Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

We arrived from our deadhead to ZZZ and proceeded to the gate and accepted the aircraft. It had just returned to the line from the maintenance hangar where it received an airworthiness inspection the night prior. Other than being hot from being unventilated; the aircraft showed no discrepancies during the preflight. I verified the fuel quantity on the aircraft from the previous night via a fuel audit of the logbook and upload from the Fueler. The amount was within two hundred pounds and was within acceptable limits at 13.3 planned and 13.2 onboard with a minimum takeoff of 12.6. We pushed from the gate and elected to taxi on two engines for the first flight of the day warm up for the engines. We were number one for the departure and received no real delays on taxi out. I verified we were above minimum fuel for takeoff as we neared departure; out take after this point was quick. Upon climbout at approximately 3000 ft; I noticed a fuel imbalance between the number one and number two main tanks of about 1800 pounds with the lower tank being the left. This struck both of us as unrealistic and we started to perform a crossfeed from the right tank and trouble shooting. I had the First Officer check our fuel in the ACARS at takeoff and it indicated we had departed below min fuel at approximately 12.4. We did not at this point believe we had burned 900 pounds on an expeditious taxi when planned for a taxi burn of 300 pounds so we knew a discrepancy of some form or failure had occurred in the fuel system. I transferred the controls and radios to the First Officer and proceeded to use the new Boeing QRH that had been activated that morning. We referenced the Fuel Leak Checklist but I proceeded to the Fuel Quantity Checklist in Chapter 12 quickly when the right quantity indicator then began to spike up and down with readings as low as zero pounds. Dispatch and Maintenance were contacted and were advised of the situation. White waiting on the patch; the numbers were run and we noticed a 1000-pound difference between our last known quantity at the gate and our totalizer fuel burn of the engines. As the flight progressed; this difference extended to 2000 pounds. Our concern became this: we knew 5500 pounds had been uploaded onto the aircraft; and we knew we had an unknown error(s) in our fuel quantity indicators and as such we could not verify how much fuel actually had been on the plane when the upload was made. We knew we would burn in excess of the known 5500 pounds that were uploaded with the continuation to ZZZ1 or a return to ZZZ. Being that we were closer to ZZZ we elected to return. We elected to proceed directly to ZZZ and to remain at a cruse altitude until we could perform a nearly idle flight path to the airport environment. We also elected to open and keep the crossfeed valve open during the descent and landing being unsure as to the remaking fuel in each main tank. Upon reaching the gate uneventfully; I asked Maintenance and they dripped the tanks. The values at the gate were consistent with the quantity indicated upon the gauges. Upon further review; it was determined this aircraft had a previous history with inaccurate fuel reading. It is my assumption that the readings in flight are not consistent with readings of a stationary aircraft on the ground for whatever reason. The First Officer was a great help. He communicated well with me and ATC and was well-skilled. I couldn't have asked for a better Crew and First Officer. I believe the situation was handled well in all regards.

Captain reported observing a fuel burn/imbalance anomaly during climbout. After completing the appropriate fuel system troubleshooting checklists he elected to return to the departure airport and landed uneventfully.


Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Approaching PHL for landing there were numerous storms approaching the airport from the west. Upon analyzing the radar; we decided to postpone the approach until the storms passed the field. After 20 minutes we decided to proceed to shoot the ILS 27R. Weather at the field was reported marginal VFR with thunderstorms in the vicinity. Right at 1;000 feet and stable; the Tower advised of a windshear alert. At 900 feet we received a 'windshear ahead' warning immediately followed by a 'go-around windshear ahead' warning. We immediately executed a go-around using normal go-around procedures. At 1;200 feet; the aircraft began to lose speed; buffet and sink. At that point we executed the windshear escape procedure as trained. Lowest altitude reached was 620 feet before we flew out of the shear and aircraft performance returned to normal. We advised the Tower and were vectored around to ILS 9R for a normal approach and landing. The event occurred because it was an act of God. We did everything possible to mitigate the potential effects of the weather on the approach. We delayed the approach to allow the weather to pass. We held extra speed on the approach as a precaution for shear. We discussed a plan of action and contingencies for the approach. We followed procedure when confronted with the windshear event. The only thing we could have done is possibly to wait a little longer for the weather to move away from the airport. However; the decision to shoot the approach was made because our alternate was about to get hit with thunderstorms and would not be an option to divert to. Our fuel was becoming an issue; and we needed to make sure we had enough to divert elsewhere if our approach in PHL did not end with a landing. Also; I wanted to mention that the windshear escape procedures that we train each year in the simulator worked very well to allow us to fly the aircraft to safety during a windshear encounter low to the ground.

The leading edge of the line was already over the field according to the radar depiction on the map display. The radar display had quite a bit of red; as well as some magenta in the cell over the field. I suggested to the Captain that we ask Approach for delaying vectors until the line had passed the field. He agreed; and the Controller started vectoring us over New Jersey. After around 10 minutes the Captain suggested the storms appeared to be moving past the field and would not be a problem by the time we reached final. I was still concerned; but did not want to be overly obstructive; so I told Approach we could accept the approach.We asked for additional delaying vectors and eventually returned for a visual approach to 9R. We could see that the smoke from local smoke stacks indicated the surface wind was from the west while we were vectoring for the second approach. Notably; when we asked the Controller for the current surface conditions (the ATIS was clearly outdated); he merely read us the current (outdated) ATIS; indicating approximately 20KT tailwind for landing on 9R. We obviously questioned that; and he then clarified that the current surface wind was out of the west at about 6KTS. We felt the second wind report was acceptable considering it would be a visual landing now that the line had moved completely past the field. However; during rapidly changing conditions; the Approach controllers should be aware that any observation older than ten minutes is probably misleading at best.[I believe we should avoid] attempting an approach until a line of thunderstorms is [at least] five miles past the field; and obtain vectors to begin the approach from behind the line of storms.

After delaying their approach while thunderstorms passed over the airport the flight crew of a B757-200 still encountered windshear requiring a go-around during their initial approach. A subsequent approach from the opposite direction was successful.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

MCO was north and Aircraft X was climbing via the EPCOT SID except maintaining 16 thousand; Aircraft X failed to comply with the BLOSM crossing at or below 7;000 and continued a climb up to approximately 085 feet prior to reaching BLOSM. Aircraft X was turned left to 240 heading to avoid conflict with Aircraft Y.  Had Aircraft Y been further along the STAR lateral track only TCAS would have prevented a NMAC.We have had several of these events since we started using Climb Via procedures while on a North operation.  I believe this has something to do with the top altitude published on the SID's; 'as assigned by ATC.'  The tower sends clearances with a top altitude of 7 thousand via PDC.  Then when the aircraft departs; approach uses either 'except maintain 16 thousand' to comply with crossing restrictions or 'climb and maintain 16 thousand' if no restrictions are needed while climbing on the SID.It is my belief that when pilots are climbing via the SID; they have a higher probability of making an error by erroneously deleting the BLOSM crossing of 7 thousand when they hear; 'except maintain 16 thousand.'As a result; I suggest several things to continue climb via with safety in mind: First; we need to publish SID's on a North Operation with a Top Altitude of 16 thousand.  Second; while we are waiting for the SID's to be re-published; MCO ATCT will need to begin communicating 16 thousand as the top altitude when departing north.  The tower can accomplish this via PDC or while the aircraft is taxiing to the runway with Ground Control.  We want the pilots to input this information when they're in a position of less task saturation.If we're unable to do the above steps or a variation of; then we need to discontinue climb via procedures for safety of the NAS.

F11 TRACON Controller reported a problem with a departure from MCO and an arrival aircraft that led to an airborne conflict.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

As we progress into domestic CPDLC capability and use; have we examined the necessity for encrypted CPDLC communications? We had a technical glitch a few years ago on the NATs (North Atlantic Tracks) where one of our planes got an unsolicited climb instruction from ATC. They contacted ATC via voice and confirmed it was erroneous; so a potentially deadly conflict was avoided. If we have CPDLC in airspace that is much more congested than the NATs and someone wanted to disrupt ATC operations; sow confusion and potentially cause midair collisions; how hard will it be for them to hack into this system and send CPDLC messages to either ATC or aircraft? If 10 aircraft; all within 20 nm of each other; got hacked ATC instructions and only half acted on those messages; the potential for catastrophic results are very high. Encrypting CPDLC communications is essential to the integrity and reliability of our ATC system.

B767 Captain reported unsolicited ATC instructions and suggested CPDLC encryption.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 155; Flight Crew Type 13

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

At approximately XA:10; flying a P28R on a night takeoffs/landings training flight; contacted the tower requesting to land on runway 33. I was cleared [to] land and followed a straight in approach; notifying the tower that I wished to perform several takeoffs and landings while I was at the airport. My request was acknowledged and I performed a normal landing without incident and without any indication of any issues with the airplane. I was cleared to taxi along taxiway Alpha to depart runway 33. Upon holding short of 33 I was cleared to takeoff and remain in the pattern; and to call right base when I turned it for 33 once again. I performed pre-takeoff checks and departed the runway without incident or indication of any malfunction. I put the gear selector in the gear up position and completed climb checks; setting my power; prop; and mixture appropriately and turning off the fuel pump. At this I proceeded to turn crosswind; reached pattern altitude and set my engine and trim to maintain the desired performance. Upon turning downwind; I observed that the gear lights were still indicating 3 down and locked. Thinking I had somehow not fully engaged the switch to retract; I reached to do so; and realized the switch was in fact in the gear UP position. I flipped the switch to the DOWN position and waiting for any change in performance indicating a drop or raise of the gear. Not receiving this feedback; I contacted the tower and requested to 'extend downwind to assess a gear issue.' I received clearance to do so and was asked if I needed any assistance. I replied that I did not at the moment but would advise if that changed. I cycled the gear lever once more with no indication of any change whatsoever; all lights showing 3 down and locked. I pulled out the emergency gear failure checklist and performed the tasks as listed; ending with executing the Emergency Gear extension using the emergency gear extension switch. I then contacted the tower and advised that I had completed checks and it appeared the gear was simply remaining down and locked; and asked if it would be possible for me to over fly the runway and have him observe whether or not it was in fact down. He said it would be too dark for him to do so; and I agreed that was true. I then stated that I would be returning to the airfield and performing a landing with hopes of 'no scraping sound'. The tower operator asked if I requested Emergency responders be on scene and I replied 'Yes that would be a good idea just in case'. He cleared me to return to the field and advised that fire trucks would be waiting when I arrived. During my final approach to the field the tower contacted me stating 'If you flew a low approach down the runway; the lights on the trucks might be able to illuminate your gear well enough for the firemen to determine whether or not it is down. Would you be okay with doing that?'. I responded that I was certainly capable of doing so and was glad for the assistance. I approached the runway in a low approach over the numbers and maintained that profile for the length of the runway; passing in front of the fire trucks parked on a perpendicular taxiway; allowing their lights to shine on my gear. The tower advised that the emergency crew confirmed 'the mains are down for sure; they could not determine if the nose gear was extended or not. If you performed a teardrop turn and returned to runway 15 for a second low approach; they may be able to ascertain the condition of the front gear.' I replied that I could certainly do that. The tower then cleared me for a teardrop turn resulting in an approach directly back to the runway; which I then performed and executed a low approach with full flaps; maintaining a low profile over the numbers and once again in front of the truck. The tower operator then confirmed 'The crew says your front is in fact down; would you like to go out and return to land runway 33?' I replied that I still had over half the runway left and couldeasily land; already being in landing configuration. The tower immediately cleared my landing and I performed a 'soft field' landing to minimize any stress on the gear. I then cleared the active runway at taxiway Bravo and requested that I be allowed to hold that position while I shut down the plane and examined my gear. The tower confirmed that I could do so. I exited the airplane and performed a thorough inspection of the entire aircraft; with special attention paid to the landing gear and safety switches. I determined that nothing with the gear itself was physically amiss and that the gear locks were deeply seated in the down and locked position. At that point the emergency vehicle arrived at my position and the driver requested my name and number; and where I was from and flying from. I answered the questions and thanked them profusely for their assistance; and climbed back into the plane. I notified the tower that I had examined the aircraft and determined that the gear was down and locked and nothing was out of place or broken. The tower operator responded asking what I wished to do. I replied that I would like to return to [departure airport] with no further flying; flying the aircraft in a gear down condition. I was asked if would like flight following and confirmed that yes I certainly would. I was given my departure clearance and squawk code from the tower and proceeded down the taxiway to hold short of Runway 33. Upon being cleared for takeoff; I departed the runway with no further incident. I left the gear switch in the down position; having never reset the system after employing the emergency gear extension lever. I was cleared to change to approach frequency and thanked the tower greatly for all of his help. While flying through [the] airspace; the approach controller contacted me stating that he had heard I experienced gear trouble and asked if any further issues had developed and if I needed anything from him. I responded that nothing further had developed and the airplane appeared to be maintaining its gear down condition. I said I did not require anything of him; but if that changed I would be sure to let him know immediately. Upon reaching ZZZ1 at approximately XB:20; I performed a soft field landing once again; to minimize any stress on the gear; cleared the active and taxied to the ramp without any incident or indication thereof. After parking the plane I performed a thorough post flight inspection; emphasizing the gear; and found nothing had changed from my previous inspection. I then called Flight Service and requested that they notify Approach and Tower that I was safely on the ground at ZZZ1 and that no further issues had occurred. After getting off the phone with them; I then called my Chief Flight Instructor and advised him on the issue and the events that had occurred. I then learned that the aircraft was considered legally 'not airworthy'; and that I should have never made the flight back to ZZZ1. I had not considered deeply enough the fact that the gear motors failing did not simply make it a fixed gear aircraft for all intents and purposes; but in fact rendered it unsafe to fly at all. Had this fact and the legality of it been clear in my mind; the return trip would never have been a consideration.

The pilot of a general aviation aircraft reported being unable to retract the landing gear after takeoff. After ground observers confirmed that the gear was down and locked; he landed safely. However; after inspecting the landing gear he elected to fly gear down to another airport in an un-airworthy condition.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Company Policy; Human Factors

With the air pressure gauges taken off the MD-80 tires; there is no way [for flight crew] to check the tire pressure. Referred to the logbook; but was unable to tell when the last Tire Pressure Check was completed; so Maintenance was summoned before sunrise; local time. Upon Contract Maintenance's arrival and pressure check; it was found that all six tires were 10-15 psi below the minimum levels. Maintenance filled the tires and the flight departed one hour late without further incident. Tire pressure gauges are needed for the flight crews; or [have] regularly scheduled and logged; tire pressure checks [accomplished] by Maintenance.

A First Officer describes why air pressure gauges should be reinstalled on wheel assemblies for their MD-80 aircraft; after all six tires were found 10-15 psi below minimum levels. Due to lack of available information; he had requested tire pressures be checked during his preflight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 2

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Approximately 30 NM northwest of MCO; I was climbing to avoid turbulence. I am proficient in the use of older; steam gauge; aircraft instrumentation; but brand new to the 'glass cockpit' such as the Garmin 1000 installed in this rental aircraft. I had taken some ground instruction in the use of the system before my checkout in the aircraft and had flown it during the checkout. However; I had cancelled a flight the previous day due to marginal VFR weather; as I was not completely sure of my familiarity with the new system. But when I was flying today; in complete VFR; the flight instruments such as altitude were not in their familiar places and; although I thought I had leveled off; I was still climbing and may have penetrated the floor of the Orlando Class B airspace while I was checking my position relative to that airspace. When I noticed the problem; I descended and moved on a course away from the Class B airspace. I think it is important that pilots new to glass cockpits become aware that the transition to the new instrumentation is confusing at first; and far from the 'almost insignificant' change many pilots think it is. I am now reviewing both the operational manual for the G1000 as well as reviewing the video tutoring lessons available online. In addition I am forcing myself to use the older gauges as confirmation and backup when using the newer instrumentation.

The pilot of a rental DA-40; unfamiliar with the 'glass cockpit' Garmin Avionics Suite failed to note his continued climb beneath the MCO Class B and may have inadvertently entered it.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I had just arrived for my shift and proceeded to get the briefing for BLR/EKN Sector. The outgoing Controller explained that it had been fairly busy; but was starting to slow down. There was one aircraft landing MRB that was deviating for weather; and a D-Side developmental receiving training on the sector; and about seven aircraft in the sector with more in hand off status. As the relieved Controller stepped back and I sat down I heard him talking to the D-Side trainer about high/low boundaries in Cleveland's airspace and to which sector an aircraft had been handed off. I roger'ed an aircraft check-in and then looked down at the keyboard to sign-in; while next to me; I heard to D-Side developmental make several calls about the aircraft that was deviating. As I finished signing-in; Air Carrier X checked on. I looked back up at the scope; located the Air Carrier X; saw he was in the shelf for BWI arrivals and descended the aircraft to FL210. I then proceeded to make other clearance and discussed the deviating aircraft with the D-Side developmental. Less than a minute later; Cleveland called on the shout line and the D-Side developmental answered the line; after which her trainer leaned forward and asked me if I had descended the Air Carrier X. I said yes and asked why; to which he replied that there was an aircraft in the self at FL250. When I moved Air Carrier X Data Block; I could see a limited at FL250 just behind the Air Carrier X. Air Carrier X had already begun his descent; resulting in a loss of separation (4.07 miles and 200 feet). At that point I asked the D-Side trainer who the limited was and if we had gotten a point out on him. The D-Side trainer then explained that the previous Controller had worked that aircraft along our boundary with Cleveland and had handed it off and switched it a while back but that it was a slow moving aircraft. He then questioned the developmental; if he/she had taken down the Data Block; to which he/she replied no. At that point I realized what had happened; that the Data Block had timed out and fallen off the scope; which happens often with Cleveland along that boundary; and since I had actually never worked the aircraft; I didn't realize it was out there. The D-Side trainer and the previous R-Side are both new to the sector and didn't realize that we often have this problem with Data Blocks along the boundary with Cleveland; and thus didn't know to look for it. When the tape was reviewed; it was found that the Data Block had been there when I received the briefing; but that in the time I looked down to sign-in and then back up at Air Carrier X check-in; the Data Block had dropped off the scope.This is a repeating problem with Data Blocks that are handed-off early to Cleveland; I can remember being warned when I first started training on BLR/ELK to now flash those particular Data Blocks early. Data Blocks that have not left a sector should not fall off or time out on their own. If the Data Block had been there; I would not have descended Air Carrier X.

ZDC Controller described a probable loss of separation event occurring immediately after a position relief. The reporter listed an on going data block drop problem near a common boundary with ZOB as the causal factor.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

[I was] advised a flight attendant experienced fume event.

A320 Captain reported being notified a Flight Attendant had experienced a fumes event.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 7775; Flight Crew Type 1200

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

My wife and I were flying to IOW. The nearest airport to IOW with a TAF is CID; 16 NM to the northwest. The CID TAF at our estimated time of arrival was... 4SM -RA BR OVC015We planned on flying the flight VFR with only CID being a little marginal VFR. About 30 NM from IOW we encountered light rain and the OVC015 ceiling started to drop. We maneuvered right and left as we made our way toward IOW. The IOW ASOS at the time was reporting the ceiling 1100 scattered. At 15NM west of IOW at 500-600 feet AGL skimming the cloud bases; I turned around to get back to better weather; but found that the weather had closed in behind me; or my route in could not be duplicated out. I knew there were antenna towers in the area and got a visual on one of the towers which appeared to be near my altitude. The safety of the flight was now in question. I called CID Approach and requested an IFR clearance to IOW. The Controller cleared me to the IOW airport via radar vectors and gave me a heading and instructions to climb to 2;500 feet. I advised the Controller that I wanted to shoot the RNAV (GPS) 30 approach into IOW circle 7. We shot the approach; broke out around 1100 AGL; circled; and safely landed on Runway 7. I hold an ATP certificate; however my last instrument proficiency check I had was a 135 check [several years ago]. Therefore; I was not instrument current.Our airplane is equipped with a Garmin 400W and a Garmin 335 ADS-B out transponder. The 400W had a current procedures data base and the pitot static encoder check was completed [two years ago]; making [my aircraft] legal for IFR operations. Additionally; I had flightplan.com app loaded onto my phone; which allowed me to have current IFR low altitude charts and approach plates for IOW; as well as the surrounding area.My brief IFR flight and approach was performed to ATP standards and did not alarm ATC in anyway. I have reviewed my ADS-B track and found that the lowest I got on that flight was 422 feet AGL; which is lower than I recall. The antenna tower I saw is at 320 feet AGL. The low flight occurred in Class G airspace during the day. Complacency on my part was definitely a factor and I have taken steps so as to not repeat this occurrence. I have scheduled an Instrument Proficiency (IPC) check.

Pilot reported descending to 422 feet AGL during an encounter with unexpectedly poor weather.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

APU was deferred; so commenced with a bottle start of the right engine. Noticed the pressure seemed low (18-25psi?); engaged starter and introduced fuel at N1 indication.  I was anticipating a failed starter cutout and put my finger on the Starter Cutout switchlight. Spool up was gradual; then IIT quickly went above 900deg. Captain called for engine shutdown and I inadvertently pressed the starter cutout instead of moving the thrust lever to Fuel Shut Off position. By the time I realized what I did and before I could shut down the engine; ITT was below 900deg and the engine indication were moving toward normal indication so we elected to not shutdown. Since the HOT icon didn't appear and we knew the reason for the high ITT (low bottle pressure) we decided it was safe to continue. At [destination] we discussed the situation with Maintenance and told us we need to write it up.I was anticipating a failed starter cutout (almost every bottle start requires the manual selection of starter cutout) and improperly responded to the Captain's call for an engine shut down. There was potential engine damage if the engine didn't return to normal parameters with the delay of the engine shutdown.I need to slow down and not presume what is going to happen. Review engine shut down parameters before a bottle start. A question I have is why there are no guidelines for minimum psi for a bottle start like there is for the Cross Bleed start?  At what psi should you not attempt a start?  I am not sure but at one time didn't we have guidelines for the minimum pressure of a bottle/huffer start?

CRJ-200 First Officer reported responding inappropriately to a hot start and then failing to write up the anomaly.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Software and Automation

GPS jamming encountered between XA21Z and XA52Z at 33;000 feet.  Jamming resulted in immediate loss of ADS-B and GPS left and right.  Once jamming ceased all system function returned to normal.  Informed ATC immediately of the jamming and then again informed ATC when our actual navigation performance was going to require vectors.  As soon as I notified ATC that we were at the point of navigation degradation beyond acceptable performance;  the jamming ceased immediately.  I believe the parties responsible were monitoring ATC frequencies. [Cause was] Some form of GPS Jamming - extremely long period. It usually happens for much shorter periods that is less than 3 minutes. Identify the parties responsible and remove them from the equation.

Air carrier Captain flying over foreign territory reported GPS jamming which ceased as soon as the Captain notified ATC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 9674; Flight Crew Type 145

No warning or cautions occurred throughout flight. when engine were shutdown at gate; both ENG 1 & 2 showed EGT limitation exceeded; temp 535 in red. we reported EGT to Maintenance with logbook Maintenance write up. Maintenance said it may have been an engine code warning and they would look into it. Crew did not know when or where exceedance took place.

First Officer reported after shutdown at gate both engines showed EGT exceedances; with no crew recollection of it happening.


Training / Qualification; Other / Unknown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A TBM pilot called established on the ILS inbound for Runway 28R; and we were on Runway 10L/R configuration; opposite direction to the inbound ILS aircraft. I was on Clearance Delivery/Flight Data; when I noticed the Local Controller tell the aircraft to report his circle north to enter right downwind for Runway 10L. The DA40 called for IFR departure from Runway 10. Local Controller crossed the DA40 on 10R and told him to hold short Runway 10L. The Local Controller then called SOCAL per our LOA for instrument release for the DA40 off Runway 10L; SOCAL responded saying release him at our discretion. By this time the TBM was approaching a 4 mile final at 210 KTS; and the Local Controller departed the DA40 on Runway 10L directly towards the inbound unrestricted TBM. The DA40 pilot had a procedure right turn to a heading of 270; and came within 2 miles and 200 FT estimated of the inbound TBM but was almost immediately established on a right turn after departure. The inbound TBM requested Runway 28R inside a 4 mile final and was granted a landing clearance on Runway 28R inside a 3 mile final; therefore having opposite direction operations inside 10 NM to the departure/landing threshold of both aircraft. Earlier in the day; we were on Runway 10 configuration; with our approach being the ILS Runway 28R circle to land Runway 10L; and SOCAL approach had at least 3 aircraft come inbound on the ILS opposite direction to the previous aircraft landing aircraft on Runway 10L ranging from 3/4 mile finals to a 7 mile final. This created an unsafe situation/possible deviation if the landing aircraft decided to go missed; and was clearly inside the 10 NM opposite direction approach point. This in my opinion with the new safety directive needs to be addressed; because the SOCAL East sector Controller clearly had no idea about the rule and created multiple possible unsafe situations that I witnessed.I recommend an established point on our approach to be written in an LOA in which the successive aircraft can't cross before the previous aircraft had landed & possibly mark it on our ART approach. I also recommend management be informed of the proper opposite direction procedures and that they relay them to the staff more clearly. I also recommend better communication between SOCAL and our facility when we are on Runway 10L/R operations; as well as SOCAL East/West sectors becoming more familiar with Runway 10L/R operations to prevent further situations from happening.

Controller describes opposite direction approaches and takeoff's at MYF that are potentially dangerous and may violate directives that are currently in effect. Also an issue is the possibility of conflict between a Runway 10L missed approach and other aircraft on the 28R ILS with circle to land instructions.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Safety Related Duties; Boarding; Deplaning

Other / Unknown; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Safety Related Duties; Deplaning; Boarding

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

While I am submitting this report late; let it be known that I began drafting notes on the below report on the afternoon of Date when the events were fresh in my mind. Please accept this report even though it is late. It would have been submitted in a timely manner but I have been consumed with caring for my health and that of my fellow Flight Attendants.I have a varied work history which includes [professional medical experience]. Before I was furloughed [on] Date and after I returned from furlough; I flew high time; however; I am an inexperienced Flight Attendant; as I only have approximately 800 hours of flight time. I find myself often relying on my recollections from training when I am faced with events that are out of the ordinary. In my short time as a Flight Attendant; I had not previously experienced a fume event. While I remember them being discussed very briefly in training; I feel that I was personally ill-prepared on how to handle the situation that happened to me and my crew on Date. I was in possession of a lanyard card from the union regarding fume events that I was able to reference as a guide during the situation; however; the actions the card indicated were not sufficient in protecting my crew that day. I believe I failed in my duty as a Flight Attendant to protect the crew and passengers in the incident that happened onboard Aircraft X on Date due to my inexperience and also due to incapacitation which was caused by the inhalation of fumes.On Date I was scheduled to work Aircraft X ZZZ to ZZZ1 on Boeing 737. At approximately XA:20 during taxi out after the safety demo Flight Attendant 2 Name and Flight Attendant 4 Name 1 called the forward cabin indicating that they smelled a strange odor in the aft galley. They could not describe the odor so I (Flight Attendant 1) went back to check it. I did not detect any unusual odor as I made my way through the cabin. In the aft galley I removed my face mask but did not detect an odor. Flight Attendants 2 and 4 indicated that they could still smell a faint odor but I could not. Flight Attendant 4 indicated that she had recently (within the last 3-4 weeks; I believe she stated) experienced a fume event and that 'it smelled the same.' Flight Attendants 2 and 4 indicated the odor was/had been coming from aircraft left; specifically the aft-most aircraft left corner of the galley. I took deep breaths in the area they indicated the odor was coming from in an attempt to detect it. They said it smelled like 'a dirty bathroom mixed with gasoline.' I did not smell anything unusual but they insisted that they did. I continued to attempt to smell the odor because I could sense that they were very concerned. I called Flight Attendant 3 Name 2 and requested that she come to the aft galley. She came back and immediately said that she smelled something unusual; describing it as 'hot dust on electrical wires.' I was still unable to detect any odor but I informed Captain of it via the interphone in the aft galley. I gave him the descriptions of the odor per the other Flight Attendants (FAs) and added that I could not smell it. He indicated that we had 'passed through a lot of exhaust from other aircraft.' I informed him that none of us smelled exhaust. I again relayed what the other FAs had smelled. He said we would return to the gate. I immediately returned to my jumpseat at the forward entry door. While we were still taxiing back to the gate my nose started running which was approximately 5 minutes after I had been in the aft galley. This was somewhat alarming to me because it was very sudden and profuse; and I became worried for the FAs 2 and 4 in the back. I called to check on them but I cannot recall what they said. We arrived at the gate at approximately XA:35; disarmed the doors and did the all call. At this point the order and timing of events is slightly unclear to me as I believe I was incapacitated to the point where my decision-making abilities were negatively affected; I am aware that we were on the aircraft for quite some time until at least XE:00 but I think it was closer to XE:30 when we deplaned. My sense of time was off from around XA:25 when I called the Captain to report the odor until after we deplaned. The event felt like a blur but I have recalled everything accurately. During this period of time I felt slow; like I was hiking at a high altitude. I was not thinking clearly. I had difficulty articulating the situation to passengers and I felt like I was at a loss for words; which is abnormal for me. Throughout the incident I recall the FAs 2; 3; and 4 having to sit in the flight deck behind the Captain (CA) at times due to lightheadedness; and they all appeared ill. I regret not putting them on O2 immediately and I regret not insisting they get immediate medical attention; especially for FAs 2 and 4 who both looked particularly ill. FA 3 also at times appeared glassy-eyed and like she did not feel well. FA 2 told us that she felt nervous and lightheaded as she was doing the safety demo; she had been in the aft galley the longest. FA 4 had also been in the aft galley for a significant period of time.After we arrived back at the gate and did the all call; I believe FAs 2 and 4 immediately came to the forward galley. I recall FA 2 sitting in the flight deck. She appeared glassy-eyed and her eyes were red and watering. She indicated that she did not feel safe on the aircraft. I told the Captain that my nose was running but that I had not smelled the odor. FA 4 and FA 2 answered the CA's questions as a report was filled out. Two maintenance employees boarded the aircraft. I relayed the information regarding the odor's location and description that the other FAs had given. I told them that I did not detect an odor but that my nose was running. They proceeded to the aft galley. Approximately 20 or 30 minutes after exposure I began to feel a raw burning sensation in my throat and my voice became hoarse. I indicated this to the Captain. I had the urge to cough but tried not to so as not to alarm passengers as they were still onboard; but I coughed several times onboard (also after we deplaned and on the way to the hospital; and occasionally still have the urge to cough). While onboard I started to develop a light headache in spite of having taken ibuprofen earlier that morning and again at XB:00 for reasons unrelated to this event. In hindsight I believe I was incapacitated as my decision-making abilities were questionable by this point.Passengers began to question whether or not it was safe for them to been the aircraft since the Captain had made an announcement about an unusual odor. I advised them that it was; which I now regret. No voluntary deplaning announcement was made. At one point; a Flight Service Manager expressed concern for us FAs; indicating that we looked like we needed fresh air and that it was unfortunate that we had to remain on the aircraft due to passengers being onboard and minimum crew requirements. More passengers eventually started complaining about still being onboard the aircraft. FA 3 indicated to me that she did not feel safe on the aircraft. I asked the Captain if we were going to deplane. He said; 'it's not up to me. They've got to make the call.' It was my impression at the time that he was referring to the gate agents when he referenced 'they' but I did not ask him to clarify. I was not thinking clearly and vaguely wondered why it was not up to him as he was the Captain. I regret not pressing the matter further and I failed my duty to keep the crew and the passengers safe. At one point a passenger asked for a snack. I did not feel comfortable going to the aft galley but I did not want the other flight attendants to go back there either because their complaints of their symptoms were worse than mine (they reported shortness of breath; feeling so faint that they had to sit down while I was comfortable standing up; and tingling lips and limbs; burningtongue; etc.; and I could see their eyes were glassy and watering) and they had been in the aft galley longer than me. I tried to hold my breath as I entered the aft galley to retrieve the snack for the passenger but I was not able to hold it for more than about 10 seconds which struck me as abnormal. Those passengers in the aft-most part of the cabin questioned whether or not they were safe being on the aircraft due to the odor the Captain had mentioned on the PA. I do not recall what I told them but I think I indicated that it was safe to be on the aircraft which I now deeply regret. As I made my way forward from the aft part of the galley; more passengers started complaining about being kept on the aircraft. When I returned to the flight deck I indicated to the Captain that the passengers had been on board (since boarding) the aircraft for over two hours without food or water. I again asked the Captain if we were going to deplane and he said he stated that the aircraft was 'going to be taken out of service soon.' I regret not pressing the matter further.At one point the flight attendants and I were the only employees at the forward part of the aircraft and I believe the only employees on the aircraft. I was nervous about this because I felt like no one should be on the aircraft. I called the gate multiple times but the line was busy so I called Ops again. I believe I told them that the passengers had been held on the aircraft for over two hours with no food or water and that we should deplane but I can't remember if I said this to Ops or to the gate agent (when I finally reached them after my call to Ops); or both. Either Ops or a gate agent told me at one point on the phone: 'Tower says you guys are going back out' or something along those lines. I did at one point get ahold of the gate agent and I indicated that passengers had been on the aircraft for over two hours without food or water. I believe he said that the Captain and the chief pilot were at the gate discussing the matter. This gate agent indicated to me that he agreed that passengers should have been deplaned as soon as we returned to the gate and that we had been held on the aircraft too long; and he stated that if it had been up to him the passengers would have been deplaned immediately upon returning to the gate. I again regret at this point not insisting the passengers be deplaned for their safety and for the safety of the crew. I regret not initiating an emergency deplaning which I believe would have been advisable given the state of incapacitation of me and my fellow crew members.Throughout this entire time all three FAs told me multiple times that they did not feel comfortable on the aircraft and that they believed passengers should not be on the aircraft. Prior to deplaning my runny nose resolved but my raw/burning throat did not. At one point I noticed my hands trembling slightly for no reason but I minimized this symptom and did not mention it to anyone. I regret not speaking up when the other FAs expressed their concerns to me. Eventually we deplaned somewhere between XE:00 and XE:30. We were advised that the flight had been re-crewed and I believe he said that there would be an aircraft swap. I then heard an announcement at the gate after we deplaned that there was to be no aircraft swap. I was gravely concerned for the oncoming crew but I wrongly assumed they would ultimately not take Aircraft X. I told one crew member that 'I didn't smell any odor but I'm having symptoms' as I walked by her at the gate but I did not have time to elaborate; as we were going to immediately seek medical treatment. I assumed that the aircraft would not go since the Captain had stated earlier to me that the aircraft was 'going to be taken out of service soon'. I assumed the fume report would be or had been filed. I assumed the new crew would not be put in any danger. I regret not staying at the gate and speaking up; and I feel it was my duty to try to protect the

On Date I boarded Aircraft X servicing route from ZZZ to ZZZ1 around XA:30 as the #2 Flight Attendant on a 737 aircraft. I got straight to work in the back due to the flight basically starting to board right as we arrived to have a delayed departure time of XB:07. I believe the original departure time was XA:00. I set up all my carts and did everything I needed to get done throughout the boarding process; we then armed our doors and cross checked and proceeded to go off to do the Safety Demo once we pushed back. It was at that time I started to feel very lightheaded and didn't feel too well. I ignored it and figured it would go away. Once we did our final safety checks we all sat down in our jumpseats and proceeded to inform Flight Attendant (FA) Name I was feeling light headed just so she would be informed. About two minutes later I started to smell an odd odor; the only way I could best describe it is a dirty bathroom smell mixed with gasoline. I wanted to make sure I was really smelling what I smelled so I asked FA Name if she smelled it and she did not. She came over to my jumpseat and immediately did smell it. We both wanted to be sure so we called back FA 1 Name 4; she did not smell anything and continued to keep smelling to be sure; she saw our concern and took into account that I was also lightheaded so she called FA 3 Name 3 back to see if she could smell it. Right away FA Name 3 did smell what she described as a burning electric smell. FA Name 4 made the call to the Captain and told him of the odor we were all smelling; he informed us we had just passed a lot of planes and exhaust; we informed him that was not what we smelled. So we proceeded back to the gate.Upon arrival to the gate; Captain informed the passengers that the flight attendants smelled an odor that was off so we would be returning to the gate. After we verified and disarmed doors and cross checked we proceeded up to the front. At this point I was extremely light headed and it had felt like I was moving very slow. FA Name and myself sat in the flight deck and answered all of Captain's questions that he had for the report he was filling out. At this point all four flight attendants were experiencing symptoms (shortness of breath; light headed; sore throat's; running noises and tingly lips.) we all clearly did not look well. For some reason we did not deplane and I regret not seeking medical attention when we got to the gate due to my heightened symptoms. I was pretty out of it so I wasn't really sure what exactly was going on between the gate agent and Captain. I do recall Captain saying he had no say on if we could deplane the aircraft (which was kind of a shock to me due to this being his aircraft). I did notice that passengers wanted to get off the aircraft due to them being held on it for so long without food or water. FA Name 4 was doing a great job handling the passengers during all this even though she too was having symptoms of her own. All in all I believe the passengers and the crew were held on this aircraft for two hours. I then with glossy eyes proceeded to tell the Captain that I needed to get off the plane due to feeling like I might pass out. At this point nothing was done to get us off. Name 5 from inflight came down and said he wished he could let us off because we clearly needed fresh air but due to FAA minimum crew we could not do that. I did hear that the plane might be going out of service but then I also heard from the gate agent that this plane was going to pushback soon. I informed FA Name that I did not feel safe on this plane and she said the same thing. We all got together and said that we would not be taking this plane back out due to how ill we have all become. Finally around XE:30 the gate agent came on and told everyone to deplane and that there would be a crew swap and an aircraft swap. As we got our bags to leave we headed up to the gate where we heard the gate agent say that there indeed was not going to be an aircraft swap and that did not sit well with me. FA Name 4 and myself quickly warned one of the crew members that were going to work the plane to ZZZ1 that we are all ill and going to seek medical attention; I also told her to please stand her grown with this. We did get in contact with that crew and you will be receiving reports from them that will describe what happen to them. At this point we are walking to go to the onsite clinic to get us checked out; halfway through terminal I grabbed onto the wall and almost passed out. Inflight manager Name 5 got me a wheelchair and told me to take deep breaths and we proceeded to the clinic. The nurse said to get blood work done we should go to the nearest emergency room. Name 5 tried to set up transportation from the numbers we were given but he could not reach anyone so we ended up taking an Uber. At the hospital we all were given chest X-rays; EKG and arterial blood work for carbon monoxide. FA Name; myself and Name 4 all came back clear since the incident had been so long ago but unfortunately FA Name 3 did still have carbon monoxide in her blood; she was then put on 100% oxygen for 40 min and more blood work was done until she was also cleared to be discharged. The next morning we went to catch our deadhead to go home and we all were clearly completely out of breath from just walking from TSA to our gate which is very abnormal. Date 1 after we all got home I received a message from FA Name 4 that she was back in the emergency room due to her heightened symptoms and that the nurse told her to go. The next day Date 2 we received a message from FA Name that she too was back in the ER due to stomach pains. Later that day I became very dizzy and was having trouble breathing so I called FA Name 4 and she drove me to the same ER she went to after I called the nurse and gave me the all clear to do so. I was put on a breathing tube to help open up my airways and was prescribed and inhaler; FA Name 4 who was with me also was prescribed an inhaler for her too. We are now all at home Date 3 resting and we cannot return to work until symptoms are completely gone. I have a note stating I can't go back until Date 10 and if needed to extend because not fully recovered the doctor will extend it. This 737 should have been taken out of service after seeing what it did to us four flight attendants. Instead they put four new flight attendants in clear danger. We did come in contact with two FAs that worked that flight and I will let them tell their own stories but at least three out of the four are seeking medical attention and one had to call off mid sequence for feeling so ill. It's a complete shame that this aircraft is still out there flying and will continue to fly and affect so many more people. A fume event is not to be messed with and I hope the company will do something about this and take this seriously.

B737 Flight Attendant crew reported a fume event during preflight resulting in extended flight delay and cabin crew being treated for physiological symptoms.


We were in cruise flight at FL400. The weather was clear VMC. My Captain stated 'what's that' and pointed to the right side of the aircraft; 1 o'clock position; same altitude. I leaned forward and looked past the window post between the R1 and R2 windows. I noticed a white balloon moving in our direction. I stated that it was in sight and that it looks like we are going to miss it. The balloon passed our right wing seconds later. I noticed a white balloon with a small box attached to it by a cord. It was close enough for me to see the cord swaying back and forth. It is difficult to say how many feet it missed us by but I can say that it was close enough to see it in detail as we quickly flew passed it. The event last seconds from the time it was spotted. Washington center was notified immediately afterwards. Upon landing we reviewed the required reports section of the Flight manual and determined that a report was required. If my Captain had not been looking in that location at that exact time we probably would not have noticed it due to the color; size; and closure rate.

While at FL400 cruise near/over ROA; I spotted a white weather balloon floating towards the aircraft. (No TCAS alerts) It was at our altitude and we could clearly see the tether hanging down from the balloon that supported a small silver instrument package. The instrument package was hanging slightly below our altitude. The best I could determine; the balloon appeared to be perfectly round in shape. Since nothing was near it; I am not able to determine the actual size of the balloon. The balloon passed off our right wing tip closer than 200 ft and may have been as close as 100 ft.I reported the balloon to Washington ARTCC immediately and they acknowledged my report. Nothing more was mentioned about the incident by ARTCC.If the balloon's instrument package had carried a transponder that reported altitude and course (drift); ATC could have alerted me to the proximity of a balloon and used vectoring to avoid hitting the balloon package. At 400+ kts ground speed; if the tether had hit the wing or if the instrument package had impacted the cockpit or had been whipped around to hit the fuselage; we could be talking about a rapid decompression; damage to hull or wing and possibly loss of life.

B737 flight crew reported an NMAC with a weather balloon at FL400 over Virginia.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 4520; Flight Crew Type 230

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

[I] was VFR and just released from NorCal flight following to squawk VFR and cleared to Lincoln UNICOM frequency. 'Caution two aircraft in traffic pattern at Lincoln.' Acknowledged and squawked VFR and switched to Lincoln Regional UNICOM. Transmitted on UNICOM that [I] was 10 miles south of Lincoln passing 4;000 feet and planned on a 45 to left downwind entry at the 'Log Pile' for Runway 15. I was still on auto pilot. One aircraft transmitted on UNICOM that it was just pulling off the Runway 15. Did not hear the other aircraft. Moments later; while passing about 3;000 MSL; a twin engine aircraft appeared in the windscreen a little above and to the east. The aircraft appeared to be climbing. I was descending. I pushed on the yoke a bit; but was still on autopilot and by that time was well clear; so no real evasive action was taken. Could not identify the tail number or type aircraft other than a twin engine.

Pilot of a small aircraft on VFR descent to LHM reported a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) with an unidentified twin-engine aircraft departing LHM.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We were given a clearance to taxi from the gate on T1. Another carrier was on T2 and was told to follow the Company jet at their 3:00 position. At Spot 55; the other carrier's jet began a right turn toward our aircraft on Spot 56. The only thing I could do to prevent what was shaping up to be a taxi collision was to hit the brakes and transmit a firm 'STOP' on the Ground frequency. The other carrier's First Officer was facing his left and did not bother to look out his window to the right to look for us. There may have been some confusion with call signs as another carrier's aircraft did taxi past another carrier. [The other] carrier did not yield.

A B737 Captain approaching Spot 56 on T1 took evasive action to avoid another aircraft on T2 as that aircraft made a right turn near Spot 55 toward spot 56.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167; Flight Crew Type 28000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MEL 30-X-XX Right Wing Valve Fixed Open. I went over the MEL line by line with Dispatch and Maintenance Control after Contract Maintenance deferred the aircraft. I went over the MEL line by line with the First Officer (FO) to cover the configuration at the gate and for takeoff. Airborne; when the temperature was below 10 degrees C; we placed the engine bleed switch ON as directed in the MEL. The right Pack had been placed OFF for takeoff and remained off for the flight. We had both checked our configuration with the MEL; but had assumed that the Pack switch needed to be off for takeoff. After placing the Pack off for takeoff; at 10;000 feet; the right Pack was correctly called (Right Pack Off); but since that was the position we had it in for takeoff for the MEL; we didn't correct the Pack position. Pressure held normally for cruise.Nowhere in the MEL does it mention turning off the right Pack. It is obvious to me now; the right Pack switch should have been placed as in a normal flight. But the verbiage in proviso (I) led us to turn the Pack off. Since the MEL does not have you turn the Pack off; there is no mention to turn the Pack back on. This was not a mistake because we didn't notice the Pack off; it was a mistake in turning it off without specific guidance and not realizing the flaw in logic. A note referencing leaving the Pack switch on (like a bleeds off takeoff) would have helped me avoid this error.

B737 Captain reports misunderstanding an MEL procedure and departing with the right pack off and the right bleed off for a right wing anti-ice valve fixed open. When the bleed valve is turned on; the pack valve is left off. The flight continued in single pack operation without difficulty. The pack should not have been turned off.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On arrival into MDW in a 250 knot Level Change descent to 6000 FT; expecting RNAV (RNP)-Y Runway 22L; we received a different approach to RNAV (RNP)-X Runway 22L; cleared direct to MIING to cross at 4000 FT cleared for the approach. After reprogramming the FMC; Pilot Flying put the next altitude on the approach 2900 FT into the MCP window but failed to select VNAV. The aircraft in Level Change descended 400 FT below the crossing altitude of 4000 FT approximately 5 NM west of the fix. Having to brief the new approach (task saturation) was put ahead of making sure the MCP was set up properly. Pilot Flying should have had the Pilot Monitoring do the programming to allow the Pilot Flying time to see the bigger picture and make sure the proper MCP mode was set prior to briefing the new approach. Knowing ATC's intentions further out would be helpful.

B737-800 Captain reported overshooting an altitude restriction on the RNAV RNP X Approach to 22L at MDW. Reporter cited a last minute clearance change as contributing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was pilot flying during for this leg. We took off from ZZZ and shortly after takeoff the captain points out that the LP vibrations on the #2 engine were 4.0 and amber in color. When it was clear that this was not an erroneous indication the Captain gave me the radios so he could run the QRH. We got handed off to Center and they told us to climb and maintain FL390. After running the QRH the Captain decided to return to the field. I informed them that we were having an engine issue on the right side and that we needed to maintain 16000 (at no point did myself or my Captain request priority handling). Around that point the captain decided take the radios back and request to return to ZZZ. We got vectors for the ZZZZZ arrival and ILS which I flew and landed without incident. Post landing we found out that either approach or the tower requested priority handling for us. Post flight we were informed that ATC had requested priority handling for us because they thought we had to shut down our #2 engine which is not the case. It would have been nice to have better communication from ATC and know that they requested priority handling for us.

First Officer reported high vibration in an engine and a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 200

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Instructed by company to return to departure airport due to unauthorized corrosive material boarded in the bulk cargo compartment. Jettisoned approximately 40;000 lbs of fuel for landing at departure airport per checklist. Landed; had cargo removed; refueled; and departed for destination.

B777 First Officer reported returning to the departure airport after being notified they had unauthorized corrosive material onboard.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 455; Flight Crew Type 225

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was in the pattern on downwind abeam the tower 1;200 ft; offset distance from the runway was 4;000 feet. I had just taken off and was instructed to make right pattern. Several F-16s went directly over the top of me at estimated 200 feet separation. They were going so fast; there was no way to count the number of aircraft. A second later; I was flying through their smoke trails and being instructed by the tower to make a 360 degree turn. I immediately turned to the north and departed the pattern temporarily until rejoining about 5 minutes later.

C172 pilot reported NMAC with F-16s while in the pattern.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 533; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

A student and I were performing maneuvers in the practice area when it became apparent that the elevator control would not move too far past neutral position. I decided to take the controls and head back for our home airport. We made a safe landing using the elevator trim to bring the nose up for flare. There were no injuries or damage to the aircraft.

The reporter stated that morning a Mechanic removed the forward instrument panel to access the INTERCOM unit which had been malfunctioning. In flight the elevator control column locked in neutral position. After landing Maintenance discovered the instrument cooling fan had become dislodged and wedged in the elevator control behind the instrument panel. The reporter did not know if the fan was manipulated during the INTERCOM maintenance.

During a training maneuver; a C-152 elevator became locked forward of neutral so the flight returned to the airport. The instrument cooling fan had become lodged in the elevator control mechanism behind the glareshield.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency

We departed the runway into moderate turbulence with flammable liquids in the main cargo compartment. Through 10;000 FT the Captain experienced problems with his headset. Not able to hear or transmit. I resumed flying and ATC communications. As I climbed through 26;000 FT I noticed my airspeed beginning to degrade. I slowed my rate of ascent to gain back airspeed. It appeared to be frontal passage windshear. Airspeed still was degrading quickly and I stopped the climb and added power. This did not work either. I spoke out loud what the problem was but the Captain couldn't hear me because he was troubleshooting his com problem. I commanded a 500 FT/minute descent to gain back airspeed. Airspeed still was dropping very rapidly now and I added more power. This is where the Captain noticed what was going on. After the final power increase we both notice an N1 overspeed. He stated he had good airspeed indications and that he had the aircraft. From good climb airspeed to this point was probably 30 seconds.At this moment we both smelled fumes and saw hazy smoke in the cockpit. We ran the smoke/fumes memory items and I declared an emergency with a return to the departure airport. I resumed to Smoke/Fumes Checklist and realized that the smoke was no longer present. We agreed to abandon the Smoke Fumes Checklist. We started the checklist for the pitot static caution light and finished that. Since we were getting close to the airport we elected to not run the Airspeed Unreliable Checklist because the Captain had good airspeed indications. Communication was still very difficult because the Captain could not hear ATC. We landed on the runway and were met by Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters. No fire was present and we taxied back to the cargo ramp. We had multiple problems: Pitot static failure; communication problems and an unknown source of smoke.

After departure a B737-400 Captain; the flying pilot; lost communications so the First Officer assuming flying but his airspeed malfunctioned so he added power overspeeding N1; but could not communicate the problems to the Captain. Both pilots detected smoke and fumes so the Captain assumed flying; declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Last night after freezing rain occurred at the airport; the taxiways and runways were very slick. ATIS was reporting wet runways and slippery taxiways. We briefed the threat prior to taxiing. Taxiing to runway requires a short back taxi at the end of the runway. I taxied to the right side of the runway to the turnaround area; when I tried to make the left 180 degree turn; the aircraft did not respond to steering or brake commands. At a very slow speed; (slow walk); combined with the runway slope; the aircraft slid off the runway at about a 45 degree angle. The RH main gear and nose gear left the runway surface. The surface was frozen and hard packed; the aircraft came to a gentle stop. [We] made arrangements to have the passengers bused back to the terminal. Ops tugged the aircraft back up on to the runway surface. Taxied aircraft back to the gate; notified Maintenance and Maintenance Operations Manager.Inclement weather; freezing rain the night prior; resulting in very slippery taxiway and runway conditions. We were the first aircraft to taxi out so we had no other pilot reports of actual conditions.Runway [assigned] requires a short back taxi and a 180 degree turn; under these condition Airfield Ops needs to take more precautions to deice the turnaround and threshold portion of the runway.

I believe we took the proper measures in mitigating this risk. We briefed it; and we taxied very slowly and cautiously to avoid this type of situation. I truly believe there was nothing more we could have done in that moment to stop the aircraft from sliding off of the runway.We were not the only people involved in a traction control issue this morning. A tug driver slid 20 feet from the point he stepped on the brakes into a window (breaking the window) at the terminal; according to the Operations Manager. The Operations Manager also fell on the ramp and injured his arm after we had taxied back to the gate. In my personal opinion; I would suggest that the airport take more steps to adequately assess and deice the taxiways as well as the runways. The runway seemed to be adequately deiced; but it was obvious that the turnaround point had not been cleared from contaminants at all. The turnaround point is there for just that reason; to turn around on a back taxi. In the future; if I come across a similar situation; I would seek out more information about the taxiways before departing the ramp.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported sliding off the pavement while taxiing on an icy surface.


Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

We were departing DFW around XA:30 local off of Runway 36 right; climbing through about 550 feet AGL I noticed the radar altimeter started to bounce up and down oddly and then I received a red RA and which is came back at around 1000 feet AGL and functioned normally until we reached the limit of the radar altimeter. I noted it to the Captain and he didn't see any issues on his side; however we were aware of the 5G NOTAMs and I had mentioned that might be the cause. That was the only time we noticed and issue; coming in from ZZZ it functioned fine and landing in ZZZ1 it was functionally normally as well.

Air Carrier First Officer reported an erroneous radio altimeter after takeoff and during climb out from DFW. The First Officer also reported they had reviewed the NOTAMs referring to 5G interference at this location.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 361; Flight Crew Type 66

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Received clearance to land on [Runway] 28R at MYF. Informed that another aircraft was landing on the parallel 28L runway. Was lined up for 28R. Watched the 28L traffic turn base and final on the ADSB display. Their base to final turn put them very close to my position. ADSB display was indicating yellow for close traffic. I looked outside the aircraft to visually identify the 28L aircraft but it was slightly above and behind me being blocked by the wing. During my quick scan for the aircraft; I inadvertently drifted closer to the 28L extended centerline. I raised the wing and identified the parallel aircraft. I was within several hundred feet of that aircraft. Immediately dove and turned to the right to get away from the aircraft and re-align with the 28R centerline. Rest of approach and landing were normal.

Pilot reported that on final approach they drifted toward the parallel runway while looking for traffic; causing a NMAC with the aircraft they were looking for.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

The Captain called upset because Load Planning (LP) sent a 'Do Not Takeoff Without Corrected Weight and Balance' message on takeoff roll. The Captain chose not to abort takeoff but says this should never happen again. Require 'final weight and balance' to sent sooner.

An A320 Dispatcher received a call from an upset Captain who received a Load Planning message during the takeoff roll which stated 'Do Not Takeoff Without Corrected Weight and Balance.' He did not reject.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

I Lead Ramp Service Man D was the Lead working flight out of ZZZ. I was on the right side of the 767 aircraft loading cargo. While loading; I noticed a shipment of dangerous goods on the orange gate cart along with some other miscellaneous items all planned to go out on [the] flight. Due to a live animal that was scheduled to travel; the dangerous goods dry ice of 33 pounds appeared on the DSTG as a hold off item below the weight restricted line. Mentally; I thought to myself that I would come back and get the shipment of dry ice later after the flight was gone; and have someone from the cargo area come and pick the shipment up and take it back to the cargo building. I also had a bag match crew at the gate that was assigned to help assist with containerizing the bags for the flight; and also assist with the bulk pit. There was a pet safe runner that arrived at the gate to drop off the live animal to have put in the bulk pit. I scanned the bar code tag that was on the kennel which was good to go. At this time it's about 10-minutes before the scheduled departure time. From the time that I went inside the kiosk at the gate to double check on unimatic that all the correctly planned cargo for the flight was on board that I input from the scanner; somehow the hold off item got loaded accidentally without me knowing. At that time the aircraft was being dispatched back from the gate; that's when I went back outside to check the orange gate cart to see if the hold off item of dry ice was still on the cart; and it was gone. That led me to believe that the dangerous goods and the live animal was loaded together in the same cargo compartment. I immediately called the area supervisor on the radio and notified her of the error that was made as the aircraft taxied away from the gate. The supervisor made a couple of phone calls from inside the kiosk. I know one of the calls was to cargo personnel; and they both came up with the conclusion that the shipment of dry ice was still down in the cargo building. That raised another red flag in my head; because the only sure way that the shipment would have made it back to the cargo building so quickly would have been by a cargo runner in a van. Possible; but not likely. After the aircraft took off and was airborne; the area supervisor received a phone call back from cargo to confirm that the shipment of dry ice was not there at the cargo building as originally said. The flight was diverted to ZZZ1 where the shipment of dry ice was removed from the aircraft.

Central Load Planning (CLP) held off item 022 (HAZMAT-DRI ICE) for LIV in bulk pit. Station called CLP stating that HAZMAT item nowhere to locate and Lead Ramp service employee confirmed item was loaded into bulk pit with the LIV after flight 54 minutes in to air. Decision made to divert flight to ZZZ1. Result- animal was still alive and removed sent it to veterinary for checkup. Flight re-departed after re-fueled and catered.

Ramp Agent and Central Load Planner reported communications breakdown with load personnel regarding HAZMAT and live animal cargo location.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 3200

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Fuel vented from right main tank through the left wing vent during refueling operations. The First Officer went down stairs to supervise refueling operations. When I observed that the fueling was pouring out of the wing. I ran out of the airplane to stop the refueling. The First Officer was not aware of the fuel spill. However he had already concluded the refueling operation. Initially I thought that the normal method of using the auto refueling system being used and that the auto fill system had malfunctioned. However; later in further discussion I learned from the First Officer that he used the manual override valves to refuel which caused the fuel spill. We informed operations and Maintenance by phone but of delay and communication issues in that country; I elected not to make any logbook entry until after arrival back in the U.S. Upon arrival at our first port of entry in the U.S. [I] made a wrong entry as to the cause of the fuel spill. i.e. I mentioned the spill was because of the auto refill system malfunction rather than saying; fuel spill caused by manual fuel override valves. I also was informed by Maintenance that because the Maintenance deferral for the refueling system was opened at the port of landing and not at the departure point I effectively flew with an open write up. The refuel system was initially put on deferral and subsequently cleared before the next flight.

A MD-80 First Officer supervised refueling at a foreign station with the Fuel Valves in the MANUAL OVERRIDE position which caused an overfilled right main fuel tank to vent out the left wing vent. The fuel system was thought to be faulty but not entered in the Maintenance Log until arrival in the U.S.


During taxi in we were instructed to hold short of the gate while another aircraft occupying our gate was pushing back. After the aircraft pushed back and left we were proceeding into our gate and we noticed the ground personnel for that gate started walking away. I continued to make the turn to line up with our gate taxi in line when my FO told me to stop. I hit the brakes hard and a white fuel pickup went speeding right in front of us. While stopped the ramp personnel just looked at us confused like we weren't supposed to be here and took about 5 minutes to get organized to guide us in.Meanwhile during our wait; an additional 5 vehicles including a fuel truck drove right in front of us even though the rampers were signaling for taxi in. Initially had I not stopped; the pickup would have run into our nose or worse our running engine if I had been moving just a little faster. Vehicle cut us off from blind spot and did not follow procedures for aircraft entering a gate. Immediately stopped aircraft and reassessed surroundings. Ground personnel and vehicles need to be reminded of the rules of right of way. I am not the only one who has had these kind of issues at CLT recently.

Air carrier Captain reported stopping abruptly due to a vehicle cutting across during taxi into the gate at CLT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Total 4072; Flight Crew Type 1818

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Flight was air return due to airborne mechanical event. Upon taxi out; second time around; we were all tired from the air return plus being into our Window of Circadian Low (WOCL) on taxi out. ATC cleared us to taxi to 22L via RF; ALPHA and SIERRA. We instead went RF BRAVO and ROMEO. FO was heads down with new checklist and IRO was helping. About half way to the runway; FO realized we were in the wrong spot and asked ATC for a revised clearance; which they were fine with since we were the only airplane operating on the field at that hour.

B757 Captain reported a taxiway incursion during taxi out due to fatigue; after a maintenance delay.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

First Officer (FO) Pilot Flying (PF); Captain (CA) Pilot Monitoring (PM). Visual approach to Runway 26R; backed up with RNAV to Runway 26R. WINDS 160/11G18 which equates to a 17kt crosswind; with a 7kt tailwind for 26R (272 degrees). Stable approach throughout final segment; in gusty conditions. Crew configured aircraft for tailwind conditions; FLAPS 40; and Autobrakes 2. Landing assessment had been completed using the full 10 knot tailwind limit.Strong gusts and a quartering tailwind encountered crossing the runway threshold; negatively affected the Landing phase of the approach. FO countered a rapid loss of lift with power and pitch; to initially arrest descent. A subsequent loss of lift with pitch correction triggered a 'tailstrike' annunciation in the HUD. CA immediately directed a GO-AROUND. The training kicked in immediately as the FO acted positively; executed a missed approach and cleaned up the aircraft.Subsequent approach to 26R; with better wind components was uneventful.This was the first GO-AROUND on a flight while acting as Captain. As pilot monitoring; my training also kicked in. While informing tower of the go-around; I used the call sign 'Air Carrier XYX'. Tower was kind enough to respond with our correct call sign; 'Air Carrier ZAAB.'Gusty winds; a strong crosswind and tailwind elements all contributed to this GO-AROUND. The airport should have been landing to the East to maximize safety margins; even though the given conditions at a point in time were within the capabilities and limits of the aircraft.One can plan for bad conditions; as we did; for this approach; and yet still not obtain the outcome that is desired. The wind conditions encountered crossing the runway numbers were changing enough so as to jeopardize the safest landing possible.Our aircrews are so experienced to handle the less than optimum environment; that we don't ask ATC to swap the landing operation in favor of better windage. More requesting and less accepting could lead to better scenarios for our crews.

B737-800 Captain reported a tail strike warning on approach in gusty wind conditions that resulted in a go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Total 8937; Flight Crew Type 1467

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Just prior to Top of Descent; got a call from the Flight Attendants (FA) saying that a woman had passed out and they had called for help. I gathered information that she was a 64 year old female; with husband; and takes BP and cholesterol medication. She was attended to by EMT and FAs on board. I called Dispatch and got a phone patch to [ground-based medical personnel]. While waiting we increased speed as we were starting our descent anyway. Passenger regained consciousness. Still waiting for [ground-based] doctor but since we were getting deeper into the arrival I asked Dispatch to notify them what was going on; that we would be [advising ATC of] a medical emergency and landing in 20 min. Returned to Pilot Flying role and asked First Officer to [advise ATC] which he did. Approach and landing was normal. Arrived at gate to find no medical personnel. Queried the company ops who said they had called 3 times. Then called ground who said that they called the company and was told by the company that we would be calling for the paramedics. I called Dispatch who said he would call them. [Advised dispatch about an hour and a half before] we blocked in. Plenty of time to have medical attention called and ready. This would have been tragic if the medical event was time critical.

B737 Captain reported he was disappointed there was no medical response team awaiting his arrival at the gate with an ill passenger even though he asked for them an hour and a half earlier.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was the First Officer assigned to operate Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. The FAR 121 flight was a revenue flight; operating on an IFR flight plan; and under daytime VFR conditions. I was the pilot monitoring. During our descent into ZZZ; we were advised by Center that we were to expect a landing on Runway XXR at ZZZ. The Captain and I performed our approach briefing procedures; briefed the passengers; and began a descent on the arrival. After crossing one of the lower altitude fixes; TRACON vectored us for an approach to XXR. The latest ATIS information for ZZZ stated that they were landing XYL and XXR; with the winds at 290 @ 7 with light rain. As we got closer to the airport; ATC advised us that there was an aircraft on final approach for XXR and they would have a PIREP for us shortly. There was light rain between the FAF (Final Approach Fix) and the runway. ATC then reported that the ride through the rain was smooth so we continued with the approach. As we joined the final approach course; ATC then advised us that the previous aircraft reported a loss of 20 kts airspeed on short final. The Captain and I agreed that sidestepping to XXL would keep us away from the rain on XXR. We then set up the RNAV approach for XXL to back up our visual approach. The approach was standard and visibility was clear.As we continued lower; at approximately 400 ft; the rain from the west had begun to make its way closer to the final approach course for XXL. The ride was smooth and visibility was good as we entered into light rain. As we began the round out and flare portion of our landing; the aircraft began to lose lift and rapidly sink. The auto thrust was engaged the entire approach up to the point at which the Captain reduced power per the aircraft call outs. We received no warnings from the aircraft's predictive or reactive windshear alerting systems. We also didn't receive any excessive pitch or speed warnings as the nose began to rise to maintain our rate of descent. It was at this time the Captain initiated a go around by advancing the throttles to TOGA (Takeoff Go-Around). What seemed like immediately thereafter; the aircraft quickly lost a significant amount of lift and settled onto the runway in a nose high attitude. The aircraft bounced back into the air and we climbed away; executing our go around procedure. We then completed our after takeoff checklist and prepared for another approach into ZZZ. We didn't suspect that there was any damage to the aircraft. ATC then vectored us for an approach to XYL. As we were setting up for that runway; we were advised that the winds were out of the north at 17 kts; exceeding our maximum tailwind landing limitations. We remained at our vectoring altitude; and overflew the runway. ATC then gave us vectors to the east and then south and turned the airport around to land north. We were then cleared for the ILS XZR; but were then advised that the ILS was out of service for that runway; so we set up for the RNAV XZR. We again briefed for the approach and landing to XZR. We landed on XZR; and taxied to the gate without incident.During this flight; we briefed the passengers in accordance to our FOM (Flight Operations Manual). In addition; we briefed the flight attendants before every landing attempt to prepare for the cabin for landing. Upon performing my post flight inspection; I discovered that we had impacted the runway with the underside of the rear fuselage and empennage during our go around. The airplane was then taken out of service for repairs. After having time to review the events that transpired on this flight; I feel that an increase to our Vref speed might have given us more energy to aid in maintaining lift during the windshear event.

Approach to XXR; rain shifts to right of runway. Aircraft ahead reported smooth in rain under cloud. I didn't think there was much vertical buildup to the cloud; affirming the preceding aircraft's ride report. That same aircraft later reported loss of airspeed on final; followed by an ATC report of windshear on XXR. Based on this information and the wind readout on the ND (Navigation Display) that showed westerly winds; we elected to switch to XXL as it appeared that the weather would continue moving to the east.Over Runway XXL; just under 30 ft and thrust coming to idle; I felt the airplane drop or sink; so I applied TOGA (Takeoff Go-Around) and began the go-around. As the engines were spooling; the airplane bounced on the runway. It was a firm touch of the main wheels; but it didn't seem an overly hard landing. There were no windshear warnings or any other from the airplane.We went around and circled back to XYL. ATC told us we were circling back to XXR; but that we'd most likely land XYL. On final to XYL; we heard a report from the airplane ahead of us; but I can't remember what was said. It didn't matter because we then heard from ATC that the wind was essentially a 16 kt tailwind. We told ATC we were unable to accept that tailwind. We went missed approach from intermediate altitude (just below 2;000 ft). They sent us to the south; then east; then back to XZR.Throughout; we ran the appropriate checklists. Workload permitting; we kept the FA's (Flight Attendants) and passengers briefed. Third approach was to XZR with a successful landing. On taxi-in we discussed whether the 1st attempt (the bounce on XXL) was hard enough to merit making a logbook entry for a hard landing. It just didn't seem much more than a firm bounce. We decided to have it checked out anyway. The FO (First Officer) did the walk around and found the tail strike damage. I called maintenance and wrote it up in the logbook.

Air carrier flight crew reported windshear on landing and had a tailstrike.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While enroute to CLT we realized that we did not have the Chsly4 STAR in our EFB/iPad. We notified Dispatch and asked for an ACARS with the info we needed for that arrival. They said to use [an alternate source] but since we did not have WiFi to do so; we could not download it. We were going to tell ATC we would be unable to do the STAR but they did not ask us to. They gave us altitudes and speeds to fly. The FMS was up to date so we flew the fixes. We did have the approach plates available and we flew a Cat2 into 36R with no issues. I checked [company information] the day before the trip and did not see anything concerning the Jepp problems. I believe I checked it when I got into the hotel but to be honest; I cannot remember if I did. I did note that my charts were up to date. When we found out about the problem with the Jepp download; and we got to CLT; my FO (First Officer) and I both checked and we had the update concerning the Flight Ops alert. But we did not have the first alert for this problem. Well this is another learning experience with the EFB; things that would not happen with paper charts. Paper charts - I would have my 'trip book' with all my charts needed for the trip. I will strive to do the same with my EFB from now on. I did have a big distraction with a maintenance issue first thing this morning so I do consider that a factor because I normally load my charts into my EFB each leg; selecting them so you can just page through the ones you need easily. I prefer the EFBs but there is a difference in how you operate with them. I will be more diligent about downloading the latest info but it would have been nice if the alert would have been on our Dispatch release. It was not. Also; it would be helpful to have WiFi available for important downloads.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported the expected arrival into CLT was not available in the iPads.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

During preflight W&B Preliminary report 1 and 2 and Final W&B all showed FOM XYZ Sup Proc [Supplementary Procedures] in effect. It was not on the [Final] release. Received ACARS message that FOM XYZ Dry Ice Sup Proc in effect but failed to adequately QA the ACARS message for Time and Dispatcher Initials. Enroute checked reviewed ACARS log confirming no T&I [time & Initial] to amended [Flight] release. Called Dispatch on arrival to verify that we hadn't just missed the T&I. [Cause was reporter's] Inattention to detail... just missed it.

Air carrier Captain reported departure with incomplete Hazmat documentation on final flight release.