Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X and Aircraft Y departed via RBV.J230.  I climbed Aircraft X to FL280.  Read back was unclear; and the frequency was blocked.  I believed that Aircraft Y was making his initial check-in; but see he had already started to climb; so again I climb Aircraft X to FL280.  I continue my scan and see that Aircraft Z departing LGA to CYYZ via Newel was climbing at FL185 and was flashing with a Lendy arrival from Area C sector 36. I call N90 and see if they were climbing this aircraft.  They informed me that no and that he had been switched to my frequency.  I then descend Aircraft Z to 170 expedite for traffic.  I call sector 36; and advise him that I am descending my aircraft and that he must have taken another aircrafts instructions.  The sector 36 controller turned his aircraft to the left to avoid Aircraft Z and stopped his descent.  I did not recall the Aircraft Z checking on; but there must have been some frequency congestion and blocking and the wrong aircraft took the wrong instructions. First; there were many distractions for a good time before this incident.  There were many deviations by RBV and the N90 controller had to continuously call to coordinate deviations.  Also; similar sounding call signs were a factor.  Frequency congestion for deviations and also landline congestions for the extraneous coordination; it is sometimes difficult to keep the aircraft from blocking the check in.  If there are that many deviations; an in-trail restriction should go into place.  Companies should refrain from using call signs so similar because it causes unnecessary confusion.

ZNY Controller reports of similar sounding call signs causing confusion and pilots taking the others clearances.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During an instrument flight lesson we decided to add 10 gallons of fuel to meet the club requirements of 1 hour reserve. We requested 10 gallons of fuel with Ramp personnel; and the FBO front desk. We went in and flight planned and in approximately 1/2 hour we paid our fuel bill for 10 gallons and departed. We thought we had the fuel; but we experienced an engine out on short final followed by an emergency landing. Extensive damage occurred to the left wing and left horizontal stabilizer during the landing. We received a phone call from the FBO the next day stating that the fuel uplift was in error; and that we received only one gallon; as opposed to the ten gallons we paid for. This unfortunate oversight was directly responsible for the emergency landing and damage to the aircraft.

An emergency landing was conducted following fuel exhaustion on approach to landing; resulting in damage to the aircraft. An inadequate amount of fuel was added even though an appropriate amount had been requested and purchased.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 1400

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I was assigned PIC and the pilot flying. The weather condition was VFR with Unlimited visibility. Prior to flight; MX had informed us that the aileron disconnect light was worked on. They manually disengaged and reengaged the disconnection device to trouble shoot the cause of the aileron light being on. They believed it was a micro switch giving a false indication. We received the aircraft for our flight with the Aileron Disconnection light MEL'd and fueled for our 4.5 hour flight. Because of our heavy weight we asked for the Runway 14 which is the longer of the two runways. Before takeoff from runway 14 we performed our runway line up checklist which calls for a flight control check. After completing the checklist; I additionally asked the First Officer to try and move his yolk left and right as I held mine in place. This was to comply with the MEL's Operational Procedure. On the takeoff roll nothing felt different. On rotation or there after I felt the disconnection device disconnect and the artificial feel on the yolk went away. The aircraft was fully controllable and operational. I asked Departure that we would like to stop our climb and diagnose the problem. We noticed the yolks were disconnected then we ran the un-commanded aileron or elevator disconnection QRH procedure in the Non Annunciated section of the QRH. This simply had us pull the Affected Disconnection handle. Since we had just departed we were heavy with fuel and needed to burn off some so we could make landing weight. We held until we could make landing weight and returned and landed uneventfully.

Upon rotation the ailerons disconnected making them separate. Prior to departure we did control check as required by check list and MEL. All controls were correct and proper prior to departure. After rotation the PIC advised me the controls had disconnected; we then checked that both sides had control but separate. We were well above landing weight so we held for a while to burn sufficient fuel to make landing weight. We landed uneventfully.

EMB135 flight crew reported the ailerons spontaneously disconnected on climb out resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Radar jamming resulting in loss of both transponders and GNS1 and GNS2. [Caused by] Military Radar Jamming.

Dispatcher reported Military Radar Jamming.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Turbulence report flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I informed the flight attendants I didn't want to take chance and for them to stay seated for the beginning of the fight. After leveling off 28;000 feet and looking ahead the flight looked smooth. I informed them they could get up and perform service. Approximately about ten minutes later ATC informed us of a small build up that was ahead. So we both looked and did not see it; other than a bunch of haze due to looking into the sun and some stratus clouds that looked like they were below us. We asked ATC for 30;000 feet due to what he said; then we turned the radar on and by the time this was done you could see it was straight ahead and building fast. ATC said we could make a right turn; so I started climbing and made a right turn; but it was growing quite rapidly so I turn the autopilot off to help try to avoid this small build up and we caught just the tops of the clouds. That's when we encountered moderate turbulence; so I contacted the flight attendants as soon as possible to get an evaluation of what their condition was. They informed me that two had fallen and hurt their legs and the cart had fallen on its side. I asked them if they needed medical assistance and if we needed to land to get medical assistance; they said no. I checked back with them every 15 minutes to make sure they were still OK. I asked again if they needed medical assistance they said no; that they were just going to rest for a few. I informed dispatch of the situation. Also prior to landing in I ZZZ1 contacted operations to inform the flight attendant supervisor on call to meet the aircraft at the gate.  Clouds were deceiving not normal that stratus clouds will have this type of outcome .99.9% of the time it's always a cumulus clouds.

Pilot reported moderate turbulence that caused injuries to flight attendants.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

The flight was fairly uneventful for the first hour. Once we crossed into United States airspace and began talking with Center; the plan took a drastic change. ATC assigned us a reroute. I immediately started to send a message advising Dispatch of the reroute. But before I finished typing the request; ATC changed the route [again; resulting in a large deviation from planned route]. It is also notable that this was the point where I started to utilize the fuel management functions in the FMS to constantly monitor and check our progress; the remaining fuel and the fuel needed to go to [destination] and various alternates; etc. On the other hand; I wanted to keep the Dispatchers in the loop as they are usually better able to assess the weather status looking at the radar and flight path. I showed the FO (First Officer) how to use the FMS to check fuel needs to and from present position or from point to point. We were checking the fuel needs constantly for the remainder of the flight.The response I received from the Dispatcher was 'we always file ZZZ as an alternate for that flight and we cannot change it; because it's an international flight.' I called Dispatch and spoke to the Dispatcher directly. The latter refused any chance of an alternate other [those already listed] and told me to go ahead and divert to ZZZ. The proposed diversion struck me as suboptimal; but I decided in favor of it based on a 1500-lbs fuel reserve and the assumption that the Dispatcher was closely watching the flight path and radar and could see more of the weather than I could. In retrospect; I believe he was not remotely aware of the situation as he had ignored my requests for support for the previous hour. Perhaps he also was task-saturated. But he still should have realized that with every minute that ATC was pushing us northeast of [destination]; we were getting farther and farther from ZZZ as a logical alternate.After what seemed like 20 minutes of trying to get in touch with a busy Center; I asked for a diversion to ZZZ. The Controller tried to get me to continue toward [destination] but could not be sure that it would stay open. So I said 'send me to ZZZ.' I was given a direct vector; followed shortly after by a clearance to deviate as necessary. Up to that point; the flight had been in smooth air and almost entirely under VMC. Moments later we entered IMC. Shortly afterward; the Controller mentioned that we were authorized to deviate if needed. I saw on radar a few specs of red at 12 o'clock. They didn't appear to be nearly as menacing as they turned out to be. I chose deviation to the right and advised ATC.We began to experience continuous light turbulence that was quickly growing more intense. I switched to the PA and said 'flight attendants; please be seated.' Seconds later; the airplane began to buffet violently as we entered heavy rain. The autopilot disengaged and we lost about 500 feet in altitude. I assumed manual control of the aircraft and got the autopilot turned back on. As we returned to FL350; ATC asked us to verify that we were level at FL350. I reported the severe turbulence and ATC asked if everyone was OK. I called the flight attendants and was informed that FA 2 had hit her head (causing me concern of possible concussion); knee and hip.  At least one other passenger also reported being injured. The turbulence had subsided as quickly as it had begun; and the air was smooth for the remainder of the flight.We were about 35 minutes from ZZZ and ATC asked me several questions. I asked for a phone number and told ATC I would answer their questions when we were safely on the ground. ATC asked if I wanted an arrival or just direct. I opted for direct and began setting up the cockpit for the longest runway.We joined the localizer about 15 miles from the runway. At around 5 mile final on the ILS and still in IMC; we received a Fuel Low caution message that came on and off several times until finally remaining on.I informed the Tower that we had emergency fuel remaining as we were flying the last few miles of the ILS. We got the runway in sight at less than 1;000 feet. There was about 1;000 lbs of fuel left when we touched down -- not enough to do a go-around.Once we landed; we asked for progressive taxi instructions to a suitable gate. After we reached the gate; it took almost 20 more minutes until we had a ground crew to marshal us into the gate. A sizable group of paramedics and law enforcement personnel had gathered on the jet bridge. They removed the injured occupants first before the rest of the passengers were deplaned and sent to Customs. I cleared Customs and then returned to the plane to finish the maintenance write-up for severe turbulence. After completing the write-up; I ran the shutdown checklist and left the aircraft with about 500 lbs of fuel indicated on the EICAS. Two things could have prevented the severe turbulence encounter in my opinion. 1. The Dispatcher could have and should have taken my requests for information and alternative options into consideration and acted accordingly at the first indication that things were not going as filed or anticipated.2. I operated on the assumption that the Dispatcher had full access and the capacity to use better weather information than I had available on the aircraft. In hindsight; I could have exercised PIC authority and diverted to an airport closer and on the side of the weather system that I was already on. In the future; I will consider use of Captain's authority and if so; use it sooner.What went well was that I had the FO do all of the flying with the exception of assuming manual control after the turbulence hit. This allowed me manage the rest of the situation and stay focused on handling the abnormal procedures.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a Flight Attendant and passenger were injured due to severe turbulence during a weather diversion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On approach into ROA we had the airport in sight. We were cleared for the visual to runway 24. We backed up the visual with the RNAV approach. In visual conditions right past the FAF we got a GPWS alert. With all terrain in sight we leveled off and the alert stopped. We seemed to be on altitude and lateral path at the time of the alert. We continued the approach to a normal landing. We believed the cause to be the initial pitch down when we started descending at the FAF.

On approach in to Runway 24 in to ROA; we were cleared on the visual; and proceeded to descend with all terrain in sight. We were on slope turning to final and received a GPWS alert. We leveled off while maintaining visual with the terrain; then proceeded to descend on standard slope in to Runway 24.Although we were at 3;700 feet at HIBAN and on glidepath; we believe a initial descent pitch may have caused the GPWS to alert.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported an erroneous GPWS warning on final approach to ROA airport.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Military 2; Air Traffic Control Radar 7; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 22; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1130; Flight Crew Type 20

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I had been doing pattern work on RWY XX for about 45 minutes. All radio calls were made for each phase of flight; including upwind. As I was doing my sweep for traffic on final; and announcing at the same time; as my scan moved from the right back to forward; I noticed Aircraft Y just below me on a straight in approach to RWY XX. I immediately pulled up and turned right. I continued the right turn back to final and saw Aircraft Y landing on RWY XX. No radio announcements were made by Aircraft Y. At the altitude I was above Aircraft Y; I did not feel like we would have hit at that time; but had I not been above him and not able to see him; we very well could have hit as we got closer to the runway.While not required to fly a standard pattern by entering the pattern level on the 45; I believe requiring this type of pattern entry would increase safety. Just flying straight in with no radio calls; and without any regard for traffic in the pattern creates a hazardous situation.

RV12 pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in the pattern at an uncontrolled airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 400

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

My student and I were practicing commercial pilot maneuvers in the South Practice Area of the ZZZ terminal area. We were .5 NM SE of [the lake] doing a steep spiral from 4;500 feet down. We made multiple radio calls and this was our second maneuver. After the first turn and a half; we were alerted to a traffic conflict on my iPad; which was supplied by a Sentry Mini ADS-B receiver. We looked for the traffic and spotted them on a collision course. We immediately terminated the maneuver and I took controls from the student to execute an emergency climb; as our paths were roughly perpendicular and I did not believe a turn would be enough to clear us. The other aircraft (C172) passed directly under us without making a control input or diverting course. We did some more maneuvers; also with thorough radio calls but had no further conflicts.

Flight Instructor reported taking evasive action due to a Near Mid Air Collision.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 650

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Speed All Types

When on a traffic pattern visual approach to 32R at BFI; on the final approach leg a helicopter cut in front of [our] C152 at the same altitude. The helicopter was supposed to follow the C152 before landing on 'PAD6'. The flight instructor on the C152 decided to go around to avoid a mid-air collision with a helicopter; which caused the airspeed in the C152 to substantially drop at a low altitude.When the Tower was queried about the position of the helicopter; the Tower mentioned the helicopter should have followed the C152.

C152 instructor pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter in the pattern at BFI airport.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS XYR

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

First Officer (FO) was Pilot Flying (PF) and cleared for a visual approach to Runway XYR; from base leg at 3;000 feet. FO chose to use LNAV and VNAV to backup approach. FO stayed too high because of improper programing; too distracted to take over visual; and fly aircraft. Repeated call outs to FO by Captain to descend but FO very unable to understand and think. Captain had to turn off LNAV & VNAV and instruct FO to follow ILS and Flight Director. In the confusion the Tower call for clearance to land was missed.This FO is very distracted by [personal difficulties and] is not 100% mentally dedicated to doing his duties.

On base to final; we received a visual clearance from Approach Control for Runway XYR. Upon landing I realized we were still with Approach Control. When we switched to Tower frequency; the Controller cleared us to taxi without further incident.

A B737 First Officer became highly distracted after mis-programming the FMS for a visual approach. The Captain commented First Officer's personal matters made him unable to perform his flying duties well.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 235; Flight Crew Total 18700; Flight Crew Type 1126

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Landing clearance issued by Cancun tower by about 1200 feet AGL. Normal approach VMC with good visibility but with some haze due to opaque sky cover and humidity. At 400 feet AGL; an unidentified aircraft holding short 12R announced 'there is a Cessna on the runway and you have an aircraft on short final'. At this we could now see the Cessna 172 stopped on the runway obscured by its blending in with runway colors. We initiated go around and notified tower. Control tower made no reference to aircraft on runway and later asked us reason for go around. Normal go around and circle back to 12R for normal landing. Tower seemed completely unaware of conflict. We believe we would have seen the Cessna prior to touchdown but at 400 feet we were in a position to land without aircraft in sight as yet due to its position 1000 feet down from runway takeoff end.

B737 Captain reported being cleared to land at MMUN by Tower. At 400 feet an unidentified voice reported a C172 on the runway; which the crew could now see; and a go-around was initiated. The Tower was unaware of why the crew went around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Scheduled to operate an owner flight to A08. Preflight planning revealed no NOTAMs at A08 that would impact our arrival. Upon arrival in the Marion Alabama area Atlanta Center asked if we had weather and NOTAMs for A08. We asked the controller to review any new NOTAMs they had; the only NOTAMs reported were tower light outages; these were the NOTAMs we had reviewed prior to departure. The weather was 600 overcast with about 5 miles visibility. We were cleared to an initial fix and cleared for the GPS 16 approach. The approach went normally until breaking out around 500 feet. All of the runway markings were gone; a large yellow x was covering the threshold of the runway; and several construction vehicles were just adjacent to the runway at the midfield point. Also to note; position reports were made throughout the approach on CTAF. We executed a go around and held at the missed approach point. We informed ATC of the situation and they were unaware of any airport closures. After about 10 minutes ATC reached the airport manager who told them the airport was closed and that he had forgotten to produce a NOTAM to that effect. I explained the situation to our owners and they requested we divert to [another airport]. The diversion and GPS approach [to diversion airport] was uneventful. Following this event we informed Operations and Dispatch so that any of our other flights heading to Marion would be aware of the closure.

Upon breaking out at the completion of an instrument approach; crew of PC-12 noticed that the runway was closed with a large yellow X on the runway threshold. The entire airport had been closed for construction; but no NOTAM was issued. Crew diverted to an alternate airport.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

During climbout the Tail Compartment Temp high light illuminated. Performed the Memory items and followed the QRH procedure and the light extinguished. This was followed by the failure of the left pack. Declared an emergency and returned. Briefed the flight attendants; explained reason for our return to the passengers. Contacted Operations; and requested Operations contact Dispatch. [We] sent a message to Dispatch informing Dispatch of our situation. Requested ARFF observe the aircraft and follow us to the gate. Passengers deplaned upon arrival at gate.

MD83 flight crew experiences a tail compartment temp high during climbout and returns to the departure airport.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was acting as the pilot flying. While enroute cruise Mexico and about half way into this 3 hour flight we were given a shortcut to CJS VOR. I was navigating with the GPS in NAV mode and for at least 30-40 minutes the aircraft was right on course. I was monitoring the airplane but also somewhat distracted because I was finishing up some trip paperwork. About 45 miles outside of CJS; ATC Center suggested us to turn about 10 degrees right for a more direct course to CJS. At this time I noticed that the aircraft had drifted about 8 miles south of course. The NAV selector was still in NAV mode and linked to the GPS. The First Officer recalled that he experienced a loss of RAIM (unreliable GPS) in this exact location before; though ATC said they had no reports of this. We turned back on course and re-engaged the NAV mode to the GPS and for the remainder of the flight it seemed to work fine.Our automation is often not very reliable and requires constant monitoring. I; like many captains; can get distracted by doing trip paperwork while in cruise (especially on longer legs). Drifting off course is very easy to do and can be very un-noticeable (the autopilot can make very slight banking turns). The First Officer (the pilot in the right seat) has a harder time noticing course deviations because while in NAV mode linked to the GPS; the deviation information is only in front of the left seat and not the right seat (only indicates on the Captain HSI).

While enroute to Mexico at FL340 over Central Texas we were given a shortcut to go direct CJS VOR. At this point it was not possible to navigate solely with the VOR due to normal range limitation (CJS VOR is a Terminal VOR which is limited to 25 NM laterally). We used GPS direct to CJS. The aircraft was tracking the course successfully until a few miles prior to the point at 45 NM east from CJS VOR on the 090 degree radial; heading westbound. The aircraft; while on autopilot in NAV mode linked to GPS mode; slowly drifted south of course by about 8 miles. Albuquerque Center identified our deviation and gave us a recommended heading of another 10 degrees to the right to head direct to CJS again. I; as the pilot not flying; remembered prior RAIM losses in the past at this very location while enroute to El Paso so I inquired with the Center Controller about this. I also suggested we may have lost RAIM. The Controller said no GPS jamming operations were taking place at the time. The autopilot was re-engaged to track the new course and for the rest of the flights during that trip it had no issues successfully tracking.It's difficult for the First Officer to notice course deviations when the GPS course is only displayed on the Captain's CDI/HSI; especially when we are beyond or on the edge of VOR range limitations. We add the ability of the First Officer's CDI to link up to the GPS course. We should as pilots also be extra careful when navigating 'direct to' with no official airways to back ourselves up with and be more vigilant of course deviations; especially since the nearest course deviation indicator while operating 'GPS direct' for the First Officer is a tiny LCD indicator on the Trimble GPS.

An Air Carrier was advised by ATC of a track deviation near CJS when the GPS was engaged and indicated on track. The flight crew suspected GPS DOS but ATC had no indication of interference.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207; Flight Crew Total 1265; Flight Crew Type 705

While maneuvering with a student who is rated in the aircraft we got in close proximity to bravo airspace. Never got less than 500 FT below the shelf; but our transponder altitude was reading about 200 FT off of what the actual MSL value was.

A C172 instructor reports flying near but not in PHX Class B airspace. The aircraft transponder however was reading higher than the actual aircraft altitude.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was receiving a position relief briefing while Air Carrier X was descending for an IFR approach. An untagged VFR target appeared and began climbing northwest bound; across [the aircraft's] final. A conflict alert activated and traffic was exchanged. This is a regular occurrence as the final approach is closely situated between two uncontrolled airports. The crossing altitude at the initial approach fix for the ILS approach is below the floor of Class C airspace. Without requiring communication with VFR aircraft in the area; these instances will continue.

A TRACON Controller reported an unindentified VFR target flew into confliction with an Air Carrier on final approach.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Weekday night; our thru-flight arrived about XA:00 PM. The pilot had a write-up; Left Inner Tank # 1 fault; no reset. When we were investigating; we found the Circuit Breaker (C/B) for the Left Inner Tank # 1 popped. Trying to make time constraints and get the flight out on time; we reset the C/B and it popped again. We wanted to isolate the problem and disconnected the Canon plug from the Left # 1 Tank Inner Fuel Pump. Reset the C/B and it stayed in. When the left # 1 Inner Tank Fuel Pump switch was turned 'On'; the C/B popped. We then decided not to reset it and find out what was causing it to pop. I was not as familiar with the General Maintenance Manual (GMM) 6-1-250 [Dimensions/Areas] pertaining to this matter as I thought. I have reviewed it carefully and thoroughly to prevent this from happening again. We were trying to solve this write-up in a timely and safely matter and were not trying to do anything wrong on purpose. The aircraft was not dispatched and was not going to be until the problem was fixed. We used our weekend layover aircraft to move the freight. Once again GMM 6-1-250 will be thoroughly reviewed and I will keep a copy of it close at hand. [Problem] possibly with older aircraft; wire fatigue and over time; wire broke down and caused Circuit Breaker to pop. Also Avionic's technicians thought [wire] bundle was tied too tight with [electrical] wires rubbing together. We; Aircraft Line Mechanics' have to keep up with many; many; many Maintenance Alerts. Could we possibly take a recurrency test on the Maintenance Alerts that are considered extremely important; although keep in mind they are all important. Also maybe make up a quick Maintenance Alert booklet; like the Mechanic's Quick Trouble Shooting (T/S) Guide; containing the very critical alerts. Rain. Aircraft damage.

Reporter stated he has thirty-five years aircraft maintenance experience. The evening was cold and wet on the Line.  An inbound flight crew had reported the left #1 fuel tank inner fuel boost pump circuit breaker (C/B) had popped. The flight crew did not try to reset the C/B.  However; he and an Avionics Technician had reset the boost pump C/B twice during troubleshooting.  That had deviated from their General Maintenance Manual (GMM) Chapter Six procedures which allowed only one reset of the affected C/B unless more in-depth fuel system testing was accomplished. Unknowingly; they had not performed those additional steps; they were just trying to isolate the C/B problem. He now keeps a copy of the GMM Chapter-6 reference next to his work desk. Reporter stated the circuit breaker for the boost pump is down in the avionics bay (E/E compartment) which can be accessed through a cockpit floor hatch; or through the lower forward cargo compartment interior door at the forward bulkhead. His Avionics Technician partner noted that the boost pump C/B and the wire harness to that C/B was OK and in a well protected area above the three aircraft batteries that are located on the right side of the avionics bay.  But approximately nine inches from that C/B the same electrical harness had burned wires that appeared to have been caused by excessively tight tie-wraps installed by the aircraft manufacturer.  A forward cabin galley section would normally be above that area. Suspicions are that inflight vibrations caused some of the individual wire insulations to chafe against the tie-wraps that held the wire bundle. This was the second time he has seen a similar burned wiring condition in the same area. On a previous A300 aircraft; environmental splices had been installed where the wire harness run should not have had any breaks in the wire bundle.  The recent A300 aircraft had been taken out of service and never left the station until repaired.  Most; if not all; of their A300s were purchased from other operators. He wonders if these two incidences would fall under the 'Aging Aircraft' description.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports a circuit breaker (C/B) for the left #1 fuel tank; inner fuel boost pump continued to pop; even with the cannon plug to the fuel pump disconnected on an A300 aircraft. Burned wires in a wire harness to the boost pump C/B were found at a tie-wrap installation in the avionics compartment.


Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Enroute to ASE; ATIS was listing approach as LOC DME-E and I selected that in the FMS with the AJAXX IAP. We were going direct to DBL and Approach Control asked if we could do the afore mentioned approach from DBL and I said we could. As we were still heading to DBL the ilot flying briefed the approaches with the mandatory altitudes while I flew the aircraft. When we were cleared for the approach I discovered that the fixes on the approach briefed were not the same as those in the approach selected in the FMS. We told Approach Control that we were breaking off the approach and wanted to hold at DBL while we solved the approach conflict. Approach Control cleared us direct to DBL and gave us holding instructions. I had a bit of difficulty putting direct DBL in the FMS and Approach Control gave us vectors and we were able to set up the direct off the manual holding pattern. Enroute to the holding pattern we were able to find the correct approach in the FMS which was listed as the LOC Circling approach. Approach Control vectored us for the final approach course and descended us and the airported was sighted as we intercepted the course. Landed without problem. FMS should not have approaches that we do not have the approach plates for and when the approach is briefed it should be checked against the approach that is in the FMS. Pilot Not Flying should also crosscheck the approach plate against the FMS approach. The approach names in the FMS should be the same as the names in the FMS.

Airborne being vectored to DBL at 13;400 feet cleared for the LOC DME-E approach to Runway 15 ASE. We were cleared for the approach from DBL VOR. DBL not part of the approach automation was interrupted and dropped the intercept when Direct DBL was selected. DBL not on approach in database nor on approach plate. Auto tune and auto intercept functions were disabled when DBL was manually entered into FMS. When flying through final request was made to return for holding at DBL. Not Flying Pilot had trouble entering the hold into the box. Manual hold with green needles was in the process of being executed when ATC gave vectors back around to final approach course for LOC DME-E to Runway 15.Do not touch the pre-established automation functions in FMS unless pre-briefed. Do not accept vectors to a point that is not associated with the approach. Fly the published-missed approach instructions manually if automation fails. Ensure clear understanding of how to enter the hold manually into FMS in case it drops out of the FMS.

CE680 flight crew reports being cleared for the LOC DME-E to ASE from DBL. After being cleared for the approach it is discovered the FMC approach procedure does not match the chart procedure and holding is requested to sort things out. The correct approach procedure is listed in the FMC as the LOC Circling approach which is then accomplished.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 34L

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We requested direct VIKES for the ILS DME 34L approach and we were given a clearance of Direct VIKES Direct; descend and maintain 10000 feet. About 10 miles from VIKES (we were approaching from the Northeast) VFR traffic popped up about 5 miles southwest of VIKES; climbing to 10500; east bound. ATC told us to level at 12000 feet for traffic. The cloud layer was scattered to broken with bases at around 9300 feet. We leveled at 12000 feet and made a right turn at VIKES; following the transition route. ATC then seemed confused and asked if we were turning toward the airport and before my FO could respond; ATC gave us a left turn vector HDG 160 and a descent to 9100 feet. We were now within a mile of the final approach course flying south; too close to make a right turn back to final. So ATC said turn left heading 140; I need to widen you out for the approach. We turned to HDG 140 and now we were clearly below all the clouds and could see all the terrain. He then told us to turn to HDG 010 which would have turned us directly into the higher terrain. I got on the radio and declined his clearance with 'Unable; we have the airport in sight'. He then said something about giving us a different altitude; and seemed confused. I responded with 'Airport in sight'. At that point he cleared us for the visual. My FO was concerned about the terrain to the right; so we slowed and put flaps to 5 degrees. During the turn back to final; I saw the airspeed slow to 154 kts at which point I sped up to 185kts. We completed the turn and intercepted the localizer from the east side and tracked it in to the airport.[Caused by] unclear or Poor ATC instructions; VFR aircraft; ATC expectations vs Pilot expectations different.

Approach quickly gave us a new heading taking us away from the traffic but towards terrain. The PF said that they did not want to turn to that heading and that direction because the PF could clearly see terrain that would be a factor. The PF requested a turn to the right. I mentioned that I didn't think turning to an assigned heading to the right was a good idea because I could see terrain that was higher than our altitude to the right. Turning to the left we had plenty of lateral separation from most of the terrain; but the vertical separation was minimal over one particular mountain. Turning to the right we had more lateral separation but would need to make a continuous turn to a localizer intercept heading due to the rising terrain. The PF made a radio transmission to approach requesting a turn to the right due to terrain on the left. Approach didn't understand exactly what the request was and started a few transmissions back and forth with the PF while we were approaching terrain. The PF then decided to relieve the approach controller of terrain separation responsibilities and called the airport in sight.

Air carrier flight crew reported they were uncomfortable with ATC issued headings relative to their proximity to terrain on approach to RNO.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 629

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

This was a post maintenance test flight after ventilation system had been partially dismantled trying to troubleshoot a noise from vents.Departed ZZZ VFR and requested from Approach to depart to the southwest and climb to FL250 for post maintenance flight to check pressurization. Was given an IFR flight plan to ZZZ1 and eventually handed off to Center. Center cleared me to FL250 and was directed to maintain current heading...basically towards ZZZ1. Upon reaching FL250 I determined that the noise had not been resolved and I requested from ATC that I was done and would like to head back to ZZZ. Immediately there was a 'pop' and the aircraft began to rapidly depressurize followed by the cabin pressurization Master Warning light and buzzer. Everything happened before the controller could give me a new heading or altitude. I immediately pulled power back to idle; banked approximately 45 degrees to left and began a rapid descent. The controller stated that he 'noticed' I was in a left turn to which I replied that I was having some pressurization issues and needed to get lower. The controller asked if I wanted to declare an emergency to which I declined and stated that it's ok I just needed to get lower. I was then cleared to 17;000 feet and then handed off to Approach control. Remainder of flight back to ZZZ was uneventful.Although the controller did not call me out for altitude or heading deviation; I was concerned that I had initiated a turn and altitude change without clearance from the controlling ATC. My main concern was to fly the plane and handle the situation prior to advising ATC. The sky condition was unlimited visibility and ceiling and there was little to no traffic in the area. The time from the onset of the depressurization; me configuring the aircraft for a rapid descent and communicating with ATC was maybe 5-10 seconds.It was later determined that the shop had not securely reinstalled pressurized ducting in the nose of the aircraft and upon reaching FL250 that ducting separated from it's connection and vented pressurized air from the cabin to the outside.

PA-31T single pilot reported a pressurization system malfunction resulting in an uneventful mechanical air return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Flew VFR and started announcing our intentions 20 miles to the east to land at GUC. On landing didn't see any other traffic. When I set the nose wheel down and looked down the runway here is a [commercial fixed wing aircraft] proceeding toward us on centerline on his takeoff roll. Both aircraft took action to the right of centerline and avoided each other. [Communicated] with Flight Crew; they said their radio was bad and they never heard us.

C414 pilot reports commencing CTAF procedures 20 NM out for landing at GUC with no response from other aircraft. After touchdown; another aircraft is noted taking off in the opposite direction. Each moves to the right and pass on the runway. The other aircraft's crew later reports they had a bad radio.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

[We were] cleared to land runway 9 in Nassau. No hold short instructions of any kind were issued prior to touchdown. After touchdown and while braking to vacate the runway at taxiway H (the end of the runway); Tower Controller cleared Aircraft Y to depart runway 14; an intersecting runway with an obscured view of runway 9. [The] FO (PF) (First Officer; Pilot Flying) heard Aircraft Y's readback and queried the Captain. The crew transferred controls and Tower was asked if there was an aircraft taking off runway 14. Tower replied 'No.' The Captain was able to get the aircraft stopped before the intersection of the two runways. Aircraft Y was rotating and getting airborne prior to the intersection of the runways; but was cleared to takeoff during [our] landing roll. When asked again; Tower claimed to have issued instructions to [us] to hold short of runway 14. Neither the CA (Captain) nor FO heard; responded; or acknowledged any such radio call.It was a clear day; and there was minimal radio traffic on Tower frequency. Only the two aircraft involved in the incident were on the frequency at the time.

B737 First Officer reported a ground conflict during landing rollout when ATC cleared an aircraft to took off from an intersecting runway at MYNN.


Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[I received] a gate call [on a DC-10] with an air system fail alert on pre-flight air system test. After getting the MEL to do the logbook entry; the circuit breaker would not reset. I collared [the circuit breaker] to prevent anyone else from trying to reset it. After looking into the System Schematic Manual Chapter 21-26-0; I realized that the breaker just controlled the Number 3 fan. I was trying to prevent any further aircraft problems. It also had no history for that discrepancy. I figured the system was inoperative and [that I was] collaring a breaker that would not reset; [so] I just collared it. I collared the breaker just to prevent anyone else from trying to reset. There was no question about safety of flight. I did the research to make sure the breaker did not affect any other components. I should have contacted Maintenance Control. I will contact Maintenance Control and make sure I go by the MEL to the letter and will not deviate. [I will] collect all information and with Maintenance Control; make a decision. Use my resources. I have seen where they put out maintenance alert about this type of problem in the last couple of day. MEL 21-26-05; is a good [reference] to be used if you have a bad cooling fan that fails an operational check; [but] not if the circuit breaker pops.

The Maintenance Technician attempted to comply with the MEL for an avionics cooling fan fault; but discovered that the circuit breaker would not reset. He utilized the MEL and collared the circuit breaker thinking that is was only affecting that fan. By doing so; he did not comply with the approved MEL procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 27000; Flight Crew Type 9500

Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Enroute approximately 45 minutes prior to arrival; ATC re-cleared us [to avoid weather].  We loaded the FMC and saw that this re-routed us nearly 150 miles to the east of destination.  When queried; ATC advised us it was due to weather moving into the area that was going to shut down the northern arrivals corridor.  At this point; there was a large area of intense convective activity to our north; which we had flown around.  Shortly after; ATC advised us to hold with an EFC of approximately 30 minutes.  At this point; the Captain and I discussed our fuel status and agreed that we could only hold for about 15 minutes.  We advised Dispatch via ACARS of our hold clearance.  Entering the hold; ATC advised us that all arrivals and departures had completely shut down due to thunderstorms over the airport; and we could expect one hour or more of holding.  At this point Captain and I agreed that we needed to immediately plan for a diversion to an alternate.  However; contacting Dispatch (both by ACARS and Radio) was extremely challenging at this point due to radio congestion (including a medical emergency on another flight) and several other diversions that Dispatch was handling.  We considered alternates in the area; however upon examination of the charts on the aircraft; we discovered that some charts were not aboard the airport (probably because those airports are not served by the 757).  The only charts in the flight bag and in the FMS database were ZZZ1; so we elected to divert there.  We advised ATC; headed toward ZZZ1; and advised Dispatch via ACARS.  Shortly thereafter; Dispatch advised that they did not recommend ZZZ1 as an alternate and recommended the airports we rejected.  We replied that we did not have those charts on board and continued toward ZZZ1.  Dispatch then replied that ZZZ1 Operations did not have the necessary equipment to handle a 757.  At this point; we reevaluated our deteriorating fuel situation (we were now at approximately 8;000 LBS of fuel) and decided an immediate decision had to be made.  We advised ATC and they said that destination arrivals might be able to accommodate us; so we reversed course back towards the northeast. At this point it became clear to us that our Dispatcher was obviously not recognizing our critical fuel situation; since they asked us if we could make [distant alternates].  We replied that was impossible; as we would have to circumnavigate the weather again and we didn't have enough fuel for that. ATC then advised us that our destination was experiencing a severe thunderstorm and that all aircraft were going around or diverting; and we knew we did not have enough fuel to make an approach and then go around.  After further discussion with ATC; the Captain and I realized that we needed to divert into ZZZ since its runway was approximately 6;600 feet.  We knew this aircraft had the capability to safely land and depart a runway of that length. The Captain declared a fuel emergency with ATC.  ATC was very helpful; vectoring us directly to ZZZ and even providing the necessary runway data; ILS frequency (even though it was VMC).  We landed at ZZZ without incident. Now we had to decide what to do to get to destination.  We knew that the Captain's emergency authority allowed us to land at ZZZ; even though the 757 Ops Specs did not list it as an approved airport.  But what about the departure?  The ground personnel at ZZZ were very helpful at getting fuel for us and assisting us in every way; and the Captain coordinated with Chief Dispatcher.  They were able to get performance data for takeoff from company engineers; put together a Sabre flight plan on the fly; and even contact the FAA to obtain an exemption for us to depart ZZZ with passengers instead of subjecting them to the inconvenience of being bussed to destination.  Meanwhile; the station personnel coordinated re-fueling and printing out the necessary flight paperwork since our ACARS had no comm on the ground there.  It took just over 2 hours; but we were finally able to get the necessary permission; flight plans; and takeoff data.  We departed ZZZ without incident; and landed about 30 minutes later.

Our flight was scheduled for operation with a comfortable fuel load taking into consideration both the existing and forecasted weather conditions. During the entire route; we were ahead of the planned fuel usage. However; we were rerouted the first time approximately 350 miles west of destination. This re-route utilized both extra time and fuel but still had us in good condition as far as a remaining fuel allotment. Dispatch was contacted regarding this issue.Approximately 16 minutes later; we received the 2nd re-route; again; using additional fuel and time. This re-route guided the aircraft to the southeast and then back west to put us in a trail of traffic. Just prior to arriving at the fix; ATC placed us in a hold over the fix with an EFC adding an additional 20 to 25 minutes to the flight. After approximately 20 minutes of holding; ATC came over the frequency and advised us that Approach had stopped all approaches and arrivals for at least an hour. At this time; I contacted Dispatch again on holding and asked for an alternate. At this point; I started to pull out the charts that would be a suitable alternate; i.e.; blue airports on the CRT screen.[After beginning our diversion]; ATC informed us that our destination may be opening up and were we interested in that route. I replied; 'Yes; if we are able to go straight to the airport with NO additional delays.' Throughout the flight; I kept everyone abreast of the situation including my flight crew; passengers; and especially Dispatch. Dispatch was extremely slow in responding throughout this entire process. About 5 minutes later; we were advised by ATC that they could not promise that there would not be additional delays for our arrival.During the process; I contacted ZZZ Tower and received frequencies that were needed as well as the runway length because at this point; I had a clear visual of the airport. I was very familiar with ZZZ and its option as a safe alternate. I immediately declared an emergency and proceeded to conduct an uneventful and safe landing. Prior to landing; I had again kept all parties aware that we had exhausted all viable options for landing at destination. We landed safely in ZZZ with 5;800 lbs. of fuel. On the ground; ground staff did an exemplary job of meeting our needs under this unusual situation. I called Dispatch by cell phone to arrange the process of departing ZZZ since we did not have plates for this location. Again; Company Dispatch seemed overwhelmed and out of touch as far as getting us usable information. About an hour later; I received a call on my cell phone from Dispatch. Their option was to bus the passengers. This was a decision that I did not agree would be in their best interest but I notified the passengers and flight attendants of the news. The ZZZ ground staff finally brought a set of air stairs that was about 3 feet short of our cabin door. I informed them that this would not be a safe or practical option for disembarking the passengers. I asked Dispatch for their assistance in working the numbers and faxing everything we would need for a legal departure. Again; Dispatch seemed disconnected with making this work. I expressed my confidence that we could take off out of ZZZ for a 30 minute flight safely. His response was; 'Oh; really?' At this point I asked him to have the Chief Dispatch Officer on duty call me immediately. The Chief Dispatcher called me and apologized for the performance from his department. He stated that they were dealing with around 20 diversions but his attention would be on my situation. I suggested that we get the engineering department involved to get the take-off data and flight plan needed as well as a waiver from the FAA if required. Within 1 hour we had fuel; all data required and the waiver from the FAA. We departed ZZZ and arrived safely with everyone on board.

B757 flight crew describes a weather diversion after being re-routed then asked to hold beyond their prudent limit of endurance. The airport chosen is not a normal diversion airport and is not in the FMC database nor are there any approach charts. VMC prevails and a safe landing ensues with 5;800 LBS of fuel on board.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

We were cleared to descend via the JAGGR RNAV STAR; landing south; so we put 9;000 FT in the altitude window. As we got closer to the airport they vectored us off the arrival for a downwind for Runway 7; specifically to turn five degrees left for Runway 7. This put us on a 295 heading. We were not given a revised altitude to descend too.  As we were descending through 12;500 FT the Controller asked us what altitude we were going to. We replied 9;000 FT because that is what we were cleared to descend to [prior to be vectored off] the arrival. The Controller; however; thought he had given us 13;000 FT. He then cleared us to descend to 11;000 FT and we continued to the airport and landed without farther incident.When getting vectored off an RNAV arrival always confirm the cleared altitude with ATC.

...the Captain contacted Denver Approach and the Supervisor said that he had not heard anything about it and not to worry about it. He also added that if we are not given an amended altitude after being broken off that RNAV arrival; then we should request one. I disagree with Denver Approach Supervisor's remarks. There is no reason for us to have to play guessing games [as to the controller's intentions]. Upon our initial contact I specifically informed the Controller of our route; altitude passing; and altitude to which we were descending; utilizing the term 'VIA.' I have thus informed the Controller as to what we are [and will be] doing. If the controller decides he/she wants to amend a portion of the clearance; he/she may do so; however; if the amendment is specific to course/heading; it only amends our track. All previous clearances in all other aspects of flight remain the same until amended. I also want to clarify that there are instances where pilots are supposed to query when controllers have not issued clearances when they are supposed to -for example: short final and not cleared to land yet; no EFC upon issuance of entry in a holding pattern; etc. In our scenario there was no reason to query since clearances in all aspects of flight have already been received and complied with.

Confusion reigned as to their cleared altitude when the flight crew of an A319 was vectored off the JAGGR RNAV STAR to DEN in order to track South of the airport to land to the East.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

I was working the shift when there was a reentry Dragon rocket. The packet with the information only had the landing zone and the monitoring aircraft. The problem was there was no information on the reentry flight path so it caught me by surprise when it was coming in over the top of my traffic. All of the airplanes started asking what it was and I didn't know which direction to call traffic for any of them or give them an option of the area to miss if they were uncomfortable with the situation.My recommendation is more information passed along. I had multiple airplanes close to the flight path and I had no way of helping them if they needed vectors because they were uncomfortable.

Center Controller at ZJX reported they were not given sufficient information about a rocket reentry and could not provide traffic information or vectors for separation to aircraft in their sector.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 59; Flight Crew Total 233; Flight Crew Type 233

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was being vectored onto the final approach course for the RNAV/GPS-15 approach into FCI. Was at assigned altitude 2600 feet. Received clearance '[tail number] turn right heading 160; maintain 2000 until established; cleared for the RNAV runway 15 straight in approach Richmond Executive'. I read back '120 maintain 2000 until established; cleared for the RNAV 15 Richmond Executive [tail number]'I intercepted the final approach course outside of SECOV (the FAF) and began my descent down to 2000 in VMC. Shortly thereafter; I received a 'low altitude' warning on my FMS and realized that I had descended below the 2200-foot minimum altitude for the segment between DOCEV and SECOV. At that point; I was VMC; cancelled IFR; and continued with a normal straight-in approach for landing.The particular controller speaks very quickly and it is sometimes hard to hear her above the background static. I listened back to the recording several times on liveatc.net and after slowing the recording down to 2/3 or normal speed; I can now hear that she said; 'Maintain two-thousand-six-hundred until established'. I read back 'maintain two-thousand until established' and was not corrected. In hindsight; I should have not descended below the segment's minimum altitude regardless and simply waited for the LPV vertical guidance needle to center while at 2600 feet.

GA pilot reported a communication breakdown with ATC led to an excursion from altitude while on approach to  Richmond Executive Airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 2630; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

While enroute through Class C on a training flight I noticed my engine running rough with an elevated [CHT] on Number 2 cylinder. I notified that I was going to return to [the] airport and started left turn to reverse course. At that time I heard a pop noise and the engine quit producing power. I declared an emergency [and] glided to an uneventful landing at [the] airport.

C172 pilot reported engine failure on a training flight. He glided back to the airport for a safe landing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 1650; Flight Crew Type 800

On 3 mile final approach to runway 36 at about 400 feet AGL. Had the RNAV GPS approach active on the KFC200 autopilot. I looked down to look at something in the cockpit and my passenger; sitting beside me; exclaimed; 'what is that?!' I looked up and saw an ultralight aircraft directly in front of me about 30 feet below me and about 200 feet directly in front of me on my glide path. I immediately turned the autopilot off and abruptly turned about 15 degrees to the right to avoid a collision. The ultralight was a dark grayish color and my passenger said she could see the pilot as we went by. It was a very close call. I surmise that the ultralight pilot did not realize he/she was too close to the airport and in the final approach path. I reported it immediately to the Tower who warned the A36 that was on an approach behind me. Both the A36 pilot and the Tower subsequently said they then see it on radar and watched it on radar until it left Class D airspace and left the area. I heard the Tower say that it was now out of the area. A close call. Not sure what can be down to avoid except maybe to alert the ultralight pilots to stay out of the approaches to busy airports like Mesquite.

BE-33 pilot reported an NMAC with an ultralight aircraft on final approach to HQZ airport.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While working LC2 when PA-28R was on the right downwind to Runway 7R he did not appear on my TDW. He flew about 3 NM before his target appeared near midfield. I notified the Supervisor who had a radar tech come to the Tower to observe what was going on as this has been a recurring problem in our facility for quite some time.[Shortly after] I had the same issue with the same aircraft. The tech requested me to have the aircraft IDENT which I did but nothing appeared on the TDW. I had the aircraft behind PA-28R on the same downwind IDENT and it was observed.

DAB Controller expressed concerns regarding the TDW operational capabilities; noting an example of one target not displaying an IDENT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Type 246

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Twenty minutes after takeoff; at FL260; we received a call from the cabin that there was a loud snap; followed by sparks and an acrid smoke coming from the ceiling of the lavatory at door 2L. We were told that when the lavatory door was locked the sparks would continue; but stopped with the door lock not locked. The cabin had a good amount of smoke in it. We contacted dispatch and was patched to [maintenance]. [Maintenance] informed us that there were no CBs to pull to isolate the overhead lights of the lav. Concurrently we were running the Smoke Fire Fumes QRC checklist; and diverted back to [departure airport]. An overweight landing was accomplished in accordance with the QRC Overweight Landing Checklists.

B757 Captain reported returning to departure airport after a lavatory overhead light began to spark and smoke.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Upon arriving at the plane we were told we had only one position that would be loaded and taken to our destination. It was already onboard and I took this opportunity to walk into the back and take a look at the cargo. It was a pallet of lithium metal batteries all clearly marked indicating not to carry if damaged. The (approx) 2 square foot boxes were all stacked on a wooden pallet which was placed on a stack of metal airplane pallets. I noticed that the boxes were overhanging the wooden pallet by about 5 inches and were being warped around the edge from all the weight. Upon closer examination one box had actually been smashed up under the corner where you could actually put your hand up into the box about 3 or 4 inches deep. This was all I needed to see and I had the pallet removed. The boxes were obviously under stress from the fact they were hanging over the wooden pallet and being warped from all the weight. I find it hard to believe with known dangers of lithium batteries they can be loaded in such a sloppy manner. These boxes in my mind were without a doubt loaded without any special attention to their danger.  The loader immediately agreed with my concerns and removed the pallet.

A B767 Captain discovered damaged lithium ion batteries on stacked cargo pallets and had them removed because of the fire damage.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Halfway through boarding the FA 1 made a announcement for everyone to deplane aircraft; not to take anything with them. The smoke alarm went off and the FA 2 and myself could smell the fumes. We proceeded to start deplaning; very slow trying to get passengers off. Found out that there was confusion with the agents and they did not know there was a situation on board. FA 4 had to leave [the] aircraft to tell them there was a situation occurring which finally got the deplaning underway.

B777-200 Flight Attendant reported the aircraft had to be deplaned halfway during boarding due to the smoke alarm going off followed by a fumes smell.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 12000

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

[We were] descending into LAS via the SUNST3 Arrival. [We] were given clearance to descend to 5;500 FT after SUNST. After crossing SUNST at 8;000 FT and 210 KTS [we] descended to 5;500 FT. Number 1 Com was on 135.0. Number 2 Com was on 121.5. Around KIMME Intersection noticed it was quiet for Approach and terrain was rising ahead. Heard call on Guard (121.5) to make immediate left turn heading 350 and IDENT. [We] complied with request and Captain called Approach on 135.0 as well. We never heard our call sign while at 5;500 FT. At that altitude you are behind a hill and below the 8;000 FT segment MEA. On a dark stormy night without visual conditions; the outcome could be catastrophic. It is my belief that we lost ATC contact due to low vectoring altitude.

Air carrier aircraft on the SUNST3 STAR into LAS experienced radio communications difficulties. The reporter noted that contact was lost because of the ATC vectoring altitude.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

While talking to the crew chief of automotive I was told he was instructed to calibrate the oil service bowsers used to service engine oil in all aircraft with a paint bucket because they did not have the proper tooling as called out in the repair and inspection manual. They have been doing inspections on this equipment for years how did they do it? And is this going on with other tooling? Like gages torque wenches etc.They do not have the tooling to do this task from my understanding. Do the proper preventative maintenance on our tooling.

The oil bowsers are not [maintained] or calibrated in accordance with manuals and have been out of calibration for quite some time.

Maintenance personnel reported that oil service bowsers were not properly calibrated.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 850; Flight Crew Type 850

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We had just departed ZZZ on a NW heading to intercept the transition route westbound 3-4nm NW of ZZZ cruising at 80 knots indicated at 1300 feet msl. We were given a vector to turn left 260 for traffic avoidance. Just as the left turn was initiated; the helicopter began a series of lateral oscillations accompanied with a high frequency vibration.The Low Rotor Light illuminated along with the Low RPM horn sounding. The helicopter began a rapid yaw to the left (35 - 45 degrees) and pitched up slightly. The Main Rotor Transmission Temp/Press light illuminated during this time. Collective was immediately lowered and full throttle applied with a great amount of aft cycle to try and help maintain rotor RPM.A left turn roughly 90 degrees was made toward a lighted area that appeared to be a parking lot. Upon very short final it was clear that the spot was actually a garbage truck storage area with fine gravel terrain. Due to the possibility of a run on into one of the trucks; an excessive flare was made to reduce all ground speed which resulted [in] the tail stinger contacting the ground. The helicopter came to a stop at a level attitude in a complete brown-out due to the dust on the ground. I reported no injuries and no assistance was needed. By the time I was done communicating the ordeal with Tower my student had already pulled the mixture and fuel cut off along with turning off all switches except for comms.

Shortly after takeoff; at 80 knots and commencing a left turn; H269C helicopter instructor pilot encountered lateral oscillations; high frequency vibrations; and subsequent Low Rotor RPM warning and Main Rotor Transmission Temp/Press light. Pilot executed a successful forced landing in a gravel parking lot.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 18300; Flight Crew Type 12600

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

At FL400; all lights on MCP flashed and autopilot and autothrottle kicked off. Aircraft dipped and rolled right. MCP completely failed and autopilot and autothrottle continued to cycle on and off. Every time they cycled; aircraft would roll and pitch to grab whatever MCP thought was in it. Declared an emergency; diverted to ZZZ with no pitch trim. Rest of flight uneventful besides having to muscle aircraft a bit.

With a total loss of the MCP (Mode Control Panel) and ALL of its associated functions; and it intermittently coming back on then off again. Even with autothrottle and autopilot switches OFF; the system would grab control of the aircraft and attempt to trim; turn; descend; or climb to whatever status it defaulted to when powered up! Had to wrestle with the aircraft the entire descent and landed with pitch and roll excursions.

B757 flight crew experiences an MCP failure at FL400 resulting in erratic autopilot and autothrust operation and failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim. Flight diverts to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104.3; Flight Crew Total 586.3; Flight Crew Type 575.4

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was conducting a training flight and was working takeoffs and landings with a student on Runway 22L out of JRF. The winds had become a tail wind so after doing a touch and go Tower instructed us on our initial climbout to fly straight out; make a tear drop entry and report established on a straight in final for Runway 4R. As we were climbing to traffic pattern altitude (800 feet MSL) I noticed some lights that I perceived to be in the distance at our 12 o'clock and at a higher altitude. Initially I thought it might be approaching traffic for 8L into PHNL as overhead traffic is a regular occurrence. As I focused in on the lights I noticed the lights descending much more rapidly than I anticipated and it became clear to me that I was on a head on course with a plane descending into JRF for Runway 4R. I took the controls and immediately made a climbing right turn to avoid traffic while simultaneously contacting Tower to ask if they were in contact with an aircraft making a straight in for Runway 4R. Tower initially said no then immediately recognized the aircraft we deviated for and called to the aircraft to contact them. The NORDO aircraft immediately responded with apologies that they never received a hand-off so they never made contact despite entering PHJR's Class D airspace. The aircraft then went around; entered right traffic for Runway 4R; and later made a downwind departure to exit the Class D to the west. We circled back to make straight in for Runway 4R to continue the flight.

GA flight instructor with a student reported an NMAC during climbout from Runway 22L at JRF airport requiring evasive action.  Reportedly; the conflicting aircraft was NORDO and on approach to Runway 4R.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Enroute received a CABIN AUTO INOP message on upper EICAS. As AUTO 1 was placarded; we were running in AUTO 2 and switched to MANUAL. Completed the QRH checklist through to the pattern altitude step. I decided to continue to filed destination; after speaking to Maintenance Control; as we were able to control the cabin pressure in MANUAL. At a while later I declared an emergency with Center as we were going to need a 500 FPM descent into our destination. While descending; received a SPOILERS advisory message on the upper EICAS. Completed the QRH checklist and landed uneventfully. I suggest we do not dispatch aircraft with inoperative subsystems.

A B767-300 CABIN AUTO INOP EICAS alerted at cruise with AUTO 1 already MEL'ed so the crew switched to MANUAL pressurization control and declared an emergency while descending on the arrival. During descent; a SPOILER advisory alert appeared.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Upon arrival; our gate was occupied and Tower told us to hold in the Lima Pad. Using the 10-9; I did my best to find and park as designated on that page. Later; the Ground Controller queried us on our parking location and we discussed the location versus what is depicted on the 10-9 page. He said others have done the same thing.The STL 10-9 page has an incorrect location for the Lima Pad. The 10-9D Low Vis page appears to have the correct location. The 10-9B Parking gates page would be a great place to put a more detailed location schematic for the Lima Pad.

B737 Captain reported the location of the Lima Pad at STL is incorrectly depicted on the 10-9 Airport Diagram.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

During descent and within approximately 20 miles of touchdown at ZZZZ Runway 06; The aircraft Continuous Repetitive Chime (CRC) activated accompanied by a red ECAM 'AVIONICS SMOKE' message. The First Officer continued to fly the aircraft while I read the ECAM procedure. We then transferred aircraft control to me while the First Officer performed the red ECAM instruction; which was to operate the Sniffer Fan to confirm the presence of smoke. The First Officer was unable to confirm the presence of smoke; and therefore; In Accordance With (IAW) ECAM instructions; we did not don our oxygen masks or continue to the procedure; 'AVIONICS SMOKE' in the QRH.     At the time of occurrence; we had the airport in sight and felt reasonably sure that the warning had been caused by something other than an actual smoke condition in the Avionics Compartment (i.e. water). When time permitted I reviewed the QRH procedure; but we concentrated our primary attention on landing the aircraft in an expeditious manner. At no time during the approach or prior to landing did we experience any indication of any aircraft systems malfunction other than the red 'AVIONICS SMOKE' indication on the Overhead Panel which remained on until after the aircraft blocked in. However; upon touchdown; we heard a sound in the cockpit similar to the sound of the electrical system when transferring aircraft electrical power from one generator to another. After setting the brakes in the parking spot; I shut down the # 1 Engine and all normal electrical power immediately failed; accompanied by numerous ECAM warnings and the E/E compartment 'low flow' warning horn. We were unable to get External Power (EXT PWR) to engage and power the aircraft; and after starting the APU; found that it's generator would not power the aircraft either. At that point we shut down the # 2 Engine and performed an Engine Shutdown Check. I believe that this event was a direct result of the presence of water in the Avionics Compartment; caused by melting snow which had not been sufficiently cleaned off the tops of the [cargo] cans loaded on the aircraft in ZZZ. After block-in; it was reported to me by ramp personnel that during taxi-in the aircraft had large quantities of water pouring from every drain hole on the bottom of the fuselage. It was also reported that the aircraft Beacon lights were not operating (even though the switch was 'On'). I now believe the sound we heard at touchdown was the sound of the # 1 Generator taking over for the # 2 Generator as it failed. Therefore; when I shut down the # 1 Engine; no aircraft generators were operating.    Subsequent inspection by Maintenance found the GEN # 1; GEN # 2; and APU GEN Generator Control Units damaged by water; and all had to be replaced. Maintenance also had to replace two separate smoke warning detectors.   Due to this information and the fact that that # 2 Generator failed upon touchdown; the First Officer and I now feel that we were probably within minutes of a real in-flight emergency; i.e. complete loss of all normal electrical power. In conclusion; I believe this entire incident; and the damage and service delays caused; could have been avoided if the ZZZ Loading crew had simply made sure ALL the cans were completely clean of any snow prior to loading them on the aircraft. Prior to loading in ZZZ; I had personally spoken to no less than four members of the ZZZ Loading crew (including one individual who identified themself as being one of the people 'in charge;') and requested that they be sure that all snow was cleaned off the [cargo] cans prior to loading. It was indicated to me at the time that my request would be complied with. The subsequent event at indicates otherwise. [Recommend] putting winter procedures in place at all ramps to ensure that no can is loaded on an aircraft if it has ANY snow on it.

Avionics Smoke alert on Overhead Panel and on ECAM. No smoke detected or confirmed using QRH procedures. Normal approach and landing. On block-in; when Number One engine was shut down; we lost all power. APU was started but didn't pick up the load. External Power would not pick up the load. Ramp personnel reported water streaming out of every port on the belly of the plane. Maintenance reported that the # 1 and # 2 Generator Control Units (GCU's) were shorted; as well as the APU GCU. Avionics Compartment smoke detectors were shorted as well.  Maintenance said there was water inside the Avionics Compartment. [Recommend] better snow removal from the top of the cans when loading the plane.  The Captain got out of his chair on preflight four different times and specifically asked four different people to ensure that the snow was removed before loading them on to the airplane.  Perhaps in addition to sweeping the snow off the tops; a heavy duty squeegee would help.  Maybe assign a monitor with no other responsibilities when these severe weather events occur.

Reporter stated they were originally delayed several hours due to the heavy snowfall and large payload. Their first indication that something wasn't right was just before landing when the Continuous Repetitive Chime (CRC) came on. He transferred control to the Captain while he performed a Sniffer Test. When he put the Sniffer fan on; there was not even a hint of smoke or smell detected by the Sniffer even though the Avionic's compartment Smoke alert appeared on the overhead panel and on the ECAM. No Circuit Breakers popped; no other alerts or warning; just a distinctive sound upon landing; similar to when Ground Electrical Power is switched over to Aircraft power; but no other indication.   Reporter stated after they arrived at the unloading area; their line mechanics reported a lot of water was noted in the cargo belly and Avionic's Compartment. But; there were no other Alerts or ECAM messages indicating that a complete loss of Generator Control Units (GCU) # 1 and # 2 including the APU GCU had occurred. The shorting out of the two smoke detectors; which he believes are in the cargo pit ceiling; was also disturbing because that would indicate how much snow was on top of the cargo cans that came in contact with the detectors and probably shorted them out.

A Captain and First Officer report about snow melting from the top of freight cans loaded in the Forward Cargo pit on an A300 aircraft contributing to excessive water accumulation flowing forward into the Avionic's Compartment. A red ECAM 'AVIONICS SMOKE' message appeared prior to landing. The loss of # 1 and # 2 Generator Control Units (GCUs); including the APU GCU; occurred after landing without any associated Alerts or ECAM messages.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 550

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After starting the engine and during our pre-taxi check at ZZZ Airport; the student pilot and I performed a brake check. The student occupied the pilot seat; and myself in the co-pilot seat. We both confirmed positive brake pressure in each pedal. We contacted Ground Control and received taxi clearance to taxi to runway XX via taxiway A. During the taxi from the FBO ramp to taxiway A; we had positive brake pressure. As we approached the end of taxiway A for runway XX; we started to maneuver the aircraft to the left so that we could make a 180-degree turn into the wind in order to perform an engine run-up. As we started to go left; the student pilot stated that he did not have pressure on the right brake. I took control of the aircraft and confirmed that I did not have pressure or authority in the right brake. I applied full right rudder for nose wheel steering and full right brake and the airplane continued straight ahead. At this time I determined the plane was going to depart the taxiway surface; and promptly pulled the mixture to idle cut-off to stop the engine running. I believe that this was the safest thing that I could do to ensure the safety of my student and myself. After that; the airplane departed the taxiway and the left main landing gear came into contact with a taxiway light.

Flight Instructor reported the right brake failed while the student was maneuvering for run-up and aircraft departed the taxiway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 400

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Got ATIS information from Homer radio; and called in for a traffic advisory while taxiing to the runway. Runway 22 at Homer only has taxiways near the approach end of runway 4. A back-taxi on the runway is required to use runway 22. I was at the middle taxiway. Homer radio provided the traffic advisory; and stated there were two float planes on the downwind to land on the lake (which has an opposite traffic pattern from runway). I had both of the float planes in sight; and they were not going to be a factor. I scanned the runway and the final approach path of runway 22 and saw no aircraft. I announced that I was back taxiing on runway 22; and pulled across the hold short line. My nose had just entered the runway when I saw an airplane coming down runway 22 on the roll out. He pulled off on the taxiway prior to the one I was using and called clear of the runway.I have no idea how I didn't see him. I was very surprised; and can't remember if his lights were on. Contributing factors may have been that I was in a slight hurry because I was running about 10 minutes behind schedule; and that flight was my sixth departure from Homer that day so a little fatigue came into play as well. Complacency was probably also a factor. Homer radio called out the traffic; but I did not hear them mention the aircraft on roll out on 22; if they even mentioned it; which I don't believe they did. I also scanned the runway pretty diligently before entering the runway; but somehow I still didn't see that aircraft. White aircraft are pretty difficult to see when going over large white runway stripes. The runway is also; convex; which can make traffic father down runway 22 harder to see.I have been an advocate; for a long time; about putting in a taxiway that extends full length down runway 22. The traffic flow on runway 22 can get pretty intense when aircraft are landing and multiple aircraft are waiting to back taxi; and can cause people to rush to back taxi in-between aircraft in the pattern. In the future; I'll slow down; and fight complacency with a good traffic scan. If that had been an aircraft on takeoff; the outcome of this event could have been very different.

Air taxi Pilot entering the takeoff runway for back taxi; reported a ground conflict with another aircraft that was on landing roll out.


While getting radar vectors to runway 4 after a runway change into LGA we encountered a possible UAV at 8;000 feet. There was no apparent vertical movement in the object to appear like a balloon rising. The object was black in color; and maybe no more than a few hundred feet horizontal separation of our aircraft [off] the left side. We were flying an easterly heading over New Jersey near the New Jersey Turnpike exit 8A.

Air carrier Captain reported a UAV at 8;000 feet near Jamesburg; NJ while on vectors to LGA Runway 4.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Runway 12 was in use and Aircraft X requested Runway 21L for departure. Aircraft X called for taxi. I needed to hold them for crossing traffic on taxiway Echo. When I could taxi them I did. My phraseology was Aircraft X; Runway 21 Left taxi via Charlie; Hold short of Runway 12. Aircraft X read back the clearance with the hold short instruction. I observed Aircraft X taxiing too fast approaching Runway 12 and told them to stop. When Aircraft X stopped; the nose and part of the front wheels were passed the hold lines. I received a runway crossing clearance from Local Control 1 and had Aircraft X cross Runway 12.After Aircraft X had permission to cross Runway 12; they asked; why the quick stop? I advised them that they had a hold short instruction. They replied that they had read back cross runway 12 on the taxi instruction. After verifying with the tapes; the pilot did indeed read back the hold short instructions. My only recommendation would be better active listening.

Flight delay in excess of two hours due to low oxygen in R hand bottle; First flight of day 4 in the trip. Taxi Aircraft to get serviced at FBO maintenance across runway 12. Normal taxi. Planned single engine turn upon return. Found out the night prior to departure scheduled FAA line check in the morning which caused both crew members additional pressure and been discussed repeatedly prior to flight. Upon finishing Single engine turn; requested taxi. Ground control instructs hold position. We hold.After receiving Taxi clearance we begin taxi; FO says: lights on; cleared to cross then shortly after Ground control calls: Aircraft X- stop! I bring Aircraft to immediate stop before hold short line and request additional information from ATC. We receive further ground taxi instructions. Perform First flight of the day runup and depart normally. Normal flight and landing in ZZZ.Ask for 2nd crossing authorization prior to any runway crossing just to make sure on the same page with ground control. Asking twice never hurts and could have prevented this event.

PRC Ground Controller and pilots reported a runway incursion. Aircraft was initially told to hold short; but they read back cross which was not corrected by ATC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 130; Flight Crew Type 26

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I have a PPL and also hold a Section 333 Exemption for commercial UAV operations. This violation occurred when I was filming a commercial for a private golf course with my UAV. I reported this flight to local airports and filed a NOTAM as required. However; during filming for this commercial I was less than 500 feet from people (anywhere from roughly 20 to 200 feet) which is a violation of the terms of my 333 Exemption. All of these people gave me verbal authorization to be filmed under these conditions; nobody was hurt; and the flight occurred safely as planned. Approximately two days ago I discovered that I need a Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM); among other things; in order to film during commercial UAV operations that occur less than 500 feet from people. This violation occurred because at the time I did not fully understand the '500 foot' rule that applied to this flight/project; but I should have; so the real cause is ignorance on my part. The corrective action I am taking is to cease this type of operation and apply for a MPTOM. I do believe this type of operation can be conducted safely by me and other UAV pilots that do not presently hold a MPTOM; provided they have the proper equipment and training. However; I do see value in the application and approval process related to a MPTOM. Note: Flying time figures provided above are 104 total hours of ASEL with 0 in last 90 days; plus 26 hours of logged UAV flying time with 3 hours in the last 90 days.

Commercial Drone Operator reported having conducted a photo shoot job using a company-owned drone within 500 feet of personnel on the ground which is a violation of their authorization to film during commercial UAV operations.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Other; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was working the [fix] sector and it was fairly busy with tankers inside the MOA airspace and fighters also; in addition to my normal traffic load. All three tanker flights were getting ready to leave and return to [destination] and they all wanted to depart separately. I pre-planned the departures and searched for the flight plans and had them ready. First aircraft called and I radar identified them and got them going. The second aircraft called for return and I radar identified them and got them going towards the airport. After all these calls I was coordinating with [facility] approach to ensure the aircraft would be able to enter and on what heading/altitudes they'd prefer. After I coordinated Aircraft X going in; I hung up to see Aircraft Y just short of [fix] at 13500 feet descending to 11000 feet and my conflict alert going off with a military aircraft at 13000 feet. I quickly glanced up to see the DME was 4.44 NM which caused us to lose a safe separation minima. I originally was calling on tactical frequency to have the Aircraft X return to the military airspace and issue a traffic call to alert them they were on a collision course. The aircraft never responded because I was calling by the wrong call sign to which I made the error on. After the call on tactical I went on my frequency to alert the Aircraft Y of the Aircraft X spilling out and his position and DME. Aircraft Y reported Aircraft X in sight and did not get any RA's. The military needs to be reminded that we can't be spilling out of the assigned airspace as IFR traffic runs right around the boundary. Additionally; we should've assigned discrete beacon codes to ensure we knew who each aircraft is when multiple are participating. I needed to issue a warning of wake turbulence as the aircraft was a heavy and less than 5 miles from it on the spill out.

Today we had [two] MOA's go active. I was relieving a controller who cleared in a flight of 3 aircraft into the MOA. While inside of the MOA; I noticed that the three all had discrete codes; two of them were both on XXXX beacon code. I caught a glimpse of one of the XXXX codes at 9000 feet when the MOA altitude is 10000 feet to 17900 feet. I immediately go onto tactical frequency and alerted the flight that one of his wingmen was at 9000 feet. I didn't observe any aircraft in the area but because of this he spilled out of the MOA and into [facility] approaches airspace. No other incidents after that.From my training I remember being in the LOA/SOP that the participating aircraft will squawk a discrete code with altitude to monitor the flights. I should've assigned codes that would differentiate the aircraft from each other to alert the leader that the specific aircraft was spilling out. I also feel that more training should be done to ensure the military understands the airspace and that we run aircraft all around that airspace close by to accommodate our [airport] and [airport] traffic flow and any spill outs could lead to a dangerous situation.

Two instances of military aircraft exiting the confines of the MOA without clearance. In one case an aircraft came into conflict with an air carrier. In a separate instance an aircraft exited below the base of the MOA and returned to its base without clearance or contacting the ATC Facility.