Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

My crew and I kept this aircraft for the entire day (4 legs) of flying; terminating with this leg.  On our initial leg with the aircraft on climb out there was a lot of unusual wind noise after gear retraction.  It almost sounded like the gear were still extended; but all of the indicators stated that the gear had retracted successfully.  I began to suspect that the nose gear doors had not closed properly during gear retraction; but there is no way to verify this from the cockpit in flight and no indication to confirm my suspicion; so after discussing with the first officer; we requested a fly by of the tower to confirm.  Tower confirmed that the nose gear doors were open.  There was no procedure indicated in the manual for the situation; so after reviewing the QRH and discussing it with the first officer; we decided to cycle the gear.  We slowed to 190 kts and cycled the gear; which successfully resolved the issue.  We continued the flight.  Upon landing; we queried maintenance as to how we should handle the write up; and after a brief wait; they informed us that it wasn't necessary to write it up because there was no indication in the cockpit and the problem had resolved itself.  We continued flying the aircraft for two more legs without further incident.  Upon retracting the gear on climb out on our 4th and final leg of the day; we again experience the continued wind noise after gear retraction.  Suspecting that again the nose gear doors were still open; we were still at 180 kts on the climb out; we cycled the gear and the nose gear doors closed without further incident.  Upon landing at the conclusion of the flight; I phoned maintenance to ask about the write up; explaining everything I've written above.  Again the maintenance personnel said that it wasn't really necessary to write it up; because the problem had resolved and there was no indication for it; and that writing it up would 'put the airplane down' because they would have to send people and equipment to trouble shoot and try to reproduce the issue; but that ultimately it was my decision what I wanted to do.  After further discussion we decided I would not write it up.I placed too much confidence in the advice given by maintenance control in both cases.  I let the pressure to remain on time and avoid possibly delaying our flights or subsequent flights cloud my judgment about the best course of action. If a maintenance issue occurs; even if the problem has fixed itself by the time we are able to contact maintenance; write it up so that a history can be built and at least there is awareness of a possible problem.  Don't allow the pressure to be on time or avoid disrupting an aircraft's schedule influence the decision of whether or not something should be written up.

An EMB145 Captain experiences failure of the nose gear doors to close after gear retraction on takeoff. The gear is cycled and the doors close. After landing Maintenance is queried about a write up and it is suggested that none is required and none is made. After two more legs are flown without incident the doors remain open on the fourth leg and are closed by cycling the gear. Again no logbook entry is made.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

At the Leonn sector 29;  I took radar on Aircraft X that was on a vector but then cleared back to MAYOS intersection; descending to FL240.  Maybe two minutes later; I had radar on Aircraft Y; which was direct MAYOS; also descending to FL240 out of about FL253.  To be honest; I'm  not quite sure I took the hand off on Aircraft Y or if I auto acquired that aircraft.  At this point; Aircraft X was cleared direct MAYOS; descending to FL240; which would have been head on with Aircraft Y; descending to the same altitude; cleared to the same fix; had I not cleared Aircraft X direct to ROYOS intersection. At this point; I may have auto acquired Aircraft Y; which had a 100 knot overtake as both aircraft are on the same path of flight.  I then turned Aircraft Y; 20 degrees right and turned Aircraft X; 20 degrees left and expedited the descent.  During this time W32 violated sector 33's airspace with aircraft on vectors that were not pointed out and an aircraft descending to FL240 was in conflict with an aircraft in sector 33's airspace; level at FL240; which the controller had to climb to FL260 to maintain positive separation.   After the aircraft were positively separated; I got the necessary spacing and in trail for CLT arrivals and continued sequencing the rest of the CLT arrivals.I recommend that ZDC maintain positive separation of aircraft; before initiating hand offs with sector 29.

ZTL Controller reports while trying to separate two aircraft another Center violates airspace which distracts the ZTL Controller.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 3800

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I had just completed a photography site in Patuxent River's restricted area R4007 that was pre-coordinated earlier in the day with no incident. This was my third visit to this location over several weeks and was turned away on two previous occasions. Upon completion of the work; I requested a west bound departure from their area with a climb to 3;000 feet. A while later Patuxent Approach terminated my flight following and I proceeded to circumnavigate what I thought was the DCA SFRA. I had my GPS zoomed in to a very large scale during the photography [mission] and saw what I thought was the DCA speed restriction ring depicted on it. My particular GPS depicts three rings; the speed restriction zone; the SFRA zone and FRZ ring. Because I was zoomed in so much I mistakenly assumed I was entering the speed restriction ring when in fact I was entering the SFRA ring. About the time I realized this I heard a call on 121.5 which was directed at me at which time immediately turned 90 degrees left to exit the SFRA. I believe I penetrated the SFRA about 1-2 miles.I rarely have a need to fly within the southeast region of the SFRA due to all of the restricted areas and although I had a DCA terminal area chart in the plane; I relied on the depiction on the GPS instead of verifying my position early enough on the TAC. I make no excuse for my inadvertent entry into the SFRA and in the future will verify my position on the TAC prior to further navigation with the GPS. I also completed the required course 'Navigating the New DC ADIZ' several years ago which further ads to my embarrassment over the inadvertent pilot deviation.

The pilot of a C-182 departing westbound following a photographic mission within R4007 over Patuxent River NAS inadvertently entered the DCA SFRA believing the GPS displayed arc represented only the DCA speed restricted area.  He exited immediately upon ATC challenge.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 177; Flight Crew Type 7780

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Just after takeoff from Runway 01L at SFO; the Tower Controller told us; 'Left turn to PORTE; climb to one five thousand; contact Departure.' I thought that seemed like an odd clearance from Tower; but the First Officer had already switched to Departure. I verified with the First Officer that the Tower had indeed cleared us left to PORTE; started the turn; and asked him to confirm our clearance with Departure. Departure told us to turn left heading 280 and climb to one five thousand. The Departure Controller asked if Tower had given us that clearance. We said yes and he asked what were the words that the Tower Controller used. He then said that was the second time that morning that a crew said they had [received] that clearance and started an early turn. The flight continued uneventfully with no known conflicts. Knowing that was a strange clearance; I feel we should have remained on the published departure and queried the Tower before changing frequencies. Our workload at that critical phase and the fact that the Tower frequency was congested added to the confusion. We are still not sure if the Tower cleared us left to PORTE or used non-standard terminology to clear us left to join the departure. If the Tower wanted us to turn left to join the SFO R350 to SEPDY and remain on the departure; he should have used standard terminology.

We were cleared for takeoff at SFO on 1L on a PORTE Departure. At approximately 500 feet AGL; SFO Tower told us; 'Left turn direct PORTE; climb and maintain 15;000 feet; contact NorCal on 135.1.' I (Pilot Monitoring) thought that was weird; and the Pilot Flying and I looked at each other. When I checked in with NorCal; I told them '1;500 feet for 15;000 feet left turn direct PORTE.' They asked us to roll out on 280 heading and then asked us if we were given that clearance. I read back to him the exact clearance that is mentioned above. He said that was the second time that SFO Tower had given that clearance. Preventative Measures: We complied with a valid ATC clearance. Even though it was unusual; that directive could have been issued to keep us out of conflict with something that we didn't know about. I believe we used good communications skills with NorCal when we checked in to let him know what we were doing since it was a 'out of the ordinary' clearance that we had been given.

Air carrier departing SFO on Runway 1L was confused with regard to the phraseology used by the Tower Controller and the intent of same.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 10620; Flight Crew Type 3915

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was the pilot monitoring. Departing on the CONNR3 SID. Approximate position was HURDL fix at approximately 9;000 feet. We experienced a very bright flash from our right (north). Within a few seconds my right eye started a burning; achy type of sensation. I was not looking directly at the source but it was more of a glancing blow. I thought the eye ache would quickly dissipate like in a camera flash event. I was still able to see and focus to perform duties. I reported the illumination to ATC. We completed the flight but unfortunately the eye irritation was still present.

A B737 First Officer reported suffering eye irritation after being struck by a laser while departing DEN.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While en route to ZZZ1 I was told via ACARS to contact Crew Scheduling. After I finished my post flight duties; I contacted Crew Scheduling; I accepted notification that the following day my dead head had been changed. Upon arriving in ZZZ I was to have a 6 hour ground time with a day room. While enroute I connected to the inflight WiFi to check the status of my day room but the connection was slow. Once we arrived into ZZZ I deplaned and went to find coffee and food since there want not much available in ZZZ1 and my overnight had been cut short by 5 hours. That was the sixth change to my schedule since the previous day. While in the airport waiting to order; I hear my name announced over the public address system to report to gate. Once at the gate I asked the agent what was going on. She was unaware of the announcement and not sure what was going on. I pulled my phone out of my bag and saw that I have 4 messages from Crew Scheduling. Once I called; I was told that they had changed my schedule; AGAIN. For a SEVENTH time in two days. When was this change made? Some time that day? How did they retry to tell me? By calling my phone which was in airplane mode and in my bag where it should be while at work. They tried to make this my problem that they were unable to get ahold of me though a non approved means once I am checked in for my trip. I told them that I would take this matter up with the union and hung up. At no point was I told what flight I was supposed to operate or any other details telling me anything about the changes. It turns out that it was a flight that had already boarded and was now delayed 30 minutes. This shift of blame to me and the seventh change in 2 days added greatly to the distraction. This addition pushed me to near max [duty period] and flight time for the day. This was after a near min rest overnight that I was not prepared for. The hotel while normally not an issue had several loud guests that night and I was awoken at least twice by noise. These constant changes and shift of responsibilities and moving from AM to PM shift and back was fatiguing. While no negative consequences came from this. The distraction and fatigue were noticeable by my final leg into ZZZ2.What ever is happening is Crew Scheduling was predictable. These flights didn't come from nowhere. These are predicted trips that were not filled with normal line coverage. Every single reserve pilot was used. As a company; we need a better way of covering scheduled events. This was chaos for those on reserve and line holders with constant changes for everyone. The philosophy of reserve is to bridge gaps in coverage left by unforeseen events; sick calls; mechanical issues; timed out crews not just covering flights that weren't bother to be staffed before hand.

Air carrier Captain reported being given multiple schedule changes in a short period of time; which caused fatigue and distraction.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 39; Flight Crew Total 1840; Flight Crew Type 1072

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

-Aircraft X departed ZZZ1 for ZZZ2 for a fuel stop with one pilot and one passenger.-When we departed ZZZ1; there was a line of thunderstorms across [our flight path] with multiple gaps.-When enroute; I requested routing over ZZZ3 where aircraft were flying through a gap in the storms. I confirmed with ATC there was a gap and planes were getting through. -I requested a climb from FL360 to FL400 to top any weather we may incur.-We saw 3 or 4 lightning strikes around us before the event below; but radar was clear ahead and had only needed to deviate right for a cell to our south.-When we were halfway over the line of weather; in the tops; there was a loud vibration in one of the engines that lasted for approximately 10-20 seconds. I couldn't tell which engine. It happened again with a corresponding red ITT gauge indicating 881 degrees on the Left engine and received an Engine Exceedance CAS. I pulled the thrust levers back half way.-Being at FL400; a TAT of -48 C (best recollection); and no ice on the wing; I didn't think it could be ice; but turned on the engine heat in case. We were never in the clouds below FL400.-Very shortly after turning on the heat; the vibration happened again with ITT Red on both engines; an Engine No Dispatch CAS; and E1 Control Fault and E2 Control Fault occurred. Other CAS messages appeared; however were gone before I could get to them and I don't recall what they were.-At the same time; the smell of jet exhaust came through the cabin. Both myself and passenger flying in the right seat put masks on. Passenger later stated she smelled exhaust in the back of the plane prior to crossing the weather.-I [coordinated with ATC]; requested vectors to closest airport; pulled thrust levers to flight idle; and began a descent through the backside of the storm.-I considered dumping the cabin; however both of us had masks on; there was no smoke; my eyes were not burning; and did not want to increase the workload in the descent.-The vibrations and ITT red line continued a few more times but stopped eventually during the descent.-The initial descent was hand flown. Once I got the aircraft stabilized in a general direction of the weakest part of the weather; I put the AP back on and ran the E1 CTRL FAULT Checklist.-Radio had severe static due to the storm and ATC was extremely hard to understand.-We cleared the back side of the line of storms; was able to manage thrust; and ATC recommended a diversion to ZZZ which I took.-I started to setup for ZZZ when we went through the north flank of a small cell which Nexrad had as yellow and 3-5 miles in diameter. The rain started to get heavy and we then started to receive hail. From what I can recall; it lasted for about a minute. While we were in it; Nexrad turned the weather to red; but we were still north of the severe section. I did not have the active radar up.-Several minutes later I noticed small dents on the leading edge of the wing but nothing substantial. I was unaware at the time and only noticed it once on the ground and out of the aircraft; but the engine nacelles; nose radome; pitot tubes; and leading edges of the wings took significant damage from the hail.

Phenom 100 pilot reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing high ITT during a weather encounter.


Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; MEL; Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy

When the First Officer came back from the preflight walk around inspection prior to departure; he reported that the Aft Cargo Door 'would not stay open'. The Belt Loader (Baggage Loader) had rails on either side and the door had drooped to the point of almost touching the rails; which is how the Ramp [employees] first noticed it. They had continued to load bags; but would periodically use the electric door opener switch to lift the door again when it drooped too low. I told the First Officer to have Ramp stop loading bags before someone got hurt and called Maintenance. They said they would contact a Mechanic to come check the door. The Mechanic looked at the door and then came up to the cockpit and called Maintenance Control in front of both pilots. Mechanic explained to Maintenance that there was a 'slow leak' in the [cargo door] actuator and that the door was falling rapidly to a point and then drifting more slowly down from that point. We heard Mechanic tell Maintenance Control that this did not seem to be a safety issue (both the First Officer and I thought Mechanic was going to sign it off as within limits). They opted to place it on MEL; and as Mechanic was writing up the MEL per Maintenance Control instructions; Mechanic told me that per Maintenance Control and the MEL; we would have to completely empty the cargo bin. This was MEL 52-30-04A. At that point; I realized that the Ramp had already loaded 80 bags in the aft bin and closed and latched the door. I questioned the safety and reasonableness of reopening the door and unloading the bags; I asked if there was some legal way; since they were already loaded and the door was closed; for us to just unload the bin [at our destination]. Besides my concern for the safety of the Ramp personnel AND the door itself; the 80 bags would not have physically fit in the forward cargo compartment (bulked out) and we also would have been outside of Center of Gravity (CG) limits (we tried multiple solutions in the Weight Performance calculations). I explained this to the Mechanic and Maintenance Control; at which point they opted to use a different MEL: MEL 52-30-01A for the door actuator. I was confused by this since I thought that was what was wrong all along; and wondered why they hadn't opted to use that MEL in the first place. The Mechanic changed the MEL sign-off in the logbook. I asked Mechanic if needed to placard anything on the cargo door and Mechanic replied that 'they never placard the outside' (which I know to be incorrect). We obtained an Amended Release for the MEL addition and readied to leave. When I checked the logbook sign-off and corresponding MEL I saw that there was a placard required for the cargo door and more importantly; that there were several pages of maintenance items to be completed as part of the MEL that I was CERTAIN had not been accomplished. The Mechanic had never left the cockpit nor referenced the MEL itself. Mechanic completed the logbook MEL sign-off and then left immediately. I called Maintenance Control to inquire about the work not being accomplished and got the impression that they were very irritated at being questioned. I was told 'FINE; if that's how you want it; we'll go back to the original MEL and you'll have to empty the bags from the bin'. The impression was that I was somehow being punished for questioning them on the MEL. Interestingly enough; the 'original' MEL 52-30-04A was for the electric door opener; which appeared to be working fine. I asked what to expect and what to do with the passengers and was told that they would have to get all kinds of additional heavy equipment out to the airplane and call a Mechanic back; he [Maintenance Control] said he didn't care about the passengers. After a considerable additional delay; a new Mechanic showed up; said he was waiting for Maintenance Control to fax him the appropriate portions of the Maintenance Manual; and then went down to look at the cargo door. He came back up to the cockpit and commented 'It would have been nice to know this airplane just came out of Heavy Maintenance'. When I apologized and inquired why that mattered; he said that Maintenance Control had mentioned that in passing; and that he figured the problem might just be air in the hydraulic lines for the door. He said that getting pressure on the line and 'exercising' the door would likely flush any air out of the line and probably solve the issue. 15-20 minutes later he had done that and it worked (with witnesses). I'm confused and concerned about the way this was handled. Maintenance Control first tried to apply MEL Chapter 52-30-04A; which doesn't seem to be the correct item and required some risk to Ramp personnel and the door itself. It still would have been incorrect; but why didn't they apply MEL # 52-30-34B which didn't require opening the door and unloading the cargo bin? Then MEL 52-30-01A was applied; but the required maintenance items were not accomplished. When challenged; Maintenance Control went back to requiring the original (and incorrect) MEL 52-30-04A and all of a sudden needed heavy equipment to allow for the bags to be unloaded (that they didn't require initially). Luckily; the second Mechanic figured out what was actually wrong with the cargo door and quickly fixed the problem. I'm not a mechanic and cannot (and should not have to) question whether MEL required maintenance is actually completed when I accept an aircraft. In this case; I was present the entire time and am 100% sure that none of the maintenance items had been accomplished. If the door had fallen and hurt someone; or drooped low enough to hit the belt loader rails and gotten damaged; would I be liable or complicit by accepting an aircraft with an MEL that didn't apply or where I was certain that the required maintenance items had not been accomplished? I cannot comment as to how or why this happened or how to prevent it. I have no way to know whether applying the wrong MEL and then not accomplishing the required maintenance items was intentional or accidental. The attitude that I perceived from Maintenance Control when I questioned them made me very uncomfortable and suspicious. The original Mechanic never referenced the actual MEL. Certainly time and schedule pressures existed; but that shouldn't have taken precedence over proper handling of the problem. The three hour delay could have been avoided entirely with some basic troubleshooting to come up with the actual reason for the cargo door malfunctioning. [We] attempted to contact on call Duty Manager.

Reporter stated Contract Maintenance was performing the work in conjunction with their Air Carrier Maintenance Control. The attitude from their Maintenance Controller was unprofessional; especially since Maintenance Control had originally applied an incorrect MEL and the required maintenance procedures had not been accomplished even after first MEL had been applied and aircraft released. That was the reason for the amended release when the second MEL was applied. The lack of basic troubleshooting to at least identify the probable cause for the door continually drooping was part of the problem.

Captain addresses multiple issues with Maintenance Control surrounding incorrect MELs being applied to an A319 aircraft's Aft Cargo Door that continued to drop down on Ramp personnel and belt loader equipment during loading operations. Concerns also raised that original MEL required maintenance items for the Aft Cargo door had not been accomplished.


Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

I was on my last day of supervised line training in the left seat while the Check Airman flew in the right. I was PF. While being vectored to final; I called for flaps 5. The trailing edge flaps came out asymmetrically. The left one was indicating 0 and the right one indicating 1. We requested vectors away from final while we worked the problem. We referenced the QRH; Asymmetric Trailing Edge Flaps Checklist. The PM called Dispatch and planned a divert to an area airport with longer runways. While enroute we finished the QRH Checklist; which included lowering the LED [leading edge devices] with the alternate Flap switch. We checked the landing performance with flaps 0 and LED extended. The reference speeds where 168/182 including wind corrections. We declared an emergency and asked for CFR to be standing by since we would be landing at fast speeds. The Check Airman briefed the flight attendants and the passengers. Finally; we finished the QRH Checklist which included the Descent and Before Landing Checklist. The approach and landing went well; including a firm landing so as to not use up too much runway and because of the gusty winds. We stopped on the runway to give the CFR time to confirm the landing gear and tires were OK. The hard part was communicating with them. We were both on Ground frequency and Ground Control was very busy talking to other aircraft. It took us close to 10 minutes to confirm everything was OK. It would have been nice to have a discrete frequency to talk to the Chief or at least a higher priority on Ground frequency. Once we knew everything looked fine; we continued to the gate; contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and wrote up the defect in the logbook.

A B737-300 flight crew diverted to an airport with longer runways when they encountered a flap asymmetry issue requiring landing with no trailing edge flaps extended.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Weather; Aircraft

Aircraft X checked on my frequency as a pop up IFR requesting a clearance to ALB.  He requested 4;000 feet for altitude; I told him he would need to climb to 5;000 feet for a clearance to ALB.  I cleared him reaching 6;000 feet cleared to ALB airport via direct.  Reaching 6;000 feet he told me he was picking up icing and requested 8;000 feet.  I climbed him to 8;000 feet and asked him the type and intensity of ice.  He said Light Rime.  I had my Supervisor put the pilot report in the computer.I then noticed Aircraft X  descending instead of climbing. I verified he was in the climb.  He said he was having a problem with his auto pilot.  I told him he was descending and that he needs to climb.  He continued descending at which point I gave him a low altitude alert and told him my minimum IFR altitude in the area is 3600 feet an he needs to climb to 6000 feet.  He continued to descend so I asked him if wanted vectors to the closest airport.  He said he had the airport in front of him in sight.  I asked if he wanted to land there. He said yes.  I cleared him for a Visual Approach.  I asked if he was requesting priority handling.  He said yes.  I read him the NOTAMs.  I asked him how many people were on board.  He didn't reply.  He was low and close to the airport.  I told him to change to advisory frequency and report his cancellation.

ZBW Center Controller reported an aircraft that reported light rime ice and a malfunctioning auto pilot descended instead of climbing and flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude. The aircraft diverted to the nearest airport and landed safely.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The company had put out a couple of messages related to new OPD's [Optimized Profile Descent] into IAD recently; but neither of us had studied the messages at length.  Basically; from what I had read; was that sometimes the descents could get away from you quick; so you have to stay on top of things.  They even suggested a 'Dive-and-Drive' approach to the new procedures.  We identified this as a threat when we were issued the new clearance enroute; for this arrival.  We both looked at the arrival and briefed it thoroughly.  I told the relatively new First Officer that all he would need to do is pretty much just fly; and monitor his descent progression.  I told him that I would brief his next crossing restrictions in a set manner.  I would say; 'The next fix is XXXXX; cross between (or at) FLXXX and FLXXX.  The lowest altitude for this fix is FLXXX.'  I did it in this manner because we both identified the advantage of being on the lower side of the crossing; than the higher side.  As we started down; the VPI [Vertical Path Indicator] came in view; and we pretty quickly got high on that.  I pointed that out; and made sure he was correcting.  He did correct some; but apparently not enough.  Honestly; I think that he may have gotten two of the points confused; as far as the crossing restrictions.  Coupled with this; his inexperience in this aircraft showed by his reluctance to descend at much more than 2;500 FPM or so (which I can understand; if you're not used to it).  We identified the crossing error; and then corrected more; and made every other altitude and speed restriction on the arrival.  Nothing was said by ATC.  The First Officer did a good job of recovering from this deviation and did not let it fluster him; including a nice landing!We were going in to a new arrival that had been presented to the pilot group; by the company; as a potential threat due to multiple crossing restrictions primarily.  There were both altitude and speed restrictions; but the altitudes restriction far outnumber the speeds.  The First Officer's inexperience in our particular aircraft did not help the situation; with reference to his uncertainty as to what an acceptable rate of descent would be.  I think that I got a little focused on what was the next point; just a little ahead of the current waypoint; and by the time I realized that we were too high; it was too late.  I do appreciate the company putting out a message about the potential threat of this arrival.  A little more advanced notice to allow time to review a training module that is being put together would be nice; but I understand the FAA did not allow more notice.  Especially when I am with a newer First Officer; especially on an arrival like this; I need to speed my scan just a little bit.  We didn't have any real weather to deal with in this scenario; but we were not filed via this arrival but were issued the change in the air.  If there had been some weather; or other increased work load factors; getting this change in the air; only a few minutes out; is going to lead to more deviations.  We need to be filed via this arrival; if it's what they're going to be using.

The reporter states that his aircraft is equipped with a Honeywell FMC which is not VNAV certified and the aircraft is not equipped with autothrust.  The FMC does compute a descent path; but it must be followed manually using vertical speed and manual thrust adjustment.

EMB145 Captain describes the factors that resulted in missing a crossing restriction during the GIBBZ1 RNAV arrival to IAD.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 8439; Flight Crew Type 600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During Flap Load Relief Check; the Left Overwing slide [raft] deployed at approximately 160 KTS and separated clear of aircraft. This occurred over open water. Accomplished procedures IAW QRH. Declared an emergency; flew over unpopulated areas. Landed. Requested runway be checked for debris (slide cover found). Wrote up wing slide in Logbook. De-briefed crew and Maintenance.

Reporter stated the B757 aircraft had been sitting in storage for two years; then flew for a while and had just completed a Heavy Maintenance Check when they arrived to perform the first Flight Test. He was the Captain flying with two other pilots. The Overwing Slide Warning light had come on earlier; shortly after level off; and then came on again about an hour later during the Flap Load Relief Check. The B757 then rolled 'hard to the left' and required full right aileron to compensate. He thought he had lost a section of flap. One of the onboard Maintenance technician's told him he saw the slide deploy; but did not seem to inflate; then tore away from the aircraft. Reporter stated he was shocked by how much of a roll the aircraft took when the slide deployed. He suspects the Flaps-20 approach configuration they were in; during the Test Flight; may produce a greater low pressure area at the upper wing. The uncommanded slide deployment marked up the wing to body fairing and damaged the upper surface of the Inboard (I/B) flap. He recommends that pilots do not delay setting up their flap configurations while on approach due to the strong roll effect on the aircraft if one of the Overwing slides should deploy. He has many hours of flight time and even with that experience; he was not sure he would have been able to recover from that much roll; close to the ground if he was on approach.Reporter stated the Airworthiness Directive (A.D.) for the Overwing Slide Warning light and Slide door had not been accomplished on that aircraft. However; the time period for accomplishment was still within the window that the FAA had allowed in their A.D. He was later told the FAA was now seriously reconsidering the length of time allowed for Operators to comply.

Flight was first flight of Heavy Maintenance Check for a B757 aircraft. Performed Flight Checks on climbout. After initial level off; noted Left (L) Slide on EICAS with EMER DOOR on Overhead discrete. Scanned wing area and fuselage in the area of [Overwing] slide and it appeared secure. Based on experience; elected to continue the Test Flight. Approximately one hour into the flight; in the Approach Configuration; the [Overwing] slide deployed and then departed. The aircraft was offshore; approximately 120 NM. The crew declared an emergency and returned to [the departure airport.] Completed procedures in accordance with QRH and landed. Request FOD check on roll out. Airfield Management recovered the slide pack on the runway.

Reporter stated they departed in the B757 after the aircraft had been released from Heavy Maintenance to perform a Functional Check Flight; and then do a Flight Test lasting approximately two hours. He was observing and comparing two different Flight Test Cards for B757 aircraft during their Flight Test. They were about 16;000 FT; cruising to the Test Area when the Left Slide light came on. The aircraft experienced a 'pretty good roll' that was corrected by the pilot flying. One of their Maintenance technicians onboard said the Overwing slide had deployed; stayed attached for about ten seconds; creating a lot of noise inside and outside the cabin and then separated from the aircraft. After they returned to the departure airport; the onboard mechanics said the Overwing Door latches were the issue.

Three pilots report the Left Overwing (Off-Wing) Slide raft deployed during a Functional Test of a B757 after the aircraft was released from a Heavy Maintenance Check. Pilot flying noted he was shocked by how much left roll the aircraft experienced; requiring full right aileron to correct and questioned whether recovery would be possible on approach.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

If I wouldn't have initiated a call to the adjacent Center Aircraft X and Aircraft Y would have collided 7 miles inside my airspace. Both aircraft were coming from the adjacent Center at the same altitude.

A ZMP Center Controller reported receiving hand offs on two aircraft that were on converging headings at the same altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 65; Flight Crew Type 60

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

After checking the approach path; I began making my takeoff call on the local CTAF while simultaneously moving onto the runway 34. Just after crossing the holdshort line; another aircraft made a call that they were on short final and that I had cut them off. I stopped about one aircraft's length over the holdshort line and waited for the aircraft on final to land.  The landing aircraft flew over at about 100 feet and landed about 300 feet down the runway.

Pilot reports reporting ready for take off; crossing the hold short line to line up another aircraft advises it is on short final; The landing aircraft flies over the departing aircraft and lands.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

While taxiing down Runway 15 and told to taxi Runway 15; Kilo; into the block of Runway 19; it became apparent we were passing Kilo and not going to make the turn. Ground called us the same time I advised the Captain of missing Kilo; and instructed us to simply follow an aircraft and take Juliet into the block of Runway 19. The sudden realization of missing the taxiway coupled with the instruction from ground to turn left onto J made the Captain make a sharp left turn instantly; rather than following the yellow line off the runway onto J. I realized we were far short of the turn off and yelled STOP as it became apparent we were going to hit runway edge lights and possibly go into the grass. The aircraft stopped with the nose gear on the white paint of the edge of the runway. The Captain quickly said 'I can fix this' and brought up the power on the right engine while turning the tiller full right to make the sharp right turn. As the power came up on the right engine the aircraft did not turn and instead jumped a few more feet forward getting us closer to the lights and grass. I advised ground we needed to start another engine before we could taxi and we did. The Captain used the left engine and right tiller to maneuver the airplane back onto the runway and exit at J. There was no damage to the lights or the aircraft. I asked if the nose gear tires would be safe for takeoff and landing and the Captain was sure they would be. We departed and landed without incident. The taxiway markings being unclear; and darkness at night made it difficult to identify the original route we were supposed to take. The startle factor of being told by ground we missed a taxiway seemed to be the reason for the Captains response to quickly turn left.From the direction we were taxiing there are absolutely no visible signs designated Taxiway Kilo when on Runway 15. The chart also depicts grass where there is actually pavement and simply painted lines adding to the confusing between taxiway S and K. Location signs placed on the east side of Runways 15 for Kilo would help a lot.

Air Carrier First Officer reported missing the proper taxi route to runway 19 at DCA due to signage and darkness.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 45; Flight Crew Type 45

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

It was my first solo flight doing pattern works - Full stop and taxi back.I landed and taxi back twice and it was last landing.I landed on runway XXL and landed safely. I touched down on center line; and I was trying to exit the runway on taxiway [1].I ground rolled maybe 500 to 1000 feet.But I noticed there was an airplane on [1]; so I changed my mind to exit the runway on [taxiway 2]. So I add little bit power to get to [taxiway 2]; And tower give me an instruction to exit the runway on [taxiway 2] and contact ground. I remember my groundspeed was around 15-20kts.but after I passed [taxiway 1]; my airplane went to the left side.I kicked right rudder few times; but it didn't work.I am not sure the reason why this happen; maybe I lost my directional control after I add little bit power to exit the runway at [taxiway 2].

Student pilot reported loss of control after landing and attempting to exit on taxiway.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Please note: My area has filed dozens; possibly even over 100 [safety reports] against this aircraft/parachute jump school and nothing has been done since.I was working a very busy combined sector and a parachute jump plane checks onto the sector like he normally does and advises he's going VFR/13500 feet to release parachute jumpers on a VERY busy ZZZ Arrival line. We had aircraft all lined up 15 Miles in trail for at least 175 miles and I told the aircraft for traffic to maintain VFR/9500 feet or below for the jump. The pilot responded and said 'NO. I am going to 13500 feet and releasing jumpers.' For collision and safety of other aircraft; I told him that jumpers are not authorized at that altitude. In the past; he has released jumpers with no prior warning right in the face of ZZZ regional jet arrivals and commercial aircraft have asked why there are bodies so close to their aircraft. He said he wanted to then terminate his radar service do jumps without talking to ATC. For safety reasons; I kept him on my frequency.I told the pilot multiple times; that jumpers are not authorized at his altitude due to a safety concern and he refused to comply. I started to vector ZZZ arrivals around UNAUTHORIZED PARACHUTE JUMPING to keep everyone safe. THE VFR Parachute jump plane then started arguing with me about FAR's over the frequency and started challenging me by letting me know when the jumpers are going to be released. Once again; I told him; that parachute jumping is not being authorized at this time at his altitude. I told him to call ZNY for a possible pilot deviation.Due to the IMMEDIATE THREAT of ZZZ arrivals entering New York airspace. I am requesting the jump school be temporary shut down and the pilot license be revoked until an investigation can occur.

We have an aircraft; whose call sign frequently changes; but is known as [Company call sign]. He does jumper activities in the vicinity of ZZZZZZ intersection. He checked on climbing VFR to 13500 feet and I told him where in minutes my next 2 ZZZ inbound aircraft were. The first was about 4 min away and the second was 12. I told him; that after the 2nd aircraft; I had more aircraft close behind. He proceeded to make a very slow climb. He reached altitude when the 2nd aircraft was 4 min from ZZZZZ intersection and told me he would like to let the jumpers go in 2 minutes. I told him I was unable due to the inbound ZZZ and that I had another 2 aircraft behind him. He says ok. About 2 min pass and he asks where the ZZZ aircraft is. I tell him about 2 min from ZZZZZ intersection; he asks where the one behind him is. I say about 5 min from ZZZZZ intersection. He tells me he will jump after the 2 min away aircraft passes. I call traffic; he asks me again a minute later where he is. I tell him and he gets the aircraft in sight. I ask if he will be able to jump in one minute; he says 'confirm.' I coordinated the time with approach and then I called [sector] to point out an aircraft; since his descent would be held up for the Aircraft Y. Aircraft X inquires if he should expect ZZZZZ intersection at 10000 feet. I tell him no; that I'm holding him up for Aircraft Y. Aircraft X remarks that this is not a good area for jumper operations. I wait 2 min and ask the Aircraft Y what his status is. He says something like 'were coming down.' I take that to mean; he has dropped; since he should have already released his jumpers; and that he is starting his descent. I don't observe him descending; so I ask if he is descending or staying at 13500 feet. He says he staying at 13500 feet. I tell him that he should have told me that; since I was holding up my aircraft. I turn to Aircraft X and tell him to descend and be level in 2 min or less. Aircraft X is over ZZZZZ intersection; Aircraft Y is over him at ZZZZZ intersection at 13500 feet and announces that he dropped the jumpers and would like to begin descent. I was surprised and asked if he just dropped them; since he was supposed to have done so minutes ago. He says he did and wants to start his descent. I tell him that he can't because he's still over the Aircraft X. I switch Aircraft X to approach and he tells me that the jumpers were dropped close to him and that it was unsafe. I tell him that he should file a report; and he said that he would. Aircraft Y once again asks me to start his descent and I say he is now clear of Aircraft X and he can descend. This is a recurring issue with this jumper aircraft. He frequently does not listen to ATC instructions; is misleading and difficult to work with. We could either change the ZZZ arrival to go over ZZZ VOR and that would keep them away from the jump site or we have to put restrictions in for this jumper. I don't think it is a safe site for the jumping at all; but if it is to continue; he needs to be made to follow our instructions and to be clear and accurate in his expression on what his intentions are and how long it will take for him to accomplish his tasks. Telling me that he can do the jumps in 1 minute and then releasing them 3 or 4 mins later; is not only misleading; it is dangerous. The pilot of the arriving aircraft called after landing and said he saw the jumpers about 400ft from his aircraft. This is dangerous to not only the jet aircraft; carrying 100's of passengers; but the jumpers themselves; who have no idea the dangerous situation the pilot is putting them in. Actions need to be taken before something traumatic and irreversible happens.

ZNY Center Controller reported of a skydiving aircraft that ignored ATC instructions; argued with controllers on frequency; and gave misleading information to have his requests approved.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On departure from ZZZ; nose wheel door indicated unlocked/open on instrument panel and overhead following gear retractions. Captain selected 230 kts on FCP and we continued climb while requesting a lower than planned level off alt. We executed QRH procedures and determined we did not have fuel quantities required based on QRH multiple. Coordinated with ATC for return to ZZZ while coordinating with Dispatch. Recovered uneventfully at ZZZ.[Cause was] Aircraft system failure.

The nose landing gear door indicated open on both indication panels after gear retraction. We complied with the ECAM and QRH. Based on the increased fuel requirement of the malfunction; we no longer had the required fuel to continue to ZZZ1. We communicated with Dispatch via ACARS and decided to return to ZZZ. [Cause was] Aircraft malfunction.

Air carrier flight crew and Dispatcher reported the nose wheel door remained open after gear retraction during climbout. A successful air return was completed.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

Flight landed uneventfully at night on Runway 10; cleared at Taxiway D and took Taxiway P and E to enter the alley between Concourse B and C to go to Gate X. While taxiing in the Center of the alley I saw what I thought was the J-Line for the Gate out the right side of the aircraft as we were about to taxi past it. I maneuvered the aircraft to line up on the J-line and had to wait for a Marshaling Crew. The ramp lighting was harsh white spot lights that cast many shadows. Both the FO and I confirmed this was the J-Line. It was a broad line angled approximately 80 degrees to the terminal. Out the left window I saw a line that paralleled what we thought was the J-line that I thought was the Safety Zone edge line. It was actually a shadow. There were markings for engine clear zones on either side of the line where the aircraft would be parked. When the Marshaller came out she faced us directly and motioned us straight forward which is what I expected. About 30 ft from the parking spot I saw a thinner yellow line on my left side that was perpendicular to the terminal and I realized; at that moment; that the J-Line we were following was an old line that someone had tried to remove. The new line was much thinner and did not have any engine clear zones associated with it. I tried to maneuver at that point to line up with the new perpendicular line but there was not enough room left to complete the turn and align the aircraft centerline with the new J-line. The Marshaler started commanding 'kind of' a right turn about the time I started turning the aircraft. Although from the right window it looked like the wingtip was inside the Safety Zone; from looking at it on the ramp after we shut down it was obvious the wingtip was well outside the Safety Zone.This gate should not be used at night (especially when the ramp is wet); until it is better marked. The first problem is that with the poor ramp lighting at Gate X; combined with how the old J-Line/Safety Zone lines were removed; the old lines stand out better than the new line. It would have helped to have had a Marshaller standing at the top of the new J-Line as we were approaching the gate area which would have been an immediate clue to proper aircraft alignment; but barring that; when the Marshaller came out; it would have helped to have the Marshaller face down the new J-Line and not directly at me looking down the old J-Line. The old markings need to be better removed so they are just a shiny as the surrounding concrete; widen the new J-line to match the same style as the old J-Lines in that area; paint engine inlet Safety Zones for the new J-Line.

We taxied onto the top of the J-line. You can clearly see the outline of it. I even snapped pictures after the event to show how it is clearly marked. We basically taxied onto the old J-line even though the Marshaler was facing us and maneuvering us forward. When we got closer the Captain realized we were on the wrong line. At that point it was too late to maneuver the aircraft anymore. I didn't think we were on the wrong line until they towed us back.

Air carrier flight crew reported that old; partially removed lead-in lines and bright white flood lighting cause confusion when parking at night at a gate in the Concourse B and C area at BWI.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 811; Flight Crew Type 620

Conditions were excellent on the evening of the event with greater than 12;000 feet cloud base and greater than 10 miles visibility.  There were quite a few people flying that evening.  I took off for a short local area flight at XA+25 and departed the pattern to the East for general handling; remaining on the CTAF frequency throughout the flight.  At XA+40 I returned to the pattern from the East and joined the runway XX pattern with left hand traffic by crossing the runway at pattern altitude at the mid-field point and then turning downwind.  I had announced my intentions when 10 miles from the field and transmitted my position as crossing the mid-field point and turning downwind for Runway XX.  I then continued the normal calls on turning base; final.  Apart from Aircraft Z that departed whilst I was on the base leg portion of the pattern there was no other traffic and no other radio traffic on the CTAF in the vicinity of ZZZ. I had decided to carry out 3 landings so on landing reconfigured the aircraft for take-off; turned cross-wind at 1;000 feet MSL and transmitted my position.  Just after making that call Aircraft Y made a call stating he was joining the Runway XX pattern.  This was his first call on the CTAF and did not indicate his position. I transmitted a request on the CTAF for his position and started scanning to my right in the upwind direction and just as I started my turn to the downwind spotted Aircraft Y in my 3 o'clock position.  I then increased my rate of turn in order to separate myself and transmitted on CTAF that I had visual on Aircraft Y and that he was immediately behind me on the downwind leg.  As I progressed downwind Aircraft Y asked my intentions and I stated that I would be continuing the pattern for another touch and go landing.  At this point I saw the aircraft again in my 8 0'clock position approximately 100 below me and now adjacent to the Runway XX threshold.  He asked me again what my intentions were and stated he was having difficulty hearing my transmission.  Given that Aircraft Y was positioned below me and about half way between my position and the runway (I was just 0.7 miles from the runway according to the GPS track) it was obvious that the most prudent course of action was to extend my downwind leg and allow him to land ahead; so transmitted my intention to do that and make myself number 2 behind the landing Aircraft Y.  Aircraft Y made a full stop landing and I continued my flight with another touch and go without further incident.  What did I learn from this incident and what could I have done better?  First of all it reemphasized the importance of using standard procedures and radio calls at non-towered airports.  Had Aircraft Y made a 10 mile call I would have been alert to his intention to join the pattern. If he had also made his position clear when joining the pattern it would have given me options to separate from him.  I also think that my action to continue on the downwind leg with Aircraft Y so close behind me was a mistake.  I should have continued my left-hand turn and positioned myself behind him.  Another thing that I could have done differently was to have my iPad in use.  Given the local flight and short duration I decided to not take it with me as I had paper charts.  Had I been using it; I would have had the ADS-B traffic information; which would probably have alerted me to the presence of Aircraft Y. The lesson here is make use of all the information and facilities available to you and not limit your options.

Pilot reported a NMAC while attempting to land at uncontrolled airport.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While operating Aircraft X [from] CVG; we had a severe turbulence encounter during climb to level off at FL300.  After departure; while climbing above 10;000 feet; we were informed by both Indianapolis Center and Chicago Center of potential light/occasional moderate turbulence along our route but that it would smooth out the further north we went. This seemed to match the weather charts provided in our flight package. One chart showed an area of forecast moderate as well as an area of moderate to severe turbulence to our East FL360/below and another chart showed our route through the West edge of a similarly forecast area of moderate to severe FL270-370. To my knowledge there were no reports of any severe turbulence; only the info passed by both ATC controllers mentioned earlier. During the climb we were given direct OXI (KNOX) which had us mostly VMC with occasional IMC during the early portion of the climb. The early turn also kept us well clear of some rain showers and turbulence we were painting on our radar to both our East and West. During the latter portion of the climb from 18;000 and above we started to encounter occasional light and occasional moderate chop. The higher we climbed; the more frequent the turbulence became with continuous light and still occasional moderate. As this persisted; I asked the First Officer; who was the Pilot Flying; to slow to turbulence penetration speed of 310 which he started to do as the turbulence again worsened to continuous moderate chop. Approaching FL280; the aircraft stopped climbing momentarily when we hit an apparent air pocket and made a momentary shallow 200ft descent before it resumed climbing. Once above FL280; between FL280 and FL300; we encountered what I assessed to be severe turbulence for 1-2 minutes where aircraft instruments became unreadable for a short time; airspeed varied +/- 20-30 knots above/below 310 and altitude appeared to vary +/-500 feet. Above approximately FL295; the turbulence decreased to light to moderate and we slightly overshot FL300 (cleared level off) by approximately 200ft (no call from ATC). As Pilot Monitoring; I called ATC and made a PIREP after we levelled off. Following the event; we did not notice any abnormalities with the aircraft and no injuries among the 4 crew; 3 deadhead and 1 jumpseat. Following level off and after some discussion of the event; we made a SATCOM call approximately one hour after the event to Dispatch to discuss the situation with Dispatch; the [Chief] Pilot and Maintenance. We got some great inputs from the [Chief] Pilot. All parties agreed that we should be safe to continue; which I planned to do; provided we did not discover any abnormalities related to the turbulence event. After having the Relief First Officer do a check of the main deck to verify the freight was secure and that there weren't any abnormalities; we elected to continue to destination with the remainder of flight being uneventful. Upon landing I made a logbook entry documenting this event IAW FOM 8.1.30.Recommend considering development of a severe/extreme turbulence encounter checklist for either the FOM or QRH which includes; at a minimum: assess aircraft status; assess crew status; verify security of freight (if able to access); notify Dispatch; make logbook entry and any other pertinent steps deemed appropriate. As far as what we could have done better; we could have possibly made additional turbulence inquiries with ATC requesting specific altitudes. In addition; we could have brought Dispatch/Maintenance/[Chief] Pilot team into the loop a little sooner.

B747-800 Captain reported severe turbulence and provided recommendations.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

PSP was broadcasting below IFR minimums all morning; several aircraft were in holding; with several more already redirected to alternate airports. There was a CFR release for PSP and the surrounding airports. I noticed a SPECI was made at PSP with weather stating it was VFR with visibility 7 and a FEW008 as the only layer of clouds. I immediately called PSP Tower and asked them what their weather conditions were. Controller stated visibility 3 OVC008. There could have been a dire outcome if people were released with this information. At this time I noticed that several more aircraft were steadily inbound to my sector with no where to land. Some approaches could be made but most were not available due to low ceilings. I had perhaps 5 to 6 aircraft in holding already and more steadily inbound. I believe that the weather reporting terminal that en route has should be more accurate and much faster in disseminating it and providing us with up to date information from the Tower. I also recommend that perhaps its not needed in most situations with PSP as it is typically a slow airport; that some manner of flow control be in place to PSP when they do have to hold aka a stricter initiative from TMU would mitigate this.

ZLA Controller described an unsafe condition event at PSP when weather information provided was incorrect resulting in some unnecessary holding; suggesting faster and more accurate weather dissemination.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Beechcraft Twin Turboprop or Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 39; Flight Crew Total 382; Flight Crew Type 137

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Human Factors

I was conducting a discovery flight a requested flight following on the ground with a departure out to the southeast of the field near City X to fly over the house of the client. I was cleared to takeoff of Runway XX. On the climbout I was not sure if Tower wanted me to make a left or right turn towards the south east so I asked for clarification. He said 'you're going to the east right?' And I repeated stating we were going to the southeast. He replied back with instructions to make a right turn to head that way. Right as I turned onto the downwind; Tower switch me to Approach. I switched frequencies and began explaining something to the student as I started to cruise the plane out at 1;500 MSL. About 15 seconds after I switched frequencies to Approach; I gave them a call to check in telling them the altitude I was at and the direction I was headed; southeast. Immediately after I called in; I saw a King Air to my right that was supposedly on final for XX. They were on a track towards us but were in a climb. I saw they were climbing so I immediately started descending. After that is when Approach called in to tell me about the traffic saying that I was intercepting the final approach course for XX. When I looked at my ground track after the flight; I did drift slightly right when I was on the extended downwind; but I never intercepted the final approach course. I did not receive notice from the Tower about the King Air on final before being switched to Approach and it wasn't until after I checked in with Approach that they gave me the advisory. The King Air's TCAS system showed that we reached within 100 feet of each other but myself and the pilots in the King Air agreed that it was much more that 100 feet. I overall feel like there was a lack of communication from all parts that could have possibly prevented this occurrence. I personally could have been more specific with tower on where I was going. I could have been more watchful of my track to stay clear of final. The winds were from the northwest so that could have been a factor in why I was slightly drifting. That is why it is important to know where your winds are coming from to maintain a constant ground track along the ground and prevent drifting.

GA instructor pilot reported an NMAC during initial climb on a VFR flight.


Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Approaching ZZZ airport for Runway XX for a visual approach with the PAPI light out of service; there is a hill and the runway has a uprising slope. At 1;300 ft. AGL the system detected that we were at 1;000 ft. due to the terrain just before the airport when in reality we were 1;300 ft. I adjusted the rate of descent just over 1;000 ft to be stabilized for the approach. The aircraft EGPWS announced terrain terrain pull up; so I adjusted by vertical descent to 800 FPM then proceeded to land on a stabilize approach. Adjusting vertical rate of descent close to the airport with the uprising hill near the approach end of Runway XX at ZZZ. Being stabilized at 2;000 ft. for this approach will help avoiding the terrain occurrence.

CRJ-200 Captain reported getting an EGPWS alert due to the terrain during visual approach. The pilot decreased the rate of descent; stabilized the aircraft; and continued to landing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 150

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy

Returning from a VFR flight following an aircraft. ATC diverted us to cross over an airport on the way to Runway 12 at San Carlos. I heard the preceding aircraft cleared to land as it was crossing over another airport. About 6 minutes later; I was over the same airport. ATC asked us to contact San Carlos Tower. San Carlos Tower asked us to report a VFR reporting point and cleared us to land Runway 12. There was a 20 knot headwind crossing towards San Carlos so this 11 miles took a long time.This is the start of a pattern at San Carlos. On earlier flights I have been cleared to land as I was leaving Oakland's Class Charlie well before San Mateo Bridge going to Runway 30. I have also been approved for change of frequency at 400 ft. before reaching the diamond shaped waterway on a coyote hills departure. I find it hard to believe that there was little traffic on SFO arrival that would warrant a lack of controlling over site as the flight goes under SFO's ILS for significantly long periods of time. San Carlos Tower has been severely understaffed for 15 months.

A VFR General Aviation pilot returning from a sight seeing flight reported ATC did not provide the proper level of service.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 265; Flight Crew Type 958

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

We were cleared to fly the LGA-5 Whitestone climb. I had to clarify that with Clearance Delivery as the Whitestone climb did not come through in our CPLDC (Controller Pilot Datalink Comminications) clearance. The FO (First Officer) had assumed we would get the Coney Climb and had been studying that routing until I told him I had never flown that before. He was unfamiliar with operating out of LGA with Company. When I told Clearance that the climb was not indicated in our clearance; he remarked that this was a problem which they were working to fix. Our aircraft was configured with the hot MIC switch on the yoke instead of the audio panel. Normally; I am used to operating with that switch configuration; but I believe most of our aircraft are configured now with the switch on the panel. I cannot remember the last time I flew an aircraft with the hot MIC switch on the yoke.All briefs and procedures were performed as we taxied without incident to the 13 hold short line. We were placed into line up and wait and then cleared for takeoff. After I transmitted; I neglected to toggle the yoke switch down to the hot MIC position but did not realize this until my 80-knot call; since I had no feedback in my headset. For some reason; I thought my noise cancelling feature was off. I calmly reached over to turn it on. In the reality; I turned it off. My 'V1' and 'rotate' calls were through the open cockpit as well and not on the ICS. The ensuing takeoff and cleanup were without incident but I was out of my comfort zone with my headset configured the way it was. I monitored the FO as he completed the right turn to 180 degrees as we cleaned up the aircraft. I then turned my attention toward getting my headset configured correctly. As I turned my attention back to monitor the FO; I noticed he had missed the left turn at 2.5 NM so I immediately told him to turn left. We were about 30 degrees into the turn before Departure asked us why we 'floated' our turn. I responded that we had experienced a minor problem and he remarked that had we gone much further toward Kennedy; they would have had a major problem with us. To my knowledge; we did not cause a conflict with any aircraft. The rest of our flight proceeded without incident.I should never have messed with my headset during the takeoff roll. I blindly reached back to do so as I was concentrating on our takeoff roll and I wound up making matters worse. Although we briefed the Whitestone Climb; I think that the FO still must have had the Coney Climb (which he had studied) on his mind. Had our clearance been clear from the CPLDC receipt he would never have looked at the Coney Climb. Lastly; it is very unfortunate that we must deal with configuration variations between aircraft at Company be it hardware or software differences. These differences should be mitigated where possible; as soon as possible. Although the simple placement and operation of a little thing like a crew ICS switch may seem insignificant; this event shows that a minor configuration variation like that increased the risk for me. This was magnified by the fact that most of our aircraft are configured the other way with the hot MIC switch on the audio panel.

I flew a safe but less than perfect departure leaving La Guardia 13 on the La Guardia 5 Departure; Whitestone Transition. I turned approximately 1 mile late; about 3.5 DME; to the 040-degree heading; and I accelerated to 220 knots before being established on the 040-degree heading before I corrected to 210 knots.We had thoroughly briefed the departure and engine out procedures during the preflight. I was expecting the Coney Climb since that favored our route of flight. Our CPLDC (Controller Pilot Datalink Communications) clearance listed the LGA5 departure; but lacked a transition. We queried Clearance Delivery and were assigned the Whitestone Transition. The Controller commented that it was unusual not to receive a particular transition with the LGA 5 in a CPDLC clearance. The lack of a complete clearance forced us to review and re-brief the departure thoroughly. Other items include the tankering of 5;000 pounds of fuel; which contributed to a flaps 10 takeoff and the subsequent extra steps during the busyness of aircraft clean up on departure. Also; Aircraft X has the interphone hot MIC that latches on the yoke switch and not the radio switch.Our pushback; taxi; and initial takeoff clearance were all uneventful. The Captain took the radios as PM (Pilot Monitoring) and answered our takeoff clearance from Tower; thus unlatching the hot MIC feature. The '80 knots;' 'V1' and 'Rotate' calls were made cross-flight deck; but easily heard. I called for 'Heading Select' passing 400 ft AGL and started my turn to 180-degrees on the Whitestone Departure. I called for 'Set Speed; Flaps 5; Climb Thrust' passing 1100 ft (cleanup altitude). The PM's acknowledgements were a combination of over the interphone and cross-flight deck as we were switched to Departure Control. That particular type of interphone switch is clumsy to use. Between checking in with Departure Control and me calling for 'Flaps 1' and 'Flaps Up' on schedule; I flew past the 2.5 DME LGA arc I had loaded in the FMC during preflight. I started the turn to 040-degrees at approximately 3.5 DME instead. Subsequently; I let the airspeed balloon to about 220 knots before being established on the 040-degree heading as depicted in the SID. I corrected to 210 knots approximately halfway through the turn. About that time; Departure Control asked how fast we were going and we responded that we had a minor issue and we were in the turn. Departure Control gave us a turn to 360-degrees and quipped that JFK might have an issue if we flew into their airspace. My late turn and extra speed obviously increased our turn radius and perhaps worried the Controller. I do not think we were close to any arrival or departure corridors into JFK. The Controller seemed to be making a point; however. The rest of the departure was normal and uneventful. The whole departure was flown smoothly and safely the entire time.In retrospect; besides flying a more precise departure; I could have selected a smaller scale on my HSI display to recognize my turn point. I used the 20-mile scale out of habit; but a 10-mile or even 5-mile scale would have made the user-built 2.5 LGA ring more noticeable. Also; the separate hot MIC latch switch on the radio is easier to use and eliminates the clumsiness of the yoke mounted switch. Clear communication is essential always but especially so on busy departures like the LGA 5.

B737 flight crew reported exceeding published speed and overshooting a turn on departure due to distraction.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Upon entering the ramp; I saw a ramp agent who waved me in to follow him to a parking spot located on the eastside of the Ramp.   As I taxied down the back alley; the ramp agent who waved me in went over to the top of the parking spot and continued to wave me in.  There were no ramp agents monitoring as wingwalkers.  There was a female ramp agent approximately 25 FT in front of the airplane to the right side of it with her arms down at her sides facing the airplane.  The route to the parking spot had two fuel trucks; one red one and one yellow one on my right and Company aircraft parked on my left as I taxied in.  As I taxied in between the fuel trucks and the other aircraft; the front of the left wing appeared to clear the tail.  As I then continued forward I saw the rudder trim tab move and immediately stopped the aircraft.  The ramp Agent who was marshalling me from the top of the parking spot; came over to the left wing and inspected it then gave me the symbol to shut the engine down; which I did.  The passengers were unloaded and escorted into the terminal.  Another ramp agent came over and went into the other aircraft; released the parking brake and pushed it forward. Once pushed forward; it's front tire was even with the painted T.  Always stop the aircraft and demand wingwalkers whenever there are other obstructions in the vicinity of the intended path of the aircraft instead of relying on your own judgment of the clearance.

Captain reports contacting the wing tip of another company aircraft with his rudder while being marshalled into a parking spot.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Loss of directional control on runway; resulting in prop strike on airport sign.

GA Instructor reported a loss of directional control during landing. The aircraft's prop was damaged after making contact with an airport sign.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Manuals; Human Factors

Maintenance came out to troubleshoot the issue and found that the WRONG part was installed the last time this was fixed in Dec 2011. The Stall Shaker on Captain's yoke had wrong electrical connector pin installed. It was about 3/8' of an inch shorter than required; not allowing the shaker to get electrical current. Suggest using correct part (part numbers) when fixing aircraft.

A pilot reports that during Maintenance troubleshooting of a repeat 'Stall fail' message that occurred in flight; Mechanics found an incorrect length electrical connector pin had been previously installed at the Captain's Stick Shaker unit on their CRJ-700 aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While I was working local assist; the lLocal Controller cleared Aircraft X for takeoff; and then put Aircraft Y into position. As soon as Aircraft X started his southbound turn off the departure end; the Local Controller then cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. I told him that I thought that it was too close; but he didn't do anything about it. It appeared that there was not sufficient wake turbulence separation. Then; about 5 minutes later; the Local Controller cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff and put Aircraft W into position. As soon as Aircraft Z started his turn off departure end; the Local Controller cleared Aircraft W for takeoff. I told him again that it was probably too close. Then I told the Supervisor that it looked too close both times and I didn't want to be his 'Controller B.' This time there was a little more separation than the first; but it still appeared that there may not have been the appropriate wake turbulence separation.Need some clarification of how exactly to calculate wake turbulence with a departure/departure; when the leading aircraft is a Heavy or B757. Include runway lengths as separation? What about diverging courses?

Two instances of the same situation; I had a heavy departure departing Runway 26L on a PRADO7 SID followed by some smaller regional jets on POM7 departures. The PRADO7 departure is a climbing left turn to PDZ VOR which is roughly a 130-135 heading with the POM7 departure on a heading of 256. In both instances the preceding heavy aircraft had started there turn southeast bound when I cleared the succeeding departure for takeoff. Resulting with a minimum of 5 miles in trail and at least 2 minutes between issuance of takeoff clearance. My Supervisor stated that since the heavy aircraft turned back to the southeast I did not have 5 miles between the aircraft. I tried to explain that the preceding heavy aircraft would have flown at least 5 miles before the second aircraft would become airborne; but to no avail. It is my belief that with her understanding of the rules that if I had a downwind departure I would no have separation until the preceding aircraft was 5 miles east of the airport.Better train the Supervisor.

Two ONT Tower Controllers report of a possible lack of separation due to departing the aircraft too soon.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During crew rest yesterday; schedules automated texting yesterday showing incorrectly documented NO SHOW; effectively removing an FDP (Flight Duty Period) of R1 ASR.  Also; trip removal and another added. Upon check in today for the scheduled; Dispatch notified me that I was removed from the line and assigned me R1. I asked Dispatch to confirm that this was my first official notification of the schedule change and confirm that I called for show time for the FDP assigned line. Remove the NO SHOW and correctly document the line show time and start and end of the FDP; and the change to R1. Additionally; for FAR 117 compliance; the pairing today needs to reflect the FDP start time for the proper show time and the amendment by Dispatch assigning the R1 after check-in extending the FDP from the scheduled end of FDP to the new FDP of the R1.

Airline pilot reported scheduling problems.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

At approximately 5;500 FT; the Flight Attendant called the cockpit to tell us there was smoke in the cabin and that other passengers see it as well around rows 12-17. At this time we asked to level off at 7;000 FT and declared an emergency. The Flight Attendant said that the smoke had disappeared but we continued with the emergency landing back at our departure airport. We were cleared for the visual Runway 28. Exited the runway and pulled into the pad for a visual inspection of the aircraft by the rescue team. They reported no outside issues to be noted and we continued to the gate; where we deplaned. It was an overweight landing by approximately 800 lbs.

The Reporter had not been told the smoke's source. Passengers reported different smells. One said an electrical odor; another reported a rubber smell. That aircraft was taken out of service and the crew continued the trip on another aircraft.

An EMB145 crew declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport after the Flight Attendant reported cabin smoke during the climb after takeoff. The smoke's odor was described as rubber or electrical in nature.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 11879; Flight Crew Type 9473

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Heavy rain on arrival at ZZZZ. Taxi lines difficult to see. Limited peripheral vision to notice movement after parking. Captain's first leg on a 767-300 after OE. Clearing runway the Captain's windshield wiper would not turn off and stow. We tried to park it several times with no success. This created a major distraction on taxi in at a destination new to the Captain. As we approached the hard stand I tried to park the wiper one last time. In my haste I accidentally turned the APU switch off. This created a further distraction. Captain set the brakes and announced brakes set. Engines remained on while we waited for the APU to restart. Turns out the parking brake did not set completely. The IRO (Relief Officer) announced that we were moving. I immediately applied brakes and stopped the aircraft. The aircraft moved about 5 feet past the stop mark and lurched when I aggressively stopped. Everyone was seated and the seatbelt sign still on; so no one was injured. The wiper finally did stow. We debriefed the threats of the wiper; unfamiliarity of the Captain with ZZZZ; heavy rain; the APU shutdown and restart; and our [fatigue]. Vigilance of the IRO during the entire taxi in was key to the successful outcome of this event.

While parking on ramp [we] were distracted from normal parking duties by extraneous malfunctions in cockpit. We had a noisy malfunctioning windshield wiper and a delay in starting APU. These distractions along with long night flying lead us to not properly setting the brake. This resulted in aircraft moving forward after thinking brake was set. Vigilant IRO (Relief Officer) called out aircraft movement and brakes were applied and aircraft stopped without event.

B767 flight crew reported the parking brake was incorrectly applied which resulted in aircraft movement at gate.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 980; Flight Crew Type 325

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X; a Cessna 172; (my aircraft) was performing touch-and-go operations on runway XX and remaining in the traffic pattern. Aircraft Y; a Cessna 172; was a student solo performing traffic pattern operations. Aircraft Z; a Piper Seminole; was performing straight-in ILS runway XX approaches to ZZZ. After departing runway XX and on the left crosswind leg; I (Aircraft X) heard Aircraft Z on the CTAF frequency ask Aircraft Y if he saw their aircraft as they were below and established on final to the runway for a full-stop landing.  I do not recall the details of this conversation; but the result was Aircraft Y executing a go-around and continuing in the traffic pattern.  Aircraft Z continued to a full-stop landing. Prior to turning from left crosswind to left downwind; I took the controls of the aircraft from my student and raised the left wing so that both of us as well as the private-pilot certificated passenger in the back seat could scan the downwind to ensure it was clear of any conflicts.  I also asked the passenger to keep an eye out for Aircraft Y as it was apparent that there was confusion. We then turned onto and announced that we were on the left downwind to runway XX.  As we turned and announced a left base for runway XX; I recall hearing Aircraft Y report on the left downwind to runway XX. As we turned final; I cleared the area; announced the turn; and then focused on working with my student to establish a stabilized approach.  I also recall hearing Aircraft Y announce turning base and assumed he was behind us. As we were approaching approximately 1;000 feet MSL or about 500 feet AGL; the private pilot passenger in the back seat announced 'aircraft to the left; break right; break right!'  I took the aircraft from my student and immediately imitated a turn to the right.  As I raised the left wing we observed Aircraft Y off the left side of and above our aircraft turning final and descending (this aircraft was basically in our blind spot).  I do not think the pilot in Aircraft Y ever saw Aircraft X.  We (Aircraft X) are estimating that the miss distance in feet was approximately 300 feet horizontal and 50 feet to 100 feet vertical. We discontinued the approach and vacated the area without further incident.  Aircraft Y continued to land on runway XX without further incident. After the incident; I immediately contacted a flight instructor at the flight school responsible for Aircraft Y and informed him of the incident involving all three aircraft and was informed that the school is taking action to ensure additional training and evaluation for the pilot of Aircraft Y. This is a situation that probably can be rectified by additional training on traffic pattern operations and collision avoidance for the pilot of Aircraft Y including methods and procedures to help insure the maintenance of situational awareness.  It was especially concerning that there were two incidents back-to-back where the pilot of Aircraft Y was unaware of the traffic on final. At the time of the conflict between Aircrafts X and Y I was very consumed with instructing my student on a stabilized approach to landing.  I probably should have been more attentive to tracking his location behind me and questioning his distance.

A student pilot was observed in two separate near mid air collisions while on a solo flight in the airport traffic pattern.


Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We had taken off before dawn IMC in stormy conditions and had been getting vectors from ATC to avoid heavier weather for approximately the first 20 minutes of the flight. After flying the arrival into DTW in VMC conditions we were given vectors to join the Y localizer for Runway 22R. After being given the vector to join; DTW approach gave us at least three different vectors that turned us approximately 180 degrees away from the runway. Each vector was also given a slower speed and lower altitude. We had a very high workload. There was another [company] flight ahead of us with a similar call sign that took our call at one point and then approach also got confused and misread our call sign with an instruction meant for our flight. After approach got us turned back around and cleared us for the approach; we failed to switch over to green needles to track the actual localizer frequency instead of the 22R localizer in our FMS. We were VMC and shot the approach in white needles which brought us left of course for the currently offset localizer to 22R.There were several factors. Initially the weather was poor. Winds were gusting to 27 knots with low overcast and precipitation. During the departure there was turbulence; moderate precipitation with ATC giving us vectors to get around the heavier parts of the weather. Much of our focus initially was on navigating around the weather safely. This was also a relatively short flight with a high work load. Once we had completed the arrival and were given vectors to join the localizer there must have been an issue with spacing because we were given multiple additional vectors from approach that turned us 180 degrees back around away from the airport. These vectors also had altitude and speed changes. We were VMC and once we got turned back around towards the airport we stayed in white needles. I believe that if we had been IMC that we would have switched over to green needles and properly tracked the localizer. There was another [company] flight with a similar call sign that took one of our ATC calls and then ATC misread our call sign causing additional confusion. This was also the next to last leg of a four day trip and although we were fit to fly; I will say that I personally was not as sharp as I was on the first day of the trip. We had show times of about 5:00 am each day except the first day of the trip which adds up.As the pilot monitoring I should have recognized the error and informed the Captain. We have been given bulletins about this situation at DTW and I have flown into DTW several times this month; I should have caught our mistake. There was so much going on that we just missed it. It doesn't help that we cannot select the Y Localizer approach for 22R at DTW into our FMS. We have to manually build in all the fixes to do this and there was simply not enough time with everything going on during this particular flight to accomplish that. I think that in this situation in particular; having an obviously different call sign from our sister flight would have prevented confusion for everyone involved and would also have added an additional layer of safety.

We departed IMC and were avoiding weather for the first 15-20 minutes of the flight. We started the arrival into DTW in VMC. The ATIS was reporting visual approaches to 22L and 22R and to use the Y LOC frequency 111.75 for 22R. I programmed the ILS 22R into the FMS and put 111.75 into the back up frequency. We were following another [company] flight with a similar sounding call sign into DTW at the same time. We were given an initial heading to join the ILS Y localizer but then approach changed their mind and starting issuing different headings; altitudes; and speeds to put us behind someone else. A few of our calls were mistakenly taken by the other [company] flight and some wrong instructions were given to each of us. Once we were lined back up and given a heading to join the ILS Y localizer we had the airport in sight and told approach we had a visual. I failed to switch to green needles and was watching the approach course for the straight in 22R. Just after we called the visual; approach control told us we were left of course and at that time we got a visual on another aircraft that was lined up for 22L. I turned off the autopilot at that time and corrected to the right and got reestablished for the visual approach to 22R. We landed with no further incidents.The root cause was programming the wrong approach. Contributing factors were confusing instructions and task saturation. Suggestions for avoidance in the future would be a more thorough approach briefing. Especially in the situation of an abnormal procedure such as the ILS Y and the ILS in the FMS not being the same approach. Also to avoid the use of similar sounding call signs in the same airspace.

CRJ900 flight crew is instructed to fly the LOC Y to Runway 22R at DTW which is not part of their FMC database. The ILS 22R is selected for a backup then the crew forgets to switch to green needles when cleared for the approach due to multiple vectors for spacing. ATC catches the error.


Flight Crew Total 3695; Flight Crew Type 500

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Takeoff planned for ZZZ Runway XX; shortly after takeoff we got a cabin alert chime. Pilots ignored chime until 1000 ft AGL; and until we had put the aircraft into clean configuration. The FA were calling to advise us of electrical odor in the cabin. We were climbing thru 3500 ft to FL190; and asked ZZZ Departure for a level off at 5000 ft. they gave us 6000 ft level off. Captain flying at the time; engaged the autopilot; set 6000 ft; and selected FLCH W/spd 250 kts. Captain then advised FO he was flying and he also had the radios. Captain then contacted the Purser to receive firsthand info of situation in the cabin. The report was the odor appeared to be rancid and most pronounced in the mid-cabin; but was also initially discovered in the Forward galley. The FA advised they could not identify where the electrical odor was coming from. The Captain then advised the FA we were going to return to airport and to call back to cockpit if the odor continued or became worse. The Captain then made a PA announcement advising the passengers we had a problem that required us to return to ZZZ.Captain had the FO ask for return vectors to ZZZ airport and get a descent and slow the plane down to 210 kts. We then [advised] ZZZ approach control. We set up for a visual approach to ZZZ Runway XX. On approach FO contacted the cabin again to find if anything else was wrong and if odor was worse. They advised situation was the same. We continued the visual approach and landed uneventfully.We then taxied clear of the runway; contacted ops for a gate; contacted the cabin again; then taxied to gate and deplaned the passengers in an expedited manner.

After returning to the gate for a flickering/sparking light in the forward galley; maintenance determined that it was a loose bracket for the lightbulb that was responsible for the issue. After replacing a number of those brackets; we taxied back out to the runway. The flight attendant called to tell us that there was some slight flickering but no sparking this time. Our assumption was that it was just a lightbulb issue and not an electrical issue and that the flickering was normal. We continued the takeoff roll; however after about 4000 feet in the climb; the flight attendants called back and told us there was an electrical smoke smell. We immediately [advised ATC]; returned to the departure airport and landed without incident. Maintenance could not immediately determine the cause of the smell upon our arrival at the gate.

B757 flight crew reported the Flight Attendants called and said there was an electrical smell in the cabin.