Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft X had been written up by previous pilot for weak brakes that were not providing stopping power. Brakes had been bled the night prior to the incident and on taxi out for take off appeared to operate correctly. On approach to land; when arming the nose wheel steering; the MAP steering annunciator did not illuminate. We landed as winds were from heading 270 with speed in the mid teens gusting to mid twenties.Upon weight on wheels; steering annunciator still had not illuminated. Rudder pedals did not assist with directional control as the aircraft decelerated. I attempted differential braking to regain centerline as the aircraft was weather-vaning towards the right to discover brake lines had zero pressure. Then I attempted full reverse prop but with the cross wind the airplane was already committed to a right hand runway excursion. As the aircraft exited the runway; I pulled the engine stop and feathers. The aircraft rolled slowly until eventually stopping with the nose approximately thirty yards distance from the runway. Combination of mechanical failure and gusty cross winds are the main cause. No spilled fluids were discovered at scene of incident or along the path of the tow to the ramp to directly point towards faulty maintenance. However; I am positive maintenance crews were rushed the night before. Two lines out of our base airport were requiring metros for the week along with a charter flight calling for another. As of the night before the incident; of the four aircraft currently at our base; none of them were airworthy. My aircraft had been at the maintenance hangar since the prior week; but it was not until I was suppose to move it to the ramp the previous night that the write up on the brakes along with two other write ups were discovered to still be open. Possibly if I hadn't stayed late after my leg the previous night attempting to taxi airplanes around and then shown early again the morning of the incident; thereby legally being on duty the entire night; my reactions to the event may have been a little quicker. However; I am still confident I would of ended up off the right side of the runway with the conditions; I just probably wouldn't have rolled as far before coming to a full stop. During the approach phase; when the MAP steering annunciator did not illuminate upon attempting to arm the steering; I looked through the maintenance log and saw several months prior I had written up this same issue while in ZZZ1. At that time the First Officer that was along with me had said that the aircraft had always been this way. Upon touchdown as soon as there was weight on wheels the annunciator illuminated and we rolled out just fine; and then I wrote up the annunciator at that time.  Recalling that situation; I assumed that the steering would be available upon landing the morning of the incident. I also assumed if the steering was not available; I would have differential braking available just as if the steering had been MEL'd since the brakes appeared fine before departing. While rolling out for the right edge of the runway; the thought crossed my mind to attempt speeds low and possibly regain steering through the prop levers; however the aircraft was still moving fairly fast and training has reinforced that engaging steering in a bad situation will make the situation worse; especially if traveling with any speed. In hind site; I don't believe there is anything I could of done differently with the given situation. The brakes are suppose to be the back up for the steering thereby with the windy conditions not many options were available.Upon discovering the open write ups the night prior to the incident; Maintenance Control claimed the previous pilot had not reported the write ups over the phone. However this aircraft had been in front of the maintenance hangar with ample time for someone to have checked the book. Usually the books are taken out of the planes at the end of the day anyways; I'm assuming for this very reason. Having caught these write ups the week prior would have reduced the workload on maintenance the night prior to the incident. Combine this with majority of the write ups on the other aircraft being repeat write ups; Maintenance could really reduce their workload by actually fixing problems instead of trying to put them off. Whether this is an issue with needing to hire more mechanics or having more available planes to help rotate through and get work done correctly rather than always being rushed for the next morning's runs.

A pilot reported their brakes failed while on landing roll and they had a runway excursion.


Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Preparing for arrival into ZZZ; top of descent; myself (Flight Attendant C) and Flight Attendant B standing in aft galley getting ready to take our jumpseat. An odor that's stays in the gallery area that is very strong smells of dirty socks. This lasted for about 1 minute. The Flight Attendant B asked me what is this smell and I told her I knew for sure it's an air quality the odor of dirty socks was so strong. Within moments I started feeling nauseous and my throat was irritated and sore to swallow. I called the Flight Attendant A to give them the information; Captain said they were busy preparing for landing [and] we would discuss it on the ground. Once we deplaned the Captain was off the aircraft and waiting to go to the van in the general boarding area. I asked the crew getting on the plane [if] they talked to the Captain regarding the air quality we had. They said no. I walked over to the Captain and asked him did he write up the air quality? He says to me did you write it up? I said no I thought we were going to discuss once we landed...this is where I get frustrated. He says since I didn't give him a cabin discrepancy he didn't write it up and turns and walks away. I walked back over to the outbound crew and gave them a narrative of what happened. At this point I'm thinking crew is gone I'll take a different shuttle to hotel. So the Flight Attendant B and I headed towards [shuttle] pick up and the crew is waiting for us. As we wait for [the] shuttle; the Captain at this point seems aware of my concerns and said he would write it up and forward to us. He also said the 'scent' could have shut the aircraft down for minimum of 6 hours. That's when I realized I have to be the voice for myself on this air quality. I get to my hotel room and I'm just not feeling well I talked to the other flight attendants and explain I would be calling [Company Medical]. I contact [Company Medical] and maybe I'm feeling better and rest; call them later advise me to go to nearest hospital. I then spent 6 hours in ER with confirmed...diagnosis occupational exposure to polluted air. Extensive blood work and 2 rounds of IV the doctor was satisfied with my blood work and release me to hotel with follow up with my primary doctor.  Captain should have taken my air quality report much more seriously. I felt the Captain did not take my air quality serious and calling it a scent was an insult to my 20 years of flying.

B737-900 Flight Attendant reported a strong smell of dirty socks on descent.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 900

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Was asked to relocate an aircraft. Aircraft just came out of paint shop; and was intended for export. Before flight was told by the owner that the gear was reported as having a leak in the gear but flew fine. Inspected aircraft for the leak but found no evidence of a leak; and aircraft just came out of annual. Owner operator was present throughout the preflight and process and was on board aircraft. Based on visual inspection and (exporter owner) owner's lack of concern and the recency of the annual inspection. It seemed reasonable that there was no problem and the aircraft was airworthy. However I did think it prudent to fly with the gear down to destination at reduced speed. Anyway after takeoff and out of habit I retracted the gear and immediately caught myself and reversed the gear handle to down. As soon as we turned crosswind the oil filler door popped open on the left engine; in consideration of the reduced cooling I decided to come around and land and close that door. After touch down and during roll out the left landing gear gave and retracted. The aircraft veered to the left as the left wing tip dragged on the pavement and slid off the runway and into the grass/sand and came to rest. There were no injuries or damage to the main structure. Pilot owner plus one passenger walked off without injury and unharmed. Lesson learned do not fly an unfamiliar aircraft if there is any reported or observed no matter however mild discrepancy till it was checked out by a mechanic. Certainly was a bad day.

After takeoff on a ferry flight; a PA-31 oil filler door opened so the piloted returned to the departure airport where the left landing gear collapsed. The aircraft was just released from a paint shop.


Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

During climb-out we were given a heading to join the 240 radial off of DEN VOR. As we were in the climb/cruise configuration; I input the 240 radial track off of DEN; but was at a loss as to how far I should put that point in space before we made our turn towards HBU VOR on our way to our destination. I queried ATC for a distance we would likely stay on this 240 radial; but was given a vague answer. So I input a 40 mile DME [waypoint] on the 240 radial as a starting point with the next fix being HBU VOR. We joined up on the 240 radial and we became busy with checklist; the threat of thunderstorms in the area; and our passenger's desire to go to a different airport. As a result; I didn't notice--some minutes later--that the airplane had reached 240/40 DME waypoint and had turned toward HBU. We; of course; were not cleared to HBU yet; so ATC called and asked if we had been given a different routing. It was at that time I realized we had a navigational error. ATC cleared us to HBU and the flight proceeded without incident.I should have just flown 'green needles' using normal NAV mode with joining and staying on the 240 radial off of DEN until given a further clearance. My haste in getting the FMS involved and lack of awareness that we had reached the point in space and had turned to HBU without clearance allowed us to take part in a navigational error.

A C-560XLS First Officer; cleared to intercept a radial off a VOR with no subsequent routing elected to make a waypoint to fly to at 40 DME and then closed the resulting route discontinuity by bringing up and executing the first 'on course' waypoint in their route. Later; distracted by other duties; the flight crew failed to note they had arrived at their 'fix' and were turning toward the en route fix without having been cleared to do so. ATC quickly reminded them they hadn't been cleared to do so...and then provided that clearance.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7100; Flight Crew Type 350

Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was the Pilot Flying (PF). After takeoff I noticed my flight director was missing the vertical bar but the horizontal bar was displayed. Captain had the same display. Tower gave us a turn to 180 after takeoff. I figured the horizontal bar was still giving the correct climb pitch so I followed the horizontal bar while conducting the turn raw data. Me and Captain started discussing what was happening and he realized that the plane was currently in approach mode instead of takeoff mode. Next we noticed the airspeed coming up on the flap retract speeds so we put the flaps up now. This was out of our normal order for putting the flaps up; the speed was getting fast because the horizontal bar was not giving the proper climb angle. We tried the autopilot and it disconnected and we got a warning. Me and the captain start trying to troubleshoot to get the plane out of approach mode. Next we hear the altitude alert as we were climbing thru 5300 FT; we were cleared to 5000 FT per the OHare8 departure. We pushed the nose over to get quickly back down to 5000 FT. Before beginning the descent the plane reached 5600 FT. On our steep descent back to 5000 FT our airspeed accelerated above 250 knots. The auto throttles had clicked off when the autopilot disconnected. When asked to contact departure we told tower that we were working on a problem and we would like to stay with them until we figured it out. We flew the plane raw data and got everything under control. At some point we recycled the flight directors and that seemed to resolve the problem. Above 10;000 FT we began to try and figure out why that had occurred. We think it was because the Captain's flight director was not recycled after the previous flight. The SOPs had just changed who turns the flight director off on taxi in. It used to be the First Officer's job to recycle both flight directors but new procedure has each pilot recycling their own. At altitude captain asked me if I had recycled his and I said no I was following the new procedure. He mentioned that every First Officer he flies with still does it the old way so he didn't even think about it. I think the main contributing factor is all of the drastic changes we have been experiencing in our SOPs over the past year.

Only after takeoff did the B757 First Officer note that only his pitch command flight director bar was displayed. Believing and utilizing it as functional resulted in the failure to level at 5;000 FT as cleared and an excessive airspeed below 10;000 FT resulted.


Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Open Space / Field; Private Property

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS)

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

New operator of sUAS asked for tips from an acquaintance who is a private pilot and commercial remote operator. With a small group of onlookers the new operator demonstrated the drones capability looking intently at display and launching it within 2 ft of an onlookers face. The new operator immediately launched the drone over a ridge of trees and out of sight head down on the display. I commented that he needed to have the drone in sight at all times to which he laughed and replied 'No. That can't be; what would be the fun in that' he proceeded to inform me that because the UAS was below 0.55 lbs that it was exempt from FAA regulation. As the new operator blew past 400 feet AGL he asked what was the max altitude again? To which I responded accordingly. A round of laughter commenced as the operator received a notification on his display that he may be violating the law. The new operator reached a maximum horizontal distance of 1;600 feet which he complained was too little and was sure the software was preventing him from going farther as he had gone 6;000 feet without issue before.From takeoff to landing this operator never had visual contact with the drone.The new operator flew recklessly in a corridor popular with manned commercial scenic tours; GA aircraft sight seeing; and GA aircraft coming in to BHB.When informed of the regulations the operator laughed; indicated that it did not apply to him; and if he were to get in trouble he would blame it on a blog post he read. Blatant disregard for FAA regulations; the safety of others; and no expectation of consequences.FAA should make something similar to the commercial remote operator course for recreational operators and make it mandatory for any UAS that has the capability of exceeding 400 feet vertical or horizontal.FAA should also crack down on manufacturers who are clearly advertising their products and encouraging use in disagreement with law.

Eyewitness observed a UAS pilot possibly violating FAA regulations by flying above 400 feet and beyond visual line of sight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working all the satellite sectors. I had a fairly decent amount of traffic and there was considerable frequency congestion. I released the aircraft via the automated rundown list. The aircraft was a south-bound jet. Initial instructions from tower are normally a 050 heading and a climb to 2;000 ft. The aircraft departed and he appeared much farther south than I had anticipated him being. I was dealing with many other priority transmissions. I heard an aircraft say shallow turn to zero five zero. I can't remember if I radar Identified the aircraft; but as soon as I registered that the plane was far too shallow to avoid the 2;200 ft. MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) he was nearing; I turned the plane to a 030 heading for the climb. I was just trying to remain west of the depicted obstacle at that point because there were no safe altitudes I could climb to for crossing traffic. I had 2 VFR aircraft at 2;500 ft. and an IFR aircraft at 3;000 ft.; 4;000 ft.; and 5;000 ft. that were all a factor. As soon as I had divergence with my traffic that was a factor; I issued a climb. Tower should assure that aircraft are turning to avoid the MVA. I don't feel we have the space available to not use 3;000 ft. in that area for other aircraft inbound just to ensure that those releases can make that turn. Weather was not an issue. The subsequent vectors the aircraft received were made quickly so I'm not sure why a shallow turn was being used. Had the plane come off correctly I would have been able to climb him in front of the VFR arrivals instead of holding underneath. I am also unaware if tower instructed the shallow turn due to a left downwind aircraft I had given them at 2;500 ft. but it's a possibility.

A TRACON Departure Controller reported a departing aircraft made an unusually shallow turn on departure and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On departure at 10;000 feet; Flight Attendant called the cockpit to report odor in the cabin and one Flight Attendant sick. We [requested ATC priority handling]; ran appropriate checklists and returned to ZZZ. Upon arrival to the gate medical personnel assisted.

During climbout the number one Flight Attendant advised that there were strong fumes in the cabin. The Captain and I were also advised that the number two Flight Attendant was not feeling well because of the fumes. The Captain advised me to [request special handling] for an immediate return to ZZZ. We ran appropriate checklists and landed. Crash Fire Rescue was called and responded to inspect the aircraft to ensure there was no outside indication of an issue. We [returned to] the terminal and had affected persons treated by medical personnel.Because the cause is unknown to me...I am not aware of any mitigation strategies other that allotting more resources in understanding; addressing; mitigating; and avoiding cabin fume events.

A321 flight crew reported being notified by the Flight Attendant in charge during departure climb of a strong cabin odor causing one Flight Attendant to experience health issues. Flight crew requested special handling to return to departure airport and executed a safe landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

Workload is starting to reach critical mass for the current staffing level.  Between normal flights and adhocs; ZZZ desk had 31 flights load up with 15 to release (last week 30 flights with 15 to release).  Many flights between the XA00-XB00 hour were sent under the allotted time as stated per the Manual due to the vast geographic area; reroute around storm; numerous domestic flights tagged at the end of international flights; last minute ATC Zero; and COVID cleaning.  Other desks are also getting workload saturated due to charters and adhocs.  Management was notified last week to evaluate staffing levels and workload.Suggestions - 1) Increase staffing levels to account for the workload. 2) Keep current staffing level and send domestic legs to the Domestic desk.

Dispatcher reported concerns with current staffing levels; especially when workload is increased due to weather diverts; last minute ATC closures for sanitizing and  international plus domestic re-routes.


Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Rolling for takeoff on Runway 31 in Quincy; just prior to liftoff I noticed an aircraft beginning to cross the end of the runway; unannounced. Being as we were now at liftoff speed; I continued the takeoff without further issue. The incursion aircraft was approximately 3;000 feet ahead of us at the time of liftoff. I had made radio calls prior to leaving the ramp; taxiing out to the runway; holding short; and rolling for takeoff. The other aircraft had not made any calls or responded to any.Always stay vigilant for other aircraft or vehicles in the area that may not have radios.

Twin Cessna pilot reported an aircraft crossed the end of his takeoff runway without announcing position while he was on the takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 72; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 800

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Shooting a Nav ILS with a pt; announcing our position with Center and CTAF; TCAS showed no traffic in area with center telling us no traffic in the area we get a RA of climb; showed no prior warning out to 6 miles; within 1 mile it tells us to climb to 300 FT below; we climbed up an additional 500 FT; the RA turned into a TA. We continued the [approach] with pt; inbound on apt we picked up airport visual. Only then did previous traffic make traffic report. Collision was avoided; but seems really close when IMC! Traffic was VMC; for their practice [approach]; we were IMC due to the terrain in the area not allowing us to descend into VMC.

The pilot of a BE200 complied with a TCAS RA while conducting an ILS approach to a non-towered airport in IMC.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After the coffee pot leaked; a Flight Attendant reported a burning like smell from around the forward oven. No smoke or fumes. Smell stopped after they turned the oven off. We were about 15 to 20 minutes from descent. During a bathroom break both me and the First Officer did not smell or see anything wrong. No circuit breakers popped either. Since there was no smoke or fumes; the odor stopped; and we were a few minutes from descent I elected to continue with a normal descent and landing. I concluded it was most likely due to the excessive leak from the coffee maker. I contacted dispatch with a message in the air; and once parked I wrote the oven smell up in the Maintenance log to have Maintenance do an inspection.

An Air Carrier pilot reported a leaking coffee pot caused a burning smell.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

As we approached our assigned parking spot the Marshaller gave us the signal to stop. I stopped the aircraft; set the parking brake; and shut down the Number 1 engine. As we waited for external electrical power to be connected; I removed my headset and turned to stow it in its cubby. At this point; my First Officer shouted that we were moving. We both immediately applied toe brake pressure and the aircraft came to an abrupt stop. We glanced down at the center console and confirmed that the parking brake was indeed set. The aircraft travelled approximately 6 to 10 feet with the Number 2 engine at idle thrust and the parking brake set. The Mechanic hooked up and told us that the aircraft would have to be pushed back into its parking spot with a tug. I told him that we had had a parking brake failure and were holding toe brake pressure to keep the aircraft from moving. Fortunately no ramp personnel were injured. The aircraft nose wheel struck a chock but neither the aircraft nor the ramp equipment was damaged.

[No additional information from Narrative #2.]

After setting the parking brake upon gate arrival the flight crew of an A300 was surprised when the aircraft; with an engine still running pending connection of ground power; moved forward several feet. The aircraft was stopped using toe brakes which were functional.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X; called me for transition to SQL airport.  I cleared Aircraft X into the class B airspace at 4;000.  SFO is in RWY 28 Shoreline Departure configuration due to construction/repair.  Just south of the Golden Gate Bridge; I assigned Aircraft X a heading of 180 to remain clear of Richmond departures that were turning east to a heading of 040.  SFO Tower departed Aircraft Y on a REBAS departure.  This departure is supposed to make a right turn to intercept the SFO 342 degree radial climbing to 5;000.  Immediately in trail Aircraft Z was departed on a Shoreline Departure.  This departure makes a right turn to a heading of 040 climbing to 10;000.  Richmond; myself; and the CI-1 noticed that Aircraft Y was not turning.  Nothing had been coordinated with CI-1; so we had no idea what was happening.  As a precaution; I assigned Aircraft X a heading of 240 in order to provide as much space as possible to protect both him and Aircraft Y.  Aircraft Y began a northbound turn still talking with the Tower.  Aircraft Y is at 021 feet in a 2;600 foot MVA and heading right at the obstruction at Mt. San Bruno.  The next MVA is 2;900 feet. Aircraft Y checks on with Richmond and is sorted out from there.  I assigned a heading 160 to Aircraft X to continue his transition.  The next departure is Aircraft Z on a REBAS departure.  Richmond and I immediately observe that the aircraft is not turning and Aircraft X is now an immediate conflict.  Right behind Aircraft Z is Aircraft A a Heavy on the Shoreline Departure.  I instruct Aircraft X to turn right heading 300 as quickly as possible to move him away from the Aircraft Z climbing to 5;000.  There was no altitude separation at this time.  The CI-1 immediately got on the line with SFO Tower and issued an amended altitude of 3;000 to Aircraft Z.  We were not talking with any of the SFO departures at this point.  This situation was totally out of control and just plain dangerous.  The deficiencies and incorrect actions on behalf of the Tower are appalling.  Anything other than what is spelled out in the LOA must be coordinated/apreqed with the CI-1.  The Tower Controller issued control instructions that entered another controller's airspace without approval or coordination.  This resulted in conflict (Aircraft X) twice.  [This operation] demonstrated a lack of understanding and or knowledge regarding vectoring aircraft below the MVA.  It is reasonable to assume; based on these actions; the Controller does not understand that when an aircraft is vectored off of a SID; the Controller assumes responsibility for terrain separation.  If my sector had been busy; we could be talking about near mid air collisions in addition to conflicting with VFR aircraft and colliding with planet earth.  As I returned from my break from writing this report; the same scenario occurred again with a different controller.  That this happened a third time with a different controller suggests the strong possibility that some of the controllers at SFO Tower have gotten together and decided that this procedure is within their authority and is ok.  This needs to be addressed immediately.  Permission to forward this report granted.

I was working the Richmond Sector; traffic was moderate. SFO is on the 28/28 Shoreline configuration. I observed Aircraft Y (scanned as a REBAS Departure) come off the airport.  He flew runway heading (280 Heading) for about 2 miles before turning which is not what they normally do on the SID.  I then observed Aircraft B depart (scanned as Shoreline Departure); he was about a mile behind Aircraft Y turning to 043 heading as per the SID. [Another Sector] had a VFR Aircraft X transitioning to SQL at 040.  I didn't have communication with Aircraft Y who; because of his altered departure path; came into conflict with Aircraft X.  [The other Sector] had to turn Aircraft X to the southwest to avoid the traffic.  Not only did Aircraft Y become a conflict with Aircraft X but he was turned by the Tower below the MVA 2;100; aimed at the depicted obstacle which is in a 2;600 foot MVA.There was no coordination with the CI-1 for Aircraft Y to come off the REBAS departure.  Mere moments later; as the NCT FLM is coming off the phone with the SFO FLM about the first pair; the same situation happens again with two different aircraft.  Aircraft Z departs SFO (REBAS Departure); I observe the aircraft fly runway heading again; followed by Aircraft A (Shoreline Departure).  Aircraft X is about 5 miles west of the airport at 4000 southbound.  Aircraft Z because of his altered departure path is now aimed right at Aircraft X.  CI-1 called over to SFO to stop Aircraft Z at 3;000.  [The other Sector] gives Aircraft X a drastic turn to the west.  Both actions were necessary to avoid a near mid air collision.About an hour later; same situation occurs with Aircraft C and Aircraft D.  I was working the [other] Sector and there was no traffic to conflict this time.  It was a different person working Local; so it appears more than one CPC thinks this situation is perfectly acceptable.If some SFO personnel believe that vectoring aircraft in someone else's airspace; below the MVA is good operating technique; then maybe some remedial training or performance review is needed.I would also recommend putting SFO on call for release on the REBAS departures to avoid this type of scenario.

NCT controllers describe situation where SFO Tower launches aircraft into NCT airspace not correctly separated causing the Controller to have to react and separate traffic.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We briefed the Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC); which stated; as usual; 'climb via SID'; but failed to notice that the usual verbiage of 'except maintain 10;000 feet had been omitted. In that section; it said 'Climb via SID; Expect 330...'. I think that both of us saw the 'Expect' and erroneously read what we expected to see; Except.' We set 10;000 as the clearance limit. On takeoff; the tower controller said; 'RNAV KIDNG; cleared for takeoff...'. We climbed out; and were switched to DEN Departure. When I checked in; I said; 'out of 8;000 on the EXTAN 4; except maintaining 10;000'.We leveled at 10;000 Feet; and were not surprised to be kept down; as two aircraft passed by overhead on arrival into DEN. After they were well clear; and no other traffic appeared (maybe a minute later); I asked the controller 'confirm that you want us to remain at 10;000.' He said no; that we should have been cleared to climb via SID. Coincidentally; he then queried three aircraft behind us what clearance they had been given. Two replied that they had not been cleared to climb via SID; and one had. The controller then told us to climb and maintain FL230; and we continued on our way.As we continued; we re-read the PDC carefully and noticed our mistake. In any other airport; we would have just put the SID top altitude in (FL230); and taken off. The long conditioning of the same procedure being used in DEN for [a while]; then changed overnight; did catch us. Interestingly; the departure controller; who was used to hearing our 'except maintaining 10;000' check in; did not catch what I said either. I think we read what we expected to read; and he heard what he had been hearing for years; and neither of us caught it.

A320 Captain reported not detecting a change in the normal clearance for the EXTAN4 departing DEN to maintain 10;000 feet. The actual clearance was to climb via the SID.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

I show up for duty to fly on aircraft in ZZZZ. We had mechanical issue and with all the passengers on board was performing my FA (Flight Attendant) duties at C1 position. After a few hours on the ground; announcement was made that the passengers will disembark the aircraft. FAs were directed to perform duties. I had to collect menu cards and customer survey forms and carry them on a tray. After the collection I returned to front galley and due to heavy people present waited few minutes on the right side in front galley. Then proceeded with the tray (with the forms) and followed the Lead FA towards L1 storage closet to store the forms. Not being aware that the maintenance bay hole was open; within couple steps I suddenly found myself falling down into the hole still holding the tray full of forms. I was not able to move for a few minutes and had a lot of sharp pain on the right side of my back and right arm. With help from Maintenance I was lifted and transferred to flight deck. I was able to move but was in pain. After returning to hotel; with the help of coworkers I went to [the hospital] in ZZZZ.It is very urgent issue. Any maintenance floor opening must be blocked at all times during opening for maintenance work. This accident happened because that open hole was not secure or had any signs of danger or proceed with caution sign. When the floor bay area is open FA activity should be suspended or limited.

Flight Attendant reported falling down an open maintenance hatch while performing duties.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 13000

Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 11800; Flight Crew Type 8000

Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

After takeoff at about 800 ft and before raising flaps; we struck a flock of approximately 20 birds. We probably hit about 6 of them. Both windscreens were partially obscured and the 'Windshear' alert sounded. The birds were spotted just before impact so it was obvious that we hadn't encountered windshear. After the encounter; the captain's airspeed was showing approximately 80 knots when the standby and First Officer's airspeed read approximately 190 kts. Control of the aircraft was transferred to the First Officer who continued the climb and retracted flaps on schedule. ATC was notified of the bird strike and location. We requested an initial climb to 10;000 ft and advised them there were some systems affected by the bird strike and that we would be working the problem. The flight directors were not working; and LNAV and VNAV seemed unreliable. The First Officer hand flew the airplane. The autopilot was later engaged as we determined that it worked in 'R.' The First Officer flew the airplane and handled most of the radio work with the second observer backing him up. The Captain and First Observer accomplished the 'IAS Disagree or Airspeed Unreliable' checklist. This brought back the Captain's airspeed indicators to normal. An analysis of the aircraft's condition and equipment status was done. The flight directors had biased from view; LNAV was inoperative; the airplane seemed to turn slower than normal; and we did not know what other damage had been done. We request ATC to provide vectors for us to prepare for dumping and used Satcom for conference call with dispatch and maintenance. We did not feel it was safe or wise to continue to destination so began preparation to return to SFO. The aircraft weight was approximately 830;000 lbs so we dumped approximately 200;000 lbs of fuel to bring weight down to 630;000 lbsin preparation for landing back in SFO. Logbook entries; approach preparation; briefings; and checklists were accomplished during dumping which took approximately 45 mins. The BDEGA 2 arrival and ILS Runway 28R were flown by the captain using the autopilot in HDG SEL and FLCH; then GS and LOC to approximately 1200 ft; then hand flown for landing with Flaps 30.

At 1000 ft after takeoff; while captain was flying; we hit a flock of geese. Blood momentarily covered windscreen on both sides and aural/EICAS warnings activated. Captain's PFD showed false air data info such as low speed; winds; altitude; vertical speed indicator; and auto throttles were unresponsive. FO instrumentation appeared accurate; and Captain transferred control to him. I worked with Captain on the EICAS messages by checklist while FO and other relief pilot flew and communicated with ATC. After checklist were completed and established in vectored holding pattern; a crew; dispatch; Maintenance Control and aircraft assessment lead Captain to decide that a return to SFO was safest. Communicated to all agencies necessary; crew; and passengers. Uneventful return to base.

Air carrier flight crew reported encountering multiple bird strikes shortly after takeoff from SFO resulting in spurious flight instrument indications. After dumping fuel; a return to the departure airport was safely accomplished.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 250

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was transiting from ZZZ1 to ZZZ; VFR;  beneath Class B at 1000 ft and circumventing ZZZ2 [military] Class D airspace to the southeast; when I got a traffic alert.  I spotted a C130 to my right; about 500 feet above and 2000-3000 feet horizontally.  In watching him and turning out of his path; I inadvertently climbed to 1260 feet; into the Class B airspace.  I immediately descended back into unrestricted airspace.

Single pilot reported an inadvertent airspace violation which maneuvering to avoid other traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 324; Flight Crew Type 12

Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I was landing Runway XX at ZZZ.  It was a normal centerline approach to landing.  As I touched down; the nose gear seemed to touch before it should have; as if the nose gear strut was in an extended rather than a normal (compressed) position.  Within moments of touchdown; the aircraft darted quickly to the left of Runway XX;  I lost directional control of the aircraft. The aircraft came to an abrupt stop at the side of the runway. No one was injured in this incident.

Commercial Single Pilot reported loss of directional control during landing.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 63; Flight Crew Total 730; Flight Crew Type 65

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was piloting an aircraft with two passengers aboard. The passenger in the right seat was an A&P and student pilot with over 40 hours of flight training. The passenger in the back was a multi-thousand hour commercial pilot and flight instructor with a significant amount of IFR experience; especially into and around HEF. Our IFR flight to HEF was coming to an end as we were being stepped down and vectored from the west onto the ILS 16L approach into HEF. We were working with Potomac Approach on 128.525 MHz at the time. Regarding altitude; I was first directed to descend from 4;000 feet MSL to 3;000 feet MSL; after which I read back and initiated the descent. Shortly after I was directed to descend from 3;000 feet MSL to 2;000 feet MSL; which I also read back and initiated. Passing through 2;200 feet I was contacted by the controller who asked what I was doing; and then informed that I was to only descend to 2;600 feet. When replying that I had heard an assigned altitude of 2;000 feet; I was then informed that we were below the sector's minimum vectoring altitude and asked if I was able to maintain visual separation with the terrain. Being in solid IMC I replied in the negative; and immediately initiated a climb back to 2;600 feet. Both of my passengers- each with a unique degree of aviation experience- attested to having also heard an assigned altitude of 2;000 feet. Soon afterwards we were cleared for the approach and the flight concluded uneventfully.

On approach to HEF in IMC; there was a breakdown in communication about an assigned altitude between the pilot and the Controller.


Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Fatigue; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Flying the route from OMDB to Asia crosses several Radio/Radar Control sectors. These sectors; Kolkatta; Dhaka; Yangon all have sub standard radio equipment and radar. On a good day it is difficult at best to understand the controllers and comply with instructions. Total and intense concentration is required during a low circadian rhythm time for crew. We were scheduled for XA:38 on this leg with only two crew members; no RFO was on board. Complicated and involved instructions are now in place for crossing Yangon airspace. These instructions require both the pilot flying and pilot monitoring to handle radios at several designated fixes throughout the flight. Transmitting in the blind; monitoring blind frequency; monitoring 121.5 and having to call on VHF and HF frequencies; while occasionally relaying information for other aircraft makes for a very intense ATC environment. Had severe weather been in place the workload would have significantly increased as would the fatigue. This leg requires an RFO; period! Flight time is irrelevant due to the complicated ATC environment. The workload is unacceptable for a crew of 2. The pilot flying must take away from his duties and responsibility to assist with pilot monitoring issues; radio control and navigation.  Better company administration and instruction of complicated procedures needs to take priority and communicated to the flight crews in a timely manner. The instructions for this route are buried deep in the flight planning pages. This procedure is worthy of a company notice and needs to be highlighted to the crews.

A First Officer describes the extreme workload of a two man flight crew operating nearly 8 flight hours at night between the Middle East and Asia while communicating with controllers in poor English; at times on two frequencies.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 362; Flight Crew Type 3000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Upon departure from ZZZ; the aircraft did not want to rotate. With a reasonably light load; the [Weight and Balance Calculation] gave us flaps 15 with a trim setting of roughly 6.0. I thought it was strange that we were that light and it was commanding a flaps 15 takeoff. The First Officer and I discussed it and thought it was simply due to the [Weight and Balance] system commanding a very reduced thrust. I also thought it was kind of strange that we didn't have a Zone count; but the Operations Agent said it was not required. All bags were loaded in the front cargo and; as it turned out; about 80 of the passengers were in Zone A. We did not know about the passenger loading until climbout; when I queried the Flight Attendant about seating.He confirmed all passengers were in Zone A. I had him redistribute the passengers among the cabin. During the takeoff roll; the First Officer was Pilot Flying; I called V1 and rotate. He pulled back but nothing happened. He pulled further until the yoke was nearly at full travel and the aircraft reluctantly rotated. He proceeded to trim to nearly 10 units of nose up trim in order to relieve some of the required back pressure. During first segment climb; with high AOA; we experienced uncommanded roll and pitch reminiscent of a wake turbulence encounter; but there was no preceding aircraft. The First Officer lowered the nose and the event stopped. The rest of the flight was uneventful and I requested a loading audit while enroute. When something seems strange; there may be a reason why.A loading error of this magnitude could easily be deadly in a short airport like ZZZ. By the time we realized the problem; had we been slightly heavier and tried to reject; we would been a giant fireball in the street.A Zone count should be mandatory for all 737-800 aircraft.There MAY be a glitch in the [Weight and Balance] system with light loads. It needs to be looked at.

B737-800 Captain reported weight and balance was out of limits; resulting in aircraft control issue during takeoff.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 30

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The M20 was in route at 9;000 FT; west to east. The CRJ200 was a departure off CAE Runway 11. Traffic was slow and I only had 4 planes I think. I established radar contact with the CRJ200 on departure and put him on course to ATL. The CRJ200 was out of about 4;000 FT when I switched him to ZJX. At the time the conflict with the 9;000 FT overflight M20 was about 15 to 20 miles away and I did not see it. I saw the conflict when the aircraft were about 6 to 7 miles apart and opposite direction to each other. I called to the aircraft I was talking to (the M20) and told him to turn right heading 180 immediately; and then gave him the traffic call. I did not wait for the response and keyed the ZJX Center line and said turn the CRJ200 north my guy is going south. Both aircraft were on east/west lines opposite direction to each other. The CRJ200 heading 270; the M20 heading 090. I again called the M20 to turn right heading 180 immediately with no response. I made the call again; no response. Then the M20 called and said are you calling me?  And I realized I had been using the wrong call sign. The call sign had a 'W' and I had been calling 'M'. The aircraft passed thanks to TCAS and a RA alert. I immediately asked the Supervisor for relief. This near midair was completely my fault. I was complacent and focused on the departure. I gave him the same thing we always give them. The slowness of the position and routine of the departure lolled me into a false sense of awareness. I will never again take the routine operation of the departure; or for that matter any operation be it only one plane for granted again. I have 30 years ATC experience and this goes to show you can never let your guard down. I deeply regret my failure and realize that if TCAS had not been on the aircraft the outcome could have been catastrophically horrible. I have learned from this error and will be forever diligent.

CAE Departure Controller describes an airborne conflict that he allowed to develop between a CRJ200 climbing and a M20 at 9;000 FT. An incorrect call sign was used to turn the M20 and ultimately a TCAS RA aboard the CRJ separated the two aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

I was on Local Control as Controller in Charge. I noticed that Aircraft X was coming in at an altitude lower than the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) the aircraft was in. I pulled a full route of the flight plan to see if the aircraft was filed on a Victor Airway and Aircraft X was not; the aircraft was filed at 11000 feet. I instructed the Approach Controller to wait until the aircraft cleared the MVA to take the handoff.

While working Approach/Departure Control Aircraft X was inbound from the Southwest direct CPR airport. According to the Full Route the aircraft was direct CPR at 11000 feet. The Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) along the route of flight was 11200 feet. I did not accept the handoff from ZDV Sector 22 until the aircraft was located in a lower MVA 3 miles from our boundary due to the aircraft at 11100 in the 11200 MVA.

CPR Local Controller reported the Approach Controller was being handed off an aircraft from the Center indicating 100 feet below the MVA. He ordered the Approach Controller to not take the handoff until the aircraft was in a lower MVA.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5.5; Flight Crew Total 93.8; Flight Crew Type 93.8

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was flying to 11R from the southeast. The winds were favoring the use of runway 16 and traffic was using 16. To enter a left downwind for 16 I planned to overfly the field; perpendicular to the runway at 2;000 feet and join using a teardrop to enter on the 45 degree angle. I made calls on unicom 10 and 5 miles out. Once about 2.5 miles out; another aircraft called in stating he was approximately 5 miles west and would be entering a right downwind for 16. I made another call stating I was 2.5 miles east of the field; would be overflying the field and performing a teardrop entry to left downwind. He called back to say he too would enter a left downwind. As I was performing my descending teardrop making my final turn to downwind I saw him crossing the departure end of runway 16 at what appeared to be 600 feet AGL. He then called traffic in sight and stated he would fly a tight pattern; which he did although his traffic pattern caused me to alter mine as I didn't want to get close to him. I stayed a little high and flew a wide; extended base to allow him time to land and clear the active.My biggest concern with his flying was crossing the departure end of runway 16 at approximately 600 feet AGL; which could have easily caused a mid air collision had he not seen an airplane departing. My secondary concern was him flying an improper pattern to cut me off to land faster while not stating his actual intentions until after performing his maneuvers.

The pilot reported that he widened his pattern at 11R to allow space for another aircraft who flew a tight pattern inside of him.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 345; Flight Crew Type 330

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I was operating a VFR Animal Rescue flight to HPN under overcast (3 dogs aboard). When I approached the NYC Bravo; ATC (La Guardia) assigned a discrete transponder and cleared me up the Hudson exclusion at 1500 (directed to follow the west bank; despite traveling north). I was handed over to Newark Tower; who double-checked my intentions and stated that I would be transgressing a TFR. Although I was obtaining real-time ADS-B feeds and showing TFR's on my ForeFlight display; no nearby TFR was being displayed. The Controller told me it was for Yankee Stadium and routed me west around the TFR and then back east to the Hudson at Alpine Tower. I was then handed over to NY Approach for approach to HPN; and NY Approach ordered me to remain clear of the HPN Class D. I circled for a while; contacted Approach again; and was told that HPN was now IFR. (I was at 1;500 clear of clouds and could see HPN). I requested SVFR and was told to stand by. After 15 minutes or so of flying a racecourse pattern over the Hudson (1;500 MSL in Class E); I checked with Approach again and was told again to stand by. Concerned about fuel; the need to get the dogs on the ground; and the potentially lowering ceilings; I requested and received VFR; switched to 1200; and immediately contacted NYC Approach on the (different) frequency appropriate for approach to SWF. I advised location; altitude; and intentions and the Controller instructed me to continue up the Hudson and notify at 10 miles from SWF. I did so; flying along the east shore of the Hudson; and as I passed West Point I saw that another game was in progress. As this was also 10 NM from SWF; I contacted Approach again and was routed in to SWF; handed to Tower; and landed.Did I bust a 'stadium' TFR at West Point? Who knows? Who can know; given the rules? I'm supposed to keep track of the stadium size and the contest schedule for every college in the country; and the TFR's don't even show up on FAA's own TFR site and aren't known to briefers? How about the fact that I was complying with ATC instructions at the time -- does that buy an exemption? Thank goodness I always use flight following; or I definitely would have busted the Yankee Stadium TFR. I appreciate the help provided by the Newark and Teterboro controllers; but wonder why the La Guardia Controller sent me up the river -- literally -- into a TFR. Maybe she was relying on the official FAA TFR map; just like I was?

PA28 pilot laments the fact that accurate TFR information cannot be found on any FAA web site or obtained from a FSS briefer. These omissions prevent moving map displays from showing the TFR's real time while airborne.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy; Airport

I was serving as First Officer. Enroute; the Captain was the Pilot Flying and I was the Pilot Monitoring. Upon exiting the runway; the Tower Controller gave us the taxi instructions 'high-speed; ...; cross XX center' and while on the taxiway; the Tower handed us over to Ground.Before reaching the next taxiway; the Ground Controller instructed us to follow an aircraft under tow which we did on a route until the under-tow continued straight and we were instructed to turn right. The Ground Controller requested 'tell me how the Ramp is going to bring you in' and I contacted Ramp as we were making the turn. The Ramp Controller instructed us to the gate and I relayed that information to the Ground Controller. He acknowledged that information and the Ground Controller had nothing else to say.Continuing on the taxiway; the Captain continued and then proceeded to turn left to enter the alley as instructed. There was an outbound aircraft occupying the West line of alley. As the Captain completed the turn; and with the nose of our aircraft pointed north; he and I both saw another aircraft accelerate from behind us; over our left shoulders; and proceed northeasterly; diagonally; to maneuver towards the East line. This other Captain aimed his aircraft between the aircraft occupying the west line and us. The Captain applied firm brake pressure and our aircraft responded and stopped. Once the conflicting aircraft passed us we could see their registration; and we proceeded to follow this flight north along the east side of the alley. They taxied to their gate; once he was clear to the left we continued to our gate. No further communication was received from the Ramp Controller during our taxi; and we heard nothing on either ground or Ramp frequency noting that there might be a potential conflict between us and the other aircraft.While there was no contact between our aircraft; or between the other aircraft had the Captain not taken the action he did then wing-to-wing contact between us and them would have occurred.  The maneuver by the other aircraft was very much unsafe; definitely unprofessional; and against the flow of the taxiway.

Air carrier pilot reported they had to brake to avoid collision with another taxiing aircraft which cut them off overtaking them from a diagonal taxiway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

There was training on the Handoff position and the trainee was a little behind causing data blocks to overlap and handoffs were slow which caused the sector to be more chaotic than normal. I descended Aircraft X from 16;000 feet to 10;000 feet with Aircraft Y at 13;000 feet opposite direction. I turned Aircraft X from a 250 heading to a 310 heading after I realized Aircraft X wasn't descending according to aircraft specifications. I issued traffic to Aircraft Y. When he reported traffic in sight; I told him to maintain visual separation. Aircraft Y replied and advised me he received an RA. I gave traffic to Aircraft X that Aircraft Y had him in sight and is maintaining visual separation.I should have used vertical separation.

A ZNY ARTCC Controller descended an aircraft through the altitude of opposite direction traffic.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This flight is this inbound flight of an out and back trip. The MEL 29-24-01 was still in effect during this flight and as on the previous leg I could not complete a preflight alternate brake check accumulator check or confirm good pressure with the parking brake set. The same agencies were contacted and consulted with again and the information given to me was that the MX Check done by MX covered for my checks. No reference or procedure for crew in MEL 29-24-01. As before I made sure chocks and tug in place to back up parking brake until an engine was started. Incomplete MEL procedures led the crew to seek info and advice from other sources.

Leg #2 dispatched with Mel 29-24-01 Yellow system electric pump inop. Again; unable to verify brake accumulator pressure during Captains pre-flight check and on before start checklist due to MEL procedure causing brake accumulator pressure to be low/ inadequate. There was no guidance in (o) or (m) procedures for this MEL that addressed this. When the Captain asked the AMT about this; he said that the accumulator was good. More importantly; there are no alternate procedures for pushback to ensure both the normal & alternate brake systems are adequately pressurized. We did not have any problems with pushback or brakes during leg 2. Flight was uneventful.I believe the Mel procedure was inadequate in that it doesn't address maintenance's check being used instead of the Captain's pre-flight requirement to check the alternate brake system as well as; the pressure check on the before start checklist. There are no (o) procedures to tell crew how to properly check alternate brakes system and pressure on before start checklist. Additionally; it doesn't address alternate pushback procedures with this item deferred. There needs to be (m) and (o) alternate pushback procedures.

A300 Flight Crew is dispatched with MEL 29-24-01 for an inoperative Yellow electric pump. The MEL does not allow the Captain to check the Yellow system/accumulator pressure prior to engine start nor does the MEL require maintenance to perform the check. The reporters believe that both the MEL and the push back procedures need to be modified to accommodate this MEL.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

My student and I were doing full-stop landing practice at Palo Alto. The visibility was in excess of 50 miles; the sky was clear; and the winds were very light; I believe less than 10 kts and less than 30 degrees off the centerline of runway 31. I believe that these excellent conditions led to a higher than normal amount of traffic in the area; as we had previously seen numerous airplanes in the practice area. The student was pre-solo and so I was doing most of the radio work and spotting traffic. Runway 31 was active. Numerous aircraft were in the pattern; probably 5 or more. We were on right downwind; runway 31. Right-hand traffic patterns are typical for runway 31 at Palo Alto. We were cleared to land (I think #3) behind a first 172 which was on the left downwind. I had difficulty spotting it and eventually saw what I thought was the traffic to follow. Typically; when the pattern is that crowded; the controller will call one's base to control the spacing. However; on this day; the controller was not doing so. Maintaining appropriate distance from the 172 I had spotted; I instructed the student to turn base. At this point we were over Shoreline Amphitheater; which is a very long final for runway 31. After turning right base; the controller shouted at us to turn left. I immediately took the controls and turned 90 degrees to the left. As I turned; I could see a second Cessna 172 just above us headed in the opposite direction. The Cessna was either on a left base or on an instrument approach to the same runway. The aircraft passed within 50 vertical feet of us and passed directly above us. We flew through its wake; and it caused the wings of our airplane to rock; probably 20 degrees of bank in each direction. I completed what was essentially a 270 degree turn and joined final for runway 31. The controller asked us if we were #1 or #2. I could see the second 172 immediately ahead of us and I responded that we were #2. However; the pilot of the second 172 responded that they were in fact #2 and gave the controller the sequence of airplanes on final. The pilot gave the N number of the 172 on short final (which was the first 172 that I had spotted when I was on downwind); stated that his N number was #2; and stated that I was #3. The first 172 landed. The second 172 asked the controller if they were cleared to land. The controller replied that the second 172 was cleared to land. At this point; we flew through the wake of the second 172 again; and again experienced our wings rocking to each side by about 20 degrees of bank. This was at approximately 400-500 feet AGL. There was negligible loss of altitude or airspeed and as an aerobatic pilot I did not feel that this particular incidence of wake turbulence was dangerous. However; it was not pleasant to experience. The second 172 landed and was rolling out. We were on short final and it became clear that the second 172 was not going to clear the runway in time. At approximately 100-200 feet AGL; I asked the controller if we were cleared to land. The controller replied by instructing us to go around and offset to the right; which is a typical go-around instruction at Palo Alto. We completed a right-hand traffic pattern. The controller called our base turn; and we landed without incident. I did not see the second 172 until it passed over us. I was not even aware there was a second 172 in the pattern; although this was the 172 we were supposed to follow. I believe that the contributing factors were several. First and foremost; the controller was not actively maintaining spacing between aircraft in the pattern by calling base turns. Second; there was a lack of awareness; certainly on my part; but perhaps also on the controller's part; as to exactly how many 172's were in the pattern. I say that the controller may not have been aware; since first; this near miss happened; and second; after it happened; he asked if we were #1 or #2; when in fact we were #3 behind 2 172's. This near miss possibly could have been prevented if I had clarified exactly who we were following and where they were; but it definitely would have been prevented had the controller followed the typical practice (at least at Palo Alto) of actively controlling spacing by calling base turns.Furthermore; the wake turbulence was disturbing. In retrospect; probably the best course of action in this regard would have been to go around far earlier. I did not expect to experience anything at all from the wake of a 172; it being a fairly light airplane. It is likely that the controller did not either; since the controller did not provide any such warnings and did not instruct us to go around until it was obvious that the second 172 was not going to clear the runway in time. All of us were slightly shaken up; including the controllers. I say this because both I and the second 172 had to ask for clearance to land on short final; and the second 172 pilot had to give the controllers the sequence of airplanes in the pattern. I am very grateful to the controller who instructed me to turn left. That was exactly the correct instruction. That put me heading away from the second 172. However; had I been 50 feet higher; we would have had a direct head-on collision regardless. The instruction would not have been in time to prevent a collision; as we passed directly under the second 172 with no horizontal clearance. The situation was avoidable. In addition to more emphasis on active control of aircraft spacing and providing better awareness of the number of airplanes in the pattern; perhaps training for controllers on dealing with the 120 seconds after a near miss would be beneficial.

A C-152 Instructor and his student on base leg for landing took prompt evasive action and avoided a C-172 that was flying on final. The pilot identified the wrong Cessna 172 as the traffic pointed out by the Tower. A timely alert from the tower as the two aircraft closed was instrumental in preventing a less benign outcome.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 1294; Flight Crew Type 700

I was practicing multiple approaches to the CON airport in night VFR conditions. My second approach was the ILS 35 which I elected to fly at 2;400 ft to remain under the overlying 2;500 ft Class C airspace at MHT to the south. After completing the procedure turn I was descending inbound on the glideslope when another aircraft called me on unicom and said BOS Center would like me to contact them.I called BOS and was asked if I was aware of the MHT class C airspace. I responded that I was and explained I purposely flew the approach at 2;400 ft to remain under the class C. I was told by the Controller the Class C is at 2;000 ft and in the future I must contact them before attempting the ILS to 35 at CON.As I continued to fly the missed approach I was approx 1 mile north of the CON airport when the BOS controller called me again and said that 'after checking the chart' the airspace in question was indeed 2;500 ft but it would be good policy to contact them prior to flying close to the Class C.At no time during the ILS 35 approach did my aircraft climb above 2;400 ft. There was very little wind and I flew the approach as published which clearly kept me out of the MHT Class C airspace; however to avoid any potential confusion in the future I will contact BOS center when operating near the Class C.

Mooney M20 pilot reported being advised by BOS ATC to contact them before operating in close proximity to the overlying Class C airspace.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

The taxiway line [ramp] north of Taxiway V in GRR stops as you head northbound around the east side of Concourse B. As you maneuver towards Gates 2 thru 8; you are kind of on your own with regards to clearances; especially from those light poles to your right; same thing as you come around the corner on taxi out until you pick up the taxiway line. Continue the taxiway line north and westbound and into the respective gates.

Air Carrier Captain reports that the Taxiway V center line at GRR ends at the ramp entrance and does not connect to the north bound taxi line around Concourse B.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

On landing roll out; we received a 'steering inop' message. We continued to use braking to attempt to stop on the runway; when the aircraft began to drift to the right. We ran the 'Asymmetrical braking' memory items from the QRH; but the aircraft continued away from center line. The aircraft drifted past the runway edge line; struck a runway edge light; and came to a stop on the pavement short of the gravel. No passengers or crew were hurt in the event. Airport maintenance came to tow us from the runway to the gate. Passengers deplaned at the gate without incident. Maintenance did not note any damage to the landing gear. The flight crew and aircraft were removed from duty for the day.The aircraft had a history of 'Steering Inop'; specifically after pushback. The unreliable equipment finally failed at a critical part of the landing roll out. Extra diligence should be used when flying an aircraft with common write ups. Additionally; repeat discrepancies that risk safety of operation possibly should require more attention before releasing to normal operations.

CRJ 700 F/O reported an aircraft with a history of steering problems had a steering failure upon landing causing the aircraft to leave the runway and strike a runway edge light.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Trim wheel froze in an upward condition at 16;000 feet. Aircraft climbed to 16;300 feet.  Center advised of altitude change; and was advised of troubleshooting in progress.Strong forward pressure was applied to control wheel. Autopilot and trim switches were turned off. Associated circuit breakers were pulled. Power was reduced. Request was granted for descent to 6;000 feet. Approaching descent altitude; trim wheel became operative. Approach and landing were made normally.

C421 Captain reported a frozen elevator trim resulted in the aircraft overshooting an altitude restriction by 300 feet. The flight crew disconnected the autopilot and ATC provided assistance clearing the crew to descend where the trim became operative.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

We were level at FL290 with a clearance to cross BUOYY at FL240.  We had not started down when we observed a TCAS target approaching the aircraft 1700 feet below us and climbing towards us.  We stayed level as it climbed to with 900 feet of our altitude and came within approximately 1.5 miles to our right hand side.  We decided to question Boston center about the traffic as we had been cleared to descend to FL240.  I asked if they were talking to the traffic climbing toward us from below and they said only that they were talking to a B777 descending towards us from above.  Both myself; and the First Officer are sure the TCAS was displaying a climbing target.  Also the First Officer is sure he saw two separate targets; one climbing towards us and one descending towards us.  Boston Center had no observed target where we claimed one to be.  When we landed we were given a phone number and asked to call the Center.  I spoke with two different managers; including three separate calls with the QC manager for Boston Center.  He seemed very concerned as they had no known target on their radar and he also indicated 'something similar had happened a week or so ago in the north of their sector' I called Maintenance Control on his behalf; and asked if the aircraft saved TCAS information.  Maintenance spoke with 'Safety' and I was told that no; the aircraft does not save TCAS information.

EMB170 Captain describes a TCAS target climbing towards his aircraft after having received a descent clearance.  When ATC is questioned they reply that there is no target at that location and altitude.


Installation; Repair; Testing; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

Aircraft X set out with Anti-Skid Control box along with Stores Parts Compatibility List and Maintenance Manual. Installed box to see if problem would be fixed; followed Maintenance Manual for trouble shooting with no help. Moved Aircraft X to [Ramp] pad and went back to Shop to gather more information and talk about what we wanted to do next. [I] talked about installing everything back to original. Troubleshoot for eight hours; found two problems; fixed them but failed to double check with my Partner that the original [Anti-Skid Control] box was back in Aircraft X and failed to document Anti-Skid was installed for troubleshooting. Also did not verify Serial Number on [Parts] Tag for new Anti-Skid box. [Recommend] verifying that the original box is in the aircraft [and] make sure to document the removal of component for the aircraft.

A Line Mechanic failed to properly document on a Non-Routine write-up that he had removed an Anti-Skid Control box and installed a new box in an aircraft for troubleshooting purposes. The new box was not removed due to a lack of adequate communication between himself and another Mechanic.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC giving changes to a new STAR Arrival into CLT; To cross BACKK below 14;000 ft [FILPZ1]. BACKK published restrictions of FL190-12;000 ft. We are 5;000 ft high from what FMS has planned. We have already started our arrival descent and with not enough time to reprogram system. Auto Pilot OFF; Speed Brakes Out; Dive to make restriction. WHY? Two days earlier on IVANE got MAYOS at FL220 with very short notice. A/P OFF and Dive to make restriction. This must stop happening! We did not have an Altitude Deviation but this should not be normal business practice in CLT!These changes are happening in CLT all too often. Please change STAR to what is needed for an arrival (Isn't this the reason for a STAR?) These last minute changes have to stop or I will stop accepting STARS or refuse to stay on a STAR with these kinds of requests. I hope you can feel my frustration in this matter. I'm too old to keep putting up with this stuff. I would be happy to help someone get this changed.

A320 Captain laments frequent ATC changes to RNAV arrival crossing restrictions requiring the use of speed brakes and defeating the purpose of the OPD.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 28; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 5; Flight Attendant Total 28; Flight Attendant Type 2

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant

After we had prepared for landing and were seated in our jumpseats; we heard the smoke alarm go off and the message panel we have on the Airbus said smoke in lav. I stood up and knocked on the door and told the passenger to take her seat we were landing. She said she had to pee and she could 'do what ever she wanted.' I knocked again on the door and asked her if she was smoking in there because I could smell smoke and the smoke alarm was going off so she needed to get out right now! She said that I could not tell her what to do! The cockpit called back to inform us they had a light that said smoke in the lav and we informed him that we had a passenger that refused to go back to her seat. The landing gear was coming down and at this point I told her she better stay in there (if she came out she couldn't get to her seat without endangering the passenger in XXC) The Captain made a PA for the passenger in the lav to return to her seat immediately! She came out; cussing up a storm; and had sprayed something in the lav that she claimed was feminine hygiene spray. I repeated 'were you smoking in there?' She started waving her arms and saying 'she could do whatever the [explitive] she wanted and no one could [explitive] tell her what to do' over and over.Another Flight Attendant got her to sit down with the assistance of the passenger in XXC. I talked to the cockpit and informed them that she was now seated and her seat number. The Captain asked me to check the lav to make sure nothing was on fire and I did. She had sprayed something in there to hide the smell of smoke and it was overpowering! No cigs were found in trash can so I took my seat. There was no reason for her to spray that spray and be so defiant if she wasn't guilty! I smell cigarettes and the smoke alarm was going off. I did not smell her spray until she opened the door! She was 2 steps away from the lav the entire flight and she chose to go to the bathroom after we were seated! Police met the flight and questioned her and never came in to check the lav. This woman interfered with the duties of the flight crew; caused alarms to go off in the cockpit during sterile cockpit; told us we couldn't tell her what the [explitive] to do; and almost caused us to land standing up. She should not be allowed to fly again if she can't follow instructions and is going to carry on the way she did! Unfortunately; I believe the police let her go. They asked us if she did finally sit down; which she did...but that was not the problem; the problem was that she was smoking in lav! That is against FAA regulations; if was not just her not complying with crew member instructions...Unbelievable!

An unruly passenger entered a lavatory on approach; apparently lit a cigarette and eventually set off the smoke alarm. The reporter/Flight Attendant's attempts to extricate the passenger were unsuccessful until the Captain made an announcement demanding she return to her seat. She then left the lav; which reeked with what she claimed was a feminine hygiene product; and excoriated the reporter in vulgar terms. The passenger was detained by airport police.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 590; Flight Crew Type 150

During approach to landing at RNT; winds were light; 360 at 3kts. We chose to land on Runway 34; during our landing I noticed bright lights at the end of the runway heading towards us. I immediately turned the aircraft towards the nearest taxiway and made a radio call. I got no answer and Aircraft Y took off from Runway 16 above us apparently oblivious to the fact that we just landed on the opposite runway at the same time they departed. Tower was closed. I went back and listened to the ATC audio from the landing and you can hear Aircraft Y make a departure call that I didn't hear. Then you hear all my calls; downwind base and final. The Aircraft Y makes another radio call again that we did not receive then we make a call from the ground once I saw the Aircraft Y rolling towards us. The Aircraft Y started it's takeoff roll on Runway 16 as we landed on Runway 34. I checked the radio after and our radio is functional; able to transmit and receive.

Pilot reported a ground conflict occurred during landing rollout when another aircraft took off from the opposite end of the runway.


Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Pushback operator alerted us to a fuel leak at the center of the fuselage. Maintenance was called. Maintenance asked for an immediate APU shutdown. No power on aircraft. Fuel odor and fumes filled the cabin. I asked the A Flight Attendant to initiate an Emergency Deplanement. She did. Passengers returned to terminal. Maintenance fixed the leak signed the book and we re-boarded and departed. The Mechanic seemed pretty serious about shutting down the APU and left with no other input. Given the information I was presented with I would react the same again.

A321 Captain reported that push back operator advised that a fuel leak was present on aircraft belly.


Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Today I was operating as the FO (First Officer) from ZZZ. [The weather] was incredibly clear and quiet so the Captain requested that when I pick up our IFR flight clearance from FSS to request a VFR climb through 17;500 which I did and FSS gave us the VFR climb as requested. I was the Pilot Flying; and as the Captain briefed with me we were doing a left downwind departure. It was also previously briefed that I would depart the left down around the high mountain RCO (Remote Communications Outlet). Upon departure and initial climb the gear was coming up and the Captain called for the left turn. I had planned on waiting a bit longer but looking at the local terrain off my left I saw no risk and making the turn when we did. This departure was completely non-automated and raw data for the way the Captain likes to fly. Truthfully I spent most of my career flying in [this area] so I was not uncomfortable with his techniques. When the left turn was made I did not think or feel that we were at risk of getting a GPWS. Unfortunately as we transited the ridge line we got the audible GPWS warning. We both immediately acknowledged the terrain and that we were not at risk and already passed the ridge. An escape maneuver was not performed due to the daytime VFR weather and the terrain clearance. After leveling off and cruise the Captain and I debriefed the entire event very thoroughly and both agreed the corrective action that we took was reasonable and he thought my lateral spacing was adequate but he was thinking I was climbing faster than I really was. Looking back on the event there are things that could've been done to prevent this event. Better crew communication and waiting a bit longer for the left turn. Flying the full departure would have been the best thing to do. That was not going to be allowed by the Captain but at no time do I believe SOPs were broken. Next time I feel it would be better to fly the full departure and or give the terrain a much larger buffer.

Requested and received from FSS a VFR climb through 17;500 ft. direct ZZZZZ departing Runway XX from ZZZ. During the departure briefing; I explained to the FO (First Officer) (his leg) that I like to curl around the NW portion of the [area] giving the passengers a nice view. I have done this many times before without incident. The issue this time was a little miscommunication between the FO and myself regarding a rather small puffy cloud; and I made a slight mention that I didn't mind that little guy as I could see through it. The FO decided to avoid it; causing the GPWS to alert. I wasn't too concerned as all terrain in sight. I just think adding some color to the possible FOQA report could be helpful as this has become a hot topic. It was absolutely not my intention to have that alert; as I wanted a little more pitch up; it just kinda happened a little quickly. I probably should been a little more assertive in what I wanted; as the FO has 220 hours in the [aircraft type] and didn't think it would alert. Again; neither of us intended that result.

Air carrier crew reported inadvertently activating the GPWS Terrain Warning during climb out after a miscommunication between the First Officer and Captain.


Indicating and Warning - Air Conditioning and Press.

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The first indication of a problem on this flight occurred while leveling off at 16;000 feet. When prompted to check the pressurization system on the cruise checklist I noticed that the cabin differential and cabin altitude were acting abnormal. The cabin altitude was indicating erratic indications between 3;000 and 4000 feet. The differential indicator seemed to be trying to indicate a cabin differential around 5; however was also indicating erratically in excess of this number up to around 6. Obviously this alarmed me at first because this exceeds the maximum differential number so my first thought was we need to begin a descent to decrease the cabin differential and run the checklist.I had a little trouble finding an appropriate checklist and settled on the cabin pressurization fail checklist only to find it not very fitting for our scenario. I knew the cabin was not fluctuating as indicated because surely I would have been able to feel sharp spikes in cabin altitude descending and climbing. Also; it was important to note that the cabin altitude rate of climb indicator was fixed at a 1;000 feet per minute climb. I asked Center for a precautionary descent to 10;000 feet which was immediately approved. We descended in an expeditious manner. When level at 10;000 feet the indicators all seemed normal; however the cabin rate did remain fixed at 1;000 FPM climb for the remainder of the flight. I called the Flight Attendant and asked if everything was ok in back. She said she noticed nothing abnormal. I told her we were flying lower than normal as a precaution but still expect us to continue to ZZZ1 as planned.My next concern was fuel. We did not have a lot of extra fuel; and it takes a very long time to reach our cruising altitude on this flight because New York Center always keeps us low longer for jet traffic to climb above which uses more fuel. I had burn numbers for 10;000 feet; but still called Dispatch to ask if we wanted to continue to ZZZ1 or turn back to ZZZ; we were about half way at the time; also I wanted some feedback from Maintenance Control. They agreed 10;000 feet was fine and continue to ZZZ1. I did lose contact with Dispatch toward the end; but I asked ATC to call our company and advise them we believed our fuel was sufficient to continue to ZZZ1 at this lower altitude. I did initially declare minimum fuel; however I was immediately given direct to the field; which cut off a lot of time; so they asked if the declaration was still needed; and I said it was not. We flew a bit slower than normal to conserve fuel. Lastly; it is important to note we did not depart with the 4;200 lbs of fuel as indicated on the release; but instead the Dispatcher and I agreed on 4;000 lbs for weight and balance issues; and this left us with about 250 lbs of extra fuel.We continued to ZZZ1 only to figure out that our weather radar was not working properly. I noticed an area of precipitation and turned it on and it depicted nothing but random yellow streaking lines. I asked ATC if they were showing any precipitation. They said they showed it as an area of moderate precipitation. I asked for a deviation and avoided it visually. I also asked for assistance as we got closer to ZZZ1 in case there were any other areas of precipitation. We arrived at ZZZ1 and upon touchdown we immediately got a caution light. I identified the #1 / #2 Engine Manual caution lights and cancelled it. We cleared the runway and ran the checklist. We feathered the propellers as directed by the checklist. The checklist advised with dual engine manual cautions to be towed to the gate. I advised air traffic control it would be some time and to try and assemble a tow team.Maintenance Control advised we could allow the first officer to go outside on the taxiway and reset a circuit breaker in the nose. I did not want to do that. We eventually had Contract Maintenance meet us on the taxiway and reset the breaker. It fixed the problem and cleared the cautionlight. Because of the proximity to the #1 engine I shut it down when the maintenance person was resetting this circuit breaker. I was unable to restart the #1 engine. The #2 engine was out of feather and functioning normally. I asked to be towed because of the abnormal situation taxiing on one engine. I was advised by airport operations that [air carrier] had just switched to outsourced vendors in ZZZ1 and he was not confident in their abilities to tow us that distance across a runway. I decided it was much safer to taxi single engine. I did that without incident. The Flight Attendant and passengers were very up to date with this situation as it unfolded. I entered discrepancies into the aircraft logbook once we reached the gate and contacted the necessary parties.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

A DHC-8 flight crew experienced aircraft pressurization indications that they thought to be erroneous.  They ran the checklists; descended; and continued to their destination.  On landing their ECUs failed requiring Maintenance to reset the ECU circuit breakers.  They then taxied to the gate.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft was dispatched with MEL 32-XXX; Anti-Skid System. This was the first time either of us had seen this MEL; and since it is fairly extensive; we spent a lot of time briefing it. I felt like we had a good understanding of the requirements and was confident that we could comply. The flight progressed normally until we began configuring for the approach. As we decelerated with the flaps at 15; the First Officer attempted to arm the speed brake lever. Instead of the normal green armed light; we got an amber 'speed brake do not arm light.' The First Officer stowed the handle and tried arming it again; to no avail. I asked him; 'Are we missing something here?.' We had thoroughly briefed the MEL; but we never saw anything that said that we couldn't arm the speed brakes. The MEL states; 'Extend speed brakes manually since automatic extension system MAY not be operative with antiskid inoperative.' We were prepared to manually deploy the speed brakes upon landing; if they didn't automatically deploy. The word 'may' implies that the system might work. How could it possibly work if the speed brake lever is not armed? We thought we had a new problem so we executed a go around to regroup and consult the QRH checklist. The checklist says to land without arming the speed brakes and manually deploy the speed brakes upon landing. We came back around using this procedure and landed without incident. I should add that during our descent; I used the speed brakes and the green armed light came on like it normally does. When we got the do not arm light with flaps extended; it confused me. I thought we had a new problem. Upon arrival at the gate; we contacted Maintenance and they showed me a copy of their 'Speed brake do not arm light is on - fault isolation' troubleshooting procedure (see attached file). This document clearly states that when two anti-skid channels are inoperative (which is what we had); the speed brake do not arm light will come on whenever the speed brake lever is moved to the armed position. In other words; the system is operating normally. At this point; I realized that the intent of the MEL was to NOT arm the speed brake lever; and the manual deploy was required. There is no 'may' or 'might' regarding this. You HAVE to manually deploy the speed brake upon landing. Both my First Officer and I were confused by the word 'may' and the lack of a clear instruction to NOT arm the speed brake lever. Maintenance cleared the logbook and we operated the flight back to ZZZ without further incident.The language in this MEL is confusing and unclear. We made our best effort to comply with the requirements; but we got it wrong.Change the language in the MEL to clearly state that the speed brake lever must not be armed and that manual deployment of the speed brakes are required. Replace the word 'may 'with the word 'will.'One other suggestion from my First Officer [is] a reminder that a bleeds off takeoff may be required would be helpful. We caught it; but it could be easily missed; especially with a 12;000 ft runway in front of you!

B737-800 Captain reported discrepancy between Antiskid MEL crew procedures and QRH crew procedure during approach.