Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Total 2680; Flight Crew Type 450

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

We arrived to the late inbound aircraft. My First Officer was performing the walk around and I noticed my paperwork was on the lower pedestal. I saw I had a NOTOC (Notification to Captain) for 1 package of dry ice. With every NOTOC; I went back to the cargo hold to visually verify the Dangerous Goods to ensure that the paperwork matched and that the proper labels were there. Upon going to the back I queried the ground crew who presented me with two packages. One contained dry ice; and was labeled properly. The other packaged was labeled properly UN3373 Cat. B but no dry ice as well- this was fine per NOTOC paperwork. However; what struck me as strange was the fact that the packaged boxes had a very large 'CRITICAL' wrapped over both packages. Also; the package not containing dry ice; had a label that said from [the medical company]: 'Donated Human Tissue for Transplant' 'If damage or delays occur; immediately notify...' 'Emergency Medical Shipment' 'Packed on WET Ice' 'remove tissue from box in preparation for surgery ' etc. Something did not feel right; as I have always understood that shipments throughout my career were usually taken into the cabin where the temperature is better controlled. I asked the ground crew about the Cornea Transplant shipment which they did not know much. Walking back to the cockpit to get the Dispatch phone number; then I saw the Gate Agent whom I asked 'are we a Medevac flight?' When I said that I would have to call the company to get more information; she got very frustrated with me and seemed to pressure me saying 'we ship corneas out of here all the time; no need for Medevac' 'were not gonna take a delay for this'. I was very unfamiliar with the whole situation. I immediately called Dispatch and talked to [a Dispatcher]. I described to [a Dispatcher] the whole situation. [The Dispatcher] said that if I did not feel comfortable with the corneas in the back its well within my power; so I elected to place the corneas in the crew closet from which I included it in W&B (Weight and Balance) calculations to keep them in a much better climate control. The weather outside was extremely hot (80/90* +) and the cooling abilities of the packs was mediocre at best. And considering they were only packed on wet ice; I was concerned. I also asked about possible MEDEVAC since we were carrying organs; we bounced back and forth and decided to file it. I consulted the FOM (Flight Operations Manual) which stated that the ground crew was supposed to tell us about the shipment which they did not. Also that the PIC (Pilot in Command) was to acknowledge the info and ensure the release in the ICAO remarks section contained the notation STS/MEDEVAC. The Release did not contain this information. [The Dispatcher]; went and refiled us as MEDEVAC; and was very helpful with it all. We pushed off the gate 3 min late. Inflight; numerous delays forced surrounding aircraft into 1 hour + holds; however with our MEDEVAC status we avoided this. There was maybe 15/20 min of hold fuel on board to work with and in all honesty we would have had to divert if it were not for the MEDEVAC notation. Found upon ground crew query after receiving NOTOC paperwork. Called Dispatch to notify and receive MEDEVAC notation on flight release per FOM.Future shipments must be labeled and announced properly if need of Medevac is needed. Ground crew should tell Captain of organs being transported. Ground crews should not pressure crew with delay coding especially with Dangerous Goods.

Ground crew handed over NOTOC (Notification to Captain) on a slip of paper and left it on the Captain's chair. The Captain went down to check out what it was and saw that they had corneas in the box with critical and emergency medical equipment all over it. The ground crew kept saying it was ok to have in the baggage compartment. It was 32 C and the packs weren't all the great at cooling the plane down so the Captain wanted to put them in the plane since they were on just regular ice. The ground crew never notified any crew of the organs. The Captain looked up in the FOM (Flight Operations Manual) the procedure and called Dispatch. There weren't any notes on release about it either. We needed to be filed as a Medevac. The ground crew was very angry because of the three minute delay and them not following procedure. They said 'they do this all the time'. We needed to be filed as Medevac especially because there were a lot of aircraft going into ZZZ that were being put into one hour holds and we were able to land with priority to get the organs where they needed to be safer and quicker.Ground crew not following procedures. On time pressure factored in heavily. Captain called Dispatch and arranged for Medevac status and placed donated corneas inside the cabin so they wouldn't deteriorate in the baggage compartment. [Ground Crew] need to notify the proper personnel in the future.

EMB-145 flight crew reported incorrect aircraft Dispatch code due to 'Critical' Human Tissue. Flight was re-dispatched as Medevac flight.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 265; Flight Crew Type 9

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was cleared for the visual approach Runway 21 into ZZZ airport. After frequency change to Tower I was cleared for a straight in; subsequently I aligned myself on the extended runway centerline and started my descent in SKC VMC (Sky Clear Visual Meteorological Conditions) conditions. When flying over the mountains lying under the straight in approach; I realized that I was approaching too low over the mountains and reduced my descent rate. Nevertheless the Tower Controller alerted me with an altitude warning. I continued the approach after passing the mountains and landed uneventfully on Runway 21.My analysis of the situation led to the conclusion; that while for a standard instrument approach I brief the lateral and vertical flight path according to the approach plate; this visual approach has none; as it is true with most visual approaches. Nevertheless on this specific approach it would help to have an altitude and waypoint over the mountains that helps to plan the approach better than just with the means of the visual assessment. I for myself will determine a minimum altitude and an appropriate waypoint to avoid this situation in the future and stay high enough on the profile.

SR22 pilot reported descending too low over terrain on approach for landing.


Rockwell Aero Commander Twin Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

I witnessed a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) today due to a Controller not ensuring separation; and also due to a misapplication of Visual Separation. The RADAR East (RE) Controller had a Commander flying north-south circuits taking pictures. A MD88 departed AUS; was turned east; and was issued a climb to 12;000. At some point RE issued traffic to the Commander on the MD88; and then instructed the Commander to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. The aircraft were wired on intersecting courses. The MD88 was beneath the Commander and climbing above the Commander. The Conflict Alert (CA) went off. I started to say something; but heard RE acknowledging the RA from the MD88. When the CA sounded; and I noticed this event; the aircraft were at the same altitude with less than 1/2 mile lateral separation. It appeared that the Commander took evasive action in order to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. This event was logged as a 'Q' entry; but I informed management that this was a NMAC that should get a little more scrutiny. This is a common practice at AUS: 1) turn aircraft right at each other; 2) issue the low aircraft an altitude that is above the level aircraft; 3) issue the slow; level; and least maneuverable aircraft traffic and 'maintain visual separation'; and 4) this essentially requires the aircraft to take evasive action to avoid the climbing Air Carrier. I have provided previous examples of this; but I have yet to see any action taken at the local level regarding the misapplication of Visual Separation or the absence of ensured separation 'before and after' the application of Visual Separation. I wonder what the airlines would think about this situation. Or the passengers that were aboard the MD88 this morning? Why are we (the FAA) allowing Controllers to play Russian Roulette with aircraft full of passengers? Recommendation; enforce the proper use and application of Visual Separation. Ensure separation before and after the use of Visual Separation. Quit training new employees the technique that was witnessed this morning.

While working RADAR West; I heard the Conflict Alert sound and looked over at the RADAR East airspace and witnessed two aircraft merge at similar altitudes 5 NM southwest of the Austin Bergstrom Airport. After which; I heard the RADAR East Controller tell the FLM that he just had a TCAS RA with this NMAC event. Recommendation; use of Vectors to ensure separation of all aircraft when altitude is not a viable option would have saved the day here instead of TCAS. All too often I see controllers here at AUS bet on separation instead of insuring separation of aircraft. Yes; we have to use our best judgment; but turning the MD88 into known traffic was inexcusable. Either use altitude or Vectors; but always insure separation.

AUS Controllers provided a witness account of a NMAC noting 'visual separation' procedures used by some controllers at the facility are misapplied; creating a safety situation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 600

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

During descent to FL270 we encountered turbulence or aircraft wake turbulence that did not allow the autopilot to level off at the assigned altitude of FL270 and continued to descend about 450 FT below the assigned altitude. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and climbed back to the assigned altitude of FL270. ATC did not inquire; most likely because we were not in RVSM airspace.

LJ55 Captain reported altitude deviation at FL270 due to either wake vortex or turbulence.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Had passenger board and was complaining that he was sitting next to another passenger and what was I going to do about it.  Then proceeded to tell me he would not wear his mask the whole flight because he has asthma. I told him he needs to wear the mask at all times.  The lady sitting next to him was asked if she was [ok] sitting by him as we had no open rows; she said she was fine.  I then was putting her bag in the overhead for her as the man tells me to grab his suit jacket as he didn't want her bag near it.  I had the CA call customer service to help the situation; customer service comes and he says he has no problem complying.He was rude in flight; tried to take mask down again and I asked him to put it on; he did.  We land and he cuts the lady off to grab his stuff from the overhead and get off; has his mask off as he is getting off the plane.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger complained about sitting next to another passenger and did not comply with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 391; Flight Crew Type 2400

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

On arrival into Houston; we encountered severe turbulence between 4000 - 5000 feet 10 miles northwest of CARCO; which is on the ILS 4 approach plate into Houston. We were at 250 knots and our speed was uncontrollable and went to 280 knots for a period of time. The Controller asked what our speed was and I responded that we were trying to get it back to 250 knots but the turbulence was making it difficult. The airplane also went past 30 degrees bank and we got the 'Bank Angle' call out. It was very rough and we gave a PIREP and wrote the airplane up when we were on the ground.A previous airplane told ATC that they encountered severe turbulence; on a previous frequency. I questioned ATC where that plane was and the Controller said he did not hear that. Other airplanes also chimed in about the severe turbulence report. Unfortunately; the Controller didn't hear and did not attempt to find out from the plane that he just switched over to another frequency to find out details. I did tell the Controller that it was the airplane who he just gave a frequency change to that reported it.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported severe turbulence in the initial stages of the approach for landing.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 792; Flight Crew Type 195

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I had just refueled at Name (FBO) off of Taxiway B and had received the following taxi clearance: 'Aircraft X; Runway 25; taxi via W'. As I was exiting the FBO and was about to make the right turn from Taxiway B onto Taxiway W; I noticed a Aircraft Y taxiing fairly quickly from West to East just to the West of Taxiway B. Having been issued a clearance without restriction (e.g.; such as to follow the Aircraft Y); I assumed the Aircraft Y would slow down and allow me to merge onto B. Within a split second; I realized that the Aircraft Y wasn't slowing down and that we were on a collision course if no evasive action was taken.To avoid the collision; I braked hard and brought our aircraft to a stop. The Aircraft Y's wingtip passed our nose by only 30-35 ft.  Just as I initiated the braking maneuver; ATC called with a transmission similar to: 'Aircraft X; do you see the...' This was meant to point out the Aircraft Y; but as he was transmitting; the controller must have realized that I had come to a complete stop already. He stopped mid-sentence. The lessons from this near-miss for me are:1) Never assume that another aircraft will stop for you; even if you have been given an unrestricted clearance. 2) Remain vigilant of other aircraft at all times.3) Do not assume that ATC will foresee and manage every conflict on the ground. If in doubt; ask ATC for a resolution.4) Once a safe outcome of the operation is in doubt; take immediate and decisive evasive / corrective action.

Small aircraft pilot reported a ground conflict with a large jet aircraft while taxiing at LZU airport.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight arrived on blocks at XA:00; the arrival onto [maintenance] bay procedures were normal. I was in the process of my aircraft walk around check and our C Mechanic had completed the oil service on right engine. At XB:05 I was near the nose gear and the C Mechanic was up on a high stand carrying out oil service on left engine when I heard an engine starter starting up. I turned toward the left engine to see it cranking over. I moved quickly to get the C Mechanic's attention for him to get down off the stand. The refueller was also at the engine with his truck attached to the aircraft and 3 security guards were located 5 meters behind the engine on their way to check the bulk cargo loaders and catering staff.After getting their attention and clearing the area I went straight to the headset at the nose gear to call the flight deck and get their attention.My first call to the flight crew was 'shut the left engine down.' Their response was 'it's not going.'My response was 'the left engine is cranking; shut it off.' Their response 'No? Fuel is not on.'My final call to them was 'listen; the left engine is motoring; the start switch is on start or crank; turn it off.'Their response was 'engine is secured.' And that was the only response I received from them.

Maintenance reported that while servicing the engine oil on a Boeing 787; it sounded like someone attempted to start the engine.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Logbook Entry; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

When we arrived at the aircraft; there were three MEL items. Two were in reference to recent maintenance work on the aircraft. One of those required an inflight APU restart; and the second was in reference to work done on both engines that required a flight before the aircraft could be returned to ETOPS status. The specific MEL was 72-XXX; ETOPS In-flight Verification Required. Enroute to the destination; we performed the APU restart; and of course monitored the engines. The Captain was getting a line check; with the Check Airman sitting in the jumpseat. After the successful APU restart; the Check Airman volunteered to do the logbook entries. Although the engine MEL didn't give specific items that we were supposed to check; I did not realize that no logbook entry was made to this MEL. MEL 72-XXX is very generic and; in our case; was unclear [with] what specific checks needed to be accomplished. Also; whether causal or not; there were several distractors on this trip. The Captain was getting a line check; there was an unrelated maintenance problem that caused a two-hour departure delay; and our sequence was being broken up after our arrival at ZZZ.For MEL 72-XXX; in the DP (Departure Procedures) section; the Dispatcher is supposed to 'discuss the ETOPS verification requirements with the Captain.' I'm not aware that this discussion took place; which left us unsure exactly what we were supposed to do to clear this MEL. There should be a line in the 'O' section that says something like; 'The Captain will discuss with the Dispatcher what specific checks need to be accomplished.'

B787 First Officer reported confusion regarding MEL procedures relating to aircraft ETOPS verification and making the required logbook entries.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Climbing out of ZZZ at 8;000 ft. my right engine failed. We [advised ATC] and turned downwind to return to Runway XX. We accomplished ECAM actions (A321) and landed uneventfully 7 minutes later. We stopped on Runway XY for inspection and returned to the gate to debrief maintenance.

After a normal takeoff and climbing through 8;500 ft. we heard a very loud bang and immediately the aircraft slowed down and some yaw feedback. There was initially minor vibration and shaking but that subsided. We immediately identified that the number 2 engine had rolled back and it was not producing any power. I believe we both verbally agreed we had a compressor stall. A few seconds after the loud bang we received an ECAM message: ENG 2 EGT OVERLIMIT. We ran that ECAM procedure. We secured the number 2 engine. The Captain was flying the aircraft and talking to ATC and flight attendants. It was extremely busy; he had already [advised ATC] and was turning downwind towards Runway XX. We were in VMC conditions turning base towards the airport; I was still trying to load an approach in the FMGC as the Captain is asking me for landing configuration (ex. Flaps; Gear). At that point the Captain briefed that the safest course was to disregard automation and just to focus on flying the aircraft VMC; We agreed on our runway alignment; safe configuration; and he flew that aircraft safely to the runway. We landed and turned off on Runway XY where we had fire rescue inspect the aircraft and then proceeded to the gate for a normal deplaning.

A321 flight crew reported that an engine failure during climb resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Time Pressure; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Fatigue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flying from ZZZ I had programmed the FMC to be on the ZZZZZ arrival landing to the west. Winds in paperwork showed all winds out of west. After takeoff; we were cleared direct to ZZZZZ1 intersection. Enroute to ZZZZZ1 we got the ATIS; landing east. As I changed the runway in the FMC to 10; the Controller instructed us to decent via the ZZZZZ landing east. I selected 5;000 in MCP and noticed that the entire arrival had dropped out of the box. We alerted ATC that the arrival was dumped and he assigned 12;000 feet and present heading. When we finally got [to] ZZZZZ 10 selected in the box we let ATC know and he said to continue direct ZZZZZ2 and decent via the ZZZZZ. I selected 5;000 [feet] in altitude selector and started down. Passing through 8;900 feet; the Controller asked us to level at 10;000 [feet] due to terrain. I believe that in the rush of this flight and mix up; I never saw the aircraft go back into VNAV path and most likely stayed in VNAV speed to cross at 5;000 [feet]. We stopped descent and leveled back at 10;000 feet. We were vectored for Runway 10L and landed without incident. Factors that contributed to event/concern [were] my own fatigue; time pressures; interruptions/distractions; high workload/task saturation; problems with automation; [and] lack of assertiveness.

Planning for ZZZ1 landing [Runway] 28; the FMC was set up for our rout to ZZZZZ1. After takeoff at ZZZ we were cleared direct to ZZZZZ1 and climbed to our final altitude of 19;000 [feet]. Enroute; I obtained and alerted Captain of the ATIS; and nearing ZZZZZ1; she changed the FMC to Runway 10L. At the same time; the Controller cleared us to descend via the ZZZZZ Arrival landing east; Captain set 5;000 in the MCP; final altitude on the arrival. At ZZZZZ1; noticed that the entire arrival has dropped out of the FMC and the airplane was not navigating in LNAV to ZZZZZ2 as the next point; but we turned the airplane to head to ZZZZZ2 and she alerted ATC that the arrival had dropped from the FMC. ATC assigned present heading and 12;000 [feet]; which was immediately set into the MCP. With Captain flying the airplane and operating the FMC; I was requested to put the arrival back into the FMC; ZZZZZ STAR; landing [Runway] 10L at ZZZ1. We let ATC know that we had the arrival set-up and he cleared us; again; to descend via and continue direct ZZZZZ2. Captain selected LNAV and put 5;000 in the MCP. ZZZZZ2 was displayed in the FMC and in map mode as '11000A'. We continued and began running the approach checklist for our approach into ZZZ1. ATC alerted us to level at 10;000 [feet] due to terrain. We had passed through 10;000 [feet] by this time and stopped descending around 9;000 [feet]. In reviewing the arrival; the highest obstacle in the area is a peak at 8;334 [feet] approximately 10 miles to the east of the route and ZZZZZ2. It was clear below 25;000 feet at the time; with 10 miles visibility. Captain maintained positive control of the aircraft and quickly corrected; leveling at 10;000 [feet] as requested. I believe that the airplane probably stayed in or went back into VNAV speed instead of VNAV path; causing the airplane to continue the descent instead of leveling to cross ZZZZZ2 at 11;000 [feet]. With both crew task saturated during this very short flight; especially following the issue with the FMC and arrival; we failed to notice this occurrence. Following this; we were vectored for the approach for RWY 10L and landed without incident at ZZZ1. Factors that contributed to event/concern [were] my own fatigue; time pressures; interruptions/distractions; [and] high workload/task saturation.

B757 flight crew reported low altitude alert by ATC when aircraft descended due to incorrect automation management.


MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

My Manual Controller pointed out a Citation XL to the BAE Sector descending to FL330 as per the SOP for DTW traffic. The BAE Controller accepted the point-out reference MD90. My Manual Controller advised me of the traffic which I observed. I knew I wanted to start Citation XL down to FL350 so that we could later give him the standard crossing restriction of FL330. This was a simple case of seeing the traffic at FL330 and issuing the assigned altitude FL330; not FL350 like I wanted to. When I saw Citation XL descending through what I thought the assigned altitude of FL350 I had the aircraft maintain his present altitude (FL347). It was too late the aircraft was already through FL340 so I climbed him back up to FL340. When I later listened to the pilot read back; I realized what I had done. Occasionally a controller will do what I did; observe the aircraft's altitude that they are supposed to miss and still issue the very same altitude.

A Citation XL was on route to DTW at FL390 the HOR Sector is required to descend DTW arrivals to FL330. I was working the D-Side and pointed the Citation XL out to Sector 60 who showed me the traffic (a MD90) I than told my RADAR Controller about the traffic and moved on to work on other things The RADAR Controller thought he cleared the Citation XL to FL350 but noticed him descend through the altitude and tried to stop his descent but was not able to stop the aircraft in time. I feel this is one of those human errors you look at the aircraft at FL330; think you are saying FL350 but FL330 is issued.

ZAU Controller described a conflict vent when thinking one altitude but issuing a conflicting altitude assignment.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Captain is pilot flying. At approximately 70 knots received ECAM message ENG 1 Compressor Vane.  ECAM directed action was to bring thrust levers to idle and therefore reject the takeoff. Rejected takeoff without incident (Autobrakes worked well); exited runway; and taxied back to the gate. No emergency was declared. Called maintenance and entered appropriate writeup in the maintenance logbook. We switched aircraft before continuing our trip. FYI...previous writeup in the maintenance logbook from earlier that morning indicated exact same ECAM message on takeoff and associated reject. Unsure of cause and associated maintenance action(s).

A319 Captain reports receiving an ECAM message 'ENG 1 Compressor Vane' at 70 knots and rejects the takeoff. A previous write up for the same anomaly had occurred earlier in the day and the aircraft is taken out of service.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

As we were getting ready to depart ZZZ1; I was going over the release with my FO and placed good emphasis on the NOTAMS that were given to us for ZZZ1 and ZZZ. We noticed some taxiway closures in ZZZ and briefed it. With this information we determined that the runway was in good condition for landing and that taxiway Juliet was probably going to be the one that we were going to use since there was no NOTAM associated with this taxiway. This is also in my experience the taxiway we normally use to roll out when we land on this runway given the Embraer 145 landing performance. Weather was VMC.We departed with no issues. Approached and landed with the Control Tower closed at our time of arrival. FO was pilot monitoring and he was making the required position reports on CTAF before landing. After landing I slowed down the aircraft to a safe taxi speed and rolled out the runway on taxiway Juliet which had the edge blue taxi lights on clearly illuminated as well as the Juliet taxiway sign; confirming that the taxiway was indeed open. After we turned into Juliet; we noticed there was snow on the taxiway but from the cockpit view there was no way for us to determine its thickness (especially at night time). We felt how the aircraft came to a stop and was no longer able to move under its own power. At the moment it created some confusion because there was no NOTAM indicating any amount of snow or contamination on that segment of the taxiway. I tried to move my Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) to about a 50% a couple of times and tried to move the steering hand wheel with differential thrust to see if I could get out of it but the aircraft was still not moving. After we got stuck someone apparently from Airport Operations talked to us on the radio and said: 'You are gonna have to take it to the end of the runway'. But of course; it was too late. At that point I realized that I did not want to risk damaging the landing gear by continuous use of thrust to try to get out of it; so I determined the best course of action was to get help to be moved. The person from Airport Ops talking on the radio said that they were going to come up and take a look and see if they could find a tug and tow us a few feet back so we could get back to the runway and taxi to the end of it and then taxi to the terminal. This was a slow process and it was very hard to communicate with them since they were just walking a lot around the aircraft trying to figure out what was the best way of doing it. Communication with the ground personnel was probably the most difficult and most frustrating issue we had all night. We were also communicating with Company ops and I believe they helped the ground personnel get a handheld device to talk to them later on. At the same time I tried to keep the passengers and the FA updated of what was going on as often as I could. FA said that everyone remained calm during the whole event and there was no issues with the passengers. We also sent an ACARS to dispatch and we were in constant communication during the entire event. When we were finally able to communicate with the ground personnel they said that they found a small tug on the field and were going to try to tow us back. They tried a couple of different ways of doing it but they said they needed bigger equipment to do this. They informed me that they notified a local Industrial Towing company to come to the field to help us out. As I was informing dispatch about everything that was going on; we agreed along with Maintenance Control that the best course of action was to wait for maintenance to get to the field first before any heavy equipment touched the aircraft. Me and my FO coordinated with ground operations to deplane the passengers using stairs and get them to the terminal safely in the SUVs that the airport had for us; since there was NO BUSES available. The FO and FA did a great job helping to make this process smooth and safe. The total time we spent on the ground after landing and opening the main door for the passengers to deplane was about 1.5 hours. We deplaned in groups of 5-10 people at a time and kept the rest of the people inside the aircraft until the SUVs were able to come back and pick up more people. This part of the event did not take long and everyone deplaned safely. After everyone deplaned we also noticed ground personnel were taking the bags from the baggage compartment and loaded those in the SUVs. Talked to the Chief Pilot as well and he recommended us to go to the hotel to get some rest; and that is what we did. He was very supportive and the next day before our departure time back to ZZZ1 he called me back to make sure we were rested and ok to operate; and we were. I was told the aircraft was towed to the terminal in the morning and inspected to be in good condition by maintenance and returned to service. The day continued normally.There were several things that caused this event. The main cause of this was the fact that the contaminated taxiway was open. That taxiway was not in good condition and it should have been closed at some point during the day. It was a VFR evening so I believe there was plenty of time to determine this taxiway was supposed to be closed.The second main cause was the fact that no one decided to create a NOTAM showing the type of contamination and depth on Taxiway Juliet between Runway XX and Taxiway A for crews to at least be aware of the condition of that taxiway before landing. For some reason they created a NOTAM specifying there was 1/8 Inch of Dry Snow over Ice on Juliet between Taxiway Alpha and Foxtrot; but nothing between Runway XX and Alpha.Third cause was that the Control Tower just closed 11 minutes before we landed. Meaning that the controller was probably directing all aircraft that landed prior to us to taxi to the end of the runway and exit there instead of rolling out on Juliet. We did not have a controller to tell us anything; and at night time everything is more difficult to see.Another 'probable' cause was that once the controller closed the Tower; he could have probably advised on his/her ASOS recording not to use taxiway Juliet along with the other closed taxiways to exit the runway. There was nothing on the ASOS to advise us of the condition of taxiway Juliet. I use the term 'probable' because I don't know if that is something that he/she can do.After the aircraft got stuck; I tried to get it out of it by advancing the TLA; tried using the hand wheel and tried differential thrust. None of that worked. Then tried to get it towed back to the runway with the help of a small tug so I could then taxi to the terminal using a different taxiway and that did not work either. At that point we decided it was better to deplane the people safely to the terminal on the SUVs provided by the airport. Constantly communicated with Company; FO and FA; passengers; Operations; Maintenance and ended by talking to the Chief Pilot before going to the hotel.Airport MUST close taxiways that are not safe for operations. Taxiway Juliet was open and edge blue lights were illuminated. Create a NOTAM to advise crews about the contamination of the taxiway and depth. Keep Control Tower open at least during airline operations. Add important NOTAMS and other important information for crews on the ASOS after Tower closes. Do a better job at plowing taxiways.

EMB-145 flight crew reported the aircraft unable to taxi to the gate under its own power due to taxiway conditions.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 65; Flight Crew Type 65

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Fuel added 14.15 gallons; estimated flight duration 2 hours. Estimated Fuel needed: 14 gallons; 12 gallons for cruise flight and 2 gallons for taxi; run-up; and climb. Total fuel on board: 19 gallons; visual verification. Estimated fuel consumption: 6 gallons per hour. Departed on a VFR flight and the crew of the airplane was the owner/student pilot; and an instructor pilot. Approximately two (2) miles from the destination airport; we received landing clearance. Our altitude was 1;900 FT MSL and we were on a modified right base entry per the Tower's instructions. The airplane's engine began to run rough. The student pilot was controlling the airplane. As the instructor pilot; I took control of the airplane and elected to make a precautionary landing on a road just short of the airport runway. The precautionary landing did not damage the airplane and no one was injured either in the airplane or on the ground. No other property was damaged. During the time the engine was running rough; I accomplished the following: 1. Mixture full rich 2. Carburetor heat on 3. Check fuel selector and selected the fullest tank; left tank. 4. Continued to pump the throttle. 5. Moved the fuel selector to the other positions with no appreciable change in engine power. Engine continued to run during this time with surges; but did not regain sufficient power to sustain level flight to reach the airport. Precautionary landing was accomplished on a dirt road. After stopping; the airplane's engine continued to run at idle. Radio calls were completed and we shut the airplane down. The FAA arrived at the precautionary landing area and the airplane and obtained their needed information. The mechanics from the local FBO inspected the airplane and drained a total of 3 gallons of fuel from the airplane. Fuel was added to the airplane; and operational check was completed; permissions from the authorities; land owners; and insurance company were received and the airplane was flown from the precautionary landing area to the airport without further incident.

Two hours after takeoff and on approach for landing; we experienced engine problems and called to the Tower to alert them. We declared an emergency and descended toward a farm field; landing on a farm road approximately 1.5 miles from the airport. No damage was sustained to the air craft. The engine continued to run following the landing.

The owner states that adding fuel was the only maintenance action preformed and the aircraft has had no further issues during several flights.

C172 Student pilot with Instructor experience a rough running engine during approach. The instructor assumes control and lands on a farm road short of the airport. Three gallons of fuel were found to be on board when maintenance came to inspect the aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34.42; Flight Crew Total 5732.72; Flight Crew Type 5732.72

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

As weight left the wheels; my primary and secondary nav; heading; DG; compass failed. Along with the failures I had a PWS (Predictive Wind Shear) fail message and a TCAS fail message. My flight director failed as well. As we continued to climb; FO flying the aircraft; I began to troubleshoot the problems. I ran 2 checklist as they did not correct the issues.  I opted to return to ZZZ. At that time I requested priority handling. I continued to communicate with company; FAs and passengers. The FO flew the ILS to [Runway] XXR. We landed and taxi to the terminal.

B737 NG Captain reported loss of navigation systems and instruments on lift off. Captain elected to return to the departure airport.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During our flight to CLE; we were at 16;000 feet on the BRWNZ2 STAR; the autopilot was engaged. We were given a descent clearance to 10;000 feet by Cleveland Center; the exact location is unknown. No 'Descend Via' was issued. We were instructed to contact Cleveland Approach; and did so successfully with the current ATIS. Our altitude was 10;000 feet; speed was approximately 300 KIAS. Some time later (the exact location is unknown) the approach controller issued a clearance to descend and maintain 6;000 feet. After slowing to 250 KIAS; a descent at a rate of 1;500 FPM was initiated. After consulting the VNAV page on the FMS the rate was increased to 1;800 FPM based on the rate to comply with the anticipated crossing restriction at LLROY of 5;000 feet and 210 KIAS. A short time later in the vicinity of TRRKY intersection we were 'cleared for the ILS 24R after LLROY'. A short discussion was had by me and the First Officer if we could descend below 6;000 feet (our last assigned altitude). I noted that the approach chart notes for the 24R ILS read 'mandatory 5000' and 'max 210 kts.'; and we were on the arrival/approach so we could/should descend. This delayed our descent; and I used the speed brakes; and commanded flaps 9. During the descent we attempted to reprogram the FMS to eliminate the vector after LLROY. We crossed LRROY at 5;000 feet and 210 KIAS; but we had not successfully configured the FMS. The airplane started a turn towards a 056 heading. I disconnected the autopilot; and turned the aircraft towards the BORNY intersection using the MFD navigation display. The First Officer was able to correctly program the FMS; and the Flight Director indicated a turn to BORNY. I asked the First Officer to select 4;000 feet in the altitude selector. He hesitated; and we again discussed if we could descend. He selected 4;000 feet; and we continued the descent. I acquired the runway visual; and asked the First Officer to change my navigation source to conventional; and to arm the APPROACH mode. We captured the localizer and glideslope; configured and executed a stabilized approach. We were never queried by ATC about our altitudes; speeds; or courses. I believe no deviations occurred.During the STAR portion no 'descend via' was issued; so the 280 KIAS speeds were not used; we were unfamiliar with the approach; and did not anticipate joining the approach at LLROY. The last altitude given was 6;000 feet which caused confusion. We did not have enough time to correctly reconfigure the FMS.I believe if at some point we had been advised to 'expect the ILS 24R after LLROY;' or words to that effect; we could have ensured that the FMS and aircraft were properly configured. It's unclear when to descend since the notes (#3) advised to 'maintain last assigned altitude until established on glideslope'; but the note for LLROY has 'Mandatory 5;000.'

Embraer 145 Captain reported confusion from an altitude clearance that did not conform to the published approach and clearance; which then resulted in a course deviation. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and continued the approach manually.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 354; Flight Crew Type 108

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

We had just taken off Runway XX at ZZZ and was climbing up to our left crosswind altitude when I heard an airplane on the 45 entry for left downwind Runway XX and an airplane crossing over mid field for a teardrop entry into left downwind Runway XX. We made our radio call and turned left crosswind and had the first 45 entry traffic insight which was no factor. We then heard the second airplane that was doing a teardrop entry say they were gonna hold off on their entry because of traffic; so I turned my attention back to my student who had climbed up to 1;850 [feet] instead of 1;700 [feet] and told him we needed to get back to 1;700 [feet]. We made a radio call for left downwind Runway XX and made our turn while still scanning for the traffic that said they were not going to do their teardrop entry into the left downwind; we didn't see any traffic partly because the sun was in our eyes; so I glanced down at my iPad and saw the traffic was directly 200 feet below us. At that exact moment; they came on the radio and said they were directly below us; I guess they saw us on their ADS-B as well and said they were breaking out of the pattern to the right. At that point; I had gotten a visual on their aircraft and as they made a right hand turn away from us they became no factor. With all the factors of a busy cockpit; training flight; several planes in the traffic pattern; the sun directly in our eyes when we turned crosswind we probably should have extended out on our climb and had a visual on the teardrop entry traffic; even if they said they were not going to execute their entry; before we turned left crosswind and put the sun right in our face.

C172 flight instructor reported an NMAC while maneuvering in the traffic pattern of a non-towered airport.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

En route from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 we were directed by the physician on call to divert to ZZZ which we had just passed at FL350. The Captain gave me controls of the aircraft and radios and began the fix strategy. We were given a heading direct to ZZZ and began a descent to the airport. We began the approach on a visual right downwind as there was a cell to the north and west of the airport we wanted to avoid. Selected speed was chosen as we slowed down; however; when managed speed was selected the aircraft accelerated because I had not activated the approach. We captured the error; however; these few seconds caused us to be high and fast. Given the already high-altitude airport and compressed diversion time for the medical issue; we elected to do a visual left 360 and rejoin final. We had selected the final approach fix altitude; however; when we did our left 360 turn it took us away from the airport. The Tower Controller alerted us that he had an altitude alert and we climbed back to the 7;200 feet altitude for the fix we were now joining the ILS. We continued the approach without further issue.Cause - 1. Compressed; high pressure with the medical emergency of passenger with 60/40 blood pressure.2. Out of sequence normal approach and landing with the diversion that greatly compressed our time from top of descent to landing. 3. Choosing ZZZ - high altitude/high terrain as a divert airport.4. Loss of situational awareness as we made the turn away from the airport.Suggestions -1. Take vectors out for a longer final approach.2. If possible; choose diversion airports that have less threats. 3. If a turn for an airport is needed to descend or slow - make them towards the airport not away as altitude is less likely going to be an issue with regards to terrain avoidance.

During a medical divert we were high and fast.  On approach we accomplished a left 360 to descend.   We initially had 7;300 feet set and when we turned inbound and had the field insight we began a descent to 6;300 feet the final approach fix altitude.  Approach received a low altitude alert and informed us.  We climbed and continued the approach visually.  We never descended below 6;300 feet before the FAF.Visual approach; high and fast resulted in loss of situational awareness.  Avoid visual approaches when in unplanned situations; get vectors for an instrument approach.

Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving an altitude alert on approach to land. Returned to cleared altitude and continued on approach.


Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Air Carrier requested [taxi clearance] to deice [pad] after push to get the [Release] for this flight. After they deiced; Ramp Tower got a call concerning HAZMAT packing. The flight is now returning to the gate to deal with the HAZMAT.

Air Carrier Dispatcher reported aircraft on a ground gate return to correct a Hazmat loading irregularity.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 2411; Flight Crew Type 2411

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was holding short of [the] runway. I thought that the Tower had instructed me to taxi to [the parallel runway] for take off. I began to move the aircraft. At the same time I looked to the left and observed another aircraft on a half mile final. I applied brakes and at the same time the Tower radioed 'stop; stop'. By that time the nose of the aircraft had passed the limit line and I had committed a runway incursion. Since I was in a tail dragger I was able to lock my right wheel; spin around; and return to the correct side of the limit line. The landing aircraft did a go-around.There were two primary factors that caused the runway incursion. First; I should have waited for a response from the Tower before moving the aircraft. That would have given the Tower time to tell me to remain where I was. Secondly; I should have visually cleared the final approach area before movement. I would have seen the aircraft and not gone past the limit line. Another factor was that; since I was in an open cockpit aircraft there was wind noise from the prop wash as well as engine noise that resulted in me mishearing the instructions from the Tower.In the future I plan to 1. before moving the aircraft; give the Tower time to correct any misinterpretation of instructions; 2. check for traffic before moving the aircraft; and 3. allowing a few more feet distance from the limit line as an added safety margin to prevent movement past the limit line.

Pilot of an open cockpit biplane reported a misunderstood communication from the Tower resulted in a runway incursion and a go-around from the aircraft on approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 1814

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

[We were] on final airspeed 170 KTS minimum directed by ATC. On the glide slope selected flaps 15; aircraft accelerated to 180 KTS outside of FAF. Near the FAF dropped gear and flaps 20 and selected Vref+20. Aircraft was slow to reduce airspeed; still not at Flap 30 speed at about 1;200 FT AGL. Captain stated 'We're fast and may need to go around.' Approaching 1;000 FT I said we are going around. Pressed Go-Around switches called for flaps 20 (already there). Aircraft began to execute the maneuver with the autopilot on. I felt the pitch rate was 'too aggressive' and forced the yoke forward. Airspeed increased rapidly; I called for flaps 1 and then flaps up; and we got to flaps 1. Throttles moved forward I pulled them back then put both hands back on the yoke; keeping the aircraft from pitching up. Throttles then move toward full throttle and the Captain pulled them back and shortly took the controls. [We] climbed to 3;000 FT turned downwind as directed and shot the ILS again with no further problems.On downwind the Tower reported a 30 KT tailwind at 1;000 FT. In hindsight the aircraft responded as designed. When I limited the pitch up by overriding the yoke; the TMC added more power to get the 2;000 FPM programmed into the Go-Around. This caused rapid acceleration and I developed PIO (Pilot Involved Oscillation) fighting the automation. I should have allowed the Go-Around function to work as advertised; knowing there was going to be the initial pitch; and monitored. Then if a problem developed; remove all the automation and fly the plane. I became so focused on stopping the aggressive pitch up that I focused solely on that lost SA (Situational Awareness) and did not diagnose the true problem. The event was caused by my reaction to the 'feeling' of the aircraft pitching up in the Go-Around. Training with an emphasis on the Go-Around so the initial pitch up is expected. We do multiple go-arounds each year in the simulator but I did not expect the large pitch up at altitude. Possibly institute a 'Discontinued Approach' procedure to be used at altitude.

I was sitting in the jumpseat behind the First Officer. I fell asleep soon after takeoff. I awoke just prior to this event. We were flying the ILS and the Captain said 'this isn't gonna work; we need to go around.' The Captain selected flaps 20; and the power increased. The aircraft pitched up. The crew became very busy at this point. Neither audio speaker was on; so I could not hear radio transmissions. Also; the crew was operating with both packs on; hence the cockpit was unusually loud. This made it difficult to discern exactly what was going on. Just a few seconds after the initial pitch up; while still on runway heading; the nose of the aircraft dropped and we began to sink. Our altitude was probably around 2;000 FT. The Captain said something like 'we need to climb' and the First Officer arrested the sink rate and began a shallow climb. About this time we were given a turn to the west. The Captain appeared busy talking to ATC as well as working the mode control panel; as I think the autopilot was turned off at this point. During the turn to the west; the nose of the aircraft again fell low. I looked at the Captain's flight instruments; and the altitude was somewhere around 1;500 MSL; the airspeed was close to 300 KTS; and we were descending fast. I was just about to say 'watch your sink' or 'pull up' or something to that effect; when the Captain said 'I have it' and he took control of the aircraft. He immediately began climbing. The Captain then flew the aircraft around and we landed.

A B757 First Officer and two jump seaters describe an unstabilized approach and a missed approach that goes awry. Pitch and airspeed are poorly managed and the Captain eventually assumes control.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Type 70

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

Before we left ZZZ1; the weather at ZZZ was partly cloudy; calm winds. Our first check of their ATIS said the same and I briefed a visual approach. A bit later we received a message from Dispatch about approaching storms providing new routing to avoid them. As PF (Pilot Flying); I primarily concerned myself with working my way around the weather. A new ATIS came in; and the Captain mentioned rain on the field. Honestly; I didn't look at it that closely because I was dealing with the enroute weather at the time. It wasn't until we were about 20 miles out that I realized that the weather wouldn't permit a visual approach. I quickly debriefed the approach as an ILS; reset the minimums and continued.As we continued inbound in heavy rain; things started to deteriorate. The Captain did not call 500 feet; then called 'approaching minimums' 100 feet early. I saw the lights and continued; but with the heavy rain and an unexpected crosswind (the latest winds had had 5-knot winds down the runway); I elected to go-around. I pushed the power up; pressed TO/GA (Takeoff/Go-Around) (or so I thought at the time); and called for 'go around power; flaps 15.' I was concentrating on flying the aircraft but saw the Captain reach over and move something as he was talking on the Tower calling our go-around. I was pushing forward while trimming nose-down to counter the pitch up caused by the power increase and called 'landing gear up;' and received a response of 'it's already up.' Instead of putting the flaps to 15; he had raise the gear. I had him raise the gear and I again asked him to recheck the go-around power. While I was pushing and trimming; the airspeed significantly decreased and we got an 'AIRSPEED LOW' warning (at the time we were about 5-10 knots below VREf (Threshold Crossing Speed)). Eventually I got the pitch trim situation under control and was able to continue the go-around.Numerous factors led to this event. First of all; the recent reduction in flight hours has definitely affected our proficiency; particularly mine. This was only my fourth day flying since the beginning of June; and I was definitely rusty. I made an error by not updating myself on the weather and setting up earlier for an instrument approach. Secondly; Crew coordination was lacking. The Captain was talking on the radio rather than helping with the go-around. Afterward; he told me the go-around caught him completely by surprise; and commented that he hated go-arounds and that he had struggled with one on a recent check-ride.

Air carrier First Officer reported a 'Slow Airspeed Warning' situation during a weather related go-around event and cited lack of flying time as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 11600; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object

The airplane experienced a complete loss of engine power shortly after the initial power reduction during the descent. My attempt to restore engine power was not successful and an off-airport landing was initiated. The airplane was airborne and running normally for approximately 25 minutes prior to the loss of engine power. I was the sole occupant and was not injured. The airplane did sustain damage to the outer portion of the right wing leading edge when it hit a stop sign. I'm not aware of the monetary amount of the damage at this time. I do not know the reason for the power loss at this time. There was no contamination present in the fuel either pre or post flight and the airplane came to rest with approximately 20 gallons of useable fuel in the main tanks. All aspects of the airplane preflight inspection and engine run up were normal.

Navion pilot reported an engine failure and subsequent off field landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were at approximately 11;000 feet descending on the arrival when we got a L ENG OIL PRESS Master Warning Message. ITT began flashing red at what I believe was 908 degrees. Engine oil pressure was also red and below 25 PSI; and we got the accompanying 'Engine Oil' verbal warning. The First Officer was flying the plane so I gave him the radios and I began the QRH Immediate Action items. At the time of the event we were already in icing conditions and light turbulence. The First Officer immediately told ATC we need lower to get out of the weather. ATC gave us a descent to 4;000 feet and at that time we began experiencing constant moderate turbulence. Meanwhile I was verifying; per the QRH; that we did in fact have the master warning message and an oil pressure below 25 PSI and I began the intentional shutdown of our left engine. It was challenging dealing with the emergency in the moderate turbulence; but I completed the QRH procedure while the First Officer got us below the weather and vectors towards [the] airport. We discussed our plan and decided to continue and land at [destination]. We had discussed the weather; so we already knew it was good weather at the field and we also knew that the Tower was open. We requested to have the firetrucks meet us at the runway as a precaution. At that time; I called the Flight Attendant and briefed him on the situation. We continued on and the First Officer did a great job landing uneventfully; with one engine and flaps 20.

CRJ-200 Captain reported landing safely after shutting down the left engine following a low oil pressure message and high ITT.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I took over the sector with aircraft deviating on the HUSTN arrival and a procedure worked out with CLT Approach that they would accept aircraft deviating north and they would take care of internal point outs.  After several aircraft made it through the hole Aircraft X said he did not want to work back to the west.  So I asked the following aircraft if they would rather turn back south and join the arrival from the south around the weather.  Several chose this option.  My D-side called CLT Approach to make sure they were ok with this plan.  Their Traffic Management Unit (TMU) (who makes these decisions for the arrival) said it would be ok.  We were told by our TMU to give the 10 Miles In Trail (MIT).  The first aircraft from the south got in and was taken by CLT East Arrival Aircraft Y.  Then we were told CLT was no longer accepting aircraft.  Aircraft Z and Aircraft A were too far into the weather to turn around and got into CLT airspace.  We tried to call many times and neither CLT East Arrival or East Departure would answer the line.  Both aircraft we issued clearances to make U-Turns.  East Arrival never called about the aircraft inside their airspace even though they now had several departures aimed right at him and didn't know what he was doing.  Aircraft A made a slow u turn and eventually East departure took the hand off. There were several times during this weather episode and about an hour earlier in which I was given the instruction to hold CLT aircraft and then I was told they were taking them with MIT.  When we would call the controller they said the arrival was not open.  So aircraft were being issued holding instructions/clearances/and holding again.  Also when they accepted several on trial; our flow told us to work aircraft out of holding stacks which were clear of weather to get them closer to CLT and they would take them one at a time.  This plan of moving aircraft through weather into gaps with the hope that the arrival will soon be open seemed to contribute to an unsafe situation for controllers as well as aircraft.  Also departing aircraft into weather that are going to deviate when we have airplanes airborne holding to get into the airport who will all want to use the same gap increased the complexity of weather deviations as well as creates dangerous situations.  No explanation was ever given as to why CLT wouldn't answer the landlines.    Arrivals need to be shut down when aircraft can't fly the arrival without minor deviations.  Information about holding aircraft needs to be given before aircraft get into weather.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

Jacksonville Center (ZJX) controllers report of a session where aircraft would not fly through weather and turned away from it. The controllers tried to hand off the aircraft; but Approach Control would not answer land lines. Confusion ensued when the controllers were told that Approach was taking aircraft. They called Approach and they said they were not taking aircraft.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 4810; Flight Crew Type 2250

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was cleared by Houston Center Direct to OXUKE intersection; Cross the IAF at 3000 ft MSL; and cleared GPS-A approach to T30; report established. OXUKE is the IAF for GPS-A on the DME arc. I crossed OXUKE at about 3500 ft MSL and was established on the DME arc for the approach. Following the published altitude on the chart; I then descended to 2500 ft MSL. About 4 miles prior to the FEELS intersection; Houston Center called on the radio and asked if I was established on the approach. I informed them that yes I was established and was now in VMC conditions and would be able to cancel my IFR flight plan. Houston then proceeded to inform me that I was below 3000 ft and not to make that mistake again; canceled my flight plan and authorized me to change frequency. ATC cautionary statement did not match the published information on the chart.

Corporate pilot reported flying the T30 Airport GPS-A 10 DME arc between OXUKE and FEELS at 2500 feet as charted. ATC instructed that his aircraft should have remained at 3000 feet.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Air Traffic Control assigned 5 degrees right. HDG mode was executed and the aircraft turned 5 degrees right. The Controller then assigned Direct BAM. The pilot flying inserted BAM in the FMS; I verified the waypoint with the pilot monitoring and the pilot flying executed it. The pilot flying then brought his hand up to the FCP and pressed NAV. NAV mode did not engage; but this was not recognized until Air Traffic Control asked us to turn 15 degrees right and proceed direct BAM when able. We instantly realized the mistake and immediately turned an additional 15 degrees right. The pilot flying put the correct waypoint in the FMS. Both the pilot flying and I verified the correct waypoint. The FMS was then executed and the pilot flying pressed NAV mode on the FCP but both the pilot flying and I failed to verify NAV mode had been displayed and captured on the FMA. I suggest the SOP mandates pilots verbalize the capture of NAV mode on the FMA. I would even suggest both the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring should be required to verbalize it. Similar concept to putting an altitude in the alerter.

On course when given a 5 degree right turn. [We were] later was given a turn direct BAM. I selected direct BAM in the FMS and confirmed the selection with the First Officer. I'm somewhat sure I entered NAV mode to have the aircraft engage the FMS. I believe I may not have pushed hard enough to send the FMS into the NAV mode. My error was not verifying that the FMS was selected. 54 seconds later; the Controller issued either another Direct BAM or a 15 degree Right turn and that is when we noticed the deviation. Immediately followed the commands of the Controller which was either direct BAM or the 15 degree turn. After discussion with the First Officer we didn't remember if there was a second command to BAM or the 15 degree turn was given first. We do know; after the first correction of the error from the Controller; we did comply with the command and the aircraft; in 1/2 bank mode; we begin the turn away from the flight that we were converging with. The Controller may not have detected the turn due to the half standard turn that is in place at those altitudes.Failure of me verifying the FMS engaging caused the initial error and the half standard bank wasn't enough turn to avoid the loss of separation. Make a three step process to navigational changes: 1. Verify correct change in the FMS 2. Push the NAV Mode 3. Verify FMS becomes active in the FMA.

CRJ-700 flight crew reports being given a heading then cleared direct to a VOR. The FMC is programmed but the NAV button is not pushed firmly enough to engage; resulting in a track deviation and loss of separation.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Several VFR targets not talking to ATC added to the workload. At the time I had multiple traffic calls for IFR aircraft about VFR's. Aircraft X was level at FL060 direct YEAGR. UIM-L 83 called with a point out landing TYR and a TRL departure VFR looking to pick up IFR. I advised the controller of my traffic at FL060 and told them to stop their departure at FL050. The controlled later relayed that he could not get Aircraft Y stopped. I saw the VFR target and called traffic to Aircraft X. When I observed Aircraft Y at 060 and merged with Aircraft X I advised Aircraft X of this and they stated the aircraft had just missed them. Later clear of traffic I asked Aircraft Y how close the cirrus was and they advised they missed by about 100 yards. More attention to traffic calls; I feel that if the UIM controller had called the traffic to his VFR departure they would not have climbed through my IFR traffic.

ZFW Controller reports of a NMAC between an IFR and VFR aircraft.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Through a LOSA observation; Aircraft X main wheel tires were brought to our attention during a service check. The technician noticed that the valve stems that were installed on all of the aircraft tires was a large-bore type versus the conventional small-bore type valve stem. This raised concerns as to the effectivity of the main wheel tire since the small-bore type; through years of experience; have always been installed on Company fleet of Airbus A319/A320. Upon further research; LOSA looked at other tire assemblies installed on aircrafts around the maintenance base and Airbus serviceable tire rack assemblies and found part numbers that were not being reflected in the IPCs for the nose and main tires. Part numbers 1531 and 1584 for the nose tires and 1590 for the main tires were observed. In addition; all tires that we looked at had the small-bore type valve stems.Whether or not this is the right configuration for Company Airbus fleet; clarification is needed to determine effectivity. If the larger bore type valve stem is effective for the airbus A319/A320; one of the concerns is that these aircrafts may fly to a station that may not have the adapter to service the tires because stations are not aware of the two different wheel assembly configurations.I have attached two sets of IPCs; one for the main wheels and the other for the nose wheel tires. The first set reflects the aircraft nose number in question; 4871; 4107). Aircraft X was a random nose number chosen to reflect an Airbus IPC.I have also attached the CMM reference 32-XX-XX which is referenced by the IPC. The CMM has an effectivity table published but I could not find the legend to define the codes. Photos of the larger-bore type valve stems and the smaller-bore valve stems have been attached which came from the aircraft that was in question. A few of the photos were taken from wheel assemblies on the serviceable racks.We reached out to All Fleet Engineer and explained to him our issues. He requested paperwork and pictures which we have not yet been able to forward to him.

Technician reported large bore valve stems installed on nose wheel assemblies and not documented correctly.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

This was a FFOD flight. While completing the hydraulic test; Hydraulic Pump 3B would not work. While writing this up; cabin boarding commenced. The associated circuit breaker 1A2 remained set in. Because of this problem; along with the emergency lights not working; and in consultation with Maintenance Control; it was determined that the airplane would be deplaned because it was unknown how long the flight would be delayed in getting maintenance personnel to the airplane to resolve the maintenance issues with the aircraft. I left the aircraft; still prior to the original departure time; and notified the ramp agents and gate agents. The passenger gate checked bags were brought back on the cart to the front of the plane so passengers would be able to have their things in the terminal. I made the announcement to the passengers face-to-face via the Flight Attendant's (FA) inter-phone explaining that we would be deplaning due to the aircraft needing maintenance and the time required for them to complete their job to ensure the airplane was safe for flight. It was also due to the hot temperatures making it uncomfortable in the cabin of the aircraft.As the passengers deplaned; there were a number of passengers saying that they would rather be late; but fly in a safe airplane. I kept assuring them their safety is our top priority. A couple expressed discontentment due to the strain placed on their travel plans and possibility missing their connections. I told them I that I apologized for the inconvenience; but that I needed to make sure they were completely safe on our flight and directed them to the gate agent to see what could be done to help them. I did not see anyone making a video or taking pictures with their phone. There were a couple of people talking on the phone.While I was greeting the passengers as they deplaned; the first officer notified me that the R PACK HI TEMP caution message came on and shut the PACK down by itself. This was then written up in the ELB.During the approximately 1 hour and 55 minutes delay; I made several trips into the terminal (about every 15-20 minutes) to make announcements to the passengers providing up-to-date information regarding the time frame of the delay; the status of the maintenance process; and to express sympathy for the inconvenience and disruption to their travel; but that their safety is our first priority.Maintenance came out to the airplane and resolved the hydraulic pump issue and verified the emergency lights had been charged long enough by the APU and the R PACK was deferred.By the time Maintenance had completed their items; several passengers had rebooked to a flight leaving for ZZZ just an hour or two later. Some that were just flying to ZZZ opted to drive instead saying the trip would be quicker. Again; I did not see anyone appearing to be making a scene or social media post; video; or taking photos. There was one man who expressed his displeasure at not making his connection in ZZZ. I expressed my apologies for his inconvenience; but told him that his safety was our top priority.As Maintenance had returned the airplane to service on their part; we elected to board the airplane while waiting for Dispatch to return the airplane to service. I made the announcement in the terminal that the maintenance issues had been resolved; again expressing apologies for the inconvenience; but telling them that their safety is our top priority. At that point; boarding commenced. I called Dispatch and verified that I had the the amended release; with its associated limitations on the cruise altitude. They then returned the airplane to service; which we saw verified in the ELB.After boarding; the flight deck crew and cabin crew complied with all procedures and we pushed out of the gate for taxi. After contacting ATC; we had a 5 minute wait for our flow time at the end of the runway. After waiting; we departed climbing on departure; with me acting as Pilot Flying (PF).As we climbed throughabout 7;000 feet; the L PACK HI TEMP caution message illuminated. A couple seconds later; the PACK fault light illuminated and the cabin depressurized slowly. I told my First Officer that we were going to level off at 9;000 feet; which we did.I verbalized that this was an unanticipated threat and that I was flying the airplane. I stated that there were no QRC procedures or memory items. I then told him that I was going to have him fly the airplane; holding a general orbit over the airport within the confines of the airport. I made the radio call at that point to ATC that we were leveling off at 9;000 feet and would be making turns over the top of the ZZZ1 airport for what I approximated to be about 15 minutes. ATC asked if we were declaring an emergency. I declined declaring an emergency and told him that when I got back with Center; that I would want vectors back for the approach. Center responded with 'roger.'I then proceeded with the QRH abnormal L PACK HI TEMP (Bleed source is engine) procedure. The procedure did not resolve the problem and the caution message remained illuminated. Because I did not have any operative PACKS that negated the ability to transfer the bleeds from the engines to the APU.I contacted Ops on COM 2 and notified them of the problem and that we would be coming back to the airport. They responded and understood. I called the Flight Attendant and notified her of the problem; but that this was not an emergency; just to clean up the cabin and configure for landing. I told her that she had 10 minutes.I then made a PA announcement that we had lost pressure in the cabin and that we would be returning to ZZZ1 after I had completed a couple of procedures. I expressed my apologies of the continued problems and the inconvenience to them.Because of the slow depressurization of the aircraft; the CABIN ALT caution message came on while I was running the L PACK HI TEMP QRH procedure. This was expected and I ran the abnormal QRH procedure for CABIN ALT after finishing the procedure for the L PACK HI TEMP. The CABIN ALT caution message persisted; as expected. My next procedure to run was the abnormal QRH for Unpressurized Flight Procedure (PACKs off). I completed this procedure; confirming the guarded switches with my First Officer. During this entire time; my First Officer had been making CTAF radio position calls. Another airplane had flown up underneath us and was staying 1;000 feet below us. Because of this; the other airplane would get within 800-900 feet below us and kept tripping TCAS traffic alerts. My previous instructions to my First Officer were to orbit the airport; which he was doing. I had to stop the QRH procedures and redirect where to put the airplane to avoid the continued TAs. I changed my instructions to him that he could outline the geographic exterior of the valley to avoid the other airplane. We never heard any radio calls on CTAF from the other airplane of what they were doing or any intentions. These radio calls are not required in the ZZZ1 area.I finished the QRH procedures.I called the passengers again and attempted to assure them that; although we had lost pressure; the airplane was still flying fine and the flight crew was working to get the airplane on the ground safely and we should be on the ground within 10 minutes.I contacted ATC and they told me that unless I could climb higher than 10;000 feet; I would not be able to get vectors. Because the weather visibility was virtually unlimited and there were no clouds; I called the airport insight and cancelled IFR. In hindsight; I should not have canceled IFR; but I was still given traffic advisories from Center until we were clear of the conflicting targets.I directed the FO to fly east over the desert area that had lower terrain obstacles that would allow us to descend to land on Runway XX.I explained to my First Officer that we didn't have cabin pressure and that we would need to plan a slow descent rate.I heard the FA's jumpseat click and I called her to verify that she had been able to complete her duties; which she affirmed. I then made a PA announcement attempting to assure the passengers that the procedures were complete and we would be landing in about 5 or so minutes. I went on to explain that because the airplane was not compensating for the lack of pressure that they would feel the pressure change in their ears.Inside the airplane; it did get very hot. Even with the RAM AIR open; we were not able to cool it off. I did have concern about some of the elderly passengers we had onboard. The ECS page said the cabin temperature was 34 degrees C; but it felt hotter. The QRH procedure talks about keeping the speed up to 250 knots for cabin cooling; but that was not possible due to landing and having to keep the airplane confined in the valley and maneuvering for landing.We landed normally; besides the pressure; and taxied into parking at the terminal. We opened the door; which immediately allowed cooler air into the cabin; and I made another passenger announcement; again expressing apologies for the problems and that they could talk to the gate agent to make further arrangements.I wrote up the L PACK HI TEMP caution message in the ELB; called maintenance control and finished up with them. Operations then wanted to move the airplane to an adjacent FBO to open up gate space for flights expected later. Maintenance Control made a note in their record of the location of the airplane being moved to the FBO and stated that they were fine with the airplane being relocated.As passengers deplaned; they were frustrated with the return of the flight.After everyone was deplaned and safe in the terminal; the plane was pushed back and we repositioned it to the FBO. I called Dispatch and had them close out the ELB; as the program had locked me out from being able to close out myself. Old equipment on a hot day.I cannot entirely control the effectiveness or reliability of an airplane or its systems.

The Captain was flying out of ZZZ1 on the ZZZZZ departure; Runway XX. With the right pack deferred already; we received a left pack hi temp on the right; climbing turn. Upon receiving the caution message; we established a benign flight regime at 200kts; 9;000 feet in a right-hand orbit atop ZZZ1. The Captain then assigned duties amongst the crew per [company guidelines]; specifically I flew the aircraft and the captain ran the appropriate checklists and assumed pilot monitoring duties. Concurrently; we notified ZZZ Center; ZZZ1 OPS and Dispatch of our situation and intentions. While completing checklists we received a traffic advisory from ZZZ Center and TCAS advisory. We were able to visually acquire the other aircraft quickly and adjust our flight path to continue our response to the situation. After completing all required checklists; we notified the FA and passengers about the situation and reengaged with ZZZ Center about our intentions to return into ZZZ1. We conducted a standard descent/approach briefing; set up a left-hand intercept onto the final approach course and established a slow; deliberate descent profile on the approach [Runway] XX into ZZZ1 and landed/taxied to the terminal without incident. The left pack hi temp caution message caused the crew to conduct the actions as described in the narrative.Issues with aircraft cannot be completely avoided; the crew acted and responded to the situation in compliance with our directives and in a safe manner.

Flight Crew reported an air turn back after the left pack failed after takeoff with the right pack on MEL.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

Passenger X was removed for testing positive for COVID virus. Plane was not deplaned and sprayed. Passenger was on board 20 minutes with face covering not covering nose.

Flight Attendant reported that a passenger who had tested positive for COVID-19 was removed from the aircraft; however; other passengers were not deplaned and the aircraft was not sanitized.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned to [service] low center hydraulic system on Aircraft X. At the start of shift; I saw two identical 5 gallon containers next to each other stored in the fluid service area; I picked up the first can which was labeled hydraulic fluid found it to be empty so I picked up can next to it and serviced hydraulic system. Only after servicing the mistake was discovered that it was not hydraulic fluid but stripper. The supervisor and engineering was notified immediately.

Maintenance technician reported inadvertently servicing hydraulic system with stripper instead of hydraulic fluid; stored in an identical container.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

This was an IFR flight.  I departed doing the FRG 4 Departure and was told to make a left turn to a HDG of 030; which I did; so I thought.  The Controller came back and told be I was on a HDG of 330.  I double checked my Compass and it was 030.  I looked at the Magnetic compass and it showed around 310 and at that time I realized something was wrong. I asked him to give me a turn because my compass was giving me an incorrect reading.  He turned me back towards 030 degrees. I tried several times to reslave my compass and kept asking him to check that I was heading in the right direction.  He asked me if I wanted to go back to FRG.  I did not want to do an instrument approach with the way it was working so I asked to continue into VFR conditions on top and head west because it was VFR to the west where I was going. As I headed west in level flight; the compass started to correct itself and I kept checking with ATC. For some reason the compass or gyros spooled up slowly so when I stopped turning on departure at 030 as cleared; I was really at 330. It is [a holiday week] and there not much I could do; but the aircraft is going to the avionics shop to be checked on why the heading lagged so much in my turn on climbout.

BE58 pilot is informed of a heading error on departure by ATC which is due to a malfunctioning compass system.  In level VMC flight the compass eventually corrects itself and the flight continues to destination.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 1825; Flight Crew Type 1130

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Departed ZZZ2 enroute to ZZZ1; planning to skirt just north of the ZZZ airspace; with two radios tuned to both UNICOMs. I shortly became distracted by two things. 1- A pilot on the ZZZ1 UNICOM was continuously asking if 'anyone was there.' More distracting was a traffic alert on my Garmin 430 and a plane just behind me at my altitude. I elected to turn left and change altitude. Watching the other plane on my ADS-B it appeared to turn with me. I know that the ADS-B will sometimes show 'my shadow' but this had a distinct call sign. I soon noticed that my 'evasive' action had put me in the southwest corner of ZZZ's airspace. I then tuned one radio to ZZZ Tower and turned northeast to exit that space. Further details are fuzzy because about 20 minutes later I lost all electrical power and was dealing with that situation.What should I have done? I usually ask for flight following and certainly intend to continue to do so. That probably would have prevented the unannounced incursion as well as hopefully taken the stress out of dealing with an unseen plane on my tail.

P28R pilot reported an airspace violation followed by a loss of electrical power.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 11600; Flight Crew Type 620

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

At cruise; clear; smooth. We were assisting a passenger in getting refreshments from the galley area just behind the pilot; when we began to sense a 'burble' that rapidly increased in intensity to near moderate turbulence; rolling the aircraft to perhaps a 45-degree right bank; causing the autopilot to disconnect. The roll caused the aircraft to descend; until I realized what was happening and took manual control; leveling the wings; climbing back to altitude and returning to track. We then contacted Center and advised them of the turbulence; upset; and deviation from altitude and track. The information regarding the location of the disturbed air was passed along to other aircraft in the area.

A C560XL encountered roll inducing turbulence at cruise which caused the autopilot to disconnect; momentary loss of control and a loss of altitude prior to recovery.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Unresponsive engine Number 2. N1 stuck at 95% and would not respond to auto thrust or thrust levers.  No ECAMs associated with this failure. Shut down and secured engine Number 2 and landed.

A321 pilot reported that an engine was stuck at 95% and would not respond to any thrust lever actions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 731; Flight Crew Type 75

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was landing on a gravel road. Was about to touch down and the aircraft dropped causing a slightly hard landing. If this was any other aircraft it would have resulted in a slight bounce; however the Quicksilver has no suspension and the rear axle which snapped off is just a thin walled aluminum tube. This caused the nose wheel to hit abruptly and the struts to let go causing the aircraft to nose over. I was alone and only received a minor cut on my left leg.

Ultralight pilot reported a hard landing that resulted in the aircraft nosing over.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

We we're flying into AVL at night. We briefed the terrain in the area and decided to use the ILS course and profile to fly the visual approach. The FO decided to get down to the FAF altitude early so he could be completely configured and slowed by the FAF. I thought we were past the terrain so I didn't see anything wrong with that. However there is a hill closer to the FAF than I thought. So we got the EGPWS terrain alert. We disconnected the autopilot and climbed until the alert stopped. At this point we still had the terrain in sight and the airport and continued the visual approach. I misinterpreted the approach chart and allowed the FO to get us down too early. On our 10-7 chart we have plotted a typical EGPWS occurrence that is a different one into this airport. I would like for the company to plot this one. I wrote a report about this.

CRJ200 Captain reported that they descended early for the FAF and received an EGPWS terrain alert.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24.0; Flight Crew Total 123; Flight Crew Type 123

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Prior to descent into a non-towered airport; TRACON advised of traffic at my 3:00 position before terminating radar service and flight following. After 2 to 3 minutes of searching for the traffic; I still could not see them; perhaps due to haze in the area. At this point my ADS-B was now showing the traffic at my altitude on an imminent converging collision course. Unable to see the traffic; and knowing that turning left or right would have kept me in this hazardous situation; I felt that my only safe option given my low wing aircraft was to initiate a rapid climb. However; being at 2;000 feet already had me at the floor of the Class B Airspace. This evasive maneuver caused me to enter Class Bravo Airspace without a Class B Clearance. As soon as I was able to determine that separation between myself and the other aircraft had been achieved; I immediately descended and exited the Class B and executed a safe landing shortly thereafter.

GA pilot descending into IWS non-towered airport reported they took evasive action to avoid traffic and climbed into Class B airspace without a clearance.


During my post flight in ZZZ I saw one fastener was not secured in the APU panel. I called maintenance control who directed me to send it in as AOG (Aircraft On Ground); which I did. I happened to speak with the maintenance technician in ZZZ before we went to the hotel.  After returning to the airport [the following day] the same tech was finishing up the paperwork when we arrived. I asked how things went and he relayed something interesting. He said that there were approximately 10-12 worn cam locks on the APU access panel that needed replacing; which he said he did. Two; he said; were faulty cam locks that were glued in place to look secured. I asked if he would file a report to which he responded that he's a vendor and did not have access to the program.  My concerns here are multiple. Primarily is mechanic gluing in broken fasteners to look secure. Second; it would be helpful for the vendors to have access to the program; if not directly then possibly through a steward of some sort.

A CE-560 Captain reported to maintenance a fastener loose on the APU panel. Maintenance found several fasteners loose and some glued in place to appear secure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

I was pass riding this flight on the new 737 Max. From my seat towards the rear of the aircraft; with seats that appear to be higher; it was impossible to see the Flight Attendant perform the safety demo. It was brought to my attention when overhearing a nearby passenger comment that they could not see the demo asking if they were supposed to be able to see it.

Off duty Flight Attendant reported being unable to see the B737 Max cabin safety demonstration because the passenger seats are too high.