Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.5

Workload; Distraction; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Manuals; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure

Aircraft X was on a 3 mile final and was cleared to land Runway 20R. Aircraft Y was on the landing roll and was instructed to turn left on taxiway Delta and then contact ground. There was no read back of instructions from Aircraft Y. Ground Control had coordinated to cross Runway 20R at Delta with a jet and was blocking taxiway Delta. Aircraft Z was on an IFR departure that was instructed to cross Runway 20R at Lima and fly Runway Heading from Runway 20L at Kilo. At this time I noticed that Aircraft Y was turning right at taxiway Delta. Since he was not going to be clear of the runway; I issued Aircraft X a go-around.Per our LOA with SCT; a heading of 195 with a climb to 3;000 ft was issued to Aircraft X. This would put Aircraft X in conflict with Aircraft Z who was flying runway heading and was less than a mile on the upwind. To avoid an imminent loss of separation; I issued an immediate turn to a heading of 150 to Aircraft Z. Traffic calls were issued to Aircraft X. In trying to avoid an imminent collision as well as a loss of separation; I gave a vector (heading 150) to Aircraft Z; which was below the MVA. The MVA is 1;900 ft and Aircraft Z was climbing out of 1;100 ft.Hindsight is 20/20 but in retrospect; I should have realized that I could have issued Aircraft X an immediate turn to 215 since there was a change to our LOA with SCT.

SNA Tower Controller reported issuing a turn to a departing aircraft beneath the MVA to avoid confliction with another aircraft going around.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

During cruise flight at FL370 Captain's airspeed and altitude disagree indicators illuminated followed by EEC failure to soft mode. Suspected pitot blockage from icing; followed Unreliable Airspeed checklist and EEC procedure in QRH and began descent to FL270. Passing through FL290 all indications returned to normal and remained that way for duration of flight.

The reporter stated that at the time of this event; they were IMC just in the tops of clouds. He stated that the first few minutes of this event were exciting but after the descent was in progress things returned to normal. This event was the third time the Captain's pitot system was unable to prevent ice accumulation so Maintenance replaced the pitot system which corrected the failing.

A B737-800 Captain pitot tube failed to prevent ice accumulation at FL370 resulting in the Captain's Altitude and Airspeed disagree and EEC failure to soft mode. The pitot system was replaced after this event and the third maintenance log entry.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

En route MIA approximately 40 SM south of DFW at FL370 experienced 25 degree roll to right. Aircraft was engaged in LNAV and was observed switching to APP mode without pilot input (FMC changed lateral modes on its own). Both Captain and First Officer VHF radios tuned to 111.75 departing. DFW ILS 17L/35R has same frequency of 111.75. Minimal heading deviation occurred before corrective action taken.

A B737-NG overflying DFW 40 SM south at FL370 had 111.75 selected on the VHF radio heads and the APP MODE engaged causing a twenty five degree roll right. DFW ILS 17L/35R frequency is 111.75.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

The First Officer was the Pilot Flying with the 'B' autopilot engaged. We had been in cruise flight for approximately one hour at FL370; at night and IMC with intermittent to continuous light turbulence; OAT approximately -54 when the Captain's airspeed indication began to decrease followed by multiple failure warnings including: Captain's 'A/S DISAGREE;' Captain's 'ALT DISAGREE;' Thrust levers increased; Master Caution: and the six pack annunciated 'ENG.' Both EEC's annunciated 'ALTN' and VNAV disengaged. The thrust levers moved to firewall and the upper center DU annunciated 'A/T LIMIT.' We completed immediate action items and determined we had unreliable Captain's airspeed and altimeter indications. We then completed the appropriate QRH checklists. We were now unable RVSM; so advised ATC; and were cleared to descend to FL270. As we descended through FL290; all the Captain's instruments returned to normal and remained normal for the duration of the flight. All probe heat indicators remained normal. A Maintenance review the next day indicated they had replaced the Captain's pitot probe; TAT; and the left ADIRU.

A B737-800 flight crew was confronted with numerous Captain's pitot/static system anomalies and warnings at FL370. During the subsequent descent to exit RVSM all systems returned to normal. Maintenance replaced the Captain's pitot probe; TAT and the left ADIRU.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Sector X. A B737-800 was on a Charted Visual Approach to Runway 30L at the airport. Adjacent traffic on a Visual Approach to Runway 30R was an A321. The A321was being worked by Sector Y which is located next to Sector X. Sector Y told the A321 to maintain visual separation from the B737. The A321 acknowledged the instruction to the Sector Y Controller. I advised the B737 to maintain visual separation from the A321. The B737 acknowledged the instruction. The B737 did not use their call sign acknowledging the clearance. According to your report from a random tape monitor you were able to ascertain that it was indeed the B737 who acknowledged the clearance. The report states 'The B737 was instructed to maintain visual separation with the A321; but failed to use a call sign when accepting the clearance.' Based on my many years experience working this sector the current light traffic situation at the time; and other factors; I also was able to ascertain that it was indeed the B737 which acknowledged the instruction. Since we were both able to ascertain that the B737 acknowledged the clearance even though they did not use their call sign why is this a problem? Since the A321 was already maintaining visual separation from the B737 why is this a problem? It is true that the B737 wound up slightly in trail of the A321. The A321 acknowledged instructions to maintain visual separation. According to the AIM it is the Pilot's responsibility to stay in a position to keep the other aircraft in sight. If unable they should advise ATC which the A321 did not. This may be a pilot deviation. Quit wasting time; our TRACON's Quality Control offices' time; Area Supervisors' time and Controller's time processing this type of non event as an event.

A TRACON Controller described an alledged error during light traffic and side-by visual approach procedures where one aircraft failed to use call signs when instructed to maintain visual separation.


Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

This was the Captain's first pairing since returning to work from a three and one half year medical disability. The flight out was flown by the First Officer and was uneventful but encountered light rime icing on the approach from 8;000 MSL to the base of an overcast layer at 2;000 MSL. The return was flown by the Captain and was prepared for an anti ice on takeoff. After departure and at 2;000 MSL; the 'Anti Ice Lo Capacity' caution message appeared; and the 'Bleed 1 Overtemp' warning message appeared ten seconds later. The flight crew elected to climb above the overcast and level off at 11;000 MSL; keeping the thrust below 65 percent N1 once in level flight. This thrust setting kept the 'carrot' on the ECS/Anti Ice MFD page in the green range. The crew entered a holding pattern at the VOR as published and executed the Bleed Over-temperature QRH procedure. The crossbleed was opened and the bleed 1 valve closed. Immediately; the 'Bleed 2 Overtemp' warning message appeared and the 'Bleed 1 Overtemp' message remained. The Captain kept the thrust setting low enough to keep the bleed air in the green range; approximately 200 KTS at 62 percent N1. After considering diverting to an airport in VFR conditions and burning off fuel; the crew decided to return to the departure airport; declare an emergency; and execute an overweight landing in order to avert hot bleed air causing severe damage. The aircraft entered holding at the VOR as published; the appropriate checklists were run; and the Flight Attendant was briefed along with the passengers. After two aircraft landed and reported negative icing along with breaks in the overcast; an ILS approach was executed. The aircraft landed at 45;700 LBS with less than a 500 FPM rate of descent at touchdown with a smoother landing. The emergency vehicles inspected the wheels and engines; determining that no damage had been noted; and the aircraft taxied to the gate and deplaned. Two separate maintenance log book entries were made: one for the 'Bleed Overtemp' condition; and one for the overweight landing. An aircraft swap was made three hours later; and the flight to our destination was uneventful.    The Bleed 1 and 2 Overtemp condition could have been catastrophic had both engines caught fire or severe icing been encountered. The overweight landing was of less concern.At this time; I am extremely fatigued and not feeling well. I will be willing to discuss this event in person when called upon.

An EMB-145 departed in icing conditions and both engine BLEED OVERTEMP warning messages appeared during climb; so an emergency was declared.  The QRH was completed and the flight returned to the departure airport for an overweight landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

A Flight Attendant in my recurrent class notified the company on [date] that they tested positive for COVID-19. Company notified me [10 days later].  That is 10 days after Company was notified which I find to be completely unacceptable. I had a trip and could have exposed hundreds of passengers plus my crew.  I should also add that I exposed my family and I am a caregiver for my XX year old father and YY year old mother.  I find this to be an egregious safety concern in delay of notification since I shared a classroom and training aids to include donning the PBE and POB (Portable Oxygen Bottle) with someone who has since been confirmed positive.

Flight Attendant reported being notified by company 10 days after another Flight Attendant tested positive for COVID-19.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We arrived at the gate on time but were not permitted to board the aircraft until [closer to departure time]. The agents had the wheelchair passengers come down about 2 minutes after we boarded and were still checking equipment. The agents came down to close the door before all the passengers were even on the plane. The agent told me she was going to close the door right after the last person got on. I explained she could not do that as we needed all passengers seated and all [overhead bins] closed. After the last passenger boarded; I followed him down to aisle to close the bins. There was still a line of standing passengers all down the aisle. I told the agent not to close the door as it was a violation of an FAR. The #3 was standing at 2L/2R (boarding door) and also told the agent she couldn't close yet. The agent closed the door with at least 50% of bins open and at least 15-20 passengers standing.

A flight attendant aboard a B757-200 reported the passenger agent; despite several reminders it was inappropriate; closed the cabin door while passengers were still in the aisle and approximately half of the overhead bins were still open in violation of SOP and FARs.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 999; Flight Crew Type 100

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was conducting training on a radar position. We had Aircraft X on a vector of 310 degrees at 2;000 ft. This vector kept the aircraft away from a 2;500 ft MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) to the west but would have been too close to the final approach course at SUA. The trainee turned Aircraft X to a heading of 290 degrees; but failed to recognize the MVA and the aircraft busted the MVA.As an Instructor it is my responsibility to take over when I see a developing situation and the trainee has not acted on it. I saw the situation; but did not take over when I should have. In the future I will not allow the trainee to get into a situation that he may not be aware of. I will fix it and then debrief after the session about it.

I was flying on an IFR flight plan. Upon descending to land the controller asked me multiple times if I had a visual; upon which I replied negative as I was in IMC at 3;000 ft. The controller told me to continue and use the instrument approach procedure and descend to 2;000 ft. As I descended I told the controller that I had a visual and he then gave me a new heading and told me to climb to 3000 ft. As I turned to the new heading and proceeded to climb I was in IMC again. I misunderstood the controller as I thought I was cleared for the visual and descended and turned directly to the airport upon which I violated the IFR environment.

PBI TRACON Controller and a GA pilot reported miscommunication; which resulted in the aircraft descending below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1425; Flight Crew Type 425

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Flew to ZZZ1 on a personal pleasure flight with normal/uneventful landing. Departed ZZZ1 for ZZZ. Upon contacting ZZZ tower was directed to enter left base RWY 25. Flew uneventful visual approach and touched down just passed the numbers at approximately 75-80 knots. Upon applying brakes left brake pedal reacted normally while right pedal appeared to depress to the stop with no/minimal back-pressure or braking apparent on right wheel. Continued to apply maximum possible left pedal/brake pressure while modulating nose wheel to the right in order to continue braking while staying on the RWY and began pumping right pedal/brake. Near end of RWY right pedal/brake began to respond to pumping and right brake effectiveness sufficiently to bring the aircraft to a full approximately 20 feet into the gravel over-run area at the departure end of the RWY. Right brake pedal then gave solid pressure and normal braking and the aircraft was taxied back to the pavement and then clear of the RWY via the taxiway. Further testing while stopped showed both right and left brakes to be functioning properly therefore Ground control was called with request to taxi to hangers which was executed carefully and with normal brake function.As a note; toe brakes and parking brake system were used during taxi and runup operations at both ZZZ and ZZZ1 prior to outbound and return flight as well as landing at ZZZ1 and gave no indication of malfunction at those times.Subsequent inspection revealed debris in the right brake master cylinder and the piston O-ring to have become fairly hard with a slight indentation along approximately 5 degrees of the circumference of the O-ring. Cause of the malfunction is believed to be a result of aged o-rings with subsequent reduced elasticity exacerbated by debris which may have wedged between the o-ring and cylinder wall reducing the ability of the right master brake cylinder to build sufficient braking pressure. Braking effectiveness returned upon pumping of the brake pedal apparently dislodging the debris and allowing the o-ring to have sufficient contact with the cylinder wall. It is surmised that debris may have entered the system via the fluid filler hole during level checking at a recent annual inspection. Logbooks show previous master cylinder rebuild or o-ring replacement to be more than 10 years ago.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:Both brake master cylinders were rebuilt using new o-rings obtained from Cessna parts. Area around filler holes was cleaned of debris; hydraulic fluid and debris flushed from system; and system was reassembled and proper operation verified.Further; a brake check line item has been added to the landing checklist to be performed after gear down to determine brake function prior to landing. Check consists of depressing the brake pedals and observing proper pedal height and resistance.

The pilot of a Cessna 210 reported that during rollout the left brake pedal felt normal and the right brake went all the to the stop and had no braking effect of the right main gear wheel; resulting in a runway excursion.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The current CBT [Computer Based Training] for CQ [Continuing Qualification Training] has a slide that reads in part '... Spare lithium batteries are any rechargeable batteries that are not installed in an electronic device.' Does this mean that when an FA commutes; and our bag is checked (or gate checked) that it is ok if our work tablet remains in the checked bag as the battery is installed inside? Or does this mean that it is not-ok? And it would not qualify to remain in the check bag? I am asking as a result of my recent interaction with the Flight Attendant Official social media group. The clarity provided does not line up with what is in the CQT slide in question. Suggestions: Enhance the clarity of text on [company website] and applicable FA [Flight Attendant] manual guidance.

Flight Attendant reported discrepancy between Qualification Training Hazmat material and Company Hazmat Policy.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During cruise; we received a FWD Equip OVHT message. We ran the QRH for the issue. While that was being resolved; we received a Cabin Altitude Master Warning. We donned oxygen masks; attempted to control the cabin altitude. That didn't work; so we executed an [expedited] descent and [advised] ATC. They vectored us to the nearest suitable airport. Attempts to contact company in the air were unsuccessful due to high terrain. We landed without incident.Equipment cooling checklist should discuss going to OVRD in single pack operations and the possibility of a cabin altitude warning.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767-300 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing loss of cabin pressure related to single pack operation and a forward equipment overheat anomaly.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X was in the adjacent Center airspace. A radar site was out of service so all aircraft at or below 23000 feet were to be on non-radar routing. The Radar Controller noticed that Aircraft X was flashing MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) at 11000 feet and below the MEA (Minimum Enroute Altitude) which was 12300 feet. He called the controller at the adjacent sector and asked if the aircraft was climbing. The controller seemed unaware that the airplane was below the MEA and said he would take care of it. He proceeded to climb the aircraft to 13000 feet. The controller should know the MEA in their sector.

A Center Controller reported that the adjacent Center Sector was handing off an aircraft below the Minimum Enroute Altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 11400; Flight Crew Type 70

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

After takeoff from TEB Runway 24 [our] aircraft climbed through 1;500 FT restriction by about 200 FT. The Tower had changed our runway from 01 to 24 and we made the changes in the FMS just prior to taxi. The pilot flying intended to fly the SID without using VNAV. The Runway 01 climb altitude of 2;000 FT was in the preselect for the Teterboro 8 departure; but was not selected to 1;500 after the runway change.The pilot flying briefed the proper procedure and the requirement to level off at 1;500 FT; but followed the flight director commands through 1;500 FT. We were given a frequency change just prior to 1;500 FT and the next Controller told cleared us to climb to 10;000 FT. After I selected 10;000 in preselect I noticed we were already climbing through 1;800 FT and that the pilot flying had not leveled off at 1;500 MSL. I estimate we were at about 1;700 FT when ATC's climb clearance was received.SOPs are being changed to emphasize the requirement to check that the preselect altitude be set to the first level off altitude on departure when not utilizing VNAV. Emphasis will also be placed on items to check/brief when runway/departure/arrival changes are made.

When ATC changed their departure runway out of TEB from 01 to 24 the flight crew of a Premier 1 failed to change the altitude preselect to the new initial SID altitude restriction of 1;500 MSL and the pilot flying failed to level off as required.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Wake turbulence encounter with aircraft [caused] upset approaching 60-degrees left bank. Arriving from south on autopilot; cleared visual approach to follow MD-11 from north which was established ILS 27R final approach behind another Embraer Jet; which slowed prematurely. As we were descending from 3;000 to 2;100 approximately 6 NM from JALTO ILS 27R Final Approach Fix on a dog-leg to 27R final and cleared behind MD-11 5-miles ahead; encountered wake turbulence; upset up to 60-degree left bank in approximately 1-second. Manually recovered; overriding autopilot; and immediately flying out of wake turbulence. Numerous EICAS faults encountered for autopilot; autothrottle; and probes. Continued hand-flying visual approach to normal landing. All EICAS faults cleared on the ground. Apparently the 50-knot north wind blew the MD-11 wake turbulence intact far south of the 27R ILS final rather than the 50-knot wind dissipating wake turbulence. Approach Control provided adequate warning our following MD-11. We heard Approach Control slow the MD-11 when the preceding Embraer Jet slowed prematurely ahead of the MD-11. We widened our turn to keep distance separation from MD-11. The wake turbulence upset was precisely like the recent simulator windshear training in severity and rapidity of roll-rate; except we immediately flew out of the wake turbulence. All passengers and flight attendants were seated with no alarm reported upon questioning Lead Flight Attendant.

ERJ-190 Captain reported wake vortex encounter from an MD-11 on approach to PHL resulting in a 60 degree uncommanded roll.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207; Flight Crew Total 561; Flight Crew Type 543

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was conducting a training flight with a primary student preparing him for solo flight. My student advised Ground Control our flight would be conducted in the pattern at CYS (Class D). The student contacted CYS Tower and was cleared for takeoff Runway 31. Upon our initial climb; ATC instructed us to enter a right downwind for Runway 27. My student acknowledged the instructions from ATC and began a right turn after reaching 500 ft. AGL.At 500 ft. AGL during the turn inbound to return to the right downwind for Runway 27 we were approximately 2 miles from the airport. During the turn inbound I heard ATC clear another aircraft for takeoff from Runway 27. This aircraft advised he was doing an east departure. I observed the aircraft take off from Runway 27 and fly what appeared to be runway heading. My student and I were still heading back to the right downwind leg at approximately 800 ft. AGL and climbing. I asked the student to lower the nose of the aircraft a bit to keep visual contact of the departing aircraft. I noticed the relative movement of the aircraft departing to stop.At this time we were beginning our left turn into the right downwind for Runway 27. The aircraft appeared to become larger with no movement. I immediately took the controls from my student and performed a steep right turn to the west to avoid a collision. The other airplane passed to the left of us approximately 150 ft. to the east of my location. I reported the near miss to ATC.ATC inquired why I was on a right downwind for Runway 31. I advised I was returning to the pattern for Runway 27 as instructed. ATC advised they thought I was going to perform a wide pattern. ATC did question the pilot of the other airplane about if he saw us before he began to turn. The other pilot responded on the radio that he saw me as I was turning west. I contacted ATC upon landing and spoke with the Controller about the situation. The Controller advised he had a trainee on the radio. The Controller further advised the other airplane was a Baron and he would speak with the other pilot about the incident.

Instructor pilot reported a miscommunication with ATC during pattern work; resulting in an NMAC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 571; Flight Crew Type 2888

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

First Officer and Captain completed the Before Pushback Checklist. Captain began to try and make contact with push crew while First Officer called for pushback clearance from Ground Control. Push clearance was received with a caution that Gate X had recently pushed; to use caution. After several attempts; the Captain was unable to communicate with push crew. A new wireless communication device was retrieved and hooked up successfully. Captain made contact with push crew; with no further problems with wireless communication. Captain and push crew exchanged company standard dialog prior to pushback. Captain instructed push crew that 'brakes are released; cleared to push; use caution for the aircraft that just pushed off of Gate X.' Push crew acknowledged. Almost immediately; the Captain and First Officer noticed the push was veering off in the direction of the other aircraft off [Gate] X. First Officer advised Captain that the aircraft was becoming uncomfortably close to the other. Seconds later; the aircraft came to a stop; just at the top of the J-line and turned at a thirty degree angle to the J-line. The First Officer suggested to Captain that we would be unable to make a turn with the other aircraft so close and due to our close proximity to ground equipment. Captain acknowledged. After a short time at a stop and with no additional communication from the push crew; the Captain and First Officer saw the aircraft off of Gate X make a turn to the right safely clearing our aircraft. As soon as the Captain saw the aircraft off [Gate] X cleared safely; he instructed the push crew to 'please push the aircraft further back and straighten the aircraft out; there is not enough room for me to make a turn out of here.' Tug driver acknowledged with an 'ok.' At this point; the First Officer had completed starting both engines. Several seconds after the 'ok' acknowledgment; the aircraft began to be towed forward and slightly to the left. Captain immediately and aggressively said to the Push Driver; 'Do not pull us forward; do not tow forward; we have both engines running.' No response was received immediately from Push Driver. However; a few seconds later; with the aircraft still moving forward; the Captain and First Officer heard push driver yelling to 'set brake; Captain set brake.' The Captain applied the aircraft brakes immediately bringing the aircraft to a safe but abrupt stop. Captain set the parking brake. Captain asked Tug Driver what the problem was; no response was received. Captain asked Tug Driver if we had a problem and what was going on; no response from Tug Driver. Captain asked Tug Driver do we have a problem; and Tug Driver responded; but neither Captain nor First Officer were able to understand what he said. Captain instructed Tug Driver to call for Ramp Supervisor immediately; again response was unintelligible by Captain and First Officer. Captain called Operations on company frequency and asked for a Ramp Supervisor to come to Gate Y immediately. A Ramp Supervisor; after several minutes; showed up to the aircraft and took over communication for the Push Driver. Captain asked what was going on. Ramp Supervisor advised Captain that the tow bar was lodged into the forward landing gear; between and under the two wheels. Captain acknowledged and began to secure the aircraft by shutting down both engines and turning off all hydraulics. Maintenance showed up to aircraft quickly without the Crew calling; Flight Crew began working with multiple maintenance people to find a solution. Captain advised passengers there was a problem during pushback and that it would be a few minutes until we could get some things sorted out. After approximately 20 minutes; Maintenance removed tow bar successfully from under gear and advised Captain the aircraft was safe to return to the gate under its own power. First Officer started number one engine after ensuring area was clear. Captain taxied the aircraft to gate without any further complications.

We received pushback clearance from Gate Y with instructions to 'use caution for company pushing off Gate X'. I noted that company on Gate X had already pushed back but had not yet begun to taxi. The Captain relayed our push clearance to the Tug Driver on flight intercom with the added instruction to 'use caution for Company pushing off Gate X'. The pre-pushback communication between the Captain and the Tug Driver was standard and we started our push. We were cleared to start both engines during the push. I was busy starting engines but also noticed we were being pushed at an angle and starting to drift toward Company who had previously pushed off of Gate X. I communicated my concern to the Captain that we were getting too close to company aircraft off of Gate X. At that moment; the Tug Driver stopped the push. It was my perception that we were too close to Company for either of us to move. I began to tell the Captain that we might need to shut down and be towed forward to allow Company to taxi out. At that time; Company traffic managed to taxi forward and make the turn away from us without incident. From the time we stopped to the time the Company aircraft taxied clear of us was about 10 to 20 seconds. There was no communication between the Captain and the Tug Driver during this time. At that time; the Captain told the Tug Driver that 'we don't have enough room to make the turn; I need you to push us deeper and straighten us out.' I think I heard the Tug Driver reply 'OK.' The engines were both running at idle power so we were both caught off-guard when the Tug Driver began towing us forward instead of pushing us further back. The Captain immediately told the Tug Driver; 'DON'T TOW US FORWARD; DON'T TOW US FORWARD.' That was immediately followed by someone (I think it was the Tug Driver) yelling on flight intercom; 'SET YOUR BRAKES; CAPTAIN SET YOUR BRAKES.' The Captain immediately applied toe brakes to bring the aircraft to a stop and set the parking brake; simultaneously; we heard and felt some loud; non-normal banging from the nose gear area. The Captain asked on flight intercom several times; 'What just happened?' There was no response. After about one minute there was a crowd of about 6 to 10 ramp personnel gathered around the nose gear; so the Captain made the decision to shut down both engines while removing all electric hydraulic power. Someone (not the Tug Driver) eventually got on flight intercom and told us the tow bar was wedged under and between the nose gear tires. It took about an hour of coordination with Maintenance and ramp personnel to free the tow bar; at which time we started engines and taxied back to the gate uneventfully. This was simply a case of ground crew failure to follow standard procedure and communications. Pushback Driver needs remedial training.

B737-700 flight crew reported deviations from SOP on pushback led to the tow bar becoming lodged into the nose gear.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During the takeoff roll while passing 60 kts I observed approximately 4 Cranes land about 1000 ft in front of me. They took flight and moved out of the way so I elected to continue the takeoff. Then at around 85 kts they landed back in the same spot. I executed a rejected takeoff and struck one; maybe two of them. The bird bounced off of the right-hand windscreen as we were stopping. I heard several other impact sounds as we plowed through the grouping. After we taxied back to parking and shut down and subsequent walk-around it was apparent that right engine had ingested the Crane. Fan blades were bent and there was blood and feathers all over the engine and adjacent hull. The windshield appeared to be scratched up from the impact glancing blow. We contacted company and our director of maintenance and filled out the wildlife hazard report with the airport manager.

CE-525 pilot reported impact with bird on takeoff roll and rejecting takeoff.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

At 3;000 FT after being cleared for a Visual approach at MCI I decided to extend the downwind leg to intercept course outside the FAF. I mis read the altitude at FAF and began to descend. upon starting our base turn atc said we appeared low. I started a climb to get back on profile. We intercepted the G/S just inside the FAF configuered for a stabilized approach and landed normally.Although I had reviewed the approach plate I inadvertantly thought it was a different altitude at the FAF. Lack of visual cues and night time ops; also situational awareness contributed.This was an eye opening lesson. how one can easily make a simple mistake of mis remembering an altitude. Even on the clearest of days under the best conditions errors can be made and missed. Also reminded me that night time ops can be a challenge even to the most seasoned of us due to the lack of all the visual cues available during daylight ops. Check and recheck altitudes especially on visuals when atc is no longer providing alt guidance. Lesson learned!

Descending into MCI we were being vectored by ATC to a right downwind for 19R right at 3;000ft. ATC asked if we had the traffic on short final in sight we acknowledged that we did and received clearance for a visual approach to follow the proceeding aircraft. We began a descent and a turn to base leg when we simultaneously with ATC recognized that we were low and made immediate corrections to our profile; continued our turn to final and intercepted the localizer and glide slope and were stabilized for a normal landing. Proper altitude for segment was misinterpreted and mistakenly verified.I strive and take great pride in always trying to complete the 'perfect flight' in reference to Company Policies; Procedures and SOPs. If I may make one suggestion that might alleviate as many opportunities for this to occur; is to consider requesting vectors to the final rather than accepting a visual approach on a downwind leg; especially at night.

A320 flight crew reports getting low during a night visual approach from the downwind position. ATC is the first to detect that the crew has descended out of 3;000 feet prematurely.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While approaching gate XX; during the final turn toward the 'J' line; my First Officer commanded STOP!; which I did. He saw a van on the right side of the aircraft that conflicted with our taxi path. During this time; the marshaller was continuing to give us the continue taxi signal. It was night time.The right wing walker likewise continued to give us the all clear signal with his wand; until after we stopped. The wing walker was looking at the marshaller; not the wing or van. He then talked to the van driver who started to move and gave us the clear signal. The marshaller signaled us to continue; but the van stopped after a few feet; so the FO (First Officer) told me to wait. The wing walker again spoke to the driver; who then drove off.We started toward the gate for a few feet; when the marshaller gave us a stop signal. The nose gear chocks were in the wrong spot; for a different type aircraft. After he moved them; we continued to the gate without further incident.Fortunately for us; we had an FO who was vigilant and assertive.

757 Captain reported a vehicle was in an unsafe position during the taxi into the gate.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On approach to Runway 19 winds were initially reported 190 degrees at 39 KTS gusting to 50 KTS. Before reaching IAF the winds had changed to 210 degrees at 30 KTS gusting to 40 KTS. After reaching the 500 foot call out we received a red windshear warning. I reached down and started to assist with advancing the throttles toward max thrust. The Captain reduced the throttles and said she was landing. We then had the wind shear warning and a sink rate warning. The aircraft landed approximately on the first half of the runway. No further events reported.Misinterpretation of windshear warning versus caution.Continue emphasizing escape maneuver during Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) training.

CRJ-200 FO reported the Captain continued to a landing after receiving a red windshear warning at 500 feet on the approach.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Staffing

The First Officer and I coordinated a return to gate with dispatch and maintenance and they agreed with the decision to keep passengers onboard. While maintenance personnel were working; I called dispatch and coordinated getting more fuel. The Fire Department arrived with the Fueler. I spoke with the Fire Chief and he explained a new airport policy which required the Fire Department to be present during fueling (even with both engines off). The Fire Chief also explained that the new policy requires two forms of egress for passengers onboard the plane. We already had the jet bridge attached and the Fire Chief recommended to me that a Flight Attendant arm an exit and standby in case of required egress. I called dispatch and they were unaware of the new return to gate procedure that required the Fire Department to be present during fueling. I then explained the full situation to the Lead Flight Attendant (including the Fire Chiefs direction and reason for arming the door) and under the Fire Chief's direction; requested that an aft door be armed and a Flight Attendant stand-by at the door in order for us to comply with the fueling requirements. The Flight Attendants armed the door and did not express concern or that they were uncomfortable with the door being armed. My intention was to operate safely and to comply with the new fueling requirements under the direction of the Fire Chief.  Helpful information for the future would be company guidance regarding this new return to gate fueling policy and how we are to comply with the requirement for two forms of egress. On the Airbus the overwing slides are always armed. This is possibly an acceptable form of ready egress without having any Flight Attendant arm doors.

Flight crew reported a lack of company guidance regarding a new return to gate fueling policy and how to comply with the requirement for two forms of egress.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

We were making the turn into the gate to park. I had just shut off my taxi light so I wouldn't blind the rampers and checked to see that the area was clear. I saw a catering truck on our right and thought it was slowing so I turned my head back to the left towards our parking spot. Just then I saw movement out of the corner of my eyes and the First Officer braked hard to prevent a collision with the catering truck that tried to speed in front of us. If we didn't stop and the catering truck kept going then we would have been close to colliding. I always brief my First Officer's to use the brakes if they think they need to and I will thank them later. That was exactly how that worked out.The driver of the truck was either poorly trained or was inattentive.Briefing the First Officer to use the brakes empowers them to use their judgment to keep us safe. Ramp drivers need better training.

Captain reported a catering truck crossed in front of the aircraft causing the First Officer to brake hard to avoid a collision while approaching the gate.


Rockwell Aero Commander Single-Engine Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 360; Flight Crew Total 5600; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While en route from ZZZ to ZZZ1 the engine of Aircraft X abruptly quit with no warning. At that point I established best glide speed; shut off my fuel selector; and landed it in a clearing in the forest with no bodily harm; no damage to other people or property; and some aircraft damage. Before flight this morning I looked into the fuel tanks and noted around 1/3 in both tanks; topped off the fuel with 72 gallons over the top of the wing; and visually double checked that the fuel was full after allowing for equalization then departed ZZZ at approximately XA00 am. The engine quit between 1:35- 1:40 into the flight. The left tank fuel gauge appeared to be inoperative when I departed but since I was not familiar with the airplane I did not know if it had been disabled or if it would come back into service throughout the flight (it has been my experience that they do some times). The right fuel gauge seemed a little erratic but was counting down the fuel as I progressed throughout the flight. When the engine quit the right tank gauge was not indicating empty. I chose that the airplane was safe for this flight concerning the fuel because of my conservative fuel planning process that I have used successfully on many other ferry flights with different aircraft. I talked to several pilots with 1340 experience and it sounded like the most I could expect it to burn would be around 36 gph using the power settings that I intended to use. I made my flight plan to ZZZ1 assuming 40 gph and decided I would divert to a closer airport if I could not make it there in less than 2 hours; leaving me with 40 minutes of reserve. I would have made it at about 1:45. After the fact; I calculated my actual fuel burn using the 106 gallons usable that was placarded on the wing and came up that the engine was burning 62 gph. This seems extraordinarily high and I am suspicious that the engine quit for a different reason or that fuel was being leaked in flight. In hindsight I can see that only flying a 1 hour leg first with an unfamiliar airplane would be best practice that I will employ from now on now that I understand how far off fuel consumption estimates can be. I also will insist that the fuel gauges be functioning to the best of their designed ability as a secondary monitoring system in any aircraft that I fly.

Rockwell pilot reported an off airfield landing after engine quit due to fuel starvation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 5781; Flight Crew Type 5781

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While on approach into SFO. We were level at 8;000 about 4 miles north of EPICK on the SERFR 1 RNAV arrival. A green laser flashed crossed the flight deck windows about 3-4 times. We notified ATC of this. We had also gotten a heads up from ATC that this might happen.

An air carrier Captain flying the SFO SERFR 1 STAR reported NCT alerted them about the possibility of a laser highlight which did in fact occur about four miles north of EPICK.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft X called for VFR clearance to practice instrument approaches to SRQ and requested taxi from the FBO.  I read his clearance to him with a proper read back and verified his location for taxi.  After confirming he was; I gave taxi instructions to runway 32 via Alpha; hold short of runway 04.  Aircraft X read back to taxi to runway 32 via Alpha and then made a comment that he could depart from 04; but then changed his mind to taxi to the long runway; runway 32.  I failed to receive the hold short read back.  While taxing on Alpha at a quick speed Aircraft Y was landing on runway 04. As I was observing his taxi I realized Aircraft X was not going to slow down or hold short of runway 04 and immediately instructed him to hold short of runway 04; hold position; and hold now in the same transmission to ensure an immediate stop of his aircraft.  Aircraft X's front half of the aircraft had crossed the hold short line when he came to a complete stop.  Aircraft Y was already on the runway and slammed on his brakes to avoid a collision.  No damage or loss of life ensued.  Aircraft Y was able to taxi around Aircraft X and safely continue to the FBO.I will ensure that I receive hold short instruction read backs.I think all pilots should have a preferred runway and taxi route pre-determined before taxing. This will avoid being distracted during taxi instructions and read back; while they decided which runway they would prefer.

SRQ Tower Controller reports of a runway incursion due to a missed readback.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 94; Flight Crew Type 3899

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 163; Flight Crew Type 2957

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

While on an ILS 4R into EWR; I was the Captain; pilot flying. The EWR weather was 800 broken with light rain. Right at the cloud base; I lost my flight director; ILS raw data (including standy att); and VNAV PDI info. First Officer instrumentation remained normal. I maintained attitude and broke out in a few seconds low and right of course. (We received a low altitude warning from ATC). We had a normal landing. I wrote up all unusual indications and did a follow up call to Maintenance Control the following day.

On the ILS to 4R EWR at about 900 feet the Captain stated he lost his flight director. I stated I still had mine and asked if he would like to transfer controls to me. He said no. At about 800 feet we started to break out intermittently and the ground was partially visible. I noticed we were getting low and stated we are 1.5 dots low at the same time ATC issued a low altitude alert. At that point I had the runway in sight and told ATC we had the runway. The Captain arrested the descent rate and we were back on the glidepath. I was outside the aircraft and thought the Captain was too but at about 600 feet we were right of course. I was looking out the window at the runway thinking we need to fly left but didn't translate that correctly and stated we are left of course instead of saying to fly left. This is the first point I realized the Captain wasn't outside the aircraft. At this point I pointed to the runway that was off to the left and the Captain corrected. We were on glideslope and within lateral limits at the 500 foot stability gate so I felt comfortable continuing the approach and landing. The landing was uneventful and in the touchdown zone.

Air carrier flight crew reported the Captain experienced loss of flight director and ILS on approach to EWR; resulting in a low altitude alert from ATC.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Airport; Airspace Structure

Arriving in the local Las Vegas area; we were assigned a visual approach to Runway 19L; in night conditions. While this is a normal approach for this airport; more frequently we arrive using Runway 25L. About 25 miles from the airport; while being vectored westbound; we were given a descent to 5;200 FT. (Assigned to 5;200 FT.) Knowing there was terrain in the area; the EGPWS/Terrain was closely monitored; and at that time showed terrain at 4;100 FT. Approach asked if the airport was in sight. We soon began a visual approach; including the initial descent from 5;200 FT.  While monitoring terrain ahead in night flying conditions; as we passed over what was believed to be a safe altitude; we received a terrain warning; for what seemed to be quick; lasting only seconds. Though it was night; the peak that we passed over is marked with red obstacle lights; and was able to be seen. It seems our rate of descent should have been delayed for more significant clearance above terrain.ATC should consider delaying offering visual clearances at night; until terrain is clearly not at risk. Flight Manual Part II for this airport only point out terrain warnings for night approaches for Runway 01. Cautions for other runways should be included. Pilots should be more frequently reminded in training about approaches in terrain; night flying; and VFR separation from clouds. This report was submitted in hopes that other aircrews in this situation are better protected from terrain at night; in visual conditions. It is often very difficult to identify terrain in darkness.

A B757 First Officer was uncomfortable on the LAS Runway 19L night visual approach while at 5;200 FT because even with terrain and the airport were insight; the EGPWS momentarily activated.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 75

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I had to turn off all electronics; including taxi Light; landing light; anti-collision lights; navigation lights; ADS-B; transponder; and radios. Due to a discharging battery state. I was worried I was not going to have the power to bring down the gear. I continued on the flight at 5;000 feet to get to ZZZ1. I let Approach know by phone; as that was the only number I had easy access to in the air; and they let the Center know of the issue and my plan and location. I had 2 iPad's and a smartphone to stay on a new course and stay out of any controlled airspace and followed a route around the western side of the Class B airspace. Route was ZZZ to ZZZ1.Then after clearing the northwest side of the airspace; I went direct to ZZZ1. Once I got less than 10 miles away from ZZZ1 I turned on my electronic system to bring down the landing gear. The backup plan if the gear was not going to go down was to go to ZZZ2. I told them I was planning on calling them no later than XA:30 PM of my plan or if I was on the ground. I got on the ground safely in ZZZ1. Approach called; and I told them I was on the ground safely. The major worry I had was my NAV lights or anti-collision lights at night and the point of this report. I decided to continue the flight and land in ZZZ1 over any other airport because I knew that was the safest place for me to land at night with no lights or radios. I had people waiting; and they turned on the airport lights for me. At any other airport; I was worried it would have ended badly. The different idea was to turn around to ZZZ; but there was flight training with multiple airplanes in the pattern. There was no damage or any injury. I still had all primary flight instruments the whole flight.

C177 pilot flying into an uncontrolled airport reported they landed at night with no aircraft lights due to battery failure.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

In cruise we received a master caution and a flaps light on the CWP. We ran the QRH which directed us to select the flap setting that was indicated which was zero and turn on the [Terrain Awareness Warning System] override. We used the tables to calculate a corrected ref for a flaps zero landing and a corrected landing distance which was ref 138 and just under 5;000 FT. We determined that a landing at destination would be ok because the runway is 7;000 FT long. We relayed a message to Dispatch via Operations to ensure that we were ok to land and briefed a zero flap visual approach. Operations relayed a message back to us that Dispatch agreed and we were ok to land. We did not declare an emergency. We did not brief the passengers to brace. I briefed the Flight Attendant that we would be making an abnormal landing and we would be slightly faster than usual but there was no serious cause for alarm. I told her this was an abnormal situation; not an emergency. We landed without incident and taxied to the gate. Contract maintenance met us at the aircraft and determined that even though the flap indicator was indicating zero; we had some flaps down which is what triggered the caution. Maintenance trouble shot the problem and found a tripped circuit breaker. They reset the breaker; and checked the flaps for full range of travel and indication and checked that the CWP flaps light was out. It was a crew swap so I'm not exactly sure what the complete corrective action was but none the less the aircraft was signed off and made the return trip with another crew.

SF340 Captain experiences a master caution and a flaps light on the CWP at cruise altitude. The flaps indicate up and a no flap landing at destination is planned and successfully executed. Maintenance found that some flaps were out and that a circuit breaker had tripped. Resetting the circuit breaker returned the flaps to normal operation.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 2600

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather

Tried to get IFR reservation to Oshkosh; but could not because they were all taken. I chose to get IFR reservation to C47; a nearby airport; with the plan to shoot an instrument approach to runway 18 at C47; then either plan A: land and wait for weather to turn VFR and continue from there to OSH VIA visual approach in OSH NOTAM (RIPON TO FISK; then direct OSH; or plan B: if I broke out visually on the approach to C47 then Fly visually to OSH VIA RIPON and FISK per NOTAM. On the descent on the approach; I did break out visually before reaching minimums; at about 1400 MSL. I then elected to fly at 1400 MSL to RIPON to try the visual approach. The problem was cloud bases were ragged and less than 100 feet above me; I had no cloud separation; barely keeping clear of clouds and barely 400-500 feet AGL. I rationalized this was OK because of the special circumstances of air adventure 2017 procedures at OSH. FORTUNATELY; everything worked out and conditions improved to VFR after I passed FISK inbound to OSH Traffic pattern. But I was taking a risk by scud running in such a narrow margin and declaring my own special VFR without ATC permission. I did have ADS-B out on board but that does not show all traffic. Worst case; I could have collided with another plane which was also scud running nearby; or hit a tower/wires. I should have landed at C47 and waited patiently for weather to get better between C47 and FISK before proceeding to OSH.

General aviation pilot reported operating below cloud minimum clearances enroute to OSH after breaking out from a nearby IFR approach.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While on the STAR into ZZZ I was the pilot flying and given a descent to 7;000 ft. following the STAR. We were then given clearance direct to ZZZZZ intersection. While in the turn; both the Captain and I simultaneously lost our MFD displays; as they both went dark at exactly the same time. We were on the arrival and our position was appropriate and our flight path was stabilized so we both began troubleshooting procedures to attempt to regain at least one working MFD. The arrival and approach has many way points and I consider the info provided on the MFDs critical to situational and positional awareness. When I switched my DRP to PFD as directed by procedure; it did not bring my screen back however it did cause the AP to enter roll mode. This was recognized immediately and I reselected NAV mode and 'FMS' was displayed on my PFD. With the assumption that our flight path was stabilized; both the Captain and I continued troubleshooting; and ultimately after a minute or two I was able to get my MFD back. The Captain's never came back. For an unknown reason; when my MFD came back; it was apparent from the map that we were a couple miles south of the desired course. At that moment ATC directed that we begin a turn back to the left (north) to re-intercept our course. The Controller queried what happened and stated that he had to level-off a departing aircraft early to avoid a conflict. He mentioned that no loss of separation had occurred and told us we would have to call the controller after landing.Faulty/insufficient equipment and a well known problem on the CRJ aircraft. Contributing factors: I failed to maintain positional awareness through my CDI which would have shown the navigational error. Both pilots went heads down to fix this problem which ultimately is one in which the aircraft can still be operated with. TEM was not optimized; one pilot should have stayed focused on flight path management; the other should have begun troubleshooting. Also due to high workload at time of failure (descent; turn; airspeed changes) the navigation error was more insidious than it would have been during most other phases of flight.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported failure of both PFDs during initial approach resulted in a clearance deviation.


Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During the departure climb the First Officer indicated to me that the right engine oil quantity was decreasing at a moderate rate. After approximately two to three minutes the right oil quantity reached zero. We then received an ECAM Warning for 'ENG 2 OIL LOW PR (in red)'.  We followed SOP and performed the ECAM procedure; which directed us to shut down the right engine.  We [advised ATC]Center and requested a return to our departure airport. I notified Dispatch of our engine shutdown and our diversion. I performed a single engine approach. We landed without further incident. Oil leak in the right engine

A319 pilot reported an oil leak on departure caused them to shut down an engine and return for a landing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Working a very busy local control position and dealing with a cumbersome and unsafe letter of agreement with the [company] ramp control is a hazard to flight safety. In this situation I was very busy adjusting the aircraft on final to achieve and maintain proper intersecting runway separation also known as preventing collisions between aircraft operating within the system. The primary purpose for the ATC. The traffic density was above average; and wind conditions made complexity elevated. As an additional contributing factor of workload a [small aircraft] departed Runway 35 VFR which could not be seen out the window or on RADAR.  During all of this Aircraft X was twice given taxi instructions in accordance with local directives. The aircraft was intentionally not given a frequency change (I have found that this is a good way to work around aircraft that choose to ignore ATC instructions and listen to ramp 'controllers' instead of air traffic controllers). Aircraft X did choose to ignore ATC instructions and held on the taxiway for an extended period of time despite being given clear taxi instructions once again. Aircraft X after blocking an exit point of the runway for an extended period of time did enter the ramp after communicating with the ramp 'controller'. This caused me to shift focus from separating aircraft on converging courses to deal with an aircraft that before the LOA was changed for efficiency would have never been an issue. This facility has placed efficiency ahead of safety. This LOA is unsafe. Listen to the controller work force who are either dissatisfied with it or choose to ignore it and have gone back to working the way we used to do things.

PHL Local Controller reported a new Letter of Agreement procedure creates an unsafe situation for aircraft taxiing to the ramp.


Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

There was a large fuel spill. Between the XX and YY gates; originating from an underground fuel hydrant. The fuel erupted from the hydrant and proceeded to flood the immediate gate area as well as covering approximately two gates down (flowing westward). The local airport fire authority was contacted and responded as well as the Airport Operations.On going to work for my shift I immediately smelt the Jet-A fumes as soon as the shuttle transport van dropped me off at the ZZ gate. Within seconds of entering the terminal I began to get a headache as well as taste a metallic taste in my mouth from the fumes. I was very disconcerted by this as I knew that I still had an entire shift ahead of me in this very unsafe condition. On speaking to my associates I learned that they sat though these events in an office that was saturated in the heavy smell of Jet-A. They were give masks as an option to wear that are not OSHA approved for working in gas fumed environments (the masks were more or less cheap painters masks). There were complaints from fellow employees of headaches; nausea; dizziness; foul tastes in their mouths and dis-ease in general.To my knowledge the only evacuation given was by order of the on-site fire chief for ramp side personnel but not to those in the building. There was no back-up location to go to to escape this unsafe and hazardous condition; if there is one available then it was not utilized. On leaving the airport at the end of my shift I had to remove my work clothes as they reeked of fuel and had to take a shower as my exposed skin and hair smelled of fuel as well. As I write this I still have a stinging in my nose and feel stuffy in my head and sinuses. I worry for my health considering that I was breathing carcinogenic fumes for 9 hours.I do not feel that [Company] adhered in any way; shape or form to its own values that it touts at every chance that it gets to. I accept that incidents happen but it is how we deal with them and treat our employees when they occur that shows our worth. I feel less safe; and significantly less confident in the local management's abilities to look after my safety and well being while I am at work.

A substantial fuel spill occurred in the ramp area of Gate. This led to a large clean up effort; that led to multiple gate areas and the smoking area to be closed for much of the shift. Due to the proximity to the spill area; the Service Oversight Center was also affected. Strong odors of aviation fuel filled the SOC; but the lack of action by management little was done to rectify the situation. Throughout the course of the afternoon shift; strong smells of aviation fuel were pervasive throughout the SOC; and some of the passenger terminal adjacent to the gate areas affected by the spill. One Ground employee was transported as a result of the fumes. Other than opening doors and using fans to try and air out the SOC; very little was done to ensure the wellbeing of employees working. Management told employees that if they felt unwell; they could take a temporary walk or break outside of the SOC; which is not a permanent solution to the situation. Little regard was given for the well being of SOC employees in this circumstance. Other than plastic masks; no protection was given to the employees; and no alternate work areas could be arranged to keep employees out of an area that had a strong odor of aviation fuel. This was not a healthy or safe work environment; and lots more could be done in order to ensure the health and wellbeing of those scheduled to work during this shift. The odors became so bad at one point; that inflight elected to move their scheduled SOC personnel back to the inflight base instead. Instead of providing alternate work areas for SOC employees to safely perform their duties; it was decided that it would be best to just work with fans blowing and all doors to the ramp area open in an attempt to air out the SOC. This simply resulted in the odor of fuel to be constantly present in the SOC throughout the course of the shift.

Flight crew reported a fuel spill caused headaches and other symptoms due to the fuel fumes emanated.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Departing BUR on Runway 15; we were assigned the heading of 210 degrees and an initial altitude clearance limit of 4000 ft. I believe it was just prior to 3000 ft that ATC asked us to expedite our climb to 4000 ft for traffic which was at 3000 ft. Shortly thereafter; with urgency and his voice; the Controller told us to turn immediately right to the heading of 340. The First Officer started to turn the aircraft while I was looking at TCAS. The intruder target was red and in close proximity to our aircraft. At this time; I thought it was necessary to intervene and increase the rate of turn and increase back pressure on the yoke to further increase our rate of climb; which I did. We were subsequently cleared to FL190 and on course; resuming our flight. Quite frankly; this event scared the hell out of me; and I would love to know how close we actually came. We never saw the intruder aircraft.

B737-700 Captain reported an NMAC while departing BUR.


Small UAS (At or above 0.55 lbs and less than 55 lbs)

Climb; Hovering (UAS); Landing; Takeoff / Launch

Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 1.5; Flight Crew Total 0; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 37.5; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 37.25

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

I used Airmap to look up the address of inspection location but did not type in physical address. I referenced the town of Tucker which was in Class G airspace but the actual location of the flight was a mile and a half west in Class D (PDK). No prior authorization was requested. Flight was completed and I was made aware of the flight error by management and we discussed the importance of looking up physical location.

Part 107 UAS pilot learned after a flight they flew in controlled airspace without authorization.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We departed SLC on Runway 35 on the ARCHZ1 departure for ZZZ. We briefed our departure instructions and performed our route verification and all SOP's were complied with. The ARCHZ1 departure states assigned heading of 260 degrees for radar vectors to the first fix (SCANT intersection); cross above 10;000 feet and the top altitude is FL230. On departure we turned to the ATC assigned heading of 260 and we were climbing at a quick rate of 230 knots as assigned via our ATC clearance via ACARS. As I was passing through 10;000 feet we received a 'Traffic' alert from the TCAS. My first thought was we shouldn't be getting a 'Traffic Alert' and I reduced my climb rate. A few seconds later we received crossing traffic advisories from ATC and I quickly picked both targets up visually in my scan. We continued our climb and I keep thinking this departure didn't make sense with respect to the crossing traffic and our altitude. Moments later ATC cleared us to FL230. That's when I knew something wasn't right and we may have made a mistake. Soon after SLC cleared us a Center frequency and we continued on our way landing in ZZZ without incident. Once we leveled off I asked my partner to review our clearance and the SID. We found our mistake. Due to limitations of the Garmin ACARS system and the fact that ATC issues clearances via ACARS in no standard format we missed in our departure instructions our initial altitude level off of 10;000 feet.  We were cleared the ARCHZ1 departure and assigned an airspeed of 230 knot. The airspeed came before the or where the altitude portion of the clearance is usually published. This was confusing and we missed it. Also; coincidentally; the initial altitude published on the ARCHZ1 departure is FL230. The way the clearance was submitted and there being no standard format was a contributing factor to us missing the 10;000 foot clearance limit. The word EXCEPT in the ALT line would have helped us with our mistake. Also the 230 knot speed limit and the FL230 altitude on the SID created a chance for confusion. We never received a TA or RA on departure and I am not sure if ATC saw we didn't level off at 10;000 feet as our clearance called for. No threat between us or other aircraft existed but it could have during a busier time period. A standard format in which all ACARS clearances is a must to prevent errors in the future. Standard or universal clearances via ACARS between all ATC outlets.

Aircraft X checked in at '095 for 230'. He should have been stopped at 100 for the downwind traffic at 110. I did not hear 230 on his check-in and issued traffic but did not correct the altitude. He lost separation with Aircraft Y in the downwind at 110.  Not missing altitudes pilots say.

Corporate pilot and Air Traffic Controller reported a missed crossing restriction resulted in a loss of separation.


Workload; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were doing a ferry flight. The First Officer's (FO) side PFD CRT screen was completely blank and the MFD was acting up.  The selection buttons that are usually below the MFD were instead below the PFD.  It was also from time to time switching to a PFD without any prompts and the reversionary panel was not doing anything.  Therefore my MFD was useless so we dimmed it out to make it blank.  So now on the FO side my PFD and MFD were unusable.  We got a clearance of heading 040 to join up with the Victor Airway.  We were not yet in autopilot as we were still early in the climb.  I set us to a 040 heading and then was discussing with the Captain how to properly sequence the FMS.  We went ahead and deleted the waypoint to try to sequence it and then I armed the LNAV.  We had decided to delete the wrong waypoint and therefore flew through the Victor Airway.  When we got handed off to another controller he asked what we were assigned.  We told him 040 heading to intercept the victor airway.  He realized that we missed it and gave us new instructions to just maintain 040 heading and that he would vector us and then eventually gave us a direct. Threats: 1: FO PFD and MFD were unusable.2: High workload conditions on climb-out.Errors: 1: Improperly sequencing the FMS.Undesired Aircraft State:1: Lateral Deviation (because we missed intercepting the victor airway and maintained course.)I need to verify with the paperwork between which 2 waypoints the victor airway we are going to intercept is.  I also need to review how to properly sequence the FMS to intercept a Victor Airway.

An EMB-145 crew ferried an aircraft with the First Officer's PFD MEL'ed and failed to intercept a Victor airway after deleting the wrong waypoint.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was the non-flying pilot on Flight X. As we were arriving in the Phoenix terminal area from the northeast; we were cleared direct OBASE at 7;000 feet and given left or right deviation for weather. We crossed OBASE and were given a base turn for Runway 7R and instructions to descend to 5;000 feet. At this point we were 6+ miles north from intercepting the localizer. Maybe 90 seconds later; the Controller cleared us to 4;000 feet and asked if we had the field in sight. I expressed concern to my Captain that we were not going to be able to make it (meaning we would not be stable at 1;000 feet AFE because we were high and fast). My Captain gave me the thumbs up and I told the controller we had the airport in sight. The controller told us to intercept the localizer for Runway 7R and then cleared us for the visual. At this stage of the flight the aircraft was in full automation mode. The localizer was armed and had been identified. Right before we were intercepting the localizer; I looked down at my HSI and saw an aircraft within our 5-mile ring. As I was turning my head to look out my right window; I hear other traffic express concern to the Controller that they were too close to us. I then look back towards the runway and notice that we had flown through the localizer. I informed Captain and he immediately started to make the corrections. At this point I felt even more uncomfortable with our situation; so I called for the go-around. Captain immediately initiated the go-around. At some point either before I looked out the window for traffic or during the go-around; the autopilot was disconnected. Captain made the appropriate go-around calls and I made mine. I noticed that the autopilot was disconnected and I asked him if he wanted the autopilot; but he declined. Since we were above 1;000 feet AFE; I selected clean maneuver speed. As the plane started to increase in speed we cleaned up the flaps and again; I asked him if he wanted the autopilot and he declined. While all of this was happening; I tried to inform PHX ATC that we were going around. On my third call attempt; PHX ATC responded that we were to fly runway heading and level at 5;000 feet. During our level off the aircraft flew through 5;000 feet to 5;350 feet. I was making the appropriate calls. During the recovery we descended to 4;800 feet. Again; I called out our altitude and he corrected to 5;000 feet. I again asked Captain if he wanted the autopilot and he accepted. We were vectored around for a second approach and landed.I believe fatigue was a contributing factor in the sloppy approach and missed approached for both the Captain and myself. I regret allowing us to accept the base turn and the approach. We were high and fast on our base turn and I should have insisted on a vector to lose altitude and to slow the plane down. I never anticipated that there would be traffic; autopilot disconnected and a sloppy altitude capture. I'm upset that I gave the Captain the option to accept. My real out option was on the downwind. I have also noticed with pilots that have flown a lot in Europe that they want to apply a constant rate of descent to flying in the states. While I know this is a preferred method of flying; it simply doesn't apply for all airports in the United States. I usually warn them that certain airports like to slam us in and Phoenix is one of them. I'm not sure if I warned Captain or not; but will make it part of my brief in the future. As a crew member; I truly believe that I'm an outspoken pilot. I regret accepting the base turn and approach; it will not happen in the future. I plan on filing a fatigue event report and a hotel event report. The environment system in my room broke and it was loud and I was unable to fall back to sleep. I tried to go back to sleep but was unable. I spoke with the hotel manager about the issue.

Air carrier pilot reported encountering a challenging approach while dealing with fatigue.


Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Weather

While being vectored on approach; ATC gave us a clearance to maintain 3;800 feet until established and then cleared the approach. The vector given placed us just inside OKAIN; approximately 11 miles. This already placed us high on a designed steep approach. Before the intercept; Approach requested us to maintain 170 KIAS until REEBO. I replied that the best we could give is 150 KIAS because we were flying a LOC approach. He queried our ability and replied that this is the first time that he had heard of this inability. He also stated that he might need to pull us out of the approach. A steep non-precision approach is a poor place to have these distractions placed on a Crew while shooting this approach near minimums. This type of approach is designed/briefed at a specific set of parameters regarding speed and descent. It was surprising to us as a crew that the Controller wasn't aware of these conditions especially given the field was IFR. We are only bringing this attention for safety reasons because we feel it placed an undue burden on a crew during a very challenging part of flight. Also; we were restricted to the LOC due to an MEL issue. With all the automation these days; controllers must still understand that crews may not always have that capability available.'

B-737 Captain reported a communications breakdown between flight crew and ATC which placed undue burden on flight crew while on a near minmums non-precision approach.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 125

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

There is a continuous problem with Los Angeles Center frequency 132.5 between PMD and DAG. The squelch does not close on the radio when L.A. Center has completed transmitting. This has been a problem for years. The Center Controller; when I questioned him last month; said this was an ongoing problem for the last 10 years he has been a Controller. I switched the radios on my aircraft and the problem continues. I have to trip the mic button to get the squelch to close. Can't something be done with this recognized problem?

Corporate pilot voiced concern regarding the on-going radio problem with ZLA frequency 132.5 between PMD and DAG; noting the squelch does not close; preventing two-way communications with ATC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

I just took the sectors; and I feel like all the aircraft were calling at the same time. This isn't unusual; but it takes a lot of my focus when I'm just sitting down getting the flick. I had a flight of 5 C130s at 12;000 feet underneath the MOA which was active 12;500 feet and above. I assumed they were looking for a clearance into an airport. As I got busy dealing with all the airplane ride complaints; check-ons and requests the C130s got closer to a higher terrain minimums area that was 13;900 feet. I asked the C130s what their intentions were and he said he wanted to operate in the MOA. We don't clear aircraft into the MOA. That is approach's clearance to issue as we don't control them. So the aircraft was under active airspace and heading towards high terrain. We called approach for the hand off and they said they would call us back and the aircraft entered the area of higher terrain right before or as they finally took the handoff after we had to call back. The aircraft didn't have clearance into the MOA; as they didn't schedule it out before departing. This is really becoming problematic.The TRACON/RAPCON should take control of the airspace underlying the MOA. The Sector being split would have helped. This sector is slow volume wise; but potentially very complex with all the weird airspace and high terrain. It's made even more complex when first taking the sector combined up that has several airplanes and the frequency congestion. The fighter wing needs to file for the MOA in their flight plans prior to departing.If the RAPCON and TRACONs controlled all the airspace underlying the lateral confines of the MOA; as well as cleared aircraft into and out of the airport; the sector would rarely need to be split off. I would highly recommend this being changed.Approach bothers the controllers with idiotic and annoying landline calls; often at the worst possible times. This is a massive annoyance and distraction to the controllers.

Controller worked a military flight of five C130s under the base of a MOA. The flight requested clearance to enter the MOA. A military facility is the controlling agency for the MOA.  The ARTCC Controller attempted to handoff the aircraft to the military controlling agency; but they would not immediately take the handoff. The aircraft was heading for an area of high terrain where the minimum vectoring altitude was 1;500 feet higher than the aircraft. The Controller could not climb the aircraft since the MOA was above. The MOA control facility called back to take the handoff but not in enough time to prevent the aircraft from entering the higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude area.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During descent into ZZZZ for a scheduled fuel stop; we had Engine 3 oil pressure low; and gauge reading 0. We followed QRH procedures and shutdown number 3 engine as directed. We [advised ATC]. We flew a 2 engine visual approach backed up by the ILS. After landing we taxied to parking without any further incident.

MD-11 flight crew reported shutting down the number 3 engine due to low oil pressure.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Flying into LAS; we were assigned a visual approach to Runway 25L and to descend via the KEPEC3 RNAV Arrival. Flying the KEPEC3 RNAV Arrival; we passed IPUMY at 230 knots and 11;000 FT. We were told at that time to change runway to visual approach 19R. We were given a 090 degree vector and subsequent step downs in altitude until 7000 FT and then directed to slow to 170 knots. I configured to flaps 5. We were given a north vector to an intercept position between EASTR and TOWEN of the RNAV Visual 19L/R. We were directed to descend to 5000 FT. I configured with landing gear down and flaps 15. We were cleared the visual approach Runway 19R. I then continued slowing to Vt of 131 with flaps 30. I intercepted the LNAV course between TOWEN and EASTR at 4400 feet. The MCP was in LNAV; VNAV. Determining that I need to correct higher altitude; I called for 40 flaps momentarily. As I continued descent through 6000 FT; we realized that we were too high and it was better to discontinue the approach. The pilot monitoring (PM) recommended that we ask for a right 360 degree spacing maneuver to line ourselves up on final. We agreed and the PM asked for the maneuver from LAS Tower. Tower gave us a 260 vector and to maintain 4000 FT. I selected heading select 270 and the PM selected 4000 FT in the altitude window. I called for flaps 30 as we descended from 4300 FT on the way down to 4000 FT. We were given a northern heading. As the aircraft reached 4000 FT; I noticed the airspeed trend vector going below Vt of 131. I observed the autothrottles not making the adequate adjustment; so I placed them manually up to full power to stop the trend. The aircraft pitched up and started climbing above 4000 FT; the stick shaker momentarily came on. Recognizing this; I turned off the autopilot/autothrottles and reduced AOA. The airspeed recovered and I called for flaps 15. We stabilized and continued for a visual approach Runway 19R. 1. Late change in runway assignments: Recognizing that I was on short vectors for Runway 19R; I will have to configure a lot earlier to adjust for a more expeditious descent. I also will give myself space by requesting to go to points on the approach segments that will give me adequate time to slow down and go down.2. Use the appropriate level of automation for the task at hand. I will turn off autopilot and fly the jet manually. We were in a visual environment; executing a VFR spacing maneuver. I will turn off autopilot and autothrottles and target the speed bug to Vt+10 as I maneuver and keep a better crosscheck of airspeed and altitude trends while in a visual maneuvering environment.

On arrival into LAS on the KEPEC 3 Arrival; we were maneuvering to avoid weather. We finally got cleared direct IPUMY; cross at or above at 11;000 feet and then descend via the KEPEC 3 Arrival for 25L. Prior to NIPZO; we were told to maintain 9000 feet and to expect left base for Runway 19R due to traffic for 25L from the east. Prior to SUNST fix; we were given a left turn to a northerly heading and cleared to descend to 7000 feet and at 7000 feet slow to 170 knots. At this time we were heading somewhere between TOWEN and EASTR. ATC asked if we had the field; and we told them we did and we were cleared for the visual. We configured for the approach and headed for EASTR. The Pilot Flying intercepted the LNAV course towards EASTR. We realized we were high and lowered the flaps to flaps 40 to lose altitude quicker so that we could get down to the proper altitude and airspeed for a stabilized approach. Approaching 6000 feet MSL; we both realized that we were high and not going to be able to attain a stabilized approach to landing. I requested a 360 on base to lose the altitude to the Tower and instead; Tower gave us a 270 heading and maintain 4000 feet MSL. The Pilot Flying accomplished the heading and altitude maneuver fine with heading and altitude selected in the appropriate windows with autopilot engaged. I suggested going to flaps 30; as we were now going to have plenty of time to maneuver to lose the altitude for a stabilized approach. The Pilot Flying commanded flaps 30 and I reset the flaps. At this time we were given a turn to a 360; and the Pilot Flying commenced the turn. On rollout; we both noticed that the airspeed was low and decreasing and the Pilot Flying added power. Unfortunately; the aircraft pitched up and the airspeed continued to decrease and we got a stick shaker warning. Pilot Flying disconnected the autopilot; added additional power; lowered the nose of the aircraft; and we got rid of the stick shaker. We turned a right base; were cleared for the approach; and had a normal approach and landing.As Pilot Monitoring (PM); I could have been more helpful in finding out where in the sequence we were for landing. This would have helped in our awareness for altitude and configuration timing. The late change in runway assignments by Tower did makes us rushed a little bit. When we started maneuvering; we should have set our airspeed to 140 knots or at least 10 knots above target airspeed for maneuvering. As PM; I should have been much quicker to recognize that the airspeed was slowing and called for corrective action sooner.

B737-700 flight crew describes an unstabilized approach that results from a late runway change from Runway 25L to Runway 19R at LAS. The go-around is commenced above 4;000 FT but insufficient thrust is added and the stick shaker is activated. With more thrust and lowering the nose; the stick shaker is silenced and the next visual approach is successful.