Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL

Referencing B777 MEL; flight crew stated their Ipad MEL showed MEL 21-55a for the Trim Air Pressure Regulating Shut-off Valve (PSROV). Placard hard-copy printed from Maintenance computer showed MEL 21-48a for Trim Air PSROV.Flight crew noticed the MEL chapter applied in Logbook didn't correlate with their Ipad MEL. Pilot later noticed effective date in their Ipad MEL was for XB-January 2013; today is still XA-January 2013 (the day before). Also; as the MEL chapter for this issue appears to be changing; we might have an MEL conflict tomorrow with currently applied MELs. Clearly MEL should not be used until 'Effective' date; some sort of notice needs to block usage until the actual date. If MEL numbering does change; does the new MEL reflect the possibility that the numbers might not correlate?

Reporter stated he has been told the Master MEL (MMEL) has been revised that should affect all B777 Operators. He is concerned about MELs issued using the old MEL reference numbers for a specific deferral and Maintenance Procedure (M) that now have a different MEL number and possibly different (M) procedure that may be required to be accomplished prior to departure. If Maintenance performs trouble shooting on an overnight B777 that is on day two; of a five day deferral; and the revised MEL is 'Effective' on day three of the old MEL; which MEL is legal. There is no cross reference for Flight crews or Maintenance to see the original MEL and the new MEL that are applicable for the same item being deferred. Maintenance is basically blind to what happened yesterday in regards to cross referencing of the old and revised MMEL when the changes become 'effective'.Reporter stated there are controls in the Ipad ACROBAT program and reader that would not display the revised MMEL until the actual 'Effective date'. His Air Carrier does not believe the issues raised are a high priority; no actions on his suggestions have been noted. Reporter also noted the B777 uses PSROVs in their Air Conditioning System; not just on the aircraft's engines.

A Line Mechanic reports that flight crews are referring to B777 MEL references on their Ipads that are not yet 'Effective' for items deferred by Maintenance. Concerns also rose about different MEL section reference numbers and different Maintenance (M) procedures between the old and revised Master MEL (MMEL).


Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

Aircraft X came in the gate from the islands; which was about 2 hour turn. While I was following the check card; the nose tire where not at max cold pressure and had the est. at #1 195; and #2 200 psi. The main tires where not reading max cold pressure at or above 205. #1 tire about 195 to 200; #2 reading 190; [and] #3 around at least 200 and for the same with #4 tire at 200. This was checked about a 45-60 minutes after the plane had landed. In this situation it seems to be confusing on what to do? 1. All tire pressures were not at max or higher. 2. The planes are coming to ZZZ to T-1 area for ETOPS (Extended Twin Operations) check and we are seeing more planes with these lower tire pressure issue. We are becoming more alarmed that something is wrong. 3. The tires felt cool; but still consider as a hot tire check. Not passing the 2-hour time limit. 4. The tire pressure gage is within calibration date. 5. To find the taxi weight and tire; find the minimum service pressure? What does that mean to Maintenance? (Reference AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) 12-15-51-780-802 Par. G item 4. A). 6. Please see: AMM task 12-15-51-780-802 hot tire check; AMM task 12-15-51-780-801 tire check and servicing. 7. As the same aircraft is scheduled multiple legs of ETOPS flights in a row with less than two hours for the tires to cool down; it is a violation of the maintenance practice as the AMM states the following: (4) If it is not possible to wait the recommended two hours for the tires to cool down before the airplane is dispatched; you can use this task as an alternative inspection just prior to dispatch. NOTE: The hot tire pressure check procedure is intended for occasional use only. It is not intended to be used as permanent alternative method to performing the more accurate cold tire checks. The more accurate cold tire pressure check method should be used as frequently as possible to avoid possible tire service life problems such as tread losses and carcass ruptures. The question remains; what is the 'intended for occasional use only'? 8. We are concern[ed] [about] what we should be doing here? 9. On this aircraft I brought all pressure up to max cold pressure 208 for the nose and 205 for the main. Are the checks being done right? Like 1svc (Service) / 2svc: ETOPS: phase check so on? Please get back to us on this and understanding the hot tire AMM as well as cold tire pressure. These tires should not be reading that low after landing; normally we would see them around 230+ for the main and about 5 to 10 higher the nose.

Maintenance Technician reports that 737-800 tire pressures are reading low after landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

After landing at ZZZ Ground Control directed us to wait on taxiway B short of Q1; then turn and stop on taxiway A to wait for our gate. While stopped at the Taxiway A location pointing east; with throttles in idle thrust awaiting our gate to open; a loosely wadded roll of clear plastic approximately 15 feet in width and 3 feet in diameter driven by the wind tumbled and rolled (reported surface winds were 290/19) toward the aircraft from our 1 o'clock position across our nose (about 50 feet in front of the nose) toward the left wing. As it passed in front of the aircraft nose; I asked the Captain; 'Does it look like that FOD will go in the engine?' Radio chatter prevented a timely verbal reply; and seconds later; as the Captain turned his head to look at the left engine nacelle; the number 1 engine (left nacelle) shuddered and stopped with an amber 'engine fail' indication on the center display panel. The Captain remarked that the plastic had just entered the engine intake. The Captain then directed me to cut off the number one engine after transferring the electrical bus to the APU; which was already running. No fire warnings or high EGT indications happened. The engine shuddered and stopped abruptly. While we were executing the engine failure checklist in the QRH; a regional jet behind us reported small flames at the bottom back section of our left engine on Ground Control radio frequency. We then coordinated with responding fire department; maintenance; operations; and ground control to 1) verify the fire was out; 2) that the jet was safe to move to the gate; and 3) that no evacuation was needed. After getting the needed approval by the fire department and maintenance representatives; we then taxied into parking and deplaned the passengers without further incident. We also pointed out other multiple similar pieces of nearby drifting rubbish to field operations personnel and request that they clean them up before they created another similar hazard.

B737 First Officer reported the left engine shut down abruptly after ingesting a large piece of plastic FOD while waiting for their gate on a taxiway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Total 16389; Flight Crew Type 6478

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 13210; Flight Crew Type 330

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

At cruise flight about an hour from coast out the First Officer and I were attempting to correct an excessive and chronic cabin heating problem when we lost control of the cabin pressure. The cabin altitude began a two thousand FPM climb which we could not arrest. We donned oxygen masks and accomplished the CABIN ALTITUDE/EMERGENCY DESCENT checklist. We requested and received clearance to descend to 10;000 FT. While in the descent the cabin altitude reached approximately 13;000 FT. After leveling off we were able to pressurize the cabin to about 2;000 FT and made the decision to return to our departure airport. The cabin altitude was above 10;000 FT for only a few minutes and the passenger oxygen masks never deployed. We decided to land overweight due no dump capability and another hour aloft was needed to burn down to maximum landing weight. Lead Flight Attendant did not report any anomalies in the cabin and no passenger issues. After landing and debriefing Maintenance; we discovered the aircraft had had a pressurization problem four days earlier.

After landing; we experienced ice chunks and water coming out of the vents. Talking to Maintenance; we found out that the aircraft had a pressurization problem four days earlier.

Following the loss of cabin pressurization a B757 flight crew initiated an emergency descent; declared and emergency and returned to their departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33.6; Flight Crew Total 136.6

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The purpose of the flight was IFR training.  I was the safety pilot for the flight; this flight was to be done under VFR and flight following.  Once we were established in the cruise portion of the flight; we decided to contact Center for flight following; and radar services were established.  A few minutes passed and the Controller came back on frequency to announce our Mode-C transponder was not coming through and asked us to recycle and report our present altitude.  I responded to the request but the Controller never acknowledged and repeated his request.  We tried to responded but it seemed we had lost the ability to transmit.  We proceeded to squawk 7600 and decided to turn back.  Shortly thereafter we realized that our entire electrical system was becoming inoperative.  It was getting quite dark and we were unable to turn the pilot controlled lighting on at the airport or have our own aircraft lighting on.  As a flight crew we decided to have the other pilot fly the aircraft and prepare for the no-flap landing.  I continued to try the radios (we were still receiving very limited electrical power) and to scan for other traffic.  We continued toward the airport; I did not see any other traffic in the vicinity of the airport and we elected to land on Runway 27; the shorter runway but more favorable with the winds.  We entered the left downwind of the runway and proceeded to land with no light or flaps without further incident.  Once on the ground I proceeded to call the ARTCC and informed them of our situation and why we could not communicate with them and to cancel our flight following.  This was our first major incident in our flying careers.  Once on the ground I realized we did not run through the emergency checklist.  The ammeter neither showed a charge or a discharge of the battery; so we assumed it was a faulty wiring or a short in the system; since before the flight the landing light was replaced.  Throughout the flight I felt we maintained good situational awareness and had good crew resource management.  We never became flustered and had a cool head.  Positive control of the aircraft was maintained throughout the flight.

C172 safety pilot describes the loss of electrical power during a VFR instrument training flight using flight following.  The two pilots return to their departure airport without exterior lighting and land flaps up on an unlighted runway.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The reason for this report is to highlight my concern about personnel who are not active working crew members on a flight (Jumpseater's); who take it upon themselves to arm and disarm aircraft doors. This is the second time I have personally had this situation happen; I have also witnessed it happening to fellow working crew members.My intent in writing this letter is to bring to the attention of the company and the FAA; an action that should be discouraged and discontinued due to its ability to impact the safety and security of an armed aircraft door. I believe that there still remains an ingrained cultural difference between the training of premerger flight attendants; in the proper procedure for aircraft door arming. I think a note or bulletin needs to be sent out to each and every flight attendant explaining proper procedures so that complacency does not breed an opportunity for a fatal outcome.

Flight Attendant laments the arming and disarming of entry doors by flight attendants that are not part of the working crew; in order to be helpful. He believes this practice may have been encouraged by the other merger partner.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 250

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

After filing IFR; I got an email (Foreflight) stating 'Expected Route Received' of 'BFI TAOMA J5 SUMMA J54 BKE BYI BEARR5 ZZZ. BFI clearance delivery gave me a verbal clearance of NRVNA1 TAOMA fly 135; climb via SID. The SID has a climb limit of 2;000 feet. Tower cleared me for takeoff and (I believe)135 heading. After takeoff; I checked in with Seattle Departure and a few seconds later; they asked me what my heading was. I replied 135 then direct NRVNA which is what the SID says. They asked me again and now I was SURE I was not doing what I was supposed to be doing. They gave me a 30deg LEFT turn followed shortly by a climb; so I believe I flew farther to the west than what they expected of me. I am still confused by what I would term a sort of 'hybrid' clearance. Was I cleared to fly the NRVNA SID or was I supposed to maintain 135 deg heading until further notice. It was the combination of 'fly 135' and 'climb via SID' that seemed contradictory. I should have been more forceful in querying the controller; but the freq was very busy. A simple solution; in my opinion; would have been for Tower to say 'Fly 135; climb and maintain 2;000 feet; cleared for takeoff'. Then it would have been clear to me that the NRVNA SID was not expected right after takeoff.

Pilot reported a heading deviation after takeoff that was caused by confusing pre-takeoff clearance instructions.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Soon after takeoff a strong odor filled the cabin. Smelled of exhaust and dirty wet carpet or boots/socks. Passengers were complaining about the odor asking what it was. The A Flight Attendant (FA) notified the flight deck; I went to sit next to her at the forward jump seat. Dissipated after 5-10 minutes. Captain decided to return to ZZZ and made an announcement to inform the passengers that we were doing so. While descending and returning; odor/fumes returned. Was very strong in the mid cabin area where I was seated as the C FA at the 2R door near row 9. My nose burned and started running.

Airbus A320 series Flight Attendant reported their flight returned to departure airport after a strong odor filled the cabin.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Had a small fuel imbalance. Decided to cross feed #1 engine from #2 tank. I recollect thinking I need to set a timer - but I forgot to. The #2 tank got depleted and #1 engine lost power. As soon as I realized that I had lost power; I realized what had happened. I switched both engines to tank #1; restored power; and regained lost altitude and resumed track. #1 engine took 15-30 seconds to restore power; though #2 engine regained power immediately. I had to restore fuel flow to #1 engine by using the electric boost pump.As I lost altitude earlier; and deviated from heading; ATC queried my deviation; and I told them I needed to descend and they could vector me as necessary. I did not want to lose airspeed by trying to climb on single engine. An air restart would be easier if the engine was wind milling.Error was in using cross feed in a situation where the cross feeding was not essential to safety of flight; then not setting a reminder to remove cross feed; and subsequently causing fuel starvation.

BE58 pilot reported mismanagement of fuel crossfeed resulted in a loss of power and an altitude excursion until power was restored.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Captain requested our one and only restroom break prior to starting our descent into Denver which was delayed because of passenger use of the forward lavatory. The Captain left the cockpit followed by myself. I came back to cockpit from restroom break and while I was gone we had received a clearance to cross TOMSN Intersection at FL190 and speed 250 KTS. I believe we had previously received a clearance to descend to FL250 and the autopilot was in ALT HOLD so VNAV was not engaged. [Neither] the Captain nor I noticed this condition and so the descent did not occur with the autoflight. Scheduling had sent an ACARS message right at the time of my bathroom break and the Captain was involved in the reassignment from Crew Scheduling that turned our scheduled one leg day into a multi leg 8 hour flying time day with approximately 13 hours of duty. I had started my day very early to make a commute; so the reassignment was unacceptable and created stress and tension in the cockpit where our focus on flying the plane was compromised as we reviewed the ACARS message from Crew Scheduling. The Captain then realized that he had not started the descent in time to make the assigned altitude and speed crossing restriction. I asked the Controller if we could get relief on the altitude crossing restriction and he said to do the best we can and that we could delete the speed. We missed the crossing altitude by approximately 2;000 FT. No apparent traffic conflict. The timing of the message from Crew Scheduling coincided with our descent into Denver and the assigned crossing assignment which was the triggering factor. Also; the delayed restroom break contributed to my being out of the cockpit during the initial descent from cruise altitude and then the assigned crossing at TOMSN.

The flight crew did not begin the descent at the appropriate point due to distraction. The distraction occurred due to a late lavatory visit and an untimely ACARS message in regard to crew schedule change.


Enroute; three hours into flight at FL360; we noticed the rudder trim  was slightly out of balance. When we attempted to trim the rudder; we found the rudder trim knob was frozen and would not move.  We very carefully moved the rudder pedals to confirm the rudders were still functional and found they were.  We notified maintenance of the issue and continued on to destination without declaring an emergency; since all primary flight controls were working normally.  The crosswinds were less than 3 knots.  The approach and landing were uneventful.  After landing and clearing the runways; we again attempted to move the rudder trim knob and found it still frozen.  At block-in we tried the knob once more just before shutting down and found the knob was functioning normally.  We wrote a maintenance discrepancy and debriefed with maintenance personnel in the cockpit after shutdown.  We also included in the maintenance write-up that the First Officer observed a significant amount of water draining from the airframe during his exterior pre-flight.  Suspected cause is ice buildup but is not confirmed.

The reporter did not remain with the aircraft after the incident and does not know if there were any maintenance findings.  A thunderstorm had passed over the field just prior to departure and a great deal of water was running of the air frame; in addition heavy rain was encountered during departure.

MD11 flight crew experiences frozen rudder trim at FL360.  Flight continues to destination for a normal landing with rudder trim still frozen.  Just prior to engine shut down the trim is found to be free.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was going to ZZZ via uncommon routing to avoid weather. The aircraft was filed ZZZ direct. The aircraft flew through the ZZZ1 arrival corridor. The aircraft entered within the correct altitude parameters; but exited the corridor 1;000 MSL above without a pointout to the ZZZ sector/XX. I believe the event happened because at the time I was taking Approach Control airspace with detailed info being passed to me and my attention was brought elsewhere. Another contributing factor would be the Controller on 3 months off prior and out of practice with normal procedures.I recommend that there be more training on assuming Approach Control airspace for individuals who do not work mid-shifts. We do not normally have to take over the approach controls until later at night; but with the pandemic we've been assuming airspace sooner in the day. More information for those that aren't familiar with normal procedures may be helpful.

Center Controller reported an airspace violation and cited having to take approach control's airspace as a contributing factor.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Other Person

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Manuals; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft Y was on final for Runway 10R (our south runway); talking to Local Control 2. I had Aircraft X with a westbound transition request to follow the Columbia River; opposite direction to our Runway 10L/R arrivals. Aircraft X's request is a routine request that usually occurs at 800 feet. On this day; the Pearson Airport; which is three miles west of PDX; right under our final; was unusually busy. I told Aircraft X that he either needed to divert to the north of Pearson for all that traffic; or climb above it. He elected to climb to 1100 feet for the westbound transition. When Aircraft X was approximately two miles west of PDX; I gave him the Aircraft Y traffic; who was now inside a 4 mile final for Runway 10R. He said he was looking. I immediately went back to him and told him to turn right 30 degrees for traffic (my concern in a more severe northerly turn; is that it would put him right on all this Pearson traffic). Aircraft X immediately came back to me and told me that he had Aircraft Y in sight. I told him to remain north of that traffic and to maintain visual separation. On the other side at local issued the Aircraft X traffic to Aircraft Y and told him that he was maintaining visual separation. Aircraft Y said he was responding to an RA and that Aircraft X was 'way too close.'This event is being brought to our attention because the region quality control staff (not the pilot) decided to file an NMAC. While this situation was not ideal; traffic advisories and visual separation had been successful. I followed the parameters of the 7110.65. I'd recommend that the region contact the pilot of Aircraft X and review the 'safe distance' to another aircraft while applying visual separation.

PDX Tower Controller reported instructing a VFR pilot to maintain visual separation from an arriving aircraft on approach. The pilot acknowledged the instruction; but the resulting conflict was logged as an NMAC.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Rejected takeoff at 80 knots due to CAWS 'Headwind Shear' Warning.  Winds were reported as 190/27 G 35. Gusty wind conditions resulted in receiving a CAWS 'Headwind Shear' warning at 80 KIAS.

Reported wind was 190/25 gusting 35. First Officer (FO) was pilot flying. On takeoff roll; shortly after the 80 knot call; we were given a windshear alert. Captain called a reject and we transferred controls. We taxied clear and ran through the rejected takeoff checklist. Upon completion of the checklist and after checking that brake temps were satisfactory for another takeoff attempt; Capt directed me to enter a windshear profile into the takeoff data. He also became the pilot flying. We then departed the field with no further incident.

Flight crew reports rejecting a takeoff at 80 knots due to CAWS 'Headwind Shear' Warning. The next takeoff is uneventful.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 4350; Flight Crew Type 5

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Intending to practice wheel landings on the grass runway; I entered left traffic to Runway XXL. The CTAF frequency was somewhat busy; with 3 helicopters practicing on the north part of the field; and 2 or 3 fixed-wing aircraft in the pattern for Runway YY. Winds were 050 at 10+ knots and I was surprised to find traffic on 31. It was light enough that I thought I could work in some Runway XXL patterns; so I continued on the downwind. From the downwind; I noticed 2 mowers on the west part of Runway XXL and began to plan for the possibility they would not vacate the rwy.Just after I called my base turn; with the addition of 'stop & go' to account for a brief stop (10 seconds or less) before my planned continuation; an aircraft called that he was taking Runway YY for departure. I intended to make a CTAF call to ensure deconfliction; but just then a long discussion between two helicopters ate up all the radio time. At this point I was dividing my attention between the approach end of Runway YY and the mowers on Runway XXL. I was unable to confidently determine the position and actions of the departing Runway YY traffic and assumed the worst; that a conflict was developing.One mower vacated; but the intentions of the other were unclear. I prepared for a possible go-around and tried to pick up the Runway YY traffic. On short final; uncertain of the intentions of the remaining mower and uncertain whether I could stop short of the Runway XXL-YY intersection should the need arise; I began a go-around. A helicopter made an alarmed call to the effect that 'there are two of you taking off' at which point I picked up the Runway YY departure at my right 2-o'clock for 2000 feet at about 100 ft AGL on climb out. I transmitted that I would stay low and leveled off at 20-30ft AGL. I maintained the visual and ensured separation as I flew more or less directly underneath the departing aircraft. My best guess is that he was at 200-300 ft AGL when our paths crossed.In hindsight; with a busy frequency and intersecting runways; the presence of the mowers made my pattern to Runway XXL unadvisable; since it had the potential to reduce my options. I could have waited for a break in the traffic or come back another day. I also wonder if my stop & go call caused the Runway YY departure to assume I was LAHSO. I was hoping to clear this up on 1 mile final when the radio congestion made it impossible. My go-around decision was also late. I could have discontinued the approach much earlier and altered my flight path to eliminate the potential for a close pass.

Cessna pilot attempting to use an intersecting grass runway to practice wheel landings discovers mowers on the runway and other fixed wing traffic using the paved intersecting runway. On short final with one mower still on the runway and unseen traffic departing on the intersecting runway; the reporter elected to go around resulting in a NMAC as he flies under the departing traffic.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Landing at LAX; Runway 24R. We had a firm landing. I felt no need to enter anything in the aircraft log. No masks dropped. It was just a firm touchdown. Entered wake turbulence at about 40 ft AGL. Found out from my First Officer who was greeting passengers after flight that a male passenger complained of an injury due to landing. It's an everyday occurrence. Talk and plan.

A321 Captain reported a passenger complained of an injury following wake turbulence during landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 8874; Flight Crew Type 8874

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Weather; Manuals; Aircraft; Company Policy

In the interest of safety; I refused an aircraft for an inoperative APU. Terrain considerations as well as being a night flight were the primary safety considerations. Having both a backup electric and pneumatic source was my primary concern in obtaining an A/C with an operable APU. After the required consultation with dispatch as well as Maintenance; I was dispatched a different aircraft which was more than safe and acceptable for our flight. Another consideration in my decision making was the possibility of leaving the aircraft overnight at an airport under possible extreme cold weather conditions under -15 degree C. I did not want to leave an aircraft under those conditions overnight without an inoperable APU and possibly pose a problem for the outbound crew the next morning. On a positive note; now having the ability to access maintenance information for any aircraft at any time via [software] is PRICELESS. An extremely useful functionality that I've greatly advocated to be returned to us. Dispatched thanked me immensely for the early notification in plenty of time as not to incur any delay due to a shorter notice refusal. On a highly negative note; this aircraft should never have been dispatched that night in my opinion for the reasons stated above. The company has to do a much better job of not setting up crews and ultimately themselves for failure. The operation could have been negatively affected the following day simply because parties allowed a non-APU aircraft to be dispatched to and stay overnight at an extreme cold weather station.

A320 Captain reported that they refused an aircraft due to an inoperable APU.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the boarding of [Aircraft X] ZZZ - ZZZ1; I noticed a message on [Software] from the gate agent to station operations to inform the ramp personnel that there was a 'motorized wheelchair' on the jet bridge to be loaded onto the aircraft. I made a note to make sure we were provided notification of the wheel chair and when it did not come through the automated weight and balance data I asked the ramp lead. He just told me that it was 'very light' so he scanned it as a normal bag. I asked him if it was electric and if it had a battery and he said he did not know. He did not understand why I needed to know so after explaining that it was Dangerous Goods and required notification; he went to check it. I decided to go down with him to the cargo bin to make sure he knew what we needed. When he went in the cargo bin there was not a belt loader available so I was not able to also get in; and it was surrounded by bags so I was not able to see the base of it myself. He looked for several minutes; then informed me that it was 'not electric' and had 'no battery or electric parts' at all. I clarified this with him multiple times; both while standing at the cargo bin and also over the headset in the cockpit. After the flight was complete; we saw the agents in ZZZ1 unload it and the passenger get on it. I asked her if it was motorized and she said that it was. I asked her what type of battery it had and she said it was lithium ion and it was removable. She also showed me exactly where the battery was and how it could be removed. She also said that someone; it was unclear who and whether or not it was a [Company] employee; told her not to 'give too much information' during her check in process or she might have trouble flying with it. She couldn't remember if she had told the agent if it was a lithium ion battery. Regardless; multiple employees should have been able to figure out along the chain that it was motorized somehow; which meant it had to be electric.The cause was the ramp's misunderstanding of our DG (Dangerous Goods) policies and not being able to identify DG loaded on the aircraft; as well as possibly the passenger not reporting it as DG during check in.This is now the second time I have had an undeclared lithium ion wheelchair carried in the cargo bin in the past year and a half; which is indicative that this may be a larger issue than just one single missed item. Also; given that the ramp lead had no idea that electric wheelchair batteries had to be declared; it is impossible to know how many other events have happened where we simply didn't see the passenger after the flight.

Air carrier Captain reported undocumented transport of Lithium Ion battery powered wheelchair.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 21500; Flight Crew Type 3500

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Ten minutes prior to departure the tug slammed the aircraft violently backward to the point I thought we had been in a severe car accident!! After recovering from the trauma I went down to see if any one was hurt in the tug. I was told it was a runaway tug. We inspected aircraft for damage. A company Maintenance Supervisor told me it was no big deal. I told him I begged to differ as I felt whiplash from the violent slamming. I also took video with my cell phone to give to my attorney to show how far off the mark we were pushed [by the impact]. I also contacted the Duty Manager as I was concerned about possible injuries to passengers; none have been reported to me at this time. We got an inspection done by Maintenance and continued on to destination.It amazes me the way our management is so cavalier in their approach to other employees' safety. This was a violent crash and to be told by a 'supervisor' who was not even on board that it was no big deal reminds me of the fact that safety at [our reorganized company] takes a back seat!

While the reporter/Captain was in the cockpit preparing the A319 for departure; the aircraft was struck violently by a 'runaway tug.' A Maintenance Manager declared the event to have been 'no big deal' although he was not present when it occured. The reporter disagreed and had a maintenance inspection performed prior to accepting the aircraft for a revenue flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 875; Flight Crew Type 725

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

In preparation for a brief flight from VNY; I requested an IFR Tower Enroute clearance. Conditions at VNY were VFR; but SMO was IFR with a 1000 foot ceiling and limited visibility due to fog and haze. Thus the need for the IFR clearance.According to my notes; I was given the following clearance by VNY clearance delivery:'Cleared to the Santa Monica airport via the ADAMM ONE departure; VNY 095 radial; DARTS; Direct. Climb and maintain 4000; expect 5000 in ten minutes. Comply with the Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP); except for the altitude restrictions.'After repeating the clearance; I referenced my charts. The relevant portion of the ODP states the following: 'climbing left turn on heading 050 and VNY-095 to DARTS.'  However; the ADAMM ONE procedure states: 'climbing left turn heading 110; then expect radar vectors to VNY-095.'Because the ground controller emphasized that I should follow the ODP; I made the assumption that ATC expected me to follow the directional guidance provided by the ODP; and thus after departure began my left turn; passed through a heading of 110; intending to stop my left turn at 050. Unfortunately; this was apparently not what was expected of me; and as a result; I began to head for the BUR final approach course; which was in use by an air carrier. The Burbank sector controller immediately directed me to turn right to a heading of 180 to avoid a separation error; and I immediately complied.In retrospect; while on the ground at VNY; I should have clarified any confusion I might have had with the conflict between the SID and ODP with the clearance controller. I was about to enter very busy airspace on a day in which flight conditions had repeatedly changed between VFR and IFR. I was stressed; and I could tell that the controllers involved in this incident were stressed as well due to the workload; traffic; and conditions. In this case I should have swallowed my pride and; rather than trying to appear 'professional'; admitted my confusion and asked for clarification on the ground.

Pilot reports of confusion after receiving his clearance from VNY ATCT. He is given a SID and also told to comply with the Obstacle Departure Procedure. Pilot departs and controller directs his flight to another direction away from the Burbank final.


Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

On the ILS in IMC with flaps 3 and gear down at 160 knots assigned; I encountered significant speed fluctuations and sheets of rain. The Pilot Monitoring and I got very focused on airspeed; course and path; particularly speed. We called the final approach fix; checked the altimeters and set the missed approach altitude; but I failed to call for flaps 5 or the Before Landing Checklist. We saw the runway at around 1300 feet. I did not note the failure of the pilot monitoring to call 'thousand; stabilized; cleared to land.' We continued below 500 feet with flaps set at 3. Starting at around 150 feet; we got several terrain warnings; an altitude warning and a finally a flap warning. I visually confirmed that we were not below glidepath and that there was no terrain conflict. During the warnings; the Captain took the controls. As we were touching down; the flap warning registered with me; I realized that we were misconfigured and I selected flaps 5. The central cause for me was channelized attention and tunnel vision. In the conditions; I focused insufficiently on calling for flaps 5; and the Before Landing Checklist and failed to notice the absence of a 1000 foot call. When the terrain and altitude warnings sounded I focused initially on terrain and glidepath and did not think to check the flap configuration until after the flap warning sounded. Because I misinterpreted the early warnings; I did not discover the flap problem until it was too late for me to timely call for a rejected landing. Never focus so completely on one element of the flight that other elements are ignored for extended periods of time. Redouble an emphasis on standard procedure so that no flow items or checklists are missed.

An Air Carrier pilot reported receiving a GPWS warning on short final then realized it was due to incorrect flap configuration.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were number two for departure; Runway 31L. We were following a Boeing 767. I instructed my First Officer (FO) to ask for separation behind the 'Heavy departing in front of us'. The Controller seemed to be confused/annoyed over our initial and subsequent requests. I then asked 'what is standard separation behind a Heavy?' The response was 'behind a B767 it's 3.5 miles.' My recollection of [Company] Flight Manual...was five miles. Not wanting to start and argument with the Controller...we accepted takeoff clearance and departed when I; as the Pilot in Command; deemed it safe to do so. After departing and level at cruise altitude; I referenced [Company] flight manual. According to AIM 7-3-9; separation between a Large...and a Heavy is five miles. The following day I called JFK Tower hoping to speak with a Tower Supervisor who was unavailable at the time. I did speak with the Controller who answered the phone and was informed that the Controller we dealt with was; in fact; in compliance with 7110.659 which allows Tower Controllers to reduce wake turbulence separation between certain aircraft. This information is not contained in our operating manual. During our conversation the Controller informed me that 7110.659 was initially implemented at certain airports with the intent of making it effective at all airports which; to his knowledge; had not yet been done.... It raises the question in my mind; is the purpose of 7110.659 to help facilitate traffic flow at the expense of safe wake turbulence separation? Wake turbulence events have been significantly reduced over the years as a result of wake turbulence separation which was initially measured in minutes but reduced to miles (radar separation) and apparently; under this new program; has now been further reduced. Is 7110.659 safe; or just more conducive/accommodating to high traffic airports? Update operating manual to reflect 7110.659.

Air Carrier Captain questioned the safety of implementing Wake Turbulence Recategorization separation standards at JFK and other major airports.


Flight Crew Total 8972; Flight Crew Type 1629

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14721; Flight Crew Type 10589

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During climb off 16R (RJAA) on the Cupid departure we were initially assigned 9;000 feet per departure control. We got a clearance direct Cupid intersection and climb to 10;000 feet which was read back. I reported 'out of 9;000 for 10;000' because I noticed traffic on the TCAS opposite direction at 10;000. ATC responded with a clearance to maintain 9;000 feet and turn right immediately to Hdg 180. The First Officer (PF) complied however we reached 9;400 feet before returning to 9;000. We did get a TA but not a RA and with the traffic in sight; there was no near miss as some passengers and flight attendants believed.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight crew of a widebody transport cleared to a conflicting altitude during departure from RJAA resulting in a TA alert. Crew complied with a new cleared altitude and thus cleared the conflict.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 691; Flight Crew Type 388

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 194

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was acting as CFI on a flight Review Flight for a certified Private Pilot with an Instrument rating. [The pilot] was acting as PIC for the whole flight and operating radios. As CFI I was having him perform required tasks for a flight review and to get him current. Upon returning to ZZZ our point of departure PIC unintentionally performed touch and go on 28R when Tower had cleared him to land on 28L. Both PIC and CFI were shocked that somehow we had missed the correct clearance. Upon landing PIC called [the Tower] and gave his name and phone number. I; as CFI; proceeded to research the situation further by pulling up the ATC recording to determine where miscommunication happened; that led to a possible pilot deviation under my supervision. Initial Call by PIC - [pilot] requests landing with information. Initial Tower Response - make straight in 28R. I inform PIC to correct his call and asked him to request touch and goes. PIC requested touch and goes. No initial response from Tower due to traffic load. Minute later Tower asked; 'who asked for touch and goes?' PIC responds [with abbreviated tail number]. No immediate response from the Tower. Eventually; Tower responds with a clearance for [a similar abbreviated call sign] #2 Cleared touch and Go 28R. PIC flying responds #2 Cleared touch and go 28R. An incorrect call by PIC responding to a clearance for a similar sounding tail number. As CFI I did not hear the initial call sign only the [letter]. There was no correction by the Tower that PIC read back wrong clearance for a similar sounding tail number. PIC proceeds to line up for touch and go on 28R.On short final Tower gives clearance [with full call sign to] make short final cleared to Land 28L. PIC responds Cleared to land. As CFI I did not hear the Tower give 28L due to congested and blocked communication. The student gave incomplete clearance read back without runway assignment. Tower did not respond to correct and requesting full clearance read back. PIC continued to perform touch and go on 28R upon turning right crosswind to downwind; Tower told PIC that next time he did a go-around he needed to communicate his intentions. It was apparent Tower was unaware of landing on the wrong runway or where we were until on right downwind for 28R. Upon the confusion; CFI took the radio and asked Tower to clarify clearance. Tower confirmed clearance was to land on 28L. PIC received clearance to land on 28R; upon which was given a number for the Tower due to the possible pilot deviation. What I believe caused this possible deviation? Multiple errors by PIC; CFI; and Tower. Due to heavy congested airspace; radio communications; and incomplete and wrong radio calls that went uncorrected by Tower. Errors by Pilot: Reading Back incorrect and incomplete clearances. Not asking for clarification when airspace and radio were busy. Errors by CFI: Failure to ask Tower for clarification for clearance amidst busy and congested pattern and radio communications. As CFI my attention was outside the aircraft scanning for traffic which took my attention away from clearly hearing the communications when my student made incorrect and wrong readbacks. Errors by Tower: Initial clearance was given for straight in 28R. According to ATC recordings; next to actual clearance that was given when we were already lined up short final 28R. This clearance was given late and appeared Tower had lost [the aircraft] amidst busy pattern. Tower also failed to correct PIC's wrong clearance for #2 Cleared to land 28R miles earlier; and failure to have PIC read back full clearance with runway number. The problem was a miscommunication and misunderstanding of clearance between PIC; CFI; and Tower due to task saturation; busy airspace; and busy communications. What will be done to correct the situation. As the CFI I will take more diligence to maintain a sterile cockpit when providing instruction to clarify clearances when thereis any doubt or miscommunication. When airspace and communications are busy I will use extreme caution and take extra time to listen to clearances even when flying with certified pilots. I will provide my student further instruction concerning Radio Communications and Clearances; Airport Operations; Runway Incursions; Traffic Avoidance. As to the Tower. Often ZZZ gets extremely busy with 2 parallel runways in use. Many of the flights in and out of ZZZ are due to flight instruction. As a result communication with Tower becomes extremely difficult; with calls often being missed; stepped on; and miscommunicated. It has been a procedure by ZZZ Tower to split the two runways on different frequencies. In my opinion; the split of frequencies should have occurred when a single Tower operator started missing calls. Upon our downwind leg for final landing on 28R the Tower then decided to split the runway frequencies. If this had been done earlier it would have been easier for PIC; CFI; and Tower to communicate and clarify the correct clearance.

C172 flight instructor and pilot reported performing touch and go landing on one runway when clearance had been a full stop landing on a different runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 177; Flight Crew Type 915

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

The previous week I flew the same [JFUND2] arrival into BOS. The aircraft should cross SEETS intersection at or above FL210. Last week it did not level off as it should have. We had to intervene and manually stop the airplane from descending. We did not have an altitude deviation. Fast forward to today and I am now doing the exact same arrival in a different airplane. This time I am watching intently to see if the aircraft levels as it should. NOPE!!!!! Three miles before SEETS the aircraft was diving below FL210. We were correctly all set up with the airplane in NAV and DES and on glide path. Without aggressively grabbing the airplane and leveling off it would have blown through FL210 by at least 1000 feet; if not more. For the second time; I had to grab the airplane and manually stop it from descending to avoid a major altitude deviation. I believe there is a problem somewhere in the database. It correctly shows on the navigation display and matches with the chart; however the airplane descends as if unaware of an altitude restriction.

A320 Captain reported the aircraft failed to initiate a proper level off  while on the JFUND2 arrival to BOS. Captain stated this is a reoccuring type of event.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I had just taken control of the sector and issued a vector for spacing to Aircraft X flight for spacing. We were currently providing 20 miles in trail (MIT) to ORD and the ultra-high sector had a faster aircraft I was going to follow. I issued Aircraft X a 20 degree left turn. We started with 0 MIT trying to get to 20 MIT. I was watching an aircraft descend out of sector 31 from 37000 feet to 33000 feet. I had taken another aircraft from sector 30 heading southeast bound at 35000 feet. Sector 31 was going to miss my traffic at 35000 feet and Aircraft X at 36000 feet. I then noticed close to my boundary Aircraft Y at 36000 feet in conflict with Aircraft X I had on a vector for spacing. I took the hand off and placed a heading of 180 in the data block. I called sector 94 to coordinate a turn to a heading of 180 for Aircraft Y. The controller at sector 94 was speaking over my coordination at first advising me to descend my Aircraft X aircraft to 35000 feet. I advised Sector 94 I was unable due to traffic at 35000 feet and to place Aircraft Y on a heading of 180. The Sector 94 controller said OK. They asked me why I had Aircraft X on a vector and was it for spacing. I advised yes. He told me to not worry about the spacing and told me to place Aircraft X flight on a 360 heading and descend to 35000 feet; that he had traffic at 36000 feet for Aircraft X. I advised OK.I could not safely issue the vector or descent until Aircraft Y was turned to the 180 heading. Aircraft Y was still not on my frequency and still no turn. The aircraft were still on unsafe headings and still about to lose separation. I issued a heading to Aircraft X to a heading of 270 to prevent a near collision. Still no Aircraft Y turn or communication. Finally Aircraft Y checked on. No turn was noticed and I asked him if he was on an assigned heading. Aircraft Y advised no; so I issued an immediate left turn to heading 180 and Aircraft Y complied. The action kept both aircraft out of conflict. I then entered FL350 into Aircraft X's data block which gave me a conflict alert with the aircraft southeast bound at 35000 feet. Once Aircraft X was clear of Aircraft Y; I issued the 360 heading to Aircraft X and then waited for him to be clear of my 35000 foot traffic and descended Aircraft X to 35000 feet as coordinated.I never coordinated Aircraft Y not going on a 180 heading; but can understand the miscommunication with the controller at sector 94. After a few controllers heard the situation they knew right away that Rivers Controllers think their coordination overrides anything coordinated. I would like to have the Rivers Controllers aware of this situation and communicate clearer; and to follow coordinated instructions.

ZKC Center Controller instructed an adjacent sector to place an aircraft on a heading for separation in their sector. The adjacent sector did not issue the heading.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 500

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

VFR multi engine training flight with CFI and one student day VFR. HUM Tower was called on the radio in a descent. Both pilots did not observe yellow/black helicopter Aircraft Y in same general direction to HUM airport. Helo took no evasive action and continued straight and level flight path. CFI took evasive action. Helo called HUM Tower after close call; it may have been that the helo was speaking to New Orleans Approach (this is unknown) at time of incident. Aircraft X had been on Tower frequency the entire flight in the vicinity of Class D airspace around HUM. Tower never reported any traffic prior to incident.

Instructor reported an NMAC event during descent for landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129.75; Flight Crew Total 19400; Flight Crew Type 129.75

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Airport

Received SELCAL from Dispatch to divert KOA due to first 2;000 FT RWY edge lights OTS at ITO for night arrival. Requested reroute KOA from Commercial Radio.At approx. XA:16z Received SELCAL from Dispatch to now continue to ITO due to runway conditions legal for arrival.INITIAL CONDITIONS:PHTO FCST FMZZXA00 VRB05KT P6SM VCSH SCT025 BKN0301. ACCULOAD sec 9: LND NTM-RWY 08/26 W 1750 FT CLOSED DECLARED DIST 8050 FT FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING. 2. NOTAM RWY 26 VASI OTS 1407161808-1407232100EST 3. NOTAM RWY 8/26 EAST 2000FT RWY EDGE LGTS OUT OF SERVICE 1407210330-1407260400 4. PREDEPARTURE BRIEF-noted ACCULOAD SEC 9. RWY 26 8;050 FT AVAIL WITH W 1750 FT OF ROLLOUT END CLOSED. DID Review all 35 PAGES of flight papers but did not highlight Notam of EAST 2000 FT RWY EDGE LGTS OTS for our time period.ACTION:Approximately XA:16z; (after second SELCAL to continue to ITO); Immediately had First Officer review all NOTAMs for the RWY 26 W 1;750 FT closure and 2000 FT EAST RWY EDGE light OTS while I called Commercial Radio for a frequency to contact Dispatch.I explained to the Dispatcher; I calculated RWY 26 (9;800 FT-1;750 FT W closed)=8;050 of RWY avail for landing; but with the first 2;000 FT of RWY edge lights OTS; ONLY THE MIDDLE 6;050 FT of RWY 26 was available and LIGHTED. With the VASI OTS and no guidance to that new landing point (6;050 RWY AVAIL); VCSH BKN030 I was uncomfortable to now change DEST back to ITO.AT XA:27z; I was immediately transferred to the Dispatch who said we were legal to continue to ITO and that LIGHTING MEETS REQ.I again stated we were proceeding to KOA and were uncomfortable with the decision to proceed back to ITO.FOM 2.50.2 Emerg/NonNormal Airport Sub Lighting.Temp light substitution by flarepots or other can be provided so that the ENTIRE usable length of RWY is defined. Captain and dispatcher MUST AGREE that substitute lighting is adequate for a safe operation for TO or LDG.FOM6.10.2 Navigation RWY Lighting Flights are not authorized to takeoff or land during the period from 20 minutes after official sunset at an airport where the RWY LTS are inop unless adequate substitute lighting is avail.Summary:I deemed that it was NOT PRUDENT to continue to ITO; and it was the SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION to continue to KOA as originally passed to us on the first SELCAL from Dispatch.THREATS:1.We could not find the NOTAM listed on ACCULOAD sec 9. w1750 RWY 26 closed in the flight papers. Either listed improperly in the ACCULOAD or the NOTAM came out after the flight papers were printed. This created confusion; however; we took that information as correct while airborne as the safest course of action.2.The Dispatcher stated that it was legal to continue to ITO and the RWY lighting met requirements. While on the frequency trying to understand his logic; we didn't feel comfortable with his reasons or his decision to continue to ITO. We took the safest course of action and proceeded to KOA. I would call the dispatcher and sort this out ON THE GROUND.ERRORS:1. FOM 2.50.2 and 6.10.2 state that the ENTIRE usable length of the RWY must be lighted or have substitute lighting for TO or LDG2. Poor communication on not listing these impending threats to landing or takeoff in the notes on the original release or a message to contact Dispatch prior to signing the release.

Dispatched to ITO; aware the last 1;750 feet of Runway 26 was closed the Captain of an overwater B737NG refused to continue to destination when advised by Dispatch while enroute that the first 2;000 feet of the runway edge lights on the runway were also out of service.  The reporter rejected strong advocacy from the Dispatcher that the operation was legal.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Loaded the STAAV6 departure during preflight. Noticed waypoint TRALR did not load. Since this point was on the published SID and listed as a point in the release I added the point. While flying the SID as we passed waypoint STAAV enroute to waypoint TRALR the aircraft started a right turn indicating it was 3.5 miles left of course. I directed the FO to manually fly the AC to TRALR which he did. The FMC did not recognize TRALR as a fly to point even though it was depicted on the NAV display directly in front of us; instead it was navigating to NICLE the next point after TRALR. I questioned LA Center if there has been any problems with aircraft flying over TRALR on the SID and he answered yes but didn't know why.It appears as some kind of FMC recognition problem with waypoint TRALR.Need to look into this waypoint FMC mix up. I really don't know what happened.

B767-300 Captain reported his FMC failed to navigate to TRALR on the STAAV6 departure out of LAX.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

At approximately [time and date] facility management evacuated the adjacent area to mine (Area X) due to a reported positive case of COVID-19. This forced a high number of additional aircraft in to our airspace. Additionally; there was a significant weather system over and east of the ZZZ1 area and southern [state] that southern arrivals into ZZZ2 were being routed in to our airspace and had to be blended with our stream. It was highly chaotic.For approximately an hour; my R-Side and the R-Side at [sector] did a tremendous job of keeping traffic separated; spaced; and rerouted where they needed to be. There were multiple instances of what would have technically been airspace violations where we had aircraft clip the Area X sectors Z;Y;A. These happened for up to fifteen miles or so as we used the corners of their airspace. As they had cleared out this area and airspace; and we could see the airspace clearly; we felt that it was a calculated risk in an extraordinary time that was worth taking. We need an in house contingency plan at ZZZ for if we lose an area(s). There are contingency plans in place already for losing entire facilities; but to my knowledge there are no contingency plans for partial losses in ARTCCs. These contingency plans need to include plans for divestiture of airspace; technological solutions for accessing frequency and land line communications; and training for the work force. The Agency should also conduct a 'table top' simulation or emergency situations with all interested entities; i.e. Tech Ops; Unions; other support staff. These exercises should be completed annually to increase readiness to protect the NAS.

ZZZ Center Controller reported that an adjacent area went ATC Zero; resulting in a complex and difficult traffic situation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Type 12000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

With the FMC Optimum Altitude indicating FL358; we elected to climb from FL340 to FL360 for a smoother ride. We used Level Change with .74 in the MCP to accomplish the climb. The aircraft leveled at FL355 and began to accelerate yet didn't climb as our airspeed touched the high speed buffet margin as indicated in the HUD. I elected to utilize the Vertical Speed mode of the MCP to trade the airspeed for altitude and reach FL360. The MCP immediately reverted to Level Change with .72 flashing in the window. I tried again but with the same result. With airspeed continuing to increase; I began to wonder if we were in a 'Mach Tuck' situation. I reduced thrust as the airspeed exceeded .76 and the aircraft began to descend. Even as early as the beginning of the event; I considered disengaging the autopilot and climbing; but was concerned that I would be overriding a built-in safety feature of the aircraft; potentially risking an upset condition. We coordinated our un-commanded descent to FL340 and began to investigate the reason for the event. We consulted the charts and compared our N1 and fuel flow indications. Chart N1's were 80.5 percent; yet ours were between 84 percent and 85 percent. Chart fuel flow expectations were around 2;100 PPH; yet the aircraft was indicating between 2;400 and 2;500 PPH. We then deduced that the likely cause was due to a combination of being heavier than we thought and light turbulence. Later we discovered that the event was called an 'Alpha Floor Excursion' and that it is covered in Distance Learning with the recommendation of disengaging the autopilot and continuing to climb. 1. An informal poll of fellow Pilots shows that few are aware of this; as most have yet to complete this training. Most of those who do know about it have had it happen to them! Apparently it was explained in an early (year) edition of (Company Publication); but that hardly seems like an effective way to communicate such an important issue. Publish a (Company Bulletin) explaining the anomaly.2. Providing a solution that requires disengaging the autopilot in RVSM airspace doesn't seem prudent. Recommendation: Fix the software. Until then; limit the older Fleet to FL350.3. Unexpected anomalies at high altitude present a certain hazard. Risk management would dictate that Company policies; procedures and equipment provide features intended to enhance safety. I recommend that items contrary to this theme be clearly and quickly communicated to the Pilots.

B737-300 Captain reports attempting to climb to FL360 with the FMC indicating the optimum altitude is FL358. For unknown reasons the aircraft will not climb above FL355 with the autopilot engaged and begins accelerating. The crew requests FL340 and is cleared to descend. Post flight investigation indicates that an alpha floor event was triggered.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Doing a hot reserve trip to ZZZ and back to ZZZ1. Was the end of a 13 hour reserve day; and the first time I have ever flown in or out of ZZZ. On the approach phase of flight on the LDA XX. The approach was standard from flaps 8 to 30; and getting on to the final approach course in white needles.I was a little uncomfortable with the whole approach; which took my attention away from the last flap setting. I made multiple calls alerting the Captain that altitude or airspeed was off. He responded with 'correcting;' and made correcting actions. I understand what is like to fight with a crosswinds and gusting. But looking back a go around call would have been the correct choice even if the flaps where at 45. In the future I will make that call.We then switched to green needles and that course was about a half dot off. So Captain switched off the autopilot; and hand flew it in and which caused an increase in work load as he descended to the 1;700 foot level off. It was gusting 26 from the right pushing us toward the prohibited area which took some of my focus. I made the 1;000 foot call out; and Tower cautioned us that we were a little low and gave us a new altimeter setting that was .04 off what we had set from the ATIS.  Then I made the 500 foot call out shortly after. Next thing we know the GPWS says 'TOO LOW FLAPS' immediately executed go-around.Immediately executed a go-around; and then vectored around for the approach again.On IOE I did not get the opportunity to fly out of ZZZ or in to ZZZ. So I was worried about the prohibited area that everyone talks about; and with that right crosswind blowing us left to it; really had my attention right when I should have reminded Captain flaps where not at 45. Then the 1;000 foot call out came; and just like that the flaps were over looked. I am still low time; and I have not flown in 2 weeks; but one time and then 2 weeks before that one time. I felt really good off IOE; but in the last month and a half I have gotten close to no flight time.

CRJ-700 First Officer reported that an unstable approach in combination with a GPWS warning prompted executing a go-around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Passenger X took his mask off when I gave him his drink orders.  He was very abrupt with me asking for ice.  I went by the cabin doing a walk through and he had his mask off.  I asked him to please put his mask on.  He then grabbed his cup took a small sip and held it.  He did not put his mask on but used the perception of drinking to not wear it. I went by again and help looked at me and again picked up his cup and held it close to his face.  Again not complying.Passenger X was very blatant in his disregard for our policy by holding a cup and pretending to take a sip each time we went by.  He was a very intimidating man and I felt he was going to get very angry and cause an issue.  It is very frustrating on our end dealing with passengers who use the eating or drinking to not follow COVID policy.  Passenger X was non-compliant and thought holding a cup and just sipping it for hours was a reason to not wear a mask.  That is not briefly or actively.  I went by again and help looked at me and again picked up his cup and held it close to his face.  Again not complying.  I think he needs to be banned while there is a mask policy in effect.  He blatantly disregarded our policy and used holding a cup and taking tiny sips as a reason to not wear his mask/neck gator at all.  He is someone who was ready to cause a scene and will bully other crews and do the same on other flights.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 122; Flight Crew Total 14554; Flight Crew Type 9436

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

On climb out we got a call from the aft galley Flight Attendant smoke coming out of the ovens. I asked the IRO to run back and check out if the smoke was burning food trays or something else. When she called back all ovens were pouring out smoke and they were in the process of de-powering the galleys. I gave the aircraft to the First Officer and [requested priority handling]. Aircraft X turning back to ZZZ with an onboard fire. I got the IRO back up and we coordinated an [expedited return.] Dispatch was notified; ATC was helping us in; Flight Attendants were briefed; and passengers briefed. We completed over weight checklist and had Crash Fire Rescue in place for a long landing and possible bailout. I told the Flight Attendants to empty every Halon bottle in the airplane. Smoke dissipated but returned after 15 minutes. I took control of the aircraft and flew an overweight landing to Runway XX; rolled to the end; turned off and were greeted by Crash Fire Rescue. We were given a frequency for the fire crew and they checked us out as nominal. Since the smoke was dissipating we decided to get to the gate and let the fire crew on board.

On climb out on the SID; at approximately 12;000 ft.; we received a call from the Flight Attendants in the aft galley. They noticed that steam or smoke was coming out of 3 ovens and starting to come out a few more; as well. They could not determine the cause or type of steam/smoke and we directed them to contact the lead Flight Attendant to assist and coordinate.They were able to confirm that there was smoke coming from the aft ovens and that they were in the process of shutting off electrical power to the aft galley. At this time we were leveling off at FL310; after a brief discussion we decided the best course of action was to return to ZZZ. The Captain then [advised ATC]; stated our intentions; and started coordinating our return with ATC to go back to ZZZ for recovery. Dispatch was notified via ACARS and a SATCOM voice link of our intentions. As we continued our descent into ZZZ; we were notified by the Flight Attendants that the smoke had started to return. The Captain then directed them to open the ovens and discharge the Halon fire extinguishers into them to mitigate the smoke and extinguish the source of the smoke.Following our descent; we shot the ILS approach with an uneventful landing and roll out. We exited the end of the runway and contacted the firefighting support team to coordinate a visual check of the rear part of the aircraft for smoke or fire. Once they confirmed that no external smoke or flames were present; we proceeded to the gate with them following in support.Upon arrival at the gate; the fire fighters boarded the aircraft to confirm there was no further danger and proceeded to deplane the aircraft once getting the 'all clear'.

B777 flight crew reported a galley fire that resulted in an air return and overweight landing.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We landed on Runway 16R during a runway change at DEN. We were not the last aircraft to land on the south flow so we didn't think they turned the runway to a north flow yet. We turned off on the high speed Taxiway D5; transitioned to WB; and taxied eastbound toward the ramp. While we were still on the high speed Taxiway D5; the Ground Controller gave us clearance to taxi on WB; turn north on F; and transition to CN to the ramp. The Controller did not give us any hold short instructions. While we were on WB; we looked down 16L and did not see any aircraft taking off on 16L. The Controller then told us to stop which we did; and we then saw a Beech 1900 cross above us while landing on 34R! The Controller apologized and cleared us to continue taxiing to the ramp. We crossed the hold short line that protects the final approach for 34R. We did not see the Beech 1900 because we thought the airport was still on a south flow and we didn't hear a hold short command. We were also distracted by the many aircraft on the ground taxiing to and from different runways while a runway change was underway. We wanted to make sure we didn't cause any problems to aircraft on the ground and we weren't thinking about any airborne threats. I will be more diligent to look BOTH ways when I cross under the approach path of a runway.

As I was receiving a response from Ops; the Ground Controller urgently called; 'Company Flight Number; STOP!' The Captain immediately stopped. As I looked out my window; I saw a B1900 in landing configuration approaching Runway 34R. As we watched; the B1900 appeared to execute a go-around.

DEN Ground Control issued a B737 crew clearance to the gate after it landed on 16R then issued it an emergency stop after the aircraft taxied into the Runway 34R Runway Safety Clearance Zone while a BE1900 on a Runway 34R final executed a go around.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated

Climbing out of FL200; we noticed our Left Fuel Flow indication at zero. I decided to contact Maintenance Control. However; before I was able to; we noticed the Fuel Flow indication vary from 0 to 950. At that time; there appeared to be an odor emitting from the left side circuit breaker panel. I asked the First Officer if he could verify the odor; and he could not. When reaching FL230; the altitude bell chimed indicating 1;000 FT remained in the climb. Simultaneously we heard an additional tone. To me it sounded similar to a smoke alarm in the lavatory. There were no abnormal indications in the cockpit. Just as I was about to call the cabin crew about the sound; the A Flight Attendant called on the interphone stating that although there was no indication of smoke or fire; the lavatory smoke detector was activated. I decided to begin a preemptive descent and diversion in case the alarm was not erroneous. We informed ATC of the emergency and decided to return. Next; the A Flight Attendant called back and stated that there was visible smoke in the cabin. There were still no abnormal indications in the cockpit at this time. I told the flight attendants to don their oxygen masks and inform them that we would be landing in approximately 10 minutes. The First Officer and I then donned our oxygen masks. Next; I made an announcement to the passengers informing them to follow the instructions of a uniformed crewmember once on the ground. At this time I transferred the radios to the First Officer as he was the pilot flying. As I opened the QRH; we received the SMOKE master warning. I followed the QRH for SMOKE. The illuminated SMOKE/EXTG switch was the AFT Cargo and I pressed it as the QRH states. I proceeded with the Galley Fire Smoke Checklist so I could dump the cabin as to ensure that the smoke would exit the aircraft. I called the flight attendants at approximately 4;000 FT to ask how the conditions were in the cabin. The flight attendants stated that the visibility was poor. The A Flight Attendant stated that she couldn't see past the First Class cabin. I told them that we would be evacuating on the runway and to wait for my evacuation command. The landing was uneventful. After 60 knots; I took control of the aircraft and brought it to a complete stop. Once the propellers stopped rotating; I initiated the evacuation command to the left side of the aircraft. After the cockpit evacuation duties were completed; I searched the entire cabin and determined that everyone was off of the aircraft safely.

DHC8-400 Captain reports detecting an electrical odor passing through FL230; along with fuel flow indication malfunctions. This is followed by a lavatory smoke alarm and visible smoke in the cabin. The crew elects to return to the departure airport and QRH procedures are commenced. At this time the Smoke Master Warning is activated indicating smoke in the aft cargo pit. QRH procedures are complied with followed by an emergency landing with an evacuation on the runway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 2845; Flight Crew Type 1123

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

I was holding short for the Runway XX on the taxiway. There was a plane about to land. As that plane passed me; the Tower told me to 'take position and hold.' I repeated the instructions and proceeded into position. While in position and holding; a third plane; came overhead to land. I repeated my instructions to verify what I was doing and the Tower gave me permission to takeoff; which I did; staying in the pattern for one more full stop landing. I was listening to the Tower and heard nothing of a third plane. Actually; the Tower operator sounded young and inexperienced.

Pilot reported that a plane landed over them while they were instructed to position and hold on the runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

We pushed back from [our] gate. The left engine start was complete and during the start of the right engine; I heard line service say 'stop stop'. My head was down during that time verifying the load closeout and inserting the takeoff performance numbers in the MCDU. But when I heard line service say 'stop stop' I looked up and saw the aircraft was moving forward. The tow bar was still connected at that time. There was slight damage to the tow bar and the aircraft nose tire. We got towed back to the gate. Maintenance changed the nose tires and we proceeded with no further incident. I believe there may have been a miscommunication on whether the brakes was set or not during that time.Eliminating heads down during movement on a busy ramp will bring more situational awareness of surrounding elements.

Aircraft rolled and damaged tow bar wheel. Slight damage to left nose wheelLine service advised over the headset to stop. Initially thought he meant stop the engine start; but when I asked; 'stop the start?' he responded by saying; 'no stop moving'.Parking brake not set and tug disconnected without crew knowledge. I never heard 'set brakes' Consequently I did not do the normal 'flow' of checking if the brake was set and did not verbally respond.

B717 flight crew started engine during pushback and damaged nose gear due to aircraft rolling forward.


Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

For the second time in the past several weeks I've had to take the airplane after the pilot flying lost situation awareness on approach.  We were being vectored for an approach to XXL; the First Officer [was] pilot flying (PF). Our heading was roughly perpendicular to the final approach course...5-8 miles from the final approach course; Approach asked us if we saw the airport. I looked to the PF to see if he wanted to accept the visual. He didn't say anything and was obviously looking for the airport so I reported back to Approach that we were looking for the field. The Controller then came back with the clearance to fly heading 030 to intercept the localizer. The PF then said he had the airport so I called Approach to relay that. Approach then cleared us for the visual to XXL.  In the meantime the pilot flying still continued flying toward the final approach course without commencing a turn toward the airport. I became concerned about flying through the localizer; so I directed him to start turning; now. He started turning; but too slowly; and I instantly realized I had a problem. I increased the urgency level of my directions to not overshoot; but it was as though he was in some kind of trance; just as was the pilot in my previous experience. He just didn't respond to commands; including 'descend now' and 'slow down' because we were not descending or slowing for the approach. So I had to take the airplane.As a result of the similar experience a few weeks ago; I now brief that I want the airplane configured and slowed early until we get to know each other. Unfortunately that's not always possible.... In our lengthy debrief this evening [the First Officer] said that he'd thought about getting slowed earlier; but didn't follow through on it. I was busy making the runway change so I didn't think anything was out of the ordinary as we got within 10 miles of the final approach course. [The First Officer] was flying the approach exactly as I would have done at that point. The problem in both cases is the sudden; and inexplicable; loss of situation awareness in the approach environment. It was like a switch being thrown in both cases. One minute we're fine; the next it's DEFCON 5. I guess I should be thankful that at least we've been high and fast; rather than the other condition; but this evening if I hadn't intervened we'd have blown through all three 36 final approach courses; and I was  appalled at that prospect to put it bluntly.Why are people screwing up simple visual approaches? These are nice guys; sharp guys. The very best guys. They have to be; to be here. But something about flying this airplane; or the training thereof; is having a hypnotic effect in these situations; and I end up scrambling at the conclusion of a perfectly normal and uneventful flight. I know it's only twice; and that's not exactly a trend; but I'm extremely tired of filing reports; not to mention the jolt of adrenalin in the process. I don't know if people are being warned off of flying visual approaches in training; or something else is going on. I don't think fatigue played a part in either of these incidents. In both cases weather was good. One airport was a sleepy outstation and we were the only airplane in the sky; the other a busy hub airport with a lot of traffic; but nothing out of the ordinary.  Visual approaches are fact of aviation life. They happen. It's all well and good to emphasize use of automation and to 'back up' visuals with instrument approaches; but the ability to look out the window and manipulate the controls and throttles in such a way as to plant the mains on the runway in the appropriate manner is still an essential part of flying. Not to mention knowing where you are; and where you're going....I guess I will emphasize and re-emphasize situation awareness. My question is: does it take special emphasis to accomplish something so basic and intrinsic to what we do?

[I] lost situational awareness and did not hear clearance to turn to heading approaching ZZZZZ Intersection when cleared for approach on Runway XL. Captain directed turn; descend; and configure. Went visual on the approach and Captain continued to direct a turn to the left to deconflict with traffic then took aircraft for landing.[I] just completed 6 month training but had not flown in more than 3 weeks and no landings in 2 months due to assignments with high mins captains. Deadhead flight evening before was delayed due to weather. Hotel air conditioning system broke during middle of night. After late arrival I woke up after only 5 hours of sleep due to excessive heat in the hotel.

B757 flight crew described their experiences related to apparent inability to fly visual approaches properly.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

During the cockpit preparation; the First Officer and I noticed that the maintenance logbook showed the yellow hydraulic system had been serviced twice in the past eight days. We noticed it was within limits during our pre-flight check but toward the low end of the reservoir. During climb our 'B' Flight Attendant called and stated she was smelling a 'dirty sock smell' in her galley. She said the smell was intermittent and seemed to be only coming from one vent in the aft galley. Two other flight attendants said they smelled the odor and two did not. The First Officer and I referenced the QRH; followed the flowchart for and odor event and at no time reached a point that directed us to do anything but continue to monitor the situation. We continued to our destination and had a normal landing. After block in; we entered the odor event in the logbook and also noticed that once again the yellow hydraulic system needed service; so we also entered that discrepancy into the logbook. Our Contract Mechanic found a leak at the drain port for the yellow system and also noticed hydraulic fluid on the belly of the airplane. In the opinion of the mechanic; he believes that hydraulic fluid contaminated the air-conditioning packs causing the odor in the airplane. At the time of this report; no crew members have reported any symptoms or medical issues. If a hydraulic system is requiring excessive servicing a leak check should be done.

A321 Captain reported being notified by Flight Attendant of 'dirty socks odor' during initial climb. Maintenance at destination identified hydraulic system leak as source of odor.


Flight Crew Total 7443; Flight Crew Type 3726

On the PARZA 3 arrival to SJO the PARZA fix is listed 'At or above 9;000'. On the approach it lists the holding pattern at PARZA as at 10;000; but does not show an altitude for PARZA as a fix on the approach. The FMC loads PARZA at 10;000 when loading the PARZA 3 arrival with the transition to the ILS DME 7; PARZA transition. It seems there is a conflict there. There are no NOTAMs that address this.

B737 First Officer reported there is an apparent discrepancy between the charted altitude and the FMC procedure altitude at PARZA on the arrival to MROC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

After level-off at cruise; the flight attendant called the flight deck to report fumes she noticed on taxi-out. She and [another] flight attendant said they felt mild symptoms of confusion & headache; but did not elect to call the flight deck till at cruise. We were de-iced after push and could have been a bit short of the 1 minute wait time in selecting ON on the engine bleeds on the second engine start; or there could have been other issues with the de-ice to cause such fumes. Further forward in the aircraft the fumes were not noted. No further fumes were noted on the flight.Always maintain caution with chemicals around the aircraft. Encourage crew members to come forward with questions/ issues in a more timely way.

After level off we received a call from aft flight attendants reporting that they smelled fumes in the cabin and were feeling sick after engine start in ZZZ. We had been de-iced at the gate with type one fluid on push back. After engine start I may have been a little to quick to turn on the #1 bleed system not giving at least one minute after engine start. We initially gave each Flight Attendant oxygen which did make them feel better. One of the flight attendants appeared to be ok however one we felt would benefit from a call to medlink. After counseling with medlink both flight attendants felt better. We had the flight met at destination by paramedics just to follow up with the flight attendants.Wait at least one minute after engine start to turn on bleeds: follow SOP.

B738 flight crew reported being notified upon level off by flight attendants of fumes and physiological symptoms on taxi out.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Departed off Runway 34R and cleared to 9;000 feet. Upon reaching nearly 8;000 feet ATC advised us of traffic descending to 10;000 feet. We attempted to slow our ascent; but the aircraft had already entered 'altitude acquire' mode. At approximately 8;500 feet a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) was aurally and visually annunciated; with 'Level-Off' commanded. The Captain complied with the RA; but due to system lag and utilizing Flight Director TCAS RA cues; the airplane's climb was not fully arrested until about 8;700 feet. In order to comply with the TCAS RA Flight Director cues; the aircraft then descended to approximately 8;400 feet. Due to some confusion between interpretation of seemingly conflicting commands from the TCAS system ('Level-Off' aural vs. slightly descending FD cue); ATC was not notified until the conflict had already cleared. No unusual maneuvering was required; and ATC seemed to be surprised by the report of the RA.The TCAS Resolution Advisory system is outdated and does not contain logic for level-offs. Today's high-performance aircraft safely maintain steady higher-rate climbs and descents with programmed level-offs that the TCAS system is incapable of compensating for. This decades-old technology; which is designed as an added safety layer; is creating false positives in the already crowded modern airspace environment. These false positives then become a safety risk in and of themselves; due to deviations in ATC clearances that are required; and yet could create even more dangerous loss of separation.

Secondary narrative contains no additonal information.

Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving conflicting instructions from a TCAS/RA Alert for traffic above them that was not a factor.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 6397

During cruise flight; at FL360; #1 engine drive light illuminated. Completed QRH; disconnected drive and attempted APU start. APU started. Placed on buss. APU performed auto shutdown. Began diversion to [a nearby alternate]. Descended to FL220; and attempted APU restart. APU restarted and stayed running. Oil temp; pressure and quantity remained stable. Monitored engine and canceled diversion. Discussed possible diversion airports if situation changed. Situation remained stable and unchanged. Requested priority handling to [destination]. Situation remained unchanged and continued on. Landing normal.

B737NG Captain reported the APU initially failed to pick up the electrical load following a malfunction of the #1 engine generator drive; but operated normally after descending to a lower altitude.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Pack overheat that could not be controlled. Declared emergency. Air return to [departure airport]. Overweight landing of 167;000 lbs.

B737-800 Captain experienced uncontrollable pack overheat; declared emergency and returned to departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 1040; Flight Crew Type 200

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After releasing skydivers over ZZZ1 airport I began a descending left turn. While passing through ~4;000 ft. MSL ZZZ ATC advised traffic less than 1 mile south; northbound altitude indicating 2;700 ft. and advised an immediate turn to the east 090. At the time I received the traffic advisory I was already on a heading of 090 and could not see the traffic. I stopped my descent and leveled off at 3;000 ft. MSL and saw the other aircraft pass directly below me at an estimated 100 feet. On the next flight I confirmed with the controller that I heard correctly to turn left; rather than west; and she confirmed the instruction of left to 090. I did not receive an instruction to stop my descent.

Pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft while under ATC flight following.