Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

The confusion began when we were given instructions to 'line up and wait' on Runway 33L. A heavy had just landed and was rolling out long and we were taking our position on the runway as cleared. Additionally; there was an inbound aircraft on an approximately 4 mile final at this time; and it was obvious the Controller was attempting to speed our departure along in an effort to prevent a go-around by the inbound aircraft. Next; the Controller issued departure instructions to us while we were in position; which we believe included a heading and something regarding contacting Departure Control. Unfortunately; the aforementioned instructions were very hurried; mumbled and quite ambiguous. Both the Captain and I were unsure of what the Tower Controller had just said; although we were certain no takeoff clearance had been issued. The landing aircraft was still on the runway. The Captain; who was the pilot not flying; queried the Controller on the aforementioned instructions. In fact; the instructions were so vague and confusing that we asked the Tower Controller if he wanted us to contact Departure at that time while we were in position. No reply was received; instead several seconds later we were cleared for takeoff as the heavy aircraft was exiting the runway. During the initial climb out; the Captain again asked the Controller to verify the heading at 250 degrees and the response we received was '150' with no turn direction included. As a result; he turned the heading indicator to 150 and we initiated a turn to the right; absent any directional instructions. We turned right since this was the shortest direction to that heading (runway heading 335). We were approximately 30 degrees into the turn and approaching acceleration altitude when the Captain asked the Tower Controller to switch to Departure frequency. The response from the Tower was to inform us the 150 degrees heading was to be a left turn. As a result; we immediately initiated a turn direction back to the left. Shortly thereafter we contacted Departure Control. We received no traffic alerts and nothing extraordinary was said on the Departure frequency regarding our initial turn to the right. The flight continued to our destination without incident. ATC Controller should issue clear; appropriate departure instructions at the appropriate time. Flight crew should not begin takeoff roll without being 100% certain of departure instructions; regardless of proximity of inbound aircraft.

An Air Carrier issued a hurried takeoff clearance from BWI was not given a clear departure vector heading and after a takeoff track deviation were given a new heading by the TRACON.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working [a B737] on the STAR. I had to take him off the arrival for an unidentified VFR primary target flying through the approach corridor. [The B737] was told of the traffic and didn't see it; so I based [the B737] to miss the primary target and the primary target decided to turn towards [the B737]. [The B737] was based high and close to breaking the noise restriction. [The B737] eventually saw the traffic and it was no factor.This is a daily problem and someone is going to eventually get hurt. There needs to be an airspace design change. VFR targets constantly fly through the approach corridor at bad altitudes that conflict with aircraft on final or turning base. Often they are primary targets with no transponders and high enough to be a major concern. This situation is very bad and nothing seems to be happening about it.

P80 TRACON Controller cancelled an arrival's STAR and vectored the aircraft to avoid an unidentified VFR aircraft flying through the final approach course.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Other Glider; Dispatcher

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 7800; Flight Crew Type 2800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

On final approach to RWY (Runway) XXL at ZZZ; with throttle retarded; throttle control became disconnected from throttle arm on engine's fuel controller; whereupon engine went to full power with no further throttle control available. Notified tower and advised of intention to go around; join the pattern for left traffic to RWY XXL; and land with limited control of engine power or with no power. Performed go-around; normal traffic pattern; and landing while in continuous communication with the tower. On roll out; coasted onto [Taxiway] XX2 but did not clear the runway holding position markings. As the engine could not be safely restarted with throttle fully open; aircraft required towing from [Taxiway] XX2 to the ramp.On the ramp; opened right gill panel on lower cowling and observed that the threaded throttle control had fully backed out (that is; it had become fully unscrewed) from the rod end that connected it to the throttle arm on fuel controller.

Pilot reported loss of engine control; resulting in an In Flight Shut Down and a precautionary emergency landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

During ascent; about 3 minutes after takeoff; I felt what seemed like an impact against aircraft left. Shortly afterwards the Captain called to let us know the left engine had power loss and we would be going back to ZZZ. Yellow emergency landing; not expecting an evacuation. Captain advised the passengers. FA A; advised the passengers to have their seatbelts on low and tight. We experienced a smooth landing and there was an immediate exterior inspection of the aircraft. We then taxied to the gate and deplaned. All passengers and crew remained calm and orderly.

ERJ-170 Flight Attendant reported an engine failure shortly after takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Center tank fuel was not feeding. Captain conferred with Dispatch and diverted to an enroute airport (good weather). Landing uneventful; under Max Landing Weight (MLW) and with well over FAR reserves in wing tanks. Maintenance could not determine cause of issue. Captain and I declined to have our duty day extended to wait for an inbound aircraft to continue flight to the filed destination.

Because an MD-82 center fuel tank would not feed the engines; the flight diverted to a nearby airport while sufficient wing tank fuel remained.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Climbing out night VFR after cleanup (approx. 7000 feet) we heard loud bangs coming from the aircraft. No obvious signs of engine issues; but we had just turned the Air Driven Pump (ADP) off as per procedure with auto mode inoperative. I reduced engine power slightly and Captain returned pump to on position. Banging stopped and we and returned to the departure airport.  Engines operated normally for return and landing. After inspection by Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) we taxied to gate.Looking back on it now; there's not a whole lot I would have done differently. I didn't go crazy pulling throttles and turning things off since there were no obvious signs where the problem was coming from. Very calmly slightly reduced power on both engines but slightly more on the left since that was my guess as to where the banging was coming from. Total reduction was probably no more than 10 percent N1 when banging stopped. The only mistake I made was probably unrelated to the whole incident. On climb out after clean and 250 I selected Climb 2 since we were only cleared to 14;000 feet and were climbing at 4800 FPM at such a light weight. Later on; I realized this procedure only applies to our 757 fleet and not the 767. Since I've been flying the 757 much more I guess it was just a habit. I will go back and review my 767 procedural differences more often and do a better job with confirming with the other pilot what I'm doing. Also; [there have been recent changes in procedures]. I've been on the airplane for about 10 years now and procedures have been in a constant state of change as long as I can remember. Hopefully that will all get resolved soon as well.Overall it went well. Approach and ARFF were excellent and helped us out the entire time. Very professional and well done!

After landing we stopped on the runway and had the Fire and Rescue people check out the exterior of the aircraft and was told all was well except for a small puddle of fluid under the left engine. We shut that engine down and taxied to the gate on one engine. At the gate we indicated what happened in the maintenance log.

During climbout; a B767 developed a loud banging sound which the crew could not positively identify; but suspected an engine because a power reduction stopped the noise.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Type 2544

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Type 260

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft was dispatched with an inoperative Pack #2 due to a regulator fault and [the flight] was in full compliance with the MEL at departure. Flight was completely full in the cabin. Due to Pack #2 being inoperative it was difficult to cool the main cabin temp using only Pack #1. Using only Pack #1 at FL370 we were able to maintain 72 degrees in the cabin using max cold and high flow. Approximately 200 nm west of ZZZ at FL370 we received an ECAM AIR PACK 1+2 FAULT. ATC was notified and [priority handling was requested]. Upon checking the pressurization and bleed air page; it appeared that Pack #1 was overheating showing an output temperature in amber yet we never received a Pack 1 OVHT ECAM. The cabin altitude was still under control. A descent to 10;000 ft. was initiated without exceeding the cabin altitude before we complied with the ECAM to turn off Pack #1 leaving us unpressurized. Contact was made with Dispatch and Maintenance Control to discuss the situation resulting in a diversion to ZZZ.

Approximately 240 nm from ZZZ; at a cruise altitude of FL350 and while in communication with Center; an ECAM aural and Master Caution sounded for AIR PACK 1+2 FAULT. The CA (Captain) said he noted a momentary amber overheat temp in Pack 1; but it did not trigger the PACK 1 OVHT caution. I (Pilot Monitoring) did not see this indication that had subsequently returned to a green inlet temperature. Pack 2 was previously secured and turned off per the MEL deferral on our 2nd release. Pack 1 showed a fault light. The AIR PACK 1+2 FAULT ECAM directed us to secure Pack 1; descend to 10;000 ft. MSL or MEA and then turn on the RAM Air when the pressure differential was less than 1.0. Even though Pack 1 had a fault light in the overhead panel; it appeared to be partially functioning; the cabin pressure holding and the cabin altimeter only increasing at a very slight rate. A flight crew decision was made to begin an immediate normal descent to 10;000 ft. without the use of oxygen while closely monitoring the pressurization page to ascertain the true nature of the Pack 1 malfunction. The CA directed me to assume pilot flying duties and ATC responsibilities while he coordinated with Operations; Dispatch; flight attendants and the passengers. We began a coordinated 1500-2000 fpm rate of descent via two ATC-assigned step down altitudes of FL300 and FL200 before ultimately reaching 10;000 ft. The aircraft was lowered in a steady continual descent with no pauses which I believe helped our situation. Cabin pressure held steady around 8;000 ft. during the normal descent. Upon reaching 10;000 ft.; Pack 1 was secured; differential pressure reached less than 1.0; RAM AIR was selected on and the cabin altimeter climbed from approximately 8;000 to 10;000 ft. as expected. We completed all remaining ECAM items until the screens were normal. The rate of fuel burn at 10;000 ft. MSL made reaching our initial destination of ZZZ1 impossible; and it was decided that ZZZ was a suitable diversion while 200nm away and with 11;600 pounds of fuel aboard along with the best Maintenance; aircraft and passenger accommodation options. We informed ATC; Dispatch; Operations; and proceeded accordingly. We switched to the next Center and the Captain [requested priority handling] and returned to the pilot flying role while we coordinated an uneventful arrival via the ZZZZZ to Visual XX approach at ZZZ and ultimately parking at gate XY. We were then met by the ZZZ Chief Pilot at the gate and proceeded to fill out a risk mitigation form following the event. We then accepted a new aircraft and release at gate XZ and ultimately brought the same passengers to ZZZ1 two hours later than originally planned.In totality; I felt the event was handled safely and professionally. The CRM skills taught and utilized allowed both the CA and First Officer to properly divide duties while ensuring sufficient cross checks and communication. At no time did I feel rushed or stressed. I believe the deliberate delay in securing the faulty Pack 1 that appeared to be functioning along with the continual scanning of the pressurization page allowed us to avoid an unnecessary priority descent; use of pilot oxygen; or the deployment of passenger oxygen that might have accompanied a rapid depressurization. All in all; I felt the CA was composed and handled the event in line with Company desires. While I regret the delay the passengers experienced; I believe we handled the event in a safe and caring manner.

Air Carrier Pilot Crew reported departing with one air cycle machine inoperative and during cruise flight the other air cycle machine indicated a fault condition necessitating a diversion.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 8040; Flight Crew Type 500

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather; Airspace Structure

[I] departed with reported weather of 900 overcast 10 miles visibility. By the south field boundary the ceiling was jagged 500-600. The visibility was about 6 miles. I proceeded southeast bound at 500 FT until I reached the Calcasieu River then proceeded southbound along the river. I announced my position and intentions southbound along the river on the Cameron CTAF 123.05 at 15 miles; 10 miles; & 5 miles. My aircraft was equipped with a Mode S transponder and TIS (Traffic Information Service) and fortunately I was in the TIS service area and noted an aircraft several miles to my east at my altitude converging on a south-southwest course. I slowed my speed to allow it to get ahead of me. Because I had slowed my speed the TIS was not considering the target a collision hazard. About 5 miles north of Cameron without having responded to any of my traffic advisory calls on CTAF the target suddenly became a Traffic Alert on the TIS. I immediately descended 250 FT assuming the target had turned into me. A few moments later a yellow helicopter in the midst of a right turn passed my left side about 150 yards away and about 150 FT above. After the helicopter passed I returned to 500 FT MSL and continued southbound another mile until I reached the lowered ceilings that precipitated the yellow helicopter's course reversal. I too reversed course and returned to base. I checked with people at the FBO to ask if they heard my traffic advisory calls on the CTAF. They said they heard my calls which confirmed my radio transmitter was working.

Helicopter pilot reports a NMAC with another helicopter while attempting to fly near LA78 beneath a low ceiling. TIS aboard the reporters helicopter was instrumental in avoiding the NMAC.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

A flameless military ration heater (FRH) was identified by the 'C' Flight Attendant about an hour into our flight. It was inactivated. The 'C' Flight Attendant notified me of his findings. He then took the FRH away from the passenger and placed it in double bags and stowed it in the wheelchair compartment for the rest of the flight. As he did that; I called the Captain and told her about the FRH; that it was being stowed properly; and that a GSC should be notified. Upon our arrival. I was busy taking care of an unaccompanied minor that was deplaning and trying to get the crew change done in a timely manner and I forgot to make sure the FRH was given to ops.

When a flight attendant aboard a B737-700 observed a passenger utilizing a military style 'flameless ration heater' they confiscated and secured it. After landing they failed to deliver it to operations due to conflicting duties.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

When we arrived at our destination; severe weather was approaching the field. On about a 10 mile final; ATC issued a wind shear alert warning; so we went around. Before we left ZZZ for Austin; we saw that there was weather moving toward the airport; so we added another 2;000 lbs of fuel for possible holding. We held at two different locations for at least an hour waiting for the weather to move; and we also knew that if we had to divert to our alternate; we would be stuck there because we would be out of duty. As the weather started moving off the airport; Austin Approach vectored us around the east side of the storm; to now approach the airport from the north. As we were approaching the final about 10 miles out; we experienced a possible lighting strike and severe turbulence that rolled the aircraft approx 70 degrees of bank to the right; all while clear of clouds. The autopilot was disconnected while recovering from the upset. We continued to the airport with only light to moderate turbulence the rest of the way in. There were no injuries to the passengers; and were grateful to us for getting them to their destination.

CE750 Captain reported a lightning strike; severe turbulence; and wind shear which resulted in a 70 degree bank while on approach to AUS.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I had to stop Aircraft X at 10000 feet for traffic. Eventually Aircraft X cleared traffic and I climbed the aircraft to 14000 feet. I did have VFR traffic for Aircraft X. That aircraft was Aircraft Y at VFR/16500 feet on a southbound course to enter W-289. Aircraft Y requested communication transfer to Plead Control and my Assist had completed the transfer of control. I knew I would be keeping Aircraft X at an altitude well below Aircraft Y so I switched communications to Plead Control.I waited until Aircraft X was behind the Aircraft Y and I climbed Aircraft X to 23000 feet. As soon as I climbed Aircraft X I could see Aircraft Y making a right hand turn and wondered why he was turning. I called traffic to Aircraft X and the Aircraft X pilot had the aircraft in sight. The Aircraft Y aircraft continued his right turn and by now had turned more than 180 degrees. I attempted to stop Aircraft X at 15500 feet but Aircraft X said he would stop at 16000 feet. I issued a traffic alert to Aircraft X. Aircraft X reported he was receiving a T-CAS alert and was descending to 15500 feet. Aircraft Y passed directly over Aircraft X and continued northbound. Aircraft X was clear of the traffic and I issued climb to Aircraft X. At that time I noticed Aircraft Y in a left turn and they were turning 180 degrees to the left. I told Aircraft X to disregard the climb clearance and maintain his present altitude which as still 15500 feet. Aircraft Y passed directly over the Aircraft X once again and continued southbound into W-289.Aircraft Y was having trouble with his radios contacting Plead Control so he decided to execute a 180 degree turn until he successfully contacted Plead Control to receive authorization to enter W-289. I wish he would have reported back to my frequency so I could have advised Aircraft Y of traffic. In [more than 20] years of ATC experience that is the closest call I have ever been involved with.Not really sure if I could have done anything different. I am thankful that I saw Aircraft Y make the 180 degree turn so I could at least call traffic to Aircraft X and stop the aircraft beneath Aircraft Y. The pilot should have reported back to my frequency when he made his turn and military pilots need to realize there are many civil and commercial aircraft flying and understand how congested civil airspace is in the en route environment.

A Center controller reported a military aircraft no longer on the frequency turned away from its intended route and toward departure traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14200; Flight Crew Type 4500

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During high speed regime of takeoff roll; approximately 110 KTS; right generator failed; right AC bus unpowered; right bus isolation illuminated. Continued takeoff; with right AC bus unpowered. During climb I determined that the problem seemed to be caused by the loss of the right generator; but that the highest priority checklist would be for the right AC bus off. Once reaching a safe altitude; Captain directed me to run the QRH for AC bus off; and restored power to right AC bus from right generator. In reading the right AC bus off checklist; we decided not to reset right bus tie since power was restored already; and bus isolated checklist does not suggest cycling bus tie switch; and in fact states not to turn it off if in flight. Captain contacted Dispatch and Maintenance; made decision to continue flight with right bus isolated; but to land at alternate airport with longer runways; as we would not be able to power right AC bus if right generator failed on landing; and would prefer not to have to deal with the associated items lost while trying to stop on a short runway. Flight landed at alternate airport without further incident.

B757-200 First Officer reports a right generator failure at 110 KTS during takeoff with the right AC bus remaining unpowered and isolated. Once safely airborne; the right generator is restored using the QRH to reset the generator; which restores power to the right AC bus. The crew elects not to cycle the bus tie switch to resume normal bus tie operation; but does elect to divert to an airport near the destination with a longer runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 6700

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

My day began as an 8 am reserve short call. Crew Scheduling called me at 8 am and informed me that I had an 11:30 departure. After arriving at the airport; the paring then called for a departure across the U.S. after a two and a half hour sit. The first aircraft that we attempted to fly had an APU that auto-shutdown. While at the gate waiting for Maintenance to repair; the temperature on the aircraft exceeded 90 degrees due to an inoperable loading bridge AC unit. The Captain elected to not board the aircraft for passenger safety due to high temperatures. After about 45 minutes and Maintenance unable to repair the APU; the Captain refused the aircraft. The replacement aircraft they found for us was due in around 17:30. After arriving at the aircraft; we noticed several inbound write ups to include oxygen servicing. The repairs delayed us to the point of me being illegal and Scheduling notified us that I would not be flying the flight to ZZZ1 due to (duty day exceeding 16 hours). Scheduling informed me that I was being reassigned and now flying a flight leaving 13 hours after my duty day began. I then informed the Flight Manager of my growing concern and fatigue. He informed me that the next flight would probably be cancelled for lack of coverage; but to use my best judgment for safety and how I felt. I notified Scheduling that I was fit to fly but may be fatigued for the following flight the next morning. The layover was scheduled for 13 hours with a mid morning departure. At approximately 5:15 am; I was awakened by a loud group of people returning to their rooms across the hall. I was then unable to get back to sleep. I then felt my body becoming ill due to lack of rest so I notified Crew Scheduling around 5:30 am that I would be unable to fly after the next flight. Several factors contributed to my fatigue on this paring. The 6 hour and 40 minute rolling delay was the primary cause. In addition; [I had] no adequate rest quarters or room during the delay. Another contributing factor for the fatigue was the reduced rest (9 hours 22 minutes) from the previous paring (just 2 days prior).

A320 First Officer describes the circumstances leading up to a fatigue call to Scheduling.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 87; Flight Crew Total 1179; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Student was sent on his 4th solo to go to the north practice area and to do landings at ZZZ. About an hour into my student's flight he calls me and states that he thought the brakes were locked up after landing and he was still on the runway. He then got out of the aircraft with the engine still running to check the brakes out to see if he could fix it. After getting out of the aircraft he was struck by the propeller on his hand. He had been instructed to never get near a moving propeller and to never get out of an aircraft that is running. After being struck he then got back into the aircraft and was able to taxi the aircraft to an FBO and walked in by himself and was able to procure assistance from the staff inside then proceeded to the hospital.

An instructor reported that his student; flying a light sport aircraft; was stuck on a runway with the brakes locked. The student injured himself in an attempt to check the brakes.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

I was working on the dock my normal job assignment is to receive parts and ship out parts out. I was made aware that I may have mistakenly shipped out a Hazardous material part. I was unaware of this at that time. I truly don't remember shipping it out. I'm aware of the Hazardous material policy and would have not shipped out the part if I knew it was Hazardous.

Air Carrier Maintenance Stock Clerk reported being notified that he shipped a Hazardous material part. Stock Clerk is aware of SOP of shipping Hazmat but does not recall the event.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Before departure; the Captain went to pull the [wheel] chocks. The Lineman [Mechanic] told him that he would take care of it but the crew member insisted that he would pull them. The Lineman then explained to him that for safety reasons and Station safety policy; they don't pull the chocks until the Ground Power Unit (GPU) power cord connected to the aircraft is disconnected. That crew member impolitely said that he's following his own policy and that he was going to instruct our company on how he strongly disagrees with this policy and went ahead and pulled the chocks anyway. The policy was set in place due to multiple times of the aircraft inadvertently rolling forward while the crew members were performing Pre-flight Checks. Several aircraft and GPU's were damaged when the cord was stretched to full length. Crews sometimes release brakes and lessen foot pressure accidently; causing the aircraft to roll forward; prior to providing the disconnect signal to the Lineman. This Local Base policy prevents 2-3 potential GPU incidents each year.

A Maintenance Manager describes his efforts to discourage a Captain from pulling the wheel chocks from an Embraer EMB-505 aircraft during pre-departure operations. Pilot disregards request; ignoring the safety concerns of Maintenance personnel and company Station safety policy.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 21; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 06; Flight Attendant Total 21; Flight Attendant Type 80

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Approximately two hours prior to landing; I was advised by my crew that we had only 35 gallons of potable water balance in the flight. I advised my crew to modify the arrival service so as to conserve water in the lavatories for washing of hands and flushing by pax and crew. We did have about four-six liters of bottled water which were saved to be placed in lavs if required in addition to hand sanitizers.About an hour prior to landing the console reading was 1 gallon. At this time; Waste tank no.1 alerted us to an INOP status and four lavs were unusable for the remainder of the flight.This has been an ongoing issue with this airplane/flight for over two years now. It is a health and safety issue which the company has not addressed adequately in all this time.Pax and crew; as primary food handlers; have limited facilities and tools to wash their hands; use lav facilities as well as flush toilets. It is unhygienic; unsanitary and a health hazard.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight attendants on international flight reported a chronic issue with insufficient water to last the duration of the trip.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 350

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft Y nearly collided with me in my Aircraft X. I had all anti-collision lights on at dusk; this aircraft had no lights on until approximately 30 seconds after the near collision. The aircraft approached from the right at approximately a 30 degree intercept angle. I did not spot the aircraft until it was roughly 100 feet away at which point I took evasive action and dove my aircraft. Had evasive action not been taken we would have certainly collided. The other aircraft took no evasive action and did not seem to notice my aircraft until I had passed on the other side of them at which point they turned on their lights.

GA pilot reported an NMAC while in cruise flight requiring evasive action. The other aircraft did not have any lights on.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 170; Flight Crew Type 170

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

During a flight to DPA I unknowingly landed on Runway 2 at EFT which was closed. Prior to flight I received a briefing to review weather along the route and any NOTAMs. To meet the requirements of the 61.429 (4i) for the long commercial cross country a full stop landing was planned enroute at EFT which is almost directly on the route to DPA. Prior to picking this as a point of landing; I reviewed the airport diagram and NOTAMs on Foreflight. I also received the weather from the AWOS prior to landing.  The landing terminated normally with a full stop; however; during my rollout I noticed cones on the runway about 1500 feet from where my rollout ended. I then looked to the left and noticed cones blocking the taxiway intersection on the runway and realized the runway must be closed. Given that the landing was uneventful I carefully taxied back to the start of Runway 2 and inspected the runway condition during my taxi. Upon reaching the threshold of Runway 2 I noticed a yellow X that was located south of the Runway 2 threshold outside of the runway environment. This was not visible during my approach for landing; nor were the unlit cones at the end of the runway. Given the runway condition appeared acceptable for a takeoff in a 172 I executed a short field takeoff without incident.The problem ultimately arose as the result of me failing to review current NOTAMS in my briefing before departing where the runway closure was notated. Since it must have been fairly unplanned; the NOTAM was not in the usual Foreflight download that would have alerted me on the taxi diagram that the runway was closed. After landing however and pulling up NOTAMS it did display the NOTAM on the airport plate and in the section for airport information.Contributing factors at the airport is the lack of any lighted signs indicating that the runway was closed and that the yellow X indicating closure was off the runway threshold and not visible with a landing light at night on a normal approach. The AWOS also did not have a remark regarding a closed runway which would have aided in awareness and planning before even arriving at the airport. To correct the situation I would recommend that the airport indicate on the AWOS that the runway is closed and also utilize some lighted cones at the taxiways; on the runway; lighted closure X's; or other indications at night that the runway is closed.  There should also be some indication within the runway environment of Runway 2 that would be visible with a landing light that the runway is closed. Without these changes; it is possible that another pilot could make this same mistake.

C172 pilot reports landing at EFT at night and discovering that the runway is closed. After taxi back and assessing the runway condition; takeoff is initiated. The closure had a NOTAM; but not noticed by the reporter. The indications of closure were unlighted cones on the connecting taxiways and an unlighted yellow X outside of the touch down zone; none of which were detected prior to landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 158; Flight Crew Type 3969

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Taxied out to Runway XX at ZZZ as planned and briefed. Nearing departure end we got an Eng 2 Reverser fault. Stopped and reviewed QRC. Nothing for on ground event noted. Called Maintenance Control. Decided to taxi back to ramp to clear taxiway and work issue. Taxied via Runway XX and exited at Taxiway XX. Parked on south side of Deice Ramp. Maintenance Control directed to start APU. Captain set brakes and we started APU. Upon direction from Maintenance Control; we shut down both motors. Captain stood up to check circuit breaker panel. CB at N41 on 121 VU panel was popped; labeled Engine 2 Oil Quantity Sensor Channel B.Upon Maintenance Control direction; we reset circuit breaker. We were directed to restart engines and report back. Started Engine 1. At 50% N2 the FO (First Officer) started Engine 2. Normal indications; when radio call reported engine fire on right side. FO looked right and saw some smoke blowing past the right window. Then the fire alarm and ECAM illuminated. FO looked up to verify indication and pointed to ECAM screen. Started to read the first step and alarm stopped and ECAM went away. Radio call reported sparks from bottom of Engine 2. There was a momentary alarm bell again and then it went away. Fire loop fault appeared and FO shut down motor with Master Engine switch. No other indications of fire noted. Airport CTAF called fire department. Crew stayed on phone with Maintenance and fire department reported a burn-through on the cowling and scorching on the cowling. Crew elected to taxi to Parking with fire department concurrence. Shutdown went normal. Passengers deplaned via air stairs. Normal checklists completed.

A320 flight crew reported an engine fire and engine cowling burn-through while troubleshooting an engine reverser fault on the ground with Maintenance Control.


Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

At cruise; before top of descent; the captain briefed the ILS DME 07 at SJO. We were not able to receive the ATIS; so Cenamer Control was asked for the weather. Cenamer control took some time getting back to us because he had to call Coco approach. The reported weather was: winds 24010; vis >10 KM; sky conditions SCT 3000 BKN 8000. We asked which approach and runway was in use. Again; we had to wait while Cenamer checked with approach control. By this time we were very near top of descent. We both thought we heard Cenamer tell us to expect the ILS DME 07. As we began the descent into SJO; and were handed over to EL Coco approach; we began to encounter several thunderstorm cells that we needed to deviate around. We completed the approach checklist. At some point; after we had done the approach checklist; approach advised us to expect the VOR DME 07 with the Cyrus Visual circle to land 25.The VOR DME 07 approach is in the database; but the Cyrus Visual; and the associated waypoints; is not. The captain asked me to load the waypoints for the Cyrus Visual while he talked to approach and deviated around the cells. While not difficult; it took me some time to enter and double check the waypoints by point/bearing/distance. We were getting task saturated at this point. I loaded the CYRUS; BELEN; and EPABE waypoint and the mandatory 4000 FT altitudes for the Cyrus Visual; and showed the captain the approach plate. He confirmed the waypoints on the plan view. I mentioned that we had briefed the ILS DME 07; but had not yet briefed the VOR DME 07. I later realized; that during this time; I had lost my positional awareness; having left it to the captain to avoid the thunderstorm cells; and navigate toward the airport. I did have the El Coco VOR tuned and identified in NAV 2; and had VOR mode selected. I don't recall exactly when I was able to 'get back into the loop;' but I think it was between the CARBA and MONTE fixes on the VOR DME 07 approach. Prior to CYRUS we broke out of the bases of the clouds; but we did not acquire the SJO airport. The weather was much lower than we had been given. I think it was closer to BKN 2000 FT; with a lower scattered cloud layer. As we turned right toward BELEN; we still had ground contact; but still did not have the SJO airport in sight. Approaching BELEN; I said something like 'We should be able to see the airport. (paraphrasing)' The captain pointed straight ahead; and indicated that he had the airport in sight.The El Coco tower controller was monitoring us very closely; and immediately questioned if we were making the left turn at BELEN for the downwind. This is when we both became very confused; because what we were seeing didn't match what the tower controller was telling us. We proceeded directly from BELEN toward the Tobias Bolanos airport; and into the PAVAS ATZ restricted airspace. We confirmed with the tower that we were on a left downwind. It was at this time that the El Coco tower controller told us that we were looking at the wrong airport. We over flew the Tobias Bolanos airport; and made an extended left base to final turn for runway 25 at SJO. While on the base leg; I realized that we hadn't done the before landing checklist; and asked the captain if he wanted it. He called for the 'gear down; before landing checklist' The remainder of the approach and landing was without incident. With the luxury of being able to think this over again and again; the simplest thing to do would have been to accept a tailwind; and land on runway 07. At our landing weight; I do not think this would have been a problem.We should have realized how time compressed and task saturated we had become. At that point; we could have asked to go hold somewhere; and taken time to build and fully brief the approach. This wasn't a great option because of the thunderstorms all around the area; but in retrospect would have been a much better way to handle this. In addition to the thunderstorms in the area; we were expecting 3000 FT scattered and an 8000 FT BKN ceiling; so we expected to break out much earlier than we did.Regardless; it's obvious now that delaying the approach would have been a safer option.

Event : Airspace violation while flying the 'Cypress Visual runway 25' approach into San Jose; Costa Rica.Enroute to MROC I built the ILS 07 at MROC in the FMC based on the projected runway in use on the Flight Release. We were unable to acquire the ATIS at the normal distance because of terrain; so around top of descent; we asked the enroute controller for the current weather and runway in use. Winds were 240 degrees at 10; 10 miles visibility; 3000 sct; broken at 8000 FT. He also said they were using the ILS to 07. We were cleared for the 'Parrita 4' arrival; but shortly after passing Iseba; we began deviating around storms. When we contacted San Jose approach control they advised that the approach in use was the VOR DME to runway 07 with the Cyrus Visual procedure to rnwy 25. I asked the FO to build the approach as I was busy deviating around numerous storms between us and the airfield. The combined procedure takes time to build as the visual portion is not in the FMC. We were unable to rejoin the arrival due to weather and eventually were vectored onto final just outside Carba. Because of time limits; we were unable to perform a thorough approach brief which would have revealed the Tobias Bolanos airport just south of our visual downwind. We descended into visual conditions just outside Belen. We saw the incorrect airport off the nose; advised the tower we had the field in site; and when the FMC started the left turn at Belen I thought we had experienced Map Shift. I selected 'heading select' to turn right to enter the downwind at Tobias Bolanos. While in visual conditions we got the GPWS terrain warning; but did not perform an avoidance maneuver. Simultaneously the tower advised that we needed to turn our base and that we were looking at the wrong airport. We needed no further clues to realize our mistake. Turned an extended left base; saw the correct airport and landed without further incident.Summary: In our time compressed approach; neither of us briefed the airfield to the south; which has similar orientation to MROC. Neither of us had previously flown this approach or landed on runway 25. I suppose we could have asked for 'holding' to allow for more preparation; but we were off route and weather closer in would have made it difficult. Another option would have been; traffic permitting; to request the ILS 07 to land 07 as the reported wind was just at our tailwind limit. Because of the visual conditions we chose to continue with the assigned approach.

An air carrier crew; deviating for weather while descending and preparing for the MROC Cypress Visual Approach Runway 25; was advised the arrival was now VOR DME 7 with the visual to Runway 25. They became disoriented and lined up on Tobias Bolanos airport and violated the PAVAS ATZ before ATC advised them about their error.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After gate arrival the flight attendants reported a strong odor like 'dirty socks' on descent.  They said it started in the aft cabin and progressed throughout the cabin.  No odor was noted on the flight deck.

Captain reported Flight Attendant notification after gate arrival of 'dirty socks' odor throughout the cabin.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 300

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

I was ferrying a Breezy (experimental) for a friend.  I had topped the tanks with fuel so it had at least 20 gallons on board.  About 20 minutes after takeoff at an altitude of approximately 1;000 feet AGL the engine started running erratically and cutting out.  The terrain below was all tall pines except for a clear strip of land where a pipeline had been run.  Since the engine was not producing full power I elected to circle that clearing while I tried to remedy the engine problem in the event I would need to land the airplane.  I could not get the engine to produce full power; so rather than head westward over the tall pines and risk a crash landing and/or accident in the heavily forested areas; I elected to make a precautionary landing on the pipeline clearing.  I landed the airplane in the clearing and did absolutely no damage to the airplane; myself; or any property whatsoever.  A couple of days later the owner of the airplane trailered it home. When the owner was draining the fuel out of the wing tanks prior to disassembly of the airplane for transport after about two gallons of flow the fuel line from the wing tanks to the carburetor stopped-up.  As of this time he has not done any further investigation; but of course he will.  We were running 100LL fuel but the previous owner ran nothing but autogas.I did not contact the FAA or file an incident or accident report of any sort because the event in my interpretation of the definitions of an incident or accident in the FAR's and AIM did not apply or require such. The event was simply a precautionary landing. The landing prevented a possible accident or incident.

A Breezy engine lost power because of a blocked fuel line so the pilot landed the aircraft on a deforested pipeline area with no aircraft damage or injury.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 550

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

This 300 foot altitude loss occurred while on a GPS direct clearance just passing PXT. Since I was in IMC and night conditions I was tuning the radar to plan any action necessary to deviate from the planned routing due to a cold front crossing ahead. I noticed that the altitude had descended from cruise. The autopilot altitude hold light was still illuminated but not correcting. I disengaged the autopilot and had to fight a full down trim situation. The electric trim did not work and the manual trim reverted quickly to a continuous nose down trim electric input. The aircraft was promptly returned to the assigned altitude and reported to ATC. While holding against the full nose down trim I located and pulled the electric trim circuit breaker which then allowed for manual trim to stabilize. ATC said they were wondering why we were down there and did not indicate if there was any traffic conflict. The remaining hour and twenty minutes of the flight was hand flown and conducted without the autopilot. Since it was at night and in the turbulent weather it was full of tasks that I was glad to have already prepared for. The runaway electric trim down input exceeded the ability and limit of the autopilot altitude hold feature to maintain altitude. This aircraft does not have any trim movement tones or altitude select or altitude alert features. The autopilot stayed engaged and did not give a disconnect tone but tried to maintain altitude and couldn't since it reached its limit. When tasks other than basic flight are added to the operation a constant recheck of the basics should be checked and rechecked. Working with the radar and comparing to the NexRad displays consumed time that added to this altitude loss not being seen earlier. Helpful hints would to be very familiar with your circuit breaker panels especially in the dark. Hand fly practice while communicating and navigating for cruise to approach situations. Whenever there is a lull in cruise activity have approach charts and navigation systems at the ready and preset as much as possible well ahead of time.

C-310 pilot reported an altitude excursion when the autopilot electric trim ran away in the nose down direction.


After takeoff; the landing gear did not retract when I selected the gear handle up. I selected gear down and noted that I only had green lights for the main gear. The gear handle was still illuminated red and the landing gear circuit breaker was out. Retarding the power levers and extending the flaps both activated the gear warning horn. I manually lowered the gear and received three green lights. The gear horn did not sound when I extended the flaps or retarded the power levers. I landed without further incident.

C99 pilot reported being unable to retract the landing gear and received an unsafe nose gear indication when the handle was returned to the down position. Manual gear extension was performed and resulted in a normal landing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Company Policy

I'm submitting this report in response to a Performance Record of Conference conducted by my supervisor. I was advised by my supervisor that I did not ensure Class C separation and operated in an unsafe manner. No loss of separation occurred however a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) was filed in response to a public inquiry. I was advised to file a report but was never given official duty time to do so therefore I'm using my personal off duty time to file this report. I acknowledge my actions did play a role in the incident. I've done a self-assessment and have determined based on the current climate that I will no longer sequence aircraft from approach control that are in a position to turn base. In the future I will either sequence aircraft to the straight-in or sequence aircraft in trail on the downwind. It is also my opinion that the Supervisor did not objectively consider all the human factors that played a role in this situation and placed most of the responsibility for this incident on me. This Record of Conference was conducted in response to an incident that occurred between an IFR Aircraft X north downwind arrival sequenced by approach control and 4 [military aircraft] in the control tower's VFR right closed traffic pattern (previously sequenced by approach control).I was summoned to my Supervisor's office to receive a Performance Record of Conference regarding the above mentioned incident. I maintain that although I was understandably defensive I remained transparent; truthful and objective while discussing the events. It quickly became clear to me that the Supervisor had already concluded I did not operate in a safe manner based on verbal feedback and the defamatory information included in the Performance Record of Conference. Phrases such as 'No! You did not know what the hell you were doing!'. 'You handed the tower a confliction requiring them to take evasive action!'; 'You did not ensure Class C separation' etc. The written portion of the Performance Record of Conference I received contains subjective and false statements about my awareness; lack of control and overall poor sequencing. I would like to reference several verbal and written statements within the Performance Record of Conference that I feel were subjective; inaccurate and in some cases downright false. In the first paragraph it states I cleared Aircraft X abeam the airport. That is incorrect as I intentionally withheld the clearance until he was in a position slightly northeast of the field to turn no less than a 3 mile right base. Supervisor also states the aircraft turned short of the 4 to 5 mile base I advised Aircraft X to expect as if I did something procedurally wrong? It was an expected advisory to pilot NOT a control instruction. I elected based on observed traffic conditions to alter my plan and clear Aircraft X sooner as I felt the aircraft was safe distance from the field; the tower would receive a workable situation and targets were not in a position to merge. The second paragraph states that my actions resulted in the local controller in training taking quick action to avoid conflicting traffic but gave the wrong vector which worsened the situation. This statement is NOT an accurate reflection of what occurred. The data clearly shows Aircraft X on a 3 mile right base entry descending when aircraft initially checks in with the tower. Aircraft X was not on a collision course with the fighters until the local controller in training issued a heading of 010 degrees (almost a complete 180 degree reciprocal of the aircrafts present heading) without specifying a direction for the turn (right or left). Aircraft X elected to turn right heading 010 degrees and was then give another control instruction by the instructor to fly east bound and then heading 090 degrees.Aircraft X did NOT start a right turn towards the Military Aircraft until they were issued a questionable heading of 010 degrees. Aircraft X was not a conflictfor the Military Aircraft until he was instructed to fly a heading by the tower and started a right turn to 010 degrees. Targets were in no way on collision course to merge until issued a control instruction by the tower. My response to Aircraft X on initial check-in if working the tower would have been to simply instruct the aircraft to square his base to final to prevent an early turn from base to final if I was concerned about it. This would have allowed plenty of room for the Military Aircraft traffic in the tower pattern for the adjacent runway to turn base inside of Aircraft X on a 3 mile right base. It is my opinion after reviewing the FALCON/audio data that the local controller in training saw a potential conflict developing and panicked causing him to issue such a drastic heading. The instructor was required to intervene as a result of action taken by the local controller in training and not because Aircraft X checked in on a 3 mile right base. The instructor took action after the developmental issued the heading of 010 degrees. The third paragraph assumes my plan was to have Aircraft X fly a 5 mile final and that I did not ensure the aircraft reached this point. Plans continuously change based on evolving traffic conditions in ATC. Although I originally advised Aircraft X to expect a 4 to 5 mile base I elected to alter my plan based on observed traffic conditions at the time I issued an approach clearance. I'm well within my rights as a controller to do so. Supervisor then states that my actions placed a burden on the local controller to instruct an IFR aircraft to enter the downwind. This statement is false in so many ways. First off the Tower always has the burden to sequence VFR aircraft in the traffic pattern with arriving aircraft previously vectored/sequenced by approach control. The Tower could have easily manipulated the VFR Military Aircraft traffic in the pattern over issuing a control instruction to the IFR arriving Aircraft X if it truly was an imminent conflict. The Tower was in no way forced to turn Aircraft X nor was a vector even needed to ensure a safe landing sequence to the airport for both aircraft. The Military Aircraft traffic in the pattern could have simply been instructed to not extend downwind beyond 1 mile which is not an unreasonable request considering the performance characteristics of an Military Aircraft. Tower is equipped with a STARS Radar display to help the local controller see arriving aircraft sequenced by approach control and plan for a landing sequence in advance. The last sentence implies I did not consider the operation being conducted at the airport and used bad judgment. This statement is subjective and downright false. If I was unaware of the Military Aircraft traffic then why did I advise Aircraft X of the traffic and referenced the Military Aircraft traffic as the reason for the aircrafts wide downwind? I have many years experience working military fighter aircraft to include 6 years military service. I felt based on my experience and knowledge of procedures I handed local control a SAFE and WORKABLE situation. Some other very important items I would like to point out. The instructor in the tower stopped by the Radar room prior to this incident to request the approach advise him when the Military Aircraft were recovering from the MOA's back to Fresno. He stated that he needed to observe his developmental sequence Military Aircraft at the airport. This led me to believe he was looking for an approach sequence that was safe but also afforded his developmental the opportunity to show he could sequence Military Aircraft in with civilian traffic at the airport. I feel my approach sequence did just that. The Ground controller has stated for the record that he had to prompt the instructor to take evasive action after the local controller in training instructed Aircraft X to fly heading 010. This control instruction causes Aircraft X to turn onto a converging course with Military Aircraft in the VFR local traffic pattern creating a conflict before the instructor intervened. The data clearly shows Aircraft X did not make a harsh right turn towards the VFR Military Aircraft traffic in the pattern until instructed to fly heading 010 degrees by the local controller in training.I was also told that I forced local controller in training to issue an 'illegal heading' control instruction to Aircraft X on the Visual Approach to ensure Class C separation with VFR Military Aircraft in the tower traffic pattern. Class C separation requires that I ensure 500 feet vertical; target resolution or a form a visual separation. I contend Aircraft X was never on a converging course with local Military Aircraft in the traffic pattern and targets were not on a path to converge until the developmental issued a conflicting heading.I provided the local controller in training a safe and workable situation where Aircraft X was sequenced on a course to ensure target resolution. Also it is important to note that the Local Controller is legally permitted to require an arriving IFR visual approach adjust their flight pattern as necessary to enter the traffic pattern in sequence with arriving VFR aircraft. Reference the note in FAAO 7110.65W 2-1-4. Just because an airman is IFR on a visual approach does not make them priority over VFR traffic in the pattern. Supervisor verbally stated that all members of local management were in agreement that I was unsafe; unaware of local tower operations; did not ensure Class C separation and left tower local controller with no out. Supervisor's verbal and written statements during the Performance Record of Conference drastically contradicted feedback I received from the QATS (Quality Assurance office); the other Supervisor and the Air traffic Manager. Somebody is not being 100% truthful with me?

A TRACON Controller reported being issued an unsatisfactory performance report by their supervisor; but feels they did nothing wrong.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Passengers noticed flames shooting out of the [aircraft's left] engine followed by a lot of smoke. Passengers noticed a lot of smoke on [the aircraft's right] coming out of the engine. We reported it to the Captain and Maintenance came out and checked out the aircraft. We had fume issues with the same aircraft the day before.

On taxiing during the safety demo playing; [I] was alerted by a passenger on [the] aircraft's left advising that there was smoke and fire coming out of the engine. Passengers [on the aircraft's] right then advised smoke coming out of engine. Aircraft left engine fire was encompassing the windows along with smoke. Same aircraft as the day before.

A330 flight attendants reported passengers informed crew of flames shooting out of engine exhaust on start. Cabin fumes became prevalent in passenger cabin.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; MEL; Aircraft; Procedure; Software and Automation

While signing off work steps on the electronic device Maintenance application; electronic sign-off allows the technician to N/A the step even when not allowed per GMM.  E/A XXXX-XXXXX does not allow for N/A to be used. therefore the option shouldn't be allowed in the maintenance application.

Technician reported that when using the maintenance application for electronic log book sign offs; it allows the use of 'Not Applicable' for entries; which is not allowed by the Engineering Authorization.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While cruising at FL320 over the mountains in day VMC conditions; we noticed that the left engine's oil temperature was increasing. The temperature seemed somewhat erratic; but the general trend was upward. We subsequently saw the yellow light and then the red light. The highest temperature I saw was about 180 degrees. We ran the Oil Temperature High QRH procedure. The Captain declared an emergency and we got clearance to divert. During the descent; I flew the airplane while the Captain ran the Engine Failure/In flight Shutdown QRH procedure. A deadheading pilot in the jumpseat provided excellent backup monitoring altitude clearances; pulling out the approach plates and so forth. We had an uneventful landing the weather was VMC with little or no wind. We stopped the aircraft on the runway. The Fire Chief and his team looked the aircraft over and saw no evidence of fire; smoke; or anything leaking. We then taxied the airplane to the gate.The mechanics later said that they found a broken wire. Are the wires in this area getting old? Are they flexing repeatedly so that they eventually break? If this is a common occurrence; perhaps these wires should be inspected during periodic maintenance checks.

I am filing this report for an in-flight shutdown of an engine and overweight landing. At cruise altitude; the left engine oil pressure began increasing above the limits. In accordance with the QRH; the left engine was shutdown. An emergency was declared and an overweight landing was accomplished. I am not aware of any deviation from either company procedures or FAR's; but am filing this report in the event that a violation is filed.

MD83 flight crew experiences high engine oil temperature at FL320 and diverts to the nearest suitable airport. The engine is shut down; an emergency is declared; and an uneventful landing ensues. A broken wire is found to have caused a false indication.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

While Flying at 3;000 feet on downwind into Norfolk I noticed an object off the left side of the aircraft less then 200 feet below us and 1/4 mile to our Left; The object was not a plane and did not appear to be balloons. It did however appear to be some sort of Unmanned Aerial System. We advise approach of the event and followed up with a call once on the ground. After calling tower I called the Dispatch supervisor and the Chief Pilot.

An air carrier Captain; on downwind for landing at ORF; observed an apparent unmanned aerial vehicle some 200' below and 1/4NM to the left of their flight.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

When I arrived on the flight deck at XB:20Z to operate flight xxx ZZZ-ZZZ1 I found the [Maintenance Release] waiting on the printer for me. I began to review the [Maintenance Release] and noticed valid the time of the [Maintenance Release] was XA:16Z. The inbound flight had written up the PA volume as being weak. My [Maintenance Release] stated that the IFE (Inflight Entertainment System) was re-booted and the technician signed off the PA as 'good to go'? I immediately contacted ZZZ hub maintenance and asked if my XA:16Z [Maintenance Release] was still valid. They checked and informed me that indeed it was the current and valid [Maintenance Release]. I then queried them as to how it was possible that a technician came onboard and rebooted the IFE and found it in good operable condition 50 minutes before the aircraft arrived on the gate?? Flight blocked in at XB:06Z and my [Maintenance Release] with an open inbound write up was supposedly resolved at XA:16Z. Obviously; the technician that signed off the write up never touched the airplane and the mechanic who signed off my airworthiness release never followed up with the vendor that signed it off or didn't notice that the inbound write up had been 'resolved' prior to the aircrafts' actual arrival on the gate.I place great trust in our maintenance chain of action and I was very disturbed by the fact that there was such a lack of follow through and lack of checks and double checks to ensure that my aircraft was legal to fly! This time thankfully it was a simple PA write up and not something more serious but; the fact remains that my aircraft was 'pencil whipped' and signed off to be legal without proper verification of the status of the aircraft as being airworthy by those who were responsible to do so.

B777 flight crew noted that the Maintenance Release was illegally signed off prior to aircraft arrival.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

The flight attendants initially called and told the cockpit that all four flight attendants were getting dizzy and nauseous and one reported a tightness in her chest. We found out later that it was actually only three of them. I advised them to stop the service and; if they felt it would help; to go breathe oxygen in the back galley with the curtain closed. We were at FL350 and our cabin altitude was 7;000 ft. We descended to FL310 to lower the cabin to 5;000 ft. The descent made no difference. While we were doing this we contacted Dispatch and Med Link for assistance. The First Officer; off line jump seater and myself also all briefly donned our oxygen masks as a precaution but then just kept them ready in case we started to feel any symptoms as well. None of us did at all. We asked the flight attendants to discretely ask if the deadheading crew in the back noticed any symptoms. They did not. No passengers reported any symptoms either. Med Link offered for them to take either one Benedryl or one Ondansetron and to continue breathing oxygen. The flight attendants didn't want to take the medication. After breathing oxygen for a few minutes they felt they could finish the service and did so. I told them that they did not need to finish the service and that I was more concerned about them. I also offered to divert immediately if the flight attendants needed me to and they all denied the offer saying that it wouldn't be necessary. We landed uneventfully where we had paramedics; mechanics and inflight supervisors meet the airplane. The three flight attendants had their vitals checked and were all normal upon landing. We reported the airplane as completely normal from our perspective to maintenance and wrote up three oxygen bottles in the Maintenance Release. I stayed with the crew until all flight attendants were checked and then went to my next flight.

B737 Captain reported that three of the four flight attendants inexplicably became ill during the flight.


This time of year; it is necessary to put covers of some sort over the potential points of entry into the tail rotor gearbox fairing in order to prevent birds from building nests in the tail rotor gearbox fairing or tail rotor drive shaft tunnel. After washing the aircraft; I placed a rag in the little hole on top of the tail rotor gearbox fairing and another on the right side where the drive shaft and linkage come out of the tail rotor gearbox. We received a dispatch from communications for a hospital transfer flight. During my walkaround; I failed to notice the rags in the tail rotor gearbox fairing.  I started the aircraft and while at idle; realized I had not removed the rags. I immediately shut down the aircraft.  After the rotors stopped; I proceeded to the tail rotor area and saw that the rags were still where they had been placed. I then removed them and inspected for damage. There was none; so I proceeded with the mission without further incident.I highly recommend that the company purchase safety orange tail rotor gearbox covers with a 'Remove before flight' streamer attached for  all rotary wing aircraft. Birds attempting to nest in the tail rotor gearbox is a constant problem during the spring through mid summer. To not cover the tail rotor gearbox makes nesting birds a certainty. They make remarkable progress in a very short period of time; necessitating having the mechanic remove the tail rotor gearbox cover to remove FOD producing material. This causes that could be avoided if we were equipped with proper covers.

AS-350 pilot reported advising his company of the need for covers for tail rotor components that birds often nest in.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Aircraft

[I] was cleared for GPS 25L approach into DVT. Approach was going smoothly. [I] was not able to get LPV on GPS. At the MDA I thought I saw the airport. I began to descend early. I then saw the correct lights 2 miles ahead. I was VFR at this time and remained so. [I was] still above the lower LPV minimums but below LNAV minimums for the approach. I really thought I was looking at the airport lights when I began to descend. Terrain was visible and well marked so I stayed where I was. I really wish I had a good answer for this. We just do not fly enough in actual IFR. I was much sharper under 121 flying than I am today. Two pilots would have helped although I know unrealistic for 99.9 percent of the flying that we do.

Air Taxi pilot reports flying the RNAV Runway 25L approach to DVT using LNAV minimums due to WAAS being unavailable for unknown reasons. The approach is continued below minimums when the runway is thought to be sighted; although this turns out to be incorrect and a normal landing ensues.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Aircraft

Our routing into DEN was filed on the PEEKK RNAV STAR via OURAY transition. Upon switching to ZDV (DEN Center); we were cleared onto the LDORA1 arrival. With some low level convective activity ahead on the arrival; we were expecting to ask for some slight deviations for weather. We switched to the next ZDV sector; and we were given a left turn heading 340 degrees for en route spacing. Several minutes later we were cleared to intercept the TELLR1 arrival. Shortly thereafter ZDV tells us: '...cleared to deviate up to 15 degrees either side of course; and descend via the TELLR1 arrival.' By this time we were both heads down for most of the descent reprogramming and verifying all the new route changes; as well as the new constraints. ZDV handed us off to DEN TRACON at FL250; and we were then issued to proceed direct POWDR direct DVV; and to descend and maintain 17;000. We were then cleared to deviate at our discretion for weather avoidance to DVV. Normal radar vectors and altitudes from the mid-teens to landing were then provided by TRACON. Also; we twice experienced airspeed anomalies during the managed descent. The FMGC and charted speeds were not being followed correctly by the airspeed tape. It was commanding 210 KTS instead of the required 250 and 280 KT speeds. We as the pilots had to manually select the correct speeds; and also use full speed brakes to meet required altitudes. This required the jet to be hand flown several times on the RNAV STAR just to be at the correct altitude and airspeed at several fixes. THIS IS NOT WORKING!

An A320 First Officer reported specific and generalized problems with respect to conducting RNAV STAR operations into DEN. His summation states: 'THIS IS NOT WORKING!'


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 22; Flight Crew Type 22

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While flying my UAS along the shore. I experienced a near miss with a low flying aircraft. I was taking pictures of the surf and cliffs for my photography portfolio. I was flying a UAS. I launched from the parking area overlooking the beach; altitude about 71ft MSL. Visibility was reported as greater than 10 NM; winds less than 4 MPH. Although visibility along the beach was unlimited to the South; [it was] about .9 Miles to the North. I had completed filming and had instituted the automated Return-To-Home procedure. In this mode the aircraft climbs to its designated RTH altitude and autonomously flies back and lands at its launch or 'Home' point. Although on autopilot the aircraft still responds to the controls. At this point; I observed and heard an aircraft flying low (a little above the top of the bluff which at that point is 71ft MSL) along the beach that had come from the North around the point. My first reaction was to dive the drone and I started to descend but I realized that it was already above the level of the approaching aircraft so I reversed throttle and continued the climb to evade. The aircraft passed below the drone which was at about 244ft MSL altitude and between the drone and I. The aircraft was a low-wing; single-engine; monoplane; dark in color. The pilot gave no indication that he saw the UAS and continued flying South along the beach. Although the sectional charts list the Minimum Safe Altitude in the area at over 1;000 ft; aircraft sometimes fly along the beach because it is very scenic with the ocean view stretching out to the horizon. This also creates the illusion that other aircraft can be seen well in time to be avoided. But the coast is not a straight line and aircraft skimming the bluffs over the beach are masked by bluffs at points along the coast. In this case the bluff [at the] point only .9 mile away masked the aircraft from my view and vice versa and it was in my flight space with almost no time to react. Pilots should expect to encounter [UAS]. FAA should remind pilots that even if visibility is unlimited; small drones can only be seen at best a mile away and they should avoid tracing the beach contour even if visual flight rules allow it.

UAS Operator reported a NMAC with an unidentified small aircraft in VMC at low altitude over coastal bluffs.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 26L

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

When we checked in with the initial approach controller we let them know we had ATIS information. It was indicating they were using VOR/DME 8R. We briefed this approach and set up for it. This was also the approach we had been planned by dispatch.When we checked in with the next controller we were given ILS 26L. We had plenty of time to set it up and brief it. We also briefed that it would be visual since we already had the airport insight. The First Officer (FO) was the pilot flying and the captain was conducting new hire IOE. We were cleared for the ILS 26L approach by the controller and then asked shortly after when we had picked up the airport. We estimated it was at least 8000 ft.At approx 6000 ft the FO clicked off the autopilot and was hand flying the aircraft on the visual approach. He called for flaps on speed and I was stetting the flaps and approach speeds; as well as the gear down before landing check. We were handed off to tower and cleared to land 26L. Approx 1000 ft I noticed that the FO didn't have his ILS freq in the active and I reached over to put it in for him. My attention was temporarily deviated as he was a little high and I was coaching him on speed and altitude. At 500 ft he called 500 to go. As I was about to call stabilized cleared to land 26L I realized he had drifted off 26L centerline. I immediately told him 26L and he said correcting. Before we had a chance to adjust course the tower controller told us cleared to land 26R. At no time was the Aircraft in an undesirable state; or did we break and FAR's we landed with no issues and taxied clear of the runway. As we were taxing to the ramp we were told by ground control to contact them by phone for a possible pilot deviation. When we talked with them we let them know at no time had we intended to land on 26R until we were cleared to land by the tower controller.

The pilot flying (a new hire IOE pilot) was correcting course and glide slope with a primary instrument scan and secondary visual scan to keep the aircraft on landing profile. At approximately 1;000 AFE the pilot monitoring (IOE check airman) recognized that the pilot flying did not have the correct navigation frequency and then corrected VHF NAV 2.As aircraft was passing 600 ft AFE; the pilot flying called '500 to go;' and the pilot monitoring called; 'stabilized; cleared to land...wait' and the tower controller simultaneously called; 'cleared to land runway 26 right.' The pilot monitoring acknowledged the radio call and the pilot flying transferred his scan to visual; lined up with runway 26R and landed on 26R stabilized and without incident.On the final approach to landing the pilot monitoring realized that the pilot flying was drifting slightly further right of course and before he could give guidance the tower controller cleared the aircraft to land on 26R and the pilot flying lined up with center line with normal control inputs and landed smoothly and on centerline safely and without incident.At no time was a FAR or SOP violated.

A CRJ-200 air crew conducting IOE briefed and initially flew an approach to runway 26L. The trainee pilot became distracted by the lights from 26R and lined up for that runway. ATC recleared the Crew to land on runway 26R.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 12125; Flight Crew Type 3288

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I have noticed a trend where a significant percentage of copilots; and for some reason; more lately; will reach up and put their hand; palm open and up against the back of the throttles; following them up on the takeoff roll; then leaving them there as if they're protecting the throttles; as if they're flying a Convair.As you know; this is not a company procedure; and frankly; it doesn't accomplish anything.I have two concerns about this;1) It is a major distraction to the Captain when in that environment; where our attention should be focused entirely on the runway; traffic; aircraft control; etc.; a hand comes up out of nowhere near the engine start levers and throttles when it's not supposed to be there. It distracts me from what I need to be focused on.2) If the captain needs to abort; those throttles are going to come back fast and hard and one of two things will happen; either the First Officer's going to get a broken hand; broken fingers; or severed fingers; or the Captain already being distracted by the hand there is going to moderate the reject and potentially extend a high speed abort distance on the runway by trying to bring the throttles back gently. In my case I have to spend the energy and distraction to tell them to get their hands out of the way. This then distracts them as well.The 777 flight manual is very clear about whose hands should be on or near the throttles on the takeoff roll. An extra set of hands is clearly not our policy or procedure and does nothing but cause distraction and is a possible injury waiting to happen.

B777 Captain reported he noticed a trend where copilots are placing their hand against the back of the throttles; when the only hand there should be the Captain's.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Woodside sector requested release on Aircraft X from San Carlos; vectors V334 SAC VOR. I released the aircraft and asked them to climb the aircraft to 4;000 FT prior to handoff. They agreed. When the aircraft checked in heading 080; I turned it to heading 090 to join V334 north of SJC. RHV Tower called and requested release on Aircraft Y; SR22/G; RHV SJC SNS V111. After coordination with Licke Sector; I released the aircraft. When Aircraft Y checked in; I RADAR identified it; pointed it out to SJC; and initiated a handoff to Licke Sector. I asked Aircraft Y if he could maintain his own terrain/obstruction clearance on a heading of 090. The pilot said affirmative; so I told him to maintain his own terrain/obstruction clearance; turn right heading 090; climb and maintain 5;000 FT. The pilot read it back. A moment later I noticed that Aircraft Y was turning left instead of right. I transmitted to him; but did not get a reply. I transmitted a radio check again; and he answered. I then instructed him to turn right immediately to a heading of 090 for traffic inbound from the South. He apologized for making the wrong turn and complied. I scanned back to Aircraft X and saw he was turning to join V334; and saw his altitude at 4;100 FT; while in the 4;100 FT MVA. I assumed that I had already issued altitude 5;000 FT to him and shipped him to the Mulford/Grove Sector. He checked in at 4;000 FT with Mulford/Grove; and they climbed him to 5;000 FT. I recommend that detailed departure procedures (SIDs) are established for departures off of San Carlos; Palo Alto; and Reid-Hill View Airports to ensure that complex airspace and higher MVA's are less of an issue. Standard procedures off SQL and PAO have departures routed to V334 climbing to 3;000 FT; although the aircraft's flight takes them into a 4;100 FT MVA. The complexity of the airspace surrounding these airports really puts the controller and pilots at risk because there is very little 'wiggle' room to which a controller has to climb and vector the aircraft. Procedures should be set up so that pilots can climb on protected routes and remain within the confines of the tight airspace in that vicinity. The 4;100 FT MVA used to be 4;000 FT until about a year or two ago. The raising of the MVA to 4;100 FT really put us at risk with little time to react.

NCT Controller described a possible MVA infraction involving a SQL departure routed via V334. The reporter noted recent MVA increases and limited airspace make this routing difficult to handle and suggests formalized SIDs to ease workload.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Gate agents used block seats [on this flight] for passenger. I was unable to sit in my assigned jumpseat due to gate agents selling seats.  We notified company and a Supervisor came down and talked to agents. The Supervisor then asked me; in front of the passengers; if I wanted to have a passenger taken off [the flight]. I was given the choices of Dead Head on the flight or sit in the jumpseat. I felt pressured to take a jumpseat; sharing with another Flight Attendant.A week later; I was notified that a crewmember working that flight had tested positive for COVID-19. I'm very upset that I was put in this position and put myself at risk. I still don't know if the Flight Attendant I sat next to on the jumpseat is the one who tested positive.

Flight Attendant reported feeling pressured to sit in a cabin jumpseat near passengers assigned to company blocked seats. Flight Attendant was later informed of exposure to COVID-19.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

[We were] level at FL330 eastbound on R578 between FAPIS and FOMAS when [we] encountered wake turbulence from a westbound aircraft at FL340. Westbound aircraft appeared to be directly on route while [we were] offset 1 NM right of course as per company policy. Turbulence was of moderate intensity and lasted approximately 30 seconds. Seat belt sign was off prior to the encounter and flight attendants were serving in the aisle. No passengers were injured but [one] flight attendant sustained bruises to her elbow and back.

B757 at FL330 eastbound encountered wake turbulence from westbound aircraft at FL340; resulting in minor injuries to a flight attendant.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Police / Security Involved

TSA advised [airline] about a paint spray can in a checked in bag.

Airline Cargo Agent reported being advised by TSA of paint spray can in checked luggage.


Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

VFR Aircraft Y was cleared for a visual approach Runway 16R into VNY. I also had a Heavy that was cleared for the ILS Z Runway 8 into BUR. The Learjet went around due to FOD on the runway. I instructed the tower to issue a vector of 210 and an altitude of 4000 feet to have the Learjet come back around for a resequence. The tower not only disregarded my instructions; but they changed the data block of the Learjet to indicate that they were VFR. When I finally got the Learjet back on frequency; I asked them if they had cancelled IFR with the tower and their response was no. The issue was compounded by aircraft flying below the heavy airbus at 2000 feet towards a 5000 foot minimum vectoring altitude (MVA). I turned the Learjet to the southwest to a lower MVA and climbed them to 6000 feet for eastbound airway traffic at 5000 feet.I acquired radar contact with a VFR slowly descending out of 7000 feet. Once I had the Learjet at altitude and northbound and coordination with the tower and supervisor; the Moorpark controller brought to my attention that the VFR and Learjet were converging both at 6000 feet. There was still ample space between the two aircraft and traffic was exchanged. The VFR reported the Learjet in sight but leveled at altitude instead of descending; causing a TCAS/RA with the Learjet. The Learjet also had the VFR in sight.Once the two aircraft were no longer a conflict; I descended the Learjet to 5000 feet. Then the tower called to notify me that the runway had reopened. I cleared the Learjet again for the visual approach and they landed without incident.According to the AIM paragraph 5-4-20 a visual approach is not an instrument approach procedure and therefore has no missed approach segment. If a go around is necessary for any reason; aircraft operating at controlled airports will be issued an appropriate advisory/clearance/instruction by the Tower. At uncontrolled airports; aircraft are expected to remain clear of clouds and complete a landing as soon as possible. If a landing cannot be accomplished; the aircraft is expected to remain clear of clouds and contact ATC as soon as possible for further clearance. Separation from other IFR aircraft will be maintained under these circumstances.The tower should be sending the aircraft back to approach control unless the aircraft cancels IFR; or they indicate they can maintain their own terrain/obstruction clearance to remain in the pattern IFR with the tower.

SCT TRACON Controller received a go-around aircraft from VNY Tower that was not proceeding via the coordinated route and altitude. While issuing instructions to resolve the situation; the Controller vectored the aircraft toward a converging VFR aircraft.