Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 15167; Flight Crew Type 2829

Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 12050; Flight Crew Type 250

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The maintenance crew chief asked the other pilot and me if we could perform a short maintenance test flight in the Falcon 2000 to check the engine anti-ice system. The purpose of the test flight was to determine if a problem had moved to the other engine after maintenance had swapped valves from side to side. This could only be checked in flight at high power settings as this was where the problem appeared.  We planned to fly a brief flight up to XXX VOR and back so we could get to a high enough altitude to have an outside air temperature cold enough to turn on the engine anti-ice system. We did not file an IFR flight plan as the weather was clear with unlimited visibility. We did plan to contact Approach control for VFR Traffic Advisories. We were also planning to troubleshoot a continuing nose-wheel steering problem that had been going on for almost a year.After engine start-up another Maintenance Technician was outside the aircraft to tap on the nose-steering unit with a rubber mallet if the control seemed to be sticking on initial taxi out. We made several short turns but could not duplicate the problem so we proceeded to the runway for departure. After several 90 degree turns we noticed that the plane wanted to constantly track to the right and slight steering inputs to the left would not correct the problem. It was only after larger inputs that the plane would jerk back to the left; the same problem that was seen on the last series of flights.Once we got to the approach end we performed the balance of the pre-departure checks and discussed that we would contact Approach Control once airborne. Once airborne the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) contacted Approach requesting traffic advisories while on a maintenance test flight. While on climb-out NFP asked if he should turn on the engine anti-ice system to perform the test. I told him 'not yet' and he thought I said 'yes' so he turned on the one engine. I then told NFP to turn it off because the TAT (total air temperature) was still 15 C; 5 degrees above the upper limit. The NFP then turned off the anti-ice and I then noticed that the control yoke was moving forward to a nose down position while I was hand flying the aircraft. At this point I thought that the autopilot had somehow gotten engaged and was leveling off the aircraft. I made the comment of 'what is happening'; when NFP stated that there was traffic crossing in front of us and that he was making corrections to resolve the conflict. As I looked up I saw what appeared to be a single engine Bonanza that came into view in my left windshield crossing left to right about 200 feet above us. I was surprised to see the aircraft and that we had no TCAS warning nor did I see any traffic on my MFD. I looked at the Transponder display to see if the code was in the display and then I looked at the Transponder switch to see that I was in the OFF position. I immediately switched the Transponder ON about the same time we heard Approach talking to the other aircraft explaining why he hadn't reported traffic (us) to him as he hadn't established radar contact with us because our transponder had was not turned on. The other aircraft reported that we crossed within 200 feet of each other. We continued climb to 10;500 feet; performed our engine anti-ice test; confirmed the failed anti-ice valve and returned to land without further incident. On decent we got a traffic advisory and also got a TA from the TCAS confirming that the system was working correctly.On post flight discussion with the other pilot I noted that this was the second time in the last month of flying with him that he has forgotten to switch on the TCAS system on leaving the blocks. Our checklist had been changed recently to put the TCAS switch as the second item on the checklist after turning on the taxi light instead of the first item to help another pilot who was also having difficulty getting the TCAS switched on. I feel that there were too many distractions during this flight that led up to the crew not being more vigilant about looking for other traffic. When we have ATC and TCAS systems working for us to help keep us clear of traffic we become complacent into thinking that these systems will prevent traffic conflicts. Also we should have briefed that we would not perform any tests until we were above 10;000 feet and clear of most other traffic. Trying to perform the anti-ice test so early in the climb was a major distraction which pulled me from looking outside into the cockpit. When the PNF smoothly but forcefully pushed the control wheel forward without saying anything as he was performing the maneuver; could have cause the PF to attempt to counter the control movement without realizing that it was the other pilot; not a system malfunction; and could have cause a disaster.We have a company Safety Management System in place and have identified this incident as a Hazard to safety and are in the process of conducting a full internal investigation and review with recommendations for changes and improvements to mitigate this from happening in the future.

During the early afternoon our aircraft needed a maintenance flight done to check a sticky engine nacelle heat valve and a problem with the steering. The day was clear VFR; unlimited visibility with the wind 090/06. I began the preflight with maintenance and as we circled the aircraft we discussed the problem the aircraft had had with the heat valve; how often it had stuck and that it had been swapped from one engine to the other in order to see if the problem followed the valve. I also asked if the valve was inoperative if there would be time to get it replaced for the upcoming flight that weekend. Maintenance assured me there was. I finished the preflight of the aircraft and the aircraft was pushed out of the hangar. The flying pilot; two mechanics and I discussed the steering problem and decided that if the system seemed to be sticking at all one of the mechanics would tap part of the system on the nose wheel with a rubber mallet in an effort to ascertain exactly where the problem was. I took the right seat and we proceeded to go through the various checklists. While we did this one mechanic took his place on the jump seat. We started the engines and after finishing the after start and beginning the taxi check we began to pay attention to the process of seeing if the steering system was working correctly or not. The flying pilot checked the brakes and then moved the tiller back and forth; slowly allowing the aircraft to move forward while a mechanic walked backwards on the right side of the aircraft watching me and the nose wheel as we moved. We moved from the center of the ramp and decided that the steering seemed to be working fairly normally for that part of the taxi check. During this process I kept my eyes on the mechanic and watched the right wing tip. After we exited the ramp I finished the taxi check; including an anti-ice check that worked normally; the flying pilot and I discussed flying North; climbing to or toward 10;500 feet; and getting traffic advisories. We finished the line-up check; made the necessary calls on CTAF and took off on runway 08. We climbed out normally and after gaining a safe altitude above the ground (2;000 ft or so) I asked the mechanic on board and the flying pilot if now would be a good time to test the valve on the left engine. The mechanic said it would be and I mistakenly heard the flying pilot say 'Can'. I turned the left engine anti ice on; got a green light and the flying pilot then told me that he had said 'You cannot' because the TAT outside was too warm. I replied that I had thought he said 'You Can'; apologized; and shut off the anti-ice which worked normally. I also glanced at the TAT and made a mental note that it read 13 degrees. (Later the flying pilot and I discussed this point. He said it read 15 degrees and I believe him. At the time we were climbing out rapidly and I can only guess that the temperature may have changed in the process.) He told me it was too warm and that I needed to be careful to look at the temperatures before I turned on the anti-ice. During this time we continued to climb out. I acknowledged this and began communicating with Approach; telling them we were VFR for advisories. They replied and gave me a squawk. As I dealt with inputting the squawk my head was down and I was listening to them talk to some other aircraft. During this time we continued climbing out. After I finished putting in the squawk I looked up; first at our altimeter; 4;800 feet; then outside and saw an aircraft at our 12:30 position moving toward our 12:00. I said; 'traffic' and pushed forward on the yoke of the aircraft because I was afraid that on our current trajectory we might collide with a Beech Bonanza. Our aircraft changed its course and we flew underneath the Bonanza at an altitude of 200-500 feet. If he was at a VFR altitude it would have been 700 feet but it looked closer. It was a few seconds later that the flying pilot found that I had missed turning on the transponder(hence no TCAS) during the taxi check and Approach verified that we had had no mode c during our climb out. As we returned I queried Approach if the Bonanza had been on an IFR flight plan and he said no; that we were both VFR. We returned without incident. There were several factors that led up to this event. The first was that I began watching the mechanic on the ground in order to communicate with him if there was any problem with the steering. There was not; but it took me away from the taxi check; the second item which is the 'transponder' which was a contributing factor later on. Also; I had not been part of the conversation that included the max temperature we are supposed to on turn the anti-ice. (There is an ongoing discussion among pilots concerning 10 degrees C to as warm as 15 Degrees C in the event that icing conditions may be encountered). This led to the next event which was confusion in the cockpit at 2;000 feet or so feet when I asked if 'Now was a good time to check the anti-ice valve' and received a 'Yes' from the mechanic and thought I heard 'Can' from the flying pilot. This led to the next event which was the flying pilot instructing me that it was too warm out to turn on the anti-ice and that I needed to check the TAT first. At that point I did and it was 13 degrees C while continuing to climb out. This led to the next set of circumstances concerning the turned off transponder and the flying pilot who did not see the Bonanza until after I had taken action. Many factors led up to that event; primarily; however; we deviated from the 'normal' processes we use on every flight and had failed to communicate on specifics of the flight.

The Falcon 2000 crew was on a maintenance check flight and was distracted by maintenance checks which resulted in the transponder being left off despite being on the taxi checklist. This led to a near miss with a Bonanza at approximately 5;000 feet; as the TCAS did not work and Approach Control had not yet established radar contact with the Falcon.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 5597; Flight Crew Type 2593

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was scheduled to fly over an event on the coast of ZZZ. I arrived about 20 minutes early and began orbiting nearby. The visibility was excellent and the air was smooth. I could see the mountains in the distance and the pier about 8 miles to the southeast. Rather than continuing to orbit; I decided to fly along the coast past the pier and back. I visually cleared the route from my location to the pier and turned on course; level at 1;200 feet MSL. I began a shallow descent off shore. As I descended through about 800 feet; suddenly; there appeared a banner tow aircraft just barely above and slightly to the left. I pushed down and to the right narrowly avoiding a midair collision.After the event; I realized that I had made a mistake. Even though I had visually cleared the area in front of me; I should not have flown a shallow; wings level; straight-ahead descent. I should have made one (or more) S-turns during the descent to scan for traffic ahead and below my flight path.

Pilot reported a near mid air collision and took evasive action.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 5

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Initially aircraft bounced upon landing. Power was added and a smooth touchdown of the main landing gear was accomplished. On landing rollout as the tail settled; a grinding noise was heard. Differential braking was initially effective; but eventually; the aircraft ground-looped hard to the right and the landing gear collapsed; causing the propeller to strike the ground and stopping the engine. Upon disembarking the aircraft; I looked and found that the tailwheel had departed the aircraft. The tailwheel was found on the runway near the point of the initial touchdown. No injuries were sustained by anyone during the course of these events. Upon further examination; the tailwheel was found to have had a faulty weld that lacked penetration. There was no documentation found of any previous repairs having been made to that portion of the aircraft. Improper and/or undocumented repairs under previous owner(s) of this aircraft were a primary factor in the incident.

Pilot of a tailwheel aircraft experiences a bounced landing followed by a smooth landing until the tail is lowered to the runway. A grinding noise is heard followed by a ground loop resulting in gear collapse and a propeller strike.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

ZZZ to WRG with 6000 overcast weather 10 miles visibility. Flew a visual pattern to runway 10 WRG at intersection JAXIS with flaps and gear down in the landing configuration. I got a hard terrain warning with all terrain and runway in sight on a visual approach following the track of the RNP 10 WRG. I must have been lower and a 1/2 dot or so west of the RNP approach course. And this is the first time I've flown this approach since the approaches have been updated in WRG; so that warning I got surprised me.

Pilot reported terrain warning on approach.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

While on the takeoff roll; the Autofeather System failed to remain armed and as a result I had to call 'Reject; Reject' and we then rejected the takeoff. The Captain then taxied clear of the runway; I made calls to ATC; the passengers; the Flight Attendant; Operations and finally Dispatch. We then proceeded back to the gate and swapped aircraft. While on the takeoff roll everything checked out fine. Then I noticed the auto-feather 'ARMED' light extinguish and called for a reject.I can think of two possible reasons why: First of all; this aircraft has a history of issues with the autofeather system. Second; Maintenance had worked on the Autofeather System the day prior which indicates there may have been improper maintenance.

During the takeoff roll; the First Officer called 'reject' due to the Autofeathering System failing to remain armed before V1. I slowed the aircraft down and took a high speed taxi exit while the First Officer notified ATC. Everyone; including the Flight Attendant; passengers; Operations; Dispatch; and Maintenance were notified and we returned to the gate without any further disruption to the flight and safety. I am uncertain why the system failed to remain armed because I did conduct an Autofeather Test and an Advisory Lights Test before the flight; so I suspect improper maintenance correction or simply equipment malfunction because the Autofeathing System had a recent history of problems. Moreover; MEL 61-2 relief was recently applied to the aircraft.

DHC-100 flight crew reports a rejected takeoff when the Autofeather armed light extinguishes during the takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 700

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

On landing; aircraft departed to side of an unimproved strip; went through a few feet of a corn field; and then returned to runway. The aircraft was inspected for damage; with only a minor dent on the underside of the airframe. Engine cowl was removed and engine inspected for foreign objects. No propeller damage was noted; and leaves; etc; were removed from around the engine. Then took off and flew the aircraft back to home base. Although the aircraft flew ok; in hindsight; I should have grounded the aircraft until a more thorough inspection of the aircraft could have been accomplished by a qualified A&P.

Maule pilot reports a runway excursion into a corn field during landing at an unimproved strip. The aircraft is inspected and leaves removed from the cowling then flown back to home base.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

[We] received a call from [operations] warning us of the risk of tail tip on arrival of [a] B737-900ER. We were directed to offload 20 bags from the rear of the aircraft which had 88 bags and 182 lbs of freight loaded. The forward compartment had 59 bags and approximately 1400 lbs of airmail and 1 dog.  Load Planning should not be planning so much weight to be loaded in the rear of these aircraft. They know these airplanes are tail heavy and yet they keep dictating the load plan to be completed in an unsafe manner putting our aircraft; equipment; employees and passengers at risk.  We offloaded everything from the rear before deplaning any passengers and we still saw a significant weight shift once passengers began deplaning.

Ramp worker reported a 'significant weight shift' during passenger disembarkation in a B737-900ER even though they had already unloaded considerable weight from rear pits.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were on a normal turn out of ZZZ when we had a slide deploy at the front of the airplane on the First Officer's side.The flight was progressing as normal. I had my MFD on the status page before push and all doors showed green. We did before start flows and before start checklist. We were cleared to push and also to cleared to start engines shortly thereafter. I reached over and started engine one. The number one engine was fully online and had stabilized when we received a master caution. The EICAS message was saying that the front door on the FO (First Officer) side was ajar. By this time we had completed the push and the ground crew was working on getting the airplane ready for taxi. The Captain called back to the flight attendants to check on the door and maybe try to recycle it. We sat there as we heard the Flight Attendant try to get the door shut. After a few seconds of messing with the door; I heard a loud hiss and the airplane started shaking. At that point we had determined that the slide had been deployed. The Flight Attendant then called to let us know what had happened. He tried opening the door and then closing it again. This was an honest mistake and had no malicious intent. It was an abnormal situation in a high pressure environment.The cause could've been a quick misinterpretation of wording between the crew. The FA (Flight Attendant) was told to recycle the door and I've heard that wording can be misinterpreted throughout the whole [company] fleet.Change the wording in the in-flight manual for the words 'recycling doors.' I've heard it can mean something different in all the airplanes and I guess maybe it was taken one way or [another] the night of the incident.

After push back in ZZZ on Aircraft X; we had an accidental slide deployment. Prior to push back; I verified the doors were green and told the ramp crew we were cleared to push. As we started the number 1 engine; once it came online we received a 'DOOR SERVICE FWD OPEN' warning message. I called back to the flight attendants and the number one answered. I had interrupted the safety demo that he was already doing. There must have been a perceived miscommunication as the next thing I knew there was a slide deployment. Thankfully no one was hurt when this honest mistake occurred and there was no willful intent by any crew member to deploy the slide.I believe the cause was miscommunication on the interphone between the CA (Captain) and the number one FA (Flight Attendant.) A contributing factor was the delayed flight and a rushed turn at the outstation.In the future I intend to treat any door issue similar to this event with a better initial reaction. First words to the FA will be to ensure the door is disarmed while following procedures more specifically.

ERJ-175 flight crew reported an inadvertent emergency slide deployment after pushback.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54.7; Flight Crew Total 512.5; Flight Crew Type 163.6

Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

This airport is known for deer in the environment of the runway. When I was lined up to land I did not see any deer in or around the runway. There was also a large deer fence along the side of the runway that I thought would protect the runway. After landing on Runway 27 I was slowing the plane when my passenger started saying 'go-around' at that moment 5 deer started to run across the runway in front of us. I decided we would not be able to get airborne and climb above the deer in the time/space between us and the deer. I got on the brakes harder and attempted to steer between the deer on the runway as I got the plane as slow as possible before impact. I missed the first deer but the second deer disappeared under the right side of the plane. There was a thump as we rolled over the deer and I immediately noticed lost pressure in the right brake. I was able to control the plane using the left brake and right rudder. We taxied clear of the runway and to transient to assess the damage to the plane. The deer was dead but no one was injured and the plane had minor damage to the gear door; the brake line and the prop. I may have been able to prevent this incident by overflying the runway to scare away any deer that may be there that I couldn't see. I didn't think it was necessary since I couldn't see any deer on final. Now I think I will do that procedure if there are deer visible or not when landing at an airport with a known deer problem. (My passenger says they were brown deer that blended with the brown grass near the runway and couldn't be seen until they moved.) The residents in this airport community said they have frequent deer strikes on the runway.

PA28 pilot reports a collision with a deer during landing rollout causing minor damage to the aircraft and killing the deer.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted

Once airborne me and the FO (First Officer) could smell what it appeared to be oil fumes coming from one of the packs. This kind of event happened in the past but it would normally go away almost immediately. This time the odor was strong enough to get us talking about it. Around 2;000 MSL I called the FA (Flight Attendant) to see if she was smelling the same thing but she did not. During the climbout I decided to momentarily turn pack Number 1 off and the smell went away. At this point we were sending messages to Maintenance Control and they told us to monitor the oil quantity and informed us that Dispatch was following our conversation with them. We noticed that the oil quantity for ENG Number 1 was showing 9 QT; we had 12 QT before we left; and the oil smell was minimal but it was still present.At this point I wasn't comfortable going all the way to [the destination] breathing that kind of air in the flight deck and I started discussing with the FO the possibility of an air return. I called the FA again to verify if she or anyone in the cabin were complaining about strong smells of oil but she said that everything was OK. The FO and I talked about possible physiological side effects that we needed to be aware of and because of that we were constantly asking one another how we were feeling. I also suggested using the oxygen mask at intervals as a precaution. Right at that point Dispatch sent a message asking if we wanted to return and we said YES. We got a route amendment; we made a plan; I informed the FA about our intentions; talked to the passengers and finally to ATC.Even though we never [advised ATC]; [they] still treated [us like a priority]. Once below FL250 we turned the PACK 1 OFF to minimize the exposure to the fumes and at a lower altitude we turned the engine bleeds off and supplied air-conditioning from the APU. The FO at some point was complaining about a minor burning sensation on his nose and we both started feeling a light headache descending through 6;000 MSL.There were rescue vehicles waiting for us and we were directed to stop the plane on the taxiway and wait for them to complete an aircraft inspection. They thought we had smoke in the flight deck and I had to correct them. After giving them more details about our situation they found a puddle of oil on the ground below ENG Number 1. We taxied to our gate; made an entry in the aircraft log; talked to Maintenance staff about the situation; talked to the on-call Chief Pilot and told him that I was not fit to fly anymore. He suggested that we should go to the airport clinic and have a check-up but since it was closed we concluded that the best action was getting some rest and go to the clinic next day early in the morning.Even though we had no smoke in the flight deck I should had performed the FIRE/SMOKE QRH and have worn the O2 mask the whole time and not just using O2 at intervals like we were doing. I would suggest that the FIRE/SMOKE QRH should be renamed in a way to address the possibility of fumes when smoke is not present.

EMB-145 Captain reported that after takeoff there was an odor of oil fumes in the cockpit.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

A CRJ was inbound on the STAR arrival. An E120 was inbound on the same STAR arrival. I left both aircraft on the approach and descended the CRJ to 090 and the Embraer to 100. I first noticed the CRJ was faster so I knew that aircraft would be #1 and the Embraer was #2. I descended the CRJ to 070 and transferred to Approach Control. Before I transferred communication the CRJ said they have the airport in sight; so I assumed as soon as they checked on with the next controller they would clear him for the visual and they would continue their descent. I then told the Embraer to reduce speed to 210 KTS then maintain 070; he read it back. I soon noticed the CRJ was not descending and the Embraer was catching him. I turned the Embraer to a 030 heading and called the traffic; he called the CRJ in sight but separation was already lost. The Embraer was still told to maintain Visual Separation and vectored across the Final Approach Course and eventually cleared for the Visual Approach. I will make sure the aircraft is at least looking for the person he will eventually be following. Also do not assume what another controller will do. I will watch the speeds of the aircraft and not assume who should be faster. It was too close to bet on the separation working itself out and I should have been more diligent in my efforts to separate the aircraft. I acted too late; so next time I will ensure my separation sooner.

Loss of separation occurred when in-trail separation was allowed to deteriorate below requirements. The reporter acknowledged less than necessary diligence during this occurrence.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 153; Flight Crew Type 153

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC

I had been flying my glider for about 2 hours and been working both south and north of my home field. The total distance between the furthest points covered was about 20 miles. I had been north as far as I could get with the available thermals and then worked my way west looking for more lift. Finding no lift I turned back south to follow the valley back to the gliderport. I was in straight cruise at about 26-2700 ft. when a power plane suddenly appeared right above me at what I estimate to be 50-100 ft. He was almost on the same heading as me and was descending. My glider is equipped with PowerFlarm which will give an alert when it detects an active transponder signal. I had been getting alerts during the entire flight; but did not get an alert from this plane even when it was right above me. I was also monitoring Tower radio traffic from a nearby airport and did not hear anything about a plane approaching from the north. However; there was a lot of radio traffic on both my primary and secondary frequencies and I could not keep up with it all. After the plane passed me; I heard someone notify the nearby airport Tower of a close call with a glider that they estimated to be 50 ft below them. Because it was a few minutes after my encounter I thought they were talking about someone else. In hindsight; given the low number of gliders in the air at the time; I think it was probably a report of my encounter.I don't know what more I could have done to avoid this conflict. If I had gotten an alert on my PowerFlarm I most likely would have banked my glider to make it more visible to an approaching plane. I do not know if the other plane had an operational transponder; but if it had I should have had warning of its approach. I will recheck my PowerFlarm to make sure the antenna connections are secure.

Schleicher glider pilot reported an NMAC with a light single and did not get an alert from his PowerFlarm unit.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After boarding was completed and main cabin door shut. Flight Crew started both engines for turn out and Flight Attendant notified cabin secure but aircraft seemed hazy and had an odor. Shut down engines and had Operations come back with stairs and opened main cabin door. Called Dispatch and talked to Maintenance while deplaned the passengers. Pack 2 on with Pack 1 off produced smoke/haze. Flight Crew detected with maintenance on the phone. Pack 2 started to make an unusual noise just prior to engine start but no other indication was noticed. Talking through with Maintenance we discussed the cause was pack 2. Deplaned. MEL'd pack. Reloaded passengers and went to ZZZ1 as normal but delayed.

EMB-145LR Captain reported a fumes event prior to pushback.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 8350; Flight Crew Type 35

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Time Pressure

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Flight was night; VMC Part 91 reposition flight; IFR flight plan; from MMU. Crew was me only; no passengers; no revenue; [I] usually fly aircraft as a two crew. This was beginning of issue. Aircraft is a Proline 21 with IFIS. Proline 21 Exp is about 190 hours of 8;600 hour career. IFIS Jeppesen charts with PL21 experience about 40 hours. Departure clearance was Morristown Two direct SBJ then as filed; 2;000 FT; 4;000 FT/10 minutes; departure Runway 5. I loaded clearance into FMS correctly; and executed. I did not bring up the Morristown 2 departure on the MFD as the airport diagram was being used to taxi. I set the Flight Director Mode to Heading for takeoff to runway heading. The FMS showed radar vector for the departure cleared for takeoff and accelerated takeoff on runway heading and climbed to 2;000 FT MSL. I failed to push 'NAV' at 400 AGL so the guidance for the prescribed turn to the south-southeast was never conveyed. When airborne I switched the MFD to map and TCAS Mode. I became aware I was in the wrong place reaching 2;000 FT when MMU ATC switched me to New York Departure. My confusion was implied at their question. I told them 'I think so.' New York gave me a climb to 4;000 FT and a turn to 165 degrees then 180 degrees then direct my first fix.Contributing factors - only one crew on aircraft; [I am] used to two. Lack of backup charts on aircraft iPad no Jeppesen yet still learning IFIS; not yet well into flow.Corrective actions - print all paper charts for airport in use.Action/inaction - producing with takeoff without review of departure failure to engage FMS. Best before takeoff roll in this case not recognizing that no data presented to NAV pointer.Human factors - new situation; loss of round instruments and established procedures.Judgment - departing less organized than required given the automation additional demands for information sources and proper display.

A BE-90 pilot used to flying as a crew of two with a Proline 21 FMS; had a track deviation after he departed solo on the Morristown Six SID and then failed to selected the Flight Director NAV Mode which caused the aircraft to remain in the heading Mode; off the SID.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Start up and taxi was normal to Runway XXR. Once cleared for takeoff we taxied onto Runway XXR and began adding power. While maintaining centerline control with the rudder pedals; I noticed the control input seemed to be off as the nose drifted from centerline to the left at a speed of approximately 5-10 kts. At the time I assumed I may have hit a small hump in the pavement which effected the steering momentarily. After correcting for this deviation with the tiller; I added power to about halfway to TOGA (Takeoff Go-Around). Again; directional control with the rudder pedals felt incorrect as we drifted to the right of centerline this time. I added left rudder and the drifting to the right of centerline actually got worse. I then rejected takeoff; bringing the thrust levers to idle and called 'reject'. Maximum airspeed achieved was approximately 30 kts. The FO (First Officer) and I complied with all SOP's regarding a rejected takeoff. The FO informed Tower of the situation and we exited Runway XXR at Taxiway Q. Nosewheel steering with the tiller; and differential braking still worked perfectly fine.Once off the runway we developed and analyzed a plan along with the maintenance director on our jumpseat. We all agreed to head back to the hangar to have the situation checked out. We taxied to the hangar without issue. In the end; Maintenance discovered the rudder input command module was malfunctioning.The only way in our position to have discovered that this was malfunctioning was unfortunately when we did; on the runway maintaining directional control with the rudder pedals. In the future; a closer check by the Maintenance team after heavy maintenance could prevent a similar situation.Rudder command module which actuates nose-wheel steering malfunctioning.

CRJ-700 Captain reported a malfunction with nose wheel steering during takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 305; Flight Crew Type 5

Tuned radio to frequency while approaching ZZZ airport from the west.  I listened for traffic at ZZZ and announced intentions to land on Runway XY after crossing midfield Runway XY-YX.  These announcements were 10 miles and again 4 miles west of the airport.  Crossed midfield from the west; made right turn to the south to enter Runway XY from 45 degrees. Announced again on frequency entering left downwind Runway XY; announced base; then final for Runway XY.  Saw that I was high and went around.  At midfield; while departing and at about 100-200 feet AGL; I saw another aircraft approaching from straight ahead and about 75 feet above me and to the left.  The opposing aircraft banked right; as did I. The other aircraft must have been landing on Runway YX and was also going around; because I did not see an aircraft on the runway or taxiway as I approached.  I checked the airport traffic CTAF against my entered radio frequency and saw the correct frequency was frequency.  I had been announcing on frequency and did not realize I was on the wrong frequency. I had made an error in tuning radio and did not hear the airport traffic; nor did they hear me and my announcements.

RV-7 pilot reported tuning the wrong CTAF frequency at an uncontrolled airport resulting in an NMAC.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

On the afternoon of DATE; during preflight in ZZZ of what was supposed to be a ZZZ-ZZZ1 flight on aircraft X; the First Officer discovered a hydraulic leak in the left main gear. We stopped boarding; called Maintenance; and Contract Maintenance was sent out. I was asked to text photos of the maintenance logs and the hydraulic leak to maintenance; which I did. I timed out on duty period that afternoon; the flight was cancelled; and the First Officer and I spent the night with the intention of ferrying the aircraft out in the morning. In the morning; I sent photos of the logs to Maintenance; spoke to Maintenance about specific operating actions (there were none); signed the ferry permit; and then we did our preflights; de-iced and continued to an uneventful flight and landing in ZZZ2.  ZZZ station did a great job throughout the entire event; handling the crew members; Contract Maintenance; and upset passengers very professionally and cheerfully in the middle of a lot of snow. On DATE1; the First Officer and I received an email from our Fleet Manager regarding this ferry flight and asking about the amount of visible chrome on the main gear. I referenced the photo of the gear that I had earlier sent to maintenance and estimate it to be about two inches of visible chrome- within tolerances for our pilot preflight. I don't recall specifically if that was the case the next morning before we ferried the aircraft; but I do remember looking at the gear in question before we boarded; and I think that I would have noticed if it were much different than the previous night. After our email correspondence; I decided to do an report in case there's something in question regarding our preflight action. A good reminder for me that in the event that a maintenance issue spans overnight; I should clarify with maintenance that nothing has changed from the night prior before departing in the morning.

Captain reported that a hydraulic leak was discovered on pre-flight inspection by the First Officer. Maintenance was unable to repair; so the fight crew ferried the aircraft to a maintenance base. Subsequent to the ferry flight; The flight crew was asked about the chrome extension visible on the leaking strut.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was working radar in the tower cab and I had Aircraft X flash from (SHV) Shreveport; (SHV) called before I took the hand off letting me know that the aircraft has been pointed out with Polk approach (POE) because he is going to ride the boundary between us (MLU) and Polk approach (POE) the whole way through the airspace. As the aircraft approached Houston center's airspace flashed the data tag to Polk Low at Houston Center the data block flashed for over 10 miles. Aircraft X got closer and closer to their boundary. About 4-5 miles from the boundary I called Polk Low Houston center on the shout line 'no response' I called additional 3 times. My supervisor and I then proceeded to call on the dial line 'no response'. Also I had another certified controller call on the shout line while we were on the dial line. 'No response' I apologized to the aircraft but told him he needs to make a right 360 for me to stay out of Houston centers airspace. The pilot acknowledged but he hesitated and asked why; I explained to him very quickly that the next sector didn't take the hand off and I needed him to turn for me. By the time he started his turn he was turning inside Houston's airspace; the pilot understood and started to turn for me. Once Aircraft X got to about a 180 degree heading Houston center called quickly and stated radar contact over the shout line.Yes I could have done things sooner and reached out sooner and or had the aircraft turn sooner; that is my mistake for having him enter their airspace. But in all honesty MLU our facility has always had issues with Houston center; they won't answer shout lines it takes us 3; 4; 5 times to call for coordination and have something done or explain an issue or request something.But when they want something done they make a big deal of it if we don't answer the shout line right away. We need to fix this issue ASAP and they need to start answering the lines in a timely manner; don't make us call 5 times and 2 times on the dial line with no responses (in a polite way that is wrong).

MLU TRACON Controller reported an aircraft entered Houston Center airspace without proper hand-off.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 15

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

First flight under Part 107 Rules. I filed a flight plan using Airmap and B4UFly apps to do a roof inspection using a DJI Inspire 1. The information I was given by both apps was to be careful flying in FTY Class D Airspace. I called the Tower Chief and he suggested that I file for a waiver. I figured since B4UFly app was a FAA app and it said just to be careful flying within 5 miles of an airport; I went with it. As soon as I came to a 2 foot hover; I got warnings on my DJI app and immediately set it down; packed it up and reviewed the sectional charts again. After further review; I found the website I should have used to file a waiver; FAADroneZone.faa.gov; to file for waivers next time.

UAV operator reported failure to obtain an FAA waiver before operating within FTY Class D airspace.


Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Open Space / Field

Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) .1; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 20; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 20

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

I originally checked the VFR sectional and misinterpreted the dashed magenta line and did not realize I was flying in controlled airspace. I was not aware I was flying in controlled airspace until management reviewed my flight and made me aware of the situation. Management discussed with me how to properly research controlled airspace. I also flew this same location without prior authorization on [previous dates].

Part 107 pilot learned after a flight they flew in controlled airspace without authorization.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Base to final turn; hand flying; single chime and GEN 2 off caution message popped up on EICAS. I glanced over and saw it and said something out loud like; 'GEN 2 is off; I'm continuing; we're short final and landing.' A few moments later; I heard a clunk sound in front of me; followed by the sound of a tiny propeller spinning. Pilot monitoring mistakenly cycled IDG 1 when intending to cycle IDG 2.

During approach our workload was a little high because we had had some problems visually acquiring the field. On base to final we got a GEN2 OFF caution message. After the aircraft was configured and on final I attempted to reset the IDG but cycled the IDG1 switch rather than the IDG2 switch causing a momentary loss of electrical power and deployment of the Air Driven Generator. I instantly realized my mistake and turned the IDG1 switch back to on. We continued the approach and landed without further incident. High workload on final approach was an unfortunate time for GEN2 to kick off. In the heat of the moment and in a critical phase of flight I attempted to solve the problem but cycled the wrong IDG. In retrospect the correct course of action would have been to just land the aircraft as we were already on short final and work thru the problem on the ground. Alternatively we might have executed a go-around and ran the QRH.

CRJ200 flight crew reported a IDG 2 trip during approach. The Captain attempted to reset it; but used the IDG 1 switch causing the air driven generator to deploy.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

When I had taken the GC [Ground Control] position; RWY 03/21 had just been returned to GC after a small arrival to the runway. RWY 03/21 is typically used by GC unless prior coordination usually when traffic permits a small prop to land on it and [Local Control] LC2 requests use of it from GC. LC2 had requested the use of RWY 03/21 for another arrival no more than 15 minutes after I took the position. I; working GC had also [Clearance Delivery] CD/FD combined with me; so I had multiple things taking my attention. I authorized the use of 03/21. Aircraft X had called for taxi and I gave them standard routing for the flow we were in; 'RWY 10L; taxi via Tango; Kilo; Cross RWY 21.' I had forgotten that I had given 03/21 to LC2 position. The other LC had come over and was standing next to me which I thought was strange and I made a comment to why he was there and he drew my attention the fact that Aircraft X was crossing the departure end of RWY03 and Aircraft Y was short final for that runway on the opposite end. The LC2 controller was made aware of the situation at the same time. We observed that Aircraft X had been clear of the runway edge before Aircraft Y crossed the landing threshold. In air traffic control; we can't always rely on our memories - there is too much at stake for that. That is why we have memory aids that we utilize. I was using a memory aid when this occurred and my scan had failed me. I had gotten into a flow that is more common and rattled off a standard instruction without giving a second thought to it. In order to prevent this situation from occurring again; I need to utilize my good scanning techniques that have saved situations from happening in the past. By doing this; I would have seen the memory aid and could have and will prevent this from happening in the future.

Portland Tower Ground Controller reported crossing an aircraft; while the Local Controller had an aircraft on final.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Training / Qualification; Workload; Confusion

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flying the DYAMD 3 RNAV Arrival ATIS was advertising the Quiet Bridge Approach; weather was VFR. Just before top of descent we verified the DYAMD 3 Arrival. We were discussing what approach to expect based on the ATIS that said to expect the Quiet Bridge Visual. Looking through the company pages and the arrival page of the FMS it became clear that there is no coded approach for the Quiet Bridge Visual and we are not allowed to build it. The ATIS was NOT advertising the actual approach in use; which was the FMS Bridge Visual. While trying to sort this out we also noted the company pages had a statement about the use of TA mode on the TCAS below 3000 due to the congestion in SFO and the possibility of a TCAS RA. Anyway; during the next few minutes I took the time to select the different coded RNAV approaches and compared them to all of the appropriate plates in the event that we were given something unexpected. Somehow; I had left the box set up with the RNAV-Z Rwy 28R and not the FMS Bridge Visual after we were cleared to descent via the DYAMD 3. We started down and were well into the arrival before ATC cleared us to fly the course for the FMS Bridge Visual (RNAV-F). I was looking at the plate and briefed it. I looked at the MCDU page and saw RNAV for the approach in the flight plan page and assumed that I had the correct RNAV approach inserted. About the time we reached ARCHI; we were cleared for the FMS Bridge Visual and were getting very busy. I pressed the APPR button to join the approach and the V/DEV was showing a descent but the airplane did not respond even though I had set a bottom altitude of 1200 into the Flight Control Unit. While I was trying to figure out why the airplane was not descending we were issued traffic that was to join final from the south for RWY 28L. We reported that aircraft in sight and they reported us in sight. Things were getting even busier and the airplane was still not doing what I expected it to so I chose to select 6000 feet and went OPEN DESCENT and walked the altitudes down. About that time ATC asked us to report the bridge and/or the airport; which we did. A few minutes later; Approach asked us if we were doing the RNAV or the Localizer. We told him we were on the RNAV; which we were; although as it happens; it was the incorrect RNAV. He didn't say anything more about it as we joined final somewhere between the Dumbarton Bridge and the San Mateo Bridge. Our traffic was an Airbus that appeared to me to be going much faster than we were and it was going to join final right next to us. The separation on the approaches to RWY 28L/R is minimal and I did not want to be wingtip to wingtip. Approach told us to maintain 180 kts to the bridge even with Airbus right next to us. I didn't think that was safe so I slowed down 10 kts to about 170 kts to let him pass us. As they were closing on us; we were about 2700 feet or so and we got an RA. In the heat of everything that was going on we never put the TCAS into TA mode. I turned the autopilot off and steered the airplane away from the Airbus and offset my final to the right of course. The TCAS cleared and the Airbus leveled off above us and then passed us. Everything else about our final approach and landing was normal. The first part of this started before top of descent when the ATIS was advertising the Quiet Bridge Visual instead of the approach they were actually using. It takes time to set up and verify and validate an RNAV procedure carefully. Instead; SFO historically seems to think the actual approach in use should be a big secret until the last minute. It would have been nice to know what to expect before we started down. Once we started down on the arrival; things got progressively busier as we got closer to ARCHI. I simply didn't stop what I was doing and re-verify that I had the correct RNAV procedure programmed. Another hole in the safety model was made when I pushed the APPR button. Even though I had the incorrect RNAV procedure programmed; the one that was in there was still an RNAV approach and the autopilot should have followed the V/DEV commands. The fact that I had to 'walk' the descent down was another major distraction. In this particular case; perhaps having a coded procedure that said 'FMS Visual' instead of the other RNAV approaches would have made a difference.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A321 flight crew reported being assigned the SFO FMS Bridge Visual while the Quiet Bridge Visual Approach was listed on the ATIS. The FMS Bridge Visual could not be found in the FMC and the RNAV-Z Runway 28R was chosen inadvertently. This resulted in a TCAS RA with traffic for Runway 28L.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 151; Flight Crew Type 54

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was in the solo commercial cross country for ZZZ1-ZZZ-ZZZ1 and before arriving the ZZZ. I wanted to go to the bathroom quickly. Usually; I do touch and go but I did a full-stop in the airport. After been to the restroom; I realized that I was too late for the schedule once making a call to Dispatcher. The Tower told me that wind [was] 290 at 12; cleared for takeoff. I put in the left aileron and right rudder with rotate speed 55 and when I started flying; the aircraft loses lift and divert into the left side of runway on the grass. No visible damage on the airplane.

PA-28 pilot reported losing lift during takeoff and ran off the runway onto the grass.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

MEL had cargo restriction ...no fwd cargo.[Computer] had 2;900 lbs showing FWD.  I called load agent to ensure no cargo would be loaded forward the agent said they could extend the Envelope to accommodate the .1 aft cg problem.  I wound up with 3;400 lbs in the aft cargo.[Computer] called for reduced power T/O.I decided to go max power 5' flaps.The aircraft was longitudinally unstable after takeoff.  It required a lot of fwd then aft trim continuously.Cruise was uneventful.During the practice CAT 111 an extraordinary amount of force and movement was required to keep the HUD presentation within the proper parameters to continue the approach.At 200 feet 'No A111' Illuminated. The approach was continued.The landing was uneventful.I did not know the CG envelope could be extended to accommodate a CG problem however I strongly recommend against this practice if what I experienced is an example of extending the envelope.

During aircraft pre-flight; maintenance had possession of the log book. Approximately ten minutes prior to departure; maintenance brought the logbook to the cockpit.Upon review of the logbook; the captain determined that an MEL existed deferring the forward baggage compartment. As a condition of the MEL; no baggage was allowed to be loaded in the forward compartment. The Captain then reviewed the [performance calculations] printout and informed me that load planning had showed over 2;000 pounds to be loaded in the forward baggage compartment.While I contacted the station operations to insure that the crew chief knew of the situation; the Captain contacted load planning.Operations informed me that the crew chief was aware of the limitations and would not load any baggage into the forward compartment. I relayed that information to the captain.When the captain got off the phone to load planning; he told me that they were aware of the situation and would provide a new TPS showing no baggage in the forward compartment; which they later did. At the same time; the Captain voiced his concern that the load planning agent told him that 'Due to the fact that the aircraft was within .1 to .2% of the aft operating envelope'; they were required to utilize the 'extended C.G. envelope'.The Captain then asked me if I had ever heard of something like that on the 737. I told him that I wasn't aware of anything like that; but I wasn't sure. (In hindsight; I recall certain aircraft with an extended C.G. envelope; but I don't recall the exact envelope for the 737.)Prior to pushback from the gate; the captain wanted to insure that I was comfortable with us departing with the aircraft in that configuration. After reviewing all available weight and balance information; I indicated to him that I was.We were originally planning a takeoff utilizing 'standard power'. Considering the C.G. issue and runway conditions; the captain elected to go 'maximum power' for the de-rated thrust setting. I believe it was 22k. I agreed. Additionally; when ATC asked for an intersection takeoff; I requested 'full length'. The captain indicated to me that he was fine with that thinking.During rotation; we both noted a fairly pronounced 'wallowing' of the aircraft. Upon climbout; the Captain Pilot Flying (PF) verbally noted the reaction of the aircraft during rotation. I affirmed his observations with my own. He engaged the autopilot and we proceeded uneventfully.On descent; the captain indicated that he would like to log a CAT III approach. He fully briefed the approach to 18 right and we set up the cockpit appropriately.Once on approach; the autopilot was disconnected. Immediately; I noticed a distinct difference in the feel of the aircraft. The captain (PF) indicated his concern that the airplane felt pitch sensitive. I agreed. At approximately 200 feet AGL; we got a 'NO A-III' amber warning on the annunciator panel. The captain landed the aircraft firmly; but normally.After landing; the captain asked whether we had excessive deviation from the localizer or glideslope. I told him that I didn't see any reason for the NO A-III warning. The glideslope indication in the cockpit was fluctuating; but as far as I knew; it was never out of CAT III parameters. It may have been from the aircraft being pitch sensitive. Or; it may have been an anomaly from the ground equipment. (Or both) There was no protection in the Cat III critical area during our approach and landing.Needless to say; the flight landed without incident. However; our concern was whether or not the aircraft was being inadvertently flown with the center of gravity out of limits by the flight crew.While being the pilot monitoring; I could not testify to the control feel of the aircraft. However; it was my observation thatthe airplane could have possibly been suffering from some degree of neutral dynamic instability.Obviously in this situation; there is a need forbetter communication between maintenance control and load planning. Additionally; if the forward baggage compartment is unusable; perhaps we might recommend utilizing actual bag weights rather than the estimated weights we use in normal operations.

B737-800 flight crew reported noticing longitudinal instability after takeoff and on approach after being advised by load planning they were loaded using 'extended CG envelope' procedures.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Total 212; Flight Crew Type 212

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Uncommanded Windshear alert and weather radar test function activation on takeoff Runway 04R  in low speed regime. Rejected takeoff; appropriate QRC and QRH accomplished. Returned for takeoff Runway 04L. Same aircraft malfunction occurred. Second rejected takeoff was performed in low speed regime. Subsequently returned to gate and swapped aircraft. Appropriate ELB entry was made.

Pilot reported an uncommanded wind shear alert and weather radar test function activation on takeoff twice; then after the second returned to the gate for an aircraft swap.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10650; Flight Crew Type 8200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

FL290; approximately 45 nm south of ZZZ; SIC (Second In Command) noticed oil streaming across the left side of the right engine. Immediately after the master caution illuminated and both crew members noticed the right engine oil pressure in the yellow range indicating 65 PSI. Shortly after the engine oil pressure dropped to the red range and the crew received a master warning oil pressure low light. Crew immediately referenced the checklist and conducted the engine shut down procedure for the right engine. Crew then advised ATC and diverted to ZZZ. Crew completed a single engine landing that was uneventful.

B350 First Officer reported inflight engine shutdown in cruise due to an oil pressure problem.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19.7

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working radar sector 06 for currency.  Vance AFB called me with a manual hand off on Aircraft X.  It is common for Vance not to amend flight plans and manually hand them off to us; verbally coordinate what they have cleared them to do so we have to fix the flight plan.  Aircraft X's flight plan was showing a low altitude hard altitude; but level at FL240; and his flight plan showed he was direct KFOE.  The Vance controller said 'Hand off Aircraft X; requesting FL280; and he's direct ICT direct KFOE.'  Since there was a discrepancy I requestioned 'Direct ICT then direct KFOE?'  Vance controller replied yes; and he's requesting FL280.'  I rogered the request; slant ok'ed the data block and took radar on Aircraft X.  I got off the line and put FL270 in the data block; since it was correct altitude for direction of flight.  Went to other tasks in the sector; then when I came back around to Aircraft X I noticed he was climbing out of FL240.  I made a transmission to see if he was on frequency and got no response.  I called Vance back and asked them if they were climbing Aircraft X.  He said something to the effect of 'He's climbing to FL280.'  I said 'Who approved the climb on Aircraft X?'  His response was 'I called any high.'  I stated that I was any high and never approved a climb on Aircraft X; that all he had called for was a hand off.  While I was talking to Vance; Aircraft X checked in climbing to FL290.  I punched off the line and  asked whoever called to say again.  Aircraft X stated he was climbing to FL290 (which was negative RVSM; which was never stated.)   I amended Aircraft X's clearance to FL270; which he acknowledged.  Meanwhile; the Vance controller was calling me on the shout line.  When I finished separating airplanes I got back on the line; and the Vance controller reiterated that he had called any high for Aircraft X.  I restated that I was the person he talked to; and that Aircraft X was never apreq'd climbing to an altitude; that I was just given information as to what his route was and what altitude he was requesting.  The Vance controller then said something to the effect of 'Well is it OK?'  I stated that it was a little late to be asking that; as I was already talking to him and he'd already climbed.A couple minutes later I noticed Aircraft X was off course from ICT.  I asked him if he was headed direct ICT; and he replied that he was not; that he had been cleared direct KFOE.  I asked him who cleared him direct KFOE; and he stated that Vance had.Better training at Vance AFB.  Stop treating any error Vance makes (like spill outs; they're deviations) like they are no big deal so maybe the overall operation will be taken more seriously.  Give Vance more/better equipment so they can actually fix flight plans/remove flight plans/etc. themselves instead of increasing our workload.  Vance trainers; don't let your trainees (assuming this controller was a trainee since there was such difficulty on his part understanding what he had done wrong) keep calling in a situation like this; take control of the situation and inform them of their error off line and fix the situation with the center controller sooner.  (Again assuming this person was in a training situation)

ZKC Controller describes a situation with another facility that doesn't have the capability to change flight plans.  After conversing with the other controller the aircraft checks on climbing to an uncoordinated altitude.  A few moments later the ZKC Controller also observes the aircraft off route and queries the pilot as to where he is going.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 500

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

The grass and weeds have grown up so substantially that you cannot see the runway lights and or taxiway lights at this airport. The runway is in the middle of an unlit field and there are no city lights to assist. It has not been cut [in a while]. It is nearly impossible to Taxi at night if unfamiliar with the airport and landing is additionally a challenge. Further; the approach indicator lights are not accurate on Runway 24. If you follow the lights during the day; it will nearly land you in the trees on the approach and while at nighttime they are absolutely black and [not visible].

GA pilot reported the runway lights at DYB airport are difficult to see due to overgrown grass and weeds.


This report is being submitted as a preemptive measure even though no actual event occurred. On this past trip the aircraft was in need of two of the most recent chart revisions for the US; LAM and CA paper Enroute charts which are carried onboard the aircraft. None of the revisions were in stock at our base. These are very important charts to have onboard; especially when operating in foreign countries. I bring this up because I have been told that the company will be discontinuing the use of paper Enroute charts at some point in the future. It appears that there may be a problem in stocking current charts even now. On a recent leg from Costa Rica; we were routed up UIM328 SELEK; UL345 UVA; UG 448 TADPO. In attempting to locate a frequency for Havana on the enroute section of the EFB; we were able to find only one VHF frequency within the communications block of the FIR/UIR boundary icon; but it was not being answered. We did find the correct frequency on the current paper Enroute charts; and Cenamer finally provided it as well. In a later search of the electronic charts the additional frequencies were discovered in the Communications Icon. I don't know if both pilots somehow overlooked this information at the time; or if a subsequent connection to WIFI downloaded the rest of them. The other issue with the EFB is that the digital Enroute charts are all but useless. They require an inordinate amount of time to download and then remain blurry for an additional period of time. Even when they eventually come into focus; it is very difficult to become oriented on these charts. In summary; I suggest that the Enroute paper charts for the US; and all foreign countries in which we operate be adequately stocked in the base and carried onboard the aircraft indefinitely. The approach plates on the EFB's are fantastic tools; but the enroute information may still have some inadequacies. The paper Enroute charts will be a good back up; and they are not difficult to update making the expense; a worthwhile safety feature to our operations.

Hawker 800 Captain believes that paper enroute charts are indispensable and cannot currently be replaced by electronic versions.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Aircraft was cleared to push from gate. ATC asked us to push deep behind [adjacent] gate to allow for aircraft to enter our gate.  Pushback Crew completed 90 degrees pushing turn. I noticed the aircraft had gone beyond 90 degrees and was deviating from the taxi line at almost the same moment the aircraft shook and came to a stop. I aborted the number one engine start at that moment and shut down the number two engine moments later. After stopping; the tug driver stated that he might have hit something; but from the cockpit we had no visibility of the impact. We were told that in fact we had collided with the parked aircraft at [adjacent] gate. The decision was made not to move the aircraft and the Passengers were deplaned on the taxiway after coordinating with airport operations. I was not aware whether this was a three person push; but it seems that if a 90 degree turn is required than the push crew should always have two wing walkers.

During pushback aircraft struck an aircraft on an adjacent gate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 450

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During cruise at 6;000 feet MSL; engine began to run erratically and I noticed that the fuel flow was fluctuating between [approximately] 14-19 gallons per hour. I attempted to use the mixture to dampen the changes in fuel flow. I suspected that I had a failing fuel control so I turned the boost pump on low to supplement the fuel flow. I [advised] ATC and elected to divert to ZZZ. I informed ATC of my issue and was provided with great assistance. Approaching ZZZ; I noticed that the fuel selector was not fully in the detent. After moving the fuel selector firmly into the detent; the engine began to run normally and the fuel flow became consistent. I landed in ZZZ and terminated the event with ATC.

BE-36 pilot reported fuel system anomaly in flight. They discovered that the fuel selector was not fully in the detent and after repositioning it; the engine ran normally.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 9650; Flight Crew Type 70

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

IFR student at the controls for GPS approach with partial panel. Student suddenly lost control of the aircraft; I suspect with very large banking and the aircraft went very quickly from 3;000 feet MSL to 600 feet MSL. With airspeed at red line. CFII took control of the aircraft; stopped the descent and climbed back up to 3;000 feet MSL. The Attitude Indicator and Directional Gyro instruments had tumbled and were unusable. We were vectored again for the approach and landed safely. The CFII's iPad resting on his left knee was found after landing in the rear of the baggage area; about 7 feet distance. Incident was very scary and happened so fast. CFII will no longer do partial panel in night or day IMC.

Pilot on partial panel GPS approach during a night IFR training flight lost control of the aircraft. Instructor regained control of the aircraft; was vectored for the approach and landed.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Beechcraft Twin Turboprop or Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 82; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 200

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Airport; Airspace Structure

During initial climb out from a touch-n-go student landing; I was flying the aircraft to execute the initial climb and turn to downwind for another practice landing for the student to provide the student a break during our multiple practice landings for this training flight. I had made a radio call of 'Dayton Wright Brothers Traffic; Aircraft X on the go; runway 2; closed pattern;' Shortly thereafter I was critiquing the student's landing and I heard another radio call made by one of the other two aircraft working the traffic pattern using runway 2. That radio call was something like; 'Aircraft on final for runway 20; we're using runway 2.' I had not heard an 'on final' radio call for runway 20 by another aircraft; but the radio call cued me there evidently was traffic on final for runway 20. I lowered the nose of my aircraft and immediately saw another aircraft that I perceived was inside 500 ft. from our aircraft and flight paths were leading to a mid-air collision. I immediately took evasive action; making an aggressively executed steep bank right turn of approximately 90 degrees of turn to deconflict our flight paths. After making the turn; I rolled back to the left and saw Aircraft Y continuing its descent to a landing on runway 20. Three aircraft were conducting training flights in the traffic pattern for Runway 2; and had been doing so for some time; at a minimum the entire time Aircraft Y was on final for runway 20. Contributing factor to this event was the student training occurring inside my cockpit. Aircraft Y either never heard the multiple radio calls by the aircraft working runway 2 or disregarded the fact runway 2 was being used by the other aircraft in the pattern. From the human factors perspective; I accomplished the evasive action based upon an instantaneous assessment of the closure rate and angle of my aircraft to Aircraft Y; subsequently perceived our mid-air collision potential; and the need to aggressively maneuver to avoid the collision.

Pilot reported NMAC with aircraft nonreporting aircraft.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was the Captain on a flight during which we experienced a break down in safety procedures that arguably put us at the last line of defense prior to an aircraft accident. Gate deicing operations were in progress and our aircraft was consequently late to be towed to the gate from a remote pad. It had sat in frozen precipitation conditions overnight. We deiced with passengers on board and at completion the deicer stated they were finished and gave the time at which deicing commenced. No other info was given.I left my seat to notify the agent we ready to depart and on the way back in was told by a flight attendant that there was still 'ice at her exit.' Even though we were in a hurry and I wasn't sure which exit she was referring to; I elected to make an un-required post deicing inspection of the wings. They were covered in ice. There was an anxious passenger seated at the over wing exit who stated he was the one who had notified the flight attendant of the situation. We called to have the aircraft deiced again and I went to the ramp to wait for the deicing crew to return. I located the person identified as the certified deicer. He was not forthcoming and did not give any indication about being concerned with the situation. I had to ask for his name; to which he responded with only his first name. At completion of deicing he again failed to include his name; position; and fluid mixture/type.I have photos available. In my judgment; the aircraft may not have produced sufficient lift for takeoff. This was not a case of refreezing. The fuel temp was +2 and the OAT was +1.

Following deicing of the B737-800 at the gate an alert passenger advised a flight attendant the wing was still covered in ice. The attendant informed the Captain who checked; agreed with the passenger and refused the aircraft until it was de-iced properly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 6355; Flight Crew Type 4600

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I had just gone over the top of ATL; having been cleared VFR through Class B. About 5 miles southwest of PDK; Approach Control handed me off to PDK Tower. Tower advised me 1) to enter right downwind for Runway 20R and 2) 12 o'clock opposite direction Waco at 2;000 FT MSL. I slowed my descent to 2;300 FT MSL. Tower advised traffic had passed below on my right side. On resuming descent; I first saw the Waco at my 3 o'clock position; same altitude. PDK Tower advised a Cessna climbing (I surmised right cross wind after departing Runway 20R) to follow me on the right downwind. Simultaneously; my Garmin 530 displayed traffic alert at my 3 o'clock; 100 FT lower. I never saw the Cessna. The Waco never showed on the Garmin 530's traffic advisory. I surmise Waco was not Mode C. I also surmise that the Tower Controller misidentified the Cessna as the Waco on radar scope. Why was the Waco flying opposite direction on the downwind? Was the Tower Controller as badly confused as I think? I had pulsing landing light 'On'; plus five strobes. This was a scary dumb near-miss.

BE33 pilot reports a NMAC in the traffic pattern at PDK.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was filming the sunrise over the buildings with my 'DJI Mavic Pro' drone over downtown; at about 350 ft AGL. To capture the shot; I had the drone flying sideways for roughly a hundred feet or so. Prior to the shot I turned the drone to the direction of flight to ensure that nothing was in the drone's path; and there wasn't; and the drone performed the maneuver as planned. The next planned maneuver was to rotate the drone 180 degrees; and capture the same shot while traversing the same horizontal track in the other direction. Unfortunately; when I made my turn; I ended up a few degrees shy of exactly 180; which made my return track not perfectly parallel with my original track; and the drone drifted into a construction crane.I guess I would say the problem was caused by me not realizing that my horizontal track wasn't exactly the same as the first. To prevent this in the future I will use a waypoint mode to program and define preset GPS points along a predetermined route that are known to be obstacle free. Or a 'track' mode; that will 'fix' the compass heading so that no deviation is possible. That way the drone can fly the route; allowing the operator to work the camera with confidence that the drone won't hit anything.The only other thing that could have prevented this would be additional obstacle avoidance sensors installed on the drone. The drone has obstacle avoidance sensors facing forward; and downward only. If there were sensors on the sides; rear; and top as well; theoretically; it would be impossible to crash into anything. In this instance; a sideways facing obstacle avoidance sensor would have detected the crane as an obstacle and stopped the drone; preventing the crash.

UAV pilot reported running into a crane while filming a sunrise over city center.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 368; Flight Crew Type 5700

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 310; Flight Crew Type 8000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; General Maintenance Action

We were at level at FL 360 in an older -300 that had three MELs. One of the MELs was a deferred APU. The other two MELs were trivial items that had no effect on the flight. I was the PM and the Captain was the PF. Without warning the autopilot disengaged; all of the Captain instruments flagged; the aft #1 fuel pump Low Pressure light illuminated; on the pitot heat panel the CAPT P/S 1 AUX STATIC; TEMP PROBE; and CAPT STATIC 1 AUX P/S lights illuminated; the yaw damper disengaged; the pressurization went to alternate mode; the cockpit mix valve became fixed in the hot position; the transponder failed and both FMCs went blank. On the First Officer's panel the only flag was on the slow/fast indicator on my ADI. After some crosschecking with the standby instruments; it was determined that my instruments were reliable and the Captain transferred the controls to me. The 'A' autopilot would not engage at all and the 'B' autopilot would engage but would just drift off while engaged; so I hand flew the airplane. We requested and descended to FL 280 for RVSM compliance and communicated our navigation issues with ATC. We both moved our seats forward and inspected the breaker panels and did not notice any breakers tripped. The Captain asked what checklist to perform in the QRH since the problem was not obvious. I told the Captain I felt we had an issue with the Bus 1. Neither the TRANSFER BUS OFF light nor the gen 1 SOURCE OFF lights were illuminated which kept throwing us off. I again asked to check the breakers and again we both looked but did not see any tripped breakers. The Captain was thumbing through the electrical section of the QRH and was not having any success finding an appropriate checklist. We talked to the flight attendants and told them what was going on and asked them to make sure that everything seemed ordinary in the back and specifically asked to see if they noticed any smoke or electrical odors. They did not notice anything unusual. To further complicate matters ZZZ Center was having some radar outages so they didn't have our transponder or primary either. So I had to provide position reports to Center as well. The Captain decided to try to talk to Maintenance Control to see if they had any recommendations. The area that we were in at the time was not good for reaching any Company stations. We tried ARINC and initially got through but it was right on a frequency boundary and we lost the patch. It took some time but the Captain was finally able to get through to Dispatch via ARINC and asked for a patch to Maintenance. We never were able to talk to Maintenance however; and by this point; we were only approximately 150 miles out of our destination and decided to scrap it and continue on; land; and worry about talking to Maintenance on the ground. Weather was clear in ZZZ but had approximately 20 knot winds. We sat the flight attendants early and advised them that without the yaw damper the tail would be swinging around more than normal. Approach Control cleared us for the visual approach and we landed Runway 26 without any issues. Upon landing; the VHF 1 radio failed and we cleared the runway and communicated with Ground Control through VHF 2. Contract Maintenance came out and embarrassed both of us when after only a few minutes he discovered the NO. 1 ALT TRANSFER BUS breaker tripped. The location of the breaker makes it incredibly hard to see while seated. The ATS call microphone and cord hide those breakers down there. Also; most people place the trash bag on the First Officer's armrest and that also hides those breakers. Although we did move the trash bag; we still never noticed the breaker. Apparently when this breaker trips the TRANSFER BUS OFF and BUS OFF lights are inhibited.

While I was trying to figure this out; I kept hearing ATC say to my First Officer 'primary target only' so I switched to transponder 2 and ATC then got all our information back. I write this because there seems to be some confusion on whether we were NORDO or not. I can assure you; we were not.As I dug into the QRH; I could not decipher were to start. With no direct light off to begin with; I started QRHing every light and panel. I believed that we had lost AC bus 1; but why?I then decided to involve Maintenance. I contacted ARINC and got a patch to Dispatch. On the first attempt we dropped the call; perhaps out of range. On the second attempt; we had a strong signal but somehow were again disconnected. I didn't attempt a third.... The Dispatcher later told me that Maintenance had told them; to tell us; to 'QRH the situation; do what it says; and call us on the ground.' Not exactly the response I would have expected. We continued to ZZZ and landed without incident.If I had found it [the circuit breaker]; under our new policy; I'm not sure that we would have reset it anyway. It was day VFR and the aircraft was flying fine. It wasn't really an option since I never found it. After several tests were done by Contract Maintenance; we took the same aircraft on a revenue flight.

When a B737-300 flight crew suffered multiple failed systems including the Captain's flight instruments they descended out of RVSM airspace and attempted to troubleshoot the problem; the multiplicity of items inoperative hindering their attempts to access an appropriate checklist.  As they were close to their destination; the airplane and their destination in the clear and communications with Dispatch and Maintenance were problematic at best they opted to concentrate on flying the airplane to a safe landing and arrival at the gate.  Once parked at the gate Contract Maintenance discovered a popped transfer bus circuit breaker which was impossible to see from either pilot position.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7.7; Flight Crew Type 140

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

I was doing some pattern work at my home field to work on my landings and maintain currency. After receiving permission to taxi to XXL behind a business jet; I confirmed with Tower that I was cleared for XXL. In hindsight; I may have missed a radio call from Tower; and similarly during Run Up I had to repeat my initial call to Ground.Once in the air I completed one circuit of the pattern without issue.On a subsequent circuit I was to land behind another aircraft ahead of me. I made my base turn; at which point Tower notified me that I was cutting off an aircraft behind me. I thought I was number 2 for XXR; but it turns out I was number 3. During this time; if I recall correctly; there was a change of staff in process at the Tower and I had to change frequency. I know I missed a call at this point.On the next circuit the controller called my crosswind turn after takeoff. Traffic appeared to be busy plus there was another aircraft in the vicinity that the controller mentioned was not responding to radio calls. I continued flying west; as I had silence on the radios; then received a call from Tower telling me that my next landing would be full stop. I complied with that.After landing on XXR I exited [the runway]. I was then directed to taxi and hold short of XXL. Upon stopping short of XXL the communications in my aircraft died. Surprising as the alt has been showing a positive charge. My medical has a restriction where I can't accept light gun signals during the daytime. As I was already on the ground there was no way I could divert; squawk 7600. Fortunately as a comms backup I have the tower's phone no. in my cell phone so I called the tower; explained where I was and that I had lost comms. I was directed to cross XXL and taxi straight into the ramp.I advised the front desk at the flight school/club about the radio issues and they said they would let the mechanic know.In future; if I think I am missing radio calls; I will try and confirm such with ATC ideally during the run up. Also; despite the METAR noting 10 SM visibility; the haze in the air from forest fires may have contributed to spotting other aircraft.

C-172 pilot reported intermittent radio communication with ATC.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

I was working BWIFN/FS combined position in a 15L/15R operation running visual approaches. We are required to run 5 mile final interval for Runway 15R due to runway closures for 10/28. We are now also required to have our parallel traffic for Runway 15L to be no more than a 30 degree turn to final to reduce the chance of a belly up situation. This is work intensive for a normal flow VFR day only having to run a 3 mile final but with the additional restrictions for the airport it just adds more complexity to the situation. The Galaxy jet was issued a 200 heading and he reported the airport in sight; at the time there was no conflict with the B737 aircraft. He proceeded to the airport and I switched the aircraft. The B737 was given a 130 degrees turn to join they reported the field and were established on the localizer and cleared for the visual but since the Galaxy jet had been issued a 200 heading they 'lost separation' according to the TARP. The 30 degree vector to establish a straight in situation should not affect airports with parallels with more than 4;300 FT or more between center lines. There are two issues I see that can and will happen. First the pilot will report the field but we'll deny the approach clearance so we can give them the intercept turn; put them on a base turn and then get busy with other aircraft or coordination. They'll blow right through the final causing either an accident or real separation errors which could cause devastating consequences and what we call the snow ball effect. Second we give them the turn and a visual approach clearance and then they turn to whatever angle they want for the approach. Once the visual approach clearance is given all our instructions have now been removed and it is in their right to fly the approach visually as they see fit. So how is this ensuring anything? It increasing our work load and increases cost for aircraft with fuel; operation cost etc.

I was working our final position combined. Running visual approaches to 15L/15R I gave headings toward the airport for each aircraft that would alleviate the belly up situation when both aircraft had the field in sight I cleared them for the approach. The TARP indicated that they were outside the 30 degree intercept and indicated I had a 'loss of separation'. I feel the 30 degree intercept adds unnecessary work loads for controllers and operational cost for airlines for the excessive vectors for visual approaches. It should be reviewed for airports that have parallels that have more then 4;300 FT between runways. There was no unsafe situation for these two aircraft's approaches.

PCT Controller voiced concern regarding current visual approach 'turn on' restrictions as applied to visual approach procedures. The reporter noted the procedure is costly and introduces several safety concerns.


Distraction; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated

[The night before] I filled the aircraft. Both tanks were full. [The following morning my passenger and I] departed [our home airport] and flew to [an intermediate stop] where we picked up two [additional passengers]. From there we flew to [another airport] about 80 miles and had lunch. When we departed; I looked at the fuel totalizer on the instrument panel and saw that we had used 9.9 gallons. I did not look at the fuel quantity indicators which are located in the wing roots. When we were about 8 miles from home the engine quit. I called ZZZ Center; gave them our position and activated the 406 ELT. We landed in a marsh and flipped over. Everyone exited the aircraft and waited on the wing until the [State] Troopers helicopter arrived. There were no injuries. After the aircraft was recovered by helicopter; I notices the right fuel cap was off.

Pilot stated the missing fuel cap caused fuel starvation.

Small aircraft pilot reported an engine failure inflight resulting in an off airport forced landing and aircraft damage.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

We were flying to ZZZZ and were at cruise altitude about half way through the flight. I happened to look at the status page and noticed our center hydraulic quantity was indicating .54 RF and decreasing. We had no EICAS messages at that point but we started to review the QRH procedures and made a call to [Operations] and Maintenance to get them in the loop. Soon thereafter; we got the HYD QUANT EICAS message and observed that the center tank quantity was still decreasing at a steady rate. There were no actions to complete at that point. We figured that the C Hadraulic System Pressure message was not far behind. After reviewing QRH procedure and the Non Normal Configuration Landing Distances chart; we all agreed that ZZZZ had plenty of runway length and it was safe to continue there and land at flaps 20. We also noted from the C Hydraulic System Pressure QRH Procedure that we MAY not have nose wheel steering after landing dependent on where the leak was located in relation to the center tank standpipe for reserve brakes and steering. Based on that; we also agreed that it would be prudent to declare an emergency and have a tug standing by to help us vacate the runway IF needed. [Maintenance Control] did a great job coordinating because everyone seemed to know our situation ahead of time. However; the First Officer and I agreed to hold off [drastic measures] until we actually got the C system pressure message that would actually drive the QRH procedure that we had been reviewing. The center quantity had dropped to .15 and seemed to stabilize and we still no system pressure message. We assumed we would get it when we started flap extension so we configured early to give us time to run the checklist. We extended the flaps to 20 hydraulically and still had no message. It wasn't until after we lowered the gear that we finally got the C System Pressure EICAS message. At that point; we ran the checklist and then declared an emergency. We landed flaps 20 and had full nose wheel steering capability via the reserve brakes and steering system. We were able to vacate the runway and taxi to the ramp under our own power with no other incidents.

The B767 lost the C Hydraulic System and landed at its destination uneventfully.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Landed 27L; exited on Y1. Directed to taxi on D4; then left on Bravo; then right to Mike. Delta taxiway is before Bravo and parallels it. We turned on Delta erroneously and was corrected by ground who gave us alternate taxi back instructions to turn right on MD-1; then MD-2 to Mike. No other implications noted.Signage was a factor and I misprioritized my tasks by completing after landing check before getting on long taxiway.

After landing we exited 27L on taxiway Y1.  We were given instructions to taxi left on D1; left on B; and then right on M to spot M.  Instead of turning left on B; we turned left early on D.  ATC caught the error at the same time we did and we received new taxi instructions to spot M.  There was no conflict with other aircraft traffic.  Bad crew situational awareness; bad signage in LFPG; language barrier.  More situational awareness on the part of the crew.   Better signage in LFPG.

A Flight Crew reported a taxiway incursion due to poor signage.