Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

This event was in my opinion a near miss. We were at 3;000 feet on a visual approach to runway XXR. Saw on TCAS a target 100 feet below us off left side of Aircraft. ATC said traffic alert turn right 150. Just then we got TCAS RA alert descend; descend now immediately followed by climb climb now. Followed SOP and complied with alert we never visually acquired traffic. After talking with ATC supervisor; he informed me it was Aircraft Y transitioning Class B to ZZZ2.  He was at 2;500 feet initially; then for some reason as he approached us he pulled up to 2;800 feet (our TCAS showed him at 2;900 feet; 100 feet below us) once he saw us he descended back down to 2;200 feet and turned west. I do not know if this classifies as a near miss; but it was way too close for my comfort.  Aircraft Y never entered Class B; so now [no] rules were broken; but I think the other pilot used questionable judgement being so close to arriving ZZZ traffic and climbing to within 100 to 200 feet of Class B airspace.There must be another area to transition to ZZZ1 from the west that doesn't involve flying so close to ZZZ arriving aircraft.  Maybe a 2;000 feet ceiling under the approach corridor for ZZZ?

Pilot reported evasive action to avoid another aircraft identified by the aircraft TCAS system.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were at FL390 overflying the ZZZ area from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 when we noticed a flicker of the lights followed by the EICAS messages indicating the left generator had gone off line. This was confirmed by the OFF light on the left gen control switch. The plane was on autopilot and held it; as we went into the QRH to rectify the issue. The first step of the QRH gave us one attempt to reset the generator; which we did. Upon that attempted reset; we instead lost the entire L AC bus and; in turn; all components associated with it. As Pilot Flying; and to make sure our first priority was safely flying the aircraft; I began to hand fly as the autopilot was kicked off and to make sure we were in full control. We completed the L GEN OFF QRH which led us to starting the APU to acquire the extra generator and then went to get the L AC BUS OFF QRH as that was our new issue. The first step in that procedure is again to try and reset the generator. That is only allowed once; we had already done it once; not to mention it had made the situation worse; so we couldn't perform that step again. It was at that time that the cockpit was getting very warm and I noticed my ADI lost all color including the artificial horizon. We noticed the equipment cooling overheat light had illuminated so we switched to alternate and regained full imaging on the ADI. The Captain also switched his flight instruments to the FO's (First Officer) side as his had failed with the L AC bus. As we returned to the QRH to continue the procedure; we noticed our screens were getting dim and slightly flickering and since we were basically right over O'Hare; we made the decision to get the plane down to the ground before things continued to get worse. The Captain [Requested Priority Handling] and we were vectored for a descent back to ZZZ. The Captain informed the FA (Flight Attendants) on what exactly was going on. We had no ACARS function so we could not contact anyone else but had ATC relay what information they could. The FA's informed us that we had an FO in the back who was willing to come up and help be an extra brain on the flight deck which was extremely helpful. She looked up our landing speeds and informed us of some of the components we would no longer have from the QRH; while the Captain and I were getting the things we could finished with the QRH procedure and preparing for landing in ZZZ. Once established on the ILS to Runway XXR; at about 4000 ft.; we transferred controls to the Captain for the landing and the emergency trucks followed us to the gate.

While flying from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 at cruise altitude of FL 390 we experienced a left generator bus off light. Immediately after attempting a reset of the generator per the checklist we experienced the loss of the left AC bus. We then ran the checklist for loss of the AC bus but discontinued the checklist after the first step which call for resetting the generator bus which we could not do because only one attempt was authorized and was already attempted during the first abnormal checklist. In the meantime we experienced an equipment overheat and the Flight Attendants complained of possible fumes in the cabin. We switched to the alternate mode for the equipment overheat and under the circumstances decided to [Request Priority Handling] and divert to ZZZ. The approach and landing at ZZZ was uneventful.

B757 flight crew reported a diversion after losing the left AC Bus.


Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I stepped onto Aircraft X. I don't have the registration number for this airplane. I immediately smelt something foul when I stepped onto the airplane. I thought it smelled like someone had thrown up in the flight deck. It was really bad on the flight deck and first class galley. I took a walk through the cabin and it seemed to me to dissipate as you went further back in the cabin. Both the First Officer and #1 Flight Attendant could smell it as well. The APU was off and we had not ground air connected. The remainder of the flight attendants boarded and they immediately started boarding after. I started the APU hoping that would clear the smell as I still thought maybe it was from some garbage the cleaners had just taken off the airplane. With the APU running you could still smell it and it was becoming more musky gym locker type of smell. I used only one pack at a time and that did not make a difference. The flight attendants working in the rear of the cabin called the flight deck and said passengers noticed the smell and they could smell it all the way in the rear of the cabin. I then turned the bleed off and called Ops to stop boarding. A few minutes later I made the call to have the passengers deplane. I called Dispatch and the Chief Pilot to keep them updated on the situation. After the passengers got off the airplane; I told our flight attendants and my First Officer to pack up and get off the airplane. Eventually Maintenance showed up took the airplane out of service. Suggestion: More routine maintenance on PACKs and bleed systems; making sure everything is clean and clear of contaminates.

A321 First Officer reported a musky gym locker" smell was noticed during passenger boarding that resulted in maintenance removing aircraft from service."


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Reaching FL310; we received a 'display cool' master caution message momentarily then went out. Approximately 5 minutes later; the same message 'display cool' came on again. Ran QRH; Message stayed on and we diverted. Emergency declared. Potential loss of all displays.

CRJ200 Captain experiences a display cooling system malfunction at FL310. QRH procedures have no effect and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

While waiting for the completion of an anti-ice MEL (at the gate with jet bridge connected) I heard a commotion in the cabin. I stepped into the flight deck entry and heard there was some type of explosion. I immediately asked my FO (First Officer) to call for CFR. The #1 FA (Flight Attendant) was making a PA to evacuate. I assisted him as best I could while trying to determine what had happened. As soon as possible I turned off the APU and the batteries to remove any power issues that may have caused the explosion. I also turned on the emergency exit lights to aid with the evacuation. Emergency exit light battery exploded. It would help to have both a FA and crew ground evacuation checklist onto the jet bridge. Given we had no ground power and the issue was electric the use of the megaphone would have been helpful if the #1 FA could have gotten it before the passengers started to leave the aircraft.

Captain reported that during a maintenance action to MEL an Anti Ice problem; and emergency exit light battery pack exploded; causing the aircraft to be evacuated and CFR to be called.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 106; Flight Crew Type 22000

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were at 4;000 feet on a vector to final about 15 southeast of ZZZ when a TA came up on TCAS on the nose co-altitude. Right after it came up we were given one more turn to join final for [Runway] XXL.  In the turn the TA became a descending RA and we complied per the maneuver's section in the QRH.  We descended about 800 feet and finished the turn at which time we were Clear of Conflict.  As we leveled the wings we saw the traffic go by our right wing a little high as they were still at 4;000 feet; appearing to be no more than a half mile away. It appeared to be a smaller GA aircraft but went by quickly.  We told ATC we descended for an RA; at which time he said to just maintain 3;000 feet.  He seemed unconcerned and asked no questions nor gave us any information.  We never received a Traffic Advisory call prior to the initial TA. The Controller was busy; but did not seem to be swamped. Maybe staffing as a result of COVID-19 is a factor.

Air carrier Captain reported a TA/RA on initial approach and believes ATC staffing may have contributed to the event.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 11178; Flight Crew Type 3498

On approach to landing in ZZZ for RWY XXL; when the gear was selected in the down position we heard an aural warning indication and subsequent warning light. The aural warning and light came on during landing gear down transition; that's when I noticed the red gear down light indication that was in the process of transitioning to three green. I at first thought the aural warning and light was a false indication for landing gear lights; but the three green down illuminated properly. During the successful completion of the landing checklist is when we then identified the red wheel well light had illuminated; and the reason for the warning bell aural indication and light. The wheel well light checklist was called for and indicated if gear down land as soon as possible. Approaching 1;000 feet it was determined the best course of action was to continue and handle the possibility of a fire on the ground. The landing was completed with no problems; and on landing roll-out we asked for ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting) to come and look at the airplane.As we taxied off the runway to a position that was determined a safe reasonable place for ARFF assistance we again reviewed and completed the wheel well light abnormality checklist in the QRH. The flight attendants were requested to do a walk through for smoke odor or abnormalities; and they indicated all seemed OK. A call was initiated with ATC. ARFF then established communication with us and was asked to complete a wheel well scan for a possible fire/smoke/heat issue. After ARFF completed their checks with no indications of fire/smoke/excessive heat it was determined the aircraft could be safely taxied to the gate with them following us to park. At the gate ARFF re-indicated there was no excessive heat issues or problems; maintenance was on board and was going to do their job since we wrote up wheel well light illuminated on gear down transition in [a logbook] entry. There were no further issues and the flight was considered completed.

B737 First Officer reported red gear down light with aural warning during gear extension.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While on Visual Approach received Terrain Caution. Because it was at night; I disconnected the automation and adjusted flight path to correct error. We were not in landing configuration and re-established Lateral and Vertical Path and continued the visual approach. I had selected Level Change while on autopilot and in HDG Select mode to join the Localizer; and I believe the rate of descend was a contributing factor to the alert sounding.

Boeing 737 Captain reported receiving a 'Terrain Caution' during initial approach.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Eastbound the First Officer's oxygen mask failed. The mask was continuously leaking oxygen. This condition would have depleted the cockpit oxygen bottle at a rapid rate making it unsafe for an Atlantic crossing. After discussion with Dispatch and [Maintenance]; a decision to land at [a suitable airport] was made. An emergency  was declared. An overweight landing was executed. This aircraft also had a compromised braking system due to a placard on inoperable brake. We decided to dump fuel to increase performance margins. Maintenance replaced mask; completed overweight landing and ETOPS inspections.  We completed flight to [destination].  About 8;000 pounds of fuel was dumped at FL 340; about 30 minutes prior to landing.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

B767-300ER flight crew enroute to an Atlantic crossing reported they diverted to an enroute airport because of the First Officer's oxygen mask was leaking.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 17700; Flight Crew Type 240

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Enroute from ZZZ to APF; we were cleared direct to UGYOW to descend to 2;100 feet; and we were cleared for the RNAV 23 approach at APF. About 4 NM from UGYOW; the FMS dropped UGYOW from our route completely; and the final approach course with a line to infinity was redrawn on our MFD with OFDOY still in view. The FMS commanded a turn to intercept the final approach course at a 45 degree angle; inside OFDOY.Here's what's so strange about this. We had the same anomaly happen to us on the same routing several months ago. I was ready for it today; but the airplane still turned and there was a minute of confusion and discussion because our next fix UGYOW was no longer in view; and dropped from the FMS. We had no guidance anymore to UGYOW. Having had this happen twice now; I have to say with confidence; there is an issue with the Universal UNS-1E FMS we have on board to provide this guidance. I realize the turns necessary to get us on the final approach course are significant in this procedure; but the FMS should not drop the IAF fix from view and redraw the final approach course as it is doing. Someone at Universal and the FAA need to look into this; and they need to publish that this procedure can't be used when coming from the SW so that others don't have this bad experience. There was no conflict with traffic; but the controller got a little excited when we first made the turn; and he canceled our approach clearance; and turned out back out to the NE and he gave us radar vectors to the final approach course; which worked out perfectly. My copilot on this flight had been an instructor on the Aircraft X at [the] simulator training center for years; and he agreed the FMS shouldn't have done that and its guidance is wrong when this happens. I will contact Universal to discuss it with them; and I plan to try this approach in the simulator when I go back for recurrent training.

Corporate pilot reported that while on an RNAV approach; the Universal UNS-1E FMA dropped the IAF and redrew the final approach course. Reporter stated this had happened previously on the same routing.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Total 9859; Flight Crew Type 1924

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While taxiing into [the] gate at EWR the marshaller tried to taxi me into a field riddled with obstructions. I had to stop the aircraft 3 times to make them move luggage carts; belt loaders and other vehicles obstructing my path. Finally; after I set the parking brake I noticed the marshaller was wearing a set of ear pods while taxiing me into the gate. These individuals are not adhering to SOPs and it's only a matter of time before we have an unnecessary collision with ground equipment.

Air carrier Captain reported the marshaller not adhering to SOP; wearing ear pods; tried to marshal into a gate riddled with obstructions.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After crossing LVZ at FL240 per ATC instructions; we were given a crossing restriction to cross MUGZY at 6000 ft. We set 6000 in the altitude alerter; programmed the FMS; and activated VNAV. The VNAV carot appeared; Aircraft started to descend from the TOD (Top of Descent) at around 2000 fpm; then the VNAV carrot dropped to the bottom of the window; VSI cue dropped to 4000 fpm so went to VS and put the VSI in the cue at 4000 fpm. Knowing that I had to slow at 10;000 ft; I increased descent manually to about 5400 fpm. Automation indicated we would be at 6000; well before MUGZY. About 12 miles before MUGZY; ATC asked if we were going to make the crossing; We looked at the VSI and it was right on the cue to make the crossing; and the 'Carot' in the MFD displayed that we would; so PF replied 'Yes.' About a minute later ATC asked how far we were from MUGZY. DME indicated only 5.5 miles from MUGZY and we were still above 10000 ft. VSI cue was still showing us on target but that's when we realized we would miss the restriction. Had we had a reliable indication sooner; we could and would have just asked for vectors off course. We crossed MUGZY around 10400ft. ATC then issued a new clearance to just cross STW at 6000 ft.The auto flight system then failed to properly capture the ILS LOC and glideslope at TEB. It captured the localizer too soon and tried to parallel it. It then pitched up about 12 degrees and started a left turn in a 20 degree bank and crossed the LOC. As we were at about 2700 ft; descending from 3000 to 2000 per ATC; and were below the glide slope; I suspect it detected the GS above us and erroneously pitched up to catch it. I couldn't wait any longer to find out and just disconnected the automation and hand flew the rest of the approach. It appeared that the flight director returned to normal for the last 1000 feet of the approach. After landing; we wrote up the automation and consulted maintenance; which resulted in grounding the airplane. Maintenance suspected that the malfunction might be related to a previous problem.Try to always back up automation with old school math; if possible. Watch automation continuously as it apparently cannot be trusted; even to let you know when it's broke or confused by displaying an error message. We all know this; but it still manages to occasionally bite us. All said; learn from the experience.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CL35 flight crew reported a malfunctioning FMS resulted in a missed crossing restriction and failure to properly capture the ILS localizer and glideslope.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Company Policy

I was conducting training on two departure sectors combined. It was supposed to be not too busy. I was told we could split off a sector if it started picking up. B737 off BFI departed on an RNAV departure which is a heading to a fix; expect vectors. The fix is about 5 miles off departure end. He [reached] the fix and turned on course which was about a 240 heading. He was issued 6000 feet. His English was not great. Meanwhile a conflicting departure heading 140 [off a different airport] climbing to 3000 feet came off. We saw B737 starting to turn and issued him a left turn to a 090 heading. He questioned it. I keyed up and said turn left heading 070 immediately. He read it back. I called Aircraft Y traffic for the B737. He had it in sight; I said maintain visual. He read it back. Separation was reestablished but then the departures starting coming out and it got busy fast.I keyed up the local line and said; 'Stop 140s' to help mitigate the traffic. I stayed on position and tried to get things under control. But because so many planes were out of position by the time we got the B737 situation under control; it was very hard to get control of the position. I had two frequencies and everyone was stepping on everyone. I had aircraft stuck under other aircraft; it was a nightmare. I have never been so busy on departures. I was already shaking from the B737 scare and I was feeling super panicked. I tried to establish separation with everyone. They tried to split off a Sector but I couldn't do that at the time so I asked that controller to work handoff instead to coordinate these aircraft that were out of position. I ended up with Aircraft Z below the MVA (minimum vectoring altitude). He was at 6000 feet in a 7000 feet MVA. I turned and climbed him but I called him the wrong call sign (I was flustered). That took multiple transmissions to rectify. With everyone stepping on each other and me having to repeat myself; and trying to coordinate and everything; it was bad. During all of this; tower kept calling for releases. I was trying to do a brasher statement to the B737 (never got a chance); center was calling; a [third aircraft] heading 140 departed after I stopped them. I really wanted to hit the stop departure lights but they were so far away and I couldn't reach them.First; the RNAV departure. I have been wanting to report this thing for a while. Ever since it changed; it now says a heading to a fix; expect vectors. I cannot tell you how many aircraft have turned on course after that fix instead of continuing on the 135 heading or asking for a Vector. From now on; I am going to issue a heading to every aircraft departing BFI. This is increasing workload and seems dumb but I don't care. Never again.Second; I should have de-combined the sectors. It wasn't supposed to get busy I thought my trainee could handle it. I wanted him to work a little volume. That was a mistake. I want him to work on picking up the pace so I thought if he had a few more airplanes but not too complex that it would be good training.Third; the check departure lights are positioned so that I would have to get up; walk away from my scope; climb up on the console (I am too short to reach them); and who knows what would have happened while I was walking away. I could have keyed the line I guess and told them to stop departures but I felt so busy that I couldn't. I probably felt busier than I was. My head was really spinning.Fourth; the low altitude alert never went off. Never. I was four miles into that MVA and it never went off. It all snowballed after that B737 and it got too busy too fast. I was trying my best to keep everyone separated. I was focused more in the southern portion of my airspace because that's where all the conflicts were happening. I forgot about Aircraft Z out there at 6000 feet. My scan got bad as I was so concentrated on the section with all the scary stuff. I was in full on recovery mode and it wasn't pretty.Hopefullychanging that RNAV departure will help a little. It's such a fine line of trying to challenge your trainee and it getting too busy. But that was busier than I could even handle. My supervisor was trying to split it off to help; but honestly it was all so fast and unexpected that it was too late. I wish someone would have seen that Aircraft Z out there and said something. I needed all the help I could get.

The reporter stated the departure procedure has been redesigned and the pilot confusion has been resolved.

TRACON Departure Controller reported becoming overloaded when a departure deviated from course and allowed another aircraft to fly below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 245; Flight Crew Type 6

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Object

While flying in the glider; I was too far from the airport and did not have enough altitude to make it back safely. I identified a large field nearby I could safely land in; did a short pattern; and landed in a field. Other than location; this was a normal landing; there were no injuries or damage to the glider. There was a small amount of crops damaged by the landing; and more crops damaged in moving the gilder from the center of the field to the trailer.The decisions made once the land out was decided were good; and the execution of the off field landing went about as well as it could. The main cause was a poor decision to attempt to get to another thermal without sufficient altitude to make it back to the airport if the thermal did not develop. This type of decision will not be repeated. Flights will stay in the airport vicinity unless sufficient altitude; plus a large safety factor; is available to return in any similar event.

Glider pilot reported landing in a field after he realized he did not have sufficient altitude to make it back to the airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

At 1;500 feet; all skydivers took off their seat belts. Immediately afterwards; the plane rolled over nearly if not 90 degrees and then went into a dive. It fired 3 skydivers reserve parachutes inside the plane. We landed and exited without further incident. They [skydiving company] had a dismissive attitude about the event; but I believe it needs [to be] addressed. If they had hit another plane; there would have been deaths and had the door been open; which many times it is; we would've all been sucked out in a tangled pile. I hope that this is the correct way of reporting the incident as I couldn't find another source. Thank you for your time.

A skydiver reported that the jump aircraft may have experienced an inflight upset.


Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Approximately ten minutes from top of descent into the DFW area; the FA's called to inform that a passenger was ill. Due to our proximity to destination; and considering that a Dr was on board; and considering that a Medlink conversation takes my attention away from PM duties; I elected to continue to destination. But; even with the reduced demands of not carrying on a conversation with Medlink; the ongoing medical event still proved distracting; and did so at the wrong time. During the last 30 mins of flight (all of which were affected by the ill passenger issue); ATC changed the arrival once; issued two lengthy off course vectors; changed one waypoint crossing from a 'between FLxxx and FLxxx' to a 'cross at' restriction and issued three (or maybe more) speed changes. The PF (FO) became task saturated with reprogramming the FMGC MCDU to accommodate the latest request for an airspeed change; and failed to initiate a descent at the proper time. I; the Capt and PM; noticed the error in time to start down before the fix (SEEVR) but not in time to cross the fix at the required altitude. The result was an altitude error at SEEVR of approximately 700 ft. ATC made no mention of the missed restriction and we received no TCAS alerts. The remainder of the flight was normal.ATC must drastically reduce or (preferably) eliminate the multiple speed changes after top of descent on these 'continuous' descent arrivals into the DFW terminal area. We routinely receive clearances that significantly modify the databased arrivals; mainly dealing with speed changes. If the speeds were modified just once; this would be a non-issue; but the requested/required speed changes are becoming almost a constant - happening numerous times during the descent phase into the DFW terminal area. ATC specialists must not have any idea of the level of disruption the constantly changing speeds impose on the flight crew during arrival into DFW.  In my opinion they truly need increased awareness of the destabilizing affect these speed changes have on a safe flight. Events such as abnormals/emergencies and passenger issues that increase pilot workload can't be avoided; but events created by ATC can and should be eliminated. DFW is attempting to 'load ten pounds into a five pound bag' and the results are becoming increasingly unsafe.

An Air Carrier Captain; dealing with the added demands of an ill passenger; expressed his concerns about the disruptive nature of multiple ATC modifications to their complex RNAV arrival to DFW; the end result of which was 700 FT deviation from an altered crossing restriction which; ultimately; went uncommented upon by ATC.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 1160; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Right main gear collapse on take off. Upon applying full power the aircraft started to roll. Everything checked out normal. Airspeed came alive and around 45 knots the right main collapsed. Pilot lost control of aircraft and the aircraft slid off the right side of runway. The right prop struck pavement and was bent. Before the incident the pilot did a thorough preflight of the plane. All landing gear seemed to be operating properly. All three landing gear had the tension springs in place. During the before take off run-up all three lights were green and the gear handle switch was in the down and locked position. At this time the pilot cannot speculate as to why the gear collapsed.

PA27 pilot experiences a right main gear collapse during takeoff resulting in aircraft damage.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway XXR

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway XXL

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 6308

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10928; Flight Crew Type 8942

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On ILS to XXR we were instructed to maintain visual separation with the aircraft in front of us on ILS to XXL. He blew through his localizer and ours. We slowed to avoid. He reported responding to an RA. He corrected back to the south and went into a cloud deck. We reported loss of visual with him and were told to go around by ATC.

Approaching ZZZ on the ZZZZZ [arrival]; cleared for ILS XXL approach. A 737 was on a long final visual approach to XXR. I do not know how a visual is assigned when visibility and ceiling are low. Our intercept angle was published at about 45 degrees; and with a tail wind; on autopilot; our aircraft overshot the LOC a bit. The most that we saw was one dot deflection. Just then we got an RA; so I turned off autopilot; descended as instructed and flew the command bars to stay on the LOC. The aircraft on XXR did a go around.

Two B737 flight crews reported that a localizer overshoot and cloudy conditions resulted in the inability to maintain visual separation.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Lighter-Than-Air

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

At the time of the incident I was working ground and Controller in Charge (CIC) combined and [name removed] was working Local control. Runway 26R was closed so we're were operating with a single runway; runway 26L. Local had Citation rolling out 26L and [a] Cherokee cleared for the option 26L. The Citation slowed down to exit taxiway Q but instead Local instructed the Citation to turn left at taxiway P. At this time the Cherokee was already within a half mile of the threshold but Local never scanned to locate both aircraft. When Local told the Cherokee to turn at P; I immediately informed him of both aircraft positions and he ignored me. The Citation was taxiing slowly down the runway and was still on the runway when the Cherokee crossed the threshold and an altitude unknown. However before the incursion happened I instructed Local to send the Cherokee around twice and he disregarded my instructions. The second time I told him to send the aircraft around he replied that the Citation was past the white line. Local never got up from his chair to locate either aircraft or his chair sits low and has limited fields of view. Also by choosing this sequence of traffic Local delayed two air carriers waiting at the runway.I would recommend that Local be counseled to insure a proper scan and that he stands to see the aircraft when they are this close. In addition we all know that regardless of how one may feel about what a CIC/Sup is telling you to do; you should comply.

Ontario Ground Controller also working as Controller In Charge reported a loss of separation due to the local Controller not identifying an aircraft on final while previous arrival was still on the runway.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

I was sent out to a B777-200 aircraft to assist another Mechanic who was answering a call from the [flight] crew regarding a hole in the nose gear door. He couldn't see the hole standing on the tow bar looking up. Supervisor X was standing alongside him claiming it was a paint chip. I put a stand underneath the nose and determined the hole was a burn mark from a lightning strike. Supervisor X kept insisting it was a paint chip. He broadcasted on the radio his disagreement with me and ordered a Lead Mechanic out to the airplane. He then added he wanted another Mechanic sent out because he was removing me from the aircraft. I walked away to look for other signs of lightning strikes. Supervisor X began screaming at me; repeatedly saying 'the damage is over here not over there.' Every Mechanic and Lead Mechanic sent out concurred with my findings. The burn mark on the periphery of the paint is obvious. Supervisor X refused to acknowledge the brown marks as burns. Instead; he was trying to rationalize that there were brown marks all over the nose gear door and they weren't burn marks. Those spots were bug spatters and immaterial to the burn mark; but Supervisor X kept citing it. Supervisor X later told three Union Officers that Management was the final authority. The Union countered that the person signing the logbook was the final authority. Supervisor X doesn't understand the FARs and how it applies to the line operation. Management is generally driven by a performance culture rather than safety. These incidents are all too common. Management fails to acknowledge the independence of mechanics to troubleshoot and ascertain conclusions. The performance culture is too ingrain in Management. At this point; only an overhaul of Management will reverse the toxic environment.

A Line Mechanic reports about the disagreement he had with a Maintenenance Supervisor involving a lightning strike burn mark on the external skin of a B777-200 Nose Landing Gear (NLG) door. Mechanic also raises his concerns about a performance driven management culture versus aircraft safety.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

This was our second leg in this aircraft and had no issues prior to this event.On descent into EWR on the PHLBO3 arrival; the aircraft just prior to a crossing restriction pitched down. Even with a relatively quick reaction; the aircraft went 800 feet below the altitude restriction.We began our descent from cruise to FUBAR intersection normally; meeting the restriction with no issue. There was a tailwind in the descent but the aircraft was not having any problems maintaining profile.  The only modification the First Officer made to the arrival was the addition of speed restrictions.  They were added to avoid receiving 'STEEP DESCENT AFTER DQO' and 'STEEP DESCENT AFTER SOMTO' scratch pad messages. The first speed restriction added was at DQO. The FO put 300 KTS next to the preprogrammed ALT restriction of 200A.  The next speed restriction added was 270 at SOMTO. Prior to DQO VNAV was not having any problem with the descent. I was watching closely as sometimes with good tailwinds on this arrival the aircraft can struggle maintaining speed.  This was not the case this evening.  There was a DECEL circle just prior to DQO which makes sense as the descent page had 310 KTS programmed and a 300/FL200A restriction. During this event; the aircraft was in VNAV PTH.  As the aircraft reached the DECEL point approximately 2 miles from the DQO VOR at an altitude just slightly above the crossing restriction; the aircraft did the opposite of what I expected it to do. I was expecting the aircraft to slightly pitch up to slow the 10 KTS and meet the FL200A crossing restriction and continue down the arrival. Instead the aircraft pitched down increasing an already high rate of descent.  I made a comment to the First Officer along the lines of 'what is this thing doing now'.  There was a slight hesitation (I am talking 1 potato 2 potato) on both our parts as the aircraft was in VNAV PTH and was now rapidly passing through the FL200A restriction just prior DQO instead of honoring the altitude.  I intervened turning off the AP and pitching up; but not wanting to be aggressive on the controls ended [up] crossing DQO at FL192.  The AP was turned back on and the remainder of the flight continued without any other issues with the VNAV.  As a side note we did receive a message several minutes after passing DQO VOR 'STEEP DESCENT AFTER DQO'. I have not seen a message like that come up after having passed the fix.

B737NG Captain reported overshooting a crossing altitude restriction when the aircraft aggressively pitched down unexpectedly on the PHLBO3 arrival into EWR.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 15700; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1700

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

During the preflight preparation I started the APU and after confirming the external PC air was disconnected; I asked the First Officer (FO) to turn on the APU bleed for pack cooling. As I looked up at the pneumatic panel both engine bleed air switches were off and I asked the FO to turn them back ON. He said he had not turned them OFF to begin with. This small fact will come into play later to possibly identify the source of our odor.During the takeoff roll and very close to 100 knots I noticed a moderate smell that can be described as rubber/plastic-like; with NO smoke; fire; or fumes present. It was an odor. I continued the takeoff and once established in the climb; the odor began to definitely and positively dissipate in the cockpit (the FO and I discussed the odor after I engaged the autopilot around 2;500 feet) as we climbed and was no longer present above 10;000 feet. Since I had the Flight Attendants seated for takeoff due to possible chop in the climb; after passing 10;000 feet; I asked the FO to let them up and to ask them about any possible odor in the cabin. The Flight Attendant (FA) reported that there was a slight odor detected around the exit rows and the FA's indicated that they would check the rest on the plane. I was monitoring some of this communication on the flight interphone even though I was the Pilot Flying (PF). The FO and I began a discussion about what was developing; our concerns and what we should do. After several calls between the FO and FA's; it seemed the odor was becoming a bit more pronounced; but the FA's were NOT uncomfortable and didn't think it was an issue. The FO asked for continued updates regarding the situation.We had received a clearance above FL230 when I asked the FO to send an ACARS to Dispatch. WE NEVER GOT A REPLY. I saw [a nearby airport] on the Navigational Display (ND) (circled FMC airport) at about 50 NM and getting closer. Before we could call Dispatch via phone patch and climbing through about FL290; the FO was again talking to the FA's on the interphone. I heard the FA from the back of the aircraft state that after opening the aft lavatory door; the rubber-like odor was 'piercing' and that they were getting sick to their stomachs; had headaches; difficulty breathing; burning eyes and burning noses. There was no fire or smoke present. (We later found out that the back few rows of passengers noted it as well)I looked at the FO and we both said almost simultaneously that we needed to divert. I told him that I had the aircraft and ATC and to set me up for a divert to [the] nearest suitable airport; [Another airport] was too far at this point. I asked ATC how long the runway was and I believe they stated the runway was 6;600 feet long. I asked the FO to send a free text ACARS message to Dispatch telling them of our [situation]; BUT NEVER RECEIVED A RESPONSE. (We were an aircraft [in a situation] and attempted to contact Dispatch per the FOM. After no reply I exercised my command authority and handled the [situation] without them).The FO also pulled out the QRH and looked for an appropriate checklist. We determined that the 'Fire; smoke; fumes' memory items did not apply since there was nothing perceptible in the cockpit. There was no smoke; fire or fumes. The FO did a great job and consulted the checklist to see if there was anything contained in the checklist to help isolate a potential problem source. At this point (we were almost on top of the airport and still needing to descend lower) we deemed it more important to concentrate on flying the aircraft and prepping for landing and not isolating systems on a checklist.The FO sent for ACARS landing data; but since that was going to take too long; I asked him to compute the data. We determined even at about our current weight; which was about 7;000 pounds over max landing weight; that our required landing distance would be about 4;600 feet with Flaps 40 and Max Autobrakes. (This included the 15% margin which we knew we didn't technically need in our situation)The weather was completely clear and we were visual from FL290 all the way to touchdown. During this time we continued to set up for the divert; did the TEST brief with the FA's with no evacuation planned unless we decided to do so mutually after landing. We also quick briefed the visual; both confirmed landing distance again for Flaps 40 and Autobrakes Max. We completed the Approach Descent Checklist.At some point I made a PA to the passengers; quickly telling them about the nature of the issue; our diversion and that the situation was under control.We continued to descend to 6;000 feet and ATC vectored us to the West of the airport and on a left downwind and base for the ILS at 2;000 feet. ATC asked for the Souls on Board (SOB) and Fuel on Board (FOB). On our final vector to final and once established I asked the FO if he thought we missed anything important. He replied that he thought everything was complete. (I felt as though we acted promptly; accomplished all tasks; yet did not create an unmanageable situation by proceeding at a faster pace).I transitioned to 1 dot below the glide slope below 200 feet and made a normal touchdown and let the Autobrakes engage in Max. We cleared the runway and the FO made a 'remain seated; remain seated' PA. We then joined taxiway 'Uniform' where Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) met our aircraft. They performed their external check of the aircraft; said our brakes were warm but well below limits and then cleared the area. We then proceeded to the gate after talking to the FAs and getting taxi clearance. We completed all checklists at the gate and wrote up the odor and overweight landing in the logbook. My FO attended to the FAs and I began to coordinate with the station; local maintenance and ARFF. The station was doing a great job with the passengers.After I made several phone calls; my FO who was doing an outstanding job attending to our Flight Attendants and other recovery duties; advised me that 2 of the Flight Attendants were attended to by the paramedics and were given supplemental oxygen due to the burning sensation in their lungs; headaches and nausea.At a later point the entire crew gathered in the first class cabin and I helped lead an informal interactive crew debriefing and support conversation.We also learned from the Duty Manager after his second call; that last night; there was an engine wash performed on our aircraft which uses very toxic chemicals. The engine bleed switch position that we discovered from our preflight was a clue that maintenance must have done some work on the aircraft prior to our arrival. (Refer to the NOTE at the top of this report)The Duty Manager also wanted to administer a Human Factors Assessment for myself and the FO; but after having already consulted with the FO; we had already determined that we were no longer able to fly any further flights. The Duty Manager was supportive of our decision and said the Human Factors Assessment was therefore not required.

Late in the takeoff roll (approximately 100 knots) I began to notice an unusual smell. It was not a familiar odor but somewhat resembled burning rubber or plastic but there was no smoke or fumes. The odor was not terribly strong and I even wondered if it originated from the environment outside the aircraft (i.e. fertilizer etc.) During climb out and at a safe altitude I commented about the smell to the Captain and he too noticed it.

B737 flight crew detects a faint burnt rubber smell during takeoff and continues to 10;000 feet as the smell gradually diminishes. The flight attendants report the odor is also in the cabin but not strong. Later the flight attendants report the odor is very strong in one of the aft lavatories and the crew elects to divert to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We were on the TYSSN3 arrival into LAS; ATC kept giving us directs; taking us off the arrival. They asked if we had the field in sight and we confirmed that we did have it in sight and they cleared us direct SHAND and the visual 25L. The First Officer asked for 5;000 FT; the published altitude for SHAND. He continued his gradual descent to 5;000 FT and maintained 250 KTS; intending to slow down at 5;000 FT to help expedite our late arrival into LAS. It was a clear night with a half moon; I believe. At no point did I consider terrain separation an issue. However; on our dog leg to final; I noticed after we landed that on the [Commercial chart] page it does show a rising terrain with a top elevation of 3;738 FT just south of LARRE. I believe this is what we flew over and my guess is that the rapidly rising terrain is what caused the EGPWS to activate the 'Too Low; Terrain' call. He disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles and climbed to approximately 5;600 FT; again with everything in sight (airport; city lights; terrain). I do believe the long day we had; being 2 hours late and it being after XA00am also played a factor.

A320 Captain reported receiving a EGPWS Terrain alert on night visual approach into LAS while being vectored off arrival routing. Fatigue was mentioned as a factor.


Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

It was day two of our two-day trip and the second leg that morning of four.  We were running about ten minutes behind schedule due to the morning traffic for departures in XXX on our first leg.  I was the First Officer and the Pilot Flying for this leg.  Even though I have been to SJC previously; it has only been maybe three or four times.We had a computer that was MEL'd which I had never seen before and which was an unexpected add to my workload.  In hindsight I feel I may have been more focused on getting that information correct.  Our clearance was to 'climb via the SID' which was the TECKY1 out of SJC; which neither the Captain nor I had flown before.  It seemed straight forward and I did a departure briefing as the Pilot Flying.  On that departure there is an initial 'at or above' altitude followed by the hard 'at' altitude of 5;000 which is followed by another 'at or above' altitude.  The final climb altitude is FL 190 which I had set in the MCP.  When I briefed the departure I don't know if I just focused on the 'at or above' altitudes or was rushed; but I did not put the 5;000 hard altitude in the MCP.On the takeoff everything was normal.  The Captain checked on with NorCal Departure and stated we were climbing to FL 190 to which the Controller responded but did not query us as to whether we were climbing via the SID.  The captain later stated he assumed this meant we were climbing unrestricted to FL 190.  Autopilot was engaged approximately 4;000 and then I went to engage VNAV and it would not engage.  In hindsight I think this was due to the fact that we were already rapidly climbing to (or through) the hard altitude of 5;000 in the FMS departure; but at the time I couldn't figure out why it would not engage.  At about the same time ATC asked us to just level off at our current altitude and I pressed the Altitude Hold mode on the MCP.  The aircraft started a gradual level off at which time I think the Captain realized what had happened and stated he was taking the controls and manually did the level off at approximately 6;000.  We queried ATC whether they wanted us back to 5;000 and they said no; they would have a continuing climb to FL 190 in just a minute.

Although a deprature briefing was accomplished the wrong altitude in the window was not caught and VNAV was not selected after takeoff prior to 5000 feet.

A B737-700 First Officer set an incorrect altitude in the altitude window causing the crew to fly through an intermediate level off altitude while on the TECKY1 SID.  The Captain also missed the mistake.


Event happened on the ramp. We were preparing for our flight to ZZZ1 and entered the cockpit to start our preflight. It was cold so we did the fire test and started the APU. We then turned the packs on and it instantly started to fill with what I initially thought was condensation but within seconds it became very thick and I realized I was having a hard time breathing at which point I quickly shut-off the packs and told the FO to get out of the cockpit. The cockpit had filled with smoke (Hydraulic vapor or burning hydraulic fluid that was pushed into the pack system). We waited for the smoke/fumes to dissipate and then we re-entered the cockpit; opened the windows; wrote up the problem in the Maintenance log and called Maintenance Control to let them know what happened. At this point we didn't yet realize that the smoke/vapor was in fact hydraulic fluid coming through the pack system. Maintenance came to the airplane; we explained what happened and we stepped off the plane while they trouble shot the problem. I re-approached Maintenance while they were walking around the pack and wheel well area at which time it was explained to me that what had happened is earlier in the morning; maintenance had serviced the hydraulic fluid; only it was severely over serviced; well beyond the full mark which then pushed fluid into the pack area; so when we turned on the packs it vaporised/burned the hydraulic fluid and pushed it through the entire system and into the cockpit ventilation. Maintenance then wiped and cleaned up as much hydraulic fluid in the wheel well and pack area and then turned the packs on to try and burn off any residual hydraulic fluid in the system with the hope of getting the plane back into service. I watched from a company van 50+ feet away while Maintenance ran the packs with all doors and windows open while smoke/vapor billowed out of the doors and windows. After approximately :20 min they told us they thought they had removed everything from the system and would we take a look and see what we thought. We still had all our personal items in the cockpit so we re entered the cockpit; I turned off the packs; waited a couple minutes and then turned the packs back on at which time we started to get the fumes and vapor/smoke again at which point I immediately turned the packs back off and told Maintenance there was no way we were going to be able to use the airplane. I called Operations and informed them of everything and that we were not going to be able to take the plane and asked if chief pilot or anyone from management was in the office; I was told no one was going to be in for a few hours. During the course of everything; I noticed I was starting to have an irritation to my eyes; throat and a skin irritation on my forehead. After cancelling the flight and heading back to the company building; the irritations became more noticeable and I contacted Operations asking for the crew to be released and that I needed to go take a shower and clean up. I then contacted the safety department telling them what had happened and that I would be submitting a report later in the day after I went back to my apartment for a shower; dispose of my contacts and take a nap because I was having a headache.  Event occurred due to maintenance overfilling the hydraulic fluid which then reached the pack system and entered the ventilation system into the cockpit; according to our maintenance personnel. Check Airman. Airline Transport Pilot.

Reporter stated there wasn't any fluid on the ground under the fuselage during their walkaround and the belly skin was fairly dry underneath. The smoke like vapor was somewhat whitish in color and that's why at first he thought the packs were pushing moisture condensation because of the cold temperature outside. But when he started getting a taste in his mouth along with the smell/fumes and difficulty to breathe and eyes irritated; he decided it was time to leave the aircraft.  Later; after they both had exited the aircraft due to the smoke/fumes; Maintenance walked them over to a very large pool of Skydrol hydraulic fluid under and forward of the main wheel wells. Maintenance noted that a servicing procedure involving a check valve to prevent a build-up of air pressure in the hydraulic reservoirs had not been accomplished on their B737. As a result; the reservoirs were overserviced and when the APU was started; the excess hydraulic fluid dumped into the forward area of the main wheel wells and on the APU pneumatic duct; then onto the ground. According to Maintenance; the fluid was somehow drawn into the Air Conditioning System. Maintenance also informed him that two more of their B737s were found with hydraulic reservoirs overserviced and the hydraulic reservoir check valve servicing procedures not accomplished.

A Check Pilot reports that he and the First Officer started a B737 (2nd generation) APU on a cold night then turned on the Air Conditioning packs. The cockpit and cabin immediately filled with very thick smoke/fumes thought to be hydraulic vapor or burning hydraulic fluid. Same situation occurred when Maintenance and Flight crew ran the packs two more times with APU on. Captain experienced eyes; nose; throat; forehead irritations and headaches. Flight cancelled.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict

I was Pilot Flying; Captain was Pilot Monitoring; and First Officer was resting. Notable weather was intermittent light turbulence; and undercast. Near [coordinates] on NAT F; we were being passed by [another air carrier]; 1000 FT below. We were on a 2M SLOP and they appeared to be on a 1M SLOP. After a few TAs; with them in sight; we received an RA; essentially telling us to stay level. We observed them by visual reference and TCAS to be turning left (away; towards the track) and descending. Contact with [other air carrier] on [frequency] confirmed that they would stay on track while passing us. We communicated the incident with ATC via HF; and confirmed our position; route; SLOP; and altitude. A notable factor was some irregularities we observed with the L Altimeter; namely that it was more erratic than normal / the R Altimeter; meaning that it deviated more (about our cruise altitude) in anything but smooth air (+/- 40' in light; and +/- 80' in moderate). Additionally; the two altimeters were near the 200 FT RVSM limit (180-200 FT). In fact; we did later get an ALT DISAGREE EICAS message. For that; we completed the QRH; consulted the Flight Operations Manual; and made a logbook entry.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a RA in RVSM airspace.  The pilot stated the aircraft's altimeters were off by 180 feet.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

My landing (CA) in ORD in gusty conditions on [Runway] 27L. Wind was 300/17G25 or thereabouts. Visual approach but followed ILS. Touched down normally; not a greased landing but not a hard landing. Thrust levers were closed upon touchdown and as I reached for reverse thrust levers the thrust levers advanced uncommanded. The speed brakes had deployed; but as the thrust levers advanced; the speed brakes stowed. The aircraft then became airborne again. At this time; the First Officer noticed the speed brakes had stowed and reached around the throttle quadrant and pulled speed brake lever. At the same time; I pulled the thrust levers back to idle; held them there with my forearm and deployed the thrust reversers. Second landing was still smooth as we were not airborne for more than a second or two. After thrust levers deployed; I initiated manual braking and exited the runway at a normal taxiway. There was no indication of a tail strike. Once at the gate; I inspected the aircraft and saw no evidence of a tail strike or aircraft damage.This is a known problem as I have experienced it when I was a First Officer. I am normally ALWAYS aware of the potential for the thrust levers to advance uncommanded after touchdown. Today I was not as vigilant as normal and today was the day the uncommanded thrust lever advancement occurred.I have spoke with numerous Check Airman about this issue and we still do not have a solution. At the very least; we need to be training for this eventuality and have a procedure in place to ensure it doesn't cause a more serious incident.In addition; I should have initiated a go-around due to the bounced landing. However; it all happened so fast and the First officer had already deployed the speed brakes after they stowed after the first deployment. To continue the landing appeared to be the best option in the limited amount of time we had.

B737-800 Captain reported the aircraft became airborne after landing when the autothrottles advanced uncommanded upon touchdown.


Flight Crew Total 7623; Flight Crew Type 1353

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Total 6517; Flight Crew Type 3968

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Being vectored for the RNAV 13L approach. SKBO in 1L; discontinuity; then ISMUT. Cleared direct ISMUT for the approach; I put ISMUT in 1L and executed. First Officer saw execute light illuminated on the right FMC (not illuminated on the left side). When he pressed execute; we lost both navigation screens and had the TRK message on them. I tried to reinstall the approach (I had BOG VOR in manual and knew we were at a safe altitude). Couldn't reinstall because the FMC's were locked up. We climbed to 14;000 (MSA) and got radar vectors while we figured it out. Controller momentarily confused my voice with that of a female air carrier pilot. This was corrected by the slow annunciation of call sign and flight number by she and I. The FMC's came back online. I installed the approach for the ILS 13R and we landed without incident.

We were given direct BOG VOR approximately 80 NM away from the VOR and descending to 12;000. We were not yet given an approach or runway assignment but planned and briefed the RNAV 13L as the ILS was out of service. Our FMC had BOG a discontinuity and ISMUT for the initial approach to 13L. ISMUT is about the same location as BOG VOR. About 15 NM prior to BOG VOR we were cleared for the RNAV 13L we put ISMUT to 1L and went direct. About the time we were leveling off in LNAV and VNAV PTH I noticed an [execute] light was on on my FMC I told the captain I was going to [execute] it making sure nothing changed as it appeared that it was already navigating to the fix. (After the event we believe only the right FMC [execute] light was illuminated). After I pressed the [execute] light on the right side FMC the magenta line on the MFD blanked out as well as all fixes on both FMCs and a TRK caution appeared on the MFD. The captain immediately tried to reload the approach but 'time out' displayed on the FMC scratchpad. It was unresponsive for about 2 minutes we went to raw data flying direct to the BOG VOR advised ATC we lost our navigation and requested climb to 14;000 and vectors for another approach by the time we began to climb and approach the BOG VOR (getting a vector heading for 13R ILS) we got all functionality back from the FMC. We loaded ILS 13R and executed the approach and landed safely.The controller was busy with a lot of traffic and I know we didn't fully explain our issue as we were busy making sure we never lost our Situational Awareness. I am writing this as I am aware the controllers wanted more information on this event.

A B757 flight crew reported the FMC dumped the SKBO RNAV 13L arrival while in a descent to 12;000 feet. The crew was locked out of the FMC for two minutes. Unable to reload data; they requested radar vectors but then successfully loaded and flew the ILS 13R.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

I am writing this in regards to our low oil temperature we experienced on a Hawker HS-125-800XPC aircraft. What happened was that we were never able to get the #-1 Engine Oil Temperature to rise to at least 30 degrees Celsius which is the start of the green arc as required for operations. This day the outside temperature was -1 degrees Celsius which reflected temperature of the oil.  As per our procedures we started the #-2 Engine and then the #-1 Engine. Because the #-2 engine is started first; the oil temperature starts rising first and usually gets about a 5-7 degree Celsius head start on its way to rise up into the green which is at 30 degrees Celsius. This was the case today as both oil temperatures started at -1 degrees Celsius and were rising with the #-2 engine oil temperature ahead by about 7 degrees.  Now in my 12 years in the Hawkers; we have had different policies on when we could taxi depending on oil temperature. When I was first in the fleet; we could taxi with oil temperature not in the green but were not allowed to take off until oil temperature was in the green. Then at some point it was changed to not bringing the throttle off idle until the oil temperature was in the green. So in essence; unless you could taxi at idle thrust; you were forced to stay in the blocks until the engine oil temperature rose to 30 degrees Celsius which is the start of the green arc. It was like this for many years until the advent of the AOM. When the AOM first came out this was changed back to the old way where you could taxi out with oil temperature not in the green but couldn't takeoff until it was in the green. Then for whatever reason it was changed back to the previous way of having to wait until normal oil temperature until power could be advanced. However; as this affected doing the engine anti-ice check; this check had to be moved to the taxi check. I bring this up because back when the engine anti-ice check was in the after start flow; it mentioned you had to wait until 30 degrees Celsius until you could advance throttle. Then with the change to checking the anti-ice on taxi; most will taxi out when at least one engine oil pressure is in the green and then when the other engine oil pressure is in the green; do the anti-ice check. Therefore; what usually is the case is that pilots including myself will wait until one engine gets the oil temperature in the green at 30 degrees Celsius and taxi out that way by advancing the power on the one engine assuming the power application is minor. Usually this is possible because the number 2 engine oil temperature will get in the green around 2-3 minutes before engine #-1; as engine #-2 is started first. That was the case today. When engine #-2 oil pressure got in the green; we taxied out by advancing engine #-2 power lever just slightly. As engine #-1 was about 23 degrees Celsius and warming; I knew it would eventually get in the green and as I wasn't advancing the power lever on it; I figured I was operating properly. Then as we were taxiing the engine #-1 oil temperature stopped rising at its previous rate and slowed substantially. As we got to the runway; it had only risen to 29 degrees Celsius and was staying there. As engine #-2 oil temperature was at 51 degrees Celsius; and from what I know from past practice; the fact that engine #-1 oil temperature should have matched #-2 I called Maintenance to confer with them. I got Maintenance Controller X and we patched in ACP X and we discussed the situation. I was probably on the phone with them for 10-15 minutes and still during the whole time the engine #-1 oil temperature never rose above 29 degrees Celsius. We decided I should write it up and we went back to the ramp. I need to again emphasize that during this whole time the throttle on engine #-1 was always kept at idle as the engine oil temperature was never at 30 degrees Celsius or higher. We got to the FBO and I wrote it up. I got follow-up from ACP Y that the housing on the oil/fuel heater had cracked allowing cold fuel to mix with the oil.  One of the things that first caught maintenance's eye I guess; was that the oil tank was filled with jet fuel. I then talked to a Hawker Beech mechanic and I got the impression this is a very rare occurrence. One of my concerns however; is what if the oil temperature had just been enough to get into the green. Then; even though the oil temperature varied between engine #-1 and #-2; both being in the green; would have been acceptable for takeoff. I wonder what could have happened? I am also concerned if this oil; being diluted by fuel; could cause engine damage. From what I read in the maintenance notes the oil/fuel heater is being replaced. But I am curious if damage to the engine is looked at with the oil being contaminated? Now; besides filing a safety report over this event with the engine; there is another concern that is the real reason I am filing this. It has to do with the limitation on oil temperature in the AOM. I had explained to my SIC that we do have a limitation on the oil temperature and that it must be in the green to advance the power. As we had both engines running but only engine #-2 oil temperature in the green; we could taxi out as long as I didn't advance power on engine #-1. As we were light and only needed a small bump of the throttle from engine #-2 just to get us moving and then idle thrust was enough to taxi us; that this would work. This is the way I have always done it and have seen many other pilots do this. I felt that the limitations was; you could not advance power until you had oil temperature in the green. Well; my SIC decided to look up the limitation in the AOM when we were back at the ramp.  Imagine my surprise when he said that the limitation is for taxi and not throttle advancement. This must be our Operator's limitation; as this is not in the AFM. So therefore; the act of taxiing with the engine #-1 oil temp not yet in the green was incorrect; regardless if the throttle is kept at idle. I did not know this and would have never done this if I did. I guess I have been in this airplane for so long and with all the back and forth changes I was applying this limitation incorrectly as laid out in the AOM.

Reporter stated the Hawker 125-800XPC aircraft has Honeywell TFE-731 Engines; originally Garrett. Maintenance drained the #-1 Engine oil; changed the oil filter; ran the engine and returned the aircraft to service. This was the second aircraft in two months with a similar problem; but also had oil pressure fluctuations.Reporter stated the taxi-out limitations in the past was driven by the number of incidences of fuel control units blowing internal seals believed to be caused by ice crystals in the fuel; when the engine oil temp was not in the green and the throttles advanced. There were also numerous incidences of warnings in the cockpit for engine oil by-pass caused by the engine oil filter by-pass pin indicator popping and triggering the warnings. All of which was thought to be caused by engine oil temp not being in the 'Green' arc.

A Captain describes two situations involving their Hawker HS-125-800XPC aircraft with Honeywell TFE 731 engines. Pilot noticed the #-1 engine oil temperature would not come up to the minimum 'green' arc during taxi-out that was found to be an internally cracked fuel/oil heater dumping fuel into the oil system. He also explains the history and confusion for pilots between the company's Aircraft Operations Manual (AOM) versus the Manufacturer's Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) regarding when to taxi with engine oil temperatures not yet in the 'green' arc.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure

At cruise; the right engine vibration was at 4.0 and in the amber caution range. The Captain handed controls over to me and went through the QRH procedure for high engine vibration. When reducing power 2 percent the vibration went down to acceptable levels. The Captain tried contacting Dispatch to see if a return to ZZZ was the best course of action; the Dispatcher replied follow the QRH and gave no other guidance. At this point we were past the 1/2 mark and continued to ZZZZ. Upon Landing it was noticed that the same engine vibration has been written up in the logbook 10 previous times in the last two weeks. In addition it was discovered on the last maintenance write up for the engine vibration; a high powered engine run was required but only an engine run to 45% N1 was completed and the maintenance write up was signed off as good. When calling maintenance in ZZZZ; the Maintenance Personnel advised the Captain against writing the engine up again; as it was contract maintenance in ZZZZ and not much they could do. This posed a huge safety risk to the passengers and crew of future flights.

E175 First Officer reported pressure from maintenance to not write up an engine problem.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 16011; Flight Crew Type 3963

Training / Qualification; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4300

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Normal pre-flight; normal pushback and taxi; in the seats were; myself; and the flying First Officer. It was the First Officer's leg. Upon takeoff clearance; we began the takeoff roll. It was a normal takeoff and at approximately 400-500 FT AGL; we got an EICAS message 'ENG FUEL FILT-L'. We continued the climb and ran the After Takeoff checklist and then the 'QRH ENG FUEL FILT' checklist. At this point we advised ATC that we needed to return to the field and needed some time to prepare for a return. We were given a level off altitude of 5;000 FT. We then called Dispatch; and got a patch to Maintenance. We made this call on SATCOM; and were disconnected; so we once again needed to reestablish the call. Not until level off; did the EICAS message disappear. The message was still in the status page. We conferred with Maintenance (which they confirmed that a return was required) and Dispatch; and while we ran the numerous checklist; and calls to the back and informed or very capable Purser; we began to prepare to dump fuel in order to get down to landing weight. We were placed in a holding; and then given a vector to some 120 miles from the field to the dump area. We were not comfortable flying out so far from the field; and then having to return the same distance with the fuel filter problem. We decided once we were given those instructions; that we would stay holding at the outer marker; and prepared for our return to the field. We asked Dispatch to run performance data for us; (an overweight landing at approximately 380;000 LBS) and to advise all parties of our impending return. The aircraft operated completely normal; so not until we requested approach clearance and were given it; did we declare an in-flight emergency. Once we had completed all checklists; reviewed performance data; we were then ready for the approach; at which time First Officer gave the airplane back to me and he then became the pilot not flying. I was now the flying pilot. The approach and landing was normal. We did an overweight landing at 380;000 LBS. Once we exited the runway; the airport fire trucks were on site and stationed behind the airplane. We canceled the emergency; and since the brakes got hot; we decided to be towed to the gate. The mechanics came out to the taxiway; did an inspection of the brakes; and towed us to a hardstand. We ran other checklist; Overweight Landing and also the Brake Temp checklist. Once at a remote parking stand; the mechanics were not able to complete all the required checks that Maintenance needed in time; and it was my understanding; that a high power run up was required per Maintenance; and the airport would have none of that in the middle of the night. As it was; we the entire crew had run past our legal duty time and the flight canceled in order to complete the necessary repairs and checks and because of the time required. I again need to thank; the entire flight crew; both my flight officers; and the in-flight crew for a job well done. Everyone on board handled this incident with the utmost professionalism. Our Relief Pilot was invaluable to the successful outcome of the return to the field. He ran numerous checklists; called the company; and kept the cabin informed. He ran performance numbers for us; and checklist. The First Officer again flew a good airplane and allowed me to work with the Relief Pilot; Dispatch; Maintenance; and the cabin crew.

I was the Relief Pilot. After takeoff at 500 FT I noticed a Left Engine Fuel Filter EICAS. I alerted the pilot flying and the Captain. As we climbed to 5;000 FT assigned altitude. I referred to the QRH checklist. We asked ATC how far the [dump] area was and were told 100 miles. We then decided it was not wise to fly that far away from our landing airfield to dump in the event the engine failed. After referencing the performance data and confirming with Dispatch; we decided an overweight landing was the best option.

A B767 EICAS alerted ENG FUEL FILT - L at 500 FT after takeoff so the QRH was complied with; an emergency declared and the flight returned to land overweight without dumping fuel because the dump area was too far away.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

The event occurred on the second leg of the morning pairing at the end of six days of work. The week began with a night hub turn sequence followed by a 24 hour layover switching to day flying followed by a 24 hour layover switching back to a night hub turn sequence. Basically night hub turn to day hub turn to night hub turn all flown as the regularly scheduled bid pack line. The last pairing of the six day trip had a two leg sequence. The second leg was conducted in early morning day IMC conditions at a cruise altitude of 13;000 ft. Event #1: Did not comply with crossing restriction.ATC issued a clearance to cross 25nm this side of DQO at 9000 ft. Our current altitude was 13;000 ft. There were three fixes in our flight plan between our current fix and DQO spaced out by small mileages (10nm; 5nm; 7nm etc.). Since we were not cleared direct first I had trouble as the PM inputting the crossing restriction into the FMS because I had to do the math to determine which fix and which mileage to attach the restriction to. I definitely recognized some cognitive 'slowness' on my behalf due to fatigue that made it difficult to figure out where to attach the restriction. In the end we added up all the distances between us and DQO and determined we had time to make the descent and gave up on trying to program the FMS so we could use VNAV PATH. As we approached 10;000 ft in VNAV SPD with the speed window closed; the speed bug did not move from 325kts to 240kts automatically and we began to pass through 10;000 ft at 325 kts. The captain as the PF disengaged the autopilot to stop his descent below 10;000 ft above 250kts. He opened the speed window and selected 240kts. As the aircraft slowed he engaged FLCH 240 and re-commenced his descent to make the 9000 ft restriction at DQO. As the airspeed slowed he re-engaged VNAV and the speed bug cycled back up to 325kts; the thrust levers advanced and we reached about 270kts in a descent at approximately 9;500 ft. As the PM; I sensed the captain was overtasked and having trouble recognizing the problem so with one hand I opened the speed window and inserted 240kts and with the other hand I manually overrode the thrust levers and brought them to IDLE while the captain continued to hand fly the aircraft to attempt to maintain 10;000 ft while we slowed. Once the situation was stabilized the captain re-engaged the autopilot; allowed the aircraft to slow below 250kts and then finished the descent to 9000 ft. In the end we did not make the 9000 ft crossing restriction 25nm from DQO.Contributing factors were fatigue and the reduction in cognitive ability to solve a non-routine FMS drill; IMC conditions and steady precipitation; the low altitude/dense traffic area between [our departure airport] and PHL and the unexpected failure of the FMS to slow at 10;000 ft. For whatever reason; the VNAV side of the LEGS page listed .59M/9;000 at DQO instead of 240/9;000. The airplane wanted to maintain .59M below 10;000 ft instead of 240kts. The FMS VNAV DES page did not have the '240/10;000' speed rest like it normally does. I'm not sure why this was but feel it had something to do with our low cruise altitude of 13;000 ft. I'm not sure what could have been done as I would consider this the perfect storm of events. High density traffic environment; lots of low altitude fixes on a Victor Route; a non-routine crossing restriction; IMC and steady precipitation conditions; fatigue and unexpected auto-flight system behavior. We had multiple problems confront us at once. The rest of the flight was uneventful. The second half of a hub turn utilizing multiple legs in a high density environment is tough. The second leg of the pairing is usually when the morning flights of the passenger carriers are the busiest; it's at a low altitude where more low-flying slow speed aircraft are and it's at high density airports. Because of the IMC conditions between ZZZ-PHL we had a 30 minute ground delay after blackout further delaying our flight. This pairing is much different from [other] pairings where there isn't as much activity. It's all a part of the job; I understand but there is more operational risk with these types of pairings because of the time of day and location/operating environment. Fatigue was definitely at play as the week-long sequence had multiple shifts between day flying and night flying. While there was a 24 hour rest period between these shifts it can still be different to shift from a day sequence to a night sequence because it is hard to sleep normally at night and then try to take a nap in the middle of the day before your night sequence begins. It is challenging to have a two-leg pairing on a night hub turn immediately following a day to night switch like [this] pairing does.

B757-200 First Officer reported he and the Captain committed several errors on their flight because of fatigue and workload.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During taxi out to [runway]; Tower reported engine fire and sparks coming out of left engine as we crossed off duty runway. Got the aircraft across the runway and stopped in the hold area while we shut down the left engine; pulled the left Fire Handle; and had no secondary indications in the cockpit. Requested ARFF inspection and ARFF rolled out for us. Checked fire warnings for valid tests: all systems tested normal. Advised flight attendant's of situation and made a PA to our passengers that the Airfield Safety Team was going to come out and look at our aircraft and that there was no cause for alarm. Also; that we shut down both engines for their safe investigation of our aircraft. Received all clear; no hot spots on our aircraft from the Fire Marshal. Advised Operations that we were returning to the gate and that the aircraft would be down for maintenance. Advised the crew and passengers that we were returning to the gate. Started the right engine and taxied single engine to the open gate. Completed the write-up in the logbook and briefed Maintenance. Fire Captain debriefed me on his all clear findings and follow me back to the gate in a post incident face to face de-brief. Called Dispatch and debriefed him on what had happened. Called [company Chief Pilot] and debriefed him on the event; and advised him that the cockpit crew was essentially done; one emergency a day; he concurred. Completed post incident debrief with First Officer in Operations. Maintenance advised me of their tailpipe fire inspection and of the 737's possible torching of leaked oil in the tailpipe section for future awareness. The follow up with Maintenance made me aware that this type of tale pipe fire or torching is in the maintenance manuals; for future reference; but engine fires must be respected when aircrew are advised from sources outside their aircraft; and quick and decisive action to secure those fires must still always be accomplished by cockpit aircrew. Additionally; Captain's decision to end the cockpit crew day following this uneventful ground emergency was good in my reflection; in that it was an early morning sign-in for a long day's flight work load.

B737-800 Captain reported ATC advised left engine fire and sparks on taxi out. Flight crew shut down the engine and had ARFF check for hot spots before returning to gate.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2850; Flight Crew Type 600

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 8670; Flight Crew Type 1854

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During the RNAV (GPS) approach to runway 17 into SGR; we experienced two TA/RA's. The first was during the initial vectors for the approach. We were at 3000 feet just above an overcast layer when the first occurred. We saw the traffic visually as well. We started a shallow descent and a turn away from the traffic as shown by the VSI and TCAS. The controller noticed the traffic later after it was behind us by 2 miles. I believe she said it was a VFR target. During the recovery she descended us to 2000 feet and turned us to intercept the inbound course. Sometime during this phase we experienced the second TA/RA that told us to climb to roughly 2000 feet per minute which took us through the final approach course as well. We were IMC. Once clear of advisory; while establishing situational awareness of the approach; being re-vectored; and question about the traffic by ATC; we had descended below the 2000 feet altitude assigned; was VMC and had visual contact of the airport. We were cleared for the visual at this time and continued with the landing.

We are set up on the Navigation equipment for the RNAV (GPS) 17. Being vectored downwind for RNAV 17 at SGR; ATC cleared us from 3000 to 2000. We are in and out of cumulus clouds; at 2600 we get a TA/RA; not to climb. No problem we are descending to 2000; and we initiate a 10 degree right turn; because we spot the traffic; 12 o'clock and what looked like 300 above. We let ATC know what happened. We get a new heading of 270 maintain 2000. We did not overfly DIZGY (IAF) or EBOKE (IF) due to vectors and TA/RA event. ATC is busy talking to other planes but gets in 'turn left 180 maintain 2000'. We are in the turn; TCAS on 6 mile scale; still in and out of the clouds; and we get another TA/RA in RED and verbal to climb at 2000 FPM. We initiate and climb to 2500. I let ATC know about our second event. We are now 'clear of conflict'; and we have flown thru the inbound course; no problem.At this point I am not paying much attention to the pilot flying; but more about being outside; and trying to communicate with ATC; who in the middle of the second event; gives us 'turn 130 maintain 2000' instructions. The course needles are pointing behind us; assuming because we didn't fly close enough to the IAF or IF to activate. Pilot flying has lost situational awareness and wants to know the course to the final approach fix. I still haven't turned the heading bug to 130; it is still on 180. Neither of us notice that we were descending; while trying to regain situational awareness. We are now VFR and not thinking about altitude; until we were called out by ATC for low altitude alert (1200); should have been 2000. I'd say the sky was broken at about 1900; but ATIS has it at few 2500. We continued inbound and landed without further incident.

CE560XL flight crew received several RA's on approach to SGR along with a descent well below charted minimums related to loss of situational awareness.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 6000

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 16000

Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

We were cleared for takeoff on Runway XXL. Upon receiving our takeoff clearance; we initiated takeoff. As our takeoff progressed; an aircraft on final (we're guessing he was maybe four miles out on final) told Tower they were going to need to go-around due to being too fast. At this point Tower responded to him and then told us 'Aircraft X cancel takeoff clearance'. By this point we were at approximately 105-110 knots. V1 was 124 knots. The Captain elected to continue the takeoff which we did. I completely agree with the Captain's decision to continue the takeoff as the reject would have increased risk to our aircraft considerably. I did not respond to Tower at this point as the Controller; and the radios; were saturated and we were in a critical phase of flight. Upon getting airborne he switched us to departure; and the rest of the departure and flight were uneventful.Not sure we could have done anything differently. I'm not sure what was on the Controller's scope; but telling an aircraft to cancel takeoff clearance that far into the takeoff phase could obviously cause some serious issues. Seems like a runway offset or vector to the aircraft on final would have been a better decision; but again not sure what his other obstacles were.

It was a busy day at ZZZ; as was expected with one runway and low ceilings and visibility. We were number one at the hold short for [Runway] XXL on our side; with one GA aircraft on the other side; with three aircraft on final. The Tower Controller seemed very hesitant to let aircraft takeoff in between arrivals. The GA aircraft was cleared into position; and took off after the first arrival. Tower then indicated to the second aircraft on final that we would be in position before he cleared the aircraft to land; however; after a several second delay following the next landing; it became obvious that we were not going into position; and he subsequently cleared the next arrival to land. After this aircraft landed we were cleared into position and hold. I taxied into position and noted that the next arrival was at 1;500 ft. on the TCAS; signaling to me that we had plenty of time. As the previous arrival cleared the runway we were cleared for takeoff; at which time we advanced power and began the takeoff roll expeditiously. At around 100 knots; I heard the aircraft on approach say that they were going around because they were too fast on the approach. We continued our roll; and Tower said 'Aircraft X cancel takeoff clearance.'By this time we were at 115 knots; with a V1 of 124. Dispatch had planned the flight with a braking action of 3 because of the wet runway. By the time the F/O (First Officer) and I confirmed what was said; we were a few knots shy of V1; at which time I elected to continue the takeoff. We continued the takeoff and climbed out; during which time Tower had given the aircraft behind us a climb and turn. When we were passing about 300 ft. on the climbout; Tower told an aircraft (I'm not sure if it was us or the aircraft on the go-around) to level at 1500 ft.; or one thousand feet above the airport. I asked the F/O to confirm the call sign; but due to frequency congestion; we could not verify who the call was for and we continued on the departure. We did not receive any TCAS advisories or warnings the entire time; and continued the departure uneventfully. ZZZ Tower did not say anything else to us and switched us to Departure as if nothing unusual had happened. Tower Controllers need to understand the high threat risk of rejecting a takeoff at high speeds; particularly on a wet runway. There was no need for us to reject the takeoff with plenty of spacing and a simple turn from the aircraft going around.

An Air Carrier crew reported ATC instructed them to cancel takeoff clearance but they did not comply due to their high speed and the critical phase of flight. A landing aircraft initiated a go around during their takeoff roll.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 07

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Called MROC Tower for weather and landing runway which was 07. Briefed arrival and ILS 07. 30 NM from airport ATC cleared us direct TOMAS which reduced the distance from MROC by 10 NM. Descend to 8;000 and cleared for VOR/DME 07 circle 25 CYRUS visual APP RWY 25. When building VOR/DME 07 you then must build the CYRUS visual because it is not in the database. Then when you select RWY 25 it dumps the VOR approach that you have loaded. This occurred while descending in mountainous terrain IMC. If you then do not load RWY 25 after the final fix on the visual; EPABE; you will not have any vertical guidance. After EPABE you are at 4;000 feet; 1;000 AGL flying into rising terrain. 2.7 NM from the end of 25 the terrain is 3;500 feet. You must descend after EPABE; into rising terrain; while in a 30 degree bank; while making a 180 degree turn. We had several sink rate alerts but were stable at 500 feet and landed without incident.

B737 Captain reports being cleared for the VOR/DME 07 circle 25 CYRUS visual APP RWY 25 at MROC. The CYRUS visual is not part of the database and must be manually entered. When Runway 25 is selected the VOR approach is dumped.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flying into DAL we [were] on the REDDN4 Arrival. The last fix is BACHR. Looking at the plan view there is not a heading after BACHR. The heading is mentioned in the textual description. We had the FMS set up to go direct to the airport after BACHR. Shortly after BACHR ATC asked us to turn immediately to a heading of 320 and made our mistake known to us. We complied and there was no conflict. We were given a phone number to call Regional Approach after we landed. We called and spoke with Mr. X who informed us that we were not the only flight crew to make this mistake. If Jeppesen could do a better job of charting the heading to fly on the plan view we might have caught this mistake.

Citation First Officer reported the REDDN4 Arrival STAR chart does not show the mandatory heading after BACHR.