Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 200

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

It was a beautiful day; and I was ready to fly the Cessna 206 for its first flight since maintenance. After taxiing to the runway; my co-pilot and I performed our run-up procedure near the hold-short line. Everything checked out and we were ready for take-off. While awaiting take-off clearance; I heard a sound resembling a piece of metal or a coin dropping on concrete. We looked to find the source of the sound; but could not determine what might have caused it. Upon takeoff; I noticed the need for slight left rudder instead of right rudder to keep the ball centered. In climb; some left rudder was required. Once the transition to cruise flight (6000 feet) was made; I noticed a strong right yaw/roll tendency; requiring full left rudder; full left rudder trim and slight left aileron to maintain straight and level flight.My co-pilot and I decided to turn around for a precautionary landing. Given the strong flight control issues; we also considered other airports on the route of flight in case the situation would become more severe. We preferred landing at a larger airport with long; wide runways. Other airports in the area had shorter; narrower runways; closer to neighborhoods and terrain. In preparation for landing; we worked as a team and discussed our plan of action. We briefed that if we were to lose control of the aircraft during landing; the co-pilot would cut-off the mixture. The touchdown was very soft and smooth on the main wheels; but as soon as the nose wheel hit the ground; the aircraft veered off to the right. The mixture was cut-off and the fuel selector turned off. We regained positive control of aircraft; and we came to a complete stop on the runway centerline. The emergency services were on standby and rushed towards us. After talking to a mechanic; it was determined that the nose wheel strut had gone flat. The strut collapsing on itself after the run-up was most likely the source of the sound we heard.In a C206 and C182; a flat nose wheel strut causes the self-centering mechanism of the nose wheel to be ineffective; leaving the nose wheel to weather vane in the slipstream. The nose wheel basically became a rudder in the front; causing the right turning/yawing tendency.

C206 Captain reported returning to departure airport after experiencing control difficulties after takeoff. After landing; nose strut was found to be flat; allowing the nosewheel to weather vane; affecting directional control.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 400

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Upon initial climbout I was given a turn on course direct to my destination. I was not told to contact Departure so I stayed on with Tower. I was flying the aircraft as I wanted to maintain proficiency in my flight skills. I have not flown this aircraft for nearly two months; and I had a forward passenger who kept trying to talk after I politely reminded him that I could not talk until cruise. Even though I have a lot of time in this aircraft I should have used the autopilot to maintain better situational awareness. Approximately 4;000 feet 6 nm into the flight I noticed I was still on with Tower. I switched to ZZZ Center; told my altitude they then gave me a clearance up to 13;000 feet MSL. There was absolutely no issue; but I just wanted to fill out this report anyways.

Small Transport aircraft pilot reported not contacting Departure Control and stayed with Tower until switching to Center Control.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178.38; Flight Crew Type 1048.15

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

We got indications of left GPS fail; then right GPS fail; then transponder fail; all stayed active until after landing.  We notified ATC and they said lots of jets reporting the same.  VMC and no degradation or our navaids was perceptible

Air carrier First Officer reported loss of GPS and transponder on arrival into DEN. Systems returned to normal after landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2.6; Flight Crew Total 2238.3; Flight Crew Type 1502.7

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

The C182 pilot called RNO TWR 13 miles south.  (This airman was disorientated on his position as well.)  I instructed the aircraft to remain outside RNO Class Charlie Airspace and to contact NorCal Approach on frequency 119.2.  The pilot read back the information in a questioning manner and I reiterated the frequency 119.2.  Several minutes later I observed an aircraft 7 northwest of RNO which initially appeared to be a transitioning aircraft. This aircraft was in fact the C182 and I will continue to refer to him as such.  A PA28 was inbound to RNO from the northeast on a straight in to RWY 16L.  There were several other arrivals and departures at this period of time also.  I had placed an air carrier in position on 16R pending the exiting of another aircraft.  The PA28 had been cleared to land RWY 16L.  I observed that the C182 was now descending and tracking toward the PA28.  I began issuing traffic to the PA28; and reaching out to the then unknown C182. The C182's track appeared to be turning into final and still descending; a NORDO aircraft.  I issued a traffic alert to the PA28.  The C182 called inbound on final RWY 16L.  I issued an immediate left turn to the PA28.  I had missed the call sign of the C182 and issued a blind transmission to the Cessna 1 mile final RWY 16L cleared to land.  I issued the airliner an immediate takeoff clearance as I could not visually acquire the C182 in the ground clutter (my CIC and other controller assisting in the cab had visually acquired the aircraft and were issuing light gun signals as well).  The C182 landed RWY 16L at which time when asked if he could hear my transmission; he replied that he did; and was issued instructions to exit the RWY and contact Ground Control.  Pilot was further confused on taxi instructions and was issued the Brasher statement.  These two aircraft closest proximity was estimated at less than a 1/2 mile same altitude.  Further review of information via LiveATC; the C182 attempted to contact Approach Control (NCT) twice and was told to standby.  The aircraft on a third attempt reported 7 miles out at which time he was given a squawk code.  He did not squawk the correct code.  NCT queried his code; and his position; finally identifying the aircraft on the wrong code 3 miles north of RNO; told him he was on the wrong code and radar identified him and told him to contact RNO TWR.NCT should have turned this aircraft out of the traffic pattern to the right and issued traffic instead of just dumping on the Tower.  I was issuing traffic; and traffic alerts followed by an immediate turn; so NCT should have been able to see the same traffic I did.  Also; a further remain outside class Charlie airspace instruction could have helped.  Ultimately it appears that if NCT Sectors had been decombined; the workload would have been less and a better service could have been provided.  I don't normally like to say 'they should have done a better job;' but in this case I do feel that this situation could have been mitigated earlier.  As for myself; I don't think I could have reacted any different or sooner with an unknown NORDO aircraft.  For note; we have VFR aircraft transition this area regularly without ATC communication; so initially there was no reason to suspect an inbound aircraft.

Contacted Approach Control Reno; NV after listening to information Bravo on ATIS. Reply was 'standby' and Controller seemingly got N number incorrect. I began to circle 12 NM north northwest to remain clear of traffic. Again called Approach Control after 5 minutes; no response; then 3rd call; 'standby'. Fourth call instructed to approach Runway 16L Reno for straight in; so I flew east and south to line up with runway. Finally (very late) Approach Control advised to contact Tower which I did. I was 'cleared to land' by a controller about 1/2 mile out. On landing I was advised to call the Tower which I did after closing my flight plan. My landing at Reno was necessitated by a shortage of fuel and the 15 minutes of circling  waiting for Approach Control response and instructions was a detriment to the situation.I was surprised to be told that I was in possible violation without a clearance to land when I and my two passengers clearly heard 'cleared to land'. Moreover; I initially remained clear of Reno's traffic until advised by Approach Control with instructions to proceeded to line up for Runway 16L. I contacted Tower when told to by Approach Control and they then said 'cleared to land.'Another issue was the transponder code that Approach Control said they were receiving. I was told to squawk XXXX (as I recall) but I was told by Approach Control that I was squawking code YXXX. I double checked and the transponder was clearly and positively set on XXXX. But the 'X' position on my transponder was reading 'Y' at Approach Control. The setting was verified with the Controller that I had the requested code set; as I reported to the Controller.I believe that I complied with all procedures as appropriate by following the required tasks; I.E.:1) Read ATIS2) Contacted Approach Control and after being ignored for a time reported possession of ATIS Bravo.3) Complied with instructions to proceed.4) Contacted Tower after a very late handoff.5) Landed after being cleared.

A RNO Tower Controller and a C182 pilot each present their version of an uncoordinated entry into the Class C airspace resulting in an airborne conflict.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

The Captain; who is quite experienced; hypothesized that this scenario may have been caused by the movement of fuel while accelerating and climbingIt is not clear whether this scenario is associated with the FCOM1 Ch. 28 NOTE concerning Fuel entering the center tank from the vent system and causing erroneous center tank quantity indications as high as 300 lbs [over takeoff limit].Weight Restricted departure from ZZZ. When Takeoff Performance Data was received; it was noted that prior to Takeoff; fuel quantity must be less than 9652.The Captain briefed that we would taxi out with both engines and APU on; and requested I coordinate with ATC to taxi to a location where we could burn the necessary fuel prior to takeoff.As directed by ATC; we taxied to hold short of Runway XX; and for the next 25 or so minutes burned fuel at this location. Once within approximately 60 lbs of the target 9650; APU was switched off and Captain directed me to advise ATC that we would soon be ready for departure. The Before Takeoff Checklist was completed and fuel verified above MIN FUEL and; at that moment; just 40 lbs above the 9650 maximum fuel for takeoff.We were subsequently cleared for takeoff; and during the acceleration; it was noted that the total FOB was surprisingly increasing by several hundred pounds; and the center tank quantity was increasing. At the moment of rotation; the FOB showed several hundred pounds more than the 9620 we confirmed prior to accepting Takeoff clearance. During initial climb center tank quantity continued to increase up to approximately 200 lbs.If this scenario was related to the FCOM1 NOTE; it would be educational to include this NOTE in the Fuel System CBT Training as a gentle reminder to all.

C550 First Officer reported a dynamic fuel quantity indication resulting in Maximum Take Off Fuel quantity exceedance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5500

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

In flight approximately 40 miles west of an enroute fix; First Officer (FO) saw smoke rising vertically above glare shield directly above the center of his yoke. He checked for a burning smell in the area of the yoke trim switches and map light rheostat. He could not identify the source. Moments later he saw another stream of smoke in the same area. He identified an electrical smoke smell. He noted some exposed wire on a light green wire that powers the map reading light. Though it appeared that the smoke had come from this area; we could not say so conclusively. We contacted flight control; declared an emergency; and diverted into the nearest suitable airport.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing smoke on the flight deck. Crew diverted to nearby.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 100

Airspace Violation All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While conducting a law enforcement mission in the Southern Arizona area; aircraft was unintentionally flown into Mexican airspace. Mission was conducted in close proximity to the International Border; crew was trying to maintain the aircraft away from the border; but in a good position to maintain surveillance while dealing with strong winds aloft. During one of our orbits around the target the aircraft was pushed over the border and into Mexican airspace. Winds aloft over the target location were from the north at 60 KTS. After flying over the border and into Mexican airspace the crew immediately commanded a turn to the north to return to U.S. airspace.

Drone pilot reports drifting into Mexican airspace due to high winds aloft while on a mission along the southwest border.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

We were opening up multiple sectors to begin normal operations after the midnight shift.  Two fellow controllers and I came back from break. The FLM on position directed that two of us 'go to the [break list] list' while the third opened up the BHM; MXF and MGM sectors.  I was tasked with giving another controller a break.  As I obtained my headset and began asking controllers who wanted a break; the FLM changed his/her mind and advised that I was to open up BHM; MXF and MGM while the original person ( a CIC) was to give her a break. I chose a chair from the corner of the room and wheeled it towards the MGM sector (where the three positions are routinely combined).  Before I sat down; I could hear pilots checking on frequency on the empty sector next to me (MXF).  I immediately turned and advised the area that there was an issue.  The controller working the actual aircraft realized at the same time that her frequencies had been taken away.  I immediately sat down; turned on the appropriate frequencies; brought up limited data blocks and answered pilots who were calling center.  There were approximately five aircraft on frequency at the time.  Three of those aircraft were departing KBHM; checking on climbing to 100 and requesting higher altitudes.  I began working the sector and advised the previous controller to give me an over the shoulder briefing until we could get everything sorted out.This event was caused from a lack of communication from the supervisor. The FLM entered the command to close the sectors and move the frequencies from one position to another without verifying if either controller was prepared to do so.  There was no way for the controller on position to communicate with the traffic he/she was working.

ZTL Controller describes being told to get out another Controller for a break; while another Controller goes and opens a position.  The Controller is then told to go to the new sector and that Controller was opening and that Controller was to give the FLM a break.  While the Controller is moving to open the new position; aircraft are heard on the sectors frequency.  The FLM had already split up the sector and taken the frequencies from the original Controller.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

First Officer was flying a visual approach at night to 31L at DAL.  As we were turning final abeam downtown; we got a Caution Obstacle Warning. The First Officer initiated a go-around and as soon as he did the caution obstacle warning stopped. I had him continue the approach to a landing with no further warnings occurring.  Because it was night; we should have continued the go-around even though the warning had stopped.

We were approaching MYLES from the east and cleared for a visual approach to Runway 31L. We were initially at 3;000; and slowing to 170 knots; and descending to 2;200 about 4 miles out. We configured to gear down; and flaps 30; and I clicked the autopilot off; and turned inside JAKID; in a turning descent.We were roughly on glide path; and centerline rolling wings level; when we got a GPWS caution 'too low obstacle'. I initiated a go-around; and as soon as I pulled up and added power; the caution stopped and light went out. We elected to continue with the approach when we should have performed a go-around.

Flight crew reported they failed to follow SOP after receiving a GPWS obstacle caution while on approach to DAL.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

New METROPLEX procedures in effect. Aircraft X out the BNGOS DTA level at 140. Aircraft Y on the BNGOS1 SID level at 130 filed for 400. Climbed via the SID to FL230. Aircraft are laterally separated; radar picture appears like the old procedure of WINCO/THNDR DTA; aircraft exit Miami Approach laterally separated and remain separated. Aircraft Y turns into the flight path of Aircraft X due to the SID; Aircraft Y is instructed to expedite descent to 130 and given a heading of 020 to diverge. Aircraft X checks on; reports Aircraft Y in sight; and is given a westerly heading to diverge.The aggressive cross-outs of the Metroplex SIDS cause multiple conflicts during high traffic volume or NORDO scenarios. Recommend true parallels out DTAs to ensure lateral separation; and allow controllers to use headings/speeds/altitude to expedite traffic flow.

ZMA Controller reported problems associated with the new metroplex design of a departure that caused a conflict between two aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 166; Flight Crew Type 853

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Stick shaker on initial climb out of 2000 feet. A/S 220 knots; yellow band 209 knots. Pitch below flight director command bars; clean configuration; bank angle less than 20 degrees. Stall indicators about 2.5 degrees below pitch attitude. Planned Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) 137.0; Final ZFW from Final Weight Manifest 132.6 which we noted was a significant drop off considering passenger count didn't seem to change. Kid count 19. Planned TOGW 177.5; Final TOGW 172.9.During turn on departure in a clean configuration and 20 degrees of bank; got stick shaker for a couple seconds. First Officer reduced pitch and indication went away. Working through the Chief Pilot and load planning; showing 47 bags in aft cargo. On arrival; increased approach speed by an extra 5 knots to account for possible increased weight. Landing normal. Would like an answer as to the actual weight of cargo and bag count.

B737 Crew experienced stick shaker during climb out due to possible incorrect weight data.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

While in cruise I put on my O2 mask as the Captain was leaving the flight deck. I couldn't exhale from the mask as the diaphragm appeared to be stuck. I held the mask tightly to my face and blew very hard which 'broke open' the diaphragm. I then decided to switch to emergency on the O2 panel but was unable to because there was some type of locking pin that appears non compliant; preventing its removal without a tool as it was jammed against the panel.  Had I actually need emergency oxygen; this could have become a very serious issue. This pin was obviously not the pin that is supposed to be installed.  It concerns me that it is our culture here to 'just get it done' and there was no consideration of whether or not a pilot would actually be able to select emergency O2 in an emergency. Standards should be followed in actions and the type of parts we use. I have sent a picture of the panel to [the Chief Pilot].

MD-83 First Officer discovers his oxygen mask exhale diaphragm is stuck after donning the mask in cruise. A hard blow breaks it loose but it is then discovered that the emergency oxygen switch is pinned in the off position and the pin cannot be removed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

At night; cleared for the visual to Runway 3 in CHO we were heading southwest to establish ourselves on the final approach course. Descending from 4;000 to 2;600 we received a GPWS warning; terrain pull up; which was immediately acted upon. Identification [through] GPWS aural warning. Cause [was having a] descent rate [of] 1;000 FPM; while crossing over a ridge in the area.Responding upon the initial GPWS warning; I immediately disconnected the autopilot; added power and climbed; which stopped the warning right away. Suggestions [are] during the brief for the approach we discussed the terrain and that it would be on the opposite side of the approach course that we would be using. With the iPad in 'light' and not 'dark' mode there is no terrain noted on the side of the approach that we used. I double checked this. The approach plan was to be turning onto final between WULDU and SIPME. Delaying the turn to outside of WULDU may have adverted this. However; at night; especially in areas with some terrain; vectors to the final approach course would be a safe action to avoid this in the future.

Air carrier First Officer reported executing an evasive maneuver during descent for a night visual approach when the GPWS Terrain Warning activated.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21.5

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

[Aircraft X] is doing paradrop activities around the airport. This aircraft routinely asks us to vector other aircraft around his position. He also behaves as if when he is there...the airport should be closed; and we shouldn't be able to run approaches or clearances out of the airport. I vectored an IFR aircraft around his position as he requested (against my better judgment) a few minutes before the issue. I called traffic for [Aircraft X] 10 miles east of his position westbound. I called it again when the plane was about 1 mile from his position. He asked me to vector the plane to the North around his position. I told him the plane was VFR and had every right to proceed westbound. [Aircraft X] then advised me he had troops in the air; and that they could be near that position. I gave an immediate turn to 340 heading and got [Aircraft Y] out of the area. [The airport] is [near] a very busy VORTAC that services all the smaller aircraft back and forth from the Los Angeles basin and the Phoenix area. It also serves as a practice approach airport for several training schools in the Phoenix area. I chastised the pilot on frequency and had him call in to management. In my opinion; this pilot was acting in gross negligence in his duties; and endangered many lives. Mine is not the only issue this particular jumper has had in the [this] area.Move this operation to a protected restricted area; or an airport that isn't along a major route.

Los Angeles [ZLA] Center Controller reported of a problem with a skydiving operation. Pilot had requested special separation service in congested airspace.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

After a routine approach and normal landing; I was unable to maintain runway centerline using the steerable tailwheel. Aircraft departed the runway to the left and stopped in the adjacent grass. No damage to airplane or property was encountered and there were no injuries.I think the mechanism that allows the tailwheel to free-caster (for towing purposes) had engaged thus making the tailwheel unsteerable. In the future; I plan to thoroughly check this during preflight and again prior to each landing.

The pilot of a tailwheeled aircraft was unable to control the tailwheel steering during landing rollout; resulting in a runway excursion.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I took over Aircraft X which was scheduled for a ferry flight later that day from ZZZ to ZZZ1 for storage.  I started reviewing the logbook to find out which overtimes needed to be added to ferry permit; which items needed to be addressed before departure and any other items required before ferry could depart.  I found approximately 4-5 additional items that would be overtime and proceeded to make the open write-ups required and lock log pages for the ferry.  We also [were working] off of for deviations allowed for returning the aircraft to flying condition after storage.As part of this the most notable deviation allowed was the allowance to place (5th stage check vlv inspection) on DIP (Deferred in Place) for 5 cycles and placing one engine hi stage vlv on either MEL XXXXX or XXXXY.  This aircraft already had MEL XXXXY applied when I took it over; the DIP was not created yet.  After a thorough review of all log pages created; items I created; review with planning of overtime items and making sure all required log pages were locked for the ferry; which took over an hour; everything appeared to be in order.  Except for the fact I still hadn't started a log page for placing a DIP on accomplishing the FCD inspection.  Approximately an hour before schedule departure time we created a DIP on Log page for accomplishing remaining steps for AMM XX-XX-XX.  Once ZZZ stated they were done with all work required; I did one last review and everything appeared to be in order so the MFD was sent to the aircraft.  Approximately 45 minutes after the aircraft departed on it's ferry flight; it finally dawned on me about the DIP required and I wasn't sure if it had been accomplished.  I went back and searched DIP log pages and all closed log pages looking to see if it had been accidentally closed; it had not; and was determined the log page was never created and did in fact get missed.At no time was the safety of the aircraft in question so I planned to make the writeup and place it on DIP once the aircraft arrived in ZZZ1 for storage.

Technician reported not completing the correct paperwork for a ferry fight.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

ECAM message: Engine No. 2 EGT over limit climbing out of 28000 feet. Complied with policy; procedures; and flows. Shutdown #2 engine; and diverted.

Approximately 25 minutes after departure climbing from 28000 feet to 34000 feet we got a number two engine EGT OVERLIMIT ECAM message. We decided to level off at FL300. After we identified the non-normal; as the pilot flying I called for ECAM actions and we shut down the number two engine. I was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. The captain informed ATC and we decided to divert to the nearest suitable airport. Approximately 20 minutes later; after accomplishing all required checklist; QRH; Landing Performance; ECAM procedures contacting Dispatch and requesting Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) we landed without incident. ARFF determined there was no fire or smoke that prohibited us from taxiing to the gate. Our Flight Attendant crew also accomplished all of their required checklist without incident.

A319 flight crew reported an ECAM message for number two engine EGT over limit climbing to FL340. ECAM actions result in the engine being shut down and the flight diverting to a suitable airport.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

The Captain said the forward phone was not working right and previous crew said it was intermittent. I was able to make my opening PA; and then we heard the Captain ding us to say cleared for departure. The intercom phone would not work; and the C Flight Attendant jumped up and went to go to the back to have the B make the announcement. The C Flight Attendant quickly started to go down the aisle and before the B said cleared for departure; the Captain took off. The C was clinging to the seats to pull herself forward; and I helped her get to her jumpseat. These next two flights were some off the longest; most frustrating ones I have had. There was no form of communication from the front to the back. As A Flight Attendant; the B had to say the PA's; and when it came time to say arm doors I would hit the call light twice and she would do the announcements. VERY FRUSTRATING. What would have happened if there was an emergency? Or worse yet; if something happened to the C Flight Attendant on takeoff? How would I have communicated to them? You know the worst part of this is this has been like this for sometime AND NO ONE IS GETTING IT FIXED!!!While things may not sound big to those that sit behind a desk; they are to us. We rely on them for communication and safety. What's going on with Maintenance? This plane went through several bases and still was not fixed. Another example; I had water in aft lav not shutting off last week. Nope; did not get fixed so now it gets passed down to some else. I had an electrical short shock me last week; that too did not get fixed and another crew flew that plane getting zapped when they touched the galley. Why are none of these maintenance issues being fixed? Why does it take so long? One of these days; something will happen due to the lack of maintenance and then what? These were very much safety issues that needed to be resolved in a timely manner!

B737-700 Flight Attendant reports being dispatched with the forward interphone and handset on MEL. This results in significant difficulties for the cabin crew and a takeoff with a Flight Attendant out of her seat.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 184; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

SEC2 fault deferral.  This deferral must be re-evaluated. Taking off with a known flight control loss; particularly the elevator control computer; is unsafe.  I refused the aircraft.  [Maintenance] called me back to advise me that [they] didn't have an SEC and the repair was scheduled that evening in [a down line station].  I regret accepting the aircraft.  I endangered my passengers and crew by flying three legs without SEC2. I even volunteered to extend beyond my FAR117 duty limit just to get the jet to [the down line station] to let maintenance repair the SEC.

A320 Captain reported his aircraft was dispatched with SEC2 (a flight control computer) fault deferred; and expressed concern about the safety of this procedure.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While climbing through 15;000 feet the FWD EXIT DOOR warning illuminated. I directed the First Officer to run the appropriate checklist. The checklist for the door also led him to run the unpressurized flight checklist. As soon as I saw the warning light I began to level off and advised ATC of the situation. I then requested a descent and vectors back to [departure airport]. We returned to the field and landed without further incident.

Dash 8 flight crew reported they returned to departure airport after noting a FWD EXIT DOOR light.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Fatigue; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were assigned the PIGLT Four RNAV Arrival to land Runway 36L. 36L only has an RNAV approach so that's what I set up for even though the conditions were VFR. On the downwind leg of the PIGLT arrival we were given clearance to descend to 1600 ft and turn to a heading for an intercept to the final approach course 36L. When we reported the runway in sight we were cleared for the visual 36L. I set the VNAV for the RNAV approach and shortly after the captain noted that it might've just been easier to go direct to BERDY (the outer fix). I checked to make sure that the course line was going to intercept the extended centerline which it did. As we rolled onto final the captain asked 'why are we still descending?' At that point I realize that even though I had selected VNAV it had not engaged. I disconnected the autopilot; applied power; and initiated a climb. While I was in the process of this procedure the tower announced an altitude alert for us. When we leveled off; due to the fact that we were in VFR conditions; no other traffic around; and in clear view of the runway I elected to continue the approach visually. We continued to configure the aircraft for landing but before I could call for flaps 30 (final flap configuration) the aircraft announced 1000 feet. At that point; we were on the extended centerline; on the visual glidepath; configured; and on airspeed. I elected to continue the approach and made a normal landing.At the point of this event we were on day four of a four-day trip. All of our sign ins had been late with long overnights. However; the night before this event we were scheduled to have a 10:35 overnight which got reduced to 10 hours as we were running late. We were three hours out of Home Base Time; getting up early in the morning. In hindsight; and after a good night's sleep; I can't believe that I didn't execute a go around at the first sign of trouble. Obviously; I was more fatigued than I realized at the time.

Air carrier flight crew reported getting low while on a visual approach to MCO Runway 36L when VNAV was selected; but it did not engage.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During descent; Approach Control assigned heading and altitude of 2;300 feet. Assigned altitude was read back; descended to and maintained. The ILS RWY 24 approach clearance contained a vector and an assigned altitude of 3;200 feet until established on the localizer. Intercept vector was given between the fixes JONLI (3;200 feet crossing restriction) and DEFJO (2;400 feet cross restriction). New assigned altitude on intercept vector was read back; and climb initiated until established on localizer.Approach Control initially assigned 2300 feet; then 3;200 feet.Should have questioned initially assigned altitude of 2;300 feet; since it is 100 feet below DEFJO (2;400 feet). Also could have reported field in sight and accept Visual Approach or canceled IFR.

First Officer reported receiving and descending to an altitude below a crossing restriction ahead of them.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On the KORRY 4 arrival into LGA; ATC issued a clearance to cross RIDGY at F270. The autopilot was engaged; in VNAV mode; and on profile for the KORRY 4 arrival fixes; but the actual procedure is published to cross RIDGY above F270; displayed in the FMS as '300/27000A.' I failed to edit the STAR procedure to delete the 'A' which caused the aircraft to fly the procedure as published; that is; to cross RIDGY above F270.The Washington Center Controller informed us when we were 8 miles from RIDGY that 'next time; let's cross RIDGY at F270; next time; listen up.' Then he handed us off to the next controller.I intervened and deployed the speed brakes and steepened the descent. We almost made the crossing; but missed RIDGY by 8 miles after we passed the fix. We then resumed the STAR as published.Identification: We were made to be aware of the situation by the ATC controller and then immediately intervened with the automation to correct the error.Cause: I neglected to change the published STAR procedure to the amended instructions given by the controller.Response: Intervention with automation to attempt to comply with clearance.Suggestions: Follow the standard procedure to brief the STAR and any changes issued by ATC should be crosschecked with the published procedure.

Fractional Captain reported failing to make the crossing restriction at RIDGY that had been modified by ATC on the KORRY 4 arrival into LGA.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4180; Flight Crew Type 225

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While flying West along the coastline; in vicinity of HRT; at an altitude of 2;900 ft.; under positive radar control with Eglin Approach (132.1); another aircraft directly overflew our aircraft in the opposite direction at an estimated distance of 250-300 ft. No traffic calls were given by ATC. (Note: Often there is background noise observed on Eglin Approach Frequencies which can be distracting and makes their comms hard to hear / understand.)

Pilot reported NMAC while in cruise flight.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Dash 8-100 had a temporary flexible [hydraulic] line that the Lead had told me to change. The line was difficult to change and also was in a bad spot to access. It was in the top inboard corner of the nacelle up against the rear spar. I had to loosen 5 additional [hydraulic] lines to get access to the specific line that I was changing. The fitting attached to that line was loose; and therefore made it more difficult to tighten the line. I had to open a panel on the top of the nacelle to get a wrench on the fitting so I could hold that line to tighten it. I did a leak check and a found that the line had leaked; so I had to loosen all of the lines to get to the leaking line again to tighten it sufficiently. After the second leak check the line was found to no longer be leaking. I then proceeded to confirm that all the other lines were tightened. [A few days later] the Maintenance Supervisor approached me and informed me that other mechanics were trying to clear an MEL related to the line that I had changed a few days before. The other mechanics that were working to resolve the MEL found that there was no hydraulic pressure going to a line [because] I had mistakenly switched it with another line. It was discovered upon further investigation that 2 of the lines; which I had to remove to get to the temporary flexible [hydraulic] line; had been swapped with each other. The incident occurred because there were many lines preventing clear access to the line that I was changing. The task required me to loosen various other lines to gain access to the temporary flexible [hydraulic] line. Two lines that I need to remove to facilitate access were small; looked very similar; and were side by side; so I must have interchanged them without noticing when I reconnected them. The fair-leads that were removed to access the line were reinstalled using retained hardware so it seemed as if I had installed the previously removed lines correctly. A satisfactory operational check was accomplished; further leading me to believe that the lines had been installed correctly. In the future I will be sure to mark the lines in a clear manner as to allow them to be reinstalled without any confusion as to where they need to be reconnected. Asking a fellow mechanic to go behind me and double-check my work can also help prevent future mishaps regarding attention to detail.

A Maintenance Technician inadvertently swapped two hydraulics lines on a Dash 8-100 while replacing a temporary flexible hydraulic located in the pylon/nacelle area. It went undetected during his leak check and manifested itself in service. The resultant condition was subsequently covered by an MEL; and discovered during the follow up maintenance troubleshooting. The lines were returned to their normal positions and the aircraft was returned to service.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Company Policy

I was working Local Control which manages the class D during north flow operations. Aircraft X had been doing air work at an adjacent airport which is about 8 to 9 miles west of this airport. Aircraft Y was inbound on the ILS. Aircraft Z and Aircraft A were inbound from the southwest. Approach called for a point out to Flight Data/Clearance delivery on Aircraft X and when asked what he was going to do we were told he was going back towards the adjacent airport. Aircraft X entered from the southwest and made maneuvers about 2 to 3 southwest at 2;300 feet and then turned southeast directly overflying Aircraft Y on the ILS by 400 feet. Aircraft Y was issued traffic alerts and broken off the approach to a 090 heading. This put them in conflict with Aircraft B; inbound from the southeast. Another traffic alert was given to Aircraft Y for Aircraft B. Just before Aircraft Y was broken off the ILS approach; Aircraft Z a VFR inbound from the southwest was issued a traffic alert since Aircraft X initially turned opposite direction to them. Aircraft A VFR from the southwest also had to be diverted to the east prior to Aircraft Y being broken off the approach because Aircraft X's intentions were unpredictable and not as described. When asked why flight check was turning east (right instead of left) toward our traffic we were told by approach that 'it is what it is.'Flight Check operations are a high risk to anyone else operating in the area. When they arrive their intentions are incredibly vague other than what they are checking. They often seem to just do whatever they want and let you know as they are doing it. From a local standpoint I think that flight check needs to be a lot more clear of their exact intentions) while operating in the vicinity. VFR arrivals need to be rerouted or placed in holding by approach to a different quadrant other than the one that Flight Check is operating in. This is not the first close call Flight Check has caused over the past few years.

A Tower Local Controller accepted a point out of a Flight Check aircraft which did not maneuver as expected causing conflicts with traffic on the final approach course.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 65

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

After receiving ATIS I taxied aircraft on ramp area to hold short line on the ramp side near XY taxiway short of X taxiway. I made repeated calls to Ground Control on both primary and secondary radio and received a response that said they were receiving carrier only. We could hear all ATC voice traffic. We received no instructions or inquiries from Ground Control. We cycled radios changed frequencies all to no avail. We still remained receive only; no transmit out. I was now faced with a problem on what to do. We were not in a position where we could execute a 180 degree to return to the ramp. Approximately 5 minutes had now elapsed from my first attempt to contact ground. There was now an airplane approaching our position on taxiway X that wanted to exit there. Ground Control informed the approaching plane that we were blocking the taxiway and they were not talking to us. Still no attempt to contact us directly. At this time there was a second plane taxiing to exit at the same taxiway we were blocking. I had few choices. We again checked Tower for any light signals and did not see any. My options were to continue to remain where I was. This seemed fruitless as I was blocking the access to the ramp and this would not facilitate my return to the ramp. I could shut down the engine but that still leave me blocking the ramp and the taxiway unable to move. As I had been monitoring Ground frequency I was aware of all aircraft taxiing in or near my position. I visually cleared all taxiways and runway exits that would be any factor to me. All these areas were clear. The only airplane near me was the one approaching on X taxiway wishing to exit to the ramp at the exit I was on. Since Ground Control was unable to realize I could not transmit and was receiving only; and in lieu of any light signals or alternate instructions from Ground I had to make a decision. I thought the best course of action based on my options was to clear the ramp entrance and return to the ramp. The only way I could do this was to cross the taxiway hold line separating the ramp from X taxiway. After again confirming there were no planes except the one wanting to use the exit I was blocking I proceeded on to X taxiway clear enough of the ramp exit to allow the plane to exit and then exited back to the ramp. I would point out considering my position on the airport and Ground Control acknowledging the were receiving a carrier only; the approaching traffic wanting to use the exit I was blocking and a third plan inbound to the same exit; there could have been a more positive attempt by Ground to use alternate means to communicate with and assist a plane with an obvious problem. Asking if the plane in my position had radio problems; was in distress or needed assistance would have gone a long way in assisting me at a trying time. A simple call to see if I needed assistance request to ident if I was having radio problems; a light signal from Tower to return to ramp and or instructions in the blind would have been very helpful to me and would have allowed a return to the ramp without my having to make my own decision as to the best course of action without any assistance from ATC.

Experimental aircraft pilot reported a radio transmit issue resulted in an unannounced exit from the taxiway area.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

I was in and out of the aircraft three times coordinating [de-icing/anti-ice] (no ground headset communications). As I left the cockpit for the walk around; I heard the First Officer calling for a verbal clearance; but did not hear the clearance or read back. After walk around I closed the cabin door; armed; readied the cabin; and returned to the cockpit. First Officer explained that Clearance Delivery changed the flight plan; which was input into the FMC; and confirmed with the Captain by stepping through the legs. I was told 10;000 feet was the cleared altitude as set in the MCP. At the same time I was ensuring that our HOT (Holdover Time) application was activated; as we had been treated with Type 4. Began towing immediately.Taxi distractions. Civilian car stuck on side of taxiway; requiring tug to veer off centerline and coordination to take us onto Taxiway A for start. Landing distance assessment. Captain tasked me with calling load control (cell phone) to coordinate closeout. We were approaching the departure point when Tower cleared us for takeoff without altitude assignment. Captain requested more time before takeoff to go over recently acquired closeout. Takeoff clearance was cancelled. When ready; takeoff clearance was granted a second time; without an altitude assignment; with Tower requesting a PIREP on cloud base. Takeoff uneventful. Tower handed us off to Departure; and Tower asked for a base report. First Officer responded with a [bases] report. Switched to Departure. Before check-in; Departure was already calling for us to level off at 3000 feet and calling traffic; initially at 3 o'clock and then 9 o'clock. Captain's NAV range was at 5 miles; and traffic was not visible on TCAS. He changed the range so the traffic could be seen at 9-10 o'clock.Approaching 3000 feet MSL; in rapid succession; Captain hand-flying; TCAS TA traffic alert; ATC call to level at 3000 feet; ATC call of traffic; TCAS RA to descend. First Officer and I both called for a descent to 3000 feet. Captain was slow to respond as he and I were looking at the converging traffic. Traffic in sight 9 o'clock high; TCAS RA. We finally started descending at 3800 feet; showing 400 feet separation. Descended to 3000 feet. After RA we descended to 3000 feet and assigned 120 heading. Autopilot was engaged at some point after the RA. Captain did not Heading Select 120; but instead began a discussion about what happened. I insisted that we needed to turn another 30 degrees to the left to a heading of 120. ATC then told us to fly 110 degrees. I insisted he Heading Select to the heading. Captain reached up and began turning the Airspeed Selector to a lower airspeed; thinking he was turning the Heading Select. I began to give loud and directive inputs to get him to reset the airspeed and instead turn the heading selector. He finally complied. 5 minutes later I found paperwork that appeared to be our departure clearance; which had a handwritten annotation of 3000 feet.Captain and First Officer had set the wrong departure altitude in the MCP; and were actively flying to the wrong altitude. [I] was not in cockpit when clearance was obtained. Captain and First Officer briefed me that clearance had given us a climb altitude that was incorrect. When ACARS printed clearance is not available; all pilots should be present for clearance request and read back.

On PAINE 6 Departure; no altitude assigned by ATC Tower. We responded to TCAS RA. ATC advised stop climb; we complied with TCAS; ATC vectors and altitudes. During preflight; we set standard 10;000 feet by habit. Clearance Delivery gave new routing and 3;000 feet (Relief First Officer was not present; executing exterior duties). Due to multiple distractions; entering revised route in FMS; deicing procedures; HOT (Holdover Time) calculations; calls to [ground handling Company] representative; non-standard operations; snow drifts; vehicle stalled in the taxiway; low ceiling; and unfamiliar airport; the MCP altitude was not correctly reset. While approaching number 1 for Runway 16R; I intended to query altitude with Paine Tower per SID (Page 10-3) but was distracted with a late closeout. All checklists completed. Uneventful takeoff. Full motor; cold day; empty plane; high performance; which resulted in the following events to occur rapidly. Immediately after takeoff; Paine Tower requested base of clouds; which I complied after a delay to achieve a safe altitude and aircraft control above 400 feet (which briefly delayed switchover to SEA Departure 128.5). On climb out; at approximately 3000 MSL; I heard 'Stop Climb' over 128.5 and immediately ordered level off; along with the Relief First Officer calls/direction; which the Captain promptly did by hand-flying. This maneuver was aided by TCAS RA indications and visual contact of the traffic. Peak altitude was approximately 3800 MSL; with closest point 400 feet vertical separation below corporate traffic. Lateral separation unknown. Relief First Officer did a great job keeping eyes on safety.To aid fellow pilots; triple check altitudes; do your best to mitigate continuous distractions; highlight altitudes on the paper clearance (to separate from the routing jargon); and possibly add non-standard notes to the airport 10-7 page (SEA dense traffic; expect X altitude when departing south; query Tower; inbound A-7 taxiway; turn onto Taxiway E and shut down; tow to parking; [ground handling Company]/Maintenance frequencies; etc.).

Air carrier flight crew reported climbing above the assigned departure altitude into a confliction with crossing traffic.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was the flight instructor conducting a training flight for a pilot who was upgrading to Captain. We had just performed a circling approach and entered a left pattern for Runway XX at an uncontrolled airport. The winds were out of the northwest. On short final I saw an airplane; which appeared to be a C172; at our 11 o'clock flying at us. We performed go-around and turned right. The C172 had turned left. We made all the proper radio calls on the appropriate frequency and did not hear anyone else in the pattern. After the evasive maneuver we tried to get a response from the other aircraft that we just avoided. We got a response after several radio calls to them. They claim that they were on frequency the whole time but it's apparent they weren't. This was a great lesson in 'see and avoid' when you are VFR. We fly VFR during passenger carrying operations in congested airspace quite often; and we make it a point to always have one pilot looking out the window when VFR. Specifically; we stress this concept when flying a particular airplane we operate that has a 'glass cockpit.' It has paid off before and did so during this event. I think there were two contributing factors. One; the other airplane was not on the CTAF Frequency. Two; we were landing with a quartering tailwind so if traffic was inbound; and not doing a training flight and circling approach; its reasonable to expect them to land on the runway that's most aligned with the wind. In the future I think I will try to do circling approaches at a controlled airport providing the latest opposite direction traffic restriction doesn't prohibit us from using a runway that is not currently in use.

A PC-12 training flight at an uncontrolled airport experienced a critical near-miss while conducting a circling approach to a runway not favored by the existing wind conditions. No communication was heard from the opposing aircraft on the CTAF frequency until after the event.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 9600; Flight Crew Type 850

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 69; Flight Crew Total 631; Flight Crew Type 47

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Dispatch called our base with a mission request to pick up patient in EHA for transport without additional accompaniment. I and my co-pilot followed standard operating procedure.a) checked Weather (WX)b) checked and printed NOTAMSc) evaluated our risk assessmentd) and returned the call to dispatch in order to accept the missione) thence had the co-pilot file an IFR flight plan for the first and second leg via the computer.Boarded our aircraft with our medics. Run-up was without issues. I handed the controls to the copilot and assigned myself the pilot non flying role. Take-off was routine and without issues. The flight toward EHA takes only a little over 15 min. ATC cleared us to EHA at 7;000 feet. WX was VMC with SCT layer above us. [It was] a moonless night. At 25 miles out listened to EHA wx report Wind was reported as 260@12G19 (NO MENTION OF A RUNWAY CLOSURE); looked at the approach plates and decided RWY22 would be the appropriate runway. Requested visual 22 and clicked the runway lights on.  At 12 miles out ATC cleared us down to 5;100 feet at 7 miles out we found the field and were cleared for the visual 22 and canceled IFR before we switched to the local frequency (122.8 MHz); Due to the fact that we were still high we flew past the centerline and made a descending right 270 degree turn to rub off altitude and airspeed. Thence lined up with RWY22 and completed the before landing checklist.  Approach was slightly steep (PAPI 1 red) but on speed (110 kts). Round out; flare and touchdown were normal.Then right before the nose wheel touched; we became aware of an unlit abandoned vehicle ON THE RIGHT RUNWAY EDGE. I thought it strange to leave a vehicle on the actual runway and noted that the copilot was already easing the aircraft to the left. Seconds later additional vehicles BLOCKING HALF THE RIGHT SIDE of the runway came into our lights. Although this caused me to grab the controls; I didn't take the controls away from the copilot because he was already veering further to the left in order to avoid the collision. We were still doing some 80 kts on the left side of the runway and barely had the [thrust] reversers spooled up. When we got confronted with another UNLIT PARKED VEHICLE straight in front of us this time (left side of the runway). The resulting avoidance maneuver was very aggressive in order to go from the extreme left side of the runway to the extreme right side of the runway while still doing in excess of 60 kts. We narrowly missed this vehicle still doing approx 40 kts with the [thrust] reversers going full blast while at the same time using all the (differential) braking we could exert and well past this last vehicle when we had brought the aircraft down to normal taxi speed. The taxi into the ramp via RWY35 was without further incident [albeit] with a detailed explanation of what just happened to our medics in the back.Please understand that RWY22 at EHA is only 60 feet wide and the wingspan [is close to that].So far the scary part of this incident.Now comes the frustrating part of this incident.After shutdown I called WXBRIEF and informed him of our incident and the HIGHLY UNSAFE condition of RWY22 and requested that he would NOTAM CLOSE EHA RWY 04-22. He informed me that I could not do so but that the airport manager of EHA could do that and volunteered the airport manager's phone number. I dialed the provided phone number and was welcomed with: 'beep buup beep THE NUMBER YOU'VE DIALED IS NO LONGER IN SERVICE; PLEASE CHECK THE NUMBER .......................' So dialed the second phone number of the 'owner of the airport'. And got an ANSWERING MACHINE!WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO REMEDY AN EXTREMELY UNSAFE SITUATION?  Called the WXBRIEF again and asked him for the KANSAS CENTER ATC phone number. [This was] in order to have ATC help keep other aircraft from the dangers lurking on RWY04-22. Luckily the person at Kansas center's watch understood the severity of the issue and immediately informed the ATC supervisor of the situation.After all this I proceeded to inform the company hierarchy of the incident.

An air ambulance flight crew reported that while landing at night at EHA they experienced a severe ground conflict with vehicles left on the runway. No NOTAM was reportedly in place.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 1250; Flight Crew Type 325

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After one of my colleagues reviewed the records of the operator regarding one of the aircraft I fly; I was informed by said colleague that that helicopter was flown past the 100 hour limit since the last maintenance; on one occasion. I was also informed that the pilot that flew past the 100 hour mark was me. I took off before the 100 hour inspection was due; but I landed 0.[X] hrs after. Maintenance was performed after said flight. I did not pay enough attention to the maintenance status of the aircraft; and maintenance is often performed right before it is due. As a result of that; I was not aware that the helicopter was almost due to the 100 hours inspection; although I fly the aircraft often and I inspect the logbooks frequently; also for teaching purposes. I was complacent with knowing that the aircraft is properly maintained and that there are indicators of impending maintenance in the aircraft's records. Together with the Maintenance personnel; the other pilots and the chief pilot; it was decided that the aircraft would receive maintenance some hours prior to being due; leaving room for errors in scheduling the flights. A new maintenance status sheet will be added to the aircraft operator book; more clear and with a better and simpler layout than the older; so that pilots can easily consult it prior to every flight. The white board in the operator's office with the status of all aircraft will be kept up to date at all times. I will also make sure that I research more carefully the airworthiness status of the aircraft; whether it is a new one to me or one that I fly often.

R44 pilot learned after a flight that the aircraft had been flown past the 100 hour inspection time.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Lead reported that during the pushback process; a fuel truck failed to stop and drove behind the aircraft. The lead had to 'slam' the brakes in order avoid a collision. The lead was unable to make the vehicle number due to the speed of the vehicle and outside lighting conditions. Incident was reported to operations so the proper department could be notified.

A ramp employee reported a ground conflict during aircraft pushback when a fuel truck drove behind the aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Approximately 10 minutes prior to push I was notified from FFA Forward Flight Attendant) that we may have ammunition on board in a cargo compartment. I was not notified of any HAZMAT on board prior to this and was not provided with a NOPIC (Notice to Captain) form. I called Ops to notify and Station Manager there advised me that according to their Station Manager that declaring ammo was not required. I referred to FOM and there was no statement that I could find that verified and confirmed Manager statement. By this time; door was closed and jetway pulled away. I advised Ops that I wanted a NOPIC form filled for us because it went against what my FOM manual stated; [and] it went against my better judgment. As a flight crew we should have awareness of any HAZMAT that is loaded on board no matter how small. It is considered a Class I material and has explosive properties. I need to know where it is and how much was loaded in the case of cargo smoke or fire. It doesn't matter if it's from a known shipper or loaded in a passenger's bag; it needs to be declared. [Manager] standards are not aligned with standard ICAO-IATA procedures and FOM procedures. If there are any exemptions regarding shipment of ammunition on board that is specifically stated in an IATA/ICAO document then our FOM needs to be updated to state that.

Captain reported missing required hazmat documents prior to departure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Immediately after gear retraction on the flight; the FO and I smelled a very strong odor of fumes that I would describe as dirty socks and an oily smell. We donned oxygen masks. A few minutes later; I briefly raised my mask off my face and could no longer detect any unusual odors. On approach into ZZZ1; we smelled the fumes again; and donned oxygen masks. However; this time the fumes were not as strong as on takeoff. In hindsight; it is clear that the better decision than continuing the flight would have been to return to the departure airport. The FO has communicated with me several times since then; advising that he has experienced headaches since this fume event occurred.

A330 Captain reported smelling a strong odor and fumes after takeoff; and then again on descent to a lesser degree.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 24

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Departed on a flight following NW bound when entering special flight rule corridor over LAX at 4500 northbound controller advised squawk 1201 and dropped flight following. On the north side of special flight rule area when I contacted the SoCal to continue my flight following I was advised to call SoCal TRACON when landed for possible pilot deviation. The rest of the flight was uneventful [and] when I called SoCal TRACON; I was told that they observed airspace incursion into Burbank Class C airspace. According to the controller; no traffic conflict had occurred.If the SoCal frequency for the northbound exit from VFR corridor was provided at the time that flight following was dropped there may have been less likelihood for this incursion to occur. It may be helpful to look into this [and] see if it's possible to hand over rather than drop the flight following in such a busy area. I don't know if this airspace is frequently violated for this reason or not?

Pilot reports of flight following being terminated due to SFRA and then he is advised later that he violated Class C on the other side of the SFRA.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After all checklists for pushback had been completed; we lost ground power on the aircraft prior to having the APU started.  So the aircraft went to battery only stand-by power for about 30 seconds.  Ground power was reconnected and the APU was started on put on the busses.  After regaining electrical power; we re-verified that all the data was still in the FMC. We rechecked the route and that all the takeoff data was still in the FMC.  There was a CDU fault that took about two minutes to clear and then everything was back up 100 percent.  We received pushback clearance and taxied to 1L at MCI.  V1 and Vr were the same (130 knots) and V2 was 135 knots.  I pushed the power up; hit the autothrottles; and asked for takeoff thrust.  My First Officer (FO) called takeoff thrust set and I re-established my hand on the thrust levers.  My FO then called 80 knots and then V1 rotate.  I thought the call came rather fast in the takeoff sequence; but at the moment I was focused on the engine instruments.  I removed my hand from the thrust levers and began my rotation.  It was at that moment that I realized we were only at about 100 knots.  The nose of the aircraft was off the ground; but we were well below the briefed speeds.  I had started my rotation based on my FO call. I kept the nose off the ground but stopped my rotation and pushed the thrust up until the aircraft felt as if it wanted to fly.  We left the ground at about 120 knots; still 15 knots below V2.  I let the aircraft accelerate to V2 and then contained a normal climb.   At this point we realized what had happened.  Due to the power loss; the V2 bug on the MCP had reset its self to 100 knots.  My FO said that when he saw it on the speed tape that he thought that the speeds I.E. V1; Vr; and V2 were all the same and called rotate.From now on; anytime I have an electric power loss on the aircraft; I am going to run the full Before Start Originating; Before Push; and Before Taxi Checklist to make sure none of these critical items have been missed or reset due to the electrical power loss.

We had just finished the Before Push Checklist when the Ground Crew on the ramp signaled to the Captain asking if they could pull Ground power. The Captain held up one finger for them to wait a minute as the APU had not been started. The Ground Crew proceeded to pull the Ground power and we were left on standby battery power until we could get the APU up and running. When we were able to establish power again; we checked to make sure all of our data in the FMC was correct. All of the flight plan data as well as the performance data was correct. What we failed to catch was the V2 bug on the MCP had reverted back to 100 knots.

A B737 flight crew reported they rotated prematurely when the FMC performance data was lost following an electrical power failure during pushback.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Inbound to VIDP the FMS SAM 6F RNAV STAR had been loaded and briefed and was being navigated by the autopilot in the VNAV mode. All indications on the NAV displays were normal for the procedure. As aircraft made the left turn at SAM fix Approach Control assigned us a 090 heading. Additionally they inquired as to which arrival we were assigned and flying. The rest of the arrival was vectors transitioning to ILS Runway 29 which was completed successfully. During taxi in we were instructed to call Approach Control on a land line. After a discussion along the lines of 'all of our company jets were not flying the correct procedural ground track' we concluded the conversation with an agreement to contact Company Sandards to investigate the matter.

The reporter advised that; during the land line call to Approach Control; limited common language skills made it impossible for him to determine exactly where their flight path deviated from where ATC expected them to go. He stated the moving map display coincided perfectly with the charted arrival which indicated to him that; if their track differed from ATC's expectation; the error was programmed into both.The reporter further addressed his concern about having no raw data means by which to confirm the digitally derived track the FMS slavishly follows coincides with the intended real life track over the ground. He referenced his many years of flying from point to point based on land based NAV fixes that did provide such independent assessment of the aircraft's real location with respect to the earth's surface.

A B777-200 Captain was advised by VIDP Approach Control that his lateral track did not conform to the SAM 6F RNAV STAR by which they had been cleared. The reporter; however; disagreed-citing their FMS track was precisely following the FMS magenta line which; in turn; exactly matched the route described on their commercially published aero chart.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During my leg while cruising at FL350 to from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with the autopilot engaged. multiple caution messages popped out; suggesting some electrical issue with the #2 IDG/BUS. there was not a lot of communication in between the pilots but the Captain grabbed the Quick Reference Handbook and began working; So I decided to keep flying and work the radios. I kept monitoring the Captains body actions because I know that moving the wrong electrical switch could lead to further electrical issues. During the troubleshoot I confirmed that he could touch the Integrated Drive Generator 2. when he mentioned he was going to turn on the APU I reacted and say no; he asked me Why I did not want APU; so I advised that we were above the maximum altitude for APU start; so he understood and agreed to wait. advised descending; to which he agreed. I requested 29;000 ft. from ATC; and descended to 29;000 ft. When I suggested we were at an altitude where we could; he asked me to turn on the APU. When attempted to start APU about 4 screens went black momentarily and the autopilot and auto throttles disconnected. I announced I had the flight controls; and the throttles. The Captain re-engaged the autopilot without asking me but voiced it over and I monitored the correct engagement. Given the autopilot was responding correctly I decided to leave it engaged and monitor it. Given the APU caused appeared to cause the distruption for the APU I did not attempt turning it on again. Captain kept working Quick Reference Handbook; and coordinated with Dispatch and flight attendants. Captain decided to do the approach and landing; we briefed and landing at ZZZ1 without incident. No request for priority handling was declared.Multiple electrical failures.While we seemed to reach each other fairly well; I feel like the threat was treated like a no-time threat rather than a time threat. However; the outcome was positive.

First Officer reported multiple electrical failures after the #2 IDG failed in flight.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

I was Pilot Flying and the Captain was Pilot Monitoring. We were cleared to land Runway 04R in HNL. After touching down and rolling out; the HNL Tower cleared us to cross Runway 08L at Kilo and contact Ground when clear of the runway. The Captain asked the Tower a second time; 'confirm cleared to cross Runway 08L?' since this is identified as Hot-Spot 2 at HNL. The Tower again confirmed we were cleared to cross 08L and contact Ground when clear of the runway. At this point we made a positive exchange of the flight controls and the Captain took control of the aircraft. Taxiway Kilo has an element of high-speed entry from Runway 04R and we were slowed from rollout; but still moving at a reasonable taxi speed when we came to the Kilo taxiway hold short line of Runway 08L. As we individually looked to 'clear' the right and left sides of the runway before taxiing onto Runway 08L; the Captain observed an Aircraft Y approximately 200 feet above the approach end of Runway 08L. Once identified we both looked and confirmed that the Aircraft Y was landing on Runway 08L. The Captain attempted to stop the aircraft; but he was unable too; before the nose of the aircraft entered Runway 08L. The Captain then pushed the thrust levers forward to propel us across Runway 08L; and clear of Runway 08L; before the Aircraft Y touched down on Runway 08L. There was no further incident.High workload; positive exchange of flight controls; speed at which we entered Taxiway Kilo; ATC commands; and the angle of our view of Runway 08L were all contributing factors. Ultimately we should have stopped the aircraft before entering Runway 08L; even though the HNL Tower had cleared us to cross the runway. Taxiway Kilo and Runway 08L intersection is already identified as Hot Spot 2 at HNL. We were aware of a threat but what we didn't consider was HNL Tower being 'wrong' to clear us to cross the runway with an aircraft on short final.

Air carrier First Officer reported they were cleared to cross 8L at HNL even though another air carrier aircraft was on short final for landing.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 32; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 11; Flight Attendant Total 32; Flight Attendant Type .06

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

As of the time the aircraft door closed we had not been catered.  I restocked the carts with the supplies we had. The boarding door was closed and all doors had been armed using proper procedures for monitor and challenge.  We were waiting to be deiced. I left my door to retrieve my demo equipment (In the last overhead bin aircraft Left.) I heard a knock at the door and saw the caterer looking through the window.  I crossed my wrists to motion that the door WAS NOT safe to open. The door handle began to rise and I grabbed the handle pushing it to the closed position; hoping to signal him to discontinue opening the door.  He continued to open the door and I was screaming and banging on the door. (The AFA told me she could hear me in the front of the aircraft!) He discontinued opening the door and the inside handle was at a half-way position. I called the flight deck to advise them of the situation and I was told not to touch the door.  They would call maintenance.  The catering truck pulled away from the aircraft.After several minutes; I went to the flight deck to communicate with the Captain the details of this incident. I was at the doorway to the flight deck when the dreaded 'hissing' of the slide could be heard throughout the airplane. I returned to my door to find the catering truck parked at the 2L door and the ripped remains of the slide caught on the ramp of the truck.

An EMB-190 Flight Attendant prevented a caterer from opening the 2R galley door after boarding was complete and slides armed. The caterer departed but proceeded to open 2L activating the slide after the Flight Attendant went forward to call Maintenance.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 520; Flight Crew Type 38

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

While enroute the aircraft lost power to the engine. The RPM indicated between 1200-1400; while the manifold [pressure] was between 12 and 13 inches. With no power; [I] was forced to make an emergency landing on [a highway] due to it being the best illuminated.

Pilot reported making a forced landing on a highway after experiencing engine power loss.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13.5; Flight Crew Total 4032; Flight Crew Type 1320

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I conducted a VFR flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ.  Flight conditions were excellent with clear skies; only light winds; and unusually light traffic due to current pandemic flight reductions.  No flight plan was filed; but I remained in contact with ATC throughout the flight.  Upon leaving ZZZ; my route was along the coast; through the 'Route' over ZZZ2 Class B; VOR; then direct to ZZZ.  For the last XX years; I have routinely flown this route each week in my commute from my firm to my residence. I had a passenger; who has flown this route with me for the last year.  As a right-seat regular passenger; she is interested in learning the basics of flying and procedures if the pilot was incapacitated.  She regularly handled the controls during the level-cruise flight and was competent in holding course and altitude.  She could start learning about descent and landings. We began a VFR descent from 8500 ft at 50 miles from ZZZ and notified ATC.  I took over control from the passenger; and explained power reductions; aircraft attitude; descent rate; etc.  At 20 miles out; the airport was visible.  We switched to ZZZ Tower and cleared for a visual straight-in approach to Runway XX.  During the entire process; I explained the techniques for a typical landing; including a power settings 22MP/22RPM (Manifold Pressure/Revolutions Per Minute) and airspeed reduction in order to drop the flaps and gear.  Once 175 kts was reached; the flaps were lowered 10 deg (typical to slow an Aircraft X down to Vgo); which takes several seconds.  During this time; I became distracted while explaining the glideslope; VASI (Visual Approach Slope Indicator) lights; critical aircraft speeds; and the landing checklist. Upon reaching Vgo; I failed to lower the gear.  As Aircraft X settled into the landing at the threshold of Runway XX; the gear warning horn sounded.   I rarely hear the horn and it (unfortunately) sounds similar to the stall warning horn; which is not unusual as you touchdown.  As the aircraft settled; I heard light scraping.  Suddenly; the combination of horn noise; ground speed; and scraping made sense.  I pushed the power forward; I pulled the controls back lightly and the plane responded.  I debated the possibility of dropping the gear; but calculated there was insufficient runway for full gear extension and a complete stop.  Since the plane was responding; I made a small climb; attempting to stay within ground effect and retracted the flaps.  The plane climbed easily and I notified Tower of a go-around.  After establishing a climb; I extended the gear; got '3-green;' turned left cross-wind; toward open fields in the event of an off-field landing.  We could climb; so I turned downwind; close-in.  At 500 ft AGL; I cautiously reduced power to reduce engine stress.  Everything sounded and felt good so I reduced power further; brought the base turn tight and dropped flaps.  The landing was uneventful and I taxied to my tie-down. Following engine shut-down; we exited the aircraft and three ZZZ operations personnel arrived.  I telephoned the Tower and answered several basic questions which lasted 5 minutes or less.  I visually surveyed the aircraft with Operations and they interviewed myself and my passenger.  I produced my pilot information and answered a few questions; which lasted about 10 minutes.  They stated that they had inspected the runway and found no damage--only the remains of the red beacon light from the underside of the aircraft. My damage inspection revealed the following:  -All 6 propeller blade tips were bent backwards.-The engines were able to re-start; but did not sound right.-Both flap skins were severely scraped; almost to the structure.-The aft portion of the underbelly was severely scraped over 2 panelsContributing factors to the failure to extend the gear; resulting in a prop-strike:1.Pilot was distracted during the final approach and did not complete the landing checklist.2.Aircraft X gear warning horn sounds similar to stall warning horn; which both operate at slow aircraft speed.3.The size of the yoke-mounted iPad EFB obstructs the pilot's clear view of the gear landing lights and gear operating switch.4.Straight-in approach vs. full pattern.Significant factors which support pilot proficiency:-Pilot had over X;000 PIC hours of flight experience.-In addition to XXXX PIC hours in make/model; pilot has Y;YYY PIC hours in retractable-gear aircraft.

Pilot flying failed to lower landing gear during landing maneuver.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Procedure; Weather; Staffing; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was working R-76.  The AR's were closed due to weather and there was weather in the middle of the state; forcing a majority of the center's traffic through the South area.  Most altitudes had chop causing most pilots to request ride reports and different altitudes.  Sectors 76 and 67 had full ACLs (at one point 67 had over 50 aircraft on their list) and were 'red' straight across the board.  I was working with both a D-side and tracker. The aircraft that were re-routed off the Atlantic Routes were coming over with bad routes (CRG-ILM or CRG-SAV-ILM etc) and required full route clearances to miss the warning areas and comply with LOA/SOP.  I also had to issue clearances to two southbound aircraft (I believe [ACR X] was one of the aircraft) who had OMN direct SJU and OMN direct MKJS.  I assume these slipped through the cracks at 67 because they were just as busy as me.  I have no idea how many other re-routes from Washington they did issue while covered up in traffic like I was doing from Miami.  The Supervisor was notified early in the session that issuing FRC's to the AR aircraft was causing the workload in the sector to become almost unbearable.  He told our TMU at least 2 times over the course of the next two hours that MIA needed to ensure the routes were issued off the ground.  When I finally got off position (after more that 2 hours 15 min); Miami was still sending aircraft northbound with SAV-ILM routing; and it seemed the volume was not reduced at all (the ACL was still full). TMU needed to take a more aggressive role in protecting the integrity of the sector.  Volume needed to be reduced and the re-routes needed to be issued from Miami Center.  The situation went on long enough that I have no doubt aircraft I was re-routing in the air were sitting on the ground when we first asked for routes to be fixed.  I see no reason while those planes could not have been given a good route from Clearance Delivery before they ever left.

Enroute Controller complains about overloaded sector due to weather and having to issue amended clearances while aircraft depart over 2 hours later on incorrect routings.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Departing ZZZ1 for ZZZ2 I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and the CA (Captain) was the PF (Pilot Flying). We planned a low altitude flight due to the shortness of the leg. Some altitudes in the legs page were edited to allow the lower cruise altitude to be selected. The flaps 10 takeoff went as normal (LNAV/VNAV). The PF called for flaps 1 as near as I can recall. I believe this is the case as most if not all of our previous legs had been flaps 5 takeoffs. I was distracted with a radio call or frequency change and I moved the flaps to 1 and did not catch the error. Shortly after that; the FMC changed to the descent phase and the speed bug moved to the flaps 5 maneuver speed; and the A/T (Auto Throttle) mode went from N1 to FMC speed; which resulted in the flaps 5 maneuver speed being the A/T target. As; or just prior to this happening the PF called for flaps up. I moved the flap lever to the up position; and since we were no longer accelerating got a momentary stick shaker. The PF instinctively lowered the nose reducing the AOA (Angle Of Attack). I increased the speed in the MCP window to get the A/T to command acceleration. The remainder of the flight was normal.Suggest crews be alert for unusual mode reversions when using low altitudes for cruise. I would probably use non VNAV takeoff procedures in the future. The big lesson is not new; vigilance absolutely has to be maintained during the 'red' parts of the flight path. The PM job is challenging and can be intolerant of errors.

Air Carrier flight crew reported a procedure error during flap retraction.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After departure ATC provided vectors to facilitate a departure climb providing for aircraft separation and weather avoidance South and West of the field. Subsequently being vectored Northbound a climb clearance was issued. As our aircraft approached 18;000 ft the windscreen was rapidly enveloped in a blanket of St. Elmo's fire; followed by an immediate blinding white flash-over accompanied by an explosive concussion. The First Officer was PF (Pilot Flying) and continued in that capacity. We briefly discussed the nature of the event then requested a lower top end altitude from ATC. During this time we assessed aircraft systems status; completed the Lightning Strike QRH checklist; communicated the nature of the incident to the Cabin Crew and conferred briefly with Maintenance. Uncertain as to the full impact the strike may have had on the aircraft and the specter of a flight into mountainous terrain; FO (First Officer) and I agreed that the safest course of action was to return so that the airworthiness of the aircraft could be determined. [Notified] ATC of our intention of returning to [the departure airport]. The Overweight Landing QRH Checklist was completed; Dispatch notified via ACARS; Landing QRH Checklist completed; and passengers notified as to the nature of the situation and pending return. At this juncture; I assumed PF duties while FO transitioned to PM (Pilot Monitoring) duties. A successful landing was accomplished. After clearing the runway no defects were indicated. After coordinating with Operations taxi to gate was accomplished.

B737 Captain reported a lightning strike at FL180. The crew elected to return to the departure airport.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When myself and another Mechanic arrived at the aircraft; we were made aware of an Engine #2 (E2) Oil Impeller Bypass message happening during flight; from the logbook. The other Mechanic spoke with the pilot(s) and checked the cockpit indications; while I waited outside because the passengers were beginning the boarding process. We were in contact with Maintenance Control about the message. I spoke with Maintenance Control in regards to the differential indication on the oil filter. I verified with them that once we opened up the E2 Cowl; the red indicator did not appear to be popped and we were advised that the E2 Oil Impeller Bypass message could be MEL'd. From there; the other Mechanic communicated that the Central Maintenance Computer (CMC) showed no oil debris message of any sort; while I placed the E2 oil impeller bypass message on deferral. Based on the message and the Maintenance actions; MEL 79-35-01-1 was used as the reference. The Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) was not used. The FIM would have been a better reference; without regard to time. Despite working well in a team manner and communicating well throughout the task; I could have reviewed the other mechanics work.

A Line Mechanic reports he deferred a #2 Engine Oil Impeller Bypass message on an EMB-145 aircraft after referencing  maintenance actions that he and another Mechanic had performed. He was later notified the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM); which he did not use; would have been a better reference souce for the deferral.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 11350

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On a flight to ZZZ we experienced an engine shutdown. The background is that we had an MEL deferring the #4 fuel gauge. The MEL called for the tank to be checked with stick by the mechanic. Our company policy also states that we shall use the previous flights arrival fuel added to the uploaded fuel to verify the proper fuel load for the flight +/- 3%. Our ramp fuel requirement was 115;000 lbs. Based on my calculations we had 113;500 lbs of fuel on board. But based on the reported fuel from each tank gauge plus the reading the mechanic gave us on tank #4 the fuel on board was 115;300 lbs. Both figures were within 3% and the Captain decided to use the 115;300 lbs figure. Additionally; the flight plan had a couple thousand pounds of extra fuel on board.In cruise we got an indication of low fuel and the Captain called the mechanic to the flight deck. The mechanic assured us that it was a false indication because he had checked the fuel and we had more than enough in that tank. A short time later we had a low fuel pressure indication in the #4 tank. Eventually the engine shutdown from apparent fuel starvation. We [notified ATC]; descended the aircraft and spoke with company to formulate a plan. It was decided that is was equally safe to continue to our destination; less than an hour away; as it was to divert. After landing; the mechanic checked the tank and said that we still had over 7;000 lbs of fuel in the tank. I have heard through other sources however that actually we had significantly less than that and that the mechanic had been misreading the gauge.As for corrective actions in this situation; I suppose I could have told the Captain that we either needed to use 113;500 for our fuel on board or get more fuel. However; I'm not sure that would have helped much since it was still within our allowable error and we easily had more than our minimum fuel for takeoff at the start of takeoff roll. It seems that the primary error was the mechanic's reading of the gauge with most likely not only affected the reading for our current flight but the previous flight as well. That would have led to a compounding error as the fuel I used and the arrival fuel from the previous flight was most likely incorrect.

B747-400 First Officer reported the #4 engine shut down in flight due to fuel starvation with the #4 fuel gauge was deferred inoperative.