Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

During preflight looking at the logbook; it was noted several times that this particular plane was having some issues with the engines specifically. Both the FO and I looked at it and made a mental note. We also went over the 4 MEL's we had on the plane and the one most affecting us was the auto-throttles being out. Once we went through each MEL we continued on our normal preflight duties. There was a discrepancy with the passenger count and also the flight plan fuel numbers were not matching up with the FMS flight planned numbers. The FMS had calculated that we would land in ZZZ1 with roughly 4100 pounds of fuel while the paper work planned us to land with 4824 pounds. This disparity was because at one waypoint; the flight plan had us crossing the point with 13715 pounds of remaining fuel while the FMS had us crossing the same point with 13100 pounds. I called the dispatcher and we went over each point on the flight plan to make sure we were all on the same page. After we concluded that there was adequate fuel; we pushed back and were on our way to ZZZ1. At roughly 15;000 feet in the climb out our ENG 2 PSI dropped from 75-80 and went to 30-33 PSI. This is over a 50% drop in PSI. An amber box illuminated the PSI and there was also an associated rise in the vibration for ENG 2. The vibration was still within limits at roughly 3.2; but was very clearly audible in the cockpit that the higher vibration in the engine was causing the engine to perform differently from ENG 1. This condition lasted for roughly 2 minutes. During this time; both the FO and I were aware of the problem and started talking about it. I was pilot flying so I instructed him to ACARS dispatch and Maintenance about our current situation. We gave a status report of the engine PSI along with the elevated vibration. They responded with something to the effect of 'mx is aware. copy thanks.' After those 2 minutes; ENG 2 went back to indicating normal PSI and lower vibration where we could not hear anything. That homeostasis lasted for another minute before ENG 2 PSI dropped down again with an associated rise in engine vibration. This was now the second indication of getting an erratic with the engine and we were still within 100 miles of ZZZ. At this point; the FO and I were not comfortable with continuing the flight another 2.5 hours to ZZZ1 or roughly 1200 miles. We asked ATC for a level off so we could trouble shoot the problem. We ACARS'd dispatch/maintenance and again updated them on our situation and their response was something to 'run the appropriate QRH'.At this point we asked ATC for box vectors for a possible return to ZZZ. We opened up the QRH and went to LOW OIL PRESS 6.7 in our book. That was boxed in red but was associated if we were actually getting the ENG 1(2) OIL LO PRESS EICAS message. We were not getting that message. However; our PSI was not far from this possibly being an emergency. The QRH again for ENG 1(2) OIL LO PRESS tells you that the oil pressure indication is abnormal and you should go to Engine Shutdown Procedure. We flipped to this section of the QRH and it says to review single engine performance and the second bullet point is to LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. At this point; we as a flight crew decided it would be best to return to ZZZ. ATC asked is we wanted to return to ZZZ and we said yes and we started getting vectors appropriately. We ACARS'd Dispatch/Maintenance about our decision and they were very helpful coordinating with operations letting them know we were returning and getting us gate space. We called back to the FA's and then I made an announcement to the passengers explaining the situation and why we would be returning to ZZZ. Once we made the turn back to ZZZ; we were roughly 100 miles away. We elected to keep ENG 2 running because at this point it was giving us good indications and we concluded that as long as it was giving us positive thrust; the prudent move was to keep it running. Also we talked with Dispatch/Maintenance about landing overweight. Max Landing Weight was roughly 74;000 pounds and we were 78;000 pounds. ATC vectored us onto the arrival into ZZZ with a visual approach. We landed and taxied back to our gate and thus completed the flight. During the debrief; we went over the situation again how the engine had given us 2 erratic indications and how we were confident that returning to ZZZ was the safest choice. I commended my FO and cabin crew for their calm attitude during the whole ordeal and then coordinated with Maintenance for applicable write ups and coordinated with crew scheduling about our switch in schedule.

EMB-175 flight crew reported returning to their departure airport because of oil pressure and vibration problems with Engine 2.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 1068

Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

There were no bird or wildlife reports from ATC or preceding aircraft. Upon a seemingly normal takeoff roll; soon after 100 knots and well prior to V1 we observed large bird take off from the runway (just right of centerline about 150 feet ahead of us) we anticipated a thump from a possible impact of the bird but instead we heard a very loud bang (compressor stall) MUCH louder than an impact of a large bird.  Suspecting possible engine damage associated with the loud bang I rejected the takeoff at 135 knots at 365;000 pounds (planned V speeds; V1 148; Vr 159; V2 164). We called ATC to advise of our situation. We decelerated and exited/cleared the runway and followed procedures and checklists. We observed BTMS numbers of 2's and 4's as we stopped.Completing QRH items; I started the APU and as [ground personnel] approached we observed the BTMS numbers increasing to maximum values of 8's and 9's. When we made interphone contact with the [ground personnel] he advised us that as they approached the aircraft there was some smoke coming from the left brakes and his men had already placed several cooling fans around the aircraft and that the smoking brakes had stopped. He also advised us that the brake temps were reading over 500 degrees from his infrared readings. We advised him not to approach the brakes/tires due to burst possibility and we shut down both engines but left flaps at takeoff position as per QRH. We consulted the RTO brake cooling charts; hot brakes checklists/charts and determined that we were in the Warning zone and calculated an 80 minute cooling time.  We conferred with the flight attendants and verified that the cabin situation was calm and stable. They reported that several passengers observed a burst of flame from the right engine associated with the bird strike. Also an outbound; taxiing aircraft observed/reported the flash of flame from our right engine. (Confirming my suspicions of possible wildlife ingestion) We consulted with Dispatch; Maintenance Control and the [Operations Manager] via SATCOM several times to coordinate and establish appropriate/best options. While we waited out our cooling time; officials took photos and samples of bird remains from our aircraft. We were informed that we had struck not one; but two large birds. We coordinated with OPS and apron control for a gate/hard stand. As our 80 minute cooling time concluded (BTMS values of 1 and 2) we asked contract maintenance to confirm that the fuse plugs had not melted prior to movement. Making timely and appropriate PA's; we coordinated with the FA's (Flight Attendants); we retracted the flaps when clear; we were towed to the hard stand and eventually deplaned. Either the wildlife officials or contract maintenance cleaned all of the blood and feathers from the nacelle and fan before we left the cooling location.  I saw a photo from one of the mechanics and the bloody impact was at the 6 o'clock position centered on the leading edge of the engine lip. About 2 feet wide left and right and about 6 inches toward the inside and about 12 inches along the underside of the nacelle. When we finally were able to exit the airplane; very little evidence remained but upon our post incident walk around and engine inspection. We noted a small amount of wildlife remains on the fan hub; fan shroud; bypass stators and engine compressor inlet.I say 'WE' in most of my narrative because it was genuinely a team effort and I have a great team every time I fly. FO (First Officer) and IRO (International Relief Officer) were exemplary in the performance of their duties and they were an incredible asset during all aspects of this incident. We as a team; made a dozen or so PA's to the passengers; we coordinated and maintained a dialog with the flight attendants; answered multiple simultaneous queries and communications to/from ATC; Police; Ops; Local Maintenance; Dispatch; [Maintenance Control] and [Operations Management] in addition to performing QRH; checklist; FOM; and SOP tasks. The flight attendants did an exemplary job of controlling the cabin; comforting the passengers and providing input to the flight deck.I will speak for the entire crew in that we all feel that we well prepared professionally for this type of event and although the coordination/support of all involved created some communication challenges; we are thankful for such support.

During the takeoff run; at approximately 135 knots [V1-148]; I saw and stated 'bird' ahead of us just right of centerline. I saw the bird start to fly away as we were abeam it. Shortly after that we heard a very loud sound from the right side of the airplane. A reject was annunciated and the appropriate procedures applied. I called Tower and let them know what we were doing. The IRO (International Relief Officer) made a cabin announcement. We exited the high speed taxiway and came to a stop on the parallel taxiway. Tower informed us that they observed a large flame exit the right engine on our takeoff roll. A passenger and a pilot on another aircraft also verified the flame exiting the right engine on takeoff roll. We accomplished the rejected takeoff checklist and also calculated our brake cooling time from the appropriate checklist. 80 minutes was our conclusion. Cooling fans were set up after [ground personnel] informed us that the left brakes were smoking. Dispatch; [Maintenance Control]; and the [Operations Manager] were all called and informed of the situation. After the allotted cooling times and confirmation that the brakes had cooled sufficiently; we were towed back to our original parking spot. Passengers were offloaded.

B767 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff following a bird strike in the right engine that resulted in a compressor stall.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

While cruising at FL400; the two of us noticed a burning smell in the cockpit. Our initial thought was that the cookies had been burnt during the cabin service. The flight attendants were consulted and initially they indicated that nothing was amiss. Then they noticed smoke coming from one of the ovens in the first class galley. The oven door was opened and the smoke seemed to dissipate. At this point we felt that all was well. ATC gave an altitude change to FL370. At this point we again heard from the flight attendants that they thought more smoke was coming from the oven. Both ovens were depowered.  It was decided at this point that I would go back and help in assessing the situation. The inboard oven was a bit warm; but no smoke or smell of smoke was apparent at this point. Shortly after returning to the cockpit; the Purser again called indicating that more smoke had become visible from the oven. The utility buses were switched to OFF. ATC was contacted; and an emergency was declared. A message was sent [to] Dispatch via ACARS; 'Emergency declared smoke in the cabin.'  The decision was made to proceed to ZZZ. Other options were considered as we descended toward ZZZ if our situation were to worsen.   ATC had cleared us direct to ZZZ and the First Officer; who was the Pilot Flying; proceeded direct at nearly max forward speed. Equipment was requested to be positioned for our arrival to ZZZ.  The SMOKE; FIRE; FUMES checklist was accomplished. The flight attendants were advised to use fire extinguishers in and around the ovens as necessary; and they continued to keep us apprised of the situation throughout the arrival.  It was decided that we would not slow for 10;000 feet speed restriction; but proceed as quickly as possible to the airport. Amazingly as we approached the airport; ATC advised us to turn left in order to follow another aircraft.  We twice advised them that we were the emergency aircraft and would be proceeding direct to the airport.  Eventually they diverted the other aircraft away from the runway and us.  As we rolled out on the runway communications with the flight attendants continued until we arrived at the gate. They continued to intermittently spray halon into the affected area as we taxied.  We were prepared to stop and evacuate the aircraft if the situation worsened.  Everyone was waiting for us; firefighters; ramp personnel; but unbelievably we waited nearly 5 minutes for someone to drive the jetway.

The Captain requested emergency equipment standing by upon our arrival; accomplished the SMOKE; FIRE; FUMES QRH; and advised the flight attendants to use fire extinguishers in and around the ovens as necessary.  They continued the status updates throughout the arrival; and aided in the evacuation decision process. Upon hearing the bursts of halon fire extinguishing agent being applied by the flight attendant; we decided to maintain our best forward speed below 10;000 feet to expedite our landing and possible evacuation should an actual uncontrollable galley fire occur. We briefed our plan of distances; speeds and aircraft configuration to efficiently manage our energy state to ensure a safe landing. Then; approaching the airport; ATC advised us to turn left to follow another aircraft approaching from the north!! Twice; the Captain calmly advised ATC that we were the emergency aircraft; and were proceeding direct to the airport. The third transmission was to get all the traffic out of our way for our landing! It was only then that ATC diverted the other traffic away from the runway and us! As we rolled out following landing; communications with the flight attendants continued until we arrived at the gate. We continued to hear intermittent bursts of fire extinguishing agent during our expedited taxi in with fire trucks in close proximity. I contacted Ramp control advising we were on the ground with smoke in the forward galley; requesting the closest available gate. I requested they divert all other taxiing aircraft; and confirm guideman and jetway driver would be available immediately upon arrival at our gate so fireman could board aircraft to help with our emergency. All was accomplished with the exception of having to wait 5 minutes for the jetway driver!?!

Air carrier flight crew detects smoke during cruise (approaching top of descent) which the flight attendants believe is coming from an oven.  An emergency is declared and the flight proceeds to the destination airport at best forward speed.  It is necessary to remind ATC that they are an emergency aircraft to prevent vectoring for traffic.  The jetway operator does not show up until five minutes after the aircraft arrives at the gate.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working a moderate arrival push into the DFW metroplex. During the push the [Radar Assist position] advised me of a code 4402 (Aircraft X) in the vicinity of TRL airport climbing out of about 10;000 feet headed south toward the string of arrivals. The code 4402 was climbing toward Aircraft Z out of 16;000 feet. I stopped Aircraft Z at 15;000 feet and called the traffic to him. Aircraft Z never got the aircraft in sight and I descended him once he was clear of the target. The code 4402 appeared to stop at 14;500 feet. I stopped Aircraft Y at 15;000 feet and called the traffic. Then Code 4402 appeared to climb to 15;500. I turned Aircraft Y 15 degrees right to clear the traffic and continued Aircraft Y down to 12;000 feet. After I turned Aircraft Y code 4402 turned to the east into Aircraft Y. I issued Aircraft Y a further right turn to heading 330 and continued to call the traffic. Aircraft Y received a resolution advisory for the traffic and increased his decent rate. At this time I assume the code 4402 saw Aircraft Y and made a hard turn to the south. The new heading put the code 4402 toward Aircraft A; who was descending on the arrival. I was able to stop Aircraft A at 17;000 feet in case the code 4402 climbed from the current altitude of 15;000 feet. Aircraft A saw the code 4402 on his TCAS and eventually got the aircraft in sight. I asked Aircraft A if he could make out the type of aircraft and he replied it was a 'Fast Mover' and 'Dark in color.' I started a track on the code and coordinated with ZHU that the code was headed south toward the IAH arrival route from the NW and advised them to use caution. Approximately 2 hours later Code 4402 flew back through the sector from the south west still at 15;500. The code 4402 performed multiple 360 degree turns and appeared to land at ZZZ airport. I would contact the operators that work out of ZZZ and advise them of the situation and have them use more caution when performing their 'missions.'

An unidentified VFR aircraft was maneuvering in the vicinity of main arrival routes to an airport. ATC had to vector and assign altitudes to several air carrier aircraft to avoid the VFR traffic.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Training / Qualification; Other / Unknown

Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared to descend via the ELDEE 5. Per our procedure we are to set the bottom altitude of the arrival in the altitude window (8;000 FT) when flying in 'VNAV Path Mode.' The aircraft was on target until the Controller issued 2 speed reductions prior to DRUZZ. We asked for and received relief at DRUZZ. The wind at altitude was roughly 280/80. During the second speed reduction the aircraft dropped out of VNAV Path. Simultaneously we had a pack trip off line. The First Officer began the QRH checklist while I continued with the descent; hustling down to at least be close to the crossing altitude at DRUZZ it did not occur to me that there existed a level portion on the descent between DRUZZ and REVUE until it was too late and we descended below 15;000 MSL. Experience with new automation and accepting the lowest form of automation when a problem exists may be the key to preventing such events. Once the aircraft dropped out of VNAV Path I should have immediately selected the next stepdown altitude (15;000 FT) in the altitude window. Being relatively new on the aircraft I am anxious to master its many modes of descent. Choosing the simplest mode when under duress is usually the safest course of action.

However; prior to reaching REVUE we descended through the required 15;000 FT to approximately 14;300 FT.

When their FMC VNAV Path function was unable to comply with both the ELDEE STAR crossing restrictions and ATC speed restrictions the flight crew of a B737NG attempted to manually comply with the crossing at POOCH at 11;000 FT; but while doing so; descended through the required 15;000 FT between DRUZZ and REVUE. Distraction from a tripped pack during the descent was a contributing factor.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Upon given clearance to taxi [via Foxtrot; we] started taxiing. While on Foxtrot we started to complete taxi checklist. While looking down to verify flaps; replied to checklist then looked up only to see Aircraft Y rapidly crossing my path at intersection Whiskey Kilo. The aircraft did not have [a] taxi light on and was given no clearance to taxi across my taxiway. I applied hard braking to avoid a collision and turned on my Landing lights. ATC queried Aircraft Y with very little reply. ATC was apologetic to us but was confused by what had happened.Event occurred during night operations and at a critical time during the taxi phase. FO (First Officer) was heads down while [I] was in and out during taxi checklist. Aircraft Y approached from left to right (36R-WK exit)/ blacked out except for nav lights and comm out as we taxied on F. We were so close to WK that Aircraft Y was masked behind cockpit window support as we taxied towards 18L. Aircraft Y crossed directly into our path from WK without clearance from Ground. Seemed he was 'zeroed in' on going directly to his ramp with blatant disregard for ATC and other aircraft around him nearly causing a collision.

Air Carrier Captain reported a near-collision during taxi at DFW.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC gave us conflicting clearances for the arrival (3 times); so we were high coming into the approach phase. I had the speed brake deployed and had pulled the throttles back to try to come down to glideslope. The aircraft started to level off while we were high and I went to VS (Vertical Speed) and put in 1;800 feet rate of descent; the aircraft came out of VS and started to level again causing the aircraft to slow. The FO called we [are] in the hook (minimum maneuver speed) and I started to add power; we had a stick shaker for about 1 second. We caught the error and corrected it. We made a stable approach and landed without any further problems. Too many changes too close to the airport. I think the system worked as we caught our error and corrected it in a timely manner.

During the arrival into San Jose; Costa Rica; ATC gave us conflicting clearances for the arrival (3 times); which caused us to be high on PATH. The last altitude assigned was 9;000 feet (I think). The PF deployed the speed brakes in an effort to regain the PATH. The last clearance given was to proceed to ALTOS and descend via the PARRITA 4 arrival. I reprogrammed the FMS for the current clearance. The PF noticed that we were still high on path and reverted the vertical mode to VS (Vertical Speed); selecting -1800 FPM... the aircraft began to transition to a -1800 rate of descent; however we began to slow below our current flap maneuver speed. (I believe we were flaps 1 and there was a speed restriction at TOMAS of 160). The MCP altitude was not set to a lower altitude and the aircraft began to level and slow. I announced that we were in the hook (minimum maneuver speed). The PF began to add power; however stick shaker activated briefly. The PF noticed that the VS window closed (because we captured the MCP altitude). I stated that we did not have the lower altitude set. The PF set the lower altitude in the MCP and selected Flight Level Change (I think). A good correction was made to return above maneuver speed for the current flap setting. The remainder of the arrival an approach was stable and without incident. Due to the language challenges in Costa Rica and the conflicting ATC clearances; there was a breakdown in CRM. While attempting to program the FMS for the current clearance; I (PM) did not verify the correct lower altitude was set in the MCP. Additionally; the PF did not set a lower altitude in the MCP; reverted to VS to try to regain PATH; did not recognize the speed reduction; and did not quickly recognize that the plane was leveling at the current MCP altitude. As a crew; we could have been better at implementing the FOM automation philosophy. Once we noticed that we deviated from our flap maneuver speed; less time should have been spent trying to correctly automate.

B757 flight crew experiences multiple arrival changes during arrival to MROC resulting in the crew getting behind and the aircraft attempting to level and slow prematurely. Stick shaker is encountered and quickly corrected. The approach continues to landing.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

Upon arrival at gate; gate agent noticed the exterior handle on the L1 door was not flush with the door and recessed into the soffit of the door. We discussed the situation with both the gate agent and the #1 flight attendant. Apparently there was a recent change to the arrival procedure where the gate agents are now opening the door upon arrival (completing the entire opening procedure) versus the former procedure where the flight attendant would crack the door and agent would open it after it is cracked. I am concerned the gate agents do not understand or have not been trained to ensure the exterior door handle has retracted into the correct position after the door is opened. If they do not check this as they open the door; many 737 aircraft will be flown this way inducing significant airflow forces on the handles which they were never designed to withstand. It would just be a matter of time before a handle fails and falls off the aircraft in flight.

B737-800 pilot reported he is concerned that gate agents may not understand or lack proper training in aircraft door handling procedures.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

At night; taxiing from off Runway 10R; we were instructed to take Taxiways J;B; and then A to the ramp.  The signage at the intersection of B and A really should be better.  As we taxied by; I looked over my shoulder and could see that going outbound the signage at that intersection was good. Why is it not so; going inbound?  An aircraft was taxiing out from the cargo ramp and we as a crew really had to stop; go heads inside to check our charts to ensure there was no conflict and that we were really seeing Taxiway A.

Air Carrier Flight Crew reports confusion attempting to transition from Taxiway B west bound to Taxiway A at night due to lack of signage during darkness.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

I was assigned a structure repair I have never done before and in an area I have never worked. I laid out the repair and asked the crew chief if that looked about right he said yes. I continued on with installing fastener holes using a drill stop until the repair was ready to install. I got clearance to install and installed the doubler. I came into work the next day to find out I had inadvertently drilled into the frame behind the doubler.

On an MD83; when making a structure repair; the repair person inadvertently drilled into the frame behind the doubler.


Dassault-Breguet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Leveling 10;000 feet on departure; aircraft from behind/below climbed to less than 500 feet of our aircraft and caused climbing RA. We executed climbing RA and advised ATC. ATC gave us climb to 17;000 feet and told Falcon jet to level at 10;000 feet.

Air carrier flight crew had an NMAC with a Falcon jet during departure from DFW airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 1500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We received two flight packages for the evening [for our two planned flight segments].  We noticed on both packages that the NOTAMS seemed to be lacking; specifically for the nightly runway closures that occur in ZZZ.  We knew this due to our experience level at both airports.  I checked the route data brief via the flight ops web page and I confirmed we were missing many NOTAMS that would be applicable for our flights.  The Captain called Dispatch and reviewed the NOTAMS verbally and had them sent via ACARS before we launched.  The Dispatcher told the Captain that they deselect some NOTAMS that they do not find applicable.  I do not agree with this [policy] and did not find this acceptable for our flight. We were specifically missing all the runway and taxiway closure that occur after XA00 at the ZZZ airport. Even if we were scheduled to be in before these closures were to occur; should we block late or have an enroute delay; we would arrive after the closures occurred without the NOTAMS.  Furthermore; if we had some emergency that rendered us without communications and we did not have these published NOTAMS; we could potentially put ourselves and workers on the ground in an extremely dangerous situation because these were omitted from our paperwork.  We only caught this due to our familiarity and experience with these airports.  I do not agree with the NOTAM information being withheld from the aircrew; nor do I think we should have to check behind the Dispatcher via other sources for complete NOTAM information.

A B757-200 First Officer reported they did not receive a complete NOTAM packet for their planned flights and were advised that Dispatchers sometimes withhold NOTAMs they feel are not necessary to include.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Guest in seat 23F was smoking a cigarette at his seat. 20A came to the back galley and had informed [flight attendants] that there was someone smoking. I immediately went into the main cabin and could smell cigarette smoke. [Flight attendant] and I came across 23F smoking. [Flight attendant] confiscated the cigarette and went to the restroom to extinguish. I told the guest that they cannot smoke on a plane. He informed me that it wasn't his fault and that he did it while he was sleeping. I then confiscated his lighter and told him we will return it when we land and he deplaned. [Flight attendant's] got and presented the disturbance report to the guest.  He was very antsy and would stumble like a zombie to the restroom multiple times before we even performed service. We did not smell any alcohol; I thought maybe he had taken a strong sleeping pill. As the flight went on and after the cigarette incident his behavior became more erratic in being up and about. Even though he had used the restroom at least 15 times he would stumble to the back struggling to find the restroom and door handle. He even would try opening other galley structures. After the incident we as a crew felt it unsafe to leave our doors and had to be vigilant of the guests movements at all times. We had to move the guest seated in 23 A; she felt very uncomfortable and was on edge about the guest. 23 F stumbled and shoved a guest waiting in line for the restroom 9C. I said something to 23F and there was no comprehension of what he did and he just stood there like a zombie. A guest in 29 F was uncomfortable with the guest's behavior and discussed it with me. As a crew we decided for the overall safety of the aircraft to divert to have the guest removed in Chicago. In my personal opinion I believe the guest may have been under the influence of a substance.

Flight Attendant reported a guest smoking and the associated behavior of the guest on the flight.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Logbook Entry; Human Factors

Aircraft X; ZZZ Line Maintenance; [date]. Midnight shift. #1 eng has running fuel leak from drain mast...; VSV (variable stator vane) actuator r&r which is RII on install and ops/leak check. Lead [Name 1] signed aircraft logbook entry [following day]. No inspector called even though 3 were on duty. RII signed for in aircraft logbook entry by [name 2]. [Name 2] is not an inspector or qualified for RII of any kind. [Name 1] signs airworthiness release for Aircraft X. Aircraft X leaves ZZZ on revenue flight to ZZZ1. Aircraft X returns to ZZZ on revenue flight. (Both flights noncompliant) with false RII sign off in logbook. Midnight shift is notified of failure by both leads and an inspector is called to inspect and do ops/leak check.[Name 3] feels something is not right with this job and starts to ask questions. I return from days off and continue to dig. [6 days later] FAA inspector [Name 4] is notified in the morning. Cause: both leads are inexperienced and lacking in procedures knowledge. Neither has worked in ZZZ as line mechanics. Suggestions: a requirement of 18 months experience as line mechanic should be in place for a crew chief position (leadman) as it is now a mechanic on probation as new hire can bid and get the job. The men he is assigned to lead cannot be trained and steered correctly to succeed by someone barely able to function in this dynamic and dangerous situation.

Technician reported non compliance with Company manuals and procedures caused an aircraft to fly in revenue service twice with falsified log book entries.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Pushback was delayed due to catering (and vehicles impeding the catering truck from approaching the aircraft).  Following push clearance; the tug began the push but we came to a stop after approx. 15 sec. I thought perhaps something crossed behind us and we would resume the push.  But; after a few more seconds; the tug driver said that a catering truck wasn't moving.  That seemed odd; and the Captain and I wondered why a catering truck wouldn't clear a moving aircraft.  That's when the Captain looked through his side window; over his shoulder and told me; 'THAT'S why the truck isn't moving - it's sitting under our wingtip!' We hadn't felt anything and the tug driver was asked if we were touching.  He said that he couldn't tell.  A crowd gathered.  I informed ramp of our situation and our intent to remain in position to investigate. A maintenance rep came on interphone and let us know it was difficult to determine how close the wingtip was to the roof of the truck.  It was judged safe to set brakes. After some time; it was decided to let air out of the truck's tires.  Personnel climbed atop the truck and after getting a closer look; the truck was moved.  No visible contact/damage was noted but the possibility was mentioned that the winds were moving the aircraft slightly and the wingtip may have bounced off the roof and that may have not been enough to show damage but that an inspection would be the best course of action.  We were cleared to be pulled forward to the gate and the aircraft was taken out of service and the crew and passengers deplaned to the aircraft at the adjoining gate.  The remainder of the flight was uneventful.Since we were being pushed straight back; we did not see the events leading up to the potential contact.  It would seem that a combination of catering truck driver and wing walker inattention may have contributed.[Suggest] Company communications to [the catering company] and maintenance re-iterating the need to be vigilant.

About 60 feet into a routine pushback; the aircraft stopped.  The Tow Driver told us a 'catering truck driver is refusing to move.'  I asked if I should set the Parking Brake.  The Tow Driver said 'No.'  I looked out the left window and saw a catering truck with no driver in the cab.  I called Ramp Control on the radio to report the situation.     I looked out the window again to see a Maintenance Technician on the catering truck's over-the-cab loading platform.  He was leaning on the railing to look toward the aft-right side of the truck.  I opened the aircraft L2 Window to get a better view.  I saw the Left Wing apparently resting on the middle; top-right of the back portion of the catering truck.  I saw numerous Ground Crew and Maintenance personnel walking around the catering truck gesturing at the apparent contact point.     A Maintenance Supervisor saw me looking out the window and got on the Ground Interphone to tell me what was going on.  She said they thought there was actually no contact with the catering truck but couldn't be sure until they employed an operable hydraulic work lift - the first one they tried was inoperative.  I asked how big/small the gap was.  She thought the wing was about an inch from touching the truck; but the wind was causing the aircraft to gently rock; possibly bouncing the wing off the top of the truck.     After many minutes; a plan emerged to deflate the tires of the catering truck and tow it out of the way; preventing any possible further contact with the wing as the wind blew.  After the catering truck was clear; the Maintenance Supervisor got back on the Ground Interphone to tell us the aircraft was being taken out of service as a precaution and a replacement Ground Crew would tow us back to the gate for deplaning.  We were not to set the parking brake until safely at the gate.  Company Operations and Maintenance coordinated a different aircraft for us to continue the flight.     The tow was uneventful.  Once parked; we ran the Shutdown Checklist.  Maintenance Technicians boarded and asked us to not shut down the aircraft.  They also invited the First Officer and me to go outside and get on the work lift to inspect the wing.  To my eye; there was absolutely no indication of any kind that the wing had contacted the catering truck; however; I know that painted panels of modern materials can deform; return to shape; and not show outward signs of damage.  Not that it was my decision; but I concurred with Maintenance in taking the aircraft out of service.     Passengers and crew boarded the new aircraft and departed uneventfully.Cause Unknown.  I would only be speculating on events that occurred out of my view.I can only speculate how this event occurred; so I cannot provide prevention suggestions.

Flight Crew reported a gate return due to possible aircraft damage from a possible collision with a catering truck during push back.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

I was driving my daughter to glider lessons. My car was on the runway. I had my hazard lights on and my headlights on even though it was noon and sunny. I got to an intersection of road and I stopped. I looked both ways. I did see an airplane at one end but it wasn't moving. I waited about 10 seconds. I thought he might be waiting for me but I didn't have a radio to ask so I decided to cross. THAT was wrong. I didn't know better but that isn't an excuse. I thought I was delaying him but I now know that was a terrible decision for me to make. As it turned out the aircraft started approaching. I got out of the way but I scared everyone and feel terrible. In the future I will wait for as long as it takes for the airplane to leave the runway. The airplane has the right of way always.

Vehicle driver reported unknowing entering and stopping a vehicle on the runway while an aircraft was preparing to takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 2120; Flight Crew Type 2120

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

The DEN NIIXX1 arrival [now NIIXX2] has two similar sounding fixes consecutive to each other; BSTON (pronounced 'Boston') and BOSSS; that could be easily confused/misheard.

Air carrier Captain reported similar sounding fixes on the NIIXX 1 [now NIIXX 2] arrival into Denver which might be confused or misheard.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were ferrying an airplane from ZZZ to ZZZ1 that had not been flown since May 2020. There was lots going on with the plane in the hangar when we arrived and we were past the scheduled time of the plane being returned to service. The plane was finally pushed back onto the ramp and the APU was left running for us. Since it had not been flown for quite a while; my FO did a walkaround clockwise and I went counter clockwise to make sure all looked normal on the outside. We then proceeded to contact Dispatch for fuel requirement and did the acceptance checklist so we could make sure everything checked out before we took the plane. I went back inside and watched them sign off the aircraft and put it back into service after talking to Maintenance in ZZZ. I talked once again to Dispatch and printed the paperwork and went back to the plane. During that time the VOR was being updated and Maintenance was still walking back and forth to the plane carrying stuff. One Maintenance worker even came on board at the end looking for a spray that another employee thought he left on the aircraft (he called the Maintenance employee from home to ask him to look for it) and the FO and myself once again did another search of the aircraft inside and out. With everything going on I unintentionally forgot to check on the logbook again and was advised the next morning that it was not on board the aircraft.With the non-normal nature of the flight (coming out of storage);  I would take the time to verify with Maintenance and the crew that the airplane is ready for return to service and ensure all required documents are on board the aircraft. Next time I will slow down and follow the checklist to mitigate this non-compliance and double check that the book is on the aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported being distracted during preflight and the flight departed without the logbook on board.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Other LSA repairman

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 1000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Instructional flight years ago with really good instrument student in stage 3 of a Part 141 program.  Doing cross-country IFR flight planning from ZZZ to POU and student requested to do the VOR Runway 24 approach at POU.  He wanted to work on VOR navigation and using 2 OBS for a non-precision approach. I thought it was a good idea until we had some trouble with ATC that day. I don't know if date is 100% correct; but it was close to Date; which is what made me think of it this year. We requested the approach and then the Controller was very busy confusing it with the VOR-A approach into POU. After attempting to clarify; he proceeded to give us radar vectors for the approach. Both the student and I were a little confused; but went with it despite out actual attitude being less than prescribed for each quadrant of the approach plate. ATC vectoring altitudes can be lower and we were VFR in some turbulence; 10+ SM visibility and clear with no ceilings. The reason for concern was that it is a hilly area and if 'Vectored to Final'; it is directly over the path of the ZZZ1 traffic pattern. There was also some confusion over this instruction as 99% of the time when you are 'Vectored-to-final' the 'intermediate' course is identical to the 'final' approach course with respect to heading/course changes/corrections. Did he want us to fly to the intermediate segment (course 218); intercept; and then remain on segment of published approach; or did he want us to fly to intercept 242 final approach course before that and continue with vectors?  Upon looking this up in 7110 afterwards there seems to be some confusion and ambiguity with these terms when intermediate segment is not the same 'course'.  Being VFR we continued as instructed; but if it were IMC this could be extremely problematic. We were low over unfamiliar terrain; irregular topography; another airport; in turbulence; and NOT on a segment of the published approach; above minimums; until passing the VOR into final. The flight continued there and back without incident and caused the student and I to look into ATC instructions; PIC compliance; instrument approaches; and safe practices during instrument procedures during our next ground lesson. I apologize for not including this form in the lesson during our ground debrief and recap of the situation. It could have been more accurate and useful had we done it with it fresh in our minds.

Instructor pilot reported communications problems with ATC and asked for clarification in approach clearance while flying over terrain below approach altitude.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

There was a line of severe weather moving through the Rochester area at the time of the incident. The two previous arrivals had reported extreme turbulence on final to Runway 4. The regional jet had been planning an approach to Runway 4 but changed his mind due to weather conditions to Runway 28. Runway 28 had just lost the glideslope portion of the ILS approach (PIREP from before I assumed the position). I saw the RJ join the runway 28 final; and heard the MSAW warning in the Tower prior to him changing to my frequency; while the aircraft was still outside the Outer Marker. The aircraft checked in with me over the Outer Marker asking about the weather at the airport. As I was answering his question the MSAW alarm went off again and I issued a low altitude alert to him. I told him he should be at 2;000 feet; and he said he thought the altitude at SUUSA was 1;200. I knew that was incorrect; but I grabbed the approach plate to verify. The crossing altitude for SUUSA is 2;100 feet; and by this point his descent was at 900 feet indicated. He was below the cloud deck and from my vantage point below the hospital between him and the airport. He elected to initiate a go-around at that point and I issued alternate missed approach instructions to keep him away from the weather which was mostly south and east of the airport at that time. On a localizer approach I believe a pilot can descend to the decision height once they cross the final approach fix; but [this crew] either misread the approach or the turbulence caused them to descend lower than they intended. They did report severe turbulence. I should have asked the Approach Controller about the aircraft's status when the first MSAW alarm went off.

I was working radar with heavy to extreme precipitation all around Rochester airspace including around the airport itself. A regional jet checked in and asked how the ride had been on final. I told him that the last aircraft that landed was a CRJ-200 and he reported gains and losses of 20 knots on final with severe turbulence. He then asked if there were any reports since then. I told him I had a C208 on final and I could get him a ride report as soon as he lands. The C208 said he had extreme turbulence on final but smoothed out inside the marker. I then passed this along to [the regional jet]. I noticed that the wind picked up out of the west 300@16 and the Runway 28 final had light to moderate precipitation and Runway 4 now had heavy precipitation. I told the RJ that Runway 28 was available and gave him the wind. There was a 10 mile gap between two areas of heavy precipitation that could get the aircraft to the Runway 28 final approach course. I made the suggestion to the RJ and he wanted to try it. I then turned him onto the final and cleared him for the ILS 28 approach. When I noticed him slipping slightly through the localizer I asked him if he was established and he acknowledged that he was. I then asked him if he was getting a reading on the glideslope and he said he was not. I asked his intentions and he said he wanted to continue on the localizer approach. I cleared him for that and switched him to the Tower. I then got a low altitude alert and noticed he was around 1;200 feet over SUUSA; the final approach fix. The altitude over SUUSA is 2;100 feet. On a three mile final the RJ was at 900 feet and the MDA for that approach is 1;200 feet. The Tower issued a low altitude alert and the RJ decided to go-around. Tower turned him northbound and climbed him to 3;000. The Tower told me what he was doing and switched him to my frequency. I identified him and asked his intentions; he wanted to go to Buffalo at four thousand feet so I cleared him direct Buffalo to maintain four thousand and entered a new flight plan. Better communication between the Tower; Radar Controller; and pilot could have possibly prevented this situation.

Two ROC controllers describe an attempted Regional Jet approach to Runway 28 at ROC in heavy weather. The glideslope had failed prior to the RJ's arrival but this was not relayed to Approach Control. The crew attempted a localizer only approach but was 900 feet low at the FAF and 300 feet below MDA three miles from the field. Minimum safe altitude warnings are issued and the RJ crew goes around and elects to divert.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4600; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Before leaving; we all were trying to check DUATS and weather but were having very difficult time maintaining an internet connection due to the mass of cellular and broadband electronic traffic clogging the system. We all (both crews) could see we had CAVU weather at Alpena. We checked the Foreflight information on Alpena. I did not see a NOTAM regarding the Tower being open on the date of our flight. We reviewed the AFD and saw that the APN Tower was a Monday to Friday operation; except holidays. Weather was pressing into our departure so we hurried to preflight the planes and leave our departure airport before the weather reached the area. I departed first with another aircraft to follow in about an hour. I flew VFR at 7;500 FT and proceeded direct to Alpena. Weather was CAVU and I gave a pilot report to flight service. As I approached to within 40 miles of Alpena; I listened to ASOS; and then I called Approach Control 128.42 (as published on the approach plates) several times and got no response. As I neared the airport; I radioed UNICOM several times on 122.95 with no response. I displayed the ILS or LOC Runway 1 approach on my iPad at about 10 miles out and again called Approach Control as published with no response. I did not call Tower because my experience at other military or joint use bases was that if Approach Control was closed; the Tower was also (example NHK). The AFD had the Tower listed as a Monday-Friday operation. I landed and taxied to the gas pumps. I could not see a single person on the airport. Shortly after landing; I was approached by a person who told me the Tower wanted to talk to me and he gave me the phone number to use. The Tower scolded me for landing without a clearance; and admitted they had nothing going on at the time. I questioned them about the no response to Approach Control. They stated that they use center for Approach Control on weekends when they operate the Tower. I asked why that is not published. They had no answer. The AFD publishes an Approach Control facility frequency for operation 2100z-1300Z but does NOT specify use other hours on weekends. To prevent this from recurring; the AFD should be clarified that it will be Approach Control during weekend daylight hours when the Tower is in operation. The approach plate needs this same addition. In hindsight; I should have also called the Tower before landing and I should have used the CTAF frequency instead of the UNICOM frequency. Turbulence at the lower altitude was bouncing me around with a moderate bump requiring more attention than normal to controlling the plane and locating the airport since I had never been there before; but with all the published information showing a MON-FRI operation and Approach Control not responding; I wrongfully assumed the Tower was closed at published. I would also suggest that the AWOS could have a recorded messaged tagged on during weekend tower operation. This would also notify the errant VFR pilot that Tower was open contrary to published AFD.

The Airport Facilities Directory (AFD) does not indicate that on weekends APN is a Class D Airport and that ARTCC acts as Approach Control during that time.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

L2 Door arming lever stuck would not go down. Maintenance called. During takeoff burning smell very strong in cabin. During climb CA (Captain) called to inform us landing gear stuck down and returning to ZZZ. Returned without incident. When (Flight Attendant) FA-A called for doors armed; my arming lever would not go down on L2 DOOR. It felt like something was jamming the arming lever. Called FA-A. She came and tried it. It wouldn't budge. CA came to aft to try the door. It still wouldn't budge. Maintenance was called. They came out and opened and looked at the door. Then closed it a few times. After he closed the door the arming lever worked. I'm positive a part or something was stuck in the door. Maintenance was a bit shady and looked like they didn't know how the door worked. I felt uneasy. Maintenance seemed unsure. We then pushed back and took off. During takeoff a burning smell came into the cabin. It was so strong it burned and irritated my nose and started giving me a headache. People were covering their nose and mouth. I called FA-A. It was just as bad in the fwd [cabin]. After a few seconds the CA called and said the landing gear was stuck down and we would be returning to ZZZ. We stayed in our (jumpseats) JSs and landed without incident.

EMB-175 Flight Attendant reported burning smell in cabin shortly after takeoff.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

DENVER SPECIAL!Aircraft Y checks on to my frequency from Denver 8 level at FL360; but FL370 is in the data block! I have head on traffic at FL360! I asked Aircraft Y to verify his assigned altitude. He confirms he's assigned FL360 (he's eastbound). Aircraft Y and Aircraft X's conflict alert goes off. I now have to call Denver 8 and Denver 18 to get control to climb Aircraft Y! With only two minutes Aircraft Y needs to be level at FL370 and he's climbing at 500 feet per minute. I ask how long it will take the pilot of Aircraft Y to level. He responds 15 seconds. I visibly notice his rate of climb increasing to expedite up!I have filed countless reports in order to remedy these unsafe; daily situations. Many more go unreported on a daily basis. Reporting has been completely ineffective!

ZMP Controller reported an unsafe situation that he continually receives from another Centers Sector. Controller has reported many times the problems with the other center and advises nothing is being done about it.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff after V1 during rotation; both the Captain and I felt unusual vibrations with the aircraft. We continued to raise the gear and noted no abnormalities other than the vibrations which at the time were thought to be wake from [the aircraft that] departed prior to us. During cruise we talked about issues it could have been; and to be cautious we both agreed it may have been something to do with the wheels/tires. However; no abnormal indications with our landing gear retraction or brake temperature were to be found so we continued to [our destination]. The flight attendants also noted no abnormalities from the cabin and the flight proceeded as normal. On arrival we opted for the longest runway just in case any issues were to arise. During gear extension we listened for any abnormal sounds and none were noted. Our touchdown on landing was normal; but followed by the same type of vibrations felt previously on takeoff. I brought the aircraft to a slow taxi speed with mostly thrust reversers and with little braking could feel the aircraft wanting to pull to the right. After exchange of controls we exited the runway and continued a slow taxi to the gate safely. Both the Captain and I did a post-flight walk around and found the outboard tread on the right side main landing gear had about a third missing. Cosmetic markings from the tread could also be seen under the wing/flaps. We contacted Dispatch and they said they would notify [departure airport] Tower that there may be tire tread on the runway. After we found the issue on the walk around; I also contacted [arrival airport] Tower and notified them of the issue we had; and advised they do a runway check to make sure no tire debris was on [the] runway. I would also like to note that on my preflight walk around I checked the tires and did not note any abnormalities.I do not have any suggestions as we couldn't be sure as to what the problem was until landing. We could have turned back although; again; we had no indication as to what exactly the problem was. I do think we made the correct decision in choosing the longest runway. I feel as though the flight was operated the safest way it could have been with the given circumstances. CRM here was also great as both the Captain and I talked and prepared for all scenarios.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported a vibration on takeoff and landing was later found to be tread separation of the outboard main landing gear tire.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Often times online we make decisions about the safe operation of our aircraft with immediate feedback that the decision was correct.  These decisions are obviously correct because there were no adverse effects to the operation; so we immediately discount them to conserve brain power and focus on the next potential threat.  It's only after some time spent in our own beds at home and a home cooked meal that we start to reflect on these decisions.  After 10;000 hours in the left seat of the E170 I realize that anytime I am saying the words '...I don't know..' there are only three possibilities.  The first possibility is that I have had my head up my rear for years and should have known better; it's something that's not known; or something has changed.  In any case it's time for me to do some research and find out so that I'm not say 'I don't know' again the next time.  This is one of those decisions I am now reflecting on and this report is more of a request for someone to point out my obvious misunderstandings and not so much a concern over possible violation of SOP/FARs.  This is a question about receiving a GPWS displayed (no aural warnings) on the 17R LOC approach to AUS; glideslope (GS) out of service; in VFR conditions. Approaching AUS the NOTAMS and ATIS stated that the 17R GS was out of service.  It is a VFR day but I decide it's a great time to practice a non-precision approach.  I input and briefed the LOC 17R approach and after being cleared for the visual at 4;000 outside of CHADE I commence the approach; dialing 3;000 to BROMS; 2;100 to HOMAL; and 900 for the minimums.  However; as I try to maintain a mostly consistent Flight Path Angle (FPA) 3.0 degree descent I tried my best to ensure making the 1;040 at WUPGA before continuing down to 900 feet; which I believe I did.  As accurate as memory serves; it was only inside of WUPGA after leaving 900 feet that the PFD started flashing a GPWS; there were no aural warnings.  I was visual throughout the approach and landing.  I scanned the VASI which did show I was slightly low but in no danger of terrain; as I remember I just scanned more vigilantly; corrected slightly; and completed the seemingly normal landing; which was probably slightly low on the GS at points. However; I believe we were inside airport property; or very close.  With no aural warnings; nothing seemed out of the ordinary; and the First Officer noticed nothing irregular and had no response when I asked him why the GPWS was blinking on the PFD.   I know the obvious recommendation here is to stay on the GS; that's what it's for right; but as I recall I wasn't what seemed to be terribly low and I could see the runway perfectly.  We were certainly not in any danger of hitting the ground.  If I was too low why did the GPWS just blink and not give a 'TOO LOW TERRAIN' warning?  If this had been an actual stormy IMC approach at night I would have been quite concern about this.In hindsight and evaluating the approach I'm thinking about the WUPGA step down fix; there is obviously some reason for this step down.  Analyzing the approach chart I see there is a 574MSL tower of some sort (not seen on my visual approach) that is inside of WUPGA!  I would expect this tower to be outside/further away from the airport than WUPGA; it would make sense to have a step-down fix that 'steps you down' AFTER you clear the fix and NOT before.  In any case here are a few of my questions for clarification; I hope there is someone that can access this approach [in flight operations] and is able to give me a reality check between my perception and the facts; this was day four of our trip after all.  Does our GPWS have towers programmed into the database and how does this work?  Does the GPWS warn of terrain as in 'dirt only' or does it raise the 'terrain' floor everywhere for towers; if so does it do this only within some proximity to towers/obstacles?  What does just blinking 'TERRAIN GRND PROX' on the PFD actually mean al alert (getting close to the threshold; or actually losing the clearance margin) and what would be my required response to this in actual IMC where I can't see a clear path in front of the aircraft?  Was I too close to this 574 foot tower; and had I been closer would the GPWS given me an aural warning for this tower?  Was the aural warning active but silenced with the 'K' codes due to proximity to the runway?  We are trained to respond to the GPWS aural warnings and we don't really care whether it is actual dirt or a tower; but we are not trained on what a blinking only indication means.   If this is an indication because of deviation from the GS should this not be disabled (as should be the GS indicator in my opinion) when programming in and conducting a LOC approach?

An ERJ-170 Captain questions his knowledge about EGPWS capabilities and the blinking 'TERRAIN GRND PROX' alert.


Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was working LC; and observed a VFR target northbound near ALIKE around 075. It's not unusual to see VFR aircraft transitioning in a corridor just east of the airspace; and I didn't think much of it at first. I turned my attention to a helicopter operating on the airport; and the next thing I remember was hearing the CA going off. I saw on the RACD an IFR target causing the CA; and transmitted in the blind to see if the other VFR aircraft '4 NE of BJC at 076' was 'on' (frequency). There was a brief pause; and right as I was about to transmit again; a 'Cessna at 7;600' responded. I immediately issued a traffic alert for a BE20 that was southbound at 080; less than a mile away and less than 500 feet above him. The Cessna who appeared to have drifted into D airspace northwest of ALIKE; and he reported the traffic was in sight. I then approved the Cessna for transition through D Airspace; and he continued northbound without further incident. Recommendation; this event highlights an area of concern regarding VFR pilots transitioning just outside of controlled airspace to the east. The area between EIK and downtown Denver; with DEN to the East and BJC to the West; can present hazards to a VFR pilots due to traffic volume; especially when pilots are not transitioning the area with D01 or BJC ATCT. Denver Class B airspace is close to this corridor to the east; and arrivals to both BJC and APA can present traffic conflicts as well; even if traffic is level at 080. Possible conflicts are greater if conflicting aircraft inbound to BJC are descending from 080 for visual approaches and/or turning final at 070 for their instrument approaches. While this pilot was following a good suggested technique by at least having our frequency tuned in and monitoring; the traffic advisory/alert could have been relayed more quickly if the pilot had requested ATC services to begin with; while in the vicinity of Class B and Class D airspace. The message I'd like to give to the pilot communities: ATC is here for a reason; so rather than circumvent controlled airspace (or risk a Pilot Deviation if you don't!); talk to us and take advantage of ATC services.  Even if you believe you'll pass just clear or just above D airspace; as long as the frequency isn't too busy; check in: having your VFR aircraft on frequency enhances safety. From the Tower perspective; worst case we might have is to transition outside the airspace if we're too busy or we'll simply acknowledge your presence if you're passing outside our airspace; and that's it. Getting ATC advisories could save you (and us) a scare from a near midair; or even save your life!

BJC Controller described a conflict event between an IFR aircraft and a VFR aircraft that had drifted into Class B airspace; the Controller suggesting that VFR aircraft request ATC services in the subject airspace.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 14912; Flight Crew Type 887

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

We had a slight change to our initial departure but this was minimal. We were flying at an initial altitude of FL 350 and going slightly faster than flight plan to make up some of the time. Approaching [our next cruise] intersection we received an FMC message FUEL DISAGREE-PROG 2. Looking at the page we discovered a discrepancy between the calculated and totalizer fuel reading. I checked the QRH and did not see a listing for FUEL DISAGREE-PROG 2 in either the index at the front or the index in the fuel section. The totalizer appeared to be the correct amount and I selected that option. At [the intersection] we discovered a 4000# difference between the [calculated] expected fuel and what we had on board. I sent a message to Dispatch via ACARS letting her know this. She replied asking if we were flying the flight plan altitude and speed. I replied that were we at flight plan altitude and going slightly faster .80 vs flight plan of .78 mach but that wouldn't account for that large of a discrepancy. She agreed and re-ran the Flt plan since our ZFW was down 6000# from the original and it showed us landing with 13.9 of fuel vs the 16.8 on the original FP. This was more in line with what we were seeing. We continued to monitor the fuel and were seeing slightly more fuel used vs the current burn rate. Approx 28 minutes later at the next point we were now down approx 5700# from forecast. Around this time; we had used all of the fuel in the center tanks and had turned off the center tank fuel pumps and were tank to engine. Concerned that we might have a fuel leak; we again brought out the QRH and began reviewing the Fuel Leak section. It was then that we discovered on 120.3 of the QRH the FUEL DISAGREE-PROG 2 in the Fuel Leak section and proceeded with that checklist. At this point we were seeing only a slight disagreement between the 2 main fuel tanks. I decided to contact Dispatch via phone patch. [Maintenance Control] and the [Chief Pilot] were both also brought in. I transferred control of the aircraft as well as the radios to the FO (First Officer). While talking with all 3 we began to see a steady decrease in the fuel in the left main tank as opposed to the right. After approximately 30 minutes we had a 1500# difference between the tanks (by the time we landed this had increased to approx 2500# difference). We were also seeing a steady decrease in our expected landing fuel in the FMC. I directed the FO to call to the back and ask the FA's (Flight Attendants) to check behind both wings for anything unusual such as vapor or spray coming off of the wings or from the engines. They reported back that it appeared that there was some type vapor coming from the left engine/wing and nothing on the right side. At this point; suspecting a possible fuel leak; I informed all 3 parties ([Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the Chief Pilot]) that we were going [divert]. ZZZ was the nearest suitable airport approx 80 miles off our right wing. They were all in agreement. I directed the FO to [advise] ATC and start coordinating with them for a divert to ZZZ. ATC turned us direct to ZZZ. I ended the call with Dispatch with her telling me they would begin coordinating with the ZZZ station to prepare for our arrival. Throughout the entire phone patch we kept having repeated issues with the transmission cutting out and them not being able to hear me or vice versa. This required both parties to have repeat what had been previously said and increased the length of the call.I began getting everything set up for the divert to ZZZ and then briefed the FA's telling them what was going on; approx time to landing and to review the Prep for Evac but that I anticipated a normal landing. I then told the passengers what was going on. While I was doing this the FO was getting ATIS and landing data for ZZZ; setting up the FMC and talking with ATC. We briefed the approach and then I took back control of the aircraft as the flying pilot. We continued our descent into ZZZ and were vectored for a visual approach to XXL. We had a normal; smooth touchdown and taxied clear of the runway. It took approx 15 minutes from [deciding to divert] to touching down in ZZZ.Emergency vehicles and personnel were standing by and followed us to our stopping point. They reported seeing and smelling fuel coming from the left engine. We shut down the left engine; turned off the left main fuel pumps and started the APU. Emergency personnel still reported seeing fuel coming from the engine and since the APU running had caused one of the left main fuel pumps to turn back on we shut the APU back down. It was determined that they would tow us to the ramp and deplane the passengers there. The fuel leak had slowed considerably. We again started the APU and shut down the right engine. While this was going on we began to smell fuel in the cockpit and were getting reports that they were smelling fuel in the cabin as well. The FA's asked for permission to open a door or two to ventilate the cabin. I directed them to disarm and crack the forward and aft doors on the right side of the aircraft and to keep a FA posted by both doors. I made a PA announcement to the passengers asking them to remain seated and not go near either of the doors. Once we were ready for the tow; the open doors were closed and re-armed and we were towed to a position on the North ramp where an air stairs and buses were waiting for the passengers. With the fuel leak on the left side; I directed that the passengers be deplaned from door 1R and that the remaining doors remain armed in case an evacuation became necessary. Once the last of the passengers were off the aircraft; all remaining doors were disarmed. The passengers and FA's were transported to the terminal to await a rescue flight. We had no reports of any injuries to the passengers or crew. The FO and I remained at the aircraft to assist in repositioning the plane to another spot where maintenance would be able to work on the aircraft. We finally finished [late at night]. We proceeded with the Station Manager to the terminal and secured hotel rooms for the night. Once at the hotel; I began making phone calls to Dispatch; [Maintenance Control; and the Chief Pilot] to brief them on the [situation]. As an FYI; a Human Factors Checklist was not run on either of us.

B757 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing a fuel leak during cruise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 28000; Flight Crew Type 2400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Climbing north on the SID we entered icing and turbulence. The anti icing turned on normally. After a couple minutes an EICAS massage; #2 Bleed Fail followed by a couple more anti ice failures. We started the QRH to deal with the bleed failure. I hoped we would soon climb out of icing conditions. By now we were approaching 10;000 ft. and cleared to FL230. Before finishing the bleed failure QRH; approximately 15;000 ft. we started loosing cabin pressure. We reached FL220 till we leveled off [received priority handling]. We used our crew O2 masks and the cabin oxygen deployed. Also started a decent and with ATCs suggestion and help we diverted to ZZZ1 and landed.Looking back it would have been better to return to ZZZ.

Loss of Engine Bleed Air resulted in an emergency descent caused by loss of cabin pressure and anti ice protection; requiring a diversion.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was inbound to RWY 10 at STT from the south. I had been given radar vectors to be sequenced behind a B757; who was inbound from the north. As I was receiving vectors at 1500ft that took me slightly north of the localizer (and slightly downwind of the jet's position); the jet was on the localizer ahead of me; coming through my altitude on the glideslope. The SJU Approach Controller advised 'caution wake turbulence' and had me switch over to Tower. At this point I am below and a little downwind of the jet; and behind by what I'd estimate to be about 3-4 miles. I decided to go to in-range power at this point to put a little more distance between me and the B757.  I would much rather be above the wake than below it; but I knew in order to safely get above it; I'd have to get upwind of it (right and south of localizer course). As I started to make my way to that side of the course; I felt a sharp shake of the airplane and then a quick snap roll to the left; close to 90 degrees of bank. I regained control of the airplane and brought it back to level flight using aileron and rudder. I checked all gauges and looked around the visible surfaces of the airplane and noted everything was working the way it should. I turned around and gave the 6 passengers a questionary 'thumbs up' and received thumbs up back. I turned back around and continued to fly.  The plane did not fly any differently after this event; so I continued the VFR approach; 2 dots above the glideslope until I landed without incident.   Upon arriving at the gate and after shutdown; I asked all the passengers if they were OK and apologized for the event. Everyone seemed fine and I only received one question asking what that big bump was. I explained in simple terms what happened and everyone proceeded to deplane. I take full responsibility for this wake turbulence event. Even though ATC vectored me below and downwind of the B757; it is my responsibility as PIC to avoid wake turbulence. I should have either asked for an avoidance deviation or just deviated and explained later. Visualizing where you think the wake is either drifting or not drifting (based on winds) to is also important.

C402C Pilot reported encountering wake turbulence that resulted in a 90 degree bank on approach to STT in trail of a B757.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft arrived late. Did not see this crew. MX write up APU overspeed on start. APU MEL'd. During preflight noticed a lot of left rudder trim; approximately 3 units. Centered it. Departed; FO flying; and I noticed he was having to apply a lot of left aileron so suggested he trim it up with some rudder trim. TOC did my fuel calculations on the flight plan and saw we should arrive with about 6.9 on the gas. 400 lb imbalance at TOC left tank low; so balanced fuel. Abeam ZZZ again saw a 400 lb imbalance; again left tank low. Balanced for the last time. Abeam ZZZ1 again watched the imbalance occur. QRH consulted as I'm thinking possible fuel leak as ALL engine parameters are dead on and aircraft is in trim. Decide to go back into the cabin myself and observe behind the left engine for any signs of a fuel leak. None observed. Back in the cockpit I have FO call MX control. Confer with MX and he checks history. Fuel gauge has a history and he is confident that it is a bad gauge. My only indication of a history is that which is my paperwork about the left gauge showing an error code when the fuel qty. test is done on preflight. At this time we are showing over a 1;000 lb imbalance. I disconnect the auto pilot again and check for any roll tendency or out of trim condition. None noted. CDU showing message 'using reserve fuel' and now showing arriving with 5.0 on the gas. With all information from MX we opt to continue. I had asked dispatch for WX for several divert airports. All were ok as far as WX goes. My dispatcher took it upon herself to ask the chief dispatcher to have ATC give us priority handling as they had planned to have us hold for several minutes at some point on the arrival. That step she took saved this flight from a much different outcome I feel. Normal descent and approach to visual approach. Short final below 500 ft I catch a glimpse of an amber caution light on the left aft fuel pump. Normal landing and taxi in. Asked line MX to have a mechanic come to the gate and meet with us. Left gauge 980 lbs; Right gauge 2650 lbs. Aft left pump light still illuminated. Showed this to the mechanic and asked if we could dip stick the left wing. We all went out and went to the number one drip stick nearest the wing root. As the drip stick extended to the max we could hear the float hit the bottom of the wing. The left gauge is accurate 980lbs in that wing at touchdown. Suggest we turn off the electric hydraulic pump in the left tank. Mechanic tells me he is familiar with this jet and issue. Looks at me and says 'I was afraid something like this would happen'. If we had held on descent I'm pretty sure this would have been a much different outcome. What about the previous flight if they had to go around or divert for WX? They thought they had landed with 7.7 on the gas. This has shaken my confidence in our MX department. With the 60 day history he had in front of him I wish MX control had come clean and said 'With what I'm seeing with this gauge being MEL'd recently and some other strange issues I don't have a lot of confidence in what this thing is telling you'. I would have diverted enroute if I had been given an honest assessment of this gauge. I will happy to discuss this with anyone if you need or want any different information other than what you see here.

A B737 Captain reported on an unreliable fuel quantity gauge; which had a history of problems but was reportedly operating normally. He was unknowingly landing in a low fuel situation; until he received low fuel pressure indications on short final.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 18

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

The First Officer (FO) was flying his first arrival to CRP; and I believe the last time I was there was more than a decade ago; but needless to say we were not familiar with the CRP environment. We had been kept high on the arrival by ATC and were hurrying to descend to be stabilized for the approach. We realized that we would be too high for the approach and requested a 360 degree turn for our descent from the Tower. They approved us to maneuver either left or right as requested and we initiated a go-around and a 360 degree left turn in VMC conditions. In retrospect this was probably not a good decision as we were not very familiar with the airport environment but the good weather conditions had me not worried about the maneuver. We initiated the go-around above 1;000 feet; but descended slightly during the first part of the turn. I directed the FO to climb to 1;000 feet which he slowly did. I had referenced the approach plate and noticed that the obstacles on the plate in our quadrant were at 487 feet and our climb ensured clearance from them. During the 360 maneuver the FO lost sight of the airport but I had it in sight and talked him through the turn back to the landing runway. The FO completed the maneuver but we were again not in a position to make a safe landing as we were not well aligned with the landing runway and initiated another go-around again getting approval to stay with Tower but we maneuvered in a right hand pattern so the FO could see the runway in the turn. I directed a climb to 1;500 feet for the 579 foot towers west of the field. The FO informed me he had lost sight of the field and wasn't sure what maneuver we were doing while on downwind. This is when I realized I had not adequately communicated my intentions for the pattern we were flying. We were maneuvering visually so I took control of the aircraft and directed the FO to resequence the FMC course on the RNAV Approach we were using as a backup; and extend the centerline. I completed the base turn; final turn; and landed uneventfully on Runway 18. The simplest solution to this event was to accomplish a straight ahead go-around and let Approach Control vector us back to final. We had plenty of fuel for that option. But the desire to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible led me to make a bad decision; and choose a visual maneuver which we don't practice. This was also the last leg on a day that began very early in domicile and I was sleep definitely feeling the effects of a poor night's and the fact that I have flown seven out of the last eight days on trips in the window of circadian low; and the additive effects of this were building up. I did brief the FO at the beginning of our day that I was tired and that would be an additive condition for me today. While we were backing up the visual approach with the RNAV procedure; the visual maneuver we flew could have been made safer by allowing Tower or Approach Control to call our pattern; even at the cost of additional time and fuel. I do give the FO credit as he was very forward with his inexperience at CRP and communicated with me that he wasn't sure what we were doing in the middle of the second maneuver. The safer option with all the conditions affecting this flight would have been to accept help from ATC in the form of vectors.

The event began during the transition from the arrival to the approach. The visibility at the field was about 10 SM with haze/mist. The approach that we had planned was a visual backed up by the RNAV Runway 18. We were in a -300. Because I've only flown the -300 a handful of times; I had decided to configure early. I began a speed reduction at about 15 miles from the FAF and asked for flaps 1 at 12 miles while slowing from 210 to 170 knots. I had asked for flaps 5 at this point. The Captain hesitated and stated were still 12 miles out. I said ok let's hold off. We continued to about 10 miles; and then ATC gave us a left turn towards the airport and told us advice when we see it. We were both outside looking and in that process I had lost my situational awareness with my altitude and speed. We picked up the field at about eight miles or so and were high. The Captain said we were going to have to do something to get down. I agreed and called for gear down flaps 15 and began to slow. The Captain had recommended S-turns to which I had agreed. I was thinking I might as well try to get down; and if I'm still high at 1;000 feet; I'll just go around. We got to about 1;200 feet or so and I suggested that perhaps we should just go around. He asked the Tower for a 360. He then told me to turn to the left. There was some confusion in my mind and so I verified a left 360? He affirmed and said he'd bring my flaps back up to 15. I agreed and began the turn. I added power to level off but not enough power and lost about 300 feet-400 feet of altitude during the maneuver. He had pointed that out to me; and I added more power and climbed back up to 1;000 feet. As we completed about 270 of turn he asked if I saw the airport which I did not. I informed I couldn't see it but he said ok just keep the turn coming. Once I did pick it up I saw that we were not in a good position to maneuver safely to land. We both decided at that point to go around which we had done. He had asked the Tower for right hand traffic. They had cleared us to make right hand traffic and cleared us to land. We were about two miles North of the runway climbing to 1;500 feet and the Captain had asked me to turn right. I then told him that I was confused. In my mind I was thinking I would climb straight out above the airport and enter a downwind somewhere midfield or beyond and come back around while keeping the runway in sight off my right. He said just turn right and make right traffic. So I had turned and lost visual with the field while on the downwind. We turned on a base heading while looking. Finally he said he saw it and I was still looking. He then said ok I have it to which I had given him the aircraft. We had continued and landed without any further event. Some of the threats were low time in a -300 aircraft; marginal visibility; lack of automation; lack of an ILS. Some of the errors were poor communication by not being more vocal about my Situational Awareness (SA) and what I would prefer to do; as opposed to following directions on where to turn etc. lack of communicating our plans and intentions to one another. Another error was my lack of scanning in and out while turning and looking for the field while climbing and configuring. Poor decision to maneuver at a low altitude as opposed to climbing straight out and re-entering a boxed traffic pattern.I think S-turns are ok on final unless below 1;000 feet; but a 360 or other maneuvers that cause you to lose sight of the field could create an unsafe condition; especially if it hadn't been briefed. Always verbalize how you feel and what you would rather do. As a Pilot Flying; I learned I need to be more assertive with decision making; especially a go-around.

B737 flight crew reports being high and fast for a visual approach to Runway 18 at CRP; with the First Officer flying. The Captain requests a left 360 which results in a misalignment and a go around. The missed approach is turned into a visual right downwind prior to reaching the runway. Turning base to final the First Officer cannot pick up the runway and the Captain makes the landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Captain told us we would have about 30 minutes for service and that there would be moderate turbulence that would require us to suspend service 15 minutes before landing prior to departing ZZZ. The Captain would not tell us to fore-go service and would not back us up when we expressed our concerns about the short time and the fact that there would eventually be moderate turbulence. 30 minutes to set up; take orders; pass out snacks; serve a full plane; do seconds; clean up the galley; clean; and secure the cabin. We were not even finished with our drink service when we were instructed to clean up and take our seats for about the last 15 minutes of the flight. Cleaning the galley and securing the cabin required us to be up after we were told to be seated as we would have no additional time before landing to secure the galley.This is the second time this month my safety as well as my crew's safety has been jeopardized with not enough briefing information and also us being required to do a FULL beverage service on flights under 60 minutes of actual flight time. This has been the requirement on many flights throughout the last two years. It is not safe to be out of our jumpseats serving on flights under 60 minutes. We have to setup; take orders; pour; get snacks out; make several trips to and from the galley with full trays; do seconds; pick up trash; break down the galley setup; pick up trash again; and secure ourselves in our jumpseats before landing. On some flights; the flight crew is still up after final descent bells [while] cleaning their galleys.

B737 Flight Attendant reported lacking the adequate time to safely perform required cabin service on short flights in turbulent weather.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I was scheduled to deadhead to work a one leg flight. Upon arriving; I immediately went to the departure gate which was across the hall. I was met by the Passenger Agent and Captain; who informed me that they had already boarded and were ready to go as soon as we (another deadheading flight attendant and I) were settled. I walked on the aircraft; introduced myself to the Lead and proceeded aft to stow my belongings. Once I was back there; I realized that there were no other flight attendants on board. I approached the Lead and asked where the boarding flight attendants were and she stated they had a deadhead flight to get to. I had a discussion in my recurrent training last year that addressed this scenario. I was advised that if there are through passengers only one Flight Attendant is needed since those passengers have been briefed on the safety equipment. However; once you have boarded the flight attendants must stay on the aircraft since the new passengers have not yet been briefed on the safety equipment. I don't believe anyone was aware of this besides me.I believe Operations shouldn't board a flight unless they are certain the boarding crew can stay until the other crew arrives. I also feel there needs to be more training on this with flight attendants; flight deck; and Operations; as I don't think anyone else realized this was an issue.

A flight attendant who had deadheaded to work a flight boarded the outbound airplane to find passengers had already been boarded despite having fewer than the required number of flight attendants on board.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

We were in communications with Atlanta Center enroute to AGS. The tower was closed. The ceiling was reported clear and we had the airport in sight about 10 miles west of the airport and were cleared for a visual approach. As we set up for a 5 mile right base we saw a broken layer ahead and below us which would prevent us from maintaining VMC. We requested vectors for the ILS runway 17 approach and were given a left turn direct the initial approach fix and instructed to fly the full procedure. No altitude assignment was provided and we were at 1800 feet. The charted procedure requires an altitude of 2500 during the initial segment of the approach.Meanwhile; a small twin; which was originally instructed to hold at IRQ VOR since he was Number 2 for the airport; had cancelled IFR and was now on an approximately 10 mile final. He was no longer communicating with the controller. The controller did not provide any traffic advisories after clearing us direct the IAF (we may have been below radar coverage). We identified the conflict on TCAS when the small twin was 5 miles away and directly head-on and descending into us. A few seconds later; I initiated a right 90-degree turn. I had not yet initiated a climb to 2500 feet since I was concerned with separation from the VFR small twin. While in the turn; we received a TCAS TA followed a few seconds later by a descending RA and I began a descent. I estimate that the lateral separation from the small twin during closest approach was 1 nm and vertical separation of 200 feet. The near-miss occurred in VMC; above a cloud deck and I maintained visual contact with the small twin at all times. We subsequently completed the full ILS procedure for runway 17.The controller was busy; but he should have been aware of the location of the inbound small twin from the north and provided a vector or an altitude that would keep us away from the traffic. We heard the small twin cancel IFR; but we were never made aware of his position. After detecting the traffic on TCAS; and then visually; I disconnected the autopilot and began a turn. After being given I descend command by TCAS; I hesitated a little since we were already at 1800 feet and I had the traffic in sight as we were turning. Soon after; I received an 'increase descent' command with a 1000+ FPM descent and promptly complied. I realized; that I had neither the terrain nor the weather radar modes selected on the MFD. Since there was no weather; I should've had the terrain mode displayed. That would've also helped with overall situational awareness.In preparation for final approach; my MFD was initially on the 5-mile range. At a closure rate of 300-400 knots; things happen quickly. One of us should have set the MFD at a farther range to be more situationally aware of the traffic. This also highlights the importance of TCAS. Sometimes we are asked to dispatch with an inoperative TCAS. Seeing and avoiding is much more difficult in a jet so the company should understand the uneasiness many pilots feel when confronted with that decision.

Air carrier Captain reported a TCAS RA with a VFR aircraft when he was vectored for the ILS 17 at AGS.