Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Total 10628; Flight Crew Type 1432

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

The flight was normal up until the point where we transitioned from Manila (RPHI) to Fukuoka (RJJJ - JAPAN OCEANIC AREA) at MEVIN intersection on airway L625. We had been in continuous contact with Manila control via CPDLC and Manila radio on HF (after receiving a good SELCAL check upon entering Manila airspace between ANOKI and ARESI). About 5 min before crossing the FIR at MEVIN we received a CPDLC disconnect message indicating the link with Manila RPHI was terminated. We immediately signed-on to RJJJ and sent them a position report after they accepted the CPDLC sign-on. We could not raise Tokyo Radio on HF and we asked RJJJ via CPDLC for an HF frequency for Tokyo Radio. We received the following cryptic message; 'This is oceanic control. Contact control on VHF'. We touched Ball note #8 on the Jepp-Pro application. The communication block that came-up in FD-Pro was WORTHLESS INFORMATION! We touched-on the communication box in the pull-out menu on FD-Pro and it showed FUKUOKA CONTROL 118.9 and 119.35(secondary) - we received no response on either. We finally received a SELCAL from the last Manila Radio frequency and was told to contact NAHA control on 123.9. We made contact with NAHA and were chastised twice by the controller and again by the controller supervisor for being in their airspace for 10 min without contacting them! The High IFR chart in JEPP-PRO indicates the airspace belongs to RJJJ FIR -This is absolutely NOT TRUE! It belongs to NAHA Control on Okinawa! The Jeppesen high chart and the pull-out information box need to be updated to reflect this REALITY. The whole incident could be avoided with proper charts and/or a CPDLC or HF handoff from Manila Control to NAHA control. Manila simply terminated the CPDLC connection without comment and Manila radio failed to SELCAL us with the hand-off to NAHA control until 10 minutes after we had passed the FIR boundary.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported being out of contact for ten minutes in Fukuoka airspace due to a late hand off from Manila ATC and an error in ATC frequency information in the Jepp-Pro application.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction

Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

We planned an ILS-Y to [Runway] 13R into DAL. We were asked which runway we preferred and agreed to stick with our plan. Approaching FUZ on the arrival; ATC then said cleared the ILS-Z to [Runway] 13R; cross HURBS at/above 4;000 FT. First Officer (pilot flying) was changing out his approach charts while I (pilot not flying) had the ILS page ready and then selected the ILS-Z 13R on the CDU. When First Officer was ready; I asked if he was good with the selection; he said yes; and then I executed it. At that point we were in a turn to HURBS; and got a route discontinuity. As I wasn't positive we had passed FUZ yet; I wasn't comfortable selecting HURBS to the top and executing. So we asked for a vector and received one pretty quick; but I'm sure we overturned the turn to HURBS because by the time we got the vector; we were in CWS roll and not sure what heading to roll out on. I need to be 100% sure of the next go-to waypoint before executing a runway or approach change; so if this happens; we can correct immediately. It might also be helpful in DAL if they publish the ATIS saying expect ILS-Z to 13R and ILS-Y to 13L; or whatever the case is; so we can program much further out. But I need to execute more accurately. Changed to ILS-Z to 13R during descent near FUZ/got route discontinuity and asked for vector.

The reporter stated that both pilots viewed and confirmed the approach selection to ILS-Z 13R before it was executed. The events following the EXEC selection were very confusing and the reporter does not recall exactly what the FMS displayed other than a route discontinuity because he was busy trying to figure out what the airplane was doing. He did positively see the FMS transition to CWS ROLL and the pitch control remain in LVL CHG. The reporter is frustrated because making an approach and runway change should be a simple process.

We were on arrival into DAL and set up for the ILS Y 13R as that was the Captain's approach expectation based on his experience. Autopilot was engaged in LNAV and LVL CHG at 210 KTS with spoilers deployed. Approaching FUZ on the arrival; we were switched to DAL Approach and subsequently assigned the ILS Z 13R transition via HURBS. As the aircraft was in the turn to HURBS over the FUZ VOR; the Captain changed the approach in the FMC and for some reason the whole arrival reinserted itself; leaving us with a discontinuity as the 'TO' point. As a result; the Flight Director disappeared and the aircraft remained in its current bank. We recognized this quickly; but not before we'd turned about 50 degrees past the course heading. We immediately notified ATC and requested a vector to HURBS. We ended up just receiving vectors to the ILS 13R and completed the approach and landing uneventfully. I later asked the Captain if he had reselected the Arrival when changing the approach and he said he had not. I did not confirm his selections in the FMC before the changes were executed; so I cannot verify what the inputs were. Therefore; I do not know why the entire arrival reinserted itself.Establish clear; concise procedures for verifying FMC and MCP inputs. I also think it's probably a good technique to load the approach that includes the transition because switching to vectors is less complicated than switching to a transition. Plus; having an approach transition loaded provides the most accurate information regarding the progress of your descent (high or low).

An air carrier crew expected the ILS-Y 13R and programmed the FMS as such but after ATC assigned ILS-Z 13R over FUZ the FMS was reprogrammed and when EXECUTE was selected the FMS reinserted the entire arrival; the autopilot transitioned to CWS and the flight director command bars biased out of view. The aircraft turn about 50 degrees beyond a heading to HURBS from over FUZ.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Declared Emergency

Took off and assigned 180 heading immediately after switching to departure. Noticed the steady rumble at the controls also immediately after clean up. Commented to the Captain that something was wrong when we got a Master Caution and Generator OFF Light on left engine. Cabin chimed about that time to say passengers thought spoilers were up on left side. I took the radios and continued to fly and informed ATC that we were declaring an emergency and requested level off at next altitude coming up which was 11;000. I started the APU and asked for vectors back around to land at the departure airport. The descent and configuring for landing were still controllable though the rumble continued. The engine; other than the generator; operated normally. The landing was normal at flaps 30 with auto brakes 2. Weather was CAVU and wind 260/4. The cowling departed the aircraft on landing; and I assume when I went into reverse. It was retrieved on the runway. No leaks or other damage was noted by fire trucks so we taxied back to the gate. Lost cowling to left engine which also cut generator for that engine.

After takeoff and during climb out there was a distinct vibration though the aircraft. Left generator fell off line. Flight attendants called stating that there was a metal object standing up at the left engine. Upon executing the QRH procedures for the Generator OFF Light I was able to get the generator to come back on line. We declared an emergency and landed back at the departure airport. Post inspection found out that the left engine outboard cowling was ripped off the engine. Airport personnel found the cowling on the departure runway which we had landed on. Aircraft was taken out of service.

The Reporter stated that an access panel on the upper left side of the left engine cowl was apparently not latched or the latch failed on takeoff. The result was that the panel was sticking up and appeared to a passenger to be part of the wing. After the panel unlatched it cut the left generator white feeder lines inside the cowling which tripped the generator OFF. The Reporter stated that the wires at top of area inside the access area were black where the panel sliced into them. The generator did reset and remained on line. During landing the panel metal tore and separated leaving only a small portion of it at the connecting fixture point.

After takeoff B737-800 passengers reported a spoiler up and the Generator OFF light alerted so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where a left engine access panel was discovered missing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On initial descent cruise at FL270 for arrival; First Officer noticed System Display page Cabin PSI indication was abnormal in red. Immediately; we responded to Cabin PSI system page abnormality. As cabin altitude was showing 9;400 feet and climbing; I commanded oxygen masks on. We asked for immediate descent with ATC and [advised them] of altitude abnormal condition. Flight attendants were already seated and cabin secured as I advised of turbulence and requested early clean up and stay seated. Descent ended at 10;000 feet. Cabin altitude continued to climb over 11;000 feet. Proceeded to airport; and landing uneventful. No deployment of oxygen masks and no injuries or other incidents.

Air carrier Captain reported a malfunctioning pressurization system during descent requiring an immediate descent to a lower altitude.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 10200; Flight Crew Type 600

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 2500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Level cruise at FL390; eastbound on J42; east of BKW. Washington Center issued the following clearance to us. 'Descend now to FL350; maintain a descent rate of 1500 FPM or greater and then cross DENNY at FL330.' We read back the clearance exactly as it was issued; ('descend now to FL350 at 1500 FPM or greater and cross DENNY at FL330'); and immediately began our descent at 1500 FPM. The Controller did not reply and proceeded to communicate with other aircraft on the frequency; as expected. While in the descent; we calculated that a 1500 FPM descent would allow us to level at DENNY exactly at FL330 and planned to maintain that descent rate all the way down to FL330. After approximately 60-90 seconds; while descending through approximately FL370 the Controller said to us; 'Descend to FL350 and maintain a descent rate of 1500 FPM or greater.' We immediately read back 'we are descending to FL350 with a descent rate of 1500 FPM and will cross DENNY at FL330.' The Controller again did not reply and went on to communicate with other aircraft. We figured she issued the clearance again because either 1) she did not copy our original read back or 2) she was verifying our descent rate was at least 1500 FPM. While leveling at FL330 just west of DENNY; the Controller came on and told us we were only cleared to FL350. We replied that we were cleared to descend to FL350 immediately; at 1500 FPM or greater; and cross DENNY at FL330 and that we read that back twice. We then confirmed that we were level at FL330 and asked her what she wanted us to do now. She instructed us to maintain FL330 and said there was a misunderstanding. We maintained FL330 and continued the flight without incident.In my opinion; the second clearance was not clear. It never occurred to us that she was attempting to get us to level at FL350. (It appears to be much clearer when only our transmissions are highlighted; as in this report. However; in real time on a busy frequency; we did not comprehend the Controllers' intentions) I feel the clearance would have been easily understood if the Controller added only a few extra words; such as 1) 'descend to FL350 ONLY' 2) 'descend to FL350 and delete the crossing restriction at DENNY' or another variation of this.

No additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.

Imprecise clearance phraseology and the failure to confirm understanding of the clearance resulted in the flight crew of a DA-90 descending to an altitude not intended by the Controller.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 835; Flight Crew Type 440

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

I took off with flight following. I plotted a course to the North East that looked like it would sufficiently avoid the highest terrain on my climb out and also get me out of the busy airspace as soon as possible. Shortly after takeoff; the tower told me to contact approach and to stay under 2500 feet until instructed otherwise. Due to heavy radio traffic; I was unable to make contact and be acknowledged by approach for several minutes; during which time my climb out was delayed. Finally; approach acknowledged my call and allowed me to begin my climb out above 2500. Approximately 4 or 5 minutes later the controller called to ask if I was familiar with the local terrain. Not being from that area I responded 'negative'. She then informed me that I was triggering a terrain alert. I was not in immediate danger of terrain collision and I had sufficient room to perform a 180 degree turn if it appeared I could not gain sufficient altitude to clear the terrain ahead. Nevertheless; I decided it was best to ask the controller's advice. She told me she was about to loose my signal and transferred me to another controller. Upon making contact with the next controller; I was immediately asked if I could turn south without delay. I responded 'affirmative' and began the course reversal immediately. I asked the controller if I could maneuver in the area until I gained sufficient altitude to clear the terrain and proceed on course. This had been my plan from the beginning as there was sufficient room in the area for me to make a 360 degree climbing turn without coming close to the terrain. However; the controller asked that I proceed on a vector of 100 and continue climbing until told to do otherwise. He also told me that I had 'scared him to death'. I did as instructed; and was soon handed off to another controller who made no mention of the terrain alert. The vector I had been provided took me through a Pass and out of the [busy airspace]. The remainder of the flight proceeded without event.

A Beach Bonanza Pilot reported that ATC informed him that he triggered a terrain alert.


Potable Water Storage; control; indication

Workload; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

The aircraft came in with an MEL regarding the aircraft failing potable water test. After studying the MEL; the Captain and I believed the aircraft was not in compliance with the MEL. The plane was written up as having failed the test about a week ago. The Captain and I read the MEL to say that the aircraft had to be disinfected and retested within 48 hours of the failed test. The logbook did not indicate any retest or corrective action of any kind since the original test fail write-up. The Captain first talked with a line mechanic who said he thought we could go; but was not adamant about us taking the plane. Next; the Captain got on the phone with Maintenance Control. They indicated their interpretation was that the plane was good to go without any documentation of disinfecting or retesting. The Captain and I disagreed with them. Next; the Captain got on the phone with the Chief Pilot on Duty who seemed to be reading the MEL as well and said we could take the plane. The Captain; with my support; elected to refuse the airplane based on our evaluation of the MEL. At some point; the Captain was back on the phone with Maintenance; Dispatch; and the Chief Pilot. This time it seemed that there was concurrence that the MEL did require disinfecting and retesting; but that had already occurred. At this point; the Captain asked that a line mechanic come out and make a logbook entry indicating the required test had been accomplished. Maintenance Control said that was not going to happen. He [the Captain] asked that some form of documentation be sent to us to take with us in the logbook. That was not granted either. Maintenance Control told the Captain that there was a non-routine card where this type of information is recorded; and it is kept in a maintenance base file. They said the FAA checks with Maintenance Control any time this issue comes up. Neither the Captain nor I had ever heard of this document before today. Maintenance Control told the Captain that the disinfection and retest had been accomplished within 48 hours; it was on file in (city); and we were legal according to the MEL. We agreed that statement satisfied the MEL requirement; and we accepted the aircraft. We were puzzled by the lack of documentation provided to the crew to satisfy this MEL. Ultimately; the Captain and I just wanted a solid way to defend our decision to take the aircraft. With no documentation of the required disinfection and retest; we felt that we did not have legal defense for accepting the aircraft. It seems that crews need some information about the 'non-routine card.' MELs that are satisfied by documents that the crew doesn't have access to is problematic.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

A flight crew refused to fly a B737-800 after a logbook entry stated 'potable water failed EPA testing; needs disinfected' but did not contain a sign off after the required 48 hour compliance period.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After arriving at the [departure airport] gate; a Flight Attendant (FA) gave me a list of about 10 main cabin seatbelts that were installed upside down. The passenger would have to twist the seatbelt in order for the buckle to be right side up. I called Maintenance Control and told the Mechanic I was speaking to about the issue. He told me that he couldn't find anything in the Embraer (EMB) maintenance manual about passenger seatbelt installation.So I again described the position of the seatbelts and asked the same question again. Again; he gave me the same answer. So I asked them if they were okay and he told [me] he guesses so; since he can't find any info on them. So I hung up the phone without writing any of the seatbelts up in the maintenance logbook. I told the flight attendants what Maintenance Control told me. The outbound flight had a very light load so the flight attendants still made sure that no one was sitting in those seats.Upon arrival at the [destination airport] gate; one of my flight attendants told me about another broken item in the cabin so I wrote it up and called Maintenance. Contract maintenance came to the aircraft to fix that write-up and also asked me about the main cabin seatbelts. I explained to them the issue and they told me that they were indeed installed incorrectly and needed to be fixed. I wrote up all the affected seatbelts into the maintenance logbook and was then swapped planes through Dispatch. Upon arrival at the next aircraft the flight attendants also found 11 more main cabin seatbelts that were installed upside down so I wrote those seats up as well and contract maintenance reinstalled the belts; taking a lengthy delay.I don't know why; or how these seatbelts are being installed incorrectly; but I think it is safe to assume that there are probably many aircraft in our fleet that have this same issue; so I feel that this needs to be brought to the company's attention. Equipment malfunction.

Reporter stated he has been seeing a lot of flight crew write-ups for passenger seatbelts found twisted due to incorrect installation at passenger seats. The unlatching buckle ends up facing the passenger's body when the two belts are connected at the buckle. Even though flight attendants are no longer required to check for passenger seatbelts; they can still see the belts are installed incorrectly by the way the buckle part of the belt lays on the seats. Passengers also inform flight attendants about the twisted safety belts.Reporter stated the Maintenance Controller he spoke with didn't seem too concerned about the seat belt installations. At a later point in time; he (Reporter) was shown pictures from the Embraer Maintenance Manual indicating the correct installation for the main cabin passenger seat belts. He doesn't know if Maintenance is installing a large number of seatbelts at one time during an overnight check and do not realize they are incorrectly attached to the seats.

A Captain reported that on two separate flights involving two different company EMB-170 aircraft; flight attendants informed him that several main cabin passenger seatbelts were installed upside down; with the unlatching buckle twisted and facing passenger's body. On first flight; Maintenance Control said there was no information in maintenance manual; okay to go. Prior to second flight; Contract Maintenance said it must be corrected. Pilot suspects numerous other aircraft have same condition.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flying the DRLLR ONE arrival into IAH we complied with the descend via instructions with no issues. At the fix DOMNO the arrival and the flight plan in the FMS had VLDEZ after DOMNO on a 087 heading. With the autopilot on the FMS never started the turn to VLDEZ and continued on our heading through DOMNO; and kicked into ROL mode. The Captain was pilot flying and quickly took control and started a turn back on course.  ATC never inquired therefore we never brought it up. The rest of the arrival was normal. With both the pilot flying and pilot monitoring the undesired aircraft state was limited and quickly corrected. We were aware of going into ROLL mode at the end of the STAR but did not expect it at DOMNO. Realized the FMS did not make the turn to VLDEZ and take action before completely passing through DOMNO.

EMB145 First Officer reports his aircraft failing to turn for VLDEZ over DOMNO on the DRLLR 1 RNAV to IAH. Manual intervention is required to turn the aircraft toward VLDEZ.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 1700

Flying level at 15;500 and 220 knots (groundspeed); both pilots observed a black object with a small red payload hanging below. The object was in sight for only a couple seconds before it went above our right wing with about 10 feet of clearance. It is unclear if it was a drone or balloon of some type; but it appeared to be maintaining altitude. The object was reported to ATC.

Captain reported sighting an object (either a drone or balloon) close by his aircraft while flying at 15;500 feet.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We were filed and cleared via the SITTH 2 arrival into Atlanta. TCAS was deferred per MEL. Enroute ATIS for ATL was obtained and stated PRM approaches landing east were in use. After contacting Dispatch and consulting the Flight Manual; it was determined PRM approaches could not be conducted due to TCAS inoperative. ATL Approach Control was notified on initial contact and we were told to expect runway 9R. Approach then cleared us to descend via the SITTH 2 arrival. Shortly after; we received a runway change and were assigned runway 8L for landing and accomplished the required runway change items. Approach Control then cleared us direct GAASS (fix on SITTH 2 for 8L) and told us to descend and maintain 8000'. Both pilots acknowledged instruction and verified descent to 8000'. Approach Control handed us off to a different Approach frequency. Upon checking in on the new frequency; we were immediately told to stop our descent and climb to 11;000' and fly an assigned heading. We read back and complied with these instructions. We then explained to the Controller that the previous Controller had cleared us to descend to 8;000'. The Controller then cleared us direct KLOWD on the SITTH arrival. During downwind; we subsequently encountered moderate wake turbulence resulting in 40 degrees of bank left and right. ATC was notified of this event and no further turbulence was encountered. The arrival and approach were also completed with no further events. TCAS inoperative prevented PRM approaches and required ATC modified clearances; which eventually resulted in ATC miscommunication. Wake turbulence was an unrelated event to the TCAS inoperative; but resulted in an [upset situation]. The MEL for TCAS does not indicate PRM approaches may be affected. Additionally; neither the approach plates nor PRM notice to all users page indicate TCAS is required for PRM approaches. Only after consulting Dispatch and the FOM were we able to determine that we could not conduct a PRM approach without TCAS. We suggest a note be added to the MEL that indicates PRM approaches are not authorized per the Flight Manual.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported a clearance misunderstanding which resulted in an altitude overshoot during arrival into ATL.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Nearly an hour after sending the flight release; and only minutes before scheduled departure; an out of service MEL was placed on the aircraft for excessive oil consumption which maintenance needed to check out before the flight could be released for departure. However; being so close to departure time already; not myself; the crew; or even the dispatch coordinators knew anything about it; so the plane pushed back from the gate. Then I finally got the alert on my desk that the plane was tagged out of service and cannot depart. I contacted the crew; but in the end the coordinators allowed the plane to depart and simply cancelled the MEL; although this potentially serious issue still existed.I did not contact the crew on the radio; I only sent them an ACARS because I incorrectly assumed that such an issue would have been something the crew would have already known about; and should have already been in contact with maintenance. It wasn't until after the pilot called me that I found out he knew nothing about his plane being tagged out of service or having any oil issues. It seemed that this MEL was added without anyone else's knowledge for I don't know what reason; or how it was determined that the aircraft was having oil consumption issues without prior consultation with this pilot; as I assumed would have been the case.Quite simply this was just a breakdown of communication between maintenance; dispatch; and the crew. While on the line with the pilot; I asked the coordinators if they would like him to return to the gate so the maintenance check could be performed; but they told me to just let him go and cancelled the MEL. The flight took no delay.

CRJ-700 Dispatcher reported an aircraft he was working departed with a known excessive oil consumption issue.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After loading all the PAX; I went remove the manual PAX stand from the aircraft. This particular PAX stand is hard to move because of the wheels. The stand has to be pushed side to side before it goes straight. After pulling the PAX stand back we were preparing for push back. The flight attendant proceeded to try to close the door but; when the door closed only half way; I was called over. The flight attendant said the orange ball had rubbed against the cable when I was pulling the PAX stand back; which derailed the cable from the pulley. Maintenance was called to put it back on track; which caused a delay.

A flight was delayed from the gate when; during the removal of the manually operated passenger loading stand; a cable was preventing the door from closing.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working Tustin radar; the arrival sector for SNA in the morning. The weather was IFR with strong gusty winds from the west. Aircraft X was on a downwind heading at 3000 ft. for the ILS approach to SNA. Shortly after issuing the base leg heading of 100 I observed the target take a hard turn due south and a rapid descent from 3000 to 1600 ft. in a 3000 ft. MVA. The turn was so sharp and the descent so rapid that I thought it was a bad return from the STARS (Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System) tracker. Instead of issuing low altitude alert instructions I asked the pilot to verify that they were level at 3000. The pilot reported back that they were climbing back up and the altitude read out went to XXX. Once the aircraft climbed back up I issued a heading of 090 for the ILS. After clearing Aircraft X for the ILS the aircraft again dove down and dramatically turned to a heading approximately 30 degrees west bound away from the approach and into another aircraft on the downwind at 3000. If the pilot had not already done this I would have also thought it was a STARS issue. The two aircraft lost separation. Approximate separation was 1.9 miles and 100 ft. I turned Aircraft X back towards the final and instructed the aircraft to maintain 3000 as the MVA in the area is 3000. I issued traffic but both aircraft were IMC. I then canceled the approach clearance for Aircraft X and climbed the aircraft to 4000. When Aircraft X reached 4000 he advised that he was canceling IFR and wanted to proceed VFR to RNM. This event has been reported to the highest level of management at SCT.The week prior to this incident I was working an aircraft into TOA. The aircraft was established on the GPS approach to TOA when the STARS tracker showed the aircraft jump 1/2 mile north of the final towards traffic. When the aircraft's target turned northbound toward traffic I asked the pilot if they had turned northbound. The pilot reported that they were still pointed at the airport. The aircraft's speed increased to 360 kts and then jumped 1/2 mile to the south of the final into a 2700 ft. MVA. This incident was reported as a STARS issue.The controllers at SCT have lost confidence in STARS. We do not know if the data we observe on the scope is accurate information. We hesitate to issue instructions as we wait to see if what we are seeing is a STARS issue or is an accurate representation of what is actually occurring. We hesitate to issue immediate instructions because if the data is wrong we risk creating other issues. If I would have issued a traffic alert to the aircraft landing TOA and issued instructions to climb and turn left immediately to avoid traffic I would have interrupted the pilot in a critical phase of flight; turning the aircraft into an MVA based on erroneous data provided by STARS. If both incidents I described occurred with CARTS (Common Automated Radar Terminal System) I would have known that what I was seeing was true and I would have issued instructions immediately. But instead; we have become so numb to the erroneous information from STARS that we hesitate and second guess. This hesitation and second guessing may cause fatalities as the instructions we give will be too late to save the situation.I recommend that SCT falls back to CARTS or fatalities may occur.

Reporter stated it was common on a shift to have the radar jump and it happens every day.  Maintenance is working to fix the problem; and the facility has tried to go back to CARTS but have been told to stay on STARS. The aircraft that turned never told the Controller what happened but it was the Controller's assumption that when the aircraft went wing up in the turn the wind caught it and turned and pushed it down.  A storm was going through the area that day.Controller would still like to have the facility return to CARTS and then have Maintenance work on STARS.  He feels safety is being jeopardized.

SCT Controller reported of a target making a hard turn and descending into a lover MVA. Controller couldn't tell if the aircraft was in fact acting erratic or an issue with STARS. Controller stated he and others at SCT would like to see a return to CARTS.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.1

Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was working local control with the radar controller switched Aircraft X to me on a visual approach.  I cleared Aircraft X to land runway 4r.  I continued to scan the d-brite and noticed that the radar controller had turn Aircraft Y onto the ILS final and with speeds compression was occurring rapidly and to avoid a tie to the runway threshold I cancelled Aircraft X's landing clearance and turn him to the south heading 180 and then called the traffic that he was going to have to follow to the airport and he reported the traffic in sight so I instructed Aircraft X to follow the traffic and issued the visual approach clearance.

Aircraft X inbound from the northwest for runway 4R and Aircraft Y from the southwest for 4R.  ILS approaches are in use.  Aircraft X was inbound from the NW and requested a Visual approach several times and was instructed that I could not vector him for a visual because the bases were too low; but if he got the field in sight at any point being vectored for the ILS; to report it in sight.  He got the airport in sight 10 east of the field and was instructed to keep his base in tight for sequence.Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach.  I turned Aircraft Y from a 110 heading base leg 18 SW of the field to a 160 to build some spacing.  When I turned Aircraft Y on to final and was cleared and established for an ILS and instructed to maintain 180 kt till the final approach fix.  Aircraft X did not turn his base to a final; instead extending his base leg while Aircraft Y was tracking inbound from the final approach fix. The Local controller had both in sight and made the decision that Aircraft X wasn't going to turn in final and land with the required spacing in front of Aircraft Y and canceled his approach clearance; turned him left to a 180 heading.  Aircraft X got Aircraft Y in sight and followed him to the runway in sequence.  When Aircraft X was tracking outbound on the 180 heading; 3mi separation appeared to not exist.I should have either taken Aircraft Y across final for spacing or not made Aircraft X #1 in front of Aircraft Y.

LFT Approach and Tower controllers report of an overtake on final due to speed and turns.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Our Lincoln transmitters are intermittent and randomly go unusable.  Sometimes at unacceptable and critical times. During this time I had about a dozen on my frequency; 124.0; when it just randomly became unusable.  I had 3 heavies in my IFR pattern for practice approaches.  I had an IFR jet inbound.  There were 2 VFRs inbound.  There was a VFR on a practice approach.  There was a VFR doing photo work over the lake area just west of the finals.  Plus additional satellite operations. It just suddenly wouldn't transmit.  I checked my headset.  Then I switched the plug into the second set of holes.  I tried using the foot pedal instead of my button.  I tried switching to the backup transmitters.  I tried guard frequency.  The Supervisor tried to use the PET [radio].  I switched to the override orange box and could reach 2 or 3 of them; but then only about 1 of the 5 tries would go through and the responses were broken; unreadable or very static-y.  We tried to put everyone on our backup 133.575; but it had the same issues.  We could hear pilots; but were unable to transmit anything back.  I told Tower to keep everyone on their frequency they had; and everyone was point out approved.  We frantically kept trying to reach the aircraft sitting on my frequency as they began to go through final and some began to get dangerously close to MVAs.  Finally; the combination of everything and the frequency seemed to snap back to working.In the next hour; we had probably 25% of the transmissions to aircraft not be received.  At many altitudes in areas that would typically work.  I used aircraft I could reach to relay to the ones I couldn't.  It was a nightmare. I may have had separation losses.  I think I kept altitude separation; but it was too busy and chaotic for myself or the Supervisor to work it and see. The VFR photo guy just decided on his own to head east; directly across the two finals in front of aircraft on [an] approach; without me telling him to; or without me being able to issue any traffic to anyone.  One of the heavies I had on a right base to RWY 18 at 040 took it upon himself just to turn in to the airport.  He ended up overflying at 040 before finally switching himself to tower frequency to enter their frequency.  This was the 2nd scariest thing I've ever had while working.  Not okay. The frequency transmitter issues need to be identified and fixed.  Just because they start working again; is not good enough.  We also need a real backup that we can use that transmits from a different source.  When our backup seems to go out at the exact same time; it is useless.  Our Omaha and Offutt frequency options are not in range for low Lincoln sector aircraft.For the last 2-3 weeks; something is wrong with the transmitting capabilities of our Lincoln sector frequencies.  Our primary 124.0 frequency will all of a sudden just not go out to the pilots.  We try switching to main/stand-by and it makes no difference.  We switch and do all the coordination with other facilities to use our backup frequency; 133.575; but then it has the same issue.  Sometimes we can use the Orange Voice Backup Override boxes; but it is also intermittent and when it goes out is maybe 2 by 5 at best with a lot of static and crackling.  If we try to work them in by leaving them on Omaha and/or Offutt frequencies; 120.1 or 124.95; the range isn't good enough to reach low aircraft on the south/west side of Lincoln and we lose contact that way completely. This is an urgent; serious issue.  When we called it into MOCC (Mid-States Operations Control Center) a week or two ago; the tech responded to us that 'it was probably due to the storm passing through' even though there was only light (level 1 and 2 precipitation).  When it came back online they just called it back in service without fixing anything or identifying the problem.  Yesterday it occurred while I had around a dozen aircraft on frequency.  The sudden loss of communications nearly caused major incidents and could have been catastrophic.  Luckily I had most of them altitude separated as an additional precaution at the time; but we still had a near MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) bust as a result and may have lost separation in the chaos.  The Supervisor tried to use the PET; but our range doesn't reach Lincoln on them; and when it did intermittently go through; only stepped on my transmissions I was making through the override box and made it worse.

R90 Approach Controller reported frequency outages; at this location; during a peak period.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 1160; Flight Crew Type 890

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On a return VFR cross country to 3N6 (Old Bridge NJ) via Intersection Panze and Ziggi. Prior to departing I contacted Atlantic City Clearance to arrange for flight following. I was given a discrete transponder code and instructions to remain clear of Class C Atlantic City Airspace. I departed remaining clear of the Charlie airspace and contacted Atlantic City Approach. We established communications and confirmed my intentions. En-route somewhere near intersection Panze I received a traffic warning from ATC. I replied as 'Looking'. Afterwards and even though I did not believe the traffic to be an issue any longer; I contacted approach saying 'No Joy on the traffic'. Typically I get a reply to that but this time I did not. Since the controller was busy; I dismissed it as just that; too busy to answer and no factor anyway. The flight progressed and at approximately 10 miles south of my next waypoint Ziggi; I thought I should have received a handoff to Maguire approach by now or at least very soon. I called Atlantic City Approach. No answer at all but they were still busy. So after a minute or two I called again. This time I got a response; 'Aircraft calling Atlantic City Standby and remain clear of Class Charlie'. At this point I realized that I was way into Maguire Approach's radar coverage and still squawking the original discrete transponder code. Since I did not get an answer from Atlantic City and now was approaching my final destination; I reset my transponder to 1200. I listened to Atlantic City Approach for another 5 minutes and never received a call back from my last instruction to standby. I then tuned in to the CTAF for Old Bridge and proceeded with my approach and landed. This upset me as I am a careful and courteous pilot. I have been flying for many years and while I realize I could have missed a call from Atlantic City; I [am] very certain that a handoff or termination of services was never given. Rather I got the sense that I was forgotten; and then unfortunately ignored. The thought of this as a possibility actually sickened me. We all make mistakes and they can be dealt with. Ignoring them is certainly not the answer. I understand that the weather was perfect but that should not matter. Once agreeing to provide the service; that must be what is done or terminate the service. In reviewing my own performance; I should have called Maguire approach and asked if I had ever handed off to them. If not; then I could have at least apologized for the transponder code. Probably because my ground speed on the return legs was 140 MPH; a whole lot faster than normal and it was all happening so quickly; I did not think of that. I worry that this might happen in poor weather conditions where I might have truly needed the assistance. In those conditions and even in good conditions I will be more persistent for an answer and if it were my mistake; I would accept that. I will also speak to an instructor to see how I would have handled this better so that if it should happen again I will be better prepared to deal with it.

Cessna 172 pilot is under flight following and never gets handed off to the next facility due to traffic and frequency congestion. Pilot fly's through intended airspace and attempts contact with ATC. Pilot lands at destination and describes how he should have been handled.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Automation Aircraft RA

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During descent on the STAR into ZZZ at about 12;000 MSL we got a TCAS intruder alert. It went yellow. From its position and altitude it was obvious to us that the other aircraft did not see us and was going to result in an RA. While getting ready for the RA we attempted to visually find the aircraft. While doing that; we got a level off RA. From a roughly 1;800 fpm descent we leveled off. I was finally able to see the aircraft as it was going underneath us. I don't know what it was but it was a small low wing GA aircraft with a full canopy and blue wingtips while the main body appeared to be all white. My FO (First Officer) said that it sounded like an RV but he didn't see it so couldn't say for sure. We reported it to ATC. They asked if we had to maneuver which we said yes. The FO (First Officer) told ATC it was a 172; but that was before I described it to him. ATC said thank you and asked no further questions and gave no further instructions. So we just rejoined the arrival and path and was able to hit all altitude gates. Flight landed without further incident. At no point did we receive a traffic callout from ATC. Without the RA; it is my opinion we would have collided with the intruder aircraft. Duty officer notified.We did what we needed to do and complied with the RA. We visually found the intruder to make sure that we avoided a collision. Only thing [is] that it would have been nice to get a traffic callout from ATC.

Air carrier Captain reported NMAC on descent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 6300

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

While on correct VNAV Vertical Path and airspeed on the MARNR 3 arrival we crossed over RAYNI waypoint and FMC instantly calculated we were high. We received prior message 'Steep Descent after RAYNI;' which is a VERY common occurrence on this arrival. With speedbrake fully deployed; the use of the landing gear for additional drag was used. The subsequent waypoint requires slowing from 250 KTS to 230 KTS while still descending and then a further speed reduction to 210 KTS. Despite all measures to meet speed and altitude constraints it became apparent we would not make the 'cross between 6;500 and 6;000' restriction. However; prior to GRIFY we were given an approach clearance and proceeded to SeaTac visually; crossing GRIFY at approximately 7;000 FT. Much has been discussed about this arrival; but it is apparent that in order to meet the GRIFY crossing restriction the speedbrake and landing gear must be deployed at least 20 miles from the field; which seems very unusual. Despite this fact; the use of the landing gear should have been used immediately crossing RAYNI waypoint. The portion of this arrival from RAYNI to GRIFY is a prime example of 'we can slow down but NOT go down' at the same time.

B737 First Officer reports difficulty flying the vertical profile of the MARNR 3 arrival TO SEA between RAYNI and GRIFY and also meeting the speed restrictions. Both the landing gear and full speed brakes are required and in this case were still not enough.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

The First Officer was Pilot Flying (PF) and Captain was Pilot Monitoring (PM). We had briefed the RNAV GPS 15 backed up by the visual approach to runway 15 at BDL. There is no ILS to runway 15. Per the PF's request; we had slowed to 180 knots with the flaps set to CONFIG 2 prior to turning inbound to final. During the (early) turn to final; I realized we were high (PAPIs) and suggested we extend the landing gear to help us descend. The PM disconnected the autopilot and initially set a vertical speed that triggered a momentary GPWS. We were visual with the runway and I set the vertical speed to 1600 feet per minute (down) to give him a proper target pitch attitude. The [Flight Computer] PROG page indicated a vertical deviation of +450 feet (above computed glide path) so I thought we would be able to correct back to path and stabilize for a visual approach. We selected final flaps but were still 25 knots fast at 1000 feet. We were very busy slowing to reference speed and I suggested 'go around if you're not comfortable.' In retrospect; I should have said 'Go-Around.' By 500 feet we were 10 knots above target. We were on the PAPI (two reds and two whites) so I said to continue as I was comfortable we would touch down in the prescribed landing zone. I did not; however; confirm the engines were spooled up for a go-around. We touched down in the required landing zone and proceeded to the gate.I have read about past events and wondered how this could happen to anybody. Here is how it happened to us. We were cleared to a short visual approach and rushed to go down and slow down. Having the field in sight leads one into believing a (steep) approach can be salvaged by 500 feet as long as the speed can be slowed to within limits while properly configured. Despite being within speed criteria at 500 feet; the engines do not have time to spool up in the event of a go-around. The thrust levers in the A320 remain in the Climb detent until retarding the power during landing. The engine gauges must be consulted; which regretfully; we did not do.Proper altitude management with respect to three-to-one calculations would help to get ahead of a pending steep and ultimately unstable approach.A Go-Around at 2000 feet is a far better decision than rushing to descend; configure and slow to be stable at 500 feet. Even if you make the speed; you can't possibly be spooled up properly for a go-around. As a new Captain; this was my first experience with a 'slam dunk' sort of approach. It is very easy to critique myself after the event. A Go-Around is a 'no fault' event. We were carrying 7200 pounds of ferry fuel in addition to our reserves and planned landing fuel. The weather was 'clear and a million;' and there was only one other aircraft behind us in the traffic pattern. Why NOT go-around? I can only say I now know the symptoms leading to this sort of event:1.Beautiful VFR day2.Visual Approach3.Short turn inbound to final4.Not being directive when obviously rushed 5.Continuing below 1000 feet to stabilize (legal but not smart in this situation).6.Last minute 'coaching' from the PM seatThe most important lesson learned was to be directive in a situation like this. Take all confusion out of the equation by simply saying 'Go-Around' like we do in the simulator. Despite our training; it is very easy to try and save a situation like this; particularly in such clear weather with the field in sight the whole time. Events occur in rapid succession; and a poor outcome is the likely result.

A320 flight crew reported continuing with an unstable approach to landing contrary to SOP.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.5

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working Local 1. Aircraft X went around for runway 31L. I instructed him to follow the second [Aircraft] on downwind (Aircraft Y) and make left closed traffic. Several minutes later I had to extend Aircraft Y in the downwind. I told Aircraft X to continue following the Aircraft Y and extend downwind. Aircraft X read back 'extend downwind.' Several minutes later I missed Aircraft X state on frequency 'turning base.' He turned base on his own and managed to cut off the Aircraft Y he had been following. Aircraft Y had to make an evasive left turn to avoid Aircraft X; who cut him off on final. I was able to resequencing everyone; and they landed without incident.I was busy and I missed Aircraft X turning base on his own. In the future I will continue to exercise vigilance to ensure that the aircraft are following my instructions.

A Tower Local Controller did not notice that an aircraft that was supposed to follow another aircraft turned in front of the aircraft it was supposed to follow.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

The following observation is 'an accident waiting to happen' at ACK (Nantucket; MA): We were parked on the back row; first spot southwest of the new fire house; facing the runway. There was another parked aircraft facing us. The gap between us proved to be tight. After getting our passenger settled; I entered the cockpit just as an inbound jet was taxiing from our left-to-right at approximately 5 KTS; going through the narrow gap described above. There was a marshaller well in front of this taxiing jet giving it a 'thumbs up'; however; the right wing was dangerously close to our nose. I expedited my exit from our aircraft; just as the taxiing jet's right wing was passing our nose--close enough that its; eye-level (for me); wing was slightly underlapping our nose. I reached out and touched both its wing and an area below our nose without a stretch. I estimate the tip of the wing was two feet below the tip of our nose and two and one half to three feet from a striking point under our nose. After the taxiing jet was away from our aircraft and near its parking location; I jogged over to the marshaller and professionally--but very sternly--told him to never marshal a plane that close to 'my aircraft' again. He said he would like to discuss this with me; once he had the other aircraft chocked. I went back to our plane to continue my duties. When the marshaller came near our aircraft; I exited and reiterated how very close he had come to causing damage to two multi-million dollar aircraft. He apologized; but added that they were very busy and needed to 'keep the planes moving.' I doubt my words had any effect. The above situation will likely go on until a wing smashes into another aircraft--or; perhaps; until someone with influence can impress upon the airport management that this type of activity is not in his/her best interest. Troubling; too; is that I know (for a fact) that the other aircraft in this scenario has very conservative procedures--much like ours--that; if followed; would not have allowed this situation to have gone this far. I do not know who should voice our concern; but it takes little imagination to picture how easily this situation could have 1) cost our company an unhappy customer; 2) cost us downtime of a valuable resource; 3) impacted another aircraft in the same way; 4) tarnished the reputation of the well-meaning line folks at ACK; and 5) likely resulted in the loss of a job for at least one person--and a too-late re-evaluation of the taxiing procedures at ACK. Finally; of all the times when there should be extra vigilance; it is when the tempo of ops is great--such as this holiday weekend--rather than a decrease in standards.

A GIV Captain reported aircraft being taxied in very tight confines under a Marshall's control at ACK; suggesting that two to three feet of clearance is not sufficient.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

On arrival to ZZZ; upon selection of the landing gear; received the 'GEAR DISAGREE' warning message with the associated aural message. We executed a missed approach and continued with Approach for vectors to run the QRH. Flight Attendant was notified of the situation and told her we would get back to her in a few minutesRunning the QRH; we accomplished a manual gear extension. Based on the situation and abnormal indications we received at the start of this problem; we felt a longer runway was needed to be 'suitable' for safety. A diversion to ZZZ1 was now the new plan. Flight Attendant was then called again and given all information and we landed at ZZZ1 without incident. Threats were the close and tight airspace and the QRH at the same time. [ATC] did a great job handling us.

CRJ-200 Captain reported receiving a gear disagree while extending the landing gear to land at ZZZ. The crew diverted to nearby ZZZ1 for its longer runways and manually extended the gear.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 119; Flight Crew Total 7609; Flight Crew Type 4777

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon completion of flight in ZZZ; we parked the aircraft at [the] gate. After completing the after landing checklist I noticed that a ramp worker was trying to communicate to me through hand signaling. I opened the cockpit window and the ramp worker stated that the right main landing gear was on fire and that the fire fighters were notified and on their way to the gate to assist. I then instructed ramp personnel to retrieve a fire extinguisher to start fighting the fire until the emergency equipment arrived. I then contacted operations to notify them of the situation and they stated that they had already been alerted. While I was communicating with ramp personnel and operations; the Captain ordered the passengers to evacuate the aircraft through the main cabin door via the PA. The flight attendants followed up with the evacuation instructions verbally and the evacuation was completed without incident. Emergency personnel extinguished the brake fire.

Aircraft X arrived at ZZZ into gate with a flat tire. When the aircraft was parked the brakes/tire caught on fire. The fire department was called to put out fire on main landing gear.

B737 flight crew and ground personnel reported Main Landing Gear caught fire at gate after taxi-in.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A long standing culture is that 'nobody cares' if a VFR enters another facility's airspace without a handoff/pointout.  This has been a source of debate at this facility for over 20 years.During OJT (On Job Training) a VFR flight-following [aircraft] was approaching the receiving facility but not in handoff status. OJTI (On Job Training Instructor) told the trainee to commence it or manually coordinate the handoff. The Controller on Flight Data asked; 'Does a VFR need approval to enter center's airspace? It's VFR. There is no separation standard.' OJTI stated that Chapter 5 of the 7110.65 states that no aircraft under your control can enter another facility/sector's airspace without a handoff or pointout; and that it does not differentiate between IFR or VFR.Aircraft X departed and climbing to 17;500 feet. NAS VFR flights do not auto-handoff and the OJT was distracted by an aircraft that was telling us about an unknown aircraft following it in close proximity. Tower called down to tell Data that Aircraft X was climbing unrestricted; OJT did not know that. OJTI saw Aircraft X approaching the top of our airspace and told the trainee to hand it off or stop the climb; the aircraft climbed into center airspace before it could occur. No loss of separation with other aircraft.The 7110.65 Chapter 4 is IFR. The 7110.65 Chapter 5 is radar. Chapter 5 of the 7110.65 states that no aircraft under your control can enter another facility/sector's airspace without a handoff or pointout; and that it does not differentiate between IFR or VFR. Some controllers maintain that VFR aircraft under one's control need no handoff/pointout to enter another facility/sectors airspace.I expect this to be unambiguously clarified; briefed; and enforced.

Controllers had a disagreement over the requirement to hand off a VFR aircraft from a TRACON to an ARTCC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 4535; Flight Crew Type 1082

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flying the RNAV RNP Z Rwy 34R; at HIMOM; autopilot on; the aircraft maintained 11;000 feet and did not turn for the approach. We had programmed the approach and checked that all points were in the system. We had LNAV and VNAV selected with 7;000 feet for the next altitude in the window. When the plane didn't turn I clicked off the autopilot to correct the course and start descent; but the controller told us to maintain heading and then vectored us for the Visual Approach 34R.

Air carrier First Officer reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV RNP Z Approach to 34R at DEN when the autopilot failed to maintain the programmed track.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 2370; Flight Crew Type 7

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; General Maintenance Action

I taxied and departed from Runway XX without authorization.  I believed the Tower was closed and announced on CTAF.  I did not realize they were open.  Here are the events.  I called Clearance Delivery and Ground for clearance to taxi.  Tower handles Ground and Tower.  I called Ground; but never received a response.  I called several times; I then called Tower several times and got no response.  I turned the aircraft to look at the Tower.  I did not see anyone inside the Tower.  I also looked for light gun signals.  After about 10 to 15 minutes; I began to believe the Tower was still closed since it was so early in the morning.  I assumed; (this was my first mistake; I should not have assumed) that the Tower was not yet open.  I should have verified.  During this time I heard no other aircraft arriving or departing to give me an indication that Tower was open.  I taxied up to Taxiway X and stopped for a couple of minutes announcing my intentions on CTAF and tried calling Tower again; during this time I looked to see if someone was in the Tower again; I did not see anyone in the Tower.  I then taxied to hold short at XX.  I did my run up and then announced my departure intentions on CTAF.  Shortly after departing and at about 700 AGL and turning north; Tower called my N number and asked why I had departed.  This was the first time I had heard from the Tower or anyone.  I responded but got no reply; I responded again.  I did not know it at that time that I was not transmitting.  I then called Tower on my cell phone to speak with them; they told me to call them at my destination.  I do not understand why Tower did not call me much sooner; like when I was taxing; or doing my run up to depart XX.  I have never made an error like this in my flying career; I recognize how grave this error could be.  I made the assumption that Tower was closed and I departed on CTAF; I should not have made that assumption or mistake.  I later determined that it was the headset.  I fixed the issue and was able to communicate over the radio with them.  I did speak with the Tower Supervisor on the phone later and they acknowledged that they heard attempts at transmissions on the tape.  The fault for departing without clearance is mine; I made errors I should not have made.  With respect on how to learn from this and increase safety for all; I believe the Tower should have called me sometime during my taxi; run up; and departure.

SR20 pilot reports calling Ground for an early morning taxi for takeoff and getting no response.  After several more attempts the reporter assumes the Tower is not yet open and uses CTAF procedures to depart.  Once airborne the Tower calls and asks who just departed without clearance.  The headset was found to be defective.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 5728; Flight Crew Type 2825

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 8597; Flight Crew Type 1352

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

I reported for duty for a flight to complete a Part 135.293 a (1) 4-8 and 135 299 line check. I was acting as SIC for the two legs. The first leg was completed without incident. The oral portions of the test were completed and administered by POI Mr. X and FAA Check Airman Mr. Y and these checks were satisfactory. The preflight portions; planning; weight and balance were observed by Mr. X. The second leg was observed by Mr. Y in the Jump Seat and as passengers were the company Chief Pilot and the POI. After an uneventful departure the After Takeoff; Climb and Cruise Checklists were completed. The ILS approach was reviewed again and confirmed that landing in 60% of runway was in accordance to company Ops Specs and FAR 135. Special Caution was taken to confirm that we were able to land and stop in the 60% of Runway 25. The flight was uneventful. The Approach and Before Landing [Checklist] was completed. [The Captain] performed a stabilized approach. I contacted the CTAF about 10-15 miles from the FAF and airport ops reported; there was communication on CTAF. I came back to Comm 2 and finished the Landing Checklist and reported crossing the FAF. Approach said to contact CTAF and I did. Again it appeared there was communication from the airport. We touched down at the 1;000 foot marker and the ground brakes reflected deployed in the EICAS; (after the fact; I cannot recall if the flight airbrakes were also deployed) I am very sure I saw the green ground brakes message on EICAS. It appeared that the thrust reversers were deployed but it did not feel like there was effective braking or thrust reversing power. I begun to count the speed and speed versus the distance of runway remaining and when it was obvious that the aircraft was not braking; I braced for impact. The airplane departed the runway end about 10-15 feet. I asked the passengers if everyone was okay or needed assistance. Passengers responded everyone was okay. I got up and opened the main cabin door after ensuring it was safe. Passengers and crew deplaned after aircraft was secured and Shutdown Checklist were completed. After ensuring there was no leaks or unsafe conditions. I noticed tire marks left of the runway centerline from the 1;000 to 1;500 foot markers. There was only one set of tire marks indicating that there was no braking on the right main wheels. The nose wheel left tire marks for about 3;000 feet along with tire tracks from locked wheel from the left main wheels. A go-around was not commanded due to uncertainty of the conditions of the brakes; antiskid and most important the thrust reversers. There was not sufficient runway left to execute a safe takeoff after it was suspected it that there was a malfunction with the aircraft. It appears there is a history of proximity switches failures and issues with the brake wear indicators not showing and representing the actual condition of the brake system. I feel the crew did everything to ensure no lives were endangered and minimum aircraft damage. I computed the performance several times and it reflected a [landing field Length] dry of 3;151 and with the 60 % factor an added margin of safety to 5;251 and the runway is longer. I feel in future; we as crewmembers should be able to decline flights to airports with such a short runway for an airplane like the G200 with a high Vref and stopping the airplane safely after a brake emergency is an issue. I feel the WOW switches did not command the airplane to be on the ground. It actually told the airplane that it was in the air; thus limiting thrust for the reverses and disabling the antiskid and the brake degradation.

The plan for the day was to ferry to ZZZ for an Oral and FAA Check Ride administered by the FSDO Office. The first flight of the day was uneventful. During the first flight of the day the crew was pilot flying; from the left seat (me) Captain; pilot not flying right seat First Officer; and in the jump seat was the Chief Pilot. Once we arrived at the FSDO Office; Oral Testing was successfully completed. All Weight and Balance and Performance for this flight were reviewed as OK. It was at this time that FAA Check Airman Mr. Y commenced the flight portion check of this 135.299 Check Ride. The crew placement was: Captain left seat; First Officer right seat and in the jump seat was FAA Check Airman Mr. Y. Passengers were FAA POI Mr. X and the company Chief Pilot. This next leg was from ZZZ to ZZZ1. After what was an uneventful flight segments of takeoff; climb; cruise; descent and approach; all regimes of flight were on profile and normal. During the normal stabilized approach to landing; I touched down on speed and on profile as a normal landing. The aircraft crossed the fence at 50 FT in the air and at Ref. speed. I touched down the aircraft at the 1;000 FT paint markings in normal configuration to land. At touchdown I lowered the nose wheel down to the ground and then applied thrust reverser levers and breaking action of steady brake pressure continually. At this point I further increased thrust reverser levers with no thrust reversing being able to be obtained. Also; at nose wheel touchdown I transferred the yoke to the pilot not flying. During rollout phase of the landing the breaking action and stopping ability was nil. I continued with increased max braking force; however I was never able to get any noticeable stopping control. Max breaking and full thrust reversers were used. I believe the thrust reversers deployed; but nothing more than that could be achieved. I felt no anti skid pulsing or any noticeable normal stopping action from my inputs. As a result the aircraft stopped off the end of the runway; approximately 10-15 FT beyond the pavement. After stopping; inspection of runway tire marks from our aircraft indicated that no braking action from the right main tires or the outer left main tire was archived.I believe this problem could have been prevented if the braking system had worked correctly. In addition; thrust reversers did not perform correctly in assisting stopping ability.

G200 flight crew experiences thrust reverser and brake failures during landing that result in a runway excursion causing minor damage to the aircraft. The aircraft had a history of proximity switch failures and issues with the brakes wear indicators.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 155

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Just after training in slow flight maneuvers; and upon the completion of clearing turns to clear the area; my student and I began to enter a simulated engine failure scenario. Seconds after establishing best glide speed of the aircraft; my student announced that he saw a helicopter on his side of the aircraft. I looked out his side of the aircraft and saw an EC 135 Eurocopter passing approximately 200 FT below us from left to right. It was a medical type helicopter that services the local area. The event took place in clear conditions in the middle of the local flight training practice area.

C172R instructor pilot reported an NMAC with a medical helicopter in the BVI flight training practice area.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

On departure from Runway XX at ZZZ during an instrument training flight I was the student flying with foggles on with my flight instructor in the right seat. In the departure phase of flight we were climbing out at about 2;000 feet southwest bound direct to ZZZZZ waypoint; an aircraft which had made little to no radio calls seemingly overflew the airport and came directly below us from the left to right at about 100 feet and was not seen until it had already gone past and was seen on the right side of our aircraft by my flight instructor. We had made all of the required and appropriate radio calls as prescribed by the SOPs for the flight school; but had heard nothing about this aircraft or of its intentions. This has become a big issue at ZZZ as we are not supposed to make what seem to be the necessary position calls due to administration at the flight school.

C172 pilot reported NMAC on departure from a non-towered field.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 3965.1; Flight Crew Type 154.5

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated

I; Pilot in Command; supported by a type rated Second in Command; on an IFR flight. We arrived on a visual approach to Runway XL upon completion of a visual approach and landing. As the aircraft slowed down to taxi speed; I proceeded to taxi clear of Runway XL onto [a taxiway]; on the right turn to enter the taxiway. The aircraft did not respond accordingly to the turn and break pressure input applied on the rudder pedals. At this time I proceeded to bring the aircraft to a complete stop with no immediate success as the airplane continued to slowly taxi clear off the runway onto the taxiway and continue on to the grass area east of the taxiway while remaining clear of any obstacles; without compromising safety of souls on board and aircraft structure. The aircraft came to a complete stop at which time the aircraft was secured following checklist procedures and passengers and crew then safely deplaned the aircraft.

A CE560XL's steering and brakes failed on landing so that the aircraft slowly taxied off the end of the runway without damage to property or injury injury to those on board.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft X reported descending for severe wake turbulence before entering my airspace. I observed the change in altitude during a transmission to another aircraft that had been blocked. As I went to talk to Aircraft X; he reported descending for severe wake turbulence. We discussed possible traffic in the area and I determined that it was probably wake turbulence from Aircraft Y which was approximately 10-12 miles in front at the time of the incident. I descended Aircraft X immediately to FL300 to get Aircraft X under control and keep them out of the wake turbulence and then immediately notified SLC sector 46 to advise them of the descent. SLC sector 46 released control. I then assigned a slower speed to Aircraft X to make more room since Aircraft X would be following Aircraft Y into LAS; the winds were about 50kts out of the NW at the time. It is not unusual to get bad rides in the area; but no other mod to severe turbulence was reported before the incident.Not sure of any recommendations because this is an unusual situation.

ZLA Controller reports a Hawker 125 reported severe turbulence; the aircraft was following a heavy B767-300 on the same route 10 to 12 miles ahead.  The Controller gave a further descent clearance to the aircraft to a suitable altitude.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Work Refused

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Company Policy

While I am writing this event report for this flight; it is typical of many flights I have had. I noted during my walk-around 17 items of Company MAIL to be loaded in the cargo bin. Item 1 was an unsealed cardboard box; the others were all cases of soda and water. They all had neon-orange stickers on them (that I have been unable to find in the Operating Manual) that require a box to be checked. The Commissary box (including soda; napkins...) was NOT checked. These forms clearly state two signatures; both required. Only one signature; with no boxes checked on ALL 17 forms/stickers. Our HAZMAT training states we must assume all unidentified company mail/cargo is HAZMAT. I therefore deny all items with this unidentified form when it is not filled out. There are 3 forms for NON-HAZMAT material in the company that I have seen. Two are noted deep in the Operating Manual. I have been unable to find the most common one; as stated above. The Operating Manual has a forms section: there are 3 examples in it; none talk about company mail. The HAZMAT section talks about forms required for carrying allowable HAZMAT. I do not want to end up like past incidents of inflight fires. I would like a one stop spot in the Operating Manual to find all approved forms that may affect the safety or legality of the aircraft.I would suggest better training of persons filling out the forms is required. Baggage handlers should be trained to not load any items that do not have the properly filled out forms on them. Forms should be located in an easy to find spot in the Operating Manual; not buried in it. We should have one approved form; not 3.

A MD-80 Captain refused to allow company cargo to remain on the aircraft because the HAZMAT forms were not properly completed and in his investigative process he found Company documentation and training lacking.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Upon approach to the airport; I saw that a balloon was basically on the extended centerline of Runway 01; so I extended my base leg to give the balloon plenty of clearance. Also; my [fellow pilot] was on a tight base leg; and flew that leg on the inside (airport side) of the balloon. As I completed my deviation around the balloon and re-intercepted the extended centerline while descending on the glide path; well past the balloon; the balloon pilot made a call on UNICOM; implying I had come too close to his aircraft. Perhaps I did not meet his spacing expectation; but I have a fair amount of aviation experience. At no time did I pass within 1;000 feet of his balloon.

C182 pilot reported maneuvering on final to avoid a balloon.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 3460; Flight Crew Type 2336

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

I was given a clearance off of SMO to ZZZ1 as follows: Depart runway heading; climb to 3000 ft; at the LAX 310 radial; turn to heading 265 for vectors to V23 GMN. Upon take off; I experienced an out of trim condition. I turned to heading 265 at R310 off of LAX and experienced a temporary loss of control either before or after I turned off (or it disengaged) the autopilot. The plane entered a steep right turn and loss of altitude. I fought the controls to a stabilized climb on course. During this time; I deviated outside of the acceptable altitude and course limits. When handed off to approach from tower; I broke through the clouds on top and was able to maintain a heading. However; the plane was badly out of trim. I discovered in flight that the auto trim motor was inop. I attempted to move it manually and it would not move. I reset the breaker and that did not resolve the issue. I advised ATC of the issue and diverted to ZZZ2. I shut down and refiled to ZZZ1. On start up the issue did not repeat itself.

TBM-900 pilot reported Auto Trim failure resulting in a diversion. Without maintenance intervention the failure did not repeat on subsequent flight.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After level off at cruise altitude FLXX0 I noticed a small crack in the lower left corner of the Captain's windshield.  Approximately XX minutes later there was a complete failure of the outer layers of the Captain's windshield which caused spiderweb cracking everywhere. We elected to advise ATC and land successfully at nearby ZZZ airport without any further complications and parked at the terminal gate.This aircraft had been parked at ZZZ1 for a number of months. I would surmise that this contributed significantly to this event.Require these aircraft that have been parked for such a long period of time to be test flown first.

Air carrier pilot reported the Captain's windshield cracked in cruise and the flight diverted successfully. Pilot surmised that the plane's lengthy time being parked contributed to the event.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 83

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

This was my first visit to the Hayward Executive Airport (KHWD).I checked the taxi diagrams prior to calling ground. There was no mention on the diagram of the location of the run-up area.I had just fueled up at the self-service fuel station. I obtained taxi clearance from the ground controller to taxi along Alpha and hold short of Runway 28L.I began taxing along Alpha looking for a sign or indication of the run-up area. I didn't see any signs clearly pointing to the run-up area. I continued down the taxiway and stopped on a concrete pad that the looked like a run-up area about 630 feet from the portions of the runway useable for takeoff and about 1;320 feet from the portions of the runway useable for landing.The ground controller indicated that I was on the active runway; at which point I realized that even though I was about 550 feet from the portions of the runway useable for take-off; I had crossed the hold short line; not expecting it to be so far removed from the useable portions of the runway.My lesson learned is to ask people familiar with the airport; such as the administrative staff or FBO personnel to point out to me any details I am lacking from the airport diagram. Also; I learned to not make assumptions about where airport markings might exist; but to watch for them carefully.

A pilot new to the Hayward airport was unable to determine the location of the run-up area and subsequently experienced a runway incursion.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Received two TAs; reduced range on NAV Display; visually identified first TA off aircraft right side and visually identified aircraft behind and below left side of aircraft. We both noticed that automatic pilot did not honor the 9000 ft restriction at CHAVO intersection; as PF; I intervened at 8700 ft and climbed back to 9000 ft. After landing; we were notified of a possible deviation.The aircraft did not honor the 9000 ft altitude restriction at CHAVO combined with two TAs resulted in my having to intervene at 8700 ft and climb back to 9000 ft.

On arrival to PHX; we were assigned to descend via the HYDRR1 arrival. Prior to CHAVO; ATC instructed us to slow to 210. A few miles prior to CHAVO intersection; we were descending out of 9500ft MSL with an altitude restriction of 9000 at CHAVO; and last I had seen; the aircraft was showing it would make the restriction. Shortly after; I noticed a B737 climbing under us and just to our right and I called out the traffic. At nearly the same time; ATC called out CRJ traffic to our 10-11 o'clock position and I called it in sight as well. At that moment; we received a TCAS Traffic Advisory from the B737 climbing to our right. We reduced our Navigation Display (ND) range per our SOP; and we received another TA from the CRJ climbing at our left. I attempted to reacquire the CRJ and had trouble spotting it again; and was able to make visual contact off our 9 o'clock position. At that point I noted they were 700 feet below us and turning behind us; approximately 3 or so miles passing to our 7-8 o'clock. We called the traffic in sight and PHX approach switched us to the next frequency. As my attention came back into the aircraft; I noted the Captain had engaged the vertical speed mode and was leveling the aircraft; and I saw around 8;640 on the altimeter; and we had not yet crossed CHAVO; which had a 9000 ft altitude restriction. He initiated a gradual climb back up to 9000 ft at that time and we switched over to the other frequency; which then gave us a descent to 7000 ft. After landing; PHX approach notified us that the CRJ received a TCAS Resolution Advisory from us; while we did not receive an RA and were unaware they had received one.This event occurred primarily due to the autopilot vertical navigation mode not honoring the 9000 foot crossing restriction for some unknown reason. It was exacerbated by the fact that at the critical moment of having to ensure the aircraft stopped its descent; we were distracted by two close-proximity traffic callouts by both PHX approach and TCAS. We spent several minutes trying to identify the TA traffic and keep them in sight right as the aircraft failed to stop its descent at 9000 ft. We were able to immediately identify that we had descended through the 9000 ft restriction after the traffic conflicts were resolved and were no factor.The best way to avoid reoccurrence of this event is to continually return back 'inside' the aircraft to ensure it is doing what it should be doing; particularly if approaching a clearance restriction. However; having two near-simultaneous TCAS TAs on opposite sides of the aircraft made it difficult for both pilots to stay focused inside the aircraft.

A320 flight crew reported receiving a TA after the autopilot overshot a crossing restriction on descent into PHX.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Unqualified techs assigned to work ETOPS ref GMM xx-xx-xx Section X Item X.

Technician reported that Company is using unqualified technicians to do ETOPS checks in violation of the GMM.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While enroute to LAS; I attempted to retrieve the ATIS via ACARS approximately 250 NM out. ACARS NO COMM message was displayed and I was forced to wait until I could receive ATIS via VHF radio. Due to the mountainous terrain northwest of LAS; I was unable to receive the ATIS until we were on an early descent; due to a bumpy ride at cruise altitude. At approximately FL250 I was able to receive ATIS on VHF while we were on a descent to FL210. While I was off getting the ATIS; the First Officer (FO); who was Pilot Flying; was inputting the landing runway info in the CDU. As soon as I was back from being off frequency; the FO started the delayed arrival briefing. Earlier in the flight he had reviewed the SUNST 3 fixes on the arrival before we began our initial descent; and all was in check with the SUNST arrival. We now were to review the remainder and the approach and landing. We both then noticed that the aircraft was proceeding directly to the SUNST fix on the arrival; bypassing BTY; MYCAL; FUZZY; TRAGR; and IPUMY. This deviation put us north of the arrival course. I immediately contacted ATC and requested direct to FUZZY in order to get us back on the arrival. As far as I could tell we were about four to five [miles] north of MYCAL when I requested direct to FUZZY. We were given 'direct to FUZZY; cross FUZZY at 16;000 feet 250 knots'; [and] the Controller said that she showed us north off course. I told her that we were aware we had a navigational error and were correcting it at that time. A few minutes later she gave us a number to call when we landed in LAS. The remainder of the arrival and landing were uneventful.Upon landing I called ATC and the gentlemen I talked to asked if I had flown that arrival often lately. He then told me that there have been several of the same deviations lately on the same arrival. The next day I found out that [another flight to LAS on a different day] had the same issue and also filed [a report]. Neither the FO nor I could figure out why; when simply adding the landing runway to the FMC; several of the fixes on the arrival were deleted and the aircraft was proceeding directly to SUNST from approximately the BTY VOR.

A B737 Captain reported a track deviation occurred when the FMS dropped some waypoints on SUNST arrival into LAS for unknown reasons.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

At about 5000 ft. near ZZZZZ on approach into ZZZ; after an emergency turn back en route to ZZZ1 for dual EEC failures and Display Source indicating on captain's side PFD; we got a traffic call from ATC. I slowed my descent as the target on my screen was getting closer. At that time ATC canceled our approach clearance and turned us right. Seconds later we got a RA to climb so I climbed about 500 ft. to avoid the traffic; which the PM (Pilot Monitoring) saw visually in our climbing turn. Eventually the passing traffic moved behind us and we were re-issued an approach clearance for the visual approach to [Runway] XXL at ZZZ. We landed uneventfully and taxied safely to the gate; whereupon the flight was cancelled due to the engine EEC failures.

At approximately 5;000 ft. MSL; near ZZZZZ on the RNAV Z XXL into ZZZ; received an RA to climb and turn right. PF (Pilot Flying) had noted approaching traffic and ZZZZ1 had just issued a level off and cancellation of our approach clearance; which PNF (Pilot Not Flying) was repeating when RA sounded. PNF gained visual of small aircraft as we were in the turn and estimates RA was successful in avoiding the 500 ft. near midair bubble but would have certainly been such without evasive action. Reported RA to ZZZZ1. Cleared for visual approach and landed with no further event.  Additional Controllers for this airspace. Too congested.

Flight Crew reported a TCAS TA and RA on approach to landing after an air turn back caused by a dual EEC failure. The flight crew initiated evasive action and was vectored back to the approach.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On Date I was assigned to fly with a PIC that I haven't flown with before.  We were scheduled to fly from ZZZ to BZN.  I have been to both of these airports a few times and I felt comfortable flying to them.  As I haven't had any issues flying to BZN before.   We began our descent and I received the ATIS as early as possible and advised the PIC that Runway 30 was in use.  GPS and Visual.   The PIC discovered that there was no approach to Runway 30.  RNAV (GPS)-A was in the FMS and available.  The PIC built the RNAV (RNP) Runway 30; I believe he did this in error and meant to select RNAV (GPS)-A.   I noticed the PIC spent a considerable amount of 'heads down' time on the FMS.  I don't think he heard ATC ask us to descend from 13;000 to 11;000;   at that point I said to him that I will initiate a descent to 11;000 at 1500 fpm.  The AP and AT was armed and the aircraft began a descent.  I was then asked to build a 5 mile final to Runway 30 which I tried to do but a message came up as 'unknown waypoint'.   I made a few more attempts to correct the situation; but did not have enough time.  We were then instructed to fly to PESRE.  And at that point ATC advised of a low altitude alert and climb to 11;000.  I'm not sure how the autopilot became disconnected.  I was not the pilot flying and I never touched the controls.  I do want to mention that the PIC briefed me to not touch the heading bug.  This was mentioned when we were starting engines in ZZZ.   I also suggested to the PIC that since we were VMC and I could see the airport environment and I made a gesture pointing to the general location.  But I guess during the workload he didn't hear me.  At no time did the GPWS activate.The PIC needs to improve CRM and delegate during high workloads.  I was using the checklist as assigned.

Light transport pilot reported ATC issued a low altitude alert during approach into BZN. Reporter stated the PIC may have programmed an incorrect approach and added that the autopilot became disconnected; but was not sure how that occurred.