Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon landing on Runway XX in ZZZ the aircraft struck a deer shortly after touchdown. The approach to runway 6 was normal; fully configured; flown at Vref +10. Shortly after touchdown the deer ran into the prop while the aircraft was traveling around 70kts. The time from initially observing the deer to impact was about one second. The engine started vibrating immediately after impact and the PF (Pilot Flying) shut down the engine on the rollout. The airplane came to a stop 500 ft. from the end of the runway. Upon stopping we did a normal shutdown. No injuries onboard and the aircrafts propeller and engine were damaged.

Upon landing at ZZZ; aircraft suffered a deer strike on roll out. The runway XX landing was fully configured flap 40 landing. Approach speed was carrot + 10 knots due to runway length. Deer spotted at the moment of impact in the right landing light cone. Sound of impact was followed by immediate engine vibration. Estimate impact speed at 70 knots during beta application for stop. Shut down engine on the roll out estimate 45 knots to minimize further damage and blade separation. Came to a stop approximately 500 ft. from the end of the runway. Preformed normal aircraft unloading. No injuries on board and damage was limited to aircraft prop and engine.

Flight crew reported that a deer struck the airplane during landing; damaging the propeller and engine.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Type 1953

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

We are just leveled off 32;000 feet. I noticed the aircraft start a small buffet and roll to the right. Shortly thereafter the aircraft rolled quickly to the left. I initiated the upset recovery technique to regain control of the aircraft. We lost our lateral navigation and deviated slightly off course. We also had a very minor altitude deviation of 40 feet. We asked ATC what type of aircraft was in front of us; their response was an A320. We quickly understood that we had encountered his wake turbulence. We were contacted by the flight attendants and we were told that two of them had fallen to the ground during the turbulence. One of the flight attendants said she twisted her ankle and it was minor. I asked if she was OK to continue and she replied yes and she did not need assistance at our destination. She continued her service and prior to the descent I asked again if she needed assistance in regards to her ankle. She responded no and was going to continue on with her trip. We landed and I ask the Flight Attendant one last time if she was OK and her response was yes.

B737NG Captain reported a Flight Attendant suffered a minor injury during a wake turbulence encounter at FL320 in trail of an A320.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 2966; Flight Crew Type 70

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During a training flight towards a tailwheel endorsement; permission was received for three high speed taxi runs on the runway. On each taxi run in which the pilot under instruction was in control of the aircraft during the run; control of the aircraft was turned over to the instructor pilot prior to the end of the high speed taxi run on the runway. During the final high speed taxi run on the runway; the pilot under instruction became uncomfortable and turned control of the aircraft over to the instructor pilot. During the transition of control of the aircraft the aircraft lifted off of the runway and it was determined that there was not enough runway to safely return to the runway before running out of runway. Before contacting the Tower to advise of the situation; the Tower inquired why a liftoff occurred when permission was only granted for a high speed taxi. Tower was informed that since the aircraft inadvertently lifted off during the high speed taxi evolution; it was requested to return for a full stop landing with a return to the ramp. In reviewing the scenario for tailwheel training; it was realized that it would be preferable to conduct this training at a non-towered airport or when at a towered airport only when 'cleared for the option' has been received. This will avoid an operation that is not specific to a tower clearance for safety of flight reasons.

Champion Citabria flight Instructor reported inadvertent takeoff while practicing high speed taxi runs with student.


Air Traffic Control Radar 35; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 2785; Flight Crew Type 1845

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was flying from ZZZ1 to ZZZ just to run the plane. It was a very bumpy ride and turbulent approach on final at this uncontrolled airport. I landed a little too fast and was caught by a gust from my left side; the right wing lifted causing the plane to veer left off the runway and onto the grass where I got it slowed and re entered the runway without any damage or injury. Cause was landing before the plane had lost all lift. I was practicing a wheel landing where you flare just as the wheels touch the runway; however still flying speed which is fine in no wind conditions. Taught me a good lesson to always do stall landings in gusty windy conditions. I stopped and did a preflight before departing to make sure all was fine. I did four more touch and goes after that with no issues.

Stationar pilot reported loss of aircraft control and momentary excursion from the runway caused by a wind gust.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

During arrival into HPN; I noticed the PAPI seemed different. After a few moments I realized that the light indications were backwards. The PAPI for 16 is on the left hand side of the runway but the red lights began on the left (farthest two lights from the runway were red).  The FAA requirements per FAA AC150/5340-30G Chapter 7.4 (d) are that the 'light housing assemblies nearest the runway (inboard) must be seen as red and the two farthest from runway (outboard) must be seen as white.' The VGSI (visual glideslope indicator) was at a corresponding angle to the ILS glideslope which we were using as a backup; despite the red and white being 'flipped'.  I wasn't sure the reference and didn't want to address my concern without being certain and without a reference so I did not immediately notify operations. In addition to my hesitation that evening; the Tower closed just a few minutes after we parked at the gate. The next morning when I arrived to the aircraft; I asked for a contact number for the Tower and gave them a call. The Controller who answered seemed helpful and keen on ensuring that the issue would be resolved. Controller said they would send OPS out to check on the system. Address with HPN operations to resolve the PAPI indications.

Pilot reported the PAPI's at HPN Runway 16 being reversed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 785; Flight Crew Type 750

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were inbound for a landing at CMA; and were instructed by Tower to enter right traffic; Runway 26. As we approached the right downwind entry another airplane; Aircraft Y; attempted to enter right traffic ahead of us and cut us off while at the same altitude. They passed just to our left; and entered the downwind ahead of us. Tower made a traffic call as Aircraft Y passed; but never provided sequencing until after the traffic conflict had been resolved. I requested on frequency clarification about the sequence; and received no response from the Tower.

C172 flight instructor reported ATC failure to separate traffic in pattern resulted in an NMAC on downwind entry to CMA.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 12575; Flight Crew Type 1700

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

We departed for ZZZ with 2 crew and 1 passenger prior to the Tower opening and picked up our IFR clearance to ZZZ from [TRACON].Preflight checks were normal; conditions were VMC; Part 91 flight; owner on board.Flaps 0 were selected climbing out of 400 feet however the flaps did not retract. We continued climb to a safe altitude; communicated with ATC and began working on the problem.We were unable to retract the flaps; canceled our IFR flight plan; requested VFR flight following and diverted to ZZZ1 which is where our maintenance base for this aircraft is as well as having a longer runway to deal with a potential flap issue on landing.1 of the 4 circuit breakers associated with the flap controls was apparently not fully seated. It's possible that a headset cord could have caught it. This breaker is not in a particularly good location for a visual inspection; moving forward we will check these breakers more closely should the situation arise again.

corporate Captain reported being unable to retract the flaps after takeoff.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 235; Flight Crew Type 235

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

I was on a training flight at PJY with a CFII. We were practicing power off 180's. We had been informed of 3 crop dusters in the area; 1 of which had no radios. We had yielded to two crop dusters during the flight already. On this power off 180; I turned the airplane towards Runway 36 and set up to land. At about 50ft AGL; Instructor noticed the crop duster had blown through the hold short line and was continuing towards the runway. Instructor took controls as the airplane flared and landed and applied full braking. At about the flare; the crop duster noticed us and stopped. We came to a complete stop just short of the taxiway the crop duster was on. Once we confirmed that the crop duster was yielding; we took off again and departed to the south. Crop duster apologized on frequency and departed as well.

Pilot reported while landing; another aircraft crossed the hold short lines causing a ground conflict.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

We are constantly being interrupted during checklists; pilot to pilot briefings; while talking to clearance delivery etc. According to many of the new flight attendants they are being taught in the flight attendant training center to ask the captain for each and every thing that they may need or want. On many occasions the flight attendants board; conduct a safety check and then sit in first class and proceed to give me a verbal request for the several cabin items that they may want. On occasion; I have asked the Lead flight attendant gently and nicely if she could please request her extra ice cubes; cold cups; head sets; toilet paper and cocktail napkins via the jetway phone as we are busy with a maintenance issue; weight restriction issue; weather; routing issue etc.  On each occasion I was met with great resistance. I was told that they are unfamiliar with the jetway phone or any other method of requesting said items. Usually boarding has not yet started and the flight attendants may use the jetway phone and/or speak to an agent as I do. Many times I just simply walk up to the top of the jetway and make this request with the agents. Usually this is for the missing agriculture forms or the necessary custom forms for international flights. I am aware of this need after my flight attendant briefing when I try to confirm that these forms are on board. These requests may seem simple at first glance. However; this starts a new stream of interruptions as the flight attendants will continue to come to the flight deck and alert us to the status of the many requests. They will either report the delivery of said items and/or ask about the status of others. The other part of this new status quo that may not be readily apparent is the inherent problem with the request. For example: How many cold cups do you need? What kind of headsets? First class or economy? How many? How many napkins? What kind? So now if I decide to just try to accommodate such requests; a plethora of issues arise as quite frankly I do not know what a 'cold cup' is exactly. So what may seem as a one minute distraction can lead to many more questions; more phone calls and more follow ups. With our new shorter show times; when exactly can I do my pilot duties? May I say that we pushed late because I was busy calling for cold cups? As we all know; interruptions and distractions lead to mistakes. I have seen many first officers miss many items on the set up. For example: They miss that the window heat that was off when it should have been on for a through flight. They miss the changes on the departure clearance (different SID; routing and/or altitude). Captains are forgetting the fuel sheet when fueling is late because they are distracted. I have had several first officers ask me if we could close the cockpit door for a while so they could be uninterrupted for their setup. This is especially true when in Mexico and we must get our departure clearance via voice. I see that CRM is now included in the flight attendant manual. Are the flight attendants being taught the ramifications of said distractions and interruptions? Do they know that a simple shout into the flight deck during a checklist or clearance read back may lead to an incident or accident? Have they seen the Tenerife accident video? Or the like?To summarize; the pilots are distracted by the plethora of interruptions. The interruptions are harsh and preclude the opportunity to stop at an appropriate point. The pilots are being tasked to perform duties outside the realm of pilot duties because of the interruptions; the pilots feel rushed and are making mistakes. This is a general report and not specific to this crew.

A B737 Captain reported pilot preflight distractions; interruptions; and task loads resulting from the company's current Flight Attendant training policy to include the crew in more of the cabin activities; needs; and wants.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working B737-800 Traversing Sector 05. I inadvertently started the hand off to the wrong sector and the aircraft entered another sector without a hand off. I was watching several traffic situations at the time; and was in the middle of a relief briefing. Disallow the ability to hand off an aircraft to a sector if the route line does not penetrate that sector.

I was taking over the R-Side position. We started and completed a position relief briefing. During the briefing a B737-800 was across the boundary of one sector and flashing at another. This is a common flash through point for departures. As I sat down to take over the sector; both the Controller I was relieving and myself noticed that we still had track control. I took the hand off back; began a hand off to the correct sector and called with a verbal hand off. I think that ERAM will have a feature where a data block will pop up on the screen of a sector through which the trajectory or route or a combination of both will travel. Kind of like an automated hand off within 2 minutes of the boundary but it should occur even if the aircraft is flashing at the wrong sector. That would ensure that if there were traffic within the next sector the Controller may have a better chance to notice it than if there were only a limited data block on their screen.

ZDV Controller described a wrong sector hand off event when inadvertently initiating a hand off to an incorrect sector; the reporter suggesting automation help to prevent future occurrences.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Departing ZZZ [Airport] on the ZZZZZX Departure; the PNF Briefed all the altitudes on the departure were at or above.  I briefed the departure and ended up saying the same thing about the altitudes.  ZZZZZ1 [Intersection] requires a crossing altitude of 2;000 at about 4 miles of the end of the runway.  With all the times I have been into ZZZ in my past; I knew this departure.  I remember thinking after COVID they finally changed the departure restrictions.  Should have re-checked the 2;000 altitude as I knew better.

Captain reported an altitude deviation during departure.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We departed already delayed. The weather in DCA was reporting 1000ft or better with the LDA-Z 19 as the approach. While on the approach; with Potomac Approach; they reported the weather was right at mins for the approach. We continued the approach; and found that LDA did not have glideslope; so we were managing altitude changes to meet the various step-downs. The DDA was 720ft on the approach for 19; and arriving at that altitude we had ground contact but not runway contact. We executed a missed; informed tower; and [were] given a heading and altitude assignment; which we complied.The CA asked the tower if there was any talk of switching up the runways so an ILS can be conducted; and they said not at this time. Noting winds were 190 at 9kts. We attempted a second approach. This time we were aware the LDA did not have glideslope so I as the PM was in pink needles to get vertical guidance. I also pulled up the VNAV data page; and verbalized how the PF was doing on the glide path; giving suggestions to correct for high or low. We had discussed that this would be the last attempt; and that BWI would be a better alternate if we don't get in. Again we were approaching minimums; and also heard other aircraft as well as the flight in front of us that went missed; and they diverted. We got to mins and again went missed and tower gave us a heading and altitude.We again asked if they will be switching up the runway to land north; for an ILS. ATC said he had just talked to management or something; and they were not doing that. We told them we would like to change our alternate to BWI and got vectors in that direction. In the mean time we coordinated with the dispatcher to have our alternate changed to BWI; and they made the changes and coordinated with BWI operations. We landed there with no incident; got our fuel and release and went to DCA shortly after; as the weather had improved and flights were getting in.

Flight crew executed two LDA approaches into DCA resulting in missed approaches. Flight diverted to nearby alternate.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft X was in for maintenance and it had two MELs that were not scheduled to be worked on due to part shortages. They were both related to one problem with the APU cross flow auto function. When the aircraft was taxing out for departure the next morning; the left engine standby fuel pump failed and the aircraft returned to the gate. This could not be MELed because of APU pump MEL. We brought plane back to hanger and no parts were in stock to fix current write up so decisions were made to rob parts from Aircraft Y. We decided to go for clearing APU related cross flow MEL and MEL the left standby fuel boost pump. I had printed the procedures and also started the paperwork process for the rob transaction. During this time; we missed noticing the pressure switch needing to be transferred and staying with the aircraft. The pump was inspected and a new tag was issued to install on the aircraft. I never looked at the pump and assumed the pressure switch was installed on the pump canister rather than the cartridge.The replacement pump/cartridge was installed and I took over for the operations and leak checks and looked over the installation not noticing the pressure switch issue where it had been transferred with the pumps. The log book entries were all documented by myself and the aircraft was returned to service. After I was at home; a day shift mechanic called saying that when he was draining the residual fuel from the part that was removed he noticed the pressure switch was still installed on removed part. After investigating he noticed the switches should have been swapped over to stay with the aircraft. He had contacted Maintenance Control and the proper documentation was completed to return the aircraft back to service. We as a company are constantly dealing with robbing parts from aircraft due to parts shortages and having to deal with this during hectic line operations. When we do have the parts they are not divided between bases equally causing many parts shortages.

Lead Technician reported that during a part swap; the proper procedure was not followed resulting in the incorrect installation of a pressure switch.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Tower requested release on Aircraft X; IFR; filed ZZZ.ZZZZZ.ZZZ with a requested altitude of FL230; runway heading. The remarks stated that they were requesting to follow the ZZZZZ2 SID; but the routing was not filed that way. When Aircraft X checked on; the language barrier hindered me from properly understanding what they were requesting to do. I asked a few times what their intent was. In the final exchange; I was able to understand that they were level at 1;500 MSL in a 2;300 MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). I immediately said; '...negative; climb and maintain 080.' No further issues were experienced and I was able to get them on their requested routing.

TRACON Controller reported that an aircraft was at an altitude below the minimum vectoring altitude for the area and directed an immediate climb.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Other / Unknown

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was the Pilot monitoring on flight to ZZZ when we encountered moderate turbulence enroute at FL340 in Monterey airspace over the gulf of Mexico over the fix of XOTUG. It went from completely smooth air to moderate turbulence with a couple of jolts and rolls to where it caused several injuries to passengers and flight attendants where we had paramedics meet the aircraft upon arrival in ZZZ. We did not have any indications on RADAR nor from ATC that it was moderate level turbulence and we were completely startled ourselves. It only lasted about 10-15 seconds while the autopilot remained on and smoothed out afterwards. We checked on the cabin status and were told of the injuries incurred by the passengers who one happened to be in the lavatory and one who had coffee spilled on her lap. The Flight Attendant also hurt her wrist and hip as well from what we were told. Prior to this; the seat belt sign was off as we were experiencing smooth air and we turned it on as soon as we encountered the turbulence. We also made the PA announcement for the flight attendants to remain seated.

B737 First Officer reported moderate turbulence with minor injuries to passengers and flight attendants.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 242; Flight Crew Type 5439

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

During descent at approximately 15;000 FT MSL; we noticed the LNAV was taking the aircraft off course (one dot). I (pilot not flying) executed another 'direct' to waypoint on the CDU with no change in aircraft heading. The Captain (pilot flying) disconnected the autopilot and steered toward the arrival waypoint using the FMC information. As we approached the waypoint at about 12;000 FT MSL; Center said we appeared about five miles off course and then handed us off to Approach. I estimate we passed within 1-2 NM of the waypoint according to the FMC. Upon check-in; Approach stated that we appeared off the arrival. I told Approach that we incurred a navigation system problem and requested vectors for a visual approach. The subsequent approach and landing were uneventful.First; LNAV worked normally during departure. Given a heading to intercept the procedure; LNAV captured normally; turned onto and maintained the initial course. Second; LNAV appeared to turn the aircraft correctly when direct the arrival waypoint was executed. When we noticed the course bar offset; I also noticed that both of our 'AUTO' tune functions read 'MANUAL' and we could not select 'AUTO.' No other anomalies were found except as stated above. Third; although unrelated; VOR and ILS worked normally as well as all MCP functions. Fourth; as we approached the airfield; known waypoints correlated with the FMC. Finally; Maintenance confirmed the LNAV problem and was able to fix by restarting the computers. I thought the event was handled well by all; including ATC (both Center and Approach). Even though we were VMC; I chose to request IFR vectors immediately rather than fly the arrival using VOR's and wind-corrected tracking--simple and safe. There were no failure flags; caution lights; or other indicators of LNAV failure; maintaining a good crosscheck of system performance is still important with automation.

As we tried to figure out what was the problem; we switched both NAV switches to normal and back and noticed the NAV receivers would not auto tune; and they stayed in manual regardless of NAV switch position. During all this; I disengaged autopilot as we neared the arrival waypoint; which I was attempting to navigate to using the FMC. Seems I turned as we went overhead the arrival waypoint; the best I could tell; when Center said we missed the waypoint and handed us off to Approach. At this time we told ATC we were unable our own NAV and then given headings to our destination. We had Maintenance come out to take a look at the problem. A very senior AMT investigated; and eventually said he had never seen anything quite like this before. I agreed. I called our ATC Specialist; and he called Center and said they did not have any problems with us.

A B737-300 FMC was unable to track directly toward and over an arrival waypoint even though it indicated that it was going to and over it. ATC stated they off the arrival by five miles at one point.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 93.58; Flight Crew Total 5325.27; Flight Crew Type 1366.03

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft; Weather; Human Factors; Company Policy

While climbing out of approximately 7;500 feet; the aircraft received a lightning strike. Primarily forward left side window heat and primary First Officer side window heat inop illuminated. I flew the aircraft; the First Officer ran the appropriate checklist; contacted Dispatch with a patch through to [Chief Pilot]. The First Officer reviewed all systems pages; all normal. CB (Circuit Breaker) check indicated CB condition unknown for items related to inoperative systems. The crew openly discussed the situation together with [Chief Pilot] and Dispatch and concurred that the aircraft was and enroute weather was safe to continue to destination. Operations were normal and systems operated as expected throughout the remainder of the flight.

Air carrier pilot reported a lightning strike rendered their window heat inoperative; but they were able to continue to their destination.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Upon contact with SGF Approach; the Captain (PM) informed the controller that we were requesting vectors to the ILS 14.The controller cleared us to the SGF VOR and the Captain informed him that we were already cleared direct to the airport; purely as clarification. The controller said something that ended in something like 'do what you want to do' or something to that effect. He eventually started to vector us to a left downwind for the ILS Runway 14. Aircraft Y was in the vicinity as well and was receiving vectors to Runway 14 for a visual. As Aircraft Y passed below us the controller asked if we had the traffic in sight. The captain stated that the traffic was in sight but that we still wanted vectors to the Runway 14 approach. Then the controller stated that the airport was off our left side and that it was clear; essentially questioning our request for an ILS. The captain; professionally restated (yet again) that the airport was in sight behind our left wing and that we wanted vectors to the ILS final approach course. The controller stated something again about the airport being in the clear. At some point the Check Airman utilized the observer seat audio panel to attempt to explain to the controller that a crewmember unfamiliar with an airport is required to utilize an instrument approach procedure as a matter of [company] policy. The controller responded with 'that's not my problem' or something to that effect. The approach and landing were flown without incident and the communications between ATC and our aircraft continued normally from that point forward.The controller's continued reluctance to simply provide the services we requested (vectors to the ILS final on Runway 14). Neither the Captain nor I have operated into SGF recently and both agreed the best course of action was to comply with the FOM regarding operations into unfamiliar airports. The controller displayed an unprofessional attitude toward our simple request. This is a small airport with little traffic at that time of the morning. If the controller was unable to accommodate our request he should have stated such and we could have flown the complete procedure. At no time were we informed that he was unable to provide us with vectors.The ATCs should be reminded that the requests of the crew are paramount and should be accommodated if at all possible. A controller has absolutely no knowledge what particular set of circumstances drives a request. Perhaps it is a required equipment check or a pilot on the initial leg of IOE. The importance of pilot/controller cooperation cannot be understated and in this particular case we were made to feel like our request was unreasonable. The fear is that his continued berating to accept a visual approach and abandon our plan of action had the potential to violate the FOM guidance and increase risk. The controller's radio 'presence' was unprofessional and did not instill confidence in the Air Traffic Control mechanism at SGF.

B757 First Officer reported ATC not acting in a professional way during flight into a non-busy ATC environment. Pilot requested ILS approach and Controller stated several times the location of the airport and that it was in the clear. Pilot went on to describe how ATC needs to comply with pilot requests when able.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 14100; Flight Crew Type 4

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10600; Flight Crew Type 400

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

As we were returning to SJC; Oakland Center gave us Direct TROXX; which I recognized as a waypoint on the SILCN ONE arrival. We pulled the Jeppesen chart up on the Multifunction Display (MFD) to begin our arrival planning. Center asked us for our best forward speed (.68 mach); and we heard other planes being asked to slow for the arrival. While descending but still in the flight levels we were given the SILCN ONE arrival as expected; and told to descend via the arrival.Between SILCN and VLLEY; we were given the 'West transition'. The Jeppesen plate was zoomed in enough that the EAST and West Transition notes were off the screen. Since the transition through BAXBY and APLLE was to the west of the one through GUUYY to KLIDE; we both assumed that was the one we were to take. On the other hand; from previous experience into San Jose; I knew that KLIDE was the normal way to get to RW 31L; which is what we expected. We discussed the situation; and I assumed that we were being taken off the normal arrival because we were slower than the people behind us. Neither of us felt comfortable about this concept and after passing BAXBY we started questioning our choice; especially after hearing the other planes that had been asked to slow down also being given the West Transition. At this point the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) called NORCAL (we'd been transferred to NORCAL earlier) and asked it we should be on the transition to KLIDE or the one to ZORSA. The reply was; of course; the one to KLIDE - NORCAL then gave us direct KLIDE.We could easily have continued on the wrong transition; and followed an inappropriate descent profile as well as the wrong course. In retrospect; we should have clarified the transition question before arriving at VLLEY by asking if the transition was the one through KLIDE or ZORSA; and should have checked the zoom on the arrival chart to make sure we had seen the entire arrival. From a human factors perspective; calling a transition that is on the west side of the chart the EAST Transition; and on the East side of the chart the WEST Transition is asking for problems. And we found them.

RNAV ARRIVAL transitions need to be renamed. This is the 2nd time in one week in training pilots to fly Citations I have had an issue. Is this situation; we were cleared for the SILCN 1 RNAV STAR and told to 'Descend via the Arrival - West Transition'.The Pilot in training is a 15;000 hour pilot with 4 Citation Type Ratings and over 10;000 hours dual given. So you have 2 very seasoned instructor pilots. I was given DUAL to the PiT on RNAV Arrivals using the Garmin G3000 (a new avionics suite to this PiT).Having been given the arrival; we both briefed the plate and noted the two transitions at the bottom of the Jeppesen plate. West Transition for Runways 29;30 -- East Transition for Runways 11;12Here is where the Human Factors element comes into play: If you look at the plate which is in a North Up depiction; one transition (the WEST Transitions) runs up the EAST side of the Arrival and the (EAST Transition) runs up the WEST side of the plate. We went back to ATC and confirmed you wanted us on the 'West Transition'. ATC confirmed this. Therefore we briefing and loaded the EAST TRANSITION which is loaded via selecting the Runway.A contributing factor to this decision making process was: Just days earlier I had been into MEM with a different pilot. This time in a Citation Mustang with Garmin G1000 flight deck. In this situation we planned the NORTH Transition as depicted on the plate however Memphis Center gave us the South Transition. When re-checking with Center about this assignment they acknowledged that the plate said for 9-27 fly the North Transition but they specifically wanted us to fly the SOUTH which we did.Here's our opinion: CHANGE these Transition Names back to the names of the waypoint you want us to fly to. 'Descend via the SILCN ONE RNAV Arrival - KLYDE Transition'. That way there won't be an accident or midair by someone descending on the wrong transition!

CE-525 flight crew landing SJC is cleared via the SILCN1 west transition; which visually is on the East side of the chart causing confusion and the wrong transition to be chosen. One suggests that the transitions should be named after the first fix after the last common fix to eliminate confusion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

During departure taxi at night to 36C in CLT; the taxi surfaces were wet with puddles of water. The glare from the surrounding lights on the water made it difficult to see taxi lines and marking so I taxied especially slow. The Ramp Controller had us holding at spot X for inbound traffic. Then Ramp Control instructed us continue our taxi to spot Y South. The First Officer requested taxi clearance on ground control frequency. The Ground Controller gave us the instructions as follows: 'Aircraft X taxi to Runway 36C via Taxiway Golf; Runway 23; hold short of Taxiway Bravo; contract Ground on 121.8.' The First Officer read the instructions back to the Ground Controller precisely. As I approach Taxiway G; I scanned Runway 23 to my left. The area in that direction was very dark and I did not see any airplanes or airplane lights to indicate that there was another airplane coming from left to right. When I looked in the easterly direction I could see the FBO lights on the east side of the Airport and with that backdrop area looked clear of traffic. I took my attention back to the Taxiway in front of us to enter the center of Taxiway G. I looked right to clear the direction I wanted to turn. As our airplane's nose was abeam the edge of the entry of Runway 23; I looked left again and barely made out Aircraft Y nose. At the same time I saw the airplane; they flashed the light on the nose wheel on and off. I slammed on the brakes and stopped in time not entering the Runway. The Aircraft Y made no attempt to stop and as the airplane passed us at a good rate of speed and it turned off the light on the nose wheel. Also I did not see navigation lights on the wings. The airplane was very dark with not even the logo light on. I set the parking brake and had to take a few minutes to decide if we [were] fine to continue. I told the First Officer to let Ground Control know we were stopped on Taxiway Golf. The Ground Controller was unaware of the issue as he was busy giving airplanes behind us taxi instructions. Once we were able to get a turn on the frequency the First Officer told him we need a minute on Taxiway G. When the Controller asked the reason; I took the radio call and advised him we almost entered Runway 23 when the Aircraft Y on Runway 23 almost abeam Taxiway Golf. He apologized for the mistake and I told him we needed a few more minutes. I needed a few minutes to discuss the event with the First Officer and check on the flight attendants. The First Officer and I discussed that the Aircraft Y probably landed on Runway 36R at approximately XA:45z and received taxi instructions before we were on the frequency. The airplane must of been on Taxiway Charlie or Romeo entering Runway 23 when I looked in that direction the first time. Without the Taxiway light there was very little chance of seeing the airplane in the dark and all the back ground lights obscuring a single navigation light. When we checked on to the ground control frequency I did not hear the Controller speak to a Company X airplane. The Controller interrupted our discussion and the time I needed to speak to the flight attendants. I instructed the First Officer to tell him we needed a few more minutes. I contacted the flight attendants and check on the cabin. They had already called 'secure for takeoff' so they said everything was fine. Afterwards; I told the First Officer to let Ground know we were ready to continue the taxi. We were given the same taxi instructions and the Controller apologized again. On the second ground control frequency I asked if he could get any information on the Aircraft Y and he came back with no information on the airplane as it was an inbound flight. We completed the taxi and prepared for takeoff. The flight was completed without further incident.

Pilot reported a ground conflict with another aircraft during taxi while complying with a taxi clearance at night.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

A787-800 was being prepared for a tow operation out of a hangat to the taxiway due to hangar construction and equipment congestion. The tow bar was attached to [the] 787-800 and a Tow Tractor GT350. The pavement was dry and the B787 had 30;000 pounds of fuel. The wheel chocks were pulled; TTWS active; and entry stair removed. The Tow Tractor parking brake was set and was shutoff. I exited the Tow Tractor to establish cockpit communication. After establishing cockpit communication; the wingwalkers; guideman and I; met at the Tow Tractor. We discussed clearance issues due to hangar construction and that we would not follow the lead out line because of construction equipment. Prior to entering the Tow Tractor; I instructed the taxi crew to release the brakes. Immediately upon release of brakes; the B787 began rolling backwards pulling the Tug with it. A Maintenance Technician noticed the B787 and Tow Tractor moving; entered the Tow Tractor; and brought it to a stop. The aircraft and tug rolled 3 feet before coming to a stop.I strongly feel Company has over rated the GT350's braking capability for wide body aircraft. The mechanical brake on the GT350 may have sufficient holding strength on a flat dry surface; but has proven to fail on a surface with a grade and is not able to hold the aircraft weight. I assume that a Tow Tractor would be able to under any situation provide sufficient braking pressure and prevent an aircraft from rolling.[Procedures Manual] states 'If you get out of the Tow Tractor set the parking brake and turn off the ignition.' Is the intent of that statement only apply when not attached to an aircraft? I feel any Tow Tractor that I use should be capable of stopping an aircraft from moving. The applicability and rating of the GT350 breaking force and stopping force on a grade needs to be reevaluated and updated.

Maintenance Technician reported an unmanned Tow Tractor; coupled to a B787; began rolling on the ramp even though the brakes on the Tow Tractor were set.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

On the ground at MMCU; our handling agent for operating in Chihuahua were tasked with filing a Flight plan to [our destination] to clear customs. I filed the necessary US eAPIS (Electronic Advance Passenger Information System) departure and arrival information and notified customs for landing rights on [two days prior] prior to the flight and then again on [day of the flight] midday to update our arrival time. I received the flight plan form from the agent and upon reviewing it; it was a VFR Flight plan at 13;500 feet. I told him that I needed an IFR Flight plan and that the altitude needed to be at least 17000 feet. He called his operations; made the necessary adjustment; and marked the flight plan type and altitude change on the original form. I called Chihuahua Tower for the clearance and they said that they only had a VFR Flight plan for me. I told them that that was a mistake and that our handler is correcting it to an IFR Flight plan. Moments later; I was given an IFR clearance with all the necessary elements of a typical IFR clearance. We contacted Chihuahua departure with no problem and received the handoff to Monterey Center with no issues. Upon getting close to the border and ALKEM intersection; Monterrey Center terminates our radar and tells us to squawk 1200. We advise him that we are still on an IFR flight plan and need a handoff to Albuquerque Center. Monterey says that they don't normally do that because of the poor radio coverage at our altitude in that area and offers us a telephone number to call.By this time; we're already past ALKEM and crossed the border. We tell him that we need a frequency and Monterrey reluctantly gives one. We contact Center; identify ourselves; our position; and intentions; and he responds that we are only 'one by five' but that he can hear us and has us on radar. We continue to [destination] and cancel IFR; land; and clear customs without issue.Upon further investigation and comments and reviews on numerous sources; this is an ongoing issue with communications between Monterrey and Albuquerque. Monterrey really doesn't seem to care to work on a handoff and Albuquerque doesn't seem to mind that you've crossed the border prior to contacting them. Customs officials on the ground never mentioned anything and when we departed to our next destination and talked with the same Center Controller; he didn't mention anything about it. There should be a different frequency in that area which allows aircraft crossing the border better communications with Center at lower altitudes. It makes for a tense few moments when you're dealing with the indifference of Monterrey Center trying to drop you off without giving you a handoff while in such close proximity to the US border.

A pilot reported the Center in Mexico would not hand him off to the Center in the United States so they had to contact the Center on their own and checked in while already in U.S airspace.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Coming in on a stable approach the student landed on Runway XL and the student landed on the centerline of the runway nicely; but started drifting to the left then I told the student; 'Centerline put in some right rudder' after seeing that the student didn't corrected I told him;' my controls and tried to put the aircraft back on centerline; but couldn't then the air aircraft started to shake from the left side and immediately I realized we have a possible blown out tire and came in to a complete stop. After that I contacted ZZZ Tower and told them that we have a blown out tire and they responded 'Roger are you able exit off the runway.' I responded that we are unable to exit out the runway. Then I told them if I can get a frequency change to contact company and they said approve and report back. Then I contacted flight Supervisor and told them about the situation and he sent out maintenance for us. Then I switched back to Tower and let them know that I contacted company and they are going to send out maintenance. Tower responded; 'Roger; I sent out Airport Operations as well they will be on the way.' Then I asked Tower if I can shutdown the aircraft and evacuated on the runway. Tower responded;'that's approved.' I said; 'Roger we will shutdown the aircraft here and this is our final call.' Then maintenance came by and replace the tire and then after that we taxied back to the ramp.

An instructor reported  during landing rollout his SR20 suffered a tire failure requiring him to take control from his student.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

After starting engines on the ramp; I announced on the CTAF frequency (118.45) that we were taxiing out for takeoff to Rwy 4L (tower closed). I noticed that all airport lights were extinguished; so I activated all lighting on 118.45 using PCL procedures. No vehicular/aircraft traffic was observed on the surface of the airport; and no movements of same were heard on the CTAF. Just prior to taking the selected runway for departure (4L); I announced that we were taking the runway for departure. After brake release; I announced on the CTAF that we were commencing takeoff roll on 4L. All aircraft / taxi lights were on full bright. Just after the aircraft began to accelerate; I heard on the CTAF; 'Airport maintenance one is crossing all airport taxiways/ runways at Baton Rouge; use caution for vehicle.' Apparently this was an inspection vehicle for the airport prior to the tower opening. After the aircraft accelerated through approximately 90 knots; I noticed the silhouette of a vehicle crossing our active runway (4L) right to left approximately 3;000 ft in front of the aircraft; most likely the vehicle was crossing the runway on taxiway G. There was never a conflict with the aircraft and vehicle; and we were airborne well prior to where the vehicle crossed the runway; and the vehicle was clear of the runway when we passed that position.

Light Transport First Officer reported an airport vehicle crossing the departure runway after the crew had announced several times that they were taxiing to and departing from Runway 4L; on the CTAF frequency. The crew had also activated the airport lighting prior to taxi.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

UPDATED FLIGHT CREW REPORT - additional information.  Filed altitude was FL380 with forecasted weather along the route as a wide perpendicular band of convective activity with embedded CBs topping at FL500 over a large area.  The weather band ran roughly diagonal across our course; and we encountered the weather which lasted for about an hour.  The weather radar was set to auto; and the radar painted a wide line of green and yellow extending well beyond the flight path to the left and right.  However; with a off course deviation to the south of up to 30 miles; we were able to transition the band perpendicularly before paralleling it to resume our filed route.  The area we transitioned through (I was the Pilot Flying) was mostly clear of returns with only occasional scattered green; with most of the CB activity off to the sides.  We used the procedure as outlined in the FCOM Boeing Bulletin to scan for CB activity below us.  We used both the manual and auto function of the weather radar; tilting the beam up and down between 0 and +/- 5 to evaluate our route.  Gain was adjusted to assure the clearest path through the line of weather.  Both radar displays were constantly in different modes and ranges to give us the best possible situational awareness.  The course we chose kept us clear of any yellow or red returns; as well as any solid green returns.  We did not transition over any CBs we could detect.  As we transitioned; we experienced continuous light to moderate turbulence and a climb to FL400 was requested and executed.  The TAT was consistent at -27C; SAT around -45C.  No visible moisture; no convective activity directly below us but there was lightning off to the sides in the vicinity of the larger cells.  The only indication we had that is stated in the FCOM Boeing Bulletin was St Elmo's fire - which in itself is not unusual in those kinds of conditions.  There was no indication of rain or visible moisture or any visible airframe icing.  The weather was in no way unusual or out of the ordinary - nothing different to what we operate in; through; or around on a daily basis.  The only difference was the time spent in the weather conditions we encountered.  On 2 different occasions; about 20 minutes apart; we experienced thrust reduction on one engine at a time; first on Engine 2 then later on Engine 4.  On both occasions; lasting approximately 15 seconds; the thrust slowly spooled back to around 60% N1; the EICAS message 'ENGINE 2 (4) THRUST' appeared and then the engines resumed normal thrust.  Both engines performed as expected after the event. The QRH was consulted - but because of the short duration and the quick return to normal operating conditions no pilot action was required.  I personally feel this is an issue that deserves immediate attention. The problem of ice crystal formation and resulting engine thrust reduction (and in some cases resulting in engine shutdown) is well known and documented by Boeing; GE; and the aircraft operators.  This known problem requires an immediate technical fix by the engine/aircraft manufacturer - asking pilots to exit weather conditions that are causal to this is simply unacceptable.  Basically the blame and dealing with the situation is left to the pilot.  As is; this aircraft should not be dispatched into known icing conditions; convective activity; or winter weather systems.  The weather we experienced on this flight were NOTHING unusual or out of the ordinary.  Just the weather any pilot has to deal with while fulfilling his duties.  If we did not fly in conditions as described; we would have to cancel a large proportion of our flights.

During cruise flight at FL380 in the vicinity of convective activity; the crew of a Boeing 747-8F experienced the loss of engine power to about 60% N1 on two separate occasions; on different engines; about 20 minutes apart.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 757; Flight Crew Type 579

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

I was flying the gyroplane north bound over highway; going back to the airport at an altitude of 800 feet MSL; around 70 MPH; and I was probably 4.2 miles from the airport. As I was getting close the gyroplane started moving the nose left and right; my reaction was to lower the engine RPM and slow down; and the nose of the gyroplane stop moving. I continued to go toward the airport; and about a minute later the same movement of the nose going left and right started again but more pronounced. I again reduced the engine power to a lower engine rpm; but this time the nose movement did not stop or slow down; instead started to increase. I decided I would not make it back to the airport safely and made a precautionary landing on the shoreline.

Gyro-copter pilot reported the nose of the aircraft began to move side to side becoming unsafe to fly resulting in an off-airport landing.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 304

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was taxiing from the parking area to the active runway via the Taxiway at 39N [Princeton Airport]. Active was Runway 28. I noticed a car parked on the grass along the runway behind the PAPI lights. As I taxied down I noticed a person runway along the runway with orange cones on the runway. As I taxied down I noticed a white sports like 'race car' approaching me on the taxiway. They veered into the grass as I taxied down and I have to veer steer my aircraft to the right of the taxiway to avoid them passing underneath my wing. As I approached the run up area I noticed two cars; various tripods with equipment and one of the cars was behind the threshold in grass of the active runway with two people outside the car. I stopped at the runway hold short lines; and had to shut down as they weren't moving. I got out of plane and had to explain to them that they have cars; equipment and cones on an active runway. The person said he worked there and had permission from his boss to be there. I had to state repeatedly that I cannot take the runway safely with people; cars; and equipment on the active runway; which they didn't seem to understand. I reviewed showed them the runway hold short lines and reviewed that anything on the runway side of these lines has to be moved. I asked what they would do about an approaching aircraft; he indicated he had a radio- but this airport doesn't technically require radio use to land there. I reviewed what they are doing is dangerous. After they cleared their cars; equipment; cones; and people I was able to start back up and obtain my departure clearance and depart uneventfully. The field was NOT NOTAM'ed closed for race car activity in my briefings. Monitoring CTAF during my previous landing; parking; then later restarting and taxiing did not indicate any of this activity.I should have notified NY Approach Controllers after establishing contact with them but I didn't. The Controller was very busy but it was my mistake not to notify them in hindsight.

Pilot reported airport was being used for car racing without NOTAMs being posted.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was being vectored for the ILS. Tower lighting panel for airport lights was out of service due to a power outage the day before. The airport management decided; in their infinite wisdom; to just have ATC call their representative to have them change the airport lighting when needed. The night airport management person on duty was not properly trained in how to use the lighting panel; and with the visibility dropping rapidly; the runway lights needed to be on step 5. Airport management was unable to turn the lights up to step 5 with the visibility dropping to less than 1/4SM. Their electrician called the tower; and was extremely unhelpful and obstructive. Luckily the medevac was able to land safely.Airport management and their electrician are NOT reliable when it comes to having control of airport lighting. They are not properly trained; and when weather moves in like this; they cannot be relied upon to make the changes to the airport lighting in a timely manner. This cannot go on [further] while we wait for a new lighting panel to be acquired and installed. It extremely unsafe.

Eugene air traffic control Tower operator reported Tower lighting panel out of service; hindering IFR operations.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

BTR was LIFR [Low Instrument Flight Rules]; VV002 and Vis was 1/4. Aircraft Y was taxied to RWY13 via Echo--Bravo without issue. Aircraft X was taxied to RWY 13 using the same route. The Ground Controller kept Aircraft X on a short leash and issued multiple hold short and reporting instructions. Aircraft X was first told to hold short of Bravo. Aircraft X reported holding short of Bravo and was told to make a left onto Bravo and hold short of RWY 22L at Bravo. Ground Control received the crossing from me (Local Controller) and crossed Aircraft X across RWYs 22L and 22R; and Aircraft X reported across RWY 22R. Aircraft Y called ready at [Runway] 13. I instructed Aircraft Y to hold short of [Runway] 13 and stated I wanted to verify the position of another aircraft one more time. Ground Control confirmed that Aircraft X was established on Bravo. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. After Aircraft Y departed; Aircraft X reported that he was sitting at Echo/Echo 1. In order for Aircraft X to be at Echo/Echo 1; Aircraft X never made the turn onto Bravo and never crossed the parallel runways; but crossed the active; RWY 13; [which] Aircraft Y departed from. The Ground Controller issued a Brasher Warning and taxied Aircraft X to RWY 22R since that would be the easiest/closest runway to depart from.BTR has had multiple issues with incursions. As part of the LSC [Local Safety Council] that just got updated; [it] recommended to the airport that their vehicle/mower operator numbers be simplified; which they did. [Also]; on each controller's birth month; each controller gets an airfield tour by Airport Ops. We received word from AJI [Safety and Technical Training] [that] we did everything that we could have to prevent this; yet it still happened. The pilot never admitted that they were lost. They lied to the Ground Control when they reported being on the expected taxiway at least 3 times. The pilot needs to be held to the same standard that we are and at a minimum; needs to have their license suspended. I would recommend going through ground school again. It is the weekend warrior that has posed the most danger.Since BTR is in the Top 5 for [Runway] incursions; I would recommend ASDE [Airport Surface Detection Equipment] as well; [I'm] not holding my breath. I would also recommend 'wig wags' at every intersection and in-ground flashing lights at every intersection. During our LSC discussions; it has been stated that we are lucky that we haven't knocked somebody out of the sky. This was by far the closest I have ever come and it wasn't because of something that we did as controllers.

Reported stated same information as reported and would like to see some input/help from the FAA as this is a Top 5 airport; [reporter thought] for runway incursions. Reporter would like equipment as requested in report for the airport.

BTR Tower Controller reported a runway incursion due to weather and pilot not following correct taxi instructions which could have ended in a disaster.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Flight was normal until approximately 60 miles before top of descent. While trying to write down a position report I noticed the control column freely moved fore and aft. Range of travel was approximately 8 inches. It felt like it wasn't attached to anything. We had both heard of similar events. My First Officer's input was that they talked about this in training and Boeing said not to disconnect the autopilot in this situation. My recollection of a similar event years ago on a B767. In that event freezing precipitation was the issue. The autopilot was flying the airplane normally. We talked about our options and decided it was best to leave the autopilot on and descend to a lower altitude using very deliberate and slow inputs so as to not disturb autopilot operation. Our hope was that the condition would improve as we descended. We consulted the QRH but there was no procedure commensurate with our problem. Contacted ATC then I called dispatch; and told them we needed an immediate patch to Maintenance. After some initial communication problems with them; Maintenance informed me that he had never heard of a problem like this. Therefore with no guidance we kept working the problem by descending slowly and leaving the autopilot on. I called the flight Attendants and told them about our issue; asked them to do their 30 second review; and gave them the TEST items. We told ATC that we need time to get down and continue working the problem. We asked for the ILS. The situation was slowly improving as we descended. Going through FL300 not much. But in the mid 20s some improvement; but still not normal. We overflew the final course on a southerly heading and later asked for a turn out to the west and and a minimum 20 mile final. When descending through 11;000 and trying to turn westerly we dropped into CWS and we could not recover any flight director modes. Heading select wouldn't work; resetting the flight directors didn't help. I elected to take it out of CWS as I could feel elevator authority now. Elevator still felt soft. We turned a long final and slowly; very deliberately; configured the aircraft. As we got closer I had confidence that the elevator was going to work fine. I elected to land flaps 30 and we landed with a soft touchdown and no further issues. My First Officer and cabin crew did a fantastic job and were true professionals; calm and collected in the face of adversity.It is my understanding this is the second such event. I would hope that Boeing comes up with an explanation and a procedure to fix or avoid it; and a checklist to deal with it.

The reporter states that Boeing is aware of the problem and that it is caused by different shrinkage rates of the B737NG fuselage and the elevator control cables. In this case the aircraft was at FL410 with an OAT of minus 65 degrees C.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B737-800 flight crew report discovering in cruise that their control column can be moved freely about eight inches fore and aft; without disturbing the autopilot or producing elevator movement. The flight continued to destination with the autopilot engaged. During a turn at 11;000 feet the autopilot becomes disengaged and cannot be reengaged. Although the elevator felt soft the Captain is able to manually land the aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

THSA (Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Assembly) Master Spline threaded bushing    (G1) was found missing safety wire during unrelated THSA general visual inspection. See AMM 27-44-00-710-001-A for safety wire installation requirements and Figure 27-44-00-991-00300-A test procedure of jamming simulation tool: Sheet 1. See log page XXXXXXX. This safety wire is removed and installed during THSA jamming tests; usually scheduled with some A checks. There is an  inspection of the installed safety wire on the task card.

A320 technician reported required safety wire missing on THSA master spline threaded bushing discovered during an unrelated general visual inspection.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On climbout; strong burning/acrid fumes burned my eyes and throat and I started coughing and could not breathe. Passengers also could smell the strong fumes. I donned a portable 02 bottle and strapped into the empty jumpseat Number 3. I told the Number 1 that I was incapacitated. This was a Fume event. This is a very serious issue and makes crew incapacitated. The Number 1 and the Captain also smelled the fumes.FAA needs to fine airlines thousands of dollars every time a fume event is found. Potential irreversible brain and physical disabilities could occur because of smelling toxic TCP (Tricresyl Phosphate) fumes from the engine oil.

EMB-190 Flight Attendant reported fume event had incapacitated them during initial climb.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 83; Flight Crew Total 296; Flight Crew Type 11

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During cruise; a smoke smell was detected. We attempted to trace the smell and quickly found smoke to be coming out of the foot wells. We proceeded to descend to the nearest airport where we found oil spattered inside of the cowling. The local Mechanic traced the leak to the oil filter which was installed by a different Mechanic who we contracted for a pre-buy. The Mechanic in question had used a pair of pliers to torque the oil filter; punching a small hole in the exterior which started leaking in flight and dripping on the heater; creating the smoke. The local Mechanic fixed our issue with a new oil filter and we proceeded to our destination the following day.

GA pilot reported the oil filter was installed improperly and caused smoke in the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 209; Flight Crew Total 4780; Flight Crew Type 3906

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

We were arriving into ORD on the VEECK arrival. We were level at 11;000 ft. about 8.5nm south of CLUSO intersection. As we were receiving instructions from ATC; I was heads up and saw a black object on the horizon approaching. At first; I thought it was a mylar balloon; but as it approached; I could easily see that it was irregular in shape. As it came closer; it was clearly an unmanned aircraft. It was all black; and multi-rotor. It passed our left wing at our altitude. It was difficult to determine how far away it was; but couldn't have been more than 1;000 ft. away due to the details I could see. It was likely closer than that. The Captain was heads down at the time; and on the radio; and didn't see the [object]. She reported it to ATC. We didn't call it a NMAC at that moment; but probably should have. We were busy with ATC instructions for heading; altitude; and airspeed changes. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully.

B737 pilot reported sighting a drone while on the VEECK arrival into O'Hare airport at 11;000 feet.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

While descending on the 25R into LAX crossing LYCOM fix at 10;500'; we [experienced] a near miss from a small single-engine aircraft that appeared to be a Piper Cherokee type. TCAS was functioning normally and did not alert us of any conflict. We believe the aircraft was not in compliance with ADS-B requirements. Our descending path took us underneath the small aircraft; missing by less than 300'. His starting position was to our left and below moving slowly to our right above. We cleared conflict below and to his left. We queried LAX Approach Control about the aircraft. They had no target on their screen of any kind and they don't believe he was in radio contact with any controlling agency. Our track was on the ILS on profile tracking 235 from CRCUS and turning to 251 track crossing LYCOM. His track appeared to be between 270-290 degrees. Once we were at a lower altitude; Control allowed us a side step visual to 24R and flight landed successful with no further incident.

Air carrier Captain reported an NMAC with a light aircraft on approach to LAX.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Training / Qualification; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Workload

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

I was the Instructor at the time of this incident. We had a Handoff/Assist positon. Aircraft X was level at 35000 feet deviating slightly left of course for weather. Aircraft Y was slow climbing out of 33000 feet to 37000 feet. Aircraft X was indicating approximately 460 knots groundspeed with Aircraft Y indicating 375-380 knots. Aircraft Y was approximately 6 miles diagonally behind Aircraft X. Vector lines also concurred with this; showing that they would be 6 miles apart in 1 or 2 minutes. I assessed this situation and agreed with what the vector lines and ground speeds were showing. Consistent to my training; Aircraft Y should pass directly behind at 6 miles from Aircraft X. As Conflict Alert activated; my trainee was working on another issue south of this situation which my trainee resolved.He looked at this situation. I told him to turn Aircraft Y 20 degrees right of course to run behind Aircraft X. As Aircraft Y was climbing through 34100 feet the trainee asked me if he should descend him back down to 34000 feet. I told him 'no'; as this instruction would induce confusion with the pilot and would not solve the conflict possibly causing him to speed up more by the time it's finally understood. Aircraft Y passed behind Aircraft X at 4.93 miles; resulting in a loss between the two aircraft. I take responsibility for my actions; and admit that I misread the situation. During this entire event; the sector had a full En route Decision Support Tool (EDST) and the sector's Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) number was at the original number of 18. The actual value was borderline to this number; at 17-18 the whole time. Future 15 minute increments were showing red. This MAP value does not change when there's weather; which I believe is a safety issue as it lulls people into a false sense of security. Based on that logic; we can work the same amount of planes with 100% weather as if we had 0 weather. There was a significant line of weather developing causing numerous deviations and frequency congestion. The volume of traffic for this sector was significant even without the weather in the north side of the sector. Routes were closed to our northeast; and then reopened; which resulted in a significant increase of over flights to our sector. The Q routes were closed; which resulted in aircraft going over a fix that would have normally exited our sector significantly faster. Throughout this whole event; no Traffic Management Issues (TMI) were applied to our sector to reduce the traffic volume; and help alleviate our congestion. The Supervisor recognized how complex that it was; and said 'If you need help; your tracker is right behind you; just grab him.' He was looking out for the situation; whereas Traffic Management Unit (TMU) failed to help our sector from becoming too complex. Compounding the situation; both the trainee and I were 'assigned to duties' since XA00. This occurred 2 hours and 17 minutes without being offered a break away from the operational area.. We both were plugged in for approximately 30 minutes; took a 30 minute break; and went to our mandated team training. From XA00-XB00; we were in our mandated briefing and training; and then told to report to the floor. We were plugged in at this sector from XB00 to XC55; a 1 hour and 55 minute plugin; but being assigned to duties for more than 2 hours and 55 minutes without a mental break or rest. Supervisors in the area do not believe that 'being assigned to training' is the same as being plugged in at a sector; but both are mentally taxing. I believe that I was not as responsive as I would have been within the first hour; even two hours; of working this sector. I believe that this length of plug in negatively affected the trainee's decision making as well.Throughout the whole summer; we are forced to push aircraft through small gaps in extreme precipitation and convective activity. Unfortunately; this is an example of that. Because of this; workload greatly increases exponentially in the sector as aircraft are deviating that normally we can run parallel; and they're dangerously close to convective weather activity. There continue to be no plans to fix this; or change this; we just continue to run aircraft through the weather until something terrible happens.I would require that the MAP value changes to reflect the current conditions in the sector; as required by the Order. We currently do not do this. As such; when the sector is borderline RED or Yellow TMU should have to advise the supervisor what actions they have taken in order to resolve it. If the sector is already inundated with weather; the more significant the plans should be in order to alleviate it. For example; once some of the routes opened back up in this case; they could have offered the routes to about 10 aircraft; which would have significantly reduced the workload in this sector at the time of the incident. Additionally; when there is weather; especially developing lines of severe weather; as this was; plans should be drawn up on how they will change the departures as the weather progresses. This should be done at TMU and at the management level; so that the sector team; who is already extremely inundated with problems; does not have to worry about this. All they have to do is turn around and tell a Supervisor; 'Hey this isn't working; what's the next plan?' Currently; this happens; and then it's up to the sector team to devise a new plan. If the opposite was true; then the following aircraft could already be executing the next few plans; without sector overload.We routinely get away from the idea of keeping aircraft away from severe weather; instead; we run aircraft as close as 3 or 4 miles away from heavy precipitation as seen in the situation above with BOTH Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. When weather is developing; we need to move our traffic away from the precipitation to the recommended 20 miles. Aircraft should not be allowed to depart on routes that take them less than that separation (20 miles) to the weather. If they deviate that direction; that is their choice; but we are setting ourselves up for failure by letting them depart on routes that are filed through areas of extreme precipitation and convective activity. I would also suggest significantly briefing supervisors on fatigue requirements; and the mental impairment caused when controllers are on position/assigned duties for more than 2 hours. The cognitive process breaks down; and results in judgment errors that normally wouldn't happen when the controller is fully rested.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Air Traffic Controller and trainee reported a loss of separation between aircraft deviating for weather.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 1130; Flight Crew Type 750

I decided to do some practice approaches with my safety pilot. I got gas at ZZZ1 and it was a direct line from there for the approach into ZZZ so I did that one first. I got the weather; which was favoring the opposite direction; and changed to the advisory frequency. Another airplane announced that it was on the the approach for Runway XX but was farther out than we were. I announced that I was on the approach for Runway XY and would break off early. There was a lot of chatter on the radio both at ZZZ and at other airports that shared that frequency. We heard someone else mention Runway XX but couldn't make out what they were doing. I broke off the approach at about 800 ft. and 2 miles from the end of the runway as I knew I'd be far from the aircraft on the opposite approach. That's when my safety pilot saw the near miss plane that had departed Runway XX at some point. We never heard them announce taking off or on upwind and they did not show up on ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast). We immediately turned left for the missed but were past them by that point. After we passed them and announced the missed; the pilot of the other aircraft said something on the radio that I couldn't make out.Contributing factors were me continuing an approach in the wrong direction longer than I should have given the heavy chatter on the radio. The other aircraft was also not announcing enough or not announcing correctly or getting stepped on by other chatter or otherwise unintelligible. Another contributing factor was the other aircraft not having ADS-B Out installed. It wasn't required there but it would have greatly helped avoid the near miss. Given that we did hear another mention of Runway XX; I should have asked for their position since I didn't hear it the first time. In the future; I will break off opposite direction approaches much sooner when there is other traffic in the vicinity.

A pilot on final approach to a non towered airport reported a near miss with an aircraft departing the opposite direction runway.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were flying Aircraft X to ZZZ. The FO (First Officer) was flying. We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway XX. We were on a wide left downwind. The FO wanted to intercept final outside the final approach fix of ZZZZZ since we had the RNAV GPS for Runway XX loaded in the FMS as a backup. We were VFR and in sight of the rising terrain and Tower to the South/Southeast of the field. The Autopilot was on and the FO had flown downwind a little more than needed at 2;300 feet MSL and I was about to tell him to turn base; when I saw him start his turn. Just as we were starting our Base leg turn; Tower informed us of a low altitude alert and that we were below the minimum vector altitude and to check altitude. I replied that we were turning our base leg and had everything in sight. ATC didn't say anything else. We never received any EGPWS warnings of any kind. We then intercepted final and landed without incident.The FO flew an extended downwind; that caused us to enter an area that ATC determined we were too low for.Suggestions - Keep the visual pattern closer to the airport.

CRJ-200 Captain reported that the First Officer conducted a wide approach; entering an area with rising terrain that caused ATC to issue a low altitude alert. The First Officer elected to continue the approach to landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 2495; Flight Crew Type 1206

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 531; Flight Crew Type 531

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On a beautiful VMC day was on the ZZZZZ arrival for the FMS Visual Approach X XXR.  LNAV/VNAV path. Approaching ZZZZZ was given the third of three large speed reductions.  Slowed prior to ZZZZZ1 to 230 then slowed to 210. Still able to remain on path.  Inside of ZZZZZ2 told to further slow to 180 cleared for the FMS.  The last speed change was too close to ZZZZZ to cross at 7;000 and 180.  The pilot flying had not flown in 85 days and was slow to recognize I was slow at requesting relief for altitude at ZZZZZ and slow advocating max allowable flaps.  The PF had flaps 5 set and max speed brakes applied trying to slow and go down. We crossed ZZZZZ at 180 but at approximately 7;400.

While on descent into ZZZ on ZZZZZ arrival we were ask several times to slow and descend at same time which left us high crossing ZZZZZ. We were in VNAV path and everything was working fine. About 5 miles before ZZZZZ we were asked to slow to 210 knots and that made us high crossing ZZZZZ.

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an altitude deviation while crossing an arrival fix.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Found in all cargo bays; all smoke detectors had been sprayed with an oily unknown substance and was seen while inspecting the cargo areas of the forward; aft and bulk. Nothing was said about them not working only that they had been sprayed with oily unknown substance and the concern was that this could cover the screens which could compromise the particles from entering the photoelectric sensing chamber.Knowing that with the blockage of particles being able to enter; a fire or excessive heat with oily/dust blocking the labyrinth can cause a delay or total failure of the smoke detectors.This was seen while doing a visual inspection of the cargo bays that all the smoke detectors had spray over them. [Component Maintenance Manual] states how to clean the detector when the external detector requires cleaning. I never said anything about the detector not working but the sign off was an operational test checking if they worked; and the [Component Maintenance Manual] of a GVI (General Visual Inspection) of the smoke detectors which is what was written up in the first place and was of concern. The manufacture states that cleaning or replacement of the smoke detector; nut neither was accomplished with the sign off only a test and a visual of all 29 smoke detectors having nothing on them. The ceilings and walls of all the cargos have an oily substance sprayed on them; with spray also on the nozzles for the discharge extinguishers and ceiling lights as well.                                                                                So again; my concern is that if the cargo bays are being sprayed with an oily unknown substance and this is covering the screens of the smoke detectors with the use of a optic circuit to detect smoke particles which pass through a mesh screen which has now been covered with an oily spray and not cleaned per Component Maintenance Manual. They might be able to pass a test because they are testing the electrical end of the circuit-- but I'm concerned that the smoke detectors that are using two different wavelengths of light to note smoke particles will not be able to analyze properly with the detectors covered and not being cleaned per the manufacturer's instructions.

Maintenance Technician found smoke detectors in cargo bays covered with oily substance.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 614; Flight Crew Type 75

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

My student and I were turning base to final when my student was cleared for the touch and go and the Tower told us to make right traffic after touch and go. My student read back the landing clearance and did not read back right traffic. I came over the radio and read back the remainder of the call for right traffic to be made. I was talking to my student the whole way down to landing. I was talking a lot to them as they were putting in too much crosswind correction. They were a little behind the aircraft; so I was helping. Upon takeoff we cleaned everything up and took off and incidentally made a mistake and turned left traffic. We did not realize the mistake that had been made until after we were midfield left downwind. Tower did not say anything; nor were we that close to any airplanes (nothing that isn't close for a normal traffic pattern where training is being done). The student and I both should have realized that we needed to turn right traffic after we were clear of the departure end and we were at least 500 ft. off the ground. From now on as an instructor; I will be making taking more precaution to be more aware and to make the correct decisions. I instill in all of my students to ask if you are not sure; do not do something that could potentially put you in a bad situation. I let this moment slip. I will take it and learn from it.

Reporter had no additional information to note.

Cessna 152 Flight Instructor reported they made closed traffic in the wrong direction.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Flight was uneventful until executing the localizer XXL approach into ZZZ.  It was Night VMC with a marine layer over the entire airport. Descending between 5000 ft. and 4600 ft. three Yellow Caution Messages suddenly appeared. After a few seconds; I instructed my First Officer to let ZZZ Tower know we needed to abort the approach due to caution messages.Tower instructed us to hold our altitudes; I proceeded to clean up the a/c; then the Tower vectored us around and finally transferred [us] over to Approach [Control]. First Officer advised ATC and Flight Attendants of our situation. At this time A/C was responding to all inputs accordingly; I transferred controls to First Office so I could reference the QRH.I decided to address the autopilot trim nose down first which stated to disengage the autopilot; re engage and monitor (AUTO 5). Prior to  following the procedure; I advised FO that there might be a heavy forward force pushing the yoke (as it was stated in QRH). After disconnecting the autopilot there was a very pronounced forward pitch which jerked the A/C very aggressively. FO countered the pitch down and I assisted him in trimming a/c until he was able to fine tune the trim. After we reengaged autopilot both Trim Caution messages disappeared however the Elevator Split still remained. Again A/C appeared to fly normally and follow inputs accordingly.At that moment; I conveyed to FO and company that we were diverting to ZZZ1 due to the caution message; better weather and not knowing how a/c would react again after disengaging the autopilot to land.  Additionally; the company Dispatch advised weather was clear at ZZZ1. Flight Attendants and passengers were briefed regarding my decision.We monitored our IECAS flight control page as we flew to ZZZ1 and all controls appeared normal. As we approached ZZZ1; I decided to advise ATC as a precautionary measure since I wasn't sure how the a/c would handle after disengaging the autopilot. Before landing we reviewed again the QRH and it stated to disengage autopilot; slow down below 200 kts. and 20 degrees of flaps. Furthermore; I requested a long final for runway XYR in order to prepare for any unexpected movements.  I took over controls at this point to execute the landing and fortunately A/C controls functioned as normal. The Brace Command was not requested.My only suggestion I can think about is that aircraft should always be returned to service ONLY after a flight check has been completed.  Especially after such a drastic movement has been experienced from a flight crew.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported an autopilot malfunction with accompanying split elevator that resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 300

While practicing landings at ZZZ airfield.  A landing gear strut cover detached in flight (plastic covering weight approximately 1lb.).   We were in the pattern two separate times from XA22 local - XB00 local and XB50-XC22 local. The aircraft stayed with in 3.0 NM radius of the airfield and north of the centerline of ZZZ during its pattern operations. The aircraft is a [UAS].Neither the [visual observer] or crew witnessed the part departure. Discovery of the strut cover departed during flight was not noticed until shutdown and post landing inspection.

Fixed wing UAS was conducting a training flight when a small portion the UAS fell off the airframe.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Dispatch

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

There was no PDC available in [originating airport]; so we sent Dispatch a message asking about it. Both pilots copied the clearance and confirmed to planned international destination. Route was 108 miles shorter than original; and fuel and time enroute still checked good. On the ground; I asked Dispatch if we needed a full route and answer was no (as per 100+ change). After departure; on climb out; we were handed off of NY Center to NY Radio. Also on the climbout; we got a message from Dispatch telling us not to go over the 'WATRS NY area.' NY Radio gave us an HF frequency to do a radio check. We realized that they were requiring us to have HF on board; so we called NY Center back to tell her we needed a new route. We were out of her coverage area; so she asked another aircraft to relay for us on 121.5 while she was working on a new route. We made communications with that aircraft who told us to use 123.45 so we wouldn't congest 121.5. Another aircraft also was on board to help us relay. I asked the relaying aircraft to see if he could get us direct ILM and back on original course when we were over ROLLE and his response was 'no; they want you to stay on course; they are working on something for you.' It took 340 miles to finally get a clearance. We were told to contact MIA Center on 123.67 20 miles from SUMRS. A pilot I had flown with 2 weeks prior was deadheading on my flight to bring return flight. I asked him to come into cockpit because it was difficult to listen to 121.5 and 123.45 and talk to him on interphone. He had flown this flight before and was used for advice and help and an extra set of eyes. Since this appears to be a reoccurring issue and the company is aware of ATC giving clearance out over ocean; it would be helpful to have something written in remarks section of the release. ATC in [originating airport] needs to be aware that we are not able to accept those routes. I should have confirmed reroute with chart and dispatch before leaving.

A319 crew took off without the required operating HF radio for the planned route. Crew obtained a modified clearance from ATC with routing that precluded the HF radio requirement.