Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 4950; Flight Crew Type 370

Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

[I was receiving] vectors to ILS Runway 32 at RAP. Thunderstorms and rain; marginal VFR on IFR flight plan. Ellsworth; descend to 5;300 FT; heading 350 degrees; turbulence and rain downdraft. [I] disconnected autopilot. Arrested descent at 4;800 FT; busting altitude restriction of 5;300 FT. Ellsworth Approach called on low altitude; but already disconnected autopilot and corrected. [I] broke out of rain; airport in sight. Visual approach [was] given; 500 FT low. [I] should have corrected sooner.

The pilot of small jet reported that while on vectors for RAP Runway 32; thunderstorms; rain; and down drafts caused him to descend to 4;800 FT; which prompted ATC to issue a low altitude alert as he attempted to correct.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During a routine flight; late at night; in smooth air with the seatbelt sign off; we were given a clearance of maximum forward airspeed and cleared direct to the destination airport. Shortly after we were give a discretionary descent clearance from FL350 to FL240. I was conducting IOE (Initial Operating Experience) and the new-hire FO (First Officer) was the PF (Pilot Flying). We discussed various methods to get down now that we were no longer on a STAR. We decided to enter the altitude of the FAF for the IAP we were planning to fly as our altitude to be at upon reaching the airport. This created a TOD and 3.0 descent path for us. However; the TOD was slightly behind the aircraft and we were slightly above the descent path. I instructed the FO to use FLCH as a way to intercept the descent path. As the aircraft smoothly pitched over the airspeed began increasing towards the barber pole. I instructed the FO to deploy the speed brakes; which he did; but it was inadequate to arrest the speed. I decided to intervene by disconnecting the autopilot and smoothly pitching up slightly to lessen our descent rate. No sooner had I done this than we had intercepted the descent path and we re-engaged the autopilot and continued our descent. About 1 minute later I got a call from the forward FA stating that the aft FA had been injured during the 'drop' and that she thinks her ankle is broken. I asked if she needed anything from us and that I would call ahead for medical assistance to meet us at the gate. Upon landing I contacted our company to let them know what happened. I gave a brief description and they wanted to talk to the injured FA to get a statement from her concerning this injury. Although I don't know what the aft FA was doing exactly at the time this occurred; the cause of this injury appears to be the unexpected pitching up of the aircraft to avoid an over speed situation. Although I believe I did this maneuver smoothly and the pitching up was not excessive; it appears that this somehow caused the aft FA to injure her ankle.

ERJ-175 Captain reported that a Flight Attendant injury resulted from pitching the aircraft up slightly to lessen the rate of descent.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On a visual approach to the runway I was the pilot flying and asked for flaps 5 and landing gear down to begin configuring for the approach. The Captain moved the flap lever and I began to slow from 210 KTS. Almost immediately; the Captain noticed the flap gauge was not indicating any movement of the flaps. I maintained speed above the flap maneuvering speed and stopped the descent at the final approach fix altitude. At the time we were approaching the FAF. The Captain began running the QRH. I flew the airplane and took the radios. When we reached the FAF we elected to go around and were given runway heading and a climb to 7;500 FT. We asked for vectors in the airport area while we worked the problem. I continued to fly the airplane and handle the radios while the Captain talked to Dispatch and ran the QRH for Trailing Edge Flaps Non-Normal. The checklist calls for using the alternate flap system to configure for a flaps 15 landing. We completed the checklist and review; computed the performance data and asked for a ten mile final for a straight in to the runway. We continued the approach and landed with no additional issues.I credit the Captain with recognizing the failure almost immediately; checking the Flap gauge every time the flap lever moves is critical. I think task division played an important role: As the pilot flying; there can be powerful urge to help work the problem and run the checklist. It does take some discipline to resist that temptation and not be distracted from flying the airplane. This can be especially critical in situations where terrain and non-normal flight control are added threats.

A B737-700 flight crew performed a go around when the flaps failed to extend as they approached the FAF. They performed the QRH procedure; obtained 15 degrees of flaps using the alternate system and landed without incident.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 950

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Zuehl Airport (1TE4) is no longer on the San Antonio Sectional Chart. For more than a year Zuehl has been charted as 'OBJECTIONABLE' with no elevation or runway data depicted. I found that to be hazardous; but wait; it is now even more hazardous! An airport that absolutely does not exist is now depicted about .9 mile Northeast of where Zuehl does exist. Charted as Nighthawks Nest (TT45) featuring a 7634' x 150' asphalt runway and a 4387' x40' turf runway. Might be planned; but it ain't there. That is hazardous in my book. Zuehl belongs on the chart; it is definitely there and many people and airplanes live there. Additionally it is a viable emergency landing field and should be accessible via a typical 'nearest' button on a GPS. For the same reason TT45 should NOT be charted.

GA pilot reported that airport 1TE4 (Zuehl) is no longer on the San Antonio Sectional chart and near its place is TT45; a private airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport

We were cleared to taxi to Runway 4L via [RG;] B and D. Looking out across RG the signage is confusing and it doesn't look like it does on the airport page. It appears to be straight across to B but I think it was actually more of a left jog and then a hard right. I took a right on A thinking it was the quickest way to B but it doesn't work that way. Ground told us to continue down A and then take N to D. Once there; however; the signage where A intersects with N is also confusing as you approach it.

The Captain of an unidentified aircraft type cleared to Runway 4L was confused by the complexity of the taxiway layout and signage at EWR and inadvertently turned from RG to A vice B as cleared. Ground Control supplied a revised clearance.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 960

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After landing in salt water I landed at Beluga Lake to rinse the salt off before proceeding north; I'm on amphibs. The afternoon southwest daybeeze was blowing so I took off southwest on the lake climbing to the recommended 1;000 feet before initiating a slow turn to the right toward rising terrain judging that with the slow turn and lift from the rising terrain and onshore wind; and a high performance aircraft; that I could easily reach the 2;000 feet desirable to avoid noise and flying too low over houses. As the turn progressed I encountered sinking air which reduced my climb rate; but I thought it only temporary. By the time I came to the realization the sinking air was not going away; hot day may have also been a factor; I was too close to the ground 500 or so; to go to full power (I was at 25 squared); as to the noise issue. I still had room to turn back and glide to safety; and was going to easily clear the rising terrain; but was at least 500 feet lower than I wanted to be; at a high power setting over homes in a noise sensitive are. I was very uncomfortable with the situation I put myself into.What I should have done was climb to at least 1;800 or more before initiating to turn. I also think that a recommended altitude in the Alaska Supplement for 5BL that aircraft taking off westerly should climb to some altitude; 1;500-2;000; before initiating a turn north. I am an experienced local and still found myself in this situation where anticipated aircraft performance and too early of a turn initiation put me in a too low situation.

General aviation pilot reported encountering sinking air after departing 5BL west bound and turning right at 1;000 feet. This resulted in being at 500 feet AGL over a noise sensitive area at high power.


Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Instructor

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 180; Flight Crew Type 20

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

The subject aircraft was a newly rebuilt/restored EXPERIMENTAL Super Cub clone with a zero time engine and 35' tundra tires. The aircraft has less than 10 hours since the rebuild and had a couple of maintenance squawks; one of which was inoperable/unreliable fuel gauges.Our previous six flights were with a known fuel quantity and subsequent visual inspection which is a little problematic with the pitch attitude of the aircraft on the ground with the large tires. Fuel is observed in the tank only when the tank is mostly full.One of the fuel gauges appeared to indicate fuel during our first couple of flights which led us to believe that; at least through part of its indication range; would give a valid fuel indication. That was a false assumption.During pre-flight inspection on the previous day; the right fuel tank fuel drain broke and needed replacement. To empty the right tank of fuel; the fuel selector valve was placed in the 'OFF' position and fuel drained from the tank and collected in a six gallon container. The first several gallons removed from the right tank were used to completely fill the left tank. As fuel was drained it became apparent that the left tank was also draining because we learned that placing the fuel selector valve in the 'OFF' position does not prevent fuel transfer from one tank to the other. The fuel valve was then placed in the 'LEFT' position which does prevent fuel transfer and the right tank completely emptied. It was estimated that there was at least half a tank of fuel remaining in the left tank. Also; the left fuel gauge indicated what we expected to see. We were wrong.The aircraft was pre-flighted for our flight on the day of the incident and on the fourth landing and subsequent go-around; the engine lost power and was landed in an adjacent field off airport without incident. No injury to the two persons on board; no damage to the aircraft or property. The aircraft was towed back to the airport to investigate the cause. The gascolator screen was inspected and cleaned and flow rates judged to be normal. Further inspection revealed less fuel in the tanks than we originally thought.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight Instructor flying experimental aircraft reported fuel exhaustion inflight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 42; Flight Crew Type 42

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Lakes amphibian student pilot reports an emergency landing on a highway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 1800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

The flight was a formation training flight of 4 with 3 other Beechcraft aircraft. The purpose of the flight was to practice basic 4 ship maneuvers. When we returned to the airport we performed a left overhead break for Runway 18. We then flew a low pass down 18 with the intention of rejoining to 2 ship formations on the downwind for 2 ship landings on Runway 18. I was flying down 18 with the gear down at 100 KTS at 100 FT. I then raised the landing gear and added power to return to pattern altitude for the pattern back around for landing on [Runway] 18. When I added the power; the engine sputtered then died. This left me in a position with few options; 2/3 or the runway was behind and so the only available landing location was in the overrun area just south of the runway. I concentrated on maintaining airspeed; cleared the runway end lights; flared over the grassy field; and then landed it on the belly in the field. The landing was actually fairly smooth and the plane came to rest about 400 FT beyond the end of Runway 18. The plane has damage to the propeller; the belly skins and the right horizontal stabilizer where the boarding step broke of and hit the leading edge. I was the only occupant and was completely unhurt. The question now is; 'why did the engine quit.' The short answer at this point is that I don't know. I had carefully kept track of the fuel used out of the right tank; the tank I was using during the flight; and determined that I took off with 24.3 gallons. The flight lasted 1.2 hours; and I don't see how I could have used that much gas in only 1.2 hours. I normally use about 15-16 gallons per hour when flying in formation which should have left 8 or 9 gallons in the right main at the time the engine quit. The FAA asked that I not add fuel until they had the opportunity to look at the plan; so I don't at this point know how much it will take to fill the tank. I don't see how it's possible that tank could be dry. At this point I have not been back to the plane with a mechanic to determine what might be the problem with the engine. Since I don't yet know what caused the engine failure; all I can speak to is my actions as PIC during the forced landing. When the engine quit I brought my attention inside the cockpit to try and figure out what had happened and run through the emergency procedures. After only a few seconds I looked at the airspeed indicator and realized that I had already dropped to 80 KTS. I made the decision right then to concentrate on landing that aircraft and not letting it stall. This was the right decision as I was only at 100 FT AGL and any additional time spent troubleshooting could have easily led to a stall and a much worse outcome. I estimate that the time from the first sign of trouble until it was all over was only 15 - 20 seconds. It definitely was not easy to get through the surprise and denial quickly and concentrate on flying the airplane and keeping it under control. The shock and the 'this can't be happening' thoughts were enormous. I'm pleased that my training and mental preparation kicked in and I was able to transition from 'normal flight' mindset to 'emergency landing' mindset and get the plane on the ground with no injuries and minimal damage. I'm very fortunate that there was a suitable field off the end of the runway. If there had been trees; a road; a river or ravine it would have been much more serious as I had no altitude and therefore no time to find a different landing site. I might have been able to turn a few degrees but for all practical purposes; I was going to have to accept the terrain right off the end of the runway. Should I have put the gear down? In hind site I think I did the right thing by leaving it up. The gear cycle time on the 12 volt Bonanza is about 9 - 10 seconds. If I had put the gear down; it's entirely possible that I might have touched down with the gear still in transition. That would've made the landing more dangerous than a simple slide on the belly and would have caused extensive damage to the gear. If the gear had gotten all the way down; the field was soft so the wheels would probably have dug in and increased the danger and damage as well.

BE33 pilot experiences an engine failure during a low approach at 100 KTS and 100 FT with most of the runway behind him. A gear up deadstick landing is executed of the end of the runway with minimal damage and no injuries.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

We were ready to push out of the gate when the lead ramp agent started signaling my First Officer. He could not understand the signaling and I could not see him from my seat so I told my First Officer to direct him to use a headset. He got in his tug cart and put a headset on. His headset did not work both ways. He could hear us; but we could not hear him. We managed to decipher that he did not like how one of the tires looked. I asked my First Officer if all the tires looked good to him when he did the post flight walk around; to which he said they did indeed look good. I told the Ramp Agent that my First Officer looked at the tires and they all were in good shape. I then asked him if he thought something had just happened to one of the tires. He clearly signaled something like 'OK; let's go!' I asked him if he was sure. He again replied 'Yeah; let's go!?' and gave me hand signals for 'Brake Release' to commence the push. I commented to my First Officer that if they were willing to push us; the tire must have been in good shape. Common sense dictates that if I have three Ramp Agents and the three of them think there is something wrong with any part of the airplane; they will not push it off the gate until they are comfortable doing so. At least that was my reasoning. I was wrong. After the push; we taxied to [Runway] 24R for departure. Everything felt good to me and my First Officer during taxi and takeoff. In fact; by the time we reached the runway we had totally forgotten about the episode at the gate. At some point during the climb; Center contacted us with a message from the Control Tower. Tower said that right around our time of departure; an airplane (they did not know which) had lost part of a tire on takeoff. They were contacting all airplanes that departed at around our departure time. We went back and forth with several controllers trying to determine how much rubber they found of the runway. Eventually; they got back to us and said they found between thirty and forty pieces of rubber ranging between one inch and three feet in length. I figured if we were the ones who lost all that rubber it must have made some noise in the cabin. I contacted both flight attendants and asked them if everything had felt all right during the takeoff. They responded that it did not. They told me loud noises and strong vibrations came from under the airplane. At this point we were ready to assume one of our tires blew on takeoff. By this time we were all the way over half way. All indications were good in the flight deck; so I decided to continue to our filed destination. As we got closer to the airport we sent a message to Dispatch; we declared an emergency; and requested to land on 27R. I expected a normal landing; except for a longer than normal landing roll. I talked to the flight attendants and also decided not to mention anything to the passengers until after landing; unless we happened to have a flap malfunction or any 'unsafe landing gear indications' during the approach. The landing was uneventful; but after the aircraft settled on the runway; it became evident we had indeed lost part of a tire on takeoff. This was also confirmed by another flight crew; and by airport personnel. We had no problems exiting the runway. In fact; once the airplane slowed down to taxi speed; it felt completely normal. Ground Control told us there was a tug team on the way; along with mechanics; to look at the airplane and tow it to the gate. We stopped on Taxiway L; I talked to the passengers; and got towed to the gate. The biggest threat here was a breakdown in communication between the ramp agents and the Captain. A working headset could have helped the Ramp Agent communicate effectively that the tire was not in a safe condition. I really did not get any sense in urgency in their attempt to communicate we had a problem. When he decided to push; I assumed all ramp agents believed the tire was safe. I questioned him once; he decidedto push; and gave me an indication that all was well. It would have helped if he had said: 'You really need to look at this tire'; or something like that. Instead; in my mind; everything went more like: Ramp Agent: 'HMMMM that tire could look better Captain' Myself: 'my First Officer looked at them a few minutes ago and they looked OK; did anything just happen to a tire?' Ramp Agent: 'OK; never mind; looks good to me Captain; let's go!' That did not tell me: Hey; we need to stop what we are doing and have a look. Next time a Ramp Agent questions something; it does not matter how little or what it is; I am going to open the door; get out; and check it out myself. If I had done that; I would not be writing this right now. I made a decision with not the best information; under a less than ideal communication situation. I should have made sure communication was adequate and information was accurate before I made the decision to continue.

The lack of an operable headset for the Tug Operator in our departure airport was directly attributable to a breakdown in communication which would have likely prevented this event if in fact our tire was losing pressure prior to departure and that was what the ground personnel was gesturing about. Unfortunately there are many stations which do not have working headsets. Additionally; nobody amongst the ground crew briefed either me or the Captain prior to us closing the door that their headset was broken and that they intended to use hand signals during the pushback. This also served to catch us off guard but sadly also happens frequently. Station Managers should verify their headsets are in working order and the company should replace them when they are not. Station Managers should inform their employees to advise them of any defects in any of the safety equipment; not just headsets. I feel as though I was thorough in my exterior inspection on this flight just as I am on all of them but going forward I plan to look much more closely at a tire if it appears worn at all.

A ground crew had no headset before a CRJ-900 engine start; but indicated something wrong with a tire. Unable to confirm an anomaly after the First Officer's normal preflight; the flight crew assumed no anomaly; but were notified after takeoff a tire had failed. An emergency was declared at the arrival station followed by an uneventful landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

During cruise; a momentary 'Smoke Fwd (aft) Cargo Smoke' ECAM warning appeared. The ECAM lasted approximately 2-4 seconds then disappeared. The ECAM could not be recalled using the 'Recall' key on the switching panel. However; the ECAM status display showed the Deferred Items as depicted in the Flight Manual and the overhead Cargo Fire Warning panel showed a 'Disch1' light; as if the initial ECAM warning was still displayed.After consultation with Dispatch and maintenance; verifying with the cabin crew that there were no indications in the rear of the airplane indicating a problem; and the fact that the Cargo Smoke system tested correctly prior to flight; it was agreed that this was some type of momentary system fault and NOT a threat to the aircraft's safety. No emergency [situation reported to ATC] and we proceeded towards our destination.Although the ECAM had cleared itself immediately with no action taken by the pilots; we continued to consult the QRH where applicable and coordinated to have all passengers disembarked prior to the cargo doors being opened on the ground. Additionally; Dispatch coordinated to have Fire Fighting personnel available to use infrared scanning to ensure there wasn't any unusual heat signature in the hold. The potential issue requiring this filing centers around whether it was necessary to land the plane as soon as possible as the Flight Manual calls for if the ECAM warning had persisted. As the ECAM warning had disappeared almost instantly and couldn't be recalled; and I had conferred with dispatch and maintenance; I didn't deem that landing as soon as possible in an overweight airplane at the closest suitable field to be appropriate.

A320 Captain reported continuing to destination after receiving a momentary ECAM for cargo smoke.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We were assigned a short repositioning flight. We ran all the checks for Taxi and T/O and everything checked ok. We were cleared for takeoff and when; at 80 knots; the Captain transferred the controls to me the aircraft pulled to the right a bit; which some of them do occasionally on control transfer; so I put more left rudder in and straightened the aircraft out. The aircraft was now back on centerline and felt normal again. On rotation the aircraft yawed to the right; as if weather vaning into the wind but there was no cross wind; so it took more left rudder to keep it going straight. I noticed it and so did the Captain so he took control to see if he could fix it. We climbed on course for a couple of minutes to try to fix it or see if it would correct itself and it did not. We then advised ATC that we needed to return to the airport and received vectors back for an overweight but uneventful landing on 02.

A BAE125-850XP flight crew experienced unexplained right yaw on takeoff and returned to their departure airport.


Since I have not flown into PIT very much; I was unfamiliar with the taxiway issue. It would be nice if they fix the airport diagram in the charts and add a taxiway sign or paint the names on the ground. I will spread the word.

Air carrier Captain reported lack of taxiway signage and an outdated airport diagram resulted in confusion during taxi at PIT airport.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 04R

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 1470

Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 199; Flight Crew Type 3272

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

EWR had low ceilings and shifting winds. The 4R was out of service; and RNAV approaches were advertised on the ATIS. We prepared and briefed the RNAV (RNP) Z 4R; as the minima were lowest; to better ensure seeing the runway at or before minimums. The autoflight and VNAV functions worked normally until passing the FAF. Upon passing the FAF; and as the winds aloft were shifting towards a headwind; VNAV PTH remained displayed; however the aircraft did not descend; despite touchdown zone altitude being set in the altitude window; per procedure. Indeed; all 3 of us noted that the Captain PFD showed us as being below the vertical path; whereas mine showed being above. The vertical path deviation indicators rapidly diverged and the aircraft remained at 1700 FT as we progressed toward the runway. This was obviously unacceptable; exceeding tolerances; and as such we elected to conduct a missed approach and informed ATC. We subsequently briefed and flew the ILS 4R GS out of service; using LOC and VNAV. This approach was uneventful.

I was in the jumpseat for the RNAV RNP Z 4R. Per the QRH briefing; we briefed if aircraft deviates outside of limits on the vertical path of +75 FT on prog page 2; it is an automatic disqualification for the approach criteria and necessitates a go-around. On the approach; the autopilot deviated from the vertical path by +75 FT and caused us to go-around per the briefing in the QRH.

B767 First Officer and Relief Pilot reported executing a go-around at EWR when the autopilot failed to track the vertical path accurately.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting

FA D on this aircraft is assigned a jumpseat that is located in the aisle at/adjacent to the AFT RH LAV door (legs and feet cross pass LAV door). With COVID precautions to lower the spread of this disease; the X row of this aircraft is normally blocked for FA use only. At boarding time; someone released the X row and filled with paying passenger; even though this flight went out with 8-10 non-revs and had an additional 7 open seats (scattered about the main cabin). At cruise level of flight; FA D used a galley box to sit on in the AFT Galley to enable passenger's access to the AFT LAV without tripping over feet and/or possible exchange of disease between passengers and FA. FA was in assigned jumpseat for taxi; takeoff; and landing.Equip this aircraft with a jumpseat at the AFT RH door so that FA D is out of path to LAV and is closest to the AFT RH door for evacuation needs.

Flight Attendant reported a row that is typically blocked for Flight Attendant use was released for passenger seating.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 200

Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Software and Automation; Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Complete GPS Signal loss for 2 minutes without NOTAM or other notification. I have 5 devices with built-in GPS devices connected to 3 GPS antennas.  Additionally; I had a portable GPS; with its own GPS antenna and power supply.  All GPS devices reported a complete lost of signal.  I covered about 3.5 miles while on the visual approach.  Signal was restored; but the virtual glideslopes from the GPS's were not available. I reported the event to the tower. Since I was in visual condition; I was able to maintain control of the aircraft and was hand flying for the landing.  Since I had been navigating with GPSS and the autopilot; this could have created a surprise in the loss of GPSS steering.  Additionally; had this been in IMC; I would have lost the glideslope and needed to make changes.  I do not know how the coupled autopilot would have responded. I do not know where else to report this sudden loss of GPS signal.

A General aviation pilot reported loss of GPS signal. The reporter had five GPS receivers in the aircraft.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

BAGG SMOKE posted while in cruise flight at FL340. [Requested priority handling] and applied QRH and diverted to nearest suitable (ZZZ) [airport] and performed emergency/overweight landing (with clearance from ATC and Dispatch also applied QRH related to overweight landing (in-flight) and emergency evacuation (after landing in ZZZ). Was unable to determine in-flight if the BAGG SMOKE was a 'legitimate' fire; or merely a faulty system indication; so assumed the worst in the interest of safety. ZZZ Approach was particularly unhelpful in this situation. They did not volunteer information (such as that XXL LOC/GS was out-of-service) that could have been helpful in the crew picking a suitable landing runway (the crew had not reviewed NOTAMs for ZZZ as it was neither our destination; nor filed alternate). Also; on final-approach; they simply stated 'Contact Tower' (without providing the frequency) thus forcing the crew to look it up on EFB and thus go 'heads-down' during a critical emergency landing; etc. A supplemental system to monitor the temperature of the Cargo Compartment (in addition to the presence of smoke) would assist the crew in determining the legitimacy of BAGG SMOKE warnings...and the subsequent need (or lack thereof) for post-landing emergency evacuation on the runway.

ERJ-145 Captain reported Baggage Smoke EICAS warning during cruise. Flight crew executed a diversion to nearest suitable airport and completed a safe overweight landing.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather

I was involved in an Aircraft Damage event. The work assignments for myself and coworker was a rather heavy. We had two aircraft that were loaded with MELs that required Troubleshooting. The night was chilly with heavy winds. My coworker and I were dealing with an aircraft that came in with an NGS degraded inbound and an Autobrake MEL with history that we were trying to T/S to the correct fix. The autobrake MEL was taking a considerable amount of time and we were having difficulty finding the issue using the FIM. We decided to return to the shop to run some questions through our leadership. We were asking our leaders for some suggestions because Company said that a SYMD was needed to fix the AC but we could not find it listed at all in the FIM. While we were having this discussion another lead starts chiming in just replace the SYMD because Company said it was what was needed. We were trying to avoid replacing that unit because it would require more maintenance task to be performed. If it wasn't going to fix the issue we didn't want to create more work for ourselves. He was insistent on us changing the SYMD and making the comment that we shouldn't be overthinking this. This ended up making me flustered so we went back to Aircraft X and changed the SYMD. It did not fix the issue so now we had created more work for us for no reason and just added more internal pressure to myself because we were getting behind on our work and it was getting late in the night so we decided to separate and I drove over to Aircraft X which was on a remote pad instead of being on a gate like the Matrix stated. This just created more annoyances to distract me. I finally get to Aircraft X and meet up with our Tech Foreman to get direction on the CPC MEL that was scheduled to be cleared tonight. We had a discussion that he was going to take the CPCs and download the EVM data to find out which CPC was INOP since they both were BIT checking good. I was just going to wait at Aircraft X until he came back with the results. This ended up taking quite a bit of time and I get a phone call from leadership asking where my coworker and I were at with our assignments. I told him that two of our four planes were completed that they just required paperwork to be turned in. I told him that the other two were still in work and that my partner and I separated to try and get both aircraft done. I asked him if he would like me to leave Aircraft X and head back to the shop and he said yes because it was [late in the day] and he was being asked about the paperwork. I said no problem I'll go back to the shop and submit the other two airplanes. After the paperwork was submitted I checked in with the Tech Foreman and he told me that the #2 CPC needed changed due to an internal fault. No problem I thought. As I am walking away leadership asks me how long will it take to complete R/R the CPC and Ops Checks. I said I don't know maybe 30 minutes. He said okay. I go back to aircraft and looked at the time and realized it was starting to get really late in the night. I jump out of my High Speed Tug and thought I had set the parking brake. I jump up into the E/E and start installing the CPCs. As I am sitting in there the plane rocks a little bit. I thought nothing of it because tonight it was extremely windy and I just assumed that it was just another super gust since all the planes were rocking tonight. When I get out of the E/E I noticed that the Highspeed had rolled into Aircraft X with the rubber guard on the cab touching the plane. I panicked and jumped into the Highspeed and backed it away and looked at the area of the airplane and didn't initially see damage. I thought I had gotten lucky and that the cab bumper saved the aircraft from damage. I went into the airplane and finished the Ops checks to the CPC and cleared the MEL. The thought of what happened was still in my head so I checked the area again noticed that there was damage to the aircraft. I then went back to theshop and notified my leadership. I was instructed to map out the damage so I did. After that was completed I turned the results of the Map over to Dayshift.

Technician reported being distracted and frustrated caused him to forget to set the parking brake on an aircraft tug; causing the tug to roll into the aircraft; causing ground damage.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Military 0; Air Traffic Control Non Radar 0; Air Traffic Control Radar 0; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 0; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 20

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Cleared for takeoff; power was applied; and aircraft veered left and departed the pavement coming to rest in the grass next to the parallel turf runway. Main runway was temporarily closed; and alternate intersecting runway put into use. Once responding airport vehicles released the aircraft to taxi back to parking; aircraft taxied on closed turf runway prior to stopping at main (closed) concrete runway and calling Ground for taxi instructions. It would probably have been preferable for aircraft to call for taxi instructions prior to any movement. Signage could possibly be added as reminder that turf operations should have taxi instructions as well.

Single pilot reported that during takeoff roll the aircraft veered left and departed the runway. During taxi back to parking; pilot did not call ground control for taxi clearance.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Workload; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Every day; the TMU assigns flow control. The problem is; the TMU doesn't always tell the controllers they are assigning flow control; nor tell the controllers when there is no longer flow control. We need to constantly look up at the ACE/IDS (Automated Surface Observing System Controller Equipment-Information Display System) to see if flow control is now on the board. We will receive our relief briefing; and there is no flow control listed; then all of a sudden; flow control will pop up on the board; the TMU will not tell us that they are having us issue flow control. And; they will just remove the flow control and not tell the controllers; and we are still vectoring aircraft; assuming flow control is still in effect.A specific instance is today; I sat down; and was told (and it was noted on the ACE/IDS) that there was flow control from XA:00 - XA:45. The R7 controller was giving me at least 10 miles in trail with all aircraft to comply with the 10 miles in trail and 250 knots at BAMBO. At XA:08; I looked up; and there was no longer flow control listed on the ACE/IDS. If the TMU is going to cancel flow control in the ACE/IDS; they need to tell us there is now no longer flow control into Honolulu. This is an ongoing problem. They do this daily; and it really should be part of the job to tell the controllers; if they put in flow control.If we do not know there is flow control; we cannot issue the flow control. And; conversely; if they cancel the flow control; they need to let the controllers know; because we are vectoring aircraft excessively for no reason; other than the laziness of the TMU to tell us flow control has been canceled.

Honolulu Control Facility Controller reported that the Traffic Managers do not advise the Controllers when flow is needed or canceled verbally.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 204; Flight Crew Total 21263; Flight Crew Type 3022

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft was approaching [coordinates] in continuous moderate turbulence. First Officer began to plot new turbulence report utilizing Rte 2 page. Shortly afterwards; Captain became aware that the aircraft was showing significantly RIGHT of course from magenta line. A turn to the left was executed in order to rejoin the established course. Shortly after turn initiated; ZZZ [ATC] contacted flight with information that it was deviating LEFT of course and issued clearance to deviate as necessary. Captain became concerned as to the accuracy of magenta course being displayed on moving map and a direct course to [coordinates] was then executed and a new position report sent. A careful examination of flight plan was made and compared to loaded route. Waypoints; distances and courses were carefully verified. Flight proceeded to [destination] normally. It would appear that that during the plotting of the turbulence that Route 2 was inadvertently activated. How this happened is not known.

Relief Pilot and I found out about the occurrence during the post flight debrief. As a member of the crew; we felt we should submit as well. I can attest to the rough ride and know the pilots were trying to avoid an area of forecast turbulence.

B787 flight crew reported flight plan course deviation by inadvertently activated secondary route in the FMS.


Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

While in the approach phase of flight; ATC gave us a descent to 3;000 feet. Crew started the descent with a 500-600 FPM and around 3;800 feet; crew received a GPWS TERRAIN alert followed with a PULL UP command. Crew arrested the descent; applied climb power and began to climb. Pilot Monitoring called ATC and advised of the GPWS warning and will level off at 5;000 feet. ATC acknowledge the climb and advised that 3;000 feet is a safe altitude for the sector we were in and not sure why we got the TERRAIN warning. In the approach chart the highest obstacles are 2;049 feet; and 3;100 feet is the MSA west of the ACO VOR. ATC instructed us to maintain 5;000 feet and to descend at pilot discretion to 3;000 feet and cleared us for the visual approach to Runway 19. Captain decided to start the descent to 3;500 feet when intercepted the localizer inbound to Runway 19. Once established on the localizer; captured the glideslope and landed. During the entire approach it was night VFR.

We were in the terminal environment descending into the CAK airspace. We were vectored into the left downwind Runway 19 and told by ATC to descend to 3;000 feet. In our descent; we get an aural 'terrain.' We looked at the map and saw a tower at about 2;000 feet. I slowed descent rate to 500 FPM and noted on my [Jeppesen] chart that we were about right over the Tower so I was comfortable to continue to descent at the 500 FPM. At about 3;800 feet; we get an aural warning; 'too low terrain; pull up' message. I [disconnected] the autopilot and took evasive action. We climbed to 5;300 feet; notified ATC; and leveled off at 5;000 feet. The Controller told us that we are safe at 3;000 feet however to again descend Pilot's Discretion to 3;000 feet. We again initiated a slow descent; 500 FPM; and never got a warning again.Prior to this event happening; we had gotten two to three aural sounds that sounded like the gear horn for a second at a time; spaced out over a minute. This had happened 3-5 mins before the evasive action was initiated. I've had this happen once before and believe it's the radio altimeter acting up. I have a suspicion that this could be linked to the EGPWS warning. There was a tower close to where we were; but it's at 2;000 feet (700 feet AGL). We were nowhere near that low (4;000 feet) and ATC was also a little baffled over the radio that we got a warning. I've looked online and don't see any obstacle or terrain; however at the end of the day; I immediately executed evasive action when I heard the aural warning. I did notice as soon as I started up the aural warning stopped immediately.

Air carrier flight crew reported an aural terrain warning while descending to CAK airport in an area where the Minimum Safe Altitude was lower than the aircraft's altitude.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 503; Flight Crew Total 1252; Flight Crew Type 1013

I was south-westbound at about 300 AGL performing low level pipeline patrol. Note that our patrol operation is performed under the provisions of an FAA low level waiver. I observed a turbine powered aerial application aircraft; an Air Tractor or similar; completing a northbound spray run towards my position. On this course the other aircraft posed no hazard to me as I would pass well beyond its course prior to it passing my course. However; out of an abundance of caution I turned on my landing light. Upon completing the spray run; the other aircraft performed a pull up and left turn to the west; which brought our courses together. Accordingly I turned right 5 degrees to the west; and descended to about 150 AGL over fields. I passed about 500 feet in front and approximately 250 feet below the other aircraft; at which point I lost sight of it despite my efforts to maintain visual contact. Until I lost sight of the aircraft; we were both flying straight and level. I turned left 10 degrees and then right 5 degrees to return to my course. Upon rolling level from the right turn; I observed the other aircraft on a southbound spray run on an approximate collision course; closing fast. The aircraft was at my 4 o'clock moving to my 2 o'clock position and slightly below my altitude. As the other aircraft's groundspeed was substantially faster than my 110 MPH; I performed an aggressive evasive maneuver by pulling up and turning hard to the right; passing behind and above the aircraft. I would estimate our nearest relative distance to be about 250 feet horizontal and 40 feet vertical. Had I not taken evasive action; I believe we would have passed closer than 50 ft. After passing behind the aircraft; I maintained visual contact with the aircraft until it completed its spray run; pulled up; and departed to the west.Light and visibility was good; and weather was not a factor.When I first saw the aircraft and turned on my landing light; I thought it likely that the other aircraft had me in sight. Considering what took place; I now doubt that the other aircraft had me in sight at any time. I don't understand how the other aircraft did not see me when it was above my position and turning towards me. My white and blue aircraft should have stood out well enough against the green cornfields.The current 'see and avoid' system can work well when both aircraft are on relatively constant courses and are participating in both the seeing and avoiding. In this case; I wonder whether the other aircraft was participating. The other aircraft's unpredictable flight path was definitely a contributing factor; leading to difficulty in choosing what evasive action to take.My aircraft is not equipped with strobe lights; and the red beacon is difficult to see in daylight. I believe that high-visibility wing-tip strobes; especially of the 3-pulse variety; could contribute significantly to better aircraft visibility. I also believe that high visibility paint schemes; such as the yellow paint of the other aircraft in this case; contribute positively to aircraft visibility. It might be prudent for low level aerial patrol companies to adopt a high visibility orange paint scheme to promote safety.

A pipeline patrol pilot reported a near mid-air collision with an aerial application aircraft.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Clear to descend the HLYWD 1 arrival. At FL280 we were hit with wake turbulence; it was brief; one thump. The aircraft in front of us was also [a] B757 at FL260 and 8 miles ahead. I asked SoCal [and] he told me what type and how far. I called in the back to make sure everybody was OK. [One] FA bumped her shoulder. She said she was OK.

B757 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence from a preceding B757 on arrival into LAX.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

HAZMAT was held off ramp loaded in the nesting system.

Air carrier Ground Personnel reported Hazmat cargo in 'Nesting System.'


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 29532; Flight Crew Type 8196

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Going into [destination airport]; with the weather around 300 and 2 (lower at times); on the ILS; at the marker I called for gear down FLAPS 15 then 30. At that time we noticed the Amber Leading Edge (LE) FLAPS TRANSIT light on. We then executed a go-around; told ATC of a possible flap problem and then started to run the LE FLAPS TRANSIT checklist from the QRH to include a FLAPS 15 landing and check of the NON-NORMAL CONFIGURATION LANDING DISTANCE TABLE. We then [advised ATC of] emergency and proceeded with vectors back for another ILS. Landing and taxi in to gate [were] without further problem.

On short final to ILS we received a LE FLAPS TRANSIT amber light with an accompanying LE amber light on #5 slat on the overhead LE Devices annunciator panel. Also received an aural 'too low airspeed' caution at normal speed for configuration. I believe this happened when the Captain called for 15-30 flaps. Gear was already extended. Due to the uncertainty of our problem; and the IMC flight conditions on short final the Captain elected to execute a missed approach. On the missed approach I immediately noticed that we were at roughly 1900 feet and were not climbing. I loudly stated that we were not climbing and that we needed to climb immediately. I called positive rate and for gear up. It was later determined that the Takeoff Go Around switch was not properly depressed; which led to confusion on our airspeed delay.

B737NG flight crew reported executing a go-around after receiving a LE FLAPS TRANSIT caution light. Flight landed safely after running the QRH procedure.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 29

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While working an adjacent sector I witnessed aircraft spilling out of W168. The briefing package at the sector was vague and had no detailed information on the UAV aircraft or the mission. It was just a black and white map. Not even sure if lined up exactly with the warning Area W168.Procedures and the Military desk should prepare and distribute a comprehensive detailed package to brief ongoing missions and particularly these missions. The briefing package should include times; altitudes; call signs; aircraft types; routes; maps; frequencies; etc and should be available for controller reference and briefing prior to assuming the position. When this type of aircraft is involved it should include lost com procedures and operator/pilot phone numbers. Lost link procedures and possible 'Loiter Points' and loiter altitudes as well as frequencies and radio capabilities.

ZMA reports of an aircraft spill out that area had no information about.


Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground; Local; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.8

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working alone in the tower; with all positions combined to the flight data position in the tower cab. A departure strip for Aircraft X printed out; filed IFR to MIA. This was the original flight plan; with no revision number; however there were some remarks in block 9 of the departure strip. The issue I found was that on the strip; the remarks read as follows: ' o SAT PHONE [number removed] F***'. At MHT; we get departure strips fairly often that have phone numbers and pilot contact information in the remarks section of block 9; especially for GA aircraft. After looking at the departure strip; I stuffed the strip in a holder and set it in the clearance delivery strip bay. I then gave a few other clearances for different aircraft and then went back to the strip for Aircraft X when I had a free minute to FR [full route] the strip from the FDIO. When the full route printed; I saw that the truncated 'F**' at the end of the remarks was an 'FRC (full route clearance).' Had I not full routed the departure strip; I never would've known that the clearance was marked with an FRC. As an FLM; I am very comfortable with working the tower combined and caught the FRC; however; I am concerned that had it been a less experienced controller; the FRC could've very easily been missed.My recommendation would be that anytime an FRC is needed; that it be put first in the remarks section of block 9 on the departure strip. As a tower controller; an 'FRC' is far more important than the pilot's SAT Phone number.

MHT FLM reports of receiving a clearance on an aircraft and while not busy; he full routes it. He didn't notice before he did the full route; that in the remarks section is did say FRC. FRC was hidden by the pilots' phone number. FLM is concerned that an inexperienced controller would have missed the FRC.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Type 7000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Prior to arrival into LAS; we were assigned 280 knots.  At some time during the arrival; we were cleared to descend via the SUNST 3. We set the VNAV and verified that the aircraft crossed FUZZY at 16;000 feet and slowed to 250 knots.  A short time later; ATC queried us about our airspeed.  We replied that we had slowed to 250 to comply with the arrival.  He stated that he thought that we had been assigned 280 knots.  We replied that we had; but that our understanding was that speeds on the arrival superseded previously assigned speeds.  At no time prior did the Center Controller ever say anything along the lines of 'DISREGARD SPEEDS AT FUZZY' or similar.We believe that we were correct in our interpretation of ATC directives as they were given to us; even if it wasn't what the Controller intended.The Approach Controller stated that it wasn't a problem; he was just expecting us to be doing 280 knots and wanted to make sure we were all on the same page.

An air carrier flight crew slowed to meet the charted RNAV arrival speed constraint after being cleared to 'descend via' the arrival. ATC advised that they were expected to maintain the previously assigned speed.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

[We were] climbing out of FL210 for FL280 when the flight crew was notified via ED1 of a left and right Engine Bleed Warning Message. Checked the ECS page which showed both engine bleeds were closed and the aircraft was depressurizing. The QRH was conducted under the Bleed Warning Tab. While running the QRH it ordered us to prepare the aircraft for unpressurized flight. We advised ATC that we need to stop the climb and descended to 10;000 MSL due to the loss of pressurization. At this point we were north of any mountain terrain and then talking to Center. After following the QRH the aircraft was fully depressurized and we were level at 8;000 MSL. We then contacted Dispatch and told them of our condition and that we needed to divert. Since this was an international flight we told Dispatch that we would like to divert to ZZZ since it was a Company Operation and had Customs. All of us concurred that ZZZ would be a good place to divert too. At that point I believe ZZZ was 80 miles away. We then informed the flight attendant's and the passengers of our aircraft condition and that we were going to divert to ZZZ. The aircraft landed safely without incident; and the passengers deplaned and cleared U.S. Customs. We did not declare an emergency since we were able to descend down to 10;000 MSL; without having the cabin climb above 10;000 MSL; while following the QRH; nor were there any issues with the crew or passengers due to the depressurization. We landed with approximately 10;500 LBS of fuel on board. After landing Maintenance was contacted and the maintenance issues were written up in the maintenance log. Also; Dispatch and Scheduling were contacted. The flight was then canceled.

CRJ First Officer experiences a bleed trip climbing through FL210 resulting in loss of pressurization. QRH procedures are complied with and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 149.63; Flight Crew Total 13538.80; Flight Crew Type 2720.75

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Both ADS-B receivers failed on base leg. Appeared to resume normal operations on final.

Air carrier Captain reported momentary loss of both ADS-B receivers on approach to DEN.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 2286

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

We pushed back off the gate and started the engines. I placed the right pack in high because it was a little warm in the cabin and planned to place it in the normal position; which I did before takeoff. Right as we were about to taxi; I noticed an odor. To me it smelled a bit like a baby diaper and I thought it may have been a smell from the lav; and didn't say anything about it. We taxied out and I don't really remember smelling it. On takeoff I noticed the smell getting a little stronger but I just figured it was due to the increased bleed air feeding the packs. As we started our climb all indications were normal. At no time did I think the smell was overpowering. Somewhere around 9000'; the Captain said; 'Hey they're getting smoke in the back'. I didn't have my service interphone on; so I assumed he must have been listening in. Then the flight attendants called and the Captain asked me to answer it. He said he had the aircraft. They told me they were getting a smell of smoke pretty strong in the cabin; but no visible smoke. I relayed this information to the Captain and he decided to notify ATC and return to the field. ATC gave us a left turn and a descent; but I don't recall the altitude. We donned our O2 masks and started the QRC. At this point; the flight attendants called back again and had a commuting Captain on the line. He said that it smelled like a recirc fan possibly going bad; but not a musty smell like one of the flight attendants had suggested. After relaying this info to the Captain I noticed all the automation was now off and we were is the left turn back to ZZZ. I suggested turning back on the automation and gave him autothrottles; Level Change and LNAV. We continued running the QRH in between talking to the flight attendants. I asked what runway we were going to and the Captain said XXR. I pulled up the chart and set myself up. At this point we were being vectored and I was cognizant of the fact that no PA had been made. I quickly told the passengers that due to the odor in the cabin we were returning to ZZZ and would be on the ground shortly. We landed and CFR (Fire Department) was waiting. The Captain said something about hot brakes so I quickly ran the data to see if it called for the brake cooling program to be run in the ACARS. I made sure to use our current fuel load and not the default destination fuel. We were not overweight so it was not required. CFR checked the outside of the aircraft including brakes and said all appeared normal. We elected to take off our masks at this point since there was no visible smoke or odor I could smell when I pulled my mask away from my face. We taxied to the gate uneventfully and deplaned normally through the forward passenger door.Preventative Measures: In the future; any time I smell anything remotely out of the ordinary; I will make sure to verbalize it. The Captain said he had thought it smelled like a burnt bagel. If we had talked about this before taking off; maybe we would have decided to go back to the gate or at least see if the flight attendants were smelling it in the cabin. Once in the air; it becomes a much bigger problem; due to the time constraint of wanting to do everything right but also just get the aircraft back on the ground; in case the problem gets worse. The oxygen mask adds a serious level of difficulty to communication. The PTT switch on the yoke is probably the best to use; versus the intercom switch on the audio panel.

B737-700 First Officer reported a return to the departure airport due to a fumes event during initial climb.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

About half-way into the flight; I (Pilot Flying) noticed a haze in the cockpit that was getting progressively worse and noticed a burning smell in the cockpit.  Origin unknown.  I mentioned to the Captain (Pilot Not-Flying) that I think we're getting smoke and he began to notice as well.  He called the Flight Attendant to ascertain the severity of the smoke build-up and she said she just started noticing it when we called; along with the passenger seated in 10A noticing a noise and vibration below his feet. We ran the memory items; ran the QRH; and elected to land at an enroute with direct to the airport routing under emergency authority. The smoke seemed to dissipate after 5 minutes and we landed uneventfully followed by a look-over from the Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters (ARFF) crew. At the gate; Maintenance appeared to have found the culprit; a total mechanical failure of Pack Number 1 (the only operating pack due to Pack 2 MEL); confirming the concerns of the passenger in 10A.The threats were the smoke itself; risk of escalation to fire; and the decreased ability of the crew to communicate normally due to O2 masks.  There were no apparent errors or undesired aircraft states. As an experienced crew; I feel we handled this event properly. I had experienced a similar emergency previously and felt comfortable with every crew decision we made.

An EMB-145 crew detected a haze and burning odor in the cockpit while the Flight Attendant and passenger identified floor vibrations. An emergency was declared; the QRH completed and after landing Maintenance discovered a Pack 1 failure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1047; Flight Crew Type 700

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[I was the second] of two consecutive departures on fairly busy day. Expedited departure for landing traffic. Runway 19 in use; moderate wind from southwest. On take off; drifted to east of runway and overtook C172 that taken off ahead of me. The C172 maintained runway heading and turned west and I drifted west. The combination of me overtaking and shortcutting the circuit resulted in a close call. I now realize the importance of flying a crisp pattern and adding more situational awareness. Because of the nose high attitude; I lost sight of the C172 and basically intercepted that aircraft in the pattern. I will work on better pattern control and be more aware of slower planes.

C182 pilot reports turning crosswind early and catching up to the slower C172 that had departed ahead into the VFR traffic pattern. The C172 traffic is not sighted after takeoff until quite close resulting in an airborne conflict.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 19900; Flight Crew Type 2200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

ZZZ Center closed due to COVID cleaning.We had come into ZZZ [airport] after ZZZ Center closed. We received a new trip to ZZZ1. I was concerned about duty time; but the director of operations determined that it could be done. Also; upper management; had told us to 'turn and burn' in ZZZ. The director of operations had filed a flight plan on or near land. The clearance we received was far from shore; due to ZZZ Center being closed. Due to concern over running out of duty time and company time pressure; the modified routing was not reviewed until we were established in cruise flight. I have been furloughed for several months recently; so I haven't given any thought to my company's lack of authorization to operate in Class 2 airspace. I have done so in the past in other employment positions in other organizations. I reverted to previous thinking in those positions and made a decision to continue to ZZZ1.We completed the flight uneventfully and landed in ZZZ1 as planned. No ATC concerns were voiced.I believe this is; of course; primarily due to the effects of the COVID pandemic; as so many life issues have been affected by this unprecedented event.However; all parties involved should have slowed down and thought more about all of the factors involved.

Air taxi Captain reported not reviewing a modified route until after being airborne; which was too far off shore; and possibly running out of duty time.  This was due to an ATC Center closing down for COVID-19 cleaning.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Company Policy

I was giving a 30-day skill check to radar trainee. Aircraft X called airborne; looking for an IFR clearance. They were given a squawk code; identified and reported an altitude of 11000 feet. At this point; they were leaving an area with a Minimum IFR Altitude of 14200 feet; moving into a Minimum IFR Altitude polygon of 15300 feet. They were given a clearance to '[destination] via [fix]; then as filed. Climb and maintain flight level two three zero.' The pilot was not asked if they could maintain terrain and obstruction clearance above the MIA altitudes. The developmental believes he was in compliance with 7110.65 4-2-8 d. and no violation took place with regard to terrain. I am uncertain how they could have known the aircraft could climb in VFR conditions; and I believe the clearance 'via [fix]' would shift the responsibility for terrain and obstacle clearance from the pilot to the FAA; as per 7110.65 4-2-8 (d.1. NOTE) An MOR (Mandatory Occurrence Report) has been entered for this incident; and I am requesting clarification as to the wording and rationale behind 7110.65 4-2-8 d. I would also like clarification as to the FAA's opinion about best practices with regard to VFR to IFR clearances.I feel 4-2-8 d. is unclear in its intent. It gives a course of action for a pilot who cannot climb in VFR conditions; but does not give a clear indication for how to determine this or what to do if a pilot can climb VMC. In addition; the additional NOTE is both broad and ambiguous in its ability to shift responsibility to the FAA. '...do not assign (or imply) specific course guidance that will (or could) be in effect below the MIA or MEA.' In terms of defining and following our 'best practices;' I would suggest dropping 4-2-8 d and providing clear guidance not to issue any IFR clearance until a pilot is either at or above the MIA/MEA or has indicated they can maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance.

ZOA Supervisor reported a trainee issued an IFR clearance to an aircraft that was below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Distraction; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was Captain on Aircraft X; ZZZ to ZZZ1 today.  A large family traveling together with some adolescent children created a disturbance at the gate area and continued after boarding.  The station CSM [Customer Service Manager] tried to help contain their behavior; however; after my FA asked one of the children to wear their mask properly once boarded; the family took exception and caused a stir using unacceptable language.  I stepped back to salvage the situation and calm the passengers; but I was not successful; and I asked for several of them to deplane.  Local security and both station managers and in flight managers arrived to assist.  Good work by the local ZZZ CSM allowed us to only remove the X adults and the several children.  This resulted in a delay; of which we made up some enroute.  Flight was uneventful otherwise and several passengers stated appreciation for our handling of the situation.CSM attempted to preempt any problems prior to boarding.  She was a great CSM.

Air carrier Captain reported a family was removed from a flight during boarding due non compliance with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 542

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During initial climbout; I heard a rattling noise and as I looked around to find the source of the noise; I found that the piano hinge rod on the right side of the cowling had slid its way forward; toward the rear of the propeller. I immediately reduced power and turned back towards the field at about 1;500 FT AGL. The other two aircraft in my flight continued on with their flight plan. The Husky I was flying was equipped with an MT composite two blade; 80 inch propeller. I reduced power and turned back towards the airport. As I started my descent the propeller automatically started to increase the blade angle to try to keep the prop below redline; bringing the trailing edge of the prop into contact with the protruding rod. The rod oscillated violently a few times as it struck the trailing edge of the propeller. At the time I thought the rod was simply being affected by the vibrations in the cowling. I landed and shut down and assessed the damage. The affected area was about 3.5 to 4 inches wide and about .75 to 1 inch deep on each trailing edge of each blade. The rod wasn't bent but had chewed its way past the fiberglass and into the wooden layers of the propeller. There was no sign of the hinge pin protruding during the pre-flight inspection. This could easily have been avoided by simply adding two 90-degree bends on the fore and aft ends of each hinge pin.

Reporter stated his Aviat A-1C-Husky is approximately five years old and uses a constant speed; two bladed composite propeller made with laminated wood; wrapped in a fiberglass shell with a metal strip on the leading edge. A steel hinge pin is used at the top of the left and right engine cowling. The cowling is made from thin aluminum; approximately .030' thousandths of an inch thick. Reporter stated that the aircraft Manufacturer's procedures are to strike the forward and aft ends of each hinge pin causing the pin to swell at the ends and prevent movement of the pin. On his Husky; the right hinge pin did not seem to have any swelling (pinching) at the forward end. What causes the hinge pin to migrate forward is unclear. There was substantial damage to the prop near the blade root; hub area. Not only was he concerned about the propeller; but he noticed gaps developing at the aft hinge section of the cowling; as the hinge pin migrated forward; raising more concerns the right cowling might separate or start to tear away in flight. On the ground; the hinge pin was easily pushed back into the hinge assembly and squeezed down (crushed) at the forward end to prevent further movement.

A pilot flying an Aviat A-1C-Husky aircraft hears a rattling noise and notices the piano hinge on the engine's right cowling migrating forward and cutting into the trailing edge of the composite propeller. Gaps had also developed at the aft hinge section as the hinge pin continued migrating forward; raising further concerns the cowling might start to tear from the aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport

We built 2 waypoints F160C and F131B in FMS as a reference point for Express Way Visual 31 into LGA which was the active runway and approach in use. The pilot flying was the First Officer (FO) and since he was not quite familiar with all the local landmarks so that he was still using autopilot with FMS with those 2 waypoints built in on FMS even after we passed DIALS.We configured the aircraft for landing at DIALS and I did not see any problem for altitude and speed control since then. But because we had over 20 knots northerly wind and aircraft did not line up with the runway 31 and were almost approaching taxiway B so we decided to go around. For the second try; we built DIALS on FMS but decided to hand fly with those 2 waypoints just as a reference. This time; the pilot flying; FO; totally lost his orientation where the Long Island Express way is and way off course to the east and since we were still descending; we had the low altitude warning from New York Approach Control. At that time; I took the flight control and climbed back up to 1;500 feet. I kept the flight control with me and landed normal in runway 31.

Air Carrier flight crew experienced a low altitude warning while on second visual approach into LGA. Crew adjusted altitude and continued to a normal landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

[The aircraft] had maintenance log history of left pack issues. After cruise at FL310 while I was on first break; a Flight Attendant told me the Captain requested my presence back in the cockpit. Upon return I noticed EICAS for left pack off and right generator off. The APU was running. The Captain explained that they already ran the Flight Manual (FM) procedures for these two events that occurred within 5 minutes of each other. He then got a SATCOM phone patch to Dispatch and Maintenance Control. The Maintenance Controller stated that these events would have precluded dispatch if prior to dispatch point (but of course MEL doesn't apply until next leg). Maintenance Control then asked the Captain to look up some maintenance readings in the maintenance ACARS menu pages. He then asked the Captain to further troubleshoot at which point the Captain had a discussion with the rest of us. We fully agreed that if the FM Non-Normal Checklists did not correct the issues that we should not deviate from the FM Checklists even if under Maintenance Control direction after the point of dispatch. I felt to do so would be paramount to deviating from the FM and use of emergency authority. In this case; Maintenance Control was referencing Maintenance Manuals that we do not have in an attempt not to correct an unsafe condition; but to return the aircraft to normal operations to continue the polar flight. We were forecast to land with 20.0 but would have needed to run the APU for about 12 more hours (5.5k). In the middle of our SATCOM discussion we lost SATCOM and data link and were not able to regain. We attempted VHF through Commercial Radio and it turned out to be a jumbled mess of communications (poor connection). SATCOM inoperative EICAS continued as we flew further north. We agreed that it was pointless continuing flight northward and were discussing a turn back to the south when we got an ACARS from Dispatch advocating a return. Also got an ACARS advocating dumping down to maximum landing weight. The Captain divided duties up and we talked to ATC; the flight attendants; and the passengers. We discussed the fuel dumping procedure and when we wanted to start that. We sent a quick note to the crew desk and told them the situation. We finished up all checklists and performed a maximum weight return. Overall; Captain did great and had excellent CRM skills. My only complaint was with Maintenance Control and Dispatch who seemed to advocate taking actions not in the flight manual in an effort to continue the flight. We absolutely did not want to return and dump 140k in gas but we also did not want to be at 80N with a repeat problem and/or land with 14k in gas.

B777 First Officer on break; is summoned to the cockpit after failure of the left pack and the right generator. After discussions with Maintenance Control the crew elects to dump fuel and return to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Blue lavatories 4LR blue fluid alone with dirty toilet tissue flowing into the galley. Started happen on the climb.  Liquid gushing from the toilets which were unusable because bio hazard chemical spread near the food contaminated layer all the bathrooms were unusable.

Flight Attendant reported Bio Hazardous leak from lavatory 4LR into aft galley.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 2073

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During a bio-break with the Captain out in the Lavatory. While at cruise at 35;000 ATC called and requested that we slow to Mach .76. At that same time; we encountered moderate turbulence. While reading back the Mach .76 call; I requested lower to smooth air. ATC then said that it was smooth at 31;000 but to descend to 33;000 for now. I started descending to 33;000 via level change. When descending through 33;500 ATC then asked if we were on frequency. I replied that we were and he had literally just slowed us and cleared us to descend to 33;000. At that point; the controller said to maintain 35;000 and turn right 20 degrees. I started a climb back to 35;000 and a turn. Realizing the situation and that the automation was not moving fast enough; I clicked off the autopilot and auto thrust and turned and climbed back to 35;000. Once level; ATC seemed confused about the clearance but fortunately we had an additional pilot in the jump seat and we all clearly heard the clearance and call sign. I told ATC that fact and he was extremely apologetic realizing what had happened. During the event; both the jump seater and I noticed on the TCAS that we were within 100 feet of the other aircrafts altitude! At that point; we did not have the other aircraft in sight but shortly after; a [aircraft] went under our nose and left wing. Once clear of traffic; ATC then cleared us lower again and handed us off to the next controller. He again apologized and thanked us for our help. The end result is that we did not get a TCAS RA; but it was a close encounter. I believe had I left the automation on; it would have resulted in a RA or even worse! I also believe that [the other aircraft] did not get an RA either based on the fact that nothing was said about it on ATC.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a clearance from ATC that created an airborne conflict. ATC identified the error and issued a new instruction to deconflict.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

We boarded the aircraft and were informed the aft interphone was inoperative and deferred. The three flight attendants discussed this and I told the Captain I was not comfortable with a deferred interphone. He immediately said 'No problem. I'll call Maintenance.' He did and it was fixed. Although I realize an inoperative interphone is a high priority Maintenance issue I question the safety of it ever being deferrable. There are many different scenarios but lets take for instance a situation where people rush the cockpit and take out the flight crew. We see this from the aft of the aircraft but without an interphone are unable to communicate the situation to the cockpit. Yes; we can use the Evac Alarm telling the cockpit 'something' is very wrong and they will immediately land the aircraft. However the loud Evac alarm could be potentially harmful as it alerts everyone and could make the situation even worse. A quick discreet interphone call could be needed. On the particular day my interphone was deferred it was incredibly windy. If we had needed to grab the megaphone since the PA was inoperative just getting to it would have been dangerous with potential injuries. These types of scenarios are endless. We have learned a lot from 9/11. We must always be prepared and ready for anything. We have learned to expect the unexpected. I would ask the FAA to reconsider allowing any interphone on any narrow body aircraft to be deferred for any amount of time. We need to have all our tools available to meet the unexpected and the interphone is one of those vital tools for flight attendants. Thank you for the consideration. I hope this is the correct venue for this type of review as my supervisor suggested it.

An A319 aft flight attendant interphone was MEL'ed inoperative but for security reasons the flight attendant crew asked that it be repaired. The Captain made the request and Maintenance complied.


Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 500

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on top of scattered clouds at 5;500 ft. arriving at HAF from the south. Weather reports from the airport all indicated the airport was VFR. As I approached the IF for the approach I had to decide between coordinating a pop up approach with Approach Control or descending through a large opening in the cloud layer and flying up the beach. I chose to remain VFR and fly up the coast due to the fact that it was getting dark and I had no idea how long it would take Approach Control to coordinate an approach. I descended uneventfully below the clouds and proceeded to the airport at between 1;000 and 1;500 ft. over hills that vary from 100 ft. to 300 ft. high. Apparently there is some drone operator who operates off a hill that gets upset when aircraft fly over at low altitude. He called me right after I had landed. He told me he 'I can not enforce this but I am requesting that we not fly over his drone operation'. I never saw a drone and am not sure if he was operating one at the time. Talking to other pilots it appears he calls every pilot he sees fly over at 1;500 ft. or below. I typically fly higher but on days when the ceilings are 1;500 to 2;000 ft. it is unavoidable to fly low. I am concerned about the drone operator calling pilots and possibly influencing their decisions when sacrificing safety of flight of the aircraft vs. inconvenience of the drone operator.

A pilot reported a concerned citizen called them after landing to request that they do not fly over the citizens' 'drone operation'. The reporter stated other pilots who fly into this airport have also received phone calls from the same person.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Type 8000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 156

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were preparing to leave; the flight was on time and the weather was perfect. Our performance computer was deferred; and this was the second leg in this aircraft. This was the first time that the First Officer (FO) had ever experienced a performance computer deferral; and used the ACARS performance system. All of our preflight procedures were completed; we pushed early and taxied to the runway for departure.I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) on this leg; and the takeoff roll was normal. I called V1; rotate; and immediately noticed something wrong. As he began to rotate I told the FO that we were too slow; and to keep the pitch low. The aircraft was very slow to rotate and lift off; and he did an excellent job smoothly letting the aircraft accelerate and fly away at higher than bugged speeds. Once we cleaned up and climbed away; I realized what must have happened and verified that the ACARS performance data was input incorrectly; and neither of us caught the error. Instead of inputting the Takeoff Weight (TOW); the FO input the Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) instead. We had 32;000 pounds of fuel onboard; so our speeds and data were for a 32;000 pound lighter aircraft. Running the numbers showed that the bugged V1 and VR were 21 knots lower than they should have been.From a crew standpoint; I simply should have caught the error. I still can't believe that the common sense aspect of the numbers didn't stand out. I think the major issue that led to the mistake is the different format of the takeoff data on the ACARS versus the performance computer. When using the performance computer; the Pilot is accustomed to inputting the ZFW and the TOW; and inputting the ZFW into the FMC. The fact that the ACARS input only requires the TOW is a minor difference; but probably very easy to screw up. The error here should have been caught in the Before Push Checklist; but again the formatting difference caused a deviation from the normal flow of crosschecking the data. I would suggest that the ACARS input be changed to include both weights; if for no other reason that it is what the Pilots are used to putting into the performance computer. From a personal perspective; this was certainly a bit of a wakeup call to be more attentive to crosschecking the data; and to take a bigger picture look to ensure that the numbers make sense.

Aircraft performance computer was inoperative. I entered the zero fuel weight into the ACARs instead of the takeoff weight giving us a lower than required rotation speed. On takeoff it was apparent; so the rotation was delayed and climb out was accomplished at flaps one maneuver speed until 1;000 feet.

The B737 crew reported on a mistake in the performance calculations because of a deferred performance computer and an incorrect entry of Zero Fuel Weight instead of Takeoff gross Weight.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While being vectored for 27L at EGLL we experienced wake turbulence events. Two of them were unable to be corrected for by the autopilot and had to be manually corrected. The second one exceeded 30 degrees in bank. Both of these events were a hard roll. I asked ATC what kind of aircraft we were following and they told us it was a 777-200. They then allowed us to slow to 150kts to increase the separation between us. We were advised that we had .2 miles from the minimum recommend separation at the time. There was zero wind at 4000 ft and the surface winds were calm.

B767 FO reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into EGLL in trail of a B777-200.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

[During approach] the slats failed to deploy on first attempt. Slats did deploy after QRH checklist procedure was competed. A normal flaps five landing was accomplished. The aircraft was returned to service: 'message cleared. No defects noted. A/C found to be in transitory condition.' On [the next] flight the Slats again failed to deploy on first attempt; but the slats deployed subsequent to QRH checklist procedure. Maintenance found possible electrical faults in SF-ACE one and/or the slat/flap deployment lever. FDR's were pulled in accordance with NTSB reportable event requirements.

EMB175 Captain reports failure of slats to extend when selected during approach. After QRH procedure (return flap lever to previous position) the flaps and slats extend normally. Maintenance can find no faults. The anomaly repeats on the next leg with the same outcome. This time Maintenance detected possible faults in the Flap/slat computer or the flap lever.


Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft

On this flight and on several B777 flights recently with the Lower Lobe Crew Rest (LLCR); we have experienced extreme heat in the bunkroom radiating from the cargo area. On this flight and several other flights recently; the bunk room floor; and walls were hot to the touch and the radiant heat was too much for the crew rest area to be properly cooled even with the temperature set as cold as it would go. This affected 3rd break worse than the other breaks as the heat had radiated into the bunkroom more and more throughout the flight. The flight attendants on 3rd break; myself included; were unable to rest well due to the heat.  I discussed the issue with the flight deck crew.It is my understanding that a procedural change may have occurred. At our Air Carrier X [prior to the merger] the Cargo Heat was not always set to 'High.' From what I understand this was the procedure [before the merger] at Air Carrier Y and has now been mandated for ALL flights [since the merger]. This may be well and good at Air Carrier Y; since they have the Overhead Area Crew Rest (OACR). But; as many planes in the Air Carrier X fleet have the LLCR; this radiating heat can become a problem. As this has not been experienced on all flights I have been on; perhaps it may have something to do with the location and/or number of cargo pallets as well. However; the issue does need to be addressed. On five flights in the last two months; I have personally experienced this phenomenon.

Reporter stated that since the merger; the new procedure from their combined Air Carriers mandated an increase in Cargo Heat temperatures in the Forward Cargo compartment. That heat radiates into the Crew Rest bunk area and even with the Crew Rest thermostat down to the coldest setting; the compartment was very hot. He notified the pilots and the Cargo Heat was lowered from the Flight deck; which did help.Reporter stated he was wondering if more or less freight pallets in the Forward Cargo compartment could have an effect on the temperature due to more pallets could absorb the heat. On B777s with the increased temperatures in the lower compartment; no one is getting adequate rest. He has not yet received any response from his Air Carrier addressing the excessive heat concerns. He has 29 years of flight experience.

A Flight Attendant reports how a mandated company policy change that increases the temperature in the Forward Cargo Compartment has affected flight crew rest periods on some of their B777-200 aircraft. The bunk room floor and walls were hot when touched; caused by heat radiating from the cargo area; even with the thermostat at full cold.