A Piaggio called for taxi from the FBO Ramp and stated he needed a run up. As per APA's orders; I instructed the aircraft to 'Taxi to the North Run Up Area via Alpha' and did not issue a runway to expect for departure as instructed by my ATM and FLM. The aircraft was IFR and taxied into the ramp at A1 and did not pull into the North Run Up area which is in the A1 ramp but it is not marked or charted and I'm done forcing aircraft to move to a small white dashed line painted box area within the A1 ramp that is not charted or marked other than the dashed lines. The aircraft called ready for departure and I informed the aircraft that I was working on their IFR release and did not issue any other instructions because his sequence may change. I received the release from D01 and I then instructed the Piaggio to taxi to Runway 17L via Alpha and the aircraft was not there. As I was calling out to him; he was moving out of the ramp to the Runway 17L hold short bars and calling the Tower. I informed Local Control that he did not receive a runway assignment and taxi instructions and the Local Control informed the pilot. This is an everyday occurrence. We taxi people using confusing phraseology and to an area next to the departure runway and all of the itinerant aircraft thinks they are going to that runway even though they have not received taxi instructions to that runway. We use this phraseology just to get away from not using 'Hold Short' instructions and getting the required read back. I want to be able to use the ramps that I already have available to me. I want to be able to use the .65 and not this confusing APA invented phraseology. Other controllers use excessive phraseology to get the aircraft to comply with the ATM's intentions. We force aircraft to do their run ups in uncontrolled ramps because we have lost huge ramps areas next to Runway 17L and 35R thanks to the ATM. These aircraft are put in danger by doing run ups next to uncontrolled vehicles; pedestrians and debris. STOP THIS PROCEDURE! GIVE US OUR RAMPS BACK! USE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS AND GET THE REQUIRED READBACKS!!!!!

APA Controller expressed concern regarding the locally mandated taxi procedure that allegedly is not in compliance with ATC national requirements and confuses pilots.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were given a service check with some other tasks on the aircraft. We had to change the #1 brake and a nose tire. When we were ready for that; we started gathering all the equipment and Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) and Illustrated Parts Catalogue (IPC) references; and this wrong brake assembly (for aircraft 737-700) was among the others for 737-800; and we happened to pick this wrong one. During this brake change and the other assignments we both failed to double check the part number (p/n) of this brake with our documents on hand. We proceeded with the brake change and since they are very much alike; we never suspected anything wrong. At the time of signing documents; since my partner didn't have a release for the aircraft in work; I signed all documents. The following night; I was informed of the mistake that we made. The brake was replaced at another station with the correct one. I feel very; very sorry for this mistake; it's something that has never happened to me before. I try always to be careful with all work. I'm so sorry for this mistake.

Maintenance Technician is informed after the fact that he and a helper installed a B737-700 brake on a B737-800 and signed it off. The part number was not correct and was detected after the aircraft had been released for flight.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1277; Flight Crew Type 1100

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Departed PHF & just finished climb to 5;000 feet over water; went to lean mixture & engine started running rough then lost power. Was a hot hazy day with ground temps above 90F; advised ATC; (note ATC was amazing in helping); while setting up a glide engine got partial power then slowly starting to develop full power. After landing & having a local mechanic check it out. It was determined it was carb ice. In the short time I was on the ground 5 pilots in the area stopped by & said they have experienced similar situations in that exact area. It seems that on hot hazy humid days over that water there is a greater reoccurrence of carb ice & it should be a warning or pilots should be made more aware this is an area of high carb ice.Also after analyzing the engine analyzer after getting home; the number 2 cylinder went cold during mixture leaning & was an additional cause of power loss.  This is a brand new engine with just over 200 hours. It's a Penn Yann 180 HP conversion; the plane is meticulously maintained & looked after. 200 hour engine should not be having a sticky valve.

C172 pilot reported experiencing a power loss during leaning at 5;000 feet on a hot humid day. As the aircraft descends power increases and the reporter is able to land safely. Carb ice is determined to be the likely cause.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

On arrival into MHT; Captain and I received a 1800 FT radio altimeter indication at 5000 FT.

Air carrier First Officer reported anomalous radio altimeter readings on descent into MHT airport.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Cleared for takeoff 15L turn right to 230. Single engine aircraft traffic in the area. We did not see the single engine aircraft until airborne. The RA went off telling us to climb more. I saw the aircraft and told the copilot to climb more as well. The Tower said something to the aircraft and he started a left turn. We came about within 400 FT horizontally and 200 FT vertically.

On Departure off of 15R IAH talking to Tower we were in a climbing right turn after takeoff to our assigned heading when we received an RA approximately 1;500 - 2;500 FT AGL. We complied with the RA Climb maneuver and when the Captain spotted the traffic it appeared to be no more than 300 FT from our aircraft. The TCAS is all that saved us from a collision with this single engine aircraft. We were never given any advisories from Tower. Our first awareness of this near midair was due to the TCAS. We told the Tower we had just responded to an RA. The Controller seemed indifferent as to the situation. As far as I know we did everything correctly and the RA maneuver did not result in any altitude deviations as we were cleared to climb and maintain 4;000 on departure.

An Air Carrier Crew reported a near miss at about 2;000 FT with a single engine aircraft after takeoff from IAH.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While in the descent Approach had cleared us from 5;000 FT to 4;000 FT. As we left 5;000 FT the Controller informed us of GA traffic in our area. We saw the aircraft in question visually as well as on TCAS and it would have been fairly close but not an issue. Passing approximately 4;500 FT the GA aircraft suddenly turned directly into our flight path which triggered a TCAS RA climb. We climbed approximately 300 FT until TCAS advised clear of traffic; then informed ATC what we had done and continued our descent back to 4;000 FT with no further issues.GA aircraft are a common annoyance and threat in this area. The GA pilots need to be more alert of their surroundings and action should be taken against them when they cause issues such as this with other aircraft; particularly commercial aviation.

An EMB-145 flight crew experienced a close encounter with a light aircraft and complied with a TCAS RA while descending in contact with Approach Control.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Air Carrier X could not hear my transmitter on 132.90. This is located at TVC; and has traditionally been a good frequency. In last few months performance has gone downhill. This aircraft was on the MBS135007 fix at 16;000 feet; and only 16 NM out of my airspace; and they could not hear my transmissions. This is unacceptable; since it will tie up the frequency and cause workload to increase when traffic increases. Either: a) Vote the 132.90 frequency with the 118.05 frequency location (at MBS) b) Install new equipment at the TVC site; and/or find the source of interference; or c) Change the LOAs and SOPs: assign 118.05 to Sector 02; since the main and standby equipment work better in that airspace and have terrific coverage; compared to Sector 01. 125.47 works much better in Sector 01; and covers better than 118.05; with the exception of a 10 NM radius around Y31 airport; which the BUEC on 118.05 works better because it is located there. I fly my personal aircraft in that airspace; and I know all of this to be a fact. Change the LOA's with ZOB to assign all aircraft 118.05 entering Sector 02. Change the LOA with MBS approach to assign all aircraft entering Sector 02 to 118.05.

ZMP Controller voiced concern regarding the recent performance of frequency 132.90; the reporter providing a number of equipment and/or procedural solutions to the problem.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I departed ZZZ1 bound for ZZZ as Aircraft X. After reaching cruise altitude of 8;000 feet I observed the right wing tank fuel gauge showed an increase of several hundred pounds of fuel. I then observed that the filler cap for the right tank stuck BELOW the right wing attached to its lanyard with fuel being vented from the fill opening. The wing tanks feed the main tanks and there was plenty of fuel to reach the destination ZZZ. I diverted with concern that spreading jet fuel over the most populous city in an environmentally conscious state might not be well received. ZZZ2 provided a close alternate over sparsely populated mountains without need to fly over the city proper.As I slowed and descended into ZZZ2 and put approach flaps down; the cap that initially dangled below the wing moved up to the top of the wing still attached to its lanyard and fuel stopped venting from the open filler hole in the tank. This was not a situation where a faulty fuel cap vented fuel 'in place'. I had 30 gallons of fuel added to the right-wing tank in ZZZ2 by an experienced fueler who opined that the cap was secure and apparently worked properly. I was not aware that I should have had a mechanic inspect the cap - and continued the flight to ZZZ in violation of company and FAA policy.

A pilot reported the fuel filler cap came off in flight. The reporter landed and refueled but failed to have a mechanic inspect the cap.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 338; Flight Crew Type 78

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Sterile cockpit was violated throughout this event due to a passenger care issue. FA (Flight Attendant) XX_10 ( XX_3 ) reported neck and back strain after block-in. Strain occurred helping a disabled passenger get out of the bathroom and into her seat using the aisle chair while on approach into ZZZ. After a '5 min' warning call that we would be putting the pax (Passengers) down; the seat belt sign went on for good at about FL220 (22;000 ft). Passing 14;000 on the STAR (Standard Terminal Arrival Route) into ZZZ RWY XXL lead FA (Flight Attendant) called to inform us two FAs in the back were assisting a disabled passenger in the bathroom; along with the passenger's mother; despite the seatbelt sign being on since FL220. FO (First Officer) (PM) (Pilot Monitoring) informed them to let us know when everyone was back in their seats. Passing 10;000 we cycled the no smoking light and they told us they were still assisting the passenger; so we requested and received clearance to slow down on the approach. Captain was PF (Pilot Flying) and FO was talking to the FAs and informed them that we would not land until everyone was back in their seats. We asked the FAs to let us know when they were ready. We had previously briefed the GA (Go Around) procedure and were ready to Go Around if we did not hear back in time. Due to the passenger's disability and size; it took longer than anyone expected. At about the FAF (Final Approach Fix); we finally heard back that they were 'all set' and everyone was back in their seats so we continued the approach and landing. After blocking in; the lead FM (Flight Manager) told us one of the FAs strained muscles helping the passenger and securing the aisle chair while seated in the aft galley jumpseat. At that time we were informed that; although we were told everyone was down in their seats and all set; the aisle chair was not stowed properly and the FA was not in her assigned jumpseat; but in the 3R jumpseat with the aisle chair in the galley. The FM did not know this either. Instead of going through the lead FM only; several different FAs were calling the flight deck; however none gave us this information. One of the FAs (not XX_10 ) reported that she felt rushed despite our assurance that we would not land until everyone was ready because she heard the gear come down; which we did when cleared to slow down on the approach.

Flight Crew flying 757 aircraft violated sterile cockpit rule due to passenger issue in the cabin.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 79; Flight Crew Total 384; Flight Crew Type 238

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was serving as a certified flight instructor conducting part 61 flight training with a student pilot. My student pilot was in control of the aircraft. We were on the downwind for Runway 25. We were told to extend downwind. Soon after was cleared to land Runway 25. We were on an extended final and number 1 for landing. While on final I saw an aircraft on the downwind off my 10 o clock position begin to turn base for Runway 25 and descent rapidly toward us. The other aircraft was descending directly in front of and on top of us on a collision course. ATC was unclear which aircraft was which and therefore unable to provide conflict resolution instructions. I took control of the aircraft and took evasive action; diving under the aircraft and in the opposite direction. We were headed toward a hillside and once I felt that the aircraft was behind us; I climbed at the highest rate possible to get over and beyond the hillside. The other aircraft continued to land. We were circled around the then landed without further incident.

An instructor Pilot reported a NMAC on short final.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Total 12621.97; Flight Crew Type 7330.60

Flight Crew Total 4002.68; Flight Crew Type 2572.63

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

While descending on the STAR ATC notified us of possible hot balloon traffic on or near a fix on the arrival. Shortly thereafter; I saw the balloon directly on our path and at our altitude. I immediately turned 20 degrees right and continued our descent. We immediately told ATC we were deviating to avoid balloon traffic. By the time we were abeam the balloon we were well below it. Unfortunately; neither us or ATC knew if the balloon was tethered. When we were done deviating; ATC cleared back on route. No loss of separation was encountered to the best of my knowledge. While on final approach; we encountered another hot air balloon. We were on final at 1000 feet. We saw a balloon at our altitude just to the right of course. ATC didn't seem to be aware of this balloon. We notified ATC of the traffic. No deviation was necessary. We made a normal landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767 flight crew reported taking evasive action while on approach to Sao Paulo to avoid a hot air balloon.


Flight Crew Total 5331; Flight Crew Type 2529

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

I had Gate Agent tell me I could get the PRR (Pilot Reconciliation Report) electronically over my iPad. I advised them that the policy was still a paper form and that not all stations were able to provide PRRs electronically as yet. Still undergoing beta testing. We were able to verify that the paper copy is still the standard but read that the PRR should be available 10 minutes prior to scheduled pushback.Issues:1. Ten minutes prior to pushback is a busy time in the cockpit. The necessity of returning to the iPad to get another form is unreasonable.2. Reliability of signal; wifi or [data]; at the gate is suspect. I frequently need to leave the cockpit and walk to the boarding area to acquire a signal of sufficient strength to get our required paperwork prior to our flight. This is done at a time when 'time' exists for flight planning.3. My iPad is in airplane mode from the time I acquire my paperwork until the next time I need paperwork. Turning the iPad's airplane mode (battery saving mode) to off to acquire one simple form; at a very busy time in the cockpit; sets up a situation where one would forget to get the device BACK into the airplane mode.4. The recharging device on the Airbus (if it works at all) barely keeps up with the discharge rate if using the WSI function. Having the device depleted; due to omission of the airplane mode; could render REQUIRED AND NECESSARY [publishings] unavailable at a vital time; which is inherently unsafe.5. Whether in the program or not; all armed individuals need to be accounted for and location/affiliation/status known to our crews; but especially for our FFDOs who could find themselves in a compromised position if this data is not provided.Bottom line; it is a small form/gesture that ensures a last minute reconciliation between customer service (our ground security coordinator) and the Captain (our inflight security coordinator) of what assets are onboard and any concerns. I know we want to achieve an autonomous; automated environment from which to operate. This one form NEEDs to stay.

A319 Captain reported that the Pilot Reconciliation Report can be accessed electronically.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5085; Flight Crew Type 2500

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

While on a routine training flight; a runway incursion occurred. A search for traffic was made and a radio call announcing our (the student and I) intention for using Runway XX for stop and go traffic operations (Prior to crossing the runway hold line). After; we taxied into position on Runway XX. It was at this time that we saw Aircraft Y initiate a go-around from Runway XY at ZZZ. No radio calls were received from Aircraft Y. We (Student and I) were not in contact with Aircraft Y until after they initiated and announced a missed approach (the weather was VFR).The training aircraft's transponder was on and set to 1200. I checked the radio gear; and headsets of the training aircraft for proper operation with no abnormalities noted.

C172 flight instructor reported an accidental runway incursion causing an aircraft to go-around.


First Aid Equipment; with Medical Kit & Defibrillator

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We were a little more than halfway into our flight when our Flight Attendant (FA) called concerning a semi responsive 57 year old female passenger foaming at the mouth and vomiting. Under the request of the patient; the patient's sister gave her a nitroglycerin tablet. There were two doctors onboard helping the FAs with the patient. I called ARINC and established a phone patch with MedLink and dispatch. We had to wait at least 10 minutes before the Medlink doctor was able to get to her phone. In the meantime; the two onboard Doctors were suggesting that we land soon because of the possibility of the patient having a heart attack. In my mind I was planning on a possible diversion to [nearby airport]. When the Medlink doctor's finally came online; her accent was hard to understand and the squeal on the radio added to the communication issues. Another issue was the fact that neither onboard doctor could get a blood pressure reading. They explained to me that the quality of the blood pressure cuff and stethoscope was in question. The cuff was too tight and they were not able to hear through the scope; therefore they could not get the pertinent vital signs. After relaying the patient's current condition to the Medlink Doctor; the doctor said to continue to ZZZ. So acting in accordance with our FOM we continued to ZZZ. I was having trouble understanding one of the requests from the Medlink Doctor. After asking a few times for the doctor to repeat the request; and between myself and my First Officer (FO) we still could not understand her instructions. I ACARS'd my dispatcher to see he was able to understand her instructions. He thought she was saying 2 Benadryl tablets. Which in fact was what Medlink was ordering. The onboard doctors thought this was an odd request and asked to speak personally to me on the FA's phone. Under the request of the onboard doctors; I asked the Medlink doctor why the Benadryl? She said it was for the vomiting. The doctors still thought it was a strange thing to order since the passenger was throwing up. I was making every attempt to make sure the medlink had complete understanding of the condition and symptoms of our passenger. I still thought we had some misunderstandings and I wanted to do everything I could to avoid a mistake. There were a few times I asked my FO to listen along with me. I also gave ATC the heads up that we were busy talking with Medlink in case we missed a call. He understood and said no problem.During all of the stressful communications; we were cleared direct to ZZZ; then given a crossing restriction; cross 85 miles southwest at FL230. I watched my FO dial in FL230 into the ALT SEL and said 'FL230 blue'. I watched him then build a fix off the VOR and add the 230 into the altitude box. My oversight was not seeing that he had programmed the wrong distance into his PFD. So basically our fix and our top of descent arrow was incorrect. Also the ATC instructions seemed to have us at a low altitude far from the airport so I asked ATC to confirm the restriction which he did. All of this was happening while I was trying to relay a lot info between Medlink and our doctors. We also [advised ATC of] a medical emergency and notified dispatch. I wanted to keep our speed up and get on the ground. When things calmed down my FO then noticed he built the wrong fix and started down in attempt to make the restriction. I was back on radio duties and told ATC of our mistake. He said not a problem. It was in the early morning hours and hardly any traffic.In the future; I am going to compartmentalize my actions and treat the situation like we treat our emergency procedures when we work our way to the status page on the ECAM. The flying pilot says 'Stop ECAM actions...after takeoff checklist'. I will brief my FOs to do the same thing. Get my attention; then and make sure I watch and confirm the fix was built correctly and all restrictions were entered not just the correct altitude. Also thisis not the first time I have had a medical professional complain about the poor quality of our stethoscope and blood pressure cuff. I will talk to my chief pilot and make him aware of this issue. Things would have gone smoother and there would be fewer distractions if we had vital signs to work with.

A320 flight crew reported they had a medical emergency onboard; difficulty understanding the Medlink Doctor and the Doctors onboard complained about the poor quality of the stethoscope and blood pressure cuff.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was the PF (Pilot Flying) doing CA (Captain) upgrade line check. Coming on the left downwind for runway 19L in ZZZ at 3000 ft. IMC we got a TA/RA and the TCAS was showing a traffic about 3 miles 12 o'clock same altitude; I disconnected the A/P (Auto-Pilot) and A/T (Auto-Throttles) and initiated the TCAS maneuver following the guidance which directed us to climb; PM (Pilot Monitoring) advised ATC and ATC informed us that there were no traffic in the vicinity of the airport and advised us to get back to 3000 ft. and vectored us for the ILS approach 19L and while we're descending back to 3000 ft. the FO (First Officer) side inbound DU (Display Unit) went blank; few seconds later the same display unit on my side went blank as well at this time we were already turning final and I saw the runway and decided to continue to land meanwhile the PM called the ATC and advised them that we had multiple display failures; 2 minutes later we got the displays back and we continued the visual approach to landing.False TCAS TA/RA and multiple display failures.

B737-800 Captain reported TCAS warning on approach.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During a night time flight under IFR in VFR conditions to Boston; we were descending via the QUABN3 arrival.  In the vicinity of UROWT intersection northwest of Boston; we listened to a conversation between Boston Approach and a VFR 'Research' Aircraft Y that was loitering VFR on the STAR corridor at 15;500 feet.  ATC was attempting to move the aircraft out of the arrival area for traffic but Aircraft Y requested to stay on that station for the next hour.  ATC then vectored an aircraft directly in front of us 30 degrees left of course to avoid Aircraft Y.  We anticipated that we would also be vectored off the arrival and shortly after; we were given vectors 30 degrees left of course and advised of the traffic at 15;500 Feet.  We were at approximately 17;000 Feet descending in order to meet the altitude restrictions of the STAR.  Without warning or advising ATC; Aircraft Y turned directly toward us which rapidly triggered a TCAS Resolution Advisory for us to CLIMB.  We immediately reversed the descent and began a climb and advised ATC that we were responding to an resolution advisory (RA).  We observed a 300 foot altitude difference between us and the RED TCAS icon at the closest proximity.  Lateral proximity appeared to be about 1 mile.  The 'Clear of Conflict' message was not heard until we had climbed well above the traffic; to approximately FL180.  We then were re-cleared to resume the arrival although we were unable to descend in time to meet at least one of the at or below altitude restrictions.  Once re-established on the arrival; we landed uneventfully. Suggestions1.  Although we anticipated a vector away from the traffic; an altitude re-clearance above the conflict and release from altitude descent restriction by ATC could have been an easier; faster; and safer way to resolve the traffic conflict.2.  Although ATC is always trying to accommodate VFR traffic requests; in my view the request by the 'Research' Aircraft Y should have been denied until ATC was able to better coordinate a long-term plan for the Aircraft Y's lengthy request to remain on that station and should have given the VFR traffics instructions to advise all changes in altitude or heading.

A Corporate Captain reported taking evasive action from a VFR Small Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Engine near 15;500 Feet while descending on the QUABN3 arrival to BOS at night after ATC allowed the aircraft to remain in the arrival corridor.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Approaching localizer for 16R between CELAK and BUGNE on a heading of 190 approach controller had flight crew fly thru localizer. Shortly after flying thru localizer controller assigned heading 130 and altitude down from 4000 to 3200 along with approach clearance. Just as aircraft was capturing 3200; coincidental with the glide path; we encountered wake turbulence from preceding 737 traffic that had joined localizer from the west side as well. After a few seconds of valiant effort the auto pilot kicked off in a fairly steep right bank; simultaneously we observed a brief (fraction of a second) stick shaker and the low speed cue briefly spiking up 10-15 knots. As pilot flying I already had my hands on the controls and immediately pitched forward and added some power. I did not initiate the stall recovery procedure; contrary to my training; as it was quite obvious that this was not a true low speed event; low speed cue returned to an acceptable spot and good aircraft control was present. It should be noted that we had acquired the airport environment visually shortly before the event. Additionally the ref speed switch was selected to increase at the time of the event. We selected ref speeds off shortly after the event as the airframe was free of contamination and I believe it was free of contamination prior to the event; we just hadn't gotten around to it yet. I don't believe that I was more than 100 feet below last assigned altitude or more than one dot below glide path at any time during or immediately after the event.I believe the cause of this event was the approach controller's tight vectoring of our flight behind preceding traffic which I feel must have been a little high on the approach. My expectation of the ATC system providing adequate clearance between IFR aircraft may have contributed to this event. Additionally the high workload associated with the late turn kept me from monitoring the altitudes of preceding TCAS targets. This is not procedure that I'm aware of but has been proven to be good practice in busy airport environments.

Turboprop First Officer reported momentary stick shaker after encountering wake turbulence in trail of a B737 on approach to SEA.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 6R

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

We were cleared to descend via the BRWNZ 1; landing north; and descended normally without incident. Approaching JIIMM on the arrival; ATC verbally cleared us for the ILS 06R. We sequenced the approach; to include a turn towards DAUGS to intercept the final approach course. As we were flying to DAUGS; approach asked us to state our intentions. We replied that we were flying towards DAUGS to intercept the ILS 6R in accordance with previous instructions. We then stated that we had the field in sight; at which point we were re-cleared for a Visual 6R. We then configured and landed normally; where upon Tower gave us the TRACON number to call. As Captain; I called TRACON. Person was very cordial and went over the STAR and approach plates; highlighting intent at CLE for aircraft to fly over HICKR before turning in on the ILS approach. He acknowledged that this is a procedure that is relatively new to CLE and may not exist in many other places. Finally; he agreed that there was no conflict issue today; and appreciated our review of this procedure with him over the phone. Unclear ATC instructions regarding the interface of points on the BROWNZ 1 STAR and ILS 6R approach at CLE. Clarify phraseology on this arrival to emphasize need to fly to a specific point; such as HICKR; before joining the ILS approach.

Air carrier Captain reported unclear ATC instructions regarding the interface of points on the BRWNZ 1 Arrival at CLE.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25L

While on the ILS 25L; my FO stated; 'Is that a bird?' and pointed to the left side of the aircraft. As I turned to look at what the FO was pointing at; he stated that he saw a UAV of some sort to the left of the approach course. I did not see the object.

Air carrier Captain reported that the First Officer saw a UAS off the aircraft's left on approach to LAX. The Captain did not see it.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 600

I called LVK Tower from Altamont pass for landing. At about the same time a C152 called for landing from Brushy peak. This landmark is about 3 nm North of Altamont pass. The Tower controller instructed me to report 4 miles out for 25R. I believe the 152 was instructed to report a 2 mile left base for 25R. As I reached the 4nm distance; the 152 called 2 mile left base. The controller instructed him to change to 25L and cleared him to land. I called in immediately after that and I was cleared to land on 25R. This resulted in the 152 crossing my flight path. In fact he crossed directly underneath me about 50 feet lower than me.  If I had descended a bit more quickly; we would have collided. I never saw the 152 and I don't think the Tower controller ever told me where he was. I think the 152 might have reported me in sight; I don't remember clearly. He might have been a student pilot.Anyway; because of the near miss and the confusion that almost led to a fatal accident; I believe a careful review of this incident is in order; including review of the recorded audio and radar tracks.

Pilot of C-172 experienced a NMAC with C-152 while on visual approach to a parallel runway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Workload; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working R17 and R11 combined without a D-side. R4001 was active; PXT restricted area was active AOB FL550; altimeters in both sectors were 29.92 or higher. TMU in trail requirements for the JAIKE arrival were at 25nm; meaning I had to provide 30nm to allow for compression. LGA had none. A LGA was released off of RIC directly underneath a line of 4 LGA's with another two coming up from the south with not that big of a gap. I realized that my LGA didn't seem to fit; so on initial call up I issued holding instructions at GARED. Immediately after; Aircraft X checks in near WOOLY going to TEB that I have to get 30NM behind Aircraft Y approx. 10NM east of OTT; NE on the JAIKE arrival. I acknowledge Aircraft X and instruct him to maintain slowest practical airspeed and a climb to FL200; so that I can vector over the top of my SWANN departures.Meanwhile; in R11 I have a RDU descending NE of PXT SW bound from FL230-220; a KRANT departure climbing to FL190 that I need to get above the RDU; the RIC LGA that has holding climbing to FL210; all headed toward COLIN intersection. When I could vector Aircraft X; I restricted the aircraft to 250KTS or less and turn right 140 because the two TEB's were still tied. Both aircraft were still about 30 miles from FUBRR and 27 miles from each other. I turned Aircraft X further right to 160 to increase the spacing even more. When Aircraft X was approx. 15-20 miles behind Aircraft Y I turned the aircraft left to a heading of 020 to point it back towards FUBRR. I issued traffic to the aircraft in R11 approaching COLIN; the KRANT departure now at FL230 climbing; and the RDU passing over the LGA opposite direction. Looking back up to R17; I noticed the spacing I was giving just wasn't enough so I descended Aircraft X to 17;000 to help slow the aircraft down. I then initiated the hand off to R19.I was still trying to figure out where to put my RIC LGA in the line and noticed that R19 had accepted the hand off so I switched the aircraft to their frequency. The aircraft was still on a heading of 020 and I didn't display the heading in the fourth line or coordinate that the aircraft wasn't on the route. During the middle of the day when the airspace in Area 1 can be the busiest; R17/11 should not be combined. And if there is a need; at the minimum a D-side should be there. 25 or 30 miles in trail (MIT) to JAIKE arrivals out of SWANN over WOOLY is a setup for disaster. Vectoring south in conflict with SWANN departures and PHL arrivals in a sector that is barely 50nm wide. Either a new route; or not requiring such large MIT would be my recommendations. Release times have got to improve. The melee of having to find a spot under an entire line? No aircraft should get holding instructions before reaching 10;000 and 5 miles off the departure end of the runway.A shout line to R4001 should be installed. There is a dial line; but by the time you dial the number; someone answers the phone; and relays the cease fire; the aircraft is already out or hopefully not worse. There is one for PXT; I've never understood why there isn't one for R4001 when we can legally vector to the boundary.

ZDC Controller reported having to make a hole for an aircraft that did not exist which resulted in the departure entering holding until it could be placed in a gap.


Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground; Local

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was told to relieve the Tower positions. That included all positions. The weather was IFR with low ceilings and visibility was less than 10 miles. I previewed the area; looked out the window; glanced at the board; noted the runway configuration and then told the controller I was relieving I was ready when he was. He gave me the position relief briefing which included two departures. One was still on our frequency and I'd need to switch and another that was on the climb out with Departure Control. Also was Aircraft X arrival that he was not talking to yet.When Aircraft X checked on with me I acknowledged with 'Aircraft X; CAK Tower; good afternoon; Runway 1 cleared to land; winds....'. The pilot read it back. I noted that he flew through his intercept to the final and was right of course but correcting. Then he went left of course and was correcting back. His altitude was good and then suddenly he descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) and the crossing altitude of the Outer Marker. I issued a Low Altitude Alert but my phraseology was not correct. Shortly after that while I was looking up the crossing restrictions the TRACON Controller called up and gave them to me which I then told the pilot. The pilot acknowledged but never climbed to meet them.During this time there was a new ATIS which I eventually broadcast while the aircraft was on about a 2-3 mile final. Once the pilot got on the ground I issued his taxi instructions. He requested them again. I reissued the taxi instructions. He still did not have them and asked again so I gave them to him one turn at a time. Eventually he got to parking. I was watching as he pulled on to the ramp. I was amazed as he pulled right past the ramp person who was trying to guide them to parking. Eventually I saw the ramp person throw up his hands and walk away because the plane went right past him.After I was relieved from position I went down stairs and spoke to the Controller in Charge (CIC). We discussed the whole situation and I enlightened them about the taxiing and parking of the aircraft. Later I was advised by that the CIC had reviewed the tapes and determined that my phraseology was not perfect. I told them don't worry about my phraseology. I was more concerned about the [passengers] on the plane.

A Tower Controller reported an aircraft on approach flying in an erratic manner; unable to understand taxi instructions and ignored the ramp personnel's instructions.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

2 cleaners came on to service the aircraft in ZZZ. I saw them take trash from the first class pocket and set in into the seat even though they had trash bags. They were doing other things which I hadn't paid much attention to; but as one of the cleaners came to change the first class side trash I told her to not worry about it because I didn't really use it. She said she thought there appeared to be trash in it. I said it was fine. She said 'Really.' I felt now pressured; so said ok; if you want to do it. I preferred they were not touching everything if I hadn't actually used anything after I had sanitized it. The other cleaner comes into the galley and they are talking and I'm near row 1. I realize my coffee cup is up in the cubbie/sink area and want to remove it while they are up there cleaning. I say excuse me and reach past the man and grab my cup on the counter. She has a trash bag in her hand. I take a drink. It is not my coffee but a cup; trash that the cleaners had set there to dispose of as they were doing the trash. I immediately spit the tea into the front lav. Tried to sani-wipe my mouth. And gargle with water but all of this is clearly futile. I know no passengers set it there. I stood in the galley until everyone deplaned. I asked the pilots. I know this is new for the airline and these cleaners. However; to even drink from a strangers cup on a non-flu; non-Coronavirus season would in itself be disgusting. An error for a cleaner to not immediately take trash and immediately put it into the trash bag in their hands. Not onto clean seats or sanitized counters. The cleaner never stopped me to say 'Stop; wait; that's trash.' She kept chatting to her coworker. This was a very bad error.

Flight Attendant reported thinking she was drinking out of her own cup and realized cleaners had put a different used cup in place; and was concerned about possible COVID-19 exposure.


Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 15

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

After performing a touch and go at the airport; I began my initial climb out to remain in the pattern for Runway XX. There were several other planes in the pattern and a Bonanza that had been calling in from the north to enter the pattern. On the climb out from the touch and go; I announced the CTAF that I was on the departure leg and remaining in the pattern climbing to 2;500 (1;500 AGL). At approximately 1;000 feet AGL my traffic system warned me of traffic ahead and above by 700 feet. I did not have the traffic in sight. I slowed my climb by throttling back and pitching forward. Unfortunately; my momentum was great enough that it did not immediately stop climbing; and I was able to level off at approximately 1;400 feet AGL. I lowered my left wing to begin a turn onto the crosswind and clear the direction of traffic and I saw the Bonanza approximately 100 feet below and VERY CLOSE. I took evasive action and turned right to avoid them; and then continued my traffic pattern at 1;500 feet AGL.The decision of the other pilot to enter the pattern on a descending crosswind across the departure corridor; I feel; was a very poor one. The other pilot turned downwind at 1;500 feet and then continued to descend into the downwind; another poor decision. On a side note; I did try to talk to the pilot on the ground about what had happened; so perhaps we could both learn something from the event and he became very belligerent blaming me for going too fast; etc.This could have ended very badly for both parties involved; and I feel keeping a standard pattern entry is of the utmost importance. Unfortunately; not everyone agrees and still insists on doing it their own way at non-towered airports.

PA-42 pilot reported a near midair collision while operating in the traffic pattern at a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165; Flight Crew Total 11400; Flight Crew Type 702

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

On the subject flight; we were cleared by the ORD tower controller for takeoff on runway 28R from intersection EE.  We performed the takeoff as per SOP with no issues.  Just after clearing us for takeoff; I heard the controller instruct the aircraft behind us to; 'Line up and wait'.During our takeoff roll; while we were still on the runway; and I would estimate about 20 knots below V1; I heard the tower controller clear the flight behind us to takeoff and the flight acknowledge the clearance.  I remember thinking; 'Boy; I hope we don't have to abort.'  Being below V1 would have meant we would still be on the runway and another flight approaching takeoff speed coming at us on the runway.  Hopefully they would be able to abort before hitting us.  Fortunately our takeoff proceeded normally and nothing occurred.I am not completely familiar with ATC procedures.  I don't know when the earliest time a controller is permitted to clear another aircraft to takeoff behind another departure.  What I did know was that we were still about another three seconds from when the other flight read back the clearance until I called V1.  If anything happened; (remote of course); SOP would have us stopping on the runway.  Though the weather was clear; it was nighttime and I don't think the following aircraft would see us until it was way too late.  Not to mention; if an abort was required there very well could have been debris left on the runway for the other plane to ingest.  This would also depend on how fast I would be able to radio tower about the problem and the other aircrew to realize they were going to have to abort.Overall; as I said; everyone may have been completely in the right and conformed to procedures.  But from where I was sitting; I thought the takeoff clearance for the next flight was too soon and could been a disaster if something we always train in the simulator for (aborts); occurred.

Pilot is cleared for takeoff and is approaching V1 when he hears Tower clear another aircraft for takeoff on the same runway. Pilot wonders what would happen if his aircraft had to abort; and also wonders what type of separation is required by ATC to have two aircraft on the same runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Normal preflight; C180 float plane; dipped fuel from dipstick calibrated specifically for the airplane; noted 16 gallons on right tank; 10 gallons on left. Added measured 10 gallons and re-dipped right tank which now read 26 gallons as expected for 36 gallons total. On start up fuel totalizer initialized and read 26 gallons; consistent with initial tank readings. [I] added 10 gal to read 36 gal total. Departed for several nearby wilderness lakes; [I] made left turns approximately 800 AGL while circling a 2;700 FT elevation; rather tricky lake; and determined it was too challenging to land. Added power to depart the area and the engine coughed; sputtered and died. I immediately turned back toward the lake; pulled carb heat on and adjusted the mixture and throttle; and the engine re-started fitfully. [I] declared an emergency and identified location; etc. with FSS and local helicopter operator flying nearby. Engine continued to surge; sputter; start and stop. [I] switched to the right tank and it caught and continued to run. I immediately began a climb; as I was not happy with the lake I was over; and hoped to gain options to other lakes. Engine monitor showed even cylinder temperatures and low EGT's; good oil pressure and oil temperature. [I] was climbing slowly under poor power; lower MP than normal for the altitude; with engine running rough and surging still. Gained enough altitude to head to a longer; lower elevation lake and did so; eventually hopping from lake to lake until over my 350 FT elevation home lake at 7;200 FT MSL. Began circling down over the lake and lost engine power at 6;900 FT MSL. Engine restarted briefly at 4;000 FT and then died again. [I] performed a dead-stick landing to the lake; uneventful [and] reported safe with FSS and local operators. [I] immediately dipped the fuel tanks and both were completely dry. Flight time had been 1.9 hours (time; not tach); including 25 minutes after the engine first quit. Fuel totalizer showed 18.6 remaining. Normal fuel usage is 10.2-12.8 GPH. For comparison; the previous day's flight under similar operating conditions was 1.4 hours and used 15 gallons; however I generally flight plan for 15 GPH just to be on the safe side. While investigating where the missing fuel was or where the error in math was; I made several important discoveries. Upon filling the tanks to the top; I was only able to pump in 72.4 gal. My 1969 POH says I have 84 gal capacity tanks with 79 usable; however; the bladders were replaced in 1999 and they are placarded at 88 gal capacity usable 84; 42 on the outboard and 37 on the inboard fuel points. I either had a bunch of fuel hiding in the bladders; or a reduced capacity. I did a search and found references to options for 88/84/65/60 gallon options on Cessna fuel bladders. Upon calling several fuel cell repair shops I was told ALL Cessna long range tanks are standardized at 80 gallon capacity; 75 usable and that Cessna POH and placards are wrong - reference Airworthiness Directive (AD) 75-16-1 which requires corrected placards and POH pages. I called the [Local] FAA office and they had no idea and referred me to [another office]; who also was unfamiliar. They found the AD; but could not read the specified placards due to poor reproduction. They noted the AD did not apply to my model. I found a note 'B' which said it applied to ALL models if they had fuel cells replaced after the mid 70's (which I had). They referenced a 1969 C180H POH which said total fuel capacity was 79 gallons and referred me to Cessna. I spoke with them; and they found the original service letter; which addressed the fuel cell replacement requirement for specific models in the 70's as well as to re-placard for older aircraft; but excludes the models from 1962-1972 from that requirement. They could not tell me anything about the fuel cells; subsequent AD nor could they read the required placard; and could only provide me with what their publication presented: 84 gallon capacity and 79 usable. I verified the part numbers for my replaced fuel cells are each 40 gallon capacity; 37.5 usable. So the first thing I found is that my fuel bladders are 8 gallons less than the 88 which its placarded for; and the 84 for which it was certified; and the usable is only certified at 75 gallons; not 84 as placarded. Of that 80 gallons actual capacity; I can say with great certainty that no more than 72.4 is usable. This is nearly an hour difference in cruise; and the issue is relatively unknown; even among Aircraft Certification Offices (ACO); well established Cessna maintenance shops and commercial operators; as well as at the manufacturer. When none of these folks can tell a Cessna 180 owner what the maximum capacity of their long-range fuel tanks is; there is a problem. I couldn't even find reference to it on online skywagon reference sites. Only the fuel cell repair shops seemed to know this. This explained where the missing 11.6 gallons (84 usable) was when I filled the tanks from their dry state; but there are still some 8 gallons missing from total capacity - perhaps bladder snaps; or collapsed corners or shrinkage? Unusable fuel below the sumps? The second thing I found out is the dip stick was calibrated for the outboard fuel port; not the inboard; as I had been told. This is the cause of the fuel starvation as the inboard readings indicate 5 gallons more per side; so I had always calculated my fuel with a 10 gallon error. Thus; I departed with 26 gallons; not the 36 I had verified from the dipstick; and its not totally unreasonable to assume I burned it all up in 1.9 hours. However; the fuel totalizer still didn't jive. While the total amount indicated (36 at departure and thus 18.6 upon landing) was based on my inputs directly derived from faulty fuel stick readings; the actual fuel flow has been very accurate over hundreds of hours; so after deducting the 10 gallon error; that meant I should still have had something close to 8 gallons remaining.This mystery was perhaps solved the next morning when I discovered fuel leaking from the left wing. It had not been evident until it dried; but was leaking visibly and streaked along the fuselage to the horizontal stab. I have since had the leak repaired; noted the AD which applies; and fuel capacity in the logbook and will order new placards for the fuel ports and have re-calibrated the fuel stick to the inboard filler ports. I knew there was a fuel flow issue; but did not consider I had under-fueled the airplane; as I had three methods of cross-check in place (fuel meter on the pump; dip-stick; totalizer) so I was biased against thinking I was actually out of fuel. I exclude the 4th method - my Cessna fuel gauges - because they are notoriously inaccurate in flight. Because the engine ran on the right tank; but not on 'both'; albeit not very well; I suspected fuel contamination; a blocked vent; or water sloshing from bladder folds. Had I realized actual fuel depletion I would have still attempted to climb in order to get to a different lake; but would have landed at the third lake I hopped to; as it was comfortably long. I would not have considered continuing on to any other lakes. With the problem undetermined; but the ability to climb and the continued operation over a 20 minute period of time; I made different decisions to continue to attempt to improve my options. I also discovered that with variations in glide speed I did not have much effect on my gliding distance or rate of sink. The Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) specifies 85 MPH as V-glide; and the float plane supplement only contains a statement that the supplement only identifies items which are different from the POH and if it is not included in the supplement; one may rely on the data in the POH. Therefore V-glide remains at 85 MPH; but I'm surprised that the same speed is used with floats; and with variations in float models. In any case; I was sinking like a rock; and will need to gopractice to establish a better glide speed. This may have helped my situation. The biggest outcome from the event is the realization that this compounded situation of dip-stick reading errors of 10 gallons; and a usable fuel of 72 instead of 84 gallons for a total fuel calculation error of over 20 gallons; was an accident waiting to happen. I have ended my flights many times with close to 20 gallons; thinking that was a very conservative margin; and now realize I may have been very close to fuel starvation on multiple occasions and would surely have attempted to continue flight with less at some point; resulting in a potential disaster. Fortunately; this situation had a safe outcome; and caused me to catch the underlying critical issues before an accident happened.

A 1969 C180 float plane lost power because of fuel starvation but made a safe dead stick lake landing with an estimated 20 gallons remaining. The wing tank bladders where changed in 1999 but the placarded quantity was inaccurate by twelve gallons; 72 usable; not 84.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 3049; Flight Crew Type 17

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Prior to entering the traffic pattern at UAO; I could hear over the radio that it would be very busy with all the air traffic and could sense the air traffic controller was not taking his job too serious because he had had a comedic inflection in his voice; which I've never heard any other controller use. I was told to enter left downwind for 'A' taxiway and report when abeam the tower. I entered the left downwind and reported when abeam the tower. Nothing was heard from the controller. After thirty seconds had passed I made another call to the tower and the controller instructed me to pass behind the traffic that was on right base for Runway 35. During the downwind approach I got multiple 'Traffic' advisories. This became a distraction and I reported back that I had the traffic on final in sight because I had been focused on that aircraft. This was not the correct aircraft that I was supposed to pass behind and my transmission was not corrected for by the controller so I turned for left base. As I'm turning I am getting another 'Traffic' annunciation and look out my right door. Down below I see Aircraft Y 500 feet under me. By the time the controller comes up on the radio and questions my intentions it is already too late. Luckily the Cessna saw me and began descending or else we would have been a much closer incident. I maintained my altitude and requested a descending right 360 because I had overshot 'A' taxiway. This in turn caused a fixed wing that was departing to the south from the right downwind to make a left 360 to avoid me. I proceeded down to the taxiway to park on the company ramp. I should have not got so caught up on the aircraft on final that caused me to not read back the proper clearance back to the tower. I was also distracted from the multiple 'Traffic' annunciations while I was trying to locate where these aircraft were in particular. I feel that had the controller also done his part in correcting my incorrect read back that the situation could have easily been avoided.

Pilot reported misidentifying an aircraft while on approach to landing and caused another aircraft to take evasive action to avoid a mid air collision.


Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Descending via the arrival we were cleared direct to intercept the localizer; descend and maintain 6000 feet. As we approached the localizer at 6000 feet we called the airport in sight and ATC cleared us for the Visual Approach. As the First Officer started a descent; I was looking for the traffic ahead of us as indicated on TCAS on the same approach when I saw a glint of light at 12:00 level with us and very close. As we were descending below 6000 feet we saw very clearly a black; four-rotor drone with a flashing red light and camera hung below pass 100 to 200 feet off our left wing nearly level with us. We immediately reported it to ATC as there were planes lined up behind us on the approach. After landing Ground Control gave us a number and we had a telephone conversation with the Tower about the near-miss. Someone flying their drone too high and on the approach path. Trying to get video of passing airliners for their Instagram? Can we install jammers that could prevent their remote controls from working near the airport?

An Air Carrier pilot reported a Near Mid Air Collision with a Drone.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 433; Flight Crew Type 5000

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I recently did 2 MMUN turns out of ZZZ. The standard arrival procedure is to land on Runway 12L; taxi D; C; E3 to the gate. The standard departure procedure is to push off the gate; take E1 and C to Runway 12R. Upon joining E3 while taxiing to our gate during the first turn; I commented that the spacing between E1; E2; and E3 seemed tight. It was not a problem that day as there were no other aircraft movements. On the second day; we pushed off Gate XX and were disconnected on E1 (per ATC instruction). We noticed another carrier B737 with scimitars taxiing on E3 taxiing towards Gate XY. 'His' scimitar winglet appeared to be directly over the E2 lane. His nose gear was centered on the E3 lane. This is not one of those situations where my assessment of where his winglet was was off by a few feet. We had an excellent vantage point; and maybe I was off by a few inches (at most). As a side note; as one joins E3; there is a sign painted on the pavement stating that the maximum wing span is 36 METERS. That translates into 118.11 FEET; not 118 feet and 11 inches. The Boeing 737-800 with scimitars has a wing span of 117'-10'. Our B737 has a wing span of 117'-X'. If the other carrier was exactly centered on E3; and we were exactly centered on E1; our winglets would be about 12 inches apart. That works great on paper; but not in real life. We taxi around all the time in close quarters (e.g. ZZZ1); but never have I been in an airplane where the margin of error on the ground is measured in inches! The story ends with both us and the other carrier deviating off the yellow line to give ourselves a few more inches of clearance. There is no mention of wingspan limitation or caution on our airport information page; none on the 10-9 (there is a note for aircraft on E2) and nothing in the MMUN route brief. Someone needs to go out to the ramp and actually measure the spacing of E1; E2; E3. Also; there should be notes added to our pages (at the very least) urging extreme caution while taxiing on the ramp.

B737 First Officer reported the taxi lanes are very tight at MMUN.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Prior to boarding; the flight attendants smelled an odor.  I also smelled it; but did not think it was a toxic fume.  We decided together to continue with our flight.   The odor persisted the whole flight.  On the descent it became very strong.  I had a metallic taste in my mouth.  Upon landing the flight attendants called up about it.  All of them had the metallic taste in their mouths and burning eyes.  We called Maintenance.  Maintenance met us at the gate and as soon as the door was opened they could smell it. [The] cause was engine oil in the packs. I will never accept an aircraft with any unknown odor.

Air carrier Captain reported a fumes event prior to boarding. After departure the fumes progressively worsened requiring Maintenance upon destination arrival.


Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I was the Pilot Flying (PF) on the subject flight. After takeoff; the Fire Fault Light intermittently flickered; flashed; and on steady passing 10;000 feet. At that point; I took both the aircraft and radios and the Pilot Monitoring (PM) performed the QRH. We determined that there was nothing to be done. Our Fire Detection System was to be considered completely or partially failed and no way to determine that extent. I sent multiple free test messages to dispatch to have them contact Maintenance to see if we had overlooked anything and if there was a way to continue the flight. Maintenance wanted to verify A or B systems. That could not be done as the light was flashing and we could not catch the flash; further; that was not an inflight procedure in our approved QRH. I sent the message that we felt we were not legal to continue and a return to the departure airport was in order. Dispatch responded in agreement. During all this time; we continued to fly west and burn fuel. I felt this would lighten our ultimate overweight landing and maximize our set-up time for the return. I specifically told ATC that the Fire Fault Light was on. The PM did the runway landing analysis. As a result of that; I elected to request and land on runway XYR just in case we had fading brakes due to the landing weight of 151;600 pounds. I briefed the flight attendants on the issue; assured them of a normal approach and landing. I also informed them that our fire detection system was in doubt and they should inform me of any visually detected fire outside the plane. I then told the passenger that we had a minor malfunction and would return. I also told them that because of the heavy landing; emergency personnel would meet the plane near the runway to ensure our brakes were cool enough to return to the gate. We briefed and flew the ILS to XYR landing with flaps 30 and brakes 3. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) verified on the discreet frequency that our brake temperature was safe for a return to the gate. Flight was terminated without further incident.

I was the PM on the subject flight. After takeoff and at around 10;000 feet AGL the Engine Fire/Overheat Detector Fault Light flickered intermittently and then came on steady. The PF then took the aircraft and radios and I as the PM ran the ORH procedure. The QRH stated that the light signified that Engine Overheat and Engine fire detection is inoperative in one or both engines. We continued the flight as we assessed the situation and sent a message to dispatch to inform them of our situation and ask them to contact the Maintenance. After ACARS communication with dispatch and reference to the QRH it was determined that we would return to the departure airport. We determined we would be landing 7;600 pounds overweight upon arrival and did a runway analysis. The analysis figured we would need 7;966 feet to land at our determined landing weight of 151;600 Lbs. Our assigned runway was XYC which is 10;000 feet and we ask for the longer runway XYR which is 13;000 feet for less stress on the brake system. We ask for AARF to be available upon landing and landed without incident on XYR and exited off the runway. ARRF checked our brakes and wheels for overheating and then cleared us to taxi to gate. AARF followed us to our gate and we parked without incident.

B737-800 flight crew reported the Engine Fire/Overheat Detector Fault Light illuminated in climb; resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 535; Flight Crew Type 8000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

The FO (First Officer) and I arrived into the Gate; and were running late due to up-line ATC delays. The FO proceeded to our gate; and I stopped on my way to get some food. When I arrived at the aircraft; I was surprised that all 175 Passengers had already been boarded. I was told that we had a Company Pilot jump seating and he had been on board when they were boarding. When I began to unpack my things; I realized that I had left my iPad at the last aircraft. I ran up the jet bridge and informed the Agent that I had to run back and get my iPad. When I returned a few minutes later; the Agent shut the door and followed me down the jet bridge. Within a minute of sitting down to start my preflight duties; the Agent shut the aircraft door. I had not even started my preflight duties; nor had I signed the Release. The FO said we needed to reopen the door because he had not done his walk around yet. We opened the door prior to his pulling the jet bridge back and I spoke with him; informing that it was going to be 10-15 minutes before we were ready. It was obvious to me that he was in a hurry to get us out. We finally completed our preflight duties; signed the paperwork and pushed back.Later; during the flight; I was told by both the jump seater and the FA's (Flight Attendants) that the Agent had begun boarding with no pilot monitoring the aircraft and no power on the aircraft other than the ground service bus. One of the FA's informed the Agent they could not board without us and went so far as to show him the bulletin in her manual. He told the FA's that there is a new procedure and they could now board without the Pilots. So when the jump seater boarded and popped his head into the cockpit to check in with us; the Crew; (we had not arrived yet) he witnessed another Agent or CSA trying to start the APU and get power on the aircraft. At that point; the jump seater took over; powered up and babysat the aircraft until my FO arrived.I spoke with the inbound Captain; and he was told by his Agent (different from ours) that the through Passengers had been deplaned and was not getting back on. Therefore; this Captain elected to terminate the aircraft rather than run the new procedure of leaving the aircraft powered.I have several concerns about what transpired. First; the Agent has a very new Employee number and was being supervised by either another Agent or a Supervisor. It was obvious that he was under a tremendous pressure to close the door and get us going. I was definitely feeling like I was being rushed. Of course; I set the tone and the pace and the FO and I were making sure we were not hurrying through our preflight and checklists. Closing the door and pulling the jet bridge back before I had even settled in; much less checking with me; the Captain; to see if I am ok with closing the door; is completely unacceptable. It seems our Agents are under so much pressure to close the door that is compromising Safety.  I was told by the Supervisor that they only had to verify the count with the 'A' before closing the door. It should be standard operating procedures to check with the Captain before closing the main cabin door. My second concern is that we obviously have OPS Personnel misinterpreting this new procedure of 'Aircraft on Gate Services without Pilots' or their procedure is wrong. They are not allowed to board without the aircraft powered AND being monitored by an operating Flight Deck Crew Member. Third; I am concerned that the Agents are under so much pressure that they are not LISTENING and heeding the information given to them by the FA's. If the FA's say they can't board; then DON'T do it. My FA's had very serious concerns. The intercom system does not work when the aircraft is not powered. If they need to order an evacuation or if they have other Passenger Safety concerns; there was no way to make a PA or communicate with each other via the interphone. The other concern was that the lavatories did not work;so the Passengers could not use them until power was restored to the aircraft.

The Pilot of a Boeing 737 reported that passengers were boarded prior to the flight crew arriving.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

I was conducting a VFR cross country and on the way back; about 8 miles from destination; I saw a small blue flame coming from underneath the right engine; it looked like by the cowl flap. It continued to get worse while in descent so I decided to declare an emergency for a right engine fire. I followed the emergency flow and checklist for an engine fire. Cut off the fuel; and feathered the prop. I squawked 7700 and landed. Safe landing and no damage. The main reason why I felt the need to shut down the engine and declare an emergency is because the flame was big enough and kept getting worse. We were descending at 16' manifold pressure and all gauges were normal. My student was on board.

BE76 instructor pilot reports sighting a small blue flame coming from underneath the right engine; near the cowl flap during descent. The flame appeared to get worse so the engine is shut down; and an emergency is declared.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flight to Washington Dulles. ATC gave us instructions to descend to 7000 ft. Airplane was on autopilot mode and we descended to 7000 ft as I announced ALTS CAP. Right after that ATC cleared us for 19C visual approach. I asked [the] Captain to sequence the approach and I started to verify approach course and frequency and when I looked up we were descending to 6700 ft and Captain put the airplane in VSI mode to climb back up to 7000 ft. While he was doing it ATC called and gave us a low altitude alert and Captain responded to that we were climbing to 7000 ft. After discussing it with Captain we concluded that I had pressed VSI mode instead of NAV mode when ATC cleared us for the approach.We should have turned off the autopilot and climbed back up to 7000 ft as this procedure would have been much quicker as the VSI mode took about 5-7 seconds.

CRJ-700 First Officer reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC after overshooting cleared altitude on descent into IAD; citing lack of mode awareness as contributing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14.0

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals

I was training a developmental on Local Control during the morning cargo outbound; when we accepted a point out on an aircraft descending to 4000 feet. My developmental had two departures; one rolling; one holding short. The aircraft on the ground was issued 'Climb via the SID; except maintain 3000 feet.' Once aircraft was airborne; developmental said to Aircraft X; 'Climb via the SID; except maintain 3000.' Aircraft X (garbled or stepped on response) was questioning whether to climb via the SID and not to 050. I said to my developmental; 'oh; I bet he was cleared via radar vectors; not the SID.'We have the option on Clearance Delivery to issue the prop aircraft vectors to first fix or SID. So; I had the developmental say; 'Climb and maintain 3000; turn right heading 330.' The other aircraft then was issued a similar clearance; since Clearance Delivery said they had read the clearances with Radar Vectors not the SID that morning. The departure controller then experienced the confused pilot deviating from the 3000 foot assigned altitude and climbing into Aircraft Y level at 4000 feet. Management was advised about the issue of not knowing on Local Control how Flight Data/Ground Control issued the clearance and not knowing what phraseology to use to amend an altitude.The SID is a worthless SID for all aircraft; but especially a prop aircraft; exempt from Noise Abatement procedures. I recommend immediately requesting all controllers issue one or the other. Either all of us shall issue the SID; or preferably; all of us shall use Radar Vectors when clearing these props (numerous cargo props this time of day). Long term; I think either the SID needs to be removed from our SIDs or the required phraseology to amend an altitude from Local Control should leave out the 'Climb via SID; except maintain (altitude)' portion and simply be; 'Maintain (altitude).' Thank you for your time and attention to this; as this procedure most definitely contributed to a pilot deviation this morning; following by two aircraft in unsafe proximity to one another!

Aircraft X was given to me from east feeder level at 6000 feet. I coordinated with tower to descend to 4000 feet. I turned Aircraft Y 10 degrees right to turn slightly away from tower airspace and descended them to 4000 feet. Aircraft X departed on a 330 heading climbing to 3000 feet. I radar identified Aircraft X; turned them to a 360 heading and reiterated maintain 3000 feet.The collision alert went off as Aircraft X was almost to 3000 feet and Aircraft Y was at 4300 feet. I assumed Aircraft X was leveling at 3000 feet and diverted my attention to other duties. As the controller on asked me if I was alright with these two aircraft I noticed Aircraft X climbing through 3600 feet and Aircraft Y at 4100 feet. I immediately issued traffic and the descent to Aircraft X; he saw the traffic; I advised him to maintain visual and descend to 3000 feet. I also pointed the traffic out to Aircraft Y who never saw Aircraft X. Later in the session I gave Aircraft X the brasher warning and he openly admitted to making the mistake. Apparently there was some sort of confusion from the tower's altitude instructions.

A departing BE99 aircraft assigned 3;000 feet climbed to 3600 feet conflicting with 4;000 foot crossing traffic.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on approach into ZZZZ there was a minor speed deviation that caused the flap load relief system to retract the flaps from 30 degrees to 25 degrees. I was on a visual approach at the time. I was flying the aircraft (Captain).

A B737NG Captain reported a minor flap 30 airspeed excedence which caused the flap load relief system to retract the flaps to 25.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

The galley carts are coming out of their storage area due to insufficient length of the locking mechanism.  Locks on galley carts are too short to secure carts within the storage area during takeoff and landing.  Installed locks fail to function properly.

Reporter stated he is a Line Captain and Check Airman.  Some of the B737-400 aircraft his Air Carrier has acquired only have the short 'Red' blade type galley locks installed; apparently because the previous operator did not use galley carts on their flights.  His company is waiting for an Engineering approval from Boeing to install the longer 'Red' bladed type locks at the end of the forward and aft galley countertops; next to the shorter locks; which is the standard two-lock set-up for domestic B737 aircraft.  Until approval is received; Flight Attendants are positioning the galley carts in the storage compartment with the cart doors facing in during takeoffs and landings to prevent supplies from coming out.

Galley carts are coming out of the storage compartment during takeoffs and landings due to insufficient length of the locking mechanism.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was flying the leg into BWI which was operating on Runway 15R. We were cleared to 2500 MSL; called the airport and in sight and were cleared [for] a visual approach by Potomac Approach. We were also directed to switch to Tower frequency. I was approaching from the east on a vector to final which intercepted between BMORE and KEVVN. We were cleared the visual when the aircraft was at about 4000 MSL. We were at about 230 knots descending with flaps 5. Once cleared the visual I set the aircraft up to go direct to KEVVN and selected 2100 in the altitude window. I announced and verified these changes with the Captain; then executed. As we switched to Tower the Captain said 'Those are big towers.' I was looking at the runway and changed my view in front of the aircraft. I saw 2 towers I believed to be the 1504 and 1437 ft towers depicted on the ILS 15R chart. We had a quick discussion. There were no GPWS warnings and nothing showing yellow on the terrain display. I made the comment 'I'm surprised there was no terrain caution or yellow.' I adjusted the path of the aircraft to intercept final inside KEVVN keeping us well clear of the towers vertically and horizontally. The aircraft did not leave 2100 MSL until we were intercepting glide path and final course past the towers. As we had the discussion about the towers; BWI Tower issued a low altitude alert and the altimeter of 29.79 (which had been set in the approach check). We completed a normal visual approach and landing with no incident. [Later] I researched the obstacles on the 15R Approach chart. At no time were we closer than 500 feet vertically of the towers. We did not fly over them and remained clear. The Captain became concerned after the flight and called the Operations Center. I am surprised the terrain database did not at least turn yellow on the display.

We were cleared for the visual approach Runway 15R. We were between the fix BMORE and KEVVN and at 2300. I felt we were going too close to the tower at 1504 feet with the arrow on top. We climbed back a few hundred feet and passed the tower on the right side of the aircraft. The EGPWS never went off and we did not have a yellow warning on our navigation display. BWI Tower got a low altitude alert.

B737 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from BWI Tower on the visual approach to Runway 15R; but did not receive an EGPWS warning.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While doing training in a King air 90; I'd been cleared for a visual approach. ATC advised of numerous contacts at the airport - which has become typical at that airport in the past year now that there's a helicopter school there. I cancelled services; and vectored my student out to about 13 miles for a practice ILS approach. I was in full communications with CTAF; and even used non-instrument/non-technical calls so the trainees and instructors would know exactly what I was doing. I had several responses from the heli-instructors acknowledging me and requesting me to report my position 'on final'; so they could stand aside. I reported 13 miles; 8 miles; 3 miles; and 1-1/2 short final. My student was on simulated instruments; but I was looking at the runway all the way. I received responses on CTAF that indicated they were standing aside for my landing. As I got near the airport I could see numerous 'Robinson' sized heli's doing maneuvers on the adjacent taxiways and pads. After reporting the runway to my trainee he went visual and went about landing the airplane. At about 50' AGL crossing the threshold a stationary small Robinson came into view as it rose out of the black runway onto the horizon directly in front of me. It was either dark red or black; must have been just off centerline so as not to block my clear view of the stripes; and was stationary/hovering and did not give any clues as to being there. NOTE: it was a darkly painted body on the Robinson; exacerbated by the runway being freshly paved and gloss black. As my trainee was reducing power to idle in prep for flare/landing; I saw the heli hovering directly in front of us in the center of the runway at approx the end of the fixed landing markers. I immediately grabbed the controls banked hard right. I estimate I saw him at about 500' linear distance and the closure rate was extreme! I thought it might be a foregone conclusion we would hit. As I rolled and felt the load factor shoot up (and heard no metal noise) I rolled back to keep from stalling and/or hitting the wingtip on the ground adjacent to the runway; firewalled the power nudged the nose up and executed (what became) an organized go-around. The heli never saw me; acknowledged me; or communicated whatsoever. Even other training traffic and the airport mgr subsequently got on CTAF and inquired if we were okay; and/or if the heli hovering on the runway had heard 'any' of the King air calls? That pilot never answered. As I was busy spontaneously maneuvering and thinking I was going to die; I can only imagine my left wing or wingtip must have JUST gone over his rotor by a little. I'm still replaying in my mind why I had the good sense to unload a slow airplane and rollback level then add power. I'm no stunt pilot. I'm a retired airline guy. I equally can't believe I had enough room to 'not' hit the wing on the ground off the side of the runway. As I replay this tape in my mind it completely surreal. As these things go; I suppose there were a million possibilities. Things I could have done wrong; right; or things the heli could've done that would have caused us to hit. Thank God we didn't; although I cannot explain why. I cannot imagine what I might have done differently up to the avoidance maneuver itself. I mean I could've yanked it up and fire walled it; but I didn't; and I cannot explain why. What I did worked - right or wrong. I'm not writing this report to avoid scrutiny against me. I 'think' I did most everything I was supposed to as a training instructor so I'm not worried about that. Maybe it was 'just one of those things'; but in retrospect it was scary and I thought I should submit a report in hopes that it makes aviation safer.

BE90 instructor pilot experiences a NMAC with a black helicopter hovering over a freshly paved runway. The helicopter did not respond to CTAF calls and was invisible until the BE90 was in the flare. The instructor takes control and pulls up and turns; narrowly missing the helicopter.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

Had flown down to MIA with weather reported less than wonderful. Had alternates of PBI and FLL. As we are nearing MIA we hear approach putting PBI arrivals in holding. Down one alternate. We set up for 26L ILS; as that is what everyone ahead is getting. We're assigned RNAV GPS 26R.  At the time IMC; cleared for approach. Just crossing ZARER at 1500; starting descent we get a call that says maintain 1500 ft light civil passing through under you at 750 ft. No TCAS (a Cirrus). We return to 1500. We are also 170 kts to ZARER. Now cleared to continue approach; inside ZARER at 1500 ft and 170 kts. Gear is down flaps are at 25; and we start down. Behind proverbial power curve. Tower says can you get down. I reply we'll see. We break out at 1300; high and fast. Now VMC I push over and do shallow S's. Too fast now for final flaps we pass 1000 ft. I call unstable; but have till 500 ft. now as I remark to FO. He responds 'perhaps so; but we're below 1000 ft not fully configured.' I respond 'Oh you're right; TOGA flaps 15!' and off we go. We climbed to 3000 on a 270 heading. Put the autopilot on and discussed options. As weather was closing I said call approach and see if we can get back in quickly. Not so fast! Airport now closed; next 3 approaches go missed. We beat feet over to Lauderdale. As FO was talking on radio; I send diversion report to dispatch and get rewarded with a no Comm light. Filed alternate....we go and land. As we roll out the aircraft behind us reports 25 kt loss on final. Then the Cirrus lands. We sit as no one knew we were coming. We finally get to a gate and I call Dispatch and tell him where we are. He asks 'what are you doing there' I replied read diversion report. He remarks;'didn't receive; oh by the way; what was your on/in/and fuel?' We refuel grab new papers; settle the PAX that are continuing and go back to MIA; shoot visual and then wait for another 25 minutes in line to get to gate due to ground stoppage opening up. Crappy weather closing in; in a hurry to get there before closed out; unexpected A/C conflict and 'can do' attitude which; while an asset most times was somewhat detrimental in this situation. ABANDON APPROACH! As soon as the light civil was reported and we were now high and fast.  Let's go somewhere else.

Below 1000 feet Capt asked for flaps 30; told him we were below 1000 feet and He called go around; flaps 15; next few approaches also went missed; we went to FLL.VMC single engine airplane below us at 700 feet; as we were at 1500 feet at final approach fix; didn't allow us to descend to minimums making us high and fast on the approach. Go around sooner; Miami Tower really messed us up; didn't see the single engine aircraft; they should have told us he would be a problem sooner.

B737-800 flight crew on the MIA RNAV GPS 26R passing ZARER at 1;500 feet; was advised by ATC of a Cirrus below them at 700 feet VFR. The B737 crew delayed their descent resulting in an unstabilized approach; go-around; and divert.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 1400

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The no touch exemption for headsets; microphones and O2 masks was directed towards relief for recurrent or CQ lessons only. It apparently did not cover the other Training/Qualification Lessons. As this seems illogical (a virus cannot tell the difference). I applied the no touch exemption to all lessons.

Air Carrier flight instructor reported the 'no touch exemption' as written for O2 masks; headsets; etc.; does not cover all types of training and checking periods.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I just took over the position X. I was briefed that we would be switching from east operations; to west operations because of a wind shift. About 3 weeks ago; we moved scopes and positions around to accommodate increased social distancing. Due to this; there are new macros and procedures that supervisors must adhere to. As our last aircraft landed on the east runways; the Supervisor started to put in new macros. My tags did not acquire; and I had to manually coordinate with the Feeder to let him know when I had radar on traffic. When I was starting to get busy and it was clear the macros being entered were not working; my scope changed from a west operations final pref set to an east operations final monitor preference set. I had to slide over to the adjacent position and work my final off of that scope because mine was completely unusable.This is an absolute safety concern that I have heard has happened before. I recommend they move the scopes back to the normal working configuration because this is clearly not working and is a huge safety hazard and it should concern everyone.

TRACON Controller reported having to make a configuration change but the data tags did not change to the correct airport configuration; making the reporter move quickly to a close by position and sharing the scope.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 480

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 124; Flight Crew Total 6245; Flight Crew Type 814

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

During refueling; a grounding plug was dropped on the inboard portion of the flap causing a small dent. We were scheduled to depart that afternoon with 6 passengers. [Company] Maintenance were notified of the problem and pictures were sent. Over the phone; I was told that the dent did not meet any of the criteria that would require it to be repaired. As a result of this conversation; I did not find it necessary to enter a discrepancy in the aircraft log book as the dent appeared to be cosmetic in nature. We departed to ZZZ and then home to ZZZ1. The [next] morning; the airplane was scheduled to fly on a Part 135 flight. I again talked with Maintenance about the dent in the flap and they responded that they had looked at it in the morning and again found no cause for concern. We flew; then flew the planned flight for the day. [Several days later;] the aircraft was scheduled for routine maintenance at the manufacture. I asked them to take a look at the flap in hopes of repairing the cosmetic damage. It was determined from Lear Jet that the flap did in fact have structural damage and required a repair. At this time; I became aware that we had flown the aircraft over several legs in an unairworthy condition. I was asked by the Director of Operations to place a write up in the aircraft log book dated [the date of the incident] and to send it to Maintenance.The root cause of this was my failure to write up the damage on the ground. Contributing factors to my decision were that [Company] Maintenance had been advised by phone; text; and email; and did not believe that the damage was more than cosmetic.

While refueling prior to a passenger flight to be conducted under 14 CFR 135; the line service technician damaged the skin of the right flap when he dropped a grounding strap adapter onto the right flap panel after completing the refueling. I observed the refueling from start to finish and witnessed the dent and scratch in the right flap skin. I informed the Captain of the damage and the certificate holders. Director of Maintenance was contacted to determine airworthiness. The crew supplied photos and a verbal description of the damage. The DOM advised the crew verbally that the damage did not exceed the limits specified in the aircraft maintenance manual and would be verified upon return to operations base; so it was not necessary to write up the damage.The crew completed the 135 passenger flight and two repositioning flights under 14 CFR 91; the last of repositioning flight to an OEM factory service center five days after the damage occurred. The OEM service center determined the damage did in fact exceed the airworthiness limits. Upon learning this information; the certificate holder; Director of Operations; directed the crew to write up the damage retroactively; essentially forging the maintenance documents after the fact. The Captain and I refused.In hindsight; the Captain and I should have written up the damage as soon as it occurred and let the DOM sign it off as airworthy instead of accepting the verbal determination.

Learjet 70 flight crew reported minor damage discovered on the flap was later determined to be in an unairworthy condition.