I asked for feedback to be relayed from Ground to Approach and was given a number to call to relay my concerns TRACON supervisor answered the phone. I believe that due to frequency congestion we were either given a wrong altitude or read back the incorrect number. As both the Pilot Monitoring and I heard the same number; read it back and were not corrected; I think it was the former. I really feel the overall threats were driven by the lack of multiple controllers. The controller was overloaded.

Captain reported receiving the wrong altitude for a descent clearance during vectors for the approach into EWR.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

I was working Ground Control; Flight Data; Clearance Delivery. I had Aircraft X taxi from the east to west ramp via Bravo and hold short of Runway XXL approach end. I coordinated crossing with local via TVS [Tower Voice Switch]. I crossed Aircraft X and gave hold instruction of Runway XXR at Victor. Local had a helicopter high on final. Local coordinated crossing observed and gave a crossing on Runway XXR/V; I just responded roger. I crossed Aircraft X; still on a taxi speed. Local did point out the helicopter high on final and had his memory aid for crossing. I noticed that the helicopter was still on short final. I advised local that Aircraft X is crossing. We should always use proper coordination; read back and be specific and don't assume.

I was working Local Control and CIC alongside a coworker who was working Ground Control. Aircraft Y in the right closed traffic pattern was given an option clearance for Runway XXR. Aircraft X was with Ground Control holding short of the approach end of Runway XXR. Local Control pointed out and informed Ground Control of the helicopter traffic on a high short final and then proceeded to approve Ground Control to cross Runway XXR on the recorded line. Local Control and Ground Control had a misunderstanding on the runway crossing and as the helicopter was crossing the runway threshold on a high approach (approximately 200-300 ft. AGL); Aircraft X had started to cross Runway XXR. Aircraft Y questioned the operation. Although Ground Control acknowledged the helicopter traffic; Local Control did not anticipate Ground control to cross Aircraft X when they did. Recommend to give runway crossings only after runway threshold has been crossed.

ATC Controllers and small aircraft pilot reported a miscommunication between Local and Ground Control that resulted in a critical ground conflict.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 1102; Flight Crew Type 61

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

I had stopped at ZZZ for refueling after my first leg. The flight was uneventful. At ZZZ; I utilized the self service fueling facility to top off both tanks with 100 LL Avgas. I filled the starboard tank first; replaced the gas cap and then filled the port tank. Obviously; I either did not properly secure the gas cap on the port tank or left it unsecured altogether after fueling. I sumped all the fuel drains to assure clean; uncontaminated fuel; and performed a quick walk-around inspection of the aircraft. I then entered the aircraft and started the aircraft using the Pre-Start and Starting manufacturer's checklist. Upon trying to pull away from the fueling area; I noticed that I had left the chock on the right main wheel. I shut down the engine; exited the aircraft and removed the chock. I then restarted the engine and proceeded to taxi. The engine run-up was normal and takeoff was normal. My ETA to my destination was calculated at 1 hour and 20 minutes at a planned cruise speed of 84 KTS. The total endurance of the [aircraft] is 3 hours and 20 minutes. Enroute; I checked the METAR at my destination to find that the winds were 200 at 11 [KTS]; gusting to 17 [KTS]. The maximum crosswind component for the [aircraft] is 15 MPH. Upon arrival; I noticed a little less that 1/2 tank in my left wing tank and what appeared to be an empty right tank. I proceeded to ZZZ to attempt a landing. After two attempts where the wind was apparently exceeding the crosswind component on short final; I departed without ever touching down on the runway. I then contacted Approach and asked for vectors to another airport that had a runway more aligned with the wind. The Controller suggested ZZZ1 and I proceeded direct. As I proceeded to ZZZ1; I noticed that there was no longer any fuel showing in the left sight gauge. About a minute later; the engine sputtered to a stop and I advised Approach that I had an engine failure. They asked about the nature of the failure and if I wanted to declare an emergency. I said I think that I had run out of fuel and that; yes; I did want to declare an emergency. At that point; I set the airplane up at the best glide speed of 60 MPH and applied Carburetor Heat. I identified a field that I could glide to and set up for an approach into the wind. I set up for a three point; full stall landing and was able to make the field. Just prior to touch down; the aircraft impacted a wire fence. After clearing the fence; the aircraft came to a stop in the field; upright on its landing gear. I immediately called Approach and advised them that I had landed safely (I did not get a response; probably due to the fact I was on the ground). I shut off the magnetos and the master switch and exited the airplane. In conclusion; I clearly missed the fact that the fuel cap was not properly secured on the left fuel tank.

LSA pilot reports running out of fuel due to the left fuel tank cap not being secured properly during a fuel stop and the crosswind at the destination being too strong; requiring a diversion to an alternate.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Violation of FAR 91.314 CFR 91.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for; and is the final authority as to; the operation of that aircraft.During the preflight I saw on the Weather Channel app that there was 100% chance of thunderstorm; so I requested additional fuel for added safety; but the Dispatcher denied. I told him I reviewed the weather and I wanted more fuel as the PIC decision but he still refused when we could have taken the requested fuel within the limitation of the aircraft and without violating the FAR and still be able to use the Flex takeoff. He gave us only 700 lbs of extra fuel for a 3 hr 15 min planned flight into IMC and potential TS situation. This is not even enough to execute a single go-around in an E175. We landed at 4850 lbs of fuel even after a significant short cut; and that was only 351 lbs more than the minimum diversion fuel.The dispatcher should know who the PIC is in the operation of the flight. It is not him; but the captain of the aircraft. If the captain request something for the interest of the safety of the flight that he is conducting; the dispatcher should cooperate with the captain as long as the request is within the limitation of the aircraft and within the boundaries of the law. This dispatcher was making the PIC decision and expected the captain to follow.

EMB-175 Captain reported his Dispatcher refused his request for additional fuel in violation of FAR 91.3. The Captain requested additional fuel because he believed weather at his destination airport would be worse than forecasted.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 61; Flight Crew Total 3907; Flight Crew Type 1001

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Our aircraft is a King Air 350 with the G1000 retrofit avionics package. We were cleared to DFW via Bowie Three Arrival PHN transition. I loaded PHN.UKW3 into the G1000 when we got the clearance on the ground. At that time we did not know if it was north or south flow into DFW so I selected south flow 17B transition when loading the Arrival. We briefed the route before takeoff but didn't brief the Arrival until we were airborne. Our G1000 is equipped with a current chart subscription. In addition we have a Garmin 696 and an iPad with current charts as well. Sometime before arriving at SPS we brief the Arrival on the G1000 charts. I noticed that the G1000 only had the first page of the Arrival Chart in the G1000 so we looked at the iPad and notice it had more than 1 page for the Bowie Three Arrival. In fact it has 3 separate pages for the Bowie Three Arrival.  We briefed what we could and once we got the DFW ATIS we noticed the Arrival loaded into the G1000 was UKW BEWTS NCONA when it should have been UKW DEBBB JOVEM HIKAY so I manually entered in the waypoints. Once we were advised that we should expect 36R I reloaded the Arrival and selected 36B for the transition. This added SILER to the Arrival. We read the Notes on page 3 of the Bowie Three and saw on the bottom of the page:'...PROPS LANDING NORTH: UKW to DEBBB INT; to JOVEM INT; to HIKAY INT depart heading 160; expect Radar vectors to final approach course.' Out of 3 pages worth of Arrival information this is the only place that mentioned PROPS. Not easy to find or readily displayed information. We briefed that we needed to turn to a 160 heading after HIKAY even though the G1000 had the TURBOJET route as the only one available in the database for that Arrival showing HIKAY to SILER then Heading 175 after SILER. We tried to find a way to change the G1000 from thinking we were a TURBOJET to a PROP but couldn't find any options for changing this or how to load the Arrival with the PROP route and not the TURBOJET route. Once we had briefed the Arrival and were given an expect runway 36R we loaded the ILS to 36R. It was IMC with 1000 overcast and expect ILS was on ATIS. As we were on the Arrival we loaded the ILS 36R into the G1000 and brief the approach. Next thing I remember we were given a 160 heading and we both thought this was before reaching HIKAY which would save us from having the manually go to 160 heading after HIKAY. A few minutes later we were given a 170 heading then more vectors for the ILS 36R approach.  We were asked to call TRACON for a possible pilot deviation after we were on the 170 heading. After landing we called and talked with the TRACON center manager. He said that they think we overflew HIKAY and continued on the 129 heading to SILER and was then given the 160 heading after HIKAY not before it - instead of turning to 160 heading at HIKAY. We both said that we thought we were given the 160 heading before reaching SILER.I learned several lessons from this experience; as follows:The G1000 FMS Navigation Database in the King Air 350 is configured to think it is in the TURBOJET category and not the PROP category and there is no apparent way to change this.  The G1000 Chart View does not always show All the available Charts for an Arrival - it showed the 1st page only and had no indications of additional pages. So additional sources should be reviewed. I should have deleted SILER from the Arrival to prevent any confusion since this waypoint was for TURBOJETS not PROPS. I think leaving SILER on the route hurt our Situational Awareness. I could have monitored the automation better and not been so Automation Dependent. So often I program the FMS and turn the autopilot on and trust that the right thing will be done while I work on something else (checklist; briefing an approach; etc.) but something as simple as accidentally leaving a fix in the flight plan allows the aircraft to auto sequence without requiring  awarenessor involvement by me - the pilot. In addition; it is very disheartening how complicated the Arrival system has become. It should not take 3 pages worth of information to thoroughly review to find 1 note on the bottom of the last page that applies to PROP operations - it would be very helpful if there was a note on the pictorial to indicate more information is required. Or better yet have separate TURBOJET and PROP arrivals. Also; it is confusing to have so many different routes and fixes on the same Arrival so close together. I realize that the heart of this incident was probably due to over automation dependency and loss of situational awareness but it is hard not to use automation when you're task saturated (ie looking for other traffic; briefing approaches; looking for frequencies etc.) I am not sure how but it seems the system needs to be simplified to be safer.  I hope this information can be of some help to the ASRS program.

A BE350 Captain reports that his G1000 with a current chart subscription does not indicate that there is more than one page to the BOWIE3 arrival to DFW. Only on the third page is it noted that the procedure is slightly different for turboprops; requiring a different heading from a different fix. The BOWIE3 for turboprops cannot be line selected in the GPS and a track deviation occurs when the aircraft passes the turn point.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was training on Radar east; GRK Approach handed off Aircraft Y southbound at 12;000 feet whose path coincided with the descend via STAR. ZHU handed off Aircraft X descending via the arrival at 14000. Aircraft X descended in front of Aircraft Y with 500 feet and 1.8 miles I believe. The Collision Alert never went off and I didn't notice it until two days later when it was received by TARP [Traffic Analysis and Review Program].Do not let GRK approach send overflights through the arrival drop box that coincides with the STAR.

AUS Approach Controller reported an airborne conflict due to a VFR aircraft in the path of an IFR arrival on a descend via clearance.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Precautionary Left Engine Shutdown in flight due to Left Pylon Bleed Leak. Flight was a maintenance flight with a Maintenance Technician on board. Notified ATC; [requested priority handling]; landed uneventfully at ZZZ.

Precautionary Left Engine Shutdown due to LEFT PYLON BLEED LEAK CAS. Maintenance flight with Maintenance Technician on board. Landed uneventfully at ZZZ.

Challenger 300 flight crew reported an in flight shut down of the left engine caused by a bleed air leak. The flight crew continued to landing at destination airport.


Final Approach; Initial Approach; Landing

Pilot Flying; Flight Engineer / Second Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 29000; Flight Crew Type 200

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While on a direct flight; I became uncomfortable with the amount of fuel showing in my two fuel tanks. My flight planning had taken into consideration my fuel on board prior to departure so as to allow for a 45 minutes reserve at my planned destination. Once in the air at the halfway point; I decided that flight planning notwithstanding; I would be more comfortable and possibly erring on the side of a more safe operation to just make a fuel stop at RCZ (Richmond; NC) which was in sight and readily available. I consulted the sectional map and the FAA Chart Supplement; listened to the AWOS; and proceeded to make a VFR approach to Richmond. The published [CTAF] frequency was the old common 122.8. There was the usual chatter of different aircraft on the frequency at other airports. I did hear some talk on the radio that was very faint and scratchy that sounded like a control tower directing air traffic. I could see another airplane in the pattern at Richmond so I advised on 122.8 that I was going to follow the airplane about to turn a right base to the active runway. As I got closer to final I could still hear faintly a controller like talk on the radio and was confused at why a control tower at a probably distant airport somewhere was broadcasting on 122.8. Upon landing as I was then very close to the temporary mobile tower and I heard the tower use my aircraft N number to ask what my intentions were. Realizing that the faint controller I had been hearing occasionally was an actual control tower at Richmond; I responded that I wanted to taxi to a refuel station. I was cleared to the FBO. Still confused as to why there was a control tower at what I thought was an uncontrolled field; I went to the FBO; found out about the NOTAM designating Richmond with a temporary control tower. After refueling; I called the temporary Richmond Control Tower on 122.8 to taxi and takeoff. Even on taxi out the tower radio was faint and scratchy and barely understandable; to which I reported to the tower.

GA pilot reported landing without a clearance at a non-towered airport while a temporary military Tower was in use.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12800; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This was a flight from ZZZ to DTW. We were originally filed and cleared to descend via the LECTR 3 Arrival into DTW. During the descent; ATC amended our clearance to descend via the HANBL 3 Arrival. Any time a new arrival is executed during a VNAV descent on the Boeing/Honeywell Pegasus FMS; it takes up to a minute for the flight management computer to recalculate the new path. During that time period; the aircraft is descending unrestricted at idle and there is no path published for the pilots or autopilot to follow until it recalculates and presents itself.Originally; on the LECTR 3 the FMS had planned to cross HANBL at or above 11;000. When ATC switched us to the HANBL 3; the new crossing altitude at HANBL is at or above 17;000 and at or below FL210. The aircraft was descending during this period of recalculation and the new path did not present itself until the aircraft was at 16;800 just outside HANBL; at which time it leveled off. We were asked by Cleveland Center to say our altitude and we reported 16;800. Center asked us if we were descending and I answered negative.This is a recurring anomaly with the Honeywell Pegasus FMS and I don't know if ATC is even aware of what this does to the FMS when they issue a new descend via clearance while the aircraft is already descending via a different arrival. Virtually every airline places the bottom altitude into the Mode Control Panel when cleared to descend via a STAR; so the autopilot will not level off to prevent busting a crossing restriction that is above the bottom altitude if the FMS is in the process of recalculating the new path.

Air carrier Captain reported an altitude overshoot during descent to DTW while on the HANBL 3 arrival.  Captain stated they had been given a clearance change and a recurring recalculation delay on their Honeywell Pegasus FMS contributed to the incident.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overrode Automation

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Aircraft on vectors into ZZZ; NAV2 was not set correctly leading to an unexpected autopilot disconnect on intercept and loss of approximately 600 feet altitude. We arrested the descent and fixed the issue. ATC issued a low alt alert but at that point we were regaining lost alt and had the runway in sight. We advised ATC as such and continued visually for a normal landing. I incorrectly set the First Officer's RTU (Radio Tuning Unit) and did not catch it on the approach check.

CRJ-200 Captain reported they entered the wrong ILS frequency in the pilot flying's autopilot causing it to disconnect resulting in an altitude loss and a Low Altitude Alert from ATC. The crew corrected the altitude and had the airport in sight and continued to a normal landing.