Air Conditioning and Pressurizaton Probes & Sensors

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Just prior to push out of ZZZ we received and Air Bleed Message. Maintenance interrogated the system and MEL'd the message iaw MEL XX-XX. Enroute the Purser called and stated 'we have an issue; in reviewing our manual we have a Class A fume event in the forward galley. It smells like dirty gym socks.' I've had fume events in the past and I know the ramifications to the safety of the crew and passengers. We also have received good training during [Flight Attendant Training]. In the cockpit we didn't smell anything. All three flight attendants confirmed the same smell. With a Jump seat rider in the cockpit; I made the decision to take a quick bathroom break. Upon reaching the front right galley is was prevalent; mild and persistent. Upon returning to the cockpit I had the purser remain in the cockpit. I used air cell to call Dispatch and maintenance. With pilots; purser; dispatch and maintenance all on the phone call we jointly made the decision it's best to divert to a suitable airport. Over the vicinity of ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 we evaluated diversions to outstations; continue to ZZZ4 or ZZZ5. We were 570 miles from ZZZ4 and 240 from ZZZ5. Knowing ZZZ5 was just as close as spiraling down from FL380 and the aircraft would be grounded; we took into consideration passengers re-accomodation; medical response; inflight support and aircraft replacement. ZZZ5 was the best option and the joint decision was made to proceed to ZZZ5. I asked the First Officer (F/O) to [request priority] from ATC and we proceeded direct to a fix on ILS [Runway] XXR and landed and taxied to the Gate. With the jump seater being pregnant and the review of other events where fumes become hard to smell after long exposure; I requested everyone in cockpit to wear oxygen. I ran through QRC and [other procedures] multiple times to make sure we didn't miss any steps. Managing and reassessing the issue I think we did a pretty thorough job. I even turned on APU and ran bleeds to trouble shoot and nothing was working. The smell persisted in a mild to moderate amount especially in descent according to Flight Attendants (F/As). The purser had F/As rotate to mitigate one persons exposure. With a full aircraft we couldn't move anyone. Upon landing and shutting down we de-masked and opened up flight door. The first officer immediately noticed the smell and we left shortly after securing the aircraft.  I was not aware that the F/As had on the previous leg noticed any smell. They all reported after the event that the dirty socks smell was present on the previous flight. When I took over the aircraft I was again blind sided by this. The F/A in aft galley even said she replaced her socks thinking it was her feet. So my suggestion is to continue to encourage communications from the cabin and have these experiences validated and documented even if there is the slightest question to certain smells. I don't know if the Air Bleed message would have an impact on this event but if so maybe adding instructions to confirm with crew no odors prior to MEL. Having these Name (Purser) able to locate his references on his tablet was huge in assisting me with my QRH.

In cruise Flight Attendant (FA) reported odor in galley. Ran QRH odor in cabin; Captain (CA) Flight Attendant (FA); Dispatch; Maintenance Control agreed best course of action divert to ZZZ5 as best suitable airport for landing. Received priority diverted direct ZZZ5; landed without incident.

A319 flight crew reported a fume event occurred during cruise; resulting in a diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 5000

The pre-departure flight planning began with all the pilots participating. All of the paperwork was reviewed; and everything appeared normal. The Captain made the required call to Dispatch; and nothing new was brought to his attention. The Captain walked out to the aircraft before the rest of the crew as he had a family member trying to accompany us on the flight. Right as we were about to leave flight ops; the Captain returned and informed us that our aircraft was not at the gate. Our aircraft was still on the ground in ZZZ; but was about to takeoff. With our lack of training on the new computer system; none of us knew how to find out if our aircraft had become airborne yet. Therefore; we were not capable of knowing exactly when to expect the aircraft at the gate. Even so; with our planned flight time of 14:24 and 1:30 briefing time; we were already at 15:54 for our duty period; thereby giving the company; 1:06 for our 17-hour flight duty limit. Right as the Captain was to call Dispatch to find out what was going on. The Chief Pilot; called to speak with the Captain to find out when our 19-hours was up! The Captain and the Chief Pilot had a conversation on whether the decision to waive only required the Captain's concurrence or did each individual pilot have to waive. The Captain said he would discuss it with the crew and get back to the Chief Pilot. As the Captain relayed the conversation; I informed him that I was not going to extend my duty period even if he and the Chief Pilot agreed to. At that point; the Captain queried whether I signed the Fit to Fly box. I told him that I had; but with that; I was agreeing to fly to 17-hours (or 17:30 if the company extended). Therefore; I timed out at XA:11 or XA:41 respectively. The Captain called the Chief Pilot back as we were walking out to the aircraft. At that point; the aircraft was just arriving at the gate. The Chief Pilot stated that the company was going to exercise their 30-minute extension. He was informed that I was not willing to extend. He queried as to why not? I informed him that the union; the company; and the FAA agreed with the scientific research that established FAR 117 which states 17-hour is the Flight Duty Period for a double augmented crew. He stated that the FAR 117 also says the crew member may extend up to 19-hours. I agreed that it did; however; if the data had supported 19-hours then the Flight Duty Period would have been 19 hours but it was not. By this time; it was XA:35; and the decision was made to cancel the flight.

B747 First Officer; as part of a double augmented crew; elects to decline the duty period extension required (17 to 19 hours) for a late departing flight and the flight is canceled.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 600

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Weather at ZZZ was Broken to Overcast about 2;000 with VCSH.We were being vectored for an ILS XXR and were approximately 5 miles on a downwind at 2;000 feet on the autopilot/flt director. Approach had told us we could have visual if we say the airport. My passenger and I had been looking for it in vain and I kept thinking that I knew where it was but there was a shower or lower hanging clouds preventing me from seeing it. I requested lower to increase my visibility and was cleared to 1;500.Although I couldn't see the airport; I had good ground contact and made my first mistake by requesting a Contact Approach which was granted. I turned to the north and began searching for the runway/airport that I had been into many times (second mistake was overconfidence). To my surprise; the GS then showed me high and the LOC came alive. Third mistake was believing these indications and attempting to follow them and failing to see the flickering NAV flag. Third mistake was listening to my passenger who kept saying that he thought we were too far north. At this point with me about 700 feet and heading east; tower gave me a low altitude alert and advised a tall tower about 1 mile ahead.Then I initiated an immediate climb and turn to the right advising tower that this was going to work. They told me to climb back to 2;000 feet; turn to 280 and recontact ZZZ1 approach. Oddly enough; after doing this and engaging the autopilot again; it tripped off twice and began a descent until it finally calmed down. Approach vectored me to toward the final approach course and asked if I had the other aircraft ahead in sight. I advised that I probably did but was a bit 'gun shy' at this point to accept a visual to which they said no problem and vectored me for an intercept and cleared for the approach. The remainder was normal. Approach and tower were excellent. Tower asked after landing what happened; did I lose sight of the airport or the ground. I advised that I had never lost sight of the ground but was essentially 'lost' and never could find the airport.Physiologically; I allowed myself to talk myself into requesting a Contact Approach to a situation where it was not warranted in an effort to shave off some time due to a prior late departure due to passengers arriving late. I also had convinced myself that the airport and runway would mysteriously appear once I got beyond or below the next cloud. Approach was attempting to be accommodating by offering a Visual IF I saw the airport. Technologically; I failed to use all of my equipment. In retrospect; I should have had my iPad on my lap with the map expanded to know EXACTLY how far from the airport that I was prior to even thinking about a Contact Approach. I probably could have put the #2 radio on the ILS as well and switched the VOR/LOC on the Garmin 530 back to GPS which would have provided me a needle on my HSI independent of where I was relative to the ILS and GS transmitters with their inherent angular limitations.With many years of flying experience; I still can't believe that I did anything so stupid and put my passengers in such danger.

Cessna pilot reported being unable to find the airport during a contact approach; resulting in a low-altitude alert from ATC.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft returned to ZZZ for a loss of Cabin Pressurization. Altitude Alert sounded to notify crew of an emergency. Climbing through FL230; lost the cabin pressurization. Altitude Alert sounded. Captain advised First Officer (F/O) to run the check list; Captain had aircraft and radios. Requested immediate descent to MSA. Was given confirmation to descend to 14;000 ft; then continue descent to 10;000 ft. F/O and myself determined that we did not have Auto and STBY modes for cabin pressurization. For the safety of the crew and passengers; we requested a priority landing ; because I was not sure if I could maintain cabin pressurization in the Manual Mode. We returned to ZZZ; I was advised to do an operational test of the outflow valve in the manual mode by Maintenance Control. I performed a ops test of the outflow valve in the manual mode; and the ops test passed. Maintenance Control advised me that I was to MEL and DMI the cabin pressurization and dispatch the aircraft. I dispatched the aircraft under MEL.

Maintenance Technician reported the pressurization system on a B737 was inoperative in auto and standby modes.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

An Airport Vehicle asked if they could get onto Runway XXL to clear signs. I clarified if they needed go to the approach end of Runway XYR or the approach end of Runway XXL. They stated the approach end of Runway XYR. I instructed the Airport Vehicle to proceed onto the approach end of Runway XYR; and hold short of Runway XZC at all times. I received a correct read back of the hold short instructions for Runway XZC. A short time later; I attempted to reach out to the Airport Vehicle to reiterate the hold short instructions and ensure they would give way to an Airbus that I was initially going to take down Runway XYR. I did not get an answer from the Airport Vehicle. I then changed the taxi instructions for Aircraft Y to stay on the taxiway; cross Runway XZL and hold short of Runway XZC. Once I ensured that Aircraft Y was holding short of Runway XZC; and the Airport Vehicle did not appear to be moving forward; I looked down to finish processing some flight progress strips. At that time; the Supervisor on the Watch Desk asked to verify that the Airport Vehicle was holding short Runway XZC. I said he was supposed to be; keyed up and reiterated the hold short instructions. The Supervisor instructed Local Control to issue a go around for Aircraft X. The Airport Vehicle appeared to just cross the runway edge of Runway XZC on Runway XYR. They immediately reversed and exited Runway XZC; remaining on Runway XYR. Soon afterwards; I issued the brasher warning.Next time I will ensure I reiterate the hold short instructions when a vehicle is in close proximity to the active runway.

An Airport Vehicle was operating on Runway XYR; a closed runway; and instructed to hold short of Runway XZC. Aircraft X was on a short final for Runway XZC; when I noticed the Airport Vehicle was entering into Runway XZC on Runway XYR. I instructed Local Control to send Aircraft X around; which they did.More vigilance is recommended from airport vehicles.

ATC Controllers reported an airport vehicle did not hold short of the runway for landing traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Type 10500

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

While stabilized with Localizer and glideslope capture on ILS to Runway 35L at DEN; with an aircraft on parallel approach to Runway 35R; we received a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) warning. As pilot flying I disconnected autopilot and autothrottle and complied with 'Adjust Vertical Speed' RA.  I was unable to regain a stabilized approach; so I called for a missed approach to include the verbiage 'Set Missed Approach Altitude.' Tower assigned an altitude to climb to which is the reason for this report. The pilot monitoring (PM) dialed (and he believes read back) 9;000 feet in the MCP. When climbing through approximately 8;000 feet MSL; the Controller notified us he assigned 7;000 feet. The PM insisted we had been cleared to 9;000 feet. We were then assigned a departure frequency and received vectors back to Runway 35L for a landing. When ATC declared we had climbed to the wrong altitude; I thought back and could not remember what clearance was given. I must have been task saturated with the missed approach and did not adequately focus on hearing the clearance. I am fairly confident I verified 9;000 feet in the MCP; but I was not aware this was possibly the wrong altitude. I recently watched the video about the low airspeed incident during a go-around and was in the 'Yellow to Red' trying to ensure I did the steps correctly which diverted attention from hearing the clearance consciously. Perhaps a preventive measure would be mentally 'chair-flying' the steps more often so it takes less mental capacity.

During the approach to Denver; we received a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA). The Captain complied with the RA and stayed above glide path. As a result; we were unable to meet stable approach criteria by 1;000 feet. The Captain initiated the go-around. After the captain called 'Set Missed Approach Altitude'; I began running the altitude up as I called the missed approach. Tower told us to maintain runway heading and climb to 9;000 feet. I read back the clearance and reset the altitude in the MCP to 9;000 feet. As we reached 9;000 feet; Tower called us and said we had been told to maintain 7;000 feet. I actually believe we complied with our assigned clearance and the Controller made a mistake.

B737-700 flight crew receives a TCAS RA during a night IMC ILS caused by traffic on the parallel runway and complies with the RA command to reduce sink rate. This results in an unstabilized approach and a go-around. The missed approach altitude assigned by ATC is misunderstood by the First Officer resulting in an overshoot.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

When we attempted to lower the landing gear on final nothing happened. After we unsuccessfully cycled the landing gear lever three times we elected to do a go around and trouble shoot. After checking in the Flight Manual; checking for popped circuit breakers; and consulting with Maintenance we prepared for our return and successfully performed the Gravity Extension checklist on a long final.  During the conversation with Maintenance Control we were told that the same thing had happened eleven days previously. In our maintenance history the last entry went back thirteen days but there was no entry for the previous gear malfunction. This knowledge could have been quite beneficial. Our initial fuel load had us planned to land with 4.8 thousand pounds of fuel. Luckily we had increased this by 1;000 pounds prior to departure. Had we not increased the fuel load we would have had very little fuel time left to further troubleshoot our problem if the gravity extension was not successful.

An A320 flight crew was unable to lower their landing gear; initiated a go around; successfully conducted a gravity extension procedure and returned for a safe landing. Their fuel remaining could have compromised more extensive trouble shooting had the gravity extension not proven successful. A previous identical failure some 11 days before was not annotated in the logbook or in the flight crew's maintenance briefing message provided for flight planning.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

After passing URSUS and en-route direct EMABU; ATC queried us and asked if were direct UCL. I did not see UCL on our flight plan; so I asked ATC for direct EMABU; which was approved. During preflight; a partial up-link occurred. I input the SID; and manually closed the discontinuity. I then verified the route IAW procedure by reading the way points from the computer and the First Officer verified the route from the paperwork. We both missed UCL. Do not allow distractions to allow a proper verified of the flight plan entered in the FMC. PERIOD. Agent; passenger; and Gen Dec issues got in the way; and we started over three times. Unacceptable to our part. Lesson re-learned.

Pilot reported discontinuity on the route due to distractions when they were putting the route into the computer.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 1600

Time Pressure; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Evacuated

Took off from a [foreign] airfield . During the climb phase my co-pilot and I detected the presence of smoke and vapors in the cockpit. We made the determination that a issue existed ran the appropriate checklists and emergency memory items. We then prepared for a return to field which was executed without incident; once on the ground passengers were evacuated from the aircraft and the aircraft was secured. During the approach to landing phase it was discovered that the microphone portion of the captains oxygen mask was inoperative. This led to some troubleshooting in the air regarding crew communications. The microphone issue was solved utilizing hand signals and slightly amplified aural communications and commands.Perception of the issue utilizing the sense of smell alerted the flight crew to the problem at hand. Judgment from the Captain and Co-Pilot led to the return to airfield as the safest course of action. No incident or accident occurred nor was any damage sustained to persons or property.The crew communication portion was a contributing factor that was mitigated due to experienced flight crew and standard operating procedures.

Flight crew detected smoke and fumes after takeoff and returned to the departure airport where the aircraft was evacuated.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Procedure; Weather; Human Factors

I was the controller training on the sector. The traffic volume and complexity began to pick up due to turbulent ride conditions and an aircraft that I was in communication with making accidental transmissions over guard which indicated a medical problem on board. Aircraft X came onto the frequency after taking the handoff from Sector 07. Upon check-on Aircraft X asked about ride conditions at 37000 feet. I responded that 37000 feet was reporting occasional light chop and Aircraft X then requested a climb to that altitude. I observed traffic in front of Aircraft X opposite direction at 36000 feet and gave Aircraft X a clearance to climb to reach 37000 feet in 2 minutes or less. The pilot read back the clearance correctly and at this point had 40 miles of separation with 3 minutes before 5 miles of separation would be lost. At this time I began trying to gather information on what was potentially a medical emergency being broadcast over guard by another aircraft whom I also had on my frequency. Scanning back to Aircraft X the climb rate indicated he would easily make his restriction but after a few more transmissions I observed that Aircraft X had leveled out at 36600 feet. After observing this; I issued Aircraft Y a descent to 35000 feet to achieve separation but the pilot than hesitated saying; 'Descending in response to a TCAS.' Aircraft Y at this time had still not actually began a descent according to our RADAR display and my trainer than keyed up to issue a descent clearance once more. The aircraft broke required separation with 4.7 miles and 800 feet. Aircraft X reached 37000 feet 3:20 minutes after reading back the restriction. In this event; I would like that the pilot be instructed that if he cannot meet a climb restriction to advise as soon as possible so an alternative action can be taken immediately.

In cruise at 35000 feet with Center we requested a climb to 37000 feet. Center issued the following clearance. 'Climb and maintain flight level 370; be level in 2 minutes or less'. Initiated climb and started timer. At 2 minutes we had attained 36;500 feet. I informed ATC that we would not be able to make it to 37000 feet within the 2 minutes. ATC issued a clearance to a converging aircraft to descend to 35000 feet. At 36600 feet we received a TCAS RA 'monitor vertical speed'. A repeat clearance to Aircraft Y was made by ATC to descend to 35000 feet. I had Aircraft Y in sight for the entire event and verbalized this to ATC. We were able to maintain visual separation and vertical separation was never less than 500 feet.ATC issued timed climb without asking if we could accomplish it. We didn't realize that we wouldn't be able to comply until 36600 feet.

ZDV Controller and the flight crew involved reported they did not comply with a clearance to be level at an altitude in two minutes or less. A loss of separation with opposite direction traffic resulted.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 1120

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

I was entering right traffic from the north. I was midfield downwind when I heard something impact my right wing. I looked right and saw a black blur. I called the tower and reported a bird strike. I continued with a normal landing. After landing I inspected the aircraft and noticed damage to the leading edge and skin. With no bird debris on the wing; I believe I had a drone strike.

Pilot believed he had a bird strike but after landing and inspecting the aircraft determined it was a collision with a drone.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

I went to retrieve a pressure gauge for the Aircraft X oxygen system and went into supply. The drawer I opened was in location cabinet XYZ for the pressure gauge. I found the gauge I needed and when I went to close the drawer I saw another gauge there that is used for the hydraulic reservoir cap with gauge attached in the same location as a gauge we use for oxygen. This is a major safety concern with petroleum products like hydraulic fluid being near oxygen tooling and equipment can cause combustion in the right conditions.The oxygen equipment needs to be segregated from ANY hydraulic or petroleum product at all times.

Technician reported discovering oxygen  gauges intermixed with hydraulic gauges in the company tool room in the same drawer.


Workload; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

We experienced multiple failures that most likely stemmed from a primary failure of FMGC Number 1. Below is the chain of events. Based on the time stamp in the 'last leg maintenance report.' We first experienced a data hit: 'Invalid Disk/MDDU.' I noticed that the MDDU panel light came on/lit up. I thought it said; 'Ready;' then; 'Invalid Disk.' After obtaining an updated ATIS a little less then a hour before arrival; Captain changed the runway on the Number 1 FMGC; from Runway 1 to Runway 19. After the insert key was pushed; the Captain's map was lost and FMGC Number 1 froze up. The message in scratch pad said to wait. FMGC Number 2 displayed 'Independent Operation' in the scratch pad. The FMA's displayed 1FD2; and remained so for the duration of the flight. We referred to the Flight Manual and the system reset procedures. We then attempted to reset the Number 1 MCDU CB on the overhead Panel 49. This procedure restored the ACARS functions but not the FMGC. It appeared that we could only get the status page for the FMGC. Thus; no other buttons such as RAD/NAV etc would function. Note: We subsequently received a 'GPWS TERR' ECAM and secured it per the ECAM procedure. Later we attempted a second attempt to reset the Number 1 MCDU which also failed. Maintenance was notified via ACARS of the situation. We also briefed the NAV/ILS tuning to ensure we would have the ILS information displayed on both sides. Note: Prior to LOC intercept the First Officer was flying with the autopilot on. When we started to intercept the final approach course the autopilot began to turn right vs. left on the intercept. In other words; our raw data was showing that we needed to turn opposite of the FD course information. We were getting ambiguous information at a critical time on both sides. With the runway visually acquired; the First Officer turned his FD off and followed raw data. On final about 1;500 FT AGL we received a 'landing elevation fault.' The system status panel showed the elevation was zero; Captain elected to wait till after rollout to deal with CAB PR ECAM and focused on the final checklist and SOP call outs. When managed speed selected on final; we did not have a 'speed bug' on the tape. We flew the remainder of the approach without approach speed bug reference and we used the adjusted VLS plus 5 KT speed that was displayed in the MCDU; about 140 KTS. On landing rollout; the pressurization outflow valve failed closed and a CAB PR ECAM was displayed and directed us to manually open the outflow valve; which we did. Once fully open; the ECAM cleared and we taxied to the gate. Upon landing; Maintenance was briefed in detail. Maintenance told me they have received reports of bugs since the last FMGC software update was installed. I was informed that this should be corrected on the next update cycle. Maintenance also said that based on the data he downloaded from our inbound flight; it appeared we actually experienced a dual FMGC failure or full failure of Number 1 and a partial failure of Number 2 FMGC. The multiple failures of cabin pressure; etc compounded our workload at a very critical time and not to mention at the end of a red eye flight. Good review of standby navigation procedures and anomalies.

An A320 crew was notified after flight that the FMGC failure they had experienced in flight is believed caused by a 'bug' in a recent software update.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Upon departure; weather reported at HXD was winds out of the north; OVC 011 with visibility of 10SM. Captain was Pilot Flying and First Officer was Pilot Monitoring. Takeoff; climb; and cruise were normal. We set up for the RNAV (GPS) to RWY 3; winds out of the north. Approach Control gave us a descent down to 4;000 ft. and shortly thereafter; approaching 10;000 ft. on our descent; they told us 'GPS signal unreliable in the area; set up for VOR-A'. High workload environment; now below 10;000 ft.; the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) set up the approach and briefed it for me as well. The Jeppesen approach plate for the VOR-A has an MDA of 800 ft. which we briefed and flew into our otherwise normal Flaps Full landing; instead of our SOP prescribed 1;000 ft. MDA for circle-to-land approaches; which the VOR-A approach is. Also would like to note there were no NOTAMs of GPS signal unreliability. There were several casual factors. It was my first time flying into HXD. Quick flight; set up the approach we thought we were to shoot into the airport; then had a quick change of the approach in a high workload environment. It is an approach we don't normally shoot; combined with a short runway I have never been to before. The First Officer had been once before. We saw the published MDA shot the circle to land approach at the published MDA; in visual conditions. We debriefed after the flight and both realized our SOP minimums for a circle to land are higher. High workload was the main cause I would say. [I suggest] not many approaches to be flown into HXD. I would suggest a note [in our manual]; published MDA may be lower than company MDA. Also; it is always ok to ask for delay vectors to make sure we are executing our duties safely and correctly.

Operating flight HXD. On the preflight; we checked the NOTAMs and weather and determined all was legal to continue with the flight. In cruise; I; as Pilot Monitoring; picked up the ATIS in HXD which reported 800 ft. ceiling and Runway 3 in use. We set up and briefed for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 into HXD which had a straight in [decision altitude] of 334MSL. Passing through 10;000 ft.; the Approach Controller informed us that GPS signal in the area was unreliable and would not be able to do the RNAV 3 approach and would be doing the VOR-A; which is not aligned with the runway and would hence be a circle to land. With little time to prepare everything; I loaded and briefed the approach for the Captain who was focusing on flight duties. VOR-A approach has an MDA of 781 ft. and 1SM. The weather was 10SM and 800 ft. ceiling and was deemed legal to do the approach which we successfully did. There was no mention of RNAV unreliability in our NOTAMs or on the ATIS. On the debrief; we realized that we infringed on the company's restriction of needing to have at least a 1;000 ft. ceiling to conduct a circle to land approach. This slipped our minds due to the high workload into a small airport; doing an approach type which we rarely use. Due to the limited approaches into HXD; maybe a reminder of the circling limitation would be helpful to future crews [in our manual]. We would also do our best in the future to ensure all limitations and restrictions are observed by slowing down and giving ourselves as much time as possible to think and plan things through.

Air carrier flight crew reported a late change from the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 3 approach to Hilton Head to the VOR-A circling approach; with an MDA very close to the reported ceiling; due to a reported loss of GPS signal.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 58; Flight Crew Total 1170; Flight Crew Type 58

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

While flying VFR at 7;500 FT AGL while utilizing flight following; I declared an emergency because my engine sputtered. I immediately changed from right fuel tank to left tank. After ATC advised the nearest airport was 10 miles away; I landed safely and the engine never stopped until I turned the engine off. I visually checked that the fuel was very low. Refueled and topped off both tanks; started the plane; performed preflight inspection. The fuel gauge indicated that both tanks were full as I had visually observed. I took off and circled the field 2 or 3 times to be sure that I had experienced faulty gauge or loose ground wire. While refueling; I spoke by phone to my Mechanic who assured me that what I had experienced was a faulty gauge or loose ground wire and the plane should operate correctly to continue. After departing; I flew the aircraft on a 10 minute flight; landed and rechecked the fuel in both tanks. While on the ground I performed pre-flight check and all systems seemed good. Flew to destination without incident and did observe normal decrease of fuel from left tank. No recurrences in route and landed safely. A few days later; an A&P Mechanic inspected the aircraft; de-fueled both tanks and determined that the plane had a faulty fuel sensor. Parts were ordered. The plane will be repaired in a few days.

DA40 pilot experiences a rough running engine at 7;500 FT; switches fuel selector from the right tank to the left; and diverts to the nearest airport. Low fuel and an inaccurate fuel gauge is determined to be the cause.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

My crew was informed that there was a confirmed positive case of COVID-19. There was nothing done until the shift ended; just teleconferences and meetings; facility management and the district and whoever else was involved. They had our crew continue to work in the contaminated facility along with the day crew who had been here from XAam to XI:15pm without any cleaning or closing of the facility. So after working our entire shift; the district; facility management and NATCA decided the best plan was to have a cleaning crew come in at night to clean the Tower and facility only not including the TRACON. The person who is believed to have tested positive for COVID-19 works the mid shifts. They enter the TRACON before their shift starts to get the briefing and enter the TRACON after their shift ends to brief the oncoming day shift Supervisor. So with this being said and COVID-19 being able to live on surfaces for hours to days; no one really knows; the TRACON was contaminated. So after all that being said; they are having my crew; the same crew who was here in the facility before the cleaning along with the day shift crew to come back to work tomorrow the very next day and re-contaminate the entire facility. None of us know if we have contracted COVID-19 because they are not quarantining us.Both of the crews working should be mandatory quarantined and the entire facility along with the TRACON should be cleaned. We are on this special COVID-19 schedule for this specific reason. 5 days on and 5 days off. The other crews that are on their 5 days off should be coming in after the facility has been cleaned.

Controller reported that someone in the facility had tested positive for COVID-19. Controller was concerned about the decontamination process.


Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

I was pilot monitoring and was looking for nearby VFR traffic indicated about 800 feet below our flight path while we were on final approach to Runway 06 at RSW. As I was searching for aircraft traffic; I noticed a large drone operating at approximately our altitude; not far from our left wingtip (less than 100 ft away). The Captain did not see the drone and continued the approach normally and we were able to land without any evasive maneuvers. I reported the drone to the RSW tower controller who asked for additional details about the drone after we taxied to the gate. The drone was a large; quad copter-type drone.

I was the flying pilot conducting the ILS Runway 6 in VMC. As we passed the FAF and received landing clearance the First Officer stated she saw a drone off of our left wing tip within 100 feet at our altitude. She reported the incident to the tower. We landed uneventfully in Fort Myers with no evasive maneuvers required. The Tower controllers got information on the drone from the FO upon landing and I notified the Chief Pilot of the event. As pilot flying I did not see the drone.

Air carrier flight crew reported sighting a UAV while conducting the ILS Runway 6 at RSW. The drone was estimated to be within 100 ft of the aircraft; however no evasive action was required.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

On a regular basis I see situations get out of control late at night. On this particular night; I was left working an overloaded sector by myself when TMU (Traffic Management Unit); and all facility management had gone home for the night. I returned from my last break at XA:00 pm [late at night] to find my supervisor gone and another controller working the sector. Almost exactly at that time; the sector was shut off for all EWR and LGA traffic. There was a lot of EWR and LGA traffic still in the air because of all the weather delays from the afternoon. I opened the D-Side (Radar Assist) and we proceeded to hold 14 aircraft and work over flights at the sector. The MAP (Monitor Alert Parameters) value for this sector is 15. At XA:30 PM the controller working the Radar was going to hit 10 hours of duty; so the Midnight shift supervisor instructed me to relieve her at the Radar and work the sector myself. When I took over the sector at XA:34 PM; we had 18 aircraft in the sector. 14 of them were holding. I proceeded to work it out of the hold by myself for the next 50 minutes when it calmed down enough to combine to the midnight scope. I would recommend that TMU and management be more proactive in planning for weather and overload situations that could occur late at night. Also; I would appreciate it if the area supervisor wouldn't leave for the night if the area were still busy.

Center Controller reported working a combined overloaded sector with no Assist or Supervisor in their area.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The B737 was en route westbound through my sector at FL380. His route took him near ZZZ1; over ZZZ2; and then westbound. The second aircraft was a Citation; descending from cruise to FL350 to meet a LOA requirement. His route of flight took him through the corner of my sector; near ZZZ1. He would only be in my sector for about two minutes. The confliction point between the two was about five miles inside my sector boundary. I do not have any recollection of accepting the Citation; but I don't think my D-Side did either. If he did accept it; he would have told me. However we got the hand off; the aircraft was issued a descent to FL350 by Sector XX prior to the hand off. My D-Side called Sector XX and asked them to get the Citation below the B737; to which they replied they had just shipped him to us. The Citation then checked on frequency at the same time as my D-Side was telling me this information. For some reason; instead of reality; I decided mentally that we were flashing the Citation through to Sector YY; and that Sector XX was separating the two aircraft. The phrase 'I told Sector XX to get that Citation under our B737' is what stuck in my head. Even though the Citation checked on; he didn't check on in my mind. The two aircraft began flashing; but it didn't alarm me; because I wasn't talking to the Citation and the gateway area is separating those two; or so I decided to believe. They were flashing for a solid minute; and I wasn't the slightest bit interested or concerned. I was aware of the situation on some level; as I thought; 'Man; I hope they don't try and blame us when they have a deal over here because it's technically inside my airspace.' I chose not to say this to my D-Side because it seemed rude and disrespectful of the Sector XX Controller. The Citation was descending at the perfect rate to hit the B737. As he descended through FL390; my D-Side leaned forward and stated; 'Hey that's not going to work.' At this point; I sort of came to and saw the situation accurately; noticing I had automatically slant one'd both aircraft; meaning they were both on frequency. I stated; 'Am I talking to him?' I knew the answer; though. I immediately cranked both aircraft; issuing 50 right and expedited descent to the Citation and 40 right and expedited climb to FL390 to the B737. Both pilots really helped me out. I would guess I began the corrective actions about 3 hits before the bubble; with the one minute vectors close to touching. The targets jumped around due to the big turns and I was getting great climb and descent rates from my pilots. Although we were flashing all the way through the event and my D-Side said he estimates 3.5 miles minimum separation; another Controller told me the 'snitch' was not activated. On the drive home from work; I noticed that I had no recollection of pulling out of the front gates; checking for traffic; and pulling out. About 10 minutes later; I realized I had made a wrong turn driving home and was pulling into a neighboring subdivision. At this point; I started trying to think of anything that could be causing this general lack of awareness and why I hadn't been able to recognize it earlier. I think this might apply to stress and fatigue; as well. I have been sleeping 5-6 hours a night for a long time because of a family illness. If you'd have asked me before this shift; I would have said I was fine and ready to work. Looking back; however; I wasn't ready to work. Just because I felt okay and exhibit that I'm okay; that doesn't mean I was. It is just like hypoxia; if you think; 'I wonder if I'm hypoxic'; then you need oxygen. I realize that I'm influenced by rampant sick leave abuse that surrounds me and I hate taking sick leave. My natural inclination concerning any stress or fatigue load is to 'suck it up.' To do otherwise makes me feel weak. I want to earn my paycheck and do not view myself as 'entitled' to it. It's not something that 'I deserve.' So; how do you take a guy like me andcause me to call in sick on a day like this? I have decided to make sleep more of a priority; to make sure I get eight hours. My attitudes may result in better productivity at other jobs. But; I now recognize that this job just doesn't allow you to cut corners on rest. I can't figure out is how to instruct someone to recognize this situation and convince them they should call off work and fix their lifestyle. I felt fine; I wouldn't have considered calling off. I don't know how to recognize this in the future. So; I'm just going to do my best to lead a lifestyle that keeps my mind more awake and alert. During my event I never felt stressed. There were large gaps in time where I was making no transmissions. I did not feel the slightest bit overwhelmed or busy. This may have been a contributing factor. I was very relaxed mentally; which may have allowed me to go into a sort of 'highway hypnosis' type of thing.

Enroute Controller described a conflict event listing multiple human factors that may have contributed to the apparent lapse in vigilance.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was 12 miles Northwest of ZZZ on a base heading 220 at 3;000 feet being vectored to the ILS Runway XXR at ZZZ airport. I observed an unidentified VFR target depart ZZZ1 airport climbing out of 1;700 feet southbound. At first the the target was flying away from Aircraft X but then I observed the target start a a turn to the east. I then assigned Aircraft X heading 250 anticipating the VFR target would make a turn to the north east to avoid the immediate incursion into the ZZZ Class C airspace. This caused Aircraft X to go through the final for Runway XXR and I climbed Aircraft X to 3;100 feet because the new projected flight path would be into a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude. I then anticipated the VFR target would turn east bound once it got north of the Class C. So I took Aircraft Y off the arrival who was 10 miles north west of the airport on the downwind. I stopped his descent at 5;000 feet when I would normally descend aircraft at this phase of flight to 3;000 feet. It then became apparent the altitude adjustment wasn't going to be enough so I turned Aircraft Y to a 220 heading. The VFR target did make a turn to the east once north of the Class C climbing opposite direction into our arrival corridor at ZZZ. The VFR target did eventually contact another controller for an IFR pickup in my airspace.This event only had a positive outcome because this happens so frequently I have become overly cautious and I guessed correctly what the non participating aircraft was going to do every step of the way. I could have easily guessed wrong and could have had a dangerous situation develop into a crash. I recommend an airspace change that would extend controlled airspace over ZZZ1.

A TRACON Controller reported they vectored two aircraft off the final approach course to avoid an unidentified VFR aircraft which departed an airport underneath the final approach course. The reporter states this conflict occurs frequently and recommends extending controlled airspace to prevent further occurrences.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During the climb out a FLAP FAIL Master Caution Message illuminated on the EICAS. Our flaps were already at zero degrees. At that point; I was pilot flying and the Captain completed the proper QRH procedure. We declared an emergency and continued the flight to our filed destination. I became the pilot not flying as briefed when we were below 18;000 FT. We coordinated with ATC to use Runway 28; as it is the longest runway. We flew the approach and landed without incident. We had an MEL for FLAP LOW SPEED that we were complying with for the previous five legs we flew. Also; it was noted by the Captain at the beginning of our first leg today that FLAP LOW SPEED had been MEL'ed multiple times on this particular aircraft. The Captain even made his point to Maintenance personnel in person at our destination when this issue was getting MEL'ed today. Maintenance decided to MEL the FLAP LOW SPEED yet again. I believe the underlying threat and eventual cause of FLAP FAIL was the fact that the core problem was never fixed. By just continuing to MEL a potentially dangerous problem a real problem occurred. I believe that MEL's that are persistent and keep recurring on the same aircraft are an absolute safety hazard.

An EMB145 EICAS alerted FLAP FAIL during climb after the aircraft had flown multiple flights with a FLAP LOW SPEED EICAS alert. An emergency was declared and the flight continued to its filed destination.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 4080

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Weather

We operated the ZZZ to ZZZ1 flight. The landing numbers were run for Runway XXL with the ATIS showing south winds at about 7 kts. and temperature about 90 degrees. Normal flaps 30 approach was flown and I used thrust reverser to about 100 kts. before getting on the brakes. Normal brake pressure was used and we took the high speed taxiway. Taxi time to the gate was about four minutes; and I released the parking brake once we were in the chocks.The Operations Agent came in and asked if we 'got on the brakes'.  I said no and he said that our Company has blown about six plugs in the last couple weeks. I received a call from the Operations and was told what happened. I also called Maintenance and answered some questions regarding the flight. Everything on this flight was normal and I believe we did not brake the aircraft down more than a normal landing.  We actually mentioned there was no reason to brake hard due to the three minute limitation on the MAX.Might consider leaving the gear down on such a short flight. Using the carbon brakes; it would be nice to have a temperature gauge for the brakes.

Our first indication that there were any concerns was as the Operations Agent met us upon arrival in ZZZ. He asked if we had used heavy braking on landing because recently he had seen 6 events where the wheel fuse plugs had deflated the tires on this particular flight. The Captain immediately ensured that the parking brake had been released to allow for improved cooling. The oncoming FO (First Officer) met us after he completed his walk-around. He noted that the brakes seemed pretty warm. However; at this point the fuse plugs had not melted yet. We turned the aircraft over to the new crew and headed to the hotel. The Chief Pilot called the Captain at the hotel to inform him that the fuse plugs had melted and deflated the tires after we left. I do not believe the landing data indicated that brake cooling was required. Once at the hotel I tried to re-run the landing data to confirm that there wasn't a brake cooling message. There was not; as far as I could tell; but I could not recall the actual landing weights. I also tried to run the brake cooling module but couldn't get it to run because the release data had expired. This led me to go dig in the books for the brake cooling charts. I believe the brakes on speed was approximately 100 kts.; because I remember seeing the runway exit coming and checking the speed as I felt the increased deceleration from the Captain applying the brakes. Using this and estimated landing conditions I used the Landing Data Charts in the MAX performance manual. This indicated that no special brake cooling procedures were required. However; I noted some interesting facts in this section of the airway manual: If we had used Autobrakes 3 and VRef 145; it puts a lot of additional energy in the brakes; requiring at least 40 minutes of cooling time; and possibly into the 'Caution' for hot brakes; depending on the landing data used. The cooling time chart seems to suggest that 7.3 minutes of cooling Inflight Gear Down is equivalent to 50 minutes of cooling on the ground. The text in that section states; 'Total energy is the sum of residual energy plus energy added.' This is important to note since the previous flights of this particular aircraft had landings at high elevations on high temperature days.

B737 MAX 8 Flight Crew reported after a flight the wheel fuse plugs melted while using normal braking.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

I was working the positions of Local and Ground combined. In the tower was another controller working Flight Data Clearance Delivery and he was the Tower CIC as well. There was a significant amount of flow programs being utilized which caused extra workload for the Flight Data position and for myself on the Ground control frequency. On tower frequency was 5 aircraft in the pattern with one of the aircraft being a drone remote piloted aircraft. This is not a normal operation at Syracuse Tower. The average amount of traffic in the pattern is 1 aircraft. Not only was there 5 aircraft in the pattern; but there were multiple air carrier arrivals into Syracuse as well as another drone.In my opinion; for traffic that was on both the Ground and Local frequencies there needed to be an extra controller in the tower. Unfortunately; due to our staffing this was not an option. The actual event that took place involved Aircraft X who was in the VFR traffic Pattern. Aircraft X was instructed to follow the drone with its chase Aircraft. Aircraft X reported both aircraft in sight and was cleared for the option. Aircraft Y was observed landing while Aircraft X was on a 2 mile final. As Aircraft X touched down the drone was turning off of the runway. The drones have to taxi at a specific speed when they are on the taxiways and the runways. Their taxiing speed is significantly slower than any fixed wing aircraft. In my opinion; this was the leading contributor to the runway incursion.I recommend that if there are more than 2 aircraft in the pattern and a drone; there needs to be a standalone CIC or decombine Local and Ground frequencies. An increase in staffing would have allowed for an extra 'pair of eyes' for the operation. A standard strip marking procedure for pattern traffic would be helpful to provide a visual aid for increased controller workload. The drone should be taxiing at a much faster pace on the runways and they can slow their taxi speed on the taxiways. A procedure should be in place to address the runway compression that occurs whenever a drone lands i.e. approach separates an arrival further from the drone to make up for the times it takes to get the drone off of the runway.

Reporter said the Military is taxiing Military UAV's at airport for training then during the time of this report they were flying them in the tower pattern. Reporter advised that the military should be doing this somewhere else and not at SYR. Reporter stated the FAA is trying to figure out how to integrate the UAVs in a normal traffic pattern.

SYR Tower Controller reported a runway incursion due to the MQ-9 UAV taxiing too slow and an arrival landing on the runway while the drone was still exiting.


Takeoff wingtip strike in the Max threat is not addressed. [Company] ops specs call for rotation on takeoff towards 10 degrees of pitch. Operations Manual states in a note 'In some instances (gusty crosswinds; windshear) it may be necessary to hesitate at 10 degrees until liftoff occurs'. As the pitch increases; the wingtip clearance decreases since the 737 is a highly swept wing aircraft and the wing tips are aft of the center of rotation for pitch. In other words as the nose rises while the plane is on the runway; the wingtips go down. There are crosswind landing wingtip strike concerns when landing the [B737] Max with the cross control technique. This wingtip strike is of concern at a body angle of approximately 5 degrees at max crosswind (33 knots) during a cross control landing.In [the operating manual concerning] Takeoff in Gusty Wind or Strong Crosswind Conditions it states regarding liftoff; under sub paragraph Rotation and Takeoff; 'The aircraft is in a side slip WITH CROSSED CONTROLS at this point. A slow; smooth recovery from this side slip is accomplished after liftoff by slowly neutralizing the control wheel and rudder pedals'. Translation and concern is this - by the [operating manual] definition of crosswind takeoff techniques; the aircraft will be; during a strong crosswind takeoff; up to an approximately 5 degree higher pitch attitude (10 degrees; mentioned above) than during landing with the aircraft in a fully cross controlled state until well after liftoff. This guarantees; by the [operating manual] and sim pilot [B737] Max landing instruction training; a severe wingtip runway strike!At max crosswind there will be insufficient wing tip clearance during a textbook crosswind takeoff in gusty wind conditions. No mention is made of any [B737] Max takeoff guidance in any documents I can find; even though by current takeoff technique guidance and wing tip strike charts; an incident is guaranteed by my observation; at crosswinds well below max demonstrated crosswind limits. If I am correct; this must be addressed prior to line flying the [B737] Max. I cannot in good conscience fly the [B737] Max with crosswinds until this threat is addressed.

B737-MAX Captain reported an unresolved threat of a wingtip strike during crosswind landing and takeoff operations.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

In cruise at FL350; embedded in 'milk bowl' conditions radar painting solid green and in moisture. Within a couple sweeps of the radar we were embedded in solid red and were in Heavy Mod to Severe Turbulence and Lightning. Experienced excursions of +300 to -500 feet in altitude while trying to override manually. Immediately called ATC (the First Officer) and descended to [FL]330 and turned shortest direction to green radar returns - no improvement. Two concurrent events - strong electrical smell (as in burning) and LEMER Door EICAS along with overhead light - EMERG DOORS. The odor cleared immediately and we found no possible causes in the cockpit. We also began monitoring cabin altitude. ATC approved the descent and indicated there was no traffic for 'miles;' and a turn south toward ZZZZ to clear the weather and pre-emptively (to me) in event of further problems. No emergency was declared. On the descent we received a Master Caution of GEAR NOT DOWN at 6;000 FT all the way to gear extension. Also; Captain lost RadALt and First Officer lost ASA. On landing were informed of engine exceedances in flight at FL350 - numbers unknown but; no indications in the cockpit. Wrote up all the pertinent points and debriefed Maintenance who grounded the aircraft for detailed inspection to include lightning strike and overstress.This report is submitted to document the altitude excursions due to severe turbulence. I believe all the related maintenance issues are tied to the turbulence and a possible lightning strike. First Officer and I conducted a thorough debrief both in flight to double check each other and on the ground to review what we could have done. A totally unexpected and unpredicted weather related event is my end assessment. There appeared to be no issues with ZZZZ ATC and with no related or continuous concerns after the odor cleared I elected not to declare an emergency and landed uneventfully.

[No additional information contained in this report].

The crew of a Boeing 757-200 unexpectedly encountered moderate to severe turbulence and lightning while in cruise at FL350; resulting in; among other things; altitude deviations. A strong electrical burning smell permeated the flight deck; and several random emergency and EICAS lights illuminated; suggesting a possible lightning strike.


Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were approximately 2 hours delayed due to late arrival of the aircraft. Crew scheduling called us while we were at the hotel to reschedule our report time. We arrived at the gate shortly before our revised report time. The aircraft was delayed but had arrived a bit earlier than expected. The ground crew had completed most of their duties by the time we arrived at the gate. When I began my preflight duties; I saw that only the nose gear was chocked. I asked a ground crewmember in person to chock the main gear. He proceeded to chock only the right main and then walked back to the tug; sat down; and waited. I then asked him to chock the left main gear; which he then did. When I completed my walk-around; a ground crew member advised me in person that they were adding one more gate check bag and that the total number of bags on board was now 38. I asked to which compartment they were adding the bag; and he stated aft; without providing a CP number. When I returned to the cockpit; the load sheet had already been delivered. It stated 2 gate checks in CP4 and 41 standard bags in CP4. My understanding was that we now had 3 gate checks in CP4; so I edited the form. I was confused; because I understood we now had 44 total bags; but the ground crewmember said 38.We asked the ground crew via the intercom how many total bags we had on board. The ground crewmember said 38. We asked the ground crew how many gate checks we had in CP4. He said 3. We asked how many standard bags there were in CP4. He said 41; and immediately stated that there were therefore 38 total bags. We explained that we were confused and asked why he was subtracting numbers. The ground crewmember reiterated that we previously had 39 total bags; he added 1 gate check; and now we had 38 total bags. This continued for one more round. The captain and I concluded that the ground crewmember was confusing the information we needed with the Bag Count Reconciliation at the bottom of the load sheet. The Reconciliation is not relevant to the flight crew; and the form specifically states that it is not required on the crew copy. However; the captain and I believed the Reconciliation was not completed properly. As best we could determine; Total Bags (line A) read 41 but should have read 44. Gate checks (line B) read 2 and was now really 3. Line C read 39 but should have read 41. The Bag Count to which line C should be compared was not written on our copy of the form (nor was it required to be). We entered 44 standard bags in CP4 into ACARS for weight & balance calculations. Both we and the ground crew remained professional during the conversation. The ground crewmember seemed just as confused with our questions as we were with his statements.Ground crew; especially at new/contract stations; must be properly trained so that they can comply with policies and procedures. Not chocking the main gear was likely done in an effort to expedite departure. Improper understanding of the Bag Count and Reconciliation led to an incorrect completion of that section and confusing/contradictory information being provided to the flight crew.

A319 First Officer believes that rampers are not being properly trained at some stations to chock all gear and how to complete a baggage count form.


Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The weather was clear with calm wind in Lebanon; NH. While briefing the arrival; I elected to choose LNAV GPS to Runway 7 because of the surrounding mountainous terrain and night time. During the descent; ATC offered the visual which I declined and I continued with flying the full approach.  While inside the final approach fix at AKHOM; the PNF asked me to offset visually from the approach in order to line up with the runway.  I replied that I will remain on the LNAV approach until short final because of the elevated terrain on the north side.I then realized that he was looking at downtown Lebanon which was very bright and had two crossing main boulevards that looked like runways with yellow light. Then the Lebanon airport appeared at 12:30; very faint with red edge light. The bottom line of this incident; if I had listened to the PNF by leaving the approach path and lining up with a city boulevard at night; it could have caused a missed approach or even worse.Two points to remember: 1) never accept a visual approach on a mountainous or unusual airport at night; and 2) request and follow the full approach until minimums; and then positively identify the runway in sight before switching to visual cues.

CE750 First Officer reports being cleared for the RNAV RWY 7 at LEB during night VMC. Inside AKHOM the Captain asks the pilot flying (PF) to offset from the approach to line up with the runway and the PF declines due to terrain. Upon descending further it is determined that what appeared to be the airport is actually the lights of downtown Lebanon.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather; Airport

My FO (First Officer) and I had been flying to MKE all week. The snow in MKE was so deep that the taxiway signs were completely obscured. On the first morning into MKE we shot the ILS 19R approach. Despite being exactly on the glideslope and at the correct FAF crossing height; the PAPI remained 4 white for the entire approach. I realize there is a note on the approach plate stating VGSI and GS not coincident; but I have never seen PAPIs and GS disagree to the extent that 4 white is correct for the GS. At this point I was very grateful for the visual landing training reinforcing what a normal sight picture looks like. We reported the issue with the PAPI to tower and they were subsequently notamed OTS (Out of Service). The subsequent 2 mornings we shot the LOC 25L and despite being exactly on each of the recommended altitudes that set of PAPIs remained 4 red. We reported this to the tower and as we were waiting for the hotel van someone from airport management came to talk to us. It seems that with all of the snow it is not unusual for the PAPIs to be knocked out of alignment due to plowing. He did mention no one else had complained about the PAPIs on 25L. On [another] morning we were again shooting the LOC 25L and were vigilant about comparing our altitude to the recommended altitudes. This time the PAPI appeared to be in agreement with the profile. We were so distracted by this that we neglected to select flaps 35. Of course a couple hundred feet off the ground the GPWS screamed at us. I am embarrassed to admit that my first instinct was to move the flaps to 35 in response to the yelling GPWS; but then my logical brain caught up to the fact we were not stable and I called Go Around. The go around and subsequent approach were executed with no issue.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported unreliable Visual Glide Slope Indicator and going around due to a GPWS warning due to an incorrect flap setting.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

At XA:18 Dispatcher sent ACARS stating Inaccessible Dangerous Goods not on paperwork in position XX. 3KG Class 2.2 and 84KG Class 9; 39KG dry ice.  Supervisor notified.  [The cause was due to] Ramp [Personnel] did not list Inaccessible Dangerous Goods on paperwork. Ramp needed to track Inaccessible Dangerous Goods better.

Received an ACARS message from Dispatcher stating they found some Inaccessible Dangerous Goods that wasn't included in DG paperwork in 3L that was class 2.2 & 9. A few minutes later received another ACARS message with the amounts of each class. The last message stated Dispatcher had contacted the Duty Officer and he recommended crew fill out report. [The error was caused by] someone [that] didn't follow procedure. Follow procedures [more carefully].

Air Carrier flight crew reported Dispatch notification of undeclared Hazmat shipment onboard. Missing Inaccessible Dangerous Goods information was sent to flight enroute.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

The aircraft was parked at the gate.  When cleared by Ramp Control to push back; the Ramp Crew initiated pushback. After pushing clear of the jet bridge while attempting to turn the aircraft toward taxi line; the Tug Operator over steered the nose wheel beyond limits resulting in the tug becoming lodged under the aircraft. The Ramp Crew alerted the Flight Crew to the problem and contacted Maintenance. Flight Crew then contacted ATC and Station Operations. When a bus arrived; passengers and crew were deplaned on the ramp and passengers bussed to the terminal to await bags.

We pushed back off of the gate. The Fleet Service Clerk driving the pushback tug lost control of the tug and ended up overturning the tug almost a complete 180 degrees striking the bottom of the fuselage of the aircraft and wedged the tug underneath. We coordinated with Operations; Ground Personnel; Maintenance and various other departments to arrange for the passengers to be safely extracted from the aircraft and taken to the terminal via company bus. The Fleet Service Clerk tug driver overturned the tug during pushback resulting in a loss of control of the push and struck the aircraft fuselage and became stuck underneath. It is suggested that tug drivers get additional training on how the push back tug operates. It is my opinion that the Tug Driver could have stopped the push and moved in reverse to correct the issue but it seems that the Tug Driver kept going forward which resulted in the tug continuing to turn past the limits and striking the aircraft.

Flight Crew reported a Tug Operator lost control of the tug and crashed into the airplane.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

I was CIC. The controller at R34 told me she had an aircraft that had a delay in AW006 in its flight plan; and asked if I had any information on the flight. I told her no; but would call and find out. I called TMU; and told them we had an aircraft going into AW006; and we had no information on the mission nor did we have a depiction of AW006. I asked if we could get one. I was told missions were busy trying to get military airspace released; but that they would work on it. It took one of my controllers going to TMU before we got a depiction of AW006.We should have a depiction of the orbit and a description of the mission before the aircraft shows up.

CIC reports of not being informed of a mission and the time period it took to receive the information.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Called for release for an Aircraft X departure; I heard 'released;' cleared aircraft for takeoff; approximately 6 minutes later TPA approach calls asking why I released Aircraft X; I told them because they said released. They said they did not say 'released' but 'hold for release.' Afterwards the developmental that was monitoring said; 'TPA said released.' I have since listened to the tape but as the TPA controller was talking with either 'released' or 'hold for release;' an aircraft was announcing his departure off of TPA so there is no way to tell what the TPA controller actually said; unfortunately. 'Released' and 'Hold for release.' if said fast sounds the same. I recommend another phrase from TPA to say if they cannot release an aircraft like:1) Standby2) I'll call you back3) HoldThe word 'released' should not be included in any portion of an instruction from TPA in which they cannot allow that aircraft to depart.

PIE Tower Controller reported confusion relating to the term 'hold for release' and hearing only 'released;' allowing an aircraft to get airborne which should not have.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

After becoming airborne climbing thru 19000 feet the flight attendants chimed the cockpit and excitedly told us the forward service door handle was in view thru the forward service door inspection window. I went to look and confirmed that the handle was visible in the service door inspection window. We were at 21000 feet and about 5 to 6 psi and had no amber alert to say the door was unsafe. In the interest of safety we elected to return to [departure airport] as we were only 10 minutes out. We landed overweight and not knowing how the door would react to depressurization on landing declared an emergency. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate where maintenance confirmed that the door handle was in the open position.

B737-800 pilot reported they were advised during climb by a Flight Attendant that the forward service door handle was in view through the window even though there was no door warning light.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 2450

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I am a flight instructor.  I was giving a flight review to a professional pilot in his personal A36 Beech Bonanza.  The pilot IFR in high-performance aircraft; but seldom flies VFR or practices basic flight maneuvers; so I emphasized these operations during the flight phase of the review.  My goal was to review slow flight and stalls; emergency procedures; ground reference maneuvers; takeoffs and landings.  Both the pilot and myself have experience in Beech Bonanzas; although I had not flown that make and model in many years. Prior to entering the airplane; I instructed the pilot that we would be reviewing emergency procedures; but that I would only verbally tell him of an engine failure.  I would expect him to reduce power himself to simulate an engine out (since he was flying his own airplane I would expect him to manage the power reduction in a manner that would not result in any damage to the engine.) The initial takeoff and subsequent slow flight and stalls were conducted at 3;000 AGL; progressed normally.  We simulated an engine fire by my verbally telling him smoke was billowing from the cowling.  The pilot properly took the corrective actions; including an emergency descent.  I instructed him to not descend below 2;500 MSL; which was about 1;100 feet AGL.  He correctly recovered and we discussed how he would have landed in the chosen field.  We then progressed to ground reference maneuvers -- turns around a point and S-turns along a road.  I then instructed the pilot to return to the airport. As we started the climb; I asked the pilot to simulate a low-altitude engine loss.  The pilot retarded the throttle and correctly trimmed the airplane; selected a field; and performed an emergency checklist.  I again instructed him to terminate the procedure at 2;400 MSL (1;000 AGL).  We passed through 2;400 MSL; and I initially thought the pilot had missed the target altitude; however it soon became clear that the engine was not responding.  I noted that this was a real engine failure and we continued our approach to the field.  The engine coughed and sputtered several times; providing sporadic power. We lowered the landing gear and I noted that we were committed to landing at that point. We continued the approach and landed in a hay field on an upslope.  Halfway up the slope there was a slight berm; perhaps an old road or hedgerow.  We believe that is what caused the nose wheel to collapse.  The aircraft came to a stop well short of the trees on the opposite end of the field; and neither of us were injured.  We exited the airplane.  I noticed that the rotating beacon was still on; and re-entered the airplane to turn off all switches. No damage was sustained to property other than the airplane itself; and no one was injured. I cannot find fault with either myself or the pilot.  I had established an operational floor 1;000 AGL; which we did not violate until the engine failed. The pilot reacted correctly in so far as I could tell; although I could not visually verify all of the controls due to the position and size of the yoke.

BE36 instructor reported an engine failure during a training exercise.


Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Taking off we were subject to the same compass deviations as reported previously in a Company newsletter. The compass spun on the takeoff roll and as a result I had to do the math in my head to figure out what heading a 40 degrees to the right would be with our erroneous compass. As a result we missed the next turn by approximately .5 miles. ATC did not query us. Had this event happened in IMC and caused a distraction; so close to NYC; the outcome could have been very different. Do not use Runway 13 when deviations of the compass are noted; especially in IMC. I strongly urge that we look at this as a Company and its effects on the BE40.

The Reporter stated that a compass disagree alert occurred on the first LGA Runway 13 takeoff attempted. The crew acknowledged the Airport's Runway 13 compass alert sign and checked heading before takeoff. After beginning the takeoff roll; the compass fault alerted so they rejected the takeoff and reset the compasses. After the second takeoff; the heading was off 30 to 40 degrees so the crew flew the departure track; which they knew from experience; in VMC conditions. The Company's newsletter had been issued on days prior to this event and so they were well aware that the anomaly might occur. The Reporter stated that the crew would not have departed had IMC conditions existed.

A BE-400XP crew rejected a takeoff on LGA Runway 13 because of a compass anomaly but departed VMC on the second takeoff with a 30 - 40 degree compass error.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During a visual approach into BHM; on downwind for Runway 6. Clear day; we were cleared for the visual at 5000 feet. I descended the aircraft to the final approach altitude of 2;200 feet. The Tower Controller asked if we had towers to the right in sight. We did; towers were at 2;049 feet; and were the highest obstacle listed on the ILS Runway 6; At that same moment the aircraft GPWS [announced] 'terrain terrain pull up.'  I quickly disconnected the autopilot and climbed to 2;600 feet. We had terrain (the towers) in sight the entire time. The flight continued uneventful and we landed normally.I descended below the MSA for the approach. Though I had the obstacle in sight. I should have held altitude longer until passing the towers; being cleared for the visual approach may have prompted me to set up early and descend when I shouldn't have.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to BHM.


PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

At gate and while performing the Before Push Checklist; we had the performance computer give us a bad recommendation. Utilizing 'Optimum Flap' in our performance computer resulted in an improper recommendation of flaps 15 with a stopping margin of only 316 FT. When manually selecting flaps 25 gave us a stopping margin of 1640 FT. Funny thing is that it even recommended 'bleeds off' or another flap setting! Naturally; we were puzzled at why it didn't RECOMMEND flaps 25 in the first place.Since we don't perform intersection takeoffs unless 2000 FT or better stopping margin is available; it seems academic to assume that we would like something more than 316' for an 'Optimum' setting when more is available with a different setting.  Please don't take the comments; which follow as personal; they are not and only used here for emphasis. So; here goes.Why does the performance computer force us to hunt for an acceptable stopping margin? The use of 'optimum flap' failed to deliver on this event and it knew it as evidenced by the screen flashing with recommendation for a different flap setting. Imagine what the lawyers would do to us if we had accepted 316 FT of stopping margin when 1640 FT was available and something went wrong. Here is the data present/used during our event: A/C type: -800 TOW: 168;400; (Release) TOW: 166;558 (Loading Schedule). BOS Runway 9 Temp: 19C; Altimeter: 30.12 Wind: 100/5.My takeaway here is that something is wrong with how our performance computer chooses a flap setting when 'Optimum Flap' is selected. I found it interesting to note that Dispatch utilized a flap setting of 25 when calculating data for our Release out of BOS; but that inside the cockpit our performance computer was perfectly happy with flaps 15 and a stopping margin of only 316 FT. Please note that 'loading and planning' were highlighted as areas in this event due to the fact that nothing else looked appropriate given the circumstances.

A B737-800 Captain questioned the aircraft performance computer erroneously calculating an optimum flaps 15 runway takeoff stopping margin of only 316 FT when manually selecting flaps 25 increased the distance to 1;640 FT.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was the ground controller. I gave instructions for Aircraft X to taxi from parking ramp to Runway 28R via Golf; Hotel; Alpha. Aircraft Y landed on Runway 28R; crossed Runway 28L on Runway 23 and called me for further taxi to parking. Recognizing Aircraft Y would be a tie at the intersection of taxiways Hotel and Golf; I issued instructions to Aircraft Y to taxi to parking via Hotel and Juliet and follow Aircraft X northbound on Golf. Pilot of Aircraft Y read back 'Taxi via Hotel Juliet; we will follow Aircraft X.' As the two aircraft approached Hotel and Golf; the pilot of Aircraft X said on frequency; 'Hey Aircraft Y you holding for me?' Aircraft Y did not hold nor did he respond or give any indication that he even saw the other aircraft. The pilot of Aircraft X told me over frequency 'That was close. That could've been an accident.' The pilot of Aircraft X asked for the phone number to MYF tower and I notified the CIC of the event.

MYF Ground Controller issues instructions to a pilot to follow another aircraft. Pilot does not follow the aircraft and the other pilot advises that was close.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 110

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Software and Automation; Procedure

I was flying on an instrument flight plan from SEE in San Diego to ZZZ1 outside of Denver and filed via Foreflight. The flight plan of direct was accepted but I assumed a SID. Given that SEE was MVFR I studied the departures including the Mission Bay Two (obstacle) Departure which seemed the most likely. I noted that this was a procedure which required tracking multiple radials of different VOR's; and I know from experience that modern glass panels (Garmin G600 and Garmin GTN 750) do not recognize these departures and they must be manually configured tuning the VOR's and radials.Shortly before departure; Foreflight via cellular connection gave me an expected route which was an odd route as it contained over 20 waypoints; but I programmed it into the Garmin GTN750 after engine start. There was no SID assigned. Normally when a SID is assigned its included in the expected route. So; I assumed SEE direct the MZB VOR. The weather was good VFR. So; I did not brief terrain clearance. When I called Ground Control; I was told it was a complicated route and asked if I was ready to copy it all down. I also advised that I had also received the route electronically. To make it faster I wrote the expected route on my knee board and followed along as the Controller gave it to me. I believe the route was the same; but I cannot rule out confirmation bias. I read the route back and received a 'readback correct'I took off on runway heading and noted that if I made an immediate turn to MZB I would not be able to out climb the terrain so continued on runway heading. It was VFR and I had the terrain in sight at all times. When I was handed off to Departure I was asked by the Approach Controller why I was not turning right. (presumably to follow the  obstacle departure). She further immediately called a terrain alert. I advised the terrain was in sight and was not a factor. The  Approach Controller then directed me to fly a heading and advised of a possible pilot deviation. It [is] possible that the Controller specifically called out the obstacle departure and I missed it due to confirmation bias. However; I believe the obstacle departure was not mentioned either due to it being a VFR day or common practice for the field and part of an unduly complicated clearance. The obstacle departure definitely did not populate as the Foreflight expected clearance like other SID's. I have screen shots of this. As a corrective action; I believe that obstacle clearances need to be built with waypoints and published like any other SID so they worked  with automated clearance delivery mechanisms and integrated avionics

A pilot reported they did not receive the obstacle clearance departure procedure or a SID from ATC or the Foreflight App. The reporter suggested obstacle departure procedures [ODP] automatically populate on the Foreflight software.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

We were cleared to cross PONZE at 27000 feet and cleared to descend via the BANKR 2 Arrival landing north. We crossed PONZE at 27000 feet in VNAV path; set 9000 feet in MCP for BLNCE. The descent winds and speeds along with the engine anti-ice was programmed into the FMC. We crossed the next four intersections at correct altitudes in VNAV path. VNAV suddenly commanded a 4;000 foot descent to meet next crossing restriction. We notified ATC we would not be able to meet next crossing altitude. ATC gave us vectors and a phone number to call. I called on the phone number provided and explained the details of our RNAV arrival. He indicated that this is a common occurrence on this arrival and encouraged a report to remedy the problem of aircraft being high and fast on this arrival. The aircraft was unable to maintain correct path with large tail wind with anti-ice on. This arrival needs a flatter vertical profile.

B737 pilot reported the aircraft was unable to meet published crossing restrictions.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Total 755; Flight Crew Type 385

Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

My student and I departed...under VFR conditions...well after the fog had cleared for that morning. The clouds were high and we could see for miles on end. We flew GPS direct...and [then] the clouds became lower; going from 1;000 FT AGL to 600 FT AGL as well as there being some fog near the ground that was thinning. We decided to proceed north...around protected airspace...and then head west towards [an] airport; which had better weather reported. We were able to maintain VFR separation at 600 FT MSL (300 FT AGL) until we reached the northern tip of the protected airspace; where we hit some low; dense fog. Knowing that there was better weather nearby; my student and I continued onwards; flying a gradual descent to stay clear of the clouds. We reached a point at about 200 FT AGL where we could no longer fly any lower due to the terrain and tall trees and decided to turn around and abandon our cross country. As we began the turn we entered the clouds and inadvertent IMC. Since we couldn't see any obstructions around us we decided to also climb back up to 700 FT MSL (400 FT AGL) to avoid hitting anything in the turn. We then became disoriented and entered into a low-g pushover. Soon afterwards we came out of the clouds with the nose pointed straight down and I recovered from the pushover. We landed in a field nearby to assess any damage to the helicopter and upon finding nothing severely damaged; we picked up and flew the helicopter directly back to our [home field]. In hindsight we should've abandoned the cross country sooner instead of pushing into the clouds. Had we decided to land at the intermediate airport or turn around to go back home we wouldn't have entered the clouds and become disoriented.

An R22 instructor and student pilot; attempting to maintain VFR flight beneath a lowering overcast; entered IMC; became disoriented and descended out of the clouds in a nose down; vertical attitude. Pilots recovered and landed in a field.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 3591; Flight Crew Type 920

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

I was holding short of runway XX on taxiway 1; and there was a light aircraft that was landing and a jet holding short of runway XX on taxiway 2. The jet was cleared for takeoff on runway XX and I radioed tower that I was ready for departure XX. The tower controller started to tell me to hold short runway XX; then gave me clearance to cross runway XX and cleared me for takeoff runway YY. When I took runway YY; I noticed what appeared to be a large vehicle past the departure end of the runway. I believed it to be on a road or parked beyond the runway. Due to the curvature of the runway; I couldn't even see the lower portion of the vehicle. Midway through my takeoff roll; I then noticed the van closer and possibly just off the end of runway YY. After I rotated; I noticed the large yellow vehicle; a utility van; was on the runway! I immediately sidestepped the runway and overflew the yellow utility van. When I looked down at it; I noticed it parked south of the runway ZZ numbers and that there was a person 15 feet south of the van looking up at me flying over. The tower never radioed me about the incident and failed to provide me any information about vehicles and personnel on the runway. The tower may have even been unaware of the situation.

SR22 pilot reported after takeoff noticing a vehicle on the runway and avoiding it by overflying it.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

At cruise flight; the Captain and I experienced an uncommanded descent and an uncommande altitude deviation of 600 FT from FL320 to FL314.  This altitude loss of 600 FT occurred (by my estimation) in less than 10 seconds. This event occurred so quickly that the Pilot Flying (Captain) had his hands on the controls; and he was attempting to correct the loss well before the 600 FT deviation took place by disengaging the autopilot to arrest the descent.  I attempted to assist the Captain between 400 FT and 500 FT of altitude deviation and I noted a rather strong nose down force present by how heavy the control wheel felt.  It appeared as though the autopilot had trimmed the aircraft nose low during cruise and then simply quit working.  It was also evidenced during the altitude recovery accomplished by the Captain that he had to input a fair amount of nose-up trim.Initially; I had assumed that the autopilot had entered into the Control Wheel Steering mode.  However; 32;000 FT was visible in the Altitude window of the MCP; and no changes or inputs had been made by either the PF or me (the PNF/PM). Shortly after this event took place; Center queried us regarding the altitude deviation.  In the heat of the moment I responded to the Center Controller that; 'We've just experienced an UNSCHEDULED descent'.  What I meant to say was; 'we've just experienced an UNCOMMANDED descent'. The Center Controller working our flight was helpful and asked us if we were in trouble and in need of further attention.  I explained that we had recovered the lost altitude by returning to FL320. An aircraft logbook entry was made regarding the nature and circumstance of this event; and the aircraft was met by Maintenance.  Absolute vigilance. Even during a low workload environment such as cruise flight.  This event has been somewhat unsettling to me.  In several thousand hours of flight time; I have NEVER experienced an uncommanded flight deviation of this nature outside of windshear.

B737-300 First Officer experiences a sudden pitch down at FL320 with the Captain flying. When the autopilot disengages great effort is required to arrest the descent at FL314 along with substantial nose up trim.