Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 11300; Flight Crew Type 2300

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 6700; Flight Crew Type 200

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

After takeoff Runway X on the ZZZZZ3 departure ZZZZZ transition; the Pilot Flying called for clean wing configuration; Climb Power and VNAV.  Pilot Monitoring failed to properly select and verify the selected vertical command.  PF flying did not receive the correct level off climb guidance.  Human error focused on initially to cross ZZZZZ1 above 7;000 feet NOT at or below 7;000 feet. ATC immediately instructed aircraft to 'STOP CLIMB' and level off in which we complied with.Contributing factors:Pandemic and lack of flying time in last 6 months.Unfamiliar airport operations.

At departure called for clean wing; CLB; VNAV. PM cleaned wing and selected VNAV;CLB. I as PF failed to verify new VCLB mode on PFD. Contributing factor: - on initial brief i misread SID as cross ZZZZZ above 7;000 feet. The SID requires a cross ZZZZZ below 7;000 feet. - last flight was July 2020.

Corporate flight crew reported an altitude deviation during departure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Turbulence; Windshear; Thunderstorm; Icing

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 410

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was Pilot in Command (PIC) and Pilot Monitoring (PM). First Officer (FO) was Pilot Flying (PF). Forecast called for a possibility of scattered afternoon thunderstorms. Descending on the arrival; ADS-B weather showed scattered small-but-developing thunderstorms. Turned on aircraft weather radar and it showed the same. PIC radar was tilted down and SIC radar was tilted up to get a full picture of the weather. Both ADS-B and radar showed small cells left and right of our arrival route; but nothing directly along our route. No other aircraft had reported turbulence beyond light chop. Below us was an undercast. We turned on nacelle heat and stab/wing heat several minutes prior to entering the cloud layer. We were indicating approximately 300 knots; slowing to 280 knots as required by the arrival. Upon entering the cloud layer; the windscreen was instantly caked in ice and the aircraft was rolled approximately 40 degrees left and pitched nose down. The PF disconnected the Autopilot; established a level attitude; and brought power to idle. After 10-20 seconds the turbulence ended and the flight continued as normal. We made a PIREP of severe turbulence to ATC. After landing we inspected the aircraft and found no visible damage. No injuries occurred. Maintenance was notified. Further inspection revealed no structural damage to the aircraft.I suspect we flew through the top of a developing thunderstorm that was embedded in the undercast; and that had formed quickly enough that ADS-B had not yet shown the cell; and that was below our radar as we approached it; even though my radar was tilted down. This incident just reiterates the need to use extreme caution when flying in the vicinity of convective activity; even if the cells appear 'scattered;' 'small;' and 'weak.'

LR60 Captain reported momentary loss of control after encountering a developing thunderstorm on descent.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We departed...on time and headed to [destination]. The current METAR reported winds 190/14 Gusting 26Kts; 9SM; OVC 800 ft. The TAF for our time of arrival reported winds 190/10 Gusting 18kts; 3SM; -RA; BR; BKN 600ft BKN 3500 ft. Upon descending; Approach gave us a PIREP from a King Air that had landed an hour prior. He had reported wind shear with a +/- 25kts. After adding the wind shear escape maneuver to our brief and changing our configuration to land with Flaps 22; we continued with our approach. Around 1;000ft; we started to fly through some turbulence and gusts of wind. By 500 ft; the gust had intensified and it felt like going through wind shear but the plane did not give a warning. Around 400ft; we executed a normal go-around and with max thrust and flaps 9. We got very little climb and set off the GPWS momentarily. We climbed to 2000 ft and reviewed the flight plan to make sure we had enough fuel to come back for a second approach; which we did. After being cleared for the second approach and on final; Tower gave us an update on the weather and it had deteriorated; putting the ceiling at 200ft (below our minimums). We canceled the approach and told them that our intentions was to divert to our alternate. We immediately advised Dispatch of our intentions; and told them that we had 4500 lbs. All we received was from them was an OK and the Weather at [alternate]. Approach made us fly east bound for a few minutes; while they were getting our clearance. We asked them for a vector towards [alternate]. We monitored the fuel and noticed that we had a 70kts headwind; and with the long arrival; we were going to burn more than the expected fuel. We declared Min Fuel; and asked for a more direct route. We ended up landing with 2500lbs of fuel. We could have skipped the second approach and decided to go back to divert with more fuel; especially after going around for wind shear. Dispatch could have been a bit more involved; especially after we reported to them our intentions; with the amount of fuel we had on board; and the headwind we were experiencing.

EMB-145 First Officer reported encountering windshear on final then a GPWS alert on the go-around due to a slow climb rate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167; Flight Crew Total 3927; Flight Crew Type 1269

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

I departed for a routine flight for parachute operations. I contacted [Departure] at 3;000 feet MSL. Climbing through 5;000 feet; the chief tandem instructor on board informed me that he could see fluid spraying from underneath the right wing. There were no adverse engine indications; no vibrations; and no fire; so I continued my climb to a safe altitude of 10;000 feet MSL so that I could allow all my skydiving passengers to exit safely.I called Approach with my 1-minute routine call and informed them that the passengers would be exiting at an altitude which was lower than our operation routinely dropped. After we were cleared to jump; all passengers exited safely; and I began my routine descent. On landing roll; it felt as though the left main tire may have blown. I ran off the left side of the runway and sustained a propeller strike on the left engine. After shutting down both engines and safely exiting the aircraft; the owner of the skydiving business informed me that the wheel came off of the airplane upon rotation; I had landed the plane and the left strut had dug into the pavement; which caused my loss of control. The fluid that the instructor witnessed at 5;000 feet was perhaps hydraulic fluid from the broken break line. There were no injuries and no damage to the airframe.

King Air BE9L pilot reported a runway excursion while landing due to a tire that blew on departure.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Gate agent put 4 people in the exit rows who did not meet exit row criteria. I found only three during boarding. The agent kept yelling at me distracting me from my exit row duties. He wanted to close the door early but I was trying to reseat a man with an orthopedic boot and figure out what was going on with a couple I wasn't sure spoke or understood English and had paperwork that they needed wheel chairs and electric carts. It also seemed the agent coached the couple to say yes to the exit row briefing. They kept interrupting my briefing saying yes. I hear that this is not an unusual thing to happen. Some agents are telling people to say yes so they do not have to rearrange their seats. The agent kept yelling and interrupting me trying to prevent me from moving this 1k couple. He finally just got off the plane and closed the main cabin door. It wasn't until the end of the flight after I had tripped over this one man's foot that I realized he was wearing an orthopedic boot and sitting in the exit row.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported distractions caused her to miss a man wearing an orthopedic boot in the exit row.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft was serviced by Maintenance before the flight and several electrical resets were performed. During preflight; First Officer noticed the position was in error; and reset it. No other anomalies were detected. After takeoff; we noticed that the FMS seemed to have jumped and gave us a fairly straight out turn.  But we noticed it didn't seem correct based on the RNAV departure.  ATC queried us and at the same time we noticed the discrepancy and we informed them of a GPS failure and requested a heading; so we could troubleshoot the problem to try and fix it.  Shortly thereafter we received a message FMS DR more than 5 minutes.  We determined at this point the GPS off substantially and flew the rest of the way using VORs and green needles. We tried several times to sync the GPS; but the position would not hold.  We contacted the Company to let them know of the situation via ACARS.  No other anomalies occurred.  We don't believe anything could have prevented this from our standpoint.  With a GPS failure of this nature; it was not recognizable until we noticed it didn't seem right as well as ATC discovering the issue.

CRJ-200 Captain experiences a GPS malfunction prior to taxi which is reset by the First Officer. After takeoff the crew and ATC both note the aircraft was not following the RNAV departure. VOR navigation is used to continue to destination.


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 511; Flight Crew Type 2900

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Tower cleared us to line up and wait Runway 26L. After the Captain lined us up; we were in position approximately 45 seconds and Tower directed us to exit the runway at Taxiway E13. We were placed behind another Company aircraft and another aircraft. After we exited; a Gulfstream if I recall correctly was cleared on and departed; followed shortly by another aircraft. The approximate additional fuel burn for us was 300 pounds. This was fuel we were not planned for and did not need to burn. By the time the Gulfstream departed we could have been three miles down range; this was an unacceptable and ridiculous delay. We have no control over Tower prerogatives; but I have never heard of an aircraft directed to exit the runway so another non priority/non emergency aircraft could depart.

B737 First Officer reported being told to exit the runway they were previously cleared to; to be re-sequenced for departure behind another aircraft; causing delay.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1100

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft X was on mission over [a] fire; approximately 5 NM southwest of ZZZ airport at 11;500 MSL. A TFR was active up to 7000 MSL. While operating within the TFR boundaries laterally; we were outside of the TFR vertically. The crew had established communications via flight following with approach at the time of the incident. Aircraft X was on a westbound heading (own nav) when ATC advised of a citation; at six o'clock; 3-4 miles; westbound; same altitude. I noted the call sign and asked the air attack (sitting right seat) if he was talking to Aircraft Y. The air attack indicated that no communication had been established with Aircraft Y and began attempting to do so. While the air attack was attempting [to] hail Aircraft Y; I monitored the progress of the approaching aircraft on TCAS. By the time the Aircraft Y was 1 mile away; I had reached my comfort limit; and ATC advised me that the approaching aircraft did not have me in sight and to either climb or descend. The air attack was unable to hail Aircraft Y on the tactical frequency. The TCAS indicated that the approaching aircraft was 100 feet below me. I elected to an immediate climbing left turn; away from and to better see the approaching aircraft. I never saw Aircraft Y. ATC advised me when the traffic was no longer a factor; we then resumed our mission over the fire. The rest of the flight was uneventful.The only thing I think I could have done to avoid this conflict was to take evasive action sooner. However; I was allowing time for: the air attack to perform his duty to hail the approaching aircraft; and the approaching aircraft to see me since I was unable to see them. Another reason why I hesitated to act was because I had the right of way according to FAR 91.113.

A BE20 pilot reported that flight following advised him of an approaching aircraft so they took evasive action to avoid a mid-air collision.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Company Flights Aircraft X (event flight) and Aircraft Y had all the elements in play for a severe collision during taxi operations at ZZZ airport; had it not been for the keen and alert awareness of the First Officer (FO) on our flight.Other Company Flight Aircraft Y had just landed on Runway XXC; exited onto Taxiway B; and received clearance to back-taxi on Runway XXR full-length and proceed to the gate. Shortly thereafter Aircraft X received taxi clearance to taxi to Runway XXC via Taxiway P; cross Runway XXR; left onto Taxiway G; and join Taxiway EX.Both flights were taxiing toward the intersection of Runway XXR and Taxiway P when it is assumed that Tower saw the potential collision as both aircraft had 'ALL LIGHTS ON' indicating that Aircraft Y was taxiing with clearance on an active runway; and Aircraft X was preparing to cross an active runway with proper clearance. Tower then attempted to modify the taxi clearance for Aircraft X but made an error by initiating the call with Aircraft Y's call sign. The transmission was unfortunately interrupted by a third aircraft trying to transmit as the Tower was attempting to correct the call sign; resulting in the amended clearance transmission being unintelligible to both Flights X and Y.Aircraft X was underway at a nominal taxi speed; and Aircraft Y was observed taxiing at a higher-than-normal speed as they back-taxied toward the turnoff point at the end of Runway XXR. Taxiway P enters at a slight angle preventing the Captain of Aircraft X from clearly seeing any approaching traffic from his right. As the Captain of Aircraft X; we had full intention of entering the intersection as initially cleared. Just prior I initiated a Safety call by saying 'Clear left.' At that point the FO looked right and said; 'Wow; they're moving fast; and don't think they're intending to stop.' Hearing that; I immediately began a full stop of our aircraft prior to crossing the hold short line; followed by turning our lights off; and yielding to Aircraft Y; in case we were the ones in error with the crossing clearance. Startled that we had just avoided a serious collision; we discussed the possibility of us missing a clearance or how that collision seemed inevitable had we not made the final 'Clearing check' prior to crossing the runway. Because of the frequency congestion with Tower working all three frequencies (Clearance; Ground; and Tower) and the fact that we didn't actually cross the hold short line; we held any immediate inquiry as to the miscommunication of the clearance to ourselves.Upon further discussion among ourselves after departure; we were certain that we did not miss any clearances from ATC and that this was a certain potential mishap that needed further investigation to acknowledge the chain of events from going unrecognized in the future.  We discovered that both aircraft had the appropriate clearance to be where they were and that there was an attempt by ATC to issue an amended clearance to us. Tower initially called Aircraft Y then quickly attempted to correct to Aircraft X; but the transmission was interrupted by a third aircraft rendering the call sign and amended clearance unintelligible for either aircraft to be warned appropriately about each other.Due to the angle to which Aircraft X was approaching Runway XXR; there wasn't a good line of sight for the Captain to see any approaching traffic back-taxing on Runway XXR until it would have been too late. It was only due to the vigilance and discipline from the FO in effectively communicating the immediate danger that we were we able to avoid a severe collision given the circumstances.It is believed that Tower was operating at reduced staffing levels even though there were a lot of aircraft movements at ZZZ that evening. This was likely due to COVID protocols in place with ATC. The increased workload enabled him to issue clearances to both Flight X and Y to be on Runway XXR at the same time if timing was ideal. In thiscase; an amendment to the clearance was attempted to be issued; however; time was not in our favor for the Tower to initiate the call with the wrong call sign and be interrupted by a third aircraft making the transition intelligible by either flight.

Air carrier Captain reported a near ground collision due to communication issues with ATC. Captain stated that Tower staffing levels may have contributed to the event.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Total 11331; Flight Crew Type 9384

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was the PIC; and I was in the right seat.  We were taxing for takeoff to Runway XX at ZZZ.  Upon reaching the end of Runway XX; we were cleared for takeoff on Runway XX. As my co-captain took the runway; he used all the runway and made a hard 90 degree turn to line up on the centerline.  As he was about to add takeoff power; I noticed a plane on TCAS not far from the end of the runway at 600 ft. AGL and warned the other pilot.  We looked out of the windshield and got a visual on the other aircraft which appeared to be heading towards the airport.  When the plane quickly turned down the runway opposite direction to us and appeared to be descending rapidly; I keyed the mike and asked on Tower frequency is that plane landing on our runway. I did not get an answer; and the plane was now about to land opposite direction on Runway XA.  I told the other pilot to get off of the runway; he powered up and exited at the next runway exit about 400 ft. down the runway. The plane appeared to be a Cessna 172 and exited the runway around midfield; still nothing was said on the radio.  The Cessna asked if he could taxi to [the FBO] and Tower responded yes for him to taxi to [the FBO].  The emergency vehicles then exited the fire station; and I heard Tower tell the emergency responders that he reported engine trouble; I guess he reported it to departure.  It was not on Tower.  We were eventually cleared to taxi back to the end and cleared to take off with nothing else said to us from the Tower.

Captain reported that another aircraft landed on the opposite direction runway after they were cleared for takeoff.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy

Upon climb out; we experienced a series of events which led to a left engine failure. The First Officer and I decided that while we were running checklists; briefing the Flight Attendant and passengers; and talking to Dispatch and ATC; that we would head toward our intended destination and be set up on final approach by the time we were finished. At the end of the QRH procedures; it says to land at the nearest suitable airport; which at the time of the event would have been a closer airport. However my thought was that by the time we would've held; completed all of our tasks and descended; we would've already been just as close to our destination anyway; which has better services for our situation. I decided that it would not adversely affect the safety of flight and elected to continue to our destination.The main cause of this event was that I did not read the words 'land at the nearest suitable airport' carefully enough and fully comprehend what it was saying. At the time; our destination was the nearest suitable airport in my mind; and once I had decided that; I had tunnel vision focus and did not consider alternatives.Moving forward; I will be aware of my tendency to set up this tunnel vision so that I'm easily able to come out of it and consider alternatives to my plan if needed. I will not say that it was an unsafe decision to continue to destination; in fact I feel as though my decision was well-founded. However; the fact still remains that it was indeed technically contrary to the language used in the QRH.

Climbing out of 17;500 ft. for 19;000 ft. we got a master warning left oil pressure. The Captain immediately monitored the instruments and transferred the controls to me. The QRH instructed him to reduce power to idle in the affected engine. As he was pulling thrust to idle in that engine we had n2 vib n1 vib and audible vibration sound that could be felt through the cabin accompanied by the smell of burning. Around this time ITT began to spike as well. We [advised ATC] at 18000 ft. about 180 miles from our destination (to the best of my knowledge). We secured the engine via the QRH and decided to continue due to the fact that we had several checklists to run; notification to the passengers and Flight Attendant; and to the company and would be at our destination in about the time that process would take. The left engine was secure so we both agreed to ask ATC direct our destination. A suitable airport was below us at the time of the incident; however; in our mind was not the best place for landing due to the criteria listed above. On the ground; Maintenance said an oil pump was disconnected to the assembly box that caused the engine to degress the way it did.

A flight crew reported they had to shut down an engine but continued to their destination instead of landing at a closer airport as stated in the QRH.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 01C

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were on the GIBBZ2 arrival into IAD; between SIYOB [and] MIKEJ intersections. My hands were on the controls and aircraft was steady at 210 knots assigned and 4000 feet. The auto-pilot was on. We were already briefed and ready for the ILS 01C. All check lists were completed and we were waiting for a vector to final to intercept the ILS. This entire event was over maybe an 8-10 second period. We encountered wingtip vortices from a B737 that was 6 miles in front of us. I had my hands on the controls at the time it started. When all of a sudden the right wing was automatically forced down. I turned the yoke to the left and seemed to regain control of the aircraft. When we were back to level; the wing took another dip. At this point; I thought the autopilot was malfunctioning and quickly hit the trim switch to disengage it quickly. Then when the wing dipped again and with more force and a little further down. This time I had almost full left aileron in to keep the aircraft up right. We were never over 45 degrees at any point. I estimate it to be in the 30-35 degrees. But when it is uncommanded; it was startling; and I was having trouble maintaining 100% control of the aircraft. Then once I would gain control again; it would start again. So; it was an intermittent event; as it would start and stop. By the 3rd time the aircraft was bumped around. We had figured we were hitting a vortex off another aircraft. First officer (F/O) ask if we were following anybody. ATC replied with a B737; 6 miles in front of us. I told him to request an immediate climb; as vortices go down and out. F/O was on the ball and requested it; the controller responded with a climb to 6000 feet. I started an immediate climb and we seemed to be clear of it; after we had climbed maybe 75 feet. Then the controller revised the clearance to maintain 5000 feet. We leveled at 5000 feet and he then turned us east bound on a left base leg. The F/O had 2 or 3 direct transmissions with ATC with no delays or other aircraft talking. He reported the turbulence; asked about traffic; requested a climb; all in a few seconds and it seemed to work out very well. This was maybe a 10 second time period. But; it was very quick; very abrupt; then we were out of it and turning left to intercept and starting a descent back down to 3000 for the approach. I ask him to check on the passengers. They said they were ok; and we would explain once on the ground. Once on the ground; engines shut down. I jumped up to greet them and explain with a big apology for the turbulence. The passenger explained his wife was in the lav and that was a great thing as she was fearful of flying. I explained to them the vortices of airplanes. They were thankful for of our work in the process. At one point; he thought we might actually end up rolling it completely over. I assured him we were not even at the 45 degree mark; but I understand his position being in the back and having a view that would maybe make him think that. They seemed happy and satisfied with the flight and went on their [way]. I briefed [Company] of the incident as well and they noted it on their files too.

BAE-125-850XP Captain reported encountering wake turbulence in 6-mile trail of a B737 on approach to IAD.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Was repositioning Aircraft X to GNV for repairs to be made to the tachometer time. I made the decision to fly IFR to Gainesville on this flight being that the cloud bases were around 2000-2500; I was in and out of the clouds at 4;000 most of the flight to GNV. About halfway to GNV I noticed a stiffness in the aileron control that was not there when I took off. I notified ATC immediately of the situation and that at the initial sign of the problem [and] that I would monitor the situation and let them know if it deteriorated. About 10 minutes later I noticed that I had very little roll control to the left; full yoke movement to the left only produced about 5 degrees of bank to the left and it felt as if the controls were binding up. At that Point I immediately notified ATC the situation had deteriorated. At that point GNV was the closest airport and made the most sense to continue to GNV. I continued the last 15 miles into GNV VFR and landed without incident. Upon landing ARF vehicles met me at the runway and followed me to the ramp. On the ground the controls moved normally but still had a stiffness to them.

A Cessna 172 pilot reported the aileron control being stiff while flying.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after level off at FL340 the ECAM indicated an engine fire on the number one engine. We followed the ECAM which lead us to secure the number one engine and discharge Fire extinguishing agent one. After discharging agent one all indications of a fire were out. We determined that KDAY was the nearest suitable airport. We notified ATC. Landed uneventfully in KDAY. Fire and Rescue personnel saw no signs of fire. Once clear we taxied to the ramp.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A300 flight crew reported an engine fire warning upon reaching cruise altitude. They accomplished all relevant checklists; and successfully diverted to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

I was returning from a [long cross country flight]. I had stopped for gas [a third of the way back] and filled both tanks; 18 gallons each. As there was approaching weather from the west that ran from the southern tip of Florida to many miles north of the Orlando region I elected to use more engine power than I usually do. Although I was in VMC the entire fight; weather was encroaching upon me as I monitored it with my 'ForeFlight' GPS/ weather program. Approximately 10 south of the Kissimmee airport and just after receiving the ATIS the engine stumbled and momentarily quit. Certainly startling me I quickly changed tanks applied and carburetor heat. The engine 'caught' momentarily and again lost power. I cycled the fuel select valve several times and again the engine 'caught' and seemed to run normally. At about that time I received clearance from the Tower to make right traffic to Runway 15. As I was approaching the south end of the airport now at 1;000 feet and having been rattled and still not 100% positive I had the situation in hand; I became distracted and made a right hand dogleg Runway 33 approach and landing. After landing I contacted the tower and indicated where I would be parking. He pointed out to me I had landed on the wrong runway and I had been instructed to land on Runway 15. He asked me if I remembered getting permission to land. I radioed back that 'no I don't remember getting clearance' and he responded with 'you have to be more alert' or something along those lines. He was very courteous and helpful. I was most certainly in the wrong.After contemplation I realize that I usually burn approximately 8 gallons an hour and 2 hours fuel at my usual power setting; but due to trying to beat the weather I used full power resulting in a fuel burn of 10.25 GPH. Having run the right tank dry; I took longer than normal for the fuel to reach the engine and reestablish power.LESSONS LEARNED; Most importantly; I should have monitored my fuel closer. I should have notified the tower immediately of having had engine issue; and if not request immediate landing. I should remember to aviate; navigate and communicate in order.

PA-22 pilot reported landing on the wrong runway after being distracted by engine issues related to improper fuel management.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 12000

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Departed PBI to east northeast. During enroute climb in low FL200's encountered strong wake turbulence from Aircraft Y in front of us and also climbing. ATC was advised. Passenger was injured from hot coffee burn.

A320 Captain reported a passenger suffered a burn from spilled coffee during a wake turbulence encounter departing PBI in trail of a Widebody Transport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I am filing this report as a general concern about an event on the Phenom fleet. From exchanges I have had with at least one of the pilots involved; a report from the crew involved was not filed. Therefore I am filing one to facilitate tracking of this event within the program. The aircraft in question had a failure of the main cabin door balancing mechanism as the door was opened from the exterior. This led to the door support cable apparently snapping; unloading the tension bar; and sending several metal shards and pieces of steel cable flying throughout the cabin. There were holes in several areas of the interior; including a seatback; sidewalls; and overhead panels. Had the crew been opening the door from the interior; or had there been passengers onboard; the potential for serious injuries would be quite high. For reference; the system description details the door balance mechanism as follows: The main door balancing mechanism is mainly composed of the torsion bar; gear sector; balance gearbox; balance cable; and balance drum. The main door balancing mechanism is responsible for equalizing the gravity action during the opening procedure and for providing mechanical assistance during the closing procedure. The torsion bar retains the elastic potential energy during the opening procedure. This energy results in a balance moment that equalizes the gravity action. When the main door is moving down; the door pulls the balance cable which is attached to the door. The balance drum rotates to load the torsion bar and keeps it at maximum tension. The accumulated potential energy of the torsion bar balances the door weight. While the door is in the fully down position; the torsion bar is under maximum stress; thus facilitating to pull the door upward. When the main door moves upward and reaches the near maximum closed position; the torsion bar keeps the balance cable slightly tensioned. When the main door is in the maximum open position; the balance cable is under maximum tension. I do not think that the average line pilot; prior to this event; had any idea how much destructive energy is stored right there at that cable drum on the door sill. From the few photos I have seen; this failure has the potential to cause serious injury to anyone in close proximity to that spool; even from the exterior; should parts be ejected as the door opens. If and when any investigation on this provides conclusive results; it should be shared with the fleet pilots without delay. It would be helpful to know if this is a design flaw; improper assembly; or improper maintenance; as well as if there is any mitigation that the crew can take while a fix is found.

The reporter made clear that he was not directly involved in the incident and was relaying information that was provided to him. The exact component that failed is unknown but thought to be the cable itself or the attachment to the door. This aircraft was also the oldest in the 505/Phenom 300 fleet.

Captain describes a failure of the main cabin door balancing mechanism as the door was opened from the exterior on an EMB505/Phenom 300. The cable apparently snapped throwing shards of metal from the cable into the cabin.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 8580; Flight Crew Type 100

Workload; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22.5; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 76

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Enroute to PDX. We had filed direct BONVL.BONVL 7 Arrival into PDX. Approaching the PDX area we were recleared to the HHOOD1 Arrival. As we established on the HHOOD1; we were recleared to descend via the arrival. The pilot not flying requested expected runway and the Controller could not provide the information in detail. The pilot not flying also went to the ATIS and was given non specific information. He was trying to load the information into the NAV System for the arrival and wanted the runway information so he could complete the data entry. As pilot flying; upon crossing JOTBA I continued the descent below FL240. The pilot not flying questioned if this was a correct descent so I stopped the descent while we reviewed the procedure and agreed upon our position. (I believe the pilot not flying had become slightly unaware of our position on the arrival while trying to determine the anticipated arrival runway.) We discussed the situation and agreed that we did need to descend. The Controller then queried if we were descending. As we descended toward HHOOD we felt we would not be able to comply with the altitude requirement; so we notified ATC. ATC then issued vectors and altitude changes for the balance of the flight.I believe the root cause was that we were given a completely different arrival with minimal time to properly review and brief the procedure. Contributing factors included: A confusing format for the arrival procedure in the STAR Plate. The Controller was unable to provide the requested runway information. Also; we have flown very few actual RNAV Arrivals following the Descent Procedure. Coupling this with minimal time to transition from a very standard arrival to a much more demanding arrival. Also; once in the Terminal area we still were never assigned a runway. Controller told us to proceed direct to a fix on the ILS 28R. We queried again regarding runway assignment and were then given 28R.Basically given the situation; we should have refused to accept the HHOOD arrival. Also a clearer format for the Arrival would be very helpful. We have spent considerable time as a crew reviewing this particular arrival as well [as] arrivals with descents in general to be better prepared in the future. We are also requesting additional training from our Training Provider on our scheduled recurrent training.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information]

A flight crew on the BONVL 7 Arrival was transitioned to the HHOOD RNAV but not given an arrival runway at PDX. The crew was reluctant to descend because the FMS programming could not be completed without the Runway.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

DSTG is reflecting 426 lbs of freight which was to be loaded as Item 3; Pit 3.  When the flight arrived in ZZZ1; the freight was not onboard the aircraft.

Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported Hazmat listed on departure cargo manifest was not on aircraft at destination.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 1052; Flight Crew Type 640

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I was waiting to depart ZZZ. I was monitoring inbound traffic visually; via ADS-B; and over the radio to determine an appropriate opportunity to depart. One aircraft had just landed. Two aircraft on downwind were discussing the spacing between them. One of them decided to do a 360 for spacing. One other plane was 8 miles out on a straight-in. After the plane that had just landed exited the runway; I continued tracking the two aircraft on downwind; listening to their reports on the radio and via ADS-B data on a moving map. I could see no one on final or base.Just as an aircraft reported turning on left base; I radioed that I was departing XX with a left downwind departure while taxiing onto the runway; and started an immediate takeoff roll. Immediately after my transmission ended; the same aircraft that had just reported turning base reported 'turning final' followed by 'coming over the top; watch out;' while another aircraft transmitted 'aircraft taking off; there's a glider landing on top of you.' During that exchange; I aborted takeoff to clear the runway as soon as possible. I also transmitted that I would vacate the runway as soon as possible. The glider flew high above me and touched down on the second half of the 7;000 foot runway.

C172 pilot reported a ground conflict after beginning the takeoff roll at a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 3

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The purpose of the flight was leisure flight to attend an airshow.This was my second flight in Aircraft X; I had been previously checked out as required by the flight school's 141 standardization. During the preflight inspection; I found no abnormalities with the aircraft; and deemed it to be in airworthy condition. During the before takeoff checklist and engine run up; the engine performed normally; all engine instruments were in the green and controls acted properly. I departed and climbed via the class B transition route; leveling off at 10;500 MSL. The aircraft and engine performed normally during the flight up to ZZZ1; all engine instruments were in their green arcs; and the aircraft made the calculated cruise performance. During the climb; I changed fuel tanks every 15 minutes to maintain fuel balance; by turning the fuel pump on; waiting a few seconds; then changing tanks; waiting a few seconds; then turning the fuel pump off. I descended into ZZZ1 and made a normal landing; I parked the aircraft at the ramp and attended the airshow.When the airshow finished; I returned to the aircraft and performed an inspection focusing on flight controls; landing gear; fuel; engine oil; and the propeller; all components showed no damage. The engine oil showed eight quarts; the right-wing tank was fuller than the left; I departed and initially climbed on the left tank. Both my passenger and I boarded Aircraft X; I performed the appropriate checklists; and started the engine on the right-wing tank. No abnormalities were noted; I received my taxi clearance; and taxi clearance to runway XY. In the run up area I performed the before takeoff checklist and engine runup on the right-wing tank. I performed the engine runup at full power and leaned the mixture until the peak power was reached; I then enriched the mixture slightly to be rich of the peak. The engine instruments all read within their green arcs and no abnormalities were noted. I have a fair amount of experience operating in high density altitude because I conducted my private; instrument; commercial single and multiengine training at ZZZ1 [a high altitude airport]. I elected to do a short field takeoff to give me the best climb performance; I received the takeoff clearance from ZZZ1 tower and took from runway XY. During the takeoff roll I noted the engine RPM and manifold pressure were indicating full power; the engine instruments were in the green; and the airspeed indicator was alive. After rotation; the aircraft climbed at approximately 700 feet per minute; I was then cleared for a left crosswind departure be ZZZ1 tower. I elected to extend the upwind leg; I turned crosswind over. At 500 feet AGL I reduced power to the climb power setting and at 1;500 feet AGL I performed the after takeoff checklist; and changed radio frequencies to contact Approach to receive VFR flight following.While climbing through 7;500 feet MSL five miles southeast of ZZZ1; I heard and felt the engine reduce in power and begin to vibrate; also I noticed a reduction in airspeed and climb rate. I started the engine troubleshoot checklist by memory and initiated a left turn towards ZZZ1. I called and [notified ATC] initially on Approach by mistake; then I changed back to ZZZ1 tower. I stated I had an engine failure and would enter left traffic for runway XY. The engine continued to run rough with all corrective action until I changed fuel tanks form right to left. After I changed fuel tanks the engine regained normal power output and the vibration ceased. I entered the traffic pattern completed the before landing checklist and landed on runway XY. I was followed by emergency vehicles and exited the runway and taxied to the FBO ramp. I performed the engine securing checklist and shut down the engine. I performed a post flight inspection and found no abnormalities on the exterior of the aircraft. I was met with ZZZ1 airport officials and provided a statement; they deemed that no further information was necessary.In the days following the company drove a mechanic and flight instructor up to ZZZ1 to inspect Aircraft X. The mechanic drained fuel from both fuel tanks; drained and cleaned the fuel strainer. The mechanic found an unreinforced duct connecting the engine air intake on the cowling and the carburetor. The unreinforced duct was replaced. As far as I know no abnormalities were found in the fuel system; no cause was found for the engines reduction in power; nor why changing fuel tanks alleviated the power loss. A flight instructor flew Aircraft X from ZZZ1 back to [departure airport] with no problems noted.

A Piper PA28 Pilot reported that during climb the engine began to lose power and vibrate. Pilot performed a succesful precautionary landing at the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 625

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Departed Runway 24 on the RUUDY 4 Departure and was climbing per the SID. Crossed WENTZ Intersection at 1;500 FT then continued climb to cross TASCA at 2;000 FT. ATC advised that we climbed to 2;000 FT too early to cross TASCA. We remained at 2;000 FT and were given radar vectors to continue climb and intercept course on the departure.

An HS125 crew departed on the TEB RUUDY 4 RNAV departure and climbed too early for the TASCA 2;000 FT constraint.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 8

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft was being flown under Part 91 on a special airworthiness certificate for Experimental (amateur-built) aircraft.  The purpose of the flight was to conduct flight testing Phase I flight limitations issued for this aircraft.  Two miles short of the intended landing field (the airfield specified as home base in the aircraft's Phase I operating limitations) the engine stopped due to fuel starvation.  I landed uneventfully in a field.  There was no damage to the aircraft or to property on the ground.  I refueled and; with the permission of the farmer who owns the field; took off to return to base.  At the time of the flight; the aircraft had flown fewer than five of the Phase I flight hours.  As the aircraft had experienced cylinder-head cooling issues; most flight time to date had focused on getting the CHT's within limits.  This flight was meant to test a new; enlarged cooling baffle that had been installed for that purpose.  Because of the need to address the cooling issues; I had not yet had time to perform the planned test flights to verify expected fuel flow; nor to cross-check expected fuel-quantity indications (as shown on the ground with the aircraft in flight attitude) with the actual indications airborne.  As a result; actual fuel quantity was less than expected.  When I realized that; about twenty miles from base; I immediately began my return to home field; the fuel supply ran out just outside of glide range.  Per my test plan; developed with the assistance of AC 90-89A; test flights to determine actual fuel flow and to crosscheck airborne fuel-quantity indications are planned.  The data derived  will provide planning data that will prevent a recurrence of this incident.

Experimental aircraft pilot experiences fuel exhaustion while attempting to return to base during a Phase 1 test flight.  An emergency landing in a farmers field ensues without damage to the aircraft.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Due to the ongoing problem with the FMS in some aircraft; we have had to reroute every aircraft going into ORD. Today we are also a one stream operation as opposed to a two stream operation.We were at 7 in trail and the operation was smooth. Our CIC took a call from our TMU (Traffic Management Unit) saying that we suddenly had to go to 25-30 miles in trail. We were allowed to offload some aircraft to SBN APCH at 15 miles in trail. This resulted in a significant amount of work very quickly. We went from an orderly operation to a mess as multiple sectors trying to get triple to quadruple our standard amount of space prior the C90 boundary.After we turned all of the aircraft away from the airport; our CIC talked to C90 and discovered that they had no idea what we were doing. They did not need all of that space. It took quite a while to recover from someone's (at our TMU) decision to tell us to get that much space. Furthermore; I do not think that they slowed ZID or ZOB or required more space from them during this event.The high altitude controller (FWA); that was feeding me; was called by ZOB asking about holding. They had been contacted by our TMU warning of an impending hold. At this point; we had not even been informed yet about the additional space requirement by our TMU so the FWA controller had no idea what ZOB was talking about.This was a shocking lack of coordination between ZAU's TMU; C90's TMU and the controllers. One should not increase the workload dramatically at multiple sectors and slow and vector multiple planes without a solid reason. This cost the airlines money and time. It also resulted in training being stopped in my area to get the needed manual controllers in place. Not to mention the added stress on an already busy sector.After this incident was over; we were told by our TMU that we were supposed to be 7 in trail to C90 the whole time. The 25-30 mile restriction was for any aircraft we routed through SBN approach. We do not route aircraft through SBN on a regular basis. It is only done when directed by TMU and usually due to weather. I would not have had any reason to do that without being told to; in this case. This entire incident was due to the order from TMU and greatly impacted operations into ORD.

ZAU Controller reported a lack of communication which led to flow control concerns affecting a couple facilities.


Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Gusty winds landing in DEN; on approach received a GPWS 'sink rate'; First Officer corrected; normal landing.

During gusty conditions at DEN a B737 EGPWS alerted 'Sink Rate' during landing so the First Officer corrected the rate of descent and landed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After landing in ZZZ; Aircraft X; while parked waiting for a gate; the aft FA (Flight Attendant) called the cockpit stating that during final descend around 6;000 ft. they smelled the dirty sock odor in the back of the airplane; the odor was present then went away during the final descent and the upon landing the odor came back and went away again. I told her that we were going to park; disembark and have Maintenance inspect the airplane. We parked shortly after and disembarked the passengers. I talked to the Flight Attendant number 1 and asked him about it and he told me that he went back and did not smell anything. I also asked him if the other [cabin] crew members were OK and he replied yes we all are OK. The odor was spontaneous and went away. I call Maintenance in ZZZ1 and reported the issue and made a log book entry. Maintenance ZZZ1 told me they will address the issue with maintenance in ZZZ.No further actions was required and all crew members went to the hotel and worked the next flight the next day without any complaints.

Air Carrier Captain reported aft cabin Flight Attendant notified the flight deck of an intermittent 'dirty socks' odor from final descent until parked.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Upon landing in ZZZ it was brought to my First Officer's attention by Ramp Personnel that a battery was left inserted in a Passenger's checked luggage that was stored in the aircraft's cargo compartment.

Captain reported ramp personnel notified flight crew that a battery powered passenger bag was illegally transported in cargo compartment.


Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After starting both engines the FO (First Officer) accidentally left one of the packs off without noticing. Neither Pilot noticed this during the Before Takeoff Checklist. It was a short taxi and the Crew was cleared to line up and wait upon reaching the runway. At some point around the lineup and wait clearance for Runway to 22L; the Captain noticed one of the packs off and erroneously turned off the other pack thinking he was turning the one that was off to on. The SIC was not aware any of this had happened so therefore unable to crosscheck. When climbing through 10;000 ft for 15;000 ft and executing the Climb Checklist; the FO pointed out that the differential did not look right. It was around 'zero' and should have been at 'four'. It may have been helpful if the FO articulated this better. The Captain looked at it and decided that it would catch up; neither Pilot thought to look at the packs and bleeds to verify proper position. Shortly after the Climb Checklist; both Pilots had started to notice discomfort in the ear at about the same time the Cabin Altitude light and warning horn came on. The FO notified ATC of a pressurization issue and the need to descend. Both Pilots donned their oxygen mask and the Captain took over the aircraft and the radios while the First Officer executed the QRC and the QRH. The aircraft was descended and vectored back towards the airport while the checklists were completed. The Captain [advised ATC] and the Crew executed the visual back into ZZZ. While executing the approach portion of the Deferred Items Checklist in the QRH; it was noticed that both packs were off around 4000 ft.  The Crew elected to continue to the airport since the Passengers and ATC had already been notified. During descent; the SIC attempted to modulate the pressurization manually per the checklist and probably could have done a better job. The APU and bleed was turned on during parking and made for an unneeded pressurization on the ground probably adding to everyone's discomfort as the door was attempted to be opened.

B737 flight crew reported difficulty in managing the pressurization system.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 65

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

After landing at a fast walk got blown to left and with full right rudder was unable to hold aircraft on Runway XXL. Wind was 340 at 4 to 6 knots. I chose not to force a ground loop to stay on the runway and took aircraft off the runway onto the grass. Aircraft slowed and I was able to get on the Heel brakes stop it and return to runway. If the aircraft had been equipped with Toe brakes instead of Heel brakes this occurrence would not have happened. I have over 2000 hours in tailwheel aircraft.

The pilot of a tailwheel aircraft equipped with heel brakes was unable to prevent a runway excursion. The sudden wind and the brake system design were contributing factors.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors

I observed the Local Controller clear a helicopter for take off. This departure is covered in a Letter of Agreement (LOA). The LOA specifies the departure point as the intersection of taxiways. It is a common practice to depart from other points on the taxiway after coordination via flight progress strip. In this case Local Control was running a modified left traffic pattern. This operation required aircraft departing to make an early left crosswind turn.In this case the helicopter was coordinated to depart the taxiway. This would place the departure to the left of the runway abeam the departing aircraft. The Local Controller failed to scan and locate the departing traffic prior issuing take off clearance. After issuing the clearance which placed the aircraft in potential conflict with aircraft departing the runway that were instructed to turn early crosswind prior to the control tower. After clearing the helicopter for takeoff the controller reached out to aircraft advising not in sight and requesting position.This individual is in need of some sort of skill enhancement training related to scan.

I observed helicopters landing and departing the runway. I questioned the operation since the runway was notamed closed. I was advised that through coordination with airport operations helicopters were being authorized to operate on the runway as long as they made their approach to the numbers of the runway and turned crosswind prior to the intersecting runway. I then observed Ground Control cross the runway without coordinating with Local Control at an intersection with a helicopter departing the runway and a helicopter on final for the numbers of the runway cleared for the option.I questioned this operation and was told that the helicopters would turn crosswind prior to an intersection and that Local Control had released control of runway/taxiway intersection and south. I questioned if this was in accordance with N JO 7110.704 paragraph 3-7-2 f; 1; 2 a; b. I was informed that this didn't apply since the helicopters were making the approach to the numbers and when departing had verbally agreed to turn crosswind prior the the intersection at which the aircraft would cross the runway. The thought process as explained was that since the helicopters were not being cleared to the runway but to the numbers that paragraph 3-7-2f; 1; 2 a;b did not apply. That this was just like using diverse landing points for helicopters and that the runway was not really active.I suggest an outside review to determine if this operation was in compliance with the intent of N JO 7110.704 ( during departure operations; ensure that aircraft/vehicles intending to cross a runway do not cross the runway holding position markings until the controller visually observes the departure aircraft in a turn; or the departure aircraft has passed the point where the crossing aircraft/vehicle is located; regardless of altitude; unless authorized in FAA Order JO 7110.65; 3-10-10; Altitude Restricted Low Approach) and JO 7110.65 (Coordination between local and ground controllers). Additionally how does this comply with N JO 7110.704 f 2 (a) An aircraft/vehicle has completed crossing prior to the arriving aircraft crossing the landing threshold; or (b) A crossing aircraft/vehicle will not cross thee runway holding position markings the arrival has landed and either: (i) The controller has confirmed by verbal commitment from the pilot that the arriving aircraft will exit the runway prior to the point at which the crossing is intended; or (ii) The controller visually observes the aircraft exiting the runway prior to the point at which the crossing is intended.Based on the above scenario it would seem that N JO 7110.704 could be ignored as long as the runway is not declared active and or restrictions are placed on arriving and departing aircraft to not use entire length of runway.

A Tower Controller was clearing helicopters to land and depart from a closed runway. The Controller allowed an aircraft to taxi across the closed runway with a helicopter on approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Total 16498; Flight Crew Type 9430

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared via the Mustang 5 departure. This DP (Departure Procedure) is for [Runways] 9L/27R. The Draggin 5 departure is also for [Runways] 9L/27R. However; there is major construction on that runway and it is closed indefinitely. We were assigned [Runway] 27L for departure. We had to query Clearance Delivery for departure instructions for that particular runway. They said it was the same for both runways on the Mustang 5 departure.It seems like Jeppessen should update the chart to include routing instructions for both runways.

Air Carrier Captain reports Departure procedure does not specify correct departure runway.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Carousel 1 became overwhelmed with too many bags and caused the passengers bags to fall off the carousel on people's feet.  Multiple baggage agents came to help pull the bags off the carousel. Airline agents were trampled and passengers were pushing agents to get to their bags. This is creating a dangerous situation with too many flights coming in on one baggage carousel.

Ground employee reported a baggage carousel with too many bags on it that were falling off and dropping on people.


Flight Crew Total 158; Flight Crew Type 165

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was in the traffic pattern inbound for the second touch and go on Runway XX at ZZZ Airport. I was turning left base for Runway XX; before I noticed that an aircraft was inbound for left base for the opposite runway which is Runway XY. I tried to communicate with him that I was turning for the final of Runway XX but I did not hear any respond. Then I continued for the final of Runway XX. Then I called out for the short final of Runway YY then I corrected twice that I was on the short final of Runway XX. Upon the completion of the touch and go I called out that I was on the upwind of Runway XX and then the aircraft called out for left base of Runway XY. I pitched down to try to avoid the aircraft that was on the left base of Runway XY. I tried to see and avoid but I still did not have the aircraft in sight. I pitched up to climb and I saw the aircraft approximately 150 feet above me and I avoided the midair collision. I communicated with the other pilot and asked him if he had seen me and he replied that he thought I was landing on Runway YY.

Pilot reported taking evasive action in response to a NMAC during landing. The other pilot believed the pilot was landing on a different runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Flight had a write up that the previous crew was unable to start the #2 engine in ZZZ. After a 34 minute delay and two engine starts at the gate; we finally were on our way. The number one engine was started normally by FO (First Officer). The number 2 by manual start by Captain.We were planning on 18L and we were parked at terminal. We were given 17R which made it a shorter taxi. I; FO; was heads down changing the FCMU for the change of runway. The close out was tardy; I had to send a request for it. When the closeout arrived; I noticed and voiced that we were 3000 lbs. heavier than ATOW (Actual Takeoff Weight) but less than MTOW (Maximum Takeoff Weight) with the correct temperature. We were good for TOGA TO (Takeoff Go Around Takeoff) and the performance V-speeds. I was still doing a mental check. We did flight controls and the taxi checklist. I was a little behind in changing frequencies from Ground to Tower. When Tower clear us to position and hold. I asked the Captain are you good he said he was. I responded position and hold.I was still a little behind because I was still dotting my i's and crossing t's on the [system] in my mind but I thought I will have a moment to catch up on the runway. The Captain brought the thrust levers forward and continued for a takeoff roll. I stated 'we were position and hold'. He said: 'No; we were cleared for TO (takeoff)' I looked down at the airspeed 40kts. And truthfully; considered that I had missed the last clearance. Before I could say something else Tower cleared [us] for takeoff. I repeated the clearance; call 80 and took off uneventfully. I was so busy that I didn't realized how behind and rushed I was until I realized we almost took off without a clearance.

Our flight had a delayed departure because of maintenance on the aircraft ignition system. Starting the aircraft required a manual start checklist. This delayed us about 35 minutes. During taxi out Ground changed our departure runway and the FO (First Officer) made the change. After the change; she had to request a close out. The close out showed we were over our assumed takeoff weight. She elected to manually compute new takeoff data for TOFA (Takeoff Go Around) power takeoff. The normal taxi checklist was accomplished as we approached the runway. I thought I heard cleared for takeoff as we were running the 'below the line' part of the taxi checklist. I asked the FO if she was ready and she responded yes. We finished the checklist as we lined up on the runway and I elected to do a rolling takeoff. She asked me if we were cleared for takeoff as I selected TOGA power. I responded yes. Passing 60 knots tower cleared us for takeoff.I allowed us to get too rushed taxiing out especially with all the changes because we were late. I would recommend that if ACARS is working that any new takeoff data is requested from Dispatch. I will make sure we finish all checklist before we take the active runway.

A321 flight crew reported that takeoff clearance was not issued prior to start of the takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Total 2480; Flight Crew Type 780

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I've been making these reports for the loaders more often than usual lately. This was a typical day trip with a full load of passengers. When I received the cargo load report it said 53 Normal bags and 4 heavy. The Captain asked if it was all below the line and the person stated 'Yes' it was below the line. I have a personal limit of 45 bags; from personal experience; that I will go ensure it's all below the fire line (2' of clearance).I went down to the ramp and opened the closed forward cargo bin. When I opened the bin I could immediately see that the cargo was touching the top of the bin (therefore not 2'!). I asked the ramp person that provided me the cargo load report to come over and he did; I then asked if he verified that the cargo was in fact below the fire suppression line before telling us (the flight crew) that it was all below. He stated 'No' he did not check. I pointed out the first bag that was clearly touching the top of the bin and he went for the loader without hesitation. I took several pictures; some after we had already moved bags. We would move a group of bags and I would see that one's behind it also touched the top/protruded into the fire line. I had them correct the issue by putting the bags in the center of the compartment that was nearly empty. Usually this is the place the baggage handler sits; but should really be used for what it's for; cargo! We corrected the issue and pushed on time.This has got to stop! This new year I have already seen multiple issues. I've started to tell rampers that if there are more than 45 bags the rest need to go in the back so that I can stop going down for inspections when it's time to push. This has already worked 2 times. I feel like we need to create a procedure to where over 45 bags they have to put the remainder in the back. If they end up having some incredibly high baggage count they can fill both bins fully but they better be below the line! I'll keep doing these reports until the problem is solved. I know enough about cargo from my other job that if you get a fire; you don't want to eliminate the chance of putting it out because of some baggage handler that was lazy.

EMB-175 First Officer reported that he routinely finds that baggage has been loaded above the fire line in the forward baggage compartment and must be redistributed to be in compliance. The baggage handlers always state that the baggage is below the line when asked but do not actually check.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted

Noticed an 'el mstrm nse up/dn' amber CAS lite. Soon the autopilot kicked off. Reset pitch trim and FGC1 and 2 lites on. The elec and manual trim were frozen. We followed QRH but still no control. We elected to descend to a warmer alt and divert. At around 15000 ft the trim was regained. We flew normal landing. We had no autopilot after pitch trim was disconnected until we regained pitch trim.There probably was a malfunction of the trim motor heater which we would have no indication of in the cockpit. Since we had no idea what was causing the malfunction we diverted to a suitable alternate to avoid RVSM airspace. Alt control was at times + or - 100 feet.

GIV-SP First Officer reported pitch trim became inoperative in cruise; flight crew decided to divert and regained pitch trim after descending to a warmer altitude.


Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

It was a long flight as we had a long route due to weather right down the middle of the country. As we were descending into our destination airspace we had the airport in sight. I believe we were cleared for the visual approach to the runway. I remember passing through 1;000 FT and I believe it was around 850 FT AGL that we both heard the EGPWS say 'TOO LOW; GEAR.' We both looked at the EICAS and confirmed the landing gear was showing three green. A few seconds later we heard the EGPWS again say 'TOO LOW; GEAR.' At that point neither one of us was comfortable continuing the approach so we decided to do a go-around. We flew runway heading and climbed to 2;000 FT (I think). I told the Tower that we were going around for a gear indication problem. We believed it was not a gear problem; but maybe a computer problem with the EGPWS. We were given vectors for a downwind and I pulled out the book to look for any procedure. Tower asked if we were declaring an emergency and I told them 'not at this time'. My co-pilot and I came to the conclusion that because we got no EICAS messages about the gear not being down and the aural warning was from the EGPWS system we decided to do another visual approach. I discussed with my co-pilot that we would do everything the same and if we got the aural warning again with the gear being down and locked on the EICAS that we would level off at about 1;000 FT AGL and just ask the Tower if they could see that all three of our gear were down. On the second approach everything was normal just as it was on the first approach; with no aural warnings on the second approach. We landed with no problems. No assistance was required. Called Maintenance Control after we were blocked in; and they agreed that it was a computer malfunction. At no point did we ever get any EICAS messages about gear disagree.

An EMB-145 EGPWS issued a 'TOO LOW GEAR' alert at about 850 FT on approach with the gear indicating down and locked with no EICAS messages; so a go around was executed and on the second approach the warning did not alert.


Initial Climb; Final Approach; Landing; Taxi; Takeoff / Launch

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 622

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I'm reporting a recurrent occurrence where an Air Traffic Controller serving the Tower (and occasionally ground) is utilizing unclear speech on the frequency. The issue is not so much the radio phraseology; it's rather the constant mumbling; fast talking and unclear speech that often force you to request repetition. I'm used to very high paced radio talk enroute; but with TRACON and ARTCC it's almost always distinct and easily recognizable. I often need to concentrate hard to try to make out what this Controller means with certain instructions. I've had occurrences where even the wind information or equivalent from the ATIS recording has been unreadable. The reason why I report it is because I can clearly hear that I'm not alone having trouble understanding; past all the fast paced mumbling. During high workload and dense traffic conditions at this airport (which is common); this becomes a safety hazard. ATC gets more stressed because they have to repeat half of the instructions and the airplane crews are not always completely sure what's expected of them. All because of indistinct radio mumbling. I couldn't find any better source of reporting this other than here. I haven't yet been in any severe traffic conflicts because you take extra precautions and scan your surroundings but I want to raise my concerns before something happens because of ATC; no less for the Controller's sake.

Cessna 172 instructor pilot reports that a local ATC Controller's mumbling; indistinct; and rapid speech on Tower; Ground Control; and ATIS communications causes confusion and requires many pilots to have to ask for a repeat of radio transmissions.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

While on a Visual Approach backed up by the ILS I misread the altitude at the Final Approach Fix as 2;000 feet; it is actually 2;800 feet. As I was descending we observed the PAPI as red and the perspective of the runway looked like we were low. At the same time we received a Low Altitude Alert from ATC. We immediately corrected our descent path and continued the approach. ATC queried whether everything was OK and we advised them that we had corrected our flight path. As we landed we realized that we were still on the Approach Control frequency. My suspicion is the Controller was distracted by my earlier error and did not think to switch us. We were similarly distracted and did not think to query the Controller.

B737 flight crew reported that distraction following an altitude deviation resulted in landing without a clearance.


Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The crew and myself had a 'limo service' to take us to airport. A nasty cab pulls up to take us on this [time period] hour drive; when dark and in rain. The driver was all over the road the entire drive. I asked multiple times if he is OK and if he wanted to pull over. He refused. He was bouncing lane to lane; on and off the shoulder. The Flight Attendant in front seat asked him multiple times if he was okay to drive. The driver was very tired or on drugs. He bounced off of a concrete barrier at one point; tire hit first so not much damage; just scraped front bumper. Which is what they are designed to do. We then proceeded to demand him to pull over and check damage; inform police. Driver denied and said no. We then were concerned he was under the influence of some drug; since he did not want to involve the police. We were scared for our lives the entire drive. I have never been so scared in a car in my life. I could not believe our company would do something so dangerous to crew members. We barely made it to the airport; and us as a crew decided we were not fit to fly an airplane.Scheduling needs to figure another system out in bringing crew members to locations. If the driver had driven off the road; we could have easily died. Scheduling cannot trust these beat up taxi services for long drives like this one. They need to take into account the time of night; weather; and how dangerous it can be. It was a huge risk getting into that taxi and we should not have accepted it.

First Officer reported that a taxi driver driving recklessly and possibly under the influence caused the crew to be unfit for flight.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 5000

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 998; Flight Crew Type 196

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

On taxi out to Runway 34 at BGM airport there was blowing snow bringing the visibility down to almost 0. The only taxiway sign for taxiway L (Lima) was obscured. The yellow directional markings on ground were covered with snow. We missed the taxiway and slid off ramp just west of taxiway Lima(L). No injuries but substantial damage to nose gear.

Began taxi from ramp between Taxiways M and L.  While taxiing parallel to Bravo PF (pilot flying) called for taxi checklist.  PM (pilot monitoring) head was down for a brief period while doing taxi checks.  When PM looked up he told PF that something looked wrong about the aircraft position.  Almost immediately the aircraft entered the grass on the east side of Lima.  PF attempted to continue through grass to Bravo and the Aircraft dropped into a snow obscured swale and came to a stop.  Aircraft secured and evacuated.  2 crew and 2 passengers on board.  No injuries.

Flight crew reported excursion from taxiway during low visibility conditions on snow-covered taxiway BGM airport.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were assigned the RNAV (GPS) Runway 18 into Corpus Christi. ATC gave us direct to CAVLA intersection; told us to cross CAVLA at 2100 ft and cleared us for the approach. The Pilot Flying set 1700 ft into the altitude window and verified that LNAV and VNAV were active. As we descended towards CAVLA; the Pilot Flying entered a speed at CAVLA of 200 knots. It took a long while for VNAV to compute the new input. As we were about to cross CAVLA; VNAV disconnected. I pointed this out to the Pilot Flying and we dipped slightly under 2100 ft. He reestablished the aircraft at 2100 ft and then set the altitude selector to zeros and started a Vertical Speed of around 1000 ft fpm descent. The next fix on the approach was PEERS and the charted altitude is 1700 ft. Although I knew he had already set zero in the altitude window; when I looked at the ND (Navigation Display) I noticed that the range to altitude line was right at PEERS intersection. Forgetting for a moment that he had set zeros; I thought that we were on profile to cross PEERS at 1700 ft; but we were actually on a glidepath that was putting us well below the correct altitude. When I figured this out I mentioned to the Pilot Flying that we should set 1700 ft in the altitude selector as we were no longer in VNAV; but by that time we were already flying below 1700 ft. We were around 1400 ft when the Pilot Flying corrected the altitude and climbed back up to 1700 ft. We were in VMC conditions with the airport in sight. The flight landed without further incident.

Air carrier flight crew descended below cleared altitude while on an RNAV approach to CRP.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

We were climbing out normally from San Diego and shortly after 10;000 feet and before JORRJ intersection we got a 'DESCEND; DESCEND' TCAS RA. There were parachute jump planes in the area. We saw the TCAS returns for the (I believe) two planes. Almost without warning (I don't recall a 'TRAFFIC' alert) we got a 'DESCEND; DESCEND' command; and the PFD directed a steep descent; almost at the bottom of the range. I immediately disconnected the autopilot to comply and started the descent. In the heat of battle I forgot to call for 'FLIGHT DIRECTORS OFF'. Fortunately it wasn't a problem. We descended at least 1;000 feet (maybe 2;000) before we got the 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' message. The PNF told ATC we were complying with a RA when it happened; and we told them we were resuming the climb after clear of traffic. ATC had no further comment.

A321 Captain reported responding to a RA departing SAN with a parachute jump aircraft.


Flight Crew Total 9213; Flight Crew Type 1800

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

The flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ was dispatched under our new fuel management program. The 1 hour and 25 minute flight was dispatched with planned fuel of 5830 lbs. The FO and I both noticed and mentioned that the landing fuel numbers were very low for our standard operation. The NAV Log section of the release showed 1;829 lbs. which is planned fuel minus taxi and fuel burn. But the fuel calculation section showed 1;660 lbs. This concerned both the FO and I; as such a long flight with very little fuel to be landing with. We both discussed that the airplane was [under] fueled by at least 200 lbs. Therefore we both felt landing with 2;000 lbs. or worst case scenario 1;800 lbs. was low but a safer and acceptable number. The performance manual shows around 1;700 lbs. at 5;000 ft. is around 45 minutes of fuel. Knowing our fuel was tight; we did what we could to help conserve fuel by delaying the second engine start as long as possible; and we attempted a Flight Level Change climb by several and normal intermediate level off altitudes with only 7 miles in the opposite direction. We continued to monitor our fuel burn. Upon our initial descent; we noticed we had burned more than planned; but we had received a shortcut and still calculated landing with around 1;800 lbs. On a few turns before final; the right fuel gauge began to flash amber at us then continued to flash in and out as fuel moved around throughout the final approach. Upon landing; we had around 1;800 lbs. of fuel. I feel this margin of safety is extremely low for a safety conscious airline and program. The fuel management program should be providing us with more fuel not less fuel. We were [under] fueled and received no undue delays and were proactive in managing and conserving fuel. Our end result was landing with 1;800 lbs. of fuel. In a medium case scenario; if the airport shuts down for an aircraft emergency or anything else; a go around diversion to the closest company destination (ZZZ2 is 78 miles away); say 25 to 30 minutes at 8;000 ft. (1;100 lbs.); would have me landing with 400 lbs. of fuel and I would have had to make that decision immediately. ZZZ3 is the next closest at 117 miles. That is also if those stations both have personnel staffed to service the aircraft. While legal; and probably acceptable; this practice seems to create an unreasonable reduced margin of safety standards with the trade-off being cost savings. In addition; as a Check Airmen and experienced pilot; I have more wherewithal to be neurotically monitoring developing situations; and weather. I can see an average pilot easily being forced into a no-win situation or very unsafe situation with dire outcome.[We] detected and attempted to manage [the issue] upon review of the release and even with proactive measures; the aircraft still landed with an uncomfortable amount of fuel. [We] took proactive fuel burn reductions with no changes in landing fuel. The airline's new fuel management program and a lack of safety margins created by the program [were contributing factors].I suggest changing the standard practice of providing 45 minutes of cruise fuel from flight level altitudes and provide the crew with an accurate and manageable 45 minutes of fuel near 10;000 ft. which is where most people will need that extra fuel in the case of holding; delays; reroutes and diversions which more likely occur below the flight levels. Add fuel and increase the amount of minimum fuel required to be on the airplane for dispatch.

An air carrier Captain reported receiving a low fuel indication during final approach and suggested that the company's fuel management program did not allow enough fuel for adequate safety margins.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 221; Flight Crew Total 1646; Flight Crew Type 681

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 24260; Flight Crew Type 4020

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

The Captain was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the FO (First Officer) was the Pilot Flying (PF). During cruise flight; the FO briefed the KOHOE3 RNAV arrival to the RNAV Z 35L; LEFT; approach based upon current DEN ATIS. A thorough brief of RNAV procedures was conducted using the approach briefing guide. The crew also discussed details and pitfalls of flying RNAV approaches into DEN during the cruise portion of flight and reviewed RNAV approach plates for both 35R and 35L.Upon contact with DEN Approach and while descending via the KOHOE3 RNAV arrival; the crew was told to expect the visual approach Runway 35R. The Captain loaded the ILS 35R and [the] crew re-briefed the approach; visual backed up with the ILS. Then; during the descent between the fixes of DHATT and DOGGG and approaching 11;000 feet; the Controller asked if we could accept the RNAV Z Runway 35R; RIGHT. Having previously conducted a thorough RNAV briefing; we said we could accept that approach and were subsequently cleared the RNAV Z 35R as we were approaching DOGGG.The aircraft was level at 11;000 feet and 210 kts with the autopilot engaged. The Captain loaded the approach and answered the ATC radio call; while the FO closed the 'vectors' fix on the FMC legs page by bringing the RNAV approach fix; MISMS; over the 'vectors' fix. The Captain confirmed the new routing before executing the FMC change. The ND (Navigation Display) appeared to show the correct path of DOGGG; MISMS; and then a turn to FRONZ. After confirming with ATC that we were cleared the approach; the Captain reset the MCP (Mode Control Panel) altitude window to 7000 feet; the next cleared altitude at FRONZ.As the aircraft reached the DOGGG fix; the FO expected the aircraft to begin descent out of 11;000 feet and was distracted when the aircraft remained at 11;000 feet. The aircraft was now approaching MISMS only 3 miles from DOGGG; and the FO finally noticed that the arrival fixes of DONTT and BARRK were still programmed in the FMC; after DOGGG; but before MISMS. An attempt was made to re-sequence the FMC to make MISMS the next fix; which APPEARED to be the next fix on the ND. However; the aircraft crossed the MISMS fix before the change could take effect. ATC quickly cancelled the approach clearance and provided vectors to a visual approach to 35R; which was flown without incident.While no deviations or unsafe issues resulted from this event; there were several lessons learned. The crew should not have accepted the late notice RNAV approach clearance. While a thorough briefing had been conducted; which included a review of both Runway 35L AND Runway 35R approaches; there was insufficient time to reprogram the FMC; comply with all altitude and airspeed restrictions; answer radio calls; AND thoroughly brief and confirm all crew actions. Equally important; recent recurrent simulator training as well as via pilot bulletin has highlighted the importance of eliminating 'vectors' on the legs page when transitioning from an RNAV arrival to an RNAV approach. Based upon this training; the FO was predisposed to bring the approach fix of MISMS over the 'vectors' fix; instead of correctly sequencing MISMS after the DOGGG fix.Furthermore; after incorrectly overwriting 'vectors' with MISMS; the ND display showed the MISMS fix and turn to FRONZ approach fix but the arrival fixes of DONTT and BARRK were not in view; giving a false sense that the aircraft would fly the approach routing. Finally; the close proximity of DOGGG to MISMS; 3 NM; provided little time to recognize and correct the mistake.

B757 flight crew reported track error during RNAV approach due to mis-programming the FMC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 10250; Flight Crew Type 120

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Departed XA:30 with full fuel (3.5 hours range) for ZZZ (ETE 2.25 hours). At XC:30; I was 4 NM west of my destination at 2000 ft and reduced power about 100 RPM to initiate a descent to pattern altitude. Immediately after the power reduction; the engine sputtered and lost power. Changing throttle position or carb heat setting made no difference. The engine quit. I selected a field about a mile outside the airport boundary and landed. The landing was smooth and uneventful. No damage. No injuries.

The reporter stated no obvious cause for fuel exhaustion was discovered in this older aircraft. The temperature that day was about 12 degrees Fahrenheit which made for low density altitude and higher fuel usage. The fuel tanks were overfilled during preflight so the reporter is certain about the amount of pre-departure fuel.

Aeronca Champion pilot reported the engine quit due to fuel exhaustion 1.5 hours sooner than planned after two hours of flight. A successful off airport landing was completed with no damage or injury.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach vectors; autopilot was not capturing the LOC; so I; PF; clicked off the autopilot. As soon as I did; I lost my flight director. I was immediately faced with a raw data; in the weather; hand flown; instrument approach. The approach was not stable so we executed a go-around. During the miss; still hand flown; assigned 2500 ft; I climbed to 2900 ft. The controller didn't say anything so I don't think there was a conflict. The second approach was similar to the first. The third approach resulted in a successful approach and landing.I really had my hands full of airplane and the normal automation was unavailable. Attempts to reestablish the autopilot were unsuccessful until being vectored for the third approach. More aggressive attention to the altitude. Maybe let my copilot fly while I tried to troubleshoot.

B737-800 Captain reported going around after an autopilot anomaly resulted in an unstable hand-flown instrument approach.