Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is a general safety report to cover the multitude of ACARS reliability issues I have experienced; especially this last week or so. Most recently was our flight to PHX. Beginning at the gate; we had an ACARS NO COMM message. This did not get corrected until close to departure time requiring a significantly higher workload to accomplish routine items and less time to focus on more critical aspects of our flight. These problems continued off and on throughout our flight to PHX with the last ACARS NO COMM scenario happening within 20 miles of PHX.With our increasing dependence on ACARS for performance and communication; I feel that this issue is becoming more and more of a safety concern. We have no official or approved way to 'reset' ACARS; although Mechanics will sometimes pull circuit breakers or use maintenance functions in the ACARS menu that may sometimes successfully reset ACARS; there is essentially nothing we as pilots can do. Even if we did have a way to effectively reset the system; our ACARS reliability is horrible. Resetting the system takes time and effort when many times that time and effort should be focused on other more pertinent and safety critical tasks. If I am in Central America somewhere and I need ACARS capability for a myriad of possible reasons such as weather/runway change; diversion; passenger issue; fuel issue; customs issue; etc.; the last thing I want to be concerned about is whether or not ACARS will work. If we are moving forward with an ACARS centered philosophy we need an ACARS system that works better than ours currently does. I feel like we are trying to race the Indy 500 in our mom's old Toyota Corolla. It seems like until someone diverts to an airport in Central America without being able to tell anyone and ends up on the ramp with armed law enforcement surrounding our aircraft; followed shortly by a flood of social media posts tagging our company and the incident; nothing is going to be done to fix the problem.Bottom line: ACARS NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED!!! First; ACARS reliability needs significant improvement. We also need an approved way to reset ACARS when required. I feel like; with many other technological aspects; we have been limping this along; band-aiding a much less than adequate system instead of fixing/upgrading it to where it needs to be to support our operation.

The reporter stated that during flight they often receive a message on the FMC stating 'No Comm' referring to ACARS. When this occurs the flight crews are unable to reset the ACARS by any means. The reporter stated when it's reported to Maintenance that the ACARS is inoperative; a technician comes out and resets a circuit breaker and this often fixes the system; but the flight crews are not allowed to do this in flight. The reporter also stated that very often after they land they receive about a half a dozen messages that they should have received in flight. The reporter stated that flying in areas where radio communication may be a problem (i.e. South America) and perhaps a runway is shut down due to a disabled aircraft or severe weather in the area and they need to divert; an unreliable ACARS not receiving information can be a problem. The reporter stated now that companies are relying more and more on technology that these systems need to be more reliable or at least give the flight crews some sort of method of resetting or rebooting the system without jeopardizing safety.

B737 First Officer reported that he has witnessed a multitude of ACARS reliability issues.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

During ILS/DME Runway 10 approach; aircraft [was] on autopilot tracking slightly below glidepath until approximately 1;800 AGL when nose pitched up slightly and power came up to correct to glidepath then glideslope dropped below horizon and autopilot chased it down resulting in an unacceptable sink rate. Disconnected autopilot and corrected to visual approach. I believe the ILS at MTPP should be tested for accuracy and proper functioning. I fly this [approach] a lot and observe the glide slope and localizer to be erratic constantly. The problem is; it is insidious and if you don't fly this [approach] a lot it can take someone by surprise. It acts like it is working normal then the glideslope slowly drifts up or down slowly. Suggest using only RNAV approaches.

The MTPP Runway 10 ILS glideslope rose slowly then quickly dropped; causing a B737-800 autopilot to chase it at an unacceptable rate down. The autopilot was disconnected and a visual approach completed.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

This is a safety of flight issue that MIA ATC is very nonchalant about. As you can see on the attachment [not provided] two different departures are assigned on the PDC. Unless things have changed I thought a PDC change would be highlighted with asterisk on each side of a new assigned routing. This procedure MIA uses is a violation waiting to happen. Very dangerous procedure. In case the attachment is unreadable; HITAG and WINCO were the two assigned departures.MIA [must be made to] comply with standard PDC procedures like the rest of the country.

A DC-10 Captain took exception to the manner in which PDC clearances are formatted in MIA; citing the 'assignment' of two different SIDs on the PDC for their flight.


Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

I was working the R-side at Nepta (R30). There was a large area of thunderstorms to the southwest of SZW VOR that all aircraft were deviating around. This was forcing multiple aircraft to deviate at various altitudes to the southwest out over the Gulf of Mexico. The TMU issued no flow restriction; MIT; or reroutes around the weather to reduce deviations and traffic volume complexity into my sector and surrounding sectors. The Brewton Sector traffic volume reached 'red' levels in the Sector Monitor Alert system. The Controller working Brewton stopped accepting hand-offs from the Central Area sectors due to the volume of traffic all deviating through the same area of airspace. The Central Area sectors had no where to hold the aircraft; so they began off loading the aircraft into my sector on vectors. In addition to the aircraft I had in the southern portion of my airspace on the Q Routes; I became inundated with aircraft from the Brewton Sector and Central Area sectors that were deviating to the south of the Florida panhandle coastline around the storm. The DSR display was so cluttered with data blocks in that area; that it was not possible for myself; my D-Side Controller or my Tracking Controller to keep data block information safely separated or verify if we were providing required separation from neighboring airspace. Because of the overlapping data blocks; I could not tell if some aircraft had been handed off before entering other sectors' and facilities airspace; as well as tell if I had accepted hand offs on the flights before they entered my airspace. This is a reoccurring problem with the ZJX TMU. Their actions are always reactionary to problems already occurring instead of being proactive and creating plans to mitigate high volumes of air traffic that will deviate all within the same small area of confined airspace. TMU consistently does very little to help controllers in situations like this that occur on a weekly if not daily basis during thunderstorm season.I would recommend that all the TMU personnel be retrained on flow control procedures and tools available in order to assist controllers during these scenarios. Their job duties include being responsible to monitor and control the flow of air traffic volume through ZJX airspace; however; they do very little to control the flow of traffic into sectors that are impacted due to weather deviations. No ground delays or mile in trail restrictions were issued to our underlying terminal facilities or neighboring ARTCC's to help ease the volume and complexity of air traffic through my sector and the other impacted sectors around me.

ZJX Developmental describes situation where weather is causing deviations and an adjacent sector stops accepting aircraft. These aircraft now come to his sector which causes the Controller to become overwhelmed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

At cruise at 40;000 feet; 3 hours into our flight between navigation points while scanning the instruments I noticed a flashing 'PITCH' mode annunciation on the PFD (Primary Flight Display). The aircraft then started an uncommanded climb. During this brief time I also saw the standby attitude indicator show red X's on attitude; altitude and airspeed. I told the Pilot in Command 'we are climbing in pitch mode; select vertical speed and recover!' During the altitude recovery the standby altitude showed as high as 47;000 feet then flashed a series of numbers. We never exceeded an actual altitude of more 40;200 feet. Once restabilized at 40;000 feet; the standby attitude; airspeed and altimeter also stabilized but the standby altitude was off as much as 260 feet high.The autopilot changed modes uncommanded from ALT to PITCH and the aircraft started an uncommanded climb. We recovered; called the company and Maintenance. We were then told to divert. We also notified ATC of an avionics issue and that we were diverting for maintenance.

CE680 First Officer reported their aircraft made an uncommanded climb due to the autopilot malfunctioning.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X departed an airport about 10 miles south of the border. By the time the next sector got Aircraft X; handing off it was very close to the airspace border. The next sector then called on the landline for a handoff as Aircraft X was approaching the border. I took radar contact not wanting to force the other sector to have to turn Aircraft X. When Aircraft X called up I realized he was 1000 ft below the MVA. I climbed Aircraft X to the MVA.

BGM TRACON Developmental Controller reported taking a handoff of an aircraft that was below the MVA.


On LYNXX 8 Arrival to BUR; while approximately 5 NM east of JANNY Intersection and descending through 11;000 FT I suddenly noticed a glider at same altitude and heading directly towards our aircraft about 50 FT away. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and began an aggressive climb. The glider pilot must have seen us at the same time; because he suddenly began a steep dive and bank. He passed about 50 FT below us. The glider was at 11;000 FT with no transponder operating. It never appeared on TCAS. This glider was operating directly along the LYNXX 8 arrival; and above 10;000 FT with no transponder/Mode C (which is required.)

A corporate jet Captain reported an NMAC with a glider who was apparently flying at 11;000 FT directly on the LYNNX 8 arrival to BUR.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Fatigue; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Due to afternoon thunderstorms in the MDW area all traffic was delayed approximately an hour and a half on a ground stop. When we arrived in MDW late at night traffic volume was understandably high yet only one person was working the Tower. All Tower functions were combined including Local; Ground Control and Clearance Delivery. While this Controller did a very commendable job; it was not working well given the huge traffic volume at that time due to the backup of delayed flights. The frequency was constantly clogged; ground traffic became a jumbled mess; and aircraft on final were not issued landing clearances in a timely manner because of the Controller's workload. The entire scenario was a huge safety issue. The Tower needs to be adequately staffed; especially when weather events cause a disruption to normal operations.

After traffic was backed up extensively for weather at MDW when the weather broke the traffic became intense and the all Tower communications were being handled by a single harried Controller who; despite best efforts; could not handle all the tasks affectively and efficiently.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway 24L. Aircraft X was rolling out on Runway 24R. I took care of other things; and next thing I observed was Aircraft X about to cross the runway while Aircraft Y was rolling one third down the runway. I yelled out 'Aircraft X stop' 'Aircraft X hold' then I instructed Aircraft Y to abort and cancel take off clearance. I did not cross Aircraft X; I had not expected Aircraft X to cross the runway. I expected all aircraft to hold short of the parallel runway; since there is enough space to clear the runway they just landed.Aircraft Y had to sit on the runway for about 10 minutes to check his aircraft (with help of rescue department) and taxied off the runway on his own. We need the center taxiway between Runway 24L and Runway 24R. Better educate foreign pilots to what they can and cannot do after landing.

Cleared for takeoff 24L E8 shortened. As we taxied onto runway; an aircraft was rolling out on 24R. We began the takeoff roll as the aircraft was exiting onto AA. After 80 kt callout the CA questioned whether the aircraft was stopping short of 24L. We both noted that the aircraft was not stopping and the Captain called to abort the takeoff at approximately 110 kts. Immediately thereafter; tower told the crossing aircraft to 'stop; stop' and called for us to abort the takeoff. The traffic had not received a clearance to cross 24L but failed to hold short of the runway. After the rejected takeoff; we remained on the runway until ARFF inspected [us] for damage. No damage noted. Returned to gate for further inspection by maintenance.

LAX Tower Controller reported of a runway incursion involving a foreign carrier. Controller had cleared an aircraft for departure while landing foreign carrier was rolling out on parallel runway. Aircraft did not stop on taxiway between the runways. Controller advised aircraft to stop. Controller told departing aircraft to abort and cancel takeoff clearance.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During normal G650 Completion test flight engine checks; Individual engine Idle-Rated-Idle thrust sweeps; at approved engine run pad; Cessna 172 [taxied] behind the aircraft exhaust direction. The Cessna experienced an 'upset event' where aircraft suddenly tipped to the right and nose down; resulting in the right wing contacting the ground and damaging the wing tip and also resulting in the propeller striking the pavement and being bent at the tips. Ground made no radio calls advising us to cease our engine run operations or that there was conflicting traffic exiting the runway behind us. We were not aware at the time nor any other time subsequently that day of any potential involvement between our engine checks and the Cessna event.Production/Completion test card requirements for preflight engine power sweeps/high power operations to be pointed into the wind +/- 10 deg should be reexamined for relevance and importance for protecting against potential engine damage.

G650 Captain reported during an engine test run a C172 behind the aircraft was affected by the jet blast.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1980; Flight Crew Type 430

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We departed ZZZ. Reaching our final altitude of 10;000 ft. we gave the FA (Flight Attendant) three chimes and turned off the sterile light. Immediately after this the FA called us using the emergency call button and notified us that one of the passengers could not breathe and she was going to administer him oxygen. We said okay and to call us back after. We then [requested priority handling] with Center and told them our situation and that we wanted to return to ZZZ. At this point we were right about 25 NM from ZZZ. ATC immediately gave us a heading and a lower altitude to bring us back to ZZZ. The FA called us back and informed us that when she went to administer oxygen to the passenger; the oxygen cylinder was not working; and was not providing him any oxygen. After the FA informed the passenger that we would be returning to ZZZ; he did not want to and did not want to 'cause a scene.' We were on the ground in about 8 minutes in ZZZ after [requesting priority handling] with ATC. Paramedics met the aircraft at the gate and escorted the man off to give him medical attention.FA heard passenger say that he could not breathe. Passenger was having trouble breathing. FA called cockpit using the emergency call button. We [requested priority handling] and returned back to ZZZ where paramedics were waiting at the gate. Oxygen cylinder should be tested and verified to make sure it works before a flight is conducted.

Upon leveling at cruise altitude; FA (Flight Attendant) contacted flight deck via EMRG (Emergency) channel and informed the Captain that a passenger was having trouble breathing. The FA attempted to provide the passenger oxygen via the portable oxygen bottle; but the bottle was not working. The Captain [requested priority handling] and informed ATC of the issue and requested a return to ZZZ. ATC issued a clearance to return to ZZZ. Flight crew coordinated with Dispatch. Aircraft landed with no further issue. Medics met the aircraft at the gate and helped the passenger; who continued to have breathing problems after landing.Flight Attendant notified flight crew of situation. Passenger was having trouble breathing after departure. Also of note is that the aircraft was operating under MEL XX-XX-X and was unpressurized at the time. The cabin altitude at the time of the event was 9;200 ft. This may or may not have been a contributing causal factor.Captain [requested priority handling] and returned to ZZZ in order to provide the passenger with medical assistance in the most timely fashion. FA continued to provide assistance as appropriate to the passenger until medical assistance was available. [I suggest] continued adherence to policy and procedures.

EMB-145 flight crew reported returning to departure airport due to an ill passenger.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While departing MCI; Departure Control gave us 'Direct CAYKO'. Even though I read back 'Direct CAYKO'; I inadvertently selected KEOKK. We both verified the wrong fix. While checking in with Kansas City Center; we were asked if we were on a heading or direct CAYKO. I read back 'Direct CAYKO'. Center then asked our heading to CAYKO in a tone that seemed confused. As I was responding 'Heading 059'; I looked in the FMS and realized the error. The FO (First Officer) was hand flying at the time.The obvious fix to this situation is to ensure that verification is accomplished properly. Confirming the wrong fix does not even give verification a chance. We need to make sure we actually read the name of the fix instead of just seeing it. A simple mix up of the letter K versus the CAY in CAYKO could have led to other issues.

During the initial climb out from Kansas City; Departure cleared us to CAYKO on the Royal6 departure. We were still in the initial climb and was in the process of cleaning the aircraft up. I called for flaps 1 right as Departure cleared us to CAYKO. My captain loaded KEOKK thinking it was CAYKO. I confirmed KEOKK before he activated the FMS. After calling for flaps up and auto pilot on; departure then asked us if we were direct CAYKO; which he confirmed we were. Departure then asked us to verify our heading to CAYKO in which he stated 295. Departure then asked us to confirm CAYKO as Charlie; Alpha; Yankee; Kilo; Oscar. It was here were we discovered our mistake in loading KEOKK instead of CAYKO. Departure then gave us a heading of 310 to get back on the departure route. After the heading of 310; we were then cleared direct to KEOKK on the arrival.This event could have been prevented by [verifying] more and confirming twice that CAYKO was actually CAYKO and not KEOKK. This event also occurred during a high workload time as we were still in the process of cleaning the aircraft up for initial climb. Both the captain and I should have confirmed better the fix of CAYKO and monitored that is what we truly loaded and not KEOKK. We could have also confirmed with ATC the spelling of CAYKO since there was a confusion.

EMB175 Flight Crew reports being cleared direct to CAYKO on the ROYAL6 departure but selects and confirms direct KEOKK. ATC detects the error and gives the crew a phonetic spelling of the fix name.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Not all C182's are created equal or looks can be deceiving!!!We departed MMH with full fuel in a C182T carrying 87 gallons of fuel and three adults. In other 182s that I have flown including my personal 182; that load would not pose any problem.Compared to other turbo charged aircraft I had flown it seemed a bit sluggish on climbout. However; it was a cold day with no turbulence and we were able to climb just fine to 11;500 feet.After a 2.5 hour flight; we made an uneventful landing. I grabbed a photo of the aircraft weight and balance and was stunned to see the difference in the weights between the 182s made in the 80s and the 2013 182 that I was flying.I did a detailed comparison between this fixed gear turbo 182 from 2013 and a retractable turbo charged 182 from 1982. I was always taught that the retractable aircraft would weigh more (due to the mechanism) than a fixed gear. That is clearly a [saying] that is not always true.The fixed gear empty weight is 928 pounds and the retractable empty weight is 1;085 pounds. In doing a detailed weight and balance; not only did we perform a significantly overweight take-off (by about 100 pounds) and we were not in the envelop for take-off. Fortunately; by the time we landed; we had burned off enough fuel to land within the envelop.OK...key learnings...just because an aircraft looks like an aircraft that you are familiar with DON'T ASSUME. Second key learning...ALWAYS do a weight and balance...even if it 'looks' like the load should be OK.

C182 pilot reported discovering after the fact that the newer aircraft weight and balance was considerable different from the older model aircraft.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Winds were strong Easterly 110 at 14. All the Air Carriers and Air Taxis were taking Runway 18 as usual (longest runway) Aircraft Y called ready for taxi and I assigned him Runway 14 via hotel as per Airport Ops designated taxi route. It would require Aircraft Y to back taxi. I taxied him onto runway and told him to advise ready because he had to turn around and taxi down full length of runway and I had Aircraft X taxiing out to Runway 18 who would have been ready to go prior to Aircraft Y and because Aircraft Y was SW bound as well as Aircraft X it made more sense to clear Aircraft X first. Aircraft Y started his turn around on 14 and was holding and did not advise he was ready. I cleared Aircraft X for take off; he went very slowly. I felt maybe he didn't want to go with Aircraft Y in position on 14 with the 4 props running. It was over a minute or more when Aircraft Y said he was ready; I cleared him for take off runway heading. As I said Aircraft X was cleared well ahead of Aircraft Y; regardless the two runways do not intersect their approach ends abut each other. As Aircraft X was rolling on departure his left gear came up (from prop wash and probably the combination of strong East wind) and aborted departure. Wing tip did not strike runway but aircraft was definitely out of control at one point. He taxied back to ramp for hot breaks and eventually departed with no problems. Aircraft Z was also on ramp and radioed Aircraft Y and called back on frequency to tell me that Aircraft Y had used max power on take off and that he had listened to frequency and that Aircraft X had been cleared much before Aircraft Y and since he was facing away from Runway 18 he had no idea Aircraft X was even in vicinity of Runway 14 anymore. In retrospect; I would not clear an aircraft with any sort of prop or jet wash of any significance from Runway 14 with aircraft on Runway 18. As far as I know there is no rule prohibiting it; but after seeing that; I'll never do it again. Legal doesn't always mean safe. Due to the runway set up and the fact that we don't have a taxi route to Runway 14 due the airport restrictions I would never tie up the airport with a take off clearance for as long as it took that aircraft to back taxi down that runway. The main contributing factor was that I did not realize the force of his idling prop wash and the effect it would have on the aircraft on Runway 18. Also the fact that Aircraft X did not take off when he was cleared. If he had an issue with Aircraft Y being on Runway 14 and holding there and concerns about the prop wash I wish he would have said something and I would have cancelled his take off clearance and got Aircraft Y out of there on a take off clearance and went when Aircraft X felt it wasn't an issue. I felt like perhaps he was thinking it but never said anything; just by the way he seemed to balk at starting his take off roll.

Local Controller described an aborted take off apparently due to prop wash from an aircraft departing another runway.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Glycol being sprayed on can loaders is causing the yellow metal stairs to become slippery. This is a slip and fall hazard. Because agents are afraid to take stairs up and down they are riding the platform up and down which is a hazard itself.

Ramp agent reported a slip and fall hazard on stairs.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Damaged freight arrived off inbound flight and had leaked into pit. There was a concern of shipment due to package having an affixed hazard label and if it may have been a DG (Dangerous Goods) shipment. It was determined not to be DG; product was Trenbolone Acetate. SDS data sheet was also pulled to make determinations on product. Ramp employee working inside aircraft pit declined going to on site [company] medical indicating did not feel bad; as a precaution the Ramp Manager had this employee go to the on site [company] medical just to make sure that he was alright. Aircraft was refused by pilot and was taken out of service.

Ramp worker reported that damaged freight had leaked in aircraft pit; causing aircraft to be taken out of service.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During a day VFR Traffic Watch flight; experienced an alternator failure in flight while in Charlie airspace.The Reporter's radio pack started acting up and transmission was weak; like it wasn't getting enough power. The aircraft radios and electrical were fine up until we turned back to land early. Signs of electrical failure started to become apparent; so I told Approach that we were going to lose radios. After a couple unreadable transmissions on my end; Approach got the message and shipped me to Tower. I checked on with Tower and let them know my situation. I shed excess electrical load which really only consisted GPS/COMM 1; lights; and Reporter's radio pack. I squawked 7600 and brought out my handheld radio and attempted to establish communication on that; but was unable. At this point; COMM 2 failed so I shut it off. I entered downwind for Runway 28R and received a steady green light gun signal and acknowledged by rocking my wings. I didn't attempt to add flaps until I knew landing was assured; so that I wouldn't get stuck with flaps down in a go-around situation. When adding flaps on final they stopped at the first notch. Upon touchdown the flaps came down all the way and the ammeter indicated a charge; suspect faulty connection somewhere. Received a flashing green light from Tower and taxied to the ramp. I called Tower after we parked and they said no further contact was necessary. The ammeters in some of the planes we fly are not sufficient. It acts as if it's stuck and only varies slightly when turning the alternator on/off. A request has been put in with the company to fix this unacknowledged issue once and for all.

A C172 Traffic Watch Pilot reported the loss of electrical; so he squawked 7600; returned to his departure airport. The pilot was given light signals to land and taxi to parking.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 5960; Flight Crew Type 354

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 6400; Flight Crew Type 120

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were scheduled to arrive at ZZZ on a direct flight from ZZZ1 in Aircraft X. We were the first of at least three arriving aircraft making the transition from the en-route environment into the airport. We confirmed with approach control that we had visual contact with the airport and were cleared by ATC for the visual approach. Shortly thereafter; we were transferred to ZZZ Tower. Ahead of us was a flight of 2 Texan Navy trainers practicing maneuvers in the traffic pattern of the airport. While on a 4-mile final; we heard tower clear the flight of two Navy Texans to land in front of us. The lead Texan was perhaps several hundred feet above the runway and about to land. The second Texan was approximately at our altitude (perhaps a thousand feet above the runway) and perhaps a half mile behind the lead Texan. The lead Texan landed without incident. We slowed to our slowest possible airspeed to accommodate the traffic ahead and provide as much spacing as possible. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) mentioned to be prepared for a Go-Around. The Tower controller advised the second Texan to Go-Around and rejoin the downwind. Our aircraft was then given clearance to land. We maintained a slower airspeed so as to allow the lead Texan time to vacate the runway and so as to not create a runway incursion. Once the Texan had cleared the runway; we continued our descent. We landed without incident and had planned on exiting the runway with a left turn off onto taxi-way D which would allow for a shorter taxi to the FBO. As we slowed and passed the intersection of the runways we realized that the first Texan was stopped on the taxi-way (D) and did not have enough space behind him for us to vacate the runway with the left turn onto D. Further down the runway and off to the right; we noticed that a Coast Guard helicopter was waiting on taxi-way A5 to cross runway from A5 to C2. At this point; the PF (Pilot Flying) had come to a stop on the runway and was then planning a right turn out onto taxi-way A4 with the plan to circle back and use taxiway D to get to the FBO.While starting to move forward; Tower asked us which FBO (Fixed Base Operator) we were going to. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) replied that we were going to the FBO. The Tower Controller responded that they had two FBOs on the field. One being FBO1 and the other being FBO2. (Both of the FBOs are geographically located on the Southeast section of the airport; South of D and East of C). The PM responded that we would be going to FBO2. ATC stated that FBO2 had a lot of traffic on their ramp. He also mentioned that the FBO normally wanted traffic to enter via taxi-way C1; but due to the Texan blocking the left turn off available on D; we were to go ahead and continue down the runway and taxi to FBO2 via taxi-way C2.With the new clearance given; the PF applied power so as to not take the previously determined right turn off onto A4 and proceed forward toward the designated left turnoff onto C2. While abeam taxi-way A4; Tower called over the radio to never-mind using C2 and instead to make the hard-right turn and exit runway onto taxiway A4. The PM responded to the direction. Once he finished the statement; Tower told us to expedite off the runway. We complied as quickly and as safely to make the greater than 90-degree turn back toward A4.As we made the more than 90-degree turn; the crew noticed that a Navy Texan (presumably the second of the previously seen flight-of-two) had landed on runway XX; which we were still currently on. We had not cleared the runway at this point. No radio transmissions were heard or recalled by the crew about the Texan having been given clearance to land on runway XX nor did we hear that the Texan should execute another Go-Around. We exited the runway on A4; made the right turns onto taxiway A; and D and held short of runway XX as per the newly given direction by ATC. Tower said nothing either to the G280 and nothing to the Navy Texan. We continued viaour clearance to the FBO without further incident.Not knowing all of the allowable rules at that airport for military traffic in conjunction with civilian traffic; I think that perhaps the tower controller became fixated on getting our plane off the runway in the most expeditious manner possible. While the Texan was able to land in a distance allowing for virtually no 'separation issues'; we still were on the runway. Perhaps no rules were broken but this could easily have created an issue of non-compliance and resulted in serious injury or even death. While we were attempting to fulfill the requirements of the transmission; either the landing clearance for the second Texan was not given; or if given; not revoked since we were still on the runway. A corrective action on our part for future flights will be to brief the controller of our desired FBO prior to landing in an attempt to facilitate a more expeditious departure from the runway and to take the first available taxi-way off the runway unless expressly told otherwise by ATC.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

G280 flight crew encountered a ground conflict with another aircraft on the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 4500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 8900

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After switching to Tower frequency and cleared to land 9L in FLL; the Tower Controller called out VFR traffic (Banner Tow) at approximately two miles low. The traffic was slightly off the left side of our aircraft. The Captain called 'in sight' and I continued the approach exactly on glide slope. Inside of 2;000 FT AGL; I lessened the vertical descent since the VFR traffic appeared like it was going to fly directly underneath us. At approximately 1;400 FT AGL; we received an RA to 'Adjust Vertical Speed' and I acted accordingly. After a slight level off; the conflict was resolved and I continued the stable approach to a landing. I would estimate the traffic passed underneath of our aircraft by approximately 400 FT. Although Tower confirmed the VFR traffic was operating in appropriate airspace; it doesn't seem to be a good idea for a Banner Tow to be at 1;000 FT AGL three to four miles from the approach end of an active runway.

The weather was VMC at the time of the challenge. We were cleared for the ILS 9L (FLL). I was acting as the pilot not flying. FLL Local called traffic (a Banner Tow aircraft at 1000' MSL) slightly north of the final tracking south. As I understand it and later confirmed the Banner Tow aircraft was just outside C Airspace; but very close to; if not in; Class D airspace. I found the traffic when we were approximately 1;300 FT MSL on the glide slope. The TCAS fired shortly thereafter with a 'Traffic/Traffic; Adjust Vertical Descent ... Adjust.' You can well imagine it got a bit hectic as were trying to respond to the RA call and maintain situational awareness on the airplane that was doing a fly under maneuver. I find it odd (but curiously legal) how FLL Local permitted a Banner Tow aircraft within 300 FT of our three degree glide to 9L. Supposedly the Banner Tow aircraft  sight; but I believe safety was degraded by allowing a minimal separation on an ILS. The First Officer acted properly and promptly and the landing was uneventful. I had what I believe was a cordial exchange with the Local Controller regarding the wisdom of permitting such a situation to develop in the first place.

B737 flight crew experiences a TCAS RA during approach to Runway 9L at FLL at 1;300 FT caused by a banner tow aircraft passing under the glide path at 1;000 FT.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Day three of a four day. Up at (time). Three approaches down to [minimums] Two missed approaches. Third approach HUD IMC to [minimums]; land.ZZZ arrival briefed and flown uneventfully until left downwind Runway XY; 250 knots. Assigned; required and 10;000 ft two miles above the runway. Mid-field; downwind; 10;000 ft; Approach Controller commanded '210 knots descend to 7;000 ft'. Speedbrakes extended; 210 knots assigned; descent to 7;000 ft. Not knowing our sequence; abeam the numbers; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; in preparation for possible close-in base vector. Between 10;000 ft and 7;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; Approach Controller commanded; descend to 3;000 ft. Controller commanded 'left turn 360 degrees; do you have the field?'Before completion of the turn; field in sight; Approach Controller commanded left turn 310; intercept Localizer Runway XY cleared for the visual approach; maintain either 180 knots or 170 knots to the final approach fix. We are required to be 170 by the final approach fix. We were descending to 3;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended and slowing to the commanded airspeed; while retracting the speedbrakes and selecting flaps 15; because we cannot select flaps with the speed brakes extended. Knowing; of course; that we have to be configured for landing; in the slot; on speed and stabilized at 1;000 ft; we slowed to 165 just outside the final approach fix; still slightly high but manageable; and selected flaps 30; so as to be stable at 1;000 ft. At this point; the Approach Controller; asked us of our speed; and in the middle of doing everything he commanded; while configuring for a stable approach; and while at the same time complying with his speed command to the final approach fix; we responded '170 knots.'  He then said; 'You must be slower'. Well; we were 165 knots for selection of flaps 30; just atop the final approach fix so as to be both stable at 1;000 ft and 170 at the final approach fix and I key the MIC and said; 'it's difficult when we begin abeam the numbers at 10;000 ft.'He then replies; very excitedly; 'Possible Pilot violation; possible Pilot violation; you will receive phone number upon landing' and forgot to hand us off to Tower. At this point the stress level is increased because we are doing everything he asked of us and he appeared to be mostly concerned about informing us about a possible Pilot violation; telling us to expect a phone number; while we are traveling at 165 knots; configuring flaps 30 for landing and getting stabilized for 1;000 ft. Nevertheless; we were configured for landing; checklist completed and stable at 1;000 ft; never overspeeding the flaps.We switched to Tower; at which point we are cleared to land.We landed in the zone; on speed on Runway XY and turned off [on taxiway.]We cleared the runway; expecting detailed taxi instructions. Instead we were told again; twice; 'possible Pilot violation; possible Pilot violation; contact this phone number XXX-XXX-XXXX'. We were then given taxi instructions.We are normally 10;000 ft 30 miles from the airport. When we are working overtime; as usual; to give Controllers everything they command; the last thing we need is zero respect and threats of certificate action while we are inside the final approach fix configuring for landing and getting stabilized; which does nothing but raise the stress level in the aircraft. It is not safe.

This was the second leg of the day with the Captain and he was the PF. During the brief; the Captain discussed the requirement to maintain 250 knots until assigned a lower speed by ATC. On downwind; ATC slowed us to 210 knots. About midfield; Approach gave us a descent to 6000 ft still 210 knots. The Captain (and I) thought we were high and he extended the speedbrakes and landing gear. I was just about to ask our sequence when Approach gave us a left turn to 360 degrees and a descent to 3000 ft and a speed of 180 knots. The Captain swapped speedbrakes for flaps 15 and continued to descend. We were still high at this point. Approach then told us to fly heading 330 degrees and asked if we had the field in sight. We had the field in sight. I told Approach that we did. Then Approach cleared us for the visual to 28 and to maintain 170 knots to the marker (it may have been 180 knots but I can't remember exactly). We were still high so the Captain continued to slow below 165 knots to get flaps 30 to help the descent. Shortly before the marker; Approach asked; 'Company Flight Number; say airspeed.' I responded with 170 knots because that is our maximum speed at a five NM final. I looked at the ND map and we were about 1.5 miles from [the marker]. I saw the airspeed around 160 knots. Approach responded with; 'I think it is a little less than that.' Shortly after that they said; 'Company Flight Number; possible ATC violation. Call us when on the ground.' Approach never switched us over to Tower. I switched over to Tower shortly after [the marker]. After we landed; the Captain cleared at taxiway and Tower told us to taxi via [taxi instructions] and gave us the phone number to call. I think I could have done better Pilot Monitoring duties in cross checking airspeeds. But we were high (which is typical going into ZZZ) and in order for us to be in the slot at 1000 ft AGL; we had to configure to landing flaps early. In order to do that; we had to slow below 165 knots. I could have coordinated with the Captain to ask for a slower speed to the marker. But; it was a busy time when I was backing up the Captain to not overspeed the flaps and still keep descending to be in the slot. Also; this approach would have been much easier if Company policy was to be in the slot at 500 ft AGL instead of 1000 ft AGL. Also; ATC's statement 'possible ATC violation' on final was a complete distraction and was unnecessary at that point. Approach could have easily relayed the message to Tower or Ground and saved a huge amount of stress to both the Captain and me on short final when we should be focused on landing instead of thoughts of losing our FAA licenses or disciplinary action.

B737-700 flight crew reported they were distracted on short final by an ATC admonishment to call regarding a possible violation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 275; Flight Crew Type 275

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approaching FAP; an object suddenly appeared in the windscreen. Before I could even communicate a warning it flew just overhead of our aircraft. Pilot Flying did not see the object as it passed directly overhead within 50 feet. I immediately commented on a near miss with some type of unidentified object. My initial thought it was a large flat type of balloon although it appeared solid in nature as it flashed by. ATIS information had noted an unauthorized drone flying; which had been reported flying east of the airport north of the final approach course.

B737-700 Captain reported an NMAC with a UAV on final approach to SAN airport.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We may have had a pilot mishap that needs to be addressed for our ongoing flight operation safety. I noticed the safety of our flight crew; passengers; and ramp personnel were jeopardized. After going through the push back procedure and disconnecting the tow bar; the pilots began to start #1 and put both engines into auto. The marshal stood in front of the plane waiting for the clear from the Captain to be relieved from the aircraft. Once the engines were in auto condition; I noticed both pilots were looking down and the aircraft began to move. The marshaller then noticed the danger and began to move out of the way of the aircraft. After a moment; the flight crew became aware of their movement and violently hit the brakes. My concern here is that there was evidence of rushing which led to not following procedure. From my view; it seemed that the flight crew were unaware of the aircrafts movement or there may have been miscommunication between pilot and marshaller. Regardless; the plane shouldn't have been moving until all ground crew are clear of the aircraft. I wanted to bring this to our attention so that this can be critiqued and corrected from happening again.

After pushback; a Mechanic reported the flight crew failed to set the parking brake and ended up stopping the aircraft abruptly after it began rolling.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I loaded the route into the FMC. We received and acknowledged revision 1 sent from Dispatch asking if we had received the revised flight plan. It was the route I had loaded earlier. It started with the ZZZZZ departure. But the route assigned in FD Pro did not match the route from Dispatch; but it too started with the ZZZZZ. I assumed the FD Pro flight plan was the original flight plan. We received the PDC clearance which stated 'Cleared to the ZZZ airport ZZZZZ then as filed; climb via SID. Expect FL340....' After takeoff; prior to completing the ZZZZZ SID; BOS ATC requested we fly direct to ZZZZ intersection as a short cut. We searched our legs page in the FMC but could not find it. We advised ATC we had no such fix. They had us go to ZZZZ regardless.  They then asked to confirm the route we were flying. The route we had loaded from Dispatch was NOT the route ATC had on file. But it was the route that was originally in FD Pro for [us].  ATC then had us fly that earliest FD Pro flight plan to ZZZ. We were asked later during our flight to call BOS Center once on the ground. I did. They wanted to figure out what might have been the reason our flight plans did not match up. They said we had not deviated off course as we were on the filed ZZZZZ which was on both flight plans. I stated to him I had loaded the revised flight plan from our Dispatcher and that I accepted the PDC flight plan clearance message as it appeared to match our revised flight plan.  I called our assigned Dispatcher and informed him of the problem. He thinks PDC did not load the revision but he should have gotten some kind of rejection notification if it was kicked back. Which he did not. So we do not know why ATC did not get the revised route that we flew. I would suggest that if the ATC PDC message that acknowledges our clearance was a complete route; not 'as filed'; I would have caught the discrepancy in the flight plans. It was unique in that both flight plans began with the ZZZZZ. It worked out in our favor that ATC gave us a short cut before we left the ZZZZZ. If not; somewhere after the ZZZZZ we would have deviated off the ATC filed route. The route that Dispatch sent us matched the route in [our] flight plan. The PDC acceptance message was not enough to make us doubt we had a route difference. PDC clearance could read the full route instead of 'as filed'.

Air Carrier Pilot Flying reported a confusing Pre Departure Clearance.


Recreational Operations / Section 44809 (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 60; Flight Crew Total 0; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 60; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 60

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was flying at LAT: XX.XXX LONG: XX.XXX recreational when a C-130 approached from behind me. It looked from my angle to maybe be at 400 feet headed straight for my drone. The aircraft then banked to the left as it approached my drone. I quickly descended as fast as possible to avoid a collision. My drone was able to make a safe landing and the aircraft kept flying. I confirmed through my data that I was 100% under 400 feet at the time of the near miss. I was not in an area where I needed permission to fly according to Aloft and B4UFLY. I talked with representatives of ZZZ which has C-130 they said; 'None of our aircraft have been below 1;000 feet over [the city] today.' They also said; 'None of their pilots had reported a close call with a drone.' But that it could be another [Airport] flying in the area as others regularly fly in the area. I then informed them that from my angle it looked lower and that I would file a report just in case there are any questions in the future or someone came forward.

UAS pilot reported they spoke with staff from the nearby airport and found no further information about the route of the C-130. The area of the flight was not near any charted military training routes.

UAS recreational pilot was flying below 400 feet in an area with no airspace restrictions and saw an approaching C-130 flying towards the UAS at a low level. The UAS pilot immediately flew to a lower altitude and landed to avoid any further conflict.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Called on the telephone;  #1 for takeoff RWY 28 DLZ. Released; climb 3;000 Direct TRAKK. We took off. Called departure. Cleared to 10;000 ft.  Was told about traffic 12:00.  Given Altimeter setting. I said on radio 'We have traffic on TCAS...' (could not see the airplane but had him on the computer screen). I wish I had just said traffic not in sight. I told the PF (Pilot Flying); the CA (Captain); I did not see traffic. To me the TCAS showed traffic on our screen about in the 11:30 position. So I advised the CA to turn right. We continued to merge. My eyes were outside; no traffic. We were about his altitude; 1 mi. We got RA to climb and the CA pulled back hard; full power. I told center we had an RA. Never saw traffic.  I'm not happy about the event. Wished CA had stopped climb when we were still below. Wished center had left us below.

Flight crew reported TCAS RA during climbout and took evasive action.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

I was working Aircraft Y; a VFR PA46 Southbound at 12;500 FT. I had given Aircraft X; A320; the descend via clearance for LGA. The aircraft crossed over each other just South of DAVYS intersection. I had never issued a traffic call; I was coordinating off landlines with controllers in my area about a flight of 2 F16 I was working; and needed a point/handoff to adjacent sectors. The Aircraft X was at 13;400 FT and keyed up that they had they traffic in sight. The Aircraft Y then said they had the traffic in sight. The Aircraft X restriction on the descend via was to cross DAVYS at or above 13;000 FT; and the confliction point was South of DAVYS. I should have still called traffic and didn't. 'Conflict alert' goes off all the time at various sectors. It is almost a second job just to divert your attention to the 'conflict alert' and determine if it's real or not. In this case; however; I do not believe 'conflict alert' went off until they were already passed each other. See if there are any improvements on the criteria for 'conflict alert'; as well as to have real time information about actual aircraft (VFR) that will be entering our space. In this regard; ERAM should help a lot. 'Conflict alert' goes off for aircraft that appear to be climbing; but aren't actually going into our airspace; and the descend via protects for the airspace. Some controllers become complacent to the fact that 'conflict alert' goes off all the time; and it is a distraction-either to analyze continuously; or the pure distraction it is and then to ignore it; even it's real.

ZDC Controller described a VFR/IFR conflict acknowledging traffic information could have been more precise; adding that the 'conflict alert' activates all too often when separation has been established.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Air return to ZZZ due to strong odor and haze entering the cockpit and cabin through the air system. This occurred right after takeoff. After running the appropriate checklists; were vectored back around and landed and taxied without incident back to the gate. We were deiced prior to the flight. Caused by fumes entering the cockpit and cabin.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a fumes event during initial climb resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 380

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

On a VFR cross country training flight; the planned course took the flight through the TFR.  Upon departing local controller handed us off to Grand Forks Departure where ATC radar contacted us.  At that point we requested transition through the Grand Forks Air Force Base TFR; and GFK DEPT told us that; 'Transition through the TFR approved.'  We acknowledged our clearance through the TFR and proceeded on course.  I was telling my student that since we are in the TFR we have to be on with GFK DEPT until we are clear of the TFR as listed in the NOTAMs.  After some time had passed; ATC advised us that 'Radar services terminated; squawk VFR and frequency changed approved.'  At that point we acknowledged back; then tuned into FSS (Grand Forks Radio) to open our flight plan.  Once we changed over to open our flight plan; FSS (Grand Forks Radio) opened our flight plan but then advised us to 'Contact Grand Forks Approach immediately.'  We acknowledged and promptly contacted GFK APP on 121.50.  They then told us to contact them on 118.1; we did so as directed and they advised us to maintain that 'Frequency and will hand us over to Minneapolis Center in a bit.'

Pilot receives clearance to fly through the GFK AFB TFR. Controller then terminates the flight while in the TFR; pilot contacts FSS for IFR clearance and is told to contact GFK Approach immediately.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Type 3733

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Software and Automation

We pushed from Gate X; after a ATC delay and two CPDLC clearances. At (time) I called Ground frequency to request to taxi. We received clearance to taxi to [Runway] XXL via C. I read it back and we began to taxi. Moments later; while on C; Ground called to inquire what we were doing. I informed them we had just been called and given 'Taxi to XXL via C' and that I read it back. Ground replied that he didn't believe we did. Ground came back and told us to squawk XXXX. We looked down and we had XXXY in there. Turns out our revised CPDLC contained a new routing as well as a new squawk; which we missed. We changed to the correct new code and were told to continue via same taxi route as given originally. No conflict with another aircraft was ever created. We speculated that our wrong squawk created the issue and confused Ground that the aircraft they saw moving wasn't the one they had given the taxi clearance to moments earlier; which was us all along. Probably overkill but we are filling this report simply over Ground's misunderstanding that we had never called for taxi; which we did.

Pushed from Gate X in ZZZ over one hour late because ZZZ1 Center was shut down due to COVID cleaning. We were on our third Release with fuel and routing changes. I was dealing with numerous Passenger and Ops Agent issues.  We started to push for the second time and received notification from Dispatch that we'd received a new Release. I called the jetway back and went to the podium to get the new Release. I asked the FO to check on our clearance. When I got back to the cockpit; we confirmed the new routing; re-briefed the routing and departure; input the new performance data; and ran the Before Push Checklist. We pushed back; started engines and ran the Before Taxi Checklist. The FO asked for taxi and I thought I heard them say for us to taxi to [Runway] XXL via Taxiway Charlie. He read that back; I confirmed the instructions and began to taxi. When we got on Taxiway C; they asked us 'What Company aircraft is on Taxiway Charlie?' We responded with our call sign and shortly thereafter; they asked us to squawk a different code. We'd both missed the fact that our squawk code had changed with the new clearance. We apologized; entered the new code and continue to taxi.

Air carrier flight crew reported communication issues with ATC regarding their taxi to runway clearance.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Chart Or Publication; Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

After making the missed approach at DGG airport we followed the missed approach instructions - 'Climbing LEFT turn to 3;800 FT direct AWAMY and hold.' The problem is that at 3;800 FT we were unable to contact Anchorage Center and receive clearance to our alternate airport. We were unable to contact Kotzebue Radio either. Eventually (about 1 1/2 turns in the hold) another pilot on the frequency established a relay for us to get clearance to climb higher from Anchorge Center.The FAA should change the missed approach holding altitude to 8;000 FT or higher at AWAMY. In the mean time; establish a policy that requires us to request an alternate missed approach holding altitude clearance before losing contact with Center when cleared for the approach.

A B737 flight crew was unable to contact Anchorage Center following a missed approach at DGG.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Gate Agent / CSR

About 15 minutes after landing it was brought to my attention that I was at the scheduled alternate airport instead of the scheduled intended airport. The cause of the mistake was initiated when I had entered the alternate airport as destination airport into the FMS and iPad. This mistake was never identified by either myself or the pilot monitoring. Halfway into the flight ATC asked us the name of the airport where we were landing and we replied what was in our FMS; the alternate airport. ATC did not question this; which only reinforced our error. Approach control cleared us for an approach to the wrong airport and the tower cleared us to land. Upon shutting down at the gate; I called [company] and informed [them] of our arrival. At that time the passenger deplaned without saying a word about the airport. The FBO at first didn't say anything to me about being at the wrong airport. Everything seemed normal until I contacted dispatch about our next release. At that time it was discovered that I was at the wrong airport. I contacted [company] and informed them of the situation. They did not indicate any problem. I did not have any contact with the passenger after he left the aircraft. I did not walk him into the FBO. I stayed in the aircraft as the PIC escorted the passenger. By the time I entered the FBO the passenger had left. We received a release to [a new destination] and flew there without further incidentAll the necessary procedures for entering data into the FMS have already been put into operation. I cannot think of anything to improve the procedures. I cannot explain how or why I entered the wrong destination or why it was not corrected. All the waypoints were double checked per procedures; but the destination was not noticed to be wrong. With some fatigue it is possible; as in this case; that the crew could enter the wrong airport in the FMS as the destination.

All I can add to the above is that I should have put the destination in my iPad from my brief not the box my partner programmed; then I would have caught our mistake. I also wish when ATC questioned our destination I would have looked at my phone not iPad.

Light transport flight crew reported landing at the wrong airport following an FMS programming error.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On [Date] at [Time] I was notified by my supervisor that I was going to be 'forced' to work overtime on [Date] on my day off per the [company operations] terms due to no volunteers and I was the junior employee on the [Aircraft Type] desk. The issue I have with this process is they are putting me; the company's certificate; and more importantly peoples' safety in jeopardy.Please let me explain; as of today's date; I have worked almost 1;100 extra hours in overtime and will be well over 1;200 before the end of the year without this forced day. [Maintenance Control personnel] work (4) 12 hour days and has (4) days off normally. In the week that I'm being 'forced' to work another day; I am already working (2) of my days off which leaves me with only (1) day off. The rotation prior; I will only have (1) day off in the last (8) days and to put it in perspective with this 'forced overtime with what I've already volunteered to work; I'll be working (19) 12 hour days out of the next (21) days. As a holder of airman's certificate in a safety sensitive position you must recognize when fatigue; stress; and lack of staffing is at point of breaking. I confess I need to take time off; coupled with stress here at home and health problems that are directly related to my job from long hours are taking its toll. My supervisors are more focused on enforcing the [company operations]; than my health; the certificate of this company; and safety of our owners/employees that I directly affect by my actions. I felt I had to take a vacation day on the 14th due to the forcing of working but it has been suggested it will be turned down because outside the [company operations] time frame to approve. One year ago our president [Name] stated [recently] that the company intended to make a major investment in Maintenance Control by addition of manpower and other resources so we could properly accomplish our daily duties. Much of our department feels very slighted and manpower has yet to be added. Many of us are working hundreds and in some cases over a thousand extra hours a year; yes there is a dollar reward for working; but we can't lose sight of the function to the operation [Maintenance Control] provides. I understand that a bad decision; recommendation; or judgment call can have catastrophic consequences; certificate action; damage/loss of equipment and life. I believe it is not good practice to force employees to work beyond their normal schedule with what they are comfortable. It adds undue stress; health implications; and leads to compromised decisions. The company; our [new mission plan] states we won't comprise safety in any way and is our 'highest priority;' but this completely contradicts the dirty dozen; good safety practices; and the [new mission plan]. I shouldn't have to ask to take vacation (which more than likely will be denied) to get rest to work a day I'm being forced to work. I try to manage my stress; rest periods; and know my limits. Each individual should know their breaking points and know when to step back. I'm at that point of knowing my point of breaking (liability) and my actions are/will be affected further by being forced to work more. I hope this report sheds light on duty times and lack of staffing. Hopefully the question will be ask. Do we really want to run our business this way and as usual put our head in the sand? I've never seen [Company] 'force' pilots to fly airplanes who were fatigued or uncomfortable about any issues and this might be a good opportunity to start the conversation of what is occurring within the [Company] maintenance department and if this a practice we want to embrace. I've been told by my supervisors this is the way the business needs to be run and there are no other options; I have to question their conclusions.

Maintenance Technician reported being forced to work overtime; describes a high stress environment due to low staffing resulting in fatigue and an unsafe situation.


Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

At approximately XA:25 am local time; we pushed off gate at DCA. Winds at that time were reporting light and variable. Runway 1 was in use and we thoroughly briefed the departure procedure (including the complex special procedures) at the gate. Upon reaching Runway 1 for departure; the Tower reported light and variable winds. Neither gusts nor wind shear had been reported. We were cleared for takeoff and proceeded to fly the standard departure procedure with the complex RNAV procedures for runway. The turn to [heading] 332 was initiated at 150 feet AGL. The Captain called for 'NAV MODE' at 150 feet. I selected NAV. During the initial climb; the aircraft encountered wind shear between approximately 600-1000 feet AGL. (Winds were estimated 40-50 kts). The wind shear warning message displayed. There was no caution message prior. The Captain (Pilot Flying) took corrective action by flying the published windshear escape maneuver. The Captain then called for 'autopilot on' and I selected autopilot on.  As a result of flying the escape maneuver; the Flight Director had sequenced to GA/WS mode therefore canceling the previously selected FMS course taking us from ADAXE to BEBLE. We noticed this shortly after the windshear recovery was complete at which time we altered course. This occurred just as we were handed off to Potomac Departure. At that time; I was task saturated. I do not recall if I made the initial check in with departure as our workload was higher than usual. Potomac Departure contacted us and asked for us to IDENT. Following that transmission we informed the Controller that we had encountered windshear and were correcting our course. By this time; we had remained right of course enough to penetrate P-56 airspace. Upon contacting Washington center; we were told to contact Potomac upon landing. The rest of the flight proceeded normally. After parking at gate; the Captain contacted Potomac Approach and was subsequently informed of the deviation.Suggestions: Though the windshear recovery was successful; I could have been quicker to alert ATC to our situation. I was task saturated at the time of the event but should have been quicker to inform the controller of our situation and subsequent deviation.

Weather at the surface in DCA was rainy; low visibility; and Tower was reporting light winds from the northeast. We taxied from gate to Runway 1. Upon reaching the approach end of Runway 1; we had little delay and were cleared for take-off. As we aligned with the center line; I noted the windsock and light winds were indeed coming from the northeast. Upon rotation; I followed standard company producers. At 150 feet AGL; I began a left hand turn to heading 332 and called for NAV Mode. Between 300 and 400 feet; the FMS captured course to ADAXE and both the FO and myself acknowledge FMS in the FMA; and I was following the FD on track to ADAXE. I noted the winds aloft at that altitude and they were coming out of the east at 9 knots. Passing through 600 feet AGL; I started to say 'Autopilot On' and the FO started to reach for the AP Button. At that time we unexpectedly got a 'Windshear' Warning message. For a quick second; I questioned whether we were actually encountering windshear because the Warning Message was not preceded by a Windshear Caution Message; airspeed was normal and stable; and we were climbing at a normal rate. However; the Warning Message did not clear and I preceded to execute our company Windshear Escape procedures. The FMA and FD went into GA/WS Mode. I rolled wings level and pitched appropriately into the FD. I noted the winds again at that time and they were 230/50. Somewhere around 500-600 feet; the wind shifted nearly 180 degrees at 40 knots. At about the same time we encountered the Windshear Warning; DCA Tower passed us onto Potomac Departure. The FO accepted the hand-off but neither one of us remember if he actually checked in with Potomac Departure. Unfortunately; we did not immediately make Potomac aware of our Windshear event. Looking back; I wish we would have done this but I think there was an initial shock that was being processed in our heads. I am not sure how long we had the Windshear Warning Message; 10 seconds or so; but the FO and I were pretty focused on following the correct procedures for it. Because the FD rolled us wings level and I followed it; we clipped the very western most point of P-56A and unfortunately flew right through the center of P-56B. As we later realized; Potomac was trying to query us. After the Windshear Warning Message cleared; the airplane was stable; and I called for Flaps Up After Take-Off Checklist; I queried Potomac Departure around 3;000 feet MSL and explained the Windshear event. By then; we were well east of BEBLE. I asked Departure if they wanted us direct to COVTO or something different and they cleared us direct to SWANN. The Controller asked for an explanation of the event over the radio of which I gave them the details of the event. We were also given a phone number to call and of which I also did. The flight was completed with no further disruptions. Evaluating are actions from the event; I am happy that the FO and myself immediately went into training mode despite it being nearly a year from my last Windshear Recovery training event and my first real life windshear event. However; we are disappointed in ourselves that we were not quicker to inform Departure of the event or declare an emergency right away.

CRJ200 flight crew reported an airspace violation shortly after takeoff from DCA due to execution of a windshear escape maneuver.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

During preflight loading of the takeoff data; FMS would not calculate V speeds or EPR.  RFO noticed that the TAT indication was well above normal.  Eventually the TAT started coming back down and soon the FMS calculated V speeds and EPR.  While the Captain student and myself were continuing with our preflight duties; the RFO deduced that the aircraft had sensed that it was airborne due to nose strut extension.  I do recall during preflight feeling the nose rise up; but it was not dramatic.The aircraft had been tethered with a [larger aircraft] tether as opposed to an MD-11 tether.  The additional length allowed the nose wheel to lift off of the ground sufficiently for the ground shift to sense airborne.All 3 crew members checked that the aircraft was securely tethered prior to entering the aircraft. However we were not aware that there are different length tethers and that interchanging them could cause a problem.

MD-11 Captain reported that during cockpit setup crew noticed the TAT indication was well above normal and the FMS would not calculate V speeds or EPR. Crew then realized ground personnel were using a tether from a larger aircraft that allowed the nose to rise enough that the flight/ground switch was activated.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 3900

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was beginning a dual instruction flight from [the airport] with a requested departure to the East. We had climbed through 800 FT and were in our turn to the east. Traffic inbound had been previously reported to us by ATC before takeoff and an update to its position given to us while we were turning on course. We had been likewise reported to the other aircraft; Aircraft Y; located to the northeast of the airport; upon our departure and upon our turn. Aircraft Y reported us in site and stated he would avoid us. ATC instructed us to 'climb; climb' and we did. We were watching for the traffic while departing but did not see them until after they had passed below us. We did initiate the turn on course as approved because I believed the traffic to be further away from us. The traffic was in a challenging position as we were in a climbing right turn from [the runway] to the east and they were approaching from the northeast. My flight was a training mission with a student pilot in the left seat.  All information was coordinated by and given to both parties. My concern is that the clearance to depart and turn created a conflict and that both aircraft were allowed to get so close. There had been several other conflicts in the airspace earlier in the day. I had just had discussion with another instructor about aircraft being mistakenly identified to each other in the traffic pattern.

A PA28 instructor pilot reported that during climb they had a near miss with another PA28 that was on descent.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

When C-30 is pushed out and proceeds to taxi away from the gate; excessive jet blast consumes C-31. The amount of throttle the pilots give the engines is unnecessary. It has become unsafe to be working C-31 on the ramp while C-30 taxis out. It is only a matter of time until someone gets injured or aircraft/equipment damage occurs. I have come up with some options to solve this issue.1: Only service [medium transport] aircraft on C-30. No [large aircraft].2: Halt operations at C-31 until C-30 had completely left the gate area (apron).3: Extend blast fence all the way down to taxi-way zippered line (between C-30 and C-31).

A ramper reported that jet blast from an adjacent gate creates an unsafe work environment for ground personnel.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 534; Flight Crew Type 52

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Runway 01/19 was closed by a NOTAM for lawnmowing. I was conducting a training flight practicing landings on Runway 14. My student and I back-taxied Runway 14 for departure. My student made a departure radio call 'Skyhaven traffic Aircraft X departing Runway 14 Skyhaven traffic' The aircraft was lined up with centerline and the runway was clear of obstructions. My student applied full power and we started the takeoff roll. Approximately 4-500 feet or 2-3 centerline stripes into our takeoff roll and at an airspeed of 50 MPH I noticed a lawnmower about to cross the runway. The lawnmower now on the runway; I said out loud to my student 'abort takeoff; power idle; max braking'. My student performed an aborted takeoff and we were able to stop before reaching the lawnmower by roughly 700 feet. I then radioed to line service at the airport and informed them of the runway incursion incident. I believe this incident was caused by the lack of airport supervision of the lawn care company that is not familiar with airport operations. Neither lawnmower that was operating near the runways had any type of flag or amber flashing beacon so it was hard to see until the lawnmower was on the actual runway. I believe better Airport Manager supervision of the lawn care crew and/or airport operations training for the lawn care crew; and orange/white flags with amber beacons on the lawnmowers would increase the visibility all helping to prevent a future incident.

Flight Instructor on training flight reports lawnmower incursion on active runway.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

FL300. Cabin pressure climbed to 10;000 feet. Diverted after [requesting a] clearance to a lower altitude. Ran proper checklists. After landing found out heat exchanger failed at weld point. No injuries. Overweight landing uneventful.

B757 FO reported loss of cabin pressure that led to a decision to divert. After landing a failed heat exchanger was found.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 25

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

During right hand closed traffic on Runway X; the Tower cleared me for the 'option'; and after that; enter a left downwind for [the crossing runway]; Runway Y. [When I was] established on a left downwind for Runway Y; the Tower called out traffic on final for Runway Y; and that I was 'Number 2'. I reported the traffic in sight. The traffic was using a [locally recognized flight school] call sign. I was then 'cleared for the option Runway Y; Number 2'. I was then told to make right traffic for Runway Y after that. I acknowledged. After a normal touch and go behind the traffic; I still had them ahead of me in the upwind in sight. The Tower then again told me to make right traffic. I acknowledged in the affirmative. The Tower then immediately asked me to make left traffic Y. I acknowledged again. At 400 feet AGL; I turned a left crosswind; and the traffic was still in an upwind. On left downwind; the Tower cleared me for a touch and go Runway Y. I acknowledged. The traffic I had been following was on the right hand crosswind for Runway Y; and I had them in sight. I turned a left base for Runway Y; and the low sun was bright. I then started a turn to final; a 2nd [flight school aircraft] emerged from under the nose of my aircraft. I initiated a go around; and [still] had the first traffic in sight on the right hand downwind. As I initiated my go around; the Tower instructed the first [flight school aircraft]; still on downwind; to go around. The Tower Controller had the two call signs confused. I turned a left crosswind; then left downwind; and then exited the area to the north. The Tower Controller never issued a traffic report for the [second aircraft]. The Tower Controller never told me that I was #2 for the field. The Tower was confused between the two aircraft and their similar call signs. The bright sun and the lower position of the second aircraft impeded my vision on left base for Runway Y. Although I verified final was clear before turning onto final; the aircraft's was position was not possible to see.

The pilot of an Aeronca Champ was performing pattern work at a Tower controlled airport with a local flight school aircraft. The Tower Controller became confused by the flight school call signs and did not recognize that another aircraft was a conflict for the Champ traffic. The Champ pilot did not initially see the other aircraft due to the sun angle; resulting in a NMAC condition.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 148.12; Flight Crew Total 3609.38; Flight Crew Type 3609.38

The procedure for screening crewmembers at ZZZ KCM [Known Crew Members] allows for social distancing; if the crewmembers follow it; right up to the actual point of screening.  There are 2 screeners/podiums; which is great and efficient; but they are located within inches of each other.  The screeners keep waving people forward to move the line; but this requires standing within a few inches of the person you were just trying to distance from.When I mentioned this to the screener he offered to send me back into the line; which I declined.

Air carrier Captain reported social distancing concerns during TSA screening.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Taxiing out in BNA; we were given an ATC reroute for our flight. Our new route was to fly the TIPPN 1 to BRXTN then SZW... When I loaded the route; I loaded SWZ instead of SZW. When we crossed BRXTN; the plane began to turn left. We immediately recognized the beginning of a problem; selected heading; and started turning south. We asked Memphis Center for a vector toward SEMINOLE [SZW]. The Controller told us to fly 180 degrees. He then told us to fly 160 degrees and proceed direct to SEMINOLE when able. He then asked the reason for the navigation issue. We were not sure at that time; but quickly realized that SWZ had been loaded instead of SZW. Both crew members should confirm reroute entries. While we both knew what was being input; I should have confirmed the route distance with the Captain. We were in a -300 so did not have a magenta line to notice the error. A magenta line would have been a sure indicator of a route problem.

B737-300 First Officer reports entering SWZ instead of SZW resulting in a track deviation. The entry was part of a reroute clearance that was entered during taxi and not checked.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1485; Flight Crew Type 129

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While on an ILS approach in IMC; I was advised that I was drifting left of course. When I changed the flight director heading; there was no response. The autopilot had disconnected. By this time I was in a descent; off course and in a 60 degree bank. After leveling the plane; I corrected the descent and climbed back to altitude. The Controller did a fantastic job vectoring us back to the airport until we had visual contact; we landed safely; parked; and kissed the ground. Dense fog was drifting through the area; I would guess the ceiling to be about 700 at that time.I believe a contributing factor was the lack of situational awareness once I realized the autopilot was off. The fog moving through the area lowered the ceiling and visibility to below what I was expecting; the sky conditions had been improving and I was anticipating a lot better visibility upon arrival. I should have been more prepared to handle the conditions that developed.

A C414 autopilot disconnected during an IMC approach and after ATC questioned the pilot's heading he recovered from a 60 degree bank descending turn and returned to land safely.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 182; Flight Crew Type 180

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

Unreported tower approximately .7nm from approach end of runway 7 at MQJ; [Indianapolis Regional Airport]. Best guess is 300 feet left of centerline and approximately 300 feet tall. Tower is painted red and white striped; but not reported on any NOTAM. No traffic conflict; just tower.

Pilot reported a 300 foot tower; 0.7nm off the approach end of Runway 7 at MQJ is not depicted on the VFR Chart and is not reported on a NOTAM.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 700

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aileron flight control abnormality during departure from ZZZ. Upon lift off I felt a slight 'catch' in aileron controls. Decided to do precautionary landing; advised tower and stayed in traffic pattern for runway 16 landing without incident.

Captain of a Learjet-31A aircraft reports he felt a slight 'catch' in the aileron controls during departure lift-off. Concerns for possible flight controls binding; pilot decides to do a precautionary return to field.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was the pilot flying; and the captain was Pilot monitoring. Takeoff was normal and I elected for a slightly steeper climb until we were turning back to the VOR at 7;800 feet on the Departure Procedure. We were given and initial altitude of 14;000 feet. As we were completing the climb checklist we were climbing through 12;000 feet with a high rate of climb when we got the 'Bleed Air Duct' Aural warning and the Master Warning. I immediately pulled the power back and began to level off and turned the autopilot on. I called for the Left Bleed Duct immediate action items; and the captain began running them right away. We completed the items in under the 30 seconds required; however both bleed valves automatically closed and we began to depressurize slowly with the cabin rate climbing. The captain [advised ATC] and I asked for a lower altitude to which Approach gave us 12;000 feet. I took the radios from him while he completed the immediate action items checklist as well as the QRH and the climb checklist and I asked for 10;000 feet or lower. We verified that we completed all memory items correctly and leveled at 10;000 feet while making a turn back to [the] airport to land. We took vectors for the visual while the captain was talking with the flight attendants; the passengers; getting landing data; and running the in-range checklist. We saw that we were going to land close to max gross landing weight so I elected for a high drag configuration and slowed to 210 kts to burn more fuel. We calculated that at our current burn we would not land above 67;000 pounds. We landed normally with a soft touchdown; well under 250 fpm however I do not recall the exact descent rate. We taxied to the gate without incident and opened the cabin door. While waiting for the jet bridge there was a passenger that complained of head and eye pain; so I called ARFF (Airport Rescue Fire Fighting) to send paramedics to evaluate the passenger. After that we deplaned and contacted the company for further instructions.There was a previous event in the log can of a Left Bleed Duct Master Warning in flight. The action items were that the aircraft OPS checked good. After talking with the contract maintenance; the mechanic said that he found at least 3 measurable bleed leaks from the bleed system that were blower extremely high heat bleed air into the tail compartment and told us that this aircraft was going to be there a while. There have been increasingly high numbers of bleed issues and deferrals with bleed/pack systems due to the high summer heat.

CL600 First Officer reported a bleed duct master warning on climb out and returned to departure airport.