Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Startup and taxi out was normal. Takeoff roll was normal; but slight vibration developed at about 60 KTS. I moved slightly off center to avoid runway lights; which slightly improved the noise and vibration. Then it got worse; just as First Officer called 100 KTS. I considered high speed reject and decided it was safer to continue. I had excellent centerline control and no indication the airplane could not fly. Vibration decreased slightly as weight shifted aft and I gently rotated. Rotation was normal; and control was fine except for loud noise and vibration from nose wheel shimmy. I was surprised that shimmy noise did not immediately dissipate after rotation and airborne and delayed retracting the gear momentarily. All flight controls were functioning normally. Retracted gear and the noise and vibration stopped. We had a normal climbout. Checked status pages and maintenance history; all seemed fine. Once safely at altitude; we discussed our options. Climbout and cruise were normal; and there was no safety advantage to landing heavier than planned. Our destination had 12;000 [feet of dry runway] and clear weather so there was no safety consideration of finding a longer or better runway. That was when the comm issues started. We sent several messages to Dispatch asking them to call us. Tried text messages and an ACARS Call Me request. We also communicated with Maintenance Control about a lost and found issue; and they answered that one. We had sent a maintenance message. I again texted Dispatch to call me with Maintenance Control on the line regarding the nose wheel problem. No luck.Finally they ACARS'd to call them on a VHF frequency. which I did but got no answer. I tried every VHF frequency in the Flight Operations Manual COMM page for non-U.S. operations; including all the commercial and foreign FSS and foreign radio operators. Nothing. Maintenance Control sent an ACARS message to try different HF frequencies. We had to inform them that we did not have HF radios. Tried ATC for suggestions and they gave us HF frequencies. It was while we were over the Midwest that I tried reaching Maintenance Control. Finally; over foreign airspace; I gave up and tried 121.5. A commercial flight with SATCOM and HF relayed for us; but I never did get Maintenance or Dispatch input. We advised ATC we wanted emergency equipment to standby for landing.After considering the issues; and terrain; it seemed like it would be a good idea to keep the gear down in case of a missed approach. Also; we wanted to stop on the runway and assess. Therefore; having decided to deviate from SOP; we declared an emergency and advised we did not need assistance until landing. We made a normal landing to a full stop and requested an inspection. Maintenance then came and towed us to the gate. Mechanic plugged in and deliberately lied to me; claiming things were normal but he would tow us in. Later explained he didn't want to scare us because the damage to the nose wheel was so bad. FAA personnel met us at the jetway door with pictures showing much of the right nose wheel was gone. They had already alerted the company.

A B757 flight crew experience significant landing gear vibration during the takeoff and requested emergency equipment standing by on landing. One nose gear tire was found to be substantially missing. Communications problems with the company enroute were a significant contributing factor to the flight's uneasiness.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We received a clearance to cross HOGGZ intersection at FL250 while cruising at FL270. I was the PF and entered FL250 in the MCP and verbalized 'FL250.' I looked at the LEGS page and noticed FL250 for the crossing on what I thought was HOGGZ intersection. I monitored the Descent page and several miles prior to descent ATC asked us if we were going to make HOGGZ at FL250. Upon further review we noticed that we had passed HOGGZ while at FL270 missing our crossing restriction. ATC advised us to maintain FL270 and expect a descent after crossing traffic. We complied with the clearance and completed the flight without any further incident.

B737 FO reported failure to comply with a crossing restriction.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

IMPROPER REFUELING OF AIRCRAFT IN LGAAt the gate in LGA; we got an indication that the nose door had been opened. I directed the First Officer (FO) to go out and see what was going on. FO discovered that the fueler had grounded the fuel truck to the grounding port in the nose gear bay. The FO told the fueler to stop fueling operations and to bond the fuel truck to the aircraft at the appropriate bonding port under the wing. The fueler stated that bonding and grounding were the same thing on his truck and that he didn't have the appropriate bonding adapter anyways. The FO instructed him again to cease fueling operations. The FO and I then discussed the situation to determine our next course of action. I went out to speak to the fueler to find that he had ignored our instructions and had already finished fueling the plane.This is an extremely dangerous situation. The FAA is very clear that 'Grounding during aircraft fueling is not allowed'. (SNFPA 407 Standards for Aircraft Fuel Servicing/Fuel Safety Training).By not equalizing the electric potential between the fuel truck and aircraft fuel components; a risk of static discharge is greatly increased. Equalization of potential cannot be accomplished by attaching a wire at the aircraft grounding port; as it is not connected to the aircraft's fuel components.Properly train and certify personnel conducting aircraft refueling operations.

Regional Jet Captain reported their fueler did not follow proper grounding procedures.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 264; Flight Crew Type 6000

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We were at about FL 240; deviating in VMC conditions around some weather; when we felt the aircraft yaw to the left. I was the Pilot Flying and immediately noticed the #2 engine N1 had spiked from 94% to 107% along with the N1 Overspeed light. I began pulling the #2 thrust lever back to attempt to get it back under the N1 limit. There was no EGT exceedance during this event. After attempting to match up the N1's; there was about a four-inch thrust lever split. We accomplished the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall QRH Checklist and determined it was best to return to [the departure airport]. We landed uneventfully about 15 minutes later.

Run-away number 2 engine N1 resulting in returning to departure city. All checklists and procedures were complied with and there were no incidents. Aircraft has a history of same issue.

The pilots of a B737-300 observed an N1 overspeed condition of the #2 engine and elected to return to the departure airport. A successful landing was completed.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 747; Flight Crew Type 231

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Hand-propped aircraft was started with throttle fully advanced; and no one in cockpit. Traveled approximately 10-15 FT collided with a parked truck. The right wing also contacted the tip of the vertical stabilizer on a nearby aircraft. Damage: Truck -- Side of body received impact damage; tire punctured by prop tip; flat 'topper' punctured by prop tip. Other aircraft -- broken vertical stab attach bracket; dented tip on vertical stab. Accident aircraft -- bent prop; bent motor mount; dented cowl; 1 bent wing rib.Details: I was being instructed on how to prop this airplane. First attempt resulted in flooded carburetor. Per procedure; magnetos were shut off; throttle advanced to full; and prop turned backwards 8 blades. Then magnetos on; throttle retarded to idle; except that after magnetos on and just about to retard throttle; another vehicle appeared and was insistent that he would drive around the plane. There was insufficient room; so trotted off to turn him around and forgot that the throttle was still advanced. Plane jumped chocks; we were able to pull throttle back; but it was still moving and spinning down to idle when it hit truck.

Luscombe 8A pilot reported the aircraft got away from him during a hand prop exercise with an instructor; striking a truck and another aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Type 249

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Total 4678; Flight Crew Type 1396

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy; Weather

My relief first officer working as the pilot monitoring and I both failed to set a hard mach number in VNAV for the Atlantic Crossing.  I was the pilot flying.  Bottom line; we made an error.It had been a very busy and non-normal flight starting at the gate.  There was a last minute aircraft change and dispatch had not told us about it.  They had called [operations] with no answer; as we had been early in planning and left OPS about 1 hour and 10 min prior to scheduled departure.  We were surprised to find a gate change with no aircraft.  Things were very busy getting new paperwork printed at the gate with added maintenance issues. We pushed 13 minutes late after receiving a valid maintenance release.  I had safety concerns for my crew and passengers. We knew we had light to moderate turbulence from Departure all the way to Coast Out at all altitudes FL 290 and above.  We had reports of severe turbulence at FL 370 along our route of flight. I chose to descend from FL 290 to FL 270 and we stayed there until required to climb to FL 370 for the crossing.  I had added fuel for this concern.  We had difficulty getting a clearance and had to use Voice communications.  Our printer was not working; a new issue; and dispatch sent communications to ACARS.  It was very busy the entire time with a lot going on.  I normally have out a paper copy of the Class II NAV/ETOPS Guide in addition to the [tablet].  I did not have the paper copy.  My window mount along with my Co-pilots mount fell three times with broken cup attachments and we held them as necessary.  My flying first officer had his NAV/ETOPS Guide open on his [tablet].  He went on break just prior to our receiving our clearance and climbing for the crossing.  I allowed distractions to keep me from verifying this Class two procedure per SOP; although I had briefed this very thing both in [operations] and on the Aircraft during the preflight check.  I learned after my third break about the Error when briefed by my first officers.  They discovered it while still in Class II airspace.  We were cleared mach .82.  It was likely that when we coasted out or very close to .82; but ended up at .79 enroute.  They sped up to .82 when they noticed it.  ATC; Oceanic never said anything at any time to them.  We were the last flight on that track with no one behind us.  I believe fatigue may have played some part for me having been awake for 16 hours; although two attempts were made to rest for a couple hours during that time period.  I felt fine when coming to work and had stayed at a local hotel the night prior and did not check out until that afternoon.

The event occurred while I was on my designated rest break.  Prior to my break we were trying to request and receive our Oceanic clearance but we were having Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC) issues sending our requests; our ACARS printer was inoperative and were in continuous light turbulence with occasional moderate turbulence so there were a lot of distractions going on. After I came back up from my break I asked where the oceanic clearance was I was told that they received it via voice and that it was as assigned. We were planned to arrive over 30 minutes ahead of our normal arrival time so I knew we would be flying slower than normal. Something was bothering me but I couldn't figure it out until I asked the other First Officer if they had chosen to fly at .79M or if that's what they had been assigned. He told me that they had requested and had been cleared to fly at .82M for the crossing. That's when it became apparent that during the distractions with the weather; ACARS; and communication issues with CPDLC that somehow the crossing speed was not entered into the FMC and ECON was the selected speed which was .03M less than cleared. We immediately increased our speed to get back into compliance with our assigned speed. The rest of the flight; descent; and landing were uneventful.We never exceeded any timing issues between any of our crossing points nor were we contacted by HF or CPDLC by ATC querying us on our speed but since we were required to notify ATC when we were more than .02M off of assigned I recommended to the other crew members that they file a [report] as I planned on doing as it was a deviation; although an unintentional one.

The B777 crew forgot to set a hard Mach number for an Atlantic crossing and flew at ECON .79 Mach instead of .82 Mach as cleared.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5.7; Flight Crew Total 691; Flight Crew Type 50

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Called landing intentions on CTAF frequency on approach to airport and prior to entering traffic pattern. No other traffic heard. On downwind leg; observed another aircraft nearby flying  approximately same heading but heard nothing on radio. I called my position and intentions on my radio but heard no response. I watched other aircraft continue on course and I landed after flying base and final legs of the pattern and calling my position on the radio. While taxiing on ground after landing; discovered volume of my radio was turned down. Turned volume up and heard the other aircraft calling landing intentions at the airport. They had apparently been flying the pattern too; and extended their downwind while I landed.Factors involved were my inadvertently turning volume down too far; and distraction of passengers (the radio was active with lots of faraway traffic and passenger asked question; so I turned radio volume down to hear better). As a side note; did not see a traffic alert on ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast); suggesting other aircraft was not ADS-B equipped.

GA pilot reported a NMAC on approach stating they did not hearing hear other aircraft but upon landing realized their volume was turned down.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As aircraft come out of storage; Circuit Breakers and systems have not been reactivated correctly causing numerous rejected takeoffs or return to airfields.I suggest a task card or work assignment on an aircraft coming out of storage as a last item before aircraft release depicting a graphic of that fleet specific circuit breaker panels and an instruction to visually check all CB's to be pushed in except those that are deferred etc. Also a CAT 3 check should be assigned which could capture most system failures due to improper reactivation. Best prevention would include a high power runup.

Maintenance Technician reported that aircraft are coming out of storage with circuit breakers and other systems in the incorrect setting/position.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Pushed back from gate and told East Ramp we needed 18C. Controller told us they would coordinate. East Ramp then cleared us to taxi forward; hold short then contact South Ramp. South Ramp told us to taxi on the North line and contact ground at Spot 9. We contacted ground at Spot 9 and continued forward into the non-movement area as Ground inquired why we were not going to 18L and what our SID was. Ground told us to stop then told us to taxi forward to E13. E13 is marked on the 10-9 page as being behind spot 9. We clarified the instructions with Ground and continued forward to join the new E13 at Spot 4N.Confusion occurred due to missed coordination for required takeoff runway (18C); new taxiway markings not updated on 10-9 pages; and congested control frequencies.[Suggest] Update 10-9 pages to show standard routes for taxi to/from runways and ramps. Many airports have documented named taxi routes; the best of these include words and diagrams. CLT operations would benefit from having documented instructions.

Air Carrier pilot reported confusion during taxi due to inaccurate airport diagram.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During takeoff; [I] noticed First Officer did not call 80 knots. At that time; the auto-throttles disconnected and the First Officer announced that there was an airspeed disagreement. [It was] concluded that Captain's airspeed was correct and continued the takeoff. During initial climb; the stick shaker activated and I flew the aircraft using pitch and power indications. We notified ATC that we had a malfunction and returned immediately to the airport. Completed all checklists and set up for landing RWY XXL at ZZZ and landed without incident.Aircraft equipment failure of pitot static or air data computer.

I was the Pilot Monitoring and First Officer. During my preflight; I did not notice any damage to any of the pitot tubes. Due to the location of the pitot tubes; I cannot look down them to check for blockages; but I did not notice any obvious signs of damage or blockage. We prepared for the flight normally and taxied out for takeoff. During the takeoff roll; as Pilot Monitoring; it was my job to set the thrust. The autothrottles didn't quite get the thrust setting to the desired takeoff thrust setting; so I spent a few seconds tweaking the thrust setting and verifying the N1 gauges and the FMC. Once the thrust was set; I called 'Thrust set;' and my eyes went to my airspeed tape. It indicated about 60 KIAS and was rising in what initially appeared to be a normal fashion. At that time; the Captain called '80 knots' and simultaneously the auto throttle disconnected. When this happened; my eyes went to the flashing red autothrottle light; then to the autothrottle switch; then to the N1 gauges. The N1 gauges still indicated normal takeoff thrust; so I reached up and tried to reset the autothrottle switch. (Sometimes the autothrottle will be inadvertently disconnected and can be reset.) The autothrottle switch would not reset and when my eyes went back to my airspeed tape; it indicated that we were not yet to V1; but the Captain called V1. That is when I looked at his airspeed indicator and realized that our two airspeed indicators did not match; which is why he had been beating me to the calls. Mine was indicating about 30 knots less than the Captain's. I quickly looked at the standby airspeed indicator and it matched the Captain's. I said 'your airspeed is correct;' and we rotated normally and climbed out; as we were already at too high of a speed to reject. As our angle of attack increased on the climbout; the difference between our two airspeed indicators got much worse. While his was increasing as we accelerated in the climb; mine was decreasing as we pitched up; and at one point mine was indicating at least 50-60 knots less than his; and the stick shaker activated. I cross-checked with the standby again; and it still matched the Captain's; and was confirmed by our current flight conditions; pitch and power settings. I reiterated 'your airspeed is correct' and the Captain continued hand flying. We retracted the flaps on schedule and I contacted Departure and advised that we would need to return to ZZZ. ATC asked if we were declaring; and after a short discussion with the Captain; we decided that since we had positive control of the aircraft and we did not need emergency services that we would not declare. In hindsight; I should've used the phrase PAN-PAN to relay that we had an urgent situation that required priority; but wasn't an emergency. ATC understood what we needed though; and they provided us vectors back to the ILS XXL immediately. When we were in level flight; my airspeed came back up to within 30 knots of the Captain's. We completed all checklists and came back around and landed without incident. (We were well under max landing weight.) I noticed that throughout the event; my analog airspeed indicator and my digital airspeed tape both matched; and were both lower than the Captain's analog and digital indicators as well as the standby. I also noticed that except for the climb-out with the higher angle of attack; my airspeed indicators behaved somewhat normally; increasing as we accelerated and decreasing when we decelerated which made the problem hard to identify at first; but they were consistently indicating much slower than the others. Upon landing I conducted a post-flight inspection; and again noticed no irregularities in the areas of the pitot tubes. Ops; [Dispatch] and MX were all notified. The cause of this event was the erroneous airspeed indications on the First Officer side. There are many things that could cause this including a pitot tube blockage; a leak in the pitot static system; or a bad ADC.If it is determined that a partial blockage was to blame; then I would suggest that we have maintenance personnel install pitot tube covers during long layovers. I wish I could've recognized the problem early enough to do a low speed reject; but that didn't happen. When we did recognize the problem; I think we handled it very well. I wish I could've been a little clearer in my communications with ATC; but ATC handled the situation very well too.

B737 flight crew reported an airspeed disagreement on takeoff roll and activation of the stick shaker on climbout.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

At XA:10 we arrived at the aircraft in ZZZ for Flight X parked at gate X. In the logbook of Aircraft X was an open write up for Air Pack 2 REG fault. I spoke with the gate agent about it and then called dispatch.  Dispatch conferenced me in with maintenance.  It was known about the open write up since  the night before. Maintenance advised me maintenance was on the way. We completed all the preflight duties and walk around items at about XA:35. Maintenance had come out to ascertain the problem at about XA:50; 10 minutes prior to our scheduled push time. Maintenance informed me that we would be delayed about one hour at the gate for a solution. Eventually maintenance informed me the pack would be selected off and the valve had to be visually scanned closed. To do that he would have to open a panel. Upon completion of the procedure by maintenance; I walked outside to see all the panels were closed on the right side of the aircraft. They were. Once back on the flight deck I received the signed off logbook with the deferred MEL item and proceeded with our checklists. As we were being pushed back; the maintenance member drove up to the guide man. We were asked to look on the flight deck and 1st class galley for an iPad. We found none and relayed the message back. We continued our start of both engines normally with no issues. We taxied out via Taxiway 1 to Taxiway 2 and took off from ZZZ on runway XX at about XC:48 local. After takeoff rotation there was just a slight rumble that sounded like an out of round tire usually does as the gear is raised. It abated quickly and no engine anomalies noted. Upon cruise to ZZZ1 we received an ACARS message from dispatch at XI:03; regarding FOD on the runway after our takeoff.  Dispatch noted the possibility it was the maintenance member's iPad he was looking for. I told dispatch all engine parameters are normal and we proceeded to ZZZ1 with a normal landing on runway XXR. After the shutdown; I met the ZZZ1 Maintenance manager outside by the number 2 engine. It had signs of ingesting FOD. It is apparent that contract maintenance at ZZZ left the iPad inside the nacelle after our initial preflight and caused damage to the engine.Maintenance having laid an item in an engine nacelle and leaving it there after our preflight was complete.Not laying any tool or item in the nacelle of an engine.

At XA:10 we arrived at the aircraft in ZZZ for Aircraft X parked at gate XX. In the logbook of Aircraft X was an open write up for Air Pack 2 REG fault. I spoke with the gate agent about it and then called dispatch.  Dispatch conferenced me in with maintenance. It was known about the open write up since  the night before. Maintenance advised me maintenance was on the way. We completed all the preflight duties and walk around items at about XA:35 maintenance had come out to ascertain the problem at about XA:50; 10 minutes prior to our scheduled push time. Maintenance informed me that we would be delayed about one hour at the gate for a solution. Eventually maintenance informed me the pack would be selected off and the valve had to be visually scanned closed. To do that he would have to open a panel. Upon completion of the procedure by maintenance; I walked outside to see all the panels were closed on the right side of the aircraft. They were. Once back on the flight deck I received the signed off logbook with the deferred MEL item and proceeded with our checklists. As we were being pushed back; the maintenance member drove up to the guide man. We were asked to look on the flight deck and 1st class galley for an iPad. We found none and relayed the message back. We continued our start of both engines normally with no issues. We taxied out via Taxiway 1 to Taxiway 2 and took off from ZZZ on runway XX at about XC:48 local. After takeoff rotation there was just a slight rumble that sounded like an out of round tire usually does as the gear is raised. It abated quickly and no engine anomalies noted. Upon cruise to ZZZ1 we received an ACARS message from dispatch at XI:03; regarding FOD on the runway after our takeoff.  Dispatch noted the possibility it was the maintenance member's iPad he was looking for. I told dispatch all engine parameters are normal and we proceeded to ZZZ1 with a normal landing on runway XXR. After the shutdown; I met the ZZZ1 Maintenance manager outside by the number 2 engine. It had signs of ingesting FOD. It is apparent that contract maintenance at ZZZ left the iPad inside the nacelle AFTER our initial preflight and caused damage to the engine.Maintenance having laid an item in an engine nacelle and leaving it there after our preflight was complete.Not laying any tool or item in the nacelle of an engine.

Flight Crew reported minor engine rumbles on takeoff and continuing the flight. After arrival at destination airport; it was discovered that the #2 engine had FOD damage. Reporters surmised it was probably caused by a technician leaving their Company iPad in the engine inlet.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were flying an A321 and our close-out weight was above our planned weight which prevented us from flying our planned cruise altitude. Loop 9 departure: direct LAX and cleared to climb via except climb and maintain FL230. The FO was flying with the autopilot on and managed climb and speed. Passing through 10;000 feet and crossing LAX VOR; the aircraft began to shallow the climb as it accelerated beyond 250 knots. Almost simultaneously; we entered IMC and engine anti-ice was turned on as TAT was below 10 C. LA center then called with a reroute. The reroute was unusual as it was very direct and eliminated nearly every waypoint across the country; so we verified this with ATC. While we were inputting the new route; LA center called out traffic. I replied that we were IMC. The FO was still adding the reroute into the FMGS when I noticed we were not going to make the KEGGS crossing restrictions and simultaneously LA center queried as to whether or not we would make the crossing restriction of 13;000 at KEGGS. I replied that I thought we would make the restriction; but it would be close. We pulled speed and spun in 250 knots to get the aircraft to climb rapidly and make the restriction. I believe we were 400-500ft below the 13;000 ft restriction at KEGGS. The [older] Airbus aircraft have quite an array of differences that pilots are not familiar with. In this case; neither of us had ever flown the Loop 9 departure in an older A321 before. The lack of climb performance; especially heavy with the anti-ice on while accelerating beyond 250 kts; was dramatically poor in comparison to the [newer model] A321 which both of us were used to. This; in addition to ATC poorly timed reroute; were enough to distract us long enough that we could not recover to make the crossing restriction altitude. I would suggest a memo to [Company] Airbus pilots highlighting the incredibly poor climb performance of the older A321s. Perhaps dictate that that if you are above 180;000 pounds; your climb performance will be poor and you may not make climb restrictions or your planned cruise altitude.

A321 Captain reported discovering that the older A321s have very poor performance when compared with the newer ones that he is used to flying. The crossing restriction at KEGGS on the LAX LOOP9 was missed by 500 feet.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On the right downwind we were given a heading of 160 for the base turn to the ILS. On the right base we were given a clearance of maintain 2;600 feet and a heading to intercept the localizer. At this point we were about three miles from the FAP and configured at flaps 20 and doing 180 kias. As the pilot flying (PF) I was in white needles in heading mode with NAV mode armed. The aircraft intercepted the final approach course and leveled at 2;600 feet. At this point I unintentionally delayed switching the NAV source selector to green needles for the approach. I then switched to green needles and realized the aircraft was above glide slope (GS). I attempted to descend in VS mode to capture the GS; but the aircraft was in ALT CAP mode. While this was going on the Pilot Monitoring (PM) was talking to ATC and setting the final aircraft configuration per Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). I realized at this point we were very close to the FAP and became fixated on the GS and neglected the airspeed as a part of my scan. At this point the Pilot Monitoring said 'check speed' I saw the speed was very slow and at that moment I advanced the thrust levers at the same time the stick shaker activated - we recovered and executed a go-around per the SOP and then returned for a normal approach and landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported becoming slow during an ILS approach activating the stick shaker briefly. A go-around ensued followed by a normal landing.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 2069; Flight Crew Type 9

After a normal engine start; taxi; and run up; I called Springs Tower that I was ready for departure on 17R. There was significant traffic at the airport and the Tower frequency was very busy. It was my impression that the controller was a trainee. After waiting approximately 15 minutes at the hold short line; I was cleared for takeoff on Runway 17R. After a normal takeoff; Springs Tower instructed me to turn right to a heading of 260. This is a normal procedure for westbound departures from this runway. I made turn and continued my climb out. There was significant radio traffic on the Tower frequency. I heard another aircraft report entering on a 45; making this transmission several times without an acknowledgement from ATC. During my scan; I then saw another aircraft at my 11:00 position above me heading toward me. I made an immediate right hand diving evasive turn. After the maneuver; Tower called me to report traffic at 11:00 less than one mile. I thought of responding to Tower that I just avoided that traffic; but elected not to make the transmission due to the channel congestion. I then proceeded with my climb out and was directed to contact Departure Control. The flight was completed without further incident. I believe the root cause of the problem was with the Local Controller at KCOS. Both the Tower frequency and the airspace around the airport was extremely busy. The controller appeared to be a trainee and was very busy; with takeoffs; landings; and pattern work occurring on 3 different runways (17L;R; 13). This is evidenced by the very long delay I encountered waiting for a VFR take off clearance and the delayed traffic call out of my near miss traffic. I didn't receive the traffic notification until after I had taken evasive action.

High-wing aircraft was departing runway 17R southwest bound climbing visual. Another high-wing inbound for right downwind 17R from the southwest. My trainee was giving the relief briefing as the first was departing. Towards the end of the brief my trainee turned the departing aircraft west bound with the inbound aircraft approaching the full downwind. The briefing was finished and the position was given to the relieving Air Traffic Control Specialist (CPC). I remained monitoring the position and told the CPC about the inbound aircraft. Traffic was exchanged and at least one aircraft got the other in sight.

An aircraft departing COS 17R was given a westbound turnout with another aircraft inbound on the 45; which resulted in the departing aircraft taking evasive action.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During taxi out in DTW on Runway 22L; we had a readback misinterpretation with DTW Tower. The CA and I were next in line for takeoff for the runway; and I heard a clearance from Tower 'Aircraft X line up and wait.' I repeated the clearance and the Captain and I agreed we were cleared into position. Around the exact same time of us crossing the runway hold line another aircraft on the field reported a coyote running toward the active runway. Once the Tower had completed the coyote call he asked who was holding in position. I stated 'Aircraft X.' The Controller then stated 'I didn't clear Aircraft X.  Aircraft Y verify number one holding short the runway.' Aircraft Y confirmed he was number one. We were then cleared for takeoff and continued with the flight. When we were handed off to Cleveland Departure they gave us the DTW Tower phone number to call. We continued onto ZZZ normally and called when we secured the aircraft at the gate. When we called the DTW Tower phone number; the Controller who was working ground answered our call.  He stated 'I was working ground at the time and I dropped your strip and got the flights out of order.' He additionally added he did not think the Supervisor would pull the tapes and review this as there was (a direct quote) 'No runway incursion.'We could have verified with Tower we were cleared into position. However; we did read the clearance back and received no clarification or corrections. The Controller was also dealing with the coyote and was possibly distracted and when he looked up to the runway expecting to see a [medium large transport] he saw us. With the distractions adding up we could have been more proactive.

Pilot reports of Control Tower advising they were not told to LUAW; when the pilot read it back and heard nothing in return from the Tower.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

During a normal take-off roll going through approximately 85 knots tower gave direction to reject the take-off; 'take-off clearance is cancelled; abort take-off.' At which time the Captain rejected the take-off; uneventfully. As the take-off was rejected at approximately 85-90 knots we cleared the runway; taxied to a gate and maintenance inspected the aircraft. We were cleared by maintenance and resumed operations. During the maintenance inspection as we waited at the gate the Captain contacted the tower and we were informed that their Airport Surface Detection Equipment ground surveillance radar had sounded an alarm in the tower which they were compelled to address by calling for us to reject the take-off. Tower informed us that no visual conflict was noticed but the alarm had to be followed. No other deviation or aircraft issue was noticed therefore we decided to continue operations.

We were cleared for takeoff by lax tower. At about 80 knots tower told us takeoff clearance was cancelled and to reject takeoff. We had reached approximately 90 knots when reject was started. We cleared runway and asked tower the reason for the reject. They told us they had received an false ground radar alert and could see there was no conflict; but it is a requirement to still call the reject. We called maintenance ; returned to gate for a high speed reject inspection. Maintenance cleared us for flight and we continued approximately 45 minutes later.

Air Carrier flight crew reported they rejected a takeoff at LAX when the Tower Controller cancelled takeoff clearance and called abort. The crew reported the ATC ground surveillance radar had sounded a false alarm.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Type 4503

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

As we were descending via the HHOOD3 arrival into PDX we were given clearance to OMMSI and a cleared alt of 6200 feet. Then after calling the airport in sight; we were cleared direct to TOLOC (OM on the ILS 28R) and told to cross TOLOC at or above 2000 feet. I was hand flying as we approached TOLOC at about a 45 deg intercept to final. There was a peak about 15 SE of PDX which I could see we were clear of; but as we passed over the top of it we got the GPWS terrain alert. I stopped the shallow descent we were in and the alert went away. Looking back at our position I should have been about 1000 feet higher crossing that peak to be on a 3 degree glide path. We continued to a normal landing. I should have looked more closely at the charted terrain on the approach chart and stayed higher longer; but once we got the clearance to cross TOLOC at or above 2000 feet; I continued a shallow descent. It could have been prevented if I had done a quick 3/1 descent calculation while we were still at about 6000 feet.

A320 Captain reported receiving a GPWS 'Terrain' warning on a visual approach into PDX airport.


Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

While flying the DUMPY Arrival to DAL; we were given a clearance to cross CQY at 10;000 feet; and ORVIL at 9;000 feet. Passing through approximately 13;000 feet; Center gave us traffic at 12 o'clock; a Lear jet climbing VFR. Almost immediately we got a climb RA. This was the most aggressive RA I have ever seen; calling for 2;500 to 3;000 FPM. I disengaged the autopilot and followed the RA. It momentarily went to monitor Vertical Speed; [and] then went back to the aggressive climb RA; which we followed. We climbed back to nearly 13;000 feet complying with the RA. ATC was talking to the Lear. I feel he should have amended our descent instructions.

We were cleared to cross CQY at 10;000 feet. Approaching CQY; at approximately 11;000 feet we got a significant RA commanding 2-3;000 FPM climb. We complied and the RA lowered to approximately 1;500 FPM. We complied; at which time the RA increased to 2-3;000 FPM again. We complied. When clear of conflict; we told ATC who informed us that there was a VFR Lear jet at 10;400 feet. I said maybe having us cross CQY at 10;000 feet with that traffic there wasn't the safest thing. He said he hadn't 'been able to get back' to the Lear jet who was climbing VFR. I think he just didn't notice the impending conflict. He should have stopped the Lear if the Lear was talking to him; or at least stopped our descent. Heck; he never even called out the traffic to us. It was the most severe RA I've ever seen commanded.

Air carrier arrival into DAL experienced a significant TCAS RA event with a VFR climbing Lear jet; the reporter questioning ATC handling.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were assigned to level off at 14;000 feet. When the 1;000 foot chime sounded; my First Officer stated 'one thousand to go; altitude select.' I verified that ALT SEL was displayed on the FMA. At about 13;400 feet; still in PITCH HOLD; I moved the UP/DN thumbwheel to shallow the climb rate. My guess is that the aircraft went to ALT* while I was adjusting the pitch; which then deselected ALT SEL and reverted to PITCH HOLD; and it went unnoticed. At 14;200 feet we realized that the aircraft had climbed through the selected altitude of 14;000 feet. I quickly pressed ALT; pushed VS with a 700 FPM descent and re selected ALT SEL. The aircraft successfully leveled off at 14;000 feet. In total we deviated from our assigned altitude by 300-400 feet for no more than about 10 seconds. ATC was busy talking to other aircraft and did not mention anything to us; nor did we have a chance to tell them that we had deviated. Adjusting PITCH HOLD within 1;000 feet of level off could result in what happened to us. The lesson I learned is to not do this as it could go unnoticed; resulting in an altitude deviation.

On ZZZ Departure to ZZZ1; climbing to our filed alt of 14;000 with A/P engaged.Passing through 13;000 Pilot Monitoring (First Officer) called 'a thousand to go' at which time the Pilot Flying (Captain) responded appropriately. Pilot Flying then initiated a pitch reduction via the FD adjustment wheel inside of 1;000 [feet] of level off; but did not notice 'ALT SEL' being deselected.Both pilots realized at the same time that the aircraft had not leveled off and was still climbing through 14;200. Pilot Flying immediately called out and pressed 'ALT' to stop the climb; reduced the power slightly to initiate a level off; and then initiated a 700 FPM descent towards 14;000 [feet] using VSI mode. The alt alerter was reverified set at '14;000' and that 'ALT SEL' was displayed. Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring noted that the aircraft apexed at 14;400 feet MSL. Aircraft captured the selected altitude (14;000 feet) as expected after the correction was made.Neither the crew nor ATC communicated the altitude overshoot. Sterile flight deck was adhered to in accordance with regulations and policy. TCAS display showed no traffic near the aircraft. No abrupt maneuvers were initiated; and neither passenger safety nor comfort became at risk.Bottom line; like we learned in ground school and the simulator; don't touch nothin' (!!) when you're inside 1;000 feet of capturing an altitude. Plain and simple.Causes/Contributors to deviation: (not excuses - but these are the other things at play)- Both pilots have not flown much since CV-19 crisis begun. The threat of low proficiency was briefed and we agree to take it slow and watch each other's back.- Flight was briefed by First Officer as the Pilot Flying. Captain took the runway when we were CFTO but kept it on the roll. I didn't ask for it back because we didn't need to do a control change on the take off roll.- After the a right turn and continuing the climb to 6;000; ZZZ Departure then directed us to climb to 15;000 feet. Pilot Monitoring (First Officer) responded to ATC and rolled in 15;000' into the alt alerter. Pilot Monitoring noted the difference from the filed altitude and mentioned to Pilot Flying that he/I would confirm with ATC. Prior to calling ZZZ Departure; ATC called us to correct the altitude back to 14;000. Pilot Monitoring immediately reset the alerter to 14;000; and confirmed 'ALT SEL' with Pilot Flying (Captain).- Somewhere in the midst of this correction; the Captain realized he had kept control for the First Officer's (briefed) leg. We decided to leave the Captain as Pilot Flying for the leg at which time the Captain followed the correct procedure for swapping the HSI carat from right (First Officer) to left (Captain).- We were also given a freq change to ZZZ ATC and Pilot Monitoring checked us in. Next came the Pilot Flying reducing the pitch attitude inside 1;000 feet from level off.Slow it down. Confirm changes. No fast hands. Remember [aircraft] gotchas. Prioritize issues and; when able; handle them sequentially versus overlapping and simultaneously.

Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude overshoot which resulted from manually adjusting the pitch during climb.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Being vectored to a visual approach Runway 22 into ROA; we had a terrain caution followed by a pull up and responded accordingly.GPWS announced the warning.While remaining at the assigned 4;000 feet from ROA approach; we were on a left base for Runway 22 when we received the terrain warning and associated pull up.I instantly disconnected autopilot and climbed the aircraft 200 feet. Although I was mainly focused on the instruments during that time; I'm confident that the warning was dismissed almost instantly once passed the highest point on the ridge being crossed.My only suggestion would be crews deliberately discuss crossing ridges at the lowest point possible at assigned ATC altitudes or opening up conversation with Roanoke approach to see if we can get higher altitudes and longer vectors. I did read the previous write about the crew going into Roanoke and having the same issue and this event was discussed in the cockpit well before it happened so both the captain and myself were ready to respond to the caution.

Cleared visual approach Runway 24 in ROA; on left base outside HIBAN on GPS 24 approach; descending to 3;700 feet; GPWS sounded terrain; pull up. Terrain was selected on MFD and not depicting terrain. Briefed waiting to descend to 3;700 for HIBAN until after crossing ridge just too south of course; initiated descent passing ridge; but GPWS still sounded. Most likely caused by the RA sensing a rapid increase in terrain passing ridge as I initiated the descent. Turbulence may have contributed by causing a momentary descent rate greater than selected.I was able to visually verify we were clear of terrain and initiated an immediate climb. The alert silenced after climbing approximately 100 feet. For this approach in particular; there is no need to leave 4;000 (last ATC assigned altitude) until basically over HIBAN in VMC conditions. There is still plenty of time to lose excess altitude to follow the FPA. I should have just stayed at 4;000 until turned onto the approach more considering I had given myself the distance from HIBAN to make a shallow descent and still configure with plenty of time to have a stable approach.

Air Carrier flight crew reported being vectored in area of high terrain which caused GPWS to issue warning.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47.5; Flight Crew Total 190.7; Flight Crew Type 39.3

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was flying VFR to Orlando Executive Airport (ORL). I had just departed from that same airport and was taking a joyride with my wife. She began to feel ill so I cut our flight short and was returning to land. I was monitoring the Tower frequency so that I would have an understanding of the air traffic situation upon my arrival in the area. I collected ATIS on Comm 2 and noticed it was the same information as my departure. I called Tower at 15 miles out and was told to continue inbound and make a turn for left base. As this was my first flight into ORL visually; I had some brief trouble locating the airport; but located it when I was about 7 or 8 miles out and to the northwest. When I was about 4 1/2 miles from the airport; I began a right turn to join the base leg. Just prior to starting my turn; I heard Tower talking to another aircraft in the pattern. ATC then contacted me; as I had just started my turn; and told me I would be number 2 for landing; to keep an eye out for the traffic that was crosswind and to go ahead and turn south and fly west of downtown to join base. I read back the instructions as I attempted to locate the other aircraft. At the time of the call I was already north/northeast of downtown and turning south to join base and did not really consider that my course would take me on the east side of downtown. I quickly made the traffic now flying downwind and determined that I would be able to follow it in while maintaining safe separation. Tower contacted me and informed me that a jet would be departing before my landing; and I acknowledged. Tower then said it looked like I was out of position and issued a traffic alert for the aircraft I was observing on the downwind. As I was receiving this alert; the other aircraft turned right directly on my line of flight and at my 12 o'clock; now heading straight for me. I estimated its altitude to be a couple hundred feet above mine as I was descending for the turn to final. I pushed the nose forward and passed under the other aircraft at 250-300 feet. As I did this; I informed the Tower that I still had the traffic and believed I was in the correct position heading south on a left base. Tower then informed me that I was on the wrong side of downtown [and] that they had directed me to the west side and I was on the east. I apologized and was cleared to land.Upon reflection; I remember receiving and reading back the Tower direction to fly base on the west side of downtown; however; I was already east of downtown and to fly the directed base turn; I would have had to backtrack somewhat and fly a west/southwest course instead of the south course I was directed. As the rest of Tower instructions matched what I was expecting and indeed already doing; and as I was focused on looking for the traffic I had been made aware of; I automatically assumed I was on the correct side of downtown without stopping to verify. There seems to be three contributing factors to the incident. First; I failed to digest the entirety of the direction I'd been given resulting in my being out of position. Second; there was the confusing directive from the tower controller telling me to fly south and to fly west of downtown; when a south bound course would take me east of downtown. Finally; there was the unexpected right turn made by the other aircraft into my line of flight. Had they turned base; I would have been no factor in their flight and would have been able to safely follow them in. Instead; they performed a 360 [degrees] maneuver that took our two planes into close proximity and resulted in them following me in.

PA-28 pilot reported did not follow ATC instructions and created a NMAC situation.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

A number of factors; weather; experience level; system malfunction; and less-than-ideal decisions lead to a situation where an EGPWS Caution was experienced as a go-around was initiated. ATIS was broadcasting marginal VFR conditions. The planned approach was to the Company preferred runway (quickest access to ramp); RNAV (GPS) Runway 23 with visual conditions expected in vicinity of FAF. I am very familiar with this approach and had flown it as the pilot not flying the night before in better weather conditions in the same aircraft. The aircraft flew it flawlessly as it usually does. On initial contact to Approach Control I advised having the ATIS which was the same as the current METAR: 21012KT 6SM BR OVC016 13/12 A2974. We were not advised that the airport weather was any different; but FWA ATC is notorious (in my experience) for not updating the ATIS in a timely manner around our arrival time in the evening. I later found out it had gone IFR for a period; before returning to VFR.The First Officer was pilot flying and had less than 100 hours in type but impressed me as being very competent. He had been to FWA before (but not with me). During the approach briefing we discussed manipulation of the MCP; and the need for VNAV PATH. Approach clearance was direct SLYDR; cross SLYDR at or above 3;000; cleared straight-in RNAV (GPS) Runway 23. With autoflight on; the First Officer began to slow and configure nicely for a planned approach in visual conditions; though it would have been late for an approach in IMC; which the weather at the field had deteriorated to unbeknownst to us. Over SLYDR; the First Officer performed 'LAVS'; setting up the autoflight system to fly the approach. He called for gear; flaps; and the Before Landing Checklist as he slowed the aircraft to Vapp. As I performed the checklist I lost my pilot not flying SA (Situational Awareness) and; in retrospect; things went downhill pretty fast. I recall breaking out of the clouds above 1;000 AGL and reminding the First Officer that we had until 500 AGL to be stable as we assumed the airport was VFR. For some reason I was unable to see the airport where I expected it to be; [Was] scud obscuring the view? Though I had ground contact as we approached 'Minimums'; something definitely did not seem right. For about one second my brain attempted to make sense of the outside picture; and then I called for a go-around. Almost simultaneously; we received an EGPWS caution 'TOO LOW; TERRAIN' as the go-around was in progress. Later during the debrief; the First Officer said that once the go-around was commanded; he hit the G/A switch but does not think it engaged (due to lack of force from his finger). He then reacted to the GPWS by abruptly pulling back on the yoke to initiate the climb; but with the power back; we briefly entered 'the foot' on the airspeed tape; and he recalls momentarily getting the stick shaker before manually adding full power. As I was not on the controls; I don't have the same recollection he does; but as I was reaching for the flaps (to raise them to 20) I noticed the airspeed out of the corner of my eye and also reached for the throttles. Again; it all happened very quickly; but my recollection is that we immediately began climbing rapidly at a safe speed; the GPWS had silenced; and I continued to configure the aircraft for the go-around. I don't recall hearing a GPWS Warning (i.e. 'PULL UP') which would've dictated the EGPWS escape maneuver (we had visual contact with the ground but it was night); and I'm sure I would not consciously make a decision not to follow the procedure. Knowing the terrain near the airport and observing the airplane's performance; I felt the go-around was an appropriate and satisfactory action at the time. As we leveled at 3;000 ATC asked if we had any issues; and I reported that we did not see the runway at minimums and that the weather seemed lower than reported. They didn't advise us of the latest weather (which had officially returned to VFR) and; for some strange reason; I did not ask. They then asked our intentions; and after briefly discussing the choice of an ILS Runway 32 or another RNAV (GPS) 23; we opted to repeat the approach. In retrospect; clearly the correct decision should have been to select an approach with ground-based navaids; vertical guidance and lower minimums. I'm not sure how much of a factor fatigue or schedule pressure played but; at that point; we assumed any problems with the approach had been 'operator error' and Runway 23 seemed to be the most efficient option. On the subsequent approach; we would be extremely alert for anything not right. We were vectored to intercept the final between SLYDR and the FAF; AKEWS; on about a 7 mile final. Looking back; I have no idea why I accepted this clearance instead of requesting to join outside SLYDR again; but at the time it seemed acceptable. The First Officer was again pilot flying and I was pilot not flying; both of us watching the autoflight system very carefully. Approaching BABAC I noticed the MCP VNAV switch annunciator extinguish and the FLCH switch illuminate. What the heck? The aircraft was now descending below profile; I took the controls; added power; but before I could say 'go-around' we acquired the runway visually; and I opted to continue the approach visually. The landing was uneventful. I made a logbook entry for the VNAV system malfunction and; after consulting with Maintenance Control and Operational Control; we MEL'd the VNAV switch prior to departure. On the next leg; we had a malfunction of the autothrottle system on approach (which was written up upon arrival); and this may have been the root cause of the VNAV malfunction.As usual; a number of factors [contributed to] this event; however; I believe familiarity with the aircraft; airport; and approach; may have led to a level of complacency on my part as pilot not flying. I fault myself primarily for allowing the planning of the RNAV (GPS) approach as a back-up to a visual; instead of planning it as an instrument approach in marginal VFR conditions. Doing so would have required slowing and configuring sooner and; with the Before Landing Checklist complete that much earlier; I could've devoted all my attention to my pilot not flying role. I believe I would've noticed what I now assume was a VNAV malfunction on the first approach. I also believe my First Officer's inexperience in the aircraft and with RNAV approaches may have caused him to become task saturated with slowing and configuring the aircraft during the approach and diverted his attention from monitoring autoflight's performance. I should have given more consideration to his experience level; and encouraged him to fly a conservative approach as opposed to allowing him to fly it as I might have. Contributing to the event was lack of appropriate weather updates from ATC; which surely would have prompted a more conservative approach. And lastly; an aircraft system malfunction and failure to recognize it sooner was the final piece to the puzzle. On the second approach; I think I made several questionable decisions; and while I know that schedule never trumps safety; I have to wonder if it was a significant influence to some of my choices. Finally; I have only briefly mentioned fatigue; but I wonder if that was a factor in my sub par monitoring and decision making that night. This particular trip can be challenging; with the amount of block time (around 6 hours); a relatively short layover; and back-side of the clock flying. The layover was further shortened due to delay to the layover destination. While I felt 'fine' when I reported for duty the night of the event; I have to wonder if my decision making was affected by less than normal rest. I've spent many hours this past weekend reflecting on what happened and thinking how to prevent it from happening again. The most significant lesson learned is; when planning an approach to an airport reporting marginal VFR conditions; treat it as an instrument approach. Allow for earlier configuration and checklist completion so that your attention can be devoted to the pilot not flying role (or if pilot flying; monitoring the autoflight). Breaking out into visual conditions over the FAF should just be a bonus. Other things that would have helped are more obvious such as; if you don't get the information you need (i.e. weather); ask for it! If the first approach is unsuccessful; seriously consider a different one. Never let schedule pressure cause you to make unsafe decisions. And finally; with short layovers; do your best to get adequate rest so you report for duty with a clear head.

The Captain provided additional information regarding the LAVS procedure and its requirements. When asked about setting the MCP altitude to field elevation plus 100 feet he advised that doing so was now SOP on all approaches at his air carrier. After a discussion of how the reversion to FLCH had gone undetected until the CFTT warnings were received; and the possible mitigating effects of how setting a higher initial altitude might prevent subsequent such events he advised that doing so was procedurally out of the question because it is an SOP mandate that if the FMA ever changed from VNAV--as it would if an intermediate altitude such as the FAF were intercepted--an immediate go-around must be initiated. The intention of that stipulation is that once the LAVS procedure is complete the flight crew is tasked exclusively with monitoring the function of autoflight and intervening only when appropriate in the final stages of the approach should it not be an autoland procedure (with the exception of resetting the MCP altitude to the MAP altitude descending through 1;000 AGL).He paused for a moment after those comments and admitted that in this event; due to completing pilot not flying duties; checklists; etc. the 1;000 foot above callout was never made; the MCP altitude had remained set at FE +100 FT and the jet continued to descend at a much greater than anticipated rate. He then commented that routine scanning of the centered flight director command bars--which remained centered--while cleaning up the pilot not flying tasks reinforced the perception that all was going as intended.He was also unaware of any faults that are known to cause the reversion to FLCH. He did; however; have a discussion with a mechanic who suggested he suspected that an autothrottle fault might do that...although there was no EICAS message of such during the event.Finally; he reinforced his comments relative to the dangers of planning an approach based on anticipated VMC conditions and finding they fail to materialize. He believed his distraction from monitoring the approach in order to complete checklists and other pilot not flying duties compromised his ability to short circuit the errors and resulted in the failure to monitor situationally revealing raw data sources.

We elected to fly the RNAV 23 with the expectation of breaking out around glideslope intercept from AKEWS inbound. We were cleared to descend at or above 3;000 until SLYDR and then cleared for the approach. As we proceeded on the approach we broke out of the weather and I began cross checking the approach and taking a couple of quick looks for the airport environment. Then; prior to our 500 foot; stabilized call and our approach minimums; we both simultaneously realized something was wrong. Upon cross checking of the FMAs [Flight Mode Annunciators] we had somehow switched to FLCH and were no longer descending on the approach. We both looked outside again and tried to visually acquire the airport and quickly came to the conclusion we were too low; too early in the approach. I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles; pitched the aircraft nose up; wings level and began to add power. Since we had degraded situational awareness; I was beginning the GPWS escape maneuver because I was not sure exactly how much vertical separation we had from the ground and I wanted to get the aircraft climbing as quickly as possible. However; I initially pitched the aircraft too quickly without having sufficient power on the aircraft and we intermittently received stick shaker warnings. We then discussed what we thought had happened. Both of us felt that we had set the aircraft up properly; so we elected to try the approach again; assuming I had made an error somewhere during the approach that we did not catch. We slowed and configured the aircraft early and made sure we would have sufficient time to recognize any anomalies should they arise again. We again began the approach and the aircraft again switched out of VNAV into FLCH.

The secondary reporter was uncertain of exactly how far from the airport they were when the alerts were given but believes they were just inside of the FAF; AKEWS. He believes their altitude at the initiation of the go-around was 800 low or about 700 AGL. He stated it was dark but thinks they had ground contact although the airport was not in sight. He had no idea when the switch from VNAV to FLCH occurred and felt it was likely the fact that the Flight Director (FD) command bars remained centered (autoflight was following the active mode; FLCH) probably minimized his scan of raw data. Their ultimate awareness; coincident with the automated warnings; was triggered by the recognition that the throttles were at idle and their rate of descent was about 1;500 FPM down.He discussed the company 'LAVS' SOP; a mnemonic acronym which directs the crew to select the following: 'L' to insure the appropriate Lateral Mode; 'A' to set the appropriate Altitude (more following); 'V' to select VNAV for vertical compliance with procedural restrictions; and; 'S' to select the desired MCP Speed.The LAVS procedure is to be performed at or just prior to intercepting the procedure; in this case at the IAF; SLYDR. LNAV selected for the lateral mode; 100 FT above field elevation would set the lowest altitude to which the jet would fly in VNAV; VNAV the selected Vertical mode to insure VNAV compliance with crossing altitudes; and the appropriate airspeed. Finally; the FMS line selected approach procedure provides a 'computed' glidepath consistent with that charted; which will be conducted by VNAV inside the FAF. The FE+100 FT setting will remain in the MCP altitude window until passing 1;000 AGL on final when the pilot not flying will set the MAP altitude. The descent will now be continued to the DA(H) which will be determined from the barometric or radar altimeter as appropriate.When the above procedure is properly programmed the approach from that point on is FMS/autoflight driven with the exception of the MCP altitude change and the need; for RNAV approaches; to disconnect the autopilot and manually land the jet. He believes what happened is that; for an unknown reason; the change from VNAV mode occurred without immediate flight crew recognition. When FLCH became active the FD command bars and; thus; the jet would reflect compliance with the demands of FLCH mode; i.e. an idle thrust descent at the speed selected on the MCP (about 1;500 FPM down) continuing down to the altitude set in the MCP altitude window...100 FT above field elevation. The FLCH descent rate would be approximately twice that required to fly the computed glidepath; thus; the jet would descend rapidly below the glidepath but the command bars; now reflecting compliance with FLCH mode; would remain essentially centered and look exactly like they would in VNAV. Lacking a timely observation of raw data--altitude; DME or FMS computed distance to the airport; IVSI indications; etc. the descent would be continued at that excessive rate until; as happened in this case; EGPWS or ATC Altitude Alert warning direct recognition of their actual situation.During a discussion of setting the MCP altitude window the reporter ruminated that he would prefer that; instead of initially setting FE+100 FT many miles from the airport it might be better to set the FAF crossing altitude as a backstop in the event of similar failures. He felt that; although doing so could require reselecting VNAV after compliance with the FAF altitude is assured; doing so would both provide an altitude safety net in that any alternative vertical nav mode would never inadvertently descend below the FAF altitude but would also require greater situational awareness on the part of the flight crew with respect to raw data information; defending against over-reliance on FD command bars which; as appears to have been the case in his event; can on rare occasion provide accurate but dangerous indications.

The flight crew of a Boeing RNAV capable; GPS equipped; twin jet cleared for the RNAV (GPS) Runway 23 at FWA were alerted by an EGPWS warning and a low altitude alert from the Tower that they had descended excessively below the RNAV generated glidepath. Simultaneous with the warning the crew was surprised to see that the autoflight system had somehow reverted from VNAV PATH to FLCH. An immediate EGPWS escape maneuver was executed by the pilot flying who applied insufficient pressure to the go-around button to activate go-around guidance and autothrottle response and a short duration stick shaker warning occurred; silenced quickly by manual thrust lever advancement. A subsequent approach under close observation repeated the anomaly with VNAV/FLCH.


Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Other During the course of an all night turnaround flight

I am a reserve Flight Attendant and went back on call this morning. I did however sleep in that morning for a half hour. An all night turn opened up mid afternoon. I monitored it for several hours to see if I would be given this sequence so I could prepare myself and perhaps take a nap before its sign in and 10 hour duty 'night'. The trip remained open most of the afternoon. Crew Scheduling waited until the very last minute to assign me this trip; calling me 2 hours prior to sign in. By the time I returned to my domicile I had been awake for over 21 hours. If any type of emergency situation had presented itself I would have been too fatigued to address it or act upon it.I understand that I am 'contractually' obligated to fly a 12 hour duty day 'on paper.' However; I find fault in the company's policy that flight attendants are on call [24 hours a day] for a block of days at a time but mostly fault the Scheduling Department for allowing this trip to remain open all day. When they wait to the last minute to assign such a trip; human beings are unable to prepare themselves for all night duty.

A Flight Attendant addressed the need for schedulers to consider rest and fatigue concerns when assigning trips to on call reserves; stressing that all night assignments should be assigned at the earliest practical time to permit attendants to realign their day's activities to minimize fatigue during non-optimal diurnal operations.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

On the RNAV Arrival into Chicago; we encountered severe turbulence in the descent. We were in the descent at approximately 14000ft over PAITN when we started to feel turbulence. The aircraft violently rolled into a 40 degree right bank which caused the autopilot to disengage. The Captain took controls and leveled the wings. As he got the LNAV set back on the turbulence started again and the aircraft violently rolled into a 40 degree left bank. The Captain continued to hand fly the plane while I contacted ATC. I informed them of the severe turbulence and queried if we were following a heavy aircraft since we saw nothing visually or on TCAS. ATC allowed us to offset to the right; so I set up the autopilot in HDG mode and 30 degree right turn off course. ATC responded that we were following a 737 which was 2000ft below us approximately 12 miles ahead. After flying on the heading for about 2 minutes; I asked ATC for instructions to rejoin the arrival. We never saw any aircraft pass overhead nor were told about any traffic passing overhead. Once the plane was under control; the Captain rang the Fight Attendant (FA) to check on her and passengers. No injuries were reported. ATC queried about injuries and/or aircraft damage to which I replied there were none; but the aircraft would be inspected on the ground. We landed without incident. The Captain wrote up the severe turbulence encounter and had maintenance inspect the aircraft. No deformations were found on my walk around. Maintenance found the Captain side piano hinge rod broken through the safety wire. It was unclear if it was caused by the turbulence. Maintenance re secured the piano hinge. The Captain took himself off the trip to get his wrist looked at since he twisted it during the turbulence encounter.

Embraer First Officer reported encountering severe turbulence while on descent into ORD.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A [Specified Rocket Club] often uses airspace for their rockets. This airspace is sometimes depicted with both a Lat/Long and a Fixed Radial Distance. A problem has occurred every time they include both means of identifying a single point where the center points are; the two points are off; usually from 2 to 7 miles. The rocket launch area is a five mile radius around (both) [specified places]. These points are five miles apart on our scopes. Uncounted amounts of aircraft were vectored into one of the protected airspaces in order to miss the other. I don't know the call signs or types of any of the aircraft that passed through the areas.Only one means of identifying a protected airspace should be used; unless they both depict the same point in space.

A ZLC Controller reports of a protected airspace that has two centers and the Controller does not know which is the correct one. Aircraft are flying through one of the areas because they do not know where the exact point is.


I was working the 3I position; parallel monitor for Runway 28 during triple simultaneous approaches to ORD (West Flow.) C90 was providing 6 miles between arrivals to Runway 28; and ORD ATC Tower was departing Runway 28 between each arrival. An A319 was approaching WAVIE on the 28 localizer at 5;000 feet. An E145 was directly next to the A319 on the Runway 27L localizer about to leave 6;000 feet. The A319 had not checked in on the local/monitor frequency. I called to the 1W1 position (West Arrival) to try the A319 again; but he was not there. While this was occurring; Local had put an aircraft in position on Runway 28; and another aircraft was inside of the final approach fix. I did not feel it was safe to override the Local Control position at this time; on an IFR/MVFR day; to verify that the A319; who appeared to be flying the localizer normally; was monitoring the frequency. After Local had cleared the departure for takeoff; and I observed the airborne target; I used the Local frequency and verified that the A319 was on frequency; they were. The E145 had descended below 6;000 feet before I was able to verify the A319 was on the frequency. I posted a systemic safety issue several months ago based on this scenario. I will reiterate that I believe ORD should either not depart Runway 28 while conducting simultaneous ILS approaches to that runway; or there should be a separate monitor frequency for arrivals that can be used by the parallel monitor without overriding the Local Controller during critical moments; i.e. an aircraft holding in position with another aircraft inside the final approach fix.

C90 Controller expressed concern regarding the use of Runway 28 when simultaneous arrival operations are being conducted.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 14800; Flight Crew Type 254

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

In cruise at FL180; the temperature in the cabin became very cold suddenly. I increased the selected temperature with the auto temperature control rheostat; and the temperature did not change after several minutes. I then selected manual hot for about three seconds. The temperature coming out of my side duct began to warm. I left the temperature controller in auto after having moved the mix valve to a warmer selection in manual; and monitored the temperature. Several minutes later; the temperature coming out of the duct suddenly rose dramatically; and I could smell a burning smell. I immediately went to manual cold and tried to decrease the temperature; but concurrently the passengers in the back alerted me to smoke in the cabin. I called the Center controller and told him I needed lower immediately; and he cleared me to 11;000 feet. The temperature continued to come out hot; so I took the bleed air switches to off; and the cabin began to rapidly climb as I was in a rapid descent from FL180 to 11;000 feet. Once the bleed valves were turned off; there was no more smoke; and no more heat coming from the air ducts. At 11;000 feet; I turned the bleed valves back on one at a time; and cold air came out of the ducts. I was able to control the cabin in this configuration; and we flew the rest of the way with cold air coming from the air ducts. After landing; I passed the information on to our mechanics; and they are investigating the auto temperature control box for the ACM (Air Cycle Machine) as the culprit. Center asked if we were declaring an emergency; and we told them we had it under control with the descent to 11;000 feet. They asked if we needed any further assistance; and we told them we did not.

MU-2 Captain experiences very cold conditioned air at FL180. Initial attempts to warm the air are unsuccessful until manual is selected; then the air becomes too hot producing smoke. Attempts to cool the air using manual control are unsuccessful initially; so the bleeds are turned off and the aircraft is descended to 11;000 feet. Flight continues to destination at 11;000 feet.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5600

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Winds favored Runway 33 so we requested 33 and I briefed for the visual backed up by the ILS. The autopilot was engaged and we were cleared to 2500 feet and vectored onto a right downwind. The ILS app for 33 was loaded in the FMC. We configured to flaps 5 and reported the field in sight. We were cleared for the visual and I requested 1800 feet (alt at FAF) be put in the MCP and called for gear down; flaps 20. At that point we were abeam the FAF and I began a right turn to intercept the final at the Final Approach Course (FAC) or just inside it. Looking back at that point I had not properly selected the lowest range on the HSI; so I was further displaced from the FAC than I thought. I selected VS down 300 feet to begin a descent to 1800 feet and I called for flaps 30. The landing checklist was completed and I selected LOC and once on an intercept heading for the FAC I armed APP. It was at this point I identified the range error on the HSI. I looked down to adjust the range and about that time the GS captured and the aircraft began to descend. I still had the field in sight; but had lost a visual on the runway. We were inside the FAF on an intercept heading; but still to the right of the FAC. The First Officer (FO) called 1000 feet and I began to feel as though I was not in a good position for the runway. We continued to descend for a little longer at which time I disengaged the autopilot and stopped the descent. Tower called and asked us if we had the runway. I had begun a climb when tower call and said that they had a low alt alert and we needed to climb; which we were already doing. I climbed to above 1000 feet AGL; intercepted the FAC and PAPI GS and the landing was uneventful. There were a number of things I could have done better. First; I recognized a loss of Situational Awareness during a portion of the approach and I should have verbalized that to my FO. I should have given myself more time to intercept the final outside of the FAF and should not have started my descent so quickly to 1800 feet. I should have verbalized to my FO when I realized that I was further to the right of the FAC than planned; and also that I had lost sight of the runway. I should not have armed APP until closer or established on the FAC. This would have prevented the GS capture and early descent inside the FAF.

I believe the event was caused by the Captain losing situational awareness. I am not sure where he thought he was in comparison to where he actually was. As I continued to watch our progress on the visual and getting more and more uncomfortable; I should have queried him sooner which would have put me more at ease and possibly made him more aware of where he really was in comparison to the actual FOC to runway 33. I also believe that not descending below the GSI altitude until the runway is in sight and can safely be flown on a normal glide path is the best way to approach a situation like this. Obviously; more communication would have gone a long way for both pilots to be on the same page.

B757-200 flight crew reported getting a low altitude alert from ATC after losing situational awareness on a night visual approach to BDL.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

On departure out of ZZZ; the Tail Comp Temp High light illuminated. Declared an emergency; completed QRH; and we returned to ZZZ. Due to previous aircraft changes; delays; return to gate for maintenance issues; and now the emergency return; we declined to continue on to ZZZ1.

An MD80 flight crew returned to their departure airport after receipt of a Tail Comp Temp High warnings.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On takeoff from 26L behind an Airbus A319; at about 50-100 FT and V2+15; we encountered a wake turbulence event.  We were cleared to takeoff as the previous aircraft was just about rotating. The takeoff was normal; with normal pitch rate and speed. The aircraft buffeted; rolled left and right about 10 to 15 degrees; and stick shaker activated for about 1 second.  The CA was PF and countered the rolling motion with the flight controls; lowered the nose and increased thrust to decrease the AOA.  The event lasted only a few seconds and we returned to the normal takeoff profile.Undesired aircraft state was the stick shaker at an altitude of about 50-100 FT; a rolling motion; and buffet.   This is the third time I have experienced this same exact event behind an A319/320.  I do not recall if I filed an ASAP or not.  In all three cases; the sequence and type of events were identical.  It seems that the A319/320 creates an unusual and/or significant wake turbulence.  I believe the FAA needs to review the wake created by the A319/320.  I also believe that the FAA should review the separation criteria for aircraft departing behind it.  I view this as a significant safety issue and it should be reviewed by both the company and the FAA.

CRJ200 FO reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of an A319 after takeoff from ATL.


Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

On approach to 18R into MEM there was a very bright billboard with flashing lights along I-240 right underneath the final approach; approximately one mile from touchdown. The brightness of this billboard was enough that I had to remove one hand from the control yoke in order to block the light. It was bright enough to illuminate the cockpit and caused a distraction for me in a critical phase of flight. Once the aircraft had passed over the billboard; the flight continued and landed uneventfully. Businesses need to advertise; billboards serve that purpose. But having a two million candlepower LED billboard pointed in the direction of an approach to land is not conducive to safety. The addition of shades attached to the top of the billboard that would prevent the light from reaching a vertical component would serve the purpose of being visible to the people on the ground without affecting the pilots.

Air carrier First Officer reported a bright billboard with flashing lights on the final approach to Runway 18R at MEM. The billboard is very distracting and about one mile from the end of the runway along I-240 facing north.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A C208 departed for Kenai. Kenai Tower called to let R5 know the field was IFR and gave me the visibility and the winds before I was even talking to the pilot. I advised the pilot of the conditions and vectored the aircraft for the ILS approach. The pilot reported the airport in site about 12-15 miles north of the airport. I cleared him for the Visual Approach and switched him to Tower. Then Kenai Tower called R5 to advise us that the field was IFR and the aircraft couldn't have a Visual Approach. The Controller got loud and aggressive on the phone so I eventually gave my initials and hung up. I immediately called the Supervisor over to tell him about the situation and ask what I should do. He told me it is fine as long as the pilot had the airport in site. He then left the area to go look up the information in the 7110.65. I couldn't find him in the area for clarification and Kenai Tower was calling me again. I didn't want to have another confrontation with the Tower Controller before I talked to the Supervisor. The aircraft landed and the Supervisor later told me that he would just be writing up the event as a learning experience for everyone because he didn't even know we couldn't clear a pilot for a visual when the field was reported IFR. I asked several other controllers in the area and there was some confusion on the matter. If a pilot has an airport in site; they should be able to assume responsibility and be given a Visual Approach. Several airports in Alaska don't have up to the minute weather updates and the weather observation isn't always taken at the runway or airport the weather is being reported for. The field could be completely clear with a bank of fog a mile to the side of the runway. The pilot is the one there at that moment with the most up to date conditions and should be able to make the final call for what type of approach he/she wants.

ZAN Controller issued a Visual Approach clearance to a Kenai IFR arrival after the pilot reported the airport in sight; however the weather was reported as IFR; the reporter indicating uncertainty regarding the procedure in question.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Total 14800; Flight Crew Type 450

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

I was flying doing low level work south of ZZZ at approximately 800 ft. AGL. After finishing several hours of this flying the in the region assigned; I was ferrying under VFR back to ZZZ1; where we had been staging out of for the past five days. While passing south of ZZZ; I made it a point to remain below 2;200 ft. MSL; to stay below the 2;600 ft. floor of ZZZ Class C airspace. I was trying to remain as high as possible due to low level turbulence; without getting too close to the lower deck of ZZZ Class C space. We had seen quite a few birds during the course of our flight. While scanning a bit more than usual for birds; I was also tuning in the frequency for ZZZ1 Unicom and AWOS; in preparation for performing my approach checklist. While doing this; I glanced at my altimeter and realized that I had strayed up to 2;450 ft. MSL. I immediately corrected back to 2;200 ft. When approaching ZZZ1 and setting in the current altimeter setting; I realized that I had been flying around 280 ft. higher than my indicated altitude. This would have put me about 8-9 miles south of ZZZ at 2;730 ft. and into the ZZZ Class C.Contributing factors: - This was my last day of two weeks of flying this contract. Distracted by thinking about getting home. - Was doing most of my flying for almost two weeks; using my Radar Altimeter as my primary altitude instrument. This; due to the nature of the low level application work I was contracted to do. I had experienced a near miss with a big bird (hawk or vulture) earlier in the morning in the same area. Was keeping too much emphasis on looking outside and not on appropriately flying the plane. Inappropriate prioritizing. I thought since I was only going to be under the Class C for less than 5 minutes; I could easily hold an altitude for that long; so I decided to stay a bit closer to the Class C than I normally would. Complacency. I was dealing with increasing low-level turbulence on the flight - Had two [passengers] on board and was trying to minimize their exposure to the low level; moderate turbulence. In reality; an extra 500 ft. lower would not have been much different than the 2;200 ft. I decided to fly. Things to different moving forward. LESSONS LEARNED: Call the local approach facility for flight following when flying near protected airspace. I had spoken to ZZZ Approach several times in the past week of flying and they were always friendly and helpful. I should have taken the extra one or two minutes to establish contact with them. Give myself a greater margin around and under protected airspace. Remain vigilant to keep a current Altimeter setting; even when prioritizing the use of the Radar Altimeter. Be more willing to use an autopilot when one is available. Remind myself that I become more vulnerable to mistakes if or when I start to 'let my guard down'; at the end of a long day.

BE90 Captain reported an altimeter error resulted in an airspace incursion.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after rotation Engine Fire Detect Warning light illuminated as well as Fault B lights on both engines. Flight crew decided to [advise ATC] and return to field to land. Emergency vehicles were available if their assistance would be needed and they were not needed. Landing and taxi was under normal procedures. Passengers were informed to remain seated and we returned to gate. After deplaning; maintenance came out to the aircraft and checked the systems and MELd the appropriate systems and the flight continued. A return to field event occurred coinciding with an emergency.

Dash 8 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after the Engine Fire Detect warning light illuminated.


RTO due to engine vibration; high ITT and APR (Automatic Performance Reserve) activation. #2 engine power loss.

LJ60 flight crew reported rejecting takeoff after experiencing power loss in #2 engine.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As I made my way out to Marshal the plane in; I turned on the [stand guidance system] so it would show the red light to stop; since I had no crew to park the plane. I stood by the push tug waiting for manpower to show; I see the plane turn to come down the line and he keeps coming and not stopping. I call over the radio to OPS to tell them what is happening (NO RESPONSE FROM OPS). The next thing I knew that the pilot was all the way down the line just about to cross the 737-8 line. So I went to make the stop signal and he finally stopped! I was fearing the he was going to run into the push tractor.

A parking Marshall reports a B737 Captain taxing into the gate without direction and with the automatic parking system indicating a stop. The Marshall initiates his own stop signal as the aircraft approaches the tug; which the Captain heeds.


Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Captain (CA) & First Officer (FO) commented on a dirty sock smell on taxi out; no other abnormal indications. Upon adding takeoff power; left side of cockpit filled with a smokey/steamy mixture and acrid smell. Captain rejected. Maintenance (MX) advised there was an engine wash performed night prior and the aircraft engines were not run up properly after the procedure. We ended up having MX onboard for the runup who had us perform duties from a checklist that should have followed this engine wash including a run up of at least 5 min at 70% N1. The odors were still present during this time. If MX had been performed accurately the night prior; this could have been avoided. And; unfortunately; this routine wash is performed under a 'work card' making it invisible to pilots during a preflight in any MX accounting systems or via the aircraft logbook.

At approximately 90 KIAS; smoke came out of cockpit floor; under Captain's side; and rejected takeoff. Uneventful. Cleared off runway stopped and had emergency equipment check for fire. All clear and taxied to gate. Maintenance said engine wash were performed overnight; probable cause of smoke/steam on takeoff roll. Maintenance did a high power engine run; delayed flight and re dispatched after maintenance cleared aircraft. Maintenance crew did an engine run; at gate; versus high power one the night prior.  According to mechanic; a duct clamp was installed improperly in the E&E bay; residual water and duct clamp coming off on ducting might have contributed to what appeared to be smoke/fumes/vapor on takeoff roll after takeoff power was applied. [Reporter recommends Maintenance] perform high power engine run after every engine wash. If non-high power engine run; performed by maintenance overnight (info only entry to AML should be recorded so as to keep flight crews informed).

B737-800 flight crew reported smoke and fumes emanating from left side of the cockpit during takeoff roll. Flight crew executed a rejected takeoff and maintenance was requested.