Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Potomac Approach cleared us for the visual approach to 19C and gave us instructions to descend to 7;000 feet. The Autopilot was in use and the aircraft descended to 7;000 feet. Alts Capped message appeared. I started to sequence the approach in the FMS. After 2 seconds I looked up and I saw the preselect altitude indicator flashing amber and we were at 6;700 feet. I put the airplane in VSI climb mode. A second later ATC transmitted a low altitude alert call and gave us the altimeter setting. I replied we are correcting. In a few seconds the aircraft leveled at 7;000 feet again.After talking it over with the First Officer we came to the conclusion he may have accidentally pressed the VSI mode instead of the NAV mode. When I saw that we were 300 feet below the preselected altitude I did not turn off the Autopilot and used the VSI mode to climb back up to 7;000 feet. The whole event must have taken about 5 seconds. The other option would have been to turn off the Autopilot and maybe the correction could have been quicker.

Air carrier Captain reported a drop in altitude on approach; catching it and getting an alert from ATC.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 150

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was at cruise on my flight; and I had just canceled IFR and picked up VFR flight following from Center; so I climbed from 8;000 feet MSL to 8;500 feet MSL and I lost all electrical power to the aircraft. My navigation instruments; radios; and ADS-B transponder all went blank. I assessed the situation and decided to take the conservative route and performed a descent into the nearest divert airfield. I got one radio transmission off to Approach on an external handheld radio that was received by Approach and [requested priority handling] and notified them that I was descending down and was proceeding to full stop landing. [The airport] is a small non-towered airfield. I did not violate any FAA FAR's in the divert process intentionally or unintentionally. As soon as I landed (uneventfully); I received a cell phone call from Approach asking if I was the pilot who diverted; I responded with yes and everything was okay and to please cancel my previously emergency and to close out my VFR flight following flight plan; and the Approach controller confirmed the emergency was canceled and VFR flight plan was closed. There was no aircraft damage.I found out during then exterior inspection after landing that my alternator belt had broke; which caused the alternator to quit and battery to run dead. My recommendation and lesson learned from this event is I highly recommend the use of external GPS enabled devices such as iPads with aviation applications such as ForeFlight and WingX Pro7 because they give you an extraordinary amount of situational awareness in a very convenient package; even when your internal aircraft equipment fails.

C182 pilot reported a complete electrical power loss and successful divert landing.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 212

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Flying a northerly course in the vicinity of Madras Muni (S33) at an altitude of 12;500 feet in clear conditions. Aviation white strobe and navigation lights were on. VFR flight following was cancelled by Seattle Center due to saturation in the Redmond sector. Seattle Center was being monitored on 128.15 (Redmond Sector; Squawk 1200 with mode C and ADS-B traffic monitored on portable device). During this time; 3 parachutists (passenger reported seeing 5 jumpers) were observed at 12 to 1 o'clock directly in front of and moving toward the aircraft. An aggressive turn to the left was initiated to avoid colliding with the parachutists. At the time the turn was initiated the silhouette of the parachutists and chute were clearly visible. None of the parachutists observed had position lights.Contributing factors to this situation were: 1) ATC inability to provide VFR separation services due to saturation;2) Contributing factor was ATC failure to advice of jumpers over frequency however; without position lights it was nearly impossible to visually identify and thus avoid parachutists.

GA pilot reported a NMAC with several jumpers near S33 at 12;500 feet that required evasive action.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

On descent into ZZZ; we set up for the visual to XX backed up by the ILS. I was the pilot flying. We were given a runway change from Runway XX to XY. We made the necessary changes and briefed them. The ILS frequency for XX and XY at ZZZ are the same. After we were not receiving a good signal on approach to XY; we asked Approach if they had switched from XX to XY. He responded roger and sent us to Tower. He sounded busy and both the Captain and I agreed that he had not really processed the question.Once with Tower; we asked the same thing and they advised us to let them know if we ever got a good signal while on approach. We didn't have good ILS guidance and the Captain suggested I click off the autopilot and hand-fly it down. I did so and was working to maneuver myself on final. I overshot final while continuing to descend. I was worried that this would trigger a GPWS warning as I could see that I was near high terrain to the south of the field. I adjusted my vertical speed as I corrected toward final; but still got a GPWS warning. I responded to the warning as I continued correcting back to runway centerline.We were immediately out of the GPWS threat and elected to continue the visual approach but we were left high after the response. It was here that I should have seen we were not in a good position to continue and should have gone around. As we continued down final; we were at idle thrust and flight spoilers were out as we continued to configure the aircraft. I don't believe that we were fully configured below 1000 ft.; which was outside of stabilized approach criteria; and we still had the flight spoilers extended - which; after review; was against company limitation. By 500 ft. we were fully configured but still fast and slightly high. Another opportunity to conduct a go-around. The power remained in idle for almost the entire approach. We landed on Runway XY.Due to poor maneuvering to final while on visual approach; an overshooting final resulted in a terrain warning. Rather than make the decision to terminate the approach there; we continued; which resulted in an unstabilized approach that continued to a landing. [The cause was also] failure to call a go-around when that was the appropriate course of action. When you think you should go around; go around. Don't wait for someone else to call it and don't continue an approach that isn't stable. Follow SOP and your training.

GPWS warning followed by an unstable approach into Runway XY in ZZZ. We were descending into ZZZ and were set up for Runway XX. Approach advised that winds had shifted and asked if we would like Runway XY. We accepted and began to set up for XY. When we had the airport in sight; we were cleared for the visual. As we armed the approach for the autopilot; we were told by Approach that the localizer and glideslope may not be working. My First Officer turned off the autopilot and began hand-flying the visual. He became distracted by configuring the airplane and was flying through the localizer when I informed him he needed to start his turn. As he began the turn he started descending; which caused a GPWS warning for a couple seconds due to terrain. We were confident of terrain clearance but leveled off until we were back on the localizer. Once we were on the localizer; we were high. We began our descent and continued configuring. We weren't fully configured until about 800 ft. AGL. We proceeded with the landing without further event.I think fatigue played a factor in our poor decision-making to continue the approach. We had a [before-dawn] wake-up call that morning and this was our 4th leg of the day. We had been dealing with thunderstorms and delays all day long.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS warning during an unstabilized approach and elected to continue the approach instead of safely executing a go-around.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On taxi out; Flight Attendant called and reported strong odor/fumes in the cabin. Turned the plane around to change wind direction. No change so returned to gate.

A321 Captain reported being notified by Flight Attendant of persistent strong fumes in cabin during taxi for departure and executed a gate return.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

During shift change I was reviewing loading on [electronic load plan for the] flight and noticed that there was Hazmat in Pit 2; with no bags. The flight had been off the gate for 12 minutes. I looked at the flight history to see when he was planned for takeoff; and it was at XA:20 local; which was the time I was looking at the flight; so I could not bring the airplane back. Shift Manager was notified. I also contacted [Load] Controller in ZZZ.

Ground employee reported detecting Hazmat cargo incorrectly loaded after aircraft departure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 14570; Flight Crew Type 6100

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Airport; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

[We] departed Runway 28R at SFO. We were in a 737-900 with a takeoff weight of 180;000 LBS. Typically we use Runway 1R for departure; but due to our weight; [Runway] 1R was too short. We got the clearance for the Quiet 4 departure. The Tower changed our clearance to heading of 050 on departure. We had departed normally; but as we turned to the north in the climb we got a TERRAIN; TERRAIN warning. We increased our pitch and the warning ended.

B737-900 Captain reports receiving a EGPWS terrain warning departing Runway 28R at SFO with instructions to turn right to a 050 heading. Pitch was increased to silence the warning. Day VMC prevailed.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 515; Flight Crew Type 15000

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flight to San Antonio. We were filed on a SID to a STAR and thus briefed the entire flight at the departure gate. I looked at the weather packet and assumed that SAT was landing on 31L. We programmed 31L into the FMC and briefed the STAR. Approaching MARKS in the descent; we were given off course vectors and several speed changes to follow traffic. We were distracted from reading the current ATIS and verifying the landing runway on the LEGS page. We flew part of the 31L transition until queried by ATC. We were on the wrong transition and were given clearance direct to a fix on the correct transition. The remainder of the approach was uneventful.The transition needs to be briefed and verified again regardless of the previous briefing at the departure gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported a track deviation on arrival into SAT after missing a runway change.


Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I noticed that the altimeter for FRM was old; so I made a change to ERAM reporting FRM altimeter as missing and subsequently reported this to the southeast as out of service. This is normal and AWOS do fail at times. I noticed that the altimeter reading for FRM was not only incorrect; it was yesterday's altimeter. It had the same time and the altimeter reading. I verified on my AISR that I had not received a new altimeter for the last 6 hours and I also confirmed with the ZMP weather unit that they had not received a new altimeter for FRM for the last 24 hours. ERAM somehow put yesterday's 1655 altimeter back in some time before today. As a result; this will cause the controllers to issue an incorrect altimeter setting for landing aircraft/or low flying aircraft near FRM; which is very dangerous and creates a safety issue. Please resolve this software issue immediately. I received an error from ERAM in the flight plan correction box on an A330. In an attempt to figure out what was wrong with the flight plan; I re-entered the flight plan into ERAM to generate an error message. The error message stated 'invalid message type.' We have written this type of problem up with the ERAM team in the past. I believe that the ERAM team has been diligently trying to solve this and many other ERAM issues. However; we are not getting written direction on how to handle this problem and the other ERAM problems. I feel that I am 'flying by the seat of my pants' with handling these ERAM messages; where in HOST we had clear written direction on how to handle these issues. In reference to the flight plan for the A330; I suspect that the problem is the route of flight. I have many questions. 1) Does ERAM recognize all fixes across the globe? 2) What does ERAM do when these fixes are duplicated? 3) Is there a way for ERAM to tell Flight Data specialist what fix it is having an issue with? 4) If the route is the issue; why are we getting the error message that reads 'invalid message type' if in fact it is a route problem? This is misleading There are two issues here: 1) We need written direction; even if it for the interim; until we get ERAM figured out; on how to handle the ERAM error messages in flight data. 2) We need new written instructions (policies; procedures; orders) from management detailing our job responsibilities when it involves an ERAM error message. With regards to the Altimeter issue and ERAM issue; this is probably a software programming issue that will need correction. With regards to the ERAM Error message issue; we need direction from ERAM software engineers and FAA management on how to handle these ERAM issues. We need new written policies and procedures so that we have a clear understanding of our job responsibilities.

ZMP Controller described an ERAM failure to update the altimeter as required. The reporter presented a number of questions regarding ERAM and its functionality.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 11575; Flight Crew Type 3926

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

The flight attendants advised us at altitude they heard banging in the cargo area on takeoff and once during taxi out. We advised dispatch and they investigated with HNL ops what may be there. It was decided that approximately 1800# pallet was not secured. This was confirmed on arrival. [ATC was advised] so we could have the long runway and fire trucks available should the cargo shift forward and come thru the EE compartment and result in a fire. A landing was made with no shift occurring.

The flight crew was advised during cruise by the flight attendants that they had heard banging noises coming from the cargo area during taxi and takeoff. It was determined that a pallet was not properly secured; and a precautionary landing was successfully accomplished.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 232; Flight Crew Total 535; Flight Crew Type 39

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

I am writing this repose because my student and I were climbing out of ZZZ this afternoon when both of our iPads died due to the heat. With our iPads being dead we could not see traffic in the area and so I lost situational awareness as we were climbing out while I had my head up looking for traffic in the surrounding area. As we were climbing out I realized how high we were getting and just as I realized it; I took over the controls and nosed over the aircraft to get out of the Bravo shelf. The shelf was 7;000 ft. and we just reached that altitude on the cuff of the shelf; leaving. I know this situation is no excuse and I am not entirely positive that we busted the shelf. I have never came close to the Bravo shelf before and I know it was close so I wanted to take action and report it just in case.

PA-44-180 flight Instructor reported exiting penetrated class B airspace without clearance due to aircraft EFB failure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Heavy aircraft TOGA power; detected slight odor at TOGA power. On climbout Flight Attendant called and said [they] could smell odor. After approximately 2-5 minutes [the] odor dissipated for 6 hour flight until descent at 15;000 feet. Odor again dissipated. Normal landing entered discrepancy in Maintenance log.

A321 Captain reported a fumes event on initial climb which was also reported by flight attendants. Fumes dissipated and returned during descent.


Fatigue; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Type 352

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Incident occurred on SFO FMS Bridge Visual to Runway 28R. First Officer has recently completed IOE and had not yet consolidated; so was prohibited from taking off or landing at SFO. Captain allowed First Officer to fly the STAR to practice VNAV descents and took the aircraft once it was established on final; (Runway 28R FMS Bridge Visual). As the aircraft was vectored to intercept the final course; a TCAS traffic warning sounded for traffic intercepting final for Runway 28R and quickly went away. Captain and First Officer were visual with the traffic; which was intercepting final for Runway 28L. First Officer was still flying as the aircraft turned to intercept final using LNAV; while the Captain monitored the traffic; which was now established on final for Runway 28L and very close.Both pilots were distracted by the proximity of the traffic and the fact that the aircraft was belly up to the traffic on the turn to final; making it hard to visually clear; but also recognized that the aircraft needed to slow down. First Officer called for flaps 10 at approximately 208-210 kts. IAS; Captain moved the flap handle then both pilots verbalized that the Flaps 10 speed was 205 - the Captain immediately moved the flap handle back into the flaps 5 position as it appeared that the flaps had not yet started moving. After this the Captain took the controls and configured normally for the approach; calling the field in sight while monitoring the traffic on Runway 28L final.At approximately 1;500 feet; the Captain called for the landing checklist and both pilots saw that the flaps were still at 5 degrees. The Captain elected to go-around and directed the First Officer to call Tower for missed approach instructions. The First Officer never heard any Go-around callouts so the go-around was non-standard.Once the First Officer told tower that the AC was going around; ATC replied with a barrage of instructions and questions; so it's likely that the First Officer did not hear the Captain's callouts. Once the aircraft was leveled off at 5;000 feet and stable; the Captain announced that the gear was still down. The First Officer and Captain decided to leave it down since the aircraft had been turned for a downwind approach for Runway 28L and would be ready for a turn to final soon.The Captain flew the aircraft and the First Officer got in the QRH. The crew ran the FLAPS - TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE checklist. The flap moved up with no problems so the crew called the checklist complete and 'proceeded normally' per the checklist. The Captain briefed the ILS Runway 28L approach; the First Officer requested vectors to final with ATC. The Captain configured normally and made an uneventful approach and landing.

First Officer was Pilot Flying the FMS Bridge Visual Runway 28R at SFO. Since the First Officer was not yet consolidated; the plan was for him to fly the aircraft until approximately 1;500 ft. on the approach fully configured for landing and then we would transfer aircraft control for Captain landing.We were given several speed restrictions on the approach. Speed 210kts; speed 180kts; speed 160kts. There was also traffic in close proximity to Runway 28L causing both a threat and a distraction. During slowdown phase we were above the ATC requested speed with flaps 5 and speed brake in flight detent. The First Officer as Pilot Flying called for flaps 10 at 210 kts. At that moment as Pilot Monitoring; I was looking at the traffic next to us to ensure safe separation. I began to move the flap lever and had not checked the speed. The First Officer immediately recognized the mistake and said something about speed. I recognized we were at 210 kts. and I reacted and moved the flap handle back to 5. The flaps indicated 5.At that point the First Officer called for gear down; then flaps 10. Then from what I remember he called for flaps 30 landing checklist. That is the point I recognized the flaps indicated 5 degrees with the flap handle set to 30. We have a brief exchange about going around and we transferred aircraft control and began the go around at about 1;500 ft. AGL with the auto pilot on. We moved the flap handle back to flaps 5. The flaps did not go beyond flaps 5. The aircraft next to us on Runway 28L was directly abeam and same altitude. I pushed the power up and as we called for a go-around.Tower directed us to fly runway heading climb to 3;000 ft. I apparently had not pushed the TOGA button because the auto pilot was still engaged. I dialed in runway heading 284 degrees and selected heading select. The aircraft began a slight left turn towards the aircraft abeam on approach to Runway 28L which made me uncomfortable so I disconnect the auto pilot and turned back to the right to fly slightly right of the Runway 28R center line. I sensed the aircraft was not climbing as expected which brought my attention to redo the go-around procedure. I called TOGA going around flaps 5 (distraction) check thrust positive rate gear up set missed approach altitude.. I called heading select; level change set speed 180. Tower directed us to climb to 4;000 ft.I asked the First Officer to pull out the checklist. I can remember being concerned about our fuel so I felt the need to be expeditious. Tower then turned us to the south for approach to Runway 28L. We did not raise the gear or did we notice the gear was down or accomplish an after takeoff checklist. I also asked the First Officer to call flight attendants to let them know what was going on. I sent a quick note to Dispatch about the flap issue. On downwind; Tower climbed us to 5;000 ft. I reprogrammed the FMS for ILS 28L. We finished the checklist by moving flap lever to flaps 2 and the flaps moved to flaps 2. I did not fully comprehend the cause of the flap malfunction for another few moments. I distinctly remember thinking 'what is that noise' which was the gear being down. That's when I realized the gear was down. We configured to flaps 10 to test the flaps and elected to leave the gear down since we were abeam the runway. We finished a visual approach and landing to Runway 28L and taxied to the gate. We debriefed the incident in detail.Plenty of lessons learned for a fairly new Captain without previous 737 experience and a brand new First Officer in SFO. Fatigue was a factor. Inexperience was a factor. The threat from the aircraft on Runway 28L was a factor. A TCAS RA on final was a factor. The non-practiced go around from approximately 1;200 ft. was a factor. The step climb was a factor. Our experience level was a factor. I feel we muddled through the problem which lends credit to our overall flying experience and training. We both remained very calm. It was not pretty but a very valuable experience.

B737 flight crew reported becoming distracted; resulting in an unstabilized approach followed by a go-around.


Other / Unknown; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working the combined RADAR/D-Side position and received a handoff from ZAU Sector 75 on Air Carrier Y; and also noticed a PVD Data Block on Air Carrier X from the same sector appear on my screen. The Data Block on Air Carrier X appeared to be a point out to me; and I expected a call as such from ZAU 75. Instead; I received a call from ZAU 75 requesting approval for Air Carrier Y to climb from FL280 to FL320. The ZAU Controller first said Air Carrier Z; to which I responded 'Where is he?'; then Air Carrier YZ; then finally Air Carrier Y. I approved the climb to FL320 on Air Carrier Y and after terminating the call; entered an assigned altitude of FL320 in the Data Block of Air Carrier Y. A short time later; less than a minute; I received a call from ZAU 75 Controller again; and he/she wanted to know why I put FL320 in 'his/her' Data Block; and then stated they could do it when they actually issued it to the pilot. I responded that I had control of the Data Block and as such I would enter the altitude. The Controller tried to explain to me that they would use a /OK to enter the altitude when they issued the clearance; and that what I did was not correct because it did not reflect what the aircraft was doing; because I had no way to know that they had issued the climb clearance. The Controller also related that I was not supposed to change his\her Data Block because I was not talking to the pilot. I said that it was my Data Block since I already had the hand off; and he/she had already gotten approval for the climb from me. The Controller stated that he/she was just the D-Side; and had to get approval first; [and] then coordinate with her R-Side; and they had other airplanes so he might not do it right away. I stated I had no way to know that; and asked when I was supposed to put the altitude in the Data Block; and was told I was not supposed to do it; they would do it when the pilot received the clearance. I told the Controller that if there was a delay in giving the pilot the altitude; he/she should have coordinated that with me. At this time; I observed Air Carrier Y climbing; so obviously there was little delay between the APPREQ and the altitude clearance. I stated I could not believe we were even arguing about this at all. At that time I hung up the line and got back to my airplanes. Shortly afterwards I noticed Air Carrier X clip the NE corner of my sector; and realized that in the confusion/frustration that followed the phone call; the ZAU D-75 Controller never did actually make the pointout on Air Carrier X; which clipped the NE corner of my sector without coordination. The ZAU D-75 Controller spent so much time and attention on something insignificant that he/she neglected to do something more important; which was the pointout on Air Carrier X. In the days of the HOST computer; this event would not have occurred for this reason because the transferring Controller would not have been able to see me change the altitude after making the handoff; thus would not have felt the need to call me and tell me that what I did was wrong; since there was no way to see what I had done. Now that several ARTCCs are on ERAM; perhaps there needs to be a clarification of just when it is OK to enter a new altitude after it has been coordinated; and by whom. Once the handoff is made; coordination is required on subsequent changes to the flight plan; and perhaps it can be stated then; who will enter the changes. Suggesting the regular use of the /OK function; as the ZAU D-75 Controller did; is opening the door to making an error; since the override (/OK) function is in place to enhance safety by helping to prevent the accidental alteration of a Data Block which is not under your control. This is a new system; with new behavior; and until more controllers get used to it there will be some confusion; which is to be expected. There is a function in ERAM; called Local Interim Altitude; which would have probably obviated the coordinating controller's need to call me and attempt to correct my methods; since they could have entered FL280 as a Local Interim Altitude; and that would have overridden the display of the assigned altitude of FL320 in their Data Block. They could have then removed the local altitude when they issued the climb clearance. This still would not change what I did; since I expected the aircraft to start climbing in the next minute or so; and was changing my own Data Block to reflect that climb. I had no reason to believe that there would be much of a delay in the clearance being issued; and was not concerned about it; either way. I don't know how to prevent a similar occurrence if someone gets so distracted by nitpicking someone else's procedures that they neglect their own; more important duties.

ZMP Controller described an unsafe condition relating to the confusion regarding who is authorized to change Data Block information and when those changes can be made.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Initial Climb; Initial Approach; Descent; Cruise; Climb

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I'm working R2 with heavy traffic and lots of VFR going to TNCM with a lot of Airliners inbound to TNCM.  The VFR's are various types.  They can make well over 10;000 MSL and go over 200 knots.  They are constantly in the middle of the departure and inbound gate of TNCM airport above 15;000 MSL.  They are constantly in the way and we gave them advisories and turns but sometimes you don't have a lot of choices where to turn them.  Is a really dangerous corridor.  Also aircraft landing TKPK and TKPN descent to 6000 MSL over GABAR and we constantly encounter VFR aircraft at 6;500 over GABAR and all of this is non radar area. They need to regulate VFR traffic around this areas.  They are constantly approaching IFR aircraft at low altitude and non radar.  Specially on weekends that TNCM and TKPK get heavy Traffic.

ZSU Controller describes an area in the vicinity of TNCM airport with a lot of VFR traffic and area in the departure and inbound gate for IFR arrivals.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

This was the first leg of a three-day trip. When the Captain arrived at the airplane; the first thing that he said to me after sitting down in his seat was; 'I don't brief anything.' I said; 'Seriously?' He replied; 'Yes. I use my brain power for more important things.' He failed to brief the departure; or any other flight concerns. Prior to descent on the PINNG1 Arrival into PHX; he failed to brief the arrival and cross check the fixes. I checked them myself; and selected the arrival runway to add the appropriate fixes at the bottom of the arrival. Approaching the BRDEY intersection; there is a speed restriction of 250 knots. The Captain asked ATC for relief on the speed; and it was granted. He then accelerated to 320 knots for the rest of the descent. He leveled off at 10;000 FT to slow in anticipation of the restriction at PUKRE; between 8000 and 9000 FT. When he realized that he needed to descend to 9000 FT; he pushed the nose over and flew at 275 knots down to 9000 FT to make the altitude restriction. The next conflict came for the restriction at FINAP between 5000 and 6000 FT. I told him that we were going to be high; as the vertical trend showed 500 feet high and growing. He said that it would be close enough. I contacted ATC to tell them that we would be high; and they told us to go direct to the field and cleared us for a visual approach. We flew the approach and landed without further incident. The Captain needs to be retrained and given another check ride to make sure that he follows Company procedures and FARs. I also will not leave the gate with another Captain that tells me that they don't do any briefings.

B737 First Officer is informed by his Captain on the first flight of the trip that he does not give briefings. The First Officer describes the errors that occur during the first RNAV arrival.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

We were straight 31's operations. Aircraft X was straight inbound to runway 31R. He was gaining on the traffic ahead of him (also a 'D' wake class) and he was losing separation. I tried to adjust his speed control but then I realized he was going to lose separation with the traffic behind him also. So I told him to go around when he was losing the 3 miles of required separation. The traffic ahead of him was still around 1800 feet and there was another aircraft at about Aircraft X's 8 o'clock and less than 2 miles at 2000 feet inbound for RWY 31L. So I told Aircraft X to climb and maintain 3000' on runway heading to get the required separation with the aircraft he was following as well as the one inbound for the parallel. It was at this time that I noticed an 'F' tag (which are suppressed on my TDW [Tower Display Workstation] pref-set because there is usually no need for me to see FRG's radar tags) tracking across my final eastbound at 3000'; about 2 miles directly ahead of Aircraft X. I told Aircraft X to immediately descend to 2000' and then issued the traffic which was at his 11:30 to 12 o'clock and a mile and a half; 3000' (Aircraft X was currently at about 2600' and descending back to 2000'). I also issued him the traffic for the parallel as well; I am not sure if there was the required stagger separation at this point. Aircraft X continued on radar vectors and was switched back to approach and landed at JFK later without incident. The weather was closing in at this point and I was issuing the RVRs as they had come down to around 4000 or 5000' RVR. The ceiling was low; and I couldn't see anything out the windows. LGA was on the LOC RWY 31; so I had no options with Aircraft X. I understand that JFK airspace only goes up to 2000'; but approach should not be bringing IFR traffic across my final at 3000' when I have no other out in this configuration. I couldn't turn Aircraft X left because of the traffic landing RWY 31L; I couldn't turn him right because of LGA's Localizer 31 traffic; and I couldn't climb him because of the crossing traffic. Approach put me in a situation where I was handed two aircraft with 3.2 miles of separation on final with strong compression and was bound to lose separation with no conceivable way to regain it. There should be a stipulation in the SOP that we should be allowed to take aircraft to 3000 feet when approach is landing both 31s and LGA is on the LOC31; otherwise we have no out. If the crossing traffic was at 4000'; this would not have been an issue.

Controller reported issuing and then having to modify a go-around clearance to a due to loss of separation.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

We were supposed to fly a ferry flight from a Contract Maintenance facility. The aircraft had undergone a routine maintenance check; and several enroute checks had to be performed in order to return the aircraft to ETOPS status. On of the checks to be performed was a high altitude cold-soaked APU start. In order to have the time to perform this test we were filed south toward before turning north towards our final destination. We departed at and leveled off at FLT 400 about 30 minutes after departure. Shortly after leveling off at our cursing altitude; I felt several cabin surges +; -1000 FT per minute. I ran the QRH checklist labeled ENG BLEED OFF - L (R) we did not regain the L Bleed valve; so according to the checklist the L Bleed switch was left in the off position. At the completion of the checklist we were not experiencing any cabin surges; however I was smelling an unusual odor (hot ducting/warm plastic or rubber). I asked the First Officer if he smelled anything unusual; and he said that he was not smelling anything. Because we did not have flight attendants I decided that a cabin inspection was in order. I asked the First Officer to walk back to the end of the cabin in the left aisle; check the cabin and lavatories on that side and come back it the cockpit on the right side; repeating the checks performed on the left. I put on my oxygen mask and the First Officer left the cockpit; and performed the cabin checks. About 5 minutes after the First Officer returned to the cockpit I felt a slight vibration on the floor. I told the First Officer to put his mask on his mask; turn his speaker on and establish communications with me. I also turned on all exterior lights and ignition to CONT. I was in the process of asking Center for lower; when the R ENG BLEED OVHT light came on; followed by a rapid increase of cabin alt. I contacted Center and advised them that we needed an immediate descend to 10;000; because we were losing control of our cabin. The Controller gave us a descend to FL 240 and the First Officer started the decent. When he pulled back the throttles the cabin rate of climb increased to the point that I tough it was best to declare and emergency. I declared the emergency and took control of the aircraft. I told the First Officer to set the transponder to 7700 and run the checklist for the R ENG BLEED OVHT since we already had completed all the steps on the emergency decent checklist. He ran the checklist; and for a moment it looked like we were going to get control of the cabin; but it was only a momentary surge in cabin pressure. During the emergency decent in the high 20's we got a master warning when the cabin altitude reached 10;000 feet. Somewhere around FL240 I looked at the cabin altitude and I thought I saw the cabin at about 10;000 FT; but I'm not sure if this is accurate because of the viewing angle from the left seat. When we leveled of at 10;000 FT we momentarily removed our masks and checked for fumes. We both this time we both smelled what I had smelled earlier at cruise. We put our mask on and I attempted to call Dispatch to coordinate the next move. While we were attempting to contact Dispatch we decided it was best to land at the nearest suitable airport. We were about 20 miles south of a large station so we advised Center that we wold like vectors for Runway X. When Dispatch contacted us we told them of our decision and the said the we going to help coordinate our unexpected arrival with our Station personnel. I then momentarily removed my mask to check for fumes and I could not detect any fumes; we decided to remove our masks. The Approach Controller asked me if I wanted the to roll the truck down the runway; I told him to have the ready to roll but I did not see any reason to have them follow us down the runway. We landed and followed the 'follow me' to the Company ramp.

A B767 on a Maintenance ferry flight at FL400 lost pressurization after both packs tripped and the aircraft developed a hot odor; so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and after an emergency descent the flight diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We were in the final phase of the flight. Captain announced our descent and advised the Flight Attendants to prepare cabin for arrival; seat belt sign was turned ON and Flight Attendant A made the arrival announcement. I was securing my beverage cart when 2 passengers approached me in the aft galley: Passenger A asked to use the LAV; I advised her that the LAV was occupied [Passenger C]. Passenger B asked me for another drink. I advised him that my cart was secured and we were making our descent. (He appeared agitated; so I told him I would try to accommodate him as best as I could given the amount of time remaining.) It was at that time the aircraft was hit by turbulence. Passenger A was thrown onto the galley floor and she landed on her back. I was thrown into R2 and landed on my left shoulder and my left forearm hit the door handle. Passenger B was able to brace himself then helped Passenger A up from the floor. I asked Passenger A if she was alright and she said 'yes' (although clearly shaken). I advised everyone to return to their seat immediately. I asked Passenger A if she was able to walk back to her seat unaided and she said she was. I secured myself in my jump seat. Captain called on the interphone to advise we had just flown into the wake of another aircraft. He asked if everyone was OK and I advised him that a passenger had fallen on the galley floor and I was thrown into R2. I advised the Captain that I would have to file a [report] since the incident involved a possible passenger injury. Captain and I confirmed the seatbelt sign was ON during the event. Passenger C in the LAV exited and I asked her if she was ok; she assured me she was fine then returned to her seat. I approached Passenger A and got her identifying information for my incident report. I asked her again if she was okay and she said she was fine. My intent was to address Passenger B as well; but at that time I heard the second double hi-low; so I had to complete my compliance and get back into my jump seat. Unfortunately; after landing; I could not reach Passenger B to get identifying information from him.

Flight Attendant reported that wake turbulence during approach caused injury to herself and two passengers.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Sector 32 was placed in a highly dangerous and unsafe situation. I was training a D-side and had to jump in and take over; the sector was overloaded with traffic and extremely complex and warranted a CPC; [Certified Professional Controller] D-side and an L-side. There was moderate to extreme precipitation in Bay 2 and TMU [Traffic Management Unit] decided to route their traffic through our sector with little to no restrictions. We were working three flows of PHL arrivals with no in trail spacing. One flow from Bay 6; one from ZTL; and one from sector 36. Blending these three flows in to one with aircraft deviating was proving to be very difficult and complex. We were also working two flows of DCA's and BWI's with no restrictions. We were told that there would only be 2 or 3; but we ended up being overloaded. We had coordinated that aircraft to enter the sector level at FL250 and in trail; but we were getting multiple flows with aircraft descending from high altitudes. During this time we were also dealing with a massive departure push; moderate chop/turbulence and frequency congestion.There were 45+ aircraft in the EDST [En Route Decision Support Tool]; and the sector was alerted red and overloaded;however we were receiving no help from TMU. At one point an L-side had to plug in because the sector was getting out of hand and there were so many aircraft that  it was difficult to see where aircraft were going. This was compounded by the fact that the other sectors in bay 5 were also overloaded. There needs to be better planning; and restrictions put in place to avoid overloading sectors. The strategy of pumping all traffic through a single sector/point is dangerous.

ZDC Center Controller reported the Traffic Management Unit and Management failed to help during a weather event which resulted in unsafe overloaded sectors.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

I have recently learned that the new pilot crew meals being served to flight crews [are packaged] in black plastic trays. These trays are being placed in the aircraft convection ovens to be cooked. The material of this tray is plastic.  I have been informed that flight attendants are not issued ceramic cooking plates and are placing the plastic trays directly on the rack in the ovens. If the flight attendant is distracted they find the plastic tray is melting and what was described to me as being 'shrink wrapped' around the meal. Please do not mistake this as a meal complaint or a quality issue this is a safety issue. I would like to receive notification; by bulletin; from the company that these containers may or may not be placed in the oven.  [Flight attendants must be copied on the bulletin as well]. I also was told that the flight attendants also place the plastic that the rolls are shipped in in the ovens as well. This is also plastic. I called the duty Captain yesterday; who was unfazed by the process or by what I communicated to him and told me to write the union. Thus; there are now two issues at hand. One; the safety situation and Two; the Duty Captain's failure to take the issue seriously. This is not a contract complaint or a grievance issue.  This is what I believe to be a potential fire problem; unless the tray or container and plastic bag is rated for oven use and will not burn. I have advised the pilot's union Air Safety Committee and the Flight Attendant's Safety Chair.  I will also copy the company's Corporate Safety V.P. as well. I would like to receive a definitive response and have it be communicated to all pilots and flight attendants. If there are procedures already in place; then we need to have new and direct communication to the crews on the proper handling of the products and what can and can not be placed in the ovens.

An air carrier Captain reported new flight crew meals are being boarded in plastic containers that are unsuitable for heating in the aircraft convection ovens; shrinking severely and threatening to be combustible.  A flight manager's response to the reporter's concerns was dismissive.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

ILS XX into ZZZ. I was pilot flying; following the incorrect glideslope and got a low altitude alert from Pittsburgh Tower and recovered immediately. Complacency played a role on my part as well as the Captain who was Pilot monitoring. To prevent this from occurring in the future; I will open the approach plates regardless of weather conditions to ensure proper configuration.

C208 First Officer reported descending below the glideslope and receiving a low altitude alert from ATC.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 10

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After takeoff at approximately 500 feet; after retracting the landing gear the engine started skipping. It appeared to be some sort of fuel issue so I switched on the emergency electric fuel pumps and this did help a little. The engine was running very rough so I headed back to the airport. With the windy conditions and poorly running engine I was barely able to reach the airport runway. I was trying to fly the plane and due to insufficient time and preparation I did not extend the landing gear; which was the reason of the gear up landing.

C210 pilot reported an engine problem after takeoff that resulted in a gear up landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Unsure of what the cause was. The Controller said that 3;000 feet was the minimum vectoring altitude at that point. The aircraft took off from ZZZ enroute to MDT. After being told to proceed direct to HAR VOR from Center; unsure of which Center; was then handed off to Harrisburg Approach; we were told to descend to 3;000 feet; and then handed off to Harrisburg Tower. Passing over the HAR VOR at 3;000 feet per ATC instructions we were cleared for the straight in ILS 13 approach from Tower; that is when we received a EGPWS terrain warning alarm. I was the Pilot Flying at the time and executed the terrain avoidance procedure. Reaching 3;600 feet the warning stopped and the Tower Controller asked about the sudden change in altitude. We leveled off picked up on the glideslope and continued to land without incident. The Captain asked for the number to the Tower and called when we landed to see why it occurred. The Tower Controller had apparently already been relieved from the shift at that point.This approach should be reviewed by the FAA to ensure that the TERPS minima is still active near the HAR VOR. The MSA is 3;400 feet and aircraft are being sent below the MSA by the controllers.

Air carrier First Officer reported being vectored below MSA during approach to MDT airport; resulting in a GPWS warning.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After takeoff; we raised the landing gear and received an ECAM warning for HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR (loss of G system hydraulic pressure).We were handed off from tower to departure control and as Captain; I [advised ATC] with departure control and requested delaying vectors to remain in the area while we accomplished emergency checklist procedures. We advised departure that we would be returning. As a safety precaution; we requested Fire and Rescue to be standing by for the landing.Two flight attendants called the flight deck to report unusual noises and a smell. I told them I was aware of the problem and that we would be returning to [our departure airport]. I also advised them we were addressing the issue and that I would get back with them in a few minutes.We completed all ECAM actions and QRH follow-up procedures. We sent an ACARS divert message to dispatch advising of our return.I briefed the Flight Attendants of the problem. I told them that we would be returning to [our departure airport] and to prepare the cabin for a normal landing. I told them I would also do a PA to the passengers. I briefed the passengers and told them we would be returning to [our departure airport] and making a normal landing; not to worry and to follow the instructions of our flight attendants.We advised the controllers that we might not be able to clear the runway due to a loss of nose-wheel steering. I called Operations to advise them of our situation and the fact that we would require being tugged to a gate once we landed due to a loss of the nose-wheel steering.We flew an uneventful approach and accomplished a normal landing. We were able to exit the runway at the high speed taxi-way exit.Fire and Rescue examined the aircraft and reported leaking hydraulic fluid; the right main gear door being extended and no other apparent damage to the aircraft. Operations personnel reported to the aircraft; pinned the landing gear and then tugged the aircraft to the gate.Upon arrival to the gate; I entered an aircraft maintenance logbook write-up for an overweight landing and for the loss of the G Hydraulic System. I spoke briefly with Maintenance personnel to answer any questions they might have. I also contacted Dispatch to insure they were aware of the situation.

After takeoff the first indication of the problem was a nose gear slow to retract. After which a series of ECAMs displayed. It was evident pretty quickly that we had lost most; if not all; of our green system hydraulic fluid. [We advised ATC] and ECAM/QRH procedures were followed. Also at this time; the flight attendants informed us of a strong odor/fumes in the cabin. During the process of completing the checklists the Yellow hydraulic system began show an overheat condition. This led us to redirect our priorities more toward a quicker return to [our departure airport]. We landed overweight without nose wheel steering. [Fire and Rescue] inspected the airplane and found a significant amount of hydraulic fluid leaking; but. No other concerns. We were towed to the gate.

A320 flight crew reported that the nose gear was slow to retract and a series of ECAM messages appeared indicating most of the green hydraulic system was lost.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 750

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After reaching cruise altitude of 6;000 MSL and setting cruise power I heard a bang and the aircraft exhibited a medium to high rate of vibration in the floor. I verified engine operation was good and looked for any missing [aircraft components]. Not being able to find the problem I canceled my IFR flight plan with Approach and turned toward a nearby suitable airport. I slowed to 120 MPH and begin a 500 foot per minute descent. As the aircraft remained controllable I determined I could be on ground at same time if I continued to back to my departure airport. Upon landing the vibration got worse as aircraft was in flare. On landing rollout I noticed the left spinner was moving about one inch side to side and so I shut down the left engine. The prop stopped with a damaged blade end up. I taxied single engine to the hanger and secured the aircraft.Post flight inspection revealed four inches of one of the left prop [blades was] missing. The left side of the aircraft; just forward of the prop center line; had damage with a dent and cracked gel coat to the fiberglass nose at the battery jumper connection. There was no known prior impact to the blade or history of prop damage.

A PA30B; Twin Comanche; pilot canceled his IFR clearance and returned to his departure airport after experiencing significant vibration ultimately found to be the result of the loss of several inches of one left prop blade which had broken off and struck the fuselage.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 31C

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We operated Aircraft X from ZZZ to MDW; and the majority of the flight was uneventful. Mr. Y was my Captain and PF; and we had setup well in advance for the RNAV RNP Y approach for Runway 22L at MDW according to their latest ATIS. Later we received an ATIS update showing that the ILS for Runway 31C was active; so we re-configured and briefed that; still with plenty of time. We had discussed the possible need of diverting to ZZZ1 rather than our filed ALT1 of ZZZ2 and ALT2 of ZZZ3; but the visibility at MDW stayed above the minimums we needed for either the RNAV or ILS approaches to 22L/31C respectively.Fast forward to our first approach attempt: we're established on the ILS to 31C; fully configured well before the FAF and I was thinking we've got it made. We broke out at around 1;700 MSL and inflight visibility was not an issue and better than reported. From around 2;000 feet and down we experienced constant light and moderate turbulence; but no icing or precipitation. Captain had turned the autopilot and autothrottles off to help deal with the winds that were gusting from 260 degrees at 21 to 39 knots. We were also landing with stall protection ice speeds; adding 10 knots to our Vref and Vapp speeds.Everything was going great until somewhere between 1/2 to 1 mile from the approach end of 31C we got multiple 'WINDSHEAR' automated call outs from the airplane. Captain elected to go-around which we did; re-configuring as needed and I let MDW Tower know at around 400 feet AGL per the SOP. They gave us a heading and altitude to fly; asked us the reason for the go-around and handed us back off to Chicago Approach. We cleaned up the airplane and got vectored in for another ILS approach to 31C behind an Air Carrier Y.The second ILS approach was almost identical to the first; albeit with slightly less wind and turbulence. This time; even though we were ready for the conditions and knew more of what to expect; we managed to catch a gust of wind right in the flare and didn't touch down on Runway 31C until between the first third and the midpoint of the runway. Captain did a great job of thinking quick and performed a rejected landing; setting and calling 'TOGA' almost immediately after touchdown and off we went. We reconfigured again; got vectored around and handed off to Chicago Approach again and came around for a third attempt at Runway 31C.The third time Captain was able to land normally and well within the touchdown zone; but when he applied the brakes we found out that the '5/5/5' runway condition codes advertised for 31C were optimistic at best with the airplane noticeably sliding and skidding as we rolled out. We also noticed that there was blowing snow obscuring at least 50 percent of the runway surface. Captain advised MDW Tower of the braking action we experienced; calling it 'poor' and; to their credit; they immediately directed the broom and plow teams out to clear Runway 31C again. The rest of the flight was normal as we taxied into our gate.If there's anything I learned tonight; it's that just because you're on short final that doesn't mean you're going to land. Also: just because the Air Carrier Y flight that landed ahead of you reported 'braking action good' doesn't mean you will. I remember being on short final during our first ILS approach to 31C feeling complacent that we 'had it made' being on the ILS rather than RNAV RNP approach with its higher minimums and having broken out early at 1;700 feet. My go-around call outs also could have been crisper and more prompt; but that was mostly due to the 'startle' factor which was my own fault.My one suggestion would be for the airport operations crews at MDW to conduct their own braking action tests more often and with a more pessimistic eye. When the ATIS states RCCs are '5/5/5' the Air Carrier Y flight that landed ahead of you reports 'braking action good' and yet you experience significant wheel slip/skid due to icy runway surface conditions upon landing; thatindicates someone is being either dishonest or overly optimistic on their own braking action reports. If we or our Dispatch had known that the 'real' RCCs for 31C at MDW were actually 3/3/3 or even 2/2/2; we most likely would not have had the required landing performance numbers that we needed to land at MDW's shorter runways and would've gone to ZZZ1.

Air carrier First Officer reported having to go-around/missed approach several times due to weather at MDW airport.  When they finally landed the crew experienced some sliding and skidding due to braking action being 'poor' contrary to the reported 'good braking action.'


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

There is a Large Force Exercise (LFE). The stationary ALTRV (Altitude Reservation) is set for 14;000 to 17;900. The NOTAM for this ALTRV was filed for XB:00 to XF:00. The paperwork and agreement for the LFE was to activate the ALTRV at XB:30. Cowboy called the area on the phone and requested the airspace (including the ALTRV) 45 minutes early. XA:45. I informed the supervisor (who I believe was not in charge of the area at the time; but was in the area not on sector) that the airspace was not NOTAM'd below FL180 and that we could not release it. She scoffed at me and continued to allow the coordination to continue. The airspace was released to Cowboy Control at XA:45. I took the sector soon after my concerns for the rules and the safety of the flying public were disregarded.Aircraft X called for VFR flight following soon after I took the sector. My trainee informed the aircraft that his route of flight wasn't going to be allowed because of the ALTRV. The pilot questioned us and asked for the NOTAM number. The embarrassing thing is that had our facility complied with the very clear times printed on the NOTAM available to us; as Federal Regulation requires; the aircraft would have been clear of the ALTRV before activation. Additionally; the jurisdiction of the airspace released in the ALTRV (again; 14;000 to 17;900) didn't belong to ZLC. Mountain Home RAPCON had been given the airspace underlying that ALTRV 16;000 and below. It became evident to us on the sector that Mountain Home RAPCON had not been notified of the release of airspace to a Military Radar Unit when they called to request additional airspace (FL230 and below). This whole fiasco had no business in the NAS. It has become clear to me that if the military asks for airspace; I must allow them to use it regardless of NOTAM status; airspace jurisdiction; or safety to the flying public. When I confronted the supervisor about the discrepancy in ZLC's actions and federal regulation; the response I received made it clear that I was in the wrong. I will now train any incoming controllers that releasing airspace to the military is of utmost importance. I will also urge and explain to my coworkers that this is how it works. We are not to follow federal regulations if it at all imposes an inconvenience or delay to a military entity.

ZLC Center Controller reported that an altitude reservation was started earlier than planned which caused an aircraft to have to alter its route.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was notified that my check ride was not valid due to the Examiner not being current in his role as a Check Airman. An Excel spreadsheet would aid in tracking the due dates associated with names of our check airman. They can be linked to Google calendar.

A pilot reported the Examiner giving them a check ride was not current in their Check Airman role.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

After reviewing the logbook for Aircraft X. I proceeded with the rest of my preflight procedure; which was to include looking at all messages displayed on the EICAS. I came across an advisory message ANTISKID OFF on the EICAS; which had OFF displayed in amber in the Antiskid Button with the switch on and a discrete light ANTISKID displayed on the upper overhead panel. I have never seen this message or lights on any aircraft; including Aircraft X in the past. Because I had never seen this before; I called Maintenance Control and asked about the message. MX (Maintenance) Control had me release the parking brake; and the EICAS message and OFF and ANTISKID lights extinguished. The MX Controller said this was normal and that the message would go out after pushback with the brakes released. We were almost 45 minutes late for a pushback due to late loading. We pushed; and after engine start; the ground crew advised me to set the parking brake; which I complied with. Upon setting the parking brake; the ANTISKID OFF EICAS; Antiskid button OFF; and the ANTISKID discrete lights all illuminated. This left the airplane with two Advisory Level EICAS Messages. I pulled out the Crew Deferral Checklist and followed it; because we had pushed back; we were now onto the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) and the MEL/CDL (Minimum Equipment List/Configuration Deviation List). I quickly looked up ANTISKID in the Aircraft X MEL (Minimum Equipment List); and it was not flight crew deferrable. I then told the ground person to stay with the airplane because we had a maintenance issue. I first called MX Control again to notify them of the issue. After explaining the issue; MX Control told me to release the Parking Brake; I did; and all EICAS Messages and lights extinguished. MX Control told me this was normal and that I should depart. However; as I explained; I could not take the aircraft out without MX looking at it; because I had never seen these messages; nor do our MEL/CDL Book; GOM; or FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual) allow us to depart with an issue; other than a Status Message. After about 25 minutes of discussing the issue; I told MX Control we were going to go back into the gate. As the ground people were getting ready for us to power back into the gate; I decided to call the Chief Pilot. I explained the exact situation to the Chief Pilot; but was told the same thing; that messages were normal and that I should depart. I declined to depart and went into the gate. After safely parking at the gate; I called the Chief Pilot again. I explained I had opted to have MX look over the airplane. I also informed the Chief Pilot that; the First Officer and I would be comfortable taking the airplane to ZZZ1; provided we had written documentation that the messages were normal. (Much like the ACARS messages on the EICAS Screen on some airplanes a year or so ago. The message was part of the COI; indicating the message was a nuisance and should be disregarded.) The Chief Pilot told me that is what the MX Representatives were doing. I took a picture of the log page after the MX Representatives had signed it off. The First Officer and I both agreed that the entry was sufficient to allow us to depart. We departed without further incident; except the same EICAS Message; and two Discrete lights were present with the Parking Brake set and would extinguish after the Parking Brake was released. Enroute to ZZZ1; I looked through both logbooks again; and was surprised to see that the ANTISKID OFF issue had been written up twice before in the days before this incident. The first write up had the ANTISKID System Deferred. With a Corrective Action the following flight day of changing a control unit. Another day later; the same write up occurred with a return to the gate with a revision by the Captain; of entered in error. Upon reviewing the logbooks; a second time and discovering I had missed the history of the same messages; I felt that I had departed in error from ZZZ. Welanded without incident in ZZZ1 and parked; I made another entry into the aircraft logbook about the ANTISKID OFF EICAS and associated Discrete Lights.First; make sure to more adequately review the aircraft write-ups to establish an aircraft history. Second; do not cave to pressure from Management or MX Control to depart with a discrepancy. Additionally; MX Control informed us that according to the MX Manual; the messages were considered normal; however; this condition was in no way normal; which makes the MX Manuals and Flight Crew Manuals in a probable disagreement.

B767 pilot encountered advisory message after pushback.


Flight Crew Total 3380; Flight Crew Type 801

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Whilst on Atlantic Track Y offset 1 NM right; we deviated an additional 1R for wake turbulence. At that point we discovered we were still in the wake and deviated an additional 1R. Shortly after we received via CPDLC; 'standard SLOP (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure) is 1-2 miles not 3.' We corrected back to the left 1 mile and requested a deviation of 3 miles from the track. The request was granted and reported when no longer deviating. No further comments from CPDLC. Captain was briefed immediately upon his return from break.

B767 flight crew reported they exceeded Atlantic track offset limits in an attempt to avoid wake turbulence.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Upon approach to LSE the F.O. (First Officer) was cleared for a visual approach 10 miles west of the airport at 2800 ft AGL. The F.O. made a wide (8 Mile) left downwind for runway 36 and attempted to make an immediate descent to 1500 ft AGL. I told him not to descend we were too far out but that we needed to slow down. While I was looking for traffic and talking to tower the F.O. started an immediate descent to 1500 ft AGL. When I told him to stop the descent I noticed a group of towers ahead of us. I took the controls and initiated a climb but it was too late. We received an alert from the EGPWS for an obstacle and to climb. Once clear of the towers I landed uneventfully.

Air carrier flight crew reported encountering an EGPWS activation during a visual approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2.3; Flight Crew Total 87.4; Flight Crew Type 80.7

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Shortly after landing; the plane started to shake substantially and pulled toward the left. I'm not sure whether I did not apply right rudder quickly/strongly enough; or if there was an issue with the plane that contributed (e.g. right brake less effective then left); but in any case I was unable to maintain sufficient control and the plane left the runway on the left side; going through a small section of grass before re-entering a paved taxiway. It is possible that the fact that I was flying with a friend who is a fairly new student pilot affected the quality of my performance; as I could have been worried about what he would think of my landing compared to how his instructor has been teaching him. In the future I will be more aware of the need to continue 'flying the plane' even after landing; and less concerned with the possible judgment of passengers.

C150 pilot experiences substantial shaking and the aircraft pulling to the left on touch down; resulting in a runway excursion.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We were flying the transition to the WAVUN.ONE arrival. Miami ARTCC descended us from FL400 to FL360. Later we were given 'pilot's discretion' to FL240. The TOD on the FMC showed the descent would not begin for over 40 NM. It was at that time I decided to brief the approach. During the brief I admit that I did not see the note to 'expect to cross DEKAL Intersection at 6;000 FT and 250 KTS.' Since neither the pilot not flying nor I noticed the restriction we neglected to enter it into the FMS. Shortly thereafter; Miami gave us a 'descend now' clearance to FL240; which we began to execute. During the descent Miami changed the instructions to 'expedite through FL260 and descend to FL180; then cross DEKAL Intersection at 6;000 FT and 250 KTS.' It was then that we realized our error. Immediately upon entering the restriction in the FMS we knew we were high and would be unable to make the restriction. Just as immediately (passing through FL240) we notified Center of our error and that we'd be unable to make the restriction. I was personally shocked when the ARTCC Controller actually went on a rant stating that (among other things) 'it's the same thing everyday with (you guys) ... you should know this by now!'; and 'you guys miss this restriction every day' (paraphrased). We remained professional on the radio and reiterated to him we could not comply with instructions. He told us to expect 'off course vectors if it became obvious we could not make it by the time we were at 8;000 FT.' We told him that would be OK with us; we'd even take the off course vector immediately. Again after that the Controller -- and there is no better word for this -- 'berated' us for not being able to make the restriction.A few minutes later; as the aircraft was descending through 11;000 FT; we tried to contact the same Controller to again notify him that we could not make the restriction at DEKAL. No answer. We made a second call; again; no answer from Miami. He was non-responsive to us; as we were rapidly descending through 8;500 FT Miami curtly switched us over to another Controller. At 8;000 FT we told the subsequent Controller we could not make DEKAL at 6;000 FT and 250 KTS at which time she gave us a descent to 5;000 FT. At the DEKAL Intersection we were passing through 7;000 FT. Obviously; the number one item is that I missed the notation of the 'expect to cross DEKAL at 6;000 and 250 KTS.' I make no excuse for that. However; IMMEDIATELY upon noticing this error we admitted our mistake and notified Miami that we were unable to comply. The Controller had plenty of time to either relieve us from the restriction; or give us off course vectors so that we could comply. Instead he spent his time both berating us; and then being completely unwilling to help us with relief. It was shocking and completely unprofessional in my opinion. In the realm of CRM; the First Officer and I had to agree to not be angry with this devolving situation; and remain professional. The situation was affecting our airmanship on the arrival. At one point; I remember asking my First Officer to not accept any more of that Controller's behavior and ask for a supervisor and phone number if he did it again.  If I'd have been the only flight unable to comply then we wouldn't have had to endure the rant we received. In my opinion; despite whether this was an ongoing issue; we gave ample time to get relief. We were given none.

Air carrier flight crew was questioned by Approach Control when they had failed to program an 'expect to cross at' note on the WAVUN into their FMS while on descent into FLL and; as a result; failed to meet the restriction when it was given.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On flight XXXX; ZZZ-ZZZ1; DATE; the crew experienced 2 high speed events during the descent into ZZZ1. While descending from cruise altitude it became necessary to expedite descent and slow the aircraft. As the PF; I retarded the throttles and extended the airbrake; configuring the aircraft for a 250 kt. descent. Upon doing so; the aircraft responded with an unexpected and unusual nose low attitude of approximately 15 degrees which caused rapid acceleration. The immediate reaction at that time was to retract the brake in order to clean the configuration of the aircraft and interrupt the pitch with TCS (Touch Control Steering) and pull carefully back into a less accelerative attitude. While the aircraft was being slowed; the highspeed warning annunciated and was active for approximately 8 seconds. The PM monitored the pitch and speed; and through proper coordination and manual control the aircraft was brought into a normal profile by disabling the previously selected SPD descent. After stabilizing the descent; the crew discussed the proximity to the airport and the relatively high altitude of the aircraft in order to proactively warn ATC of assistance. S Turns were requested and executed. During coordination with ATC and at approximately 12;000 ft I; the PF selected a FLC descent with speed brake to attempt to bring the aircraft through 10;000 with proper speed. The aircraft responded again with unusually steep downward pitch; and expecting this; faster action to apply TCS and reconfigure the aircraft for a hand flown descent was enacted by both crewmembers. Even with swift corrective action; the aircraft did accelerate to approximately 280 kts for a period of roughly 5 seconds. The approach and landing phases of flight were then safely executed without AP. After landing a normal shutdown was performed; AML entry was made; and the PM contacted Maintenance Control and described the event in detail. Afterward; the crew debriefed the event; the remedial actions performed; technique; and follow on maintenance requirements. Contract maintenance was dispatched; normal inspections were conducted and logged; and the aircraft conducted its return flight to ZZZ. [Cause was] reacting to an unexpected profile or response by the system by attempting to rapidly diagnose settings and correct with autopilot. Seconds can be lost when quicker response to engage TCS and reorient isn't immediately executed.When faced with an unexpected and unusual response from automation; react immediately with manual control. Afterward; be extremely clear In detailing to the PM what was entered; what was received; and verify clarity of the situation in order to develop a most-conservative response and closer monitoring of possible human or automation factors at play. Trust the automation; but be prepared to verify any and all factors at play VS instinctively defaulting to experience and prior use and operation of the system.

While on the descent into ZZZ the crew experienced two (2) highspeed events. The flight descended from their cruise ALT of FL160 to FL 110 at 300 kts to begin the arrival. When ZZZ Approach cleared them from 11;000 ft to 3;000 ft the PF retarded the throttles; selected 250 kts; extended the speed brakes; selected 3;000 ft in the ALT; and selected IAS. The aircraft pitched down aggressively; and the aircraft accelerated rapidly. The PM was on the radio requesting S-Turns to assist in losing altitude and had programmed the FMS to activate the RNAV approach. At 10;500 ft the PM noticed that the speed was accelerating towards the redline and instructed the PF to slow down by depressing the TCS (Touch Control Steering) button and pitching the aircraft up to bleed off speed. The PF retracted the speed brakes; TCS the controls steadily and smoothly; however; the airspeed continued to increase; and the speed reached 270 or 280 for less than 10 seconds. Once the airspeed was below 250 kts the PF released the TCS button and the aircraft pitched down aggressively and received the highspeed warning and the speed reached 260-270 for less than 8 seconds. The PF depressed the TCS button and pitched up again to slow down. Once the speed was below 250 kts the PF turned off the AP; selected VS 1800 fpm; and completed the VIS APPCH without further incident. Upon arrival at the gate and after the shutdown checklist the crew contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and described what had occurred. The Captain made an AML entry and Maintenance contacted contract maintenance to complete the overspeed checklist and download the DFR. When Maintenance completed the inspection and closed out the AML the return flight to ZZZ1 operated without further incident.The crew began a descent from 11;000 ft to 3;000 ft prior to slowing the aircraft to <250 kts.Ensure that the aircraft is at the proper speed and configuration for each phase of flight. Stay ahead of the aircraft by planning your descent from cruise to transition 10;000 ft. at the proper speed.

ERJ-145 flight crew reported Autopilot failure on descent caused two overspeed occurrences resulting from extreme pitch down commands.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

It was cloudy; could not see the ground but we were close. The gear dropped and the Captain said 'Prepare for landing.' Yikes! We hadn't gotten the approach announcement. We rushed around; picking up trash and checking seat belts.  Still couldn't see the ground. I saw the ground; we were coming in fast; perhaps 100 feet? Rushed to my jumpseat and made it. Just before landing the lavatory door behind me opens and a passenger is there. I told him to stay in the lavatory for landing; because he couldn't get back to his seat before landing; hold onto the assist handle and brace himself. This was a  passenger sitting in 6C; according to my tablet. The landing was good; the passenger was OK. I called the Captain to ask him to stop for a minute so he could get back to his assigned seat; but the Captain didn't answer. We did stop for a while so I told him to return to his seat. 'The Flight Attendant told me I could use the bathroom;' he declared.  Wrong. I checked and none of us said he could - we were landing!The Captain called me back and I told him what had happened and what I had done. After deplaning; the Captain was very apologetic; telling me that Air Traffic Control had changed the runway on them THREE times. I passed on his apology to the crew. Oh; and I think I forgot to dump the coffee before we landed too.  If Air Traffic Control hadn't changed the runway three times; the Captain would have been able to notify us in a timely manner. But...stuff happens.

A321 Flight Attendant reported not receiving the approach announcement from the Captain and only realizing how close to landing when hearing the gear extended. The cabin was not completely secured and a passenger was in the forward lavatory during the landing.


Inspection; Installation; Work Cards; Repair

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Lead Technician 0.5; Maintenance Technician 2

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Procedure; Logbook Entry; Aircraft; Staffing

My Recommendation: Because there is what I believe to be a low but uncertain chance that the primary pressure vessel of the Aircraft X has a current active failure; the aircraft should be immediately grounded; and an investigation be initiated into whether this issue is just a classification and engineering oversight; or indeed a failure to the aircraft's primary structure. Aircraft X (Boeing-767-300) is potentially operating on an inapplicable airworthiness sign off and may fly (already has flown) with a possible serious defect to the aircraft's primary structure (pressure vessel). Aircraft X arrived at ZZZ station December 2020. Upon arrival the following defect was found and recorded into the maintenance log book:Discrepancy: Undocumented Speed tape found concealing stripped & unsecured mounting screw to extruded Main Cargo Door (MCD) Manual Vent Door Drive (Pressure Vessel) cover panel.I notified Maintenance Control of the defect and submitted via email a proposal for a temp repair utilizing non-standard substitution parts available on-hand at our station that I hoped would allow for a timely repair keeping the aircraft on scheduled revenue flights despite the need for an Engineering Order (EO) and additional authorizations. After an appropriate time; an outline of maintenance action to be completed was submitted to our station for a yet unapproved EO numbered: XXXXXXXX; that was a substantial deviation from my own earlier proposed temp repair. This EO after performing a Detailed Visual Inspection (DVI) merely called for reattaching the panel in place with RTV-106 sealant; no hardware; and a covering of multiple layers of aluminum speed tape. Knowing that an external application of tape over a hole in the primary pressure vessel of an aircraft did not meet the basic criteria for acceptable maintenance standards; I contacted maintenance Control to inform them that we (aircraft technicians under my purview) at ZZZ would not be able to comply with the EO maintenance instructions as they were currently written because of the safety implications.After expressing my unwillingness to press forward with the draft EO I began receiving pressuring communications from various maintenance controllers; maintenance duty managers; and Company management; saying everything from 'just do it;' to 'it'll be fine.' Additionally; it was overheard in background talk on more than one phone call with maintenance controllers that they did not believe the panel in question was actually a primary pressure vessel fitting as I had asserted in multiple emails and phone conversations; and was merely a weather seal. Worried that I had somehow made an egregious mistake about the panel in-fact being a pressure hull seal; I enlisted both additional night shift mechanics to assist with a cabin pressurization leak check (referencing AMM 05-51-24-782-001) with the damaged MCD Manual Drive cover panel removed. As I operated the cabin pressure manually; utilizing APU bleed source; the two assisting technicians reported a strong; unrestricted flow of air emanating from the uncovered hole; while I was observing only 1 PSI indicated differential cabin pressure. Believing that this observation adequately supported my previous assertation; I terminated the test; returned the aircraft to its previous configuration; and felt confident that my continued refusal to repair the aircraft as outlined in the draft EO to be a safe and correct judgment call.The scheduled departure of the aircraft was altered from XA:15z to XE:00z. At XB:16z I received an email asking me to 'please call In to Maintenance Control to advise on current status of approved EO compliance;' (no approved EO had been received or transmitted to anyone at ZZZ station). Given the ongoing pressure from phone calls and condescending emails to comply with an EO I had yet to see; I advised [the] maintenance controllers that I would not be complying with the EO and to direct all future communications to be in writing. I then suggested at that point that they 'just AOG (aircraft on ground) ship the required parts necessary to return this defect to its original condition;' with the observation 'that the original undocumented speed tape repair has already been proven to fail;' as my own justification for non-compliance with an EO that called for doing the same thing; only with more tape.At XD:50z we received the first approved copy of the EO XXXXXXXX via email from the Maintenance Manager; which upon review was consistent with the advised sealant and tape repair already rejected. The scheduled aircraft departure was once again pushed back to XG:00z; well after the scheduled arrival of the oncoming maintenance day shift. At XE:15z I received a phone call from my Company Regional Manager asking me why I was not complying with the EO and then; regarding taping over a hole in the pressure vessel; to 'explain how this is a safety concern?' After briefly elaborating to him about how the loss of cabin pressure makes flight crews go to sleep and planes to become lawn-darts; he said that I would 'have coverage in terms of liability because the engineer signed off on three layers of speed tape.' After mutually disagreeing; he proceeded to switch the subject to asking me which maintenance technicians were coming in on day shift; then; seeming unsatisfied; continued to ask me about the status of other technicians not scheduled for shift. Several minutes after hanging up; another call was received from a subordinate technician; not scheduled to come in; inquiring as to what was going on and why the Regional Manager was asking him to come into work on his weekend and 'override' us. At the advice of another technician overhearing the conversations; I took a written note of the above quotes from the calls.With continued inquiries for resolution on the aircraft; the oncoming day shift Lead informed Maintenance Control that the EO was still unworkable as it was and reiterated that the original temp repair proposal forwarded to Maintenance Control that included substituted hardware installation would be a fix deemed acceptable and believed conforming with standard practices that we would still be willing to sign off on. Giving in; the Maintenance Controller agreed to get the hardware installation added to a revised version of the EO along with an additional step for a cabin pressurization check that the day shift Lead smartly felt necessary for repairs performed on the pressurized structure of an aircraft. With assurances that the revised EO would include the agreed upon amendments; the day shift Lead and myself expedited the repair to the aircraft in an effort to make the scheduled departure pending timely receipt of the revised EO. The cabin pressure leak check of the repair was then successfully accomplished with only a small movement observed in the repair at a peak indicated differential pressure of 4.5 PSI; and no leaks or excessive loss rates noted. Upon departing the aircraft to accomplish paperwork closeout we were greeted by the oncoming flight crew; who had apparently been kept apprised of the ongoing situation and wanted to personally thank us for looking out for their safety.At XF:18z we received the approved EO XXXXXXXX Revision 1. Required paperwork was completed; signed log pages were sent; flight crew was briefed; and the aircraft was returned to green status at XG:10z. The aircraft subsequently blocked out of the gate at XG:39z for a delay from scheduled departure of 39 minutes. Why is this a safety concern? Upon later realization and review; I have found several possible deviations to Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs); the airline General Maintenance Manual; and uncertainty to the validity of the accomplished repair that should be investigated immediately as it may represent a serious safety issue to the aircraft. Having been so narrowly focused on getting the point across to the necessary parties involved in the tribulations of Dec Xth that the damaged part was indeed part of the pressure vessel of the aircraft and that a workable repair would have to be tailored to the additional physics involved with that part of the structure; I failed to realize the broader implications of what a repair to the pressurized structure of an aircraft entailed in terms of adherence to regulations; maintenance policy; and accepted practices. The FARs define 'Primary Structure: is that structure which carries flight; ground; or pressurization loads; and whose failure would reduce the structural integrity of the airplane.' Even though steps were added to Revision 1 of the EO to conform the repair to acceptable practices 'equal to its original or properly altered condition;' because the installation hardware was a reasonably close approximation of the original parts; the additional step of adding three layers of overlapping speed tape is in direct contradiction to the airline General Maintenance Manual policy for its use:          -HIGH SPEED ALUMINUM TAPE-          High speed tape is a convenient material for use as an interim repair for          non-structural materials. Under no circumstances will it be used on primary          aircraft structure. A Log Book entry is required when high speed tape is           applied unless instructed to do so by an EO with DER approval.Under this policy; the use of speed tape in this manner is strictly forbidden and forgiveness when it comes to doing the maintenance under the provision of an EO only absolves the requirement of a log book entry for its use. However; even though agreement was made in Revision 1 of the EO for addition of attachment hardware and an added cabin pressurization leak check; the EO creator did not alter the original classification of the repair to acknowledge that the repair was in-fact being accomplished on an aircraft primary structure:          'The Main Deck Cargo Door Manual Vent Door Drive Cover is considered secondary          structure. The time limited repair per this EO is minor; and the temporary           repair per Part 1 does not affect the fit; form or function of the skin.'I would imagine this to be an oversight; and if it is; then an additional revision needs to be made which would at a minimum alter the category of the defect deferral and its associated time-limited re-inspections and permanent repair due date/cycles. If this is not an oversight; however; as this EO has been twice over reviewed and approved; and the MCD Manual Vent Door Drive Cover is indeed a secondary structure; then the original investigative cabin pressure leak test failed for a reason other than indicated (i.e. there is an existing failure of the primary pressure vessel somewhere internal to the Main Cargo Door). Which would in turn mean that a damaged secondary structure is now fulfilling the function of a primary structure pressure seal. I do not believe this to be the case; but; as the MCD is a modification from the original aircraft structure; the existing reference material available for my use to confirm the hypothesis that the cover plate is indeed a primary structure component is vague and uncertain. Tech Engineering likely has additional references not available at a line station that could perhaps shed light on the issue.Since issuing equivalent versions of the above safety report to both Airline and Company on [the next day]; Aircraft X has remained on a regular flight schedule with recurrent re-inspects per Part 2 of EO XXXXXXXX Rev 1; until receiving Part 3 Permanent Repair [4 days later]. I can currently find no record that any further investigation has been conducted.

Lead Technician reported refusing to sign an Engineering Order due to compliance issues.


Dispatched with Pack #1 inoperative. Enroute at FL300; Pack #2 failed. Descended and diverted to [nearby airport].

A321 Captain reported being dispatched with one air conditioning pack inoperative; second pack failed enroute at FL300. Captain reported a descent and diversion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Prior to pax door closure; when the APU bleed was put into the ON position prior to pushback on Aircraft X; the First Officer (FO) sensed 'dirty socks'; musty smell after a couple minutes of use. Captain concurred with FO odor assessment and APU bleed turned off after 2 - 3 minutes of use. Maintenance was called to [the] aircraft and they concurred with smell assessment and the pax and crew deplaned to a new aircraft. Aircraft X was removed from service for further investigation. Captain submitted Cabin Odor report for Maintenance review and crew reported to new aircraft and continued to ZZZ1.

Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event during preflight at departure gate. Maintenance was requested resulting in an aircraft swap.