Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 18000

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Day VFR takeoff. Around 100 KTS I noted an amber speed brake 'Do not Arm' light. After takeoff I called for Flaps 1 and started to accelerate; this is when I noticed my main electric trim from the yoke switch was not responding. I started using the manual trim (the auto trim feature was kicking against my inputs). I asked the First Officer to try his pickle switch and it was inoperative as well. I stabilized the aircraft and handed the controls to the First Officer. I used the newly formatted checklist and completed it to the phase line. Our altitude was still low (around 10;000 FT). I told the First Officer to tell Center I did not want to go above FL200 with possible multiple problems in the flight controls. The flight eventually leveled off at FL190. Having past difficulties with VHF AIRINC phone patches (usually dropped calls) I elected to call Maintenance at [departure station].  I explained the situation to them and they had me check and reset the stab trim breaker behind the Captain seat. It was in and I reset it per their request. No help.I realized our fuel situation would not be prudent to continue and the possible problem of the main electric trim. I elected to air return to [departure airport]. I did not want to stay in the air any longer than I needed to with this problem. Additional warnings were the 'Speed Brake do not arm' and the 'Speed Trim' lights on the overhead.  I noted [an] accident from years ago.During descent we descended through a cloud deck with icing conditions so we used Vref ice numbers. The flight landed without incident. Threats I noted were the new checklist format; mainly this is the first time I have used the new checklist in a truly an abnormal situation. The 737 fleet has no other way to contact Dispatch/Maintenance other than VHF phone patch. I sent a message to Dispatch using ACARS which is slow and time consuming. It was noted after landing another STAB breaker behind the First Officer was out. (The First Officer never released his shoulder straps). It was later found when the trim was inspected the cannon plug; after one half turn; fell off. The maintenance manual stated it should take about 15 turns. Although I like the NAV kits I considered it a threat since it is not the usual format I fly with and the manuals are bulky to use during such a busy time. Also; I [am] still getting used to what I need with me from my old flight kit; i.e.; a circuit breaker location guide; a 1 inch binder vs. the bulky binders. With all the changes to both the flight manual; FOM and the QRH added to the threat level of a non-normal flight.

The trim failure resulted in considerable nose up trim as the flaps were move to up. Also; the speed trim was trimming for; as designed; airspeed considerably slower than Clean Maneuvering Speed. 3/4 to 2/3 yoke nose down from neutral was required to maintain Clean Maneuvering Speed until the QRH was accomplished.

B737 flight crew reported abnormalities with the primary electric pitch trim system. They declared an emergency and returned to departure airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

I was working Radar combined to the Tower. We are on COVID-19 schedules with reduced staffing. It was a VFR day and traffic was building. We had just made the decision to open radar off to the TRACON on the hour. Complexity was definitely increased due to working moderate to busy traffic in the Tower.  Aircraft Y was an IFR practice approach; climbing off ZZZ. Aircraft X was a ZZZ airport departure level flying eastbound. Aircraft Y wasn't able to be handed off to ZZZ approach due to his round robin flight plan. I was assisting the Tower Controller with 6-7-10 work and other tricks to get a handoff accomplished on Aircraft Y. Aircraft X asked if he had traffic; when I noticed Aircraft Y and Aircraft X converging. I turned Aircraft X to a 360 heading and descended Aircraft Y; but I think I lost separation. I didn't notice the converging traffic on the aircraft I was actual busy with trying to accomplish a handoff with. Aircraft X coming faster from the west didn't stick out to me as traffic heading northeast bound. Honestly I also forgot that I had climbed Aircraft Y to 7;000; I thought I had stopped him at 5;000. That doesn't make up for missing the traffic and altitude in my scan.Traffic picked up faster than expected and we probably should have split radar earlier. I should not have let myself get distracted with automation issues and should have stayed focused on the traffic. Also due to COVID-19 traffic has been much reduced; and honestly I got behind in ramping up with traffic that used to be normal but is now busy in the current situation.

TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation event and made reference to COVID-19 staffing levels as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Climbing out of ZZZ; my FO informed me that he was having problems trimming down the aircraft. As he voiced that statement. The message PTRIM MAIN INOP appeared on our ECIS. I aided him with the backup trim and the aircraft was in control. We then engaged the autopilot and it worked. During that time; I took the radios and read the QRH. As I reached the part of Main Trim Cutoff and push it. My FO informed me that the autopilot had not been following the flight director and he was going to turn it off. As soon as he voiced it- the autopilot disengaged and we got an ECIS message AUTOPILOT FAIL. At the same time a foul odor was smelt in the flight station. Our FA [Flight Attendant] rung to say that there was a foul odor in the cabin. With that we [notified ATC] and prepare the aircraft. We choose ZZZ1; [and] informed ATC. Advised the number of souls and fuel on board. I informed the FA and she prepared the aircraft without a need to brace. Obtained the weather for ZZZ2 and was given the ILS Rwy XX and thus prepared it. Obtained the speeds and flap settings. We landed safely and then I asked the FA if there was any smoke or if she could smell that foul odor. The answer was a negative and so we comfortably to the gate.

EMB-145 Captain reported a sudden onset of foul odor in the aircraft while handling a 'Pitch Trim/Auto Pilot' malfunction. Flight crew executed a diversion.


Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Company Policy; Procedure; Staffing; Weather; Aircraft

When I came on shift the morning of the flight; there was a Part 91 ferry flight set up for ZZZ-ZZZ1 with Aircraft X.  The nose number was not yet loaded into system; but a few minutes after launching system; the Operations Manager sent me a note that he was waiting for the ferry permit to be issued and once it was; he would enter the N-number into system.  I acknowledged his message.  After getting caught up with my regular flights; I was ready to flight plan the ferry; but it was not yet loaded into the system.  I located the airplane in computer and went ahead and pre-planned everything I wanted; and then waited for system and computer to update.  At around XA:15Z (?); the Operations Manager advised me the plane was loaded and they had the ferry permit in hand.  I loaded the flight into computer; noted the plane was showing Aircraft X; crosschecked all my numbers and released the flight.  Computer was still showing the city pair ZZZ-ZZZ1.  I did not have or see a copy of the ferry permit.  I was not aware the ferry permit was showing a city pair ZZZ-ZZZ2 and was not notified of the discrepancy until that evening.

Aircraft X was in storage in ZZZ. My turnover on my start of shift was that 4 aircraft would need to be emergency returned to service from active storage due to a possible inclement weather forecast; and then maintenance ferried to other stations. My information was that Aircraft X would re-position in ZZZ2; and Aircraft Y would reposition to ZZZ1. These departures were scheduled for [date/time]. Aircraft X had a number of overtime items that were required to be on the arrange meter for the ferry process and ultimately on the ferry document given to the crew in lieu of a maintenance release. The maintenance release is issued by Maintenance Control when all the procedures required by the maintenance ferry process are satisfied. A maintenance release is the normal maintenance release document provided to the crew on departure from a station and is supplied by suitably release qualified Aircraft Maintenance Technicians.Aircraft Y had a mechanical issue and did not depart from ZZZ as the crew were out of time. Aircraft X had an issue with an Engineering Change Repair Authorization (ECRA); accomplished in a vendor maintenance station in ZZZ3. An interior modification was accomplished and alterations to the In Flight Entertainment (IFE) requiring an ECRA to be accomplished to deactivate an air-conditioning component. This was accomplished by an AMT in ZZZ but the sign off was not correct per the ECRA and took a little while to resolve. Once all the items were cleared or determined they were overtime and would remain open; and thus be entered as open items on the maintenance release.The approval from Dispatch and the Operations Manager was issued and received by myself and the maintenance department. All of these documents; and a planning document received previously state the aircrafts destination was ZZZ2. The Maintenance Control duty manager called me and said the aircraft had in fact flown from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and not to ZZZ2 as was the maintenance departments understanding of the airline's requirements. I have attached documents from the Maintenance Ferry process and a planning document to show the requirement and my understanding of the destination being ZZZ2.I do not know; or have any input; into the maintenance planning and operations planning department's requirements for the positioning of aircraft and resources for flight purposes and strategic maintenance planning purposes. The fact that the aircraft did not operate the routing I was informed it was proposed to; the destination I had stated on a very important document; and the maintenance release and landed at ZZZ1 and not ZZZ2 was something of a shock to me. How an International Airline could operate with so little communication and cooperation between such important departments is something I have never encountered in a long career in aviation or my service with the Company.I am also very disappointed that no management individual has spoken to me about the issue. The lack of communication continues.Communication definitely needs to be improved between departments involved in the ferry process and a clear understanding of the issues involved be conveyed to all personnel  participating in the process. When a process as important as the Maintenance Ferry Process is involved individuals should read the documentation provided with that process and concur with all intended statements and requirements.

Dispatcher reported confusion in city pairing used for a Part 91 Ferry Permit; which resulted in the aircraft flying to a different destination airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I took over the sector. The previous Controller told me Aircraft X was on the airway at 13;000 ft. I took over the sector; some time lapsed; and I began to see Aircraft X's tag flashing MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning). This happens a lot even when the airplane is established on an airway; I didn't think much of it. After about a minute I took a closer look and asked him if he was established on the Victor Airway. He said he was. I then looked up on the above-head map and saw where he was further south than where he was supposed to be. I measured and he was 6.7 miles away from the Victor Airway; he was in the 13;400 MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) at this time. He looked to be on the Q route; opposed to the Victor Airway. I called over my Controller in Charge; told him and then gave him a low altitude alert; climbed him to 14;000. He then thanked me for the help a couple minutes later. The pilot must have put something wrong into his FMS; or was just flying the incorrect route. Lack of concentration on the pilot's end was the problem.

Center Controller reported an aircraft deviated off course and flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Fuel imbalance 900 LBS after leveloff; tried to open crossfeed valve; would not open. Noticed crossfeed CB tripped. Referenced QRH consulted Maintenance Control on radio and reset CB. Opened the crossfeed valve to balance fuel; CB tripped again. Imbalance continued to about 1;700 LBS while talking to Maintenance and discussing situation [we] decided to divert to safest and closest airport. Landed without incident. Mechanical failure of valve.

B737 Captain notes a fuel imbalance after leveloff; which cannot be corrected with the crossfeed valve. The valve circuit breakers are found tripped and reset; after discussion with Maintenance Control; but trip again when the valve is opened. Flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Laptop Computer (performance; planning; etc.)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the process of inputting the takeoff data; the battery went dead on the [performance computer]. Being the first flight of the day; we elected to have dispatch run the takeoff data and we were going to let the [performance computer] charge in the cradle. When we got the numbers; we failed to realize that dispatch had used our zero fuel weight as our takeoff weight. I attribute the oversight on our part due to our lack of familiarity to getting our takeoff data in such a manner. We realized our error too late in the takeoff to effectively adapt other than to just rotate slower to accommodate for the slower bugged speeds.

At pushback the [performance computer] lost charge and shut down; making the Before Pushback Checklist undoable. The First Officer (FO) contacted Dispatch with our takeoff information in order to receive takeoff data. This took a while to complete. We already knew that we were going to be late into [our destination] due to strong headwinds. We received the data in an unusual two-transmission format; first receiving a read back of our transmitted input; then another transmission containing our actual settings. All appeared normal; though I had a nagging feeling that the V-Speeds seemed low. I did not voice that concern to my FO (expectation bias - 'the numbers' are always right). During this time; the B Flight Attendant called with a potential Passenger issue that was quickly resolved. (Performance pressures; trying to get back to some degree of on-time performance). Once we taxied; everything up to takeoff rotation was normal.At rotation; the aircraft didn't start flying at a normal pitch attitude. It didn't feel right; so I eased off the pack pressure and let the aircraft to continue to accelerate and delayed my takeoff; holding a takeoff attitude. We broke ground about 15 to 20 knots over computed V2 and slowly climbed out.It was obvious that something was wrong with our takeoff data. Clearing 10;000 feet MSL we reviewed our communications with Dispatch and found the error. Though all weights were transmitted; the weight used for our takeoff weight was in fact our Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW)! Neither of us (Captain or FO) caught this on review. The number we saw was accurate; so we moved on (expectation bias). I began an ACARS conversation with Dispatch; ultimately coordinating a phone call [at our destination]. My Dispatcher apologized profusely for the error; citing a new process using the computer instead of [the performance computer] to calculate the takeoff data; and that she mistakenly used ZFW instead of Takeoff Weight. I emphasized that there were at least three links in this error chain; and none of us broke one.

B737NG flight crew reported receiving incorrect takeoff weights from Dispatch. Flight crew cited a dead battery on the performance computer and having to utilize Dispatch for the weights as contributing factor.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Software and Automation; Weather; Human Factors

We were on approach to RWY 30 into BZN on the RNAV RNP 30 from Livingston transition. We were getting moderate turbulence with the wind around 600-70 kts below 10;000 [feet]. We had thoroughly briefed the approach prior to the descent. While on the approach around 5;000ft Tower advised us the an aircraft had circled to 30 from ILS 12 and during the approach experienced a 2;000 fpm updraft and moderate turbulence on approach but braking action was good upon landing. Around LAVPE; the Captain called for below the line landing checklist while we were descending on the VPATH. I ran the checklist and then looked at my Jepp Approach Chart to confirm what the missed approach altitude was; it was right after that we got a 'Caution Terrain' aural warning followed by Tower telling us we had a low altitude warning. We then got another caution terrain warning and the Captain disconnected the AP and started to climb; I saw at that point we were below the VPATH somehow. We started to climb back towards the path and then got the RWY in sight and descended for a normal landing. Some time between me going heads down to run the below the line landing checklist and MOSNE intersection we got low and I still do not know how. We were on AP and VPATH just a few seconds prior; I don't know if we got a downdraft or what but I'm still confused as to how the aircraft got low. We decided to continue to the approach instead of going around and I believe that was the safer of the two options giving the wind gusts and moderate turbulence in mountainous and unfamiliar (for me first time to BZN) terrain.We both had a long day (I commuted in that morning because I missed my last commute the night prior due to operational delays) and had been fighting turbulence all day long on ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ-BZN routes which probably made us more tired than normal. This was my first time into BZN and the low visibility; moderate icing from the snow storm; and moderate (or greater) turbulence on approach made it tougher to concentrate and multi task.I'm not sure how we got below the path on approach as I was Pilot Monitoring and heads down running the checklist so I have no suggestions as of now. I should have done a better job monitoring our descent and VPATH even while conducting the Landing Checklist.

B737 First Officer reported distraction prevented noticing Pilot Flying descended below path; resulted in ATC low altitude alert and GPWS terrain alert.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174; Flight Crew Type 3750

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

My 'A' Flight Attendant (FA) chimed the cockpit informing us of an electrical smell mostly emanating from the forward most part of the passenger cabin; on the passenger side of the forward galley. As both pilots were listening up on the service interphone; my First Officer (FO) pulled out his O2 mask (as I did); and used it while I further questioned the FA. At no time were there any noticeable vapors or fumes circulating on the flight deck; therefore smoke goggles were not needed. While I asked the FA to confirm it was an electrical smell; my FO sent an ACARS message to Dispatch initially of the fumes reported. I asked if she knew its source; which she did not. I then asked her to question the passengers in the area the fumes appeared the strongest about the contents of their baggage. This included having her check the overhead bins in that area as a possible source; with emphasis on laptops; cell phones; other electronics or power sources; while we initiated our protocols for a report of fumes being reported in the cabin. I asked her to notify me of her findings; and if the fumes intensified or decreased by our actions from the QRH. We then pulled out the QRC and accomplished the items under Smoke; Fire or Fumes. She called back shortly after this and said the fumes were intensifying. We continuously evaluated what was happening; and in an effort to better identify; process; and comprehend her information; I said 'I have the aircraft'; and sent my FO back to the passenger cabin to make an assessment (this involved coordinating the safety zone). My FO had the passengers in the affected area help him assess for possible sources of the fumes. Consensus was drawn from the Cabin Crew and those passengers in the affected area; the fumes they were experiencing were of an acrid nature. My FO returned to the flight deck to report his observations; and then the FA chimed again; except this time she and the 'B' and 'C' FAs thought the acrid fumes were even intensifying more. I decided to inspect the area of concern for myself (using safety zone protocols); and the fumes were very noticeable to me around rows 4; 5 and 6. The passengers in these three rows were very alarmed; and it was evident to me the existing fumes were creating a physiological reaction to those affected. My concern was without eliminating the source of fumes; there would be a medical emergency and a fire as a result of persistent fumes if the flight continued. It was evident that a continued flight was not the safest course of action. As the QRC leads us right into the QRH; we executed the checklist items (turning off non-essential electrical power; etc.) in hopes to eliminate the source of the fumes; except these vaporous emissions of fumes (while colorless to the naked eye); were not decreasing. My 'A' FA chimed again saying it was their belief the fumes were getting even worse than earlier reported. My short exposure to these fumes made me believe a longer exposure to the passengers would be harmful. Its source was unknown. The QRH states 'Fumes that occur in the cabin constitutes a fire onboard the aircraft.' We evaluated this situation as an emergency. Having a most suitable airport in our proximity; in point of time and distance; we chose the safest course of action; given the circumstances; was to divert to [a nearby airport]. I radioed Center with our 'PAN PAN PAN;' and asked for their help clearing us direct.Explanation was given to ATC for our reason to divert. Clearance was given; and the Pilot Flying updated the FMC to [the new destination]; and executed it. A PA was made informing the passengers of our decision to divert; and the reasons for doing so. We did not delay landing in our attempt to complete the Fumes Removal Checklist; and all things considered; we made every attempt to accomplish all checklist items in a deliberate Challenge-Response-Response method consistent with managing intensive tasks.Continuing to Maintain Situational Awareness; we enlisted our Dispatcher to confirm our landing performance; but we were able to accomplish the Descent and Approach Checklists ourselves; as appropriate; with the current field conditions (ATIS). Upon getting a hand off to Approach; we were asked for souls onboard and fuel remaining. We requested a clearance direct to ZZZZZ Intersection for the RNAV [approach]; this allowed us the needed time to brief the arrival (landing was below MLGW). We asked the Tower Controller the frequency the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) was on; and we were told on the Tower frequency. We confirmed ARFF was on standby. We stopped the aircraft on the runway for a safe landing and set the parking brake (I made a PA asking the passengers to remain seated); and ARFF communicated there was no smoke or fire. The Tower then cleared us in to our parking bay.After engine shut-down; ARFF pulled up air stairs to the FWD passenger door where I met the Battalion Chief; and at the same time ARFF inspected the cargo bins. He asked for all passengers to deplane; but as it appeared the fumes had dissipated; and there was no sign of smoke or fire; and due to the immediate ramp being congested with other local aircraft; including the danger of moving propellers and gusty winds; I asked the Fire Chief if his safety inspection of the passenger Cabin could be accomplished with all passengers remaining in their seats; and he agreed. I made a PA from the FA station informing the passengers to remain seated while ARFF conducted their safety checks. After it was determined the passengers could be properly accommodated in the small terminal; and with the help of the Station Manager (for the new station not yet opened); an orderly deplaning of the passengers commenced. The aircraft was met by a (other carrier) B-737 Mechanic (with the assistance of my Dispatcher and the Chief Pilot in the Operations Center); and the aircraft was secured for the night.Reportedly a bad ballast in a cabin light (logbook corrective action to make it airworthy). If it even was a faulty or failed ballast if there was a current spike overheating a ballast of a light without a circuit breaker trip; where is the fault detection capability; or fail safe to prevent emissions of harmful fumes?

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737NG flight crew reported diverting to a nearby alternate after electrical fumes were reported in the cabin.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 635; Flight Crew Type 495

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

A very smooth landing was executed aligned with; and onto the centerline; of Runway 34L under conditions of a reported 8 KT wind essentially directed along the runway heading. When the nose wheel contacted the pavement the aircraft turned left immediately. Corrective action was taken by right rudder input and braking to no avail. The sharp left turn of the aircraft lifted the left main landing gear wheel off the pavement and the right wing tip contacted the pavement causing an arc of paint transfer onto the pavement for a distance of some 30 FT. Right wing tip contact resulted in a scrape mark on the underside of the right wing tip that is approximately 4 inches in length and is repairable. The right wing tip strobe globe was broken as well. The oleo strut was collapsed and loss of strut fluid was obvious. Initial investigation by mechanics identified a lack of steering control of the nose wheel by rudder pedal input. This occurrence (unplanned runway departure) was the result of mechanical failure of a direct rudder pedal steering component; yet to be specifically pinpointed; allowing the free pivoting (left and/or right) of the nose gear wheel assembly.

The rudder pedal control of a C177RG nose wheel steering failed during landing which resulted in a wingtip contacting the runway and subsequently the aircraft exited the runway.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

PHL airport sits adjacent to the Delaware River. When we are running visuals to runway 35; we must be aware of 'Tall ship' activity in the channel. If it is daylight; we must tell the pilot about the ship; its type and direction; and advise the pilot to 'Call the ship in sight'. After dark; we must suspend arrivals to runway 35 until such time that the ship is clear of the channel. River Watch (city of Philadelphia) advises TRACON OM of ship activity. Today I was working W; running the final to runway 35; during a very busy push. I hadn't been on position for very long at the time of the incident. During the position relief briefing when I took the sector; the controller being relieved did not tell me about any ships in the channel at the approach end to runway 35. Just after he unplugged and walked away; he came back over and told me that there was currently a ship in the channel. I made the 'Ship in the channel' call to an aircraft that I had just cleared for the visual; and switched him to tower. A very short time later I heard the supervisor say that the first ship was clear and that there would be another ship later. The supervisor did not make this call to me on a recorded line; nor did he make this statement directly to me; instead it was shouted in the room. I was very busy at the time. I did hear another controller ask the supervisor if the 2nd ship was due to arrive around sunset; to which the supervisor said yes. Because I was busy; I didn't look at the current time; nor did I try to determine what time sunset was. I figured the supervisor would advise me when the next ship entered the channel; and if it were due to arrive after dark I assumed he would give me a 'Suspend' time.A while later I over [heard] another controller elsewhere in the TRACON talking about the ship in the channel. I turned around and asked the controller if there was a ship in the river; to which the controller said 'Yeah; I think so. Any time now.' I asked what time sunset was and the controller said XA47z. I looked at the clock and it was XA47z. I heard nothing from the supervisor.  I turned and asked the supervisor if there was a ship in the river and he said 'Yes; but we don't need to suspend.' I told him that it was after sunset; and he told me that River Watch had said the ship would be clear before sunset. I questioned him again; because he had just told me there was a ship in the river and it was already after sunset. The supervisor again told me that the ship would be no factor. I didn't understand how he could be saying this; as there was a ship in the river (as per him) and it was after sunset. About that time the phone rang; it was River Watch advising that the ship was clear. It was about 2 minutes after sunset.In any case; I was not advised of this ship in the river ahead of time; as I am supposed to be. I had been running traffic to runway 35 with this ship in the river and had not been making my 'Ship advisories'. Furthermore; after the sun went down; we should have stopped arrivals to runway 35 all together until the ship was clear. This didn't happen. The supervisor's communication regarding the ships in the channel was terrible. I was not told about the 2nd ship; and clearly the supervisor was confused over what was supposed to happen at sunset.1. Supervisors should be required to advise the W controller of ships in the river; and suspend/clear times; on a recorded landline.2. Supervisors should be briefed on what we are supposed to do with runway 35 arrival traffic; after sunset; when there is a ship in the channel.

PHL Tower Controller describes a notification procedure of ships in the channel; which identifies a procedure where in day time hours the pilots must report the ship in sight. At night the controllers must suspend arrivals to Runway 35 until the ship is clear of the channel. The controller working complained of bad coordination from the Front Line Manager and not knowing if a ship was in the channel at sunset.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

We set up the RNAV Y Runway 21 to ABQ; with a gust; correction of a target ref plus 20. We were cleared for a visual but followed the RNAV. We got some up drafts off the hills so we dropped the gear early and were stabilized with flaps a little more than 2;000 feet above the ground. On the initial stages of approach; the tower was calling wind shifts on our approach with some gusts; and one shear of 20 knots. There were only green returns on the radar with a little visible Virga on the west edge of the valley floor. Shortly after Tower called the winds again; without reporting windshear; then the aircraft in front of us went around. We continued; I was flying and the Captain stated he would call out airspeed trends from the HUD. About 1;800 feet; he called for power even though we were two knots fast. I added a little and speed dropped right back down on target. I was on autopilot with autothrottles so I just overrode them by pushing it up. Around 1;400 feet; he called for power again; then more power. I pushed it up again but this time came within two knots of overspending the flaps. So I disconnected autopilot and autothrottles and picked the nose up slightly; which made us very slightly high on the VASI; two red; one white; and one just starting to turn white. The Captain said the speed vectors trend on the HUD were jumping; so he had the aircraft. Right after I called 1;000 feet; we seemed stabilized. I think about 700 feet the speed jumped up and down. Almost simultaneously I think Captain was pushing power up for a go-around; we got a report of a microburst and then the windshear icon. I said windshear; as I noticed the Captain was already starting to escape. I called our climb of 2000 fpm; then called it again and all indications of shear stopped. We cleaned up; Tower gave us a climb to 9;000 feet and we proceeded to ABQ for to hold and notify Dispatch. The Captain gave me Pilot Flying duties again; as he talked to Dispatch and we evaluated options. We had fuel to hold for a long time; we were tankering. The winds shifted again and Tower asked us if we wanted Runway 8; and we declined. After a few Guinea Pigs; tried and got in without windshear; and the winds stabilized for a while; we joined the pack and landed on 8. At some point I told the Captain I thought I saw the airspeed jump into the red; flap overspeed as we were starting to go around. The Captain said we did not; he never saw an overspeed on the HUD. I thought it was three knots. When we pulled in the gate we had a flap overspeed message; so the Captain called Dispatch/Maintenance to talk it over with them and put it in the book.If I had to do it again; with a wind shift and Virga in the area; I would have gone around the minute the [plane] in front of us did. I talked to an old (carrier) Pilot years ago who said Virga and mountains do not mix.

Air Carrier First Officer described a windshear event on final to ABQ Runway 21 which resulted in a go-around and ultimately a Runway 8 approach and uneventful landing. A flap overspeed occurred during the go-around.


Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

ATC on CPDLC (Controller Pilot Datalink Communications) gave us a climb and maintain FL 360 without an ATC controller assigning us a clearance via radio. I don't know if it's legal in our ops spec for a B737. We called ATC via radio instead to verify assigned altitude. I don't remember seeing or reading if B737's can legally accept this type clearance. Why is ATC giving us CPDLC altitude clearances? We're not ETOPS over Washington DC! Now they're giving us reroutes via CPDLC. I don't know if we can accept these as well. I have talked to many pilots and the Assistant Chief Pilot and no one has an answer to my situation.

B737 Captain reported receiving ATC clearance via CPDLC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 105

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 3000

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Arrival into SAN was night VFR. Approach procedure had changed several times. We had been filed for Shamu 1; were cleared the Bayvu 3 for a 27 localizer. We re- requested the Shamu 1 with an ILS to 9 approach. ILS to 9 was denied due to [airport] construction. We were then given vectors to a 27 LOC. We were on a right down wind to 27 and given a vector that would intercept the localizer just outside of the IAF (REEBO) on a diagonal intercept course. As we were passing abeam the runway; ATC inquired if we had the runway insight. We did and they cleared us for a visual approach. We were about 4000 feet (estimate) and descending. The REEBO intercept alt is 2000 feet and my plan was to square the base turn to arrive at REEBO wings level inbound at 2000 feet. In order to do this I had to turn left slightly in order to have enough separation to turn back into REEBO and be wings level for the crossing and descent. I started my descent to 2000 feet. There was terrain to the left of us; which we both saw and talked about. We passed the highest terrain to the right and turned base leg at 2000 feet. There was never a GPWS terrain warning in the cockpit; ATC never issued a terrain warning; nor was there ever a 1000 foot or 500 foot radar altimeter indication. At some point in the approach we did get the 2500 foot altitude radar call out. We had all terrain in sight; talked about it; did not feel uncomfortable and did not receive any cockpit or ATC warnings. This report is timely due to just receiving notification of this potential incident from the Chief Pilot.

A B737 on a visual approach to Runway 27 at SAN generated an ATC low altitude alert but the crew had the terrain in sight descending to 2;000 feet.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 9

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

I had taken a passenger (also a pilot) on a flight. We turned around due to fog not lifting at the destination.There were equipment issues in the rental aircraft; a T-Tail Piper PA32 Lance. The first thing noticed was that the intercom didn't work. I could talk to the passenger but he couldn't talk to me.The #2 radio would not transmit when selected and the #1 unit was scratchy and often not clear on reception.There was no panel mounted GPS database at all so I used my portable Garmin 496 for navigation.The landing gear unsafe light was on all the time; but went out when the gear came down. There was a standby vacuum warning light on and off but the vacuum pump gauge showed no malfunction. The amp gauge had no pointer; but for voltage check; the 496 portable GPS has a voltage indication; which was fine.Other things seemed to work OK; but I made the mistake of trusting the autopilot too much.Upon commencing the ILS approach to Runway XY; I had all the parameters set up correctly on the radios; HSI; and #2 CDI. When selecting the LOC function on the autopilot the airplane flew into an unusual attitude and the GPS terrain warning came on. The airplane rolled into a steep bank and the nose dropped.ATC was talking to me; telling of the warning. I told them I would abandon the approach but mostly I was busy disconnecting the autopilot; correcting the wings to level and initiating a climb.The approach controller talked too much while I had things to do to straighten out the aircraft; but I'm sure that's their function. I tried to ignore audio in my headset until the aircraft was in a normal attitude.Eventually I said to them; I have the wings level; I'm climbing and proceeding to the 180 degrees heading you assigned me.I hand flew the second approach.First I told the tower I wanted to land straight in on Runway XY because I didn't want to circle due to the high accident rate of circling approaches. But when I descended out of the clouds; I saw I was traveling too fast; so told the tower I wanted to land on the other end; Runway XX; due to the strong winds.After circling the field; the landing was uneventful. Upon returning the plane to the FBO; I told maintenance of the issues reported here.

PA32 pilot reported a malfunctioning autopilot put the aircraft into an unusual attitude and triggered a terrain warning on approach.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 530

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 2639

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After a normal take off from Runway 8R at KATL; I instructed the Captain who was PM to select 'NAV' mode at 400 feet AGL; as per our procedures. I verified NAV TRK mode engaged. Shortly after; Tower asked if we were direct to the first RNAV waypoint on the departure; 'RONII'. I had the RNAV progress page up which displays the aircrafts lateral deviation from the course. It showed .2 NM right; not uncommon. The Captain indicated we were direct to the point. Tower then gave us heading to the northeast; and switched us to departure control. Just before initiating the turn; the lateral deviation moved to .3 NM right. Departure asked us if we were RNAV capable; and Captain replied we were. We stayed on the heading for a couple minutes; and eventually we were cleared to a waypoint further down the departure. No mention was ever made of possible deviation or that we were off course. Honestly; from our standpoint; it appeared to be a normal departure. ATC is indicating we were off course. Perhaps the RNAV was in error.Our aircraft do not have GPS; and use only IRU's and ground based NAVAIDs. Maybe GPS would enhance the capability of the RNAV and provide more precise information. Also; pilots should strive to maintain 0 cross track error.

On departure from Runway 8R in ATL; we were given 'RNAV to RONII; cleared for takeoff' (SUMMT9 RNAV departure). We performed the normal 'NAV (navigation) select' at 400 feet AGL; and then 'climb power; flaps up; VNAV' at 1;000 feet AGL.At that point; the Tower Controller asked if we were direct to RONII. I responded that we were direct to RONII and looked down at the FMS; PROGRESS PAGE 2 which was displayed on both my side and my first officer's side. It showed that the lateral deviation was 0.2 NM right of course. That is normal operation in this aircraft to fly the command bars and actually be off 0.2NM. The Tower Controller then instructed us to turn left to a 060 degree heading and then switched us to Atlanta Departure. During the turn to 060 degrees; the FMS; PROGRESS PAGE 2 showed only 0.3 NM right of course; then counted down to 0.0 NM when we crossed the original course; and then counted up to left of course as we crossed the course that was direct to RONII. When I checked in with Atlanta Departure; I informed the controller that we were given a heading. He asked if we were RNAV capable; and I responded that we were capable and earlier were showing direct to RONII. We were perplexed and only assumed that the tower controller gave us a preventative vector.

A non-GPS RNAV equipped aircraft departed on the ATL SUMMT9 RNAV flying with VNAV engaged and indicating a 0.2 NM lateral deviation. ATL asked if they were direct RONII; the FMS indicated they were but a vector was given.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Weather; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I was working during an arrival bank. The bank was much busier than normal because of numerous diversions due to weather earlier during the Cargo Bank. I had strong winds out of the south; a handoff that was training at the time; and offloads. Aircraft X checked in on the arrival and I descended the aircraft to 13;000 feet; which he read back. I had aircraft Y on the arrival that I was sequencing in front of aircraft X. I descended aircraft Y to 14;000 feet; then slowed aircraft X to 230 knots. I then went back to aircraft Y and descended him to 11;000 feet.Aircraft X took aircraft Y's instructions and descended to 11;000 feet. I did not hear the incorrect read back at the time; likely hearing only '[the similar flight number]' and incorrectly interpreting that this was aircraft Y. Aircraft X was around 12;000 feet when I noticed that the aircraft had descended below the 12;700 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA). I advised aircraft Y to maintain 13;000 feet; then went back and told aircraft X to stop his descent; and advised the aircraft later to maintain 12;000 feet. I realized that aircraft X had taken aircraft Y's instructions when aircraft Y was still level at 14;000 feet; and expedited the aircraft to 11;000 feet again.Aircraft X was given a brasher warning for a pilot deviation; but I missed the readback when I should not have. I was extremely busy at the time with complex traffic and numerous vectors instead of RNAV's; but I still feel that I missed it at a bad time. At the time of this mix-up; my handoffs were on the line with another sector and Traffic Management Unit (TMU); unable to hear the readback from the aircraft. At the same time of this arrival bank; numerous aircraft were departing a satellite airport right into my downwind sequence. I very well may have been talking to my handoff at the time of the missed readback as well; but I do not know for sure. This event definitely hit my psyche as my last 3 arrivals in sequence were not to my normal standard of work; and one offload was high in the downwind to bear.First of all; I should have listened better to the readback and caught it. I pride myself on catching incorrect readbacks and have caught numerous in the past. I can't explain why or how I missed this one and I am extremely disappointed for my failure to do so. I believe that specifically the traffic volume; complexity; and the fact that I had training on handoff could have contributed to this event. Ultimately; my responsibility as a controller is to catch the pilot's error to prevent this from occurring.One thing I most certainly would have changed was the releases off of the satellite airport. This was a particularly busy arrival bank with lots of sequence calls to be made with the arrivals from ZLC. Offloads were called for my sector simply to facilitate the release of traffic underneath my arrival downwind into SLC. I easily could have missed aircraft below if they didn't get handed off or check in immediately; especially when these departures were on a 110 heading towards the mountains with 11;800 and 12;700 foot MVAs. I had to vector these aircraft not on the SID and control their speeds to blend them into a sequence that I made without these aircraft 20 miles prior to the satellite departures tagging on my scope.As a controller; my job is definitely to handle the volume; but I feel that sector overload could easily have been prevented by holding these departures on the ground for literally no more than 5 minutes to provide a safe and efficient traffic flow instead of stacking the downwind multiple times and introducing undue risk in the system. My handoffs were both on the line at the time of the missed readback directly because of offloads being called. TMU called after things had already been coordinated for a sequence and interrupted the handoff when they otherwise would have been involved in the sector. Ultimately; I missed the readback and take responsibility; but sector overload; traffic management; weather; and complexity played a direct role in this event.

Controller reported that during a busy arrival session he missed the wrong aircraft acknowledging a descent clearance. The aircraft descended below the minimum vectoring altitude.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 120

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Airplane departed TEB [with] clearance altitude of 1;500 FT MSL. At approximately 1;300 FT MSL an amber CAS message [alerted] 'ELEVATOR TRIM FAIL' and 'AUTOPILOT TRIM FAIL.' The airplane was being hand flown and went to 1;700 FT for about 1 second and returned to 1;500 FT. ATC queried us and at the moment they asked we were at 1;590 FT MSL. The CAS messages only lasted about 15 seconds. There were no separation issues. The airplane was trimmed for takeoff. The trim failure was short lived; but distracting and at a bad time. Electronic airplanes - gotta love them!

A G550 over shot the TEB RUUDY 4 initial level off altitude of 1;500 FT because both elevator and autopilot trim systems momentarily failed and so the aircraft did not level until the pilot manually returned to 1;500 FT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Type 401

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were taxiing out in ZZZ and had an extended delay on the ground due to thunderstorms in the area. Initially we taxied on only the number one engine. After about 20 minutes; we started the second engine. About 20 minutes later after getting a second reroute from ATC; the number 2 engine was shut down. Shortly thereafter the advisory system activated the fuel system display on the lower ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) page for a fuel imbalance. The center tank and left main tanks were full; and the right main tank indicated about 7900 pounds. I expected a lower fuel value in the left tank since we had run the APU and number one engine for an extended time; so this did not make any sense. We were in the middle of reprogramming the FMGC (Flight Management Guidance Computer) when the ECAM for Fuel Auto Fuel Feed Fault appeared. As we were doing the ECAM; the aircraft behind us reported fuel leaking from the left wing. ATC called the fire equipment; and within three minutes they were surrounding the airplane. We started the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit); and once it was online; the number one engine was shut down. I called the flight attendants and told them the fire trucks were on their way; and we are not evacuating. I then made an announcement to the passengers. Once the fuel pumps were turned off; the fuel leak stopped. After discussions with operations and the emergency personnel; we decided to tow the airplane to the gate. Once at the gate; the passengers were deplaned via the jet bridge. After some calculations and talking to ZZZ Maintenance; we determined that right main tank leaked into the center tank. Once the center tank was full; fuel got rerouted to the left main tank. Once that was full; fuel poured out the left wing ventilation system. We estimated that we lost about 1800 pounds of fuel on the taxiway.

Extended taxi in ZZZ (1 hour). We had pulled off onto taxiway W short of U to get a reroute from clearance. An aircraft behind us transmitted on ground frequency that we had a large fuel leak coming from our left wing. Initially we had no ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) or other warning/knowledge of this event. The CA (Captain) pulled up the fuel page and we saw a large discrepancy in the fuel totals of the wing tanks. I started the APU (auxiliary Power Unit) after confirming with the CA; because without it; the aircraft would have no electrical power once we shut the #1 engine down (#2 was not running). The Ground Controller rolled the trucks and hazmat team. We ran the ECAM; made sure the engines were secured and turned off all fuel pumps. We arranged for a tug to come to the aircraft and worked with operations to find us a gate to return to. We were towed back to the terminal; the passengers deplaned; and the maintenance team met us at the aircraft. CA worked with Maintenance and wrote up the malfunction.

Flight Crew taxiing A320 encountered fuel spill from wing vent system.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 550

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was instructed by the ZZZ1 Tower after taking off on Runway XR to follow another small aircraft who had taken off before me before turning right downwind to depart to the north east. I was expecting to get clearance through the [ZZZ] Class B because the Tower had indicated so. The aircraft I was following never turned crosswind; so I initiated my turn and was a little faster than normal climb because I was trying to stay below 1;800 feet which was the bottom of the Class B airspace straight ahead. In turning right to depart to the east; I clipped the corner of the Class B surrounding ZZZ2 just to the north of ZZZ1. The Tower asked if I was familiar with the airspace around ZZZ1 and I stated that I am and that I had clipped the corner of the Class B and was expediting turning south. I thought the bottom at that point was 1;800 feet and I remained below 1;800 feet before getting south of that corner; however; after landing at home ZZZ3; I checked my actual track and saw that at that point where I briefly went in to the Class B it exists from ground to 10;000 feet; not 1;800  feet to 10;0000 as I had thought. In this particular area the Class B just to the west of me showed 1;800 feet to 10;000 feet which is what I saw on my chart. Tower thanked me for getting out quickly and handed me off to ZZZ Departure who gave me an unrestricted climb to 10;500 feet; my filed encounter altitude. Departure never specifically cleared me through the Class B to the east which has a base of 4;800 feet and top of 10;000 feet; but they did give me an unrestricted climb to 10;500. It's possible that I was above 4;800 feet; on my climbout which also would have been flight in to the Class B without a specific clearance which I failed to ask for.I have flown down to ZZZ1 3 times in the past few months and because of the reduced traffic during COVID I've been cleared through the Class B and even offered it by ATC without asking; which is unusual. ATC is very pleasant in that area; but I thought I should report this to help others with this type of potential confusion. ZZZ1 gets a lot of local flights and the Tower issues quite a few follow another aircraft instructions as well as 'stay south of highway XXX that only locals would know; I presume to stay away from the nearby Class B airspace from the ground to 10;000 feet.

GA pilot reported a Class B airspace violation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 400

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was on a VFR flight. There was a crosswind on Runway 5 and I was practicing crosswind landing. This approach was stabilized and normal until on final just before touchdown when a sudden gust of wind lifted my upwind (left) wing. While correcting for the sudden gust the right wing touched the runway and the aircraft ground looped into the grass between the runway and taxiway. There were no injuries during this event.

M20 pilot reported while correcting for a crosswind gust during landing; the wing tip contacted the ground which resulted in a loss of control and runway excursion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft differences issues. As I sit here and study updates to manuals (FOM; Ops Specs; AOM; Systems Manual; What's New And Why B757-767; FSB; FOIB; MISC) I am trying to find information on the N391; N392; N393 and N395 Lower Cargo Fire Panel; as well as the N391-N395 Bulk Cargo Heat selector Now maybe I am not looking in the right place; but I have scanned through the following on my iPad: AOM Rev 63 SYS Rev 39 What's New and Why [recent] update All the FOIBs FSBs Flight Safety News Training Folder B757-767 Vault Now I am guessing these are the 'Dry Lease' airplanes and they might not be on property yet; but the preflight info is still in the AOM The only mention I have located is in the AOM under the preflight section on page 451; where the switch and lights preflight is listed. I can find no pictures; diagrams or even system description in the Systems Manual (where it belongs.) As I look at AOM page 451; it strikes me how many differences there are listed on that single page. Besides the above mentioned items; there is also an item unique to N301-N334 as well as N335-N364 and N391-N395. So I decided to count the Preflight differences that are not 757/767 specific; but rather tail number specific from the AOM Preflight section and I came up with 45 listed differences spread over the fleet with all the various configurations. We now have 2 airframes (757-767); 3 wings (757-767-767 winglets); 4 engine types (757 2037-2040; 757RR; 767GE) and I am not sure how many different cockpit configurations ALL of which might be CFD (Central Flight Display) or LDS (Large display System.) I know this is a lot of information to process the way I have written it; but that is roughly what we're dealing with out on the line. Imagine a tail swap at 4:30AM into something you have never seen before (I have yet to see a 767BCF cockpit; but I'm supposed to have it figured out from reading the manual.) In the interest of safety; I think you should produce a tail number specific video with the differences pointed out. Perhaps a 757 P&W with RR differences highlighted. A 767 N301-N334 with newer model/BCF/Dry Lease differences highlighted. I'm sure this could be done with a handful of 2-3 minute videos for each difference. That way I can quickly review my tail swap differences during preflight; and it would greatly enhance safety and initial training learning.

Captain reported that AOM's do not accurately reflect differences between aircraft and additional training would be of great help.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Cleared direct to ZZZZZ which is a fix on the RNAV XX with clearance to turn to 180 heading after crossing ZZZZZ. Descent issued by Approach to 2;500 feet which crew acknowledged. The 180 heading was preset on the heading bug by PM (Pilot Monitoring). Night conditions prevailed and airport was not yet in sight; however; I was beginning to pick up airport beacon. As we approached ZZZZZ; while still in descent; I began making out the Runway (XXR). As PF (Pilot Flying)/PM were visually confirming; the aircraft began a smart turn to the inbound course of the RNAV approach. This momentary startle effect caused me to reach up and select HDG mode. The only thing I can think of is that I must have bumped the alt select knob and lowered it; as CDFA minimums of 1;250 feet got posted on the AAD (Automatic Activation Device). As PF/PM agreed runway was in sight and before we could inform Approach; the aircraft had passed through 2;500 feet and we received a low alt alert from Approach. I immediately disconnected autopilot and stopped descent. Approach verified we had the field in sight; which we confirmed; and then were cleared for the visual. I began the descent again and maintained profile till landing. At no time were any [Ground Proximity Warning System] warnings encountered; and aircraft was configured and stable by all SOPs.I cannot confirm that I reset the AAD device; however; it must have been bumped or turned initially when the smart turn began; because as I stated prior; the smart turn caught me off guard as we both were looking outside acquiring the runway visually. This was a beautiful night with VMC conditions; however the placement of the runway in surrounding lights and the fact that the Initial Fix and Final Approach Fix legs are doglegs complicated visual orientation. I should have just asked for the approach off of ZZZZZ.

Citation 680 Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on a night visual approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 180; Flight Crew Type 20

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Enroute from to 0G0; [I] used ATC flight following. ATC informed me that destination was at [12 o'clock upon] terminating services and switching to frequency 123.0. Had runway 10/28 in sight and began calling position reports on CTAF 123.0. I did not realize I was entering the pattern at KIAG. I landed on runway 10 (as was the plan for 0G0) and cleared the runway. Upon clearing right; I noticed military aircraft [and] began to question the information in the AF/D. I noticed an FBO on the other side of the runway (10) so crossed using taxiway A2. Crossing the runway I noticed the tower and cleared the runway as quickly as possible on to a closed taxiway. I then held short; located myself 10 miles west of destination and contacted tower on 118.5 and followed instructions. Factors contributing to this deviation are inexperience; unfamiliarity with area and failure of GPS.

Private pilot landed at wrong airport; 10 miles from original destination.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

The inbound aircraft arrived late and the crew was hustling trying to get the outbound flight out on time. The FO and I were still getting ourselves situated in the cockpit as the passengers were boarding. The boarding complete; the FA handed us the passenger count and baggage sheet and asked if the Main Cabin Door could be closed. I said 'Yes' and she shut the door. As I looked out the left direct vision window; I saw one of the ground handlers flash the 'Release Brakes' hand signal. It should be noted that neither of us had our headsets plugged in at this point. The doors all indicated shut on the MFD and I released the parking brake to capture the OUT time. Moments later the FO said; 'He wants to know if he can pull the GPU.' I said; 'We're not on GPU'. The ELEC MFD page showed the GPU at zero volts the APU on bus. 'I made this sign' he said; indicating the 'Remove PC Air' hand signal. Suddenly the pushback began. I flashed the nose landing light to try and get the tug operator's attention. When that had no effect I turned on Hydraulic Pump 2 and began gently applying the wheel brakes to stop the aircraft from moving. I reasoned that a slow stop would be better for all involved than a quick stop by pulling up the parking brake suddenly. I reached for the hand mic and transmitted; 'STOP THE PUSH!' on the off chance that the tug operator had a headset on. Then there was a big thump and the airplane stopped. The ground handlers made the 'Set Brakes' hand signal and I set the brake. After fishing out the headset and establishing communications; we learned that the towbar had failed. The towbar head had been bent up at a 90 degree angle and wedged itself against both nosewheel assemblies. After removing the damaged towbar; we called Maintenance Control and they contacted the contract Maintenance provider. I sent three pictures to Maintenance Control via email so that they could more clearly understand what had happened. The contract mechanic completed his inspection; coordinated with Maintenance Control and determined that no further action was required. We proceeded to our destination without further incident.

While rushing their cockpit preparation due to a short airplane switch; the flight and ground Crews of an E-145 failed to coordinate their pushback communications and the Captain's attempt to bring the pushback to a stop by applying brakes while the tractor was pushing caused a massive failure of the tow bar.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 70

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 8040; Flight Crew Type 1750

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were preparing to depart to BFI to end the work day. As I was running the After Battery flows/checks; I noticed that our Back-Up Battery was not testing correctly. We knew the battery itself was working but the test light was not illuminating and the light inside of the Stand-by Attitude Gyro was also not illuminating. My captain; and I brought out the MEL to see what we could do about the issue. After reading the MEL and speaking with maintenance about it; we decided we could & were allowed to take off VFR with the Stand-By Attitude Gyro 'Inop'; as long as we stayed under the clouds. I had never flown [this] aircraft VFR and since I have little experience with the airplane; I was hesitant on doing so. After talking with dispatch; we were released. The Captain and I came up with a route and a plan on how we would get back to Seattle safely and legally & so we decided to take off. Now; at this point; even after reviewing the current weather and forecast weather; which indicated that we could make the flight possible with no issues; I had not realized the severity of this decision until further on into the flight. For this leg; I was the pilot flying and the Captain was the pilot monitoring. After our initial climb-out; the Captain had mentioned that he wanted to take control of the airplane once we were going to descend and fly through the pass we had planned for since he had experience flying through this specific area of terrain. The original pass we wanted to fly through was Snoqualmie Pass. Once we were nearing Ellensburg VOR; we initiated a positive exchange of control and had begun our descent. He leveled off and passed the city of Cle Elum at 1;500 Feet AGL. The plan was to pass the 3 lakes ahead; Cle Elum; Kachess; and Keechelus. Once we reached Keechelus Lake; we were to follow it northbound to arrive in the Snoqualmie pass. This is when my doubts of a successful flight began.Upon entering the South side of Keechelus Lake; it was apparent that there was no way we could make it without inadvertently going IMC. The pass and peaks around it were covered with an overcast layer. This was when I made my first attempt at voicing my opinion that I did not feel it was safe to continue. I then asked the Captain to return or at the very least; turn around & get out of the situation we were about to be in. He tried to assure me that there were other routes and passes we had as options. His new plan was to follow the I-90 Highway near Bandera until we made it past the terrain. It was at this point that I again; voiced my concerns about the continuation of this flight. I knew once we passed the ski area; things were only going to get worse. I saw that with each attempt I made to speak up with my concern; it wasn't the Captain I was talking to anymore. I was talking to a pilot who almost; in a way; wanted to prove to himself that he could make this flight happen. Whenever I voiced my concerns; he either ignored it; or replied in a way that made my opinion feel irrelevant and childish. This continued as the airplane continued down the pass. As this was happening; I really felt trapped. I felt that there was nothing else I could do but try and talk some sense into him. Looking back now; I know I should have taken control of the airplane.As we continued down the pass; visibility was only getting worse. Rain began to fall. The Captain had to slow down to around 180 Knots just to keep in control of the situation. At this point; the GPWS had begun to go off and stayed on for the remainder of the time we were in the pass. The Captain had complete disregard for the alarm. As we neared a bend in the I-90; I could feel my absolute limit coming up. There were two specific peaks I remember being on either side of the I-90. One at 5;584 Feet MSL and the other at 5;162 Feet MSL. Looking as far forward as I could; I couldn't even see the tops of these peaks or even some of the other surrounding mountains. It came to the point where Iknew we made the turn around the bend; it would be a death sentence. This is when I began calling the Captain by his first name; trying to snap him out of the mindset he had. I had attempted 4+ times; warning him that we were not going to make it past the bend. Not only did I now have to worry about the bend; but also how we were going to make a full 180 Degree turn in the tightest point of this pass. Finally; after at least 10 more seconds after my last plead to turn the airplane around; the Captain realized that he needed to turn around. He asked for Flaps 15 and to call out the airspeed as it decreased in the turn. Even with a steep turn; it was a close call. Once the airplane had made a full 180 Degree turn; we returned to our original point of entry; Keechelus Lake. After escaping the situation we had been in and exiting the harsh conditions; I voiced one last recommendation. I recommended that we returned to our original departure airport; for the night. Instead; the Captain insisted that we pick up an IFR flight plan in the air and return to Seattle. And so; after experiencing what we just did; I agreed and contacted ATC. We then continued the flight normally without any problems back to BFI. Looking back now; there were a number of times that I; as a First Officer; failed to act on my instincts. I feel like there were a number of things I could have done. I could have declared an emergency to 121.5 or any surrounding ARTCC or even taken control of the airplane. In a way; I feel like I let this incident happen by not taking control of that airplane. While everything was happening; I really felt as if my experience was surpassed by the Captain's. Also; the situation was so delicate that I felt that fighting for control over the airplane would have been a costly decision as well. And it was for that reason I allowed him to keep control of the airplane. I know that was the wrong decision to make; and it was a decision that almost cost me my own life. This experience taught me a life lesson: To never allow a captain or anyone else push or set your own personal limits and to understand that even though I am second in command; sometimes it is necessary to take control of the situation. It is my duty as SIC to make sure the flight is completed in a safe and legal manner. And I should never allow another person to make choices that will put everyone on board and the airplane at risk.

The planned flight was to go IFR to BFI. After loading the aircraft; closing the door and getting ready to start the aircraft; it was it was determined that the Standby Horizon was not working properly. I called dispatch and informed him of the issue and was transferred to Maintenance for a Field Deferral. Maintenance deferred the Standby horizon with MEL restrictions limiting the flight to 'Day VFR Only and No VFR Over the Top.' I was transferred back to dispatch and advised him of the maintenance issue and the new MEL restrictions that were in place. I remembered from the weather brief that I had recently received via DUAT.com that the weather at both departure  and arrival stations was VFR but that there were clouds over the cascades; but when I was looking at the weather the flight was going to operate IFR I didn't focus on the details of the area forecast for the Cascades. I did not print the weather report out and therefore didn't have it readily available in the cockpit when I was talking to dispatch. I asked the dispatcher what the weather was like and he reported that it was VFR at BFI; with no detail about weather over the Cascades. The route of flight was altered to be more direct than our original IFR routing but more importantly to take us over Snoqualmie Pass which has the lowest terrain for crossing the mountains in the area and our best option to complete the flight and comply with the MEL restrictions and a new release was received.The flight took off with the Flight Controls (FO) at the controls under VMC/VFR conditions. As we approached ELN it was apparent that it was going to be challenging to comply with the No VFR Over the Top MEL restriction since there were low clouds obscuring the mountains. I took control of the aircraft for this portion of the flight (though forgot to transfer the autopilot control transfer switch to my side) since I was more familiar with the terrain and the routing over the pass. We followed the Interstate towards the pass and were being pushed lower and lower by lowering cloud bases. The FO was starting to voice some concern as to our ability to continue due to clouds blocking our path and the valley we were flying up getting narrower. As we reached the top of the pass we were at approximately 4;200 Feet MSL which depending on exactly where we were was anywhere from 1;000 Feet to 2;000 Feet AGL and trying to determine if I could make out enough of the valley on the other side of the pass to continue. I found a break in the clouds and recognized the interstate on the other side of the pass so continued over the ridge crossing it at about 1;300 Feet AGL after crossing the pass the clouds and visibility dropped quickly and I called for the FO to bring flaps to 15 degree as I descended to 3;700 Feet MSL; so we could fly slower and have a smaller radius of turn should we need it. The FO further stated that he was uncomfortable with our position. Shortly after crossing the ridgeline at the pass in the vicinity Bandera (4W0) the cloud bases dropped to the valley floor; our GPWS warning started to activate and I executed a steep 180 degree turn to keep from entering IMC; and returned up the valley and back over the pass and down the other side now in good VFR and continued towards ELN. Both the FO and I were frazzled with the predicament I had put us in. When we were able to climb VFR to an altitude we could contact ATC; about 15 miles from ELN; I decided that it would be better to pick up an IFR clearance to BFI than to continue VFR over the top of the clouds; to better facilitate a descent into the Seattle area. We picked up an IFR clearance and continued to BFI under IFR. Now under ATC control I activated the heading and altitude portion of the auto pilot and the FO noticed about 30 seconds later that the aircraft was about 30 degrees off our assigned heading; and that is when I noticed that the autopilot transfer switch was not set to my side and so the autopilot was not following my flight director but the FO's side which didn't have the flight director active. The flight was continued without further incident to BFI. A standard weather brief that was not readily available to the crew in the cockpit to reference the details. A seeming lack of understanding on the dispatcher's part of how the MEL restrictions would affect the flight with regard to enroute weather. And no contingency plan was discussed incase weather was an issue and we were not able to complete the flight under the MEL restrictions. Failure of the crew to take the time to obtain the area forecast details and inform the dispatcher of those details and how it will affect the flight.I was feeling some pressure to get the flight moving quickly since we were already delayed with the mechanical issue. The crew did not transfer the autopilot control transfer switch when the controls were transferred from the FO to the Captain. Also the nonflying pilot did not have his flight director activated and mirroring the flying pilot's flight director.The FO didn't have a clear understanding that we were going to have to be under the clouds and not able to fly over the clouds putting us down below the ridge topes; and upon clearing up this misunderstanding; he mentioned that he did not have much experience with flight in low VFR conditions in his previous 600 hours of flying experience.When the FO first started to voice his concerns we were still in a wide portion of the valley and were substantially (1;500 Feet-2;000 Feet) below the cloud bases and 2;500 Feet-3;000 Feet AGL with unlimited visibility blow the clouds. I attributed his concern more to a lack of experience than to a warranted concern at this point.I didn't fully understand the level of the FO's uncomfortableness with the situation as the flight progressed and I feel that if the FO had used the words 'Captain; you must listen...' as outlined in our CRM training; I may have better understood his level of concern but; I shouldn't have let our situation get that far.Looking back at the event I notice there were some 'hazardous attitudes' that I was displaying. There was a level of excitement for a flight that was more challenging and unusual than our normal every day flight. This excitement I had for a change to the monotony of everyday flights was a factor in my decision making.  I am a senior captain and I know this area/terrain well. I can overcome this challenge and complete the flight to get the job done.I recognize this is a scenario I have read about in other accident investigations; flying up a mountain pass into deteriorating weather; but I am better than that and it won't happen to me.Anti-Authority thoughts: The MEL restriction is silly; you would have to have 5 generators fail before we would be down to the Standby Horizon.This flight should have gone one of two ways.1. The weather over the pass should have been discussed and a decision to not depart made.2. If the decision to depart was made; to have turned around at the first voice of concern from either crew member and to have either terminated the flight short of the destination or return to the departure airport; and have made and coordinated this plan ahead of time and with Dispatch.

Light twin flight crew describes an attempted VFR flight through Snoqualmie Pass in an attempt to remain in VMC to comply with an MEL. After passing through the pass the clouds lower to the surface and a very tight turn is required to maintain VFR and avoid the terrain. Once clear an IFR clearance is picked up to destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 13900; Flight Crew Type 9000

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

Shortly after departure the flight attendants reported visible smoke in the cabin. We declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport and made an uneventful landing on Runway 30L. We exited Runway 30L at Taxiway Kilo since crash-fire-rescue (CFR) equipment was standing by and blocking Taxiway Juliet. As we exited the runway the Tower Controller asked if we needed further assistance. My response was to ask if the CFR truck could see any smoke. The Tower had to repeat my request to the CFR truck [that] was apparently operating on a different frequency; causing a delay between communications and extra task-loading for the Tower Controller. While I was busy talking to the Tower; the Captain continued to taxi the aircraft and crossed Runway 30R which we visually confirmed was clear of traffic. The problem is that I do not remember receiving explicit instructions to cross Runway 30R. I am very confident that we did not receive a hold-short clearance because the Tower Controller was busy talking to the CFR truck; and I am sure I never read back a hold short instruction. I am not confident; however; that a crossing clearance was ever issued. By the time I realized that we were not going to stop; it was too late to say anything to the Captain that would have prevented us from entering Runway 30R. We may have been issued a crossing clearance and I simply missed it.  My expectation; however; was that the Captain was going to stop the aircraft short of Runway 30R.  After crossing; I said to the Captain 'Did we have clearance to cross' and he stated that he was sure that we had been given a crossing clearance. We proceeded to the gate uneventfully. Neither the Tower Controller or Ground Controller made any mention of any violation. Non-normal communications and communications occurring on different frequencies were factors in this event. Confusion arose from trying to communicate simultaneously with the Tower and with the CFR equipment while clearing the runway and before the aircraft was stopped. Under normal circumstances; the first communication we expect after landing is a clearance to cross or hold short of any parallel runway. In this case; the Tower and flight crew had the additional task of trying to determine if smoke was coming from the aircraft and if CFR action was immediately necessary. Crew task loading and perceptions were also factors. My task loading was probably higher than the Captain's because I was involved in non-normal communications with both the Tower and CFR equipment. My perception was that we were not cleared across Runway 30R while the Captain's perception was that we had indeed received clearance. Since the Tower and Ground Controllers never alerted us to any violation; the Captain's perception was probably correct. Tower task loading was also a factor. In the future; I would first confirm any taxi or hold-short instructions before answering additional questions from the Tower or engaging in non-normal communication with the Tower or CFR equipment. We normally brief our intended runway exit and taxi route as part of our descent briefing; but during an emergency I would recommend that we also brief our intention to stop the aircraft before communicating with CFR equipment.

An A320 crew declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport after flight attendants reported smoke in the cabin and in the after landing confusion may have crossed a parallel runway without clearance.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 142

Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was returning to ADS from a training flight with a student and was in contact with Dallas Fort Worth 'Regional Approach' TRACON. I was conducting the flight under VFR at the time. I was in contact with Regional Approach because ADS is a unique Class D airport in that they require all pilots to contact Regional Approach for sequencing into the airport. At no time was I ever in the Class B airspace; however it is still required for VFR pilots to contact Regional Approach. This requirement is explicitly mentioned in all of ADS's ATIS broadcasts. After contacting Regional Approach; I was assigned a squawk code and given instructions to enter a left base for Runway 15. It should be noted that the Approach Controller was extremely busy from the point I made contact with him and the point where he switched me over to Tower. After being assigned a squawk code I was getting closer and closer to ADS as I was flying directly to the field to enter a left base for Runway 15. The Approach Controller never replied back to my squawk code with the standard procedure of identifying me as a radar contact and giving me my position. As I got closer and closer to ADS Class D airspace; I became concerned that I would enter the airspace without being switched over to Tower and having the chance to identify myself and have them read back my call sign. All that is required for an aircraft to enter Class D airspace is a readback of the aircraft's callsign by the air traffic controller in the ATC Tower. This is where my confusion began. I was not clear on whether the TRACON Controller's readback of my callsign allowed me to enter Class D airspace since that airspace does not belong to the TRACON Controller. Because of my concern I tried numerous times to clarify with the TRACON Controller whether or not I could enter the Class D airspace without talking to the Tower Controller. In my previous experience operating to and from ADS; I had always been switched to tower prior to entering Class D airspace. The TRACON Controller was too busy and did not respond for clarification. I decided that I would make a 360 turn at my current position about one mile outside of the Class D airspace boundary to ensure that I did not enter any airspace without acknowledgement. I announced that intention to the TRACON Controller and again received no response. The TRACON Controller finally acknowledged me as I was rolling out of my 360 degree turn and announced that I should enter a left base for Runway 15. About two miles outside of the Class D airspace I was finally told to contact the Tower and I landed without further confusion or incident. I believe that this set up of contacting Regional Approach prior to contacting ADS Tower provides a confusing and non-standard situation to pilots operating under VFR to ADS. Unlike a Class C airport or a Class D airport with TRSA; the VFR pilot assumes he must have his call sign acknowledged by the Class D ATC Tower prior to entering its airspace. There is no such guidance for the type of setup at ADS. The only information about this practice is included in the ATIS broadcast and is limited to the phrase 'all VFR arrivals contact Regional Approach on 124.25 prior to contacting Tower.'

Small aircraft Instructor Pilot; unable to obtain handoff from a busy Regional Approach Controller for entry into the ADS Class D airspace; executed a 360-degree turn outside of the airspace before being cleared to enter a left base for Runway 15. Pilot was not handed off to the Local Controller until two miles inside the Class D airspace and noted the lack of information available as to the proper airspace entry procedure for this airport.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The Captain was the pilot flying and I was the pilot not flying on this particular leg. After Tower cleared us for takeoff; the Captain advanced the power levers to the normal takeoff position and we began our roll down the runway. As the power levers were set; the overspeed warning horn came on and the Captains altimeter flagged and displayed an altitude of 60;000 FT. In addition; the vertical speed indicator fluctuated between an excessive climb and an excessive descent. Upon detection of the issue; we decided to reject the takeoff and notify ATC of the rejection. As we taxied back to the gate; the overspeed warning horn continued to go off. As soon as we arrived back at the gate; the Captain contacted Operations to notify them of the rejection; and then proceeded to contact Maintenance. In the meantime; we were instructed to deplane the passengers; and proceeded to do so. Shortly after; we were assigned a new aircraft to complete our flight.

DHC100 First Officer reports a rejected takeoff after the Captain's IAS overspeed warning sounds and his altimeter shows 60;000 FT. During the taxi back to the gate the overspeed warning continues to sound.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 254; Flight Crew Total 1868; Flight Crew Type 1868

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

After pushing back we started both engines for the short taxi to runway one. After holding short of runway four we were told to cross the runway and to proceed to the block. Shortly after heading towards the block we started the before takeoff checklist and the moment we started that the tower asked us if we were ready for takeoff. I replied yes after getting the ok from the Captain to do so. At that point I was heads down rushing to finish the full before takeoff checklist. The tower instructed us without delay to line up and wait runway one. There was an airplane on final for our runway. I replied runway one line up and wait. As we approached the hold short line the tower said intersection Echo runway one line up and wait. I replied runway one at Echo line up and wait and then we were given the takeoff clearance. The before takeoff checklist was extremely rushed due to the traffic on final and we took off. I didn't realize until climb out when I was able to look at the chart exactly why the tower said echo line up and wait that the captain didn't stay on Juliet but he turned a bit early on to echo instead. Me being heads down trying to accomplish our new very long number verifying checklist had my eyes off of what the Captain was doing that and the fact that we were rushing. That isn't the first time this new cumbersome checklist has had me heads down for a period of time while taxiing. The takeoff was without incident but it was definitely an eye opener as to how being rushed and how this new checklist can take the first officer out of the game.

B737 FO reported that new before takeoff checklist resulted in a heads-down moment for the FO that led to a taxiway incursion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated

During flight at FL350 we received a master warning for smoke aft lav. I transferred controls to my First Officer and then proceeded to call the flight attendants asking them to check for smoke. They said there was no smoke; and the message extinguished. Moments later it came back on and we ran the full QRH procedure. We diverted to ZZZ. As we were descending and the QRH was completed we got a call from the flight attendants that the cabin was filling with smoke. We both donned our oxygen masks and then I told the FAs that when we land there is a potential for deplaning and to 'assess and wait for my command.' I then [notified ATC] and continued towards our diversion airport of ZZZ. The descent check was not completed as policy states and I asked the First Officer to just do it himself so I could focus on getting us to the airport as fast as possible; as we had a possible fire in the back of the aircraft. I deviated from the 250 knots below 10;000 feet to get the airplane on the ground quickly due to the nature of the situation. We came in visually for Runway XL and had a normal landing. I used brakes and reverser to stop on the runway and then turned the aircraft right ten degrees to face into the wind. As I set the parking brake and called for the deplaning/expedited deplaning QRC; I heard; saw; and confirmed on the EICAS that the main cabin door was opened and that deplaning had been initiated by the FAs. I told Tower immediately that we were deplaning as there was several fire trucks approaching. The FO [First Officer] read the QRC and I accidentally took a few of his actions as he read them. For example the EMER DEPRESS button.  This did not affect the outcome or timing of the deplaning. We completed the [checklist] in its entirety then followed our protocols when deplaning.  I was the last one off the aircraft and ensured everyone was off. Once off; grabbed the passenger count; iPad for the aircraft logbook; and a cell phone to contact company.  Once off the aircraft I performed a head count and ensured no one was injured along with the first responders. Followed all protocols for notifying the company.  During deplaning all doors were opened including the over wing exits.  No injuries and everyone was accounted for. Smoke in the aft cabin caused the FAs to initiate deplaning along with a smoke aft lav master caution.  Just aircraft Maintenance; however; things happen sometimes and we just deal with it when it happens.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a diversion due to 'cabin filling with smoke.'


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Bag arrived with battery installed. Battery was not removed at acceptance location per SOP.

Ramp personnel reported smart bag erroneously transported with battery installed in violation of company Hazmat Procedures.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

At 4;000 FT and 12 minutes from touchdown we received an EICAS message 'airspeed disagree.' We noted the Captain's and Standby ASIs were in agreement and the First Officer's was 10-12 KTS lower. The QRC directed to turn off flight directors; autopilot and auto throttle and land at nearest suitable airport. We were in IMC and weather reported for Runway 34L was IMC. Declared an emergency and continued the approach with raw data. At 1;200 FT lost the glide slope indication on the Captain's instruments so I flew cross cockpit using the First Officer's GSI until the Captain's glide slope indication came back at around 900 FT. Broke out at 400 FT and landed making the second high speed turnoff uneventfully.

[No substantive additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]

A B747-400 flight crew complied with the appropriate QRC; declared an emergency and landed uneventfully in IMC after receiving an airspeed disagree EICAS warning while being sequenced for landing at their destination.