Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Taking off on Runway XXR at ZZZ; I was pilot flying. Approaching V1 we noticed a large bird with an estimated wing span of ten feet appear out of nowhere on the right side of center just in front of the aircraft. I was hoping the blue heron would climb out and not hit us for if it did; it would hit either the right cockpit window; the right side of the fuselage and the First Officer's sensors; or the right engine. I was concentrating on the runway center line trying not to be distracted when the impact occurred. WHAM somewhere on the right side. I did not know if it hit the engine or the right side of the fuselage; I knew it hit and there was a serious chance of impending damage and possible injuries. I still had my hands on the throttles; we were still on the ground just a few kts. from rotation when I rejected the takeoff. I pulled the throttles to idle as my First Officer announced V1 but I was committed. I went into full reverse; felt the auto-brakes kick in and we rapidly decelerated. Approaching a safe taxi speed I de-selected the auto-brakes; heard my First Officer state 'Remain Seated; Remain Seated!' to the passengers. I taxied off the runway and when I knew we had sufficient clearance from the runway I set the parking brake. My First Officer had the QRC out and we made sure we performed all the pertinent items on the checklist. Then we secured the right engine to minimize any possible damage. We did not know the extent of the damage; if any; to the aircraft. I checked with the flight attendants to ensure the cabin was undamaged and the passengers were safe and secure. I made a quick announcement over the PA to assure the passengers of what happened then went back to my duties. We initially stated to Ground Control no assistance was needed but a very short attempt to taxi revealed we had problems. We quickly noticed the aircraft was listing one or two degrees and we knew the tires were deflating. The brake temperature indicators were all over 900 degrees. We called Ground Control and asked for assistance. Shortly the ZZZ fire department arrived and hosed the tires and main landing gear area with plain water. The fire department informed us the tires were smoking and small flames were on the wheels. They extinguished all and checked for damage which they did not find.We checked with the [company] Operations; informed them of the situation and made other phone calls to ensure proper agencies and corporate entities were informed. We also kept the flight attendants and passengers involved. Later the boarding steps and buses arrived and we de-planed the passengers with their carry-on luggage into the waiting buses.No passengers were injured; no damage was done to the aircraft except the deflated tires.

The event occurred while taking off on Runway XXR at ZZZ on an A319. The aircraft had a final takeoff weight of 139.3 and calculated V1-145 kts.; VR-145 kts. and V2-150 kts. for a Flaps 1 reduced thrust takeoff. I was the Pilot Monitoring during the takeoff. The aircraft was operating normally through the takeoff roll and as we were approaching the 'V1' callout (V1-5) we noticed a very large bird (I estimate a 10-12ft wingspan) appear in front of and slightly to the right of center at cockpit height above the runway. The bird appeared out of nowhere and I was fully expecting it to impact my First Officer side front window as it was not moving to avoid the aircraft. I used a composite crosscheck to ensure the V1 callout at the correct time and also try and gauge the relative movement of the bird to the aircraft. Before I opened my mouth to announce 'V1' (at V1-5 kts.; 140 kts. in this case) the bird impacted the aircraft just below my front window on the nose and I saw a very large black mass move past my lower right peripheral. It's trajectory past the nose and down the right side of the fuselage led me to believe that it was going to take out right side fuselage sensors and most likely be ingested into Engine #2 causing further damage.Based on the strong impact and very loud bang happening just before I got the V1 call announced I saw the Captain had already initiated the reject when I called V1. I then monitored the CDUs and PFD for proper speed brake deployment; full thrust reverser deployment; deceleration and potential damage to Engine #2. The auto brakes engaged and we rapidly decelerated. I called '80 kts.' as we slowed below that speed and then announced 'Remain Seated; Remain Seated' over the PA. I also notified Tower of our reject on Runway XXR and told them to stand by for further coordination after we cleared the runway. The auto brakes were deselected upon reaching a safe taxi speed and I pulled up the rejected takeoff QRC to run once we were clear of the runway. We taxied off the runway and set the parking brake in order to run the QRC and Rejected Takeoff non-normal checklist. We also secured Engine #2 in order to minimize any potential damage.The Captain was coordinating with the cabin crew to check on the state of the cabin and the passengers while I was giving ZZZ Operations an initial notification of the event. We then called for further taxi away from the runway onto a taxiway and to standby for any further assistance requests. After a very short taxi I informed the Captain that I felt that the aircraft listing to the right a few degrees and he agreed. We immediately stopped for suspected tire deflation. We cross checked the brake temperature indicators and they were increasing above 900 degrees with a peak of 980 degrees.We called ZZZ Ground Control to dispatch fire department trucks to assist in helping determine the state of the aircraft. Upon arrival at the aircraft the fire department stated that they observed smoke and some small flames on the wheel assembly. They then proceeded to spray the tires and main landing gear at regular intervals to extinguish the flames and cool the brakes. We regularly communicated with the fire chief over the radio relaying brake temperatures until they went down to 50 degrees across all main brakes. They conducted multiple inspections during the process and did not find any damage to aircraft except the deflated tires.During this period we also coordinated with [Company] Operations; Maintenance via ACARS; Dispatch and other appropriate entities to make sure all were informed. We requested boarding steps and buses for the passengers be readied so that we could deplane them and take them back to the terminal once it was safe to do so. The cabin crew also reported no injuries to anyone on board the aircraft. After all passengers were off the aircraft we ran the parking checklist; absent setting the parking brake for previous events; before turning the aircraft over to Maintenance and deplaned the aircraft ourselves. We inspected the bird strike areas with the fire department and maintenance personnel and found initial strikes on the Engine #2 cowling and inboard leading edge of the right wing.

A319 flight crew reported that a large bird strike just prior to V1 resulted in a rejected takeoff and a minor wheel fire.


Human Factors; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling

Signed on and had my data blocks go full bright. The relieved Controller's method of tracking NORAC's is to highlight the aircraft he is talking to. My method is the complete opposite (I highlight the ones I am NOT talking to.) It is very distracting and consumes valuable time right after assuming control of the sector to have to go to each and every aircraft to unwell the data block. We need one simple standardized way to track NORAC's. While changing over to my system of tracking NORACs I missed a hand off flashing at me and Sector 13 had to call. Later on Sector 46 asked if I could try flight ABC to Sector 13 frequency because they were NORAC. When I checked to see if the aircraft was on my frequency they were still there so I must have converted the dwell but thought I didn't. I thought the aircraft had already been shipped to Sector 13 by the Controller had being relieved because of the difference in tracking methods and the conversion process. Implement a standard method for tracking NORAC's so that there is no need for switching methods immediately after taking over a sector. In the meanwhile create a function to allow an all aircraft dwell toggle so that I can toggle all data blocks immediately to my dwell method of tracking NORACs. If I could toggle all data blocks to the opposite of what they are then that would be great.

ZSE Controller described a confused relief effort when the relieving controller utilized the exact opposite procedure regarding data block illuminations; the reporter suggesting a common facility procedure be adopted.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were cleared to Denver via the TELLR arrival. We were instructed to maintain 280 KTS or greater and descend and maintain FL270. We were then cleared direct CREDE. While I read back the clearance; the First Officer (pilot flying) set FL190 in the altitude pre-select and stated 'flight level 190'. I hesitated because I wasn't sure why he had set this; however; I looked at the MFD and noted that CREDE had a FL190A restriction. I then confirmed the selection. Subsequently; we checked in with a new Controller. After giving us some instructions; he stated: 'it's not really a problem right now but you should not be descending via the arrival.' I queried the First Officer and we both agreed that the previous Controller had given us a descend via clearance. I said this to the Controller and he said that they would look into it. After arrival at the gate; the First Officer and I reviewed the sequence of events and realized that we could not remember receiving a descend via clearance. We could remember only the cleared via clearance. I contacted DEN clearance and requested a phone number for Denver Center. I then called the Operations Manager at DEN Center. Manager stated that they were not aware of any event; however; they would research the matter and call me back. Later; Manager called and told me that they had reviewed the tapes and it was clear that we had not received the descend via clearance. I thanked the Manager for the information and let them know that the First Officer and I would conduct a thorough de-brief. Manager stated that there was no traffic in the area and that there was 'no harm; no foul'. The First Officer and I then de-briefed; focusing on the mistakes that we had made and the best way to prevent a recurrence.When the First Officer set FL190 in the altitude pre-select; it was my job to confirm the accuracy of this selection. Initially; I felt uncertain; however; I decided that this was because I had not specifically received and read back an assignment to FL190. When I saw the published restriction on the MFD; I decided the selection was correct. At this point; I believed erroneously that we had been cleared to descend via the arrival. Multiple distractions contributed to this error. We had been deviating for thunderstorms; the arrival had been changed; we had been re-cleared multiple times too different fixes on the arrival; and I had been communicating to the flight attendant and passengers about possible turbulence during the descent. I did a poor job of monitoring the altitude pre-select. My initial uncertainty about the FL190 setting was a red flag. I should have expressed my uncertainty to the First Officer and confirmed the clearance with ATC. In the future; I will not hesitate to obtain confirmation whenever either crew member is even slightly unsure.

CRJ-200 Captain describes an altitude deviation caused by a misunderstood arrival clearance. The clearance was via the TELLR arrival and to maintain 280 KTS or greater and descend and maintain FL270. This is interpreted by the First Officer as a descend via clearance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 3621

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was the flying pilot. At about 400 AGL on initial climb out from Runway 25 the Captain announced that he had lost his attitude information on his Primary Flight Display. At the same time I lost my flight director and the autothrust system. He told me to continue to fly while he worked the check list on the ECAM. After some initial fumbling with the transfer switches; he regained his PFD by switching to the stand by system. We advised departure (and later Center) that we were not RNAV or RVSM capable due to a temporary navigation problem. At that point air traffic control gave us vectors.We noticed that the number 1 Air Data Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) was in the off position. The ADIRS controls barometric altitude; flight path vector; airspeed; Mach; angle of attack; temperature; overspeed warnings; heading; track; speed trends; VSI; groundspeed; and airplane attitude. This explained why we lost all of the Captain's information; but it did not explain why the number 2 flight director; both autopilots; and the autothrust systems did not work. ADIRS 1 should have been in the NAV position; and neither one of us had touched it since the initial cockpit set up at the gate. I tried repeatedly to restore my flight director; the autopilot; and the autothrust by cycling the switches on and off; but none of the systems returned at that time. The Captain then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via radio number 2 as I continued to fly and handled ATC on radio 1. After some discussion and evaluation; we determined that we had adequate fuel and navigation capability to continue to our destination at FL270. The Captain then advised the flight attendants of our situation. None of us could understand why the flight directors; autopilots; and autothrust were not working. Our company had no answer. The flight manual made no mention of this happening with an ADIRS failure.I have been on the Airbus for thirteen and a half years. Nine of those years I was a simulator instructor in addition to being a First Officer. In the simulator we often times cycled both flight directors off and that would reset them. We tried it and it worked! Both flight directors; both autopilots; and the autothrust system were restored. I had been hand flying for about 40 minutes. Autopilot 2 and the autothrust system were engaged. The Captain and I then went through a sequence of events on initial climb out to try to understand what had happened. He said that after rotation the sun was in his eyes; so he repositioned his sun visor. The sun visor in the Airbus is about 18x10 inch tinted hard plastic and is hinged via a ball socket above the pilots head. I remembered talking to another captain a few months earlier who told me that he accidentally turned off ADIRS 1 by bumping it with his sun visor while repositioning it. The ADIRS system is supposed to have a detent to prevent this from happening; but clearly it did not work. The timing of our ADIRS 1 failure matched the Captain repositioning of his sun visor; and it was the only explanation that we could find for the ADIRS 1 to go from the NAV to the Off position. We continued the flight uneventfully to destination.

An A320 flight crew suffered the loss of multiple systems associated with the Air Data System shortly after takeoff. A comprehensive review of switch positions discovered the Captain's ADIRS was in the off position despite having been on during flight preparation and the initial takeoff. They suspect the Captain's adjustment of his sun screen immediately prior to the event may have struck the switch and turned the ADIRS off. All systems were eventually restored and the flight continued to destination.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

My FO and I set up for departure as normal; with a dry runway at approximately 49;000 lbs with a temperature outside of approximately 18 degrees Celsius. Our flap configuration was for flaps 8. I don't recall the winds but I believe them to be mostly calm; not requiring crosswind correction. We were close to full; and tankering fuel to the point where we landed with about 6000 lbs remaining. While we were awaiting takeoff; a group of aircraft began to collect in line on [a nearby] taxiway. These aircraft had previously landed and were awaiting taxi to their gates. They were holding short of runway while other aircraft departed. I will have to guess that there were approximately 4; maybe 5 aircraft in line to cross; while all of them were of comparable size to A321s or B757s. We completed our pre-departure checklists as normal and accepted a 'line up and wait' clearance. We were advised that traffic would be crossing downfield. We complied. More than a mile down the runway from us; traffic downfield was then cleared to cross. I never did actually see where the traffic lined up after crossing on the way to their gates but at some point after crossing; the first aircraft stopped. I am not sure; but I believe they all joined the taxiway and became blocked from continuing. Because of the size of the aircraft and the number of the aircraft; the last aircraft was only able to clear the runway; but not make the turn onto taxiway. I saw the aircraft cross; but did not notice anything besides that at the time. However; later my FO told me that he did notice that the aircraft; which was a B757; did not turn left after crossing and remained relatively close to the runway; though he appeared to be clear of the hold short lines. While holding the brakes; the FO put the power above 70 percent; then released the brakes and said 'set thrust.' The takeoff roll happened normally and while I watched outside as well as inside during the takeoff roll; I did not look as far down as the B757. However; once again; my FO did notice that aircraft and later told me that he anticipated this problem. My eyes were inside our aircraft as I called 'V1; rotate.' As the FO began pulling the yoke back; the B757 on taxiway powered up for the purpose of taxiing and we caught his jet blast right at rotation. Our rotation speed was approximately 142 knots. The FO; having been aware that this could happen; reacted immediately with a quick and hard left aileron. He did not use the rudder. After the FO's hard correction; we still banked to the right. I believe his correction to be approximately 40% of the aileron travel for a half second before immediately returning to center. The aircraft was physically moved sideways; off of the centerline by a couple of feet as we rotated. Immediately after the jet blast hit; I looked up; back and left to see what caused the aircraft to move the way it did; thinking we ran over something. It was at that time that I saw the B757 moving to its left onto taxiway Kilo. The FO and I confirmed verbally that it was the jet blast shortly after rotation and we continued on with our normal callouts and takeoff profile. Upon being assigned to departure frequency; I informed the tower controller that we had received jet blast at rotation from the taxiing traffic. The tower acknowledged my communication and we continued on with our day without further incident.Though I'm unsure of what the result would have been without a control wheel reaction from the FO; I do believe the anticipation and quick reaction of the FO potentially avoided a wing strike in this situation due to the immediate bank of the aircraft; even after the aileron correction. I would guess that there was about a one degree bank after aileron correction; maybe more. The left wing definitely came upwards as if we ran over something. I am not sure if the nose wheel was still on the ground or not at the time. I also am appreciative of the FO's experience level; professionalism and expertise throughout the ordeal because I did not anticipate this problem. I specifically did not notice that the B757 had not made the turn after crossing. As it happened; the only preventative measure to this being a bigger problem than it was; was the experience and anticipation; as well as the quick reaction by the FO. I will certainly be better aware of my surroundings about taxiing aircraft near the runway and have a better situational awareness of this issue in the future.

CRJ-200 Captain reported that while on the takeoff roll their aircraft was affected by jet blast from a taxiing B757.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While working CIC; ZOA notified us that Aircraft X was [making an urgent landing] due to loss of their alternator. They had 1 soul on board and could possibly lose their transponder on approach. They coordinated opposite direction ILS 32 which was approved. I reached out to ZOA before they set Aircraft X for approach and informed them of the strong tailwind with gusting winds. That they weren't going to be able to land RWY 32. ZOA asked what the ceiling was and it was 007 which was above the circling minimum. On approach we gave Aircraft X the winds and she said she wasn't going to be able to land that RWY. She would need to circle. Aircraft X never got the field in sight. LCL advised that the ceiling was much higher midfield and she'd then be able to circle to land RWY 14 or RWY 20. She then said she was loading up the approach for RWY 2. She never advised us the field in sight or that she was circling. We never saw her and LCL asked her position and she said she was 5 miles out on RWY 2. We immediately informed ZOA. She then said she was in IMC setting up for RWY 2 and she was getting blown around by the strong winds. I thought I heard LCL ask if she could start her missed approach for RWY 32 at her current position. But after reviewing the tapes; LCL asked if she wanted to go back to Center which she replied with yes. ZOA thought she was on the missed and said to have her climb to 070. But she was on a 070 heading not on the published missed approach. Aircraft X got vectored back for RNAV RWY 14 and landed safely without incident. Airport authorities were notified with an alert 2. I would have recommended LCL to advise Aircraft X if she could start a missed approach.

STS Tower Controller reported an aircraft coming into land with alternator problems; attempting to land opposite direction with low ceilings and windy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Total 9125; Flight Crew Type 7363

Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

The pushback started well with good; standardized communications. Early in the pushback; the captain was told by push crew 'cleared to start 1 or 2 or both.' Captain acknowledged 'clear to start.' Captain instructed probationary FO to start 1 and 2. As the aircraft came to a stop; with engine 1 about to reach idle; push crew stated 'here comes late bags; can we put them on?' Captain replied with a strong 'negative.' Captain believed FO was starting engine 2 and did not want to interrupt the start sequence. Again pushback crew asked 'can we put on bags?' Captain gave another strong 'negative; we are in the middle of our start sequence!' Captain felt forward cargo door open and asked 'did you hear me say negative?' Pushback crew said something to the effect 'yea; but got the lead talking at me too; it'll be closed in a minute.' The very astute FO realized something was wrong hearing me repeat strong 'negatives' and did not begin engine 2 start. Captain explained to pushback crew that someone could have easily been killed. This did not seem to bother the tug driver. Throughout this exchange the parking brake had never been set. Captain asked for tug driver's name and file number. Captain called operations and explained what had occurred. Captain passed name to operations and emphasized how dangerous the situation had been and asked that the tug driver not push another aircraft until this had been addressed.

During pushback; the ground crew cleared pilots for engine start then requested to open the forward cargo door for late bags. The request was denied; but the ground crew opened the door anyway. The #2 engine start had fortunately been delayed.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Flight crew was on the RNAV (GPS) runway 13 approach. The pilot flying briefed the MDA at 2100'. There was; however; a small ball note showing 'LNAV only;' 2380 MDA. In the [approach profile] pictorial depiction the 2380 MDA was hard to see therefore the crew missed it. The crew used the 2100 MDA; which was depicted in the approach [chart minima block]; instead of the [ball] noted MDA on the [profile] portion. The crew had the runway in sight in VMC when we saw a building in front of us. As the Captain was going to make adjustments for the building the enhanced ground proximity warning went off telling the crew to pull up. The crew pulled up until the warning went away and then proceeded to land the aircraft visually.The LNAV only MDA should have been depicted at the bottom of the approach plate instead of in the notes section.  The MDA for this approach could be seen as very confusing.

The flight crew of a commercial fixed wing aircraft flying the RNAV (GPS) Runway 13 approach at BIS utilized an LNAV MDA of 2;100 MSL as depicted in the Jeppesen Minima box vice what they believed to be a 'number 2' ball noted MDA of 2;380 MSL depicted on the profile view in three locations. During the approach they received an EGPWS terrain warning and; when visual noted a building in front of them. They climbed to extinguish the warning and continued the approach.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.7

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Sector 75 had lost their frequency. They had several aircraft that were higher than normal due to the fact that they were not talking to them. Aircraft Y being worked by sector 75 was level at 33000 feet. This was a LGA lander. I was working Aircraft X on J60. He was level at 23000 feet. His path would have taken him directly underneath Aircraft Y who I thought was going to descend shortly. I had my Radar Assist controller point out that aircraft to Sector 75 and I turned Aircraft X to a 300 heading and climbed Aircraft X. This would have kept Aircraft X clear from Aircraft Y. Due to miscommunication; the Radar Controller at 75 did not know I was doing this. Once I noticed that we would lose separation I acted accordingly to re-establish separation as quickly as possible.

Sector 75 lost all frequencies for a period of time. Back-up frequencies were unavailable. Sector traffic that needed to be descended were high. Aircraft went to different frequencies then came back when we received new frequency. Aircraft Y was flying the MIP4 arrival to NY LGA. We regained communications with Aircraft Y and descended the aircraft. A point out was made to ZNY Sec 39 as the aircraft would be high going into the next fix. ZNY Sector 39 issued traffic to the Sector 75 Assist; Aircraft X climbing out of 22;000 for 36000 feet. Aircraft Y was issued an altitude and turned to the left to be descended and re-sequenced. HOWEVER; ZNY Sector 39 turned Aircraft X to a westbound heading into my airspace. THIS INFORMATION WAS NEVER COORDINATED WITH ME. Aircraft X continued westbound into Aircraft Y. The Assist Controller was told to have the Aircraft X stop at 26000 feet; and Aircraft Y was ordered to stop at 27000 feet. Aircraft X NEVER STOPPED ITS CLIMB AND CLIMBED INTO Aircraft Y. TCAS alerted Aircraft Y to climb. Separation was re-established.

ZNY Center controllers reported turning two aircraft; one climbing and one descending; into confliction due to incomplete coordination.


Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We were taxiing out in LAS for around 20 minutes when a call light when on at mid-cabin. I walked out and a mother said her toddler had to use the restroom and couldn't wait. I told the woman that I needed to contact the Captain and see if it was possible to let her use the facility before departure. I walked back to the aft inter phone and called the cockpit. The Captain said we would pull off to the side and she would have about 2-3 minutes to use the lavatory. I walked back out into the cabin and relayed the information to her and said to wait until the plane stopped and to make it as quick as possible. The aircraft turned and when we stopped the woman handed the toddler to her husband and they headed to the back lavatory. As the father and toddler entered the lavatory there was a single high-low chime. I headed back to the aft inter phone as the [Flight Attendant] A cleared us for departure. I called the Captain to remind him that we had a passenger and toddler in the lavatory and he responded 'we are going; tell them to hang on'. I knocked on the lavatory door and told the passengers to hang on; that we were taking off and to please stay in there until I said it was safe to come out (keep in mind that there were no empty seats towards the back and they were about 15 rows from their seat). It is very bumpy for the first 5-10 minutes in LAS this time of year and I didn't want them up for initial ascent either. We took off and around the 10;000 ft. ding I escorted the gentleman and toddler back to their seats. The Captain called back via the inter phone and apologized and said something to the effect of 'we were supposed to be second for departure but they moved us up'.

Flight Attendant reported that Captain elected to take off with a gentleman and toddler in the lavatory.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

We were enroute to ZZZ and at FL390. We felt and heard a brief thud; then noticed the #2 engine N1 had decreased approximately 8%. We suspected a possible compressor stall. This lasted maybe a few seconds and engine operation returned to normal. We also noticed that the #2 engine EGT had increased slightly. We decided to start a descent just in case we eventually might need to be at a single engine altitude. ATC initially cleared us to FL370 and then to FL310. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying. As power was reduced further; we felt an increase in vibration with a corresponding increase on the VIB reading.We increased power to a mid-position and vibration readings returned to normal. During this time; we also evaluated possible diversion airports; and ZZZ1 was closest with excellent weather conditions as well. We continued descent to FL250 and ran the Engine Limit/Surge Stall Checklist. We followed all pertinent procedures but since engine parameters were normal except for the slightly higher EGT; we stopped at 'Engine Runs Normally.' Just an FYI; The flight attendants and passengers were kept fully informed that we were evaluating what had occurred; and at present; we're continuing to ZZZ.At that point I wanted to send an ACARS message to Dispatch to advise what was going on; and to voice contact us on the ZZZ1 Ops frequency. I get ready to type...'ACARS NO COMM' illuminated. I typed it in anyhow and as I got ready to call ZZZ1 Ops; Dispatch came on line. They were apprised of our situation; would they 'please advise Maintenance Control; and at present we're continuing to ZZZ.' Shortly after finishing with Dispatch it became apparent that a ZZZ1 diversion would be a more prudent plan. While the VIB indicator was still around .6 for the #2 engine; the EGT was creeping up slowly and now about 80 degrees greater than engine #1.ATC was informed of our request to proceed to ZZZ1 and we were cleared direct. While we did not declare an emergency; we did ask to have the emergency equipment standing by. We opted to operate #2 at idle power for the duration of the flight. All appropriate checklists and procedures were accomplished; flight attendants were informed of our divert; that we weren't planning on anything further out of the ordinary and asked if they would please plan as they normally would for an arrival. Passengers were advised we would be diverting to ZZZ1 as a precaution. The single approach was uneventful followed by a normal landing. No brake cooling issues. After landing on Runway XXR and turning from [the first] taxiway onto [the second] taxiway; we were advised by the fire trucks that they saw a flame in the 'tailpipe' of engine #2. We shut the engine down with the start lever; pulled the appropriate fire handle but did not discharge the bottle; and accomplished the proper checklist. The trucks advised the fire was out and we taxied to the terminal. Passengers were eventually deplaned and were to be accommodated on a flight later in the evening.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported irregular engine indications led to a diversion.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Working 4 positions combined (8 if you count D-sides since I didn't have one) because no additional personnel was called in earlier in the evening. Sector was overloaded with traffic in excess of 45 aircraft in the Aircraft List (ACL). Supervisor left approximately 20-25 minutes prior; which was ample warning to know the sectors would be overloaded if combined. DLF approach was open running traffic that normally doesn't happen in the evening. Bad rides at pretty much every altitude; which created lots of excessive radio transmissions because no one is ever aware of ride conditions prior to departure. I had a trainee (not certified on even one position) monitor the position to ensure handoffs were taken; initiated; and to look for conflicting traffic. Supervisor who came in for mid shift was clueless as to what was going on in the whole facility because the specialty across the way (CRP) was encountering the exact same scenario. All she was worried about was telling us about switching radar channels in the mix of everything. Lack of staffing; lack of leadership from immediate supervisor (outgoing and incoming) put me in a situation that was very unsafe and could have led to a potential disaster. Supervisor was in a rush to go home and never looked to see what the upcoming traffic load was.1) Have supervisors work their assigned shifts. They're there for a reason. Cover times when controllers are working busier periods. It's no surprise that there's a departure rush from the Houston area. No need to leave [before that] and have a control room working the way it was. They're shifts are assigned to overlap but they don't work that way; instead we are left with fewer usable bodies. 2) Assign overtime when there are numerous people gone for extra events; and sick leave. One person out for union event; one sick leave; one denied annual that took sick leave (two from the same crew). It's all too common that we 'make it work'; rather than call in reinforcements. An extra body for 45 minutes would have made all the difference. Even outgoing supervisor could have helped.3) Have oncoming supervisors check up on specialties to see what the traffic load is and help if need be. The supervisors that cover the mid shifts I work always check to make sure we have proper staffing to cover workload; long before the night shift crews go home. 4) If aware of situation; have the Traffic Management Unit put in trail spacing to busier sectors to avoid saturation. 5) Don't combine positions that shouldn't be combined based on workload. The amount of traffic tonight would have been split into numerous positions. Because the supervisor was in a hurry to leave; he neglected to look at the traffic count and hold someone for overtime.

ZHU Controller reported working 4 positions combined with heavy traffic and no help.


Check Pilot; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

We took off for a routine multi-engine stage check. About 30 minutes into the flight; we ran through our engine failure procedure where I failed the left engine by use of throttle. The student showed his ability to control the aircraft. We proceeded to do the engine shut down checklist - in practice. The way we teach it here is to actually feather the propeller and shut off the mixture. Let the student see the single engine performance and handling characteristics of the plane on one engine and then run through the engine air start checklist. We did the air start checklist but the prop did not come out of feather. We tried 4 or 5 times and decided at that point to divert to the nearest suitable airport. I took controls and the radio as my student ran through the checklist aloud. We landed without incident on [the] longest runway. The aircraft was found to have a faulty accumulator and/or settings. Before we departed; I checked the maintenance logs as usual and saw both engines had been replaced after prop strikes. I've worked at [company] for 3 years now and have done maintenance test flights for them following maintenance. So I was under the impression they did a maintenance test flight after the new engines were installed. When I returned to [home base]; I did some investigating and found out they did not; in fact; do any maintenance test flights before returning it to service. As our manual says they are not required to do test flights for new engines that come from the factory broken in. I looked up FAR 91.407 and it states after maintenance; the plane has to have a test flight. I believe a test flight after the new engines were installed may have caught the accumulator issue and would have been a much safer route.

DA-42 flight instructor reported diverting to an alternate after an intentionally feathered prop would not unfeather.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flight was routine and operations normal on night flight along the East Coast with only six passengers onboard. I was the pilot flying on this flight. We were filed for FL360. As part of the cockpit chatter above 10;000 FT; I talked to First Officer on climbout about how the East Coast has you at an odd altitude when you are headed westbound vs. the normal odd altitude when eastbound every where else in the USA. We requested FL370 for final altitude and received that altitude. This particular night was the height of a meteor shower as we had seen quite a few meteors the previous night and seen a news report on TV about the shower. We had the cockpit lights turned down lower than normal and were scanning the sky more than normal for meteors. About mid flight the First Officer answered a radio call from ATC to turn to heading 360. I was looking out the left window and was viewing the Milky Way and thinking about the meteors and missed part of the transmission. I heard '360' and reached over and set FL360 on the FCP; checked the FMA and said 'FL360'. The First Officer did not confirm that. We leveled off at FL360 and were there about a minute or two when ATC said 'Climb to FL370'. We climbed back up and; after a couple of minutes; ATC said that they had given us a heading of 360 vs. altitude. At that time; the First Officer and I said that we would fill out a report on this.Contributing factors to this occurrence: Cockpit lighting was lower than normal. Extra attention was being paid outside the aircraft as a result of the spectacular meteor showers [and] previous conversation about East Coast sometimes wrong way altitudes. Breakdown of CRM in that I did not press the First Officer to confirm my FCP action (she turned and was looking out the right side for meteors). A suggestion to avoid future occurrences is to follow existing pilot flying/pilot not flying duties as outlined in our manuals. These CRM procedures would prevent this occurrence every time.

I was the pilot not flying at cruise. We were cleared to FL370 and were in NAV mode in the vicinity of CRG VOR. ATC asked us to turn ten degrees left for traffic and we complied. ATC then came back and said she needed us further left for traffic and asked us to turn to a heading of 360. I read back 'heading 360' Then said to the Captain '360.' The Captain dialed in an altitude of 36;000 FT and descended. I did not notice the descent and never verified his input. We did not get a CAWS call out of '1;000 FT.' After a few minutes ATC asked us what altitude we were at. It was then that I noticed the error. I told her we were at 36;000 FT. She said that she had assigned us heading 360; not 36;000 FT and that we should climb back to 37;000 FT and turn to heading 360. We complied. On descent into BWI; ATC advised us to call them once on the ground.When directing the pilot flying; I should have worded the instructions as heading 360; and not just 360. I also should have verified his input with mandatory call outs. These parameters are already a part of our SOP; I just did not follow them.

An Air Carrier flight crew; distracted while viewing a meteor shower; turned to heading 360 when ATC's call was actually to climb to FL360. ATC detected the error.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

On Date; I planned a flight to land at 23M Clarke County (a non towered field); then on to ZZZ. I obtained a full flight briefing through Foreflight prior to departure and confirmed that the only airport NOTAM for 23M was that the PAPI for runway 34 was unusable. I departed and had an uneventful flight en route to 23M. About 6 miles from 23M; I announced my position and intention to land on runway 16 on the CTAF. I made position reports again on turning left downwind; left base; and final. Abeam the numbers on downwind leg; I reduced throttle to normal MAP for landing. As I turned from base to final; I went to reduce throttle to idle; but the throttle stuck at about 12 inches MAP. As I approached the runway; I tried very diligently to get the throttle unstuck by turning the throttle tension knob and firmly pulling on the throttle. I was able to get the throttle to pull back to idle just before crossing the runway threshold and proceeded to land on runway 16 at 23M. Once on the ground; a voice came over the radio that said 'You can't land here; the airport is closed; didn't you see the yellow X on the runway?' I had not seen any X's on the runway on approach. At this point I reached the entry to the taxiway and saw that it was blocked off. I responded that I was having a semi-emergency and was troubleshooting a stuck throttle. They asked if there was anything they could do to help. I replied no and that I think I had the problem resolved and would immediately back taxi and take back off. I told them I checked NOTAMs before I departed and that I hadn't seen any NOTAMS about a closure; to which they replied 'Well I don't know how that happened.' He stated that they had no fuel and something about that being why the airport was closed; which did not completely make sense to me at the time. I cycled the throttle several times to ensure it was not sticking and the engine responded properly. There were no obstructions on the runway that would prevent takeoff and there were no workers visible around the runway. As I taxied back to the takeoff end of runway 16; I was thinking about how I did not see any X's on the runway and how there was no NOTAM for the airport being closed when I did my briefing just an hour or so prior. I felt like a real bonehead for missing this. When I got to the end of the runway; I saw that there was in fact NO X ON THE PAVED RUNWAY INDICATING IT WAS CLOSED. There was a yellow X laying on the grass leading up to the runway threshold; but there were no markings on the runway itself. I departed without issue and returned to my home airport. I checked the NOTAMs for the airport again and confirmed that there were no NOTAMs for 23M being closed on this date. Three issues stand out to me in this situation. First; if a runway is to be closed; the yellow X needs to be ON the runway; not in the grass leading up to the runway. All examples of runway closure markings I have ever seen have been ON the runway surface. Second; if an airport or runway is to be temporarily closed; there should be a NOTAM for that closure. Third; while there was an X on the grass leading up to the runway; I did not see it on final approach due to being preoccupied troubleshooting the stuck throttle. In the future; I will do a more thorough job of looking AROUND the runway for yellow X's while on downwind leg and on final approach. I am not sure if an unauthorized individual may have placed the X's in the grass and the airport wasn't really officially closed. The person on the CTAF did not identify themselves so I do not know if they were airport officials or someone else. The lack of a NOTAM and improper placement of the X's leads me to think this may not have been an official airport closure. Nevertheless; I will do a better job of scanning the area around the runway from now on for any indication of problems.

Single Private Pilot reported landing at a closed airport; but there was no Notam or 'X' on runway indicating 'closed' but preceding the runway in the grass was the X.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229; Flight Crew Total 423; Flight Crew Type 423

While climbing out enroute; I felt a slight vibration in the aircraft. As we leveled off in cruise; I asked the other members in the cockpit if they felt anything odd; like a slight vibration. We all agreed and also noticed the aircraft was flying about 3 degrees in a left bank. When the FO disconnected the autopilot; the aircraft rolled slightly to the right. After adjusting the rudder trim and getting the aircraft to fly level; I asked the jumpseater; to go back and take a look at the wing. He came back and said the right spoiler number 3 was up about 8 inches. We landed uneventfully after making the required logs and contact with maintenance.

A319 crew noticed a vibration and trim anomaly during climbout; and traced it to an extended spoiler panel.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

During takeoff from Runway 26 at Juneau; we heard Tower tell a helicopter to remain north of the front course into Runway 8. Later we heard the helicopter tell the Tower that we were in sight as we made our departure from Juneau. During takeoff this aircraft has a high rate of climb; about 3500-4000 FPM. With an accentuated deck angle; combined with the helicopter traffic being predominantly over the ridge line to the north; the flying pilot will never see the traffic under the same circumstances. The captain is the only one allowed to make the takeoffs from Juneau while the runway is under construction. Therefore this scenario is likely anytime the weather is VFR and Part 121 traffic is departing to the west. During the climbout; we received a 'Descend; descend now' command. The closure rate to the traffic at such a high rate of climb results in an unsafe condition. In order to comply with the RA; it is likely that the aircraft would have to go into negative G's in order to alter altitude to remain below the target. I estimate that the helicopter altitude was about 2;500 - 3;000 ft above the airport; when the RA command was issued. The First Officer was able to spot the traffic as we went through his altitude; and he estimated him to be about 3/4 of a mile from us at our 2 o'clock position. Therefore; he was likely closer to us as we went abeam.My response was to disconnect the autopilot and autothrottle and immediately reduce the pitch to comply with the RA command. It was clear shortly afterwards that pitch alone was not going to permit a solution. I did bank slightly left; but that maneuver was going to put the target out of view with a bank away. We were in a position of having to trust that the helicopter pilot had us in sight as he had announced; and that he was remaining outside of a hazardous position. The First Officer had the helicopter in sight as we went through his altitude at our 2 o'clock position; and I had the target just before he passed abeam of us.Technically I do not believe there was any FAA violation from any of us; the helicopter; or ATC. Our clearance was to depart Runway 26; climbing to FL200. The helicopter did remain north of the Runway 8 localizer course and said he had us in sight. I would question why the helicopter pilot elected to remain so close to the course; especially with the closure climb rate that he had to have witnessed. The First Officer has been flying in Alaska for longer than me; and he said at one time we had a departure procedure that permitted us to bank left to a heading of 248 degrees after takeoff. That would permit a wider margin for all of us. But it seems that some procedure needs to be established with helicopter flow in Juneau; so that separation is adequate enough to prevent an RA command. The event will happen multiple times in these conditions; permitting only the helicopter traffic the ability to see the target climbing up from below them in VFR conditions. With so much helicopter activity in the summer; a repeat event is highly likely. Nothing prevents helicopter traffic from being only 100 ft north of the course to Runway 8 and still be in compliance their clearance; and airliner traffic complying with their clearance as they merge flight paths very close together during climb out.

An aircraft departed JNU Runway 26 after helicopter traffic but at a 3;500-4;000 FPM climb rate was only able to take modified evasive action from the TCAS RA 'DESCEND NOW' command. The First Officer reports the traffic 3;000 ft abeam.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 55

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

VFR pattern work at CPK; just turned left crosswind. Minor updraft with turbulence; loud bang and pitch down moment. Regained control of aircraft; returned to ZZZ1 (home base). Upon post flight; noticed a 4 inch dent on leading edge of right horizontal stabilizer approximately 9 inches from root.  Scratch marks evident inside concavity and adjacent (medial) to dented concavity. No red discoloration noted; no organic tissue noted anywhere on aircraft. 100% certain an impact occurred in the pattern at Chesapeake; do not believe it was a bird strike.

Cessna pilot reported aircraft was struck by an object during initial climb causing a dent in aircraft.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 36L

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Descending on the BTSEY 2 Arrival into CLT for 36L. After BTSEY the Controller cleared us to CEDOX. We thought we heard DEFOX ON THE 36L Localizer. We tried to query the Controller; but the radios were so congested that we couldn't get a word in. Before we had a chance to ask; the Controller gave us a heading for downwind. As we started to investigate; we found CEDOX on the PARQR 3 Arrival. We noticed that the PARQR 3 is one of the SIDs that we are unable to fly. The PM; on initial check-in gave the Controller all of the required information including the SID we were on and the transition.Recommend changing the name of either CEDOX or DEFOX. They're too similar to be that close together.

Air Carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during arrival to CLT airport due to similar sounding fix names CEDOX and DEFOX.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were flying in IMC and received an IAS comparator on both the Captain and F/O (First Officer) PFD (Primary Flight Display). About 30 seconds later the autopilot disconnected. We knew that we had an Unreliable Airspeed. The F/O continued to fly the plane and we went through [the] unreliable airspeed checklist.  We then spoke with ATC and received a block altitude. We then went through the QRH procedure for unreliable airspeed. We determined that the Captain's airspeed was inoperative. We completed the checklist pulling from the F/O CADC (Central Air Data Computer). We got #2 Autopilot and NAV working. The Captain landed the airplane without any issues.Cause: We believe the Captain's pitot tube could have been frozen when we were flying in IMC.

MD-11 Captain reported his airspeed indicator became unreliable; possibly due to pitot icing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 141; Flight Crew Type 141

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

On climb out at 2;000 feet on an IFR training flight with my instructor; I was handed off from tower to approach. I called approach and asked for vectors for LOC approach. At that time; 1.5 miles south airport ZZZ and 2;200 feet; I experienced severe vibration on the controls and a partial loss of power. I notified approach. At that time; I began to go through the emergency check procedures and pitch for my best glide speed (65 KTS). The emergency checklist did not resolve the loss of power nor the vibration so I continued to pitch for best glide speed and turn to a heading that would take me back to ZZZ. Approach said that they could not hear me. There was an aircraft in the local area that was able to relay our communication to ATC. I was able to dump all flaps and implement full power and maintain 65 KTS with severe vibration. I kept asking [ATC] for clearance to land but I could not hear a response. Once I knew that I had the runway made and I knew that there were no aircraft taking off; I pulled the throttle to idle and landed without incident. I made it off of the runway under power and then ATC sent out a tug to pull me back to my hangar.

The pilot of a Grumman Tiger experienced vibration and loss of power; and was unable to clearly communicate with ATC. He was able to land successfully.


Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Training / Qualification; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I was pilot not flying on flight. It was the first flight of the day on day four. All preflight checks were accomplished with no anomalies found. We pushed back two minutes late and taxied to Runway 8R. We were cleared for takeoff and the Captain pushed the thrust levers up and called; 'Set takeoff thrust.' By the time I got the levers adjusted and said; 'Set;' I called '90 KTS.' At approximately 115 KTS; the Fire Warning Light on the glareshield illuminated and the associated bell sounded. I immediately said; 'Fire Warning.' The warnings went away almost as soon as they appeared; but came on again; and I repeated 'Fire Warning.' At about 130 KTS (V1; VR 144; 145); the Captain pulled the thrust levers to idle. I called; 'Speedbrakes; Thrust Reversers;' to remind him to follow those steps. I also called; 'Autobrake Disarm.' While decelerating; I told the Tower; 'Company Flight Number; rejecting the takeoff.' We exited the runway and stopped the aircraft in the adjacent run-up area. The Captain made a cabin PA to stay seated. The Tower asked us whether we needed assistance and the Captain told them to send the fire trucks as a precaution; even though the fire warning had ceased prior to exiting the runway. As the Captain was holding the brakes; I reviewed the rejected takeoff procedure in the Non-Normal Maneuvers section of the QRH. I looked at the fire section; but there was no indication of which system may have caused the alarm. The Captain tested the Engine/APU fire system and found it to be operating normally; but when he pushed the Master Caution/Fire Warning reset buttons on his side; they caused the alarm bell to sound and only the glareshield Fire Warning Lights (both sides) to illuminate. We immediately had the suspicion that the warnings we had received on the runway were false (this was reconfirmed at least two more times in the same manner). While the fire trucks were inspecting the aircraft; I ran the Brake Cooling page of the performance computer and determined we needed 53 minutes of brake cooling before returning to the gate. The Fire Chief said there was no smoke or indication of a fire on any part of the aircraft; including the wheels. The Captain communicated the situation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and determined returning to the gate was the best course of action. In the time between all the preceding events; the Captain briefed the flight attendants on the situation and made another PA to the passengers. We started the APU and shut both engines down to wait out the brake cooling time. The fire trucks waited with us. Sometime during this wait; the Captain got a call from Scheduling about a reassignment for both of us. As we were about to taxi back to the gate; the 'A' Flight Attendant called to request medical assistance for a passenger who said she was feeling pain in her leg. The Captain requested from Operations that paramedics meet us at the gate upon our arrival. We taxied back to gate and blocked in. The mechanics who met us were able to reproduce the false fire warnings.I do not think there is much that could have prevented the rejected takeoff nor do I think there is much more we could have done to handle the situation any better. The Captain and I followed Company procedures and guidance on the aborted takeoff; and were supported by the flight attendants; ATC; fire trucks; Operations; Dispatch and Maintenance. They all performed their jobs well. The only thing is Scheduling might have waited until we were blocked back into the gate before attempting to contact us. While waiting for brake cooling in the runup area after a high speed rejected takeoff; the Captain received a call from Scheduling advising us of a reschedule once we arrived back at the gate. I was aware that we would be continuing to our next destination as scheduled; then (not as originally scheduled) operating two additional legs and then deadheading. Our release time was well past our original release time;but I thought nothing of it; since it was within Scheduling's rights to reassign us. However; upon arriving in our destination; I noticed that the day had a block time of over eight hours; and this was from a print out taken once we had blocked back in from our gate return. I didn't notice it then because the aircraft we were taking over had just pulled into its gate and I was about to perform my preflight duties; and; because I thought that; unless an assignment shows up in red in the [Scheduling Program]; it is legal. However; upon investigating the matter with Scheduling after landing in our final destination; I realized that at the time the reassignment was given; it may have appeared to the Scheduler that it was a legal reassignment (under 8 block hours). However; he/she did not take into account that we were still operating the aircraft and had not blocked back into the gate (still had 30 left to block in). Since I did not personally speak to any Scheduler at the time of reassignment; I do not know the exact words spoken; but I am almost certain that he/she did not ask the Captain what our block-in time was.I would suggest: First; no calls from Scheduling to flight crews while the aircraft is not blocked in (although I realize Scheduling may not have known we weren't blocked back in). Second; have Scheduling always ask; 'What's your block-in time?' Lastly; as pilots [we should] not answer our cell phones while not blocked back into the gate after a gate return event.

At first we were unable to contact Operations. Thinking we may be in a bad spot for the radios; I asked Dispatch to have them call us and turned on my phone. Operations said when we came back we would go to a different gate and another aircraft was due in about 15 minutes later for us. We let Tower and the Fire Chief know we were starting an engine and heading back to the gate and the fire trucks said they would follow us to the gate. Somewhere in here I got a call with and it was Scheduling about a reassignment for both of us. I was also notified by the 'A' Flight Attendant to request medical assistance for a passenger who said she was feeling pain in her leg (she had a full leg cast/brace and apparently hit the bulk head with her leg during the abort). I immediately requested paramedics from Operations.I think everything went very well and everyone did a great job; especially First Officer; he did a fantastic job! I was a little disappointed with myself thinking maybe I could have done things better or faster. Normally a pilot not flying guy; this self-inflicted AM was very early; a fire warning on takeoff was a bit of a surprise. I was so impressed with myself for letting the rejected takeoff (RTO) function work without me overriding with manual brakes and how well the RTO worked. I felt I could have been faster with the speedbrake and reversers; but the First Officer did great making his callouts. It was a bit disconcerting having the Fire Warning lights and bell on the glareshield without any other indications; it makes you think you might be missing something. The First Officer did a great job quickly reviewing the fire section of the QRH; but we were still scratching our heads until I was able to duplicate the warnings by hitting the light/button assembly. Ironically; I have been studying and reviewing all the pilot and Safety reports lately for an upcoming PT; like the one on RTOs. I still wasn't in the you can't takeoff mode like I am in the simulator and need to mentally prepare that way every takeoff as recent reports discussed.Not really sure but we may have been assigned to work more than an 8-hour day; but without the 'snapshot' right at the time of the reassignment; I can't be sure. After a RTO event and near the end of our brake cooling period; I received a call from Scheduling that the First Officer and I were being reassigned when we arrived in our next destination. Between the RTO; all the coordination with Dispatch; Operations; the flight attendants; Fire Chief; ATC; checklists; logbooks write-ups; medical situation with passenger; and talking to Maintenance; I accepted the reassignment without looking at it thinking I would have a chance to review it.My phone would have never been on had we not had communication problems with Operations. It was also weird that all calls I have received from Scheduling always showed 'unknown' and this one came up with XXX area code. With all the coordinating with Dispatch and Maintenance not sure who I expected to call me while holding brakes during brake cooling. Looking back on it; it wouldn't have taken long for me to actually review the reassignment rather just accepting it.

A B737-300 crew rejected a takeoff for a fire warning which turnout to be faulty fire handle switch but continued the day's flights on another aircraft with a rescheduled flight sequence. Later that day they realized 8 flight hours had been exceeded.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 130

Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

ASOS weather taken from my TOLD card that I kept from the day of the incident: XA:05Z 360/3 3SM -SN BR 024 OVC -1/-2C A29.92 Runway used: 7;008 FT x 100 FT. Runway conditions: light dusting of snow all surfaces. Approach used: VOR/DME. After parking and just before shutdown; the right main gear warning light illuminated. Initially I thought a micro switch had been fouled by some ice so I dismissed the notion of anything being wrong at that point of the shutdown process. I continued to unload the freight from the aircraft and returned to the cockpit thereafter to call in numbers. It should be noted that during the unload; I felt the aircraft shift slightly as if someone had pushed the tail quite hard but that the aircraft never returned to the neutral point; almost as if the airplane had slid downhill 3 inches. Again; at the time I didn't think anything of it other than the thought in my mind of 'that felt kind of weird.' Turning on the battery switch again illuminated the right main gear warning light so I went to check the micro switches. It was at that time that I discovered the outboard drag link on the gear had sheared from the main gear itself. I took pictures and sent them to Maintenance for preliminary inspection. The landing itself was not unusual in any way. Touchdown was approximately 100 FT beyond the thousand foot markers. On a scale of 1-10; 10 being perfect; was probably a 6. Not great but I've had much worse. No unusual side loading occurred and directional control was maintained throughout the rollout and no indication that any malfunction had occurred even during the taxi to park. Airport Operations later conducted a runway inspection and found part of the sheared drag link approximately 3;000 FT down the runway 3 FT right of the centerline. After close inspection by a mechanic; further damage was discovered deep within the gear well itself. Further inspections are pending.

A SA-226 pilot reported discovering a fractured outboard main landing gear drag link after the right main landing gear warning light illuminated at the gate.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Confusion; Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors

Taxied to incorrect runway while dealing with poor radio quality. Went to ZZZ to update databases in newly installed avionics and after recent completed annual. Had no intentions of flying and only slightly considered starting the engine to see that the engine monitor was working. Didn't want to go flying because: The winds were gusty; above my personal minimums. [The] new avionics were going to be a distraction as a single pilot. Didn't want to involve instructor to abide to social distancing. Recent flight time was low: have only had 1 hour of solo time in my aircraft. No hours in [a month] for avionics repair and annual. [I] had comms trouble before with a malfunctioning secondary EDM (Engine Data Management) - considered that perhaps comms interference was caused by bad EDM.A young passenger was with me and was a distraction. Pulled the plane out of the hanger to get GPS signal. I wanted to also check if fuel flow information was being reported from the EDM to the IFD (Integrated Flight Deck) - that meant I needed to start the engine. So; on a whim decided that it would be good to run the airplane for a while and taxi around to break in new brakes and verify things are ok after the annual.  And so it began -- I called Ground on comm 1 and told my intentions to taxi up X; down Y; and then back up X to park again. In my head I expected to head east up X; cross [Runway] XY. Then down Y.; cross [Runway] XY; then back up X. I did not hear a response on comm 1. I called for a radio check 2 more times on comm 1. After barely hearing a response on comm 1 decided to try comm 2 - my head now boiling with frustration over the newly installed malfunctioning radio.I called Ground on comm 2 and was able to get a clearance. I wrote down and repeated the clearance... Taxi to Runway XY; via X; hold short X1. Note that this is opposite my expectations. Not realizing it; and grumbling about the radio failures; I proceeded east towards Runway XY. This is the pilot deviation. I did not hear a call that was made that I was heading the wrong way; and an offer to either turn around; or cross. I heard another call that sounded like further taxi instructions; but I didn't understand what was being said; except that I should use X6. I turned onto X6 and stopped at the hold short line as I wasn't sure I was cleared to cross. The Controller listed out some instructions; which I miss heard and asked that I would take it one step at a time. Next clearance I understood enough to cross the Runway to Y6 down Y. There was more; but I just repeated that part I understood that got me down Y.When I got down to the run-up area on Y; near Y6; I stopped and called for further clearance to cross. I heard no responses. After listening to the recording at home; I heard the further clearance prior to my arrival to the run-up area; but actually did not hear responses to my calls. I made several calls; both on comm 1 and comm 2.At this point a little panic set in. How the heck was I going to get back across the runway without comms. OK lost comms procedures; in the slight panic/frustration; did not even think about a checklist...I proceeded to squawk 7700; thinking I was squawking the lost comms code.I eventually got a hold of him on the Tower frequency. I was cleared across and back to the hangar area. I made a few more radio checks on the way back; and things were still iffy - but I was done at this point. No one asked me to; but after putting the plane back in the hangar; I got the phone number to the Tower from the FBO. I called; to hear what they thought happened; but the crew had changed out while I was hangaring the plane. The current Controller said no big deal was made of it.It wasn't until I got home; where I re-read my clearance notes that I realized I had taxied the wrong way.Contributing problems [included] a lack of currency/experience. Radio problems caused frustration and distractions. Stress. Dismissive: this will just bea simple taxi - I'm not flying. Corrective actions [would include to] consider that taxing can be just as complicated as being airborne. IMSAFE applies to both on the ground or airborne.I - illness; nope.M - meds are good.S - Stress - oh yeah I'm stressed. COVID shutdown; kids at home; work from home; couldn't fly for months because of bad avionics install. This is why I wasn't going to 'fly.' A - alcohol - zip.F - fatigue; well rested.E - emotions - did I mention stress; also dismissed that taxing could be just as challenging as flying.Review lost comms procedures. I'm printing a label for the squawk codes to stick on my transponder. Pretty sure I don't remember the Tower light signals; either. I called my instructor for ideas and he also suggested that I could have used my cell phone to call the Tower (even though; at the time I didn't have the number.) Really listen to clearances. They may not be what you are expecting. Before rolling; physically point to the direction of clearance; and verify with some outside evidence that it is the correct direction.

GA pilot reported experiencing a taxiway incursion citing multiple distractions and other human factors as contributing to the event.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

During takeoff roll at approximately 80 KIAS the FAs (Flight Attendants) alerted the flight deck with four chimes followed by four chimes. A rejected takeoff was accomplished. While taxiing clear of the runway the flight attendants said the alert was caused by three passengers on the left side of the aircraft at row 22 yelled 'FIRE' three times after observing a fire ball from the aft of engine Number 1. Tower reported that no fire or smoke was observed from our aircraft. An Airport Operations person was nearby and made a visual inspection of our aircraft and reported no fire or smoke coming from the engine. At no time during the takeoff roll and subsequent reject were there any indications or warnings of engine fire; overheat; high EGT; high fuel flow; or compressor stall. Brake cooling calculations were made through [performance data calculator.] No cooling time was required. We taxied to a gate and deplaned the passengers. Dispatch; Maintenance Control; the Chief Pilot were contacted. A logbook entry was made and Mechanics were called out. Required inspections and a five minute engine run were performed. No abnormalities were found and the aircraft was returned to service.

During the takeoff roll we received four chimes from the Cabin Crew followed by an additional four chimes. I was the Pilot Flying. The Captain called for the reject and rejected the takeoff at approximately 85 knots. I advised the Tower of the reject and I contacted the Cabin Crew. They told me that three passengers seated between rows 20 and 23 on the left side (Captain's side) noticed flames coming out of the #1 engine tailpipe during takeoff. I asked them if there was any visible fire; smoke or fumes; to which they replied in the negative. We had normal engine indications throughout; and the Number 1 engine was no longer showing any symptoms of fire or smoke. An Operations vehicle inspected the aircraft and everything was normal. We checked brake cooling and proceeded to the gate. The passengers deplaned; the engine was inspected by Contract Maintenance; and after we ran the engine for five minutes the paperwork was completed and the aircraft was cleared to continue.

B737-700 flight crew reported rejecting a takeoff due to a call from flight attendants who said passengers saw flames coming out the number one engine.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

While in cruise; at FL380; flight attendants in the rear of the aircraft called to report a burning smell; haze; and eye and throat irritation. Flight attendants thoroughly searched the area but were unable to determine the source. No indications of smoke or fire appeared on cockpit displays. The flight attendants shut off the In Flight Entertainment [IFE] system and we selected the utility busses off; but these actions had no effect on the smell or haze.Due to the uncertainty of the situation we elected to divert to a land at a nearby airport. We declared an emergency and landed uneventfully. The aircraft was not overweight. ARFF looked the aircraft over with thermal imaging after landing and continued to investigate after parking at the gate. No evidence of fire or source of smoke were found. The passengers were deplaned via jetbridge through the 1L door and cargo doors were opened after deplaning.

When the aft flight attendants reported haze and smoke and a source could not be determined the Captain of a B767-300ER elected to divert to a nearby suitable airport. No source or evidence of fire was immediately determined.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Type 1106

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were on the SITEE3 arrival into LAS. The ATIS was advertising ILS 26L and RNAV Visual 19R approaches. Because of our direction of arrival we had set up for and briefed the ILS 26R. Just prior to WYYNN; Approach advised us we would be doing the RNAV visual 19R. This required changing runways very quickly as the arrival also changes shortly after WYYNN. We were able to do this; but Approach Control then refused to clear us for the approach until we called the airport in sight. We had been very busy setting up for the new approach and had not had time to visually acquire the airport. This caused a delay in beginning our descent. Compounding this; LAS is only visible at night as a dark spot near lights and while it is possible to see the airport; Runway 19R does not come into view until short final.We were able to successfully fly the approach and make a safe landing; but this practice is far from safe.

B737 Captain reported receiving a late runway/arrival change and increased workload associated with making the necessary FMS changes resulting in a late descent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 153; Flight Crew Total 15600; Flight Crew Type 584

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Total 10560; Flight Crew Type 4726

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Initially I briefed and prepared for an Autoland approach into ORD as the weather was near Cat 1 minimums. The weather was improving as we got closer; so the First Officer and I discussed that we would continue with the Autoland approach just for practice. I was flying with the A Autopilot on. When cleared for the approach; and while intercepting the Localizer; I engaged the B Autopilot. During the approach; the First Officer noticed that while both Autopilots were engaged; only his Flight Director was showing Master.At this point; I clicked off the Autopilots and asked the First Officer to then re-engage them. He turned the Flight Directors off; re-engaged my FD first; then his FD next. Then he re-engaged the APs by selecting the A Autopilot first; but was not able to get the A Autopilot to engage first for some reason. After a second attempt; he was able to engage the A Autopilot after engaging the B Autopilot first. This provided us with two Autopilots; but only the First Officer's Flight Director Master Light was illuminated. We also had both Flight Directors with correct indications; Approach Mode still engaged and all other indications appearing normal.Since the weather had improved to 800 overcast and 2 miles visibility while on the arrival; and we were well outside of the Final Approach Fix; I quickly re-briefed the Cat 1 minimums and requirements and we continued to the FAF. I left both Autopilots on while I configured the aircraft and the First Officer ran the Landing Checklist.Just after passing the FAF; I noticed the 'Self Test' of the Autoland System and the Flare Armed indication. The First Officer and I discussed that the Autoland System passed the 'Self Test' and we had all of the necessary equipment (including both Autopilots; Flight Director bars and Flare Armed indicated) for the Autoland except the Master FD light on my side. At this point and around 1000 feet; we were in visual conditions. I then stated that I had visual conditions and would proceed visually.I continued to let the Autopilots fly the airplane as we again discussed that we believed the Autoland Systems was working for us because the system passed the 'Self Test' and we had no Warnings/Cautions/Alerts/Abnormal annunciations at all. At the expected altitude of around 300-350 feet; the trim began correctly biasing for the flare. Yet again; the First Officer and I confirmed that everything appeared to be working correctly. Though I had been pondering the disconnecting of the Autopilot the whole way down on the approach; I still believed that everything was working for the Autoland; we were in visual conditions and my hands were at the controls to immediately disconnect the Autopilot and Autothrottles if needed as suggested during a visual or Cat 1 Autoland. Just as we passed over the numbers to Runway 27R; the flare engaged; the airplane smoothly touched down and I assumed control by disengaging the Autopilots and Autothrottles.At the gate and just not feeling right about it; we elected to enter a Maintenance Log Item to explain our experience and have the system checked. We also discussed our experience with the outbound crew.Also; the First Officer and I discussed our experience again after we had a chance to decompress and elected to file FSAP Reports as we realized that the most conservative action would have been for me to disconnect the automation and manually land the airplane. Additionally; while we had already discussed and agreed earlier that we would have performed the Go-Around at the FAF if the weather was not continuing to improve and while there was no doubt in my mind that I would have immediately disengaged any and all automation at the first hint of a deviation or drift; I believe after 6 days straight of flying; I was tired and got lulled into complacency; a little 'get-home-itis' and let my guard down on Autoland procedures because of the visual conditions and my past experience in a Fail-Operational Autoland System from another Boeing that has an Autoland Status Annunciator. Again; I believe that the best choice would have been to manually land the airplane and save the systems discussion for after the flight.As an aside; I am still fairly new on the airplane and wish I had a lot more experience with the systems. If there was one additional suggestion or change I could recommend regarding this experience; I would highly advocate more systems education and review classes for this fleet. As some recent Transition Pilots I have spoken with from other Boeing Fleets would agree; I did not feel there was enough time given to operational-type systems training during Transition training and most of the training was quite rushed. While I have many hours of experience in commercial airliners; most of that time was in another Boeing with slightly different procedures and Autoland Systems. In all of my previous fleets; there were always fairly robust and comprehensive systems review videos and handouts that incorporated most of the major systems in an operational and phase-of-flight presentation that supplemented the Flight Manual. Additionally; there were voluntary Systems Review classes every day at the training center. I believe better systems knowledge will help pilots coming from other airplanes to more quickly identify systems or maintenance issues that will expedite the operation and avoid unnecessary delays and incorrect decision making.

After block in; the Captain asked how I thought the issue should be written up. That led us to researching the FM about approach indications and questioning if we should have continued the Autoland without the Captain's Master light illuminated. Since the weather was CAT I and we are allowed to do CAT I Autolands with the understanding that the aircraft may require manual intervention in such situations; I don't doubt the legality of our decision to continue; but I do think that next time; without proper indications; the autoland should be abandoned and a CAT I approach flown using non-Autoland procedures.

B737 flight crew reported executing an autoland even though the Captain's Master light was not illuminated as required.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 1290; Flight Crew Type 1104

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Called airport upon departure from ZZZ. Winds were said to be calm. Flight was direct to UT25. On final approach it was very bumpy and as I flared and touched down the wind changed from the right and picked up that wing. I lowered the right wing and aligned to the center line and touched down again. As I set down I was pushed left again and the left wheel hit a tumbleweed in the sand and right wheel touched down in the soft sand. I applied right rudder to get back on the runway and then the soft sand grabbed the wheel and pulled me hard left. At that point all I could do is keep straight as possible and brake to a stop in the sand and tumbleweeds.

Solo pilot reported encountering windshear during landing flare which caused the aircraft to departed the runway surface.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Safety Concern: FAA/NGA A/FD guidance for PDX states that 'Rwy 21 clsd to Height Group IV acraft with cockpit to wheel height greater than 22'.' According to the PDX Airfield Manager's Office representative who is knowledgeable of the restriction; this is due to the VGSI settings not compliant with Height Group 4 setting parameters. According to the representative; this restriction has been in place for at least 20 years. This is a safety related restriction. In addition; it is enforceable on pilots. This restriction is not communicated to aircrews through any current commercial chart products and Height Group IV aircraft databases both contain the LOC21 approach procedure; which could lead crews to think the approach and runway are legal to use. Recommendations: 1. Include a note to this effect in flight paperwork for any Height Group IV aircraft flights into PDX and the surrounding airports (in case of alternate/diversion) 2. Request commercial chart provider AND FAA/NGA to publish this restriction on the LOC21 procedure itself; in the Notes section. The IAP is the best place to publish this because it is usually the first and then the last document a crew will study and utilize when preparing for arrival and executing an approach/landing. 3. Coordinate with commercial chart provider to annotate this restriction. 4. Remove the LOC21 procedure from all applicable aircraft types' GPS database.

An Air Carrier pilot reported aircraft in Height Group IV (B757 and larger) with a cockpit to nose wheel height 22' or greater are prohibited from landing on PDX Runway 21 because the VGSI angle and runway end location are not compliant with FAA Flight Standards guidelines for aircraft in Group IV.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Type 4000

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

As we were climbing through about 5;000 feet MSL; I told the Captain that I was turning the packs on HIGH to cool the cabin; as it was very hot. I looked up at the pack switches and unintentionally moved them in the wrong direction to the OFF position instead of HIGH. Contrary to what I normally do; I did not verify my action. Climbing through 10;000 feet I called for the Climb Checklist; the Fuel Caution illuminated (due to the center tank being empty) and ATC gave us 'direct ZZZZZ' intersection and 'climb to FL 210' which added to the workload and distracted me. As the Captain read 'Pressurization' from the checklist; I did look up at the Cabin Altitude Differential Pressure; and rate gauges and the position of the needles looked normal; so I replied: 'checked.' In hindsight; I realize that I missed the first point of my usual Pressurization Check Flow; which includes checking the two needles on the Duct Pressure gauge; and the packs switches position. Shortly above 20;000 feet the Cabin Altitude Warning light illuminated and the horn sounded. In short order we donned the oxygen masks and established communication; leveled off and silenced the horn. The Captain ran the QRC; QRH; and requested a lower altitude to ATC.We agreed that we were going back to ZZZ. Sometimes in this time frame; I realized that the packs were OFF due to my error in positioning the pack switches. I told the Captain and reached up to move them back to HIGH. I did not realize that the Captain had not heard me and did not see me. With the noise of the masks and the various tasks of running the QRC; QRH; the flight attendant calling us; and the return to ZZZ; I should have communicated much more effectively and assertively with the Captain to make sure he had heard me and that we were on the same page. When we leveled off at 10;000 feet and took the oxygen masks off is when I told him again that I inadvertently turned OFF the pack switches and that there was no issue with the aircraft.  We agreed that the safest course of action was to run the appropriate checklists and return to ZZZ.Cause - I am usually pretty consistent and methodical in double and triple checking what I do; but I did not realize that this morning the combination of a number of risk factors could lead me to let my guard down and become more distracted. The heat made me rush and I reverted to muscle memory by moving the pack switches up (like when I start the engines or transfer to APU bleed). The only other couple of times in six years that I needed to move the packs to HIGH I remember thinking how easy it could be to make the error of moving the switch in the wrong direction as this is what we normally do with each engine start. AM trip against my preferred PM circadian rhythm. Busy four-day with the ETOPS check out and with earlier show times than scheduled due to reroutes for ZZZ1 cancellations.General uncertainty of COVID-19 and preoccupation of being furloughed (for both myself and my husband who is junior to me).

Air carrier First Officer reported inadvertently moving the pack switches to off instead of high flow causing a cabin depressurization during climbout.


I was assigned International Gate from XA:30-XH:00. After I finished the flight departure; and checked the computer; I had a new assignment. I acknowledged my assignment knowing that I was not being provided much time to travel between the gate breakroom and the scheduled arriving gate. I made my way to the gate and was positioned on the jetbridge as the aircraft arrived.  After aircraft was blocked in and Ramp Servicemen (RSM) gave me the Nose to door signal to approach aircraft.I drove B jetbridge to try to meet L1 door; but Jetbridge limit alarm sounded; and ramp agent asked me to stop. I went down onto the envelope to look at what the RSM was stopping me for.  I saw that the B and A bridge were close to each other but still enough apart for a person to walk in between approx. 3 ft apart.  I could not see where any contact had been made between the two bridges. RSM guided me back to the stow box; prior to moving the bridge again I contacted Zone 5 and verified what the correct aircraft was to be met for this 767 aircraft. After 2 or 3 minutes I was told 2L. I then approached the 2L door and completed meeting and deplaning the passengers. Supervisor came to me and said something was damaged.

There is a consistent problem when widebodies come into this international gate. There are 2 jet bridges in order to use both L1 and L2 doors to deplane and board passengers. The jet bridge for L1 is a fixed bridge; therefore no steering is available.If the aircraft is stopped and parked where the front wheel sits on towards the front part of the yellow paint touching the front black stripe; it is actually a mispark. It is a mispark because it is more than 1 ft too far and the jet bridge for the L1 door will not fit properly; therefore L1 cannot be opened. The jet bridge for L2 is a regular apron or drivable bridge; therefore; any sight modification can be done with steering that bridge. Since steering is not an option for the front jet bridge; no modifications can be done if the captain does not stop on time or if the ramp guide does not indicate to the captain to stop on the correct spot. So since the L1 door cannot be used to deplane; it also cannot be used to board an aircraft. By only boarding through 1 door on a full widebody; we take a delay with boarding.

A Gate Agent and a Marshaller described problems with a fixed jet bridge at one of their international gates. At the forward edge of the painted marking for the nose gear; the bridge will not mate properly with the L1 door and only the steerable jet bridge can be used and connected to the L2 door.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172; Flight Crew Type 30000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 202; Flight Crew Type 7000

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Lost visual contact with runway and; at same time; got a GPWS Warning. Did a go-around and landing uneventfully on the other runway.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B737 flight crew reported they received a GPWS warning on approach to ELP.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[Airways bill]- This appears to have initially been captured and processed properly and witnessed by two Managers; but at some point the DG information disappeared from [loading software]. This led to this shipment not being on the workbench and was not manifested out on flight XXX/XXJUL21. The manifesting agent placed the shipment in the [Airline] outbound area where a ramp runner came and picked it up and was loaded on to the flight. This shipment was never properly manifested out and the information was not sent to the flight deck. [Report] was opened for this issue.

Air Carrier cargo personnel reported undocumented transport of Hazmat cargo.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Manuals; Aircraft

Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) 31-41-00-815; Figure 103 (Sheet 5 and 6); FIM Blocks -9 and -11. Blocks -9 and -11 both reference Block-10; which does not exist on the applicable FIM. FIM is for post Service Bulletin (SB) 767-31-0098 aircraft. FIM is missing a Block number-10; or the blocks are misnumbered. ETOPS Pre-departure Check; re-reviewing FIM after departure. [Recommend] contacting Boeing to determine what is wrong with the FIM Block numbering or if a Block is missing.

A Line Mechanic reports their Boeing Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) Chapter 31-41-00-815; Figure 103; have Block item numbers -9 and -11 that reference a Block -10 that does not exists on the applicable FIM. The current FIM is for post Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32-0098.