Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

We where at 15;000 FT into the decent for ZZZ1 when we had large thunderstorms to the left and to the right of the aircraft.  We started to paint a large thunderstorm on our radar in front of us.  We could not see what was behind this thunderstorm in front of us. I then told my First Officer to tell ZZZ Approach Control on frequency 120.5 that we need to deviate to the left for weather.  So my First Officer told the Controller that we need to deviate to the left and the Controller told us unable.  So I told my First Officer to ask him if we can deviate to the right then.  The ZZZ Controller said unable and that he needs us to remain on course.  So at this point I got on the radio and told the Controller that we either have to deviate to the left or right to get around weather and if we cannot do that then we will have to declare an emergency.  The Controller came back and said; 'Then declare an emergency.' So I said; 'We are declaring an emergency at this time for weather.'At that point the Controller let us deviate to the left for about 15 to 20 miles to get around this thunderstorm. We ended up having to go-around several more thunderstorms that where behind this first one and we landed in ZZZ1 safely.I believe that these controllers need to understand that we cannot fly through thunderstorms under any circumstances and that when we need to deviate for weather; we need to deviate.  They need to work the traffic more around the aircraft that has to deviate for weather and not tell that crew that has to deviate that they are unable and that they need to remain on course.  That's how aircraft go down is when they fly into severe thunderstorms and not being able to see on radar what is behind the first thunderstorm.  As pilots we need to remember that ATC provides us a service and to not let ATC fly your aircraft for you.  That you and your crew need to take control and fly your aircraft and if you have to declare an emergency for weather or any reason in the interest of safety then do it.  Do not hesitate you have many lives in your hands and everyone is counting on you to get them to their destination safely.

Pilot describes situation where they need to deviate around weather and Controller denies the request until pilot declares weather emergency.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Captain is flying and descends at 280 kts. 1500 fpm with zero VNAV help programmed in. As a result; he is unaware of how high he is with respect to the airport. 240 kts.; high; and clean at 5 mile right base. Calls for gear at 225 kts. to slow and then Flaps 8/20/30/45 while on base; all within 8mi to 5 mi base. At 0.5 miles from final course and 90 degrees from 5 mile FAF; starts 45 degree turn because he's overshooting final and full deflection high on the glide slope. He corrects course but remains high. Chases the glideslope down the entire way at almost idle. Was fully configured at 1;000 ft and glideslope was within full deflection (barely). I just revisited the stabilized approach criteria and should have called a go-around. Captain inability to plan vertical descent and speed adjustments. Captain's inability to judge a base to final turn distance; speed and altitude. VNAV; visual approach; and SOP guideline review is necessary. This Captain has not performed a visual approach to SOPM guidelines in three trips.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported that the Captain performed multiple unstabilized approaches to ICT airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was working R31 and it started to get busy. Fellow controllers noticed I was getting busy and told a Certified Professional Controller who was working D32 to go get D31; because the Supervisor was not around. Aircraft X had FL280 descending to FL250 in his data block when I took the handoff from R07 because he was above Aircraft Y who was level at FL240. When the Aircraft X checked on; I did not hear him say that he was Profile Descent (PD) to FL240. I noticed when Aircraft X was at FL247 two miles in front of Aircraft Y and I told him to maintain FL250. He said he would climb back up and the data block showed he was at FL243 before he climbed back to FL250. Upon listening to the tapes; I realized he did in fact say he was PD to FL240. When I listened to the R07 controller; he had issued a PD descent to FL250 and the pilot read back FL240. Hearback/Readback error should have been caught both times. Should have had a D-side earlier so I didn't get behind. Because I was trying to catch up and quickly move from one task to another I missed the incorrect altitude on initial check on.

ZSE Center Controller reported missing an initial call where the pilot reported descending to an altitude which caused a loss of separation with another aircraft.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 7; Air Traffic Control Radar 7; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 580; Flight Crew Type 98

I was cleared as number one to land when I gave the position report of 1.5 miles from the airport.  Shortly after there was another aircraft that reported 2.5 and the Controller told him to do a left 360 for spacing.  As the Controller said that the plane that reported 2.5 flew in front of me within 500 feet and same altitude.  This prompted me to go full power and start climbing to miss the traffic.  I called the tower and reported going around due to traffic.This problem arose due to a wrong position report by the second aircraft.  This then leads into the controller having the wrong idea of where they were.One thing that helped me was when I heard what type the other plane was I kept my speed up for spacing.  By doing that it allowed me to transfer the speed into a climb giving me a faster climb.  This was very beneficial since the other plane started his left 360 in my direction.

PA-22 pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at LSE airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 28

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was showing on the flight plan MYDIA Y240 SHAQQ. The pilot had reported over MYDIA at XA:24 with a center estimate of XA:23. The previous controller asked the pilot to report SNAKR intersection. At XA:27 I signed in and assumed the position for R+D sides for sector 72 Ocean East. I was attempting to take some non-radar position reports when I noticed a beacon code on the border between ZHU and ZMA airspace. I looked at the beacon code and saw on the flight strip that this was Aircraft X. I asked the pilot what fix he was navigating to and he answered direct SHAQQ intersection. I then asked the pilot what his route of flight was and he answered back with direct SHAQQ given by the previous controller in Merida centers airspace. I knew this was not true because Merida center would have had to request this route which would have been promptly denied by Houston Center due to being non-radar. I called ZMA Key West sector with a point-out and got this accomplished. I then asked the pilot again where he received this clearance and he stated that he may have been mistaken. After the point out and telling the Key West sector controller that the aircraft was direct SHAQQ I cleared the pilot direct SHAQQ rest of route unchanged. ZMA Key West then advised me that ZMA Cigar sector had the hand-off and I switched the pilot to ZMA. Pilots have become remiss and complacent with non-radar procedures and what to do. Every IFR rated pilot is taught how to give a proper non-radar position report. We here in the center have become complacent with not getting proper reports from the pilots. In this case the pilot did not fly the route assigned and flew what he thought he had. The pilot was asked; according to the previous controller telling me; to report SNAKR intersection and he never answered. This should have made the pilot question what position was required to report and check his navigation. Pilots should always do proper non-radar position reports all the time. We got lucky with this one because the W174 area has been going hot and cold all day and was cold at this time. The aircraft entered into the W147 area while it was cold.

ZHU Controller reported a flight that was not flying the correct route.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 53

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

On an IFR flight plan I was told by Approach to fly the arrival into ZZZ. The arrival and assigned altitude crossing restriction would set us up to high; to close into the airport for a normal descent and ATC could not give me lower. I elected to cancel IFR and switch to flight following so I could descend on a normal profile.Approximately 10 miles out; for an unknown reason; Approach canceled my flight following and told me to squawk VFR before handing me off to ZZZ tower. A moment later I made my initial call to Tower.  There were multiple aircraft making calls in the vicinity to approach the airport.The tower controller acknowledge my and other transmissions (did not use the terms 'standby' or 'remain clear') but sounded flustered as more aircraft called. At one point he laughed on the frequency but did not give traffic advisories or instructions initially. Many transmissions were stepping on each other and I heard one aircraft saying they were circling over [a lake] so until hearing any instructions from the tower; I elected to alter course to the left to set up for right traffic for the south runway; as per the AFD specified normal traffic pattern. At this point I am about 5nm SSW of the airport near ZZZZ intersection; on a northwest heading to get to the west of the airport absent any tower instructions. I transmitted to tower that they were being stepped on and vice versa and I had not received any instructions.A moment later my non-pilot passenger spotted traffic. It appeared to be a twin departing ZZZ to the south and was climbing while I was descending on a collision course. I altered course immediately to the right and the other aircraft appeared to do the same. I did not hear them on frequency so they may have already been handed off to approach. I did not report this right away to tower because the frequency was too busy and they were dealing with multiple incoming aircraft. I eventually got instructions from the Tower to make left; not right traffic for the south runway and had a normal final approach and landing.From my perspective this chain of events contributed to this traffic conflict:1) Approach dropping me from flight following without warning when I was close to the Class D airspace with multiple aircraft in the vicinity; and not handing me over to Tower.2) The Tower controller getting flustered and not giving proper instructions to multiple approaching aircraft. This turned it into what felt like an uncontrolled airport.3) Me crossing the departure path to set up for the expected traffic pattern as published in the AFD absent any tower instructions.

IFR aircraft inbound to an airport cancelled IFR with Approach Control. The pilot attempted to check on to the Tower frequency for arrival instructions several times; but was not able due to frequency congestion. During this time the pilot sighted a departure from the airport on a converging course and climbing. The pilot took evasive action to avoid the departing traffic.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Flying from ZZZ to SLC IFR; I was given the Cargo 1 Visual approach to Runway 32 (over the top) by SLC Approach 135.5. After my descent from 11;000 ft. to 7;000 ft.; while leveling off at AMENR way point; Tower called traffic at my 12 o'clock and 5 miles at 7;000; Aircraft Y. I assume the pilot was doing a VFR transition north over I-15 which runs directly below the approach path. I did not see the aircraft; however; he reported to see Aircraft X. Tower told me to stay on the profile and he would call my base turn for Runway 32. The profile has you level at 7;000 until DUECE way point. In-between AMENR and DUECE I spotted Aircraft Y at my 1 o'clock slightly lower within 400 ft. heading for a collision course. I immediately performed a climbing left hand turn to avoid the traffic; while he did a left turn at the same time. We narrowly missed each other. I called Tower in my turn to advise them of the deviation for traffic. Finished the flight with no other incident.I would advise that VFR transitions north while the Cargo 1 approach is being used stay below 6;500 ft. MSL; or refused entirely.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Pilot reported evasive action due to NMAC on approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 250

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Strange flight to begin with.  Deadheaded to ferry aircraft.  Aircraft parked on cargo ramp and started and taxied from cargo Spot 7.  Preflight was normal other than no jetway or pushback.  After takeoff and clean-up tried to engage LNAV.  Initially LNAV engaged and then when autopilot was turned on LNAV disconnected.  Then the autopilot disconnected and would not re-engage until much higher in the climb.  At approximately FL180; the CDU flashed a message which said something to the effect of 'aircraft not located at origination position.'  (That is not exact language but it was something similar to that.)  When I checked the position page; it showed the aircraft still on the ground (i.e.; it still showed the coordinates for cargo Spot 7; Line 2 and not our current position.  Troubleshooting this problem caused us to overshoot our turn on the HAROB 4 Departure at DODVE by one to two miles.  We were just getting ready to ask for radar vectors when Departure Control asked if we were having navigation problems.  We replied yes and wanted radar vectors.  No traffic conflict occurred to my knowledge.  Later on approaching FL250 both LNAV and autopilot began operating normally and when we checked the position page it now showed the aircraft airborne with proper coordinates for our location.  We continued the flight but asked for new routing off of the Q-ROUTES since we didn't have a lot of confidence in the LNAV.  Additional issue was TCAS tested as okay on the ground and was operating on the ground during taxi out but once we got in the air it didn't work again until landing where it worked fine again.  Additional issue was on descent we got a 'low idle' in-flight on the engine.  We handled IAW the QRH.   I believe the aircraft never thought it was in-flight and; to my knowledge; we did everything correct (i.e.; IRS alignment was complete).  We handed the aircraft over to Maintenance upon arrival.

After picking up a B737-300 aircraft to ferry; numerous FMS and navigational difficulties are encountered resulting in a track deviation during departure. Some of the problems cleared up but the crew believed that the aircraft thought it was still on the ground.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

MEL'd center tank pumps. Captain and I both reviewed the MEL. Big item is maintenance verifying that no fuel was added. Flight planned with 10.7 gate fuel and 10.4 takeoff fuel. Burn 4.3. FAR 3.7. Planned remaining fuel 6.1. 0 unusable. MEL for center tank pumps has maintenance verify that no fuel was added which maintenance did. Fuel in center tank at the time was 2.9. It didn't register at that point with either myself or the Captain that our flight plan didn't match what was in the center tank. Since the plane arrived with 2.9 unusable and maintenance had verified no change I suppose we assumed that the fuel plan sheet was correct when in reality it showed zero unusable fuel. I remember seeing the zero unusable on the plan and then checking that we has the required fuel on board from looking at the totalizer and comparing gate fuel. We taxied out and took off. As I pulled the gear up I looked at the fuel again as a normal cross check and did some mental math that didn't quite make sense and that's when it sunk in that our center tank was unusable fuel and hadn't been considered when briefing the fuel load vs. our dispatch release. We took off with 10.4; minus the 2.9 indicated unusable = 7.5 usable. I pointed this out to the captain and suggested we return to [departure airport]. At this point we were climbing through approximately 2;500 feet. The Captain said he wanted to talk to Dispatch so I took the plane and radios while he spoke with Dispatch. After talking to Dispatch they (Captain and Dispatch) decided to declare minimum fuel and continue to our destination. I still believe a return to [departure airport] was the safest course of action but my advocacy proved ineffective. I was confident we could make our destination and land; but I was not confident that we weren't going to have an emergency [state] to do it. At the time the decision to continue was made we showed landing with 7.4 on the FMC; minus the 2.9 unusable = 4.5 which was above our required FAR reserve of 3.7. As the flight progressed; landing fuel decreased on the FMC to a low of 6.4; but so did the amount indicated in the center tank so the calculation of FMC landing fuel; unusable never put us below FAR. Perhaps the jet (scavenge) pumps were active and some of the fuel actually got burned? My systems knowledge says that shouldn't have happened; but it seems to have. We also had an imbalance of 500 LBS high on the left wing tank by the time we reached TOD (which we fixed by crossfeed) which would also indicate that some of the center tank fuel was actually burned (thankfully). When we landed the center tanks had 2.17 remaining. The left tank had 2.1 and the right tank had 2.1 so we actually landed with 4.2 usable (at the gate after a 5+ minute taxi).

B737 FO reported they took off without complying with a fuel system MEL and were left with less fuel than they were planned with.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 11; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was in the North tower at ORD. The conditions were IFR ceiling and visibility; plus freezing precipitation. Runway 9L hadn't been used all night and my first arrival was Aircraft X. I asked them for a braking action PIREP and they gave me Fair to Good. I passed that to the next arrival; who passed a Good braking action report to me. I only received Good braking action reports for the next hour. After the first 2-3 arrivals; City [Vehicle] asked for a runway inspection. I gave them 3 minutes between 2 arrivals and they finished. Then; the final picked up and I landed about 10 more aircraft. City [Vehicle] came back for another inspection and I was instructed to pull out Aircraft Y on about a 15 mile final. This was a critical runway inspection. After City [Vehicle] finished; I asked why the second inspection. They stated that they needed Mu [testing friction; mu is the co-efficient of friction] readings; which were all above 40. I landed 10 more aircraft; none with less than a Good braking action. The freezing precipitation continued. I was instructed to send around all aircraft on my final due to another critical runway inspection. City [Vehicle] was put back on Runway 9L. Aircraft Z was short final; under the cloud deck when I sent it around. The next 3 aircraft were kept in line on approach until they were turned back along the arrival area and handed off to C90 (TRACON). All morning; pilots were reporting rain above 2;300 MSL and Light Rime Ice below 2;300. So at least 2 of these go arounds were forced to re-enter icing conditions. All this because of two critical runway inspections; during times when aircraft were constantly giving me Good braking action reports and Mu readings were above 40. I was later told that they need to check the runway every 25 minutes. This put aircraft that were landing in good conditions back into known icing conditions. First; I think the procedure is over-restrictive. If a runway has good conditions; there is no need to force a go around to confirm that it is indeed good. But; if we are to continue this procedure; then better coordination needs to happen. We should have the finals dry up every 25 minutes to let the city vehicles do their inspections. This would require better communication between the tower supervisor; the TMCs at the tower and TRACON; and the city operations. This should also trigger a lower arrival rate to accommodate the runways closing for inspections. Go-arounds always put flight crews in a high workload situation; especially ones that are issued inside a 2 mile final. This was a waste of fuel; waste of time for passengers; and more importantly puts the aircraft at a greater risk than necessary.

ORD Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation where the Local Controller sent aircraft around to do a runway braking action check every 25 minutes.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

During preflight; I found the Ops Specs to be out of date. I immediately called dispatch and notified them of the issue. I was put on hold and when the dispatcher came back on the line he notified me that the Certificate Chief Pilot had granted permission to fly this flight with the old Ops Specs. I requested a written document that indicated this waiver; and was put on hold again. When the dispatcher came back the second time he gave me the phone number for the Certificate Chief Pilot and told me to call him. When I did; [Certificate Chief Pilot] made it clear; in no uncertain terms; that I did not need written permission and that his word was 'good enough'; and that he had authority to issue this waiver in this case to get the airplane back. I took that as correct and departed. The flight diverted later due to weather; refueled and continued on the same flight number to destination; where the aircraft terminated for the night. I became aware 12 days later in an ALPA email that no one; not even the Certificate Chief Pilot has authority to issue a waiver regarding out of date manuals.I wish I had known that the Chief Pilot cannot issue a waiver regarding this. I also wish that the Certificate Chief Pilot had not pressured me into the flight or told me that he had the authority when; in fact; he did not. I hope to have written documentation that no one can issue a waiver regarding this issue for possible disputes with the Flight Ops department in the future.

EMB175 Captain discovers that the OpSpec aboard his aircraft is out of date and informs the Dispatcher. The Chief Pilot contacts the Captain and authorizes him to operate back to base with the out of date OpSpec. The reporter learns later that the Chief Pilot does not have this authority.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

[Inbound to] DFW. ILS/visual approach 17L. Approaching DRAAK at 5000 FT. Received a TCAS RA command to 'descend; descend.' (No preliminary 'traffic' alert). We complied with the RA and advised tower controller. The FO sighted the aircraft above and to our right on the course for 17C. The TCAS indicated they were 400-600 FT above us and on a parallel descent path. We also had visual on the ground and the runway 17L. We were below 3000 FT when we received a TCAS 'level off' alert; and another 'descend' alert shortly thereafter. Finally got a 'Clear of Conflict' at about 1500 AGL when we offset slightly left of course and the other aircraft pulled slightly ahead. We also got a 'low altitude alert' from tower at about 2000 FT AGL; even though the controller was aware of our RA maneuver. The RA maneuver resulted in our being below the altitudes at INWOD and GBUSH. We were fully stable by 1000 FT AGL. If this had taken place in IMC conditions it would have been a much trickier situation. We question why the other aircraft did not receive a corresponding RA to climb. Additionally; our situational awareness was hampered by having the other aircraft on a different tower frequency. It should be noted that we received a 'LEVEL OFF' command; but no such command is listed in the table of [our] 737 Ops Manual. Lastly; if I had it to do over; I would have offset to the left of course slightly sooner in order to be clear of the conflict.

We did not experience a quick resolution to the conflict as the target aircraft was following the 17C GS and basically forcing us lower and lower. The entire process took place from 5000 FT just outside of DRAAK to approximately 1500 FT AGL when we finally received the TCAS 'clear of conflict.' After receiving the 'clear of conflict'; we leveled off and intercepted the ILS GS for a stabilized approach and uneventful landing.I'm curious to know why the tower controllers did not direct the aircraft on approach to 17C to level off and discontinue their approach; knowing that we were continuing to receive an RA to descend. Had we elected to go-around; we would have been going directly against the TCAS guidance. Breaking off the approach and making a turn to the east could have put us in conflict with traffic on downwind or traffic going into DAL. The captain did an excellent job of complying with the TCAS guidance; yet minimizing the descent rate to the extent possible given our altitude; and remaining cognizant of the obstacles left of course; all while slowing; configuring; responding to normal checklists; and listening to me...great job. Needless to say; this would have been quite a handful in IMC.

B737-800 flight crew reported receiving TCAS 'descend' commands on a parallel approach to DFW that took them down to 1500 FT and prompted a low altitude alert from Tower.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were flying into Aspen; we went missed because we didn't have the airport environment insight. On the missed approach we were task saturated with the missed approach. We were in addition trying to calculate fuel to see if we could hold for another attempted approach. We decided to hold. Received our holding instruction; and as I as pilot monitoring input the wrong holding instruction into the FMS. I put a SE hold at DBL instead of a NW hold at DBL.During the missed approach in a mountainous terrain airport; we were task saturated; switched frequencies; executing a complicated missed approach; and we were issued a long holding instruction that we read back properly but input improperly into the FMS. We caught our mistake and fixed the hold in the FMS and corrected out holding track. In the future I will ask for radar vectors to catch up with the aircraft inside and outside before asking or accepting a holding clearance. It was due to the task saturation why we made the mistake.

Air Carrier First Officer reported after a missed approach at ASE; they entered a SE holding pattern into the FMS instead of a NW pattern.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure

We activated the Pilot Controlled Lighting (PCL); announced our intentions on Unicom; and taxied from our hangar ramp at approximately XA25 enroute for an IFR departure from Runway 04. Our clearance was received via BHM approach. Just as we approached the runway another tenant on our field operating a Aircraft Y announced that he was taxiing for Runway 22. I responded and indicated that we were about to depart Runway 04. He acknowledged and advised that we should be aware that there was an Ultralight taxiing for Runway 12 who was not communicating on UNICOM. We lined up in position in order to establish visual contact with the other aircraft. After a few seconds of being unable to locate the aircraft; I inquired with the Aircraft Y if he still had visual contact. He advised that the aircraft was airborne and had made a right turn to head in our general direction. We then spotted the black unlit aircraft at an altitude of approximately 200 feet above and slightly to our left; heading straight toward us. The aircraft made a turn crossing to the southeast crossing Runway 04 in front of us and completed a full course reversal to head away from us parallel to Runway 4 on our right side. When we lost sight of him I again asked the Aircraft Y if he had visual contact and he replied that he did not; and that they would now taxi to Runway 04 to depart behind us. Aircraft Y then advised that he had regained visual and it appeared the aircraft might be coming back. We next spotted the aircraft above and to our left at approximately 200 feet heading toward us and converging with the runway. The aircraft crossed over again just in front of our position; passed just to our right; and headed away from us behind and to our right. At this time we announced our departure and departed straight out to the northeast opposite from his direction of flight.Subsequent investigation yielded that the operator of the aircraft is a local tenant who is a flight instructor.We were extremely fortunate that our fellow tenants in Aircraft Y were taxiing out at the same time and were able to advise us that the ultralight was about to depart in the dark; without communicating with anyone; from a runway that we could not see. If we had not delayed our departure we would have definitely encountered a NMAC; and possibly had an accident resulting in 11 fatalities. By any account this was an extremely dangerous and illegal operation by the pilot of the experimental aircraft (Ultralight). Given the fact that this individual is evidently a CFI indicates that his actions were not a result of ignorance; but a blatant disregard for FARs and flying safety. It is our opinion that the operational judgment of this individual needs to be examined by the FAA in order to avoid future incidents that could lead to an accident and/or loss of life.

While approaching the runway; getting ready for take-off after stating my intentions on UNICOM; we received an acknowledgment from another aircraft and that an ultralight was in the area. We delayed our departure and avoided a conflict with the ultralight.


Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

The frequency for FEEDER (AR4); failed. I was working AR1; the adjacent Final Sector; and needed to change Radar sites and expand my range to 'take' AR4 because their frequency was unusable. After 10-12 minutes of chaos; the transition was accomplished; but at least 7 airplanes were 'NORDO' because they were on 124.05 when it failed. It turns out that Tech Ops took 124.05 off the air without coordinating with the correct area (LA Arrivals); and were dismissive of our concerns when they were first notified. There was an obvious mistake; this has been at least the third incident in the last 6 months where Tech Ops made a mistake and there is no accountability. There needs to be more accountability on the part of Tech Ops.

SCT Controller described a chaotic situation when Tech Ops failed to follow appropriate protocols when taking one of operational frequencies.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 13500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 411; Flight Crew Type 3500

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

[We had a] normal takeoff on the runway close to ATOG. Rotation initiated at 142 KIAS; ground speed approximately 165 KTS. No adverse conditions were noticed with gear retraction and clean up. While at cruise; Minneapolis Center informed us the Tower reported we were one of four possible aircraft that may have lost some rubber on the runway on takeoff. I called the 'A' Flight Attendant; and asked her if she or anyone else had heard or felt anything unusual during the takeoff; and she stated she had not and no one else had noticed anything unusual. I then talked with the 'B' Flight Attendant; and he stated he thought 'we might have run over something on takeoff'. I then contacted Dispatch and informed him what Center had told us and that I suspected we could have some tire damage. I suggested we could divert and deal with it there as we have Maintenance on the field and it would still be daylight with good weather conditions. Dispatch then contacted Maintenance Control who preferred us to continue to our destination. Five minutes later; Dispatch contacted us and stated they had decided jointly that diverting was a better choice. We agreed and began our diversion to the other airport. We declared an emergency with ATC and requested holding at 10;000 FT to burn off enough fuel to land below our MGLW [Maximum Gross Landing Weight]. We held for about 20 minutes while the flight attendants prepared the cabin for an emergency landing. We then flew a low approach over the runway so the Tower and fire trucks could help us determine if; indeed; we did have damage to our tires and to what extent. The Tower stated the last fire truck detected some damage to our right inside main gear tire. We then flew a left downwind approach and landing with noticeable degradation of the landing gear. We stopped the aircraft on the runway with no directional control issues other than the obvious destruction of the right inside main tire. The Fire Department indicated through the use of their FLIR equipment that the right inside main tire was extremely hot and falling apart. When we were sure of the safety of the aircraft; we shut the engines down and requested a tug to tow us to the gate. After the tug was hooked up; they attempted to move the aircraft but were unable to do so without further damage. Maintenance determined the tires needed to be changed on the runway before the aircraft could be moved. Station Ops had the Passengers deplane and take buses to the terminal and board another airplane. Maintenance changed the tires and we were then tugged into a remote gate. We preflighted the other aircraft and; with the same flight attendants; boarded the passengers and departed.Some final thoughts; even though we reviewed the emergency evacuation QRH items; my timing on letting the Flight Attendants know when we were one minute from landing came too early; and as a result they ended up calling out their commands longer than normal. After ensuring the aircraft was safe I called for flaps up when I should have left them in the 40 position due to possible damage from the tires.

The Captain and I checked the weather and noticed rain in the forecast for our time of arrival which was taken into consideration and made the Center plan seem a bit more desirable. That and the fact that having daylight on our side would have of course made any outside visual confirmation much easier.I actually think that this event went very smoothly and was handled well by all parties involved. The presence of tire pressure sensors of course would have given us some valuable information regarding what to expect on the landing. This seems like a potentially common enough event that maybe some specific QRH guidance could be developed for such an event.

A B737-700 diverted to land after it became likely they had suffered tire damage on their takeoff. Upon landing it was clear the likelihood was confirmed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 18000

Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approaching EMMRL on the DSNEE 4 Arrival to SNA; we elected to brief and fly the RNAV Z 20R Approach with clear weather. The approach branches from the arrival at point DSNEE. At that point; the arrival continues to point JWARD with a mandatory altitude of 7;600 feet. The RNAV Z 20R branches on a different track to BONVY with a 6;000 feet mandatory altitude. The 7;600 feet mandatory altitude after the branch point sets an altitude constraint in the FMC and prevents loading the RNAV approach. The approach loads in reverse video. To load and brief the approach requires deleting the clearance limit altitude from the DSNEE 4 and sets the Crew up for altitude crossing non-compliance. This requires the Crew to modify the approach and takes system automation out of the loop in the high traffic; high terrain area northeast of SNA where it is most needed. Additionally; despite requesting RNAV Z on initial contact with Approach; they had to call another frequency for this clearance. We weren't cleared the approach until about three miles prior to the branch point.

B737-700 Captain reported being unable to load the RNAV approach in the FMC because of a mandatory crossing restriction on the arrival.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Working Aircraft X at FL380; right engine pressure observed to go in and out of caution range. Oil quantity observed to be zero. Referred to QRH for both conditions observed and decided to divert.Considering weather conditions [at destination] and altitude to be lost decision made to divert (both engines operating). Informed dispatch of situation and diversion via ACARS.[Advised ATC of situation] and proceeded direct to [diversion airport] with normal landing.

B737 Captain reported that the right hand engine oil pressure was erratic and the oil quantity was indicating zero and diverting.


As throttles retarded at top of descent; number one engine experienced 6-7 stalls. We followed the QRH and operated at idle for 4-5 minutes. Observed the N1 decaying and EGT rising slowly above 600 degrees. We elected to secure the engine in accordance with the QRH and followed the single engine procedure in the QRH. [Requested priority handling] with Center and the landing was uneventful. [Destination airport] ARFF checked the number one engine after landing and cleared us to proceed. We canceled [priority handling] with Tower and taxied to parking.

A300-600 flight crew reported receiving a number of compressor stalls when the #1 throttle was retarded for descent. Engine was shut down in accordance with procedure.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 600

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Doing a VOR practice approach in VFR conditions to maintain proficiency; Lead Pilot with a view limiting device and the Reporting Pilot acting as safety in the right seat. Just before crossing the FAF; Approach hands us off to Tower. Tower clears us to continue the approach and then enter left downwind to land and [Lead] Pilot acknowledges. I double check with [Lead] Pilot over intercom that our intention is a missed approach and he indicates he will correct when there is a break in comms. Airport environment busier than average and we get a call for departing traffic crossing below us as we continue the descent; to which [Lead] Pilot responds 'looking'. I inform the [Lead] Pilot (not the Tower) that I have the traffic in sight; a helicopter following the freeway to the south. I hear Tower give a traffic advisory to the helicopter about an oncoming aircraft approaching from above (don't remember specifically; let's call it a Cirrus). I am looking for the Cirrus; but unable to see it. After the Cirrus passes over the helicopter; Tower tells them to follow us in left downwind pattern and Cirrus acknowledges we are in sight. Tower busy with other aircraft as well. Roughly three minutes after crossing the FAF we are at target altitude at the MAP; still 500 feet above pattern; and [Lead] Pilot begins missed approach. This would also have been the point we would have made a 30 degrees turn to descend into the pattern. I inform the [Lead] Pilot that we still have not radioed Tower [our] intention to enter missed. Pilot continues to turn towards the missed heading when I finally catch sight of the close Cirrus approaching from the right; I take controls briefly to level wings so we don't turn closer to the approaching Cirrus before allowing [Lead] Pilot to resume. Tower then asks what's going on; [Lead] Pilot informs performing the missed approach; Tower chastises [Lead] Pilot for failing to inform intentions and creating a dangerous situation. I don't think the situation was dangerous; given both planes had sight of each other and avoidance was straightforward.Takeaways: 1) I should have been more forceful about having the [Lead] Pilot correct intentions to the Tower.2) The Cirrus told to follow us into the pattern should have given more space.3) At the missed approach point; I should have insisted we continue to fly the clearance Tower had given (enter left downwind) instead of the missed approach; until we could have had a chance to radio a request.I was focusing too much on what I thought my job was: making sure we did not fly into any airplanes or terrain; being eyes. [However]; I should have also been helping offload the [Lead] Pilot workload more and insisting rules were followed.Contributing factors were the unusually busy workload the Tower was experiencing and subsequent duty cycle of the radio making it hard to get a call through.

GA safety pilot reported an airborne conflict and a clearance deviation during a missed approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise; without any warning the following alert lights illuminated: WINDSHEAR; SPEED BRAKES; GRD PROX (GS INHB). Only the left bulb of: PULL UP; CABIN ALT; Master Caution; EICAS ATC FAULT. At the same time: Captain's Altimeter spun continuously; First Officer (FO) Altimeter spun continuously; FO Airspeed went to zero. The autopilot did not disconnect. There were no tones/audible warnings. With the aircraft stable we attempted to figure out what was going on by referencing the QRH. After about 1 minute all lights extinguished and flight instruments returned to normal except for the FO Altimeter; which remained failed for the remainder of the flight. We contacted Dispatch via SATCOM and asked for Maintenance to join the conversation. After discussing; maintenance stated that something was wrong but couldn't identify a single system that might cause the problem. They checked and observed some work was done on the EGPWS over the weekend; but weren't sure what was going on. Maintenance stated they wanted to discuss further and might want to bring the airplane to ZZZ instead of ZZZ1. We determined that we could not remain in RVSM since we were operating via one ADC (failed FO Altimeter) and requested new fuel burn from Dispatch. I also asked Dispatch to bring Flight Operations (pilot) into the discussion on whether everyone agreed it was a good idea to operate the aircraft with possible altimeter and EGPWS issues into a high terrain; special qualification airport at night. SATCOM dropped off line several times which necessitated multiple calls; but an ACP was able to join the conversation. He initially thought we had a simple ADC failure and that we were concerned about the possibility of a second failure. When I explained that we were dealing with an unknown anomaly that had impacted both primary altimeters and potentially the EGPWS and asked if anyone had performed a Risk Assessment of redispatching into the previously described ZZZ airport; the response was we should be fine since we still had a standby altimeter. I had already determined; after conferring with the FO; that we were comfortable operating into ZZZ; but was disappointed that there appeared to be no process of performing a Risk Assessment for the operation. Although ZZZ2 is still being fully implemented into our operation; a process should be created so that when a change to a flight is being considered; before making the change; appropriately qualified people are brought into the decision process so that unintended risk is not allowed to negatively impact the safety of our operations.

While in cruise; the B767 crew received a number of apparently false alerts/warnings as well as failure of altimeters and one airspeed indicator. After a short period of time; most of the warnings disappeared although the First Officers altimeter remained failed. After consulting with the company; they decided to divert into an airport with good maintenance support.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Flight Attendant reported that faint musty dirty sock odor had grown stronger. No medical attention requested[Captain stated] odor related to contamination of air conditioning pack and suggested proper maintenance.

A319 Captain reported being notified by a Flight Attendant of a 'faint musty dirty socks odor' during initial approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft has history of oil needing added to left CSD (Constant Speed Drive). Last four flights had write-up of left CSD oil level low. One mentioned CSD in red band by maintenance tech (most likely during aircraft reposition. One additional write-up of excess oil from left engine cowling. Engine was run; no leaks noted; oil cleaned up; and signed off. Clearly here is an aircraft with a known discrepancy (left CSD leaking oil) and maintenance; rather than finding the leak and fixing it; re-fills the oil and releases it for flight. I told maintenance that I was uncomfortable taking the A/C (Aircraft). Had conference call with myself; dispatch; duty pilot; and maintenance control. Maintenance control agreed with my decision to not fly the A/C. We switched to a different aircraft and completed the turn uneventfully.Upon further investigation; I've discovered that A/C was re-assigned to a turn after I refused it. I spoke to him and he stated that upon his return to point of origin; excessive oil was on the left engine cowling and maintenance was looking into it.This A/C should never have been 're-assigned'. It should have been placed in maintenance with the goal of finding the source of the oil leak. In my opinion; this practice is completely unsatisfactory.I expect and demand follow-up regarding the practice of re-dispatching an aircraft that has been deemed unairworthy by a Captain; and a Dispatcher; Duty Pilot; and Maintenance supervisor by implicit concurrence.

Captain refused aircraft due to repeat CSD (Constant Speed Drive) oil leak on left engine. Company reassigned aircraft to another crew which accepted and flew the trip. That crew experienced the same CSD leak.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 7900; Flight Crew Type 1675

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flew into Henderson; Nevada airport. Flew the CLARR3 arrival into the airport followed by a visual approach. Las Vegas approach set us up for 8 mile final then switched us to tower. We flew the visual approach 35L into Henderson. There were three other aircraft on frequency one landing in front of us; one departing and another aircraft joining the left downwind for the parallel runway 35R. When we checked on we were not given the landing clearance; until other aircraft landed and taxi off runway followed by us querying him for landing clearance. We were given clearance 2 miles out. Then we heard an Aztec cleared to join the downwind for 35R. As we approach landing 1 mile out we hear tower querying other aircraft you're clear for left downwind 35R. Tower queries again asking what are you doing then states you're not cleared for base. By that time we noticed the aircraft turning into us. I stopped the descent and begin looking at the incoming aircraft. I looked at our position with the aircraft and runway and as a crew we elected to go around and reenter the traffic pattern for left the downwind 35L. The Aztec aircraft deviated from ATC instructions and clearance. As a crew we responded and acted upon the given circumstances.

BE40 flight crew reported a NMAC while on short final to HND with an aircraft that turned base too early.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Approaching runway 18R on the localizer near glide slope intercept encountered significant wake turbulence. ATC stated preceding aircraft was a B757 4 miles ahead. Aircraft was temporarily uncontrollable. Autopilot was disconnected and aircraft slowed to minimum approach speed while maintaining flight path above the glide slope.ATC has decided that the previous 5 mile spacing behind B757 aircraft is no longer required when in fact we were vectored too close behind the preceding aircraft to conduct safe operations. Provide the previously required 5 mile spacing behind B757 aircraft.

A319 flight crew reported encountering significant wake turbulence on approach to CLT 4.5 miles in trail of a B757. Reporter expressed concern at the reduced separation standards in trail of B757 aircraft.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After taxi clearance received and after throttles were increased for taxi; I noticed the Number 2 engine had exceeded its EGT parameters. I brought this exceedence to the attention of the Captain who immediately shut off the fuel to the Number 2 engine. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighters inspected Number 2 engine prior to returning to gate. Taxied to gate once they gave us all clear notification. Reviewed QRH. Called for maintenance. Was temporarily distracted from duties as a result of a call from Tower changing our runway assignment. Maintain more vigilance to prevent distractions while performing duties in the cockpit.

A B757 Number 2 EGT exceeded temperature parameters as the throttles were moved to begin taxi so the engine was shutdown; an emergency declared; the QRH completed and the aircraft returned to the gate.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Ground Personnel

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors

ZZZ break-room not being disinfected and sprayed on a daily basis; as we were told it was going to be. A fellow co-worker has tested positive for COVID and all employees working with this agent have not been properly advised of fellow employee we are working alongside being positive; with symptoms. We had to hear this through the grapevine. And even since agent being confirmed as positive our break-room and back offices have not been properly cleaned.

Airline Ground Agent reported the breakroom is not being sanitized properly for COVID-19.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

5G radio interference. At 100 ft. AGL had 'Flare Fail' in heads up display with no flare cue. Altitude call outs were normal. Roll out of 5G telecom. Don't allow 5G telecom near airports!

Pilot reported possible 5G interference on short final landing in IND.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Other A&P

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 900

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were on the ZZZZZ arrival at about 15;000 ft. MSL to ZZZ to cross ZZZZZ at 8;000 [ft.] MSL when the left engine flamed out (failed). We subsequently [advised ATC] and ran the checklist. We had all favorable conditions to restart the engine. The engine airborne restart was successful and we landed at ZZZ without incident.[Company] Mobile Service is in process of repairs. A faulty engine run/stop switch is suspect.

Flight Crew reported engine flameout on short final and continued on to land successfully.


While entering left downwind on a 45 entry for Runway 05 at CGZ we almost collided with a high wing Cessna. We had been making radio calls 10 miles out; 5 miles out; 3 mile 45; and entering downwind. While merging in the downwind I (the instructor pilot sitting right seat) looked left one last time and noticed the Cessna climbing above us. I reduced power and kept the Cessna insight; discontinued the traffic pattern. I had attempted multiple radio calls to 'Cessna in the downwind' with no response. Eventually I heard 'Skylane XYZ; radio check.' I confirmed that Skylane XYZ was the aircraft involved in the NMAC and he admitted that he was having radio problems; not able to communicate very well. The G430 had no traffic information on it as we were not in radar contact. Look outside more and do not fly CGZ on heavy traffic days.

PA28 instructor pilot entering the CGZ traffic pattern on the 45 reports a NMAC with a C182 climbing on the downwind. CTAF procedures were in use by the instructor but no reports were received from the C182; whose pilot latter admitted to having radio difficulties.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MEM reported wind as 180/10 landing 18L/R. Approximately 40 SW of TAMMY intersection; ATC told us to cross TAMMY at 10;000 indicating a North landing. I told ATC that ATIS was reporting landing to the South. He told us Tower just put out a new ATIS and the weather was the exact same only landing to the North with a strong South wind. When we were handed off to Tower they told us to expect 36L. Because of the tailwind; I requested Runway 09 or 36C the longer of all the North runways; Tower told us unable plan 36L. As we were on final for 36L at 3;000 FT we were showing at 31 KT tailwind. I requested a wind check and we were told 120/15. At approximately 500 FT the wind arrow was indicating a tail wind out of the SE of 19 KTS. At that point; I directed my full attention out side and we may have exceeded the 10 KT tailwind limitation. The landing was normal; maybe a tad long. On rollout I noticed the wind sock was completing extended indicating a strong wind out of the SE. Once clear of the runway; we asked for a wind check and we were told 120/9 which was inconsistent with the wind sock. On taxi-in we pulled a new ATIS and it showed the wind as 120/15g23. Suggestions; my belief is that MEM Tower purposely tries to accommodate the another company operation by landing to the North even when they shouldn't. This is not the first time that this has happened to me; but it is the last! Next time I will declare an emergency; so I can land in the direction that we all should be landing on.

Air Carrier landing MEM voiced concern regarding ATC's accommodation of another operator preferences with regard to runway selection regardless of existing wind conditions.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Oxygen masks drop on takeoff. Had to stay FL250 for the entire flight.   Got to destination with approximately 5.5 on the fuel. On a 2 mile final tower clear a Dash 8 for takeoff.  He wasn't that close to end of the runway when tower cleared him for takeoff.  By the time he got on the runway we were on a 1 mile final.  I made a comment to tower at about 200 feet this isn't good. Shortly after that he sent us around.  First off; tower made a gross error; and the Dash 8 pilot compounded towers mistake by not looking out the window.  On the go-around I told my first officer to angle to the south side off the runway to keep eyes on the Dash 8.  Tower instructed us to turn to 330; the First Officer looked down and said that's not a good idea; I looked out that side and the Dash 8 was almost at our altitude.   If we would have turned we would have had a midair collision.   I immediately told tower we were turning southwest. He said climb to 3;000 feet.  I looked down after clean up and saw 4;200 lbs of fuel.  I knew that was a little low due to our climb angle.   I declared [minimum] Fuel; I instructed approach to tell tower we cannot afford a go-around again.  Approach said he would shut the runway down for us.  We made a short approach to limit our fuel burn.  We were configured and on speed a 1;000 feet; and in the slot and on speed at 500 feet.  It was not unsafe however; it was expeditious. As we taxied the low level fuel light came on in the right wing tank.

As a secondary factor to this event; note that we flew the segment at FL250 due to a row of O2 masks that had deployed in flight. Having received a revised clearance; we reached destination with approximately 5;500 lbs. of fuel. During a stable approach; while we were on short final; a previously 'cleared for takeoff' aircraft took the runway and proceeded to takeoff. We executed a go-around and proceeded to return with minimum fuel. We executed a short approach and landed uneventfully. We arrived at the gate with approximately 4;000 lbs. of fuel. We arrived at the gate with a Low Fuel message on the Right fuel quantity indicator.The takeoff clearance seemed to be granted well in advance of the departing aircrew's readiness to execute the takeoff. Thus; when the flight crew taxied onto the runway; it was evident that separation was an issue to the Captain and I and I prepared to go around. I am curious if the departing flight crew ever checked the final as it seemed highly unlikely that their aircraft could depart before our landing would commence. Taking the runway seemed imprudent from my perspective. Upon contacting the tower to debrief the scenario; it was relayed to me by Captain that the tower supervisor stated that training was in progress during this event. A review of the training protocol for takeoff and landing separation criteria may have value where perhaps additional separation maybe indicated when training is in progress (I suspect this may already be in place).

A B737 flight crew reports arriving at their destination with low fuel and then having the Tower clear an aircraft for takeoff in front of them with tight spacing which results in a go-around. A tight visual pattern is flown and the aircraft arrives at the gate with 4;000 pounds of fuel.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 217; Flight Crew Type 16000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Prior to beginning the RAVNN 6 Arrival into BWI (we had thoroughly briefed the descent and arrival well before our initial descent) we were given several step-down altitude changes as well as speed restrictions and off-profile vectors. As we began the descent; we were then re-cleared direct FZEEK to continue the RNAV Arrival. About this time the PM went off VHF COMM1 to talk to the Flight Attendants regarding the potential for turbulence in the descent and to clean up the cabin now and call us when seated; we will make normal 10;000 ft notification; etc. So for a period of time I was essentially a single-seat pilot. The combination of multiple off-profile headings; altitude changes; and speed requirements; along with weather concerns and ongoing lack of confidence in the FMC software to accurately 'catch up' in a dynamic environment; all caused my situational awareness to degrade. I was clearly in the 'Yellow' to the point I had to revert automation from FMC mode to MCP mode; and eventually to CWS; in attempts to ascertain where we were laterally and vertically on the descent profile. All of which caused me to miss the FL230 altitude restriction at FZEEK. Once back on VHF COMM1; the PM did an excellent job of communicating with ATC to report the altitude error and in assisting me getting us back on the arrival profile and back into FMC automation for the remainder of the arrival (although ATC made further modifications to the arrival). Conversation with ATC indicated they were not concerned about our altitude error; however; I am submitting this report (I believe the FO will also report) in order to highlight a safety concern of the continuing trend of ATC severely modifying already intricate arrival procedures thus significantly increasing crew task loading; reducing situational awareness; and adding unnecessary (in many cases) risk.1. Better Crew Coordination in timing of conversations with Flight Attendants (However; the PM's pro-active approach in light of recent crew injury emphasis seemed appropriate; as he had no indication of further off-profile clearances). 2. Better information availability on the reliability and quality of FMC software. Many pilots I've flown with have commented that our FMC's do not operate as reliably as those they have used in previous aircraft flown. 3. Better standardization from ATC regarding published arrivals. It seems pointless to establish; publish; train; brief; and be cleared for RNAV arrivals if the likelihood of flying them as published is minimal. This did not seem to be a busy arrival (I realize there are other arrivals at multiple airports in the Washington DC area); yet the number of revisions in a dynamic situation seemed unreasonable. Also; once vectored off a profile or given airspeed or altitude changes after established in VNAV PATH; it should be ATC's responsibility for separation for the remainder of the descent profile.

B737-800 Captain reported missing a crossing altitude on the RAVNN 6 Arrival into BWI citing ATC changes to the procedure as a factor in the incident.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5250; Flight Crew Type 1200

Pilot in Command checked in with ZZZ Tower approximately 9 miles to the north of ZZZ with information Uniform and stating landing was requested at the south high tails (located on west side of field). Pilot in Command was advised to report two miles north. Approximately two miles north of ZZZ; Pilot in Command checked in as instructed. At this point; Pilot in Command was setup to enter a left downwind which would have enabled an approach from the west directly into the south high tails and avoiding the flow of traffic. Tower Controller directed Pilot in Command to fly east of the parallels then enter the south high tails from there. Winds were approximately 020 at 7-10 knots. Pilot in Command complied and was advised by tower that an aircraft was departing [Runway] XXL making a left turn to the southwest. The Pilot in Command believes this is why the Controller made the direction to fly east of the parallels. The Tower Controller advised the aircraft taking off to begin the southwest turn. Pilot in Command observed the aircraft and advised tower he had a visual on the aircraft. The Tower stated another aircraft was also departing [Runway] XXR and would be turning crosswind. At this time; the Pilot in Command was approximately 1/2 mile off the departure end of [Runway] XXR heading to make the east of the parallels entry as directed earlier. The Pilot in Command observed the aircraft climbing off [Runway] XXR making a hard right crosswind turn placing him directly in the path of the Pilot in Command. The Pilot in Command made a hard right turn to avoid the aircraft. At this point; the Pilot in Command came on the radio and stated to the controller that it would have been better to come from the west.

Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC while attempting to land.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

On approach to KAVL; we received an EGPWS warning. It was day; VMC and positive visual verification found that no obstacle or terrain hazard existed so the warning was regarded as cautionary and the approach was continued; per the [flight manual]. After turning final and descending; flaps 45 was selected at approximately 1000 and the aircraft was stabilized at 500 feet. A normal landing was performed.Rising terrain beneath the aircraft appeared to have triggered the warning based on closure rate. That caused a momentary delay in configuring the aircraft for landing.Due to surrounding terrain; vectors to the final approach course well outside the FAF would have helped to avoid the terrain issue and allowed additional time to configure the aircraft for landing.

Air Carrier First Officer reported EGPWS warning on approach to landing.


Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Landing in LCH and while crossing the threshold and commencing the flare; the runway lights turned off. The aircraft lighting was sufficient to see the runway and execute a normal landing. At the height the aircraft was at; reaching up to click the mic to turn the lights on would have been a distraction that low to the ground. A go-around on a clear/VMC night where the aircraft's landing lights were illuminating the runway was unnecessary.  A normal landing and clearing of the runway was executed.

EMB-145 Captain reports the runway lights turning off right as the aircraft is in the flare. With sufficient light from landing lights the landing is successfully completed.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft X checked on my frequency and requested to change destination. I gave the clearance and took mental note that in about 20 minutes he would need a climb to 13000 feet. After about 20 minutes I issued the clearance to climb to 13000 feet with a new altimeter setting with no response. I tried two other transmitters with no acknowledgement. I then relayed through another close by aircraft who got no response. I then tried Aircraft X on guard frequency and to acknowledge with an ident with no response. I then told my Supervisor because I wanted to make sure there wasn't anything else I could try; and to make him aware of the situation. My supervisor had one more idea which we tried along with trying another relay aircraft and guard frequency again. About this time Aircraft X was heard talking on the frequency and was responding to other aircraft and then to me. He was level at 12000 feet and had flown in a 12500 foot MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) for about 8 minutes and a 12900 foot MIA for about 2 minutes and then into a 13000 foot MIA before getting the clearance to climb to 13000.I'm not sure if this pilot was disconnected somehow or not; but if this was an radio frequency issue maybe there is something that could be done with that. If not; I don't have any recommendations other than me climbing this aircraft when I noticed the eventual need.

A Center Controller observed a NORDO aircraft fly below the minimum IFR Altitudes along their route.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Airport

We were on a flight from ZZZ1 to ELP.  We were descending on the MOLLY4. Runway 22 was closed so we planned on an RNAV (GPS) Y Rwy 26L. Our aircraft was not certified to perform the RNAV (RNP) Z Rwy 26L. Approaching the terminal area; we received an ECAM message for NAV: FM/GPS POS Disagree. It was VMC; and we quickly verified our position. ATC also advised all in the area that there was GPS jamming coming from a military installation. We opted to switch to the VOR Rwy 26L approach as it was the only other approach to the runway; and I didn't want to confuse ELP with BIF; the military airport less than 2 miles away.  We had intermittent NAV indications while proceeding to the airport for a visual approach. We turned final; and I used the VOR approach directions from the FMS for guidance as seeing the PAPI was a little difficult in the bright afternoon sun. The FMS VOR indications lined us up nicely for the runway and with autopilot on; it started descending us for the runway. About 6 miles out though; the CA (Captain) noticed differences in our FMS course depictions and aircraft positions. I turned off the autopilot; leveled off; and continued visually. At about 5 miles; I picked up the PAPI. We landed uneventfully. In hindsight; the [manufacturer] uses the GPS overlay almost exclusively for VOR approaches with only a bearing pointer to the VOR as the backup. With the GPS jamming in the area; I should have disregarded any FMS positions completely and potentially deselected the GPS inputs to the FMS. This is not part of the procedure in the QRH though. Had it been IMC; we would not have had a compatible approach to the field. We also did not recall seeing any GPS jamming NOTAMs prior to our arrival in the area.

Air carrier First Officer reported GPS jamming on approach.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 6300; Flight Crew Type 450

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

GPS failure with the Flight Management System caused a deviation off of course.

Small Transport Captain reported losing the GPS signal near Midway Airport.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 78; Flight Crew Type 3

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During a morning approach; BJC was busier than usual. It took three calls to establish two-way communication with Tower; during which a right 360 was completed for spacing. On approach; ATC cleared us straight in for a left base on Runway 12L; then with about 2 miles to go; handed us off to Tower Frequency 2 and changed us to Runway 12R. After changing; we continued the southbound approach 'behind Aircraft Y'. about a half mile from the airfield; over US 36; we saw not one but two [aircraft]; same altitude and 1/4 mile apart; heading for us west-to-east up US 36. I felt that this was loss of separation and far too close for comfort; and uncommanded (By ATC) evasive action was taken including a sharp right turn and an arrested descent; to allow the aircraft to pass under and behind us. No traffic advisory was given (possibly because the other two were on Tower 1 frequency); and it felt as though Tower had no idea where we were. After nearly missing; Tower cleared us No. 1 for Touch and Go on Runway 12R; and we completed our touch and go in front of Aircraft Y on right traffic behind us for the same runway. During the climb-out; the Controller gave us a traffic alert for a 'helicopter on your left' (he was on our right). It felt to me as though the Controller was over-saturated and had no idea where the aircraft he was in control of were located. I also believe there was a lack of communication between Controller staff in the tower during the hand offs from Tower 1 to Tower 2; as the receiving Controller seemed to have no idea where we were; what we were doing; or what we were previously cleared to do. To have the FAA breathing down ZZZ's throat for recent mid-airs (both of which were pilot error and had nothing to do with ATC); and then to be directed into a near-collision on base by BJC Tower; is unacceptable; and tells me that the FAA doesn't care until something makes the news.

Private Pilot reported an airborne conflict due to ATC saturation.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 150

While operating flight [from] PHL; while in cruise flight at 36;000 feet MSL; we noticed an abnormally cold temperature in the cockpit. We turned up the Pack 1 temperature and noted the flight deck temperature got even colder. It was indicating 18 [degrees] Celsius and after increasing the temperature more. It continued to drop to 16 [degrees] Celsius. It was so cold; we noticed frost beginning to form on the inside of the unheated portion of the windshield. Around this time; we noticed the EICAS cabin altitude was indicating 7;700 feet ALT and 7.7 PSID and still indicating green while a small climb of 100 FPM on the cabin rate of climb. After a few moments; it was indicating amber around 8;400 feet and still climbing. We started discussing pressurization problems and the need to descend. We notified ATC and requested a descent to a lower altitude. ATC gave us 24;000 MSL at first. We began to run the QRH for Cabin Rate Abnormal Fluctuations and notified the Flight Attendant to take her seat. We noted that the cabin altitude became green again with lower values once passing through FL200. We took control of the cabin pressurization in manual mode and followed NAP-30 as directed by the QRH to achieve normal cabin pressure values. We notified ATC of an abnormal cabin pressure event and that we were continuing to [destination airport]. We texted Dispatch about our cabin pressurization problem and that the fuel state and weather looked good enough to continue. We got no response from Dispatch. We notified our Flight Attendant that everything was normal again and she could get up to do her final walk through. We completed our normal descent and landing checklists and landed normally with the pressurization in manual mode.Self scan; vigilance. and situational awareness.Pack 1 unable to heat cockpit and pressurize aircraft sufficiently at aircraft altitude 36;000 feet MSL. There were no EICAS messages of a pack failure or any other abnormal indications except the Amber high cabin altitude on the EICAS. Took action to stop the cabin from climbing and depressurizing. Ran QRH; notified ATC notified Flight Attendant; took manual control of cabin pressurization; and landed safely at our planned destination. We also notified company Dispatch via ACARS with 2 messages and got no response.Thankfully we had good weather and were tankering a lot of fuel. Had the weather been marginal and the fuel state less than desirable; we would have been much more task saturated determining an alternate course of action especially because dispatch did not respond to our messages.

Flying along at FL360; [we] noticed that we were cold; turning the pack one up to keep us warm and the temp got even colder. Troubleshoot the pack with no effect. Ice was present on the INSIDE of the unheated area on the windscreen. No EICAS or system abnormal indications. We noticed cabin altitude was 7;700 feet with a climb of 100 feet/minute and we started discussing cabin pressurization and the apparent pack issue. The Captain pulled out the QRH and referenced the cabin altitude tables; we discovered the ideal value was 7;600 feet and 7.7 PSI. Cabin altitude went to amber at 8;400 feet with a constant 100 feet/minute climb. We requested descent and was cleared to FL240 initially; then 11;000 feet after a few minutes. The Captain ran the 'Cabin Rate Abnormal Fluctuations' QRH which we completed resulting in the indications stabilizing and the cabin altitude indication returning to green status. We leveled at 11;000 feet and after a discussion with the Flight Attendant and ourselves; we elected to continue to [destination airport]. The Captain notified the company dispatcher via ACARS of our situation and we landed with a normal landing and deplaned. On the phone to the Dispatch after the flight; the Captain was made aware that the Dispatcher had not even read our messages and was not aware we're flying at such a low altitude or that we had issues with the pressurization. We had looked at the fuel plan and amount of fuel in the tanks; the weather at [destination airport] and had already decided to continue; which was also sent to the Dispatcher; but we never got any response.

Air carrier flight crew noticed an issue with pressurization during cruise flight. The PACK was unable to maintain cabin altitude nor temperature. The crew followed the QRH; made a descent to a lower altitude; and continued to their original destination.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 666

Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After Takeoff on our climb up 2;500 ft. out of ZZZ; we lost the use of both VHF radios com1 and com2. We leveled off at 2;500 ft. worked the problem and the Captain was able to get com1 back by using the ALT switch. All the communications on the First Officer side of the plane had died I could not use the hot mic or communicate with ATC on my side I tired different headsets and nothing worked. We then decided to return to ZZZ since we were going out over the water on our way to ZZZ1. WE had to burn 14;000 lbs. of fuel to get under max landing weight. We ended up holding over ZZZ VOR since the weather in the area was raining and turbulent and ZZZ VOR was in the clear and smooth. We worked the Flight Attendant; Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and ATC; till we had burned off enough fuel to return to land in ZZZ. We kept the passengers informed of what was going on as much as we could during the entire event.

Air carrier First Officer reported that both VHF radios stopped working during departure; resulting in a diversion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

[We were] cleared for the RNAV [arrival] with 35 knot tailwind. All speed and altitude restrictions were made. Initial Arrival ATIS had [destination airport] was landing ILS XYR with Weather 9 Vis 1;000 overcast / Winds approximately 100 at 11. Briefed and Confirmed the Arrival and the ILS Runway XYR with all parameters. Updated ATIS; I noticed the Vis dropped to 8 miles. Approach advised us of a tall Ship and told us to expect the RNAV (GPS) Runway XYR. The First Officer reloaded the approach and we confirmed / validated the approach. I however missed the notation on the size / height of the Vessel restriction 144 feet.We were cleared to descend to 4;000 feet outside ZZZZZ Intersection and cleared the approach. I armed the approach and received correct Final Approach armed indications (actually checked the perf page for confirmation as I normally do thru 10;000 feet) prior to ZZZZZ Intersection.Began landing configuration after passing ZZZZZ Intersection inbound. However the aircraft did not capture and begin descent at ZZZZZ Intersection so I used Speed / Vertical speed to make the remaining restrictions. I checked ground position on approach visually prior to passing the [a building] at approximately 1;000 feet With visibility less than I expected I was able to pick up Runway XYR about the same instant I observed the Large Vessel exiting the Port. When we reported runway XYR in sight. Tower cleared us for a Visual Approach. Some of the Cruise Ship was still in our direct path to the runway. I leveled off approximately 700 feet; called for autopilot off / flight directors off and maneuvered left of centerline then back to runway heading and a safe landing profile. First Officer noted airspeed deviations and sink rate on short final that were immediately corrected. We landed on speed and approximately 1200 feet down the runway on centerline. Rollout was normal. This event occurred due to IMC / Cruise Ship exiting the Harbor.Personally I believe air traffic in IMC conditions should be held for 3-5 minutes to allow an occasional Cruise Ship to Exit.

Inside final approach the aircraft started to accelerate instead of slow down as expected. I called 'Airspeed Increasing - watch your airspeed' - three times. Captain disengaged Autopilot and Auto thrust and corrected the airspeed which exceeded Flaps Full Airspeed by approximately 2 knots. We returned to a stabilized approach and then broke out of the weather and was cleared for a visual approach with a Tall Ship in the way. The Captain veered slightly to the left and remained slightly high of Glidepath to ensure separation. Once we were clear The Captain corrected back to glideslope and momentarily exceeded 1000ft descent. I called out 1300 descent rate. The Captain returned to an 800 descent rate and landed on speed about 1200 feet down the runway. High workload caused by change in Approach Type and managing the airplane during the approach. Airplane started to accelerate unexpectedly and took the Captain time to override automation which time delay caused Flap overspeed. Unstable approach was caused by unexpected Tall Ship directly on flight path once we broke out of the weather; forcing descent profile correction. The correction back to glideslope caused the momentary steep descent on final.The Tall ship was in the harbor for a long time; but really only effected us. Tower should be able to delay approaches during the short window the ship is directly crossing the flight path. If it had been VMC then no issues.

B767 flight crew reported heading and glide path deviation due to a cruise ship in the flight path for landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10500; Flight Crew Type 44

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise; the 582 Rotax engine lost power. Established a glide and followed appropriate engine failure procedures. Attempted three restarts but with no success. Made an uneventful; safe landing on a Golf Course. No injuries; no damage to either myself; the aircraft or surrounding area. The wings were subsequently removed and the aircraft was trucked to a repair station.

Pilot experiences an engine failure in cruise and a safe emergency landing on a golf course. No damage or injuries are reported.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

When descending on the HUSTN 2 Arrival into CLT we were cleared from FL410 to descend to cross NAVEE Intersection at FL240. As we descended on the VNAV path through FL330; JAX Center (frequency 133.625) amended our clearance to maintain FL330. Since we were descending at 3500-4000 fpm; we advised JAX that we could not level at FL330; and asked for an amended clearance. He said 'Level off' in a frantic voice. We were able to level at FL320 and complied with this clearance. Then in a frantic voice the controller said 'Climb expeditiously to FL330'. I commanded 'AP off FDs off' which placed the auto thrust system into the speed mode and hand flew up to FL330. Hand flown is more expeditious then AP. In addition; both pilots reduced ND [Navigation Display] scales to 10NM and identified threatening aircraft at 10 o'clock and 5 miles on a converging course with us at our altitude. Due to thin air and rusty flying skills and separating from the other aircraft visually; I climbed then leveled off between 32;750 and 33;200. An aircraft passed immediately below us at FL320 during maneuvering. JAX Center controller acknowledged verbally that he 'Forgot about that aircraft orbiting.' The clearance to descend to FL240 should have been to descend only to FL330. Note: Other fields above could not be selected by me for additive information.

Pilot reports of Controller descending them to an altitude; then telling pilot to maintain an altitude they are at and going through. Pilot advises ATC and climbs up to specified altitude. Traffic is below their aircraft 1;000 feet. Controller forgot about the other aircraft orbiting.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Ramp controller gave instructions for Aircraft X at Gate XX to push on the South line after outbound traffic. The ramp crew was pushing Aircraft X on the South line when [tug] called the Ramp Tower and advised that whoever was pushing Aircraft X needed to stop because they were 1 ft. away from hitting the aircraft at Gate XY. Ramp control told Aircraft X to hold position right away. [Tug] reported back that they were about 1 ft. away from hitting Aircraft Y at Gate XY. Ramp control advised Aircraft X to continue their push and disconnect at engine start line. The separation was clear at that point. The tug pushing Aircraft X was a [company] tug; which means it was our ramp personnel pushing the aircraft to the South line. The wing walkers were not seen at this event. Everything continued back to normal but it was a very close near miss. [Tug] really helped the operation by advising the Ramp Tower and reporting that. Thanks to the move team for great team work!

Ground personnel reported a loss of situational awareness during pushback; resulting in a critical ground conflict.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

While being vectored for approach into ZZZ. I asked the First Officer to execute an intercept course to the FAF as we were being vectored to just outside it. We were then turned further out. Once we were cleared for the visual I set the FAF altitude on the Mode Control Panel; and selected vertical speed to make sure we captured the localizer before intercepting the glide slope. Just as we leveled off at the FAF altitude of 1;600 MSL; ATC issued a Low Altitude Alert; and said to check altitude. At this time we were coming up on the FAF; and we were visual; so I continued and landed. No other alerts; warnings; or words.  After researching Low Altitude Alerts at the hotel I believe it was caused by my selected rate of descent of 1200 RPM; and it placed me below the glide slope. More than one lesson learned. In future I will ask the Pilot Monitoring to reload the approach; or just go-around; and setup for the approach again. Definitely would go missed if this was not a visual approach!

B737 Captain reported leveling at proper altitude and receiving a low altitude alert from ATC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 197; Flight Crew Total 21964; Flight Crew Type 4223

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was the Captain and the Pilot Flying to ORD. We were in contact with Chicago Center and given a descent to FL270 and we were given a speed restriction prior to upset event of 270 knots. The aircraft ahead of us was a Boeing 747. The B747 was doing 300 knots or better to increase the separation. At the time of the upset; we were separated by 11 NM.Approaching the level off at FL270; approximately 200 feet above that altitude descending at a rate of 500 feet per minute we encountered some moderate buffeting characteristic of aircraft wake turbulence. Within about 1 second of the onset of the turbulence; the aircraft started to roll to the left and the autopilot was unsuccessfully struggling to counteract the roll. I disconnected the autopilot and the First Officer called out 'Upset'. We had entered the B747's right wingtip vortex.Heading changed by a few degrees to the left and we were out of the rolling moment just as quickly as we entered. The seatbelt sign was quickly turned during that event by me. After the event; we were about 50 feet above our level off altitude and I hand flew the level off. I returned the aircraft to course and reengaged the autopilot. The First Officer commented after the event that we reached about 35 degrees of left bank. I had the First Officer make a PA explaining the event to the passengers to help calm their fears they may have had. I made a report to Chicago Center that they flew us into the B747's wake turbulence. They apologized and offered me an offset if I wanted. I accepted and we setup 1 mile right of course. The B747 was given direct FYTTE shortly after the upset while leaving us on the FYTTE FIVE ARRIVAL to BHAWK to further increase lateral separation and reduce the possibility that we would fly back into his wake turbulence.

B737NG Captain reported an inflight upset occurred at FL270 descending into ORD 11 miles in trail of a B747.


Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 9875; Flight Crew Type 690

CMI approach controller cleared me for a visual approach to DEC Runway 24 at about 5 to 6 miles from DEC. He did not turn over communication. I queried him and he turned me over immediately. I was then just 3.5 miles from the field and in DEC airspace. A VFR Bonanza was on a left downwind turning base right at me. Tower told me to report 3 mile final and I stated already there. My TCAS started stating 'traffic' and I was trying to pick the traffic up visually. I spotted aircraft low and left and knew I could get behind him with a hard left turn. I think we came within 100 feet apart with no or little horizontal.I talked to DEC tower manager and they said at the very time I was calling they were receiving a call from CMI about a conflict report on their radar.I had noticed the controller seemed slow in speech rate and seemed to be getting behind the power curve with excess phraseology and no concern for timeliness. I had troubles even reporting on and used a faster speech rate hoping he would pick it up.  When talking to the DEC tower they said they also were having problems that morning with him being so slow in giving data to them.I do know that the letter of agreement was broken by not turning communication over to DEC tower at the point it states.

PC-12 pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at DEC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 5.5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft X was a departure off of ZZZ in a climbing left turn southbound. I radar identified the aircraft off departure end and left the aircraft on the assigned ALT of 3000 feet from tower. Aircraft Y was a VFR aircraft transitioning the departure corridor airspace at 2900-3000 feet on own navigation northwest bound. Aircraft Y had originally requested 3000 feet as the transition altitude. To which I approved when I had no departures off of ZZZ that always climb to 3000 feet on contact. I'm not sure why I approved this altitude because I know it is a conflict. I also had another VFR aircraft at 4500 feet transitioning the same departure corridor.When Aircraft X came off the departure end; in my head I left him at 3000 feet because I knew I had the 4500 feet [traffic] and I told myself that I did what I always do and had Aircraft Y at 3500 feet not at 3000 feet. So I initially I left Aircraft X at 3000 feet and didn't climb the aircraft because 3000 feet should be safe. I went to another pertinent issue that the final controller was yelling across the room coordinating a speed with me and was taking care of that request; I then went back to my departure aircraft and realized that Aircraft Y was not at 3500 feet but at 3000 feet; which was same altitude as Aircraft X. I told Aircraft X to climb without delay and maintain 7000 feet and gave traffic on Aircraft Y. I then gave Aircraft Y traffic on Aircraft X and gave him a wake turbulence call and told him to start to descend immediately. I believe I then went back to Aircraft X; who still had not started to climb and gave another traffic call. The aircraft I felt passed at similar altitudes a lot closer then I would have normally had them. About 3 miles after the above situation; Aircraft X told me that he did have a RA on the VFR aircraft. I was slightly distracted and I was just not 100% on my game. I realize this. I always keep those VFR aircraft at a safe VFR altitude. (3500 feet) and I just don't know why I didn't this time. I will continue to be more vigilant and do what I know is the safest operation.

A TRACON Controller clears a locally departing IFR aircraft and a transitioning VFR aircraft to the same 3000 foot altitude. The Controller issued instructions to expedite separation yet the IFR departure still receives a TCAS RA.