Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Departing from the gate to [the] runway all was normal with all checks being done. Once taking the runway the PF (pilot flying) took the controls and smoothly advanced the thrust levers. Once airborne he immediately trimmed the aircraft for climb feeling the aircraft responding and visually confirming it on the pitch trim indicator on the EICAS. At approximately 6 degrees pitch; we noticed a stoppage at 6 degrees and immediately after; the PITCHTRIM INOP EICAS message appeared. As the aircraft accelerated the PF felt aft forces too heavy to push forward so he asked for assistance from the PM (pilot monitoring). Upon the PM applying full forward force on the yoke; the PF reduced power to try and relieve pressure. A small pressure change was noted but still required on person with full force to maintain semi level flight and a non-full nose up pitching. Unable to continue with too strong of pressure on the yoke for PF; the PF conducted a positive control pass to PM and it was accomplished within standards to transfer to right seat to take the aircraft. This was done to also allow for immediate action to [advise ATC]. We ran the QRH which instructed us to use the backup trim which we used however worked intermittently. With the QRH complete we turned back to the airport to land. Approach was conducted using power adjustment to help with pitch control due to little to no pitch control with yoke due to forces. Successful landing was conducted with no further incidents. We were escorted by trucks back to the gate.

ERJ-145 First Officer; while conducting a flight systems check; reported loss of pitch trim authority.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Two Dangerous Goods (DG) cans loaded on aircraft in positions 1L & 2L; DG manifest page showed 432 LBS of class 2.2 along with other DG in container as accessible DG. FO was shown container in position 1L only and not shown container in position 2L which had only class 2.2. Fire extinguishing hose was not connected to position 2L container. Upon arrival DG specialist discovered and explained to crew that the additional position 2L had a portion of class 2.2 shown on DG Manifest due to a max weight limitation of class 2.2 per container. Referencing the DG position summary it shows 288 LBS of the 432 LBS of class 2.2 listed on the DG manifest was in a second container in position 2L.[Departure airport] DG specialist failed to present FO the second DG container in position 2L and failed to attach extinguishing hose to DG container in position 2LDG manifest does not indicate that there is/are one or more Accessible Dangerous Goods (ADG) containers; must rely on knowledge of container serial numbers on DG position summary to know if there is an additional DG container loaded.Indicate on DG manifest with a symbol that there are more than one ADG containers on board. Relying on FO and Captain to recognize container serial numbers on DG position summary is not reliable. If symbol on DG manifest this would help FO and Captain recognize that there are more than one ADG containers on board and question DG specialist if not shown second container.

A300 FO reported some dangerous good cargo was improperly loaded and the flight crew failed to catch the error.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 14575; Flight Crew Type 35

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The propeller turned slowly during starting but did start. All systems were good; alternator was charging and all instruments worked properly. Aircraft lights; radios and other electrical equipment were turned on and in use. Upon takeoff clearance and during the takeoff roll; I noticed static in my headset and dimming of the instrument back lighting. Upon climb out at about 100 to 150 feet AGL; the lights and systems began to flash and then there was a total loss of electric power. I was moments from entering the cloud layer and still had the ground and Tower in sight. I decided to make a hard 360 degree turn and returned to the runway I had just departed from. I had no radio contact with the Tower and did not receive a landing clearance. I could see that there was no aircraft on final or in a 'line up and wait' position. Upon landing I taxied to the first available taxiway at which time the electric systems came back on line. In discussion with an experienced Cessna retractable gear mechanic; I was informed that it was not that uncommon that when you have a low battery that the alternator will kick off when the gear pump is activated. This happens in take-off roll when the aircraft gets light and the 'squat' switch opens enabling the electric gear pump to build pressure for gear retraction. The pump being activated along with all the other electrical equipment puts a very big load on the alternator. The battery on the aircraft was inspected and found to have a dead cell. It was replaced and the aircraft was returned to service.

A C-172RG pilot returned to land immediately after takeoff because of an apparent loss of electrical which was later determined caused by a weak battery and the hydraulic pump starting at lift off in order to pressurize the landing gear retraction system.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215; Flight Crew Total 4499; Flight Crew Type 3069

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The chart for this approach [SBGR ILS Y Rwy 09R] really needs to be rewritten.  In my opinion; showing the missed approach procedures for [Runway] 9L is not necessary and a bit dangerous. I do not care what the other runways' missed [approaches] are. The write up about it should be deleted from the MISSED APCH box and the arrows in the plan view should be deleted. [Company] should get its own version of this approach plate with this changes made to it.

Reporter stated the approach in question is the SBGR ILS Rwy 09R.

Air carrier First Officer reported the SBGR ILS Rwy 09R approach chart is inaccurate and confusing.


Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

We were performing a post C-Check maintenance test flight on an MD-10-30 aircraft . During the test flight; during normal engine shutdown/restart procedures; the number one engine failed to relight. After several unsuccessful restart attempts; we performed the appropriate emergency checklists and at 70 miles north of our destination declared an emergency. We landed uneventfully.

During several attempts to relight and altiude changes for thicker air; all attempts to relight failed.

A DC-10-30's number one engine failed to relight after it was shut down on post C-Check maintenance test flight; so an emergency was declared followed by a normal landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 26; Flight Crew Type 26

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Winds were favoring Runway 16; all immediate traffic was using the same I called in 'Bend Traffic; Skyhawk [tail number]; holding short at Runway 16 student pilot;' when a yellow experimental had called in 'ahhh Bend Traffic experimental (tail number not remembered) turning right downwind 16' a helicopter called in '[helicopter tail number] experimental I'm on the downwind for 16; where are you?' the experimental did not reply.'Experimental [tail number] turning base on 16' a few moments passed when he comes in final on Runway 34 for a touch and go.'Experimental [tail number] touch and go Runway 16 for left; no right closed traffic' some traffic reports he's going the wrong way and he seemingly calls in a correction to assume the correct traffic pattern.He comes in and goes out of site. The helicopter lands; another plane comes in for final on 16 in the correct traffic pattern. The airplane calls in 'Bend traffic [tail number] clear the active''Bend traffic; experimental [tail number] turning right downwind for 16'I search around for surrounding traffic understanding I have ample time for a takeoff and assume the experimental has made his correction for the proper runway. All seems clear; 'Bend Traffic; Skyhawk [tail number] taking the active 16 for eastbound departure'Upon taking the runway I get to about halfway down and just as I'm pulling up; taxi lights are in view and it's a yellow experimental landing on Runway 34. I quickly pull-up; remembering that there may be right pattern traffic for runway 16; I check my left then quickly veer off to the east while making a call to advise traffic 'Bend Traffic; [tail number]; experimental is currently landing Runway 34'A few troubled aviators in the pattern chime in remarking about the actions of experimental and advising him that he's; once again; not using the correct runway as I departed east.

A Cessna 172 pilot reported an experimental aircraft was landing in the opposite direction.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Air Carrier XXXX was taxied to Runway 01L for departure; however; Ground Control passed the strip for Company Air Carrier YXYX. I loaded and departed Air Carrier XXXX using and receiving the call sign of Air Carrier YXYX in all read backs. Upwind; I noticed the aircraft execute a right turn vs. the left turn I was expecting. I asked Air Carrier YXYX what departure procedure he was on and was told the SFO8 (as opposed to the PORTE3 SID). Sensing I was given the wrong strip; I asked the flight crew to verify their call sign and destination; they informed me they were Air Carrier XXXX northbound not Air Carrier YXYX heading southwest bound. Both Ground Control and the Flight Crew should have noticed the discrepancy in call sign before reaching the runway. Listening to the read backs would've eventually tipped off the problem. Unfortunately; the aircraft responded to and read back the wrong call sign by the time they were on my Tower frequency.

A SFO Tower Controller had a confused departure event when the wrong strip; with incorrect routing information; was passed along to Local Control with the Flight Crew responding to and with the wrong call sign.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

RFO was PM while FO was in rest. RFO upon returning to cockpit for physiological break; noticed Alert 'LAT FUEL UNBAL'. By the time I looked; alert went away. After RFO was seated; alert returned. We selected fuel on systems display and noted Number 3 fuel tank with excessive fuel; believe approximately 3000 lbs+; relative to tanks Number 1 and 2. Also noted fuel FILL icon on display and switch on overhead panel on. Attempted to stop FILL by way of selecting MANUAL on fuel panel; than pushing Number 3 FILL switch. This had no effect. Reselected auto 2nd auto controller and no change noted in FILL valve position and fuel in Number 3 tank was increasing at a fast pace. Consulted the QRH for LAT FUEL UNBAL and moved Fuel system select switch back to Manual. Proceed to FUEL CROSSFEED DESIRED checklist. Opened Crossfeed for tank 1 turned pumps for tank 1 off. By this time fuel in tanks was approximately Number 1 13;000 lbs; Number 2 12;000 lbs; Number 3 19;000 lbs. While fuel in tank 1 seemed to stabilize; tank Number 2 continued to decrease and the difference to below 10;000 lbs. It appeared all tail tank fuel was being moved to tank Number 3. RFO reported later that he saw fuel in tank Number 3 as high as 20;000 lbs at some point. I discussed with the RFO that I wished to balance tank Number 2 and hope that it would help lower tank Number 3 if we could include tank Number 2 in the crossfeed. He showed concern about turning off fuel pump on tank Number 2 and we reviewed FUEL CROSSFEED DESIRED checklist and concurred that more than one tank could be crossfed according to QRH. We complied with QRH and when selecting tank Number 2 fuel pump off; Number 2 engine shutdown. At this point fuel issues were put aside and we dealt with ENGINE RESTART INFLIGHT. We reestablished that I would fly and deal with ATC while RFO ran checklist. We had been at FL380 and aircraft was unable to maintain altitude; so [advised ATC] and requested with ZZZZ control descent to FL340 which they agreed and shortly thereafter they requested we descend to FL320. RFO advised while reviewing the QRH that the Pratt & Whitney engine need to be at or lower than FL300 to affect an inflight restart. At this point; I directed the RFO to wake the FO and shortly thereafter; he returned to the cockpit. I requested FL280 and ATC approved. After passing FL300; I advised RFO to attempt start if within perimeters and we were; so he restarted Number 2 engine. Multiple alerts after the engine shutdown were dealt with as and when time allowed. After the engine was restarted; I delegated duties so I could call Operations via SELCOM while RFO (still in right seat) could be PF and FO could deal with remaining alerts. After consultation with Operations and Maintenance Control; we all agreed that landing at ZZZZ was both prudent and that no diversion was necessary. By this time we were handed to another control facility and shortly thereafter [advised ATC all was well]. Continued to ZZZZ landed Runway XXL without incident and taxied to gate without assistance. Conditions at ZZZZ with CAVOK as observed with good visibility and light winds.Great assistance from both RFO and FO. Would also add that ATC were very helpful; did not impede or hamper us while workload was high. I was very pleased that all these facilities did not contribute to our problems with unnecessary queries or clearances. Problem with Number 3 fuel tank FILL valve and attempt to balance fuel due to this problem created situation which caused problems leading to engine Number 2 flaming out. In debrief with crew; we went over very carefully events leading up to the failure of engine 2 to remain running. We believe we followed the QRH procedure as published. After engine Number 2 failed; our attention was directed away from the fuel issue and only revisited after engine Number 2 was restarted. At that point; fuel system had been returned to Auto and Number 3 FILL closed and fuel did rebalance. We did note; however; that the FILL on tank Number 3 did come on again for an indeterminate amount of time during the descent phase. One of many nuance faults after the engine shutdown was the failure of Number 2 engine HYD pumps to remain on when system controller was in auto. The pumps worked when HYD SYS elected to MANUAL but would turn off when in auto. I elected to leave sys in auto; accept the pumps off in cruise and expected that when SLATS were extended sys Number 2 would pressurize. It worked as expected. Failure of FILL VALVES in tank Number 3 was not a failure I have practiced nor expected from my training. The inability to control this valve may be an issue worth consulting with the system engineers who built it. Otherwise; this was a failure of the part that I did not have the resources at hand to fix. Regarding the engine shutdown; I wrote up the failure and at this point believe issues with the fuel system management contributed to this problem. Many lessons learned or re learned about managing a nonstandard event during flight. With three pilots on board; I wish I had brought the resting FO into the loop earlier to reduce work load and get further opinion on management of the problems.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-11 flight crew reported a lateral fuel imbalance which they troubleshot using the QRH and caused the #2 engine to shut down. They successfully restarted the engine and landed at the destination airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 2250

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During climbout from CGZ airport on a dual CFII flight we noticed a helicopter quickly approaching us at the same altitude from our left. They initially appeared to be flying away from us deviating to the right. I knew the right away rules said they should give way to us and I believed they were initially. Shortly after though I noticed they were continuing to fly toward us so I chose to quickly execute a rapid climb. I did not think it was safe to descend or turn away as we had mountains below us the helicopter was approaching us rapidly. I believe the helicopter passed 500 feet below us.

GA instructor pilot reported a Near Mid Air Collision with a helicopter and took evasive action to avoid it.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 31

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I had cleared Aircraft X for takeoff and he took a while to roll. I then cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff behind Aircraft X and was preparing to cross aircraft downfield. After I had cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff I was scanning my arrivals and departures and taxiing the aircraft that had landed. I saw an aircraft pass in front of me airborne and assuming it was Aircraft Y that I had cleared for takeoff; I began to cross Aircraft Z at Taxiway WJ; Aircraft A at Taxiway Z and Aircraft B at Taxiway Y. I then went to tell the departing aircraft to contact departure and noticed with my strip management that it was Aircraft X who was acquiring and that Aircraft Y was still cleared for takeoff on the runway.I then went to stop Aircraft Z; Aircraft A and Aircraft B to hold short of the runway. Aircraft Z did not read it back but Aircraft A said that they had already crossed the hold short line but had stopped. It appeared Aircraft A [was] short of the runway lines. I observed Aircraft B not to have moved and was coming back to get a read back from Aircraft Z to hold short of the runway. Aircraft Z had come to a stop but had crossed the hold short line but appeared to have stopped prior to entering the runway. I was observing and scanning everything to see what I could do to make sure it was the safest thing I could do in this situation and make sure everyone had stopped prior to the runway. Aircraft Z was calling Tower to let me know that they had stopped because they saw the departure.I should slow down a bit and double check my departure strips before crossing. Get a good read back of hold short instructions from aircraft who didn't answer.

A Tower Local controller reported they cleared three aircraft to taxi across a runway which they had cleared an aircraft to depart from.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On climb-out Engine 1 NAC (Nacelle) 300 degrees flashed. Also noticed Bleed Air High Pressure valve open on Engine 1. Output of Intermediate Pressure valve showed matched temp and PSI comparing Engine 1 and Engine 2. Leveled at FL250 per ATC. Engine 1 NAC message became constant. Reduced thrust on Engine 1 and NAC temp message went away with almost idle thrust. Suspected bleed air leak since low power was only way to keep NAC temp message off. Made decision to return to Airport ZZZ. Accomplished overweight landing checklist with estimated landing weight of 160;200 lbs. Uneventful landing with minimal sink rate. Had fire and rescue inspect Engine 1 for possible fire damage. No damage noted and taxied to gate. Maintenance personnel met plane and I wrote up Engine 1 NAC. Maintenance personnel told us not to write up overweight landing due to low sink rate on landing. I should have written up overweight landing according to checklist procedures. First officer did a great job flying the airplane and coordinating with ATC to expeditiously get plane to ZZZ while I coordinated with company through ACARS. All flight attendants did an excellent job of getting cabin ready for precautionary landing.Engine 1 High Pressure valve was stuck open causing NAC message and possible bleed leak.

A320 Captain reported returning to destination airport when they received a nacelle high temperature ECAM warning that was apparently related to a High Pressure bleed valve stuck open.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather

Upon arrival at ZZZ Maintenance notified us that there were multiple damaged fan blades in the number 1 engine. While we do not know when or how this occurred; we can only guess that it was due to snow/ice ingestion on takeoff roll; improper de-icing and inspection of engine inlets prior to engine start; or de-icing prior to takeoff. While there was no active precipitation; upon arrival at the aircraft; the crew noted snow and ice on the aircraft to include in the engine inlets. Per [company] procedures; after the doors were closed; before blockout; the crew call Ramp to have engines cleared. The clearing crew showed up. The Tug Driver noted them moving around the aircraft and appeared to be clearing engines. They left shortly thereafter; and we confirmed with Ramp Tower that the clearing and inspection had been logged complete. After push back onto taxi; we noted that the taxi lane had not been completely plowed. There was a large snow berm; approximately 2 ft. high about 10 ft. left of centerline; which converged toward centerline all the way until Taxiway XX. After some discussion with Tower and the Pushback Crew; we opted to have plows come and clear an area in front of us; that they could pull us to clear of the berm before engine start to avoid ingestion. Engine start was slow; even for Pratt & Whitney; but no starter or engine limitations were exceeded. N1 started around 20-25%; well below the 40% limit. After engine start anti-ice was turned on due to temp/dew point spread. We taxied on cleared pavement to the de-ice area. The taxi took less than 15 minutes so no engine clearing was used. During de-ice we noticed B777 push back out of a gate on [taxiway XX]. It was pushed back through a berm of snow and ice. After de-ice we taxied and took off after this B777. It is possible that the B777 had some snow/ice on its trucks that was deposited on the runway on takeoff. From de-ice; we taxied to Runway XX. The turn from Taxiway XY onto Taxiway XZ could have been cleared of snow better; but the turn was made using minimal thrust. It is possible that some compact snow or ice was ingested here; however; once cleared for takeoff; we did a 30 second engine clearing procedure and all engine instruments appeared normal. After takeoff; the Captain mentioned a rumble; which sounded like it was coming from a pack. It was faint enough; that we didn't feel it was an issue; as all packs checked out normal. Later on climb out the number 3 engine EVM fluctuated up to 5.0; then back down to normal ranges only slightly above the other two engines. The captain sent a message to [Operations} asking about engine telemetry; and we were advised it was good; so we decided to press on.

MD-11 First Officer reported after landing Maintenance notified them of damaged fan blades in one of the engines.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

During preflight First Officer advised me that I should contact Maintenance with regards to an issue concerning the #2 engine. Appeared to be damage to the exit guide vanes; these are the stationary vanes directly behind the engine fan blades. Maintenance was contacted. First Officer and I both went to check the #2 engine. Upon further check we found multiple exit guide vanes throughout the bank of vanes that appeared to have been damaged. This went completely around the engine. There was material that was missing and exposing a green material underneath the missing material on multiple vanes. The missing material looked to have been torn or gouged out. Some of the material on the vanes appeared to have been shredded along with scratches on some of the vanes. The scratches ranged from 1/2 to three inches in length. The missing material was in various positions along the length of the vanes and on different sides of the vanes. Some of the material extended upward from the vanes in a jagged manner. None of this visible damage appeared to be uniform in nature. Not all vanes were damaged; but more than half of them were as far as I could tell. Note: An exit guide vane at the 4 o'clock position had been removed and was noted as such in the Log. In addition the #1 engine had two exit guide vanes at the 6 o'clock position that had been damaged and repaired. From what I could see it appeared that something had gone through the #2 engine and had damaged it. I made an entry in the Log to report the damage and request that the engine be checked and borescoped. I advised Maintenance; Dispatch; and the Duty Officer that I was not going to take this aircraft.This started another series of events. I had two mechanics that looked at the engine and told me that this was just normal wear and tear caused by wind erosion over time and that the missing material was a carbon tape that wrapped around the leading edges of the vanes. They both stated that the engine was ok. I disagreed and requested an inspection of the engine. Not at distance with a flashlight at night. This resulted in multiple phone calls to the Duty Officer; power plants; and eventually a conference call with two or three maintenance personnel and the Duty Officer. After about an hour of multiple conversations; it was determined that I was serious about not taking this aircraft until it was properly inspected. I cannot tell you the amount of pressure that I was placed under to try and convince me to take an airplane that in my view was damaged and not safe to fly. I was also left with the impression that my safety concerns were secondary at best and that the real issue was that maintenance did not want to take a hit for a down aircraft for the launch. We were eventually assigned at different aircraft; transloaded; departed 2 hours late.Appeared that something had been ingested through the #2 engine causing visible damage to multiple exit guide vanes on the #2 engine. This was found during the preflight of the aircraft by the first officer and reported to me. I do not know when the damage occurred.I think that the event could have been prevented if there was a record of the damage/wear and tear of the exit guide vanes and that this information was relayed to the flight crew if and when this damage was discovered. It was obvious to me that the aircraft did have a history of this nature since two vanes on the #1 engine had been damaged and repaired; and that a vane at the 4 o'clock position on the #2 engine had been removed. I hope that maintenance will keep a record and watch on this engine so that any future crews will have access to the history; know that the engine is being monitored and that the aircraft is safe to fly. I have had the exit guide vanes break and destroy an engine cowling before. It was quite significant. Maintenance did not tell me if there was any previous history of the damage that I was looking at.

A300 Captain is informed by his First Officer that a coating material appears to be peeling off the fan exit guide vanes. Maintenance is called and indicates that the missing material is carbon tape applied to the leading edges of the guide vanes and the ragged appearance is the result of normal erosion. The Captain refuses the aircraft and a two hour delay results.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 308; Flight Crew Type 18000

During preflight preparation and testing of systems I noted that the Cargo Fire Detection system did not test correctly. 'FWD' Warning light would not illuminate. I waited a few seconds and retested the system again. This time neither the 'FWD or the 'AFT' Warning light illuminated. After waiting a few moments; I again retested the system and this time the 'AFT' Warning light did not illuminate. We called out Maintenance to address the issue. They troubleshot the system and swapped the cockpit control panel with a panel from another aircraft with all the same symptoms reoccurring. Please note that every so often the system would test normally; but on subsequent testing all the same symptoms would re-appear. When a normal test would take place; the Mechanic seemed inclined to want to sign off the aircraft immediately and send us on our way. This was unacceptable to me since further testing always led to another incomplete test.I find this alarming that this Technician would send the aircraft on its way under these circumstances. Considering the potential hazards we have traveling on our aircraft in checked baggage; for example; e-Cigarettes; PEDs (Personal Electronic Devices); lithium batteries; and smart bags; we need to be exceptionally cautious that the Cargo Fire Detection system is FULLY functional. Obviously Company is concerned about the potential hazard of these items ending up in our cargo compartments since the flight attendants are required to ask passengers checking bags at the jetway if they have any of these items contained in their checked bags; as per Flight Attendant Manual Customer Care. During this particular situation; I dealt with three Mechanics and Maintenance Control and all gave me a different reason why we were getting faulty tests.I was told if we test it more than three times the circuit would overheat. I was also told that we needed to give it 15 seconds between each test. Thirdly; I was told if you test it more than two times you would get a faulty reading. Nowhere in our manuals are any of these stated. If any of these statements are true why is it not listed in our manuals? Why would a system be designed that you could only test twice before it presents a fault? I seriously doubt this is the case. This was the second aircraft with faulty Cargo Fire Tests in this week's four-day pairing. A Maintenance Technician in [another airport] told me he is now seeing more of the Cargo Fire Test issues than ever. The Cargo Fire Warning System needs to be investigated. I have experienced numerous faults during testing over the last year and I have spoken with other Company Pilots experiencing the same issues. Mechanics need to be instructed not to be so quick to sign off the logbook when dealing with these issues of this system. If any of the explanations they gave to me regarding the faulty test results were true; Company needs to include this information in our manuals.

B737-700 Captain reported multiple instances improper Maintenance procedure regarding the Malfunctioning Cargo Fire Warning Systems on multiple aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Let us once again discuss the Lake Elsinore Jump Zone (hereby referred to as: LEJZ). Aircraft X departed SNA on the MUSEL6.TRM departure; which goes directly through the LEJZ. Aircraft X checks in; I initially climb him to 150 but then amend back to 130 for a faster airliner behind to climb above. So after a minimum of two communications with Aircraft X; he then goes NORDO and as he approaches the LEJZ; I attempt to turn Aircraft X [Runway] 15R however he does not respond. I tried numerous times; changing frequency sites numerous times. I attempted a climb and turn in the blind broadcast; asking for acknowledgment with an ident. No observed ident/climb/turn. I called SoCal TRACON; Hemet Sector (who talks to the jump aircraft at 140) and let her know that I attempted to move Aircraft X but he's NORDO at 130. She advised she should let the jump aircraft know. I observed the limited data block for the jump aircraft climbing out of 115 in the close vicinity of Aircraft X; who was still NORDO at 130. I called Shore; the SoCal Sector who had handed Aircraft X off to me previously; to see if Aircraft X was on his frequency. He was not. I observed the jump aircraft limited [data block] stop his climb and turn away; then Aircraft X returns to my frequency with a radio check. I did not say anything to him other than to issue a climb; since at that point he was clear of the LEJZ. The Controller sitting next to me at R21 observed the situation and afterward had told me that earlier today; he was working R12 and had a departure from Shore (climbing to 130); which they never shipped to him; get quite close to a VFR jump aircraft code at 140 (which Hemet never pointed out to him). All this happens in ZLA's airspace yet we have no control on what the VFR jump aircraft does; how long they are there; when the OTHER SoCal Sector will ship us SNA departures; etc. Apparently; there is no in-house communication between SoCal Shore Sector and SoCal Hemet Sector regarding these jump operations since it takes place in a shelf that is ZLA's airspace 120 and above. Even if there were changes made to both the SNA SID's (MUSEL and STREL) to include a bend around the LEJZ on the way to TRM; there is still no way to be sure of what the VFR jump aircraft will do. Case in point is the Perris Valley Jump Zone; a few miles north of the LEJZ. Hemet owns that airspace up to 140; ZLA owns 150 and above. ONT departures are shipped to ZLA climbing to 140; the very altitude the aircraft drop their jumpers. Hemet rarely calls with a point-out on these VFR jump aircraft since they technically do not require one as it is their airspace. But even with an active jump aircraft in the air orbiting; they will routinely ship the ONT departures to Sector 12 out of 080 for 120; with no guarantee of separation other than the blind faith that Hemet is advising the VFR jump aircraft about the departure. What I have pieced together from SoCal controllers and ONT pilots is that Hemet tells the VFR jump aircraft to stay 'north of the airway' and calls traffic to the airliner when they're climbing out of 040 to 140; then ship them to ZLA out of 080. You're guess is as good as mine. Route the SIDs around both jump zones and we still have no control of the path of the VFR aircraft (who are much more comfortable getting close to an airliner than the airliner pilots are). Make ZLA talk to the VFR jump aircraft every time and traffic workload for both Hemet and Sector 12 would sky-rocket; delays would be commonplace for the jump zone companies and nobody will win. I doubt you can limit the VFR jump aircraft to a lower altitude for obvious reasons. We are all fed up with these jump zone aircraft. This has been an unsafe situation for years and only now with these reports has it come into the spotlight.

ZLA controller describes an unsafe situation with traffic around a jump site that is NORDO; causing his workload to increase.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 5366; Flight Crew Type 3510

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 3500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Approximately one hour from ZZZ on Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ we encountered a green system low hydraulic quantity and low pressure ECAM. We performed the action items and turned off the PTU (power transfer unit) and green system engine driven pump. The Captain informed Dispatch; Maintenance; and briefed the lead Flight Attendant. We agreed with the concurrence of Dispatch that the best course of action was to continue to ZZZ. We requested priority handling and received traffic priority to ZZZ. On final approach; we performed the alternate gear extension checklist and landed on the longest runway (XXR). We stopped straight ahead due to no nose wheel steering and waited for the tug to tow us back to the gate. We completed the after landing flows; tow in checklist; and parking checklist back at the gate.The reason for my fatigue call to the Chief Pilot and scheduling following our incident was due to minimal broken sleep from the previous evening at the layover hotel. The hotel was hosting a fraternity convention and my sleep was disrupted from 1-3 am due to the occupants of the room next door. I called the front desk and they notified security to silence the fraternity party. Following the minimal disrupted rest and the stress associated with the hydraulic emergency; I felt I was not fit to continue duty and called in fatigue!

We were approximately 1 hour from ZZZ when we were alerted by a master caution and subsequent ECAM indicating a loss of green system hydraulics both quantity and pressure. I continued flying and had my first officer accomplish the ECAM and subsequently the QRH. We requested priority handling with ATC and I then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control; it was decided that given the situation our best option was to continue on to ZZZ. At this point I had our lead flight attendant come up to the flight deck and briefed him on the situation and provided him with the required information. I then made a PA to the passengers explaining the situation and what to expect. We were provided expedited handling by ZZZ ATC and were able to accomplish all remaining clean up items on the QRH in an orderly and efficient manner. A non eventful and smooth landing was performed in ZZZ and we were able to maintain center line where we brought the aircraft to a stop and were meet by CFR and airport operations who towed us back to the gate.

A319 flight crew reported loss of green hydraulic system while in cruise. After communication with dispatch and maintenance; they elected to request priority handling and continue to destination airport.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

On our flight we were heavily loaded on payload and thus going to be close to being over landing weight at our arrival airport. In flight the Captain and I discussed a plan of action between ourselves and the check airman who was conducting a line check to ensure that we would meet our landing weight limitation. This included starting the APU approximately 1 hour remaining in flight to burn a little extra fuel and to request early descent and configure the aircraft early for landing if needed. As such; we started the APU [early] and requested a descent shortly thereafter and descended to FL240 from FL360. [About 30 minutes later] we received a shudder followed by a constant light vibration in the aircraft. Simultaneously; upon review of the situation I noticed and properly called out the EICAS caution message 'APU FAULT'. The Captain called for and I properly completed the associated QRH items; and the PF slowed the aircraft eliminating the vibration. The APU did not re-light and was left off for the remainder of the flight; resulting in a normal approach and landing. Upon taxi in we attempted to start the APU once again. At this time; we once again received an 'APU FAULT' message; this time accompanied by an 'APU DOOR' status message. We left the APU off and parked the aircraft. Upon further review on the post flight inspection it was found that the APU door had indeed departed the aircraft. At this point MX contacted the company and the flight crew notified the proper chain of command.

B767-300 First Officer reported the APU door departed the aircraft in flight.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Radar 10; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 10; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1000

I was conducting flight training and we were on an ILS approach to Runway 9R at MLB when I observed a red and white PA28 extending his left base through the final to Runway 9L. He was on a southerly heading flying directly towards us at the same altitude. When the separation became too close for my comfort level; I took control of the aircraft from my student who was under the hood. The moment I started evasive action I saw the pilot in the right seat of the Piper react to our aircraft and the Piper made an immediate and steep left turn back to the final for 9L. Once sufficient separation prevailed; I re-established the aircraft back on the ILS and gave control back to the student. We completed the approach and landing without incident. The frequency was very busy and I waited until on the ground to tell the Ground Controller how close the PA28 was. I estimated 500 FT or less and told Ground that. The other aircraft's crew then came on the frequency to say it wasn't that close. I have hundreds of hours of formation flying in addition to over 5;000 hours of flight time; and can judge distances as well as anyone. The Instructor's face was clearly surprised to see our aircraft and its proximity to him; that's how close the two aircraft did get.

A student and instructor pilot aboard a M20K suffered an NMAC with a PA28 while on approach to parallel runways at MLB.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure

The severe wake turbulence took place on a flight which was operating under Part 91; at the time; to BFL. We had 5 passengers on board. The encounter took place between the HEC and PMD VORs. Sometime after our initial descent we were given ATC instructions to turn left 10 degrees for our descent. Shortly after that we were cleared to descend to FL300. We began a 1;000 FPM descent to FL300 and it was at that time I noticed a TCAS target at our altitude; but descending; at our 3 o'clock. I acquired the target visually and noted its size and assumed it was a B747. Its position was gradually moving from our 3 o'clock toward our 12 o'clock as it descended. I also noted that it was descending at about the same rate as we were. It stayed at 800-1;000 FT below us and 8-10 miles from us throughout our descent. I assumed that this was the traffic we were being vectored for and I anticipated a turn back on course (toward this aircraft's flight path) and further descent. I increased our descent rate to 1;500 FPM thinking that the sooner we reached FL300 the sooner we would be turned back on course. My thinking was that this would get us on the other side of the plane's wake sooner; allowing for a larger buffer between our plane and where I perceived the wake to be. It was at this time I noted that the winds aloft were from the northwest at around 40 KTS; moving the wake toward us.I commented to the co-pilot that this situation was making me a bit uneasy; but after a short discussion we both thought that the 8-10 miles between us and the large jet was adequate. It wasn't. Seconds later we encountered the wake. The plane instantly rolled 45-50 degrees to the right. I reacted by applying full power and pitching up to approximately 20 degrees to escape. Once things settled down we advised ATC of our altitude deviation and the cause. Strangely; the Controller seemed not to believe us at first. He advised us of the distance from us to the large jet; which turned out to be an A340; and stated that the plane was always at least 10 miles from us and 2;000-3;000 FT below us. According to our TCAS this was not true. After checking on the passengers I reported to ATC the scenario as we saw it and gave him a winds aloft reading. I think that one of the large contributing factors to us encountering the wake was the wind aloft. I don't think the Controller that directed us onto a heading downwind of the A340's wake had taken into consideration the winds aloft. On my part; I should have gone with my intuition and requested a vector and/or a descent or climb to avoid the wake. However; all of those requests would have been made on the assumption that we were being vectored in reference to the A340. ATC never mentioned the A340 until after we had encountered the wake.

A C560 Captain reported encountering very strong wake from an A340 at FL300 that resulted in a 45-50 deg roll.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was flying to PVR and for the third of four legs. I was unable to uplink winds either on the ground or in flight. I was trying to contact Dispatch to find a resolution to this problem and I requested a CALL ME on ACARS. I made three requests within 50 minutes and got no reply. I tried to AIRINC Dispatch using the foreign frequency and could not make contact with an operator. My concern is with our ability to communicate with Dispatch while flying in North America. On descent; I received a message from a new Dispatcher that the dispatchers are overwhelmed and understaffed and that they cannot respond to CALL ME messages. I find that entirely unacceptable for a large airline to not be able to communicate to all its aircraft in flight.

A B737 Captain reported his Dispatcher would not return a requested call about winds inflight because their carrier's dispatchers are overwhelmed and understaffed.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

The Captain of the plane didn't wear a mask in the cabin. He walked to the back of the plane prior to boarding without a mask. As boarding began I witnessed him greet passengers while standing in the galley next to the A Flight Attendant without a mask. We need someone to have a serious talk with the pilots about keeping us all safe and wear masks.

Flight Attendant reported a Captain did not comply with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 10871; Flight Crew Type 7071

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 184; Flight Crew Total 13049; Flight Crew Type 6022

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Approximately 45 minutes after going on break I was called back to the flight deck and informed that a loss in oil quantity on the number 2 engine subsequently resulted in a low oil pressure EICAS message. Maintenance Control and Dispatch were notified of the situation. The Checklist called for an engine shutdown due to the low oil pressure and a decision was made to return to ZZZ. We [requested priority handling] and we were given clearance to a lower altitude. We communicated our situation to the Purser using the acronym and made a PA to the passengers advising them of the situation and that we would be returning to ZZZ. We requested the ILS to the longest Runway XXR and landed at ZZZ without further incident. Airport Rescue and Firefighting followed us to Gate XX on the taxi in as well.

Departed ZZZ to ZZZ1 on flight XXXX. Shortly after reaching cruise altitude; we noticed a low oil indication on the #2 engine of 1 quart. All other engine indications were normal at the time; so we called Dispatch and Maintenance Control to get their input. While on the Sat Phone with them; the #2 oil pressure gauge started jumping around slowly bouncing lower. We made the decision to discontinue the flight and return to ZZZ. We informed ATC that we needed to return and they cleared us back to ZZZ. We then informed the flight attendants of the situation and called our Relief Pilot back to the flight deck. About 5 minutes into our return; the oil pressure gauge continued to drop lower and we got the low oil pressure warning indication. At that time we ran the appropriate checklist and secured the #2 engine. We then informed ATC; requested priority handling; and got a lower altitude. We then informed Dispatch/Maintenance Control of the situation; all while keeping our flight attendants and passengers updated. Then we decided to dump fuel; informed ATC when we started and stopped dumping. Shot the ILS XXR approach in ZZZ because the winds were favoring that runway and it was the longest. Landed without incident. Taxied to Gate XX and deplaned the passengers.

Flight Crew reported a loss of #2 engine oil quantity; resulting an in flight shut down of the engine and a precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Visual RWY 15; 3;500 MSL; pop up traffic; TCAS TA; Tower sounded very concerned; TCAS RA 'Climb' to go around. Tower notified approach; vectors provided to RWY 8 ILS. Good work by ATC. Until another TCAS approaching SILEX; this time 'descend' then I saw a C-150 quite close; then behind. Landing uneventful.

Pilot reported airborne conflict twice while attempting to land at BUR.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MEL X not showing on dispatch software for Aircraft X at time of release. AMD for fuel onboard given to crew before departure and crew did not mentioned that the MEL was missing from the flight release. I became aware when preparing the return flight release for ZZZ-ZZZ1 and that is when I noticed that Aircraft X had a MEL which was not listed on the previous ZZZ1-ZZZ flight.Mel's needs to be updated in the dispatcher software more accurately and pic needs to pay more attention to their flight release/logbook in regards of MELs.

Dispatcher reported being out of the loop when a MEL was not listed in the Dispatchers software and was missing from the flight release.


Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

On TO roll experienced a steady increase in volume of airflow in the cockpit. Upon liftoff airflow continued to increase until it was extremely difficult to communicate in the cockpit. Flt deck temp increased to 97 degrees. During this time I received cabin call that passengers felt the increased airflow; heard popping noises and noticed damage to cabin sidewalls. Simultaneously (while FO flying); I placed the left pack in the standby cold position at which time both cockpit airflow and temperature returned to normal. I told the FA that I would get back to her once the aircraft was safely airborne. We leveled off at 10;000; I requested vectors back while investigating the situation and I made a PA. I called the cabin and obtained additional information and along with normal cockpit indications (pressurization; airflow and temperature); we decided to climb and continue to our destination. I made PA assuring the passengers that all indications were normal and we would make sure that if there were any abnormalities we would divert and land the airplane. After level off I received another call from the cabin that passengers were still uneasy. At this point I decided to assess the situation for myself. After seeing the damage to the cabin interior and the concern of the passengers; even though the aircraft was performing normally; I elected to return. I declared an emergency and landed uneventfully.

B757 flight crew experiences a pack failure during takeoff that initially results in very high air flow and high temperatures. The left pack is placed in the standby cold position which seems to correct the problem. The flight attendants report damage to the side wall in the cabin and agitated passengers. The Captain investigates and finding the damage to be significant; elects to return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Total 17848; Flight Crew Type 614

Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 184; Flight Crew Total 7370; Flight Crew Type 884

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Captain was Pilot Monitoring. First Officer (FO) was Pilot Flying. FO was being vectored downwind for a visual approach to LAX Runway 24L. ATC turned us onto Base leg sooner than expected. Aircraft energy was high at that point and FO made inputs to manage speed and descent. At 1;500 feet things seemed manageable as the aircraft was decelerating and descending as desired. Once joining the final approach course we fell behind the energy management of the aircraft. Captain prompted FO to lower the Landing Gear which the FO responded that he agreed that was a good idea. The landing gear was lowered at that time. Once the landing gear was down; aircraft speed began to slow more quickly and FO called for flaps as speed allowed. At this time we became aware that Tower Control was placing an aircraft into position on our landing runway. It became apparent that this was beginning to become a tight fit for us as we continued slow and to configure to a landing state/condition. At 500 feet; the Captain called Go-around. However; the aircraft on our landing runway received their Takeoff clearance and began to roll just prior to the go-around call by the Captain. When the Captain stated Go-around the Captain also said that if we execute a Go-around at this point; we would become an immediate conflict with the aircraft now taking off on our landing runway. The Captain decided under those circumstances it was a safer course of action to continue the approach and landing. The FO continued and landed the aircraft on runway 24L.

I failed to meet the required stabilized approach gates and should have performed a go around. At the time the captain and I realized this it was actually safer; in our opinion; to continue the approach to landing.The flight was a typical long range flight in that we were tired and ready to finish the long 6 day trip. I was the flying pilot and the flight was routine up to the approach phase. We were given a descent to 3;000 feet after SMO and expected a long downwind for Runway 24L. The typical landing runway; 24R; is closed for construction so 24L is being used for both takeoffs and landings. As we descended through about 3;500 feet; approach control gave us an early turn to heading 160 and asked us to call the airport in sight. The current aircraft condition was flaps 5 and 200 knots as assigned by ATC. I realized we were inside BOUBY and asked the captain to clean up the FMS. I also disconnected the autopilot to keep us from getting too high because the aircraft was going to capture the LOC at or above the GS. The captain was busy with multiple calls from ATC so I was manipulating the MCP as well. As soon as we joined final I realized I should have asked for flaps 15 on base leg. I asked for flaps 15; gear down and fully extended the speed brakes. We were getting high on the GS so I decided to capture the GS rather than slow down. I used speed brakes down to about 1;200 AGL and then stowed them. At 1;000 AGL the configuration was gear down; flaps 20; and 181 knots. We should have gone around at this point but I thought I could get the aircraft stabilized by the final 500 foot gate. Right at this time ATC cleared another aircraft for immediate takeoff and asked us to slow to approach speed. At about 900 AGL we selected flaps 30 and at 500 AGL got a momentary caution alert as the flaps were not yet at 30. We were all watching the aircraft that was cleared for takeoff on our landing runway but was not yet airborne. The captain said 'we should go around but we will be right on top of that guy'. I said 'I agree; continue'. We both saw continuing the approach to landing as the safest course of action at this point. We were on speed and configured by 400 AGL and continued to a normal landing; in the touchdown zone and made the planned turn off at AA taxiway. I realize I should have; corrected for speed failures earlier; gone around at 1;000 feet and asked tower for a turn or gone around at 500 feet and performed a turn on our own.

This flight crew reported that; due to an early turn toward the airport; the approach exceeded the parameters for a stable approach. However; due to a potential conflict with a departing aircraft on the same runway; both pilots determined that continuing the approach and landing was a better course of action than a go-around.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

While on a Part 91k revenue flight on a descent from FL450; when passing thru FL380; the Master Warning illuminated along with the audio triple chime and the R ENG OIL PRESS LO EICAS message was posted on the CAS (Crew Alerting System).We complied with the QRH and performed an inflight engine shutdown and were cleared direct to the Airport. We briefed the Passengers about the situation and continued to the airport where we performed a single engine approach and landing. CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) met the plane after an uneventful landing and taxi to the FBO.After arrival and deplaning of the passengers we contacted the company and maintenance control and entered it in the log book.

During descent a CL-350 EICAS alerted right engine oil pressure low; the engine was shut down and a normal single engine landing completed.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 487; Flight Crew Type 11000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Inbound from waypoint STERE on the RNP Y 22L at 3000'; we heard ATC communicating with an aircraft northwest of our position about the several [other aircraft] lined up flying the approach into MDW. As we approached that aircraft our TCAS display indicated that the target aircraft was 100' below us and level; heading south towards our lateral course. The Pilot Monitoring communicated this to ATC. ATC cleared us to deviate north (right) of course to avoid the aircraft. I Pilot Flying (PF) immediately engaged CWS and began a right turn; level at 3000'. While in the turn we received a TA alert. The Pilot Monitoring called out we were clear of the aircraft so I turned left and intercepted the approach course and engaged LNAV/VNAV and setting the altitude window to 1500'. Approaching waypoint SAILZ; ATC alerted us to another aircraft approaching our path ahead. At SAILZ this aircraft triggered a Resolution Advisory (RA). The RA red command box indicated I could not descend. So I disconnected the autopilot and maintained 3000'-3100'. After we were 'Clear of Conflict' I accessed and communicated that we were high on the approach path. Still hand flying I began to descend to intercept the descent path.Approaching the lake shore; we encountered another Traffic Alert (TA) alert. Both Pilot Monitoring and I looked but could not see either an aircraft outside or on our displays. This third traffic alert distracted us just as we approached the FMS descent path. I then realized we were approaching 2100' MSL just outside KEEEL. I corrected our flight path and rejoined our descent path at KEEEL. I then continued to hand fly the approach to a landing.Trying to fly an instrument approach procedure in VFR weather with several VFR aircraft flying in the vicinity of the approach creates challenges not encountered when in IMC. Abandoning the RNAV Y Approach and requesting vectors to a visual approach would have decreased our workload on the approach. When I began my descent to recapture the glidepath after the RA; I should have called for the Pilot Monitoring to reset the altitude window to 2400.

While cleared direct to SAILZ at 3000'; we heard Approach talking to VFR general aviation traffic at 2900'. They pointed out three aircraft; including us; to him as potential conflicts as he was crossing our approach path. The 2900' traffic was pointed out to us at two miles just as it showed as a Traffic Alert (TA). We called visual and were given permission to turn as required to avoid the traffic. The First Officer (FO) did a great job of turning right towards his tail avoiding a certain RA. We then re-engaged automation direct SAILZ to finish the approach. Over SAILZ we got another TA which quickly changed to an RA to 'Monitor Vertical Speed' preventing the necessary descent on the approach out of SAILZ.Once again; the (FO) did a great job of complying with the RA but found himself high on profile inside SAILZ when we were 'Clear of Conflict'. He announced his selection of vertical speed to try to get back on profile. I informed ATC that we were off profile on the approach due to an RA. While correcting; we got another TA with no target shown. There was a moment of confusion as the traffic info was shown in text on the right side of the PFD but not displayed as a target (behind us). These few seconds of uncertainty distracted us long enough to descend below profile; which I announced. The FO corrected and crossed KEEEL at 2100'; 300 below the 2400' crossing. The FO hand-flew the remainder of the approach to an uneventful landing. There was no comment from ATC on the altitude deviation for the third TCAS event on final as we were still maneuvering for the second event. This also occurred right with the switch to Tower over KEEEL. I heard no comments from any Passengers about the event. When on the ground we debriefed the event. I was then distracted by operational events during the turn and neglected to inform Dispatch of the RA.Establish a VFR corridor to de-conflict general aviation traffic from this often-used approach procedure. At a minimum ATC should direct altitude de-confliction to general aviation traffic under flight following over the lake front.

B737 flight crew experienced three separate TCAS events during a visual approach into MDW.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft was being taxied and then blocked in at position [parking spot] on the company ramp. The APU was not used after landing but the ground power was connected and powering the aircraft. The Captain began the shutdown flow as well as the normal shutdown checklist while I contact company ground reporting our landing 'on' and taxi 'in' times. The Marshaller signaled to the Captain to keep the brakes on and wait for the aircraft to be chalked in which he complied. I then noticed that the aircraft was moving backwards and immediately notified the Captain. The Captain and myself immediately pressed on the brake pedals but the aircraft continued to roll backwards. The ground power unit then disconnected from the aircraft and the Captain immediately switched to battery power and started the APU as well as the right hydraulic pump. The Captain then turned the nose tiller to help prevent contacting an aircraft behind us. The aircraft contacted another aircraft parked at position [different parking spot]. We then contacted company ramp as well as our company maintenance control as well as our flight control.

Flight crew reported a loss of aircraft brakes while parking that resulted in a collision with another aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 8200; Flight Crew Type 250

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Downloaded filed flight plan from ARINC to our FMS at ZZZ.After picking up our clearance which was different than the filed route; I updated the FMS with the new clearance and waypoints. Somewhere along the rush I mistakenly deleted ZZZ VOR and kept ZZZ1 VOR. So the issue came about on the leg between ZZZZZ and ZZZ1 VOR. ATC issued a terrain alert with an immediate left turn and a climb to FL130. After being told of a possible pilot deviation I looked at the route and realized my mistake.The aircraft EGPWS never indicated a terrain issues and after looking at the route from ZZZZZ to ZZZ1 at FL120 on ForeFlight Map we were above the terrain and therefore never should have heard the EGPWS as we did not.Weather conditions at time; we were in between broken layers with good visibility in front of us.

Challenger 300 flight crew reported accidentally deleting a waypoint from the FMS resulting in an altitude deviation and low altitude alert.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Prior to TO (Takeoff) I used the automated cabin announcement system to notify the flight attendants that we were ready for TO. While doing so I monitored the PA to make sure the announcement was actually made; which it was. When exiting the flight deck to initiate the rest period I was told that at least three flight attendants were standing up when the TO was made. Throughout the flight I heard three different excused for this having happened; two of which contradict one another. 1); I was told that the period of time between the announcement and the actual TO was too long and so they disregarded the announcement thinking we would make a follow up announcement. This is absurd as the announcement was made at an appropriate time; and SOP does not provide any guidelines for making a secondary announcement. 2) The same FA (Flight Attendant) who gave me excuse number one later changed her story and said the announcement wasn't heard at all. Clearly false. 3) A second FA told me that she heard the announcement but felt she couldn't comply with it as she was still taking meal orders from business class customers. She intentionally violated policy; put safety at risk; and clearly managed her time poorly. Every time [I] go to some sort of recurrent training event the topic of FA injuries is discussed. I hate the idea of someone getting hurt on a flight I am operating; so when I know something like this happened it is very upsetting.

B777 First Officer reported miscommunication resulting in several Flight Attendants still standing during takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 296; Flight Crew Type 51.4

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

During a standard departure from ZZZ; my aircraft veered to the left off of Runway XXL into the gravel apron between the runway and Taxiway A coming to a stop on Taxiway C.Preflight check was normal; refueling went normal; run-up was normal; contacted Ground from the fuel pump and was given taxi instructions to [Runway] XYL via E; and Alpha. Taxi went normal. Contacted Tower that I was holding short of [Runway] XYL at A. I was then given clearance to take off on Runway XYL with a left turn out and departure to the southwest.My aircraft is equipped with 'Finger Brakes' located on the center console. I entered the runway and used differential braking and rudder; turned left to line up with the runway centerline. Once lined up but still rolling; I gradually applied full power and some right rudder. As the plane quickly moved forward; it started to veer to the left. I applied more right rudder until I had all right rudder and still only managed to decrease left turn.The plane left the runway between [taxiways B and C]; but once on the gravel came more to the right and I was able to avoid any runway lights or signs. Its momentum carried me onto the Taxiway C intersection in between Runway XYL and Taxiway A where I stopped. I contacted the Tower and advised them that I had aborted the takeoff and requested taxi back to parking. During the taxi back; the aircraft had a distinct tendency to turn left. When I put my hand on the brake levers; I felt a misalignment between the levers. Further inspections showed that the finger knob on the left lever had jammed behind the finger knob on the right lever. This caused the left brake to drag while taxiing enough to cause the veering tendency. Once they were unjammed; normal steering resumed. I taxied to parking and performed a detailed inspection of the aircraft. With the exception of some dings to the paint on the rear horizontal tail plane; no other damage was noted. With this issue in mind; I continued my flight uneventfully with several landings and takeoffs with no problems.After returning; I secured the aircraft and began to engineer replacement parts to prevent this issue again. I manufactured two replacement knobs that will not be able to jam and repeat this problem. The following week; I performed repairs to the paint dings. I also replaced both finger brake knobs and exercised the finger brakes several times and am confident this problem will not be repeated.

Experimental aircraft pilot reported a brake malfunction and runway excursion during takeoff roll.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Multiple crew members asked passenger to comply with mask policy during various phases of flight. After 3rd attempt; his demeanor; hostility; and inappropriate language; the passenger was written up.  The guest had a flagrant disregard for authority from the moment we started the demo when the C FA told him to comply with an FAA policy; and the guest ignored him; when asked for compliance again; this guest just looked at FA and replied 'I heard you the first time.'

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

APU was on MEL so external electrical power was necessary upon arrival at the gate at GSP.  The ground agent attempted several times to connect power from the gate without success.  He then came to the cockpit where express directions were given to obtain a power cart and also to not let the fueler start fueling.  About 5 minutes later with the engine still running at the gate and no external power; I noticed the fuel level rising on the fuel gauges.  I immediately shut down the idling left engine.The fueler failed to notice both the beacon and the engine running on the aircraft before he approached the aircraft and hooked up his equipment.  The ground agent who I spoke with was at the nose of the aircraft about to hook up the external power.  He drove right by the fueler; but failed to notice and stop the fueler from hooking up his equipment.GSP has recently had poor oversight and management of its employees and also seems to be lacking enough personnel to handle [this type of aircraft]. The fueler needs additional training on aircraft beacons and how to recognize when an engine is still running.External power should be working on every arrival.

Air carrier Captain reported the ramp crew at GSP created an unsafe situation when they deviated from SOPs and began fueling with an engine running.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working a combined position with sector 10; 11; and 12 combined at 12.  At approximately XA50 local I got the handoff on Aircraft X a ZZZ arrival at FL390 that was in cruise; but had to be descended beneath two aircraft Aircraft Y at FL360 and an Aircraft Z aircraft at FL380. I issued Aircraft X a crossing restriction to miss both pieces of traffic; 'Cross OTT at FL350'; but later corrected this to 'Cross 10 miles south of OTT at FL350' to over separate Aircraft X from Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z.  Aircraft X's pilot reported out of flight level 390 and was started his descent.   I rogered this and continued my duties. Over the course of my next coupe of scans and saw that separation was obtained for Aircraft X with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z as Aircraft X leveled at FL350 complying with the restriction I had given him.  However; for his descent I used a interim altitude and could see his mode C altitude.  Between OTT and PALEO; where the suspected loss occurred; Aircraft X's reported Mode-C altitude varied between 350 and 351.  This is a common occurrence and I disregarded it was a equipment malfunction.  When Aircraft Y; still at FL360; got within 5 miles of Aircraft X; Aircraft X's reported Mode-C jumped to 351 and caused a suspected loss of separation which I only became aware of after reviewing the FALCON replay.  I did not verify Aircraft X's altitude to see if he was level at FL350 or if it was an equipment malfunction.  I cannot make a recommendation for this event because I feel my procedures were correct and the restriction I gave to Aircraft X ensured separation with both of the conflictions.  The fluctuating Mode-C altitude; in my opinion; was the cause of the separation error and it just a fault of the system between the transponder on the aircraft and the receiver on the ground.

Enroute controller reported a possible loss of separation but only after the suspected conflict was identified after a reviewed on the FALCON replay system.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 995; Flight Crew Type 165

Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After departure I made contact with Approach and was assigned squawk for flight following to destination. While climbing to cruising altitude of 9;500 FT there was a smell of burnt plastic and small amount of white smoke. All engine instruments indicate normal operation. No circuit breakers blown. Told ATC was going to change destination and return to the departure airport. [I] made the 180 to return still no indication from instruments of malfunction. Believing the smoke was electrical I turned off all radios and electronic devices not needed for flight and removed from under right seat the fire extinguisher and continued to my destination. Once I had the airport in sight I told Approach and they cleared me to change frequencies and to keep my assigned squawk. Still with small amount of white smoke made normal landing and taxi to parking. Before shutdown [I had] no indication from instruments of abnormal operation. After shutdown opened all doors and let light smoke out. No indication of any further smoke accumulation at this time. I believe the cause of the events to be directly related to hand held GPS that was wired and mounted in the panel during annual.

A C210 pilot detected a burnt plastic odor and a small amount of white smoke; so he returned to his departure airport where he discovered a failed portable GPS receiver which was wired into the aircraft electrical system.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight X; to ATL proceeded uneventfully.  We were initially assigned the KOLTT 1 Arrival and then later changed to the BNELE 1 Arrival.  All restrictions and speed assignments were complied with.  A Visual Approach was flown 2.5 miles in trail of a Regional Jet. As LAHSO operations were in effect; but not assigned; and there was a high arrival demand; minimum time on the runway was planned.  A smooth accurate touchdown followed and the aircraft exited Runway 26R at the first available taxiway (first high speed) as per AIM 4.3.20; a. The taxi instructions that followed as we understood them were to proceed via B and V (standard Victor Loop) and to monitor Ground which we did.  As we proceeded on B; I noticed an aircraft exiting the runway at the high speed ahead of us and called the First Officers (FO) attention to that.  We were both aware that it is undesirable to stop the flow of traffic at ATL; but it did not appear that the exiting aircraft was intending to stop; so I brought the aircraft to a comfortable stop short of the taxiway.  The exiting aircraft also stopped short of B.  Ground Control was advised and we were instructed to continue our taxi. Upon reaching Ramp we were given a number to contact the Tower.  A one minute conversation followed and I was told that we had been instructed to taxi via B and V; to remain on Tower frequency until reaching V and then to monitor Ground; that multiple attempts were made to assign us a hold short clearance for the exiting aircraft from the Tower without response.  It was also explained that most aircraft exit the runway at the second high speed and that this was considered customary and expected by the Tower.  Exiting at the first high speed required Tower to provide both Ground Control to aircraft on B and Tower Control of exiting aircraft and that this information could be found in our publications. It has been routine for me to exit at the first available taxiway at ATL in the past; and my last trip was allowed to taxi straight across to Ramp with a 'nice job' which my FO and I actually briefed prior to this arrival.  After reviewing 10-7; 10-9; and ATL [company information chart]; we were unable to find a published preference to roll to the second high speed; but will plan to do so in the future.Ultimately; it is likely that the issue was our understanding of 'monitor Ground'.  If it was Tower's intention for us to monitor Ground (but remain on Tower until V) the situation would not have resulted.  Perhaps 'taxi via B and V stay with me' or remain on Tower would have been more clear.  It was never our intention to switch from Tower to Ground without instruction.  I sincerely appreciate ATL Tower taking the time to provide this insight to their local procedures and hope that it is useful to other Crews as well.

A pilot reports of landing at ATL and following instructions from Tower. An aircraft exits runway ahead of them; they stop to allow aircraft to exit then continue. Later they are chastised for leaving Tower frequency even though Tower told them to monitor Ground.


Training / Qualification; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Captain flying pilot. At cruise FL360. Number 2 engine ITT on the EICAS spiked twice. The temperature got as high as 10-15 degrees. With the spikes two separate vibrations were felt. The Number 2 engine then had a uncommanded shutdown. I checked the oil level on the MFD and saw it was at 4 QTS. Departing we had at least 10 QTS in the Number 2 engine. I followed the emergency procedure for an engine failure and called for the EPC and AOM. We declared an emergency with ATC and asked for emergency equipment to be standing by in FAR. Notified the Flight Attendant who was already aware of the problem. She and the passengers felt and heard the vibrations. The Flight Attendant said the passenger were concerned but calm. The First Officer ran the appropriate checklists and radios. He also made a PA to the passengers. Our single engine descent was smooth and we were vectored in for an ILS approach. The approach went well. We landed smoothly and stopped in the required distance. Crash and rescue checked the exterior of the aircraft and did not see any debris; leakage; smoke or fire. We taxied to the gate and deplaned without further incident. Passengers all seemed to be calm. Notified Dispatch and Maintenance Control then entered the information in the AML.

An EMB145 engine auto shutdown in flight after an engine oil system problem. An emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight proceeded to its filed destination.


Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft

After arrival and with the aircraft stopped; the white paint spiral on the engine inlet spinner was not visible. We were just audited and this is one of the things that we failed on; however; this practice is unsafe in its entirety. As the marshaller of the aircraft; I am about 100 feet from the engines and the wing walkers are 15 feet away and they have a much better chance of seeing; and hearing the engine from that distance than I do from the distance that I am. Sometimes it is extremely hard; if not impossible to see the engine fan blades; especially at night or in inclement weather. Furthermore; many of our aircraft have faded; chipped; or missing paint from the spinner; making the spirals nonexistent. I don't have any special training to know that the engines have spooled down to a sufficient speed nor do I have any special equipment to measure the RPM's of the spooling down engine. Standing that far away while having to get the jetbridge up to the aircraft; get the nose gear chocked; and keep the wands crossed until we get the chocks in; is a lot of tasks to accomplish before trying to see if it is safe for the wing walkers to approach the aircraft. It's very uncomfortable having the expectations and safety of a fellow coworker in my hands when there is no way of me being able to see or fulfill that obligation when I cannot see the fan blades; the spiral is worn off; and we are tasked with doing so many things at that very limited; yet critical time.

Air carrier ramp agent reported that aircraft parking procedures do not have adequate safety constraints.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Hand flown visual approach at night. At approximately 4 miles from touchdown; First Officer stated; 'you're slow.' I checked my airspeed indicator and speed was right at bottom of bug. I stated; 'I'm right on'. Two more calls from the First Officer approximately 15 seconds apart stating I was slow. First Officer never stated how slow. I saw nothing except minor deviations of plus or minus 2-3 knots and prompt; timely corrections. I suspected there may be instrument error as aircraft had pitot system drained prior to flight. Approach was very smooth; on course and on glide path. At approximately 2 miles and 800 feet; First Officer called tower and stated we were going around. For a moment; I thought First Officer stated this over the Intercom Communication System and then Tower responded with go around instructions. As PIC; I immediately called Tower and asked him to disregard the transmission. Tower complied and reissued landing clearance. Aircraft continued on a stable approach to touchdown and uneventful taxi to gate.

CRJ-900 Captain reported that an error was suspected in the First Officer's airspeed indication and therefore the landing was continued after the First Officer called for a go-around.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On arrival to MMMX; we were cleared via the arrival for the ILS 5R and cleared to descend via the arrival. We descended to cross the MEX VOR at 24000 feet. Passing the VOR we were then cleared to 12;000 feet. Approximately 15 miles northwest of the VOR we began receiving headings to the west and southwest for the approach. We were then cleared direct to MAVEK and cleared for the approach. We initially did not understand the clearance and asked for clarification; to which we were then cleared direct to SMO VOR and cleared for the approach. We entered DIR to SMO in the [flight computer] and the turn to the VOR was initiated as continued to descend toward 12;000 feet. In our descent we received a TCAS RA of 'MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED'. We disengaged the autopilot and flight director and corrected the vertical speed without incident. Our closeness to the VOR and angle of the outbound course necessitated that we would overshoot the outbound course to the east. As we were correcting for the outbound course; we received a clearance from approach control to turn right to heading 150 and descend to 9;700 feet. Our heading at the time we received the instruction to turn right to 150 was approximately 220 and we asked for clarification twice to verify the clearance. From our perspective from the flight deck; we ascertained that we were receiving a 270 degree turn to re-intercept the outbound course from SMO VOR. The controller then directed an' immediate left turn! Left turn! To 150 and continue descend to 9;700 feet. As we started to turn back to the left for the 150 heading we received an additional TCAS RA of CLIMB; to which we properly complied with and climbed to 11;000 feet before we received 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT'. At this point; with the aircraft well under control; we then received and complied the following instructions: ATC- HDG 150 DESCEND TO 8;800FT; ATC- HDG 160 SPEED 160 CLEARED FOR THE ILS; ATC - HDG 120 TO INTERCEPT THE LOCILIZER. We contacted tower and was cleared to land at approximately 500 feet AGL.This event occurred due to communication failure. The controller referred to the SMO VOR as MAVEK and when we asked for clarification; this put us behind the turn than intended by the controller. As we attempted to correct our course; we continued to receive instructions that became increasingly more difficult to understand. This is due in part from the delay of execution of instructions to be able to confirm the received clearances as well as the English from the controller deteriorated as the event progressed.

An air carrier pilot reported received conflicting and confusing ATC instructions on an arrival in a foreign country and had to respond to an RA for conflicting traffic.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Shortly after leaving the break room after the morning shift briefing myself and the other lead were talking just outside of the break room doors and I noticed a crew who I thought were jacking Aircraft X as you could hear one or many of the jacks pumping with the air hoses attached.  I saw two techs at each main gear and one at the nose (from my view). I was looking for the jacking supervisor who should have been about 15-20 at the nose of the aircraft watching the aircraft being lowered or raised either way.  There could have been one at the right side of the nose as it would have been out of view.  As I started looking closer I noticed a person at each jack start turning the wing jack locks to the unlock position which told me they were lowering the aircraft but continued to hear the jacks pumping which was confusing as there should be no jacks pumping during the lowering process.  I then heard a horn/buzzing sound going off and realized it was coming from the tail stand.  I then immediately yelled 'STOP! STOP! STOP!' from across the hangar and they continued lowering for about 5 seconds after that until they realized what was going on.  Once they stopped I went to the tail of the aircraft and noticed the wrinkled skin and also noticed that the tail stand was in the wrong location as it should have been about three inches forward. The lack of care from the crew involved is concerning.Was leaving the break room after shift briefing and noticed the aircraft being lowered onto the tail stand while the buzzer on the tail stand was going off.I feel the cause was due to lack of assertiveness and a lack of communication. I am not sure what led up to this event as I was not present until the event happened. A lack of use of the manual is a cause as well as the damage may not of happened if the tail stand was in the wrong location.I yelled across the hangar telling the jacking crew to stop stop stop!!! I was upset and kept shaking my head and asking how and why this happened as a similar event had just happened a company is considering making the recommendation that the tail stands with the buzzers be placed at each base.I recommend that we strongly consider a tech at the tail area when jacking and lowering of the aircraft.  Also there should be a briefing and a walk around performed prior to raising and lowering of the aircraft.

Maintenance Lead on CRJ-200 observed improper aircraft jacking procedures during maintenance visit.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 17400; Flight Crew Type 100

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

At a cruise altitude of 8000 ft; the manifold pressure on the left engine decreased to approximately 22' from 28'. The engine was still producing thrust; but was obviously not operating normally. At the time; I was talking to Approach Control and told them I would like to modify my flight plan and divert. As an experienced pilot; Aviate; Navigate; and Communicate were the words I turned into actions. Analyzing the left engine; running the checklist; and setting up for the approach became my priorities. I was already cleared direct to the field so there was very little communicating I need to do. When handed off to Tower; I was concentrating on an appropriate approach for my condition; slightly steeper to maintain energy in case the left engine failed. As I didn't answer the Tower immediately when they addressed me; the guy said 'I'm declaring for you'. I did not counter his action frankly because I didn't care what he did. My intention was to declare if the left engine stopped producing thrust. Also; as a [Fighter] pilot who has [had] emergencies over 20 times; I am quick to use the resource if needed. In this case; there was no need. The result of the antsy Controller who doesn't understand he is at the bottom of my list of priorities is that now the FAA wants information on a [situation] that wasn't [necessary]. Of course; I supplied them the requested information immediately upon hearing of their request.There needs to be more training for Controllers that a pilot has more to do than talk to a Controller; especially when things are not normal. His disposition and non-stop communications addressed at me was the set up for taking a non-normal situation and turning it into a disaster; e.g. landing gear up or worse. I understand it's within the rights of a Controller to declare if he feels it is in the best interest of the aircraft; but in this case; he added to the work load of a single pilot complex aircraft scenario.

PA-34 pilot reported an unnecessary increase in workload while troubleshooting a malfunctioning engine due to extensive communications by the Tower.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X contacted LNK Tower; 118.5 when 25 miles west of LNK wanting to go to SDA. I was working all the frequencies and had numerous aircraft calling on Clearance and Ground. I assumed that the aircraft was trying to get a clearance to depart LNK to SDA. After several transmissions I figured out that Aircraft X was not on the ground at LNK and needed to contact R90; 'Omaha Approach' to transition through the LNK area airspace. I was also working complex traffic with two H/K35R in the VFR pattern on the west side of the airport; and multiple VFR aircraft departing on the east side of the airport; most also wanting to fly westbound. When Aircraft X called he caused additional frequency congestion and created a frustrating and an unsafe situation since he was flying in another controller's airspace on the incorrect frequency. The pilot may have been confused due to the name change of the airspace.Pilots are confused when transitioning through the LNK area airspace on who to contact for clearance. Several months ago the airspace changed names from 'Lincoln Approach/Departure' to 'Omaha Approach/Departure'. I think that pilots assume that since they are flying near Lincoln they need to contact us and not approach since they are not flying in Omaha area; which is 60 miles NE of LNK. The name for the LNK sector for approach needs to be changed back to 'Lincoln Approach/Departure' to decrease pilot confusion and increase safety in this airspace. Having the pilot contact Tower also increases the workload on the Tower Controller; which can become a safety concern when there is already busy traffic.

LNK Local Controller reports of aircraft calling Tower; causing frequency congestion and confusion. Aircraft should have been on Approach Control frequency which name had previously changed from Lincoln to Omaha Approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 31; Flight Crew Type 31

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

While coming in to land in the C172; a strong right crosswind had developed; causing me to put in a crosswind correction with the left rudder. As I was coming in to land at ZZZ; approximately 20 ft. off of the ground a gust had occurred; causing me to put in even more crosswind correction. The rear two wheels touched down with no issue; and then the nose wheel touched down with some left rudder correction still in place; causing the nose of the plane to veer left on the runway at 65 kt. Not wanting to overcorrect the plane and cause damage to self; plane; or surrounding structures; I took the opportunity to safely guide the plane into the grass to the left of the runway.

C172 pilot reported a runway excursion during a crosswind landing in order to avoid injury and property damage.