Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Approximately XA00; the student [Aircraft X] was taxiing to depart IND while the instructor was monitoring. We were given instructions to taxi to 23L via M; M3; cross 32; N; and to hold short of D. While approaching 32 ground was coordinating with an Aircraft Y plane on D just short of N trying to return to ramp; and Aircraft Z (air carrier) plane on 14 trying to get to point X. Initially; ground control told the Aircraft Y plane to hold short so the Aircraft Z could turn right onto D then left into point 2; but Aircraft Z crew offered to continue down 14 and enter the ramp at point 1 which is essentially where our taxi route was. Ground hesitated then approved this request just about when we were crossing the hold short lines to cross 32. We noticed Aircraft Z began speeding up their taxi and the student noted hesitation whether to continue further onto the runway. Since we had already begun crossing the hold short lines I instructed her to continue but to expedite taxi. At this point; Aircraft Z was still just past D with what I had thought would be plenty of forward visibility to see us crossing directly in front of them. As we pulled onto N I became concerned Aircraft Z may not see us as the amount of thrust he was using and my perceived distance he was behind us indicated to me he was expediting his taxi into the ramp. As we approached our hold short instruction at D I radioed ground to confirm Aircraft Z had us in sight. At this point; I don't even think Aircraft Z was still on ground frequency even though he was still on N which is what I was hoping for to give him notice of our position if he was unaware. Before ground responded Aircraft Z began their turn into their ramp at point 2 off N as we came to a stop holding short of D. I was having a hard time judging how far they were behind us due to lack of rearward visibility; and was close to increasing throttle and continuing on delta without clearance but did not. It is hard to tell; but as Aircraft Z turned it seemed to me and the student their right wing crossed over our horizontal stabilizer or at least very close to it. This is what in hindsight seemed to confirm my suspicions they never saw us. After a short delay as we were holding short ground responded something to the effect of; 'Um; Aircraft X yeah the Aircraft Z is clear of Delta so you can continue taxi Delta to 23L.' This indicated to me he did not really understand what I was communicating and was likely unaware of the hazard that had just occurred.In hindsight; I could have cued up ground a little sooner as to my concerns. I wrongly assumed the Aircraft Z saw us. I also should have simply taken control and taxied onto D without clearance and immediately notified ATC as there was no conflict on D. It is entirely possible the Aircraft Y did see us; and spacing was fine - hard to tell with limitations in rearward visibility; but either way it made both instructor and student extremely uncomfortable. If Aircraft Z did not see us I believe there is some responsibility on their shoulders of seeing traffic as we were off their nose at least 1;500 feet ahead of them when they accepted altered taxi instructions; and I believe they deviated from their taxi routing as they were cleared to point 1 but followed us on N to enter at point 2 creating the hazard. Also; ground control seemed unaware of the possible conflict giving Aircraft Z a taxi route without confirming our position along our route and without confirming Aircraft Z had us in sight. I'm also not sure whether they landed on 14; or if it was coming out of maintenance and they were taxing to ramp. I would think the latter as I think I'd have seen them land if so as a 14 landing would be unusual for the winds and traffic.The instructor should have been more proactive in contacting ground earlier upon possible conflict; and should have deviated per PIC authority from clearance to be 100% safety of flight was not compromised. Aircraft Z should be more aware of potential for not identifying small aircraft on taxi; and deviated from their ATC taxi clearance creating a hazard. Ground control should not accept taxi routing suggestions from pilots without being 100% certain they do not create a hazard; and confirming all prior traffic will not be at risk. Ground should have confirmed Aircraft Z had us in sight if they were going to be closely following our routing. I do think it would be pertinent to notify ATC of this event for them to play back and learn from this as well.

Small Aircraft Flight Instructor reported that during taxi the wing of a transport category aircraft may have passed over the horizontal stabilizer of the smaller instructional aircraft. Reporter stated that IND Ground Control did not notify the large aircraft of the position of the small aircraft.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The ground crew is always under so much pressure to get flights out on time; they do not follow proper procedures. Aside from maintenance not finishing the MEL items; the ground crew filled out the load sheet incorrectly. They could have questioned us about the placards. If the load sheet was filled out accurately we would have caught and corrected the error at the gate and wouldn't have taken off with a miscalculated CG. They repeatedly call us while we're doing briefings and checklists instead of saying 'ground crew standing by' once. It happens on every single fight and it is a distraction. This morning they even initiated a push-back at full speed without a clearance from the captain and before we called ramp control. We all strive to be on time; but safety really should be the priority on the ramp; too. Proper training and emphasis on safety would reduce these errors.

Air Carrier First Officer reported that Ground Personnel are not adhering to SOPs and are creating ground and airborne hazards.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 4500

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Manuals

Flying the Waterloo Four Arrival into Toronto. Both pilots reviewed the new 'Canadian Airspace and ATC Phraseology Changes' and thought we understood the procedure. Upon approaching ROKTO at an altitude above 14;000 FT I queried ATC (pilot not flying was off frequency) if we were cleared for the STAR and should we maintain the associated altitudes on our own. The Controller replied confusedly; 'you haven't been cleared for the arrival?' We had not been given specific clearance. He then cleared us for the Waterloo Four Arrival and told us to slow to 250 and maintain 11;000 FT I think. We may not have crossed ROKTO at exactly 250 KTS and possibly were between 14;000 and 12;000 FT; maybe lower. With each fix and a lower crossing altitude ahead we both thought we had to descend on our own to meet those restrictions. Reluctant to do this automatically on our own the Captain asked ATC if we should clear the next fix at its assigned altitude. Each time the Controller did not answer our question but instead cleared us to an altitude lower than the restriction. We were finally cleared to 4;000 FT before NOXER. ALORU has a crossing altitude of 3;000 FT. The Captain thinks we were given a heading before we reached ALORU. I can't remember if we crossed ALORU or not. Either way we were cleared for our approach and told to intercept the glide slope at 4;000 FT. After the flight I mentioned that I thought we had made several errors on the arrival and that we should have started down to 3;000 FT to cross ALORU on our own. We reviewed the memo on this and became even more confused. For instance the Company's memo states; 'The new phraseology requires aircraft to comply with SID/STAR altitude and speed restrictions unless specifically canceled by ATC.' We were never told to NOT comply with the restrictions so we think we should have kept descending on our own to meet them. It then goes on to say; 'Descend Via the (STAR)' does not exist in Canada. When you hear 'Cleared for the (STAR)' or 'Via (STAR); descend to 12;000 FT' you are expected to descend via the STAR and meet all altitude and speed restrictions contained therein. So descend (meeting altitude requirements) to 12;000 FT but because ATC did not specifically cancel the other restrictions I wasn't sure whether we should stay at 12;000 FT or continue down per the STAR. The point I was missing; does ATC have to clear you for the arrival and then clear you to descend to the lowest altitude on the STAR to meet every restriction or should you just meet them on your own since you are cleared for the STAR and restrictions were not canceled? Looking at a Canadian publication; it reads; 'Without delay the pilot will commence a normal descent to FL240 and when convenient continue descent in order to meet the altitude and speed restrictions coded in the STAR. The pilot will level at 12;000 FT unless further descent is received from ATC.' I interpret this to mean one should only comply with restrictions on the STAR within the altitude block given unless canceled by ATC; NOT to comply with ALL restrictions unless canceled. In our case; approaching ROKTO we were told to descend to 11;000 FT. I wasn't sure if we should we have stayed at 11;000 FT or descended on our own to meet NOXER at or below 4;500 FT. Now I believe we should have stayed at 11;000 FT until cleared to a lower altitude as happened. Similarly; we were cleared to 4;000 FT before NOXER; I didn't know if that meant we should have stayed at 4;000 FT after NOXER or descended via the rest of the arrival to be at 3;000 FT by ALORU. ATC never said anything to us about an improper altitude. I found the Company's memo to be somewhat misleading in that it is telling us if we are cleared for the STAR we should comply with all published altitudes unless specifically canceled. The operative word is 'therein' obviously restrictions 'therein' but what about the next lower altitude? Nowhere did it say to stay at the assigned altitude. More emphasis was place on; if cleared for the STAR; we should meet ALL restrictions. Now that I have read over the Canadian memo I think I understand the procedure. I think I would have been better off reading ONLY the Canadian memo. The Company's memo only confused me as it was someone's interpretation of the official Canadian explanation yet only addressed 1 or 2 scenarios and put emphasis on the main point as if it were the only condition. In future; perhaps the Company memo should simply state there have been changes to phraseology and reference the official documents instead of providing their own version of an explanation.

An Air Carrier crew descending into CYYZ was confused; as are many US based crews; about the descent STAR procedure after the clearance statement 'DESCEND to XX;000 FT' and the aircraft is on the arrival routing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 91; Flight Crew Total 16848; Flight Crew Type 6619

Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 5000

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During our initial climb after takeoff on Runway XXR; an aircraft on the ground advised the Tower that we had a 'left engine surge' during our takeoff roll abeam. The Tower asked us if we had heard the report; and repeated the information to us. I had heard the report but did not realize it was our aircraft until ATC queried us. All cockpit indications had been normal to this point. We did have a significant crosswind for the takeoff. We were busy with the takeoff profile and flap retraction; and the usual departure communications at this international airport with numerous heading and altitude changes. At about the time we began the engine surge procedure; the flight attendants called the cockpit to report a vibration in the cabin. Throttle response and engine indications were still normal. We continued the climb and then did notice a subtle humming sound. Then amber 'R ENG EEC MODE EICAS' message illuminated. We accomplished the QRH procedure as we reached our initial cruise altitude of FL300. I initiated a SATCOM call to Dispatch; who brought Maintenance Control on to the call. I told them that we thought it best to return to departure airport; with the engines operating in the alternate EEC mode; unless they had any input. About that time; the call disconnected. I re-initiated the call; and they agreed the best plan would be to return to the field; but then the call disconnected again. We advised Control that we needed to return due to a mechanical problem; but that we were not declaring an emergency. We obtained vectors back toward the airport and were told to expect holding; and were issued a descent clearance. About this time we noticed 'R ENG FIRE LP 2' status message. I made an announcement to the passengers explaining our return. We received additional calls from the cabin crew indicating that the vibration was getting worse; though we still did not sense anything more than a humming noise. The right engine vibration indication had increased to about 4.9; with a spike to 8.0. Some of the other engine indications went blank on both EICAS and the standby engine indicator; although throttle response seemed normal. Then the right engine oil quantity began decreasing steadily and reached zero. Oil pressure decreased below red line and the 'R ENG OIL PRESS' light illuminated. We accomplished the 'Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation' QRH procedure. We declared an emergency to Control; and advised Dispatch via ACARS. We were passing through FL250 and were 73 miles from the airport. We decided that our departure airport was the nearest suitable airport given the distance to descend and the need for a long runway. The thrust reverser on the operating engine had been deferred inoperative. I decided to land 12;000 LBS overweight rather than dump fuel to expedite our arrival; given the unusual series of malfunctions and the ground report of a malfunction on the left engine; our only operative engine. At least one attempt to reach Dispatch via ACARS 'Call me' was unsuccessful. Dispatch did acknowledge our '7700' message. We forgot to actually set the transponder to 7700; however. I advised the Lead Flight Attendant that we expected a normal landing with a higher speed; and that there was no need to prepare for an evacuation. Once the FMC had been programmed; landing performance reviewed; I made a passenger announcement advising the passengers we expected a normal landing; and then took control of the aircraft for the approach and landing. Approximately 15 minutes prior to landing; Control asked us to confirm that we were single engine. We requested that fire equipment meet the aircraft. We made an uneventful flaps 20 landing on Runway XXL; cleared the runway and stopped on the taxiway. As expected after an overweight; high speed landing; our brake temperatures were climbing and the 'BRAKE TEMP' light illuminated. We accomplished the QRH procedure. Fire crews were advised and ably handled the situation. We advised thelead flight attendant to be ready for a possible evacuation after a small fire broke out on the aft right brake of the main gear. The fire crews promptly extinguished it; so no evacuation was necessary. After 1 hour of brake cooling; we were towed to the gate. I debriefed the entire crew; contacted the Duty Chief Pilot; the Base Assistant Chief Pilot; and Maintenance. All maintenance log entries were accomplished through communications with Maintenance Control and Local Station Maintenance. The single highlight of the whole series of events was a great crew that worked together well on both sides of the flight deck door. That gave us the most favorable outcome possible.

We did have a 17 KT crosswind on takeoff and initially thought the autothrottles may have accelerated too quickly and caused a light stall in engine.

A B777 engine surge was observed by ground personnel during takeoff; but because no abnormal engine or EICAS alerts were present the flight continued. At 30;000 FT engine vibration; engine fire; and loss of oil alerts caused the crew to shut the engine down; declare an emergency; and return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On ground in ZZZ; after APU was started; there was a slight odor of oil in the flight deck. Smell dissipated and then we noticed it again upon landing in ZZZ1 once APU was started. Flight Attendant notified us once we reached the gate that he also smelled an odor on landing. [I suggest] better maintenance of APU; oil filters; etc.

Air Carrier First Officer reported an 'oil' odor during preflight which dissipated and returned on landing.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

While coming off A PREVIOUS flight I had flight ABC with 68 mins to load after I printed out the card. While working ABC the crew had 3 leads total. While loading the front another lead said I'm going to take care of the manual pit 51. I responded OK he continued to load the back. After completion of loading the cans; I tried closing the flight it wouldn't close so I went to the loading program. While at loading program; I still can't close the flight. I call load planner and we determine there isn't enough weight in pit 51 as I'm on the phone I noticed the plane went by and I called zone to let them know I need them to return to gate to add more weight. Apparently; they were calling me for weights on zone 1 but I was on channel X till the flight is closed out. I never authorized the plane to leave the gate. Also; when verifying the Hazmat; the scanner never showed pit 51 it showed the Hazmat in the forward cargo holds.

Ground employee reported an aircraft departed the with erroneous Hazmat cargo location; as well as incorrect weight and balance data.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Tower was call for release in North Flow.  Aircraft Y departed VFR northbound.  Tower got release with heading 270 for Aircraft X.  After Aircraft X rolled; Tulsa TRACON called on shout line and FLM (Front Line Manager) answered that line.  TRACON APPREQD Aircraft Y return for landing.  No special handling was requested; just a turn back to downwind.  About a minute later; the LC controller saw Aircraft Y southbound northwest of the airport and asked what Aircraft Y was doing.  The FLM told him he had approved it.  The LC controller asked about the departure on a 270 heading.  The FLM told him to turn the departure to 300 heading; contrary to release given.  The controller issued the 300 heading and then switched the Aircraft X to departure.  Aircraft X reported traffic in sight but did not acknowledge the frequency change.  After traffic was no factor; the FLM told the controller to turn departure to 270 heading.  The controller replied he had already switched.  The FLM then APPREQD a 300 heading.  TRACON called and asked to try Aircraft X again and they were switched to departure.  The FLM said he thought the returning aircraft had some sort of problem. This all happened during all hands meeting concerning conflicts with management over leave policy.  All CPCs (Certified Professional Controller) except the one on LC were in meeting and the Staff Specialist was on Ground.  FLM was CIC.If the controller is too busy to answer the line; FLM should not approve actions out of the ordinary.  If FLM does not have the whole traffic picture; do not approve things out of the ordinary.  If the FLM is going to do things to disrupt a controller's plan; tell them a new plan ' Change Aircraft X to a 300 heading; but don't switch him until he passes Aircraft Y who I approved back inbound.'   A request to return for landing is not automatically an emergency to be approved without question.

RVS Tower controller reports of an aircraft that just departed having to return to the airport. The Front Line Manager answers the phone line and coordinates with departure control and coordinates things that aren't common. The controller then gets confused as what to do with his next departure and the returning aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We received our paperwork for the flight; and there were no notes on the release. Looking through the weather information we saw a SIGMET for most of the northeast for severe turbulence between 13;000 FT and FL330; exactly where we would be flying. There were no PIREPs listed on the weather packet; however the packet is limited because it only shows PIREPs for the departure; destination; and alternate airports; nothing else. On receiving the ATIS it stated: Severe and extreme turbulence at FL220 west of the airport. I immediately sent an ACARs message to our Dispatcher; asking for information. He replied: several reports between 220-340 of severe and extreme turbulence all along the east coast. I asked why we were not given those very important PIREPs; to which he replied: 'Clear air turbulence does not stay in one spot; PIREPs and SIGMETs are advisory only and not known turbulence. One planes' severe is another's light chop.' I have pictures of the ATIS; and the ACARs received from Dispatch. Reading those messages it is very clear that this Dispatcher does not have a full grasp of the requirements of our manuals or 14 CFR 121. The Operations Manual states: Flight into known severe turbulence is prohibited. Also: Operations in potentially hazardous weather conditions. The Dispatcher will consult with the pilot in command on any concerns when operating in or near areas where the potential for hazardous weather conditions exist. Pilots will adhere to the procedures in the respective POH. The need for exercising prudent judgment with regard to flight through areas of known or forecast severe weather such as thunderstorm activity; severe turbulence; and hail; is well recognized by experienced pilots. Flight through severe weather activity must be avoided if possible. Flights shall be released and operated only if it appears that the area of severe weather can be avoided. Flights should not proceed through an area in which thunderstorms or turbulence of more than moderate intensity are known to exist; unless the PIC can alter the flight path to avoid the storm center by visual or radar guidance. 14 CFR 121.601 states: Aircraft Dispatcher information to pilot in command: Domestic and flag operations. (a) The aircraft Dispatcher shall provide the pilot in command all available current reports or information on airport conditions and irregularities of navigation facilities that may affect the safety of the flight. (b) Before beginning a flight; the aircraft Dispatcher shall provide the pilot in command with all available weather reports and forecasts of weather phenomena that may affect the safety of flight; including adverse weather phenomena; such as clear air turbulence; thunderstorms; and low altitude wind shear; for each route to be flown and each airport to be used. (c) During a flight; the aircraft Dispatcher shall provide the Pilot in Command any additional available information of meteorological conditions (including adverse weather phenomena; such as clear air turbulence; thunderstorms; and low altitude wind shear); and irregularities of facilities and services that may affect the safety of the flight. The turbulence was so bad that when a B777 encountered it; 5 flight attendants were injured; and the aircraft had to turn back. It is clear to me that this Dispatcher did not follow the Manual or 121.601 by not notifying us of the potential for severe to extreme turbulence. We did not encounter it; but the complacency of the Dispatcher scared us; what else is he neglecting to notify crews about? 1. Remove this Dispatcher from actively dispatching until he can complete remedial training to ensure that all required notifications to crews are completed. 2. Work with our weather vendor to increase the listings of PIREPs; so that we can get more in formation than just the departure and arrival airports. 3. Send a must read memo to all dispatchers reiterating the importance of crew notification of potentially hazardous weather information.

EMB-170 Captain laments not being informed of potential severe turbulence by his Dispatcher prior to departure as required by the Operations Manual and FAR 121.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 350

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

At the beginning of the shift I performed the pre-flight inspection of the aircraft and noted that the fuel level was down below 300 LBS and was going to need to be topped off. Normally when an aircraft is left down fuel the crew leaving it down is supposed to leave a placard on the instrument panel; alerting other crews of the fuel situation. In this case there was no placard left on the panel. Due to the hot weather; I performed the pre-flight inspection in my civilian clothes (shorts and T-shirt). Once I pushed the aircraft out of the hangar; I decided it would be better to fuel the aircraft once I had my flight suit and boots on; in case fuel was spilled while fueling. I left the aircraft without a placard on the panel and went inside to change my clothes. Once I changed into my flight suit; I was distracted by administrative details inside the office and forgot to go back out and fuel the aircraft. Approximately one hour later; we were requested for a mission so we took off and I failed to note the reduced fuel state. I then mistakenly believed I had a full tank of fuel and I was only planning on flying for one hour. A full take of fuel will normally allow two hours of flight time; with a reserve. About one hour into the flight I noticed a yellow caution light on the instrument panel briefly flicker. I pressed the 'Test' button and realized the light I saw flicker was the 'Low Fuel' caution light. I looked down at the fuel gauge and noticed that the fuel gauge was indicating below 100 pounds of fuel. I immediately realized that I had forgotten to fuel the aircraft prior to departure. I immediately turned the aircraft toward the airport and reduced power. The caution light stayed off for a few seconds and then it flickered again. I decided to make a precautionary landing in a suitable area; rather than risk having a flame out of the engine trying to make it back to the airport. Just before landing; the low fuel light came on and remained illuminated. After landing and a normal engine shutdown; we retrieved 15 gallons of fuel from our fuel facility and fueled the aircraft. I checked and noted that we had approximately 150 LBS of fuel; which was more than adequate to safely make it back to the airport. I flew the aircraft back to the airport without incident. I topped off the fuel tank at the hangar and the aircraft took a total of 45.2 gallons of fuel. Human Performance Considerations: Issue #1. Upon noting the low fuel state during the pre-flight; I should have immediately put fuel in the aircraft; so it was mission ready. The reason I did not put fuel in the aircraft was because I felt I wasn't wearing the proper clothing to safely refuel the aircraft. Solution #1. To alleviate this situation in the future; I should always pre-flight the aircraft in the proper clothing; so if the aircraft needs to be serviced I will be able to take care of the situation immediately. Another option is I could have left a placard on the panel; upon noticing the low fuel state; which would have reminded me; prior to take off that the fuel level was low. Issue #2. It was the first time in a while that I have flown this particular aircraft. This aircraft has a different panel layout than all of our other aircraft. The fuel gauge is a different type and in a completely different location on the panel on this aircraft. I believe this contributed to the fact that I wasn't picking-up the fuel gauge in my scan of the instrument panel. Solution #2. I must realize and make a conscious effort to adjust my instrument scan when flying this aircraft; to make sure I am not forgetting to monitor the aircraft fuel level.

A Police Helicopter pilot failed to fuel the aircraft after becoming distracted by administrative and mission events so made a precautionary landing for fuel before returning to base.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 760

While on RNAV 24 approach issued direct HIBAN and cleared for the approach. With terrain displayed on MFD (Multi-function Flight Display) 1; PF (Pilot Flying) began to descend to 3;700 feet for HIBAN. At 3;900 feet and .8 NM from HIBAN terrain warning was received. (V/S (Vertical Speed) was less than 1;000 feet per minute). PF disconnected auto pilot and climbed to 4;200 feet until aural warning stopped (VMC). Once aircraft safety and stability was ensured approach was continued.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a terrain warning during approach to ROA.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 1750; Flight Crew Type 780

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On a Part 91 repositioning flight we were leveling off at 3;000 feet in contact with Charlotte Approach activating our IFR flight plan. Weather conditions were clear with unlimited ceiling and unlimited visibility despite our destination airport JQF reporting a broken layer at 500 feet. We were loading and activating the approach for our destination airport and had it in sight visually. When I looked up as Pilot Flying out the left-hand window I saw a flash and looked behind the wing to see a high wing aircraft a my 8 o'clock position about 25 feet below me. We did not see the airplane in front of us at any time and had overtaken it as it was flying in the same direction. We were well within the 30 mile mode C veil of Charlotte International yet that airplane did not show up on ADS-B. No evasive action was taken because we had already passed it by the time I saw it. We queried Charlotte Approach if they had a primary target in our vicinity and they said that they did not have any target.

Air taxi flight crew reported NMAC with another aircraft not on ADS-B while in climb.


Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Flying to San Juan; I was in cruise flight at 2;000 feet 10 nm from Plaza Carolina. Mid-morning local time ATC advised me of traffic at 12:00; 1/4 mile; 2;100 feet. Since I did not see the traffic I immediately started a precautionary descent. I again received the same advisory for traffic at 12:00; 1/4 mile and 2;100 feet. At this point I had descended about 50-100 feet when an Aero Commander passed about 100 feet directly above my aircraft in the opposite direction.

A light twin commercial carrier pilot approaching SJU reported a near miss at about 2;000 feet after descending in response to an ATC alert about approaching an approaching aircraft.


Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Work Refused

Aircraft; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

On the IVANE RNAV STAR; approaching MAYOS...FMS message [repeatedly advising] 'too steep path.' ATC repeatedly re-assigning speed. Aircraft was attempting to exceed depicted speeds in order to make altitudes. I did not feel safe. Using [my best] judgment and PIC discretion; I requested a different arrival.Why? The Airbus cannot reconcile [the complexities of] the IVANE [STAR]. The STAR is poor; no better than KELLS. Add in tailwinds and ATC continuously vectoring us off the arrival and continuously re-assigning speeds. We reduced speeds also because of turbulence. [Finally I] requested ATC re-clear us on the MAJIC STAR. ATC did so. Problem solved.Lots of task loading; turbulent conditions; argumentative ATC. And then later; as I was trying to get home afterwards; my Chief Pilot calling my standby/spare/children's cell phone and leaving me messages to call him on Sunday night when I am OFF! ALL of these things put me 'in the red.'

An A320 Captain expressed his disgust for the IVANE RNAV STAR into CLT advising its complexities exceeded the capabilities of his autoflight system; compelling it to exceed required airspeeds in order to attempt to comply with the associated altitude restrictions. Further difficulties were provided by the demands of ATC to comply with the published restrictions and/or to reassign airspeeds; vector or otherwise interfere with the flight crew's efforts to comply with the published constraints of the arrival. They ultimately refused the IVANE and requested and were assigned the MAJIC; a less complex; non RNAV STAR.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Violated 2 possibly 3 FAR's: 1. Blocked own jumpseat with parked service carts. Official procedure is to park 2 half carts each at 1L and 1R blocking 1L aft and 1R jumpseat. Also must park beverage cart in cross aisle blocking 1 Center L and 1 Center R jumpseat. Service lasts approximately 3 to 4.5 hours due to extent of service and number of passengers. 2. Three of 5 parked carts are unattended (unsecured-there are no tie-downs) during service. By definition each aisle flight attendant can only attend 1 cart each. Galley flight attendant and purser are setting up and breaking down 3 tier carts in galley therefore not able to attend and position either of the unsecured parked carts. Had to violate FAR's to accomplish. Approximately 2 hours into flight experienced moderate turbulence and Captain instructed all flight attendants to take seats/suspend service. We pushed all half carts into galley moved beverage cart to side so that all 4 flight attendants could take seats. All 4 half carts rolled around in galley due to flaws in braking systems. This is the case with ALL of the half carts and most food and beverage carts on reconfigured 767's as well. Half cart brake only works if pushed backwards: they will roll forward and sideways with brake set. One half cart started rolling down aisle toward cabin. I and Flight Attendant in 1L aft had to physically hold onto carts to keep them from leaving galley. I have video of this phenomenon. Luckily no one was hurt. Three possible FAR violations: could not deploy all 4 required restraints for cart positions 3L or R/F and 311 R/F. If rear restraints deployed front restraints cannot be deployed: will not fit. Only deployed front restraints.

A Flight Attendant working in First Class reports that possibly 3 FAR's were violated during cabin service in cruise flight because of malfunctioning and unsecured serving carts during turbulence.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1750; Flight Crew Type 20

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 ATC

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Got up early and got a weather briefing; with marginal VFR expected at departure time; but forecast expected clearing up. Departed on a VFR cross country in marginal VMC conditions (ceilings). After departure; flew heading as required to avoid a few clouds. Later became apparent that the cross country would not be able to be safely completed; due to clouds developing below; rather than dissipating (could see that ground lights were becoming 'fuzzy'); and due to being dark; unsure what was above. Flew to a local airport (towered; but tower not open) I am familiar with and setup for [the] runway. On approach; everything seemed normal; except the runway lights were out. After landing; I noticed that all of the taxiways leading up to runway were barricaded. Came to conclusion runway was closed. Was able to taxi clear on an intersecting runway; and taxied to the ramp while it was still dark. Checked NOTAMs and found the runway was closed. The runway closure NOTAM was not in the weather. Additionally; there was not a lighted 'X' on the runway to designate that the runway was closed. No personnel were working on the runway; and no damage occurred.

Ultralight pilot reported landing on a closed runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 440; Flight Crew Type 275

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

I was taking some friends up on a flight and did a practice approach in visual conditions with a touch and go; then went and did another practice approach. Performed a circle to land for Runway 20. There was a slight cross wind. Winds were 210-220 at 10 knots. Touched down on right main gear first with stall warning horn going on and then left main gear touched down; then nose gear. As I rolled out at maybe 25-30 knots or so I started to get severe shudder in the airplane and it started to pull to the left. I added heavy right rudder to correct. Tower cleared us to taxiway Charlie and taxi to ramp on his frequency. I reported that I was having control issues. I got the aircraft stopped and tried to turn to the right while adding power and right rudder the aircraft spun to the left. The Tower asked if we needed assistance I said yes or we could get out and push. Tower said stay in aircraft and he would send a tug. I looked out at left main gear and saw the tire was nearly off the rim. I alerted the Tower of my left main gear issue. The aircraft was towed to the FBO. I made sure to check all three tires as part of preflight. I did notice some wear on left main (but flyable) and the right main had been replaced within the last month or two. Nose gear was also in decent shape. All tires were properly inflated. I am not sure if this was a FOD incident during the touch and goes or wear on tire which caused the tire to blowout. The landing was at Vref 40 knots or slightly lower.

C172 pilot reports making several touch and go landings before landing and discovering the left tire is flat. Directional control problems are reported but the aircraft is kept on the runway and stopped.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213.18; Flight Crew Type 7414.87

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Third leg of OE (Operations Experience). New hire First Officer. First experience with Boeing. He had difficulties in sim phase. I had been advised this could be a challenging OE. It was that. However; in this instance; my error contributed: I was fully engaged with trying to get my student to properly fly an FMS Bridge Visual to Rwy 28R [and] I failed to set TCAS to TA as recommended. Student was Pilot Flying. We experienced an RA at around 1;000 feet MSL (due to my TA error); commanding a climb. He failed to respond/respect the TCAS climb guidance (he froze); despite my directives that he do so. I took the aircraft; hand-flying; to respond to RA (shocked that he was not responding to the RA despite my directives that he do so). The RA response took us out of a position to make a safe landing; so I called for a go-around. He failed to properly respond to go-around commands/call-outs. I was solo; attempting to fly; manage Mode Control Panel; respond to Tower heading and altitude instructions; and cleaning up the aircraft. At one point in the sequence; at/above 2;500 feet MSL; we entered a shallow descent; I am guessing in the 300-foot range. I immediately corrected the deviation. Shortly after my correction; Tower called us regarding the descent. Once stable; there were no further issues.

B757 Captain reported a new First Officer had difficulty complying with procedures and clearances in reaction to an RA and subsequent go-around.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 7600; Flight Crew Type 4500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 200

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

My student and I departed to go over the coast and practice a few maneuvers and then go into ZZZ for a few landings. Student made her requisite calls starting at 10 miles out in bound for over flight to enter on the right 45 for Runway 30. The wind was approximately a 15 KT wind. We made two landings including making all the recommended calls on each leg. When we were ready to take off again we spotted an aircraft on the runway in the reverse direction heading toward the 30 numbers. We immediately stopped; waited for the aircraft to turn around and taxi off the runway; and then we took off.Shortly thereafter we realized that the volume had been turned down; so my student turned it up and heard someone saying 'Cessna XXXXX are you on frequency.' She responded 'I am now' and continued to make a downwind call. Then someone said we have been trying to reach you as an aircraft had an emergency. Student said she was sorry she had the volume down; but was on now.Next we turned crosswind and she made her announcement. Then someone with a very aggressive loud voice said; 'CESSNA XXXXX IS THERE A CFI ON BOARD?' She now announced she was on final and the voice stepped on her call and said; 'XXXXX DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD.' So she made her announcement again and was stepped on again with; 'DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD.' So while trying to set up for landing she made an announcement again and we heard; 'XXXXX DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD.' This is where it started to become unsafe; a threatening; harassing voice while we were landing the airplane. Student landed the airplane; did a touch and go; announced her crosswind and the aggressive voice said again; 'XXXXX DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD?' (The voice was just about yelling at this point).I had no intention of answering this aggressive; threatening voice as now I just wanted to get out of there; so I told my student lets depart on downwind. At this point I heard the tail number YYYYY from X Club associated with this voice and then guessed it was TTTTT. Student made her final call saying she was on downwind 30 and was departing the area. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE END OF THE ISSUE AT HAF.Again the aggressive voice said; 'XXXXX DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD?' Then in a few more seconds he said; 'I'm going to catch her.' Another pilot said she is responding; she is on frequency (implying why are you doing that?) And he said again; 'I am going to catch her.' While following us down the coast he repeated; 'XXXXX DO YOU HAVE A CFI' ON BOARD several more times? He must have said this 15 - 20 times. Now I am watching TIS to see if anyone is coming up behind us. I see on TIS someone at 1 o'clock; 300 FT above us; not very far away. Student starts pointing and I asked what?  She couldn't speak. So as I looked up to the right; I saw the aircraft drop its left wing; descend and head straight for us. I immediately took the controls; cut the power and started a descent to the left to avoid a collision. I then leveled off and saw the aircraft on TIS coming up behind us; 100 FT above us and according to TIS just about on top of us. Meanwhile TIS is saying TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC over and over. At this point I said; 'TTTTT; get off our butts and stop acting like the FAA and the police.' He said something that I don't remember; and I repeated the same thing and I said; 'since you know the aircraft; take this up on the ground not in the air.'We arrived at our home airport shortly after he did and someone was still at YYYYY; but then disappeared and was not in the office.Student and I were so rattled we stayed for an hour talking about this and writing down what happened. This was clearly a deliberate act of aggression; total disregard for safety; completely reckless and negligent; with loss of separation. It was scary and we were both shaking. This was the closest I have ever come to another aircraft in the air. This was ROAD RAGE in the air to the furthest extent; TTTTT was out of control. This incident is as bad as it gets without actually having a collision. There is absolutely no reason for anyone to EVER; EVER; EVER do anything like this.

My CFI and I left and flew along the coast to practice maneuvers and then headed to ZZZ (non-towered) for practice landings. CFI had turned down radio volume after we left our home airport; which I didn't realize. I made appropriate voluntary calls coming in to ZZZ (10 miles out; 5 miles out; over the runway at 2;000 FT; on the 45 for right 30; etc.). No other planes were in the area.After 2 practice landings/takeoffs; when taxied up to runway; noticed plane on the runway; so waited for it to back taxi and then get off at exit. Took off again. Given that we hadn't heard them talking; CFI checked volume and noticed it was down; turned it up. As on downwind; another pilot asked; 'XXXX; are you on frequency?' I said I was now; apologized; and continued to make my downwind call. At that point; the other pilot (a pilot in the air; not the one on the ground) said in a loud and belligerent voice; 'DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD?' My CFI instructed me to fly my airplane and land safely; so just as I started to announce I was on right base; the other pilot again said; DO YOU HAVE A CFI WITH YOU? He kept repeating this; stepping on my calls; as I announced I was on final. The pilot with the plane on the ground announced; 'Hey; she's on frequency;' which I interpreted to mean that he was telling the pilot in the air to calm down. The pilot in the air then said calmly; 'I recognize the tail number; it's a plane from my club.' I thought that would be the end of it; but as I did a touch and go; the pilot in the air kept saying in a louder and louder voice; 'DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD?' At that point; we decided to leave the area and cut short our practice as the pilot in the air was clearly being aggressive and trying to rattle me as I landed and that it wasn't safe for me to keep practicing. He must have shouted the same question 10+ times while I was in the pattern; and as I made my departing calls. At that point; my CFI recognized the other pilot's voice and told me who it was and that he was a CFI at the same club we belong to.When I announced I was leaving the area; the pilot in the air shouted; 'I'M GOING TO CATCH HER!' The pilot on the ground said; 'Whoa; she's on frequency;' again which I took to mean he was trying to calm down the pilot in the air. The pilot in the air repeated; 'I'M GOING TO CATCH HER!' I had no idea what he meant when he said he was going to catch me; what he intended to do to me and my plane in the air. My CFI instructed me to fly down the coast rather than going over the ridge. As we were flying along; I saw a plane at the same elevation; to the west of us. It turned its wings and I assumed it was doing that so I could see it but then I realized it had turned and was flying straight at us. I kept pointing at it; as I couldn't get my voice to work -- I was literally speechless. My CFI glanced to the right; saw it; just as TIS started going off saying; TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC. The other pilot was still repeating; 'DO YOU HAVE A CFI ON BOARD;' over and over. When it was clear he was not going to deviate from his course (and I was thinking that if I turned the plane to the right and upward; I would be in his path); my CFI took the controls and turned our plane down and to the right as he came at us.What I didn't realize was that he had turned back so he was right on our tail; but my CFI knew where he was and TIS kept going off and showing that he was 100 FT above us and it looked like the two planes were on top of each other. At that point; my CFI got on the radio and said firmly; 'XXXX [his name]; get off our butt; you aren't the FAA or the police;' and the other pilot said; 'I'M JUST TRYING TO HELP A BROTHER;' which later I realized perhaps referred to the pilot that was on the runway that I waited for before I took off for the third time at ZZZ. My CFI said calmly; 'XXXX; we will talk about it on the ground;' and then the other pilot said; 'BUT SHE WAS OFF FREQUENCY;' and my CFI again said calmly; 'We will talk about it on the ground; you know who we are.' We continued south and then headed for our home airport; and heard the other pilot also calling in to land before us.When we landed; the other pilot was not around. My CFI and I sat down to talk; and both of us were extremely rattled by the whole experience -- to have another pilot announce they are going to 'catch you' in the air and then to have them fly directly at you was incredibly scary. I will never forget the amount of aggression in the other pilot's voice; his complete loss of control (even as a third pilot was pointing out that all was OK and trying to calm down the situation); his deliberately flying his plane at ours and then coming up on our tail -- all I could think of was that this was some sort of 'air rage' and that we were all lucky to have walked away from our planes. To know this person is a CFI is mind-boggling and the club's record showed he had a student with him. I've also reported this incident to the club.

A student pilot and instructor were verbally harassed by a pilot after landing with a low radio volume and missing another aircraft's call. The harassment resulted in an intentional near miss after departing the traffic pattern.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Runway change TEB from takeoff Runway 1 to take off [on Runway] 24. Assigned the TEB 8 departure. [We] had 2;000 feet in the altitude alert. Supposed to level off at 1;500 [feet]. [We] caught [the] mistake and went to 1;800 [feet] on overshoot. Corrected as ATC noticed and leveled [off] at 1;500 [feet]. No conflict noted by TCAS or ATC.

LJ31 Captain reports exceeding the initial 1;500 foot altitude restriction on the TEB 8 departure from Runway 24. Runway 1 had been the expected runway for departure but had been changed to Runway 24 just prior to departure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 92; Flight Crew Type 91

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

I was cruising VFR eastbound along the south shore of Long Island at 3500 MSL; and receiving VFR traffic advisories from New York Approach with a discrete squawk code.  After passing 87N I informed the controller I was descending to 2500 MSL in order to avoid scattered clouds.  I subsequently informed the controller I would be reversing course to return westbound along the south shore; and did not note a change in altitude.I overlooked that my course and 2500 MSL altitude would have me crossing into the FOK Class D; which extends to 2600 MSL over the south shore.  In hindsight; while in two way contact with Approach for flight following I may have relaxed my airspace vigilance.  Upon inadvertently entering the FOK Class D the controller instructed to climb at or above 2600 MSL and to remain clear of FOK.  I then climbed to 2600+ to exit the top of the KFOK Class D.It is unclear to me whether this qualifies as a pilot deviation into the FOK Class D.  I was in two-way communication with the ATC controller responsible for FOK approach; and this controller was made aware of my intended altitude and flight path.  I did not however explicitly inform of intended transit through the FOK Class D and do not know if the approach controller coordinated with FOK tower; who would be the ATC facility 'having jurisdiction'.  It is unclear from the applicable regulations whether the Approach/TRACON controller also qualifies as the ATC facility responsible for the Class D; especially in a VFR advisory context (not IFR or other positive control).  Because of this ambiguity; in the future I will plan to explicitly inform the approach controller in advance of my flight path transiting Class D or C airspace; to either receive acknowledgment or instruction to remain clear.

Pilot reports of advising ATC while under flight following that he was descending to avoid clouds.  While doing so he entered a Class D airspace.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Passengers boarded & travelled from ZZZ to ZZZ1. In ZZZ1; the passengers then boarded a [make/model aircraft] and boarded through the aft with their carry on bags. I saw their bags and let them know they were too big to fit in the overhead bin. Passenger stated they were told to bring them onboard as a carry on. FA A and I were trying to accommodate the bags and were then told by the Gate Agent they were smart bags & since the battery couldn't be removed; the bags would need to come off. The pax were deplaned along with their bags. FA A stated the passengers were with us (along with their bags) on the previous flight. I did not see them board with their bags on the original flight.

Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported passengers were denied boarding due to carry on smart bags with non removable batteries.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Ground Control and also the FLM. Local Control had a C152; who was a first student solo. Local Control also had an RV7; inbound from the northwest. Runway 31 was in use; and at [the airport] the preferred traffic pattern for touch-and-goes is right closed traffic for Runway 31 due to the fly friendly program. Local Control told the pilot of the C152 to extend upwind and Tower would call his crosswind. The pilot did not read the instruction back so Local Control repeated the instruction. The C152 started a right turn and then asked if he could start his crosswind. Local Control tried to get him back to the upwind to follow the RV7 but by this time the C152 was already starting a right downwind. The RV7 was well outside of the C152 also on right downwind. Local Control then told the C152 to fly over the field for a left downwind but instead the C152 started a left turn which put him in proximity to the RV7. Local Control asked the RV7 pilot if he had the C152 in sight and the pilot said that he did. The RV7 maneuvered to avoid the C152. Both the Local Controller and I saw the entire situation and the two aircraft did not appear to be in unsafe proximity to each other. The RV7 continued on a right downwind and the C152 eventually followed. The pilot of the RV7 called the Tower about 10 minutes after he landed and sounded upset. He said that his heart was racing and that he and the C152 were within 'tens of feet' of each other. However; the pilot did not use the words near mid-air or NMAC. I had already called the FBO where the C152 is based; and advised Dispatch of what had happened with the student solo pilot. Because the RV7 pilot had called; I filed an MOR under 'public inquiry.' I recommend to all my ATCs that they not repeat the same instruction but instead; if an instruction doesn't appear to be clear the first time; issue an alternate instruction. In this case; the Local Controller could have said 'fly straight ahead' or 'fly present heading.' The Local Controller could have issued the RV7 traffic and told the C152 to follow the RV; or Local Control could have put the C152 in left closed traffic. The local FBO trains a large number of foreign pilots whose first language is not English. We here at [this airport] deal with this issue every day and have many techniques to help with the problems that arise. However; events like the one I described above are not unusual and may never be able to be eradicated given the combination of English language difficulties and low-time pilots. I do not feel it was a NMAC nor a significant occurrence. [The airport] is a Class Delta airspace and a Level 7 VFR Tower. We have a lot of student training and VFR traffic so this kind of event is not unusual. While I do think Local Control could have handled the event more successfully; that does not mean I believe that the Local Controller did anything wrong or was not in compliance with national or local orders and notices.

Tower Supervisor described a reported NMAC in the traffic pattern when a student pilot with apparent limited English skills failed to extend upwind as instructed and conflicted with traffic entering downwind.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

With new guidelines for wearing mask on position. (With no one around) I am having multiple read back errors. Aircraft X miss read his restriction and frequency. The issue was corrected.When there is no one is close proximity controllers should not be made to wear mask.

Center Controller reported multiple read back errors while wearing a mandated face mask.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On descent for landing right engine began losing oil quantity. Pressure and temp were normal. Quantity eventually went to zero. We were unsure at this point if we had a quantity indication failure or actual loss of oil. I planned a 28 flap landing just in case we would have to shut down the right engine. In the turn to base leg we began to lose oil pressure. Ran the appropriate check list and shut down the right engine. Advised ATC and completed a single engine landing. Cleared the runway after landing and made the appropriate PA while CFR checked us. After the checks were complete; we taxied to the gate.

MD83 pilot reported losing engine oil quantity during descent. The quantity eventually went to zero; but the temperature and pressure remained good until turning base. The pressure then began to drop; the engine was shut down; and a single engine landing ensued.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

An aircraft purchased by the FBO where I instruct was signed off as airworthy by the Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) mechanic/repair station from which it was purchased. This was after an extensive repair and rebuild of the aircraft following a landing accident. The aircraft was represented as airworthy in the aircraft airframe logbook after the repair/rebuild. After the first flight in the aircraft (by another pilot) it was found that the trim control was operating backwards from what is normally expected in this aircraft. There were also several discrepancies found regarding the elevator hinges and horizontal stabilizer that were identified. These discrepancies were remedied by the original A&P mechanic after being notified of them.After those repairs I subsequently flew this aircraft on over 30 separate occasions over a span of 8 months while believing that it was in airworthy condition based on the airframe logbook entries; the repairs made to the original squawks on the trim; elevator hinges; and horizontal stabilizer; and my own preflight inspections. The aircraft was later sent to a different maintenance facility for compliance with a recently issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) as well as having a 100 hour/annual inspection performed. During the course of this annual inspection there were numerous discrepancies found with the aircraft and the previous airframe logbook entries. It was subsequently determined by the maintenance facility that at least part of the aircraft repair/rebuild had not been accomplished properly; had not been documented properly; and was not airworthy. In addition; there were several ADs that were found not having been complied with.I unknowingly had flown; instructed; and allowed students to fly solo in this aircraft when it was not in an airworthy condition. The un-airworthy repair was not visible or discernible during normal preflight inspections and could only be determined by disassembly of the aircraft by a knowledgeable mechanic. I believed at the time that the aircraft had been repaired properly and the airframe logbook entries represented the airworthy state of the aircraft and compliance with ADs.

It was determined by a maintenance facility that at least part of the aircraft repair/rebuild had not been accomplished properly; had not been documented properly; and was not airworthy.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

The plane had MEL for localizer inop and approach mode button inop. We flew to ZZZ as normal but communicated we are unable for ILS and needed the RNAV XXL. We set up and briefed the RNAV approach in accordance with [Company] SOP. We were given a 110 heading to intercept the XXL final approach course. The First Officer selected heading mode and Captain activated the approach on the FMS. First Officer selected NAV mode so it would capture the final approach course. AP then went turn further right than the 110 heading to intercept the course. Captain tells First Officer to return to heading mode at 110 and wait till we are more aligned on final approach course. First Officer complies; but when he rearms NAV we can see that LNAV is boxed and captured. However; the AP/FD remained wings level.Captain starts scanning and cross checking as to why we aren't joining the course properly. Then; Captain takes controls from First Officer via the TCS button to manually turn back on course. As this was happening ATC (ZZZ Approach) tells us to turn left 070 to now join the course learned RNAV XXL. Captain returns controls to First Officer and tells him to not use AP; just hand fly the approach.The MEL 22-XX was for not using the APR mode button; as a crew wrote up the AP/FD behaved erratically when using it. We used NAV mode navigating off of the GPS only and had no issues till using NAV during approach to landing. I believe there is a deeper problem with this plane's automation system. We landed without incident and wrote up the issue in the MX logbook.AP/FD malfunction. We took manual corrective action when we noticed the discrepancy between what the automation said it was going to do vs. what it did do. I; as Captain; should have been quicker correct the automation error.As pilots; I feel we need to be more descriptive in writing up our MX problems. I feel this can help MX fix write ups more effectively; to the deeper root problem as opposed to surface problems.

Air carrier pilot reported AP/FD malfunction which led to them flying through the localizer and having to fly the rest of the approach by hand.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During the climbout passing about 5;500-6;000 FT we noticed the left engine ITT indications were red and over 900 degrees. There were no other visual or audible warnings at this time. I don't even recall seeing the blinking 'HOT' icon. The Captain immediately decreased power but the ITT stayed hot. After several seconds of the left engine being at idle we felt a vibration (no VIB icon); heard grinding; then a pop. At this point the N1 and N2 decreased and the Oil Pressure; 'engine oil'; aural and visual master warnings quickly followed. We just lost and engine and severe damage was suspected. I began running the Immediate Action Items Checklist. I declared an emergency. We leveled off and descended to 5;000 FT and begin getting vectors to return. We shutdown the left engine as directed by the Immediate Action Items Checklist and I began the Single Engine Procedures Checklist. It was very difficult to complete the checklist due to the task saturated; high work load environment. We had to ask for multiple vectors in order to make time to complete necessary items. Captain called Flight Attendant and Flight Control to inform them of situation and emergency air return. The Single Engine Procedures Checklist directed me to turn on HYD 1B ON. I did and the system was fine for several minutes. As we were just about complete with checklists; landing assessment and other duties we received a HYD 1 LO PRESS caution message. The quantity is fine but the pressure was dropping and indications were yellow. I then ran the appropriate QRH procedure for that failure. It had me further increase landing distance and turn off HYD 1B. We were now ready to land. The Captain made a fine landing and we exited the runway and have the Fire Chiefs visually inspect our left engine for possible smoke or fire. We had the all clear and taxied to the gate.I believe the entire crew did an excellent job. The only difference between this event and the simulator is the number of seemingly continuous requests from ATC; Flight Attendant; Captain; etc. I couldn't get through 2 or 3 steps on the checklist with out a legitimate distraction stopping my progress. It is similar in the simulator but the constant chatter isn't there. ATC is very good and professional. They did a great job too. The only thing they are not good at is 'standing by' while we deal with a crisis. The threat was a hot ITT and the crew not noticing it but I'm not sure it would have made a difference. Whatever caused the ITT to go hot eventually caused that engine to blow regardless of throttle position. It wasn't a smooth flame out. It was quite rough with vibrations and other noises.

CRJ200 First Officer describes an engine failure during climbout and the failure of the HYD 1B pump during the return. The event is compared with simulator training with the conclusion that there are far more distractions during the real event.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 112; Flight Crew Total 5030; Flight Crew Type 4102

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

There is ongoing Taxiway construction on A adjacent to the Terminal. The NOTAMs mention closure of the Taxiway but there is no mention of the work on [the] airline ramp. There needs to be a NOTAM to reflect the ramp construction. The construction goes far beyond Taxiway A and there needs to be a NOTAM that if you are parking gates 1; 2; 3; 4; 6; that they should only be accessed via A10; A then A9. I feel this is a grave hazard to our operation.

Air Carrier First Officer reported the NOTAMs for CID airport do not describe the extent of the construction in progress.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 3950; Flight Crew Type 180

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

En-route while climbing IMC through 14;500 feet to my final altitude of 16;000 feet I experienced an electrical failure.  I called ATC; advised them of the failure.  I initially was given a vector to ZZZ; continued my climb; broke out at 15;000 feet.  I leveled off at 15;000 feet VFR on top; and could see that the overcast layer I had been in was turning to a broken layer over ZZZ and beyond.  I performed the emergency checklist and tried unsuccessfully to reset the electrical system.  Upon reaching ZZZ I advised ATC that I would proceed to ZZZ1 because of maintenance facilities there and turned off the electrical system.  I proceeded in that direction for approximately 5-6 minutes and decided that I would return to ZZZ and land.  I turned the radio and transponder back on and advised ATC of decision.  Circling over ZZZ in broken conditions I was advised that I was cleared for a visual approach to land at ZZZ and given a phone number to call after landing.  I performed the before landing checklist; lowered the landing gear; again turned the master off and started my descent.  I descended from 15;000 in VFR conditions through a broken layer.  The bases were at approximately 9;000 feet.  I referenced my iPad that was connected to my Stratus receiver that has inflight weather and determined that it would be VFR all the way to ZZZ2.  I then elected to proceed to ZZZ2 at 8;500 FT which I did.  VFR all the way.  I decided that I would leave the gear down and save the battery for the flaps and not to contact ATC with the aircraft radio.  Enroute to ZZZ2 I tried to contact ATC with my hand held radio and cell phone to no avail.  Within the vicinity of ZZZ using my hand held to communicate with another aircraft that was departing and sequenced myself into the traffic pattern.  I entered the traffic pattern at ZZZ2; lowered the flaps; and landed without incident. Within two minutes of shutting down ATC called me on my cell and advised me they were looking for me and I told them what happened.My pre-flight planning indicated that the forecast weather would be VFR west ward of ZZZ and the actual weather lived up to the forecast. Having a hand held radio; iPad; and Status receiver gave me adequate back up for this situation. I had just done an IPC the week before in my aircraft and was ready for an Electrical Failure in IMC. The previous month I completed a systems course with the Cessna Pilots Association for my aircraft.  That course gave me real insight into how long the battery would last in an Electrical Failure scenario. In retrospect; I should have used the aircraft radio to contact ATC to inform them that I was proceeding to ZZZ2 so they did not initiate a search; but also to alleviate the worry the folks at ATC experienced.

C210 pilot experiences electrical failure while climbing in IMC to 16;000 feet and advises ATC. The climb is stopped at 15;000 feet in VMC and the decision to divert to a VMC airport is made; then changed; then changed again and ATC is advised. A different diversion airport (third choice; 100 NM) is chosen when it is determined that VMC can be maintained but ATC is not advised until after landing.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

During cruise flight; we had a malfunction of the AOA Heater (AOA HEAT FAIL L). We ran the checklist and since we were in clear skies and had over an hour of flight remaining; I decided to call the Company to first see if there would be any icing conditions that we would encounter going into ZZZ; and second if there were icing conditions; what airport would be a good diversion airport since the nature of the malfunction would have made the airport of intended landing dangerous. When discussing the issue with the Chief Pilot and the Dispatcher; we agreed and decided to press on to ZZZ because there was no icing enroute. The Chief Pilot also mentioned that we were good all the way to ZZZ1 (our next destination). I stated that I would call when I got on the ground and contact the Company to deal with the MEL of the AOA Heater and we would discuss going to ZZZ1 at that time. After we landed; I submitted the MEL and discussed the nature of the MEL with Maintenance Control. In the MEL it specifically states in the Operational Procedures; 'Review flight planning to ensure flight is not conducted in icing conditions.' Having been a pilot that was based in ZZZ1 for many years and very experienced with the area I had a hard time believing that I was not going to be encountering any icing in the month of March; during what has turned out to be a very crazy winter. Dispatch stated that there was no known or forecast icing in the ZZZ1 area and that I should be good to go. I disagreed and called the [On Duty Moderator] to discuss the situation further because I believed that I would be encountering icing.  We conferenced in all parties and decided that the flight would not go to ZZZ1 but instead take this aircraft to a nearby airport and swap to another aircraft there to continue the flight to ZZZ1. After a lengthy delay and the plane swap we got the passengers safely to their destination without incident.Life on the road is tough enough when everything goes smoothly. When things fall apart and plans don't come together as we had expected they would; we are forced to make alternate plans and as a team; I think we do a pretty good job. There are times when the pressure of the job and the time critical nature of our business do make people feel pressured to make bad decisions and further putting people into danger and therefore jeopardizing safety. I believe this was one of those times. I felt the pressure from the Company to get the job done; regardless of informing them that in my years of experience with ZZZ1 that icing conditions were to be expected therefore making the flight to ZZZ1 illegal with regard to the MEL limitation on the AOA Heater Fail. I have a chart from NOAA (obtained after the fact) for the date and time clearly displaying that there indeed was reported and expected icing along our route of flight into ZZZ1. Why did the Company not have this information? Why did they not make this information available to me? I can only presume that they did know and that they wanted this flight completed because we were their only option and if we didn't get this flight done; the owner might leave the program. As professionals; we are the last line of safety for the lives that we are responsible for everyday. My job would be easier and less stressful if I didn't have to worry about the Company pressuring me to complete a flight because they are worried about an owner that might leave the program and is fine with me flying an aircraft with a known AOA Heat malfunction into an area of icing.

A Citation X Captain expressed concern over attempts by his company to coerce him into accepting an aircraft with the AOA heater deferred inoperative into what he believed would be icing conditions in order to complete a flight for an already disgruntled fractional owner.  Ultimately a compromise was reached where the crew flew the aircraft to another airport where it was swapped for another without disqualifying maintenance issues.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

ATIS sheet fell through the slot forward of the center pedestal and the blank off plate. We had Maintenance come out to remove it. We discovered 20 other ATIS sheets mixed into the wiring. The aircraft is only six months old. Severe potential fire hazard!

737MAX8 Captain reported a slot in the cockpit center pedestal allowed flight documents to slip through and collect on aircraft wire bundles.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Company Policy; Staffing; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

This morning I had XX aircraft on my desk and all of a sudden the ATC strips were not filing.  I had to then manually file all my flight strips which is a lengthy process with so many aircraft and immediately I was task saturated.  I was able to get a few flights to depart but after I had to call in a ZZZ1 flight; I lost the ability to flight follow since that process takes a longer time than manually filing strips over the internet.The issue we have is everyone was affected and I couldn't ask another Dispatcher for help since they were also having issues and didn't have the free time to look after additional flights along with thunderstorms all over.Having IT issues is nothing new and we need to have faster resolutions and our workload is so high we can easily get over our head in an instant. We need more dispatchers for this shift and we have many dispatchers on furlough that could come in and work and it would help to have someone from IT inside for help.The big issue is our company cares more for the bottom line than for the safety of the thousands of passengers we fly.  I'm very fearful we will have some major incident soon.

Dispatcher reported being overwhelmed with aircraft due to staffing shortages and computer system difficulties.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

As Captain; I was the pilot flying. A 'FIRE CARGO FWD' EICAS message appeared. We followed the QRH checklist. As per my direction; the Relief Pilot; the pilot not flying; called ATC and declared an Emergency. I called back to the crew rest bunk to have the First Officer come back to the cockpit. I elected to divert to ZZZ because it was the closest suitable alternate. The Relief Pilot asked ATC for clearance to the divert airport. I turned the aircraft toward that airport. ATC cleared us to the divert airport. The First Officer came back into the cockpit. We proceeded to the divert airport and landed without further incident. The event occurred just as the Relief Pilot was sitting down from getting our meals. The FIRE CARGO FWD light remained illuminated through the entire event. I contacted Dispatch to inform of the deviation and confirm with her to suitability of the airport as an alternate. The First Officer came back to the cockpit was briefed and became the pilot flying. I then briefed the Purser as to the type of emergency; evacuation possibilities; signal to be used; and time remaining airborne. I made a PA to the passengers that we were diverting and to follow the flight attendant directions. I requested Fire Fighters to meet the aircraft through ATC and Dispatch. We began the decent and briefed the weather; VMC; and the approach. I asked the First Officer and Relief Pilot if they could think of anything that we missed. We continued the approach; ILS 23; and landing; nice; and taxied clear of the runway and stopped on the taxiway so ARFF could look for any signs of fire. There were none! I taxied to the ramp with ARFF in tow; air stairs were brought to the aircraft and the passengers deplaned.

I was taking my crew rest break (3rd) and was called up to address the CARGO FIRE FWD indication that was being displayed on the EICAS. There were no other indications of a fire from the flight attendants or other system synopsis. I did monitor the AIR Synoptic throughout the emergency to monitor the temperature in the cargo areas. The Captain and Relief Pilot had already started the checklist and were approximately halfway through when I arrived. I was briefed on what part of the checklists had been accomplished and where we were planning to divert to. The Captain assigned me to pilot flying because it was my leg and the Relief Pilot and Captain were coordinating with ATC; Dispatch; Maintenance and the flight attendants. The Captain briefed T.E.S.T. with myself and the flight attendants and further explained in more detail what the current situation was and how the evacuation would be changed if the conditions warranted. We were proceeding directly to the closest airport and maintained .84 MACH and remained at a faster that normal speed until reaching the final approach portion of the approach were we slowed to normal speed. The Captain informed the passengers that we were diverting due to a mechanical issue so as not to cause any undue stress on the passengers. We landed without incident. We coordinated with Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters to meet us apron landing in a taxiway were they inspected the cargo areas with inferred sensors. They notified us that there were no indications of heat and cleared us to taxi. We taxied to a hard spot and had coordinated for air-stairs to meet us once parked. The passengers debarked and were led to the terminal where they waited. We spent several hours coordinating with Dispatch and Tracking on our next course of action. We proceeded to the hotel for crew rest and then returned to the airport to ferry the airplane back to our planned destination with the flight attendants. The cargo was removed from the aircraft while we were in crew rest. Flight was uneventful.

A B-777 EICAS alerted CARGO FIRE FWD at cruise; so an emergency was declared; a diversion to a nearby airport begun and the QRH completed followed by an uneventful landing. An actual fire was not detected by Fire Fighters.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Maintenance; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure

We flew the same A321 from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and later from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. When we picked up the aircraft in ZZZ for the XA:00am departure to ZZZ1; the Autobrakes were on MEL. The flight to ZZZ1 was otherwise uneventful; except that when we reached the gate in ZZZ1 (after landing on Runway 23 in ZZZ1); the Right Inboard brake temperature was 545 degrees C (Centigrade) and the Right Outboard was 35 degrees C. Both left Main [Gear tires] were around 290 degrees C.  We notified Maintenance of the discrepancy and were eventually informed this aircraft had been having brake problems for over 10 days; and the Brake Steering Control Unit (BSCU) computers had already been changed.  After the local Maintenance conferred with Maintenmance Control; they decided to bleed the brake system. Having worked on automotive brake systems; I strongly suspected this would be ineffective; since brakes with air in the lines tend to brake weakly; but do brake some. The right outboard temperature (approximately ambient; and verified by Maintenance with a radiant thermometer) indicated the brake was completely ineffective (thus the unusually high brake temperature on the Right inboard; which was compensating for the lack of outboard braking).  However; I acknowledge that I am not a qualified aircraft Mechanic. In addition; as a First Officer (F/O); my ability to influence Maintenance actions are limited to mere verbal influence via discussion with the Maintenance technicians and the C/O; unless I feel I must exercise the 'nuclear option' of declaring my unwillingness to fly in a given situation. The Captain was comfortable with Maintenance's explanations that the bleeding procedure was within the normal responses to this malfunction. I knew that we were taking off and landing in excellent weather and on very long runways; so I elected to accept the aircraft and fly to ZZZ3. On the other hand; I was highly skeptical that the bleeding of the brakes would successfully fix the problem; and told the Captain that I suspected [brake issue] would again appear upon our arrival in ZZZ3. I was surprised; considering the apparent history of this problem; that we weren't given a spare plane and [that] our aircraft was not taken to the Hangar in ZZZ1 to perform in-depth troubleshooting.  Upon arrival in ZZZ3; after landing on very long runways with a strong headwind; our Left Brake temperatures were around 170 degrees C; the left inboard was 320 degrees (deg.) C and the right inboard was again 35 degrees C (it had only changed from that when it dropped to 30 deg. C in ZZZ1 when we ran the brake fans for the high inboard brake temperature). In ZZZ3; the Maintenance technicians told me the plane had been having brake problems for 30-days (rather than the 15 [days] I had been told in ZZZ1). I told them what I had been told in ZZZ1 and our experience with the problem. Eventually; since we were beginning to run out of crew duty day; we were told to take the aircraft that had arrived for the next ZZZ3-ZZZ1 flight; and that [Flight] crew was assigned our very delayed flight; since they had more duty time available. Apparently; this aircraft has somehow been allowed to fly revenue flights for either 15 or 30 days with an existing brake system malfunction. I wonder if the right outboard brake has been inoperative for weeks. While I understand that we do have the brake on the other tire; and it was clearly working hard; it appears to me that no one has recognized that this aircraft needs to be taken out of service and VERIFIABLY FIXED. I believe there is a safety PROCESS problem (perhaps influenced by a culture of operational imperative over safety consciousness) that is reflected in this problem continuing for so long. Believe it or not; brakes are actually a pretty important system on a plane; and had this plane been required to make a maximum performance Rejected Takeoff (RTO) on a wet runway at some point; I would not have been surprised to see it depart the runway; at great risk to the people on board.  Some process needs to be developed (or repaired) to identify recurring major system faults; and to take those aircraft out of service until the plane can be VERIFIED to have been fixed. This is a DIFFICULT challenge; but an IMPORTANT one. It would require effective communication between the maintenance and flight operations departments. However; it may prevent a horrible accident; which none of us want to see again. Flight delay.

Reporter stated from what he remembers; the Autobrakes MEL was a Category 'C' MEL with a ten day repair window. The Brake Steering Control Unit (BSCU) was replaced again and a recent check of the aircraft's history indicates no further problems after several flights.

A pilot reports about an A321 aircraft that somehow had been allowed to fly revenue flights between 15 and 30 days with an existing right-hand Outboard Brake not functioning and the Autobrakes on MEL.  Replacing the Brake Steering Control Unit (BSCU) did not correct the discrepancy; deferral had continued. Concerns also raised about chronic major system faults not being fixed.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared by the ground controller to Taxi to C6 via Taxiway Bravo (eastbound). As we approached Taxiway Papa; there was [another air carrier] who was crossing Runway 25 right; then turned eastbound on Bravo in front of us. We were forced to come to a complete stop on Taxiway Bravo to ensure a good level of clearance between aircraft. The ground controller noticed that we had stopped and thanked us for doing so.I have seen the same thing occur several times in recent months. In all cases; the 'mixup' occurs with aircraft taxiing eastbound on Bravo; and conflicts with aircraft crossing Runway 25 Right at either Tango or Papa.In one case; we were forced to stop on Runway 25R/Papa Taxiway to allow another aircraft that was taxiing east on Bravo who continued to taxi in front of us; thereby blocking 25R for a short period.I am only guessing; but it seems that there may be a communication breakdown between the Tower Controller; and the South side Ground controller.

B737 Captain reported ground conflicts at LAX with aircraft crossing Runway 25 Right at either Tango or Papa.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was at the midfield left downwind; Runway 24 at X07; at pattern altitude. Another aircraft; also involved in flight training; was on left base for the same runway. Student was flying our aircraft. An aircraft which most closely resembled a Long EZ directly overflew the field at about pattern altitude from north to south; making no calls on the radio. The Long EZ's path was a direct intercept with mine. I only noticed the aircraft when it was at our 10 o'clock; 200 FT away; slightly lower in altitude. Intercept angle was about 100 degrees. To avoid collision; I took controls and pitched up and banked slightly left. The reasoning behind the left bank was that if the Long EZ were to pitch up and I had turned right; I would be at further risk of collision. Looking back at the aircraft; I saw no indication that he had taken evasive action. He continued to the south at the same altitude; without any comments on the radio. As an Instructor; care is taken so the student doesn't deviate from assigned paths. This may have reduced my situational awareness enough that my scan was compromised. The knowledge that pilots should not be flying in such a manner gave us a false sense of security about our position - usually it is expected for aircraft to enter from outside the pattern; so efforts toward collision avoidance are more often focused away from the runway. Judging by the path and lack of action of the other aircraft; I think his path was deliberate. He may have been too focused on matters inside the aircraft to notice traffic; or he simply may not have cared. A canopy like that of the Long EZ and similar designs has no visual obstructions forward of the pilot's headrest.

An Instructor pilot took control of the aircraft to take evasive action from a Long EZ aircraft which crossed through the Lake Wales airport traffic pattern at pattern altitude.