Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 369; Flight Crew Total 1225; Flight Crew Type 282

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During a training flight to ZZZ; a catastrophic engine failure was experience approximately 3SM southwest of ZZZ1 during level cruise flight at 3;500 ft. MSL. After diagnosing the complete loss of engine power as a catastrophic engine failure; I tuned Tower into the radio and immediately [requested priority handling]. As I made a turn for ZZZ1; I was cleared to land both Runway XXR and Runway XXL. Aircraft in closed traffic at ZZZ1 were given instruction by Tower to extend their downwind legs to ensure no traffic conflicts would be present for my forced landing. Ultimately; a safe landing was accomplished on Runway XXR; and no further assistance was required to remove the aircraft from the runway. A phone call was made to Tower; where my name; phone number; and pilot certificate number were recorded. I was advised the Federal Aviation Administration may be reaching out regarding the [priority handling].The direct cause of the engine failure has not been determined. It appeared; however; that at least one cylinder had a piston which experienced a shearing force; ultimately damaging both the piston and the crankshaft. Shortly after the engine failure; the propeller stopped; refusing to windmill. This is consistent with the proposition that the crankshaft was damaged. After determining the engine could not be restarted; the mixture was positioned to 'idle-cutoff;' the fuel-selection positioned to 'off;' the electric fuel pump positioned to 'off;' and the magnetos positioned to 'off.' On close-in base leg; I opened the door as a preventative measure for quick egress of the aircraft in the event of an engine-bay fire upon landing. Barring no fire; I was able to roll the aircraft off the runway; taxiway; and into a transient spot. The aircraft currently resides in a transient parking stall until the aircraft owner's Mechanic can assess the damage.

P28A Instructor Pilot reported emergency diversion leading to an uneventful emergency landing due to engine failure during cruise.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Better monitor FO actions. Increase awareness of calculating descent points using distance from the runway to approximate a 3 degree descent path to the runway in order to avoid unnecessary and lengthy low level segments.  Flying at 3;000 feet about 15 miles WSW of IND direct to BIGRD on the RNAV Y 5R. Approach asked if we had the field in sight; we responded that we did; and then we were given a left turn pretty much direct to HUUPS; which is the final approach fix on the RNAV Y 5R; and cleared for the visual approach. Tower then handed us off to Tower. During this time while I was switching to Tower I became task saturated with my PM flying duties from the frequency change; getting a landing clearance; and the FO requesting flap configuration changes. After we were cleared to land I noticed we were just about to level off at 2;100 feet. Well below a 3 degree descent path given our current position to the runway. I had not noticed the FO had set 2;100 feet; which is the altitude at HUUPS; and started a descent as soon as we were cleared for the approach. We leveled off at 2;100 feet and continued for some time before reaching HUUPS and continuing the descent for the runway. We were level at approximately 1;300' feet AGL for a while before descending for landing. I don't think this was technically illegal or in violation of an FAR; as we were cleared for the visual and in the process of making a descent for landing; but I do feel it's not a good technique to simply set the FAF altitude; dive and drive to that altitude; level off for several miles; then continue descent once over the FAF. We were not on a published portion of an approach; and well below a 3 degree descent path to the runway. This wasn't an issue for this particular approach; but it could become an issue at night in mountainous terrain or if there are obstacles in the area.

Air carrier Captain reported getting too low while on a visual approach to IND airport.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

A normal flight to ZZZ. The FO (First Officer) was flying the aircraft. Approach had us keep our speed at 250kts on the descent. Then 5 miles prior to final approach course we were instructed to slow to 230 kts to keep us inside of traffic on an extended leg of the final approach course. ATC cleared us for the visual 18R approximately 5 miles from the final approach fix at 3000ft. At this point the FO was clear to slow to our approach speed and altitudes. The FO was flying and once cleared for the approach commenced a slowdown with throttle reduction and flaps at appropriate air speeds but was late in descending out of 3000 feet to 2100 feet at the FAF. He could not get down and be stable due to the excessive altitude and called a go around. All procedures were complied with according to the [Flight Manual] and GOM. Tower cleared us to 3000 ft and gave us vectors and handed us over to Approach. FAs (Flight Attendants) and passengers were briefed; go-around checklist was conducted and another approach ensued to another visual approach to 18R. All the while the FO was flying; I let him call for the checklists and I complied with them. On base leg heading 090 degrees; approximately 5 miles from the FAF; 3000ft and 200kts; the FO called field in sight as was communicated to approach control. Approach control cleared us for the visual RWY XXR and then switch to tower. A switch to tower ensued and before I could check in for the visual XXR; I saw the FO input a vertical speed of 2;700 fpm! I immediately instructed him to shallow his decent to no more than 1;500fpm. I then noticed the FO increase the altitude bug to 3;300ft which was above our altitude of 2;100ft. I looked down and the autopilot was on and a descent rate of 1800fpm passing 1900ft with nothing to stop the autopilot from a continuous descent to the ground; at which point; I said; I have the controls and clicked off the autopilot and immediately arrested the decent at 1800ft by adding power and turning to intercept the proper approach course and glide path; whereby the FO said 'I have it' and I retorted no you did not. I received clearance to land and was stable by 1000ft with checklists completed per the [Flight Manual] and GOM. We completed the after landing checklists; the engine shutdown bulleted items; and at the gate the shutdown checklist. While at the gate; I calmly and politely debriefed the FO on his lack of situational awareness and the importance of being ahead of the aircraft. I said that he needed to hand fly the airplane when the situation requires it such as a compressed timeframe. The FO sat there quietly and did not say much as I politely debriefed him as to what he could improve upon. I did not notice the FO writing down any possible lessons learned. After landing; dispatch was given an ACARS message notifying the company of the missed approach due to an unstable approach situation. ATC could have slowed us down or vectored us differently to preclude the unstable approach. However the task was not outside the skills of the pilots flying. As for the possible altitude deviation turning final approach course; the CA (Captain) could have assumed the controls sooner as the FO was unable to successfully land the plane on the first attempt?

CRJ-900 Captain reported unstabilized approach and performed a go-around.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

I was working the log while Local Control 1 was issuing a 'low approach only' instruction to Aircraft Y on short final. Aircraft X called from RWY 25R north side run-up area requesting right closed traffic; however; because the pilot over-keyed the Local Control Controller; the beginning of the transmission (call sign and position) was clipped. Local Control 1; realizing that his transmission may have been blocked; restated his instructions to Aircraft Y. Aircraft X then stated 'Right closed traffic RWY25R; Aircraft X'. I saw Aircraft X move forward; however; I did not recognize that he was passing the hold short lines. I did watch to make sure the aircraft came to a complete stop; which it did; still clear of the runway; just before Aircraft Y crossed the threshold. While there was no time to have sent Aircraft Y around; I should have recognized that Aircraft X was passing the hold short lines as I watched it move forward. It wasn't until Aircraft X asked for verification that he was cleared for [Runway] 25R and other controllers stated that he had crossed the lines that I realized this was the case.Because of the low height of our Tower; it's difficult for us to see our hold short lines. The lines are also closer to the runway on the north side than they are on the south side. I've been at this facility for several years now however; so I'm used to this being an issue and have caught mistakes like this before. Traffic volume was very heavy and there was some complexity due to the fact that we were split; training on Local Control 2 and a relief briefing had just occurred on Ground Control. I may have been trying to multi-task too much; dividing my attention between Local Control 1; Local Control 2 and Ground Control; rather than giving each of them all my attention at different times. I will be more careful in the future to give all my attention to one position at a time.

Livermore Tower Controller reported a runway incursion.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Possible altitude deviation. There is a lot of confusion on one specific crossing altitude on the SEQM ILS Z Runway 36 approach. The approach starts at QIT VOR. The approach plate and the tailored company page both say 18;000 feet; however the transition level is FL180. So....do we cross at 18;000 feet or FL180? My copilot and I discussed this question at length. The copilot found on Part One page 17.4-2 (International Section): When flying at or above the transition level; QNE altimeter setting (29.92' Hg/1013 hPa) is to be used and the height of the aircraft is to be expressed in terms of flight levels. As a result of this paragraph; we crossed QIT VOR and the next point (also to cross at 18;000) at FL180 with altimeters set to 29.92. Quito approach never asked us about this; however we are submitting a safety report because there is a doubt.

An air carrier Captain; flying the ILS Z RWY 36 approach at SEQM expressed confusion over whether the charted 18;000 feet MEA over QIT and the QIT 177/6.0 DME should be flown as a flight level or an altitude since FL180/18000 are the transition FL/ALTs.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213; Flight Crew Type 13300

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 320; Flight Crew Type 4387

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

LAS was giving vectors for north landing and we were being vectored for 1R. A business aircraft was called out to us as traffic as they were being vectored on base leg for 1L. I do not recall hearing if the other aircraft was given a speed restriction but as we later discovered; that Crew's spacing awareness and control seemed to be greatly relaxed. As we rolled out on final; approach Control called them again as traffic and; shortly after we received a TA. When I finally spotted the traffic visually; I was surprised at how close it was. Shortly after being handed off to Tower we received an RA to descend. We discussed our options and agreed that; to comply with the descend RA; was the safest course and we continued the approach. I notified the Tower of the RA to let them know that the spacing left little to be desired. Tower asked our intentions and I let him know we were complying with the RA by continuing the descent. Somewhat unhelpfully; another on-air voice (possibly the other aircraft Pilot) interjected the assertion that the RA was a false indication. This presented a tempting opportunity for retort (not helping) but I declined to comment. While our approach continued; compliance with the RA seemed to force us below the PAPI and the RA continued to enunciate. I felt boxed in but to go around seemed like the least safe option. We discussed this and agreed to continue while opting to turn the TCAS to TA in order to silence one of the distractions. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate without incident or comment. I realized that by silencing the RA by switching to TA only; I was violating policy; but to do so seemed prudent under the circumstance. In addition I forgot to notify Dispatch of the incident but a report was filed upon completion of the trip.Despite violating TCAS policy; I am proud of our reaction as a Crew to the traffic threat. My First Officer did a great job keeping a cool head and flying precisely as we needed to mitigate the danger. We reassessed the situation at least three separate times to reach what I consider the safest course. ATC could have given safer sequencing and the other Crew could have opted not to push the margin so closely. In addition; unnecessary commentary over the frequency at such a critical moment is unhelpful.

LAS was giving vectors for north landing and we were on a base leg about 10 miles south of the airport. I was flying the aircraft. We had set up to fly the RNAV 01R; but had not yet been cleared for the approach or even told what runway we would be landing on.Approach informed us of our landing runway; gave us a vector to final approach course; and cleared us for the approach. After we intercepted final approach course; I used the MCP to fly the plane using LNAV and VNAV Path with autopilot and autothrottle engaged. Soon after intercepting VNAV Path; we received a TCAS TA alert from an aircraft about 600 ft above and behind us. ATC called out a business jet as traffic for us to be aware of. The Captain began looking for the threat while I continued flying the approach. After about 30 seconds; it became apparent to us that the business jet was flying an approach to LAS 01L and was sequenced too close behind us.Shortly after switching to LAS Tower frequency; the TA changed to a TCAS RA. I disengaged the autopilot and autothrottles and flew the aircraft to stay clear of the conflict by following the PFD guidance and commands. We were now VMC and the landing runway was in sight. The Captain and I agreed that the safest course of action was to continue the approach visually; using the RNAV approach guidance as able; as executing a missed approach would counter the TCAS commands and might fly us too close to the aircraft causing the RA.During the approach; the TCAS commands were going off the whole time because the other aircraft had continued to fly his approach to 01L behind us; maintaining an altitude of about 500-600 ft above and behind us. The aural commands were extremely distracting as we tried to configure the aircraft for landing; accomplish required checklists; ensure safe terrain separation; and attempt to coordinate with ATC. We were definitely in the 'yellow' as a crew; and I was probably in the 'red' as I was flying the aircraft approach to LAS 01R manually while attempting to maintain altitude separation from the aircraft above me while maintaining safe terrain separation below. The Captain asked me if I was comfortable with turning the TCAS switch to TA mode (as we can do in Denver when sequenced close to parallel aircraft) even though this was in violation of policy; and I agreed that this would reduce the level of stress in the flight deck and increase SA and overall safety.After completing this action; we accomplished the rest of the approach and landing without incident.

B737 flight crew reported continuing the approach to LAS Runway 1R despite a continuous RA due to traffic behind for landing on Runway 1L being too close.


Indicating and Warning - Lighting Systems

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

MEL; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Aircraft; Procedure

Refused to operate aircraft with entire overhead panel lights inoperative. Lights would go full bright; dim; and off uncommanded at random intervals. Deemed unacceptable for night flying and totally unsafe for a late night flight to ZZZ with moderate/heavy rain; low clouds and over 20 kts of crosswinds. Refused at aircraft at gate. I believe the MEL that Maintenance was going to use was not meant for the entire panel being dark.

B737-800 Captain refused aircraft due to erratic overhead warning lights affecting the entire overhead panel.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.8

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Our support personnel coordinated for Parachute operation into Salt Lake Class Bravo airspace for the State Fair at specific times.  These times coincided with our evening cargo banks; one of our busiest VFR traffic times.  The jump was also scheduled to occur almost directly over the main transition for all VFR aircraft in and out of SLC.  The controllers requested and had the tower supervisor coordinate to hold out all VFR traffic for the tower airspace until the jumpers were down.  We also requested to be given a 5 minute warning and a 1 minute warning so that we could sterilize our airspace from our end as well.  We were given the 5 minute warning but never given the 1 minute and never asked for permission to allow the jumpers to jump.  We still have Aircraft Y in a downwind directly under the jump aircraft when we were told jumpers away.  We were never informed of how many jumpers there would be and how we could tell which one was the last one so we could verify that they were out of the way.  As we are watching parachutes still in the air and fairly high in the sky; TRACON begins bringing aircraft into the airspace; pointed directly at the parachutes.  To make it worse; we were not transferred communication to the Aircraft Y pilots until there were about 3 miles into our airspace already.  When asked to make the Aircraft Y's turn around and/or spin; the TRACON ignored us and instead asked the jump aircraft if the jumpers were down; to which he responded affirmative; even though we were watching the parachutes still descending with our binoculars.  When we finally did get communication with the Aircraft Y pilots we had to take them off their normal flight path to avoid the area the parachutes were in.  When the Aircraft Y's finally passed the parachutes; there were well above the parachutes; but until then we had no way of knowing the altitude of the parachutes.  For parachute operations in that close to the airport; the tower controllers need to be in absolute control of who comes in to the airspace and when; it should not be dictated to us by the TRACON.

SLC Tower Controller describes a situation involving parachutists and IFR aircraft in close proximity. Coordination between Tower and TRACON was not complete.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Did preflight inspection of cockpit. Pushed back and started # 1. After start got ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) with horn about hydraulic and flight controls. Hydraulics were in the normal range but were not feeding the systems. Started getting fumes in the cockpit so shut down engine. Called Maintenance and returned to gate. Maintenance comes on and finds 2 guarded switches on maintenance panel in off position.Maintenance not returning aircraft to airworthiness condition after tests. They were extremely hard to spot from our vantage point.Return switches to normal after system checks. This is setting us up for failure.

After pushback; and after number 1 engine start; we received a hydraulic system warning message. We shut down number one engine and the warning went away; and we returned to the gate. It was discovered that one of the guarded maintenance panel switches was in the not normal configuration.Maintenance performed the checks and did not return the aircraft system to normal configuration. The guarded button was not discovered in preflight as being on.Would change maintenance checklist to read; maintenance panel: keep guard switch cover in 'open' position to highlight button is in the 'not' normal configuration. With the switch cover closed; it is difficult to ascertain button position in all ambient conditions.

A321 flight crew reported receiving an hydraulic anomaly ECAM during taxi out which resulted in a return to the gate.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

As First Officer I received the CPDLC and programmed the FMC; the clearance came with a change to 'load new route.' At the bottom of this note; I failed to notice 'Climb via SID; except maintain 4;000 feet.' I too quickly went to the page with the new route and the 'load new route.' This page said 'Fly the CONLE 3 RNAV.' After inspecting the departure; I put 13;000 feet in the altitude window; as the hold-down altitude for the SID; having failed to notice the 'except maintain 4;000 feet' back on page one of the CDPLC. Too often now; we receive a 'load new route' clearance when it is the exact same route as is filed. Then the new route and old cleared route are on two separate pages of the CPDLC. I think this can cause confusion and omissions. I have also found when selecting the 'load new route' selection; it often drops out any loaded SID; and the corresponding legs on the SID. This is often unnecessary because the routes are exactly the same. This unnecessary step can lead to errors in lateral track and altitude deviations if they go unnoticed. I realize the importance of thoroughly reviewing all of the pages of the CPDLC and reviewing the loaded route.Additionally; when checking on with Departure the first time; I said we were climbing on the SID to 13;000 feet; since we were not yet in VNAV; and had not reached ZZZZZ. The Controller at that time did not alert us to the fact that we should remain at 4;000 feet. The next controller was the one that asked us how we were cleared; and that we should have remained at 4;000 feet. He noted that many aircraft are missing this and that it was not a big deal at this time. It seems these clearances are confusing or easily missed.

B737 First Officer reported the format of the CDPLC clearance was not confirmed by the pilots and failed to maintain 4;000 feet per the clearance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 1645; Flight Crew Type 125

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

As a preamble; the aircraft is very well maintained; but as it is nearly forty years old; there are a couple of issues that it has that are pertinent to the incident.  They are not problems that cause the aircraft to be unairworthy; and the PIC needs to deal with them to have a successful outcome.  First; the autopilot in the aircraft is old; and has difficultly intercepting final approach courses when the intercept angle is too great.  Attempting to get the autopilot settled led to valuable time lost before I disconnected it.  Another issue with the aircraft is that the flight controls are rigged in such a way that the yoke appears to be slightly turned to the left in straight and level flight.  Therefore if one were to fly the aircraft with the yoke in the standard straight and level position; the airplane would be in a shallow right turn.  When I fixated during my hand-flown final approach; I reverted to holding the yoke in a 'normal' straight and level position.  This led the plane to deviate to the right. I was cleared for the ILS 23 approach into FDK.  My final vector onto the LOC was approximately a quickly descending 120 turn to the right; directly onto both the LOC and glide slope.  I was not prepared to be so aggressively vectored; and rolled out high and fast; with the aircraft in a clean configuration.  At this point I should have abandoned the approach; as I had too much potential and kinetic energy; I was not established on my final approach course; my aircraft was not properly configured; and the autopilot was having great difficultly intercepting the LOC.  But; due to both pride and get-there-itis for my passenger; I pressed on.  This; combined with an inadequate scan due to fixation; led to me having an excessively high rate of descent and to be off course to the right.  Frederick Tower told me that approach control was getting a low altitude alert; but at this point I had broken out and stabilized the aircraft.  I landed without incident. Lessons that I have taken away from this incident for use in all aircraft: 1. If aggressively vectored to final approach; one may need to aggressively reduce the aircraft's energy state.  I was too worried about 'babying' the engines in the early stages; whereas if I had aggressively reduced power when intercepting the final approach course I would have been able to slow down appropriately.  If I am not willing to aggressively reduce power; I need to refuse the approach clearance. 2. If the aircraft is not in the proper configuration and in a stabilized approach at the FAF; I need to abandon the approach and try again. 3. If the approach becomes unstable inside the FAF; I need to immediately execute a missed approach.  2 & 3 are obviously basic rules of instrument flying.  I need to lay aside my pride and get-there-itis to be safe. Lessons that I have taken away when flying this specific aircraft: 1. When aggressively vectored onto a final approach course; just turn the autopilot off immediately.  It can't handle the intercept.  I must establish the aircraft on a stable approach; and then I may re-engage the autopilot if I desire. 2. Be more aware of the unusual flight control rigging when hand-flying in IMC. A final lesson:  Keep my scan up.  If not actively flying approaches in IMC; I need to be using simulators to keep my scan active and crisp.

PA34 pilot reported he deviated from charted procedure on a steep approach to FDK in IMC that resulted in a CFTT incident.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Landed 14R and exited T6; Ground Control then gave taxi instructions; right on Tango-A10-Bravo. After we completed 'the after landing and taxi checklist' we were approaching The T9 high speed at approximately 15 knots ground speed. Just before entering the intersection of Tango and T9 I observed my First Officer taking a double look out his window. Observing that I started to slow the aircraft. To our amazement a RJ exited T9 and continued across the intersection at a high speed onto A9 and then a right turn onto Bravo. By the time I was able to stop the aircraft the RJ crossed in front of us approximately 30 feet in front of our nose. By the time the RJ's tail was past us Ground Control instructed us to 'give way to the RJ and proceed to A10'. The RJ was already on Taxiway Bravo contacted Ground and proceeded to their gate. I was stunned to say the least. Had it not been for my First Officer's situational awareness and mine I'm not sure we would have been able to stop in time without emergency braking and endangering our cabin crew and/passengers. As we continued with our taxi instructions I asked the Ground Controller what the RJ's flight number was. After she responded with their flight number the RJ's response was 'that's what you get for taxing so slow.' Let's forget for a moment the complete lack of professionalism from the RJ. First of all I think 15 knots of taxi speed is quite appropriate and safe at night crossing high speed intersections. Secondly; I personally do not taxi an aircraft on taxiways without a clearance. Thirdly; I'm not really sure why a small RJ needs approximately 8500 feet of runway to exit safely especially with out a request to roll out to T9 or a clearance to do so. Had it been a wet taxiway or a contaminated surface it would have increased the chances for an incursion. There is no 'hot spot' for Tango and T9 but in my mind what the RJ did created one. I contacted the Tower after reaching gate and spoke with a Controller and explained my concerns. He agreed and then passed me over to his Supervisor. He agreed as well with my concerns and offered to pass it along to the carrier's Chief Pilot. Let me be perfectly clear; I am not asking for any discipline against either pilot on the RJ. I simply want them to understand what took place and be aware of a potential for a runway or taxiway incursion. Operating in that matter has the potential of a negative outcome for both aircraft. The unprofessional comment had no place on the radio. I suggest contacting the Captain and First officer of RJ and explain the danger in the way they operated the aircraft exiting a runway with another aircraft approaching the intersection.

An air carrier exited ORD Runway 14R at Taxiway T6 and approaching T9 on Tango nearly collided with an RJ which exited A9 at a high speed and forced the aircraft on Tango to stop; thus avoiding a collision.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Maintenance Action

Descending to 14;000 feet; with Center. Lost F-PLN on FMS. Notified Center of loss of navigation capability and asked for radar vectors. I was unable to restore any navigation capability on the Captain MCDU. Transferred aircraft control to me. First Officer was unable to restore any navigation capability on the First Officer MCDU. Advised Approach Control. Approach provided radar vectors to final for the ILS. Manually tuned and identified the ILS. I flew ILS approach to a normal landing. FMS system failure.

A330 Captain reported experiencing a dual MCDU failure during descent for landing and requested vectors to the ILS from ATC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Sector 23 called requesting higher FL250 for Aircraft X to climb above Active Military Airspace. I approved FL250. I did not have the handoff on the aircraft. About two minutes later; I accepted the radar handoff of Aircraft X because I knew Sector 23 was climbing the aircraft into my airspace to top the [Active Military Airspace]. Almost immediately after accepting the handoff; Sector 23 switched Aircraft X to my frequency; but he was only leaving 160. I assigned Aircraft X a clearance to reach FL250 in 4 minutes or less for Active Military Airspace. Aircraft X said unable. I called Sector 23 to get control for turns. I then turned Aircraft X heading 180. Aircraft X said unable due to weather. I then assigned a heading of 090 and pilot said unable. I then assigned heading 080. I then asked again for Aircraft X to turn heading 180 when able. I then climbed Aircraft X FL290 and said leave FL250 in two minutes and Aircraft X said unable. Aircraft X entered Active Military Airspace still climbing. I could not do a point out to the military because there was no way to contact the ship or unit who was using the airspace. I advised Aircraft X that he was entering an area with possible live fire. I could not turn Aircraft X north because of the active [Military Airspace] and because of weather to the south the pilot refused to turn.Sector 23 should have Aircraft X head south of the weather instead of letting the aircraft get north of the weather. All other departures off MCO were vectored south of weather. Aircraft X was the only aircraft allowed to stay north of weather. When Sector 23 called and requested higher; they should have ensured that the pilot would be able to maintain a climb rate to clear the Military Airspace. Sector 23 should have never let Aircraft X continue eastbound once the aircraft advised he would be unable to climb fast enough. Sector 23 could have turned Aircraft X north clear of weather and before the [Active Military] airspace started. By the time they switched the aircraft to me; there was no options for vectors to miss the airspace. [There was] no way to contact the military to advise them of Aircraft X. We use to have pilots [advise ATC] and squawk 7700; but the 7110.65 changed and we were briefed to not have the pilot squawk emergency. My recommendations would be to allow aircraft to squawk emergency for these kinds of situations.

Aircraft X departed MCO and checked in climbing to FL140. I asked the pilot to say max climb rate and they said 1800 feet/minute. I instructed them to maintain their max climb rate and fly heading 070. Because of [Military Airspace] (FL240); I requested FL250 with R02; and R02 approved and took the handoff. I quickly shipped Aircraft X to R02 and R02 immediately called to request control of Aircraft X. I approved the request.Weather to the south of the aircraft impacted the situation. The aircraft may have lost minimum separation with [the Military Airspace].

Miami Center Controllers reported an aircraft that did not meet climb restrictions and entered an active military airspace.


Confusion; Other / Unknown; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors

Because of inbound connecting passengers from MMUN; our MSP flight was delayed per [Operations]/Customer Service.  Customer Service said we had to have brake released by XA:35.  I inquired with Crew Scheduling as to why the XA:35 and what that time was based on?  I never got a firm answer why that was our go or no go time other than it was for [FAR] 117 legalities.  Just prior to boarding while walking from the back of the airplane to the front; I looked outside and noticed frost on our spoiler panels. I called Crew Scheduling and spoke with Mr. X.  I advised Mr. X that we would need to add 20 to our flight time as we would need to deice.  I asked if that effected our brake release time or would we be OK.  He asked why we needed to deice and said [Operations] would like to know why we were the only flight needing to deice and informed me that no one else was on the pad.  I advised him that the airplane was frosting up since it had been sitting for over an hour at this point in time. When did it become OK for crew scheduling to question a captain's authority about a safety of flight item such as deicing a frosted airplane?  Additionally; my very experienced First Officer (FO) agreed with my decision to deice as well as a company dead heading captain.  And; the release had remarks; 800 pounds extra fuel for [possible] deicing delays.  Leave the flight crew alone when it comes to safety and operational concerns.

The primary event occurred between a captain and a crew scheduler. The crew had a crew time issue that crew scheduling was aware of before the fact was presented that the captain would require deice out of DEN. Enroute icing conditions existed as a winter system moved slowly towards DEN. The majority of [Operations]; including the [Operations] manager; and all of crew scheduling began an uproar questioning the captain's motive for requiring deice. A mob mentality developed with the theme being that no one else has deiced so this captain should not have to. A phone conversation occurred between scheduling and the captain. In this phone conversation the unqualified scheduler; in an accusatory tone; said that the [Operations] wanted to know why he had to deice. The captain mentioned that there was a frost buildup on the aircraft that needed to be removed. After the call; the scheduler in a proud fashion declared that the captain was 'taken aback' that he would be asking that. There was an unnerving rejoice among the room that he would 'call out' this captain who appeared to only have safety in mind.This is a continuing trend largely among crew scheduling; and the [Operations] manager of constantly challenging and pressuring crews to accept situations that do not meet proper safety standards in the mere interest of not having to do additional work associated with having to recrew or take delays. Also the mob resorts to name-calling of those involved crews that in turn inflates the emotions to have confrontational conversations when crewmembers call back. I have on many occasions overheard conversations in crew scheduling and over to the [Operations] Manager pressuring crews to extend according to Part 117. Condescending tones and mild threats have been used to coerce crews into accepting these conditions. It is also an increasing problem as we have several new captains that would be more susceptible to these threats and pressure in order to please the company.I understand that emotions do get involved in certain situations; but there is an alarming increase in these confrontations that seemingly come from nothing.  The evening crew scheduling supervisors are also confrontational and do not handle stress well; making the transfer of important information very difficult. We have a problem with misinformation when departments constantly comment on the operation of another department; it creates confusion and also delays the transmission of relevant information. This would be difficult to remedy; there is a growing company culture of peer pressure and hostility towards crewmembers to accept extensions and other unsafe conditions to protect on time performance. There may have to be retraining throughout the department and the heads of these departments to curb this trend.  Only speaking on the evening shift crew schedulers; they all seem overwhelmed; especially the supervisors.  Their stress then transfers over to the rest of the department.  Perhaps they need to be replaced by people that can handle stress in a more appropriate manner.  It should probably all begin with making the departments aware of the situation and go from there.

An A319 Flight Crew was running behind schedule and was given a break release time in compliance with FAR Part 117. The Captain then noticed frost on the wings. He called crew scheduling to advise them. The Scheduler wanted to know why he needed to be de-iced when other departures were not being de-iced.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

While boarding and loading baggage; the ramp agent came up to the flight deck with completed load report and Notification to Captain form. The ramp agent stated we had 24 LBS of dry ice in the forward cargo compartment as indicated on the load report as 24 LBS CTC (Counter to Counter). I questioned this statement and asked what the total weight of the cargo was. During this time; gate checked bags were added and the load report had to be amended. The ramp agent appeared to be confused from my question and stated we had a total of 24 LBS of cargo in the forward compartment. The amended cargo report came back to the flight deck with no changes to cargo load and it had 22 checked bags and 4 gate checked bags. At this time I went down to the ramp to get clarification on the loading. The forward compartment door was closed and ready for departure. I asked to see the package with dry ice in it. It was at this time I noticed there were two boxes loaded in the forward compartment. I again questioned their load report and the ramp agents said 'oh you know what you're right. We'll fix it.' The ramp agent came back up to the flight deck with completed load report and no changes were made. For a third time I questioned the load report and the two boxes. The agent explained that the second box was accounted for as checked luggage. I assumed that the box was a passengers and the weight and dimensions of the box were at or under 30 LBS. While in ORD; as I looked into the forward cargo compartment; the cargo net was down and I did not get a good look at the two boxes. When we arrived I decided to walk out and check the cargo load coming off the plane. When I did this I noticed the cargo boxes were marked cargo. I asked ramp agents how many bags they unloaded and they responded with 26. So it is my understanding we had 26 bags on board; 24 LBS of dry ice in a box and another box labeled 85 LBS. The box labeled 85 LBS was apparently not accounted for in the load report. After repeated attempts to discover the correct load of the aircraft; ORD ramp agents were unable to provide me with a correct report.

EMB175 Captain reports receiving an inaccurate load close out from a Ramp Agent; even when the Agent is directly questioned about an extra box in the forward cargo compartment. The box is described as gate checked baggage and not included in the weight and balance. It was actually 85 pounds of cargo.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On climb out; left wing body overheat light illuminated. Ran checklist in QRH. Attempted consult with Dispatch and was told to standby; also contacted Local Maintenance airborne. Decided to return to airport for further aircraft evaluation and more fuel. Unable to continue to destination safely at FL250 with fuel on board. Did not require declaring an emergency.

B737 Captain experienced a 'left wing body overheat' light during climb. After complying with QRH procedures it was decided to return to the departure airport.


Aircraft; found IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) oil level not even on the site glass; I serviced IDG to full. This is a trip going on a flight to ZZZ. If this IDG failed the flight crew would have to run the APU; if APU failed; the last thing is the other engine to support the electric.

Maintenance Technician reported that Integrated Drive Generator oil level was very low.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Wind calm/variable at 04 knots according to ASOS. I approached ZZZ from 10 miles to the north. Started making radio calls on UNICOM [CTAF] that I would use Runway 14. No other calls heard. I entered downwind for 14 on a 45. Made call. Turned base. Made call. Final. Made call.Saw no other aircraft. Landed 14. Upon landing; saw other aircraft coming towards me on the runway. Other aircraft just landed opposite direction 32. I called 'Do you see me?' on [CTAF]. No response.Other aircraft made 1st turnoff; so did I; without incident. After both aircraft stopped; other operator approached me and said he had heard no calls at all on his 'old radio.' Said he had heard ASOS but not anyone in pattern. Apologized to me as he assumes his radio was at fault.

C182 pilot reported an opposite direction ground conflict on landing at a non-towered airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

After engine start; we noticed a mechanical problem that necessitated a return to the blocks. After coordinating with Ramp; we taxied back to the blocks. Immediately upon setting the parking brake; maintenance personnel approached the aircraft with stairs to board before either engine has been shut down. We shut down the engines; and before we could complete our checklists; the mechanics were already in the cockpit asking questions about the mechanical issue. Even at idle thrust these engines are dangerous and there was no need for ground crew to be approaching an aircraft before the flight crew has had an opportunity to shut down the engines. Two of them were wearing hats which could have easily been sucked into the operating engine; but their proximity to the engine could have had a much more devastating result.When we spoke to the crew and asked why they felt so hurried to approach the airplane; they told us that they weren't sure if we were going to shut down the engines and that they remained outside the yellow lines. If an aircraft returns to the blocks; there is no need to have Maintenance approach to board before engines have been shut down. While I understand that a mechanical delay can elicit a hurried response to get the aircraft in the air; there is no need to rush. Hasty reactions are very dangerous. Furthermore; it takes just a few minutes to shut down the engines and [to] allow the flight crew to finish their shutdown checklists. These 2 or 3 minutes are minimal to the often hour or so delay caused by a block turn back. As such; nothing can be gained by adding such unnecessary risk to the aircraft; or worse; to ground personnel. In such cases I believe it is imperative that before approaching any aircraft with the intent to board; and getting near an engine; that ground crew allows the flight crew time to perform their shutdown procedure and any necessary checklist(s).

B767 First Officer reported Maintenance dangerously approaching the aircraft before the engines were shutdown.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 8900

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Contract Maintenance was in cockpit [neither] unsupervised nor observed by any crew member. We were both in operations flight planning return leg. Disregarding normal safety practices; Contract Maintenance did not ensure flight controls were safe to move prior to actuating. Consequently; aircraft was seriously damaged and refueling personnel nearly injured when contract maintenance moved flap lever with fuel truck connected.

A320 First Officer reports flap damage caused by Contract Maintenance when the flaps are extended at the gate with a fuel truck parked under the wing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Cleared to descend via the STAR; Inbound to ZZZ we were cleared to fly runway XX transition prior to ZZZZZ intersection on the STAR. Speed was modified by ATC a number of times initially 290 kts for early to middle part of the STAR; then assigned as 210 kts or greater ZZZZZ1; I believe. This lead to some extra workload and verbalization to ensure we were in complying correctly and In agreement that we were flying. During this time the Approach Clearance was issued. As PF (Pilot Flying) I left the altitude alerter set at 6;000 MSL to allow the aircraft to capture the glide slope at 6;000 ft. ATC issued a clearance to fly a heading and descend to 3;000 followed quickly by clearance to descend to 2;000 MSL. I looked at the MCDU and noticed the 4;000 ft. published altitude. From the controllers tone; I had a feeling we could be high or were not set up properly although I could not find evidence at the time to support that. I initiated a 2;000 foot/minute descent. During this descent we the Captured the LOC and subsequently the glideslope. Uneventful approach and landing. After parking at the gate I noticed the tiny numbered notes for ZZZZZ2 and ZZZZZ3; 'MANDATORY at 4;000 ... and 3;000 ft.'. We were approaching ZZZZZ2 at 6;000 MSL when ATC issued the fly heading 310; descend and maintain 3;000; expedite descent'. We would not have been able to comply with ZZZZZ2 at 4;000 ft. had the ATC clearance not been issued. Abeam ZZZZZ3 we were at 3;000 ft. With dusk light and workload plus some tiredness it was difficult to see fine detail on the Approach Plate. The tiny; inconsequential note numbering makes it very difficult to see notations that are very untypical for approach plates. They need to be bigger and/or made more prominent. Blended STAR/Approach clearances are relatively new and are exposing new compliance threats such as this. Aircraft and all crew members are low time; inexperienced in aircraft and the nuances of VNAV set-up and unique compliance threats especially with a 'hidden'; too subtle note such as this.

Medium Large Transport Captain reported automation mismanagement resulting in undershooting altitude restrictions on approach.


DC Generation Indicating and Warning System

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After gate arrival; it was discovered that the No. 2 DC generator was indicating a load of approximately .85 with the No 2 engine shut down.  Maintenance could not resolve the problem and decided to MEL the Gen 2 load indicator in compliance with MEL 24-6-1.  No problem.  After discussing this with my First Officer; we decided that we could not operate the aircraft because we were unable to monitor the DC generator load to ensure we were in compliance with the DC generator load limits in the Limitations section of the AFM (.7 on the ground and 1.0 inflight).  Before contacting Maintenance Control; I contacted the Chief Pilot and discussed the situation. He was in agreement that we could not comply with the AFM limitations since there was no way to monitor it.  Maintenance Control was unaware of what the AFM load limitation was.  It turned out that the resolution to the problem was to inop the No. 2 DC Generator since there was no way to monitor the load.  The No. 2 DC generator was then MEL'd under 24-10-1.  All of us were in agreement that this was the best course of action.  And the No. 2 DC generator was inoped.  It wasn't until later that it was discovered that the 2 MEL's were non-compliant.  The weather was not a factor. I received a call after I arrived; my First Officer and I did some MEL research and found out how and where the error occurred. My opinion was that there were no provisions to operate the aircraft if one could not monitor a required generator limitation if the indicator was allowed to be MEL'd.  Additionally once the first MEL was issued; and then the second one issued; we did not look back at the MEL's because in their own right each was complied with in succession and not collectively. I think that MTC perhaps should know what limitations the pilots have to deal with; and why a MEL would be issued or allowed to be used if it usurps the AFM limitation.  To my knowledge there is no protection or other method for load limit protection except for the visual indication.

On the ground; the Captain called with a discrepancy saying that his No. 2 DC generator load meter was reading approximately .85 with his engines shut down. I issued MEL 24-6-1 after attempting to R and R the load meter; it was a no fix. We complied with MEL procedures and verified that the generator and all tru's did work normally. After his ground time; the Captain called back and said that his AFM says that he had to be able to read the loads to legally fly the plane. I then put the DC generator on MEL 24-10-1; again verifying the Maintenance procedure was complied with. DC generator turned off; both ac gens operate normally and both tru's ops normal. He then flew the plane for two legs. The next Captain said that we had incompatible MEL's. The 24-6-1 says that DC generators have to operate normally; which we verified when issuing the MEL. After discussion with the flight ops; we verified that the first Captain was incorrect about his AFM; it is complied with during normal operations; not when an MEL has been issued; so the DC generator MEL was unnecessary; and we again verified the operation of the DC generator and cleared MEL 24-10-1.The event occurred because of the Captain misunderstanding his AFM; and me not going back and rechecking the original MEL that I had given (24-6-1); in hindsight; I should have change the 24-6-1 to a 24-6-2; which is an MEL for a loadmeter that doesn't operate normally because of a DC generator being inoperative (which it wasn't; as verified numerous times during this procedure) once the problem was identified; I had Maintenance go to the aircraft; and yet again; verify that the DC generator operated normally; and cleared MEL 24-10-1 (DC gen) making the loadmeter MEL again legal.

DHC-8 flight crew discovers the load meter for the number two DC generator to be in operative and Maintenance attempts to MEL the load meter; but the crew will not accept it due to a FOM requirement to monitor load limits. The generator is then MELed; but the two MEL's are not compatible. Switching to MEL 24-6-2 from MEL 24-6-1 satisfied all requirements.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Four departures were waiting and one arrival. I departed a PC12 IFR from Runway 30R; departed a Bonanza from Runway 30L; then crossed a King Air waiting for IFR release to hold between the runways to get a Cirrus VFR departure airborne. I told the Citation on final one VFR departure prior to their arrival and cleared [the citation] to land. I cleared [the Cirrus] for departure 'no delay' traffic on 1.5 mile final. [The Cirrus] responded with we have the traffic in sight and cleared for takeoff. I advised [the Cirrus] to expect an offset as soon as airborne. When I turned to radar identify [the bonanza] on the upwind it had a wrong squawk code. As I verified the squawk code [the citation] said there's an aircraft on the runway. I gave instructions to start a climb go around or change to Runway 30R. The Cirrus took his time for departure roll.I should be more cautious with unfamiliar call signs and the moment the aircraft sounded unsure with the read back it was best to cancel take off clearance.

SJC Tower Controller reported being distracted by an incorrect beacon code. The reporter failed to notice an aircraft on the runway with landing traffic on short final.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I cannot count how many times recently the pilots are not wearing masks. I was sitting up front for my flight to ZZZ when the flight deck came out of cockpit to find a seat. No one wearing a mask. One was but around his chin.  I moved to a different Zone.  Then additional pilots came on; no masks. It's either our policy or not. I do not feel it is my place as a FA to point this out to pilots.  I know quite a few crews are getting sick. It makes me very uneasy to fly in these conditions.  I have family members I return home to.  This is not limited to pilots even though it's very prevalent.  Some FAs will also take off masks when passengers leave. It is alarming and I feel a very unsafe workplace. We can't have 1/2 the workforce adhering to a serious policy regarding a pandemic and 1/2 not. The precautions such as masks are only effective if there is 100% compliance.  I do not want to wear a mask for hours; sometimes 20+; but I do.  [Cause is a] total disregard for policy and others safety. Safety and security is either important to the company or not. My suggestion would be a no exceptions policy or we will continue to see a rise in sick flight crews.

Flight Attendant reported concerns over pilots and flight attendants not adhering to company face mask policy.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 1.4; Flight Attendant Total 2.4

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The seat belt sign remained on for more of the flight; as we were experiencing on and off light chop throughout the flight.  I could feel that we had started our descent.  I had begun normal landing duties (tidying up the galley and general duties).  I did hear the slats come down; however I just thought we were trying to slow down as little.  Next thing I hear is the gear come down.  I had been trying to look out and see how high we were; however I was unable to due to the visibility outside.  As soon as I heard the gear drop I called the flight deck and advised them that the cabin was NO WHERE near secure for landing; as no information was given to the flight attendants.  Also once I called the flight deck; then did the sterile light come on.  I advised them; we had kids standing up; bags out; people out of their seatbelts; and again that the cabin was not secure.  I was asked by the flight deck if we needed to go around; I stated 'YES'.  I was then asked; can you just sit down for landing.  I said UMMMMM yup and hung up the phone!  I made a PA; Flight attendant be seated for landing.  I secured the galley as fast as I could.  And sat in my jump seat; as did the B Flight Attendant.  No final descent announcement was given at all; as there was just not time.  We landed and taxied to the gate with no incident.  After landing; the Captain apologized to me many times.  He stated that they were extremely busy with weather and trying to figure out if we were going to divert to our [alternate].  At the very last minute; the weather improved and they shot the approach and forgot all about us in the back.Flight deck does get busy at times; however they cannot lose sight of what is going on in the back of the aircraft.  We should have gone around and made sure our passengers were safe and secure; even if that meant we had to divert to our [alternate] if the condition had deteriorated.

An ERJ-175 Flight Attendant reported they landed before the cabin was safe and ready because the flight crew rushed due to weather concerns.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS XXL

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Landing [Runway] XXL on final; aircraft in front of us reported a 10 knot loss. The FO was pilot flying at the time and over corrected for the wind; causing us to descend below glideslope very quickly on short final.  As soon as I was calling go-around the GS aural warning came on.  The FO executed a go-around. Because of the difficult wind conditions and seeing we were already at 2;100-2;200 LBS; I decided that I would land the second attempt as I did not want to get into a fuel situation. We were in agreement with this.  On short final for the second attempt; with me as pilot flying; at about 150 feet; we had the wind-shear caution alert and proceeded to execute our second go-around. ATC gave us instructions to set up for [Runway] XXR but due to fuel concerns I said 'Unable' and declared min fuel. Also; I added that if we did have to take any delays we would be declaring emergency fuel. ATC set us up immediately for a close pattern for [Runway] XXL. On this attempt; I stayed slightly high as the wind shear seem to be the worse right at the tree line at about 150 feet.  On this third attempt; we landed successfully and taxied back to the gate.Unstable approach recognized by me and a wind shear caution message for the second attempt.Inexperienced FO who had only flown once since May 2020 and challenging weather conditions with wind shear.Two go-arounds and declared min-fuel.Have pilots who have been out a while receive more recurrent training.  It was evident due to lack of recency the FO was struggling with the conditions that day.  Also; be vigilant on [Runway] XXL as I have had issues on windy days before where the tree line ends and the field begins. With the second attempt we had a 15 knot increase with the wind shear caution message.

I was the Pilot Flying. The Wind shear changes in combination with the amount of time since I've been flying in the airplane were contributing factors. There were changes of +/- 15kts and on short approach I went slightly below glide slope and then the Wind shear happened which caused the Glideslope aural warning to sound. The Captain called for a Go-Around which we executed. Once we were at a safe altitude and being vectored back for another approach the we exchanged controls and the Captain became the Pilot Flying. As we were coming in on short approach the Wind shear Aural Caution message sounded so we executed a second go-around. ATC told us that they were going to vector us around for Runway XXR; but were now low on fuel and declared min fuel. They instead kept us close pattern for Runway XXL and we landed safely. Upon landing we had 1;450 LBS of fuel. We taxied to the gate with no issues.Glideslope Aural Warning System on first attempt and Wind shear warning system on second attempt.Wind shear affecting experience level.Go-Around executed twice.Keep crews more recent on flying or more time in simulator if it's been a while.

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing wind shear on final resulting in a go-around. Captain made reference to the First Officer's lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

While performing the anti-ice duct inspection on the Number 1 engine on Aircraft X; I was told by the Shift Supervisor that; 'It does not look good for the station when you write so many items on the aircraft when the aircraft was just here [at ZZZ] for the past two days.'The event occurred because the Supervisor did not like that I had found so many discrepancies on the Number 1 engine; my only heavy jet experience is on the A320 fleet doing heavy maintenance. The items that I wrote up would have been written up at any MRO (Maintenance; Repair; Overhaul) that did/does 12 day C checks on these aircraft.I do not accept being pressured by supervision to not document discrepancies with an aircraft; whether minor or major. The notion that preserving a station's reputation has priority over aircraft safety represents an egregious safety concern. Please leave the employees on the floor to do their job; with no interruptions; the inspection process requires concentration and attention to detail.

Aircraft Maintenance Technician reported being pressured by his Supervisor not to write-up discrepancies found during aircraft inspection.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[I] accepted turnover for flight with one of the ETOPS alternates being MDY (Midway Island). MDY has NOTAM for ASOS not providing visibility or altimeter setting. Contacted MDY Operations last week via e-mail via response; and they had stated that during daylight hours they would provide observations. This e-mail was forward to rest of department for all to benefit. When I looked at e-mail again today; realized that they had also mentioned that their observations would not include altimeter setting. I reviewed the Commercial Charts for all of the approaches into MDY; and they all require a local altimeter setting or else they are not authorized. At this point; flight had not entered the ETOPS area of operations; and I elected to change his ETOPS alternates. [NOTAM:] MDY SVC AUTOMATED WEATHER BROADCAST SYSTEM VIS; ALTITUDE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE NOT AVBL[I] advised crew that MDY was not a good ETOPS alternate and we would have to drop it. The remaining ETOPS alternates did not cover the area of operations; so changed all of the alternates; resulting in the crew being given RJCC/CDB (Cold Bay). [I] sent the appropriate amendments to the crew along with weather; NOTAMs and a new ETOPS critical fuel summary. Crew accepted the changes and pressed on.

A Dispatcher dispatched an oceanic flight with MDY as an ETOPS alternate but it was not legal because of inadequate weather information.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116; Flight Crew Type 941

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after reaching cruise altitude at FL 330; we noticed a pressurization issue. The cabin was at 8;900 ft.; the cabin rate was +100 and the pressure differential was 6.8. We descended to FL 310 and the cabin stabilized at 8;700 ft. Notable in this incident was there was no indication on the EICAS of any problem; no warnings; cautions; alerts or status messages. The only indication was the displayed cabin altitude; cabin rate and pressure differential at the bottom of the CRT that displays engine indications. These three items are displayed in a fairly small font and what caught our eye was the cabin altitude was displayed in yellow instead of white. With all the other items displayed on the multiple screens in a 787; it was mostly luck we noticed the cabin altitude. After discussion with [Technical Support Maintenance Control] and Dispatch and further research into our issue by [Technical Support Maintenance Control]; no solution was found. [Technical Support Maintenance Control] said he could see all 4 cabin air compressors functioning normally and the outflow valves were 100% closed. He speculated we had a large air leak via a duct somewhere in the pressurization system. It was obvious to me we needed to descend and return to ZZZ. I mentioned this and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] and Dispatch agreed. We coordinated with ATC a descent to 20;000 and a clearance back to ZZZ. A fuel jettison was accomplished to bring our landing weight below the max allowable landing weight. The return flight and landing were uneventful.

B787 Captain reported an air turnback after loss of pressurization control.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft had an MEL for ENGINE BLEED on the number 1 engine. Icing conditions were not forecasted. At FL210; 300KTS; ICE CONDITION and STALL PROT ICE messages illuminated followed by the automatic opening of the wing anti-ice valves. Shortly after; the BLEED 2 LEAK message illuminated. I continued as the pilot flying and the Captain went through the QRH procedure for BLEED 2 LEAK. Additionally; FL230 was requested in order to remain above the cloud layer. Following this; the A-I WING FAIL message illuminated and the Captain accomplished the associated QRH procedure. At this time; with BLEED 1 inop due to the MEL; and BLEED 2 off due to the QRH procedure for the leak; the CABIN ALT HI message illuminated. Oxygen masks were immediately donned; and a descent was initiated. The Captain [requested priority handling] with ATC and we descended to 7000. No icing was encountered during the descent and the cabin altitude had not gotten high enough to deploy the passenger oxygen masks. A normal approach and landing were accomplished.

EMB-190 pilot flying reported a loss of pressurization and immediate descent.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

Flight ZZZ-ZZZ1: We experienced a departure delay for the first flight of the day due to extreme heat and a broken APU on Aircraft X.  I was working as the lead flight attendant for the day.  We had a scheduled departure time of XA+00.  Our original Aircraft Y; had a broken APU with no air conditioning and the outside temperature was 108 degrees.  Boarding commenced at XA-40 due to no APU and to make sure that passengers could stay cool as long as possible in the terminal. Boarding ended at XA+05.  At XA+07; the Captain informed me that it would a 15-minute wait before we could close the door because a new battery was needed for the air start machine.  I made an announcement to the passengers regarding the delay and made announcements every 15 minutes.  I was later informed that the existing battery in the aircraft machine had exploded and that a new one was needed for replacement. At XA+15; the crew started handing out ice and water to the passengers to help keep them cool and hydrated due to the plane being extremely hot inside.  At this point; I asked the Captain if the passengers could take off their masks because it was getting hard to breathe.  I was given permission to make an announcement for passengers to take off their mask given the extreme cabin conditions. At XA+22; another announcement was made regarding the delay.  During this time; two passengers had began to overheat inside the cabin.  Company Representative tended to the passengers with cold packs; ice and water and checked on other passengers throughout the cabin.  I also called FA #2 in regards passengers being in the AFT galley with concern for their safety as well.  Passengers started asking for reassurance regarding the aircraft's safety as well.At XA+30; Captain made an announcement to the passengers from the FWD galley to reassure passengers of the aircraft; that the plane was safe; and that we were having issues with the ground equipment that prevented us from taking off at our normal departure time. At XA+40; the aircraft was air started; a slight delay in starting because ground personnel failed to get fuel for the air start machine and turned aircraft power.  The cabin went dark at least twice during this process; which didn't help matters because the temperature was over 100 degrees at this point.  Another announcement was made that the aircraft would be starting up and that the boarding door would be closed within three-to-five minutes.  We closed the boarding door at XA+45.  The passengers and crew sat on the aircraft in extreme heat with 100+ degree temperatures for one hour and five minutes.  Equipment and aircraft should be distributed to each base in regard to extreme and changing weather conditions at each base and should be in working order.  Aircraft with working APUs cannot handle extreme temperatures above 100 degrees.  This base experiences temperatures above 100 degrees at least 3-4 months out of the year given a desert climate.  I recommend that a proper Air Start machine be in place for future flights.  I recommend equipment be provided to help keep the aircraft cool in extreme weather circumstances and to prevent passengers from experiencing medical episodes such as heat stroke or possibly death.  A majority of the passengers are over the age of 65 and cannot handle such extreme heat.  The safety of all persons involved; working crew and passengers; should be taken into consideration with extreme heat inside the aircraft cabin.  I also recommend that contracted ground personnel be advised well in advanced of future aircraft problems and take proper procedures ahead of schedule; such as necessary equipment ready and in working order so this doesn't happen again.  If our contracted personnel cannot handle such duties; then I recommend that we hire our own personnel for each base to assist in such matters and to invest in working equipment for each base.  Our number one priority is safety for our passengers; before; during and after a flight; and the safety of our flight crews.  This incident should never happen again.

Flight Attendant reported a ground delay due to an inoperative APU and failure of Ground Support Equipment with temperatures of 108 degrees F.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was Pilot Flying. I triggered a stick shaker/pusher at the Final Approach Fix. I recovered per SOP.[There was] a northbound squall line west of the field. A last minute wind shift caused us to switch runways. Although it was fast; we were able to set up and brief before intercepting course. ATC forgot to turn [us] on the ILS; so we went through the localizer course. This led to reactionary vectors and the aircraft doing S turns until we passed the final approach fix. At this point we were flaps 30 with the power reduced. I called for the go-around; but when I pressed the autopilot disconnect button; I became fixated on the lack of a missed approach course. (I didn't press the TO-GA button.) While troubleshooting; the airspeed continued to decrease leading to a simultaneous stick shaker and pusher. I lowered the nose and recovered per the training; paying special attention to the radar altimeter. I briefly oversped flaps 8 on recovery.Stall recovery training works. I was able to accomplish the recovery quickly without having to think about it. However; it shouldn't have gotten that far. It was my first go-around since OE. I was task saturated and in the moment couldn't remember where the TO-GA button was. We were able to handle weather; ATC error; runway changes and an instrument approach at the same time. However; because our go around was triggered at a relatively untrained aircraft state/position; I missed a critical aspect of the maneuver. I don't believe this is a common problem; but incorporating go-arounds during recurrent in various positions may be beneficial.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported experiencing a stick shaker on go-around following an unstabilized approach.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16.6

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure

I was in the process of relieving the R48 position. While waiting and monitoring frequency; current radar controller tried issuing Aircraft X direct Gemni; and a descent clearance to FL240 because of conflicting traffic at FL300; Aircraft Y. Controller tried with many attempts; both aircraft; and meanwhile; Appleton; I87 sector at ZID shouted to us that Aircraft X returned to their frequency. R48 controller said 'Nobody's listening to me on 119.87'; and hung up. I tried to break in and tell them to descend Aircraft X; however was not in override position. R48 controller tried to issue Aircraft Y descent clearance; but no response. Now aircraft are approaching 'Head on' situation; and no radio communication with either aircraft. I immediately unplugged from that jack; and plugged into D-side position and called I87 to see if they had Aircraft X on their frequency; they did not. R48 controller tried MANY times on guard frequency; with no response from anyone. At some point I heard the Aircraft Y call on guard frequency that they were responding to a TCAS alert; R48 tried to stop them over Guard and descend; however that is out of our jurisdiction. The aircraft must respond. With the help of the D47 sector; Aircraft X went back to I87 freq; and they requested them on their frequency. Meanwhile Aircraft X is responding to TCAS as well. After relieving R48; I immediately went to backup radios (BUEC); and other aircraft on 119.87 could hear me. The main was completely unusable. Eventually the sector regained normalcy; and we acquired a new frequency of 127.9. We've had many issues with this frequency; 119.87; as well as others in the area for a long period of time. They are checked twice a day; usually; however this has been and ongoing issue. A MAJOR issue. I've said this in the past that the only way the FAA will respond to our needs is a disaster. This by far was way too close to that situation. In my 26+ years of ATC; this by far is the scariest; gut wrenching situation I have seen; or been part of. Instead of calling us Controllers whiny babies; listen to us when we have major issues. Don't take them in stride. Too many other issues throughout the Agency get higher treatment. It needs to stop.First; I would have told I87 sector to take Aircraft X down to FL280 since they had radio communication. If not; our first avenue is go to standby; then to BUEC if necessary. I wouldn't have gone directly to guard frequency first.

ZOB Controller lost their main radio transmitters. The Controller was working two aircraft head on at the same altitude. Both aircraft responded to TCAS/RA alerts.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 630; Flight Crew Type 30

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Piper J-3 was on a ferry flight direct ZZZ VFR without a radio due to technical troubles. The Cub was going to enter a final for Runway XX at ZZZ however noticed an aircraft at the hold-short of YY [intersecting runway] and decided to enter a 45 for a right downwind YY. The pilot fixated on the Cessna at the hold-short and didn't clear final prior to making the base turn.Beechcraft Baron was on a final approach to Runway YY trying to hail the Cub over the radio. Piper J-3 was on right base for Runway YY with no radio due to technical failures when noticed [the] Beech Baron on short final. The J-3 was not visual [with] the Baron until noticing the Baron was taking evasive action to avoid collision. Piper Cub took evasive action to the left departing the pattern before returning to the airfield.There were many human factors going on with the pilot of the Piper J-3. The pilot was rushing back to ZZZ to get in his car and meet his wife at the hospital. With these factors it must have drove his attention elsewhere and broke down his visual scan for other aircraft.To mitigate this in the future it is imperative that pilots evaluate themselves with some sort of IMSAFE checklist to make sure they are good to fly. Even though the pilot thought he was good to fly it was evident his mind was elsewhere and he was 'not safe' almost causing a terrible accident.

J-3 pilot reported a NMAC while in the traffic pattern of a non-towered airport without a operable VHF radio.


Time Pressure; Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During our descent into COS the storm cell had moved off the field but ATC informed us that there was a micro-burst alert and they assigned us to hold at the VOR. We discussed our plans if we were not able to get into COS. We settled on DEN as a good plan B. As we held it became apparent that we may not get into COS. I told ATC we'd like to divert to DEN. They informed us there was now a ground stop into DEN. Since we were holding over the PUB airport that became the clear alternative. We checked with dispatch and we could have landed there but there was no fuel available. Our only option then became to [advise ATC of our fuel situation] so that we could get into DEN. Just as we made the turn to DEN ATC informed us that the winds appeared to be dying down in COS. We had just enough fuel to get in so we gave it a try and were able to land without incident. We continued into COS with the priority because if we had gone missed we would have had to go direct to DEN given our fuel situation. While everything worked ok alright as we held and burned fuel our options especially in the inter-mountain west became fewer and fewer until we had no choices left except to [advise ATC of the situation] and head to DEN.

An EMB-145's filed destination closed because of weather and a microburst alert so the crew planned a diversion but were advised of a ground stop. As the crew prepared for a diversion; their destination airport opened and the crew continued on.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Departures. Aircraft X departed and then told me they had a cargo door issue and needed to return. I cleared them back to LAS via radar vectors. I told the supervisor. I handed off the aircraft to the final sector. I climbed the aircraft to 6;300 feet to comply with the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). I gave Aircraft X a 210 heading and switched him to the finals sector. I did not realize I gave him the wrong frequency. I said 135.1 not 135.0. I didn't know this until I listened to the replay. We tried on guard and everyone in the room tried on their frequency to get contact with the aircraft. He went into a 6;500 foot MVA and then a 7;000 foot; and then an 8;300 foot MVA before the adjacent Approach said they had the aircraft and they were switching him to us. The final Controller climbed and turned the aircraft out of the higher MVAs. I should have given the correct frequency and made sure they had it before letting them go. I should have known that they went to 135.1 and reached out to the facility who owns that frequency for help before the aircraft got into those higher MVAs.

L30 TRACON Controller reported they issued a wrong frequency to an emergency aircraft on a vector causing it to be NORDO and it flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We arrived at the aircraft unaware of the fuel system problem that had occurred on the inbound flight. The inbound defect report was empty and there were no fuel system deferrals. During my walk-around a mechanic approached me and said that the right wing gravity refueling cap was leaking and that they were in the process of replacing the seal. I immediately brought this information to the captain and we both went out on the ramp to have a better look and to speak with maintenance. Nothing abnormal was visible from the ground. The maintenance technician said that the existing seal appeared to be degraded and that this could explain the leak. From inside the cabin I could see that the top of the wing near the fuel cap appeared damp with fuel and that maintenance had been swabbing a bit with a towel as they worked. Maintenance completed the seal replacement and then checked the fuel cap for leaks after the wing tanks were filled for flight. We delayed boarding until the tanks were full and the aircraft was signed off.While the Captain; the flying FO; and I were waiting for repairs; we discussed how a fuel leak might affect our flight. This was a 180 minute ETOPS flight with one critical point and two ETOPS alternates; both of which were more than one thousand miles from the flight path. Our route also took us over [another alternate]; but gusty winds and IFR were forecast shortly after our scheduled time of passing. We studied the fuel leak QRH and that lead us to question precisely when the fuel leak appeared on the inbound flight and how the previous crew's experience might help us should the problem reappear. The captain made several phone calls to get more information while the flying FO and I had a productive argument about whether it would be acceptable to continue the flight with fuel misting from the fuel cap. In my experience with other aircraft it is not uncommon that fuel can temporarily mist from fuel vents shortly after takeoff with full fuel. But continuing the flight; even over land with suitable alternates; was a difficult position to defend. A leaking fuel cap would be an abnormal case. We wouldn't know where all of the leaked fuel is going and if it might cause other systems problems. The Fuel Leak QRH has a step instructing us monitor the fuel imbalance to confirm a leak but we determined; I believe correctly; and that this guidance does not override a following step that asks us to visually check for a leak. In the case where a fuel leak is confirmed the QRH leads to a 'land at the nearest suitable airport' statement.The captain briefed us and the company of the plan: that should a fuel leak be discovered after takeoff we would be returning to [the departure airport]. He asked one of the flight attendants to observe the wing after takeoff and I went to the cabin with her to point out where she should look. A passenger in the exit row overheard our conversation.After takeoff the flight attendant reported that there appeared to be a stain on the wing; or that it was wet with fuel. I knew the wing had been wet before so I was unsure if she was referring to a residual stain that perhaps appeared differently under different light or if there was actually a leak. The captain asked me to go check things out near 10;000 ft in the climb.From the right front overwing exit window I saw fuel running aft from the fuel cap and turning to mist near the trailing edge. The passenger who had earlier overheard me briefing the flight attendant said that he didn't notice very much flow immediately after takeoff but now the leak was very apparent. As I understand it; the flight attendant checked right after liftoff when there was little to no flow and the passenger asked her to come and have another look once he noticed the wing appeared wet. At that point she called us. I asked this passenger to let us know if anything changed; snapped a photo of the leak with my phone; and returned to the flight deck.Since wehad already decided to return in case of a leak things went pretty smoothly. I'm glad the captain briefed a good plan for the contingency. Immediately after takeoff I had observed 500 lbs more fuel on the right wing totalizer than the left. After I returned to the flight deck less than 5 minutes later the indicated imbalance was 300 lbs. I don't know if this was gauge fluctuations or an actual reading of leaked fuel because the imbalance stayed constant after that.As IRO I ran the fuel leak QRH with the captain while the FO flew the aircraft. The Fuel Leak QRH has some drastic measures once a fuel leak is confirmed and we felt that following these would increase our workload unreasonably and decrease our safety margins given what we knew about the leak. We did not turn off autothrust nor shutdown an engine. Once we had taken as much guidance from this checklist as was reasonable the captain began coordinating with ATC; company; and flight attendants. I calculated our maximum landing fuel to avoid an overweight landing. We dumped center tank fuel and then put the gear down to burn the wing tanks down to maximum landing weight. In retrospect I feel that the captain made the best choice in choosing to land under the maximum landing weight. There was no point in adding brake energy and other considerations to our palate given what we knew about the leak. We didn't feel it was an emergency; but we didn't want to continue across the Atlantic either. In total we dumped approximately 17;000 lbs from the center tank and once that was complete we had a little more than 10;000 lbs to burn from the wing tanks before landing. Once we had burned some fuel out of the wing tanks the captain asked a flight attendant to check the leak. It had stopped. The captain told the flight attendants to expect a normal landing. We did not declare an emergency. We covered our bases with diversion planning guide in the QRH and landed. The authorities directed us to park at a remote stand and passengers were bussed to the terminal.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767 flight crew reported dealing with a fuel leak from an overwing fuel cap requiring a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 15000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were being vectored for Visual Approach to Runway 25L in PHX. We were slowed to 170 knots and were vectored to a very long final. Eventually; we were given a long left dogleg to join final for Visual Approach to Runway 25L. We saw the RJ (Regional Jet) being vectored to a right base for Runway 26. We commented that it looked like it would be a conflict if he overshot. Shortly after that; we received a TA on him. Right about then; ATC called him out as traffic. We responded that we had him in sight. We continued our approach and began a left turn to join extended final. We were in a left turn and couldn't see the RJ under us. I was monitoring his position on the TCAS display. It turned red and directed an RA climb. I remember seeing it close and 400 ft separation. My F/O initially rolled out of the left turn and leveled his approach. I directed him to climb to match the TCAS guidance. We informed ATC that we were climbing for an RA. They gave the RJ an avoidance vector. Our TCAS changed from a climb to level flight. I noticed that we had slightly overshot final while following our RA guidance. Eventually; the TCAS announced; 'Clear of Conflict.' ATC sent us to Tower. My F/O reattempted an approach; but we were high and fast. We requested an S-turn; but Tower was busy with other aircraft and did not grant our request. We approached our 1000 ft slot on glidepath; but too fast to make the approach. We initiated a go-around. Tower asked us why; we informed him that we had to respond to the RA guidance that that put us too high for landing. They issued us instructions and switched us to Approach. We came back around for an uneventful approach and landing. Normally; TRACON staggers the approaches to prevent these conflicts. For some reason; it didn't work out this time; probably because they slowed us to 170 knots while on downwind; changing the typical approach timing.

B737 Captain reported executing a go-around at PHX following an unstable approach that resulted from an RA encounter with parallel traffic.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On the ILS approach I was slow to configure and reduce to final approach speed. We were given a heading to intercept the localizer. I selected NAV and began to reduce speed. The autopilot then flew straight though the localizer with a preview course selected and the correct frequency. Seeing this I attempted to correct the localizer deflection. By the time we were fully corrected on course the glideslope was well below us. I attempted to make corrections and configure but by 1500 feet or so I realized we would not be configured or on speed and in a safe position to land on time. I told this to my captain who then relayed our go around decision to tower and we successfully performed a safe go around complying with all of the towers instructions. As part of his climb out instructions we were given a heading directly away from the airport and told to climb to 5000 feet.After reaching about 8 DME from the airport and still with no sign of vectors back to the ILS approach; we received a check reserve fuel message through the MCDU. I asked the captain about this and as we did not have time to make any calculations for fuel burn we decided to declare min fuel as our projected at landing was 2200; exactly reserve. We told approach about our remaining fuel and souls on board. We received vectors back to final and landed safely via the ILS with 2800 pounds of fuel remaining; well above reserve minimums.

On approach we were late configuring. This was compounded with the fact that the aircraft failed to capture the LOC/GS despite the fact that approach mode was armed; the First Officer used the TCS button to override the automation and correct our course. It became clear that we would not be configured and stabilized in time to meet the stabilized approach criteria so we decided to go around and notified the tower of the go around. Once we had executed the missed approach per tower instructions; on climb out to 5;000 feet we got an FMS message of 'CHECK RESERVE FUEL.' The fuel status on the progress bar showed that we would land with 2200 LBS of fuel; minimum reserve. We elected to notify ATC that we were in a min fuel condition so as not to incur any undue delay. We were vectored for another approach to runway 22L and landed without incident. We landed with approximately 2900 LBS of fuel. We think that the FMS was calculating that we would still fly the published missed approach despite the fact that we were on vectors for another approach.The go around could have been prevented by configuring earlier. Also; we should have been more proactive when the automation failed to capture the LOC/GS. On the missed approach/min fuel situation; if we had cleaned up the FMS route so that it was not still calculating fuel for the full missed approach we would have seen that we still had more than min fuel.

An air carrier First Officer reported configuring late on an ILS approach ending up high above the glideslope. Aircrew initiated a go-around and landed off of the second approach.