Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Crew called up to discuss FOM (Flight Operations Manual) 10.XX [country] operations. They had DG (Dangerous Good) on board that was only transiting [through the country]; that came into ZZZ on [company] flight; then moved directly to onward destinations on outbound flight. None of the DG originated in [the country]; per policy. Nor was any of the DG destined to get off in [the country]. It was all transit DG.FOM 10.XX [Country] OPERATIONS has a new change bar ball note that says this:If dangerous goods are flown into [the country]; they may be flown out with a waiver from Flight Safety.According to the statement above; it seems that a waiver is required for this situation; and any situation where DG is flown into [the country]; and then subsequently flown out of [the country].So we got the DO; and DG Administrator on the phone to discuss. No one could really comment much on this new statement. [The administrator] then got [the manager] involved; and I also explained that new statement to [the manager]. [The manager] was also at a loss; so he recommended to get [the] Manager of Flight Safety; involved.I called [Manager of Flight Safety]; and he explained in more detail the interpretation of this new FOM verbiage. [The Manager of Flight Safety] relayed that this change bar is specifically written to abide by [the country] law. This new statement only applies to a situation where a DG shipment was destination (not transit); and for whatever reason; that DG item did not clear customs; and then has to be shipped out--only in that case would a waiver be required. But for normal transit DG thru ZZZ; a waiver remains not required.This new verbiage does not delineate between normal transit DG; or DG that was destined to [the country] and could not clear Customs. It simply says 'DG that are flown into [the country] may be flown out with a waiver'. I called the crew back and explained what [the Manager of Flight Safety] had outlined. The crew accepted this; despite it not written in this manner; then departed. I did ask the crew to file a report; as I will as well.In closing; it would have been helpful if the new verbiage contained more clarity; for example:A waiver from Flight Safety is required in cases where a DG shipment was originally destined to [the country]; but did not clear Customs and had to be reshipped out of [country] on a [company] flight.But there is currently no distinction in what is currently written in the FOM; so therefore the call of ambiguity from the crew. We took a lengthy delay to sort this out and obtain a definitive 'verbal-only' answer from [the Manager of Flight Safety].

Airline Dispatcher reported new 'Dangerous Goods International Cargo Procedure' requires a revision to address transport waiver requirements.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant; Person Maintenance

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aft (B) Flight Attendant contacted cockpit on arrival at around 5;000 FT saying she smelled a chemical odor. She had briefly smelled it on takeoff but dismissed it until it came back on arrival. We completed landing and taxied to gate. On shut down odor occurred again; this time all main cabin and cockpit was able to smell it as well. We had deiced the plane on a previous leg but this was not a deicing glycol smell; although it could be smelled at times too. Write up was made and cabin odor report filled out. Mechanic came and began procedure to determine smell. Nothing was found at gate. Crew was checked by paramedics for possible medical distress but nothing was found at time of checking. Mechanic said that procedure requested a run up to see if we could determine odor. Pilots and Mechanic went out and took aircraft to run up stand and ran both engines separately at high power to see if odor would happen but it did not. Aircraft was taken to hard stand and shut down. On shut down of Engine Number 2 odor re-occurred. Company was notified that odor seemed to be coming from Engine Number 2 and was happening on ground at shut down. Crew was sent home. Possible leakage of engine oil or fuel into air conditioning; but not fully determined. Find way to prevent contamination of cabin air from engines or a way to trap fumes if they do come from engine. The Company seemed very thorough in procedure to find leak. There was a form to fill out and MOC was fully involved as well and assisted us. However; I do not know what outcome is for this event.

A321 engine oil was suspected of contaminating the aircraft bleed system and the cabin air after a flight attendant detected a chemical odor in flight and mechanics confirmed the odor after an engine ground runup.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 1165; Flight Crew Type 37

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was SIC on an IFR flight departing from ZZZ. The PIC asked me to pick up our clearance prior to our departure. I received our clearance from ZZZ Clearance Delivery frequency. Our clearance route was 'Via radar vectors then as filed.' The PIC determined that we would have to fly the published ODP (Obstacle Departure Procedure) for runway XXL at ZZZ. He insisted that since we were not given a departure procedure; the ODP was mandatory.Immediately prior to receiving our take off clearance; Tower gave us a new departure frequency as well as departure instructions. I read the instructions back to Tower and accepted our take off clearance. Our instructions were 'On departure turn right heading 270 climb and maintain 3;000 cleared for takeoff runway XXL.' Shortly after rotation and during our initial climb out; the PIC began a left turn to heading 150 to follow the ODP. I challenged the PIC by saying 'I believe it's a right turn to heading 270'. The PIC responded to me with 'We're following the ODP.' Approximately 2 seconds later; tower instructed us 'I need you to make a right turn; that's a right turn to 270 immediately.' The PIC assumed radio communications from me at that time and responded to tower with 'We're following the ODP.' The PIC continued the left turn to heading 150 after being instructed by tower to turn right heading 270. Tower then instructed another aircraft to make a left turn heading 090 immediately. The PIC finally listened to tower's instructions and began the right turn to heading 270 after several seconds of defiance. Tower was professional at all times and politely asserted that clarification of clearance needs to be made for future reference.

Air Taxi First Officer reported Captain flew Obstacle Departure Procedure instead of assigned departure resulting in an airborne conflict.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After landing on Runway 36L we exited E2 and was given instruction to taxi via [Taxiway] E and hold short [Taxiway] J. Approaching [Taxiway] J we were given taxi instruction to cross Runway 36R at [Intersection] WJ and contact Ground on the other side. I turned the aircraft onto [Intersection] WJ turned on all aircraft lights and stated that the runway was clear to the left. As we approached Runway 36R I heard [another] flight state that they were already past the hold short line. My check airman in the right seat looked right to make sure the runway was clear and applied the brakes as he saw the aircraft on the takeoff roll and lifting off the runway. Stopped in position (just short of the runway or pretty close) and we tried to contact Tower several times to verify that the runway was clear and that we could proceed. Tower stated that we were clear to continue and cross Runway 36R at [Intersection] WJ and contact Ground. After crossing the runway the check airman asked for a phone for Tower to discuss the issue. We contacted our Chief Pilot's office and safety department.As I wasn't in the Tower it would be speculation to what I think the cause was other than situational awareness.

After landing on Runway 36L at DFW we were given instructions to taxi via [Taxiway] E to [Intersection] WJ and hold short of Runway 36R. I read back the clearance. As we approached the hold short position the Ground Controller told us to cross Runway 36R at [Intersection] WJ. As we turned the corner onto [Intersection] WJ we turned all lights on an began to cross; I noticed an aircraft on takeoff roll. I promptly applied the brakes from the right seat since the IOE Captain Student had no visibility of the aircraft yet. We stopped short of the runway but across the hold short line. No radio call was made for us to hold short after been given clearance to cross. All I heard on the frequency was [another] aircraft on Taxiway Z stating they had already crossed the hold short line. I made repeated calls to the ground controller to clarify the issue and get out of the danger area of the runway. Shortly afterwards we were given clearance to cross the runway. Once we were clear of the runway we requested a tower phone number to clarify the incident.It appeared there was a considerable amount of traffic landing and taking off after weather had come through the airport area. There seemed to be a loss of situational awareness by the controller working the west side tower at DFW.The taxiway and surface mov guidance system would have prevented either us or the [other] aircraft from entering the runway safety area had it been working.

EMB-175 flight crew reported a near collision while taxiing at DFW.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 5605; Flight Crew Type 3899

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

I should have called in fatigued. I flew Flight X the day the 3 days prior. I had one day left on reserve before 2 [days off]. Scheduling called me about 5 hours after landing from Flight X that they were assigning me Flight Y and were rolling my days off. I informed them that I might be fatigued. They said I had 30 hours off and it was legal. Just because it's legal does not mean it's safe. Well if I had to do it again I would have called in fatigued. I was not given a short flight or short duty day. I was assigned one of our longest flights. I was the flying pilot and I could not keep my eyes open for the last 3 hours on the flight deck. And I was making tons of mistakes. I was in no shape to be flying an all-nighter to the other side of the world. And the bunks are far from perfect. The 777-300 bunks are so hard that sleeping is not easy for me. It's like trying to sleep on hard wood. And trying to sleep in turbulence isn't exactly easy either. Overall my performance as a crew member was sub-standard and I was making a lot of mistakes and also just barely able to stay awake. Because I went from a 3 day [international] trip which you have fatigue from even after a night of sleep because you miss 2 nights of sleep; to a 4 day trip. We are not machines and [Company] must not schedule us like we are machines.

B777 First Officer reported being assigned to international trips in close succession resulted in flying fatigued.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Picking up ATIS returning from a VFR flight in a rental plane; I found that the ceiling has gone from clear to 900 overcast. I was on flight following so informed ATC that I would need the ILS but would remain VFR for the time being. Our prevailing weather often generates lower stratus above the airport; with clear skies along the ILS; and it was my assumption this would likely be the case again.While establishing on the localizer outside of the final approach point; I eventually noticed a flag on the glide slope for the #1 CDI (Course Deviation Indicator); and no movement on the needle. I noticed that the #2 CDI had a glide slope display as well; and since I was still in VMC I tuned the ILS in #2 and saw no flag; so I made the poor choice to continue the approach utilizing #2; still assuming I would likely remain clear of clouds.Before reaching the final approach point I did enter the clouds. Although the altitude at the final approach point gave a reasonable cross check; I was noticing that the stability of the glide slope almost looked too good. Soon I noticed that I was continuing to hold a higher than normal descent rate to hold the needle centered; and quickly realized that the needle was not truly responding to the glide slope but was simply centered and that I'd been blindly following faulty vertical guidance.While task load being single pilot in IMC I struggled to juggle decision making about the best course of action (which should have been ingrained to just go missed); and soon I realized I was breaking out into VMC again below the deck. The PAPIs confirmed that I was indeed below the glide slope. However at this point I could continue with visible contact with the ground and airport.The chain of bad decisions here started when I first noticed an issue with the glide slope of the #1 CDI. I was in VMC and could easily have told the controller that I had an issue and would like to come back to do another approach; with time to troubleshoot; set up a non-precision approach; etc. I suppose get-there-it-is; my preconception that I'd likely never enter IMC on this local approach where I knew the local terrain; and the thought that I could fix the situation on the fly egged me on.The second set of bad decisions came when I ignored by feelings that something just didn't feel right about the #2 glide slope and continued the approach rather than confessing that there was an issue and taking the relatively quick climb back into VMC above to figure out the issue there. By the time that really hit me I was pretty task saturated and my delay in acting resulted in me breaking out into VMC.I'd like to think that had the ceilings not been so high; or had it been an unfamiliar approach to an unfamiliar airport; I would have immediately made the right call and canceled the approach. But apparently the trap I let myself get into was being complacent with the familiar approach to my home airport; which could have ended up just as bad.

C172 pilot reported descending on approach without a reliable glide slope in IFR conditions.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

The timing of the situation was ripe for a mistake; as a similar-sounding call sign received the exact type of clearance we would have expected as we approached the end of the runway while I was task saturated with completing the required checklist. Ideally; I would not have misheard the call sign; but ultimately I should have realized my attention had been entirely focused on the checklist; not the radio; and asked Tower for a short delay; clarification; or repeated clearance. We were operating the second leg of the day as Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We were given a short taxi from the terminal to Runway XXR. Approaching the departure end of XXR I switched to Tower frequency while still completing the Before Takeoff Checklist. As we made the turn from B onto B5 and while still finishing the last few steps of the checklist; Tower cleared another aircraft with a similar-sounding call sign; to line up and wait on XXC. I mistakenly thought the line up and wait clearance was for us and read back a clearance to line up and wait on Runway] XXR. Tower did not acknowledge my call; and while the Captain and I both saw an aircraft on final for [Runway] XXR; it appeared there was adequate spacing for the line up and wait clearance to be reasonable. As our aircraft passed the hold short line; Tower cleared the similar call sign for takeoff on XXC. The Captain and I simultaneously realized there had been a possible mix up of call signs. We advised tower we had read back the line up and wait clearance and asked for confirmation that it had been for us. Tower advised that it had not been for us; but cleared us for an immediate takeoff to accommodate the aircraft on final for [Runway] XXR. We immediately transitioned to a rolling takeoff and were able to get airborne before any go-around or other action was required by the aircraft on final.

It did not sound right to me when the Tower said to line up and wait; but after the First Officer read back the instructions and the Tower did not correct us we pressed on. Next time I am in a situation that does not feel right; I will stop what I am doing and verify the instructions before taking the runway.We were taxiing to Runway XXR in ZZZ. As we were approaching the hold short line we heard the instruction to line up and wait. The First Officer read back 'Aircraft X line up and wait XXR.' Both of us looked at final approach and saw an  aircraft on approximately a 5 mile final; I verified this with my MFD. As we turned on to the runway the Tower cleared an aircraft for takeoff that had a very similar call sign as ours. At this point; I verified our instructions to lineup and wait. Tower said that he did not clear us to line up and wait. The Controller immediately cleared us for takeoff and so we took off.

A320 flight crew reported runway incursion.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Weather; Human Factors

Cleared to FL240; we were climbing through 15;000 feet and realized that there was some convective weather in front of us. Requested deviation to the left or direct to SZW that would keep us out of the weather. ATC said that they could give us direct SZW if we expedited the climb through FL230; which we agreed to. F/O increased vertical speed and I set the heading towards SZW for an initial turn; then adjusted power in FMS to MCT limits to provide more thrust. I then entered direct to SZW in the FMS. Passing FL210; I realized that we had not reset the altimeters to 29.92. We immediately corrected this and resumed the climb. No deviations occurred.Recently the checklist was revised to remove the 'below the line' item of altimeters; ostensibly due to the need to standardize with the 777. While the previous procedure for setting altimeters when cleared above/below transition was rescinded due to more altitude errors (more likely due to lack of training the procedure than a problem with the procedure itself; as the procedure has been that way for international for many years without issue); the removal of the checklist item removes the ability of the checklist to capture the error. A recent [company bulletin] discussed the need to pay more attention to detail; and then listed a number of items that appear to be things that would be categorized as 'errors.' I believe the policies and procedures are failing us. While there may be a technological fix to the altimeter problem; right now we have a problem with our policies and procedures that are leading to these types of errors and setting up the scenario where an error is highly probable. Eliminating an error control--such as a checklist item--does not help. In the past; I would have had the checklist on my lap (which is my habit) until it was complete. I believe [such a procedure as policy] may have increased the probability of capturing the altimeter change. Perhaps better policies or procedures can be developed to better mitigate these issues; but removing it from the checklist does not appear to be a solution.

After a lapse in resetting the altimeter passing the transition altitude the Captain opined that a change in company SOP regarding checklists was a contributing factor.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Noticed checklist indicated Main Landing Gear (MLG) psi was 160 on each tire and thought that was pretty low. Looked through logbook and could not find tire where the tire pressure had been re-inflated; recorded in logbook and checked after 24 hours to see if the pressure loss is more than 5%. I called Maintenance and spoke to [technician]. I asked him the tire pressure parameters for normal inflation of MLG and he looked it up and stated it was 174-184 PSI. I then asked what you do when it is down as low as 160 PSI. [Technician] replied; 'between 90-95% you inflate to normal pressure'. I then read the rest of Table-301 of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) that I had a copy of stating: 'Do a check of the tire/wheel assembly for the cause of pressure loss. Inflate again and record this in the logbook. Remove the tire/wheel assembly if the pressure loss is more than 5% and occurs again in 24 hours.' So; I told [technician] I was concerned there was no documented recheck. I asked him to fax me the form he had that omitted this vital step and I would be satisfied. I never got the different version of the AMM and I am assuming [technician] omitted the part about the re-check. I received a noticed looking for the write-up [later] in the evening.I am always leery of these inspections because I always feel they are done by contractors not familiar with our fleets. I believe our own employees would be more familiar with our aircraft. As to the information omitted to me over the phone; I have no comment.

Captain questions the lack of maintenance documentation in their Embraer EMB-505 (Phenom-300) aircraft logbook for the re-inflation of the Main Landing Gear (MLG) tires that were noted to be below minimum tire pressures. Pilot noted a Maintenance individual was not forthcoming in addressing and recording the tire pressure information and requirement to check tire pressures again in 24-hours.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 77; Flight Crew Total 5017; Flight Crew Type 4476

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 182; Flight Crew Type 950

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

During the takeoff roll in the low-speed region; we received am ECAM F/CTRL GRND SPLR fault 3+4. We assumed this was an ECAM associated with our current deferral F/CTL AIL SERVO fault and decided to continue rather than abort. When at a safe altitude; we reviewed the ECAM in detail and concluded that this was a separate issue and we should have aborted.

On takeoff from ZZZ [Runway] XX; we received an ECAM at about 60 kt. for Ground Spoiler 3+4; which we thought was associated with the Aileron Servo Fault deferral. I elected to continue the takeoff and once airborne we were able to tell that it was indeed a separate issue. We should have rejected the takeoff. Unfortunately; the Aileron Servo Fault deferral generated multiple transient ECAMs during start and power changes and we became accustomed to them. They went away in a second or two. On the takeoff roll; we thought it was yet another transient and associated ECAM. I had talked to the inbound Captain who gave us the jet initially in ZZZ1 and he mentioned that there were a lot of stray ECAMs associated with the deferral and it probably added to my thinking that this was another one of those. Airborne; we ran the QRH checklist and determined our landing distances for ZZZ1; made the write-up; and landed normally.

A320 flight crew reported receiving a Spoiler System ECAM alert on takeoff and elected to continue the takeoff. At altitude and reviewing the ECAM alert; flight crew discovered takeoff should have been rejected and wrote up the alert for maintenance.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

On approach into Chicago; I was briefing my First Officer on the approach to Runway 28 at ORD. ATC notified us of traffic about 2:00 from our position. We were at 14;000 FT at the time. The other aircraft was also at 14;000 FT and climbing slowly. We received a RA on the TCAS to descend. I did notice that the other aircraft was only 200 FT above. We were so close that we actually saw parachutist bailing out of the aircraft. We ended up leveling at 12;300 FT. Reported it to ATC and asked if they want us back at 14;000 FT or descend to 12;000 FT. We ended up descending down to 10;000 FT. After landing; Dispatch had me call the ATC duty manager about the RA. They pretty much said that it was their fault. He also wanted to make sure that nobody was injured in the descent; nobody was. I don't remember what frequency we were on but it was on one of the Approach frequencies into Chicago. The ATC Manager told me that the Controller working that frequency was new. He was also doing a report to help teach his new controllers from doing this again.

EMB170 Captain arriving ORD from the south describes a TCAS RA to descend generated by a skydiving aircraft at 14;000 FT; just as the skydivers exit the aircraft. ATC took responsibility for the close call; citing a new Controller on the position.


Installation; Inspection; Testing; Work Cards

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

After a transport lasting from approximately XA00-XH30; the med crew and I returned to base and were informed that we would be out of service for maintenance. At this time; I placed the helicopter in the hanger; debriefed with the crew; and returned to my office to complete the manifest.At approximately XI30 I approached the aircraft to check in on the maintenance with Name1 and Name. I inquired about the filter; asking Name if that was the filter that was sent in to be weighed and he answered 'Yes'. I observed Name show Name1 the replacement of the O rings for the filter housing and filter. I then returned to my office. At approximately XJ00 Name1 came to my office and stated maintenance was complete; requesting me to complete a maintenance ground run up leak check; to which I agreed. Name1 informed me that he did an auto pilot visual check and removed three panels. At this time; he showed me the panels (the first was located underneath the aircraft attached to the ELT antenna; the second was under the pilot's seat; and the third panel was located in the baggage compartment) I assessed each panel to ensure they were secured properly (which they were). He also informed me they completed the 150-hour oil filter change; together we assessed the filter location and confirmed it was installed and securely tightened. I was informed by Name1 that there may be some residual oil trapped in the heat shield that could potentially leak out. I noticed Name using the Honeywell computer and asked Name1 what he was doing. I was told by Name1 that he was clearing a maintenance light that was induced by prematurely engaging the power before a sensor wire was plugged in. I was also informed that once this was cleared; we would be able to do the run up. I confirmed with Name1 that we just needed to do a run up for a leak check and was told yes just for the leak check. I proceeded to complete my walk around; both engine cowlings were open at this time. I visually inspected each side of the engine for items such as rags and tools as well as loose nuts and bolts. I went to step on the right side step and removed a rag; then I looked into the right transmission cowling and upper deck where nothing abnormal was discovered. I stepped down; moved the ladder away from the aircraft; walked around the tail boom and continued to visually inspect cowlings and fasteners. On the left side I retrieved the step stool to look in the engine cowling that was open as well as the left side transmission cowling; continuing to inspect and nothing abnormal was discovered. I got off the step stool and placed it to the side. At this time; I noticed Name was speaking on the phone regarding the Honeywell computer; which he was still working on. I was notified it would take a few more minutes before I could transport the aircraft outside for the run up. I walked into Name2's office to inform them that I would be doing a maintenance run up; also inquiring if there was night shift pilot coverage; to which I was told there was not. I returned to the hanger to find Name was done with the computer. I assisted Name1 with placement of the heliporter under the aircraft and proceeded to transport the aircraft outside. Name remained in the hanger. I removed the heliporter from under the aircraft and placed it in front of the hanger door. At this time; I completed another walk around check around the aircraft inspecting for abnormalities; with exception of the opened cowlings for leak check inspection nothing was out of the ordinary. I spoke with Name1 and asked him how he wished to perform the run up; he informed me he would like a normal startup; once ready take it to 100 percent and run it for approximately ten minutes; if there were any leaks or abnormalities; he would immediately give me the cutoff signal to shut down the helicopter. I entered the aircraft as Name1 retrieved his hearing protection; once he returned; he stated he was ready and clear to start. I placed my helmet on and fastened my belts. Per prestart and startup checklists I started the helicopter. Engine ignition at approximately 12 percent Ng; MGT temperature rise normal; voltage normal; blades turning by approximately 18 percent; transmission and oil pressure gauge with pressure increase; and no lights were observed. Start completed with starter light out and approximately 62 percent Ng. Start checklist completed; alternator on; FADEC reset; no lights observed; gauges in the green. I proceeded to roll up throttle while observing the torque gauge increasing abnormally slow. I rolled throttle back down to idle then rolled it back up observing the torque gauge to once again increase abnormally slow; simultaneously the low engine oil pressure light illuminated. When assessing the oil pressure gauge; I saw zero oil pressure and rolled throttle off; engaged rotor break below 40 percent; turned off generator; and turned off the battery. Once the aircraft was shut down; I informed Name1 what had occurred. While I exited the aircraft; Name1 went to get Name from the maintenance hanger. I returned to the helicopter hanger; where I waited for Name and Name1 to join with their assessment of the findings and plan for diagnosing the problem. Approximately five minutes later both Name and Name1 returned to the helicopter with their ladder; tools and oil. I observed Name adding oil and consulted with Name1 regarding what they felt the problem was. Name1 stated there was approximately two quarts of oil noted in the reservoir and there may be some air in the line; the plan was to add more oil then proceed to complete another ground run. Once Name was finished adding oil he informed me that he was ready for the ground run. I went to the oil reservoir and assessed the oil level as well as ensured the cap was secured. I discussed with Name1 the plan for the ground run; and was informed that we would proceed like the prior ground run; keeping a close eye on the oil pressure. I completed another walk around the aircraft ensuring all rags; tools and equipment were removed before entering the helicopter. Per prestart and startup checklists I started the helicopter with Name1 next to me. Engine ignition at approximately 12 percent Ng; MGT temperature rise normal; voltage normal; blades turning by approximately 18 percent; zero indication of oil pressure increase; and transmission oil pressure was increasing. Focusing my attention on the oil pressure gauge I allowed the Ng to increase approximately another 20 percent; with zero indication of oil pressure increase. At this point Name1 instructed me to shut down the aircraft; I rolled throttle off; engaged rotor break; and turned battery off. I exited the aircraft and went to the helicopter hanger. In the hanger I spoke with Name and Name1; inquiring what they thought the problem may be. I was informed by Name that they may have to bleed the lines out; although he has never had to do this before. Both Name and Name1 went to the Maintenance hanger. It was now approximately XJ50; I returned to the office where I gathered my stuff to complete my shift. Approximately five minutes later Name entered the office and I asked if he would like me to return the aircraft to the hanger. He informed me that he would like it returned to the hanger and the aircraft would be out of service for the night as he was awaiting more information from John regarding the next steps for maintenance of the aircraft. I returned the aircraft to the hanger using the heliporter; securing it for the night; and completed my shift as there was no Relief Pilot for the night shift to report off to.

Pilot reported no oil pressure during two consecutive post maintenance engine runs and elected to forego any additional engine runs until maintenance could investigate.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On the way to ZZZ airport to get fuel the engine started to stutter. I immediately pulled carb heat; verified mixture full rich; and fuel selector on; fuel gauge showing to have fuel; oil pressure and temperature both in the green. I continually pumped the throttle; as that seemed to be the only thing to keep the engine running partially. I looked for the private grass strips that I know of in the area; I was too far and too low to make it to them so I continued toward the best field options I could see when I remembered a friend of my boss had a big field he said we could land at just north of ZZZ. I then located the field and proceeded to circle the field while performing my final check list. I secured the engine and preformed a textbook 3 point soft field landing. I called my boss and he promptly arrived with an aircraft mechanic to inspect the airplane. They found absolutely no evidence of a problem so they started the airplane and my boss flew it back to the airport where he could have it checked tested and fixed. No one was injured; no damage to persons or property occurred; and the airplane was in perfect flying condition. The airplane is now grounded until the issue can be found; however; my boss could not duplicate the issue and the engine ran perfectly smooth on the way back to the airport. The only thing they could come up with to this point is carb ice or vapor lock. Those are just guesses seeing how the issue cannot be duplicated. Also; I used carb heat and it only seemed to escalate the issue; progressively losing power and never restoring fuel flow. When pumping the throttle the engine would start back up for about a second per pump. This continued for about 2 minutes before it stopped healing and the engine stopped completely.

The reporter stated that the field where he made the emergency landing was a field that they used for practicing soft field landing. He added that Maintenance has replaced the fuel line precautionary and ensured that the carb heat was working properly. They were unable to determine the actual cause of the engine shutting down; but suspect icing was the probable cause since the aircraft has been operating normally since the incident.

Aeronca Pilot reported landing in an open field due to a loss of engine power.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14.4

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was issued to 'descend via the KKILR ONE ARRIVAL...' by ZMP (high altitude) Sector 16.  This clearance authorizes the aircraft to descend into low altitude (Sector 06) airspace.  The aircraft was handed off to Sector 06 but a frequency change was not issued until requested by the Sector 06 controller while the aircraft was descending through FL220.This procedure is inherently dangerous and goes against everything we have been accustomed to and trained for.  Descending into another sectors' airspace by procedure?  Why don't we just climb all departures to their requested altitude?  It's the same thing.  The STAR arrivals should be given a PD descent to FL240 and handed off to the low sector.  Let the low altitude sector issue the 'descend via' clearance.  The potential for issues like this; not talking to an aircraft in your sector; are too great.  This procedure has reduced safety by eliminating an important step in the handoff process.

ZMP Controller reports of a procedure where the high altitude controller clears the aircraft to descend into another controller's airspace.  The aircraft is handed off to the underlying sector but transfer of communications is not completed until the underlying sector asks for the aircraft.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Heavy thunderstorms in the area; and ATC was having difficulty getting traffic into MEM. Only two arrival gates were open; so we experienced multiple arrival revisions and vectors. At the time of the incident there were multiple aircraft in close proximity and the controller was very busy. What happened was very dangerous; a near mid-air; so my recollection of the sequence of events may not be exactly correct. After the flight the three of us discussed the events to clarify what happened.After multiple vectors we were finally cleared direct to ROCAB for the HOBRK 1 arrival. We were at FL220. My first officer asked the controller if we were cleared to descend; since we were high. Location was between HOBRK and ROCAB. Clearance was 'descend via the HOBRK 1'. We said we'd have trouble making the 10;000 ft. restriction at ROCAB and the controller said do the best you can. As we started down we got a TCAS 'Traffic; Traffic' alert; and the display showed an aircraft directly in front of us 100 Ft. above. I did not note the exact distance but I think it was within 5 nm. Immediately thereafter came the TCAS RA; 'descend; descend now.' I referenced the display and started an aggressive descent. A few seconds later we got 'climb; climb; increase rate to climb'; with the corresponding display on the PFD. I complied and then got a level off command. We leveled off back at FL220; and told the controller we had the RA. Right after or during the RA; we were given a heading of 360; and I complied. The controller then said we were supposed to be at FL220. The first officer said no; we had been cleared to descend via the arrival; to 10;000 ft. All three of us clearly remember the descent clearance. Then we were cleared direct HOBRK; and the FO said that was behind us; so the controller cleared us back to ROCAB and descent to 7;000; and we complied. We were then vectored to final for RWY 36L and flew the visual/ILS approach and landed.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported a close encounter with another heavy aircraft while on descent to MEM. Evasive action was taken.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was the Captain/ pilot flying. Air Traffic Control requested us to maintain at least 170 knots to the marker. After setting managed speed the Tower advised us that a Boeing 757 would be departing with minimum separation before our landing and cleared us to land. I advised the First Officer to be ready for a go around in case the 757 did not continue its take off roll. The 757 was airborne by the time we were at 500 feet so we continued the approach. At 50 feet we encountered a sink which caused a firm bounce on the main gear and subsequent second touchdown. There were no further problems with the rollout and turn off to the taxiway. During taxi in an ECAM message was generated and an action report printed out. I called dispatch and maintenence control to confer with them prior to writing the discrepancies in the logbook. Keeping our speed up to the marker and then having to make sure we kept our spacing on the slow moving departing aircraft contributed to encountering that aircraft's jet blast and turbulance during our flare and was a factor in the bounced landing. In the future I will have to ask ahead of time if a certain distance can be extended for a departing 757.

Landing behind a 757 which previously took off on 30L MSP. Had about a 15 knot left crosswind. Crossing the numbers the aircraft pitched over and I immediately stated to 'watch it'. I believe he had already began his input to correct the pitch. The aircraft contacted the runway in what seemed to be a flat configuration. The aircraft made a bounce and landed and the rollout seem as normal as could be for the circumstance. I really can't explain what caused the nose down attitude over the numbers. It just all happened so quickly. I believe that we met all SOP's during this approach. The Captain was still on low time. He was aware of the 757 and showed concerned for the potential jet blast. He had added 3 knots extra to his approach speed for the winds and potential jet blast. From my perspective it all happened too fast for any action that could be taken on my part to mitigate the hard landing.

A320 flight crew reported a hard landing following a B757's takeoff from the same runway. Captain believes jet blast could have been a factor.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 2293; Flight Crew Type 1413

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Flying to GYY; about 30 miles south of GYY; I cancelled IFR; received confirmation of same; and advised ATC of a change of destination to PWK. I asked for flight following below the Chicago Class B airspace along the shore of Lake Michigan; asked ATC whether to continue the previous squawk and they said yes so I did. A few minutes later; ATC attempted to 'clear' me through the GYY Class D airspace at or below 2;500 feet. I replied that we would remain clear of their Class D; and refused the unrequested 'clearance' as I didn't require one while operating VFR. After that; I got a stern response advising me that I was required to follow ATC instructions and was asked if I was still going to refuse to follow their order. I replied that I was VFR; but rather than argue about it I would comply and would discuss it later. A few miles later; ATC said if I wasn't going to follow their instructions I could 'squawk 1200; frequency change approved' without flight following so that's what I did. The ensuing trip to PWK was uneventful; all VFR outside of controlled airspace (excepting the 30NM transponder-squawking required ring). From the time I cancelled IFR to the time I entered the PWK Class D airspace; no portion of the flight was other than VFR outside of controlled airspace. There was no ceiling and visibility was greater than 20 miles.It's not clear to me; and apparently this controller; just what pilot responsibilities are required when receiving flight following. As I understand it; while flying outside of controlled airspace; I can pick my own route so long as I remain in VFR conditions. If flight following requires a specific path or a clearance through Class D (or C or B); I've never experienced that in 40 years of flying.  All I wanted to receive was potential conflict information.  I think this controller overstepped his authority and attempted to bully me into following his instructions with a clearance that I didn't want or need.  Some clarity on this issue would be beneficial. Since when is a clearance required when operating VFR outside of Class D airspace?

General aviation pilot reported canceling IFR and requesting flight following to PWK below the ORD Class B. ATC attempted to 'clear' the reporter through the GYY Class D which he declined. This upset the Controller and resulted in cancelation of flight following.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

ZZZ MX (Maintenance) called and informed that the LH eng took 19 Quarts. MX inspected the inside and outside of the eng cowl and eng; tailpipe; inlet and behind fan blades with no evidence of a leak. The inbound crew did not write up a problem with the oil QTY. We reviewed AHM (Automated Health Monitoring) report with was posted inflight an hour prior to landing and showed good QTY and oil pressure and no high oil temp. We reviewed the oil service screen in work bench and no servicing has been done for a while which showed no oil consumption issues. We asked to MX service the oil tank and run the engine; no leaks found and a good oil gulp at start which tells us the tank is not over serviced. We put the engine oil qty on MEL for two reasons one that the oil qty transmitter was giving false readings and MX may have thought when they checked the gauge in the cockpit that the engine was full and that's why the oil screen also showed very little oil servicing of the engine. Second reason is that by putting the engine on MEL that forces the mechanic to check oil at the tank and document it. There for showing if we truly have an oil consumption problem. We monitored the take off and looked at the takeoff report and it showed good oil qty and pressure. About an hour later we got a report of the engine having high oil temp. We looked at AHM; it did show a high oil temp with oil Qty and pressure good. On post landing at ZZZ1 MX did a look at the engine and once again no leaks found. With the oil temp high that's when we asked them to pull the master oil chip detector and it had metal shavings on it. With the oil temp over limit that requires an engine change.I'm not sure we can prevent this kind of failure this was a really oddball problem we have not seen before. I think we were a victim of a failing lube and scavenge pump or gearbox the oil may have been hiding in the gearbox. If we were to do this again I may have asked MX to do a high power run instead of just an idle run; But it may not have shown the problem.

Maintenance Technician reported excessive oil consumption was addressed by placing an oil monitor MEL on the aircraft; after which high oil temp and metal found on the oil scavenge screen/main chip detector required an engine change.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Dispatched with inoperative APU generator. Shortly after top of climb; RT CSD PRESS LOW light illuminated. Followed QRH procedures and was now on single generator operation; with no system degradation. Returned to the departure airport.

A MD-82 crew with an MEL'ed APU generator disconnected an engine driven generator after the RT CSD PRESS LOW light annunciated and so with a single generator returned to the departure airport.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Upon review of the aircraft's AML I found an MEL for the engine driven generator Number 2. I read the MEL book and it mentioned that the advisory message GEN BRG FAIL may be present and we are dispatchable provided the Caution Message GEN OFF BUS was not present for the previous flight. The write up from the previous crew mentioned the GEN BRG FAIL message but not the Gen off Bus message. I interpreted that we were good to depart with the MEL. After pushback from the gate and starting of Eng Number 2; we got the message GEN 2 OFF BUS. I called Maintenance Control and informed him of the situation and he asked if Maintenance had collared two circuit breakers and deselected Gen 2 on the overhead. I said they had not. He said they should have and then instructed me two collar circuit breaker E8 and E9 behind the FO seat and deselect the Gen 2 on the overhead with which I complied. I believed that this brought us in compliance with our MEL. Doing this cleared the GEN BRG 2 FAIL message; but the GEN 2 OFF BUS remained. This made sense to me as it was now deselected. He also asked me if I was hearing the relays clicking I said they were not. I asked if we were good to depart with the GEN 2 OFF BUS message on the EICAS and he said I was. The MEL only mentioned it as a restriction if it was on the EICAS on the previous flight and made no mention of the current flight so I believed we were legal to depart.  We departed and; while enroute; I was reading over the MEL book on generator MELs. The MEL listed [prior] the one we had been MEL 24-31-01 which was for the Engine Driven Generators (not the bearings as was the one we had). The (Maintenance) items for this MEL mentioned all of the steps that I had done on the ground prior to our departure. I believe Maintenance Control was reading the procedures for the wrong MEL and that maintenance had correctly 'not' collared and deselected the GEN. Therefore the GEN 2 OFF BUS should not have been on the EICAS and we should not have departed. After landing I again called Maintenance Control and this controller said that the breakers should not have been pulled and collared and that GEN 2 should not have been deselected for our MEL. We then MELed GEN 2 which did instruct the circuits to be pulled and the generator to be deselected. I believe that it was just human error that resulted in this situation. The MEL numbers are very similar and mistakes can happen. I should have questioned more with Maintenance Control that the MEL book did not specifically mention the presence of the GEN OFF BUS message even though I expected the message given how the generators were [then configured].

Confusion reigned regarding a generator MEL item in the AML for the reporter's E-145 which resulted with the generators improperly configured. After reviewing the pertinent documents enroute the reporter contacted Maintenance Control with his discovery and the errors were corrected prior to the next departure.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X; an ERJ-170; had a failed Generator Input/Output Module-2 card (GEN I/O 2) and needed to leave soon for a flight to a larger Maintenance Base for scheduled maintenance that night. We didn't have a card here to replace it with; but had Aircraft-Y (ACFT-Y) with the same type of card. So I took ACFT-Y's GEN I/O 2 card out; noting the arrow was facing UP. Took it to Aircraft-X (ACFT-X) to replace it (with the arrow facing Up; the way I removed it) with the canned (cannibalized) [card] from ACFT-Y. Loaded the card [into Aircraft-X] and ran the Ops Check; everything tested good at the time. We went AOG for a new card for ACFT-Y.  Once we received it; I installed the new card in ACFT-Y with the arrow; face Up; the way I removed it. Loaded the card and ran the Ops Check and everything passed. We had the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) with us to locate the card slot number in the Modular Avionics Unit (MAU2); but in the rush of getting the card out [of Aircraft-Y] and loaded into our Maintenance Tracking and Parts computer program to be [considered] Serviceable to be installed on ACFT-X; we did not notice the step annotating the arrow [on the card] should be in the DOWN position. With both Aircraft passing the Operational Checks we went about thinking it was correct until there was an error a few days later that it was then brought to my attention it was installed upside down on both aircraft.[Contributor] Wanting to make sure the aircraft was fixed before the flight crew timed out; to get it to a Base for its scheduled workload; the task was done without full notice to the AMM stating the direction of the arrows. [Recommend] Be sure to fully read all steps of the AMM. Do not believe [assume] that the current installation of a part is the correct configuration for it to be in. Cannibalize part for another aircraft. Ramp. Gate.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed he had installed a cannibalized Generator Input/Output module-2 card (GEN I/O-2) upside down into the Modular Avionics Unit-2 (MAU2) on an outbound ERJ-170 aircraft. Technician noted that even though both cards were removed and reinstalled with the arrows facing up; instead of down; they still passed the AMM Operational Checks.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 27000; Flight Crew Type 40

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft was modified with an STC engine change. During engine change the engine mount; between engine and firewall; was modified which was outside the STC specification. Further; exhaust system was installed incorrectly thus partially separating from engine cylinders in flight.

Cessna 175 pilot reported that the aircraft was removed from service due to maintenance issues that were not in compliance with FARs.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person X informed me that he had performed a 'maintenance only' test on each of the lavatory hot water systems and determined that all were malfunctioned. When I inquired further as to how he determined the operational status of the water system he explained to me a mechanic had shown him how to initiate a self test on each lav by opening the panel below the sink and turning some switches; then look for a light [to] illuminate. After conferencing with dispatch and maintenance control we were all in agreement that an illegal and unauthorized tampering of each lav's electrical component had occurred; and each had to be inspected by maintenance to confirm switches and breakers etc were in the correct position. A log book entry was made.Person X performed an illegal and unauthorized test of the lavatory hot water system. I attempted to explain to him the breach of safety that had occurred. I do not believe I was able to convey a satisfactory answer to him on why he should discontinue this practice.   I do not believe this practice is wide spread. I do believe a conference with his immediate supervisor is appropriate.

An air carrier Mechanic reported non-maintenance personnel performed a 'maintenance only' test on each of the lavatory hot water systems and determined that all were malfunctioned.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were filed for the ZZZ RNAV SID transition but cleared on the ZZZ1 Departure. Per the SID we turned southwest and were switched to departure at 1;000 ft. where the initial instructions were confusing to Pilot Monitoring. We leveled at 3;000 ft. were instructed to climb to 10;000 ft.; but the turn direction (left) and heading 080 were confusing to Pilot Monitoring; who spun the heading right instead of left resulting in incorrect FD guidance and preventing autopilot engagement as a means to task shed. The Pilot Monitoring was unable to understand the clearance direct to ZZZZZ; resulting in several transmissions to resolve the spelling of the fix. It quickly became evident to me that Approach and later Center (switched at 10;000 ft.) believed we were on the ZZZ RNAV SID; but that was not our clearance. Because we were not cleared on the ZZZ SID; we did not brief the ZZZ SID; and lack of familiarity with the fixes ZZZZZ and later ZZZZZ1 coupled with regional accents made it difficult for the Pilot Monitoring to manage radio communications and FMS entries.We were filed for the ZZZ SID but cleared on the ZZZ1 Departure. ZZZ departure and center expected us on the ZZZ with its unusual routing (take off south; turn southwest; then turn back east for climb; then south; and finally again southwest toward destination) and multiple fixes. Clear flights on the ZZZ SID if departure and center are going to reference multiple points on the ZZZ SID during the climb through ZZZ airspace.

B767 Flight Crew reported they were cleared via a departure different from what was expected and filed.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

With the spread of the COVID-19 virus still spreading throughout the world; we here at Company need to do our part to help stop the spread of the virus to each other; our families; friends and the communities we live in. After looking at all the time clock areas I noticed that there are no hand sanitizing stations there. We hourly employees have to use our hands to clock both in and out and that's just another potential point of contact for the spread of the virus and not just at our time clocks but also point of entry to the sterile work areas including the ramp. Today when I asked for a hand sanitizing wipe packet; the person behind the equipment counter said they were all out and they didn't have any alcohol wipes either.

Ground employee reported the lack of sanitizing agents especially in the clock in/out areas.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 29; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 3; Flight Attendant Total 31; Flight Attendant Type 25

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I believe we were flying directly through a storm. That is information that I learned days after the incident.  Also one Flight Attendant had called the cockpit during the meal service.  She asked the captain when would the turbulence smooth out. The Captain replied that he did not have any information.  The Captain also told her; that our aircraft did not have a 'Satcom'. For that reason we could not fly above 28;000 feet.I feel on airplanes flying trans-atlantic; they must be in tip top shape.  Also dispatch must give us flight plans that go around storms and not thru them.InflightXA:00 PM. About 4 hours in-flight we hit a very strange; loud; hard and rough bit of severe turbulence. Very bizarre. It felt like something  huge outside had pounded our aircraft. I was sitting on J/S #5. [Flight Attendant (FA) B] was sitting on J/S #8. [FA C] was standing in front of me. We were flying along smoothly and this came from no where. It was like a bang; a long feeling of the aircraft falling and tilting to the right; then another bang. FA C grabbed on to the galley. FA B and I grabbed onto [her]. When she could; FA C rushed over to 1L J/S. Very few items were out in the galley but all the carts; in their compartments and inserts just jumped and landed back in place. Even the 2R aux table jumped up and back into place. It was frightening.XA:05 PM. The 3 of us; FA B; FA C; myself; looked at each other in amazement and begin to discuss what had happened. Then; came an interphone call. I figured it was the cockpit calling to explain. However; FA B jumped up; yelled FA D and took off to the back. FA C soon followed and I agreed to monitor up front. Suddenly; FA B made a PA requesting medical assistance. I started to secure the galley. It seemed very difficult because it was still bumpy and I was scared. I just didn't know what had happened with our aircraft.  It was also difficult securing the galley because so many items that we needed for the service; came from the mid-galley. There just was not enough space in the B/C galley.  FA B made another P/A; in foreign language and English; telling passengers to sit down. I turned the lights on in B/C; did a walk thru; picked up all service items; answered a few pax's questions; turned the lights off.  I then buckled in to J/S #1; as it was getting bumpy again.FA B ran up to B/C; asked me for the EMK. I got it; she also took it along with Med kit and Defibrillator. She told me that FA D was badly injured; the cart door was deeply embedded into FA D's leg and the insides of her leg were protruding out. I continued securing galley when a Pilot on break came and started asking questions. It got turbulent again and we both strapped in to a J/S.  It smoothed out and the pilot went AFT to get info for me. I was the only F/A up front and could not leave B/C.Soon FA C ran up and told me that FA E was unconscious. I'm thinking 2 F/As? FA C asked if I was ok? and she returned to the back.  The Pilot came back and told me that it was a mess in back. FA B came back and told me that FA F was hurt. That she had hit the ceiling; hit her head; may have a concussion. She said that FA E flew up as well and landed on top of FA F.  She mentioned that FA F may have broken her foot.  Horrible feelings now as I think 3 F/As are injured. FA B gave me a list of directives and she returned to the back. I don't remember what the directions were but I know I accomplished each task.FA C came back asking for oxygen. I got the bottles from behind B/C. She returned to the back with them.  I also got many bottles from the Mid galley area. I went back to Front and kept trying to call the back. But no one would answer. I figured they were all very busy. So I said over the P/A. 'This is FA A; I have more oxygen bottles up front [if] you need them'. At that moment; I realized I was dialing 44.  Damn interphone!! [There is a different number to] call 4L and 4R. Not an AFT button like on other 767 or 44 on777 planes.The Captain made a P/A 'that Flight Attendants are injured and we are turning around and diverting to ZZZZ; and that we should be landing in 1 hour'. I remember feeling relieved but was still wondering why the Captain did not explain what the hell had just happened to us?  The Captain never told us or the passengers what happened. Why?Around XA:10 PM we landed.We were met by Paramedics. 3 Flight Attendants and 4 passengers were taking off; placed in ambulances and taken to Hospital.

A Flight Attendant describes a turbulent flight over the North Atlantic.  A diversion is required and 3 Flight Attendants and 4 passengers are taken off by ambulance.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

This report describes a significant confliction between the Metroplex designed ANJLL RNAV arrival into LAX and VFR aircraft on V137. I was working the EAFR (East Feeder Radar) sector at SCT. EAFR is a sector in the LAX arrival area at Southern California TRACON. It acts as the primary feeder sector for LAX arrivals from the east. The purpose of the sector is to accept LAX arrival handoffs from ZLA 20 and to organize the flow before it is given to the final approach sectors. EAFR sector accepts LAX arrival handoffs from ZLA 20. These aircraft are given 'descend via' clearances on the Metroplex designed ANJLL 1 RNAV arrival by ZLA prior to the frequency change to the EAFR sector. Aircraft Y was given a descend via clearance on the ANJLL by ZLA. As the EAFR; I accepted the handoff knowing this. There is a crossing restriction on the ANJLL STAR at CAANN fix at or above 17000 ft. Aircraft X was conflicting VFR traffic eastbound on V137 at 17500 ft. I observed this traffic and stopped Aircraft Y at FL190. There was no loss of separation; closest proximity was 0.3 miles and 1500 ft. Aircraft X appeared to have been handed off to the Hemet sector; which is in another area at SCT. This happened in ZLA airspace close to the EAFR boundary. Had I not stopped Aircraft Y's descent; it is possible he could have been at the same altitude as Aircraft X with less than half a mile of lateral separation. This is the second time that I have had to stop aircraft on the ANJLL star above conflicting VFR traffic at 17500 in ZLA airspace. Informally; other Controllers in the LAX arrival area have run into this issue. The Metroplex representatives know; but the response has been lackluster. What is worrisome is that all players involved; i.e. the pilots; the ZLA controller; and the Hemet controller; might have the best of intentions and not realize a procedural confliction exists. Hemet may assume the ZLA waited until all confliction were resolved before transferring communications. The VFR pilot might assume radar services provided by controllers alleviate any significant confliction. The ZLA controller may assume Hemet will issue a VFR descent. But none of these things are happening. Because there is the potential for a significant loss of separation; and because this appears to happen several times a week; and because the channels to report this safety issue are muddled; I believe significant action is warranted. At minimum; there should be a review of the procedures at SCT and ZLA the ensure separation between VFR traffic on V137 and aircraft descending via the ANJLL star. It may make sense for ZLA 20 to stop issuing 'descend via' clearances and to stop all ANJLL arrivals at FL190 until it is determined why some VFR aircraft intersect the STAR at 17500.

Reporter stated there seems to be a problem with everyone thinking someone else is taking care of the problem.  When talking to a controller at ZLA; the reporter stated that the ZLA Controller said; 'It's just a VFR.'

SCT TRACON Controller reported conflict problems with aircraft descending via the ANJLL 1 STAR into LAX and VFR traffic on V137 airway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While in the traffic pattern we turned to a left crosswind and encountered a traffic conflict with another aircraft (C172) who was downwind. We did not receive any kind of advisory or instruction(s) from ATC. Both pilots (us and the other aircraft) took proper evasive action. Contributing to the incident; the controller was working 2 runways in a very busy environment. In addition; the other aircraft appeared to be in a longer traffic pattern than normal.

C182 Pilot reported a NMAC on crosswind at controlled airport resulted in evasive action.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 18.5; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 51.4; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 51.4

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I had just landed on Runway XX and exited on the ground via taxiway Kilo. I was instructed to take taxiway Kilo to Foxtrot to the ramp for parking and disembarking. However; I made a mistake and turned right onto Bravo from Kilo rather than crossing Bravo before turning right to stay on Kilo. About the same time I noticed my error ZZZ Tower had contacted me and updated my instructions to taxi via Bravo; Alpha; Hotel to the ramp; which I successfully completed without further issues. Luckily I was the only aircraft maneuvering on the ground at the time and this did not endanger or impede any other aircraft or persons at the facility. In the future I need to take a few extra moments to verify my instructions and the airport diagrams to prevent any further deviations that could result in damages or injury by going the wrong way.

The reporter had no additional information to note.

PA-28 student pilot made a wrong turn on a taxiway after landing. ATC issued a new clearance and the pilot continued their taxi to parking.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types

No violation of FARS but I want to document the event for future aviation safety. Shortly after takeoff we had IAS caution and ALT caution on both PFDs (Primary Flight Displays). Also had EFIS COMP MON and MACH TRIM caution messages. I was flying and my Captain pulled out the QRH for the two caution messages. However; our airspeeds and altitudes did not match and we were unsure of both airspeed and altitude. We [advised ATC] and asked for vectors to figure out the problem. We asked ATC what they showed for our airspeed and determined that my airspeed indicator was incorrect (I was showing 250 knots while Captain's PFD was showing 310) and my Captain's airspeed indicator was correct. We then asked ATC what they had for our altitude and they said 8000 ft. I was displaying 8000 ft while my Captain was showing 11;000 ft. So; my airspeed was incorrect but my altitude was correct while my Captain's airspeed was correct but altitude was incorrect. Also; our TCAS was not working. While we were trying to solve the problem a plane flew right by us with no indication from TCAS nor from ATC. I had to pull the power quickly to avoid the plane. We know something drastically went wrong with our pitot-static system or was wrong before we even departed. We first flew the plane out of maintenance for a 'bird strike' that maintenance signed off but Tower did not think they did. Perhaps it was damage from the bird strike or debris flew in the tube or it was loose or who knows what. More thorough maintenance. Maintenance should be in house. This event could have been a lot worse than it was.

CRJ-700 First Officer reported erroneous airspeed and altitude indications on both pilot's primary flight displays.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I failed to switch fuel tanks properly and ran the left fuel tank dry causing the engine to lose power. I informed ATC that I had an [issue] and located [a diversion] airport nearly under me. Over the airport spiraling down I had time to determine that I had run the tank dry and switched to the other tank with over 20 gallons of fuel left and the engine restarted normally. I continued to my destination.I had stared out with full fuel; 90 gallons; switched tanks at .5; 1.5; 2.5 hours after take off. After that time I forgot to do the tank switch at 3.5 hours and the left tank ran dry at 4.0 hours. I lost about 2500 feet before I restarted the engine. I quickly determined I could reach [a diversion] airport with no problems and I was actually trying to lose altitude to set up for a dead stick landing at the airport. I should have set up for best glide and I should have run the emergency checklist earlier to determine the problem. Had I been at a lower altitude the problem would have been more serious.I almost always fly distances of less than an hour so fuel management isn't normally an issue because starting on the tank with the most fuel is sufficient for my trips. This trip was a longer; about 4.3 hours; I was out of practice dealing with fuel management issues until my normal GUMP check approaching the destination runway.

A single engine Cessna pilot reported the loss of engine power due to fuel crossfeed mismanagement. While descending to accomplish a landing; he successfully reconfigured the fuel system; restarted the engine; and continued on to his destination.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

I; as Technician X; was made aware that the absence of proper documentation regarding the cracking of the APU fuel line is being reviewed for possible non-conformance of FAA and Air Carrier X's Maintenance Policy. This was a surprise to me as I knew what caused the APU shutdown and it was no fault of the APU. I had assumed cracking a fuel line to bleed air following a fuel starvation event to be the same category as resetting a Circuit Breaker (C/B) to restore normal system operation. The following is to the best of my recollection regarding the low fuel issue on Flight XXXX; MD-88 aircraft that occurred July of this year.  For the technicians (techs) working out of F-2; we generally assign one tech to each 3-gate set; and then we generally assign one floater to assist as needed with all 9-gates in our work area. I was working as a floater that day and Technician Y was assigned to three gates. A call came in over the radio regarding a low fuel situation on Technician Y's gates; so I went out to assist Tech Y on the call. Tech Y proceeded to the cockpit to check with the Flight crew and I went straight to the fueling panel. When I arrived at the fueling panel; the fuel hose was already hooked up. I checked the wing fuel gauges and noted approximately 1000 lbs. of fuel in each wing and approximately 6;000 lbs. of fuel in the center tank.I understood that the APU [did an] auto-shutdown due to low fuel shortly after the crew started it. Technician Y and I decided to bleed the APU fuel line in an attempt to get the APU started. Technician Y went to the APU compartment to crack the fuel line while I went to the cockpit to turn on the fuel pump. After bleeding the fuel line; the APU was started without any further issues. Both engines were also started and run at idle power while at the gate. The Flight crew also expressed concern with the way their fuel boost pump low pressure lights were checking out. The lights were taking a full two minutes to come on after the fuel pumps were turned off. I explained to the crew that it was just a tight system and the lights would come on once the pressure in the lines decayed. MD-88 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 73-33 PB-20-I; Paragraph-4 states that it can take approximately two minutes for the lights to come on. On this aircraft; the lights did take a full two minutes to come on after the pumps were shut off. The captain was also concerned about the left engine fuel flow indicator showing 480 with the engine shut down. He originally thought that indication was 'pressure' rather than 'flow' and felt that might be why his fuel boost pump low-pressure lights took so long to come during his test. I explained that there was no correlation between the measurements of flow and pressure and I then placed the left engine fuel flow on MEL 73-00-01B. To help prevent similar situations regarding the proper documentation of maintenance from occurring in the future; I believe AMT's should be provided with an improved definition of just what constitutes 'documentable maintenance.'  While some items such as changing a hydraulic pump; fuel pump; tire; etc. are clearly maintenance and; as such; need to be documented in the logbook; other items are so minor in nature that I question the need for documentation. The lack of clarity for me lie in defining lesser events such as reseating a lower sidewall grill in the cabin of a B-757 or reseating an in-seat video monitor trim bezel (both daily events); or tightening a loose screw on a galley lock. I believed cracking of the fuel line on a fully functional APU fell into this latter category and did not need to be documented in the logbook. I now understand that I was in error and that I should have documented my actions.

I; Technician Y; was not aware that a log book entry was not accomplished by the flight crew. I met the FO and captain in the jetway at the time the passengers were deplaning so there was a lot of noise from ground equipment and passengers deplaning. What I thought I heard them say was' I think we [screwed] up'; they went on to say some more stuff but all I could make out what they said was the APU shut down or would not start. I told my partner Technician X that I would go and bleed the APU fuel line to see if that would help [and for] him to turn the fuel pump on [in the cockpit] and I will call on the radio with my findings. I was able to get the APU started after bleeding the air from the fuel line. I was outside most of the time and it was very busy so I am not sure if I was involved in the engine run. I was also helping out at another gate at the time.

Two Line Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) report about the lack of proper documentation of maintenance work they performed after cracking an APU fuel line to bleed air from the APU fuel system on an MD-88 aircraft. Flight crew had verbally informed technicians about the APU Auto-Shutdown; but failed to enter discrepancy in their logbook. APU fuel starvation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 101; Flight Crew Total 582; Flight Crew Type 508

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

After touchdown; the aircraft failed to maintain directional control and veered to the right. The aircraft left the runway and dragged the left wing on the grass.

Light aircraft pilot reported loss of directional control after touchdown resulted in wing tip contact with the grass.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Total 8650; Flight Crew Type 700

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During final Visual Approach to RWY 26R at MIA; at 1;000 FT MSL AND 3 NM from the RWY; we saw a small black drone static from our left side; no evasive action was needed. We alerted the tower about the sighting and [the] controller mentioned that he would gather some more info as soon as we landed. Indeed; he asked us about the size; color; and if any evasive action was taken. We provided the info and mentioned no evasive action was taken. Controller advised the traffic behind us about the drone.

Pilot reported seeing a small drone on the left side of the aircraft at 1;000 ft MSL and 3 NM from the runway while the flight was on final approach.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was working Local Control and Ground Control. I had Aircraft X cleared  to land Runway 28L and an Aircraft Y taxing out to Runway 36 for departure holding short of Runway 28L for Aircraft X to land. There was a phone call on the land line around the same time from the police department regarding searching for a missing person. The Aircraft X pilot on short; short final asked if he was lined up for the correct runway. Due to our location of the Tower; we cannot see. I sent Aircraft X around. Had he not questioned this he would have landed on an incorrect; shorter; runway but what could have been worse was the Aircraft Y taxing out crossing that runway at the same time he questioned the runway. I would have never questioned the runway he was lined up for had it not been the pilot had not said something. We need a tower in a place where we can see the runways and one that gives the controllers an opportunity to save this situation from happening. Relocate the control tower in a better place.

FCM Tower Controller reported they instructed an aircraft lined up with the wrong runway to go around when there was traffic crossing the same runway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

FL360 is the bottom of [Other Center] Sector 45; FL350 and below is [Other Center] Sector 47. These 2 sectors are often combined. [Reporters Center] has control for descent from [Other Center]; but point out is required to [Other Center] Sector 47 if 45 and 47 are split. [Other Center] Sector 45 and 47 were split. OJT in progress at the D-side. Aircraft X at FL360 westbound in [Other Center] 45 airspace getting a bad ride; lower was better. Aircraft requested lower and R-side descended aircraft to FL340. No point out was made to [Other Center] 47. We were not aware of this event until 4 hours later. I do not recall what was happening at the time other than listening to the replay.I think we could use the draw function to note on the scope when 45 is open.

We have control for descent per the LOA with [Other Center]. I was currently training on the D side. [Other Center] 45 and 47 are usually combined but at this time they were not. [Other Center] Sector 47 is from SFC-350; [Other Center] Sector 45 is from 360-UNL. Aircraft X checked on at FL 360 and requested descent to FL340; due to bad rides. The R side did this without any prior pointout or coordination being done.We could write on the scope when 45 is open; especially when training.

Center Controller reported an airspace violation.


Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Enroute to MMUN at FL380; I was pilot flying and Captain; pilot not flying. Both heard loud pop and immediately noticed R1 cockpit window had cracked. We put on O2 masks immediately as we assessed the situation. Captain took control of aircraft and I got the QRH out. We accomplished window damage checklist. After contacting Maintenance and Dispatch we were told to divert. Dispatch provided us new weather and fuel burn and was given new clearance to our diversion airport. We had to burn off 11;000 LBS of fuel to land at Max landing weight. We landed uneventfully.

B737-700 R1 windshield shattered at FL380. After complying with QRH procedures and consulting maintenance; the crew diverts to a suitable airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency

I was training a Student. We were busy with Runway 13R arrivals. A PA32 called. The Trainee instructed him to depart GREGS heading 120. There was no other traffic in the vicinity and at his speed; we had some time before we would need to get back to him. The next thing we knew; the adjacent position Controller; who wasn't busy; informed us that the PA32 had turned northbound back into the Center's airspace. We called the aircraft and tried to get him turned back around in the direction he was supposed to be going. He advised us that he had instrument problems and I assumed a directional gyro (DG) problem and told the student to issue 'no gyro vectors'. I took the position when the Student was unsure about issuing the no gyro vectors and asked the Supervisor to open another position to take the Runway 13R traffic off our frequency. I also asked the adjacent Controller to call the 2 Center sectors near the PA32 and advise them of the problem. It turned out that the pilot was unable to maintain directional control. I changed my mind from instrument trouble to a pilot with vertigo. At this point I simply advised the pilot that he was still turning and asked him to simply keep the airplane straight and level. This went on for a little while; during which the PA32 also climbed from 040 to 060. Once or twice he seemed to stabilize but then would lose control again. He finally got the aircraft enough under control that we were able to vector him for and ILS approach. He went below his assigned altitude when being cleared for the ILS and reported the airport in sight. At this time; we cleared him for a visual approach switched him to the Tower. He answered but failed to do so with his call sign. However; he was having enough problems and didn't need anything else to confuse him so we didn't berate him over the no call sign. Recurrent training for the pilot on partial panel procedures and following the instruments when disoriented.

Enroute Controller initiated 'no gyro vectors' to an aircraft that was experiencing difficulties complying with assigned headings; the reporter recommending more pilot training to prevent future occurrences.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

During preflight; the APU was started and the packs were turned on. Shortly after APU air was initiated; a foul smell began to emanate from the ECS. The smell was a strong body-odor/burnt onion odor. After some time; my eyes began to burn and I developed a slight headache. The odor did not get better; it only got worse. When it was determined we were experiencing a fume event; the CA immediately stopped boarding; de-planed; and maintenance took the aircraft out of service. All agencies were notified (Ramp; Ops; Mx; Flight Leadership). The entire crew went to the ZZZ clinic to get checked out. I was rescheduled to operate a later flight to ZZZ1 after the event. However; after being seen by the clinic physician and in the interest of flight safety; I chose not to operate the re-scheduled leg.

B737-800 First Officer reported a fume event during boarding resulting in flight cancellation and entire flight crew received medical evaluation due to physiological symptoms.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 7151; Flight Crew Type 900

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 4396; Flight Crew Type 273

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Cleared by ground to taxi to runway XY via taxiway 1 and taxiway 2; Hold short of taxiway 2. Approaching 2; cleared to cross [runway XY]. I read back clearance. Captain acknowledged and said 'cleared to taxi.' ATC was busy with additional traffic and an approaching thunderstorm. While referencing aerodrome chart I looked up from my airport chart to reference the runway designated sign to see that we were crossing runway XY with an aircraft conducting its takeoff roll; I called 'Go go go aircraft left' Departing aircraft was rotating and passed behind and 300+ feet above.We should have held until we both confirmed the appropriate taxi route; and verified correct route.Contributing factors: Captain unfamiliar [with] aerodrome. ATC workload; multiple commuter flights and firefighting aircraft. Approaching thunderstorm.Corrective actions: Improve CRM and aerodrome familiarity with expected taxi route verses cleared taxi route. Aircraft should not move until taxi route has been confirmed.

Taxi instructions were from [our present location] to RWY XY via left on taxiway 1; 3 to hold short of 2.  Instructions were read back by the CP (Check Pilot) and verified by CA (Captain). Upon reaching taxiway 2; ground control amended clearance to RWY XY via 2 and by clearing us to cross RWY XX. The CP read back the taxi instructions and the CA acknowledged. The CP pointed out another aircraft on 2 that was holding for us and the CA acknowledged. The CP proceeded to verify the amended taxi route on an EFB. The CA proceeded to cross 2 and RWY XX at 3. The CP went heads up to notice departing traffic on RWY XX and stated 'Go Go Go'.  Once clear of RWY XX the crew was notified by ground of a possible pilot deviation. Weather was CAVOK at the airport.Contributing factors were a takeoff brief being conducted at critical points on the taxi route and a large amount of traffic on the ground control frequency due to adverse weather in the area.      Preventive measures in the future are to minimize briefings while the aircraft is in motion; for the pilot taxiing the aircraft to ensure proper taxi clearance is understood by stating their intentions at trigger points along the taxi route and for the pilot not taxiing the aircraft to ensure the correct taxi route is being followed while query the pilot taxiing the aircraft if any deviations start to develop.

Flight crew reported a runway incursion caused by lack of communication between crew members and not confirming the taxi route.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was the SIC [on a flight] which landed at a privately owned airstrip a few miles short of our intended destination; HBV.The flight to HBV; Hebbronville; TX was logged at 2:19 hours. The flight was flown at an altitude of 39;000 ft under visual conditions. My partner and I while at altitude briefed the field conditions; WX; and decided upon a visual approach backed up with the RNAV GPS 13 approach into HBV. We were both not familiar with this field and stated this would be our best course of action. The flight was uneventful until approximately 80 nm northwest of the intended field of HBV. The chain of events into this incident started at this point. Our approach planning was briefed at this point. Although [the Captain] and I were not familiar with this field we felt confident the RNAV GPS 13 would best back up the visual. LRD was the IAF for the approach. I briefed we would fly over and it and the FMS would guide us the rest of the way. Simple.Things now start to change. Houston Center now starts to vector us away from Laredo. OK; we are now going to be east of our intended course. Additionally Center is providing us with a few fairly aggressive altitude crossing restrictions that started to demand our full attention. As flying pilot my full attention becomes fully devoted to complying with the ATC requests. Nothing unusual or unsafe but just requiring our total crew focus. At one point [the Captain] remarked this is crossing a bit tight. I stated I didn't want to descend any greater with [passengers] on board so we stated this to Center. No problem Center remarked but another vector to the East was given. I believe our altitude to be 3;000 feet at this point. My concentration as flying pilot was a little more inside of the airplane than I would have preferred. My situational awareness told me we were slightly east of course and now fairly close in. Houston Center asked if we would like to proceed with the GPS approach and we stated yes. As I selected the final approach fix altitude of 2;000 feet; VNAV and armed the approach mode I had an inherent worry about the FMS. It's been my experience with this box that it can sometime struggle with close in vectoring and provide erroneous inputs. Sometimes the FMS simply needs time to properly sequence and my concern was perhaps we could be a little too close.  A pilot preconceived notion and a level of distrust in my avionics is being developed right here on my part; not good.  My FMS is telling [me] to fly right to intercept yet so is my awareness. So all is well; besides were are VMC. As I scan back to my flight director I am not however 100% confident with my flight director. Where are all the approach cues I wanted to see? Visual 10 miles of visibility; I believe my box is struggling; just fly the jet were my thoughts.  As fate would have a landing strip appears in the distance right on the nose. [The Captain] and I briefed what the field would look like and its orientation. Everything before us looked good.  Our decision to call the field visually and cancel with ATC was made. At this point I had to discredit my flight director inputs as I believed them to be somewhat misleading. I transitioned fully to a VFR landing and concentrated on my flying speeds and stopping the aircraft on a 5;000 feet strip.In the flare my little voice which is never wrong started talking to me. Absent was the PAPI I briefed and other visual runway cues we had talked about. The landing was smooth and uneventful. I knew at this time of our flight crew error.Landings into small private West Texas airports pose unique threats to arriving pilots; especially when flown in visual conditions. We all know and are trained to step up our game when flying into these unfamiliar strips that are now being constructed and popping up seemingly all over Southwest Texas. Some are certified top notch airports offering approach guidance. Others are not. It's been my experience with these fields [thatthey frequently] have NAVAIDs NOTAMed out of service; or some can be highly questionable when using. On this day all these factors played into my reasoning and pilot decision making. Perhaps this is why I continued a botched approach into a rancher's field. Unbelievable. Long time piloting experience is largely beneficial. However we must all fight pilot preconceived notions that can unfortunately lead us astray; much like this one did for me. With over 30;000 hours of combined military and civilian flight crew and piloting experience I have never been involved in any such incident. On this day that record came to an end. It stings a little.

Corporate Jet First Officer reported landing at the wrong airport after canceling IFR with the field in sight.