Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

While returning to ZZZ airport for fuel after patient drop-off at hospital; [Aircraft X] experienced a near miss with another helicopter [Aircraft Y] departing the airport. [Hospital] is approximately 3.5 miles Northwest of ZZZ1. We lifted to the south. As we were lifting; I heard the Tower clear the helicopter to depart to the southwest. I contacted the Tower for a clearance and told the Tower I had lifted off [Hospital] and would remain west of RWY 16 and requested TWY Bravo to FBO (TWY Bravo parallels RWY 16 and intersects with TWY Alpha; Charlie and Lima at FBO.) The Tower Controller said; 'We can give you Bravo; report 1 mile.' While remaining west of RWY 16; I maneuvered the aircraft to be more perpendicular with the runway to track toward TWY Bravo and reported 1 mile. The Tower asked if we had the helicopter at one-half mile departing from ZZZ1 to the southwest in sight. I did not and reported; '[Aircraft X] looking.' I informed the crew that we had an aircraft 'close' departing to the southwest and everyone was looking for the aircraft. The Tower immediately asked again if we had the helicopter in sight. The Tower had not given any reference point of departure for the other helicopter. Therefore; we had no reference to any area to focus a scan. I was about to depress the comms trigger to respond that we still did not have a visual on the helicopter when it crossed the windscreen from left to right in a left-hand turn at approximately 30-50 yards. I informed the Tower the helicopter just past beyond the nose of the aircraft and continued inbound to landing.After landing and shutdown; I contacted the Tower to inquire if I had done something wrong or what may have contributed to this incident. The Controller I spoke with was unaware of any issue. I explained our passing extremely close and did not see the other aircraft until it was passing across the windscreen. He said he would investigate the situation and we planned to communicate after we returned to base. I spoke with the Controller I had spoken with earlier about the near miss. He had spoken with the other pilot about the incident. The other helicopter had departed the northwest end of the field and was climbing out to the southwest and didn't see us until the last minute. We discussed the departure path typically used by [a] helicopter tour company operating [Aircraft Y]. I asked if there was a delay in departure and he did not know if there was a delay. But he did say that sometimes they must allow the belts tighten up before departure (R-22 and R-44 have a clutch actuated rotor engagement system). I explained that it would be helpful to give a reference point for aircraft departing areas other than the runway. We also discussed [Company's] common procedure of land on to the west at FBO along TWY Lima. I explained that it was my normal practice to land to the west. However; the last three times I refueled at FBO; I was hover taxied around to the non-movement area adjacent TWY Bravo. Bearing that in mind; the flight path back to FBO kept us to the west of all runways and straight in to FBO. There were no issues of fault discussed and we ended the call.I also spoke with the pilot of [Aircraft Y]. He had also contacted the Tower to see if he had done anything wrong or find out how the incident occurred. On this flight; he was training a tour pilot new to the area. He thought they may have missed our call while listening to ATIS and the Tower did not inform them of any other traffic. They departed as their procedure allows and proceeded to climb out to the Southwest. He said the sun may have been an issue with locating our position. He also expressed his lack of confidence in the controllers due to other incidents that have occurred at ZZZ1. We have the tour operator's procedure for future reference.When I heard the Tower clear [Aircraft Y] to the southwest; I expected it to be clear to the southwest if taking off after clearance was given. They could have been delayed due to clutch engagement. The other helicopter was unaware of our location and the tower did not inform them of our flight path to ZZZ1. Also; the tower did not inform us of their departure; and I was unaware of [Aircraft Y] location of departure. When the Tower asked if we had them in sight; I did assume that the departing aircraft would be somewhere in my visual view. A reference point from the Tower would have been beneficial in locating the other helicopter to avoid their flight path. In the discussion with the other pilot we determined their aircraft to be at the 9 to 11 o'clock position in a climb to the southwest. At that position and climb angle the helicopter it would be difficult to see close; low and on the left-hand side of the aircraft effectively in a blind spot. In the future I will not assume the aircraft is clear of the area and I will clarify with the Tower the other aircrafts position and/or location of departure.

BH206L-4 pilot reported a NMAC with another helicopter. The pilot was taking off and the other helicopter was landing. ATC was in communication with both aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I observed this error while working LN (08L). This incident happened on LC (08R).Aircraft X was on approach to land runway 08R and slowing. Field visibility was 1/4 SM and ceiling OVC002. Aircraft Y was behind him with an overtake situation. I noticed the overtake and asked the Local controller (LC) if the monitor was taking care of that. The reply was nope they haven't said a word. After IFR separation was lost the final monitor controller called the LC controller and said are you going to break him out? The LC controller said isn't that your job. The final monitor did nothing with the aircraft; and the LC controller turned around and told the FLM (Front Line Manager) what should I do with these two? The FLM did not respond or give any answer so the controller let him land.This is a common problem at this facility where the final monitors do not pay attention to the traffic. They are reactive and not proactive to the aircraft situations. This is also an issue because final doesn't know if they should be breaking out the aircraft and the LC controller wasn't sure if they should break the aircraft out. During this configuration and with the weather like it was; the final monitor has separation responsibility till one mile final. The final monitors need refresher on what their roles and responsibilities are. The tower should also be reminded of our responsibility during this situation via a briefing.

IAH Local Controller (LC) describes a situation where the other LC and other final monitor had a loss of separation; due to the final monitor not slowing the aircraft and/or the other local not sending the aircraft around. The other local asked the Front Line Manager what to do; but got no response.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

First Officer was flying [Runway] XXR departure. Took off. Started the turn and climb to the east. At that point we received an aft cargo open ECAM message. It went off moments later. Then came on again and went off again. Then it came on again. At that point I told the First Officer he had the radios and that we were [advising ATC] and we wanted to return to ZZZ; but since we were overweight; I wanted to run through the Overweight Checklist as well as deal with the cargo door issue. We were vectored within in the ZZZ area as I went through the Overweight Checklist; talked to the Pilot Flying and took the passengers we were returning to the airport. The cargo door ECAM cleared itself as I was going through the checklists and did not come on again. We never went above 9;000 ft. We switched controls and I land uneventfully on [Runway] XXL. ZZZ approach set us up nicely for the approach back into ZZZ. We landed flaps full; brakes off. Returned to the gate with out any issues. The Maintenance Manager meet us at the gate and we reviewed to book. The cargo door had been a repeat issue. Talking to the Maintenance Manager he thought the aircraft should have been pressure check to ensure the aft cargo door was working properly. Ensuring all maintenance is completed to everyone's satisfaction.

A321 Captain reported a cargo door warning light illuminated on climb out; causing an air turn back and precautionary landing.


Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Both the first officer (pilot flying) and I (pilot monitoring) earlier in the flight briefed and verified with the aircraft flight management system the RIIVR2 arrival and ILS Runway 25L approach in LAX. We were then cleared by ATC to proceed the RIIVR2 arrival to ILS 25L LAX. LA Center advised us that we were the lead arrival airplane and to keep our speed up to 300 knots or greater. We were then cleared to proceed direct to Gramm intersection and cross Gramm at FL180 and 280 knots and handed off to SoCal approach. We complied with the restriction at Gramm intersection and then received an amended clearance to proceed direct to Krain intersection and initially cleared to descend to 14;000 feet and to keep our speed up.Our next clearance was to cross Krain at 10;000 feet and cleared the ILS 25L. We were then given clearance to reduce speed to 250 knots. The airplane was in managed descent mode and the crossing altitude of 1900 feet at Limma intersection was set in the FCU. As we descended through approximately 10;500 feet the airplane made an unexpected aggressive roll to the left. Both the first officer and I assessed the situation and were figuring out why the airplane was making the unexpected left turn when I noticed the approach arm button had been activated which changes the managed descent mode. I then asked the first officer to disarm approach mode and by the time this was done the airplane had descended through 10;000 feet prior to Krain intersection and our speed was above 250 knots. We stopped descent; re-engaged nav mode and slowed the aircraft. There was no other traffic in our area. The remainder of the approach proceeded in a normal manner.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A321 flight crew reported selecting approach mode early on the LAX RIIVR2 causing an unplanned turn to the unstable localizer signal. Crew overrode the automation and corrected back to the proper course.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While executing a routine aircraft verification flight at FL450 felt an unusual vibration and could not determine whether it originated from one of the engines; or whether it was a control surface issue. Immediately requested to leave FL450 and return to land.Controllers were very proactive giving us direct clearances and allowing us to land in a short amount of time.

Phenom 300 flight crew reported unusual vibrations during cruise from an undetermined source.


Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I discovered yesterday that I have been flying model aircraft 4.02 miles from Shenandoah Regional airport without first notifying them. I had previously measured the distance as over five miles but while listening to my scanner heard an aircraft on approach to runway five report four miles out while abeam my location. I then used GPS on my phone to precisely determine my location relative to the airport and found I had made a measuring error in my initial location check. At no time have I flown models above 400 feet AGL and at no time have I ever flown while full scale aircraft were visible in the area; but I take regulations seriously and consider this a serious breach of etiquette in addition to a regulatory error. I will visit the airport and determine the best way to notify them of my intention to fly models at any time in the future. There was never a real safety issue here; but this incident certainly points out the need for more readily available fly/don't fly information for model aircraft operators. I understand the FAA has a system that provides the necessary information in beta test now and very much look forward to seeing it go live.

Model aircraft pilot; who is also a private pilot; discovered that he has been operating his model aircraft 4 SM from SHD airport while believing he was outside 5 SM previously.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was purser. The aircraft was turning on descent and flew thru unreported wake turbulence. I received a call from [a] flight attendant who was in the coach galley. [He] informed me that [another Flight Attendant] was injured during the turbulence. I went to check on [her]. She had been thrown against door 2R and hit her head and back. She was sitting on the jump seat talking to me. She appeared to be in a lot of pain; was talking slowly and kept repeating herself. I called the pilots and requested an inflight supervisor meet the airplane upon arrival. We landed and there wasn't a supervisor there to meet us. The Captain called for paramedics who took [her] off the airplane (after all passengers were off) in a wheelchair.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported another Flight Attendant was injured after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Company Policy; Airport

Upon arriving at the gate there were no personnel to guide us in. The taxi inline was covered in snow. After a few minutes rampers appeared in tugs and on foot. The ramp was slippery as indicated by a ramper falling down after slipping. The tugs were sliding as well. We waited a few more minutes to be marshaled in. Finally the marshals showed up and we proceeded into the gate indicating 1 knot on the ground speed readout on the Navigation Display (ND). I was purposely very cautious on the taxi in. We were given the stop signal as normally presented and set the brakes. The aircraft continued to slide forward even though the brakes were set. The residual thrust at idle was enough to move the aircraft on the ramp under these conditions. The aircraft was not going to hit anything or anyone but I was helpless at this point. I indicated to the marshaller to get the chocks in. He didn't have any!!! I turned on the yellow pump and decided to shut down the engines in the hopes the loss of the residual thrust would help. It did. The aircraft stopped sliding. What a helpless feeling.Do I go into reverse and blow equipment and people around? We thought the best thing to do was just shut it down. The rampers were quick to open the cargo door creating another obstacle. During the walk around the First Officer (FO) verified that the brakes were set and all the landing gears were plowing the snow in front of them instead of rolling over it. The event occurred because the ramp was in no condition to receive this aircraft. We couldn't tell anything of its surface condition. Chocks should have been at the gate instead of waiting for them to show up from another gate. I could have at least gotten the chocks installed quicker at the gate. We were lucky that nothing was touched or damaged. Fortunately the jetway was very far away from its normal position.In the future I recommend a cursory check of the gate arrival area prior to an arriving aircraft given the fact that the snow was falling during this time. I feel the rampers were not prepared to receive us and we should have been left way off the gate till they were truly ready with chocks in hand. After the event occurred and we were stopped I later wondered if stopping and shutting down way off the gate and being towed in would have been a better idea. After the FO came back up after the post flight and described the ramp conditions (he fell himself on the ramp walking very diligently) even a tow in would not have worked. Could have been worse. In the future I will not follow the marshallers instructions to taxi in when we recognize a similar situation. I would shut it down or go to a gate prepared for our arrival.

An A320 Captain encountered extremely slippery ramp conditions and a lack of preparation by the ground crew during gate arrival at DTW. When the stop signal is received the brakes are set; but the aircraft continues to move forward due to slippery conditions and residual thrust. The engines are quickly shut down and the aircraft stops sliding.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 163; Flight Crew Total 4636; Flight Crew Type 163

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Navigation deviation (didn't fly over STINS) departing SFO on GUNNR2 Departure SID due to incomplete loading and improper confirmation of AMAKR transition on the before takeoff checklist. Normally the First Officer (FO) loads the route; but the flight manual allows either pilot to do so. In this instance the relief pilot and I were in the cockpit; done with our required checks; and the FO was still in back talking to flight attendants. When the route uplinked; I loaded it; verified it against the cleared route and checked the legs against the flight plan. I handed the relief pilot the master flight plan so that he could verify and mark each leg as per SOP; which we accomplished. Shortly thereafter the FO; who was to be Pilot Monitoring (PM); came up to the cockpit; I told her I had loaded and verified the route with the relief pilot but had not yet entered the departures/arrivals because I was waiting for the winds to upload. I then went in the back to brief the flight attendants. On departure; NORCAL asked us if we had been cleared to AMAKR. At this point; we realized we had a navigation deviation problem. As we started to review the process; the FO said she had seen the discontinuity after GUNNR and had 'closed it up' putting AMAKR next in sequence... not STINS. I was quite dismayed. Without questioning it; or checking it; or asking; or telling either of the other pilots we lost an opportunity for us to discover the mistake. Our SOP is very simple in that regard; we communicate with other pilots via the FMC; and we advise when we make changes. She knew this; and there was no reason to belabor that point. We were cleared the GUNNR2 Departure; AMAKR transition; and she obviously thought AMAKR was the next and only waypoint after GUNNR when she closed the discontinuity. I cannot blame her in her thinking. I too reviewed the transition chart and I did not see STINS after GUNNR either! I have been flying a steady diet of GUNNR Departures lately and my eye went to the left side of the page; to the outbound oceanic fixes in my search for AMAKR. I found it; the last one right at the top of the page. All the other transition fixes; including the ones I have been flying lately; were direct from GUNNR...except of course; AMAKR. Since I did not load the departure I didn't catch the fact that the transition had not been entered at all. Nonetheless; my mistake.  Just recently the checklists were revised to include an actual reading of the runway; DEP and SID transition. Everyone I know is happy to see this much-needed change come about. Surely this last chance to catch any missteps up to now would save us. Unfortunately our new SOP still let us down. The FO read exactly what she thought she saw on the route page. '28L; GUNNR2 DEP; AMAKR transition.' I was taxing and did not look down to verify it as I sometimes do. I heard exactly what I expected to hear; and what I was supposed to hear; but that wasn't what was loaded. The FO and I'm assuming the relief pilot saw all the right words; '28L; GUNNR; AMAKR;' but those were always on the route; there was no 'transition'.If there is anything good that comes out of this unfortunate incident; let it be this: neither the FO or the relief pilot were familiar with EXACTLY what the transition should look like on the route page. It's 'GUNNR2.AMAKR' we need to see; not 'GUNNR2' and then 'AMAKR.' It's all in the 'dot' AMAKR part. In our debrief conversations none of us could find any reference to this fact in the flight manual.Breaking the accident chain. How many mistakes were made before improper reading of Before Takeoff Checklist?  Captain entering route but not departures/arrivals. Class 2 Ops requires one pilot load it all; which is what I thought I did. But the departures/arrivals don't get loaded until after the winds. Did I break SOP by not loading SID in addition to class 2 route? SIDs change frequently on taxi out; who loads then?Expectation error. When you brief a transition; don't look at the oceanic fix; look at it the way you are going to fly it: from the runway to the oceanic fix... GUNNR; STINS; then AMAKR. Effect: Missing transition was not discovered. Any changes to FMC route should be confirmed with the other pilot. Maybe the discontinuity after GUNNR would have alerted us to the incomplete transition selection. Missing transition not discovered. Confirmation using Route Page DEP SID and Transition verification. Everyone needs to know to look for the exact 'dot' transition coding so as to avoid being led astray. AND; it's just too important; the captain may just need to look down and verify it personally even though the PM specifically states that it's not required or maybe the captain needs to hear 'GUNNR2; DOT AMAKR transition' Either one would have avoided this deviation. Let's hope this info gets out there and helps someone else.

During preflight a B777 crew entered the incorrect transition for the cleared SID. Crew did not discover the error during subsequent checklist review. ATC issued corrective clearance upon departure.


The training for dispatchers covered the numbers and systems of the aircraft. The training did not cover the actual system and routine dispatch of the fleet. QRH and irregularity information was not covered. I have done some studying on my own. However I am not comfortable advising or assisting other dispatchers with this fleet.

Dispatcher reports inadequate aircraft systems training.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4400; Flight Crew Type 325

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While descending from 17;000 FT in IMC we passed through a snow storm and lost the air speed indicator. While in the descent the airspeed fell to 120 KTS and continued decreasing to 60 KTS and I became concerned with an imminent stall and lost altitude awareness. When the airspeed went to zero I looked at the GPS airspeed which was nearly 200 KTS ground speed and realized we had a faulty airspeed indication and slowed our descent. I had checked the pitot heat operation before take off and my Mechanic checked it post landing. Both times pitot heat was operational. After descending below the clouds the airspeed indicator became operational again.

A PA34 lost the airspeed indicator in descent probably due to pitot icing. The indicator returned to normal after leaving icing conditions.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

I was flying a Piper J3 Cub with receive only radio capability. I was listening to the traffic and spaced myself accordingly. I was rolling out after landing on runway 23 and saw an aircraft on about a 2 mile final for runway 5. I tried desperately to make myself visible by s-turning from one side of the runway to the other. I expected the aircraft on final to see me and go around. It did not go around; it landed. I exited the runway onto the dirt south-side. I think it was then that the other pilot on landing rollout finally saw me and took off. The other aircraft passed approximately 150 feet overhead. Once he was clear I got back on the runway and taxied to the first taxiway available to exit the runway. Fortunately I was in an aircraft that was slow and had the capability to get off the runway before the taxiway. No harm to the aircraft. The wind was favoring runway 23. The other aircraft was a flight school aircraft practicing ILS approaches to runway 5.

The pilot of a J3 Cub reported a ground conflict during landing at a non-towered airport with an aircraft on an opposite direction practice instrument approach.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 600

Departed Lakeland Airport event as part of a continuous line of departures. The VFR departure procedure instructs to fly 'straight out' (in this case due west) until 3 miles from airport before turning on course (reference NOTAM). I departed Runway 27 and flew due west at 800 feet and 95 mph. Shortly before turning on course to 240 degrees; at about 2.5 miles from the airport; a fast low-wing airplane crossed above me; from left to right; at about a 45 degree angle to the northwest. I didn't see the airplane until it was directly overhead and moving very quickly to the northwest. I recall that the aircraft cleared for takeoff behind me was a Bonanza; which was very likely the fast airplane I observed crossing my path. Fortunately; I was flying below the typical 1000 MSL; so we didn't touch; but otherwise... My high wing and the Bonanza low wing set up the perfect 'can't see and avoid' situation. This was compounded by the close sequenced takeoff timing at LAL; the Bonanza pilot turning on course before the 3 mile limit; and the lack of radar (transponder) advisories. In addition; Bonanza pilot was apparently unaware that he was following a much slower aircraft (200 MPH vs 100 MPH cruise). On departure; he should have noted that slower traffic was ahead and moderated his speed accordingly. The NOTAM is very clear about matching aircraft speeds for the approach pattern and approach holding pattern; but is silent on the departures. If the Bonanza had reduced power until the 3 mile point; then our separation would have been improved.

After departing using the departure procedure described in the NOTAM; the pilot noticed a faster aircraft pass overhead. This other aircraft apparently turned earlier than the designated turn point.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Received from the USPS mail parcel on for [destination airport] flight with lithium battery UN3481. USPS should not give [company] mail parcels with lithium batteries.

Ground Agent reported US Postal Mail containing Lithium Ion batteries accepted for shipment.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 24500; Flight Crew Type 6000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

During takeoff just before the 100 knots call out; we heard a loud bang and the airplane vibrated. I aborted takeoff; checked engine instruments; and the engine had high EGT-- close to limit.ECIAS indicated ENGINE FAIL L. Another flight reported a large flame that came out of the left engine during the event. We came to a slow taxi and turned off the runway. We made an announcement for flight attendants and passengers to remain seated. After exiting the runway; we stopped and did checklists: We did ENG FAIL L CHECKLIST; then we did ENGINE LIMIT SURGE STALL CHECKLIST. We had N1 and N2 rpm near normal. The left engine instruments stayed within normal range at idle except EGT was high; but was still below limit. If I advanced the left engine past idle; we got high EGT temperatures.We checked the BRAKE temperatures and they were within limits. We taxied back to the gate with the engine at idle due to high gross weight. I spoke with Dispatch and a human factors representative for a debrief on the event.

During takeoff a B777 left engine compressor stalled so the Captain rejected the takeoff. The engine had developed a high EGT and the EICAS alerted ENGINE FAIL L so the ENGINE FAIL and SURGE STALL Checklists were accomplished with a returned to the gate.


Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Prior to departure for our flight I briefed the First Officer that there is a lot of VFR traffic and flight training in the vicinity of our destination airport. Well in four miles of that airspace lining up for a right base we got two separate RAs; one to climb and one to descend. Both times we came within 200 ft. vertically of the aircraft which we eventually saw. Plus we got one additional TA for a third aircraft. All three other aircraft were not on approach control's frequency. We had just been handed off from approach control to the tower. Busy airspace with a lot of local flight training from students training at an adjacent airport. Suggest air work flight training not be allowed in the airspace between the two airports.

While on approach and cleared for the Visual Approach by Approach Control we were handed over to Tower. As we were descending through around 5;000 ft. we were receiving multiple targets on the TCAS and after first receiving a TA it quickly turned into an RA. I notified the tower that we were responding to an RA and were told to advise when clear. Shortly after; we received another TA which also turned into an RA. We notified the tower of the second RA and eventually when clear of the second conflict we advised the tower and we were instructed that we were clear to land.Busy airspace due to proximity to a major airport and multiple other airports in the area; the airspace is very busy with both corporate jets and piston aircraft. In short; the immediate airspace was saturated with traffic. Not quite sure what would be a good remedy to prevent this from happening again. Personally; I believe the only way would be to remain on an instrument approach with defined separation from other aircraft. However; that is not always possible in VMC conditions as other aircraft may be operating on a VFR flight plan and not necessarily communicating with ATC. Also the lack of TCAS on most small GA aircraft precludes from safely acquiring traffic.

Corporate flight crew reported responding to two RA's for traffic they had not been advised about when switching from Approach to Tower frequency.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

During cruise flight; approximately one hour and 30 minutes from landing; a call was received from the cabin regarding a passenger; who was not complying with the face covering policy and disturbing nearby passengers. I asked the A Flight Attendant if any assistance or a diversion will be required; the reply was that more information was needed. A short time later; I received a call from the cabin informing me that the situation had been diffused and that passenger was now compliant.While on approach to landing in ZZZ; I received a call from the cabin stating that passenger was out of his seat creating a disturbance. The A Flight Attendant requested personnel meet the aircraft at the gate. Personnel met the aircraft and escorted passenger to the terminal without further incident.Due to the first flight attendants calm demeanor; I allowed myself to believe the incident was not an issue. From this point further; I will involve my Dispatcher as well as other available resources.Monitoring of passengers behavior during the boarding process can sometimes identify potential problems. Whenever possible; it is better to deal with these potential problems on the ground before the flight.

Air carrier pilot reported an in-flight passenger misconduct event.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On the initial climb out; we noticed very limited air out of the flight deck gaspers. Shortly after; the Flight Attendant called and said there was no air coming out of the gaspers in the cabin. We then came to the conclusion that the left pack had been over pressurized. We then proceeded with the QRH procedure and the QRH had us reset the left pack. When we did turn the left pack off and closed the left 10TH stage valve; the right pack worked normally so we requested FL250 as a final. About ten minutes later we got a right pack HI TEMP CAUTION MSG and I noticed cabin pressure raising rapidly about 1400 FPM. We proceeded to don our O2 (Oxygen) mask; initiated an emergency descent; and [requested priority handling]. We than diverted to ZZZ.

CRJ-200 Captain reported encountering depressurization resulting in a diversion to an alternate airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was working Final Center. IAH was on an East Flow; and we were bringing aircraft into Runways 8L; 8R; and 09. Final North was getting visual approaches below 4;100 feet for 8L. I was vectoring aircraft around heavy thunderstorms on the final; which had associated microburst alerts. I had two RNAV Yankee RNP Approaches on the south downwind for Runway 9. I was trying to thread the needle so to speak with Aircraft Y from the southwest inbound for Runway 8R. When I realized that I was going to lose both lateral and vertical separation with Aircraft X; I cancelled Aircraft X's approach clearance; and gave a descent to 2;000 feet and a heading of 070. I thought that was the only initial divergence that I'd need; because I was expecting Aircraft X to call the airport in sight almost immediately. Previous aircraft in the same position; had seen the airport; and I was expecting the 070 heading to be enough once it was combined with a visual approach clearance. When I realized that the pilot was not going to see the airport; I turned further to a 090 degree heading; and stopped my subsequent downwind aircraft at 5;000 feet. I then immediately turned Aircraft X to a right turn heading 180; and assigned the aircraft 3;000 feet. I believe the separation was 2.56 lateral; and 400 feet vertical (estimated). I shouldn't have descended Aircraft Y until I had ensured Aircraft X was lower; or assured a visual approach. The convective activity on the final; made the situation extremely difficult; however I should not have given up altitude. In the moment; I thought it would work; and upon realizing that it wasn't I took action; however separation was shortly lost thereafter.

Houston TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation between two aircraft on a RNAV approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 0.00

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 5473; Flight Crew Type 3817

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

My first leg of Operating Experience (OE) on the 777; unfamiliar airport/area of the world. Wind was forecast to be 20-35kts in Narita at landing. Scheduled to land with 18;000 lbs of fuel. Upon arrival to Narita we are given holding. After 10-15 minutes we are vectored on the approach to 16R. Approx 1;000 feet AGL we received a 'Windshear' warning. We proceeded to go around on a missed approach; we had 15;000 lbs on the go around. ZZZZ was our listed alternate which is in very close proximity to our destination and had the same gusty winds. We decided to try the approach at Narita again due to the longer wider runway. After asking ATC what number we were for approach (number 10) we decided to request for priority handling. ON our second approach approx 500 feet we received another 'windshear' warning on the PFD; the captain executed another go around; we had 10;000 lbs of fuel. Winds on the ground were 200 25G35 with variable winds and reported gains of 15 kts on final. Wind at 2;000 feet MSL was 240@80; yes 80. ATC took us on a right downwind for a close in approach back to 16R. ATC kept us fairly tight and turned us to the LOC; but with the 80kt wind at 2;000 feet we were blown through the LOC and into the approach area for 16L; where [a] 777 was on final. We received an RA 'climb.' We followed the red bars and got back on our approach course and landed the aircraft. We had 7;500lbs of gas on board after landing with both left and right tanks amber (low fuel). This is just over [30 minutes] of fuel. This is unacceptable; especially on a 14 hour flight.

Assigned holding into RJAA with no Expect Further Clearance (EFC) issued. Fuel 19;000. Held for 2 turns and vectored RJAA ILS 16R. Wind reports were to be max crosswind 23 kts per landing data. However winds from 10;000 to 1;500 were constant 80 kts variable 190-210. PIREPS preceding aircraft were +/-10 and +/-15. First approach at 200-300 feet; got GPWS 'Windshear! Windshear!'warning; the warning felt correct and we encountered windshear but ultimately flyable windshear and immediately performed windshear escape into go around; fuel state 14;700 lbs. While on vector and we were told we were number 7 for landing; I declared Low Fuel'. As a crew we discussed the fuel versus windshear issue and decided that if we encountered windshear a second time; we had the fuel for another go around/escape maneuver. Then on our second approach 16R; we got a second 'Windshear! Windshear!' warning at 500 feet AGL and I performed the go around/windshear escape a second time. This; too; felt like a good warning. Both windshear encounters were short. By the by the time I had called going around windshear and hit TOGA the warning was gone. Airspeed mostly fluctuating to the plus side 30 kts or more.First officer told ATC we wanted an immediate right turn back to land 16R. We were IMC on downwind and so we asked for descent to make possible a visual approach to 16R. We thereafter visually acquired the runway and made a visual turn onto the approach course at 2;000; but with a tailwind of 80 kts I overshot the approach course to 16R; got TA/RA with traffic to 16L; and because that traffic was in-sight and; although not the desired separation; I continued the approach and made a normal landing on 16R. Fuel at touchdown was 7;400 lbs--about [30] minutes. Gate fuel 6;900lbs.

B777 flight crew reported windshear during two consecutive approaches resulting in go arounds. After noting that the warnings were for increasing airspeed the crew elects to fly a third approach and ignore the windshear warning should it occur; but it does not. Gate arrival fuel is 6;900 pounds.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Airport; Human Factors

Prior to pushback; the First Officer and I reviewed the Commercial Charts. Prior to taxi; I was unaware that he called Ramp Control on #2 radio while I was on #1 radio; so I did not hear the clearance. He said Ramp cleared us to taxi onto Taxiway Alpha; right on RA; contact Ground. As I began a right turn onto Taxiway Alpha; he said; 'No; turn left'. I turned back onto the ramp to Taxiway RA thinking I misunderstood our clearance. I asked the First Officer to verify our clearance. He replied; 'Taxiway Alpha to Taxiway RA'. I said 'I was turning onto Taxiway Alpha; but you directed me onto the ramp'. The First Officer then realized he was confused between ramp and Taxiway Alpha. There were no airplanes moving on the ramp or pushing from any gate.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

B737 flight crew experienced a taxiway incursion. No conflict was reported.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was the A FA on this flight.  I proceeded down the aisle.  I saw seat number XX1 without a mask and I said; 'Hey; you have to wear your mask.'  He just rolled his eyes and pull the mask from his neck.  Just as I finished; a lady was in front of me headed to her seat.  I turned and walked back up front until she could get to her seat.  I immediately returned to the back and passenger XXA had the mask pulled back down to his neck.  I did exactly the same thing again; very politely; I stated; 'Hey; you have to wear your mask.' He looked at me and said; 'Shut up.'  I responded; sorry; what did you say?  He removed the mask and yelled very loudly; 'SHUT UP!' and that's what I did and walked away.  I proceeded to the back to inform the crew what had transpired and before I could finish;  Flight Attendant Y asked me was it the guy with the X hair [style] at the window and I said yes; how do you know?  He stated he had asked him several times already and once during boarding.  At that time passenger in [seat] XY4 had come to the back and told me that the gate agents had an issue with him at the gate and during boarding before we left ZZZ about the mask and he has been a nuisance the whole time.  I just said OK.  I proceeded back to the front of the aircraft and when I looked at him; the mask was back down around his neck.  I informed the Captain.  Honestly; I felt like if this man is bold enough to scream 'SHUT UP' at me in the cabin; there is no limits.  I was too afraid to say anything else to him.  He continued the flight without a mask.  I discussed this with the Captain.  The crew and I agreed he would become belligerent.  We informed the Captain of such.  A CSA met us at the gate and I just know she spoke with him and stated he had the mask off when she approached him.  Passengers were complaining about him not wearing a mask.He does not need to fly if he cannot comply.  Also; the CSA in ZZZ did not inform us/me of his previous behavior.  He should not have been allowed to fly.  It would have been helpful if we knew in advance.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was confrontational and refused to wear a face mask.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at 9;000 feet MSL in IMC conditions with the Autopilot engaged and being vectored by TRACON. The PFD indicated the aircraft was rolling to the left approximately 35-40 degrees pitching down approximately 7-10 Degrees and the airspeed was increasing; I simultaneously rolled the aircraft level; reduced the thrust levers and disengaged the autopilot as airspeed decreased I began raising the nose to a level attitude and increasing thrust continuing to pitch up to Climb Attitude Upon regaining the assigned altitude. I assured the crew that the situation was under control. ATC continued to provide vectors to avoid areas of moderate to heavy precipitation allowing me to proceed direct to the IAF. While proceeding direct to the IAF I made 2 unsuccessful attempts to re-engage the autopilot.I advised the crew to prepare for landing completed the Descent Checklist and was cleared for the approach. with the aircraft established on the approach and approaching the glide slope I extended Approach Flaps; lowered the Landing Gear and while performing the Landing Checklist observed The Nose Gear Down Indication was not illuminated. I pressed to test the light and it illuminated. I notified ATC that I was executing a missed approach and proceed according to ATC instructions. Once established at the assigned altitude; I queried ATC concerning the weather conditions at ZZZ2 while I considered diverting there. As I awaited the response I cycled the Landing Gear down the Nose Gear Down Indication Failed to Illuminate. ATC indicated that ZZZ2 was indicating 1500 Overcast. Prior to requesting a clearance to ZZZ2 I once again cycled the Landing Gear Handle down and observed all three Gear Down Indicator Lights Illuminated. I requested and received a clearance to proceed direct to the RNAV GPS Runway XX IAF and proceed to execute the approach which terminated with an uneventful landing and taxied to the ramp. Inadvertent Autopilot disconnect; Failure of Autopilot Alarm to notify pilot of disconnect and pilots diverted attention to programming the Navigation System for the approach. Thorough diagnosis of Autopilot to determine cause of Inadvertent Disconnect and repair is required.

BE90 Captain reported autopilot failure caused a diversion.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

TRISH3 RNAV Arrival BWI - Flying Pilot Briefed STAR altitude restrictions. At FL140 [we were] cleared to descend via the STAR. Non Flying Pilot (NFP) set 4000 feet into the altitude alert and was confirmed by Pilot Flying (PF). Aircraft made TROYZ Intersection at FL120 and leveled off. After level off Flying Pilot went into the FMS PROG page and observed Top of Descent for next fix was scheduled in 1 min. Flying Pilot then went into the FMS and selected Direct 8000 feet interrupting the scheduled RNAV descent. Aircraft went into an immediate descent. Non flying pilot advised Approach FMS had lost VNAV and was unable to comply with STAR. ATC then descended [us] to 4000 feet for Radar Vectors for [the] 33R Visual. CRM or lack thereof! PF was in my opinion unsure [the aircraft] was going to cross the next fix at the correct altitude. PF neglected to communicate concern. PF when unsure needs to communicate with NFP any concerns!

C680 Captain reported that the pilot flying went into the FMS and selected Direct 8000 feet interrupting the scheduled RNAV descent.


Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted

While enroute 1.5 hours into flight; both GPS units began showing intermittent faults. I began coordinating with Dispatch. Eventually; both GPS units failed completely. Dispatch and I agreed that diverting to ZZZ was the best option. It was accomplished uneventfully. No GPS jamming reported by other aircraft or ATC.

An Air Carrier pilot reported both GPS units failed.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Our original aircraft for this leg was a -300 with an inop APU. Ground Ops hooked up a ground air cart to start the #1 engine. After clearance from the ground crew and verification of airflow; we began the start sequence for the #1 engine. At about 35% N2; we noticed the air cart making a lot more noise than usual and the N2 rotation had hung at 35%. We aborted the engine start. The Captain informed the ground personnel that we had aborted the engine start. Ground Ops then informed the Captain via the headset that the airstart hose had disconnected from the aircraft. Ground Ops then shut down the start cart. After making sure that everyone on the ground was okay; we were informed that the end of the hose had struck the #2 engine. I immediately called for Maintenance and the Captain went down on the ramp to assess the situation. The hose damaged the cowling on the inboard side of the #2 engine at eye level. We swapped to another aircraft. The main reason for writing this report is to ensure that the ground crew is safe in the event that this occurs again. I am just thankful that no one was hurt. Make sure that everyone on the ground is well clear of the hose during ground air starts. Thankfully everyone was clear during this event. Hopefully ground personnel are aware of what that hose can do if it disconnects during a ground air start.

B737 First Officer reports the air hose; from a ground air start cart; separating from the aircraft during engine start and striking the number two engine. The engine cowl is dented and the aircraft is taken out of service.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Company Policy; MEL; Procedure

On the takeoff roll at approximately 100 kts.; the ISIS failed and showed an ATT caged. I aborted the takeoff at approximately 110 kts. After applying appropriate procedures we contacted Maintenance and reset the system. Brakes never left the green temp range. A takeoff was then performed to go to EWR. Several subsequent [warnings] were encountered due to other aircraft maintenance issues. Set up for arrival Runway 11 with a high traffic volume to TEB. we were vectored through the final approach course and set up for a intercept of the localizer. ATC then told us that visibility had dropped and to fly heading 050 for a breakout and to set up for ILS 4R. At about the same time we got a Bleed 2 low temp in icing with a low power setting due to an assigned speed of 170 kts. This distracted me and I failed to select heading mode. The localizer attempted to capture and turn the wrong direction. I recognized immediately and disconnected the autopilot and hand flew while resetting the AFCS for the desired state. We then were given a climb and a vectors for ILS 4R which was flown. Additional system issues on this aircraft occurred.Aircraft maintenance is becoming a detriment to safety. In two aircraft today; I had eight write ups. The following writeups occurred due to preflight or inflight discovery. On a prior flight the following 4 occurred - E1 FUEL IMP Bypass (Preflight); Coffee Pot 2 inop. (in flight); AP AIL Mistrim (inflight); AP FAIL (Inflight). On this flight there was an ISIS FAIL (takeoff); Pack 2 Overheat which did not reset (inflight); Wing AI FAIL (inflight).

Captain reported that distraction by multiple mechanical failures before and during flight resulted in a go around.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 3850; Flight Crew Type 1750

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure

On short final; I was cleared for the visual and when I was about 1000 ft above the ground a military T1 turned in from base to final underneath me. I was about 300 ft above the other plane and contacted the tower as I pulled up to avoid contact. The tower said I would be number 2 behind the T1. As the T1 went missed; I came in behind it and landed. The tower does not have radar and must rely on pilot reports and visual sightings.

C337 Pilot reported that while on final approach another aircraft turned from base to final underneath him.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

First Officer was hand flying while climbing off of Runway XXR on the SID while departing ZZZZ. I noticed the airspeed decreasing while the airplane was increasing pitch. This was prior to flap retraction; so it was less than 3;000 ft. I verbalized to the First Officer 'watch your airspeed.' When I said this; the First Officer looked at his Indicated Airspeed and then at mine; while I was doing the same. We realized that one of the airspeed indicators was incorrect. We were able to determine that it was most likely the First Officer's airspeed that was incorrect based on the standby altimeter and airspeed indicator that was matching mine. I took control of the airplane and was hand flying the airplane while the First Officer pulled out the QRH. We also started receiving multiple level-two alerts and noticed the autopilot and auto throttles were inoperative. The Flight Director failed [and] the FCP (Flight Control Panel) had dashed lines in the windows. During the climb the First Officer was converting meters to feet to be used. The FCP was not working at all. Airspeed; heading; altitude; and climbs were all determined and complied with without automation. No airspeed bugs; no altitude bugs; no heading bugs were usable. I tried to fly the departure via the magenta navigation line while constantly increasing/decreasing the map range to ensure terrain and aircraft separation.While we were trying to sort through the alerts to determine what checklist to perform we continued to climb when instructed up to 2;100 meters and finally 6;300 meters. Sometime early in the climb; The CAWS (Caution and Warning System) 'overspeed' was annunciating due to the First Officer's false airspeed. It was indicating it was exceeding the top foot. We realized that the proper checklist was the Airspeed Unreliable checklist. The CAWS 'overspeed' call lasted throughout the event making it extremely difficult to communicate with ZZZZ and the complete the checklist. The language barrier with the Controllers was equally challenging.In the climb we were also asked to speed up for traffic flow. While we were sorting out the problem I attempted to keep the airspeed around 280 kts to ensure we weren't exceeding any limitations; but giving us enough airspeed for performance. Shortly after this request as I leveled at 20;700 ft. (6;300 meters); we were queried about our altitude. My altimeter was indicating 20;700 ft. and my First Officer's altimeter was 1;000 ft. above and the Controller said we were showing 300 meters high. This was close to the time we were able to [advise ATC]. We [requested priority handling] to return back to ZZZZ. We were issued a left turn to 090 and started our descent. We were vectored back to Runway XXR and landed uneventfully.The language challenges; dealing with the constant 'overspeed' CAWS; multiple alerts in conjunction with a lack of automation made this event extremely challenging.When we were debriefing the event after blocking in; we determined the altitude deviation was due to the #2 transponder being selected but indicating [inaccurate] information. The First Officer did a great job managing the radios and performing the checklists. Maintenance at ZZZZ found an ADC #2 fault.

Early on climb out; before even cleaned up; First Officer's airspeed started increasing inappropriately. Pitch command from flight director became unexpectedly high even for the SID. Captain; who was Pilot Monitoring at the time; said something to the effect of watch your airspeed. Captain's airspeed was 10 kts. above the foot and mine was approaching slat retract speed. A very rough estimate of altitude would be 1;500 ft. I gave him the jet and he continued on the SID. We determined the standby system agreed with Captain's instruments. Adherence to the SID was maintained. After cleaning up flaps and slats; the airspeed differential continued to become worse. All the symptoms documented in the QRH become present; (FADEC; elevator feel; airspeed and altitude comparator; over speed warning). Additionally; the flight director; autothrottles; autopilot; and entire FCP (Flight Control Panel) became inoperative. The 'meters' value in the altimeters also disappeared. Eventually we reached a level off of 6300m (20;700 ft.). I was struggling to keep the Captain fed with all the altitude conversions. At 6;300 m.; ATC queried our altitude and made some comment about being off altitude. I don't recall the specifics. When this happened; we noted the First Officer's altitude was 1;000 ft. higher than the Captain's. Captain's altitude was 20;700 ft. +/- 50 ft. I do not recall the specific order of events; but it was at this time we [requested priority handling] and expressed a desire to return to ZZZZ. We by now had determined the unreliable airspeed checklist was appropriate. We were also being queried about fuel; people; dangerous goods; required assistance; landing weight and intentions all with the inherent language barrier. ATC was not out of line; but all; the questions; along with incessant CAWS over speed clacker and warning made communication very difficult. In addition the first vector was the long way around (270 deg) to a 090; on a metric altitude that had to be converted manually. ATC was also asking for our altitude; which I was trying to convert back to meters; and I'm not confident the translations were very successful. We saw the QRH note about certain tail numbers with the additional CADC (Central Air Data Computer) but elected not to accomplish because of proximity to landing and an anticipated unfamiliarity with the switch location. The First Officer's static switch was moved to Alternate and returned to Normal because nothing changed. At this point we were approaching final; with lots of ATC instructions and no approach built. So I elected to build the approach; communicated an abbreviated brief and get the approach and before landing checklists accomplished. The runaway came into sight at about 4 miles and and approximately 3;000 ft. At this point I felt it better to forgo any more checklist items and continue to land. The Captain seemed in concurrence. Landing was uneventful. After parking; we noticed the transponder in 2; which was the likely cause of ATCs altitude concern. It was probably reporting 1;000 ft. high.Maintenance deferred ADC 2.I don't feel this was unpreventable. We were not extremely fast to start the unreliable airspeed checklist; because of all the all the other associated warnings; but eventually got there. ATC is likely and rightly to be concerned about altitude. I believe the transponder reporting was wrong; but am confident we did not violate any altitude restrictions.

MD-11 flight crew reported Air Data Computer malfunction resulted in multiple instrumentation and system failures during climbout and required a return to land.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22400; Flight Crew Type 850

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While departing from Beijing...we were cleared to climb and maintain 8;900 meters by the Chinese enroute air traffic controller. During this portion of the flight the right transponder was in use.As the pilot monitoring; I referenced a shirt-pocket meters conversion chart that had been issued to me while in training. Both the pilot flying and the relief pilot referenced the iPad Tables/Code section of the FOM on page 16.10.10. My shirt pocket reference chart indicated a conversion which resulted in me setting FL291. I was advised by both of the other pilots that this conversion was incorrect. They both showed that the correct conversion for this meters to flight level altitude should be FL292. Seeing that their reference material was a more current reference; I set FL292 in the altitude alert window and we climbed up to FL292.Once level at this altitude; ATC queried us about our altitude. They advised us that we were above the assigned altitude of 8;900 meters. They asked us if we were at FL291 and we advised them we were at FL292. They issued an immediate descent to us and a 45 degree right turn off course to avoid converging traffic. Later in the flight we determined that the right transponder was showing the aircraft altitude to be 100 feet higher than the altitude being reported by the left transponder. This was written up in the logbook and maintenance was advised.After being able to review the situation I believe we have two separate issues that caused this controller to believe we had a potential loss of separation in RVSM airspace. They are: 1. Pilots using the FOM conversion table to convert meters to Flight Levels. This resulted in the aircraft being 100 feet higher in altitude than it would be if we used the altitudes on the enroute chart; and 2. The fact that; unknown to us at the time; the right transponder was reporting 100 feet higher than the left transponder which gave the controller the impression that we were a total of 200 feet high in altitude.I suggest that the training center reinforce the correct reference for obtaining the meters to feet altitude conversion is the enroute chart and NOT the FOM tables/codes conversion chart. I also suggest that a meters to FL conversion chart be put into the FOM rather than having to rely on old and possibly outdated training material hand outs. A secondary issue is that the FOM meters conversion table FOM 16.10.10 is not pilot friendly. The single chart is broken into two pages and this is VERY confusing during a time critical analysis of an inflight situation because it appears that data is missing from what a person might assume is a single chart.

[ATC] then directed a HDG change of 90 degrees to 180 and a descent to 29200 feet/8900 meters.

Confusion between two different flight level/meter conversion tables and a small error in the altitude reporting of the transponder resulted in a small altitude deviation and a corrective clearance from ATC for the flight crew of a B747.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

A B737 was cleared for takeoff from Runway 23L and assigned runway heading. ATC immediately cleared us to line up and wait for Runway 23L. I noticed that the Captain was taxiing into position on the runway more quickly than usual given the circumstances. I reminded him that I don't have good luck with wake turbulence referring to the past when we hit severe wake turbulence a few days back while I was flying. We were then cleared for takeoff from Tower with runway heading assigned right behind this B737.As we started to roll down the runway ATC transmitted 'traffic two miles out.' We continued with the takeoff and upon liftoff I was limited to how high I could pitch the attitude up without the pitch limit indicator activating due to our weight. At about 500-600 FT and again at 1;200 FT in our turn we encountered moderate to severe wake turbulence; which caused a temporary loss of positive control of the aircraft each time. We were switched to departure by the Tower Controller and the Captain reported the wake turbulence event to the Departure Controller.Cause: ATC clearing our aircraft for takeoff right behind a B737. ATC trying to rush our departure between the landing of one aircraft and the departure of a B737. We didn't vocalize our concern to ATC that we weren't comfortable taking off right behind a B737 particularly when our departure heading was the same as the B737. The undesired aircraft state was the moderate to severe turbulence/rolling moment induced from the wake of the B737 relatively close to the ground or at any altitude for that matter. The policy of minimizing the effect of wake turbulence by a B737 or A320 for that matter in separating aircraft during takeoff or landing when some of the worst wake turbulence I've ever encountered has been while flying behind a B737.Suggestions: I wish that there was a way to communicate our concern to ATC that we don't want to takeoff right behind a B737 or A320 when we aren't comfortable doing so without fearing catching an attitude from the Controller or being excoriated in some way for requesting a delay. The controllers are sitting in the Tower. We're risking our lives in an airplane. It makes my job really stressful climbing after takeoff anticipating the hit from the wake turbulence of an aircraft that ATC and the FAA has deemed a non-threat. Just because we don't crash when we hit the wake doesn't make it safe.

EMB-145XR First Officer reported encountering moderate to severe wake vortex departing RDU in trail of a B737 that resulted in momentary loss of control.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While on a 5 mile final to Runway XX in ZZZ; we noticed previously identified traffic on a left downwind leg starting what looked like a turn to a base leg. Unsure of his intentions; we asked the aircraft; at which point they informed us they would be out of our way by the time we got there. We responded by saying that would not work; and requested they do a 360 degree turn to fall in behind us. They responded by saying 'ok; you're in sight.' At this point the aircraft began a turn as we expected; however we believe they shot a low approach in the process; but it was difficult see. Once on short final; we saw them again making a climbing left crosswind turn. Our aircraft then crossed the threshold; and encountered wake turbulence just prior to the left main wheel touching the ground. This caused the aircraft to lose lift suddenly; and drift left of the centerline. The FO initiated a go-around. After the go-around we completed required checklists; I notified the flight attendant [and] passengers; and we landed uneventfully.

Dash 8 Captain reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence on short final in trail of an E2 military aircraft.


Repair; Installation; Inspection; Testing; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Procedure

An ERJ-145 aircraft was at the hanger for a Service Check and two MELs for the Pack-2 and Pack-1 Systems. Mechanic Y and myself; did troubleshoot the pack problems outside; finding that Pack-2 had a hole in one of the duct boots and that Pack-1 had a seized up Air Cycle Machine (ACM). After bringing the aircraft into the hangar; Mechanic Y started work on the Pack-2 duct that was damaged and I started on the Service Check. Mechanic Y finished the work on Pack-2 and started the removal of the Pack-1 ACM; while I finished completing the Service Check and changed a pair of nose tires. I next came over to see at what point Mechanic Y was at with the ACM; he had just finished removing the old ACM. I took over the project at that point; completing the installation of the new ACM. The aircraft was than pushed back outside to perform Operational Checks of both Pack-1 and Pack-2 Systems. Mechanic Y was in the aircraft performing the Operational (Ops) Checks for quite some time. After he shut down the aircraft; I spoke with him about the results of the Ops Checks at which time he told me that all the Ops Checks had been good. We then proceeded to sign-off the work we had preformed in the Logbook. Mechanic Y signing-off the Pack-2 MEL and myself signing-off Pack-1. In the morning the aircraft was taken to the gate and left for the [Flight] crews arrival. At about XA:30am; the Captain of that flight of the day arrived and found one of the aircraft's outflow valves in the forward crew closet. This event occurred due to a missed step in the MEL Manual when putting the Pack Systems back into service.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports a Captain had found an outflow valve in the crew forward closet on an ERJ-145 aircraft. Maintenance had missed a step in the MEL Manual when putting the Air Conditioning Pack System back into service after troubleshooting and repairs.


Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

Logbook Entry; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

During pre-flight planning; I noticed that the airplane had diverted into ZZZ the day before. The only flight subsequent to that was the ferry flight to bring the airplane to me in ZZZ1 that morning. I was to fly ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. The write up stated; 'Cabin altitude; 10;000 feet at FL300; diverted.' 'Found secondary heat exchange anger blown out at lower end. Replaced per Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) 21-51-02. See station maintenance for ops check and check' That did not tell me much; so I called Maintenance Control to get a better understanding of their findings and repairs. The Maintenance Controller with whom I spoke explained that they had essentially lost the right pack on that flight due to a hole in the heat exchanger. My next question was; why then; if the left pack was still operating; had they lost pressurization. The airplane should not have gone to 10;000 feet at FL300 with one pack still operating; unless something else was going on. I was feeling that I was going to have to refuse the airplane if they could not give me a good explanation of why this occurred. If you can't identify the problem; you can't fix it. The Maintenance Controller agreed that that was a good question for which he had no answer; so he said he needed to research this a little more. He asked if he could put me on hold; which; of course; was fine. He then came back on the line; and I asked him to patch Dispatch in on the call; which he did. I also had my phone on speaker so that my FO could be in on this 'conference' and ask any questions he might have.We discussed some options; which led to the Maintenance Controller going off-line to check something else. The Maintenance Controller kept repeating that he believed that the airplane should have been able to maintain pressurization in that situation; and that he could not explain why it hadn't. Additionally; the Dispatcher also stated that the guy working the desk next to his; had worked that flight yesterday and stated that the pilots said the Cabin Altitude Warning horn was going off. When he came back; the Maintenance Controller discovered that when you have a Cabin Altitude Alert occurrence; there are some mandatory checks/inspections that have to be performed. I believe he said that there were five. He stated that these were either not done in ZZZ; or were not logged as having been done. Wow. That meant that the airplane flew from ZZZ to ZZZ1 illegally and was set to continue to be flown indefinitely in that condition. Needless to say; I refused the airplane with Maintenance Control's concurrence.It is extremely disturbing that an airplane would divert into a major Maintenance hub and be there all night without the maintenance personnel complying with or recording these required inspections. How could this happen? Did they not correctly log it in the logbook as having been done? I know this is new to them. Or did they not understand that they needed to perform these inspections? If so; why not? Or is there a problem with the safety culture in ZZZ?We all make mistakes; but where were the checks and balances that would have caught this? The airplane was actually ferried out of [ZZZ] as if all was well. Are there no procedures in place to verify what needs to be done and what was actually done? If there are; what happened in this case? Are the procedures not being followed? If it wasn't for my phone call and the very sharp Maintenance Controller with whom I was speaking; this airplane would still be flying around illegally and; perhaps; unsafely. And by the way; why did the heat exchanger 'blow out'? That would be interesting to know; as well. Also; I have nothing but good things to say about the Maintenance Controller I spoke [to] and my Dispatcher. Maintenance Controller was especially sharp and helpful.

A Captain describes the positive support received from a company Maintenance Controller and Dispatcher during their efforts to determine whether a B757 previously released for service actually had mandatory checks and inspections accomplished. Aircraft experienced an inflight loss of the right pack with the Cabin Altitude Warning horn going off even with the left pack operating. Aircraft refused due to required maintenance not accomplished.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

During preflight; the First Officer; was the first one that entered the cockpit.  He started his normal routine; when he noticed an empty beer can in the garbage bag located behind the center pedestal in the cockpit.  We immediately removed the garbage bag from the flight deck; realizing that it was in violation of the FOM alcoholic beverage container policy. Initially; I thought a cleaner must have found the can in the back of the plane; and without thinking; saw the garbage bag in the flight deck and tossed it in there.  The flight attendants heard our conversation; and saw the beer can as well.  We all thought it was very odd; but didn't think it posed security risk; or threat; and I never thought for a second it was from one of my crew-members.  I placed the bag in the jetway; and carried on with my preflight duties; aiming for an on time departure. Once airborne and after further discussion with the FO (First Officer); we decided there are any number of scenarios for how the beer can got there. The previous day; we had flown that same airplane.  We had an open write up for an inoperative lav waste indication system.  We had messaged MX (Maintenance) about it; and as we were walking off the plane; we discussed it with the two gate agents on the jetway.  They informed us that Contract Maintenance would have to be called out. I also recall seeing two cleaners come on board; I believe one male; and female as we got off the plane that night. The next day; after removing the garbage bag; I reviewed the MX log; and noted that maintenance had placed the MEL (Minimum Equipment List) on the plane for the lav waste indication system.  So; Maintenance had clearly been on board at some point between the time we blocked-in the previous night; until that next morning when we reported for work.  Again; I am not sure how the beer can made its way into the flight deck garbage bag; but we might want to take a look at our security procedures.  Also; it should be noted that it was a beer; which the flight attendants explained; we sell onboard our flights.  All information is in the event narrative. Remind employees of the FOM policy for alcoholic beverages beyond the cockpit door threshold.  Review security procedures; and make sure there is someone over seeing Contract Maintenance when they are on board.

Flight Crew flying 737-900 aircraft found empty beer can in cockpit during pre-flight.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Departing on our last flight of the day and fifth flight in that airplane we got a beta lockout warning horn. It started to blare at 50 FT above the ground and did not go off until 50 FT above the ground for landing. When the horn started to sound; both the Captain and I agreed that it was the sound of the beta lockout horn; the power levers were not behind or in the beta position and the lift gates were down. There was no indication of any problems via the engine instruments. We continued with the callouts and appropriate normal takeoff actions; and the After Takeoff checklist. We agreed that we should return to the field. I informed Departure Control of our intentions and we didn't feel it necessary to declare an emergency. I called the Flight Attendant to tell her of the return and made a PA to inform the passengers as well. I called Operations and informed them of our return. We landed with no complications and were in the air for less than 10 minutes. The horn is very loud and we have been trained that beta lockout problems usually occur a short height off the runway. Although this was not the engine surging that we have been trained for; we have heard the sound of the horn before and the place where it took place all fit. Beta lockout system failed. Remove the beta lockout system.

DHC8 First Officer experiences a beta lockout warning horn after lift off and since the horn cannot be silenced the crew elects to return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 25116; Flight Crew Type 5147

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

While being vectored by NY Approach Control in the vicinity of Morristown Airport at 6;000 feet MSL my two First Officers and I noticed what we all thought were balloons but turned out to be a UAS (drone) which passed off our right wing by less than 500 feet. I estimated the actual distance to be closer to +/- 200 feet. We were just being handed off to another controller frequency 120.15 to whom we reported the sighting. No evasive action was taken. [Flight Duty Manager] briefed via telephone after the flight.

Air carrier Captain reported a NMAC with a UAV while on approach in NY area.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Type 750

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Test flight being carried out after prop overhaul. Propeller went to feather shortly after rotation. Aircraft was cleaned up and engine shut down. Tower notified of problem on downwind to runway XX and request for immediate return made. Cleared to land on runway XY; which we were on a close right base to. Landed without difficulty without realizing we were on taxiway which was the first pavement I lined up on as we turned a short final. No conflict with any traffic and was cleared to taxi by tower and ground to parking without incident.

BE30 Captain reported engine failure after rotation.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Approaching a West/East line ATC advised a hole several aircraft had flown through as an easy way on filed route. From the south we were cleared deviations and when able direct a fix. At FL340 encountered icing conditions and engaged all anti icing and experienced speed decay at max cruise power. Switched to [different altitude]; no relief. Told First Officer (FO) to call for lower altitude; frequency was busy. Finally speed was below 250 and decaying; moderate to severe turbulence occurred and autopilot disconnected; right wing dropped 45 degrees as right engine surged from 1.4 to 2.4. Hand flew a descending recovery checking TCAS below and called mayday and cardinal altitudes on the way down until ATC contact established. Turned to BERRI fix and arrested descent at FL310; reported no injuries. Wrote up severe turbulence and engine surge parameters in [the log].Lee side of storm downdraft exceeded performance of the airplane.Use lower altitude and greater horizontal clearance.

MD80 Crew reported icing conditions; turbulence; engine surge and inability to maintain altitude at FL340. Crew reported they arrested the descent at FL310.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On climb out; aircraft nose pitched up more than normal and I was pushing nose forward and trimming down. I noticed the trim was not moving on the trim tab indicator. I had the First Officer attempt to reset stab and Mach trim. I turned on autopilot to see if the autopilot could trim it out. That resulted in a autopilot Nose Up Trim Caution message and I turned off the autopilot and resumed manually flying the aircraft. The nose up trim condition did not improve. I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer while I referenced the QRH. I read through the stab trim and Mach trim runaway procedures even though we did not get a runaway trim message. Every time we tried to reset stab/Mach trim the trim increased by .4 and would not let us lower the trim value making the aircraft more nose up trimmed. I advised ZZZ Departure and ran the appropriate check lists and returned to the field landing on Runway 28L.I think the main problem was the Mach trim inputs from the aircraft computer system which caused the stab trim indicator to increase every time we disconnected and re engaged the stab/Mach trim system. The pilots went back to the hotel after the flight. I ran into the pilots who bought the aircraft in the night before at the hotel and they said that they had an autopilot nose up trim situation after take off from ZZZ1 and they reset it according to the QRH with no other problems.

Captain reported an uncontrollable Mach Trim condition that caused an Air Turn Back and precautionary emergency landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213; Flight Crew Total 9029; Flight Crew Type 1361

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

We arrived to the [aircraft] that afternoon and MX (maintenance) were in the process of fixing the O2 mask receptacle on the FO (First Officer) side (the black bar that holds mask was loose). A swap with the observer O2 was the only solution. Once MX was done we were able to accomplish checks. Just prior to closing doors; they opened the valve and asked the flight deck to verify operation. Both CA (Captain) and I tested the O2 mask as per procedure; for proper flow and mike. We had the status page displayed and we observed a normal decrease of O2. I personally held it open for flow for 10 sec; only 10 psi decreased. Both CA and I were satisfied with the operation and O2 available.At FL360; right before the FA (Flight Attendants) were to start the service; they called the flight deck to give the CA the hot meal. I asked to do a quick bathroom break. It was approximately 1 hour in flight. It was when I was opening the door the CA; on pulling the O2 mask; noticed it did not inflate (the look on our faces had to be a good one). I looked at him puzzled; and I remember mentioning 'I know we had proper pressure; did they close the valve after we tested?'. CA told me 'go use the bathroom and I will figure this out'.I returned the flight deck and I saw on the status page that we had only 60PSI of O2! CA told me that had requested 'CALL ME to dispatch' as I took my seat I mentioned that we needed to get down to 10;000 feet ASAP (As Soon As Possible). CA wanted a QRH; I quickly searched Oxygen on the QRH iPad and found nothing related to loss of O2 from the cylinder. I advised the CA there was no procedure; but that we needed to get down quickly; we were not longer in [a] safe environment. CA was on patch to Dispatch and [Maintenance]; and finally said; yes ok request descend to 10;000 ft. CA was flying pilot; I was pilot monitoring. Once the CA was on the conversation with [Maintenance]; I had assumed I was flying and doing ATC; but CA never transferred airplane to me. I asked [ATC] for 10;000 feet and explained that we had lost the O2 supply for the flight deck. I set 10;000 feet and pointed to CA for verification. The CA started the descent to 10;000 feet using FLCH (Flight Level Change) and a slow speed. We were only descending at 1200 fpm. I mentioned to the CA we needed to divert; as [the nearest suitable airport] was only 1 hour away and best options per MX. CA was still in conversation to Dispatch and [Maintenance] in regards the lack of guidance and what to do. I pressed for a decision to divert and finally got the 'go-ahead' I requested new destination [with] ATC. Set the FMC to divert and set the new route on the FMC. CA was still on the radio with Dispatch. Dispatch coordinated the diversion with ZZZ and they turned off. I filled [in] the CA with all I had done; and then [ATC] asked us to squawk 7700. We explained to them the emergency would be over once we got to 10;000 feet and we would be able to continue to ZZZ. We were instructed to return to squawk at 10;000 ft. We continued with no further issues to ZZZ; landed 100 lbs below maximum landing weight. Taxied to gate and MX was waiting. The O2 mask in the FO position was cracked and the O2 leaked out inflight. A repair was made; new bottle was installed and we left a couple hours later to continue to [destination].

B757 First Officer reported a loss of crew oxygen system pressure in cruise resulted in a diversion to a suitable airport for maintenance.


We lost cabin pressurization at FL370. We should buy more new airplanes.


Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

After taking off at about 2000 FT; we heard a loud bang from the right side of the airplane and the number two engine started vibrating with no indication of an engine failure or fire. We started with the QRH High Engine Vibration Checklist (not in icing conditions); but we suspected a possible engine stall; so accomplished the QRH Engine Limit/Surge/Stall Checklist with power reduced; all engine indications normal. Due to unknown status of #2 engine; we declared an emergency and advised Tower we needed to return to the departure airport. Out of an abundance of caution; we elected to perform a flaps 15 landing and reviewed the One Engine Inop Landing Checklist; in case the engine failed on approach. Once we landed; the engine #2 fail light illuminated. I manually shut the #2 engine down while taxiing to the gate.

A B737-700 engine made a loud bang with vibrations after takeoff. Suspecting an engine stall the crew completed the QRH and returned to the departure airport where after landing the Number 2 Engine Fail light alerted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 63.5; Flight Crew Total 712.82; Flight Crew Type 63.50

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I operated Aircraft X and Aircraft Y ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ respectively. On both segments; the FCRF (Flight Crew Rest Facilities) did not have any pillows. We were told anecdotally; that due to COVID pillows were not being boarded. While I understand that to be a passenger comfort/safety decision; I also believe that this may be in violation of FAR 117 and Class 1 rest facility requirements.As a result; I did not obtain the rest I expected. I felt fatigued after my rest break.

Air carrier Captain reported having no pillows on flights due to COVID-19 and not being able to adequately rest.


Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During the initial climb; we experience several events of strong radio interference due to ACARS transmissions/crosstalk. This events caused both discomfort due to the very loud volume of the interfering transmissions and difficulty in understanding ATC communication.  Additional interference events occurred during the flight for a total of 15 events.  During the last six weeks many crews have been experiencing frequent events of radio interference due to ACARS transmissions/crosstalk. These interference events should be a safety concern. They caused; in more than one occasion; us to miss/misunderstand critical ATC communications and instructions during the departure phase of the flight. Something changed in the last few months; [however]. The intereference could be caused by changes in the ACARS communication software; protocols; procedures; equipment.  Usually after Weight Off Wheels both the FMS and the EICAS show an 'ACARS NO COMM' message; shortly after that a very loud burst of digital communication is heard in the pilot headsets. In the worst cases the interfering signal is repeated multiple times during the first few minutes after takeoff. There should be an investigation of these events. In the meantime pilots should be provided temporary procedures (like disabling the ACARS system) to be used during the departure phase of the flight.

CRJ700 First Officer reports strong interference from ACARS transmissions occurring after takeoff on most of his company's CRJ aircraft; making ATC communication difficult. The reporter believes that changes in the ACARS communication software; protocols; procedures or equipment since late December are the cause of the problem.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Smoke and Fumes in cockpit. We suspect a malfunction occurred in flight with left ACM (Air Cycle Machine). This created the smoke and fumes in cockpit.

B757-200 flight crew reported they landed in emergency condition because of smoke and fumes in the cockpit that were later traced to suspected Air Cycle Machine failure.


Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

While completing the Before Takeoff Checklist; we noticed during Recall; ENG annunciation indicating EEC's were in ALTN mode. We pulled over to complete the QRH procedure. Captain spoke with Maintenance and was advised to taxi back to gate. Maintenance was called out to the aircraft and noticed an error during the BITE test and the EEC's switches were pushed out.Although schedule pressures were involved; my Captain and I used [risk management] to purposely take our time running checklists. During the Before Start/Originating Checklist; when I read the checklist item referring to EECs; I know I looked up at the EECs while Captain responded; and I thought I observed an ON indication. The plastic cover was scratched and hazy and I may have overlooked it. To prevent this in the future; I will take extra time and attention in ensuring switches are in the correct position before moving on to the next item.

After starting #2 engine; ENG alert displayed and we noted EECs in ALTN mode. Ran QRH and then called Maintenance and discussed deferral versus return to gate. During this discussion; we noted that EEC switches were pushed out (versus pushed in or ON). After discussing further with Maintenance; the decision was made to return to the gate. When Maintenance arrived; we agreed that the EEC switches may have been left in the ALT position and were in that position when the aircraft was towed to the gate (it had been remotely parked).Due to a late RSV (Reserve) callout (one hour prior to show) and very heavy traffic en route from home; I arrived to find the aircraft completely boarded and waiting for my arrival. FO (First Officer) had arrived prior to me and was helpful and professional and ready to go. We recognized the potential for time pressure to cause us to rush and even verbalized the need to be careful and methodical. However; in performing the Before Start Checklist; it is possible that we failed to notice that the EEC switches were not in the ON position; despite the fact that we both remember looking up at it when performing the checklist. This is due to the fact that the plastic covers were cloudy and scratched and the amber ALTN annunciation would not appear until after engine start. You must look closely to determine that the white ON circle appears in the switch. In the future; I plan to look VERY closely at this switch to avoid this issue again. However; I think there should be some type of review to determine how they were left there.

B737-700 flight crew reported returning to the gate because the EEC switches were in the alternate position.