Flight Crew Last 90 Days 205; Flight Crew Total 19400; Flight Crew Type 1320

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 6398; Flight Crew Type 408

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

At cruise; we had ECAMs for the Captain's window heat and a pack regulator fault. I completed the ECAMs. About 5 minutes later; the Captain's ND; PFD and the upper ECAM switched back and forth between being blank and having a diagonal line; finally going totally blank. The 3 screens came back to life about five minutes later and worked well for the remainder of the flight. Simultaneously; we had a multitude of various ECAMs. The aircraft also started to shake considerably. I assigned the FO (First Officer) to fly and I [notified ATC]; initially asking for a diversion to [a nearby airport]. After realizing that [another nearby airport] was behind us and quite a bit closer; I changed my diversion choice. I worked through the ECAMs and required checklists. The FO and I worked very well together and I kept Dispatch; the flight attendants and the passengers informed as the workload decreased. One important note - my iPad froze while I was trying to access JeppPro to brief the approach. I had to shut it down and restart it. Prior to this; I've never had a problem with my iPad. The airframe vibration intensified on the approach. The approach and landing were normal; but we didn't have reversers. This was a surprise because it wasn't displayed as an ECAM and didn't show on the STATUS page. Later the flight attendants told us that there was a vibration in the rear of the aircraft and the tail was swaying side to side. This swaying was indicative of a dual yaw damper failure. This was never made aware to us because it also wasn't an ECAM and didn't appear on the STATUS page.

ANTI ICE L Window and Windshield ECAMs came on in flight; Captain verified his windshield and back window were very cold to touch (unlike the normal heated windows). He looked up info in the [Maintenance Log] and we checked the QRH which related info we already knew 'left windshield heat failed.' A few moments later another ECAM relating to the left pack appeared. Captain noted the left-most fuel pump light also flicker on and off without indication of an ECAM. When the Captain was preparing to send the [Maintenance Report] codes for each of the ECAMs; his PFD; MFD and top ECAM flickered to red lines on and off and went blank. I think the Captain said 'Let's think about diverting; I don't like this' I completely concurred. Seconds later; multiple ECAM cautions began to appear with a 'ding' and yellow caution occurring almost every second; 10-15 times (?). The Captain called ATC and asked for a vector for ZZZ1 which appeared ahead of us (closest large airport; ~150 miles) on our map displays. ATC gave us a lower [altitude] (280?) and a slight turn. Moments later the Captain looked at the closest airports page and noted ZZZ was behind us but only 80 NM away - we changed our intended diversion airport to ZZZ; got another vector and continued descent. Captain gave me the radios; while he worked through the ECAM msgs/checklists. I left the autoflight system on in the ~180 deg turn to ZZZ.The system failures continued to chime and we felt a significant vibration/shaking on the flight deck (FAs later confirmed it was worse in the back). The failed systems that I recall at that point were those mentioned above plus Blue Hydraulic; Avionics cooling; a fuel pump; a pack. I kept taking deep breaths doing my own check for the smell of smoke; expecting it any moment with my O2 mask close by. We executed an ILS/Visual approach with normal speeds and flap settings; without the use of spoilers (the vibration/shaking worsened as we slowed). Landing/touchdown was normal; but neither thrust reversers developed any reverse thrust worked despite levers being in full reverse (there was no ECAM indication that stated they wouldn't be available). I let the aircraft slow mostly on its own until applying light braking. Ground fire support noted no external damage or fire so we taxied to gate.

A320 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing multiple system failures in cruise flight.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Local Control during IFR weather. I was unable to see the runway or any aircraft on final. I was relying on the ASR (Airport Surveillance Radar) and the ASDE-X (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) for separation and safety. On short final; Aircraft X appeared to make a major correction to the north and this caught my attention Aircraft X showed up on the ASDE-X and appeared to be lined up on taxiway November. It took me a second to process what I was seeing; and I then instructed Aircraft X to go around.

ATL Tower Controller reported instructing an aircraft to go around after they appeared to line up with a taxiway in IFR conditions.


People / Populated Areas; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 14500

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Witnessed from the surface 2 different quadcopter UAS operating at the above location most likely without ATC authorization. Within the SFAR 93 area close to single engine seaplane and helicopter tour operators near Destin airport and directly over persons in the open. There should be some type of warning or NOTAM put out that in the vicinity of Destin in the area of Crab Island this is a common occurrence. Most likely unlicensed UAS operators who don't know and don't care about the rules who are doing his and should be held liable for the airspace violation.

An eyewitness saw two UAS flying within a Special Air Traffic Rule (SFAR) area close to numerous operating fixed wing and rotor wing aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Y was being vectored for a practice ILS runway 17 circle to active runway 35 at VCV airport.  VCV Tower asked on a 15 mile base to hold him and allow an IFR aircraft to back taxi and depart runway 35; Aircraft X; Heavy.   Aircraft Y was advised he would be vectored through the localizer to allow spacing.  Aircraft X was released with a turn out towards PMD.  Aircraft Y was vectored back towards the localizer and asked to reduce to final approach speed.  Aircraft Y was advised the Aircraft X was taking a longer than expected time and would be turned to localizer after crossing for additional spacing.  Aircraft Y was given a turn to 140 from a 9.5 mile base and told to maintain an altitude of 4;600 feet.  Aircraft X was radar identified and observed in his left turn towards PMD VORTAC.  After observing the turn; Aircraft Y was told to maintain assigned and altitude until established on the localizer; then he was cleared for the ILS runway 17 circle to runway 35 at VCV airport.  Aircraft Y was on vectors until Aircraft X was no longer opposite direction and was not issued a clearance to VCV airport until Aircraft X was no longer opposite direction.  As the aircraft was not cleared to the VCV airport or any runway; there could not have been any infringement of the Opposite Direction Operation section of our VCV airport Letter of Agreement.The event could have been better handled or more positively controlled by issuing the Aircraft Y a right turn to 150 to join the localizer from their initial 250 heading; which would have allowed an extra minute and 2 additional miles of spacing; but the LOA was not clear on how to handle a situation with a VFR aircraft on vectors expecting additional services and the controller awaiting a brief to take the position and the Supervisor at the time on the desk were unsure as well I asked while on position.   I'd suggest a more in depth brief on opposite direction operations for all controllers to ensure sound understanding of what can and cannot be done.

JCF Controller reports of an Opposite Direction Operation that worked out fine; but he critiqued his operation and determined it could have been done better.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After the before takeoff checklist was completed and configuration checked ok we began the takeoff roll and a master warning spoiler config message appeared and we aborted the takeoff. The Captain checked the flight control page and noted that all spoilers had deployed during takeoff roll. We called maintenance and were advised to return to the gate and deplane. System malfunctioned and spoilers deployed un-commanded during takeoff roll.

We got the takeoff configuration ok message and rolled on to the runway and applied power for takeoff around 60 knots we got 'configure spoilers' master warning. So I aborted the takeoff. While rolling down the runway I checked the flight control page and saw that all the spoilers where deployed. As we exited the runway all the spoilers stowed themselves. The spoiler switch was in its proper place of auto.Equipment malfunction; spoilers deployed uncommanded on takeoff roll.

Flight crew reported a rejected take off due to spoilers deploying on takeoff roll.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 15C

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Arrived at SPS with known tower closed; briefed and flew ILS to Runway 15C. Made all transmissions for landing with non-tower operations.  Used pilot controlled lighting procedures which were on the approach plate.  Broke out at 2000 feet AGL and the runway lights were not on for 15C only 15R.  Side stepped to 15R and made a normal landing and rollout.  During preflight for return flight I called and talked to the tower supervisor.  He informed me that there is no pilot controlled lighting for 15C only 15R; the approach plate is in error. Since it was VFR when I broke out there was no threat for this landing. If the weather had be below minimum to circle a go-around would have been required.  The company needs to verify that pilot controlled lighting is only available for 15R and provide that information to all pilots on the dispatch release.

Captain reported that his chart indicates that the pilot controlled lighting should illuminate runways 15R/33L; 15C/33C; 15L/33R however on arrival to the airport; the pilot controlled lighting ONLY illuminated RWY 15R/33L.The captain stated he then had to fly the approach ILS RWY 15C and sidestep to RWY 15R.The information about pilot controlled lighting is inaccurate.  Please refer to the pilots' ASAP report for more specific information. Aircraft had to sidestep to another runway.Before flying into an airport; the dispatcher and pilot MUST be given the most current information.

During a night approach to SPS Runway 15C; the pilot sidestepped to Runway 15R because the pilot controlled lighting is installed only on 15R. Both the Pilot and Dispatcher missed the Jeppesen and AFD notes regarding the location of the lights installed.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I had put Aircraft X in position RWY 27 behind Aircraft Y arrival. Aircraft Y exited off the runway quickly and I gave him instructions to taxi into the ramp on my frequency since it was a very short route and ground control did not have any traffic in the area. Then my mind started thinking about how much work it is for a pilot to switch frequencies rapidly when going such a short distance etc. As my mind drifted I forgot that I had put Aircraft X into position and had it in the back of my mind that the only traffic I had was still 5+ miles out.After a long moment of silence someone said 'Radio check' and I replied loud and clear then scanned the runway; that's when I realized my mistake. The ASDE-X alerted and I sent Aircraft Z around on a heading and altitude. I coordinated with TRACON while Aircraft X held in position then he departed without further incident.An ELMS on the dangers complacency? I am not really sure. I have always prided myself with always being alert and scanning most especially when it is slow and easy to let thoughts distract you from maintaining alertness. I will certainly be more cognizant of maintaining alertness during slow traffic; and keep an eye out for it with my coworkers as well.

Aircraft Z was on very short final when ASDE-X alerted and initiated go around because Aircraft X was holding in position. I was working ground and played no role in the event.

SAN Local Controller puts an aircraft into position and forgets about it while thinking about other things. ASDE-X alarms and local sends aircraft on final around.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6.9; Flight Crew Total 722; Flight Crew Type 448

Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft X departed BGM and requested vectors for a VOR-A approach into CZG airport. Aircraft Y Departed CZG and requested VFR flight following to B16. I assigned Aircraft X and heading of 250 for his base leg to the final approach course. I noticed Aircraft Y a half mile west of the final approach course and I told him to turn left heading of 270. I reviewed the approach plate and then looked up and saw Aircraft X 3/4 of a mile east of the approach course and began to initiate his approach clearance. I was using degree divergence and thought I would have enough room to follow through with the approach but once I realized the proximity of the aircraft I no longer had time to issue a safety alert. When Aircraft X was reading back the approach clearance he said on frequency 'watch out!' Aircraft X began to question me about the traffic and was very upset with the closeness to the other aircraft. Aircraft Y advised me he had Aircraft X in sight and requested to proceed on course which I approved. Aircraft X reported the aircraft was a half mile in front of him of his nose while he was in the turn. This event developed mainly to my lack of attention to the closure rate of these aircraft. Also I distracted myself by reviewing the approach plate when that time should have been spent watching the scope.

I was practicing the VOR-A approach into CZG under VFR conditions; under the hood. After receiving the last vector from BGM Approach to intercept the approach course and just before intercepting the approach course radial; my safety pilot grabbed control of the aircraft and made a descending left turn to avoid an oncoming Cherokee aircraft coming from the opposite direction. At about the same time; the pilot of the other aircraft also made a left turn. My safety pilot immediately called ATC and told the Controller of the near miss and expressed concern that neither we nor the other aircraft were given traffic advisories. The other aircraft had been monitoring the Approach frequency and responded that we were probably about .5 miles apart; but my safety pilot believed that it was much closer and that the other pilot was attempting to downplay the occurrence. Later on in the day; I flew solo from BGM to CZG VFR and after establishing contact with BGM Approach; the same Controller apologized for the earlier incident. After informing Approach that I had CZG in sight; I asked if there was any traffic near CZG and the Controller responded that there was another aircraft 2 miles west of the field at 2;200 FT. I wondered why; especially after the earlier incident; the Controller had still not advised of the traffic since it was likely about 4 miles from my position.Likely factors in this incident were inexperience of the ATC Controller (cannot verify but he sounded young and inexperienced and I had heard that BGM is used for training inexperienced controllers since it is not a busy area) and general complacency of all people involved since it was a beautiful morning without much traffic.

Report of NMAC due to Controller not issuing traffic because he was looking at the approach plate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 16000

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Max power takeoff was planed (due to deicing). The aircraft was relatively light with a takeoff weight of 100.7 lbs. It was my (Captain) takeoff. After takeoff power was set by my First Officer; we heard a click similar to a generator relay closing. Right after the 'click' sound; I noticed my flight director command bars went out of view immediately followed by the two Master Caution lights. The 'FUEL'; 'ELEC'; 'ANTI-ICE'; 'HYD' and 'OVER HEAD' lights illuminated on the annunciator panel. The 80 knot call out had not yet been made. I announced my intention to abort the takeoff; and after the reject procedure was initiated; my First Officer informed the Tower. During the reject; the RTO function of the auto brake activated; the braking was very aggressive; and I let the auto brakes bring the aircraft to a complete stop. I asked my First Officer to make a PA and tell everybody to remain seated. The Tower asked if we needed any assistance and I initially said no. My First Officer and I then smelled burning rubber and I made contact with the flight attendants who confirmed the burning rubber smell. The Tower then informed us they saw smoke coming from our landing gear area. We requested the fire trucks be sent; and I asked my First Officer for the RTO Checklist. In the meantime; I made a PA and told the passengers we rejected our takeoff out of caution because of several system malfunctions and that everything was okay and the fire trucks will be coming out to check out our tires and we will be returning to the gate in a few minutes. Tower cleared me to the Ground Control frequency so I could contact the fire trucks. As the fire trucks approached the aircraft; I informed them that both our engines were still running. The contact person in the fire truck told us everything appeared fine with no smoke from the landing gear and that no tires deflated. After checking the brake cooling on the OPC; we cleared the runway and asked the fire trucks to follow us back to the gate. We contacted Operations and informed them of our reject and requested a gate and parked. After parking; a Mechanic came in the cockpit and asked us what happened. We determined the Number 2 generator tripped causing the multiple system caution lights. After explaining our situation to the Mechanic; I checked on my crew and informed Dispatch; the Chief Pilot on duty; and the Tower of our situation. My crew; particularly my First Officer; did an outstanding job. All the passengers remained very calm and cooperative.

Crew received multiple flight instrument failures and warning indications during take-off; and executed an abort.First Officer could not locate the QRH page referencing an RTO.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Recently on a departure from ZZZ; a question came up regarding the Engine Out procedure for Runway XL. The Engine Failure on Takeoff Procedure for XL calls for tracking RCL and a non-standard acceleration of 1;300 feet MSL/1;000 feet AGL as identified from the ACARS performance data at the bottom.  The ACARS printout is attached. The FMC performance data uplink for this departure on this day; uplinked 896 ft. as the engine out acceleration height.So there was a difference for the engine out acceleration height on the two data sources; the ACARS printed data; 1300 MSL/1000 AGL; and the uplinked ACARS data in the FMC showing 896 feet. for the engine out acceleration height. This was discussed between some LCA's and XXXXX provided an answer from Performance Engineering highlighted the reason for the discrepancy; which is below:Some time ago I discussed this issue with flight standards and ask that there be an update to the FM to provide the background.  I think this was accomplished in the 737 FM but I am not sure about any of the other fleets.  Before I answer the question; I will state that either number may be used and both are valid. We still have some aircraft that do not uplink the engine out acceleration heights.  Because of this; whenever we review an airport we have a safety requirement to determine the engine out height for the aircraft with no uplink.  Since the procedure information is plain text; we have to determine the highest of the required altitudes for an array of input conditions.  In the case of this condition we computed and noted the 1;300 feet.  When computer software performed the actual computation; it used the specific conditions for the departure to determine the 896 feet altitude; which is uplinked to the 777.  I believe the Airbus is the only one that does not receive the uplink. So XXXXX has answered the discrepancy between the two values.  The reason for the report is that this is not readily apparent in the FM for the 777; and most likely pertains to all the Fleets that uplink data to the FMC; 787; 777; 757; and 737.  The B777 had a recent change on FM 3.80. 4 on [month/year]; which does address this; but it is not very clear that there may be two different values for engine out acceleration heights; but only highlights to use the uplinked data.  While both values are legal; the uplinked data is tailored to the conditions of the day; rather than the ACARS engine out data; which would be a worse case number. Could Standards identify the why behind the recent change on FM 3.80.4 to help pilots understand why two values may appear for the same data point?   XX_2 so could a Fleet Newsletter be drafted to explain in more detail; this issue and the Performance Engineering answer to this discrepancy?

Air carrier Captain reported concerns with the GUM Runway 6L engine out procedure.


ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast)

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

During descent the aircraft experienced a loss of both ADS-B receiving 1 & 2 and a temporary Terrain display to standby on our NAV display. Loss was accompanied by a Class 2 message alerts which we began to run. Since the message alert requires determining the state of the transponder; I queried the ATC Controller as to the status of our transponder. He stated 'Everything is fine; 5G interference in the vicinity of DEN was reported'. We completed the approach.

Air carrier Captain reported loss of ADS-B systems during approach to DEN airport.  Reportedly; ATC advised them 5G interference had been reported in the area.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The ground elevation is 6500' so I believe that was why it was confused with the FAF altitude.After being cleared RNAV XX in ZZZ at night we dialed 6500' for the FAF when it is published at 8500'. We received a Ground Proximity warning and complied by pulling up/leveling off and returning to 8500' after realizing the mistake.The LR EGPWS doesn't display obstacles clearance altitudes similar to the XR and shouldn't be dispatched to mountains based airports.The Lido brightness is too dark and flashes when adjusting at night leading to more errors at quick glances.

ERJ-145LR Captain reported EGPWS warning on approach due to setting airport field elevation as FAF altitude.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 400

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I have flown into MYF several times on an Instrument Approach; ILS 28R. Every time; I am given headings and vectors to final. I have asked for the full approach sometimes; but usually given vectors. The issue is that the altitudes and heading make it very difficult to fly a controlled and standard approach. This last approach I was given a heading to the final approach course at a higher altitude; then turned right and left and then back to final and then a steep descent to be able to get back on the right altitudes for the approach. This has happened about 5 times and usually the same sequence. I am kept high; then a step descent; various headings and then cleared for the approach at the last few minutes. It makes it very difficult to manage speed and altitude. Also; when in instrument conditions it provides an opportunity to become spatially disoriented with the turns and the assigned descent profile. I believe it would be MUCH safer to be given the full approach and follow the listed altitudes. I can tell there is a lot of traffic and a lot of training going on in the area; 2 parallel runways at MYF also present a challenge for controllers; but we should find a way to make the instrument approach be according to the plate. I believe this will make it safer for us all. I respect the Approach controllers and they are dealing with all the traffic the best they can. It just makes the Approach more difficult to fly correctly. If the approach is not workable; perhaps it should be revised.

Private Pilot reports on non-standard Air Traffic Control procedure at MYF.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was training a Developmental on Local Control. Two aircraft were on final with level 4 and 5 weather just northwest of the field and rapidly approaching the airport. The first aircraft (Air Carrier X) was on an ILS approach landing Runway XXR he asked for the side step to XXL; trying to avoid the weather that was fast approaching. As this was happening; the windshear alert equipment went off and warned of a fifteen knot loss one mile off departure Runway XXR. I instructed the trainee to issue the warning even though we had no departures because we were probably going to have a go around. The trainee issued the warning. Air Carrier X was about to touch down when he decided to go around and he wanted a left turn out. The trainee gave the aircraft go around instructions and instructed it to climb and maintain 4;000 FT and fly heading 180. The trainee had to be prompted to do all the necessary steps to complete the go around. As this was going on; Air Carrier Y; who was 4 [miles] in trail of the other aircraft; asked the reason for the go around. At this point I keyed up and asked Air Carrier X reason for go around. He promptly responded 'wind shear.' I relayed this information to Air Carrier Y and about 5 seconds later he said he would need to go around also. While this was happening; the trainee was struggling with inputs in the ETVS to print a strip for departure and neglected to give the first go around departure frequency change. When Air Carrier Y asked for go around he also needed a left turn out. The trainee gave him a 210 heading but this go around was on a three mile final instead of short final so the heading was basically inside of the first go around. As Air Carrier Y was going around he keyed up and said with; what I felt a little bit of panic; that he needed to 'deviate.' At this point I decided I needed to take over the frequency. The pilot asked for a deviation I took that as meaning a deviation around the inclement weather. So; I made the decision to turn him left to 180. I knew this turn would most likely put him in a position closer than three miles from Air Carrier X; but at that moment I felt it was the safest thing to do. While this was happening our first go around had still not been switched to Departure and even when I gave him the appropriate frequency he came back and asked for a different one because no one was answering. I then gave him another frequency. As this was happening; Air Carrier Y said that he needed to deviate to another airport because he was minimum fuel. I told him that he could land ZZZ1 and gave him a 60 heading so start him going there. As I was talking to the pilot about this the CIC spoke up and said that ZZZ1 had similar weather to ZZZ; so I offered the pilot ZZZ2; which was about 10 miles further northwest. When this was happening; I forgot and neglected to give Air Carrier Y clearance to ZZZ2; although I did tell him that the 60 heading would be a vector for the Visual Approach to Runway XX. He accepted and I coordinated with the appropriate RADAR controllers and handed him of to satellite to be worked. In conclusion; the separation went below three miles between Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y on the initial part of go around once Air Carrier Y was on the 60 degree heading divergence was accomplished. I was talking to at least one of the aircraft until divergence was insured and; technically; was able to provide Visual Separation between the two aircraft because the weather southeast of the field was still VFR. Right after I got off position I went to the supervisor and said that I had probably lost separation forgetting that I could provide visual between the two aircraft. I think the CIC could have been more helpful with handling the numerous pieces of coordination that had to occur in a very brief moment. I feel I should have taken over the position sooner than I did. I am a fairly new trainer and am still learning how far I should let a trainee go before taking over.

Tower Controller providing OJT described a conflict event when an aircraft executing a go-around due to windshear followed immediately by a second windshear go-around. The Controller noted that the trainee issued a 'cut off vector' to the second aircraft leading to the conflict.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After rotation with the positive rate gear up call the gear handle was raised and we received the ECIAS message Gear Disagree. We continued with the departure and I advised the IRO (International Relief Officer) to read the QRH procedure. We advised ATC we had a Gear problem and advised them of our situation. I contacted Flight Control and with Maintenance; Dispatch; and a SME (Subject Matter Expert) we discussed the problem and determined that the best course of action was return to [the airport]. Dispatch sent an amended release and we dumped fuel for the return. On the STAR we received an EICAS Fuel Imbalance 1 and 4 followed by EICAS Fuel Imbalance 2 and 3. All attempts using the QRH Procedures proved unsuccessful. Fuel imbalance continued to deteriorate. Fuel was draining out of Tank 1 rapidly. We then ran the fuel leak checklist. We determined that the fuel was not leaking externally but going into tank Number 2. The fuel would not stop draining from tank Number 1 into tank Number 2. We looked for further guidance in the QRH but could not find any. Using system knowledge we chose to open the cross feed and feed engine Number 1 from tank 2 and turn off the pumps on engine Number 1. The fuel continued to leave tank 1 and go into tank 2. Upon landing the difference between tank 1 and 4 was 10;000 pounds. The fuel imbalance 2-3 was brought back into tolerance by using tank 2 to feed 1;2; and 3 engines. When tank 1 continued to drain uncommanded we declared PAN PAN PAN at which time ATC gave us expedited handling. Landing was uneventful.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

The flight crew of a B747 reported they received an EICAS message 'Gear Disagree' and also had an un-commanded fuel transfer.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

This was day one of resuming training for both myself as instructor; and for the trainee; since the COVID-19 schedule began.  The radar positions were previously de-combined; but were combined up just before beginning training.  Shortly after; traffic and complexity increased rapidly.  As it was getting more difficult to complete a timely and accurate scan; Aircraft X was descending on a vector to the airport; and was on a converging course with an un-identified VFR tag at 7;500 feet indicated.  Before realizing this conflict; Aircraft X reported traffic up ahead.  The trainee issued traffic and a heading away; but not a traffic alert.  Aircraft X then informed us he was executing a TCAS RA; at which point we issued a traffic alert and to advise when complete.  He finished the RA; and continued on vectors to the airport.Traffic throughout the airspace has increased to a point in which multiple positions should have been used; both identified; controlled traffic; as well as VFR traffic saturating the airspace.  In addition to the traffic factors; the Supervisor position had just been switched over to a Controller; so the Controller in charge of the TRACON was fulfilling several duties at that time while the Supervisor was doing other duties.  This led to a lack of overall awareness throughout the TRACON; with more traffic at hand than controllers and supervision present. I recommend that supervisory personnel and controllers alike; myself included; be more vigilant of rapidly increasing traffic; and take action to de-combine positions in a more timely manner.  I also suggest that it be noted to be more vigilant when it is the very first day back in a training environment; as controllers could be rusty in a training environment.  It was also the first day back from X days off due to COVID-19; and these extending absences should be taken into account when managing workload for controllers.  As an OJTI and Controller; I need to be more aware of these things; and be better prepared to handle any traffic presented; but this was a very difficult task to accomplish given all of the factors mentioned above; specifically workload; complexity; training; and overall saturation.

On approach to ZZZ we were on vectors for a right downwind for Runway XXL at 10;000 feet. ATC issued us a descent clearance to 6;000 feet. The frequency was extremely saturated with aircraft and radio transmissions and it appeared as if ATC was training (there were two controllers working the frequency together). As my first officer was descending through about 9;000 feet I noticed an aircraft on our TCAS display that appeared to be climbing quickly towards us on a trajectory for our flight path. We began to shallow our descent and I queried ATC about the traffic. We received a TCAS TA 'Traffic; Traffic.' The Controller issued us a turn towards the east and told us to continue our descent to 6;000 feet. At this point we received a TCAS RA 'Monitor Vertical Speed' and shallowed out descent to level. I told ATC about that we were responding to a TCAS RA; and they asked us to report clear of conflict and resume the descent at that point.ZZZ TRACON was extremely saturated with traffic while we were on approach and had a layer of broken clouds at about 4;000-6;500 feet. I think this was potentially a VFR aircraft at 7;500 feet that was not talking to TRACON. TRACON seemed unaware of their position relative to our flight path.Good thing we have TCAS...ATC was completely unaware of this aircraft and continuously asked us to continue the descent even after we queried them about the traffic. We ignored them and followed the commands of the TCAS RA and avoided the conflict.

TRACON Controller and air carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict situation between the Captain's commercial aircraft and an unknown VFR aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 125; Flight Crew Type 125

Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on a pleasure flight and intended to do a landing at ZZZ; where I have landed many times before. The wind was light [at] 220; and my intent was to land on Runway 16. After announcing my intent at 8 NM to the NW; two other planes announced to the east for landing on 16. I did look at the airport diagram; but had the clipboard upside down. I continued the approach; calling out downwind; etc for 16 when in reality I was approaching and landing on 34. I remember holding some R aileron for an anticipated R crosswind and being surprised that it was from the L. After landing I stopped on the taxiway facing S and wondered why I never saw the 2nd plane land; but it still didn't click. So I went to the end of 34; announced I was departing 16; and uneventfully took off as the 3rd plane was entering the downwind for 16. Looking to the L I never saw him; because of course he was behind me to the R. It was only when I leveled off that I realized what I had done and how lucky 3 pilots had been. Before this; I thought this was something that could only happen to a complete idiot; but it happened to me at an airport I thought I was familiar with. I had the airport diagram out but was holding the clipboard upside down. I think I did look at the heading at some point; which was of course the reciprocal and was 160. I was completely turned around without any reason to be. I have now decided that 'confirm course' should be done immediately after turning final.

GA pilot reports becoming confused approaching his destination with intentions to land on Runway 16 but instead entering the downwind and landing on Runway 34. The error is not discovered until after the ensuing takeoff.


Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Approaching Front Range over DEN; encountered instantaneous airspeed increase to barber pole; then overspeed warning. I pulled the power to near idle then increased climb rate to no effect. Got second overspeed warning. I was worried about stalling on backside. Pushed power back up a little. I transferred control to First Officer to make the PA to take seats immediately. Then severe turbulence hit; First Officer stopped climb and started descent. First Officer made turn to right to avoid area. First Officer had momentary loss of control. He was worried about maintaining control of Aircraft. I made calls to get descent clearance. One call was consonants only due to the turbulence knocking out my breath. Turbulence was in all 3 directions of rotation; especially in roll and yaw. I had difficulty reading gages; especially the smaller figures. I remember seeing FL370 (I assume that was highest altitude) and FL355 for a while; [and] then turbulence decreased at FL330 and only light chop at FL310. Although I exercised my emergency authority in reversing climb; I didn't declare an emergency. Didn't have time; didn't think of it; [and] was concerned for aircraft control. I did immediately report severe mountain wave and repeatedly tell ATC 'we ARE descending'.No injuries. Flight attendants in seats; two passengers in lavs who rode it out bracing themselves. After the event I consulted FM; and determined that the event met all 6 of the parameters listed in the definition of severe turbulence. I reported severe turbulence to ATC and verbally to the Dispatcher. I then received a barrage of second guessing by Maintenance through the Dispatcher. Eventually I stopped responding to the messages. I would like to see the FOQA data to see how what I remembered compares to what the data says. I am a trained human factors researcher/educator and I know how severe stress affects memory. Right afterward; First Officer and I agreed that this would be a good human factors scenario. I believe we coordinated very well; acting as a team. We did encounter a minor tertiary (or more) wave maybe 100 miles downwind. Afterward discovered yellow book; which was in the book cubbyhole with the strap by the observers seat; on the console to the right of the First Officer forward of his kit bag. That much thrown about. Upon landing I discovered minor bleeding from my elbow; cause unknown. We need an immediate PA button. I gave up control to punch buttons on the comm. panel. Flight attendants had turbulence inbound and thus were in their seats but didn't mention the turbulence to me. Inbound pilots didn't brief me as they were concerned about their mistake of extending flaps above FL200. Dispatcher described 'cry wolf syndrome' because they had daily wave warnings for over 60 days with no reports. Afterward he said got 3 different warnings from different sources that day so maybe he should have emphasized it. I didn't keep my paperwork so I can't say if it was in the flight plan. I wasn't thinking wave in particular; maybe due to the excessive flying I was doing. I have flown gliders to above FL300 on the Front Range and Sagre deCristo ranges in Colorado; so am experienced. The angle to the cloud formation didn't catch my attention; not that it is always that obvious. I don't remember the winds catching my attention as being strong enough for strong wave but I could be wrong.I am very concerned by the actions of Maintenance to try and talk crews out of reports that cause them to inspect the aircraft. This was the second time they've done it to me. I have copies of the 6 messages sent to me putting pressure on me about the severe turbulence report. The Dispatcher; as well; was pretty tired of the requests he was forwarding. Pressure doesn't work on me but I'm sure it does with some. I hope the FAA representative will take this comment very seriously. I didn't call it severe without some thought and reference to FM. Corporate culture is very much thatwith flight planning; the fuel planning; etc someone on the ground can do it better than the Captain and usually the Captain is even left in the dark. I can't tell you how many flight plans I get with non optimum routes and altitudes with NO explanation of why or what's out there to cause a change- when I call to ask; the response is 'the computer did that.' And yet the FAA will hold me responsible. Responsibility and Authority must go hand in hand; Leadership 101. I think its time the FAA steps in and corrects this financially driven industry back to match FAR's.

A B757 Captain described a severe turbulence and loss of control event over the Front Range near DEN which the incoming crew and flight attendants experienced but did not pass on.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 225

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188; Flight Crew Total 19100; Flight Crew Type 1400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We were flying at FL430 when the Flight Attendant notified crew that there was a flood in the lavatory. Captain went back to investigate while First Officer flew aircraft. Owner went up to flight deck and hit his head on emergency electrical gang bar in cockpit. All electrical power was lost and cabin began depressurization. Captain returned to flight deck and tried to reset electrical power and began emergency descent. We could not notify [Center] of our descent because our radios were inoperative due to electrical power unable to restore. Passengers and flight crew all donned O2 masks except owner; who passed out due to hypoxia. Captain was finally able to restore electrical power at 16;000 FT. First Officer was now able to contact...Center and advise of the situation. We were able to then land. In the future no one except flight crew is allowed to enter flight deck during flight; not even aircraft owner. One good thing that happened was that both pilots had iPads. We were able to still navigate even though aircraft lost electrical power. The IRs and navigation boxes were not able to power up for the rest of the short flight.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information].

At FL430; owner of a GIII hit his head on an electrical gang bar in the cockpit causing loss of electrical power and cabin decompression. Electrical power restored at 16;000 FT and aircraft landed without further incident.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Software and Automation

We were on a quick turned from a late inbound flight and it verified in ACARS that we were going to keep the aircraft for the final leg of the day. We had flown 3 legs in and out of ZZZ under winter conditions; active snow and de-icing every leg. My attention had been high on the aircraft MEL items; airport NOTAMs and the changing weather conditions. We pushed back for gate de-ice in ZZZ; we had received a SELCAL/ACARS message (MSG) regarding a change and we were still good to go. However; the ACARS remained on this page and prior to de-ice I noticed there was still a SELCAL message posted. My FO and I checked the MSGs and it came to our knowledge that our Flight Attendant (FA) was being removed from our trip due to COVID Exposure. This ACARS message was received after push-back as we were getting de-iced. We then double checked the release and we realized there were 2 amendments. One was for the TAIL SWAP which we were aware of. However; due to the immediate boarding at our gate and activation of ACARS and upon finding that we were keeping the current airplane we did not see AMD # 2 with the FA change. We completed de-icing and that is when I called my Dispatcher and acknowledged the change. I advised him that we would be returning back to the gate; however due to extenuating circumstances; this should have been a notification that should have been sent earlier in particular VIA phone call to myself; the PIC; regarding this change. Prior to push; I had no knowledge of the situation or the change; the change I knew of was of the plane swap because I noticed the tail number in ACARS. Due to the quick turn; the FA had her phone off as we were boarding and was not aware either of the change and of the COVID exposure. However; since there was no acknowledgement there should have been an attempt to notify the FA through my FO or myself.I believe that the quick turn and the focus on the inclement weather distracted me from the information being received. I also believe there was breakdown in CRM from the PIC/Dispatcher point of view. This was a last minute change to our paperwork; and this change should have required a phone call to me; the PIC or an ACARS MSG PRIOR to push to acknowledge the change. At times there is lack of support from the Flight Ops/ Dispatcher level in being proactive to provide the most up to date information forcing the PIC to take attention away from other tasks; potentially like in this scenario and missing information.There needs to be a way to notify the flight crews of amendments made on the release. There are multiple reasons a release can be amended ranging from; CREW SWAPS; TAIL SWAPS; Weather; Alternate; NOTAMs; MEL; TIMES; etc. These amendments; can be essential to flight and ensuring both PIC and Dispatch is aware of the change is key. On our ACARS we have the ability to respond for numerous items; acknowledge TARMAC delays; acknowledge 'UNSTABLE APP AIRPORTS' via ACARS but we do not have a way to acknowledge flight release amendments. I am suggesting that prior to push should an amendment be made; if not acknowledged; it will NOT ALLOW crews to send for T/O DATA until it is ACKNOWLEDGED via ACARS or via telephone. After push back; you would have T/O data; but an acknowledge would be required VIA ACARS or Telephone. I believe this would also help with our AIRWORTHINESS Management system in ensuring crews have the correct MEL Listed on the release prior to push or especially after pushback. I strongly believe this would add an additional layer of safety that ALL Pilots could benefit from.

We had to return to the gate because we became aware that we had the wrong Fight Attendant (FA) on board after push-back. There was an amendment to the release that we didn't receive notification for the FA change.Quick; late; and focused on the weather. Lack of system to ensure receipt of amendments. Break down in CRM between Company; Dispatch; and Flight Crew.I suggest better CRM systems between Dispatch and Flight Crew by implementing some type of acknowledgement when there are amendments to the RLS. Flight crews should not have to dig for information when Flight Ops and Dispatchers can also have the ability to provide the information to flight crews. Therefore; reducing workload on flight crews and staying focused on the things that require our full attention.

Air carrier flight crew reported returning to the gate after receiving notification a Flight Attendant onboard had been exposed to COVID-19.


Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

We had a DH at the beginning of our day that was an hour and fifteen minutes late and then an aircraft swap after that. The inbound crew stayed and boarded our passenger; so the plane was full when we arrived. We were rushed to make announcements and pushback. I got distracted by the rush and all the new COVID and mask PA's and I said the old safety demo PA.

Flight Attendant reported that an old version of the safety demo was presented due to being rushed.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Throp was east bound at 5;500 FT VFR 20 southwest; called Approach for RADAR flight following and priority handling into our airport due to low/intermittent oil pressure. RADAR Controller on duty provided expedited service to the airport. I passed all pertinent info to Local Control and suggested they roll the fire trucks. The Controller on Local failed to follow proper procedure and sounded the emergency siren; but never picked up the crash phone to pass the emergency information to the Fire Department. The response vehicles had to come up on Ground frequency and ask for information. This Controller has a history of not following procedure and providing poor/ineffective service. Numerous controllers have complained about this Controller and Management is either scared to do anything about his\her or just not interested in fixing the problem. This Controller is CIC qualified. This Controller can't even follow proper procedures for emergencies. This is a severe safety issue and something needs to be done.

TRACON Controller voiced concern regarding the actions taken by the Tower CIC when emergency information was relayed to the Tower.  The reporter questioned the CIC's capability.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While descending on the DRLLR5 into IAH; I asked the Captain a question regarding the flight and we began to converse about the topic. I continued to monitor the descent and we were on speed and on altitude all the way through MPORT. The Captain had the bottom altitude of MPORT (16;000 ft.) in the altitude selector and once past MPORT it was not changed to the bottom altitude of DRLLR (13;000 ft.). Since the altitude selector was still at 16;000 ft.; it looked as if we would be fine with the restriction at DRLLR according to the vertical guidance. 5 miles from DRLLR I noticed we were actually high and told the Captain we needed to increase the vertical descent. He increased the vertical descent while maintaining the speed restriction but we passed DRLLR 400-500 feet above the restriction. The flight continued normally and we continued on the arrival into the visual on 26R. This event was caused by a discussion about the flight leading to a monitoring breakdown. As Pilot Monitoring; I lost focus of the descent path and did not realize the bottom altitude of DRLLR was not set. By the time I realized and queried the Captain to increase the descent rate it was too late. I should have waited to ask a question until we were on the ground considering we were already on the arrival. This would have allowed me to monitor the descent rate more accurately and avoid being high at DRLLR. I also probably would have caught the altitude still being set to MPORT.

First Officer reported missing a crossing altitude on the DRLLR FIVE Arrival into IAH.


As a commuter heading back to my base; I was assigned a jump seat (inboard aft right). Proceeding to the aft of aircraft to take my seat; only the C Flight Attendant was present in the aft galley and was heading to the front to perform a safety demo. I was presently the only one in the aft galley and I double checked the galley to make sure that all latches; doors and coffee pots etc. were properly engaged and secured as the flight crew was performing their safety demo. I walked over to both aft doors R2 then to L2 as a double safety precaution to make sure that both doors and straps were secured and armed and noticed that the R2 was armed and that the L2 was 'unarmed' during taxing out. My eyes nearly popped out of my head in seeing this and I immediately secured and armed the L2 door! When C Flight Attendant and B Flight Attendant returned to the aft aircraft I immediately told both of them of the incident and that the L2 was not secured and I secured and armed it.

B737-900 Flight Attendant; jump seating to work; notices the 2L door is not armed during taxi out and arms it.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Picked up assigned aircraft from Company's Maintenance Vendor.  We found numerous maintenance discrepancies on the aircraft previously; the reason for the aircraft's return to Maintenance status.Two discrepancies found during the second pre-flight: A.  One of the Maintenance Log forms was missing from the aircraft's log-book.  It was a fixed discrepancy for a suspected; turned out to be an actual; oil leak on the left engine.  I would not have known said Maintenance Log form was missing if I wasn't the one to write up said discrepancy.  Yet another sign to the great deficiencies the Company's aircraft logbook system has; and; the issues the Company has with quality control.Furthermore; the aforementioned missing Maintenance Log form was the one and only form with the maintenance release for this event in section 4 of the Maintenance Log.  The Inspector that brought out the form mentioned said fact.  I am not able to find a reference in the FOM in which the PIC is responsible to ensure a maintenance release is found for each maintenance event.  The FOM states that section 4 of the Maintenance Log is only for Maintenance use.  Does that mean the PIC is not responsible to ensure at least one maintenance release has been signed off for each maintenance event?B.  I previously wrote up two exterior APU cover fasteners to be either of the wrong type; too long; or; not properly fastened.  The corrective action stated that the vendor found the Company used a total of 4 wrong fasteners for said cover and the 4 were replaced with the correct ones.  My first question:  What are the consequences of using the wrong parts for the aircraft?  How and why does it happen that wrong parts are used for the aircraft.Secondly; upon the pre-flight inspection I found one of the replaced fasteners not to be fastened.  Yet another example of the Company's lack of Maintenance quality control.

A CE-560XLS pilot discovered a missing maintenance logbook page on which he personally had entered an oil leak discrepancy and separately an APU access panel with incorrect fasteners which was cleared but later found with one incorrectly secured.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 1100

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

[While] at FL350 we changed frequency to Center 100 miles north of...our intended arrival location.  We checked in at FL350 as call sign.  We then were instructed to descend to FL240; we read back clearance 'Aircraft X descend to FL240.'  At this time we descended to FL240; around FL310 we were asked if we were in the descent and responded yes and at that time was issued another descent clearance.  We landed at [our destination] uneventful.  I was notified today (four weeks later); that we checked on at FL350 and the intended descent was for a [an aircraft with a similar sounding call sign] to which we read back the clearance and descended.  ATC did not inform us it was for [another aircraft] nor did they stop us from descending or communicating to us that we had mistakenly thought it was a call to us.  We were not given a number to call upon landing.  Our crew made the mistake of responding to what we heard was [our call sign] and not confirming it was actually [for other aircraft] who we were unaware was even on frequency.  Up until today we had no idea a mishap had even taken place; it was an unfortunate place to be; considering two very similar call signs.  Both ATC and our crew is responsible and I think better communication and situational awareness can prevent other similar incidents.

A Boeing C17 flight crew inadvertently responded and complied with clearances intended for another aircraft with a similar call sign.  The flight was not advised at the time and the reporter only learned of the incident approximately a month after it occurred.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Once again the PAPIs at PTKK are inoperative.  There should be a Company response to lack of electronic/ visual glidepath for night operations.

Air carrier Captain reported the PAPI lights at PTKK are inoperative.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 173; Flight Crew Total 6789; Flight Crew Type 4069

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Leaving VABB we had a numerous distractions. Flight was planned to depart 2:30 late. Gate return due to sick passenger and associated security concern with deplaning passenger. Captain then becomes highly concerned cabin crew will time out.The gate return prompted our ACARS to be re-initialized. This caused a lot of confusion with the FO; as so much energy was spent helping the FO properly load the ACARS and download new takeoff data.Taxi out was a cluster of confusion due to a weak FO and high workload mostly due to the new before takeoff checklist. Consequently he became task saturated. Add to this the stress the Captain was putting on the FO to depart the airport promptly.Approaching the end of runway 27 the tower asked if we could accept the next closest intersection N3 instead of N1 (Full length). FO states affirmatively. We were not good for that intersection. Captain more assertively states we are legal to depart from that intersection. Captain states that he is overly familiar with the airport and N3 intersection and it is only '10 feet from the end of the runway' and he would taxi the airplane to make up the difference in any lost runway. I believe the Captain responded to the tower that we could accept the intersection. By the way; the Captain talking to ATC was not unique for this crew as the FO was very weak and overloaded. Consequently the Captain repeatedly keyed the mic to respond to ATC. The IROs spent much of the time assisting the FO; backing up ATC; and backing up the taxiing.As the Captain made the turn onto intersection N3 I was busy scrambling for the takeoff data and verifying runway remaining from intersection N3. Before I could interpret our takeoff data for Runway 27 the FO was advancing the throttles for takeoff. Takeoff and subsequent flight were uneventful. Upon later inspection of takeoff data our flight was not legal to accept that intersection departure given our takeoff data regardless of the Captains efforts to reduce the effect through any taxi maneuvers. I believe Captain was irresponsible and rash not to include input from crew.

A flight crew illegally departed from a runway intersection for which they did not have proper takeoff data. The First Officer was reportedly weak and overloaded and the Captain disregarded other inputs from the Relief Officers.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

On approach at 180 knots; gear selected down. No in-transition for nose gear; mains down and locked. Gear Disagree warning. Discontinued approach and complied with QRH; cycled gear 3 times. Previous write up with failure into previous airport; gear cycled 8 times. Chose not to cycle more as failure corresponds to previous write up. QRH gear extension procedure complied with; nose gear deployed down; green and locked. Could not stow landing gear handle; left in up position per QRH notes. Performed fly by over runway at 1;000 feet AGL; gear appeared down by examination by ATC with binoculars. Normal traffic pattern flown; normal landing; nosewheel steering failure steering failure per QRH. Taxied to gate with no further incident. Flight Attendant briefed as to potential situation and passengers briefed throughout situation as to indication issue and crew needed time to determine indicator status. Flight Attendant finally re-briefed as to status and if nose gear collapses; to follow Captain instructions and initial evacuation out serviceable exit. Maintenance was done at the previous airport that is a threat in itself. There were two prior write ups for the issue.

[Report contains no additional information.]

A CRJ-200 nose gear did not extend when the landing gear was selected down so the crew declared an emergency; complied with the checklist; and landed safely after the nose gear extended. This was a repeat problem.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft experienced gradual; uncommanded left roll/yaw at 16;000 ft and 300 KIAS; level flight; while vectored direct for the Arrival. Continuous light vibration felt throughout airframe. Slip/skid (ball) indicator displaced completely to the left of center (unusual for a left yaw situation). No unusual engine or flight control malfunctions or abnormalities indicated on the MFD/PFD/MWS.Slowed to 250 KIAS; disengaged Auto Pilot (AP)/ Yaw Damper (YD); and centered the ball by displacing rudder trim 2 indications to the left. Coordinated diversion with ATC. Aircraft remained stable with rudder trim 2 indications to the left; rudder pedals difficult to move as if Yaw Damp still engaged; and vibrations still noticeable. Flew stable visual approach. ATC arranged for emergency vehicles to be on standby. Landed with no complications.On post flight; discovered a fastener on the leading edge of an accessory panel; on the underside of the left engine pylon; became loose and allowed for the leading edge of the panel to be forced aft. Although it was understandable that the panel could cause the aircraft to yaw left; it was confusing as to why the slip/skid (ball) indication was indicating to step on the left pedal and add left trim. Notified ACP; maintenance and steward on duty.

HS125 flight crew on a ferry flight reported experiencing flight anomalies created by an unfastened panel on the engine pylon.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On arrival with vogler transition to join localizer 27L; crew momentarily overshot localizer course.Better understanding that 'VOGLR' transition to join 27L localizer does not include CENAK waypoint overfly.

We were cleared to fly the WATSN2 RNAV arrival into ORD. After STYLE and before VOGLR; the controller told us to 'Fly the VOGLR Transition'. With very little time; the Captain and First Officer reviewed the arrival again and could find no transition on the arrival. We both agreed that the arrival instructed us to depart CENAK on a heading of 270 or assigned; and expect radar vectors to final approach course. We flew the remainder of the arrival as published; and from CENAK; we turned to 270 degree heading. The Controller then asked us if we had 'missed the turn'; and instructed us to fly heading 250 and intercept the final approach course for Runway 27L. We complied and intercepted the 27L final approach course. VOGLR is listed as an IAF for the ILS 27L approach; and I believe the controller wanted us to depart VOGLR and fly course 281 to NRMAH and intercept the final approach course; even though we were not cleared for the approach when the event occurred. The WATSN2 Arrival instructs crews to fly from VOGLR to CENAK; then turn to heading 270; however; the ILS 27L approach can begin at VOGLR. The crew was confused as to what exactly the controller wanted. The crew should have queried the controller and verified exactly what he expected us to do. Next; the WATSN2 Arrival should have transitions listed if ATC expects crews to fly 'transitions' off of the arrival. In addition; the IAP's should have approach transitions listed if crews are expected to fly 'transitions'. Reference the ILS 35R at KDEN. The WATSN2 and the ILS 27L; do not seem to have a seamless transition. It would have been more clear if we were cleared for the approach prior to VOGLR. The crew should have recognized that this clearance is not commonly given at this airport and immediately asked for clarification from the controller.

ERJ-175 flight crew reported some confusion on what constituted their cleared track on the WATSN2 RNAV arrival to ORD.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

A ZZZ Building Maintenance Mechanic is servicing and conducting Annual Checks on all station Fire Extinguishing Bottles in a Hangar Shop. The Shop so assigned to this task is much smaller than the previous work space. There have been complaints that the threat of an accidental bottle discharge is great enough to mandate a less restrictive and congested work environment so personnel can escape from the release of Purple-K Fire Retardant. The current Shop was formally a Warranty Office and has poor ventilation and is not of adequate size. Building Maintenance and Line Maintenance Management have been seeking a suitable location to move this operation but have had multiple roadblocks finding available space. Environmental Facilities.

Reporter stated his Air Carrier has recently added ventilation equipment and re-designed the Hangar Shop floor space to allow for quicker egress if an emergency should occur. The fire bottles involved are the 400 LB type bottles with wheels; that use Purple-K retardant and are stationed at various locations in their Hangars and at the Terminal gates.

A Line Safety Mechanic reports about a congested and restrictive work environment in their Fire Bottle Shop. He raises concerns about adequate egress to escape from the release of Purple-K Fire Retardant during Servicing and Annual Checks of their 400 LB Fire Bottles.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals

Aircraft came in with a [logbook write-up] stating the left [engine] oil bypass light came on at landing. The crew who flew the plane in stated to the mechanics working the plane that the light flickered. Later that night the mechanics came to me and told me about the [logbook write-up] and the verbal from the crew. They stated they had inspected the Delta P (differential pressure switch) and it had not popped for the oil filter; they also tried to remove the filter bowl to replace the filter and it was stuck. I got into the IPC (Illustrated Parts Catalog) to see if we had the next higher component; the module that the filter bowl attaches to and we did not have one. In the meanwhile the mechanics went to the plane and cleaned the cannon plug and ran the engine and the bypass light did not re-illuminate. They came back in and told me about the situation and I dialed up Maintenance Control to tell them what was going on with the plane. I told Maintenance Control that the filter bowl was stuck and we would destroy it if we forced it any further plus we did not have the module 'next higher assembly'. Since we cleaned the plug; ran the engine and no delta P indication we; myself the Mechanic and the Controller; felt it was an indication issue; and we made the decision to clear the [logbook write-up]. I did not pull up the FIM (Fault Isolation Manual) that night and assumed that the mechanics did which I should have questioned when I reviewed the [logbook write-up] because of no mention of a FIM or MM (Maintenance Manual) used to come to this conclusion. The plane left the next morning and while on climbout at 25;000 FT the light came on and the plane returned to the field. Once back day shift removed the module and cut the filter bowl off and the filter was clean. They then looked at the chips [detectors] and found the gearbox detector had debris and the engine was changed.

#1 Engine oil filter bypass light flickered enroute to (STA) on (date). There was no history of any other indications or engine problems reported; and the light was extinguished upon arrival. I believe that the determination was that this was the product of an intermittent electrical anomaly. (STA) MX performed an engine run with no other indications illuminating. The aircraft was dispatched out of (STA). The bypass light illuminated once again resulting in an air return. Upon further inspection; the oil filter showed evidence of debris and the engine was replaced.

While troubleshooting an engine oil filter bypass light write up on a B737-700; Maintenance personnel were unable to remove the oil filter bowl. With no module available; they were hesitant to damage the filter bowl and concluded that the problem was indication only. The next flight; when the light came on again; the flight crew returned to the field. During the subsequent troubleshooting; the module was removed and the filter accessed; only to be found clean. However; when the chip detectors were checked; they contained material; leading to an engine change.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

We were on the arrival into our filed destination and had just finished deviating around a few thunderstorms.  All of the sudden we got an ECAM that the autothrottles turned OFF and we got an ECAM that the autothrottles were in thrust lock.  Then the Number 1 engine suddenly rolled back to idle thrust while the Number 2 engine remained at normal thrust.  We declared an emergency letting ATC know we were experiencing and engine failure and we would get back to them.  Within one minute later; we were able to regain normal control of the Number 1 engine; but not the autothrust.  We rescinded the emergency with ATC and continued the flight to ZZZ1 without the autothrust.  The rest of the flight was uneventful.

An A320's autothrottle transitioned to THRUST LOCK followed by the number one engine spooling back.  The crew declared an emergency; but the engine returned to normal operation with no autothrottles.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 1100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

At approximately 7PM local time; during my final approach to ZZZ; Runway XXR; I lowered my landing gear and received 2 of 3 green lights. The left main landing gear light was dark and the warning horn sounded. I recycled the gear once with the same result. I reported my situation to the Tower and requested that they visually report whether they saw all three gear down and they affirmed to the effect 'all three gear down'. I also recall a [Company] pilot taxiing northwestwardly either on Charlie or Mike toward the main terminal as reporting that he too observed all three gear down. The Tower asked my intentions - whether I would proceed with landing. I inject here that this same left landing gear light indicator in years past had failed to light only to find that it was the indicator light and not the gear. That experience factored into my decision and response to the Tower that I would proceed to land. Upon touching down in the vicinity of where Runway XXR crosses Runway XY and where taxiway Kilo crosses Runway XXR; the left main gear collapsed. I skid down Runway XXR veering leftwardly through the XXR/taxiway Lima intersection onto to the grassy area between XXR and taxiway Mike; coming to a stop in that grassy area. I shut down both engines; exited the aircraft; and disconnected the battery; by which time the Fire Dept. trucks; airport operations and Houston police were on their way; arriving very promptly.

Citation CE 501 pilot reported the left main gear collapsed on landing and the aircraft departed the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 12096; Flight Crew Type 3259

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I have reported this issue a number of times through logbook entries and/or ASAP reports each time I have flown this aircraft.This aircraft (as well as [another] aircraft) has a chronic noise issue; which violates FAR 117 with regard to providing the pilots a quiet rest facility. When in the Pilot Crew Rest Facility (Bunk) an intermittent; loud knocking noise is heard at varying intensities on irregular schedules. I have recorded this noise and provided it to the company. I recorded it again last night. It sounds as if someone kicks or raps loudly with a knuckle on the bunk wall right near the pilots' heads as they sleep. Last night it sounded like it was coming from below the bunk; through the aft wall. On other aircraft the location can vary. It is impossible to sleep through. First Officer stated to me that he distinctly heard the noise last night and it woke him up at least five times. It was so bad for me that I had to leave the bunk and tried to sleep in the crew rest seat. This was impossible due to coughing passengers and people walking up and down the aisle. I went back into the bunk. My break was almost six hours. Last night; this noise was so bad that I maybe slept an hour and a half. This was totally inadequate. I did not realize how fatigued I was until we after we landed.   We happened to have a representative from Boeing on the flight. I asked him afterward what he thought the knocking could be. He said that it is possible that 'oil-canning' between the E&E compartment and deck floor is what's happening; being caused by the differential in pressure and/or temperatures. The noise created by this problem is obstructive to the intent and application of FAR 117; and negatively impacts the safe conduct of our flights by interfering with the pilots' ability to achieve a restful break.  The insidious degradation of cognitive function which is not necessarily apparent to the pilot; and the fact one might not realize just how fatigued they are; should I encounter this situation again I will give strong consideration to new FAA guidance regarding inflight fatigue accumulation and need to reevaluate continuance of the flight so as to ensure fatigue level does not continue to increase.

B777 Captain reported the crew rest bunk area is subject to random noise intrusions in flight that make it difficult to get quality rest.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Manuals

We were filed on the BMRNG SID by Dispatch. However; the active runway changed to Runway 30R; and ATC cleared us via the TEKKY 5 to TEKKY; direct SJC; then BMRNG; flight plan route; maintain 5000 ft. When we were cleared for takeoff; ATC advised us to climb and maintain 4500 ft. Thought this was odd. The TEKKY Sid shows a maximum speed of 230 kts. at the first turn point. However this may be under the SFO Class B airspace. According to the ATC liaison; we cannot exceed 200 kts. We may not fly at our minimum maneuvering speed below the Class B. This needs clarification. The SID is apparently constructed for airspace compliance and track; not for flight below Class B airspace. We need to publish guidance for our pilots on what speed they need to fly and until what point.

An Air Carrier pilot reported a SID speed which is published at 230 kts even though the route is below Class B Airspace causes confusion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 71; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 60

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were climbing out on initial heading and; when we attempted to raise the gear; it would not retract. We 'cleaned up' the aircraft; leveled at 5;000 MSL and followed the ECAM procedures for L/G retraction fault. We then calculated the increased fuel consumption to destination which required us to return to our departure airport. We explained our landing gear problem to departure control and got vectors back to an ILS. Enroute we reviewed ECAM procedures; informed Dispatch and Maintenance Control; completed all checklists and approach briefings and then completed an uneventful landing and taxi back to the ramp.

Once we were on the ground; there was some question from Maintenance as to why we did not switch to the opposite gear system. I explained that this procedure was in another checklist that we were not alerted to by ECAM. We ran the procedure that was presented by the aircraft. The 'L/G Lever Interlock' procedure calls for switching the L/G Position Det System switch to opposite system. That will work if the gear is all aligned and centered for retraction. In our case; the system had determined there was a problem with gear positioning for retraction and gave us a different ECAM procedure.

An A300 flight crew elected to return to their departure airport for maintenance when the landing gear failed to retract after takeoff and the increased fuel burn to destination precluded continuing.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

After experiencing wake turbulence from B757 ahead; landing LAX; we went above glide slope and slightly left of course (VMC visual). Ended up high on final and out of position for proper landing. Went around. Was vectored 6 miles behind B747. Experienced wake turbulence again. Landed.

Air carrier Captain reported encountering wake vortex on arrival to LAX; resulting in an unstable approach followed by a go around. Flight encountered wake turbulence on the next approach also but a normal landing was made.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Once the aircraft door was opened and only a few passengers from first class deplaned; the cleaners were trying to come on. We asked them to wait just a bit; as we had 4 wheelchairs; and our first-class cabin was still getting off. The cleaners told us they are instructed to get on right away. The Captain said No; they needed to wait till most of the aircraft had deplaned. A few of the cleaners were still trying to argue with us; even after the Captain had said they had to wait. There are no quick turns; as our cleaning procedures during this pandemic are totally opposite of the term quick turn. This also is dangerous for the passengers and crew. There is no room for cleaners in the galleys or in the aisle as we safety try to deplaned using the company's policy of social distance; and deplaning a few rows at a time.In addition; the cleaners are getting in the way of the flight crew full filing our FARs responsibilities and safety obligations; post cabin sweeps. This is a safety hazard and needs to be addressed immediately.

Flight Attendant reported; after gate arrival; the oncoming cleaning crew was interfering with passenger deplaning and social distance policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 133; Flight Crew Type 100

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

An exhaust manifold of PA28-180 broke off over open water causing me to declare an emergency. I took off for a cross country flight. When I was 50 NM from my destination airport I noticed a loss of RPM so I started switching tanks; leaning and enriching the mixture. Turning on the fuel pump and turning on carburetor heat. Etc. the plane sounded like it was coming apart. It was backfiring and sputtering like crazy and any change in throttle or mixture made it worse. I immediately declared an emergency and set transponder to 7700 as I was not in glide range of an airport and was loosing power and altitude. I was over water and swamp with nothing to land on. I declared to ATC that I was flying through a cloud as I was holding the altitude I had while engine was still running. They advised me against it but I was at the cloud already it was really a non issue as once I got to it I skipped right under it so it all worked out. When my A&P came to see what happened he said the cylinder was running overly lean from the exhaust leek and also it was blowing all the exhaust gas right in the carburetor which is probably what caused all the backfire. In hindsight I guess the engine wasn't totally stopped maybe I shouldn't have declared an emergency as I made it to the airport but I was loosing altitude and the engine could have stopped at any time so if I had to do it again I would have probably done the same thing.

PA28 pilot reports a very noisy and rough running engine with reduced power during a cross country flight. Reporter is able to return to the departure airport safely.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Total 5497; Flight Crew Type 5497

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Both on this flight and on a previous flight; I noticed that the summary form no longer has 'Hazmat' on it; did the form change and no one told us; or did the procedure change and no one told us? This a good way for the pilots to know to keep an eye out for Hazmat paperwork; as opposed to the ramp forgetting to bring it up and us not even knowing it is on board.

B737 Captain reported the flight crew preflight summary form has discontinued listing Hazmat information.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 99; Flight Crew Type 99

Enroute heading 050 and climbing to get reception for flight following from Center while VFR I was in the right seat of a Robinson R44 when I saw a light fixed wing aircraft that appeared to be a Blue and White Bonanza or Cirrus out of the lower left window next to the console begin to turn away on a westerly heading. Left seat had controls and turned slightly to the right and then returned to our previous heading as the other aircraft had already passed us and was no longer a factor. The fixed wing aircraft appeared to be approximately 50 feet below and approximately 100-150 feet to the left of our aircraft. The flight went on and completed with no issue. Had we already been on with Center before; this event may have been avoided.

R-44 pilot reported a NMAC with a fixed wing aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft X was at 3;000 feet on a vector 3 miles northeast of APF. There was an aircraft that departed APF squawking 1200. I observed the aircraft climbing and saw the aircraft go above 2;500 feet. I immediately called APF Tower and told them to stop the VFR aircraft for traffic. These aircraft were min separation was 0.12 on my scope when I observed the VFR departure climb thru 2;500 feet. This is now the 4th incident with the same controller at APF. I have had a VFR aircraft climb through my downwind at 3;000 feet. When I called over; I was told that 'The aircraft is VFR;' in a real condescending fashion. I tried to explain that regardless of the type of flight; we have an obligation to separate aircraft. I have also had 2 subsequent departures with the Controller where a jet has been turned through a VFR aircraft's flight path. In fact; one happened last week and they were .4 miles apart and climbing through the aircraft's altitude. Both aircraft were on me; so visual separation was not being provided. There is a history with issue with APF Tower. It is dangerous and needs to be addressed.There needs to be intervention from the FAA to address the safety issues at APF Tower. Although they have made improvements in the recent past; there still appears to be a lack of safety culture especially with VFR aircraft. There needs to be remedial training given on separation responsibilities. Although VFR aircraft are required minimal separation; the idea that they are VFR and subsequently not subject to any separation is a falsehood.

A TRACON Controller reported the Tower allowed a VFR aircraft to climb into confliction with traffic TRACON was vectoring on downwind.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

While flying VFR in cruise flight; the Emergency Exit door in Row 2 opened as we were approaching the south shore of the island. I told Approach that I needed to divert to the [nearby] airport. They handed me over to Tower. Not knowing what; if any; damage was done to the aircraft; or if any passengers were injured; I declared an emergency with the Tower. Once established inbound I checked on the passengers; who were all fine. We landed with no further incident.

When an air taxi CE-402 lost the emergency exit door in flight the Captain declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Departing ZZZ; heavy slush and temperatures were at 32 degrees. We discussed possible brake freeze and took precautionary measures. We dragged the brakes during taxi; left the flaps up until ready for take-off and left the gear down until 200 knots. During the approach brief to MSP; we again discussed brake freeze prior to landing. When we touched down; it became apparent that the brakes were locked. We kept the plane near centerline and came to a stop. We contacted tower; informing them of our situation; requested a tow and asked for rescue trucks. There were no injuries and damage was limited to the main gear. Passengers were transferred to FBO van and the Fire Commander took charge of having the airplane towed from the runway.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

A CE-680 flight crew reported that even though they followed all proper procedures; they found the brakes were frozen solid upon landing from slush and ice.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 930; Flight Crew Type 750

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

My flight was from TEB. The route clearance started with TEB 8 SBJ V6 etc. 3;000; 8;000 in ten minutes. After a LUAW instruction from Teterboro Tower; I was cleared for takeoff from Runway 1 at TEB. The Tower instruction was 'Runway 1 cleared for takeoff'. I neither heard nor read back any initial heading or altitude assignment. The airport and airspace was very busy. After departure; I did not hear a contact Departure instruction as expected. After several minutes; I called Teterboro Tower to ask if I had missed the call. The Tower Controller then instructed me to contact Departure. By the time I made my initial call to New York Departure; I had flown the required northeast portion of the departure procedure and was southwest of TEB at 3;000 FT on the way to SBJ. The flight conditions were clear VMC but the delay in the hand off was not a good situation. I am not sure if I missed the call or if it was not made but either way the situation should not have happened. An earlier call by myself to TEB to inquire about the hand off would have made the situation better. Also; it sounded as if the Tower Controller was assisting the Ground Controller adding to his already heavy work load.

An pilot departed on the TEB 8 and transitioned direct SBJ before contacting the TRACON because TEB Tower had not directed a frequency change after takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 450

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Aircraft

During climb I called ATC approach and requested flight following. My #1 comm radio quit working earlier in the day so I was using a handheld. During the cruise portion; my communication with ATC was not consistent and I was having to move my antennae around for reception. As I was getting near [destination area] I could not get ATC to let them know I was going to start my decent. I called several times and ATC was not receiving my transmissions. I then squaked 7600 for lost communications and landed at [planned private destination airport]. Normally I tell ATC on initial call that I am going to [a nearby public airport] because [the private airport] is not in their system and as I get closer I tell them I am going to [the private airport] 10 miles north; which I did. I had also told ATC during the cruise that I had radio problems and I was in fact using a hand held. Later that night the local sheriff came to my house looking for the airplane and I let him in the hangar to verify.After the sheriff left; I called flight service to discuss and let them know what happened.A few minutes later I got a call from ATC and we discussed what happened and he told me they sent out a search. I told him that I thought squawking 7600 would have alerted them that I lost communication and I did not think I needed to take any other action. He told me I should have called flight service after I landed; but he did not think I did anything wrong. I was disappointed that I wasted resources looking for me and learned that I should have called them.

The pilot of a small airplane reported the loss of communication with ATC while enroute to a private airport that had not been shared with ATC. Later; law enforcement located the pilot to confirm a safe arrival.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Fatigue; Workload

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Manuals

Maintenance personnel say they found the Left-Hand (LH) Main Landing Gear (MLG) Auxiliary (Aux) Retract actuator to be missing a bushing on the 'wing side' bolt attachment point on Aircraft X; a CRJ-900 aircraft in the ZZZ hangar.  The aircraft was in the hangar due to a leaking MLG Retract actuator. The bushing was replaced with no damage noted. ZZZ Maintenance reported a missing slip bushing. February 2014; during Routine Overnight Maintenance (RON); I; as the Inspector; along with a Mechanic X; installed the LH MLG Aux Actuator on Aircraft X.  We performed Task Card RXXX6; Step-9.  We installed the LH MLG Aux Actuator as required by CRJ-900 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Task 32-32-03-XXX.  The maintenance procedure calls out to install the slip bushing and pin in the Aux Actuator in Step 4 A. (1); (d).  There is a 'Note' under the Step that states: 'Make sure the slip bushing (17) is under the head of the pin.'  Further; if you reference Figure (Fig) 405; Sheets One and Two both show the bushing UNDER THE HEAD OF THE PIN for the LH AUX Actuator AS SHOWN.  The right side is opposite.  When I looked at the hardware stack it looked correct.  The AMM Manual was wrong; the bushing is in fact installed under the washer on the nut side.  You have to bend over and carefully look for the bushing when in place or you will miss it.  I understand that only a bushing was required to correct the problem. After researching this procedure; I noticed that the AMM I had to work with was updated two days after I performed this task.  The CRJ-900 AMM Temporary Revision (TR) 32-XXXX Revision issued two days later has corrected the misprint to state in the Note: 'Make sure the Slip bushing (17) is under the washer (21) on the LH MLG and under the head of the pin (20) on the RH MLG.'  Furthermore; they corrected the figures (images) and even added an additional Figure for clarification. Fatigue. Graveyard shift.

An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector was informed that a slip bushing for the Left-Hand (LH) Main Landing Gear (MLG) Auxiliary (Aux) Retract actuator was found missing on a CRJ-900 aircraft; approximately three weeks after he inspected the actuator installation. The Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Figures (drawings) were incorrect.