Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

While working locals combined with Ground Control; I issued a takeoff clearance to Aircraft X. The pilot informed me that while departing a vehicle had crossed the runway near midfield in front of him and that the pilot was still taking off and would pass behind him. The vehicle that crossed is part of the construction team working on repaving runways. The procedures for crossing the active runway is a single point of contact on the ground who is also part of the construction team. The vehicle that crossed the runway did not have permission to do so; now a radio to contact me for crossing. Someone with radio communication who is familiar with air traffic radio calls and phraseology to be put in charge of the crossings; which has already been put into place.

I had just taken position maybe 2 minutes prior to the incident occurring. My back was turned away from the runways as I was seated at my position. I was on the shout line doing some coordination when I heard some yelling from the other controllers in the tower cab reference a vehicle crossing a runway in front of an aircraft. My understanding is that the Local Controller was not in contact with this vehicle in any way; nor gave permission to any vehicle during this time to cross the runway. It is my belief that a breakdown in runway crossing procedures from the construction side of things is what led to this happening. My recommendation is no more single point of contact for runway crossings. At minimum one person or point of contact on either side of the runway both with radio capabilities to control the line from the closed non-movement area to the runway movement area.

MHW Tower controllers reported a departing aircraft notified them they took off over a vehicle which was on the runway.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Passenger vomited on aft galley floor; [portable spill kit] was used. Flight Attendant B cleaned up vomit as Flight Attendant A maintained the main cabin and first class.

EMB-175 Flight Attendant reported using biohazard cleanup kit to clean up vomit in aft galley.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 650

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The Ivanpah Solar Power Plant glare caused cockpit illumination. The glare makes scanning for traffic impossible over approximately 40 degrees of the horizon which is directly ahead of the aircraft; approaching WHIGG Intersection; on V21. To avoid eye discomfort the pilot had to lower his view point in the aircraft to place the power plant mirrors below the glareshield.

M20 pilot reports the glare from a Solar Power Plant requires the pilot seat to be lowered so the glareshield blocks the mirrors; but also eliminates the view forward.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Aircraft X apparently operated with dangerous goods onboard without being provided with a NOTOC [Notice to Captain] and apparently with cargo not loaded according to the load plan. Loadmaster in ZZZ provided a W/B balance form that stated 'NOTOC: YES' but did not provide a NOTOC. When I asked the Loadmaster about the NOTOC; he said 'the two containers of Hazmat did not get loaded onto our aircraft because it accidentally was loaded on the other flight instead;' and asked us if we would make a last minute change to the W/B to reflect no NOTOC. I asked several times to confirm that no dangerous goods were loaded on the aircraft and was verbally assured of this. Load verification was performed with no discrepancies. The flight continued to ZZZ1 without incident. Upon receiving the W/B in ZZZ1 for the continuing flight to ZZZ2; I was provided a NOTOC. I asked the Loadmaster if cargo was uploaded. He said no; cargo was only offloaded. So I asked why we were provided a NOTOC and he said 'because you have dangerous goods onboard.' I explained what we were told in ZZZ and he confirmed that there were two containers of dangerous goods in the belly and furthermore there were several containers not loaded according to the load plan (wrong location).

B767 Captain reported transporting Hazmat shipment with incorrect/missing documentation and verbal verification of no Hazmat on board.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 438; Flight Crew Type 17000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Descending on the [arrival] into ZZZ about 70 NM out; we retrieved the updated ATIS as well as the METAR. Both indicated a tailwind exceeding limits into ZZZ on Runway 30. Winds were indicating about a 13 kt. tailwind. Pilot Monitoring asked NorCal approach if ZZZ was going to change runways to Runway XX since the winds were out of limits for Runway XY. They said they would ask and to continue on the Runway XY transition. We were switched over to another NorCal frequency and they asked what our limit was and we told them 10 kts. Approach reported ZZZ Tower said the winds were 120 at 9 knots and to continue to Runway XY. Eventually cleared ILS Runway XY and broke out into visual conditions about 2;500 ft. MSL. We had [weather] up and were monitoring the tailwind as well as asking for multiple wind checks from Tower. [Weather] showed a tailwind from 18-20 kts. all the way down final to include 150 ft. AGL where a go-around was initiated. During this time; ZZZ Tower kept reporting surface winds 120 at 9 knots. Tower recognized our going around and directed to fly runway heading and maintain 2;000 ft. The Pilot Flying hit TOGA and applied thrust to climb away and called for flaps 15. Pilot Monitoring moved the flaps to 15 and responded back to Tower.At this point the aircraft was accelerating and the Pilot Flying called for flaps 5 and Pilot Monitoring repeated and moved the flaps. The same with flaps 1. About 1;000 ft.; we realized we had not placed the gear up; so we did so at this point. During this time Pilot Monitoring had to make multiple radio calls to ZZZ to confirm they wanted us runway heading instead of the published missed approach which was different. Once we got cleaned up; we were cleared to 5;000 ft. and placed on a heading back to Runway XY. Once everything had calmed down; we realized we performed the incorrect procedure for the go-around and had cleaned up the aircraft fully prior to 1;000 ft. We debriefed the procedure and what we needed to do to mitigate the risks and ensure correct procedures in the future. We then started setting up for the next approach. At this point; the aircraft behind us on approach to Runway XY went around as well. Pilot Monitoring called NorCal and asked them again if the runway was going to be switched to Runway XX. They were not sure and said it's Tower's decision and we might need to hold. Finally after 15 minutes of vectors; we were cleared the ILS Runway XX into ZZZ with no further incident. Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring further debriefed on the ground.

Flight Crew reported a go around due to tail winds exceeding limits.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our aircraft had APU MEL requiring an air start to get an engine running; however the APU could still provide electrical power. About the time we were finishing loading passengers we became aware of an Estimated Departure Clearance Time (EDCT) for our departure that was an hour and ten minutes away. I decided to complete the boarding process and made preparations for departure and pushed off the gate in order to free the gate up for the next arrival. On taxi out Ground gave us a clearance to taxi to the intersection of two taxiways to hold for the remainder of the time till the EDCT. Ground told us we could shut down engines; but be ready to move [20 Minutes before EDCT]. We acknowledged. While continuing taxiing I contemplated whether to leave the engine running since I only had about thirty minutes remaining and I would still be above minimum takeoff fuel or shut it down to save the fuel for airborne contingencies. I choose the later. When we stopped; I set the parking brake; looked at the fuel and time; told the First Officer my plan; checked the electrical AC synoptic page to ensure the APU was still a viable source of power and proceeded to shut the engine down. As I brought the thrust lever into the shut off detent; the FO said 'Wait' and it hit me as to what I had just done; shut down the engine which now required an air start cart to get it running again. We immediately formulated how we were going to resolve this dilemma. I contacted Operations and explained what I had done and what I needed. The FO explained to Ground what had happened and what we were working on with our Operations folks. Ground control said they would contact the City to provide escort to get what ever equipment was needed out to us. Operations had me call Maintenance and explain what we needed; which I did. All in all it took about 12 minutes for the air cart to arrive. We got an engine started and were ready to taxi to make our original EDCT. Other than one airplane that was asked to give way to the convoy of City escort vehicles; no operations on the airport were held up or adversely affected.The event occurred because I wasn't paying attention to my immediate situation. I let call from Ground about shutting down distract me and set a plan in motion that would have been 'normal' procedure on any other day. Before taking actions that take primary components off-line; verify the reason(s) with the other pilot. That little bit of extra time and thought could have produced the 'wait' call before it was too late.

With 30 minutes to go before assigned departure time; the captain of a commercial aircraft with an MEL that precluded the APU from starting engines; shut down the engine while stopped on a taxiway; forgetting that an air-start cart would be required to restart the engine. The crew requested and received an air-start cart to their location. Ground Control coordinated providing an escort.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft X was on route direct to MANTA intersection and then an arrival into PHL descending to FL280. I had plugged into Sector 31 as the radar controller a couple of minutes prior to the aircraft checking on; and was informed by the previous controller that there were some weather deviations; but surprisingly no bad rides. I issued the weather to Aircraft X and received no response. No more than two minutes later I issued a descent clearance to Aircraft X to cross 35 miles north of MANTA at FL200; no response and I issued it one more time. The pilot read back the clearance and then reported moderate turbulence descending from FL300-280 five miles behind. I thanked him for the report. At this point I was relieved from position to take over as CIC (Controller In Charge) in the area.  A couple of minutes later; the new Sector 31 Controller advised me that Aircraft X encountered moderate to severe turbulence and that there were injuries on board the aircraft. The aircraft was switched to ZNY for more expedient routing.

Aircraft X was flight planned through a FPG (Flight Planning Guidance) that had light-moderate-occasional Turbulence from FL280-FL340. Flight was planned to descend to FL280 at LFV. There was an FPG in the area; if I remember it started just prior to LFV. I had no reports of bad or good rides reported by other Flights in the area.There were no SIGMETs or PIREPs in the area; from other flights traversing the area in question.

Two Controllers and two Dispatchers reported a flight encountered severe turbulence which resulted in injuries to flight attendants and passengers.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While the flight was holding due to thunderstorms at ZZZ; the Dispatcher began to evaluate closer alternates. The Dispatcher checked SPS NOTAMs in SABRE and noted the Tower was NOTAMed closed but there was no runway closure NOTAMs in SABRE. Upon further evaluation and checking NOTAMs on the FAA website; the Dispatcher saw that there in fact was a NOTAM in effect for runway 15R/33L CLOSED that was not in SABRE. The runway was closed with work in progress. The NOTAM was sent to the NOTAM Management System but was never published into SABRE. Flight Planning published the NOTAM after becoming aware of the discrepancy. This could have been a dangerous situation if the flight attempted to land on this closed runway with possible work equipment on the runway; tower closed and at night time.

An air carrier Dispatcher reported that important NOTAM information regarding a runway closer was not published in the company's flight planning software.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On takeoff from ZZZ; at approximately V1; aircraft pulled slightly left (perhaps 6-10 ft.). CA (Captain) suspected either wind gust; wake turbulence from preceding aircraft; or uneven pavement as the possible cause. Aircraft corrected back to centerline and normal takeoff and departure were made. Both CA and FO (First Officer) felt it was prudent however; to have the Tower observe the undercarriage before a landing was made just in case the cause was due to tire; nose gear; etc. so; as a precautionary measure; CA chose to make a low approach prior to landing for a visual inspection of the landing gear by the tower. As expected; no anomalies were seen by the Tower and subsequently a normal landing was made without incident or further issue. No further ground control issues were noted. A report was filed to ensure the company was aware of the reason for the low approach and since it appeared that ATC may have subsequently [given us priority handling] and had emergency vehicles standing by as a precaution. I became aware of possible FAA investigation via phone call from [Company]. Prior to this phone call; I was not aware of any potential non-compliance or outstanding issue for that flight. Therefore; no report was previously filed. Additionally; no maintenance write-up was made of this incident due to the fact that no known maintenance problem or repair was identified.Be aware of possible wake turbulence effects during t/o roll.Ensure Captain is made aware that [priority handling was given] by ATC; etc.

E-175 Captain reported becoming aware of possible FAA investigation regarding a low approach prior to full stop landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 137; Flight Crew Type 137

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Standard landing approach to Runway 13. Flared for landing and touched right rear wheel first. A wind gust lifted the plane from the left rear and the nose went into the runway damaging the propeller. The plane did not flip and ultimately settled on all 3 wheels. The engine continued to run and did not feel off-balance so I pulled off the runway and taxied to the ramp area. After shutting the engine down I exited the plane and examined the plane. The propeller was significantly damaged and the tip of the passenger side wing was slightly damaged.

A Cessna 172 pilot reported that gust of wind caused him lose control during landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 18501; Flight Crew Type 7858

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

The aircraft had a recent history of a trailing edge flap disagreement. We were on final approach; lowered the landing gear and selected flaps 25 when the trailing edge light and associated TE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message illuminated. After initially deciding to run the checklist while continuing the approach; it quickly became apparent as we approached 1;000 FT that a go-around was a safer course of action. We accomplished a go-around and notified ATC.Once level at 4;000 FT I left the flaps at 20; gave the aircraft to the First Officer; and accomplished the abnormal checklist from the QRH with the Relief First Officer. I then noticed the note in the procedure advising to leave the flaps in the selected position. We had reverted to the normal go around profile and had moved the flap handle to 20. Because of this; the QRH procedure was a bit confusing. We no longer had the TRAILING EDGE light or the EICAS message because both the flap lever and flap position were at 20. We configured the aircraft per the QRH procedure for a flaps 20 approach and landing. We checked the Abnormal Landing Distance Table and the runway length required was not a problem; but we requested 10; a longer runway. We did not declare an emergency. I briefed the Lead Flight Attendant to advise her of the aircraft condition and an expected normal landing in 10 minutes. I made a passenger announcement advising the same. I then resumed flying the aircraft and performed an uneventful approach and landing. After landing; we left the flaps at position 20; and stayed on the aircraft 25 minutes to brief Maintenance personnel at the gate to ensure a proper write-up was entered in the maintenance system.

TE Flap Disagree Checklist was performed to conclusion with a flaps 20 final landing configuration.After completing the checklist and a brief discussion; the Captain and First Officer again switch roles with the Captain now flying the approach. Landing was uneventful and the aircraft taxied to the gate.Of note: Normal go-around procedures conflict somewhat with TE Flap Disagree Checklist in that once the flaps are positioned to 20 on the go-around the TE Flap Disagree message goes away. However; once you run the checklist it states not to move the flap handle. Additionally the checklist becomes confusing because the light is now OUT vice ON. However; the end result would have been the same in that both possible branches of the checklist (light ON or light OFF) would have led to the same resulting configuration in this situation. Also; flying with the flap handle at position 25 with the landing gear up on a go-around would have led to a loud configuration warning.

A B767-300 EICAS alerted TE FLAP DISAGREE when flaps 20 were selected on final. Unable to complete the QRH; a go-around was executed; flaps 20 mistakenly selected and the QRH then completed for a normal landing. The Alert ceased with flaps 20 selection.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

An air start was needed at [gate] on a quick turn. when I went on the headset I told the Captain we are ready for an air start. He then proceeded to start engine number 2 on his own. An agent did not know that engine was on and walked right in front and almost got sucked in.

Ground personnel reported Captain started engine without obtaining clearance; almost ingesting a ground agent.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated

During the walk around I noticed a light brown liquid dripping from the tail cone area of the fuselage and down the left side of the aircraft. Maintenance was called and reported that it was glycol. Upon taxi out we received an EICAS 'L HYD ELEC PUMP' advisory message so we returned to the gate. After making the arrival PA we shutdown and ran the parking checklist. We then noticed an overheat light illuminated for the L HYD ELEC PUMP; which was off. A Mechanic then came onboard and advised us we had smoke coming out of our left wing. The Captain directed me to call ARFF. I requested ARFF on Ramp Control frequency and was advised to request ARFF on operations frequency. While I was on the radio the Captain was making his PA and coordinating with the flight attendants. When we exited the aircraft I looked at the wing and noticed the left aft slide deployed and people sliding down it.

After departure; flight returned to the gate as the Captain announced that there was hydraulic problem. When we got to the gate; we started an orange juice and water beverage service. The FA1 made an announcement directing all passengers to collect all their belongings and get off of the aircraft. Shortly thereafter; FA1 made a subsequent announcement stating this is an emergency; get off the aircraft now; don't bring anything with you; this is an emergency. I was towards the rear of the aircraft serving the beverages when I heard the first announcement; so I went to the aft galley immediately. It seemed like only moments later the second announcement was made. I began looking in the cabin to see if I could determine what was happening. I could smell a strong odor that suggested something was burning. The passengers immediately began lining up and moving towards the rear of the cabin with urgency and were quickly amassed at the aft galley. I heard excited utterances from passengers but cannot recall the specific statements. Then a female passenger stated: 'she told us we had to use this exit.' I assessed the situation and with the limited facts I had; I determined that an emergency did indeed exist due to the announcements; the passenger stating she was directed to my exit; and passengers were indeed at my exit apparently following crew member commands. I determined that passengers would not have taken these actions without being directed to do so. I believed the only safe course of action was to follow procedures; arm the door; release the slide and begin evacuating the aircraft.

B757 flight crew and two of the flight attendants describe the events leading up to a return to the gate and an evacuation that follows when smoke is detected coming from the wheel well by ground personnel. The Captain had intended that passengers leave promptly through the 2L entry door; but some of the crew and passengers used the escape slide at the 4L door.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

After one hour in flight; ECAM displayed WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT. This fault was not an Immediate Action nor an ECAM Exception; however the QRH follow-up directed us to go to page 10. The instructions on page 11 of the QRH directed us to initiate the steps after landing gear extension. After we discussed the plan of action as a crew; the Captain communicated the final plan to the Dispatcher and Maintenance personnel. Once coordinated with ATC; we decided to execute the procedure about 10 miles from the airport. The landing gear was lowered and the nose wheel steering fault remained on display. The WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT checklist was completed. The final QRH guidance was that automatic rollout was not permitted and the use of differential braking to steer the aircraft during taxi was necessary. The ECAM supplemental Non-normal and Emergency Landing Checklist were also reviewed and followed step by step. The ECAM displayed CAT III Dual and N/W STRG were inoperative. The Captain decided to land on the longest runway. After landing the Captain cleared the runway using differential braking. The Fire Chief inspected the nose gear and once cleared; the Captain taxied forward to better position the airplane to be towed away. Once coordinated with ATC and ground personnel; the airplane was towed to the gate.Unknown cause of the equipment malfunction. All QRH procedures and Company guidance were followed. The Captain did an outstanding job integrating the crew; communicating and coordinating the final plan.

A321 First Officer reported a nosewheel steering fault inflight. The flight landed with inoperative nosewheel steering.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Staffing; Airspace Structure

I was working three radar positions combined:  LOVES; VIKKY & SEALL.  Aircraft X was descending on the BUONO4 arrival route into HPN.  He had crossed GWENY intersection at 11;000 FT and was descending to 6;000 FT as instructed by me; still established on the arrival route.  Aircraft Y; was also inbound to HPN; routed HTO...KEYED...BDR...RYMES...KHPN.  He had just crossed KEYED intersection at 7;000 as instructed by the adjacent controller (position I308) and was on my frequency.  These two routes converge just north of CCC.  The normal but unofficial Standard Operating Procedure for the sector is to take the BUONO4 arrival off the route once they have begun descending out of 11;000 by turning them left direct BDR.  This saves the descending aircraft approximately 10NM of travel and keeps the arrival stream compact.  This was my plan; had I turned Aircraft X when I should have; he would have been 10NM in front of Aircraft Y.  But I got distracted by some VFR aircraft criss-crossing IFR traffic to the SW of BDR; and by a VFR who was calling for advisories but using very confusing position reporting and incorrect altitude reports.  While attempting to locate the as-yet unidentified VFR aircraft (was not sure he was even in my airspace); I neglected to turn Aircraft X towards BDR.  Aircraft X descended on a NE-bound heading on a converging course towards Aircraft Y who was established on a NW-bound heading.  When I realized the aircraft were converging; I took immediate action; turning Aircraft X left to a heading of 360.  I recognized that this was inadequate; so I turned Aircraft Y left to a 240 heading in an attempt to turn him behind Aircraft X.  As Aircraft X was already descending out of 7;000 FT as he was turning; I had no choice but to have him continue his descent; trying to stop the descent at that point would have only made the situation worse.  The speeds of the aircraft (both 250 KTS) and the trajectory made it impossible to maintain separation.  I am told the aircraft passed within 1.43 NM of each other; 400 FT separation.  I was working three positions combined; and the only other Radar Controller (SATCS) was working four positions combined.  The staffing in our sector is less than half of what it was in 1994 when our facility experienced a record number of operational errors.  The Regional Assessment Team assembled to research common contributing causes of operational errors that year reported too many combined positions being a major contributing factor.   We have been working with combined positions as the norm for so long that formal SOP procedures are all but unused; vectors and short-cuts are the 'new SOP.' I should have stopped Aircraft X at 8;000 feet; ensuring that I turned him and had separation before descending him further.  This is what I normally would have done; especially if I had been working the VIKKY position alone.  Due to the constant working of LOVES VIKKY SEALL combined; the routine of turning aircraft off the BUONO4 arrival route has become habit; over-riding common sense.

N90 controller reports of working a combined sectors and having an operational error due to distractions of VFR aircraft calling him.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 3437; Flight Crew Type 500

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I took off on and made a left 270 to 1;500 feet MSL as directed to cross over ZZZ airport midfield and then vectors to 020.  As I rolled out on heading and ZZZ called the frequency change at 1;800 feet to Approach; the rear latch on my Glasair Super II Pilot side door failed and slid out of the latched position and back up inside the door. I immediately grabbed the door handle and held it cross body to keep the door from opening in flight and subsequently departing the aircraft. (The Glasair gull wing door is known for departing the aircraft and possibly striking the tail in flight if it opens fully). Thankfully the forward latching pin stayed engaged enough to hold the door in place with my having grabbed the handle and slowing the aircraft enough that the air stream stopped pulling it outward (I slowed from 140 kts indicated to approximately 90 kts indicated). At this point I made a right turn back towards and right downwind for the XX runways. I explained the situation with Tower.  They cleared runway and cleared me to land.  I was able to maintain a slow enough speed and descended from 1;800 feet to the runway without further incident.  I taxied off as directed and into a run up area; where I was able to shutdown; explained the situation to Ground Control; retrieve my tool kit and manually reset and lock the pilot side door for flight.  I was then able to take off and fly back to ZZZ1 without incident.Upon Further investigation once back home; I found that the resin block that held the rear latching pin and guide in place had completely dislodged inside the door and caused the rear latching pin to slide up into the door instead of into the latch housing into the aircraft frame.  This lack of closure was not evident until slipstream was fast enough to pull the door from its recess (approximately 130 kts) and cause it start to dislodge from the aircraft body.  The repair will be to use vinyl ester resin and cabosil filler to glue the metal latch guide back into place inside the door frame; so that the latch cannot slide into and up inside the door frame.

Pilot flying Glasair Super II encountered unlatched cockpit door after takeoff.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

We were in the process of flying an uneventful approach at the end of an uneventful flight. The approach was the visual approach to runway 32 in IND. We were following an aircraft and another aircraft was about to depart and we assume that one of these aircraft; perhaps both; interfered with the glideslope signal. As is usual; we were backing up the visual approach with the ILS and on autopilot as well.When the interference occurred; it was sudden and surprising in intensity. I have seen this occur many times throughout the years; and without question this was the worst I've seen. As the glideslope deviated upward; the aircraft of course went with it and initiated a steep pitch attitude and almost full power. The first officer (FO)was caught unaware as this was new to him; and in the moment's indecision; I assumed the controls and stabilized the aircraft. I was able to return to a stable configured flight path at about 1;100-1;200 ft; and decided to maintain controls for the remainder of the approach; as I didn't feel it appropriate to transfer controls at that point of the approach. We then landed without further incident.A check airman was on the jumpseat and was able to provide some added and informed insight to a discussion we all had upon reaching the parking point. The FO seemed slightly shaken; and we veterans were surprised as well; at how quickly the aircraft reacted to a disrupted glideslope indication. The pitch and power inputs were drastic; personally; I'd like a download of the data to see just what it did. It was a vivid demonstration to the FO of what this particular situation can do to a pilot in that you can have a pristine day that suddenly goes wrong. Without intervention; I'm not sure what state the aircraft would have achieved with the oscillation that followed. The downward pitch and excessive power input would probably have resulted in a potential CFIT threat.As well; indecision as to what action to take can create issues hazardous to a positive outcome of the flight. Absent a decision to correct the flight path or to call for a go-around; I needed to intervene; which provided a vivid and excellent teaching moment for the FO who now has seen an authentic representation of how quickly scenarios can change in this environment. We decided to report this since we do believe it was an upset. There may be an issue with the glideslope itself and may need to be addressed by the airport authority as this scenario is easily repeated. The only way to get experience is to get experience. The FO needed it; and now he has some more. Because I have some; we corrected it to an uneventful outcome.

While on final approach to IND RWY 32 at approximately the FAF; IND Tower cleared an aircraft onto RWY 32. The aircraft passed through and interrupted the RWY 32 Glide Slope transmission. The FO had the FMS coupled to the ILS 32. The disruption caused a GS indication that was nose high (estimated 10 degrees) which the autopilot (AP) tracked and the autothrottle advanced to takeoff thrust. FO's reaction to this inflight upset was delayed; (fixation/confusion on the abrupt pitch/thrust change); prompting the CA to announce; and take the flight controls. The CA immediately and smoothly returned the aircraft to the ILS glide path and because being in a critical phase of flight; landed the aircraft.Several contributing factors.1) FO was on a line check with a check airman jumpseat observing him. He was a little nervous. 2) Weather was clear with light to moderate winds. This crew was performing well and were literally minutes away from landing.3) FO was a recent new hire. Because of that; I am assuming he had low time in CFR Part 121 operations.4) FO described that he had never encountered this kind of GS anomaly before and was unfamiliar with ground GS aircraft disruptions.Crew knowledge and experience are the only way to prevent this event.Conclusion: Excellent rapid control by the CA. Excellent learning experience for the FO.

Air carrier flight crew reported an interrupted glideslope signal at IND caused the aircraft to pitch up while on autopilot. The Captain took control from the First Officer and landed the aircraft.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 2300

Three aircraft were involved in this incident. The corporate jet about to depart Runway 12; the experimental that took off on Runway 3; and the trainer my student and I were in as observers on downwind. My student and I were doing touch and go pattern work on runway 12 at LVN. Winds were calm. Normally; 30 is the calm wind runway; but at the beginning of operations that morning; aircraft favored 12. During one of our circuits; a corporate jet taxied out to the takeoff end of 12 in order to await our arrival/departure. As we were climbing out and turning a right crosswind; I heard a white experimental aircraft announce takeoff on 30. At the same time; the jet announced departure on 12. I informed the experimental that he should not enter the runway as a jet was about to depart and 12 was the current active runway (we had been announcing our position in the pattern all along). The experimental continued its takeoff roll without any further communication. I told the jet on CTAF that he had a renegade aircraft heading his way; so he stopped.During this time; we executed a left hand turn away from the traffic pattern to ensure we would not conflict with the experimental. The jet pilot thanked me for the heads up. The offending aircraft yelled the word 'renegade' on the airwaves as a taunt and continued to depart the area.

GA flight instructor reported while in the pattern at LVN a corporate jet announced their intention to depart Runway 12 while an experimental aircraft announced and continued to takeoff on Runway 30.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 88.3; Flight Crew Total 754.7; Flight Crew Type 213.1

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During flight on a practice VFR/VMC approach; the engine began sputtering. I swapped fuel tanks and it fixed the issue but I immediately began making my way to the nearest airport (ZZZ about 10NM from our location). Roughly 5-10 seconds later; the engine began sputtering again. I swapped the tanks again; and identified a location to set it down. A few seconds after swapping fuel tanks for the second time the engine quit. The auxiliary pump was on before the first instance of engine sputter and remained for the remainder of the flight. Once the engine quit and I realized I was not going to make ZZZ; so I [advised ATC] on XXX.YYY (ZZZ Approach). I advised Approach I was over the town of X and was going to set it down on a road in town. It was the only road that had enough lamp posts to where I could actually see the road. I executed the landing with no power. There was no damage done to any property or the aircraft; and there were no injuries or deaths.The conditions the night of the off field landing were night time (approximately 3 hours after sunset); winds from the south around 5 kts; 0% illumination with the moon still below the horizon at the time of the landing; and clear skies.The POH of the aircraft flown states at 75% power at the altitudes I was flying the aircraft should have been burning 10.5 gallons per hour. The 48 gallons total usable fuel capacity of the aircraft allows for appximately 4.5 hours of flight time before empty. We took off with full fuel. We ran out of fuel at 3.5 hours of Hobbs times. At the time of the engine stoppage; we should have had approximately 10 gallons/1 hour of fuel remaining.A new engine had just been installed on the aircraft. It had already flown on the new engine for approximately 2-3 hours when I was dispatched the aircraft for my flight. There was no fuel leak identified during the pre-flight. Or reported from the prior users of the aircraft.

PA-28 pilot reported that the engine began sputtering during approach and eventually stopped. Pilot executed a successful off-field landing.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure

I started July 2015 in ZZZ; for a flight to ZZZ1. When I took the plane from the crew; I checked through the logbook as I usually do and noticed the brakes and Brake Temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) had been an ongoing issue for this tail number. I think the first write up was in June. I looked at the BTMS readings and they seemed normal to me; but that was after 30 minutes on the ground. I believe they read 02 01 02 00; so no cause for alarm. We took the plane to ZZZ1; and in route I studied the logbook a bit closer. It was apparent to me and the first Mechanic in the logbook; that; there is/was a brake issue with this aircraft. So I decided to look a bit closer at the problem.We landed in ZZZ1 with no issues and taxied to the gate. Under normal conditions and now parked at the gate; the BTMS now read 05 06 05 00. And this became my write up for the aircraft. I called Dispatch; and then talked to Maintenance. I explained how the aircraft had been written up a few times for this issue; and said I didn't think the brake was working. I also mentioned how when I went outside; the Right-Hand Outboard Brake (RHOB) wheel did not seem anywhere near as warm as the others. I had put my hand near the outside of the wheels; not inside near the brakes. I was told a Mechanic would be out to take a look. We had about a two hour turn; and I went into the Crew room. I came back to the aircraft 35 minutes prior to find the BTMS had been MEL'd again. This was the second time I believe. I called for the Mechanics to come out as I had an issue with this. I also called my Dispatcher; a Dispatch Lead and Maintenance again; and told them all I didn't think the RHOB brake was working and just wanted a Mechanic to assure me it was and that it was just the BTMS.Three mechanics came out to the aircraft to hear my concerns. They told me when they checked the brake it was warm and so assumed that it must have been hotter before (when the BTMS read 00) and so it must have been the temperature sensor. I told them I thought the heat they were feeling was residual heat from the neighboring brake; and that the bit of warmth now; still would not show 01 on the sensor. They disagreed and I ask them to just make sure the brake works so I'll feel better about taking this aircraft to ZZZ1. They argued some more but finally said; 'Fine! We will check the brakes.' One mechanic went into the flight deck while another went outside. The third remained in the jet bridge with me. After only about two minutes; the other two mechanics came back up and said the brakes were fine. When I asked how they tested them and how I can be sure they work they stated; 'We followed the procedure.' When I asked what that was; that was all they would tell me. I called Dispatch again; explained what had been done and told them though I'm not happy about how this was handled; that if a Mechanic looks me in the eye; tells me my aircraft is airworthy; then I can't really argue the point any further. I then asked Dispatch to coordinate with Maintenance in ZZZ2 and I would like someone to meet the plane at the gate in ZZZ2. They agreed and would make it happen.Took the flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 with no issues. Landed; taxied to the gate and looked again at the BTMS. It read 05 06 06 -- ; and so I assumed all the brakes would be noticeably hot to the touch. I went directly to the RHOB brake five minutes after we parked at the gate. It was cold to the touch. No heat at all. It was again my belief the brake; though brand new and recently replaced (in the attempts to fix the issue since June) was not working. At all. The ZZZ2 Mechanic showed up soon after and took a look as well. I wrote the plane up again; called [Dispatch] and expressed my anger; disappointment and concern that I was shoved off in ZZZ1 and sent to ZZZ2 with an aircraft that was not airworthy

Reporter stated he has not experienced any issues with the Brake Temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) in the past on the CRJ-900 except for this particular aircraft. He believes the connector to the brake temperature sensor was previously disconnected and capped; but the brake function did not seem to have been fully confirmed prior to the MEL deferral of the BTMS. He was unaware his aircraft was not airworthy when he departed on the first leg of two flights. Since one of the four MLG brakes was not functioning; RTO limitations could have been an issue. He does not know if a wheel spin test was accomplished as part of the maintenance troubleshooting after he wrote-up the 'cold' brake. He doesn't know what the fix was; if any; but the aircraft was considered okay for service and released again.

A Captain reports about his efforts to convince Maintenance and Dispatch that the Right-Hand Outboard Brake (RHOB) on a CRJ-900 aircraft had not been operating and the Brake Temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) deferral was not the problem.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 9022; Flight Crew Type 207

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was switched from ZHU Center to Kingsville Approach and I requested direct to the IAF CELIV for the COPTER RNAV 22 into the Alice Hospital. Kingsville Approach stated that they could not clear me for the approach; because they did not have the procedures; yet in the past we have had other controllers clear us. This has been an on-going issue with this particular facility. The approaches are certified and have been established for this hospital for some time. A short time later Kingsville came back and told me to maintain altitude until reaching CELIV and established; switch to advisory and report IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) cancellation on the frequency; or call their number when I'm on the ground. In hindsight; I'm not sure if they were finally able to locate their copy of the procedure; and I may have confused their last set of instructions as the clearance. When I contacted Kingsville TRACON by phone to coordinate my departure from the hospital; I was given the designated Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP) for that particular location; adding further confusion; because there must be a copy of the procedure.

Helicopter pilot reports Air Traffic Control did not have proper procedure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While on approach into PBI; we were at 7000 FT MSL and given a clearance to cross GULLO at 3000 FT. As we started the descent; we hit turbulence; then rolled hard to the right. The autopilot disconnected. I took [the] controls and started to level the aircraft when a second wave hit us harder and pitched the plane down and rolled hard right to about 45-60 degrees wing down. I tried to level the aircraft but it wouldn't roll back level. I tried to climb above the wake turbulence. After using excessive control I got the plane to roll level and climbed back to 7000 FT from about 6600 FT. We lost about 400 feet during the encounter. We asked ATC and they said we were 7 miles behind a 737-800. We took a vector out of the turbulence area and returned to another attempt to the approach.

Descending on the WLACE4 arrival into PBI just about to GULLO we encountered severe wake turbulence from aircraft in front of us. This resulted in a 45-60 degree right roll and nose down pitch attitude. Pilot flying was fighting aircraft to return to level flight. Passengers were in seat belts and were ok but scared. After recovering to level flight after 300 FT altitude loss I queried ATC as to climb back up to 7000 FT and reported the wake turbulence. [Controller gave] us a spacing vector and continued on arrival to 10L. She said it was a 737-800 seven miles ahead. Landed safe and wrote up airplane to be inspected.

CE-560XLS flight crew reported encountering severe wake turbulence on arrival into PBI 7 miles in trail of a B737-800.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Captain called into Maintenance Control reporting that as soon as he put power on his aircraft he received the following CAS messages LG LEVER DISAG; E1 FUEL IMP BYP; PRESN AUTO FAIL and ENG NO DISPATCH. The status page showed ENG 1-2 SHORT DISPATCH. Received left and right MLG up and locked indications and a red hatched NLG gear unsafe indication along with aural 'landing gear' warning. The electrical status page displayed yellow X's over BATT 1; HOT BUS 1; DC BUS 1 and SHED BUS 1. As there was no previous history for any of these issues on the aircraft and Phenoms are known to produce these miscellaneous nuisance faults during a bad power up; Maintenance Control suggested performing the 'Airplane Power Reset' Procedure per Embraer's Phenom 300 Pilot's Operating Handbook (a manual for flight crews published by the OEM for ground operations of the aircraft). After I made this suggesting the crew's first response is 'do we have an approved procedure for that?' I once again referred the crew to their POH section 5-55 page 6.  The crew refused to perform the OEM approved procedure to prevent a non issue from becoming an AOG event. The crew then called their Chief Pilot and reported this as a Safety issue. Once maintenance personnel arrived and performed a CMC download and submitted the data to the Embraer Contact Center for evaluation; they responded that it was some transient in the system; and that taking into consideration that all messages went away on the next power up; there was no need for any further troubleshooting on this matter.  The technician then proceeded to perform the ops test on the Engine/Airframe unit with no faults found and the aircraft was returned to service.  This situation has created a conflict in the tasks set for the Maintenance Control department. We are tasked with providing technical support and being a resource for the flight crews. When a Maintenance Controller offers a flight crew an OEM approved procedures from a Pilots Operating Handbook and is then accused of suggesting an unsafe procedure it creates unwanted stress in an already stressful work environment. Flight crews and Maintenance Controllers need to be notified if a crew is not allowed to follow a procedure listed in a Pilot Operating Handbook or other OEM published manuals for their specific aircraft or if maintenance control is not allowed to suggest these procedures. This should be addressed by the Heads of the maintenance and operations department to determine what the SOP should be for events similar to this in the future. As we are stressing aircraft availability during our Peak Period and now allowing aircraft to become AOG when an OEM approved procedure can  keep an aircraft flying safely and prevent unneeded downtime for maintenance in remote locations.

A Maintenance Controller reported that Pilots are unwilling to perform published manufacturer's recommended procedures to solve simple aircraft power-up faults.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was the PM; CA was PF. Approaching the VOR at FL340; we were given a descent to FL320.  While established on our descent we received an amber EICAS message 'PITCH TRIM FAIL'.  CA instructed me to run the associated QRH procedure.  I ran the QRH procedure which instructed me to reset the Pitch Trim System (Pitch Trim System 1 and 2 Cutout Buttons- PUSH IN; then OUT).  In performing this; we received an amber EICAS message 'AP FAIL'.  In addition; the PITCH TRIM FAIL message illuminated again.  I followed the QRH procedure which further instructed to '...LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT'.CA delegated this responsibility to me since he was now hand-flying the aircraft.  We also determined that due to our close proximity we would continue to our destination.  I relayed to ATC that we had 1.5 hrs of fuel remaining (~5000 lbs). I requested we get direct to FAF for the ILS; and to have emergency equipment standing by upon our arrival.  ATC complied and gave us a descent to 5000' at pilot's discretion.  I continued with the QRH checklist which prompted me to ESTABLISH AND COMMUNICATE A PLAN.After informing the CA that I would be off comms; I told the FA's briefly that we want them to ready the cabin for arrival and to expect a call from the CA.  After; I sent Dispatch an ACARS message stating; 'PITCH TRIM FAIL/AP FAIL_VECTORS TO FINAL'.  Upon completing the PITCH TRIM FAIL QRH procedure and prior to commencing with the PITCH/ROLL Malfunction Descent Checklist; the CA positively transferred flight controls to me so that he could make the appropriate calls to the cabin and FA's. After positively exchanging the flight controls back to the CA; I continued with the PITCH/ROLL Malfunction Descent Checklist.Our gross landing weight was ~66;000lbs and the weather conditions were VMC.  I briefed the full ILS 32L to the CA.  While in the course of completing the checklist; ATC allowed for small turns to a southerly heading to provide for more time to configure the aircraft.  We had the aircraft fully configured about 8 NM from the runway.  At FAF the CA called for; and I ran; the PITCH/ROLL Malfunction Landing Checklist.  At this point; the CA requested that our V-APP speed be at 150KIAS; for increased aircraft control (V-REF was calculated at 133 KIAS).Upon touchdown; we determined that nose wheel steering capabilities were unaffected; turned off the runway.  Stopped here; we received an amber 'FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH' which was determined to be as a result of the PITCH TRIM FAIL and resulted in no QRH actions necessary to accomplish.  At this point ARFF vehicles made a 360-degree inspection of the aircraft.  During the inspection; we queried the FA's as to the status of the cabin; to which they reported no one injured.  Upon finding no visual faults by ARFF; we proceeded to taxi to the gate without further incident.

ERJ-175 First Officer reported continuing to the nearby destination after receiving a 'PITCH TRIM FAIL' EICAS message.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

[As we were] descending for landing while IMC; Approach had just started talking to X; a VFR aircraft with no transponder. The VFR aircraft told ATC they were at 3;000 MSL. We were about to level off at 3;000 FT and broke out of the cloud base at around 3;100 FT. Just then we saw the VFR aircraft at our two o'clock; 1/2 mile co-altitude moving away on a northeast heading; we were headed west. The VFR aircraft told TRACON that a 'Boeing just went by.'The VFR aircraft was just below the cloud base by only a small amount. We told Tower that we had a near mid-air and would file a report.

We were IMC until leveling at 3;000 FT. As we came out of the clouds we saw a Cessna at our two o'clock and 1/2 mile at our altitude. We never received a TCAS Alert. The plane known as Jump 1 had just began to communicate with Approach to let him know he had jumpers and no TCAS.

An arriving IFR Air Carrier just exiting IMC suffered a close encounter with a VFR Cessna flying immediately below the cloud cover.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27.5

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Very long story short.  I only report a quarter of the events I see because they are all caused by staffing issues and I am won't waste any more time complaining about an issue the FAA so clearly tolerates. Today; while training on the LNR manual; with a Certified Professional Controller (CPC) working the radar; witnessed an event unique to all my years of ATC.  We had been properly informed of military airspace that was going hot at XA:30. (I say that because sometimes we are not properly informed.)  At the time we were vectoring Aircraft X around the VOKE because it was set to go hot at XA:00 and the SAWHI controller at Minneapolis center (ZMP) told the BAEHI controller that the aircraft needed a reroute because the SAW controller would not approve the aircraft going 'over the top' into GRB.  So Aircraft X is south of the VOKE boundary on an east heading descending.  At XA:24 or so; AUWLO sector at ZMP flashed us a hand off on Aircraft Y clearly headed for the airspace.  I told my trainee to call and give AUWLO a heads up that the airspace was going hot.  We called twice; no answer; had other stuff to do; hung up.  A couple minutes later; the aircraft in the airspace about to go hot; AUWLO calls us on the line to take the handoff.  We say 'Isn't VE hot'?  She says; no we pushed it back 10 minutes. Is that a secret to you?  We said yes; and since that has never happened before to me; I said just take the handoff.  Now we start talking about how screwed up this place is.  We are vectoring an aircraft around airspace that we believe is going hot. SAW HI believes it too; because they forced the aircraft around the airspace; which; given another 10 minutes; he would have certainly been through and could have continued on course.  Meanwhile; AUWLO is routing aircraft through the airspace; somehow believing that we can just delay the military whenever we want.  Vigorous conversation ensues involving the sector personnel and the CIC.  CIC leaves to find out what is going on with military.  Now; AUWLO starts to flash another hand off; this time on Aircraft Z; on virtually the same course as the last guy.  Again; AUWLO calls us for a hand off.  What is going on with this guy??  He will clearly be inside the airspace that has been glowing red since XA:30 even if the airspace is delayed until XA+10!  No; the AUWLO controller says; the VE is cold now until this guy gets through.  No; we say; it doesn't work that way.  We are about to clear a flight of F16s into the airspace that we believe is now going hot at XA+10.  Can't we just keep our military guy away from Aircraft Z; she asks?  No; I say; get your guy out of the airspace.  She does.  Phone immediately starts to ring.  It is the supervisor from MSP asking what the problem is?   Really!  Why can't Chicago Center (ZAU) just delay the airspace when AUWLO wants to?  What is the big deal?  And the CIC has to try to explain how the military works. To a Supervisor!The FAA will get exactly the quality of employees they deserve.  This facility; and obviously ZMP too; is run so poorly that situations like this happen regularly.  There is literally a supervisor at ZMP who has no idea why we use the procedures and protocols that we do regarding military airspace.  Is he another 'One year wonder?' promoted despite his naivety because there are no other applicants for supervisor jobs?  Is he a transfer from some VFR tower that the FAA has now put in charge of carrying out a mission he is ignorant of?  Our facility is full of such individuals.  In my opinion; the controller at AUWLO should be decertified and retrained (find out later that this same situation happened yesterday with AUWLO) The ZMP supervisor should be demoted; retrained; perhaps relocated.  Management should be made to answer for staffing the facility with incompetent individuals.  No one bids on supervisor jobs because it is a horrible position with no authority and management is staffed with incompetent;lazy; low seniority; low knowledge folks that no self-respecting controller could ever take orders from.   This sort of thing will become commonplace if we continue to hire; certify and promote based on criteria other than competence.  It will certainly result in reduced safety in the system.  Staffing is woefully inadequate; as well.  Our TMU; ZMP TMU; AUWLO; SAWHI; all on different pages.  The safety of the pilots we protect is based on a mutual understanding of the procedures we use.  There can be no deviations from that safety without causing risk!  Ask the pilots whether cutting costs is an acceptable reason to risk safety.  How frustrating!

Sector P16 (EAU) wanted to give sector 60 (BAE) a GRB arrival high to go over VOK East; South; West military airspace which was active. SAW sector did not want this so BAE put Aircraft X on a vector to go to the south side of the airspace and handed off to LNR. I continued to work this aircraft on a vector and descended this aircraft for GRB. Sector P04 started flashing Aircraft Z at FL190 landing RAC and he was headed right for the VOK airspace. My D side trainee and his trainer attempted to call sector P04 and ask what they were doing with this aircraft. They said the airspace had been delayed 10 minutes and asked if this was a secret to us. We thought maybe there was a chance that Traffic Management Unit (TMU) knew about this and failed to tell us so we proceeded to tell our CIC in charge and went about and worked this aircraft. Nearly 10 minutes later; sector P04 started flashing Aircraft Z at us landing RAC also at FL190 and also headed straight for the military airspace again. My d side called and asked what they were doing again and the P04 controller said 'Oh after this aircraft it's active'. Meanwhile; we have fighters off of MSN wanting to go into the military airspace. My D side asked her what she would like us to do with the fighters off MSN and the P04 controller asked if we could just separate them from the Aircraft Z. No! This is not how this works. We have numerous problems with the military airspace over the last couple of months. Sector P04 took it upon themselves to delay airspace and failed to tell anyone about it all because they were too lazy to vector aircraft around it. Very dangerous situation. No one except TMU or military officials should be allowed to delay airspace.

Chicago Center (ZAU) Controllers reported a situation where a military airspace is supposed to be going hot in a few minutes. Another sector had an aircraft going into the airspace and the Controllers questioned the other Controller. The other Controller advised them that they have extended the cold time for 10 minutes to allow this aircraft to go through it. A few minutes later another aircraft was handed off to them which will go through the airspace. Controller dialogue ensued. The other sector thought it was ok to delay the airspace for traffic; but the reporting Controller had military aircraft that needed to use the airspace.


Flight Crew Total 5742; Flight Crew Type 4660

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Enroute; I sent a Maintenance request code stating that the (Captain's) Audio Control Panel 1 was inoperative and that transmissions from the Captain's boom microphone over VHR radios 1 and 2 were being reported as scratchy and unreadable over two separate headsets.After landing; Local Maintenance met our aircraft and according to the subsequent maintenance release document; the technician removed and replaced the Number 1 Radio Management Panel (RMP). Prior to our scheduled departure; I checked the function and quality of radio transmissions from the Captain's station with Clearance Delivery and Company Hub maintenance and was informed that the transmissions were still scratchy and unreadable. In my radio communication with Hub maintenance; the controller directed me to re-enter the discrepancy via ACARS and said that he would send the technicians back to the cockpit to address the problem.When the technicians returned to the cockpit; I explained that the original problem we were having with the radios was not corrected and asked for further help. We reviewed all action taken to this point in order to understand where the problem might be and the technician suggested exchanging headsets with the co-pilot station. After doing this; transmissions to Clearance Delivery and Hub Maintenance were described as satisfactory. In the light of the fact that I had earlier tried two headsets with no effect; I requested that our spare headset be replaced. The technician agreed and left the cockpit to obtain a replacement. He subsequently returned with a new; 'still in the box' headset from stock. At that point I thanked the technicians and we closed the main cabin door explaining to the agent and purser that we would wait for the new Maintenance Release to be delivered over the cockpit printer before starting our pushback.After receiving the Maintenance Release over the cockpit printer; I reviewed it and noted that the action addressing my last defect write-up made no mention of the fact that we had been directed by the technicians to exchange headsets between stations or that maintenance had replaced the presumably defective spare unit carried in the cockpit. Instead; the technician stated in the Maintenance Release that the only 'Action' taken to resolve the 'Defect' was 'CLR-ACP OP CHECK NORMAL'In my experience; anytime a headset is exchanged it is so noted in the corrective action section of the Maintenance Release. In my review of the Maintenance Release; I noted that the sign off for the last discrepancy did not describe the maintenance actions taken to resolve the discrepancy. Considering that the aircraft cabin door was closed and that we were beyond our scheduled departure time; I elected to overlook the disparity rationalizing that we had a valid Maintenance Release and should be legal to dispatch. We released brakes and pushed back for departure.Enroute we received a message via the ACARS requesting further information concerning our delayed departure. The request stated that the delay had been coded '(FLT OPS CALL TECH OPS).' I responded to the message with a miscellaneous message: 'GR - ZZZLM REQD TO RETURN TO ACFT TO FINISH REPAIR OF DISCREPANCY NO. X.'In retrospect; it appears that the technician signing off the final work accomplished concerning Defect No. Y obfuscated the maintenance action taken so as to avoid having the delayed departure assigned to Maintenance. If this is the case then I am concerned it represents a falsification of the aircraft maintenance record by omission. All departments concerned with the on-time departure of our flights are under substantial pressure to avoid any delay in those departures. This has been made clear to me in discussions with personnel from various departments at planeside as well as our flight office. That pressure was evidenced in this situation when almost immediately upon entering the cockpit to address our original maintenance discrepancies the two reporting maintenance technicians began talking about what they would and would not take a delay for with respect to the defects noted in our maintenance log. Their preoccupation was avoiding the consequence of a maintenance delay as much or more than the proper repair of the noted discrepancies. Misplaced priorities like these are a direct threat to the continued safe operation of our aircraft.

A320 Captain reported a log book entry was incorrectly signed off causing a delay assigned to the flight crew instead of maintenance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 3300

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We arrived at the aircraft 1:15 prior. Loading had just begun; and paperwork was at the aircraft waiting for us. We went through our normal pre-flight routine; including requesting/receiving the route via FMS. Our copy of the flight plan did not have a departure (SID) listed or filed. Knowing that we ALWAYS fly a SID out of ZGSZ (there are 47 different ones); the First Officer entered Runway 15 based on the ATIS; and the SIE7W departure because the points on that SID EXACTLY matched the points on our filed flight plan. Since it was the Captain's leg; the First Officer briefed the Captain that he expected the SIE7W based on what had been filed for us. During his initial brief; this was the SID we all referenced; since we didn't have our PDC yet. An hour later; after dealing with a fueling issue; a load issue; a possible maintenance issue; and an ATC delay; we were late but finally ready to go. Our PDC came through; but all three of us immediately cued in on the fact that we were assigned a squawk code. The First Officer stated that he would clear that up with Clearance Delivery; we confirmed the initial altitude of 1200M; myself and the First Officer double checked the conversion to feet. Not one of us caught that the assigned SID on the PDC was the SIE9W; not the SIE7W. The First Officer called Clearance Delivery to clarify our squawk and request pushback and engine start. Clearance assigned us a squawk and said SIE9W to us. The First Officer repeated that information back to him; wrote both down on the MFP and entered the new squawk into the transponder. We started push back during this; and we were also discussing our fuel; since we were currently too heavy for takeoff and would have to ensure a minimum burn off during taxi. Once again; all three of us missed the '9' W versus the '7' W that was loaded in the FMS. We started engines and taxied slower than usual because we had to burn off fuel. During the Captain's Before Takeoff briefing; the tower controller called us twice to ask us to expedite our taxi. Tower gave us no indication why he was rushing us; but we were cleared for immediate departure; given a radio frequency; winds and our level off altitude in very fast; difficult to understand speech. Our fuel quantity was now correct; so we took off. Tower did not switch us over to departure frequency; so at about 1000' as we were commencing our turn on the SIE7W; the First Officer switched frequencies on his own and turned on the autopilot at the Captain's request. The First Officer checked in with departure passing through about 1200' and in a right turn to our next waypoint; NLG. Within 10 seconds; departure assigned us a heading of 230 degrees and asked us what heading we were on. As we turned 20 degrees back left to 230; the First Officer read back 230 degrees and told her we were flying the SIE7W. She then cleared us to climb; and cleared us direct ZUH; the next point on the SIE7W and the point that both SIDs match each other. About 2 minutes later; she gave us a frequency change. At no time did she say anything about flying the wrong departure. The rest of our departure was very busy; stuck at low altitude; dodging thunderstorms; bouncing around in turbulence; switching from meters to feet; and navigating through Hong Kong's departure and arrival corridors with lots of other traffic. When we finally leveled off at cruise altitude nearly 30 minutes later; we discussed the fact that we entered and flew the wrong departure.   Contributing factors: Expectation bias. We matched our filed flight plan with the SID and entered it into the FMS without an actual PDC to reference. Communication. The language barrier is always a concern flying internationally; and often we hear what we expect to hear if the annunciation is not clear. Distractions. We were dealing with a number of issues that threatened to delay our departure; and our attention was split in too many directions. Time Pressure. First; we were delayed pushand start by ATC due to Hong Kong airspace limitations. Then; for some reason; Tower wanted us to taxi faster than the 13 knots we were doing; and called us multiple times with just the word 'expedite'. The language barrier would not allow the First Officer to explain to him that we had to burn off fuel before takeoff; so we did the best we could under the circumstances. Bottom line; we made a mistake. At least twice we saw or heard Sierra NINE Whiskey; but processed it as what we expected to hear - Sierra SEVEN Whiskey. ATC caught the problem immediately and corrected it.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Commercial flight crew reported departing ZGSZ on the SIE7W while the clearance was actually the SIE9W. Many distractions during preflight and the language barrier allowed the error to go undetected.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2750; Flight Crew Type 635

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise westbound at FL260; briefly transiting [foreign] airspace; a single turbulence bump was encountered and the pilot's headset impacted the overhead switch array. Simultaneously both radio bus fail lights illuminated; and GPS/NAV/COM/Transponders were without power. We were in VFR conditions at the time; had just passed the ZZZ airport which was clearly in sight; and we attempted to restore power to the radio busses; including resetting the overhead switches; cycling battery power off and on; pulling all load from the busses and attempting to reset the busses or tie and crossfeed the busses with no load devices attached. We maintained VFR and turned on a handheld VHF transceiver and had intermittent COM with [foreign] Center; transmitting in the blind that we had lost electrical power and would be descending. We circled the area while troubleshooting; achieved contact with ZZZ Tower; asked them to advise [Foreign] Center we were OK; that our intention was to proceed VFR to ZZZ2 and land there; but again COMS with the handheld were somewhat intermittent. We proceeded VFR at about 6;300 feet near ZZZ1 and were able to achieve good COMS with their tower; explained the situation; that we were OK and able to fly normally and asked them to advise ZZZ2 tower we were inbound. We transitioned COMS to ZZZ2 routinely; entered the VFR pattern and landed safely.On the ground after shutdown the radio busses fully recovered and we were unable to recreate the dual bus failure. After much testing we continued our flight; with the pilot's seat rolled back enroute to prevent the possibility of any recurrence of the headset strike on the overhead; and kept breakers pulled on certain non-essential high current equipment (HF radio; etc). The overhead switches will shortly be checked at an appropriate maintenance facility.We believe we handled the situation to the best of our ability; with primary focus on maintaining flight control of the aircraft; secondary focus investigating recovery from the fault; communicating to the best of our ability with ATC on backup equipment; and electing to land promptly in VFR conditions on US territory.

AC695 pilot reported losing much of his electrical power after bumping his head on the overhead panel in turbulence.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

At FL320 I noticed that the Number 2 engine oil quantity was dropping quickly and was at 30 percent. I notified the Captain who decided to divert. On approach to Runway 18 we flew through the Class D airspace at greater than the speed limit of 200 knots. I let Approach know that we would be doing this and they said that it would be fine. We had declared an emergency.

This report contains no additional information.

A B737 Crew declared an emergency and diverted after the Number 2 engine oil was discovered at 30 percent and decreasing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 800

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was doing practice approaches (ILS; 35R) at APA. During the 3rd or 4th approach; I heard another aircraft on frequency; also doing the approach; just ahead of me. While my safety pilot and I were searching for that traffic; just prior to the MAP; I looked up just in time to see an aircraft departing 17L; directly toward us.Rather than execute the missed approach right in front of him; and across his route of flight; I elected to extend the approach and go missed behind (rather than in front of) him. In doing so; I was criticized by the Tower (who had cleared the aircraft to take-off into us) for not going missed sooner (perhaps; 2;000 FT sooner). The Tower also criticized the other aircraft for not turning out sooner.I'm not sure that either aircraft did anything questionable (Query: the Tower; however). I know that my action was taken; in what I thought to be; in the interest of aviation safety ('see and avoid'); first. While; normally; I can look and find that I might have done things differently; in this instance I believe that the Tower should either (1) not have cleared the other aircraft to take-off directly into approaching traffic; or; (2) should have done so with greater separation.

C425 pilot doing practice ILS approaches to Runway 35R at APA reports NMAC with another aircraft departing Runway 17L with Tower clearance to do so.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Upon landing a gate agent met the aircraft. He wanted to board as soon as the passengers from the previous flight were deplaned and he cleaned and removed trash himself while the passengers were still deplaning. I asked for the preliminary paperwork prior to boarding. He started boarding and halfway through boarding he gave me the paperwork I asked for. On the paperwork it showed that we had two Armed Individuals and 1 escorted prisoner. I also knew that we had two Air Marshals (FAMS) on board since the two that were on the flight were on the previous flight that we just brought in. They moved seats but I recognized each of them as did my flying partner. After everyone was boarded he came on board to give me the final paperwork and informed me that he didn't inform the flight deck nor the flight attendants of the armed individuals; the FAMS (2) and the escorted prisoner. He said something around the lines of 'my bad my bad that's my fault I told the marshals but not you guys.' I said that it's very serious since we need to know who's on board the airplane. The first officer asked me if the gate agent told us; the flight attendants about the above and I explained to him; no. I am not writing this up for the gate agent to be reprimanded. But rather I'm doing this because this was a major security issue and I feel that [the company] and the appropriate parties need to know to ensure this does not happen again.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported being rushed by the Gate Agent and not being informed about Air Marshals and an escorted prisoner before boarding.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

I flew the GIBBZ RNAV STAR to IAD numerous times this month. Each time; after the route was entered into the FMS; frequent MCDU messages commenced warning that the 9;000 MSL altitude constraint at OTTTO could not be met. It IS a tight constraint. These MCDU messages continue to recur after engine start and during flight. Entering descent winds did not prevent these messages; so I was on my guard; having seen profile information in error previously. Prior to the clearance to descend via the GIBBZ1 STAR; I had checked each speed and altitude constraint against the chart and confirmed all were correct in the flight plan. I remained concerned about the OTTTO constraint as the MCDU messages continued. The autopilot had a hard time managing the descent. The autothrottles were 'fishing'; going from idle to a thrust setting too high for a descent; and back to idle. Numerous times I disconnected the autothrottles as automation was having difficulty managing the descent. Even with full speedbrakes and throttles at idle; the autopilot kept attempting to overspeed the aircraft in order to fly the descent profile which is very demanding performance wise; much more frequently than is normally the case. Close to OTTTO; with full speedbrakes; I had to downgrade the automation to vertical speed in order to keep from overspeeding. This put me above the descent profile. I managed the descent using vertical speed while I attempted to meet the crossing restriction. When OTTTO became the 'TO' waypoint; it turned magenta (normal); the same color as the 9;000 figure. At this point; I cannot remember what blanked out part of the '9' in the crossing restriction. The '9' was touching either the last letter in the fix name (OTTTO) or it was touching a magenta circle around the fix itself. This overlap caused me to think it was an 8;000 MSL crossing restriction which I was battling to meet. As I reached 9;000 the First Officer called out that the MCDU showed 9;000 at OTTTO; vice the 8;000 I was attempting to meet. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and returned to 9;000. I believe my altitude was approximately 8;800 at its lowest. During the event and after; as we looked at the NAV display; we could not tell if the constraint was 8;000 or 9;000. I was able to cross OTTTO very close to; if not at; 9;000.The GIBBZ STAR needs to be examined to determine if the OTTTO altitude constraint is unreasonable considering aircraft performance. Extending the slats has little effect on descent rates in addition to speedbrakes in the MD-10 and 11. Primarily; ensure that critical altitude restrictions are not superimposed over or blanked by other data on the navigation display.

A DC10 flight crew; struggling to comply with the GIBBZ RNAV STAR into IAD descended below the required 9;000 MSL at OTTTO. Masking of the magenta 9 in 9;000 by other data on the NAV moving map display may have contributed to the deviation.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Please reference ZZZ [airport]; ZZZZZ 4 RNAV SID.  We were assigned the ZZZZZ 4 RNAV SID and departed Runway XXR at ZZZ.  After checking in with Departure Control the FO (pilot flying) called for the After TO Checklist.  This is when several things happened at once.   Before finishing the checklist the Departure Controller told us to climb to 10;000 feet and said we were clear ZZZZZ1 [Intersection] then ZZZZZ2 [Intersection].  At the same time we received an ECAM alert for a #1 Pressure Regulator Fault.  By the time I set the altitude in the FCP; read back the clearance; re-visited and completed the after TO checklist and trying to diagnose what the ECAM was telling me we were over ZZZZZ1 [Intersection] and the aircraft was starting to turn to the next point on the SID which was ZZZZZ3 [Intersection].  The FO put turned the auto pilot on and placed the aircraft in heading mode and started a turn to ZZZZZ2 [Intersection].  We got the aircraft navigating to ZZZZZ2 [Intersection] but apparently it was not quick enough for the controller.  He chimed in and gave us a heading for ZZZZZ2 [Intersection].  We told him we were in the turn and navigating to ZZZZZ2 [Intersection] at that time.  Probably not a big deal.  No conflict with other aircraft or terrain.  No airspeed or altitude violations.  Just a lot of things happening at once during a busy phase of flight.  The result was we were a few seconds late to make our turn when our departure instructions were changed from what was given to us on the PDC.We complied with the ATC instructions as soon as we could.  It was a busy phase of flight and we were task saturated at the time. Getting an ECAM message for a pressurization fault was an added distraction.   I have been off work for almost a month due to COVID leave and this was my second trip since returning.   I was a little slow to respond but I've been off work almost X weeks and I'm still shaking off the cobwebs.Not pointing fingers; but a change to our SID would have been nice to know BEFORE we took off so we could expect; brief; and build the change into the FMS.  When taking off on [Runway] XXR via the ZZZZZ 4 RNAV SID you are over the first point; ZZZZZ1 [Intersection]; seconds after TO.   Having a change to the SID when approaching ZZZZZ1 [Intersection] only gave us a few seconds to react.  Trying to read back and amend the departure clearance in the FMS; clean up the airplane; finish the after takeoff checklist; and diagnose an ECAM caution made for a lot of balls to juggle.

Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during departure. Captain cited distraction dealing with an ECAM alert and lack of flying contributed to the event.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 5; Maintenance Lead Technician 5; Maintenance Technician 14

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Fatigue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I removed the Aft Evaporator Blower motor. To gain access; the Tail Rotor Control tube had to be removed.  When the job was finished I asked a Pilot to come and look the job over.  We both missed the bolt that I failed to tighten on the Tail Rotor Control tube. We operate a 24/7 Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) operation and are on call 24/5. I feel that pressure from Supervisors to get the job done so we can capture flights affected my performance.  I feel that the pilots are not adequately trained to look over major maintenance such as Flight Controls.  I removed the Aft Evaporator Blower motor. To gain access; the Tail Rotor Control tube had to be removed. When the job was finished I asked a pilot to come and look the job over. We both missed the bolt that I failed to tighten on the Tail Rotor Control tube. We operate a 24/7 Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) operation and are on call 24/5. I feel that pressure from supervisors to get the job done so we can capture flights affected my performance. I feel that the pilots are not adequately trained to look over major maintenance such as flight controls being taken loose in places where they don't look on a daily basis. taken loose in places where they don't look on a daily basis.

Reporter stated the Aft Evaporator Blower Motor draws cabin air and also helps cool the Air Conditioning Pack. Replacement was necessary because the motor had quit. Access is through the baggage compartment door; removing an upper panel behind the cabin aft bulkhead where the blower motor is; in an area known as the 'Hell Hole' because of the heat and tight quarters. He had to remove the Tail Rotor Control tube to access the blower motor. The control tubes are inside a 'V' channel.Reporter stated he was sick and fatigued the day he replaced the blower motor and felt he needed someone to look over his work; before he went home early. They are not short staffed on Maintenance personnel. But; a culture has developed at their operation where pilots are called upon by Dispatch to verify the aircraft is mechanically ready for flight; even though pilots do not sign any documents after they reviewed the maintenance work. Maintenance just recently started to add a couple of Quality Assurance (Q/A) items to Mechanic's sign-off. Complacency can be an issue especially if pilot and mechanic are both known to have a good record. Reporter stated the Bell-206L was in for a 300-hour Inspection at one of their regional Maintenance Bases when a Mechanic noticed the loose bolt that secures the Tail Rotor Push-Pull Control tube had not been tightened. The Push-Pull tubes control the pitch of the Tail Rotor via input from the Tail Rotor pedals in the cockpit. The Medi-Vac helicopter had flown about 100-hours in that condition. Their Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) operations are a push; push; push environment; including Maintenance. He was separated from the company shortly after the incident.

A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed he had not tighten one of the bolts that secure the Tail Rotor Control tube on a Bell-206L helicopter after replacing the Aft Evaporator Blower motor. Technician noted that pressure from supervisors to get the job done and the use of pilots to look over major maintenance work accomplished by mechanics were contributors.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Weather in local area; specifically thunderstorms and heavy gusty winds out of SSW.  Set up MAX Power Takeoff for Precautionary Profile due to W/S Advisory in ATIS.  Long line of aircraft for runway.  Shut down Number 1 Engine while waiting for departure corridor to open.  Restarted Number 1 when flights started moving again.  Number 1 had been stabilized for 10 minutes before taxi into lineup and wait.  Captain appeared to do good job centering aircraft nose on runway centerline.  Given takeoff clearance; Captain ran engines up to 40%; depressed TOGA; engines growled and nose immediately yawed to the right.  Captain appeared to counter with tiller.  Encountered major 'chattering' as nose continued to veer off; and then Captain immediately pulled throttles to idle while nose started to come back to the left and once again parallel Runway centerline.  We stopped parallel to Runway centerline; offset by about 10-12' and what seemed to be 50-75' down the runway.  We agreed our takeoff attempt was over and elected to exit the runway at closest intersection.  Whole event lasted just a few seconds; probably never got faster than 10 knots.  Another carrier Airbus at hold short said over Tower frequency that smoke came from nose wheel during the event.  We taxied off runway; faced west and held our position for a few minutes while we assessed the situation.  We agreed to taxi back to gate slowly and have Maintenance take a look.  Coordinated with Operations to effect plan; and Captain assessed nose wheel steering on the way back; fully prepared to stop immediately if need be.  Aircraft was pulled from service.  After talking with Company Safety the next day; they believed it to be a nose wheel steering hydraulic metering valve issue; which caused the nose wheel to remain cocked out of commanded position. Check the engines/EEC's to make sure it was not an engine issue.  Then have the nose wheel steering hydraulic cylinder from the event aircraft evaluated.  It was such an out-of-the-norm event following textbook execution of normal procedures that there isn't anything I can think of to prevent it.

A B737-700 nose wheel steering metering valve apparently malfunctioned as takeoff thrust was set which caused the aircraft to veer off centerline and resulted in a low speed rejected takeoff.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 9600; Flight Crew Type 113

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 1500

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Piper PA-12 (tailwheel) airplane. I was seated in rear seat and pilot flying was seated in front seat. After landing on Runway XXL and all three tires on pavement; aircraft started to veer rightward off runway. Pilot corrected left; resulting in a wide left turn and the aircraft exited the runway perpendicular to the runway centerline and continued off into the grass; coming to a stop.

I was flying front seat in a PA-12 for a 30 minute familiarization flight.  [Other pilot] was in the backseat. I made a straight-in visual approach to RWY XXL at ZZZ. Landing was uneventful. During roll out; the aircraft turned away from centerline to the right. Rudder control forces were different from mine; and I over-corrected to the left. The aircraft left the runway on the left side and rolled down a hill; coming to an upright stop in tall grass. We reported to Tower immediately that no one was hurt; and the aircraft was OK. Vehicles came out to inspect; take reports (airport; FSDO (Flight Standards District Office); Sheriff; fire) and pull us back to the runway for start-up and taxi back to the hangar. Both pilots were fine. Maintenance inspection revealed only cosmetic damage to the underside of the aircraft. With all requirements met; no claims are being processed.

Pilot flying PA-12 aircraft departed runway during landing rollout.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Something that has come to my attention is the incompatibility between [Company] and Alaska FSS. I have encountered several pilots (and myself) who have filed VFR flight plans electronically; which were then transmitted via [Company]; only to have all data deleted. I find this to be extremely dangerous. My first encounter with this was a VFR flight from JNU to [destination]. I filed a flight plan electronically with my iPad via the app Foreflight; which transmits to [Company]. I got a file confirmation; and even opened my flight plan by radio with JNU FSS. Upon arriving; the flight service specialist there said they had no information on my flight except for a departure time sent by JNU. I thought this must just be a fluke. Upon talking to other pilots; particularly those from the CONUS (Continental United States) who usually file electronically; I am concerned that this could become very dangerous. The [Company] platforms do not indicate any problems; and even allow flight plans to be opened electronically. In my discussion with FSS specialists; they said they are aware of the problem but nothing has been done; and they've even had people call to close flight plans that were never opened or filed according to them; all because the [Company] system is not interfacing. A pilot will be under the impression (and even have confirmation) that their flight plan and associated alerting is active; even when no such service has been assured. I fear the day someone actually goes missing on one of these flight plans and no one even knows. I think this needs to be addressed immediately; as the only way to effectively file a VFR flight plan in Alaska is via telephone.

A Pilot reported several instances of VFR Flight plans being dropped from the system when filed electronically in Alaska