Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Type 14000

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Distraction; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The flight was the first leg of a three-day trip. We had just departed Runway 27R on the RNAV Departure with a clearance to 10;000 Feet. We checked in with Departure Control and were told 'delete the 250 knot speed restriction.' We were then given a climb to 14;000 Feet and contact Center. We read back the altitude and frequency and switched to Center. We were then cleared to climb to FL240. Moments later we received a TCAS Alert and complied with its commands. We questioned ATC as to what happened and they switched us back to Departure Control. Departure Control informed us that we had mistakenly taken another aircraft's altitude clearance and frequency change. We continued on to ZZZ and called ATC upon landing. The Supervisor gave us an explanation as to what had happened. The Departure Controller had given a climb clearance and frequency change in the same transmission which he said they shouldn't do. The clearance we had taken was meant for the aircraft in front of us on the same departure.Flying out of this airport is busy enough. But flying an older model aircraft just adds to the workload. No auto throttles; no map display; etc. I feel these planes should be base specific like we did with the old pre-FMS aircraft back in the day.

The mixing of old and new technology aircraft has put my margin of risk very high. In 17 years of 121 flying; this is the first time I have ever had this type of error.

A flight crew flying a less automated aircraft than they were accustomed to and somewhat overloaded; took another aircraft's clearance which resulted in a TCAS alert along with a call to ATC.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 25

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

[Aircraft] was on departure for ZZZ1 airport on the filed IFR plan. At around 800 feet. AGL I noticed that the radios got silent. I continued the upwind and started to troubleshoot loss of radio communications (checked circuit breakers; recycled the avionics master; tried comm 2; tried the hand held microphone mounted in the aircraft) and then squawked 7600 from the initial transponder code. I then turned crosswind then downwind of RWY XXL of ZZZ then tried to deploy flaps and it was set but did not indicate. I then extended the landing gear saw one over my shoulder and one in the mirror. I checked to see if the RWY (Runway) was clear and it was; I then reduced to the approach speed of 85 KIAS. I was able to land comfortably. After getting on the ground I was unable to easily keep directional control and I gave it as much right rudder and brakes as possible. In order to stop as safely as possible. I saw the XX taxiway and attempted to make it however; I could only stop in the grass between RWY XXL and taxiway XX.

Cessna 210 pilot reported that on departure lost all communication; returned and lost directional control of the aircraft upon landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Per the recommendation of a previous [report]; I was concerned that the crew for flight XXX would add fuel creating a weight restriction and possibly an overweight aircraft via the pilot mobile fuel add; so I added the remark please call Dispatch prior to adding fuel.The crew unilaterally added fuel via the pilot mobile application without calling Dispatch per the condition of the flight release. I contend that this is a violation of FAR 121.533 as I have no way to restrict this functionality allowing the pilot unilateral decision making over the preflight planning of a flight.

Dispatcher reported being out of the loop when a flight crew unilaterally added fuel to the aircraft by using a mobile fuel application.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

I have worked this flight many times. It is not deemed by Management a 'critical flight'; but it is very time consuming to plan; communicate; and monitor this flight. This flight often carries heavy loads of tuna in boxes. Many times the pits are staged very close to their limits. Some days there was no tuna caught; so the loads won't be heavy. Today this flight was quite heavy with tuna. There were also 23 through bags. The station communicated very early with me how they would like the tuna loaded; as well as asking for 'max bag' limits for each pit. This is the best practice for this flight to ensure that the pit limits (structural limits) aren't exceeded. I saved their message and would get back to it when it was time to plan the flight.My workload was rather high today. In fact; after XA:00 my tab was nonstop. At all times there was at least one 'locked' flight that needed to be worked. Usually; there were several. I also had flights that were weight restricted; as many as three on my screen at once during this time. I was doing my best to keep up; but it was challenging. Shortly after this flight 'locked'; fuel was added; and I was able to start planning. It took me quite a while to plan the flight; with many interruptions from working other 'locked' flights; following up on weight restrictions; and dealing with a large number of phone calls related to the weight restrictions; issues with live animals; and requests to unlock flights. I was able to pit the tuna and other cargo in a way that would balance the aircraft. Then; I added the bags to each pit. I took pit limit for each pit; subtracted the cargo items; and divided by 36; the [flight] standard bag weight. This would give me a max bag number for each pit. I allowed a little extra to account for heavy bags. In my haste to work my busy screen; I probably didn't allow enough extra weight in each pit for the heavy bags. This flight normally has a few heavy bags; not as many as some other markets in the region. I made the flight ready and returned to my other flights. Shortly after I readied the flight; we had the shift change. The flights being worked tend to shuffle around a bit during this time. As often happens; I ended up with several locked flights during the change; which meant I stayed continuously busy without much chance to review the readied flights I had worked; including this one. I didn't notice any big changes when the flight went to 'closed' status; so I just continued trying to keep up with my tab.At scheduled departure time; I got a call from the station. They were having difficulty closing out the flight; getting a response of being over pit weight. I attempt to review the flight. I get a series of popups advising 'pit weight exceeded'. Once I cleared the popups; I saw a blank screen. If I squinted; at the very bottom of the screen; the available pit weights were dimly visible. I saw pit 3 showed '-17'; so I imagine that pit 3 must be over the pit limit by 17 pounds. I reviewed the bag counts with the ops agent; and determined that pit 3 was indeed overweight by 17 pounds. The flight had already pushed; and I could hear the crew over the Ops radio. I could hear the pilots offer to move passengers; thinking we were out of balance. I explained to the Ops agent that we were over the pit limits; and moving pax would not help. I advised we would have to move 2 bags to pit 2 to correct the problem. The crew wasn't happy as they would have to shut down an engine and miss their departure slot. While all of this was going on; my screen was just as busy as it had been since XA:00. Multiple locked flights; including an overstaged domestic wide body that has a short locked time relative to  most wide bodies; plus a couple of weight restrictions and phone calls mixed in. My error was in not allowing enough extra pit weight to account for heavy bags. This particular flight required high quality work from its Load Planner. I wasn't able to provide enoughattention to this flight given all that was expected of me during this time period.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported making an error in load planning procedures that caused a delay; citing workload issues as contributing.


Flight Crew Total 6612; Flight Crew Type 1733

During flight; I was trying to look at the map on the iPad to get info and while trying to close in on the area; it froze up and I could not change the picture to get the information I wanted. Also after landing; my iPad does not switch to the taxi diagram even though it is selected and this time it had timed out so when I was given complicated taxi directions after getting clear of the runway; my iPad wasn't available and I had to rely totally on the First Officer's for directions.

B747 Captain reported iPad malfunctions in flight and during taxi.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was Pilot Flying; when cleared by Approach to descend to 3000. Received an altitude alert; and responded by executing escape maneuver. Not sure if the aircraft terrain database is off; my descent was too steep (1000 fpm); or what. There was no imminent terrain threat; and we were cleared down by ATC. Executed climb to approximately 3800 feet and notified ATC that we were responding to an altitude alert. Eventually descended again back to 3000. I would likely just attempt a more shallow descent if given the same instructions in that area to see if that was why the alert occurred.

EMB145 First Officer reported a terrain warning after being cleared by Approach to descend to 3000 feet. Evasive action was taken; but no reason for the warning could be found.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 180; Flight Crew Type 20

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

My instructor and I were climbing out of Carlsbad on runway heading. We made a 180 degree turn to our right after passing the coastline to head back east towards our destination while continuing our climb. Our light twin can climb at over 1;000 FPM; so we were passing through 4;000 FT within a few minutes from takeoff. As we came closer to the coastline; my instructor and I noticed some traffic on our MFD at our 2-o-clock position 400 FT above us. The autopilot was flying the plane; and both of us were trying to look for the traffic; which was heading north. We thought that given our climb rate; we'd be over the traffic by the time we would converge; and the other aircraft would have passed below from the right. However; the other aircraft seemed to be climbing; as well - the 400 foot gap never increased. The traffic inset on the PFD came up along with a 'traffic' annunciator. We still had no visual of the other aircraft; so I disconnected the autopilot and began a rapid descent. Apparently; the other aircraft began a rapid descent as well; so my instructor took the controls and put us into a rapid ascent. I took a look at the MFD and saw that the traffic was directly above us about 100 FT. I quickly told my instructor; and he initiated a sharp left hand turn. The other aircraft's target on the MFD made a sharp right hand turn to avoid us. We still had no visual of the traffic. It wasn't until we had rolled out back on our original course that we saw the other aircraft heading north.The weather at the time of the incident was MVFR; although it was only a little hazy up at altitude. Carlsbad was reporting 5 SM of visibility when we departed. It was also night; and with the amount of light coming from the city below; it could have exacerbated our problem of trying to find the traffic. All of our lights were on at the time of the incident. Regardless; I feel that we could have avoided this incident. I could have taken it upon myself to level off or descend earlier to ensure separation from the traffic. We also could have been monitoring the SoCal Approach frequency; as the other aircraft could have been communicating on that. We were still on Tower frequency at the time of the incident; and we are used to getting our frequency change approved by the Tower Controller. This was not my first NMAC; but by being more vigilant; I'm hoping it'll be my last.

A light twin pilot and instructor departed CRQ and at the coastline turned east where; climbing through 4;000 FT; they took evasive action from another aircraft which they were tracking on the MFD.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Landed hoping gear was down and locked after completing all possible checklists.Sign off [said] maintenance cleaned cannon plug. Cannon plugs on an aircraft less than one year old should not be causing this many issues. Are there moisture seals inside all of these cannon plugs?

C680A First Officer reported the aircraft landed with a left main gear disagree indication. Post flight maintenance sign off showed they cleaned cannon plugs.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 2380; Flight Crew Type 937

Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

We had a gear up landing in [a TBM700]. I was flying with my son; and the good news is that we are both fine; but the airplane does not look too good. I'm embarrassed that this happened and a little unsure of what occurred. I did a go-around on our first attempt because a couple of coyotes were crossing the runway. I must have retracted the gear on the go-around and then not realized that the gear was up on the second approach. Usually I put the gear down to slow the airplane; but since we were already slow; I thought it was already down. The gear warning horn did not sound because I had only 10 degrees of flaps in.

A TBM-700 pilot landed gear up when he did not remember raising the landing gear following a go-around because of animals on the runway.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Departed on time; experienced light turbulence for the first 4 hours of flight. About 2 1/2 hours into flight (FL350); we had pockets of moderate chop. We were told of continuous moderate about 100 west of fix ZZZZ until well beyond ZZZZ1 at our altitude. We requested FL290; but ARINC denied us due to company flight off our right and 1;000 below. We told ATC we could see traffic and could maintain visual; but they didn't care.Not 10 minutes later we began experiencing continuous moderate turbulence with pockets of severe. It quickly migrated to continuous severe turbulence with altitude and airspeed deviations (+/- 100 feet and +/- 15 knots). We were also unable to view instruments any more.We then turned right about 60 degrees and left our offset track and descended to FL290; then FL270 as the ride at FL290 was still intolerable. At the same time; the other company flight executed a turn to the left and descended as well. They also encountered severe turbulence.We broadcast our actions on 121.5 and 123.45. As the event began to end we attempted dispatch and ATC to let them know as well and attempted to get a new clearance back to our filed track.There were no injuries. There were some sick passengers. If it weren't for the Captain staying on top of the PA announcements and a great cabin crew enforcing them I believe the outcome would have been different.We eventually landed at [our destination] 10 minutes early to a round of applause and 1;000 thank yous for a great flight.Learning what took place: the Extended Range Twin Operations (ETOPS) procedures work. They work well. ATC is a source; but with 1940's technology you may be on our own. Also; multiple seatbelt announcements are vital as there is always some passenger that thinks we are overselling the turbulence problem and feels it is okay to get up and get something out of the overhead bin. Situational awareness is key. Don't start thinking about what you want to do as the event happens. Have an escape plan in your back pocket always.

A Boeing 737 flight crew reported experiencing severe turbulence while on an oceanic flight plan. The captain exercised emergency authority; turned off course and descended to a smoother altitude. This action was done in accordance with established overwater emergency procedures.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

It was the first flight of the morning and also the first flight of the trip for me. I just met the crew; me and the FO [First Officer] never flew with each other as well as being new. Also; we never had been to this airport before. Everything was normal as far as boarding; we started both engines at the gate because the end of the runway was very close to the ramp. The FO called for taxi and ATC says taxi to Runway 27. While taxing I was telling the FO about the hydraulic procedure and asking him when he turned the hydraulic switches from on to auto. During that brief conversation I passed [Taxiway] A5 and was told by ATC to stop and do a 180 back to [Taxiway] A5. (Which is the beginning of the runway) and given the Tower number. I called them when we landed in ZZZ1 and he said it was common (it happens about once a week) and they will soon be posting that area as a hotspot. The rest of the flight was normal ops.Causal factors: It was the first flight of the morning and it always seems rushed; combined with the new weight and balance and a new crew; it felt like I was trying to catch up. Also; it was a new unfamiliar airport with the runway about 100 yards away; combined with a somewhat vague restricted area on the other side of the field. I believe this was the subtle chain of events along with a brief disruption in my situational awareness that was the direct cause.I believe I should have looked a lot closer (zoomed in) at the airport diagram; and should have briefed the FO exactly where the runway entrance was at [Taxiway] A5 and where the restricted area boundaries were. Also; as I mentioned before; and ATC also told me; they need to revise this chart and put that area as a hotspot because it's so easy to pass if you're not completely focused. Also; I should have waited to ask the FO about the hydraulic procedure till later. Also; as far as the chart goes; not only should this area be a hotspot but it should be magnified in the corner of the chart as well as having a description on the 10-7 pages that covers both sides of the airport where the boundary is.

Air carrier Captain reported missing a turn at Taxiway A5 in DLH airport. Captain stated ATC mentioned it was a common occurrence at the location in the airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 500; Flight Crew Type 100

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working with a student pilot in the traffic pattern at FFZ. We were conducting multiple touch and goes on runway 4L. On downwind; Falcon Tower announced to us 'number two 4L cleared touch and go 4L; follow the citabria on base'; we responded that we had the traffic in sight and continued the traffic pattern. The tower told the aircraft behind us to follow our aircraft and they were also cleared touch and go (or land) 4L. Once on final approach to runway 4L; I noticed the aircraft that was supposed to follow us was around 10-20 ft above us and our wingtips were 10-20 feet apart. I don't believe the low-wing aircraft was able to see us; and I was unable to maneuver the aircraft out of the possible collision course much because of low altitude and parallel runway in use. I announced to tower that there was an aircraft parallel to ours. Once I made the radio call; the pilot of the aircraft said 'go-around'. The tower acknowledged the other aircraft's go-around; and had told them that they were supposed to follow our aircraft. There was some haze so it could have been that the traffic behind us had never seen us due to the fact our aircraft is white; or that they were following the citabria instead of our aircraft. Tower never advised the other aircraft that they had turned too early.

DA40 instructor pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft on final approach. The other aircraft had been instructed to follow the reporter; but apparently followed the aircraft ahead.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was final monitor and was the first to notice Aircraft X on the RNAV 17C Approach. It has previously been identified that you cannot run an RNAV approach during simultaneous instrument approaches with the displaced threshold that we currently have to 17C. The aircraft landed without incident but this was an illegal approach. It has been deemed illegal to run the RNAV approach to 17C due to lack of vertical guidance. What makes this interesting is the legal approach is the LOC 17C which also doesn't have vertical guidance.

Dallas TRACON Controller reported not being able to run an RNAV approach while running simultaneous ILS approaches.


Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After spending 15 to 20 minutes coordinating with Dispatch for an MEL and performance data computations; ATC was eager to move us off the gate. Startup flows and sequence was initiated; and one (#2) engine was started. Immediately after the Ground Crew disconnected and drove off; Ramp pushed us to Tower 'for clearance.'  First Officer switched the radio frequency and Tower quickly instructed us for an immediate taxi. Upon releasing the parking brake to begin taxi; I noticed the flaps at zero and the 'A' pumps were off. I immediately stopped the aircraft. (We moved approximately two to three feet.) I set the parking brake and the First Officer requested a short delay for taxi. We then started the #1 engine; set the flaps to 1; and completed the Before Taxi Checklist. Subsequent operations were normal.  Our delay with Dispatch to coordinate the MEL and associated communication must have pressured Aruba/Beatrix ramp to get us off the gate and Tower to get us moving. As a Crew; we were already 'in the Orange' after working to push off and get the engine started and; when switched to Tower and told to begin taxi; we fell into the trap of focusing our attention on the radios and taxi operation without first ensuring we were ready to do so. Tower was in a hurry to get us moving The procedure for giving Aircrews clearance over the already congested and busy Tower frequency in conjunction with taxi is full of pitfalls. It would be much easier if Ramp could give us our clearance and then we could briefly confirm it with Tower before taxi.  Lots of moving parts in a short duration.

Crew began taxi before completion of the engine start sequence and post-start checklist. As a result; the aircraft was not properly configured and all hydraulic systems were not turned on.  Crew faulted the urgency from Tower to move the aircraft and recommended that local procedures be changed so that flight clearances are not broadcast to crews over the busy tower frequency.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170.1; Flight Crew Total 17006.6; Flight Crew Type 6767.5

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were being vectored for a visual at ZZZ following a go-around. ATC instructed us to descend to 4;000 [feet]. I started a V/S descent; at about 4;600 feet; ATC advised 'Stop descent; traffic alert 11 o'clock; 1 mile altitude indicates 3;700 [feet]' I clicked off the autopilot and leveled off at 4;500 feet. About the same time; TCAS issued a 'traffic traffic' call. We sighted the VFR aircraft; which appeared to be close off our left; and maintained visual separation as instructed by ATC.  Our recommended procedure of selecting TA on simultaneous parallel approaches (ZZZ 10-7) sets us up for not having TCAS RAs available following a go-around. We aren't trained; nor did I ever think about; going back to TA/RA after our Tower instructed go-around. It wasn't until we heard 'traffic traffic' that I remembered we were still in TA.  This incident followed a go-around; and we were extremely busy setting up for a new approach to a different runway.  We were never closer than 500 feet from the VFR aircraft to the best of my recollection but was still surprised by the proximity of the VFR aircraft.  Shortly after ATC advised us to descend to 4;000 feet. then cleared us for the visual approach [Runway] XXL.  I contacted the [Chief Pilot] to report the incident shortly after we landed.

A320 Captain reported after an ATC requested go-around; they encountered TA while on the return visual approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 1190

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Before entering Runway XX I announced my intentions to depart and leave the area on a southeast heading. After my rollout about 400 feet down the runway I heard a helicopter pilot report his departure from the field left of Runway XX. He would be heading south. When I was airborne and climbing out I looked to my left and saw said helicopter about 100-150 feet off my left wing. I performed a hard climb and continued on runway heading until clear of the other aircraft.

Cessna 350 pilot reported taking evasive action after takeoff due to a helicopter executing a simultaneous takeoff from the opposite end of the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 200

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I arrived [on an IFR flight] and received fuel and added 2 qt of oil and filed a IFR plan for the return. I departed and received radar vectors from the tower and departure. At around 6;000 feet I had a very sudden and large power loss. I contacted departure and [requested a return to the field] with a subsequent safe landing. The shop that looked at it found the number 5 air intake line had come loose. They advised and repaired with normal performance restored.

The pilot of a C206 reported a power loss during climb out with a subsequent return to the departure airport. Maintenance personnel identified that an air intake line had come loose.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1470; Flight Crew Type 150

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 195; Flight Crew Type 37

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Upon completing landing for a touch and go; I (the instructor); called out to the student that I was bringing the flaps up and was about to tell him to go full power. The student reached over and put the gear handle into the 'up' position. This caused the nose gear to collapse and the airplane to skid on its nose. The props also struck the ground; due to not having enough clearance now that the nose gear was up.

After landing for a touch and go; I tried to pull the flaps up but instead grabbed the gear handle and put it in the up position. This caused the nose gear to collapse and the nose of the airplane to drop. The props struck the ground because of no clearance and the nose skin was damaged.

The pilot and instructor of a BE-76 reported a landing gear collapse during a touch-and-go when the pilot in training manipulated the landing gear control rather than the flap control.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

A military fighter jet at 39000 feet; had an equipment suffix of /W; which made it RVSM capable. A different military fighter jet 60-70 miles behind the first one; checked on frequency. It was showing NON-RVSM capable at 41000 feet. Instinct caused us to question the first one. The pilot stated they were; in fact; NON-RVSM capable. We notified the supervisor and changed the aircraft's equipment suffix to /I. We were notified that separation had been lost with an aircraft at 38000 feet and an aircraft at 40000 feet.

An F/A18 filed a flight plan with an equipment suffix indicating they were RVSM capable which permits ATC to use 1;000 feet vertical separation above 29;000 feet instead of 2;000 feet. The Controller asked the pilot to verify its equipment suffix type. The pilot responded with slant India which is not RVSM capable. The aircraft had passed two other aircraft with 1;000 feet of vertical separation prior to the Controller finding out the wrong suffix was filed.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 454; Flight Crew Type 380

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was demonstrating how to perform the Turns-around-a-point maneuver to both of my Students. We had completed our pre-maneuver flow and made a radio call announcing our intention to perform Ground Reference Maneuvers within the vicinity of [two] practice area checkpoints. I then proceeded to descend from 1;700 AGL to 1;000 AGL and began demonstrating Turns-around-a-point. As half the maneuver was completed; my backseat student called out a Cessna to our 7-8 o'clock approaching us from below. I aborted the maneuver and proceeded to climb; the conflicting traffic was then at our 9 o'clock; and at an approximate altitude of 500-600 AGL; passing right below us.I heard no other radio calls indicative of someone operating within the same area; or heading towards the area I was operating. A company aircraft made a radio call immediately after the event; stating a position and direction that seemed coincident with where the conflicting traffic would be after the event had occurred. I was unable to verify if they were the encountered traffic; as they had not stated their altitude. No one else had mentioned the occurrence over the practice area frequency. I believe that a lapse in communication contributed to this event.

C172 flight instructor reported an NMAC while conducting ground reference maneuvers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 4300; Flight Crew Type 130

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While on descent into Eagle; I was cleared for the LDA 25 approach after the Kremmling VOR. While on the initial segment of the approach; I was informed that Denver Center was getting a low altitude alert on the aircraft. Upon review of the approach plate; I realized that the altitude on that initial segment was 13;800 feet prior to AQULA Intersection; not 12;900 feet. So; I corrected the altitude and the flight continued to Eagle uneventfully. I realized after the fact that I did not see the 13;800 feet when I first looked at the plate because of the terrain depictions behind it. Regardless; I will more carefully review the published altitudes on all segments of the approaches.

EMB500 pilot reports descending below the MEA after passing RLG on the LDA DME Runway 25 at EGE due to terrain depiction clutter on the chart. ZDV issues a low altitude alert and the altitude is corrected.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We were assigned the GIBBZ1 RNAV STAR transitioning from MGW to GIBBZ. The Captain was utilizing the VNAV function after the crew confirmed all waypoints and altitudes were properly set in the FMS for descent and approach into IAD. ATC delayed our descent from FL450 and that delay required at least a 4.0 degree descent via the GIBBZ1. Initial descent appeared to be correct based on manually confirming required descent rate. Later; a disparity between FMS 1 and FMS 2 presented a different descent profile. The FMS 1 clock froze and shallowed out our descent multiple times despite the PF's attempts to correct the descent rate. FMS 2 presented a level-off pitch which we knew was incorrect. Since there are multiple altitude restrictions with this STAR and an aggressive descent [was required]; we missed an altitude restriction; at/below FL290; at BRNDN by approximately 1;000 feet. In addition; the FMS Approach mode did not provide proper course and vertical guidance during the ILS approach requiring us to utilize LOC2 guidance for the approach. We wrote up FMS 1 with Maintenance after landing. A common technique prior to flying a complex arrival with multiple descent limits is to begin the descent from cruise altitude early (fuel permitting). Also; don't trust VNAV; stick with using VS in the Citation X and mentally calculating required descent rates (old school method).

When they experienced malfunctions of both FMS systems while flying the GIBBZ RNAV STAR to IAD; a Citation 750 flight crew failed to comply with an altitude crossing restriction at BRNDN.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

[We were] descending to 10;000 FT approaching TENCO. NORCAL called out climbing traffic to our north--then gave us two vector headings in quick succession. We then got a TA at approximately 10;200 FT followed by a descend RA--followed immediately by a climb RA. I disconnected the autopilot and flew the escape maneuver. At about 10;400 FT we got an 'adjust vertical speed' RA followed quickly at about 10;500 FT by the 'clear of conflict' advisory. I never saw the traffic but believe I saw an altitude difference of -200 FT on the ND.

[We were] filed on the Flunk Three Arrival into SMF; cleared to descend to 10;000 and direct to TENCO....Upon landing I talked with a supervisor at NorCal who told me the traffic was a VFR Cessna Conquest climbing out of Grass Valley who happened to request flight following. I told her my concern that we had so little warning and separation. She said the Conquest was operating within its rights flying through an area where IFR traffic was descending into SMF and it could happen again anytime.

An A320 flight crew descending on the FLUNK Arrival to SMF suffered a TA\RA conflict with a VFR Cessna Conquest in the process of requesting flight following from ATC during its climbout.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During boarding; Flight Attendant X noticed passenger in XX4 not wearing her mask fully. He kindly informed her that her mask must completely cover her nose and mouth. She said it wasn't comfortable; that it kept slipping off her nose.Flight Attendant X kindly offered her a new; more secure mask. She refused. Flight Attendant asked for a third time to cover her nose and mouth with either covering. She told him that she was fine; and to leave her alone. Flight Attendant X told me about the situation. I told the Captain. He; as most Captains agree: If someone doesn't listen to these rules; they probably won't observe other rules.The gate agent spoke to the passenger twice. Then a Customer Service Supervisor met the aircraft to escort her off the plane. The passenger then proceeded to try to speak to the Captain whilst passing through to the jet bridge. The Captain continued to support us; stating that she disrespected the crew. As she was trying to reason with our Captain; it was past departure time. The Customer Service Supervisor asked her 3 times to leave the plane. He reminded her that he asked her three times to deplane. She finally did; without further incident; but she caused a delay.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed from the flight due to refusing to adhere to face mask policy.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While flight watching; a UAV ran off RWY XXL/XXR; closing this RWY indefinitely. Our flight was taxiing to the RWY when this occurred. There is another RWY at ZZZZ; XXR/XXL; however it is more narrow that the southern RWY. Upon looking in database; to see if we could use the alternate RWY; this note is contained: 'Runway XXL/XXR restricted from use for MD10/MD11 due to narrow width.' Upon running departure performance in aircraft performance software; performance information is given for XXR/XXL. However; none of this information is published for the crew to see in the JEPPs; and there is no custom [company] JEPP page for ZZZZ. Had I not looked; we were considering departing on XXR/XXL; which would have been a violation of the system limitation. Without access to this information; it is possible that a flight would depart XXR/XXL; especially if it is a last moment decision like today. I would like to propose removing XXR/XXL from the aircraft performance software database so no performance will be given for this RWY; or at least the system limitation information must be made available to the crew so they do not use that RWY. I relayed this information to the crew; and they obviously were very surprised that they had no access to this information; and they were clearly very happy I investigated AIR to see this limitation. Or is it possible that the system limitation is not accurate?

Dispatcher reported concern with critical runway specific takeoff data not being available to the flight crew. Dispatcher obtained the data and relayed to the flight crew.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1926; Flight Crew Type 501

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was returning on an SFRA flight plan; northwest bound through the VFR flyway between BAL and DCA; at an altitude of approximately 1;900 feet. I had not flown this flyway for several years and I was unaware of the recommended altitudes for transitioning VFR traffic (1;500 feet west bound and 2;000 feet eastbound. An aircraft at my 12:00 position flying in the opposite direction about 100 feet above me came into view on my ADS-In display; and Potomac Approach notified me of the potential conflicting traffic. The pilot of the other plane; when notified by Potomac; told Potomac that my plane should be at 1;500 feet. That's when I realized that I was flying higher than I should have been. Potomac could have; but did not give me an indication that I was flying at/near an altitude intended for eastbound traffic; not westbound traffic. I should have been more diligent in checking the flyway chart where these altitudes are noted; as they are not shown on the Terminal Area Chart.

Pilot reported an NMAC with an aircraft in an SFRA due to being at the wrong transitioning altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Ramp Control has been giving aircraft on Taxiway K (an active movement area parallel to a runway) taxi clearances contrary to what Ground Control (GC) or Local Control (LC) gave them. This has put aircraft in unexpected places at inopportune times. I gave ramp Aircraft X at K short of Q for spot 7. Ramp gave Aircraft X K short of V contact GC. Aircraft Y was landing roll on RWY 27R parallel to Aircraft X and had to be told to exit further down the runway because Aircraft X was in the way; blocking runway exits and opposite direction to the flow of traffic. The aircraft behind Aircraft Y almost had to go around. Later Aircraft Z was told K; N contact Ramp. Ramp told Aircraft Z; K short of Q contact GC; which put them in the way of Aircraft A trying to exit RWY 27R. I also found out today that we are unable to hear tapes of Ramp Control; so we are unable to investigate or look into what happened on their end when we have issues or incidents. We have non FAA Ramp Controllers issuing control instructions on active taxiways with no recording or accountability. Ramp control should not own Taxiway J. J should be a movement area controlled by GC. Ramp should only own the alleyways which should remain non movement. This is what is done at LGA and we had none of these issues.

PHL Controller reported problems with the Ramp Tower issuing different instructions than Ground Control causing problems on the airport.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Enroute to BWI we were cleared for the RAVNN6 arrival via the BKW transition. As we started our descent on the arrival; ATC asked us which part of the regulations we were operating under. I told her we were operating as a part 135 flight; and she said 'ok' then handed us off to the next controller. Before I accepted the hand-off; I asked why she needed to know which part we were operating under. She said it had to do with the airspace around Washington D.C. but that we were fine and there was no issue. I accepted the hand-off and we continued the arrival and landed without incident. After ATC had asked us the question about our operations; however; we took a closer look at the STAR on the iPad. We found a small note at the top saying that part 91; part 135 and several other operation types were not allowed to shoot the RAVNN6 arrival via certain transitions; including BKW; which is the transition we were assigned.  The note for this arrival was in fine print at the top of the STAR diagram. If it was in bold print we probably would have noticed it and requested a different transition on the arrival.

Arrival procedures within the DC area and into BWI are restricted to limited types of operating regulations. ATC cleared flight for the RAVNN6 STAR BKW transition into BWI normally prohibited to part 135 operators.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

We were cleared for the MAREO2 departure and assigned Runway 23L for departure.  The ILS 23L DME was NOTAMed out of service (IFVJ).  For departure off 23L the MAREO2 departure reads; 'Climb on heading 227 to IFVJ 2.3 DME then on assigned heading 210; 227; or 242.'   Without an operable IFVJ DME you can not comply with the departure.  The reason that I point this out is that the DME for 23L and other IND runways is periodically NOTAMed out of service.  Whenever this happens IND Clearance still issues clearances that are predicated on these items being operable.  In these cases I will notify either Ground Control or Clearance Delivery that we are unable the departure.  From those interactions I get the impression that the Local controllers are unaware of the discrepancy at hand or maybe unaware of the exact verbiage on the departure plate.  What further piques my interest in this issue is a secondary interaction I have had numerous times with the IND controllers.  Often; even when all equipment is operable; Tower will repeat an assigned heading during initial climb out; and well before the IFVJ 2.3 DME.  It seems the intent in this case is to depart from the MAREO2 departure language and turn prior to the 2.3 DME.  However; I am unclear on what ATC's expectations are.I would like to know if I am correct in not accepting this departure if the DME is OTS.  I would also like to better understand what should occur in the following situation: Cleared via MAREO2; all equipment operable; Tower clearance of; 'Cleared for takeoff Runway 23L; fly heading 210' (At this point I'm following the clearance to fly runway heading to IFVJ 2.3 then turning to 210).  Once airborne cleared by Tower to (turn left heading 210; contact Departure).  Final suggestion: Share report with ATC for feedback and possible follow up with IND ATC.  I don't believe they should issue the clearance for this departure; or similar ones; if the equipment it is predicated on is inoperative.

Pilot reports of issue where DME that is OTS is still being used for clearances he is receiving out of IND airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 236; Flight Crew Type 236

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I lost all electrical power in my aircraft. The radios began to go first; and I advised ATC I may lose contact. Eventually all of the radios failed and I squawked 7600. Once I noticed that all my lighting outside the aircraft failed; I felt increasingly more unsafe. I squawked 7700 as I turned toward ZZZ; the most well-lit [airport] around me. I visually identified the direction of arrivals and departures and stayed well out of the way. I circled over the downtown area until I could get a hold of someone on the cell phone (911; TRACON; tower etc). Eventually 911 relayed my number to the tower and the tower called me. Once the airport was mine; I landed uneventfully. My primary concerns with this emergency were:1. Get to a well-lit area where I could be seen.2. Get to an area with the most services available in the case of additional failures. 3. Have a long runway available for a no-flap landing.4. I had zero cell service at [my] location. I did not get service until I was approaching the [metropolitan] area. My only form of communication was my cell phone; so this was a big factor.The following days were uneventful; and I also departed uneventfully.  On the way out to fly the plane to where repairs could be made; I lost my radios again. I had been able to depart the airport and most of the airspace legally; with two-way radio communication as well as Mode C reporting equipment. Once that failed; I expected another call from TRACON; and of course I got it. The controller was very nice and understanding and was glad I got to my destination safely. It appears this occurrence wasn't a very big deal; however; I am expecting to do a lot of paperwork over the first incident. What I learned from the incident:1. Don't get short sighted. I did not consider the nearby Class C and D airports because I had fixated only on getting to [the nearby large airport]. In hindsight; it may have been less of a hassle to divert to a less busy airport.2. I would have preferred not to clog up [the large airport]. In my decision making; this was obviously a factor; but I was not so concerned at the time with clogging up the airport as I was with getting to a well-lit area. Next time; I will take this into consideration.3. I will be buying a hand-held radio after this incident. A hand-held radio would have negated a lot of uncertainty on my end; as well as ATC's end. If I was in contact with someone; perhaps a controller suggestion would have helped avoid a diversion to the big busy Bravo airport. If I was in contact with someone; I would have felt much more calm and would have given myself space to think.

C172 pilot reported diverting to a large international airport after experiencing communication failure related to loss of electrical power.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Per LOA with PHX Approach; aircraft on the Jesse Arrival can be blended/stacked with EAGUL Arrivals. Controller in PHX Approach had already asked me to pull out 1 Jesse arrival if the inbound stream which I complied with. His communication was rude and vague. The aircraft mentioned above were coordinated with the Apache Sector Controller. I coordinated descending to 140 and 250 knots to protect for Aircraft X. The rude controller responded 'What am I gonna do with that?' I told him I had no idea because I don't work in that facility but I was complying with the letter. He told me he wasn't going to accept the handoff and to spin him. I told him I wasn't going to spin him; that I had numerous EAGUL arrivals in the stream behind him and that he needed to take the handoff. He told me no; he wasn't going accept the aircraft and to spin him. I told him I absolutely was not going to spin the aircraft unnecessarily. I hung up [and] waited for him to accept the hand off which he didn't do. I called him back and told him he needed to take the hand off and comply with the letter and he refused. I decided instead of risking safety of flight for all aircraft on the EAGUL behind him due to this controller's lack of ability or understanding of facility agreement letters; I would let the aircraft continue. At no time was safety compromised. I shipped the aircraft to Phoenix Approach Control without a handoff. I would address the issue at the TRACON level. It's been an ongoing issue with P50 and ZAB.

Albuquerque Center Controller reported an airspace deviation due to unprofessional Phoenix TRACON Controller not accepting the aircraft.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 25

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was not the pilot in command. [We were] departing from TEB on Runway 28 [24] with a Ruudy 4 departure. Departure Control stated that a possible deviation might have occurred. The turn to WENTZ was late. There is no fix for the turn. A 240 degree track is held until intercepting a 260 degree bearing to WENTZ. [It is] difficult to see while fighting strong crosswinds and turbulence at 1;500 FT at night. Recommend a fix to be assigned at the intersection of the 240 degree track and the 260 degree bearing to WENTZ. This would allow the GPS to direct the path required.

PA60 pilot reports a possible late turn toward WENTZ during the RUUDY 4 from TEB.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The scanner radio room is located in a busy hallway at [location] on the X-Concourse. During peak times; many employees are accessing the scanner radio room for equipment needed for their shift. Recently a temperature check station was installed near the scanner radio room in an already busy hallway where many employees are accessing for various areas. The added temperature check station is creating congestion where six feet of spacing for COVID is not able to happen. As much; many lead kits taken from the scanner radio room are being taken off the counter and coming close to hitting people in the hallway when congestion is high during peak times.

Ground employee reported that the addition of a temperature check station nearby an equipment room creates congestion; making it difficult to social distance during busy times when many people are in the hallway.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During the takeoff roll; we felt an abrupt pull at 80 knots. It felt as if we had a tire blow or hit something. It was very brief but the airplane continued to accelerate as if nothing happened. All engine and EICAS indications were normal. The same thing happened at rotation. The aircraft got airborne without a problem. At about 200 feet AGL it happened again very abruptly. At about 1000 feet AGL the left engine went to idle. Both power levers were in the takeoff detent. I told the FO 'we have a left engine failure' He agreed.  He notified ATC. Tower gave us a heading of 090 and descend to 3000 ft. We were climbing thru 3;800 at that time. I had the FO read the QRC for engine failure. I did not shut the left engine down because it was not on fire and still had a little bit of thrust. I got the visual approach and cleared to land on the longest runway. We landed without incident. We had crash and rescue confirm that our engine was not on fire. We then returned to the gate and deplaned the passengers.The previous crew wrote up an ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) exceedance. Maintenance cleared it. Crews should always keep in mind that there could be an engine failure with past engine problems.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after the #1 engine rolled back to idle.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy; Airport

After landing Runway 1L at LAS and clearing the runway at Taxiway Sierra; I contacted Ground Control to taxi to the FBO ramp. Our instructions where to taxi straight ahead on Sierra; make a left turn onto Taxiway Hotel then a right turn onto Taxiway Whiskey into the ramp. I wrote the instructions down; had my iPad out and on the taxi chart and reviewed them with the PIC. I told the PIC taxi straight ahead and make the left turn onto Hotel. The PIC refused and turned left onto the inner taxiway Foxtrot placing us on the wrong taxiway and therefore not complying with our clearance. I told him we were on the wrong taxiway and to stop. When he didn't; I stepped on the brakes bringing the aircraft to a stop and showed him the taxiway sign in front of us that indicated we were now on Foxtrot instead of Hotel. I informed Ground Control of our mistake and she issued a new clearance to continue on Foxtrot to Whiskey and into the ramp. We continued with no further mistakes. This was at the end of a long day that resulted in a fatigue call but that is no excuse. Taxiing the aircraft is a fundamental and basic skill. The issue was the Pilot-in-Command's refusal to listen to the Controller's instructions and my directions while showing him our location on the taxi chart. I do not know if this was fatigue; insistence; confusion or incompetence on his part. The prudent thing would have been for him to just stop the plane and sort out the taxi route instead of refusing to listen to me. This shows a blatant disregard on his part for CRM procedures and a total lack of professionalism. I had to intervene and stop the plane myself and force him to see his error. I believe with our reduced training foot print the principles of good CRM and airmanship are beginning to wane. This error is an example. We need take more time to enforce and implant the concepts of CRM. This error could have easily been prevented.

The Captain (SIC) of a Citation Sovereign took the initiative and braked the aircraft to a stop when the Captain (PIC) was unresponsive to his insistence that they were taxiing on the wrong taxiway per their ATC clearance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Round trip to MMUN is normally scheduled for 7:45 flying time with aircraft equipped with life rafts. Flying time for non-life raft equipped aircraft is approx 8:10 and two crews operate the round trip or the crew RON's in MMUN. We arrived at aircraft to find it non-life raft equipped but filed over the gulf beyond 162 NM. We advised the Dispatcher and he re-dispatched the aircraft; with final paperwork arriving at departure time. We hurried to make departure and after takeoff; realized we were probably not legal to make the round trip due to the additional time required for not crossing the Gulf of Mexico. Upon arrival in MMUN; Dispatch was able to produce paperwork which suggested we could accomplish the flight in under eight hours. I'm not sure we actually did the round trip in under eight hours using the 'wheels rolling method' that the company uses for FAR compliance. However; the more troubling aspect of this was Scheduling's insistence that 'legal to start; legal to finish' applied in this case. They argued that because we showed up to work intending to fly under eight hours; we were legal to finish regardless of the circumstances. I believe that as soon as we showed up to work with an aircraft incapable of making the round trip under normal circumstances (non-life raft equipped aircraft;) we were NOT legal to start; therefore; not legal to finish. Clearly the company knows this as all advance pairings where non-life raft equipped aircraft are anticipated for this route is scheduled with either two crews or an RON; and pairings where life raft equipped aircraft are anticipated are scheduled in advance with one crew. I believe Scheduling is stretching the intent of 'legal to start; legal to finish' beyond reasonable. I don't believe Scheduling should consider you having started legally when you arrive at work to find they have assigned an aircraft incapable of legally completing the scheduled round trip. They believe because you showed up to work intending to have an aircraft capable of making the round trip legally; regardless of the fact that the company long ago changed the legal aircraft out. I believe this should be clarified to both Scheduling and flight crews one way or the other.

A B737-NG crew originally scheduled to fly a non EOW aircraft to MMUN over water were rescheduled over land and exceeded eight hours but were told because the original over water flight was less than eight hours they were legal to fly the rescheduled flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After pushback; we were cleared by Ramp Control to taxi to Spot 7 and contact Ground Control. Prior to reaching Spot 7; we were unable to make contact with Ground Control and had to stop at the assigned spot. Once contact was established; Ground Control cleared us to taxi. We verified the area was clear and I attempted to taxi forward. However; the aircraft would not move forward even with the power at 40% N1 for several seconds. We verified the brakes were released and tried again; with the same result. We were apparently stuck in a depression in the pavement and; since we were reasonably certain the area around us was clear; I increased power to 50% N1; in excess of the AOM (Aircraft Operation Manual) maximum of 40%; to get the aircraft moving. The flight continued safely with no further issues.

Air carrier Captain reported pavement depression necessitated excessive thrust application to move aircraft at BOS airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 1500

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Green Hydraulic System reservoir overheat followed ECAM and turned off PTU and Green System engine driven hydraulic pump. [We] coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. [We] obtained landing distance from Dispatch. [We] explored issues and expectations with Maintenance Control. Confirmed we could not use Green System unless overheat corrected itself. Per non normal checklist- extended landing gear (manual gear extension produced normal gear down/locked indications). Declared emergency and requested emergency equipment due to loss of nose wheel steering. Long downwind/final; normal landing. [We] stopped on runway then exited on high speed and stopped. Requested tow in from company.

Just prior to the top of descent; we received a Green Hydraulic System overheat ECAM. The Captain ran the ECAM checklists which led to turning off the Green Engine 1 pump and the PTU. The Captain; after completing the checklist; reviewed the Manual Landing Gear Extension checklist as well and briefed me on both. He then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and discussed issues and options. He then briefed the flight attendants of the issue. We then extended the gear manually and made a normal landing. We cleared the runway and stopped and were then towed to the gate.

A319 flight crew reports a Green Hydraulic System overheat ECAM just prior to start of descent. ECAM actions are complied with and crew lands normally after extending the gear via gravity extension; with a tow to the gate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 210

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

I was climbing out of 15;000 feet to FL230 when my TBM had a cabin decompression light come on. Everything else looked normal but I put on my mask and the told a lady controller I had a decompression light on and wanted to drop down and she asked if 11;000 would be ok and I said great and meant it. She was perfect. I then had to drop down to 10;000 to finish my trip. The next day another pilot and I took the plane to FL230 and everything checked out but I am going to take it the shop and have them check it out. I think it may have had a bad signal from one of the sensors which read false.

TBM pilot notices a cabin decompression light passing 15;000 feet and descends to 10;000 feet to complete the flight. The next day the aircraft is taken up to FL230 without any issues.


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 15154; Flight Crew Type 2325

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

While taxiing to RWY 28L on taxiway A1 at HWD; I passed the hold short line before I realized it. There were several contributing factors:1. The hold short line markings were not very well marked (faded).2. The hold short line markings were located in an unusual (non-standard) location relative to the run up area. They are located before the run up area; instead of between the run up area and the runway threshold which is normal; so during taxi; we were expecting and looking for them further ahead beyond the hold short area.3. Taxiing uphill on that taxiway with the sun shining in our eyes made it difficult for the crew to see any markings; and especially the hold short line until we were right on top of it (First Officer saw it just as we crossed it; I did not see it at all as I was looking up at the time).4. An outside distraction occurred at the moment we were about to cross the hold short line: I was looking up at two light single engine aircraft maneuvering close together on what seemed to me to be an unusually low and tight base to final turn right in front of us. Because I was looking up at them for a few seconds; I did not see the hold short line as I crossed it; though my First Officer noticed it just as we were about to cross it. He failed to call it out. We are conducting additional CRM and SOP training to address that failure.Because of the unusual location of the hold short markings for Runway 28L on taxiway A1; I think that the airport should put up a vividly marked sign at the entrance to taxiway A1 that warns of the unusual location of the hold short line. Maybe a white sign with a red border or similar.

Gulfstream Captain reported they passed the Runway 28L hold short line on Taxiway A1 at HWD.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167; Flight Crew Total 2959; Flight Crew Type 1809

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Taxiing to the runway we stopped the aircraft short of the takeoff line. The parking brake was set with both engines running and out of feather. We received a Number 2 RUD ISO Valve caution light followed by a Nose Wheel Steering caution light then noticed the aircraft moving forward. We stopped the aircraft using normal braking and noted the Number 2 system quantity was at 0.5 quarts. We had lost all pressure from the main and standby pumps; and also the parking brake accumulator pressure. We alerted ATC and taxied onto the cargo ramp. The Flight Attendant called and said passengers noted fluid on the right main gear; so we decided not to taxi to the gate. Trailing aircraft also noted the fluid on the ramp and smoke from the brakes; but no indication of fire. The firefighters arrived and choked the aircraft since we had no parking brake; then we shut down the aircraft and the passengers were bused back to the terminal. Failure in the Number 2 hydraulic system; most likely a hose or brake caliper failure on the right main. No abnormalities were noted on taxi out; or the previous flight. We discussed the amount of control remaining with the loss of the Number 2 hydraulics and determined the aircraft was safe to move off the taxiway; but with the fluid on the wheels we decided it was not safe to return to the gate. We shut down in a safe location and the passengers were deplaned when the buses arrived. There were no indications on preflight or leading up to the event that suggested the failure was to occur. However it was my understanding; and that of every pilot I have talked to; that in the event of a hydraulic failure the parking brake accumulator operated outside the system and would hold pressure and retain the fluid regardless of system operation. It is worth noting that the accumulator; at least in this instance; will bleed down; and the aircraft must be secured prior to engine shutdown.

During taxi; we were number three or four for takeoff. While stopped with the parking brake set; the First Officer stated that we had a hydraulic ISO caution light. I looked down at the hydraulic panel and saw that the Number 2 quantity and pressure were below normal. I happened to look up to find that the aircraft was rolling forward and to the right (with the parking brake set). I applied the toe brakes to bring the aircraft to a stop. We contacted Ground Control and asked to pull off the taxiway into the non-movement ramp to our right. Other aircraft began saying on frequency that they observed smoke and fluid coming from our right wheel area. The Flight Attendant also called and said that passengers were seeing smoke coming from the wheels. I taxied into the ramp and brought the aircraft to a stop. At this point we saw that the Number 2 hydraulic quantity was basically zero; as was the parking brake pressure; and we had very little pressure. The First Officer then turned off the Number 2 standby pump. The Controller asked if we would like to have the fire trucks come to the aircraft. I said yes; and asked that they chock the wheels for us so that we could shut the engines down. The fire trucks arrived; but there was some confusion about what we needed from them. It took about five minutes for us to communicate that we needed to have the nosewheel chocked before we could shut down the engines. We completed a normal shutdown and kept the passengers seated until buses arrived to take them to the terminal.

DHC8 flight crew experiences failure of the number two hydraulic system while holding short with the parking brake set. The aircraft begins to move and is stopped with with the normal brakes. The aircraft is taxied clear of the taxiway and shutdown and the passengers are bussed to the terminal.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff at approximately 80kt Tower said 'Takeoff clearance canceled; vehicle on runway.'I immediately rejected the takeoff. Accomplished rejected takeoff procedure. When the autobrake engaged in RTO the aircraft pulled to the left. I compensated and brought aircraft to a stop. ATC directed us to exit to the right. ATC informed us that 'there was a lot of blue smoke' from the aircraft when we rejected. Clearing the runway we asked for a spot to stop and made an announcement to the passengers. I also asked if airport operation vehicles that were checking the runway could inspect our wheels. This was done and they said there was no damage. Due to the smoke and the pull to the left by the autobrake system I decided to return to the gate.Maintenance and dispatch were advised and we taxied to gate.

A320 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff at 80 knots when ATC reported a truck on the runway. During the stop the aircraft pulled to the left and smoke was observed; so they returned to the gate for maintenance attention.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Manuals; Logbook Entry; Aircraft; Procedure

My partner and I were assigned to do an ETOPS inspection on Aircraft X. While doing our walk around; we found evidence of a bird strike on the First Officer's side; aft of the radome; and before the pitot tubes. At that time we told our Crew Chief; and Supervisor that we had the item; and our crew chief pulled up the bird strike inspection paperwork. While accomplishing the card; Step 5; tells us to deactivate the GCS antenna; or to [skip] this if no indication of bird strike on the crown. The issue with this is we're told in step 2 to do an inspection from the ground (in which case; you can't see the crown of the airplane). The next item we had; was step 7 (in the notes) that 'If GCS is installed; inspect the GCS Antenna Radome. When we pulled that AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) reference; this was a detailed inspection; of which the antenna needed to be removed to properly inspect it. We then contacted engineering; for relief from these items; as we could not accomplish them as they were written. An Engineering Authorization was issued. We thought nothing of this; until we were brought in today to do the 5 question part of the Investigation Form; by Manager. We found this odd; as he was present at the time this issue was developing; and our understanding; was that anyone involved in the issue; and wouldn't be involved in the Investigation Form process.

Technician reported a procedural deficiency in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual that required an Engineering Authorization.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Flight Attendant #1 became ill and unresponsive during flight. I; Flight Attendant #2 took command of the situation and treated the ill Flight Attendant with First Aid procedures. I relocated ill Flight Attendant to back row of aircraft until flight landed. I then assumed responsibility for the front of the aircraft through landing and gate arrival. Paramedics and law enforcement met flight. Oxygen was used to stabilize ill Flight Attendant. Cabin then became staffed with only two working flight attendants no deadheading flight attendants or cockpit personnel were on board the aircraft. I paged for medical assistance but got no response. I occupied forward jump seat for landing and I assigned Flight Attendant #4 to maintain their own jump seat and safety procedures for the back of the aircraft including door responsibility for both exits. I assumed responsibility for forward door exits.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reports the lead Flight Attendat becoming ill and unresponsive during flight. Oxygen is administered and the flight continues to destination with three working flight attendants.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 260; Flight Crew Type 260

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

When I got my taxi clearance from the SQL Tower; I had to ask for it to be repeated; because the Controller was speaking so fast - and I didn't fully catch what he'd said the first time.After my run up; I received clearance from the Tower for departure. I climbed out of Runway 30; and at about 700 ft. altitude; began to turn to crosswind. As I rolled out; I was confronted with what I believe was a military helicopter just slightly above my altitude passing diagonally in front of me - coming from my right to my left. I immediately banked hard into my downwind turn; and the helicopter passed to my left. We were both at about 800 ft. at that point.As I was completing my downwind turn; I received a call from the Controller asking for a radio check. I responded 'affirmative radio check;' and was then chastised by the Controller for not responding to an earlier call he'd made. He asked if I was aware that I missed that helicopter by about 100 ft. I responded that I was indeed aware of the helicopter when it first appeared in my windscreen and made my immediate right turn to avoid it. The Controller then went on to call another aircraft in the pattern and chastised him for missing two radio calls; followed by a request to stand by for a telephone number to call the Tower after he landed. At this point; I made my left turn to depart the pattern toward the east without further contact to me from the SQL Tower. The rest of my flight over the next two hours was uneventful; and quite enjoyable.However; during the following two days; I got to thinking more about the incident; and thought I ought to see if I could find out more about what had happened. Obviously; I'd missed a radio call from the Controller - as did at least one other pilot in the pattern. The Controller had been speaking unnecessarily fast to everyone prior to this (from the time of my engine start) - even faster than the ZZZ Controllers I occasionally deal with during Class B transitions. It had also been 2-1/2 months since I'd flown in bay area airspace; so I was probably not as attuned to the radio traffic and pace as I might have been otherwise.But still; I wondered what the hell a military helicopter was doing crossing diagonally through the crosswind / downwind pattern at SQL at pattern altitude; and why had the Tower cleared me for takeoff knowing we'd be on a likely collision course. Even if I had heard the missed call from the SQL Controller; what would the instruction have been? If I'd continued straight on my upwind leg; I'd have likely collided with the helicopter coming from slightly above and behind me to my right; or passed immediately under his rotor wash; which also could have been disastrous. I'd have never seen him through my right wing. I suppose the Controller could have instructed me to make an immediate left turn; but I'm only guessing; at this point.I phoned the SQL Tower; briefly explained what happened; and that I'd like to speak with someone who might help me get a better understanding of the incident in the hopes of avoiding a similar situation in the future. The Controller I spoke with said he wasn't in the Tower on that day so he couldn't speak from firsthand experience; but said I should call back the following few days when the Tower Manager; was available.The Controller added that there are literally hundreds of these military helicopters that fly though Bay Area controlled airspaces; including ZZZ Class B; without ever being in touch with the Towers. They basically go where they want whenever they want; he said; and Tower personnel wind up having to scramble pretty hard to divert traffic away from them. That's certainly news to me; but definitely valuable information to have.I spoke on the phone briefly with Tower Manager [in the following days]. He informed me he was unaware of this incident; but promised to investigate it; listen to 'the tape;' and call me back. Tower Manager; phoned me the following day after reviewing the tape and speaking with the Controller on duty.He informed me that the incident actually happened at about XA:05 hrs. (I'd requested my ground clearance around XX:50). Apparently; the SQL Tower was in contact with the military helicopter when it reported inbound toward SQL from ZZZ1. He said the helicopter was instructed by the SQL Controller to cross over the SQL pattern 'at or above 1;200 ft.' It did not do this; and passed through the crosswind & downwind legs of the SQL pattern at pattern altitude (800 ft.); directly in front of me.Tower Manager also said that the Controller had made two radio calls to me during my climb from Runway 30 advising me to 'remain below 800 ft.' He said the Controller also made two calls to another aircraft in the pattern; which were also missed by that pilot; but that this other pilot responded to one of the Controller's calls to me asking if he was supposed to remain below 800 ft. (This was apparently the pilot who was asked to call the Tower after landing at SQL.) Tower Manager acknowledged that the Controller's speech was extremely fast and not well-enunciated; which probably contributed to the confusion. He also acknowledged my request for this Controller to repeat my ground clearance when I didn't understand him the first time.I asked [Tower Manager] whether the Tower could see the altitude of the incoming military helicopter as being at 800 ft.; rather than at the 1;200 ft. it had been assigned; and he said 'yes; of course.' I asked him 'couldn't the Controller have instructed me to hold short; or line up and wait on Runway 30 until after the helicopter had passed?' He agreed that would have been better.I have to be way more attentive to radio calls in the pattern; particularly when the Controller is difficult to understand; whether due to speed; lack of enunciation; accent; etc. [Tower Manager] said he's been a Controller for 25 years; but it's only been in the last 10 that he's learned how to better enunciate his radio communication; which also slows his speech down somewhat - even during frantic traffic periods.I need to get back in the habit of lifting a wing for a clearing turn while in a Tower controlled pattern. Had I lifted my right wing and looked to the side and backward before making my right crosswind turn; I might have seen the helicopter approaching me sooner. Simply remaining below 800 ft. (as the Controller was apparently instructing me); would still have put me on a collision course (or immediately under the helicopter's rotor wash) no matter whether I'd continued straight ahead or turned to crosswind. Had I actually seen the helicopter before turning crosswind; I could have made a hard left evasive turn (if I'd had the presence to recognize the conflict and react quickly enough). I'd mistakenly become complacent when flying in a controlled tower pattern; assuming that the Controllers were keeping aircraft separated. They make mistakes; too.Before ending our call; I asked [Tower Manager] if I should file a NASA ASRS form. He paused; and said that he'd reviewed the incident; spoken with the Controller and me; and that we'd pretty much worked everything out - that we'd all learned lessons from it.[Tower Manager] also asked whether I was flying solo that day; as he knew it was a training aircraft. I said I was. He then told me that when there's a student and an instructor flying together; 'they often turn down the radio volume so they can better talk with each other; and that means they miss Controller calls more often.' I told him that was not my experience at all - that every instructor I'd ever flown with over the last 20 years emphasized the sterile cockpit concept with no unnecessary conversation during critical flight phases such as takeoffs and landings. I said; in fact; that we generally turn the radio volume up when within or approaching the pattern; specifically to help avoid missing radio calls.

Pilot reported a NMAC immediately after takeoff with a helicopter that was crossing the traffic pattern.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

Landing at Dubai International Airport; UAE the following 2 incidents occurred. Landing on Runway 30L; our instructions were; 'Exit high-speed on K-8; followed by right turn on K.' Next; we were instructed to contact Ground. Ground instructions to us were as follows: 'Keep it rolling on K; to KA.' Pilot not flying looked at his commercial chart trying to locate KA. When one looks at the current chart; no such taxiway is indicated. All of a sudden Ground Control said; 'Stop the aircraft; you just transgressed KA and I told you to hold short of KA.' After the stop; we were instructed to continue onto L3; to M; and a right turn onto L. We never did see L; nor is it depicted on the Commercial airport diagram. Subsequently; we stopped; held short of Runway 30R; and asked for 'progressive.' On this particular day Ground Control was very busy; transmissions were stepped on each other; and we did read back all of our instructions. No runway incursions ever occurred on our part. After shut-down; we reviewed our charts. They were current but the taxiways in question (KA and L) are not depicted.

[Narrative 2 contained no substantive additional information.]

The Reporter stated that this was the crew's first flight into OMDB and the language plus the airport ground operation's hurried tempo contributed to the taxiway incursions. The first incursion at hold point KA occurred because KA was not identified on the main airport taxiway chart. As the crew was taxiing they also did not identify the signage painted on the taxiway because sand and intense sunshine had faded the KA paint. After the flight; the OMDB Parking Position chart was referenced and it was then that the taxiway hold position notations were identified. A main airport chart note references parking positions but does not reference detailed taxiway hold positions and the simple note 'FOR PARKING POSITIONS SEE XX-XB' is misleading. The Reporter stated that perhaps the crew would have been better prepared had the main airport chart note stated something like 'FOR DETAILED TAXIWAY HOLD POSITIONS AND PARKING POSITIONS SEE XX-XB. The Reporter also stated that as they entered Taxiway K from KA the Controller's language was not initially an issue but as they progressed the Controller began speaking more rapidly and then language did become an issue.

A CL601 crew landed at OMDB and was given taxi instructions which included a Taxiway KA hold point; but since the main airport diagram did not contain the point ATC instructed them to hold after passing KA. Taxiway hold positions were described on a different chart; not referenced on the main airport diagram.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While being vectored for the ILS 4R into Newark; ATC issued a traffic advisory for an aircraft 500 FT below; opposite direction at approximately 10 to 11 o'clock. Both the Captain and I began searching for the aircraft; I used the TCAS display and stated the aircraft was passing below us. I then spotted the aircraft and called it in sight. Shortly after the TCAS alerted 'Monitor Vertical Speed.' I did not react because the aircraft was level and the TCAS commanded Red for any descent on the VSI. At this point the Captain reacted by pressing the TCS and initiating a descent and calling TCAS descent on the radio; thinking the aircraft was above us. I immediately responded by grabbing the control and stating No; No; No; the aircraft is below us. The Captain then looked at the VSI and began a climb. We leveled off at 6;000 FT. I then inquired if approach knew we were now at 6;000 FT; and the Captain verified that and told ATC that he was deviating for TCAS. Shortly thereafter we were instructed to descend and continued the approach and landing as normal. The threat was the traffic conflict in close proximity. The error was the Captain and I not being on the same page as to the location of the traffic we were looking for. The undesired aircraft state was initiating a descent while the TCAS was alerting to not descend. I will be more assertive when searching for traffic to verify the location of traffic that I am looking for. When calling traffic in sight; using correct phraseology such as '10 o'clock low' will ensure that there is no confusion between crew members as to the location of the traffic in close proximity. I assumed the Captain was seeing and hearing the same cues that I was. When a TCAS alert is triggered especially as the flying pilot; I should verbally respond what my action and intentions are. My lack of action likely lead to the Captain feeling as though I was being complacent to the alert and urged him to take immediate action.

EMB145 First Officer arriving EWR is informed by ATC of opposite direction traffic 500 FT below. A TA is annunciated stating 'monitor vertical speed' with red indicated on the VSI for any descent. The First Officer maintains level flight but the Captain takes control and initiates a descent; which the First Officer quickly countermands. The Captain begins climbing and levels off at 6;000 FT.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 19440; Flight Crew Type 3491

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft touched down with brakes locked faulty emergency brake release. Prop strike.

An M-7 landed with faulty emergency brakes locked and had a prop strike during the sudden stop.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Airborne at XA:32z. Crew received FTX GEAR DISAGREE MSG. GR DOORS WONT CLOSE. Recycled the gear; still had indication. Broken actuator.

Dispatcher reported landing gear door actuator failed causing doors to remain open; resulting in an air turn back and precautionary landing.


Thunderstorm; Rain; Turbulence; Windshear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Physiological - Other; Workload; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

I had routed around the Atlanta Class B airspace while penetrating an area of thunderstorms using visual; radar and Nexrad. Requested climb from 9;000 to 10;000 to get above the tops and better judge appropriate deviation routes. I was also cleared to deviate left and right. I set 10;000 into Altitude Alert; put the autopilot in pitch mode and started climb.I was distracted by the need to make several turns to avoid visual and radar areas of heavy rain while in light to very heavy rain and turbulence. I recall seeing too high a pitch attitude and decreasing airspeed so rotated the pitch wheel down. I was so intent on staying out of the nasty stuff and finding a good way through that I forgot I was supposed to be climbing to 10;000. Approach called to confirm my altitude as 8;300 and asked why I was going down; not up. I told them I was in heavy turbulence and having trouble holding altitude. The autopilot did not disconnect in the bumps. I simply got distracted trying to get through the weather. I re-initiated by climb to 10;000. Approach said there was lower traffic; but was out of the way. Single pilot piston twin; in and out of heavy rain in southeast afternoon thunderstorms; in and out of IMC and worried about a passenger is a full work load. My last real IMC thunderstorm experience was several years ago. The more successful you are at staying out of thunderstorms the less proficient you are at getting through them. My autopilot does not have an altitude preselect which would have avoided the problem. I thought about disconnecting and hand flying; but managing the turns to avoid with radar and Nexrad and the occasional VFR peek took a lot of attention. In hindsight I could have deviated 20 miles north and had a less stressful flight.

An Aerostar 601P single pilot reported difficulties experienced when attempting to avoid thunderstorms and turbulence while circumnavigating the ATL Class B airspace.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We completed a normal preflight and pushed back off the gate. After push back and engine start I noticed that the cabin pressurization display was showing all amber dashes on the cabin rate display. I called Maintenance Control from my cell phone. I was directed to pull out and reset 2 circuit breakers. The circuit breaker reset brought back the missing indications. I told the Maintenance Controller that the reset worked and asked him if he wanted to put the reset in the logbook. I probably should have asked if doing that reset was a 'required' logbook entry; because his answer was not definitive. I'm never sure what maintenance items require a logbook entry or not; so I always ask what ever mechanic responds if there needs to be a logbook entry. I get mixed results on the subject that keeps me asking. So when asked if I wanted to log it; I replied by saying it doesn't matter to me. It's a maintenance item. In hindsight the subsequent flight had a pressurization failure that required an emergency descent with a declared emergency. Now I'm second guessing if the reset required a logbook entry. Though I'm still not sure.

EMB145 Captain reports a pressurization display anomaly after pushback which is corrected by pulling two circuit breakers at the direction of Maintenance Control with no logbook entry. A loss of cabin pressurization event occurs on the subsequent flight requiring an emergency descent.                                  See ACN 1125914


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals

I was coming off a 5-day break and came into work start time XA:00. This desk is not covered by a midnight shift dispatcher. Under the new dynamic dispatch workload management system; that means there is no pass down from midnight shift; no work sheet set up. Once I got Dispatch View and Sabre FPM started up; I saw that the first 4 flights were scheduled to be released at XA:00; XA:00; XA:01; and XA:10. With no idea what was going on in the National Airspace System and no weather or NOTAMS whatsoever; I began my self-brief. As a result; those first 4 flights were released late. I didn't manage to release the XA:10 flight until XA:55. I'm not quite sure how I am supposed to be able to sit down with no information and start releasing flights. A thorough self-brief is required to safely and legally begin dispatching flights. With no briefing from a midnight dispatcher that is a 15 minute procedure. This automatically meant that those first 4 flights were going to be released late. I am worried that management will be pressuring dispatchers to release unsafe and illegal flight releases based on an unrealistically heavy work load from the very start of the shift.

A Dispatcher reported flight releases were delayed due to being scheduled as soon as shift started and without a proper briefing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 200

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

This happened to me again on my return flight. Flying at FL410 I encountered a loss of GPS signal as a result of jamming. On the ATC frequency there were numerous aircraft that were similarly affected. All aircraft had to resort to flying by heading; or an alternative means of navigation. In some cases aircraft had to descend since their AHRS require GPS signals. In my case the disruption to navigation lasted nearly an hour. This extremely frequent jamming of critical GPS navigation is a significant threat to aviation safety. This affects all aircraft and could result in critical altitude changes for aircraft that are required to descend to lower altitude when losing a GPS signal. If can aircraft has to descend to a lower altitude it can have a significant impact on its range and could result in a diversion. Most modern aircraft rely solely on GPS not only for navigation signals in cruise; but also to determine range; fuel remaining; and other critical aspects of flight. In addition this disruption also impact instrument approach procedures. Since the FAA is deprecating VORs; NDBs; and associated approaches; we are becoming dependent upon an unreliable navigation system. Imagine an aircraft on an RNAV approach in IMC and it loses the GPS signal. Not only could it not continue to descend on the approach - the pilot would have no method to execute a missed approach. This jamming has to end.

Eclipse pilot reported experiencing GPS jamming that lasted an hour.