Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 1526; Flight Crew Type 1526

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 184; Flight Crew Total 532; Flight Crew Type 217

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

About 20 miles from TOD (Top of Descent); the FO (First Officer) and I noticed a slight acrid smell. I directed us to don our oxygen masks. It seemed that as soon as we did that; we heard and felt a light rumbling sound from below the flight deck. It sounded like a fan starting to fail. We ran the entire smoke and fumes checklist at that point; and after turning off the fans; the sound stopped. The Lead Flight Attendant had also called up and said that there was a slight smell at first; but didn't notice it anymore. I explained to him what was going on; and that I'd call him back once we decided how we wanted to proceed. The FO and I agreed that being so close to descent; with the arrival and approach having already been briefed; with the fumes situation stabilized; it was best to continue into ZZZ. I [advised ATC] at that point; asked for clearance to fly the STAR and approach for [Runway] XXR; and to have crash and fire rescue available. ATC cleared us as requested. I then sent a 'call me' to dispatch. I explained to him what was going on; that the situation was stabilized; and that we were planning on continuing to ZZZ. He did not have anything for us and said that was a good idea. I then phoned the Lead FA; and gave him the [plan] information; and let me know if they needed anything. Since it was late at night; it was the last leg of a 3 leg day; were already on the descent and needed to pay attention to the terrain in the area; and we had already had a rejected takeoff on the same flight; I elected to not mention anything to the passengers. Having me come in the PA with an oxygen mask; telling them that there are fumes in the airplane (again; the problem seemed to have been isolated and situation stabilized); after they just experienced a rejected takeoff; was only going to cause them more undue stress. Instead; I told the Lead FA to tell them something in general terms that there was an issue; but it's now stabilized. The arrival and approach were uneventful; and we elected to taxi to the gate. I told the FO to make an announcement to the passengers to remain seated while we have the fire department come on board to check something out on the Flight Deck. He did. After we pulled into the gate; we shut down the engines; but left the seat belt sign on. The fire department was already walking up the jet way stairs almost as soon as we shut down the engines. After the main door were open; two guys came onboard with some sensor equipment. We took off our oxygen masks at that point since they didn't have theirs on. They said their sensors were showing the air was safe. As soon as they were done and off the plane; we turned off the seat belt sign. After we were deplaned; I called the [Chief Pilot]; gave him a rundown of what happened. Then I called Dispatch and did the same thing; and had him patch me through with Maintenance. I talked to them for about 10 minutes; and filled out their smoke and fumes report. ZZZ Maintenance was on board by this time and were already looking at the plane. They told us to terminate it; leaving the switches that we turned off for the smoke and fumes checklist. We terminated it and left for the hotel.

I was Pilot Flying. Just prior to Top of Descent I smelled a sudden order of what smelled like sulfur/fireworks followed by a intermittent humming noise on my right side. We both put on our masks and we ran the smoke/fumes checklist. While we were completing the checklist; the Flight Attendants also called up saying they smelled something as well. The Captain told them to keep us informed if it was getting worse and we continued with the checklist. After putting the blower and extract fans in override per the checklist the noise on my right side stopped. At the same time we coordinated with Air Traffic Control to start down on the arrival and also the Captain [requested priority handling]. The smell did not get any worse but as a precaution we kept our masks on for the rest of the flight. We landed safely and taxied to the gate where we were met by firemen who sampled the air and found no hot areas and we deplaned the passengers normally.

A319 flight crew reported a fume event during cruise. The flight continued to destination and after an air quality check at the gate; passengers and crew deplaned safely.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

We performed a run-up and determined that the airplane was safe for its first flight of the day. We ran all appropriate checklists and took off without incident. Climbing through 22;000 FT the Master Warning flasher illuminated with no associated annunciator. Approximately 10 seconds later; the Right Oil Pressure Low annunciator illuminated along with oil pressure and torque gauge fluctuations. The engine performance was rapidly decreasing and we elected to shut the engine down in flight; as the checklist required us to do. We secured the right engine; made a right turn back to [departure] airport; declared an emergency and began a slow descent. In the descent; we got updated weather; ran all appropriate checklists; and coordinated Crash; Fire; Rescue Operations with Air Traffic Control. We were cleared for the visual approach and landed without further incident. After the airplane was brought to a complete stop; we shut down the running (left) engine and were towed off the runway back to the maintenance hangar.

B1900 flight crew reported low oil pressure in right engine climbing through FL220. Engine was shut down; an emergency declared; and a return to departure airport was safely executed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 75

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

While on the arrival into ZZZ at FL 220; we were running the Descent Checklist. When I pressed the Recall I noticed a 'FLT CNTRL' light illuminated. We found the 'SPEED TRIM FAIL' light illuminated. After completing the 'SPEED TRIM FAIL' Checklist in the QRH; we discussed our options and concerns. Shortly after starting our descent on the arrival; we noticed an 'IAS DISAGREE' on both primary displays.We complied with the immediate action items for 'Airspeed Unreliable' then ran the QRC along with QRH for 'Airspeed Unreliable.' The IAS was intermittent for a while. It was visible when there was 6 knots or greater difference between the Captain and FO altimeters. During that time we were descending in IMC conditions with Engine Anti-Ice on. We felt like the Captains airspeed seemed more accurate based on ground speed; Prog page on the MCDU and ATC. At one point on the descent we had an 'ALTITUDE DISAGREE' for 1-2 seconds. It never illuminated again after that. At that time we decided to request priority and ask for vectors into ZZZ and the approach.We flew the approach and landed with no further issues. The 'IAS DISAGREE' was illuminated the entire time in the terminal area and approach. We had anywhere from 2-20+ knots difference in our airspeed indicators. During the approach we elected to split the difference in the airspeed indicators for our target speed; because we couldn't be sure which one was accurate at that time due to altitude and speed changes by ATC. We utilized the 'UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED CHART' in the Performance Table for pitch and power to verify indicated airspeed.Possibly blow out the pitot lines and perform a pitot static check for the max aircraft that's been parked for a longer duration and put pitot covers over them. Don't remove the pitot covers until ready to fly.

B737 MAX 8 Captain reported an indicated airspeed disagree issue during arrival.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 83; Flight Crew Total 6300; Flight Crew Type 1456

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was departing to go back home. As I remember it; I departed on runway heading and upon reaching safe altitude; engaged heading function of the autopilot and was told to contact departure. After my first contact with departure I know I turned in a westerly direction; I'm not sure whether I was instructed to a heading or was instructed to join the outbound radial on the departure procedure; and/or both. This is about the time that I realized the departure procedure was not loaded in my NAV plan. I believe this is when ATC informed me to expect radar vectors of 090 degrees after I was established on the outbound radial of the departure procedure. (Thinking I still had time to load the departure procedure before I reached the outbound radial) I loaded the departure procedure and about the same time I swung the heading bug to the north to intercept the 313 degree radial to then track the next fix on the departure procedure. At this same moment; ATC calls me to verify if I'm established on outbound radial. I believe I responded that I was turning to that radial now; ATC calls back within a few seconds and then gives me instructions to turn 180 degrees to a heading of 090 and informs me that I was in an area below the minimum vectoring altitude. I can't remember how busy ATC was in the moments of discovering that the departure procedure wasn't in my flight plan; but I should have acknowledged to ATC as soon as I realized that I didn't have the departure procedure loaded; that I needed to ask for radar vectors while I reloaded departure procedure. But if the frequency was busy; I knew that I couldn't wait-- I had to load the departure procedure ASAP. But by the time I was correcting to get back on course; I was informed that I had flown below the minimum vectoring altitude. In analyzing the sequence of events; I made an error due to the fact that I loaded the flight plan into the Garmin 430; omitting the departure procedure that was given to me in the clearance due to the fact that I noticed a plane departing on the opposite direction of that runway of the departure procedure they had just given me. This made me wonder if there was going to be a runway change; which I would confirm with taxi instructions. Therefore; I hesitated to load that departure procedure at that time instead of following my normal routine. Looking back on it; I realize that this is where I made my first mistake; because after getting my taxi instructions for the runway that was in my clearance with the proper departure procedure; I got busy and forgot to input the departure procedure into my navigation plan. My second mistake was not verifying what my next fix in the GPS was indicating. In retrospect; what I should have done and will be doing in the future is to load the whole clearance into the flight plan as given to me from ATC; which has always been my procedure. I know I can go back and change any part of the navigational flight plan if ATC amends it. I will also be very vigilant in verifying my next fix in my GPS that is my clearance before I depart the runway.

Aircraft was issued an IFR clearance; with a SID right turn. Aircraft was radar identified; and issued climb to 7;000. Aircraft was observed off route; and flying toward high terrain at low altitude. Aircraft was advised to reverse course to the east to re-intercept the departure route. Aircraft when above minimum vectoring altitude was issued heading to climb. Aircraft was advised to call the facility. Had this sector been busy and actual IFR conditions; this could have resulted in a very dangerous if not fatal occurrence. Many procedures in the valley point aircraft directly at high terrain; and if a turn is missed; and the controller is busy or distracted and does not notice pilot deviation; a bad situation could occur.

The pilot of a SR22 turned towards higher terrain as he attempted to reload the departure procedure. He was operating below the minimim vectoring altitude so the Air Traffic Controller advised the pilot to reverse course until able to become established on the departure route.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Our flight had landed and was approaching the gate with both engines operating. I observed the Ramp Agents approaching their positions to receive the aircraft; so I reduced taxi speed in order that the aircraft could continue to roll; rather than stopping short of the Safety Zone while they got into position. As we approached the lead-in line and began our left turn; a baggage tug with carts behind it approached from our left. Given our position; movement; and the fact that we had commenced our turn toward the Gate; I had every expectation that the driver would stop. He did not; crossing directly in front of our moving aircraft.A moment later; a second tug approached from the left; which also did not stop; but passed even closer in front of our aircraft; necessitating a violent brake application to stop our aircraft in order to avoid a collision. After this vehicle was clear; we taxied into the gate and terminated the aircraft. Two Mechanics who were accepting the aircraft to reposition it witnessed what had happened; and confirmed our impressions that what had just transpired was far outside the bounds of safe practice. One specifically commented that the drivers were closer to our operating engines than Mechanics are allowed to be; with attendant hazard to both personnel and also to the risk of ingesting a bag into an engine if we had been at a high power setting.I also spoke with the Ramp Supervisor who had marshalled us in to our gate; who also concurred that both drivers acted inappropriately in not holding short of the Gate Safety Zone until we had parked. I advised him of my intention to report what had happened; and while he didn't know who the individual drivers were; he said that he would attempt to find out.The intentional; blatant; and reckless disregard for even the most rudimentary safe operating practices demonstrated by the behavior of the two drivers is deeply troubling. What happened in front of our aircraft was not only unsafe; it was gross. Violations like this are how people can get killed.

A B737 Captain reported back to back incidences of baggage cart drivers improperly speeding between his inbound jet and the ground personnel marshalling his arrival at the gate.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were working a return from storage work card on Aircraft X; we were working off paper because the task card was going to be revised and it would have cleared all completed work if worked on iPad. The task card was revised and steps had to be transferred to a new task card. There were several technicians working the job so there were also working task cards for reference.  So there was the original task card - the revised task card and working copies to go through.I was the supervisor and assigned the upgrade [to the] Radios and Electronics Lead; xxxxxx step X electrical/electronics on task card; that step included de-preservation of emergency lights; aircraft battery; EPAS batteries and 'any other batteries' including flight attendant station emergency flash lights.At almost going home time for the technicians which is earlier than normal due COVID work hours nothing was signed off by the Lead; when I asked xxxxxx he stated 'it was all done' and they would sign it off.  When I was auditing the master paperwork step x.9 'any other batteries' was not signed; and all technicians had already left. I signed for the step as Supervisor since I was told it was done; I was going to verify that it was done but then got side tracked with other aircraft issues.The aircraft then position ferried with no flight attendants or passengers to ZZZ for a dead 'A' check where they found the flight attendant station emergency flash lights did not have batteries in them.No suggestion for resolution as I should have not signed it off without verification; I never have signed steps before without verification and will not again; however it could have been worse if it had been a revenue flight so the task card should include a flag; not serviceable tape; or some other way of visually seeing the flashlights did not have a battery in them; these return to service cards are something we have never done; the paperwork is extensive and made worse by the revision. I have used this as a reminder not to get complacent.

Supervising Maintenance Technician reported signing off work without verifying it had been completed.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Aircraft X was inbound. Coordination was made through the scratch pad for the VOR B approach; missed approach; and then hand-off back to TRACON. TRACON did not coordinate any further. I informed local control they should call TRACON. As I understand; local control advised me that he tried to contact them; but there was no response. Local control cleared the aircraft to land. The pilot asked for the missed approach. Local control cleared the aircraft for the option with a 7 knot tailwind component. This was not at the pilot's request; not coordinated with TRACON; and not coordinated with ground control; as per local standard operating procedure.The aircraft was IFR. After the aircraft did a not-so-low approach; on the upwind; local control told the aircraft to fly the SID. The pilot reported that he didn't have it dialed in to his FMS because he hadn't been previously briefed or cleared or told by anyone what to expect. Local control issued an IFR clearance to the aircraft. The aircraft was at roughly 5000 feet when they were finally switched back to TRACON. The aircraft continued about 3 miles beyond procedural turn; and toward a 13000 foot MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) before the SID was dialed in and followed or before TRACON was able to communicate with and turn them.All above is what happened. What should have happened is; 1st transmission; 'Aircraft X; PSP tower; Runway 13R continue; report going missed; circle to the north.' 2nd transmission; 'execute published missed approach procedure; contact SOCAL Departure.' without coordination; it's assumed TRACON will issue a new IFR clearance.As I've recommended in several reports previous to this one; the controller is the one that doesn't understand the job. He was not trained properly or efficiently and was signed off without merit; and against the recommendation from his trainers and the union. The controller needs to go through mass re-training; be de-certified; or at least massive amounts of s.e.t training. This controller on position is like a person driving down a street full of cars blind-folded. It's amazing he hasn't hit any of them; and it's only a matter of time until he does.

I took the handoff on Aircraft X and in the scratch pad it said RDM which indicates the aircraft is on an approach; going back to Departure Control; on a missed approach. I understood that but I never received any information as to whether I would be giving the clearance to the pilot or not. Aircraft X on initial call requested a clearance and wanted to do the missed approach. I gave a clearance to land. Aircraft X requested the missed approach. The winds were VRB at 06. I decided to clear Aircraft X for the Option because I thought Aircraft X wanted a VFR departure. I told Aircraft X after the option to fly runway heading maintain at or below 8000 feet in accordance with our LOA (Letter of Agreement). I tried to reach out to TRACON to get clarification. While I didn't get a response I decided to ask the pilot directly if they wanted to remain IFR or VFR. They said IFR. I went to ground and saw the clearance and told Aircraft X after the option to fly the SID. I then gave Aircraft X the clearance and when I was finished they were already out of my airspace. I couldn't point out or hand off Aircraft X without the tag completed so therefore I busted airspace. After this happened I asked my CIC (Controller in Charge) what they would have done; he responded with; 'Since there was no coordination; he would have sent that back to Socal to give that pilot the clearance'.Approximately 5 minutes later; TRACON called me and said I would not have done that; I would have kept him on the missed approach. I told him that another controller just told me that afterward and I agreed with them both. I also apologized for my misunderstanding. I believe this event happened for a few different reasons. When I was in training; my trainer was a controller when the radar was here. He taught me to be a part of the tower team and to help the next controller. He taught to give the clearance. I believe I could have done it sooner and been clearer with my phraseology; but I now know I should not have done that at all. Things are not the same as when the radar was here. I believe my CIC was fully able and capable of instructing me to do something different; but he instead choose to watch. There is no tower team concept when a CIC says he was 'busy' on ground talking to a trainee. The operation comes first. He was able to write a very detailed report without listening to the recordings. He choose not to help me.I hope that there is an understanding that I am a newly certified controller that is looking to learn and I am not perfect but I am working in an environment that is isolating me from my own tower team and insulating me from productive real time feedback while working the position. If other controllers have a problem with giving me feedback in the tower cab then fixing that problem is a major opportunity to improve the safety of our operations.

PSP Tower controllers reported allowing an aircraft to enter TRACON airspace without coordination and with incorrect departure instructions.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22L

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were on a vector to the ILS 22L at EWR and were given a turn to join the localizer over TEB. The controller kept us at 250kts and started to slow us down to 190kts just past TEB; at which point we already had the LOC captured; and then gave instructions to slow down to 170kts before GIMEE. By that time we were already half-way to the set up for our approach. At around 1800'; I press Control Steering button to help capture the GS and a second later; I disconnected the autopilot. When we were at a 1000' we were configured. Just below 1000' the captain reached for the checklist and at around 700' called for a go-around; which we performed with no more issues.

First Officer reported executing a go-around due to an unstable approach which had resulted from high assigned airspeeds by ATC.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Supervisor failed to warn and inform mechanics assigned to aircraft that work was going to be performed. Failing to follow Job Card XXX4003; Step 7; A; (1) WARNING [notice]. The Supervisor was performing Job Card XXX4003; upgrade to CAT-2 scheduled Certification Check and turned on hydraulics without informing the mechanics working the airplane that this was going to happen; or that flight controls were going to move. Failure to notify personnel working the aircraft of potential movement of flight surfaces and other areas. Supervisor proceeded with Job Card and mechanics stayed away from any potential moving parts. [Recommend] following safety precautions outlined in the Maintenance Procedures and Job Card.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports that a Supervisor failed to warn and inform Maintenance personnel when he turned on a B737-400 aircraft's Hydraulic System and moved flight controls. Supervisor did not follow the 'Warning' notice in their Job Card prior to performing a scheduled CAT-2 upgrade Certification Check.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 488; Flight Crew Type 285

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The Clearance: VNY CANOG2.GMN SID Gorman Transition. The Deviation: busted MVA. I loaded the route of flight into the GPS along with the CANOG2.GMN. After getting airborne and upon reaching the end of the runway; I made a left turn to a heading of 253 and continued climbing. As I approached the course shown on the GPS; I made ready to turn to follow the GPS course to the GMN VOR. This action caused me to get on course to go below the MVA. SoCal Approach caught it and turned me. I did notice the mountains and was going to say something as SoCal called me. SoCal gave me a number; which I called. I spoke with the gentleman that answered the phone at SoCal TRACON. During our conversation; Controller expressed to me that this was happening more and more. He also told me that they were just as frustrated with this as I was and they were looking for a solution to help stop these. Since that is the case; here is my input. 1) Pilots reading the plate; who do not do it for a living; loading the SID into the GPS; then following the GPS line rather than the plate and waiting for the vectors from SoCal. 2) IPIHO is the start of the transition; which may bait pilots who are cleared to fly the SID and transition into joining the course when approaching that course and prior to reaching the MVA. I am confident that I fell for this. 3) The plate states that expect radar vectors to IPIHO Intersection. Then via the transition. Another point where I am confident got me to turn since once I got to IPIHO; I turned onto the transition. Since SIDs are meant to reduce communication workload; when I got to the course to follow to Gorman with no word from SoCal; I turned. What can be some solutions? 1) Possibly making the Santa Susana Pass (VPLSS) the vector point instead of IPIHO; or creating a new GPS intersection 3 NM west of VPLSS. That would take a pilot further west and to lower terrain before turning. So; even if they did join the GPS course at that point; they would be at a safe altitude. I was 2.5 NM west of VPLSS when they turned me on course after the deviation. SUANA could also be used as the new radar vector point since it is about where a 253 heading would take you. 2) Make the phrase 'expect radar vectors' another color; or at least bold; on the plate and verbal description. This should help it stand out. 3) The plate states that expect radar vectors to IPIHO intersection. Then via the transition. Maybe this should say to maintain climb to ATC assigned altitude; heading 253 until cleared by ATC on course. What could I have done to mitigate this deviation? Several things have come to mind as I have been studying this and speaking with my CFII on this subject. 1) Simply state in the flight plan 'NO SIDs.' If you are not use to flying them; then do not. I know this is more workload for ATC and the pilot; but worth it in my opinion as a safety aspect and leaves no ambiguity. Instructions such as 'on departure fly heading 253; radar vectors Gorman.' Hard to not understand those instructions. 2) Ask for clarification from Tower or Clearance Delivery. I know it is all on the plate that is why it is there. However; asking questions before hand is never a bad thing. Especially when you do not fly for a living. 3) Ask Departure if you are getting close to the course change and have not gotten what you expect from them. What are my plans to learn from this deviation and get better at reading SIDs and over all flying in the IFR system? 1) I have already spent some time with my CFII discussing this and looking at why; and some solutions to mitigate this in the future. Those I have listed above on what I could have done to mitigate the deviation. 2) [Date] through [date] I will be attending the [aircraft manufacturer] Airplane and Pilots Association Safety Conference and Pilot Proficiency Program at KSMX. Part of the program is to receive both a basic flight review and an instrument proficiency check. I will take this opportunity to get another CFII input; as well as from the other pilots that are attending; on this deviation and possible way to mitigate this in the future. Also; to possibly teach those that are attending what they can do to not get a deviation on SIDs.

Small aircraft pilot reported the CANOGA TWO SID was unclear regarding transition instructions and the pilot violated the MVA.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

This report again raises awareness about the consistent misuse of the seat belt sign by a significant number of flight deck crews (mainly Captains). On the past five flights; Captains have insisted upon leaving the seat belt sign on for the entire flight. Some are so brazen they make an announcement prior to take-off advising the sign will be left on for the entire flight! Keep in mind; flying times range between 6.5 to 9.5 hours. On past flights; I have attempted to employ/educate using CRM strategies with some Captains in order to understand their reasoning behind their actions of keeping the sign on. Most express concerns about liability related to passenger injury due to unexpected severe turbulence. Others state they are doing flight attendants a favor by not cycling the sign off during late night flights - minimizing need for compliance checks. I'm deeply concerned the negative safety culture this type of behavior is creating -- a dangerous risk for passengers and crew. It encourages passengers to disobey the sign while fostering complacency among flight attendants. For example; during my last flight; FAs stopped enforcing the requirement for passengers to be buckled due to the sign being constantly on and lack of turbulence. Their reasoning (understandable); belts were unnecessary due to the smooth ride. At one point; I counted at least 15 passengers in the aisle while the sign was on. This occurred about seven hours into the flight; following the breakfast service. Clearly a violation of 121.311 and portions of 121.571. I witnessed this more often on long range flights.

Air carrier Flight Attendant expressed concern in regard to the overuse of the seat belt.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 69; Flight Crew Type 69

I was flying a Cessna 172 on a solo cross country to ZZZ1 via ZZZ; I knew of glider activity in the area and upon arrival to ZZZ made radio contact with a glider pilot whose glider and two trucks were parked in the dirt near the end of runway 20. They requested I land a bit long and I complied without any problems. I made all of the proper radio calls and taxied back to 20 via Alpha taxiway. I stopped at the end of alpha and called letting ZZZ traffic know I was holding short of the active runway. The glider pilot then made a call that I was unfamiliar with and began driving a truck onto the active runway towing a glider for takeoff. I continued to hold short and watched the glider takeoff and depart to the left. I then looked down the runway and saw the truck which looked to have pulled off the end of the runway similar to how it had been parked the dirt on the other end runway only moments earlier. I visually verified that the glider was on the left side of the runway in what looked to be a left traffic pattern for 20. I called and announced my intent to enter the runway and takeoff with a right turn out to the north. After waiting a few seconds for a reply I heard what sounded like two clicks and static. I called asking for the individual to repeat and did not receive anything. I then entered the runway and began takeoff procedures. After lifting off I could then see that the truck had not exited the runway and was sitting on it still in the active runway. At this point I had already begun my climb and could not abort the takeoff safely. About this time the driver of the truck began to yell at me over the radio. I continued a safe climb out while calmly explaining to him that I announced I was entering the runway and even given extra time for a response; after not receiving any sort of response from the three calls I had made while on the taxiway I had concluded both visually and through radio communications that the runway was safe for my use.

C172 pilot reported he took off at a non-towered airport on a runway that had a truck parked on it when the truck failed to communicate effectively.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Aircraft / UAS; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 803

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were on the downwind on our inlet departure from PAMR Runway 25 and my student noticed a drone at our 8-9 o'clock position. We reported it to tower. The drone appeared a red tone and it was at an estimated 1;100 feet MSL and less than a 1/4 away.

Reporter had no additional information to share.

General aviation flight crew saw a UAS while in the traffic pattern and reported to ATC.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Cleared for takeoff First Officer's (FO) leg. During takeoff roll; at about 20 knots; we got 'R REV INOP' caution message. As this did not affect the safety of flight; which is the minimum standard to abort a takeoff; I elected to continue. Soon after rotation on climbout; 'R REV INOP' extinguished and EDP 2A caution message appeared. There-after both messages would cycle on and off. At 1;000 AGL I transferred the radios to the FO and began referencing the QRH. 'EDP 2A' message now constant so I started with that; however during the QRH procedure we received 'HYD SYS 2 LO PRESS' message. After checking the synoptic page I could see that our hydraulic reservoir for system 2 was completely empty. This was obviously the root problem so I went to that checklist instead. A cursory glance at the checklist told us we would need to return to base. By now we were at 10;000 feet climbing to 13;000 feet. At this time we told departure we would have to return. Going through the checklist and referencing the hydraulic synoptic; we saw we had no available brake pressure in the Number 2 system. This restricted our landing weight according to the QRH; so we coordinated with ATC for box vectors to burn fuel and get lighter. We also noted we would have to land at Flaps 20. It was about this time we declared an emergency. Checklist complete we completed our climb check; then notified Dispatch of our troubles and need for re-release. I then notified the FA of our situation and time frame to landing. From ATC we requested and were given the longest runway. The rest of the approach proceeded without incident. I elected for my FO to fly the approach since I am a recent transfer to the 900 and he has over a thousand hours in the airframe. He did a fine job. We landed below our maximum permitted weight derived from the QRH and thereafter taxied to the gate. The inboard brakes got a bit hot; with the left inboard triggering a warning with a BTMS reading of 15.

CRJ900 Captain experiences an 'R REV INOP' caution message at 20 knots during takeoff and continues. After takeoff an 'EDP 2A' caution message appeared but before QRH procedures can be applied a 'HYD SYS 2 LO PRESS' message appears. From the hydraulic synoptic page the root cause of all the messages is determined to be loss of fluid in the number two system. An emergency is declared and the flight returns for landing at the maximum allowable landing weight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I had a taxi back on Runway 04L and told him to expedite to the end to exit the runway as Aircraft X was on final behind him. Aircraft Y was transitioning to the base of the tower via the GECKO1 transition. Aircraft X for whatever reason decided to go-around even though spacing was going to exist. He informed me of this decision short final. After completing a scan I noticed that Aircraft Y was 0.5 NM northwest of the field about to cross. Aircraft X was passing the numbers at this time and so I issued a traffic alert to both aircraft. Aircraft Y took evasive action avoiding collision and I would estimate the aircraft passed within 100 feet of each other. Neither pilot informed me they were going to file a NMAC.

FFZ Tower Controller reported a Near Mid Air Collision that happened while working local. An aircraft executed an unexpected go-around with another aircraft transitioning the airspace and got too close at the departure end of the runway.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

While I was working an arrival sector I was controlling Aircraft X descending on the ZZZZZ arrival. I was also controlling Aircraft Y that was dropping jumpers from 14;000 ft. directly east of the ZZZZZ arrival. Once Aircraft Y advised me that he dropped his jumpers I saw a potential conflict between Aircraft Y descending to their airport and Aircraft X descending on the arrival. To resolve this conflict I instructed Aircraft Y to descend east so that the aircraft would descend away from Aircraft X. Aircraft Y did not proceed as I instructed and instead turned west bound and continued to descend on top of Aircraft X. As soon as I saw Aircraft Y ignoring my instruction and descending west I issued traffic to Aircraft X and instructed him to turn northwest bound heading 330.Aircraft X did not hear my initial instruction and I had to repeat with a traffic alert and a further turn northwest bound heading 310. Not only is the pilot of Aircraft Y ignoring my instructions a safety risk but the LOA (Letter of Agreement) that is in place with these skydive operations is not specific enough to keep these operations at a safe distance from our ZZZZZ arrival. As long as I have been working here this has been a safety issue. The pilots of these skydive operations have been allowed to practice unsafe operations without any repercussions. To prevent a reoccurrence of this event I think there should be a dialogue between our facility and the pilots of these skydive operations. If there is one already then I am not aware of this because there appears to be no transparency between the controllers and management. I also think that the LOA we have in place with Company A and Company B are not specific enough to ensure a safe operation between skydiving and aircraft descending on the arrival. The LOA between TRACON; Company A and Company B should be re-written to ensure the safe operation of aircraft within the TRACON airspace.

An Approach Controller reported an airborne conflict between a parachute jump aircraft and an air carrier on arrival.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While at the gate my cabin crew notified me that the aft left hand door (2L) was not able to shut and was misaligned. I went back and examined the door and found that assessment to be accurate. I was not aware of what had caused this; but the entire door was two inches low. I notified the Gate Agent that the aircraft was not airworthy and instructed her not to board the aircraft. I went to the cockpit and notified Maintenance of the issue as well as Operations and advised them not to board the aircraft. About two minutes later and before the mechanics had arrived the passengers started to come on board with the Gate Agent telling me that Operations had said that they didn't care what the Captain had said board the aircraft. After all the passengers had boarded the mechanics could finally get to the back of the aircraft and inspect the door. They had the immediate and exact same conclusion that I had come to which was that the aircraft was unairworthy and instructed me to remove the passengers as the flight would require a new aircraft. I made the calls to Operations; the Gate Agent and a PA to the very upset passengers and started the deplaning process. Once everyone was off I shut down the aircraft and ran my checklists.This event saw the Captain's authority overridden by Operations and possibly put safety of the passengers at risk as one of the primary exits of the aircraft was inoperative.Captain should have final say of what happens while in command of the aircraft.

Air carrier First Officer reported the Captain's authority was overridden by operations.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Attendant was severely injured by a fallen liquor cart. I would like to bring to the attention of the FAA the inherent instability of the galley carts and ease with which they can be pushed over. While investigating the area of the back galley; it was apparent to me that the floor was irregular with deep seams. [Some] carts are much lighter than [other] galley carts along with [some] being excessively worn and unstable. In addition the liquor carts are loaded very top heavy. The top positions consist of ice and soda bins; all of which are much heavier than the liquor mini's and other miscellaneous items in the lower bins. [Some] carts themselves are much lighter than [other] galley carts which make them less stable. With the wheels remaining on the floor; one can flex the cart side to side by as much as six inches. The wheels play a role in the ease with which the cart may be tipped over. When the wheels are facing to the sides of the cart; the cart is much more easily pushed over. Lastly; another factor is the aircraft's pitch and roll characteristics. The pitch at the time was approximately three degrees nose up (Mach .78). I am unaware of any turns at the time of the accident. A combination of all the above factors; make it extremely easy to tip the cart onto its side. I can push the cart over with very little effort; and by pushing with only with my index finger.

An Air Carrier Captain reports a severe Flight Attendant injury due to a liquor cart tipping over in flight. He believes the carts are poorly designed and loaded in a top heavy condition. This condition can easily lead to carts tipping over.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 666; Flight Crew Total 599; Flight Crew Type 433

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 37; Flight Crew Type 25

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Near miss with a T-38 during a right downwind at ZZZ Runway XX. The T-38 did a go around for Runway XY and started a climb while we were turning crosswind to downwind; upon intersecting Runway XY the T-38 had leveled off co-altitude and was headed at us from the arrival end of Runway XY. IP (Instructor Pilot) had them in sight and was about to take controls to make evasive action when the T-38 aggressively pitched up as if they spotted us as well. Ultimately; the T-38 passed over and behind us within 500 ft. The T-38 was on a military frequency however we overheard Tower respond to their call with something along the lines of 'He was in a right downwind for [Runway] XX; no factor'.

ATC cleared me for right traffic out of Runway XX and I was staying in the pattern. ATC had cleared a T-38 for landing on Runway XY. The T-38 performed a go around and my instructor point out that he was headed directly for us. I saw him aggressively pitch up and climb above our wing.

Flight Instructor and Student reported a Near Mid Air Collision and observed the other aircraft pitched up aggressively to avoid collision.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 5954; Flight Crew Type 791

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During preflight I ensured that the main landing struts and components were reasonably clear of ice and slush. Also ensured that squat switches were unobstructed. I taxied at a slow rate en-route to runway to ensure the minimum buildup of slush and ice on the landing gear. Brakes were used extensively to keep the aircraft at a slow taxi speed and to utilize the residual brake heat for preventing contamination of the main landing gear.  A normal takeoff was executed. During our takeoff briefing I stated that we would leave the landing gear down for one minute after takeoff. We followed through with the plan but the landing gear would not retract. Cycled the landing gear one more time with no success. I instructed the First Officer to ask ATC if we could maintain 8;000 since the aircraft would not pressurize in ground mode. ATC granted our request. Next we activated the main wing anti-ice system in an attempt to use the excess bleed air; vented through the main landing gear well; to melt the contamination on the squat switches. After 10 minutes we attempted gear retraction two more times with no success. Also tried disengaging the anti-skid system and pumping the brakes with no effect. At that point we elected to return to Airport ZZZ but recognized we were over max landing weight and would need to burn off fuel for 15 to 20 minutes. ATC vectored us in the southeastern portion of their airspace. While on vectors; still at 8;000 feet; we also tried increasing speed from less than 200 knots to 250 knots hoping it would shed more of the contamination off the landing gear. We may have been underneath the Class Bravo airspace at this time. We executed a normal descent; approach; and landing at ZZZ. After taxi-in and shutdown we observed an abundance of ice had accumulated on the main landing gear. A discrepancy was noted in the aircraft's maintenance log.

Despite efforts to reduce landing gear exposure to the winter elements during preflight and taxi out; following takeoff the flight crew of a LJ-31 was unable to raise the landing gear. Despite a variety of creative efforts to overcome/eliminate the suspected accumulation of frozen material preventing retraction; the landing gear refused to respond. After a period of delay vectors to reduce the landing gross weight they landed the aircraft and; upon inspection; determined that their suspicions were accurate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

STARS in the 747 Navigation (NAV) database do not match the charted STARs by name. They are not even close. ZBAA (Beijing) has a history of assigning the arrival procedure very late in the arrival sequence. When the procedure designation in the FMC does not remotely match the name on ANY chart; and one only has a couple of minutes to load the procedure; there is no time to start at the top and search manually for one that follows the same points. We almost flew past a clearance limit due to not knowing which arrival to program in. Chinese controllers are not adept with manual control of aircraft in airspace where they expect it to be automated. We were minutes from a potentially very dangerous situation. At the very least; we were minutes away from a Chinese violation. This is a regular occurrence flying into ZBAA and unsatisfactory. In addition; every database update changes enough of the STARS that familiarity cannot be counted on. A good example of this is; one First Officer (FO) on this leg had the 'paired' FMC database STAR electronically written on the page in his EFB. That STAR no longer existed in the FMC for the runway we were assigned.  It was pure luck that we found the correct one in the FMC before flying past the first fix associated with the clearance.

A B747 First Officer states that the STAR names in the FMC do not match the names on the arrival charts for ZBAA; causing late selection of the assigned arrival procedure.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Upon take off into climb real bad smell of something burning overtook the cabin. As the A-F/A I called the captain and advised him of the burning smell; which he said he was able to smell as well; but would get back to me. A few minutes later my first class passengers began to cough; I got up to see if they're ok; at that time I began to feel dizzy; nauseous; and had shortness of breath. Captain called back and asked was there smoke; [there] was none; and was [it] getting worse; he [then] advised me that it's going to be a precautionary landing and he would make the announcement to the passengers. [At that time] we returned back to [departure airport].

ERJ-190 Flight Attendant reported the flight returned to the departure airport after the cabin filled with noxious fumes.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Manuals; Procedure; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

OGG changed its RNAV Z Approach to go below the minimum vectoring altitudes.  Once an aircraft is cleared on the RNAV Z; we are unable to vector them off the approach; due to the minimum vectoring altitudes being above the altitude of the approach.  I was under the impression; and I was also told this on a recorded line by a controller at OGG that if an aircraft is on the RNAV Z; OGG Tower would be responsible for separating any departing VFR aircraft from the inbound IFR aircraft on the RNAV Z approach.  I asked if I need to call for each aircraft; and the OGG Tower controller told me that as long as I type in 'RNZ' into the scratch pad; OGG Tower would handle the separation.  OGG Tower typically climbs an aircraft southbound to stop at 1;000 feet; and the altitude on the RNAV Z descends to 1;800 feet.  For a heavy IFR aircraft and a VFR aircraft; a minimum separation of 1;000 feet would be needed.  I assumed; based on my conversation on the recorded line with OGG Tower that they would handle whatever separation would be necessary with any VFR departing off the airport; since I am not made aware of any departing VFR aircraft.  I believed this to be true for every aircraft.  There was never an issue with VFR aircraft being a factor for my IFR inbound on the RNZ until I had an inbound heavy Aircraft X.  I had cleared Aircraft X for the RNAV Z approach; and I was unable to take Aircraft X off the approach; since minimum vectoring altitudes are above the approach altitudes. Then; a VFR aircraft departed off OGG and was switched to me. I called on the shout line and asked what type of separation OGG Tower was giving me with the VFR and my Aircraft X on the RNAV Z approach.  The OGG Tower was unaware of any separation being necessary; and I told him about my conversation with a controller about how they would provide separation.  The OGG Tower Controller denied any knowledge of this; and basically gave me an aircraft that would not be separated from my heavy on the RNAV Z approach.  I told him to have his supervisor call my supervisor and work out something; because it is unacceptable that OGG Tower will provide no separation for the RNAV Z approach.  Either we make OGG Tower separate their VFR traffic from our IFR inbounds on the RNAV Z; or we stop using the RNAV Z approach.  If the approach was made that did not provide separation; then it was a very poor approach to implement.  My question is do I keep using this approach?  Do I stop using this approach?

A HCF Approach controller reported confusion with the Tower over a procedure to separate arriving IFR aircraft from VFR departures.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 7276; Flight Crew Type 2783

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 11600; Flight Crew Type 12

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

We requested taxi clearance and were given instructions to proceed to Runway 7L via taxiway H and monitor tower only. Las Vegas tower called us and told us to hurry up and taxi faster to the hold short line because we were going to get an immediate departure. Approaching the line of hold short we got cleared into position and as we were taxiing tower said 'DO YOU SEE THE 737 TAKING OFF FROM YOUR LEFT?' and we responded 'NO AT THIS TIME.' There was some confusion and he cleared us for takeoff. As we lined up with the runway we got rushed by the controller and realized we overturned and were facing runway 1L. We realized this immediately as well as the airplane showed us the same on our Primary Flight Display and simultaneously tower called and said 'STOP TURN OFF THE RUNWAY ON TAXIWAY BRAVO IMMEDIATELY.' We did as instructed and without any harm got re-cleared for takeoff on runway 7L again. There is a hot spot #4 at this intersection of runway 1L & 7L that makes it difficult to spot which runway you are ON because there are displaced thresholds. This coupled with the controller urgency for us to hurry confused us while taxiing and doing our pre-takeoff checklist.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Corporate Jet flight crew reported lining up on Runway 1L instead of 7L for takeoff at LAS; shown as hot spot #4.


I was doing the A CHECK but I did not notice that the oxygen mask was disconnected. I was at the terminal working the night shift and nobody else was involved. The FAA Inspector made his inspection and noticed this issue. I reconnected the oxygen mask to the bottle and made an entry in to the log book. I made the inspection and saw the bottle with oxygen mask in the top and it appeared to be connected.

A Maintenance Technician did not recognize that an oxygen mask was not connected to the bottle until it was pointed out by an FAA Inspector.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

On short final a B737 requested a 360 and did not give a reason why; traffic was relevantly slow and I had one A319 six mile final cleared to land and looking on my scope I saw a second B737 flight inbound Runway 25L approach talking to Approach about 17 mile final. I told the second B737 to fly runway heading and I would coordinate and see if I could get him a closed traffic pattern. I coordinated to Final Sector to see if they would allow a closed traffic behind the A319. Hesitantly; the Final Sector approved the request; I believe that is what pushed me to opt for the closed traffic. As the second B737 climbed; I issued left closed traffic; adding I need you to keep it tight for traffic on 15 mile final; and instructed to advise the A319 on 2 mile final in sight. The second B737 reported the A319 in sight and I instructed the second B737 to follow the A319; 'cleared visual Runway 25L' and then also told the second B737 traffic 15 mile final. The second B737 did not turn base to final and was nearly abeam the company aircraft. I asked if I could take the first B737 to the 19's and he said that was fine. I told the second B737 to fly north for Runway 19L; as I instructed this; I noticed Final had started turning another B737 and another A319 north to the 19's to avoid the first B737. I had not had time to coordinate my intentions at this point to Final sector to avoid them changing the second B737 and second A319's route to the 19's. I observed the first B737 turn north and ask the B737 if he still had his company in sight; he reported the company insight. I told him to follow his company to the 19L and maintain visual separation. Tower had visual out the window with all aircraft at all times. I do not believe there was loss of separation or a vector below the MVA. I am fairly low in experience and during training our Tower simulator was not running yet; I have requested to have a few days working on the simulator running problems that involve unusual situations. I need to continue to improve my skills and make better decisions during times of unusual situations and will continue to strive to be better.

Limited experienced Controller described a complex traffic event that eventually resulted in a go around; the reporter indicated the need for training on unusual traffic situations.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 175

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 328; Flight Crew Type 6000

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On takeoff I was the pilot flying.  After taking off; I called for the gear up.  The Captain was distracted by other aircraft and helicopters operating in the vicinity and did not raise the gear.  This was my first flight in over 30 days and I was distracted flying the aircraft and making a rapid turn out at 400 feet to heading 020 for the departure.  I called for the flaps up and the after takeoff checklist on climb out.  The Captain raised the flaps and stowed the spoilers but failed to run the checklist or raise the gear.  The cockpit was very loud on departure.  I checked the pressurization (which was fine) and assumed that it had been so long since I'd flown that my memory of the noise was off.  As we passed 10;000 feet; the barber pole speed moved to show a limit of 280 knots.  This prompted the Captain to identify that the landing gear was down.  I slowed the plane above 10;000 feet and the Captain raised the gear.  The landing gear doors were oversped as the landing gear was raised.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A320 flight crew failed to raise the landing gear after takeoff. Gear status was recognized when barber pole speed limit of 280 knots was noted passing 10;000 feet.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 575

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

I [planned to fly] 3 hours; using 13.1 gallons. Sea level cruise GPH is 5; so it was 4.36 outbound. The return flight took longer and the fuel gauge was getting low. According to calculations 40 minutes prior to arrival; I would have 1.7 gallons upon landing; plus 1 gallon in the header tank. The wing tank (only one) is 18 gal. Previously; I had flown the plane until the float gauge went out of view and the tank had 2.1 gallons in it once the gauge was no longer useful (not quite zero; just the float is not visible). 5 minutes after the float disappeared; with 7 minutes left until arrival; I reached out in flight to the wing sump and pushed the drain and fuel came out. 30 seconds later the engine began losing RPM. I immediately nosed forward; which restored fuel flow; turned toward [a private field] and executed an emergency landing without incident. The engine maintained power through descent and while taxiing; though I knew nose up pitch/go around would interrupt the fuel flow.The problem was one of 'usable fuel.' In prior instances; the float disappearing indicated 2 gallons in the wing tank + 1 in the header. That test was on a colder day; with more nose forward flight. I was cruising at 2;200 RPM to conserve fuel; with 27C OAT; thus; nose slightly up; which would not allow the fuel to enter the drain to the header tank. I have also put 18.1 gallons in that tank before; which may be either a) a problem with the airport's fuel dispenser b) on a colder day with greater fuel density or c) a colder day with nose forward pitch in cruise and I was down to the header tank (Stupid; if that was the case. From my memory; I did not run it below the float disappearing). This airplane; being so old; doesn't have reliable 'usable' amounts. Further; flight training makes usable black and white. X capacity; Y usable. End of story. Don't drain it lower. No explanation. For those that go into the unusable area; it may work one time; and not another; due to flight attitude and a whole host of other events. Further; fuel starvation is viewed as black and white also. The engine quits or it doesn't. I had just had a conversation with a pilot who starved a comparable model of fuel; and he described how the engine will repeatedly sputter and rev up for minutes on end. Had I not had that conversation; I would have thought the problem was something other than fuel starvation.

Pilot of a single-engine Piper aircraft attempted to fly a three hour out and back flight but had to divert on the return leg when the engine started losing power due to fuel exhaustion.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While on the Hobrk One arrival into Memphis Center issued the heading of 130 for spacing with arrival aircraft. We were on the heading for approximately 5 to 10 miles and then issued a left turn to the heading of 010. [I] informed Center Controller that we would be unable to maintain 010 for any length of time due to severe thunderstorm that was at our 12 o'clock position. Center stated no problem I will turn you prior to you getting very close. At approximately 25 miles from red and magenta radar cell; copilot requested that we be allowed to reduce forward speed; Center Controller denied request and asked us to maintain forward speed. We again stated that we were unable to maintain 010 heading; center issued clearance to descend to Flight Level 240; additionally when leaving Flight Level 300 right turn to a heading of 100. We began the descent; but were unable to descend at a rate high enough to allow the aircraft to avoid entering the thunderstorm. Told Center that we were turning back toward the right and I turned to a heading of 050 to avoid convective activity. Center Controller very upset and informed us that we were not allowed to turn when we wanted to; requested that we stop descent and maintain FL320 which we complied with. First Officer informed Center Controller that he was not allowed to the vector into thunderstorms. Additional clearance from Center Controller to proceed direct to Hobrk Intersection; we complied and returned to now then he reversed his decision and gave us another heading. The Center Controller was very unprofessional; he had unlimited options on dealing with traffic separation however chose to use the only option that would vector us directly into an extreme precipitation thunderstorm cell. There was only one thunderstorm in our immediate proximity we informed him of our limited ability on that heading; we also requested to reduce velocity to aid in solving the traffic separation problem and were refused. He seems extremely determined that we would fly into the thunderstorm. Due to the safety risk I had no choice; but to deviate from that clearance and turned to a heading that would avoid thunderstorm entry. I realize that Memphis Center is utilized to train many new ATC controllers; however; there needs to be some supervision of these individuals; so that they cannot produce hazardous events through their own actions.Memphis Center needs to realize that [company] aircraft like all others cannot penetrate thunderstorms at will and while I understand the difficulty in providing traffic separation for all of our rivals into Memphis disregarding safety and science in the name of traffic separation is unacceptable. He had already pushed us to the limit of our required separation distance from thunderstorms and we had made every effort to make clear to him that we were unable to maintain that heading. It might be good for him to remember that the world does not revolve around him.

Pilot requests deviation heading for weather and controller does not issue a deviation until pilot requests again.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 400

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

A two-ship military flight on a training mission was descending to commence [a Visual] low-level training route. During the descent; the wingman gained sight of a light civil aircraft overhead the formation flying in roughly the same direction. The wingman directed the lead to 'push the nose over.' Neither aircraft had any radar indications of the traffic ahead. It appeared the traffic aircraft never had sight of the military aircraft. The military aircraft were VFR; squawking appropriately; and were in communication with the local FSS in preparation to enter the [Visual] route. As it seems both sets of aircraft were VFR; preventing the recurrence was solely incumbent on the pilots. In this case; the military aircraft were rapidly overtaking the civil aircraft and had collision avoidance responsibility. Lack of radar indications and difficult visibility in the forward quarter due to the environment during the descent led to a very short-range visual pickup. Preventing near midair's like this one in the future requires extra vigilance during dynamic maneuvers while VFR.

Flight of two F/A-18s took evasive action to avoid a light civil aircraft while descending VFR to a Visual Training Route.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Takeoff into wake of preceding aircraft with flaps 5. With 'positive rate; gear up' FO (First Officer) raised flaps [instead of] gear. We had rotated late and flat in anticipation of wake. Carried extra airspeed into air; never had a settle; speed low warning; or entrance to barber pole area of tape. Noticed configuration deviation when I looked for flap retract bug to go from flaps 5 to 1; but only had clean min/man bug. Also noise from nose gear gave it away and was able to reconstruct what happened. Distraction and complacency due to takeoff into prior jet's wake. Mistake plain and simple. Had flown with FO a few dozen times; no concerns. Just flat out grabbed the wrong handle.

We were cleared for takeoff on RWY 28R and N5 after an A320. Take off roll was normal. Rotation was normal. After rotation; with a positive rate of climb I called 'positive rate'; the Captain called for gear up. Once airborne; we began to experience some wake turbulence from the Airbus. The Captain was having to add trim and counteract the wake. He then expressed that something did not seem right. I began to scan the panel and saw that the gear was down and the flap handle was selected in the up position. I raised the landing gear at that time. The airspeed was below limits for the gear. The airspeed was passing the 'up' bug as we accelerated. After this we climbed out normally. I got complacent and did not visually verify the handle I was moving. I inadvertently grabbed the flap handle when the gear up command was given. Visually verify any and all handles; knobs and switches before moving them.

B737-800 flight crew reported the pilot monitoring inadvertently retracted the flaps instead of the landing gear after takeoff at ORD; with wake from a preceding Airbus A320 cited as contributing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

In cruise we got a ECAM alert of hydraulic blue sys low press followed by blue hydraulic low quantity. Followed ECAM checklist and contacted Dispatch to discuss option. Determined it best to continue to ZZZ. We advised ATC and landed on Runway XX.It was an unforeseen event that was handled according to company passengers and policies.

During cruise; the ECAM notified us of a HYD B RSVR LO LVL failure with associated B SYS LO PR. Followed ECAM procedure and secured B SYS Hydraulics. Notified Dispatch; evaluated situation; advised ATC and landed safely in ZZZ.The decision to continue to ZZZ was a good one; giving the crew and myself plenty of time to assess and not rush. First Officer (Pilot Flying) did a good job staying on task while I handled the problem with Dispatch and the Flight Attendant crew. He also did a nice job flying.Failure of an electrical HYD pump cannot be planned for. Good crew coordination makes the response to the problem easier to handle.

A319 flight crew reported loss of Blue System hydraulic pressure and quantity resulted in a precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Reported 10 west of DWH with [current ATIS] and was told to report right downwind for 17R about one mile later further instructions continue for right base 17R number two following an aircraft on short final. Three miles out made contact with aircraft on short final and was told cleared to land keep my speed up and head for the numbers of 17R aircraft following. Turning final with the #1 aircraft still in sight and on the runway I started preparing for a go around. Tower told him twice to expedite. Desending through 200-100 over the threshold that aircraft got airborne after a touch and go. After touchdown tower said thanks for the help and asked where I was parking. After my speed was under control and assured Taxiway Echo I replied. Instructed to contact ground on Echo. Exited the runway on echo ensured my tail was cleared (concern about aircraft #3) came to a stop and contacted ground. Was instructed by ground to taxi to the ramp via Echo cross 17L a minute later was contacted to called the tower with a phone number. Spoke to the controller. At that time I was made aware by him there was a possibility of a incursion on 17L. To my knowledge I complied with all signs and markings. The controller mentioned a light identifying the hold short line at echo and 17L but it was not visible or illuminated. I'm aware of the hot spot and operated cautiously and safely in that area.As a pilot for the last 25 years; in retrospect don't understand why that spot is not controlled by the tower.

After landing on DWH Runway 17R then clearing at Taxiway E; a Pilot held short of Runway 17L but was informed by Tower that he may have incurred the Runway at the hotspot. The pilot disagreed.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After releasing Aircraft X off BET airport; BET TWR entered a departure message for the aircraft. Moments after Aircraft X auto-acquired at 015 turning southbound into a right downwind to land north. It was very noticeable since a CA (Conflict Alert) sounded due to close proximity with a 1200 VFR beacon code inside tower's airspace. I figured Aircraft X was returning to the airport for reasons unknown. I waited until after I observed the aircraft descend and appear to land on RWY 1R to call tower and inquire about what I saw. I did make the mistake of not using the full call sign (Aircraft X) and only [the first three letters]. I asked if they were going to depart again shortly or if they would re-file a new flight plan and if I should remove the one that was active. The tower informed me that they would re-file and the flight plan could be removed. Though; tower was talking about a different aircraft still on the ground. I proceeded to remove the flight plan and drop the target on the radar display. Little did I know Aircraft X was well East of BET airport still climbing to assigned altitude. 10 minutes later the relieving controller received a transmission from Aircraft X asking for a reroute to save flying time. Questioning who was calling; and me still being in the operations area post viewing; I recognized the squawk code and we got the flight plan restored and data on the airborne flight.I don't know why the aircraft tagged up so low and was shown landing. The facility is unable to pull up the radar playback. Apparently there was an equipment malfunction and for seven and a half hours no radar data was being recorded.In the future I will make sure to use full call signs to avoid confusion or incorrect coordination. Even though the radar was not working properly; this could have been avoided if coordination was better.

Anchorage Center Controller reported an aircraft departed; they thought they were returning on their own to the departure airport; but actually kept flying and were discovered minutes later when the pilot questioned the Controller about a possible re-route.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Total 10468; Flight Crew Type 3859

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight number assignment at our Airline result in similar callsigns cause both an increase in pilot Controller communications in saturated ATC environments and resultantly increase the risk of inadvertent clearance and miss-communication which can lead to minor deviation or serious error. Although no error is being reported for this flight due to aggressive hear-back/readback awareness; this callsign situation needs to be addressed. On a particular day; three departures from the same airport in the late evening had similar callsigns: ABC X24; ABC Y24; and ABC Z22. On taxi out alone; I had to clarify with Ground Control that the clearance issued was for our flight (X24) and not Y24; in effect; doubling pilot-controller communications. We had to specify again while enroute that it was our flight to switch frequencies versus the misheard other. This experience is bad enough here in domestic operations; but is far worse in operation in the international theater where difficult accents (for both pilots and controllers) complicate the situation even more. I've flown into a European airport as X60 with Y60 on the same frequency; or from another European airport on X57; with Y57 trying to work the same ATC enroute and oceanic frequencies. This sometimes happens inadvertently when another airline has the same flight number; but is a terrible practice when the airline itself is setting up the chain of events that lead to communication errors. Although no errors occurred during this particular segment; the potential was great. As such; this is a communications safety issue that can and should be addressed promptly before a misheard clearance results in deviation or error.

An Air Carrier pilot noted numerous hear-back/read-back errors when his air carrier assigns flight numbers ending in the same two numbers into airports and airspace concurrently.


Chart Or Publication; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure

I noticed a Tire Servicing Placard on nose strut of a B-777 aircraft. This placard does not reflect the 'Acceptable Tire Pressure' range listed in the General Maintenance Manual (GMM). [Recommend] either update or remove inaccurate placards. Evening shift. Routine maintenance. [Terminal] Gates.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports finding a Tire Servicing placard on the nose strut of a B-777 aircraft that did not reflect the 'Acceptable Tire Pressure' range listed in their General Maintenance Manual (GMM).


A Chiller Access Panel came loose and became a flying projectile in the flight deck during landing rollout and braking.  After striking the aft portion of the center instrument pedestal; (in the area of the parking brake location); the panel came to rest on the floor at the base of the center pedestal.  The panel narrowly missed striking and likely severely injuring one or both of us while during a critical phase of flight.   Furthermore; had the door hit the parking brake handle at the right spot it could have set the parking brake at a speed of approximately 140 KTS.  The panel has sharp edges and enough mass that it would have most likely caused very severe injuries to a primary jumpseat occupant; had there been one.   No indications of the panel being loose or unsecured were observed by myself or the First Officer during the accomplishment of the safety and power on inspection.  The landing touchdown was soft and braking was normal.  The First Officer and I inspected the Forward Chiller Access Compartment after the flight and neither of us found any obvious abnormalities or suspicious objects within the area of the compartment we could observe.

A321 Captain reports a galley access panel coming loose in the cockpit during landing and becoming a projectile.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.6

Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

The aircraft was issued the instructions to taxi to 17L via L and ED; hold short of the 17R approach on ED. Pilot read back correctly the hold short instructions.  The pilot then blew past the hold short line causing a go around on short final.  The very next week I had the same situation working Local Control 2 (LC2) and I had to send an aircraft around on very short final with an aircraft in the protection area who had also read back the hold short instructions.  I will fill out additional reports for this occurrence as well.  This continues to be a problem at DEN Tower. The pilots are confused on where to hold short.  When we taxi them north on L or M there are 17R approach signs and lines to hold short. This however is not where we expect them to hold short.  So half of them stop on M or L; but we really want them to make the turn on ED and then there is another 17R approach sign there.  This is an extremely hot spot when we have arrivals to 17R. They are not crossing a runway; but if they cross the approach sign we are required to send the aircraft around on short final. I believe in the 7 years I have been here I have sent over 10 aircraft around on short final because of this problem.  Times that by 40 controllers and we have a pretty big issue here.  So to make it clear we issue; 'Runway 17L taxi via (L or M); ED hold short runway 17R approach.'   On either taxi route there are 2 17R approach lines to hold short of causing confusion.There should be one line depicting where we want the pilot to hold short of; and this should stick out to the pilot and no be something of question.  If you need to paint a purple line or hot pink line and have a different name for it; that may work.  The pilots don't understand what we are asking them to do.  I have filled out 2 pilot deviations this week because of it.

DEN Tower Controller reports of a problem with aircraft not holding short of an approach area to a runway causing aircraft on short final to go-around.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft had MEL for Left Aft Galley Chiller Circuit Breaker (C/B) popped.  Aircraft came to ZZZ for Routine Overnight (RON) Maintenance between May 2013.  During troubleshooting for problem; it was discovered that the [electrical] harness for the Chiller had burned through and damaged the Floor Cross Beam at Station (Sta.) 1562; approximately Right Body Line (RBL) 28. A Maintenance Reporting Form was started with the original MEL in the Discrepancy Remarks section and the damage to the floor beam was added to the Reporting Form in the Open Items/Work to be accomplished section.  For two days; over multiple shifts; company Engineering was contacted and consulted with about the damage and acceptable limits.  Damage was blended and measured after blending. Reworked area also received a conductivity check by Inspection per Structural Repair Manual (SRM) 51-20-02 and Non-Destructive Testing  (NDT) Manual 51-00-03. Engineering was asked for an Engineering Authorization (EA) to cover the damage; but request was refused because Engineering believed damage to be within limits per the SRM after blending.  Reworked area was roto-peened and painted. I was not involved with repair to the damaged floor beam.  My only task was to re-pin the Left Chiller [electrical] connector after the wiring harness was repaired and reinstalled; and check the chiller after the damage to the floor beam was repaired.  My sign-offs on the Maintenance Reporting Form reflect this.  I was notified of the floor beam issue by the Midnight Hangar Supervisor after my return to work; after my scheduled days off.             After aircraft was released for service in the morning; Dayshift Engineering reviewed information sent to ZZZ Maintenance for floor beam damage and repair by Midnight Engineering and determined that damage was 'Out of Limits' and that blending and roto-peening was not an acceptable repair.  I cannot directly address why this event occurred.  Multiple departments were involved in this incident and I cannot comment on how Engineering determined what limits to use for the damage.  I do know that the aircraft was down for multiple shifts in ZZZ and there was constant communication between Maintenance and Engineering on the damage.  In the end; Maintenance followed the recommendations given to us by Engineering.  Aircraft had made one round trip revenue flight.  On its return to ZZZ; it was taken out of service and ferried to ZZZ1 for a Floor Beam Repair.  I have been told by ZZZ Supervision that Engineering has taken responsibility for this event and that they have submitted an Engineering Non-Compliance Reporting Form. I have no recommendations for avoiding a recurrence. Flight cancellation.

B767 aircraft was in ZZZ with a write-up for Left Aft Galley Chiller Circuit Breaker (C/B) popped. Engineering had determined that the damage was within limits. Then they reviewed their work in the morning and determined that their [allowed] limits on the Floor Beam [repair] were [actually] 'Out of Limits'. Engineering reviewed their paperwork on the next shift. I would have like to have had an Engineering Authorization (EA) stating that the damage was 'within limits'; instead of using the Structural Repair Manual (SRM).  Engineering had diagrams and calculations that should have been included with the paperwork. Hangar.

Two Mechanics report about a repair procedure to a B767 Cabin Floor Beam that was originally approved by company Midnight Engineering; but later considered to be 'Out of Limits' by their Dayshift Engineering. An electrical harness for the Aft Galley Chiller had burned through the harness and damaged the floor beam at Fuselage Station (Sta.) 1562.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft X was on final to Runway 28 Left following Aircraft Y; by about 4 mile visual approach/separation. At about 600 feet Aircraft X advised they were going around. Local Control asked the reason and the pilot stated 'Wake turbulence.' I coordinated the go around with the departure coordinator.At the time; there was a quartering tailwind; ideal for the wake turbulence remaining active in the trailing aircraft's flight profile.

SFO Tower Controller reported a go-around due to wake turbulence.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 9800; Flight Crew Type 550

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Descending through about 6;000 on way into Gateway Mesa Airport IWA; I was told to descend to 2;500 ft; I responded to the Controller to descend to 2;500 ft. The descent was VMC and being slightly familiar with the area I knew that there was a ridge of mountains I had to cross before descending that low. I slowed my descent so that I could easily cross the mountains with plenary of clearance; once between the last peaks I was still around 4;800 ft in a slow descent and began to continue to descend to the cleared altitude of 2;500 ft.Passing through 3;800 ft the Controller says Aircraft X immediately climb to 4;300 ft the Minimum Safe Altitude in that area is 4;300. Safety was not compromised and I heard nothing else the entire flight. Landed at Mesa without any complications or notices from ATC. Using the vertical track feature in App I can tell that I descended to 3;568 ft then returned to 4;045 ft. before being cleared to continue descent. Conditions were CAVU VMC and at no time was there conflict with terrain as I made sure that I was clear before descending. Flight originated at ZZZ; top altitude was FL250. In hindsight I should of queried the Controller on the altitude before initiating the descent.

Pilot reported descending to an altitude; then having ATC call and advise they were below the MSA.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Type 9200

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On approach to Runway 30L; we noted at about 25 NM from runway that we had the VASI in sight.  Unfortunately; as we continued the approach; we realized the lights we saw were the scoreboard for Levi's Stadium which lines up with Runway 30.Notify aircrew of possible confusion with football stadium lights.

B737 Captain reported he confused Levi's Stadium lights for SJC Runway 30L VASI lights.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon initial radio call to Ground Control requesting to taxi for deicing; Ground cleared us to taxi to 'CDF Deice pad' via K; E2. We taxied via Taxiway K; then made the 45deg left turn onto Taxiway E2 and saw the numerous deice spots there. We then contacted Iceman; and he told us to come to the 'CDF Deice Pad.' It turns out there is another deice pad further east on the easternmost part of Taxiway E2. This is not depicted on the 10-9 pages.We taxied further east to the easternmost part of Taxiway E2 without further incident.

Pilot reported going to the de-ice pad; but not knowing the de-ice pad they were supposed to go to was further down the taxiway. Reporter claims the further east de-ice pad is not displayed on the DTW 10-9 page.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Every winter numerous aircraft depart runways or taxiways that are contaminated with snow/slush/ice. Our Company had a similar event in the past. I believe there is a significant safety hazard at DEN at the junction of D5 and WB. There is a very steep drop off at the end of D5. Should such an event occur while taxiing and turning east bound onto WB from D5 it would lead to significant aircraft damage and bodily injury.I believe the use of D5 should be prohibited if contaminated with any snow/slush or if there are any reports of braking action less than good.

The reporter expressed concern that during winter months with icy taxiways an aircraft transitioning from DEN Taxiway D5 to Taxiway WB may be in danger of a taxiway excursion on the south side of that intersection and risk serious damage or injury because of a forty foot drop off.