Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance; Person Dispatch

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; MEL; Procedure; Human Factors

MEL 28-21-03-B center tank pumps-inop. MEL advises that fuel increase of 1.0% OVB; fuel in trim tank no more than 4;400 lb and unusable part of ZFW (This was ADZ to ramp). The MEL does not state in any area that in order for RA (Gate Agent) to be able to enter the numbers in weight and balance (W/B); they need to put an 'x' next to the inop pump or the fact that if it is only 1 pump; they still have to mark both inop in order for the center tank fuel to show as ballast/MEL.The agent did not advise dispatch that they had fuel in the center tank that would affect the W/B. They could not get the center tank fuel to populate in the ballast/center tank. It wasn't until another dispatcher heard the issue and advised he had had this same issue a few weeks ago; had to write an ASAP. I was advised to instruct the crew to have RA put an 'x' next to both center pumps; which I relayed to the Captain over the phone.RA was able to get the fuel entered in W/B and Captain and I discussed the MEL and operations #2. Make sure applicable tank(s) (center; act; and/or trim tank) fuel quantity is accounted for in release as MEL penalty fuel and that the fuel total figure is correct. This was accomplished and both dispatcher and Captain were comfortable with all fuel numbers. Center tanks were not showing checked inop on the W/B on all previous flight legs. Could this be because there was no fuel in these tanks? Do the pumps have to [have] 'x' even if there is a small amount or no fuel in the tanks?The MEL should be changed to show the RA needs to mark not just (1) but (2) center tank pumps inop; in order to get the MEL to show correct fuel numbers on W/B. This MEL shows nowhere that the pump is to [be] marked with an 'x' as inop. No mention of this in the MEL; Mx scratch pad or placard. Until the MEL can be revised; a **note** should be either in the mx scratch pad or placard; or both to reflect this procedure. Mx should have to advise Ops ASAP as to how much fuel is trapped in the tanks.

A/C had both Center Pumps on MEL and required 4000 lbs penalty fuel. We fueled the a/c; including penalty fuel. A/C took 1 hr delay due to fuel not reflecting on the W/B as MEL fuel and the crew not taking the a/c. The ramp tried multiple times to get the fuel to show on the release and could not make it happen. The ramp and crew somehow came to an agreement and the a/c departed. About 1 hr later; we were asked to come to the ramp office. We were told that Ops had decided this was a Mx delay; probably Engineering and that's how they were going to code the delay. They said that the a/c had probably been flying illegal due to the way the Releases has been printing and not showing the unusable fuel.

Airbus A300 had a fuel center tank pump MEL deferral; but ramp personnel and Dispatch had difficulty getting the weight and balance computer to accept the MEL fuel correctly.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

I will start out by saying that all three of these aircraft go to the same point and descend to the same altitude; I then give them all to the same controller within our core airspace. I got Aircraft X at 11;000 to cross BLUBL at 9;000; there were at 11;000 about 7 miles from the fix. I then see Aircraft Y start to flash and turn into BLUBL at 11;000; keep in mind my Aircraft X is just off their left still showing 11;000. I then see the Aircraft Z that they have right behind the Aircraft Y also lower but I can't recall their altitude. At this point Aircraft X and Aircraft Y are going to merge and might almost hit; remember Aircraft Y is a flight of two. I called the Center to and at this point I'm vomiting words to get them to pry Aircraft Y away from my Aircraft X and I'm trying to get control of the Aircraft X because it's still in the centers airspace. I thought about just cranking the Aircraft X to the EAST but then I saw Aircraft Y turn to the EAST. At this point the Aircraft Z is a mess with the Aircraft Y. The center never acknowledged what was happening and never answered the line when I was begging for control of the Aircraft X. I ended up descending them expeditiously. I finally got the center on the line; she wanted a hand off of the Aircraft Y who was now showing 8;800; which is in my airspace; I told her to slow them to 210 kt; because they had to follow the Aircraft X. The Aircraft Y checked in and were showing 270kt; I feel like they were never slowed; I told the center controller to slow them. This was a total; complete mess. I guarantee the center controller switched the Aircraft X and completely forgot about it. Then proceeded to crank the Aircraft Y in and then saw the Aircraft X. This happens all the time; where the first aircraft goes in to Never Neverland once they are switched to us. I'M SICK AND TIRED OF THE CENTER PUTTING AIRPLANES IN UNSAFE SITUATIONS AND NO ONE IN MANAGEMENT DOING ANYTHING ABOUT IT.Have the center understand that they MUST sequence to BLUBL and not forget about the first aircraft. Have the center understand that speeds have to be taken into consideration on the arrival. They will put a fast moving jet right behind a prop with the crossing; thinking the first aircraft will keep their speed up because they are high. Once the first one starts down their speed goes to nothing with a jet eating them up. This exact scenario happens all the time. It's unsafe. The controllers that work U are sick and tired of it. Once again; I'm sick and tired of sitting in briefings where the FAA tells us to not insert risk into the NAS. Here is an example of the center inserting risk into the NAS and it doesn't stop. Why can't they learn how to do air traffic control? Another example of management not doing their job; they need to manage their people. Problem is; most of the FLM's over there do not know how to work planes in the areas they are suppose to be managing.

Houston I90 TRACON Controller reported an NMAC and stated handoff communication issues with ZHU Center contributed to the event.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

During ILS approach at JFK 31R runway with localizer and glideslope armed; landing was authorized by ATC as fourth behind B747 at 5 miles and requested hold 170 kts until ZULAB; immediately Flaps 10 were set and speed was reduced to hold distance [at] 5 [to] 7 miles; [wake] vortex turbulence was considered. Then at 2 miles prior to MALDE position; roll to the left side almost 35 degrees was induced by [wake] vortex turbulence; autopilot was disengaged and bank angle alarm was activated; the airplane had lost 200 ft. Immediately a recovery maneuver was [initiated]; [we were] able to reconfigure the localizer and intercept the glideslope at 2800 feet approximately 2 miles before ZULAB; proceeded to inform tower of what happened; [Tower] informed us to continue. The approach and landing phase was continued within established parameters.

B737-800 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to JFK about 5 miles in trail of a B747.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

I was sitting in the jumpseat located directly behind the Captain and First Officer's seats. The PF (Pilot Flying) was the First Officer. The PF (Pilot Flying) was on IOE. The Line Check Captain was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). Another First Officer was situated in the seats behind the main jumpseat.On departure; ATC asked if we had traffic in sight. From my seat; the jumpseat; I could not see this traffic. The Captain reported 'traffic in sight'. ATC then issued us a further climb at our discretion through 7;000 ft.; provided we maintained visual separation from that traffic. The PM read back the climb clearance. The autopilot was engaged. The PF and PM continued the climb on course. This triggered an RA; presumably with the aircraft we were told to maintain visual separation from. The RA required us to stop our climb immediately and descend. [Neither] the PF nor PM appeared to react immediately to the RA. The Check Airman did not take control of the aircraft. I do not recall hearing any communication between the PF and PM. The aircraft continued to climb. Seeing a lack of a response and not being able to see the traffic ourselves nor resolve the RA; the other First Officer and I (from the jumpseats) both repeatedly yelled out 'PUSH DOWN!' 'TURN OFF THE AUTOPILOT' and 'DESCEND!'. The PF somewhat [casually] turned off the autopilot; stopped the climb; and initiated a descent. I think we came within 300 ft. of vertical separation from the other aircraft. The PM reported the RA to ATC. The flight appeared to continue as normal from this point forward.

B767 First Officer in the cockpit jump seat reported an NMAC during climb.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 1401; Flight Crew Type 547

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I had an uneventful pre-flight; run up and departure from ZZZ1 enroute to ZZZ2. Approximately 2 hours into the 3.5 hour flight; my left turbine inlet temperature spiked and while trying to diagnose the problem; I heard a grinding noise from the engine. I had just been switched from ZZZ Center to ZZZ1 [Center] and while reporting in; told them that I may [need priority handling]. They immediately located ZZZ airport 20nm at 12 o'clock so I immediately pulled power to 50% to try to preserve my engine. The grinding noise occurred one more time but I was able to land uneventfully under normal landing conditions. The mechanics have diagnosed a potential problem with the alternator and left magneto that could have caused the runaway temps and noises. The aircraft maintenance is being performed and will be certified before I fly it.

SR22 pilot reported engine malfunction in flight that resulted in a diversion and successful precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 5

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flying from Phoenix area headed towards Dallas area; I encountered isolated thunderstorms and rain showers and was deviating around them using a combination of XM (for strategic overview) and on-board radar (for near/tactical decision making). Aircraft was new to me; as was the G600 glass panel; and this was the inaugural trip home in the new airplane. I'd done some reading on weather radar and was consciously trying to learn to the use the radar to augment my visual assessment of the clouds and isolated rain showers; so I was picking my way through/around the rain showers; rather than doing a large deviation around the area entirely. In the course of doing this; the XM was showing that the weather (Nexrad) was generally best to the right of my course; so when I was picking through the showers; I was tending to deviate right. At all times; the aircraft was in legal VFR; and was generally in very good VFR as the showers were fairly wide-spread. We never even got the windshield wet; though cloud-to-ground lightning was visible 10-30 miles away.At some point; I noticed a strange-looking and visually striking set of parallel roads below and I switched over to the map view to try to identify them. It was at that point that I realized that those were the roads representing the border between Mexico and the US and that I was very close to the ADIZ boundary. I don't know whether or not I was ever in Mexican airspace; but I was disappointed in myself to not even be aware to ask the question. I realize that I was spending so much time and attention trying to learn the new-to-me weather radar (in an effort to be safer down the road); that I lost awareness of where I was in relation to the national border and ADIZ. Had the road/fence/border not come into view; and the weather been a little different; it's entirely possible that I'd have flown 25 miles into Mexico on a 1200 squawk deviating south of the weather without any awareness. Corrective action: Hold a more appropriate balance between learning for tomorrow's safety and executing for today's. Use weather deviations as a cue to review where you are. IFR; this is much less of a concern; but single-pilot-VFR; it's easy to imagine how one could drift into rising terrain; Class B airspace; a restricted area; or in this case; an ADIZ.

BE58 pilot reports becoming distracted using XM weather and on-board radar for the first time in his new aircraft and not paying attention to navigation. This results in a possible intrusion into Mexican airspace without a flight plan.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We received a call from one of our flights.  They told us that they had to shutdown the #1 engine due to low oil pressure and had declared an emergency.  They advised that they were planning to return to their departure airport and did not need any other services from us.  We received word from maintenance control a short time later that the crew was working on burning fuel off to prevent an overweight landing.  Crew advised after arrival that they had landed 20;000 kilos overweight.

A Dispatcher reported a B767-300ER had declared an emergency and returned to its departure airport when they shut down the left engine due to low oil pressure and landed modestly overweight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 58; Flight Crew Total 770; Flight Crew Type 658

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was the pilot in command of a Cessna 206 returning to ZZZ.  I was cleared by the Tower to land on Runway XXL.  On the landing roll out the right main tire failed causing the aircraft to yaw to the right.  I was unable to maintain directional control of the aircraft and the aircraft rolled off the north edge of the runway.  The aircraft struck a runway marker light as it left the runway.  Airport personnel responded to my location to provide assistance.  An emergency repair of the failed tire was performed by an on-field maintenance vendor and the aircraft was removed from the runway area.  No one was injured.

C206 pilot reported a tire failure on landing rollout.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 450

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Upon return from a one hour training flight; the student pilot set up for a gusty wind landing on Runway 14; configured the C172 with 20 degrees of flaps and established a final approach speed of 70-75 KTS. Initial round out and flare was normal. As the aircraft slowed; the student pilot allowed the aircraft to 'weather vane' into the wind (180@12G24KTS). The CFI noted this to the student pilot with verbal cues and hand gestures. During the flare; the student pilot allowed the aircraft to balloon slightly (approximately 4-5' above the runway) as he strived to input crosswind corrections with the rudder and ailerons. The gusting wind suddenly 'died away' causing the aircraft to suddenly sink toward the runway. The student pilot corrected for this by swiftly applying excessive back yoke causing the nose to rise sharply and the tail tie-down ring to strike the runway surface causing the tail tie-down ring to shear off and the plastic rudder fairing (bottom) to crack. The aluminum skin around the tail tie-down ring was scratched (an area approx 2' X 2' square). The roll out and taxi was normal. The CFI (me) failed to intervene fast enough to prevent the tail from striking the runway. There were no passengers on board and neither the student nor the CFI was injured. I believe this situation could have been prevented if the CFI had kept his hands closer to the yoke given the gusty conditions and intervened earlier when the student began showing signs of getting behind the aircraft. Also; we could have requested Runway 19 (more in line with the existing winds) and removed the crosswind from the equation.

A C172 instructor reported his student ballooned during a crosswind landing and as the aircraft settled again near the runway the student pulled rapidly on the yoke driving the tail into the runway before the main gear touched. Damage was reported.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

PAPI for Runway 02 at MKL has been NOTAMed as unreliable for a number of months; but remains active. If pilot were to follow the glideslope suggested by the PAPI; it would without a doubt cause flight into terrain. Suggest that PAPI be decommissioned till it can be properly repaired.

A pilot reported an MKL airport PAPI system was NOTAMed unreliable; but was still active.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing

After landing and parking at the gate to deplane passengers; the Captain; Flight Mechanic; and myself (First Officer) passed through Customs and security back to the aircraft to reposition to the FBO on the north side of the field for overnight parking (as per ground handling sheets and itinerary.) Approaching the FBO on the taxi; a radio call was given so they would be ready to handle our arrival. This apparently was a surprise to the FBO as they did not know we were coming; and did not have the manpower to support our operation. After waiting for nearly an hour on the taxiway; we inquired with the FBO if would be okay to self park on their ramp. The FBO responded that that would be fine and to get as close as we felt comfortable. At that point; I started Number 2 engine upon the Captain's command. Only one engine was started to save fuel. The Captain taxied the aircraft to the north (left) side of the ramp to begin a turn to the right to do a 180 and park facing southwest. In about the first third of the turn it became apparent that the aircraft had contacted something. The Captain immediately shut the engine down and set the parking brake. At that point; we observed the left wingtip had come into contact with some parked; unmanned airstair trucks along the perimeter fence. Specifically; the wing struck the hand rails on the platform at the stop of the stair trucks. Unfortunately as we were turning right; from the right seat; I was unable to view the left wing clearance/obstructions; and just monitored the right side for wing clearance/obstructions. Workers from the FBO later showed up and moved some of the trucks out of the way and hooked up a towbar to push the aircraft back off the truck that the wingtip was currently in contact with. The primary reason the event occurred was an error in perception and lack of ground support to monitor wing clearances. Also; it would have been better to start the Number 1 engine as we were executing a turn to the right. Being empty without much weight on the nose wheel made a turn to the right more difficult than usual.

B737-800 First Officer reports the left wing coming into contact with airstairs during a right turn; night time; self parking maneuver.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Total 975; Flight Crew Type 975

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During cruise at FL340 in the vicinity of ZZZ VOR with LNAV/VNAV and Autopilot A engaged; the 'FMC P/RST' (Flight Management Computer Primary Reset) light illuminated; FMC data on Captain's and First Officer's navigation display Map mode disappeared and the FMC prompt at 1L on both CDUs (Control Display Unit) disappeared. The auto flight system reverted to Control Wheel Steering. The pilots advised ATC that aircraft navigation system failure was preventing use of area navigation and the flight was proceeding via conventional VOR navigation. Pilots completed the B737 FM Non-Normals (MAX) FMC FAIL Checklist and reviewed the FMC INFLIGHT RESTART Checklist. The Captain obtained voice contact conference call with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and Duty Pilot via ARINC VHF. Procedures and options were discussed; and the decision was made to continue to flight planned destination by use of conventional navigation (VOR; DME and ILS). The original flight plan included VOR to VOR direct routing. After the dual FMC malfunction the flight may have inadvertently exceeded the 'operational service volume' distances while navigating between enroute VORs. Upon realizing this the Pilots requested and received ATC clearance via published airways routing for the remainder of the flight. The Captain briefed the Purser on the non-normal. While on vectors for the ILS there was brief pilot confusion as to why the ILS was not displayed on the navigation display. This was promptly resolved by moving the EFIS (Electronic Flight Information System) Control Panel rotating selector from VOR that was used during enroute navigation to ILS for the approach. No declaration of emergency and the flight arrived at ZZZ1 otherwise uneventfully. Captain made an ELB (Electronic Log Book) entry for the malfunction and pilots briefed Maintenance personnel at the arrival gate. Upon arrival at the crew layover hotel the Captain contacted both Dispatch and Duty Pilot by telephone for post event debrief.

VMC near ZZZ level FL340 encountered loss of roll depicted by loss of roll bar; CWS (Control Wheel Steering) and FMC P/RST light. MCP (Mode Control Panel) set with LNAV and VNAV. As a result both FMCs failed with no L1 restart selection available. PF (Pilot Flying) took the controls as I attempted to regain the FMC along with finding the appropriate checklist for FMC Fail. After running the checklist we discovered we could fly in HDG and ALT SEL modes with the AP engaged. We selected the ZZZ VOR and outbound radial to track towards ZZZ2 providing details to ATC regarding the failure as well as we would navigate VOR to VOR. We had no issues pulling up the VOR needles however selection of the VOR mode was delayed as this function is not used enough. ACARS was available for communicating with company. Controls were transferred and Captain reran the QRH items to ensure we didn't miss anything. ATC provided some vectoring towards ZZZ2 as a result of being outside VOR service volume distances. Captain setup ARINC comm with Dispatch; Maintenance Control and Duty Pilot to make a decision as to continue or divert. All agreed to continue via VOR to VOR. Fortunately routing took us over multiple defining VORs to ZZZ1. Between ZZZ-ZZZ2 and ZZZ3-ZZZ4 we operating VOR outside the VOR standard service volume but backed up navigation with IPad GPS locator which was good SA (Situational Awareness) reference. We did receive VOR information throughout the flight. From ZZZ4-ZZZ5 request navigation on XXX complying with VOR service volumes. We arrived into the ZZZ1 area without issue until vectoring for the ILS.We were in the VOR mode therefore the localizer will not work until switching to the MAP mode. Approach was night VMC and landing was uneventful.Weights; Vref and GA power information must be manually input to the aircraft to provide guidance during approach to GA if needed.

Flight Crew reported the loss of FMC P in flight and elected to use VOR for navigation to destination airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 6600; Flight Crew Type 250

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Taxiing to [the FBO] we were instructed to hold short of runway 24 on taxiway C. We held short of runway 24. After holding short for about 3 minutes Teterboro Ground control cleared us to cross runway 24 and taxi to [the FBO] via taxiway P. We read back the instructions; confirmed the clearance between the crew members and illuminated the strobes and taxi light. As we crossed the hold short line ground control told us to hold short of runway 24. I stopped the aircraft and we informed ground that we had already crossed the hold short line. We saw an aircraft on short final 24 performing a 360 degree turn. TEB ground then instructed us to continue crossing the runway to [the FBO]. As we were taxiing in the ground controller said to us 'Sorry; I cleared you across the runway; you did nothing wrong' which was very reassuring.

A DA2000EX Captain reported ATC cleared him across a runway that had an aircraft on short final; forcing that aircraft to go around.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

I was assigned a repositioning flight.  The previous day; there was an air leak coming from the service door.  [Company] maintenance performed necessary maintenance and closed out the open write up on the air leak.My first officer met me at the operations office; we got to the airplane; and performed our preflight checks.  We started engines; taxied; took off; and climbed to FL320 with no abnormalities.I was fully aware of the leak issue; and kept my eye on the cabin pressure during the flight.  The first half of the flight went uneventfully; but halfway to [destination]; we suddenly heard a loud whoosh sound coming from behind us.  I looked at the cabin altitude; and it was slowly climbing.  At this point it was somewhere in the 6;000 to 7;000 feet range; which was in the normal operating range.  I wanted to check on the problem; so I transferred the controls to the First Officer (FO) and he put his oxygen mask on.Upon checking the service door; I noticed that there was an air leak coming from the bottom.  While inspecting the door; the FO chimed me to come back to the cockpit.  When I got back in; he notified me that we were above 8;000 feet cabin pressure and the CABIN ALT caution message had appeared.  I instructed him to request lower with ATC and descend the aircraft.  In the meantime; I donned my oxygen mask and buckled my seatbelt.  I then took back the controls of the aircraft.We were cleared to a lower altitude by ATC; and started the descent.  At this point; the cabin pressure altitude was still in the 8;000 foot range.  I reduced thrust for the descent; and when I did that; the cabin pressure started to climb quickly.  In less than a minute; the cabin pressure had climbed passed 10;000 feet and the CABIN ALT warning message appeared.At this point I instructed the FO to ask ATC for a descent to 10;000 feet; which was cleared by ATC.  I ran the QRC for [the situation] and descended down very quickly.  Once the descent was established; the FO and I discussed divert options and decided to divert to [a nearby airport].  Upon reaching 10;000 feet; the FO and I came off oxygen.At this point we advised ATC that we would not need any more special handling and were going to continue to a landing.  We briefed the approach and landing and landed uneventfully.Root cause of the event was the failure of the service door to remain sealed properly.More frequent maintenance checks of doors/door sealing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A CRJ-200 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate after losing cabin pressure at FL320.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We took off from Runway 8R in Atlanta on the GEETK 6 Departure. We were sequenced behind a [Company aircraft]. I was the Pilot Flying. After liftoff; a course of 092 was followed until 400 FT when LNAV was called for and selected. At approximately this same time; we entered some wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft. We continued to climb out and contacted Departure. Very shortly thereafter; the Departure Controller asked us if we were headed to HRSHL which was the first fix we would turn on the departure (69 degrees). A very hurried glance showed that the LNAV was not engaged and we were still following the heading of 092. The Controller immediately issued vectors and said there was a possibility of an aircraft conflict. We immediately replied we were having FMS issues and he said we should have let him know sooner. Since we were unaware of the problem to begin with; there was no way of being able to advise sooner. We continued to receive vectors on course and advised the Controller the FMC was working properly. After a few minutes we were switched to Center and given a phone number to call upon our arrival. I talked with Atlanta Tower and gave them a description of the problem. He said they were documenting it as an RNAV anomaly and that we would not hear from them again. I do not remember verifying that the LNAV had been engaged because; as the pilot flying; that was the time that we started to encounter the wake turbulence and my attention turned to that. It was a big mistake at a very busy airport. We both needed to be more vigilant.

After takeoff; we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft. The Captain (pilot flying) called for LNAV. I (pilot not flying) pushed the LNAV button but it failed to engage. The Captain noticed we over flew the first turn (to HRSHL). I started to program the FMS when ATC queried why we were not turning. I inadvertently put GEETK as the first fix thus erasing all the previous fixes. Given the circumstances of the event (gear up; wake turbulence; LNAV button and first turn) there was not much room for error. Fortunately; there was no conflict with any other traffic.

On departure from ATL a B737-700 flight crew encountered wake vortex and then failed to engage LNAV which caused a deviation from the departure track.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

On final visual approach to Runway 16 ECP; at 600 FT and 3 miles and cleared to land; a banner towing aircraft flying over the airport terminal on a downwind course was cleared by the Tower to pickup his banner.  The banner pickup location is between Taxiway D and Runway 34 between M and K approximately 50-75 FT from the runway.  At that point; the banner towing aircraft turned left directly into our flight path.  I had spotted the aircraft flying over the field before he was cleared to pick up his banner and was monitoring his position.  I also noted that his aircraft was not displayed on the TCAS and that he probably did not have a transponder.  As the aircraft started to turn I asked the Captain if he saw the other aircraft and did it look like he was turning in front of us.  At that point; the Captain initiated a go-around climbing and turning to the right.  I informed the Tower that we were going around because of the banner towing aircraft to which the Controller replied that the other aircraft really wasn't in the way.  We were issued instructions for a right 180 and cleared for another visual to 34.  We landed without further incident.  The Tower Controller never informed us of the other aircraft's presence.  I believe Tower made an error clearing him to pick up his banner while we were on final due to non transponder equipped aircraft operating in close proximity to the active runway.  ATC Tower Control not paying attention.

Air Carrier landing ECP reported a developing conflict event with a banner tow aircraft near the landing runway. The reporter claimed ATC services were inadequate.


Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

The center tank fuel indicating system was on MEL and therefore an alternate fueling procedure was used to fuel the center tank to a known quantity. Just prior to Top Of Climb (TOC) my center tank fuel pump low pressure lights began to blink indicating the center tank was depleted of fuel. The center tank should not have been depleted of fuel yet and the low pressure lights should not have started blinking until TOC. This prompted my First Officer and I to question our fuel load that we thought we had and closely monitor our fuel burn.As stated above the Center Tank Fuel system was on MEL. While executing preflight duties Maintenance personnel came into the flight deck to verify our fuel load. Our fuel totalizer indicated that our fuel load was 19.1. Our departure ramp fuel load was supposed to be 21.4. However; the center tank indicating system was on MEL. No disrespect; but the Maintenance guy had a real 'deer in the headlights' look on his face and I could tell he was uncertain with this fueling procedure and what our fuel load really was. This prompted me to question him as our totalizer was indicating 19.1. He left the flight deck and came back shortly with the fueler. With the gallons added at that time; we determined that we had 21.3 on board. I asked the fueler to bump the fuel load to 21.4 or more considering APU burn. The Mechanic came back shortly thereafter and now appeared confident with the ME-10 form. The gallons added as indicated on the form led us to believe that we had a fuel total of 21.5; although our fuel totalizer still indicated 19.1. The jetway was pulled back and our load numbers arrived from Central Load Planning (CLP). The FMC was not allowing us to input our fuel load on the PERF-INIT page as per the MEL instructions. It was indicating 19.1 and our TOGW was under what it should have been; therefore impacting our takeoff data. I called Maintenance Control to query why we couldn't input the fuel amount into the he FMC. He did not have an answer but said that the airplane had been flying like this for the last 8 days and asked why we had a problem with it. We were day 9 of a 10 day MEL allowance. We then tried inputting our correct TOW into the FMC based off our fuel load of 21.5. The FMC accepted the corrected TOW and therefore updated our takeoff data which was my main concern at that point. Although my First Officer and I did not have an answer for why the FMC would not allow us to change the fuel load as per the MEL; but neither did Maintenance Control. We felt comfortable that our takeoff data was accurate with the updated TOW and our fuel load was supposed to be 21.5 by the gallons added as indicated on the ME-10 form. We continued with the flight and as stated earlier the center tank fuel indicating lights began to blink earlier than they should have; prompting me to once again question our center tank fuel load. We referenced MEL: 28-7D once again and both read it thoroughly; now that we had no other distractions. We replayed and talked about all the events that had taken place up to this point and started monitoring our fuel very closely. As the flight progressed we determined that our fuel totalizer was reading correctly based off the fuel in the main tanks and our fuel burn. We then determined that our departure fuel load was actually 19.1 and not 21.5 that we were led to believe we had. I notified Dispatch that I would be calling the Duty Officer once at our destination regarding our MEL: 28-7D. We continued to monitor our fuel closely and the destination weather. Initially the destination weather was overcast; but the marine layer burned off quickly and it became 'Clear' with visual approaches. As we passed a potential divert airport we determined that we had enough fuel to make it to our filed destination and based off the weather we expected no delays on our approach. I knew I had two options if unexpected ATC delays occurred by either declaring 'MIN FUEL' or declaring an emergency to expedite our approach phase to landing if needed. We had no delays on arrival; and on shutdown at the gate we ended up with 5.1 fuel on board which was approximately 2.4 less than we should have had. We determined that the gallons added on the ME-10 form were incorrect and off by approximately 350 gallons. I immediately called Dispatch and got transferred to the Duty Officer on duty. We discussed the events in order to come up with a solution to get proper and accurate fueling before we took this aircraft under this MEL. The Station Maintenance personnel really impressed me and instilled confidence with the steps that they took. They disabled the center tank and fuel totalizer which left us with main tank indication readings only. They then fueled the wing tanks full first. They next added a known quantity in the center tank so we knew our departure fuel load was accurate. With that being done; our FMC now performed the way it was suppose to as per the MEL. We had --- for the fuel load on the PERF-INIT page and were able to input our correct fuel load. We continued to our next destination and monitored our fuel as per the flight plan utilizing the 'Fuel Used' switch until the center tank was depleted. We briefed the outbound flight crew and the fueler as to how the previous Mechanics fueled the aircraft with main tanks first and how we monitored our enroute fuel.

A B737-NG center tank fuel quantity totalizer was inoperative which required a special MEL procedure completion before the FMC PERF-INIT weight was correct. Maintenance failed to fully comply with complex procedure so the required fuel was 2;400 LBS low.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Approaching in gusty wind conditions 320/19G21 RNAV/GPS [approach] in use. I was the Pilot Flying. Starting about 1;200 feet AGL; I selected auto pilot OFF. I transitioned to VASI guidance. I was receiving consistent call outs from First Officer regarding airspeed fluctuations above and below target. At about 1;100 feet AGL; amber windshear annunciated and I decided to continue the approach. At about 300 [feet] AGL; RED windshear annunciated and First Officer called out 'GO AROUND'. I said no; I want to land! The landing was very smooth with absolutely no side loads or control issues. I wanted to land because I thought the airplane was handling well and that the warnings were related to horizontal wind shifts and not vertical shifts such as micro bursts. Also there were no airport warnings issued during the approach other than a few PIREPS of plus minus changes in airspeed. First Officer was very supportive and professional during this event. After gate arrival and the door open I stepped out onto the jet bridge to greet the customers and many of them shook my hand and were grateful for arriving safely. I am willing to completely cooperate with recommendations moving forward. I felt absolutely confident that this landing would be done safely considering the conditions at the time. I regret not executing a go-around for amber windshear alerts or escape for red windshear alert and further overriding the First Officer call to go around. I have fully committed to respect these procedures moving forward despite blue sky and visibility unlimited!This event occurred because the windshear detection system annunciated due to gusty low level winds and I decided to land rather than go around.Very simple; go around any time amber windshear displays! Had I responded properly; this event would have been avoided.

While on approach; we received 2 windshear alerts. It was clear with winds from 320@17G27. We had briefed go around/escape procedures prior to the approach. Our Vapp speed was 150 and Vref 130. The first [alert] was a Master Caution Windshear alert at 1;100 feet AGL. We had a gain of 10 kts. The Captain was the Pilot Flying and immediately stated that he was not going around for that windshear caution. He would override the auto-throttles by bringing them to full idle; which I spoke up and mentioned that full idle wasn't a good idea [since] the engines weren't spooled and we would get behind the power curve. At 1;000 feet we were stable. I began to call out airspeed trends and advised him that we were below the glide path indicated by the runway VASI (3 reds 1 white). He corrected and was back on the glide path. At 500 feet; we were stable; on speed; sinking 800 fpm. At 300 feet; we received a Red Master Windshear Warning. I immediately called for the go around and noticed an airspeed decrease of 20 kts. The Captain replied 'NO; NO; WE ARE LANDING' At that point; I realized his mind was made up and I went back to calling out airspeed and glide path deviations (3 reds; 1 white again). I also began telling him how to correct 'Add power' etc. We landed. Upon taxiing to the gate the Captain said 'If there had been a thunderstorm; I would have gone around.' I replied 'So what if we went around once or even twice; we could have always diverted to [an alternate].' After parking the plane and while walking to catch the hotel van; the Captain asked me what I saw. I told him there was a 20kt airspeed loss and he was low. He said he was sorry; he should have gone around; but he just wanted to land and that he wouldn't ever do that again. Then he told me I did a good job on calling out deviations. A few minutes later he again apologized and said it was stupid of him and his mistake. He asked me more questions about the windshear; altitude; airspeed loss and then asked if I would be filing an ASAP. I responded 'YES.'Windshear due to gusty winds.I should have called for a go around with the first Windshear Caution at 1;100 feet and then should have told Tower we were going around to force the go around when the Captain said he wouldn't be doing a missed for the caution. I should have forced the go around with the RED Master Windshear warning by telling Tower we were going around after I called for it and was told no by the Captain. I didn't at that point by I felt he was going to land regardless; so I better call out deviations and corrections being so low to the ground. I also was taken aback by how adamant he was with telling me NO.

ERJ-190 flight crew reported the Captain continued the approach to a landing even after receiving multiple wind shear alerts; along with the First Officer calling for a go-around.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165; Flight Crew Total 11700; Flight Crew Type 5000

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Approach was ILS X30L. Aircraft was being vectored and was flying assigned speed of 170 Kts. ATC advised we were following a heavy 767. ATC issued a 'Go-Around' clearance due to loss of separation. At that moment; our aircraft experienced a wake turbulence event that rolled the airplane to the right at approximately 45 degrees of bank. The aircraft returned to straight and level flight on its own; within a few seconds. The aircraft flew the go-around procedure as cleared and returned for an uneventful and normal landing.

Reporter stated he would like more separation from widebody aircraft.

CL601 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SJC in trail of a B767.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I turned final for the hospital helipad at 500 ft. AGL. I called final to STAT Radio and lowered the collective to approximately 45% TQ. As I lowered the collective I heard a loud grinding noise. At nearly the same time the crew asked what is that? I looked to the left side engine panel and saw the number 1 side filling up with cautions related to [the] engine such as oil pressure; temp etc. At nearly the same time I changed the aircraft attitude to gain airspeed and abort the landing. In moments the crew said they smelled smoke and they saw an orange glow on the left side. As I was turning away from the pad I reached over and shut off the engine. I established single engine ops and announced my intent to go to ZZZ Airport. During this time I was also watching for a fire warning indication illumination that might cause me to land sooner than ZZZ Airport. I asked the crew if they could still see an orange glow on the left side and they said no. I passed the Aircraft checklist back to the crew and asked them to read the portion on engine failure which they did. I continued my climb to clear the ridgelines between hospital and the airport. The crew asked if they should call STATCOM to have Aircraft Y repo to the airport to get the patient which I thought was a great idea. The radio operator had already thought of that and they were dispatching Aircraft Y. I briefed the crew on what we were going to do; a running landing to the airport. I asked the crew to ask the radio operator to dispatch fire trucks to the airport; in case I screwed up the landing or I had residual fire that I was not aware of. Before landing check completed I turned to land the parallel taxiway for Runway XX. As I was on base I changed my mind and decided to take the Runway XX. The parallel for Runway XX is not straight for very long and then it bends. At Night on night vision goggles; with patients I was not taking the chance. I added to the crew that we train for this all the time. A shallow approach to running landing is really a non event due to our training. On final I set up for the shallow approach. I allowed the aircraft to touchdown and come to a stop. Aircraft Y landed and transferred my crew and patient to Hospital. My shutdown of Number 2 engine was uneventful. The max TQ I remember seeing during the whole event was 101.5% Temperature outside was about -2C. The Mechanics showed up about 45 minutes later. Aircraft Y had been dispatched to recover the wheels and tow bar from Aircraft Z base. It took him about an hour to get back. Once he was there the mechanics put the wheels and tow bar on and cleared the runway. After I landed I called approach and told them that my aircraft was on the runway. OCS called the FSS to send out a NOTAM. Once the aircraft was off the runway I called Approach to tell them as such. I also called OCS to call the FSS. Inside the aircraft we worked as a team. The crew did a great job of providing patient care and providing information and checklist verification when I asked for it. The Radio Operator and the OCS were excellent. They were all about support without asking questions. Whatever we asked for they were on it.

Pilot reported an engine fire on approach; requiring an inflight engine shut down and divert.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 1860; Flight Crew Type 662

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Long Beach Harbor has a long history of sea plane operations that reach back to the dawn of Aviation.  One of the first commercial aviation operations was passenger service to Catalina Island from Long Beach and the iconic Spruce goose flew it's only Flight there.Late on a hazy but otherwise benign weather weekend afternoon; I departed the Long Beach Airport for a short flight to the Harbor. From a vantage point at the foot of the LA River; I could see conditions were conducive to seaplane operations. I contacted the tower to inform them of my intentions to conduct multiple seaplane operations within the southern boundary of their Class D airspace and received the usual acknowledgment with the catchphrase 'At your own risk.'The area chosen for those operations lay parallel to the shoreline and 150 feet south of the swimming buoys.  (I have conducted many seaplane operations in this same area over the last XX years; as have other seaplane pilots.)My first pass remained airborne at 50 feet above the surface to insure there were no hazards in the water.  The next three passes involved multiple touch and goes from the surface.  I saw no swimmers south of the buoys.I departed the area southbound; climbing to pattern altitude plus 500 feet before turning 180deg back to the airport.While taxing to parking; the tower informed me there had been a complaint that my operations were too close to swimmers.

Seaplane pilot reported Long Beach Tower advising pilot that their operation was too close to swimmers in the area.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other Glider

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 30; Air Traffic Control Radar 28; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 1; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 300

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

This airport's rotating beacon is located 1.4 nm NE of the airport; well outside the airport boundary. Though very non-standard; it is not mentioned in the Flight Information Publication (FLIP) or depicted on the IPP plates. Even the Green Bay sectional could show the correct position; instead of the standard symbology which implies the beacon would be found on the airport.Only the Jeppesen instrument charts depict it accurately.This secret non-standard placement could result in disorientation and worse; at least give pilots a chance by publishing it.

Pilot reported the rotating beacon located 1.4 NM NE of IMT airport is at a non-standard location and could potentially result in pilot disorientation.  Pilot also stated the beacon location is not mentioned in the Flight Information Publication; nor depicted in the IPP plates.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was flying to observe a friend's home after a wildfire.  I was using my EFB for navigation and was very aware of the presence of multiple TFRs.  According to my visual landmarks and the perimeter of the TFR according my EFB; I was clearly outside of the TFR perimeter as it paralleled the coast and was slightly inland.  I was contacted by another pilot that he thought I may have violated a TFR. I assured him I was very careful using my EFB and very identifiable landmarks.  His comment was the the TFR had expanded and encompassed my course of flight.At XM:00 pm the evening of my flight when I opened my EFB; the TFR had indeed expanded.  Even though the active time was listed as XA:00; my EFB updated nearly 12 hours later.I am Respectful of the firefighting TFRs and am grateful that the fire was nearly out and there were no fire fighting aircraft in the vicinity. I will follow up with my EFB vendor to report this incident.

GA pilot reported a possible entry into a fire related TFR which was not depicted in his EFB pre-flight; but was noted post flight as the EFB updated.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Departed FAT; flew runway heading and cleared to 10;000 feet on departure. We were given direct to FRAME by departure and once established direct and climbing through 7;000 feet we simultaneously received a traffic call from ATC and an resolution advisory (RA) to descend. I began to comply with the RA and gained visual contact with a white and red Cessna.  As soon as we were established in a descending maneuver the Cessna began a right turn towards our aircraft and the TCAS gave us an RA to climb. I arrested the descent and began to climb.  I could see visually that the climb and current heading would cause us to [hit] the Cessna and made a right turn off course in addition to the climb to avoid a collision. The aircraft passed a few hundred feet off our left side and we received the 'clear of conflict' from TCAS. Captain advised ATC of the deviation and we were instructed to turn back direct to FRAME and given a frequency change.   ATC was extremely late advising us of conflicting traffic. In fact the traffic call was almost simultaneous with the RA.  It appeared visually to me that the descending maneuver would have worked to keep us clear but as soon as the Cessna turned towards us and the TCAS reversed its command to a climb it appeared to put us back on a collision course with the Cessna forcing a turn to the right in addition to the climb to avoid a collision.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].

CRJ-900 flight crew reported an NMAC with a Cessna during departure from FAT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116.82; Flight Crew Total 1239.68; Flight Crew Type 1239.68

We were on a left downwind to RWY 22 … about abeam GREKO at 4;000 MSL. The First Officer and Jumpseater reported seeing a yellow and white drone; about 2 feet square; pass off the right side of the aircraft at approximately 3;900 MSL. We reported it to Approach Control.

Flight crew observed a drone pass off the right side of the airplane during approach to landing.


Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

This is a new type of safety issue for me; but I felt compelled to report it to have more eyes review the information. I had Aircraft X; a VFR; call up for flight following from within my area. The pilot had a strong accent; and that along with what I suspect was the quality of his radio made it very hard for me to understand his transmissions. I also had some distraction from within the TRACON itself; which I will describe in a moment. It probably took me over 10 transmissions to get Aircraft X pilot's intentions; and successfully get him processed for flight following. He had also requested an IFR clearance; but after I informed him his requested altitude of 020 was likely to cause issues with MVA's and the subsequent Center sector; he elected to maintain VFR with flight following. There were multiple SIGMETs from all over Texas; and the weather at ZZZ was IFR; information I gave the pilot. I had Aircraft Y being vectored for an RNAV Runway XX Approach at ZZZ; followed by Aircraft Z; on the same approach from the west via the IAF of ZZZZZ. The following Aircraft Z seemed likely to catch Aircraft Y; so I began speed instructions for both aircraft. I was certain that Aircraft X was likely to encounter weather difficulty; possibly becoming an emergency. I instructed him to remain clear of ZZZ Class Delta; but due to TRACON distractions; I missed the read back. A controller plugged in behind me and started observing; in preparation to relieve my position. I told him I had an issue to work out with these two aircraft on final; and preferred him to wait a moment for me to handle it. He did. It took a considerable amount of work for me to end up sequencing the two aircraft; and I was having some issues getting them on the speed restrictions I was intending. I also had coordination to do with ZZZ1 Approach for a point out on Aircraft Y; and subsequently for the following Aircraft Z as well. [Relieving Controller] began to get pushy about doing the relief briefing; so when I thought I had everything reasonably handled I pushed the button and began the briefing. As I was doing the briefing; which was going to take a while considering the information I felt compelled to give him concerning the VFR aircraft in weather difficulty; and the two RNAV aircraft requiring close attention; I realized the speed I had issued appeared to not be enough to maintain required separation later on final. I stopped the briefing; and reissued new speed restrictions to both aircraft. As I was doing this; [the relieving controller] got impatient with the amount of time it was taking to complete the briefing and started becoming borderline belligerent with me because of it. He insulted my controlling; and cursed many times at me. His comments said things like; 'Are we going to get this briefing done; I've been here for six or seven [Expletive] minutes'; 'You only have four [Expletive] aircraft'; and 'Don't touch my [Expletive] headset'. He made other comments as well; some of which I didn't catch because I was still attempting to listen to; work; and adjust my seemingly imminent loss of separation on final. During this argument with him; I unplugged him; and asked him to leave and find the supervisor. I also missed a key read back and made a mistake; I found later when listening to the tapes. I missed the read back of Aircraft X when I instructed him to remain outside of ZZZ Delta; and I forgot to reissue a speed restriction to Aircraft Y when clearing him for the approach. That speed restriction was something I needed with the following Aircraft Z still faster; and Aircraft Y subsequently turned onto final and slowed down considerably. I am confident that had I not been constantly insulted and distracted in the TRACON; I would have not made this mistake. I saw the separation would not be maintained on final; and cancelled the approach clearance of the Aircraft Z; vectored him across final; and then gave him a hard turn back to get him on the approach. He was in IMC conditions. At no time did I lose separation. I'm not really sure what to expect of this report; and I have informed my ATM of everything that happened. I am certain the issue will be addressed. What does concern me; however; is that management seemed to be more concerned with the verbal abuse of me; and less concerned with the safety situation it caused for me while trying to run my sector. I am not worried about the personal confrontation so much; as the fact that it was causing an unsafe situation on my sector. I really do not have any idea what to suggest for this one. I honestly feel this is well above my position pay grade.

TRACON Controller reported an unsafe operation along with pressure induced by a relieving controller.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I have been flying our Cheyenne for six years.  We recently purchased a new plane requiring two crew and since the owner of both planes is a pilot he wants to get qualified as SIC in our new plane. On nice days; I let him practice the SIC duties in our Cheyenne so he can transfer the habits into our new plane after he goes to school.This was a very nice VFR day.  We were running the before taxi checklists and got to the flight instruments set.  I know my boss had listened to the ASOS because I saw him write it down.  I saw him set both altimeters because they were a couple of hundred feet off.  He acknowledged the challenge with 'Altimeters set two times'.  I looked at the pointer on both altimeters and they were within 75' of field elevation (mine was perfect at field elevation.  We finished the check list.  What I didn't look at was the thousand foot altitude.  The altimeter was actually was actually set to -880 feet; which we discovered once we leveled off at 170.We took off and contacted approach with our altitude we were climbing through and climbing to.  The reception and transmissions in that area aren't great down low so there is a chance the controller did not pick up my current altitude we were climbing through. Approach did give me the altimeter setting but I only verified and read back the last two digits rather than the entire four digits. Before we leveled off we were assigned a higher altitude and I only acknowledged the new assigned altitude. We were handed off to Center before leveling off and I checked in with my altitude climbing through and climbing to.  He greeted me; gave me the altimeter setting; and asked me if I was climbing through a given altitude.  Because of my rate of climb; I don't remember the exact altitude but for example he asked if I was at 14;600 and I saw my 100 pointer was just coming up on my next 1000 foot interval; and when I check my thousands feet I was showing 14;000 and didn't make the connection I was actually climbing from 13000 through 140000; not 140000 through 150000.  I think the controller saw the discrepancy and tried to politely point out my mistake.  We were handed off to the next center frequency and I checked on climbing through 16;600 for 17000.  The controller welcomed me.  A short period later the controller called me and asked me to confirm my assigned altitude.  I verified 17;000.  He said my mode C indicated 16;200.  I told him I showed level 17;000.  At that point I looked at my mode C read out and saw 16;200 which prompted me to ask him to verify the altimeter.  This was when I realized I allowed the altimeter to be set 1000' too low before takeoff.  We reset the altimeter properly and climbed to our proper assigned altitude. When I went to school for our new plane they emphasized crew coordination and depending on the second pilot.  They instilled the need to trust he knows what he is doing and broke me of the habit of doing everything myself.  Once I heard the confirmation altimeters set twice and saw the 100' pointer where it should be; I continued with the checklist.  I am not sure why I didn't notice the altimeter was set to 30.72 instead of 29.72 even though the controllers did give me the setting a number of times.  I guess believing the altimeter was set correctly on the ground and the last two digits on the setting didn't change from ATC that I only listened to the last two digits of the setting.  I am also thinking I take the short cut of listening to the hundreds foot position and not the entire altitude when ATC reads off the altitude when I am climbing.In hindsight; I am going to have to rethink how much to trust a second pilot and question them more.  I also realize how strong the feeling is that I knew the altimeter was set on the ground so it didn't register when ATC politely queried me on my altitude. In this case I failed in all four double checks.....The use of checklist; verify actual altitude against altimeter before takeoff; reading back altimeter settings to ATC (I think I read back only the last two digits instead of the full four); and missing the ATC query regarding my actual altitude.  I guess once you believe one piece of the puzzle is correct (I knew the altimeter was set correct on the ground) that the mind makes all the other information fit and ignores the pieces that don't.

PA31 pilot reported ATC alerted him to an altitude deviation resulting from an incorrect altimeter setting.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181; Flight Crew Total 7370; Flight Crew Type 352

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Evacuated

The aircraft had sat on the ramp for about 5 days; where the last 3 days included some rain. During pre-flight; I noticed a small fuel stain on the bottom of the left engine firewall (inboard side of nacelle). I also noted that the left main tank was dripping from the the overflow vent; having just been filled.I taxied to the runway and completed the engine run-up checks at the runway hold short line. When pulling the throttles back to idle after the run-up I heard a sound that was later determined to be fuel vapor igniting. At the time I didn't know what it was. My passenger informed me that the left wall panel had been blown out towards his leg and we saw smoke from the vent on the center wing spar cover.At this point I notified the Tower of the smoke. Immediately after that I saw flames through the spar cover openings and [advised] the tower. I requested fire trucks; and communicated souls; fuel on-board; and the intent to evacuate. I shut down all fuel and electrical systems. As I exited the aircraft; the flame had stopped. I believe that shutting the engines down and turning off the fuel selectors stopped the fuel from feeding the fire.I informed emergency personnel that I believed the flames were out after I turned everything off. They verified that the fire was out and we were towed back to the ramp and the aircraft was put into maintenance to determine the issue.I believe that fuel leaked from the left side of the aircraft; I don't know where from. This fuel must have been ignited during the run-up with hot engines.Finding and fixing fuel leaks might have helped prevent this situation.

The reporter indicated that during maintenance follow up; it was concluded that a fuel leak existed in the engine driven fuel pump.

The pilot of a PA31 observed smoke and a small fire during run-up. An aircraft shutdown and evacuation were executed. A fuel leak from an engine driven fuel pump is suspected.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

In cruise; while checking the status of the EICAS messages; the message MAIN DECK A/C was displayed. After reviewing the QRH; we looked further into the DDPG [Dispatch Deviations Procedures Guide] and discovered that the message was a result of MEL 21-40-01. We looked further into the MEL's and discovered that we were not in compliance due to conflicting MEL's. The MEL's that were on the aircraft and certified as airworthy by Maintenance Control were: 1. MAIN DECK FWD SOV 1 - M21-40-01 2. MAIN DECK FWD SOV 3 - M21-40-013. MAIN DECK AFT SOV 3 - M21-40-011 above has an (O) procedure. #2 & #3 do not have an (O) procedure. Initially; reading only the (O) portion of the MEL's within the DDPG; we were required to position the M/D FLOW switch to HIGH under MEL 21-40-01. The other MEL did not contain an (O) which is an Operational procedure for the flight crew to deal with. When reading all notes it was discovered that there was a conflict with the two MEL's that were placed into the logbook. In order to have FWD SOV 1 MEL'd the AFT SOV 1 and 2 must operate normally. Additionally; the FWD and AFT SOV 3 must operate normally. In order to have the FWD SOV 3 MEL'd; the FWD SOV 1 AND 2 must operate normally. Additionally; the AFT SOV 1 and 2 must operate normally. In order to have the AFT SOV 3 MEL'd; the FWD SOV 1 and 2 must operate normally. Additionally the AFT SOV 1 and 2 must operate normally. As you can see; there is direct conflict within the MEL's and it is not possible to have these respective MEL's active at the same time. The event officially occurred when we blocked out due to NOT being in compliance upon block out. After it was discovered that there was a potential issue with the MEL status of the aircraft; Maintenance Control was consulted. After Maintenance Control agreed that we were out of compliance; we contacted the Chief Pilot to advise him as to the situation. I would like to suggest that a full briefing be at minimum; accomplished by the Maintenance personnel on site to the operating captain/crew prior to every departure. This could possibly assist in all parties being in full understanding of the MEL's and potential conflict between any specific series of MEL's. Furthermore; a more comprehensive check/investigation by Maintenance Control should be conducted before issuing any control numbers for MEL's. It is understood that as Captain; the final responsibility falls upon his/her shoulders as to the airworthiness of the aircraft; however to what extent? Do I need to have them pull every panel and show that each individual item is deactivated; tie wrapped; secured closed or open; etc.; per the MEL? I would hope that once maintenance personnel places MEL's in the logbook; places stickers on the logbook cover; and places stickers on the affected items in the aircraft; then signs off the logbook; that this would mean that the items in the logbook had been checked for compliance; maintenance actions performed; and proper entries made.

As an (O) Operations Procedure; we complied with the statement in the appropriate MEL stating to operate the M/D FLOW switch to HIGH. We as a crew complied with the MEL (O) OPERATIONS function of the respective MELs. The event occurred due to Maintenance improperly certifying an aircraft being airworthy when the respective MEL's were in direct conflict.

B777 flight crew discovers airborne that they have departed with conflicting MEL's concerning Main Deck shut off valves. After consulting with Maintenance the flight continues to destination.


Air Carrier X was southbound on J53 at FL380. Air Carrier Y; FL390; was northeast bound on a vector to meet the SOP restriction for aircraft landing Pittsburgh. Off the vector; Air Carrier Y was descended to FL340 to miss two (point outs) aircraft from Indy Center at FL370 eastbound. Air Carrier Y had to be descended quickly not to only miss the two aircraft at FL370; but to try and make the SOP restrictions. Obviously separation is paramount and our job to ensure. That being said; the fact that there is no LOA with Washington Center and Atlanta Center for Pittsburgh landers is dangerous and unreasonable. As of now; Atlanta can hand off an aircraft at FL410; landing Pittsburgh; and we have about 40 miles to get the aircraft out of FL310 descending to FL290 to meet our restriction. This can be an issue with no other traffic; but throw in other traffic southwest bound; east bound; southeast bound from Washington; Indy and Atlanta it can create potential for error. There is an LOA with other Centers for aircraft landing just as far away as Pittsburgh if not further. It would be a simple and painless correction for everybody. Pittsburgh aircraft cross the Atlanta/Washington Center boundary at or below FL350 will be extremely helpful and safe.

ZDC Controller reported that existing procedures make it very difficult to handle PIT arrivals transferred at high altitudes; alleging that a procedural fix would not be difficult.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174.2; Flight Crew Total 7982.90; Flight Crew Type 1598.62

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207.95; Flight Crew Total 14245.95; Flight Crew Type 2014.80

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was the relief FO on the flight. Preflight was normal with the exception of a 'SLATS DRIVE' EICAS message which none of us had ever seen before. We called maintenance and they troubleshot the problem for about 30 minutes. Ultimately they were able to extinguish the EICAS message and a new flight release was issued. Taxi; takeoff; and initial climb out were uneventful and I went on first break. As I was climbing into the bunk; I was called back to the flight deck. When I arrived; we were in holding; the SLATS DRIVE message had returned; and the crew was setting up to dump fuel and return to TLV. The Captain had me run landing distance for RWY 12 for max landing weight. In general; I observed the crew manage the situation; and making sure someone was always flying the airplane; and that checklists were complete. As I joined the problem late; I verified they had issued an alert to ATC (they did; both with Nicosia control and Tel Aviv arrival). Because TLV typically jams the GPS; SATCOM was garbled but the Captain was able to communicate with Dispatch via ACARS. Arrival and landing were uneventful other than the expected Brake Temperature EICAS message which we handled per the proper checklist. (We did request vehicles who inspected us upon exiting the runway and followed us to gate.)

Arrived at gate saw unusual EICAS Slat drive message. Entered as MRM code and called TLV Operations to have maintenance come to aircraft. Maintenance worked the issue and cleared the item. Uneventful taxi and takeoff. About 90-120 miles from TLV communication with Nicosia control we got Slat Drive EICAS. We communicated to Nicosia we had a flight control issue; declared emergency and told of our intentions were to return to TLV. We requested hold and informed Nicosia we would have to jettison fuel as well. Nicosia authorized the fuel Jettison. We entered hold about 118 miles North of TLV and worked the Slat drive EICAS and the un-annunciated fuel jettison checklist. Both checklists completed successfully. It had been the FOs leg but after checklists had been completed I opted to fly the airplane back to TLV.We were within 180 miles of TLV which required us to talk to BGN control to request re-entry into their airspace and to also declare the emergency. They asked if we were a priority aircraft and we affirmed. During the hold we tried to Satcom dispatch after we had already notified them of the nature of the issues via ACARS and included our intentions. Satcom was weak so we sent ACARS to dispatch to work out our landing distance needed with our slat drive malfunction. We came up with approximately 7;000 feet runway needed and dispatch came up with 7;200.  After checklists completed and fuel jettisoned down to MLW we requested clearance to TLV. TLV offered us straight in RW 12 which we accepted. Land although fast 182kts at flaps 20 was uneventful (auto brakes 4 used) we rolled to almost end of runway for a slow uneventful turn off.We expected hot brakes and advised Tower to tell CFR trucks to inspect wheels brakes. They noted nothing and we taxied uneventfully to gate. CFR had expressed they were given only 12 minutes notice to roll trucks and wanted to know when we had actually requested priority. We explained well before contact with approach control. Final write up made at blocks was hot brakes. My crew acted like a well oiled machine great CRM; and all was included in the debrief. Dispatch was also a great help throughout the problem.

Air Carrier First Officer reported the pilot crew; during an in-flight mechanical abnormality; had difficulty communicating with dispatch. The transmission was garbled and the FO suspected it may have been caused by known GPS jamming in the TLV area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

After a normal flight we made a stabilized approach with an approach speed of 141 knots at a landing weight of 70;650 pounds. Weather conditions were good; VMC with winds 190/9. Touchdown was smooth and on centerline and the nose wheel was lowered smoothly to the runway. Thrust reversers were deployed. The aircraft started pulling to the right as the aircraft slowed. We received a nose wheel steering caution message. The tiller did not respond and left rudder was insufficient to stop the drift to the right; so I applied left braking. As the aircraft slowed the turn increased. Full left brake also did not stop the turn and I asked the First Officer to help me and we both applied hard left brake and then full braking as the aircraft didn't respond to the inputs and was heading for the grass. The nose wheel of the aircraft departed the runway at slow speed into the grass off the right side of the runway. The left and right main landing gear both remained on the runway. At this point I made a brief PA to the cabin to remain seated. APU power was established and both engines were shutdown. While the APU was spooling up I spoke with the flight attendants. I asked if they were okay and got a quick assessment from them that there seemed to be no injuries or immediate issues; and advised them that we would not be evacuating at that time; and that I would be back to them shortly. Appropriate checklists and procedures were complied with. SOC was notified. Once the engines were shut down I made another PA quickly summarizing our situation. The ARFF vehicles were approaching the aircraft from the front so I asked Number 1 Flight Attendant to open the main cabin door. There were no leaks; fires; flat tires; or other issues of immediate concern and we reported that we had no known injuries on board. We told them that we had not yet contacted local operations but that busing would be required and that we would be deplaning onto the runway. Cooling fans were placed on the brakes. Landing gear was pinned. Passengers were bussed to the terminal without incident. All checked and gate checked carry-on bags were left on board and passengers later retrieved them at baggage claim.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported they lost nosewheel steering on landing roll and were unable to keep the aircraft on the runway. No damage or injuries were reported.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 377; Flight Crew Type 228

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Prop strike occurred due to flare too high due to distractions (see below); went to second bounce before throttle up to go around. This was when the prop strike occurred. Second circuit successful; with flyby Tower at 500 FT to check undercarriage and wheels. Third circuit successful landing. Held on runway to check undercarriage by fire department. Distractions: pilot's microphone switch jammed so had to use co-pilot's switch. Wind was on starboard quarter on landing; it had been a crosswind about 160 to 180 at about 12/14 KTS on left downwind to Runway 08. On final wind switched to 260 at about 6 to 8 but varying. I think there was a gust as I came in to flare. As a result I felt too fast with full flaps on final approach. Contributing factor was the airport was very busy at the time and I was hurrying to make space for others to takeoff/land. By the way there was no pressure from the Tower at all; that was purely my self imposed pressure; they gave me full description of wind conditions and were accurate and helpful throughout. In fact I compliment the Tower and emergency staff for their rapid and very professional response to the situation. After my bounce and communication that I was going around they asked immediately if I needed assistance; notified the emergency service and cleared the airspace for my flyby and subsequent landing. I do not know what might be better done to avoid such a situation except perhaps more emphasis in training on landing in unusual wind conditions. This was my first landing with a tail/cross wind.

SR22 pilot reports a double bounce landing and go around resulting in a propeller strike. A safe landing ensues.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 11010; Flight Crew Type 2400

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Taxing out for departure to Runway 28L at SFO; after [we were] being advised to expect 28L. I requested a weight and balance uplink for 28L. Holding short number 1; SFO Tower clears us to cross 28L for 28R. I advise that we were told to expect 28L for departure and that we did not have the numbers for 28R. Local then tells us he can not give 28L for traffic and to continue holding short of 28L. Advise when you have your numbers for 28R. I then send another a weight and balance request for 28R. We receive the data and I load the FMC and reselect the new departure runway and departure per our Flight Manual procedures. Once the Captain and I verified everything was in order for 28R I advised Tower we had our numbers for 28R and were ready for departure. SFO Tower then comes back with a line up and wait clearance for 28L. I then ask again; you just told us 28R; while I was querying the Tower the Captain began to cross the hold short line as instructed by ATC. Tower then replies to my query you need to have numbers for both runways; that's how we do it here. Now I am scrambling to reload the 28L data in the FMC and re-confirm the departure runway and SID. SFO Tower then issues a quick hold short instruction but the nose was across the line already as previously instructed. Then Local Controller sees this and re-issues a line up and wait clearance. As I'm finishing up the verification Tower issues an immediate takeoff clearance for 28L. Checklists complete; runway verification callout complete and the Captain is now calling for auto throttles as we accelerate for takeoff. While rolling on 28L I hear the Tower command a go around for the aircraft on final. We followed our established procedures and ATC kept changing the plan and trying to rush us. Had we not followed our procedures I believe many other errors could have happened.

Air Carrier First Officer is told to expect Runway 28L at SFO and FMC and weight and balance information are loaded for Runway 28L. Runway 28R is assigned and the crew advises that they cannot accept Runway 28R without reprogramming and are told to hold short and advise when ready. When the crew announces ready the Tower instructs to line up and wait Runway 28L which the crew is again not ready for and results in a takeoff delay and a go around for an aircraft on approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I had just taken a number of sectors combined. I began to receive a handoff from Approach on a B1900. I had good RADAR on the track and; via automated means; took RADAR contact on the B1900. The B1900 checked on climbing to 12;000; requesting FL200. They also stated that they were 'when able' direct [the] VOR. I assumed that meant they were on a vector until able to receive [the VOR]; although I had not been given that information from Approach. I then climbed the B1900 to FL200. Shortly thereafter (within 1 minute); I lost RADAR on the B1900 and noticed that I had completely lost both beacon and search capabilities of the TAD RADAR. I notified the supervisor of the problem. My concern was that the B1900 was now on a heading; until receiving [the] VOR; non-RADAR; climbing into high terrain with MIA's (Minimum IFR Altitudes) as high as 16;300 MSL. I had no way of knowing if their climb rate would suffice to top the MIA's; given that I had completely lost the RADAR site. I asked the B1900 for their altitude leaving; radial and DME off of [another] VOR. They stated that they were about on the [other VOR] 180 radial at 7 miles leaving 11;800 MSL. Given that information; I knew they were still well clear of the mountainous terrain; but also knew that I needed to get them established on a [victor airway] (which was about 5 NM east of their position; in an area of lower MIA's). I knew I had to make a decision quickly; given that they were non-RADAR; not on good non-RADAR routing; and also flying towards high terrain. I did not think of using a non-RADAR arc at the time; I just knew I had to get them moving eastbound; away from the mountains; toward the victor airway. As they were leaving about 12;000 MSL; I assigned the B1900 a vector (non-RADAR; which I know is wrong) knowing that this vector would keep them above MIA's and move them away from high terrain; while also joining them to a victor airway. The B1900 was then assigned to join [the victor airway] to [the] VOR at 17;000 MSL. I should have thought to use a DME arc in this case. Once I receive a DME from [the other VOR]; I could have had the B1900 intercept an arc to join [the victor airway].

ZDV Controller described an unsafe event when issuing a 'vector' in a non-RADAR environment; the reporter acknowedging his unfamilarity with non-RADAR procedures.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Flight [advised ATC] going into ZZZ due to odor in the cockpit. I was informed the day after the event occurred. I am not aware of what caused the event.

Dispatcher reported being made aware of fume event on flight he dispatched resulted in an uneventful landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Initial approach to Runway 26 PHX plan arrival fuel approximately 9.0. On final to Runway 26 aircraft reports FOD (Foreign Object Debris) on runway; a dislodged concrete on runway near Taxiway B7. Crew asked if we are cleared to land - Tower responds yes. Crew then asks if full length is available. Tower responds cleared to land your discretion FOD reported on runway. Crew elected to GA (Go Around). Vectors on departure initially to Runway 26 again; crew informed Controller of GA due to FOD; controller was unaware but then informed 8/26 now closed expect vectors Runway 25L. On final 25L Tower reports winds gusting with tailwind above 10 knots. Crew elected to GA due to excessive tailwind reported on short final. Additional aircraft reported unable to accept tailwind for both takeoff and landing. Airport then changed runways to 8; 7L; 7R. ATC vectored to 8 or 7R with ATIS reporting 7R closed. Crew planned 7R. During extended vectors crew declared Pan Pan due to approaching minimum fuel. Planned arrival fuel was 5.0 with reserves 4.1. Vectors for visual Runway 7R. On initial check in with Tower for Runway 7R winds again shifted to a tailwind. Offered longer Runway 8 and accepted due to tailwind and low fuel state. While maneuvering for Runway 8 approach became unstable with flap over speed which required a GA. On downwind for Runway 8 [requested priority handling] due to possible landing below fuel reserves. Uneventful approach and landing Runway 8. Shut down at gate with approximately 3.8 fuel. Initially event was due to FOD on runway followed by unexpected tailwind and shifting winds. Unstable approach; flap over speed and final GA was due to task saturation; concern over tailwind/short runway; automation; and concern over low fuel state. Remain vigilant during high stress events task saturation can result in unstable approach and deviation. Strict adherence to SOP. I will stress this during my 'possible threats' brief each departure and arrival.

Initial approach to Runway 26. Tower reported a piece of the runway coming up around B7. Confirmed cleared to land. Asked if entire runway was usable. Tower said at your discretion. Elected to go-around because of the uncertainty of the runway surface. Vectors to Runway 25L. On final for 25L Tower gave us the current winds and were reporting a tailwind gusting over the limitation. Executed a second go-around. Discussed our reserve fuel and we needed to land with 4.1. Made several attempts to get a plan from ATC whether they were planning to change landing direction. On the third attempt; got confirmation they would be landing east. While being vectored for 07R declared Pan Pan. On final for 07R received another wind report that was a gusting tailwind. Asked for 08 and was given 08 and cleared to land. Became unstable and had a flap over speed on approach. Executed another go around. [Requested priority handling] because we were low on fuel. Vectored around and landed 08. Arrived at gate with 3800 lbs of fuel. FOD (Foreign Object Debris) on runway. Changing winds. Task saturation. High stress because of low fuel.

A321 flight crew reported going around due to FOD; then wind; unstable with flap over speed; eventually landing on the fourth attempt with fuel issues.


We flew uneventfully from [our departure airport]. It had been raining at [our departure airport] while the airplane was parked outside overnight. Also; the initial climb was flown in light rain and we used the weather radar to avoid weather returns. Tops were around 30;000 FT and we cruised in clear skies at 40;000 FT. Upon post-flight inspection I noticed an area of frost (5 inches x 4 inches forming under the fuselage. The area was located on the bottom of the tail section; beginning roughly 24 inches after the 'tail stand' placard (just aft of the rear-most inspection panel). There was a definite temperature difference to the touch between the affected area and the surrounding areas of the aircraft skin. After landing the airplane was dry; except for that area. I suspected a block of ice had formed inside the tailcone and it was slowly melting. The temperature on the ground at the destination airport was 15C. No abnormalities were noted on the flight controls (main flight controls and trim worked normally throughout the flight). I am not sure if ice forming in that area has the potential to affect the flight controls cables; but I would recommend Cessna to eventually add an additional drain hole or mast.

During post flight inspection a CE-560XLS Captain discovered an area of frost on the bottom of the tail cone which lead him to believe that ice had formed inside of the tailcone during flight after the aircraft was exposed to rain the previous night.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Manual safety demo was performed. Announcements regarding safety demo changes were not made. Customers were not advised to remove face covering and masks for decompression and it was not explained that the life vest and the oxygen masks were not demonstrated.

Flight Attendant reported that announcements regarding the safety demonstration changes were not made and that passengers were not advised to remove face coverings and masks in the event of decompression.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 330; Flight Crew Type 55

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft flew an extended crosswind pattern. We didn't see or hear him on radio. He reported that he heard us and didn't reply. He is faster and attempted and overtake; when we reported turning final he reported to be 200 ft. above us; he decided to go around. We had descended below TPA to land. He was way too high to be attempting to land from his current position. We apologized and continued to land; he went around and landed. We became visual with the conflicting aircraft as we rolled into final. The other aircraft was still on his base leg.

PA28 Instructor Pilot reported an NMAC while on final approach.