Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.7

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft Y; departed an airport 5 miles northwest of ZZZ and requested a low approach on Runway 10 with a left turn out back to ZZZ1. I gave him traffic to follow to the field and cleared him for a Low Approach to Runway 10.  I did not realize that the aircraft was so fast (approx. 150 kts on final) so I cleared an aircraft for departure off of Runway 8. After realizing that the Aircraft Y would overtake the departing aircraft; I instructed Aircraft Y to do a right turn out to join the right downwind. He asked for another approach; so I cleared him for the Low Approach. I lined up an air carrier on Runway 8 with the expectation of Aircraft Y to turn out left to ZZZ1 after the Low Approach. At the same time; I had a C172 overhead the tower at 1500 feet eastbound and a helicopter 4 miles east of the field; westbound along the shoreline at 300 feet and an aircraft on a 5 mile final for Runway 10. After Aircraft Y completed the 2nd low approach I gave him instructions to turn left to join the shoreline westbound to ZZZ1 and to change to ZZZ1 frequency. After Aircraft Y crossed over rwy 8; I cleared the departing air carrier for departure (left turn to a 350 degree heading) for takeoff off of rwy 8.I then remembered about the helicopter now 3 miles east of the field who probably would not have been a factor as the departing air carrier would have likely cleared him by more than 500 feet vertical; but to be sure; I told the helicopter to proceed direct to the tower and remain south of rwy 8. All of a sudden I got a call from Aircraft X who was on the River transition (ZZZ1 had prior coordinated as a courtesy). I was talking for 2 minutes nonstop and did not realize Aircraft X was already in my airspace. I looked at the scope and saw that Aircraft X and Aircraft Y (who I had already switched) were at the same altitude opposite direction to each other with a closing speed of probably almost 400 knots. I called the traffic to Aircraft X; who did not see Aircraft Y. I did not have a clear picture of the direction of their movement as there wasn't enough time before sweeps on the scope; so I was unable to give a proper Safety Alert. Aircraft X called traffic in sight when targets were less than .5 mile lateral separation at the same altitude. I called R5 sector to coordinate for higher for Aircraft X; climbed the traffic VFR to 9500 ft; and switched him to approach airspace. During the confusion; I also mistook another aircraft; now for 4 miles east of the field; for the helicopter and gave incorrect instructions to the other aircraft accidentally that were meant for the helicopter. (The data block for the helicopter dropped automatically because he was over the airport at less than 500 feet; so I saw the other aircraft data block in around the same place as the helicopter was). I lost the picture momentarily with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y and it took a few seconds to get it back. I believe Aircraft X was an airspace intrusion; having entered my airspace without my responding to him. He may have called once or twice; but I was busy and unable to respond. Pattern work is fairly uncommon here; as are jets on a VFR transition; so the combination of the two led to an increased workload and ultimately an unsafe situation. I was also overly eager to get out departures; leading to my misunderstanding of the picture with Aircraft Y and the first departure initially followed by my departing air carrier with the helicopter. I unintentionally increased my workload to a level I was unable to handle with the offending VFR traffic added in. I went from being fairly slow; low workload; low complexity to high volume; high complexity in less than 2 minutes.Coming off the quick turn with 6 hours of sleep led to slight fatigue that I believe was a contributing factor.It would be beneficial if ZZZ1 was able to coordinate high-performance VFR transitions directly with TRACON and then simply call us as a courtesy or for a point-out. The VFR transition was developed for and is utilized by mostly single and twin-engine prop aircraft cruising at less than 150 knots. Allowing an aircraft to fly the VFR transition at double the speed of other aircraft is a potential safety risk; and given that the courtesy call was 5 minutes in advance of when the Aircraft X actually departed; it is difficult to pre-plan for it. I am all for giving pilots shortcuts to save them time; but not at the expense of safety margin.

During a busy arrival period a Tower Controller approved an aircraft for a low approach which resulted in a traffic conflict with a second aircraft transiting through the airspace.  During the same time period the controller issued instructions to one aircraft that were meant for another as well as cleared an air carrier for takeoff into the crossing route of a VFR helicopter.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

I was doing a random line check on the crew. They departed the gate with 1;400 pounds of fuel in the center tank. The Captain had the center fuel tank pumps on; as per SOP. Shortly after takeoff the left center tank fuel low pressure light illuminated. The Captain turned the pump off per the company procedure. The procedure does not mention opening the crossfeed. Fuel was then feeding the left engine from the left fuel tank and the right engine from the right fuel boost pump in the center tank. The crew was given a turn on the RNAV departure and an at or below crossing restriction which was not part of the RNAV departure; i.e.; they were busy. Shortly thereafter the fuel imbalance light came on. I informed the crew of their fuel issue.This is the second time I have seen this happen to a crew. The procedure should be all center pumps on or off or; if one is off; the crossfeed should be opened. Maybe with less than 2;000 pounds in the center tank the center pumps should be off for takeoff.

A B737NG Check Airman witnessed as the flight crew; following the company procedure; turned off the left center fuel tank pump shortly after takeoff when the its low pressure light illuminated but did not concurrently open the crossfeed valve...which is NOT directed by the procedure.  A short time later the fuel imbalance light illuminated and the reporter advised the crew of the cause; the left engine now burning from the left main tank and the right from the center tank via the right center tank boost pump.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted

Engine surge (repeatedly) followed by loss of power (right engine). Determination was made that engine power was insufficient. Due to low altitude and proximity to airport; decision was made to shut down and secure engine per engine inoperative after takeoff procedures. ATC was notified and a return for landing was accomplished.

C402 pilot reported loss of power in right engine.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

With MIA Center; climbing thru FL360 for FL380. Traffic displayed on TCAS at 1:00 heading directly toward us and descending toward our altitude. Flight crew inquired and ATC Controller advised 'There is no traffic'. Pilot Flying was hand flying and turned slightly north of course to increase spacing from TCAS displayed traffic. TCAS showed traffic passed approximately 3 miles from us on a Southeast course near our altitude. We did get visual on the traffic. Pilot Monitoring inquired again with ATC and was advised that traffic was beyond 5 miles. Our TCAS displayed well within 5 miles; near 3 miles. Our ground speed at the time was 471 KTS which would most likely be somewhere in excess of 900 KTS closure rate. I believe that if Pilot Flying had not turned away impact could have occurred. Suggestions; proficiency analysis on said Controller.

About 40 ESE of SRQ during climb from FL360 to FL380; as assigned by ATC; we received TA traffic. On TCAS traffic showed at our one o'clock; at our altitude; moving right to left. I was set at the 10 mile map mode on my navigation display. I inquired ATC about traffic at our altitude and he responded that we had no traffic ahead of us. We spotted the traffic and it had moved just to the left of our nose. Captain turned gently about 5 to 10 degrees right for a period of less than 20 seconds as aircraft passed. I inquired with ATC about the now sighted traffic again and he responded that traffic had required 5 mile separation. It appeared to the Captain and I that the aircraft was probably closer than 5 miles by sight and TCAS readout. We resumed normal course.

Air Carrier; with ZMA climbing to FL380; described a TCAS RA event; turning slightly from the observed traffic; the reporter noting that a certain impact would have occurred had not the turn been initiated.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Work Refused

The ramp gave us a NOTOC [Notification to Captain] showing a package containing 6.8kgs of dry ice was loaded on to the aircraft.this was over the 2.5kg limit and when I told them it was not allowed to go they did not want to unload it and provided excuses as to why it could go. Eventually I convinced them it had to be removed and it was.Ramp Personnel need better training and are not to be pressured by management to disregard rules.

Air Carrier Captain reported ramp personnel loaded package of dry ice in excess of max weight allowed. Captain refused hazmat cargo.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 8101; Flight Crew Type 5368

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Under MEL ITEM INFO was the following entry 'XXXX - AIRCRAFT NO AUTOLAND'.When the MEL installed on the iPad was consulted it was discovered that there was no 'XXXX' code to be referenced. Dispatch was called. The initial reaction of the dispatcher was that this may be a code in reference to [former company] aircraft which have been purchased; but that since he was not sure he would get [Maintenance Control] on the line.The explanation for the 'XXXX' code from [Maintenance Control] was that there was a 'chronic' problem with the number 1 engine thrust reverser which was still useable but removed the aircraft from AUTOLAND status. I did not have the presence of mind to ask; at that time; exactly what the chronic problem was. During landing I noticed that the First Officer was having difficulty deploying the thrust reversers. The First Officer said that the number 1 thrust reverser was slow to deploy.There are three major problems here. First; the system allowed a non-existent MEL code to be entered on to the flight paperwork to legally release a flight. Second; the presence of this code; with no supplementary written information; lulled the dispatcher into a false sense security with regard to the status of the aircraft as revealed by his ignorance of what the issue actually was. Third; specific information regarding the slow deployment of the number 1 engine thrust reverser was either concealed or withheld from both the dispatcher and the flight crew by the use of this code. Exactly how this allows the dispatcher and crew to safely plan a flight in accordance with the FARs is an open question. It should not be necessary to telephone [Maintenance Control] and engage in a conversation to determine what the status of an aircraft actually is.Incidentally; this is the second time that I have been dispatched with a non-existent MEL code in the paperwork. The first was with a previously mentioned former company aircraft. The existence of the [previous company's code] appears to have created a situation whereby dispatchers have been lulled into accepting aircraft even though they are not actually aware of what the status of the aircraft is.

On a B737 the #1 Reverser was deferred but still useable with a code that was not recognized by the flight crew or dispatch.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After departure the right engine vibration gauge indicated in the amber band at 3.2. We ran the checklist for Engine Vibration in the QRH which directed us to turn off the autothrottles. After retarding the throttle the indication stayed within limits. The Captain and I both decided that it would not be smart to land at [destination] which is a shorter runway with mountainous terrain. We landed 2;000 lbs over max landing weight (201.0k) and ran the Overweight Landing checklist. We landed flaps 25 to a soft landing and did not touch the brakes until under 50kts. We taxied to the gate uneventfully.

A B757-200 First Officer reported they returned to their departure airport because of high right engine vibration indications.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The aircraft had an existing MEL for FLT DECK FUEL QTY R/H IND INOP. Complying with the requirements of the MEL; the fueler and contract MX personnel used the Fuel Measuring Sticks to determine the RH wing fuel quantity. The MX contractor believed that the outboard Fuel Measuring Stick was reading erroneously and deferred it as well (28-16B). The MEL allows it to be deferred if tank fuel quantity can be determined by Fuel Quantity Indicators (also MEL'd for the associated side) or by other acceptable means. Note: An operative dripstick within the same tank may be used.The guidance provided to the pilots within the MEL or Supplemental Procedures are vague as to the exact actions taken to ensure that 'correct fuel loading' has been achieved 'by acceptable means' for the flight crew to verify. The lack of guidance invites a false sense of security when a 'trained' non MX base contract mechanic says 'good to go.'Upon arrival to [the destination] and opening the main entry door; a FAA MX Inspector entered; identified himself and asked the CA a couple questions about the problem with the fuel system of the AC. The visit was short. It was followed by a MX Tech who was very quick to say that the contract MX at the departure airport cut corners and deviated from proper procedure in determining the correct fuel load. He stated that the Aircraft should have been deplaned and the fuel transfer method should have been used. That was not done and although the flight crew was adequately confident that sufficient fuel was on board the aircraft and the MELs were complete and compliant; it is of concern to us that the proper method of determining fuel load was not done properly. There was no known fuel deficiency on the flight and the flight was completed with no other abnormalities.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported MEL fueling procedures at Contract Maintenance location may have countered company policy.


Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Declared Emergency; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

We experienced a compressor stall at 120 KTS and V1 was 136. We heard a loud bang and the airplane veered hard to left. I initiated an abort and we were informed that there was a large flame that shot out the left engine. We informed ATC of our abort and to roll the crash/fire/rescue. We pulled the aircraft onto taxiway and requested the hot brake area and they said that we were fine where we are. I made a passenger announcement and talked to flight attendants.  Fire trucks checked the aircraft and everything looked alright. After we contacted Operations and Maintenance we had fire trucks follow us to gate. Informed ground crew that the right brakes where overheating and to remain clear. I talked to Maintenance and we proceeded to get a new aircraft and continue with our flight.This is my logbook write up. On dept roll at 120 KTS V1. We heard loud pop and aircraft veered to left. We aborted the takeoff; 'LVL 2 LEFT COMPRESSOR STALL' alert displayed. Aircraft behind us reported flames out left engine. Abort was normal and fire trucks as precaution. Power loss on left engine notable. Right side brakes at time of abort 420/440!

A B717 left engine compressor stalled at about 120 KTS on takeoff so a high speed reject was completed; and the aircraft returned to the gate accompanied by Airport Rescue and Fire.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Near midair [with] a small drone flying one block east of the hospital.  Our aircraft was on initial climb out at approximately 65 knots and was climbing from helipad to 2200 MSL.  Elevation [at] time of near miss was probably 100-150 feet above helipad which is approximately 1250 MSL.  The primary departure path from this helipad is standardized due to close noise sensitive areas and must be protected from drone activities and intrusions due to high flight volume around the hospital. We had to look up through the rotors to keep it in sight as it passed directly over the aircraft by about 25-50 feet.  We saw it at the last second and had no time to react.  Ground all private drones. They are going to cause a mishap with a manned aircraft; the regulations for their operation do not provide helicopters with a margin of safety that is acceptable to flight crews who cannot see them because they are too small.  The drones also do not have lights or markings that aid in their visual acquisition.  They also do not register on TCAS or other radar systems. Alternately; 'no drone' fly zones within 1 NM of all hospital helipads.

Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a UAV shortly after takeoff from a hospital.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

We departed on the departure and immediately after switching [frequencies; we] began experiencing communication problems. The #1 radio began to get 'scratchy' and only intermittently readable. We were able to hear well enough to take an initial turn to a heading 180 degrees and climb to 15000 feet. We were given a frequency change and this frequency was also very scratchy and almost unreadable. The controllers were also having a extremely hard time understanding our transmissions. We were given a turn to proceed direct to the ZZZZZ intersection and at this point the radios became almost impossible to hear or transmit at all. The #2 radio was MELed because the Radio Management Unit (RMU) digits would intermittently go to dashes and stay dashes. The radio would transmit and receive on which ever the last frequency that was dialed in but it would not switch frequencies. This flight the #2 Radio was stuck on the [departure airport] ATIS frequency. What little we could hear from ATC was them asking us if we wanted to return to [departure airport]. We transmitted in the blind numerous times that we believed the ZZZ2 was a better option due to longer runways and further away from ZZZ3 and ZZZ4 traffic. We were able to send a message to the company was able to inform ZZZ2 of our plan. During our decent we established communications well enough to inform ZZZ2 of our plan to hold over ZZZ1 VOR for 20 minutes to burn off fuel the proceed to ZZZ1 and land. While holding we were able to establish text communications on my cell phone. [Dispatch] provided me with the phone number for ZZZ1 tower and from there we were able to communicate via telephone with the control tower. The landing was uneventful.The Encore has limited communication methods when compared to other aircraft in the fleet. The telephone has been deactivated. The Encore only has two VHF radios and a HF radio that is almost never used. Our crewmembers are not current with HF radio operations so it leaves us few options in the event of a dual VHF radio failure. Because of this I believe we should not continue to MEL the #2 radio when it malfunctions. Instead we should have the airplane immediately repaired. In the case of this aircraft this is the 7th time that the #2 radio was MEL'd in the preceding 2 months.

CE560 Captain reported being dispatched with the number two radio deferred. Shortly after takeoff the number one radio becomes unusable. The crew was able to convey through the use of cell phones and data link communications that they wished to hold to burn fuel then divert. This aircraft had a history communication radio failures.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 1200

Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Weather: snow 3/4; visibility 300 overcast. ILS 35; Captain pilot flying. Aircraft configured on speed just out side the outer marker. Right before marker and glide slope intercept; ECAM alerted WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT. [We] briefly discussed options and meaning of ECAM while continuing approach. Told Tower we needed to break off approach and work issue. [We] climbed to 7;000 FT then soon after turned east and climbed to 9;000 FT. Ran WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT check list. No actions available in flight. Discussed issue 'no nose wheel steering.' [We] discussed techniques; outcomes; and reaction to outcomes due to no nose wheel steering on ground in snow and low visibility conditions upon landing. Briefed flight attendants and deadheading crewmembers. [We] attempted to contact Dispatch and Maintenance via ACARS. No reply in time we had decided to get on ground due to deteriorating weather conditions and the possibility of lower CAT approach weather than the aircraft potentially had capability of. [We] briefed new approach [and] ran normal checklist. DECLARED AN EMERGENCY and had the trucks roll with Approach Controller. No nose wheel steering on FAIR braking conditions on runway. [We] informed ATC of potential needs; TOWING. ILS 35 approach normal. Touch down and rollout normal with normal procedure; differential braking until 25 KTS. At approximately 25 KTS tested to steer aircraft with nose wheel steering. NO nose wheel steering available. [We] came to a full stop on centerline using differential braking. Contacted Tower and emergency vehicles; all was fine on and with the aircraft except we could not steer aircraft and needed tow. Shut down engines; coordinated with Ground Operations for tow in; briefed flight attendants and passengers. [We were] towed to gate; discussed event with Maintenance. Maintenance confirmed fault.

An A320 ECAM alerted WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT on approach so a go around was executed to comply with the QRH; an emergency was declared; and a normal landing completed on a snowy runway after which the aircraft was towed to the gate.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 784

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On a routine IFR flight to OME in [an aircraft] with no auto-pilot I was given a clearance to begin an initial descent from 10;000 to 7000 ft.  Somewhere in the descent I fell asleep and upon waking found our altitude was descending through 5;000.  We were in VMC at the time; but within a few miles of a mountain ridge line obscured in an overcast layer.  That same mountain ridge line caused us to lose radar contact and radio communications with Anchorage Center (normal for that route).  An immediate maximum performance climb was initiated to return to 7;000 ft.  Several minutes later radio communications were re-established and the captain reported level 7;000.  I believe the primary cause was crew fatigue.  The captain had just returned to station late the previous night following a 16 hour commute and was noticeably fatigued prior to the flight. As first officer; I had flown five of the previous seven days right to duty day maximums and was also feeling fatigued.  Our crew rest facilities are located on the airport; and a [Large Transport aircraft] came in next door around XA:00 that morning interrupting sleep for both pilots.

Cargo aircraft First Officer reported descending below cleared altitude in mountainous Alaska terrain; when he fell asleep; following a very fatiguing series of flight assignments.


Installation; Inspection; Testing; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Aircraft X; a Eurocopter EC-135 was placed into Maintenance for its 800-Hour inspections. While complying with the aircraft inspections; the A-2411 Datasheet [indicated] a 1600-Hour inspection was due. The main rotor hub and the main rotor hub shaft were removed in accordance with EC-135 Maintenance Manual Chapter 62-31-00 (4-3); Removal Main Rotor Hub-Shaft; with no incident. We then carried out the inspection of the spacer tube. Upon reassembly of main rotor hub-shaft in accordance with EC-135 MM Chapter 62-31-00 (4-4); the bolts that attach the hinged support to the bearing block just aft of the mixing unit of this aircraft were installed. While installing the main rotor hub; I was on the lift that was used to assist with the install. Mechanic Y was in the aircraft watching the shaft to make sure that the splines were inserted into the grooves correctly. Lead Mechanic X was on top of the aircraft watching the shaft from the top of the aircraft; it was at that point that I believe that the bolts were installed. These two bolts were not torqued or cotter pinned. The aircraft was then moved back into to the hangar and reassembly resumed. This was not noticed at time of reassembly of aircraft for maintenance flight following 800-Hour inspections. The aircraft then flew its maintenance flight which lasted about 2-hours total flight time. The aircraft returned to ZZZ to finish up paperwork and to be placed back in service in ZZZ1. The pilot came down to swap Aircraft X from Aircraft Y; which they were currently in so that the pilot could take Aircraft X back to ZZZ1. Aircraft X was [later] placed back into service at the ZZZ1 Base. I wanted to make sure my night pilot was good with all the paper and to see if he had any questions over anything that had been completed during the maintenance evolution. He informed me that the day pilot stated that there was a 1 to 1 hop in all axis of flight; I then proceeded to ask him to let me know what he felt about the aircraft after he flew it to see if he could duplicate the 1 to 1 hop in all axis of flight. I arrived to work this morning; upon my arrival Aircraft X was just starting to start engines on a patient flight. They completed patient flight without an incident. I walked out to talk to the pilot about 1 to 1 hop in all axis of flight and he said that it was there and seemed to be getting worse. I then stated to him to place Aircraft X on a 30-minute maintenance delay and for us to take the aircraft for a flight to see if I could identify the 1 to 1 hop in all axis of flight. Aircraft X was then placed on a 30-minute maintenance delay. Before we got into the aircraft the pilot and I took a look at everything from the hub cap down to the mixing unit. That's when I noticed something was not correct with the hinged support attachment to the bearing block. I then pulled the Co-Pilot's side transmission cowling and noticed the bolts securing the hinged support to the bearing block on the Co-Pilot's side were not torqued nor cotter pinned. I then stopped everything took Aircraft X out of service and made to notification to Lead Mechanic X. After speaking with Lead Mechanic X; I was directed to call the Area Maintenance Manager who advised me to take the other transmission cowling off to inspect the other bolt and to take pictures and send them to him. I removed the other cowling and it was noticed the bolt was installed and the nut had worked its way off the bolt. I did a search for the nut and it was found in between the main transmission and the mixing unit. Once the nut was located I took pictures from every angle that I could see and then sent them to Maintenance Manager and Mr. X. I informed the Maintenance Manager; Mr. X and my Lead Mechanic of where the nut was located. While informing Mr. X of where nut was located; he directed me to call American Eurocopter Technical Support Representative; Mr. Y who was out to lunch at the time I called. Mr. Y then returned my phone call and I informed him of what was going on and he advised me to send him information stating what had happened and how it was found; along with pictures of the area. He also advised me that he would forward the pictures and statement to the design department for review and that we should have an answer back in the morning to advise us what was needed to place Aircraft X back into service.I believe that there is certain action that could have been handled differently. We could have had another Mechanic that was not there during the maintenance; come in and inspect everything before that aircraft was placed back into service. The extra set of eyes from someone that was not there at the time of install would have been very beneficial in the aid of identifying issues before the aircraft was placed back into a state to which it was ready to be flown for the post 800-Hour flight. I also believe another Mechanic could have been on hand to assist with the install of the main rotor hub shaft.

A Line Mechanic reports finding bolts that attach a hinge support to a bearing block just aft of a mixing unit; on a EC-135 Eurocopter; were not torqued or cotter pinned. Pilot had noted the EC-135 had a 1 to 1 hop in all axis of flight that had been getting worse.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were on profile and over the river when we received an 'Obstacle; Obstacle; Pull Up' alert. We followed the procedure; and told ATC we were going around due to a GPS alert. They gave us vectors for another approach. We flew slightly above the profile approximately 300 FT higher on the second approach and landed without incident.I believe we were right where we were supposed to be; so I don't know [what preventative measures to suggest]. Possibly raise the altitude target to 1100 instead of 900 over the bridge.

A B737 descending on the RIVER VISUAL to Runway 19 at DCA responded to and EGPWS 'TOO LOW; Obstacle' warning when approaching the Key Bridge. They executed a go-around and returned for a successful second attempt.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

We were at cruise when our oil pressure started to indicate low in the amber range (Captain detected).  We ran the QRH at this time and it did not require an engine shutdown.  Within minutes the oil pressure dropped and remained in the red.  The QRH called for a precautionary shutdown.  We had already called center and requested to divert as a precautionary.  At this time the Captain (CA) turned toward the airport with the help of ATC.  We were becoming pretty task saturated and were preparing to shut down the number 1 engine and the CA made the comment that we needed to slow down.  We did. We shut down number one; ran checklists and prepared for the divert including getting the speeds for a flaps 22 single engine approach; briefed the possible go-around as it was overcast and gusty. The CA notified the Flight Attendant (FA) and also the jumpseating FA who had also stepped up to assist.  ATC gave us several turns to assist in the descent and we intercepted the LOC for RWY XY at 7000 ft.; completed the single engine approach and taxied to the ramp.  While conducting a walk around; we found the nacelle (lower portion) covered in oil as well as the area behind the engine.  There were many threats; however I feel that given the situation they were all managed very; very well.  It was a positive outcome. It appears that this was a maintenance issue so I do not believe that we could have prevented the issue.   One thing I cannot emphasis enough is that the company should NEVER ask a pilot to fly immediately after an event of this nature. I don't know that they are aware of the physiological effects that happen to a pilot after something like this and they are things that actually take time to develop.

Seconds later I noticed an irregularity with the ENG1 Oil pressure.  It had sporadically dropped from about 60 to 40ish and back up.  I saw it happen a few times within seconds so I requested the First Officer (FO) to QRH Low oil pressure.  I simultaneously pulled up the takeoff data page and observed the oil quantity at 3 quarts.  The FO ran the QRH and at that point still had oil pressure within limits so we elected to divert while the engine was still good.  I sent a [message] to dispatch that we were diverting due to low oil; and informed the FA that we were diverting for precautionary reasons and informed the pax.  Within about two minutes the situation escalated to where the QRH directed a shutdown.  The low oil quantity also advised the same.

An EMB-145 engine oil pressure initially dropped; stabilized; then dropped into the RED band. The QRH was referenced; the engine shutdown; and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 3976; Flight Crew Type 141

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

My pre-acceptance weather check indicated clear and 10 miles visibility at CVH. I accepted the flight and completed all the preflight paperwork. On the way out to the aircraft we noticed there was a layer overhead. We discussed this on the drive; commenting it was unusual based on what I had seen on my weather check. Because of the two 'clear' reportings; I didn't think this layer would impede our take-off. We launched but on climb out I ran into the bottom of the cloud layer at about 550 feet MSL. I descended back to 500; and since visibility was not an issue; continued to CVH; focused on getting to the destination. My passenger expressed concern about the clouds; to which I responded I was at 500 feet in the clear; and fully expected the weather to improve as we got closer to the airport. My passenger then expressed a concern about making contact and not being able to get to our destination by air; necessitating a ground transport. I told passenger my expectations for the weather and that I would double check the weather at our next destination before we got to the rendezvous so we could alleviate that concern before landing. About halfway to CVH the weather broke completely; and was in fact clear and 10 as reported. I double checked the weather report for our next destination and relayed it. They were also reporting Clear and 10. On departure from CVH I climbed to 2500 feet MSL and went direct. There was a cloud layer on the other side of the range; but I was well above it at 2500 feet. Destination ATIS was still reporting clear; which I confirmed with the Tower Controller as soon as I made contact. The cloud layer ended well before our destination; allowing a normal descent to landing.When we returned to the aircraft after dropping off our passenger; the reported weather at E16 was 400 Overcast; so we shifted to the [alternate] ramp for fuel and to wait for the weather to clear. I called the E16 ASOS by phone and it was reporting an 800 feet Overcast layer. We launched and returned to base. By the time I arrived; I was level at 800 feet MSL and well below the cloud deck. I landed and turned over to the Day pilot.In hindsight; my most grievous error was that I did not cancel the flight and return to base as soon as I realized I didn't have the 800 feet ceiling required by section 135.609 of the FARs; regardless of the visibility. I realize the client's issues was not our issue despite my confidence in better weather ahead. And while I felt comfortable with continuing; I realize that decision was not within my purview to make. This lesson has been learned and will not be repeated. There was also a crew coordination issue present that was not resolved by any crewmember; myself included. As explained above; I felt like I had addressed the concerns expressed by the passenger in the back; though I believe there were other concerns that were not voiced and only came to light after our post-flight debrief. The relatively new crew member in the front seat; whether because of passenger inexperience or lack of knowledge; contributed nothing to the discussion; either in the air or during the post-flight debrief. I have told my students for years I believe Communication is the most important skill of Crew Coordination and while I thought I was addressing the concerns of the crew; I realize I should have taken an operational pause; stepped back from my focus on getting to the passenger; and actually had a discussion with the crew about their concerns and fears.

A helicopter pilot departed after a weather review indicated clear and greater than 10 miles visibility but entered a cloud layer at 550 feet. He descended to 500 feet and continued toward the destination where the weather was in fact clear.


Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

On takeoff at approximately 100 knots we hit at least two seagulls; one entered the left engine. We rejected the takeoff. After clearing the runway we requested fire trucks out of an abundance of caution for the high speed reject. We ran the RTO (Rejected Takeoff) in ACARS. Data said we could return to the gate with a brake cooling time of 16 minutes. We returned to the gate after Fire and Rescue cleared us. No Passenger injuries were reported.

B737-700 flight crew reported rejecting takeoff due to bird strike.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Early afternoon I received taxi instruction from TUS Ground for taxi from the FBO. I was advised to taxi Delta to Runway 11R. Upon approaching 11L; was advised by Ground to continue and cross Runway 11L which I did. I was observing Foreflight iPad taxi diagram and [was] unfamiliar with the airport never having been there before. I noted on taxi diagram that gray color taxiway did not seem to actually cross the runway and assumed it was OK to continue with that area looking clear of the actual runway. I accidentally went further on the Delta taxiway than I realized; apparently being near the approach area of Runway 11R. Ground Control notified me to hold short Runway 11R but by then I was in the middle of that area so advised them that I was already almost across that area. Believe the diagram is somewhat confusing due to the gray taxing area color as opposed to the black color for the runways on the diagram. If the approach area at Delta and the intersection of both runways were black; feel it would be a bit more obvious of the runway area. Runway 11R is also very narrow and easy to miss at that location. I realize it is a 'Hotspot' area but initially missed it.

A Corporate pilot unfamiliar with TUS and using an iPad; was cleared to cross Runway 11L but could not visually identify or did the EFB Airport Chart indicate Taxiway D as an extension of Runway 11R and so he taxied onto it.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During cruise at FL380; approximately 45 minutes after takeoff and in IMC; we experienced multiple airspeed and altitude reported excursions. Captain's airspeed indicated about 140 knots while First Officer's showed about 260 knots. Captain's altimeter appeared correct at FL380; but First Officer's showed FL371. The autothrottles responded to the apparent low airspeed by advancing the throttles to the engine limit. I disengaged the autothrottles and reduced the throttles manually to a normal cruise setting. However; both EEC's tripped to ALTN. After assessing which instruments reflected accurate information; we descended to FL340. During the descent and shortly after level off at FL340; all instruments began returning to normal. We continued the flight at FL340 to uneventful landing. This was caused by some unknown aircraft malfunction and; as such; there is not much we could have done to avoid it. We were presented with conflicting information and we had to methodically determine which instruments we believed to be reliable and which were not and then proceed accordingly. The symptoms we had were not unlike the simulator scenarios for unreliable airspeed and altimetry.

B737-800 Captain experiences unreliable airspeed and altimeter indications at FL380. Both EEC's were noted to have tripped to alternate. The Captain's airspeed and the First Officer's altimeter are determined to be in error and the flight is descended to FL340 where all systems return to normal.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 170; Flight Crew Type 170

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While taxing to Runway XL; we encountered some COM issues. I did transmit over the ground frequency but they could not hear us. Upon reaching the hold Short Line for Runway XL; I was unable to stop the plane. The brake pedals lost complete pressure and I had no control over the plane. I immediately applied the parking brakes; however; the plane went past the hold short line and turned left into the grass. There was no damage to the plane; or any airport environment. Airport Personnel arrived and assisted me. They took down all my information and then towed me to the FBO. A local ground staff did check out the plane and confirmed that the brakes have failed and lost all pressure. I did inform the flight school and squawked the airplane for all the issues. There were no people harmed nor any damages reported.

Pilot reported loss of normal brake system during taxi into position on runway; causing a runway excursion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon arrival at ZZZ; Ramp informed us that the door was completely off of the DG (Dangerous Goods) can in position 1R. Additionally; the Hazmat agent stated that the latches all appeared to be unlatched. It is impossible to know if the door was ever put into position or if it was installed and not latched. FO (First Officer) stated that she was unsure of its condition after inspection but was certain that the hose had been properly connected.There was a failure of the Hazmat agent to properly close/latch the door as well as a failure of the ramp agent to visually confirm prior to closure of the rigid cargo barrier door.Rigid compliance to DG procedures and independent verification is necessary.

B757-200 Captain reported that the Hazmat agent at destination notified crew of Dangerous Goods container improperly secured for air transport.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Encountered moderate wake turbulence approximately five miles behind Company 737-800 while on the TERPZ Arrival at BWI airport. Aircraft rolled approximately 10 degrees left and right; airspeed plus/minus five knots. Event lasted a few seconds on three different occasions on our arrival. Captain requested vector and ATC was helpful and gave us vectors to final approach. Autopilot remained on during the event. ATC requested that we submit an ASAP.

B737-800 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence in 5 mile trail of another B737-800 on approach to BWI.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Climbing above 10000 feet east of PEVEE on the HOLTZ 9 departure; seven miles in trail of a B777-200 on the same route; we had two moderate encounters with wake turbulence with large variations in roll. This necessitated us leaving the assigned track and required alternate heading instructions from ATC. We subsequently encountered two more wakes which required us to change headings again. Winds at altitude were from 050 at 5 knots indicated. The A321 will not out climb heavy jets when in trail on the same route.

[Report narraritive contained no additional information.]

A321 flight crew reported three wake encounters on climbout in trail of a B777-200 that induced roll and prompted the crew to deviate from the assigned course.


Flying north with Miami Center southeast of CRG. [There were] significant buildups and moderate turbulence throughout the area. [There were] many aircraft on frequency trying to check-in and trying to get clearances to avoid weather and turbulence. The Controller was doing her best to handle the radio traffic; but; as she stated; she was working two frequencies simultaneously. Therefore; it was difficult to contact her as everyone was stepping on everyone else's transmission; she wasn't receiving our calls; and her calls were being blocked. This was a weekend afternoon; so I don't know if ATC is minimally-manned during this period; but the working Controller was doing the best she could; but she was nevertheless overwhelmed by the circumstances. In my opinion; she needed to be working a single frequency and; frankly; that would have been very busy. This report is in no way suggesting the Controller was faulty or making mistakes. As noted above; she was doing an admirable job in a very tough situation. The density of aircraft coupled with the bad weather situation really required additional Controller availability. Fortunately; we didn't need to declare an emergency to avoid weather (due to an inability to communicate with ATC) and didn't come close to another aircraft. But; the potential for both was there. Storm buildups; turbulence; and aircraft density should require ATC to work a single frequency in order to allow for clear and frequent communication.

Pilot reports Controller working two frequencies and can't contact the Controller due to congestion on the frequencies.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As Flight Attendant I9 I sit at door 2R FWD. FA (Flight Attendant) B2 who is responsible for arming; disarming and evacuation responsibilities sits at 2R AFT. The controls for this door are at 2R FWD. In an emergency every second counts and there's no room for confusion. In order for FA B2 to effectively operate this door as quickly as possible we would have to switch jumpseats; creating possible confusion and using up precious time. This needs to be corrected immediately.

Flight Attendant reported safety issue related to duties versus crew seat assignments for arming/disarming doors.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 1000

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

On departure the power on our #1 (left) engine stuck at max power.  We had not noticed any abnormalities during preflight or our run ups. We continued on our flight plan; notified ATC; and attempted some troubleshooting steps to fix the issue. After about 30 minutes of flying / troubleshooting; we opted to return to ZZZ. We planned the RNAV approach; and shut the engine down while descending to the initial approach fix; rather than try to land with 1 engine at max power. We [advised ATC] as we were now single engine; and proceeded to fly the approach and land without incident.

BE90 First Officer reported returning to departure airport after the left engine was shut down in flight because power could not be reduced below max.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We operated into DTW and had a little over an hour sit before our flight out. After we shut down; the FO got out to do his walk around; while I escorted an unaccompanied minor to the top of the jetway. After that I went and grabbed a cheeseburger. When I got back to the plane; the only people on board were the FA and a Check Airman who was about to do my line check. Both were seated in the back of the aircraft. I went and sat in the main cabin as well.  After a few minutes; an unidentified individual came on board and said we had an engine running. When I checked; the number two engine was running near idle. I shut it down immediately.

Air carrier Captain reported leaving the cockpit after parking the aircraft and realizing later one engine was left running.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

First Officer was flying; I was pilot monitoring.  We were flying the arrival; and were given the ILS approach.  Weather conditions were 1;200 overcast and 8 miles visibility.  As we were on the arrival; I noticed that there was little to no traffic ahead of us; and we had about a 15-20 knot tailwind throughout our descent.  So; our arrival and approach clearance were fairly quick and efficient; and we received no speed restrictions or delays.  Our altitude was about 5;000 FT and we were intercepting the localizer when we were cleared for the approach.  At this point we were at 250 KTS and clean.  We intercepted the glideslope and I remarked to the First Officer that we needed to level off a little; and slow down so that we could configure for the approach in time to be stable.  He concurred and disconnected the autopilot so that he could level off.  As our speed slowed we began deploying flaps and landing gear in accordance with the speed limitations.  I noticed that we were about 4;000 FT and about a dot and a half high on the glideslope.  I was concerned that we were going to be high and fast and I began coaching the First Officer that we really needed to slow down.  As we came through flaps 30 and flaps 45; I did not realize that our descent had markedly increased.  I was entirely focused on slowing down and making sure the aircraft was configured by 1;000 feet per the stable approach concept.  The First Officer was still hand flying at this point; and I noticed that we were now a dot and half low on the glideslope.  We were fully configured and our speed was quickly approaching our ref plus 5 target.  Our altitude at this point was 1;800 FT.  I said; 'Whoa we're low.  Level off and get back on the glideslope.'  The First Officer complied and we leveled off and began a slight climb back onto the glideslope.  As the glideslope was coming back to us; Tower queried us and said he received a low altitude alert.  I responded that we were back on the glideslope and he replied that it was fairly brief; and by the time he got done telling us about the alert it had extinguished.  The First Officer re-engaged the autopilot and flew a normal approach from this point on; and we made a normal landing within the touchdown zone and taxied to the gate. Earlier on the trip the First Officer had told me that he was new to the 700/900; as he had just transitioned from the 200.  Therefore he was not as familiar with the 900 as I am; particularly with the difficulty involved in descending and slowing down quickly.  There was also not very much traffic in the area.  The First Officer remarked to me that he expected to be slowed down by Approach Control and vectored around before commencing the approach; so perhaps he felt like he had more time than we actually did.  During times of low traffic; Approach tends to let you fly the approach and arrival at speeds of our discretion.  Other threats would be the tailwind during the arrival; which gave us even less time to descend and slow down.  The IFR weather is another threat; this approach would have been much easier if it had been a visual approach and we could easily see what was happening.  We made a few errors during the event.  First; we came in too high and too fast.  We intercepted the approach on glideslope at 250 knots and clean; which made slowing down a difficult task.  We compounded this error by descending too rapidly while we were slowing down and configuring.  I failed to monitor our descent in relation to the glideslope.  I continually had in my mind that we were 'too high too fast;' when in reality we were getting too low.  Another error I made was not actively taking control of the aircraft when I realized our approach was becoming unstable.  I should have either commanded the First Officer to execute a missed approach or taken the controls and executed a missed approach myself.  I attribute those errors to poor judgment on my part.  I need to learn to take a more active role and better communicate to my first officers how I want the aircraft to be flown.  This should have happened much sooner; while we were on the arrival.  I realized that we had a tailwind; very light traffic; and a relatively short transition from arrival to approach.  I need to learn to better communicate situational awareness factors to my first officer; particularly when they are less familiar and less experienced than I am.   I also need to learn to do a better job deciding to go-around in cases of an unstable approach; rather than trying to 'make it work.'  I would suspect that this is a problem that a lot of pilots face:  trying to salvage an unstable approach rather than abandoning the approach and trying again.  This experience greatly impressed upon me the need to execute a missed approach when the time comes; as I failed to do so in this situation.

CRJ-900 Captain describes an unstabilized approach flown by the First Officer who is new to the 900. The Captain laments his late involvement in coaching the First Officer who is initially high and fast then low during the approach; resulting in a low altitude alert from the Tower.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

After a normal landing; we began our taxi to a remote gate; no jet bridge (passengers must deplane then walk from the ramp to the terminal). We started the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit); which started normally and ran normally. After the APU had been running; we received the EICAS (Engine Indication Crew Alerting System) message 'APU GEN OFF BUS.' We then reset the APU generator; per the QRH. There was no indication in the logbook of previous APU issues; and during the entire day up until this point; the APU had been operating without any issues of any sort.I did not know if the station had an adequate GPU (Ground Power Unit) readily available; and I was concerned about passenger and ramp personnel's safety with an engine running at the gate in this situation. Given these facts; I then completely shut down the APU. After the APU was completely shut down; I then re-initialized the APU control and made sure the APU had been off for at least 1 minute. We then re-started the APU; which started normally and safely.At this time; I shut down engine 1. When I shut down engine 1; DC BUS 1 disconnected from the system. I knew that it was DC 1 because the PFD 1 (Primary Flight Display) and MFD 2 (Multifunction Display) went black; and on the EICAS several components associated with DC 1 came offline as well. While on the phone with Maintenance Control; and as we had begun to deplane; ramp notified me that there was smoke or fire coming from the rear of the aircraft. There was no fire bell; master warning; or red indications on the overhead panel.At this time; I immediately instructed my FA (Flight Attendant) to evacuate the aircraft and to get everyone clear of the ramp and safely away from the aircraft. My First Officer and I then began to initiate an emergency evacuation via the Quick Reference Checklist. As we performed the emergency shut down; I noted that the Cargo Door was open. Because I had no indication of a cargo fire; and because I was concerned about discharging halon onto ramp personnel; I pulled both Fire T-Handles; pressed the APU fuel shutoff valve; and discharged the APU fire bottle. With the last passengers off the aircraft; I then instructed my crew to evacuate; grabbed the portable fire extinguisher in the cockpit; and went to the back of the cabin to search for any passengers and investigate any source of fire. There was no smoke or indication of fire in the cabin.After this; I ran outside to the back of the airplane with the fire extinguisher to make sure that all ramp personnel were clear and there was no fire in back. When I investigated the empennage; the only damage to the aircraft was on the intake to the APU.Once I knew that everyone was safe; I called dispatch to notify them of what had happened; and coordinated with CFR (Crash Fire Rescue).Speaking with a Mechanic later; I was told that there was no damage to the APU itself; or the Fire Loop on the APU. The fire was contained in the intake; which the Mechanic likened to a back-fire. He explained that this was the reason there was no indication of fire in the cockpit; and that he had heard of this type of back-fire happening before.

Landed and taxied to gate; on the ramp we attempted to start the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit). It started normally and ran for a bit; then an APU GEN OFF BUS message appeared. We ran the QRH and reset the GEN. We asked for a GPU (Ground Power Unit). We tried to start APU again and it ran normal. Engine one was then shut down and a DC 1 Bus failure happened. We began to deplane; then ramp notified us of a fire in the back of the plane; at that point we shut down number 2 engine and started the emergency evacuation checklist. Everything turned out safely.

EMB145 flight crew experiences an APU fire after parking on the ramp with both engines and the APU running. The APU generator would not come on line then a ramp person reported that the APU was on fire. There was no fire warning but the APU was shut down and the fire bottle was discharged and the passengers evacuated.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was unaware that [our company] was not authorized to fly a B-767 in to FLL. In the future I will ask the company if there is any doubt about our certification at an airport.

B767 Captain reported landing at an airport not authorized in company Op Specs.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff with the First Officer (FO) flying it was apparent that the aircraft was out of trim.  The FO said he was having trouble keeping the wings level.  We then received a vector to the north.  We then leveled off and determined the rudder trim was malfunctioning.  It took about 8 units of left trim to maintain level flight.  We [elected to return to the departure airport] and received vectors back.  We determined the aircraft was controllable in the landing configuration at approach speed.  We ran the overweight landing checklist and returned for an uneventful landing flown by the Captain.

I was the Pilot Flying and right after lift off the aircraft wanted to bank hard right. Nothing was making sense at the moment. Both engines were operating normally; and both rudder & ailerons trims were centered but aircraft wanted to roll to the right. Told captain I was having an issue with the aircraft wanting to roll to the right. Added rudder trim to stop the roll and it took 8 units to left to stop the roll. We elected to return for the control problem we were having. The approach and landing were normal with a touchdown weight of 132.0 lbs at 700 VSI. Taxied to the gate and shut her down. Maintenance made the comment that the rudder spiral plate could have been the issue. Will now make sure I spin through more than 5 units of travel in both directions before every gate departure.

A MD83 Flight Crew; with the First Officer flying; reports a strong right rolling tenancy after lift off. Eventually eight units of rudder trim are required for wings level flight and the crew elects to return to the departure airport for an over weight landing.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 100

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Rejected take off above 60 knots. AFC's light came on on the master warning system; returned to the maintenance facility to be checked out by Maintenance.

Captain reported a Master Warning activation and executing a RTO.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 134; Flight Crew Type 134

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Incursion Runway

While inbound; 10 miles east of the airport I made a position call on CTAF frequency. An unknown person called back and asked if I was familiar with the airport. I called back and answered 'yes; I am; I know I have to stay east of the runway.' They called back and confirmed; and informed me they are using Runway XX. I continued to make position calls at 5 miles; then 2 miles at which time I entered the downwind for Runway XX. I then continued to make my base call followed by my final call. As I touched down on XX; a pilot proceeded to make taxi call for XX and entered the runway about 1;000 feet ahead of me. I had to slam on my brakes and divert off to the left of Runway XX onto flat dirt and skidded to a halt sideways to avoid hitting her aircraft on the runway; and avoid hitting aircraft parked in the dirt. The pilot then apologized and said 'sorry; I didn't see you.' I departed a little later to my next destination.

PA28 pilot reported an aircraft taxied onto the active runway down field; which required an evasive maneuver resulting in a runway excursion.


Amber Fuel Filter Bypass Left CAS Message in cruise at 40;000 feet. Ran QRH and contacted Dispatch with divert airport choice off our left at 100 miles. Received re-release from Dispatcher; advised ATC and proceeded to [alternate] for an uneventful landing. I advised [Maintenance] of possible fuel contamination.

CE-680 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after receiving a Fuel Filter Bypass message on CAS.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Enroute to ZZZ.  The original destination requested by the passengers was TEB; but the destination was changed to ZZZ due to expected 1 hour plus delays at TEB.   We departed with the understanding that we would check with ATC enroute and if TEB didn't have delays; we would land there.  Just after crossing ITH VOR; about 30 minutes out we were handed to Boston Center.  We queried the controller and were told that TEB no longer had delays.  We requested and were granted a clearance to TEB.   The new clearance was HNK V167 WEARD V489 COATE direct TEB which we repeated and entered into the FMS.  I briefly compared the major points in the FMS with the enroute charts in [the tablet].  Everything seemed to agree.  The controller begin assigning multiple descents and I was on the phone with [Company name removed] letting them know to switch destinations and arrange ground transportation.  Things were very busy in the cockpit.  About 20 minutes out from TEB; the controller told us; 'Aircraft X cleared direct to RUBER.  R-U-B-E-R (spelled out with letters; not phonetically).  Cross RUBER at 7;000.'   I read the clearance back and the [pilot flying] already started entering the point in the FMS scratchpad.   Initially he had heard the spelling as RUBBR and entered that.  That was a waypoint 2;000 miles away.  I corrected him and he entered the correct point RUBER.   Neither of us saw RUBER as a point in the FMS.   This combined with the fact that the controller had spelled it out as if it was a new waypoint; led both of us to believe we had been given a new clearance to TEB.  We crossed RUBER at 7;000 and turned direct to TEB not realizing that RUBER was a point on V489 and the controller had still wanted us to maintain the remainder of the originally assigned route.  A few moments later the controller asked us if we were turning to HUO.  We replied that we understood our clearance to be RUBER direct to TEB.  He stated that RUBER was on V489 and wanted us to still maintain the remainder of the route.  Because we had entered a new route in the box; it wiped out the original route.  We asked for a vector to HUO and worked to quickly get it programmed in the FMS.  The vector given was 190 degrees.  Then the controller then told us to turn direct COATE.  Things were very busy; but we got it in the FMS and began following the route.   After COATE we turned direct to TEB.  ATC (now New York Approach) then asked us what our heading was.  We stated that we were direct TEB (approximate heading 135).  ATC stated that he had given us a heading of 200 degrees.  Neither of us ever remember getting this clearance or reading it back.  We promptly turned to a heading of 200.  At no time did we ever appear to be close to other aircraft or be in danger of causing a Traffic Alert.   In the future; I will be more diligent to verify that a point we are cleared to is indeed a new point and not an existing point on our route.  I believe this confusion was greatly compounded by the well-meaning controller who spelled out the fix.  This phraseology is typical with a new route; but not a clearance to a point on an existing route.  My assumption was that we had been given a new clearance.  In the future I will ask ATC if there seems to be any confusion.  The confusion of the clearance may have then led us to miss a call from ATC; but we didn't ever read the clearance back or respond; so it would have been helpful for ATC to make a follow-up call to ensure we received the 200 degree heading clearance.

A pilot reported confusion with ATC on a waypoint. When the crew entered the new waypoint it wiped out the existing route and took the flight slightly off course. The Controller issued one heading but the crew heard another then corrected it.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors

I was working Ground Control sectors combined; moderate to heavy traffic. There was a disabled aircraft on the primary arrival runway. As a result arrivals were landing on the primary departure runway; increasing the workload for both myself and the local east controller. Adding to the complexity of the situation were several similar call signs among proposed departure aircraft. Air Carrier X called for taxi; but called himself Air Carrier Y. I issued instructions to Air Carrier Z; believing it to be the correct call sign; and Air Carrier X responded. Hearing the read back with the correct call sign; I realized I needed to replace the misposted Air Carrier Z strip from local east's bay with the correct Air Carrier X; correct the strip marking; remove the incorrect Air Carrier Z from taxi status in the Departure Sequencing Program (DSP); and put Air Carrier X into taxi status.Workload increased significantly at this point as I attempted to continue responding to other departures while correcting the issues caused by the call sign mixup. Shortly after these events; Air Carrier A called at spot 2 and I issued instructions to taxi 'Runway X via Juliet; Yankee; Kilo' and verified that the pilot had his weight and balance numbers and would be ready for departure; as this was a very short taxi. He said he was ready and I instructed him to monitor tower. There were at least two similar call signs also proposed for departure; I cannot recall the exact numbers. Shortly after taxiing Air Carrier A; I realized that once again I had put the incorrect flight plan into taxi status and posted the wrong strip; this time for Air Carrier B instead of Air Carrier A as I had intended. This time the mistake was entirely my own; as I had simply taken the wrong strip out of my bay. Once again; my workload spiked as I retrieved the incorrect strip from local east's bay; replaced it with the correct strip; marked it appropriately; removed the incorrect Air Carrier B from taxi status; put Air Carrier A into taxi status; and quickly reviewed the flow control program to make sure I wasn't missing anything. While I was accomplishing these tasks; I did not see that Air Carrier A missed the eastbound turn onto the wrong taxiway continuing south and across the runway approach safety area. Two other members of the tower team spotted the conflict with an arrival short final and shouted warnings to Local Control. I began calling out to Air Carrier A; on the chance that he had not switched to tower yet; but got no answer. Local Control sent the arriving aircraft around; but it appeared to overfly the taxiing Air Carrier A on short final.The Yankee/Kilo/Whiskey area is one where we often see pilots take wrong turns or fail to turn when they should; often taxiing right past the end of the runway or crossing the runway approach on Yankee. A contributing factor worth noting is that without numerous similar call signs among [Air Carriers]; I would have had more time to scan out the windows and I feel I would have been more likely to spot and stop Air Carrier A's incursion. [This company] often assigns very similar call signs to aircraft which are not only proposed at the same time; but many times will fly to the same parts of the country and therefore potentially cause issues for multiple controllers as they fly similar or identical routes. Seeing three or four call signs which can all be easily confused for each other is common during departure pushes and even vigilant pilots and controllers fall victim to the resulting confusion routinely. It's a contributing factor that should be removed from the equation. I firmly believe that had I not been preoccupied with sorting out the [similar call sign] confusion; I would have been able to keep a more efficient scan; catch Air Carrier A miss his turn; and prevent an overfly event.

[Report narative contains no additional information.]

A Tower Ground Controller and flight crew reported an aircraft missed a turn while taxiing and entered the runway approach safety area with an arriving aircraft on short final.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 450

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Departure from TEB on the RUUDY 2 departure with BREZY transition was assigned for an empty ferry flight. My First Officer was to fly the leg. The departure was loaded in the FMS and the flight director was to be used in NAV mode. The pilot flying had set 2;000 FT in the altitude selector. Our airplane uses the Proline21 system. The departure calls for 1;500 FT at WENTZ then 2;000 FT at TASCA (or assigned by ATC). After a normal takeoff I ran the checklist while the SIC was hand flying the airplane following the flight director. 1;500 FT was reached before WENTZ and I realized that he was not leveling of. I called it ('Altitude; go back to 1;500!') but by the time he reversed the trend and descended we had reached 1;800 FT. New York Approach made a friendly (I think) statement: 'for future reference do not climb to 2;000 FT until passing WENTZ.'After our short flight we debriefed what had happened. He was blindly following the flight director and forgot to level of at 1;500 FT even though he knew the altitude restriction. I believe that multiple factors contributed to the event. I have flown many times with this crew member; including that particular departure. Knowing the departure; before the takeoff a preselection of 1;500 FT was a safer approach with VNAV preselected. Even though we briefed the departure; including the altitude restriction; the event took place. This shows that the flying pilot was not fully competent in the automation on this airplane and relies too much on the Flight Director on the departure phase of the flight. We talked about the event and I explained to him that the FMS and flight directors as well as autopilots are tools that we have for more efficient and safer flights but that you need to fully understand their limitations and constantly check that they are doing what they are supposed to do. When approaching an assigned altitude (or course or heading) it should be checked that the flight director (or autopilot) shows a trend of leveling of and if not; immediate action must be taken. I explained to him that the best way to set up the departure is to have the flight director set on NAV and VNAV with 1;500 preselected. Being set on NAV only provides lateral guidance and requires much more attention when approaching the altitude restriction with a greater risk of overshooting the altitude. Even though the FMS points were verified before takeoff with 1;500 at WENTZ the Flight Director cannot be blindly followed. In this case the flight director would have leveled of at 2;000. During my next recurrent training I will mention the event so that maybe they can incorporate this type of automation issue in their training. Also knowing my crewmember and having flown with him before multiple times; including this departure; gave me I guess an overconfidence of his skills and his understanding of the flight director potential issues. He had told me that that he understood the 1;500 restriction and had setup 2;000 has the final altitude on the departure. I should have suggested the 1;500 preselection. Allowing the SIC to fly a leg; should always be treated with extra attention and much more lengthy briefs as they often spend a lot of time observing the Captain from the right seat but spend less hands on flying time.

Hawker 800 Captain describes an altitude deviation during the RUUDY4 departure from TEB; with the First Officer flying. The altitude placed in MCP altitude window was 2;000 FT and the departure was hand flown in NAV only.


Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The Takeoff was a Flaps 15; takeoff with a 35 degree derate on an approximately 770;000 weight airplane.  Max N1 was approximately 101%.  An ICAO II takeoff was programmed into the CDU with a 1500 FT AGL thrust reduction and 3000 FT Level off.On initial takeoff; I was distracted and reduced the climb rate to maintain the required speed on the departure from Runway 7.  With flaps still at 15 degrees; and at approximately 1000 FT MSL; I had the First Officer speed intervene from VNAV to 220 knots. I then reduced the climb rate at approximately 1400 FT MSL and while still manually flying the airplane entered into the red overspeed margin by approximately 2 inches above the flaps 15 degrees (230 KIAS) max position.  Highest speed reached during the overspeed was 260 knots. Concurrent with the overspeed; the airplane started a slight sink rate reaching approximately 1040 FT MSL at which time an aural 'Don't Sink' warning was received.The other three pilots gave verbal cues and warnings concerning the overspeed and sink rate before the 'Don't Sink' audio warning was received. A normal climbout was reestablished; the airplane was cleaned up on schedule; and climbout to 9000 FT MSL was accomplished.I had not flown much in several weeks. Also; although I was in bed for over 8 hours I got very little sleep. I didn't feel particularly fatigued at the time but later became very tired. I probably should have put the early speeds in the box instead of using speed intervention.

I was first officer on the Boeing 777.  On initial climb out the Captain was distracted and reduced the climb rate.  With flaps still at 15 degrees and approximately 1000 FT MSL the Captain had me (FO) to speed intervene from VNAV to 220 knots.  Captain then reduced his climb rate at approximately 1400 FT MSL and while manually flying; the aircraft entered into the red overspeed margin by about a couple of inches above the flaps 15 limit which is 230 KIAS. The highest speed reached during the overspeed was 260 knots.  Concurrent with the overspeed; the airplane started a slight sink rate reaching approximately 1040 FT MSL. At which time we hear the 'Don't Sink' aural warning.  The relief CA; FO; and relief FO gave verbal clues and warnings concerning the overspeed and sink rate just before the 'don't Sink' audio was received.  Captain then reestablished a normal climb out and the aircraft was cleaned up on schedule and the rest of the SID was accomplished.

A fatigued B777 Captain flying an ICAO SID procedure had his First Officer SPEED INTERVENE to 220 KTS at 1;000 feet and began a descent which oversped the flaps. All three non-flying pilots verbalized the descent before the EGPWS 'DON'T SINK' alerted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 194; Flight Crew Type 10000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Due to a DCA runway change; traffic was stacked in holding at the published hold at PLDGE on the FRDMM 2 Arrival.  Prior to knowing we would have to hold; we had briefed the STAR points; altitudes; and speeds per the FOM.  The PLDGE waypoint has an altitude restriction of 17;000' to 15;000'; which we verified to be loaded in the FMC correctly.  We were subsequently cleared to hold at PLDGE at FL 210.  Upon entering the hold; I loaded a holding altitude of 21;000' on the HOLD page of the FMC in order to see the best hold speed at that altitude.  I did not realize doing that would delete the 17;000 to 15;000 that was previously on the LEGS page.  Later; I realized it was replaced with FL 210 at PLDGE.  While outbound in the hold; we were cleared direct PLDGE and cleared to descend via the arrival.  We also had just been informed of the runway change from 1 to 19 so we were busy reprogramming and briefing the RNP 19 approach.  I did not see that the FMC was going to hold 21;000' until PLDGE despite not being in the Hold mode anymore.  Washington Center said he saw we would not make the 17;000' to 15;000' restriction at PLDGE and to make the next one.

Even though we had briefed the STAR and Approach prior to TOD and verified all the FMC programming; once the plan changes we need to ensure we verify correct altitudes.

A B737-700 flight crew entered the hold as cleared at PLDGE at FL210 on the FRDMM RNAV STAR to DCA.  On an outbound leg they were cleared direct back to PLDGE; to descend via the STAR and also to change their landing runway to 19 vice 1.  They crossed PLDGE inbound at FL210 vice between 15;000 FT and 17;000 FT as charted.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I received a phone call from [a manager] asking me to return to the airport and remove an MEL placed on the aircraft the previous day for a tail deice boot patch that is peeling. He said he needed it removed and a NEF (Nonessential Equipment and Furnishings program) applied instead so it can be flown in icing conditions. I voiced my concerns that if that patch comes off or peels further inflight; we will have no way to remove ice from the tail and we will then begin accumulating tail plane ice. He said to; 'check it on the ground and watch it close on pre and post flight'. I told him that did no good if it peels off in a descent. His response was; 'we need that airplane available to generate revenue before we have to fix it'.We need management to stop pressuring us to fly potentially dangerous aircraft. This NEF should have never been approved by the FAA in the first place. Thought needs to be given to safety before these items are approved.

CE-560XLS Captain reported he felt pressure from his company to withdraw a maintenance write-up on a tail deice boot patch.


Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Today Commander 114 originally called Sector XX to pick up flight following. The Controller placed the aircraft on Approach frequency since he was still in that airspace. With Approach; the aircraft picked up an IFR clearance and continued onto his destination. After entering Sector XX; the Controller confirmed that he had the weather and NOTAMS and cleared him for the GPS approach in IFR conditions. Another Controller then plugged into the sector to relieve the sector. Before the briefing started the Controller being relieved cleared the aircraft to CTAF and asked the relieving Controller if he/she got that. All acknowledged and then the recorded briefing began. The Controller being relieved indicated that he/she thought about the aircraft but lost track of time and thought that that the aircraft had cancelled. It was not until the relieved Controller came back from break that a data block was still there. The two Controllers questioned each other about the aircraft and that is the first time that I knew about the incident. I gathered the strip and the information and immediately called the front desk so that an ALNOT could be issued. I have spoken to the Controllers involved and they are aware of the severity of the incident. I told them to make sure that information is on the recorded briefing and to not keep anything to themselves.

Commander 114 had come up on my frequency requesting VFR flight following. I had him IDENT and determined that he was not in my airspace and was about to enter TRACON's airspace; so I switched him to their frequency. TRACON called me a few minutes later; asking for the weather at ZZZ. I gave them the full sequence; and they relayed it to Commander 114. I eventually got an IFR handoff on the aircraft at 060; with discretion to 030. When the pilot checked on; I again verified that he had the local weather and NOTAMS for ZZZ. He responded that he did; and requested to go direct NACIR for the GPS35 Approach. I cleared him as requested; then told him to maintain 030 until established on the approach and cleared him for the approach. A few minutes later; I was offered a break. As the relieving Controller was plugging in; I terminated RADAR services with Commander 114 and told him to report closing his Flight Plan on my frequency; or if unable; with radio. When starting the briefing; I said to the relieving Controller 'okay; you heard that'; meaning my clearing Commander 114 off frequency; I also left the correctly marked strip at the sector. I did NOT put this information on the recorded portion of the briefing; however. When I returned form my break; the first thing that the Controller who relieved me asked me was whether or not the aircraft had cancelled his IFR with me before I left. I replied that he had not. At this time; the aircraft was now seriously overdue and we had not heard back from him. We reported it to the Supervisor; who then initiated the necessary procedures to locate the aircraft. Calls to radio and Unicom (Unicom through another aircraft) yielded no results. Search and Rescue ended up having to physically go to the ZZZ airport to look for the aircraft. It was found; safe and sound; on the ramp. When questioned; the pilot replied that he was unaccustomed to flying into airports without a Tower; and had gotten distracted with getting the aircraft parked and unloaded in the rain that increased as he landed. He said that he was just getting ready to call and cancel with flight service when SAR located him. I should have made sure to include information about the aircraft in my recorded briefing to ensure that there was no confusion about him still needing to cancel his IFR with us. The relieving Controller also should have been more aggressive about following up; as he/she said that he/she knew the 30 minutes had already passed before he/she questioned me about the aircraft.

Enroute Controller described a failed coordination event between facility controllers and the pilot of an aircraft inbound to a non-towered airport that resulted an ALNOT and Search and Rescue intervention.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

After departure from SDF; climbing through 3;000ft we hit what I suspected to be wake turbulence. Immediately the airplane developed a violent vibration. When leveling off at 4;000ft the vibration became rhythmic; but slightly less violent with a pronounced oscillation. It was unusual and significant enough that both the First Officer (FO) and I felt like there was a possibility of aircraft damage and/or malfunction of some sort. We were still within a few minutes of the departure airport; so we performed an air return and precautionary landing. The FO [flew] the aircraft on the previous leg; and confirmed that the noise/vibration was a new development. We agreed it was significant enough to warrant a return for inspection by Maintenance rather than risk further damage or the creation of an emergency situation.

Beech 1900 Captain reported returning to departure airport after experiencing an unusual vibration that may have been related to an earlier wake turbulence encounter.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 520; Flight Crew Type 7

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While performing take offs and landings at Trenton airport; we climbed off the runway aware that there was traffic in the pattern.Although initially we did not see that traffic; the Cirrus system warned us and subsequently we found the traffic entering the downwind as we were already there. We had planned to do a close traffic approach; the other airplane seemed to have extended their pattern.Evasive action was performed and we continued in the pattern. Tower asked us to do a 360 degree turn away from the airport to space the traffic and we entered the downwind behind the other airplane. There were no additional events.

SR22 pilot reported an NMAC shortly after takeoff from TTN airport.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On climb out somewhere between 15000 - 18700 ft; Chinese ATC quickly told us to 260 and climb to 25000 ft. As the flying pilot I should've immediately said unable; but many of us are used to accommodating ATC so I opened the speed window to slow down. I think ATC had a slower aircraft in front of us and I suspect he wanted us to slow our closing rate and climb us faster over the top at the same time. We were very heavy and climb out speed was like 281 knots below 10000 ft; which is why I should've said 'unable.' I opened the speed window first and then began to roll the speed back. The speed began to slow towards the yellow band and at the same time the CA suddenly calls flaps and moved the lever to flaps 1. Immediately the speed tape band narrowed and I realized my focus needed to be zeroed in on the speed and pitch to avoid stick shaker or worse; stall the inboard section of wing. I firmly stated I didn't like this situation and told the Captain to say unable and request something higher than 290; which was our max angle speed. The CA initially hesitated trying to say 260 knots would be fine; but by then we were so far behind the power curve. I fought the VNAV forces; especially with thrust levers wanting to come way back but elected not to disconnect the autopilot because I thought it safer to act quickly with better observation using the autopilot rather than being off of it and the CA doing other strange things like selecting flaps again on climb out. I had the thrust fire walled for quite some time to prevent worse. I also shallowed the rate of climb. Myself and the 3rd pilot convinced the CA to join the plan in asking for a higher speed and pulling the flaps back up. We were still prior to 20000 ft but in my focus on speed and pitch I forgot to reset the altitude to 250 and it began to level off. I realized it then and pressed the button for higher so it was not much an issue on altitude. I think we got very close to stick shaker though and possibly a critical inboard wing stall with the flaps out and slow airspeed. I definitely think the Chinese ATC didn't handle this well. I imagine someone told him 'Hey; you know how to really get someone to climb fast if they're getting jammed up behind other traffic?... slow their speed significantly and give them an higher altitude!!' I don't think this was done well on their part but again; I never should've accepted this speed of 260 knots from ATC. I'm trying to think what else could help in this scenario... we brief the climb speed below 10000 ft but from 10-20k; we don't have anything. And where's the cutoff? We could fly a 250 knot restriction below 10k say out of ZZZ with heavy aircraft; but then how high can we keep that speed through 20k? After this; I would prefer to brief whatever speed below 10k and then say we can't accept anything below 280 from 10-20 so there's no risk of thought for flaps which can immediately aggravate the situation. As far as I remember; if given speed and altitude restrictions at the same time; it doesn't seem to say which one to move first. I moved the speed window and knob first but I think it may have helped keep us from getting so significantly behind the power curve.

B747 First Officer reported experiencing airspeed control problems attempting to comply with ATC speed reduction clearance during climb out.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 2170; Flight Crew Type 1240

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Airspace Structure

I was attempting to transition south west to north east below the Class B airspace when I visually saw the airport and 3 towers. This seemed odd given the MFD map position didn't agree with what I saw with regard to this particular airport and associated towers. I looked at the GPS that was driving the MFD and noticed a message indicating GPS loss of integrity. After checking for traffic; I immediately started a decent and in a direction to keep me out of a lower Class B shelf ahead. Almost simultaneous to this I opened foreflight on my phone to see if I had better reception and coverage for the Class B airspace. I did have proper coverage and got to an altitude I knew was below the Class B shelf. Once stabilized in altitude and direction; I reset the aircraft GPS to see if the loss of integrity signal would go away and it did.

SR22 pilot reported receiving incorrect GPS information.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Upon arrival at the cockpit; I noticed a bottle that seemed out of place. Upon examination; the bottle was glass cleaner that was labeled as HAZMAT. I removed the item from the cockpit and noticed a spill in the compartment. I read the label and noticed that the label stated 'WARNING: Flammable liquid and vapor...' I notified the Captain and he called Maintenance Control and made a logbook entry. Maintenance Control assigned a Technician who cleaned the spill and made a corrective entry in the logbook. Given the size of the spill; I can assume that the previous crew unknowingly flew the aircraft with a HAZMAT spill in the cockpit.An unknown person must have left the bottle behind after using it in the cockpit. The hazardous item and spill went undetected by the previous crew(s).It's important to use the correct cleaning agents on the aircraft. It's even more important to ensure (and have a procedure) to make sure hazardous items are removed from the aircraft. I self-rated the risk rating as HIGH since the aircraft had presumably flown with a HAZMAT spill that was undetected by a previous crew.

Air Carrier First Officer reported a liquid spill from a bottle of glass cleaner labeled as Hazmat which was inadvertently left in cockpit.