Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Just after takeoff from runway 01 in DCA the aircraft entered into prohibited airspace P-56A and P-56B. It was a fairly quick turn in DCA that required the flight crew to start the engines at the gate with the jet bridge still attached for external power. Because this was the Captain's leg to fly he gave the briefing on our departure from DCA. In his brief he gave specific instructions on the complex engine failure procedure that accompanied runway 01. In these instructions it states that DCA 0.4 DME is the decision point for how the flight crew should react to an engine failure just after takeoff. In order to identify the 0.4 DME the Captain decided to takeoff with green needles on his side so that he could identify the turning point; should it be necessary. The first officer stayed in white needles because the flight crew was planning on an RNAV departure procedure. The flight crew also discussed the proximity of the prohibited airspace to the northeast of the field and noted that the main goal of the complex engine failure procedure and the RNAV departure procedure was to avoid this airspace. Just prior to push back the flight crew was advised by ground control that they were to contact clearance for a full reroute; this was the start of a series of events that began to increase the flight crew's work load. The flight crew decided that they should proceed with the engine start process at the gate so that the ground crew could disconnect the jet bridge while they talked with clearance. A new routing was given and it included a new RNAV departure procedure; the Captain loaded the new route and briefed on the differences. The push began then normal procedures and checklists were accomplished. Taxiing out to runway 01 was fairly simple; upon reaching the runway we were number 1 for departure after what turned out to be two arrivals. Takeoff clearance was received with some hesitation due to the tower giving the wrong call sign. Just after takeoff the Captain calls for gear up; speed mode; NAV mode which was briefed. Just after the first officer executed these commands tower gave the switch to contact Potomac departure. During this time the first officer first noticed that something was wrong with the flight director's instructions and noticed that it was not making the turn that the SID required. After checking in with departure the first officer noticed that the Captain was off course and tried to bring his attention to how close they were getting to the prohibited airspace by questioning 'what is the FMS doing?' hoping that that this would make him realize he was not on the right heading. Then tried to further warn and remind the Captain that they cannot go any further to the right. The first officer pointed to the left but incorrectly said 'we need to go to the right'. The Captain acknowledged and corrected by saying 'left'. The departure controller called inquiring about the flight crews efforts to get back on course and the first officer replied 'we are turning now'. The Captain was just starting to realize why he was off course and started asking for heading mode in order to get flight director guidance back to the SID. Once in heading mode the plane began to fly on the correct direction but due to the multiple turns in the SID the plane went across course while the crew was working to get the FMS programmed appropriately and to get back to NAV mode on the FCP. Finally once NAV mode was selected and the FMS1 was armed and captured the plane was turning back on the routing of the SID then the Captain called for autopilot on and the first officer got back to finishing the after takeoff procedure/checklist. Then the crew was notified via ATC on the deviation from course.

During the preflight setup and briefing; I failed to completely brief the required comments for departing from Runway 1 in DCA via the BOOCK2 RNAV departure. As a consequence; I inadvertently set up the NAV source selector for my side with DCA VOR as the source; to identify 0.4 DME; in case of engine failure. The First Officer (FO); as Pilot Monitoring (PM); was in white needles with FMS as the NAV source. I briefed the FO that we would do the RNAV departure; but did not catch that I had erroneously requested the exact opposite setup that we would need for the Captain (CA) as Pilot Flying (PF) and FO as PM for the Runway 1 departure. Due to the improper setup; I was in green needles without the proper heading selected. On takeoff I called for gear up; speed mode and NAV mode for the departure on schedule. The auto-pilot was not engaged; as it is my normal preference to hand fly departures. Shortly after reaching 400 feet; knowing we should be in a left turn; I initiated a turn to the northwest but realized that we were late for the turn; as we were beyond the middle of the Potomac. It was shortly after this that we both realized that the flight director was not giving us the desired course information. Although we initiated the turn to the northwest; it was not to a heading that would get us back on course in an expedited manner. We entered the clouds between 800 and 1400 feet and I lost visual contact with the ground. We were both attempting to identify the error and make the correction to the NAV setup; but our track was still not on course. I made an additional turn to the left. ATC queried us to determine if we were making corrections to the left to resume the departure. We were doing so; and replied in the affirmative. Shortly thereafter; we identified the error and immediately corrected the NAV source selection; ensured that the FCP was in NAV mode; selected the next fix on the departure; COVTO; and went direct to it. As we were by now nearly south of the departure course; this was the quickest route to resume the departure. We rejoined the departure and continued per normal. A few minutes later; ATC provided a telephone number to us and requested we make a call to TRACON. When my post flight duties were complete; I contacted the TRACON and it was from them that I learned we had penetrated the prohibited areas; both P56A and P56B. This was completely unintentional on our part; and resulted from an oversight on my part during the preflight portion of the flight and the improper setup of the navigation source for the CA as PF. This could have been prevented by exercising more vigilance when briefing procedure pages in the 10-7; thus following SOP; and more vigilance to the NAV source selections. I will take further precautions in the future; to ensure that this NEVER happens again. I will be sure to continue the pursuit of the methodical and thorough adherence to SOP procedures; best practices and techniques that has been my goal from the beginning of my career.

Air carrier flight crew reported entering prohibited airspace on departure from DCA due to an improper instrument set up prior to departure. ATC corrected the flight's assigned heading.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 272; Flight Crew Type 23

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Regarding the fire incident this morning with Aircraft X at ZZZ; here are the facts. I was with my instructor. I was told Aircraft X was out of maintenance and assigned to me. Did the pre-flight and everything seemed normal. Pre-flight and final walk around was checked by [Instructor]. The plan for this lesson was to practice landings. We taxi to Runway XXR; did the run up; after it; we were cleared for takeoff to do a close traffic. Took off; did the first pattern and landed. Exit Runway XXR at Taxiway X. Then I requested Ground Control taxi back to Runway XXR. When we were holding short Runway XXR at Taxiway B; I was doing pre-takeoff checklist when I noticed smoke coming from the right engine cowling. Then the first thing I did was kill the right mixture. My instructor saw the smoke and we shut down everything; including fuel selectors; and electrical. We exited the aircraft and stayed away from it. Because it was a fire we acted quickly and couldn't advise ATC.

PA-34 student pilot reported encountering an engine fire while taxiing for takeoff; resulting in the student and instructor evacuating the aircraft.


Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Captain flying. VMC. Takeoff on Runway 28 with right steady crosswind.  [We were the] 3rd aircraft to takeoff of 28 while Runway 32L was also in use for takeoff-departure.  Normal takeoff roll.  On rotation at intersection of 28/32L; at 5-10 FT AGL; severe right crosswind gust.  No gusts reported in ATIS.  I suspect gust was from takeoff thrust of aircraft that was on 32L.  I noticed aircraft in position during my takeoff roll. I did not hear his takeoff clearance; suspect different frequencies (unsure).  While still flat at initial rotation at 5-10 FT; there was a noticeable and uncomfortable gust that I was able to control.  Gust/skid was uncomfortable & noticed by the First Officer; Pilot Monitoring.  Aircraft displacement off centerline (airborne) at time of event.  It felt like the aircraft was skidding right to left at 5 ft AGL.  It did not feel like a regular gust; and no other gusts were encountered on climbout.[I suggest] do not clear aircraft for takeoff from 32L while aircraft take off on 28.

A B737-800 took off on ORD Runway 28 and at rotation was displaced about 5 feet by the thrust of an aircraft taking off from Runway 32L.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

1;000 foot altitude deviation. The SID had an altitude of 8;000 feet. During the preflight we saw that the altitude window was set for 10;000 feet. I thought the First Officer set 10;000 feet and he thought I set 10;000 feet. We both failed to take the time to read the SID carefully. Bottom line....it's our fault; we weren't very careful in our cockpit preflight. I need to be more careful to follow the checklist and read the SID. This onion had a few layers of protection that were missing. It's my fault; but I would like to mention that when I checked in with Departure after takeoff; I said 'Callsign...climbing through 2;400 for 10;000.' Usually ATC would question that...not today. The ACARS PDC clearance usually has an altitude on it ....not today. The previous crew usually leaves an obviously wrong altitude in the FMA window....not today. In summary; I need to step it up and not miss things on the preflight.

MD82 Captain detailed the factors that contributed to both crew members missing the wrong altitude set in the altitude window which resulted in an altitude deviation on a SID.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Prior to Equal Time Point (ETP) we had about a 1;200 pound fuel imbalance; right side low; so we cross fed. Then shortly after that we noticed that the right side was getting low again. About 2 minutes prior to ETP we got the FMC message; FUEL QTY ERROR-PROG 2 [and] we noticed the difference between totalizer and calculated on the FMC was about 3;000 LBS which happened really fast. QRH has you go to the ENGINE FUEL LEAK checklist. Part of this checklist states; if you have a fuel imbalance of 1;000 pounds or more within a 30 minute time frame; you should assume that you have a leak and you should shut down that engine. We had 800 pounds in 30 minutes. I had [the First Officer] go back to see if he could see a leak; he said maybe a little mist; but couldn't tell if it was just a faint contrail; he said other side looked about the same. The imbalance stabilized at around 1;500 to 1;700 pounds and fuel at destination continued to show 16.3. Fuel remaining was decreasing also; but not real dramatically. At our last waypoint we were -1.8. We started our descent into [destination]; and while descending; the imbalance started to increase again; the difference was about 3;200 pounds at one point.Right after parking and shutting down the engines; the flight attendant called to tell us that there was a heavy fuel smell coming from the back. Maintenance came up to the cockpit and told us that there was a bunch of fuel coming out of our right engine. We went down to take a look and one of the ramp guys came over to tell us that as we were taxiing in; he noticed a bunch of liquid coming from our right engine; but thought it just might be condensation. He said the fuel leak stopped once we shut the engine down. Fuel leak; right engine.

B767-300 Captain reported a fuel imbalance and FMC message FUEL QTY ERROR-PROG 2 on a trans-oceanic flight. After parking at the gate; ramp personnel reported a significant fuel leak from the right engine.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

During the preflight; I had a jumpseater come to the cockpit and ask to ride in the jumpseat to our destination. This was my first time having someone occupy the jumpseat in over a year due to Covid; and this was my first experience with an Additional Crew Member (ACM) in the auto-closeout passenger counts. The First Officer performed the W&B and Takeoff calculations. Neither of us noticed that the jumpseater was missing from the ACM data that was pushed to us from the gate agent. As a result; we took off with an improper W&B and Takeoff performance calculation. During the climbout I realized I didn't double check the W&B for the ACM before departure and found the ACM was missing. I was chatting with the jumpseater and did not double check the First Officer's work to make sure the jumpseater had been added into the W&B. I should have remained focused and double checked the W&B for the ACM.

Full flight with jumpseat access granted from gate agent; jumpseat would be occupied. Received auto closeout thinking everything was taken care of including ACM in jumpseat. After departure; the Captain asked if the takeoff data included the ACM; after review; it did not. Cause of this event was being in the mindset that passenger auto closeout took care of all people loading considerations without double checking that the ACM was included. Recurrence of the event can be prevented by verifying ACM is included when they are occupying jumpseat instead of relying on auto closeout.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported failing to include the jumpseater in the weight and balance calculations.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel

Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Outbound Aircraft X on Date scheduled ZZZ-ZZZ1 had a Part Power Stops [priority package] for the flight. Our procedure is cargo goes to Operations drops off [with] paper work and Operations notifies crew chief that a Part Power Stops is scheduled for their flight. No word or mention at that time of package needing a Dangerous Goods Form. Package was loaded [in] accordance to load instruction from ZZZ1. After flight arrived in ZZZ1 and transferred to cargo. At that time it was stated a Dangerous Goods Form was required. From my understanding miscellaneous class 9 UN3373 [label] was on box. However no photos available.[Lead Avionics Technician stated] it was brought to my attention my station director [name] on DATE. Vendor in ZZZ cargo does all cargo and Part Power Stops ...they have the responsibility of knowing the contents of package and [determine] if Dangerous Goods Form is required. After being spoken to about this I did research on misc 9 UN3373 'gmmo or gmo that does not meet the definition of toxic substances or infectious substance shall be assigned a UN number. Now with that being said we do our DG training which gives us general knowledge of Hazmat material... there should be copies of all packages that originate from cargo facility so when we sign for packages we can refer to package and information to crew chief. I am not schooled enough in such practices that we can remember all package numbers that require Dangerous Goods Form. [Recommend] that all packages from cargo have to be signed for and also duplicate copies given to Ops; also oral confirmation of type package and contents.

Air carrier Inspector reported undocumented hazmat cargo was transported due to a breakdown of hazmat handling procedures.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was pilot flying. After we crossed ZZZZZ at 11;000 feet; the controller gave us a descent down to 7;000 feet. We then changed frequencies to 128.75. The next controller gave us a descent to 6;000 feet and said after ZZZZZ1 to join the approach. We thought we were cleared for the approach after ZZZZZ1 because he did not say to join the localizer; so my FO (First Officer) called to clarify what the instructions were. The approach plate said ZZZZZ1 is at 7;000 feet; and we were confused as to why the clearance was 6;000 feet. The controller verified 6;000 feet and join the approach after ZZZZZ1. After ZZZZZ1 we started a descent to 3;700 feet as published; when the controller called us and said we weren't cleared for the approach. We were in a critical phase of flight with a heavy workload when he told us to write down a phone number. We then thought we had been given a heading of 010 and were trying to call to confirm but he was overloaded talking to other aircraft and kept asking us to write down the phone number for the possible deviation. We had started our turn northbound and conditions were VMC at that point with terrain in sight. He then came back and gave us a new heading and asked us to climb to 5;000 feet We complied with all instructions and landed back [at our destination] safely with no further event.Unfortunately; there was a communication error between us pilots and ATC. We were trying our best to clarify the instructions given; however the phraseology used in terms of join approach instead of join the localizer contributed to the mistake. Also; the second error when we turned the wrong direction was a result to being given a phone number during a critical phase of Flight; high workload environment and the frequency being tied up when we were trying to confirm instructions.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-135 flight crew reported that due to a communication error between pilots and ATC there was confusion when instructions stated to join the approach not clearance for the approach.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was number 1 to the runway on Visual approach. Aircraft Y was number 2. I cleared Aircraft X; for a Visual Approach at about a 10 NM final; Aircraft Y was still 22 miles from the runway and following Aircraft X; but not on a visual approach. I slowed Aircraft Y to 190 Knots while he was still around 10 miles in trail of Aircraft X; in order to prevent a compression situation. I transferred Aircraft X to SAN tower at about a 6 NM final. I almost immediately noticed that Aircraft X has slowed to about slowest possible speed and was indicating 120 knots. I then slowed Aircraft Y to '160 knots or less'. At this time I looked to view the SWIM resource tool; this display allows me to see what the SAN Tower has on the runway/ movement area. My instinct was correct in that the Tower had decided to put an aircraft on the runway in front of Aircraft X; and thereby requiring Aircraft X; to go as slow as possible to prevent himself from going around. This in turn led to the aircraft behind Aircraft X; Aircraft Y; to compress rapidly. I issued traffic to Aircraft Y in hopes that I would be able to clear him for a Visual Approach to follow Aircraft X; he was unable to see the small aircraft down low in the buildings. Again I issued traffic to Aircraft Y and advised that due to compression I would only be able to allow him to continue the approach if he was able to visually obtain preceding traffic. The pilot read back roger were going to the tower. Separation decreased to about 2.76 miles. Aircraft Y landed without incident. At no time did the tower call to tell me that they could provide visual separation. At no time did the tower advise me that they were going to be slowing the first aircraft on my final to slowest speed 5 NM from the runway. Although I had time to break Aircraft Y off of the approach I allowed him to proceed for a number of reasons. First; it was safe to do so. Secondly; SAN tower has now made this move a common occurrence; it is ridiculous; and there is no reason for me as a controller to have to punish the pilot and passengers on-board Aircraft Y for the poor decision making ability of the SAN tower.1. If the tower is going to require a hole for a departure they should use the land-line to advise as such.2. If the tower is going to slow the first aircraft in a sequence to make a non-existent hole for a departure; they should advise approach to plan for compression.3. If the tower is going to cause a situation that will result in less than the standard IFR separation of 3 NM; they should have the professional courtesy to advise approach control that another form of separation is/will be used. ie; tower approved visual separation.4. Tower controllers should not be slowing aircraft inside the final approach fix as this is not approved. Usage of the phrase 'there will be traffic departing before you' or' traffic taking the runway now for departure is a B737' Is all but telling the pilot 'you better go as slow as you can because if you don't you're going around'. It amounts to a speed assignment inside the final approach fix.5. The tower should look at the RADAR display and pick and use good judgement as to when a 'squeeze play' is necessary. In this situation there were ZERO aircraft in trail of Aircraft perhaps a good indication that a 'squeeze play' was unnecessary. If the departure has a TMU release window they should again advise approach that they require a hole for a departure.

An Approach Controller had a jet following a slower single engine prop airplane on final approach to the same runway. The controller felt there was sufficient space between arrivals to account for the jets' faster speed. After shipping the first slower aircraft to the Tower he observed the speed of that aircraft reduce drastically; more than normal for that type of aircraft. The controller issued the preceding traffic to the jet in an attempt to achieve Visual Separation. The jet acknowledged the traffic call without stating they saw it and switched frequency to the Tower on their own. The Approach Controller saw the spacing reduce to less than minimum required while both aircraft were on the tower frequency. Both aircraft landed.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

We were cleared for a visual approach and I was the pilot monitoring while the Captain was flying. Around the final approach fix; the Captain called for gear down; which resulted in the EICAS messages BRK LH Fault and BRK RH Fault. I called out the message; and executed a go around and was given a heading and an altitude by ATC. Before the Tower Controller handed us off to Departure; he asked us for the nature of the go around; and we told him a fault message had been received on approach and we needed to run a checklist. We were given a few step climbs in the go around up to 6;000 feet. We were given a delay vector to run the QRH. We ran the BRK LH (RH) FAULT QRH. The QRH lead us to setting up the next approach flaps full; as well as compute a landing distance. After running the QRH we contacted Dispatch as well as Maintenance. We agreed that the proper QRH was run and that we would declare an emergency and land. We completed all checklists and briefed approach; and what our back up plan was. We declared an emergency and we were given a clearance to land on the long runway and had crash/fire/rescue standing by. We landed; and had all normal indications from the cockpit. We brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway and assessed the situation; talked with crash/fire/rescue and determined the aircraft was capable of taxing to the gate under its own power.

EMB170 First Officer reports EICAS messages for BRK LH Fault and BRK RH Fault when the gear is extended during approach. A go around is initiated; the QRH is consulted and a normal landing ensues after declaring an emergency.


Flight Crew Student; Other Sport/Gyro; Student/Fixed

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 840; Flight Crew Type 68

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted

On final approach to ZZZ in perfect VFR conditions landing Runway XX; my aircraft experienced power loss. I had just completed two S turns for spacing (authorized by ATC) and after leveling for short final the engine started to sputter. I had 8 gallons of fuel on board. I was 800 feet AGL and 0.25 miles from the runway. I realized I was not going to clear the airport fence and immediately diverted to an adjacent concrete culvert adjacent to the airport. The engine stopped prior to my landing. I touched down on the mains at 66 knots. No damage to the aircraft or property occurred. No individuals or myself were harmed. I was flying solo. I experienced loss of power likely due to fuel starvation NOT exhaustion. There is a possible issue with the fuel valve selector that may have contributed to air getting into the fuel lines. The S turns on final may have also contributed to fuel sloshing around in the tanks and air being drawn into the system. I plan on changing the fuel valve selector and avoid S turns on final in the future.

Student pilot flying experimental aircraft reported engine power loss on final approach. Conducted off airport landing without incident.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Cleared for the visual to runway 5R into TYS at 4000 feet on a right downwind. The First Officer stated he would begin the descent as we slowed down and dialed in 2000 feet. We had previously discussed using 2500 for the missed approach altitude if necessary; but I had looked at the MFD and determined that he would be on final by the time we hit 2000 feet so chose not to say anything about it. This was my fault; because at that point I usually have the MFD zoomed in to the 2.5/5 NM range; but still had it at the 5/10 range. We hit 2000 feet during the base leg and the First Officer called for flaps 8 and flaps 20. After the flaps were at 20; before making the final turn we got a 'Terrain; Terrain' warning. Followed shortly after that was the landing gear buzzer. I requested the First officer add some power and climb us up a few hundred feet until we make our turn to final and finish configuring. He disconnected the autopilot and complied. We finished configuring and landed without incident.My complacency on when I tune the MFD rings. After we got on final the First Officer had stated that he probably should have used 2500 instead of 2000; and I agreed with him and explained my reasoning for not mentioning it at the time. Simply put; we should always be using 1500 AGL when cleared for a visual approach; especially if being vectored towards the 5 mile final.

Air Carrier Captain; as the pilot monitoring; reports getting too low during a night visual approach to Runway 5R at TYS causing a terrain warning and correction by the First Officer.


Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

There is a very bright roadside billboard west of the approach end of Runway 18R at CLT. I noticed this light in early August while making several landings during night VFR conditions. This new billboard advertising sign on the side of Interstate 485 has extremely bright white light on its entire surface for long periods of time. I estimate this sign to be at least 20 ft high and 40 ft wide and to be as bright as stadium lighting. It has the potential to destroy a pilot's night vision and could cause disorientation while landing with low ceiling and visibility conditions. It could possibly even overpower the runway lights in these conditions.  This sign should be removed because it is so close to the end of the runway as to be a hazard to aircraft landing on 18R. If this is not possible then it should not be allowed to be illuminated in low visibility conditions or low light and night conditions.

Reporter clarified the exact location of the billboard as being west of Interstate 485 and abeam the approach end of Runway 18R.

Air carrier Captain reported a new illuminated billboard adjacent to the approach end of Runway 18R along Interstate 485 is very distracting during night and IMC approaches.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 825; Flight Crew Type 402

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Upon post flight inspection of a re position flight of a C172 for an annual inspection the side plastic covering of the left hand side of the elevator was found missing. No parts found on the ground therefore assumed to have come off enroute due to heavy turbulence. Aircraft flew normally and did not noticeably affect safety of flight. Turbulence could be described as moderate to severe. No injuries. Would not describe this as a malfunction say to flight controls however it is related. No structural damage found.

C172 pilot reported that a plastic elevator fairing separated from the aircraft during flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 6000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Pushback from Gate was normal. Both engines were started while pushing back. The Tug Driver stopped the aircraft at the top of the alley and asked me to set brakes; which I did. I then asked the Driver if he could push us back further or spin us around as we were in somewhat close proximity to equipment and we could get clearance from Ground onto the taxiway if needed. He stated that they didn't normally push back further or spin aircraft around anymore (due to some prior issues with other aircraft during pushbacks); and I said to standby and we would talk to Ground to get clearance onto the taxiway. While I could have made the turn out of the alley from my position at that time; I felt Safety would be improved by having the Tug Driver push us back further away from the ground support equipment; especially at night when it's harder to judge clearance distance. It took about one minute to obtain clearance from Ground to push onto the taxiway. At no time did the Tug Driver give any verbal or visual indication that any part of the towbar system had been disconnected. After receiving ATC clearance I released the parking brake and was about to tell the Tug Driver we were cleared to push onto the taxiway when the aircraft rolled forward immediately upon brake release. The aircraft movement was momentarily startling but I quickly applied the brakes as my FO called 'brake; brake; brake' however the nose gear rolled onto the towbar even though brake application was almost immediate. We first confirmed that nobody was hurt and then asked what had happened as we felt and heard that we had run over something. The Tug Driver said the aircraft had run over the towbar which was now trapped under the nose wheels. We ran through the profile and decided to shut down the engines. We then informed the Flight Attendants and Passengers that we would be returning to the gate. We contacted Station Operations and Maintenance and let them know what had happened. The Tug Driver was able to release the towbar from under the nose wheel. While we were waiting for Maintenance to arrive to inspect the nose wheel and nose landing gear area; I asked the Tug Driver what had happened as I did not understand why the aircraft had rolled forward. He said that he had not moved the tug as he knew we wanted to be pushed back further but the Guide Agent had released the lock on the towbar in preparation for disconnect. So when I released the brakes the aircraft jumped the towbar.Once Maintenance had confirmed it was safe to do so; we requested to be towed back to the gate. Once there; after the normal Shutdown Checklist; we took care of the Passengers first and kept them informed. A logbook entry was made. Maintenance did notice some scuff marks on the tires; which they changed; and a small amount of metal showing at the bottom of the strut where the towbar scraped it. They did not know when we left the aircraft for another one if it was simply paint that had come off; or if it was a gouge in the metal. I spoke with Dispatch and the Chief Pilot on Call. The Chief Pilot on Call approved continuing onto ZZZ if we felt safe and able to. We were swapped into another aircraft and the subsequent flight into ZZZ was uneventful.Clearly; my failure to communicate fully with the Tug Driver was the root cause of the incident and I take complete responsibility for that. At the gate; I am very careful to make sure the Tug Driver is ready for the aircraft before I release the brake. Had I done this at the top of the alley there is a good chance the Tug Driver would have said he was not ready to continue the push and the towbar needed to be secured. While nobody was hurt; this incident had a very serious potential for injury to the Ramp Personnel and I am immensely grateful that nobody was hurt. I am very troubled that my actions could have caused or contributed to life changing injury to another person and will always be grateful that no injury occurred. As to actions to prevent this happening again; and this is purely speculation on my part; it is possible that with a wired headset; the Guide Agent would not have released the towbar as the Tug Driver knew the push was not complete and would not have given the disconnect signal. Now with the new headsets; which of course overall are a great Safety enhancement; the Guide Agent heard the 'set brakes' and was primed to release the pin on the towbar. It might be possible to provide training (or further training) to Ramp Personnel not to release any part of the towbar system until the Pushback Driver indicates they are ready for release. For my part; I will never release the brakes again once they are placed on during a pushback without double confirming that the Tug Driver is ready for brake release. Also; although not a factor in this incident; I will be sure to triple check when the parking brake is placed on; it really is on; with the red light illuminated as this incident made it very apparent the potential for very serious injury or aircraft damage that can happen within one or two seconds if the aircraft rolls even one inch during the towbar disconnection process. In the past; I have been careful to ensure the parking brake is set when I think it is; but now I will be even more alert for possible errors regarding the setting and releasing of the parking brake.

B737 flight crew reported the aircraft rolled onto the towbar trapping it under the nose wheels when the Captain released the brakes before notifying the Tug Driver after the pushback.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During descent from enroute structure; flying pilot conducted approach briefing pertaining to visual arrival to uncontrolled airport with a single runway; winds favored landing Runway 16. The commercial airport diagram was examined for note pertaining to non-standard traffic pattern direction; no such note was observed. Pilot flying noted absence of such note during approach briefing and indicated that all turns would be the left. Crew discussed method of pattern entry and; given direction of arrival resulting from ATC clearance prior to canceling IFR clearance; a left crosswind entry was briefed. Position reports were made on CTAF while approaching airport and upon approaching left crosswind. While established on left crosswind; two other aircraft announced themselves to be on right downwind for Runway 16. A dialog between pilot flying and one of these aircraft resulted in the other aircraft stating the airport utilized a right pattern for Runway 16. Since this could not be confirmed and given the absence of such information on the commercial chart airport diagram; the crew elected to turn a left downwind and continue a left pattern until touchdown. After landing; crew referenced the Airport Facility Directory; which listed a right pattern for this runway. The commercial airport chart was again examined; but no indication of a right traffic pattern direction could be found. Suggest submitting notification to the commercial chart publisher regarding this publishing error. Also suggest adding a note to my company briefing sheets for MCC regarding this error until such time as the commercial chart manufacturer publishes a corrected airport diagram which includes right traffic pattern information for Runway 16. It is also worth noting the value of referencing the AFD when dispatched to uncontrolled airports.

A Captain noted that the commercial airport chart for MCC does not indicate that the airport uses a right traffic pattern and so they elected to continue a left traffic pattern opposite other traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2082; Flight Crew Type 185

Airspace Violation All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I departed airport VFR for a short flight to LNC.  Both airports reporting MVFR with ceilings of 2;000.  I entered the traffic pattern at LNC; and was turning downwind.  The cloud base fell to 700 AGL and I entered the clouds.  I did not descend further due to hearing a Bonanza reporting base in front of me; which I could not see.  I decided the safest course of action was to climb and contact Approach for a pop up clearance and return to departure airport.  I contacted Approach and requested an IFR clearance.  I was asked if I could remain VFR; which I responded negative; that I was IMC at this time.  I was continuing to climb and must have gone through 4;000 FT (base of Class B).  I was told that I was in Class B airspace; that I was cleared into Class B airspace; to maintain 4;000 FT and given radar vectors for the GPS approach at [home airport]. The return and rest of approach was uneventful.  At the final approach fix I was in visual conditions and cancelled my clearance and thanked the controller for his assistance.

M20J pilot reported returning to departure airport after encountering IFR conditions at his destination.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4650; Flight Crew Type 670

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

My student (Private Pilot candidate) was on a solo flight to do practice landings. Both METAR and TAF for ZZZ; and METAR for Destination Airport showed ceiling and visibility well above minimums specified in Solo Endorsement. No rain or freezing precipitation was forecast. According to the student: Shortly after departure; freezing rain began at approximately 2500 MSL; partially obscuring forward vision. Student requested ZZZ tower for vectors to return for landing. Vectors were given and clearance to land issued. Student attempted to land twice without success; due to loss of visual contact with the runway. On the third attempt; student landed successfully with no damage or injuries. After learning of the occurrence; the student and I reviewed the events to try to figure out how to avoid similar events in the future. I initiated additional weather and preflight training with the student; which was well received. I was informed that during the three landing attempts; a pilot deviation may have occurred. I am immediately filing report after learning that a pilot deviation may have occurred.

Flight Instructor reported that his student flying a C172 solo encountered freezing rain weather shortly after takeoff.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 300

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Procedure; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Sortie was planned as a night local pattern flight to reacquire night landing currency. It had been four or five months since I had made night landings in a single engine airplane. I fly multi-engine jets in my full-time job.The airport has two runways; 01 and 04. After engine start; I requested to taxi to the long runway; 01; to do stop and go landings. Ground told me that would not be possible because of numerous aircraft in the instrument pattern for that runway. I elected to use the shorter runway 04 and do full stop taxi backs. I even set the runway heading for 04 into my heading bug and my course arrow prior to takeoff. After takeoff on Runway 04; I was given right closed traffic. Once on downwind; Tower asked if I could make a short base and stay east of Runway 01 because of traffic on an instrument approach to that runway. I had never done this before; but thought I could do it. I answered that I could and Tower cleared me to land on Runway 04 staying east of runway 01.While on downwind; I acquired what I thought was runway 04; but evidently was runway 01. I didn't refer to my compass because I was sure I had the right runway in sight. The visual cues were very limited; it was a very dark moonless night. I called right base; gear down; and full stop runway 04. I proceeded in what I perceived as a very tight final turn to land on the runway that I thought was runway 04. As I rolled out on a very short final; I saw that the runway had sequenced flashers and thought for an instant 'Does runway 04 have flashers?' But I only thought that for a moment; as I had to concentrate on a safe landing. After touchdown; the Tower told me I had landed on the wrong runway. They also mentioned that they couldn't talk to me in the final turn for some reason that I don't remember now. By that time; I realized that I was indeed on the wrong runway. Instead of continuing to do my three takeoffs and landings for currency; I elected to taxi back to the ramp and put the airplane away for the night.I didn't realize how few visual cues would be available to orient to the correct runway; especially with very little experience with that runway at night. Unfamiliarity with the short runway at night; an unusual request from Tower; and not using all my instruments to enhance my situational awareness led to an unfortunate mistake. In hindsight I should not have accepted the unusual request and instead accepted a 360 on downwind for spacing and flown a normal pattern to Runway 04.

BE36 Pilot reported that on a night landing currency flight at a towered airport; he landed on the wrong runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Operating flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1; pushed about 5 mins early. I was the PF (Pilot Flying); for the leg. During the push we started E1 first normal start. Then; we taxied out to Runway XXL at DD; it was a long taxi from the North Port. Once in line on N for departure started E2 with no problems; set hydraulics and shutdown the APU. Received a Line Up and Wait clearance with an advisory about a helicopter operating 2 south of the field; we taxied onto the runway and completed the Before Start Checklist. Once on the runway; controls we transferred to me. We received our take off clearance to fly runway heading and stay with the tower. Takeoff roll everything was normal; and the departure was normal. Tower gave us two vectors; 180 and 220 respectively; presumably around the helicopter traffic. Then switched us to departure. CA (Captain) Pilot Monitoring (PM) checked in with departure; who didn't give us higher initially; So we were leveling at 5000 ft. Once level; departure gave us a climb to 15;000 ft.; which we read back and started climbing. About 5500 ft.; during the climb there was a loud bang from the left side of the aircraft; immediately the E1 started to roll back; with a Amber E1 Fail message on the EICAS. CA (PM) identified and cancelled; and began running the QRH; at the same time departure had cleared us direct to ZZZZZ. The CA [Requested Priority Handling] and advised we would need vectors to return to ZZZ. Departure assigned a 280 heading and maintain 6000 ft.; which I complied with and set into the FGP and turned off the autothrottles. The CA continued to run the QRH; we attempted the auto relight procedure which did not happen. There was no oil pressure; but full quantity. So the engine was secured using the QRH. We then established with approach that we would return to ZZZ; they told us to expect Runway XXC. Approach gave a few different westerly vectors to give us time to run the QRH; and get set up for the approach. The CA attempted to talk to the FAs (Flight Attendant) using the EMER call button; after they picked up he was unable to hear himself or them or me with his headset (no idea why). I could hear him and the FAs just fine; so I talked with the FAs told them we had an engine failure; we would be returning to ZZZ in about 10-15 minutes; there would be no need for brace. He was finally able to get back on the headset; and hear normally. He continued to notify and sent an ACARS message to Dispatch to advise our return and made a PA to the passengers. The CA continued the QRH; and setup the Runway XXC approach. We considered the Runway XXC approach briefed as we had just done the approach on leg 1 of that day into ZZZ. We advised approach we were ready for the approach and vectors were given onto the approach; we were over KARR in the turn. The CA followed up with the FAs on the normal call button; and was able to talk with them and make sure everything/everyone was safe and ready. They advised the cabin was secured and ready. We continued on the approach; and they wanted us maintain 210 till ZZZZZ1; and then 170 till ZZZZZ2. I slowed a little before ZZZZ2; during configuration so we were configured and stable a little before the FAF. Which meant we were slower than 170 before ZZZZZ2 (probably 155 or so). We followed the ILS glideslope and localizer in and landed on Runway XXC. Tower advised us to expected a right turn off after landing and the [airport rescue and fire fighting] would inspect. We turned right on F and left on RR and stopped had [airport rescue and fire fighting] inspect the left engine for signs of damage. They reported no visible damage; fire; or leaking fluids. We then advised ground that we were ready to taxi to the gate; and taxied to the gate and parked without incident. Passengers deplaned; and I completed the post flight inspection; did not note any other damage to the aircraft or damage on the external of the engine. Company Maintenance personnel met the airplane as well.

E170 Captain reported engine failure on climb out; requiring an air turnback and successful landing.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Observer

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

On approach; while jumpseating; I noticed the flaps were not extending properly. The crew wasn't aware of the malfunction initially; and continued to slow to; and then well below; the speed for the desired flap setting; not realizing the wing was nearly clean. FO was hand flying. Shortly after I informed the crew of their flap problem; their speed further decayed. I called out the low airspeed/high AOA condition; and a few seconds later; the 'Airspeed Low' aural warning came from the aircraft. The FO recovered the aircraft from the approaching stall at approximately 2;400 feet on vectors for the approach. After the aircraft was back under control; the next problem was recognition and application of the appropriate flap malfunction checklist.Initially; I was very interested in looking out the windows; as I was about to fly my little plane over the same route over the mountains the next day; so my full attention wasn't on the crew in the beginning. That changed; however; as I felt the nose seemed higher than normal. I glanced forward and the flap needles being split caught my eye; looked up to see the yellow lights overhead; and then noticed the decaying airspeed. The FO was hand flying; which might have been a good thing if he had picked up on the abnormal pitch attitude sooner; but absent that; he would have been much better off with the autopilot selected; as the a/p would have maintained the 190KIAS selected in the airspeed window. The minimum speed reached was 172 KIAS with trailing flaps at 1/2 and 1 degrees; LED extension unknown; but indicating yellow on both the panel amber light and the overhead panel. From data available; I estimated the stall speed was only approximately 10 KIAS lower. As long as the autopilot was working and that speed selected; we shouldn't have been able to get any slower. Both crewmembers seemed tired and slow to react; in my opinion. I remember wanting to see the FO act more quickly; and I felt buoyed when the 'Low Airspeed' automated call reinforced my own call to get the nose down and reduce AOA. The FO continued to hand fly even after that; which added workload to the CA; as he had to monitor closely which detracted from his PNF duties and checklist attention. I'm hoping this makes its way to the training people. FO's in particular should be trained to talk; coordinate; and fly with good use of a/p all on their own allowing the PNF/PM to work the problem with minimal distractions. Instead of just a V1 cut; try a scenario like this to completion where both pilots are busy in their own roles.But once the problem was recognized and an appropriate speed attained/maintained; the immediate problem was over; but the flap issue remained. The CA was swamped with coordinating with ATC; monitoring his FO; and choosing the correct checklist for a flap problem. The checklists are known to be less than clear; as for years the sim's have pointed that out in recurrent; including my recent one; so I actually felt reasonably prepared for this event. Just the same; the first checklist that appeared to be appropriate was the Leading Edge Flaps Transit in the QRH based on the listed condition that the LED's were not in the commanded position. I was doing my best to back up the CA; and when he started with this checklist and before I got there; he repositioned the flap handle back to 1 or up; not sure but I'm thinking up. I wasn't happy with the checklist choice or the flap handle movement at that time; plus I was watching the FO and also the distracted CA; so as a group; we weren't in sync. After a short time; I became the checklist reader; so they both could fly. That checklist eventually directed us to Trailing Edge Flap Disagree. Somehow the CA and I ended up not diagnosing the less apparent asymmetry and proceeding on to step two; which called for alternate flap extension. I was concerned that by doing that; we had the potential of inducing a split flap configuration; but after identifying theabsence of any roll and continued absence during extension; I'm certain we would have not allowed anything more than a minor split; and in this case; it gave us a normal landing configuration of 15 flaps and corresponding LED's. But no question; we overrode a valuable protection system without appropriate consideration. Of note; there is no stop at 15 degrees; and the CA got distracted and was heading past that when I alerted him. It really worked out much better that we were a 3 man crew. With the super busy crew; I handled the FA comm; a not rushed passenger PA both prior to landing and after landing to keep control of the cabin while the CFR vehicles were in plain view and FAs were jittery. Once on the approach; I still wasn't thrilled with the checklist; and then I found the better choice; Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry; where we should have started; but by then we were in a normal 15 flap configuration. So the end result was better; but our handling was admittedly incorrect.With this experience; I know the flap system far better than I did before. We first dodged a near stall; then potentially exposed us to a bigger asymmetry. Next time; I'll be the flap failure God; but this time; we didn't react well. This is why we train; and my guess is the vast majority of even long time 737 pilots would screw this checklist up also. Recommendations; all for training folks:1) Demand more from FO's (and CA's) so they can expect to talk and fly allowing the PNF to focus intently on the checklist.2) Stress how the a/p is your friend in these situations. A good FO with a working a/p is practically a whole crew alone. Practice that with typical ATC distractions; not the usual sim verbiage. 3) Take the time in the sim to freeze and point out what each variant of flap malfunction looks like and which checklist corresponds to the indications. 4) Management seems bent on these 3 leg 12+ hour days with 8+ hours flying; with our aging pilots; you're going to see degraded performance regularly. I saw signs of slow reactions that suggested this crew wasn't at their best.5) Redesign the checklists into a better flow chart. Simple 'Are trailing edge flap needles split?' kind of questions would help in the heat of the moment; as opposed to having us bite on the LED checklist which appeared attractive due to the 'condition' of the LED's not matching the flap handle. Obviously not the big picture; but with all the distractions and fatigue; clearly we fell for it. A real systems review in recurrent aligning what the checklists do with why from a systems point of view would be beneficial. Flying single seat in the military; we pretty much had to know every checklist; as it was very difficult to fly (no a/p on my old jets) and read. In training; ideally we should perform as many checklists as possible. Honestly; a V1 cut was way easier than this issue. We're practiced at the V1 cut; yet this felt like virgin territory.

A B737-800 Pilot observer detected a flap asymmetry before the crew who flew into an 'Airspeed Low' aural warning before recognizing the anomaly. The crew's actions that followed demonstrated the B737 ASYMMMETRY TRAILING EDGE FLAP Checklist pitfalls and confusion experienced by many crews.


Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Was PF on last leg of four-day.  This final day was flown with different Captain than previous three days.  I had flown with the Captain numerous times before and had an excellent working (personal and coordination) relationship.  The four-day trip was a higher than average duty hour four-day trip with the last two days of the trip requiring early predawn wake ups.  The last day was the longest at near 11-hour duty day.  In addition; after landing on the final leg; I would be immediately non-revving to XXX; to fly a two-day trip starting the next day. The three previous legs were uneventful; with only a slight delay at the beginning of the third leg due to a very minor line Maintenance repair (tightening a screw).  Weather was only a minor factor on only the last leg requiring minor avoidance deviations enroute.  The arrival and approach brief was accomplished in accordance with Company policies and procedures.  A visual approach was briefed for XXL.  Abeam the approach end of XXL; we were cleared the visual to XXL and to maintain visual separation on aircraft ahead of us to XXL and one on XXR.  Configuration went normal through landing gear down and flaps 15. Rolling onto final; PF focused on not overshooting and PF kept lookout for aircraft on [the parallel].  But due to extra tasking; visual lookout and ensuring not to overshoot and cumulative effect of early wake ups and long last day; Crew communication broke down as call for final landing flaps by PF was not clearly stated nor was it verified; as PF got behind. PF got tunnel vision and began focusing on unusual power settings and associated airspeed.  This caused both Pilots to narrow their focus.  Neither called for Landing Checklist.  At 600' AGL the PF felt something was incorrect and started to state going around. At that moment the GPWS call Too Low Flaps occurred.  PF stated going around and a missed approach was executed followed by a normal visual approach and landing. Ensure don't get complacent following Company prescribed policy and procedures.  Also communicate to Crew Member to keep a keen watch if you have done consecutive early wake ups which may catch up with you especially on last long day of a four-day trip; i.e.; providing them a verbal mental picture of how you're doing!

Landing configuration error resulting in a subsequent go-around. All it took was 10 seconds to ruin a perfectly executed flying day. I believe that fatigue and complacency on my part was a major contributor. This was a very early and long duty day. We had a predawn report at the gate resulting in an even earlier lobby time. In my case; a wakeup two hours before show time. I have been flying PMs the last two months so my body clock was most likely affected. I was flying with one of our best Pilots with exceptional flying talent and skills. We were very familiar and comfortable flying with each other as we have flown together in the past. This was the last of four long flights which blocked 7+12 for the day. Our last leg was from XXX to our domicile with a southern route diversion for weather avoidance. We just finished flying an exceptionally long and circuitous vectors the long way around the south of the the Airspace Airport complex while on the Arrival to XXL. We were both were very familiar with the VFR pattern and procedures. Approach turned us on a very tight base before clearing us for a visual. My First Officer was flying and already called for flaps 5 early on downwind. When we were cleared for the visual; my First Officer called for gear down; flaps 15 as he made the turn to [final]. I was a little preoccupied with the tight turn and sensed we were a little tight and somewhat low. I could also hear that my First Officer was adding power which sounded a little higher than normal. As we rolled out at 500 feet; I made my 500 foot call and I always verify as a technique; 5 green; cleared to land. At that point; almost simultaneously; we both realized that we had not configured the aircraft with flaps 30 and executed a go-around as the GPWS sounded 'Too Low Flaps.' The First Officer executed a flawless go-around and subsequent VFR pattern and landing.It was a very embarrassing and eye-opening experience for both of us! I really do not know how we missed putting the flaps to 30 nor how we missed performing the Before Landing Checklist. I believe a combination of the long duty day; a tight turn to final; target fixation; overconfidence with each other; and even the possibility of the lack of the hot mic function on our older model may have all contributed to our mistake. Thankfully we caught it in time and executed a proper go-around!What I need to do to prevent this from happening again is to go back to the basics; stay vigilant for the entire flight sequence; and try to not become overly comfortable or complacent. I also need to ensure that I force myself to sleep earlier on AM flights. I guess I should try reading the FOM in be - that should do the trick! Also recommend installing a hot mic function on the second generation B737s. We did not have a hot mic; which may have been a contributing factor. I may have missed the flaps 30 call and the Landing Checklist call. In any case; I should not have been distracted and ensured the completion of these two critical actions at the proper time.

A fatigued B737 crew failed to recognize landing flaps were not set at 600 feet AGL. Consequently; the EGPWS TOO LOW FLAPS alerted so the First Officer executed a go-around; configured correctly; and returned for uneventful landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Total 5314; Flight Crew Type 985

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was the PM. I was on the interphone talking to the FAs in the back about new routing which would add on flight time. ATC had re-cleared us to fly towards the west and then in on the [VOR] instead of the [STAR] due to weather. While on the phone; I started to hear a frantic call from ATC to DESCEND IMMEDIATELY to FL380. I hung up; and then there was second call. By this time; the Captain had already disconnected the autopilot and begun to descend manually in FLCH (Flight Level Change) down to FL380. I then told ATC we were. She then became very apologetic saying that all of the planes being rerouted created confusion and she had left us (or the other plane) at the wrong altitude. She asked if the nature of our descent caused any onboard injuries; which I said it did not. (It was not a violent descent.) We received a TA for the other traffic; but not an RA. When they passed overhead; they were about 900 ft. above. Before we descended; we were both at FL390 on a converging course. The controller was once again very apologetic and obviously alarmed at their error. The Captain wanted us to file this report given the situation; even though we did not technically respond to an RA. We continued on without any other issues.

B757 First Officer reported that during a reroute for weather their aircraft was on a converging course with another aircraft.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

I was working a T38 who was briefed to me as primary only. I lost RADAR on him just north of LBL and asked him for a position report. He then told me he was on the LBL355025; which is well within my airspace. Around this time I coordinated with ZDV to let them know of the primary only aircraft coming their way. A couple minutes later I was briefing a Controller for a break. The T38 was still in coast track; so the relieving Controller asked 'where is he?' I then stated that I just got a report from him that he was just north of LBL; but I said I'll get another report. I asked the T38 his position again; this time he gave me the 3 different locations with the last on being the LAA100025; which is inside ZDV's airspace. I jumped on the line to coordinate his new location and that he just gave me with ZDV and to let them know that he was 'RADAR contact lost'. ZDV said OK; and I let them know that if they get him on RADAR again; they'll have to re identify him. I then switched the T38 to ZDV. Only aircraft with operating equipment should be allowed up in the Class A airspace.

ZKX Controller described the loss of RADAR on a military training jet in Class A airspace requiring re-identification of same by an adjacent facility.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 1867

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

As I was on my final approach to Runway 30; an unknown person on the ground shined a green laser at the aircraft. The laser flashed my left eye and caused temporary night blindness. I turned the aircraft northeast to avoid the light; and selected an alternate Runway 26 to land on.

PC-12 Single Pilot reported a laser event during final approach which caused the Pilot to experience temporary night blindness.


Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3275; Flight Crew Type 2100

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Weather; Airspace Structure

On an IFR flight plan; BUR was VMC so I asked for a visual approach. It was hazy and I don't fly into BUR and I couldn't positively identify the airport at 9-10 miles out; and it seemed like SOCAL wanted me to shoot an instrument approach. But I hadn't reviewed the approach plate and I was reluctant to just punch an approach into my Garmin 430W. I was trying to call up the approach on my iPad but it was hot and slow to respond. I prefer to review the approach plates well in advance; memorize the fixes and altitude restrictions. I think the issue was that BUR is near a lot of big hills; so if you don't say you see the airport; and you're relatively high; they want you to shoot an instrument approach. But; as stated; but I hadn't done my normal pre-approach briefing I didn't want to do it. BUR was hard VMC no ceiling and 5-7 miles visibility; as I recall; so I wasn't expecting to do an instrument approach. Twice I went down to 2500 ft; below the 3000 ft assigned. I was in VMC and completely clear of the hills and mountains; but ATC called an altitude alert.  Autopilot apparently was in ATT (Attitude Hold) instead of ALT (Altitude Hold) mode. High stress; due to not being familiar with the approach and not being able to call it up on iPad or iPhone; and didn't apparently switch back to ALT mode after reaching 3000 ft.  I think I'll try to do an approach review for flights into the Los Angeles area regardless of stated conditions. I'm wondering how I could find out in advance about this kind of issue in BUR? It didn't seem that near the mountains.

Piper twin pilot reported descending below an assigned altitude while on an approach to Burbank Airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

There was no event; but an inquiry for a confusing PDC. We were filed to ZZZ at 8000 via the HAALO 2 departure. The PDC modified the routing to ATL 9 DEPARTURE.  The filed altitude showed 8000 but in the lower part of the PDC (local option fields) the instruction was 'MAINTAIN 10000FT'. While at the gate setting up the airplane; I contacted ATL clearance and asked for clarification. I knew the ATL 9 said maintain 10000 or lower requested altitude but the instruction in the PDC was not 'CLIMB VIA SID' as it had been typically until about 2 weeks prior; but was instead 'MAINTAIN 10000'. The controller said climbing to 10000 would be a pilot deviation; which had happened recently. Our initial and final altitude was clarified to be 8000. Threats include:1) Filing below 10000 creates an odd situation for initial altitude and I believe it also causes the change from the RNAV SID to the ATL 9 vector SID. 2) The recent change from 'CLIMB VIA SID' in the ATL PDCs to 'MAINTAIN 10000' looks like a solid local clearance to 10000; seeming to override the altitude instructions which are actually found in the 'routing' part of the ATL 9 SID.3) Flying at 8000 to the southwest off runway 27R results in crossing under RNAV departure aircraft who are climbing to 10000 and turning crosswind and downwind thus creating a wake turbulence threat.I contacted our dispatcher and asked about the filing at 8000. They said the software defaults to 8000 and it takes manipulation to make it 10000 for flight planning; but to avoid the confusion they could pass the word to the manager to have these flights planned at 10000.ATC consideration: If the routing instructions altitude allowance is still in effect in the ATL vector SID; without climb via SID instructions as it has historically been the case; and the lower filed altitude is required; the PDC should not say 'MAINTAIN 10000' as it does for all the RNAV SIDs. Even if this is ok legally/technically; why risk the confusion? I clarified but good chance not everyone will.

CRJ-200 Captain reported some confusion when he received a PDC in ATL that seemed to indicate a clearance to 10;000 ft; but was really a clearance to 8;000 ft.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were radar vectored; then cleared direct GRAMM RIIVR 2 arrival to 25L ILS and instructed to hold 300 KTS. We set up VNAV Path set 1;900 FT in ALT window of Mode Control Panel (MCP). Approaching LUVYN ATC ordered a slow down to 250 KTS. The First Officer who was Pilot Flying deployed speedbrakes and did not think we were slowing fast enough and shallowing our descent fast enough so he selected vertical speed on mode control and slowed sink to slow to 250 KTS. At approximately the same time we had a TCAS FAIL MSG on the ND and XPONDER FAIL LIGHT on the transponder unit. These warning lights help distract me the Captain and Pilot Not Flying at a critical time. We still had 1;900 FT set in the ALT window on the Mode Control Panel from the VNAV path descent for FAF LIMMA. We should have set 10;000 FT in the ALT window for KRAIN once we left VNAV path but failed to do it in time resulting in us going below the 10;000 FT crossing restriction at KRAIN. We corrected back to the path and continued the approach and landing without further problem.

We were being vectored to the arrival and given direct GRAMM with a directed speed of 300 KTS. We were cleared the arrival and placed 1;900 FT in the altitude window. We approached LUVYN and requested a speed reduction to 250 KTS. As we were slowing and descending to the 10;000 FT restriction; the aircraft was in VNAV mode. At 11;000 FT our descent rate was 2;300 ft/min and I felt the aircraft was going to descend through the restricted altitude; I selected Vertical Speed to slow the descent rate; taking us out of VNAV. The restricted altitude was not subsequently put into the MCP altitude window. As I verified the speedbrakes were stowed and VNAV re-selected; I noticed our altitude had descended below 10;000 FT; as was required. I leveled off for the next fix TAROC. We completed the remainder of the approach without any other issues. At this approximate time; we received a TCAS and Transponder malfunction warning; further complicating our work load.

A B737-800 crew flying the RIIVR 2 arrival set 1;900 FT in the MCP ALT for the Runway 25L FAF; then selected VS to begin slowing to 250 KTS at 10;000 FT but became distracted and forgot to re-select VNAV. They descended to 8;500 FT before KRAIN.


Other / Unknown; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We flew into ZZZ with the understanding we were on a quick turn. There was a lot to do; making things hectic. I had to step off the airplane for a few minutes. When I returned; there was only about 15 minutes until departure. On my seat (Captain's) was a form notifying me of a lithium ion battery that would be on board and traveling with us. I then received the [cabin load] which notified me of a powered wheel chair in the cargo bin. The [cabin load] also noted that the battery had been removed. The battery was not listed as additional cargo on the [cabin load]. I understood that the two items were related and assumed that the battery was being carried in the cabin per our policy. That was my mistake. I never confirmed the location of the battery; and no ground personnel came up to speak to me about it. Enroute; I called back to the FA (Flight Attendant) and asked her if she noticed a battery that came on board. She had not. Upon arrival I went out to watch the bags come off the airplane. The powered wheel chair finally came off and sitting on the wheel chair in its own separate case was the battery. The battery was in its own hard black plastic case; made for travel. It also had a white baggage claim tag attached; as did the wheel chair. I should have slowed down; and asked the ground crew about the location of the battery. If I had known they had placed it in the cargo bin; I already knew that was not in line with company policy. The turn was a bit of a cluster; those times especially one needs to slow down and think about what they are doing.

We were running late due to cumulative delays forcing us into quick turns (24 min turns). We arrived in ZZZ; both the CA (Captain) and I needed to enter the terminal (FA (Fight Attendant) remained with aircraft). I returned to the gate and the GA (Gate Agent) says that now that a pilot was at the aircraft; she would begin boarding (this served to further reduce available time to get duties accomplished as we were distracted by late boarding on a quick turn). We accomplished our gate prep; pushed and departed. We had noticed a battery form that had been left on the CA's seat and assumed it was related to the mobility scooter that was loaded; but in our haste to meet performance standards; did not give it enough attention pre-departure. Enroute; we discovered that it was for a lithium battery that was removed from the scooter. We believed that this form may have indicated that the battery was removed for transport in the cabin (as we understand that our policies do not allow lithium batteries to be carried in the cargo hold). The CA called and asked the FA if she saw a battery brought on board; but she had not. Upon arrival the CA observed the removal of bags and discovered the case with the battery from the scooter had been with the scooter in the baggage compartment.I feel that there should have been better communication with ground handler that loaded the battery; not just a note tossed on the CA seat. However; we should have taken the time to verify the placement of the battery prior to push.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported a Lithium Ion Battery Hazmat transport procedure violation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1075; Flight Crew Type 395

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 21415; Flight Crew Type 4

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

On a VFR departure from the ZZZ Airport Runway XXL; the floor of the ZZZ1 Bravo Airspace (X;000 ft) immediately east of ZZZ was inadvertently and briefly entered without ATC consent. The airspace infringement was instantaneously recognized by the pilots; as well as the ZZZ Tower controller; and corrective action taken immediately. The altitude encroachment was 300 ft into the airspace and total duration was only seconds.   Contributing factors:Hand flying high performance aircraft to regain proficiency associated with the impact of COVID-19 and lack of currency.Confusion over the altitude of the floor of the Class B Airspace in part because it was not depicted on the Garmin G3X Touch avionics system's Map Display page at the scale selected.  Toggling to the VFR Sectional Display showed the airspace floor altitude.

[Narrative contained no additional information.]

Pilot reported an airspace incursion occurred right after departing a nearby airport.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Repairman; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 19; Maintenance Lead Technician 19; Maintenance Repairman 10; Maintenance Technician 21

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 13; Maintenance Lead Technician 6; Maintenance Technician 17

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Fire bottle improperly reinstalled; not caught during quality inspection.This morning it was brought to my attention that a work order was begun on a Hawker 400XP to perform an inspection and hydrostatic test of the LH and RH engine fire bottles. The assigned mechanic removed the fire bottles and sent them to [Company] for inspection and testing. [Company] performed the inspections and tests; then shipped the fire bottles back to our repair station; where the assigned mechanic reinstalled the bottles in the aircraft. I performed the quality inspection. The work order was resolved with; 'reinstalled bottles in accordance with Beechjet 400 MM Ch. 26-XX-XX. Functional check complied with in accordance with Beechjet MM Ch. 26-XX-XX. Operations check good; no defects noted.' This resolution was signed by assigned Mechanic and myself as inspector.The aircraft visited another repair station for unrelated Maintenance; where it was discovered that both electrical connectors for the LH engine fire bottle had been connected to a single squib in that bottle; rather than to two independent squibs. This incorrect installation resulted in the pre-flight test of the fire bottles resulting in normal indications; but could have resulted in an inoperative fire bottle in the event of an engine fire. The pilot of the aircraft emailed me;about this error. I opened that email after returning to work.

[Second narrative contains no additional information]

Technician reported that both electrical connectors were installed on a single squib during fire bottle installation.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

We were cleared to taxi to and hold short of Runway 27. We complied with those instructions and were holding short when the Tower asked if we were ready to go; where upon I told them that we would need a minute or so more so we can finish our cockpit duties. After we got done I told them we were ready. At that point the Tower cleared me for takeoff on Runway 27 with a 360 degree heading after departure and we read back the take off clearance. We then cleared ourselves visually and began to slowly move forward and before I could apply power and say 'props forward; runway checks' I suddenly I heard a voice which was not Tower's come over the radio saying 'no; no; no; no; no; Tower; short final!' I hit the brakes and stopped just as the nose touched the hold short line and might have crossed it. As our plane stopped I heard Tower come on the radio and say 'hold short; hold short' and before I could reply or say that our nose might be over the hold short line a plane passed before me; with his left wing down clearly coming out of a turn; straighten out and landed on Runway 27. After the seaplane cleared the runway; Tower apologized followed by silence. After a few moments I then asked the Tower if I was cleared for 'line up and wait' and after a few more moments of silence Tower cleared me for takeoff with the same instructions as before. I read back the instructions; visually cleared ourselves again and proceeded to take off with no further incident.

A pilot cleared into position on EYW Runway 27 was warned by an aircraft on short final to remain clear of the runway as it passed overhead for landing. ATC then recleared the aircraft onto the runway.


Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecnam Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 770; Flight Crew Type 133

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Skies were clear; outside air temperature approx 45 degrees Fahrenheit on the ground; temperature approx 40 degrees Fahrenheit at 2500 ft. MSL. Practicing maneuvers in the air; steep turns; slow flight; power on stalls; power off stalls; in that order; on the recovery from the second power off stall (dropping the nose of the airplane to break the stall; and introducing full power) aircraft immediately starting shaking violently and the engine was running extremely rough; at full power the engine was producing 3000 RPM and intermittently jumping to approx. 3500 RPM (Normal full power produces around 5200 RPM) attempted different throttle settings to try and find a setting that would produce enough power to maintain altitude; no improvements. Engine instruments were all reading green or in the normal range; ran checklist to ensure the engine was getting fuel and no improvement on the performance or vibrations from engine; turned immediately towards the closest Airport ZZZ and communicated on the radio with UNICOM to tell them we probably weren't going to make it to the Airport; reported on 121.5 (GARD) with tail number and location and problems we were having; could not hold altitude from 2500 ft. MSL. Made the decision to land in a field to avoid overflying trees; flew a rectangle around the field to land into the wind. Landed in the field approximately 11 miles N/NE of ZZZ; communicated with cell phone to appropriate people (FBO; FSS; ZZZ TRACON; Airport Manager; Maintenance) no visible damage to aircraft and no injuries to myself or my student. I believe there may have been impurities in the fuel which would have caused the engine to run improperly or one or both of the carburetors developed ice (no carb heat in the plane) or water in the fuel lines may have frozen or one of the carburetors could have been faulty.

Tecnam P92 Instructor reported engine roughness resulted in a safe off airport landing. Instructor suspected fuel contamination.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I was the pilot flying on the leg into ZZZ. We were set up for the RNP M RWY XX. I made 2;000 at ZZZZZ a hard altitude instead of an at or above to make sure I wasn't high on my arrival. After being cleared for the RNP M to Runway XX in ZZZ; I was in LNAV and VNAV and in the path so I set field elevation. Prior to reaching the XXX fix; we were told by ZZZ Center of a low alt alert. We were at 4;200 and the min alt prior to XXX fix is 5;000. We were in VMC with all terrain in sight. We climbed back up to 5;000 and continued with the approach and landed uneventfully on XX. Somehow the 5;000 restriction got removed from the XXX waypoint in the legs page of the FMC; so we descended through it while established on the VNAV path.Pilots need to be careful to check all altitudes on the legs page to prevent this from occurring.

B737 First Officer reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC while on an RNP approach after entering the airport elevation in the FMC; which may have removed an altitude restriction.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 6760; Flight Crew Type 800

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

[I] was navigating around the Class B airspace near Philadelphia near South Jersey Regional Airport when the GPS signal intermittently stopped. When the signal returned the aircraft appeared right on the airspace boundary; however; according to the visual reference; should have been clear of the airspace. This happened again near Tangier Island; R-6609. The GPS signal stopped operation on both the Garmin 430 and Garmin 396 and they receive signals independently.

C177 pilot experiences loss of GPS signal two times during a flight near PHL Class B airspace on two seperate GPS receivers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 96; Flight Crew Type 37

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was under radar surveillance with Kalamazoo Approach control. I was being vectored for the RNAV 31 approach into BTL. I was currently flying with a view limiting device during my approach to simulate IFR conditions while my safety pilot was looking for traffic. We were flying at 2800 FT MSL when we monitored our traffic advisory system and spotted two additional aircraft in the vicinity of our route. One aircraft was 500 ft below us and climbing and to our left. An additional aircraft was 2 miles north of us and also being vectored for the RNAV Approach at 2500 MSL. As the aircraft that was 500 ft below us began to close in on our direction of flight and began their climb; I initiated my climb to avoid the traffic at which point we entered the cloud for 2 seconds and then broke out and descended back to our original altitude of 2;500. The traffic below passed below us and then off to our right heading eastbound as we were heading northeast bound now for our vectors. ATC warned us when the aircraft was 200 feet below us and within a 0.5 NM range. At which point I began to climb for traffic avoidance.

SR20 pilot reported an airborne conflict with another aircraft requiring evasive action. The traffic was detected by an onboard TCAS system and also reported by ATC.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Logbook Entry; Manuals

Refer to report previously filed for Aircraft X Number 1 slat damage at out station ZZZ. Damage was out of limits once aircraft arrived and reevaluated in ZZZ1 causing Number 1 slat to be changed. Damage was not properly documented on the attached engineering order allowing the aircraft to fly out of ZZZ. Turns out when ZZZ filled out the damage report they did state there was a crease present. See attached documents for details.More often than not when we; ZZZ1 sheet metal; contacts ZZZ2 in regards to damage with a crease we almost always get push back from ZZZ2 maintenance with them always trying to claim it is not a crease by definition. The definition is black and white but yet they insist we reevaluate over and over again even when there are pictures with well define lines/ridges defining underlying structure. This is a known issue with ZZZ1 sheet metal and ZZZ2 maintenance.Maintenance should have never issued an engineering order with a documented crease over underlying structure. I suggest having maintenance contact Boeing to get the definition of a crease revised to their liking and have them stop intimidating technicians when they are contact with damage consisting of a crease.

Lead Technician reported that an aircraft with a damaged Number 1 leading edge slat was allowed to fly in an unairworthy condition.


Confusion; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Climbing through FL230 the right engine started surging and the engine indications were fluctuating with the surge. I felt a bump and heard a dull bang with every surge and fluctuation. I had the First Officer run the Engine Fluctuation QRH 72.15 because if the condition continued we would be directed to 72.8;9. The issue of the fluctuation occurred one more time after completion of the QRH and the engine performed normally for the duration of the flight. I notified Dispatch and Maintenance Control via the SAT Phone. After some the discussion with Maintenance made the determination to bring the aircraft to an enroute station as a precaution due to history on the aircraft. We coordinated with ATC and notified the passengers and flight attendants on the plan. I declared an emergency with Tower because of the overweight landing. The Operating Manual has guidance on overweight landings but there was a paragraph that may have not allowed for an overweight landing without declaring an emergency. No assistance was required and the landing was normal aside from the weight. Taxied to the gate and was met by Maintenance personnel. I then put the conditions I experienced in the aircraft maintenance log. Maintenance asked if I had looked at the duct pressure; I replied that I had not. The Fault Reporting Manual (FRM) suggests looking at the pressure to determine the proper write-up but there was no guidance in the QRH addressing to notation of duct pressure. I left the aircraft with maintenance. A few things I recommend after this experience. I recommend a note or addition to the QRH directing the pilot to note or look at the duct pressure. The Operating Manual was not clear on the need to declare an emergency or not in this case. It states to not land overweight for maintenance conditions that don't warrant an immediate action. I was unsure if the issue was an engine; EEC; or bleed air issue so I elected to declare the emergency going with the worst case scenario that there was a possible engine issue; although operating normal at the time of landing. The First Officer and I had some discussion on the proper QRH procedure to conduct. Both 72.8 and 72.15 seemed to be the correct procedures for what we were experiencing. 72.15 was the checklist procedure we elected to run first; if the condition continued then we would have run 72.8 as directed by 72.15. A couple notes regarding both these procedures. Neither procedure 72.8 or 72.15 directs you to note duct pressure. 72.15 directs you to page 72.9 but the procedure starts on 72.8. I feel it is bad procedure to jump in the middle of a checklist missing possible valuable information such as notes or conditions. 72.8 never directs to turn off the EEC and seems to be a more urgent procedure compared to 72.1. 72.8 under conditions state 'Engine indications are rapidly approaching or exceeding limits.' Rapidly approaching could be interpreted as a fluctuation. I feel that both of these procedures; 72.8 and 72.15 should be combined into one procedure with a step by step guidance to final engine shutdown after the procedure is complete. It would alleviate confusion on what procedure to complete and in the end 72.15 directs the pilot to the other procedure anyway. I think duct pressure check should be part of the procedure to help Maintenance determine the cause of the issue. It is listed in the FRM manual but honestly who is going to look through the FRM during this situation. I feel that the Operating Manual under my circumstances was unclear as to whether I should land overweight or not. I went with Operating Manual Section 11 and declared an emergency; thinking that worst case scenario there could be possible engine damage or malfunction although operating normally at the time after completion of the QRH procedure. I was asked to conference in on the phone with other departments after landing and felt that was a valuable tool and great idea. It enabled everyone to hear the accounts that took place immediately after the event occurred while still fresh in our minds.

A B757 right engine was surging with compressor stalls so the crew completed the QRH procedure; then declared an emergency and diverted. Maintenance requested the duct pressure indications but the QRH made no reference to a duct pressure requirement.