Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During the climb; just about passing FL200; we received an ICAS warning of BLEED 2 FAIL. Normally; this would be a non-critical event; but in this case; our BLEED 1 system was already deferred; thus leaving us with NO bleed pressurization. I immediately stopped the climb and alerted ATC we needed a lower altitude immediately; while my first officer ran the QRH procedure. We were cleared to 10;000 and proceeded to initiate an immediate descent. We also asked for a turn back; and that was granted. We completed our descent in approximately three minutes. The QRH Procedure was successfully accomplished during the descent and we were able to restore pressurization in about a minute. The cabin altitude never exceeded 5000 feet and the emergency ram air system worked as advertised. As we had no idea what had caused the Bleed 2 system to shut down; we elected to return instead of trying to continue to destination with a possibly faulty pressurization system (Bleed 1 system was already deactivated by MEL; so we had no real backup system should it have failed again...). We were over 4000 pounds over our maximum landing weight; so after a ACARS discussion with dispatch and the fact there was no immediate need to land; we elected to hold and burn off the fuel to avoid the complications of an overweight landing. We descended to 8000 feet (going lower would have put us in constant light to moderate chop so we elected for some passenger comfort...); went to a high-drag configuration (gear-down; speed brakes out) and burned the fuel down to our maximum landing weight in about 20-25 minutes. We then proceeded to land without further incident. Contract maintenance met us at the gate and with maintenance control's help; troubleshot the system. It was determined this was only a transitory problem; so the logbook signed off and we left again 1:42 after we landed. No further incidents occurred en-route and we arrived approximately three hours late. The BLEED 1 system had been deferred after three write-ups for the same condition - BLEED 1 failures on the ground and in-flight - over the preceding several days. I realize that it is perfectly legitimate to defer items; but we need greater emphasis on getting critical items like bleed failures fixed quicker. Had a bleed failure like this occurred with both systems operating; we could have continued on and it would have been a non-event.

EMB-170 Captain reports being dispatched with the Number 1 bleed system deferred then having the Number 2 system fail passing FL200. An immediate descent is requested and the flight returns to the departure airport after burning down to landing weight.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Equipment / Tooling

While dealing with a medical situation two things happened on this flight that were of great safety concern! 1) Although the wrong oxygen bottle was accidentally grabbed the much bigger issue was that the metal mask insertion [fitting] was malfunctioning! Whether it was the mask tubing fitting or on the bottle side it would not attach! I tried; the male EMT tried; and then; once we landed; the Mechanic even tried and had difficulty with connecting the mask to the bottle; the Mechanic initially suspected it might be the wrong mask for the bottle. Later the Mechanic told me it was the correct numbered part for that bottle; however; it definitely was not working properly. Had we had a decompression issue or some other issue where we needed more oxygen; especially for the flight attendants; we would have been compromised! 2) Once on the ground and taxied to our gate we had to 'HOLD' for several minutes while they pushed another aircraft out of our way! I could not believe this! Had this been a bigger medical [issue] than it was--or had we been performing CPR--we could have easily lost this passenger! I later learned that the ATC Controller failed to notify our ground crew that we had a medical situation on board. That mistake could have cost our passenger his life!!I do not know what caused the break down of communication on the ground as I was attending to the passenger on my aircraft and I do not have access to the communications from ATC or ground.

The reporter advised that there are two separate and distinct types of portable O2 bottles on board the fleet.  There are three flight attendant walkaround bottles stored with the mask installed in the low flow outlet but with an adjacent high flow outlet for use with medical emergencies.  In addition; there is one passenger emergency portable bottle with the mask installed in the high flow outlet.  Another Flight Attendant had inadvertently retrieved a flight attendant bottle and; when they were unable to access the high flow outlet the assisting attendant was sent in pursuit of the passenger bottle for timely access to the high flow supply.  Unfortunately; the reporter remained engaged with the passenger and was not aware whether the other walkaround bottles suffered the same high flow failure.She noted the passenger had responded to ministrations by EMTs and herself; and although looking a little peaked; was last seen awaiting a connecting flight.

When faced with supplying oxygen to an unresponsive passenger the Lead Flight Attendant aboard a Q400 was unable to insert the mask into the preferred high flow port on a flight attendant walkaround bottle.  Another portable bottle; intended specifically for medical emergencies with immediate access to high flow was obtained to successfully resuscitate the passenger who was mobile upon arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

We departed several minutes early due to the destination airport curfew. Noticed an EICAS GEN CONT R and overhead amber light at 1500AGL. AT 3000 feet directed by checklist to try single generator reset that was unsuccessful. Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control who were aware of the problem with ADS EICAS generator drive disconnect checklist was completed. Started APU shortly after first generator EICAS msg. Dispatch said with APU fuel burn and performance penalty with open door for 14 hour flight we would arrive to destination low on fuel. We decided to dump fuel and return.We stared dumping fuel [and] ATC gave us vector to parallel the coastline. We terminated fuel dump at FL230 [and] landed at our departure airport at 457;000 pounds; 3000 pounds below max landing weight.

When the right generator control failed on a long range B777 overwater flight; the fuel burn and drag penalties associated with utilizing the APU generator precluded continuing the flight. Crew dumped fuel and returned to their departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 76; Flight Crew Total 327; Flight Crew Type 160

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

IFR instructions were to takeoff RWY 17; turn heading 190. On runup and check; all instruments were working as normal. After takeoff; I entered the clouds at roughly 800-900 ft. MSL. After reaching a safe altitude 1;100 ft. MSL; being in IMC; I was relying on my instruments. I look down to realize I was off of my runway heading; and was instead on a heading of about 240; indicated by the HSI. This lead me to believe that I had possibly gotten disorientated upon entering the clouds and had inadvertently turned to the right. Based off a heading of 240; I initiated a turn to the left to intercept 190. Upon doing so; ATC started yelling that I was on the wrong heading and needed to turn right. With the information being received from the HSI; I believed that they were wanting me to do a 360 turn in order to intercept 190. I verified the HSI with the compass. While still in the right hand turn; the compass was holding due south and was not moving at all. I consulted ATC and got no assistance; but rather told that I was 'incompetent and couldn't follow directions'. I reported to him that both compasses were impaired and that we were getting wrong readings. I then consulted ForeFlight and followed the magnetic heading that was reporting on there. After rolling out on the correct heading; the compass came swinging around and was reporting correctly; matching ForeFlight. The HSI continued to precess; but was frequently corrected for the remaining on the short flight.

PA-28 pilot reported deviating from the departure clearance due to a malfunctioning HSI and compass.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66.4; Flight Crew Total 1780; Flight Crew Type 866

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

We were cleared for takeoff RWY XX up to 2;000 [feet]. After rotation I see the shadow of and airplane go overhead as if it was landing on RWY XX TCAS started alerting for 'Traffic'; I told the PIC to stop climbing and turn left being that the Aircraft Y was on the right of us and above. Aircraft Y turned right and all is well.

PC-12 First Officer reported an NMAC event during take-off with a landing aircraft that overflew them. Both aircraft executed a successful evasive maneuver.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

This was the 3rd fume event in this aircraft in 4 days. Maintenance at the airplane stated they were deferring pack 1 as a result. This course of action should have been taken after the first or second event; making the 3rd an avoidable incident.

A320 First Officer reported multiple avoidable fume events on same aircraft due to incorrect maintenance trouble shooting procedure.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

As instructed; we were holding short of RWY 27R on Taxiway K3. The controller issued us instructions to 'Expedite; cleared to cross 27R.' Using SOPs; I looked to my left to verify 'Clear left' and that it was safe to cross. As our aircraft crossed the Hold Short Line; the controller changed his mind and told us to 'hold short'. We told him that we were unable to comply with his new clearance because we had crossed the Hold Short Line. He then told us to continue to cross the runway. I believe that the aircraft on final approach was given go-around instructions.Although we used SOPs to verify the safety of our runway crossing; the controller changed his clearance too late.

After flight crew received a clearance to expedite crossing PHL Runway 27R; they were subsequently told to hold short. Unable to comply due to having already passed the hold short line; they were re-cleared to cross runway. This resulted a go-around for an aircraft on final approach to the same runway.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

A Dash 8 had departed Runway 8 and reported a bird strike. Airport Operations was dispatched to conduct a runway inspection. Airport Operations was instructed to proceed onto the runway after proper coordination had been accomplished; and the runway occupancy sign was lighted. Airport Operations had been on the runway for a few minutes; while operations continued on other runways. Another Dash 8 was taxiing towards Runway 8; and I noted that I had a gap between departures and arrivals; so issued a takeoff clearance. Fortunately; Airport Operations heard this; and exited the runway; reporting clear of the runway before the Dash 8 began his take off role. The lighted sign was turned on by the Tower FLM; but I did not use my usual memory jogger; which is to turn the strips face-down when a runway is occupied. I should have done this immediately upon putting the vehicle on the runway; and instead only saw the gap to launch.

Tower Controller described a potential runway conflict when clearing an aircraft for takeoff with an airport vehicle on the runway checking for debris; the vehicle cleared on his own hearing the ATC clearance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Customer and bag loaded out of ZZZZ to ZZZ1. The bag was in a cardboard box package. The bag did not make the original connecting flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. The bag was expedited on a flight [the next day]. Upon receipt in ZZZ2; agent opened the bag to deliver it and contacted the customer. The agent noted the was a lithium battery in the bag.

A Baggage handler or Agent found a lithium battery in lost baggage.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

The aircraft arrived and ramp did not have a tail stand available and was going to start downloading [the] front of aircraft and telling [the] agent [it was] okay to attach jetbridge without the tail stand being installed. I spoke to Ramp Lead and he said it was okay to attach once again. I was concerned to do this since the procedures to offload passengers [in] X rows at time leaves the tail heavy still as ramp downloads the front. As we were attaching the bridge the Flight Attendant cracked door and started to open [it]; but bridge was not attached yet [and] was about 3 feet away.

Ramp worker reported that a tailstand was not available to support the plane while passengers were deplaned from the front of the aircraft.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 78; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 500

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

During takeoff roll Tower called wind gust of direct crosswind of 50+ knots. This was a large swing in winds from prior quartering head wind call and given the rain in the area the Captain elected to conduct a low speed abort for safety reasons rather than taking the aircraft into the air and possibly exposing the aircraft and passengers to a wind shear condition. He called the abort prior to 80 knots and retarded the throttles; I was the pilot flying; I acknowledged the call; stayed on the aircraft controls and began braking; minimal brakes were used due to low speed; length of runway and next turn off distance from aircraft. As we slowed I notified Tower of abort and transferred aircraft control to Captain. Tower did query as to reason for abort and I simply stated 'winds.' We turned off runway as directed by Tower contacted ground conducted after landing checklist; taxi checklist and before takeoff checklist. We then notified Dispatcher; contacted duty pilot and eventually contacted western regional Chief Pilot and explained abort. We were cleared to proceed by Chief Pilot and departed uneventfully. I was hearing this on the radios while turning off of runway and it did not apply to us directly so I could have missed something. After excessive gust call and/or abort call I'm pretty sure at least one aircraft elected to go around due to winds. Then as we were turning off runway there was a brief discussion between other aircraft and Tower concerning the wind call and Tower indicated wind equipment might have malfunction or given erroneous reading.

During takeoff; a B737 flight crew is informed of a 50 knot wind gust 90 degrees to the runway by the Tower. The Captain elects to reject the takeoff prior to the 80 knot call. During taxi back the Tower indicated wind equipment might have malfunctioned or given an erroneous reading.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on rest period was notified by Captain that the wrong database was in the FMS for the aircraft. It was [another aircraft type] load rather than a 777 load. Maintenance put the wrong database into the FMS. The aircraft flew for quite some time without crew awareness and catching the mistake. Verification steps need to be addressed. The code for the specific load is not common knowledge.

Reporter stated the database is navigation information only; no performance data changes. Further stated it is not obvious from the FMS database page what aircraft it applies to.

I was on duty and performed the task of updating the FMS software together with my colleague. We downloaded the latest version from the website and saved [it] to the computer desktop. We transferred it to the floppy disk and updated the FMS software on to the [B777] aircraft per [procedure] and facted out the item. I was informed later that the incorrect FMS data was uploaded on to the aircraft and the FMS data uploaded was actually for [another aircraft type]. We might have inadvertently transferred the wrong file from the desktop into the disk.Perform additional verification by having another person validate the upload. Additional coding on the data to clearly specify the designation. File names [for the two aircraft were similar]. Although they have different file names; when opened on the PC it has disk 1 and disk 2 and both contain the same data [designation] which could lead to possible transfer error or overlooked if downloaded simultaneously into the desktop.

B777 First Officer Relief Pilot reported the aircraft was operated for 'quite some time' with an FMS Navigation database installed that was for another aircraft type. Maintenance Technician responsible for the data load suggested improvements to prevent a future occurrence.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 1200

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Aircraft

The KEFFR THREE ARRIVAL was programmed into the FMS and crossing restrictions were confirmed present and correct. Autopilot and Autothrottles were armed and the Aircraft was traveling at approximately 300 KTS. After crossing EDANE at FL240 we were instructed to descend via the KEFFR THREE ARRIVAL. We set 8000 ft (altitude at KEFFR) and armed VNAV. Shortly after we noticed that the aircraft was not descending; that the VNAV path vector was displaying erroneous information and that the left and right VNAV indicator on the PFDs did not match. We armed Vertical Speed and set a rate of 3000 ft/minute. Shortly after the controller asked if we were descending on the arrival and we confirmed that we were. The controller then instructed us to increase our descent rate because he didn't think we would be able to meet the restriction at CAARR (13000 ft/280 KTS). We set our descent rate to 5000 ft/min. Shortly after he instructed us to level off at FL180. We entered FL180 into the Altitude Selector. The Auto Pilot was unable to level off at FL180; possibly due to the time permitted; aircraft speed and descent angle. We disarmed the Autopilot and stopped the descent so that we could climb back to FL180. Before we could climb back to FL180 the controller instructed us to descend via the KEFFR THREE ARRIVAL once again. We were instructed to contact the control center via phone for a possible pilot deviation.

Aircraft X was at FL240 on the KEFFR3 arrival HEC transition. The r-side issued a descend via clearance at XA:40. We already had radar on aircraft Y landing PSP at 170 and no additional restriction was issued to get Aircraft X below Aircraft Y. Initially the KEFFR2 arrival had a built in restriction to separate from the PSP arrivals but when the KEFFR3 arrival came out that restriction was removed making PSP arrivals traffic for KEFFR3 arrivals. This creates an unsafe situation every time we have both arrivals at the same time. At XA:42 the r-side stopped Aircraft X at FL180. The r-side also made a transmission to Aircraft X that he wasn't going to make the restrictions and needs to expedite his descent which may have caused some confusion. At XA:43 r-side issued a 25 degree left vector to Aircraft Y to allow the 2 aircraft to cross further north so that Aircraft X could continue the descent. At XA:44 Aircraft X descended below FL180 creating a loss of separation.Add a restriction back to the KEFFR arrival to separate these 2 arrival courses. The KEFFR2 arrival had a restriction to cross BARSE intersection at or below 15000 which ensured separation.

Corporate Captain reported a delay in starting the descent on the KEFFR 3 Arrival to SNA which led to an overshoot at an intermediate level off. ZLA Controller reported a loss of separation with an aircraft descending to PSP.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

After landing in LGA we were given taxi instructions to the ramp. We were not given any hold short instructions. Taking the turn onto taxiway L; I had to stop suddenly to prevent a collision with an [air carrier] aircraft on taxiway A. The [other] aircraft also had to stop quickly. The [other] Captain then waved us on (they did not have room to clear our aircraft; but we did have the space to continue our turn safely).I did not hear ground issue any hold short instructions for us. I am fairly certain we did not miss any calls but I do not know if [the other aircraft] was supposed to hold short; or if the ground controller did not anticipate the conflict.We came far too close for my comfort to striking each other. When stopped we had plenty of physical separation; but if both crews had not stopped; then there would have been a collision. Given the right hand turn we were making; it was almost luck we saw them in time.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-700 flight crew reported a near-collision with an Airbus while taxiing at LGA airport.


Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

On approach to land on Runway 8L into PUB; I noticed that the PAPI read high and then transitioned directly to both lights on the right and the one on the far left changed to red while the second from the left stayed white. I made multiple approaches to the runway and the results were the same on every approach.

GA pilot reported the PAPI was not working properly at PUB airport.


Boarding; Safety Related Duties; Service

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On flight ABCD from ZZZ to ZZZ1 while boarding passenger seated in seat XX1 came on that aircraft with his mask below his nose and between his lips. I told that passenger his mask must come over his nose and mouth. He responded 'He will try.' I then offered him a company approved surgical mask that were provided by the company. He responded 'No thanks.' That was the first time of me asking him to put his mask on properly. During my compliant check before doing the safety demo; the mask was down again. I told him once again about the mask. That was the second time. During cabin service the mask was down again and I had to remind him once more. Once cabin service was over and passengers were given time to eat and drink; I then went around to collect trash and he was asleep with his mask down. I called out to him and he opened his eyes and I told him for the third time about his mask. Once we got to the final descent his mask was down and I reminded him once again for the fourth time. Once I told him this time he just looked at me and shook his head. This passenger (XX1) and his wife seated in XX2 were both sick. They were both coughing without covering their cough.The couple kept coughing during takeoff; throughout the flight and landing. The coughing drew the attention of other passengers to look. People are very scared and when they hear coughing and other passengers [are] not wearing mask properly they worry. Many verbal warnings were given.

Flight Attendant reported that a passenger had to be reminded four times to wear a face mask. Flight Attendant stated that the passenger and his wife were coughing without covering their cough.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 185; Flight Crew Type 45

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

I was flying in a dual cross country under Part 61 training with my instructor. We were descending to 2;500 FT AGL when we experienced engine roughness and severe vibration. We contacted ATC and requested a deviation to the nearest airport. As the engine roughness increased and we were no longer able to maintain altitude we declared the emergency and decided to land in an open road beside a canal. There were no injuries or damage to people or property. We came to land safe and sound.

A private pilot and instructor experienced engine roughness and severe vibration. As they began to deviate to the nearest airport; the conditions worsened; so they performed a successful precautionary landing on a road.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54; Flight Crew Total 38000; Flight Crew Type 150

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

On our arrival; we were cleared by Approach for a visual approach to runway 15; to turn left short of the VOR and contact Tower Controller. On contact with Tower we were cleared to land and informed of a King Air on the runway that would be taking off and making a left turn. We were in a left descending turn; 160 kts; gear down; flaps 20 about 8nm from the runway passing about 13;000 ft through a heading of about 220 degrees magnetic when the Control Tower told to cancel our landing clearance. (no explanation).We informed the Tower that we would extend slightly to the southwest and received a conformation from the Tower. Being that the airport is Class D the Tower controller did not inform us that he had radar or visual contact. During this time there was a lot of voice confusion on the tower frequency and we could not figure out whether the King Air was departing or was still on the runway. We asked for landing clearance on at least two occasions; we were denied and told to continue inbound. I had by this time turned to a heading of 070 degrees to join the inbound course at about 6nm from airport. We stayed above and out of Class D airspace during this maneuvering to the final. My reason for delaying outside Class D airspace was because I did not want to meet a King Air nose to nose on short final. While the voice confusion on the tower frequency was going on; the Tower Controller never informed us of the runway status; his only transmissions; 'continue inbound.' What the Tower Controller did not seem to realize is that while he was chattering on the radio and failing to give us pertinent information on the runway status we were moving over the ground at 2 1/2 nm per minute. When we were almost ninety degrees to the inbound course the Tower Controller gave us clearance to land. The aircraft heading was 070 degrees; there was high terrain to the east side of the approach course at 6nm so I turned left 270 degrees to the final approach course.  From this point the approach and landing was without problems except when we were about 100 ft airborne over the landing threshold the tower informed us of a 'possible pilot deviation' and gave us a phone number for the tower supervisor. The Tower Supervisor explained to me that the 'pilot deviation' had already been submitted because of my 270 degree to final at 6nm from the airport. He also stated that was the first visual contact the tower controller had with our aircraft. I tried to discuss with [the supervisor] some of the problems we had encountered on our approach into Aspen; [the supervisor] was not interested. It appeared to me the filing of the 'pilot deviation' was the answer. End of discussion!After a thorough debrief as a crew; we believe the Tower Controller was more concerned with his problem on the airport surface than with our arriving airborne aircraft. It was obvious that the tower controller never had visual or radar contact until our aircraft was in the 270 degree left turn. We believe the Tower Controller was in error when issuing a landing clearance with an aircraft on the runway. The Tower Controller never informed us of the whereabouts of the King Air; just 'cleared to land.' All of our maneuvering was accomplished outside and above Class D airspace. The Tower Controller should never had told us of a 'possible pilot deviation;' while airborne over the landing threshold.

During a visual approach to an airport with high terrain; a Lear 35 Captain is cleared to land and told a King air is on the runway and about to depart. The landing clearance is then canceled without explanation and the reporter is told to continue inbound. At the point the reporter is cleared to land he is too close and high so a 270 degree turn is accomplished to line up. The Tower Controller expressed dismay.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing; Weather

Weather was moving through the airspace. Two sectors were combined feeding me at the Finals Sector working staggered finals. The Center was feeding arrival aircraft all over the place that should have been put on a different arrival route. The Sector feeding me was overloaded with deviating aircraft; and this resulted in a wildly out of control and unsafe operation.We tried to get the final into simultaneous approaches and split of the finals Sector. The feeder's aircraft were coming in from the southeast in an absolutely unsafe feed from the Center which resulted in a possible loss of separation on final between a straight in and an aircraft from the southeast.Better communication between the supervisor and traffic management was needed. The Traffic Management Unit (TMU) Supervisor dropped the ball and allowed an unsafe situation to occur. TMU should have been paying attention to our operation and put the Center on a different arrival route. Supervisors should have put the Center in holding when this didn't happen.

PCT TRACON Controller reported combined sectors and lack of Traffic Management initiatives during a busy period with weather deviations created an unsafe operation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 2355; Flight Crew Type 1976

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was involved in a rapid decompression event of an aircraft. I was acting as pilot in command of a reposition flight. We were filed under an IFR flight plan. At the time of the event we were cruising at FL410 and on frequency with ZZZ Center. While in cruise flight; roughly 1:10 into the flight we started experiencing a loss of pressurization in the cabin. I made my First Officer aware of the decompression; immediately donning the oxygen masks and requesting a descent from ATC. The frequency was cluttered with radio chatter and I was having trouble transmitting to ATC that we needed an immediate descent due to the loss of pressurization. Due to the hazardous nature of our situation I began a descent without being able to communicate with ATC. My First Officer immediately input the emergency squawk code of 7700 into our transponder to relay to ATC that we had an emergency. ATC saw our descent and queried us 'Aircraft X verify level at FL410.' I replied with 'We need a descent now.' ATC then cleared us to FL240 where we began running checklists and were able to stabilize our cabin altitude.Once we had the situation under control we informed ATC that we were no longer [in need of priority handling] and that we had our cabin altitude stabilized. My copilot and I agreed that the situation was under control and that our cabin altitude was stabilized enough to where we could safely continue our flight to our destination at FL240. We flew the remainder of the flight and landed safely without other incident.

Captain reported loss of cabin pressure resulted in an emergency descent and continued on to destination airport at a lower altitude.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

We were made aware that we were planned to ferry an aircraft following a MX engine run-up. I was told by MX control that two of the left engine fan blades had 'dings' in them and that there was damage to the acoustical dampening material inside the cowl. After arriving to the airport; talking to the on-call mechanic; and inspecting the two damaged fan blades and the cowl ourselves; we agreed to conduct the MX run-up. The run-up was uneventful. I still had remaining questions about any limitations to fan blade damage. At first; MX control didn't know of any limitations. Then I was told .375 inches. I told them that one of the dings measured .5'x.5'; so that in itself was a 'nonstarter'. MX control then got on the line and angrily told me that there was no such limitation; I didn't need to know that info; and that they had taken aircraft with much worse damage and that if I didn't want to take the aircraft then we could take it up with our manager. I then requested a flight manager be put on the phone. A Manager was put into the conversation; then promptly 'shut down' the conversation after it was apparent that noting was going to be resolved. Twenty minutes later; the Manager called me from his personal number to discuss the matter. I requested that he have scheduling call me and we could three way the conversation so it could be recorded. We discussed the issue further and he said he was trying to get further information from other sources within the MX department regarding any limitations regarding the damage. Approximately an hour later; the Manager; myself; Maintenance Control; and a gentleman that claimed he was a CF34 'expert'; had a conference call and presented me with several pieces on information. I told them I would discuss it with my crew and call them back. As a crew; we decided that it was not safe to operate the aircraft in its current condition; and therefore refused to operate the flight on safety grounds. Our reasons were the following:1. We were getting several conflicting numbers from MX on the limits on what was an acceptable amount of damage for safe prolonged engine operation. We were told .375'; then told that was just for Part 121 passenger ops; and then that it could be blended down to .5'' as per GE. Then I believe they mentioned there was actually no limitations for damage. I find that hard to believe since every engineered material has a structural limitation before failure. Considering that the damage was .5'' unblended; and would not be blended prior to flight was not acceptable. Even if it was blended before flight; it would exceed that GE limitation.2. The larger 'ding' was a 'V' shaped chunk of the fan blade that was missing; not bent. I have no way of knowing what underlying damage might be present in that blade that is not visible to naked eye. With enough prolonged stress on that area; and without knowing the status of the structural integrity of the blade; we felt it was too much of a risk to operate that engine safely. The MX people were willing to sign it off based on cell phone pictures. Trust me when I say that seeing the damage in pictures and seeing in person don't even compare. It's hard to gain perspective from a cell phone picture.3. The damage to the acoustical liner and within the cowling was concerning. Whatever FOD was encountered was enough to create over a .5'' hole in the acoustical liner inside the cowling that appeared to penetrate the protective Kevlar shroud in the housing. All of these factors played into our decision as a crew that the aircraft could not be operated safely. After we told the parties jointly in a conference call; the CF34 'expert' demanded to know my background and how I could make that determination. As PIC; it is my job to take all of the information that is presented to me; and make an informed and safe decision. Certain personnel in your MX department do not like to give out information. This particular Maintenance Controller in particular. I don't like feeling like I'm being lied to; or that information is being kept from me. His accusation that 'I don't need to know' certain information is false and dangerous. It makes it look like he is hiding something. Second; I don't like how he talks to pilots; it is completely unprofessional. We can disagree and still remain professional. The same goes for the other gentleman and self-proclaimed CF34 'expert'. While he was professional in our initial conversation; his tone and antics turned sour after we refused the aircraft. I do not appreciate having my qualifications; experience; or judgment called into question like that. I will not be pressured into taking an aircraft that I do not think is safe to fly; and there were certain individuals that were trying to pressure me into accepting this aircraft by thinly veiled threats or coercion. I highly encourage the individuals on the ASAP committee to review all of the recorded conversations that took place between myself and the people involved. We also has several more pictures.

Our flight was not operated and felt that further inspection and closer analysis by a company mechanic with experience in fan blade damage could have been conducted rule out the potential for further damage and help assess risk analysis. Since multiple 'limits' and 'no limits' were given to the flight crew by maintenance control it was difficult to assess the risk. In regards to one limit given by Maintenance Control of 0.375 inch fan blade nick for revenue flight; our damage was 0.5 inch and exceeded the 0.375 inch limitation by 33%. Better guidance and or limits could be given to help Flight Crew/Maintenance in the decision making process.

CRJ-200 flight crew refused an aircraft for ferry with apparent left engine FOD damage because Company Maintenance Control gave differencing values for FAA acceptable non blended fan blade and inner wall puncture damage.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

The flight plan of Aircraft X was passed to Approach (non radar adjacent facility that controls surface-10;000 ft). The estimated time over NLD VOR that was passed was XA:47z at 8000 feet. At some point a flight plan was copied from Approach regarding a LRD lander. Because Approach requires non-radar separation they would need to de-conflict any conflicts through their airspace. Aircraft Y populated on my radar scope when he was descending from 11;500 feet to 5;000 feet. At the time; I did not have this flight plan in my strip bay. Upon noticing the conflict I immediately called Approach to make sure they were stopping the traffic at 9;000 feet above my coordinated overflight at 8;000 feet. By the time I got a hold of the Approach Controller and issued him a control action of maintaining 9;000 feet the Aircraft Y was out of 8;700 feet in the climb back up to 9;000 with 8 miles lateral. Furthermore; I must mention that not having a direct and quick line to Approach is a safety hazard. We must manually dial a 7 digit number and wait for a response; to then be passed over to the Approach Controller. We must have a direct and quick line that allows us to speak to an adjacent facility. Approach was applying non radar separation to aircraft transitioning through there airspace.

ZHU Center Controller was not made aware of an aircraft estimating their airspace from an adjacent non radar facility that was descending into a conflict with their traffic.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 700

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Noted on preflight; a write up; for a cycling trim situation on the inbound leg. With no faults noted by maintenance; it was cleared. First Officer (FO) and I discussed the situation as one of the threats possible; with emphasis on being alert for the cycling trim situation to possibly repeat. Reviewed applicable procedure for a possible runaway trim scenario. Upon takeoff; Autopilot A was engaged at approximately 1;200 FT AGL. As flaps were retracted and airspeed began to increase; additional trim inputs were immediately noticed by both pilots. With flaps now up; FMC called for 250 KTS. Aircraft pitched to 260 KTS with trim inputs; then re-pitched to 240 KTS. The trim system would activate for 1-2 seconds and then immediately reverse itself; trimming in opposite direction. I directed FO to ask for intermediate stop on climb; where we then stopped at FL230. Advised ATC we were experiencing a trim system problem; but the aircraft was stable and trim stopped fluctuating once a stable and level pitch was attained. I chose not to declare an emergency at this time as we did have a stable aircraft; but contacted dispatch via radio; and informed dispatcher of the situation; that it was a reoccurring event; and that I was not comfortable taking the aircraft to ZZZ1 with a primary flight control system not operating properly. Therefore I would return to ZZZ. Dispatcher brought Maintenance Control in I believe at that point and I gave them a description of the problem. We then completed those calls; informed ATC of our desire to return to ZZZ; and no emergency being declared at this time. The trim problem immediately reappeared when given a descent to 11;000; executed via Level Change on the Mode Control Panel. I was flying and at that point disconnected the autopilot; and hand flew the remainder of the approach to the landing. No trim problems were noted with autopilot disconnected. Maintenance ACARSed us several times; requesting us to attempt to troubleshoot the failure and gather information. I elected to not do this. I knew I had a failed trim system and did not wish to engage a deeper problem if something else went wrong with the system while troubleshooting. In addition we [were] now under 15000 FT; in the terminal area; and I was hand flying the aircraft. Too many distractions; as well as a potential bigger problem if something else went wrong. We both put on the table the trim motor / elevator jackscrew failure a few years back that happened to another carrier. That situation was perhaps the final reason I did not want to troubleshoot the failure. We finally told Maintenance Control via ACARS. 'We are busy '; as they were now a distraction with their requests as we were near or under 10;000 FT. Aviate; Navigate; Communicate. That is what I start every brief off with a new pilot at the beginning of a trip.

B737NG flight crew reported a trim problem during climbout resulting in a return to field.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

At the gate; we were having some intermittent interphone problems while talking to the ground crew predominantly on the Captain's side. We thought we had them resolved and pushed back. When it came time to start the engines; it became apparent that the problem had worsened. We were towed back to the gate and maintenance swapped the Captain's interphone box; which fixed one problem but the Captain's headset jack didn't work. Maintenance MELed the headset and we attempted to depart again. Once again; the interphone system failed. There was a great deal of confusion as we tried to communicate with the ground personnel. Before that was resolved; both the forward and the middle cabin call chimes lit up. I picked up the interphone handset and heard a loud squeal. Through that squeal I heard a flight attendant say that there was smoke entering the cabin and that a smoke alarm was sounding.I got up to see for myself what was going on. FO and FB ran the Smoke and Fume Elimination Checklist and called for the jet-bridge to return to the gate. I smelled a strong electrical smoke odor. The smoke detector reactivated after being reset. I directed the flight attendants to rearm the slides on the right side of the aircraft just in case. As soon as the L1 door was open; I had the flight attendants evacuate the passengers out through the jet-bridge. After running the Smoke and Fume checklist the smell began to dissipate.

After the passengers were all off the airplane; the Flight Attendants disarmed all doors and the Crew debriefed the firemen; maintenance and the [Company] supervisors. After turning the aircraft over to Maintenance; the Crew met with the FA supervisors and their stress management representatives.

B767-300 flight crew and cabin crew reported the aircraft was evacuated at the gate due to fumes; smoke; and smoke detector activation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On walk around the First Officer found that the right engine chip detector light was illuminated in the aft equipment bay. He attempted a reset and then contacted me. I then went back and confirmed that the chip detector was indeed illuminated. Two subsequent attempts were tried with no results. Maintenance Control was then contacted and the Mechanic working the desk told me 'Captain why do you have to go there; are you serious?' When I queried him on his comment he put me on hold. Even though I gave him the ship number he questioned me on the type of aircraft I was on i.e.: 200/700/900 as if I didn't know the aircraft I was flying. He was not helpful and somewhat defiant in that I wanted a mechanic to come and resolve this problem. Is this how our safety program works. Is this how our Maintenance Department handles maintenance items that are critical to safety of flight. Maintenance does not appear to want to operate safe aircraft.

CRJ900 Captain is informed that the right engine chip detector light was illuminated in the aft equipment bay. Maintenance Control is contacted and they do not deem it necessary to take any action prior to flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 22300; Flight Crew Type 4506

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 9900; Flight Crew Type 2200

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On initial descent; we got a Level 1 BUS R EMER DC OFF alert which caused Auto Pilot (AP) 2 and FD2 to fail. Captain as Pilot Monitoring selected AP 1 and directed First Officer (FO) to FD1 to regain automation on the right side of the cockpit. FO continued as Pilot Flying. Captain retained radio because right ACP failed.A review of the Engine and Alert Display (EAD) presented the following: L1 BUS R EMER DC OFF; L2 FCC 2B DATA FAULT L1 SEL LSAS LOB OFF; L1 SEL YAW UPR A OFF. First actions were to satisfy EAD prompts at LSAS LOB and YAW UPR A. After this; we accomplished AOM procedures for FCC 2B DATA FAULT and BUS R EMER DC OFF. At the conclusion of those checklists; we had time to brief the arrival and discussed the likelihood of a configuration problem since we had flap segment indicators on the PFD; two of which were 'X' presenting no data.We decided to configure early several miles out on base. At slats extend; we got an immediate L2 SLAT DISAG alert and entered a checklist for that. The AOM procedure led us to an abnormal configuration for landing (28/RET) and a moderate speed increase on final. We informed approach control. Our approach and landing were conducted at flaps 28; slats retracted; GPWS flap override on. Rollout to parking was uneventful.

Aircrew experienced an electrical failure resulting in multiple systems degradation. Successfully landed in an emergency status.


Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

D01 began the hand off of Aircraft X at 8;000 feet with 9;000 feet as the final altitude request. Per the LOA; I took the hand off assuming the aircraft would be level at 9;000 feet before the boundary. A couple minutes from the boundary; it was apparent Aircraft X was still not climbing to 9;000 feet. I had the D-side (a trainee) call D01 and inquire if the aircraft was climbing and would be level. My minimum IFR altitude is 9;000 feet. D01 responded saying Aircraft X was NORDO and they had attempted to call him multiple times. Aircraft X entered my airspace level at 8;000 feet; below my terrain. I attempted to get a hold of Aircraft X multiple times on my frequency and on guard with no luck. I was then relieved from position.

Called Denver Approach to ask if Aircraft X was climbing to 9;000 feet because he was showing 8;000 feet with no updates to indicate a climb. The airway the aircraft was filed over had an MEA of 8;500 feet. Denver Approach said they tried to climb with no response from the aircraft and to show him NORDO. We tried the aircraft on guard frequency and on out frequency with no response. The aircraft eventually came up on our frequency and was able to climb them to a safe altitude.

ZDV ARTCC Controllers reported handoff coordination issues with D01 TRACON resulting in an aircraft flying below the MEA.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 53; Flight Crew Total 12653; Flight Crew Type 1323

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We briefed the RNAV RNP Z 16L into DEN. Conditions VFR. This was during IOE. Approach Control approved the RNAV RNP Z 16L Approach. Approach was installed and we were given direct to either KUURT or KIKME can't remember now which one; both fixes are part of the RNAV GPS Y 16L. Queried Controller and was given an intercept course to the final (between JOBOB (IAF) and LEETS). LEETS was the active waypoint and LNAV was armed; in HDG SEL at this time. Autopilot A in CMD. LNAV never captured and we went through the final approach course by maybe .5NM. Turned off the autopilot and manually re-intercepted the final. Normal and stable approach from that point until touch down.

On arrival to DEN. I was conducting Captain (CA) Operating Experience (OE) and had requested the RNAV (RNP) Z 16L Approach from ATC. I was hoping to have the CA get more experience conducting non precision approaches. DEN ATC had acknowledged my request for the RNAV (RNP) Z 16L and told us to expect vectors to intercept the final approach course. ATC had given us a heading of 190 to intercept the final approach course for RWY 16L. So far all was well. Weather conditions at the time were good VFR with visibilities greater than 10 miles and a high scattered layer of clouds. The CA OE student had configured with Flaps 5 and speed was assigned at 180 or 170; I can't remember exactly. At any rate; DEN ATC assigned us heading 190 to intercept final approach course and 8;000 feet until KIKME and cleared us for the RNAV Approach to RWY 16L. I was confused for a moment because we had asked for and been told to expect the RNAV Z 16L and that approach does not have KIKME intersection on it. The RNAV Y 16L does have KIKME intersection on it. I asked ATC if they meant LEETS intersection....LEETS is the FAF on the RNAV (RNP) Z 16L and I was expecting to hear that intersection. ATC responded and said sure; just maintain 7;000 until LEETS 190 on the heading and intercept the final approach course cleared for the approach. I read all that back and watched the OE CA arm the LNAV and the VNAV so that the autopilot would fly the initial portion of the approach. The autopilot proceeded to fly on the 190 heading right through the final approach course and start to infringe on the final approach course for RWY 16R. Both of us saw this happen and the OE CA disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft back to the left to rejoin the final approach course for RWY 16L. At the same time DEN ATC asks us if we are joining the final approach course for 16L. We acknowledged that we had accidentally flown through the final approach course for our assigned runway and were correcting back. ATC pointed out traffic that was ahead of us and flying to the parallel runway....we saw that aircraft and informed ATC that we had the preceding aircraft in sight; we were correcting back to the assigned runway final approach course. We never received a TCAS RA or TA regarding the aircraft ahead of us and landing the parallel runway.

B737 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV (RNP) Z 16L Approach to DEN.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While attempting to line up properly with the DGS (Docking Guidance System); both I and the FO (First Officer) were literally unable to see the J line. I lined up with the DGS very slowly as best I could; and gingerly inched forward; stopping; and even illuminating the taxi light a few times. To no avail. Neither one of us could pick up the J line with certainty. The FO suggested calling for a Marshaller for better and safer guidance. I happily agreed; and with the marshaller's guidance we were able to correct our path to the J line which was in fact to our left. The FO notified the ramp ops of our exact difficulty and suggested that future crews parking at the gate that evening should be advised and offered the suggestion of a full compliment of marshallers.It had been raining in CLT most of the day; up to and including our arrival. There were a few periods of heavy rain in the surrounding hours of our arrival. At any rate; the rain wasn't in fact heavy for us; it was raining and the ramp was extremely wet and shiny looking. Something about this gate area and the surrounding terminal lighting just made it a bear to see the markings.I'm not sure exactly what the solution is; but I do think it needs to be looked at. The fact that both of us had such difficulty leads me to believe most others would have just as hard a time.  Though I'm sure all are crews would deal with it professionally; I don't think it's as safe as it could be with those conditions in the future. The FO was a great help to me; and on behalf of myself and all our other personnel; I appreciate it.  Looking back on it; though we believed it was safe to reposition with the marshaller's help; the safety margins could have been increased had I just shut down the engines and had a tug hooked up to us. Something I will very much consider if faced with such difficulty in the future.

After a successful flight into CLT; we were arriving at the gate for parking. It was night and also raining. Between the dark; the rain; and the light from the flood lights reflecting off of the ramp; it was nearly impossible to see the lead in line and the safety zone lines. The DGS (Docking Guidance System) sign became active when we approached the gate. I expressed my concern with the Captain and asked him if he could see the line; and he could not. I suggested that we wait until we had a marshaller to continue to park. I called operations to ask for marshallers; but before I could ask; they walked out. It was at that point that we realized that we were far off to the right of being aligned. We swung to the left and finally could see the lead in line and safely taxiied the rest of the way into the gate with the help of the marshaller. Had we continued on what we perceived as being aligned; we would have been far off to the right and there would have been potential to damage the aircraft by striking ground equipment.Night time; rain; flood lights reflecting light; and old non reflective paint in the gate areas and ramp.The ramp and gate areas need to be repainted with a thick layer of high reflective paint to increase visibility during all conditions.

Air carrier Captain reported being unable to see the lead-in line and other ramp markings approaching the gate during night and rainy conditions at CLT airport. Marshallers were needed to guide the aircraft to the gate.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 59; Flight Crew Total 1335

Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

The conditions were a solid overcast layer with bases at 8100 MSL and tops at 9800 MSL with an aerodrome field elevation of 6200 MSL. I was conducting practice approaches under an IFR flight plan. My first approach was relatively normal with much of the flying above the overcast. However; during this approach; I was noticing that I was having difficulty maintaining altitude and heading. I was experiencing altitude differences of up to 500 feet and heading errors of 10-15 degrees. The heading errors were largely due to excessive time spent addressing altitude problems. While experiencing continued difficulty controlling altitude I eventually noticed air rushing sounds consistent with increasing airspeed while the altimeter was indicating a continuous climb. This significantly puzzled me for a while and I responded as if the aircraft was in a descent to stop the rushing air sound. I turned on the pitot heat and after about a minute the pitot static readings all jumped; probably due to unblocking the pitot tube. The approach proceeded normally thereafter once I re-aligned the track on the initial approach course; and terminated in a low approach. During a second approach I continued to experience erratic problems holding altitude; some of which was due to my continued concern about the erroneous pitot static readings; but also my ability to control the aircraft was not good and seemed to be getting worse. During this second approach the controller had me fly at 9000 MSL and then at 9500 MSL; putting the aircraft squarely in the layer during much of the time. Although the field was reporting +6C; the temperature at 9500 MSL was -4C. The controller initially vectored me for the approach; but then away from the approach path and outside of the airspace; for traffic de-confliction. After being in the layer for five minutes I noticed rime ice accumulating on the wings. I requested lower and tower responded that they could not give me lower than 9000 MSL. I then cancelled my IFR flight plan and simultaneously started a rapid descent from 9500 MSL to 8000 MSL; below the layer. I then concluded the flight under VFR with a straight in visual approach.

A PA32 pilot shooting practice instrument approaches into a high altitude airport in IMC suffered erratic altitude and heading readings which were likely the result of pitot static blockage.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft

I was in the flight deck checking the weather for the return trip to ZZZ; after having completed the exterior preflight inspection; when one of the Flight Attendant's called me to check the left wing. I went out and saw fuel being vented out of the left wing tip. I ran downstairs and started shouting to stop fueling. The firefighters were called and took care of the spill. I checked with the fuelers and they said that they had all switches selected on Auto. We departed about 30-minutes late without any further complications.

A Captain was informed by an onboard Flight Attendant that fuel was venting out of the left wing tip of their MD-83 aircraft during a gate refueling procedure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181; Flight Crew Total 864; Flight Crew Type 498

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The problem was a near mid air collision with small drone at 6500 MSL that appeared to be moving southerly while my airplane was flying a magnetic heading of 200 approximately. Our lateral separation was between 150-200 feet. We were in the immediate vicinity of LAS; almost directly above the approach end of Runway 26L. The drone was yellow in color and circular; at most 3 feet in diameter; and did not appear fixed wing. It appeared to have some kind of design/camera at its center. We were receiving radar vectors from Las Vegas TRACON. I was scanning visually while my student was under the view limiting device. We made no evasive action; there was merely a second between the time I saw the drone and it's passing of our position. I queried Las Vegas Approach if there was any drone activity in the area; they responded there was not; I then proceeded to describe the situation; to which they asked questions regarding the drone's altitude and flight path; and prior to our hand off they said they had made a report. This near mid air collision was no fault of Las Vegas Approach or my own; rather the drone operator who violated the airspace.

C172 flight instructor reported a NMAC with a UAV at 6500 in the vicinity of LAS airport.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 6400; Flight Crew Type 850

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

We were repositioning our aircraft Part 91 from UDD to the East Coast on an IFR flight plan. We picked up our clearance on the ground and read back the clearance to SOCAL. We read back cleared ... via the UDD obstacle departure PSP-DEJAY... Once airborne we followed that clearance as we thought that is what we were given. As we departed the PSP VOR we were given a terrain warning from SOCAL and given instructions to climb to 13;000 FT and fly a new heading to avoid terrain. Our aircraft never did give us a terrain warning but we were very confused. The issue and concern is we were supposed to be flying to 'DEWAY' Intersection and not 'DEJAY'. I find it very dangerous to have two intersections with very similar sounds and spelling that close together in the same airspace. Having two similar intersections caused us confusion and could of caused us to fly into terrain. We appreciate SOCAL doing their job but would ask that one of those intersections named be changed.

A corporate jet pilot reported that ATC issued a terrain alert along with a heading and altitude change after the flight crew began navigating to DEJAY Intersection in mountainous terrain instead of to DEWAY.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Total 11652; Flight Crew Type 11652

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 126; Flight Crew Total 9011; Flight Crew Type 5089

On visual approach Runway XR ZZZ approximately 1 NM from ZZZZZ 2;300 feet landing gear lever selected down with no response. Cycled the gear handle again with no response. Told Tower we were discontinuing the approach and were handed off to Approach Control for vectors. Shortly thereafter; with the gear handle down L/G Gear Not Down Locked ECAM appeared. Cycled the gear handle again per the ECAM with no success; Continued with the Landing Gear Gravity Extension Checklist per the ECAM and QRH. The procedure was successful with positive down and locked indications. All checklists were completed and flight attendants and passenger briefed. I assumed duties as Pilot Flying. Flew a normal visual approach to Runway YYR. Landing was uneventful. Stopped the aircraft on runway centerline for ARFF inspection and eventual tow to the terminal. This aircraft had experienced the same malfunction the day before.

On final to [Runway] XR at ZZZ we attempted to put the landing gear down; but it failed to extend. We turned downwind and completed the checklist and manually lowered the gear. This same thing happened the day before with a different crew but maintenance said they had solved the problem. Landed without incident on [Runway] YYR and was towed to the gate.

A320 flight crew reported that the landing gear would not extend normally; necessitating use of the alternate gravity extension method.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201.05; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116.28; Flight Crew Total 4552.47; Flight Crew Type 2411.07

Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

DEN ground instructed us to taxi to RWY 17L from E4 via mike; hold short of ED. Once on Mike northbound Ground instructed us to turn right at ED and hold short of the approach end of Runway 17R. The FO (First Officer) was in the process of completing his delayed engine start flow as I started the turn on ED. At this point I noticed traffic on short final to Runway 17R and thinking to myself that it didn't seem right to turn on ED. I stopped the aircraft as soon as it was straight and pointed east on ED. I asked the FO if he saw a sign or hold short line on his side. I saw no signage in front of us and now felt extremely uncomfortable with our proximity to the Runway 17R approach path. At this point the Ground Controller told us we were supposed to stop 50 ft. further back. I looked behind us and noticed the left wing tip was over the east edge of Taxiway Mike. I could not see a hold line below the wing. We were switched to Tower. The Tower Controller gave us a number to call for a possible pilot deviation. Shortly after writing down the number we were cleared for takeoff. As we rolled down the runway I realized we failed to complete the final items.I spoke to the Tower supervisor later that day and explained the events as they occurred. He admitted that this hot spot is an ongoing issue; the hold area is not well marked and the Controller's intent was to have us pointed east to help move aircraft through the Runway 17R approach path faster. Unfortunately the Tower had to send around the landing traffic I was distracted with during the turn because they were not sure if we would stop. I have flown in and out of DEN since the day it opened and have never been issued a clearance like this. I have always been instructed to hold short of ED when aircraft are landing Runway 17R. I believe this type of clearance should be avoided; specially in an area that is a hot spot. The aircraft behind us which received the same clearance had to confirm the clearance and the intent to hold short immediately after turning.

We had a leg planned for DEN-ZZZ with Runways 17L; 17R; and 8 being used for departure.  Going westbound; I programmed and planned and briefed a 17R departure. The captain briefed a single-engine taxi.  After block out we were advised of a 17L departure.  For me that is several threats; a runway change requiring FMC programming; retrieving new performance; single-engine taxi ( increased workload; 2 engine-start flows etc); and unavoidable time when only the Captains eyes are outside the cockpit during FO single-engine duties during hi intensity ground operations @ DEN. On taxi out we were instructed to taxi to Runway 17L via Taxiway M and hold short of ED.  At some point northbound on Taxiway M with a hold short instruction in hand;  I initiated start of ENG 1.   During the engine start; the ground controller gave an additional instruction to turn right on to ED and hold short of the Runway 17R approach area.  Due to my required duties during an engine start which aren't easily paused/stopped; I could not write down the instruction; nor could I refer to my taxi diagram so that I could act as a backup-another set of eyes in the cockpit; I was only able to say-back the instruction and nothing else. The captain had a response to me that conveyed that he heard and understood the instruction.  I pressed on completing the engine-start.   I was heads down completing my duties during our expected right hand turn onto ED.  Shortly thereafter I heard the captain make a comment about an aircraft landing on Runway 17R and he brought the airplane to stop.  It was several moments before the ground controller came on the radio to say that we were to hold short of the approach area which was now behind us.  We were then instructed to continue taxi; switched over to tower; given a phone number and cleared for takeoff.

Air Carrier Pilot Crew reported Ground Control instructions and the charted version of this Hotspot at DEN airport are confusing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 87.08; Flight Crew Total 2920.67; Flight Crew Type 2920.67

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I flew a night operation into PTKK.  While I was aware of the NOTAM'd PAPI being out of service; and the flight was flown in accordance with SOP; I would like to make the [company] aware of the potential risk associated when conducting a night  RNAV(GPS) 4 PTKK approach under these conditions.  I believe this reduction in safety at night is due to several factors:1) Lack of visual reference on short final (black hole effect).2) RNAV(GPS) 4 approach lacks vertical guidance to the runway; resulting in the FD's initiating a missed approach at HAMAX.3) Reaching the MAP 300 ft. higher than published DDA.  If not briefed and aware; the FD will command a left turn and level flight prior to the 'expected' minimums.4) Lack of outside and inside references to determine if you meet the stabilized approach criteria once you are in visual conditions.5) PTKK is one of shortest runways in our system.6) Numerous threats associated with preloading an electronic glide path while still on the published approach; especially in IMC conditions (a technique many use to increase the level of safety) 7) Junior and less experienced pilots typically fly this trip.

Pilot reported issues related to flying into PTKK Chuuk International Airport; Weno Island; Micronesia; at night.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Manuals

While performing a fire cartridge change on (Aircraft Number) the #2 right hand engine squib was set off and discharged the canister. The cartridge was discharged while performing the continuity check which requires the pulling and turning of the fire pull handle. The lighting inside the cockpit was very poor and multiple glares coming through each window caused even less visibility. Handle was turned in the wrong position causing the bottle to be discharged. Both lead and supervisor were notified immediately of the situation. Once the bottle was discharged a hissing sound was heard. The cause of the bottle being discharged was lack of lighting; the AMM and task card not having enough safety measures (the C/B's for the bottles not being tested should be pulled alleviating any potential error).Radioed mechanics at the rear of the aircraft that were watching the continuity test box to make sure no one was injured and then immediately notified the lead and supervisor on shift of the mishap. The C/B's for the bottles not being tested should be pulled alleviating any potential error. A task card should be made for this job (the task card is currently just a component replace task card with no specifics other than p/n and s/n) specific to the aircraft and air carrier so that no further errors occur.

Maintenance Technician reports inadvertently discharging an engine fire cartridge.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Had a strong electrical/ozone burning smell in the cockpit for 30 seconds after feeling and hearing a loud thud. I [notified ATC] and used the electrical system fire or smoke checklist; but there was not any smoke or haze or any EICAS; MFD or PFD emergency abnormal or advisory indications so most of the checklist was not applicable.After ATC was notified; we did not have much time before we landed back: The electrical system fire or smoke checklist looked the best at the time. Looking at the checklist; it really did not apply to our situation; we never got any fire or smoke anywhere in the aircraft; just an occasional smell of electrical burning in the cockpit that lasted at most 30 seconds. But I did focus too much time on the checklists.Just read the checklist and if a bullet point does not apply go to the next bullet point and so on; and if none of the bullet points apply; then the checklist did not apply. In my case the checklist bullet points kept referring to smoke dissipation but we had no smoke or fumes so the checklist did not apply.

EMB-145 Captain reported electrical/ozone-burning odor and the electrical fire or smoke checklist was not applicable during troubleshooting.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 5000

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Procedure

On vectors from Big Sky approach for ILS12; [I was] told to expect KICDO. We were level at 11;000 left downwind east of BZN airport. No terrain displayed on NAV display between our position and KICDO. Terrain had been briefed prior to approach and we were aware of terrain to east of airport with a height of 9;541 FT. While level at assigned altitude of 11;000 we received a GPWS Terrain; Terrain pull up warning. GPWS ESCAPE maneuver followed immediately. Warning ceased and level off completed at 12;000. ATC notified and we were told MVA is 10;900 FT for that area. We were then given a descent back down to 11;000 and continued to be vectored for the ILS12 approach. [I] called Big Sky Approach Supervisor to discuss event. He was able to pull up our radar track and verified the MVA in that sector was 10;900 FT and that other aircraft had been vectored in that same area without incident.

An air carrier flight crew responded to an EGPWS terrain warning while being vectored for an ILS Runway 12 approach to BZN.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 152; Flight Crew Type 85

The aircraft ran off the end of [the] runway (length 2400 ft) approximately 10 to 15 ft into soft dirt and mud following a long landing and soft braking action. The engine came to a stop following approximately 1 to 1.5 propeller revolutions after contacting the mud to a depth of approximately 6 inches. The aircraft was pushed by hand back onto the taxiway at the end of [the] runway. There was no injury to pilot or passenger; there was no visible damage to the aircraft; and no damage to the airport facility.

PA-28 pilot reported a runway excursion following a long landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 6216

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Took off from [departure airport]; on upwind electric and Autopilot trim failed. [Notified ATC]. Recovered at [departure airport]. Landed overweight. Did maintenance write ups.

Boeing 737 pilot reported the loss of electric and manual trim control shortly after takeoff resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

As my First Officer (FO) and I approached LAX on the OLAAA1 RNAV arrival; we were given a crossing restriction of 8;000 and then descend and maintain 7;000. From previous wake turbulence encounters in LAX; I already had the TCAS in 'relative expanded' so I could start watching for potential threats. I also started listening to anything that involved 'heavy' or 'super' over the frequency several miles from the airport. As we approached; I/we heard a Cargo 'heavy'. Hmmm. So; we started scanning the TCAS data to try to decipher if he was ahead of us or behind us. We found what could potentially be a 'heavy' off in the distance and on TCAS. I just assumed that was him and started using caution. We were not behind him directly in the moment; but in the future could be. On we flew; and eventually began the descent of 8;000 at a crossing restriction and then maintain 7;000. At this point; the potential threat was approximately 7 miles ahead of us. As I started to level off at 7;000; I started to feel the 'tickle' of wake. I disconnected the autopilot and immediately got into the heavy's wake. Rolled around for what seemed like eternity; said a few colorful words; and attempted to climb above the wake. I got it under control...only ended up at 7;100 feet and my FO called SoCal to inform him of our wake encounter.We had just recently gotten handed off to this frequency. I recognized the Controller's voice; (one of my favorites; he does great) from previous flights and his voice was that of resignation. He said we got wake from a heavy that was ahead of us; and let's get you a new heading of 10 degrees right to get you out of his path. I turned immediately and then asked for the autopilot. I still guarded the controls. The Controller came back to us within about 60 seconds to ask how our new heading was. I gave my FO a thumbs up; but asked him to ask for 5 more degrees right for spacing. The Controller responded with a reduced airspeed to get the more spacing. Perfect for us. I flew the remainder of the arrival high and flew the ILS 25L a dot above glide slope. Right after the encounter; I also called the Flight Attendants to make sure everyone was safe and uninjured. All was well. Passengers were seated. One FA was seated. The other one was standing; but uninjured. I asked them to stay in their seats for the remainder of the flight. Once on final and on LAX tower frequency we were told to use caution wake turbulence; following a 747. Suggestions: This is not my first encounter with wake at LAX. Ask any of my FOs and I'm an ardent wake turbulence avoider. I sometimes ask miles out from LAX what we will be following in today; and sometimes I ask for reduced speeds to get more separation. The Controllers are always helpful. I just wish that the Controllers would provide the facts of what's ahead of us BEFORE we are on LAX tower frequency or before we fly into wake. I feel like some Controllers provide it; and some do not...unless asked.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into LAX in trail of a B747.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 33

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While maneuvering at approximately 1;000 feet AGL the engine suddenly ran rough and quit. I applied full rich mixture; checked main fuel valve; mag switch; fuel boost pump and tried to restart; none of which solved the problem. Since I was almost directly over a 4 lane divided highway headed south and getting low; I lined up with southbound side and proceeded to make the landing. Highway traffic was light and there were no power lines in the area. I made a perfect landing and rolled with traffic till I reached a wide driveway and exited the highway. As I exited the aircraft I was approached by an off duty sheriff sergeant who had seen my situation and made a U turn to block traffic behind me. This prevented a traffic conflict until I was clear of the highway. [My aircraft] has folding wings; so we folded the wings; hooked it to the back of my pickup truck and towed it back to the airport; about 2 miles. Post incident analysis: (1) No damage to anything (people; aircraft or highway) (2) The cause: Fuel exhaustion in the left tank caused by a valve (designed to prevent fuel cross feed and fuel leakage when topped off) that was accidentally left in the wrong position. Fuel in right tank was prevented from being used even though it was half full. (3) The remedy: The transfer valve will be wired or taped in the open position and a checklist note added to check this item at preflight. This should preclude this from happening again. Also a low fuel warning indicator has apparently malfunctioned and will be checked out. (4) What I learned: a. Do a more thorough preflight b. don't panic; fly the aircraft.

Experimental pilot reported engine failure due to fuel mismanagement resulting in off-field landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Takeoff roll began normally on [Runway] 10R; upon rotation; the command bars immediately changed to the flight director; and at the same time; track mode changed to roll mode. The flight director was commanding a level off a few hundred feet above the runway; even though the altitude selector was set to 6000 ft.; the aircraft briefly entered magenta ALT hold a few hundred feet above the runway. As this happened; the auto-throttles then tried to roll back to maintain V2 + 10kts. (140 kts.) as though we were going to level off there. We immediately overrode the auto-throttles to continue the climb; then selected green flight level change and manual speeds at VFS. We changed LNAV and VNAV once at a safe altitude. During the brief cruise segment; just prior to descent we noted we had lost vertical PTH guidance/VNAV profile on both MFDs as well as both MCDUs. Fuel remaining at arrival; and ETA were also missing from the MFDs. We notified ATC we didn't have VNAV guidance and requested them to descend us. About 50 miles from destination; VNAV profile began working and we were able to resume the arrival as published.

Upon rotation on [Runway] 10R the command bars switched to the flight director. The lateral mode switched to roll and the vertical mode went to ALT. The auto-throttles retarded and the flight director was commanding level off. I manually pushed the throttles forward and pitched the plane to approximately 15 degrees up. I asked the FO (First Officer) for heading and flight level change. We went to manual speeds as the speed schedule was not sequencing either. Once at a safe altitude and on course we went back to LNAV and VNAV. Upon decent we did not have a VNAV profile and were unable to fly the STAR as published and received guidance from ATC. About 50 miles out of destination the VNAV profile populated.

E175 flight crew reported the loss of flight director presentations immediately after takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Weather

We were in descent from 10;000 to 5;000 FT and had just switched to final approach; slowing to 230 KIAS. The weather at our destination was 1.5 miles visibility in rain and mist. At some point in the arrival sequence the Captain disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles in preparation for the approach. At that point I noted an IAS miscompare warning on the PFD; followed by Level 2 Alerts: 'SEL ELEV FEEL MAN; SEL FLAP LIM OVRD'. I then noted PFD ASI indications - Captain's 217 KIAS; First Officer's 236 KIAS; Standby 235 KIAS.We ran the QRH Airspeed Lost; Suspect; Erratic Checklist [and determined] CADC #1 was suspect. The Captain selected CADC 2 for Flight Director; autpoilot; etc. No emergency was declared and we landed uneventfully. I missed the recommendation at beginning of QRH procedure [regarding] getting to and maintaining VMC; as I was focused on getting the disparity between the 2 ASI displays resolved.We wrote the event up after the flight. This was a repeat of the same item which was signed off prior to our flight as replaced CADC #1. Maintenance action following our flight was signed off as 'Purged moisture from #1 Pitot Static System'...I have no recommendation for prevention. The QRH Checklist should; however; be amended to direct use of AOA when experiencing Airspeed Lost/Suspect/Erratic events. Anecdotal to this event was my familiarity [with the QRH procedure]; in part; due to recent completion of annual training where the pitot covered scenario directs its use.

An MD-11 flight crew successfully resolved anomalous airspeed indications during an arrival in IMC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

MRI departed a VFR Aircraft Y on what I can only assume to be a Campbell departure. Aircraft Y seemed to shortcut the corner of the departure and was clearly going to clip the 'Seward Segment' (described in the Alaska Chart Supplement).Aircraft X; a known [type] to climb slowly; departed shortly after Aircraft Y from ANC RWY 7L. Aircraft X was assigned an Anchorage 8 departure; a departure that the aircraft is unable to comply with due to climb gradient restrictions.Both aircraft were on a course and climb gradient to place them in unsafe proximity with one another and mitigating action was required which included both a traffic and low altitude alert.Aircraft Y went to the wrong frequency and was talking to North RADAR (NR) while heading southbound into my airspace; the NR Controller did a fine job figuring out the pilots' intentions and then noticing the conflict. I was working South RADAR (SR) and was talking to Aircraft X. Both the NR Controller and myself grew very concerned about the conflict as soon as we noticed Aircraft X acquire its tag and projected the two aircraft to be in unsafe proximity. We both issued traffic and applied merging target procedures to our respective planes while coordinating with one another for a mitigating action. The NR Controller attempted to turn his VFR aircraft to the east in order to provide more space for my Aircraft X to climb to the south; however; the VFR Aircraft Y was failing to respond and the situation was growing dire.Once Aircraft Y failed to respond to NR controlling prompts; he instructed me to turn my Aircraft X even though we were both fully aware of the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) factor which complicated vectoring of Aircraft X. I issued the traffic alert and an immediate turn to the southwest to Aircraft X. Then I issued a low altitude alert and instructed the aircraft to expedite its climb and gave the appropriate MVA information. Aircraft X effected its turn but seemed to struggle to climb; assumedly due to the rate of turn bleeding climb performance from the already underpowered aircraft. Once Aircraft X committed to the southwest turn; Aircraft Y then came back to the NR Controller and complied with the turn to the east which further mitigated the conflict.Safe separation was achieved due to the turn of an IFR aircraft below the MVA.Closest proximity was 1.22 nm and 500 feet.A) Tower needs to be held accountable for issuing traffic to aircraft that will be in unsafe proximity immediately on departure. Aircraft X advised that traffic was not issued by the Tower despite both aircraft clearly being in direct conflict with one another.B) Aircraft that cannot comply with the SID off RWY 7L need to be assigned the climbing gradient for the 7L DVA (Diverse Vector Area) procedure. Aircraft X was allowed to be at an egregiously low altitude and allowed to remain on a SID that he was not able to climb in compliance with. The SID's ground track would have been extremely unsafe and I was forced to disregard MVA procedures in order to ensure safe separation of aircraft.C) The 'Seward Segment' needs to be addressed. Our facility has raised issue with this particular airspace several times to no avail.

Aircraft Y erroneously checked in on my frequency departing southbound out of MRI on what I assume was the Campbell Departure. I identified him in an effort to help out the SR (South RADAR) Controller and anticipated switching him to SR immediately after. As I was going to switch him; Aircraft X tagged up off of the departure end of 7L at ANC; and checked on with SR. I assume they were assigned the ANC8 departure despite their known inability to comply with climb gradient requirements. The targets were converging and I issued merging target procedures. Aircraft Y did not have Aircraft X in sight. The SR was issuing traffic to his aircraft (Aircraft X) who also didn't have Aircraft Y in sight. I issued a turn to the east to avoid a near collision in a timely manner. Aircraft Y did not respond. I informed SR Controller that my aircraft wasn't listening and he should turn his Aircraft X regardless of the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude); as they were above the known obstacles in the area and were converging laterally and vertically with the unresponsive Aircraft Y. I immediately issued a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and he responded and turned to avoid the Aircraft X.No traffic was issued to Aircraft X by local prior to switching Aircraft X to Approach.Add a requirement for ANC Local [Controller] to coordinate with MRI when they have a 7R/L departure that doesn't meet the climb gradient.Clear up any confusion concerning the ANC8 being issued to aircraft that don't meet the climb gradient; and as a result have non-standard takeoff minimums. I believe there is an alternate departure procedure for aircraft with non-standard minimums.Add a requirement for MRI to tag up departures with aircraft type as well a departure procedure/direction of flight. This may lead to more accurate; more timely traffic calls.Reiterate the importance of ensuring separation prior to communications transfer. This seems to be a recurring theme here. There is absolutely no guarantee that a pilot will check on clearly and in a timely manner. If there had been any delay or mistake by the Aircraft X pilot with his check in; there may not have been time to react.Also; more oversight locally concerning these issues. The last report generated a response that is unbelievable to the controller workforce here. It was suggested that we take it to PSP (Partnership for Safety Plan). A systemic deficiency was identified and we were supposed to talk about it at PSP? Unacceptable.

Anchorage TRACON controllers reported an unsafe operation which led to turning an aircraft while below the MVA away from a VFR aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 9424

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Type 2107

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During descent on the PHLBO arrival into EWR we asked to deviate to the left for a line of weather directly below us during the descent. NY center said unable due to PHL traffic and allow a 10-15 degree deviation to the right. We could not continue descent below 10;000 ft because the controller put LGA traffic into holding 1000 ft below us. Approximately abeam DYLIN the controller told us EWR wasn't taking anyone and gave us a 180 turn to the right and because of the LGA traffic could not allow us to turn or climb until almost to DUPONT. We climbed back up to 15000 ft and turned south to parallel the arrival on the left side of the weather as originally requested. Once with NY approach and evaluating our options we informed NY approach that we were fuel critical now and once we turned left departing METRO we asked how long we would be on this heading and now for the 3rd time announced to NY approach that we were fuel critical with no reply. When we pressed the matter; approach informed us that it would be another 68 air miles before a turn to the airport so we had to decide to divert or continue and the NY approach controller now told us if we said the magic word we would get right in. Given the circumstances and approaching our FAA fuel minimum for landing we decided the best course of action was to [advised ATC] for low fuel and get the airplane safely to EWR. It is my personal opinion that better options from NY center during the deviation on descent as well as more assistance from NY approach could have kept this event from happening.

B737 flight crew reported a low fuel situation on arrival to EWR.