Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Inspector 6; Maintenance Technician 13

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Manuals; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

Stinson L-5C aircraft has conventional gear equipped with a Scott tailwheel. This tailwheel is not original equipment; but paperwork in the aircraft forms appears proper for this modification. The Tail Wheel connections were made using compression springs and tail wheel connection clips typical for small aircraft. The aircraft had been previously flown using this tail wheel set up with no difficulties. The plane had been down for an Annual Inspection during which time significant maintenance was accomplished on the fuel tanks and wings. Also during the maintenance period; some rudder cables were replaced which required the tailwheel to be disconnected. Upon completion of the rudder cable maintenance; the tailwheel was re-connected and the rudder cables were tensioned In Accordance With (IAW) the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). Taxi tests showed that the tail wheel was performing correctly. I signed-off the aircraft as having completed the Annual Inspection. An experienced L-5 Instructor Pilot flew the plane on a Return to Service flight without incident. After the Return to Service flight; the Instructor Pilot put a trainee with zero L-5 experience in the aircraft and they began a training sortie. The trainee is qualified in other conventional gear aircraft and is an experienced pilot. The trainee executed a full-flap three point landing on his first attempt to land the plane. The trainee stated that this was what the Instructor wanted him to do. L-5 Landing Main Gear has a very long throw on their oleos because they were made to land in rough terrain. It is important that weight on wheels be maintained so that the gear remains at full deflection during roll-out. If the aircraft rises back into the air or partial so; the tires will drop to a position nearly below the fuselage longerons in a very narrow track. This can contribute to a ground loop on the L-5 and therefore bounces are to be avoided. The trainee reported that the aircraft bounced twice to the top of the landing gear throw; but probably not back into the air. Given the oleo travel and shock absorption capacity of the L-5 gear; this indicated that the landing was firm. At some point during the landing it appears that the connections on the tailwheel were stretched beyond their ability and broke. The aircraft executed a ground loop to the left and dragged the right wing tip causing significant damage the wing. Wind was light and down the runway. Two other pilots who were qualified in this aircraft had only done wheel landings at the advice of a different Check Pilot. The L-5 is fairly heavy on the controls and can establish a high sink rate if the pilot allows it. As per most heavy; conventional gear aircraft; the mechanic and other qualified pilots recommended that the aircraft be wheel landed. The other qualified pilots had not executed a three point landing in this plane. Compression springs have a sufficient but limited amount of travel before they reach full compression and thereupon have no more travel. If the tailwheel spring is deflected far enough on a firm landing; the compression springs can reach full travel which they apparently did and then certain connecting hardware let go. At that point there was no tailwheel steering and rudder control. At landing speed; rudder authority in the L-5 is very limited. Had the pilot applied full left aileron; the extra drag on the right wing may have mitigated the ground loop but this can't be known for certain.

Reporter stated the original tailwheel utilized an actuator as part of tailwheel assembly that could accommodate the 18 inch deflection of the Main Landing Gears (MLG). The tailwheel had previously been replaced with a Scott Leaf Spring Tail Wheel Assembly using directions from an FAA 337 Form: Major Repair and Alteration information. The modification appeared correct per the forms included in the aircraft's history. The original tailwheel could handle a three-point landing and deflection of the tail wheel; but not the Scott design that is similar to a Piper Shawnee tailwheel. During a three-point landing; the leaf spring assembly could only straighten out so far before collapsing; damaging the underside of the aft fuselage; causing a ground loop and cracking the Right Rear Spar. Reporter stated the FAA 337 Form does not require a placard in the cockpit or logbook notifying pilots of the limitations of the modified tailwheel assembly and to 'not' attempt a three-point landing. Most pilots end up learning about the different tail wheel assemblies on Stinson L-5 aircraft through 'Tribal Knowledge'.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) with Inspection Authority (I/A) reports about a ground loop incident involving a Stinson L-5 aircraft with a modified Tailwheel Assembly.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 100

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Had massive stomach cramps after level off at cruise. Switched positions with [Relief Pilot]. Got sick twice in lavatory; shaking violently. Decided to [aircraft returned to departure airport] to ZZZZ. Went to hospital. Blood test confirmed I had pancreatic episode. Feel totally better today. Slept all day.

Several minutes after level off at cruise altitude the Captain indicated that he was not feeling well. When he stood up to take the first rest break it appeared to me that he was having more than just an upset stomach. The [Relief Pilot] took the Captains seat and I continued as Pilot Flying. We made a SAT COM call to our Dispatcher and asked for assistance from AeroMed service. After we described his symptoms and discussed our options AeroMed recommended a diversion to ZZZZ. Our Dispatcher concurred that this was the best option. We [requested priority handling] and got clearance to return to ZZZZ. Once we reached ZZZZ airspace we received approval to jettison fuel. With the Captain in the crew rest area; [Relief Pilot] and I requested Runway XXR and made a normal landing. Paramedics and an ambulance were awaiting our arrival and came onboard to provide medical care. I accompanied our Captain to the hospital along with a Gateway Agent and a person from International SOS service.

B747-8F flight crew reported airborne medical return to departure airport due to Captain experiencing pancreatic episode.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

About 10 minutes into boarding flight to ZZZ1 aft cabin was cool. FA (Flight Attendant) called f/d (flight deck) to turn heat up in back. Pilots started APU. Quickly we smelled exhaust in cabin. Trouble is; it got worse with heat and stayed in cabin for about 5 minutes when I called fwd Flight Attendant to see if odor was worse in mid cabin as we were actively boarding and I could not move fwd easily. D FA said yes odor is bad. I called f/d to notify. They stated it is normal on APU start up. I have been flying for over 15 years in and out of ZZZ. I never had odor last so long. About 10 minutes later I asked pilot to come back. 6-7 minutes later he made it back here. By then I opened L2 for fresh air. He explained the odor is totally normal for cold dense air that was ZZZ. When boarding was complete I did cabin safety check and one passenger at row 21 asked about odor and said she had a headache coming on because of it. Other FA stated that passenger in exit row was wiping their eyes and stated that is was due to odor. The odor did diminish within maybe 20 minutes. This is not safe for any of us on aircraft. I had an unusual cough through this morning since incident. I am sure I am not the only one. Please mitigate this issue in such cold temps for our safety and passengers. Turn on APU before passengers board in such cold temps.

B737-900 Flight Attendant reported a fume event during passenger boarding. Flight attendants and one passenger experienced physiological issues.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

PM (Pilot Monitoring) recorded ATIS information from ZZZ and the PF (Pilot Flying) briefed the approach accordingly. Runway conditions were expected to be wet; and braking reported as 5/5/5. Approach to land was stable; with touchdown occurring within the touchdown zone. Ground flaps and brakes were applied according to CE-525B operating procedures. Braking action was consistent to wet runway conditions with no issues of traction or stopping power as experienced by the PF. PIC (Pilot in Command) requested controls from SIC (Second in Command) to further test the braking action. Prior to the transfer of controls; the aircraft was nearing normal taxi speed. Transfer of controls was made; and the PIC determined the braking was excellent and returned controls to the SIC. (Prior to exiting the runway; a communication from another aircraft was heard on Tower frequency reporting they had clipped taxiway lights and braking nil while exiting at the end of the parallel runway.) PF slowed the aircraft to a near stop and exited the runway at [Taxiway] XX. Once the aircraft was turned and exiting the runway; PF informed the PM that sliding was occurring and there was no directional or stopping control. The aircraft slid laterally and came to a stop with the left main in the grass on the left side of [Taxiway] XX exiting the runway. Break thrust was applied in an attempt to move out of the grass and the aircraft began sliding again; making a left 270 spin. With both engines at idle; the aircraft was again sliding laterally. The left engine was then shut down which stopped the slide. ATC was notified and checklists were performed. The aircraft was towed from XX to [the] hangar where post flight actions were conducted.

CE-525 Pilot reported taxiway excursion due to icing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Type 1390

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 420

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During van ride we noticed a write-up from the inbound crew with a defect of SYS A LOW PSI LIGHT ON DURING GEAR RETRACTION LIGHT EXTINGUISHED HYD A QTY STEADY 18PCT. When we arrived maintenance informed us they were looking into the write-up. At update time they were still working and the decision was made to move the aircraft off the gate so it could be used by another aircraft. The aircraft was towed [to the gate] and we were informed there was a leak by the solenoid valve gasket plate and it was repaired and system was serviced full. No issues during ground ops and lined up for takeoff. After putting the gear handle up we got the Master Caution light with HYD and FLT CNTL lights. Shortly thereafter the light went out and we noticed system A was 76%. System A continued to increase to 78% while we continued our climb. Started discussing the issue when we noticed system A quantity started dropping. Due to our knowledge of the write-up from the last flight and the confirmation from maintenance that there was a leak we decided to call Ops frequency to talk to maintenance. We expressed our concerns and decided since system A quantity continued to decrease we may have a leak. We then decided the safest course of action is to go back to [our departure airport]. We contacted ATC for a return to and asked the controller to pass to company. The Captain TEST'd (Type of Emergency; Estimated time available; Signal for brace; Take special instructions) the FAs and informed the passengers that we were going back to [the airport]. The Captain and I then discussed the fact we were heavier than max landing weight (we were at 160.0k at the time). As we discussed plans to get under the weight we got an ACARS message from Dispatch that [maintenance control] had already coordinated with maintenance for a heavy weight landing inspection if we chose to do it. We decided to land since our concern was a hydraulic leak which would get worse with time. We configured early and noticed the system A hydraulics jumped back into the mid-80s. The Captain flew a visual approach to the runway and rolled to the end. Emergency vehicles were standing by and the emergency was terminated.  We then entered crew rest.Talked to a maintainer who told us there was no leak but they did find air in the system which could have caused nonstandard indications. Took off and had no issues on [the next flight].

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported the 'A' hydraulic system quantity indication began to diminish in flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 12762; Flight Crew Type 1264

Flight Crew Total 6400; Flight Crew Type 1122

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was pilot flying on Flight XXX. It was planned as a reduced thrust flaps 15 takeoff. Winds presented a light crosswind from right. All routine until rotation. As I rotated into the TOGA (Take-off/Go-Around) reference line on the HUD; the aircraft yawed to the left and there was a loud banging from the left side of the aircraft with a marked loss of performance. The Captain and relief pilot called out 'engine failure'. The Captain told ATC that we were experiencing an engine problem and would be tracking on the engine out T-procedure. Another aircraft reported that they had observed 25 foot sheets of flame emanating from our left engine. I continued to follow the command bars and asked for the EO (Engine Out) procedure to be executed on the FMC. At approximately 400 feet AGL I engaged the autopilot. The EO prompt was not available on the FMC; so I engaged HDG SELECT on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) and flew the engine out T procedure with the heading bug; utilizing the VOR radial/DME guidance that had been preset in the box before takeoff. The banging stopped and aircraft performance improved. Flaps were retracted on engine out schedule at 800 feet AGL. The left engine had returned to normal operating parameters. We ran the ENG SURGE L Emergency Checklist as prompted by the EICAS. The checklist directed us to continue the flight as the ENG SURGE message remained blank with all the engine parameters in the normal range. None of us on the crew thought it an appropriate course of action to take the aircraft on a continued 14 hours ETOPS flight. Coordination was made with ATC for delay vectors and a fuel dump; having to avoid some weather off the coast. Captain conference called on SATCOM and Maintenance Control concurred that returning to [the departure airport] was the appropriate course.After adjusting our gross weight to maximum landing weight; a normal and uneventful approach and landing was made and we taxied to the gate.

Compressor Stall on TakeoffLeft engine compressor stall on rotation; approximately three surges with loses and increases of thrust on each surge. First Officer accomplished engine failure on takeoff profile and routing. Left engine recovery to full operation evident by acceleration altitude. Captain accomplished Engine Surge Checklist; coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance. Captain accomplished Fuel Dump checklist overwater FL230 to maximum landing weight. First Officer [did the] approach and landing.Biggest threat to crew communication and engine failure on takeoff profile was repeated Tower communication. Captain communicated engine failure to the Tower Controller and our necessary engine failure routing that deviates from ZZZZZ2 departure. Tower Controller continued to inquire/insist clearance of ZZZZZ2.

B787 Flight Crew reported that an engine malfunctioned at takeoff.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.3

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft X was waiting for a release. I asked Aircraft X if they had the numbers for Runway 26L. They were working on it. I didn't want to put Aircraft X in between the Runways if they would be unable Runway 26L. They were ready when Aircraft Y was on a 2.5 mile final and I gave Aircraft X the clearance to cross Runway 26R and 'Runway 26L LUAW [line up and wait] traffic 2 mile final no delay'. I then informed Aircraft Y traffic crossing upfield. Aircraft X was almost off the Runway but was still in the safety area for Runway 26R moving towards Runway 26L.Aircraft Y initiated a go-around at 0.69 mile final and 1;300 feel MSL going 150 knots. I instructed Aircraft Y to maintain 4;000 feet with the intention of giving them heading 255 and departure frequency after the altitude readback and established on the go-around. Aircraft Y incorrectly readback the altitude with a question of 7;000 feet. I restated maintain 4;000 feet and to contact SoCal departure. I held Aircraft X short of Runway 26L due to traffic on 4 mile final Runway 26L and the Aircraft Y going around. During this workload I forgot to give Aircraft Y a heading and departure frequency. After switching they turned south and contacted riverside sector. I had no time during this event to try and coordinate with departure control.There are several things I could have done differently. Cleared Aircraft Y for the visual approach for Runway 26L and depart Aircraft X off Runway 26R. I still didn't have my release when Aircraft Y was far enough out to change Runways. I could have gotten Aircraft X a 3rd new flow time and given him a delay due to the delayed IFR releases. I could have also held Aircraft X in between the Runways but I wasn't sure yet that Aircraft X was going to be able to depart Runway 26L. I could have let Aircraft Y arrive then LUAW Aircraft X.I should have given Aircraft Y the altitude; heading and departure frequency all at once.

We were holding 30 yards short of the hold short line for Runway 26R at ONT; awaiting IFR release. The Controller asked if we could accept Runway 26L for departure. We replied affirmative and quickly ran Performance and Departure Plan Checklist for the new runway. During that time; we were given a 'line up and wait' clearance for Runway 26L. As we crossed the Runway 26R hold short line; I observed a jet at approximately 300 feet beginning a go-around maneuver. The Controller then issued a go-around command to the  jet (too late); and we continued to the hold short line for Runway 26L and queried the Controller about what had just occurred.The Controller assumed we would be quicker crossing the runway and failed to inform us that he had traffic on final for Runway 26R. Completing runway change tasks takes time and had we known he had final approach traffic; we would have asked to delay our crossing clearance until we were ready to proceed. The fact that we were 30 yards from the Runway 26R hold short line to accommodate any departures ahead of our wheels-up time did not help with the delay in crossing the runway.

A Tower Controller reports an arriving aircraft initiated a go-around due to traffic crossing the runway. The Controller forgot to issue complete go-around instructions to the aircraft prior to switching them to the Departure Controller.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

CS closed the aircraft door before ensuring that all bins; bags and butts were good to go. We had people standing; bins not closed due to last minute passengers stowing bags and one more last minute person to brief at the window exit row.

Flight Attendant reports the Customer Service agent closing the door with people standing; bins not closed due to last minute passengers stowing bags and one more last minute person to brief at the window exit row.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 58; Flight Crew Total 10500; Flight Crew Type 3300

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Taxied on to runway; a designated event parking area. Taxiing west bound along the right side of the 75 foot runway; aircraft were parked on the left side of the runway; facing north. Taxied as close to the right side; limited by the runway edge lights; while cautiously observing the left wing clearance. A mild vibration was felt similar to running over a rougher runway surface. Post flight inspection revealed that there had been an impact on the bottom edge of the left wing.The ground attendant let us know that local knowledge for parking in this area was done by weaving in between the runway edge lights on the right side of the runway. The impacted aircraft was parked with its nose protruding further out by a few feet compared to the line of parked aircraft. There were no wing walkers to provide assistance with wing clearance. Post flight measurements determined that wing tip clearance could only have been achieved by taxiing within a foot of the runway edge lights. This was later confirmed with a crew on a Global Express parked beside the damaged aircraft; as two wing walkers guided them past the aircraft with no room to spare on left wing and the right main gear. After our mishap; other large aircraft were subsequently parked on the other side of the airport. Later observing a departing aircraft; we saw how the crew taxied; weaving between the runway lights.The following morning line servicing had been moving parked aircraft further back to the runway edge. When asked why it hadn't been done on arrival; I was informed that all qualified tow crew personnel had completed their shift at XC:00. Yet the damaged aircraft had arrived shortly before XA:00. Ultimately it was my responsibility to ensure safe and proper clearances. In future; in confined and restricted taxi operations; I will make sure there are outside ground handling personnel to assist in guiding the aircraft.

BD700 Captain reported that while using a 75 ft runway to taxi; the bottom of the wing made contact with the nose of one of the parked aircraft. The runway was reportedly being used as a designated event parking area.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 24; VOR / VORTAC rsw

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 235; Flight Crew Type 16042

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 606; Flight Crew Type 1400

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We had to find a route to get through the line of weather; on our second ATC assigned route; we made it through the weather somewhat easily. Handed off to Ft. Myers Approach. The current ATIS; Q; showed winds 180-7; 10 VIS; 800 Few; Temp/ Dew Point 23/23; 30.08. RSW VOR was out of service. Runway 24 was in use. I told the First Officer to 'Let Approach know we could NOT do the RNAV Runway 24 GPS Approach.' He notified Approach of this. Approach told us to expect the VOR Runway 24 Approach. We reminded Approach the VOR was out of service. Approach forgot. He said he would vector us for the Visual Approach since it was 1500 Few at that time. As we got closer; I told the First Officer; 'That sure is a pretty THICK Few clouds.' It was broken clouds at best; almost overcast. We asked what aircraft were breaking out on the approach. Approach said they would ask (other carrier). They never got back with us on that. We were vectored on a tight left base for Runway 24 at 150 ft.'. You could see many layers of broken clouds; easily 300 to 400 ft. below us at 1500 ft.; no ground contact. We told Approach. Approach had us climb back up to be vectored for left downwind for ILS Runway 24. Approach asked us; 'Winds were around 200 at 7 knots. Can you accept that?' We said; 'YES.' Later; we were cleared to intercept the LOC Runway 24. We did. Coming tight on LOC Runway 24 at TROPC; no clearance. We asked for a clearance three times coming up to and ON top of TROPC; and finally got a clearance from Approach Control. We were descending on the ILS Ruway 6 Approach. I noticed the winds on the EFIS was a 30-knot tailwind! I told this to the First Officer. Then I told the First Officer; the winds must die out close to the airport. Soon after; Approach told us the winds are now '220 at 18 gusting 24!' I told the First Officer; we have to miss approach and go to our alternate. First Officer told Approach and they vectored us for missed approach; and handed us over to Miami Center (if I remember right.) Told them we 'Want to go to our ZZZ; which is our alternate.' Sent a message to Dispatch. Dispatch responded and said we needed to go to ZZZ1 for an alternate; since of the TFR coming into effect at ZZZ.We went uneventfully to ZZZ1; to a long taxi in at ZZZ1. Found out our Maintenance at ZZZ1 had the replacement part for the MEL there; and they replaced the part. Maintenance signed off the logbook and off we went to RSW; with another very long taxi out. I was told by Dispatch to talk to the Operations Center Chief Pilot. He was upset why we diverted; with weather 1500 Few. He wanted to know why we did not circle to land. I told him what the weather really was. He seemed more understanding. He said; do an [Report]. I said; we did not do anything wrong. He said; so maybe this MEL 34-XX-XX will be studied out more for future flights; or something like that.

Report requested from Chief Pilot; Two missed approaches followed by a diversion to ZZZ1. En route from ZZZ2 to RSW we had to pass through a front that was crossing the state old FL. The aircraft had the GPWS on MEL which prevented us from flying a RNAV Approach. Weather in RSW at departure time did not indicate that we would need to fly an approach to get in. Runway in use at RSW was Runway 24. The two approaches they had were RNAV and VOR. VOR was [Out of Service]. Weather via ACARS was 1500 ft. scattered with ten mile visibility or somewhere close to that. On contact with RSW Approach we told them we were unable the RNAV. They told us that we should be able to get in with the visual. Descended down to 1500 ft. and turn base. The cloud cover prevented us from getting into the airport visually. Went missed and were told to expect the ILS Runway 6. Winds were reported 220/7. Came in for the ILS and upon contacting Tower we were told the winds were 220/17G29. This exceeded the tailwind for the Aircraft. Went missed and diverted to ZZZ1. Landed without incident.

Pilot crew reported a divert necessary due to an MEL preventing an RNAV approach and the VOR becoming inoperative at the destination airport.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

During initial takeoff roll; aircraft had a vibration that seemed to be associated with nose gear tires; but nothing extreme. Passing 90 KTS; when I expected the vibration to dissipate; the vibration slightly intensified; but still nothing extreme. At approximately 120 KTS; the vibration became extreme with tremendous effects in the cockpit. Executed the rejected takeoff (RTO) procedure as soon as I could when this vibration intensified; deeming the aircraft unsafe to fly. Exited runway; followed QRH procedure for RTO; determined brake demands; communicated with Tower; Ramp Tower; and Maintenance to return to gate. I was occupying the left seat in role of Check Airman for a First Officer student that had been off for over a week; thus I elected to operate the first leg in the role of pilot flying.Aircraft had been sitting over the weekend. Maintenance informed us that work had been performed on the fuel system; requiring the aircraft to be fueled to full capacity. Evidently the aircraft sat in this condition so long that the nose tires developed severe flat spots. This is what made the vibration intensify with increased airspeed. Maintenance changed both nose gear tires and informed us it was definitely the flat spots that caused the observed vibration.If we could limit the time the aircraft sits on the ramp in the full fuel condition that would certainly alleviate the ensuing flat spots. However; once we returned to the gate; entire team did a nice job working together to get us back out as soon as possible.

A B757-200 Captain rejected the takeoff at 120 KTS when the nose tire vibration became excessive due to flat spots developed because the aircraft sat fully loaded with fuel over a weekend.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

A DC87 landing roll out on Runway 28R was told to turn left at Taxiway Romeo and hold short of Runway 28L. Cleared an A320 for takeoff on Runway 28L; the DC87 continued west of Runway 28L in front of the A320. The A320 aborted his takeoff on his own after seeing the DC87 crossing. The DC87 [should have] read back hold short of 28L.

During landing at SFO on Runway 28R; ATC issued us taxi instructions. My attention was on handling the aircraft as our speed was still high and we had a direct 15 knot crosswind which made the roll out challenging. My First Officer took the taxi instructions from ATC and read them back. I apparently only heard the first part of those instructions which was to exit Runway 28R at 'R'. Romeo was near the end of Runway 28R. Once I reached 'R' exit I turned left onto the taxiway. Unfortunately; I did not hear the second part of the taxi instructions which was to hold short of 28L. I continued my taxi on 'R' until I heard SFO Tower call the departure to abort their takeoff. Then the Tower told us that we were supposed to hold short of 28L. I turned to my First Officer and asked if we were supposed to hold sort of 28L and he said yes. He was distracted once I was exiting the runway with his after landing flows and he was not paying attention to where I was taxiing. I spoke with the Tower and they said that we did not have a runway incursion. However it was a failure to follow instructions. They submitted a report.

SFO Tower Controller described an aborted takeoff on Runway 28L when observing an aircraft crossing down field without ATC approval.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon arriving at the gate; the Captain and the First Officer (FO) were informed by the Agent that the aircraft needed to be deiced. Upon the FO's preflight walkaround; he confirmed there was frost on the upper wing surface.  PHL ATIS stated calm winds with a temp of +1c 10sm.The 'A' Flight Attendant informed the FO 'Passengers were complaining they were cold.'  The FO attempted to reach Operations via radio to disconnect the air. Then the FO proceeded down the jetway to disconnect the air and stated he witnessed a Company deice truck commencing deice procedures.The Captain was informed by the Agent that aircraft was being deiced at the gate and the Captain stated that we had not communicated with the Deice Crew or received a Company Flight Crew Deice/Anti-Ice Notification Sheet. After the aircraft deicing was competed; the Captain proceeded to the jetway to inspect the aircraft.  At that time; the Captain was met by the Agent who stated that he saw frost on the wings after the aircraft deicing had been completed.  The Captain could not verify the aircraft was clean. The Captain then requested to the Agent that the Deice Crew to return to re-inspect the aircraft. The Agent brought the loading schedule and the Flight Crew Deice/Anti-Ice Notification Sheet and once again stated there was still frost on the aircraft. Once again the Captain requested to have the Deice Crew return and re-inspect the aircraft for frost. The Captain then asked the FO to re-inspect the aircraft. The FO stated he could not verify the aircraft was clean and requested to the Agent in the jetway to have the Deice Crew return and re-inspect the aircraft for frost. The Agent stated to the FO that he did not understand why the Captain wanted the aircraft re-inspected.  The FO said he tried to explain to the Agent that both the FO and the Captain could not verify that the aircraft was clean of frost and safe to fly and that we were both requesting the Deice Crew to re-inspect the aircraft for frost.A short time later; we had another individual come to the flightdeck and state; 'The aircraft had been deiced and is clean.' As stated on the Flight Crew Deice/ Anti-Ice Notification form; we informed the person that the Agent stated there was frost still on the wing after the aircraft had been deiced.  Both Crew Members could not verify that the aircraft was clean of contaminants.  Also; both Crew Members requested a re-inspection of the aircraft numerous times to the Agent. The Captain requested that person to speak with the Agent with regards to re-inspection.Agent asked what we were going to do. The Captain once again ask the FO if he can verify that the aircraft was clean and the FO said that he could not verify a clean aircraft nor could the Captain. The Captain then stated once again that we were waiting on the Deice Crew to re-inspect the aircraft.  The Agent was annoyed that we were requesting that the aircraft be re-inspected.  At that time; the Agent stated in a loud voice several times to the Captain; 'You are the Captain and need to make a decision on what you're going to do.'  The Captain once again requested the Deice Crew re-inspect the aircraft for frost. Both the Captain and the FO had requested the aircraft be re-inspected for frost for 20 minutes and why was this not complied with. The Ops Supervisor came to the flightdeck stating that we were not getting re-inspected and the Deice Crew was only able to use 40 gallons of fluid to deice at the gate. We were then told we would have to proceed to the PHL deice pad for an inspection and additional deicing if needed.   We then proceeded to the PHL deice pad for inspection and deicing. The PHL Deice Crew confirmed that there was in fact frost on the wings and deiced us a second time.

B737-700 Captain describes a test of wills with the Gate Agent and the deice crew to get his aircraft properly deiced at the gate.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

I was pilot monitoring. About 2 miles from the final approach fix captain called gear down.  After I selected gear down we got a gear disagree message and noticed that the nose wheel was not in the down and locked position. We immediately executed a go-around. Got a vector and an altitude and ran the QRH. We decided to attempt a second approach. On that approach we experienced the same indication once the gear was selected down. We did another go-around and continued to run the QRH. After all the procedures were completed we had an all 3 green indication. Once that was complete we did a low approach to have the ground crew try and verify the nose gear was down. They thought it was down and we had 3 green indication so we did the approach again and landed. Captain did the landing and kept the nose off as long as possible. Once the nose touched down we noticed a different sound than normal and we did not have any steering. So we stopped on the runway and were towed to the gate. Try and keep the QRH in better condition. The QRH in the plane had pages falling out; which made it difficult to find the correct pages.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported a failure of the nose gear to extend properly during approach. Using QRH procedures a safe indication was achieved; but there was no steering upon landing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

CFI applicant was instructing me on proper preflight and systems. During the course of the lesson we took off the oil filler cap and inserted a funnel intending to put in 1 qt of oil. We determined that the oil level was sufficient for the flight (8 qts) and it would be unnecessary to add the additional quart. We removed the funnel and took the quart of oil back to the supply cabinet; returned to the aircraft and closed the access door neglecting to put the filler lid back on. During climb out I noticed oil streaming out from the access panel and realized that we forgot to put the cap on. We [advised ATC] and landed without incident. Upon removing the cowl at [the] ramp we discovered that we did leave the cap off. Less than 1 quart was lost according to the dipstick. Maintenance was called and the aircraft was taxied to them to have the engine cleaned. Without having a clear understanding of who was doing the actual preflight and who was instructing; we both missed that the cap was left unsecured.

C182RG Instructor pilot reported taking off with the oil filler cap not installed.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I assumed the Positions of Arrival West (W); Arrival East (E) and Boeing Final (O).  I was briefed about a Aircraft X flying around the local area.  It appeared he was in South Satellite's Airspace (N) or Final (F); more than he was mine.  But I assumed the area he was going to be working was mostly gonna be my Airspace.  I assumed the position and looked over a sheet that had the aircraft's call sign on it and a Map of our local area.  It failed to state what route the aircraft was actually flying and at no point did the aircraft advise me of his route or when he was on station or changing positions.  He was mostly tracking a north/south route along our final as we were in a north flow at SeaTac (SEA). At this point I started to get busy with Arrival Traffic at SEA; arrival traffic into Boeing (BFI); arrival traffic into Renton (RNT) on a GPS circle approach which was a conflict with my BFI Traffic and I was having to coordinate a sequence with departure east (A); which had the RNT aircraft and arrival traffic going into Auburn (S50) on a GPS approach.  At this point in time Aircraft X started to work further south west.  I was distracted with everything else going on and failed to notice that he had penetrated McChord Air Force Base's (TCM) Class D Airspace. At this point the CIC came over and said that McChord might have some activity going on at their airport and to ensure I got a point out with their tower.  At that time I realized he was much more N's airspace than mine; so I attempted an automated hand off to N and I called TCM and notified them of his activity. After getting off the line; N Called me back and said McChord Tower wanted to talk to the aircraft.  So I said I was just on the line with them; they want him?  The N Controller said yes; so at that point the N controller flashed the aircraft to TCM; they took the handoff.  We discussed which frequency they wanted him on and I transferred the aircraft to TCM Tower.  I was relieved off of position a few minutes later and told that the aircraft had penetrated the TCM Class D airspace. I would say De-Combining Positions would have certainly helped in this scenario.  I was too occupied with other traffic in other areas to provide quality service and flight following to this aircraft.  Also; I should have handed this aircraft off to N sooner; maybe their work load would have been less and they would have had time to point the aircraft out prior to him entering the TCM Class D.  Also; I should have asked for help on figuring out what the aircraft's intended route of flight actually would be; either from the aircraft himself or management.  I kept reviewing the paper thinking I was missing something and didn't see any route markings; certainly had no idea he would be penetrating any Class D Airspace.

An S46 Controller reports of working an aircraft and then getting busy with other traffic. The aircraft enters Class Delta Airspace and the Controller fails to notice this. The Controller was working combined airspace and this aircraft was inside another Controller's airspace and not handed off to him.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Over 1;000 kg of Lithium Ion batteries on board; half of which (either 540 or 460 kg) were loaded in the forward belly. This is an unsafe loading position for batteries which are a known fire hazard.Not sure why the batteries were loaded in an inaccessible Dangerous Goods position. Because the CFSS is so much more effective on Lithium battery fires than halon; all Lithium Ion and Lithium Metal batteries ought to be loaded on the main cargo deck; not in halon controlled; inaccessible positions.

A cargo flight Captain noted that Lithium Ion batteries were loaded the aircraft's inaccessible belly compartment but the crew would be better able to fight a fire if they were in the main deck cargo area.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While being vectored for the approach the Final Approach Controller left us high and gave us a short vector for the CANPA approach. While intercepting the localizer I realized that we were not tracking the localizer inbound. I verified the localizer frequency in both the active Nav 1 and Nav 2 frequencies. At this point the pilot flying (First Officer) disconnected the autopilot while we discussed the problem and began to mention the possibility of going around. The Tower Controller then gave us a low altitude alert. I told the Controller that we were correcting. At this point we made the decision to execute a go-around. We began the go-around and I told the Controller we were going around. Cause: Focusing too much on intercepting the course and not properly monitoring the approach. After experiencing this circumstance; I would ask for a longer approach where we didn't feel rushed to get down and get configured. If we had had another 3-5 miles on the approach I believe that we would not have had this problem.

We were left high and fast and were doing the CANPA approach to Runway 27 into SAN when the localizer didn't capture we got fixated on the green needles and were still descending. Approach came on and said we were low; turn to a heading; and we immediately executed the missed approach. We felt rushed and when the localizer didn't capture it created a snowball effect.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported while on approach to Runway 27 at SAN they deviated from the localizer during a rushed approach and were given a low altitude warning from ATC; which triggered a go-around.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 13800; Flight Crew Type 800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

I received a call from an FAA person inquiring for more history on damage to Aircraft X in order to grant a ferry permit. While his questions pertained to a gear event that occurred over one year ago; I answered as best I could recall. He stated that the FSDO believed the aircraft had received substantial damage and that I had failed to report the event. I did not believe that it was a reportable event for several reasons; namely that the reporting paragraphs of NTSB 830.5 did not apply. There were no injuries; and there was no damage to anything other than the airplane; and it was very minimal damage.The damage consisted of main gear doors; nose gear doors; flaps; propeller; and one belly skin. All damage was topical in nature as the gear collapse happened at a very slow speed and the engine continued run after the event and was shut down normally. Additionally; three separate mechanics at two Beechcraft repair shops stated that was the least amount of damage they had ever seen. They each stated that with the skin replacement; repairing of gear doors and a [replacement] propeller; the aircraft could return to service immediately.After receiving the evaluations; and being unsure of exactly what caused the gear to retract and or fail; I elected to sell the airplane. The new owner attempted to get a ferry permit which was denied by this same office as they considered this substantial damage. I pointed out that nowhere in 830.5 was any of this light damage reportable. The inspector stated that it was. I don't want to be in denial of not reporting; but each of the inspecting mechanics said it was also not reportable. So through reading the FARs (Federal Aviation Regulations) and NTSB requirements; I could not find the applicable reporting parameters.The original event occurred in [month; year]. The OAT for the last 2.0 hours of the flight exceeded 100 degrees F. I am not sure what the interior cockpit temperature was but recall it was very hot; I ran out of drinking water for hydration; and had to wipe my brow every 3-4 minutes from perspiration. The descent was even hotter and very bumpy. I put the gear and flaps down normally for landing; used a landing checklist and a GUMP (Gas; Undercarriage; Mixture; Propeller) check and proceeded to land. I touched down in the first 300 ft. of the runway and the aircraft bounced and floated for approximately 1;000 ft. at about 65-70mph. After the bounce there were several strange noises which I could not identify as normal or their source as I was concentrating on re-transitioning to flare for landing again. I seemed to touch down normally and gently on the second landing. Then upon adding power to get over the hump of the runway and get to the first turnoff; the aircraft settled and stopped. I was in disbelief that I appeared to be sitting on the ground. I added more power but the aircraft failed to move. I shut down the engine and aircraft and exited the airplane normally; albeit closer to the ground.I called a mechanic and airport personnel in fear that another aircraft would attempt to land while I had the runway fouled and darkness was quickly approaching. The FAA was notified of the disabled aircraft on the runway. This shut down of the runway via the NOTAMS while I worked at getting the airplane removed. I believe this to be true as no other airplanes attempted to takeoff or land during this time. This process took about 2 hours to locate the lifting equipment and a tow vehicle. The aircraft was towed to a hangar for further evaluation.

Bonanza pilot reported landing gear collapse after landing; resulting in minor damage to the aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

I was flying a solo cross country and had flight following for a majority of the flight. During the flight I refueled and continued. It was a windy day and the flight was obviously taking longer than expected. I attempted to contact FSS to amend my flight plan for an extra hour to give me time to get back on three different frequencies. I attempted to call up three FSS; two of which were recommended by Center; and couldn't pick up the signal for any of them in the area and neither could a fellow student flying about 15-20 NM miles ahead of me. We let control know that we couldn't pick up any of the frequencies. He said it wasn't a good area. I requested for him to amend my flight plan for an hour more. [The other pilot] asked if he could have the same thing I requested. Center answered and said he would pass on that info and have it amended. When I landed as soon as I taxied back and shut off the plane I immediately called 1-800-WX-BRIEF and requested to close my flight plan. Without letting me know that anything was wrong; the briefer closed the flight plan. As I walked into the airport lobby; 30 minutes later I was notified that search and rescue had been sent out for me. I called back 1-800-WX-BRIEF and asked if my flight was closed. The briefer said it had and didn't mention anything about search and rescue. I then asked if my flight had been amended for an extra hour and was notified that the information was never passed on for my plane from the Center controller as I was told it would be.

DA40 pilot reported that ATC had not passed on their request to extend a flight plan and that search and rescue may have been dispatched.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Taking Runway 24 for departure we lost Number 1 Hydraulic Quantity when the flight taxi switch was moved to the flight position. It was detected by the loss of normal brakes; the roll spoiler inboard hydraulic caution light; and the Number 1 ISO valve caution light. We briefly discussed that we had lost Number 1 Hydraulic quantity. We decided that with nose wheel steering; deicing; and the emergency brake that we could safely return to the gate. We notified ATC and company. Then returned to the gate. The First Officer made a PA and talked to the Flight Attendant. I was not able to use the normal brakes. The Roll Spoiler inboard hydraulic caution light and Number 1 ISO Valve caution light illuminated. The number 1 hydraulic fluid gauge was at 1 quart. Maintenance told us that a hydraulic actuator had cracked and dumped fluid overboard. We discussed what had happened. Then determined that we had what we needed to return to the gate and did so.

A DHC-8-100 hydraulic actuator failed which dumped the Number 1 Hydraulic System fluid overboard as the takeoff was begun; so the takeoff was rejected; but the crew had sufficient brakes and steering to taxi to the gate.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

A319 departed DAL on the LOA heading and altitude of H130 climbing to 050. On initial contact I responded; 'A319; Regional Departure; RADAR contact; climb and maintain 060.' A319 read back the new altitude assignment. A few moments later; it looked to me like A319 had made a right turn. I asked him to verify heading and he responded with something similar to 'Heading 240; resuming the departure as cleared.' At this point; I realized that he had traffic head on climbing out of 050; traffic south of him at 040; and traffic that was east/northeast of him that had departed DAL right after him. I issued a series of turns; stop climb; immediate turns and climbs; traffic calls to keep the aircraft from merging with each other. At some point; I asked the pilot who had issued the clearance to 'resume the departure' and he responded that I had given it to him. I told him that I had identified myself as 'Regional Departure'; not 'resume the departure'. My assumption was that he had misunderstood; because this same situation has happened numerous times in the past due to the wording sounding very similar. Later; after I issued the pilot the 'possible pilot deviation' instructions and switched his frequency to ZFW; he apologized and said that it was a language issue (it sounded like he had a foreign accent); and that normally he would read back that portion of the clearance for verification and was sorry that he had not done so. The OMIC listened to the replay and said that I had issued the clearance correctly and that it was plainly heard that I said 'Regional Departure'. The pilot never responded that he was resuming the departure and the facility has processed the MOR as a pilot deviation. Within the last year; our facility addressed the possibility of changing the name of our facility to something other than 'Regional'. One of the reasons we looked at a change was because of this very same scenario that has happened to almost everyone. Unfortunately; a name change was voted down by our facility personnel and management. It appears to possibly be a safety issue that the name of our facility; at least on the departure sectors; can be misinterpreted so easily as a control instruction. On other positions; where we call our facility 'Regional Approach'; this problem does not seem to occur. This is probably due to the fact that 'resume the approach' is a clearance that would rarely be issued; but 'resume the departure' is a clearance given quite frequently. I would suggest either a complete name change for the facility or some type of waiver that would allow us to identify ourselves on initial contact as 'Departure' on the departure positions. Another possible solution would be if the Towers in our airspace would instruct the pilots to 'contact Regional Departure' rather than 'contact Departure.' At least then the pilots will be expecting us to identify as 'Regional Departure.' Absent a facility name change or waiver for initial identification; if a pilot doesn't give a full read back as he or she understands the clearance; then there is no way for a controller to anticipate or correct the misinterpretation.

After take off from Runway 13L and transferred to Departure it was understood by the Captain to 'resume departure'; I asked him to verify and he did not; I was assured he understood the instruction from ATC. As we were turning; ATC asked for our heading; the Captain informed them we had turned towards TTT (initial point on our assigned departure) and we were ordered to level off at 4;000 feet and immediate left turn to a heading of 130 degrees. I disconnected the auto-pilot; immediately leveled off and did a 45 degree bank turn towards 130 degrees. We got a traffic advisory; not a resolution advisory. After a discussion with ATC; they stated they never said 'resume departure;' but did identify themselves as 'regional departure.'

D10 Departure Controller described a conflict event reportedly resulting from the flight crew confusing the ATC facility name 'Regional Departure' with a 'resume departure' instructions.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

While turning into Spot XXX on the cargo apron in ZZZZ; the plane was unable to stop in a timely manner due to what I believe was contamination on the apron. Due to the lack of braking ability the CA (Captain) briefly deployed the thrust reversers and the plane was then able to slow and we regained braking ability. I was not aware that there was difficulty braking until the CA deployed the reversers. We then proceeded to finish the turn into [spot] without issue. The entrance to the ramp was well cleaned and mostly free of contaminants; and according to the Captain; the braking condition was very good. However; further into the ramp; the contamination became present; although it was not very visible; almost like it was black ice on top of the pavement. When we exited the plane after shutting down and securing; the ramp and parking area was covered in a transparent; very slippery layer of ice with slush scattered sporadically throughout. I believe that this ice existed on the apron just outside of the parking spot as well. There was no active precipitation and all of the airport surfaces we had been on up until that point had had good breaking conditions. Thankfully the CA was able to control the aircraft without causing damage to the plane or surroundings. I do not have an exact recollection of the ground speed when we had the difficulty breaking; but I would estimate it to be in the range of roughly 5-7 knots. We notified the ground crew of the difficulty braking and hopefully they took actions to decontaminate that area of the ramp for the next aircraft.I believe the transition from well-cleared; contaminant free areas; to the contaminated area caused the braking issue. It was also night and the light did not reflect off of the ice on the contaminated areas of the ramp; making it difficult to see the contamination. I thought the Captain was maintaining a safe speed for the conditions and was surprised when the reversers were deployed.I would suggest that the entirety of the ramp is cleared to the same standard in the future if able. Crews should also be extra vigilant of contamination that is not easily visible in low light; or poorly lit conditions.

Normal arrival. While taxiing to Stand XXX we were following a company aircraft. Due to the light weight of our aircraft it kept accelerating while at idle thrust. When entering the cargo ramp; the pavement was bare and wet. The last 500 feet of taxi had thin frozen slush. The aircraft ahead slowed; and we were slowing to turn into our stand; when the Captain noted the aircraft was sliding. He applied full brakes to no effect; then deployed reverse thrust on both engines; slightly above idle. The aircraft slowed and stopped after sliding about 50 feet. The reversers were stowed and the aircraft turned into the stand and parked. As it approached the stop point it again slid about 5 feet in the attempt to stop. Reverse thrust was not used a second time. Less than 30% n1 in reverse.[The cause was] thin ice on the ramp. Taxi speed about 8-10 knots. Unnoticed change in braking effectiveness. Fatigue from a 15+ hour day.Reverse thrust was a last ditch effort to not scrape paint. Parking brake might have worked also. Even creeping to the stop point; the aircraft still slid about 2 feet past the stop point.

B777 flight crew reported temporary loss of directional control while taxing into parking spot due to contaminated ramp area.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.5

Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Equipment / Tooling; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

At XA:00 Aircraft X was an automated handoff (HO) accepted by ZBW-17 from ZNY-65. Aircraft X was on a code from ZZZZ to KEWR at FL380. At XA:09 Aircraft X checks on frequency at [FL]380 and is acknowledged; 110 miles southwest of the WHALE intersection. At XA:09 Yarmouth Sector (YQM) calls ZBW-17 with a HO on Aircraft Y 10 miles east of the WHALE intersection; RA17 answers the call. At XA:10 Aircraft X's data block jumps to the WHALE intersection; 113 miles northeast of where it was prior and is now tracking on what will become Aircraft Y. XA:10 responds to Yarmouth Sector with Aircraft Y? Then says he's on a bad code and responds RADAR contact. At XA:10 Aircraft Y checks on frequency at [FL]350. At XA:10 Aircraft X's data block now drops off the scope. At XA:10 Aircraft Y is instructed to squawk code XXXX; Aircraft Y was squawking YXYX. At XA:11 Aircraft X should now be entering ZBW-17 at [FL]380 without a data block; can't see the limited on Falcon. At XA:23 Aircraft X should be entering ZBW-46. At XA:26; watching Boston TRACONs Falcon looks like Aircraft X was 10 miles at closest to another AC (Aircraft Z at [FL]380). At XA:27 ZBW-46 broadcasts in the blind for Aircraft X; Aircraft X should be over BOS now at [FL]380. At XA:27 ZBW-17 ships Aircraft X to ZBW-46; ZBW-17 was asked to ship this aircraft by someone. At XA:29 Aircraft X now has a data block over KBOS at [FL]380; is now talking to ZBW-46 and is given a left 360 degree turn for descent. Looks like Aircraft X flew about 135 miles through ZBW airspace; Sectors 17; 18 and 46 without a data block.

Boston Center Controller reported an air carrier flew through Boston Center's airspace for 135 miles unidentified.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 375

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I am a First Officer for a part 135 tour operator at the Grand Canyon. As the FO (First Officer); we were operating a flight through the Special Flight Rules Area on the route 'Blue Direct North.' As we passed the reporting point 'Colorado River' I was given instructions by the Captain to deviate north of course for the purpose of him wanting to point out some landmarks.  We proceeded to follow the Colorado River north easterly. After a short distance away from the Blue Direct North route; I questioned the Captain as to how far we were going; and if it was necessary.  He indicated that it wasn't very far and he would tell me where to fly.  I did not feel comfortable with his reasoning as I knew that we were exceeding the route dimensions set in the Special Flight Rules Area and reminded him of such.  During this deviation; the flight controls were exchanged on multiple occasions as the Captain would point out prominent land features.  When I was in control of the airplane; I would start a course back towards the Blue Direct North and voice that we should return to our route; but the controls would be exchanged again with the Captain changing our course. As we continued north easterly we proceeded to enter the southernmost extension of the Toroweap/Shinumo Flight Free Zone. This was not intentional on my behalf as I had made multiple efforts prior to entering the Flight Free Zone to return to a south heading and rejoin the Blue Direct North route. I also voiced my opinion and desire to discontinue our deviation. This was not a direct safety concern and did not warrant me to forcefully take control of the airplane and return to our designed route.  I do not believe there was anything else I could do at the time to avoid entering the Flight Free Zone.  Once on the ground; I proceeded to discuss the matter with our Director of Operations and Chief Pilot.

First Officer flying a Grand Canyon tour was directed by Captain to deviate off the Special Flight Rules route and enter a Flight Free Zone.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS guidance with the Captain. On departure; we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing; however; no LLWS or Micro-burst activity was reported at the field. After verifying LNAV; selecting gear and flaps up; I set 'UP' speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the 'A' autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1;200 to 1;500 FPM. I called 'descending' just prior to the GPWS sounding 'don't sink; don't sink.' The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively.

B737 MAX First Officer reported that the aircraft pitched nose down after engaging autopilot on departure. Autopilot was disconnected and flight continued to destination.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

To begin with; the descent and approach were planned and briefed prior to Top of Descent. The clearance was to descend via the CREDE 3 RNAV Arrival for a south landing. Unsure of the runway to expect (16L or 16R) I had briefed flying the arrival with vectors to a visual approach. I expected and briefed the ILS backup for the visual approach to 16L. Between CREDE and POWDR it was necessary to make slight deviations from course to avoid cumulus build ups. ATC was advised. As a result of the off course deviations it appeared that we might have a problem complying with the speed restriction at POWDR. We asked for relief from the restriction and were told to comply with the altitude restriction and 'do your best on the speed'. We were in compliance on the altitude; but about 15 knots above the 250 knot crossing restriction and quickly came within speed compliance. After that; the real challenge began. It was becoming obvious that ATC was under the gun. We were handed off to the Final Controller around MOGLS. The female Controller; speaking very fast; issued us a clearance for an RNAV Z Approach to 16R. This was unusual in that in all previous RNAV approaches I've made; it was because we asked for it. Nevertheless; it was unclear what she said with her rapid verbiage; so the FO asked her to repeat the clearance; which she did speaking even faster it seemed. This is the point where there was misunderstanding between the FO and me. I believed that she had given us the RNAV Z to 16L and was busy reprogramming the FMC; while the FO was receiving the approach clearance for the second time. When that was done; and after the FO was finished on the radio; he asked me to brief the approach. We did it by the book; I briefed all the points from the CDU (FMC) while he verified it on the EFB (iPad) chart. There were more radio distractions at the end of the brief. The airport was VMC with good visibility during the approach. I clearly saw the preceding traffic for 16L reported four and a half miles ahead. It was my understanding that I would follow him to 16L. However; the FO correctly believed our intended runway was 16R. When Tower cleared us to land on 16R; I thought that it was a late runway change so I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles and adjusted my flight path to line up and land on 16R as cleared. It wasn't until later that I was able to determine that we were indeed cleared for the RNAV Z 16R. The first three points: CLFFF; CEPEE; and AAGEE are the same on both approach charts which is why the FO thought I was briefing the correct approach.The First Officer was outstanding in his duties as Pilot Monitoring. It was because of his diligence in speaking up that we were able to navigate what seemed like a mine field on the arrival. The female Controller was; because of her rapid fire clearance; very hard to understand and the pace in which she spoke contributed to the rushed feeling that we all had. RNAV approaches are very helpful and contribute to overall safety when planned and properly briefed in an unhurried environment. If it is the intent of ATC to have everyone flying RNAV approaches; it should be so advised in the ATIS if possible and not given so close in that it can't be properly briefed.

We were given instruction to descend via CREDE 3 at approximately FL320. This descent point put us slightly above the descent path. Additionally; we also requested a slight deviation due to a weather buildup. The radios were very busy at the time and it was difficult to transmit/receive. Once we were given the weather deviation clearance and very early on in the descent profile; we determined we were high on the PATH and most likely would miss the crossing restriction at POWDR (at 250 knots between FL220 and 17;000'). I immediately asked for crossing altitude relief. Following our request for relief; the Controller immediately responded; 'I don't understand; I gave you instructions to descend via.' At this point; we continued to attempt to make the crossing restrictions. About 30 seconds later; the Controller came back and said; 'make the altitude; and do the best you can with the airspeed.' We made the crossing restriction altitude at POWDR at FL220; but crossed at approximately 267 knots. We essentially were given relief and made the Controller's new instructions. We made all further restrictions. Following this event; Approach Control gave us an approach type just short of CLFFF that was not in the ATIS; nor was one that we had expected or briefed; RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 16R. In addition; the radio traffic was extremely busy at the time and the Controller had to state the approach clearance three times due to breaks in the transmissions. It was not the approach we had loaded nor briefed. The Captain; who was flying the approach; quickly loaded the approach and very quickly briefed it. At the time; the radio traffic continued to be heavy. In my mind; we were cleared the RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 16R; but due to all the radio traffic and late changes; I made a call at CLFFF to the Controller for mutual verification. I said; 'CLFFF; commencing the RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 16R approach.' A non-standard call; but I had a feeling that there was some confusion. She said 'Roger.' This gave me assurance we were flying the correct approach. Just shy of AAGEE; the Approach Controller switched us to Denver Tower. I checked in and we were cleared to land on 16R. This is what I had expected. At that point the Captain said; I thought we were landing on 16L. I said no and queried the Tower Controller. The Tower Controller re-stated; 'Cleared to land on 16R.' At this point it was discovered that the Captain had thought we were given the clearance for the RNAV (RNP) Z to 16L. Fortunately; we caught the error prior to AAGEE and since both approaches share the same track and point up to AAGEE; it's very unlikely we violated any airspace. There is a difference of 100 feet between the two approaches; so a slight altitude deviation may have occurred. The error occurred because the Captain and I did not have a shared mental model of what we were cleared for. In addition; when the Captain briefed the approach; I did not catch that the incorrect approach was loaded and did not hear the difference between the two approaches due to the heavy radio traffic; my perceived expectation of what he was briefing and was cleared to fly (RNAV RNP Z 16R); along with the rushed nature of our clearance. We corrected the error and landed on 16R without further incident. Be ready for all approaches and ensure there is adequate Crew coordination between Crew Members. If the briefing is rushed or a situation dictates; spend the extra time to brief the approach; even if it means asking for a different approach (visual) or asking for vectors back around the approach corridor to garner more time.

B737-800 Flight Crew reported misunderstanding an approach clearance to Runway 16R at DEN due to a last minute assignment of an RNAV approach when an ILS or visual was expected. The frequency was also very congested and the Controller was speaking rapidly. The clearance was for the right runway but the Captain heard the left and programed the FMC that way. This error was detected and corrected before a significant deviation resulted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 34; Flight Crew Type 34

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

On landing; drifted left off center line. Winds were 040@7 at the time Landed on runway X - went off the left of the runway and was able to correct back onto the runway. Struck a light was able to taxi and park the aircraft without further incident.Corrective action would have been to go-around and not complete the landing.

SR20 pilot reported a loss of control during landing resulted in a runway excursion and contact with a runway light.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 1218; Flight Crew Type 694

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

The day started by topping off fuel. Capacity is 110 gallons. Took off and flew direct to ZZZ. Dropped off the owner of the plane at ZZZ and then flew from ZZZ toward ZZZZZ Intersection. Once clear of Class B airspace I flew direct to ZZZ1. Approximately 30 minutes into the flight the engine quit and the fuel pressure light came on. I wobbled the emergency pump but had little success. A large corn field was ahead and left and I made a pattern to land there. This type of plane is landed gear up if off airport and no hard surface. I approached the field at 90 kts and made a couple S turns to lose altitude. Once closer I noticed the field sloped downhill. The adjacent field was chosen to land in and it was straight ahead after a low area with overgrowth and a dirt road. I flew the profile of the first field to maintain speed and aimed for the start of the second field. Once the plane hit it slid for 250 ft. There was no injuries and no fire. The remaining fuel was drained from the tanks and verified the tanks did not have enough fuel to keep the engine running. The total time from the departure airport to the field was 2.7 flight hrs. I normally use 30 GPH to plan. With that I should have had some reserve once at ZZZ1. In hindsight I should have refueled at ZZZ. In the future I will limit time to 2 hrs between fueling. I also feel that there could have been a loose fuel cap causing venting of fuel or the aircraft was tilted during fueling causing a lower amount of fuel to go into tanks. Once the plane is repaired the owner will drain the tanks and check the capacity by filling.

T6 Texan pilot reported an off airport landing due to fuel starvation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 350

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We departure in our normal configuration with the APU running. Shortly after takeoff we noticed light smoke in the cockpit and cabin. We requested a priority landing and were given vectors to back to the airport. At this point we shutdown the APU and immediately the smoke started to dissipate. We reviewed emergency procedure for smoke in the cockpit and made a normal landing without incident. After the pax deplaned we started troubleshooting with our Mechanic. As such; we started just the APU and after a couple of minutes we turned on the blower; immediately we started getting smoke in the cockpit. At this point we shutdown the APU.With the APU stowed we did a battery start on the engines; and taxied the aircraft to run up spot on the field; set the brake and increased power to climb. After a couple of minutes with no smoke or odor we determined that the problem is with the APU. After consulting the Aircraft's Master Mel list we determined we could dispatch with the APU being labeled inop.After consulting with maintenance over the phone I determined the aircraft was safe to operate per 91.213. At that point we took off empty to destination and landed without incident.In retrospect I am concerned that we may have or not have dispatched with other inoperative equipment.

C560XL Captain reported noticing smoke in the cockpit shortly after takeoff resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

After rotation we had a #2 AHRS failure. We continued to climb out; and followed ATC instructions. After all appropriate checks were completed we ran the emergency checklist. We then decided it was best to return to the field. The First Officer saw a bunch of flags on his instruments as well as a flag on the captain's side RMI. It probably happened because the #2 AHRS was written up 5 times within the last week and Maintenance never fixed the problem correctly. No emergency was ever declared. Fix the aircraft right the first time.

DHC8 Captain describes a #2 AHRS failure after rotation and return to field. AHRS had been written up five times in the last week.


Toilet Smoke; Overheat; Fire Detectors & Warning

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Smoke detector; crew rest; master caution EICAS activated on climb out. The Relief Pilot (RP) obtained a fire extinguisher and opened crew rest door. An acrid odor was present but no smoke was visible.  The EICAS message and crew rest smoke detector cautions went away soon after the door was opened.  The RP investigated LAV; Galley; upper cargo deck (no freight; ferry flight) and EE (electronics) compartment. No smoke was present. On further investigation RP found a small piece of black tape covering the smoke detector green light in the lower bunk. It was beginning to melt.  With the EICAS message and caution gone and with zero payload we elected to continue to our destination.  This event could easily be avoided if someone would have not covered the green light with the electrical tape.

Smoke detector; crew rest; master caution + EICAS activated on climb out. The Relief Pilot (RP) obtained a fire extinguisher and opened crew rest door. An acrid odor was present but no smoke was visible.  The EICAS message and crew rest smoke detector cautions went away soon after the door was opened.  The RP investigated LAV; Galley; upper cargo deck (no freight; ferry flight) and EE (electronics) compartment. No smoke was present. On further investigation RP found a small piece of black tape covering the smoke detector green light in the lower bunk. It was beginning to melt.  With the EICAS message and caution gone and with zero payload we elected to continue to our destination.  It's possible the heat from the covered smoke detector green light melted the tape causing smell and setting off the Master Caution and smoke detector.  I speculate that the tape was placed upon the light by a crew member; on a previous flight to prevent smoke detector light from shining in their eyes while sleeping?

Air carrier flight crew reported smoke detector activation during initial climb. The cause was attributed to melting tape placed over crew rest smoke detector light.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

In flight I received an ACARs message that revised our zero fuel weight. The new weight was 1;100 pounds more. No adverse conditions were caused by the error. Upon landing; I was advised that the system computers were dropping bags out of the calculations with no indication to the operators.

ACARS message revised Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) one hour into flight. We entered new data into FMC. Performance and landing weight ok. NO MZFW or MAX After Take Off Gross Weight (ATOG) were exceeded. No envelope or CG limit was out of tolerance; supposedly a computer malfunction on aircraft loading side.

B737-700 flight crew was advised one hour into flight that their zero fuel weight had gone up by 1;100 pounds due to a computer glitch.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Total 11326; Flight Crew Type 449

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

I was the Captain and I was on rest break. My co-pilot woke me and told me the relief pilots had called him and told him that there was an electrical burning smell in the cockpit and cabin. When I arrived back in the cockpit; the relief pilots told me we had lost our #1 L Cabin Air Compressor (CAC). We assumed that the fumes we were smelling was from the failed CAC. We contacted Dispatch and had them patch us in to [Maintenance Control]. We wanted to run the fumes removal checklist. Together we ran the fumes removal checklist; but there were still strong electrical fumes in the cockpit. We talked to the [Chief Pilot] and together we felt the best and safest course of action was to divert.

B787 flight crew reported a cabin air compressor failure resulted in cabin fumes and a diversion.


Flight Crew Total 2862; Flight Crew Type 1637

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

As we boarded the aircraft for preflight; I saw 5 mechanics around seat 20A inspecting an inbound write up; regarding reported excessive heat at the sidewall panel. There was also an accompanying mark on the spot that appeared to be a scuff mark; (surface only); rather than a deterioration of the composite material. The chief mechanic explained that by the emergency exit windows there were heat strips in the panel that would get warm; but should not produce excessive heat; as the write up suggested. I encouraged them to find the person who wrote up the aircraft; but they were unable to contact him. [Company maintenance] and local maintenance concurred that the aircraft could be released; finding no related damage; and my crew and I felt comfortable with that decision. All flight attendants were briefed and vigilant to this write up. At 2+20 into flight; a passenger reported the sidewall was very hot; at the same spot; and she was unable to put her head against it; due to the heat. The International Reserve Officer (IRO) was coming off of break; so the First Officer (FO) went back to observe and assess; and returned; reporting it was hot; but he could place his hand on it (describing it as coffee pot hot). After consulting with Dispatch and Maintenance; to discern if we could control the heaters with any circuit breakers (inaccessible in flight); I decided we would [advise ATC of emergency situation]; and if possible; return to ZZZ; although diversion enroute might occur if the heat at the hot spot continued to increase significantly. The FO coordinated with ATC via HF; and announcements were made as we turned off track. We received an initial clearance to ZZZ via Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC); with a load prompt; but that point was 3000 miles in the opposite direction of ZZZ. After a few messages; we were cleared to ZZZ; FL370. The IRO ran the diversion checklist; we obtained the weather for all possible enroute diversion airports; and kept a close eye on the nearest alternate choices; in case of deteriorating conditions. I briefed the lead flight attendant of our plan and of the possibility of divert if conditions deteriorated. A second hot spot; 6 inches below the first; was reported by the flight attendant stationed at that seat. As we descended through FL180; the flight attendant reported that the hot spot was getting hotter. There was no visible smoke or odor throughout the flight. We landed uneventfully; flaps 30; and taxied to the gate.The coordination of clearances via CPDLC was a distraction. Upon coast out; before the emergency; we were given a new route clearance with a load prompt direct to 40W. We queried; and the next clearance eliminated the 30W position in the load route prompt. Querying again; we received the full route clearance as expected. We were careful during the coordination for the turn off the track to make sure we received the correct clearance; after the previous confusion.

B757 flight crew reported a return to departure airport when a hot spot developed at a sidewall panel that was an inbound write up.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 98; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Immediately after departure; approximately 1;000 ft. Instrument failure presented; followed by failure of other electrical systems. Leveled off bellow controlled airspace using standby instruments. Squawked 7600 and began turn to return to uncontrolled airfield of departure for VFR landing. Troubleshot systems; found number 2 generator inoperative. Reset all electronics and generators. No change. Repeated system reset; generator came online. Restarted electronics; reported issue to ATC. Requested vectors and altitude for safe continuation to home base. Continued to airport; landed safely. Initial troubleshooting on the ground suggests failure of voltage cross limiter. Unknown cause of generator failure. Aircraft sent to maintenance.

King Air pilot reported that a generator failure shortly after takeoff resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure

While climbing thru FL240; [we] received PACK 1 VLV CLSD message on EICAS. Performed EMERG/ABNORM procedure and message went away. Previous write-ups exist; dating back to log page XXXXX06; Item # 1; in July 2014. While reviewing aircraft logbook for previous occurrences; found a previous Maintenance Station write-up indicating ram air duct blown out; needs new duct (log page XXXXX16; Item # 3). There is no further documentation in aircraft logbook indicating this was corrected. MEL 21-29 (PACK 1) was cleared approximately six days later on log page XXXXX18; Item # 3. [But log page XXXXX16; item # 3 still open]. Logbook entry incomplete; additional documented discrepancies not corrected.

Captain reports an EICAS Pack-1 VLV CLSD message appeared during climb thru FL240 on an EMB-145 aircraft. Performed EMERG/ABNORM procedure and message went away. While reviewing logbook for previous occurrences; pilot notes a maintenance write-up for a 'Ram Air Duct blown out' had not been cleared. Documented discrepancy not corrected.


Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 16700; Flight Crew Type 1500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Inbound to FXE on the FISEL SEVEN ARRIVAL. We were given a vector off of the arrival track and cleared to 3000 ft. Several miles Northwest of FXE on approximately a left downwind for the approach to Runway 09; as we were approaching level off at 3000 ft. we received a 'Traffic' warning from TCAS. Target was noted on the display at about 10 o'clock less than 1000 ft. below our altitude and well within the 3 mile circle; with a climbing indication (up arrow). As we continued on assigned heading at 3000 ft. the target appeared to be closing on our track and continuing to climb. Shortly after level off the TCAS issued a 'Climb' command. At this point I noted that the target was indicating 300 ft. below our altitude. I initiated the climb and called for the PM (Pilot Monitoring) to advise ATC of TCAS CLIMB. ATC acknowledged by calling out VFR traffic to us and stating that it was 'never above 2000 ft.' I acquired the target visually (low wing piston single) and observed it to be converging with our track from the left and close to our altitude. It is difficult to judge distance in this context; but we routinely pass aircraft that are 1000 ft. above/below our altitude. In my judgement the target in this case was much closer. We reached about 3600 ft. before TCAS went to a neutral vertical speed command; and the target aircraft was still indicating less than 1000 ft. below. By this time target was behind our aircraft and distance was increasing. Shortly after that TCAS issued a 'Clear of Conflict' and we returned to 3000 ft. The rest of the flight was uneventful; except to note that the same controller put us on a vector for the left base and then sent us beyond the final for Runway 09 while dealing with multiple VFR aircraft.

Captain reported responding to RA while on approach.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1250

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On approach to 31L ILS and just inside final approach fix in VMC; we received an RA to climb. We disconnected the autopilot and complied with the RA. We climbed very briefly before the RA stopped. The target aircraft passed 200-300 FT below us. We advised Tower of the RA and descended back to the glide-slope. Tower called the traffic just prior to the RA. Normal approach after recovery. RA received just after hand off from Approach Control to Tower frequency.

B737 Captain reports a TCAS RA inside DUANE during the ILS 31L approach to BFI. Evasive action is taken and the intruder passes 300 FT below the B737.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 16000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 69; Flight Crew Type 3000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We were descending on the BRUSR 1 arrival. We had an Airbus A320 approximately seven miles ahead of us. We encountered some wake turbulence from the A320 a few times while following him on the arrival. During the last encounter; our aircraft started to roll a bit quicker left and right due to the wake turbulence. I guarded the controls in case our aircraft rolled too far.We continued on the arrival; and I noticed we were slightly off course. I looked at the FMA and noticed the amber control wheel steering roll mode annunciated. Somehow the LNAV disengaged so I re-engaged it. I'm sure it happened as a result of the wake turbulence. The aircraft intercepted the course; and we continued on the arrival. I did not think we were off course by much or very long. We had multiple speed reductions assigned to us due to compression during this event. I think I lost some situational awareness while trying to get the aircraft slowed up while staying on path. One last thing is that we did have a decent tailwind on the arrival. That can increase the chance of this kind of hazard.

Encountered wake turbulence on arrival. Due to wake turbulence; automation changed from LNAV/VNAV to VNAV/control wheel steering roll. Pilot flying controlled the aircraft. We discussed mode switch and reset desired mode once out of wake turbulence. Approach asked if we were off arrival; which we were not.

B737-700 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into PHX in trail of an A320 that resulted in the temporary loss of LNAV.


Late aircraft swap and the new aircraft came from the hangar with an MEL. Prior to departure we did the control check and [it] was normal. On climbout aircraft controls felt a little loose. Autopilot went on within about 2 min after takeoff. Autopilot flew fine in flight. In flight I also made sure I wasn't missing anything associated with the MEL. Talked with the FO and made the decision to continue to [destination]. Autopilot was disengaged for a visual approach. On the approach we realized that the controls were moving totally independent from one another. I did not think to declare an emergency and less than 5 min later we landed without incident. On the ground we did another control check to make sure we weren't both crazy and sure enough the controls were moving independently from one another.The next time I have this MEL I will probably do 2 or 3 control checks to make sure this doesn't happen inflight. Second guessing myself I could have returned to [departure airport] had I hand flown. I feel it was a bad situation all around with last minute aircraft swap and this plane coming out of maintenance. I also could have declared an emergency for flight control malfunction. This is also my first real malfunction sitting in the left seat and looking back I have already [thought about] what I could have done different. As I write this I realize 10 Captains would have done 10 different things. So make a decision and go with it.

Next time we have this MEL; many control checks should be accomplished to ensure the elevator connection. Clearly the one control check we did at the gate was not sufficient. In conclusion; as soon as we noticed a difference in elevator inputs to the yoke on approach; an emergency should have been declared.

EMB-145LR flight crew reported they departed with an MEL pertaining to flight controls and in flight they noticed the elevators were not reacting normally to control input.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

During the JONZE arrival for Runway 18R [and] descending through 6;000 feet; we encountered wake turbulence causing autopilot disengagement and banking more than 30 degrees.  Sudden over-banking and autopilot disengagement. Descent through the wake of arriving aircraft. Continue manual flight until positive clear of area of wake. [I suggest] better ATC separation.

EMB-145 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into CLT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2092; Flight Crew Type 108

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 4075; Flight Crew Type 3175

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While we were en route approximately 40 miles southwest of MNATE Intersection at FL300 we noted a fuel tank imbalance and performed the wing fuel balancing procedure. Later we noted that the fuel was imbalanced slightly in the opposite direction and; during the rebalance procedure; both the left and right FUEL PRESS lights illuminated on the annunciator panel. We ran the Low Fuel Pressure Checklist and determined that; as a precaution; we should divert to our point of departure and obtained a clearance to do so. We then discussed what the best options were to get the aircraft on the ground safely. Prior to landing we declared an emergency as a precaution and requested emergency services are present upon landing. We landed uneventfully on 9R and taxied to customs per airport authority request.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

The flight crew of a P180 elected to declare an emergency and return to their departure airport after noting the illumination of both left and right FUEL PRESS warning lights during a fuel balancing procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 1075; Flight Crew Type 898

Situational Awareness; Workload; Fatigue

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Landing; after smooth touchdown; gust picked up wing; during correction; ground looped. Maintain sight picture to other end of runway and directional control during rollout. Poor sleep night prior may have affected performance.

A C-180 ground looped after a smooth landing when a gust of wind lifted a wing. Poor sleep may have been a factor.