Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 650

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

While climbing to cruise altitude of FL230 we noticed fluctuations of 50 to 100 lbs of torque on the right engine. While looking for a cause and leveling at our cruise altitude we observed the oil pressure of the right engine dropping down below 20 psi. We contacted ATC requested a turn back towards our departure airport while we trouble shooted the problem. During the initial climb and enroute climb the engine instruments were scanned and all parameters were correct; in limits; and matching. After a short check of the engine and the oil pressure dropping more; it was determined that a precautionary shutdown was required to prevent any damage to the engine.We then decided that a landing was required since only one engine was operating. A safe landing was accomplished without any further issues.Maintenance personnel checked out the aircraft [and] it was determined that the right engine dipstick was not properly locked in place and sometime in the final segment of the climb to cruise the dipstick came loose. Oil then leaked out of the engine causing the low oil pressure. The engine was then serviced per the Beechcraft Maintenance Manual and returned to service.The takeaway from this event is to have everyone double check what has been done or check with any engine before closing and locking the cowling.

BE9L instructor pilot reported torque fluctuations and low oil pressure in right engine; so the engine was shut down and a precautionary landing accomplished. On the ground it was determined the oil dipstick was not locked properly before flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Upon entering the ramp (Taxiway Delta to Foxtrot) both of us noted that the Foxtrot taxiway centerline on the ramp and perpendicular to the gate centerline seemed too close to the southern edge of the taxiway on the ramp next to the grass. Recommend a site survey be conducted for heavy aircraft arriving/departing San Salvador to better understand how close taxiing on the Taxiway Foxtrot centerline will place the main wheels to the grass and edge of the taxiway. It appeared that taxiing on the Taxiway Foxtrot centerline would put our wheels very close to the grass or in it. We elected to deviate from centerline to keep us away from the edge of the grass and edge of the ramp taxiway.  It is possible that taxiway Foxtrot was measured and painted for B757 and smaller aircraft.  Conduct a site survey of MSLP to determine if the taxiway centerline is measured and painted for larger aircraft like Aircraft X. Publish guidance on the -7 pages describing the need for deviating from taxiway centerline on Taxiway F if it is found to be of sufficient distance from the edge.

Air Carrier First Officer reported the taxi line at MSLP airport is too near the grass area for a large aircraft; creating a safety concern.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X contacted flight dispatch via Satcom requesting phone patch with Maintenance Control referencing dual pack failure. Aircraft X patched with Maintenance Control. At that time; on the fusion aircraft situational display; flight had descended to FL100 per the procedure in the AFM. Captain requested that Flight Operations Duty Manager and Fleet Technical Director come on the patch for additional guidance.  Per the AFM; with dual pack failure; step 4 or 5 indicated for flight to land at the nearest suitable airport. Initially; this was discussed and Captain said he did not want to go to ZZZZ. Best airport at the time was ZZZZ1. Weather; NOTAMs; airport facilities were good. Meanwhile for the next 30 minutes crew was busy still running multiple checklist with various EICAS messages popping up while talking to the fleet technical director.  ZZZ airport was brought for consideration as a diversionary alternate. It was decided between the Captain and crew and Flight Dispatch that Aircraft X would proceed to ZZZ for diversion alternate. The airport was approximately 1 hour 20 minutes away. As the flight proceeded south; the cabin and flight deck begin warming up. The Captain; crew and technical director were discussing how to cool both areas. At that time the crew started getting multiple EICAS failure messages pop up. It was then decided that ZZZ was not going to work and the new diversion station was changed to ZZZ1. Fleet technical director; Maintenance Control; and Flight Dispatch remained on the line with flight crew until they landed uneventfully in ZZZ1.

Dispatcher reported SATCOM call from a flight crew with a dual pack failure that resulted in a diversion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On climb out with clearance to turn to heading 040 the heading miscompare light illuminated on the PFD as the aircraft was turning....  ATC questioned our heading I compared my RMI to the co Pilots RMI his RMI was frozen and then rotated... I then notice my RMI was 60 degree out from the right RMI .... At that time I informed ATC that our compass system has failed and that I was trouble shooting the system.... ATC cleared us to a way point... When level flight was attained at a safe attitude the crew aligned their RMI's to the standby compass using DG mode.... After approximately 10 minutes in flight the RMI functioned normally in slaved mode- this is the normal position...After seeing the owners off safely I called Maintenance and AOG the aircraft; requesting that the system be inspected... There are no preambles to prevent this occurrence... The heading 'HDG' miscompare on the PFD will illuminate at some known locations on the ground prior to take off but this failure occurred after departure in a climb in a turn with no warning... This failure would be a very good training failure in re-current... Immediate corrective procedure during this failure is to inform ATC and request a direct- to a waypoint - this immediately allowed the crew to maintain their situation awareness in congested airspace. The long range NAV in the G200 is GPS driven; separate from the flux valves driving the RMI's.

During initial climbing out turn crew detected EFIS mis-compare [and] heading flags during turn to assigned heading. Situation analysis revealed both DGs in error; left vs. right about 80 degrees; right side DG froze during turn. Turned off window heat to observe whiskey compass to determine our actual magnetic course; at the same time ATC questioned us and we advised of compass failures. Asked for turn vectors to correct course. After a short time during straight and level flight system corrected itself. Monitored system and no other abnormalities noted. Aircraft written up.This aircraft has a long history of these problems. In the G200 Program Memos; under G200 Heading Anomalies 1-D1 magnetic flux low levels; or magnetic anomalies. 'Those caused by distortion of the magnetic field of the earth and those caused by the vertical component; or dip; of the magnetic field of the earth' are listed. These systems are getting old and we are starting to see more issues. Replace the flux detectors.

G-200 flight crew reported noticing heading miscompare warning after takeoff. Reporter stated the aircraft 'has a long history of these problems.'


Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Weather; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

This is a general report (no specific incident) related to RNAV (GPS) Z Runway 22L MDW. I flew this approach in visual conditions but as if we were IMC to see what this is going to look like when I have to do it in IMC. I apologize in advance for yelling with capital letters! HOW IS THIS APPROACH LEGAL?Given all the changes in our procedures over the last several years to improve the safety of our operation (specifically; but not limited to stabilized approaches); how did this approach pass muster for Company operations? The MDA is 1;020 MSL. DA would then be 1;070 MSL. That is 464 AGL and 11 degrees offset from the runway for making a decision to land. I flew this day VMC and was [not] wings level [until] below 300 AGL. Also; [at] the decision point; I do not believe the VASI was visible. If it was; I did not notice it until lined up with the runway.Given our stabilized approach criteria; this is not a safe approach and is setting us up for failure. Picture this: 737-800; maximum performance landing; weather at minimums; wings [not] level [until] below 300 FT at the end of a long day. Can you say tail strike? or worse? Again; from a safety system perspective; this approach is dangerous and is setting us up for failure. I challenge each of you to fly this approach and with a straight face explain how it is safe. Personally; yes I can fly it and make a decision as to whether I can land safely or not. Professionally; there is too much inherent risk in this approach and I will not fly it near minimums. This is a safety systems failure. Money over safety is very clear in the approval of this approach procedure.[We should] revisit this approach procedure [and require] higher minimums and/or less offset from centerline.

A B737NG Captain expressed concern that the RNAV (GPS) Z Runway 22L approach compromises the flight crew's ability to conduct a safe; stabilized approach; especially under adverse conditions.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 5400; Flight Crew Type 1510

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Our flight was uneventful until touchdown. The weather was good and the aircraft touched down normally on centerline; with zero drift and in the touchdown zone. When brakes were evenly applied the aircraft slewed immediately and drastically to the left. I countered with full right brake and rudder and initiated nose wheel steering. The left main and nose wheel departed the runway. As the aircraft slowed the nose wheel steering became more effective which allowed me to steer the aircraft back on the runway. Postflight inspection revealed minor damage.

With the aircraft heading towards the safety area on the left side of the runway; I assisted the pilot flying by ensuring full right brake and rudder had been applied.

The flight crew of a DA-20 lost control of the aircraft upon brake activation following landing. They were only able to regain control after the aircraft's nose and left main gears exited the paved runway surface. Minor damage was noted by the reporters.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Upon arrival at the gate in ZZZ I received a call from one of our aft flight attendants during deplaning. The FA's (Flight Attendants) in the rear of the aircraft reported feeling ill due to a strong chemical odor which commenced shortly after the top of descent and gradually grew stronger until touchdown. They reported that the smell was sweet; very; acute; abrasive to the throat and nauseating. They believed that the smell was nearly strong enough to justify utilizing O2 bottles but decided not to.As soon as I was made aware of the problem the aircraft was written up and per the request of both affected FA's. Paramedics were called. Multiple attempts by multiple crew members to medical assist company yielded very unsatisfactory results. Long hold times were followed by little if any helpful advice that I have been made aware of.Get rid of medical assist company. From what I have gathered from the affected flight attendants medical assist company services added more stress and anxiety to an already stressful situation.

Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event during descent until gate arrival. The fumes were reported by the aft flight attendants who experienced physiological symptoms.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 684; Flight Crew Type 69

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I landed gear-up. During my approach; I completed other checklist items including flap setting; trim; fuel pump; etc.; but failed to lower the landing gear. During the approach phase; I think that there were a few factors that contributed to my failure to lower the landing gear; as well as notice on final approach that the landing that the gear was not extended. I had been flying [for 7 hours]; and had a fairly busy afternoon and evening - by the time I had begun my approach into [the airport]; I was fairly fatigued. Additionally; I do not recall hearing the landing gear warning sound; which might have contributed to a subconscious false security that I must have already lowered the gear. My approach was somewhat abnormal as well; due to the fact that I had a late descent to the airport; and again; subconsciously I might have made the assumption that I had lowered the gear since the flaps were already extended in an effort to slow the aircraft. I believe my level of fatigue was the primary cause for my lack of awareness during the approach and landing. I cannot explain why I did not complete my Landing Checklist; other than the sum of all of the aforementioned factors helped instill a certain complacency. In all; the mishap could have easily been avoided through several measures: Better awareness of my fatigue level; and bringing back the basics of the IMSAFE checklist [and] ensuring a well-rested state before flying. Better approach and landing CRM; with thorough checklist usage throughout [and] improved proactive cockpit scan to include lack of a landing gear indication. Recognizing and avoiding abnormal flight situations that increase safety risk. Consistently practice [in my] safe landing gear habits; including confirming that gear is extended more than once.

The pilot of a Mooney M20 landed with the gear up but does not recall hearing the gear warning horn. The aircraft was not substantial damaged.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Cleared visual with GPS FMS backup. Vectored in for visual; not on intercept course to GPS straight in. Captain had airport in sight; I did not but knew general area of field (referenced Jeppesen graphic and noted field location in reference to major landmarks). As a crew we called field in sight. I began descent based on mental calculation; mistakenly assuming Captain was visually backing up me with regards to runway alignment and visual descent point. Captain assumed I had a plan and situational awareness of runway. [Received] GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) terrain message; Captain momentarily took controls; momentary stick shaker. Corrected flight path and normal approach and landing.Vertical guidance not set correctly. Communication breakdown. Failure to verify vertical guidance. Unfamiliar with airport at dusk. Never assume anything. Never assume in aviation. Never call field in sight unless pilot flying sees it.

Cleared for the visual approach. Also had the GPS approach in the FMS (Flight Management System) to back it up since it was dusk. Captain had airport and runway in sight. Assumed FO (First Officer) did as well. FO was flying and commenced the visual and started descending but was not on the course. Captain assumed FO knew what he was doing and making a tighter approach since FO was more familiar with the airport. Captain noticed proximity to terrain but terrain aural went off before Captain spoke up. Captain instructed FO to level off but the altitude kept decreasing. Captain took over and was too aggressive with the controls which caused a momentary stick shaker. Corrective action was taken. Aircraft returned to altitude and course and a stabilized; normal landing was made.Captain made erroneous assumptions based on FO previous experience. Captain should have instructed the FO to make a more square base to allow for a more conservative approach. Box was not set up to aid in approach (VNAV guidance snowflake). There was no shared mental model.As a crew we should be saying the plan aloud to ensure a shared mental model. If unsure of anything; airport location; course; plan; just ask and never assume. Ensure the box has been properly set up (VNAV snowflake) to aid in approach. Even though the approach was shot at dusk; being on the approach and briefing it as to shoot it at night would be much advised.

CRJ flight crew reported receiving a terrain warning on a dusk visual approach to LSE.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26.1; Flight Crew Total 409; Flight Crew Type 10.2

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

While receiving dual instruction I bounced the landing of my Pitts S-2B. The instructor declared; 'I have the airplane;' took control of the aircraft and attempted to salvage the landing. This resulted in a ground loop which damaged the landing gear. There were no injuries or property damage. After reviewing CFR 14; Part 830; Sub-part B; 830.5 we determined that an initial report to the NTSB was not required as there was no property damage or injuries. It took nearly two hours to locate personnel and equipment necessary to move the aircraft. During this time the aircraft was just off the runway and presented a potential hazard to landing and departing traffic. The Local Airport Management seemed to be unclear about their reporting requirements and debated about moving the aircraft. They chose to post an individual with a hand-held aviation radio to watch for traffic and provide advisories. Perhaps a nation-wide 800 number and posted placards for reporting potential hazards could have ensured immediate dissemination of the potential risk.

A Pitts pilot bounced the aircraft during landing and the instructor was unable to salvage the landing; resulting in a ground loop and damage to the landing gear.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

The O2 masks on the 737-800s I was on this week have a data plate that says approved to 40;000 ft. The 737 is approved to 41;000 ft. Is there something about the mask data plate that is incorrect?

B737-800 Captain reported an oxygen mask on his aircraft was placarded certified to 40;000 ft while the aircraft is certified to 41;000 ft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were loaded up on a brand new Max headed to ZZZ1. Shortly after initial speed up but before rotation we hear this loud pop sound from the #1 engine area. Then the plane fish tailed slightly to the left; we then hear braking and the reverse engine thrust and come to fast stop and an aborted take off. Sat on runway for about 10 seconds in silence. Aircraft stopped very quickly; no injuries reported from cabin that we could hear from passengers. Unknown damage at full stop.Parked on runway we then within a minute hear pilot on PA say to stay seated with seat belt on; as we will return to the gate to get it all checked. Pilot then calls flight attendant's (FA) on phone to alert us that everything is okay that we had a malfunction and we aborted takeoff.

Flight Attendant on a B737 MAX 8 reported the flight crew performed a rejected take off after hearing a loud pop from the number 1 engine.


Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Descending through 37;000 feet; we had the autopilot and yaw damp disengage. Yesterday; we also had the very same issue occur on this aircraft. In both instances we were cruising at 43;000 feet; with the exception today. We were in the descent; just out of 37;000 feet from 43;000 feet. In both instances; we were outside the GPS testing range; with no GPS abnormalities. About two hours into both of the flights; the autopilot and yaw damp disengage; and then; about two to three minutes later; we have an automatic switch to AHRS 2. After running the appropriate checklists; we elected to divert. No further issues occurred.

Twin jet pilot reported GPS abnormalities two days in a row.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Due to Sigmet 7 and Sigmet Juliet 2 we were aware of the eruption of X Volcano in the area and on our route.  At FL320 we communicated with ATC via CPDLC about observations.  They asked if we observed VA (Volcanic Activity); we responded; 'No VA seen.  Dark sky no moon. Lights down-EFVS shows clouds below.'  We entered a layer of IMC and identified it as volcanic ash.  Left and right turnoff lights were on; showing a very different layer: dark shadows; haze; shadows and contrast.  Not normal diffusion from clouds.  We monitored engine instruments/airpseed and immediately contacted Center on voice/VHF; reported the VA and requested and received immediate climb to FLXXX.  At FLXYY there was no smell; no dust in the cockpit.  No Saint Elmo's fire. No abnormal indications from engines or airspeed.  The onset was sudden.  At FLXXX clear skies returned and the layer lasted below us.QRH and FOM and training all underscored the importance of fast action; and reporting to ATC to alert other flights.

Air carrier Captain reported volcanic activity while airborne.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flying the published missed with autopilot in NAV and VS ALT to capture 4;000 [feet] as assigned by ATC. I was instructed to fly heading 070. After setting the heading bug to 070 I forgot to switch AP from NAV to HDG mode. The autopilot then started into the hold turning right to 161. [ATC] asked where I was going and at that point lost control trying to turn too steeply back to 070. In an unusual attitude I was trying to recover. Eventually; [I] hit the straight and level button on the autopilot and climbed above the cloud deck; got reoriented and rejoined the approach and landed without further problems.

SR22 pilot reported experiencing inflight loss of control while trying to correct to the proper track during a go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 1053; Flight Crew Type 441

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

I taxied from the ramp to the runway. Along the fairly long taxi route; I monitored the CTAF and took the opportunity to observe any traffic in the pattern and generally get a good picture of activity around the airport. Upon approaching the hold short line for the runway; I stopped; performed my run up and systems checks; and then again looked for traffic on downwind; base and final legs in the pattern. Observing no traffic; I made a transmission on the CTAF that I was taking [the runway] for departure; and proceeded past the hold short line while continuing to look for traffic in the pattern and airport surface. As I approached the edge of the active runway; my pilot rated passenger observed an aircraft on an approximately 1 mile final. I immediately stopped our aircraft; then turned around and exited back across the hold short line; and turned around to be able to observe the runway.The traffic we had observed on final continued its approach and landed without any apparent change in its approach path. I am unsure if the pilot of the other aircraft had observed our movements on the ground. After touch down we heard a couple of silent carrier transmissions on the CTAF; and I transmitted to the aircraft that just landed that there was no audio on their transmissions. After a short time; the pilot of the aircraft transmitted that they had experienced a radio problem; and thanked me for the report.After making a very thorough check for other traffic; we departed without further incident.I had an extensive discussion with my passenger about how both of us had initially missed seeing the traffic on final. Based upon the facts; it was apparent that my scan for traffic was ineffective in picking up the other aircraft. This was likely due to the angle of my aircraft relative to the final approach portion of the pattern; where parts of my aircraft structure may have blocked my view. Had I moved the aircraft as I usually do in order to get a wider view of the airspace; I would have had a better chance of seeing the traffic that I had missed.Contributing factors were:1) The lack of hearing position reports from the aircraft that was experiencing radio troubles2) Over reliance on my part that a quiet CTAF signified no traffic3) Obscuration of vision toward final due to aircraft orientation; coupled with the 45 degree angle the taxiway joins the runway4) No landing light observed on approaching aircraftCorrective actions:1) Never assume that a quiet CTAF means anything other than an unknown traffic condition. Some aircraft may not have radios or are experiencing a malfunction2) Always assure an unobstructed view of all portions of the pattern by adjusting the orientation or circling the aircraft as needed

After making appropriate CTAF radio announcements and entering the runway environment; a Piper pilot and passenger observed landing traffic on short final; so they quickly exited the runway. It was later determined that the landing aircraft had experienced radio problems.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on approach to DVL at approximately 3 mile final; the runway lights went out. We initiated a go-around; and started discussing options for where to go. Before we left the frequency; an ops vehicle called us on CTAF and informed us that they'd been having issues with the lights; and they would probably come back on in about 5 minutes. After verifying that we had enough fuel to fly to another airport if we made another attempt; we made a VFR pattern. As we turned base; the ops vehicle contacted us stating the lights were on again. We verified they were; and made a normal landing. While on final the 2nd time; [another] flight overhead tried to contact us; presumably because Center was looking for us as we had not yet canceled. They called us with the wrong call sign; but mentioned DVL airport and CTAF frequency; so I responded that we were on final and would contact Center shortly. They apparently didn't hear me; because they tried to call again. At that point we were focused on landing; so I didn't respond. After landing; we contacted Flight Service to cancel. They indicated no issues. I also called our dispatcher to alert her of the lighting issue at DVL; and she said she had not been contacted by anyone searching for us. The vehicle on the ground at DVL said they had been having issues. They didn't specify; and I didn't ask; for how long the problem had been happening. Our failure to notify ATC of our go-around was due to prioritizing aviate; navigate; communicate. We flew the traffic pattern first. While we did this; we were considering options for where to go if the lights did not re-illuminate; attempting to get more information from the ops vehicle; which was unresponsive; as well as making sure fuel was sufficient to get to another airport. By the time we could have made contact with ATC; we were about to turn our base leg; so aviate once again took priority. Determine the frequency this has been occurring at DVL by contacting airport ops. Provide extra contingency fuel for flights into DVL until the issue is resolved (I suggested this to our dispatcher already; who said she will pass it to the supervisor). If a go-around is necessary; attempt to contact ATC even if your plan is not certain yet. Details can be given and a plan can be made later.

We were cleared for the Visual 13 into Devils Lake; North Dakota. Conditions were night time with good visibility. We switched to the CTAF local frequency and make a normal visual approach. On short final; the runway lights went out and we were unable to reactivate them. A go-around was necessary and we executed a go-around immediately. Captain began to speak with maintenance personnel on the ground and the maintenance person said that it was an ongoing issue but they should come back on shortly. We stayed in the pattern to wait for the lights to come up and we were discussing a contingency plan if the lights would not come up. Another airborne aircraft was attempting to reach us to relay for ATC inquiry but since we were on short final on our second attempt; we did not answer him. On downwind for Runway 13 the lights came back on and we landed without incident. We contacted radio on the ground to cancel our flight plan which we did after landing and no further communication was made with ATC. On our debrief; Captain said we should have contacted ATC after our go-around but because of communication with personnel on the ground and communicating between Captain and First Officer about contingency plans and fuel concerns; we forgot and failed to contact Center regarding the go-around and intentions. Cause: task saturation after runway lights going out on short final. Suggestion: communication with ATC as soon as practicable after a go-around.

Air carier flight crew reported the runway lights at DVL were intermittently unavailable.


Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

Aircraft was dispatched with MEL [for an] Engine generator systems (IDG; GCB) RH INOP; requiring use of APU to power right side electrics. Although the procedures applicable to this MEL were thoroughly briefed; after pushback First Officer (FO) inadvertently selected APU to off per habituated normal procedures. Captain caught it almost immediately and returned the APU switch to RUN. The APU continued it's normal shutdown cycle because the switch was not placed to START then RUN. Although the MEL was completely understood and briefed; neither pilot caught that the APU had shutdown because they thought they had intervened in time by returning the APU switch to RUN. As well; during taxi out to the runway; no EICAS or panel lights alert that the affected electrics are not being powered by the APU nor that the APU has shutdown. The only way to ensure that the affected electrics are being powered by the APU is to verify PRIOR to takeoff that the APU RUN light is illuminated. No existing procedures guarantee nor mandate that this critical action is accomplished.During initial power application for [Takeoff (TO)]; both Utility busses auto load shed as a result of the right side electrics being unpowered. Aircraft speed never exceeded 10 knots and a slow speed reject was performed with the aircraft being taxied off the runway to an unoccupied taxiway. Corrective actions were taken by restoring the APU and a normal TO followed.Inadequate systems training and reinforcement of systems knowledge; operational application; during initial training. The brevity of systems training and lack of operational application does not provide crews with an adequate back-stop of experience when faced with non-normal situations.Additionally; during preflight no preliminary W&B was delivered to the aircraft. The Final W&B was delivered approximately 3 minutes prior to scheduled pushback. The lateness of the W&B created a feeling of being rushed; which ultimately led to the FO habituating to normal after takeoff procedures.Standardize procedures for operations with MEL's. Although the After Start Checklist includes RECALL and the Pilot Handbook (PHB) discusses unexpected EICAS messages; it was insufficient in this instance to prevent the event as the two EICAS messages encountered were anticipated and expected. If RECALL were placed earlier in the checklist; in this case prior to APU; the expected EICAS messages; and then appropriate follow-on action (APU on versus shutdown); would have been more easily facilitated. Additionally; procedures requiring crews with MEL's to discuss EICAS messages prior to calling for the After Start Checklist could help alleviate this kind of event.In addition; the MEL should be modified to include an additional Operations step.PRIOR TO TAKING THE RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF; ENSURE APU RUN LIGHT IS ILLUMINATED

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A B767 flight crew rejected the takeoff due to EICAS warnings resulting from mistakenly shutting down the APU after dispatching with a generator inop.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

We got the clearance for takeoff. The student had a hard time holding centerline during the taxi; so my feet were on the rudder as well. [Student applied] full power and started acceleration. The airplane was on the right side of the centerline; so I was helping him to intercept the centerline with my feet. We were slowly intercepting. [I believe he tried to] intercept the centerline of the runway [too] quickly; and kicked the left rudder abruptly. At the time; airspeed was around 50 and [we] started to skid left and right. I took the controls right away; slowed it down and made it stable. It was close to [a taxiway]; so I thought we had better abort the takeoff and move off from the runway. I declared the aborted takeoff and moved off the runway.

C172 instructor pilot reported rejecting the takeoff after the student experienced directional control difficulties on the takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

[I was] SIC inbound and on circle to land RWY XX at ZZZ from RNAV GPS RWY XY. While being cleared for the RNAV XY circle to land XX at ZZZ; the PIC flew through the final approach course due to her disarming the approach function in the Universal UNS-1 FMS. We were vectored back on course by ZZZ Approach Control. As we saw the runway and were descending to the initial approach altitude; ZZZ Approach Control cleared us for the visual to XX circle east; report canceling instruments with him or Tower. The PIC was preoccupied with many other extraneous matters and was voicing that. She began her descent to the circling altitude of 1;160 msl while I checked in with the Tower and canceled instruments. I recommended her to level off at the pattern altitude of 2;100 MSL; in order to have a much better view of the runway for the downwind circle. The ceiling and visibility were excellent. She disregarded my advice and continued her descent to the much lower circle altitude. When we arrived at the circle alt I was having difficulty keeping the runway in sight; the PIC had disengaged the A/P and was hand flying. Her heading was [20 degrees off from the] reciprocal of the landing runway and she was allowing the aircraft airspeed to slow down near Vref. I brought this to her attention several times and she would momentarily correct. As her situational awareness deteriorated; she told me to have the Tower call her base leg turn. I was struggling to keep the runway in sight at this low altitude and monitoring our airspeed and heading. She became preoccupied with what a poor impression she was presenting to our passengers; I told her to forget that and fly the aircraft. As a small single engine prop aircraft in the pattern with us was cleared to turn base and land; she became more anxious about ours and the runway location. I saw the aircraft turn base and told her she could begin her turn toward the runway; again her airspeed management became an issue. Her turn rate was becoming insufficient and I was more emphatic in my calls to her on turn rate and airspeed. At this point she became audibly irate with me and rolled out of her turn only to line up with Runway XZ instead of Runway XX. At this point the Tower; noticing the error; cleared her to land on RWY XZ. I asked her if that was her intention; at which she exclaimed RWY XZ was too short for us to land. I told the Tower we declined to land on RWY XZ because it was too short and the Tower told us to 'go around'. She did not execute our SOP missed approach procedure; I asked her if she was going to 'go around'; no answer. She simply flew the aircraft down the runway at the circling altitude. The Tower noticed this and asked our intentions. I said we would like to land on Runway XX; the Tower cleared us to turn left and enter the downwind for Runway XX. At this point I looked over in front of her and noticed the REILS and then the PAPI for RWY XX. I announced this to her; she apparently saw the runway and began here turn. I told the Tower we had the runway in sight. The Tower then cleared us to land. Even at this point in the approach sequence the PIC was complaining that she was going to look bad to the passengers. Again; I told her to forget about that and fly the aircraft. In summary I was very apprehensive regarding taking control of the aircraft from her at that low altitude and her low airspeed at night because of the possible negative and perilous reaction she might have. There was no CRM or situational awareness present and she was not at all responsive to my guidance.

Corporate jet SIC reported that during a circle to land maneuver at night; the PIC lined up with the wrong runway; allowed airspeed to decay; and did not execute an ATC-commanded go-around. The PIC did not respond to the SIC's guidance and CRM was compromised.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

After we pushed off gate XX; our pushback crew stopped the aircraft at a slight angle toward gate XY; while we were facing the service road between the ramp and the gate XX Safety Zone. The nose of the aircraft was approximately 30 feet from the service road.  I cleared my left side; my FO (First Officer) cleared the right side; and we began our right turn to taxi to Runway XXR. Since we were very close to the service road; our nose and left wing needed to cross the service road during the right turn.  As I was looking into my turn to the right; I noticed motion from the left side of the aircraft using my peripheral vision.  When I turned my head to the left; I saw a fast moving (Company) tug towing baggage carts approaching from my left traveling east to west on the service road. The vehicle did not stop and continued on the road traveling between my left wing and nose. As the driver was passing by; it appeared that he did not see us. I immediately applied the brakes to prevent the tug from colliding with our aircraft. We came to a stop just short of the road as the vehicle passed by. The driver swerved left off the service road and pulled alongside another (Company) vehicle and began talking to the driver of the other vehicle.  I set the parking brake; called (Company) Operations on the radio to report the near-miss incident with tug. The tug remained stopped momentarily while the two drivers spoke to each other.  The second driver seemed to be telling the offending driver that he was blocking our aircraft and needed to move away.  Tug did a looping turn and departed the area.  If we had not stopped; we would have had a collision with the fast moving tug and baggage carts.

B737-700 flight crew reported a ground conflict with a tug during taxi.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 14000

Night; cruise; smooth; flight deck lighting (dome lights) on - bright. Dry bright white light flash; and loud pop. Captain's dome light burst - debris contained within dome light panel. No odor; fumes; smoke. We checked for all of the aforementioned items; as well as for circuit breakers condition. Evidently; the Captain's dim dome lightbulb burst. After evaluation; and turning off dome lights completely (remove power to the dome lights); we continued to destination without further issue.Having flown the Airbus for almost 20 years; I have only experienced this twice… both in the last 3 months. Coincidence? Or perhaps a shipment of bad bulbs? We wrote up the defect; and sent a note to Maintenance. I write this report so as to document the peculiarity of this circumstance; and that; if necessary; a review of this event could lead to further understanding. Debriefed with First Officer and with contract Maintenance.

A319 Captain reported cockpit dome light failure.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 9483; Flight Crew Type 1300

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

I was administering a private pilot ASEL add-on to a commercial rated helicopter applicant with instrument helicopter rating as well.  During recovery from emergency descent; myself and applicant heard loud bang.  Sounded like baggage door opening.  Applicant stated he was having trouble flying aircraft and asked me to fly aircraft.  IAS approximately 80 knots; altitude 1000 FTt.  At 80 knots; I had trouble keeping aircraft going straight.  Full left aileron; approximately full left rudder.  I decided to slow aircraft and climb to approximately 2500 FT.  At 2500 FT; I slowed aircraft to determine controllability at different airspeeds.  Decision was made to fly 70 knots IAS on final.  At this point we were 19 NM NW of ZZZ with left flap at approximately 30 degrees; right flap 0 degrees.  Flew back and landed; wind approximately 090 degrees at 10 gusting 13.  Landed without incident.  My concerns: 1) Is this an 'AD' concern? 2) Based on my experience; I believe this would be a major flight control issue for a private pilot. 3) I am 6'4' and it was very uncomfortable flying aircraft in this condition due to flight control pressures required to maintain control.

The flaps had been extended during the emergency descent with the left flap failing to retract during clean up from the maneuver.  The reporter states that consideration was given to extending the right flap and rejected due to the fact that the aircraft was controllable and the possibility of making the situation worse.  Post flight revealed that a left flap track bearing had failed causing the flap to jam.  The cable connection between the left and right flap had snapped and was likely responsible for the loud bang that was heard.  Flaps had been manually preflighted by both pilots during the walk around prior to flight.

C172 Examiner reports a left flap jammed at 30 degrees when the flaps are selected up after an emergency descent with the examinee at the controls.  Examinee passes control of the aircraft to the Examiner due to controlability issues.  Reporter finds aircraft marginally controllable but is able to climb and land at a suitable airport.


Luscombe (Silvaire) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 530; Flight Crew Type 400

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

My student and I had just departed Runway XXR to do some training in the traffic pattern in ZZZ. We were instructed to extend our departure leg to allow aircraft on the parallel to turn crosswind before us. After that; Aircraft Z turned crosswind. We were given clearance to turn crosswind about another mile beyond them to join left traffic for XXL to start pattern work. Aircraft Y behind me was given instruction to extend upwind and to look for Aircraft X traffic on the crosswind leg - my student and I - and to report them in sight. He reported that he had the Aircraft Z traffic in sight and Tower gave them instructions to turn crosswind north of the Aircraft X traffic. Aircraft Y appeared to have seen the Aircraft Z ahead of us that was already on downwind but had not seen us turning crosswind to downwind. On downwind; I heard the situation play out on the radio and became aware of a potential hazard as we approached the normal crosswind leg. I saw an aircraft on the ADS-B screen on our transponder showing it approaching from our left and climbing with 200 - 100 feet below. I grabbed controls of the aircraft as Tower began advising Aircraft Y of Aircraft X traffic ahead; and told him to descend 200 feet immediately. I saw the aircraft approaching us directly from the left and did a climbing left-hand chandelle to avoid the converging traffic that appeared to still be climbing. I am not certain that they saw us in time to begin a descent; which is why I did not initiate a right-hand turn as stated in Part 91 for right-of-way rules. The aircraft departed the airspace to the west and we continued flying out traffic pattern with no action towards the other aircraft from ATC.

C172 Flight Instructor reported having to execute an evasive maneuver during an NMAC event while on visual approach as the other aircraft misidentified traffic; resulting in a loss of separation.


Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Captain (Pilot Monitoring) First Officer (Pilot Flying) Unable to contact Ramp 150 miles out.  We were switched to Approach and checked in.  Prior to descent Captain gave VHF L to First Officer to monitor while he attempted another contact with Ramp.  I selected VHF L rather than leaving the radio selection as it was. My selection of VHF L placed the Captain's radio control panel on the First Officer panel side.  I looked down and noticed the incorrect frequency for Ramp and said I would correct it. By doing this I changed the frequency of the Captain's head from Approach Control to Ramp in the active window and Guard in the secondary.   Captain called Ramp and was unable to contact them. He stated he was back on VHF L. We were called on Guard 3 minutes later and responded.  We checked in with new frequency to Approach control.      FIRST OFFICER; I; SELECTED THE INCORRECT BUTTON ON THE AUDIO CONTROL PANEL WHEN INSTRUCTED TO MONITOR VHF L.  I ALREADY WAS MONITORING VHF L (MIC) AND DID NOT NEED TO SELECT ANYTHING. I PUSHED VHF L DUE TO 12 YEARS OF MUSCLE MEMORY OF SELECTIONS ON THE Airbus. I SELECTED THE INCORRECT BUTTON. 3 MIN LATER WE RECOGNIZED THE CALL ON GUARD FREQUENCY THAT I SHIFTED OVER TO VHF L. THIS WAS MY FIRST FLIGHT IN THE AIRCRAFT. DURING TRAINING MANY INSTRUCTORS STATED THAT WE USE AND DIAL UP THE CORRECT FREQUENCY DURING EACH SIM.  WE DID JUST THAT.  HOWEVER WE ALWAYS USED VHF L.  WE ONCE USED SATCOM WHICH WAS VERY INSTRUCTIONAL.  I DO NOT RECALL EVER USING VHF R AND GOING BACK TO VHF L. A SIMPLE PROCEDURE IN ITSELF; HOWEVER IN A BUSY ENVIRONMENT SIMPLE ITEMS LIKE THIS CAN CREATE LARGER PROBLEMS. OVERALL THE TRAINING IS GREAT. HOWEVER; DUE TO THE DESIRE TO REDUCE TRAINING EVENTS THUS COST WE HAVE IMPLEMENTED MORE INFORMATION INTO EACH EVENT THAN CAN BE DIGESTED BY THE STUDENT. TAKE THE EXISTING CURRICULUM AND SPREAD IT INTO ONE ADDITIONAL FTD AND ONE ADDITIONAL SIM. TAKE THE OPERATIONS SIM AND PLACE IT AFTER THE LINE ORIENTED FLIGHT SIM.  THE OPERATIONS SIM IS THE OVERSEAS AND TRANS OCEANIC OPS.  IT IS DIFFICULT TO FOCUS ON THIS MATERIAL PRIOR TO A CHECK RIDE.  IF THIS TRAINING WAS PLACED PRIOR TO DOING THE ACTUAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MUCH MORE WOULD BE GAINED.  EFB HAS BEEN REFERENCED IN TRAINING BUT LITTLE IF ANY TIME HAS BEEN PUT ASIDE TO TRAIN IT.  TOO MANY ITEMS TO PROPERLY COVER IN ALLOCATED TIME.  GREAT INSTRUCTORS DOING THE BEST WITH THE TIME THEY ARE ALLOCATED.

B777 First Officer reports lost comm with Approach Control due to improper comm panel selection. The B777 comm panel operates differently than the Airbus the reporter had previously flown and this was his first flight after IOE. The subject was not adequately covered during training.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 496; Flight Crew Type 25

While being vectored for the ILS 24 PNE under VFR conditions; we were advised of a potential conflict. I was under the hood; the safety pilot took control and performed an evasive action. The other aircraft; a single engine; continued on course.

Piper Seminole took evasive action after experiencing NMAC.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft X was in conflict with another aircraft at 36000 feet. I queried the second aircraft if they were able higher altitude to cross; they replied unable 38000 feet but could accept 37000 feet. I then asked Aircraft X if they were able 38000 feet. The response was heavily accented and sounded like 'Able 380.' I asked to confirm; they then said what sounded like 'Standby.' A moment later; I heard what sounded like 'Unable 380.' I then climbed the crossing aircraft to 37000 feet. A couple minutes later; I noticed Aircraft X radar target had changed to a FREE track. I asked what fix they were proceeding to; they replied 'We're heading 280.' I became puzzled as to why and then cleared them to a fix on their route. They made their initial turn in the confines of the previous sector; but I did not notice that maneuver until they were in my airspace.I reviewed the tape and was able to then decipher what they said when I initially asked if they could 'Accept FL380 for crossing traffic;' they replied with '[garbled] heading 280.' I spoke with the Operations Manager to see if a Brasher notification was needed; but he said 'No; we should have caught that.'Readback/hearback is to blame. Heavy foreign accent is contributory. [Recommend] Fast-track Datalink/CPDLC. There is an increasing number of foreign flights operating in US airspace. Voice communications are becoming more problematic and readback/hearback errors of this nature could end badly. Most; if not all; long-haul airliners are equipped for CPDLC; as is NavCanada and Eurocontrol. If we want to maintain the safest system in the world; we need to adopt appropriate safety technologies.

ZMP ARTCC Controller asked an aircraft if they could accept a climb clearance to 38;000 feet. The responses were misunderstood by the Controller due to the pilot's foreign accent. The Controller noticed the aircraft turned to a 280 degree heading. The aircraft was still in the previous sectors airspace so the turn was not coordinated.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

East configuration; landing Runway 19L departing runways 10L/10R. Aircraft X was loaded on 10L; Aircraft Y was on approximately 3 mile final. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff; when they did not roll quickly enough I canceled their takeoff clearance. There was no response and I gave approximately 3-5 seconds to see if they were complying. At that time an aircraft on the adjacent runway said 'He's still rolling' I sent Aircraft Y around somewhere between 1-2 mile final. Once in the upwind I did a radio check with Aircraft X in case they had been NORDO. They responded with just their call sign. I changed Aircraft X to departure. NCT issued the brasher per the CIC. Aircraft X returned to tower frequency a few times confused on how or why to call us. I instructed Aircraft X to contact company upon landing at their destination and to get the tower number from them; then call the Tower.This is not the first time I have had a foreign air carrier ignore a cancellation of takeoff clearance. This is the first time it has caused a go around for me. I am not sure if it is company policy to not cancel after a certain point but; outright ignoring control instructions that are for their and others safety is unacceptable.

SFO Tower Controller reported an unsafe operation with a foreign departure and an arrival to the same runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 565; Flight Crew Type 135

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

Was preparing to land [I] noted that there was a low voltage situation developing. Cleared to land; and while on base leg noted that I could not lower my gear. I turned final and was deciding whether to abort and land on the nearby river when I noted that my radio communication with the Tower was failing. I could hear them; however it did not appear that they were receiving me. With another attempt at lowering the gear (unsuccessful); I exited the pattern at low altitude and headed for the river (as an amphibian that seemed to be my best option to minimize personal risk; aircraft damage and interruption of flight operations).Before I could reach the river; my engine started to cut out (due to below minimums on voltage) and [I] noticed a large rock quarry pond immediately under my left wing. I diverted into a left downwind to land on the quarry pond and while turning base lost all engine power. I maintained my airspeed to clear trees and power lines and made a successful (though glassy water so a bounce or two) dead-stick landing at the flooded quarry.Immediately on touchdown I called my FBO and requested they immediately call the Tower and notify them of my successful touchdown with NO injuries or damage. (I tried to look up the number on AirNav for the tower however was unsuccessful). Airport police were dispatched to assess the situation and I confirmed the lack of injuries or damage.After calling my A&P to come assist in repairs I attempted to ascertain the loss of system voltage.We checked aircraft systems and determined a possible left gear motor problem. The plan was to fly to the [home base] area and land on another body of water and make repairs there. I notified the Tower; took off with that intention; however noted warning messages on my MFD (Multi-function Flight Display) of low voltage so immediately returned and landed again on the quarry pond. After further assessment and correction of a loose cable; it was determined that it was safe to attempt a wheel landing [at the airport] which I completed safely; with no incident. Further discovery into the causal chain of events will be conducted to ensure safe continued operation of my aircraft.

SeaRey pilot reported landing in a quarry after experiencing inflight engine failure.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

I came from ZZZ airport and boarded the employee bus to the employee parking lot. The bus sat for about 20 minutes before leaving and waited to overfill the bus with employees. There were more employees than seats available on the bus. The driver still continued to wait for more people to board after people were already standing without seats. This not only puts everyone on the bus at increased risk for the spread of COVID; but also increases risk for injury for those standing on the bus. We were just asked to not board a crowded bus and instead wait for the next one; however; if all the buses are being filled in this way than this leaves no choice for everyone; but to either put themselves in an unsafe situation or find other means to get to the employee parking lot.

Air carrier First Officer reported a full bus of people on the employee bus which put everyone at risk of COVID-19 and increased risk for injury on the bus ride.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After arriving early; we stopped short of the J-line and waited several minutes for our ground crew to position and marshal us to the gate after an uneventful flight and landing. We parked the aircraft at [the] gate and accomplished the parking flow and checklist. I then opened the flight deck door and proceeded to say goodbye to the deplaning passengers. I immediately noticed excessive noise from outside the forward entry door. It was then I looked back into the cockpit and realized we failed to shut down the left engine. I immediately shut it down and the noise ceased. Apparently; we accomplished the parking checklist without visually verifying the left start lever was in the cutoff position.

The flight was unremarkable up until parking at the gate. The flight arrived 19 minutes early and it was a short taxi from Runway XXL to the gate. The Captain ordered the shutdown of the #2 Engine during taxi and I shut it down normally. He had started the APU and I switched electrical power to the APU in the normal sequence. After another minute; I closed the #1 Engine bleed valve; turned on the APU Bleed Air Switch and checked the packs switches in auto to provide more air to the cabin. We stopped just short of the gate to wait for the marshaling crew then taxied forward and parked at Gate XX. He set the parking brake. I don't remember specifically if the Captain ordered the shutdown of the #1 Engine but I assume he did and that I simply overlooked it and immediately accomplished the rest of my parking flow items. A few seconds later; he called for the Parking Checklist. I announced it and we did the required challenge and response of all steps; including 'Engine Start Levers;' 'Cutoff.' I usually look at each switch/lever as I read the checklist. I remember specifically doing a visual check of the start switches and transponder. I did not realize I had not placed the #1 Start Lever in Cutoff. I called the checklist complete and we both continued with other post flight duties. The jetbridge was positioned against the aircraft and the main cabin door was opened. Passengers started deplaning. The Captain had donned his jacket and hat and was standing outside the flightdeck doorway saying goodbye to every passenger; as he normally does. I was looking out the left window to see if external air was hooked up when the Captain quickly stepped forward and reached by me in order to Cutoff the #1 Engine. He said he had noticed the unusual noise level and then realized the engine was still running. That was the end of the incident. No one was hurt; no equipment was damaged; and no one else mentioned to the flight crew that they had noticed the error. I suspect the ground crew realized it but the Captain acted before they had a chance to say anything.

B737 flight crew reported neglecting to shutdown the left engine after parking the aircraft at the gate.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Two events occurred while conducting the RNAV GPS 13 approach to LGA. The initial event was a flap overspeed (not exceeding 5 knots) at flaps 30 for 3-5 seconds due to gusts. Approximate altitude was 1800ft MSL. Approximate airspeed was slightly above 185 (possibly 187ks). The overspeed occurred as we were initiating a step down on the approach from RABBY @ 2000ft to MEATZ @ 1300ft. Pitch and power adjustments were made to resolve the overspeed. Almost immediately following the overspeed; we received a TCAS RA (monitor vertical display) to not descend into the red arc. We stopped our descent and initiated a slight climb which resolved the RA. The RA was resolved with a small altitude adjustment. We were able to quickly regain stabilized approach criteria well before the 1;000 ft. call and opted to continue the approach. Prior to the events; the approach was stable and un-rushed. We were on speed at flap selection; however; I believe the combination of initiating our descent; wind gusts and a slight delay in power reduction led to the flap over speed. In regards to the RA; I believe the conflict was due to VFR traffic traversing the area along the Hudson River. We noted that a commercial jet aircraft (immediately behind us on the same approach also reported an RA).

Pilot reported receiving a TCAS resolution advisory while on initial approach to LGA.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

This was our second attempt to fly this trip. On the first attempt in the same aircraft; we had an icing system failure in icing conditions and returned to our departure airport. Maintenance checked it out and 'ops check good' was the result. This second time; similar problem; Wing Anti-Ice Fail message; a quicker decision to return but with an additional issue of needing to descend through a cloud layer in freezing conditions. We worked with ATC and found a break in the cloud deck and descended to 10;000 feet without encountering icing. The flight terminated in an overweight landing (I caught the landing weight on short final but told the First Officeer to continue because of approaching thunderstorms and low-level windsheer advisories) and briefed him on the need to make a smooth; low rate descent landing; and he greased it on.Everything seemed like it worked pretty well. The PF and I kept checking in with each other as we did our tasks to make sure we weren't missing anything. It was stressful and exhausting; with lots of things to do; reports to send; people to notify; frequencies to change; flight plans to fix; FMS data to fix; passengers and Flight Attendant stuff to do. The PF commented to me that he thought my idea/request to descend quickly in the opening in the cloud layers (basically VFR) to get below the freezing level was something he never would have considered before this event. He said he just kept wondering how we were going to safely get down through the clouds. We worked with Approach and did a descending 360 through a hole in the clouds to avoid ice and get below the freezing level.

An EMB-145 flight crew experienced a Bleed Over-Temp and Wing Anti-Ice Fail warning while entering icing conditions; and returned to their departure airport for maintenance inspection. The Anti-Ice system ground checked normal; and the flight again was dispatched. When entering icing conditions for the second time and activating the Anti-Ice system; they again had the same failure and the same Master Caution warnings as before.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

On our flight we were staffed with minimum crew of 6 flight attendants. When following the aircraft sign in sheet and abiding by the FAA minimum crew highlighted area it left door 2L without a FA (Flight Attendant) seated there. There was the Purser (myself) seated at door 1L and one FA seated at door 2R. All other flight attendants were seated aft of door 2. Door 2L is our main door we use for boarding and deplaning. Not having someone seated there is a major distraction for the FA assigned to door 2R. They not only have the two doors to arm/disarm but they also have to worry about the jetbridge/specials/gate agent at their secondary responsibility. Also during boarding they were using two doors to board passengers. That left only the aft galley FA to not only check and prep his galley but monitor bags/assist passengers/and remain vigilant of the cabin environment. Those are my concerns and observations regarding safety.Now from a service standpoint: when fulfilling the highlighted FAA minimum crew positions first that leaves us with no one in the position to work A zone galley. That obviously cannot be the case so the FA that was assigned the first class galley on the pairing worked the position even though she had to take a different jumpseat for FAA purposes. Now for in the economy cabin it took the 3 FAs working that cabin 2 hours to complete their service. Between the fact that you have only the galley FA available to sell food and nowhere to cross from aisle to aisle it made for the service extremely time consuming. A flight of that length is going to spur more passengers to buy food and not having at least a 7th flight attendant to support the economy cabin makes for an extremely long and inefficient service flow for passengers (and crew). From a staffing standpoint we had a deadheading reserve FA yet they weren't converted to work when they need was clearly present.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported concern that minimum FAR staffing was inadequate for proper cabin operations.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency

During descent; at FL250 with wing and engine anti-ice on; the RT BLD DUCT warning light illuminated. QRH procedures were followed which extinguished the warning light. We landed with the right engine bleed; bleed crossover; and the wing anti-ice off. We also declared an emergency with Tower as a precaution. Landing was accomplished and emergency was terminated. A maintenance logbook entry was made concerning the event.

During descent; a B767-300 RT BLD DUCT warning alerted then extinguished after the QRH procedure was completed; but as a precaution an emergency declared for landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Landed in SBPA runway 11. As Captain I took the aircraft from the First Officer after he slowed the aircraft to a safe taxi speed. I made the left turn off the runway onto taxiway E. Tower then told us to make a 180 at the end of the runway. We informed them that we were already on E. They said that D is not usable for us as our wingspan was to great; and to hold position. (E leads to D). Tower then sent out a follow me truck; and we then were cleared to follow him on E and D to the gate. A review of all of our flight pubs; notams and documentation reveals no information on us being out of limits for that taxiway. Update and/or correct the airport [tailored page] 10-7 and 10-9 pages for SBPA. There is a note on [the company] page that reads 'For landing on Rwy 11; you must taxi to the end and use turnbutton; 180 deg turns on runway are not permitted'. I took that to mean that if you need to make a 180; you must use the turnbutton located at the end of the runway. If it is meant to prohibit use of E it is very poorly worded and lacks the critical part of the directive.

After landing at SBPA the flight crew of a large air carrier aircraft exited Runway 11 at E. ATC advised the taxiway wasn't approved for aircraft of that size. The airport pages for SBPA advise only that 180 degree turns should only be performed on the 'button' expansion of the 148 FT wide runway at the far end. No mention is made of the restriction on use of the parallel taxiway.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Returned from break and was relieving the Ocean East D-Side. ACR X was in hand off mode to Miami Center and deviating over 20 miles south of course. I asked D-Side if he needed a point out to Key West Sector and the R-Side advised she was on line with Miami coordinating. So his replied was handled and left. Miami Controller advised R-Side W174 active and R79 advised that we did not even show it scheduled. Then R79 asked the A319 if able left 10 degrees left turn and pilot responded no. I advised Houston Missions who did not show W174 active. Advised W174 was active and Miami Missions had not advised Houston Missions who had not advised us. I advised that the A319 was unable turn due to weather and we needed airspace capped immediately. I recommend Airspace that [was] originally part of Miami Center at 8600W be returned to Miami Center. It should have never been assigned to Houston Center and is fraught with danger due to Military Airspace and lack of communication between Centers and causes both coordination with airspace and radio and radar communication errors. This is not the first occurrence over Military Airspace activity and numerous times we are not advised of RADAR outages either.

Aircraft was deviating east for weather. I was informed after off the sector by another Controller that W174 was active and the aircraft was in it. I relieved the Controller before me and he didn't advise of the airspace being hot. We show this airspace as active in real time; however we sometimes get calls from Miami that it's hot. We need to proceduralize the call when the airspace goes hot and/or cold.

ZHU Controller described a restricted area incursion when intra and inter facility coordination was incomplete.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Taxiways RA; RB; and RC are inadequately marked. It is difficult in VMC conditions to be sure which taxi lane you are turning on to. In low visibility conditions it would be very easy to inadvertently taxi on to the wrong taxi lane. Simply painting the taxiway designation onto each lane would be helpful.

A Captain reported that during day VMC conditions determining which Taxiway RA; RB or RC is being entered is difficult and during night IMC the task would be very difficult.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Upon landing; on roll out; got 'SPEED TRIM FAIL' light. Upon turning off runway; got left 'PACK' light followed by right 'PACK' light. ACARS had no 'on' time.  I asked [the First Officer] to check if we were depressurized- we were not. We went to manual pressurization and opened the outflow valve. It seemed pretty obvious that we had an air/ground sensor type problem as the ACARS scratchpad also indicated 'buffet alert.' I wrote all this up and I saw the Mechanic and told him about it. The next day; I called Maintenance Control to find out what happened to that plane. He told me they dried out some harnesses and could not duplicate [the problem] and signed it off. He then said that on takeoff roll; the [next flight crew] experienced similar problems; got airborne; declared an emergency and landed at [a diversion airport].  I am not pointing fingers at anyone; I just believe that with this type of problem; with obvious; specific write ups/descriptions of problems; that this is NOT what being a leader in safety and compliance is all about.

During troubleshooting of an apparent air-ground disagree problem; Maintenance personnel were unable to duplicate the problem. They signed off the discrepancy and released the aircraft for service. The anomaly appeared again on the next flight; which resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Type 1004

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Originally set at Houston gate X. We were set to push off of gate X approximately 34 minutes late at XA:33Z due to aft lavatory being cleaned and placarded inoperative. Once we pushed; I closed the APU valve for engine start; turned off the packs; and then tried to reopen the APU valve; to start engines. The APU valve would not open and was failed closed. After numerous attempts to recycle; consulting the QRH; and talking on the radio with maintenance; it was evident that maintenance was going to have to look at the valve and we would need to return to the gate. At this point it was getting extremely hot in the aircraft due to an inability to cool the aircraft because the APU valve had failed in the closed position. The temperature throughout the cockpit and cabin was over 90 degrees at this time. We called ramp and told them that we would be returning to gate X. Ramp then told us to confirm with Operations. Operations then denied us a return to gate X; even though it was abeam the aircraft. Operations cited an international arrival as the priority for gate X. The Captain tried to intervene and express his concern for passenger comfort with the temperature in the aircraft becoming more than uncomfortable and approaching unbearable. The Captain had concerns that the heat stress was unbearable for the passengers because at this point the aircraft was indicating a temperature of over 95 Degrees. Operations continued to insist that the priority for gate X was the international arrival. Operations then directed us to be towed to Gate Y. The Captain then relayed to the tug driver that we needed to be towed to Gate Y. The tug driver then refused to take the aircraft to Gate Y; citing that it was too far of a tow. The Captain then notified Operation of the situation to which Operations then coordinated for the supertug to meet us at the aircraft and get towed to gate Y. At this point the temperature was over 98 degrees. The Captain tried one last time to voice his concerns of passenger discomfort and fear of heat stress to Operations; to which; operations still directed us to go to gate Y. Once we were towed to gate Y; there was no jet-way driver there; thus causing further delay and more heat stress. Finally; we blocked in at XB:05Z. The Captain then elected to deplane the passengers in an effort to cool down the cabin and the passengers while maintenance worked the issue.After; a lengthy delay cooling down the aircraft; maintenance placarded the APU and properly annotated it in the logbook. The aircraft was reboarded and we pushed at XD:01Z. At this point the Captain was approaching his max duty day and approaching a Crew Critical Offtime (CCO) time of XD:32. The Captain accepted a CCO extension of 2 hours. We then departed at XD:25Z.After leveling off at FL370; approximately at XE:50Z; the left generator appeared to be offline; the switch was not depressed and the flow valve indication appeared to have no flow line; leading one to think that the left generator was offline. Due to this fact; the Captain inadvertently tripped the left generator due to its faulty indication. The generator then came offline as well as both utility buses were shed momentarily. The left generator and both utility buses were then immediately restored. No undesired aircraft state or overall safety of the flight was compromised as a result of this inadvertent trip of the left generator. Max duty day fatigue along with the extreme heat stress contributed to the Captain's inadvertent trip of the left generator. The QRH was then referenced to ensure that all items that resulted from this action were appropriately taken care of.

B757 FO reported the Captain inadvertently disconnected the left generator in flight following an extended ground delay in extreme heat.


No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

In my opinion Desk X on the AM shift for Date is flight release/task saturated. With the addition of 5G on top of an already hefty workload; I feel this desk Dispatcher could very easily lose operational control; if any Irregular Operations situations arise. This desk has ZZZ Functional Check Flight flights as well. So not only do I think the flights on my desk are at the boiling over pt.; throw in 5G; and ZZZ Functional Check Flight flights. This desk workload needs to be addressed. I do not feel I have or will lose operational control today; however I see this desk as setup for failure and could quickly slide down that slippery slope if anything were to arise. I did send a help alert for the potential of my desk needing help due to the sheer volume of work and daily work tasks. Factors that lead to my conclusion about my desk include daily weather/5G NOTAMs and material related/the shear amount of flights. The only solution I see as benefiting this situation is task reduction. More desk would equal less flights/tasks per desk.

Dispatcher reported they were task saturated and their desk has a heavy workload. Dispatcher expressed concern that 5G-related NOTAMs and additional flights increase the workload.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; MEL

Today I had the shift logs for 5 scheduled ferry flights; Aicraft X; Aircraft Y; Aircraft Z; Aircraft A; and Aircraft B. Started off by verifying departure times and flight numbers. Then reviewed the open items; MEL's; and scheduled Maintenance both assigned and possible expiring. Followed up with planning to confirm that there were no overtime items that I may have missed. Contacted the stations the aircraft were located; ZZZ; ZZZ1; and ZZZ2 and made sure they were aware of the scheduled ferry flights and reviewed the open items with them. Updated all 5 aircraft ferry flight checklist. Aircraft Z at ZZZ2 was the first scheduled out to ZZZ3. On taxi out the crew had the leading edge device amber light on the fwd panel. The aircraft returned to the gate where Maintenance evaluated the light and was unable to reset it. So; we placed it on deferral IAW the MEL. Sent the new arrange meter to request the new MFD (Maintenance Ferry Document) the equivalent of an MRD (Maintenance Release Document). The aircraft taxis back out and they receive a takeoff warning for misconfiguration of the aircraft for takeoff. Back to the gate again. this time we had to have Maintenance work the item as it is not deferrable. They replaced a box and performed the test and returned the aircraft to ferry flight ready status. 3rd time is a charm. the aircraft left ZZZ2 for ZZZ3.In the middle of all of this we had issues with Aircraft B in ZZZ1 with the potable water and a dead MEL along with 2 DIPs that required reinspect. During my conversation with ZZZ1 initially we needed the dead MEL cleared. It had been repaired but needed leak checked. Upon servicing the potable water and leak checking it they found that it still leaked. We were asked to have them fix it prior to departure. After further evaluation it would be a major job. The decision was made to go ahead and let it fly with the dead MEL added to the MFD. keep in mind this is several phone calls and all going on at the same time as Aircraft Z and regular calls for deferrals and any other number of problems and questions. After clearing all that up I went through my other aircraft to see how close to departure they were. that is when I noticed that [Aircraft] X and Aircraft A were airborne. Thought good; hey made it out without any problems. So; I went to update the paper work and download the MFD's and attach them to the logs and send them to the shift managers. that is when I panicked. When I pulled up [Aircraft] X and saw it still showed just an arrange meter I went to verify that it was truly in flight. My fears were confirmed it was. So; I called (Shift Manager) and told him. HE was on a call and told me he would get right back with me. While waiting on his call back I started reviewing the other aircraft and found that the same thing happened with Aircraft A. I sent [Shift Manager] a [message] letting him know about the 2nd aircraft. Shift Manager asked what happened and asked that I contact ZZZ1 to see what I could find out. I contacted ZZZ1 [Maintenance]. He explained that the crews called and they told them that they would have to contact [Maintenance Control] for the MFD as they are unable to issue one.After that call I followed up on Aircraft A as it was due out soon and reviewed the logs and logbook and issued the MFD.During follow up review of what all happened I discovered that the 2 DIPs requested to be worked had not been cleared. So; I notified Shift Manager and [ZZZ1 Maintenance] about the flight with overdue items not addressed on the MFD or cleared prior to flight.A couple possibilities. 1. One would to add to the procedure that prior to any ferry flight the crew should contact [Maintenance Control]  and review the aircraft maintenance status; flight ready status and any special request.2. Would be to setup the ferry flights like the regular flights where if the crew tries to depart without a  valid MFD they receive a warning to the flight deck stating they need a MFD. (I believe this one is possibly in work.)3. Have the auto generated log page for inspection be generated locked so Maintenance has to contact [Maintenance Control] when the ferry flight inspection is complete. With this option I think we should include in the inspection item discrepancy a statement like ***THIS ITEM MUST BE CLEARED PRIOR TO ANY FLIGHT CONTACT [Maintenance Control]***. This would reduce the possibility of Maintenance thinking that the inspection item is part of the ferry flight and supposed to remain open.

Maintenance Controller reported miscommunication and excessive workload caused multiple errors in releases for aircraft requiring ferry flight permits resulting in non compliance.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 17; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 15; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 30; Flight Crew Total 3000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Police / Security Involved

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Last month I was contacted by a chief pilot; stating they were losing GPS satellite coverage on the RNAV (GPS) RWY 33 approach within the last mile of the approach. This would happen intermittently with different aircraft; and different avionics.  RNAV (GPS) RWY 33 approach also uses Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) which is a network of ground-based reference stations to augment the Global Positioning System (GPS).After many inquiries to different divisions within the FAA; I discussed the issue with a Senior Engineer from DOT/FAA Spectrum Engineering Services; who put me in contact with the Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau. I spoke with an agent in Philadelphia. Agent located a GPS jamming unit in a truck located within one mile from the approach end of Runway 33. The truck was in a parking lot; henceforth the intermittent interference; when the truck left the area; the GPS approach was normal. Agent confiscated the jamming unit and destroyed it with a sledge hammer. The driver had no idea he was using a device that was illegal. He was using the jammer to disable a tracking device that was placed in his vehicle by a vendor; to hide his location.

A truck driver near PNE installed a jamming device to block his GPS derived position; but when nearby the airport the device also interfered with the GPS signal on the RNAV (GPS) Runway 33 final approach.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Weather; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was northwest bound near ZZZZZ intersection at FL260. The sector next to me was Sector XX; in another area. They had coordinated with my previous sector controller that they would just PVD (Display Data Tag) their ZZZ arrivals to my sector and would descend into my sector airspace without a 'phone call'. The controller I relieved informed me of this temporary agreement. As I took the sector; it was fairly busy and complex with significant weather impacts to the sector and ZZZ gate swaps in effect due to weather at the arrival gates. I don't know for how long I had a PVD on the aircraft that would eventually conflict with Aircraft X; but the first time I noticed the ZZZ arrival; the datablock indicated 27;400 feet; descending to 17000 feet (likely given 'descend via' by the sector XX controller). As soon as I noticed that the ZZZ arrival was potentially descending through Aircraft X's altitude; I issued a 020 heading to avoid the ZZZ arrival. Once I was confident this would add separation between the two aircraft I returned to other tasks and aircraft. I can only assume that sector XX did not see this traffic and I don't believe I displayed Aircraft X to sector XX. I should have done that and called to reference the traffic. Again; I'm not sure how long I was aware of the ZZZ arrival.Don't allow other sectors to simply PVD as a means of coordination. Perhaps a D-Side (they may have had one) on sectors would have helped with the coordination.

Controller had a data tag of an aircraft being worked by the adjacent Controller displayed on his radar in his sector airspace. No verbal coordination had been accomplished. Normally verbal coordination in addition to the data tag display is required in this situation. The controllers agreed for this time period that verbal coordination would not be necessary. The reporter did not notice the displayed data tag in his sector in a timely manner and had to turn one of his aircraft away to achieve separation.


Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Descending into PDX via the Moxie STAR we were cleared to cross seven miles south of VANTZ Intersection at 10;000 MSL. Because of how unusual this clearance was (VANTZ at 10 or 12 thousand is the norm) I queried ATC asking to confirm the clearance and ATC responded that was correct. The pilot flying mistakenly set 7;000 into the altitude alerter and I mistakenly confirmed 7;000 as a correct altitude. We descended to 9;500 where we re-considered the clearance; briefly talked and decided to stop the descent. At this time ATC asked our altitude. I explained we had become confused or misunderstood the clearance and were descending to 7;000 MSL; 7 miles south of VANTZ. From there ATC cleared us to descend and maintain 9;000. Flight continued normally.Being initially confused by the clearance to cross seven miles south of VANTZ and then seeing 7;000 in the altitude window may have drawn an incorrect correlation resulting in a positive response in my mind because of the relation between the seven mile south restriction and seeing the '7' recur in the altitude window. This is only educated guess to as why seeing 7 thousand set produced a positive response in my mind. Increased scrutiny of altitude set in the altitude alerter. Even though the pilot not flying may initially concur with the pilot flying's altitude selection it doesn't necessarily mean that is the correct altitude. Do not just agree with what digits are set in the window. Make sure to agree that the proper altitude set.

An unusual crossing restriction from Approach while descending on the MOXIE STAR to PDX led the flight crew of an EMB-120 to descend below their cleared altitude.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

On climb out our CAS system displayed 'PTRIM NML FAIL'; 'SWPS FAULT'; 'FLAP FAIL'; 'PTRIM BKP FAIL' all in yellow. Along with 'SPOILER FAULT' in white. At the same time the autopilot disconnected on its own. First Officer was pilot flying 'PF' and I was pilot monitoring 'PM'. [First Officer] immediately noticed the loss of autopilot and took control. As we were cleared to FL270 we continued climb as we discussed what we had going on. After acknowledging what we had displayed; I thought best to have [the First Officer] do the checklist items while I would fly and handle radios. [The First Officer] has a lot more experience with the Phenom and better systems knowledge to boot. I am a High mins Captain. With scattered thunderstorms ahead; over 300 miles to go until destination and in VFR conditions; we elected to return to [departure airport]. As we were now landing no flaps with a return to departure airport I told [ATC] we were returning. [The First Officer] ran all pertinent checklists and found that we needed a longer runway than [departure airport] had with a no flap landing configuration. I elected to go to [a different alternate] and [the First Officer] concurred. ATC helped greatly with information pertaining to runway length; weather and easy commands with clearance limits. As in direct to the airport and descents. I had the passenger lead come up front and explained our situation; she asked how long until touchdown and returned to her seat. [The First Officer] made a call to company and explained our situation. Once that was done [the First Officer] ran the checklists a second time and confirmed we had things straight. With the runway in sight; [the First Officer] ran the no flap landing checklist. What we missed during the checklists was the 'PTRIM NML FAIL' going away; [the First Officer] noticed this and asked me to try the electric trim. It worked normally but with no indication as that display was 'X' out. This helped immensely as the controls were getting heavy as was expected. Landing was as expected; high pitch attitude; fast approach and landing speed; with long roll out. Approximately 8-9000 ft of runway. I was easy on the braking though. We were met by numerous airport fire rescue as we taxied off. Taxi to [FBO] was done normally. We disembarked our passengers and baggage. I talked to a firefighter who was filling out a report. We waited with the passengers till the recovery aircraft arrived.It has come to our attention that this fault is caused by a computer failure that is becoming more common place in our fleet. In my past fleets; I had maybe 2 control issues in 13 years. We had two this week. One was a ground spoiler fail; the second being this event. If there is a way to preempt these issues; it should be taken. I was aware after the fact of becoming a little tunnel-visioned to hand flying the plane when I detected the control pressures changing. At one point I was having to pull upwards of 30 pounds of force depending on speed. Control became easier with both hands until electric trim was restored. This was definitely a distraction for my attention. Having good CRM was apparent and immensely important with my attention taken to flying an unconfigured plane. First Officer kept me in the loop and informed with checklist statuses. This was important to timing needs and when we could land safely.

While climbing to an assigned altitude of FL270; the autopilot disconnected and several CASS messages were displayed. They were PTRIM NML FAIL; PTRIM BKP FAIL; SWPS FAULT; FLAP FAIL; SPOILER FAULT. All of the indicators for the above system had yellow crosses; so a correct position could not be ascertained. I immediately pressed the quick disconnect button on the control column and began flying the aircraft manually.During this process; we were in a climb; and the aircraft was out of trim; which caused me to exceed our assigned altitude of FL270 by 200ft. I returned to assigned altitude within a very short [time]; and the Captain advised ATC that we had a problem. We took a moment to scan and verbally communicate as to what we were seeing and the course of action to take. The Captain and I changed pilot roles; he became the pilot flying; and I became the pilot monitoring. I pulled out the QRH and began completing the respective checklist. I verbally went through each checklist and kept the Captain aware of the status of each item. The Captain was flying the aircraft and communicating with ATC. We diverted to [an appropriate alternate] due to the long runways. All checklists completed as well as all landing computations and appropriate numbers. The landing was performed with no flaps but was uneventful. We taxied into FBO and shut down the aircraft. This would be an excellent training scenario for the sim. We train to land with flaps 0; but we always do it with the autopilot on and no other failure. The event that we experienced had both primary and secondary trim inoperative; we had no flaps [or] ground spoilers; and the aircraft was flown manually. I think that adding multiple failures into a scenario would better prepare us for the situation that we experienced.

EMB-505 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing loss of multiple flight control system components; including flaps; spoilers; and autopilot.