Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 22

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Aircraft X was at 39000 feet and coordinated with Santa Maria Center at 39000 feet. Approximately 40 minutes to the facility boundary Aircraft X requested a climb to 40000 feet. I opened the coordination window for the flight with the intention of revising the coordinated altitude to 40000 feet. The standard procedure for this action is to input 40000 feet in the altitude box; press the 'NEGOTIATE' button; and then the 'SEND' button. But in this particular case; I inadvertently pressed the 'MANUAL' button; which opened up a popup window asking me to confirm that I want to send this coordination manually. Based on the message log for Aircraft X; I pressed 'OK' to confirm that I wanted to coordinate this flight manually.  After I closed the coordination window; I climbed Aircraft X from 39000 feet to 40000 feet. As far as Santa Maria was concerned; the flight was coming at 39000 feet. As far as the ATOP system was concerned; 40000 feet was the coordinated altitude and the flight was (soon to be) at 40000 feet. A few minutes after Aircraft X progressed 43N/40W at 40000 feet; I received a phone call from Santa Maria controller who wanted to verify the coordinated altitude.  As I reviewed the message log for Aircraft X; I discovered the error that I had made. The Santa Maria controller advised me that there was no traffic and no loss of separation and I continued to work the sector.  This was an error on my part; and thus I have no recommendations other than to be more vigilant. The system performed correctly in prompting me to confirm that I intended to coordinate manually.  A very likely explanation for my error is this:  throughout the session; numerous aircraft transitioning from ZNY to Gander Center requested either altitude or Mach speed changes; or both; due to moderate turbulence along the facility boundary. Each change of altitude/Mach number required manual re-coordination with Gander Center. In these instances; I would use the coordination window; pressing the 'NEGOTIATE' and then the 'MANUAL' button. A popup window would prompt me to confirm that I was coordinating manually; in which case I would correctly confirm.  My best guess is I incorrectly followed the same steps when coordinating Aircraft X because I thought I was coordinating with Gander Center.

ZNY Center Controller reported failing to coordinate an altitude revision due to entering the data into the incorrectly computer.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Passing through approximately 23;000-24;000 feet we experienced a CABIN ALTITUDE Warning light on the Forward Panel with the associated warning horn. We donned the O2 masks; established communications [and] requested a descent to 10;000 feet with Center. We completed the QRC/ QRH Checklist items for CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING and established communication with the flight attendants and were told that the cabin O2 masks had not dropped. The cabin pressure gauge was giving what we determined to be anomalous/unexpected pressure readings and ATC cleared us to 10;000 feet and to continue the LNAV arrival track. After arriving at 10;000 feet; we removed our masks and proceeded to land. We discussed the situation and determined we would not need CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) resources to assist us upon landing and told Approach and Tower we were a 'no Assistance required' aircraft. We did request paramedics to be on-hand in the gate area since the flight attendants stated that a few (six to eight) passengers were complaining of pressure in their ears. As we descended from 10;000 feet; the First Officer adjusted the pressurization to decrease cabin pressure to provide relief. Because we were focused on the arrival; the cabin altitude was found to be in the negative range (overpressure) due to the fact that we were more concerned with our descent than controlling a comfortable pressure. We landed uneventfully and made a maintenance logbook entry which outlined the pressure discrepancy. Because we did not discuss the specific altitudes noted when the event occurred; I wrote in the logbook that the event occurred around 19;000 feet (which is what I recalled). The First Officer later told me he thought the altitude at the time of the event was between 23;000-24;000 feet. We debriefed the flight attendants and they told us that they heard 'pressure/air leaking noises from around the Aft Service Door around the time of the event. After debrief with the Gate/Ops Agent I learned that only two passengers discussed their health concerns with paramedics and were consulted; but not treated. The passengers proceeded (on their own) out of the terminal. It was only after I filled out the maintenance logbook that I wrote the wrong event altitude in the writeup; though I was told that the exact altitude information was not essential to maintenance trouble-shooting. This was an aircraft mechanical issue. There is nothing the flight crew could have done to prevent the event. On an administrative note; the QRC Checklist instructs flight crews to 'move outflow valve to OPEN or CLOSE as needed to control cabin altitude and rate' but how to do so to promote passenger comfort is not outlined in the QRC or in Associated Ops Manuals. The system; in Manual mode; is extremely sensitive and was not easy for the FO (First Officer) to manipulate with assurance that the actions were going to be more than just a 'best guess.' As a result; we inadvertently over-pressured the Cabin Altitude as we descended below 10;000 feet. This may have forestalled any additional passenger discomfort.

B737-700 Captain reported a loss of cabin pressure descending through FL240.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

After takeoff and during gear retraction; we heard a thump followed by increased wind noise.  As the PF (Pilot Flying); I looked down and noted the gear indicating down with the gear handle in the up position.  We had three green gear lights and a red gear disagree light. On the EICAS; we had amber HYD VOLUME LOW A and HYD PTU FAIL. The quantity and pressure of the A side hydraulics both indicated zero. The hydraulic temperature was holding steady.  We were switched to Departure and advised them of our mechanical failure and the subsequent need to work with Company on our diversion airport of choice.  They provided delay vectors and climbed us to 5;000 FT to work the problem.  I; the PF; handled the radio while the PM (Pilot Monitoring) ran the HYD VOLUME LOW A checklist.  ATC asked if we would declare an emergency; and I replied in the affirmative.  Once the initial parts of the checklist were complete; The PM went to the back to explain the mechanical failure to our passenger and explained the need to divert.  The passenger was pleasant; calm; and understanding throughout the whole process.  As a crew; we decided a nearby airport would be an excellent divert airport given its light headwinds; long; wide runway and CFR (Crash/Fire/Rescue) services.  We advised ATC of our choice and set up our NAV radios for Runway XX.  The PM and I fully briefed the approach and landing requirements and our crew plan for landing using emergency braking and our lack of normal steering and reverse thrust.  Enroute; to the divert airport; the PM briefed the passenger on our expected normal landing with the potential for an emergency evacuation; he also explained our Company would be working on a recovery plan for his trip.  Again; he was very calm and understanding.  Upon return to the cockpit; I called Tower on the secondary radio to inform them of our emergency arrival in about 10-15 minutes and that we would be disabled on the runway.  We requested CFR be standing by as well as a tug.  The subsequent arrival; approach; and landing went as briefed and expected.  We shut down the engines and waited about 20 minutes while CFR monitored our brake temperatures for possible fire.   They reported some residual hydraulic fluid leaking.  Once given the all clear; we were escorted and tugged to the Cessna Service Center.  Total time from landing to completion of tow off the runway was about 50 minutes. Initial post-flight inspection points to a simple burst of a hydraulic line under the aircraft forward of the wheel wells. The only evidence I saw was the spray pattern of residual hydraulic fluid.  I'm surmising it burst during the gear retraction as the gear did begin to rise before free-falling back down. The crew coordination went very smoothly as we divided up our duties to complete checklists; communicate; and coordinate emergency services. We were fortunate to have plenty of time and good weather to determine a course of action; brief it; and execute.  It was also very good to brief and re-brief the exact sequence of our non-normal landing as we had to use emergency braking; back-up steering and non-standard reverse thrust.  A thorough brief along with a mental 'chair fly' of the landing sequence was very helpful.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A C-750 hydraulic line burst after takeoff with EICAS alerts HYD VOLUME LOW A and HYD PTU FAIL. Both red and green gear lights illuminated with the handle UP; so an emergency was declared; the flight diverted to a nearby airport for an uneventful landing; and then was towed off the runway.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

At approximately 100 KIAS the Tower instructed us to abort our takeoff due to a warning they had received about a conflict a taxiway and the Runway. Takeoff was aborted and after coordinating with the Tower and Fire Rescue we taxied to a taxiway and allowed the brakes to stabilize. After the brake temperatures started decreasing we taxied back to the terminal; refueled and departed. With a heavier aircraft and a wet runway this could have been a very interesting situation.

At approximately 100 knots; the A330 Crew was instructed by the Tower to reject the takeoff due to a runway incursion alert.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13.5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight of 3/Fighter aircraft checked on to my frequency at level at 170. [The flight] was flying a [coded route] to SELLS MOA. I acknowledged the check in and switched the aircraft to tactical frequency. It is standard operation procedure to acknowledge the check in and immediately switch the aircraft to Tracon.TUS Approach Control attempted to point out [Aircraft A]; C130; to Sector 46 level at 170. I informed the TUS controller that I was no longer talking to [the flight of 3] who was in conflict with [Aircraft A].Both aircraft were at 170 inside TUS approach airspace. The error occurred between 2 aircraft that TUS had the responsibility to separate. The [coded route the flight of 3] was flying does not enter ZAB airspace. It goes from TUS to SELLS MOA. Does ZAB still need to be involved in the process?I would recommend ZAB not even talk to these aircraft. TUS approach should switch them to tactical frequency after they have separated from all of their known aircraft.

Albuquerque Center Controller reported a loss of separation in Tucson Approach airspace.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 1700

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In day VMC conditions; sky clear; ceiling and visibility unlimited; we established our Cessna on a 12 mile straight-in visual approach from 2;000 FT MSL for landing at PMP. For training value the crew of two activated and followed the advisory course and glide path provided by the G1000 system for the GPS 15 approach with LPV minimums. Crew made multiple callouts on PMP CTAF. PMP Class Delta was not in effect at that early. Tower opens at 0800 local. Passing through 1;000 FT MSL; crew was alerted by TAS that an aircraft was within 2 miles; 200 FT below our altitude. Both crew members searched for the aircraft; assuming it was a light GA aircraft departing the field and not announcing on CTAF.Passing through 900 FT MSL; on the advisory glide path; at 2.9 NM from the field; 2.5 NM from the approach end of Runway 15; crew observed a light jet traveling north; approximately 100 FT BELOW our altitude; and approximately 300 FT to our rear. There was no time to take any evasive action; and the jet was never heard on the CTAF frequency. Crew called FXE Tower (over 6 miles south) and determined a jet matching the description had just departed FXE. It is likely the jet was flying a low level trip to BCT; and rather than check the PMP CTAF frequency; switched directly to BCT which is 6 miles north of our near miss. It was very surprising to see a light jet operating below 1;000 MSL over a populated airport over 6 miles from a point of departure or arrival.

A C182 Instructor reported a light jet flew below them at approximately 800 FT AGL in the vicinity of PMP airport; apparently enroute to another airport.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During pushback the tow bar broke resulting in a 30 minute delay on the taxiway. Tow bar was removed and aircraft inspected. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

B777 First Officer reported the tow bar broke during pushback resulting in a delay until the aircraft could be inspected.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 495

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

[I] picked up safety pilot at EKM for practicing instrument approaches. Called Clearance Delivery at EKM and requested VFR practice approaches starting with the RNAV 27 at Charlie 91 (C91). Controller gave me clearance and told me to report crossing FAF way point (was setting up for the RNAV 27 at C91 but Controller gave me instructions for RNAV 27 at EKM). I didn't catch the discrepancy and neither did the Controller or safety pilot. I continued setting up the RNAV 27 at C91 and wrote down the FAF fix to C91 instead of at EKM. When reading back clearance I read back that I was cleared for the RNAV 27 at C91 and to report passing the FAF (WUKOV). The Controller had given me the FAF to EKM RNAV 27 (COGNE). I didn't repeat his clearance correctly and he didn't correct my error and cleared me for departure. He asked me if I would like to stay with him on the Tower frequency; I said yes; but we would then resume our own navigation. We flew to the IAF to C91 and proceeded to complete the approach and upon crossing FAF (WUKOV) I called to report. [I] was cleared for the RNAV 27 approach. Switched to CTAF at C91 and continued on with our flight. After the approach I called EKM to report back up; no reply; twice. Continued on with approach to 3TR and during approach was contacted by another pilot that SBN was looking for us. I called SBN Approach and reported in. They told me EKM was looking for us. I finished approach at 3TR and returned to EKM. [I] was told to call Tower. Controller told me of our error and proceeded to chastise me using profanity. 'I didn't know where the #@$% you were. We talked through the clearance discrepancies and I told him that I had clearly had asked for the RNAV 27 at Charlie 91. He said that with everyone talking so fast how was he supposed to hear Charlie 91. He said I should have said RNAV 27 to Dowagiac. I thought I was using proper FAA language. I was told they had half the Elkhart Fire department looking for us. There were enough mistakes from both sides; but in the end I'm pilot in command. My take away from this situation is this:1. Make sure the clearance you ask for and the clearance you are given are correct. Don't assume they know where you are planning to go.2. From now on I won't do practice approaches with out using Approach Control. No more Tower controllers at Class D airports.3. I should have known something was wrong when he asked if I wanted to stay on his frequency. I would have been outside his airspace.4. If something doesn't seem normal it probably needs to be questioned.5. Don't feel pressured to get going. Get it right or sit tight.6. In the end it was nice to know that the Controller was really most upset about my safety. He did what he could to make sure we were fine.

Pilot reports confusion of perceived clearance and actual clearance received from ATC; resulting in pilot flying to a different airport then what the Controller cleared him to.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 250

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I filed an instrument flight plan from 7B2. I picked up my clearance on the ground at 7B2 (Northampton Airport) and was asked which runway I would be using (runway 14); I was told to hold for release. When I was released; I was instructed to turn right to a specified southwesterly heading. There were two problem with this instruction (neither of which occurred to me until after the flight): 1. Traffic pattern at 7B2 for runway 14 is LEFT traffic. Perhaps Bradley clearance could see there were no other aircraft in the vicinity and therefore were comfortable giving me a heading that would be in conflict with the traffic pattern at the airport. Had I not been given that heading; my plan was to fly three left turns (essentially fly to pattern) and then turn on course.2. Much more importantly; the assigned heading took me dangerously close to terrain. Happily; I had half tanks of fuel and only one passenger; and it was a cool evening; so my climb rate was in excess of 1;500 fpm. However; even with that climb rate; I came dangerously close to unlit terrain in the direction I was instructed to fly. While not specifically instructed when to begin the turn; I waited until I climbed above pattern altitude; perhaps an earlier turn or an even more steep climb (or a slower airspeed) would have kept me further from the terrain; but I was not given any instructions other than to turn right to that heading. In the future; I would suggest that Clearance Delivery take into account the traffic pattern at the airport (assuming this wasn't done) and more importantly make the departing pilot aware of terrain and give more specific instructions to avoid the terrain. I note that this will differ for different aircraft (speed and climb rate). Perhaps the safest alternative would be to instruct pilots to fly a turn in the traffic pattern prior to flying to an assigned heading and contacting the departure controller.

PC12 pilot reports receiving an IFR departure clearance from 7B2 departing Runway 14 to turn right after takeoff on a southwesterly heading. The reporter questions the turn direction as being opposite to the VFR pattern and notes that he came dangerously close to terrain before starting his turn above traffic pattern altitude.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was called to assist in an aircraft spill situation on an A300 aircraft. I arrived as the First Responder was finishing up. I initiated the spill form and another AMT (Aircraft Maintenance Technician) documented the spill in the aircraft logbook. The aircraft had been in ZZZ since about midday and the spill was reported by the unload crew. The aircraft arrived with no containers in the aft lower compartment where the spill was located so a determination as to the source of origin for the spill would not be possible. The aircraft had operated [two] previous flight legs. The spill affected all areas of both the LH side and RH side outboard positions 5 through position 6. The responder said the spill was a 'mild' alkali and that he had used gray spill pads to try to absorb and clean up the unknown material. He said that a sample should be sent out to positively identify the substance. I documented this on the spill form which I completed down to the corrective action field. I inquired as to obtaining an [reference number] but there seemed to be a hesitancy to issue one and the spill form seemed to be met with the same response. The responder showed me the reference material that he used and stated that sodium bicarbonate could be used to clean up the unidentified spill. I informed both him and several on site Supervisors that since it had been identified as an alkali; the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) Chapter 5 procedures (as per the GMM) would take precedence for any cleanup actions. It appeared that they wanted to load the aircraft but sometime later; the aircraft was ultimately removed from service. I later spoke briefly to the incoming supervisor prior to my leaving my shift for the day and mentioned the spill form which needed the [reference number] and remaining entries after corrective actions were completed. The following day I pulled the history and saw that the log item had been cleared and noted that there was no deferral for a spill on the aircraft. Since I had initiated the spill form; I was concerned and called Company and asked if they had a copy of the completed form. They controller looked but could not find one. I reached out to the [records department] who had the applicable log page but no attached spill form. I inquired as to whether the form had possibly already been scanned and the log page was there but the spill form was not to be found. I informed my Supervisor of my concerns. I understand the GMM (General Maintenance Manual) procedure directs that once the area has been cleaned and a visual inspection accomplished by the AMT; no further action is required but there is more to that procedure. GMM spill response procedures cover roughly two pages and are fairly specific regarding spills determined to be an alkali; a spill that does not have a known source and the requirement for a deferral for a reinspect of the spill area at a later date. The GMM also provides guidance for the disposition of the aircraft spill form. I went upstairs to my manager's office and asked the questions regarding this procedure with the GMM in hand. The response that I got was that the spill was cleaned up by a [company name] vendor that we pay good money for (cleanup service) and at that point; the aircraft spill form is no longer necessary and that is the end of it as far as I was to be concerned. I mentioned that his answer is not in line with what the GMM says. My ultimate concern is for the aircraft and for the AMT's who signed the logbook if any part of this process was misrepresented to them in the name of getting the aircraft back into service. Hopefully this is not the case. The ZZZ Aircraft Hazardous Material Spill Flow Chart; the GMM and the Aircraft Substance Spill Form are very specific with the responsibilities for spill events such as this. It seems like every spill event in ZZZ is like the first time with decisions being made on the fly.

Air carrier Maintenance Technician reported cargo spill cleanup procedures were not correctly followed.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I became aware that a loss of runway separation had occurred when three of my co-workers on three separate days came to me for advice/counsel regarding events that had transpired. All of these co-workers are Certified Controllers (CPC) with less than a year of rated time as ATCs. The situation is as follows: The instructor was training the trainee on the Local Control position and the facility was in a Runway 29 and Runway 23 configuration; conducting intersecting runway operations in the midst of a runway change conducting LUAW (Line up and Wait) on Runway 23 and departing traffic off Runway 29. Aircraft X was a jet on the hold on Runway 23 and Aircraft Y was a single prop departing Runway 29. Aircraft Y was airborne and abeam taxiway Foxtrot approximately 3500 feet down Runway 29 and approximately 1000 feet distance remaining to the Runway 23/29 intersection; when Aircraft X was given a departure clearance from the Runway 23 hold with about 1500 feet distance remaining to the Runway 29/23 intersection.I am unable to ascertain from any of the CPC's if Aircraft X started its departure roll before Aircraft Y had passed the intersection. The 'role' I played in this situation is as the trusted informal leader whose advice is sought out in difficult situations. What led to the event and why it happened; this is the second such report that I have filed regarding this OJT (On Job Training) Instructor where standards are not being followed.I feel that the event occurred because during the OJT; the OJT Instructor has poor skills sets and a general lack of experience in air traffic operations under busy/complex traffic situations and this translated into a lack of ability to train another person to handle the same situation. They were unable to sustain air traffic operations and the volume of departure traffic sitting on the ground started to back-up and then a required runway was initiated. Further departure delays and ramp congestion ensued as the level of aircraft waiting built up the OJT Instructor's desire to 'clean up the airport' so to speak may have allowed standards to lapse. I feel I am reporting this situation because the CPC's who actually were present are fearful of repercussions because; I speculate that management was present in the operation and they think he would have reported it if it were an event.I recommend that the following take place; OJT Instructor should be removed from the training team. This is the second event related to runway separation standards; with this same trainee. This is a training team mismatch where the OJT Instructor is over accommodating to the trainee. Retrain this OJT Instructor and trainee on intersecting runway operations separation standards; conduct simulations and perform FLM (Front Line Manager) Skills check prior to the resumption of OJT Instructor duties.Air traffic operations are not being sustained because of the performance of this training team; it is impacting the arrival and departure rate. When this occurs stop training. Recognize that OJT Instructor has limited skills and employ that skill set only when appropriate under light traffic; not complex; until proper performance has been documented.Under moderate traffic conditions conduct OJT Instructor over the shoulder evaluation to ensure that runway separation standards performance will be followed under pressure.OJT Instructor is not accurately reporting the performance of training which takes place and or capturing this performance deficiencies on the 3120-25 (training form). OJT Instructor is not being held accountable. Retrain this OJT Instructor on required entries. Conduct performance review immediately following OJT for the next 3 training periods to ensure the actual performance is being captured on the form.I feel that the actual training taking place has not been productive and in some instances it has been counterproductive for the trainee as standards are not being followed and performance issues in training have not been documented properly. The true picture of this trainee whom only trains with this instructor has not been fully captured. I strongly recommend that several supervisors if not all perform independent Skill Checks to determine what knowledge regarding runway separation has been 'acquired during OJT'. That additional simulations be performed to validate knowledge and skill and that the training hours be adjusted to correct any negative learned behaviors.Consider the 'maturity' of the OJT Instructor; the skill level and experience on the position before assigning the task. Both instructor and trainee were in over their heads apparently. Employ your units within their capabilities to ensure operational success.

A Controller was told of an incident where an Instructor told their trainee to use less than required simultaneous intersecting departure separation standards. The Controller states this ATC Instructor is not qualified to conduct On the Job Training.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

If the jet experienced cockpit smoke and we had to wear the mask we would potentially consume all of the oxygen; best case; 5 minutes before landing. The [manual] states we have 15 minutes of O2 onboard if we dispatch at [minimum] dispatch limits. The [manual] doesn't distinguish the number of crew members; so we could assume 2 @550 psi and 4 @850 psi. Had we dispatched at the [minimum] limit; in a smoke scenario on that route; the outcome would have been unfavorable. So; is [it] our position; given a specific route; [that it is acceptable to] dispatch at the dispatch limits knowing that the quantity will be insufficient to safely land the jet within 15 minutes?

A320 Captain reported that aircraft are being dispatched with less than an adequate amount of crew oxygen.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

There were several actions I could have taken before allowing the aircraft to descend to 6;000 feet. I could have leveled off at 6;700 feet when I first knew that we were descending below the GS; taken manual control of the aircraft and hand fly back up to the glideslope; [and] follow SOP. I understand that my poor decision could have placed the aircraft in a hazardous situation. I have learned a tremendous amount from this event and know that I will not make the same mistake again. I hope others can learn from my poor decisions during this event.

A321 pilot reported descending below a certain altitude and receiving a low altitude alert.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airport; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

I was the PF (Pilot Flying). I was receiving my annual line check from LCA (Line Check Airman) Captain. The flight up to this point had proceeded without incident. We were cleared for the visual approach 24R at LAX. Touchdown was within the touchdown zone with a fairly gusty right crosswind. During the rollout phase; with the reversers out; we were instructed to 'roll to the end BB; I'll call your turn off the runway.' To which my FO (First Officer) replied; 'Roll to BB.' We then continued past Z and AA and turned off on BB. It was only after making the turn at BB did I notice Super departing 24L in his rotation phase between Z and AA. We held short of 24L on BB. After the A380 had departed; we were cleared to cross 24L and contacted North Ground. North Ground instructed us to taxi via the Bridge route. After switching to South Ground we were told to copy a phone number for a possible pilot deviation. We blocked into gate and shut down. At that point I asked [Check Captain] if he heard or seen anything that we could have possibly done wrong. An observer; with a bird's eye view; often sees trends and developments that pilots don't notice. In this case; [he] didn't see any safety; procedural or ATC concerns. [ATC was] researching whether we had deviated ATC instructions during the landing roll out. [ATC stated] that with an A380 departing 24L; the tower controllers must maintain a safety area. They cannot have any aircraft holding in between 24L and 24R. With that in mind we should have not turned onto BB. Essentially; the Tower Controller gave me a non-standard; improvised LASHO clearance during a critical phase of flight while I was managing the decelerating energy of our aircraft in gusty crosswind conditions. These instructions were given while we were using max reverse causing added noise to clearly hear ATC's unusual hold short instructions. All I heard was 'roll down to BB.' No problem. Not sure why I needed to pass up Z or AA as those are no longer full; but I will comply with the controller's request. When I heard; 'BB' that to me meant; turn off on BB. Why would it not? On final; had the controller said something specific like: Head's up; Aircraft X; departing Super on 24L; plan on rolling to the end and hold short of BB on 24R.' Even better; the controller could have delayed [A380's] departure for 20 more seconds and allowed us to clear 24L behind [another aircraft]. At that point; 24R and the safety zone would have been clear. As pilots we get nervous when we spend too much time on the runway after landing. It is not intuitive to roll down to an available taxiway; stop the aircraft and stay ON the runway. I always assume traffic is landing behind us and I felt uneasy as it was to roll past AA. Now I was supposed to STAY ON THE RUNWAY?! Nowhere in the LAX reference charts; taxi charts or [Company] 10-7 plates does it mention the ATC safety area for A380's departing 24L. At 100 knots on landing; how are we to interpret that a controllers comment; 'I'll call your turn off the runway;' means that if a Super were to abort its takeoff; its right wingtip would strike your airplane if were holding between the runways. As he was behind us; we didn't realize a Super was departing the inbound runway until we turned the aircraft onto BB. In the dozens of times I've reviewed this scenario in my mind; based on the split second information I had at the time; at 100 knots; I would have done the same thing again. However; based on this new information from the Tower; I now have the inside knowledge of the Airbus A380 safety zone and the controllers cryptic; 'I'll call your turn off the runway;' now makes sense and I'd know for next time. But how do you convey all that information to a pilot during the landing phase. Quite simply; you don't. It needs to be briefed ahead of time; through safety bulletins and notes in the Jeppesen plates. [Company] Flight Ops needs to get this information out to all [company] pilots. Wecan't just rely on tribal knowledge that a clearance like this may occur and why. It makes sense now that it's been explained to me; but such non-standard phraseology in our case wasn't clear at the time. I also encourage LAX to put something on the page about the safety zone for departing A380's. In 7 years of being based in LAX; I had no idea the 'Super A380 safety zone' existed. I knew there were in-trail separation requirements; but had no idea there were also lateral requirements unique to the north complex at LAX. That needs to change. This information needs to be shared to all pilots operating in/out of LAX.

Air carrier pilot reported a taxiway incursion at LAX airport. Reporter cited non-standard phraseology as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56; Flight Crew Total 318; Flight Crew Type 105

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While established on a right downwind for runway 23; a Cessna reported over CTAF that they would be performing a 45 degree entry to the right downwind for runway 23. Our aircraft then observed the Cessna traffic flying directly toward us in an opposite pattern and the same altitude. Our aircraft took immediate action and dove down away from the oncoming aircraft; which then passed directly over us. Our aircraft had been making position reports for upwind; right crosswind; and right downwind runway 23 before this conflict occurred. While turning base; our aircraft observed the Cessna making a right 180 degree turn to enter onto the appropriate downwind. The Cessna traffic was making position reports stating right downwind runway 23 while they were flying the opposing downwind. I believe the other pilot may have been confused on how to perform a proper traffic pattern entry; and as a result was making incorrect position reports.

Flight instructor reported another aircraft entered the traffic pattern in a direction opposite that previously announced; resulting in a near-mid-air-collision.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

During descent into ZZZ on the RNAV arrival; I was the PF (Pilot Flying) and the CA (Captain) was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). ATC told us to expect Runway XXL and cleared us to point ZZZZZ on the ILS XXL approach. This clearance put the aircraft on an intercept to final from the north side of the approach course. At approximately 10-15 nm from ZZZZZ and in IMC; ATC cleared us to descend from 6;500 ft to 5;300 ft MSL. I descended and the aircraft leveled off at 5;300 ft. Shortly thereafter; and still in IMC; we received an aural EGPWS Caution ('CAUTION TERRAIN') followed immediately by an aural EGPWS Warning ('TERRAIN; TERRAIN PULL UP'). I immediately selected TOGA thrust and full back sidestick. Both the CA and I had TERR ON ND selected on our respective instrument panels. I did not observe any solid red or yellow areas on my ND; nor did I observe TERR or OBST AHEAD. The EGPWS Caution and Warning each sounded only the one time; and neither was heard again after initiating the maneuver. While subsequently initiating a level-off; I left TOGA thrust selected too long and allowed airspeed to reach approximately 280 KIAS. The aircraft was clean; so no configuration limits were exceeded; however I still exceeded the 250-KIAS limit below 10;000 MSL. The CA called out my excessive airspeed and I subsequently reduced thrust. The CA had already notified ATC that we were maneuvering in response to the EGPWS Warning. During the process; and while leveling at 6;000 ft. MSL (MSA for the approach); we regained VMC and subsequently coordinated vectors for a visual approach to Runway XXL. A normal approach and landing ensued. Following the EGPWS warning and escape maneuver; ATC advised the CA that the minimum vectoring altitude in our area at the time was 3;800 ft MSL. Based on the fact that we were level at the ATC-assigned altitude of 5;300 ft; above the minimum vectoring altitude; and did not observe any of the expected indications on the CA or FO NDs; I believe this was a false EGPWS warning. That said; in the process of responding to an EGPWS Warning; I allowed airspeed to drop out of my scan with TOGA thrust selected and consequently exceeded 250 KIAS below 10;000 ft MSL.Following the EGPWS warning and escape maneuver; ATC advised the CA that the minimum vectoring altitude in our area at the time was 3;800 feet MSL.  Based on the fact that we were level at the ATC-assigned altitude of 5;300 ft; above the minimum vectoring altitude; and did not observe any of the expected indications on the CA or FO NDs; I believe this was a false EGPWS warning.  That said; in the process of responding to an EGPWS Warning; I allowed airspeed to drop out of my scan with TOGA thrust selected and consequently exceeded 250 KIAS below 10'000 ft MSL.

We started our briefing before our descent into ZZZ...we went over the threats...which included a discussion about mountainous terrain; discussion about the engine out missed approach procedures; and displaying the terrain on our ND.The approach briefing included a briefing on the Minimum Safe Altitudes. Near the end of the STAR; we were initially given direct ZZZZZ; the FAF for XXL. Then we were given vectors to Runway XXL. We were given various step down altitudes by ATC. I don't remember all of them but we were given 6;500 ft. and then a descent to 5;300 ft.We were in Open Descent. We slowed ourselves for the descent and approach to approx. 220 KIAS. We were in a clean configuration. We were well ahead of the aircraft. Somewhere above 5;300 we entered IMC...full overcast layer. We had just leveled at 5;300 ft. when we got a single 'Caution Terrain'.I quickly checked the altimeter and we were level at 5;300 and all flight instruments showed normal for level flight. Almost as quickly we got a single 'Terrain Pull Up' We executed the EGPWS recovery maneuver. We set TOGA thrust and pitched up and started climbing. I notified ATC. During the procedure; ATC stated that the minimum altitude she could descend us to was 3;800 ft.??; I was too busy to remember.Immediately the EGPWS warning stopped (we only got one of each warning). Neither ND showed terrain or warning. All we got were the single two aural warnings. There were no other visual indications. We leveled at approximately 6;000. The EGPWS did not activate any more.We briefly exited out of the clouds around 6;000 and I could visually see ahead. Satisfied that we were clear of terrain I noticed that we had accelerated past 250KIAS...this was because of the recovery maneuver; the TOGA thrust setting; and leveling at 6;000. My focus was directed at climbing and altitude. Once we recognized our airspeed; we corrected our airspeed. Again we were in the clean configuration so no aircraft limitation was exceeded.During the re-vector back to ZZZ; I checked our altimeters with the ATIS; and they were set correctly. Once I was satisfied we were clear of terrain; ATC vectored us back for a visual approach to XXL and landed normally. I believe it was a FALSE EGPWS caution and warning...after the fact.

A319 flight crew reported receiving a possible false ground proximity caution and warning while at an altitude well above Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

The Y Flight Attendant (FA) informed me that she will not occupy the forward jump seat for takeoff and landing. The jumpseat is in working order.The reason provided by the Y FA is 'social distancing' due to the potential spread of the Coronavirus.I informed her of the policy; but she still refused to occupy the jumpseat placing the passengers onboard in potential danger in the event of an evacuation.

Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant refused to occupy the appropriate jumpseat due to social distancing concerns.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During extended taxi in; I called for right engine shut down just after required cooling time. FO acknowledged and announced generator switch. I confirmed I was off brakes and steering; and FO switched electrics but did NOT immediately shut down the engine. This was due to ground controller calling at that precise time with instructions to taxi to a holding pad. There was unusually heavy ground traffic. I failed to cross check the engine instruments to verify that the engine was shut down as requested; and due to many distractions from the subsequent ground instructions and ground traffic; neither of us noticed the error until I parked at the gate. Since I did not have the APU running for parking; I waited for ground power to be plugged in before calling for the left engine to be shut down. It was only then that we both realized the right engine was still running; as well.

A320 Captain discovered at the gate that the right engine had not been shut down by the First Officer during taxi in due to distraction with ATC communications.


Pilot Flying; First Officer; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 7600

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

At 5:15 hours into flight; pilot flying; Relief Pilot in Captain seat in cruise at FL340 a Fuel SYS Pressure caution sounded and displayed on the EICAS accompanied by illumination of the amber light in the Left Aft Fuel Pump switch on the overhead fuel system control panel. The First Officer and I immediately determined that the aircraft was flying normally with no adverse engine or flight management issues. I monitored the aircraft while the First Officer referenced the appropriate checklist in the QRH and directed the purser to have the Captain return to the flight deck. With the Captain in command; we determined that the flight manual directed a landing at the nearest suitable airport because both A/C Fuel Pumps in the left main system were now indicating inoperative --the Left Forward Fuel Pump was properly deferred and rendered inoperative prior to our departure. The Captain consulted with Dispatch and Maintenance via SATCOM and we all concurred a diversion to ZZZZ; was the appropriate course of action. The Captain then briefed the purser and the passengers as to our intentions. With the completion of the Diversion Checklist and direction from Air Traffic Control; an uneventful descent; approach and heavyweight landing were accomplished by the Captain. The fuel system malfunction; overweight landing and some unrelated cabin discrepancies were properly communicated to Maintenance before we deplaned. The Captain then directed me and the other First Officer to assist him in coordinating for and confirming that all passengers and crew were properly cleared by authorities; fed and quartered. We departed the next day in a different 767 and completed the trip.

Approaching the coast I was called back from break. I was advised by the crew that the [left] aft fuel pump had failed. (The forward pump was already deferred as an MEL item for our dispatch; leaving us with nothing but suction feed for the left engine at this time; at cruise altitude.) The engine was still running without seeming difficulty; after the second pump failed. After going through the QRH; (Quick Reference Handbook) as well as speaking with dispatch and (our Maintenance Controller) regarding our condition (including an overweight landing) we relayed our intentions to divert to ZZZZ as it appeared to be the safest and most prudent course of action. ZZZZ was about 80 miles behind us at the time and the closest airport to us. We received a clearance from ATC without delay and made an overweight landing (329.0 vs. max 320.0) via a visual approach with a headwind of around 10 knots. The landing performance obtained from ACARS indicated the runway was more than adequate. Although this particular runway didn't have an approach that we could utilize the weather conditions were quite favorable for a simple visual approach. The landing was very smooth; (0 Vertical velocity at touchdown as indicated by our computers) we rolled out using mostly reverse thrust for speed reduction; which kept the brake temps in a low/normal range. The engine with the failed pumps stayed in a normal condition throughout the approach and landing and taxi in. We had FAM's on board; so we notified ATC on taxi in as well as Dispatch; as per our diversion guide. The passengers were off loaded within a few hours to the terminal once it was secured for foreign visitors (us). The flight resumed the next day on a different A/C. To my knowledge; we didn't violate any FAR's during this event.

B767 flight crew experiences the failure of a left wing tank fuel pump after being dispatched with the left forward pump on MEL; leaving the left engine to suction (and gravity) feed. Company procedures required diversion to the nearest suitable airport for maintenance.


Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Show up to gate X to work a flight and a coworker wasn't wearing a mask the whole shift also another coworker was wearing his mask on his neck. While the Supervisor watched 12 feet away. We signal him about the problem and he ignored it.

Ground employee reported co-workers are not complying with face mask policy and supervisors are ignoring the issue.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 131; Flight Crew Total 13707; Flight Crew Type 212

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

With shutting down an engine; dumping fuel and returning to the departure airport; we might have landed slightly overweight. With all that was going on; I forgot to record and keep track of our landing weight. I do not think we did land overweight as I believe we would have received an ACARS message stating such but just in case; I am submitting this report as no logbook entry was made to cover an overweight landing.

Captain reported confusion about actual landing weight during an event with an in flight shut down and an air turn back event.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 81; Flight Crew Total 1093; Flight Crew Type 561

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Training flight on IFR Tower enroute clearance from TOA to ZZZ. Clearance was fly runway heading to intercept LAX 170 radial to LIMBO; V64; SLI; Direct. On departure from TOA my student was flying under the view-limiting device and I was pilot monitoring and looking outside for traffic. We departed Runway 29R; shortly after there was a departure from a parallel 29L of a light aircraft that was faster than our aircraft. While switching to Departure Control frequency we were advised of proximity of the overtaking aircraft and its altitude being same as ours. I was looking outside and was able to spot the aircraft in about 20 seconds and student flying advised ATC of us having visual contact. Another 20 seconds later I lost visual contact and took over controls momentarily using 3 step process to raise the left wing to check on the overtaking aircraft that was turning south at that time. I gave the controls back to my student using 3 step process. When my student was saying 'my controls' he blocked end of Controller's transmission for me. The part that I heard was only 'turn left 150.' Then; student read back 'Turn left 150 Aircraft X' and initiated a left turn to 150. At that time I started to question myself if this instruction could really be intended to us since it would probably put us below the MVA in the area. I clearly heard my student's readback to ATC about left turn to 150 and since Controller didn't say anything about his read back being wrong; I thought I shouldn't probably even worry. Just a moment later; because of the oddness of the situation I decided to clarify the instruction with the ATC; but by the time I was able to key the mic; Controller already was getting back to us questioning our actions. Only then I realized that my student responded to a call intended to another aircraft and Controller didn't even hear his readback because the transmission was blocked by the radio call of the aircraft that really received that instruction.I think contributing factors to this little misunderstanding was our scratchy radio. Because of it the student misheard the call sign and I couldn't even hear it; due to intercom on that particular plane being clearer than the radio and student was talking at the same time.Good thing there was no conflicting traffic and VMC conditions let me see the terrain.

GA flight instructor reported a track heading deviation resulting in a CFTT event during departure from TOA airport.  Reporter stated they inadvertently took a heading clearance intended for another aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 1800

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While approaching and preparing to enter the traffic pattern at PYM and about four or five miles from the field; we encountered numerous (estimated about fifty) helium filled balloons launched from the ground. We were at about 1200 feet MSL; and had little or no time for evasive action. I believe that these balloons were launched from the ground to celebrate the beginning of the [a] bicycle race. Fortunately; no balloons struck the aircraft. We reported the incident on the UNICOM frequency to warn other aircraft. There was no NOTAM for the event that took place in the vicinity of the airport (Lakeville; MA). Suggest these types of events deserve either a NOTAM or should be prohibited at distance close to an airport.

AA5B pilot reported encountering a large number of balloons in flight that had been released in the vicinity of his destination; PYM.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We held at VULAM and then were cleared to intercept the 300 radial BOG inbound to SKBO. There were several other aircraft holding and one aircraft a few miles ahead of us starting their approach. The Controller gave us decreasing speeds to fly until she assigned us 170 KTS at least 15 miles out. She gave us a heading to intercept the LOC [at] and descended us to 12;000 FT and cleared us for the approach. She did not tell us to maintain an altitude until on the LOC. When she cleared us for the approach the pilot not flying cleaned up the approach which deleted visual representation of the BOG VOR. The intercept heading was not getting us to the LOC so we turned 10 degrees more toward the LOC course. At some point we discussed staying at 12;000 FT or descending. We mistakenly decided to start a descent lower. I believe the high airport elevation and the fact that we were at 12;000 FT contributed to a lack of realization that we needed to stay at 12;000 FT until we were closer in on the LOC. We had thoroughly briefed staying at 12;000 FT until over the BOG VOR but since we were not flying to the VOR and we had cleaned up the approach we lost some situational awareness (SA) as to our location relative to the BOG VOR. As we decided to start down toward 10;000 FT we were VMC the entire time and I used VS to start a slow (less than 1;000 FPM) rate of descent. I had the surrounding terrain in sight and I was also watching the aircraft ahead of us on TCAS because we were close in altitude. I had visual of the surrounding terrain at all times and did not think we were descending too rapidly. At approximately 11;000 FT I decided to slow the rate of descent (ROD) more. About this same time the Controller asked us if we were VMC and said she had wanted us to maintain 12;000 FT until we were on the approach. About this same time we received a GPWS terrain warning and I started a slow climb and added a little power due to the fact we had all terrain in sight. We leveled off and intercepted the glide path with no further incidence. We called the ATC facility when we blocked in and they discussed what happened with the Captain. They said there would be no further reports or action taken.This event was caused by a combination of factors which include[flight] crew error and communication problems with ATC. We should have stayed at 12;000 FT until we were past the BOG VOR. I take full responsibility in this mistake and should have kept better situational awareness of my location on the approach. I think it would also be helpful if there was a solid black line under the 12;000 FT description on the approach chart at the BOG VOR. This should be a hard altitude and usually a hard altitude on an approach is underlined in black. We briefed the altitudes on the approach but in hind sight we should have also talked more about what DME to start out of 12;000 FT so that if we weren't over the BOG VOR we would still know where to start our descent.

An air carrier on a vector to intercept the SKBO Runway 31 LOC descended toward 10;000 FT before the BOG VOR but climbed after recieving an EGPWS terrain warning concurrent with an ATC request for current flight conditions.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Pushback was completed with both engines running. Ground crew was unable to release the tow bar. Ask if I would release the parking brake to relieve the pressure on the tow bar. I did. They moved the Aircraft then asked to set brakes but the Aircraft was still moving. I told him to stop the push; he continued to say set brakes. Then I figured out he had released the tow bar. I stopped the Aircraft from moving; set brakes. No injury and Aircraft damage. We had a 90 minute delay due to cargo loading. Ground crew not following SOP. The ground crew needs to review SOP; also have a mindset of not having the urgency to rushing.

Air carrier Pilot reported the push back ground crew disconnected the tow bar without advising the flight crew; resulting in the uncontrolled aircraft rolling on the ramp.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

When given descent [from FL370] noticed airspeed indicators (all three) were giving false readings. SAT at this altitude was -49 degrees. We could hear airspeed increasing as descent began; but airspeed indicators were indicating decreasing speed. The indications decreased at the same rate on all three indicators (CA; FO and Stby). The Stby was the first to clear itself followed by the CA at approx FL290; then finally the FO at approx FL250. When noticed condition used AOM volume 1 and looked up unreliable airspeed charts for EMJ 145 idle descent. Before putting charts to use airspeed indications started to return to normal. Charts were kept handy and used to verify readings during remainder of descent. Declared an emergency with ATC. Continued descent to destination. Weather was VFR for landing. Landed runway 18 uneventfully and notified dispatch and maintenance.

The flight crew of an EMB-145 suffered the temporary loss of all three airspeed indicators while at FL370.  During the subsequent descent all three returned to normal operation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Type 10550

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

On takeoff climb from ZZZ at 300 FT AGL and 160 KIAS; the Stall Warning Stick Shaker activated for approximately five seconds. I pushed forward on the stick as the PM confirmed that the flaps and airspeed were both set and correct. Pitch attitude was decreased from eight degrees to five degrees; which resulted in the aircraft accelerating to 180 KIAS. Flaps were set at 5 with a green light. The Flap Transient Light did not illuminate. After the stall indication stopped; we continued the takeoff and departure without any further stall issues. While still flying the departure to our destination; we called ZZZ Ops and verified the load sheet numbers were correct. After looking in the QRH and not finding any guidance; I decided to increase our landing weight; for performance computer calculations; to just below max landing weight. By using 109;500 pounds (which was the per-calculated landing weight on the Release) we eliminated the possibility of setting a final approach speed which was too slow. This procedure ensured we did not have a Weight and Balance Issue. After landing; we asked for a bag check audit to confirm our load sheet numbers. Our Zero Fuel Weight numbers were found to be 300 pounds low; which would not cause our indications. A logbook writeup was accomplished and Maintenance was notified.

A B737 flight crew experienced a stall warning stick shaker shortly after takeoff. The pilot flying lowered the nose and the stick shaker stopped. The crew verified that the flaps and airspeed were set and correct. They continued to their destination; wrote up the event; and notified Maintenance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

We had an unscheduled aircraft swap and I had not eaten since [early morning] and was starting to feel somewhat weak; and felt the need to acquire nutritious food. So on my way from one gate to the other; I stopped off to get food at an eatery that had NO LINE; and was able to get food quickly. [I] went directly to my gate and after eating some of my sandwich; shortly after I began feeling better. This is a reoccurring issue/problems happening with many co-workers; sometimes on a flight duty day as long as 10 hours. We can be subject to disciplinary action due to delay of flight. Either build time in the pairing schedule or time between flights to get food after 5+ hours without the possibility of disciplinary action being taken; when we have many times NO opportunity to get food during up to a 10 hour duty day.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported difficulty in finding time to acquire and consume food between flights.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

Flights were being diverted to Sector 26; to go to MIA on the west side. Due to volume they shut us off leaving Sector 40 with around 7 MIA landers that needed to be placed on hold. An air carrier was given a heading to fly to the holding fix. The pilot was unable to comply with the heading; he said it on the frequency and then on guard but when he said it on frequency I didn't hear it and I don't think anyone else heard it. He turned the opposite way to the holding fix and got together with company descending and going to the holding fix. Revise the way we train and practice for the Tracker Position. In at least 3 instances conflict alert was activated on the scope and between me; Tracker and D Side nobody saw the conflict until the conflict alert activated. I think that needs to be revised.

I was asked to track at Sector R40. When I arrived all MIA arrivals were going to Sector 26 with 15 miles in trail. Everything look OK; but the aircraft had to go just south of the weather to go to [Runway] 26...except for the first aircraft all the others were on vectors to get in line (15 in trail). After taking two airplanes Sector 26 called to say they could take no more and that we had to hold/keep our airplanes. The problem was that our airplanes were 'trapped' south of the weather.Sector R40 is a very complex and busy sector on a normal sunny day. When you add weather and deviations you need to have a Tracker sooner. Also flow control should have kept a watch on Sector 26 and I think they should have divided our traffic (normally busy enough for one sector) into R26 and R1. Two different areas; it is very hard to execute a plan from flow control around weather and then when you are in the weather to say 'go back and hold in your airspace' just because of saturation. I can see emergency or equipment issues but saturation you can see that coming; to not plan or come up with ideas on how to ameliorate it is troubling.Sector R40 every day [evening commute] is the most complex sector in ZMA. There should be procedures (flow) to mitigate problems with weather get every sector who feeds R40 to provide spacing; get Havana center to help with MIA arrivals and I have seen Supervisor reroute departures around R40 to help the controllers (its normally an arrival problem).

Two ZMA Controllers describe the workload during a heavy late afternoon MIA arrival period with weather.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 27

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Total 542

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Practicing landings and flight pattern. As practicing the landing I was told to pull quickly for the flare process of the plane and caused a miscommunication as to pull on the yolk quicker. With the miscommunication caused the airplane to balloon and land on the nose wheel hard and causing internal damage to the nose wheel internals; ripping almost all the screws off the nose wheel screws keeping it attached to the plane. After the incident the instructor took control of the plane and went on a go-around and landed the plane with the nose being as high off ground as possible.

I was instructing my student on landing; focusing on the timing of flaring. He flared too much; which made him balloon. And to correct for it; he pushed down on the control to bring the nose down and landed nose first. The process was too quick for me to intervene. I heard a cracking sound as the nose wheel touched down on the runway. I executed a go around and made a soft field landing; wheelbarrowing the plane all the way down to the taxiway connected to our flight school's entrance. When I exited the plane; I visibly verified that the nose strut was sitting abnormally. I alerted our maintenance tech; who has verified that the nose strut was damaged.

C172 student and instructor pilots reported a hard landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Immediately after takeoff; the horizontal trim failed. Neither pilot could activate the electric trim. The manual trim wheels were used to keep the aircraft in a trimmed condition; though with a significant amount of difficulty possibly due to the trim motor clutching against the manual inputs. The Stabilizer Trim Inoperative QRH procedures were followed.  [We advised ATC] and the flight returned to ZZZ for an uneventful flaps 15 landing.I don't know why the electric horizontal trim failed. I do know that the manual trim was significantly more difficult to operate during this event than it had been in previous instances where I've had to use the manual trim wheels. The aircraft was never too far out of trimmed condition; but a strong binding was felt as we rotated the trim wheels. It was suggested to me after the event that this binding sensation was in fact the trim motor 'clutching' against the manual inputs.  I'm not a strongman; but I worry that two smaller; weaker pilots might have found themselves in extremis.Figure out why the manual trim wheels felt as if they were binding; and correct that design condition.

Everything that occurred prior to the time we became aware of the Stab trim failure was normal and uneventful. Shortly after Takeoff; the Captain said his stab trim didn't seem to be working and asked me to check mine.  My stab trim was also inoperative. There were no other secondary issues. We continued with the departure while reviewing/going through the Stabilizer Trim Inoperative procedure. Once we had gone through the QRH procedure; we [advised ATC] and returned uneventfully to ZZZ where we wrote up the problem. We were given a new airplane about an hour later and continued our trip to ZZZ1. Cause; unknown maintenance issue.

Flight crew reported horizontal trim became inoperative with binding when attempting to use manual trim wheels. Flight crew elected to perform an air turn back.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Other / Unknown

I was PM.  On initial climb passing 1;500 feet there was no power reduction as programmed on T/O page X.  I reached up and manually reduced power then checked T/O page X to find it was in fact still programmed properly. Passing 3;000 feet the speed bug did not bug up for flap retraction.  That is when I realized VNAV was not selected. I selected VNAV.  We retracted the flaps on schedule and continued the flight to destination.I have low experience with only 40 hours on the aircraft.  My Relief Pilot also was not yet consolidated and my FO just recently consolidated.  I must have incorrectly responded 'checked' to the 'MCP' challenge on the before Start checklist and missed that VNAV was not selected.Fly more often.  But hard to do under COVID. Be more deliberate in accomplishing checklist especially at the gate before airborne when stress and task demand is low.

Departing ZZZZ at 1;500 feet power did not reduce to climb power. The Captain checked the takeoff pg X for altitudes; they were correct. At 3;000 feet the speed bug did not bug up for cleanup; that's when the Captain realized VNAV was not engaged. He engaged VNAV and I called for flap retraction on schedule.Cause - Recency in right seat. Monitoring. Refrain from staying heads down in the checklist. Confirm selected items.

Air Carrier flight crew reported not following SOPs during the takeoff and departure phase and forgetting to select VNAV mode resulting in a delayed flap retraction. Captain stated lack of flying contributed to the event.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight departed with 500 lbs less than planned/released. Release FOB was to be 22.7 and pushed with 22.5. Load planning sent a fuel slip for less fuel than what the flight was planned for. This is becoming a issue of safety of aircraft getting less fuel than released by dispatch without a phone call from Central Load Planning (CLP); station or pilot.The flight needs to be fueled to the released FOB per dispatch. If there is a discrepancy a phone call needs to be made. No one is speaking to one another and CLP is constantly shorting us fuel.

Flight Dispatcher reports that Central Load Planning is routinely sending fuel slips to flight crews for less fuel than called for on the dispatch release; and the crews are accepting it without question.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

This report is not connected to an event. It is something I have observed and consider a potential threat that I want to highlight. I have observed there are many locations on many airports where multiple stop bars are in close proximity to each other. As far as I know; there is no source document available that lets me know while taxiing which stop bar to use. The threat becomes that any plane could be stopped at the wrong stop bar and not allow sufficient wingtip clearance for a taxiing aircraft on a crossing taxiway. This situation develops when two stop bars are installed near each other for opposite direction traffic. For example; at EWR on Taxiway J there are two stop bars installed between taxiways S and R; one for each direction of travel to hold a taxiing plane short of the upcoming crossing taxiway inbound and outbound. They are so close that there could be an over lap and the possibility of stopping at the wrong one leaving insufficient clearance for a taxiing aircraft on a crossing taxiway. Another situation that poses this threat is a location where multiple taxiways converge. Stop bars are installed to provide clearance for each taxiway. Again it can be difficult to know which is the correct stop bar to use. An example here is again at EWR taxiing northbound on R. As you approach the B1 and L intersection there are as many as 4 stop bars in close proximity. Stopping at the wrong one many leave a risk of insufficient clearance from another aircraft.

An Air Carrier Captain reported stop bars placed in close proximity to each other at EWR causes confusion and stopping at the wrong one could block another aircraft's taxi route.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

While on approach to runway XXL; we experienced an Right Engine Oil Bypass message on our upper DU [Display Unit]. After identifying the message and performing the checklist for the warning message; we were directed to perform the engine shutdown checklist. After doing so; we [advised ATC]; and continued to configure the aircraft for a single engine approach. We landed on runway XXL; were met by ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting) and after being inspected by ARFF; we taxied to the gate without further incident.

First Officer reported a right engine oil bypass message; which led to shutting down the engine and landing with only one operational engine.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

The Captain (CA) was the Pilot Flying (PF) and described an abnormal feel of aileron movement while airborne. CA briefly gave control to me to confirm; which felt like a partial binding in the system when the yoke was moved from center to about 1/4 deflection right bank position.Past that area and left deflection felt normal. The abnormal [feel] was not a roll jam as roll control was fully possible; and the QRH had no applicable procedures. CA made contact with Dispatch and Maintenance and the decision was made to continue the flight. ATC [was advised] as a precaution because we were unsure of the cause of the abnormal feel; and whether it would worsen with speed/altitude/configuration changes during approach and landing. The approach and landing were uneventful and the abnormal feel was not present on the ground with no air loading on the flight control surfaces.

Reporter stated that this is an unusual occurrence and has never felt this before. It felt like a high resistance until past the 1/4 turn then felt normal. Reporter stated it checked okay on the ground; it only occurred after the aircraft was in flight and pressurized. The reporter also stated that Maintenance said it checked okay then a subsequent crew wrote it up again. The reporter doesn't know the present disposition of the aircraft presently or; if repaired; what the repair was.

Embraer 175 the flight crew felt a partial binding of aileron control when the yoke was moved from center to the right about 1/4 deflection.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

This flight was originally scheduled to be a type X aircraft; but was downgraded to a type Y aircraft. One of the Customer Service Reps asked me if they could use the blocked seats; X5 and X6 because first was booked with too many people and they would have to downgrade two passengers. I said no; X5 is my assigned jumpseat due to the FAA exemption guide due to COVID. My normal jumpseat is X5 inboard; but the exemption reference guide has my assigned jumpseat as seat X12 for this aircraft. There were three agents working the flight. Boarding was chaotic as they were trying to depart to as close on time (the aircraft swap made the flight late) as possible. The door was closed quickly and there were two passengers sitting in seats X5 and X6. I asked them if they were assigned those seats; because when I looked 20 minutes prior they were still blocked in my link. They had boarding passes that gave them those seats; so I had to sit in my normal jumpseat of X12 inboard. I was specifically asked about it and I said no; so I'm not sure why two passengers were placed in those seats and how those seats were able to be unblocked in the first place.

Flight Attendant reported being displaced from the seats assigned due to COVID-19 changes; by passengers assigned to the seats.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

During descent into ZZZ1 we leveled at 6;000 feet and as the power increased we noticed a dirty sock smell that lasted for approximately 1 to 2 minutes. When the power reduced again as the descent continued the odor dissipated. The flight attendants noticed it in both the forward and aft cabin in flight. Once at the gate when the APU bleed was selected the odor returned although it was much less noticeable. Possible problem with the APU causing some sort of contamination in the packs. This has been a continuing issue that the company has been working to correct. Apparently more needs to be done to prevent these types of fume exposures to both passengers and crew.

A320 Captain reported a temporary fumes event of 'dirty socks' smell during landing approach. Odor returned at gate arrival.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

While I was performing a test of the VOR accuracy; Systems mechanics started the process of locking out the spoilers on both wings as part of the normal docking procedures. This procedure involves 3 mechanics; 1 mechanic on each wing and 1 mechanic in the flight deck responsible to run all 3 hydraulics systems at the same time and moving the flight controls to the needed positions. The mechanic in the flight deck is there as a safety measure to secure the flight controls so they will not be inadvertently moved. The mechanics on each wing wait for the Spoilers/Speed Brakes on each wing to hydraulically move to the full up position and then they install locks on the mechanisms to prevent them from coming to the down and stowed position.I was sitting in the captain's seat going through of my work card which involves aligning the IRUs (Inertial Reference Unit) but does not require hydraulics when the Systems mechanic assigned to the flight deck entered; sat in the first observer's seat and announced to me what he was preparing to do. He asked if their assigned duties would interfere with mine; since no hydraulics were required on my work card; I said it was OK for them to do theirs in conjunction with mine.After getting the proper clearance; he pressurized all 3 hydraulics systems and moved the Speed Brake handle to the full up position and sat there securing the flight controls while the other 2 mechanics were on both wings installing the lockout devices. About 10 minutes later; I finished my work card and the 2 mechanics on the wings were up under the Ailerons on each wing installing the locks.The last step on my work card stated to remove power from the IRUs. I asked if this would affect his task and we could find nothing to indicate this would be an issue. After I turned off the last of the 3 IRU switches; the Speed Brake handle automatically moved all the way to the down and locked position. This un-commanded flight control movement happened while 2 mechanics were working on each wing in an extremely dangerous area and had no warning. This was a near miss not an injury.Causes:1. Work Cards need to have warnings about un-commanded flight control movement.2. Add a step to Work Cards to tag out the Auto Speed Brake breaker G11 on the pilots overhead (P11) panel. This breaker disables the Auto Brake Actuator ensuring the Speed brakes will not move unless manually commanded to do so.3. Add a step to the Aircraft Maintenance Manual procedure to say 'Open Auto Speed Brake breaker G11 on the P11 Panel.When Work Cards are being assigned on all 767 aircraft; there is a possibility of uncommanded flight control movement anytime the aircraft is put into air mode and pulling the G11 breaker is a proactive measure to ensure the workers safety.

B767 Maintenance Technician reported that when the last of the 3 IRU switches were turned off the spoilers were un-commanded to the down position while maintenance personnel were installing up-locks to the spoilers.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

While working approach for the satellite airports; Aircraft X had been released IFR with the previous controller. Several flights of fighters were inbound for their recoveries back to HIF. I misjudged the climb rate characteristics for Aircraft X and had anticipated them to climb at a faster rate than they did. They were assigned a vector to join the airway; climbing. Traffic was issued to Aircraft Y; 4/fighters several times and also to Aircraft X. The conflict alert did not go off. When the fighters were 4NM west; I answered another flight checking in instead of issuing a traffic alert. I felt the projected flight path of the fighters was behind that of Aircraft X. However; after reviewing the tape I recognized that I did not see the wingman's primary target pass directly below Aircraft X. At the crossing point; Aircraft X was at 8100 feet and Aircraft Y flight indicated 7600 feet. I do not know what altitude the wingman who passed below Aircraft X was. The pilot of that aircraft called to report a NMAC. Consider aircraft characteristics more appropriately. Maintain a more diligent scan.

S56 controller reports of a NMAC caused by an un-anticipated climb rate of one aircraft and the possible altitude deviation of a flight of four aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10100; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 125

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Human Factors

During landing an over-run occurred. The weather reported winds of 190 at 8 knots; with variable direction.  We were stabilized before the final approach fix.  Upon landing the wind switched to a right crosswind (less than 10 knots).  I applied max thrust reverse and moderate braking. Because of unforeseen standing water the anti-skid was activated and minimal braking was possible and we also encountered hydroplaning.  We exited the end of the runway into a dirt clearway at a very low speed; approximately 5-10 knots. Hard compact dirt allowed me to stop the aircraft within about 10-20 feet. No damage occurred. The aircraft was towed back onto the taxiway.

Gulfstream flight crew reported hydroplaning during their landing rollout which led to a runway overrun.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While departing Moscow; Russia on the BESTA 25E departure we were climbing to 900 meters (3;000 FT). While beginning to level at 900 meters we were given a clearance for a right turn direct to BESTA when able. This clearance was followed shortly after with a clearance to climb to FL050. But the language barrier caused us to question the right turn and ask for the instructions again. The Controller repeated the right turn direct to BESTA instructions and climb to FL050. The transition level was FL050. The aircraft was being hand flown at this time and we were completing the initial turn towards BESTA when another climb clearance was given to FL060. The Pilot Not Flying was busy completing the direct to BESTA in the FMS while also making the heading changes and altitude changes. We initially took off in LNAV but had to switch to heading to establish the turn towards BESTA then switch back to LNAV again. The speed was being held at 200 KTS so the turn radius would be smaller because of protected airspace in the area; but we were climbing at a faster rate. As we were approaching FL060 the Controller directed us to descend to FL060. It was then that we discovered that we had inadvertently not made the change from QFE to QNE of 1013. Very quickly the Pilot Not Flying switched both altimeters to standard QNE and we returned to FL060. There was no other communication from the Controller other than the subsequent frequency change. No TA or RA occurred. The flight was completed uneventfully. Suggestions: While we included the Transition Level in our pre-departure briefing; a more thorough discussion is necessary; highlighting to differences transitioning from meters to Flight Level and from QFE to QNE all at the same time. The immediate switch for our flight from a QFE of 992mb to a QNE of 1013mb was a 630 FT difference though we did not miss our altitude by that much. Additionally I would plan to activate the auto pilot at the earliest possible time in a busy work load and unfamiliar environment. This would allow the various duties to be divided more equally during the climbout; allowing for a more enhanced collective situational awareness. Also; possibly remaining on the SID may have facilitated a more manageable pace.

G-V Captain reported deviating from assigned altitude departing UUEE; with the language barrier being a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 1667; Flight Crew Type 26

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During normal cruise; red CAS message came on; LOW PRESS; along with automatic display of of EMER Descent checklist on DU4. Cabin Pressure differential was seen as abnormally low; cabin altitude indicated 17;000 ft.; did not match pilot perception. Oxygen masked were donned according to SOP and Checklists; Pilots requested lower with ATC; leaving FL430 for FL360. at FL360; the pilots were troubleshooting the problem; and switched from ADC [Air Data Computer] #1 to ADC#2. This prompted the cabin differential pressure to rise again to a normal level. Flight was continued at FL360 to destination with no further issues.

First Officer reported ADC (Air Data Computer) #1 failure affected the cabin pressurization system; requiring a descent and a switch to #2 ADC; which restored cabin pressure control.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

During the final segment of the approach phase on short final; we hear gear up at 960 feet RA. Captain told Pilot Monitoring to put the gear down and decided to continue to land. We decided it was safer to land rather to do the balked landing.I believe the cause of the event was fatigue and complacency. I felt a little tired and did not scan and confirm Captain checklist items that were called for. It was night time with turbulence and at a critical phase of flight were several things were happening at the same time.I need to be more aware of confirming actual checklist items at critical phases of flight and scanning everything looks good when the Captain is focused on flying the aircraft into ZZZ.

Air carrier First Officer reported fatigue and procedural deviations led to the landing gear not being lowered per the checklist resulting in an unstabilized approach.


Work Cards; Inspection; Installation; Repair; Testing

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

While taxiing back from engine runs; brakes failed. Emergency brake was used to stop aircraft. Root cause was the PWR Brake System CB popped/disengaged. Vendor had the aircraft out on the taxiway for Engine 5 point-capped runs due to RH engine change. When returning to the company hangar in ZZZ; they were following Operations. While getting ready to turn off the taxiway; the low brake pressure annunciator light came on. The Technician checked the brakes and found no brakes were present. They then turned the aircraft back to the taxi with Operations and slowly stopped the aircraft with the emergency brake. No aircraft damage; no one hurt; and stopped a slow rate using the TR (Thrust Reverser) system to not flat-spot the tires with a sudden stop.Operations went to the aircraft and stopped aircraft movement until Vendor got the tug on site and pulled the aircraft to the hangar. Once inside the hangar; the nose area was inspected due to the statements that there was fluid coming out of the nose area. After reviewing; it was the fluid in the lines that was blown out when the emergency brake was pulled and was coming out of the drain only. Inspected the LH and RH gear; no leaks were noted. Opened the MCD (Mode Control Display) and noticed the PWR BRKS CB was not engaged and the anti-skid was in the off position. Technician did not know the CB was popped.

Maintenance Manager reported a brake failure during the taxi back from maintenance engine runs due to popped circuit breakers. The emergency brakes were used to stop the aircraft and it was towed back to the hangar.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were assigned to do a flight covered by a Special Maintenance (MX) Ferry Permit -- technically an Operational Check Flight (OCF) in accordance with the Non Routine Flight Operation (NRFO) manual. Both of us are not NRFO pilots and the flight was classified as a Group I flight.The open discrepancy was related to the HYD system -- particularly; a discrepancy when the flaps are raised to Flaps 0. The original Ferry Permit included two limitations: No icing conditions and speed below 200 KTS. However; once reviewing the MX logbook I realized that the MX sign-off for the ferry flight included a statement that the flaps were preset to Flaps 7 -- the usual configuration prior to engine-start is Flaps 0. I contacted the Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) to confirm what the intended parameters of the flight should be. The ACP thought we were free to utilize the flaps as needed aside from raising it to Flaps 0; however; he wanted to confer with MX first. Turns out; MX wanted us to maintain Flaps 7 configuration throughout the flight -- to include landing. Upon the receipt of said information; I asked for a revised Special MX Ferry Permit that includes the additional limitation.Upon flight deck pre-flight inspection we noticed the flaps were indeed set to Flaps 7; however; the Flap Control CB was pulled and collared. I reviewed the log-book again to find whether a notation was made related to the pulling and securing of said CB. None was found. Therefore; I contacted the ACP again for clarification. The 'Air Boss' indicated that the CB should not be pulled and collared and that no MX procedure exists for doing so.Once MX rectified the CB situation and completed another inspection and [logbook] entry as to the safe condition of the aircraft and a proper Special MX Ferry Permit in hand we departed on the short flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1.We planned on utilizing the Abnormal/Emergency Checklist for this flight -- Flaps Inoperative Approach and Landing -- as it is the only data and checklist we have for a partial flap landing. The normal procedures checklist does not address partial flap landings. Furthermore; neither dispatch; nor; iPreFlight performance calculator have data for Flaps 7 landing. No briefing by the Company was conducted to advise/instruct us to utilize said Abnormal/Emergency Checklist. What safety implications would it have had in case we didn't think ahead and plan accordingly -- I.e. Systemically; what are the chances the next crew won't remember to do so?Initially; an alternate was needed for the flight. Dispatch wanted to send us to ZZZ1 which has a shorter runway; without the accurate data the dispatcher had no way of knowing what we would need. We asked the alternate to be filled for ZZZ3 instead that would have had a much greater margin of error for such a NRFO operation.Finally; after asking for Flaps 7 takeoff data from Dispatch on more than a few phone calls; Dispatch released us with Flaps 15 takeoff data instead. We confirmed via iPreFlight locally what takeoff performance as well as landing performance we needed prior to launch; however; it did not decrease our workload; and; from a systemic stand point; would other crews have done the same 100% of the time?The question that I have; why are the crews seemly the only safety/regulatory valve for such a NRFO operation? This Company has an accepted/approved Safety Management System program/manual; it would be my hope that the crews would not be the only safety/regulatory valve in the system. Particularly; as neither one of the assigned crew was a NRFO crew.

Captain of a Non Routine Flight Operation reported his thoughts on maintenance procedures for compliance with a maintenance ferry flight for an aircraft with a flap issue.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X; ZZZ; First Officer leg; source on the right side and flaps 3 takeoff Runway XX. On climb out; ZZZ departure; we were assigned a turn and climb (heading 320/15;000 ft.). Climb profile was normal. Flap retraction was occurring normally with the autopilot engaged. After the flap lever was moved to 0 the speed bug remained below the barber pole but the aircraft accelerated. The aircraft then gave the audible 'high speed' alert. Situation was corrected by assuming control; disengaging the autopilot; increasing pitch and reducing thrust. Maintenance and Dispatch were notified through ACARS and a log book entry was made. Situation briefed and priority handling requested due to 0 flap landing. Taxi to Gate and engine shutdown were also uneventful. Inspection by Maintenance revealed no damage to the aircraft.

Flight crew reported a failure and overspeed of the trailing edge flaps during climb. Crew continued with priority handling to their destination where an inspection by maintenance was made.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The passenger in XXD was sick due to turbulence or other related factors and started to vomit in flight. It caused a mess in the seat area and around the seat. We contacted the Captain to break open the Universal Precaution Kit (UPK). We used the UPK to clean up around the seat and dispose of human waste in the biohazard bag.

Flight Attendant reported opening UPK (Universal Precaution Kit) to clean up and dispose of human waste in the biohazard bag.