Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

I was initially giving OJT to a Developmental on Sector 15 whose airspace is ground to FL280. Sector 87 called to APREQ Aircraft X flight; which was an ALRV from TCC to IRW scheduled at FL250B270; with a revised altitude of FL250B290. The Developmental approved it after clarifying with Sector 87 that they would accomplish a point out to Sector 97 which owns FL290 and up directly over Sector 15. Within a few minutes of that approval OJT was discontinued and I stayed on sector as CPC. Soon after Aircraft X flight entered Sector 15's airspace ZFW called with a point out near SYO of Aircraft Y climbing to FL300. Aircraft Y's route was SYO..PNH..TCC. directly head on with the Aircraft X flight. Aircraft Y would easily be level near PNH when crossing out with the Aircraft X flight. I did not think there was any problem with these two flights since they were both RVSM and no coral box showed on the data block. I thought in the back of my mind that if one of the flights was negative RVSM it would be a problem; but I felt confident that all aircraft were RVSM qualified based on my cursory glance at their flight plans. I had seen the ALTRV sheet earlier in the day for the Aircraft X flight; and noted that the two fighter's were in tow. I failed to note all aircraft equipment suffixes at that time; and did not think to look at them again. As Aircraft X flight and Aircraft Y passed each other east of PNH; the Sector 97 Controller called me to quick look them and issue traffic on the two flights. I issued traffic to the Aircraft X flight and they acknowledged they were looking. No data blocks flashed and neither pilot said anything unusual. One thing that would have been very helpful would be having the lead aircraft say 'negative RVSM' if the whole flight is negative RVSM. 99% of all aircraft I have talked to that were negative RVSM specified; on contact with a new sector; that they are negative RVSM. Another item would be in the ALTRV sheets that are given out to specify and spell out in plain language somewhere that the flight is negative RVSM. Last; I would ask for clarification to avoid any doubts whatsoever that: 1) Any aircraft in a block altitude flight that is negative RVSM makes the whole flight negative RVSM.2) Negative RVSM separation needs to be accomplished even if the flight is in a two or three thousand foot block (e.g. FL310B330).

ZAB Controller describes situation where aircraft are not RVSM equipped and has a loss of separation due to one on the aircraft being a flight with non-RVSM aircraft in tow.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After leaving a scene with patient on board in cruise flight approximately 5 to 10 minutes from destination the left rear door slid open; this was reported by the nurse. The Pilot immediately slowed down and started a descent to land so that the door could be secured. The nurse then closed the door a few seconds after the door had slid open; no debris was loose nor did anything leave the aircraft. Upon closing the door the pilot flew to the nearest suitable landing area (which was the hospital) the aircraft was shut down and the patient was successfully offloaded. The pilot conducted a thorough walk around inspection and inspection of the door; hinges and track and associated hardware. There was absolutely no indication of damage of any kind. Upon a thorough debrief with the crew; the nurse confirmed that the door handle was down and secured when the door slid open. The nurse also confirmed that prior to lifting he as well as the pilot visually confirmed that the door handle was down and secured indicating that the door was locked.The Pilot tried to recreate the condition that caused the door to come open. The pilot noted that the door handle could be closed and secured; but the upper latch pin would not seat properly (the door would be slightly ajar). And with a sufficient amount of pressure the door would slide open.This was in fact pilot error due to the fact the pilot did not ensure the door was sealed completely around the frame. Other conditions that lead to the door coming open were a significant crosswind of approximately 30 knots.After a thorough inspection and debrief the pilot flew the aircraft to the airport for further inspection by maintenance; which concluded no damage was sustained.Corrective actions. During the debrief with the [chief pilot]; the pilot was told that he should not have left the helipad without consulting the mechanic first. This will be discussed with the other pilots at the base and should also be shared with all pilots to dispel any misconceptions procedures if a door comes open in flight.The pilot will take extra precautions and take an extra 15 seconds to ensure all the doors are sealed about their frames and provide sufficient pressure on doors and cowlings to ensure its security and not take for granted that just because the latch is closed it does not ensure the cowling or door is actually secure or ready for flight conditions.

EC-130 Captain reported the left rear door came open in flight when it was not properly checked before departure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 34000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy

February 2014. Trip XXX; B757-200 Aircraft. Found Right IDG with no oil showing in sight gauge and no 'OK' [indication] in IDG sight gauge. According to responding Technician; it required two quarts to service to full. Trip YYY March 2014; B757. Found oil quantity in BOTH IDGs below minimum service level. Trip ZZZ March 2014; B757. Found Right IDG with no oil showing in sight gauge and no 'OK' in sight gauge. According to the responding Technician; IDG required two quarts to service to full. B757 aircraft IDGs hold 4.25 quarts.There are several problems which seem to be leading to this problem as I detailed in a report to the ZZZ Chief Pilot's office in November 2013; but one of them is that the checking of the IDG oil quantity has been removed from the S-1 Service Check and; more importantly; from the ETOPS Pre-Departure Check (PDC). One of the responding technicians explained that the rationale for this change was that some; or all; of the Generator Drives from the B757s that came with the Air Carrier we had merged with; do not have sight gauges installed and that in any event; technicians always look for leaks when doing a general inspection of aircraft. I don't know anything about the design of the Generator Drives from the merged B757s; but it seems obvious that not checking the IDG oil quantity on our B757 fleet is resulting in aircraft departing on ETOPS and other flights with IDG oil on one or more IDGs below minimum service level. At a minimum; IDG Oil quantity should be checked before an ETOPS departure. Checking both IDGs takes about one minute total and seems like a reasonable investment of time.

Reporter stated that servicing the IDGs takes some time to perform correctly since the pressure fill procedure requires a liter of oil to drain into an overflow bottle to verify proper filling of the IDG drive. Removing the IDG Oil Quantity Check from the Pre-departure Check (PDC) for ETOPS departures and from the Maintenance Service Checks that occur every 72-hours does not seem to be a safe practice for aircraft that fly over the pond. The removal of the IDG Oil Quantity from their B757 ETOPS PDCs and Service Checks allows B757s to fly roundtrip ETOPS flights without ever checking the IDG oil quantity. Reporter stated that even though the Maintenance Manual (M/M) notes that the IDGs could operate approximately five hours with oil quantity below minimums; he always asks: 'just when does that 5-hour clock start'? Because there are no EICAS warnings; message or indications available to the Flight crew that the IDG Oil Quantity is low or below minimums.

Captain raises concerns about their merged Air Carrier removing the IDG Oil Quantity Checks from their Service Checks and Pre-Departure Checks (PDC) on B757 aircraft. That practice has resulted in aircraft departing on ETOPS and other flights with IDG Oil Quantities below minimum service levels. No EICAS messages or warnings available to alert flight crews to an IDG low oil quantity.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were on arrival to SFO. About an hour out; we were rerouted to BDEGA3 arrival. ATIS was calling for landing [Runway] 10L. Arrival and runway didn't match. In 2nd to last Center sector; we were given new arrival; STLER3. Again; ATIS was calling for [Runway] 10L; which doesn't match arrival. Just prior to switching to NORCAL approach; [new] ATIS  comes out switching to simultaneous ILS and VA [visual approach] to 19L/R. Clearly from our direction; we are going to get a visual to [Runway] 19R. We decided and briefed a VA backed up by RNAV (GPS) 19R. We discussed importance of using PAPI on left. Since we had previously briefed an RNAV GPS to [Runway] 10L; we quick briefed the backup procedures for RNAV. Planned and flew flaps 30 approach with 125 ref and 132 target. Winds forecast I believe 060@14kts. We then started being vectored basically along arrival and told visual [Runway] 19R. We were switched to Final Controller who was handling left and right runways. He was also very difficult to understand. He seemed to have an accent and slightly 'slurred' type speech that drew out length of calls in fast paced environment. We were vectored to final and told to maintain visual with 737 to left runway. I inquired if we would be ahead or behind other aircraft and told 'right next to'. Runway 19L was illuminated like a bright Christmas tree and Runway 19R barely lit up. I informed First Officer; who was flying pilot; to use preceding aircraft as reference for runway. We were cleared approach; told to maintain 3;000 feet until 9 DME; and to maintain 180kts to 5 DME. We basically flew RNAV approach on autopilot following all procedures for RNAV approach. I monitored the 737 right next to us on [Runway] 19L. Winds at 2;800 feet were 060/40. I was beginning to feel uncomfortably close to 737. We configured at about 1;500 feet; First Officer disconnected autopilot and hand flew rest of approach. We were cleared to land. About 6 DME; we slowed to target of about 132 and that gave us spacing on 737 to left runway. At 900 feet I made 1;000 feet call and we were configured and stable. Runway environment for landing was relatively dark (especially compared to 19L). We also commented on no PAPI for guidance. Winds at 500 feet were about 060/30. I made 500 feet call and First Officer responded stable. I asked for wind check and winds were reported 100/14 (?). Winds at 200 feet were still about 060/25. At about 200 feet; I saw a descent rate of 1;000 feet per minute and commented 'descent rate'. First Officer made timely correction. I made a call out that crosswinds were decreasing. Landing was a bit firmer than normal but in touchdown zone and uneventful. We taxied clear and onto gate.During entire approach and landing; we were both task saturated. On reflection; I don't believe my leadership effectiveness was as good as it should have been. I never made an inquiry to Tower about brightness of runway lights or why PAPI wasn't operational. It seems to me like SFO TRACON was behind the power curve and not ready or appropriately manned for the amount of arrivals. Controllers all seemed to be over task saturated. The environment was ripe for a safety mishap. Aircraft two behind us went around. Winds were not conducive on Approach for using the 19's.

B757 Captain reported SFO ATC seemed understaffed and overworked during an arrival on a windy and rainy night.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Local Control during a lull period in between pushes. The push was just about to start. With Runway 18R being closed; we were occasionally arriving to Runway 18L and we were also arriving to 13R which is a converging runway. Like I said; the push was about to start and the taxi status and our hat (position who controls departure gates) status had been set to the west side only having west departures and sending all other departures to the eastside. The Ground Controller accidently kept a northbound departure. He had the taxi status mistaken. Since he had mistaken the hat and taxi status the controller failed to underline the SID in red to remind me that I had to get a release. Then during this aircraft Y checked on to Runway 13R and I cleared him to land. Also I had an aircraft inbound to runway 18R. I put the BLECO in position and realized I had not obtained a release from Local East. I called Local East and got the release. I then launched aircraft X and the supervisor advised me I was in the Converging Runway Operation (CRO) box. I just barely missed getting through the extended centerline for 13R before aircraft Y landed 13R.First of all get rid of CRO procedure. In my opinion it is totally unnecessary. My guard was down being that I was in between pushes. I felt rushed to launch aircraft X because I had obtained the release; even though I did not need to rush. I did not perform my usual scan of the airport and I just simply forgot about the 13R arrival. I need to ensure that I go through all my mental checks before I issue a takeoff clearance.

DFW Local Controller reported clearing an aircraft for takeoff with an arrival landing on the converging non intersecting runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 400

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1340; Flight Crew Type 15

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

We were conducting a VFR flight in order to reposition our aircraft to pick up the owners. Upon departing we experienced a Master Caution message indicating an anti-skid failure. This caution message occurred after rotation and remained illuminated for approximately 5 seconds before it extinguished. The remainder of the flight was continued to destination and a visual approach was initiated. The pilot flying; completed a base to final turn and was stabilized and on speed by 1;000 feet. Upon touchdown; he applied the brakes; however the aircraft braking did not engage and no deceleration was observed. I also put max brake pressure on and felt no deceleration. The brake pedals provided no feedback and felt as if they were stuck in position. Thrust reversers were deployed to maximum and I initiated the emergency memory items for a brake failure on landing. I turned off the anti-skid system and immediately applied maximum braking due to only having approximately 1;500 feet of runway remaining. The aircraft began to decelerate and the rear tires were skidding. A slight loss of direction control was noticed and the aircraft came to a stop with approximately 500-600 feet of runway remaining. Both rear tires burst and the aircraft was resting on the rims. I completed a shutdown checklist and exited the aircraft. Maintenance personnel removed the aircraft from the runway.

I was the copilot flying in a BE-400. I turned a two mile final from a visual approach to the runway; configured for landing on speed and on the visual glide path. We touched down and I applied the brakes. There was no apparent deceleration. The PIC noted the lack of deceleration; took the aircraft and applied the brakes with no response. He then checked the thrust reversers in max; turned off the anti-skid and re applied the brakes. The airplane stopped near centerline after a slight loss of directional control with about 600 feet remaining. Both main tires blew due to the lack of anti-skid. The aircraft was removed from the runway by Maintenance.

BE-400 flight crew experiences an anti-skid failure message after rotation on a ferry flight. The warning quickly disappears and the flight continues to destination where the brakes are found to be inoperative on touchdown. The anti-skid is switched off and the brakes are reapplied firmly causing both main tires to burst.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 975; Flight Crew Type 650

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

During pre-flight; distraction led to failure to remove pitot tube cover.  Upon takeoff roll; noticed airspeed indicator not showing airspeed.  Approximately 1/2 down the runway; aborted takeoff.  After hard braking; realized that runway would be overshot.  Aircraft stopped approximately 10 feet past end of Runway XX.  No runway lights were hit.  No damage occurred to either plane or runway lighting.  Informed Tower what transpired.  Taxied to terminal ramp.  Upon inspection; removed pitot tube cover; informed tower; and was given permission to taxi to active runway.  Completed the flight without other incident.

SR22 pilot reported failure to remove the pitot tube covers caused a rejected takeoff and a runway excursion due to loss of airspeed indication.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 3500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Weather; Airspace Structure

Flying west bound northwest of EMT talking with [SoCal] was told to turn 20 degrees to the right for eastbound airplane. A minute later heard them tell the eastbound plane to descend 500 feet immediately. About 10 seconds later I saw him on my north side of my airplane just under my wing. Haze flying west bound was a factor. I do have ADS-B and saw the initial conflict but was looking out for the plane after I turned 20 degrees to the right. The controller did not have the other plane turn to his right and I would have been out of the conflict if I continued not turning and going straight. I believe the controller was not on top of the situation and also for me not changing altitude.

C206 pilot reported a NMAC while receiving radar services.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was the OJTI providing training to a Developmental on all RADAR positions combined.  We were working approximately 8-10 aircraft at the time of the event.  The Developmental was getting behind and I was trying to help the Developmental work through the issues and catch up without having to take the position.  Aircraft X was being vectored for a Visual Approach and descending for the airport.  Aircraft Y had just called up for VFR flight following and been identified at 6;500 feet.  Aircraft X was cleared down to 5;000 feet and had received several vectors around overflight traffic.  The final vector that aircraft X was given prior to the event; was a heading of 220 from the northeast to be set up on a right base for Runway XX.  I told the Developmental to instruct aircraft X to turn right heading 240; descend to 4;000 feet; and issue traffic on aircraft Y because the 2 aircraft were in conflict with each other.  Aircraft X was issued traffic on aircraft Y; reported aircraft Y in sight; told to maintain visual separation; but did not respond that they would comply; then alerted that they were responding to an RA.  I did not take over the position until aircraft X said they had the traffic in sight.  I believe that this event happened because I allowed the Developmental to go too far without taking the position.  I allowed myself to be distracted by helping the Developmental with lower priorities.  At the time that I realized aircraft X and aircraft Y were in an unsafe situation; my resolution was too little too late.  I had told the Developmental what to do instead of just taking over the position and doing what I believed needed to be done.  I have trained the Developmental for the past year and was comfortable with knowing what their abilities were and were not.  I became complacent as the session dragged on.  I would recommend that at no time should this position be in the TRACON alone and without assistance.  If training is being conducted; there should be an assist or flight data controller signed on position and working in the TRACON. Also; when training; sessions should be kept to; 1 hour or as close to 1 hour; as possible to prevent OJTI fatigue.  Being the OJTI for 1hour and 30 minuets is much more difficult and challenging than just working the position by yourself.

This event took place during my training session.  I had aircraft X from the northeast heading southwest bound descending from 11;000 feet to 5;000 feet.  I had a few overflights in the airspace; one that was a VFR aircraft Y flying from the southeast heading northwest bound at a heading of 065.  The instructions given to aircraft X to descend to 5;000 feet was in order to get the plane below the overflight; and then turn inbound to our airport.  After watching the rate of descent; I mentioned that I would issue a 'paper stop' and instruct aircraft X to maintain 7;000 feet until passed the traffic; my instructor then had me issue a turn and further the descent away from aircraft Y; I issued the turn and descent and issued traffic so the aircraft X pilot will be able to look for the VFR aircraft Y.  Seconds later; aircraft X said he was responding to an RA.  My instructor took over the frequency to have the aircraft X pilot advise when he was able to accept further instructions.  The pilot informed us he was able to; so I continued to turn him inbound and descend to ZZZ for the Visual Approach.  During my training session; we had a Supervisor at the facility and marked on as the CIC-2; however he was not in the TRACON during the event; this has been quite popular; supervisors will be 'CIC-2' yet not be in the TRACON.  About 5-10 minutes after the RA; I gave the position to the Supervisor.  After I monitored the position for the required time; I attempted to discuss the training session with my OJTI; yet was instructed to go up to the tower and get on Local Control.  After a training session of one hour and thirty minutes; I was working Local Control for 47 minutes; with no OJT briefing and no discussion about the RA that had just occurred.  I feel that it was simply communication between my instructor and I during the quick discussion about aircraft X getting a 'paper stop' or not.  However; the fact that the Supervisor was marked as our CIC-2; and not in the TRACON to observe the situation; could have been avoided by enforcing the title of CIC-2; and have them remain in the operation.

TRACON Controller providing OJT described a conflict event when failing to take over the position in a timely manner.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 251; Flight Crew Total 2310; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were being vectored for the ILS 8 to BUR. About 20 miles northwest of the field. We were assigned and were descending to 5;000. About 5;300 feet; our GPWS announced 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull UP.' I kicked off the autopilot and climbed aggressively in response. By the time the alert was silenced; we were at about 6;500 feet.We notified ATC; who didn't seem too perturbed; and responded by saying 'minimum vectoring altitude in your area is XX feet' (don't remember the number but it was well below us.) We realized with certainty what I had initially suspected - we were never near terrain and were at a safe altitude at all times. In trying to figure out the issue; and determine why our gear horn was also sounding at the same time; I realized that my radar altimeter showed 0 feet. It had obviously malfunctioned and given the false GPWS warning. We were able to continue our approach and land without incident.We deviated from our ATC clearance; and as it turned out it was unnecessary to do so; but when you're in IMC and know that you're in high terrain; when that GPWS tells you to pull up; you don't hesitate; you hit the gas and get out of there. We did what we had to do; what we are trained to do. It was just good that it was only a malfunction and not a real safety hazard; and good that no conflict was created with other aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew experienced a seemingly false GPWS warning due to mechanical malfunction.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

This situation was not a compliance or violation event; but a general information event. During our ground time; both the First Officer (FO) and I were charging our iPads. I remember seeing the charging cord against the circuit breaker (CB) panel behind the FO's seat because of the way I had my iPad seated. I believe that at some point by moving the cord; it inadvertently pulled one of the landing gear CBs. Unfortunately; I did not catch this before I took my seat for pushback. I was the Pilot Flying and right after takeoff; I called for the landing gear up. The FO raised the gear handle but only went to the mid-position. Things got a little busy then. I continued to fly the plane and the FO requested a level off. I was thinking back to the cord next to the CB during our ground time. In the past; I have had a couple of times where the seatbelt shoulder harness had pulled the landing CB and figured out that was what had probably happened to us with the charging cord. We started to run the checklist for Landing Gear Will Not Retract. I looked back and saw that the CB was out. I then pushed the breaker in and directed the FO to retract the gear which did come up at that time. We then continued the climb and proceeded with the flight. Upon arriving; we did notify Maintenance and filled the logbook out with an Info Only write-up since we did reset a CB. We explained to them what had happened and that I was fairly certain that at some point the charging cord must have snagged the CB and pulled it out. In the future I will continue to do a thorough check of the CB panel before I take my seat; especially with the charging cord hanging across the FO panel.

While on the ground; Captain plugged his EFB into recharge cable. At one point; I moved the cable to run behind my seat. Captain unplugged his EFB and I took the cable and rerouted and plugged it into my EFB for a few minutes. Before pushback; I unplugged the charging cable and stowed it. Pushback; engine start; and taxi to the takeoff runway were uneventful.Captain was Pilot Flying. After liftoff; Captain called for landing gear up. Upon moving the handle; it would not go past mid-point and both red and green lights were illuminated for all gear. We agreed to continue initial climb and clean up then work on gear issue once level. Thinking that we would need a little time to consult QRH and troubleshoot; I requested a turn downwind and level off from Tower. They gave us a heading and altitude and then switched us to Departure frequency. At the same time; I was looking for the correct checklist in the QRH. The Captain leveled the aircraft (at assigned altitude of 3000 feet) and engaged the autopilot about the same time I located the 'Landing Gear Lever Will Not Move Up After Takeoff' Checklist in the QRH. Just as I started to read this checklist; the Captain stated that one of the landing gear circuit breakers with a blue collar was out. He also said that he felt it probably got pulled by the EFB charge cord and that he would reset it. Upon reset; he asked me to raise the gear handle and it raised to up position and the gear fully retracted. At that point we agreed that the issue was corrected and we should continue to our filed destination. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Upon arrival; the Captain called for Maintenance; informed them of what had happened; and documented the circuit breaker reset in the aircraft logbook.Make sure Crews are aware of the hazard of the EFB charging cable pulling a CB and are always checking circuit breakers during/after charging cable use. I read through the 'Landing Gear Lever Will Not Move Up After Takeoff' Checklist. There is no direction to check the status of landing gear system circuit breakers. Why? Perhaps this checklist content should be reviewed and updated.

A B737 Captain charged his iPad during a turnaround preflight and accidently pulled the landing gear control circuit breaker while removing the charging cable. After takeoff when the landing gear did not retract and while completing the QRH; the pulled circuit breaker was reset.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 1996; Flight Crew Type 1208

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

We were flying back to home base.  I was going to drop my [passenger] off & go on for an overnight w/some friends.  I was flying an SR22T. Had a pop up IFR FPL and noticed; after calling out the dash info; my airspeed was off a bit.  Had made a slight turn; so my initial thought was it was wind change.  But then it seemed too low for that (was around 140-150 versus 150 to 160); so I nosed up the throttle.  Looked at the MP and it was like 26 or so.  Pushed the throttle to get back to about 29-30 (where I normally run); but w/full throttle it would not hold 25.  Airspeed deteriorating about 1k/2 min.  Gauges all green.  TIT CHT & EGT just fine.  Enriched the mix.  No joy.  Started running a bit; not a lot but a bit; rough.  Changed tanks (L to R).  That was better.  But speed still dropping; just more slowly & nothing getting better for the MP.   Told ATC I had an engine problem & needed to divert.  ZZZ was closest acceptable and behind us.  They gave me vectors; then came back & said the airport was at 800 ceilings.  Got flustered inserting ZZZ in the FPL but I was on HDG; so I did it over & realized my mistake.  Chose the GPS approach. Got it loaded. Never had time to pull the chart up on the iPad or the MFD to brief it. We were in pretty solid soup when we turned to ZZZ; and I was watching the gauges & listening to the engine.  And flying the plane. No time to punch buttons or look down.I asked my [passenger] to dial in the CTAF for ZZZ.  [Passenger] is not a pilot & does not like to do entry except the FPL on the ground. I pointed at the NAV instead of the COM so [passenger] was having a tough time.  I realized that mistake; put it in the COM and announced my presence & the problem.  ATC said I was still w/them.  Had failed to flip the radio.  Clearly I was frazzled. But I was flying the plane.  Got set up for the GPS approach; ATC gave me vectors to the FAF to keep my distance shorter.  They let me go to CTAF after asking us to write down a # & call from the ground to say we were ok.  Got settled in on the approach; broke out about 1000-1500 feet AGL and [landed].  Never even had a chance to pull up the chart & brief it.  Just too busy.  Just hand flew it on the PFD.  The last 1-2000 feet or so the engine got real rough & was backfiring noisily.  Quite disconcerting!  Tried to hold my altitude above 1500 until I saw the runway; less than 2 miles out; I guess (maybe 800 maybe 900; maybe 1000); as I knew I would not get a 2nd chance.  As I worked thru the incident; I considered CAPS (the parachute) a couple of times; but decided not yet each time. On short final; I decided that if I did not see the runway at 1.5 m out; I would pull the chute.  But we broke out & there it was. The local guys told me to taxi down to a hangar well past the FBO; where there was a mechanic. But by the time we shut down; the guy had driven over & said they had no idea where the mechanic was.  Then another guy drove up from FBO & said ATC had just called saying there was company traffic (I am a fractional owner) nearby that could come by to help!  I said; yes; please ask him to come if it was a solo person. Waiting on him to come; I was on the phone w/the company mechanic. I cranked the plane & did some stuff (checked the mags; full throttle; changed mix; etc.) for our mechanic; but he could not diagnose the problem just listening. Post mortem; I can't remember if [I] declared an emergency or not!  Maybe not; since neither my [passenger] nor I remember them asking souls on board or fuel on board!  When I first recognized there was a problem; I grabbed the POH; intending to see if I could find something.  Never even opened it.  Had NO warnings on the dash or gauge alerts.  My preflight was thorough with no fuel stuff.  Had flown down w/92g; so I could make it back w/o a fuel stop.  Took off w/62g. Sumped fuel was clean as a whistle.  Everything was fine until I noticed the speed erosion.  I was doing my normal callouts each time anything changed; and the engine stuff was all green.  I was surprised how slow I was pulling up nearest; getting to a good airport (3rd one down; others had short runways or such).  My [passenger] pulled up the frequencies for ZZZ on the old 496 he uses for identifying towns.  I went to iPad airport page to check the runways.  I felt slow choosing which approach I wanted; after ATC gave me the winds.We found that on the pilot's side of the engine that the middle section of the exhaust pipe (manifold section) that connects to the cylinder had burned through and created a 1' hole. That caused lack of exhaust pressure to the left turbo charger and manifold pressure dropped as a result. Lack of power and speed and backfire was due to this. Location of the hole was just above the intake air cleaner for the left turbo charger.  The heat then burned thru the intake housing & damaged the air cleaner. Guy reporting all this to me remarked that I was quite lucky there was no fire.   What caused the problem?  Hot air blowing on the same spot evidently weakened it.I could have asked ATC for the DA.  I could have set IAS on the autopilot at 90 to extend glide.  But I wanted to control the descent so that I had plenty of altitude in reserve to pull the chute if necessary.  I am not certain that I could have identified the potential problem unless I had pulled the cowl off before flight & inspected the pipes and saw a bulge.  But I am not a mechanic and would not be comfortable doing that.  All in all; I think I handled the situation well; with the help of my [passenger] and ATC.  I did not panic; but did get frazzled.  I flew the plane the entire time.  I did not feel out of control; but I did not feel I fully knew what the problem was.  I think if I had tried to fly on to where I knew there was a Cirrus Service Center; I likely would  not have made it & would have had to pull the chute.  And I may have lost the engine and had a fire.  Glad none of that happened.  The Fraction's training requirements (flight review every 6 months instead of every other year) I am sure contributed to my satisfactory outcome.

The reporter states that about ten minutes elapsed between the time the engine anomaly was detected and the time of landing; although it seemed longer. This aircraft is equipped with data cards; which the mechanic stated; showed no excessive temperatures that might have caused the failure. When the mechanic changed the number 4 exhaust tube he also replaced the tube for the number 3 cylinder due to past experience with this engine [center cylinders on opposing sides]. The air filter box was also replaced due to damage. The aircraft and engine were less than three years old with under 1500 hours total time.

SR22 pilot experienced a gradual loss of airspeed and MAP at 7000 feet and elected to divert. A suitable airport was chosen and a successful GPS approach was flown with the engine rough and backfiring noisily. Post flight revealed a hole burned in the number 4 exhaust manifold; reducing exhaust pressure to the turbo and impinging on the intake air box.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 19500; Flight Crew Type 700

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While in line (#18) for takeoff with the Before Takeoff Checklist completed down to final items; we started to hear reports of wind shear on the tower frequency. There may have also been a wind shear advisory on the ATIS. The Captain decided to change the takeoff thrust setting and use TOGA. I asked if he would also like to use Flaps 2. He said yes and I requested Flaps 2 takeoff data from the ACARS. While I was doing this the Captain began reprogramming the Perf page by entering 2 in the Flap setting. When we received the Takeoff data; we had a long discussion about what speeds he wanted for takeoff. He decided to use the Max thrust V-speeds for V1 and Vr and a speed of 142 for rotate. This speed was well below the 154 Vr maximum listed on the data; but he chose it because it matched the 10 knot tailwind Vr for a reduced takeoff (I guess this is his technique). I programmed the speeds into the Perf page and shortly thereafter we departed 4L; rotating at 142 knots. At 800 feet AFE; upon power reduction; the Captain noticed and stated that the flaps were still at position 1 and that we had never set Flaps 2. We discussed what had occurred and compared the speeds we had used with the Flaps 1 data. It appeared that we rotated 4 knots below the rotate speed for Flaps 1 reduced; but I didn't think to compare it to the Vr speed on the TOGA thrust line for the Flaps 1 data.The error was that we did not comply with the flight manual and repeat the Before Takeoff Checklist after repositioning a flight control. Other contributing factors were my flow for setting the new Flap position on the Perf page followed by moving the flap lever to the proper position was interrupted by the Captain selecting position 2 on the Perf page; the extensive discussion on V-speeds; and the first time flying together with this out of domicile Captain.

This was first flight as a crewWondering why the backup [for takeoff]; we were told there were reported 15 knot wind shears on approach and takeoff. I stated we should swap to TOGA power and the First Officer (FO) asked should we consider flaps 2. I agreed. While he got the performance data I set 2 in the performance page of the FMC. We briefed the flaps two data and also that we would delay rotation slightly using V1 VR and 'rotate' at a higher speed using the flaps 2 data. After the briefing we should have run the takeoff checklist again; but we both forgot. This led us to not resetting the flap lever to 2 even though all plans now were for flaps 2 and TOGA.

An A320 flight crew; number 18 for takeoff due to reported windshear; reports on takeoff and landing; wisely opted to change their takeoff configuration to flaps position two and TOGA power as a precaution. They programmed new performance numbers based on the new configuration but failed to repeat the before takeoff checklist after doing so. During climbout they realized they had not reset the flaps and they had remained in their original flaps one position.


Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

There was a planned [computer] outage by IT for upgrades. Shortly after XA:00 time we received word from the Chief Dispatchers that the outage was canceled. For the next 3 hours work was normal. Around XD:15 I received notification from a Dispatcher working in the Atlantic region that the Captain on [a flight] had been trying to contact me at sector xx to add to his gate fuel. The Captain stated he had been calling for 30 minutes. This is when I learned that my IP TRADE turret was not properly working; however all lights on the turret were green. I then turned up the volume for the back up phone. I noticed that the back up phone is programmed for sectors 14; 25; and 31. Sector 14 on the midnight shift has not been responsible for sector 31 for well over a year. I am not sure when but within the past couple of weeks midnight shift workload has shifted and sector 14 is no longer responsible for sector 25. The new secondary sector for 14 is now sector xx . The back up phone has not been programmed to monitor sector xx. With all of the workload changes going on at this time; IT needs to be copied in on the emails so they can change the programming of the back up phones to coincide with the workload changes happening on midnight shift. I was without a way to monitor sector 38s phones for about 2 hours during my shift. I advised the Chief Dispatchers of this issue and they said IT was working on fixing the phone system. The IP TRADE phone is working now; however calls are not being recorded. In addition to the phone issues this evening; Dispatch View has also had a lot of latency issues and IT still has no solution to recover it. I also had to do an amendment 3 times in Dispatch View before it would let me add a takeoff alternate. Very limited messages were sent out by the Chiefs communicating info to Dispatchers. After the 2 hour outage I was told by a Chief to reboot the IP trade system because now only the odd sectors were affected. After rebooting this in fact was the case. No message was sent out to the floor to remind people to use the phone call log on sharepoint due to the phones not being recorded.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported an unexpected communication issue with company personnel due to equipment problems.


Installation; Inspection; Testing; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 3950

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Aircraft Owner/ Operator reported damage to the propeller. The aircraft was received in for maintenance. The decision was made to replace the propeller. Airworthiness Directive (A.D.) 2004-10-14 was inadvertently missed. The error was discovered over the weekend (following the date of propeller installation). The aircraft owner was advised and the aircraft has been grounded. I am familiar with A.D. 2004-10-14. I see it almost daily. Unfortunately; at the time; the [Repair] Shop was under a heavy workload and I wasn't thinking of everything encompassed within the A.D. I ran the aircraft up. I signed-off the propeller installation. I have reread A.D. 2004-10-14.

March 2014; following a flight in my Agency's aircraft; I discovered a large gouge on the leading edge of one of the propeller blades. The damage likely occurred earlier that day when debris was thrown while another aircraft was maneuvering in the run-up area. I reported the damage to my Agency's Director of Maintenance (DOM). The next day; our local Mechanic inspected the propeller and immediately determined that it could not be repaired; based on the depth of the gouge. During several conversations; both our local Mechanic and Agency personnel referred to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-10-14 regarding propeller damage and repair. Later that day; the DOM advised me that the propeller would be replaced. Three days later; the propeller was installed and the aircraft was returned to service. A new propeller maintenance record was entered into the aircraft Logbook with an entry for replacement of an overhauled propeller assembly. That afternoon; I conducted a post maintenance flight and notified the other pilot-in-command that the aircraft was returned to service.Two days later; following a morning flight; my Copilot (Pilot Not Flying) found a note taped to the Hangar door. The note was posted that morning and requested that we contact the Mechanic before flying our airplane. When I spoke to the Mechanic; he stated that it did not occur to him until yesterday that the 'AD included pulling the engine due to the significant propeller damage.' When I contacted the DOM; he initially questioned interpretation of the AD; but later agreed with the Mechanic that the extent of damage to the propeller would require an engine breakdown for inspection.As Pilot-in-Command (PIC); I am responsible for determining if an aircraft is in an airworthy condition prior to flight. On two different days; I inadvertently flew our aircraft when it was out of compliance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-10-14 and not considered airworthy. This could have been prevented if I had familiarized myself with the AD when the propeller damage occurred. Even with a basic understanding; I would have been able to ask pertinent questions. As the Aviation Coordinator; I advised another pilot that the aircraft had been returned to service. This ultimately led him to deviate from regulations and put flight crew members at risk. To help prevent this from happening again; in addition to working with qualified Maintenance professionals; I'll make it a priority to develop my own understanding of the regulations and requirements before making a determination that an aircraft is airworthy.

A pilot and an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) report a Cessna 182T aircraft was inadvertently returned to service prior to accomplishment of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-10-14. The AD required an engine teardown and inspection due to significant damage to the propeller that was replaced.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

On takeoff; shortly before reaching V1; I felt a little shimmy; or wobble or maybe a vibration. Hard to describe exactly. Continued takeoff and all was normal. The shimmy; or whatever it was; went away after takeoff. I opened up a discussion with my FO (and a jumpseater) about what the heck that was; and whether I should write it up. They felt it too; but didn't have any idea what it was. I thought maybe it was just attributable to the relatively high tire speeds taking off in ZZZ; especially with flaps 1. Maybe a tire or two were a bit out of balance? I decided if we felt anything odd on the landing; I'd write it up. Sure enough; we did. As we were taxiing in; an airplane behind us reported tire debris where we exited the runway. Later someone on the frequency reported that our right inboard tire was 'shredded.' In my mind; I pictured the tire as having some of the tread coming off; but otherwise intact. The airplane taxied normally. As we approached the gate; the marshaller stopped us well short; and was pointing at the tire. We shut down; and they towed us in the rest of the way. My FO and I went down after we were parked; to have a look. We were shocked to see the tire severely damaged; and practicality off the wheel! There were also numerous black marks on the fuselage that were caused by pieces of tire hitting it. I heard - second hand - that some passengers said they heard it on takeoff. No one said a word to us until after landing! If I'd have known the tire had failed on takeoff; I'd have done a few things differently.1. I might have considered leaving the gear extended 2. I would have asked the tower to conduct a runway inspection 3. If the tower had reported finding parts of a tire on the runway; I'd have considered returning to ZZZ.If I'd have had any idea about how badly the tire was damaged; I would have had equipment standing by for our landing; and I would have been asked to be towed to the gate. I'm still amazed that the flight attendants didn't report anything out of the ordinary. In my experience; they're usually not shy about doing that! I guess I need to make that a part of my briefing - that they are our eyes and ears in the cabin and to please report anything unusual.

B737 flight crew reported a vibration during the takeoff roll that was later determined to be from a failure of a main landing gear inner tire.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 300

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was performing a test flight of the aircraft for purposes of testing the pressurization system. I had filed an IFR flight plan for the initial purpose of going up to 25;000 feet. Upon reaching 12;000 feet I had determined the system was functioning well and I cancelled IFR to return. I was handed over to the Tower who gave me a 180 heading and told me to report a 4 mile base to final. I reported the 4 mile final and on final approach at approximately the 2 mile point I noticed that the right engine oil pressure was at '0'. I proceeded to shut the right engine down at which point there was a loud noise from the right engine. The right engine was secured and I landed single engine without further issues. After considering the situation; safe and on the ground I think that if there was more time I could have declared an emergency. However there was good altitude and speed for the single engine landing.

C340 pilot experiences an engine failure on short final indicated by zero oil pressure. The engine is shut down and a single engine landing ensues.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were on approach to CRW and assigned 3000 feet by ATC. Conditions were clear and we called the airport in sight. ATC cleared us for the visual while on a left base. We were vectored between the IF (Intermediate Fix) and FAF (Final Approach Fix) and the Captain set the altitude for the FAF at 2400 feet and initiated an easy descent. As we were about to level; there was a terrain warning that sounded one time and cleared. The CA (Captain) immediately disconnected the AP (Autopilot) and stopped descent. We confirmed there were no terrain issue and completed the approach and landing without further issues.CA disconnected AP and assumed manual control to arrest the descent and assure clearance of any obstacles.It would be helpful to have a topographic reference for these special qualification airports.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported receiving a terrain warning on a visual approach to CRW airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

The Chief Pilot notified me that we departed without an ETOPS Pre-Departure Check and an open AML write-up for the same issue.The logbook had all the ETOPS Pre-Departure Work Cards For the mechanics in it that made it appear that the check was completed and that caused confusion.The logbook was on the airplane in the normal location; when there is an open write-up they could remove the logbook from the storage bin and return it when the write-up has a corrective action.

Aircraft X left our station at XA:45 local for a scheduled XB:00 departure with an open logbook entry for the ETOPS pre-departure check completed steps 1-8 and the final steps not accomplished. The aircraft was towed to the gate at 1X:49 local and was never assigned to anyone to accomplish the final ETOPS steps of the pre-departure check. We have been splitting workload between Terminal Y and Terminal X maintenance personnel. Terminal Y AMT's had been accomplishing all [State] ETOPS PDC's since most of the Terminal X AMT's were out on pandemic leave. Terminal Y AMT's have primarily covered gates [4 named gates] and the [State] ETOPS. Terminal Y personnel did not have a crew chief yesterday and assumed Terminal X AMT's were accomplishing trip ABC ETOPS; since it was leaving from gate YYY as the Supervisor; I was consumed with a problem on [two other aircraft] scheduled for a flight to ZZZZ and did not follow up on trip ABC ETOPS prior to shift change and trip ABC was departing on the evening shift. I did not give a detailed enough turn over to the oncoming crew about its status. Going forward Terminal X AMT's will be accomplishing all of the ETOPS PDC's leaving from Terminal X. We will be assigning AMT's to meet and greet every arriving aircraft upon arrival at the gate regardless of inbound flight or a taxi/tow up from remote or hangar; to debrief the flight crew and get eyes on the logbook. As the Supervisor on shift; I will be backstopping and double checking/verifying compliance with this policy. I will be briefing the crew daily to make sure these expectations are clear and understood. We will be giving a detailed written and verbal turn over to the oncoming crew chiefs and management team members about the status of work that is in progress and yet to be accomplished. We will be giving parking locations and taxi/tow up times for the ETOPS flights that are departing on the evening shift.

Flight crew reported they departed without an ETOPS Pre-Departure Check and an open AML write-up for the same issue. Maintenance personnel reported the aircraft was not assigned to anyone; therefore the work was not accomplished.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 8300; Flight Crew Type 150

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

En route in cruise; noted a slight wisp of oil on windshield. While contemplating the situation; noticed a slight increase in oil flow. Canceled IFR (was IFR) and opted direct to nearest airport approximately 40 miles. At 30 miles; oil flow became heavier. Started looking for a place to park it. Saw a nice straight road ahead and headed for it. By 20 miles; very heavy oil flow. A precautionary landing seemed in order. Set up an approach to the north. Due to the heavy oil flow; pilot flying could not see through the windshield. Right seat had better visibility. Oil flow was heavier on left side than right seat. As pilot in command; I relinquished control to right seat pilot (ATP; CFI with total time 25;000). Landed uneventfully. After landing; cause of leak was discovered as spiral crack in crankshaft over 1/2 round. Engine was a factory new IO-550 and had accumulated 138.7 hours.

A C-206's IO-550 crankshaft cracked in flight; spraying oil on the aircraft's left windshield. The pilot gave control to the experienced pilot in the right seat; who made a successful off airport landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the Ground Control position and observed this event on Local West. The CIC was also observing and attempted to communicate instructions to the Local Controller; however; these suggestions went unused or were unwanted. Aircraft X; SR22; IFR; issued heading 230 and 2;000 FT; per LOA with Approach Control. Thirty seconds later; Aircraft Y; MO20; called 6 miles south inbound. Mooney was instructed to enter right downwind to runway; and issued a beacon code and traffic departing on a 230 heading. Mooney was on a 1200 code and was 5 miles southwest of the field tracking a Northeasterly course directly towards the path of the departing Cirrus. Mooney was descending. Traffic was called to the Cirrus with 'no joy.' Moony finally entered the correct code and the position from the Cirrus was approximately 2 miles. Cirrus was instructed to maintain 1;000 FT. Mooney was instructed to maintain 1;100 FT. The two aircraft had past each other by the time the Mooney said he had the Cirrus in sight. The Cirrus was advised traffic no factor and switched to Departure. I reminded the Local Controller in a loud tone to climb the Cirrus to 2;000 FT. The Local Controller complied; the Cirrus had not switched yet and received the climb instruction; [and] the MVA is 1;700 FT. No positive separation was being applied when several alternatives were available. This was a very dangerous situation that was completely preventable. Any type of positive control would have been preferable. Move the VFR Mooney immediately. Using assigned altitudes below MVA that are only 100 FT apart is not approved separation. Certainly this was at a minimum; a 'Traffic Alert' situation to both aircraft.

Tower Controller described an unsafe event when the Local Controller used questionable altitude assignments to separate a VFR from an IFR aircraft.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On A590; after crossing PASRO; we noticed an airliner directly above us and started encountering turbulence; which we believed was wake turbulence. In order to avoid the turbulence; we deviated left upwind one mile left of course. In the distraction of discussing where to avoid the turbulence; we failed to ask for clearance to deviate left of course. Control asked us about the deviation via CPDLC; and informed us we needed to ask to deviate left. We took out the offset; and returned to the track (the overtaking airplane was far enough ahead at this point). There were no other airplanes either visually or on TCAS that we were aware of; and we believe no separation issues were caused as a result of our deviation.Channelized attention to our position relative to the overtaking aircraft led to a breakdown in contacting ATC.

B777 First Officer reported deviating left off track on their trans-Pacific route to avoid wake turbulence; but failed to ask ATC for approval.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 10000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On taxi to an intersection L departure for Runway 8L; an intersection I've never used; I became confused of the appropriate place to turn due to confusing airport signage. We were given taxi to 8L at Lima via Taxiway Zulu Alpha Lima. The signage at intersection N makes it appear that this is the correct turn to join Taxiway A. After we made the turn we stopped almost immediately because we realized our error and then allowed a small Cessna to taxi in front of us before Air Traffic Control gave us clearance to continue. Maybe a hot spot marking on the chart; or better signage on the airport grounds would help avoid this in the future.

Air carrier Captain reported he was confused by the signage on taxi out to Runway 8L at HNL airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 81.7; Flight Crew Total 1150.5; Flight Crew Type 85

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While flying the 'Channel transition' in the San Diego bay; I was unable to continue around Point Loma and fly north along the coast due to low lying clouds. After returning northbound; I requested the 'Delta transition' to over fly SAN northbound and continue into northern San Diego County. I heard 'Cleared into Class Bravo eastbound' from the North Island Tower and I flew north.When I was abeam SAN; I requested the Delta transition again and North Island tower told me 'Frequency change approved.' Seeing how I had been 'cleared in to Class Bravo' and North Island tower told me to change to SAN; I turned north and proceeded to 1500 and called San Diego tower. San Diego tower gave me a squawk code and I continued northbound. As I passed over the airfield at 1500; tower asked me if I was the aircraft transitioning over the field. I replied yes and the controller informed that she had not cleared me into Class Bravo. I responded saying that North Island had told me that I was cleared into the Class Bravo. She then informed me that North Island cannot clear aircraft for the Delta Transition and let me continue north to Mission Bay. The controller did not give me a number to call; however; I believe this is a point of confusion that should be clarified between the transition from North Island Tower and San Diego Tower. I have flown this transition before (although always North to South) but I believe that North Island Tower should not say anything about clearance into Class Bravo airspace to make certain there is no confusion. All pilots know that 'Cleared in to Class Bravo' are the magic words. So; if they can only get this phrase from one tower; it will help make sure you're getting clearance from the proper entity.

Pilot reports of being cleared through Class Bravo by one Controller; then is shipped to another Tower and checks in. The new Tower Controller questions the pilot and the pilot states the last Controller gave him clearance through the Class Bravo. The new Controller told the pilot that the other Tower cannot issue Class Bravo clearances. The pilot is confused as to why he received the first clearance if that Tower Controller cannot issue it.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

At cruise ECAM alert of HYD SYS LO PRESS. The BLUE HYD SYS QTY was lost. Communicated with [Operations] via ACARS the malfunction and that an emergency would be declared for precautionary measures. We requested [Operations] to inform ATC in order to coordinate the arrival ahead of time which they did indeed do. The approach and landing were uneventful and we taxied to the gate.

A300-600 Captain reported loss of Blue hydraulic system at cruise. Flight declared an emergency and continued to destination for a normal landing.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

I was the pilot flying; climbing on the SID. Passing approximately 3;000 feet MSL; both navigation displays showed a 'map fail'. I advised the Captain and we asked ATC for vectors and told them that our navigation system had failed. We were given vectors for the remainder of the climb through FL190. Both Directional Gyros (DG) were off of the standby compass in different directions. ATC gave us updated vectors as needed until the system corrected itself. After consulting with maintenance operations; we returned to the departure uneventfully.We checked both headings prior to takeoff and they were correct. The problem arose after takeoff and was a system failure. A timely coordination with ATC for vectors and to relay our needs was critical in complying with ATC's needs as well as our navigation.

MD-80 First Officer reported after takeoff both navigation displays displayed a 'MAP FAIL' alert along with compass errors so the flight returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 202; Flight Crew Type 8650

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

On descent into Akron; we were cleared direct BSV cleared for the approach maintain 3;100 FT and contact the Tower. Upon contacting the Tower; we were cleared to land. I queried the Tower about our clearance because we were not clear on how we were going to transition to the ILS from BSV. The Tower then asked what my clearance was from Approach to which I repeated 'cleared BSV VOR ILS 1 approach' to which he responded 'cleared for the approach.'If you look at the approach plate this is very confusing on how we were expected to reverse course inbound. There is a holding pattern over BSV but it is not a mandatory hold in bold print. We were quickly approaching BSV and both we were discussing how we were going to do this approach. We were not expecting a clearance to BSV. We were expecting vectors to final since we were in a radar environment. To eliminate the confusion; I requested direct CABLE (the FAF) twice to which Tower responded; 'cleared for the approach' both times. Was that a clearance to CABLE? At this time; we crossed BSV and the First Officer (pilot flying) turned north; intercepted the Localizer and landed. This was a very confusing event in a very short period of time that I tried to clarify and resolve; but was unable to do so because of absolutely no help from the Tower Controller. At the very least he should have cleared us to CABLE then to land. This would have eliminated all the confusion between us and the Tower on how we were safely going to accomplish this approach. The Tower Controller knew there was some confusion on our part as to our approach clearance yet he was no help whatsoever in clearing this up. I expect a Controller to clarify his clearance to me if I question it in the interest of safety. I was very disappointed in the way this Tower Controller responded to our needs.

Inbound from the west and about 30 miles from CAK; we were told by CAK Approach we needed to slow to minimum allowable airspeed because we were following a priority aircraft and to expect radar vectors to ILS Runway 1. A descent to 3;100 FT was also given along with clearance to BSV. BSV was not on our route; but the IAF is so I reloaded the approach in the FMC and selected BSV as the approach transition.About five to ten miles from BSV; the Approach Controller told us to cross BSV at 3;100 FT and cleared us for the ILS to Runway 1 and then handed us off to Tower. I looked at the approach chart and realized that we would be flying through the Localizer for Runway 1 to get to BSV. I then asked the Captain if he thought that since we were cleared to BSV if we needed to fly the course reversal. Three factors that entered my mind as to why we didn't need to fly the course reversal were; 1) we were in radar contact and were told to expect radar vectors for the approach; 2) the course reversal was not in bold print on the approach chart; and 3) the FMC route had us going from BSV; then had BULIT as a flyby fix and then had us intercepting final outside of CABLE (the FAF).We then decided to fly the course reversal so I put the outbound heading of the course reversal in the heading bug but; as we passed over BSV; the Captain said to just fly the turn. Since we had already decided to fly the course reversal; I thought he meant that we should fly the turn the FMC route had us doing. We continued to fly the FMC route and abeam BULIT we started a descent to 2;400 FT (the published altitude inside of BULIT) thinking we were on the protected side of the holding fix at BSV. After leveling at 2;400 FT we were told by Tower that we needed to maintain 3;000 FT until established on the Localizer. I started correcting but the correction wasn't quick enough and we got another alert from the Tower Controller. I then made a quicker correction and intercepted the glideslope at 3;000 FT and continued the approach.

An RNAV equipped air carrier flight crew was uncertain whether their clearance direct to BSV; cleared for the Runway 1 ILS to CAK required them to fly a course reversal at BSV. ATC was unresponsive to their request for clarification and they opted not to fly the reversal. They then descended from the 3;000 FT MEA from BSV to BULIT prior to being 'established' on the Localizer per the Tower Controller.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While on the GPS 25R approach ATC alerted us that we were below altitude for the leg of the approach we were on and to stop descending. The analog altimeter was reading 300-400 higher than what ATC radar was receiving from our mode C transponder. The altimeter was set correctly; and we confirmed this setting with the controller. We stopped descent and checked alternate air in the case of static port blockage; but it had no effective change in the indicated altimeter. I alerted the tower we were having 'altimeter trouble' and requested that he standby as we were troubleshooting the situation.The weather was improving and the field was in sight and I was reasonably sure I could return to [home airport] for final landing; so I requested low approach only with a return to Approach frequency ASAP. The filed flight plan said training/multiple approaches in the remarks section and I was hopeful for a seamless and constant communication with Approach for the return leg. Tower ATC asked if we were canceling our IFR flight plan and continuing VFR. I said 'no' and that we could maintain VFR through the low approach and climb out; but to transfer us back to Approach ASAP. ATC stated that he was in a 'quandary' as to whether we were canceling IFR and going VFR. I said no; so he then told us to go missed approach; which we did; and we were transferred to Approach soon after.Approach stated that our intention to return to [home airport] threw them off guard and that they were there to help. I stated how our flight plan said training flight and multiple approaches and apologized. He vectored us back without any more incident. While researching the potential problems with the altimeter; I learned that since there had been a significant rainstorm for the previous 2-3 days with heavy winds and downpours that there was a chance water had somehow entered into the static port.I am reporting this incident because after recollecting the series of transmissions and events during the critical phase of approach flight and the controller's curt and pressing demands for answers while we were in the midst of troubleshooting; that this event could have led to this situation becoming more serious. If I wasn't being pressed for hard decisions during this time and instead supported through the tower by more informational data regarding our current received transponder altitude and comparing it to what our analog altimeter was reading; I feel I could have made my transmission in a more concise and effective format. For instance; when he asked if we were canceling IFR and returning VFR and I said I could maintain VFR through the low approach; I should have said VMC instead of VFR; but my focus at that point was maintaining safe flight with this student and keeping the aircraft and cockpit managed. During the return leg to [home airport]; I kept an eye on both the transponder's indicated altitude as well as the analog altimeter. Minor discrepancies continued; but with the weather becoming VMC; it wasn't as critical to resuming a safe flight. The aircraft was squawked upon return.

A C172 pilot reported altimeter accuracy issues during a practice instrument approach. Pilot elected to break off approach in VMC conditions and return to base airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Weather; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure; Staffing

I was the Radar Controller working Aircraft X. They were direct on flight plan and about to enter a sector's airspace at 28;000 feet. Before I called on a handoff I noticed Conflict Alert was going off between the Aircraft X and another aircraft in the next sector's airspace at 28;000 feet. I called them and said 'I am going to take my Aircraft X down to FL260 to miss the traffic; handoff.' The Controller stated they were too busy to accept a handoff on the aircraft even though they were in conflict with one of their airplanes. They stated they would 'watch him though'. I didn't have time to argue for separation purposes so I hung up the line. Aircraft X needed to deviate for weather; so I cleared him to deviate and descended them to 26;000 feet expeditiously for the traffic. My D-side had to call back later and verify they were too busy to work the aircraft.What added to this situation was the complexity of the airspace. Center Traffic Management Unit had routed 'off-loads' into my sector to 'get in before the weather.' The problem was that the meter numbers were 4-7 on each aircraft coming in; so speed and vectors needed to be applied to each aircraft to comply with the A80 LOA (Letter of Agreement). No guidance or relief was given to us by calling ZJX to slow ATL arrivals down. We had to shut them off ourselves. By the time the off loads were at our sector; Approach cut our arrivals off and I was forced to put several aircraft; already on vectors; into holding; while other traffic situations were present. In the middle of this situation we were getting aircraft that were routed through the middle of our arrivals holding. I have worked at this Center for over 10 years now and that was as unsafe a situation that should have been helped by TMU (Traffic Management Unit) as I can remember. For a facet of ATC that has the 'big picture' to drop the ball and reroute that many aircraft into an already saturated sector when they should have had the foresight to know that the weather would be over the field before they landed is unacceptable.Also the Supervisor for our Area needs to be held accountable for not splitting the sector due to volume. I was also told by my Supervisor on that shift that the two offloads coming from adjacent areas should have been held in their airspace but that was either not communicated to the controllers by management or the request was simply not followed.

ZJX Center Controllers reported sector workload was excessive due to lack of effective traffic flow management during a period of weather deviations.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 360; Flight Crew Type 265

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

I had parked the plane and positioned my PowerTow to place the plane in the hangar. I noticed that my flaps were down and returned to the cockpit to raise the flaps. Forgetting that the PowerTow was in front of my plane; and not seeing it; I started the engine. The propeller tore into the PowerTow; damaging the propeller. I immediately shut the engine down.

C177 pilot reported damaging the propeller while attempting to start the engine with the tow bar connected.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 4749; Flight Crew Type 728

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Numerous passengers wore the mask incorrectly. Both flight attendants and Captain made multiple PAs detailing the importance of proper mask wearing. Gate Agent also made additional PAs prior to pushback. Throughout the flight; passengers would not comply with mandate. Notified Dispatch.

Air carrier First Officer reported that despite multiple PAs; passengers would not comply with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 8217; Flight Crew Type 7794

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167; Flight Crew Total 2181; Flight Crew Type 2181

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

I landed Runway 17C and was given taxi instructions to taxi via M; EL to hold short Runway 17R. With setting sun I confused Runway 17R and the taxiway. As we rolled up to the hold short line the First Officer yelled 'hold short.' At that point; I realized I confused the runway and taxiway in front of me. I rolled beyond the hold short line; coming to a stop. Tower canceled takeoff clearance for a departing aircraft and cleared us to cross Runway 17R.

A320 Captain reported confusion and a loss of situational awareness that resulted in a runway incursion.


Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Day 1; leg 1. APU on MEL. We (the whole crew) arrive at the aircraft and it is already very warm; despite the early hour (and relatively low temps for an early summer day).  There was no air hooked up to the plane for aircraft.  As we; the flight crew; situate in the cockpit; both of us reach to open the DV windows for ventilation.  My (right side/First Officer window) was nearly impossible to operate/open-after repeated attempts.  I got out of my seat and asked my Captain to try to get it open. He had some difficulty but was finally able to get it open.  Neither of us were comfortable with the difficulty operating an emergency egress window. He called Maintenance and wrote it up.  Maintenance showed up with a bottle of LPS (1 or 2; not sure which) and proceeded to spray what seemed like a half of a bottle; at least (based on visuals & residual odor in the flight deck).  The door continued to be difficult to open. Maintenance invited me; the First Officer; to try it again. No real change in my estimation. It still took 2 hands; 1 foot on the panel and all my strength to move it one iota. That is not how it is designed; I am pretty sure.  However; Maintenance 'Ops checked [it] good' in the logbook. At this point; in utter frustration; I invited one of the mechanics working with us to walk with me to the aircraft at the neighboring gate to watch me operate a properly functioning egress window.  I sat down on the right seat of the aircraft; and with my right arm; alone; (without effort) opened and closed the window 3 times. He agreed there was a difference; but since they had already 'Ops checked good' he was wanting to wash his hands (proverbially) of this. Now; it was an issue of Maintenance clearing the discrepancy.  Then; Maintenance sent a female Mechanic (VERY relevant because I am a female First Officer) to 'try and operate the door.' As though I simply might not be able to do it on my own; being a woman. Well; I take objection to that very subtle sexism because I have been a licensed Commercial Pilot since the 1990's and this is my second airline and I have 2 type ratings.  I was MORE than insulted by that.  She; as I; was able to open it with both hands and all her weight; but when I challenged her to do it with one hand; she could not. And; unfortunately; I think she was frustrated and/or feeling pressured to acquiesce to her mission (albeit; I have no idea if that was from Maintenance; Scheduling; or Dispatch and/or all of them).The issue is Maintenance not wanting to deal with legitimate issues; particularly with an older fleet.  And occasionally; (not all stations) the discounting of crew concerns. We are all on our own. It seems more and more like that every day.

An EMB-145 First Officer's window was very difficult to open; so Maintenance lubricated it; signed it off; and then refused to do more even though the actions taken did not improve the windows functioning.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was conducting a banner drop operation. I approved the Banner drop operation. We had a crosswind of about 060 degrees at 6 knots. As Aircraft X dropped the banner and started to climb upwind; Aircraft Y requested a right crosswind departure off of Runway 28R. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. Aircraft X requested to land on Runway 10R because of the crosswind. I advised Aircraft X as he was downwind to make a 180 degree turn and make right traffic for Runway 10R. Aircraft X acknowledged and made a 180 degree turn and an unauthorized short approach at the approach end of Runway 10R. Aircraft Y was still on Runway 28R; so I instructed Aircraft Y to cancel take off clearance; hold position; Aircraft Y did not acknowledge and began rolling. Aircraft X was short final and almost touching down as Aircraft Y became airborne. Simultaneous opposite direction may have occurred as Aircraft Y departed and Aircraft X landed. I would recommend clarification on the rule of Simultaneous Opposite Direction Separation.

Local Controller reported that an aircraft departed at the same time as an aircraft was landing on a parallel runway in the opposite direction. Contributing was the landing aircraft making an unanticipated short approach and the departing aircraft not acknowledging their takeoff clearance being cancelled.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Fatigue; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors

Long night; complications with transportation to the airport; fuel spill; late departure from origin; late arrival at destination; continual late stairs to the airplane at destination; habitual late ACARS not closing because of main cabin door not being 'cracked' enough.  Upon block-in; stairs had been late getting to the airplane during the week (as late as 13 minutes); ACARS was not closing out unless doors were 'cracked' open more than normal; etc.  Shutdown was normal and checklists accomplished.  While waiting for stairs; Captain cracked the door to initiate ACARS closing process; but door was not disarmed.  Door starting initiating process of opening and inflating slide.  Slide never deployed completely nor door opened all the way.  Slide and door remained partially deployed and open.  No injuries; no damage except for need of slide replacement.  Log book entry made.  Normal checklist flow and normal procedures dictate that after block-in; the First Officer or crew insure that the slides are disarmed.  Because of aforementioned distractions with late stairs; etc.; the doors were not double checked via normal procedures.  Thus; any crewmember must insure that the door is disarmed completely before opening the door for any reason.

An A310 Captain opened the main cabin door before disarming the slide because he was impatient about ground crew delays and ACARS close-out message sending; and so partially inflated the slide.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Multiple events occurred and the entire situation should be reviewed. When coming into work I was asked to D-Side on Sector 42/49. There was weather causing aircraft to deviate on departure and arrival. R2307 was active with aircraft FL230 and below. Gladden was active FL330 and below blocking additional airspace that could have been used to accommodate deviating aircraft. I asked the Supervisor if we could get Gladden back since arrivals were deviating south around weather and departures were deviating even further north and getting close to Gladden. I was informed by controllers in the room that earlier the OMIC had insisted that Gladden be approved in spite of controller recommendations to the contrary. Additionally the Supervisor went to ask the OMIC about getting Gladden back and the OMIC chose not to do so. Minutes later a slow climbing aircraft insisted that they could only deviate further north for weather and would not accept a south deviation. I called LUF to see if we could take immediate action to cap Gladden to allow the aircraft to deviate or at least keep the using [airspace] below the aircraft. The Controller at LUF put me on with the LUF Supervisor who issued a control instruction to have the aircraft fly heading 030 which put the aircraft into the Gladden airspace. The aircraft violated Gladden on its weather deviation which was exacerbated by the control instruction from LUF. None of that would have happened if management had taken steps to insure safety beyond putting everything on the shoulder of the Controller. Because LUF was unable to release any portion of Gladden I called P50 and stopped all the BXK departures and had them moved south over GBN to prevent additional aircraft violating Gladden. Almost immediately after we moved the departures over GBN aircraft that had been deviating south of the weather but remaining north of R2307 began to deviate much further south preventing a timely descent. Several aircraft deviated so far south that they almost violated R2301E and were in conflict with the aircraft which were now departing PHX over GBN. I called L60 and told them to hold all aircraft until advised to allow the R-Side to manage the already overloaded situation. I was informed by management that there were no additional P50 departures however the sector continued to get handoffs from P50 over GBN. At one point there were several aircraft in the vicinity of GBN all assigned FL190 and I had to prompt the R-Side to take immediate action which prevented timely point outs to NYL and perhaps other sectors that I am unaware of. While I don't believe that any aircraft had less than 5 [miles] or 1 [thousand feet] the situation was unsafe because management failed to mitigate risk in this sector despite controller input to make changes and take timely action. This is not uncommon in our Center. We get weather and have complex military airspace active on a regular basis. There is much pressure from upper management to release the airspace and Front Line Management fails to stand up and declare it unsafe even if the controller objects. TMU seems to take no steps to mitigate our risk other than telling us that they are. In this scenario we should have never released Gladden. Additionally instead of having a stream of arrivals from L60 and L31 all PHX arrivals should have been routed on J2 and spaced maybe 15 [miles in trail] to make the situation manageable. The OMIC and military should have collaborated to recover some of R3207 and in a perfect world R2301E. Basically if someone beyond the controller cares enough to stand up and take action when we have significant weather; recover some airspace or reroute aircraft we can have a safer NAS.

ZAB Controller describes situation where weather is causing deviations to a very large amount of traffic. Controller asks management to recall a restricted airspace due to the deviations; but is met with resistance. Aircraft violates restricted area.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

A mother and four young children (three boys and one girl) were on board. None of them spoke English; making communication very difficult. The mother was seated next to one of the boys with the girl and a boy behind her and one boy in front of her. The girl appeared to be the youngest and was about 3 or 4 years old. When we secured the cabin before door closure they were all in their seat belts; but after we closed the MCD (Main Cabin Door) and started the safety pre-departure announcement and demo; the little girl got out of her seat and stood next to her mother. The mother made no effort to get her child back in her seat. We stopped the demo and I managed to get her back in her seat belt and tried to indicate to her brother that she needed to stay there. We finished the demo; secured the cabin and taxied out to the runway. We were in line to take off and were expecting our takeoff chime when the little girl got up again. This time the mother picked her up and put her on her lap. Even though she appeared to be over two years of age; I felt that getting up to rectify the situation at that phase of the flight was not safe as it would take some time to get her settled again and decided to leave the child held on her mother's lap for takeoff. As soon as it was safe for us to get up; I went back to the mother and decided to rearrange the children to try to avoid a repeat incident. I tried to indicate that the little boy sitting next to her should go to the row behind and that she should strap the little girl into the seat next to her. There was very little cooperation from any of them; including the mother; but I finally got the little boy strapped into the seat one row back and the little girl seated next to her mother and in her seat belt. She fell asleep and stayed there for the rest of the flight.There was a big language barrier and complete lack of understanding of airplane safety and regulations. They not only did not speak English; but hardly spoke at all (even to each other). The family boarded last and had been escorted out to the plane; presumably so that they would know where to go. I did not realize until after we closed the door that none of the family spoke English and there was no information on the paperwork. When the little girl got up the first time; during the demo; I alerted the flight deck that we might have a problem with an unsecured child over two years old. When I got her seated; the CA (Captain) said that if she was secured; we were going to go. I thought that I had succeeded in making someone in the family understand that she needed to be in her seat belt and that she wouldn't get up again; so we proceeded to taxi out and get in line for takeoff.

Air carrier Flight Attendants reported having difficulty getting a non-English speaking family to understand and comply with safety procedures and regulations.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

7 mile finale on glide slope between Hunda and Limma; a drone flew overhead.  Reported to tower; landed as normal.  Unannounced drone traffic. Drone procedures made more aware to public.

Pilot reported a NMAC with a drone on final into LAX Runway 25L.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Aircraft X was IFR arriving from the southwest level at 7;000 feet requesting an RNAV Approach. The Controller working the radar enabled the request to due to the approach course being within 3 nm of an active MOA. The Controller advised pilot the VOR-B approach was available and the pilot accepted requesting to execute the procedure turn at [fix] and that it would take him a couple minutes to setup the approach since they were expecting the VOR-B Approach. The Controller issued a vector to heading 340 and to expect direct [fix]. This vector took the aircraft 10 nm west of [fix] and the CPC then cleared Aircraft X for the approach and the pilot does not reply. A position relief briefing begins. The Pilot during the briefing requests joining approach at [fix] and the relieving Controller cancels the clearance and begins to vector for the [fix]. Then Aircraft Y questions the descent profile of the arrival. The oncoming Controller forgets about Aircraft X who is now north of the approach course and issued a 030 heading and then a right turn towards the active MOA. I suggested a left turn away from the MOA and the Controller corrected to the left turn. The pilot delayed the turn and entered the 8;000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude at 7;000 feet. The Controller issued a climb to 9;200 feet but was too late.In this scenario we have an instance where we had a newly certified Controller relieving a fairly inexperienced Controller and both got distracted by other aircraft and Aircraft X got away combined with a pilot on a training flight executing an approach they were not expecting or I believed planned for since they first wanted the RNAV approach. I believed up until the time the aircraft was past [fix] that the situation was under control but we must still be vigilant as I knew at that point the new Controller was going to need assistance to resolve the sequence of events. Had I been working Aircraft X I would have waited to turn him until he was 5 west of the VORTAC and cleared him direct. We also need to be checking for compliance with our instructions and taking care of higher priority tasks versus distraction leading us down the wrong path.

JCF TRACON Controller reported observing another Controller vector an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The First Officer was landing on Runway 22 at LGA. The approach was normal; touchdown was normal as was the rollout. Brake application was normal throughout the landing rollout. Exiting the runway the ANTISKID R FAIL alert illuminates on the EAD. Upon arrival at the gate we discovered the Number 4 tire had deflated. We wrote the airplane up which resulted in a cancellation. This event was possibly caused by the Number 4 brake locking up. This airplane had previously been written up for the same occurrence at LGA.

B717 Captain reports an ANTISKID R FAIL alert exiting the runway after landing. Upon gate arrival the number four tire is found to be deflated. The aircraft had previously experienced the same fault/failure sequence.