Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 228; Flight Crew Total 1510; Flight Crew Type 1510

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 132; Flight Crew Total 520; Flight Crew Type 520

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

During our arrival to ZZZ from ZZZ1 we had the wrong runway transition for ILS Runway XXL. I realized it when we started to turn south bound and Approach Control asked us if we had the wrong transition loaded. Immediately we asked for vectors and were given vectors for Runway XXL. While we were intercepting the localizer our FMA and MCP went blank and were unable to intercept the LOC for XXL. I instructed CA to hand fly the visual to XXL; since it was VMC. We rolled out on final slightly right of localizer course; which tower asked if we were established and we said correcting; since we were just little right of course. We then verified the runway and continue to land visually to Runway XXL. I made several attempts prior to glide slope intercept to reset MCP to no-avail. Raw data approach was uneventfully flown by Captain to normal landing. We continued to gate; and during my after landing flow recycled FDs and MCP RESET; we both noticed that the FMA returned to normal values after we landed; it was not blank anymore; with normal indications.

During our arrival to ZZZ from ZZZ1 we had the wrong runway transition for ILS Runway XXL. We realized it when we started to turn south bound and approach control asked us if we had the wrong transition loaded. Immediately we asked for vectors and were given vectors for Runway XXL. While we were intercepting the localizer our FMA went blank and were unable to intercept the LOC for XXL. Tower asked if we were established and we said correcting; since we were just little right of course. We then saw the runway and continue to land visually to Runway XXL. We continue to gate and notice that the FMA returned to normal values after we landed; it was not blank anymore.

Flight Crew reported that while intercepting the localizer; the MCP and FMA went blank. The approach was flown to a normal landing in visual conditions.


Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure; Airport; Airspace Structure

VMC Visual into Aspen; light winds and configured early. ATC approach cleared us for a Visual Approach but told us to line up straight with runway due to inbound traffic behind us. Pilot Flying had aircraft configured and stable but due to straight in we got a TAWS terrain alert. We were obviously going to miss the obstacle but were slow to disconnect autopilot and respond to alert. By the time corrections were made got another alert. Once clear the terrain we continued to airport and landed without incident.We should not have accepted straight in or maintained higher altitude. At the moment of incident a go around in mountainous terrain seemed more dangerous since we were clearly above terrain. After landing we debriefed and realized we should have went around and made a second approach.

A Corporate pilot conducting a Visual Approach reported receiving a Terrain Alert but continued the approach.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 235; Flight Crew Total 4395; Flight Crew Type 3629

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Our lightweight [Aircraft X] was stuck on Taxiway B5 short of 20R. When cleared for takeoff; thrust was applied to taxi into position and depart. The aircraft did not move. Several additional attempts were accomplished with sufficient power to move the aircraft. During the last attempt to taxi; the rippled pavement caused vibrations in the aircraft and lent us to believe we were dragging a tire. Airport operations were notified. Local Maintenance inspected the aircraft; and airport operations inspected the taxiway and marked all of the divots. Local officials notified us that other aircraft had experienced the same problem on that taxiway. Eventually we were pushed back out of the divot and taxied effortlessly back to the terminal to resume our flight to ZZZ.

Air carrier Captain reported taxiway pavement damage at BNA airport.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 500

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Procedure

The FAA needs to take action regarding the over-saturation of CTAF frequencies at non-towered airports. I fly in the X area out of ZZZ1 airport; and frequently use ZZZ as a training field; as well as other fields in the area. The CTAF frequencies are grossly over-saturated; and it is unsafe to operate at non-controlled fields; especially on weekends and good weather days. I'm sure the FAA will come up and say there are no frequencies available; but I don't believe this; and the FAA could reassign other frequencies that are assigned to other uses but less used; to the CTAF function. Three or four airports share the same CTAF frequencies; and while flying some patterns I am unable to make one location transmission due to the CTAF being used by multiple pilots at multiple airports at the same time. This will cause an accident; it's just waiting to happen.

GA pilot reported concerns with CTAF frequency saturation and the use of one frequency for multiple airports.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Shortly after takeoff we had a ECAM Anti-ice Captain Pitot static. After completing ECAM; the QRH follow up directed us to the ETOPS guidance which stated to avoid icing conditions. Based on forecast icing conditions; and with Dispatch guidance; we were unable to continue into ETOPS airspace; additionally we were unable to return to ZZZ because of icing as well. We diverted to ZZZ1 to avoid icing condition. En-route to ZZZ1 we had an additional ECAM Anti-ice CAPTAIN Probes. We held for approx 1 hour to burn down below max landing weight. Uneventful landing. Having the phone app and being able to talk to Dispatch clearly and conveniently was a great help in this event. If this would have happened a bit later in our flight we would have attempted to do this on a HF phone patch. Not having SATCOM on our aircraft on our aircraft on a 180 min ETOPS flight is unacceptable and verges on irresponsible.  Captain pitot static anti-ice failure.

A321 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after receiving an ECAM alert on the Captain's pitot/static anti-ice system.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Type 3470

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Type 9200

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

On takeoff at 80 knots; no airspeed indication on Captain's side. Captain chose to abort takeoff. Normal aborted takeoff.  Turned off runway; stopped; and conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance. We were then instructed to taxi to the gate. We arrived at the gate without incidence and deplaned the aircraft.

On takeoff roll; after setting power; I looked at my airspeed indicator to make the '80-knot' call. This is when I realized it was not working so I looked over at the First Officer's airspeed indicator and we were approaching 80 knots. I elected to and called for the takeoff abort. We had an uneventful abort and cleared the runway. Tower asked for the reason for the abort and the First Officer told them it was an inop airspeed indicator. I stopped the aircraft when clear of the runway and called for 'flaps up.''' I discussed with the First Officer the maximum speed we attained and we decided it was around 120 knots. We checked brake cooling at this time. I briefed the Flight Attendants and Passengers. Dispatch was then notified and requested that we taxi to the gate and call them when we got there. We taxied uneventfully to the gate. Approximately 10 minutess after parking; the #1 tire went flat.

B737-300 flight crew reports rejecting a takeoff due to the Captain's airspeed indicator being inoperative. The inoperative indicator is detected at 80 knots; but the takeoff is rejected at 120 knots.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Just before beginning the BRDJE1 arrival ATC gave us descend to FL260; pilot's discretion; no mention of descend via. A few minutes into this descent a new controller gave us 'descend via the BRDJE1; except maintain 15;000.' We set in 15;000; and verified it as 'set and armed.' I looked and saw a 15;000 limit on another waypoint further into the arrival; and somehow justified the 15;000 in my mind. Passing thru FL230 controller had us stop descent; then told us we were to have levelled at FL260 per the arrival; but to now maintain FL230 and comply with rest of arrival except maintain 310 kts. We did so without further incident. Controller was very tactful regarding our error; and thank him for that. I think that transitioning from a cruise altitude to a pilot's discretion clearance to FL260 without mention of a descend via; might have lulled us into getting the next descent to 15;000 with a descend via; however it was plain and simple an error that either one of us pilots should not have committed. I think we pilots both got a little dyslexic thinking that we were to descend now to 15;000; THEN comply with rest of STAR; instead of meet all higher altitude constraints on STAR; EXCEPT do not descend below 15;000. I would prefer to hear 'descend via STAR; except do not descend below 15;000.' However; in the future I will do as I usually do and query the controller if unsure about his/her expectations.

While flying the BRDJE1 RNAV arrival; ATC first cleared us from FL320 pilot's discretion to FL260. During our descent thru Approx. FL300 ATC then cleared us 'to descend via the BRDJE1 arrival except maintain 15000 ft.' We continued via the arrival routing and speeds planning on crossing LEMYN at 15000. ATC interceded approximately 10 NM prior to ARMYY and told us to level off at our current altitude of 23000 ft. We cleared up the miscommunication and ATC later cleared us to continue descending via the BRDJE1 Arrival. There was no further incident and there was no apparent traffic conflict. Approach and landing were uneventful.

Air Carrier flight crew reports being cleared to descend via the BRDJE1 RNAV arrival except maintain 15;000 feet. The crew attempts to descend directly to 15;000 feet and is admonished by ATC.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I operated the flight; and upon arrival at the hotel I was informed by the new Captain who was onboard the aircraft; that there had been a discrepancy on our weight and balance paperwork and that the aircraft had departed 3;982 KG over the weight listed on the weight and balance manifest. This discrepancy was discovered when the load master was preparing the loading supervisor verification form for the next leg. It was during this time that the load master realized he had failed to recalculate the actual passenger weight [before departure] after additional passengers had boarded the aircraft.The discrepancy on our weight and balance paperwork occurred because the load master provided me with a loading supervisor verification form which contained the actual passenger weight from the previous leg; and did not account for the additional passengers that had boarded the aircraft [at our departure airport]. I spoke to the load master about the error over the phone and he admitted to giving me an inaccurate loading supervisor verification form [before departure] and apologized. The aircraft was never over max gross weight and no limitations were exceeded due to this error.The load master was fatigued; when I spoke to him on the phone he told me he was tired and had been on the airplane for 10 days straight.I see the same level of fatigue in our ride-along mechanics. Company employees are required to stay onboard the aircraft for long periods of time with little to no time for adequate rest in hotels. This leads to extreme levels of fatigue that I often witness in our load masters and ride-along mechanics. Human performance at this level of fatigue is severely degraded.The loading supervisor verification form itself is not well suited for military flights that require actual passenger and baggage weights. The form was designed for scheduled service flying and translates poorly to military flying as there is no place for the load masters to write the actual weights or the calculations used to obtain those weights. Actual weights are often scribbled in a random location on the form.Calculations used to derive those weights are seldom provided. Readability and ease of use of this form is critical as it is often one of the last forms we receive immediately prior to closing the door and preparing for takeoff. This provides little time for verifying accuracy of calculations; etc. when up against time constraints for an on-time departure. I strongly recommend revising this from.Upon our arrival to the aircraft [at the departure airport;] dispatch was having a lot of difficulty filing a flight plan that would be accepted by ATC. Multiple flight plans were filed and subsequently rejected by ATC which lead to multiple versions of important paperwork being sent to the aircraft. Our workload was abnormally high as we tried to sort through all the revisions; assist dispatch in verifying flight plan status with local ATC; and obtain new versions of paperwork as they were released. This led to decreased amounts of time for me to scrutinize the work of others; such as the load master and his calculations on the loading supervisor verification form.

I helped operate a flight. I was informed later that the Captain had found out an error that had occurred with the weight and balance for the flight. The error occurred because the weight and balance manifest form was completed improperly and the wrong weight was written down for the actual passenger weights. This incorrect information caused a difference of 3;900 KG from the actual takeoff weight and the takeoff weight found on the weight and balance. The flight did not exceed any limitations and the weight used on the [takeoff and landing report] was still valid so all our flap settings and takeoff speeds were not affected. There is a need for a location on the weight and balance manifest form for actual passenger weights.

B757-200 flight crew reported being informed after a flight that the Loadmaster had not accounted for additional passengers that were boarded at the previous stop resulting in a 3;900 KG error. The Loadmaster had been on the aircraft for 10 days and was very fatigued.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During climb out we received a level 1 alert indicating the Manifold Drain valve was open. Utilizing the QRH we verified the switch was actually not in the open position; verified the light bulb was operable; and the QRH consequence of not utilizing the cross-feed manifold as the fuel would drain if it were open. This was followed by another alert Tank 2 LOW with an indication of ZERO fuel on the synoptic display. Engine 2 continued to operate. The tank lo alert disappeared; we cycled to manual and back to automatic on the Fuel Controller and the Manifold Drain alert disappeared. Almost immediately later at the top of climb the above two alerts re-appeared with zero again in tank 2 but with 600 LBS and 1200 LBS of fuel in tank 1 & 3 respectively without tank 1 & 3 low alerts. The Fuel Quantity/Used Check along with a WHITE 'possible fuel leak' alert displayed on the Fuel synoptic. Captain requested and executed an immediate turn-back and when queried if it was a mayday event replied yes. We received excellent ATC support and flew directly back to the airport. The procedures for preparing to return went exceptionally smooth after the event. We approached high and fast just in case and had time to re-verify our fuel; discuss airspeeds and take pictures of the status on the synoptic displays. At the FAF; we were stable and in the groove followed by an uneventful landing. The fuel system went back to normal and the 32;000 LBS of actual fuel on board was on display. The fuel system was giving erroneous indications first with a manifold drain valve alert suggesting the drain valve was open and to not utilize cross-feed. We verified the alert was questionable by observing that the Manifold Drain switch did not indicate open and the bulb was verified operable. The second alert indicated Tank number 2 fuel was low and the indication was ZERO 0! Engine two continued to operate without cross-feed so again we verified the alert was probably erroneous. The follow on alerts were an escalation of more suspected indications but were treated as possibly actual as there is no way of knowing with certainty that they were erroneous.

Received diversion report from [this] flight as it approached top of climb. ACARs sent to crew; they confirmed returning to [the airport] due to fuel quantity issue. Aircraft landed safely; after which Captain called on to advise they had received multiple fuel quantity; fuel low and fuel manifold alerts and were unable to determine exactly how much fuel was on aircraft. Crew [informed of the mayday event] on the return; no fuel was dumped. [Supervisor] notified manager on duty (no airport manager present) and I notified duty officer and submitted shift note as per procedure. At time of [this report]; aircraft is still down in at the airport and next leg will likely cancel.

An MD-11 flight crew reported erroneous indications from the fuel systems during climb; resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Arriving flight taxing into gate. Departing aircraft on aircraft right is on line (A) at stopping point. Wing tip is very close to outbound aircraft as the light on Safe Park gave him the all clear.Aircraft involve was a 777 and a 737 which was on spot (A) getting ready to be released to taxi. Triple 777 wing tip was very close to 737 nose and winglets upon arrival yet light indicator on Safe Park still gave the all clear. Near miss because the wing almost overshadowed the 737.

Ground Personnel reported discomfort with space between to parked aircraft; one a large transport and the other mid-sized.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 106; Flight Crew Type 106

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

[I] departed ZZZ VFR direct to ZZZ1. [I] made three radio calls on the ZZZ CTAF frequency indicating taxi; departure; and crosswind departure. No radio calls were made by other aircraft in the vicinity. No navigation lights; strobes; or landing lights were observed on final or in the pattern by either the pilot or the co-pilot. On crosswind departure from ZZZ; Runway 22; at approximately 900 feet; we were alerted by multiple ADS-B sources in the aircraft to inbound traffic for landing on Runway 04; approximately 25 feet horizontal from our position; and 100 feet below. No lights were observed in the air. The pilot in command made an immediate course deviation to avoid the traffic on final approach. Radio calls made after the deviation did not result in a return. The co-pilot observed a high-wing aircraft landing downwind at ZZZ approximately 90 seconds after our course deviation. Another radio call to ZZZ resulted in no communication.

Cessna 172 pilot reported an NMAC after take off.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Upon climb out; at approximately 2;000 FT MSL; I noticed that we were going to level off at 3;000 FT. Occasionally we are held down at a lower altitude for conflicting traffic; but I saw on TCAS that there was none. I thought this to be unusual and clarified with Departure Control as we climbed through 2;500 FT. I asked; 'Do you want higher for XXXX?' He noticed us slowing our climb and asked if we were assigned 3;000 FT. I replied 'Affirmative' and he responded; 'Climb to 17;000 FT.' Nothing more resulted. Thinking about it later; I recalled that there was some confusion on the taxi to the runway where they held the line and had us sidestep out to move up to the number one position in front of another carrier. At the same time there was another plane moving in line also with instructions to move up in front of a second carrier. They were confusing our call signs with the instructions; but the orders were clear to us; as there was no second carrier in view; and the proper aircraft responded to the instructions given with clarification following. At this time there were several times on Ground and Tower; that the frequency was distorted with people talking at the same time. We thought we were given 3;000 FT but that may have been incorrect.All involved reacted smoothly without hesitation; but it's apparent where there is potential for an adverse outcome. The First Officer and I both discussed it and agree we will use more vigilance and prompter clarification when given changes. Another suggestion might be; to repeat the heading and altitude when simply given 'Cleared for Takeoff'.

A CRJ-900 departed MSP after confusing taxi instructions and multiple aircraft blocking communications with Ground and Tower. The crew thought a 3;000 FT was issued but the constraint was not part of their clearance so Departure canceled it.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Landing in DFW RWY 17C. No weather or obstruction. During landing phase approach; runway lights are excessively illuminated. This condition causes our vision to be impaired during flare. As you transition over the overrun to landing; it takes several seconds for your eyes to adjust from high light settings or illumination. The distraction is more notable in low visibility when a halo effect 'Blooming' around the lights. During VFR conditions with high illumination levels we can easily see the runway from a great distance but it is not necessary for our landing.  Use of LED lighting which is pure light; this produces high illumination levels which hurts our night vision. LED lights also cause a blooming effect during high moisture days. Lighting must be adjusted to suitable levels to not hurt our night vision. Day time levels are not an issue. With high moisture level blooming occurs at high illumination levels; lights must be adjusted to prevent this at night.

Air carrier pilot reported DFW Runway 17C lights are too bright and are a distraction.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft had a history of fuel system failures associated with CTR Tank Pump 2. These appeared to be sequencing failures; and thus Maintenance ran and passed a sequencing test. On taxi out; a subsequent ECAM for CTR Tank Pump 1 appeared. As the resulting ECAM was followed; the ECAM disappeared; and all systems were functioning normally. This continued until after Takeoff and into climbout; when the CTR tank pumps should begin to sequence on. The pumps failed to sequence on; with CTR Tank Pump 1 showing low pressure and CTR Tank pump 2 showing itself stuck in the standby mode. The associated ECAM's were completed; and attempts to restore pump operation through manual mode were unsuccessful. At that point; we checked the CB panel and discovered that CTR Tank Pump 1 CB was out. We then remembered the mechanic complaining about a CB that was difficult to operate in conjunction with his test and thought that may be the reason Pump 1 had low pressure. Nonetheless; we reviewed our options and considered landing enroute as useable fuel was insufficient to continue all the way to our destination. Dispatch; Maintenance Control and ATC were all brought into the loop and after all procedures were completed the event concluded with an uneventful landing and a replacement aircraft was obtained to complete the trip.

When chronic fuel pump problems resurfaced enroute the flight crew of an A319 was forced to land short of their destination due to insufficient accessible fuel. A substitute aircraft was utilized to complete the scheduled flight.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 50; Flight Crew Type 50

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 445; Flight Crew Type 420

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On initial climb out 600 ft. AGL; [an] airplane climbing from [the] parallel runway turned left crosswind in front of me with no ATC clearance; causing me to level off for collision avoidance. ATC was supposed to call our turns but the other aircraft did not follow instructions.

I; [the] Flight Instructor; took a private pilot; whom I have never flown with before; up in the traffic pattern to 'kick off some rust' as he hadn't flown in the last 60 days. We had done 8 touch-and-go's prior and were completing one more to end the lesson. Upon takeoff; Tower called and stated; 'Aircraft Y continue upwind; I will call the crosswind.' We continued the upwind and I began talking with the private pilot to do the right traffic; etc. At this point; Tower called up to unknown aircraft and states; 'Turn left crosswind.' I did not hear the tail number clearly and could not confirm it was for our aircraft. [The] private pilot states the call was for us and was given to turn left crosswind. I stated I did not hear the call and cannot confirm. I began to second-guess him and asked 3 times; and each time the private pilot stated yes; we have the okay to turn left. [The] private pilot turns left and Tower called and stated; 'Aircraft Y; turn right crosswind.' [The] private pilot got on the mic and stated; 'We are in the wrong downwind and made the incorrect turn.' Other aircraft later transmits it was a 'close one' to Tower.To avoid this from happening in the future; I believe as Flight Instructor I should have called the Tower due to the miscommunication. At the end of the day; I have more experience and it is my duty to make sure the aircraft is operated correctly and safely. I also believe the private pilot should have recognized they were unsure of the radio call and [to] call to Tower as well. If the communication was better in the cockpit and we were more authoritative to speak with Tower; this situation could have been avoided.

Pilot Flying in light aircraft and Private Pilot and Flight Instructor in another light aircraft reported encountring an NMAC with each other in the pattern after the latter misunderstood a clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 318; Flight Crew Type 5600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was PM (Pilot Monitoring). Captain was PF (Pilot Flying). We have flown many times together. We departed on the OAK 2 Departure. We were delayed at the gate but I don't believe that manifested itself as a causal factor in the bird strike. We leveled off at 2000 ft as we checked in with NorCal Departure. NorCal told us that one mile in front of us there might be traffic. The Controller was getting a non-reporting return. We did not acquire any traffic. Controller reported us clear and instructed us to climb unrestricted to FL190. We put 19;000 ft in the altitude and initiated a climb. Just as the climb started; we passed through a flock of birds that were not discernible until they were right in front of us. They were brown in color and; for the moment I saw them; appeared smaller than Water Fowl; maybe Finch to Crow size. We knew we had at least one strike; audible. We suspected more.Aircraft performed normally on controls. Engine indications remained entirely normal. No abnormal odor. Captain remained PF. I relayed to ATC the bird strike. I then referred to the QRH (no guidance); AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual) Non Normal bird strikes; and [other manuals] guidance. We contacted Dispatch with notification of the strike. About this time; Non-rev Pilot in back communicated that there was a large dent in the number 2 nacelle leading edge. Captain kept control. Using security protocol; I went to Passenger compartment and observed damage. Baseball-Softball sized dent leading edge number 2 nacelle. The dent contour suggested that the bird remains went over nacelle not thru the engine. We took photos. We reviewed photos on flight deck and; given good engine ops and no other observed damage we elected to continue.Safe; uneventful flight; approach; and landing. Upon post flight inspection; we observed a softball size hole in the leading edge of the FO (First Officer) side horizontal stabilizer. This was a location of another strike. We could not observe this location in flight and; since the aircraft was operating entirely normally; we had no reason to suspect significant further damage on aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported a bird strike during departure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At 11;000 ft. climbing after takeoff the FA (Flight Attendant) called the flight deck and informed the flight deck that a PSU (Passenger Service Unit) deployed over two passenger seats. I thought that we needed to reseat the passengers; alter our planned flight level or repack the oxygen masks. [Another FA] went back to see about repacking the masks. He called me and said the masks were not activated and stowed as requested. During climb I attempted to get guidance from the EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) to confirm or contradict my options. After a busy climb to altitude the FO (First Officer) found the source for unwanted mask deployment. Repacking was not an option so the passengers were relocated.The information was not in the manuals that I thought they would be in. When I did a general search numerous links came up and it was difficult to filter out during the numerous heading; altitude and frequency changes occurring out of ZZZZ. I elected to continue the climb and search for the answer at cruise.

B777-300 Captain reported inadvertent oxygen mask deployment over 2 seats in the cabin during climb.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Departed and we noted a strong toxic chemical smell on departure. We continued the climb thinking it would burn off as we picked up the plane from maintenance. We continued the climb and the smell lessened; but continued. We attempted to contact the company with the iPhone; but that did not work. We leveled at 23;000 and continued to smell the odor though not nearly as strong. We decided to return to the departure airport; at that time we donned the oxygen masks. There was no smoke; and the smell was not a hot smell. The temperature of the ducts was cool the entire time and the cabin was also cool. We landed without incident. One of the mechanics met us and we asked him to step inside the cabin and smell the interior. He noted a chemical smell. After we had landed I noted my nostrils were burning. I went and asked the PIC if his burned also; he said they did. I decided to go to the doctor and have them give me a check up. They did not find any serious issues though they asked several times what could have been burning. I could not tell them as I didn't know. Something definitely was leaking into the air system. This was a repeat write-up; and both the PIC and I were not aware of this. It was in the logbook; we failed to review the past write-ups in depth. A thorough review of what was done to the aircraft during maintenance is a step we missed and should not have. Electronic logbooks would make this easier for both the PIC and SIC to review. As I spoke with the mechanics they thought it might be residual burn off from the repairs made. Why was this aircraft not run at a high power setting to burn it off before we were supposed to take it to 40;000? We were complacent in thinking the smell would burn off (I can understand this in some situations-like de-ice where you can identify the smell) and we did not know where the smell came from. We should have donned the masks and returned shortly after takeoff when we first noticed the toxic chemical smell.

A CE-560XL crew picked up an aircraft from maintenance and during takeoff noticed a strong toxic chemical odor; so after donning oxygen masks they returned to the departure airport. Medical tests were inconclusive and the odor's source not determined.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 300

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

DUATS briefing; contained NOTAM for glider activity. Departed 3 hours late without getting new briefing. ATC passed new NOTAM ; for acrobatic activity in 3 mi radius of [the airport] from surface to 5;000 feet. Closed IFR flight plan ~7 miles short of [the airport] and continued VFR.Was a bit unclear on where the acrobatic activity was and how to arrive at the airport. Descended to traffic pattern altitude (800 feet) before 3 miles from airport and headed for airport. Active runway was XY. Crossed west of end of XY on 'crosswind' for entry to left downwind. Heard call on UNICOM that a plane just flew through an active acrobatic box. Landed without further incident.Was at [the airport] for Orientation Flights; both power and glider; activity. There were 7 other aircraft. Organizer got call from Acrobatic group that another one of our planes had just departed through the active acrobatic box. This seems to be the first they knew about the box (and probably did not know about the NOTAM).There was a disorganized 'briefing' about this from which I understood that the box was centered on end of the runway and we should depart asap at 45 degree either way.On a subsequent departure; after announcing on UNICOM that I was taxiing to the runway and then again for takeoff; I turned 45 degree to the right without seeing any other aircraft.Upon landing I was greeted by the Safety Team for having flown through the box while an aircraft was in an inverted spin above me and they had to take evasive action (I did not see the other aircraft). I was told the briefing was to turn 45 degree to the left not either way.Afterwards I was able to find on the internet (took about an hour) a graphic with the aerobatic box. It was not centered on the runway. It was slightly offset to the right and covered almost half XY departure length of the runway. Having had this graphic beforehand would have prevented the problem. Having the acrobatic box defined in the NOTAM would have prevented this problem. The acro group behaved as if the NOTAM (3 mi; surf to 5000') meant they owned the airspace and could fly in the box without taking into account other activity. (They were visited by an FAA Official; who told them that they were supposed to monitor for other aircraft and hold aerobatic activity till the other aircraft was clear; but did not change their operations after the Official left.)I'm not sure the group knew where the box was; but the left 45 degree turn was clearing it.[The airport] has another runway; ZZ/A (actually it also has a third; XB/CD that also runs into the box); that would have kept all activity out of the aerobatic box; but they did not want to use it as the glider operation was running on the grass alongside this runway. The gliders were also flying a standard/required right pattern to ZZ which meant they had to thread their way between the runway and the box. An 'illegal' left pattern would have kept them well clear.There seemed to be a complete lack of pre planning on both ours and Acro groups parts. The flying was also delayed and there was a lot of pressure to get going.There are a number of lessons to be learned here; the most important of which is to slow down and figure out what the situation is. Ask questions until one understands exactly what to do.

C182 pilot reported flying through an aerobatic box during approach and landing because he was not aware of the NOTAM. After being briefed by the aerobatic group organizer; but apparently not clearly; he flies through the box again on departure.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X; a B777; arrived with the Center Tank RH Refuel Valve stuck open.  I was instructed by the OAL (Other Air Line) Maintenance Manager to apply the MEL.  I then contacted OAL Maintenance via [software program] and was instructed to apply MEL XX-XX-XX-XXB Pressure Fueling System Refuel Valves Refuel Valve open; with Derivative MEL XX-XY-XX-XX Fuel Jettison System With New Scavenge System; and Derivative MEL XX-XY-XZ Fuel Scavenge Systems. I applied these 3 MELs as instructed and found out 2 days later from Company local management that MEL XX-XX-XX-XXB does not apply to the Center fuel Tank; only the Left Main and Right Main fuel tanks.

Technician reported aircraft departed with three MELs applied and was informed that one MEL was not valid and misapplied.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Upon landing in ZZZ Runway XX in strong gusty crosswinds from the left with reported wet runway of 555; the aircraft exited the left side of the runway with the left main gear and the nose gear. The right main remained on the runway surface. The conditions at the airport were rapidly changing from convective activity and rain over to ice/ snow conditions. At the time of the landing only rain was reported. 4 minutes after landing weather was reported as wind 290 at 34 gusting to 48 2 1/2 miles in light freezing rain and mist 800 overcast temperature 1* dew point -2* altimeter 2914. The last report we had received just a minute prior to landing was wind 290 at 25 gust 39. This was from the tower. This equates to 26 kts crosswind and well within the limitations of the aircraft for a runway condition of 555 which was the last report 30 minutes prior. The weather had been studied and determined to be acceptable prior to take off. It was going to be potentially challenging due to convective weather moving out and a cold front moving in; but it was determined that the conditions were within the limitations of the aircraft. The temperature was falling rapidly with the fast approaching cold front from the time of the runway condition report unknown to us at the time. Despite landing upwind wheel first; applying full aileron into the wind; full right rudder and right brake while applying maximum reverse the aircraft turned and the slid towards the left side of the runway. No amount of effort on my part would bring the aircraft back into alignment with the runway centerline. Some differential power was even applied towards the end of the event as a last ditch effort to remain on the runway; to no effect. If the runway had become contaminated with ice prior to landing the crosswind limitation would have been exceeded due to runway contamination. It is my belief that this in fact did happen. I observed ice pellets or similar on the windows while taxiing after the event. When the aircraft exited the paved surface it did so at a very low speed in my estimation. Low enough that applying the right brake should have had the desired effect well before this and significant effect at such low speed; yet it seemed to have no effect at all. Possibly the anti skid was doing it's job but on an icy surface reducing the braking ability. Once we came to a stop half on half off runway edge we notified Tower of our condition. I took a minute or so to rerun the events in my head and access the condition of the aircraft. I saw the runway light go by as we went off the edge. I had heard no impact nor did I believe we ran over the light. The aircraft was not tilting significantly indicating to me that we had neither sank into mud or blown a tire or collapsed a gear leg. The departure from the runway was surprisingly gentle with no abrupt drop off. Based on these observations I decided to see if the aircraft would taxi back onto the runway surface. At first I encountered the takeoff config warning when I added power since we were not in the takeoff configuration. After figuring this out I then had the FO (First Officer) pull the yoke back full to lighten the nosewheel and proceeded to add power to see if we would move. It did move and subsequently taxied back onto the runway surface with little effort once it started to move. We then taxied to parking without further issues. The approach itself was turbulent and icy. We had level 3s once passing the final approach fix. After we broke out wipers were required due to the rain and they were marginally effective at best. Due to the crab for wind the runway was located behind the center pillar of the windshield. Not ideal and the FO saw the runway first. Maintaining glide slop was difficult as was controlling airspeed. Windshear was present. But it was manageable and not at all unusual at this airport during gusty wind conditions; particularly on Runway XX. So I continued. As we approached for a landing I had sufficient rudder for the winds and decided to continue to a landing. As near as I could tell we landed aligned with the runway and the FO also remembers that as well. Due to ice and 13 kts gust factor our landing speed was 116 kts at 27000 lbs. normal landing speed is 89 kts at this weight. May have contributed to the subsequent inability to control the aircraft possibly from hydroplaning? Hard to say; but it's fast being that light. In summation I believe that based on the information I had leading up to and at the time of landing that we were well within limitations and were not taking on unnecessary risks. Had I become aware of icing on the runway a missed approach would have been the only option. It is unfortunate timing and very quickly changing conditions that led to this unfortunate event in my assessment. Next time? If there is one; I'm going around or not departing. I truly regret the outcome of these events and recognize my own contribution to what ultimately took place. I used what I believed to be good information and my own experience in this aircraft to make my decision. In this case that was not adequate when combined with the unknown.

During landing on Runway XX with reported winds of 290 at 25 gusting 39 with a wet runway; the aircraft started sliding to the left edge and came to a stop with the left main wheels in the grass; nose wheel just off the edge of the runway; and right main wheels still on the runway. Reported runway conditions were good/wet with a FICON 5/5/5 30 mins prior to landing. 4 minutes after landing; ATIS was reporting winds 290 a t34 gusting 48; 2.5 miles visibility in freezing rain and mist; 800 overcast. These conditions would calculate a 32 kt crosswind. If runway conditions were compromised by the freezing precipitation that had not been reported; it would exceed the crosswind limitation of the aircraft. The Captain landed with the left main wheels first; aileron into the wind; and applied max reverse with right brake; but despite his efforts; the aircraft slid to the left side of the runway until it came to a stop as previously mentioned. I assisted the Captain by holding his aileron wind correction with him. The nose of the aircraft was aligned with the runway after it came to a stop. As best as I can recall; the nose of the aircraft was aligned or nearly so with the runway the entire time. Some weather vaning may have occurred but it was hard to tell due to the rain and wipers on which restricted some forward visibility. The Captain applied differential thrust in an effort to stop the slide but this had no effect from what we could tell as the aircraft continued to slide. The planes right side exited the runway at a slow speed. Even at slow speed the Captain still could not gain traction. His braking inputs also had negligible results. After leaving the runway; the Captain was able to access that the aircraft had not struck any lights and that the aircraft was still in good condition. After communicating with ATC; the captain had me hold the yoke back to relieve some nose wheel pressure and was then able to use power and taxi back on to the runway. During taxi to parking it was obvious that some kind of freezing precipitation was falling as small ice chunks started adhering to the side windows. The approach was turbulent with significant gusts and rain; the ice detector went off between the final approach fix and next step down as I recall. I then completed first visual indication of icing conditions on the checklist; however we noted no significant or notable ice accretion on the plane. Icing speeds were used with full gust adjustment. At 27;000 lbs; icing speeds pus wind adjustment was 116 kts. The Captain and I agreed that the runway conditions must have been contaminated in some way and normal crosswind inputs were ineffective in getting the aircraft to stop sliding.

Flight crew reported a runway excursion due to incorrect weather reporting and FICON; field conditions; failed to indicate rapidly changing conditions.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While flying over ZZZ VOR and joining the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ; we encountered severe turbulence while descending through flight levels 320-290. The event lasted approximately 2 mins and we exceeded the Mach limit for the aircraft. The seat belt sign was on and the Captain had given the FA's (Flight Attendants) a PA to take their seats approximately 2 minutes before the event based on a 'bumpy' ride report on descent from ATC. Upon entering the turbulence; the autopilot disconnected and we experienced +/- 1500 fpm on the VSI; +/- 60 kts. of airspeed and 25 degree rolls left and right. No injuries were reported by any of the passengers; however a couple of our FA may have strained their backs or necks trying to get their service carts stowed and into their seats. We believe that we encountered a severe wind shear as we had a 131 kts tailwind when we began our descent and when we finally came out of the turbulence it was a 50 kts crosswind. A company aircraft joining the same arrival behind us experienced a similar event about 30-45 seconds after us.

We encountered severe turbulence in the descent into ZZZ while descending on the ZZZZZ3 overhead ZZZ1 through FL320 - FL290. The event lasted approximately 2 mins and we exceeded the Mach limit for the aircraft. We had already exited all weather and were in clear VMC conditions. The seat belt sign was on and I had given the FA's (Flight Attendants) a PA to take their seats approximately 2 mins before the event based on a 'bumpy' ride report on descent from ATC. The auto pilot did disconnect and we experienced +/- 1500 fpm on the VSI; +/- 60 kts of airspeed and 25 degree rolls left and right. No injuries were reported by any passengers; however a couple of the FA may have strained their backs or necks trying to get to get the carts stowed and return to their seats. I believe we encountered a severe wind shear as we had a 131 kts. tail wind when we began our descent and when we finally came out of the turbulence it was a 50 cross wind. The company aircraft directly behind us encountered the same event.Unreported severe turbulence due to what I suspect was severe wind shear.I do not know how to avoid this in the future other than to avoid it if you know about it. However; the fact that I made a PA to the FA rather than call them on the inter phone saved invaluable time. This allowed the FA to clear the aisle and get close to their seats. I do believe that if I hadn't; there would have been several injuries to the crew and passengers. While this procedure is addressed clearly in our manuals; I wanted to stress its importance here in this forum.

B737 NG flight crew reported severe turbulence on descent.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Fatigue; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Company Policy; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing; Human Factors

Aircraft X was climbing. I had to stop the aircraft at 26;000 ft. for traffic at 27;000 ft. When cleared; I climbed Aircraft X to 28;000 ft. because of Aircraft Y at 29;000 ft. passing overhead. A few minutes later; Aircraft X reported an RA. I informed pilot that traffic was passing to the west 1;000 ft. above. Pilot respondent 'ROGER; leaving FL280 for FL380.' I replied 'Negative; maintain FL280. FL280 was your assigned altitude'. At this time; Aircraft Y informed me that they were responding to an RA also. I never observed Aircraft Y change altitude nor Aircraft X above 28;100 ft. The aircraft passed 2 miles abreast. Listening to the tape later; my clearance could have been garbled but the pilot read back FL380.In my opinion; fatigue and frequency issues could be a contributing factor. As far as fatigue; I have worked 28 days of overtime in the last 36 weeks; with 6 scheduled for the next 6 weeks. I am lower in hours than most on the overtime list and we are not even into the high leave part of the year. After 31 years of a 2-2-1 schedule; I can cope with the ups and downs of that; but throw in a random shift on my weekend; never knowing which day or which shift; it make rest hard. With our staffing levels it appears this will continue for the foreseeable future. Add in home life; and now the stress of having to work and not getting paid and my anxiety levels are at a peak. The burn-out factor and negativity is high; and I feel I speak for a lot of controllers here.As far as frequencies; they have been problematic for quite some time. Not as clear as they used to be; static on both the pilots side and ours; over all weak; with no clear plan for a fix. The SOC will change TELCO paths and it may clear them up momentarily but it is no true fix. The feeling around the control room is that no feels frequencies are a priority. We can't do our job without them. They are as important as the RADAR. I can't say any of these thing were truly contributory to this incident; but I also can't say they weren't.Need to listen more closely to read backs. Increase staffing. Clean up frequencies. Get the Government opened back up.

A Center Controller reported an aircraft misunderstood their traffic information; possibly due to poor radio coverage; and climbed above their assigned altitude into confliction with converging traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 2785; Flight Crew Type 227

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 469; Flight Crew Type 469

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Loss Blue Hyd system. Applied QRH procedures and advised ATC.

Approximately 200 nm south of ZZZ we received our first indication of any issue with the blue hydraulic system. In level cruise flight we received an ECAM for HYD B SYS LO PR. While running the ECAM we noticed that the hydraulic quantity was low. The procedure calls for the Blue Electric Pump to be shut off; and as we did so; we monitored the quantity indicator. As it dropped; we received an ECAM for Hyd B RSVR LO LVL. After running the ECAM; finishing the QRH and conferring with dispatch we advised ATC for the loss of redundant systems. We chose to divert to ZZZ for a multitude of reasons including the nice weather; long runways; availability of ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) and the fact that it's a maintenance hub. We immediately received vectors and a descent from ATC for an arrival into ZZZ. The Captain finalized his briefings to both the flight attendants and passengers. We then updated the FMC; applied the landing distance procedure and landing calculations and briefed the descent and approach. We completed the RNAV to [Runway XX]; landed and had ARFF inspect the aircraft for any potential hazards or safety concerns. Once complete; we taxied to the gate and completed the diversion safely.

A320 flight crew reported a loss of hydraulic pressure that resulted in a diversion.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was working approach/departure when the event occurred. Aircraft X was transitioning through ZZZ airspace enroute to ZZZ1. When they were about 13 miles southwest of ZZZ; I noticed their altitude drop a few hundred feet. I was about to verify with the pilot that they were on course; level at 5;000 feet; and give them the current altimeter; when the pilot called up. He said he needed to land immediately. I got him direct and then asked him what the nature of the [event] was. He said his door flew off and he lost a finger during the incident. I asked him how many people on board and fuel remaining. He said just himself on board and a little over 3 hours of fuel. He couldn't keep his altitude high enough for the ILS approach; so I kept him direct the field until he got it in sight. We got the emergency vehicles in their standby positions along with medical services. I coordinated with Local Control that he was cleared to land. I then relayed to him that Tower advises he was cleared to land RWY XX ZZZ. He landed without issue and taxied into the FBO and the vehicles followed him.

A Controller reported a pilot requested an immediate landing from ATC when the aircraft door flew off and the pilot's finger was severed.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Manuals

We were cleared to CALLS on a visual to [TUS Runway] 11L.  The First Officer selected 5000' as depicted on the approach chart.  Initially; it appeared to be an appropriate setting because of our higher altitude and descent rate.  The First Officer increased descent rate and reached 5000' outside the DME depicted for CALLS.  I determined that terrain was about to be a factor and directed the First Officer to climb.  As the climb was initiated; we received a momentary 'Caution Terrain' and small yellow depiction on the display.  At the same time; Approach advised that minimum vector altitude was 5500'.  We re-established altitude in compliance with the 11L ILS approach chart and completed the visual approach with ILS guidance.  Ensure that both Pilots have the appropriate approach chart in front of them and verbalize the clearance limit altitudes on the chart during a visual approach.

A B737 crew descended below 5;000 FT prior to CALLS intersection on a TUS Runway 11L night visual approach and received a momentary 'Caution Terrain' alert while climbing.


Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Upon landing; pitch seemed normal; less than 9 degrees. Felt wheels make contact with runway then felt a bump and I stated to the F/O we must have hit something. I held the nose off of the runway for a smooth nose wheel touchdown. Leaving [the] runway; I called for flaps up and taxied to the gate. Flight Attendant position C told me that a passenger heard a metal sound upon landing. Upon the walk around; I found damage to the bottom of the aircraft; forward of the tail skid. The tail skid was not damaged at all. I wrote in the aircraft logbook that we experienced a tail strike. I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and informed them of the damage. I then contacted the Chief Pilot's office and reported the event.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

B737 flight crew reported they experienced a tail strike during what seemed to be a normal landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 72; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 750

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise flight at Flight Level 380 the amber Hydraulic Overheat annunciator illuminated; the check list was performed for the corresponding annunciator which indicated no action in flight. Shortly afterward the Amber Hydraulic Low Pressure for the right engine illuminated and the Amber Hydraulic Overheat extinguished. It was also noted that the right engine vibrated briefly when the annunciator illuminated. The checklist for the Amber Right Hydraulic Low Pressure annunciator was performed which indicated no inflight action required unless hydraulics fell in which case flight would have to continue at a lower altitude (FL350 or lower) due to concerns for emergency descents. Due to the rapid occurrence of the two annunciators the decision was made to divert to ZZZ out of an abundance of caution.We landed safely without further issues and Maintenance was sought.The Right Engine Hydraulic pump had failed.

HS 125 Captain reported diverting after a hydraulic system overheat annunciator illuminated during cruise.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While enroute encountered light ice. Turned on new TKS fluid anti ice system. Noticed subtle odor in cockpit. 20 minutes later pilot had headache. Pilot put on full face oxygen mask to complete flight. Upon landing pilot noticed hands and manuals were sticky. Headache disappeared one hour after exiting aircraft. Aircraft cockpit was later wiped down with new white cloth. Cloth showed significant residue on entire new cockpit panel. Symptoms matched TKS fluid exposure on MSDS data.

A C208 pilot activated the TKS anti-ice system during light icing inflight and donned his oxygen mask after detecting a subtle odor and developing a headache. During post flight a clean cloth cockpit wipe down revealed a significant residue.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

While climbing through approx. 12;000 feet we were asked to accelerate to greater than 320 KTS for following traffic. Established on assigned speed and climbing a small vibration could be felt throughout the aircraft. As we climbed this vibration steadily grew. Having had Elevator Servo problems in the past; it felt familiar and we did a little trouble shooting as we climbed. We tried different speeds; both slower and faster. We tried putting a small load on the aircraft by increasing our rate of climb and decreasing it as well. Nothing we did seemed to slow the crescendo of this vibration. The intensity of the vibration grew to the point that the face of my [tablet] was blurry from vibration. The vibration seemed to be emanating from the tail and not related to any engine function. I contacted Maintenance through the cockpit phone and after a very short conversation it was told to us that the 'aircraft had a history and their recommendation would be to return to PHX.' We agreed with their recommendation entirely.We informed ATC of a precautionary landing and also the flight attendants. A normal approach and landing was made.

An A319 Captain returned to the departure airport after a significant vibration developed which seemed to emanate from the tail area. The aircraft had a history of these vibrations.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Climbing through 5;000 feet we heard a boom; felt the aircraft yaw; and experienced auto pilot disconnect. Engine 2 EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) was in excess of 900 C. We were unable to reduce Engine 2 EGT with the thrust lever so we shut the engine down.Approach provided vectors for a return to Runway XXR (Visual Approach) normal landing. After the aircraft was stopped on the runway emergency equipment inspected the aircraft for damage and none was observed.

A321 First Officer reported shutting engine 2 down while in climb due to excessive EGT; resulting in them returning to their departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103; Flight Crew Total 1267; Flight Crew Type 334

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Equipment / Tooling; Airport

CLT Tower told us to 'Line up and wait Runway 36R; caution wake turbulence for departing Airbus A320 and there is landing traffic on an 8 mile final.' The Pilot not flying acknowledged and responded to ATC appropriately. While taxiing onto the runway we heard ATC tell the departing aircraft to 'Contact departure' shortly after hearing that transmission I aligned the aircraft for departure on the runway threshold markings. After stopping on the runway we could no longer hear any transmissions on the frequency. We attempted to contact Tower multiple times and eventually we heard them on guard frequency 121.5. Tower cleared us for takeoff or to get off the runway. We departed and once moving off the threshold markings we could then hear Tower on 118.1. We feel that area of the runway may be a dead zone for smaller aircraft.

Pilot reported a possible signal reception issue that resulted in them being unable to communicate with ATC while lined up on the runway.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were flying from Fresno to Van Nuys. While flying in the San Joaquin Valley we encountered numerous ceilings and clouds and tried climbing above them two times only to descend later. When we were south of Bakersfield; we tried climbing to 9;500 FT. While the visibility was great; there was an overcast layer in all directions; so I decided we should turn back; descend to 5;500 FT; and continue VFR at that altitude while following I-5 through the Tejon Pass.As we got closer to the mountains; the clouds became lower. I then descended to 5;000 FT. We were able to stay out of the clouds and visibility was adequate; but the proximity to terrain did not seem very safe. I decided to continue on and came close to turning us back around to cancel the flight momentarily. However; after a few miles; the weather became incredibly better and we were able to climb higher and land at Van Nuys without issue.This event was very alarming because I really underestimated the height of the clouds and how low we would be while flying over the Tejon Pass - I think 5;500 FT MSL would be barely safe while flying over the pass; but flying 5;000 FT MSL is too low; especially in those weather conditions. I will not attempt to ever fly over that pass again lower than 5;500 FT when VFR.

An instrument rated flight instructor aboard a PA-38 enroute between FAT and VNY attempted to fly below the overcast through Tejon Pass and got uncomfortably close to the ground before the ceiling lifted allowing a climb to a safer altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

On [date removed] myself and another pilot departed OSU.  I was the PIC and we had coordinated with Columbus approach via telephone prior to our departure as we had done for the past several days.  Previously we had been departing on runway 27 to the west but the winds favored runway 9 that day. Squawking 1200 and using our tail number we were cleared to take off and turn to a heading of 240.  As we climbed out we maintained contact with the tower and never received a hand off to approach.  The vertical limit of the Class D is depicted as 34 in brackets; meaning up to and including 3;400 feet.  The airport is bisected by the outer ring of Class C airspace starting at 2;500 feet up to 4;800.  While still in contact with the tower and within the confines of the Class D we leveled off at 3;400 and proceeded on a 240 heading.  We very quickly exited the Class C ring to the west and continued to maintain 3;400 feet till clear of the Class D.  Upon exiting Class D we made two attempts to advise tower of a frequency change with no response.  We immediately changed over to approach; squawked our pre assigned code; and established contact.  We were turned on course and cleared up to our requested altitude of 5;500.  At no time did we get a traffic alert or experience any aircraft at close proximity.  Shortly after arriving on station we were asked to make a phone call either that night or in the morning regarding a possible pilot deviation.  Upon landing I called approach and was told to call back in the morning to speak the shift supervisor.  Both myself and the other pilot believed that as long as we were in contact with the tower; within the limits of the Class D ring; and had not received a handoff to approach that we were outside of the Class C airspace.  As you might have guessed [name removed] disagreed and stated that we entered the Class C at 2;500 even if only for a short time.  He stated that his controller held an air carrier at 4;000 to maintain separation so there was no Resolution Advisory (RA) or near miss with 600 feet of vertical clearance. [Name removed] continued to say that this really only becomes a problem when OSU uses runway 27 and Port Columbus (CMH); uses runway 10.  He was very nice and was more concerned about this being a learning experience but was required to file a report.  Although at the time he could not remember the exact details he had previously filed report for a similar occurrence on another company aircraft that caused an RA with an air carrier.  Shortly after speaking to [name removed] I spoke to [name removed] [at the] FSDO.  He was very appreciative of the call and stated that he had not received our report but had received the previous one and was in the early stages of determining who it was using that call sign. [Name removed] was also very cordial and stated that he would pull the other folder and contact me if he had any questions.  I told both [names removed] that I would be filing a [safety] form; and an internal company form to advise my superiors of the situation.     I believe that the documentation in the FAR and AIM is confusing as well as on the sectional chart regarding overlapping airspace.  The class D ring is unbroken and clearly labeled as 34 within brackets.  The AIM addresses departing satellite airports of Class C airspace.  It is commonly understood that while in contact with the tower you remain under the control and limits of the Class D.  Other types of overlapping airspace is clearly marked.  We were able to quickly find several instances where this confusion is depicted on a sectional chart.  This may be a larger understanding by pilots as a whole and has and will continue to create this same occurrence; hopefully not to the point of a midair collision.

A Pilot reports of an airspace issue relayed to him by approach control. The aircraft departed OSU airport and climbed to 3;400 feet; made a right turn to a 240 degree heading. Approach stated that the aircraft entered into the Class C airspace of CMH and they had to restrict a carrier above this aircraft.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During the takeoff roll all seemed normal at the V1/rotate call the aircraft started to shake almost like a bad shimmy dampener on a small aircraft. After a positive rate of climb was attained we decided to leave the gear down with the assumption we blew a tire on takeoff. We also left the flaps at 9 just in case we damaged the flaps with the flying rubber. Around 200 FT we noted that the right main gear indication turned from green to amber then finally red and we got the master warning for a landing gear disagree. ATC instructed us to contact departure and at that time we let them know we thought we blew a tire and we would like to stay in the pattern. ATC approved and we entered left downwind for 32. We declared an emergency and let them know about our gear indication. We asked them if they could look on the runway for tire debris and any metal debris that could help determine how bad we damaged the landing gear. On the downwind we discussed that fact that we were not loosing fuel/oil/hydraulic fluid and all other systems appear normal. We also discussed that fact that we have plenty of time and fuel to trouble shoot and an immediate return was not necessary. Also on the downwind we let the Flight Attendant know what was going on and our intentions to return to [the airport]. We asked her to prepare the cabin for an evacuation due to our gear indication. We also asked her to make the initial announcements to the passengers and we would talk to them in a bit. At that point we decided to come off of the downwind to overfly the Tower and see if they could get a visual on the damage and to ascertain if the gear appeared in the down/locked position. After a flyover and confirmation that the gear appeared to be down and locked we asked to go over the water to eliminate the possibility of dropping aircraft parts into the houses below while running the appropriate checklists. And we let them know our plan was to return to [the airport] shortly. Once over the water we orbited VFR while running the Landing Gear Disagree Checklist. We both agreed we would not cycle the gear as instructed due to possibility of not getting it back down again in the event that had bent metal in the gear mechanism. (ATC said they did not find metallic parts on the runway but later it was discovered they did find a sheared bolt and nut). We then accomplished the emergency landing gear extension procedure to try to get a down and locked indication. (No luck) an announcement was then made to the passengers that stated what was going on and the fact that we thought a sensor was damaged but we are going to treat it as if the gear is not locked down. To get additional input from someone outside looking in; we had the jumpseating First Officer call us on the interphone and advised him of the situation. We wanted to see if he had any additional ideas or if he thought we were missing anything. We had him explain what he felt in the cabin and asked him to look at the flaps to see if there was any visible damage. At this point it was apparent that we were going to have to land with the gear not showing down and locked. And we discussed the various factors affecting the landing as well as the possible evacuation logistics. We were now below landing weight and had done everything we could think of. We opted to overfly the Tower once more since many more observers had gathered. They noted that it looked like only one of the mains was blown and the gear still appeared down and locked. We entered left traffic again and finished the appropriate checklists for depressurizing and turning on the emergency lights in preparation for the evacuation. We made one last PA to let the passengers know that just because it might be rough and the emergency lights were on they are not to evacuate until instructed to do so by the flight deck or the flight attendant. I also let them know that the next PA will be the brace command. The landing was uneventful and shortly after touchdown wehad a down and locked indication on the EICAS. The ARFF got a temperature reading and no sign of fire was noted. Since we now had a steady gear down and locked indication; we opted to taxi very slowly to the gate and deplane via the jet bridge.Blown tire and aircraft damage was a threat. Landing gear not down and locked indication during landing was an undesired aircraft state.

An E-145 flight crew suffered a blown main gear tire on takeoff. They remained in the pattern; performed two inspection flybys of the Tower; and landed uneventfully.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were cleared to descend to 11;000 feet on the LAS SUNST3 arrival.  During the descent; we received a traffic warning and RA as another aircraft was given an unrestricted climb to FL190 on the LAS SHEAD8 departure; which deviated from the published speeds and altitudes.  We were descending through 2;500 feet when we got the alert.  The traffic was close enough for me to identify that it was another EMB175.  The First Officer took evasive action and followed flight director guidance and adjusted vertical speed to avoid collision.  This was a result of ATC issuing a clearance that deviated from published altitudes and speeds; which in turn caused the RA.  Had the departure been flown as published we would have crossed with 2000 feet clearance of the other aircraft.  Instead; we were descending at 1500fpm as another aircraft with an unrestricted climb; was climbing at approximately 3000fpm giving a 4500fpm closure rate; which caused the RA.  The RA was reported to ATC.  We landed without incident.

An EMB-175 Captain on descent into LAS reported a conflict with another EMB-175 who was departing LAS. The reporter stated he believed the ATC clearance precipitated the event.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

Deviated around weather north of MMSD; FO (First Officer) monitored terrain on ND (Navigation Display) and 'Own Ship' display and minimum required altitudes on Radar Minimum Altitudes chart. I monitored weather radar. Numerous requests from us to ATC to fly a particular heading and/or proceed direct to a fix in order to avoid weather were ignored; misunderstood or responded to slowly by ATC. ATC asked if we could proceed to the IAF (Initial Approach Fix) for the approach (there are 9 IAFs) without specifying which one. We proceeded direct to D346K 11 DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) Fix on VOR DME 2 Runway 16 - not an IAF; it is charted as an IF (Initial Fix) based on weather and terrain and assumed ATC understood. ATC cleared us for the approach; we began descent to 3;600 feet; and maintained; VMC conditions with terrain in sight. ATC asked if we had terrain in sight; provided terrain warning and told us we were supposed to have maintained 5;000 feet. I now believe ATC thought we were proceeding direct to D005O (we initially asked to proceed direct to it and ATC stated he didn't know where that fix was) and cleared us for the visual approach. Numerous aircraft in the area were deviating and having difficulty reading back and understanding clearances. Arrival and approach charts use similar fixes (MARUX and MARAK) which sound similar in Spanish and English and add to the confusion in determining where the best deviation options exist. Numerous other points on charts show in FMS (Flight Management System) database but ATC is apparently unfamiliar with alpha-numeric points. I believe ATC was unsure of where we were (we knew where we were) and which fix we were headed to even though we were in a radar environment. Reconsider naming conventions for fixes on charts and databases and ensure ATC familiarity/access to said points and/or ensure quick way to identify alpha-numeric fixes. Biggest lessons learned: continue emphasizing importance of constant verification of ATC clearances and altitude assignments and use of 'Own Ship' on Radar Minimum Altitudes chart. While it would have helped if ATC stated 'maintain 5;000 feet until established' (ATC did not); confirmation with ATC prior to descent would have alleviated Controller's concerns. Maintaining 5;000 feet until on a published segment of the approach would have left us high but would also have alleviated Controller's concerns.

Air carrier flight crew reported miscommunication with ATC over clearances.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 800

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were cleared for the TEB 8 departure; reviewed it with Captain; and set altitude for 1;500 FT for the initial altitude on the departure. It was a normal takeoff; climb; and call outs. I was hand flying the departure and at about 1;200 FT one of our passengers began yelling up at us about cabin air was too hot and the distraction caused me to continue the climb. When I looked back down we were about 1;800 FT and immediately corrected our altitude and leveled off at 1;500 FT. The Controller did notice our deviation and did not seem worried. I believe there were no separation issues with other traffic. It was a small distraction at a bad time that surprised both of us. Since I was hand flying I should have ignored the distraction or had the autopilot engaged and let it level off itself.

We were cleared for the TEB departure; the departure was reviewed and 1500' was set as the initial altitude. The takeoff and climb was a normal. The pilot flying was hand flying the departure. Approximately at 1200 ft one of our passengers began yelling with urgency to us about cabin air being extremely hot. I quickly gave an indication that I would take care of it. I knew the problem as our temperature controller had been having problems recently; and that is one issue on the list to remedy during major inspection scheduled next week. During the few seconds my eyes came off the altimeter to the duct/cabin temp; the Pilot Flying also was distracted and continued the climb through 1500. I then noticed we had climbed to 1800' MSL and then directed and immediate correction to 1500'. The Controller did notice our deviation; and stated such indicating no concern with any traffic conflicts; and directed us to climb to 5000'. It was a small distraction at a bad time that surprised both of us. We discussed this event and determined that the pilot flying should have ignored the distraction or had the autopilot engaged and let it level off itself.

HS125 flight crew reports exceeding the 1;500 FT initial level off altitude on the TEB 8 due to a passenger yelling that the cabin air was too hot just prior to level off.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 98; Flight Crew Type 98

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The last two times flying through HOU; both Ground Control and Tower Control have been combined into one frequency and consequently one Controller. During both of those flights; upon being cleared for takeoff; the Tower Controller was also coordinating pushback clearances and ground taxi instructions. Predictably; multiple aircraft called for pushback during our takeoff roll; all while 'stepping on each other' and blocking the frequency. As we were rotating; other aircraft were [sending unnecessary messages] (Why not get a full route clearance on Tower while we're at it?!).All these distracting radio events: the blocked transmissions; frivolous radio calls and non-runway-pertinent radio chatter; compromised the safe execution of what is arguably the highest risk portion of any flight; the takeoff. In this scenario; ATC was juggling pushbacks; ground taxiing aircraft; and most crucially aircraft taking off while loaded with humans and fuel. Worse yet; aircraft on takeoff were hearing it. Pilots' ears are trained to be listening for certain things at certain stages of the flight. Hearing pushback calls; blocked radios and the like on takeoff is nothing but a potentially dangerous distraction to the pilots.

Air carrier Captain reported an unsafe environment at HOU with the Ground and Local Control positions being combined into one frequency.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

We were arriving from the North and were cleared for a Visual Approach to Runway 27 at San Diego Lindbergh International (KSAN). We executed a right hand traffic pattern and turned Final approximately seven miles from the runway threshold. We conducted the Visual Approach; backed up with the Localizer for Runway 27. The approach was stabilized; and the landing was normal. Several days after this flight; I had a general conversation with a colleague regarding inadvertent descents below the floor of Class B (violation of 14 CFR 91.131(a)(2)). I looked at our flight path for this flight using www.flightaware.com and believe that although we maintained altitude at or above published altitudes for the Localizer approach; I suspect we may have momentarily descended below the 4;800 MSL floor of Class B airspace while conducting the Visual Approach; specifically during the Right Downwind / Right Downwind to Right Base portions of the Visual Approach.A review of the KSAN class B airspace will show that a normal Right Downwind leg (North of the MZB 084 radial) must be flown at or above 4;800 MSL in order to remain above the floor of class B airspace. This is an unusually high altitude to fly a Downwind leg if planning to fly a normal Visual Approach. My understanding is that this is a known issue and the KSAN class B airspace is in the process of being re-designed in order to better accommodate normal right hand traffic pattern Visual Approaches to Runway 27 at KSAN.After looking at the flight paths of several flights arriving KSAN from the North; I believe inadvertent descents below the 4;800 MSL sector of the KSAN class B is a relatively common occurrence. I suggest either a Flight Operations Bulletin or otherwise a NOTE on the plate alerting flight crews to this issue; at least until the KSAN class B airspace re-design has been completed.

A First Officer expressed concern regarding SAN traffic pattern when flying a Visual Approach to Runway 27. The Downwind leg descends below the floor of the SAN Class B (4;800 feet MSL); where it abuts the MYF and SEE Class D associated quadrants; north of the MZB 084 Radial.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While climbing out on the departure at approximately 13;500 feet and at 310 KIAS; we experienced a bird strike on the radome aircraft left. The remains of the bird covered the L1 window making it nearly impossible to see through. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) and transferred control to the First Officer (FO). We diverted back [to departure airport]. Operations were normal.

Air carrier operation during climb experienced a major bird strike resulting in obscuration of Captain's windshield. First Officer flew remainder of flight back to airport of origin.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Several minutes into cruise flight; we received the CAS message 'HYD VOLUME LOW A' with the Master Caution light. I called for the Master Caution-Amber Message checklist; acknowledged the light; and brought up the Fuel/Hydraulic system synoptic page on the EICAS. Step one on the checklist is to check the hydraulic pressure and fluid quantity. Pressure appeared normal; but the quantity was holding steady at 17%; and temperature appeared normal. At top of cruise; a few minutes before; the A system quantity was checked per normal operations checklist and read better than 60%. Given that there was no abnormal temperature; nor fluctuations in pressure; I elected to wait and monitor before continuing with the Master Caution checklist. The next step in the checklist has you unload the main hydraulic pump which effectively makes that system inoperative and I did not want to shut a system down unnecessarily if the problem was indication only and not mechanical. A short time later; I observed the fluid quantity drop to 16% and then; after some additional time; finally to 15%. At that time; I asked my FO to unload the A system hydraulic pump and complete the checklist which ends with '...Land as soon as practical...'. My FO and I reviewed the Cessna 750 checklist page which defines this and agreed that with the hydraulic system secured; and no other abnormal indications; nor any catastrophic failure; we did not need to land immediately at the nearest airport. We were over the northern plains states at FL430; airspeed approximately .89M-.90M and fuel was not an issue as I had planned to tanker additional fuel back to base. We began reviewing various suitable airports within several hundred miles of our position and determined that many were either below minimums for the available instrument approach; or the prevailing winds were not well suited for an approach with a only the B hydraulic system and the Rudder Standby System. My FO and I discussed several options for landing; the first being the possibility of landing in ZZZ1 which was several hundred miles from our current position; but appeared the closest suitable major airport with light winds; relatively clear skies. At this point; I asked my FO to bring up the weather at our filed alternate [California]. At that time; the weather there was reported as VFR; winds that favored the active runway. I asked my FO to change our destination to ZZZ even though this was substantially further away. My reasoning was that ZZZ provided an excellent balance between getting our passengers to their destination; specialized repair capability for the aircraft; close proximity to our home base; as well as suitable multiple runways and emergency capabilities. I discussed my thought processes with my FO and reviewed other various options. My FO stated she agreed with continuing to ZZZ instead of diverting to ZZZ1.During the descent into ZZZ; we began to receive weather reports that showed substantial weather deterioration with many storm cells moving over the airport. My FO and I again discussed other landing options; but came to the conclusion that ZZZ was still our best one. It was at this point that my FO reminded me that we had not declared an emergency; nor informed ATC of the loss of the A hydraulic system. I immediately asked my FO to report our condition to Approach and communicate with the ZZZ tower that we would need time to complete the manual extension of the landing gear; various checklists; and would prefer a longer than normal final on the ILS. Additionally; we informed ATC that we would not be able to clear the runway on our own after landing. Approach and ZZZ Tower worked us as priority in the airspace for our arrival and I executed an uneventful approach and landing; using the predicted amount of runway for our condition.Looking back; the decision to carry on to ZZZ was NOT CORRECT. We should have landed in ZZZ1; or another suitable airport much closer to our position when the hydraulic issue presented itself. To continue on with a primary hydraulic system inoperative for an extended amount of time is less than ideal judgment and I believe several human factors contributed to this. Among them; a Target Fixation and Mission First mentality: I had been dealing with the other previous trip interruptions and cancelations due to maintenance issues before launching on this trip. There had been two chronic problems; unrelated to the hydraulic fault; that had just recently been resolved the night before and I did not want to down the aircraft at another out-station with the additional expense of putting our passengers on the airlines again. Also; Fatigue: As part of the continuing unrelated maintenance issues; I had recently traveled to the service center to pick up the current airplane; in addition to continuing to fly trips on our company's other aircraft and had been at a high activity level for an extended amount of time.

CE750 Captain experienced a CAS message 'HYD VOLUME LOW A' at FL430 a few minutes after level off. The applicable checklist directed that the system be unloaded by turning off the engine driven pump and ends with 'land as soon as practical.' The reporter elected to continue to an alternate that was two hours ahead and closer to destination.