Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9.5; Flight Crew Total 277; Flight Crew Type 96

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Intended destination Poplar Grove/C77. Route VFR around southern tip of Lake Michigan. Encountered weather in the vicinity of Laporte/PPO. Proceeded south looking for a way around the weather. Turned back north after communicating with Grissom Approach and failing to find a way around the weather. In the vicinity of Starke County/OXI the overcast disappeared and went to clear. Lake Michigan shoreline was visible 20 miles north. We climbed to 6;500 FT in the clear and proceeded west over the weather. Contacted Chicago flight watch on 122.0 for weather at our destination. I also provided flight watch with a PIREP relating to observed conditions. As I proceeded west; flight watch advised us that ceilings were overcast around our destination. I turned back to the east to return to home base. Spoke with flight watch again and they advised us that at Marshall County/C75 conditions were clear below 12;000. Having adequate fuel with reserves I again turned west. I contacted Chicago Center for flight following and was given a transponder code. Upon arrival to C75 I found that the field was overcast. Contacting Chicago for weather they replied that C75 was still clear below 12;000. The AWOS at C75 was also broadcasting that same information. As my fuel level was low and there was not an airport within reasonable distance that was reporting clear conditions; I made the decision to enter the layer and land at C75. This was completed successfully. In my descent; I lost contact with Chicago. Approximately 15 minutes after landing I was met by a police officer asking us if we had just landed. Apparently they were contacted by Chicago. I had the officer observe the weather on the FBO display monitor and make an outside visual observation that indeed the AWOS was reporting incorrectly. The airport manager for C75 was contacted by myself and appraised of the fact that the AWOS was reporting incorrect information. He informed me that he was aware of the problem and had been aware of it for some time. He did not seem willing or able to remedy the situation. As this posed a significant hazard to my flight operations that day; please enter in to the NOTAMs that the AWOS at C75 is inaccurate. Flight watch and Chicago Center had no idea that the information they were giving to me was incorrect. Had it been know that the AWOS weather information was unreliable or if the AWOS had simply been disconnected or turned off; we would have returned to our home base with little effort or effect. My apologies for any problems that I may have caused. I would like to thank the folks at Chicago as they assisted professionally and promptly when needed.

The reporter states that he talked to the airport manager who reports that the AWOS at C75 has been sporadically reporting completely inaccurate weather; while at other times functioning flawlessly. The manager believes that the state is responsible for maintaining the AWOS; but they have been unresponsive.

PA28 pilot reports that the AWOS at C75 gave inaccurate information; which was also relayed to him by ZAU. The result was arriving at the airport above a solid under cast with insufficient fuel to go elsewhere. The decision was made to enter the layer and land; which was successful.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

[We] diverted to a nearby airport due to poor visibility and lack of alternate fuel. Took off and proceeded to our destination. [We] went around due to deteriorating visibility and no sight of runway. On go around; alerted by EICAS message and saw center hydraulic quantity rapidly decreasing (about .37). [We] leveled at 7;000 FT; coordinated with approach to return to our alternate. Lowered landing gear as a precaution; and fluid level decreased to .06. Captain declared emergency; notified Dispatch; and coordinated with the flight attendants for the emergency landing. I ran the QRH checklist. Shot a 12 mile final in VMC and we notified Tower to roll the AARF and that we planned to stop straight ahead due to total center hydraulic pressure failure. Uneventful landing; AARF confirmed brake temperature normal and tires OK. I talked with operations three times; but a tug did not arrive to tow us to the gate until 50 minutes after landing. Controllers all deserve an A grade: they couldn't have been more helpful and made this incident much easier to deal with as we ran the checklist and briefed the passengers and crew. AARF response and help was outstanding; as well. Unfortunately; I can't say the same for the company. Despite repeated calls; and even a cell phone conversation with Dispatch; we sat on an active runway at night; closing it down; for 50 long minutes. I feel safety was jeopardized for other arriving flights during a very busy time. Another Captain we met on the van; diverting behind us; told us he was within minutes of having to divert; with minimum fuel; because we were stuck on the runway. An emergency aircraft; holding on an active runway; needs to be removed promptly. Sadly; that did not happen.

B767-300 First Officer reports diverting due to weather and low fuel. Fuel is added and another attempt is made; this time resulting in a go around and an EICAS message for low Center Hydraulic system quantity. An emergency is declared and flight returns to departure (diversion) airport. Center system fluid is completely lost when the gear is lowered and the aircraft is stranded on the runway for 50 minutes waiting for a tug.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 7500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

This is no surprise......2 reports in 2 legs. The commonality is the Captain's deviation from SOPs and his weird idiosyncrasies. Everything he did was a distraction and different than what's normal. Both the working bunkie and I were talking; after the flight was over; about how all our attention was paid in watching him and trying to figure out what he was doing. I always look outside but was taken out of my game because of his behavior. At that stage; he had the automation hooked up but improperly. He had only LOC armed; not APP despite us being cleared for a visual. I had set the altitude for the marker. He then requested touchdown zone to be set. He was late on calling for the gear; said he didn't want the speed brakes armed etc. It was one abnormal thing after another and two of us had 100% attention on him. The non-working bunkie was doing nothing; nor did he have his head set on to listen to tower. That's when we got low and tower announced a low altitude warning.

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing CRM issues became low on final approach with a low altitude warning from ATC.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We were over LUVYN at 10;000 FT and were cleared to descend via the ILS 25L procedure. The pilot flying programmed the VNAV and we started our descent. We were approaching TAROC at 9;800 FT. The plate showed TAROC at 9;000 FT; I told the pilot flying we need to be at 9;000 FT at TAROC and he said we could be at or above 9;000 FT. We were crossing DYMMO 800 FT above the charted 8;000 FT and I again mentioned that we should cross DYMMO at 8;000 FT again the pilot flying said it was at or above 8;000 FT. We were crossing FUELER 800 FT above the charted 7;000 FT and then we crossed GATTE at the charted 5;000 FT. The rest of the approach was flown as indicated on the chart.We are trained and highly encouraged by our company to use the VNAV function. Some of the older aircraft FMS have very slow processors and sometimes have trouble meeting crossing restrictions. Many crewmembers have made this known to the company training department and the company continually strongly encourages the use of VNAV. I believe we should have manually flown the procedure to ensure we crossed the points at the charted altitudes.

When on the ILS 25L approach at LAX; the Captain elected to cross the intermediate segment fixes approximately 800 FT above the charted crossing altitudes. The First Officer advocated the need to cross at those altitudes; but the Captain disagreed; believing them to be minimum altitudes.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 320; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 320

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

I began the morning with a thorough preflight inspection of the Cessna 208 Caravan I would be flying that day to perform parachute operations. I verified that the engine oil was in the normal operating range. I departed on the first flight of the day. Upon climbout; I performed my daily routine engine checks at 6;000 FT MSL. The ITT; NG; fuel flow; propeller RPM; torque; oil pressure; and oil temperature were all within normal range. At 11;000 FT MSL; there was a loud 'bang' from the engine compartment followed by a residual 'screeching' noise. I began an emergency descent back into the airport. The fuel flow; oil pressure; and torque indicated '0;' so I began the standard emergency procedure for in-flight engine failure. I pitched for 80 KTS; turned the fuel selectors; fuel cutoff; and fuel condition to 'off;' and feathered the propeller. I landed the plane safely. Upon examination of the engine compartment; the Mechanic and I saw no evidence of engine oil or external damage to the engine. The fuel gauges were indicating approximately 500 LBS of fuel. There was no damage the airframe. Upon disassembly of the engine; the Mechanic found substantial amounts of metal shavings in the engine oil and significant damage to the free turbine. He stated; 'The problem was caused due to a catastrophic failure of the free turbine.' It was also noted that there was no chip detector installed on this PT6-A engine.

C208 Caravan pilot reported catastrophic engine failure that was later traced to the free turbine. He returned for a safe landing at departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X was enroute to BOI at FL130. I initiated the handoff to Big Sky with ample time for them to take it; but they did not. As the aircraft approached Big Sky North I called using the shout line for a handoff. I received no response and tried two more times elevating my voice as to hopefully get the attention of the Big Sky Controller. After no response; I told Aircraft X to turn 180 degrees left immediately to avoid Big Sky airspace. The pilot the asked; 'Was that for Aircraft X?' I replied 'Affirmative; turn 180 degrees left immediately to avoid Boise airspace. The pilot; not following my instruction; proceeded to tell me 'But I'm a Medevac' and asked what he should do and if the airport was closed. I repeated my clearance and told him that it was open but Big Sky would not take the handoff on his flight. The aircraft made its first turn on the boundary of Big Sky airspace then Big Sky took the handoff resulting in a loss of separation from airspace. We have been having a lot of problems with Big Sky not taking handoffs and Management is aware. The 'descend via' clearances put us at greater risk and add significantly to our workload on a sector that is already difficult.We need to seriously consider deleting or changing the 'descend via' procedures to stop at FL170 for BOI arrivals. Another alternative is to reclaim some of Big Sky's airspace vertically. This is becoming a major problem and needs attention.

ZLC ARTCC Controller reported an airspace violation due to the approach control not taking a handoff in a timely manner; and a late turn to avoid the airspace by the reporter.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I performed my postflight walkaround and apparently missed that there was engine blade damage on the number two engine. I totally missed it while doing my postflight and it cancelled the originating flight in the morning because of it. Lighting on the ramp was dark; and even though I had my flashlight with me; I failed to notice this. It came to my attention the next morning how the flight cancelled for something I should have caught the night before.

A B737 pilot failed to see blade damage on number two engine during post flight inspection.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While operating Aircraft X we received a 'Cell call' message on ACARS from our Dispatcher. The message informed us that we were NORDO and that we needed to contact center on Frequency X. In the 5 mins prior the radios were quiet. For the night in particular; we didn't find this to be that unusual because radio chatter had already been sporadic. Guard was tuned on VHF 2; however we turned it down due to unnecessary chatter earlier in the flight.As a procedure; guard should be tuned; and selected in VHF 2 with the volume turned up loud enough to be heard. If radio chatter becomes unnecessary and distracting then guard should be turned down for no longer than 5 minutes. This could alleviate any potential NORDO incidents in the future.

Air carrier Captain reported being NORDO and having 121.5 Guard frequency turned down because of unnecessary chatter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 9800; Flight Crew Type 6800

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

On a vector to intercept localizer; both FMGC's dropped all data and we lost NAV radios; maps; cabin pressure controller and managed speed. Declared emergency; took vectors to work the problem. First Officer emailed Dispatch looking for VFR. I manually inserted the ILS into the RMP; got a good ident; depressurized the aircraft; and flew an ILS with selected speed to a normal landing.

Approach assigned a turn off the arrival; vectoring for the ILS at 4;000 FT in IFR conditions. With turn to heading; I saw that my display now said map not available. I checked and saw that Captain's display also said map not available. Neither FMGC displayed navigation information. Then ECAM alarmed Cabin Landing Elev not set - use manual pressurization. We asked for vectors off approach to try to investigate situation. ACARS to Dispatch for closest VFR weather; Captain asked ATC for weather at nearby airports and declared Emergency Aircraft. Manually tuned ILS available on Captain's radio and set inbound course. [We] received good ident and DME asked for vectors to ILS. Manually depressurized aircraft to landing elevation; used selected speeds for approach and landing.

A320 flight crew reports dual FMGC failure during approach in IMC. The ILS frequency is successfully tuned using the RMP and the flight lands at destination after manually depressurizing the aircraft.


Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Logbook Entry; Human Factors

Following an emergency decent that resulted in deploying passenger oxygen masks and a diversion; the Captain made entries into the maintenance log to reflect known messages that were displayed on the ICAS that resulted in the emergency condition. There was a significant level of phone debriefing and discussions with Dispatch; Duty Managers; Chief Pilot; and Maintenance. I was working on ensuring passengers were taken care of; that Operations had a full understanding of the situation and was working with Dispatch on getting a new aircraft to us to take the passengers to their destination. In the span of events that took place I overlooked making a log entry re the failure of Row X CD and Row Y CD passenger oxygen masks to deploy. The paragraph below reflects the incident leading up to this point. 'While in cruise flight at FL390 the 'R BLEED DUCT' master warning occurred with subsequent bleed closure and loss of pressurization. Flight crew took immediate action following QRH reference; initiated an emergency decent to 10;000 FT MSL and alerted ATC and cabin crew of the issue. Our first course of action after stabilizing the decent and finishing the QRH procedure was to choose an emergency alternate airport for landing. We asked for ZZZ initially but ATC advised us that ZZZ was experiencing thunderstorms; we then quickly decided to proceed to ZZZ1 that was ahead of us and soon had the airport in sight while we were still above FL200. During the decent the cabin altitude continued to rise and eventually reached 10;000 FT prompting the 'CABIN ALT' master warning to occur around 17;000 FT. The flight crew took immediate action and followed QRH reference to deploy passenger oxygen masks and continued the emergency decent to 10;000 FT. Once we were in contact with the Approach Controller in ZZZ1 we preceded below 10;000 FT; and the cabin altitude soon was stabilized below 10;000 FT. We then requested vectors to land on Runway 22 which allowed us time to properly set up for a safe approach and landing. I took this opportunity to make a quick PA to the passengers advising them of the issue; our actions; that oxygen was no longer needed and our planned landing at ZZZ1. We landed under visual conditions and I requested that CFR crews remain with the aircraft to the terminal so that we could ensure the status of all the passengers. Once we were at the gate the flight attendants checked on all passengers. When the entire crew was satisfied everyone was okay we sent them into the terminal to await a further update. At this time I released the CFR crews from our position. Dispatch; Maintenance; and the Chief Pilot were then updated on our status.'While debriefing the event after the fact; it was brought to my attention that I did not write up Row X and Y. I realized it was an oversight at that time. The flight crew was saturated with tasks and debriefing following the event. My primary concern was passenger safety and comfort also I was ensuring Dispatch and Operations had detailed information about the event and our current status. In the process of discussing the event with various parties I overlooked the write up for the oxygen mask failure to deploy. This emergency occurred quickly and as with any emergency situation there are many pressing issues that happen after a safe landing. In the future I will personally develop a checklist to make sure that all maintenance and dispatch items are complied with. Having a checklist in the cockpit for post emergency operations would ensure flight crew; Operations; and Maintenance are all on the same page and would help flight crews provide the most detailed information while ensuring operational efficiency.

Following a depressurization event the Captain failed to write up the failure of the O2 masks in two passenger rows to deploy. The reporter cited distractions from multiple post event tasks as a contributing factor.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Manuals; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

The installed captain ADC [Air Data Computer] (left) mfg p/n [Manufacturer Part Number] was incorrect as per IPC although the [Air Carrier Part Number] was correct. The discrepancy was noticed while completing post job paper work. The correct part was then installed prior to the aircraft departing.

Maintenance Technician reported discovering wrong part listed in Illustrated Parts Catalog; error was fixed and correct part was installed instead.


Safety Related Duties; Deplaning; Boarding; Service

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Routine Inspection; Pre-flight; In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate; Taxi

I do not feel safe flying in an environment with passengers who do not wear their masks over their noses and mouths.  The Company's policy is not effective.  People should not be allowed to wear gaiters and bandannas.  Flights should not be booked full.  Flight attendants are not protected.  Look at the numbers of infected flight attendants since the loads have gone up.  Our Company is not notifying flight attendants in a timely manner when exposed.  This is outrageous.  I am absolutely 100% disappointed with the Company's lack of care for their frontline workers.

Flight Attendant reported feeling the company is not doing enough to protect the frontline employees during the pandemic.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Runway

I was working Local Control. Runway 5/23 was closed and several airport vehicles were working on that runway. Runway 13 was the advertised runway. I had first cleared an air carrier for landing; and shortly thereafter cleared a CRJ for take off. Ground Control had issued a Sweeper Runway 13 hold short instructions at the intersection of the runways. Ground Control then observed the Sweeper crossing the hold short line and immediately instructed the vehicle to 'stop' and then 'back up'. At this moment; the CRJ had just entered the runway and was beginning his take off roll. The landing air carrier was on short final. I observed that 1/3 of the vehicle had crossed the hold short line before it stopped and started to back up. The Sweeper never was on the runway. The Sweeper was back behind the hold short line before I could have issued landing and take off cancellations to both aircraft. I issued no instructions to either aircraft; as in my judgment that was the safest course of action. I have no recommendations. Both controllers involved appear to have handled the event as effectively as possible.

Local Controller described a momentary unauthorized runway entry event by an airport vehicle; the reporter noting he elected to not cancel a landing and takeoff clearance because the vehicle cleared in sufficient time.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft X was issued direct to PMPKN; one of C90's new STAR fixes.  The aircraft turned west towards PUMKN located in western Iowa.Leave everything alone and pronounce C90's new fix; PMPKN; 'Pimpkin.'

C90 FLM describes a situation where an aircraft is issued direct a fix but the aircraft turns towards another fix that is similar sounding but in a different state.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

[We] dispatched with inoperative auto speedbrakes due to continually displayed 'SPEEDBRAKE ARMED' status message. Delay in receiving final maintenance release due to late discovery of possible hydraulic leak. Maintenance did not inform me of the airplane's status until well into the problem. The hydraulic pumps were turned on per pre-start SOP because I was left out of the loop. Someone could have been injured. Fortunately; it was just a distraction as the problem was fixed. We pushed and received a final MRD. I checked it and the EICAS annunciations were as described in the maintenance release. We taxied to the assigned runway and were cleared for take off while lining up. I mentioned to the flying First Officer that we might not have the gear completely straightened out. The First Officer advanced power and we got a Takeoff Warning. I thought it was a gear steering issue caused by me so I delayed a second or two to see if it would resolve itself as the airplane moved forward a bit. It didn't so the takeoff was abandoned. Airspeed was not yet indicated so we were at least below 30 KTS IAS. Tower was notified and we turned right onto the parallel C. We called Dispatch and linked Maintenance Control in. They were asking about Circuit Breaker positions and such and I got the idea that they thought that we were going to attempt another take off. I had no intention of doing so. All flight controls and flaps were positioned correctly. Spoilers were all showing down. I couldn't see what caused the warning so I elected to return to the gate. Upon arrival to the gate the mechanics came aboard and quickly trouble shot the system. They determined that the aircraft had probably been deferred in error as the speedbrake actuator was mis-rigged. You could hear it activate whenever the throttles moved forward or back; a sound that one would normally only hear if the speedbrakes were actually armed or deployed. The distractions pre-push are typical. The RTO was at such a low speed that there was no threat and the brake temps did not indicate above 0 the entire time that we were in the airplane. The problem that I see with the situation is that for one; we are willing to Dispatch a B747 with that problem. Secondly; the required maintenance actions either were not correctly performed; the true problem was misidentified; or the MEL procedure was incorrect. In any case; the speedbrake actuator was actuating. This is not meant to cast maintenance in an unfavorable light. The Mechanics that met the airplane diagnosed the issue within a couple of minutes and said that the aircraft should not have been signed off in that condition. That was obvious in the outcome of the takeoff attempt. Imagine the confusion that we felt when presented with two EICAS messages relating to ground spoilers presented as normal and safe per MEL; being distracted by the body gear possibly being a little out of line and seeing a Takeoff Warning with the expected BIAS that we might momentarily get it and that it would quickly disappear. Reality is always stranger than the simulator. Fortunately; everything happened slowly; at low speed and was easily handled. Do we; as a company that prides itself on safety; really find value in dispatching our largest aircraft with these kinds of systems inoperative? It is unlikely that I will accept another B747 with this malfunction; all politics aside; it just seems unreasonable. The B747 isn't like the B727. Two many systems are interrelated in ways that are unknown to the pilots.

A B747 status display constantly indicated SPEEDBRAKE ARMED so maintenance MELed the system prior to flight but because the Takeoff Warning sounded; a slow speed reject was completed. The flight returned to the gate where Maintenance determined the speedbrake system should not have been MELed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 800

Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The Captain and myself where departing. At around 600 FT AFE there was a very loud bang and the aircraft had a significant yawing moment to the right. We both looked at the engine instruments and did not see anything indicating an engine malfunction. I kept flying the airplane and the Captain started to analyze the situation. My thoughts were a compressor stall or a bird strike which I shared with the Captain. About a minute later the Flight Attendant called up to the Captain and said that several passengers had seen a very large flame come out the back of the number 2 engine. All indications on every system where showing no issues. The plane was handling fine. The Captain had decided due to the very loud bang and the yawing moment plus the passenger assessment that we would return to the departure airport and not fly in the airplane. The Captain handled all duties as the non flying pilot and I flew the airplane. The Captain called Operations and advised them of our air return and that Maintenance should be expecting a possible bird strike and a definite overweight landing. ATC handled us back to [departure airport] with a successful landing. No emergency was ever declared because the Captain and I did not think it was necessary. The Captain handled the entire situation extremely professional and it was a very excellent example of CRM and doing what we are trained to do. After returning to the gate and Maintenance inspecting the airplane it was determined that it was not a bird strike but a very likely Compressor Stall.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]

A B-737 crew reported a compressor stall at 600 FT after takeoff so they returned to the departure airport where Maintenance determined the cause was an engine malfunction and not a bird strike.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

At cruise; we heard a bang from the back left of the airplane. We had normal indications on all instruments and synoptic pages; except for the electrical synoptic page. Gen 1 had erratic [voltage]; ranging from 3 to 14 and back very rapidly. All PFDs; MFDs; EICAS Display (ED); and the FMS began to flicker and go in and out. I was in favor of diverting initially. The Captain wanted to monitor and look into the situation before making a decision. The engine had a vibration and our displays continued to act up. We still had normal indications. Rather than continue; we came to an agreement to divert to [a nearby airport] and made an uneventful landing.After a maintenance run up we do not know why the issues occurred.

A CRJ-200 First Officer reported diverting to a nearby alternate after hearing a bang and noticing electrical anomalies.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On initial climb after departing ZZZ; Tower notified me of possible fuel leak or smoke. I immediately returned to ZZZ. Upon landing; we found an oil leak that was spraying on the right exhaust. We landed without incident or any aircraft damage.

BE-35 Pilot reported oil leak on initial climb and resulted in returning to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

PHX tower has a habit of clearing aircraft for takeoff when the preceding aircraft is not only still on the runway but soon after preceding aircraft was given takeoff clearance. This has resulted in experiencing wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft. On this day; we were cleared into position after a preceding aircraft began his takeoff roll. Before that aircraft was half way down the runway; we were cleared for takeoff. I delayed advancing the throttles until I was sure the preceding aircraft had departed the runway. Tower stated; 'Aircraft X; you were cleared for takeoff;' obviously wondering why we had not started our takeoff roll the moment he cleared us. When I saw we had adequate clearance; we started our takeoff roll.Rushing aircraft by the tower to comply with their clearances regardless of safety.Do not clear a aircraft for takeoff until the preceding aircraft has left the runway. Tower needs to understand that a clearance for takeoff means that they haven given us permission to advance our throttles. Only the Captain decides when to advance the throttles after the clearance; not the tower. PHX tower constantly rushes aircraft for takeoff resulting in wake turbulence encounters.

B737 Captain reported delaying takeoff for wake turbulence separation when cleared for take-off before the previous aircraft had lifted off.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 200

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was following tower's instruction to follow 405 freeway south and maintain 140 kts. Tower then called out traffic to me and called me out to the traffic. Both replied 'no joy'. Seconds later while looking for the traffic I saw it directly in front of me and beginning a hard bank to the west. I responded in kind with a hard bank to the east. I guess we were within a couple of hundred feet of each other at the same altitude. I recall thinking we almost made it into the news and thought about the folks below on the ground this almost accident would have taken out. I went over to the tower to discuss the event and was told a student on first solo cross country was not following directions and was making too many radio calls so additional traffic alert messages could not be heard by me.

The pilot of a single engine aircraft reported a near-mid-air-collision with another small aircraft near Renton; Washington. The other pilot was reported to not be following ATC directions as well as blocking radio traffic.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

A Cessna 182 was proceeding direct to DRK at 9000. At the time; I believed the highest upcoming Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) to be 9000 feet. I likely believed this because I misread the MIA chart that showed it to be 9900 feet. As the aircraft approached the area with the 9900 MIA; Albuquerque center called me asking if the aircraft could accept higher. At this point; I saw my mistake and immediately climbed the aircraft to 10000 feet. However; the aircraft was too close the area with the 9900 MIA; and entered it while still climbing to 10000 feet. The aircraft spent a few radar hits in the area before reaching 10000 feet.I should have payed closer attention to the MIA chart to verify what altitude would be required. Upon entering the area; I should have issued a terrain alert to the pilot.

ZLA ARTCC reported misreading Minimum IFR Altitude chart; contributing to an aircraft flying below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Ramp was unsure if [Hazmat] was loaded or not and item was held off for no show. Upon audit on arrival [at destination] item was found loaded in pit 6 with no bags in the pit to secure.

Ramp personnel reported Hazmat cargo not listed on DSTG [Departure Staging Guide] was incorrectly loaded in different cargo pit.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Level at FL390 numerous reports of turbulence enroute. Thunderstorms cells developed everywhere enroute; we were above them. Captain was flying. We were in continuous light/occasional moderate when out of the blue we hit severe turbulence. The aircraft started climbing and then descending 400-500 ft. Airspeed started jumping 20 to 40 knots. We hit the overspeed pole and [then] went to low speed. Captain pushed throttles to max thrust and held pitch down to regain airspeed. We lost 800 ft; then leveled at FL382. We reported to ATC and he replied no conflict issue.This incident was weather related; we did everything we could. Also; a good thing was we held the nose down to regain the airspeed that was lost. Also communicated with ATC so he was aware.

B737 First Officer reported encountering severe turbulence at FL390 that resulted in 20-40 knot speed deviations and a loss of 800 ft of altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 88.78; Flight Crew Total 15353; Flight Crew Type 88.78

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 875.32; Flight Crew Type 875.32

Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Upon arrival in ZZZZ; we were instructed to taxi on Taxiway E and hold short of the ramp since our gate was occupied. I was watching the activity on the ramp that was indicating a possible gate change to hard stand X. During that time with the parking brake set and while I was looking at the airport diagram the First Officer informed me that we had reached the 3-minute required cool down of the engines. I asked him to shut down engine 2. I instinctively followed his movements and noticed that he was holding eng1. Without thinking I said 'no no no' and as a result he moved the engine master from off back to on and the EGT momentarily entered the red zone. All other indications were normal and no ECAM or STATUS messages were displayed. I then asked the First Officer to shutdown engine 2 which he did. We taxied to hardstand X with no incident; shut down engine 1; and performed the parking and terminating checklists. We debriefed the incident and it was obvious that the First Officer was really affected by the mistake. After the last passengers deplaned; I called Maintenance Control to discuss the incident. Local Contract Maintenance also arrived because they were going to move the aircraft. I asked the crew to head to the hotel and I stayed with the airplane to make sure everything was taken care of. The EGT exceedance was considered transient and the required inspection was minimal so the airplane was available to return to service quickly and caused no delays. Later I met with the First Officer and we had a long conversation regarding what went on; the threats this pandemic had brought to us as a pilot group especially the fact that we don't fly much; what we both learned from the incident and what we could have done better next time.

Taxing to the gate; ramp told us to hold short of the ramp on [Taxiway] E.  While holding short of the ramp on E; I told the Captain that we had our 3 minutes for engine cool down.  The Captain told me to go ahead and shut down engine 2.  I ran my flow and instead of selecting engine master 2 I select engine master one.  The Captain saw that I had select the wrong one; and said; ' no no no'.  With the Captain saying that; I took that as put engine select one back to on.  I put the selector back to on and the engine stayed running but the EGT came up and momentarily touched the red arc.  Once we got to the gate; and accomplished all of the checklist and got the passengers off the plane the Captain called Maintenance and was talking with the local Maintenance guys on the situation.  He stayed behind to make sure everything was being taken care of properly and making sure Company Maintenance and local understood what had happened instead of just writing it up and walking away.  Kudos to the Captain!  I was disappointed in myself for making the mistake and during the debrief the Captain could see that.  I apologized to him for making the error that I did. We talked about it and he mentored me through it. I believe not flying that much in the past year do the pandemic played a factor into my error.  I am not blaming the pandemic; but do to not flying as much it's a link to the error.  Another link to the error; is I reverted to the last plane I flew.  We would shut down engine one while taxing in.  What I learned from this situation is that when you are not flying as much as you normally do; you really need to slow down and be more deliberate in your flying and flows.  Think what you are doing and what you will be doing next. Do more chair flying to help close the gap from not flying as much. Do to flying not as much before each trip I will review flows; procedures; and do more chair flying to keep this from happening again.

Air carrier flight crew reported the First Officer inadvertently turned off the number one engine rather than engine number 2 during taxi-in resulting in a momentary EGT spike. Both crew members cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On passing through 10;000 feet; the First Officer noticed the engine fail annunciator on the engine EGT display. The engine still had N1 rotation with no fuel flow. I [advised ATC] and asked for delay vectors to run our QRH engine failure checklist. We did one box pattern in doing our checklists and headed into land. Switching from Runway 7R to the longer Runway 8. On final I sent a quick ACARS to Dispatch we had an engine failure. Since we were task overloaded I gave the arrival check late. Which was on our way inbound on final. I finally had time to talk to the flight attendants but they were doing their arrival announcements. So I chimed them 4 times. The A continued with the announcement and I believe I talked with the B. I informed him we had an engine failure; it would be a normal landing and would we will be on the ground in 5 mins. The A called back up under sterile cockpit and talked with my First Officer. He asked what he needed to do. My First Officer said nothing we were landing normally just with one engine.We landed uneventfully on Runway 8 and taxied off. We stopped to run the [manual] for brake cooling. I talked with the fire chief and told him we didn't need any assistance. The numbers came back that we could taxi to the gate. Which we did. I didn't inform the passengers of the engine failure since I didn't feel the need to since we train for the situation and it's not a big deal and didn't want to cause alarm.The engine failed do to a fuel nozzle filter assembly had broken loose starving the engine of fuel thus causing the engine failure. We didn't chose to restart the engine since we were so close to the airport and it wouldn't have.

B737 Captain reported a failure of the engine fuel nozzle filter assembly during descent; resulting in an engine failure.


Other / Unknown; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Staffing; Manuals

APU team turned off APU and no ground power was available. APU team shut down aircraft at least two times. APU would not restart from over temp. Person doing the shutdown had no idea what he was doing and then acted like he could not speak English. Management was called and still no help; I was doing walk around and noticed power going off and on. Three times the emergency lights were on in the aircraft when I accessed the flight deck. APU person had no idea what the emergency lights did or use for.

Pilot reported APU was operated incorrectly; causing aircraft to be without external power; activating the emergency exit lights on three occasions.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passenger assigned to [seat] XX1 or XX2; sat in XX2. He requested several times to switch seats to the AFT FA for social distancing. During our briefing with the Gate; we witnessed her inform all passengers that our aircraft was at capacity in terms of social distancing and offered passengers to travel on a later flight. The Agent also called passengers up one by one and spoke to each passenger regarding their seat assignments. We had several passengers during our flight complain regarding our capacity. The specific passenger asked the AFT FA several times and she apologized and offered him to speak to the Gate Agent; he declined. After we completed our safety demo the passenger got buckled up and stretched completely out in YY3/4. The AFT FA asked me to follow up with this passenger and I spoke to him apologizing; stating that row YY was blocked to allow social distancing for the FA's. He was very curt and rude when asked to return to his assigned seat for safety. I also explained that we were actively taxing to the runway and that it is a federal regulation to [not] move around the cabin at this time. I notified the Captain that reassured me that I handled it properly. He was also aware that we were over capacity in terms of social distancing and told passengers that he would get them as quickly and safely as possible to their destinations during his welcome announcement at the gate. He asked me to document. The passenger requested my name as he exited the aircraft.Several passengers were dissatisfied regarding social distancing on the aircraft.

Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported the flight was over capacity per social distancing policy and reported one passenger was uncooperative regarding social distancing during the flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 30; Flight Crew Type 30

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Police / Security Involved

I am a licensed Part 107 remote pilot. While preflight checking my aircraft I was approached by [a] Police Officer informing me that I was operating in a restricted area.  I informed them that I was a Part 107 operator in I had filed a flight plan earlier in the morning using LAANC (via the Airmap app). After this exchange; [the] officer spoke with [police] Sgt. whom informed me that [the] Police Department would have their helicopter operating in the area.  I was requested at that time not to exceed 100 feet for my operation.  This was in alignment with my prior FAA LAANC flight plan.  And as such I continued my flight confident in both my LAANC approval; communication with local air traffic and while maintaining VLOS (Visual Line of Sight) on my SUAS (Small Unmanned Aircraft System) at all times.  After some time and completing my mission; I was approached by the officer who said that their helicopter reached out to the FAA and was unable to locate any flight plan filed.  I continued to partner with [the] officer during this time and shared any Part 107 license and my LAANC approval through Airmap (I have screenshots of this as well for review; if requested).  He informed me that ZZZ Tower or the FAA couldn't locate my flight plan. My concern rests in making sure other low flying aircraft in busy Class B airspace (particularly police/MEDEVAC/etc) are able to get updated information on registered SUAS flights in the area during operations.  I'm unsure of how the LAANC system failed to provide this information through whatever channel the police used. I phoned ZZZ Tower and spoke with an Air Traffic Controller whom informed me that they have no way of reviewing LAANC information after it is file.  If this is the case; how can local law enforcement leverage reviewing the LAANC system to validate legitimate authorized SUAS operations in the area.

Pilot of a SUAS (Small Unmanned Aircraft System) reported that while conducting a mission in controlled airspace; local law enforcement and ATC were unable to locate the filed flight plan.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 572; Flight Crew Type 524

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

After being told by tower and my acknowledgment back to tower to 'hold short Runway 24' for landing traffic on 14; I saw the landing aircraft land onto runway 14 then I taxied my aircraft onto runway 24 without clearance. There was no other runway 24 traffic landing. Anticipated being cleared for takeoff.

General Aviation pilot reported taxiing onto the runway after receiving hold short instructions from the tower.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 740; Flight Crew Type 450

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This was a daytime VFR flight. The route was JOT-V8-CGT-V422-BOONE-V422-OXI-V340-FWA-V144-. Over JOT at 3;500 MSL we requested flight following with Chicago Approach and were assigned a discrete squawk. At CGT we requested 5;500 MSL and were approved. We were then worked progressively by Chicago Center; South Bend Approach; and Fort Wayne Approach. We reported level at 5;500 on each check in; with no discrepancies between our indicated altitude (altimeter) and Mode C altitude squawk to ATC. Changes to the altimeter settings received from ATC while enroute were small and we were careful to enter each new setting upon receipt. After each change; both the new setting and our altitude were confirmed by my co-pilot/passenger; a rated and current Private Pilot. We fly together often and try to work as a team exercising good CRM. After being handed off to Fort Wayne Approach; but prior to reaching FWA VOR; we requested and were granted a descent to 3;500 MSL. This was to maintain VFR and stay clear of a scattered to broken cloud layer that was building ahead of us at about 4;000-5;000 MSL. After descending to 3;500 MSL we continued on course and crossed over FWA and the on-field FWA VOR with no issues. This is where the story gets interesting. We were about 15 minutes past FWA on V144 at 3;500. I was momentarily heads-down checking weather; while my co-pilot minded the flight controls and watched for traffic. Suddenly he blurted; 'Did you see that?!' I looked up; said; 'No' and asked him what he saw. He replied that he had just seen what looked like a 'flat black bar' flying head-on toward the airplane; which then quickly maneuvered and passed under the aircraft. I suggested that it was probably a bird; but my copilot was firm that it did not look like one. (He later noted; 'The object looked like a flat black bar with squared off edges and was extremely long and rigid. No bending of any kind as it dove under us. I've seen birds dive under the plane before and this did not seem the same. The profile never changed.') Since there had been no actual strike and things seemed otherwise normal; we dismissed the matter and continued our flight. But a short time later something peculiar began to happen. The fluid compass suddenly started to dip violently in quasi-rhythmic pulses. The card was being yanked downward in a pulsing fashion; all the way to its limits; while the azimuth oscillated 20 degrees left and right of course. The airplane itself was not bouncing around and the gyroscopic heading indicator was stable.  Only the wet compass seemed to be affected. In level flight and fully under control; we remained on course at 3;500 MSL. The panel mounted KLN-90B GPS and a centered needle on the VOR agreed as we tracked our outbound course on V144 from FWA. Several backup devices; including a Garmin portable aviation GPS and an iPad running ForeFlight; verified the panel equipment indications.  But the compass anomaly continued. We tried shutting down all on-board electronics including the portable devices but it had no effect. Nor did turning off lights; strobes; etc. We also tried Left and Right magnetos separately but it did not help. One thing we did not try but possibly should have done was to momentarily cut the alternator field and run solely on battery power. We were basically trying to think of anything that might create a magnetic field but we were running out of ideas. But with everything else operating normally; it seemed possible that the 6-month old compass might have simply just failed.Then another strange thing happened. Fort Wayne Approach called and asked us to confirm our altitude. We checked and confirmed 3;500 MSL. Approach then said they were showing us at 2;400 and asked us to check our altimeter setting. My co-pilot and I then individually cross-checked both our indicated altitude and the altimeter setting in order to be certain we hadn't misread anything. We agreed that we were definitely at 3;500 MSL and weconfirmed this back to Approach. (Our GPS altitude display also helped us confirm 3;500. And yes; we do understand the difference between GPS and barometric altitude). We then 'recycled' the transponder and verified our squawk code to be certain Approach was looking at the correct target. It had no effect. Approach reported that they were still seeing us at 2;400 MSL. We continued to fly for a few minutes but the ambiguities were beginning to stack up. My co-pilot and I were busy discussing options for terminating the flight when Approach called again to say they were showing us back at 3;500 FT. The thing is; we had never changed our altitude in the first place! Then - as if things weren't already weird enough - the compass then began to settle down. After few minutes was pretty much back to normal. In the end we elected to continue on to our destination. Along the way we received additional flight following from Columbus Approach and Indianapolis Center with no issues. The balance of our trip was uneventful; as was the return flight later on that day. At the time of this writing the aircraft is being checked out by an FAA Approved maintenance shop. The normal 24-month IFR checks were current for this flight (last completed in the spring of 2013) but everything including the compass is being evaluated. If there are any equipment problems we'll find and fix them. We don't know and will probably never know what my co-pilot saw or whether it had anything to do with the anomalies we experienced. We've speculated that it might have been a UAV (Indiana is currently vying to become a test ground for them); perhaps even some military contractor horsing around. Or maybe it was all just a creepy coincidence. It is almost Halloween.

PA28 pilot with pilot passenger report a UFO at 3;500 FT 30 NM east of FWA that may have affected the wet compass and the Mode C read out to ATC.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Recently we were told we had to wear masks while on sector. Following the rules I was wearing a mask; and multiple aircraft could not understand what I was saying. Multiple times I was told to 'Say again' until I pulled the mask down to give the aircraft the transmission. After I pulled the mask down they said they could understand me better. This is a safety issue. If the aircraft can't understand what we are saying and takes the wrong altitude this could be disastrous.Since Coronavirus started we were told we only had to wear masks when we couldn't be socially distanced. What has changed? Why do we have to wear masks all the time even if we are socially distanced?

Center Controller reported communication issues with pilots while wearing a face mask.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2660; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Tower instructed Aircraft X the following directions:Tower: Aircraft X cross Runway 8L at Echo Taxi Bravo Delta to 4L at Delta.	Aircraft X: Cross 8L Bravo Delta.Tower: Aircraft X; 4L at Delta Line up and Wait.Aircraft X: 4L at Delta Line up and Wait.Tower: Aircraft Y cleared for takeoff 4L at Foxtrot.I am already lined up and waiting on 4L at Delta one taxi way down the departure end of the runway.He then instructs Aircraft Y to do a 180 and exit 4L on foxtrot.I query tower; Aircraft X; 180 to 4L at Foxtrot?Aircraft X: 180 to 4L at Foxtrot?Tower instructs: Aircraft X to depart Runway 4L.In the air tower gives me a number to call.It is clear that tower instructed us to cross Runway 8L taxi via Bravo then Delta. There is no instruction to hold short at Delta other than when ground instructed us to hold 4L at Delta on our initial taxi instructions.Then Tower instructs me to taxi to 4L at Delta and 'Line up and wait for spacing.'I am lined up and waiting when Tower clears Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway 4L at foxtrot. This is after he has instructed me to line up and wait on 4L. I am on the Runway 4L lined up as instructed; when he tells Aircraft Y to do a 180 and exit onto foxtrot. I repeated and queried tower 3 times: 'line up and wait[?]'; he came back 'Aircraft X Line up and Wait 4L Delta.'It is clear that Tower put me on the runway before Aircraft Y and then cleared Aircraft Y after I was already in front of Aircraft Y. I had the clear instructions from Tower; which I repeated clearly. And when I mistook Aircraft Y for my call sign I repeated the instructions again. This was the Tower's error and it could have been a disaster; since he cleared Aircraft Y for departure after we were already lined up and waiting thus could not see him when we entered the runway.Very poor job on the part of ZZZ Tower; thank goodness there was no accident.

Pilot reported that a Tower Controller instructed them to line up and wait while clearing another aircraft to takeoff on the same runway; resulting in a ground conflict.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft was on terminal air conditioner for prior smoke/odor/fume event. After both engines started a 'dirty sock' type odor was noticed in the cockpit. The smell dissipated somewhat during initial taxi. The flight attendants did not notice any odor in the cabin. We continued the taxi; but when we were #1 for takeoff; the odor was still present. QRH procedure followed and returned to gate.

A319 Captain reported a return to gate after noticing 'dirty socks' odor during taxi for departure.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Statements from the crew members below: Flight Attendant 'B': On the takeoff roll when the airplane began to accelerate right before lift off; I started to smell fumes until we left the ground and when we lifted off the runway; I felt lightheaded; dizzy and unusual. At that time Flight Attendant A called me and asked how I was feeling because she could see from her seat that something was wrong with me. She asked; 'How are you feeling?' and I responded; 'Very lightheaded' and she said; 'Me too; something is not right; my vision is messed up; I'm going to call the cockpit.' We were both on the phone with the First Officer in the cockpit. We were still seated when we spoke to the First Officer. He didn't say much because he was listening to what Flight Attendant A was saying and then said OK; give us a second and we will call you right back. We hung up and Flight Attendant A told me to get my oxygen bottle out. I waited for more instructions and then the Captain called and at that point I released myself out of my jumpseat to head up to the Galley by Flight Attendant A. I told Flight Attendant A that my head hurt and she said sit down and get some oxygen. At that point I was sitting down in the Galley breathing oxygen while Flight Attendant A was checking on First Class and talking to the Captain. She said that the Captain told us to breathe some oxygen if we needed to. I began to feel better and good enough to continue with my duties. I continued with my duties and I checked on passengers while doing the beverage service and observing their mannerisms. The passengers didn't appear to be experiencing any of the symptoms we felt; but they seemed very relaxed and quiet. One passenger traveling with her daughter had her head back and her eyes closed and her daughter ordered for her. She seemed to be concentrating on her breathing like she didn't feel well. I asked her if she felt OK and her response was; 'I was feeling a little funny and I have a headache; but I'm fine.' I continued on with my service and I noticed that a lot of people were sleeping and a lot of people ordered water; Sprite; or ginger ale. Shortly after we were done with the beverage service we received a call from the First Officer that we were going to get turbulence so we should sit down right away. A few minutes after sitting back down in the jump seat; I started to feel the same symptoms again that I felt on the takeoff and climb; so I got the oxygen bottle out and put [it] in seat 17C and leaned over into the seat to use the oxygen so the passengers wouldn't see me use it because I didn't want to make them nervous. While I was using the oxygen; I continued to look at Flight Attendant A and scanned the passengers until we landed. Flight Attendant A said that she could see that I didn't feel good again on the descent. She called and asked me if I felt OK and I told her that I had a headache and she told me to continue to use the oxygen. After our last passenger deplaned; Flight Attendant A and I went up to the cockpit and told the Captain we think there is a problem with the plane and we didn't feel safe to keep flying in it. We both felt ill and went out into the jetbridge and sat down on the floor while the Captain called the company and reported the situation. Flight Attendant 'A': I noticed during takeoff that Flight Attendant B's eyes were closing and I thought I need to call her and wake her up. Then I noticed that she was slumping and it wasn't her normal posture. The Service door was abnormally loud on the takeoff and climb. I was monitoring the service door situation as well as Flight Attendant B's condition. Then I started to feel lightheaded and my vision started to get blurry and that's when I noticed Flight Attendant B's eyes were closed. I picked up the phone to call her and asked her if she felt OK. She said I feel dizzy and lightheaded. I said; 'Me too; something is not right; I'm going to call the cockpit.' We agreed I should call and break sterile cockpit because we were concerned. I spoke with First Officer; and I said we both don't feel right; we are lightheaded and dizzy and my vision is messed up. I also told him the service door was really loud; but the loud noise dissipated and evened out after awhile as we continued to climb. I don't really remember what he said to me other than they would get back to me and he hung up. A short while later; the Captain called us back. At that time; Flight Attendant B released herself from her jumpseat and came forward into the Galley. I told her to breathe some oxygen. I explained what was going on to the Captain and she told me we should breathe oxygen if we need to. She asked me several questions that I'm really foggy on right now; but as we breathed the oxygen a few times; we both felt better. She told us that all the doors indicated that they were closed and that everything appeared to be normal indications with the cabin pressure. She thought maybe we passed through some exhaust from a landing aircraft on the takeoff roll and that might be what the fumes were that Flight Attendant B smelled on takeoff. She asked if we should turn around and go back; but because we both started to feel better we said no; I think we will be OK now. She said OK; call us if you need to. After we were done with the beverage service which was quick because we didn't have that many passengers; we were told by the First Officer to sit down because we were going to get into some turbulence. The Flight Attendant B and I returned to our jump seats and after a few minutes of sitting there we started to descend. I noticed that look on Flight Attendant B's face again that I saw during the takeoff. I called her and asked her how she was feeling. She said she had a headache and didn't feel good. I told her to make sure she kept the oxygen nearby. I saw her lean into the row of seats next to her a few times to breath the oxygen. I started to feel lightheaded; dizzy; and had blurry vision again as we descended lower. By the time we got to the gate; I didn't feel well at all. After the last passenger was off the plane; Flight Attendant B and I both felt that there was something wrong with the plane and we didn't feel safe flying on it. We went up to the cockpit and I told the Captain that we did not feel safe flying on this plane and that we didn't feel good. She said OK and got on the phone to call the company. Flight Attendant B and I sat down on the floor in the jet-bridge to rest; and I filled out the oxygen bottle report form because we used enough oxygen out of one of the bottles that it dropped below 1;500 [PSI]. Captain: I was the Captain flying [during that] flight. This departure required us to cross through the intersection of the landing runway immediately after an aircraft had landed. The winds were 170/14G19. An aircraft reported wind shear to Tower so we took the 'FLEX' out and departed with Full Thrust TOGA power. Shortly after departure and in the climb; the Flight Attendant called. I told the First Officer I had the radios and to see what was wrong. He spoke to the Flight Attendant and then came back and told me that they said they felt dizzy and lightheaded and that the service door was making a lot of noise and that we would get back to them. At this time we were approaching 9;000 FT so I told him to take the flight controls and the radios and I quickly did the 10;000 FT check and was 'off to talk to the girls;' I asked the girls what was going on and Flight Attendant A told me that Flight Attendant B smelled fumes briefly on the takeoff when we were accelerated and about to lift off. She said that they both felt dizzy and lightheaded and she said that her vision went blurry. I told them to breathe Oxygen if they needed to because it might help make them feel better. They already had the bottles out and they took a few breaths. By this time we were now leveled off at 12;000 FT for quite some time and I told her that the doorsindicated they were all closed and cabin pressure seemed fine and normal. I asked her if they wanted me to turn back. They paused for a moment and then said we are starting to feel better now that we breathed the oxygen. They said they thought they would be OK and they didn't think we needed to go back. I told them to call back if they needed to. My thought process from what Flight Attendant A was telling me was that we had passed through the intersection of a recently landing airplane and I figured the momentary smell of fumes was probably from that. We executed a 'NO FLEX' TOGA takeoff and we accelerated very fast and climbed very fast so maybe that was what made them feel dizzy. Breathing the oxygen usually makes people feel better which is why I told them to do so if they needed to. I was asking them lots of questions to see if I thought they were not coherent or distraught; and that did not seem to be the case. They were not having trouble speaking. When I asked them if we should return; they said no because they were starting to feel better; and the passengers didn't seem to be having any issues at that time. When I returned to the intercom with the First Officer; I looked at him to see if he looked hypoxic and he appeared normal. I asked him if he thought I looked hypoxic and if he thought we should return and he said no because it was probably fumes from the landing aircraft and the fact that we tookoff so fast with the 'NO FLEX' takeoff. He had the same thoughts I did so we continued to climb to our final altitude of FL280. We monitored the pressurization and everything seemed normal. About 30 minutes prior to landing; we started to get some moderate chop. The First Officer told the flight attendants to sit down. At that time they did not indicate that they still weren't feeling well. The First Officer and I discussed what had happened earlier and that was the first time he mentioned to me that he felt a little funny on takeoff too; but he didn't think it was anything with the plane but maybe his sinuses acting up from the pressure because we were climbing faster than normal. He said it passed quickly and he was fine. Up until that point; I was unaware of the fact that he had experienced something too. I didn't experience any symptoms of any kind during the entire flight. When we landed and after the passengers were gone; both flight attendants came into the cockpit to tell me that it happened to them again on the descent and that something was really wrong with the airplane and they didn't feel safe flying on it and no one else should fly on it either. They informed me that they had to use oxygen in the descent. Up to this point; I was unaware that the flight attendants continued to use oxygen to feel well during flight other than the time I told them to breathe it back in the climb out. They both looked awful. Their eyes were glassy and red; Flight Attendant A's face was pale and Flight Attendant B's face was flushed. They left the airplane and sat down on the jet bridge floor. They indicated to me that their heads felt foggy. Flight Attendant B had a headache. That's the point when I realized the severity of the situation and I called Dispatch to inform them. The crew was removed from duty and sent to the nearest hospital to be tested for carbon monoxide poisoning.

A CRJ-700 flight attendant crew reported moderate breathing and eye irritation after takeoff requiring the use of oxygen while the flight crew reported very slight effects from an odorless cabin contaminant which required post flight medical attention.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 2370

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

While being radar vectored to the visual final for Runway XX at ZZZ; Approach Control issued a descent to 6;000 feet MSL. We read back the clearance and proceeded to descend to 6;000 feet MSL. The Captain did observe that we seemed closer to some radio Towers on a hill than what would appear normal; but we received no GPWS Alerts. We continued on vectors and flew an uneventful approach and landing. After a call from Tower a few hours later; it was explained that the descent clearance to 6;000 feet was issued to a (other carrier X) whose readback was on a different Approach Control frequency. Our readback to that clearance as Company A (very similar sounding call sign) must have occurred at the same moment as (other carrier's) reply. Since the (other carrier X) aircraft had been on a different approach frequency; we had yet to hear any other communications to or from that aircraft; and ATC had not issued a caution for the similar sounding call signs. Additionally; ATC did not issue a low altitude warning if we had gone below the Minimum Vector Altitude in the sector we were within.When managing multiple frequencies; ATC should ensure that aircraft with similar call signs are alerted to possible miss interpretations. Furthermore; ATC should minimize the use of simulcasting on multiple Approach frequencies and consolidate traffic to one radio frequency.

We were being vectored for the visual approach to Runway XX at ZZZ from the east. ZZZ Approach Control issued a clearance to 6;000 feet MSL. We were later contacted that the clearance was for (other carrier) X; on another frequency and not for Company A. The clearance apparently took us below the MVA for that sector. The Controller was controlling multiple frequencies (he was busy) and never advised us of similar sounding call signs. We did not receive any terrain cautions from the aircraft or Controller.  The subsequent approach and landing were uneventful.Listening during communications is always the most important.  Being advised of similar sounding call signs is an important step to help alleviate threats and for Crews to be more vigilant.

B737-700 flight crew reported a CFIT event during a visual approach due to an ATC communications breakdown between flight crew and Approach Control who was working multiple frequencies with similar callsigns.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Total 3935; Flight Crew Type 298

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

We were setup on the ILS 27 approach into BOS. They were also landing 33L. The Final Approach controller issued us maintain 170 kts to RIPIT (FAF) during the approach we received Red X's 3 times which would indicate the Localizer isn't working on our instruments. This happened outside the FAF and we were visual and could maintain a visual with the airport that we decided that we wouldn't go around because it was VMC. We continued the Approach. Final asked what speed we were doing. I replied 170 kts. He then came back and said spacing wouldn't work and even if we slowed it wouldn't work. Cancel Approach clearance turn right 360 and maintain 2000 and that he would sequence us back. My Captain then replied over the radio 'Unable we were given red x's and we are having navigational problems.' After a few seconds the Captain then said 'we broke out we need to continue the approach' (we were already visual). Final says traffic to look out for 11 o'clock 800 ft. Captain replies traffic insight. Final says maintain a visual with the traffic cleared ILS 27. I then repeat back maintain visual and clear for the approach. Final asks if we were having issues with navigation. I reply we are visual with the airport. Final hands us off to tower. This whole exchange lasted for over 30 seconds from when he asked how fast we were going until we got the hand off to tower. We were 3.6 DME from the ILS when the other aircraft landed. The red X's appeared around 13.5 to 11.5 DME. Upon taxiing in ground had a number for the captain to call. The captain called the number and then after some time referred the guy to our chief pilot I wasn't able to hear what the whole conversation entailed I just heard what the Captain said to the person.

Air carrier First Officer reported navigation problems arose on final to BOS Runway 27 and they continued to a visual landing after ATC had cancelled their approach clearance due to traffic to Runway 33L.


Installation; Work Cards; Testing; Repair; Inspection

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working as part of a Field Service Team working on a chronic No Start and Engine Fuel Valve problem. I was involved in troubleshooting the problem and helping replace the [wire] harness from the engine firewall and also various other troubleshooting tasks. In early July; I completed the reinstallation of the J-Box (Junction Box) top cover and in the process used a 1/4' inch to 5/16' inch Ratchet Ring wrench. When I had finished this job; I went upstairs and cleaned the Spanner [wrench] and had lunch.Later that evening before we finished for the night; I asked a fellow Mechanic to pass me the said wrench and we could not find the wrench. As it had been a long day we went to the hotel and would complete a thorough search in the morning. We returned in the morning the next day and carried out a thorough search of the engine. Four mechanics spent in excess of one hour and as much as two hours searching the engine using lights; mirrors and magnetic pick-up tools in the area above the heat shield. We also checked the tool box again and the ramp area. We accomplished a Dry Motor (Engine Run-no fuel) with cowling open to see if we could hear the wrench move. We then accomplished a series of six engine runs over several hours as part of our checks. We then opened cowls and searched again to ensure if wrench was there; and if it was; the [Engines] runs would have moved its location. That afternoon I informed the Engine Desk of everything that we had done. I told them I was unable to say for certain where the wrench was but; that we had done everything we could to ensure it was not in the engine; but that I could not for certain say that it was not there. I asked that at the end of the Ferry Flight; that another search be accomplished in case the wrench was in the engine and had not moved. I also informed them that on my return to work I would file a report. I do not know the outcome of the event as we still have not found wrench and the Ferry Flight has not terminated so I am unsure as to the wrench's whereabouts. At the time that the wrench was noted as being missing; we were at the end of a second long day. I think if we had completed a search on that night then we would have been fatigued and the better option was to complete search the next day.

A Technician reports about the intense efforts by himself and his Field Service Engine Repair Crew trying to locate a ratchet ring wrench that was misplaced during maintenance on a B767-200 aircraft engine for a chronic 'No Start' and Engine Fuel Valve problem.


Flight Crew Total 1689.9; Flight Crew Type 246.6

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While climbing out at approximately 19;000 ft. MSL we experienced clear air turbulence. After ensuring positive aircraft control and relaying the turbulence report and PIREP to ATC the Captain received an interphone call from the Flight Attendant (FA)'s. I was flying with the autopilot engaged and monitoring the number one (ATC) radio so I did not directly hear the conversation(s) between the FA's and the Captain. As the Captain relayed the information to me directly it appeared we may have a possible flight attendant injury from the aft galley area. As the flight progressed the Captain continued to communicate with the flight attendants frequently to assess the situation and it appeared having medical personnel meet the aircraft would be prudent given the information the Captain was receiving via interphone from the flight attendants. When we arrived at [our destination] the medical personnel we requested were present in the boarding area. Passengers were deplaned normally from my perspective although I remained in the cockpit until deplaning was complete as there was a lot of activity in the jet bridge.

A319 First Officer reported clear air turbulence that resulted in a flight attendant injury.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 7105; Flight Crew Type 1600

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency

Enroute line of frontal storms across track; approximately ZZZ-ZZZ1. Cleared to deviate right of track up to HDG 020 deg M. Was holding HDG 020 to fly through only available gap. Turbulence continuous moderate; but wasn't sure if there would be worse. In IMC and hand flying to minimize possible turbulence vs. autopilot induced loads on airframe ('g' and IAS outside limits). Was right between cells with a large storm to the left. MIA Center gave an instruction to turn left. Don't remember the new heading other than it would have put me into a TS cell. Instructed accompanying pilot to reply with 'Unable;' then I queried the instruction in case I had misunderstood. Had understood correctly; but a left turn was not possible due TS. Advised Center that I was still unable to turn as directed. Center advised that I would need to declare an emergency to disregard the instruction - so I declared. Unable to select TXDR 7700 at the time due to a need to adjust power settings to control speed excursions. By the time I could change the code I was clear of the immediate storms with a clear path for the rest of the flight; so I cancelled the emergency and turned to a newly assigned heading of (I think) 340 deg M.

PA31 Captain reports being unable to comply with an ATC heading instruction due to a thunderstorm and is instructed to declare an emergency; which is accomplished.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1375

Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During some traffic pattern practice during the evening hours; our aircraft was on the Left downwind Runway XX when ATC cleared us to land. Another single engine aircraft was cleared to land #2 in sequence behind us. We saw the other aircraft on the North downwind and proceeded to configure to land and fly our base and final turns. I glanced down at the ADS-B traffic on my iPad and saw their aircraft was at 0 ft. vertical separation and appeared to be almost right on my own aircraft's position. They were behind our aircraft; so I could not see them right away; and only until the Tower called them to suggest they perform a 360 degree turn to create space; I noticed them pulling away from our aircraft to our left at our same altitude.

GA instructor pilot reported an NMAC while on final approach. The Instructor states being aware of another aircraft in the airport traffic pattern. When on final the instructor's ADS-B showed zero vertical feet separation with the other aircraft. It was then the Tower Controller instructed the second aircraft to make a 360 degree turn.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While on LUCKI 4 Arrival to SAN; we were distracted by an odd aircraft close to our track. It looked like a large drone. We were distracted discussing this aircraft and possibly missed something. Soon after ATC made an odd query as to our position as if we were tracking incorrectly; asked if we had the field in sight. I replied that we did and ATC cleared us for a visual approach. After landing they gave a phone number to call for possible deviation. SoCal implied we were off course/asked if field in sight/cleared us for a visual approach. I am unsure what was wrong. Need better communication with ATC.

First Officer reported sighting a drone while on initial approach to SAN; which caused a distraction and possible track deviation.


Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5580

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 16839; Flight Crew Type 11555

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Cleared to descend directly to 3000 FT on downwind and to slow to 210K. I called for flaps 1; then we got an EICAS LE SLAT DISAGREE. Flap indicator stopped halfway between 0 and 1. First Officer (F/O) pulled out checklist; I declared 'I've got the plane and the radios' and told ATC we had a mechanical issue and would like to level at 4000 FT and stay on heading. I asked for a long final once we got things squared away. Traffic was light; we were above a cloud deck; there were no weather issues and we had 10000 [pounds] of gas; about 1.5 hours worth. F/O tried retracting flaps but nothing happened as system was locked out (as designed). Checklist completed; F/O then contacted Dispatch to get landing data for abnormal landing configuration. While waiting for response; he wrote up the ELB for the EICAS message and looked up the landing data. ATC vectored us around in a big left turn oval. Didn't hear back from Dispatch; thought possible datalink problem; and opted to continue inbound without taking time to make voice contact with Dispatch as everything was under control and aircraft was flying fine. I gave the aircraft and radios to the F/O; then talked to purser; telling her of our issue; planning a normal landing in 10-15 minutes. Took back plane; F/O then told ATC [that we were] ready to be vectored inbound for landing; SOBs 170; 1.5 hours of fuel. I then had us extend flaps to 20; knowing it would take a long time using the electrics. F/O had time to type a last message to Dispatch that we...were inbound for landing; Dispatch responded he 'would inform everyone.' I dropped the gear...and slowed to approach speed; kept it on autopilot until 500 FT. Good landing between 1000 FT -1500 FT markers; full reverse; really didn't need Auto Brakes 3 after all.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757 Flight Crew reported that the alternate flap procedure was used after an EICAS LE SLAT DISAGREE was received on a downwind vector for landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On departure from ZZZ climbing through approx 4000ft msl we experienced a strong engine vibration from engine #1. We had a blinking N1 vibration of 9.9. We followed the QRH procedure which called for disengagement of the autothrust and retarding the throttle of affected engine until the vibration level was acceptable (around 50% N1) we had approx vibration level of 4.5. We leveled off at approx 10;000 ft; [notified ATC;] and was vectored back to runway XXL and landed without incident.Nothing we would have done differently.

Air Carrier Captain reported high engine vibration and an air return.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Release 1 was planned by midnight shift with FOB 16.8. Scheduled departure XA:00. Captain called at XA:29 to advise that FOB was 28.0 in IAH. (Flight was already late due to no ground power hooked up to aircraft; and had a faulty APU). In SABRE I created RLSE (3) to show updated FOB of 28.0. At approximately XA:45 Captain called and was upset that he was sent weights by load planning there were 'dangerously incorrect.' I confirmed the weight manifest in ACARS still showed the original FOB of 16.8I called load planning (Omitted) and asked him if he had received a new fuel slip or message that showed the new FOB. (Omitted) stated that he had not received anything to show the FOB of 16.8. I created RLSE 4 in SABRE to again show 28.0 FOB. I asked Omitted if anything had been generated (fuel slip or otherwise) to show the new FOB.  Omitted stated that nothing was received. Omitted manually updated the DPWM to show 28.0.  New weights were sent to the pilot.Captain was concerned that this was a dangerous situation; because had he gone based off the weights that load planning had sent them; it would have been a 'bad situation.' I generally don't like to assume; but I was under the assumption that SABRE generates a new fuel 'slip' or MSG to load planning anytime the FOB changes.  The question being; why didn't anybody in load planning; or ACARS catch these changes? Hindsight; I should have sent a meter to called Load planning to advise them of the FOB; so that this may have been caught before the weight manifest was sent out to the pilot. Is this an automation issue?

Dispatcher encountered difficulty getting the weight and balance program to accept a new fuel load in calculating aircraft weight and takeoff data sent to the crew during preflight. Coordination between the crew and the Dispatcher ensured that Load Planning manually entered the correct fuel load.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 588; Flight Crew Type 244

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Using ForeFlight Performance Plus and a Stratus 2S; after departing approaching the 60 mile ring of the DCA VOR; the area between the 30NM SFRA boundary and outer 60NM ring displayed as a TFR on my ForeFlight map shaded in a light red color.  No NOTAMs were issued regarding a TFR in that area. While on the ground prior to departure; no TFR was displayed. Due to the zoom scale of the ForeFlight map approximately 5 to 8 miles and the light shading I did not notice it until the 60 mile ring appeared on my map display in a dark red color. Just prior to crossing the 60 mile ring the TFR disappeared from my ForeFlight map. After landing I telephoned TRACON to ensure that I did not violate any TFR airspace and was assured by the TRACON that there was no TFR violation. I also telephoned our Club President who in turn reported the event to the FSDO. I was asked to contact another FSDO representative which I did. I explained the above description to him. He saw no violation and suggested that I file this report.After researching this issue I found that it is a known problem with the FAA's data broadcast from certain ADS-B towers.  Since ForeFlight does not overwrite or change any of the FAA data broadcasted it appeared on my ForeFlight map display as a TFR even though no TFR existed at any point that day. As I proceeded west I apparently began receiving data from different towers and the TFR disappeared from my map display. In hindsight I wish I would have taken a few screenshots of the towers that my Stratus was receiving so that I could give a more detailed description of the possible problem towers. In the interest of flight safety; this was a very unpleasant distraction that could possibly divert a pilot's attention from safe operation of the aircraft. I believe the FAA data broadcasted through the ADS-B towers needs to be evaluated and a solution to this issue found.  I would think that all of the ADB-B towers would be broadcasting the same data without erroneous data (i.e.; a non-existent TFR). This could possibly be a hardware/software issue.

A Pilot reported their Foreflight displayed a TFR when there was no TFR in effect and that this is a known problem related to FAA ADSB signals.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Clearance delivery out of SBA re-routed this airplane to include 'Drake' VOR (DRK); but both pilots wrote down 'DRAKE' i.e. the intersection on the scratch paper in the cockpit and this was subsequently programmed in to the FMS.  After flying the SID and transitioning to the enroute segment of flight; the LA Center Controller assigned the flight 'cleared direct Drake.'  The crew proceeded to fly direct to the DRAKE intersection.  Crew noticed that it caused about a 90 degree turn along the route of flight and asked for direct for a fix after that point to 'straighten the line.'  Upon asking and Controller seemed incredulous and implied that 'Drake' was about a 4 degree course change from the currently assigned route.  Crew insisted that 'Drake' was about a 90 degree heading change and would require a significant turn thereafter to get back on course.  After query from ATC; it was determined that the crew erroneously put 'DRAKE' Intersection in to the FMS rather than DRK (VORTAC).  Crew admitted fault; corrected in the FMS and the rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. Controller at SBA didn't specify DRK VORTAC; out of pure coincidence there is a DRAKE Intersection in the same general direction even though it is in a different state.  On the ground crew assumed and wrote down 'DRAKE' and never questioned the type of fix.  In the air; crew had MFD ranged out too far to realize the massive difference in course between DRK and DRAKE intersection - an entirely different state.   If a course discrepancy is seen on the MFD when zooming out i.e.; not a straight line; ask ATC to verify that an intersection is spelled properly; or if it is supposed to be a VOR rather than an intersection.

On taxi out the Ground Control issued a re-route to include 'Drake' VOR (DRK); but both pilots wrote down 'DRAKE' i.e.; the intersection on the scratch paper in the cockpit and this was subsequently programmed in to the FMS. It was kind of one of those things where we got a re-route while getting the taxi clearance. We both wrote the clearance as it was read: 'Drake.' Ironically there is a Drake VOR and an Intersection that aren't that far off the line from each other from SBA. As we were taxiing I didn't do a full check of the route via the MFD; just a cursory page check to ensure a reasonable distance/fuel for the re-route. I should have looked at the full route and stopped the taxi.Ideally the Ground Controller would have issued 'Drake VOR' in the clearance. But at the same he probably didn't know there was a fix of 'DRAKE' Intersection as well. There was never a NAV or pilot deviation issued as we figured it out with the Center Controller after some initial confusion. I guess you could say it was...'God's Plan.' I mean we did 'start from the bottom and now we are here.'

Air carrier flight crew reported a track heading deviation during departure from SBA airport.  The crew reported they had entered DRAKE Intersection in their FMS rather than 'Drake' DRK VOR as cleared.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

In cruise flight at FL290 as we approached 50 West we detected weather along our course. Deviated 25nm left of course to avoid the weather and began a turn back on course when we detected additional weather ahead. We returned to our 25nm offset. Throughout we were in and out of cloud layers with light chop and had the seat belt sign on due to this. We briefly broke out of the layer to see what appeared to be a hole in the weather as illuminated by the full moon. We quickly realized it was actually a buildup even though it did not appear on our radar. The First Officer (Pilot Flying) began an immediate turn to the left to avoid the buildup. The aircraft briefly entered the cloud and encountered two jolts each lasting two to three seconds. We then emerged again into clear air between the layers. We received reports from the cabin of injuries and began to assess the situation that led to our decision to divert.  We requested clearance to ZZZZ as well as a climb to FL340 to climb above the weather.  Our landing in ZZZZ an hour later was uneventful. Paramedics met the aircraft to tend to the injured. The emergency responders; ZZZZ station and airport personnel were all exceptional in their support.

Air carrier flight crew and a Flight Attendant reported diverting to a nearby alternate after several injuries resulted from a turbulence encounter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4.3; Flight Crew Total 312; Flight Crew Type 153.7

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

I was originally given a clearance of right downwind for landing; and that ATC would call my base turn. About 1 to 2 miles past the runway threshold I received the radio call from the Tower; 'Number 2 cleared to land'. I mistook this call as meaning it was okay for me to turn base and continue towards the runway. I cut off a Cessna that was on about a 4 mile final. The Controller gave me a new clearance to turn left and join left downwind. I went to make the left turn but was unable because of a bird. Fearing a bird strike and busting the neighboring Class B airspace; I turned tight to the right; which was directly into the path; head-on; of a second Cessna. This left me disoriented and still worried about busting the Class B airspace. After the Controller gave me a heading to fly; I was able to land. I was told to call the Tower. During the phone call with the Controller; I was told that I cut off an aircraft on final and that I turned into traffic on left downwind. I apologized and explained about trying to avoid the bird but the Controller said that I should have made the left turn and not worried about hitting the bird as he was busy and had planes on final; right downwind; left downwind and four waiting to takeoff. This was an example of how a misunderstanding can lead to whole string of unforeseen events. From now on I will ask for clarification when I am not 100% sure of what ATC means.

The pilot of a Cessna 172 misunderstood the landing clearance that he received from the Tower Controller and turned in front of the aircraft he was to follow. The subsequent instructions that the Tower gave him to re-sequence for landing were not followed due to his concern over a bird in the vicinity and the nearby Class B airspace. Instead; he turned into the path of another aircraft before being given further instructions to provide separation.