Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 18865; Flight Crew Type 9045

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

We received a: 'Wheel N/W steering fault'; while en-route to ZZZ. The QRH page was reviewed and discussed with the First Officer (FO). I sent a message [maintenance control] and asked for additional guidance since cycling the anti-skid was not necessarily ideal in flight. However; [maintenance control] did not respond despite repeated requests. We were trying to wait for [them] to weigh in since the QRH had a caution note; which stated it was possible to lose anti-skid functionality if any braking errors existed. (We did not see or discover any Brake and Steering Control Unit (BSCU) or brake failures). Essentially our options were: 1). Land without Nose Wheel (NW) steering functionality and stop straight ahead on the runway; then reset on the ground or 2). Re-cycle the anti-skid switch in flight with the caution in mind. We mutually decided to re-cycle the anti-skid switch per [QRH]; just prior to final approach. The reset appeared to be successfully as the NW steering fault disappeared. However; upon landing between 100kts-80kts the NW steering fault re- manifested itself. At this point; I assumed control of the aircraft and pointed the jet toward the high speed turnoff using rudders for steering while slowing the jet. We successfully cleared the runway and I used a combination of engine thrust and differential breaking to ensure the tail section was clear. After coordinating with ground control; ATC called company via a land line and arranged for a tug to meet the aircraft. A passenger announcement was made and the tow-in checklist completed. We were then towed to the gate without incident. The tug driver told us during the tow-in; the hydraulic service panel was open. I understood that meant it was open the entire flight. Arguably; maintenance should have closed the access panel and or the push back crew should have seen it during their inspection.After parking at the gate; our checklist was completed and I followed up with an inspection of the hydraulic service panel. It was open and unsecured as reported. I then placed a call into [maintenance control] and queried them as to why they did not respond to my request for guidance. I was told they were on the phone with other issues and did not have time to respond. Moreover; he stated that [maintenance control] normally does not have the capacity to help in these situations like they did in days past. In my view; items which involve safety of flight should be paramount and receive additional support when requested.

A320 flight crew reported that while in flight they received a 'Wheel N/W steering fault'; possibly caused by an open hydraulic service panel.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 150; Flight Crew Type 43

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We (R22B helicopter) approached Paine Field from downtown Everett to avoid over flying Port Gardener waters. We were given clearance to the intersection point of the coastline and the extended centerline of Runway 16L [8 NM final]. We reported 'coastline' and began our turn onto the approach path for [Runway] 16L. At about 1.5 miles out; Tower broadcast our position to a Cessna that was told to extend its downwind leg and fall in behind us as #3 for landing. At about 1 mile final to Runway 16L the position of #1 had not been reported by Tower; and we could not see #1 traffic ahead. Just as we decided to ask Tower for a position report for #1; #1 (Beech Bonanza) over flew us approximately 5 FT to the left and 25 FT above. Tower was contacted immediately; and we were diverted between the parallel runways; away from the fixed wing traffic. At this point we opted for a straight in landing to D2 Taxiway.A discussion with my instructor following the incident hit upon a couple of factors that may have contributed to the incident: First; during our approach; there was a change of controllers in the Tower. Secondly; neither of us remembered hearing a position report for #1; instead of hesitating; trying to 'see' #1; we should have made the position request as soon as we were identified as #2.

Student helicopter pilot with instructor on visual approach to PAE; reports a NMAC with a BE35 overtaking at 1.5 miles on final. The reporter had been apprised that he was number two for landing but the position of number one was not determined until the NMAC. A controller change occurred during the approach.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

As I was approaching [the airport] I called in for a traffic report at 20 miles out; to report my aircraft and to talk to other possible traffic. One airplane landed and taxied clear of the active. No other traffic ever reported on frequency. As I was on short final a Cessna 182 taxied out and took off in front of us with no radio contact. After repeated attempts to reach him I was forced to land as a turn was not possible at that altitude. If I had gone around he would have climbed into me. I decided to land short; if I had rolled out long he may have decided to land again and it would have been on top of me. I applied reverse [thrust] and brakes; and subsequently the left main tire went flat and steered us off the left side of [the] runway. We impacted a runway light as we left the runway. The other aircraft flew the pattern and landed on [a different] runway and taxied to parking and left the airport. Possibly [with] more diligence [I] would have seen him on the runway and we could have gone around and not had the short landing. All crewmembers did not see him [until] he was right in front of us taking off.

PC-12 pilot reported a C182 took off just before his arrival without announcing intentions on CTAF. Reporter felt it was unsafe to go-around; so landed short and ran off the runway when he blew a tire.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After making the turn at ZZZZZ intersection at FL300; we had a bleed 1 leak caution message. We ran the QRH and isolated system 1 and after a few minutes the message returned forcing us to continue the checklist through the descent portion. As we were waiting the three minutes before the descent; I initiated contact with AIRINC to reach dispatch as our ACARS had just lost coms most likely to it transitioning from one frequency to another. However with the need for a descent arising we lost communication with AIRINC before establishing any plan with dispatch. We requested priority handling with ZZZ Center and initiated a turn towards ZZZ as the thought of continuing towards ZZZZ or ZZZZ1 was the longest stretch of open water on the route and worst case scenario we were 60-80 miles north of the coast and ZZZZ2 was the closest [authorized] airport around if we had to continue the checklist and shut down the engine. As we got closer to ZZZZ2 while still 130 miles from ZZZ we were able to get an ACARS connection and get dispatch caught up on the situation. They did not realize how bad the situation was and thought we were closer to ZZZZ and ZZZZ1 than we actually were. As the aircraft was stable and the bleed temp of system 1 was around 50C; the system still held almost 70psi throughout the flight indicating one of the valves was still open and not properly closed; we confirmed with dispatch that it was safe to continue beyond ZZZ to ZZZ1 for an uneventful landing. Throughout the communication black out center was very professional and extremely helpful. I hope our thanks and appreciation for their work can be passed on to the controllers working with us.

Prior to ZZZZZ1 [fix]; flight sent an ACARS message stating a Bleed Leak. Flight followed the QRH and three minutes later the message returned requiring a diversion to nearest suitable. There was quite a bit confusion going on because the flight also attempted to contact us via ARINC. The ARINC call failed; and the flight seemed to be in an ACARS dead spot as well. A few minutes later; I received multiple ACARS messages stating the flight was diverting to ZZZ. Per the flight's location; ZZZZ1 seemed like the closer; more suitable option and would've had the flight avoid going EOW (Extended Over Water) at 10;000 [with priority handling]. After running numbers for ZZZZ1; flight informed me over ACARS that ZZZ or ZZZ1 was closer. Although [our equipment] showed the flight over ZZZZ1; in reality the flight was 250 nm to the east; indeed much closer to ZZZ or ZZZ1. With that information; we decided ZZZ1 was a more suitable airport. In addition to runway length; ZZZ ops informed us that pax would not be allowed off the aircraft due to customs issues. Flight landed and blocked in.While I was certainly caught off guard and should've opened the QRH a few minutes faster; I was seriously hampered by our lack of equipment accuracy; ACARS dead spots; and ARINC being unable to raise the flight. It's hard to have an accurate; timely discussion over ACARS when both sides of the situation are working quickly on fixing the problems. If this were being done via remote dispatching; I do not wish to imagine the consequences. In the future; I will remind myself to remain calm and follow step-by-step actions to reach a quicker; less confusing end.

Air carrier pilot and Dispatcher reported confusion over diversion airports due to communication difficulties after bleed air leak.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Type 136

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I was provided with two NOTOC forms late in the boarding process which I reviewed and signed. I kept a copy of each and OPS kept a copy of each. Distracted by a delay in boarding bags; I forgot to verify a NOTOC statement in the remarks section of the Dispatch Release per FOM. The error was realized once airborne when Dispatch contacted us to verify we had the NOTOC. We communicated with Dispatch; amended our release; and asked them to communicate with ZZZ Operations to add the pen and ink change to the release as well.

B737-800 Captain reported not completing the Hazmat procedure requirement to verify NOTOC prior to departure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While operating Aircraft X; which was scheduled service from ZZZ to ZZZ1; we received a Master Warning for L ENG OIL PRESS. This prompted me to run the affiliated QRH procedure. After doing so we notified ATC and returned to ZZZ. It appears that the left engine lost oil during climbout. While climbing through FL330 for FL360; we received an aural warning and triple chime for L ENG OIL PRESS. This prompted us to run the L ENG OIL PRESS QRH. As we ran the QRH I gave control of the aircraft and radios to First Officer. The QRH asked if we met any 2 of the listed 3 indications for which we did. The conditions that we met were L ENG OIL PRESS warning message and affected engine oil pressure below limits. The QRH then directed us to complete the Engine Failure/ In-Flight Engine Shutdown checklist. After this occurred we communicated with ATC; Dispatch; the flight attendants; and the customers to return to ZZZ.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a L ENG OIL PRESS master warning on climb; resulting in an In Flight Shut Down and an Air Turn Back to precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Evacuated

Our Beechjet 400A was cleared for takeoff. As the copilot called 80 knots; I noticed I was using more left rudder than normal to maintain runway centerline. I opted to abort per the operations manual and began to slow the aircraft using brakes; reverse thrust; and speed brakes. As the aircraft was coming to a stop; tower advised us that our right tire was on fire. After stopping to the right of the runway centerline; the crew shutdown the aircraft and emergency evacuated the aircraft with our two passengers.

BE400A Captain reported rejecting the takeoff when he noticed a yaw tendency. During the reject procedure; Tower advised the right main gear tire was on fire.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Last night I flew the airplane across the border from ZZZZ to ZZZ to clear Customs on my way to ZZZ1. Customs held me for about 30 minutes. I was quite tired and stressed because this flight was scheduled very suddenly and I had to drive to ZZZZ to make the flight. By the time I was released from Customs; jumped in the airplane; started the engines; and tried to get my clearance to ZZZ1; ZZZ Tower was long closed. So I tried a phone call to TRACON first; but since ZZZ is so close to the border; my cell phone could not get the proper signal; between Mexico and U.S.; so the call did not go through. At that moment; I switched the ZZZ Tower frequency to see if I could get my clearance from TRACON with no success. So; I decided to taxi to the head of Runway XXR; and try it again there. No joy. I began to feel desperate. I tried again calling by phone and this time I made contact; but the call dropped in a second. I kept trying for about four times; until I finally could get my clearance.My 'void if not off by' time was about 8 minutes; so I rushed the flight plan into the FMS; and put Tower frequency again in Comm 1. I then made the call that I was taking off from ZZZ for a straight out departure. Nobody answered; so I began my take off run. I saw some lights down the runway but; from my perspective; looked beyond the runway. Only when I was about to rotate realized and almost froze to see what I think was a helicopter on the runway! I pulled hard on the yoke; since I could not stop the airplane on the ground without hitting the other aircraft. I tried to calm myself down as I was scared to death. I was surprised that I did not hear the helicopter on the Tower frequency. That is when I realized I had not put in the correct Tower frequency! My blood went to my feet and my heart was racing and I felt so bad and miserable to think I could have killed some innocent people along with myself just for that 'little' error. I still feel awful.From now on; I will double and triple check my frequencies; altitudes; headings and runway holding instructions. I assure you that I learned my lesson on how external factors as stress and fatigue can and will affect your judgment. I will do my best to prevent this from happening to me again. Just the thought of the terrible disaster I might have caused; makes me realize the importance of proper focus; concentration and compliance with SOP's; no matter how tired you are. Besides; I will try to fly with a copilot from now on. Another set of eyes and mind are better than one.

Pilot reported a near collision during departure after they announced their intentions on the wrong frequency. The Tower was closed at the time of the event.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 620; Flight Crew Type 17000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

PHX Approach Control vectored us to an eight mile final for Runway 26 coming off of the EAGUL 6 Arrival. The Controller told us to 'Maintain 190 knots to a five mile; if able.' I replied 'We'll do our best.' About 15 seconds later she said 'Normal speed; and contact Tower' Our TCAS was very cluttered with ground traffic and traffic to our left for the south Runway 25L. We contacted Tower at about seven mile final and were immediately told 'cleared to land Runway 26; 50 knot overtake on preceding traffic.' At that time we notice the preceding aircraft at only two miles ahead of us. It was a B757; very light weight; and five seconds later Tower said '70 knots overtake; make S-turns to the north.' My FO was flying; we were fully configured and at final approach speed; and made a 60 degree turn to the north; then turned back; pointing right at the traffic landing on the south runway; started turning final at 1000 AGL. In the last 200 before landing we encountered very aggressive wake turbulence from the 757. During the S-turn I told the FO we'll never make this; we needed to go around. He continued. I monitored the approach but was extremely uncomfortable. We landed as the (other carrier) aircraft cleared the runway.I cannot believe the Controller put us in that situation. It was an unsafe job by the ATC Controller. It looked like it might work out; so I let the FO continue. I was prepared to call for a go-around if the preceding aircraft was not clear. It was close; but he cleared just as we crossed the threshold. I should have been more directive on the go-around call and taken the aircraft. Superior judgment prevents having to use superior flying skills.

B737 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on short final at PHX in trail of a B757.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 143; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 9800

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116; Flight Crew Type 412

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

At approximately 100 knots the Number 3 tire blew. We heard a very loud noise and the right side of aircraft lifted. It was apparent that we would not be able to takeoff and the rejected takeoff procedure was initiated. At that point I was unable to tell if a tire had blown or if we had lost an engine. I believe the last airspeed noted was 113 knots. We remained on the runway center-line. As we came to a stop; the airplane began to pull hard to the left towards the operational brakes. We remained on the runway and [advised ATC of emergency] and had the fire trucks meet the Aircraft. We completed the rejected takeoff checklist. We contacted the flight attendants to look for any fire indications from the over-wing exits. They did not see any fire coming from the wing area. Tower saw smoke coming from the landing gear. Tower thought we had an engine fire. Airport Fire Rescue (ARF) was very quick to respond to the aircraft. We tried to get a discrete frequency for ARF and finally did after a couple of minutes. Before we established contact with ARF Tower was giving us information. Tower was unable to tell which side of the aircraft the fire was coming from and the flight attendants saw no fire from the over-wing exits. The tower was having difficulty telling the location of the smoke or if there was fire. There were no wheel well or engine fire indications from the flight deck. We shut down both engines and were evaluating the need for evacuation. At that time ARF arrived and we were able to establish radio contact. At the point when we were about to initiate the Evacuation ARF was able to quickly extinguish the smoke and fire. We determined that immediate evacuation was not necessary. Airport operations met the aircraft with buses and all passengers exited through the main cabin door safely. We maintained continuous communication with the flight attendants and passengers through the entire process. My first officer did an excellent job completing checklists and communicating ideas.

We experienced a blown tire and rejected our takeoff roll at approximately 110 knots. I was the pilot monitoring. Soon after I made the 100 knots callout; there was a loud bang; the plane 'rocked' sideways; and began to rattle while acceleration slowed. The Captain immediately began to reject the takeoff as I expected due to the noticeable lack of acceleration and increased directional control difficulty. I told tower control. As we slowed; they asked what assistance we needed and I requested emergency response. We ran the rejected takeoff QRH and determined that an evacuation was not currently necessary or prudent. We continued evaluating our condition and noted no abnormal indications other than the likely blown tire. I requested an evaluation from tower and the Captain (CA) asked for an evaluation from the Flight Attendants (FAs). The FAs noted no smoke or fire. Tower noted some faint smoke. Soon after they noted the smoke was increasing and they could now see some fire; but they could not determine its origin. I opened my window but could not see smoke or fire. The tower then noted they thought the left engine was on fire. We had no abnormal engine or fire indications. The CA shut down engine 1. The ARF was on scene within a minute or so. They later told us they heard the tire blow and began rolling before the official call from tower. ARF immediately began spraying us upon arrival. There was a fire truck outside the First Officer (FO) side front spraying toward our gear. Since tower had told us that the CA side was on fire; I believed they were just spraying our brakes to keep them cool. Tower switched us to 121.35 for discrete comm with ARF; but we could not immediately reach them for evaluation. When they finally began communicating a minute or 2 later; they noted that it was the starboard side gear that was on fire. Not familiar with nautical terms; we initially thought this was the CA side because that is what tower had told us. We soon realized that it was the FO side. Once ARF was on scene and spraying; we felt the threat was neutralized and an evacuation was not prudent. The CA shut down Eng 2 and started the APU. The CA made multiple PAs to the customers; FAs; and spoke with ARF. I spoke primarily with ARF; Tower and Ops. We requested air stairs and buses and were accommodated rather quickly. We ran the parking checklist. During the entire process; we regularly evaluated whether an evacuation was necessary and read through the evacuation QRH to be familiar in the event the CA called for evacuation.

B737 flight crew experienced a tire failure at 110 knots during takeoff and rejected. Airport Rescue and Firefighting arrived quickly and extinguished a small fire that developed on the main gear with the failed tire. No evacuation was necessary.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Captain and I were ready to do a [test flight] for Aircraft X that just came out of maintenance. During the taxi out; the airplane felt fine and the flight controls check was successfully done. We were cleared for takeoff a few minutes later on Runway XXR. The Captain aligned the airplane to the runway centerline and we confirmed runway heading. On the initial addition of power; from idle position to halfway up to TOGA; the airplane veered left as if the nose wheel was not aligned with the centerline. Captain reduced the thrust to idle; re-centered the nose to the centerline; and added power again to halfway up; around 75% N2. As the airspeed increased; the airplane veered to the right. As the Captain tried correcting with left rudder; the airplane veered more to the right this time.Captain reduced the thrust levers and called out rejecting at around 30 kt. We did the necessary call-outs and communicated to ATC that we were rejecting and will be exiting the runway on the next right available; which was Taxiway XX. ATC queried our intentions. After analyzing and developing a plan; including the input from the Maintenance Representative in ZZZ who was in our jumpseat; we decided that the airplane was unsafe to fly and that we needed to go back to the hangar after running the appropriate checklists and complying with all SOPs. The taxi to the hangar was without issue.Unfortunately for the flight crew; the only way we could have found that error was when we did on take off roll; since the steering using the tiller was correct. Maintenance could have found it earlier while doing the heavy maintenance checks; but I am not sure.

CRJ700 First Officer reported that a loss of directional control during the takeoff roll led to a rejected takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 8940; Flight Crew Type 1694

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Normal operations until lining up [and] cleared for takeoff. As I was turning onto centerline I set throttles to 40%. An aircraft behind me called on Tower frequency and informed me there were flames coming out of back of left engine. I aborted takeoff at approximately 10 knots and taxied off [the runway] at first exit to right. We called emergency vehicles to meet us. Passengers were informed to stay seated. Vehicles arrived; noticed no abnormalities. No abnormal engine indications. We taxied back to gate.Additional comments:At no time were there any abnormal engine indications from either cockpit or from outside other than initial call from another aircraft that he saw flames in our exhaust. When asked we told Tower our Souls on Board and 2 hours of gas. I coordinated with emergency on radio 1 to observe our engines while we turned airplane around; and there were no abnormal visual indications. After discussion with maintenance; we decided to taxi back to gate by our own power. Wrote up in log book and interview two passengers who saw the event.

B737 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff when another aircraft reported seeing flames from the left engine.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 765; Flight Crew Type 650

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While performing a 180 degrees. Turn to my first waypoint after departure from BLM I experienced spatial disorientation at approximately 900 FT MSL. Moderate to severe turbulence made it difficult to regain control of the aircraft for about 40 seconds. This incident caused me a great deal of stress. BLM was below minimums so I could not return to the airport and I had the plane under control so I elected to continue the flight. I was cleared to 5;000 FT and traveling on V229 enroute to JFK when ATC directed me to climb to 6;000 FT. After acknowledging; I began the climb. Still unnerved by the loss of control and reliving what happened; I climbed past my assigned altitude and was called by ATC as I broke through 6;700 FT. I was then instructed to remain at 7;000 FT. The rest of the flight to UUU was completed without incident and no aircraft had to be diverted because of my mistake. Losing control so close to the ground shook me up. It affected my ability to fly the plane properly. I should have told ATC what happened and asked for delaying vectors until I regained my calm. I am going up with a CII this week for an IFR proficiency check.

A BE-36 pilot on an IFR flight experienced spatial disorientation at low altitude as a result of an encounter with moderate or greater turbulence during his climbout in IMC. Shortly after; still distressed from the encounter; he failed to level at his cleared altitude of 6;000. ATC alerted him and cleared him to level at and maintain 7;000 as he was climbing through 6;700.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

While picking up cargo we noticed a discrepancy between the paperwork and actual weights. I contacted Customer Service but was unable to get a better number on the weights. Originally we were to pick up 9 racks at 15;750 LBS. The load was short shipped and only 6 racks arrived. The paperwork stated a weight of 6;424 LBS. We didn't fell this was accurate but felt confident it was under the 15;750. I made the decision to use a weight based on the original shipment. With nine racks the weight of each rack would be approximately 1;750 each; so six would be 10;500. Because even using the 15;750 number; no weight limitations or CG would be out of limits we went with the conservative figure of 10;500. Upon arriving; I had the racks reweighed and the new weight was 8;130. This had my calculated weight on the conservative side by 2;370 LBS while the shipper under estimated the weight by 1;706 LBS. There were no scales to reweigh at the departure airport. Customer Service was unable to get any better estimate from the shipper. In a perfect world the shipper would have exact weights for their products. In the future; it would be prudent to only use cargo loading facilities that had proper weighing equipment or having a calibrated/certified pallet jack with built in scale. While the on demand world does not lend itself to these things I would suggest making sure the shipper was held accountable for their weights.

DC9 Captain does not believe his cargo load has been weighed accurately and using some assumptions; increases the weight by 4;000 LBS. No accurate method of weighing the freight could be found and the estimate turns out to be conservative.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 242; Flight Crew Type 1600

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

During cruise at FL390; we noticed an airframe/engine vibration. EGT on the number one engine increased 100 degrees higher than the number two. F/A (Flight Attendant) reported flames from the number one engine. Accomplished QRC Engine Fire Checklist; and shutdown the engine. Diverted and landed flaps 15. ARFF (Air Rescue Fire Fighting) reported no fire/smoke. Taxied to the gate; and shut down.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-700 flight crew experienced engine vibrations along with rising EGT at FL390. A Flight Attendant reported flames coming from the number one engine. The engine was shut down and the flight diverted to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 5100; Flight Crew Type 170

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

I was departing ZZZ1 and going northwest toward ZZZ2 with a slight jog to the east to avoid the ZZZ3 Class B.  My plan departing uncontrolled ZZZ1 was to turn out to the south to climb above the ZZZ4 Class D and call TRACON for flight following and transition through the ZZZ Class C.  I have done this dozens of times and never had any trouble getting TRACON to respond.  However; I failed to consider that TRACON controllers are handling multiple sectors because of the pandemic.  Presumably because of this I did not get a response from TRACON; and I hadn't properly planned for this possibility; and I flew into ZZZ's Class C without ATC communication.  As [soon] as I realized that I had done so; I turned and descended to exit the Class [C] (while still avoiding the ZZZ3 Class B.  Once I was sure I was clear of the ZZZ Class C; I turned back on course; and was able to establish flight following with the ZZZ5 sector of TRACON.I was assuming that I would get a response from TRACON and thus be cleared through the Class C; because that is what has always happened before; but I failed to plan for the possibility of what actually happened.

GA pilot reported being unable to contact ATC due to possible Controller under staffing resulting in a Class C airspace violation.


Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While flying a filed IFR flight plan I experienced total electrical failure i.e. no instruments/no radios. Using my cell phone I got a hold of Flight Service and asked to relay to Approach that I was climbing to VFR conditions and reversing course. It was relayed to Approach. I had checked the fuses and found none popped and continued north at about 7;500 feet. I saw an opportunity to descend to clear skies and did so. When VFR and around 2;000 feet I was able to contact a family member and asked that person to notify Tower of my proposed landing; which was done. Tower gave me a green light as I prepped for landing but when close to touchdown they saw my gear was up. They switched to a red light that I didn't see but my emergency gear extension worked so my gear dropped just in time. Tower called me and told me of the late deployment of my landing gear and said to call the Supervisor at Approach which I did immediately. Supervisor told me they did get the call from Flight Service; saw the climb; turn; and descent; but that I should have landed at closest airport. I said I was in the clouds or above heavy broken I couldn't see the ground and thought it prudent to return to a familiar airport. The Supervisor told me that during my descent I was in Class B and since they couldn't read my altitude I could have caused approach problems for the 'Big Guys' but that they were glad I got down safely. I am still awaiting the avionics shop to diagnose the problem. It seems it might have been the detent on the master switch on a relay malfunction.

GA pilot on an IFR flight plan reported experiencing complete electrical failure and descended to VFR conditions into Class B airspace to return to the departure airport.


In 2019 52% of TCAS RA (Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory) events occurred within 25 miles of the Deschutes [DSD] VOR. Based on a total of 260;000 square miles of Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Centers Airspace. (According to data presented at Bend Municipal Airport).At a meeting; ATC expressed that they initiated the meeting as they have 'genuine concern over the unstructured air traffic' in Central Oregon. They stated 'We often have no idea what they are doing; no communication and no structure.'Commercial pilots were in attendance from: several airlines as they have a genuine concern with the number of TCAS events and aborted approaches due the unstructured volume.ATC recommended 'Avoid the DSD VOR if at all possible;' yet despite all of the above; the flight schools continue to circle the DSD VOR non- stop on a daily basis.Yes; the flight schools have a legal right to use the VOR. But at what cost? Does there need to be a catastrophic event?The FAA tag line at the end of every letter to concerned citizens: 'The FAA is continuing to manage the NAS in a safe and efficient manner while continuing to explore measures to reduce noise from aircraft in the future.' Is this a true goal or just a tag line?Many of us use the commercial carrier on a regular basis. We are very fortunate to have the fabulous commercial service out of RDM. But we are the same people; (along with our families; friends and colleagues) who are onboard the commercial carriers as these repeated TCAS events are occurring. The commercial traffic is not the issue.The FAA needs to move the training traffic off of the DSD VOR. We all deserve safe skies; not continuous near misses.

Reporter stated heavy training traffic over DSD VOR often results in TCAS RAs for air carrier aircraft. This is reportedly a known issue; but there is no solution yet.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 800

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After receiving an IFR departure clearance while positioned near the intersection of taxiways A and C; I taxied the aircraft west on taxiway A with the intention of taxiing to runway 8 for departure. After moving only 10 feet or so I noticed there were numerous people and equipment working on either side of taxiway A and about 100 feet east of taxiway E. It was unclear whether there would be sufficient room to safely taxi between the equipment or if they would be capable of moving. There were no NOTAMs published for the airport at the time and no warnings on the AWOS-3 118.07. I elected to back taxi on Runway 8 from intersection C in order to position the aircraft for departure from Runway 8. Upon passing the construction area it was apparent that there would not have been sufficient room for the aircraft to safely clear the workers and equipment. It would also have been impossible to safely turn the aircraft around on the taxiway if I had committed too far west on Taxiway A towards the construction area. Similarly; if any aircraft with a similar wingspan (36 ft) or greater that landed on Runway 26 and proceeded via Taxiway E and A would find themselves trapped on Taxiway A with no way to turn around.The previous afternoon; I encountered a piece of unattended construction equipment on the north side of Taxiway A (same area) that required me to taxi the aircraft along the rightmost side of the taxiway to avoid my left wing from coming too close to the equipment. Immediately after the previous afternoons incident I notified the airport line staff who phoned the Airport Manager; and notified him of the conflict. I believe the construction work and equipment operating so close to active runways and taxiways represent a clear hazard that pilots should be informed of via NOTAM as well as on the automated AWOS recording. I further believe that the lack of response to known conflicts by the airport management represents a general hazard for aircraft operating at IZA.

Reporter clarified the Taxiway designations at IZA (A is parallel; B; C; D; E from east to west) and indicated the current phase of construction is complete but future construction is planned.

Light twin pilot reported construction at IZA that made Taxiway A (the parallel taxiway) unusable. There were no NOTAMs and nothing on the AWOS concerning the construction.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 8975; Flight Crew Type 1550

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was conducting a practice approach under visual conditions; for the ILS Z RWY 16R approach into Reno/Tahoe Intl. I initially contacted NORCAL approach on 126.3 and asked for vectors to the approach. Approach asked for my intentions at the completion of the approach; and I told them that after I reached minimums I would make a low approach and proceed visually back to my departure airport. After vectors they cleared me for the approach; and told me to contact Reno Tower on 118.7 which I did. I established communications with the tower; and everything went fine on the practice approach. Upon reaching 200 feet minimums; I added power and proceeded to climb on runway heading. The tower then reprimanded me; telling me that next time I needed to tell them I was going to do a low approach - they apparently thought I was going to land. I replied and told them that I told approach control of my intentions; and I guessed they didn't pass that on to the tower. RNO tower had another VFR departure which they cleared for takeoff on a parallel runway; so I can understand their concern. My mistake was assuming tower knew my intentions; which they did not. I have been in other situations when I was unclear about which information is passed from approach control to the tower; and I am unsure as to how to know for sure. So in the future I will make sure to always inform the tower of my intentions even if I think they should already know.

Small aircraft pilot reported requesting a practice ILS from Approach Control to terminate in a go-around. The pilot's intentions were requested by Approach Control. At minimums the reporter went around and was admonished by the Tower for not informing them of the plan.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 150

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Flight was an instrument training flight conducted in a Piper Arrow II; (PA28R) with one student and instructor.  During IFR training we heard a loud noise sounding like a very rough engine occurred without any additional vibration or visual signs. The instructor took control of the flight and told the student to remove his vision restriction device. After checking with the student to verify the sound was indeed present and appeared to be coming from the engine the instructor informed ATC and; being in VFR conditions; cancelled the IFR flight requesting return to [departure airport]. All engine gauges appeared normal. ATC asked if [it was an emergency] and the instructor stated 'not at this time.' The instructor then request frequency change to [the Tower] and was approved. Contact was established with the Tower. [ATC] requested 'souls on board' and 'fuel on board.' These requests were responded to with 'two' and 'four hours' respectively. [Tower] cleared [us] to land and it was completed without incident.The engine cowling was removed by the instructor and student after parking to determine if there was in fact any damage. Visual inspection of the engine showed that the right front cylinder exhaust stack had broken off of the engine and was at the bottom of the engine compartment. Also; damage to the inside of the cowling was observed; apparently caused by the direct impingement of the exhaust.  No other damage was noticed.

A PA28 pilot and instructor noticed a strange noise but noticed no abnormal engine indications. After a successful return to the departure airport; a broken exhaust stack was noted.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After receiving clearance to cross 18R on Taxiway A and told traffic will hold short of Taxiway B we entered the runway and then the RWSL (Runway Status Lights) RED lights came on. Committed to crossing the runway I continued taxi to hold short of 18L. Traffic was on short final and pulling off Runway 18R at the time. ATC said nothing as we confirmed our clearance to hold short 18L.

Landed on 13R. Initial taxi instructions had us hold short of 18R at Taxiway A. Next told aircraft landing but will holding short of our intersection and cleared to cross 18R and hold short 18L. As we crossed Runway Status Lights turned on colored red. We confirmed visually no traffic and continued expeditiously across runway held short 18L and confirmed our clearance with Tower.

Air carrier flight crew reported Runway Status Lights illuminated while crossing runway after receiving Controller's verbal crossing clearance at DFW airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103; Flight Crew Type 15560

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Cleared to line up and wait Runway XX. When cleared for takeoff; pushed power to approximate 40% then selected TO/GA. As the thrust levers advanced; there was a very loud bang and yaw to the left. We had just started rolling. The thrust levers were brought to idle and we stopped on the runway. Initially; with the bang and yaw I thought we hit something or ran over something. As I was looking out the window; the First Officer stated we had a #1 Engine failure. Tower asked if we wanted equipment. We asked if they saw smoke or damage; and they replied 'No'; along with another aircraft on the taxiway. I made a PA for everyone to remain seated. I then called the F/A's (Flight Attendants) and asked them to look at the Captain side engine for smoke or flames. They reported it looked normal. We ran the Engine Failure Checklist; and discussed running the Rejected Takeoff Checklist. Since the event happened as the aircraft had just started to roll (probably less than 10 knots) we didn't run the Rejected Takeoff Checklist; knowing that brake energy and cooling wouldn't be an issue. After we taxied to the gate; I made calls to Dispatch; Maintenance; and the Chief Pilot on call; while the First Officer went to the ramp to inspect the aircraft. He discovered bent and broken turbine blades with metal pieces loose in the engine. He came back upstairs and called ZZZ Ground to do a runway check for engine debris. I made a PA to the passengers explaining that we had an engine failure at power up; and the aircraft would be taken out of service. They would receive more flight information in the terminal. After the passengers had deplaned; the crew got together and debriefed the event. I informed the F/As of what had happened and let them ask questions.

Captain reported engine failure on take off roll causing a rejected take off and a return to the gate.


Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Confusion

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

On final as the airspeed bled off to Vap (Approach Speed); the PM noted that green dot was above Vap. I observed that green dot was approximately eight knots above Vap. I verified that the aircraft was configured correctly and requested that the PF add at least ten knots to bug speed. We briefly discussed the large amount of fuel on board (tankering) and the PF opined that there must have been a calculation error. Having increased airspeed to the new bug speed; we determined that we were stabilized and continued [the] approach. I failed to recognize that this constituted a misconfiguration and should have required that I initiate a go-around in order to rework the landing data. We landed uneventfully.We debriefed at the gate and concluded that there was a calculation error in the landing data resulting in an incorrect landing weight and inappropriate landing V-speeds. We attempted to determine whether this was caused by an automation error or a 'fuel on board' data entry error but the ACARS landing data printout did not reveal what 'fuel on board' weight had been used in the landing calculation. In examining the ACARS takeoff data and landing data after the fact; the ACARS landing weight was 61;030 lbs and the ACARS zero fuel weight was 121 lbs less at 60;909 lbs. The fuel on board at the gate was 11;700 lbs.The weight disparity in the landing calculation appears to have been on the order of 11;770 lbs; which is very close to the fuel on board we observed at the gate (11;700 lbs). The landing init page was automatically cleared on landing; and looking at the landing init page in flight may not capture the actual numbers that were sent via ACARS when requesting landing data. Including the 'fuel on board' information on the ACARS landing data printout could be useful as a cross check. Simply printing the calculated landing weight; as is done now; may require mental calculation to discern a disparity whereas a direct reading 'fuel on board' number printed on the ACARS printout that correlates directly to the fuel quantity displayed on EICAS could help to alert flight crews to such a disparity. Another 'reality check' could be added to the automation when the disparity between entered fuel on board and release landing fuel exceeds a certain value; or when landing fuel on board is less than a minimum value as happens on the EICAS with yellow and magenta coding.As it was; I failed to monitor the fuel on board data entry when the PM requested landing data; exercising the expectation bias that he had done the due diligence since he had not requested that I verify his data entries before sending. I do not know whether the PM even made an entry to override the FMS value; or whether the FMS-supplied entry was zero or blank; so it is possible that this is also an automation error; especially since the new ACARS Rev. N was just instituted and contains significant rework of the weight and balance sections -- perhaps a coding error slipped in. In future; I will monitor and/or double-check the landing init data entry and ask my other flight deck crew members to do the same. I will also compare the ACARS generated landing weight against the zero fuel weight.

EMB-175 flight crew reported a calculation error in the landing data which resulted in an incorrect landing weight and inappropriate landing V-speeds.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

We were over fueled by 9000 pounds and did not catch the error. The fueler was having problems with fueling the aircraft and informed us over the ICS he had over fueled the aircraft by 9;000 pounds. I interpreted the number to be 900 pounds instead of 9;000; thinking it was a translation error. We sent the actual fuel on board 38.6 via ACARS which was 9.0 Thousand pounds over the plan fuel of 29.6 and the error was undetected. At takeoff I did notice the aircraft was a little nose heavy other than that the performance was relatively unaffected. After reaching cruise altitude (FL280) I did a fuel check and discovered the error. I reported to dispatch via ACARS we had been over fueled and what the actual fuel on board was. The remainder the flight was uneventful. After we landed I called dispatch and discussed the situation and was told they never received our actual fuel on board we had sent (38.6). Instead they were showing fuel of (28.6) at takeoff. This was confirmed by the load closeout which also showed fuel weight of 28.9.I'm not sure why the system did not accept the actual fuel on board we sent and then send back an alert that we had sent in a fuel load that was over what was planned. I have had it do that before.

B757-200 flight crew and Dispatcher reported the aircraft was over fueled by 9000 lbs. The Captain thought the Fueler said 900 lbs; but discovered the true amount while in cruise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 12215; Flight Crew Type 9415

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 133; Flight Crew Type 6152

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On climb out; approximately FL250; ECAM for generator 1 fault. First Officer did ECAM and QRH. Generator 1 would not come back online. Started APU. About 3 hours into flight climbing from FL330 to FL350 out of FL336; APU did an auto shutdown. Again; followed ECAM and QRH. Contacted [Maintenance] and Dispatch. Descended to FL290. Restarted APU. Worked fine but continued as [priority] aircraft as didn't know if it would shut down again. Uneventful landing. Met by fire trucks. Received okay and under ship's power taxied to gate.

A320 flight crew reported failure of generator #1; followed by auto-shutdown of APU. Flight continued to destination after the APU was successfully restarted at a lower altitude.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working the Radar position two sectors combined. I had just worked a departure push out of as well as aircraft inbound to TXK; an aircraft on the VOR/DME B approach at SLR and a jump plane. I took a handoff on Aircraft X descending to 24000 feet. I had traffic; Aircraft Y; at 20000 feet southwest bound across the sector that was traffic for Aircraft X landing SHV. Shortly after taking the handoff on Aircraft X I put a halo on Aircraft Y and gave them a 30 degree turn to the right to go behind Aircraft X and give myself room to descend.Upon check on I gave Aircraft X a descent to FL210 to monitor the rate of descent compared to the lateral spacing with Aircraft Y. As Aircraft X approached 21500 feet there was approximately 10 miles between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I displayed the vector lines out and Aircraft X looked to stay in front of Aircraft Y and the rate of descent had been good to 21000 feet. I gave Aircraft X a clearance to descend to 13000 feet and expedite through 19000 feet for Aircraft Y traffic. As I took out the interim altitude the data blocks began to flash. I immediately came back and instructed Aircraft X to maintain 21000 feet. The pilot replied that they were already through 21000 feet and would have to go back to it. I turned Aircraft Y to a heading of 280 to go further behind Aircraft X and turned Aircraft X 20 degrees to the right. Aircraft X returned to 21000 feet and on the other side of the halo of Aircraft Y I issued a descent to 13000 feet. Afterward I cleared Aircraft X to SHV and Aircraft Y to CRP back on their courses. There are several things I can do in the future to prevent a re-occurrence of this event. The first thing would be to maintain vertical separation until the aircraft that needs to descend is clear on the other side of the traffic and issue a further descent from there. To maintain lateral separation I could have turned the first aircraft sooner to go behind the descending aircraft; I also could have issued a turn for the descending aircraft sooner as well. Additionally; once the descending aircraft reported already through the previously assigned altitude I could have kept the descent going to maintain vertical separation since the aircraft is already in a descent configuration.

A Trainee Controller vectored an aircraft away from another aircraft that was descending through its altitude. The vector was insufficient to maintain required separation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon landing and arrival at gate a strong odor engulfed entire cabin.  Started as a manure/organic smell then changed to chemical/sulfur type smell.  Captain was notified and maintenance was called.

A320 Flight Attendant reported a fume event in passenger cabin during landing and gate arrival.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

While at gate; our ground crew advised they were ready for push. We called ramp and asked for push clearance. Ramp advised we were cleared to push after an aircraft under tow was parked at gate. I advised our push crew of the clearance. We began our push within a minute or so. The tug driver pushed us back and stopped abeam gate. Where he stopped us; I did not feel comfortable attempting to make a very tight right turn to get out of the ally. Aircraft Y was parked on our right side; at about our 12:30-1:00 position. There was also airplanes parked at the gates on our left; as well as catering trucks; tugs; baggage carts; pedestrians and all sorts of other hazards in this very cramped and congested area.I advised the tug driver we would need to push further back; that I was not comfortable making that tight of a right turn; (I would have to power up to better than 40% power just to get forward momentum before I could commence the tight right turn; then worry about blowing stuff over behind me; not to mention not hitting Aircraft Y while turning). The tug driver advised me he couldn't go any further because of Aircraft Z that was pushing directly behind us. That was the first we heard of another aircraft pushing behind us. I called Ramp Control on the radio and asked who was behind us? The Ramp Controller advised they were not talking to Aircraft Z; that they were under the control of metering.From our position on the flight deck we could not see what was going on behind us and since that aircraft was given push clearance on a different frequency we couldn't hear them. This had the potential to become a real problem. Aircraft Z that was pushing went from behind us on our left and was pushed all the way around us; ending up on our right side; wing tip to wing tip with us; they were facing west and we were facing east. My First Officer said; 'whoa! Where did they come from?' When he noticed them off our right wingtip. We had no idea they were going to be there; nor were we expecting to see another aircraft within that proximity to us!Once Aircraft Z was stopped on our right side; our tug driver advised it was clear behind us and we pushed back a little further and stopped. After disconnect from the tug; the aircraft on our right moved under its own power and we had enough room to safely make a hard right turn approximately 150-160 degrees to get out of the alley and onto Taxiway RC.Please see the attached photos; the first one shows Aircraft Y parked on the ramp between RC and the ramp alley. Next to Aircraft Y; on its left is Aircraft Z that was pushed around us. The second picture shows a straight view into gate; you can see airplanes on the sides. This view shows the gauntlet we see going into and out of this gate during hours of darkness and reduced visibility. The last picture is of the terminal and gates on our left side; you can see how close the airplanes are as well as catering trucks and other equipment.It appears there was some confusion on the part of either the metering controller; the Aircraft Z flight deck crew or the Aircraft Z push crew? It sounded like the ramp controller we were talking to did not expect Aircraft Z to be where it was nor were we!The parking arrangement here is not very user friendly. It seems like an incident or accident waiting to happen (again). Maybe they should close the RC taxiway after a certain time at night and move those parked airplanes further south towards the closed RC taxiway; allowing airplanes more room to maneuver within this cramped; poorly lighted area. Also some surface markings would help tremendously.

Air carrier Captain reported that lack of communication between ramp and ground personnel during pushback resulted in a critical ground conflict.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

After departing ZZZ in cruise; I disengaged the autothrottles and autopilot to trim the aircraft. Autopilot was reconnected; but I inadvertently forgot to reconnect the autothrottles. We then encountered continuous light turbulence; I selected .76 in the speed window and manually pulled the throttles back; not realizing that the autothrottles were not on.The speed dropped into the upper yellow band; we got a 'buffet alert' in the FMC. Throttles were manually advanced to continue; but speed recovery was slow so we asked for a descent from FL340 to FL320. Speed recovery was rapid after we started down. In cruise we got a low speed buffet alert. Airspeed was in the lower yellow band. Power levers were manually advanced to continue power; but recovery was not adequate. We asked for a descent from FL340 to FL320. Speed recovered.This was the second leg of my 1st trip back after X months off. I thought after an uneventful 1st leg I thought I was through the danger of being rusty; boy was I wrong. The major cause was my complacency after an uneventful first leg coming back from X months off. I wrongly figured I had knocked the rust off on when the first leg went so well. We don't disconnect the autopilot/ autothrottles in cruise very often; this requires extra vigilance to make sure the aircraft is in the correct configuration.

Departed ZZZ; aircraft needed constant retrimming; which it did on flight ZZZ1- ZZZ day before (same aircraft).  Leveled off at FL340.  Smooth air; needed retrimming after level off.  CA disconnected A/P and A/T to retrim ailerons; then reengaged A/P.  I did not notice that A/T [had] not reengaged.  Shortly after; entered area of constant light turbulence occasional moderate bump; slowed speed to .76 M.  Speed not coming back; CA pulled throttles back to Maintain .76.  Shortly after; got BUFFET ALERT; added power and started descent to FL 320.  At that point; CA realized A/T not engaged.  Engaged A/T;  Normal after that. Always be extra vigilant; especially when disengaging A/P and A/T at altitude.  Since retrimming not usually necessary; disengaging at altitude not done that much; and due to not flying as much; and a lot of deadheading; did not catch the A/T.

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a low speed buffet alert during cruise due to having the aircraft in the incorrect configuration with autothrottles not engaged. Lack of flying was cited as a contributing factor.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Encountered wake turbulance in landing flare from crossing departure aircraft (Boeing 737). Flying pilot corrected with quick roll command and landed.

CRJ-200 Captain reported wake vortex encounter on landing at LGA from crossing departure aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 56; Flight Crew Type 56

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

After a company policy signoff; I entered the plane after a pre-flight inspection. The plane was airworthy to fly; although I can't remember the fuel level of the plane. At the run-up area I did not experience any problems with the airplane; the engine instruments were all in the green arcs and the RPM drop of the carb heater and magneto checks were within limits. I called Tower; got a takeoff clearance and took off with the fuel selector on the left tank.Later while I was at an altitude of 6;500 FT to the right tank and kept on heading to my first stop where I performed one full-stop/taxiback and then continued my flight during which I swapped to the left tank after the departure.I repeated the landing; taxi back operations twice more at my next stop and then continued the flight performing some training exercises along the way.Right after I received the weather for my final destination I experienced an engine failure.I heard the engine losing power. Adrenaline took control; I went for the best glide speed of the aircraft (76 knots) and trimmed the airplane for that speed. [I] then looked for a place to land. I noticed a road with cars on it; but I decided that I did not want to put the life of other people in danger. Straight after that I noticed some green fields under my right wing. I chose those as a spot to land. I went through the emergency restart procedure; checked the magnetos; put the fuel pump on; mixture full rich; throttle at full power. I was already getting closer to the ground; so I made a 'mayday' call on the southeast practice area frequency. Right after the call I finished the emergency procedure by switching tanks. I heard the magnetos fire and the plane trying to recover power; but without success. I pitched the aircraft slightly downwards; to get more airflow into the propeller and achieved a restart. I gained altitude again and made a call on the southeast frequency. Following the restart; there was no distress situation anymore. I looked on the gauges to see what they were indicating; and the [left] fuel quantity gauge dropped from 10 to zero during the restart procedure. At that point I realized I had suffered fuel starvation because I had run the left tank dry. I proceeded according to the standard company arrival procedure. I contacted the Tower who were already aware of the situation and asked me if I wanted to have priority and what my endurance was. I replied with Negative and the amount of 20 gallons instead of time. After I landed the Senior Flight Instructor and my instructor were there to help me get out of the plane. I really learned from this experience; and know that I won't freeze during an emergency. There was no structural damage on the plane.

A student pilot aboard a PA-28 suffered engine failure when he ran the left tank dry. A restart after switching back to the right tank was successful and the flight was concluded uneventfully.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4956; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft experienced a blow tire/rim lock upon landing. As the aircraft touched down; the aircraft rolled 40 FT; then; experienced an aggressive left yawing moment. At that time; I applied full right rudder and maximum right braking to counter this action. As the aircraft decelerated though VMC; the aircraft's rudder authority diminished and I was unable to maintain directional control. The aircraft proceeded to exit the runway at approximately 30 KTS where it came to rest approximately 100 FT north of the runway edge line for Runway 08L. At that time; I commanded the passengers to evacuate and 911 was called. There were no injuries to passengers or pilot. The aircraft was removed from the dirt area to a transit aircraft ramp that morning. The aircraft was on speed; on target; under max landing weight and within weight and balance limitations. The aircraft had both tires replaced six days prior by a Cessna repair station due to wear limits. Approximately 10 cycles between the repair and the incident accumulated. Maintenance personnel did not advise of any wear limit issues when the aircraft was picked up. Brake pad limits were expressed with Cessna upon pre-buy inspection but Cessna elected to only replace the right main landing gear brake. Upon pre-flight inspection that morning; I noted no abnormalities with the braking system. Cessna mechanics found brake pads to have aggressive wearing on the left main tire causing the wheel to freeze upon landing. The aircraft is currently being repaired by Cessna. Left brake pad; left wheel and tire needed to be replaced. No other known damage to the aircraft.

CE525 Captain experiences a locked brake after landing and loss of directional control; resulting in a runway excursion at low speed. The right brake pads had been replaced six days prior; but not the left; although post flight revealed extreme wear on the left brake (the locked wheel).


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 19200

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

FL370 enroute from ZZZ to ZZZ1; we encountered an Air Traffic Controller that was clearly over saturated because of multiple frequencies or too many aircraft.  Traffic in these 2 areas are returning to normal.  We need more Controllers and frequencies to avoid safety of flight issues.

Captain reported concerns about safety of flight issues due to ATC controllers being under staffed and overworked while having to work multiple frequencies.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

VNAV (vertical navigation) would not arm before takeoff. Because I was flying the Max for the first time I considered this may be something different or weird about the new airplane. After writing this up on the ground the mechanics did a reboot of the airplane and these problems seemed to go away but now we experienced the failure of the Captain's FMC multiple times.  Upon arrival at the airplane that morning I found the FMC switch in the 'R' position instead of the normal 'BOTH.' During preflight; with the FMC programmed; I engaged LNAV (lateral navigation) and VNAV with the Master on my (First Officer) side. A few minutes later I noticed VNAV disengaged. I reengaged it. A few minutes later I noticed it disengaged again. This time I told the Captain and he said he noticed it as well. This was my first flight in the Max so I chalked it up as a Max-ism. I thought it would 'fix itself' airborne. The Captain and I discussed it and decided to just proceed and attempt to engage it airborne after multiple attempts on the ground to keep it engaged. This was the only discrepancy I noticed on the ground. Once airborne we did attempt to engage VNAV but it would disengage within a couple seconds. I climbed out in LVL CHG (level change mode) all the way to FLXXX when ALT HLD (altitude hold) engaged. After a few minutes at cruise the Captain decided we should try switching everything to his side so we switched to CMD A and engaged VNAV. After this we had no further issues with VNAV. We agreed I would continue to be pilot flying utilizing the A autopilot and the master on his side.  During cruise shortly after engaging VNAV as previously discussed I began noticing weird things on my ND (navigation display) and PFD. On the PFD on my speed tape the minimum and maximum maneuvering amber bars would simultaneously shoot out.  The minimum would jump up about 8 knots while the maximum would simultaneously shoot down about 2 knots and then immediately retract. Also the ND would ratchet instead of making smooth movements. This was especially noticeable in turns. Lastly we noticed ANP (actual navigation performance) going as high as 1.3. By the end of the flight I would say it was back in the normal range; less than 0.1. I flew the STAR in LNAV/VNAV to the bottom and performed a visual [approach] with no other issues. We wrote this up on the ground doing our best to explain this to Maintenance. The Captain and I decided if we set up the box and selected the master on my side and engaged VNAV and it stayed engaged we would be satisfied and then switch everything to his side. After boarding was complete and we were just about to shut the door both FMC's blanked with a MAP and VTK (vertical track) on Captain's PFD. We called Maintenance back out for another 'reset'. We then closed the door and pushed back. As I began to start the engine we had the same failure again on the FMC. Captain called Maintenance and they told us to return to gate.  By this point the Captain and I agreed we would not be taking this airplane. With its previous history that we learned about in previous log pages; along with the multiple issues we experienced; combined with the complicated process involving an MEL for both FMCs and an early wake up we agreed it would not be the safest course of action. Hindsight is 20/20 and looking back armed with the information I have now I would have never left the gate in ZZZ.

During my preflight I noticed the FO (First Officer) engaging VNAV and it disengaging a few minutes later. He tried a couple of times and it would not stay engaged.  He told me he found the FMC switch in the Both on R and switched it back to normal. We discussed waiting for final numbers and trying again.  It continued not to engage after final numbers and I decided to push back and start and try again on taxi.  A couple times during taxi we tried to engage it and would only last seconds. We discussed departing old school bug up N1 flaps 1 and try again airborne knowing the jet can fly without VNAV.  We both were comfortable with that decision. It was his leg and the F/D (flight director) was on his side.  There were no other discrepancies. As we rolled out on the runway and were cleared for take off I engage VNAV and it stayed on until 500 feet and disconnected. I am guessing it held on with TOGA (takeoff/go-around). We tried engaging VNAV a couple times in climb and after level off at FLXXX with no success.  We were on autopilot CMD B (command B). At that point I selected CMD A and then engaged VNAV and it stayed on. We decided to leave it on CMD A.  The remainder of the flight VNAV remained engaged. It was the FO's first time in the Max and my second leg so he remained the pilot flying using CMD A. About the same time we were switching sides we noticed on his speed tape the minimum and maximum amber bars would jump up from the bottom about 5 knots and down from the top about 2-3 knots. Also the ND (navigation display) would glitch from left to right 5-7 degrees. Both of those continued the entire flight; the ND would glitch more in a turn. All 3 airspeeds were matched the entire flight and Captain's side had no issues of glitching and we received no cautions about airspeed.  A little while later we received a scratch pad message that I don't remember exact wording but was about FMC position when I looked at all latitude and longitudes FMC; IRSL (left inertial reference system); IRSR; GPSL (GPS left); GPSR were normal within a couple of decimal points looking normal to me. I then noticed the ANP was 1.3 and bouncing between 1.2 and 1.3.  I monitored that and it started to decrease back to normal around .03; .02 but it took 20 to 30 minutes and would move between .02 and .11.  Towards the end of the flight it seemed to be more steady around .03; .02. No other scratch pad messages and the flight had no other issues. We landed [and] I wrote up the problems and we both talked to the 3 maintenance technicians to relay as much info as we could. I know that they powered down the aircraft and did operation tests that all passed and signed off the aircraft. We boarded the passengers for [our next] flight.  We discussed that we would check both sides for VNAV engagement; also monitor all speed tapes and ND's for any glitching before takeoff.  As we were about to close the door both FMC's blanked out and Map flag; VTK flag; and no runway flag on my side only appeared. No FMC prompt on either FMC screens only ACARS; ACMS (aircraft condition monitoring system); SAT (satellite).  I called Maintenance and they came out and talked about that they had Captain's FMC history. I asked about it and we looked it up in the previous logbook; first I had heard about that. I was thinking new airplane I did not realize that there was an entire logbook already used below the current logbook.  They then switched the FMC switch to both on R and the flags on my side went away and FMC prompts returned. I told them I cannot takeoff like that.  They called Maintenance Control I believe and they did a circuit breaker reset which fixed the flags and returned the FMC prompts and the FMC switch back to normal. We closed the door and started the pushback. As the FO was about to start engine 2 the same flags returned on my side and no FMC prompts on both sides. Maintenance Control told us to return to the gate because he could not MEL it. We returned to the gate and Maintenance again did the circuit breaker reset that only lasted a few minutes before the flags returned. They decided to MEL the FMC with my approval. The FO and I did not want to continue with this aircraft because of our history with it and that it had only been powered down and 2 circuit breaker resets.  We now would be manually setting bugs and thrust for the entire flight in an aircraft we both had very little time in and had an early morning show to start the day and it was now late afternoon.

B737 MAX 9 flight crew reported multiple autoflight anomalies that ultimately resulted in their refusal to accept the aircraft.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I; [Mechanic X] was assigned to exterior portion of ETOPS; Mechanic Y had interior. Lead Mechanic had Mechanic Z shadow me to familiarize him with ETOPS operation because he was not ETOPS qualified. Found #4 MLG tire below pressure limits per General procedures Manual (GPM). I proceeded to pull paperwork while Mechanic Y and Z gathered the tire jacks and equipment for tire change. Mechanic Y showed Mechanic Z where the gear pins were in the aircraft; I witnessed them install gear pins from the right hand MLG [area]. At this time all of us helped change the #4 MLG tire. During this time Mechanic Z was shown by myself and Mechanic Y how to fill out tags / paperwork and some details of removing and installing a B767 MLG tire. After tire installation I witnessed Mechanic Z remove MLG pins and looking forward from right hand MLG [area]; I saw Mechanic Y and Z with the pins/flags [streamers] and gear pin pouch under the E/E Compartment. I then saw them put the pouch into the E/E Compartment. Finishing up paperwork; I then asked Mechanic Y if the pins were removed. He answered 'yes' the pins were out; as a further confirmation for what I thought I witnessed. Finished up ETOPS paperwork and logbook; aircraft departed. Approximately early evening; the Manager approached me and stated that the B767-300 aircraft was returning from flight due to no gear retraction. Upon arrival of the B767 to gate; myself and Mechanic Y then inspected NLG area and found NLG pin still installed. Mechanic Z was present at the gate and we discussed if he remembers removing the NLG pin and he replied yes. During further discussion; he (Mechanic Z) was not clear on the NLG [towing] bypass pin and the NLG downlock pin location. I removed the NLG downlock pin from the B767 aircraft.[Contributing causes]:Ferry flight came in late for the outbound ETOPS flight.Scheduled quick turn. Finding #4 MLG tire low and requesting additional one hour before departure.Working with employee new to terminal and ETOPS operations and new to this fleet type of aircraft.Not checking NLG for compliance of pin removal before Aircraft departure.[Recommend]Verify all tasks in detail personally before signing.Additional familiarization with fleet type of aircraft for employees before working live flight/terminal operations.Nose gear strut and fixed gear doors hide current [gear pin] flag length from view unless directly in front of NLG nose strut.Suggesting NLG [downlock] pin flag be longer; to clear NLG doors; bright orange for visibility; wider and [make] possible tether to [towing] bypass pin.Improved NLG flag could have been seen by Pushback crew on their walk around and pushback operation.

I was instructed to pull the gear pins on the aircraft after a main tire change. I did not see the streamer on the nose gear lockout pin and because I am a recent transfer to ZZZ and learning; [I] accidentally pulled the nose gear [towing bypass lever] lockout pin instead. I stowed the correct five pins in the bag and thought I had pulled the correct pin. Due to lack of experience I pulled the wrong Lockout pin. [Recommend to] have a 2nd set of eyes confirm the correct pin was pulled.

Three Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs); one who was in training; describe their involvement with a B767-300 ETOPs aircraft returning to departure airport with a nose landing gear (NLG) pin not removed. One Technician noted that the AMT in training was not clear on the NLG towing bypass pin and NLG downlock pin locations. Also; the streamer flag for the NLG downlock pin is hidden by the gear strut and fixed gear doors; flag needs to be longer.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft X was assigned a right turn onto Taxiway A3 after landing roll. Aircraft X turned onto the closed Taxiway A4 instead which resulted in me sending around an air carrier. Shortly after this incident Operations called me to inform me that there was no signage to indicate to pilots where Taxiway A3 was. There are numerous taxiway closures due to construction and this has made our airfield configuration very complex at times. I highly recommend more signage to help out both the controllers and pilots to not get confused. The number one contributing factor was the pilot not having adequate signs to know where he was going.

SBN Local Controller reported an aircraft exited on wrong taxiway; resulting in the Controller sending traffic around.  Reporter was notified that there is a lack of Taxiway A3 signage due to construction.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS HSH

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were on the Lam 12X departure from RWY 35R and cleared above 5000 meters prior PD062. We had a frequency change; checked for anti-ice requirements after entering IMC; and had just finished the after takeoff checklist. The crossing restriction of 4930 feet was entered and verified for HSH prior to departure. The aircraft had around 40k lbs fuel and less than 5k lbs freight and was very light. The climb rate was close to 10;000 FPM. We had not reached PD062 and as the airplane started to pitch down to level off; the HSH altitude restriction disappeared from FMS and aircraft continued to climb. Since the clearance and FCP was in meters; and the FMS and chart was in feet; it took me a few seconds to confirm exactly what happened and that we were in fact supposed to level off at 4930 until passing HSH. Since I had never seen an FMS altitude deletion like that I thought I might have made a mistake in meters/feet conversion; or had the waypoints confused. In addition; as this was happening; we were cleared direct to HSH. Due to the high climb rate; by the time I confirmed that we had climbed above a restriction; we were already significantly higher; and we immediately asked for an unrestricted climb; which was granted. No mention was made by ATC of missing an altitude restriction. All both crewmembers saw out of the corner of our eyes was a flash on the FMS (similar to a waypoint sequencing) when the restriction was removed; and neither of us was making an FMS entry at the time. One reason it took me a few seconds to confirm that we were above the restriction was that the airplane acted as if it was approaching an altitude restriction and the waypoint of the restriction simultaneously. It appeared that the flash was normal waypoint sequencing as the altitude restriction was met; and that it was just continuing the climb. Again; since I'd never seen an altitude restriction removed by the FMS at first I thought I might have confused which waypoint had the altitude restriction. It didn't take long to realize what happened and to confirm that I understood where we were; but with a 10;000 FPM climb rate; 15 seconds is a climb of 2500 feet. I've never seen the FMS remove a restriction like that; nor have I ever seen the MD-11 automation not honor an FMS entered crossing restriction without alerting the crew before that it wasn't possible. I am not sure why the FMS removed the restriction. I don't know if there is a software issue or something else caused the restriction to be removed. The high climb rate may have been an issue. Obviously; better pilot monitoring of the situation could have prevented the event; but in some ways this was similar to taking controls from another pilot during a botched landing. There was only a small window when intervention was possible to prevent the deviation. The MD-11 can sometimes wait until the last second to make pitch changes when leveling off. Since we were climbing at 10;000 FPM and the plane just starting to pitch for level off; I assumed it would make the programmed restriction. In addition; there was a few seconds of confusion in my mind regarding meters/feet conversion. I think the cleared altitude was around 5500 meters which was numerically close to the altitude restriction in feet and it took a few seconds to ensure I understood the aircraft altitude in relation to both the cleared altitude and the crossing restriction. Normally a few seconds is not a factor; but when climbing at 10;000 FPM it is a significant altitude gain. Given our current procedures of mixing feet and meters in our operations; the best way to handle a ZSPD departure is for the pilot flying to focus only on the course and altitude and not get distracted backing up the pilot monitoring on radio; anti-ice; and FMS usage. This is less than ideal as both pilots need backup in a busy foreign environment. Either chart and operate in meters or feet. Using charts in feet and accepting clearances in meters can lead toconfusion. It is not a difficult conversion; but after takeoff with several other issues requiring attention; taking a few seconds to confirm altitude awareness can be critical.

MD11 Captain reports missing a crossing restriction at HSH during the LAM 12X departure from ZSPD. The aircraft was climbing at more than 10;000 FPM and was given direct HSH as the aircraft was starting to level off at 4;930 feet. For some reason the FMC deleted the HSH crossing restriction at that time and continued climbing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I swapped into this aircraft and I tested the oxygen mask in accordance with the Canadair SOPM; and coincident with actuation of the TEST/RESET lever the  CREW OXY LO PRESS caution message posted. The message disappeared when I released the TEST/RESET lever. Since the gauge indicated approximately 1500 psi; I contacted Line Maintenance to resolve this discrepancy. Line Maintenance discovered that the crew oxygen shut-off valve was in the closed position; meaning that no oxygen was  available to the crew masks. The valve was opened and we were returned to service.Failure of maintenance up-line to open the crew oxygen shut-off valve. Maintenance: Verify task completion. Flight Operations: Revise the Canadair Standard Operating Procedures Manual; to include verifying that the CREW OXY LO PRESS caution message is not presented during the oxygen mask test. Coincident with issuance of the temporary revision; issue a Flight Operations Alert Bulletin for pilot awareness.

CRJ-200 Captain reported discovering during preflight that the crew oxygen supply was turned off at the bottle.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After normal preflight and engine start operations we received a taxi clearance. Paraphrasing; taxi to RWY 25L via Taxiway A; A13; hold short of RWY 25L. It was the taxi clearance we expected and briefed. As we started the taxi we commenced with the taxi checklist. The taxi checklist was completed. As we approached the 90 degree turn from Taxiway A onto Taxiway A13 we discussed the narrow taxiway and the tight 90 degree turn. During the turn; even though we favored the left side of the taxiway; the right main wheel went off the taxiway. We contacted ground control for assistance.  Suggest an Airport Operations  review of the DVT intersection of Taxiway A and A13.  Convergence of two narrow taxiways.  The inside of the turn is not a smooth arc for transition from Taxiway A to A13. The old   taxiway had a smooth arc inside of the turn.  The taxiway markings are at the very edge of the taxiway with no hard surface margins. The old   taxiway had hard surface outside of the taxiway markings creating a margin.For narrow taxiways the crew should use the onboard cameras for situational awareness for wheel/edge proximity.

G450 First Officer experiences a taxiway excursion at DVT during a turn from Taxiway A to A13. The right main gear departs the paved surface during the turn.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was conducting a scheduled test flight for a Duchess Be-76. I performed my preflight actions. The reason for this test flight was that a problem had occurred with the accumulator and governor in the right engine. I was tasked with climbing to altitude shutting down the engine testing the ability of the engine to re-start. I departed the airspace and climbed to 5;500 feet. I remained nearby the airport approximately 5 nm southwest of the field. After conduct of pre-maneuver checklist and clearing turns I proceeded to shut down the right engine. On engine shut down I went through the usual procedure feathered the propeller and isolated the engine.After a period of a few minutes I then began the process of re-starting the engine; by use of the unfeathering accumulator; this did not work. The right propeller moved [less than] a turn. I began troubleshooting by exercising the propeller level and engaging the starter to 'kick start' that is create some momentum on the propeller to re-start the engine. This did not rectify the situation so I proceeded with the next course of action. I shut all on my avionics began to crank start the engine; I pitched up and achieve an airspeed of approximately 70 knots. This also failed to rectify the situation I tried this 4 four times in the space 5 to 10 minutes. During this time I noticed I was now experiencing a loss of oil pressure in my still operating engine (left engine). The throttles and the propeller lever were both in the full forward position. While both sets of levers were in the full forward position the propeller RPM gauge would only indicted a reading of approximately 1;400-1;600 and the oil pressure was reading lower than the lowest posted value on the gauge. I believe the gauge may have been failing because when I exercised the throttle lever I could hear and feel the change in power condition; a yawing force and minor change of heading.Due to this change in situation I elected to return to the airport immediately. I turn my avionics back on and intended to communicate my intentions to the Tower. It was at this time my audio panel had failed and I was unable to use the onboard radios. Fortunately I had brought a handheld VHF radio with me on the test flight and communicated my intentions to Tower. I did not squawk 7700 I was pre-occupied bringing the aircraft back to the runway. Moreover I missed several radio calls due to the fact I needed to fly the aircraft rather than monitor the handheld and I could not monitor the frequency through my headset.Once I was establish on approximately a 4 nm final (I made my approach above the glide path) I moved the landing gear switch to the down and locked position. I was in the process of checking that the landing gear was down and locked I looked and the landing gear lights to see that I did not have 3 solid greens. I instead had three flashing greens and no red lights. I recycled my landing gear and then performed the emergency gear extension procedure to mitigate the risk. I communicated the condition of my landing to the Tower and sort the relevant assistance. The aircraft holding short of the runway stated that the gear appeared down; and the Tower also stated that the gear appeared to be down. I made single engine landing on Runway XXR and exited at taxiway Bravo.I left the aircraft in the condition in which it landed and was met by the airport fire brigade I gave my details to the fire brigade representative. The aviator tug arrive at taxiway Bravo I briefed the maintain crew and returned to the ramp. I then briefed the Chief Pilot and Director of Operations.

BE76 pilot reported several aircraft system malfunctions occurred during a test flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Total 15802; Flight Crew Type 13000

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 1327; Flight Crew Type 1078

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

After landing Runway 3 at SJT; we were taxiing on Runway 27. I believe the tower told us to hold short of Runway 18. As we approached 18 we looked down final and did not see the white colored light aircraft on short final. He was difficult to see with the overcast skies. Tower contacted me right after we crossed and I saw the light aircraft on the runway about 1;000 feet from our crossing point.There appears to be a miss-understanding of some sort on my part of the clearance.If I may ask a question; are there supposed to be painted markings on a runway crossing another runway?

My first flight in [this aircraft] doing training exercises to prepare me for SIC. I just landed my second ILS on Runway 3 at SJT. We copied to taxi on Runway 27 and hold short Runway 18. PIC was taxiing. There was confusion about where the hold short line was for Runway 18. It was overcast and didn't see traffic until we crossed 18. Traffic was 1;000 feet away and wasn't a factor. I believe there was poor communication in the cockpit and could be corrected with cross reference clearance from both pilots and a reminder from tower of this unusual hold short circumstance.

Air taxi flight crew reported while taxing; ATC issued a hold short clearance at intersecting runways with no identifiable hold short marking; resulting in a runway incursion.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Flight operating on an ICAO descent via clearance; ATC issued a new altitude to descend to but did not specifically cancel star altitude constraints. Confused with the differences between the FAA and ICAO descend via clearance requirements (FAA needs to re-issue descent via for constraints to be in effect; ICAO does not) we descended below the star constraints. Additionally; later on the flight; during approach; the pilot flying failed to operate below the speed limits [160] established for Mexico's airspace and for the Runway 5R ILS approach.

Air Carrier First Officer reports confusion descending into MMMX over RNAV descent criteria for ICAO vs. FAA. The 160 KT speed restriction on the ILS 5R approach is also overlooked.