Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.1

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Last night; I was informed that Aircraft X was involved in a NMAC.Last night; I was working the radar position. At some point during the session; another sector initiated a handoff to me of Aircraft X at 37;000 feet. Prior to taking the handoff I examined its route. I realized that route put the aircraft in conflict with a Warning Area.I figured that Aircraft X was too heavy for 39;000 feet at the time; and rather than inconvenience the overseas flight; I decided to see if I could get the controlling agency for the Warning Area to approve the aircraft on its filed route through the Warning Area.  From experience; I know that sometimes they assume separation responsibility (via pointout or handoff) for flights through active warning areas on specific routes or at specific altitudes. I was thinking that if they were able to take a pointout or handoff of Aircraft X through the Warning Area I would not create an additional conflict within my airspace for Aircraft X and the aircraft could remain on the most direct routing.I then initiated coordination to determine whether or not they could approve a pointout on Aircraft X. They could not initially answer; they said they would call me back. I continued working and approximately a minute later they called me and told me they could assume separation responsibility (via pointout) for Aircraft X through the Warning Area. My plan was to affect a handoff of the aircraft to a ZDC Sector; as it transited a portion of their airspace prior to entering [the warning area]; and let them know that Aircraft X was approved on his route.The Warning Area controlling Agency agreed to take communications with Aircraft X (accepting a handoff) and I switched Aircraft X to them.I finished that session and went on break. I then worked another session and when I was relieved; my manager asked me if I knew what had happened with the Aircraft X debacle. I remembered the flight and the details of the situation; but wasn't aware of an issue until he informed me that Aircraft X had been involved in a NMAC. I was not able to see what happened on the Falcon; but I am told Aircraft X received an RA while in the Warning Area.I take my duty as a controller very seriously; and I was very disheartened to know that Aircraft X was placed in any potential danger as a consequence of my decision to allow the Warning Area controllers to assume separation responsibility for the flight. Though it is my understanding that they have the capability to provide separation for aircraft transiting airspace under their control; I will not trust them to do so in the future. It is probably much safer to simply route aircraft around their airspace to the extent practicable.

A ZDC Controller received approval for an aircraft to fly through a Warning Area. While in the Warning Area the aircraft was involved in a NMAC and responded to an RA.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A B737-800 LUAW Runway 1R waiting for traffic to land Runway 28 L/R. A B777 exiting the South ramp on Mike for taxi to Runway 28 L/R for departure. I advised the B777 to cross Runway 1L; hold short Runway 1R; departing traffic; read back was correct. Next; I cleared the B737-800 for takeoff. At this time; the B777 had not yet crossed the Runway 1L to hold short and the B737-800 was rolling through Mike; so I advised the B777 to cross Runway 1R; hold short Runway 28L; read back was correct. A very short time later; the B737-800 said they were departing Runway 1R; and aborting. I advised them cancel takeoff clearance; turn right Taxiway F1; turn right onto Lima; and advise when ready to go again. They made a displeasing remark about the intelligence of my instruction? I immediately went back to the B777 and advised them to turn left onto Runway 1R; turn right Taxiway F1 to join Foxtrot; and hold short Runway 28L; read back was correct. The B757 was on final Runway 28R; and was not sent around; as I was able to get the read back of exiting instructions in a timely manner. There was no way to predict that the B737-800 would hear this and conclude that an aircraft would be crossing down field; as not a single aircraft was in their field of vision except the arrival that had rolled through before they were cleared for take off. This may have been the issue; however; as normally; an aircraft with the B777's taxi instructions would have been closer to Runway 1R (maybe even holding short); therefore placing them in the field of vision; possibly identifying them as the B777; alleviating any question when the instruction was issued and read back. Additionally; with the fairly recent events; and this being an outbound leg for a red eye flight; it is very likely that the flight crew was on a higher sense of personal well being and self protective mechanisms quickly sought after with a seemingly unusual clearance. This is a taxi clearance that is estimated to be issued thirteen to fifteen times a day in all light conditions.

Tower Controller described an aborted takeoff event on an intersecting runway when assumptions were made by the flight crew that runway crossing traffic would be a factor.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Our cruise altitude was flight level 350. Our speed was .81 mach. We were on an Eastbound track. Flight conditions were IMC; obscured hazy layer; no radar images; and no other reports of turbulence on the track. Severe turbulence was experienced for 2-3 minutes. The autopilot disengaged; speed fluctuated 15-20 knots fast and slow. Our speed went 4-5 knots into red speed tape and we an received aural warning for approximately 3-4 seconds. The stick shaker was intermittently engaging during the event. We had an altitude loss of 250 feet due to the performance of the aircraft. No engine parameters were exceeded. The Captain was pilot flying and I was pilot monitoring. I was calling out airspeeds; altitudes; pitch and roll during the event. After the event contacted [Company] and maintenance. We issued a PIREP on 123.45 common radio and requested climb to FL360 via CPDLC. A logbook entry was entered for severe turbulence. Severe Turbulence was encountered. There were no signs of severe turbulence prior to event. I do not think this event could have been avoided. We did not have any warnings prior to the severe turbulence encounter. After the Captain and I debriefed the event we both had the immediate same thought.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported encountering unexpected severe turbulence in cruise causing an overspeed warning alert.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 640

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I departed for a VFR flight to ILE. Before departing; I checked weather; NOTAMS and TFRs enroute and saw that there were only two active TFRs in the Texas area; Dallas and Corpus Christi. Neither of which was along my flight path. I was in the vicinity of Waco; TX Approach Control and contacted them on 127.65 to let them know I was 15-20 NM northeast of their position at 4;500 FT MSL and wanted to get permission to transition through their airspace to my destination. I was informed by the Approach Controller that I was near an active TFR and that I needed to turn east to avoid penetrating the restricted area. After complying with the order; the Controller vectored me around toward the south and then west to maintain TFR clearance. I was told to contact Waco Approach Control via the telephone upon my arrival to ILE. I called them at my destination and spoke about the problem. Apparently; there was a moving TFR that was being conducted in the Waco vicinity that I was unaware of and it was not listed on the FAA.gov TFR website. Being a Part 135 professional pilot; I was shocked to have been snared into a situation such as this and I can assure you that I make safety paramount in all of my aviation related activities.

General Aviation pilot voiced concern regarding the lack of published information on a moving TFR near Waco; TX; noting no NOTAM information was published regarding this TFR.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

It is impossible to egress the jetway at Gate XX at MYR. The jetway doors lock from the inside; and there is no exit button or push bar that will allow you to exit the jetway into the terminal. These codes are obviously not available to Passengers or even Crew Members. You must enter the security code to exit the terminal door even from the inside. Same thing for the door to the ramp at the bottom of the jetway. These are the only jetways in the system that I am aware of that lock you in at the top of the jetway. In the event an evacuation from the aircraft is necessary for a fire; smoke or some other emergency; people are going to pile up in the jetway with no means of escape into the terminal. Exit buttons that unlock the terminal doors from the inside allowing egress from a jetway that has become dangerous should be installed immediately.

Air Carrier pilot reported the jetway at their gate at MYR airport cannot be opened from the inside which would be a hazard during an emergency evacuation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 4200

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 400

Ground Excursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On the ride over from the hotel it was thundering and lightning as a storm passed over. We arrived at the airport and began getting the aircraft ready and at this time and until we left the gate for our taxi it was just a light rain. The preflight was uneventful except for the need to call Dispatch for our weight and balance information because our ACARS has no reception; which I did. The taxiways and runways were reporting braking actions good and MU's of 40 on the departure runway. I did not notice NOTAM 21/1 that said to be careful when taxing at night due to closure of Taxiway C. While I was on the phone with Dispatch we received our close out and I glanced over it while I was still talking to them. I did not notice that the taxiways were now reporting poor braking and I should have looked it over while not on the phone with Dispatch. We completed our checklist and closed the door. On our taxi out the braking seemed to be pretty good on Taxiway E. We were taxing very slow and crossed 07/25 and began to join Taxiway C which was the closed runway. In the turn I could feel that we were beginning to slip a little so I slowed down even more. We made it through the turn and had just began to taxi straight onto C when we started sliding again; but this time it was starting to twist sideways. I then shut both engines down and we continued the turn and ended up spinning around 120 degrees to the right and came to a stop with our nose wheel in the snow off the taxiway. No taxi lights or signs where hit and no passengers were injured. We called Operations and they came out and took the passengers to the terminal and we stayed with the aircraft for another hour until we had made all the necessary phone calls. The event occurred because I; the Captain; did not thoroughly read through the close out paper work because I was on the phone with Dispatch and completely forgot to look it over better once off the phone. If I had I would have noticed that the taxiways and runways had deteriorated. I should have also noticed that Taxiway C was closed even though there were not cones or lights indicating that it was a closed taxiway.

We arrived at the aircraft and I performed the preflight. At this time it was raining lightly. I returned to the aircraft and set up for the flight. ACARS was unavailable so the Captain contacted Dispatch for our takeoff data. When he was on the phone we received the closeout. We input the numbers; ran checklists; and started the engines. Then we began the taxi to Runway XX. After crossing Runway YY there was a slight turn on Taxiway C and we began to slide after coming out of the turn. The Captain made the appropriate actions attempting to stop the slide and regain control of the aircraft; but it wouldn't stop so he shut down the engines. The plane continued to slide and turned nearly 120 degrees as it came to a stop with the nose wheel in the snow. No lights or signs were hit and there were no injuries.The event occurred due to contaminated taxiway surfaces and our failure to thoroughly read the closeout paperwork containing deteriorating surface conditions and the closure of Taxiway C. The paperwork we had received prior had braking conditions reported good.

CRJ200 flight crew describes the events leading up to a taxiway excursion due to failure to read the latest NOTAMs. Breaking action had gone from good to poor and the crew was attempting to taxi on a closed taxiway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Type 289

There seems to be an increasing problem with the smells of strong fragranced cosmetics in the workplace. According to research posted on several internet sites; approximately 10-12% of the population has a severe sensitivity to these harsh chemicals. Reactions include asthma; allergies; migraine; dizziness; lung and throat irritation; and neurological impairment in as short as 30 mins after exposure.Due to the serious safety concerns when pilot health is degraded; we need to address this issue. I am suggesting a remedy for two particular situations that have presented in the past two days.First; please reinstate the restriction for pilots prohibiting the wearing of any fragranced cosmetics in the cockpit. It is a very confined space with restricted airflow. A sensitive person could have a serious medical issue during flight. This restriction used to be in the FOM but has since been removed. Also; publishing a reminder in a newsletter would be helpful to draw attention to the change.Second; please notify all ground transportation providers of the same restriction. Many vehicles are showing up to transport pilots with multiple extreme air fresheners in vents. The driver may also be wearing fragrance which adds to the toxic load. This was an unbearable situation today which could result in a sick call due to a throbbing headache. This is totally unnecessary and compromises the bottom line profitability of the operation. It also erodes pilot health and well being which also costs money and causes needless suffering.

B777 Captain suggests that the company should institute a policy prohibiting strong scents and fragrances in the work place.


Icing; Turbulence; Rain; Thunderstorm; 10

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Was cleared to descend from FL270 to FL230 and at same time handed off from one Chicago Center Controller to the next when severe turbulence was encountered. This lasted approximately 5 minutes. The windscreen iced over immediately. The autopilot kicked off. During this time I hit my head hard on the cockpit ceiling twice. There were short periods of time that I could not read the flight instruments because of motion. I tried to maintain attitude within 30 degrees of bank and pitch within 10 degrees of level. At times the attitude indicator pitched up while the VSI showed a descent. By the time I was able to regain complete control the aircraft was 2;000 feet to 3;000 feet below my assigned altitude of FL230. I reported this to the next sector Controller who issued a new clearance. The rest of the flight was unremarkable. The route of flight was South of and parallel to a line of thunderstorms. Just before the turbulence began the onboard radar suddenly showed an area of red immediately in front. This did not appear to be present until just as we entered the area. I feel that this occurrence could have been avoided if I would have deviated to the south further from the line of convective activity. The Center controllers were very proactive in providing me weather radar updates during the entire flight. In the future I will stay further away from convective activity. It concerns me deeply that I was involved in an altitude deviation that could have endangered another aircraft. The aircraft was equipped with a stormscope and onboard radar. I did not have aboard access to NWS radar. Perhaps if it had been onboard I would have had a better understanding of the overall picture and would have moved my route further south.

A small transport pilot encountered severe turbulence and descended up to 3;000 feet from his assigned altitude while flying south of and parallel to a line of Midwestern thunderstorms.


Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

On [the ORD] FYTTE RNAV STAR; ZZIPR transition; Chicago Center's last clearance was to descend and maintain FL240 by BHAWK. (BHAWK profile altitude constraints are between FL260 & FL 220)  At approx. 10 NM prior to BHAWK and level at FL240; ATC re-cleared us to descend via the FYTTE2; except maintain 300 knots until further advised.At that point we were already in LNAV; 11000 feet was selected in the FMC window; the Captain (CA) selected VNAV and we started a descent in VNAV PATH. When the CA changed the speeds on the legs page to 300 knots; the altitude constraints on the legs page disappeared; BHAWK turned white on the NAV display and the aircraft immediately began a 90 degree right turn; though the next fix ahead; STNLE was now the active waypoint on the legs page. The CA engaged Heading Select and rotated the heading bug back to the left to rejoin the lateral arrival path; but the aircraft was very; very slow to reverse course in the Auto-Pilot (A/P) mode.  The aircraft continued to descend as the CA disconnected the A/P; increased the left turn rate to rejoin the lateral path and leveled the aircraft now below FL220 just prior to BHAWK.  The controller queried us and I acknowledged that we had descended below the BHAWK altitude limit.  The controller indicated that there was no traffic conflict at that point.  After BHAWK; the CA re-selected the A/P; LNAV & VNAV and continued the arrival.It continues to be my experience that controller directed altitude and/or airspeed changes to arrival profiles require significant pilot attention allocation at dynamic moments to execute the changes in the FMC at multiple waypoints. Then additional heads-down time is required to verify that the executed changes result in the desired profile adjustments.  See and avoid time out the front windows is negatively impacted by FMC profile adjustments and monitoring.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A B777-200 flight crew described anomalous behavior of the autoflight system when programming the FMS in order to comply with ATC alterations to the crossing window at BHAWK on the FYTTE RNAV STAR to ORD. In addition; ATC assigned an airspeed well in excess of those charted. The FMS Inexplicably altered the active waypoint from BHAWK to STNLE; which was the first fix beyond BHAWK. The aircraft began an abrupt right turn when to track to STNLE would have only required a modest left turn. The flight crew abandoned VNAV operations in order to regain the assigned lateral track and while engaged in doing so descended below their cleared altitude at BHAWK. The First Officer's report was appended with detailed (and commonly reported) complaints with respect to the effects on flight crew workload and situational awareness imposed by ATC modifications to complex RNAV terminal area procedures.


Excessive Humidity; Temperature - Extreme

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Two medium to large dogs were loaded in my rear pit. When I went to check on my pets before departure there was only one dog in the pit. I noticed that the dog did not have a bowl of water; he had a gerbil drip bottle attached to the outside of his large wooden kennel. If a dog has not been trained to drink out of this type of water dispenser; they will not drink out of it. The dispenser was also dripping water on the floor of the kennel. Our flight was a long one (four plus hours) with possible delays because of high winds. I went to operations and asked them to change out the bottle and give the dog a bowl of water instead. They did that. I was unable to recheck the kennel and dog before we left but the ground lead said that it was done. I always wait with the dogs on the ramp after landing until they are picked up. I called operations and asked them to notify the Animal Transport department that a dog is waiting. I have waited between 15 minutes and an hour and 15 minutes for dogs to be picked up. When I went down to wait with the dog there were two dogs. The departure ramp crew put another dog on before we pushed that I didn't know about. This second dog had the same gerbil drip water dispenser. The first dog that was given a bowl did not get a real bowl. He got a very small; black rectangular dish about one inch deep with a divider in it. It looked like it was for a puppy to be fed dry food in. It couldn't hold very much water and if it were turbulent; the water would easily splash out. This Dog was scheduled to fly to Europe that night after landing. That bowl would never have held enough water for a pretty large dog that was going on a very long second flight of probably 8 hours or more.I was concerned about both dogs getting any water in either kennel on the next leg of their journey. When I was leaving the terminal to go home I stopped by the Animal Transport department to tell them my concerns. I asked to speak to a Supervisor. What happened next was a big disappointment for me. The woman that was out front said there was no Supervisor. Then someone; another male employee rudely said there were three businesses here; which one did I want? He knew I was there for the two dogs I brought. He was standing there when I told the woman. This man said he would get someone. A few minutes later; another man who claimed to be a supervisor came out with three other employees who all surrounded me. This man; who was about 6 feet 4 inches tall came right up to me and got uncomfortably close and peered down at me. The three other employees all stood around never saying anything; but were clearly there because they were asked to be there by this man. The tall man never asked me what I wanted; he just started saying; 'we don't give our dogs water; we give them ice'. I tried to say something and he cut me off. In fact; he cut me off every time I tried to say anything. He said things like 'don't tell us how to do our jobs'. He even said to me several times 'don't raise your voice to me' when in fact I never even got a chance to say anything and he was the one that was raising his voice. I; in fact; never actually told him what my concern was with the water for the dogs. I just turned around and left. There are lots of pilots that actually care about their pet passengers; and try to take care of them. I personally feel that I am as responsible for them as I am my people passengers. When we see things that are questionable about their handling and we try to alert the Animal Transport department of a problem or concern; I feel they should be happy to have the input. After all; we know a lot of dogs die in the care of the company. With the help of this valuable feedback; we can change that trend and strive for no animal deaths at our airline.Just to say a few of the things I have seen on the ramp: Dogs placed in the exhaust of the APU before or after boarding. Dogs left sitting in the sun on extremely hot days while waitingto be picked up. Dogs waiting way too long to be picked up; up to an hour; sometimes longer. Puppies left on the ramp in the very bitter cold weather; like what we have been having lately; with no protection. No water or too shallow of a bowl of water that has spilled in the kennels in frigid temperatures. Dogs being put in the pit on hot days; the cargo door being closed and then taking a delay on the ground; or just while waiting to push back. This has the same result as leaving your dog in a grocery store parking lot on a hot day with the windows closed; maybe worse. I could go on but; to sum it up; the biggest problems are HEAT; COLD and WATER. There are days that our air-conditioning is just not good enough to be safe for the transportation of animals.

An air carrier Captain reported pets being transported by the carrier are routinely mistreated by ground personnel.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

First day on IOE. Third leg. Vectors to a course to visually pick up the river for the River Visual 19. Just after those instructions we were asked to switch to the LDA Z. After passing the FAF and descending to the MDA we heard an 'Obstacle' aural warning. At this time we broke out of the clouds (unadvertised momentary layer). Checkairmen took controls and performed the GPWS escape maneuver. Momentary stick shaker. Now in visual conditions; obstacle/airport in sight we elected to land with no further incidents.Upon review; we did not catch an intermediate step down fix that was not loaded into the FMS causing us to descend below altitude.

An air carrier Captain flying the DCA LDA Z Runway 19 on IOE; apparently descended below the WEVPU fix altitude and momentarily responded to the EGPWS 'OBSTACLE' alert before becoming VMC and landing.


Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

While preflighting EMB-505; a Phenom 300; we discovered that the Emergency Brake accumulator pressure had bled down overnight and was showing zero (0). Normally this system indicates 2700-3000 psi (green range on the digital synoptic); and I have never seen it below that unless we intentionally bled the system down to zero (0). Some background information on this: We are required to bleed the system every 15-days to check the hydraulic system; and this is an approved procedure in our AOM. When we do this; we disable both the Normal and Emergency Brake systems; including the Parking brake. Until an engine is started to restore pressure to the system we have no braking ability. Once the engine restores Emergency Brake accumulator pressure; the system holds the normal 2700-3000 range until it is intentionally bled down again.When I discovered the Emergency Brake pressure was zero I called Maintenance. They told me that 'they are known to do that from time to time' and that this was not a maintenance squawk. I told him that I had never heard of this and that I was under the impression the pressure had to be in the green. He challenged me to find something in our checklist that says that; so we agreed that I would call him back after I looked. I couldn't find any reference for the system at all in any AOM procedure; the POH; or the AFM. To my knowledge; there is no mention of it having to hold pressure or not in any of these documents; nor is there a Flight Operations Bulletin; AOB; Manufacturer's Guidance Letters; or any other guidance on this one way or another. However there is guidance in the MEL. The low pressure triggers an amber Crew Alerting System (CAS) Caution message; and the MEL indicates a 'NO DISPATCH' condition if this CAS message is present. There is wording to allow for crew actions that create this message to be excluded from the NO DISPATCH condition (the 15-Day Check; for example); but in this case that was not relevant. I had flown the plane the night prior; and the security seal that I placed on the airplane was still there when we arrived yesterday morning.I called the Maintenance Controller back and informed him that the MEL indicated this was a Grounding item; and that since there was no documentation that indicated that a pressure bleed-down was normal as he had suggested; that I would be sending in an Aircraft On Ground (AOG) squawk. At this point he told me that before I did that the Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) wanted to speak to me. The ACP said that the MEL only applied if the engines were running; that this was not a squawk; and that if I continued to disagree that this would be escalated to our Chief Pilot (CP). I told the ACP that I wasn't comfortable and to go ahead and escalate the issue. At that point they got off the phone and said they would call back once they got in touch with the CP. The ACP and Maintenance Controller called me back and said that this had been escalated to Director of Operations (DO) (who was not on the phone and there was no mention of whether or not CP had been informed) and that the Director of Operations had told me to go out and start an engine; check to see if the system held pressure with the engine running and if it quickly bled down after shutdown. I informed them both that I was not able to perform a maintenance procedure for them; but that I would be happy to perform the 15-day hydraulic check (which is almost identical to this) since that is an approved procedure in our AOM for crews to do. I also stated that my intention was to ground the airplane regardless of the outcome of the test; since a successful test didn't erase the fact that somehow the system lost pressure overnight. They did not agree with this but said that if it passed the test to call them back and we would go from there. After hanging up I began to make arrangements with the FBO to perform the test and my phone rang again. It was the ACP and maintenance Controller telling me to disregard the test; that it wasn't necessary if I was going write it up anyway. They said just send it in; and that's how the event concluded.Here are my concerns/questions:-I was told by the Maintenance Controller that this happens often and that it's normal. However; the MEL indicates that this should be a Grounding item. As best I can tell; the assertion that this is not a squawk is in direct conflict with the MEL.-In almost a year of flying the Phenom; I have never seen this. I have never even heard of it. I've picked up planes that had been sitting for several days and the emergency brake pressure was still well within the green range of 2700-3000 PSI. I asked the Maintenance Controller and ACP if this was a common occurrence; what was the root cause of it. They didn't know. If they don't know the underlying cause; how can they be sure that it isn't a squawk? How do they know this is 'normal?' -If this is really something that's happening frequently there should be written guidance that allows the plane to be flown when this happens (if they are correct that this isn't an abnormal condition); the MEL should be changed; or they should stop pressuring crews to fly it. At one point the ACP asked the Controller what the tolerance was for pressure bleed-down and the Controller said that there is no guidance at all; even in the Maintenance Manual (M/M). There is nothing to indicate that it should; or should not; hold pressure over an extended period of time; or how much pressure loss is acceptable.-I received significant pressure to fly the airplane after I brought the MEL guidance to their attention. The Maintenance Controller was polite and professional; but the ACP began pushing the instant he got on the phone. He told me 'this isn't a squawk' repeatedly; said that the MEL doesn't apply unless the engines are running (there is nothing I could find in the MEL that supports that statement); and suggested that the previous crew had done a 15-Day Check the night prior without any idea if that were true (it wasn't; I had flown the plane the night prior and had not done any check of the system).I'm concerned that there could be a serious safety issue lurking here. Nobody seems to know what's causing this issue; or if it could result in a total brake failure. At the very least; clear guidance should be provided so that crews aren't operating an airplane that the MEL indicates is not airworthy. Airline Transport Pilot.

Captain describes his efforts to explain to a Maintenance Controller and the Assistant Chief Pilot why their EMB-505 (Phenom 300) aircraft was not airworthy after he discovered the Emergency Brake accumulator had bled down to zero overnight. ACP continued to pressure pilot to accept aircraft as is; even after being informed the MEL language indicates a 'No Dispatch condition'. Pilot refused. Aircraft does not have Thrust Reversers.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I was working Local Control and Approach APREQed a VOR Runway 2 approach. I knew that this approach had had an issue several days earlier that Flight Check had checked and deemed to be within tolerance. I was watching the aircraft on the approach and at approximately a five mile final; the aircraft veered west of course and was no longer on the approach. I knew the aircraft was below the clouds doing this approach as practice IFR. I informed the pilot that he was west of course and he advised that he was correcting. I knew that the approach had been flight tested the day before and deemed appropriate but I still wanted to pay extra close attention to the approach. This approach; VOR Runway 2; into SGF has an issue. Aircraft veer west of course even though the approach should keep aircraft on the east side of the runway for the duration. This approach needs to be further investigated immediately! The approach has already locally been deemed unusable until further action is taken. I would recommend all controllers watch aircraft courses.

SGF Controller voiced concern regarding the accuracy of the VOR Runway 2 Approach Procedures; noting that even after a Flight Check aircraft appeared to veer West of the final approach course.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 7663

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On approach encountered Trailing Edge Flap malfunction. Complied with QRH and landed uneventfully Flaps 20. Normal Taxi in. [About a month later]; same scenario; same airport; same ship. This time we were unable to drive Flaps down via the alternate [procedure]. An uneventful Flap 1 landing was executed. [Another month later]; same scenario as [previous]. An uneventful Flap 1 landing was made. In the last two incidents the Alternate Flap Power circuit breaker was discovered popped.

B767 Captain reported he experienced trailing edge flap malfunctions on the same aircraft on three different flights about a month apart from each other.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

As I was towing Aircraft X from widebody spot XX to gate XX; I was approaching spot XX and the brake rider said 'Stop; stop right here.' The tower was late in telling us to hold at spot XX; thus causing me to push the brakes too hard bouncing the push out and tossing us about the cabin.The other Ground Service Technician that was in the push out with me; switched seats and finished towing the aircraft to the gate. I sustained facial injuries; a hand injury as well as cuts to my left leg and right knee. While towing to the gate the brake rider notified a CSM (Customer Service Manager).Better communication and being more careful while driving a vehicle with air brakes.

Ground Service Technician reported sustaining injuries after abruptly braking a tug while towing an aircraft to the gate.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

At 32;000 ft. I observed the right engine VIB (Vibration) gauge spike from .2 to 1.4 trending toward the yellow caution range along with an accompanying vibration in the floorboard. The First Officer and I reviewed the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) for abnormal engine fan VIB indication and realized that if such conditions worsened that an intentional engine shut down may be needed. I contacted the flight attendants and asked them if they noticed anything different in the cabin and the aft Flight Attendant said it was exceedingly loud with a stronger than usual vibration coming from the right side of the aircraft. I notified Center Control that we would request Runway XX as a straight in approach due to an abnormal engine indication but that both engines were still producing power and no [priority handling] was needed. Upon arrival in ZZZ; we were met with ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) equipment and personnel and taxied to the gate without incident.

CRJ Captain reported excessive engine vibration in cruise that resulted in a precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I have just been informed by [Company] that during an internal AIMS audit; the company discovered that the crew scheduling rule in the AIMS system which impacts three FAA regulations was inadvertently turned off. As a result; I may have exceeded: 14 CFR 121.471(a) resulting in flying in excess of 30 hours in a 7 day period. Due to the complexity of our operations throughout the world; I suggest keeping all FAR 121; 117; domestic and international operations separate from each other and flown by a set of dedicated crew members. This allows us to better monitor our own schedules and help prevent this kind of error in the future.

Captain reported notification by company audit department of FAR Flight Time violation due to company monitoring system error.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Total 493; Flight Crew Type 225

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Changed pattern from Runway 2 to Runway 14; we were already on base by then for Runway 14. Approach setup was fine; we entered the flare fine; landed and then immediately heard the left tire screeching. The student had locked up the left brake. I tried taking controls and pushing on the right rudder; however he was overpowering me. So we ended up skidding off the runway to the left. We did a ground loop and came to a stop. The prop luckily never struck the ground; and the tires were still inflated by the end of it. I quickly shut down the aircraft and shut off the fuel following. Tower asked if we needed assistance; and I said yes.Something that can be done to prevent this is to really make sure to look at your student's setup getting into the plane; ensure that the student has his/her seat adjusted properly and cannot lock his/her leg into place. We were also given strictly a touch and go; so in our case we should have just stuck with a 'Go around'; or 'Low approach'. Something that I can do better as an instructor is to really harp on brakes; and proper foot placement on the rudder. I already use 'Heels on the deck' for takeoff; and can also use it again on landing.

PA-28 instructor pilot reported the student lost directional control on the landing roll after locking up the left brake.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 8

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working the R-side on Sector XX. I had an Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y both on frequency at the same time; both landing at LAS. I was not aware of the similar sounding call signs. I gave Air Carrier X a decent clearance to cross an intersection at FL160 250 KTS. Air Carrier Y took the clearance and began descending from FL310. I did not catch this until I saw Air Carrier Y about a mile inside my airspace descending out of FL298. I instructed Air Carrier Y to maintain FL290 and reissued the descent clearance to Air Carrier X. I believe Air Carrier Y began its descent while he was still in another centers airspace.I recommend that the airlines adjust their call signs so they are not so similar or space out these flights numbers so that they are not in the same area at the same time.

Similar sounding call signs caused the wrong aircraft to begin a descent in another Centers airspace.


Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

In-flight; while in smooth air with a good ride; cruising at flight plan FL270; CA observed and verbally communicated to the FO a deep auto-throttle reduction to approximately 50% N1. As a precaution CA turned on the seat belt sign believing this throttle movement might be associated with unstable air. With FO as pilot flying; aircraft encountered the first vertical jolt. On first impression and without any warning other than the throttle movement; the turbulence initially felt like wake turbulence. However; it persisted and the ride rapidly degenerated into a series of waves; some moderate and some severe with short windows of relatively calmer; manageable air for the next 40 minutes of flight. Upon the first sudden onset with this turbulence the CA commanded the flight attendants to take their seats immediately over the PA system. The cockpit crew asked for an altitude change to FL310 and repeatedly asked ATC for guidance of ride reports and a smooth altitude. ATC may not have understood or may not have had any information to give; in either event no useful information was forthcoming. The climb clearance to FL310 was accompanied by a frequency change where the next controller indicated higher altitudes were worse including moderate turbulence at FL340 from an aircraft approximately 160 miles ahead of us. The turbulence remained as we got close to FL310 and with rides ahead and higher appearing no better we asked for FL290 seeking relief from often severe jolts which sent the aircraft into the overspeed (red) A/S tape a few times in spite of having autopilot and auto throttles engaged throughout. I opted to descend to open up the 'A/S window' rather than attempt higher altitudes given the dismal ATC reports at higher altitudes. [Over the next 40 minutes] we sought relief from these continuous moderate; sometimes severe turbulent horizontal and vertical jolts between FL270 and FL340; to no avail until exiting the system near ZZZZZ. I had limited ability to obtain information from the cabin crew though I knew via interphone communication with my purser as well as from the aft cabin that I had at least 2 FAs hurt; one with a shoulder injury and another who was reported unconscious for a few minutes after having her leg pinned by a cart. Subsequently; the latter was reported conscious and in a jumpseat with leg abrasions. Control of the aircraft and ATC communication as well as the pandemonium in the passenger cabin throughout the 40 minutes of turbulence restricted my ability to assess and comprehend the totality of conditions in the cabin. Both cockpit crew members who started the event in the bunks were assisting the cabin crew. For a large part of the turbulence encounter; movement through the cabin was restricted and during periods when they could move they were clearing broken glass; plates; food; and carts that had in some cases; contacted the ceiling. Only after departing the turbulent airspace was I able to really begin assessing with my copilots conditions in the cabin. Those conditions and crew injuries along with increasing reports of passenger injuries made me believe a divert was probable. The FO flew the airplane and prepared SELCAL/oceanic entry as we proceeded. I SATCOM called Dispatch to ask for assistance with any ability they might have to assess real time airframe or engine parameters for exceedances on the aircraft. While that conversation was inconclusive; my suspicion was that the airframe may have exceeded g limits and could have sustained damage. I was most reluctant to continue an oceanic crossing considering injured crew members and passengers; passenger service concerns; and finally; possible airframe damage. I indicated to the Dispatcher that given the totality of circumstances; I wanted to divert; probably to ZZZZ with his concurrence. I requested him to explore all weather resources and send me a route that would minimize returning through the turbulence we had endured. Once the route was received from Dispatch (absent the altitude I had requested) we notified ATC of our intent to divert to ZZZZ via that route for medical emergency and overweight landing. The preparation; request; and receipt of this ATC clearance required much more time than I hoped. Assigned FL350 for oceanic crossing; ATC assigned FL360 for the divert. We rejected that level based on aircraft performance. They then assigned FL320. We accepted this level and reaching that altitude were cleared to turn on the prescribed route to ZZZZ. The balance of the flight involved many communications with queries from Dispatch; company; and ATC concerning crew/passenger needs/conditions... some duplicate requests. We ran overweight landing checklist for a landing at 493k lbs. Landed uneventfully. Gentle touchdown in visual weather conditions. Lots of medical and media at gate on arrival. To my knowledge; 12 passengers and 3 flight attendants received medical assistance... the most serious a fractured neck vertebrae and in another case; a fractured shoulder. Aircraft exhibited visual physical damage between the engines and wing roots 2 - 3 ft. aft of the leading edge on the underside of each wing. Skin was wrinkled at repetitive intervals every 18 - 24 inches. Logbook was completed and aircraft returned to ops/maintenance who indicated foreign authorities would want to review cockpit voice and data recorder. I responded that I had not taken any action with either and the aircraft was theirs to do as they wished. The crew left the airport with requests from the media which we declined. Suggestions: Subcontracted weather services like WSI are completely inadequate compared to a meteorology department whose services could be incorporated into the flight planning/dispatch system. Reports of extreme weather over the area were recurrent in the period during and after this event. However; I did not have access to this information. I believe this event is a result of a failure in the flight planning/dispatch system.

Aircraft encountered severe turbulence 1 1/2 hours after takeoff. I was Relief Pilot on break in the crew bunk. Severe/moderate turbulence lasted approximately 30-40 minutes. When I was able; exited the crew bunk and assessed the cabin; cabin crew injuries; and passenger injuries; relayed information to cockpit via interphone. I was asked to come to the cockpit to assist with communications during the diversion to ZZZZ. Due to the condition of the cabin; the injuries to 4 cabin crew and 12 passengers; decision made to divert. Landed overweight 7 1/2 hours after takeoff.

B777 flight crew reported encountering severe turbulence on a international flight that resulted in injuries to cabin crew and passengers; as well as overstress damage to the aircraft. Reporter was critical of weather forecasting resources available to him during flight planning.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Nearing top of descent; the ISFD quit and displayed OUT OF ORDER. Descent began and passing approx 12;000 feet; received call from cabin that they smelled smoke. The smell was of a burning smell; similar to burned popcorn. It was prevalent in rows 10-14. I confirmed that no smoke was actually present just the smell.  We adjusted the packs cooler and the smell dissipated. We had [Runway] XXL in the FMS and received a change to [Runway] XXC. While trying to load [Runway] XXC into the box we found that both FMSs would only show [Runway] XXL and no other approaches would populate on the arrival page. We then received another call from the cabin reporting that the burning smell was back but no smoke present. With the ISFD having quit; the FMS anomaly suddenly present; and more burning smell present; began to think we had a melt down of some sort going on in the E & E compartment. [Advised ATC] stating we wanted [Runway] XXL since we couldn't as yet make out the field through the scattered clouds below us and couldn't select any other approach. Fire trucks gave us a once over and followed us to the gate. Kept the flaps at 40 just in case an evac was necessary if smoke began to fill the cabin. Burning smell persisted on the ground to the gate but no smoke was present. Had pulled the Smoke; Fire; Fumes Checklist out but I decided the most prudent and efficient act was to land ASAP and elected not to execute this checklist while on an accelerated final approach with no smoke present in the cabin. No FA or passenger needed medical attention. We never smelled smoke or a burning smell in the cockpit.Post flight maintenance found a bad light ballast in the vicinity of rows 10-13.  The ISFD failure and FMS anomaly were apparently unrelated but had occurred rather simultaneously.With more time; say if we'd been at altitude; the Smoke; Fire; Fumes checklist could have isolated the problem and may not have led to the interpretation of a more serious situation possibly developing.

B737 Captain reported a cockpit display failure with an unrelated simultaneous cabin lighting ballast failure resulting in a precautionary landing due to suspected electrical fire.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 380; Flight Crew Type 240

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After returning to Grand Forks from a cross country flight; I requested a long landing to allow my student to practice a soft field landing. ATC put us on extended downwind to allow the aircraft behind us to land first; and then cleared us for 17R behind them. While on approximately a one mile final for 17R the ADS-B indicated a traffic alert directly behind us; at very close proximity and at the same altitude. I initially thought this was a false return of our own aircraft. I turned around to visually verify the traffic warning and saw another C172 through the rear window that appeared very close and on glide path; which appeared to be overtaking us. Due to the close proximity of the aircraft; I took the flight controls from my student and aborted the approach by executing a climbing right turn to a heading of west. I immediately informed ATC of my deviation. Upon receiving my transmission; ATC spaced us in front of another aircraft on downwind; which in my opinion never caused any danger of an additional traffic situation; as we had the aircraft in sight shortly after the turn. ATC informed us that overtaking aircraft had been doing a low approach; which seemed to fit with what I had seen out the window. From what I recall hearing on the radio; the other aircraft (also a FBO aircraft) was doing an instrument approach to terminate in a missed approach. The other aircraft; which would have been following FBO procedures as well; would have been flying at 90 KTS on the approach; while we were on a VFR final approach at 63 KTS with full flaps. I was not able to determine if the other aircraft had us in sight; but at that moment; I felt that the other aircraft was in danger of overtaking us and colliding with our aircraft. I did not feel that there was sufficient time available to query ATC about the aircraft; so I elected to take evasive action to prevent what I thought was an imminent collision.

C172 instructor with student is advised of traffic close behind during approach by ADS-B and elects to go around. The traffic behind had been cleared for a low approach and apparently had the reporter in sight.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Prior to engine start during push back; the flight attendants called and reported a 'chemical smell or dirty sock smell.' We elected to terminate the push back and were pulled back into the gate. We turned off the packs and the APU bleed air. We deplaned the passengers and crew and accomplished the QRH for smoke odor/fumes. While exiting one passenger began having symptoms of nausea and vomited. We called Paramedics. After deplaning 2 FAs began having headaches and paramedics treated them in the terminal. No one was transported to the hospital.

Captain reported Flight Attendant notification of 'chemical or dirty socks' smell during pushback for departure. Crew returned to gate for Maintenance. Deplaned with a passenger and two flight attendants experiencing health issues.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After landing; we used mostly reverse thrust to slow the aircraft and exited the runway. We had to use only minimal braking to stop the aircraft at the gate. However; when the main cabin door opened; the rampers came up and told us to look at the wheels (on the aircraft left side) because they were smoking. I went outside to look and saw that the wheels were in fact smoking. Based on previous experience with a brake overheat issue that nearly resulted in a fire; and because I thought it was the safest course of action; I preemptively called ARFF to come to our gate. We also made a phone call to Dispatch to inform them of the situation. The passengers deplaned normally during this time. The smoke was not thick enough to be readily noticeable to passengers; nobody became alarmed. After the firefighters arrived; they determined that the brakes did not overheat as we suspected; but rather some sort of fluid (hydraulic fluid) had dripped on the brakes and was evaporating visibly. The firefighters measured a brake temperature of only 140 C. They left and maintenance showed up. They determined that there was a hydraulic leak in the nacelle; above the wheels. The aircraft was written up and handed over to maintenance.

Dash 8 Captain reported ramp personnel spotted smoke in the brake area after parking at the gate. Cause of the smoke was determined to be hydraulic fluid leaking onto the brake area.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Shortly after rotation; while the First Officer was retracting the gear; we felt a shudder in the right engine. It continued to produce full power; but shortly thereafter started to produce only partial power. I then took over the flight controls and ran through the Engine Failure after Takeoff flow. The right engine regained full power after the aux pump was selected to high. After climbing through 1;100 feet MSL; the First Officer ran through the QRH. We elected not to shut down the engine; as it was still producing power. I elected to set 'single engine cruise'/normal climb power as we flew the regular left traffic pattern back to [departure airport]; as that seemed to produce the most stable power throughout our return to the airport. I then ran the normal In Range and Before Landing flows and checklists. The right engine did start to run rougher on short final; most likely due to the high aux pump setting; but we were able to maintain control and the appropriate approach and landing speeds and land safely. Upon landing rollout; the right engine quit; but we were able to continue a taxi off the runway; then safely to the gate.

C402 flight crew reported returning to departure airport following an engine issue.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While scanning boarding guests; I overheard that one had allegedly left her laptop in the bag that was checked at the gate. I immediately approached the guest and she confirmed. I notified the [flight crew] ASAP; while the passenger spoke to a ramp personnel who happened to be in the jet bridge at the moment. When a Gate Agent came by; I informed her as well. However she was quite reluctant and showed little enthusiasm in retrieving the luggage. The same [Gate Agent] had been quite 'pushy' in starting the boarding process; although she did not ask me whether the minimum crew were on board and the temperature were safe to board; not taking into consideration that it was still not [time to board] and the flight was not full. I suspect the boarding agents did not ask the vital question; whether the guest had any devices with lithium battery in the bag they were checking. The guest admitted she was not asked the question; however she was a bit 'frazzled'. The Captain ran down the ramp and did everything he could to locate the bag in an expeditious manner!On behalf of all airline crews who are enclosed in the flying tubes with - at times - no opportunity to do emergency landing; and in the light of the recent fatal fires on foreign carriers; I beg [gate agents] to pay more attention to the type of the issue - rather than just rush to board & close the door ASAP; as safety should be paramount!

Flight Attendant reported passenger inadvertently checked baggage containing laptop with batteries installed.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Arriving at the aircraft we learned the yaw damper was inoperative and the aircraft was being operated under MEL 22-X-XX relief. I reviewed the requirements of the provisos of the MEL and discussed it with the First Officer. During the crew briefing with the Flight Attendants; I informed them of the MEL and inoperative yaw damper and advised they may feel a difference in the rear of the aircraft as a result. I continued that this was the first time I operated the B-737 with an inoperative yaw damper and was unsure of how significant a difference they would notice.We discussed the weather and the existence of a turbulence plot; but Dispatch had filed us with ample fuel and at an altitude below the tropopause. They were informed that if the ride did get bumpy; sit immediately and do not wait for us to tell them; but we would communicate with them about any adverse conditions we were informed about as far in advance as possible.During climb to FL300; the flight was normal and without incident. We encountered an occasion light bump and noticed the lack of yaw damper operation was immediately apparent. After reaching FL300; approximately two to three minutes later; the aircraft encountered moderate turbulence. The response from the aircraft was shocking. The tail began to yaw dramatically left; then right; then left. The resulting yaw induced a significant and severe 'Dutch roll'. The First Officer (PF) instinctively disconnected the autopilot; and attempted to control the aircraft. Seeing the severe yawing and accompanying Dutch roll; I instructed him to immediately re-engage the autopilot to prevent Pilot induced oscillations and possible loss of control.I made an immediate PA for the Flight Attendants (FA) to take their seats; contacted Center; advised that we were in moderate turbulence and operating with no yaw damper and the aircraft's reaction to the turbulence was unacceptable. ATC issued a descent to FL280. We leveled at FL280 and had another severe Dutch roll encounter. We sought and received another descent to FL260. Leveling at FL260; I instructed the First Officer to maintain a speed of 280 KIAS or less and be prepared for more turbulence. I then called the Flight Attendants on the service interphone. Both FA's (front and back) were on the interphone and were extremely shaken by the event. The B or C Flight Attendant on the line sounded almost panicked. She stated service items were tossed about; but they were able to get into a seat and were uninjured but Passengers were getting sick; and were terrified.I made a PA to the Passengers explaining that we had encountered clear air turbulence; to keep their seats with their seat belts securely fastened and that the Flight Attendants would be remaining in their seats as well.The aircraft handled much better at the lower altitude; but a subsequent descent to FL240 was required later to keep the aircraft manageable. I used ACARs to request voice contact with our Dispatcher. Voice contact was established and I informed our Dispatcher that it was our intention to continue but if we encountered ANY more severe yawing/Dutch roll we would be diverting immediately. The Dispatcher initially was confused and asked if we encountered severe turbulence. I explained that it was moderate turbulence; but a severe reaction by the aircraft to that turbulence. It was agreed that the Dispatcher would keep a listening watch on down line frequencies to monitor our progress. Eventually; the ride was smooth and the Flight Attendants were able to get a service out to the customers.Arriving at the gate; I was informed by the Flight Attendants that the flight was the worst they had ever experienced. They were still shaken by the event. As Passengers deplaned; numerous Passengers commented on their fear of the situation; but thanked us for getting them safely on the ground. Some of the Passengers had gotten airsick as well.In the future I will not accept an aircraft with an inoperative yaw damper if the possibility of adverse weather exists on the route of flight. I fully believed; as did the First Officer; that we were on the edge of departing controlled flight at least twice during the event. The apprehension of using manual rudder imputes without a yaw damper; possibly over controlling or experiencing PIO; leading to possible aircraft damage or upset is just far too real. I believe it is a real threat to safety operating an aircraft under this MEL when ANY adverse weather exists.

I received an ACARS for voice request from one of my airborne flights. We established contact and the Captain shared that the flight had to emergency descend to FL240 due to turbulence on climb out. He stated that they we're unable to physically type an ACARS message due to the turbulence they encountered and the reaction of the aircraft. The Yaw Damper was on MEL. He said the aircraft control was questionable. At the time of voice contact they had established more control of the aircraft- I asked if he wanted to divert he said no; however; if they encountered anymore turbulence we would divert to the nearest airport. I shared that rides down the coast along his route had no PIREP SIGMET plots. We established a plan as I monitored his progress to the frequency we would use or ACARS if they able to communicate that way.I checked in with flight 25 minutes later via ACARS and got PIREP. He made reference again to the lack of control of aircraft from before - in which I asked if SEV was the nature/ for inspection etc. and if the cabin crew was able to perform duty and well being of our passengers. He said the TURB was not SEVERE; but the reaction of the aircraft was with no Yaw Damper. Shared that the cabin crew was very scared and they stayed seated. We kept in communication via ACARS with ride reports along route; which all seemed to be handling much better - per Captain for the rest of flight. This flight landed without further incident.The leg prior the aircraft was flown on the reverse route at FL290 without issue. There were SIGMETS out at time of planning well to the West and not along planned route. This flight was late into my shift; and not one complaint or PIREP from any of my flights departing to the South. I put remark on the release stating that it was filed lower at FL300 due to MEL...and make sure tanker fuel was onboard so fuel would not be an issue. Around the same time of sending release; a SIGMET came out [the same area]. MOD FL270-FL330. I had no PIREPS or complaints from my flights departing; to cause any alarm to my flight planning nor did the flight crew check in for any flight brief or MEL concerns. This aircraft was routed for the MEL and Yaw Damper to be fixed.

B737-300 Captain reports being dispatched with an inoperative yaw damper and encounters moderate turbulence at FL300. The response from the aircraft was shocking with the tail yawing dramatically left; then right; then left producing a significant and severe 'Dutch roll'. Flight descends to a lower altitude and is able to continue to destination. The Dispatchers report is also included.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 3275; Flight Crew Type 873

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were in CE750 aircraft flying under FAA part 91 into BIKF for a fuel stop. At our arrival time weather in BIKF showed: winds from 150 at 25G36; light rain; few clouds at 1;800 FT; broken 2;400; temp 3C and altimeter 28.82 inches. Transition level FL60. On our descent from FL340 to FL200; we completed [the] Descent Checklist and turned ON ALL anti-ice (A/I) systems in the aircraft to get surfaces heated up for cold; rainy weather down below. Leaving FL200 to 6;000 FT; we were given altimeter setting of 977mb; which I/SIC set in the standby altimeter. As we were cleared for descent from 6;000 FT; we set our altimeters to 29.82in. While descending from 4;000 FT to 2;000 FT as cleared by ATC; they gave us final left turn to intercept the localizer and also cleared us for the ILS 20 approach. I noticed that even though the FAF glideslope intercept altitude to ILS20 was 2;400 FT; ATC had cleared us to 2;000 FT. But I considered that as their standard practice and as long as we are on the approach they will provide the obstruction clearance. We also noticed that the Left Engine A/I cold CAS message was still amber; while all other A/I cold messages had come and gone away. Furthermore; when I tried to compute landing speeds on the FMS; I got a message stating that the crosswind component is outside of limits (of 21 KTS). PIC and I discussed that given there were not other safer and/or practical airports to land; that the weather around the entire Iceland area was similar; we had no choice to safely land the aircraft. We also briefly discussed the Left Engine A/I cold CAS message and decided to keep an eye on the instruments and aircraft performance. By this time; we could see the ground (water) below us; we knew that we must be getting below the ceilings and should be visual on the runway for short final approach. However; as we were continuing our descent to 2;000 FT; at 2;400 FT MSL (indicated altitude in our PFDs); we got a call from ATC stating to check our altitude because they got an altitude alert and they show us at 1;300 FT MSL. We immediately looked at our altimeters and realized that they were set to 29.82 instead of 28.82.We climbed to correct altitude of 2;000 FT MSL; although our altitude showed 1;250 FT when set to correct altimeter before we started our climb back to the assigned altitude. After correcting that mistake; approach was continued and completed in successful landing. We were questioned by the Tower while taxiing about the altitude and we told them it was related to altimeter mistake. They responded with 'Thank you' and no further actions were taken by ATC or by pilots related to the altitude deviation incident.

CE750 First Officer reported descending below charted altitude in IMC on approach to BIKF because the altimeter was mis-set by 1 inch of mercury. ATC called the flight when they received a low altitude alert.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Training in progress on Local; I was the OJTI. Aircraft X landed runway 28R; and my student instructed Aircraft X to exit taxiway Foxtrot hold short of Runway 28L and remain this frequency. Aircraft X gave an incomplete readback of hold short instructions. My student corrected the pilot and then Aircraft X gave a complete and accurate readback of hold short instructions. My student then cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on runway 28L. As I was watching the situation develop; it appeared that Aircraft X was getting very close to the runway; at which point I jumped in and canceled the takeoff clearance for Aircraft Y twice; to be sure the pilot heard it. As Aircraft Y was decelerating; Aircraft X was about halfway through crossing runway 28L. Aircraft X was then issued the Brasher warning.

MYF Local Controller Instructor reported of a runway incursion and ground conflict because of an aircraft that crossed halfway onto the runway while a departure aircraft was told to stop twice. The crossing aircraft read back hold short instructions.


Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working alone on Turkey. We were split with Raider-ultra high. Because of this the traffic wasn't heavy; but due to the circumstances; it was abnormally task-complex. We had Lancer active in low up to 260; an aircraft that had just left Lancer split between my altitudes and Raider; as well as another entering my altitudes and Lancer. At the same time I had a SJT arrival that INK/LEE wanted turned out for their MAF departure. I also had a flight of two re-fuelers coming from INK/LEE that were breaking up and an aircraft coming from BGD-L trying to descend into CVS-A who couldn't hear me. The aircraft of subject was a BE30 landing MAF who I have a PD descent to FL240 and handed off to LBB-L and switched. This is obviously where I dropped the ball; becoming consumed with the other tasks happening relatively at the same time while dealing with bad rides and poor frequencies. I lost focus until the BE30 had already crossed 61/82's boundary; at which point I called and pointed him out. I have long felt that unless the traffic volume is incredibly heavy; it's much more advantageous to have a D-Side than have the ultra high sector open. For issues such as this; a D-Side to make/take calls is much more effective; where the coordination can be alleviated off the R-Side. That being said; much of this came on quickly so it would've been hard to anticipate such events to accumulate at once. If I had any suggestions for myself or supervisors it'd be to recognize when complex issues are rising and add a D-Side rather than have an ultra high sector open on a normal traffic volume afternoon; especially one with issues like we had today with poor frequency reception on both ends and bad rides; resulting in more frequency congestion by the R-Side; tying up time needed to coordinate.

ZFW Controller experienced an airspace infraction when internal coordination requirements increased the workload significantly; the reporter arguing that a D-Side would be more helpful than 'splitting' the sector.


Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Parked at gate waiting for jetway. I was told by ground personnel that the jetway driver hit the engine. I didn't see any damage and did not write anything up because the local ops people said they have maintenance coming to check to be sure.

A319 Captain was informed after parking that the Jetway may have made contact with the left engine at it was maneuvered to mate with the aircraft. No damage could be detected but Maintenance was called.


Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was the Pilot Flying. Level at FL 340 nearing the TED VOR (ANC) when the Pilot Monitoring and I noticed a large white balloon at out 2 o'clock position within 1/2 mile laterally from us on our right and what appeared to be about 200 feet above us. The balloon was very large similar to a weather balloon with a large device suspended below it about 20 feet. The suspended device was attached via three connections and was viewed with enough detail that the size was rather large. It could have been closer; but at 450 knots ground speed it all happens rather quickly. Can't image what would occur if that we would have made contact.  A report to ATC was made via VHF radio call to the Controller. Transponders should be affixed to these devices when there are in the upper airway structure so that ATC can maneuver aircraft around them.

An air carrier at FL340 near TED in ZAN airspace flew with half a mile and 200 feet of a very large balloon with a large device suspended beneath it.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 135; Flight Crew Type 120

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was a pilot on the ground in Battle Creek Park approximately 1 mile east of STP. I noticed a drone hovering on the base leg VFR approach to Runways 13 and 14 due north of my position and at the same altitude that a R44 helicopter was operating that day. This is not a good place to be operating a drone. I've flown this approach to STP in the past in a helicopter; and I don't want to hit a drone coming into land at STP. The R44 helicopter I saw was lower than the drone was today.

Private pilot observing from the ground; reports a NMAC between an R44 helicopter and a drone during a visual approach to Runway 13 or 14 at STP. The drone was hovering near the base leg of the VFR traffic pattern and 100 feet above the helicopter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Total 9701; Flight Crew Type 9701

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Numerous B737 aircraft have dirt and debris that cover the Fire Control and Radio panels in the cockpit. Whenever a maintenance Logbook write up is made; the action is deferred and not done. I have sent images and emails to the CEO; System Chief pilots; Chief pilots; Assistant Chief pilots; etc over the previous months and the cockpits are still not being cleaned. [Affected components]: Flight Deck Displays. Instruments. Airworthiness [concerns].

A pilot reported numerous company B737s had dirt and debris accumulation that covered the Fire Control and Radio panels in the cockpit. Logbook write-ups resulted in Maintenance deferrals with Flight decks still not being cleaned.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

On the ACCRA SID out of MKE after 10;000 feet; we indicated 300K.  When Center said we could resume normal speed we then saw on chart that 250 knots was the speed.  We both checked and talked about the SID before pushback and did not see speed restriction. The 250 speed restriction needs to be easier to notice.

The flight crew of an air carrier twin jet departing MKE on the ACCRA RNAV SID failed to note the restriction to maintain 250 knots until advised by ATC. They cited the format of the chart as a contributing factor.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Number One engine outboard side mount was written up for failed Drift Check.  Mechanic changed mount bracket and attaching hardware only.  Other side mount assembly components were not taken out of the box and changed as required.  The task was accomplished during Routine Overnight Maintenance (RON) and completed on the next shift.  Incoming Lead Mechanic put supposedly all removed engine side mount components on Supervisor's Review cart after asking outgoing Lead Mechanic if those were the old parts which he confirmed.   It was determined that [some] parts were not changed out as required when one Supervisor reviewed parts for turn-in/ repair.  Note: Another Supervisor previously signed turn-in rotable for old parts that still had the new parts in the box. The Task of changing the engine mount was written up as a discrepancy as part of a scheduled engine removal and re-install on a weekend aircraft project. Maintenance Control was notified and Chief Inspector was consulted for any and all actions to be taken at the time of discovery. [Recommend] all Maintenance personnel should be reminded that any parts replaced on an aircraft requires complete removal of assembly and turned in as a complete assembly at the time the maintenance action has started.  Maintenance personnel should ensure that any sign-offs for removal and replacement of assembled components are actually complied with (example all new parts taken out of box and old ones immediately turned in). [Improper Maintenance noticed] after aircraft dispatched.

After realizing that a #1 Engine mount change was only partially completed on a DHC-8-100 aircraft that had already departed; an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) recommends that all Maintenance personnel should ensure that any sign-offs for removal and replacement of assembled components are actually complied with.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Flying Electronic News Gathering we were sent up to near the state border to a very small town for a bank robbery. We launched almost immediately to go flyover the scene for the TV station. Before we departed I did not check for TFR's but did check weather considering I did turn down the flight earlier in the day for less than ideal flying conditions. We were over the scene for about 30 minutes and judging by the seriousness of what took place I did maintain a higher than normal altitude but was limited to the ceilings of about 1;700 FT MSL at the time. Upon my return I was notified by a fellow pilot about the TFR and after I returned I checked the FAA website and the TFR was in place. I operate with a 496 Garmin GPS with TFR information and it showed nothing in the vicinity and this feature has not let me down in the past. I was surprised not only by the nature of the TFR; its' location; and not showing up on the GPS that it existed at all. I will from now on make sure I check for TFR's before each flight and not rely on the GPS for that information.

Helicopter pilot reports discovering after landing that he had been operating in a TFR. A 496 Garmin GPS with TFR information was in use during the flight and did not show the TFR.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

When we exited the runway onto Taxiway Lima going east bound. Ground Control instructions were to give way to an MD88 and hold short of Ramp X. We gave way for the MD88 continued down Lima and held short of Ramp X. While holding short of Ramp X a 757 crossed our path into the ramp; at this point we were not aware of any other traffic nor saw any other aircraft. At that point we called Ramp told them we were holding short of Ramp X for the gate. Ramp Control came back and told us to taxi in left side to the gate. We then entered the ramp and taxied down towards gate. As we were waiting to get parked we sat there approximately 10 minutes when Ramp Control wanted us to call Ground. When we called Ground we were informed that she did not want us to contact ramp and taxi in; she wanted us to wait so she could get another aircraft in before us. She also instructed us that we are not to make that turn until she says so. It is common in other airports as you hold short of a ramp it is expected to call ramp on your own. If the controller would have added in her instruction to hold short of Ramp X and stay with her or hold short of Taxiway Sierra there would have not been any doubt as to not switch frequency and contact Ramp.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier taxiing to gate at ATL experienced confusion regarding frequency assignments involving Ground Control and Ramp Control.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight was dispatched and departed without a suitable alternate. Arrived at departure Ramp and a release was unavailable. Departure paperwork was available; scheduled departure time in an hour and fifteen minutes. At the airport there are only approximately 9 computer terminals available to review flight papers with multiple flights departing I was unable to get on a computer. Captain viewed paperwork and printed paperwork at approximately thirty-five minutes before departure. I reviewed paperwork concentrating on fuel and weather at departure field; destination and alternate. I also looked at departure NOTAMS before walking to the aircraft. I DID NOT REVIEW DESTINATION OR ALTERNATE NOTAMS. Captain asked both First Officers if we were comfortable with the fuel and if we had any questions. There were a total of 37 pages of NOTAMS; 4 pages for the Departure field; 18 pages for the destination and 15 pages for the alternate. Preflight; start; taxi; departure and enroute were all normal. At cruise I reviewed all destination NOTAMS; destination forecast and current weather. We continued to query Dispatch for updated destination weather via ACARS enroute. I had the last rest period; when returning to the Cockpit approximately 30 minutes prior to top of descent the Captain informed me that Dispatch had changed our alternate because it was NOTAMed closed. The current NOTAM system is UNSAT. It encourages pilots to speed read the NOTAMS while trying to decipher which NOTAMS are current; applicable and relevant to the flight. To read research and completely understand every NOTAM in 37 pages of NOTAMS would take several hours to do. If the only runway at a field is closed the NOTAM should NOT read that the runway is closed it SHOULD read that the field is closed. The Captain saw the runway closure NOTAM before departure but having never been to the alternate airport did not realize that was the only runway. In my opinion the NOTAM system is one of the highest threats to aviation safety. Provide the flight paperwork with sufficient time prior to departure for crews to review all information. If the paperwork is late pilot still need to do review it thoroughly even if it means a late departure.

Arrived at Operations; no dispatch release (checked for release online at the hotel also). Actually; everyone there was waiting for their release. Finally arrived 1 hour before scheduled push; we checked the weather; fuel and NOTAMs; our alternate a not far distant airport from the destination. NOTAMs (page 27 of 42 pages of WEATHER / NOTAMs) included Runway 09/27 closed. No one in my crew had been to that airport; so we had no idea that it only has one runway. Approximately 4 hours into the flight; we received an ACARS from Dispatch changing our Alternate. We were curious and began by re-reviewing the NOTAMs and now checking the AGC page of our EFB. It was at that point that we realized that Dispatch released us with an alternate that was closed. I never would have thought that Dispatch would release us using an Although the NOTAM was a bit cryptic; Dispatch should have been more aware of these airports they are using as alternates (especially since it is an airport we have scheduled service into). Dispatch needs to step up to the plate and give us reliable information in a timely manner. If a single runway airport has a closed runway; then the airport is closed; and should be annotated as such in the NOTAMs. Have Flight Releases ready for review more than the bare minimum time allowed; especially when there are 42 pages of weather and NOTAMs.

A crew became airborne on an international flight and realized that their alternate had only one runway which was closed. Error was due partly to the fact that there were 37 pages of NOTAMS for the entire flight.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While cruising at 27000 feet in icing conditions; both packs failed shortly after tail deicing was selected.  A descent to a lower altitude was initiated.  The packs resumed normal operations at about 16000 feet.  We had at this time exited icing conditions.  All deicing systems were engaged prior to the event and had been operating for about 20 - 25 minutes when failures occurred.  Engines were operating at normal power for flight at 27000 feet and 280 knots.  Cabin reached an altitude of 7000 - 7500; before pressurization was restored.  No abnormal deicing annunciators lights were observed until after pack failure.  I believe the pressurization flow annunciator was the only abnormal light on; as it should have been on.  Remainder of the flight was normal with packs on and anti-icing turned off.

MD-82 pilot experiences a dual pack failure at FL270 shortly after tail deicing was selected. A descent to a lower altitude is initiated and the packs return to normal operation passing 16;000 feet.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft was stopped at intersection X waiting to taxi to [Runway] XR. Last ground instruction was to use Taxiway E; but then was changed to follow company off right by different Controller. FO and I both missed transition to Taxiway F instruction. Controller said 'No big deal;' but it was clearly a pilot error in not understanding and reading back correctly the instructions. Day five of flying led to slight fatigue; coupled with change of ATC instructions leading to failure.

We were approaching ramp number [X] from the gate for departure.  Contacted Ground for taxi clearance.  They instructed us to proceed onto Taxiway Echo westbound to Runway YR; the rest of the transmission was difficult to understand.  We; instead; turned westbound on Taxiway Foxtrot. While I was trying to interpret what the second part of the transmission while I was starting the number one engine; a second Controller informed us of our error.  Lots of time compression and task loading along with part of the Ground Controller's transmission being difficult to understand.  The airport was busy; lots of aircraft simultaneously taxiing in and out with numerous 'stepped on' transmissions.  An additional 'additive condition' was the Ground Controller's transmission.  I believe a contributing factor was mask wearing in the Controller facility.  If this is true; they need to standardize what type of masks they wear and work harder to enunciate their syllables.

Air carrier flight crew reported turning the wrong way on taxiway due to not clearly understanding Controller instructions. FO stated controllers wearing face masks could have contributed to them not clearly understanding the clearance.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

When we plugged in Aircraft X was already on approach and another aircraft was orbiting about 7 miles north of BLH waiting for Aircraft X to finish the approach to continue parachute operations. A few minutes later the Supervisor walks over holding the phone and asking us to give Aircraft X a vector because 'Tower wasn't going to take him.' I had heard rumors that there was a Tower operating there; and that there had been an incident the day before where someone; not this facility; had broken off another [carrier aircraft] on approach and issued vectors below the minimum IFR altitude. So; when the Supervisor demanded for us to give a control instruction to [aircraft] I was initially confused as to why. The other aircraft was waiting for the approach to conclude and there was no other observed traffic in the area. I was never briefed that there was a facility operating at BLH; there was no Letter of Agreement; nothing. So; I under duress; and since the Supervisor was standing behind me demanding for me to 'give him something because Tower wasn't taking him' told my trainee to have '[Aircraft X] continue on the radials of the approach climb to and maintain 6;000 feet; upon reaching 6;000 feet direct...and hold as published.' When Aircraft X was holding at the fix after the trainee identified him and gave him a clearance to his next airport; I keyed up and advised the pilot that what had just occurred had been done by an unsanctioned facility and urged the pilot to call the Center and FSDO to file a report. My transmitting the advisory to Aircraft X was done out of concern for [aircraft]'s safety; as well as the safety of anyone else IFR or VFR landing at that airport. Brief the controllers if a new facility is operating in our airspace. Have a Letter of Agreement in place before operations commence.

ZLA Center Controller reported they were told by a Supervisor the Tower would not accept an aircraft on approach. The Controller was not aware of a Control Tower operating at this airport.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Air Carrier X Ramp Service in ZZZ took over the 'below the wing work' of Regional Operator X's aircraft. We have been trained and signed off to work ONLY ERJ-175 aircraft. No one in ZZZ ramp service has been trained; qualified and signed off by our Air Carrier Ramp Service Trainer to work CRJ or CRJ-700 (CRJ7) aircraft! In the June schedule; Regional Operator X's CRJ was scheduled and was [worked] by unqualified ramp service personnel and again on the [following day] there were four CRJ or CR7 aircraft that were scheduled and worked by untrained and unqualified ramp service personnel!I brought this issue to Ramp Supervisor X and told him no one is qualified to work that aircraft and should not have been touched by any ramp personnel. He said nothing and left the room. I brought up the same issue at the afternoon briefing on the [second day] with Supervisor Y and tried to explain that we were not qualified to work these CRJ and CRJ7 aircraft. Supervisor Y asked the crew if there was anyone qualified. Two people raised their hands saying that since they had worked the planes (even though they are not qualified and [not] signed off by our Air Carrier Ramp Service Trainer) they felt they were qualified. I tried to explain to Supervisor Y that no ramp service personnel were qualified and we could not work the planes. Supervisor Y then said 'Are you done?' Realizing that I could not possibly get my point across; I said; 'Yes; I'm done.'It is very difficult to argue your point with a Supervisor who summarily dismisses any safety concerns when brought up and would just not take a Lead Ramp Serviceman with 25 years ramp experience seriously. An hour or so later; a ramp service lead noticed that the crew working a CRJ or CR7 had hooked up the wrong towbar; and the towbar wasn't locked properly. This Ramp Serviceman saved that aircraft from very serious damage because he had worked these type of aircraft [at another airport]. Also; even later that evening; an ERJ175 aircraft that we are qualified to work; suffered an aircraft damage; taking a delay; rendering the Forward Cargo Compartment inoperable. What would have happened to the ramp crew if the damaged aircraft was a CRJ or CRJ7? Likely; Management would have gone through their records; saw that the two people involved were not qualified and signed off to work the aircraft and then fire them because they should have told management they were not qualified!

An Air Carrier Ramp Lead expresses his safety concerns and also describes his work environment where company ramp personnel are being assigned to work a Regional Operator's CRJ-700 aircraft that they are not qualified or trained on. Company Management have been unresponsive to his concerns for safe operations.