Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 19500; Flight Crew Type 7500

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During preflight the First Officer (FO) informed me that we would be good to use D2 for our takeoff power setting. I asked how big a buffer that gave us and I remember figuring that to be 8000 LBs but after checking later turned out to be more like 13;000 LBs.  In any case I took a conservative approach and decided I wanted even more power so I told the FO to use a reduced off of Max setting; which would give us more power. The FO then set the thrust management computer; TMC; to a reduced setting; which I believed to be a reduced off of max setting. During taxi out; as it was my leg; I briefed that we were using a reduced off of max power for our takeoff power setting. After being cleared for takeoff and setting the autothrottles for takeoff; it seemed to me like we were not getting a normal power increase and I checked the autothrottle to make sure it had increased to the selected takeoff power setting and it had. The takeoff run seemed longer than normal but we finally reached takeoff speed and the aircraft climbed out. After clean up and an increase in speed I looked over and saw that the TMC was in the D2 mode. I asked the FO if he had changed us to the D2 mode after takeoff and the FO stated no. I asked for max power for the rest of the climb. I then understood and told the FO that we had taken off in the D2 mode.    Initially I was not too concerned as I knew we were good to use D2 for takeoff and that the takeoff had been successful; but later in cruise when I had time to reflect; I realized that we had not only used D2 for takeoff but that we had reduced off of D2; which would explain the lackluster takeoff performance. After rechecking it turned out that our power setting was for 40;000 LBs less than we needed for takeoff.  In trying to figure out how this could happen; the FO told me that he always set the TMC to D2 whenever it would work because most captains were ok with using D2 for takeoff. I told the FO that it has been my understanding that FOs do not set D2 on the TMC until after the captain approved its use.  In our case it seems that the TMC was not set back to Max power even after the reduced setting was set.  In any case we both understood that we were supposed to use a reduced off of max setting; and that we both missed that the TMC was improperly set.

Our Takeoff weight was 324.7. I told the captain we were good for D2 and selected D2. He asked me what D2 was? I informed him D2 was 338.3 for runway 26 L. Our takeoff weight was 324.7 that gave us a buffer of 13.6. The Captain decided he wanted Assumed off of Max. I assumed at 48 degrees which was good for a weight of 347.8 and I rolled the dial to 48 degrees. On takeoff he asked me to set Thrust we both noticed the thrust did not seem normal. We both verified the auto throttles were armed and I also checked for the throttle Arm notification. The takeoff roll was unusually long but we lifted off at V1 and climbed out without any problems. On climb out the captain noticed that D2 was set for climbout and asked me if I had changed anything. It was not until cruise that the Captain realized I had never deselected D2 for takeoff and we had in fact assumed off of D2 not Max. In order to stop this from happening again we discussed how we should confirm D2 before selecting it.

The crew of a B767-300 reports inadvertently taking off with a thrust setting much lower than required for the actual aircraft weight. The First Officer had set D2 in the Thrust Management Computer (TMC) and the Captain decided he preferred the assumed temperature method of de-rating thrust; but the D2 was never removed from the TMC.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On short final to Runway 3R at PDK; a small low wing airplane attempting to land on Rwy 3L overshot his landing runway centerline and nearly missed our aircraft. The passengers onboard my aircraft were noticeably concerned; as well as all three crew members who witnessed the near miss. The small airplane missed our aircraft by approximately 250 lateral feet and approximately 50 vertical feet. The SIC contacted the tower upon landing and expressed his concerns. Initially the tower operator tried to say that these things happened every day at PDK and that it was the second busiest airport in Georgia. Blah; blah; blah! (No humor intended!); and that it was not a problem.When using parallel runways that are very close together; traffic information; heads up information; and possible de-confliction information would have been nice to hear and get!

On short final approximately 2 miles and 1;000 ft MSL I brought my scan from looking out on final to inside at the instruments and noticed a TCAS target at about 11 o'clock less than a mile and at our altitude. I looked back outside and visually acquired a low wing on a perpendicular collision course with us. As I was telling the flying pilot about the traffic and to turn; the small aircraft turned to the left for final on the left runway. At this time the tower told us of the traffic; (first time mentioned) and he would be on the parallel runway. I replied that the other pilot needed to make a harder turn now! We continued on course for an uneventful landing. The runways are maybe 500 ft apart. The traffic seemed closer at about 250 ft from us. I was able to hear a passenger in the cabin shout out about the aircraft and was visibly shaken by the ordeal. I spoke by phone to the tower cab and then I believe the tower chief about the event. They reviewed the radar and tapes and agreed it was close and consider it a near miss. The tower left the separation of aircraft up to the crews but we were never notified of the other aircraft. With runways so close the tower still needs to provide separation between us. The controller should have extended the small aircraft on downwind to turn base after US.

A jet on short final to PDK Runway 3R had a near miss with a single engine aircraft which overshot it's final turn to Runway 3L. ATC made no attempt at notifying either aircraft of the traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

I was acting as pilot monitoring (PM) while First Officer was the pilot flying (PF).At our cruise altitude of FL380 a HYD Y RSVR LO LVL; ECAM appeared on our screen.After completing the actions required by the ECAM and checking in the QRH; I contacted dispatch via ACARS.Two attempts were made on two different frequencies suggested by dispatch; to talk to dispatch. Both attempts were unsuccessful. We completed communication via ACARS.Dispatch decided that the best thing to do would be to return to [our departure airport and] I concurred.Center was advised that we wanted to return and a new clearance was received.At this time I called; via interphone the Purser and requested her presence in the cockpit. I explained the situation; advised her that an evacuation or cabin preparation was not necessary; that we had approximately 40 minutes flight time until landing and that at this point we had no idea what was going to happen in regard to the passengers; gate information; clearing customs or the continuation of the flight. An attempt was made to send [an equipment code report] as to the loss of yellow hydraulic system fluid to maintenance but we received an ACARS message stating ''' INIT ERROR; ACARS INIT ISSUE; PLEASE CHECK 'FLIGHT NUMBER' DEPT STATION 'DEST STATION' FLIGHT DATE. SUGGEST AUTO INITALIZATION TO CORRECT.'A message was sent directly to MAINT via ACARS as to the write up; no response was received for approximately 20 minutes. A message was sent to dispatch asking if they had notified [the airport] of our return and no response was received. A message to airport operations via ACARS was sent directly and no message was received.There is an issue here; we as pilots are doing our best with a damaged aircraft and expecting support that has been promised to us; to provide us some information; the passengers some information and nothing comes back to us.This is the second time in two years that I have been the pilot in command of [one of our] aircraft that experienced a problem in flight and was unable to contact or be contacted by dispatch in a timely manner. I realize that dispatch is busy; understaffed and over worked but a little help would go a long way.

An A320 Captain; after suffering the loss of yellow system hydraulic quantity; opted to return to their departure airport but found himself unable to communicate reliably with either Dispatch or Maintenance. The reporter expressed in strong terms his conviction that the company was not providing the communications capabilities required by their flight crews and required by regulation.


Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Procedure

Trade or Kona winds are common on Maui and may change without notice. My fellow employee's [baggage handlers] and I are concerned that the lavs are being dumped on a B757 while we are offloading an inbound aircraft or on loading an outbound aircraft (rear compartment.) Since the beginning of March we have asked that the dumping of the lavs be done after we offload and we will resume loading when they are done. Under OSHA regulations we; as employees; who are exposed to hazardous materials; ex. BIO-HAZ must be supplied with proper protective equipment and trained on how to use such equipment as well as proper action in case of spill or exposure; which our employees who work in the back of the aircraft are not provided with. We were informed yesterday that Management is allowing the servicing of the lavs to be done while we are off/on loading an aircraft. It was also suggested that the dumping be allowed when winds are away from us but we have seen the contract employees attempt to dump the lavs with the winds coming towards us too. We have requested that our contract service please wait until we offload an inbound flight and then we will clear the area for them to do their part. We have a lot of years among us and we have been sprayed while they have dumped the lavs. We have felt the spray of the truck being parking under the aircraft in an attempt to dump. This is caused by the liquid build up on the truck where the hose is stored. Our contract service may at times take up to 30 minutes until they show up to an aircraft which puts us having to stop loading when they show up. Our rampers have asked that if they do not show up within that 30 minute window and we start loading they would prefer us not stopping to accommodate them so we won't be hit with a delay for not loading all the bags in time of closeout.

Baggage handler suggest that the aircraft lavatories should not be serviced while the rear compartment is being loaded and unloaded due to the high winds present at PHOG and the likelihood that the ground crew will get sprayed.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Single Engine taxi; load data was late. Captain began starting sequence for right engine. Approximate 10 KT tailwind. Start progress was normal. EGT rise was normal for this type engine; but after about 400 degrees started rising rapidly. I called out temps. Captain called abort! I immediately shut the fuel lever off. EGT rose to approximately 580. Whole process was no more than 2-3 seconds. We returned to the gate.We were experiencing task saturation. Frustrated with not getting Load data and repeated calls for this information going unanswered. Task split; Captain doing part of the start; with the First Officer doing the other. [We were] lured into the EGT normally not exceeding the limit; with an unusually rapid rise.

Single engine taxi and engine start were contributing factors.

The flight crew of an MD83 aborted an engine start during a single engine taxi-out when the EGT rose excessively. They returned to the gate for maintenance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We had an issue with a family in regards to our mask policy. After we did the demo I walked back to compliance and saw that the mother; in [seat] XX4; the face mask was below her nose and when I got closer she pulled it up. The three kids in [seats] XX 123 pulled their masks up and kept them on. I turned to the mother and said that 'I need your mask to stay over your nose at all times.' As I'm saying this she has it pinched between her finger pulled away from her face. She snapped back; 'It's there or it's covering' something along those lines and dismissively continued her conversation with the woman across from her. When I walked to the front of the plane before the demo I told the woman in XX3 to follow the mask policy so XX4 knew we were enforcing it. After my first encounter I informed the crew that I already talked to her and received attitude back and for them to keep an eye out.My second encounter was shortly after that when I went to pass out the [snacks] to the family next to her. As I walked up the mask again was down below her nose and when she saw me there she moved it up. I told her I really need her to keep the mask up and she snapped that it was up. I said it wasn't a moment ago and that I didn't want to have any issues on this long flight. Her responses to that was did I know that the politicians didn't believe in masks and I told her that this wasn't political; it was me doing my job to enforce our policy. She continued to give me attitude and talking about it was political. I went to the back and informed Flight Attendant (FA) C and D how my second encounter went and that she would be an issue the remainder of the flight and I strongly believe we should give her the Warning. They both offered to be the one to talk and give it to her. Flight Attendant C took care of that.While passing out the snack mix; I got to the row the husband was in. He asked for the wife's snack and his mask was down and FA D asked him to make sure his mask was up. XX4 had some kind of response that I missed but FA D told her not to have attitude towards us when we were just doing our job. Then she responded as a victim; saying she's been yelled at the whole flight and that she has been talking to us respectfully and not yelling at us. Which is not the truth because my encounters with her were very unpleasant; disrespectful and had the intent to belittle me and the policy.The remainder of the flight the entire family didn't comply with the mask policy. Their son rarely had the mask on when I passed; the daughters below their nose and the husband as well even though he would pull it up as we passed by. We all spoke to the family at one point and most of us multiple times. The mother was constantly having the mask below her nose or pulling the mask away from her face as she spoke to her kids and the woman across from her. I also was informed that another guest moved his seat because he was so uncomfortable sitting in front of them. I was told after everyone was off that they didn't have their mask on properly while deplaning either.

Flight Attendant reported a family would not comply with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On departure from ZZZ climbing through 4;500 ft. we experienced a bird strike on the FO (First Officer) side front window. As of a result of the impact; it knocked out some of the switch lights and lighting covers from the overhead panel. We did not reset the switches. After we accessed the situation and concluded that all engine indications and system operations were normal; we contacted company and Maintenance. The joint decision was to continue to ZZZ1. But because the impact was so hard we couldn't be sure the window wasn't compromised and some of the switch lights that came out were on the pressurization panel; we elected to stay at 10;000 ft. for the duration of the flight and get a more direct routing to ZZZ1 for fuel burn. Our Dispatcher sent us new fuel burn numbers at that altitude and we landed in ZZZ1 without any further issues. We did not [request priority handling] but about halfway to ZZZ1 ATC said they were [establishing priority] for us. I believe; as a precaution from the bird strike; ATC did this because we had stayed at the lower altitude and requested a more direct routing to ZZZ1.

CRJ900 Captain reported a bird strike lead to flying at or below 10;000 ft. for the duration of the flight.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 8700; Flight Crew Type 490

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 6050; Flight Crew Type 1800

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

We were cleared to [destination] via the CLRBK2 departure to J534 to IWACK intersection; after departing we climb up to 5;000 ft and ATC told us we were close to terrain and they ask us to climb; we complied with ATC. We understood climb via the Sid to intercept J534. At no time were we in danger it was a VFR day; clear and no terrain warning called out on the cockpit. We had the terrain in sight at all times at it was below us at all times.

Departure called and told us to climb; and asked if we had the terrain in sight. We complied with the climb and had the terrain in sight at all times. We were informed that we should have flown the SID and waited for vectors to the airway. Since vectors were not included in the clearance; we did not expect them. We misunderstood and should have asked for clarification. We do not feel we were in danger but ATC did. Next time; we ask.

Air Taxi flight crew reported ATC issued a low altitude alert departing CYXX.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

On pushback from ZZZZ ramp; mechanic on the headset advised tow bar disconnected; bypass pin removed and said he was clearing to the left. He appeared on the left; showed the pin and waived us off and walked back towards the spot.  We finished after start checklist and called for taxi.  Ramp cleared us and I turned the taxi light on and started to push the power up (could have been worse had we taxied on 2 engines) as I cleared to the left.  Then a tug front left tire appeared from below the cockpit.  I jumped on the brakes and stopped the airplane and observed the mechanic running back to the tug.  It apparently had stalled and he could not get it moving at that point.  Mechanic got it running and it moved clear.  No contact was made and we departed for ZZZ.Cause - I was a little tired after a lengthy new hire IOE trip and do not recall looking for the tug moving away.  I relied on the wave off from the mechanic.  The potential for a disastrous collision was definitely there.Suggestions - I should look more intently for the tug to pull away and the mechanic should not be waving off with a tug under the aircraft.

Air carrier Captain reported nearly colliding with a tug that had stalled after they had cleared the crew for pushback at a foreign airport.  The Captain immediately 'jumped' on the brakes after seeing the tug was still there.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Early morning departure from ZZZ Runway XXR. Cleared for takeoff direct ZZZZZ. On the takeoff roll all engine indications were normal. As I pitched up to takeoff and receiving positive rate from my First Officer I asked for gear up. As the gear was in transit we heard and felt a bang. At first we thought it was gear related then the gear was in and another bang is heard. At that point tower tells us that we have 'sparks' coming from our engine. The bangs were intermittent about every 3-5 seconds. As we analyzed the situation we knew the right side engine was the issue sign ITT (Inter-stage Turbine Temperature) was hotter then normal. Once I seen the ITT start to shoot up into the red I put the engine from TOGA to Climb and ITT some what reduced. By this time we were also reaching 3;000 ft. so I was in the process of leveling off and reducing power. At no point did we get any alerts or indications that anything was wrong other then the weird ITT indications. The bangs only happened when throttle was in TOGA position. Once level all indications were green and we quickly decided to return to ZZZ. We requested priority handling and received vectors back to ZZZ. I contacted the Flight Attendants and told them we had issues with the right engine they quickly responded with 'Yeah; we know it was really loud back here'. Asked if any smoke is present they said no. Told them were going back to ZZZ and that everything is good and normal as of now and if that changes I will let them know. Continued to land Runway XXR with no other engine indications. We told the Tower to have fuel trucks waiting just in case of a fire. Upon landing we stopped on the runway; and Tower tells us no fire is visible and I make a PA letting everyone know of the situation and that we will be returning to the gate. Fire Trucks verified no fire and followed us back to the gate. Engines were working as normal on landing and taxi as if nothing happened.

An Air Carrier pilot reported a compressor stall in the right engine while taking off.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During the take-off roll on Runway XXR we observed the wheel-not-turning light illuminate.  The light illuminated at 120 KTS; V1 was 146 KTS.  The Captain (Pilot Flying) initiated a rejected takeoff and brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway.  Aircraft weight was 137;000 lbs. We taxied off the runway and stopped.  Brake temperatures ranged between 80-400 degrees.  The fire department was called and conducted an inspection of the tires and brakes.  They then cooled the brakes and determined they were safe.  The left inner tire was flat.  The aircraft was towed to Gate X and parked.  Passengers were deplaned.

No additional information was provided by the secondary narrative.

An MD-82 flight crew rejected their takeoff at 120 KTS when they observed a wheel not turning warning.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Airspace Structure

The following event occurred while I was working and all aircraft involved were in the PHL Bravo airspace at the time. Air Carrier Z was level at 4;000 and southbound on the downwind for Runway 35. A VFR Helicopter X; was northbound at 3;500; opposite direction to Air Carrier Z. A VFR Aircraft Y at 4;500; also northbound; following roughly the same track as Helicopter X; but about 2.5 miles behind it. All aircraft were on my frequency; and both VFR aircraft had been cleared into the Bravo by me and had been assigned their respective altitudes. In fact; a short time prior to this event; I gave Helicopter X the current altimeter; restated his altitude assignment of 3;500 and informed him were would be multiple targets opposite direction to him at 4;000.When the aircraft were southeast I issued traffic to Air Carrier Z at 11 to 12 o'clock and 3 miles; opposite direction; VFR at 3;500. He acknowledged my transmission. I can't remember if I again called traffic to Helicopter X. A very short time later Air Carrier Z advised me they had climbed due to a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA). I looked at their target and observed them at 4;400; now nose-to-nose with Aircraft Y who was at 4;500; maybe only about 3 miles apart. I told Air Carrier Z I needed him 'back down' due to opposite direction traffic at 4;500; and he said roger. Seeing Air Carrier Z had now passed Helicopter X I descended them further to help expedite his descent away from the traffic; then turned Aircraft Y to the northeast to ensure that I had the airplanes pried apart.All three aircraft were level at valid; assigned altitudes. All were separated as per requirements; and the situation was safe and under control. Due to Air Carrier Z's response to a TCAS RA; a safe situation became very dangerous and chaotic for no reason.I would recommend that the 'tolerances' or 'sensitivity' of the TCAS on this aircraft be checked. I don't see any reason a TCAS RA should occur in congested Bravo airspace due to two vertically separated aircraft passing each other. A safe situation was turned into a near disaster by the TCAS RA and the crew's response to it. Additionally; perhaps flight crews should be given discretion as to whether or not they should respond to a TCAS RA in congested Bravo airspace; when the TCAS traffic in question has been issued to them by ATC.

A PHL area Approach Controller reported the controlled fixed altitude relationship of one IFR and two VFR aircraft with required 500 FT separation turned chaotic when the Air Carrier in the middle of the altitude sandwich responded to a TCAS RA. His suggested resolutions included giving flight crew discretion as to whether to respond to RA's in congested airspace.


Dassault-Breguet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 203; Flight Crew Total 1181; Flight Crew Type 753

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft X (student at the controls) performed a practice approach at AVQ airport (RNAV 12 Approach). Airport was very busy. On first attempt to land; a Falcon business jet was filling CTAF frequency with unnecessary chatter with the AVQ FBO regarding passenger rental cars; causing inability for aircraft in the airport vicinity to make traffic calls.While inbound from the FAF; a Civil Air Patrol (CAP) Cessna turned base-to-final in front of us. I visually acquired the CAP Cessna in front of us and determined us to have adequate spacing. As we joined an approximately 3 mile final; the Falcon jet made an 'On final for 12' radio call. I then visually acquired the Falcon jet; which was in an unsafe position (approximately 4 o'clock; same altitude; 1 mile; much faster than us) causing a potential traffic conflict with our aircraft. I immediately discontinued the approach and vectored my student away from the airport in a climb.There were several other training aircraft on the RNAV 12 Approach behind us at the time. After several minutes; I determined the conflicting traffic had landed and re-joined the RNAV 12 Approach prior to the FAF (behind the other inbound aircraft). While on final I heard a Cessna Citation call that he was 30 miles out; intending to cross the airport midfield for left traffic Runway 12. Being aware of the Citation; and the still busy traffic pattern at AVQ; after performing a touch-and-go at AVQ; I instructed my student to extend upwind; and continue a climb to stay well-clear of the traffic in and entering the pattern.Excessive radio chatter continued at AVQ; hindering aircraft position reports (we made multiple radio calls during lulls). With no TIS (Traffic Information Service) active and no ADS-B installed in the aircraft; my student and I continually scanned visually for traffic. At approximately 3000 feet; we turned crosswind and then began a downwind turn when TIS became active. As soon as TIS became active; I observed a target moving very quickly; indicating +300 feet and less than 1.5 miles; descending. The target was at our approximately 9 o'clock. As we were in a left turn; the wing was hindering our view. I took the flight controls; raised the left wing and instructed my student to help me look for the conflicting traffic.After lifting the wing; I observed the Citation jet at approximately 500 feet +/- to our left; same altitude and closing quickly. The Citation jet was in a left bank and it did not appear that they ever saw us. I immediately pitched for Vx and attempted to out-climb the Citation. Descending nor turning was [not] an option as the Citation had appeared to be in a descent; and its wide left turn was in direct conflict with us turning either direction. The Citation jet passed; I would estimate; 100-200 feet directly below us. There was no radio communication between us and the Citation jet due to lack of free space on frequency. As our conflict resolved; I heard other conflicts on the CTAF between other aircraft.

C172 flight instructor reported several conflicts including a near miss with a Citation jet while maneuvering in AVQ traffic pattern.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was providing OJTI on the satellite position. The Developmental had a Dash 8 depart on a 270 heading climbing to 4;000 FT. She RADAR [identified] him and then climbed to 5;000 FT in her airspace. The Departure Controller turned the CRJ north off the left of the Dash 8. The jet was at 5;000 FT; the Dash was at 4;600 FT. The Developmental immediately called a Traffic Alert and told the Dash to descend to 4;000 FT. The Dash got visual with the jet. The jet would have never been at 5;000 FT if there were not picture takers to the south of the airport during a departure bank. There were also excessive departures off another nearby airport because of a new procedure to have reduced separation off the airport. Vectoring off the RNAV and having visual separation. There has to be procedures briefed to controllers prior to implementing them. Vectoring off the RNAV and reduced separation was not briefed but sent in an e-mail from Union Representative. Also; picture takers should be briefed and have some sort of plan and should be monitored.

TRACON Controller providing OJT described a conflict event between two IFR aircraft complicated by a photo mission operation nearby and less than adequate briefings provided to the Controller workforce.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 29500; Flight Crew Type 150

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Landing gear jammed on retraction halfway. Attempted to recycle gear with no response. Leveled off at lower altitude and requested vectors from ATC while we worked on the issue. Followed the emergency procedures in our manual and attempted to extend the gear back down. The manual gear extension handle locked in the forward position and we did not have three green lights. Did a fly-by of the Tower after consulting with our maintenance people. The gear according to them was not fully extended. We went out away from the airport and I once again tried to move the manual gear extension handle. I pulled as hard as I could on the handle and it snapped loose. I was then able to pump the gear down the rest of the way and had three green lights. The landing was uneventful. Emergency equipment was called as a precaution prior to landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight crew reported that gear handle jammed on retraction; was able to manually get the gear down and landed uneventfully.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after takeoff both MCDU's locked out. We lost all navigation ability. The course line on the map display disappeared; we could not select standby Nav; manually tune any frequencies; the autopilot would not engage and the FMS would not compute the proper airspeeds. We checked the QRH and AOM for guidance and realized we could not correct the problem. After checking the weather we declared an emergency and diverted because the weather there was VFR. Landed without incident. Maintenance corrected the issue and we continued to destination.

B717 crew experiences a dual MCDU lockout shortly after takeoff which cannot be corrected. The flight diverts to a suitable airport for maintenance; then continues to destination.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

After leveling off at FL410; power was being reduced to set normal cruise thrust; a loud bang was heard from the right side of the plane. The plane shook and yawed briefly to the right. Occurrence happened only once.  Fuel flow and ITT remained stable.  The right ITT was higher than the left by about 50 deg but well within limits.  The ITT eventually lowered to correspond with the other Left ITT. The situation was stable; so my copilot and I discussed the situation. Although indications were normal in the cockpit; there were a host of possibilities as to what would have caused such a loud boom and shake the aircraft as it did. We called the ACP (Chief Pilot); to relay our request for diversion.  He agreed and we coordinated with Dispatch for a diversion.  We maintained the aircraft at slower airspeed as a factor of safety.  Post flight reviewed no obvious damage to the aircraft. After our crew debrief; we suspect we could have had a compressor stall.

CE560XL Captain experiences a compressor stall at FL410 as the thrust is reduced for cruise flight. The engine continues to run and after a few minutes exhibits normal parameters; but the crew elects to divert to a suitable airport. No obvious damage is found.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 14000

Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Received a runway assignment change from Runway XX to Runway XYR after initial Runway XX briefing.  Re-briefed the Runway XYR ILS and began approach.  Between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 intersections PF began descending to 1;500 feet.  Altitude deviation was noted and a correction was made around 1;600 feet; shortly thereafter the tower issued a low altitude warning.  Altitude was corrected back to 2;000 feet; approach and landing was accomplished without further incident.  During debrief; crew agreed that expectation bias was a major contributing factor to the deviation.  The PF was still thinking about the altitudes for the Runway XX ILS.  It was the last leg of a three-day pairing so the PM did not properly back up the PF due to Pilot Flying's strong performance during the entire pairing.  PM should not allow previous performance or experience to impact critical backup role.

Initially set up and briefed for the ILS XX. New ATIS was obtained with runway change to XYR just prior to runway transition point on the ZZZZZ Arrival.  Re briefed and set up for ILS XYR. Approach Control gave us a  vector to intercept the Localizer XYR and then to descend to 2;000 feet from 4;000 feet outside of ZZZZZ [intersection] and then cleared us for the approach. I armed the localizer and set 2;000 feet; localizer captured and upon reaching 2;000 feet at ZZZZZ; I reverted to my previous briefing of the ILS XX and set 1;500 feet and proceeded to descend to 1;500 feet. Several hundred feet into the descent; Approach Control told us that we were low. Upon realizing what I had done I initiated a climb back to 2;000 feet from now 1;600 feet prior to ZZZZZ1. Reaching 2;000 feet prior to ZZZZZ1 and being stable again; we now continued to configure and resume the approach to land with no further incident.I should have verified my actions as I was accomplishing them and verified them with the PM. I was still in the mind set of what I had originally briefed and should have transitioned to the new approach even though we were rushed with the late runway change.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Weather; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was an arrival into PVU airport. He came to my sector from the northwest.  I had to vector the aircraft to get him in trail of SLC arrivals. I turned the aircraft in trail of a SLC B752.  As I turned the aircraft further north so final turn wasn't so tight; the pilot called the airport in sight. PVU was advertising Visual Approach Runway 13. I cleared the aircraft for the Visual Approach. They turned towards the airport; I shipped them to the Tower approximately 10 miles out when I saw them turning towards the airport. Almost immediately the aircraft started turning further south towards a 8;900 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude descending out of 8000 feet. I called PVU and they said they were talking to him. I asked what they were doing and was advised the pilot stated they were making S turns or something. The aircraft descended to 5;100 feet 7 miles from the airport; elevation 4;497 feet.  At that point PVU called stating the pilot had lost the airport and was climbing to 9;000 feet. The pilot checked in with me heading 180 and climbing to 9;000 feet. I said roger. They then asked for vectors to an ILS and I stated I would when they were at Minimum Vectoring Altitudes. I vectored for the ILS with no further complications. I don't really have recommendations on my end. PVU after this incident continued to advertise Visual Approaches. My Supervisor did not want to fill out any paperwork on the incident; so they said nobody did anything wrong and to leave it at that. I felt like this should be reported somehow. The pilot was extremely low a long distance from the airport trying to scud run the Visual Approach. I knew visuals were iffy because when I descended the aircraft to 9;000 feet they were IMC; I turned them and descended them to 8;000 feet (also telling them to expect the ILS) and they called the airport. It's not surprising they were able to call the airport in sight at that point; the mountain sits below and often they can descend slightly and get the airport in sight. What's surprising is the pilot accepted the approach if clouds were that bad; that we didn't 'declare an emergency' for the aircraft when they lost the airport at 5;100 feet in an 8;900 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude MVA; and that the supervisor wouldn't at least want to follow up with the pilot. I truly don't know why we wouldn't want to look at this further.

A TRACON Controller reported an aircraft cleared for a Visual Approach turned away from the airport due to losing sight of the airport and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 300

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

At the end of an hour of airwork practicing Commercial maneuvers; I decided to practice spot landings on my way back from the practice area. The wind at the training airport was 310 @ 10 G 19 and I was cleared for the options on runway 26. My procedure for engine out spot landing called for power out and gear down abeam the point of landing. I chopped the power and put in landing flaps instead of putting gear down. As I floated beyond the box on the runway in ground effect; not slowing down much; I realized I had the gear up. I firewalled the throttle; but sank onto the runway striking the prop twice with the sound of a machinegun. The airplane then started to climb and I continued a go around. My instinct was to stay in the pattern and land; but there was other aircraft in the pattern. There was no vibration so I elected to fly back to home base at ZZZ1 without incident. Upon shut down I discovered that the prop was badly bent and partially shaved off. I called ZZZ tower to insure they knew how to reach me and encouraged them to check for FOD on the runway. I usually complete GUMPS at least twice and sometimes three times in the pattern and on final. I can only assume that my concern with the gusting crosswind distracted me from completing my procedures. I also believe that mentally I switched landing flaps for gear down in the procedure. Fatigue after aggressive steep turns; lazy 8s; 8s on pylons may also have contributed.

A fatigued TB20 pilot intended to practice an engine out spot landing but failed to lower the landing gear. He realized the error when the prop struck the runway as he went around; diverting to his home field.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During my preflight cockpit setup; I tested the Crew Oxygen system. While depressing the 100%/Test button on the oxygen mask; I noticed that the Crew Oxygen pressure on the overhead panel indicated 0 PSI. When I released the press to test button; the pressure went back up to 1700 PSI. I checked the other two masks in the cockpit and found the same issue. I wrote up the issue and maintenance came out to check the oxygen bottle in the forward cargo compartment. The mechanic found that after servicing the day before; the oxygen bottle valve had only been cracked open; not fully opened. He corrected the situation and we verified proper operation of the crew oxygen system.

The Captain of a B737 discovered the crew oxygen system failed to maintain pressure during the pre-flight check. Maintenance found the bottle valve only cracked open. When fully opened the system checked properly.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight arrived with a battery powered wheelchair in pit 2. For some unknown reason the 2 batteries were removed from the chair and just sitting in the pit. No battery box. Prongs not covered. When we delivered it to the customer she was clearly distraught and shocked that we would take apart her husband's wheelchair without their permission or direction. With her instruction we were able to reinstall the batteries. The batteries were handled incorrectly; which could have led to a dangerous situation.

Ramp Agent reported battery powered wheelchair in cargo pit with batteries improperly removed and transported.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After experiencing some abnormal engine parameters I turned back toward my departure airport. As a precaution I secured the left engine in flight. On about a 5 mile final Tower asked me to do a 360 to follow another aircraft. I informed them unable due to being on a single engine. I did not feel there was any danger or need for emergency vehicles upon landing and therefore no need to declare an emergency. However; I did not want to engage in any unnecessary maneuvering.

A C414 pilot secured an abnormally running engine after takeoff and returned to the departure airport but did not declare an emergency.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 1300

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

I had been flying with a CFI for 2 hours before leaving a CPPP [Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program] for home. I checked the oil level before the dual flight. I thought it read five quarts. I checked the oil level before take off for the flight home. I thought I read five quarts on the stick. While idling and waiting for take off an oil warning light lit up. I found low pressure on the oil pressure gauge and a high oil temp reading. I notified ground control of the problem taxied back to the ramp and shut down. Checked the oil level again. I again thought it read five quarts. No evidence of oil loss on the belly or under the cowl. I added three quarts of oil. The stick then read six quarts. Upon restart the oil pressure and temp were normal. I need to check the oil level better. This oil stick does not show a good level when the engine has been running. Adding a quart has NO downside. I need to do a better preflight and look very closely at the oil dipstick.

SR20 pilot reports low oil pressure while waiting for takeoff clearance and taxis back to the ramp. Dip stick oil quantity indicates five quarts as it had previously. Three quarts are added and the dip stick indicates six quarts and engine run up indicates normal pressure.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned a meet on Aircraft X. Prior to meeting this aircraft; I was with my partner for the shift working an inbound item on a meet for Aircraft Y for a Datalink Fault. Aircraft Y had a morning departure after arrival. I left Aircraft Y to meet Aircraft X leaving the inbound item on Aircraft Y open for the time being. Upon meeting Aircraft X I serviced oils and my partner went to check the logbook for any inbound items. Concerned with the inbound on Aircraft Y I did not get a chance to enter the oil servicing into the logbook on Aircraft X. I also accidentally left a tool used to open the cans of oil for servicing in the inlet of the #2 engine. I was notified of the issue and the maintenance team removed the tool from the inlet of Number 2 engine prior to departure.The shift occurred during extreme cold conditions and due to working [another aircraft] I was assigned that night with my partner I developed a cold. I felt under pressure with the inbound item on Aircraft Y and did not want the aircraft to catch a delay for the morning flight in case it had to be placed on MEL (Minimum Equipment List).I have contacted [Maintenance Control] to notify the issue with the oil servicing logbook entry for Aircraft X. A logbook entry and IOA block entry were made and entered into Workbench. The tool left in the Number 2 Engine inlet was removed prior to departure. I will be in better communication with my shift leads to adjust my workload and assistance.

Maintenance Technician reported not entering the service done into the aircraft logbook and leaving a tool in the inlet of an engine.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We encountered severe turbulence on descent from FL240 - FL200. It was reported by ATC as moderate about 20 seconds prior to entering the turbulence.  After receiving the weather report from ATC; the Captain immediately turns the Fasten Seatbelt sign on and made a PA.While he was making the PA we entered the turbulence around FL240. The turbulence we encountered fit the book definition of severe turbulence. Some navigational deviation as well as altitude deviations may have occurred during the turbulence episode. One Flight Attendant was taken to the hospital for evaluation.Earlier warnings by ATC if they have the information.

An aircrew while on descent for landing encountered severe turbulence. One flight attendant was injured enough to require hospital care. The reporter stated that earlier warning by ATC would have been helpful.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 51; Flight Crew Total 1431; Flight Crew Type 283

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After landing Runway 33; I exited on Taxiway K. Tower did not hand me off to Ground; so I called Tower for taxi instructions. After no reply from Tower; I switched to Ground and requested taxi instructions. After no reply from Ground; I switched back to Tower; and Tower instructed me to 'Taxi to the GA ramp via A; B.' I proceeded along Taxiway A and turned off my beacon/strobes (single switch) to avoid blinding effect. My nav/position lights and taxi lights (nose and wing tips) were all illuminated.I did not see Aircraft Y until starting my turn onto Taxiway B. From the angle; it appeared Aircraft Y had been taxiing in parallel to (or nearly parallel to) my direction of travel on Taxiway A. At no time did I hear taxi instructions issued to Aircraft Y.Because Tower provided my taxi instructions; I was not listening to Ground. When talking to the Tower controller after the event; I mentioned that he appeared to be working multiple frequencies. He verified that he was; and that both aircraft received taxi instructions on different frequencies (me on Tower; Aircraft Y on Ground).There was no damage to either aircraft. We both stopped short of contact between the two aircraft. Once Aircraft Y cleared Bravo to continue taxi to Runway 33 via A; I completed my turn onto Taxiway B and parked in the GA tie-down area. During this final stretch; Tower asked me to call him via landline; at which time I answered his questions for his safety report.

GA pilot reported a ground conflict while the Local Controller was working both Tower and Ground frequencies.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207.58; Flight Crew Total 5429.08; Flight Crew Type 5429.08

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

On a 14 mile final Runway 24R LAX Airport [at] 4300 MSL I spotted a drone approach another airplane at our 10:00 position on parallel final RWY 25R off their right wing.  Drone then turned and flew off of our left wing tip opposite direction at an estimated distance of 300 feet.  It appeared to be a silver quad propeller drone but not totally positive.

Air carrier Captain noticed a drone within 300 feet of their flight path during final approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We picked up [the aircraft at ZZZ]. Upon picking it up there were a few minor issues that were passed on to us by the previous crew through the crew turn over checklist. These items were:-Missing 2 pitot covers-Left engine has a slow oil drip-First officer ALT Light inoperative-Left Rudder pedal Captain side hits side wall-Left lavatory door able to move backwards and forward-3rd seat back First Officer side missing knob-Engine Cowling screw missing on left engine.In accordance with SOP procedures; minor issues are not generally written up; but passed along to maintenance and management personal verbally over the phone.Throughout the week we discovered several additional minor issues with the aircraft that I relayed to the Captain which he in turn relayed to the company. I relied on his decision that the aircraft was still good to fly based on the issues it had.All of these items were sent to the company via email to make sure all items were properly relayed. To my knowledge [maintenance] did not report all; but did report some of these issues verbally to maintenance. [Maintenance] has told me he has submitted the email in question already so I will not do the same. I will update this report further if I can think of anything else useful. I will also make sure in the future the Captain relays all issues to maintenance verbally.I believe a better procedure is needed to deal with minor mx issues. Verbally handing this many issues over the phone would have been difficult for mx to grasp each issue without forgetting about some. Yes verbal communication is needed; but a written documentation may be needed as well that will comply with company SOPs; and FAA regulations.

Corporate First Officer reported that company SOP was that minor issues are not generally written up; but passed along to maintenance and management personnel verbally by phone. The First Officer believes a better procedure is needed to deal with minor maintenance issues.


AC Generation Indicating and Warning System

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We initially had an issue with GPWS message when we switched power from external to APU. Circuit breaker popped an we called Maintenance. They were able to fix the problem and reset the circuit breaker. After that all was normal until we rotated and got to about 100-200 FT off the ground and we started to hear a very loud noise while climbing. The Captain checked the electric page and saw the ADG was deployed. We finished climbing out on the SID to 7;000 FT. Informed ATC of the situation and ran the QRH. We requested to return. We finished the flight without any other problems or incidents.

On the ground we shut down the aircraft at Gate XX after receiving ground power. We left the gate area to get food and came back to the airplane powered up the aircraft and then a few minutes later started the APU. Once we transferred the power from the ground to the APU we had a hard transfer and then noticed we had a windshear and GPWS fail status message and then we checked the circuit breaker panel and noticed that the GND PROX WARN circuit breaker was popped. Notified Maintenance and they fixed the problem. We then pushed back from the gate and taxied to Runway 4R. Once we were airborne at about 100 FT and when the First Officer called for gear up we heard a loud nose thinking it was the nose gear. After the gear was up and locked noise still persisted checked the electrical EICAS page and noticed the ADG was deployed. We notified dispatch and ATC that we then needed to air return to ZZZ. We ran the QRH for inadvertent ADG deployment and landed safely back in Detroit with all systems operating normally.Cause: Possible bad power at the Gate XX.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported a loud noise on initial climb and elected to return to the departure airport.


Thunderstorm; Windshear; Turbulence; Rain

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 13

Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

I attempted the ferry flight of a twin engine aircraft; and a student to the Santa Fe Municipal Airport. I was acting as PIC for the mission while the student was restricted to co-pilot duties having not yet passed his commercial multi-engine check ride. The student had logged 23.7 hours of training time in the twin at the time of the ferry flight. The flight was conducted under VFR with flight following. The first leg of the flight was completed with a landing without incident. The FBO was closed so the only service was fuel. No food was available. I refueled and proceeded to the Northwest my next stop. The intent was to proceed directly to Santa Fe prior to the expected buildup of thunderstorms in the vicinity of Albuquerque and Santa Fe. As we approached; the co-pilot complained of great discomfort from hunger and asked me several times to stop for something to eat. I elected to land at an intermediate airport rather than continue with a student co-pilot who was hungry and stressed. By the time we returned to the FBO; the weather had deteriorated over Albuquerque and Santa Fe to the point that I decided to wait to see of conditions improved later in the day. Before sunset the weather conditions appeared to improve and I elected to depart for Santa Fe. We encountered bands of rain and clouds between there and Albuquerque but easily maneuvered around them. However; a large cell was encountered over the Corona VOR forcing me to deviate west and then northwest toward Albuquerque. At that time the largest cell was to our east. I chose to climb to 12;500 to ensure terrain clearance in the event of severe down drafts. About 12 Miles east of ABQ we picked up flight following from approach. I chose to fly northeast; just east of Interstate 25. At that point the cell I had earlier avoided had moved directly over Santa Fe. We were in moderate turbulence and struggling to maintain altitude. Radio communications were becoming difficult with ATC being very busy and our contact sporadic. In addition; the student was exhibiting great stress because of the deteriorating weather. He was also exhibiting a decreasing ability to communicate or function effectively in English. I elected to [descend] and land as soon as possible and told ATC of my intentions to land at Los Alamos. I was advised that a TFR was in effect at that airport. At this time I became aware that I was becoming hypoxic with deteriorating vision and increased fatigue. I was aware that Center had tried to communicate with us but the transmission was garbled. I used my iPad sectional to locate another airport nearby and found E14 just north of Espanola. I could see the vicinity of E14 was clear of thunderstorm and decided to turn directly toward the airfield to avoid both terrain and thunderstorm activity. I elected not to declare an emergency with the airfield in sight and calm winds. Also; my vision improved and extreme fatigue dissipated as we descended in preparation for landing. The landing was uneventful and I was advised that I should call ABQ center. The aircraft was recovered the following day. I made a call to Albuquerque Center and was advised that a possible deviation had occurred. I was also advised that a report would be generated and that Flight Standards would be contacting me. I notified my superiors and was interviewed at length by the Santa Fe Site Manager. My interviewer covered the entire flight from tasking to final landing. He then asked me to identify where my decision-making had led me into a situation where I felt forced to land as soon as possible in mountainous terrain; in bad weather; risking a violation of restricted airspace while possibly suffering from hypoxia. I was able to identify two primary points in the flight. The first point was the decision to proceed to Santa Fe without a solid idea of developing weather conditions. I launched with a tired and nervous student co-pilot and was also experiencing fatigue. These factors combined tocloud my judgment and caused me to make poor decisions in ever-deteriorating conditions. In retrospect; I should have elected to stay at Roswell or; at the very least; contacted my superiors for guidance. I now know I would have been advised to stay at Roswell for the night and proceed in the morning. My interviewer also made clear to me that I could have elected to turn to Roswell or land at Albuquerque at any time prior to becoming trapped North of Santa Fe. The second point was to fail to simply turn around and proceed back to Albuquerque and request vectors for an approach for landing; upon finding Santa Fe weather unacceptable. My interviewer asked me about my decision to proceed to E14 rather than toward Albuquerque. My only response is that I did not know what was behind me and I had a visual on a clear airfield. The stress of the flying situation; the perceived difficulty with communications; and the lack of support by the stressed student caused me to focus on the nearest possible out. My interviewer pointed out that the decision to proceed to Los Alamos; after finding Santa Fe unusable; was an error in judgment. I could have turned toward Albuquerque and requested vectors for an approach or made a visual approach to Double Eagle had that airfield been clear.My interviewer's immediate response was to advise that he was recommending me for remedial training in Weather; Restricted Airspace; Crew Resource Management; inadvertent-flight-into IMC; aeromedical factors and aeronautical decision-making. He also stated that I would be restricted from ferry operations until that training was completed as well as being closely monitored on all cross-country student flights. Conclusion: The ferry flight and possible deviation R-5101 is a vivid personal lesson on the dangers of flying under stress while experiencing a great desire to get to the destination. I also learned that the combination of deteriorating weather; possible hypoxia; fatigue; and decreased crew resource management might occur quickly and without clear indication. I understand my responsibilities and readily accept the requirement for additional training.

An instructor pilot ferrying a light twin to SAF unexpectedly encountered thunderstorms and; while deviating; climbed to 12;500 ft; entered restricted airspace; and inadvertently entered IMC flight.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

[Two Maintenance technicians] were called to go on a road trip that had a left emergency exit door squeal. We were told that we would be the only 2 people going on the road trip. We were dispatched via a chartered plane. After boarding the aircraft and reviewing the logbook; we determined that we needed to run the engines and pressurize the aircraft. During the pressurization there was a notable noise coming from the left overwing emergency exit door lower side. We contacted Maintenance Control to update them and told them that we were going to need to open that door and remove it and check the condition of the seal. We asked them for an AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) reference and they stated that we would be using AMM 52-21-11. We went into the aft cargo pit and pinned the [slide inflation] bottle; then proceeded to the cabin and disarmed the door and pinned it. We removed the door and checked the seam and cleaned it; then reinstalled the door; rearmed the door and removed the safety pin. Then we went into the aft cargo pit an unpinned the bottle and closed up the access panel and had the aircraft back into a normal configuration. We ran the engines and pressurized the aircraft again and found no leaks or noises coming from the left overwing emergency exit door. We used the AMM 52-21-11 reference for this task. At no time were we aware of a Job Card that could have been used for the removal and installation of the overwing exit. Prior to leaving on the road trip a question came up as to whether Inspection would be coming on the road trip or not. It was determined by the Duty Manager that Inspection would not be going. After we had returned from the road trip the Inspection Department notified us that there should have been an Inspector present during the installation of the overwing exit door. Assumptions that inspection would not be needed proved to be wrong as the overwing exit door needed to be removed and reinstalled. Send an inspector on a road trip if you think you might need one or not.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

Two Maintenance technicians were flown to an outlying station to repair a maintenance defect. After they completed the work; and returned to the home station; they were advised that the work they performed should have been verified by an Inspector.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

On departure out of ZZZ was given a heading after taking off and to level at 6;000 feet. I turned to the heading and let the nose [go] below the flight director to try and give an easier level off. At first I reduced the throttles manually; but as we were also looking for traffic ahead I let go of the throttles while looking outside and ended up speeding up to about 265 knots before realizing it. I immediately pulled the throttles back and added back pressure.I believe I underestimated how rusty I might be from barely flying this month. Going forward I'm going to rely more on following the flight director much closer; especially because of how little I'm flying.

Air carrier Captain had an airspeed deviation and cited being rusty due lack of flying as contributing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 4858; Flight Crew Type 110

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

An equipment change inside of an hour before departure; efforts to launch the flight as scheduled; a new crew pairing and a misinterpretation of a hand written note along with cockpit distractions were contributing factors to an altitude deviation during initial climb. I set the captains side altimeter just before I had to turn off avionics prior to engine start. The truncation in cockpit set up was due to passengers boarding the aircraft and to conserve battery power from prior maintenance performed on the aircraft since a start without external power was to be performed. The copilot shut the door and I began starting engines. Upon arrival of the co-pilot to the flight deck I was completing engine start and powering up avionics when he began reading the ATIS and clearance from a handwritten note laid on the pedestal. The co-pilot assumed that none of the altimeters had been set and began setting them from right to left to what he believed was the correct interpretation of my handwritten note. I was distracted with a headset malfunction on my side. My note read 29.74 and he interpreted it to read 29.24 a difference of .50 inches of mercury. He did not verify the resulting altimeter reading with field elevation or obtain positive confirmation from me nor check it against the recorded ATIS in order to clarify. A second chance for both pilots to catch the mistake would have taken place during the flight instrument check under the performance of the taxi checklist. The flight instruments were checked but I glanced at the altimeter setting and noticed the ending four and assumed nothing had changed since I set the altimeter prior to engine start. The departure was normal with the exception that ATC allowed us to level at 3000' then issued a climb to 4000' and upon reaching 4000' notified us of that the current altimeter setting was 29.74 and that we were 700' high and to descend immediately for traffic to 4000'. The co-pilot immediately changed my altimeter as I was descending and we did not experience a TA or and RA on TCAS and no traffic was observed outside that we could see. From the crews perspective there was no loss of separation. ATC issued no further instructions to call the facility manager and the balance of the flight was completed without further incident. At the conclusion of the flight I debriefed the co-pilot on the events that had transpired and over the next day or so we both had the opportunity to think about what we could have done differently to avoid the chain of events. Both of us have reviewed standard operating procedures and proper checklist operations relative to the appropriate checks prior to flight. In addition; crew pairing considerations will be taken into closer account in the future along with taking a delay when circumstances such as these encroach on sufficient time to allow for readying the aircraft for flight.

B350 Captain reported an incorrect altimeter setting before departure resulted in a 700 feet overshoot on intermediate level off.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 6600; Flight Crew Type 1800

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

After working hard with dispatch and coordinating with a hospital; I was repositioning from ZZZ to pick up a critical patient in ZZZ1 to fly to ZZZ2. There was a lot of emphasis to get airborne and en route as fast as possible to meet an ETA. Taxing out it was snowing and we had 1 1/2 miles of visibility and a 2300 feet ceiling and 2 inches of light snow on the runway. After announcing that I was taxing out and later announcing on Unicom that I was taking the runway I heard no reply over Unicom/CTAF. We had blowing snow and a 6051 foot runway; after putting the throttles up and rapidly approaching V1; I saw a set of head lights from a snow plow that had just turned around at the end of the runway I made a quick call telling him to hold his position with no reply. The plow driver saw me and pulled over. He had entered the runway mid field and I could not see him due to the snow he was kicking up and the fact that the county snow plow lacked good lighting. I lifted off mid field using a soft field technique to avoid any plowed rows of snow. I accelerated and comfortably flew over the snow plow who was waiting at the end of the runway. There were no NOTAMs for snow removal and I wouldn't think they would be out plowing for such a small amount of snow. I believe after I taxied out past our hangar the plow past behind me at a 90 deg angle on a taxi way that meets the runway mid field he then headed away from me so we both had our backs to each other. I did not want to become contaminated with snow on the wings so emphases was to go. Looking down the runway I thought I saw a set of tire tracks on the runway from the night pilot who stated he drove the runway. I feel if the plow had a radio with the CTAF frequency available and was making calls this would not have had happened. The county looks at this airport like it is just another duty to clear another section of concrete of snow. We have a base located at ZZZ and county is trying to plow the runway more often due to the high amount of flights that we are doing out of this uncontrolled airport. If there was a training program in place for plow drivers or if we had some company personnel watching the runway with a radio or I just elected to have higher personal weather minimums this would not have happened; an active NOTAM would have helped too.

Air taxi Captain reported that on takeoff from ZZZ when it was snowing he noticed a snow plow at the departure end of the runway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Our duty day started at ZZZ Gate XXX with Aircraft X. This aircraft already had a maintenance issue with a radio altimeter RA1 fault. A few minutes after our scheduled departure time we were completely boarded and ready to go when [Maintenance Control] informed us this aircraft was grounded. ZZZ Maintenance concurred and informed us that we will have to deplane Aircraft X and go next door to Gate YYY and take Aircraft Y which was arriving in about 20 minutes. When we finally arrived at Aircraft Y; we noticed the inbound crew completely shut down this aircraft because they were not aware we were taking this aircraft to ZZZ1. We then completed our normal power-up; preflight and loading procedures. After push back and engine start up we got a FCU1 fault ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor). I set the parking brake and we proceeded with the ECAM procedure with reference guidance described in our QRH . The ECAM procedure was successful and then we taxied to RWY XXL for our takeoff. During the initial part of our takeoff roll I was the Pilot Flying and I set takeoff power for a FLEX takeoff. My First Officer confirmed takeoff power was set. It was then that I noticed and felt a slight surging; and a tendency of the aircraft nose turning left. I immediately corrected the aircraft nose back to centerline using my rudders. It was then one second later that the aircraft nose abruptly went back to approximately 30 degrees left of centerline. I immediately initiated a low-speed Rejected Takeoff while bringing the aircraft nose back to centerline. I made my PA to tell our passengers to remain seated. I also briefly informed our passengers and crew what happened and why I elected In the interest of safety to discontinue our takeoff. We taxied the aircraft back to our new gate with no other incidents. After shutting down both engines and securing our aircraft we noticed In the E/WDU lower ECAM display in the class II messages that both ENG 1 FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) and ENG 2 FADEC were displayed in the lower right of the display...something I have never seen in my +XX years of flying the A320. ZZZ Maintenance noted this class II message and took the aircraft maintenance logbook with my RTO write up.

We were cleared for takeoff; set the power per SOPs and began the takeoff roll. Immediately the aircraft veered to the left. The Captain; as the Pilot Flying; corrected course and brought the aircraft back to center line. The takeoff continued normally until; what I would estimate; about 70 knots and then the aircraft veered even harder to the left and that is when the Captain rejected the takeoff. I don't really have an explanation as to why the event occurred. The power was set correctly and all engine indications showed stable thrust. When the aircraft veered to the left a second time; I thought it a good decision to reject the takeoff. I thought the decision to reject was a good one.

A319 flight crew report nose gear steering issue during takeoff roll.


Beechcraft Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 2000

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

While flying a survey mission over the area at 15;500 ft VFR we saw a small drone flying below us at about 14;500 ft.  The drone was about the size of DJI drone and gray in color.  It was moving south as we were going north; so we didn't have much time to make out the exact size.  We immediately reported to TRACON.  For the remaining two hours of our survey mission we did not see it again.

A VFR pilot in cruise flight at 15;500 feet noticed a small UAS about 1000 feet below them flying in the opposite direction.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Approaching LOC intercept to ILS 25L LAX we were made aware of several other A/C on approach including 757 ahead of us for 25L. We were sequenced in behind the 757 very tight at just 3nm spacing. I attempted to add spacing by squaring the turn and slowing early but was told by Approach to turn to 320 and intercept; cleared the approach. Soon after intercepting the glide slope we hit minor turbulence that we assumed was the 757 wake. Within 10 secs the turbulence was so great that the A/C was temporarily uncontrollable (not responding to manual stick inputs). This was followed by an aural warning advising us that we had a NAV ADR disagree and a NAV STBY AOA fault. It also advised us we had reverted to Alternate Law and had manual trim only. We chose to continue the approach as the A/C was configured and back under control. I asked for flaps full and landing checklist. FO was reading over the faults delineated on the EICAS and apparently didn't hear my call for full flaps. We completed the check list but then somewhere around 500ft the A/C advised us that we were not in full flaps as we had programmed. We selected full and made an uneventful landing.At the gate I called LA approach and they said that there was a new rule now that made the 757 just another large A/C and that they only needed 3nm for spacing. He then apologized for the fact that we were 3.15nm in trail with 7nm spacing to the A/C behind us. The bottom line is that there is NO WAY that spacing should be just 3nm behind a 757! This upset knocked out the Normal flight control logic of the A319. Do we not remember the [A300] that went down in NY due to wake turbulence! In the throes of the upset; with the A/C not responding to inputs for a short time; all I could think of was 'STAY OFF THE RUDDERS'. One suggestion: End this new minimum separation rule for the 757!

Reporter stated he learned later that the angle of attack vane was found to be physically broken; which was the cause of the reversion to alternate law.

A319 flight crew reported experiencing a momentary loss of control following a wake vortex encounter in trail of a B757 on approach to LAX.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 748; Flight Crew Type 400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

At 6000 feet MSL in cruise; I attempted to plug an adapter into my cigarette lighter to aid in charging an iPad using my Garmin pilot app in flight for weather. As I placed the adapter into the socket and turned it slightly to better align the wires to keep it from conflicting with any other aircraft systems; (i.e. flap handle and my knees); there was an immediate short which took my EDM 830 engine monitoring system off line and my Garmin 430w began to display an info box which stated dead reckoning only. I immediately [advised ATC]; unsure what might fail next and wanted to make ATC aware of any issues I might have as well as preparing for any eventual help I may need. Then I noticed that my autopilot GNSS steering was displaying a fault by a blinking light; knowing that this was from the GPS system fault; I immediately switched this from GPS to heading; which kept the autopilot working and following my heading bug and not the GPS track from the 430w. This kept the autopilot flying the airplane wings level in IMC and allowed me to begin to deal with the [situation]. The 430w quickly reoriented itself and within a minute began to display normal function; I again switched the GNSS button back to GPS which then allowed the autopilot to follow the flight plan loaded into the equipment. This to me was a huge factor in allowing me to assess the situation and determine my course of action. ATC asked me to say intention; I relayed my panel information at the time and elected to continue the flight toward VFR conditions which I knew was well ahead of my current position. This to me was much safer than trying to do an approach into an airport that almost certainly in my current position; in the mountain area of West Virginia; was low IFR. The engine continued to run strong and showed no signs of any issues; based on basic engine sound and remaining engine instruments on the panel. I continued to my destination airport and researched the cause of the [issue] and found a blown 30amp in line fuse as part of the cigarette lighter; replacing the fuse all systems were back to normal; which at this time was only the EDM 830. The actual [situation] was handled extremely well by my controller at the time; he was calm; kept everybody else quiet while he clarified my situation; once he understood my issues and my intentions he let the next controller in line know my situation; it's a true blessing to have these folks there when you need them; their training and professionalism really pays off to those in the clouds.

BE19 pilot reported losing a number of electrical components when he plugged his iPad into the cigarette lighter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 139; Flight Crew Total 3165; Flight Crew Type 3165

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 3878; Flight Crew Type 1318

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

High speed abort.Captain at controls.Cleared for takeoff and Tower advised aircraft on 5 mile final as we approached the RWY (Runway). Approximately 1/4 way down runway into our takeoff roll; Challenger announced going around left side. At approximately 1/2 way down runway into our takeoff roll; Tower directed us to abort our takeoff. We were in the high-speed regime at approximately 115 kts. I could see the jet going around on our left abeam; in my peripheral vision as we were aborting.Maximum reverse application w/ maximum brakes. Uneventful abort; cleared runway onto Taxiway F and brought jet to a stop. Manually held brakes while running all applicable checklists. 2 MLG (Main Landing Gear) trucks reached 610 C; others approximately 590 C. Brake temp cooling chart referenced 35 mins used; brakes took approximately 50 min to cool to 270 C. In the meantime; ZZZ Fire-Rescue examined MLG. No evidence of overheat. Conferred with [Maintenance Control] for any further guidance. Later; Maintenance came to the jet; examined MLG per [Maintenance Control] guidance and gave us a thumbs up.In the meantime; we had a conference call with Flight Ops Management and ZZZ Station Ops. Both gave us the ok to continue'.Maintenance Control sent us a new maintenance release; Dispatch sent Release 3. Brake temp left main was the highest temp; at approximately 240 C when we began taxi. No noticeable increases.We departed ZZZ; kept gear down for approximately 5 minutes til all MLG brakes were below 200 C and decreasing. Retracted gear and continued to ZZZ1 via the flight plan.As a side-note; we received an ACARS message at approximately 7;000 ft.; on climbout; directing us to return to gate for another check. We leveled at 9;000 ft.; called Dispatch for clarification. He talked to Maintenance Control and surmised the return to gate message was an old message and may have been caught up in the ACARS system somehow and decided to transmit to us after takeoff roll. Anyhow; message was deemed as received in error and we got a thumbs up to continue OPS (Operations) normal to ZZZ1. I'm not sure if this is something systemic to Company 2 ACARS interface or not; but this issue might need to be examined."

Cleared takeoff at ZZZ with aircraft on 5 nm final. As we began our roll I heard the aircraft on final say they were initiating a go-around. Around 115 KIAS the Tower directed us to reject which we accomplished. We told the passengers to remain seated and we taxied clear to find a place to cool our brakes; get Maintenance to inspect our brakes/tires; and coordinate for a new maintenance release and Dispatch release while re-initializing our FMC. We accomplished all pre-flight; before push and before takeoff checklists again and accomplished an uneventful takeoff over an hour later and landing uneventfully in ZZZ1.

Air carrier flight crew reported a runway confliction resulted in an ATC directed high speed RTO. Captain also report a late ACARS message conflict.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 600

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was on a training flight with a student in Cessna [172]. We were dispatched; METAR was showing wind from 120 at 8 gusting to 14 at the moment; which is within the maximum demonstrated crosswind component described in POH; and also lower than the insurance policy.During the preflight we did not find any issue would affect safety of flight. Then; we followed the procedure described in checklist and the instruction from Ground Control as every other flight will do.We started to taxi with crosswind correction; everything was going normal and as expected. Suddenly I feel our tail is rising from the right side and the aircraft is flipping to the left and forward; then the propeller stroke on the ground as well as the left wing tip. At the moment we immediately bring power to idle and I made sure both of us are not on the brake or rudder. The whole aircraft was still driven to the left side; and turned 180 degrees into the grass near [the] taxiway.

Cessna 172 Instructor reported losing control of the aircraft while taxiing in crosswind conditions; resulting in a runway excursion and damage to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 7300; Flight Crew Type 4000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

The event was an improper traffic pattern into ZZZ which was uncontrolled Class G airspace at the time.We were on an IFR re-positioning flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and I was the non-flying pilot. The weather conditions were VFR with clear clouds and unrestricted visibility. The winds were approximately 300 degrees at 10 kts. The flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ would be quick; approximately 15 minutes flying time; so prior to takeoff from ZZZ1 the flying pilot and I briefed the flight as much as we could. We reviewed the weather; NOTAMs; and airport procedures at ZZZ knowing the Tower would be closed at the time of our arrival. Given the forecast weather at ZZZ we initially planned to land on Runway XX. While enroute and approximately 10 miles from the airport we heard other traffic operating at ZZZ and they were using Runway YYL. We decided to change runways and land on Runway YYL as well so as to not conflict with the other traffic. We reported the airport in sight and Approach cleared us for the visual approach and we entered the pattern from the North. At that point we changed to the advisory frequency and prepared for a right downwind entry for Runway YYL. We heard one other aircraft in the traffic pattern who just departed YYL and reported entering the left crosswind. After hearing that; I asked the flying pilot if he was sure that the traffic pattern for YYL was right traffic and we both felt that it was. I remembered during our pre-departure brief seeing on the airport diagram Runway XX right traffic pattern; as well as right pattern for Runway YY; but I later found out that it is right pattern for the parallel Runway YYR only. At this point we were entering the right downwind at 1;600 feet and we had the other traffic in sight which was entering the left downwind for YYL. We continued our approach and landing using a right traffic pattern and maintained communication and a constant visual with the other aircraft in the pattern and landed uneventfully. After landing we reviewed the airport information again and realized that it should have been standard pattern for Runway YYL and we mistakenly thought the right traffic pattern for YYR to be for both.Even though we reviewed the traffic pattern direction prior to departure from ZZZ1 we should have reviewed it again and verified it once the decision was made to change from Runway XX to YYL. We thought we were on the correct entry; but we questioned it after hearing the departing traffic was entering a left crosswind for YYL. We were established in the traffic pattern already and working on configuring the airplane for landing. Since we had a constant visual of the other aircraft and was announcing our position and intentions to the other traffic; we decided to continue with the approach and land. They had us in sight as well and announced they would be extending their downwind and would be following behind us.To prevent a recurrence of this I will be sure to be more vigilant of traffic pattern direction while approaching an airport especially an uncontrolled airport and as well; I will not be so focused on landing on one runway that I miss important information about other runways. Also; anytime there is a change of the runway in use we should review the airport information again. I should have spoken up once I had doubt about the traffic pattern and we should not of continued our approach until the correct pattern could be confirmed. We preferred to land runway XX since it was the longer runway; but we should have better anticipated that other traffic would be using YYL since it was preferential with the direction of the wind. This is not an excuse; but this was our first trip in several months due to the pandemic that is affecting our country. I believe a factor affecting the quality of my performance in this event was the lack of sharpness due to the slowdown in flying. This was also the last leg to a relatively long duty day; 11 hours. I believe a contributing operating factor was that we are used to arriving straight-in at this airport because it is normally a controlled Class C airport.

[Narrative contained no additional information.]

Corporate flight crew reported flying the incorrect pattern to a landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 4490; Flight Crew Type 235

Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 106; Flight Crew Total 5974

Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were in position for takeoff on Runway 1R at SFO with an A380 on final for 28R. The aircraft on 1L was cleared to takeoff with the 380 at approximately 3 mile final. ATC waited a few moments before clearing us for departure. We began the process with throttles just settling into takeoff thrust when clearance was cancelled. The Captain did not hear; so I loudly declared abort and ensured we were stopping. The aircraft had only just begun to move and we were fully stopped with the nose just at the beginning of Taxiway M. Configuration was rechecked and after the A380 landed we were cleared for takeoff from that position. No other issues noted.

Started takeoff roll and then clearance was cancelled due to an arriving aircraft. Very low speed reject. Subsequent takeoff received; continued take off from stopping point maybe around 50 feet from original takeoff point. Rest of flight uneventful.

Pilots report of rejecting a takeoff due to ATC cancelling takeoff clearance.