Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 5029; Flight Crew Type 4

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 134; Flight Crew Total 2751; Flight Crew Type 2751

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

ATC said there was rain on the field. There was a B737 flight ahead of us on the approach by 5 to 10 minutes. We were listening to both Approach and Tower to monitor their approach and landing. We discussed holding; prior to the preceding aircraft landing. The preceding B737 reported safe on deck; medium braking; and no issues. They said they broke out 300 feet above minimums; 500 feet above ground. This gave us confidence to conduct the approach and landing. We complied with the wet runway requirements on the 10-7 page (max braking).We were fully configured with flaps 30 by the final approach fix with the landing checklist complete. We were stable at both the 1000 feet and 500 feet calls. Approach was mostly smooth in the clouds with no turbulence. Auto throttles moved very little. The rain was moderate; maybe moderate to high. Once we broke out; we could see the runway the entire time. Wiper were keeping up; but on high. We broke out about 300 feet. Saw some ground before that; so knew we were close to breaking out. Saw the Runway End Identifier Lights at 300 feet and the runway edge lights and center line lights shortly after. Captain called 'approaching minimums' just prior to breaking out and I said I had the field in sight. The auto pilot and auto throttles were disengaged around 200 feet.Landed a little left of center line; but the right main gear was to the right of the center line. Nose was pointed down the runway. Landing was firm to hard. Flare was normal. Raised nose to arrest descent at 30 feet and power was at idle at touchdown. We were both surprised by the firmness of the landing. Nose wheel was set down normally. I thought we might have skipped a little bit; but the Captain did not think so. Maybe we hydro-planed then the tires grabbed. We immediately started sliding left. I don't remember us turning to the left. It seemed we were pointed down the runway but going left. I stepped on the right rudder; but it didn't seem to have an effect. The left main mount went off the pavement on the left side of the runway. It seemed to take a while to get it back on the pavement with full right rudder and full manual braking. With both pilots stepping on full manual brakes; the aircraft did not seem to slowdown. Never felt the brakes grabbing; and with max brakes; we should have felt the brakes grab. I do not know if that Captain was using the nose wheel steering to assist getting it back to the right.Once back on the pavement; we started to veer to the right; but never left the pavement on the right side. Once on the runway; we added full reverse. We put in full left rudder to keep it on the runway. We got the aircraft direction under control; but it was still pulling to the right with full braking and full left rudder. I think the Captain was countering the pull with nose wheel steering. The aircraft was still difficult to slow down.We exited the runway on the high-speed taxiway on the right at a slow speed and came to a stop just off the runway. Tower asked about our position and if we needed assistance. The aircraft instruments; indications and controls were all normal. The only noticed adverse indication was an 'anti-skid inop ' light. The Captain released the brakes and rolled forward a little to check for a blown tire and brake function. All seemed fine so we said we can proceed to the gate. The taxi in was uneventful.On the taxi in we informed Tower that we may have departed the paved surface and there may be Foreign Object and Debris (FOD)on the runway. After shutdown; the Captain got up and checked on the Flight Attendants and passengers. All seemed fine. One Flight Attendant said she was scared while it was occurring; but otherwise no adverse comments. They were obviously a little shaken at the time; but not excessively so. We contacted Company maintenance and wrote up the maintenance items that we knew about. Several of the Flight Attendants were working our deadhead flight back the next morning. Theystill did not seem to have any after effects from the event and were friendly toward us.Maybe the initial left drift was due to the right gear hydro planning while the left gear had full auto-brakes using anti-skid. Once the left gear returned to the pavement; it's ant-skid may have been damaged; causing the veering to the right under full brakes.

Leg 3 of a transitioning First Officer on a 4 day 15 hour IOE (Initial Operating Experience). The First Officer had just flown the previous leg and done well. He shot the ILS Approach and flew a nice approach to a very nice landing. During the 3 hour sit prior to our flight we discussed the upcoming flight including the special airport requirements and 10-7 pages. Reviewed the flight plan NOTAMs and maintenance status of the aircraft. Noted the sequenced flashing lights to our planned arrival runway were out of service.First Officer made a nice takeoff and climb out to cruise and we continued to update the weather forecasts on the flight. Reviewed 10-7 pages decided to use max braking for training and for possibility of a wet runway. Worst weather report we saw was 4000 feet broken; light rain; and winds 240 at 8. Briefed the arrival and RNAV Approaches due to winds. We also briefed the ILS. Approaching top of descent asked Center which runway was in use. The ILS was the approach in use. Pulled up the landing data. Approaching with radar on noticed a cell and heard [an] aircraft ask for deviations. We asked for and received direct ZZZZZ on the arrival. Descending to 12;000 feet were cleared for the arrival and preceding aircraft ask for direct to a fix. There appeared to be cells just south of the approach. Approach informed us there was rain on the field; we discussed possible holding when we heard [another aircraft] cleared for the approach.I tuned VHF 2 to Tower frequency to get a heads up on the preceding aircraft. They were cleared to land and reported to Tower breaking out a few hundred feet above minimums landed and reported braking action medium. Approach cleared us direct to a fix and to report on the localizer cleared for the approach. Slowed toward 180 kts.; flaps 5 auto pilot on LNAV/VNAV; armed the app mode; made 2;500 feet call; reported established and was told to switch to Tower. Called Tower and reported 9 mile final was cleared to land. I believe Tower also said preceding aircraft broke out at 500 feet and braking action medium. Localizer and glideslope engaged set Touchdown Zone Elevation. Approaching the final approach fix gear down flaps 15 rolled speed back then selected flaps 30 and landing checklist.IMC and moderate rain but little to no turbulence or wind shifts. Passing approximately 1;000 to 800 feet saw ground and lights looking down called 1;000 feet then set Missed Approach altitude. Approach was stable and verified at 500 feet. Called approaching minimums slightly early approximately 400 feet to prepare for possibility of a go around. Approximately 300 feet broke out with Runway End Lights; High Intensity Runway Lights and runway center line in sight. First Officer disengaged the auto pilot and auto throttle approximately 150 to 200 feet. Still raining with wind shield wipers on high but could clearly see the runway environment. Short final dipped 1/4 dot low to try and land in the first 1;000 feet. Heard 50 feet just prior to crossing the threshold then 40; 30. At 30 the First Officer began the flare slowing the rate of descent then began reducing power. Everything appeared normal till the last 5 to 10 feet when it felt like the bottom dropped out to a firm to hard landing. Written up as a hard landing.There was no bounce. Power levers at idle and speed brakes deployed. I have used max auto brakes often due to the demo requirement for Operational Experience. Ordinarily they grab and push you forward in the seat. There was no such sensation other than a feeling the anti-skid was cycling and the aircraft did not appear to be slowing. I believe the nose was pointed straight down the runway and the touchdown had the nose just left of the center line. On touchdown the aircraft began to immediately slide to the left. I believe the aircraft hydroplaned after landing. The First Officer depressed full right rudder with no effect. First Officer was slow to go into reverse so I came on the controlsset max reverse and followed full right rudder yet the aircraft continued to slide left and the left main mount left the prepared surface. I used nose wheel steering to bring the aircraft back toward center line. All this happened immediately after touchdown or so I believe. As we continued down the runway with both of us standing on the brakes the aircraft began to slide toward the right side of the runway. With full reverse full manual brakes and what I believed to be full left rudder it required nose wheel input to keep the aircraft from leaving the right side of the runway. At no point in time did I feel the aircraft nose was pointed at or mostly toward either side of the runway from initial touchdown to stop.As we continued down the right side of the runway the aircraft still did not appear to be slowing normally. Approaching the high speed taxiway on the right side of the runway I elected to allow the aircraft to veer onto the taxi way. We had finally slowed where we were able to bring the aircraft to a stop. We were not 100 percent sure the left main mount had left the prepared surface so we discussed the possibility and the possibility of blown tires. Tower asked if we needed assistance. We did not note any usual indications or issues all instruments appeared normal. With the exception of the anti-skid fault light. I allowed the aircraft to roll forward checking the brakes which appeared to operate normally at slow speed and we had no indication of a deflated tire. I decided the aircraft could be taxied to the gate to deplane the passengers safely at slow speed and was cleared by Tower to do so. We also informed Tower there may be FOD (Foreign Object and Debris) on the runway. Uneventful taxi to parking with good clear area all the way into the gate. Performed the parking checklist then left the flight deck to check on the passengers and flight attendants. No injuries were reported. One flight attendant said she was a little shaken. Conferred with base ops then did a walk around with the contract mechanic. Called Company maintenance and made maintenance write ups.

B737 Flight Crew reported a hard landing which resulted in a temporary loss of control on roll out and the aircraft's left main gear left the runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 942.88; Flight Crew Type 942.88

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Right engine failed during climb out passing approximately FL330; about 10 to 15 mins after takeoff.  Failure appeared to be due to loss of oil pressure (0 oil pressure indication; RT ENG LP PUMP status message).  We immediately [advised ATC]. The flight was FO's leg and so we decided to have him continue flying while I handle checklists and coordination. We decided to turn around and start heading in the direction of ZZZ; the field we just departed from; one of the closest airports in point of time.  We secured the right engine; per the engine failure checklist.  We decided not to try restarting the engine because of no oil pressure.   We finished up checklists and coordinated with ATC and dispatch for a return to ZZZ for an otherwise uneventful single engine ILS landing in ZZZ.

Climbing through FL325; the autopilot kicked off and the airplane began yawing right. We saw that the #2 engine had failed; oil pressure was zero. I righted the aircraft and began a descent to FL200 while the Captain [advised ATC] and began the Engine Failure Checklist. We determined a relight was not warranted and secured the right engine. We accepted vectors from ZZZ Center and I began the process of diverting to ZZZ. We accomplished an uneventful single engine approach and landing to [Runway] XXR. The brakes were heating a little by the time we reached the gate; and we were only about 5 minutes after touchdown; so I requested that ramp chock the wheels and otherwise remain clear. Brake temps settled at 4.

B757 flight crew reported to the departure airport after the #2 engine failed during climb out.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15.5; Flight Crew Total 86.9; Flight Crew Type 6.8

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Aircraft

After making a normal traffic pattern and landing; a gentleman told me I was very close to an airplane on short final and that the other pilot had to make a steep bank to avoid me. I am concerned that a nonstandard procedure may have led to the incident. I had no visual of the other airplane I was just told it got very close and he made an evasive maneuver.

A small experimental biplane pilot was told after the fact that another aircraft took evasive action on short final to avoid a midair with his aircraft. The biplane pilot did not see the other aircraft.


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Staffing; Procedure

I was working Clearance Delivery; Flight Data and was Controller in Charge. Training was being conducted on Local 1; 2; and 3 combined. We're in a temporary tower. 80 degrees outside. Air conditioner was NOT WORKING AGAIN! Portable fans were up giving some relief. Maintenance Techs came up later and used a temperature meter saying it was over 90 degrees in some parts of the tower cab. Local requested Local 3 be split. I called a body up to relieve me on Clearance/Flight Data.I am now working combined Controller in Charge and Local 3. Aircraft Y at 1900 feet called about 7 miles southwest requesting a transition east bound on the 101 freeway. A [military] helicopter (Aircraft X) was already in the area patrolling at 1300 feet which I called traffic. There was an unknown aircraft westbound 101 freeway about 2 east of the helicopter around 2300 feet. After all traffic conflicts were resolved I started to formulate a new watch rotation since I had to bring somebody up early. I noticed the helicopter at 1900 feet about 1 1/2 miles southwest of VNY when I saw Aircraft Y tag on the radar departing near the 101 freeway around 2200 feet turning southeast bound via the SID. Once I realized I never restricted the helicopter to 1300 feet for the transition (we are authorized higher due to terrain south of the freeway) I did call traffic (which should have been a traffic alert) and the helicopter respond with a 'yeah'. Once the helicopter turned southbound they asked to mark the tapes. I had to ask the helicopter to say again about 3 times because I couldn't understand the request. At this point I put in the request for the pilot inquiry. Due to being in the temporary tower and only 5 people are permitted in the cab. Training was in progress and the air conditioning was out of service again. Inside the tower cab was over 80 degrees and working combined positions. For some reason I didn't restrict the altitude of the helicopter like I always do. That was a mistake on my part.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

VNY Tower Controller working as Controller in Charge in addition to Local Control forgot to restrict a helicopter's altitude resulting in a NMAC.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

An E135 checked on [cleared via] the RYYMN RNAV Star from the northwest. He took the time to complain that the RNAV arrivals were impacting their safety margin as they were continuously heads down in the cockpit working on the complex routing. Spending all your time heads down working on automation instead of flying the airplane has been cited by the FAA multiple times as a factor in incidents. I've had this complaint from multiple carriers about these new procedures and failed to log them. I will try and log more as they come in. I encouraged this pilot to file a complaint with his own safety program as well.These RNAV procedures seem to be a solution to a problem that didn't exist. We are mixing aircraft both on the RNAV and other aircraft off or not capable of the arrival and the different speeds and altitudes can conflict unless you watch it closely.I think it would be better to take just a single post of our 4 post arrivals and reserve it exclusively for RNAV and let the other three posts continue as before. That way we wouldn't run into as many conflicting scenarios.

An Approach Controller reported one of several instances of complaints from flight crews about the complexity of the newer; 'optimized' RNAV STAR procedures into BNA. In this particular instance; the STAR in question was the RYYMN.


Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

My First Officer and I arrived one hour before departure at gate. I immediately went to operations and my First Officer stayed on the plane to prepare the plane for departure. I returned back to the plane 15 minutes later after flight planning. I started doing my cockpit checks as my First Officer stepped out to do the walk around. Gate agents started boarding the passengers. Purser notified me that cabin temperature was cold and she needed water pressure. I started the APU after the fire test and I turned on the air condition packs for heat. Shortly after; Purser notified me of smoke and haze filling the cabin. My First Officer walked in and said that there was excessive deicing fluid dripping from the airplane. I also smelled a strong glycol smell. I immediately turned off the packs and APU bleed. I also ordered the Lead Flight Attendant to deplane the passengers. The smell; smoke and haze started burning eyes and throats of the passengers and crew. I notified Operations of the situation and called the mechanics to the plane. I also asked the deicing to be stopped immediately. Everybody quickly departed the plane using the Jetway. One older female wheelchair passenger was helped to leave the plane. The Lead Flight Attendant noticed that passenger was having difficulty breathing. She brought the portable oxygen bottle from the plane and started giving oxygen to the passenger. Paramedics were called and she received medical assistance inside the terminal. Eventually she was taken to a hospital. Customer Service (CSR) Supervisor and Gate Agents were all notified and passengers were moved back to the terminal. Mechanics showed up and started working on the plane. They ventilated the plane by using external air and air conditioning packs. I also called both Duty Manager and the Maintenance Control to report the situation. Maintenance Control made a write-up for us since we could not access the airplane. I also had a chance to talk to deicing Truck Driver. He told me that they thought that we were not in the cockpit before they started deicing. So they did not attempt to contact us to configure the airplane for deicing. He said that they thought the APU was off and Boom Operator was experienced. He said that Boom Operator must have accidentally sprayed the APU intake. It took a long time to glycol smell to disappear. Cabin crew and passengers did not want to board till airplane completely cleared of smell and haze. I noticed that Lead Flight Attendant and one other flight attendant's eyes were red and irritated from the glycol. The Lead Flight Attendant also started losing her voice. Finally after one hour; aircraft cabin air returned to normal and we started boarding. One couple with a young baby refused to board and returned to terminal.  We departed 1 hour 5 minutes late due to this incident. I think similar incidents can be easily avoided in the future by communicating with flight crews and configuring the aircraft for deicing. Unfortunately I have been noticing a growing trend of lack of communication between the departments or employees. Necessary communication or information exchange has been seen as a burden by maintenance or ops personnel. It is a big treat to our safety. It can cause a serious injury or accident.

A De-ice Crew did not know an A320's APU was operating during de-ice at the gate so after the APU injected glycol the aircraft had to be evacuated because it filled with fumes and smoke which made some passengers ill.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Pilot reported near mid-air collision with an object that appeared to be a UAS.

Pilot reported NMAC with what appeared to be a UAS.


Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS); Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 1000; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 1000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Person Manipulating Controls; Party2 ATC

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

I was on-site to perform a photo mission to take some photos of [the roof top] of [an] elementary school. We are doing an [equipment] replacement project for this school. The work will involve some work on the [rooftop]. I called the ZZZ Tower/ATC to let them know about the flight prior to the flight. After speaking to them; I assumed that I was authorized to make the flight from having informed them about the flight and based on the fact that they did not tell me that I was not authorized to make the flight during the call. I performed the drone flight to an altitude of no more than 150 feet AGL for a duration of no more than 18 minutes. That is the time from the first call to the second call to the Tower/ATC to let them know that I was done with the flight. While I was operating the drone; [the] Manager of Drone Operations called and left me a message. I did not know about his call until after I made the flight. After the flight; I returned his call. He identified himself as the person in charge of the Drone Operations for ZZZ Tower. He indicated that I was not authorized to make the drone flight. At that point; as stated above; the flight was already complete; and I made the flight assuming I was already authorized to make the flight from my earlier conversation with the Control Tower Operators. I explained this to Manager of Drone Operations. I also asked him what I should do to ensure that I was authorized to make future flights in the area of ZZZ. He indicated that I would need to contact him for future authorizations. I indicated that I would do that for any future flights in the area of ZZZ. The call was ended.

Part 107 pilot failed to receive authorization to conduct a flight within controlled airspace. Flight was completed safely.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 8132

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

I have flown into Missoula multiple times this winter. Missoula can be a challenging airport to fly into. On my previous flights I have used the ILS to runway 12 because of the IFR conditions and night arrivals. Today we were expecting a visual to runway 30. The conditions were VFR with high ceilings and excellent visibility. We had the airport in sight about 60 miles out. Because this was the first time that either of us had attempted this approach we did an extensive briefing and set up the FMC for the approach. We flew the VOR-B approach and then transitioned to the visual approach. The FO (First Officer) was flying and configured early hitting all the target speeds and altitudes until we turned about 2 mile final. There was some confusion on that segment of the approach regarding descent technique which resulted in us being approximately 500 feet high. At that point the FO suggested that we go around. We were on speed completely configured with the checklist completed and I thought we could still meet our stabilization criteria so I pushed him to continue. This was my first poor decision. At my urging he increased the descent rate and we got up to 3 sink rates each corrected immediately. By 500 feet I perceived that we had caught our glide path which resulted in a landing in the touchdown zone albeit a little fast. We exited the runway at A4 for a normal taxi to the gate.

We were cleared for the visual approach to runway 30 into MSO. We briefed the VOR B and the visual arrival to 30 in the charts. We briefed thoroughly and had configured on schedule and on speed and fully configured at managed speed at the 6 DME fix. As I turned in and lined up with the runway; I saw that we were high even though I followed the profile and the chart exactly. I was at 6500 feet at the 6 DME fix and started to descend at 1200-1400 fpm as soon as I crossed it. Regardless; the PAPI showed high and I told the Captain I think we should go around. He said we were just slightly high and we can catch the path so just keep coming down. I adjusted my rate of descent accordingly. As we were getting onto the path; we received a sink rate and I adjusted. Then lowered the nose again to stay on the path and the 'sink rate' came on again. I adjusted again. It happened one more time for a total of 3 times while I adjusted and then nosed back over to stay on path. By 500 feet there were no sink rate alerts and I landed in the touchdown zone with minimum floating albeit 10-15 knots fast. I applied full reverse thrust and minimum braking (I got on the brakes ~85 knots) we taxied off at A4.In debriefing at the gate; the Captain and I agreed that we should have just gone around; especially after the sink rate. I suggested the go-around early on and should have pushed for it after the first sink rate call; even though we were getting on the descent path. The problem with this approach into MSO; is that I followed the procedure to a fault. I did exactly 1200-1300 FPM from 6 DME-2.2 DME as called for in the chart and it did not get me to 3900 feet by 2.2 DME. We were on profile the entire approach early on; so to be high all of a sudden was something we thought would be a minor adjustment or a quick fix and it wasn't. It should've been an open descent in the turn until 3900 (we couldn't see the PAPI until lined up at about 2.5 DME.)

Air Carrier flight crew reported continuing an unstabilized approach into MSO even after receiving three 'sink rate' advisories.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were in ZZZ. I don't Remember the gate. It was my leg to fly to ZZZ1. We had some weather approaching from the south. Me and the Captain knew it was going to be a quick taxi being we were going to takeoff XXR. So we did preflight check at the gate and then when the flight attendants were ready they closed the flight deck door and then locked it. When the ramp crew was ready we did the push checklist. We started both engines as me and the Captain talked about because of the short taxi. Then we did the taxi check before we moved the aircraft due to the short taxi. We then taxied towards Runway XXR and during that time we did the before takeoff checklist. I'm pretty sure I called the back and told the flight attendants and cabin we were next for takeoff. After going through the checklist and noticed that the flight attendants did not call us. So I called back there to see if they were ready and from what I heard they were. It was not as clear as normal because of the wearing of the mask for COVID. We then closed the before takeoff checklist before departure and was cleared to takeoff. We then arrived at ZZZ1 with no issues. Then we landed and passengers deplaned; someone getting off the plane said something to me but was not able to hear being she was walking and far away with her mask on. Then the forward Flight Attendant came to the front and spoke to the Captain saying they had a passenger was not listening to the rules with the mask compliance. That's all I heard about. We then continued the rest of the trip. Then yesterday; we went ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 had 2 hrs between the next flight so then I went to go get food before everything closed. As I was going back to the gate the Captain told me we were removed from the rest of the pairing because of the other day that the flight attendants were not seated for departure. That was what I heard for the first time and was a little confused because the flight attendants never said anything to me after that flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 the day before.

Air carrier First Officer reported taking off with the flight attendants not seated citing a possible misunderstanding because the FA was speaking through a protective mask.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During the landing rollout; the Tower Controller was asking what turnoff we could make. As the PF; I was zoned in on trying to get the aircraft stopped and wasn't hearing most of the Controller's communications with my F/O. With other aircraft inbound on the same runway; I chose to turn right at [a particular] Taxiway. After we cleared the runway; the Controller told us that Taxiway was closed there and that we were supposed to have turned left on [another taxiway] instead. With the aircraft in full reverse thrust and in critical phase of flight; confusion with Controller's communications took place. We taxied on into the gate.

While rolling out on landing; the runway was reported 5; 5; 5. We were still in reverse trust and anti-skid cycling while Tower was telling us to exit [assigned] taxiway while we were still very busy in a critical phase of flight. I was responding back unable. We were stepping on each other and all I heard was [a different taxiway]; as did the Captain; and he turned right on [the wrong taxiway]. After turning right; Tower told us to stop and do a 180 turn. We were unable at that point. Tower then said to continue and contact Ground and to comply with instructions next time.

B737-700 Captain reported missing a taxi clearance that was issued during a critical phase of flight during reverse thrust application on landing roll.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Inbound; initially expecting runway 16R; then switched to 16L for a visual approach due to traffic on approach to 16R. Switched to tower; then cleared to land 16L. Just prior to landing 16L; heard tower controller give [another] flight that had just landed 16R a clearance to cross 16C and 16L. Since we were about to land 16L; I made a quick call to the tower that we were on short final to 16L. The controller immediately had [the other aircraft] hold short 16L; which they did. We landed uneventfully.I could see the [other] flight on the taxiway approaching 16C when the clearance to cross 16L was given. Based on the timing; had [the other aircraft] continued to cross 16L as cleared; we likely would have arrived at that intersection on the runway at the same time. Luckily for all of us; we were paying attention and heard the clearance given to [the other aircraft] to cross the runway we were about to land on and were able to avoid a runway incursion.The controller stated after landing that we were the first to land 16L in a while. Due to the complexity of SEA and that the vast majority of flights land 16R; anytime there is a runway change can create an Expectation Bias or Loss of Situational Awareness among the controllers and/or pilots. Obviously mistakes have and will be made with runway changes; so it's important that we pay attention to what's happening around us. In this case; a clearance that was not for us had a direct impact on our flight.

Q400 Captain reported he was on short final to SEA Runway 16L when he heard Tower clear another aircraft to cross the runway. Tower cancelled that clearance after a heads-up from the reporter.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 1020; Flight Crew Type 800

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Holding over JLI VOR; descending to 7700 to execute the RNAV-B approach; I noticed a plane approaching the VOR from the south as I crossed the VOR he turned behind me and deliberately followed me as I tried to evade. He passed behind and then overtook us on the right hand side. He was also doing a VFR practice approach. I contacted the TRACON and asked if he had both of us on radar and said that I had a very close call. I switched to RNM Tower frequency and called and asked if they were talking to the aircraft and they said no. The aircraft continued on the approach ahead of us and we were about 1 mile behind during the remainder of the approach. Eventually he contacted RNM Tower and said he was conducting the VOR approach. I wasn't able to tell if there was more than one person on board as I landed and saw him taxiing.

An instructor pilot and student flying the RNM RNAV (GPS)-B Approach reported a near miss near JLI VOR at 7;700 ft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

I am flying through ZZZ this month; several days with originating aircraft after a international leg. After an international flight the US Government requires insecticide to be sprayed throughout the aircraft including the flight deck.The last two days on flights; I have noticed a very thick white film on the flight deck glare shield. It is so thick that it looks like someone has been grinding some type of plastic and the dust has settled on the glare shield. At the same time; there is a film of dust on the inside of the glare shield.On; day two the layer of dust on the windshield was so thick that I could not see out the window. I called ops for an interior window clean.The cleaner came and wiped a dry rag across the inside of the window; accomplishing nothing then left.Maintenance was coming to the aircraft; when they got there I asked if they had some rags; which they did; I used their rags and water and cleaned the windows myself. I entered into a discussion with the Mechanic about the substance on the window and glare shield. The Mechanic is the one that told me it was the insecticide. He said that the Mechanics had written it up several times with no action.I am very concerned about the amount of insecticide in the flight deck. It is so thick that it reduces the ability of the glare shield color to do its job in the sunlight. Also with that amount of insecticide on the glare shield and console I am concerned about the side effects of breathing it and skin intake from having it also on the controls and console.The aircraft need to be sprayed. But the clean-up needs to be much more comprehensive. Because the cleaning crew is not well trained and does not complete their job as required. There is no oversight of the crew. Maintenance stated they have written this up several times with no response. Think about the Roundup weed killer lawsuits currently in process. This is the same type of illness causing situation waiting to happen.Complete review of the insecticide program. Require supervisor check and sign off after cleaning of the flight deck.

B787 pilot reported that cleaning crews failed on two occasions to remove insecticide from cockpit surfaces; resulting in a health risk.


Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Company Policy

A B757-200 was departing Runway 25R. The LC2 assist was unable to rundown the departure via automation; had to verbally run down aircraft. I investigated as to the cause of the 'dup id' message and found that there was another flight with same call sign; but as an arrival to LAX. The 'T' affixed to the end of the callsign led me to believe the departure was a continuation of this arrival; and that the arrival had already landed and the RADAR track was in coast mode; not uncommon at LAX. I removed the arrival control by using the OK function. The departure rundown was now completed via automation. Later I found out that the arrival was still inbound; and due to my actions; the data tag had been lost; but the RADAR track was still displayed. In removing the arrival control track; I created the same situation I was trying to prevent; i.e. have an aircraft airborne with no associated data tag. In this case; an un-tagged departure would have been better than an un-tagged arrival. The first change would be to discuss with the company why they used a 'T' suffix on two callsigns; when the use of the suffix is to resolve confusion to same callsign events (like this one). A better fix would be to use two different suffixes; a 'Q' or 'J' etc.

LAX Controller described a confused event when an automated departure run down to the TRACON failed because of an apparent 'dupe ID;' the reporter's corrective actions resulted in an arrival aircraft losing data block information.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4700; Flight Crew Type 100

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

VFR flight from to [Airport X]. Level at 9;500 MSL and approximately 10 miles outside the outer limit of Denver Class B airspace I was switched over to Denver Approach. I checked in and requested clearance into Class B airspace. This request was denied and I was told to remain clear of Class B airspace and to descend below. I made a decent to 8;500 MSL to fly below the outer layer of Class B airspace with a floor of 9;000 feet MSL. The next layer of Class B airspace had a floor of 8;000 feet MSL. I again requested clearance into Class B airspace and was told that I would not be cleared into the airspace and that they handle 100's of aircraft VFR in and out of [Airport X] each day. I informed the controller I did not want to descend below the 8;000 MSL layer until I was closer to [Airport X]. I was then informed by the controller that the floor of the airspace in front of me was 10;000 MSL. I responded that my charts said 8;000 MSL and started a descend to 7;800 MSL to remain clear of the Class B airspace. As soon I leveled at 7;800 to remain clear of the airspace a traffic contact 500 below me came up on my TCAS as a yellow target. [Airport X] tower informed me of the traffic; said he thought they were talking to Denver Approach and that I might need to make a turn or climb to avoid the traffic if they continued to climb. The traffic did not level off and my TCAS gave me an RA 'Traffic; Climb Climb!' I responded as necessary which caused me to climb into the Class B airspace at an altitude of 8300 MSL. Where I temporarily leveled until my TCAS gave me the RA clear message and then I descended back to 7;800 MSL.

Aircraft responded to a Resolution Advisory (RA) while on approach. During the evasive event there was a possible incursion into class B airspace; but it is not clear that it actually occurred. Denver approach control did not state as such.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 24150; Flight Crew Type 8200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Climb out of normal. Cleared to climb to FL340. Oceanic clearance received was for NAT B crossing at FL330. At 110 mi. E of DOGAL; EINN cleared us to FL330. MCP altitude was set and I pushed the Altitude knob to initiate descent. The VNAV cruise page was set for FL330; with a hard tuned speed of M.83 (the assigned speed in the oceanic clearance.) The legs page was also programmed for M.83/FL330 at DOGAL fix. The plane descended to FL330 normally; but we did not notice that at some point the aircraft had slowed to 250 kts. As we crossed DOGAL; we were busy accomplishing the Class II fix procedures; as well as receiving and accomplishing radio communications switch to HF. At the same time; an 'Insufficient Fuel' message displayed in the CDU. It took a moment or two to investigate the reason for the fuel message. We noticed that the Prog Page showed a landing fuel of 3.6 and the landing time had increased about 20-25 minutes over what it initially was. We eventually found that the VNAV cruise page had completely blanked; and all the entered information was now blank. At this time we noticed that the plane had slowed in cruise to 250 kts. (about 40 kt decrease from what it was.) It is unknown when; or how long the 250 kt speed occurred. After reprogramming the VNAV cruise page; the plane accelerated back to M.83; and the Prog Page now showed normal arrival fuel and time. I believe we were not at 250 kts for more than 5 or possibly 10 minutes; but we did apparently cross DOGAL below the assigned M.83 speed. We do not know how or why the VNAV cruise page deleted its entered information.

B777 Captain reported his speed dropped to 250 KTS in cruise flight at FL330 when the FMC dumped the cruise speed settings.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Company Policy

Cleared for the RARYO at or above 3;000 feet with straight in RNAV 34L approach. Traffic reported by ATC and we reported traffic in sight to ATC. After sequencing RARYO in descent traffic in-sight was near our track and ATC advised and asked if we would like to continue. With traffic in sight and not in conflict; visually continued straight in to Runway 34L. Traffic encroached our path and initiated an RA. Autopilot was disconnected and flew manually to climb 200 to 300 feet; then followed by a level off. Report of RA was made to ATC. ATC asked if we were able to continue with the Visual Approach. Decision was made to continue with the Visual Approach with traffic in sight and being non-issue with associated traffic. Tower cleared us to land and landed 34L. Selection of TA in the MCDU versus TA/RA while on final approach with traffic in sight.

Air carrier Captain reported an RA for an unidentified VFR aircraft while on an RNAV Approach to PAE airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

[We] performed an emergency descent. The aircraft was cruising at flight level 430. The aircraft was about 2 hours into the flight and weighed approximately 33000 lbs and was in smooth air on top of the clouds. Both pilots felt the large cabin pressure change in their ears first and noticed the rapid cabin rate increase on the synoptic. The aircraft oxygen masks were donned and an emergency descent was initiated. The passenger oxygen masks were deployed and donned. The Cabin Altitude CAS was displayed. Air Traffic Control was notified and the aircraft descended to 7000 feet while deviating around several thunderstorms. The CABIN ALTITUDE AND EMERGENCY DESCENT Checklists were completed during the descent. The highest cabin altitude was approximately 15000 ft. ATC provided radar vectors to ZZZ. We had an uneventful landing. After reflecting on the event; I believe a single button push notifying ATC of our emergency and auto selecting 7700 on the transponder would have helped. Donning the crew masks; establishing radio communication with ATC and then selecting the 7700 transponder code within a submenu all while initiating an emergency descent could have been accomplished faster with a change in transponder interaction.

Falcon 2000EX First Officer reported loss of cabin pressure at FL430 resulting in an emergency descent and diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

Assigned PDC (pre-Departure Check) up to step #7 on [aircraft] Stamped completed steps worked. Being previously ETOPS (Extended Twin Operations) qualified; completed assignment and later found out qualifications had been changed by other qualifications added to be ETOPS qualified with no verbal notifications by company or local management.Better notifications of qualification changes by management at morning briefings and monthly safety & compliance meeting.

Maintenance Technician reported completing Pre-Departure Check on an ETOPS aircraft without proper ETOPS qualification.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After passing DUCXS on the DUCXS3 arrival ATC cleared flight to heading 050 and down to 3000 ft. The ILS 16 had been set up in FMC and the final approach course (156) was extended off of FIBUG. The vector positioned the flight directly to FIBUG with a 100 degree intercept (with 25 kt tail wind) for a landing on Runway 16. At approximately 10 miles west of FIBUG ATC cleared flight to 2100 ft. PF called field in sight and flight was cleared for the visual. Aircraft configured with gear down and flaps 3. PF disengaged AP and entered right descending turn to align with runway 16. Flight descended to as low as 1700 MSL. PM queried about flight's position in relation to airport which was off to the left. PF crossed checked the Nav Display and realized that the perceived visual acquisition of the runway was in error. PF initially considered trying to salvage the visual approach by leveling off and turning left towards FIBUG. The PM called for Go Around. The visual approach was abandoned. The PM remained assertive and supportive throughout which helped PF regain situational awareness. ATC was advised and cleared flight to 3000 ft; heading 180. The flight was vectored around for an ILS 16. Normal landing. No further event.When initially cleared for the visual approach the Nav Display indicated that aircraft position would require a tight intercept inside FIBUG. Consequently; it appeared best to keep a visual on the runway and disengage AP for immediate maneuvering. PF became disoriented after relying on incorrect visual perception of runway environment and aircraft position in relation to airport. The PF's perceived runway environment was in fact an area west of the airport. Utilize Threat Error Management. Maintain barriers to error. When unfamiliar with airport and especially at night follow instrument approach procedures. This will prevent issues associated with visual acquisition and potential error. Use ATC as a resource and follow vectors until positioned outside of FAF and on vectors to intercept final approach course. This will ensure orientation and aircraft position awareness and reduce Flight Crew task loading. If it appears that ATC vectors may not be a good set up do not request the visual as corrective means. Instead; communicate to ATC with concerns for clarification and correction. Regardless of how clear the weather might be always use the electronic Nav Displays as the primary reference. Do not rely solely on visual cues; they are subject to misperceptions and incorrect interpretations. When one pilot thinks the runway is in sight seek concurrence with the other pilot. If disoriented and position becomes uncertain; that's in the RED; state it so and don't waste time trying to salvage the situation; immediately follow SOP's and go around. Communicate early with other pilot and express your concerns 'I'm in the yellow because...' etc. If at any time during an approach if either PF/PM is In the Red; go around.

A320 series flight crew reported lack of situational awareness on a night visual approach led to track and altitude deviations.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 9094; Flight Crew Type 698

Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Briefly; as I can write and remember...TCAS advisory of traffic 12:00 closing +3;900 [ft.] descending and less than 15 miles.We were estimated FL210 for FL230 on the SID; the process of switching from ZZZ to ZZZ1 ATC.Traffic continued to descend and closing now 'amber' and 'Traffic Traffic.'Keying the mic to say Aircraft X climbing from FL222 to FL230 when in the midst receive 'Monitor Vertical Speed' 'Climb Climb. Announcing to ATC we were on an RA climb for traffic (I think the conflict was being announced during the transmission).The target was now 'red' and near. (We never saw any traffic outside.)Controller returned with 'We have no traffic in your vicinity climb maintain FL230.'We complied and began our level off as TCAS instructed and 'Clear of Conflict' at FL230.Again ATC advised NO traffic in our vicinity (and apologized at least 2x.)ATC cleared us to climb from FL230 to FL430.The target was still red and directly below us (estimated as I don't remember 3;000 feet; but immediately below our aircraft.As I keyed the mic we heard and saw 'Monitor Vertical Speed' and 'Climb Climb' perhaps we heard 'Traffic Traffic' too... I don't remember.Again as keying the mic; I replied (while RA was announced over the radio) we are on an RA emergency climb from [Flight Level] 230 to 430.Again ATC replied we have no traffic in your vicinity climb to FL430.Once we had 'Clear of Conflict' and climbing quickly I took 2 pictures to show our displays. The target (never seen by us visually nor ATC on their radar) was depicted immediately below our aircraft in 'red' and at that time of the picture 6;100 feet and descending and then disappeared."

C680 Captain reported getting two RAs during climbout; however; they were unable to visually locate the traffic and ATC advised there was no other traffic in the vicinity.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I had just finished receiving to position from the previous controller. Aircraft X was an overflight level at FL110. The data block started to flash MSAW with the next MIA block which was FL115 less than a minute from enter it. I instructed Aircraft X to climb to FL120 immediately. He started his climb and was at FL111 when he entered the MIA block and about a minute later he was thru FL115.[This event] was a simple oversight.

ZAB Controller reported of an aircraft under his control that was lower than the MIA. Controller climbed aircraft; but had already entered the higher airspace; resulting in an airspace deviation.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was landing in a Cirrus SR-22 when the carpet became entangled with the rudder pedal and the airplane started pulling hard to the right. I throttled up in an effort to get back into the air but was unsuccessful and hit a runway sign with the right wing flap at which point I lost control of the airplane. I was going approximately 70 knots when I pulled the throttle back to idle. The plane continued across taxiway bravo and I struck a taxi light with the right main tire and finally came to a stop on Runway 36R. Runway 36 right was also in use so I taxied off of the runway to the FBO as expeditiously as possible. In retrospect I probably would've been ahead not to try to get the airplane back into the air.

Cirrus pilot reported carpet in the aircraft becoming entangled with the rudder panel causing the pilot to lose control of the aircraft and hit objects while trying to get the aircraft back under control.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 127; Flight Crew Total 952; Flight Crew Type 144

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

I departed BED with my passengers onboard and a CFI friend on the right seat and myself as a PIC. The CFI; not giving any instruction on this specific flight; was unfamiliar with the aircraft as it was her first flight on one; she had no experience with the G1000 avionics either.I was instructed to line-up-and-wait on Runway 23 after Aircraft Y who performed a T&G. I was then cleared for takeoff; instructed to turn right 270 after takeoff and was advised the Aircraft Y ahead of me was doing left traffic.I took off and once at 800 feet I initiated my turn. I then noticed the Aircraft Y started turning right and the avionics started to complain about that traffic being close to us. In parallel the CFI in the right seat indicated she lost visual of that plane; but I still had it in sight. As I saw it turning right I disconnected the autopilot; stopped my right turn and decided to turn a bit to the left as not to cut in front of that traffic and pulled the controls as to tighten my climb. The Controller then inquired whether I had that traffic in sight; I indicated I did and commented I thought that traffic was doing left traffic which the controller agreed to and changed me to Approach after that. I ended up passing above that traffic by about 300-400 feet. I then re-engaged the autopilot; turned 270 and changed frequency.I spoke to the tower later that day; they indicated the Controller's belief the traffic ahead of me was assigned left traffic was a mistake. I'm not sure why the CFI in that plane didn't hear the Tower indicating that in their transmission to me (I believe it was a dual instruction flight).

GA pilot reported an NMAC during takeoff from BED airport requiring evasive action.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 204; Flight Crew Type 3331

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working [flight XXXX] when a FAA Hazardous Materials Aviation Safety Inspector came onboard asking what hazardous material we were carrying on the flight. I retrieved the Planned Dangerous Goods Summary that listed 1 item; 11 pounds of Flammable Liquid. He then asked if that is all the notification I had; to which I responded 'Yes'. He then told me that there was more hazardous [goods] onboard; 3 items; because he saw it going into the pit. He took a picture of my Dangerous Goods Summary and showed me a picture on his phone of some kind of manifest. I then called the Dangerous Goods Hotline and asked about the Dangerous Goods on this flight. I explained the situation to the Dangerous Goods Specialist who informed me that we in fact had 3 items loaded; but 2 were lithium batteries which have an exemption from pilot notification. Once I relayed this info to the FAA Inspector; he was happy. He wanted to ensure our procedures were correct and said he had been waiting for some time to witness a [Company] dangerous goods shipment. He then left the aircraft satisfied.The operational impact then occurred when Load Planning decided to split the batteries and flammable liquid out of an abundance of caution. After doing that; local ramp objected saying the shipment was properly packed and shipped by the same shipper and put the load back to the original state. This process of second guessing our procedures caused a 15 minute delay.

B737 Captain reported Hazmat FAA ramp check resulted in flight delay with no anomalies detected.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airport; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X departed ALM; looking to pick up IFR to ZZZ1. Normally HMN Approach would issue this clearance; however; they were closed. When I issued the code and got him tracked up; I noticed he was on a southwest bound heading and had filed direct to ZZZ1. This was an issue; because that would put him straight through White Sands Missile Range (R-5107B/R-5107D). Therefore; I asked him if he was familiar with White Sands and the restricted airspace; he said he was not. At this point I let him know he had restricted airspace at his 12 o'clock in 1 mile and to turn flying H170. He made the turn and stayed clear of the airspace. I then asked him if he was familiar with the VFR corridor towards ELP; and he was also unfamiliar. I asked for a D-side at this point; which was then given right away. I issued a second vector to Aircraft X to turn him northbound out of the VFR corridor; and told him to remain VFR. I asked my D-side to put in a good route for the aircraft; so I could focus on my other traffic. Once Aircraft X was clear of the restricted airspace I issued IFR around R-5103 A;B;C and onward to ZZZ1. With an airport this close to restricted airspace; and the potential to depart straight west into it; how can an aircraft possibly be unaware. This isn't something I have witnessed a lot; but I would imagine there are several warnings this aircraft looked past to put him in this situation. If not there definitely should be.

A Center Controller reported an aircraft departed an airport requesting an IFR clearance but the pilot was not aware they were adjacent to restricted areas and heading into them.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 122; Flight Crew Total 4140; Flight Crew Type 4140

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication

The ALPIN3 chart restriction at KICNE to cross it at 15;000 feet is incorrect per JAC ATC Tower. When queried the Controller clarified that it's supposed to be at or above 15;000 feet and that they have filed reports on this issue. The FMC database contains no restriction at KICNE.

Air Carrier First Officer reported an altitude shown on the JAC airport ALPIN3 SID chart; at the way-point KICNE; does not correspond to that given by the local ATC Tower.


Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Supervisor / CIC; Ground

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working ground control; clearance delivery; and CIC positions. Aircraft X was on the VOR runway 33 approach with intentions to circle to the Runway 02. Runway 02 was the active runway at the time. Aircraft X checked on with local control; reporting a 3 mile final to runway 33 and requested to circle to Runway 02. Local then instructed Aircraft X to circle west for a left base Runway 02; but was also restricted to remain south of the runway for a departure. There was a jet holding short of the approach end of Runway 02 but had not been cleared for takeoff. I told the local controller that he would not be able to get the jet out in time and that it 'would not work'. Nothing that I said was recorded. Aircraft X read back 'circle west for a left base Runway 02 cleared for the option.' Aircraft X then asked for clarification on the restriction to remain south of the runway for the departure. The local controller again told Aircraft X about a jet that would depart prior to his arrival. I again told the local controller that it would not work and he should hold the jet. Aircraft X then requested maneuvers to hold south of Runway 02 for departing traffic. By this time; Aircraft X was crossing the approach course for Runway 02 and continued to the west side while making a left hand 360 degree turn. The local controller finally told Aircraft X to disregard the departing traffic and to 'maneuver as needed'. Aircraft X read back these instructions and continued his left hand turn back towards final.Prior to reaching final; a Medevac helicopter called off of a hospital that is west of CHA airport wanting to transition over the airport to the east side. Local then radar identified the helicopter and issued traffic in regards to Aircraft X; who at that time appeared to be joining the final for Runway 02. Aircraft Y at this was turning a 5 mile base to Runway 02. Aircraft X however; was still confused about the instructions and continued the left turn back to the west in another 360 degree turn. As soon as I saw Aircraft X continuing the left turn; I told the local controller to watch Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was now on a 4 mile final and Aircraft X was facing due west and continuing to turn left. I then told the local controller to have Aircraft X join the left downwind to follow Aircraft Y. This was stated multiple times. Aircraft X was now facing more to the southwest and continuing to turn left when Aircraft X asked Local if he should continue to orbit. Again; I told the local controller to have Aircraft X join the left downwind to follow Aircraft Y. The local controller was focused on what Aircraft X had said; so he replied to Aircraft X and told him 'Aircraft X negative; cleared to land Runway 02'. I again told local control to have Aircraft X join the left downwind to follow Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y then checked on with local on a 4 mile final to Runway 02. The local controller then told Aircraft X to 'Hold his position west of the runway' and that traffic would pass off his left wing landing Runway 02. Again; I said one last time to have Aircraft X join the left downwind; but it was too late by this time. Aircraft X was facing due east; about to cross in front of Aircraft Y with about a half mile or less between them. This is when the local controller finally told Aircraft X to enter the left downwind for Runway 02.Due to confusion and not enough reaction time available at this point; Aircraft X continued the left turn; unaware that Aircraft Y was in close proximity. No traffic alerts were issued. Aircraft Y reported Aircraft X in sight on the base leg joining in front of him. Aircraft X then tried responding to the instructions of local control; but was only able to get out his call sign and an explicit when he caught sight of Aircraft Y. Aircraft X crossed in front of Aircraft Y in close proximity which is estimated at about .46 miles lateral and 200 to 300 feet vertical separation. I then told the local controller to issue a 090 heading to Aircraft X; but instead he told Aircraft X to enter the right downwind for Runway 02. Aircraft X then requested to proceed to the east VFR and to get resequenced to final. I again told the local controller to issue Aircraft X a 090 heading; which he did. Local then told Aircraft X to maintain VFR at or below 3000 ft. I asked the local controller then if Aircraft X had reported cancellation of IFR. Local then asked Aircraft X if he was canceling IFR; to which Aircraft X replied in the affirmative. Local cleared Aircraft Y to land; and coordination and sequence was established with East radar. Aircraft X was then VFR in the traffic pattern; was told to turn base behind Aircraft Y and both aircraft made a full stop landing without further incident.I would recommend in-house retraining to the local controller. The way in which he cleared the aircraft for the circle approach was non-standard and confusing. The instructions that I was giving were not heeded; mostly because of the frustration of the local controller. There was no animosity in his actions towards me. The main issue was the falling apart of standard phraseology; lack of understanding of local procedures and traffic alerts. I should have taken over the frequency and fixed the situation myself; but I kept thinking that he was going to do what I was telling him to.

CHA Tower Controller observed Local Control conducting an unsafe operation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 1776

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were told by LAS Ramp Controller to taxi to Spot 7. When I looked at the Commercial chart for Concourse D; I located spot seven and began a taxi to what I thought was that spot. As I arrived at the spot it was in fact spot 8. If you look at the chart you will see spot 8; not next to spot seven (where in fact it is) but half way down the chart. When I tried to call ramp to inform them of my mistake I noticed the First Officer had already switched to Ground and we then received a runway change and amendment to our clearance. I continued the taxi as I felt this was the safest course of action.

Reporter states that the current Commercial Chart diagram has corrected the discrepancy.

Air Carrier Captain reports that Spot 8 near Concourse D at LAS is not located where it is depicted on the Commercial Chart diagram.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.8

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

ILS Maintenance and company; 2 vehicles; proceeded from the terminal to the approach end of Runway 6 to change a light near the threshold. ILS Maintenance correctly read back all instructions but due to the line of sight obstruction; the new academy hangar; was not visible for 6 minutes. While there was no conflicting traffic; had there been; we would have been unable to ensure that the vehicle was clear of the runway edge line.  Perform the necessary structural adjustments/changes to the academy hangar to allow for full visibility of the entire approach end of Runway 6.

A Tower Controller reported a new hangar being constructed blocks their view of part of one of the runways.


Captain was Pilot Flying. I was the Pilot Monitoring. We were climbing through FL180 on a Standard Instrument Departure. With full climb power on the engines; we heard a loud bang accompanied by vibration and a yaw to the left. The EGT was flashing red and indicated approximately 998 degrees. The Captain announced; 'Left engine failure;' and retarded the throttle to idle; disconnected the autopilot; and leveled the aircraft. We both assessed the engine instruments; determined it was a normal engine failure; declared an emergency; and requested an immediate return to ZZZ for landing. We proceeded with the Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist in the QRH as we started a slow turn and descent back to ZZZ. We assessed the engine and determined a restart was possible. We ran the In-flight Engine Start Checklist but could not get the N2 to rise above 25%. We then aborted the in-flight restart and proceeded with the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist. We were cleared the ILS XXL at ZZZ and flew the 15 flap approach and landing to an uneventful full stop landing. With no smoke; fire; or braking issues we taxied to Gate XX; shut down the aircraft; and deplaned the passengers.  Periodically throughout the descent to landing; we communicated with the flight attendants and passengers to anticipate an uneventful landing. We also informed ATC of our souls on board and fuel remaining when questioned about this. We told them to inform crash; fire; and rescue personnel which engine had failed and that a normal landing and rollout was anticipated.

We departed ZZZ on the Departure. While climbing through 18;000 feet; there was a loud bang from the left engine area. The left engine N1 and N2 were rolling back; and the EGT was flashing RED and indicated approximately 998 degrees. I turned off the autopilot; reduced the left engine thrust lever; leveled the aircraft; and corrected the yaw. I announced a left engine failure and the First Officer pulled out the QRH. We assessed the engine and ran the Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist. I told Center we had lost an engine; and declared an emergency and we needed to return to ZZZ. Center gave us a turn back to ZZZ and a lower altitude. The First Officer ran the checklist and; due to the parameters; we attempted an engine restart. The N2 never exceeded 25% so we aborted the restart. We notified the flight attendants and passengers of the problem and prepared for a one engine landing visual approach to XXL with an ILS backup. The First Officer computed the numbers for a Flaps 15; one engine landing; under max landing weight. We had an uneventful landing and rollout. The fire trucks reported no smoke or fire observed so we taxied single engine to Gate XX and shut down the aircraft. Contract Maintenance confirmed N2 section failure from initial inspection.

Air carrier departure described an engine failure during the climb to flight levels and the actions taken by the crew and ATC during the return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Windshear and power lever over-travel event. Route of flight was from the north into Boise. There had been occasional light chop along the way; coinciding with the tops and bases of the different cloud layers. This happened on the RNAV (RNP) Z 10L approach into Boise via the LIBYY transition. We were night VMC from LIBYY on. There was a scattered layer of clouds over the Boise airport about 4500 feet AFE. Reported wind was 120/7. We had ice on the wings and REF SPEEDS INCR selected; but it was 6 degrees Celsius at Boise.Sequence of events; as best remembered: Airspeed was moving between 200 and 205 on the VPATH approaching CAMML; which is 9 miles from the runway; and almost 3000 feet AFE. Airspeed jumped very quickly. Power was retarded to flight idle as airspeed approached the high speed redline for flaps zero. The power reduction wasn't enough; so VS was pushed and rolled to less of a descent rate; maybe 200 feet per minute. The speed still wasn't slowing; so the autopilot was disengaged and a level flight pitch was added. Maximum airspeed reached was a few knots below redline before the airspeed was under control and moving toward 200 again. Approaching SEPRE (5.3 miles from the runway) there was a rapid reversal of the airspeed; and it required a pitch down and huge power input to keep the airspeed from dropping into the red stickshaker region. Minimum airspeed reached was 2 kts. above the low speed redline; and for just a few seconds. Later; after the flight; it was noted that the power levers had slipped marginally beyond the rating detent for a second. We had overshot the centerline for 10L and were lined up for 10R. There was no traffic conflict with other aircraft. The wind seemed steady at that point. We had flown out of the windshear by the time we turned final; and a return to the centerline of 10L was made by using gentle banking. A smooth landing was made. Maintenance was notified about the power lever over-travel and windshear event. Dispatch was also notified. The maintenance inspection and diagnostic code retrieval delayed the next flight about 20 extra minutes.Later; we talked with Boise Tower. He told us that when we were on approach to the airport that the west end (where we were on the approach to 10L) winds were directionally 220 V 340 gusting to 30 knots. He also said that the east end winds had been 70 V 190 gusting to 24. This had not been previously reported. There were indications for a missed approach; from the big airspeed swings to lining up on the incorrect close parallel runway. Why not go missed approach? We both considered it after the final approach fix. Perhaps the VMC conditions and the eventual smoothness above 1000 feet AFE gave us a 'Can Do' bias. We decided that to land was safe after the windshear had subsided. When we debriefed later; we discussed how fast the airspeed had changed when pitch; power; airspeed; glidepath had been mostly steady. The increased groundspeed at the beginning of the event took away more distance and time than we had initially perceived in flight. I kept thinking that this was a momentary deviation from a stabilized approach; and it appeared to be that as we made corrections along the way. These events hit so hard and fast; and you try to follow the proper procedures as best you can. Just keep reviewing and studying your procedures. Try to be as methodical as you can.

Air Carrier Captain reported power lever over travel event while executing windshear maneuver and resulted in an overspeed condition.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

On final [weather radar] was painting yellow at the end of the runway with red off the end. A 'splattering' of green on and in front of and to the side of the runway. We could see centerline on final to the end on the runway. Very near touchdown; below 30 ft; we encountered a very strong gust of wind from the right side. At the same time; visibility dropped to very low. The airplane weather-vaned into the wind [and got] pushed the [to] right of the runway. I tried to keep the airplane on the runway by using rudder and as little ailerons as I could because I did not want to [get a] wing strike. I could no longer see the center line but I could tell we were still on pavement. The airplane floated just a bit due to the sudden added wind speed we touched down with a side load. Just before we touched down; the F/O (First Officer) said 'we need to go left.' I tried but the aircraft didn't respond right away. The FO said again 'left; left' and then because he didn't feel me trying he [input] rudder as well. We got a dual input.I then said 'my controls' and the aircraft started responding and I was able to get it back to centerline. This all happened in a matter of seconds from the gust/ sudden loss of visibility to touchdown right of center line; side-loaded. Just as quickly it passed and visibility returned to what is was before. In the second it happened; I thought of a go-around and very quickly dismissed because of the thunderstorm at the end of the runway and our very low energy. I was worried about wind shear with the low energy and didn't think we could get enough altitude to turn before heavy rain at the departure end of the runway.Exited the runway and taxied back to the terminals normally. When we reached the gate; local Maintenance was waiting on us. I asked them to the cockpit. I told them that we had a hard landing and a side-loaded landing. I told them I was going to write it up for that. I was in the process of writing it up and calling Dispatch and Maintenance Control when local [Maintenance] came back up and said there was damage and grass on the underbelly. I finished writing up the side-loading and then went out to take a look to see what I needed to write up. The left engine appeared to have ingested FOD (grass) and there was damage to the right engine lower outboard reverser door. I returned to the cockpit and wrote these up as well. Looking back on it; I don't think I should have written up a hard landing. I don't feel like it was a hard landing but it was definitely a side-loaded landing.I might have been able to glance back inside and continued to use the localizer guidance to be able to tell how far off of center line the aircraft was for the few seconds that the visibility dropped.

[We] were on final [and] both noticed that there was some yellow painting on the radar at the very end of the runway; with red painting well off the end of the runway. The only thing that we actually painted on the runway was green.On short final; at 500 feet AGL; we were able to see the centerline of the runway all the way to the end. The Tower stated the wind was 170 at 18 gust 27. There was rain present also. I never at any time saw any lightning. At approximately 10 feet off the runway; I placed the Captain's windshield wiper on low then followed by high; just to make sure that we had visibility through the rain. As soon as we entered the rain area; there was what appeared to be a strong gust and significant rain; and the plane's nose [weather-vaned] into the wind. At the point where I felt like we were going to touch down; the plane floated a bit; and moved to the right side of the runway. At which point; I stated; 'left; left'..... I never heard my Captain's response; so I stated it again; 'we need to go left; left' and at which point I did give some input to the left rudder; due to feeling like we might go off the runway. After stating the 2nd time of needing to go left; my Captain acknowledged me and we slowed enough to maneuver to the left and then back to center line.At no point did I believe a go-around would be a good idea; due to the fact of having little to no energy for a safe go-around. This entire incident took a total of less than 4-8 seconds.After getting back on centerline; I heard [another aircraft] 3 miles behind us; and advised them to NOT LAND; due to low visibility. They got a heading and broke off the visual approach. There was also [a second aircraft] and I advised the Tower to ask them to also; NOT LAND too due to the same reasons. They too; took a heading and landed later.We taxied to the ramp without further incident. My Captain talked to Maintenance; wrote it up in the log book and also; did the post flight walk around.Preventive measures would be to go around/break off the visual approach. However we didn't have anyone to attempt prior to us; which would have been nice; because we did not have any visibility reports prior to landing.

A320 flight crew reported a runway excursion in gusty wind conditions that resulted in damage to the belly and engine nacelle.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Not 100% sure. It doesn't seem like there is any rhyme or reason when fume events occur. The smell wasn't a dirty sock [smell]; but rather a hot metal type smell which threw me off. I suppose I could have aborted the Takeoff when we smelled it. Again; not having smelled the hot metal smell before; I wasn't thinking it was a necessarily a fume event at that exact second. Once I had a reaction to it; then I knew it was something abnormal.

A319 First Officer reported a fumes event during takeoff.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16.6

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I was working CIC when Aircraft X declared they were going around from a visual approach on a 2 1/2 mile final for BUR runway 8 due to altitude. Aircraft Y had just departed BUR runway 15 and was climbing to the southwest just off of the departure end. The local controller asked Aircraft X if they could accept a circle to runway 15 and they said they could. Aircraft X began a climb and circle northwest of BUR for runway 15. 1 mile northwest of BUR at approximately 3000 feet MSL Aircraft X declared they could not make it and would like to be re-sequenced for another approach. The local controller told Aircraft X to climb to 4000 feet and fly suggested heading of 270 as we have no procedure for this scenario and had not yet received instructions from SoCal TRACON. During this time I was coordinating with WHP ATCT as Aircraft X could enter their airspace and received approval. I then began to coordinate with SoCal Valley Sector for instructions to give to Aircraft X. Aircraft X was continuing to climb into SoCal Woodland sector airspace and as I was on the line with Valley sector he coordinated with Woodland sector for the re-sequence. Valley sector then advised me to give Aircraft X to Woodland sector and I coordinated that with the local controller who handed off and switched Aircraft X to Woodland sector. There was apparently a miscommunication as Woodland sector thought that Aircraft X was going to stay in the pattern at BUR and be re-sequenced by BUR.There is no set procedure for go-arounds at BUR. Aircraft on an instrument approach are supposed to be given the published missed approach which puts them head on with any arrivals behind them. BUR is supposed to get climb out instructions from SOCAL TRACON for these situations and they too have restrictions. Previous procedures for these situations were deemed unusable due to non-current mapping of the area. Visual approaches to BUR that go-around are expected to be kept in the pattern by BUR and re-sequenced by us; or coordinated with SoCal for instructions if this is not a practical solution if the pilot states they are unable. The above situation was unique in the fact that the aircraft was northwest of BUR in a turn to the west-northwest when they requested the re-sequence. Not having the ability to vector this aircraft due to the new restrictions; and not having yet received instructions from SoCal leaves a major issue with what we can do with the aircraft; hence the suggested heading given by the local controller. BUR needs to have the ability returned to vector go-arounds to the previous headings (the SID heading) and previous altitude (the climb via except maintain altitude). This lack of procedure has caused several issues at BUR and needs to be addressed.

Aircraft X was on final for runway 8; about five miles out. They advised that they needed S-turns for descent; which I approved. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff with Aircraft X on about a 3 and 1/2 mile final. Aircraft Y was on departure roll about 3000 feet down runway 15 when Aircraft X advised that they couldn't make the runway. I asked Aircraft X if they could accept a circling approach to runway 15; to avoid a wake turbulence issue with Aircraft Y; they responded in the affirmative. I then shipped Aircraft Y to departure. Aircraft X advised that the circling maneuver was not going to work for them; and at this point they were northbound north of the airport. They requested vectors back for the approach. The Controller-in-charge began coordinating with SoCal approach; specifically Valley sector; who handles the missed approaches. I was able to get on the line to hear some of the coordination; and heard the Valley controller say 'Give him to Woodland'; the other corresponding sector; I climbed Aircraft X to 4000 feet because they were already climbing on their own; and then suggested a 270 heading. Woodland then called and wanted to know what was going on with Aircraft X. I advised that Aircraft X wanted vectors back for the approach and she was climbing to 4000 feet on a suggested heading of 270. Woodland then got off the land line.I recommend that we have more options as the tower for missed approaches for runway 8; runway 15; and circling maneuvers to 15. Additionally; the statement by the SoCal Valley controller left me under the impression that the Woodland sector wanted to the aircraft as soon as possible; when from what I could gather after the event; something completely different was coordinated by Valley. Without the ability to vector an missed approach that was a visual; or an altitude that could keep them safe; I was left with no other option except to coordinate with SoCal; who from what I could gather did not want to deal with the missed approach. As a controller I don't know what options can be given because the SoCal controllers expect us at Burbank to keep the missed approaches in the pattern. This is not a viable system; and needs to be looked into.

BUR Tower controllers report of a go-around that cannot be kept in the traffic pattern at the airport and is handed off to approach for sequencing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Equipment / Tooling

During preparation for our flight; all pre-flight items and activities were normal. There were no discrepancies were noted.  We departed ZZZ for ZZZ1. Once in cruise; the Captain and I noticed the oil quantity decreasing. We consulted the QRH for low oil quantity. As the quantity continued to decrease; the Captain called dispatch and maintenance for any guidance or assistance they could give.  The tech told the Captain to follow the QRH.  The Captain and I began discussing engine shutdown and diversion scenarios. The oil level eventually fell to zero. Over a period of time; the oil pressure also began to fall slowly and we now were consulting the low oil pressure and engine shutdown procedures in the QRH.  In the descent to ZZZ airport ; the oil pressure dropped to where the QRH directs engine shutdown. We followed the engine shutdown checklist and [advised the TRACON]. We were vectored for a Visual approach to runway XX. When we transferred to ZZZ1 tower; we were cleared to land. A few miles from landing; ZZZ1 tower advised us that ZZZ2 tower reported possible missing cowlings from our engine. The Captain informed me that he was going to stop on the runway to find out if there was aircraft damage before proceeding to the gate. The landing and rollout were normal and we stopped the aircraft on the runway. After an inspection of the aircraft; the fire commander gave us the all clear to proceed to our gate with rescue personnel following. At the gate and after the jet bridge was brought to the aircraft; we were met by two mechanics. We briefed them on the situation and they went outside to investigate. Once they opened the cowls; I went down to find out if they had any idea what happened. I could see that the inner cowl was covered with oil on the inside; but there was no evidence of oil on the outside of the nacelle and only a little had dripped on the ground. I was told by one of the mechanics that they found an 'oil plug' in the bottom of the inside cowl when they opened the engine cowls. I returned to the cockpit to brief the Captain with the information I acquired on the ramp.

Flight Crew reported a loss of engine oil quantity and a loss of oil pressure caused an inflight shut down of the engine and an ATC guided landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Type 5000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were on the Arrival into ZZZ and were told to hold at the ZZZZZ intersection. An air show was in progress and we were given a 20 minute EFC time. The Captain and I knew that we were scheduled to arrive in ZZZ with only 5;400 pounds of fuel and that were would be unable to hold for that long to get into ZZZ. A divert plan was needed. The Captain gave the aircraft to me to fly; he was the Pilot Flying (PF) while he worked on a divert plan. I began to enter the hold and realized that the LNAV was not engaging. I manually entered the hold using Heading Select and continued talking to ATC as they began several step descents in the holding pattern. We messaged Dispatch via ACARS for divert guidance. We got a reply back that the current dispatcher had no idea why the last dispatcher didn't give us more fuel; since an air show was scheduled to end right at our arrival time. I completely missed the air show in the NOTAMS during the preflight planning stage as well. We did not hear back from Dispatch for several minutes while we were coming up with a plan. We got a message to contact Dispatch on the ZZZ Operations frequency. They mentioned ZZZ1 as our alternate. We never received a diversion plan for ZZZ1.The Captain put ZZZ1 in the Fix page and saw that it was 135 miles away. He decided against it due to distance; wind; fuel and traffic congestion considerations. We also discussed ZZZ2 and quickly ruled it out. It was at that time that the Captain mentioned ZZZ3. He pulled it up on the enroute cart on our EFB and saw that it had a 6500' runway and was 150' wide. He had prior experience with the field. The Captain told Dispatch on the ZZZ Operations frequency that we were diverting to ZZZ3.We told ATC that we were diverting to ZZZ3 and received vectors for a straight in landing on 28. The weather was VFR. It was then that I realized that ZZZ3 was not listed as an airport in JeppFD-Pro. It also was not in the [flight computer]. We got the Localizer frequency from the Tower Controller. We got our flaps 40 landing numbers off of the FMC and planned an autobrake 3 landing.The Captain informed the Flight Attendants about the unscheduled divert and why we were diverting. He made a PA to our Customers informing them of our landing in ZZZ3 instead of ZZZ. We landed safely and taxied to the corporate terminal. We had 5;000 pounds of fuel at that time. After landing we received an ACARS message with numbers for ZZZ Runway 28R. We safely parked the aircraft and immediately ensured the customers were comfortable and taken care of while waiting on the aircraft. The Captain suggested a water and snack service and I continued to keep the customers informed to the best of my ability every five minutes. The Captain began the offline fueling procedures; helped the Line Serviceman hook up to our center point fueling station; and began the fuel quality checks. We kept the customers on the aircraft; hoping to eventually get performance numbers from Dispatch so we could get them to ZZZ. We got an ACARS saying that the latest plan was to bus the people to ZZZ. Dispatch also said that engineering was working on performance numbers and that I had a Part 117 Duty Limit approaching.The crew personally escorted every customer off the aircraft via air stairs; where they waited in the corporate terminal for transportation to ZZZ.

I took over [the] Desk and aircraft X was already en route to ZZZ. ZZZ was scheduled to have an airshow with the airport closed. This flight was scheduled to land [right after the closure and the] flight had pushed 5 mins early; and was scheduled to arrive with 5.4 Fuel on Board (FOB). [Initial] dispatcher had failed to bring the airshow to the crew's attention; and no additional fuel was taken on to account for delays associated with this airshow. [Subsequent] dispatcher was notified of holding over on the arrival. Over ACARS; it was suggested to divert to ZZZ1 if the hold did in fact materialize. Crew requested dispatch come up on frequency. Dispatch came up on ZZZ Ops Freq. Transmission was very broken; but dispatch attempted to relay the burn to ZZZ1. Flight continued descent according to Fusion; so it was believed that he was c1eared into ZZZ. Through the broken transmission it sounded like the crew was asking for landing performance for [the runway]; the runway ZZZ had been using. Performance numbers were run and relayed via ACARS even though [the flight computer was] operable. Suddenly there was an 'on ground' message; but the fusion depiction showed the aircraft to the southeast of ZZZ. A call to the ZZZ tower confirmed the aircraft was not at their field; and suggested they may possibly be at ZZZ3. Shortly after; a phone call from the captain confirmed this suspicion. He claimed they did not have enough fuel for ZZZ1; and land at ZZZ3; an airport he was familiar with from landing there during a previous career. Crew made it to an FBO were the passengers were deplaned; served pizza; and ultimately bused up to ZZZ. Aircraft will remain over night until data and crew can be obtained to ferry back out.

An air carrier First Officer and a Dispatcher reported that an aircraft had to divert due to a planned temporary airport closure and insufficient fuel for the required hold.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Troubleshot oxygen system all day for aircraft leaking crew O2 and not able to take any new O2. Replaced a transducer; ops checked bad; troubleshot it down to a broken regulator on the crew O2 bottle. Removed and replaced the O2 bottle yet misread the regulator saying closed instead of open.The crew tested O2 system with no oxygen coming out. Mechanics noticed regulator was wired in the OFF position. Was hurried to finish job due to unable to work late yet had to stay to complete job.Had a lapse of memory thought I re-secured the valve in the on position. Just made a mistake.

Maintenance staff reported that while repairing an inoperative Crew oxygen bottle; a valve was inadvertently secured in the wrong position.