ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While being handed off from MSP Center to MSP Approach; both the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and I were fully planned; briefed and ready to shoot the ILS to 30L. We checked-in to Approach; where it's my understanding (Pilot Flying) that we were instructed to fly a vector and descend to 4;000 feet and expect the 30L approach. Upon checking onto the frequency I noticed that the frequency was completely saturated with traffic and the Controller sounded behind. After reaching 4;000 feet we were then instructed to fly another vector to intercept the 30R Localizer. At that moment we were only a few miles from the 30L Localizer in which changing runway assignment at that critical phase is challenging in itself with just a second or two to adjust;  but the PM accepted the clearance and changed the ILS frequency in both NAV radios.I thought this was not a good course of action in which I would have rejected the clearance to give us more time to change NAV frequencies and set the FMC up to properly fly the approach. As I started to fly the new vector I noticed that I couldn't arm the LOC on the MCP panel and tried to just fly by heading mode to get on the 30R Localizer. I instructed the PM to set up the FMC so I could arm the LOC.  At this point we flew through the LOC for 30R in which the Controller gave us a new heading and took us off the approach corridor completely for new sequencing. There was an error of communication between us; the Flight Crew; and ATC; with the proper runway assignment; and more critically; poor communication between the PM and Pilot Flying.

Air carrier copilot reported he flew through the localizer during a late runway change to an ILS to Runway 30R at MSP and was re-sequenced for the approach.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 1060; Flight Crew Type 384

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

My student pilot had just done an uneventful run-up after which we taxied toward the center line of the taxiway where we started our '360 left turn to look around for traffic in the pattern.'  This was right next to the entrance to Runway XX and in front of the run-up apron. We had noticed another Cessna 152 from our school in the run-up area but it had remained silent and motionless as we initiated our 360.As we turned on the centerline checking the downwind to Runway XX we were stunned to see the C152 zooming by in front of us; without warning or radio call and; as we were clearly engaged in a common procedure (namely our taxi 360 turn to observe potential traffic); I hit the brakes hard to make sure we would get no closer to the other aircraft that had managed to 'squeeze' by without a peep.  I immediately made a radio call and said: '[N number]; next time; use the radio.'  I was immediately hit with an answer from the CFI on board stating: 'I had you in sight; [name]; SHUT UP!'  Bear in mind that up to this point nothing had been personal as my student and I did not even know who was on board [the other aircraft]. I immediately judged that this was inappropriate and told the other young and inexperienced CFI [by name]:'Don't tell me to shut up; you XXXXX!'I regret using the last two words of this exchange but was caught in the moment with the audacity; lack of professionalism and plain ignorance of the level of danger that this new CFI had just put us through.  It had been a close call and he did not even acknowledge it.  Furthermore; we were in a procedure that would have required maybe 5 more seconds for us to move onto the runway for departure.I proceeded to perform my instructor duties uneventfully until I came back to our hangar. I was then faced with the perpetrator of the near miss on the ground who was near a computer that we use to enter our flight times and student records. I asked him what his thought process was and told him to never tell me to shut up; especially when it is a matter of SAFETY.His lack of judgment and incapacity to perceive his wrong doing is one of the reasons for this report.  Another reason is that I brought the situation up to the Chief Flight Instructor who was more concerned about my use of the word 'XXXXX' on the radio than the REAL ISSUE; namely; SAFETY!  I could not believe this denial.This was the second event within five days where I witnessed a total lack of radio communication from two different newly minted CFIs.  I wish to establish a record with this report that I have witnessed a lack of correct radio procedure on the ground and in the air; as well as a TOTAL lack of response from the Chief Flight Instructor in the evaluation of current practices.To add insult to injury; the same Chief Flight Instructor played games with my student who happens to be a Commercially Rated Helicopter Pilot (Army retired) with over 2;000 (two-thousand hours).  When the student reported the facts to the Chief Flight Instructor he was met with sarcasm and deflection of the main topic of safety entirely.  According to the student; if someone had acted like the Chief Flight Instructor did while in the military he would have been put on some kind of notice for as much as six months for endangering lives on the ground.Lessons learned from this for me: I will try not to use expletives even if I am flustered by the actions; unaccountability; or rudeness of others.  My mistake was to allow the CFI and 'Management' to deflect from the real issues at stake here: safety in a training environment and correct radio usage. I have also learned to recognize the signs of complacency and 'boys club mentality' that are detrimental to overall safety and good cohesion of instructors.I will continue; however; to call out any unsafe practices that I witness and lead by example as I know more and more that students will 'mimic' their instructors when soloing and therefore; instructors have to hold themselves to the highest standards possible; especially while instructing.

A close encounter between two C152s; visually clearing the pattern prior to takeoff; resulted in a testosterone fueled radio exchange between the flight instructors aboard each aircraft.  The altercation was further reinforced by the Chief Flight Instructor's attempts to shift blame to the reporter who believes he had merely responded to inappropriate on air comments from the other CFI.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1850; Flight Crew Type 200

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

While flying my Luscombe 8A it suffered minor damage to the gear and wing. I was getting use to flying the Luscombe with skis on snow/ice. While landing there was glare ice I did not account for and there was not enough runway remaining to slow down. There was also not enough runway remaining to safely do a go around. I attempted to make s-turns in an effort to slow the aircraft down before the end of the runway and in the process folded the right gear leg under the fuselage. This could have been avoided with a modification to the gear (ski strut); but the modification is not required and wasn't recommend while installing the skis. I came to a stop 20 feet from the end of the runway with the aircraft resting on the gear and right wing tip. Had I made the decision to go around I know there would not have been enough runway remaining for me to do it successfully. Had I continued straight I would have flipped the aircraft off of the end of the runway [where] there is a 20 foot drop off.

Luscombe pilot reported reactive maneuvering while landing with skis resulted in a damaged landing gear leg and ground strike.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Weather at LAN was reporting reduced visibility and a broken layer so I was told by ATC to expect the ILS 10R and to proceed direct to PETKE which put me on an approximate heading of 180. The controller instructed me to turn to HDG 130 to intercept the localizer when I was approximately 1 NM to the fix; which lead on an overshoot of the LOC (due to the fact that my ground speed was 200 kts and performing a standard rate turn resulted in a wide turning radius that lead to the overshoot). Once I corrected for the overshoot and turned to a HDG to re-intercept the LOC I noticed at this time that I had a NAV FLAG on HSI 1 & 2. After a quick troubleshoot of swapping frequencies to standby and back the flag went away. It was around this time I was instructed to contact tower; and after the frequency change I saw a runway in the distance; which I thought was LAN RWY 10R. I told tower I was with them for the ILS 10R and that I had the runway in sight and I was then informed that I was cleared to land. I began to continue visually to the runway in sight; but quickly realized this was the incorrect airport/runway and at the time the tower controller told me to check altitude and that I was reported at being low. I then began a climb and transitioned back to the instruments thus realizing I was actually not lined up with the correct runway. I informed the tower that I was correcting and the controller told me that it was okay and it wasn't the first time someone had done the same thing by attempting to land at the wrong airport while on this approach and it happens all the time. After a safe landing I taxied in and shut down without any communication that there was a potential pilot deviation or else I would've completed a report right away. After being brought to my attention that there was a potential pilot deviation I have been able to reflect on the situation and have come up with a few conclusions. To begin with I had a bad vector to intercept the LOC; which I had even stated on the radio to the tower controller. The approach controller allowed me to get far too close to the PETKE waypoint without the understanding that the aircraft would require more time and distance to make the turn to be wings level prior to intercepting the LOC. Instead; I was given insufficient distance and time to complete the turn prior to overshooting the LOC. By the time I was wings level at the intercept HDG he gave me I was already 1 dot past the LOC. In the future to prevent this I will not accept a bad vector. I will inform them that I am unable and will need to be vectored around with a better intercept HDG. The next thing that went wrong was the fact that I got a NAV FLAG on both HSIs and didn't immediately report the failure of NAV equipment; instead I troubleshot the issue (which seemed to correct itself since I originally had the correct frequency in the NAV radio to begin with). I believe the correct action if this happens in the future is to immediately execute a published missed approach procedure and ask for a HDG and altitude if necessary to insure that everything is being done to aviate safely and without violation of FARs. Next was the lack of communication/misunderstanding of ATC communications that occurred. After the handoff from approach to tower when I reported field in sight and was told that I was clear to land. I was under the impression that at this point it was considered a visual approach therefore when I continued visually (only to quickly realize that this was NOT my intended runway of landing) and I further disregarded my flight instruments. I believe; this was a lack of effective communication from the tower and myself and also a pilot error on my part. The communication portion I believe could have been solved when I called field in sight that the tower (knowing visibility and ceilings were reduced and NOT having me in sight on final approach) would have verified that I actually have the correct airport in sight and not cleared me to land unless they indeed had a visual on me as well. In terms of the pilot error portion; I failed to cross-check my flight instruments until I had already descended and only then did I realize there was a disagreement between what I saw in my windscreen and what the instruments were telling me.The last (and possibly most concerning) thing about this incident that I believe requires immediate action is the fact that the controller informed me that this exact situation happens quite often on a frequent basis. I asked another pilot if they had any issues and they informed me the same thing happened to them; but without any notification of an incident or any action brought forth against them. To me; this is a major safety issue that needs to be addressed. I believe that the local FAA agency needs to reevaluate this particular approach procedure and consider a revision. For starters; the approach requires radar services; therefore if I'm expected to execute this approach utilizing the radar services I need to have a controller who is on duty that is competent to effectively and safety vector me onto an appropriate intercept HDG. Next; if there have been so many issues in the past perhaps changing this to a DME IAP procedure would be better; seeing as there is no way (other than using RADAR or GPS) to identify the PETKE intersection or even the distance to the OM/RADAR (FAMLI) final approach fix. Lastly; there should be information readily available to any/all pilots landing LAN on Runway 10R airport about the close proximity of an airport with a runway that is only 6 miles to the west of the field that is aligned almost exactly on the approach path to the 10R runway. I believe that this type of communication can/will prevent this type of incident from happening in the future. Overall; this has been a learning experience for me and I believe with the proper education and communication this is something that could've been easily been prevented. I can only hope that this information will be used to further educate and prevent further incidents from happening in the future so that we; as aviators; can continue to operate safely; efficiently; and legally for years to come.

Air Taxi pilot reported that after overshooting the LAN Runway 10R LOC; lined up for the wrong airport.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

I was working sectors X/Y/XX at the time. The Saab was cleared for a VOR RWY approach to ZZZ. Soon ZZZ FSS called and said that the flight was on the missed approach and was coming back to my frequency. On contact I stated to the pilot to execute the published missed approach and when able say intentions. Soon after he stated that they wished to climb to 070 and divert direct to ZZZ1. I told the pilot to climb and maintain 040 in the hold; reaching 040 cleared direct ZZZ1 then climb and maintain 070. Pilot stated that he wanted direct at 070 again. I noticed that the pilot was not flying the published missed approach and headed towards higher terrain. I issued a low altitude alert and received no response from the aircraft. He soon turned towards ZZZ1 and planned the visual approach. About half way from ZZZ to ZZZ1 I asked the pilot if he would need any further assistance with me or ZZZ1 Tower. At that time he declared an emergency; stating low hydraulic pressure and was unsure if their braking was going to be able to work. Gear was locked [down with] three in the green. I did manual coordination with ZZZ1 Tower on all emergency information and intentions. Later they landed safely but were unable to taxi off the runway. If the pilot is unable to execute the published missed; they should tell the controller immediately. Then different instructions can be given to the pilot based on aircraft performance; emergency situation.

Assisted by approach control; a SAAB 340 experiencing hydraulic system problems conducted a flawed missed approach procedure at ZZZ and diverted to ZZZ1 where they landed safely but were unable to taxi off the runway.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Following passenger boarding; the Flight Attendant was observed inspecting the cabin and opening all the overhead bins. From my seat in row 1; I overheard her tell the ramp agent that he should bring up 6 bags. As the ramp agent struggled to carry the oversize bags to the rear of the cabin; the Flight Attendant announced to the passengers that the aircraft is overweight and they are putting bags in the cabin so they don't count towards the total weight; and that we will be leaving shortly. To help rectify the situation; I elected to leave the aircraft. As I gathered my belongings; I observed the ramp agent and Flight Attendant unsuccessfully try to fit one of the bags under a seat. The ramp agent asked if he can just strap it to the seat; because there was 'no way it was going to fit anywhere back here.' Prior to exiting the aircraft; I notified the Captain that I was removing myself due to the overweight condition. He responded 'suit yourself'. I collected my baggage and proceeded up the jetway. The Gate Agent asked me if I was leaving. I told her that as the aircraft was overweight; my leaving would bring it back into compliance. As I left the gate area to find alternate travel; the Gate Agent was boarding another passenger.I do not know what the [air carrier's] procedure is for this situation; but I was given the impression that it is quite common. At least the crew did not seem to attach any special significance to it. I was unable to get in contact with anyone through Professional Standards and other unofficial channels to find out. My main concern is how this type of situation is handled. I have not found anything in the manuals that supports this procedure. While I found relief in specific circumstances (e.g.; count adult passengers as children when appropriate and necessary; gender specific weights for crew members when using ACARS to calculate the aircraft index); I did not find anything that allows us to discount baggage weight. As I was making my inquiries; I was surprised how many pilots that I spoke with did not see this as an issue. It may even be a common technique to deal with an overweight aircraft. If so; some clarification from the FAA and Union Safety as to the proper method and circumstances for its use would help our pilots apply the technique safely.Specifically:1. How many bags may be discounted? Is one bag acceptable? Ten?2. Are there size restrictions that allow this? Are bags over a certain size too large to ignore?3. At what point after the valet baggage has been counted can the count be adjusted? Is it OK as long as the bag hasn't been loaded; or is sitting in the jetway?4. Why do they have to be moved to the cabin? The benefit to our CG is maximized if they stay in the cargo compartment. Is it possible to dismiss the number of bags that we need to; and leave them in place?In addition; the announcement that the Flight Attendant makes should not mention that the aircraft is overweight; as moving bags around does not actually change the aircraft weight; and a passenger might notice the logic fault and become concerned.

A CRJ-200 First Officer deadheading in the cabin questioned the airline's procedures for dealing with weight and balance issues.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I recently was informed about a trim runaway situation involving an ERJ170/175 after take-off from Atlanta. I worked briefly as a consultant to [Company] and manager doing reviews of the TTP [time-triggered protocol] Fly by Wire Flight Control FPGA [field-programmable gate array] and hardware. While there I observed that the Trim Control Unit used a Lattice FPGA which normally does not offer Single Event Upset Resistance unless specifically placed in the FPGA manually by the design engineer using one of the applicable techniques as outlined in the FPGA white papers on SEU [single-event upsets]. The TTP FPGA which [a co-worker] was in charge of used these and I and other consultants who had access to this FPGA code identified the SEU issues with the TTP FPGA; and people who followed me addressed some (or all) of the issues with the TTP ASIC [application-specific integrated circuit]. I did not have access to the Trim Control FPGA code. This trim circuit is common to the A220; ERJ170; ERJ175; ERJ195; C929; and possibly the MRJ-70 and MRJ-100 airliners. While a low probability; it is still possible that SEU toggling a bit in the Lattice Trim Control FPGA could result in a trim runaway situation on any of these airliners depending on if they all use identical trim control FPGA code.

Reporter with experience in flight control engineering and design reported a concern that trim runaway is possible in several aircraft types.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On LOC to 16L at 9000 ft; parallel traffic above and converging. Approach [advised] there was traffic; but we did not acknowledge in sight. [We received an] RA (Resolution Advisory) as we became parallel to 16R traffic. Followed RA to descend; but able to stay on approach. Approach was notified. Wake turbulence from previous aircraft to 16L. Second time recently with the exact same issue of RA.

B737NG Captain reported responding to a Resolution Advisory for an airborne conflict on arrival into DEN.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 300

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Error message indicating loss of Number 1 GPS connection. Auto select back-up GPS Number 2 (loss degrades approach capability). While trouble shooting the error inadvertently pulled the AHRS (Air Heading Reference System) breaker and lost Primary Flight Display (PFD) altitude; heading and attitude indicator.Distracted by the loss of information and still trying to trouble shoot the GPS failure and in solid IFR conditions there was a brief loss of control.  The aircraft lost over 1;000 feet and 90 degrees of heading before I recognized the problem and using back-up instruments began correcting. The entire episode lasted about 2 minutes.I contacted ATC as soon as I recognized the loss of control but the controller misunderstood and thought I was asking for a new routing? Eventually we reinstated our fight plan clearance.

SR22T pilot reported heading and altitude deviations associated with loss of control during troubleshooting of a GPS problem.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I was assigned to operate flight to ZZZ. I was the Pilot In Command and was the Pilot Monitoring during this flight. While on the STAR going into ZZZ; we just passed through approximately 19;000 feet MSL. At that time; my First Officer and I both looked at each other and asked if we smelled something. Both of us agreed that it smelled like a wet or dirty sock in the flight deck. Based on other information I have received from other pilots flying this type of aircraft; and other types of aircraft; I assumed it was potentially a fumes event we were experiencing. I immediately pulled my quick donning oxygen mask out and donned it. I called back to the flight attendants and asked if they smelled anything unusual to which they both said no. At that time and knowing that PACK 1 generally supplies air to the flight deck and based on our altitude of approximately 16;000 feet MSL; I told my First Officer I was going to turn PACK 1 off; to which I did. We continued the descent and after approximately 3 minutes; I took my mask off to see if I could smell the odor anymore; to which I could not. I told my First Officer that we will continue with the arrival and approach and once we land; we will write up the airplane; to which I later did. The remainder of the arrival and approach was conducted without further incident and no emergencies were declared. Based on these continual and potential fumes events; I highly recommend that [Company] along with other airlines; develop a QRC checklist for these type of odors.

EMB-175 Captain reported a 'dirty socks' odor during arrival. Odor dissipated after turning Pack 1 off.


Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

While being fueled I first noticed that the fueler fueled the left wing first; which triggered a fuel imbalanced ECAM. Then he fueled the right wing. Then he fueled the AFT ACT (Additional Center Tank) with 850 lbs; then the FWD ACT with 175 lbs. Because there was fuel in the AFT ACT with the forward not full (working with our dispatcher); we called the fueler back to the aircraft to fill the FWD ACT tank; causing a departure delay. At the first waypoint check we found that the FWD ACT fuel (5000 lbs) was trapped and not burning. Again working with our dispatcher; we continued on to our destination. At the gate we inspected the aircraft wing fuel panel to find 4 of the fuel panel switches in the wrong position.

A321 Captain reported that the Fueler did not reposition switches correctly in the wing fuel panel which resulted in trapped fuel in the forward ACT (Additional Center Tank).


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 1391; Flight Crew Type 1345

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Under positive control from the Tower; I taxied on Alpha west from the ramp. The taxiway to the convergence of Runways 02 and 06 passes through a restricted zone encompassing the national command aircraft; a restricted area where (I was warned) the use of deadly force is authorized in the event of vehicles traversing the area come to a halt. Immediately after passing these armed guards; I crossed three feet over the hold short line for the Runway (06) I was to depart on and stopped approximately 75 to 100 yards from the runway. I confused the line I breached with the hold short line for the closer Runway (02) but both converge at the same point and there was only one hold short line. I requested a 180; but had already fouled the deck necessitating a go-around by a landing aircraft. At the time of the incident; my aircraft's position was clearly marked and visible to me on GPS airport maps by Garmin and Avidyne but the error still obtained. I should have requested a progressive taxi; but was speaking to the Tower while crossing through the restricted zone. I did not turn back to see whether the signage was clear; but obviously; this was my responsibility.

A pilot failed to detect the hold short for NHK Runways 2 and 6 because it was so distant from the common runway entry point. An aircraft on final approach was issued a go around clearance.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 200

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft ground-looped on landing damaging landing gear; prop and wingtip.

Pilot of a biplane reported loss of directional control on landing that resulted in a ground loop and some aircraft damage.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 61; Flight Crew Total 821; Flight Crew Type 26

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We were coming in for approach on Runway XX. When we hit the glideslope; I put the gear down and flaps 10; but the gear horn kept sounding and the gear light would not extinguish. I slowed down to flap speeds and further dropped the flaps. Approximately 500 feet AGL; we executed a go-around to troubleshoot.When I retracted the flaps with the flap lever; the flaps wouldn't retract. We reset the circuit breakers for the gear and the flaps but neither was working. We then pulled the emergency gear release at 90 knots; but the gear horn kept going off and the gear light still didn't extinguish. We were on a left downwind at that time and tried to porpoise and fishtail the plane but that didn't seem to work either.We started smelling and seeing smoke come out of the pilot-side circuit breakers; so we pulled into a left base to final and landed on the belly.

PA-46 pilot reported the flaps failed to retract and landing gear failed to extend fully; resulting in a gear up landing. Additionally; smoke appeared behind the pilot side circuit breakers.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After landing and while taxiing in towards the FBO ramp at ZZZ (uncontrolled airport) a helicopter while practicing hover operations over the grass was dangerously close to the edge of the taxiway that we were on. The helicopter was to our 11 o'clock position over the grass. It was facing away from us during this part of the maneuver and drifting towards the taxiway. I being the left seat pilot sensed trouble and brought the aircraft to a stop. The helicopter is now continuing to drift towards the taxiway and now at most 50 feet from our aircraft. The helicopter now pivots the nose towards the right where the 2 pilots now see our aircraft stopped. At this point; they are a third over our taxiway; ahead of us and still 50 feet out front. Without a second thought or any kind of evasive maneuver; the helicopter just proceeds straight across the taxiway and over to a ramp for refueling. Not a word from them on the Unicom; nothing. Not even an acknowledgment of their mistake of any kind. After the helicopter had passed we proceeded to the FBO ramp which was only another 200 yards away. All ramp personnel had seen what had just happened. They were astonished though not really surprised as this helicopter pilot who is a regular there at the airport apparently does this sort of thing quite frequently. I spoke briefly to the manager of the FBO and he was going to contact the airport manager and file a complaint.

Landed on runway 13 and exited runway at the end to the left. Taxied to Runway 23/5 where we turned right onto runway 23 to back taxi. At approach end of runway 23 we turned left to exit runway and taxi to FBO. During the back taxi on runway 23 I called out to the Captain a helicopter that was hovering between runway 23 and the taxiway. He acknowledged. While on the taxiway we slowed to a crawl to exercise caution with the hovering helicopter that was facing away from us; but hovering close to taxiway. We observed helicopter slide towards runway 23; so we began our taxi with a little more urgency. At a split second the helicopter turned right and crossed our taxi path within 50 feet of nose of our aircraft at eye level. Helicopter landed at a fuel farm located to our right on vacant ramp. Pilots of helicopter upon cutting us off looked at us with no concern. If we did not stop with urgency helicopter would have most likely contacted aircraft.

Embraer Jet flight crew describes a conflict with a helicopter doing hover practice over the grass at an uncontrolled airport. The helicopter is facing away from the Embraer Jet and slowly drifting backwards toward the taxiway. The helicopter crew finally pivots to the right and sees the Embraer Jet and continues across the taxiway to the fuel ramp.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated

Due to smoke in cockpit. Detected smoke in cockpit. [ATC] recleared [us] to our destination. Emergency evacuation accomplished.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

The Captain stated that when maintenance examined the aircraft they found the recirculation fan motor bearing had failed which caused the smoke.

An EMB-145 crew reported detecting smoke in the cockpit; and diverting to a nearby airport. A recirculation fan bearing had failed.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

The Airport vehicle was doing his usual daily airport inspection for bird activity. Weather was IFR; visibility >1 and ceiling about 200 FT. Vehicle notified me he was stopping for a moment near the approach end of Runway 4R. There was an aircraft on about a three mile final to that runway. The CIC and I noticed; using binoculars; that the vehicle driver was shooting flares in the direction of the oncoming aircraft. Not only were the flares a potential hazard; but if the birds lying in the grass were agitated; they would be in flight low level at the approach end of the runway while the arriving aircraft was short final. I have continuously asked the facility to address the issue of airport vehicles and their movement on the airport. There seems to be a lack of understanding of air traffic operations. This is an acute example. Vehicle operators need to be aware of what they're doing and how it may impact the safety of aircraft. Birds sitting in the grass are much less a hazard than getting those birds to commence flight off the ground while an aircraft if flaring on arrival to an adjacent runway less than 100 FT away. It would be beneficial for airport operators to discuss these issues with the controllers they regularly communicate with; rather than having points of contact who are staff that have not worked traffic in the tower in several years. Bird inspections and dispersal of birds should be done when there is NO activity on the airport; not when the traffic is starting up for the day. In no case should flares be shot towards an oncoming arrival aircraft.

A BOS Controller voiced concern regarding bird activity actions taken by an airport vehicle operator that was potentially unsafe. The reporter suggests airport employees be given training regarding this issue.


Flight went as planned. It was a ferry flight [that] was to be conducted with the gear to remain down and locked for the duration of the flight. There were no abnormal indications in the cockpit throughout the flight. All three landing gear position indicators indicated down and locked for the entire duration of the flight. After landing the airplane was taxied to the hangar for parking where the engines were shut down and airplane was secured per the aircraft checklists. The landing gear also indicated down and locked during the taxi from after landing to parking. The airplane was then hooked up to a tug where the aircraft began to be pushed back into the hangar with a towbar. The right main gear then collapsed as it was being pushed back. I have no knowledge of why this may have happened. A thorough preflight was conducted prior to flight using the aircraft checklist which included an inspection of the right main landing gear and gear well. No abnormalities were noted or detected. Throughout the entire duration of the flight and also after landing at our destination; the landing gear position indicators indicated all three landing gear were down and locked.

SA-227 flight crew reported that following an uneventful ferry flight the right main landing gear collapsed while the aircraft was being backed into the hangar by a tug.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Taxiing into [ramp parking] spot at LAX. We had [another] airplane directly in front of us as we taxied in. The preceding aircraft had moved far enough down the lane to allow us to follow them in safely. As I was taxiing through the throat; two fuel trucks were observed by myself and the first officer to be driving past the preceding airplane on the active taxiway. From what I could tell; the aircraft in front of us was still under its own power and the tug had not yet had a chance to hook up to the aircraft. The trucks were; at best; over-anxious to move past them. After they passed the aircraft in front of us they continued toward us while I was still actively taxiing. Both trucks were squarely in the taxi lane with no part of their vehicles was on the proper side of the taxiway clearance lines. I had to bring my aircraft to a halt because the trucks were driving toward my left wing without clearance while in the taxiway. The trucks then stopped; on the active taxiway; abeam the cockpit of my aircraft. The smaller of the two; which had been following the first larger truck; apparently understood the need to get off the taxiway and he went around the large truck to get out of the way. The larger truck sat on the taxiway; blocking our progress for about two minutes. Repeated flashing of the runway turnoff lights finally got him to get off of the taxiway.The operators of these trucks had little; if any; respect for aircraft priority on taxiways. I have not seen something this blatant in ground operations in 30 years of flying. Please work with this fueler to bring their operators within the rules for ground ops. Lack of proper training for fuel truck operators. Retraining of the personnel involved; and restating of the policies to other drivers in the employer's workforce.

MD-11 Captain reported a fuel truck did not follow proper procedures and interfered with his taxi on the ramp at LAX.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After working 5 consecutive days with a five leg day on day 4 with only a 10.5 hour rest period the night before and after just completing a 4 leg 9 hour day; I was junior manned. I did not feel alert or rested enough to accept the extension of my planned duty time; especially considering that it would have created a 7 day conflict with my next sequence.Cause - Staffing and Weather; ZZZ had long weather delays before my duty day had even started and was declared [non-normal operations]. The high winds and resulting weather made for a longer and more stressful day and I was very tired by the end. The bigger problem is the constant under staffing of the Captains on the Medium Transport aircraft in ZZZ. Junior manning should not be the only staffing solution; but it is! Every question above on this report is exasperated by the constant junior manning that we have experienced for the past X months.

Air carrier Captain reported fatigue due to long; consecutive days of flying and cited weather and staffing as contributing factors.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

We were pushing back; communications were established and ops were normal.  We had been cleared to start and had started the number 2 engine. At one point the pushback stopped; a bit sooner than I expected. I assumed there must be something blocking our path. After a short delay and not hearing from the tug driver I tried numerous times to contact the driver. I got no response from him. I noticed the aircraft moving forward; leaned forward to see that the tug was not moving (not towing us) and went for the brakes. However; it was too late and I felt a small impact. I set the brakes. I opened the flight deck window and attempted to talk to the ground crew. Communication was difficult. There seemed to be a language barrier and the tug driver's headset was malfunctioning. I think it might have been a Bluetooth headset. After several minutes of trying I was finally able to talk to the driver on the headset. I told him that we struck something. I told the driver that we would need to be towed back to the gate for a maintenance inspection. I thought I was quite clear. Instead the driver disconnected the headset and drove away. The marshaller attempted to give me a salute as I was shaking my head 'no.' I did not flash my light to accept the salute but the marshaller just walked away. I had the First Officer shut down the number 2 engine and inform the ramp tower that we needed a tow back to the gate for maintenance inspection. It took quite some time to get another crew out there. In the mean time we called maintenance and I entered the need for an inspection in the Log. No damage was found; the inspection was signed off and we departed again. Failure of the tug driver to follow standard operating procedures after a failure of the tug driver's headset. No attempt was made to substitute hand signals after a failure of the headset to assure brakes were set. Emphasize the importance of standard operating procedures to ground crews.

B737 Captain reported the aircraft rolled forward after push back and a small bump was felt before the brakes could be set. The ground crew attempted to release the aircraft over the Captain's request for maintenance inspection.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

At FL390; EICAS message RT Pack Heat and RT Pack OFF message. Followed QRH. I then noticed the cabin rate of climb was still increasing and the cabin altitude was at 15;000 feet. We donned our oxygen masks; established communication; [notified ATC;] and started an emergency descent. We leveled at 10;000 feet and contacted company and decided to continue to [destination].Captain and I believe that there is a problem with the L4 door being closed and seated properly.

B767 First Officer reported loss of pressurization at cruise.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X (not tagged up and just on a 1200 code) called BFI on 118.3 about 12-13 miles north well outside the Class Delta inbound to land. I observed S46 working a VFR airplane Aircraft Y 8 miles north of my airspace NE bound and the aircraft did not have an altitude display; just RDR. Aircraft Y was on a direct intercept course for my arrival Aircraft X. This airspace is VERY busy and if they were going to let a VFR fly through it at a displayed VFR target southbound it's a safe bet the BFI might be talking with that aircraft. I had to call S46 and ask what altitude Aircraft Y before the targets merged. S46 is the RADAR facility and they should have reached out to BFI to ask if they were talking to the target.S46 is required to advise us if a known target in our Delta doesn't have any correct info in the display. This was definitely outside our Delta but an early call would have prevented wo targets merging. If BFI had a larger Class Delta this might not have been an issue.

BFI Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict that may have been prevented if Class D was larger or TRACON had been more proactive.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Two Class 8 Dangerous Goods packages were tied down too tightly and the packages were crushed. We had them removed from the aircraft before pushback.Inspect the tie down ropes and ensure they secure the packages but don't crush them.

Air carrier Captain reported Dangerous Goods cargo was unloaded due to packages being crushed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 10071; Flight Crew Type 1265

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Because of the wind gusts and rain we elected to make a max thrust TO on 06L with the GOPUP One Departure which gave us a V1 speed of approximately 111 kts. We were cleared for takeoff and everything was normal. Aircraft were landing on 06R and at V1 speed I noticed an EMB145 that had landed clearing onto taxiway D3 (I think; but maybe it was D5). It was supposed to hold short of our runway but at approximately 130-140 kts we could see it had missed its hold short area. If the aircraft continued onto our runway I think we could have rotated and cleared it but it would have been close. The tower called for them to stop and they did so just on the edge of our runway. I steered our aircraft just to the left of centerline to give us some extra room and we took off at our normal rotate speed. After we changed freq ATC asked us a couple of questions and we continued to destination without other incident.

B737 flight crew taking off and an EMB145 flight crew instructed to hold short reported a runway incursion at CYYZ.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

Due to the pandemic and the reduction in flight and passenger activity; many piers were closed. This led to packing more flights into fewer piers; while the passenger volume was low this did not have an effect on safety. The pier worker was able to work more flights simultaneously with a very low baggage volume.Many employees have expressed concerns to management and to their labor leaders.Today; the same piers are closed while the open piers are still working multiple flights and the baggage and passenger counts increasing. This is where the safety concern develops; there is limited space in the piers and the worker are forced to place bags on the ground waiting for future equipment to be placed in the pier. The main issue is that international destinations (bags) come down in advance of the ETD and other heavy volume flights cause the same hazard. The walking and working floor space is negligible. We have identified it as a serious tripping hazard. The majority of work place injuries come from 'Slips; Trips and Falls.' This has been identified and brought to operations leadership; no actions have taken place.Reopen closed piers and space out the work; as work volume has increased.

Ramp employee reported that passenger counts and baggage are increasing; but there are not enough piers open to safely accommodate baggage handling.


Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was on an IFR flight to RAP. Minneapolis Center handed me off to Ellsworth Approach on our approach to RAP. RAP was VFR; but I was in the broken cloud base at 5;400 FT MSL; so the field was not in sight. Approach Control gave me vectors to the VOR 14 approach to RAP; holding me in the clouds at 5;400 FT MSL; their radar minimum. While making the vectored left turn onto the final approach course; I broke out of the clouds several miles north of the approach end of Runway 13 at nearby Ellsworth Air Force Base; which is aligned along the same course as Runway 14 at RAP. I informed Ellsworth approach that I had the 'field in sight;' even though it was the wrong field. Approach quickly cleared me for the visual and handed me over to the RAP Tower. Having never seen the field at RAP; I flew a visual approach toward Ellsworth AFB Runway 13 before the terrain warning alerted me that I was too low for an approach to Runway 14 at RAP. During this time I contacted RAP Tower and waited for clearance to land. Tower recognized that I was over the wrong field and alerted me; directing me to the approach end of Runway 14 at RAP (1 o'clock and 2 miles.) The Tower also advised me of traffic; a Bellanca on a 2 mile final to Runway 14 RAP.Several seconds later I found myself on final to Runway 14 at RAP; one-half mile behind and 500 FT above the Bellanca. The horizontal distance was closing rapidly as my speed was about 80 KTS and the Bellanca's was considerably less than that. It was clear that there was insufficient space for me to land behind the Bellanca. I called Tower and informed them that I was making a turn to the right; off the final approach course and that I would make a 360 degree turn to allow the Bellanca to land. I could have also climbed and gone around; but I did not know what traffic was on downwind and did not know if the Bellanca was going to perform a full stop or touch-and-go. Tower allowed the 360 degree turn; or at least did not object or ask me to go around. The Bellanca cleared the runway and I landed uneventfully. The situation arose because I was vectored out of the clouds close enough to the approach end of Ellsworth AFB to mistake it for my destination at RAP. This is a frequent problem; apparently; because a warning appears in the airport information; and I had read it. I even commented to others that I did not want to make the mistake of landing at Ellsworth! The problem was compounded by my searching for the airport as I broke out of the clouds. Once seeing Ellsworth AFB; and being aligned on the runway; I kept my eyes out of the plane; on a visual approach. I had 3 devices that knew where to go; including my autopilot; which was engaged and flying the intercept to the Runway 14 final course; my certified GPS; which had the approach loaded; and my IPad; with geo-referenced approach plates. All the avionics and the iPad knew where to go; but I was looking out of the plane; not at the avionics. Fortunately I did not land at the air force base. I realize that despite my knowing Ellsworth was there and having equipment telling me otherwise; it is really hard to ignore that big; long runway ahead when breaking out of the clouds on an instrument approach. It did seem as if Tower and Approach were not talking to each other; as it appeared that Tower did not know I was on the Runway 14 approach; and did not reply to my first two radio calls after Approach Control passed me off. When Tower did talk to me; they correctly verified my location and called out the traffic in front of me. As soon as I saw the traffic; the Bellanca; I diverted. Another contributing problem was that approach told other planes to beware of Ellsworth AFB on their approach; but I do not recall approach giving me such a warning. This would have been especially useful while being vectored onto the final approach course for the VOR 14 approach to RAP; since the vectors brought me directly onto a final course for Runway 13 at Ellsworth.

A BE-33 pilot flying IFR to RAP declared the runway in sight after breaking out of the clouds. A low altitude alert from the RAP ILS made him realize he was making a visual approach to a similarly aligned runway at RCA some seven miles closer than RAP.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

After the last passenger was seated; I waited until the A [Flight Attendant] finished her Opening public address and held the Safety Information Card and gave the Over Wing Exit Emergency Briefing to the aft over wing exit doors. All passengers in that area responded with a verbal YES that they are willing and able to assist in a possible evacuation. Then; I moved to brief the forward over wing exit seats. When I asked for a verbal confirmation that they were willing and able; the man in seat F said NO. Then; his wife hit him and told him he was supposed to say yes. He quickly corrected himself and said YES; explaining he couldn't hear me over the music. The lady in seat C said she could hear me both times when I briefed and she has a hearing aid. I was concerned he wouldn't be able to hear Flight Attendant commands during a real evacuation; so we talked about the exit doors and I asked him questions about the doors from the briefing. He did not seem to understand or hear me well enough to carry a conversation from 3 people away. I told him no problem I can reseat him in an available aisle seat. His wife got upset and asked me why several times; and they told me they would not move. They became very combative and argued when I answered their questions.I needed to finish my briefing and asked the rest of the passengers in the row if they were willing and able and everyone else said YES; except a man in seat A who said I DONT KNOW and he doesn't understand how the door operates. I explained how to open the door and referred him to the safety information card and directions on the exit door as a visual reference. He asked me where the life vest was and seemed confused what to do. I told him it was under the seat. He had his hands out in front of him and shook them like he didn't understand. I told him no problem we have another aisle seat he can sit in that would make everyone more comfortable. Neither man would voluntarily move seats; even when I hit the call light and got help from [another Flight Attendant]. At this point; the fact that they could not follow flight attendant directions concerned me more in the event of an evacuation. Together; [the other Flight Attendant] and I went up to the forward galley to ask for a Supervisor and talk about the situation as a crew. When the Supervisor arrived; she asked me where the passenger was and I walked her out to the row and showed her the two men. She asked them if they were okay to sit there and then told me we're good. Before I could talk to her about what she said and their response; she closed the forward door and pulled the jet bridge back.Supervisors do not determine if a passenger is willing and able to sit in an exit row seat. CRM needs to occur without pressure to push the plane.

Flight Attendant reported problems with emergency row passengers and a Customer Service Representative not moving the people out of the emergency row.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Heavy snow had fallen at LFPG and after sorting through many issues we made our way to Runway 26R. Following a landing B777 we went into position to line-up and wait. The far end of 26R has a rise and the end is not visible from line-up position. After a long delay with a conversation in French between the Tower and the B777; an approaching aircraft was sent around and we waited several minutes more. The runway was called plowed and clear with less than 5mm of snow. To our eyes it appeared clear. We then were cleared for take-off. As we were breaking ground it became clear that the entire runway had not been cleared. Perhaps the last 1;500 feet had not been cleared at all and had 6 or more inches of snow on it. This lack of plowing began near the t-4 intersection. I am fairly sure that the 777 got into the snow and began to move very slowly causing the aircraft to be sent around. We assumed full length clear when it was not and we did not have the situational awareness of the Tower/777 conversation and were not advised by Tower of less than full length.

B767 Captain discovers at lift off that the last 1;800 feet of Runway 26R at LFPG are not plowed and may have six inches of snow on it. The runway was described as plowed and clear by the Tower.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 6600; Flight Crew Type 5000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was in communication with ZZZ Center; I checked in and the check in was acknowledged.  With COVID I have become accustomed to long periods of silence on the radio.  After a while; I think about 30 minutes; I realized it had been too long since I heard a radio communication.  So I tried to raise ZZZ Center; but received no reply.  I asked any aircraft on my last assigned frequency if they would ask Center what frequency I should be using.  A helpful pilot relayed that frequency; and at the new frequency I was able to contact ZZZ1 Center.  There were no further issues after that.

GA pilot reported having communication issues with Center.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We were given instructions from ground to taxi to Runway 22L via taxiways B-D-ZV-M and give way to an MD-80 left to right. After the MD-80 passed the Captain began to taxi via the route instructed by ATC. Approaching Taxiway A16 we noticed a B737 moving slowly towards (almost not moving at all) Taxiway B ahead of us at A16. My Captain began to slow down to make sure the B737 wasn't going to continue on to B ahead of us. He then let off the brakes when he saw the B737 was almost at a stop. As we were about 50 feet from the B737; the B737 began to accelerate and pull out in front of us. My Captain then applied full brakes bringing our aircraft to a full and sudden stop to avoid making contact with the B737. At almost the same time the Ground Controller gave the instruction to give way; but failed to give a callsign. The pilot on the B737 said 'we can't give way now' and the B737 continued to join Taxiway B. The Controller then came on the frequency and said 'sorry that was my fault.' At this time we observed the B737 taxiing down B at a very slow pace once again. At this time I made an announcement to the passengers briefly explaining what had happened. At the same time my Captain said on the Ground frequency 'you know for as slow as you guys taxi you could have given way.' To which the pilot voice responded 'Whaa.' (The sound a baby makes.) The Flight Attendant then called us and stated that she had injured herself when we came to a sudden stop. She said she was in the galley and the stop had thrown her into the forward part of the galley area. The Captain then asked her if anyone else had been injured and she said she would check. As we waited for her to call us back we informed Ground that our Flight Attendant had been injured and we could have more injuries. The Flight Attendant called us back and informed us that everyone was ok and all in their seats. The Captain told the Flight Attendant that we were going back to the gate and we would have the medics there to check on her. I called Operations to get a gate and have them send the paramedics at the same time the Captain was calling Ground to let him know we need to go back to the gate and have the paramedics meet us there. We returned to the gate and waited on the paramedics. The Captain decided to use his Captains Emergency Authority and leave the passengers on board while the paramedics placed the Flight Attendant in the ambulance. I stayed on the aircraft the entire time at the gate with the passengers and the Captain helped put the Flight Attendant and her personal items in the ambulance. After the Flight Attendant was on the way to the hospital the Captain came back on board the aircraft and we deplaned all of the passengers to the terminal.

Regional Jet First Officer reports a ground conflict with a B737 entering Taxiway B from A16; requiring a sudden application of brakes and causing injuries to the Flight Attendant. ATC accepted responsibility for the lack of coordination.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Advised by Flight Attendant of fumes in the cabin. I asked two flight attendants to come to the cockpit for more detailed information. All four flight attendants were experiencing the fumes as well as a couple of passengers. The fumes were reported strong in the aft cabin and weak in the forward cabin. No noticeable odors in the cockpit. The fumes were bad enough for at least two of the flight attendants to use supplemental oxygen. This event occurred on climbout out at approximately 6;000 feet. I leveled off at 14;000 feet to access the situation and decided to return. No emergency was declared. The odor remained throughout the divert back where the passengers were deplaned. Landing [was] uneventful. Paramedics took vital signs of 5 of the 6 crewmembers; some of who were experiencing different symptoms. A fumes/odor maintenance form was completed by the Captain.The APU was off. Only the engines were running. There were two maintenance issues resolved away from the gate and prior to takeoff. First issue was an autoflight Yaw Dampner Number 1 and the second item was an inoperative autopilot. If there could be a connection with the hydraulic system; I do not know. I was informed that the aircraft had no prior history of fume events.

During taxi out aircraft stopped at hard stand for approximately 15 minutes for a flight computer issue. On climb out approximately 5 minutes into flight a Flight Attendant received a call from one of aft Flight Attendants regarding cabin odor. Both I and A Flight Attendant were on jumpers; strapped in. I got up and took a few steps into the aisle and noticed the smell of chemicals and fumes. I turned around and told the A Flight Attendant to call Captain and get on oxygen; which I did also. While A Flight Attendant was speaking to Captain on interphone I held up my O2 bottle for aft flight attendants to see and pointed to them. I believe they quickly donned their O2 then. Captain asked me to come to cockpit which I did. He asked me for a situation evaluation and I told him I believed there were fumes in the cabin and described it as a 6 out 10 with 10 being the strongest I had experienced. I told him we were on O2. While we were speaking; B Flight Attendant came to cockpit and said fumes were much stronger in back cabin compared to forward. Captain told us he was going back to ZZZ. We returned to our jumps seats. I asked the female passenger in 1F if she could smell any thing and she said she could. I was feeling some tightness in my chest and a headache and burning throat. It took us approximately 15 minutes to get back to [departure airport] and another 5 [minutes] to land and taxi to gate where we immediately taxied to gate and deplaned passengers. Captain regularly called us during return flight. And taxi to check on situation. Fumes did not abate until we arrived at gate and got Captain ok to open all doors during deplaning which we did. We deplaned right behind passengers and met Flight Attendant Supervisor in jetway. Maintenance people took statement and asked us some questions then we all went for a debrief in break room where EMS came and checked us out. All flight attendants had symptoms including elevated blood pressure; headaches; sore throat; [and] irritated eyes. A Flight Attendant had extremely cold; shaking hands; and teeth numbness. All flight attendants declined hospital visit. Captain planned to go to hospital. My headache worsened and I flew home that afternoon.

An A319 Captain and Flight Attendant reported fumes in the cabin; so with two flight attendants on supplemental oxygen; the flight returned to the departure airport where the aircraft was removed from service.


On Number 2 engine shut down there was a very hard power transfer. Captain stated that she lost all throttle control of Number 1. I immediately hit the yellow pump and started the process of APU start up. Notified ground we might be stopping with an engine issue. (I did NOT touch Number 1 engine!) Number 1 engine shows normal running indications Captain went full power no thrust; pulled back to idle and full again with no power change then back to idle. AC was not dark APU and Number 2 engine were off Number 1 engine showed running with no control. We were able to turn off and stop in a pad after APU start and we secured Number 1 engine as we didn't know why it was non responsive. Restarted Number 2 engine since it shut down properly and called Operations to call for Maintenance to meet at gate and resumed taxi to gate. I sent a brief message with events to Maintenance Control since there was no specific error or ECAM to report or trouble shoot. Additionally during morning acceptance walk around after Maintenance had the AC all night in inspection; I found a bird strike. Maintenance improperly shut down AC during bird strike inspection which caused some reset issues. This could have been an additional factor for our event later that day. Next day one of the mechanics stated an Engine 1 cannon plug disconnected I don't know if this was true.

During taxi in I asked the First Officer to secure Number 2 engine. ''When he secured Number 2 engine there was a 'heavy' power transfer. We were on the bridge; and we began slowing down and it got very quite. We both looked at the master switches to verify that the Number 1 engine master was not moved by accident.  It was still in the on position. The engine gauges for Number 2 engine were amber with the appropriate X's.  Number 1 engine was showing normal engine indications. However since we had begun slowing down I advanced the Number 1 engine thrust lever forward and received NO response. There were no changes to the engine indications. The First Officer asked if I had brakes; at this point we were about to start down the bridge; I did have brake pressure; and he did turn on the PTU. The First Officer informed Ground that we may need to stop on the bridge; they said we had to turn into the pad.  We were able to turn onto the pad and stop. During this time the First Officer was starting the APU. I checked again for thrust lever response and yet again NO response on Number 1 engine. Since Number 2 engine shutdown correctly I had the First Officer shutdown Number 1 engine and restart Number 2 engine. ''We then began our taxi to the gate. I had the First Officer ACARS a message to Maintenance Control. We received the AC earlier that morning after it had been on the ground for at least 9 hrs. Maintenance had done a weekly inspection. Upon walk around the First Officer found evidence of a bird strike; which required a bird strike inspection. Maintenance improperly shutdown the AC; which required a reset of the FMGC 2. Throughout the day we had 'issues' with the MCDU.  Since this AC is so electrical; I would like to request that Maintenance use the Mechanics check list for proper shutdown. One of the mechanics actually said to me that they do not have to use checklist that 'they were for pilots'!

A319 flight crew describes a 'hard power transfer' when the Number 2 engine is shut down during taxi in. The Number 1 engine was unresponsive to power lever movement; although all engine indications appear normal. The Number 2 engine is restarted; the Number 1 shutdown and the aircraft turned over to Maintenance at the gate.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

On date at XA:15L; ZZZ went ATC Zero for COVID cleaning.There are NO procedures in place to assist controllers to properly close the sectors.  Coordination was/is left up to the controller's judgment.  Should controllers really be 'shooting from the hip' and guessing how to handle an event of this magnitude?Controllers are being instructed (and audited for proper usage) to use position relief checklist EVERYTIME we're relieved; R-R; D-R; D-D; R-D; but we are left to make up how we walk away from the scope with AIRCRAFT STILL FLYING within the sector.We were at the tail end of the busy morning departure push.  Aircraft were still in the sector and we were instructed to 'put the aircraft on non-radar routings' and TERMINATE RADAR SERVICE to IFR aircraft and leave the control room!IFR aircraft were still departing ZZZ1 at XA:15L!Why wasn't the airspace sterilized FIRST before controllers were instructed to shut the sectors down?!?Instructing aircraft flying IFR; 'Radar service terminated; frequency change approved' does not seem morally right.  We're not trained on Oceanic procedures if that's what we were trying to use.  How do these aircraft know which frequencies to change too?  How is it legal to allow IFR aircraft to just penetrate adjacent centers without coordination and/or flight plan information?What good are 'non-radar' routings if no one is insuring separation will exist?  For example; three sectors; 31; 28 and 46 are all routing an airplane at FL340 to fix XYZ.  Did anyone know about anyone else's traffic; no.  How is that SAFE or ORDERLY?  How is that PREVENTING a COLLISION?Procedures must be developed for this.FAAO 7110.65 2-1-1 para a and b was not adhered to!'The primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision involving aircraft operating in the system.''In addition to its primary purpose; the ATC system also provides a safe; orderly; and expeditious flow of air traffic.'Checklist and procedures must be developed!Why aren't we using our Facility Contingency plans?Why isn't traffic stopped from entering ZZZ airspace if they can't exit ZZZ airspace before we go ATC zero?The following are a few suggestion that MUST be included:- STOP departures from tower and approach controlled airspace at a time that will allow the aircraft to exit ZZZ (Center) airspace while they're still be radar monitored by center controllers.- Have a cut off where adjacent facilities reroute traffic around ZZZ.- Planes should NOT still be in ZZZ airspace while on an IFR flight plan at FL300; FL350; etc; when we leave the control room.

At XA:15L ZZZ was to enter an ATC zero status due to positive COVID-19 cases in the building and the need for a cleaning crew to sterilize the affected areas. At approximately XA:00:00L; the controller I was working with notified the watch desk that we would still have aircraft in our airspace at the time the facility's ATC zero was to begin. The two supervisors walked down to the area and told us to explain the situation to the aircraft and; when the time came; terminate their radar services; flash them to the next appropriate facility and provide a time/mileage for the aircraft to switch to the next facility frequency. My sector; at the time of ATC zero; only had 1 aircraft in in. The aircraft was in level flight at FL210 direct to ZZZ2. I explained the situation to the pilot who understood and told him; when the time came; to contact ZZZ1 100 miles from ZZZ2. I called to coordinate this with ZZZ1's low altitude sector who understood and acknowledged the plan. At 0515L; I told the pilot his radar services were terminated; started flashing the a/c's datablock to ZZZ1 and told the pilot to contact ZZZ1 at the previously coordinated mileage. The operations manager walked down to the area to ensure we terminated radar and got rid of any airplanes we could.  I then made a blanket statement on frequency that ZZZ was now ATC zero. I think there could have been better planning/Implementation of ATC zero. I also think we should have waited to sterilize the airspace instead of leaving multiple aircraft in ZZZ airspace in class A airspace flying along without ATC services. Had an event occurred; there was no one here to even monitor the airspace.

ATC Controllers reported after 'ATC Zero' was enacted in their building there were no procedures to assist controllers to safely close sectors.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As some of our older A320 family aircraft come of age I am encountering more delaminating or bubbling forming along the edge of cockpit windows. 20 years or so I had an A320 window internally catch fire during cruise at night between the window plies at the window heating element due to window delamination. On postflight I noticed that this particular aircraft had delamination hazing starting along the edge of the L3 window; for which an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log) entry was made to have checked; and was found to be within limits. I have been told over the years by Maintenance that so long as the delamination is less than 3 inches wide and not within the direct field of view it is within limits. I have never run across a window even close to those limits. However; I thought my write-ups would [have at] least put the window on some sort of a monitor or watch list. I am told by Maintenance Control that is not the case. Furthermore; there is no way for a pilot to know if the window has already been written up in the past. In short; it would be helpful to have additional preflight guidance; similar to the preflight limitations we have for tires; to know what the window delamination/hazing limits are. As well as guidance on if and when an AML entry is appropriate. Perhaps an entry could also be made to the aircraft damage report once a window has been reviewed and found to be within limits to avoid repeat write-ups.

A320 Captain reported the flight deck crew needs window delamination limits and guidance on when to enter the damaged window into the logbook.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

BACKGROUND: The VOR/DME RW 31 approach at PAO brings aircraft into PAO on an approximate 290 heading directly over the runway 32 departure end at Moffett Filed (NUQ). During the event; PAO was under IMC weather conditions with rather good visibility and a low overcast ceiling of 700 feet.EVENT: While working Local Control (LC) at PAO; a Aircraft X checked in on the VOR approach. I acknowledged Aircraft X and asked them to report the bases of the clouds when they break out. Several minutes later; the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) alarm sounded and I immediately looked at the radar display to see if I needed to inform Aircraft X of an unsafe altitude. It was not Aircraft X; however; that caused the alarm. Instead; Aircraft Y had just popped up climbing off NUQ runway 32 directly under and behind Aircraft X on approach. At the same time the MSAW; NUQ called via the shout-line to advise me of the conflict and I inquired as to whether or not the TRACON had released them with my Aircraft X crossing their departure corridor. NUQ said 'Affirmative; Aircraft Y on a 360 heading.' I looked out the window to see if I could make visual contact with the aircraft; but was only able to see Aircraft Y briefly before they disappeared into the ceiling. I then attempted to coordinate with NCT (Toga sector) to understand if there was anything I needed to do to help keep the aircraft separated or try and reestablish separation (as it appeared there was not any standard separation). NCT asked me to call them back two minutes later and then I replied that they could call me back when they had time; as now I was just curious as to where the miscommunication has occurred. NCT did not return my call and I did not call them back or press the issue further because it sounded like training was in progress and I wanted to avoid introducing more distraction.I did not quote traffic to Aircraft X because they were still in the clouds and Aircraft Y was behind them the entire time. My attempts to visually identify the aircraft were futile because of the clouds. As the event occurred; it seemed that coordination was needed more than a traffic alert; that's why I attempted to call NCT and corresponded with NUQ when they called. Since NCT did not return my shout-line coordination/call; I do not know if this event was even categorized as a loss of IFR separation. There may have been a rule or procedure applied (maybe something to do with divergence) that allowed this Aircraft Y to depart directly underneath Aircraft X; but based on the proximity of the two aircraft and the hurried tone of the NCT and NUQ controllers; I believe there was a major error in coordination and somehow Aircraft Y was released several minutes early/rolled several minutes late.If this was a legal maneuver; I would recommend that in the future; NUQ or NCT provide PAO with a 'rolling call' to let the LC know that a large aircraft will be tagging up directly beneath the VOR approach aircraft. This type of call would have lessened my reaction and had me prepared and possibly even advising Aircraft X that an aircraft is departing NUQ and they may see them either out the window or on their traffic display. If this was not a legal maneuver; however; and coordination was majorly mishandled; then I would recommend a review of the procedures for releasing aircraft off of NUQ while PAO has VOR approaches in use. I don't intend to speculate on all of the outcomes this scenario could have ended with as I do not know all the details from each party involved; but had the NUQ departure been an aircraft with greater vertical climb performance than Aircraft Y [military transport]; the two aircraft would have come into such close proximity with one another that the outcome begins to become unthinkable. The elements that kept these two aircraft separated were 1) the slow climb performance of Aircraft Y and 2) the fact Aircraft X had not descended as low as they were currently authorized to following the approach.The FALCON showed the two aircraft at their proximity on the first radar sweep after Aircraft Y tagged up. Several radar sweeps later; Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were at a proximity of 0.93 NM and 0 feet.

PAO Tower Controller reported a loss of separation between an IFR GA aircraft inbound to PAO and a departure off Moffett Field (NUQ).


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Total 4883; Flight Crew Type 4883

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

While parking at gate XX; the automated parking guidance and the marshaller parking guidance (should not have had both; should be one or the other) were not in agreement. Indeed; auto-guidance and marshaller guidance were one-eighty out. Furthermore; marshaller guidance was entirely non-standard signals. Indeed; none of the marshaller's signals were standard. Both First Officer and I noted the guidance (auto versus human) discrepancy; and the lack of signal standardization. Situation did not inspire confidence. Prudence dictated 'stop the jet'. We stopped the jet; set parking brake; and contacted Ramp. We advised Ramp that marshaller guidance and auto guidance were not in agreement. Ramp directed us to shutdown engines and await tow-in. We did so. Shortly thereafter; another aircraft impacted our right horizontal stabilizer with its left winglet. We briefed Flight Attendants and made calming PAs to passengers. We assisted Maintenance; over interphone; in separating the two aircraft; by restoring hydraulic pressure; applying full nose-up trim; and applying full aft yoke. As a post-script; when checking in on Crew Communication System (CCS) this/following morning; I received a CCS message to contact Ops. I did so. The person identified himself as a 'maintenance liaison' in Ops. He advised me that in the last week; three maintenance tow-ins had reported erroneous auto-guidance at Gate XX. He stated he had reported the erroneous Gate XX auto-guidance up-channel.

I was the FO. This trip was in conjunction with my continuing 756 IOE. The trip was completely uneventful until parking at gate XX. The weather was clear VFR upon arrival and our gate was immediately available. The Line Check Airman (LCA) conducted normal taxi procedure to the gate until turning into gate XX. There was a Marshaller at the gate that was giving conflicting information from the JBI-1900 Accu Park system. We were following the guidance of the system; however the Marshaller was giving conflicting direction by moving his right arm up and down as if to be trying to marshal us left. There was confusion and both the LCA and myself agreed we needed to stop the aircraft for clarification before moving further forward. We stopped about 40-50 feet short of the 757 parking spot and I contact Ramp control immediately to explain the situation in detail; and that we were holding position until we could get tugged into parking. Ramp control concurred and directed us to shut down and await a tug. We secured both engines and set parking break. The LCA explained the situation to the passengers and we awaited a tug. Approximately 5-7 minutes passed giving us enough time to actually debrief the entire arrival and landing; when all of a sudden there was a large strike felt to the aircraft. Ground personnel hooked up and told us that the aircraft at the gate behind us was just pushed back into our aircraft and that they were stuck together. We discussed the need to possibly secure the APU but it was determined by ground personnel that the exhaust was not an immediate concern. We were instructed to hold full nose up trim and horizontal stab up to aid in getting the jets separated. We assessed the damage during post flight and saw that the jet struck the right horizontal stab; damaging the tip of our stab and shearing off the other aircraft's winglet; and also continuing to scrape the bottom of the stab for about 20-25 feet. We were also informed that it was believed that the jet didn't have appropriate wing walkers and that the gate XX JBI-1900 had been written up three previous times with no corrective action. While we did stop short of the gate due to uncertainty of the marshaling; in accordance with expected actions based on previous formal guidance on such systems; I don't feel that any of our actions as the cockpit crew resulted in collision. Ramp control cleared the jet to push and was fully aware of our situation.

A B757 stopped short of the gate during taxi in because the autoparking and Marshaller gave conflicting directions. While waiting for a tow in; a another aircraft's ground crew pushed their aircraft to where it's winglet struck the B757's horizontal stabilizer.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Was working 91/65 combined. Had previously had a few aircraft going southbound to Mexico. One requested to deviate due to building weather around VYLLA. Sector 46 had called to request FUZZY/RUBY airspace AOB450 and I approved it. I did not have any traffic that I saw at that time coming from; or going to Mexico. Mazatlan called and said that Aircraft X was needing to deviate to the West of VYLLA due to weather. I told them that I was unable a deviation to the west due to military airspace that was active. That's when the Mazatlan controller replied 'I understand deviation is approved.' I said no and that if the aircraft wanted to deviate; he would have to turn the aircraft around and make them go to the East of VYLLA. (R2303 to the East of VYLLA was also active; but we have a direct line to Libby to which we are able to coordinate a point out with them and have the aircraft go through that airspace.) It seemed as if the Mazatlan controller finally understood and I gave my initials and hung up. Not even a minute later; Aircraft X checked on frequency deviating to the West of VYLLA. Mazatlan did nothing they were told to do; and totally disregarded the unable I had just given them for a West deviation. I asked sector 46 if they could call their aircraft in FUZZY/RUBY airspace on guard and see if they could cap them. The controller on 46 was reluctant at first because they seemed more interested in me 'punishing' Mazatlan by spinning an aircraft in their airspace to avoid going in to the active airspace. The 46 controller finally attempted to call the aircraft on guard; but there was an issue with static on guard. By this time Aircraft X had slightly deviated in to the active airspace. Aircraft Y had called and was also deviating to the West and I had asked the pilot if they could deviate to the East and they said it would have to be an immediate 90 degree turn to the right and that it was becoming too late for that to happen so I just let the aircraft continue on their deviation to the West. By this time; the aircraft working in the active airspace had called and was exiting the FUZZY/RUBY airspace. This is something that happens every single weather season; or time there is weather around VYLLA. Mazatlan Center completely disregards [any] sort of control instructions we give them; or disregards [and] unable. On more than one occasion; aircraft have deviated [into] the military airspace West of VYLLA; that is why we had a dial line put in to Snake Eyes so we could call the with an 'advisory' when an aircraft was going to be deviating in to the SELLS MOA/ATCAA because Mazatlan disregards any sort of restriction we give them. i.e. deviations no further west than 25 of VYLLA. This is probably gonna continue to happen because Mazatlan controllers don't seem to care what control instructions we give them; they just simply ship the aircraft to our frequency in a 'you deal with it' mindset; and I don't think that can be changed.

ZAB Center Controller denied a turn to the west due to weather and Special Use Airspace. Transferring foreign Controller shipped aircraft deviating to the west. Reporter stated this type of issue happens with this foreign Center whenever weather is an issue.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

This was the third and last flight of day one on a 3-day trip. The previous two flights were very delayed resulting in quick turns. Both flights were very task saturating because they were very short. The first flight required an ILS Cat II landing into ZZZ; while the other required a non-coupled approach down to mins into LGA. Departing LGA we were assigned the LGA 5 Coney departure departing Runway 13. We set and briefed everything properly. However; on the climbout we continued flying heading 180. We failed to intercept the CRI 043R to CRI and then outbound on the 223R. We did comply with the crossing restriction and climb gradient. When we switched to departure frequency; ATC asked us to say heading; in which I; Captain (PM) replied 'heading 180.' ATC then stated 'roger;' gave us a turn direct to our first fix and a climb to 11;000 feet. It was late at night and ATC workload seemed low. ATC did not mention anything about the departure when giving us a frequency change. We didn't realize our mistake until the next morning while we were discussing it the next day. This mistake was due to multiple factors. We had a long day that was full of delays with quick turns; both crew members were task saturated from previous flights; and both crew members are ZZZ based and do not fly into or out of LGA. I also think the departure procedures are a little confusing since none of it shows up in the box or MFD and has to be manually put in. The next morning we flew into and out of JFK. We noticed that JFK had FOQA alerts for the JFK 5 departure. This would be a good idea to also implement FOQA alert or company notes in the LGA 5 departure to help alleviate some of the confusion of the LGA 5 departure; especially for those who do not operate into or out of the LGA airport.

Air carrier flight crew reported that while departing LGA via the LA GUARDIA FIVE SID; the flight continued on a heading and did not intercept the charted VOR radial. The crew cited fatigue; lack of familiarity with the departure airport and confusing SID procedures that must be manually input into the FMS; as contributing factors.


Aircraft Fleet X task cards for the X; XX and XY day checks have a non-existent AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) reference listed for servicing the APU while the aircraft is in storage (49-XX-XX-XXX-XXXA) for the APS XXXX is incorrect. The correct AMM is 49-XX-XX-XXX-YXXA. We have brought this issue up several time here locally and sent several feedback requests in hopes of getting them corrected; with no joy. Please find someone to fix the paperwork.

Technician reported that task cards for servicing the APU of aircraft in storage do not have the correct reference number.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 15500; Flight Crew Type 12000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

After parking and running checklists; we had a brake temp light and one of the brakes was at 7. We wrote up the hot brakes and were reviewing the book for additional information/actions when ground personnel called the cockpit. We were advised they had seen a small fire on the hot brake and had used an extinguisher on it. Ground said no indications of fire remained.

After a normal landing we had a short taxi to our gate. After block in we wrote up Hot Brakes since we had a Brake Temp light. After block in the Ramp called us and told us we had a brake fire; and they used a fire extinguisher to put out fire. I never saw the fire; and think there was a smoking brake only.

B767-300 flight crew reports a brake temperature warning for one brake (7) after parking and makes a logbook entry. They are subsequently informed by ground personnel that a fire was detected and a fire extinguisher was used.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC cleared us the DSNEE4 to DSNEE; descend via. We were given two intermediate altitudes on short notice in the descent then told to resume descend via. The 20R GS was out according to the ATIS and we anticipated getting the RNAV RNP Z to 20R. We selected that before descent and at DSNEE the LNAV turned us to the fix after DSNEE on the RNAV Z Approach instead of going to JWARD as depicted in the arrival inset chart. ATC then turned us 10 degrees right and vectored us to final. There were no traffic separation issues or other deviations. We executed a visual approach without incident.

B737NG First Officer reported a track deviation occurred on the DSNEE4 arrival into SNA.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 85; Flight Crew Type 80

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The first flight of the day began at ZZZ with myself (the pilot) and 2 passengers departing; gas was to the tabs (36 US gal). OAT at the time of first departure (around 1100L) was 80F and although the aircraft was ~20lbs short of MGTOW; climb performance was as expected in the 500-700 FPM range (I have performed several takeoffs in this aircraft before while loaded near max takeoff and performance has always been satisfactory even on hot days). The flight to the intended destination of ZZZ1 was uneventful with the engine running smoothly for the duration of the flight. Upon landing; the aircraft was secured on the ramp.Several hours later; the pilot and passengers returned to the aircraft; a normal preflight was accomplished with no issues noted. There was no fuel added to the aircraft at ZZZ1. During the engine run up the LH mag showed about 100 RPM drop and the RH showed ~65 RPM. Both Slick mags have 500 hours since new. At the time of the event takeoff from Runway XX at ZZZ1; OAT was reported by ZZZ2 as ~88F with winds 040 at 11. During takeoff; the aircraft acceleration appeared to be slower than anticipated with the airspeed indicator bouncing +/-5 KCAS around acceleration during the roll. I do not recall engine RPM during takeoff. Once liftoff speed was attained; moderate nose down pressure had to be applied to maintain Vy. The climb rate while maintaining Vy was 100-200 FPM; even with flaps retracted. Upon reaching ~1100 ft. MSL; a bump/jolt was felt through the aircraft and engine RPM momentarily dropped ~200 RPM and quickly recovered. Engine indications appeared normal following RPM recovery. Concerned with a potential imminent engine failure over swamp/river terrain due to the low climb performance coupled with jolt and engine RPM drop; I elected to [advise ATC] and divert to ZZZ2 which at the time was about 2 miles off the RH side of the aircraft. The diversion into the pattern and landing was non-eventful and engine power was not lost.Following the landing; I inspected the exterior of the aircraft and the engine/firewall area and nothing remarkable was found. An A&P mechanic based on the field came out and also inspected the aircraft and engine and performed full power static runs and mag checks and found no major issues. The LH mag was noted to be inconsistent in the RPM drop during mag checks dropping between 20-100 RPM. Finding nothing wrong with the power plant; I elected to arrange alternate travel means for the passengers and ferry the aircraft back to the home airport solo in order to improve performance margin and reduce the evacuation risk in worst case of a ditching.During pre-flight before the ferry flight; I noticed a small paint fleck in the pitot hole of the airspeed probe. I was able to blow it out of the hole easily. Prior to takeoff; mag checks were again performed and a static full power takeoff was performed with no issues noted. The aircraft performed normally for the entire duration of the return flight with no issues.Probable cause for the event is believed to be a paint fleck; from the painted airspeed mast; partially covered the pitot port and resulted in an indicated airspeed lower than actual during takeoff and climb out from ZZZ1. As a response I held the nose down to maintain the improperly indicated Vy; resulting in significantly lower climb rate than the aircraft was capable of. Compounding the perceived issue was a potential momentary mis-fire of the LH mag that has not been reproduced subsequently. Both mags were sent in for overhaul following the ferry flight.

Pilot reported an air turn back after low airspeed and engine RPM drop.