Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On taxi out; I noticed that there was a bit of a 'dead spot' in the steering near the neutral position. I even stated that it wasn't like this leaving ORD or arriving at IND. This is the second leg with this plane. On takeoff upon handing over controls to the FO (Pilot Flying) we received a 'Steering INOP' message as he advanced the thrust levers.It was then that I looked down and noticed that the cord to my cell phone earbuds were touching the base of the tiller (where movement occurs; not totally at the base) and that was possibly inhibiting the steering. We rejected takeoff immediately; taxied clear of the runway; ran the proper procedures. It was then that I moved the tiller (after moving the cord) and verified that this was the issue. We taxied back and flight occurred without incident. I normally leave my phone and earbud cord in my pocket during flight operations. I'm not sure why I had tossed it up to the compartment forward to the tiller. Double check that all things are clear the tiller no matter how small or innocuous it may seem.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

EMB-145XR flight crew reported abnormal nose wheel steering and a STEERING INOP EICAS message on takeoff roll. A rejected takeoff was performed; and the Captain found the nose wheel tiller was being affected by iPhone ear buds that had been placed there.


PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

During pre-flight; the FMC uplinked takeoff data for runway 01. After receiving TPS (Takeoff Performance System); runway 19 was selected and uploaded. When checking the uplinked FMC data for runway 19 against the TPS; the FMC thrust setting showed TO at a 38 degree derate vs the TPS which showed TO 1 with no derate. Furthermore; the thrust reduction altitude input of 1500 ft had changed to 1000 ft. Everything else matched the TPS.The crew discussed this odd occurrence; manual inputs to correct FMC to match the TPS and noise abatement data were made; and crew planned a coordinated check of uplinked takeoff data after receiving load closeout data. After receiving the post closeout uplink the same data appeared on the thrust page (TO with 38 degree derate) and takeoff thrust reduction (changed to 1000 ft). Thinking perhaps something had changed since the original TPS was printed; we requested a new TPS via ACARS using the current ATIS information. The new TPS matched the original; so manual changes were made once again to the FMC to match the TPS and to correct thrust reduction altitude. No further discrepancies occurred. Both the FB and FC have seen this anomaly before on both 787 and 777.

B787 Captain reported that the auto load function for engine thrust settings was acting improperly and required a manual override.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Seattle ARTCC often fails to correctly issue our IFR clearance for flights from EAT. On this occasion; as is often the case; they did not state the name of the departure procedure; the ZARLO2; when they cleared us 'as filed'. Since; according to the AIM in section 5-2-5; the specific Departure (DP) must be named prior to the phrase 'as filed' if it is to be flown; I attempted to clarify our clearance with Center by requesting the ZARLO2. After several verbal exchanges; things weren't much clearer. The controller kept repeating that we were already cleared 'as filed' while never once stating the name 'ZARLO2'; or any other DP; despite my request. At one point; he did state that we could 'do whatever you need to do; and I'll clear you direct GLASR when I have you in radar contact'. After hearing this; in the interest of safety and clarity; I informed him that we intended to fly the ZARLO2. Once we were aloft and again in radio contact with this controller; he queried us about our concern; and when I informed him that being cleared 'as filed' does NOT include the DP; and that those had to be named specifically; he stated 'that's the dumbest thing I'd ever heard'.I recommend additional training for Seattle Center's controllers. Every other ATC facility in our system (except LWS; which is another problem) issues clearances properly; according to the protocol outlined in the AIM section 5-2-5. I believe it's dangerous to deviate from this common practice. Catastrophic consequences could result if the pilot and controller allow sloppy and lazily delivered clearances to lead to a misunderstanding over which DP is being flown.

Air Carrier Captain reported ZSE Center did not correctly issue IFR clearances from EAT by not including the departure procedure.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1060; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

When taxing after making an aerial survey fuel stop; I experienced complete loss of rudder control. I glanced down at the rudder pedals and it appears that one has broken and is jammed. I texted a picture of the rudder pedal & mechanical failure to my boss who is an A&P (Airframe and Powerplant) with IA (Inspection Authorization). He insisted that I must remove the rudder pedal/cotter pins to help him determine what is mechanically wrong. He insisted that this is legal since he's 'supervising' me and told me I can simply remove the rudder and fly the aircraft from the right seat back to my home airport. I told him I don't want to fly the aircraft and would prefer if he sent another aerial survey pilot or taxi to pick me up. He then insisted that I should try to remove the cotter pins while I wait for a taxi; and I proceeded with removing one. I took a break and consulted with other pilots who informed me that he physically has to be present for it to be legal for me to work on the aircraft; and that it is obviously not airworthy. I fortunately met another pilot at the airport who told me they would fly me back to my home airport where my car was and I gratefully accepted their invitation. After further research; I determined that this incident is required by the operator to be reported to the NTSB immediately since loss of flight controls was involved. I'm certain that my boss never reported this incident. In addition; I came to the conclusion that I could have unintentionally violated FARs by removing one of the rudders cotter pins.

C150 pilot reported a rudder pedal jammed during taxi; resulting in a complete loss of rudder control.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Weather; Human Factors

The winds at SLC were light out of the south before I went on break and projected to be a north wind the rest of the day. I came back early from break and the wind had picked up to sustained speeds above 10 knots. I received a very quick briefing and began looking into the wind situation. At the time there was an aircraft on final that was very concerned with the winds. The pilot stated that 11 was the maximum tailwind they could accept or they had to go around. I monitored and the aircraft landed. This was because the wind was issued at the Final Approach Fix on initial check-in with the tower at 11 knots.However; their landing restrictions/minimums apply at the runway; and then the wind was 12 knots; but not issued. I called the tower and made a comment about how lucky it was that they landed and said that we should go south flow. The Tower Traffic Management Coordinator stated that they will call the weather and call me back. While waiting; another controller coordinated with me about how the aircraft were wanting to land south with the winds; I told him that we were going south and that I would coordinate. I yelled out that we were going south. I called the Tower and told them we need to go south and asked what the last north departure was going to be. The Supervisor in the TRACON was on the line and I was excused from the conversation.From pilot briefings a go-around is treated as an emergency by the flight crew because it adds complexity and more work. From this reasoning; and from the winds; I was not willing to place another aircraft in a situation that was on the border of their limits. The Supervisor came back to the Traffic Management area and yelled at me about going south and told me that it was not my call and that I couldn't just 'go and do that'. I told him that there was no need to yell at me; and as he was walking away I told him that he had flow.At this point my duty as a Flow controller was taken from me because the Supervisor told the controller to change the aircraft back to a North flow and re-sequence them into the downwind. I forwarded the TMU (Traffic Management Unit) position back to the Supervisor and left the room. Another controller; who was standing next to me at the TMU position; came out to talk and told me that I was still being shown on break at 36 minutes. (When I returned early from my break the Supervisor never moved me over to show me on position.) I then put away my study material; went to the rest room; and re-entered the control room a few minutes later. That is when I was asked to leave the control room and wait to find out what was going to happen to me.Why are aircraft being placed into an unsafe situation? At KSLC; we are constantly placing these aircraft into a tailwind situation because the SLC Tower does not wish to change from a North flow configuration. The benefit of this configuration has first been the re-issuance of clearances to all of the aircraft that were went through the PDC. The other issue is that the 'special de-ice' program that they were in required the aircraft to depart within 10 minutes. This procedure has never before been brought up as a reason to stay in a North flow configuration. The SLC tower needs to adhere to the stipulations of the FAAH 7110.65 for runway in use.

Aircraft X was a go around. I had descended Aircraft X to 6000 feet then after readback I descended the trailing aircraft from 10000 feet to 8000 feet. I had 1300 feet of vertical separation and the trailing aircraft caught up to Aircraft X. That was 1 hit on the replay of 900 feet and then the next hit was back at 1000 feet vertical separation. I thought with a normal descent rate; the second aircraft would not catch him. Overall; I think I need to relax and not give up the vertical separation until I know I have it as opposed to I 'think' I have it.

S56 TRACON Traffic Management Coordinator reported a decision to change runways was overridden by the Supervisor. The Final Controller reported a loss of separation on final due to the strong winds.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

We were filed to fly an RNAV STAR and ATC had us switch to a different RNAV STAR; which the week prior; the company told us not accept such a change. Upon loading the arrival; we had several issues getting the arrival to load correctly. Due to the last minute change to our new arrival and issues loading the new arrival; we were unable to make the crossing restrictions. We then informed ATC that we could not make the crossing restrictions. [We should have] worked out approach changes with our company prior to our departure in order for us to have time to review arrival parameters.

Air carrier Captain reported ATC changed the filed RNAV STAR and the flight crew was unable to load it in the FMC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 150

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was informed to hold short of the runway awaiting IFR release. There was a Pilatus PC12 on final. By the time I was up next to the runway; the Pilatus was on short final over a levee that is about 100 ft. before the blast pad at the approach end of the runway. The Tower Controller instructed us to line up and wait when the Pilatus was still at least 300 ft. before the threshold of the runway. This Tower Controller frequently seems fed up with his job and frequently issues unsafe instructions to pilots that seem to be in a lazy manner. As a pilot; I feel unsafe operating at this airport when this Controller is on position. This Tower has no manager and only three air traffic controllers which leads to overworked ATC who sometimes show no regard for aircraft.

C172 pilot reported that the Tower Controller instructed them to line up and wait while an aircraft was on short final.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Shortly after acceleration Height we received a master warning and associated Number 1 engine oil annunciation; we discovered the oil pressure dropping rapidly; we declared an emergency; and proceeded immediately to return to the field. As the oil pressure continued to drop we decided to initiate an in-flight shutdown of the Number 1 engine and proceeded with the engine failure checklist. The situation ended with a normal landing and contacted Dispatch on the ground.

DHC8-300 Captain experiences a loss of engine oil pressure shortly after takeoff and declares an emergency to return to the departure airport. With oil pressure continuing to drop the engine is shut down and the flight returns for a single engine landing.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.4

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I just arrived at the position for a morning shift. First transmission of the day; after a relief briefing from the midnight crew. I had two departures; one off Runway 23L and one off 23R Aircraft X off RWY 23L on an assigned heading 210 with a first fix of CVG which is approximately a 140 degree heading; and Aircraft Y off Runway 23R on runway heading; with the MAREO3 departure; a 080 heading; with Aircraft X a couple miles ahead. This is a somewhat common practice on the midnight shift to expedite traffic; with the 23R runway heading departure getting a right turn over the airport to the east. This practice is almost exclusively for [name removed] aircraft only. I turned Aircraft Y left direct MAREO intersection which turned Aircraft Y into Aircraft X's flight path. I had not sat down yet and the preference sets were still from the previous controller; which confused me. We have automatic leader direction changes in our stars equipment here and I made a terrible assumption that Aircraft Y was off Runway 23L; not runway 23R. There had been no previous coordination from the tower or in the briefing of this unusual operation. I sat down; changed to my preference sets and immediately recognized the error. I instructed Aircraft Y to remain on runway heading and turned Aircraft X to a 140 heading. I watched both targets and their tracks to see if Aircraft Y had turned. It appeared to me that they hadn't.    Upon arriving at work today I was informed that Traffic Analysis and Review Program (TARP) had gone off and Aircraft Y had started a left turn; and I had an operational error. I would like to have the stars equipment offset the leaders from all parallel runways to the direction away from the airport from that runway to eliminate confusion. Side by side departures off Runway 23; where the data tags overlap always crisscross; which I have never liked. I would also recommend mandatory coordination for this type of midnight operation.

IND Controller describes a loss of separation due to an aircraft turning later than expected and a midnight shift procedure that runs aircraft close together. Discussion about the direction of leader lines and possible offsets were recommended by the Controller.


Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Observer

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Upon liftoff; nose gear had unusual amount of vibration/wobbling; however; gear retracted normally.  Upon selecting gear DOWN; nose gear slammed down with green indications. Requested flyby of ZZZ1 tower which reported gear did NOT appear to be all the way down.  Additionally; [another aircraft] reported that nose gear appeared 'cocked.'Returned to ZZZ1 with uneventful landing.Taxied clear of runway.  Inspection by Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) and ZZZ1 maintenance reported no damage.  Gear pins were installed by ZZZ1 Maintenance on taxiway and proceeded to gate with no additional events.Entry requesting inspection of nose gear made in [logbook].

Upon the fly-by; the Tower said that the NOSE gear seemed to be extended abnormally. I flew the go-around; while the Captain received input from an [aircraft] on the ground; who observed our flyby as well. That flight also reported to the Captain that the nose gear appeared to be extended abnormal. We checked the QRH; and then we returned to land and landed uneventfully.

A B767 flight crew noted an unusual vibration upon gear retraction. They continued to their destination and when they selected gear down the nose gear seemed to immediately fall into place. They did a Tower fly-by and both ATC and another pilot observing said the gear appeared to be extended abnormally. They continued to land without incident.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This was my first time flying the airplane in 75 days. I did have sim 30 days ago. The FO hadn't flown in a couple weeks I believe. The airplane was full to capacity of XX pax. There was an issue with being able to take everyone before we left. Also there was a maintenance issue that was signed off but needed clarifying. Overall it was a smooth on time departure. During climb out above 10;000 we were discussing COVID and the new procedures. The APU altitude exceed message came up. We ran the QRH it went away and continued the rest of the flight without incident.

Climbing through FL330 we got a caution chime and EICAS message. APU ceiling exceeded. We followed the QRH instructions and shut down the APU with no further incidences.  I cannot recall what distracted me during engine start; but I did not complete my after start flow. In addition I did not notice that the APU was still running when I completed the after takeoff checklist. I should always believe that something is wrong when my flow is interrupted and should repeat the checklist when this happens.  That will be my behavior in the future.

Air carrier flight crew reported forgetting to turn off APU and later exceeding the APU ceiling.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 881

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

We were given a recovery trip from PBI to ZZZ1. Upon arriving at the aircraft we had to defer the Nav database and the Jeppessen charts. We did just that which made us unable to do RNAV STARS; SIDS; routes etc. When the First Officer tried to get the clearance they gave us a RNAV SID and an AR route as that is what had been filed. The First Officer advised them we were unable to accept the route as we weren't able RNAV SIDS; STARS; routes etc. they informed us that our suffix indicated we were RNAV capable so we would have to refile correctly for us to go without using an RNAV SID. I called dispatch and explained it to the dispatcher and asked for it to be refiled with an appropriate route and suffix. It was refiled with a different route but the suffix still showed us as RNAV capable so clearance still wouldn't issue it. I called dispatch again and asked for it to be corrected and filed again. I made sure the third flight plan did come through with a different suffix before turning my attention to the passengers as they had now shown up. I greeted the owners and got them loaded and made sure the bags were loaded. During the baggage loading it became apparent I would have to increase the weight to match the weight of bags for the trip. I adjusted the weight in the waypoint app and waited for a valid release. The First Officer had briefed the passengers and we got into the cockpit and got ready to go while we waited for the release. We waited quite a while for the release as we began making phone calls and sending messages to try and see if the release was coming. Once I finally got through to the dispatcher on the phone and asked if the new release was coming soon. He responded 'what do you mean? You're in the air already.' I informed him that no we weren't we were still waiting on a valid release due to the weight change. Shortly after that we received a release from a different dispatcher which we verified the suffix was still the same as the last release and made our way to depart. A short time into the flight they gave us a reroute to a couple RNAV fixes and different route. We advised them we weren't RNAV and would like to remain on our route navigating by ground based navigation. It was at this point that I started to wonder if the suffix still wasn't correct for the airplanes condition. We continued without further issues. The entire process was truly exhausting having to review and keep straight in my head four releases and make sure they were done correctly; even if it wasn't already a new airplane as well as a recovery at the end of what was now becoming a long day. The last two releases being issued after the passengers were already onboard the airplane.

Captain reported difficulty with dispatch getting the correct aircraft suffix filed on the flight plan.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

A C172 checked on my frequency with the intent to land PRC. I issued standard pattern entry instructions per local directives for the current runway configuration and airspace delegation. The instructions issued were for left traffic Runway 12. A second C172; checked on my frequency from the other Local Control position on departure heading 15 degrees left of runway heading. The VFR departure strip I had in front of me indicated the aircraft was requesting an eastbound departure. There was additional traffic; a helicopter; not involved with this report but was a factor for the second C172. After the helicopter traffic vs. the C172 was resolved; I issued instructions to the C172 to proceed on course which I expected to be eastbound. At this time the first C172 was inbound on the left 45 VFR pattern entry talking to the other Local Controller for descent and landing instructions. The second C172 actually turned to an approximate heading of 010; northeast bound; a flight path that conflicted with the first C172. I continued to work additional in-bounds and diverted my attention from the second C172. Moments later I received a report from the second C172 that they were passing under the first C172 by about 100 FT and that they have them in sight. I acknowledged the report; visually acquired both aircraft; and notified the other Local Controller of the traffic who was working the first C172 inbound. Recommendation; there were multiple factors that led to this event. The non-verbal coordination written on the VFR departure strip indicating the aircraft was requesting an eastbound departure was incorrect. My instructions to the aircraft were not specific enough; 'on course approved; rather than eastbound approved'; to listen and verify that the aircraft would comply. Traffic volume and complexity were both building at the time and my attention could not be fully applied to the second C172.

PRC Controller described a pattern conflict event when the internal Tower coordination failed.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

B787 have a constant red illuminating padlock on every boarding door. Other carriers have an illuminating red padlock when armed and a green padlock when disarmed. Vendors have expressed concern that this method of a constant red padlock illuminating in the door could lead to a possible deployment as human error (complacency) could occur as an agent will just assume the door is disarmed when in actual fact; it is armed.

Ground employee the B787 has an illuminated door lock light on the passenger entry door which can be misinterpreted.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 1583; Flight Crew Type 17

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was flying in to refuel and continue when I was instructed by Tower to enter right base; configured aircraft for landing; and verified three green gear down and locked; applied flaps and performed standard landing. I was asked by Tower to clear on first taxiway to left; and informed Tower I was unable due to higher than taxi speeds upon landing and was asked if I could clear on [perpendicular runway] and informed yes since aircraft had slowed down to proper taxi speeds. I cleared left on runway and proceeded to contact Ground frequency. Contacted Ground and was instructed to clear right on Taxiway 'D1.' Cleared right on 'D1' and was beginning a left turn on Taxiway 'D' at no more than 5 to 7 mph; when right gear began failing and collapsed. I immediately closed throttle cut off mixture shutting both engines down; and closing fuel to both engines; and mags to both engines. Before shutting down master switch I contacted Ground and informed everything was ok and shut down master; proceeded to exit the plane to verify any fuel or oil leaks. Confirmed there were none; contacted local FBO for assistance.

C402 pilot experiences a right main gear collapse during taxi in after landing.


Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft on this flight had two MELs; the first was the right pack and the second was the left generator.  The single pack limited our altitude to a maximum of 25;000 feet; and the single generator required us to run the APU for the entire flight. I decided to take the airplane because the weather was good along the entire route. We were also carrying 16;000 lbs of ferry fuel. The flight proceeded normally until we were airborne about an hour when we noticed a Master Caution light illuminated because of an electric problem. We noticed the APU had shut down giving us the Source Off light. The APU was restarted; but the APU Low Pressure light remained illuminated and the APU shut down again. We realized we were down to a single generator and discussed airports to divert to. After talking to dispatch; we decided to come back to the departure airport. I [advised] ATC and told them we were down to a single generator and would be landing overweight. The arrival and landing were uneventful. The First Officer landed the airplane and I taxied to the gate with no further problems.

A B737-800 dispatched with a single generator and pack cruised at FL250 when the APU shutdown. The APU was restarted but shutdown a second time with a low oil pressure warning. The flight returned to the departure airport with a single generator.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Cruising at FL250 and encountered rapid loss of cabin pressure. Donned oxygen max. Started emergency decent out of FL250. [Notified ATC]; they asked what altitude I was requesting; and while it was very difficult to hear I requested below FL120 and ended up stopping at FL100 after a controller change. After consideration I decided to land at ZZZ to look everything over before proceeding to the original destination. I spoke with my mechanic; and we decided the plane was good to fly on to my original destination. I did so at FL110 with no issues in flight.

LNC4 Pilot reported rapid loss of cabin pressure at FL250 resulting in a diversion to a nearby airport.


Sikorsky Helicopter Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

I am no longer an active helicopter pilot; and the following is part of the reason I have bowed out.The regulations prohibit flight in known icing conditions in an aircraft that is not equipped for icing. The Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for each of the above aircraft (Robinson R44 and Sikorsky S76) also clearly state that flight in known icing conditions in their aircraft is prohibited. The SOPs for my last employer prohibited flight in known icing conditions (the employer before that had no SOPs). For both; my coworkers and I regularly flew in what would be considered by definition 'icing conditions;' in one instance; I called my fellow pilot after he landed; and he explained that although they had indeed accumulated some ice on the airframe during the flight; he 'knew it wouldn't accumulate too fast.' (He has been flying this area for the last couple [of] decades.)My training department had almost nothing to say on the subject. Everyone in both the R44 and S76 jobs (news gathering and EMS respectively) treated me as if I were being far; far too conservative; and 'we would just never fly in the winter if we did it that way.'As far as I can tell; all published material from the FAA and otherwise concerning aircraft icing is exclusively applicable to airplanes. There is usually some disclaimer stating that no one actually knows how quickly ice may accumulate on a helicopter main rotor system (but it will definitely be bad when it does). It seemed to me at the time that I was flying these missions that we were dancing blindfolded in the vicinity of a canyon; and I was called a chicken for pointing it out (I was the most junior pilot in that program. My co-pilot; who was only my senior by about a year; was the only one who listened). That flight on which my fellow pilot experienced icing was a mission that my co-pilot and I had turned down.There is a lack of knowledge concerning icing in helicopters in general; and in the two professions I was in (EMS and news); there seemed to be an across-the-board lack of respect for what that phenomenon can do. I know that NASA has been conducting tests of helicopter rotors in their icing tunnel...can those results be made public? Even if they aren't conclusive yet...if they will raise awareness; reach out to these industries; and maybe drum up a little more conservatism in our helicopter pilots; it might save a life or two.

Helicopter Pilot reported that multiple times aircraft were flown in known icing conditions even though the aircraft were not equipped for icing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After reaching cruise altitude; a message from dispatch was received on the ACARS. The message said 'I was just notified by Operations that there was dangerous goods loaded - Flammable Maintenance Materials'. The First Officer and I were unaware of the Hazmat on the airplane until this time. No further action was taken by the crew.

A321 Captain reported Dispatch notification of Hazmat cargo on board during cruise. Flight crew not provided with required documents or NOTOC at departure airport.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Was notified of air return due to left main gear unsafe warning light. Crew coordinated with ATC to be able to dump fuel to get under max landing weight. Approximately 53;000 lbs fuel dumped. [Caused by] Gear unsafe warning light.

Dispatcher reported that an aircraft received a 'Gear Unsafe' light; and elected to return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 78; Flight Crew Total 13700; Flight Crew Type 834

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

During a climb through 35;000 FT the aircraft started to roll to the right about 45 degrees and then a second roll to about 75 to 90 degrees (not sure exactly). I regained control of the aircraft after climbing about 3;000 fpm and then descended 3;000 fpm and leveled at 36;000 FT. After informing ATC we encountered wake turbulence; I asked ATC what aircraft we were following and they informed us we were following a DC-10 about 20 miles ahead that was climbing the same rate as us. Food Service was thrown to the floor. All on board had seatbelts fastened and there were no injuries. After resetting Flight Guidance computers we were able to use autopilot again and flight was back to normal. We took all corrective actions regarding the aircraft. I'm not sure how to correct the separation problem. It would seem 20 miles would be sufficient. If ATC informed us of the aircraft we were following and their position we could have the option of vectors; depending on the winds; to fly off the airway or be able to choose a different altitude.

GLF4 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence 20 miles in trail of a DC-10 at FL360 that resulted in a roll to as much as 90 degrees.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While cruising at FL370 in foreign airspace my Communications Control Panel (CCP) showed 'panel fail' on the frequency screens. The VHF Number 2 still worked; but the First Officer's CCP would not tune any radios. About 5 minutes later when given a frequency change the Captain's CCP would not tune VHF Number 1 radio as when we tried to change the frequencies it would just go back to the previous frequency. We then started using the Number 2 VHF; tuning it with the Number 3 CCP. The Captain then called Maintenance Control via the Sat phone and attempted to reset the VHF Number 2 radio with no success. We told ATC that we could not change frequencies and he said to stay on the current frequency and we thus used Number 1 VHF. We attempted to use Number 3 VHF as well; but it kept going back into DATA mode for the ACARS. Maintenance researched we could utilize VHF Number 3; i.e. disconnect it from ACARS. They sent us the circuit breakers to pull and sent it to us via ACARS a few minutes later. By this time the Number 2 VHF was the same as Number 1 VHF in that it would not change frequencies; although it transmitted and received. The attempt to disconnect the ACARS from Number 3 VHF was unsuccessful; so the Captain called Maintenance back. We were now around 10 minutes from [the next FIR] so we asked ATC to please call the next FIR for us and notify them that we could only broadcast on our current frequency but were working on the problem. We also advised that we were going to try and reset the radios entirely and might go NORDO. They told us that if we could no longer communicate to squawk 7600 and they would so inform downrange FIRs. Maintenance advised that the reset of all the VHF radios was the only option left and; as we could not change frequencies on any radio; we felt that this was the only option. Maintenance said they had never done an airborne reset as it was usually only done on the ground. But in effect we were NORDO in a few minutes anyway; so we concurred that we should try it. The Captain then pulled all VHF radio circuit breakers and waited one minute. When he pushed them back in all the radios reset and returned to normal function for the rest of the flight. We regained radio communication right around the FIR and continued on as normal to our destination.

An MD-11 on an overland international flight suffered the inability to change VHF comm. frequencies on any of their three comm. radios and was on the verge of going NORDO when they left their current FIR. A fingers crossed full VHF power reset was determined to be the only; albeit untested inflight; possible cure for the problem. As they approached the FIR the reset was initiated and proved successful. The flight continued to destination.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action

As First Officer accomplished walk around the Crew Chief approached with a NOTOC (Notice to Captain) and stated that 3 of the 4 articles on the NOTOC were on the aircraft. He would let us know if the 4th showed up. At door closure; I had not received word of the 4th article and proceeded to the gate shack to ask the ground crew. They stated we had only 3 of the articles onboard; so I requested a new NOTOC; per [Company protocol]. The crew stated to me that the Crew Chief had closed the flight out and gone home and they could not change the NOTOC. They contacted a 'Zone Chief' for assistance. I went back to the flight deck and awaited word. The ground crewman and a 'Zone Chief' came to the flight deck and stated they could not fix the NOTOC; so they were going to remove the articles. We witnessed 5 articles removed from the forward cargo compartment. I spoke to [Company Cargo Operations] twice to try to find out what happened. He did state that 3 parcels of dry ice had been loaded; and the 4th had not. A copy of his email pasted below. We pushed late and flew to ZZZ1 uneventfully.Hello DG Management Team; Captain called [Company Cargo Operations] as follow up with a dangerous goods loading concern yesterday; which resulted in a flight delay. Reportedly; the ramp Crew Chief of provided Captain with a NOTOC that indicated 4 pieces of restricted articles onboard; but the flight's load plan only indicated 3 pieces of restricted articles onboard. Captain attempted to present this concern to the ramp Crew Chief for correction; but the Crew Chief had departed the area and was unreachable. Resultantly; 5 total packages were removed from the aircraft; the packages were also removed from the load plan; and the flight departed on a delay.Cause: Crew Chief submitted an erroneous NOTOC to crew; closed out flight prior to departure; and left for the evening.Suggestions: Crew Chief should remain at gate until flight closes and pushes back.

Air carrier Captain reported uncorrectable erroneousness NOTOC resulting in the removal of Hazmat cargo.


Company Policy; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

In the interests of pilot safety; I have two ideas.  First; pilots should only use iPads to access the Checklist; instead of constantly touching the physical checklist; which I've never seen anyone wipe with a cleanser.  Secondly; since the FAA has already approved the new rule that oxygen be used above FL410 vs the old FL250; why doesn't the FAA pass that rule immediately.  The last thing we need is for pilots to start coming down with the virus.  Is this THE solution?  Of course not; but it may lower the risk.  Costs nothing and may provide benefit.  Why not do it?

Captain reported two safety ideas to assist with reducing exposure to COVID-19 in the flight deck.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 11; Flight Crew Type 11

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

I made a takeoff over private property in a rural area to practice for a drone class I was participating in and to take some pictures for the property owner. It was a nice; sunny day. The winds at takeoff were reported to be 070[@]010 but on takeoff they picked up somewhat. I went to approximately 300 feet AGL and then dropped down to approximately 250 AGL. I decided to enter an orbit mode to practice entering and setting up this 'intelligent' flight mode. It had been some time since I had practiced an auto flight orbit. After setting up my Point of Interest and defining the orbit radius; I started the orbit. The drone was circling in a counter-clockwise direction and seemed to be doing well. Approximately 11 minutes after takeoff I got a High Wind Velocity Caution; with guidance to land ASAP. Since I was in a rural area in Class G airspace with the drone clearly in sight; I was not too concerned.A two-lane country road ran east-west through the owner's property and my position was south of the road looking north. Although I could see the drone clearly; I could not see the road but had no intention of crossing the road with my orbit flight path. However; as the drone entered the downwind side of the orbit; I could tell its downwind ground track was going long (towards the north) and I might cross the road. I fumbled briefly trying to press the 'PAUSE' switch to stop the orbit. I pointed my camera straight down but by that time I discovered I had indeed crossed the road. I paused there and waited for a truck to pass. When it was clear; I initiated a 'Return-To-Home' and landed uneventfully. On a post video review a few days later; it appeared that I passed behind a moving vehicle traveling east but due to the angle of the camera set up for the orbit; I could not see the point where my ground track crossed the road or how close I was to the vehicle.Reflecting on this sortie; there are several things I failed to do and will do differently in the future: (1) Failed the check the low-altitude forecast winds for the altitude I was flying; (2) I failed to recognize the potential effect of the winds on the orbit path I set up; (3) I failed to terminate the automatic orbit when I received the High Wind Velocity Caution to see how the wind was affecting my ground track and then drop to a lower altitude to hand-fly the orbit or return to land. (4) I failed to position myself between my point of interest for the orbit and the road so that I could better tell when the drone was deviating from the flight path.

A drone operator taking photos reported they allowed their drone to fly over a moving vehicle.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATL Ground control cleared us to Runway 27R via M; LC. ATL tower cleared us to line up and wait Runway 27R. As we taxied onto the runway the tower advised that we had used LB instead of LC.The taxiway signage and pavement markings for LC and LB are confusing. The first officer and I both thought we were following the signage for LC. There was not any loss of separation or other ground traffic affected by the error. The tower pointed out the error and then cleared us for takeoff.

An air carrier crew cleared to ATL Runway 27R at taxiway Lima Charlie; became confused but the taxiway signage and taxied onto taxiway Lima Bravo.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Company tuned to IND Center. We had a similar call sign; aircraft on the same frequency; all simultaneously. Similar call signs like this on regularly scheduled; on time flights should never be in the same airspace simultaneously. Similar call signs contribute to likelihood of a pilot accepting another flight's frequency change or clearance resulting in a possible pilot deviation or even worse; a mid-air collision.

B737-700 pilot reported their company has similar sounding call signs scheduled in the same airspace simultaneously; causing confusion.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

After forward entry door closed; I was advised by #1 FA that we had a sick passenger on board; and a CSM had okayed travel by the passenger.  At the same time; I got a call from the #4 FA advising me that the passenger was acting sick/nauseous and disoriented and was causing a lot of concern with the other passengers; who were concerned about their safety and health.  This was the first time I was informed of the passenger issue; CSM never consulted or briefed me.  We had no way to isolate [the] ill passenger.  Contacted operations to have CSM return to aircraft.Was told that passenger had been denied boarding on a previous flight; and paramedics had attended to passenger and okayed the travel; but there was no record of this or witnesses; just what the passenger claimed.  I asked CSM if the passenger's temperature had been taken; it had not.  I asked that be done; but they had to get a thermometer from outside security.While waiting for the thermometer; and after further consultation with the FA's concerning their interaction with the passenger; as well as increasing concern by other passengers about traveling with a passenger that was exhibiting obvious signs of illness of some type; I decided to have the passenger removed from the flight to ensure the safety of my crew and passengers because of the behavior and symptoms being exhibited by the passenger in question and the unknown cause of illness. In my opinion; poor screening by gate and CSM personal; desire to not deal with an issue and try to push it off on the crew; hoping to let the problem be handled by the flight crew and not dealt with by the gate personnel.In these times during a national health pandemic; we need to be more cautious and err on the side of safety for the majority of the passengers and crew rather than avoiding making a decision that affects just one passenger or crew.  We; as an airline; including gate/CSM personnel; need to treat these situations as if the potentially ill passenger is going to go back and sit down next to one of our family or loved ones.  Also; we need to consider the optics of allowing a visibly ill passenger onto an aircraft with a public that has a heightened awareness and concern about the health conditions of other passengers.  Also; the CSM and agents need to get the Captain in the loop about things that are going on his/her aircraft.  I am absolutely floored that the first I heard about this was by my flight attendants after the agent had given me the final check before closing the door.  I hate to say it; but this was yet another example of the degradation of not only Captain's authority; but also professional respect for the Captain and the entire flight crew.

Air carrier Captain reported having to remove a passenger showing symptoms of illness.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were asked by University Park Tower to fly the right base to final approach runway 24. While on the base leg just about to initiate the turn to final; I heard the 'terrain; terrain; pull up; pull up'. I was non-flying pilot and took the controls to initiate the climb procedure to clear the terrain pull up warning. Once we were cleared of the warning; I transferred control to the first officer to continue the approach.The threats that I encountered was that it was very dark; and the terrain was not visible. I was also bothered by the fact that Tower asked us to fly the base to final approach at 2700 feet. Noting the chart the approach safe altitude shows an initial 3100 feet. In my view; I did not listen to the voice inside me telling me to fly this portion of the approach at 3100 feet. I am somewhat familiar with the airport area and took it for granted that the Tower was giving us a reasonable altitude. I was also a bit distracted by looking forward to spending the night at State College which tells me that I was not completely present.While flying an approach at night time; ask for vectors for an instrument approach to be more conservative with the transition to the approach corridor. Continued adherence to the Flight Operations Manual and training that was received in the training center set us up to take corrective action to keep us safe.

Air Carrier Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on a night visual approach to UNV airport.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I came on duty for an early morning day shift as flight Dispatcher for company. It was a busy morning as a Captain called wanting his flight plan that had not yet been done yet and I reviewed the weather; I noticed I had to amend a flight plan done on the midnight shift to change to a legal alternate. That flight was due at its destination in about 35 minutes. Thirty-eight minutes later I also got an ACARS message from a flight; asking if the RNAV departure out of his departure airport was not authorized for a non-GPS equipped airplane due to a NOTAM stating that. I confirmed the NOTAM stated that the SID was not authorized for non-GPS planes. Flight was still sitting at the gate. At the time I came on duty that flight had already been flight planned and the terms of the flight plan had been accepted by the Captain's signature on the release. The Captain claims he was cleared by ATC on the RNAV SID; and the Dispatcher was at fault. I had not flight planned or ATC filed this flight; but did assume responsibility as the relieving Dispatcher. As I had not done the original paperwork; I could not confirm all that had occurred on the previous shift. However; ATC routinely assigns SID's and STARS to flights without regard to their GPA capabilities. The Dispatcher that I relieved has since told me that he did not plan or ATC file the RNAV departure for that flight.

A Dispatcher reported that a non-GPS equipped B757-200 he became responsible for after shift change; was issued an RNAV departure which was NOTAMed GPS only by either ATC or the Dispatcher.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 5500

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On climbout from FL260 to FL320 noted to occurrences of an engine surge on the right engine. Fuel flow and EGT on the associated engine remained above normal after engine stabilized. Contacted Maintenance and Dispatch. After conference; decision made to return to the departure airport. Fuel dump required on descent to land under max landing weight.

I was on first break when the crew call chime rang earlier then planned. I immediately called the cockpit and the Captain informed me we were heading back to the departure airport. I woke up the other Relief Pilot and then went up to cockpit. The Captain was coordinating with Dispatch and the flying First Officer was coordinating with ATC regarding fuel dump. We dumped fuel on the way back to the departure airport and the Captain made an uneventful landing.

A B777 right engine surged during climb at FL260 with fuel flow and EGT remaining above normal so fuel was dumped as the flight returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing.


Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecnam Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 70; Flight Crew Type 70

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On the downwind landing at ZZZ; I was #2 in the pattern when abeam the touchdown point. The plane that was #1 had just touched down; and around the same time my engine began stuttering and soon after failed. At that point; I had begun my descent and was at [approximately] 800 ft. AGL. I began to attempt to restart the engine and was unable to do so. I then decided to execute a power off 180 degree turn and land on the runway. Perhaps as a result of attempting to restart my engine and triggering the master on/off; I lost communication with ZZZ Tower (I had been previously communicating with them). The plane that was previously #1 was already quite far down the runway and not a factor. I ultimately ended up landing safely; although never received clear to land instructions from Tower due to communications failure. I attempted to advise ATC when the engine failed; however I don't believe this was communicated.Upon landing; I noticed that both of the fuel selector valves were turned off. I am not sure if these were inadvertently disabled when I was attempting to restart the engine; or perhaps I had accidentally turned both of them off before engine failure. I am skeptical that this would be the case; as I remember ensuring that they were both enabled as part of my descent checklist ~15 minutes before the engine failed. It is indeed possible that I may have turned both to the 'off' position accidentally during the descent checklist; but I do not believe the engine would have continued to operate for this long were they to be off.I do not have a clear recollection of what actions I took to restart the engine in the air as it is frankly quite a blur. After being on the ground; I enabled both fuel selector valves and attempted to restart my engine without success. I tried a second time; and it started and I taxied off the runway (at that point 2 fire trucks and a police car had arrived; and I taxied off in convoy with them).A takeaway for me is that; regardless of the cause of the engine failure; my previous flights had been in another model of airplane; and while I was very familiar with Aircraft X; I would say that I should have spent more time familiarizing myself with the emergency procedures checklist. Also; earlier in the day while pre-flighting; there were some irregularities with the communications systems in the plane; and also it was very difficult to start the engine. I did not feel that these issues were enough to warrant aborting the flight; but in hindsight perhaps I should not have flown that plane that day and had it serviced instead.

Private Pilot reported engine failure on downwind that resulted in a successful power-off landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Radar 14; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Other Person

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Cessna departed the airport and requested VFR flight following. Due to a language barrier; it was very difficult to understand the call sign. The airplane was eastbound at approximately 6;500 MSL. Looking ahead at traffic; and understanding the language barrier; I in plain language told the pilot the aircraft needed to be at appropriate VFR cruising altitudes. There was an opposite direction target at 6;400 MSL the exact altitude. I called traffic. The pilot acknowledged. As they continued to get closer and obviously merging; I again warned the pilot to climb. We then found the call sign was incorrect; but the pilot was answering the calls. At four miles; the targets looked very likely to merge I told the pilot to deviate right and maintain VFR. The aircraft did not turn. At two miles I again told the pilot to turn right; at a brief pause another pilot from the frequency said over the frequency 'turn right!' The pilot did and said thank you; the targets got very close.Radios may have been an issue; however the D-Side and I were both hearing different call signs. Language barrier was the biggest issue.

Language barrier between VFR pilot and Controller delayed an airborne conflict resolution with another VFR aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 151; Flight Crew Total 12126; Flight Crew Type 12126

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Several times prior to push the tug drive asked to pull electrics. Per current SOP we delayed APU start. This tug driver did not use correct verbiage and showed great impatience. [Nine] min before scheduled push he again used non standard terms and said he was ready for push; I said standby. We completed the before push and called ramp for push. During the First Officers (FOs) call the tug driver again asked if we would release brakes. I said I would when I received my push clearance. Less than 10 seconds later the FO told me cleared to push spot D. He turned on the beacon I released the brakes and using intercom told the tug driver brakes released cleared to push spot D. I received no answer. I repeated the call. I then noticed the forward cargo door was opening. I told the FO to cancel our push and reset the brakes. What I found out was the driver left the tug to help load the bags. So while the belt loader was against the airplane and ground crew was loading bags our brakes were released no chocks and no one in the tug protecting against movement. I do not consider this a safe operation. At no time did the tug driver advise loading of additional bags. He removed himself from the headset after clearing me to release brakes. I called operations and asked for a supervisor. I was told none available; all in a meeting and it would take too long. As I could not trust this pushback crew; more to the point I doubted their training and ability to conduct a safe push back; I asked for another pushback crew. Again I was told it would take too long. I said fine I would wait. They ended up rotating a wing walker for the tug driver. Neither operations or the push crew seemed to think anything was out of the ordinary. I accepted the new drive and push was normal except again verbiage was incorrect and he forgot to clear us to start number 2 engine. I am concerned that this lack of standardization found on all levels of the ramp operation will get someone badly hurt or even killed. For a very short time while men and equipment were near; on; and in the cargo area; no one NO ONE was holding the airplane.

An A319 Captain reported what he felt were unsafe deviations from SOP during pushback.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62; Flight Crew Total 6262; Flight Crew Type 1282

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft X departs ZZZ to move on station for orbits at Cal State University (VPZZZ). Aircraft X reports on station; as requested by tower and orbits at approximately 1;100 ft. to 1;300 ft. MSL.Aircraft X hears a call from Aircraft Y inbound to ZZZ and hears the Tower instruct him/her (paraphrasing): 'Enter a 4-mile right base.... there is a helicopter orbiting at Cal-State at [altitude]'.There are various exchanges between Tower; Aircraft Y and Aircraft X where Tower reports position of Aircraft Y to Aircraft X and vice versa. On each of these call Aircraft X reports 'Looking...'.At one point Tower calls Aircraft X and reports that Aircraft Y 'is one mile north'; Aircraft X reports back 'Looking' again. But Aircraft Y reports 'traffic in sight [ I believe he/she actually said 'Helicopter in sight''.Upon rounding the orbit in a direction where I could see north; Aircraft Y ends up coming visually through the bottom right chin bubble of the helicopter and we almost were directly over him by the time he was in line with the nose of the helicopter. Separation was about 500 ft. per the pilot. Passenger in back who could have only seen the airplane out his left window; (flying in a direction away from Aircraft X) says it was 300 ft.Neither pilot of either aircraft took any evasive action - it was clear at least to me that we would not hit. But it was closer than expected. And Aircraft Y was not where it was to be expected.Based on Tower's initial instruction (enter a 4-mile base); I was expecting Aircraft Y to pass east of my position and then turn straight-in to the runways. In other words; passing me at a distance further away from the airport than I was. Instead; Aircraft Y decided to 'cut the corner' at about 3 miles and make a 45 entry to final. Aircraft Y effectively tried to pass between me and the airport instead.I think it was poor judgement on the part of the Aircraft Y pilot to turn in towards the runways at Cal State; rather than continue until he/she was perpendicular to the runways before turning final. I believe that the intent from Tower; right from the first call to Aircraft Y was specifically designed to avoid exactly the situation that happened. I do not believe Aircraft Y understood the implication of the initial call up from the tower (Enter 4-mile right base.... there is a helicopter at Cal State...)Perhaps Tower could have emphasized. 'Enter a 4-mile base to final and square the base; or pass east of the helicopter before turning final')Upon analysis afterwards on the ground; Aircraft Y landed at ZZZ at XA:24 on [date]. Aircraft X lifted ZZZ at XA:15 and landed at XA:36.

Helicopter pilot reported that a misunderstanding between Tower and a fixed wing aircraft resulted in a NMAC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 538; Flight Crew Type 1500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

It was a VFR day in MDW when the crew was arriving on the PANGG 3 RNAV Arrival. We briefed the ILS 4R transition and verified everything in the FMS. As the crew was approaching the OLCYK waypoint (15 miles out) Chicago Approach gave us the RNAV Y 4R Approach. The crew divided the tasks and the First Officer (F/O) watched the aircraft as the Captain loaded the new approach into the FMS. It was getting a little busy with an altitude change and a new frequency to Chicago Approach; so task management was trying to be utilized to keep us in the Green. Once the crew checked in with Approach; ATC cleared us for the RNAV Y 4R Approach. The Captain had re-briefed the new approach and verified the waypoints with the F/O as well as the altitudes and RNP value. Everything looked good and the crew verified the LNAV/VNAV on the PFD and set a lower altitude of 1700 FT in the altitude selector. Once crossing OLCYK (IAF) the Crew verified LNAV/VNAV and the Pilot Flying dialed in zeros. The Pilot Monitoring recognized right away that the turn did not initiate as expected and the Captain disconnected the autopilot and turned towards the next fix. In the turn ATC gave us a heading to intercept the ILS 4R which was flown and nothing else was said. Once at the gate the crew debriefed themselves on why everything was verified but the turn did not happen as expected to what was programmed in the FMS. I have flown this approach numerous times and have never had this happen in the past. I understand [procedures] require some extra programming when you are changing approaches and on an arrival; but everything was verified and crosschecked as I normally do. The crew handled the situation very well by not letting the automation take control and working with ATC to correct the problem. In the future; I believe accepting these clearances close in on busy arrivals needs to be reconsidered. I thought having 15 miles would be enough time and not rush us; so this is why as a crew we proceeded on. ATC giving crews another approach on a clear VMC day is not only increases the workload for both of us but increases the threat level too.

Set up for ILS 4R Approach at MDW. About 15 miles out ATC changed the approach to RNAV Y 4R Approach. We set up the box re-briefed and confirmed the RNP and re-cruised the box. LNAV VNAV was confirmed and we reset the next ALT in the window. At the fix the aircraft continued straight ahead and did not intercept the course. Pilot Monitoring noticed and notified Pilot Flying and correction initiated. ATC noticed and clearance was canceled and instructions were given to change to 4R ILS. No traffic issues and ILS visual approach was uneventful. It would be helpful if ATC gave us a little more time to change an approach. We also could have just asked for the ILS or the visual approach.

B737-700 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred on arrival into MDW following a late clearance change. First Officer reported late clearance changes on 'busy arrivals' can pose safety risks.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Aircraft X landing at CGE from sector 38 entered our airspace at FL270 and was given a straight decent to FL130 with out a restriction. The aircraft was PVD [Plan View Display] to sectors 21 below us and 11 north of us. The R side pointed the aircraft out to sector 21. The aircraft was handed off to TAPPA sector in PCT. We then noticed the altitude in the data block read FL070 but neither the R side or myself did that. I called sector 11 and referenced this aircraft who had the PVD and asked if they put in FL070. They said no and that they didn't have track control. I called TAPPA and asked if they put in FL070. He said yes and I mentioned that we have never seen PCT be able to put in an ALT on our scope before. He said to just keep the aircraft going to FL130.  The R side kept him going to FL130 and switched the aircraft to TAPPA freq. Sector 11 called me and asked if Aircraft X had a crossing restriction.  I said no; he has a straight decent to FL130.  My prior reference of this aircraft and them calling me asking about a restriction was all done prior to the aircraft entering sector 11's airspace.  They said ok and hung up the line.I asked the R side if he had been pointed out to 11.  He thought I had done it and I thought he had done it and that 11 was well aware of the aircraft due to the two prior calls but then phrase 'Point out approved' was never stated on the land line.  The R side and I also had confusion about this point out due to the conversation and calls regarding the altitude of FL070 somehow being entered in to the data block by the TAPPA controller at Potomac Approach.When the aircraft was at about FL185 I called 11 to confirm the aircraft was point out approved and they confirmed that it was even though the aircraft was already in their airspace.Less confusion about what Potomac Approach can do to change the altitude of the data block on our scope.  The aircraft should have been pointed out.  It was a confusion between the R side and I and with the R side at 11.

ZDC controller reports of something he hadn't ever seen before. PCT has the ability to change altitudes of data tags on his center scope. Controller reports that a sector at PCT did this and it caused confusion and an airspace deviation by them doing so.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 271

Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Before departing; both student and I revisited the reported weather. The nature of the flight in question was instructional and centered around traffic pattern proficiency; thus terminal and local weather synopsis were sufficient for pre-flight review. Terminal cloud ceilings were textually reported at 1;500 feet AGL with scattered clouds existing around 300; ATIS broadcasting offered confirmation. With a warm occlusion powered by a maritime low to the south; I expected the cloud bases to gradually lower throughout the evening; however; no PIREPS were available to indicate any change to the current conditions. Departing runway 25; it is my understanding that a ceilometer exists just beyond the runway terminus; which dampened any concerns of encountering conditions other than reported during the initial climb. Pattern altitude established at 900 AGL; a determination was made to entertain the flight. Typically; any perceived anomaly in weather is relayed to the pilot during initial call-up. As none were addressed; I assumed none existed. With the student at the controls; we departed runway 25 as intended and began our initial climb in the upwind leg. At approximately 400 feet AGL (537 feet MSL); the aircraft entered hard IMC with no perceivable top. Visibility dropped to zero with no ground reference available. Knowing that the downtown structures loomed ahead; I immediately took control and executed a 90 degree left turn; reducing power to transition into a descent; during which Merrill Tower solicited a report of flight visibility. Break-out occurred at around 350 feet AGL over the Quebec Apron (south end of the airport) followed by an immediate landing on the departure runway. Though instrument proficient; inadvertent flight into IMC is by nature . . . inadvertent. Therefore no planning was made leading to perceptual upset; further delaying the reactive process. The hazards involved are well-known and the possibility exists that future events may not yield favorable results. Though Merrill has adequate weather reporting capability; field location is seasonally hampered by weather dynamics unique to the environment; leading to asymmetric field conditions. Tower/ground controllers are typically good about soliciting PIREPS from arriving traffic; but traffic must exist in the first place. I conclude that there was little that could be done to avoid this event based on the information available at the time. The reported weather conditions favored terminal flight well within my experience level and I believe my decision was justified on those grounds. Furthermore; the illusions associated with slant-range visibility and parallax make a visual ground estimation unreliable at best as the cloud ceilings looked adequate from my perspective. I would be hard-pressed to recommend additional technology as the requisite technology exists for data collection; though in this instance an anomaly may exist. However; due to the explained nature of Merrill's environment; it may not be outside reason to employ the services of a trained human observer as such an anomaly could be fatal.

A flight instructor and student pilot experience unexpected IFR conditions on climbout when the reported weather and visual conditions indicated that VFR operations would exist.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 3700; Flight Crew Type 2000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

The Captain was the flying pilot. The Captain on this flight had filed the flight plan earlier that morning. After we completed our preflight preparations I checked Fltplan.com to double check our route for the flight. The route was: PHL-OOD-TEBEE-SBY-ZZZ1. After briefly discussing the ATIS we called clearance delivery. Our clearance was 'cleared to ZZZ1 via direct OOD HAYDO TEBEE SBY ZZZ1. CLIMB 5000 EXPECT 280/10 Minutes; Departure on 119.75; Squawk XXXX'. I think it was after the read back we were informed that we were number 35 for departure. The Captain entered the routing into the FMS as I monitored and assisted. We then called Ground for taxi. During the next hour we were directed to taxi to various locations on the airport. It was during this hour we learned some of the delay was due to the weather in the Washington DC area. It was also during this time that our routing was changed to take us west of the Washington DC area. We were instructed to switch back to Clearance Delivery to get this new route. We received this new route/clearance and the Captain then entered it into the FMS. I am unsure of how much time past after returning to Ground frequency that we were instructed to return to Clearance Delivery for yet another change to our routing. This time it was back to our original route. It was a little over an hour since engine start; with some difficult taxi instructions; getting switched back to Clearance Delivery two times; that we were finally number 1 for takeoff. The Tower Controller gave us our takeoff clearance with a heading to fly. The autopilot was engaged and all was going normally. We switched Departure frequencies a few times during the climb and was given direct to our first fix. We were given several climb instructions during the climb and departure phase. Shortly before reaching HAYDO we were given another climb from; I believe from 16;000 feet to 17;000 feet. The autopilot was still engaged and the new altitude selected and the climb was initiated. During the climb; the aircraft reached HAYDO intersection but started a turn back to TEBEE intersection; a 180 degree turn as TEBEE was behind us. The Captain quickly disengaged the autopilot. Since the autopilot had the aircraft trimmed for the climb the Captain was unable to get the climb stopped while trying to get back on the correct heading. When he realized the altitude error; significant control inputs were used to get to our assigned altitude. I think we deviated from our assigned altitude by 800 feet; possibly more. ATC also called the altitude deviation to our attention during this event and we corrected as quickly as possible. It was a very busy morning and all the controllers and flight crews seemed to be doing their best to keep traffic moving. Yet somehow we ended up with these two fixes reversed in our routing. I still have the paper that I copied and read back the clearance on. My normal procedures is to also put this routing on the map on my iPad; which I did; but since these fixes are so nearly aligned on our route you must look very closely to notice that they are not entered in the correct order. Looking back on this event the number one thing would be not to disengage the autopilot when you are within a few seconds of leveling off at an assigned altitude; had we simply went to heading mode on the autopilot it would have captured the altitude and leveled off and we could then correct the turn in heading mode.

A Corporate jet pilot reported two fixes in their FMS were reversed causing them to fly off course and then exceed the assigned altitude while trying to fix their course deviation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

At cruise altitude of 370 the following failures occurred:1. HYD B ELEC PUMP LO PR (electric pump failed)2. ANTI-ICE L WINDOW3. ANTI-ICE L WINDSHIELD4. AIR PACK 1 REGUL FAULT5. CAPT MAP DISPLAY UNIT FAILEDPrior to the system failures a pronounced electrical arcing sound was heard by both pilotsECAM procedures were conducted per SOPs. [ATC was notified] and aircraft was diverted.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

A319 flight crew reported issues with the electrical system in cruise resulted in a diversion.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon landing in ZZZZ; completing leg one of the foreign country trip; I was advised that the aircraft required an immediate Service Check because it was not compliant.  Apparently the B767-300 had been sitting in ZZZ1 for a few days; and while a daily check had been done; the Service Check had expired. Maintenance Control told me that they were very sorry they missed it but it had to be done in ZZZZ immediately so we would be legal. I felt responsible that I had missed it but the First Officer produced the FOM which says the following in the Maintenance Procedures chapter; 'AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE BLOCK-The airworthiness release block is a Maintenance function. After servicing; checks and inspection intervals are a Maintenance responsibility.'  Also reviewed was the following from the Flight Crew Chapter; under Preflight: Aircraft airworthiness will be determined by the Captain prior to the initiation of the Before Start Checklist. In making this determination; the captain will ensure that all discrepancies entered in the aircraft Log have been cleared or deferred in accordance with the approved MEL/CDL.'It appears that I am free of responsibility of any maintenance inspections; but I realize that even so; I'm still the Captain; and if the aircraft wasn't compliant I bear responsibility. The Mechanic in ZZZZ did the required inspection and we proceeded on our way and completed the trips a bit late. Upon returning to ZZZ1; a Mechanic remarked that Maintenance [at our company's headquarters] didn't tell them there was an inspection due; which is why it hadn't been completed.

A Captain was informed by Maintenance Control that the B767-300 aircraft he had just landed in a foreign country required an immediate Service Check because the aircraft was not compliant prior to his departure. The First Officer showed Captain the FOM Chapter that stated the Airworthiness Release block sign-off was a Maintenance function responsibility for servicing; checks; and inspection intervals.


Lead Technician; Parts / Stores Personnel

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An aircraft part going [from] ZZZ that was not Hazmat. On paper work it said Hazmat. It is not Hazmat if it come from vendor. This part was checked by looking and smelling and computer that it came from vendor. This makes it a not Hazmat; but paperwork from window says Hazmat. Policy is to check if from vendor it is not Hazmat to get the parts out on time. He did that. We have different policy on shipping potential Hazmat. It depend on were the part is going. If it is a potential Hazmat; we use to ship it like a domestic flight. We check to see; smell; [and check] computer work to see if it is Hazmat by policy. Now today; they say if it is potential Hazmat going overseas; ship it as it was Hazmat. We would like some help in this. We really do not have a great idea at this time but we need to report this matter.

Commercial airline Lead Technician reported documentation discrepancies during shipping and receiving of aircraft parts due to confusing company handling procedures.


Distraction; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

On the return flight I was deadheading because I was illegal to fly back. At about 20 minutes prior to landing I went to the back galley to have some water and all the sudden we noticed a cabin odor. We started asking some passengers if they smelled it too. And they did. It was a smell of old moldy socks but also kind of acid and sweet at the same time. We realized it was the smell that everyone talks about. We landed pretty fast and the Lead Flight Attendant informed the Captain. No one got sick or had any kind of reaction toward the odor since we landed so fast. We might not have been exposed long enough to have any kind of concerns. No passengers were sick during this incident.

During descent for landing a B767-200 developed a cabin dirty socks odor which was detected by both flight attendants and passengers.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Weather

EGLL RWY 27R; stable approach to 250 feet AGL. Due wind gusts: at 250 feet AGL a loss of 8 kts airspeed with corresponding pitch attitude change. Auto-throttle engaged and system unable to rapidly correct deteriorating airspeed. Aiding the Auto-throttle system; I initially manually applied considerable power. Subsequent total loss of 12 - 14 kts at 150 feet AGL. Pushed throttles up to TOGA and pressed TOGA switch. Preformed successful manual go-around followed by auto-pilot engaged at 900 feet AGL. Engaged LNAV and VNAV.Missed approach procedures: First Officer advised me that a 185 kt speed limit (in a turn) may have been exceeded. I am unaware of speed exceedance during the 'turning portion' of this missed approach. Accelerated to clean maneuver speed during straight (non-turning) portion of this event. I could not find the initial (185kts) missed approach turning speed assignment on EGLL chart 11-4.  This event bordered on Low Level windshear.

A B777 Captain is advised by his First Officer that a 185 kt speed limit (in a turn) may have been exceeded during a missed approach at EGLL due windshear. This limit cannot be found anywhere on the 11-4 Approach chart.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 240; Flight Crew Type 60

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Riding passenger with a 100 hour pilot; VFR. Inbound airliner passed about 1000 ft above us maybe 1/2 NM ahead of us; perpendicular to our path. I believe we were not talking to ATC any more as we had just crossed through TKI airspace and were not handed off to approach or center. I believe we had started out with VFR flight following [enroute to ZZZ]. It's been a few months and I don't remember fully; so it is possible we simply squawked VFR and informed McKinney Tower as we transited their airspace. As we spotted the traffic; we noted on the sectional that we were right near the jetways that come in to DFW and Love; so we didn't think seeing the airliner was unusual; and we had experience with the Class Bravo airspace with lots of air traffic. The air was cool; smooth; and stable. As we crossed the path where the jet had just been; we noticed a very slight bit of turbulence. It rocked our wings a little but didn't even amount to light turbulence; and it was momentary. We remarked that it was most likely the wake turbulence from the jet. It stopped; then we noticed it again; but more slight. Our pilot remarked that it was from the other wing. I said; 'maybe tail'; and then we encountered the turbulence from the other wing; which was slightly stronger again; matching the other wing. The only reason I'm filing this report is I noticed that NASA was soliciting reports of wake turbulence encounters from GA pilots. If there had been any other turbulence at all; we never would have known we passed through wake turbulence.

PA-28 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence from an air carrier aircraft in the vicinity of TKI airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We took aircraft the aircraft round trip. We were in and out of IMC both there and back. Temperature was above freezing on first leg; but on return we momentarily picked up some trace ice. De-ice system was activated normally per the company SOP and aircraft POH. System was only used in the normal position for a few minutes. Later that afternoon while preparing to take the same aircraft for another flight; I was informed that glycol was added to the TKS fluid tank. Neither the captain nor myself had knowledge of this prior to departing and only became aware later that afternoon.

A C208 crew was informed after flight in icing conditions that the aircraft's TKS system was mistakenly serviced with glycol instead of the authorized fluid.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

We were cleared to 2;000 feet from ATC on the approach then cleared for the approach. Glide slope appeared to be working because it was at the correct altitude when it came up. Started to follow it down. We realized that it wasn't working when we saw that we got low and then we started to correct back to our altitude. It was an all-nighter; a little tired by the time we were given clearance to land.If the glide slope is out of service please shut it off so it doesn't lead to another situation like that.

While on a visual approach into ZZZ; landing Runway XX Center; we were cleared to land. The First Officer was flying and was tracking the glide slope. As he was descending; I noticed we were getting low relative to our position with the runway. I had him stop his descent and climb back to our last assigned altitude of two thousand feet. At the same time the Tower Controller also noticed our altitude and issued a climb back to two thousand feet. We discovered the glide slope was [out of service]. It was buried in the ATIS and was missed by both pilots. The indication from the instruments was it was functioning properly. To add to the confusion the PAPI was also inoperative. We used altitude and distance as a glide slope to a safe and uneventful landing.Primary reason was both the First Officer and Captain missing the glide slope [out of service] which was buried in the ATIS. It was a redeye flight which didn't help matters any. I am sure a certain [amount] of tiredness played a factor. We were cleared to a runway that had equipment that was inoperative which exacerbated the problem. At no time was any verbal warning issued by either Approach Control or Tower indicating the inoperative equipment.Make it loud and clear anytime ground based equipment is [out of service]. Don't bury it in all of the ATIS clutter. A reminder from ATC that systems are down would be a great help to a flight crew. Don't clear an aircraft for a visual approach without some vertical guidance to the runway.

A319 flight crew reported following an inoperative glide slope and receiving a low altitude alert from Tower.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 10200; Flight Crew Type 1100

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 12

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Was departing Runway XXL in ZZZZ. We were taking off at 861;000 lbs with a max power flap 20 takeoff. The crew consisted of Captain; First Officer #1; Relief Pilot; First Officer #2; and jumpseater. The takeoff felt normal as well as gear and flap retraction. It was First Officer #1's takeoff and the 1st leg of IOE for him with me. Climb out was normal with a cruise altitude of 30;000 feet. After passing into ZZZZ1's airspace; we were about 30 minutes into the flight when we got a call from ZZZZ1 that ZZZZ said they think that we left something on the runway and would we check. We looked at the hydraulic synoptic; gear synoptic; and pressurization. Plus; out the windows all were normal. A few minutes later; ZZZZ1 called again said ZZZZ believes we left a tire on the runway. So again; we checked and all were normal. We then called Dispatch and had them get [Maintenance Control] on the phone. [We] asked them to look at the aircraft and see if they could find anything; they did and didn't see anything that we didn't see. We told them that there might have been a tire failure for a heads up for landing in case we did have a failure. The rest of the flight went normally.  On landing after touchdown; the aircraft stared to shake badly.  We informed Tower that we might have had a tire failure on landing. We exited [runway]. We did tell Tower that we might have had a tire failure when we were on approach; because there was no indication of one other than a report from ZZZZ. After leaving the runway; the aircraft was taxiing without problem. We checked the brake temps. The right side was 1 or 0. There was no reported smoke and it was a short taxiing to gate so we taxied to gate. Stopping at gate and shutting down; the mechanic said that we had blown number 11 tire. Right body gear aft inboard tire.

I was on the second leg of my OE trip from ZZZZ. I was the Pilot Flying in the right seat taking off of [Runway] XXL. It was a 20 flap TO takeoff with a gross weight of 848.7k. It was a beautiful day and takeoff was standard with no indication of any problems what so ever. We were notified by Control that we may have left something on the runway in ZZZZ. We immediately questioned for more info and began scanning status and synoptic pages. We had again no indications of any problems and continued. Minutes later; we were notified that it was a piece of a tire; but again they were not sure if it was from our aircraft. The Captain called Maintenance Control and asked them if they were seeing any indication of a problem and they did not. Also; they said they had no way of knowing if there was a problem with a tire because it was a 747-400. We continued with no indication of any failures or loss of hydraulics to [destination]. I flew the ILS to XXR and we briefed that if there was a problem what to expect and how we would transfer controls if we had to. The approach and landing was standard no events. After touchdown; it felt like we did not have and problem; but a second later; the plane started shaking and we transferred the controls and the Captain brought the plane to a stop with a MEL #2 thrust reverser inop. After slowing to taxi speed; there was no loss of controllability and we taxied clear and notified Tower the we may have left FOD on the runway. We pulled up the synoptic page and brake temperature was safe taxi to park. We then performed normal checklist items and taxied to park and shutdown.

B747 flight crew reported being informed enroute of a possible blown tire during takeoff. Following a normal landing; one tire was confirmed to have failed.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Due to COVID-19 I had not been home in over a month. I work in ZZZ but live in a different state. I'm at risk at work so did not come home. Finally got a long stretch of days off and needed to fly my airplane. I had not seen my family for a long time. With no body flying I thought it would be a good chance be able to fly over there house. So I told them I was flying over if I could. ZZZ1 said they had a 40 minute gap with no traffic and I could fly over. I found their house and they were out side. After that we flew to another city.After we got back I got thinking about the flight and I realized I had probably exceeded the normal bank angle and I was not in a rural area. I did my normal planning but had not really thought about what it entailed once I got there. My ADM [Aeronautical Decision Making] was lacking in my preflight planning. I thought about the flight but not what was going to happen when I got there. Thought we will wave take a picture and leave. But there was more to it than that. I needed to think about the process once we got there other than we will just wave and take a picture. Just poor planning for that part of the flight.

GA pilot reported a flight over homes may have been too low.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

After briefing FA (Flight Attendant) I inspected crew meals. There was no dry ice in galley cart. FO (First Officer) meal was cold and with his plan to eat early he was fine. My meal was warm and I deemed it spoiled. Catering came took temperature and at 67 degrees agreed it was spoiled. Eventually a replacement meal and dry ice was provided. During the process I was greeted by a retired pilot and then subsequently a call by [Chief Pilot] due to me delaying flight to get a crew meal replacement. Both were friendly and not overtly pushing; but the mere presence and phone call implied pushing. Safety is priority. Just like a crew plans a route and fuel to safely conduct a flight; I also include my meal plan for the day to fuel me. I expect catering to provide the meals ordered so my plan can be safely executed. Had I not inspected the meals consuming a spoiled me further not refrigerated by dry ice 3 hours after departure and 4 plus after a spoiled meal was boarded a food poisoning event was a serious threat. To have two management types get involved and have station blame delay on me rather than root cause that catering failed; smacks of pushing and is contrary to safety. I don't like delaying flights. I take pride in serving our customers on time; but my health and safety should not be questioned or pushed.

B757 Captain reported an issue with the crew meals.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Company Policy; Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 in an overwater equipped aircraft with a co-pilot that hasn't completed overwater training. We were on a filed route that kept us close to the shoreline but had to deviate around area of heavy thunderstorms which got us farther off shore than authorized by our ops specs. I filed the flight [plan]; but didn't take into account that any deviation further offshore would exceed acceptable distance from the shoreline. Due to COVID-19 my co-pilot's overwater training had been cancelled and that fact I hadn't considered when I filed the flight plan. I will definitely review everyone's quals in the future and be sure the filed route complies with all regulations.

Air taxi pilot reported that while deviating around thunderstorms; the track resulted in flying farther offshore than allowed by company Ops Specs. The pilot noted that due to COVID-19 the co-pilot's overwater training had been cancelled.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was the [Relief Pilot]. Captain and First Officer were on break. We received a severe turbulence segment on our outs of flight from FL240 to FL410. Requested deviation below which was denied and then to offset laterally 150 miles; but only given 120 miles. We considered weather deviation without a clearance procedures as well as declaring an [urgent situation]. As Captain was awake in the seat; and had requested we wake him in prior briefing should an event like this be considered; he came up to flight deck. I then sat in Observer's seat. He had [another Relief Pilot] CPDLC to ATC that we would be deviating to the lat/long of outer most point of severe turbulence segment which was a 148 offset. As this was not our clearance; I suggested the weather deviation without a clearance procedure as well as possibility of declaring an [urgent situation]. We had just been cleared from FL400 to FL390 while preceding on the south offset. The Captain did not want to go up or down 300 feet with the decency of the altitude clearance. We turned on all lights and broadcast our position and intentions on both 121.5 and 124.45. We talked to Dispatch on SAT comm. We reached Nadi Radio who said we were only cleared to offset 120 miles and we were at 148 miles. We received the same message over CPDLC. I spoke with Nadi Radio and said we were given no other options as we were flying through an area of forecast severe turbulence. We were then given a clearance through Nadi Radio to deviate up to 148 miles and received the same on CPDLC.

Air carrier First Officer reported needing to deviate around an area of forecast severe turbulence and was unable to get complete clearance to do so.