Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Local 1. Departure Runway 4L; I cleared a B737; for take off Runway 4L. I issued 'Runway heading' to protect for possible missed approach Runway 4R. Controller working Runway 4R advised traffic landing Runway 4R was on missed approach. I did not hear his instruction to his missed approach. I advised my departure that traffic on his right side was going around and I needed him to stay on runway heading. I saw the missed approach; a second B737; turning left instead of the usual right turn. I advised the Runway 4R Controller what his traffic was doing. He stated he gave the missed a right turn. I noticed my departure was climbing thru 2;000 FT and the missed approach aircraft was turning into my departure at about 800 FT. I told my departure to expedite his climb to 5;000. I told the other Controller to stop his missed approach at 2;000. He stated he already had. I then stopped my departure at 4;000 because I had a 4;000 FT altitude restriction. I then observed the missed approach turning right and no longer a factor for my departure; I turned my departure back on his usual heading. We have had many problems on this runway set-up throughout my tenure; and it can all be traced to one variable. The standard departure off of Runway 4L turns over the extended center line of Runway 4R (the arrival runway). Until we develop procedures that allow for the departures to remain on runway heading; we will continue to have these incidents. The situation definitely was exacerbated by the second B737 turning left instead of right which is normal operating procedures for this situation. And no doubt; a language barrier issue might have been a contributing factor. We shouldn't ignore the fact that we often use this runway set-up in bad weather. And it remains a possibility in really bad weather that the miss will not want to turn right into convective weather. Then what options do we have to keep the departure and missed approach separated.

Tower Controller described a conflict event when traffic on a missed approach conflicted with departure traffic that turn unexpectedly in the wrong direction; the reporter suggested new missed approach procedures be developed.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Aircraft X reported passing very closely to a weather balloon. He stated it passed between his wingtip and his number one engine. I don't know much about weather balloons but it would be helpful to be able to track them so we could warn aircraft of their presence.

ZLA ARTCC Controller reported a military aircraft pilot reported a near miss with a weather balloon.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104; Flight Crew Total 2070; Flight Crew Type 104

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Performed normal origination walk around; observed no abnormalities. 4 pins on board and no visible gear pins or red flags observed. Taxied to runway and performed normal take off. At positive rate I called for gear up. Crew noted air noise louder than normal as gear was coming up and noted that nose gear remained in down position. Landing gear warning went off. We looked at the hydraulics page and noted normal indications and quantities. We recycled the gear and problem remained. We advised Departure that we needed to level off at 5000 feet to run a checklist. We leveled off at 5000; put the flaps to 9 and speed 180 while we diagnosed the situation. We ran the QRH and followed the procedures. At this time we decided to return to field as we had three green gear down indication and that the nose gear never went into transit: it always showed DN. We had to burn off fuel so that we did not land over weight. We landed with no issue with the gear on RWY 27R but did get an indication on roll out that Baggage door open. When we returned to the gate maintenance met us and discovered that there was a gear pin left in the nose wheel. I met maintenance at the jet bridge and informed them that we did have 4 pins on board. They inspected the pins on board and notes that one of the pins in the flight deck was an elevator pin that was left by maintenance by mistake. They also noted that the gear pin left in the gear was not visible; it was tucked up in the wheel well. It was also a shorter red flag and not the normal long extended flag that hangs lower like the 3 other gear pins on board.Detected on initial gear up. Nose wheel remained down due to gear pin in gear. We cycled the gear; looked at the hydraulics page on MFD; Leveled at 5000 speed 180 flaps 9 and ran QRHIn training we never actually do a walk around. Our walk around training was a cluttered side show. I had never actually seen a gear pin in any of the gear or out of the holder. There should be at least a half day devoted to hands on walk around in training. The walk around is a barrier which can detect abnormalities or problems on the ground and I feel that this is overlooked in the training of pilots. It would benefit the company to have pilots do a walk around on a real airplane to see the walk around items first hand.

An Embraer-145 First Officer reported that the nose gear would not retract after takeoff. The crew opted to return to the departure airport and discovered that the nose gear pin was still installed.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

At cruise altitude (FL280); near ZZZ1; our plane entered a cloud; requiring us to turn on anti-ice. Within seconds after turning on engine heat; the flight attendants chimed and reported 'an odor' in the cabin. There was also an odor in cockpit. Nothing visible; just a smell. The smell was described as a 'burning electrical' smell.  I decided to declare an emergency and divert to ZZZ. We landed safely. ARFF inspected the aircraft before we taxied to the gate.It is very possible we flew through a smoke cloud that was from the massive forest fires in the region.  If I had been aware of the possibility of that smell entering the aircraft; I could have done something to prevent an unnecessary divert. On the return trip; I made a PA that alerted the passengers and flight attendants that we may get an odor inside the airplane. While flying over the forest fire area; it is very possible to get that smell in the cabin. Armed with this knowledge; I believe there would be far less fear and panic.

In cruise at FL280; MD-82 flight crew detected 'burning electrical' odor after turning on engine heat. Flight attendants reported same odor in the cabin. Crew declared an emergency and diverted to ZZZ where odor was attributed to massive forest fires in the area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

On departure we experienced a sudden failure of the number two engine with severe damage. We were climbing through 15;000 feet when; without warning; we experienced a violent shudder and loud noise from the right side of the aircraft. We quickly determined the number two engine had seized by the engine indications; no fire warnings. We ran the QRH for severe damage; [informed] ATC and received vectors back. We then ran the QRH for severe damage while briefing the flight attendants; passengers and notifying Operations. We made an uneventful landing and taxied to our gate. Upon postflight inspection; we did notice some white feathers well inside the engine and suspect it may have been a large bird or two that caused the sudden seizure.

Climbing out of 15;000 feet a very loud noise along with yawing of aircraft occurred. Upon reviewing the engine instruments; it was apparent the number two engine had failed. There was fairly significant vibration associated with the failed engine that ceased as the engine wound down. We immediately asked to level at 15;000 feet; and informed ATC of our desire to return. Once we secured the engine; we asked for vectors back. We continued the checklist and once we got to the point in the checklist that allowed me to talk to the flight attendants; I called back to ensure everything was okay in the back. I informed the flight attendants what had occurred and the plan to return. I then let the passengers know. After informing Operations that we were returning; we started the approach. The approach and landing were uneventful. We had Fire and Rescue standing by and they followed us back to the gate. Once parked at gate; I called Dispatch and asked for a patch to Maintenance Control to inform them both of what had occurred. I then got in touch with Chief Pilot on call.Fire and Rescue informed us that there was possible evidence of bird feathers in the engine.

B737 flight crew experienced a sudden engine failure climbing through 15;000 feet and returned to the departure airport. Post flight inspection revealed possible bird feathers in the engine.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Working LC2 landing 17R departing 17R/17L; transitioning into a north operation in which we would be landing 35L/35R.  Traffic management had coordinated the last 17R arrival would be Aircraft X but had not advised what the first north arrival(s) would be.  As it turns out; D01 (Denver Approach) was bringing arrivals into both 35L and 35R.  By appearances they were attempting to time the operation so that Aircraft X would be off the runway before opposite direction operation procedures would need to be applied.  I observed Aircraft Y tagged for 35L and another aircraft (flight # not noted) for 35R; south of the airport; slowly maneuvering northbound and kept high.  By my judgment the timing would not work out if the ODO (Opposite Direction Operation) arrivals were cleared for approach; but since they were high my expectation was that they would be getting a holding turn. This did not happen; however.  Aircraft X was not even across the 17R threshold (probably 500-1;000 feet from it) when Aircraft Y checked on over the FAF for Runway 35L; descending out of 8;400 feet MSL.  I advised them to continue and that opposite direction arrival was rolling out; which was Aircraft X's status when the transmission was made.  Aircraft X exited a reverse high-speed (do not remember if it was M6 or M7); and when they were clear of the runway I cleared Aircraft Y to land 35L.  At that time they were approximately three mile final but still at 6;900 feet MSL; significantly above the normal glide path.  They subsequently executed a missed approach on short final (approximately 1/4 mile) due to being too high. It should be noted that during the majority of this event I was in the process of being relieved but that did not interfere with my actions as I kept the frequency and issued instructions; while between myself and the relieving controller we accomplished the coordination and handoff per facility SOP.  Also; I found out after the fact that the Runway 35L ILS and PAPI were not turned on when Aircraft Y was on approach.  The PAPI could have been turned on by myself (but I was not directed to do so) or by supervisor/TMC (as is normal at our facility) but the ILS for 35L could not be turned on until Aircraft X was on the ground or if they had been solicited to allow the change while airborne.  It appears that D01 had not coordinated the first north arrivals with our ODO operations in the Denver approach control airspace were recently suspended at the instruction of D01 due to misapplication of rules/procedures and the need for further training of their controllers.  Despite the suspension of ODO; it appears the final controller did not apply common sense in ensuring that the last 17R arrival would be clear of the runway before transferring communication and control of the first for 35L.  I would recommend that D01 get ODO training as soon as possible if it is ever to be used in the Denver hub.

A Denver Tower Controller reports of an Opposite Direction Operation (ODO) that led to a loss of separation.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were cleared number 1 for the visual approach RWY 03R and the P-51 was cleared number 2 on the visual and called us insight. While on the base leg of our approach we received a TA to 'monitor vertical speed' for traffic below us identified as the P51. While making our turn from base to final we received an RA to CLIMB. I was sitting right seat and looked back at the 4-5 O'clock position and noticed the P-51 climbing over our tail and immediately instructed the pilot flying not to climb because the traffic was overtaking us from above at a high closure rate and extremely close distance.The Pilot in the other aircraft had a strong lack of acknowledging and following ATC instructions (including airspeed reductions; and position reports) as evident from the ATC live recordings of the event. We reported the RA to the tower controller and landed safely. I have contacted the tower and started a complaint with the supervisor. In our perception of the event; the tower controller offered adequate reports and instructions to both aircraft but the event arose due to the negligence of the other aircraft.

A Gulfstream First Officer reported they received a Traffic Advisory on base leg and a Resolution Advisory during final approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I was working a Parallel Monitor Position. A B737 was the lead aircraft; a B767 the trailing aircraft. The B737 slowed more than expected at the FAF. I instructed the B767 to slow to final approach speed; and he did. Two point five miles was required; and it went down to 2.36 at the time the B737 was over the approach end. The rate of compression had reduced; and I made a conscience decision to allow the B767 to continue the approach. Spacing was sufficient for the Tower; and there was no danger of a go-around due to long roll out of the lead aircraft with current conditions. There was no reduction in safety; and no danger to the users. Local Control 1 had made the Transfer Control Point (TCP) 1 mile; but a few airplanes later went to 3 miles; which would have made the operation legal. I honestly don't know; with the new confusing Quality Control order; if we still have an approach end; or if this is simply a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) now.

A80 Controller described a less than required arrival spacing event but elected not to issue a go around.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

We began our descent and received a Master Warning Caution light with a 'TE FLAP ASYM' EICAS message. We had not changed our configuration prior to the illumination of the lights. There was no rolling moment of the aircraft or any other aircraft control problems. We went through the QRH and felt we needed more time to work our checklists so we asked the Approach Controller if we could hold. We received clearance to hold at 7;000 FT. During the hold; we contacted [Operations and Maintenance] to inform them of our situation and [Maintenance] felt there was nothing we could do airborne to fix the problem. We worked through the checklist ensuring all steps were adhered to; including calculation of our approach speed given flaps were between up and 1 degree. We then declared an emergency with Approach Control; asked for a 10 mile straight and began our approach. Upon switching to Tower; we asked to stop on the runway and wait for the fire trucks to inspect our brakes prior to taxiing. We touched down on target airspeed and rolled to a stop with approximately 5;000 FT remaining. We switched frequencies to match the Fire Captain who informed us that the brakes did not register excessive temperatures. We switched back to Tower and asked to taxi to the ramp.

B757-200 First Officer reported receiving 'TE FLAP ASYM' EICAS during descent. The flight crew entered a hold to work the problem; declared an emergency; and landed at destination with no other issues.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X was cleared down to 12;000 ft. I was dealing with a VFR aircraft requesting flight following when I noticed Aircraft X was below 11;000 ft. in a 12;000 ft. Minimum Vectoring Area. I queried him about his altitude and he said he was in VFR conditions and forgot to tell me. He then reported destination airport in sight and was cleared for a Visual Approach. He subsequently canceled IFR. Remind pilots not to descend without a clearance.

Center Controller reported an aircraft left its assigned altitude and descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

I'm writing this report because we have guidance in Chapter 15 of the AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual) regarding windshear that is impossible to follow. In a nutshell; we are given black/white guidance in a very gray area. We are told in para 15.5.1; 'Stay clear of thunderstorm cells; heavy precipitation; and areas of known windshear.' Para 15.5.2 says; 'Do not take off if known windshear exists;' and para 15.5.5 says; 'Do not continue the approach if known windshear exists.' But what exactly is 'known' windshear? It is never defined. I have conversed with several of our company experts over the past few months. In all of my discussions with flight standards; flight operations procedures; and various check airmen no one has been able to define 'known' windshear. One subject matter expert told me that an ATC windshear alert; for example; is 'known' windshear; while another told me it was only an advisory. Which is it? All of the company experts I've spoken with admit 'known' windshear is extremely difficult; if not impossible; to define...yet; we're told we must avoid it. AC 00-54 Pilot Windshear Guide; 2.4.2 states; 'The importance of avoiding severe windshear and microbursts cannot be over-emphasized.' Agreed. It goes on to say that 'Unfortunately; there are no universal quantitative windshear avoidance criteria that provide unambiguous go/no-go decision guidelines.' It provides a Table 1 that gives probability of encountering windshear guidelines; but it also admits the information is a 'subjective evaluation of various observational clues to aid in making real time avoidance decisions.'So; there seems to be a wide and varied interpretation within the pilot group; to include our subject matter experts; over what constitutes 'known' windshear. Even the FAA's evaluation criteria for making a go/no-go decision is subjective. It's for these reasons; the AOM should be changed to either define what company means by 'known' windshear; and give examples for clarity; or rewrite the paragraphs cited above to allow for better risk management decision-making. Providing black/white (objective) guidance in a gray (subjective) environment creates confusion; is ambiguous; and can be detrimental to safety when there is not agreement within the pilot group as to what exactly constitutes 'known' windshear.

Reporter describes ambiguous guidance in company manuals with regard to avoiding known windshear.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

The culmination of events on [this day] led to an overall lack of situational awareness and loss of operational control. The following is a brief description of all events. 1) Dispatch [computer system] was not operating properly. Example: receive an ACARS and the chime would not sound. Receive an ACARS and once clicked on; the page would be blank or you would just get an error message. Dispatch [computer system] had to reboot throughout the morning. I lost track of the times. I believe it was 6 times before noon. These inconveniences lead to poor flight monitoring and difficult crew briefings. I was either unable to pull up the info needed in a timely fashion or was in the middle of a reboot when the crew needed information. 2) FLT XXX an out and back test flight. I received notice of this flight 20 minutes before its scheduled departure; by the Captain. He gave me all the information necessary to quickly plan the flight. EVERY time I calculated the flight plan Sabre logged off. Every time. [The Chief Dispatcher] could not find the problem and this resulted in him taking over the flight at his desk. This resulted in multiple calls from the crew and eventually the flight departed; almost 2 hours behind schedule. 3) Ghost restricted areas on Sabre. While working the NY Metro flights; I use the wind route hook ups. I noticed one of my [transcon] flights had an odd routing. I fixed it; built my own route and moved on. Next flight I attempted to use the wind route hook up. The plan did a strange zig zag to ZZZ-ZZZ1. I had [The Chief Dispatcher] look into this. There were ACTIVE restricted areas on my desk! Put in by other dispatchers currently working the floor. Two very important things to note. First they restricted areas were active; yet not visible on the map. So the flight was routing around something I could not see. Second [The Chief Dispatcher] discovered the dispatchers entered these areas correctly. They did not use 'global' but 'dispatcher' which is correct. While he worked the problem; I made my own route. Later I went back to the flight to add an alternate. I did not recheck the route on the map after adding the alternate. I should not have to do this. However... Sabre reoptimized my old route and put the flight back on the ZZZ-ZZZ1 zig zag. I did not catch this. I should not have to! The Captain called; irate. The most ridiculous route he has ever seen. I looked like an idiot. I think that infuriates me more than anything!! We are beginning to look like chumps. All of the interruptions; system failures and work-arounds on [this day] were the cause of me barely keeping my head above water. I sent out only a fraction of the ACARS updates I should; and would if we had a better system. Lack of situational awareness is through the roof. Operational control is down. This should not happen. This is the last day I will help the company with 'keeping up with the worksheet' and workarounds. Every 'I' will be dotted every 'T' will be crossed. Checked and double checked throughout the day. If I fall behind; so be it... it's my ticket and reputation that is on the line not management's.

Dispatcher reports repetitive problems with the dispatch workstations; including flight planning and communications.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 37

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Winds were moderate; variable; and gusty; but within limits for the aircraft. In accordance with accepted technique; half the gust factor; approximately 6 knots; was added to the final approach and landing speeds. Just after touchdown on the centerline; with all three gears established on the runway; a gust was felt and corrected for. As the correction was made with what was perceived as moderate aileron and rudder input; the airplane veered sharply to the left. With the thought that over-controlling back to the right could lead to the left wingtip dipping and then digging into the runway resulting in the aircraft tumbling (worst case) or a ground loop at high energy (best case); I elected to input enough control to keep the aircraft tracking as straight ahead as possible. This resulted in departing the runway surface to the left of the runway. Once in the gravel that was lining the left side of the runway; my entire focus was on maintaining enough control not to hit obstacles or dig in gear or wingtips so as to cause tumbling. In the process of dissipating energy; I crossed two high-speed taxiways at almost a perpendicular angle and at a still relatively high-speed resulting in the aircraft becoming lighter on the struts. The struts compressed again on the other side of the taxiways resulting in enough energy depletion to safely steer back to the runway surface.Upon re-establishing safe contact with asphalt; the aircraft was taxied a short distance to parking. Upon the post-flight walk-around inspection; there was visible damage to two of three propeller blade tips (of composite material made by Hartzell) from contact with gravel likely occurring when the struts compressed after crossing the taxiways. No other visible damage to the aircraft was observed nor were fluids observed to be leaking. It is very likely the root cause of this event was the application of too much rudder for the capabilities of the aircraft in countering the cross-wind gust after landing.The PA-46 line of aircraft is known to have very sensitive nose wheel steering; especially at higher speeds; and while being aware of it and managing it were trained to extensively; it's entirely possible that too much rudder was applied as was appropriate for this aircraft type. Habit pattern transference is a likely contributing factor in that I have several thousand hours in other type aircraft; to include very recent and continued professional flying experience in the Pilatus PC-12; and all of which do not exhibit the level of sensitivity in nose wheel steering that the PA-46 does. In instinctively applying the crosswind gust correction I'm used to; it is very possible that I applied an amount that was too much for safe control of the PA-46 at the time of occurrence.I do not feel training was a contributing factor as I received very thorough Piper-authorized training and initial conditioning in the aircraft with a Piper-authorized instructor. However; overall low time in type is definitely a contributing factor. Up to the time of this event; I had logged 20 landings in the PA-46 and several of which were in gusty conditions and or crosswinds similar to what was experienced during this event. In the future; the biggest take away from the event for me for flying the PA-46 is to concentrate on keeping the nose wheel off the runway as long as possible as energy depletes so that when the nose wheel does contact the runway; it's at the lowest speed practical. During this event the nose wheel was centered upon initial contact with the runway; as was emphasized in training. Any application of nose wheel steering at higher speeds should always be done very lightly at first to ensure the aircraft remains under control.

PA-46 pilot reported a runway excursion during the landing roll out.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 90

Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 4500

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We were filed into DFW via the BRDJE1 RNAV arrival. Approaching SEEVR with the BRDJE1 arrival in the FMGC; Fort Worth Approach told us were cleared to SEEVR; descend via the SEEVR arrival.  We checked the STAR; and were somewhat confused over the clearance; because the title page of 60-2B looks like this:BRDJE ONE RNAV ARRIVAL (SEEVR.BRDJE1) Note how it says (SEEVR) in parentheses. We thought we had understood the clearance; and were descending to cross SEEVR at FL200-230 as published. What the controller meant was for us to go to SEEVR; and join the SEEVR ONE RNAV ARRIVAL [Jeppesen title page 60-2Q]. The controller told us we were looking high at SEEVR. That got our attention; and we finally figured out that we were heading to the same fix [SEEVR]; but cleared for a different arrival; with a different crossing restriction [of between] 13000-16000. Seeing that we would be high at SEEVR; the controller gave us a 270 heading and a clearance to descend to 6000; then cleared us direct to INWOD; which is a fix on the approach to runway 17L.The annotation on page 60-2B certainly confused us. Getting a clearance for a different [STAR] close into a duplicate arrival fix certainly confused and time-compressed us as well. We should have been more proactive in resolving the ambiguity.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Although they were originally cleared 'as filed' and; thus; via the BRDJE RNAV STAR to DFW the flight crew of an A320 was cleared '...direct to SEEVR; descend via' the SEEVR arrival. Aware that SEEVR was a fix on their filed route AND on the BRDJE STAR they mistakenly assumed the FMGC was properly programmed and planned to cross SEEVR between FL230 and FL200. As they approached SEEVR ATC advised they looked to be too high and; only then; did they realize that--although sub-titled (SEEVR.BRDJE1)--their latest clearance was for the SEEVR RNAV STAR--sub-titled (SEEVR.SEEVR1)--and they were to cross SEEVR between 16000 FT and 13000 FT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 82; Flight Crew Total 1626; Flight Crew Type 1626

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were in clear air above our altitude of FL410. we encountered unexpected continuous moderate turbulence and were unable to maintain altitude. We rapidly lost 1;000 feet of altitude.

B737 First Officer reported temporarily losing altitude control due to continuous moderate turbulence.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 9820; Flight Crew Type 215

Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

I and [copilot] were assigned a Part 135 flight to ZZZ with two passengers at standard weights; and less than 60lbs of cargo in the AFT cargo compartment; to depart at XA am local time; after our first flight with another passenger canceled. We had a bit over 2000 lbs/300 gallons of fuel onboard for the leg to ZZZ at FL390. The weather at ZZZ1 was clear and calm; the weather at ZZZ was clear and variable. As we reached our cruising altitude of FL390 we did our cruise checks; and all systems were normal. We then discussed how much time there was left for the arrival into ZZZ; approximately 29 minutes. As [copilot] grabbed her company iPad to start getting familiarized with the frequencies and runway; I also grabbed my company iPad to get the Vref landing numbers and put them in the box. At that moment [copilot] yelled SMOKE!! I turned to look at her and noticed white smoke coming from behind the right side of her seat; I then asked her if she had an iPad or phone charger connected to the A/C outlet that is in the same position as where the smoke was coming from; She said no!; and yelled let's descend now! I immediately performed our immediate emergency descent smoke and fire memory items; squawked 7700 and informed the Controller that we were [advising ATC]; and had to descend immediately with vectors to the nearest airport due to smoke in the cabin. The Controller replied ZZZ2 or ZZZ3 are the nearest. I requested vectors to ZZZ2 because of its long runways; professional fire department; and emergency equipment on the airport premises. The Controller cleared us to descend to FL240 and gave us a 330 heading. As we turned to ZZZ2 while rapidly descending with speed brakes deployed at 260-265 kts and a 5;000 [feet] a min rate of descent to FL240; flames broke out on the top right corner of the co-pilots windshield; I immediately asked [copilot] to grab the fire extinguisher that was behind my seat; and extinguish the flames with the halon bottle. I then informed the Controller that we had a spreading fire in our flight deck and required lower immediately; the Controller then gave us step down altitudes all the way to final approach. Please Note: We did not get any CASS messages for windshield overheat; but I still checked my QRH checklist; looking for window overheat; and electrical fire and smoke; nothing made sense. So after containing the fire; my focus was getting us on the ground ASAP; but was overwhelmed with communication confusion; because on many calls that we received; we could not properly hear the Controller over the speaker. I was going to go into my CDU and remove the window heat at high flight levels just to see if that would stop the burning; but I was told in ground class that the windows might shatter due to temperature inversions; so at that point I relied on the circuit breaker to do its job; if it was detecting a short. Knowing all this; I did not want to continue focusing my attention on this anymore; because my number one priority was to fly the plane; and not get distracted if we could contain the fire; just like we did. While descending and trying to keep the fire under control; [copilot] was trying to help me in every way she could; without getting burned from the burning plastic that was falling on her from up above the ceiling. One thing I do need to add is after speaking with the passengers; they said that very hot air was venting into the cabin; and that the floor and the side walls of the aircraft were real hot; this leads me into believing [we had] environmental air issues. I also recall [copilot] saying the vents are pushing hot air when we were about to land. I have to commend her for her extraordinary bravery; professionalism; and for performing her duties in the flight deck way above and beyond. Once [copilot] had everything under control; she checked in with our passengers to make sure they had their masks on; and were ok. Both passengers and [copilot] gave the thumbs up. While passing 15;000 feet I noticed the controls felt heavier and my trim had gone to full aft. I tried pushing the trim switch forward on my yoke; and the trim would not respond. I then tried manual mode and both switches; the trim forward and aft levers. I then pushed the normal mode trim push button and it would not turn amber. I asked [copilot] to help me push the yoke forward and she did; but once we went below 7;000 [feet]; the trims started working. I performed the descent and landing checklist while [copilot] was handling the radio communication; and trying to keep the fire under control with the halon fire extinguisher; we then briefed that after we land we would pull off the runway and evacuate. The Tower gave us wind direction and our runway choice; we requested Runway 1L which was direct with no further delays; the Tower brought it to our attention that the winds were not favoring that runway due to the 28kts and gusting winds. I told the Tower I needed no delays to Runway 1L. As I and [copilot] had already discussed the length of the runway and it was sufficient even with a tail wind; plus due to our smoke and fire emergency status; we both agreed that Runway 1L would be the right choice to get on the ground immediately. After we landed; the Tower asked us if we were going to evacuate on the runway; and we replied no we will turn into the intersection of S and F; the Tower thanked us. Then; we initiated our evacuation; [copilot] opened the boarding and deplaning main door; and evacuated the aircraft. [Copilot] directed the passengers to a safe area away from the aircraft. After everyone was out; and the aircraft was secure; I exit the aircraft and let the fire department go into the aircraft to check if the plane was still on fire; and it was. The fire department had to use their halon bottle to completely extinguish the fire. This is after the aircraft had already been shut down and secured. I advised the fire department that I would disconnect both batteries so that the aircraft would no longer have any sort of electrical current whatsoever..

An HA-420 HondaJet Captain reported smoke and flames in the cockpit; due to a window heat element malfunction; which necessitated an immediate diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I was giving a private pilot a flight review in an airplane that he built (but no longer owned). He had about 65 hours in the airplane but I had never flown the airplane before. I was told the airplane had a current inspection and that the engine had just been test run on the ground. I checked the airplane myself carefully and we began our flight. Immediately on takeoff the cylinder head temperature shot over the red line and the Dynon sounded an alarm. Our takeoff was on Runway 19. We made a left turn to return to the field and land on Runway 28 as that was the quickest way to safely get on the ground. The landing was almost directly into an extremely bright sun that made it very difficult to see over the nose even though (or actually; because) the visibility was unrestricted. The landing was rough; but under control; and the rollout started normally. As the airplane slowed and lost rudder authority it began a gentle turn to the left into the wind. The airplane did not respond to the tailwheel steering and rolled off the side of the runway where the turn sharpened and caused the airplane to slide sideways to a stop. There was hardly any damage done to the airplane apart from a sheared wheel pin on the right main gear. The total estimated cost to repair is less than $100.00. Upon inspection after the landing we found a bolt missing from the steering linkage on the tailwheel. That was the reason we could not keep the airplane straight on the runway after it slowed down and lost rudder authority. The aircraft does not have differential braking; but only a 'Johnson Bar' where one lever applies both brakes. It would seem that I missed a loose nut and perhaps missing cotter pin on the tailwheel steering linkage or it would not have fallen out. A better preflight inspection should have caught this. In addition; after looking at the logbooks after the flight it was discovered that the condition inspection had in fact not been done and the aircraft was just over a month out of inspection. I should have checked the logbooks personally for this rather than rely on the aircraft owner who was mistaken. The flight times listed above are estimates as I have not had time to run exact totals as of this date.

Flight instructor reports departing on a Flight Review (BFR) in a tailwheel aircraft that the pilot being checked had built. Immediately after takeoff the cylinder head temperature shot into the red and a quick turn to land on an intersecting runway is made successfully. On landing the tailwheel steering fails and a runway excursion occurs.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

FO (First Officer) contacted Paine Field Clearance Delivery for ATC clearance a digital PDC was unavailable. Clearance Delivery passed 'Cleared to ZZZ via the Paine 6 Departure; radar vectors to HAROB; Eason; then as filed; climb and maintain 3;000 ft.' FO mistakenly believed the waypoint in question was spelled HARAB and erroneously entered this spelling (i.e. a different waypoint) into the navigation system. Before taxi; four passengers were re-seated due to weight and balance considerations; resulting in a somewhat lengthy delay on Company day; heightening the aircrew's sense of urgency prior to takeoff. Recognizing this threat; prior to taxi; the CA (Captain) and FO took an extra minute to review the Originating and Before Start Checklists; in attempt to ensure completeness; but this effort was rushed. During the initial climb out; ATC directed the aircrew to 'turn right heading 260 degrees and; once established in the turn; climb to 9;000 ft.' In response; the PF (Pilot Flying) set a 30 degree angle of bank right turn; the PM (Pilot Monitoring) increased the altitude pre-select to 9;000 ft.; and then the PF established a gradual climb. At that point; ATC re-directed to the aircrew to 'climb once established on heading 260.' So; the PF arrested the climb; topping out at 3;200 ft.; and then descended back down to 3;000 ft. (all while maintaining the turn). Upon reaching heading 260 degrees; the flight climbed up to 9;000 ft. Then; ATC cleared the flight direct to HAROB (to the south/southwest); but the aircrew incorrectly established a direct course to HARAB (to the east). Shortly thereafter; ATC queried the aircrew if they were direct to the assigned waypoint; and the PF responded the flight was direct to 'HARAB; spelled H-A-R-A-B.' ATC corrected the flight; spelling the waypoint 'H-A-R-O-B' and assigned an initial heading of 210 degrees. The PF turned to 210 degrees; the PM typed in the correct waypoint spelling; and an updated course was established. From that point forward; the flight continued without further incident.This report covers two separate deviations. The first is an altitude deviation caused by ATC communications that did not clearly specify the desired sequence for turning and climbing. The second deviation was the result of aircrew incorrectly spelling an assigned waypoint (provided via radio communications); during navigation system entry. This was largely driven by the aircrew's failure to QA the entirety of the navigation route; in part due to a false sense of urgency associated with a ground delay and heightened company scrutiny.For the first deviation; it is suggested that clearer; more specific ATC communications would have been 'once established on heading 260; climb to 9;000 ft.'; or the Controller simply could have waited until the flight was established on proper heading before issuing clearance to climb. For the second deviation; on deck a full QA of the navigation route via the map page (i.e. by scrolling through each waypoint individually to ensure none was significantly off course; as was the case with HARAB) likely would have led the aircrew to recognize/correct the navigation error before takeoff. Furthermore; a digital pre-departure clearance capability at Paine Field likely would have prevented the confusion over waypoint spelling. Lastly; while HARAB and HAROB are separated by a significant distance; there remains inherent risk of confusion in the future; which could be resolved by renaming one of these waypoints.

ERJ-175 First Officer reported inputted wrong waypoint into Flight Management Computer.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

VFR helicopter inbound to from northwest at 1;500 FT. Unknown target appeared off his left side approximately same altitude. I called traffic who took evasive action and descended immediately to about 1;200 FT.

Local Controller described a conflict event between a VFR helicopter arrival and an unknown target suddenly appearing to the side of the helicopter.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X on [date] left fuel bypass light illuminated. On [date] right fuel bypass light illuminated. Fuel filter changed both times. I wrote AML entry requiring an inspection of the fuel filter assemblies; concerned about fuel contamination. Maintenance Control and engineering were not very concerned but [representative] in Maintenance Control assured me they would at least check the fuel sumps. We were given another aircraft. The sign off indicated that Maintenance Control and engineering did not believe an inspection was required. No corrective action was taken and the plane was signed off and flew. I hereby recommend this aircraft be immediately grounded and the entire fuel system be inspected for contamination and if not aircraft derived; an immediate investigation as to where the contamination came from. This is a serious safety of flight issue that is being callously disregarded. I reiterate that the chance of this happening to 2 engines on the same aircraft in 4 days is highly unlikely without some sort of unverified fuel contamination. I have almost 25;000 hours and have never had this light even once. I am calling the [reporting] hot-line to emphasize this aircraft needs to be grounded today.

B737 Captain reported that a fuel filter problem resulted in an aircraft refusal.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 1450

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

After advising the Controller of airport in sight and cancelling IFR flight plan; Controller requested to squawk 1200 VFR code. We made a visual approach and landing to what we thought was ODO airport. It was not until we had safely landed without any incident to anyone; that we realized that we had landed at MAF instead of ODO. At the time of our landing Midland Airport Tower was closed. The flight was a 3:30 hour flight. We had left our hotel at XA00 local time for a XD00 departure however; the passengers showed up 2 hours late. It is my belief that fatigue was a contributing factor; as well as; accepting a visual in a non-familiar airport at night. Both airports have similar runway alignment and are within a close proximity to each other (ODO Rwy 34 and Rwy 29) (MAF Rwy 34 and Rwy 28). In the future when landing in a non-familiar airport day or night; I will not take a visual approach; instead; I will remain on instruments until positive identification of correct airport has been made or I will allow the controller to vector me to final.

On roll out found that the taxiways did not match our airport diagram and found we have landed at the wrong airport MAF! Both airports have similar runway alignment and are about 9 nm apart! Class C & D were not violated due to service hours of operation. Lesson well learned.

CE500 Flight Crew on an IFR flight to ODO; late at night; reports canceling IFR and accepting a visual approach. After landing they discover they have landed at MAF.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1030; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

After landing we were cleared to taxi off on [another runway]. As we were taxiing and power was at idle the Low Volts and Low Pressure annunciators popped up. Immediately; the RPM began to decrease from normal idle at 700 RPM to 300; and then to 0. [I] advised Tower that we needed to restart on the runway; they asked if we were clear; I said yes; but then realized we had not yet cleared the hold short line. There was some confusion at first but we clarified with Tower and they sent the other traffic in the pattern on a go around. We were then able to restart the engine and taxi off clear of both runways. In the end everyone did what was required to make it a safe and uneventful situation. We are working with the maintenance shop to prevent this [from] happening again; but other than communicating more clearly with Tower there was nothing that could have been done differently.

C172 instructor pilot reported they were unable to clear the runway as planned when the engine quit after landing.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 320

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Aircraft

On the descent into AAO; we received an RA. Both myself and the PF (Pilot Flying) visually spotted the traffic but was too late to request clearance to turn from ATC and we were never informed of the traffic. As we were receiving the RA instructions; ATC finally told us about the traffic and we started the RA response of climbing. Since the traffic was visually spotted as well; we start a climbing right turn and informed ATC we were doing so. Because of this RA; myself and the PF got behind the airplane; and weren't able to properly brief the remaining flight into AAO; which has multiple airspaces. We were cleared for the visual approach and cleared off approach freq. We initiated the descent from 3;000 feet later than normal to get below the Class C shelf on the downwind near AAO. I believe we were able to get below the shelf before the airspace. Next issue is the airspace around BEC. The winds were out of the North so we needed to land on 36 at AAO. BEC airspace is about 1 mile south of AAO. Again; I believe we turned base before the airspace and was able to stay out.Because of the RA near the airport; myself and the PF were a little on edge and weren't as briefed as we normally are. I believe the contributing factor to any problems with this flight was due to us being shaken up by the near miss resulting in an RA. While I believe we avoided all airspace; we were a lot closer to busting than I would prefer. Also that airspace around Wichita is super complex.

Pilot reported an airborne conflict and a possible BEC airspace incursion during descent to AAO airport.


We had to reject a takeoff due to the auto-feather not arming. This aircraft has for the past month had a rejected takeoff and/or a failed auto-feather test on an almost daily basis. Yet this aircraft keeps getting signed off for revenue service. This is solely a management/maintenance issue.

Dash 8 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff due to the propeller autofeather failing to arm.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 2300

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on downwind to runway 30 at LVN at 1800 ft MSL; an unannounced aircraft flew 100 ft over the top of us in the opposite direction.  When queried over the radio as to what the aircraft was doing; he said he was setting up to enter a downwind for 30.  I suggested that he enter the pattern from further out at a 45 degree angle; rather than on top of downwind.

C172 instructor pilot reported a NMAC with opposite direction aircraft in the pattern at LVN airport.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 800

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Contacted NORCAL and was cleared into Class B at/below 2000 ft.; proposed route of flight was from the Golden Gate Bridge via HWY 101 over SFO then south for landing.Experienced radio interference over downtown San Francisco at 1500 ft. Sounded like a local radio station breaking through onto both aircraft COMM's with high volume static hash. Was instructed by NORCAL to change frequencies to SFO tower.Contacted SFO tower; they replied with our full callsign but was unable to understand all of their call. We could hear them continuing to call us; but were unable to copy all of transmission. As we were turning around to head North (away from SFO) and away from Class B we entered 1NM into Class B at 1500 ft.Then contacted NORCAL and explained that due to radio issues we would not continue into Class B and opted for an alternative route to destination.I experienced this radio interference a few weeks prior in another airplane in the same location. It prevented us from flying our desired flight route and from maintaining desired communications with ATC. Other pilots have subsequently remarked that they have experienced the same radio interference in this location; particularly at low altitude; but have said that often NORCAL's signal is strong enough to break through the hash.

The reporter flies through this area frequently and has experienced the 'noise' starting near downtown Oakland up to the Berkeley Marina but no 'noise' out over the Bay to the Golden Gate Bridge. Approaching downtown San Francisco over the Marina; the noise becomes clearer and loud enough for the reporter to believe the source is a talk show frequency. Other pilots with whom the reporter has discussed the issue believe the sound over the City to be a music station. 80% of this reporter's recent flights in different aircraft have experienced the 'noise' in that area. The reporter believes the 'noise' is strongest below 2;500 feet over the City and not detectable at 3;500 feet. On this day neither NCT nor SFO could clearly break through the 'noise' although NCT is strong enough; most times; to overcome the extraneous signals.

A pilot over San Francisco reported a commercial radio broadcast loud enough to block NCT and SFO Tower necessitating the flight's exit from Class B airspace.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 190; Flight Crew Type 75

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted

I had just picked up the aircraft at dusk from having an annual from a nearby airport. I had not flown this particular aircraft at night previously. Once I took off it became dark enroute 5 minutes approximately into the flight. I attempted to turn on the cockpit lights; they would not work; and none of the radios would function either. In summary; I just took off in an unfamiliar aircraft and inadvertently experienced a partial electrical system failure. At that point I could not see my aeronautical charts; compass; or radios and did not have a GPS in that aircraft. I flew towards the city lights of ZZZ and landed with no radio communications at ZZZ airport. I was instructed to communicate with the Tower; which I did immediately upon landing without incident despite there being air traffic using the airport. I sincerely hope others may benefit from my experience.

A C152 pilot reported a partial electrical failure in night conditions and landed at a nearby towered airport without contacting the Tower.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

A Navajo departed CBF northbound; opposite direction to a VFR Cherokee being vectored for sequencing to OMA. The Navajo climbed into the Class C airspace and became a collision hazard for the Cherokee. The Cherokee was issued traffic and got the Navajo in sight just prior to the CA going off. The Navajo called to pick up his IFR at which point he was climbing out of 039 and still inside Class C airspace. I informed him of the dimensions of the airspace. The pilot said he didn't fly into CBF very often and was sorry. CBF is a very busy GA airport with a growing pilot education program. It is only about 7 miles from OMA which at times can be very busy. Knowledge of aircraft planning to depart would allow controllers to plan and control accordingly. To this end a 'Remote Control Communications Equipment' (RCO) on the airport would allow timely IFR clearances and cancellations.

R90 Controller described a Class C infraction/conflict when VFR traffic departing CBF awaiting an IFR clearance climbed into Class C and caused the event; the reporter suggested an RCO be installed at CBF for improved ATC planning.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise; the FA (Flight Attendant)-A called and said that a passenger in first class thought they smelled smoke of some kind; but it was very faint. The flight attendant and other passengers could not smell the fumes at that time. Within about twenty minutes of the first report; a second passenger in first class said they thought they smelled something like what a gas leak in a house would smell like; but again was fairly faint. FA-A had another FA come forward to verify the odor because she could still not detect anything. The other FA said she could not smell anything; either. The first passenger then reported feeling nauseous; having hot flashes; and vomited. Several minutes later; a passenger in row 8 said they smelled a 'dirty socks' smell or something that smelled like sewage. At this time FA-A had the other FA come from the back of the aircraft to verify the smell. This time the aft FA could smell a 'dirty socks' smell. When the Captain and I heard 'dirty socks'; we immediately thought about a fume event and the Captain ran the QRH for Fumes in the cabin. About this time the FA-A reported that her eyes and nose felt like they were getting irritated. After the QRH; procedure was complete and we had turned PACK 1 off; the fumes subsided for the remainder of the flight. The Captain followed the guidance in the FOM and filled out the appropriate reports. The crew debriefed the event after the flight and a Report was submitted. There was some engine work done on the number one engine before we left; apparently replacing a high pressure valve for turbine cooling and additionally adding engine oil to both engines. This may be coincidental but I don't know what other parts the mechanics had to remove to perform this procedure. This was particularly insidious as the smell was quite faint for a long time. Only one passenger smelled it and it seemed to be in conjunction with the ovens at first. The description of the smell was also hard to decipher and only one passenger thought they smelled it for quite a while with no corroboration.

After service passenger in XC informed me she had been smelling an intermittent smoke/gasoline scent throughout the flight. I could not smell anything so I asked the FAs in the back to come and take a look. Neither of them could smell it. I looked for possible issues in the overhead bins and felt the walls but felt nothing strange. I let the passenger know it could've possibly been the oven since it has a strange smell but the pilots did know about the issue and to let me know if she smelled it again. About ten minutes later she rings her call light and smells it- I still did not. Passenger in YA started to get a pain in her stomach and got flashes- she started to vomit. I continued to let the pilots know but there was no guarantee that her illness was because of the smell. At this time we had to break the pilots so the C FA was guarding. After the f/d was closed the C claimed she got a little bit of the smell but she described it as the smell of a gas stove being left on. Not long after; XC claimed she was feeling a little nausea and XA agreed that he had smelled it. I still smelled nothing. C FA started to get a headache and a non rev was using the FC lav so I asked her if she smelled anything during the flight. She claimed she had actually smelled fuel for a moment but it went away during service so she thought nothing of it. XC rings her call light again and claims the smell is very strong so I asked the person in row 6 if he had smelled anything weird. He replied yes actually it smelt like a sewer or a men's locker room. This smell I actually did notice (assuming it was human) and my nose was burning so I let the pilots know. At this time the pilots agreed their nose burned too so they followed their checklist. After they turned off something no one else complained of any smells; YA was not sick anymore and eventually my nose stopped burning. C FA still had her headache. During clean up a passenger in row 7 told me that by the way during the flight she smelt burning. We needed to start precautions when the first complaint was brought to our attention. We should have asked other passengers earlier if they had smelled anything because we could've spent less time in contaminated air.

A320 First Officer reported Flight Attendant and passengers experienced physiological symptoms due to fumes in the cabin.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff; crew noticed all cockpit lights flickering. On inspection; found Number 3 generator with excessive kilowatt reading. Shortly after; Number 2 generator failed with an annunciation of 'over excitation' shortly after the AC bus suffered phase imbalance and tripped all three bus tie breaker. This was followed by numerous circuit breakers popping and the failure of the Number 3 generator with a three light trip. ATC was contacted and the decision was made to declare an emergency and return the aircraft to the departure airport for further inspection. On the subsequent approach and landing further breakers popped and accordingly further systems were lost. The decision to reengage the Number 1 bus tie breaker was made on final approach to facilitate sufficient systems to complete a safe approach and landing. No further incidents occurred. The apparent cause was a mechanical failure of the Number 3 generator system; accompanied by the mechanical failure of the remaining generators to protect themselves from the kilowatt spike caused by the Number 3 generator.

A B727's Number 3 Generator failed mechanically resulting in all three bus tie breakers opening and numerous other breakers popping. An emergency was declared while the flight returned to the departure airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Being vectored onto the final approach course 26R; we had a brief encounter with a wake turbulence. And then again during the landing flare to the point where it was becoming a problem to maintain a stabilized approach path above the runway in ground effect. Did not have time to notify air traffic control that this happened. I don't know if we were behind a heavy previous arrival. But we were getting really close to having to go around from the landing flare. The roll motion was becoming such a problem with keeping the aircraft stabilized; and aligned with the runway. I was actually shocked that we touchdown as smooth as we did. I asked the pilot flying if he thought that was a bit unusual his statement was 'I was just one more jolt away from going around'. Wake turbulence encounters in Atlanta are becoming an every week problem; more like almost every inbound leg into Atlanta problem. Also it seems there is little consideration given to the fact that we may be departing behind something that might be a threat as well. I'm beginning to think that there's nothing much going to be done about it until something serious happens. Often the wake encounter threats are not much of a problem if there's sufficient crosswind push the wake away from trailing aircraft; from my experience it does not take much to all. However I've learned that this is still a problem at some point on the arrival or departure procedure. For example a crosswind on the departure runways will clear you of the wake threat for takeoff; but might present a very real problem in trail of a heavy navigating to a point; to the same on that departure or arrival. Especially if it's a direct head; or tailwind now.

Reporter stated wake encounters in ATL are becoming far too frequent and he recommended a change to arrival and departure procedures to increase spacing.

CRJ-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on final approach into ATL.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was landing Runway 34 while Aircraft Y was departing Runway 25.  Due to newly implemented converging runway rules; this was a loss of separation.   Local Control (LC) tried to control the situation by withholding landing clearance; but did not react quickly enough to resolve the situation.  At the point the Local Controller realized separation did not exist; they allowed Aircraft X to land Runway 34 rather than send the aircraft around and into Aircraft Y. LC also tried to offset Aircraft Y; which pilot did not comply and would not have resolved the situation.  Additionally; Aircraft X did not fly the approach to Runway 34 as published and thus shortened his time to the runway and LC did not see the aircraft cut the corner.  FLM alerted LC that the aircraft was cutting the corner; the expectation was the controller would square the aircraft's final or turn the aircraft east to land Runway 25; instead the controller cleared the aircraft to land.  At that point; the aircraft was low on final and any evasive maneuvers would have been too dangerous.  Local Controller disputed the loss of separation with the FLM; they believed the departing aircraft Aircraft Y was through the intersection prior to Aircraft X crossing the Runway 34 threshold.  As the FLM; I saw the aircraft was still over the Runway Safety Area when the aircraft landed.  The controller working Ground Control when questioned appeared to agree with the FLM; but did not want to dispute what the Local Controller said. This is the first event since implementation of new rules; a good opportunity to use this in [this] facility is to instruct the controllers to prevent events from happening in the future.  Also; the misapplication of offsetting the runway should be addressed.  The union has been briefing the facility on these new changes.  The FLM asked the union to put out a General Announcement in CEDAR addressing; that telling an aircraft to offset when departing will not fix this issue.

MRI Tower FLM describes operational error due to miss use of the new converging runway rules.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was PF (Pilot Flying) on Aircraft X from MSP. After takeoff dispatch advised us of a reroute into MSP for weather. Our new route took us North of a weather system that was passing southeast over MSP. We had our weather radar on as we monitored the weather south of our position. Dispatch advised us to expect moderate turbulence below 10;000' for our approach into MSP. The CA/PM (Captain/ Pilot Monitoring) advised the passengers and FAs (Flight Attendants) to expect turbulence during the descent and had the FAs take their seats. We continued to monitor the weather with our radar and turned on continuous ignition for the descent. Approximately 35 minutes from landing ATC told us to expect moderate turbulence during the descent and on downwind to 30L. The CA/PM again advised the passengers and FAs of the expected turbulence. ATC had us fly 190 KIAS for most of the descent and we had flaps 8 selected. Passing 10;000' in VMC conditions airspeed became challenging to manage with +/-15kt variations; at one point we abruptly lost 25kts and 300' in altitude. Both the CA/PM and I were forcefully pushed up against our restraints. I continued to manage the flight controls as the CA/PM managed the FCP (Flight Control Panel). Again the CA/PM checked in with the FAs to makes sure the FAs and passengers were okay; they passengers and FAs were fine. The CA/PM notified ATC of the severe turbulence and sent a quick ACARS message to dispatch. Upon being vectored to final and below 5000' we entered the weather and the air smoothed out. The ILS 30L approach to minimums and landing was conducted normally. Upon arrival at the gate the CA notified [Operations Control] and maintenance of the severe turbulence encounter and logged the event in the forms.[I would suggest a] training program on characteristics and how to differentiate light vs. moderate vs. severe turbulence.

I was PM (Pilot Monitoring) Aircraft X. The flight was very normal and we were put on an arrival to allow us to arrive in MSP north of a line of thunderstorms that were tracking to the southeast and were already north of the airport at this point. Weather Radar was operating as well. About 35 minutes out the center controller advised another flight of moderate turbulence below 25;000 ft continuing all the way into MSP. Our dispatcher also advised us of moderate turbulence from 10;000 ft to 6;000 ft. At this point I called the flight attendants and told them to prepare the cabin and let them know it will be bumpy. I also made a PA advising the passengers to remain seated the rest of the flight. Continuous Ignition was put on at this point. The reports were correct and once on with Minneapolis approach they advised us of potential severe turbulence at 9;000 ft. I passed this information along to the Flight Attendants and she advised me they were all seated. We passed through 9;000 ft and it was moderate turbulence. ATC had slowed us to 190kts and we lowered the flaps to 8 degrees. Passing through 8;000 ft the airspeed became very hard to manage and was +/-15kts and at one point dropping to -25kts. At the same time we descended 200-300ft in altitude abruptly. I was lifted from my seat while still strapped into the harness. As the First Officer managed the flight controls I assisted by operating the FCP (Flight Control Panel). Airspeed was almost impossible to manage. Weather was VMC. I reported the event to ATC and once clear of the turbulence sent dispatch an ACARS. Below 6;000 ft the rest of the flight was normal with smooth air. Upon landing I called dispatch and reported it to maintenance. I also reported the event in the maintenance log. After speaking with the Fleet Manager I feel it would be of great benefit to show a quick demonstration the signs of severe turbulence. It is usually quite rare unless you plan on flying through a thunderstorm. I think it would be beneficial because I was shown this during my upgrade when we had a few minutes to spare. There are a lot of new captains who may not have experienced a lot of weather.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported encountering turbulence on descent.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Weather dictated that IFR arrival aircraft be vectored at least 2 miles outside the approach gate. The safest MVA at that point for aircraft on a right base to final is 3;700 FT. This altitude was blocked by a VFR aircraft eastbound at 3;500 FT; so I descended Air Carrier X to 3;000 FT. This is a safe altitude as long as the arrival intercepts the final. After issuing traffic to both Air Carrier X and the VFR aircraft; I turned Air Carrier X to heading 180 degrees to intercept the final approach course. His turn took him through the localizer; so I corrected his heading and issued him an immediate right turn to 220 to intercept. When I questioned the pilot's turn rate he replied; 'Standard; but we were a little slow on our turn' or something like that. I guess it would have been better for Air Carrier X to intercept above glide slope (4;000 FT) in order to stay above the VFR aircraft in this case. It would have been tedious to try to move the VFR out of the way of Air Carrier X as there were additional aircraft inbound as well. Since the MVA's in this area were raised; this 'spill-out' occurs fairly frequently. We are diligent in trying to prevent it from occurring; but occasionally it still does.

SCT Controller described a below MVA event when an Air Carrier aircraft was being separated from VFR traffic; turned to intercept localizer; but failed to capture ending up in a lower MVA area.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Ramp; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Ramp Control cleared us to push straight back which we did. After taxi checklist was complete the FO (First Officer) requested taxi instructions. Ramp Control said; 'Cleared to turn left and proceed to Spot XX.' I visually cleared left as far as I could see and saw no aircraft. When turning left I stopped the aircraft immediately when I saw us turning into a line [of] aircraft. They swerved to the left to avoid us. I had no chance to see aircraft coming behind me and had to rely solely on Ramp Control to be my eyes behind me. When the FO queried the unsafe taxi instructions the Ramp Controller replied back; 'It happens.'Relied entirely on Ramp Controller to be my eyes behind the aircraft.Please ask the Ramp Controller to realize we can't see behind us. We should not have been cleared to taxi with the line of aircraft behind us.

Captain reported that the push back crew did not allow a line of taxiing aircraft to pass by and forced the aircraft to deviate to the left to avoid collisions with his aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156.35; Flight Crew Total 2561.43; Flight Crew Type 2561.43

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon departing [Runway] 24L in ZZZZ I called 'positive rate; gear up'. The First Officer selected the gear handle to up. A couple seconds after selecting it to up; we both heard a loud bang that came from somewhere behind the cockpit. No adverse flight conditions were noticed nor were there any airframe vibrations. The gear retracted normally as did the flaps. The First Officer and I began discussing what might have caused the noise and narrowed it down to one of two potential problems. Either a blown tire or a weight shift. I gave all PF and PM duties to the First Officer and contacted the flight attendants to see if they could better locate where the noise had come from. None of the flight attendants reported hearing any noise. We retracted flaps on schedule and continued on our assigned route. Once clearing 10;000 feet; I contacted Dispatch and was patched through to [Maintenance Control]. I then requested that the [Chief Pilot] be included in the conversation. Without any of us really knowing for sure what the problem was or if there even was one; we all came to the same conclusion that the safest course of action would be to [advise ATC] in ZZZ. The [Chief Pilot] contacted ZZZZ to see if there was any debris on the runway and there was not. As we checked on with Center; I [advised ATC] for a possible blown tire anyways. We had a normal landing and taxied to the gate under our own power after confirming with ARFF that everything appeared normal. Upon inspection at the gate a Ramp Supervisor noted that cargo in the aft baggage compartment was not loaded properly and that is was most likely a weight shift that made the noise. The ZZZZ ground crew appeared to be training what appeared to be new hire employees but nobody told us if that was the case.

B737 Captain reported 'loud bang' after selecting gear up on departure. No adverse flight conditions were noticed.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

On final approach to the ILS Runway XXR; we were given direct to ZZZZZ (Outer Marker) at 1800 ft. and were told that we were cleared for the ILS Runway XXR approach. The ILS had been earlier identified as valid (IZZZ). At that point we were approximately 7 miles from ZZZZZ; and the PF (Pilot Flying) armed the Approach (APP button). The autopilot was engaged. At this point the LOC immediately captured the LOC. I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and felt at this point that the LOC captured very early given our 45 degree intercept to the LOC and still had another 7 miles to go before the LOC should have been captured. We had set 1800 ft. (Outer Marker altitude) in the MCP. Somewhere along the way; the Glide Slope captured and also commanded the airplane to descend below the 3 degree glide path. As we got lower to approximately 1350 ft. and still not as yet at ZZZZZ; I mentioned to the PF that I felt that we were low. At this point; the PF disconnected the A/P and began a gentle ascent back to the Outer Marker altitude of 1800 ft. ATC subsequently advised us of a 'Low Altitude Alert'. Once we reached ZZZZZ; the PF joined a normal and stable descent to an uneventful landing.After engine shutdown at ZZZ at the gate; I discussed this event at length with the PM. Neither he nor I understood why the automation led us astray in this manner. I was told that we had done everything correctly.....A/P; A/T's were on; APP was engaged; ILS identified correctly. The team is also at a loss for how this event occurred given the data that they received from our aircraft onboard avionics readouts. Both the PF and I are relatively new on the B787; so we are unaware if other B787 pilots have experienced this type of occurrence. I hope to ask around the B787 training team and associated check airman for more possible information of similar events happening to other B787 pilots.Further look into B787 avionic ILS malfunctions related to capturing the LOC/G/S and that relationship to the altitude set in the MCP (Mode Control Panel).

B787 Captain reported avionics malfunction during approach to land.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors

We departed out of BOS off of runway 9. Climbing out of 6;400 feet to FL260; the autopilot was engaged. The command bars were set in pitch mode ~5 degrees with altitude armed and not yet captured. Heading mode was the active lateral guidance. When the autopilot was engaged; the aircraft immediately pitched un-commanded to 9-10 degrees and was immediately followed by a nose down descending pitch of ~6 degrees. I am unsure what the exact pitch down was at the time; however; the aircraft was descending +1500 feet/min. Recognizing the autopilot was not responding to commands; I disconnected the autopilot. The autopilot disconnected; and the controls were extremely heavy with a nose down tendency. The autopilot had trimmed the aircraft nearly full nose down. By the time the aircraft was back under positive control; we had lost 300 feet (6;400 feet to 6;100 feet indicated) in the climb. Primary flight control movement was free and correct. The aircraft was hand flown until we topped the clouds. Reaching FL240; we attempted to reengage the autopilot. The flight director was commanding nav mode and altitude capture. The same results occurred. The last attempt was after we leveled off at FL260. In level flight with nav and altitude commanded; the autopilot still displayed the same results: a rapid pitch to 8-10 degrees nose up followed by a rapid descent to about 6 degrees nose down with the pitch trim motor trimming full nose down. The flight director commanded level flight during this occurrence. No Caution and Warning System (CAWS) messages or aural warnings were received. [Captain] called Maintenance and Company to inform them of the situation. VFR conditions prevailed in [destination]; thus; it was a good place to land. To combat fatigue from hand-flying; [Captain] and I alternated Pilot Flying/Pilot Monitoring duties. Several minutes before the descent; we collectively decided to run the QRH procedure for a failed autopilot since the conditions were near identical to what we had received. Further; we did not want the autopilot servo to engage un-commanded. The procedure called for the autopilot circuit breaker to be pulled. ATC gave us a crossing restriction on the arrival into [destination]: cross ZZZZZ Intersection at 11;000. During the descent; we ran the QRH procedure. The Autopilot circuit breaker was pulled; and the entire autopilot control panel became inoperative: the autopilot; altitude alerts; yaw damper; and flight director went out. Since the QRH did not specify we would lose these items; it came as a bit of a shock. Our workload increased drastically. As I was setting up the approach for the RNAV into ZZZ; [Captain] asked what altitude we were supposed to be at; and we then realized that we had blown our assigned altitude of 11;000 by 500 feet (10;500 feet). During this; we had been given a controller change to Approach. Checking on with the controller; we stated that we were 10;500 climbing 11;000 and stated that we had descended through our assigned altitude and were correcting for the mistake. The controller was very calm; and relaxed and did not mention a notice of pilot deviation. Had the QRH specified that the altitude alerts would be inoperative; we would not have had the altitude deviation. After landing; the autopilot was written up per the MEL and maintenance request. In the initial cruise; we also suffered a de-ice boot fail. We ran the QRH for a de-ice boot failure. The CAWS appeared at 35 seconds into the cycle. We maintained flight in non-icing conditions and landed in ZZZ. The de-ice boots were written up per the MEL and maintenance request. Limit autopilot failures to VFR conditions. Increase awareness that the QRH will not state the loss of altitude alerts; flight director; yaw damper; etc with this procedure. In my opinion; we would not have had the altitude deviation had the QRH stated it would become inoperative.

A PC-12 First Officer reported that they overshot an altitude crossing clearance during descent. Autopilot failure and increased workload were mentioned as key contributors.


Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was out when the Captain called me requesting Takeoff (TO) Data due to a [computer] Error. (The Chief's had sent out a message prior indicating there were issues with flights getting [computer] Errors). The Captain gave me the parameters he wanted the takeoff data for; and requested I send it to the printer. He asked for [the] runway; Anti-ice on; Wet; Zero Fuel Eight (ZFW) 122.3. We hung up; and I went to calculate the TO Data. I entered the flight; reactivated the release; updated the ZFW on the Flight Tab; Calculated the flight; and went to the Takeoff Weight (TOW) button to calculate the TO Data message which I then sent to the crew. After sending the message; I realized that assumed weight on the TO Data message seemed off. I checked the weights message to see what the TOG should have been. The TOG was approximately 1300 pounds above the assumed weight on the TO Data Message. I quickly sent a message to the crew asking them to double check the weight on the TO Data Message and asked them to confirm their TOG. Within a minute of sending that message the Aircraft took-off. As I continued to investigate why the there was a discrepancy; I realized that when I calculated the flight I forgot to set the Target Window to BLOCKF. Therefore; when I updated the ZFW (which was a several thousand pound decrease); it decreased my planned fuel and therefore decreased my TOG. Normally when calculating a TO Data Message; the crew tells me the TOG they want me to run it for; not the ZFW. In the future when calculating a TO Data message; I will always ask the crew to confirm what TOG they want it for; and will double check it against the weights message to ensure accuracy.

Dispatcher reported an error when imputing flight data and forgot to set the Target Window. The updated Zero Fuel Weight decreased the planned fuel and therefore decreased the Take-off Gross Weight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Multiengine; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 3

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Manuals

While in cruise initiated right hand banking turn when a bang was felt in control stick. Complete aileron control was lost. Aircraft started a slight left hand roll tendency (approx. 1-degree per second). Attempts to regain control of roll were unsuccessful using aileron. I was able to regain some control and check the roll by using rudder inputs. I then was able to (marginally) able to line up on a private airstrip (3/4 mile away) using only rudder; elevator; and power to land the aircraft without damage to aircraft or property. Upon inspection of aircraft the next day an improper aileron cable Nicropress sleeve had let loose causing the loss of control. Inspecting the other cable shows the same type of condition to exist.

Reporter stated he was asked to do a 'Shake-down' flight on the Storm Rally LSA by a new Owner. The aircraft had only 17-hours; but had been sitting outside for a long time. Aircraft has a 3-bladed prop with a Rotax 912 Engine. Initially; after he felt the bang in the control stick and sudden lost of aileron control; he wasn't sure he could control the aircraft. But the winds were in his favor. After he found that the right aileron control cable had slipped out from the swaged Nicopress sleeve; leaving only the 'Thimble' section connected to the crank arm bolt that holds the left and right aileron cables below the floorboards; he then decided to check all the control cables and swages and noticed two distinct differences in the wall thickness of the swaged sleeves. Reporter stated the Nicopress sleeve wall thickness for the stainless steel 1/8th (one-eighth) diameter aileron cable should have been .085' of an inch and 18-3-3 material; instead he found the failed sleeve was .069' wall thickness and of unknown material. A 'Go-No-GO' swage gauge will not indicate proper thickness of the swage sleeve and a thin wall sleeve will pass a 'Go-No-GO' gauge with less swaging on the sleeve. The aircraft is constructed in a foreign country and assembled in the U.S. under an FAA approved Manufacturing certificate. An FAA Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR) then comes in and issues an Airworthiness Certificate after assembly. Reporter stated the aircraft's control cables and turnbarrels are swaged on one end from the foreign Manufacturer and the other end is swaged after the aircraft and cables are assembled by the U.S. manufacturer. He was unable to determine which company was responsible for the improper sleeves that were swaged. The rudder cables were found to be galvanized steel; instead of stainless steel; with the thin wall sleeves swaged at the external section where the cable exits the fuselage and attaches to the rudder horn fitting. Looking back at the incident; he feels very fortunate he did not have the rudder or elevator control cables also slip out from the improper cable sleeves at the same time. He would have lost total control of the aircraft. He is replacing all the control cables and swages on the aircraft. He wants the FAA to issue an Emergency A.D. to have all the Storm Rally LSA aircraft inspected for improper sleeves swaged on the control cables.

A pilot reports a bang was felt in the control stick of a Storm Rally Light Sport Aircraft (LSA) during a right banking turn. Complete aileron control was lost. Aileron cable had slipped out from a Nicopress swaged sleeve under floorboard. Pilot landed using only rudder; elevator and engine power without damage to aircraft or property.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

The session I worked before this one was unusually long. A large line of thunderstorms cut across several states from the southwest to the northeast. INK-H had a gap in the line through which many aircraft were deviating. The Conflict Alert went off between the two aircraft at the same time an Air Carrier called requesting higher. I climbed the other aircraft; and then turned Air Carrier X forty degrees left. This turned Air Carrier X out of the wind; but the wind was only about 20 KTS. Air Carrier X had about a forty knot overtake on Air Carrier Y. Air Carrier Y requested a right deviation which I was unable due to traffic. Air Carrier Y requested FL390. After coordination was completed with LEE-H; I climbed Air Carrier Y to FL370. It was clear it was going to be close; so I asked Air Carrier X if he was on the new heading. He said he was and reported the heading. Separation was lost. Keep priorities in place. When the Conflict Alert went off; I should have turned Air Carrier X and then went back and climbed the first Air Carrier. Give turns sufficient to maintain separation. I should have used a turn of no less than fifty degrees with that much of an over take. Keep working the problem. Rather than ask Air Carrier X if he was on the new heading I should have issued another clearance that would ensure separation. Provide adequate staffing so that controllers do not go over two hours on position especially during a severe weather event.

ZFW Controller described a loss of separation event when attempts to provide weather deviations resulted in a conflict.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28R

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On the ILS for 28R in ZZZ; as we intercepted the localizer and were establishing on the glideslope soon after; we had FGC (Flight Guidance Computer) 1 FAIL; FGC 2 FAIL; Yaw Damp disconnect; Electric Trim Disconnect; Autopilot Disconnect; Auto Throttle Disconnect. All this while we were descending caused us to shoot below the glideslope and apparently trigger a ground proximity warning at Approach. We immediately corrected and climbed as ATC told us to; we were in VMC and had all terrain in sight. No GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) alerts occurred. We did not do much troubleshooting as we had the field in sight and were on approach; quick glance to see if the any circuit breakers were popped. Upon landing; we were told [Approach] wanted to have us call them; I did immediately after clearing customs and deplaning passengers. I told them we had equipment issues as we were intercepting; they took notes and I advised I'd file an [ASRS Report]. I also called both the Chief Pilot and Director of Safety to let them know what happened. Maintenance was informed of the write-up and MEL.We could have arrested the descent to make sure everything was ok; the momentary confusion of what exactly was happening probably caused us to dip too low. I'm not sure what else we could have done in the situation; we did not declare an emergency or get into detail with ATC of what was going on as we were on the approach and our attention was needed elsewhere. Maybe a quick declaration of the emergency would have helped?

G-IV Captain reported having multiple equipment issues on approach causing the aircraft to veer below the glideslope resulting in a terrain warning from ATC.