Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178; Flight Crew Total 6147; Flight Crew Type 924

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was one of the Relief Pilots on Flight XXX. During our preflight paperwork review; all four pilots noted a strange Carry Forward write up in the [Deferred Items List]. The write up read:----------------------------------------Passenger at seat XXL lost mobile phone under the seat. Mobile phone rang but couldn't [be] located.----------------------------------------Our discussion centered on the potential safety concerns with flying with a lost phone in the aircraft; and in this case; lost under/near a business class seat; with all of the moving parts that could damage the phone and start a thermal runaway.The Captain asked each pilot if they were comfortable flying the aircraft with this issue; and the consensus was that we were not comfortable; and that the phone had to be found before we would take the aircraft on a 10 hour; 138 minute ETOPS overwater segment.The Captain initiated a phone call with Dispatch; informing them of our intent to refuse the aircraft until the phone was found. I was not present for the entire phone call; but the Captain relayed that there was a conference call with Dispatch; [Maintenance Control] and the [Chief Pilot] to discuss the write up and our concerns about operating the aircraft with this potential hazard. At the end of the call the Captain confirmed with all parties that we would refuse to operate the aircraft until the phone could be located.The Pilot Monitoring entered the appropriate [Fault Reporting Manual] code for aircraft refusal into the Electronic Logbook and sent it to [Maintenance Control].The aircraft was de-boarded and Maintenance commenced a search for the phone. This included taking apart the [cabin] compartment at seat XXL; as well as removing cargo from the Forward Cargo Compartment to prepare to search the ceiling area near the seat location. Approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes after our original push time the phone was located in the area under the seat; and it took another 10-15 minutes to actually retrieve the phone. The phone was still powered on when it was found!The [Maintenance Release] was cleared to reflect the resolution of the maintenance item and we departed ZZZ1 approximately 3 hours late.There are a couple of very important additional details to discuss regarding this event:First; during our investigation into the Carry Forward write up; we discovered that the phone was lost on a previous flight to ZZZ. The Carry Forward was added to the maintenance history in ZZZ. That aircraft subsequently flew a segment from ZZZ to ZZZ1; where it remained overnight prior to our flight.It is very concerning to consider the huge risk that was introduced into our Safety Management System by allowing an aircraft to fly an ETOPS segment with this potential hazard on board. The fact that [Maintenance Control] categorized it as a Carry Forward had the potential of normalizing a very hazardous situation. We looked at the [Maintenance Release] for the inbound flight to ZZZ1 and discovered the Carry Forward in their [Deferred Items List] as well; which meant that the crew either questioned the write up and concluded that it was ok; or they didn't notice/realize the hazard.Second; this aircraft was on the ground for 4.5 hours in ZZZ after the original write up; and it was on the ground in ZZZ1 for nearly 14 hours before our flight. ZZZ1 Maintenance confirmed to us that they had not taken any actions to locate the phone prior to our refusal to operate the aircraft.Third; the Captain told the rest of the Flight Deck crew that during his conference call; he was frustrated that [Maintenance Control] did not see a safety hazard from the cell phone missing in the aircraft. This lack of concern from a safety standpoint is confirmed by the simple fact that the original write up was classified as a Carry Forward; with no action taken by Maintenance after the initial search. There were several hours in ZZZ before the flight to ZZZ1 and over 12hours in ZZZ1 where maintenance personnel could have undertaken a search to find it. The Captain replayed that the [Maintenance Control] participant on the call stated that they had 3 days to find the phone; so he was not concerned yet that it was missing. When the Captain queried him as to the reason for giving Maintenance 3 days to find it; [Maintenance Control] said that the 3-day limit was in order to satisfy Customer Service metrics on returning the phone to the customer; and had nothing to do with a potential hazard to flight from a lithium ion battery device missing underneath the passenger cabin in the aircraft.I am deeply--deeply concerned by [Maintenance Control]'s complete lack of awareness that this missing phone constituted a potential catastrophic hazard to flight. The fact that the write up was classified as a Carry Forward and a new [Maintenance Release] issued for the [previous] flight scares me to the core. [The company] accepted a huge and unnecessary risk to passenger and crew safety by operating Flight XXY. Until this event happened to us I would have never considered that [the company] would knowingly accept such an unnecessary risk.There are far too many examples of lithium ion battery hazards to flight for this to have happened on these flights. It is completely unacceptable to me as a professional pilot.

B777 First Officer reported Captain refused assigned aircraft citing safety concerns regarding a lost mobile phone in the passenger cabin.


Workload; Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On departure we were issued an RNAV departure from Runway 16 left.  To the best of my recollection we were climbing via the SID and contacted departure control.  Shortly after contacting departure control we were cleared to 'climb and maintain' an altitude above the climb via profile restrictions.  I was the PF (pilot flying) and followed the SOP in selecting the new altitude.  Since it was a 'climb and maintain' clearance I confirmed with the First Officer (FO) and he agreed that we did not have to comply with the climb via altitude restrictions.I do not recall being advised that we had missed any of the altitude restrictions on the SID. Unfortunately the intervening period between the event and the many other flights leaves me at a loss to recall in more detail the specific particulars of this alleged incident.  Because of the relative newness of the Climb Via procedures I am very cautious to confirm that the FMS indicates CLB and that the restrictions are still present on the ND and the MCDU.  This is part of our Airbus CAMI (Confirm; Monitor; Activate; Intervene) procedures.  CAMI procedures were implemented in order to ameliorate the profound deficiencies of the Airbus vertical navigation system.  If such an event occurred and I were advised of its occurrence at the time I probably would have been able to make such determination to the cause. We are required; by company procedures; to use Level 4 automation as much as possible.  Many times the automation is wholly inadequate (specifically the vertical navigation component) and safety in compromised because the automation does not perform as expected.  At this point the automation becomes a distraction and does not enhance safety but actually compromises it.

An A319 Captain was apparently notified after the fact that an RNAV 'Climb Via' constraint was not met. He describes his uncertainty about the event as well as his lack of confidence in the Airbus vertical navigation system.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Vectored on a base for the ILS 4R; we had a few 30 degree bank fluctuations due to wake turbulence. We asked whom we were following - we were behind a heavy DC10. We told them we wanted more spacing so they gave us a speed reduction of 180 KTS. We were also given a heading of 040 which put us parallel to the localizer course. I queried Approach about the heading. She said she gave us 010 to intercept; but we both had heard 040. We turned and intercepted on a 010 heading. The winds were blowing almost straight at us at 42 KTS at 2;000 FT. We were IMC; but I could see our spacing on TCAS. We had been cleared for the approach at this point and switched to Tower. The DC10 reported a speed of 150; so we slowed to our final ref speed of 145. We were about 5.5 miles behind the DC10. The Tower Controller then asked what our speed was and if we had been assigned a speed to maintain by the previous Controller. Once we had been cleared for the approach; we had not been told to maintain any particular speed to the marker; so I replied that we had not been given a speed. We were instructed to increase speed by 20 KTS. I told her we were unable due to wake turbulence. She told us we had adequate spacing of 5 miles. I replied that we had been affected by their wake and we were not going to get any closer. I felt justified to do so for safety of flight. I believe that even though we had the required spacing; the wind conditions is what caused us to experience the wake turbulence beyond the standard mileage. We continued and had no more wake disruptions for the rest of the approach or landing.

The wake turbulence put the aircraft in a undesired state by continuously experiencing severe turbulence. ATC was reluctant in handling the situation with an appropriate reaction by not providing spacing after being told of the severe wake turbulence. The crew recognized the threat after the first pocket of wake turbulence and took the appropriate actions by slowing and configuring to provide our own spacing since ATC was of no concern to our situation. We continuously monitored our TCAS to ensure we were separating from the traffic along with watching the winds at altitude to ensure we would be out of the path of the wake turbulence.

A CRJ200 experienced a wake turbulence event when vectored behind a DC10 on approach to JFK.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 1915

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Prior to descending from FL350 the vibration indicator on the right engine was fluctuating from 2.0 - 5.0 on the LPT. All other engine indicators were normal.  We were given a descent from FL350 and upon the power coming back to idle there was a loud bang and aircraft shudder.  I saw the VIB on the Right Eng was at 5.0 but all other instruments were indicating normal.  On a subsequent descent from FL220 we observed a second bang from the engine and began to suspect a compressor stall.  I was the PF; the Captain; the PM; began running the compressor stall checklist from the QRH and followed all of the procedures.  We elected to conduct a 20 flap landing; leaving the right engine at idle IAW QRH procedures.  Once the appropriate checklists were run aircraft control was transferred to the Captain  for an uneventful landing.  After waiting three minutes after landing; and observing the LPT VIB still at 5.0;  we shutdown the right engine and continued to taxi to park.

On the descent into ZZZZ from 35;000; FO retarded the throttles and we experienced a loud bang that got both of our attention. Leveled off at 22;000 then descended to 16;000. Upon retarding the throttles again; we experienced the same type of loud bang. We determined that it was a compressor stall on the right engine. Followed the QRH procedures and decided to leave the engine at idle until landing. LPT indicator was fluctuating the entire descent into ZZZZ up to 5.0. Due to the nature of the situation; I requested priority handling going into ZZZZ. We left the throttle at idle and landed flaps 20 with no incident. Thoroughly debriefed the several mechanics at ZZZZ and spoke to [Maintenance Operations] and flight control via satcom also. Captain made the landing.

B767 flight crew reported a suspected compressor stall in right engine during descent from cruise.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on final approach for Runway 35 at PHL conducting a Flaps 22 visual approach and landing. Conditions were VMC and we were configured for landing by 1;000 ft. and stable by 800 ft. in accordance with policies requiring the aircraft to be configured by 1;000 ft. and stable by 500 ft. in visual conditions. We were notified by the Tower that an aircraft was landing on the intersecting 27R runway and that we were cleared to land on Runway 35. During my landing flare as we crossed the [Runway] 27R intersection we encountered wake turbulence from the previous arrival. The left wing suddenly dipped and I felt the aircraft enter only what I can describe as an enhanced ground effect where the aircraft was not sinking at the rate that it was prior to crossing the intersection. Due to this condition I felt as though the aircraft would not be able to touchdown in the Runway 35 TDZ and I called for and executed a go around. We completed the go around maneuver successfully and were vectored back around for a visual approach to RWY 27R where we landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate.The FO (First Officer) and I felt the wing dip and the aircraft began floating and my sink rate had ceased.I believe the cause of the wing dip and enhanced ground effect was due to wake turbulence from the previous RWY 27R arrival. This all happened as soon as we were over the [Runways] 27R/35 intersection in the landing flare. The aircraft was sinking normally during my flare prior to crossing the intersection.Feeling as though a touchdown in the touchdown zone would no longer be possible I elected to go around.Prior to this event I have landed on [Runway] 35 many times after an arrival on the intersecting runway and felt the wake of the landing aircraft. In this instance the effects of what we encountered far exceeded what I have ever felt before. Perhaps more information could be distributed to the flight crews regarding any other similar events if there is a pattern of this occurring.

Reporter stated more ATC awareness is needed in the area of possible wake from intersecting runways.

Air Carrier Captain reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence from previous arrival on an intersecting runway.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

The weather was IFR and I was on an IFR flight plan. I received instructions to fly direct [to a fix] for the RNAV RWY 2 into [the airport]. At that point; I could see passenger; Mr. X (who was sitting directly behind me) start leaning over to his right and looking at the GPS. He started to talk and say where he thought [the airport] was and start pointing towards it. I flew the RNAV RWY 2 approach to minimums and could not see the runway; I executed the published missed approach. It appears there was a fog bank sitting right over the approach end of runway 2. I thought the fog would dissipate; therefore; I decided to set up for RNAV RWY 2 approach again. As I was executing the missed approach; Mr. X starts yelling again; and telling me where he thought [the airport] was and that he could see the runway. I flew back; executed published hold; and got clearance for RNAV RWY 2 approach again. Meanwhile; Mr. X is talking the whole time. I fly the whole RWY 2 approach to minimums again; and same thing; I could not see the runway at minimums. However; as soon as I flew over the approach end of runway 20; I could see the runway. I executed the published missed approach procedure again. As I am climbing to altitude; Mr. X starts yelling more saying 'hey pilot; [the airport] is over there' and points to it.He also keeps saying 'young pilot is too scared to fly into fog and doesn't want to land.' He then starts tapping me on my shoulder violently and starts yelling. At this point; I had to turn around and tell him to cut it out. As I am climbing up to altitude; I decided I needed this passenger off of the airplane. I keep climbing up to published missed approach altitude (1900 ft). I was severely distracted by Mr. X; who was interfering with my duties at a critical phase of flight. I then instructed the controller that I wanted to get clearance for the RNAV RWY 20 as it appeared on my last missed approach that the approach into runway 20 would work better. I received clearance to climb to 3000 ft. The controller also advised me to contact a number when I got on the ground. I was thinking to myself; I had no idea what I did wrong; if anything. I flew direct [to the assigned fix] and was instructed to climb an additional 100 ft; to 3100 ft until crossing [the fix] and received approach clearance.I believed requesting the RNAV 20 and flying a third approach was the best course of action; first off; because I needed this passenger off of the airplane and did not feel comfortable flying 60 minutes back to [our departure airport] with him on board; and secondly; the fog seemed to just be at the approach end of RWY 2. I could see the runway as I flew over it on the missed approach off RWY 2. I got on the ground and had a 'kind' word with Mr. X. I called ATC and they told me they needed to follow up on a possible pilot deviation. They had told me that I climbed to 2700 ft; instead of the published 1900 ft on the missed approach off of runway 2. I had no idea that was what happened. Like I said; I was severely distracted by said passenger.

C208 Captain reported being severely distracted by a passenger during two consecutive approaches that resulted in go arounds. The third attempt to the opposite runway was successful.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

We were in cruise at FL350 approaching BAREE; when I noticed that the left engine oil quantity was zero. I then checked all the other engine indications and discovered that the left engine oil pressure; while in limits; was about 100 PSI lower and the oil temp was significantly higher than the right engine. I contacted Maintenance Control and Dispatch on SATCOM. After reviewing all the indications and previous write-ups we concluded that the scavenge pump on the number 1 engine had failed; and that it could cause us to lose the engine enroute. He recommended we not cross the Atlantic like this. Dispatch recommended we divert and we concurred. We dumped fuel down to below maximum landing weight and landed uneventfully. If this situation could have actually led to an in-flight shutdown; or worse; maybe there should be some EICAS indication associated with it. We had no indications other than the fact that I noticed the oil quantity was indicating zero.

During the descent; we observed the number 1 engine oil quantity indication slowly return to normal.

A eastbound transatlantic air carrier flight diverted to a stateside airport after experiencing indications of low oil quantity and pressure and high oil temperature in the left engine.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

While taxing; aircraft engine sputtered and shutdown. I contacted ground on and informed them we were stuck in the middle of the taxiway and advised we would attempt restart and if successful request amended clearance from. ATC advised us to advise them. After conducting successful hot start we taxied with clearance from ground back to ramp and contacted ops and asked for maintenance to come out to aircraft. Maintenance arrived and advised writing up aircraft due to prior similar incident.

SR20 flight instructor reported the engine sputtered and shutdown on taxi out. The aircraft restarted and returned to the ramp.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Lost VNAV inside the FAF while on a RNP approach in marginal weather conditions. Although the weather was below minimums all day and forecast to remain so; after we delayed for an hour we were told the weather was reported at 400 with 1.5 visibility wind 080/18 making RNAV 36 usable. The Captain agreed to go. We were mishandled by the Enroute Controller who kept us high to accommodate other traffic; which subsequently required us to slow to 270 to drop the gear at 12;000 FT in order to regain the profile for the RNAV approach. We were stable on the arrival with VNAV path and LNAV engaged autopilot on for a RNP 1.5. The Captain thoroughly briefed the autopilot approach then walked through the calls and actions we would perform on the missed approach.  We were told to contact the Tower at (FAF). The Tower cleared us to land and when prompted reported the winds now at 080/29 steady. This was a great increase and startled me. The Captain queried if it was within limits. I checked via the iPad; which necessitated numerous page swipes - a major distraction while inside the FAF. When I looked up; I noted immediately that we had lost VNAV. The Captain stated 'We lost VNAV.' I looked at the altimeter and called 'Approaching DA' and immediately 'DA' The Captain asked if I could see anything and I said 'no - only trees' and he called for the Missed Approach. We continued to sink as he applied power and we executed the missed. I thought we were critically close to the trees and within seconds of contacting them. At the gate; the agent told me the passengers were all commenting on how close the trees were.I don't understand why we lost VNAV. I missed the exact moment we lost it due to being distracted with the iPad; but upon recognition; it seemed there was an unexpected brief delay in the processing of the information before the missed was executed. I believe the Dispatcher pushed the flight to depart when it should not have and I believe the combined meteorological factors precluded this being a safe approach. I don't think 38 feet is enough reported ceiling above DA to render a consistently safe outcome and I think a 29 KT direct crosswind adds enough complication that even though it is technically within limits it's an unsafe margin given the winds swirling against the back of the bowl in the bay; and the angle the autopilot must maintain to comply with the 1.5 RNP. To arrive at the MAP; locate the runway through reduced visibility and cloudy conditions with the extreme crosswind angle; with only 38 feet to establish control and descend safely from the already steep 3.75 glideslope; does not make safety sense in my mind. Had I not been distracted by the iPad search for limits (something I would have already had in front of me with paper); I may have noted the VNAV loss and prompted the need for the missed a 1/2 a beat earlier; but I don't know that I actually would have noticed it any sooner as the Captain articulated it himself a half second behind my recognition. Further; the ceilings were not as reported at our location; and the loss of VNAV was a critical component of a safe approach. If we had lost the LNAV instead; I believe we would have been an accident due to the strong crosswind. As a First Officer I can already tell that as a Captain; I would not descend to minimums on this approach under these conditions even with a functioning VNAV. This approach requires a highly alert crew; reasonable winds; accurate weather reporting and reliable and properly functioning equipment; none of which we had in my opinion.

Air carrier First Officer reported CFTT incident following loss of VNAV on approach in marginal weather conditions.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I received an altitude deviation inquiry on the arrival of [our] flight to IWA and subsequently was asked to call PHX Tracon after landing. While on an assigned heading near the northwest valley of the Superstition Mountains; we experienced turbulence and windshear (with a subsequent loss of airspeed and altitude). Recovery procedures were applied; and altitude and airspeed were regained. Upon recovery of our assigned altitude of 6;000 ft; ATC did query us on our assigned altitude. We lost approximately 20 knots and approximately 200 feet of altitude. We became quite busy at this point and did not make a PIREP on the windshear.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight crew reported an altitude excursion on arrival into IWA when they encountered turbulence and windshear.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Other ATP

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Intended flight was from my home base at ZZZ; to ZZZ1. Flight time was calculated to be about 20 minutes. Approximately 4 miles from ZZZ1 the engine power suddenly rolled back. I immediately looked for a landing field while at the same time trying to adjust the mixture and the throttle to regain power.As I was setting up to land on a field; the engine power came back up again. I deducted that the partial power failure was due to either water on the fuel tank or a clog in the fuel line. I decided to abandon the forced landing and try to land at the airport; which was only about 3 miles away. I lowered the landing gear; execute my Before Landing Checklist and set to land. The engine quit shortly after that. I had to quickly pick another forced landing spot because there were trees all around. The aircraft impacted hard; 1.2 SM from the airport. I sustained injuries.

Pilot flying RC-3 aircraft reports engine failure inflight.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Assigned this aircraft and saw that it had 12 MEL's with one additional open item forthcoming according to ramp maintenance. Capt and I reviewed the MEL's and could comply with each MEL on the flight tonight. Concern was at what number of MEL's does it become too much and the jet become down until they are fixed. Capt had flown with an FAA maintenance inspector previously who informed him that generally speaking it would be 5 to 6. We consulted with our dispatcher and the Duty Officer over our concerns. We knew we could safely execute the flight while satisfying all MEL requirements so we proceeded to fly the aircraft as scheduled without any incidents other than identifying the right hand turn off light while working appeared to be misaligned and of little use to the Captain but did assist myself looking out to the right side of the aircraft. During flight the Captain sent an ACARS message to Maintenance and wrote this up making the total MELs now at 13.

MD11 First Officer reported accepting the aircraft and flew with 13 listed MELs.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Procedure

Helicopter X called me at Local Control for a practice departure scramble launch from their flight line. I was trying to resolve a transponder issue with the two previous helicopters that departed shortly before helicopter X called. At the same time; a MEDEVAC aircraft which was a higher priority called ready for departure which I was trying to coordinate a release for with the departure controller. Helicopter X departed and entered Class B airspace without a clearance. I radar identified helicopter X and allowed them to continue their mission. A Brasher Warning was not issued.Shortly after helicopter Y called me for a practice departure scramble launch from their flight line. I issued helicopter Y the MEDEVAC aircraft traffic that was cleared for takeoff and departing Runway 1L; but not clearance into the Washington Bravo Airspace. Helicopter Y entered the Bravo airspace without clearance. I radar identified helicopter Y and they continued on their mission. A Brasher Warning was not issued.Helicopter X and helicopter Y's flight line is on the west side of the airport. Helicopter Y departed his flight line north bound while aircraft Z was rotating. Aircraft Z was on a SID that states he must turn to a 270 heading within 3 DME of ADW. As aircraft Z started his turn; helicopter Y was underneath him and separation was not ensured.When the helicopters are practicing their scramble missions they must obtain a clearance from Local Control before entering Class-B airspace. If we are unable to answer their initial call right away they depart without a clearance. This type of event happens on a daily basis at ADW and is a huge safety concern in the Tower. The Tower has called their flight line on numerous occasions; however this event continues to happen.

ADW Tower Local Controller reported two helicopters departed without a clearance conflicting with departing traffic.  The helicopters also entered Class B airspace without clearance.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

ZZZ to ZZZ1; visual approach into Runway XX; VMC weather conditions. At approximately 300 feet AGL two messages populated on the EICAS; PTRIM (Pitch Trim) MAIN INOP and PTRIM BACKUP INOP. Both crew members initially looked to see if half of the trim control on either side yolk had been accidentally held; which would cause the effected main control to become INOP; neither side was observed being pressed or stuck. The crew then quickly tested each main control and back up control; one at a time; each control switch failed to activate/ control the elevator trim. The airspeed was 145 KTS IAS. The crew briefed that the controls were trimmed for landing speed; 145 KTS; and due to the short final; now near 200 feet AGL; the landing would be continued. The crew also quickly briefed that in the event of a go-around special attention would need to be paid attention to airspeed due to the INOP trim and the traffic pattern and second landing would be flown at/near 145 KTS. The flight terminated safely and maintenance was called. Maintenance investigation found that when the autopilot disconnect button was pressed to disengage the autopilot it became stuck in the pressed position. This stuck position lead to the dual; main and backup; trim inoperative condition.I would very much like to know if this is a replicable condition with the AP disconnect button or if this failure was an anomaly. If this is a programming fail safe designed into the system; then awareness training might be beneficial to the rest of the group.

Air carrier Captain reported PITCH TRIM FAIL EICAS messages during short final approach.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were on an IFR flight plan to JAC inbound from OLNUE intersection.  Approximately 15 miles from the airport ATC advised us that there was a King Air at our 6 o'clock position.  We acknowledged and continued; staying with Center.  About 7 miles from the airport ATC was going to hand us over to Tower but said 'No stay with me as I want to keep an eye on the King Air'. We had been setting up for a left downwind entry.  At abeam the end of the runway we were told to switch to Tower.  When we switched Tower was not happy and wanted to know where we had been.  There was no delay from the time we switched from Center to Tower.  Tower informed us we had entered class D airspace without communicating to them.Since Center had told us to stay with them we thought tower would know this and that it was coordinated between the both of them.  In the future we will ask if we should continue into class D airspace or stay outside of it if a similar situation arises.  Also pay closer attention as to how close the airspace is and ask ahead of time to make sure we are not in airspace that we aren't supposed to be in.

Pilot reports of Center telling them to stay with him; because of traffic in close proximity. Center switches aircraft over to Tower and Tower complains that they had violated the Class Delta airspace and should have called them sooner.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 2507; Flight Crew Type 146

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft

The aircraft was being inspected by a Cessna mechanic due to veering left when the brakes were applied on wet pavement. Two crews had experienced this on two separate flights. I was on one of those previous flights into ZZZ. Our Lead Pilot also performed a high speed taxi the previous day. I was told to come out to the hangar to escort a Cessna Citation mechanic so that he could inspect the brakes. The Mechanic did several checks initially and found no issues. He informed me that he did not have all the tools needed to do all the inspections he needed to perform. The main equipment that he told me he needed was a pressure tester. He initially told me he thought the issue was related to a brake master cylinder or the metering valve. It was my understanding that the aircraft utilized cables from the toe brake pedals and actuated hydraulically by a brake metering valve. I saw that the Mechanic was in the process of reviewing the schematics. After looking at the schematics; he did confirm that the pilot and co-pilot brakes are controlled mechanically through cables from the toe brake pedals and actuated hydraulically by a brake metering valve. He showed me the schematics as well. Because he did not have a pressure tester; he said it would help him find the issue if we did a high speed taxi. He then talked to our Lead Pilot over the phone; and I was asked to perform a high speed taxi with the Mechanic. I was hesitant to do a high speed taxi because I've never done one in that jet or any jet. I also had a concern that the plane would veer to the left again as well. I called my Chief Pilot to inform him of the situation. I informed him that I had never done a high speed taxi and would feel more comfortable with another pilot with experience performing a high speed taxi in a jet. He told me he had full faith in me but understood I was uncomfortable with it having never done it before. He told me he would talk to the Lead Pilot. I talked to one of the other First Officers; with experience doing this procedure; while waiting and asked if he felt comfortable doing a high speed taxi with me. He said he was. He then called our Chief Pilot and told him he was comfortable doing the high speed taxi with me. Our Chief Pilot then told us to do the high speed taxi together.The Mechanic told us he wanted the brakes tested from the right and left seat. I was unsure why he wanted to test from both sides at this point and asked him specifically if checking both sides by doing a high speed taxi was needed and would help him in determining the cause of the issue. He told me it would and would still like to do it. Once the other pilot arrived; we boarded the plane and taxied out. I was in the right seat; [the other First Officer] was in the left seat; and the Mechanic was in the back. [The other First Officer] started both engines; I called Ground and we were told to taxi out to XX. It was agreed that I would do the initial check from the right seat. I took the controls at the hold short line and taxied out onto the runway. [The other First Officer] told me he would call my speeds. I powered up and allowed the aircraft to accelerate. [He] called 40 and 50 knots. At 40 knots; I began to bring the power levers back to idle. I subsequently applied the brakes and came to a complete stop. I did not notice any pull to the left. The Mechanic wanted to see it done from [the other side] (left seat) at that point. [The other First Officer] took the controls. I made the callouts at 40 and 50 knots. [He] pulled the power levers to idle. We accelerated to 60 knots. [He] applied the brakes and then we taxied off the runway. There was no pull to the left. We both confirmed to each other and the Mechanic that we did not feel a pull or veering to the left. I asked [the other First Officer] if he wanted me to ask Ground to taxi back to the hangar. [He] looked back at the Mechanic and asked if we should return to the hangar. The Mechanic said that he wanted to see one more high speed taxi from the left seat. I called Ground and they told us to taxi down to XY to perform the final high speed taxi. [The other First Officer] then powered up; and I repeated the speed callouts the same as our previous one. There was no veering to the left again. [He] then taxied off onto the taxiway. I called Ground and they told us to proceed back to the hangar. We were on a taxiway just getting ready to make the turn onto the tarmac in front of the hangar; when we started to feel vibration. [The other First Officer] stopped the plane and shut down the left engine. The Mechanic opened the door and informed us the left tire was flat. [The First Officer] then shut down the right engine. The Mechanic stepped out and informed us it was flat as well. We notified Ground Control and called the FBO at that point.The ground crew arrived with the tug and informed us they did not have any dollies to use for the aircraft and did not believe they would be able to get any that day because it was [a holiday]. [The other First Officer] asked the Mechanic his thoughts on how best to get it back to the hangar. The Mechanic said the wheels themselves would have to be replaced and to go ahead and tow it back. [The other First Officer] and I talked it over and agreed to call our Chief Pilot and Director of Maintenance before proceeding any further. It was decided that we should not move it until we could acquire dollies for both sides. We were able to acquire them later that evening so the plane could be moved to the hangar. This problem arose from a chain of events. I specifically informed my Chief Pilot that I was not comfortable doing the high speed taxi. A more experienced pilot was brought out to help perform the procedure. The Mechanic was the one that requested multiple high speed taxis and advised us on how he wanted it conducted and how many times. The problem could have been avoided if the Company and Mechanic didn't insist on a third attempt to check for veering to the left. The Mechanic could have had access to the correct tools (pressure tester) the following day to check the problem correctly. That in turn would have prevented the tires from overheating.

The cause of the dual tire deflation was caused by the thermal relief plugs melting in the rims; due to high rim/brake temperature. I feel that we weren't properly trained on this at CAE. I also feel that this wouldn't have happened if the Cessna Mechanic had known the proper tolerances and not request 3 high speed taxi tests from us. We assumed that if the Mechanic was asking for certain tests; that he felt it was within the aircraft limitations.

Two First Officers and a Mechanic performed three high speed rejects to test a C525 brake system and during taxi back to the ramp; the wheel fuses melted flattening the tires. No training was given about hot brakes and cooling times.


Flight Crew Total 8647; Flight Crew Type 1262

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I will start off with my recommendation; that VHHH 10-7 pages include a statement that pushback crews; particularly at the maintenance hardstands; may not check in with the flight deck; and may simply await a call from the flight deck no matter what. I sense that this may be partly a cultural thing; and partly that the maintenance folks in VHHH handle probably dozens of different airline crews. I already know to expect irregularities in non-mainline operations such as this maintenance ferry; but what happened with us at the release from guidance point in VHHH was potentially VERY serious. First off; after stairs were pulled; and all doors closed; I asked if anyone was on headset. No response. The maintenance guy sat over in his truck as if he; too were waiting for a push crew. After waiting for over 10 minutes; I finally keyed my mike and asked again; and this time got a response! No telling how long they had been on headset. During push we were cleared to start engines.As soon as we came to a stop from the push; I was asked if they could disconnect the tow bar (nonstandard). I said yes; disconnect tow bar. We started the engines; and I observed the towbar/tractor drive off to the left and stop; along with second individual on foot (no salute or all clear signal). Since I didn't hear a 'towbar disconnected' or anything else for that matter; I assumed that they were probably unfamiliar with our procedures. However; I wanted to make sure we were clear to taxi. Assuming that no-one was left at the nose gear; I flashed both my taxi light and my left turnoff light many; many times in order to get the attention of the tractor or the other individual; now standing there talking on his cellphone. When finally I did get his attention; I waved to him in a questioning manner and gave him a thumbs up. He emphatically gave me a thumbs up back! We pilots were 99% convinced that we were clear to taxi; but to cover that 1% I luckily keyed my mike and asked if anyone was below. Surprisingly; in broken English I got an answer! I subsequently cleared him off headset (two individuals walked out) and got a wave goodbye from them. I am still mystified that even with the flashing of my lights; no one called up to us; or anything. And with the thumbs up I received; I came very close to taxiing with someone still down there.

Air carrier Captain reported nonstandard pushback procedures at VHHH including being given a thumbs up by a ground crew member even though there was another crew member still on the headset.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

During the final approach at approximately 1;000 feet; Tower cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. Aircraft Y had just lined up and initiated the takeoff when we approached 500 feet. At 200 feet we initiated the go-around because Aircraft Y had still not rotated. Tower then gave us a left heading to reinterpret the pattern and we landed without issue. Tower should not have cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff while we were on the final approach and Aircraft Y should have requested to hold position instead of cutting it that close should they have had an issue on the roll and had we committed to land.

EMB-145 pilot reported a loss of spacing on final approach that resulted in a go-around.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 60

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was executing a practice VOR A approach to ZZZ in VFR weather and was inbound from the ZZZ VOR. My initial plan was to land on Runway XX. As I approached Runway XX I saw the runway appeared to have some snow on it. Therefore I decided to land on Runway XY which appeared to have much less snow on it. The landing seemed normal but as I applied brakes the aircraft did not slow down. I suspect that there may have been ice on the runway that I did not identify in the air. As a result the aircraft overran the runway by about 30 ft. (my estimate is only approximate) and came to a stop without hitting anything. Initially I did not see any damage but after a more careful examination I saw damage to a propeller blade which had struck a runway light located at the departure threshold. I think two contributing factors were that I may have been too fast and too high but could have successfully landed if the runway had been dry. Failure to properly compensate for icy conditions was a factor in the overrun.

SR22 Pilot reported a runway excursion and ground damage due to the loss of control on a potentially ice covered runway.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

FO (First Officer) observed a black and white object roughly 2 feet in diameter passed extremely close to aircraft left during climb passing 13;500 feet on the ZZZZZ2 [SID] prior to ZZZZZ [fix]. The object was close enough that he expected an impact. As Pilot Monitoring; I was heads down attending to FMS programming and did not see the object. FO did not see wings or recognize the object as a balloon; nor could he confirm the object to be a drone.

Air carrier flight crew was flying a published SID and climbing above 10;000 feet when an object; possibly a UAS; passed by the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 153; Flight Crew Type 12

We encountered a drone at our cruise altitude of 4500 feet. It was clearly identifiable as an unmanned aerial vehicle with a white/red top and black bottom. No evasive action taken because the time between seeing the drone and the drone passing about 150 feet from our left wing was too short (estimate between 0.5 and 1 second).

C-172 pilot reported sighting a drone close by during cruise flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20100; Flight Crew Type 12000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Yesterday while flying to EWR there were THREE of us with similar call signs...all [my airline]. The controllers were having a tough time keeping us straight and spent a lot of time correcting themselves. During descent; one controller kept telling us to level off at 10;000 feet when we were already at 8;400 and descending to 8;000. We were SURE we'd busted an altitude. We were in heavy rain and IMC; immediately stopped the descent until we could verify OUR clearance. After we queried the controller she apologized several times that she'd mixed up the call signs; but it WASN'T HER FAULT! When controllers are so busy this is setting us up for a MAJOR ACCIDENT or violation!

B737 Captain reported there were three company aircraft on the same frequency with similar call signs; which caused problems for both the flights and ATC.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 535; Flight Crew Type 39

Confusion; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Student pilot climbed to 4;500 feet where Class B started at 4;000 feet. Instructor did not catch the error in time and airspace was busted. The instructor had [the] student pilot descend in altitude immediately once she realized airspace was busted.Fatigue and stress were involved with student pilot. It was the last flight before the student's checkride and he was not prepared and frustrated. Instructor did not pick up on the student busting the airspace until after the airspace was busted.Instructor and student talked about this error and reviewed airspace after the flight. This was the student's first flight under the Philadelphia Class Bravo and they are now more knowledgeable of the precautions of busting airspace. Instructor also learned from this error and knows to not let it happen again.

GA instructor with a student pilot reported they flew into Class B airspace without a clearance.


Beechcraft / Beech Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 23000

Ground Event / Encounter FOD; Ground Incursion Runway

Truck towing a piece of farm implement drove onto the taxiway and past the runway hold bars without stopping and or looking and at the edge of the runway turned into the field to unload the piece of equipment. Vehicle had no lights; flags; or VHF radio with numerous aircraft in the traffic pattern. No effort to remove F.O.D. from taxiway/runway from the dirt on vehicle tires. The piece of farm machinery; a plow; is now next to Runway 16/34; unmarked; not NOTAMed; unlighted. Yolo County Airport is unfenced; non-gated; [and] poor to no markings identifying either taxiways or active runways. In its 68 year existence it has NEVER had a fence or gate to prevent people from walking; driving; or bicycling on the taxiways and runway. Yolo County refuses to address fencing issues. In the reporters opinion it is only a matter of time before an event takes place.

General Aviation pilot reports conditions and practices at DWA airport that are not safe.


Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Some last minute passengers boarded the airplane. Due to new social distancing guidelines with passengers spreading out throughout the cabin I had a Flight Attendant perform a count. We received a paper CLR from ramp. We entered the information and received good numbers and departed on time. Approximately 5 minutes after departure we received the close out data while taxiing and approaching the end of the runway. I assumed the ZONE data would be wrong; but the total passenger count would be correct. Because I was actively taxiing I asked the FO to resend the data from the FA count. ATC gave us our takeoff clearance which I instructed the FO to reject the clearance and let them know we are working on an issue with our takeoff data. We held short of the runway were I was able to review the correct CLR date from the paper copy and correct ZONE data based on the FA count. We re-sent the data to make sure the data on file last sent was correct. We reviewed that nothing in the takeoff data had changed based on what we had sent prior to departure. The rest of the flight was normal. [X] days later I received notification from our company saying our passenger count was off by 'X'. They stated the auto close out numbers showed XX passengers but our manifest on file was showing YY; a difference of X. I sent my reply to our company stating the story I am telling here to explain the situation and apologize for any mistake on my; or my crews part. The next morning (X days after the flight) I received a reply from the company saying further investigation revealed airline updated there system showing YY passengers and apologizing to me stating our count was only off by 'X' passengers. But based on the original and updated notification I received we had YY both times so we should be correct. I'm filling this out as a precaution if we were off of our count due to any error between the gate agent and FA; the FA count; or our pilot inputs to the manifest. I tried to create time to fix the problem prior to takeoff and double check the manifest for accuracy; as well as the takeoff data. The one thing I failed to do was double check the total count of the auto closeout compared to our [count]. Prior to door close and departure I am fairly positive I asked the FA if her total was verified with the agent prior to closing the door; as this is my normal habit with [passenger] counts; and she said yes. I had a great crew; so I had no reason to doubt the count. To sum up; I am not sure if our count was correct or off by one; but I am extremely sorry for any errors on my part. The cause was the auto closeout data coming through the system after departure while taxiing and automatically sending new takeoff data. When this happens it frustrating trying to re-input all of the corrections and find any required changes. Based on prior flights if there is any change in CLR or passenger counts the closeout will knock out any inputs previously made; and verified by the crew. This can happen several times even if there is no change in closeout data. I'm not sure if the gate agents are clicking to close out the flight more than once or an error trying to transmit or receive the data from the system. This can cause a rushed and stressed environment if the closeout comes within a few minutes from departure. Particularly if the closeout gets sent multiple times with the same wrong data. This gets increasingly frustrating when the data comes in after departure and pushback or while taxiing. Knowing this I tried to do my best to create more time to avoid rushing and give us both (CA and FO) together time to review all of the inputs and verify all of our takeoff data was correct and unchanged. We held short of the runway to accomplish this. A major contributing factor on my part was I failed to look at the takeoff data generated by the closeout to verify the total count. I assumed just the zones would be off. I should not have had that mindset. Because I was taxiing when the closeout data came in I did not have a chance to check the totals before the FO started changing them. Had I caught this we could have called Operations and resolved the issue prior to takeoff. This was also a failure on the FO not to double check the total count prior to making any changes. The FO was a sharp guy and had been performing great so I also trusted he looked at the data before making changes. I should not have trusted and assumed this would have taken place. Another factor could be a counting mistake by the FA or failure to verify the total with the gate agent. A possible issue could be the gate agent just agreeing with the total the FA said and not actually cross checking it with his computer total. But; I have a feeling the root cause; and what actually happened; was the gate agent did verify the correct total with the FA based on the count; but failed to close out the flight prior to pulling the jet bridge.First and foremost require gate agents to close out the flight prior to coming down to pull the jet bridge. Prior to pulling the jet bridge verify we received the close out data. In our case we were operating off of a paper CLR and [passenger] count; no closeout was received until after departure and pushback and we were already taxiing. Require gate agents to split up passengers for social distancing guidelines and not move passenger forward to avoid any weight and balance issues and passengers moving from assigned seats. That way the closeout data will actually be correct and usable and we can mitigate error in the chain such as input error; count error; and verification errors.

Air carrier Captain reported issues with the passenger count on board and social distance seating guidelines which delayed the flight.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 884; Flight Crew Type 626

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure

My takeoff was from full length and my clearance was; 'XXX; cleared for takeoff; make right traffic.' Since I was not told; 'Traffic you're following is' and the aircraft that took off ahead of me from mid-field was handed off to departure; I assumed that there was no one else in the pattern that would be a factor.As I turned crosswind; someone else called downwind and tower told him that the aircraft behind him just cut him off. We saw each other and took appropriate evasive action. The bases were ragged and possibly made spotting targets from the cab difficult as evidenced by the controller's subsequent misunderstanding as to my sequence and then the request that all aircraft in the pattern squawk 1200 Mode C.I could have made life easier (and safer) for everyone had I assumed NOTHING and asked; 'Where is my traffic?' or 'How many aircraft in the pattern?'

A pilot took off at ISP for closed pattern work and after turning downwind had a near miss with an aircraft already in the pattern which Tower had not pointed out.


While on the arrival and in IMC; we encountered an MCP lockup.  The autopilot kicked off and the MCP went to 888's.  We could not silence the Altitude Alert.  I took the controls and flew the plan manually and released the HGS combiner.  I leveled off using the HGS.  I told the First Officer to pull out the QRH and run the MCP Lockup checklist.  The First Officer reset four CB's and the MCP restored itself.  Flight returned to normal.

B737 Captain experiences a MCP lockup during arrival resulting in autopilot disconnect and a continuous altitude alert.  The Captain takes control and levels the aircraft while the First Officer preforms the QRH procedure and restores the MCP to normal operation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

On takeoff roll from grass strip on a no-wind; dry; early morning; [the] little C150 begun to pull to the right. I tried to correct by applying left rudder and brake but aircraft kept pulling to right; turned 180 degrees and stopped at right side off runway in brush. The left gear was completely detached with the rudder cable broken.

Reporter stated it is possible the landing gear had some previous damage that contributed to the control problem and subsequent failure.

A C150 pilot reported losing control on takeoff roll; ground looping and leaving the runway which resulted in damage to left gear.


Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Departing Engine # 1 thrust reverser inoperative and on MEL. Captain is flying pilot. On the takeoff roll; after making the 80 KTS call and looking back to the engine instruments I noticed the oil quantity was at 7 QTS; I called the abnormal oil level out to the Captain. Immediately after bringing this to the Captain's attention the oil quantity was now showing 2.5 QTS and pulsing. I said to the Captain 'oil is now at 2.5 QTS.' The Captain then chose to reject the takeoff at approximately 125 KTS; V1 was 135 KTS. The aircraft came to a full stop; on the center line of Runway 36. I made the call to the Tower and notified them of the reject while the aircraft was coming to a stop. After the aircraft came to a full stop; the Captain made his PA announcement to the cabin. We assessed the situation; turned on the brake fans and taxied clear of the runway and into the ramp. While waiting for our gate and communicating with maintenance and the company the oil level was now showing normal. We returned to the gate and wrote the malfunction up in the FDML. The brake temps rose to approximately 760 degrees C and then cooled with the brake fans on. Maintenance then informed us that this aircraft had a history of this oil quantity indicator problem and the flight was canceled. After seeing the oil quantity drop rapidly to 2.5 QTS and pulsing; we believed that we had lost the oil from the number 1 engine and that an engine failure was imminent. We were below V1; so the decision was made to reject the take off. A thorough knowledge and understanding of the reasons to reject a take off above 80 KTS would have led to a different decision about rejecting at a high speed. The previous statement is a reference to myself.

An A320-200 Captain rejected a takeoff at 125 KTS after the oil quantity decreased to 2.5 QTS during the takeoff roll and after arrival at the gate the crew was told the aircraft history indicated a quantity indicating problem so the flight was canceled.


Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Airport; Airspace Structure

This was both the First Officer and Captain's first time to this airport. We had trouble picking up our clearance on the ground and were not familiar with procedures to get the clearance at the uncontrolled airport. We had to call on a phone to get the clearance and were given a 6 minute void time; which was extremely short. As we taxied out we talked to two aircraft on CTAF. One reported 10 miles out and inbound and another was taxiing behind us. The traffic that was in the pattern said that he had us in sight and said he would remain clear.  We took off and soon after our acceleration altitude we received a traffic alert from our TCAS. The traffic was approximately 2 to 5 miles in front of us and 400 feet above us. We both looked for the traffic but could not see him. We then received a RA command from TCAS to descend. We leveled off and started a descent. We then received another descend warning. I started a descent for a few hundred feet and then received an EGPWS warning to stop our decent. I leveled off as best I could to manage the two separate warnings to climb and descend. I am not sure how we could avoid this traffic conflict with out having a Controller or radar at the airport. We cleared the runway before taking it and we were talking to traffic in the pattern. We also checked TCAS before taking off.

SF340 Captain reports a TCAS RA to descend after flap retraction at an uncontrolled airport. The descend RA is repeated followed quickly by an EGPWS warning to; don't sink.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

[In flight] I encountered a steady discharge indication on my ammeter. The voltage indicated battery power only; even though the alternator did not drop off line. In order to preserve battery power I switched off all nonessential electrical equipment. My plan was to have enough battery power at our destination for landing gear and flap extension. My fuel log reflected enough fuel on board to destination and I navigated mostly by pilotage; with an occasional GPS bearing check. Once in a while I had to turn the power back on as the main gear tires were drooping into the airflow; causing a reduction in airspeed and increase of fuel burn.The main wheels are held up by hydraulic power and will over time sag with a pressure decrease in the hydraulic system. Due to this added drag my fuel estimate over the last checkpoint showed us behind on time and I was concerned about reaching the destination in daylight. Approaching the airport I advised Approach of my alternator trouble and declared an emergency due to a potential fuel shortage. I requested a vector to the closest runway and landed without incident. After shutdown; I checked the fuel remaining and was relieved to find out that I had in fact the legal night fuel reserve left. I appreciate all the help given by ATC and ARFF.

C177R pilot reported a malfunctioning alternator. He declared an emergency; conserved electrical power; and continued to destination.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On arrival yesterday we got a strong burning rubber smell in the cabin. It seemed to dissipate when we removed electrical power to the galley and cabin. We were about 10 minutes out when it started. The FA searched around but couldn't find anything wrong (expect smell) except for the CEO temp panel was warmer than normal. We wrote it up; but couldn't get the smell to come back on the ground.Maintenance came out and ran stuff for a bit and the typical 'cannot duplicate' was achieved and signed off. I was surprised they didn't bring in people to test fly it. I was with a new CA and FA for the morning. I briefed them of the prior event the day prior. We then departed this morning; [and while] climbing out of 8000 ft we started smelling it again. It would come and go but was gradually getting stronger. It was a strong burning rubber smell. The FA did not smell it in the cabin; only the FWD galley and cockpit area. No smoke but something was creating a strong burning odor. We returned immediately and landed. We didn't feel the need to put masks on nor did we declare an emergency. It was VFR and we were given an immediate clearance with vector. If conditions had worsened beyond an odor; we would have declared an emergency. For whatever reason; we couldn't get the smell to appear on the ground. Maintenance mentioned the anti-ice/windshield heat could be arcing behind the panel. We did use the anti-ice for a cloud layer; but I don't personally think that was it based on when we were smelling the odor. It was not air-conditioning related; but definitely electrical of some sort.I've been seeing numerous repeat write-ups across our fleet. I don't have the basis to say it's lousy maintenance or complicated intermittent mechanicals. However; in my personal opinion; the most serious of events in the cockpit is having a burning smell. There should have been a much more thorough inspection after the 1st time we wrote it up. Test fly it if they have too. I find it very disappointing to have something so serious; just signed off so easily. And sure enough; the burning smell magically reappeared 5 mins after departing. It's frustrating to have repeat write-ups but this is the type of stuff that kills people. The maintenance people need to be absolutely sure they find the problem and fix it the first time.

Falcon 2000 First Officer reported experiencing a strong 'burning rubber' smell on two consecutive flights. Maintenance was unable to find the cause.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

While cruising at 28;000 feet and an estimated 300 KIAS; the left wing rubber seal located on the top of the wing root came loose causing a loud and rapid onset vibration. I immediately reduced power to slow and we determined that a divert was the best course of action to take. I made a slow speed (approximately 200 KIAS) and mild rate of descent which resulted in an uneventful landing.The post flight inspection initially did not reveal any damage to the rubber seal; only after fairly close inspection were we able to see the seal had come loose about half way back from the leading edge. The seal separated for an estimated 3 feet; but without airflow over the wing; it appeared nearly normal.My suggestion is to pass along to other Hawker crew members that a very close inspection of the seal may be in order to determine if it is still entirely secured to the wing.

HS-125-800XPC Captain reported the left wing rubber wing root seal came loose in flight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While working JOT alone; I saw two aircraft; Aircraft X and Aircraft Y begin to flash in Logan's (34) airspace. The conflict alert was going off east of OXI in their airspace. With the aircraft 'flashing' a speed was placed on Aircraft X to go fast; but no speed was assigned to Aircraft Y in the rear. Then LOGAN starting to hand off both aircraft to me at JOT; while they are both flashing with the conflict alert. I placed a J-ball on the front aircraft; Aircraft X and Aircraft Y was on and bouncing in and out of the J-ball. Both aircraft continued to flash as they came closer to my airspace. The speed was then taken off of Aircraft X as they continued to flash. The LOGAN Controller then called on the land line for a hand off on both aircraft and I proceeded to explain that both aircraft were coming together and he needed to resolve the conflict. He responded that they were diverging. They were not; they were maintaining the same speed on or less than 5 miles separation. I requested the back aircraft be turned out 15 left to insure separation. He complied; and I took the hand off on the first aircraft Aircraft X. The LOGAN Controller shipped Aircraft Y; the back aircraft; without a hand off.This was an incredibly dangerous and unnecessary situation; separation was not lost.I believe the LOGAN Controller should be asked why he failed to resolve the conflict and how he would react if another sector were to hand him the same situation. This controller has been notorious for reporting other controllers for doing anything minutely averted from the specified requirements per the 7110.65. This event shows an immense amount of hypocrisy on the part of the LOGAN Controller. To give another controller that situation is un-called; un-professional and dangerous. This should be investigated.

ZAU Center Controller reported an airborne conflict resulting from inadequate handoff procedures.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

We noticed the left engine quantity at three quarts with a box around the engine instruments. We sent an ACARS to Dispatch and Maintenance letting them know what was going on. The Captain; as Pilot Monitoring; reviewed the QRH to look for any low oil quantity procedure but did not find one. While doing that the oil quantity dropped to two quarts and the oil temp began rising and the oil pressure falling. At that time we decided to run the QRH procedure for a precautionary engine shutdown in-flight. After discussing it with Dispatch we decided to the nearest suitable airport in time with favorable weather. We configured the aircraft per the procedure and landed without further incident.

A B737-800 flight crew performed an in-flight shutdown of the left engine following receipt of a low quantity warning; rising oil temperature and lowering oil pressure. They consulted with Dispatch and opted to divert to the nearest suitable airport where they landed without incident.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14.0

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure

I was working R35. I was required to give 15 Miles in Trail to LAS; 10 Miles in Trail to LAX and turbulence was reported at many of my altitudes. The traffic volume and complexity were low; but my attention was definitely required. I had noticed activity going on around my physical self but wasn't sure exactly what was happening. I knew that sector 08 was being moved to sector 53 for what I assumed was for tech ops activity on the MID shift. Sector 08's traffic began to be handed off to my sector which was confusing and it also made me suspect that the combine sector message input by the Front Line Manager (FLM) had opened sector 53; which was my airspace. I voiced this concern to the FLM and did not get a response. Configuration at the time Sector 53 was combined at Sector 35. I needed to ship an aircraft to sector 08 but was concerned that the correct frequencies were not assigned to sector 53 since this has been a problem in the past. I was also still concerned about 53 not being assigned to my sector so I asked the FLM '... can you explain to us what is going on with our sectors?'. He angrily told me 'You know what's going on!'. I was taken aback by his response and was frankly worried additional questioning would result in further hostility. I knew my priority was to resolve these situations but I was at a loss as to what to do. Then Sector 36 displayed a datablock to what should have been my sector; but it populated at Sector 53. Sector 36 and Sector 53 reported this behavior to the FLM. The FLM proceeded to enter approximately 5 combine sector messages into the system experimenting with our sectors to try to find the right message. This action made me very uncomfortable; more than I already was. The problem wasn't resolved and I advised the FLM that I was not comfortable working the sector with half of the airspace assigned to another controller. He ordered us to go into the MID configuration. I'm not sure what to advise; other than to train FLM's to be more cautious and deliberate when inputting sector messages. This is not the first time this FLM has disregarded safety and the well-being of the operation in our area. This FLM's anger was also very distracting and uncomfortable; not a position I like to be put in when I am responsible for the safety of aircraft.

A Center Controller reported the Supervisor was making incorrect computer system entries to combine and de-combine sectors causing confusion.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Cruise; Final Approach; Initial Approach

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Myself and an Instructor flight planned to do a commercial long cross country going ZZZ1-ZZZ2-ZZZ-ZZZ3. The flight plan read that we would have used up less than half our fuel (50 useable per POH) going to ZZZ2. We departed ZZZ1 having a ground speed much higher than expected of 125-131 using up less fuel than expected. Other than deviating around clouds and cells it was an uneventful flight. I have done this flight before and last time made the smart decision of fueling up in ZZZ2 to go back to ZZZ1. When we landed this time in ZZZ2 during day light; It was shown that we had used about 21 gallons. Leaving 29 gallons remaining. Then once our preflight was done in ZZZ2 we jumped in the plane and started it up. At this point it was night time. The plan was still to go to ZZZ. So we departed and start to head in that direction.  We found ourselves deviating around storms and making sure we are of course not running into airspace. We found that we had a greater headwind than expected and our ground speed ending up being around 90. When we were en route to ZZZ the engine began sputtering south of ZZZ4. I thought we were having an engine failure because throughout the flight I had constantly been checking the fuel gauges to show we had fuel. I turn the fuel pump on and switch the tanks from left to right. Once I was complete the engine ran normally. It was after this that I said to the Instructor that I wanted to get on the ground as soon as possible. He reassured me that we had plenty of fuel based on the aircraft fuel gauges and the secondary JPI. The left fuel gauge read a quarter of a tank of fuel when we ran out. We were still going toward ZZZ and continued. We contacted ZZZ Tower and they instructed us to enter left base and report a 3 mile final for Runway XX. We enter the base to final and report a 3 mile final. Followed by the Tower's instruction that we were number two and cleared to land on Runway XX. On about a 1 mile final we had the engine sputter again. I turn the fuel pump on and switched tanks from right to left hoping there was a possibility we have a little bit more fuel in there to keep the propeller going. Unfortunately; there was no more fuel even though the gauges read there was and the JPI indicated we had 8.8 gallons remaining when the engine died. The Instructor [advised] Tower and we then landing on [the] highway.

Flight Instructor and Student reported the engine failed during cruise due to fuel exhaustion and an off airport landing was done.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was moving a lift to do a door lube.  When done with the R2 door I moved the lift while looking to the rear; I did not realize that the lift was in drive not reverse.  While looking over my shoulder I felt the tug go forward I hit the brakes.  I did not feel it strike the aircraft. I then moved the lift to the L2 door and completed the lube on the L2 door and then moved the lift back to the parking area.  I did not know that I had contacted the aircraft until notified by the Senior Manager.  The lighting was poor and I had never done a door lube on this type of aircraft.  I also had just came back from almost three weeks off from being quarantined for COVID-19.  I was not used to night and was very tired.When selecting the lift to Reverse it inadvertently ended up in Drive.  Some of our lifts have drive forward on the gear selector and some have drive in the back of the gear selector.  Shifters are not lit and some go forward to go forward and some go forward to go aft.I really have no idea [for suggestions] other than making sure all lifts have the gear selectors the same way.  Gear selector levers should be lit at night so they can be observed.

Technician reported making contact with an aircraft after moving a lift in the wrong direction.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

While shooting an approach into DCA Runway 19 LDA Z; Tower informed us that we were low and we received an aural terrain alert from the aircraft. Just before this occurred we broke out above minimums and we were turning to track the river. As pilot monitoring; I did not see a high sink rate or course deviation based on our flight instruments. I responded to the Tower by stating 'We are visual.' We landed and did not have any further issues.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a Tower low altitude alert along with an aircraft terrain warning after breaking out above minimums and turning to track the river on the Runway 19 LDA Z approach to DCA.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Was unaware that my captain was not qualified to do my IOE training flight.

Advised after the flight that a captain flew as a check airman when in fact he had not received his final check by the FAA.

Air carrier First Officer and an airline employee reported IOE training was done by a Captain who had not received his certification by the FAA to be a check airman.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 801; Flight Crew Type 715

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Electrical instruments started failing about 1;000 FT AGL on runway heading. Initiated a right turn back to the runway; tried to contact Tower on failed radio. [I] squawked 7600 on transponder; received transmission from an entity that monitors 121.5. I tried to lower gear with no positive result [and] contacted ATC. Advised them of the situation and declared an emergency. Center responded. I told them I was going southeast of the airport to manually crank down the gear. ATC approved and requested to let them know when I was ready to go to [departure airport] to land. [I] got gear down but no green lights due to the electrical failure. Told ATC ready to go to [departure airport] they approved a straight in. [I] asked Tower for a fly by to verify gear down. On fly by Tower indicated that the gear looked down. Circled and successfully landed. After shutdown [I] called Tower Supervisor for follow up; he indicated everything was good on his end. Airplane inspection showed that the battery had failed.

A BE35 loss of battery took down the electrical system.  An emergency return to departure airport was followed by a safe landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

During initial climb out from ZZZZ; we had a 'Wheel Well Fire' warning at FL260. We immediately lowered landing gear because we were restricted to speed 250 kts by ATC at the time.  I read aloud the QRH checklist for 'Wheel Well Fire' twice.  Once that was completed (warning light out already); Captain transferred control to me so he could read the checklist himself.  I focused on flying the aircraft by navigating through some weather system. I descended to FL200 in order to maintain safe airspeed. Captain called Company Dispatcher via SATCOM and discussed about course of action.  I did not note any hot brake temp during Before Takeoff check; and during the emergency procedure; I noted all brake temp indicated 0.  We all agreed to continue to ZZZ since we had sufficient fuel w/ reserve. We requested ZZZ Approach to have fire trucks stand by to inspect our landing gear just in case. Landing was non-eventful; and post flight inspection showed no signs of fire damage.

B767 pilot reported that at cruise the Wheel Well Fire light illuminated. Flight crew accomplishing the QRH and subsequently made an uneventful landing at destination airport.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 850

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 2600

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I clicked off the autopilot and autothrottles and performed the descend RA down to 10;500 FT when the TCAS reported clear of conflict. The Captain; pilot not flying; told ATC that we were responding to an RA. Chicago Center cleared us to 10;000 FT near HIHRY. The general aviation aircraft was not talking to Center and was moving right to left on us.  We came within 200 FT altitude and lateral of the traffic. Center re-cleared us to 10;000 FT and we continued uneventfully.

Level at 11;000 on the TRTLL RNAV Arrival into O'Hare. ATC called traffic at 1 o'clock but before I could answer the radio we received an RA. First Officer flawlessly executed the RA Maneuver; disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles and descended 500 FT before the 'clear of conflict' announcement was made. I notified ATC that we were responding to an RA and that we had descended to 10;500 FT and had acquired the target visually. Airplane was a light Cessna and I estimate we were within 300 FT vertically and within 200 FT laterally of that traffic. ATC descended us to 10;000 FT. Autothrottles and autopilot were reengaged and the flight continued normally.

An air carrier crew reported taking evasive action during a TCAS RA with a Cessna on the ORD TRTLL1 RNAV near HIHRY intersection.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant; Person Other Person

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

I was deadheading on Aircraft X. I identified myself to the A Flight Attendant (FA) (as I always do) as a safety and security asset.The flight was nearly full.  During boarding a man who I later learned was Mr. X approached my seat.  He was wearing a camo gaiter around his neck which was partially covering his mouth but was not covering his nose. As he approached; I identified myself as a crew member and politely asked him to pull his mask up over his nose.  He complied but said that I should pinch my mask tight over my nose.  I didn't quite hear what he said so I queried him.  He said; 'You should pinch down on your nose to close the gap at the top of your mask.'   My mask was an NP95 which had no gaps anywhere around my face.  It was my sense that the man was being sarcastic and antagonistic.  I said nothing further to him.I advised the FA A what happened before we pushed back.  She told me that the man had boarded without his face covered and was told to cover his face.  Thus he had pulled his face covering off his face between the time he boarded (when he was told to put it on) and the time he approached me; which was no more than thirty seconds. He clearly had no intention of complying with the mask policy.  FA A asked me to brief the Captain about the incident and asked if I would talk to the CSR agent whom she wanted to speak with Mr. X. I agreed.  Before departure I walked into the jet bridge and spoke with FA A and the CSR.  I briefly explained what I observed and what he said to me then I went back onto the airplane and took my seat.  A short time later I observed Mr. X walk back down the aisle past me.Sometime during the flight FA A advised me that Mr. X had been [violating other regulations].  She advised me that Mr. X demanded to know the crews names (including mine) but that she did not give him any names. She was clearly concerned about this and I could see how his actions were distracting to the flight crew and were thus interfering with their duties.  She told me that she was going to have CS meet the aircraft and asked me to stay as a witness.  FA A as well as the rest of the inflight crew were nothing but polite and professional the entire flight; when I observed her dealing with Mr. X or otherwise.After leaving the aircraft I was standing in the jet bridge and spoke with a CS Supervisor.  Mr. X walked by me and said in an aggressive and hostile tone; 'I want your name.'  I told him that I could not give it to him and that I could not speak with him about this matter.  He again demanded my name and moved closer to me.  I backed up.  He then raised his camera and said; 'I'm taking your picture.'  I stated; 'Do not take my picture.'  He said; I'm taking your picture.'  I quickly turned around and walked around the jet bridge corner toward the aircraft door.   I do not know if he took my photograph or not but felt that his forcing his camera in my face was one of belligerence; hostility; and aggression.  I felt threatened.  All of this simply because he was asked to properly wear his mask.  After the CSR Supervisor and Mr. X walked into the terminal; I remained in the jet bridge as I did not want to encounter Mr. X again.When the CSR Supervisor walked back onto the jet bridge; I explained to her that I could not have my photograph taken and suggested that if he loitered around the terminal waiting for me that she please call law enforcement.  I asked her if she felt he was being hostile and or belligerent.  She agreed that he was.  After some time; Mr. X left the area; and I departed the terminal.Based on his behavior and actions I would strongly urge that Mr. X is not allowed to fly on our airline in the future.

Air carrier Captain deadheading on a company flight reported a passenger would not conform to the face mask policy and was hostile; aggressive; belligerent towards the flight attendants.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Airport

The C206 was a ZZZ arrival from the south.  During this time our primary runway was out of service.  The only runway we had intersected with ZZZ1 final.  During the time leading up to the C206 arriving we were extremely busy trying to interweave the final between ZZZ1 and ZZZ and as a result many aircraft were holding both in ZZZ2's airspace as well as our airspace.  As soon as I had control of the C206 from the previous sector I vectored him to the northeast to join the downwind and he acknowledged and told me he had 13 minutes of fuel left.  This was his first mention of low fuel.  At this time we currently had at least two other minimum fuel; possibly emergency fuel aircraft at the time already and from his point it was likely he would not have enough fuel to make it to ZZZ. I explained to him I was going to vector him to ZZZ3 and asked if he had the approach plates.  Both of his responses were vague; I believe due to language barrier; but he complied with the vector so I just read him the approach plate information slowly to him.  At one point I resorted to giving him the localizer frequency in Spanish to which he finally read the frequency back correctly.  He initially went through the localizer and was not stabilized but at this point he only had approximately 5 minutes of fuel and I elected to continue vectoring him as close to the localizer final as possible. I descended him to the MVA and once he was on the localizer he continued to descend below his assigned altitude.  As the low altitude alarm went off I looked at the approach plate to see what altitude he needed to be at but almost immediately he reported the field in sight.  I cleared him for a visual approach; cleared him to land; and switched him to ZZZ3 Tower.  He landed safely with from what I can only assume; less than 3 minutes of fuel based on the information he initially gave me. This whole operation could have been handled better; and more safely if we had known the aircraft was low on fuel; at the point he told me he had 13 minutes of fuel I declared him an emergency myself and did everything I could to get him pointed at the closest usable runway to give him a fighting chance of making an airport. Unfortunately aircraft dangerously low on fuel has been normal for aircraft arriving ZZZ airspace in the last two weeks due to our primary runway being out of service.  Mostly due to the wind favored runway intersecting with another busy airport's final creating a VERY complex situation.  This could be mitigated if we at least could use the ILS to the closed runway and then sidestep to our smaller parallel runway and then circle others to the primary runway.  This would prevent the finals from mixing with ZZZ1.  The 7110.65 specifically states we can still use an approach to a closed runway if not having it would adversely affect the operation.  I believe I speak on behalf of the entire facility; not having that ILS has created an adverse affect on not only us; but all of the users as well.  Tech Ops turned off that ILS when the runway was closed and claim it's mandatory to be turned off for the closure and thus far have not turned it back on.

ZZZ Approach Controller describes a low fuel emergency caused by delays due to runway construction and the inability to use the localizer to the closed runway with a side step maneuver to the right runway due to interpretation of 7110.65 rules.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Received a call from [Company] cargo in ZZZ regarding flight. The Cargo Agent had called and mentioned that the hazardous cargo was not loaded. This information was provided after the flight had been loaded and weight information had been sent to the aircraft. A call was made to ZZZ Operations to make re-finalize the flight information. The flight was finalized with the Hazardous material showing loaded on the aircraft. The Ramp finalized the information knowingly that the Hazardous material WAS NOT LOADED.

Airline Ground Agent reported a communication breakdown between aircraft ramp load personnel and Load Planning regarding incorrect finalized Hazmat cargo data indicating it was loaded on aircraft when it was not.