Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Ramp tried to close out flight with Hazmat Pit 6 with only 10 bags. Advised [they] needed 15 bags. Ramp moved Hazmat to Pit 4 but could not close out due to nesting system. Crew advised to return to gate. Captain advised he needed more fuel. Ramp moved bags. Flight departed 56 minutes late.

Air carrier ramp personnel reported aircraft ground return to correct Hazmat cargo incorrectly configured for air transport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

There is an important FDC NOTAM (#5631) that adds climb gradients to all runways in Chicago for the MDW 5 Departure. It is currently on page 7 of a 14 page packet under 'Station Information FDC NOTAMs.' Being 'buried in the NOTAMs' is no excuse to miss this; but the chances of it being missed are high. This might deserve explanation as well.  Crews seem to have a limited understanding of climb gradients and this one applies to 2900 feet in Chicago. All directions; not just toward downtown. It is in the weather packet but deserves more attention perhaps the front cover of the weather packet or in a safety publication.

A Pilot reported an important change to the MDW5 SID climb gradient is easy to miss in the NOTAMs and should be highlighted in a more prominent area of their pre flight.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 635; Flight Crew Type 100

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was flying a peninsula tour to Crystal Springs reservoir; and then proceeding south to Stanford stadium via the Santa Cruz mountains (west of SQL) with two passengers. Prior to the flight; I had checked Sky Vector for any active TFRs as I usually do. There was a game that day at Stanford stadium; which I thought had ended; as it no longer showed up in a Sky Vector; and it was past the proposed end time. Typically; when there is a TFR over Stanford stadium we will stay at least 3 NM from the stadium and above 3;000 MSL; or we will take a different route entirely. However; this time I did not because to my knowledge the TFR was no longer active. As I was approaching the stadium at 2400 feet (well above Palo Alto's; PAO; airspace) I noticed that the stadium was still about half full of people. At that point I attempted to make a turn towards the south to try and put as much distance from my aircraft and the stadium as possible. I then contacted San Carlos tower for a clearance to approach and land on runway 30. It was after I landed that I was informed by San Carlos that Palo Alto tower wished for me to call a phone number in response to a possible pilot deviation. From what I have learned; the game may have gone into overtime or was in some other way extended; thereby rendering the TFR still active. Through my typical means of checking TFRs; I was unable to discover this prior to the flight.

PA28 pilot reports inadvertently entering a stadium TFR which had apparently been extended and did not show up on Sky Vector.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 1850

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

After we came out of the clouds there was a blinding sign 'sporting arena' that was so bright it was distracting and made it hard to discern runway lights until very close in. We were both surprised by its brightness and wondered how it could be legal by the FAA to have such a sign uncovered on the top.

Air carrier flight crew on approach to ORD had difficulty picking up the runway lights after breaking out of the clouds due to the sporting arena sign west of the airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181.52; Flight Crew Total 2352.30; Flight Crew Type 2352.30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after takeoff from ZZZ-ZZZ1 both flight deck and cabin crew members detected a mild smell of burning oil or engine exhaust. Smell lasted for approximately 3-4 minutes during climb; with the strongest smell in the aft galley area. There was no fire; smoke or mist present; only a strange smell of what I would classify as oil burning. The fumes did not increase and began to stabilize and finally decrease after a few minutes. The crew began the Smoke; Fire or Fumes checklist but the fumes decreased before the checklist could be completed. The cabin crew investigated all lavs; galleys; and PEDs for any source of fumes. Dispatch and Technical Support Maintenance Control were contacted via Commercial Radio and an ELB write up was made. Since the fumes ended and did not appear to emanate from within the cabin or flight deck; I opted to continue the flight to ZZZ1. The flight concluded uneventfully and a written Smoke/Fume Report was filed with ZZZ1 Maintenance. Subsequently; the Chief Pilot was verbally debriefed. The aircraft was removed from service upon arrival at ZZZ1.

B737 Captain reported a fumes event shortly after takeoff which dissipated after 3-4 minutes allowing flight to continue to its destination.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Upon our arrival into Calgary (CYYC); approach descended us to 5;500 MSL at least 15 miles out. They vectored us to a visual approach to Runway 16; and as we intercepted the LOC; we started a descent to 4;000 FT; believing that was the glide slope intercept altitude; which was; in fact; 4;800 FT. The visual cues from the wider than normal runway indicated we were possibly slightly low. We then got a 'too low; gear' warning and at approximately 600 FT RA; the gear was lowered and we intercepted the glide slope. The landing was normal and the weather conditions were VFR and clear. Approach descended us down far out and low. This; along with the wide runway; created visual cues that were non normal.

A319 Captain reports getting low during a visual approach to CYYC due to an early descent by ATC and the visual perception of the wide runway. The EGPWS sounds a gear warning at 600 FT; the gear is extended and the approach continued to landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 350

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 82; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While executing the Teterboro Eight SID our aircraft lost separation with traffic operating to/from EWR. The loss of separation was reported to the crew after the fact by an FAA inspector. At the time of the incident there was no indication given by TCAS or ATC that there was a traffic conflict of any kind. Winds at 1;500 FT were in excess of 60 KTS and may have contributed to the loss of separation.

During takeoff on Runway 24 at TEB; and during the initial climb on the TEB 8 SID; Runway 24; we encountered strong winds at both the surface level and during climb; along with light to moderate chop. The surface winds were approximately 290 degrees at 20-25 KTS and low level windshear was being advised. During our initial turn on the TEB 8; we noticed while leveling at 1;500 FT the winds were 300 degrees at approximately 35-40 KTS. We initiated our turn to a 280 degree heading as per the SID at the appropriate time. Due to strong wind conditions I am concerned we encroached on the EWR final corridor. At no time was there instance of a TA; RA; or an ATC advisory or alert. We continued on the departure procedure and were given a climb and a northwesterly turn almost immediately upon check in with N90 TRACON. The initial clearance from TEB Clearance Delivery was the RUUDY SID; however we requested; and received; the TEB 8 SID.

HS125 crew is informed after the fact by an FAA inspector of a loss of separation incident departing TEB on the TEB 8 SID.  Low level windshear and strong surface winds added to the crews workload during takeoff phase.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Preliminary information: The aircraft is a BE-9L with a 'Power 90' engine conversion STC. The engines are Walter M601 E-11s with Avia five bladed props. The preflight; start and taxi were all normal. During takeoff after rotation and initial climb with about 100 feet of altitude; gear retraction was initiated and bleed valves closed. As the right bleed valve was closed there was an audible sound of power loss and rapid yaw of the nose to the right. I returned my right hand to the yoke and applied rudder and aileron to maintain aircraft control as I simultaneously lowered the nose to maintain airspeed of 105 KIAS. I identified the loss of power; verified it and feathered the right propeller. Aircraft control was maintained straight ahead and the call made to Tower that I had an engine out and was returning to the field to land. Maintaining single engine climb speed; I was able to establish a shallow climb and a half standard rate turn into the good engine with left rudder trim applied and takeoff power still set on the left engine. At this point I finished securing the right engine. After communicating my intentions to land at the departure airport; I aligned with the centerline of the runway configured appropriately for a single engine landing. The landing was normal; braking was normal. I taxied the aircraft clear of the runway shut the left engine down and arranged to tow the aircraft to parking.Investigation by Maintenance determined that part of the throttle linkage of the right engine was inadvertently lubricated and made it possible for the throttle to 'snap' backward under normal takeoff conditions. This happened during the time after I had moved my hand from the throttles and right when I was setting the right bleed switch closed. The snapping back action of the right throttle was duplicated during full power run-ups and recorded by Maintenance. The gradual unexpected loss of power by throttle movement creeping aft is something I have seen throughout the years. This was not what happened. The throttle 'snapped back' in probably less than half a second. Compounding the situation was that with this engine STC the throttle travel from full power to idle is just a little less than a full knob width. I did not notice the aft travel of the right engine's throttle as I was leaning over the power quadrant to retract the gear and turn the bleed valves to close. My assumption was that the right engine had failed based on the rapid loss of thrust and yawing and audible power loss. As that would be the worst case I applied my training for the perceived situation. However; in doing so I inadvertently feathered and secured the right engine because of an unexpected uncommanded throttle movement. Maintenance will replace the parts of the linkage that were inappropriately lubricated. This should give normal throttle operation back to the right engine. The most difficult part of this situation was the requirement for quick decision-making and performance when an unexpected occurrence takes place in a critical phase of flight. The actions I took was a reversion to training. It put the aircraft in a position that I knew it would fly in. Unfortunately; that action was inappropriate. That action was performed well; but was unnecessary. This occurrence highlights for me that planning for every situation is impossible and that defaulting to what will work when time for troubleshooting is limited is useful.

A BE-9L 'Power 90' engine was shutdown and the flight returned to land after the throttle 'snapped' backward during takeoff. Maintenance discovered an incorrect part of BE-9L right engine throttle linkage was lubricated.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 4100

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Following a normal taxi and takeoff; the FO (PF) turned south and accelerated. He requested flaps up; then; upon passing slat retract speed; requested slats retract. As soon as the CA retracted the slats; we got the stick shaker and a Level 2 'Slats Disag' alert. The FO continued to fly the aircraft while the CA and I referred to the QRH Level 2 alert 'Slat Disag' checklist and then the 'Slats Disag' checklist. ATC had cleared us to 16;000 ft. We proceeded direct to the cleared waypoint and continued our climb to 16;000 ft; but we informed ATC that we had a problem and requested a final altitude of 16;000 ft with an entry into a holding pattern. We contacted Maintenance to discuss the problem; we contacted station Ops to let them know we would probably return. We also informed ATC that we would need to adjust our gross weight prior to landing. (We referred to the '28/RET Estimated Landing Distances - Slats Disag' chart in the 'Slats Disag' checklist to decide what gross weight to use for fuel dumping.) After completing the 'Slats Disag' checklist; and with permission from ATC; we referred to the Non-Alert 'Fuel Dump' checklist; and we reduced our gross weight to 460.0 lbs. After all checklists were complete; and after a thorough discussion of the approach and landing; we commenced our descent. The FO flew the approach and landing; using the 28/RET Approach Speeds with a configuration of 28/EXT. The approach was flown to a full stop; and we taxied to the ramp.

MD-11 SLAT DISAG alert was received during slat retraction after takeoff. The SLAT DISAG checklist was completed; fuel dumped; and the crew returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[We were] cleared to descend via the GEELA 6 RNAV arrival with a Runway 7R transition. Autopilot 1 had been engaged since leaving 500 FT MSL on departure. Wind during the descent was out of the southwest above 7;000-8;000 FT at an average of about 25 KTS. However; the velocity varied both up and down about 10 KTS during the descent. We crossed HYDRR Intersection at 16;000 FT (in the middle of the altitude window) and 270 KIAS (5 KIAS fast). We did slow to 250 KIAS by GEELA although I don't recall the altitude. The autopilot had the aircraft on the pink donut in the descent to 10;000 FT at PUNNT. I was a bit concerned about the speed since we were still indicating 250 KIAS. The PUNNT restriction also has a 230 KIAS speed restriction. I was considering using the speed brakes as I wasn't sure we would make BOTH 10;000 FT and 230 KIAS at PUNNT even though we were on the donut. I thought we might just be at a maximum of 240 KIAS and 10;000 at our current rate; so I felt no need to INTERVENE. However; at 10;500 FT the autopilot pitched the nose up; initiating the slowdown to 230 (I thought it was going to get to 10;000 and then slow down). Hence we crossed PUNNT at 10;500 (500 FT high) and 230 KIAS (on target speed). We had a slight quartering tailwind from the right at the time. In hindsight; there is not enough mileage between HYDRR and PUNNT to lose 6;000 or 7;000 FT AND slow up 35 KIAS. My old descent planning rule of thumb is 3 NM per 1;000 FT of altitude loss plus another 1 NM for every 10 KIAS in speed reduction required. There are 19.7 MN between the two intersections. Subtracting 3.5 NM for the required speed reduction means you only have 16.2NM for descent purposes. It is difficult (and not very efficient) to come down and slow down at the same time. If you cross HYDRR at 15;000 (the bottom of the envelope) you require a descent rate of 308 FT/NM. Crossing at 17;000 (the upper end of the envelope) ups the descent requirement to 432 FT/NM. I believe these are unrealistic numbers; even in calm air. Use the speedbrakes earlier if there is anything (altitude or airspeed) that is starting to stray on this arrival and runway transition. I know from plenty of experience that there are no problems when landing to the west with this RNAV arrival. This arrival should be re-engineered or thrown out.

A319 Captain reports missing the PUNNT crossing restriction on the GEELA 6 arrival to PHX. The FMGC had been properly programed and showed on path until 10;500 FT when the autopilot pitched the nose up to slow to the required 230 KTS and crossed PUNNT at that altitude.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 10

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

I was practicing takeoff and landings in the pattern with a Student. Our fifth approach around the pattern was normal and the Student actually made a nice three point landing; but shortly after touching down the aircraft veered to the left when the left tire popped. The Student reacted by applying hard right rudder which then caused the aircraft to quickly and sharply veer to the right which resulted in a ground loop off the runway; ending up in the grass. It happened so fast that by the time I was able to react with left rudder inputs it was too late and we were committed to the imminent ground loop. The Student and I were unhurt; but the aircraft sustained some damage to the landing gear strut; wing tip and tail wheel; plus a cracked windshield. The tires appeared to be in good condition; tread was good; no dry rot noticed and inflations looked good. The Student did say the tire that popped was about ten years old.  I think tail draggers are risky for teaching in and things can get bad very fast. I'm sticking to tricycle gear aircraft.

An Instructor pilot and his Student lost control of their aircraft when the left tire blew out during the landing roll.  A ground loop followed when the Student pilot overreacted and the aircraft exited the runway suffering damage to a wingtip; landing gear; tail wheel and windshield.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

I was asked to verify Serial/Part Numbers [S/N-P/N] of the Cargo Fire Bottle Squibs per Management request. Both serial and part numbers needing to be replaced were on the one fire bottle. My Lead told me to just change the whole fire bottle; therein replacing both fire bottle squibs in the process. I did all procedures for Repair and Replacement (R/R) in accordance with the AMM reference Chapter 26-25-01 and I did the Operational (Ops) Check of the Fire Bottle / Squib Test in accordance with AMM reference 26-25-00. All Ops Checks where good; when I performed them. However I was just informed by my Supervisor that [approximately] twenty days later; the [flight] crew reported the squibs failed their Preflight Check. Maintenance found both cannon plugs where off the squibs. Because I was the last documented person to work on the squibs/fire bottle; I want to say: As far as I can remember; I had all connections and Cannon plugs on and completely secured. Maybe I made a mistake somewhere along the way; but I cannot say with absolute certainty; as I cannot recall any mistakes that I made. As we are all human it is possible I missed a step; but I don't recall that; I am always very attentive to doing things the correctly. I was under pressure; I had one hour to complete this task prior to departure. I had never done this task before; and I don't think so; but I may have made a mistake under the pressure of getting the job done in time. Evening. Line Mechanic.

A Line Mechanic was informed that cannon plugs to the squibs on a Cargo Fire Bottle were found not connected on a CRJ-200 aircraft approximately twenty days after he had installed the fire bottle. Flight crew had reported the Squibs Test had failed during their Pre-flight Check.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were on an IFR flight plan; on a visual approach to runway 34; on a wide left base to final. I was using the ILS as a backup to the visual approach. I inappropriately armed the approach mode instead of the localizer mode; and when the glide slope needle started descending; I followed the flight director commands to descend.My copilot protested that something was wrong; and that I should not be descending any lower considering we were now at 800 feet AGL while still 5 miles from the runway. Immediately thereafter the control tower called and asked about our altitude.I immediately climbed back up to 1;500 feet AGL.We did not receive a Traffic Alert Warning System (TAWS) alert.After landing we discussed that the flight director must have captured a false glide slope; and that I should not have armed the approach mode before being established on the localizer.I believe that a contributing factor was complacency due to the visual conditions.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

FA10 flight crew reported descending to 800 feet AGL on a visual approach to FTW when the pilot flying followed a false glideslope.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 35; Flight Crew Type 35

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I landed on the runway and I heard the stall horn go off. I landed with the left main wheel first; then the right main wheel and then the front wheel. I applied brakes and lost control of the aircraft. I slid off the runway to a full stop. The right main wheel touched the grass; not sure about the other two wheels.

PA28 student pilot reported loss of directional control after landing that led to a runway excursion.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

This is a series of events involving the coyote problem on the field. Coyote observed on runway; Med evac on approach was issued a go around by Local Control. Security was summoned to chase the coyote off the field. A pilot on the ramp reported a coyote; security vehicle was summoned to chase the animal off the field. FAA Vehicle eastbound on taxiway reported a coyote just north of the approach end of the runway. The vehicle chased the animal into the treeline. Aircraft Y landed and reported almost hitting a coyote on landing roll; the animal cut right in front of him on the runway. A coyote was spotted near a taxiway near the runway. Security was summoned to chase the animal off the field. A coyote was spotted west of a runway; security was summoned to chase the animal off the field.This has been going on since last summer or fall. The population of coyotes is growing as we often see them in pairs or small groups now. Airport operations does not seem to be able to achieve the appropriate permissions to handle the situation; e.g. trap or shot; from the state or local government. This problem is getting progressively worse and aircraft safety is at risk daily.  The above list is a typical day of dealing with the coyote problem on the airport here. Get the presiding authority; whomever that may be; to issue the order to handle this escalating safety problem and capture or kill these animals before there is an accident.

FXE Tower Controller reported a recurring problem with coyotes. An aircraft was issued a go-around due to a coyote on the runway. A landing aircraft reported almost hitting a coyote on the runway.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

Captain [on flight XXX] called and said the ZZZ -ZZZ1 leg is delayed because ZZZ ramp unloaded some haz[Hazmat] meant for ZZZ1. When the ramp opened F1; it was full of freight not accounted for on the ZZZ2 -ZZZ [inbound flight] weight and balance. I contacted the Duty Officer; and she recommended the crew fill out a report and contact company. I confirmed that recovery was notified. Crew informed delay is so weight and balance can be fixed in ZZZ to account for the extra freight.

Air Carrier Dispatcher reported the Captain notified Dispatch that a flight delay was required to correct a Weight & Balance discrepancy. During the correction process the Hazmat cargo had to be moved to complete the Weight & Balance adjustment.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This report applies to multiple [CRJ-200] aircraft. In the past approx year there has been a noticeable change to the Thrust Lever Quadrant on most of the CRJ-200 fleet. I do not know if this is a result of a change in maintenance or if the aircraft are simply getting old; but it is potentially a huge safety issue. The throttles are much tighter /harder to move than they should be. In most cases the friction lock will not even move; if it does; it doesn't loosen the throttles at all. Whenever I have throttles like this the thrust reversers are almost always even tighter. In a few instances the thrust [reverser] levers are so tight that the only way I would be able to physically deploy them would be to intentionally injure my wrist (due to the strength that would be required). As we do not test the thrust reversers; this problem is not found until the landing roll. The threat [is] finding out that the thrust levers cannot be pulled at a time when you are counting on them; i.e. on a short or contaminated runway. Other crews do not write them up; because while they might seem tight; they are still able to deploy them. It does not occur to them that some would most likely find the reversers difficult to impossible to deploy.Maintenance needs to change the way they are inspecting and/or maintaining the throttle quadrant. I have flown this airplane eight years now; only recently has this been an issue.

A First Officer reports about a noticeable change to the force required to move the thrust levers; almost to the point of injury; on multiple CRJ-200 aircraft. Throttles are much tighter-harder to move and the friction lock most times does not move. Thrust Reversers are even tighter and cannot be pulled at a time when you are counting on them; such as; on a short or contaminated runway.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Total 1489; Flight Crew Type 321

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Training a student and while doing traffic pattern work the engine lost power due to the right tank running out of gas.  I told Tower that we had lost engine and then performed the restart procedure.  I was able to get power restored and reported to Tower that engine was running fine.Here is a recount of the chain of events.  I had flown with one of my other students in the evening (1 hour) and had ask the FBO to refuel plane the next morning due to the early closure due to COVID-19.  Upon returning the next morning to fly with another student that had about XX hours of instruction; I had student go out to plane and start the preflight. Student did the preflight and I came up when student was around on the left side of the plane and finished up the preflight with student.  I did not; however go back and check the right tank to make sure it was to the tabs.  We got in and started the engine and taxied out to the runway during the run up and engine check all the gauges seemed to indicate the normal amount settings including the fuel tanks.  We had flown about 1.2 hours when the incident happened and I immediately looked at the fuel tanks and noticed it was indicating empty.In assuming that the FBO had fueled the plane and that the student had performed a good preflight was my downfall; even though this had a good outcome it has opened my eyes to be vigilant in checking and making sure for myself that the preflight is done properly.  I will always do the preflight myself; even after my student has completed their check.

Instructor pilot reported not checking the fuel status before departure resulting in a temporary loss of power due to fuel starvation in one of the tanks.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 18335; Flight Crew Type 8317

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During descent we were advised of reported moderate turbulence below 20;000. As we already had seat belt sign on and airspeed of 270 for light turbulence on descent and being vectored for approach; first officer started slowing toward 250 and I informed flight attendants to take their seats. Continued descent from 27;000 to assigned altitude of 16;000 and at about 20;000 encountered moderate turbulence for about 2-3 minutes. At 4;000 feet and on final first flight attendant called cockpit to inform us that a crewmember in aft galley had not gotten to his seat and fell hurting his ankle and requested we call for paramedics.Paramedics met the aircraft and decided to take the injured flight attendant to hospital for X-rays. As of this report I do not know if he had a sprain; ligament tear or hair line fracture to his left ankle. He stated that he went up and came down on ankle in turbulence. He has to stay at the layover for 10 days until released back to duty. Weather was VMC and no aircraft in front of us and we had just passed a mountain range.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A flight encountered moderate turbulence during descent. One flight attendant was injured.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 18000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was the Pilot Flying on this flight and I will comment on what I remember. This whole incident literally lasted seconds from beginning to end. Shortly after departure we were given a 050 heading off the Departure and then given DIRECT to ZZZZZ intersection to join the SID and climb to 17;000 FT. Passing 8000 FT we received a TCAS alert for traffic at 9000 FT and 3 to 5 miles at our 11 position. Immediately ATC instructed us to maintain 8000 FT; which we replied that we were already passing 8600 FT and would descend to 8000 FT. I began the descent immediately and shortly received an RA. I turned off all automation and complied with the RA. I remember hearing 'Maintain Vertical Speed' during the descent. I did not descend to 8000 FT because my First Officer; the PM (Pilot Monitoring) had the corporate aircraft in sight and the RA was not telling us to. I maintained altitude as I saw the traffic pass below us from left to right. I remember the TCAS display showed the traffic 300 FT below us. The PM told ATC we had traffic in sight and was past us. I queried ATC about giving us a descent to 8000 FT where the traffic was. ATC said he was at 9000 FT. The traffic was certainly not at 9000 FT because we were at 8300 FT and he passed under us. TCAS certainly saved us this day. We assume the TCAS in the other aircraft was giving him a descend RA; since we were climbing but ATC gave us the descend; which probably made their TCAS descend them faster. The contradiction in TCAS RAs and ATC instructions certainly had us in the 'Red.' We were given a frequency change to Center and continued to destination. We ACARS'd a message to Dispatch as immediate notification but received no response. I called Dispatch by Phone.

Climbing out [via the SID]; assigned 17;000 FT; and passing 8000 FT; we received a TA for traffic 900 FT above us. We started looking for traffic. Moments later ATC told us to 'maintain 8000 FT;' By the time his transmission finished we were 8500 FT plus. As I was responding; the PF (Pilot Flying) started a pushover to comply with ATC directions. I responded '(call sign) descending 8600 FT for 8000 FT [RA went off] now responding to TCAS RA.' As I recall; the alert went off after we had started pushing over. The RA display on the ADI was the red chevron on the bottom pointing up. I heard MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED. PF was pushing the nose over when the RA went off and had to pull the nose back up to place the ADI wings on top of the chevron. The Navigation Display showed the target about 11 o'clock; 2NM; 200 FT low. I picked up the traffic; called it out to the PF and then clarified don't descend. As the traffic passed below us approximately 300 FT; I called back to ATC that the traffic was past us now. We queried the altitude of the traffic to which ATC responded he was at 9000 FT. We were dumbfounded at that point because he was below us and we were below 9000 FT. We then got a frequency change and started to try to sort out what had happened. Our only guess is that the other aircraft's TCAS told them to descend while ours told us to climb. During the fray; we heard ATC tell them to climb to 10;000 FT immediately; but we never heard their response. The conflicting instructions (ATC versus TCAS) put a lot of fog in the situation. I'm glad we both followed TCAS.It was very difficult in the moment to discern what was going on and where the safe path was. Everything happened so fast. ATC was trying their hardest to keep us under the other aircraft while TCAS (and our momentum) was trying to get us above them. Ultimately; it came down to following procedure (comply with TCAS RA versus ATC) that kept us out of harm's way. We can keep our scan up both on the ND and outside; but need to realize that these things develop very quickly.

B737 flight crew reported that while ATC asked them to descend and maintain altitude; TCAS told them to 'CLIMB' for traffic. TCAS and ATC were in disagreement.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Heavy snow on arrival; landing and taxi in okay. Gate area was partially plowed; however when given stop signal by line person the aircraft continued moving. Both pilots applied full braking and parking brake was set to no avail. Cycled reverse thrust several times to stop aircraft. Managed to stop before hitting any ground gear. Airport was completely covered in snow; weather was low Runway Visual Range around 2500-3000ft. All surfaces very slick. We were moving very slowly and deliberately; obviously the ramp area was much slicker than I anticipated. Should have tried stopping before the signal.

Air Carrier pilot reported braking did not stop their aircraft while parking at a snow covered gate so they applied reverse thrust to stop the aircraft.


During a ferry flight of aircraft due to #2 VHF radio failure; upon being vectored on a heading of 120 degrees to intercept the ILS at ZZZ we loss radio contact due to failure of #1 VHF radio. We maintained our assigned heading and altitude until ILS intercept and set the transponder to 7600. At 400 FT AGL we were able to contact the Tower briefly and received a landing clearance. Upon exiting the runway we attempted to contact Tower and Ground without success. We observed light gun Tower signals to cross the intersecting runway and to taxi to the ramp. The Captain contacted the Tower by phone to follow up. As we discovered upon and talking to the Tower by phone after landing; they  could hear us the entire time.

The pilots of a Challenger 300 experienced the apparent loss of the second VHF radio during a maintenance ferry flight for one radio failure. After landing the flight crew was advised that the Tower was receiving their transmissions; but they could not hear the Tower.


ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X was an [inbound for the] arrival. The aircraft entered our airspace from sector 89 but was a point out from 90 to sector 89. Sector 90 was the Sector that talked to the aircraft prior to entry into our sector. Ten miles north of ZZZ VOR; Aircraft X was still on Sector 90's frequency; reported severe turbulence in level flight at FL350. The Pilot communicated to Sector 46 that there were possible injuries to both the passengers and the crew and was waiting to hear word from the cabin if there were any injuries onboard. The radar controller gave Aircraft X direct to ZZZ airport and a descent to 13;000 feet. The Supervisor was notified. I coordinated with [the TRACON] to pass along what the pilot had told us and that he was direct to ZZZ airport. There were areas of moderate to extreme precipitation spanning the entire western portion of sector 46 and most of the northern portion during the event.

Center Controller reported a CRJ encountered severe turbulence with possible injuries.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Type 138

Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Taxi in on B attempted to make a left turn onto C[X] and LAX vehicle; a pickup pulled in front of aircraft causing me to slam on the brakes. Vehicle subsequently had to back up to clear the taxiway. My taxi light was on and I was abeam the vehicle and starting my left turn when they pulled out in front of us.

Air carrier Captain reported a conflict with an airport truck while taxiing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 1250; Flight Crew Type 1050

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on an evening flight with a co-worker and on my way back to ZZZ; where I live and my plane is kept; I called out on CTAF at 4 miles and again at 2 miles; that I was inbound for that airport. No other aircraft responded nor was there any calls of any activity at that airport.All of a sudden in front of me at no more than a quarter mile was the blue and gray ultralight/light sport aircraft that has been flying out of a neighbor's property on ZZZ. He was at about 1250-1300 ft. flying directly east after take off. Then a transmission came over frequency 'Don't worry Aircraft X; I will get out of your way'. I turned right to be sure not to hit him as he went off to my left and up. He had no navigation lights on; but being right in front of my vision; I had no trouble seeing him as it was still sunny and clear out.At this point I was on right downwind. My partner on the ground radioed that 'The crazy idiot with the little plane is up so be sure to look out for him'. Too late; we'd already had too close of an encounter. I landed my plane safely and saw that plane land too. I intend to go talk to him about his unsafe practices that I have been witnessing in addition to this event. He is a danger to himself and others. He takes off in winds too strong for his craft and weather that I wouldn't even dare fly in. A neighboring pilot watched him disappear into clouds not far above the airport just a few weeks ago. He is a disaster that will happen. He has purchased a aircraft and is getting it ready to fly. That will be a major disaster for certain. I do not even know if this fellow; even has a license of any sort.I lost my father in a mid-air collision because someone was flying inappropriately at an airport and without their radio on. Dad must have been looking out for me last night.

Pilot reported a NMAC on final to home airport with someone in an ultralight/sport aircraft that has been a nuisance around the area.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During the climb-out about 4;500 feet N1 on Engine 1 decreased about 6-8%. The power change was noticed immediately and then power returned to requested N1. The First Officer and I discussed the uncommanded power reduction change and checked EICAS; other indications were normal. We noted the change and said we would keep an eye on it. Then [we noted] EICAS message 'Engine 1 rev disagree' on EICAS for a second or two and then EICAS screen went blank. I felt a power loss and then I reduced the thrust on Number 1 because I was concerned with the EICAS message I had seen. The EICAS screen then came back on and [we] saw 'Engine 1 out' then message cleared and [we] had 'Engine 1 rev disagree' on EICAS. At this time we referred to the QRH 'Engine rev disagree' and performed the procedure. We notified ATC of [our] Emergency and leveled off. We continued to run QRC procedures; which resulting in us shutting down the Number 1 engine. We briefed the Flight Attendant and asked ATC to notify [our] company. We also confirmed with ATC that they would have emergency equipment standing by. We chose [the appropriate runway] for winds.  We had ATC vector us until we were ready for the approach. We continued to run checklist as directed by the QRH.  I informed the passengers that we would be returning to [departure airport]. After landing and informing ATC we would not need emergency assistance we exited the runway and stopped and called the Flight Attendant; [told her] everything was fine; then informed her we would be taxiing to the gate. After arriving at the gate and parking pulled the CVR CB. The First Officer and I were communicating throughout the trip and today when we really need to work as a team it paid off. [This] demonstrates how important it is to continually work on crew communication skills. Errors: we made mistakes on verbiage; callouts of checklist; and somehow we overlooked or missed the crossfeeding consideration on the QRH communication or checklist error. Due to this; we did get a fuel imbalance message at which time we did start crossfeeding. We landed within limitations. To improve performance; I will review QRH on a more regular basis and pay more attention to proper verbiage and continue to work on my communication skills.

The high workload that occurred at the realization of an engine failure was one of the biggest threats in this incident. Multiple targets in the vicinity of [the airport] were also a factor as ATC had to vector us around from the North to the visual.

EMB-145LR flight crew reported losing Number 1 engine shortly after takeoff. Engine was shut down; emergency declared; and a safe return to departure airport was executed.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Taxi; Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Flight Attendant (FA) A did not follow proper procedure arming his door and also when we arrived at the gate to have the agent open the door. He also continuously pulls his face mask away from his face when speaking and has trouble keeping it over his nose. Not sure how we can expect customers to comply with the face mask policy when the purser cannot comply.Arming the door: he started by putting the girt bar in the brackets; not putting the red streamer over the window.  When we arrived at the gate: he disarmed the door and soon after he cracked the door; before the jet bridge was even pulled up to the plane! Then when the gate agent was not opening the door FA A became frustrated. The gate agent was very confused and I could tell he wanted to address the issue but chose not to. Someone needs to go over door procedures and proper face mask wearing with FA A.

Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported that a Flight Attendant did not use correct procedures arming and disarming the aircraft door. In addition; the Flight Attendant did not follow face mask policy.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

I was notified that I apparently flew our aircraft four legs with jack pads installed from a previous maintenance event.  The aircraft in question had been in that station for approximately 3 weeks and was located in the hangar when we arrived that morning.  After requesting the aircraft be towed out of the hangar; I proceeded to accomplish a review and conduct a day one aircraft inventory.  Gear pins were left in and the aircraft was towed out of the hangar and placed on line in front of the FBO.  A review of the aircraft log showed numerous write-ups and sign-offs for a myriad of discrepancies; none of which left the impression that the airplane had been jacked up off the ground using the jack-pads.  A pre-flight walk around was conducted by the First Officer as well as the removal of the gear pins.  A pre-departure walk around was completed by me prior to departing.  A post flight walk-around; another pre-departure and again another post-flight walk-around was again completed upon arrival at our destination where I was relieved by a Captain.  The jack-pads were not seen/identified during any of these procedures by any of the crew members that day.  I am unaware of when and how the jack-pads were detected.  Inadequate Pre; Post Flight walkaround inspections by crew members.  I am disappointed and upset at myself for not seeing the jack-pads during my time operating the aircraft.  All crew members should complete a more thorough Pre; Post Flight Walkaround.  Paying more attention to the less obvious areas of the underside of the aircraft.  A maintenance log entry indicating the installation of the jack-pads and subsequent sign-off would help prevent this situation from occurring again in the future.

Notified that Aircraft X was found with 3 jack pads installed from previous maintenance performed unknown to me after the fact. Four legs were flown. Captain said he was checking aircraft in hangar and completed inventory check. Next morning departed after preflight and did not notice jack pads attached nor was I even aware of where jack pads would be attached. Emphasis was on wheels and brakes and general airframe condition.Suggestions - Have both crew aware of what type maintenance is accomplished and quality control of maintenance facilities performing work. Show where jack pads would be attached at and how it can easily be overlooked after even cursory walkaround inspections during multiple legs.

Challenger 300 flight crew reported flying four legs with jack pads still attached from previous maintenance.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

After submitting a write up; company requested Captain to contact maintenance. To avoid a call to contract maintenance; Captain was given verbal instructions over the phone to complete an MEL procedure. Verbal instructions were to pull circuit breakers and apply M-74C and M-74B stickers to the appropriate areas on the aircraft. At no time was the Captain instructed to collar the circuit breakers. 1.5 hours later; Captain remembered the circuit breakers were never pushed in again or collared under the direction of Maintenance Control. Upon referencing the MEL; the Captain found the circuit breakers were supposed to be pulled and collared. Captain contacted maintenance to advise the oversight. Attempts were also made to advise the next crew taking the aircraft in the morning to ensure the collars were in place prior to flight. [Causes include] Maintenance Control not advising of the complete MEL procedure. Not using contract maintenance to complete a maintenance procedure. Contributing factor was having a Captain complete an MEL procedure under direction of Maintenance Control. Because Captain terminated the aircraft; and there were no further flights for the night; no reference to MEL manual was made. Only guidance Captain used was through Maintenance Control. Captain should read through the MEL manual even when under Maintenance Control and terminating an aircraft that will not fly until the next day. Do not rely on Maintenance Control to provide all the details to an MEL procedure. Allow contract maintenance to complete a deferral to ensure to it [is] completed correctly.

CRJ-700 Captain reported deviation from MEL deferral procedure as guided by company maintenance.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.0

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An aircraft entered New York's non-radar airspace; without coordination. I took responsibility for the position a few minutes before the aircraft reached the boundary between Miami ARTCC and New York ARTCC's non-radar airspace. During the position relief briefing the controller being relieved did not mention that the aircraft had not been coordinated; and the flight strip was laid flat. I did not catch it during the relief briefing because it was among many other strips for aircraft northbound that had been coordinated; I did not look in detail at each individual strip during the briefing. My focus was mainly looking at the far opposite corner from where the aircraft was; due to the major weather deviations. I also had briefed the previous controller; that he would need to pass an estimate to New York once the aircraft entered our airspace; because I had briefed the previous controller I had a false assurance that the estimate had already been passed. As soon as I sat down after assuming responsibility for the position; I started to verify that all New York airspace bound aircraft were at their coordinated altitudes. At that time I noticed that the aircraft had not been coordinated with New York; I immediately called the New York sector to coordinate; now about 1 minute from the boundary. New York did not answer the line; after calling multiple times another sector for New York picked up the line and told me that the controller was on another line and he would call me back. I told the controller that I needed to pass an estimate on an aircraft at the boundary; and he replied again that the other controller would call me back; at which point I hung up the line. We were no longer in contact with the aircraft at this time; because the radar controller had terminated radar service and switched the aircraft to Commercial Radio frequencies prior to me assuming the radar assist position. The New York controller called back after the aircraft was approximately 30 miles inside their airspace; the Radar Controller talked to the controller because I was on another line with another facility at the time. The New York controller told the Radar Controller that we had an airspace deviation because New York did not receive an estimate; and the New York controller said he had no paperwork for the flight. The Radar Controller was under the assumption that we did not have to coordinate these special flights with New York due to the paperwork that is distributed to all facilities involved with the operation. He thought New York already knew the aircraft was entering back into their airspace at approximately that time; so he did not think an estimate needed to be passed to New York before he had terminated radar service and switched the aircraft to Commercial Radio frequencies before I sat down.In the short time I have been at the facility I have learned that there are constant issues with all of the Hurricane Hunter/Weather Recon aircraft. There is a great amount of confusion between all the controllers; supervisors; and the aircraft pilots; as to what procedures are required and what is required of the pilots and controllers during operations. I think there should be outlined specific procedures outlined for operations; outlining what is expected of the pilots and what is expected of the controllers during hurricane/weather recon operations.

A weather research flight came from New York ARTCC into Miami ARTCC direct latitude/longitude fixes just south of the boundary then turned back to the boundary then back to the southeast into New York ARTCC all within 15 minutes. The pilot checked in with me about 10 minutes I think after crossing southbound. I got busy with other deviations around and had several reports of moderate turbulence. The aircraft went back into New York ARTCC airspace with no estimate being passed from Miami to New York. There was paperwork at the sectors with exactly what he was doing. When I realized that the aircraft was crossing into New York airspace without an estimate; I told my Radar Assist to call but New York was too busy to answer the phone; finally after the aircraft was 20 miles inside their airspace; New York answered and said that they had no paperwork on the flight and we had violated their airspace.When there are [weather research] flights flying every facility involved should have paperwork.

ARTCC Controller reported relieving a position; but did not initially catch that an aircraft had not been coordinated with its next ARTCC. The error was caught only a minute before the aircraft crossed the boundary and the receiving ARTCC Controller could not be contacted before the aircraft crossed the boundary resulting in an airspace deviation.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

At cruise passing TRM we had a discontinuity in [the] FMC routing which resulted in a slight course deviation. ATC issued a turn due to possibly nearing a restricted area. Shortly after ATC cleared us direct NWN.Be aware of distractions by gate personnel during prefight route check. Better crew monitoring and crew coordination in the future.

A B737 flight crew reported a route discontinuity due to improper preflight checks. ATC detected the track deviation and issued new clearance.


Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

We flew to SUS; the weather in SUS was 1600 OVC per the ATIS; but when we got closer during the descent we saw the airport. It was clear surrounding the airport. The Pilot Monitoring mentioned that the airport was visible beyond 'those very bright lights.' I looked up and saw the airport; and indeed an area of extremely bright; white lights. Because the lights were so close to the airport; we were taken by surprise; and wondered about what that could be; and why any facility would need that many bright lights. We reported the airport in sight; and received a visual clearance from ATC. When switched to the Tower; we received a landing clearance. I engaged the APP mode; to lessen my workload; and we intercepted the final course and glideslope. When we were aligned with the runway; the full extent of those bright lights hit us. It was horrible! Completely unsafe. These lights were bright outside proportion and extremely distracting. We both commented on the brightness again; and then I briefed the Pilot Monitoring that I was going to keep my head down and inside; focused on the instruments; so that I would not have to look outside into the lights. They were interfering with my night vision and disrupting our final approach. The Pilot Monitoring kept looking outside; and he commented that the lights were so bright that they unwittingly made him look at them even though he did not want to. After we passed the area; I was finally able to look back outside at the runway. The landing was fine and uneventful. When we were taxiing I told the Pilot Monitoring that I was taking the radio for a minute. I then asked the SUS Tower if he had time for a question. I asked what the area of bright lights were; and the Tower informed us that those were the lights at a golf facility. He asked if they were distracting and we said yes; extremely so. The Tower also informed us that apparently there were multiple reports filed on this. So obviously we were not the only ones bothered by those lights.Something has to be done about this. It is surprising to me that such a facility was allowed to be build right in the final flight path. The lights are extremely distracting. They interfere with the night vision; they interfere with the safety of flight itself. Because in our case we were discussing the lights and their location and we briefed how we were going to proceed; at a phase of flight where we are not even supposed to be speaking unless it's SOP. The flight conditions were VMC; but I wonder on a night where there is fog; or a very low ceiling; how the light will break through the moisture and reflect in the cockpit. In our opinion these lights are dangerous and could potentially lead to worse distraction.

Corporate Jet Captain reported the lights from a Golf Range on short final were very distracting and unsafe.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 200

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were in the traffic pattern at 1;300 FT on downwind for Runway 16. At midfield I noticed an aircraft crossing in front of us approximately 50-100 FT above me and 300 FT ahead of my aircraft heading approximately due west across midfield at the time of event.The aircraft was a Cessna single engine high wing retractable; possibly a C210 or C177. I did not see a tail number. I would estimate the aircraft was traveling at approximately 150 KTS.We were working on UNICOM frequency; making normal announcements in the traffic pattern. We did not hear any other aircraft on UNICOM. We confirmed the radio to be working properly when another aircraft announced their intentions for landing a short time later.Aircraft did not appear to notice our aircraft in close proximity and did not appear to take any evasive action.

An Aeronca pilot in the pattern at a non-towered airport suffered an NMAC with a Cessna apparently crossing over the airport at cruise. The reporter heard no associated CTAF reports.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 300

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

A foreign pilot from the United Kingdom requested an aircraft checkout in a light training aircraft at my FBO. I was the instructor conducting this aircraft checkout. The pilot in this report told me he converted his certificate to a U.S. PPL by visiting a FSDO office; there were no additional training or testing requirements. He has only held his U.S. PPL for 15 months.  During the checkout; the pilot informed me he had never been trained on power off stalls; power on stalls; or steep turns. He demonstrated his understanding of slow flight principles to a marginal degree; but he could not set up or recover from a stall. When it came to steep turns; he refused to bank more than 25 degrees. None of these tasks were performed anywhere close to U.S. private pilot standards.Returning to the airport from the South; the tower controller instructed us to enter a midfield left downwind to Runway 23. We were still 2 miles South of the airport and had not yet entered the pattern when the pilot descended us to an unsafe altitude of 300 feet AGL. Prior to reaching this altitude; I had been asking him to climb and return to pattern altitude. He was not responding to my requests. I finally took the controls and climbed us back to pattern altitude.  Before this low altitude issue; we had discussed that the U.S. standard traffic pattern was 1;000 AGL; which is apparently what is also used in the U.K.; according to the pilot. When he told me the standard procedure in the U.K. was to set the altimeter to read 0 feet while on the ground; I reiterated the importance of remembering to use MSL altitudes here. I reiterated the MSL pattern altitude at our airport.  300 ft AGL is 900 feet MSL at this particular airport. I am concerned that the pilot may have reverted to his U.K. procedure of descending to 1;000 feet indicated; forgetting that our altimeters are calibrated to read airport elevation when on the ground. This possibly led us to being at approximately 900 feet MSL / 300 feet AGL before I took the controls. I am concerned that this could be a more widespread issue. This scenario could have easily ended in a CFIT or other serious incident or accident. I recommend the FAA reevaluate its process for converting foreign private pilot certificates. The idea that a foreign-based private pilot can so easily obtain a U.S. PPL; despite never having been trained in major private pilot maneuvers including stalls; concerns me.

C152 instructor pilot reported his UK-trained student descended to 300 feet AGL in the pattern because of differences in altimeter setting procedures.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

On takeoff roll; I was pilot-flying. While making minor corrections to maintain centerline; I started to notice the heel of my left shoe was rubbing the floor underneath the rudder pedals. I didn't remember that ever happening before; so I thought it was odd; but thought maybe I had just positioned my feet a little bit lower than usual on the rudder pedals; so I tried to slide my feet up the rudder pedals as much as I could without putting pressure on the toe brakes. The movement of the pedals was initially unrestricted; but somewhere; maybe 20 knots (purely a guess) below V1/VR; I applied a slight left rudder correction that I was unable to take back out. The airplane started to steer left of the centerline and I was initially unable to correct it; so I got pretty excited; and started to pull my left foot out of my shoe while snapping my right foot down to try to get some right rudder input in. That worked and the plane steered right; over-correcting a little bit; and I was able to get the plane back on centerline. It all happened very quickly; and about that time; we are at V1/VR; and under control so I rotated normally. When my foot got stuck; I think I said some kind of expletive; but it happened so quickly; I didn't really have time to understand the situation; much less to coherently state the situation to the captain. In retrospect; if I had been expecting it; or if the nose wheel would've gone more than a foot or two off of the centerline; I would've tried to say 'my foot's stuck; abort' --but by the time I processed what was happening; we were back under control; and ready to rotate. We got a few feet left of centerline; no more than on really gusty day; but the momentary loss of directional control was quite disconcerting. Once in the air; at a safe altitude; I started to talk over what had happened with the captain and I realized that the metal kick plate below the left rudder pedal was not secured to the floor and it was curved upward at its forward end; kind of like a skateboard quarter pipe. The kick plate was attached to the carpet; but the carpet was not attached to the structural floor of the aircraft. It was not readily apparent that anything was out of the ordinary because there was no gap between the kick plate and the carpet; even though the forward edge of the plate curved to be about 1.5 inches (again; purely a guess) above the structural floor. My heel slid easily forward; up the subtle bend; but got jammed when I tried to slide it back out. The captain and I both agreed that the most prudent thing to do was to transfer the controls to the captain and allow him to fly the approach and landing; to eliminate the possibility of having a similar incident on landing roll-out.I think the primary threat was that the kick plate was not properly secured and had become bent instead of being flat. My height is a contributing factor--I normally move the rudder pedals just about as far forward as they will go. A shorter pilot; or someone who doesn't adjust the rudder pedals so far forward would probably never notice the bent kick plate; because the rudder travel would not be sufficient enough to get past the forward edge of the kick plate. I think not immediately vocalizing my situation to the captain could have been an error; but I honestly wasn't sure what my situation was. I can definitely be more vigilant in checking the area around the rudder pedals and ensuring adequate clearance. I think the way we conduct aborted takeoffs works well; and I would not suggest changing any of the company procedures.

CRJ900 First Officer reports getting his foot caught on the metal skid plate under the rudder pedals during takeoff; causing a momentary loss of directional control. The plate was attached to the carpet but the carpet was not attached to the floor and foreword end of the plate was bent up allowing it to catch on the reporters' heel.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Type 9490

I was recently dispatched from [a West Coast airport] on a northern random route to Paris. The B767 was fueled with Jet A; which has a minimum temperature limit of -37 degrees C. The coldest enroute fuel temperature from the flight plan remarks the dispatcher gave us was -38 degrees C; lower than our limit. This essentially required us to ignore the speeds and altitudes we were forecast to fly in order to keep our fuel temperature above the limit. The SAT at 64N on our route of flight actually reached -70 degrees C; pretty darn cold. If [we are] going to fly these northern latitudes in this aircraft; it needs to provide the aircrews with some minimum polar training; equip the aircraft with a polar suit in the event of a diversion (how will the first officer do a walk around in minus 26 degrees; which was the temperature at one of our diversion alternates; CYYQ?); and provide aircrews with the minimum fuel freeze point for the fuel loaded. The operation as currently conducted is not entirely safe.

International Air Carrier B767 Captain reported he was concerned about the safety of his airline's operations in the far Northern routes to Europe.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

On right downwind to land on XXL at ZZZ; Tower offered a tight visual approach to avoid traffic. We accepted the approach and the Captain immediately turned off the autopilot and hand flew the visual approach; intercepting final just inside the final approach fix. We accomplished all checklists and configured the aircraft for a stable approach. After landing; we noticed that the landing light was turned off and realized we were still on approach frequency. We exited the runway; contacted Ground and apologized for the mistake. Looking back at the event; I don't believe we were ever instructed to contact the Tower. Failure to ensure we were on the correct frequency. I would develop a personal habit of checking the nose taxi light for verification of landing clearance prior to making the 'stable and cleared to land' call out.

On right downwind to land on XXL at ZZZ; Tower offered us a tight visual approach to avoid traffic in the approach corridor. We were daylight VMC in a good position to accept the approach but it would be tight. We accepted and I immediately turned off the automation and hand flew the visual approach because we were going to turn final inside the Final Approach Fix and to automate that would have been more difficult. My FO did a great job of monitoring my approach while configuring on speed; accomplishing the checklist; and making all the call outs. The approach and landing was stable; on profile and without any deviations. After landing; I was about to call for the after landing checklist and noticed the nose gear light switch was off then looked to see that we were still on approach frequency. We contacted Ground who was also Tower and apologized for our mistake and asked if there was any problem. I don't believe that we were ever handed off and approach was busy with the traffic that was maneuvering in the corridor. Controller said it was no problem at all and proceed via taxi instructions.This was my third leg of the night and my 6th in 2 days due to substitution. It was also the third straight night of over 1 hour delays at ZZZ1. Add in 3 straight nights of thunderstorms and landing late in the morning daylight after a long night and fatigue was an issue. I almost always touch the nose gear switch at the cleared to land call but the tight approach and hand flown operation caused me to not physically check the switch. I don't think we were handed off but it was still my responsibility to verify the landing clearance. The FO PM was swamped with a last minute runway change and unexpected tight visual approach in hill covered terrain. He did a great job of monitoring but missed that he had not been cleared when he made the cleared to land call because of the rushed nature of the approach.Realize that in the current environment of COVID for our particular operations that fatigue is going to play increased role. Identify and verbalize the increased risk associated with what feels like a never ending peak environment and be more aware of the need to use the fatigue call when necessary. I don't feel that the choice to accept a tighter than normal approach was unsafe but to increase my awareness of the heavier load that I placed on the PM.

Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors

The company needed to pull record numbers of aircraft out of service because of COVID-19 reduced loads by about XX%. Because of that the towing team has been inundated with work. We have planes parked in remote areas across the entire airport that were not designed for aircraft storage. I could almost justify it if these were one time moves for planes being parked long term; but as it turns out we seem to be rotating about YY% of them in and out of service a couple times a week. The places we are working in do not have lead in lines or stop marks for any of aircraft types so we are forced to use our best judgment on what safe distance is between aircraft; and where to stop them. There is no standard operating procedure on how much space there has to be between aircraft so we are winging it as best we can. Instead of following taxi [lines] or lead in lines that were orchestrated for the safe movement of aircraft; we are having to choose cracks in the concrete to use as a reference in the hopes that it will give us the clearances that we need to reach our destination safely. We are working shorthanded about ZZ% of the time. I understand the company needs to cut costs. I do find it a bit odd that we do not even have a safety advocate in times like these when we probably need them most. We had one prior to COVID; but [the individual] has since been put back on the team numbers to move planes. We do have safety procedures in place that work really well in conventional times; but nothing we are doing now could be considered conventional. It would be nice to have an advocate we could turn to for advice and concerns. The warning system is in place in all our tugs and are always used by the drivers and observers; but with our increased workloads we are using setup crews to help reduce the time it takes for each move and they don't have the warning systems at their disposal until the aircraft has arrived.

Ground employee reported large numbers of aircraft are being moved in and out of storage without proper procedures in place.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

[Date]; Aircraft X CLT/ZZZ; Scheduled XA:30 UTC. At the Gate1) During passenger boarding.a. Lead F/A (Flight Attendant) was given a safety brief. Included with the brief was a request to maintain good communication with the flight crew on any matters. Further; instruction was given to the Lead F/A to step back from any passenger problems while at the gate and engage the Gate Agent to handle the passenger problem.b. Near the completion of boarding the Lead F/A came to the flight deck to inform the crew that two passengers boarded the aircraft with alcohol. Passengers were engaged by another flight attendant; not the Lead; and denied that they had alcohol. Lead F/A advised that the alcohol beverages had spilled. Flight crew and Lead F/A agreed to a plan to resolve the matter. Passengers complied with instructions and remained onboard.2) During Push Back from Gate Xa. Flight crew worked through preflight preparations; including a review of performance data for [Runways] 18C and 18L. During FMC programming flight crew determined that a new [set of performance data] had been generated removing data for 18L; the most probable runway for departure. New performance data was updated via ACARS for 18L and was reviewed by the flight crew and programmed into the FMC. MEL XX-XX was reviewed. All other preflight preparations were completed per company policies; procedures and flows. Load close-out was received at the gateb. Flight crew called Ramp [name] for a clearance from Gate X and received clearance to push back. Ground crew declined to push the aircraft from Gate X due to conflict with aircraft in the ramp alley. First Officer discussed the push clearance with Ramp [name] and was assured the clearance to push was valid and that aircraft were not in conflict as the other aircraft were from the adjacent concourse. Ground crew was advised and still refused to push the aircraft. Another inquiry was made to Ramp [name] and push clearance was rescinded.c. Conflict aircraft from adjacent concourse departed the ramp. Ramp [name] re-cleared the aircraft to push from [Gate] X. Ground crew complied with the push back clearance. Two engines were started in the ramp alley. Ground crew received a wave off/salute. After start flows and checklist were accomplished. Out time XB:31 local/XA:31 UTC. d. Captain and First Officer used headsets and discussed abnormally high side tone volume on the INT function with MIC selected. Various adjustments were made to set appropriate communication volume3) Taxi from Gate X to Runway 18La. First Officer issued a request to taxi. Ramp [name] issued a multiple part clearance. (Taxi south line; Spot XXS; caution for pushback on [neighboring gate]; contact Ramp East 129.225 at Spot XXS). The clearance from Ramp [name] clearance was given rapidly and muffled. A second request was made for a taxi clearance/confirmation. Clearance was heard and understood by both crew members. Aircraft proceeded to XXS.b. Approaching XXS; First Officer contacted Ramp [name2]. Ramp [name 2] responded with a clearance to taxi to [Spot] XXS and contact Ground at  [spot] XXS. Captain verbally reviewed triggers with First Officer for Before Take Off Flow and advised that a flight control check would commence on Taxiway C. Approaching [spot]  XXS Ground Control issued a clearance to taxi [Taxiways] Mike; Charlie; hold short C10 for [Runway] 18L. First Officer replied to Ground Control and Captain responded to the First Officer repeating the clearance with emphasis to Hold Short of C10. The taxi route was continuous without stops or delays. Numerous aircraft were on Taxiway C and positioned at various ramp location spots adjacent and parallel too Taxiway C. Two aircraft were positioned facing south at Spot XYE. The aft positioned aircraft at XYE had its landing/taxi lights illuminated while stationary.c. Flight control checks were initiated on Taxiway C prior to C10. During the initiation of the elevator check as the First Officer was verbalizing elevator position; Ground Control re-issued the taxi clearance to hold short of [Taxiway] C11. Flight control checks were discontinued; the taxi clearance was accepted and responded too by the First Officer. The Captain repeated and verbalized the clearance to the First Officer with emphasis to hold short of C11. Flight Control checks were re-initiated by the Captain. At full aft elevator the First Officer verbalized the elevator position simultaneously as Ground Control re-issued a clearance to continue to [Runway] 18L. The First Officer read back the clearance. The Captain repeated the clearance to the First Officer. The Captain maintained full aft elevator during the communication with Ground Control and the First Officer.d. Flight control checks re-initiated from the beginning of the Before Take Off Flow and the remaining flow items were completed. The taxi/landing lights from the aft aircraft at [Spot] XYE were obscuring the view on Taxiway C. The Captain stopped the aircraft in a position on Taxiway C that used the forward aircraft's wing at Spot XYE to block the glare from the aft aircraft at Spot XYE. The Captain gave a courtesy flash of the taxi light to alert the crew of the aircraft on XYE of their landing/taxi light illumination. The First Officer verbalized and switched Radio One to the Tower Control frequency. The parking brake was set. The Captain called for the Before Take Off checklist. Task Loading increased due to a reduced time factor in the task/time equation. Flight crew members were in the green area of the [threat mode]; however external factors were compressing the time component and additional time elements would be required to remain out of the yellow and in the green area of the threat mode paradigm.e. As the Before Take Off checklist was being accomplished the aircraft on [Taxiway] C12 was cleared on to [Runway] 18L; however no clearance was heard on the radio. At this time both the Captain and the First Officer deduced that an incorrect frequency was selected on Radio One. The error was trapped and corrected. The flight crew was now in the yellow area of the threat mode paradigm due to a high task load environment.f. Upon tuning of the Tower frequency; the crew re-initiated the Before Take Off Checklist. Simultaneously the Tower Controller issued a clearance to proceed onto the runaway. The Tower Controller's voice conveyed a tone of agitation; immediacy; anger and frustration. Additionally; the Tower Controllers diction was rapid; difficult to hear and understand. For reasons of safety; the crew declined the clearance. The flight crew again attempted to complete the Before Take Off Checklist. The Tower Controller responded with agitation and another clearance that was rapid and difficult to understand with a demand to expedite taxi onto the runway and in some manner exit the runway. We advised the Tower we would need 30 seconds and we would be ready for departure. The Tower Controller responded again with agitation and anger and demanded we taxi onto the active runway in an expedited manner; with a rapid diction pattern and clearance that we were unable to understand while an aircraft was approaching the runway for landing as we were being lambasted by the Tower Controller regarding other traffic waiting to depart.g. At this point the demands from the Tower Controller had compromised the safe operation of the aircraft as the issued clearances appeared too no longer be operationally motivated. The Captain momentarily took over radio communication and advised the tower that we were unable to accept the clearance. Our decision to not move the aircraft was driven by safety concerns and based on the threat mode model. The true safest course of action was to keep the aircraft stationary until the task loading paradigm could be shifted to normal operational expectations.h. The Tower Controller remained agitated and instructed the crew to copy a telephone number and demanded a call tothe number. The Tower Controller read the number; we advised that we received the number and the Tower Controller re-read the number a second time and got a digit incorrect in the second reading and self-corrected their error of the telephone number. We confirmed receipt. The Before Take Off Checklist was completed; and we advised the Tower Controller we were ready for departure.The CLT airport during this bank of flights and the previous bank of flights was a chaotic mess; as is the case with CLT with all banks of flights. Aircraft crew transiting into an out of the 1 and 2 concourse are subject to extraordinary delays and the resultant increase in stress as are the Ramp Controllers and local ATC controllers. This high level of stress with too many aircraft movements in too small of space is a significant negative factor in the safety equation. The attempts by airlines to operate in this manner is a contributing factor to the degradation of safety and the stress applied to all personnel is a concrete byproduct of this poor planning and management. Further; the manifest stress is evident in the voice; demeanor and diction of ATC and other personnel which results in a degrade performance profile.Reduce access and aircraft movements in the 1 and 2 concourses to better manage traffic flow. Properly staff and monitor ATC positions and personnel for signs of stress. Review and stream line CLT Ramp operations and coordination with ATC Ground Control.

1. During passenger boarding.Lead F/A (Flight Attendant) was given a safety brief. Included with the brief was a request to maintain good communication with the flight crew on any matters. Further; instruction was given to the Lead F/A to step back from any passenger problems while at the gate and engage the Gate Agent to handle the passenger problem. Near the completion of boarding the Lead F/A came to the flight deck to inform the crew that two passengers boarded the aircraft with alcohol. Passengers were engaged by another flight attendant; not the Lead; and denied that they had alcohol. Lead F/A advised that the alcohol beverages had spilled. Flight crew and Lead F/A agreed to a plan to resolve the matter. Passengers complied with instructions and remained onboard.2. During Push Back from Gate XFlight crew worked through preflight preparations; including a review of performance data for [Runways] 18C and 18L. During FMC programming flight crew determined that a new [set of performance data] had been generated removing data for 18L; the most probable runway for departure. New performance data was updated via ACARS for 18L and was reviewed by the flight crew and programmed into the FMC. MEL was reviewed. All other preflight preparations were completed per company policies; procedures and flows. Load close-out was received at the gate.Flight crew called Ramp [name] for a clearance from Gate X and received clearance to push back. Ground crew declined to push the aircraft from Gate X due to conflict with aircraft in the ramp alley. First Officer discussed the push clearance with Ramp [name] and was assured the clearance to push was valid and that aircraft were not in conflict as the other aircraft were from the adjacent concourse. Ground crew was advised and still refused to push the aircraft. Another inquiry was made to Ramp [name] and push clearance was rescinded.Conflict aircraft from adjacent concourse departed the ramp. Ramp [name] re-cleared the aircraft to push from [Gate] X. Ground crew complied with the push back clearance. Two engines were started in the ramp alley. Ground crew received a wave off/salute. After start flows and checklist were accomplished. Out time XB:31 local/XA:31 UTC.Captain and First Officer used headsets and discussed abnormally high side tone volume on the INT function with MIC selected. Various adjustments were made to set appropriate communication volume.3. Taxi from Gate X to Runway 18LFirst Officer issued a request to taxi. Ramp [name] issued a multiple part clearance. (Taxi south line; Spot XXS; caution for pushback on neighboring gate; contact Ramp [name 2] 129.225 at Spot XXS). The clearance from Ramp [name] clearance was given rapidly and muffled. A second request was made for a taxi clearance/confirmation. Clearance was heard and understood by both crew members. Aircraft proceeded to XXS. Approaching XXS; First Officer contacted Ramp [name2]. Ramp [name 2] responded with a clearance to taxi to [Spot] YYS and contact Ground at YYS. Captain verbally reviewed triggers with First Officer for Before Take Off Flow and advised that a flight control check would commence on Taxiway C. Approaching YYS Ground Control issued a clearance to taxi [Taxiways] Mike; Charlie; hold short C10 for [Runway] 18L. First Officer replied to Ground Control and Captain responded to the First Officer repeating the clearance with emphasis to Hold Short of C10. The taxi route was continuous without stops or delays. Numerous aircraft were on Taxiway C and positioned at various ramp location spots adjacent and parallel too Taxiway C. Two aircraft were positioned facing south at Spot XYE. The aft positioned aircraft at XYE had its landing/taxi lights illuminated while stationary.Flight control checks were initiated on Taxiway C prior to C10. During the initiation of the elevator check as the First Officer was verbalizing elevator position; Ground Control re-issued the taxi clearance to hold short of [Taxiway] C11. Flight control checks were discontinued; the taxi clearance was accepted and responded too by the First Officer. The Captain repeated and verbalized the clearance to the First Officer with emphasis to hold short of C11. Flight control checks were re-initiated by the Captain. At full aft elevator the First Officer verbalized the elevator position simultaneously as Ground Control re-issued a clearance to continue to 18L.The First Officer read back the clearance. The Captain repeated the clearance to the First Officer. The Captain maintained full aft elevator during the communication with Ground Control and the First Officer.Flight Control checks re-initiated from the beginning of the Before Take Off Flow and the remaining flow items were completed. The taxi/landing lights from the aft aircraft at XYE were obscuring the view on Taxiway C. The Captain stopped the aircraft in a position on taxiway C that used the forward aircraft's wing at Spot XYE to block the glare from the aft aircraft at Spot XYE. The Captain gave a courtesy flash of the taxi light to alert the crew of the aircraft on XYE of their landing/taxi light illumination. The First Officer verbalized and switched Radio One to the Tower Control frequency. The Parking Brake was set. The Captain called for the Before Take Off checklist. Task Loading increased due to a reduced time factor in the task/time equation. Flight Crew members were in the green area of the threat mode model; however external factors were compressing the time component and additional time elements would be required to remain out of the yellow and in the green area of the threat mode paradigm.As the Before Take Off checklist was being accomplished the aircraft on [Taxiway] C12 was cleared on to 18L; however no clearance was heard on the radio. At this time both the Captain and the First Officer deduced that an incorrect frequency was selected on Radio One. The error was trapped and corrected. The flight crew was now in the yellow area of the threat mode paradigm due to a high task load environment.Upon tuning of the Tower frequency; the crew re-initiated the Before Take Off Checklist. Simultaneously the Tower Controller issued a clearance to proceed onto the runaway. The Tower Controllers voice conveyed a tone of agitation; immediacy; anger and frustration. Additionally; the Tower Controllers diction was rapid; difficult to hear and understand. For reasons of safety; the crew declined the clearance. The Flight crew again attempted to complete the Before Take Off Checklist. The Tower Controller responded with agitation and another clearance that was rapid and difficult to understand with a demand to expedite taxi onto the runway and in some manner exit the runway. We advised the Tower we would need 30 seconds and we would be ready for departure. The Tower Controller responded again with agitation and anger and demanded we taxi onto the active runway in an expedited manner; with a rapid diction pattern and clearance that we were unable to understand while an aircraft was approaching the runway for landing as we were being lambasted by the Tower Controller regarding other traffic waiting to depart.At this point the demands from the Tower Controller had compromised the safe operation of the aircraft as the issued clearances appeared too no longer be operationally motivated. The Captain momentarily took over radio communication and advised the tower that we were unable to accept the clearance. Our decision to not move the aircraft was driven by safety concerns and based on the threat mode model. The true safest course of action was to keep the aircraft stationary until the task loading paradigm could be shifted to normal operational expectations.The Tower Controller remained agitated and instructed the crew to copy a telephone number and demanded a call to the number. The Tower Controller read the number; we advised that we received the number and the Tower Controller re-read the number a second time and got a digit incorrect in the second reading and self-corrected their error of the telephone number. We confirmed receipt. The Before Take Off Checklist was completed; and we advised the Tower Controller we were ready for departure.The sequential style ([Spots] S; YYS; hold short [Taxiways] C10; hold short C11; continue full length; etc) of the taxi instructions from the gate to Runway 18L required several communications from ATC/Ramp Control to our aircraft. This lead to interruptions in our checklists; flows; and SOPs.Perhaps we should complete the 'before takeoff flow' and before takeoff checklist in the ramp area when using 18L. Although CLT Ramp is not going to like that. Also the ATC Tower Controller should sit jumpseat when we are using 18L to observe the task saturation. I personally need to ensure correct frequencies into #1 Comm during preflight; I mixed up ZZZ Tower with CLT Tower (118.1).

Flight crew reported passengers boarded the aircraft with alcohol. The crew reported confusion with ramp control during push back about potential conflicting push back traffic. The crew reported difficulty completing pre takeoff checklists due to several Ramp Control and ATC taxi instructions during a busy departure period at the airport. The crew reported another taxiing aircraft had its landing lights on making it difficult to see the taxiway markings. The crew utilized the wrong Tower frequency causing them to miss their clearance to taxi onto the runway.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

There was an MEL 28-25-03b for the Left Inner Tank high level detection system inoperative. But no other faults for the fuel quantity or fuel system faults. I explained to the Captain that the Fuel Quantity System (FQS) is very accurate and if no faults were displayed that there was nothing wrong with the system. The Magnetic Level Indicator (MLI) System [Fuel Sticks]; as per the Fuel Manual for the inner tanks are accurate to +/- 5% of their indication. If there was an error between the Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) or the MLI System; I would say that the MLI System would be in error with the human factor of not reading the [fuel] charts or sticks correctly.There were no real time Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) faults and no faults in the FQIS. Therefore I could apply the MEL for the MLI System. They metered in 2;000 LBS [of fuel] supposedly into the Left Inner Tank and the three pilots watched the indication for that Left Inner Tank and it did not increase. The Total Fuel increased; but to their knowledge there was no indication that it went to the Left Inner Tank or other tanks. Therefore; they were saying that their six eyes were more believable than the aircraft's Fuel Indicating System. The MLI [fuel] sticks for the Left Inner Tank did show an increase for the metered fuel added. The Left Inner Tank Indication could not be MEL'd due to the pre-existing MEL for the Left Inner Tank Detection System was inoperative. The flight was canceled. I instructed Maintenance to transfer fuel in 1;000 LB increments to the Left Inner Tank and to verify fuel increased in that tank only and not the other tanks. However; before they accomplished this; they repositioned aircraft. After tow [of aircraft]; the Left Inner Tank had increased by the 2;000 LBS that was not showing previously. After completing their fuel transfer; all indications checked normal and no other faults could be found. No parts were replaced. Aircraft was fueled to 112;000 LBS for correct distribution.I suspect improper sumping; not necessarily on Maintenance behalf; but rather on extremely short turn times these aircraft experience during heavy summer flying season/schedule. [Fuel] Tanks [were] sumped after flight canceled and aircraft was moved to remote area. At that time; Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) showed proper increase in fuel load. [Suggest] allowing more time on ground for water to settle; allowing proper sumping.

Reporter stated he is a Technician working the Technical Support Desk. The whole event and flight cancellation started at the departure gate when the flight crew was reviewing the MEL deferral for the Left Inner Tank High [Fuel] Level Detection System. They were also watching the fuel indications and trying to determine where 2;000 LBS of metered off fuel had gone. The Fuel Totalizer showed the increase; but no increase in fuel levels were indicated in the other fuel tanks.Reporter stated after the flight canceled and the aircraft was repositioned; all fuel indications and quantities were normal; including the missing 2;000 LBS and the 'known' metered fuel in 1;000 LBS increments he requested Maintenance to perform. The aircraft was released the next morning. He still believes water in the fuel tanks is responsible for some of the indication failures; even though there are no faults showing up in the Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) data. Their aircraft are flying constantly; with short turnarounds on the ground. Water in the fuel just doesn't have enough time to settle down to where the Water Extraction System can remove the water; or even manually sumping the tanks is not adequate; because the water just hasn't settled. On one of their aircraft; ten gallons of water had been drained (sumped) from a single fuel tank during an Overnight Check.

An A330 aircraft had fuel quantity indication failures that did not show up as fuel faults in the Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS). Only after flight cancellation and repositioning of the aircraft did 2;000 LBS of missing fuel reappear. Technician believes water in the fuel tanks may be a factor.