Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 28

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I came in for the beginning of a midshift and there was weather everywhere. On top of the weather and deviations due to special events there was additional traffic. I plugged in at Sector 20 which had 3 sectors combined to it. Sector 22 had Macon Hi and South Departure combined on it. There was a line of weather over Atlanta and another line of weather over the coast of Georgia. All aircraft were transitioning through the corridor between those 2 lines. The volume of traffic was crazy. Too much for the sectors to be combined the way they were; but there were not many options because of the staffing. There was way too much traffic for the amount of people we had.When I arrived for the mid shift at XA:00 there were 3 people that had been on position for over 2 hours. The 2 Ultra Hi sectors were getting hammered as well as sector 22. Sector 20; with the 3 sectors combined on it; started out manageable; but quickly got very busy. The added traffic departing the area only added to the complexity and volume. I called for an Assist and received one in a fairly timely manner. The actual safety event came when I had an aircraft deviating at 34000 feet. I handed the aircraft off to sector 22 and switched him in a timely manner. A few minutes later; the conflict alert went off with another aircraft at 34000 feet in sector 22. The second aircraft was also deviating and was head-on with the aircraft I handed off to 22. I immediately checked to see if the original aircraft was on my frequency. He was not. Sector 22 tried frantically to call the 2 aircraft with no luck. The supervisor was standing directly behind him; just watching. I hollered across the room and told the supervisor to try the aircraft on guard frequency. Communication was established and separation was achieved. Where do I begin? The capacity far exceeded our staffing. Sectors should never have been combined or should have been split when traffic began to build. That's hard to do when you don't have the bodies. Flow control has been awful so far this year. In the 3 big weather days I've seen so far this year; every one of them has gotten completely out of control. I don't know exactly what or who needs to be addressed; but something needs to be done. At this rate; summer traffic will be unmanageable. In our area the guard frequency is on a sector that is hardly ever manned. That's unacceptable. It should actually be available at every single sector. All day long. We should all have INSTANT access to those frequencies. When we need to call someone on guard; we have to tell the supervisor who then has to get up and walk over to the sector where it's located and then has to ask us the call sign again. If it's a supervisor they also want to know the frequency because they are not certified and don't know them. Those are PRECIOUS seconds that are lost in an emergency situation. Most importantly; the supervisor working that night and watching the whole thing unfold before his eyes should have taken it upon himself to get on guard and call those pilots. I shouldn't have had to tell him to do it. This same supervisor asked us if we were ready to combine up on a midshift 2 or 3 times; before we were really in any shape to do it. It was still way too busy to do it when he was asking us. He should have realized that on his own.

ZTL Center Controller working combined sectors with weather deviations reported their area's airspace became overloaded with traffic and he observed two aircraft head on at the same altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

We had a customer passed out in front of the aft lavatories in the reconfigured 737-800. The space between the lavatories is so narrow that we; the flight attendants; in the aft galley could not get around the unresponsive customer to get the safety equipment and grab our AED and medical supplies. Also; there were people inside the lavatories at the time of the incident that could not get out of the lavatory until after the customer regain consciousness and we were able to assist the customer to the aft galley floor. This wasn't an issue with the previous configuration where the flight attendant could easily pass around another passenger in front of the lavatory area. I find this very unsafe.

Flight Attendant reported the new cabin configuration prevented the cabin crew from assisting a passenger that had a medical issue in front of the aft lavatories.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 3000

My aircraft 5 miles northeast of the Paso Robles Airport (PRB) inbound for landing and monitoring UNICOM traffic. Two other aircraft reported inbound. One aircraft 10 miles east of PRB; one aircraft 5 miles north west of PRB. Aircraft east advised maneuvering to allow me to enter downwind left traffic runway 19. I made several UNICOM traffic announcements and reported inbound on the 45 for runway 19; left traffic; full stop. No other traffic was observed and no further radio traffic heard. I then advised my downwind abeam runway 19 position. No other traffic was in the pattern that we observed. When about to begin my left turn to base with a descent; my right seat passenger advised 'stop the descent; aircraft going underneath me from right to left (westbound). I stopped the descent and observed a Cherokee at around 800 ft. on a tight base to final turn; landing on 19. The other pilot made a radio position call when on short final; giving his N number. I extended my downwind at that time and called the pilot asking if he was aware that he almost caused an incident? The pilot did not answer my call. The pilot exited the runway and taxied to a permanent ramp tie down. I picked up my car and drove to the ramp where this plane had taxied. The pilot had left the area. We were within 500 ft of a mid-air collision on downwind due to the gross negligence and reckless disregard for other aircraft in the pattern by this pilot. When speaking with another pilot on the ground; he said he heard this pilot make a weak and broken radio announcement when he took off; apparently without regard for other area traffic.

A pilot approaching a non-towered airport is surprised by the close proximity of another aircraft that had not identified his location and seemingly aware of conflicting traffic.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

We received a 'Steer Fail' CAS message during approach with the gear down. We executed a go around to complete QRH; after completing QRH for 'steer fail'; we had about 3;000 pounds of gas on board; and decided to go back to the same runway. The same message came back; and we landed with steering failed. No emergency declared; we stopped; taxied off the runway and called operations to get a tow to the gate. After minimal delay we were towed to the gate with no further incident. Since we got a tow very quickly; I opted to call maintenance at the gate instead of on the taxi way.

After a go around and an unsuccessful completion of the QRH for a 'steer fail' CAS warning on final approach; the flight crew of an ERJ-170 elected to land and be towed to the gate for maintenance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 19200; Flight Crew Type 9000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 16500; Flight Crew Type 7000

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Procedure

During cruise got an Engine 2 Reverser Fault ECAM with no other messages. Having had this happen [to me] numerous times during my many years on this equipment I was not concerned and knew what to expect when referencing the flight manual. Upon referencing the Flight Manual I was dismayed to see that the first action item was 'Land as soon as possible' followed by the next steps which read 'if pressurized engine to idle' with no further direction. I knew from previous experience that this seemed either poorly written or mis-written. A reverser fault never required a diversion unless there were other qualifiers such as pressurized system or unlocked situation. Contact was made with Maintenance; Dispatch; Duty Manager and the A320 Fleet Technical Manager who all agreed that the procedure was improperly written. They concurred that a diversion was not required and a continuation to destination was appropriate.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

An A320 Engine 2 Reverser Fault ECAM alerted and even though the Flight Manual directed a diversion the crew knew is was not necessary. Dispatch and the Duty Manager confirmed the procedural error so the crew continued.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

After holding 50 minutes to board the aircraft the flight attendants were told we could board first class and business. Cleaners were still on board. I arranged with the Customer Service Representative (CSR) Supervisor (with a handshake) that he would check with me before boarding - we needed 15 min for our security and safety checks. A Manager was wandering around. The flight crew; flight attendants and I were faced with bulk packages of newspapers in front of our equipment credenza filled with amenity kits; head sets and document bag. Old document bag and blue service kits from the inbound flight were never removed from plane. Four overhead bins in first class were filled with return amenity kits and headsets - leaving no room for passengers' luggage. It is mandatory that they place their bags in those overhead compartments. Closets for the flight attendant bag storage are filled with bassinets - not where they belong. Faced with juggling these items to comply with my luggage stowage and moving new papers to get to emergency equipment- I was informed by the Manager that we were boarding. The first passenger to enter the plane 2 seconds after the Manager informed me - forced his way passed the bulk newspapers and I bent over checking my flashlight. The Manager without regard to my duties had circumvented me and told the CSRs that I was ready. I was not. It had been about nine minutes since crewmembers had entered the plane. I had not checked the lavatory; my safety equipment nor had I been briefed by the Captain. At this point the Manager moved the newspapers and began greeting customers. I was incredulous. I left the door to be briefed by the Captain. I had briefed my crew to be hyper vigilant. This situation was a standards procedure failure. We boarded with vacuum cleaner cords on the floor (a tripping hazard) and were rushed to board without due diligence of security and safety procedures. Why doesn't Management have to comply with the SOPs? It takes too long to show the supervisor the necessary verbiage in the new handbooks. Once passengers are on board it is difficult to check the lavatory. Having a captain's briefing after boarding demeans his authority. How can I be alert for unauthorized bags; intoxicated passengers; odd behavior when the special briefing hasn't been given or I'm not at the door because I'm not ready. Once passengers are on board service begins and they don't understand anything but your complete attention. After spending time with the handbook- here is what I know. I have up to 15 minutes to preflight my plane. The purser; captain; agent and zone are responsible for the flight- not a supervisor. The company manual gives me the authority to decide if the regulations have been met. It says preflight is an FAR and must be accomplished before closing the door. None of these requirements were accomplished because the Manager decided we could board. Oddly enough he was instrumental in delaying our flight further by holding for ice cream that was missing- directly countering the Captain's wishes to be on our way. In fact after waiting about 15 minutes we left without the dessert. How is ice cream more important than safety?

A B777 Flight Attendant reported a Manager initiated aircraft boarding for an international flight shortly after the flight attendants boarded; before the cabin preflight was complete and as aircraft cleaning was in progress.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Total 5344; Flight Crew Type 207

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

MEL; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft

The aircraft was dispatched to ZZZZ with the APU Bleed Valve MEL'd. ZZZZ has no pre-conditioned air for cooling the aircraft. This was a total blunder which resulted in excessive flight deck/cabin temperatures and a delayed pushback. The issue was exacerbated by ramp personnel who had a huge English speaking language barrier. This resulted in gross miscommunication between him and the Captain. The worst part was the ramper not understanding the difference between the air start cart being hooked up; and it providing pressurized air for starting. The cart was sitting there attached to the aircraft idling for an unnecessary 5 minutes while the cockpit/cabin temperatures continued to climb. The combination of no PC air and delayed engine start resulted in unacceptably high temperatures for the passengers and crew. The ramper also did not understand the difference between pulling the external power and pulling the air start cart. During and after pushback he did not use SOP phraseology. The care portion of the safety philosophy that [company] management preaches was completely thrown out the window in this case in favor of perceived cost savings. It should be noted that the APU Bleed Air Valve has been deferred for five days while passing through maintenance hubs; in July! Experience shows that anytime an aircraft is in a location with the ambient temperature above about 45 degrees Fahrenheit there should be PC air or APU cooling available during boarding to preclude uncomfortable cabin temperatures. It is irresponsible to dispatch an aircraft to a location with no pre-conditioned air. The aircraft was actually scheduled to go back to ZZZZ again; but we messaged dispatch and the [Chief Pilot] regarding the issue. Dispatch indicated that the aircraft would be refused.

B757 First Officer reported APU bleed valve MEL and language barrier with ground personnel not following standard procedures which resulted in excessive onboard temperatures.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Company Policy; Procedure; Staffing

We encountered multiple issues at the SAN station. The flight was delayed due to late inbound aircraft. Immediately after crew boarding aircraft; before preflight had begun and while cleaning crew had just started; the station started boarding; the passengers needing assistance and struggling to stand were piled up outside on the ramp. It was unsafe as the fuel truck almost struck some of them. Luckily the gate agent stepped in at the last minute. The Agent brought a LEO and I had to track her down to ensure the paper work was handed correctly. She did not seem to know the process.The station agent did not know how to close the aircraft door requiring crew coaching. This agent has required help on multiple other flights. This station is struggling and it is creating safety hazards. Additionally the passengers noticed the chaotic events and commented. The stations struggles are making our operation look unprofessional and it's embarrassing. Send the station some staff from stations that are strong like Spokane or Boise on temp basis; to help train/audit the stations overall processes and procedures. Review how leadership is running this station and work on improving its culture.

EMB175 Captain reported multiple service failures at SAN including passengers waiting to board aircraft and standing near the fuel service truck.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.0

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Staffing; Procedure

Airway C1177 was closed due to a stationary Altitude Reserve Flight Plan (ALTRV) and the departure routes for aircraft departing LAX that would normally enter this airspace were turned off. New routes to SAN airport in east configuration were being issued and most aircraft would need to have it issued more than once. Some weather deviations in the northern part of the sector were starting to develop as well.I was also pulling my own strips for the oceanic aircraft. When I accepted the handoff on aircraft X it did not occur to me that this aircraft was less than 5 minutes from entering a hot ALTRV with no place to turn the aircraft. I think part of the reason it didn't register was the airspace was hot because we work this sector on two different scopes. The red lines I saw on Sector 25's scope are always there and I didn't have any aircraft in Sector 28's airspace so I wasn't looking at that scope. My Assist had just sat down and asked me about the ALTRV. We then coordinated with the Range Control Officer to remove the aircraft from the active airspace.Put LAX Tower on a call for release when C1177 is not available. Correct the automation issue that allowed this aircraft to depart on a bad route. Ensure airlines are checking NOTAMS and filing routes accordingly.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Center Controller reported working combined sectors and not noticing an aircraft on a route through Special Use Airspace (SUA).


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was performing maintenance to the #1 L/H engine; specifically to [a B737]. One of the maintenance tasks required the #1 Engine L/H outboard cowl to be open for IDG [integrated drive generator] servicing. I noticed no issues opening the cowl. Later that evening I closed and latched the same cowl. Later that night I again checked the engine oil cap and cowl security as I normally do; noticing no issues; to the best of recollection; specifically to the latching security of the #1 L/H engine fan cowl. I had only the forward hold open rod engaged; and rested the cowl against my body for a minute or two while stowing the hold open rod. I lowered the cowl door with no issues; later I moved to the ground and latched the center; forward; and then aft latch. I recall dripping oil splattering lightly on my head from the forward latch closing and using my jacket to wipe my forehead. When opening cowl I clicked the all three hooks into the handle for clearance purposes when closing. Pins; hooks and handles appeared normal. All three latches closed nicely; good torque and a nice secure click when shut. I noticed nothing wrong and was not distracted in any manner. I checked the #1 engine cowl latches more than once later that evening and latches were secure.

Maintenance Technician reported that the fan cowls on #1 engine appeared to be properly latched closed after he had performed maintenance; but the cowling apparently later opened in flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95.53; Flight Crew Total 15748; Flight Crew Type 6126

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160.12; Flight Crew Total 5590.18; Flight Crew Type 804.70

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On approach into ZZZ; near the ZZZZZ waypoint at an altitude 6;000 feet on the FMS ZZZZZ1 Visual Runway XXR approach course; the First Officer (FO); who was PF; asked for Flaps 1.  I moved the Flap handle from UP to position 1.  A TE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message appeared.  I informed ATC we would not be able to continue the approach.  ATC provided radar vectors off the approach course to the west of ZZZ. The FO continued in the role as PF as we ran the TE FLAP DISAGREE non-normal checklist.I [requested priority] with ATC.With clear; day VMC; a headwind on final; a 3;450 foot runway requirement; and two 10;000+ foot runways available; ZZZ was the obvious best choice for landing.   I typed an ACARS message to Dispatch stating PRIOR TRAILING EDGE FLAPS DISAGREE FLAP 20 LANDNG ZZZ (sic).  Dispatch replied with an ACARS message that the tower had been advised.After the event I spoke with the dispatcher and we discussed my ACARS message. He correctly interpreted the 'Prior' in my message as 'Priority.'  In the future; I would not abbreviate that word so that no interpretation would be involved.I appreciated that he could see we were at a low altitude in the terminal area with a landing at ZZZ being the obvious best course of action with nearly perfect weather and ample runway; and that he kept his communication during this event brief and to the point.I called the purser and [briefed them]; with no Evac preparation necessary or special instructions.   I then made an announcement to the passengers explaining our delay and that we would be landing in ZZZ shortly.The FO and I then changed roles and I acted as PF for the Flaps 20 landing; flying the ILS XXL with the full runway length available in visual conditions. During taxi-in we decided to leave the flaps at 20 and informed ramp and operations.  We are able to proceed and park at gate X.We entered a Maintenance defect. I discussed the defect with Maintenance who arrived on the flight deck. This person described a component; apparently visible in the wheel; that indicated a protection feature had activated.   The FO and I debriefed the event using the debrief card as our guide.  We felt the event had gone well.In particular; the aircraft had a history of flap and slat Maintenance defects; and the FO had brought this to my attention during preflight planning.  Prior to our event; we had already looked at the QRH for one of the previously reported Maintenance defects and read through the checklist; identifying switches and selectors; and saw that a Flaps 20 landing would be the likely outcome.  We both felt this exercise proved to be useful.

Arriving on ZZZZZ5 into ZZZ; we had just passed ZZZZZ2 and were cleared to 6K. At 230 kts; we selected Flaps 1 and got TE Flap Disagree EICAS. This was a repeat maintenance write up. I was flying; so Captain requested to break off approach and get vectors while we ran the QRH checklist. He also coordinated with ATC; informed dispatch and the FA's. He [advised ATC]; and we requested ILS XXL once we were ready to land. Flaps were configured to 20 using the alternate extension. CA took over Pilot Flying duties once the checklist was complete. We made an uneventful F20 [Flaps 20] landing on XXL and taxied to the gate.

Pilots reported a flap problem; requested priority handling; and then made a safe landing at original destination airport.


McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

While on approach to runway 36L; we were following a B777 by about 6 miles.  The winds on final were 180 at 14 knots while flying down final.  At around 350 feet AGL; the wind shifted to something close to 210 to 220 at 23 knots.  As the winds were shifting I started to notice some wake turbulence.  At around 250 feet AGL; the turbulence was strong enough that I decided to go around.  Our wing rock was over 5 degrees left and right.  We reported the wake turbulence encounter to both Tower and Approach. MEM continues to operate in a North landing configuration while the winds aloft and surface winds are from the south.  While the surface winds are reported as less than a 10 knot tailwind; the winds on final down to 100 feet can be in excess of our limits.  In this case; the wind shifted and increased around 350 to 250 feet AGL which presented us with wake turbulence on final low to the ground.Like it or not; Memphis needs to land into the wind.  This time of the year the winds aloft close to the ground can be a lot stronger than the surface winds which lead to these encounters.

Visual approach; landing 36L. Tailwind and some crosswind on final. On short final at approximately 300 FT AGL we encountered moderate turbulence and an increase in tailwind/crosswind and elected to go around. At approximately 1000 FT AGL we had a left quartering tailwind of 23 knots. At approximately 500 FT AGL wind shifted to mostly crosswind of approximately 13 knots. At approximately 300 FT quartering tailwind picked back up over 20 knots and we encountered turbulence causing the wings to rock. We were behind another heavy aircraft approximately 6 miles in front (maybe a 777). The turbulence started to cause the wings to rock the aircraft also started to go high on glide path. As I was assessing stability parameters of the aircraft during this sudden encounter of turbulence and wind shift effect the Captain elected to go around. We went around before any issues arose and safety was compromised.

Flight crew reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence in trail of a B777 on approach to MEM. Reporter stated ATC should be more aware of wind issues when deciding which approaches and runways should be used.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 250

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

I was cleared for departure on Runway 24 at Chicago Executive airport. Runway 16 and 24 were being used for departures. I commenced my takeoff roll and was approximately 25-30% down the runway at approximately 50-60 knots; accelerating rapidly when over the Tower frequency controller called 'STOP! [Call sign] STOP; STOP RIGHT NOW!' I immediately applied full brakes; initially thinking that I had misunderstood my takeoff clearance; or that I was not actually on a runway; but was on a taxiway (more on that later.) A fraction of a second later I saw Aircraft Y taxiing on Taxiway Echo from left to right toward Runway 16; and crossing over the hold short line onto Runway 24; directly in front of me. I estimate that he was 100 feet directly in front of me with my speed down to probably less than 20 knots. I could clearly see the copilot in the cockpit as he was looking forward; I don't think he even saw me. The Tower Controller then had me turn behind him onto Taxiway Charlie back to the departure end of Runway 24. The controller apologized for what had happened; then again cleared me for takeoff which was uneventful as was the rest of the flight.Since I was on Tower frequency and not Ground; I do not know what taxi clearance was given to the Aircraft Y pilots. Whether the Ground Controller cleared him to taxi to 16 without holding at Runway 24; or he was instructed to hold at 24; but did not; the mistake was potentially catastrophic. Had the controller not called out when he did; or even a fraction of a second later; I would have not seen Aircraft Y until it was too late for me to stop in time to avoid hitting him. I would have been very close to rotation speed and it would have been impossible to fly over him. By the grace of God an accident did not occur which no doubt would have resulted in fatalities.Because I do not know the instructions given to the Aircraft Y; it is impossible for me to know why he was on the runway; but Runway 24 is quite narrow and the painted white markings are extremely faded. I initially mistook it for a taxiway when I was cleared on to Runway 24; and taxied north onto taxiway Charlie so had to make a 180 degree turn on Charlie and taxi back to the runway. This despite me having SafeTaxi diagrams on my Garmin 750; which I was using at the time. That portion of the runway has a displaced threshold so the markings are not typical white lines; but are the arrows pointing to the threshold; again these were very faded and nearly imperceptible. If the markings for Runway 24 at Taxiway Echo were similarly faded (likely) I could see how a taxiing airplane could mistake it for just another taxiway. This location is listed as a 'hot spot' on the airport diagram; and clearly that designation is justified; but just listing it as such doesn't make it any less dangerous.

GA pilot reported aggressive aborted takeoff when alerted by ATC; as another aircraft taxied onto the runway.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I took over R5 from a developmental when I was giving OJT because it was getting too complex and I needed to clear up 3 opposite direction conflicts. My trainee had given ACR X DIRECT UJGEM and the aircraft read it back. When I took over; I reiterated direct UJGEM. It did not look like he was going as South as he should have. I thought he read back UJGEM. As a few minutes went by and he looked like he was going direct to the KOA airport; I said;'you're not going direct UJGEM are you?' and gave him a turn to the South. He later told me that he was going direct to YUCUV which doesn't even sound the same. I don't know any controllers that use YUCUV. The crazy names are causing a hazard! We need to get better names that mean something. Recommendation; make names that mean something and not just 5 random letters together; this is not the first time I have seen this happen.

HCF Controller expressed concern regarding confusing fix names and how they can be easily misinterpreted by flight crews.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were in ZZZZ airspace; and had to deviate way east of course due to a large line of thunderstorms (other aircraft were deviating also with us). The controller kept asking us how much farther; and we told him; although communications were very hard to understand (the [foreign] voice is one of the hardest in the world for us to understand; as they talk very fast and at a frequency that is difficult and sometimes impossible to understand. Repeating things numerous times is quite common.). All of a sudden; we were told we had a reroute; but it was given so fast and again impossible to understand. We asked him to phonetically spell the first fix; and if he did; we could not understand it. We used our JEPPFD and paper en-route charts trying to find the fix and/or airway he tried to clear us on. After the third time we asked him to repeat it; so told us to 'Contact Radio.'  We were logged onto Oceanic; and when we queried them CPDLC; they just kept telling us to go back to VHF. The HF frequency was tough to understand; so while the First Officer worked with them; I called dispatch on Satcom and had him contact Radio too so dispatch could relay to us what they wanted. The First Officer (FO) work on HF and dispatch came back at about the same time; and we were able to get the new routing and reestablish contact.  Another flight behind us had the same problem; and we ended up relaying to them.

Boeing 777 Captain reported communication problems and difficulty in understanding the foreign Controller while receiving a re-route.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were both arrivals into MCI. My airspace was from FL240 and above. I gave both arrivals FL240 and handed them off to ZMP Sector 26. Aircraft X was in front so I assigned hem 300 knots or greater; Aircraft Y I assigned 280 knots or less. They were both indicating 500 knots (Aircraft X was descending through FL250 and Aircraft Y was descending through FL310. Sector 26 took the hand off on both aircraft and entered their new assigned altitude of FL190. I issued the new altitudes to both aircraft. As Aircraft X was descending through FL230 for FL190; I noticed that his airspeed indicated 462 knots while Aircraft Y; who was descending through FL300 to FL190 was indicating 503 knots.  Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were 9 miles apart with a large overtake. Aircraft Y was leaving FL250 for FL190 and 30 knots faster than Aircraft X who was level at FL190. I increased Aircraft X's airspeed to 310 or greater and stopped Aircraft Y at FL200. This was all done 4000-5000 feet below my airspace! I then had to coordinate with the ZKC sector my new plan since they had the hand off on both aircraft. I also needed to coordinate my new plan with Sector 26 (both aircraft were in his airspace). Apparently; after reviewing the Falcon; ZKC didn't like my plan and told the ZMP Sector 26 to descend Aircraft Y to FL190 and increase his airspeed to 300 knots or less. What? Speed that back guy up and assign him the same altitude as the aircraft in front? There was only 6 miles of separation! ZKC also said that FL200 was not approved on Aircraft Y. I was providing positive separation on these two aircraft and ZKC was trying to be difficult by denying us to use FL200.  Sector 26 had to back coordinate to me to tell me this information because ZKC called the sector that should be working these two aircraft. I never received this information and shipped both aircraft to ZKC without incident. This new procedure is flawed and dangerous! Sector 39 is working aircraft 5000 ft. below their airspace for no reason! I am coordinating with two sectors and controlling aircraft that are no longer in my airspace! I had no time to do all of that coordination! I did not hear ZKC unable FL200 or issue the new speed assignments! This whole situation would be resolved if I had descended both aircraft to cross 10 west of PWE at FL240 and shipped them both to sector 26! Sector 26 could have amended the speeds/altitude and coordinate with ZKC themselves on two aircraft that were in their own airspace! This new procedure is unsafe! The high altitude sector is always busier [than] Sector 26 to have this many distractions and restrictions! Critical safety information was missed because the sectors around us don't realize ZMP high altitude sectors are working aircraft in the low altitude sectors! There is no reason to have this procedure! Altitudes are being entered in the data block by a sector that is not working or controlling those aircraft! We are relying on good memory to determine if that altitude was issued or not. There [are] no tools to indicate if the altitude was issued or going to be issued! Unsafe!

ZMP Center Controller reported an unsafe procedure that was resolved; but was not what the center controller wanted; which would have led to an operational error.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were preparing for a transcontinental flight; so we requested a complete top off of fuel. After the fueling was complete; I walked outside and noticed fuel coming from the right wing tip vent. I notified the fueler and he immediately contained the spill; which was completely cleaned and dry within 10 minutes. Upon returning to the cockpit; we noticed the WING OVERFILL R CAS message. No passengers were aboard and the flight was not delayed.The right fuel shutoff valve apparently did not completely shut off. Unsure of how the crew could prevent this in the future.

Citation X First Officer reported that a fuel shutoff valve failed to properly close and resulted in a fuel spill.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 603; Flight Crew Type 553

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

I was flying at 3000 feet headed to Airport ZZZ1 on a personal flight. I got ATC flight following when near Airport ZZZ. I got my squawk code and after approach had me on radar contact I saw another small aircraft or drone about 2 to 3 miles at my 11 o'clock position. The drone was headed on a 360 course and was just below my altitude and moving at a fast speed. The drone did not get close enough to cause me to need to change course or altitude. I reported because ATC did not see it and I thought in interest of safety they (ATC) needed to know about that activity.  ATC did not see it and I gave them a pilot report on the object. A few minutes later the controller's manager asked for more details on location and size etc. and I gave him size and a landmark.  It was a couple miles east of the chemical plant and white on top with delta shaped wing. 1/4 scale of a Long-EZ. I realized after talking to the FSDO that the registration on my aircraft was expired. I moved several times during the time the registration policy changed and that the airplane has been flying with expired registration. I have sent in application and the fee to FAA registration and will not allow plane to fly until registration is complete. I also went through all of my other documents and saw that my 3rd class medical expired. I erroneously thought that my driver's license would serve as medical if I had less than 180 HP and a no complex aircraft. I thought I could operate under the sport pilot rules. Upon my review of FARs I saw that I was incorrect and went to a local AME and had my medical exam and received my 3rd class medical certificate. I was incorrect on the difference in sport pilot and recreational pilot requirements. I had been inactive and not flying at all for several years and got back into aviation recently. I was not clear on all the changes and I should have asked my instructor and done a better job of reviewing FARs and staying up to date with [notes from a general aviation association].

A VFR pilot reported a UAS shaped like an LONG-EZ near his 3;000 FT altitude and reported it to ATC with location and description. While examining his documents for the FAA he discovered his aircraft registration and physical were noncompliant to the FARs.


Ground 1 and 2 were combined to Local 2 due to the lack of staffing. Local 1 was staffed by a person that rarely works traffic and has no clue as to how to be helpful to the person with the most traffic. He could have ensured that they did not call me on ground until they were on [Taxiway] ED. He could even ask them their gate and enter that on the ASDE-X and then ship them.The lack of proper staffing of ground control is what led to the unsafe event of total frequency congestion and workload saturation. There were braking action reports; snow removal activity on the airport and coordinators in the tower; RVR's to issue and monitor controllers not doing their job. No airspace assigned to local 2.Later this same day myself and others worked Ground 4 during heavy traffic with all departures on the west side of the airport. Ground 3 should have been open to relieve the frequency congestion. When multiple aircraft are calling ready to taxi out of all the deice pads and also at the ramp exit spots because some were not deicing; it is time to open Ground 3. Oh; but let me guess; we didn't have the staffing to do that either. Reduce the arrival rate to one and a half runways so that snow equipment can keep up with cleaning runways and the controller that has to work combined positions with all kinds of distractions in the tower and on the airport can maintain the frequency.The airport ops needs to allow us to get a detailed description of the braking action before flipping out and closing a runway and causing multiple aircraft to unnecessarily go around. Denver TRACON needs to retrain everyone down there on the correct procedures of breaking an aircraft off the approach.

Denver Tower Controller reported various complaints due to staffing; weather and the traffic level.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Was given PUFFR4 arrival; on the initial descent was given late and had to descend rapidly. Then was told to fly as per the PUFFR4 arrival. The FMS was calling to descend to 7;800 and the chart was confusing as to the fixes and altitudes. Then was told to fly the 17L transition as we were rapidly descending. The altitude should have been 11;000 at CREEQ we were descending to 7;800 as called by the FMS. The controller told us to climb to 11;000 and go to CREEQ. I misidentified CREEQ and programed CENIK into the FMS and the aircraft turned to CENIK. There was no loss of separation.

A C525 Captain reports receiving a late clearance to descend on the PUFFR4 arrival to APA resulting in a descent below assigned altitude and a track deviation when a fix name is misunderstood.


I was assigned this trip more than a week prior to the actual day it would occur. This trip would start in ZZZZ1; after the crew would be there long enough to acclimate to the local time zone; and would begin shortly after midnight local time. My crew was scheduled to deadhead to ZZZZ2 and then fly back to ZZZZ1 on a part 91 flight. This duty day was too long even for a 4 pilot crew under FAR Part 117 rules. I questioned the safety of this trip and sent my concerns to the chief pilot; director of safety; director of OCC; and crew scheduling. The only response I received was from the chief pilot who forwarded it to the manager of crew scheduling for comment. The response was 'it's legal'. Since there are no legal limits on part 91 flying; this response is irrelevant. I questioned the safety of such an operation; and received no reply.The fact that this trip would not have been legal under part 117 rules for a 4 pilot crew was completely ignored.The day of the trip; my crew rested as best they could; which is a difficult task considering that the flight leaves in the middle of the night; and the rest facilities on the aircraft consist of open business class seats. The Flight Attendants are required to provide multiple meal/beverage services to the passengers during the initial flight. We tried to rest during the flight to ZZZZ2; with not much success. The crew evaluated our readiness to fly in ZZZZ2; and decided that although we were tired; we would commence the flight. We refused to sign the part 117 rest statement on the flight release that was still present from dispatch due to the length of the duty day. Added pressure exists on flights of this nature; because a layover in ZZZZ2 due to fatigue subjects the entire crew to security issues; which is why the company refuses to layover there in the first place and provide a safe duty day to crews.After departure; and about 2 1/2 hours into an almost 6 hour flight; I noticed that the other crew member on the flight deck had fallen asleep. I was having a difficult time staying awake and alert myself and felt very uncomfortable that we had been forced into this situation.The [company fatigue program] states that the controls are checked during morning meetings and monthly metrics of flight and duty times. It appears that these do not occur since this concerns that were brought forth prior to the flight were never addressed by the chief pilot; or director of safety who were made aware of the issue and concerns of the crew. Chapter 3 of the [company fatigue program] states that FARs will be used to mitigate fatigue and provide limits to flights as part of the 'RISK MANAGEMENT' program. This is obviously not the case as the regulations were completely ignored in this case even when a safety concern was raised. The Company's attitude toward fatigue and safety in Part 91 flying is unsafe; and there are no controls in place to prevent this sort of scheduling. Crews are directed to fly unsafe duty days regularly with the statement 'it's legal' being the catch all for any expression of concern.The company needs to follow the procedures outlined in the [fatigue program] for Part 91 flights (perform them within the applicable regulations); or establish limits and guidelines to mitigate fatigue on Part 91 flights. Crew members' duties and responsibilities do not change just because the cargo or passengers are not onboard. Safe operation of the aircraft is dependent upon the fatigue level of the crew in large part; whether the flight is operated with revenue on board or not. The appearance is that the Company has little regard for the safety of the crew members on board the aircraft and only follows the rules when forced to do so by strict FAA guidelines. Part 91 flights MUST be taken seriously when it comes to fatigue and the duty/flight times of crews involved. Hiding behind the words 'it's legal' will not explain an accident or incident that occurs on a flight.

The B757 Captain reported on a Part 91 ferry flight that he said pushed FAR legalities and compromised safety. He was having a difficult time staying awake and noticed other crewmembers who had fallen asleep.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 5

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We stayed offshore to avoid thunderstorms on the arrival. About 20 miles out from the airport we proceeded to DME 8.5 on the approach course to avoid thunderstorms over BEMUV. We shot the LOC Runway 5 approach because the glideslope was not available due to the DTHR for Runway 5. We were not able to acquire the displaced runway threshold (DTHR) marking until 2.5 miles out on the approach. The runway marking isn't wide enough and has almost no contrast to the surrounding runway surface. The marking for the DTHR is about 200 ft northeast of Taxiway B. My local knowledge of where the DTHR was made the difference in continuing the approach. We departed at dusk with the runway lights on and the DTHR was clearly marked. The lack of approach lighting and an almost invisible DTHR would result in a missed approach in IFR weather conditions.

Air carrier pilot reported difficulty identifying the MUHG Runway 5 displaced threshold because of the prevailing visibility; the runway marking width; the low contrast from the surrounding runway surface; and no approach lights.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Shortly after level off at FL310; heard audible cabin altitude warning horn; accompanied by red cabin altitude annunciator. CA and FO immediately donned oxygen masks; established communications; and [advised ATC]. CA executed an emergency descent to 10;000 ft MSL per QRC procedures while FO performed cabin altitude Warning/Rapid Depressurization QRC procedures. Upon level off at 10000 ft Cabin Stabilized (regained pressurization) in Standby Mode. Entered hold to burn off gas; run appropriate checklists; make additional PA to passengers; communicate with FA's in What's format; advise Dispatch of intentions; contact ops; get current ATIS; reset nav equipment; & returned to land. No illnesses or injury reported. After communicating with Maintenance Control post event; it is believed to be either a Pressurization Mode Controller malfunction or an indicator fault.

B737 crew reported loss of pressurization shortly after level off. Crew executed an emergency descent; complied with procedures; and returned to departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 980

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was on a midfield downwind left for Runway XX when the Tower called out traffic for me to follow as a Jetprop on a 3 mile final and asked me to report when the traffic was in sight.I could see the traffic on ADS-B; but did not acquire visually until I was just past a point parallel with the end of the runway. I called traffic in sight and the tower replied with '#2; cleared to land Runway XX'. I waited a few moments until the Jetprop was off my left wing; then commenced my base turn.I was aware of two other aircraft in the pattern; both military trainers (later determined to be T6 Texan II's). I was also aware that at least one of the aircraft was on a right downwind for Runway XX.Shortly after we were cleared to land; the tower called to one of the Texans that his traffic to follow was an experimental aircraft and asked him to report traffic in sight. The Texan replied that he had the Experimental in sight and the tower instructed the Texan as #3 to follow the Experimental.On final; at approximately 350 feet AGL and 80 knots airspeed; I was concentrating on the Jetprop in front; as I was following somewhat closely and wanted to ensure my touchdown point was beyond his (for wake turbulence avoidance). At about this point; my passenger said 'Airplane; Airplane!' I looked right and saw the Texan at my 5:00 position; approximately 10 feet higher and approximately 150 feet lateral distance; on a collision course and overtaking us. At the same moment; the Texan pulled up and turned left; as I pushed the stick forward and dove down. The tower then transmitted: '[Texan]; I believe you were looking at the wrong traffic. Traffic to follow is an experimental on final'. The Texan replied that they agreed with the Tower.In retrospect; I should have made an attempt to visually acquire the Texan while he was on the downwind right. However; in my defense; I was concentrating on landing and separation from the Jetprop I was following and did not have much time or feel it was a high priority to be acquiring traffic which had declared me to be in sight and which the tower was monitoring. I did not make allowance for the potential that the Texan in fact did not have me in sight or that the Tower may not have visually confirmed that the Texan was following the correct traffic.In my opinion; this was an oversight between the three of us (myself; Tower and Texan) that had a happy ending; but which could have been a much different outcome if our evasive actions had been delayed by just a couple of seconds.

Pilot reported taking evasive action to avoid amid air collision with another aircraft whine in approach to landing.


Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Shortly after selecting APU BL AIR OPEN; CABIN DUCT HOT and FLT COMPT DUCT HOT cautions illuminated. In the flight deck; there was the familiar smell of hot bleed air; but it didn't seem out of the ordinary except that it might have been a little stronger than normal.APU BL AIR was selected OFF and the RECIRC fan was checked to make sure it was on. Temperatures on both ducts were reading 70 Celsius [degrees] and not decreasing.Shortly thereafter; Flight Attendant A reported smoke in the cabin. Looking back from the flight deck; the air in the cabin appeared gray and misty.The Captain elected to deplane the passengers through the main cabin door. Deplaning was uneventful. Eternal power was connected and the APU was shut down.Emergency personnel were called and arrived after a few minutes.Maintenance personnel opened the aft doors and the smoke dissipated quickly. They restarted the APU and opened the bleed air with the same effect as the flight crew had experienced.Passengers' belongings were removed from the aircraft and relocated to a new aircraft. The flight was then operated uneventfully with that aircraft. The APU bleed problem by itself would have been stressful enough to deal with; but there were additional distractions that probably delayed my reaction to problem.At the time of the event; I was on the phone with Dispatch regarding weather issues; which were themselves compounded by a malfunctioning fuel quantity indicator and inoperative EFBs that made communication a little more difficult.Also; there was a stuck mic on station frequency; which further inhibited communication.At the time I selected APU BLEED AIR to OPEN; I was on the phone with Dispatch. I had to use my cell phone as the EFBs were inoperative. With the bleed air on; the flight deck was noisy. I asked the First Officer to close the flight deck vents to reduce noise. When we saw the ducts were hot; we reopened the vents and checked to make sure the recirc fan was on (I can't remember if it was).I delayed the decision to deplane for a moment because I was worried about containing the passengers on the ramp; but I decided that it was urgent that I not have people on the airplane with smoke from an uncertain source.I made the announcement to deplane from the front of the cabin without first advising Flight Attendant B. I did not advise the passengers to leave all their belongings; but I did ask them to move in an orderly fashion and to stay close to the airplane. I did not contact Ground Services to help contain the deplaned passengers; though I did notice some ground personnel approaching the airplane soon after deplaning began.In retrospect; I wish I had made a more thorough deplaning announcement; but on the other hand; I am glad that I didn't waste much time in getting the people off the airplane. I also wish I had called for firefighters. After deplaning the passengers; someone asked me if I had called them. I answered no and he said he would do it for me.All company personnel were very helpful and professional.I have operated the APU with bleed air open and recirc fan off in the past for short spans of time to help communication in the flight deck (e.g. getting a clearance; calling CLP/dispatch) and have never gotten hot ducts or smoke in the cabin. Maybe this is a place to be more cautious in the future.I'm glad that I have spent time in the past thinking of how to handle emergencies at the gate. We don't have specific procedures for handling such events and we don't train them.There was a moment when I thought I could try to evacuate the smoke and continue with the operation in that airplane. That did not last long and I decided to get the people out right away. Maybe the lesson is; don't mess with smoke.This event was good practice in prioritizing tasks. My attention was consumed by four different MEL's and talking with several different people about their part in dealing with the various pieces of malfunctioning equipment on the airplane. There were also communications problems as noted above. When the FA said there was smoke on the plane; I had to drop all that and switch into a completely different mode. Without our training and time spent imagining various emergencies; it would have been harder to make this transition.

Bombardier Q400 Captain reported orderly evacuation due to smoke in the passenger cabin.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Just after takeoff; got an IRS/POS Disagree light. At 400 FT; called for LNAV and FD bars disappeared. LNAV info looked incorrect so we notified ATC we were unable to utilize the RNAV departure. ATC gave us vectors toward TRM. Out of 10;000 FT I called for the Climb Checklist and noted nothing abnormal. As we reached FL230; the intermittent Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded. Preformed memory items; O2 mask on 100%; and communication established. Called for checklist; notified ATC; and declared an emergency. Continued to run the checklist; and not seeing an immediate cabin change; we asked for and initiated an emergency descent to 7;000 FT. We called the Flight Attendants; had them secure the cabin and asked ATC for a clearance to return to our departure airport. We then got the cabin pressure under control and informed the Passengers we were returning. ATC headed us back to LAX; and we then asked for holding or vector to slow things down [while we checked with Dispatch and Maintenance on overweight landing data due to being 7000 to 8000 pounds over maximum structural landing weight. We landed uneventfully; filled out logbook; and contacted Dispatch; Maintenance; and the Chief Pilot on duty.With the things that were happening; it was an early indicator that the aircraft was not sure it was in the air. Closer and more frequent checks of the cabin pressure could have been done.

It was a high workload environment due to ATC clearances; i.e. headings; speeds; altitudes. We completed the Climb Checklist quickly where neither one of us noticed anything unusual. I believe the cabin was climbing at 500 FPM. The Captain then noticed that the TCAS had failed; and I remembered that it had tested on the ground. Then I noticed that the GPWS had failed also. Now we were trying to figure out why all this stuff was failing. The cabin was at 10;000 FT when we started the descent and never got above 12;000 FT. No pressurization switches were in an abnormal position and we were able to control the cabin in standby DC. At some point while this coordination was going on; the TCAS/GPWS starting working and normal FMC functions returned ([it had] initially shown us 540 miles away from the FAF).

When confronted with multiple system anomalies--including an FMS position error and the failure of the pressurization system--shortly after takeoff; the flight crew of a B737-300 declared an emergency; initiated an emergency descent from FL230; and returned to their departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Total 11933; Flight Crew Type 580

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Police / Security Involved

Just after I had left the flight deck for my scheduled crew rest; I was called by the purser to inform me of an incident in the cabin with a passenger who had become verbally abusive. He was demanding more liquor and called the purser names. He had shown the threat of physical violence by displaying his pumped up biceps and saying he was going get physical. He  announced the he was a One K; he paid our salaries and would sue us and the airline and have our jobs if he was not served. The purser stated that he felt unsafe and wanted this passenger off the airplane. I felt that at this point it would be better to talk to the purser face to face. I hung up the phone and went to the aft galley where the purser was trying to separate himself from the passenger to deescalate the situation. He repeated the story which was confirmed by an additional flight attendant. While they were relating the story the passenger entered the aft galley. I turned to the passenger and told him he needed to return to his seat. He demanded a 'double whiskey!' I continued to tell him he had a choice to return to his seat or he would force me to divert the aircraft. He demanded a double whiskey and started to bow up and flex his muscles. Fearing a physical escalation the purser grabbed me by the shoulder and moved me away from the passenger. Leaving him with the other two flight attendants in the aft galley. He continued his demands and threats. I returned to the flight deck with the purser and we discussed our options including dispatch on the satellite phone. The consensus was we did not want this to escalate. We coordinated a divert with ATC and dispatch. We dumped approximately 10;000 pounds of fuel. Once the cabin was secured I made an announcement that we were diverting at which time the passenger hid in the lavatory for a period of time. He did return to his seat for landing and left the airplane without incidence with the Port Authority Police.

B777 Captain reported diverting due to a threatening intoxicated passenger.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

During pre-flight I discovered damage to the aircraft right gear door assembly. Damage was isolated to the lower front edge. I reported the damage to the Captain upon completion of my pre-flight. Captain checked the aircraft Maintenance Logs at that time for a DMI or MEL and found none noted. Prior to pushback Captain inspected the damage & took pictures. Some time later Captain called Maintenance back. During this call the Captain clearly stated the flights current delayed status and concern for a prolonged delay further for this new item. Captain clearly expressed his willingness and desire to accept the condition; go and have the repairs resolved at our destination. It was clear to me at the time; from the one sided conversation that I had heard between the Captain and Maintenance that they had decided this was an acceptable and best course of action.  It wasn't until we were airborne that ATC said Maintenance was attempting to reach us but they had received the message after our take off clearance was issued. During our ground time at the next stop I heard the Captain leave a voice mail for the Chief Pilot. It was then that I learned that Maintenance had not cleared the aircraft for departure and the Captain had solely made the decision to go and claimed full responsibility.

When the First Officer of an E-145 discovered damage to the right main gear door during the preflight inspection the Captain was unable to obtain Maintenance assistance and elected to proceed with the flight.  The First Officer was of the understanding Maintenance had consented to the action.


Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

We pulled in to [the gate]. The Captain began his shutdown flow and either forgot to set the parking brake or somehow it was released. I went to grab the checklist and out of the corner of my eye; I noticed we were moving backwards. The Captain immediately applied the brakes and they connected the tow-bar and towed us back to the line after we made sure everyone was back in their seats. It was a really long day with a weather diversion and almost timing out. We were eager to get the passengers on their way after a very long flight. We had started the checklist and I did not visually verify that the parking brake was set when I was completing the parking checklist.

B737-800 First Officer reported failing to ensure parking brake was set after taxi into gate.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were beginning the first leg of our trip for the day. My crew and I were boarding the aircraft that had just arrived. I could smell of the distinct odor of hydraulic oil at the door of the aircraft. The smell was throughout the cabin and flight deck. Maintenance was servicing the blue hydraulic system. I went downstairs to talk to the mechanics about the logbook write up from the previous crew and get some fresh air; so I could verify my observation. I went back to the flight deck; the odor was still prevalent; so I turned off the APU bleed air; stopped boarding; asked the boarded passengers to go back to the boarding area. Only about a dozen or so had boarded. Then told the rest of the crew to leave the aircraft.Cause: I don't know; there was previous write ups or servicing of both blue and yellow hydraulic systems. I would suspect that had something to do with it.Suggestions: This has been a high-profile ongoing problem; I don't know.

A319 Captain reported hydraulic fluid type smell during preflight and boarding.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

The aircraft was given a preflight by both the PIC and SIC. We pushed back tail east with the right engine feathered using high pressure air for cooling. All operations appeared to be normal and the flight continued to airport ZZZ.We landed [at ZZZ] and as we taxied to the gate we had to stop for a few minutes for another company aircraft to move out of the gate area. Our aircraft pulled in and the engines were shut down. A few minutes later the FO went outside to do the post flight. The lead ramp supervisor asked the FO to come over to the cargo door area to look at something. As the FO walked past the left side of the cockpit; he called me to come out and look at the bottom of the cargo door area.The damage below the cargo door was a large 2.5 meter by 10 cm scrape with multiple depressions in the exterior skin. Primer paint and bare aluminum was exposed. The depressions had raised high spots over the bulkhead and stringers. The damage shows strong blunt force impact of an object striking the lower fuselage and continuing aft.The ground crews had spotted this damage as the aircraft taxied in. At least three direct witnesses saw the damage and surveillance cameras showed the aircraft taxi in before ground crews approached the aircraft. The lead supervisor even waited to push the loading stairs any closer until the FO and myself saw the damage.Photos of the damage and log book write up were taken and emailed to maintenance control. Dispatch and the Chief Pilot were notified. Contract maintenance would not sign off on the open write up. More inspections were needed below the cargo floor boards before the ferry permit was completed. The aircraft was then ferried for major repair work.There is strong evidence that shows the damage occurred on the ground [at our departure airport.] There was no damage noted during the preflight and the damage was noted first by the ZZZ ground crews and then by the flight crew. The impact force of the dents made by a bag cart or a GPU would be very hard to miss if it was being pulled away by a tractor. The individual responsible for this must have seen or felt something. There was no notification given to the flight crew after the damage occurred. The flight continued to ZZZ as an unairworthy Part 121 aircraft. The damage was only noted after the fact. My recommendations are very simple for avoiding a recurrence of this event. If you break or damage something; admit it and don't put innocent lives at stake with a damaged flying airplane. Some gates are very crowded and more work space is needed.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

After landing; evidence of damage below the cargo door of the SF340 was discovered by the ground crew.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Descending from FL70 at 300 knots LE Slats Asymmetry EICAS and leading edge light with the flap handle in the up position. Proceed to hold; declared an emergency; did the QRH procedures; landing distance chart and landed with no slats and flaps 30. Because it was during the approach Dispatch was not contacted until we checked in at the hotel.

B767-300 flight crew experiences LE SLAT ASYM EICAS message while descending at 300 knots with the flap handle in the up position. An emergency was declared and QRH procedures are complied with; resulting in flaps 30 zero slat landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 211.3; Flight Crew Total 16154; Flight Crew Type 2363

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon leveling off at 37;000 feet 'Lavatory Smoke' displayed on the EICAS. As we got into the QRC/QRH; the caution light extinguished. We assumed it was a false indication at that point; however; approx 15 to 20 seconds later; another 'Lavatory Smoke' caution displayed followed by a cabin call from the aft galley station Flight Attendants. They explained to me that the smoke alarms in the lavatory were going off (I could also hear the alarms in the background) but that it was just from the ovens and that the smoke was already dissipating. The First Officer reminded me that one of the ovens had just been replaced so between that information and the Flight Attendant's suggestion that smoke was getting less we figured it was a temporary situation. The second 'Lavatory Smoke' illumination had also extinguished at that moment. I discussed with the Flight Attendants that we couldn't continue unless they were absolutely certain that the smoke was merely due to food in the oven and that that there indeed was no fire so I asked them to verify once more and get back to me. I also instructed them to cease use of the oven that was the source of the smoke. The First Officer was still 'pilot flying' so I told him to continue in that capacity while I finished the QRH. Right as I got to the section in the QRH that gave me the option; as the Captain; to continue (assuming smoke had properly dissipated and the source was removed); 'Lavatory Smoke' illuminated on the EICAS. At that moment the aft galley Flight Attendants called back and I could hear the lavatory smoke alarm in the background. As we discussed the source; I could hear the other Flight Attendant say; 'it started up again'... meaning the smoke started again. The Flight Attendant on the handset confirmed what she said and I then made the decision at that moment that the safest course of action would be to declare an emergency and divert to nearest airport. I informed the Flight Attendant on the handset to expect a further briefing from me but for now to plan on a diversion and to start preparing the cabin. At that point I turned to the First Officer and he agreed we needed to get on the ground. I informed ATC that we were declaring an emergency. The First Officer and I both agreed where  the safest and most logical airport to divert to was and we informed Center that we would like to divert. I then turned to the First Officer and said; 'You fly; I'll manage'. While he  began the descent and set the airplane up for the arrival; I asked him to oversee what I was doing to make sure I executed the QRH properly. Once I got the section in the QRH where it became a loop; I informed him. We both agreed that we can proceed no further in the QRH and I began my Captain duties with the Flight Attendant's and passenger announcements. I called the purser and informed her of the emergency in an official fashion; including use of the TEST acronym in detail to the plan; followed by an announcement to the passengers of our intentions to divert. I then got back with the First Officer and he briefed up the arrival and approach. As I completed the rest of the checklist and got caught up; I sent a message to dispatch on the ACARS that we were an emergency aircraft diverting due to persistent aft galley smoke.  We discussed that we would be overweight for landing by approximately 7;500 lbs. I felt since he was calibrated to the arrival and approach set up; and since I still needed to wrap up checklist adherence; he should complete the landing. I did inform ATC to have fire equipment standing by. Landing was uneventful. We taxied clear of the runway into a holding area and brought the aircraft to a stop. We then called the aft galley and verified that indeed all smoke has dissipated. We reported that to the fire ground crew and they informed us that they would follow us back to the gate out of an abundance of caution; which we of course appreciated. Upon arrival to the gate a crew of fire fighters boarded the aircraft to inspect the ovens and galley area and indeed declare the source of the smoke was eliminated. They reported to me that they felt it was a combination of residue in the ovens coupled with abnormally high amounts of steam. The maintenance staff then came aboard and ran the ovens for 12 minute cycles to confirm the same. They MEL'd the one oven that was putting out excess smoke and informed us that we could not use the other oven. I got on the PA in front of the passengers to explain what occurred and why it was important to take the safest course of action when it comes to smoke. I also informed them that we will do everything we can to get the flight back on track once our maintenance team completes their repairs and inspections and signs off the aircraft. Except for one passenger in First Class who snapped at me for the delay; everyone else was in good spirits and appreciative of our actions and efforts. We wrote up the aircraft for the ovens as well as for overweight landing. As we waited for the overweight landing inspection to get completed; First Officer and I discussed whether we would be fit to continue to our destination. We both agreed to get the aircraft ready for the next flight and reassess 10 minutes prior to push as our destination was on a 3 hour EDCT(Expect Departure Clearance Time) anyway. Operations was able to move the EDCT time up for us and upon 10 minutes prior to the actual push we assessed our state and both agreed that we were fit and in the right frame of mind to continue. I also contacted the FODM who was EXTREMELY supportive; professional; and helpful. She offered to get us anything we need; we just had to say the word. I informed her I would confer with my crew that they were all OK to continue (they all did an OUTSTANDING job) and that we would reassess 10 minutes prior to push and that I would call here and let her know either way. I then went to the aft galley to discuss the whole event with the Flight Attendants who were in the thick of the battle; as it were and thanked them for their professionalism and for being calm and collected. I was really impressed that my entire crew was so supportive and kept such a great attitude throughout. Not one complaint from anyone on my crew. The First Officer did an excellent job as well by flying to standards and backing up the captain 100%.

Aft galley oven producing persistent smoke. Smoke caused smoke alarm to sound and Lavatory Smoke EICAS warning. Cockpit called FA's to determine extent of smoke/fire. FA's said there was persistent smoke and steam coming from one or more ovens. Lavatory Smoke alarm went on and off 3 times over a 5 min period. Aft galley oven had recently been replaced. CA declared emergency. Crew diverted to LAS for an uneventful landing.

B-757 flight crew reported declaring an emergency and executing an uneventful emergency diversion due to smoke in the aft galley.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1990; Flight Crew Type 860

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While on downwind for a Visual [Runway] 21 we received a terrain caution (that lasted for about one second) while flying over the mountains. We were in visual conditions and clear of all obstacles. We continued the approach into CHO with no further delays.  Casual Factor - Terrain around the Charlottesville airport.  Made sure we were clear of the terrain and then continued on approach. Be weary of taking the visual around the mountains at lower altitudes. We should have also climbed a little bit to give ourselves some more clearance.

While being vectored for a Visual Approach to Runway 21 at CHO on a left downwind; level; at an assigned altitude of 3;000 MSL we received a GPWS caution annunciation of: 'terrain pull up'. The flight conditions were day VMC; so both the Captain and I had the terrain we were overflying in sight.  Our vectored flight path took us over steep rising terrain. Upon hearing the GPWS annunciation; we verbally acknowledged the annunciation and the visual steep rising terrain we were overflying.  We maintained straight and level flight because we could visual ensure we were clear of all obstacles and/or terrain. Request ATC assigned an altitude of 4;000 MSL instead of 3;000 MSL when vectoring on this flight path for a visual approach to Runway 21 into CHO.

Air carrier flight crew reported a GPWS Alert on initial approach to CHO airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Inbound on a visual approach to [Runway] 8R into IAH over the JELLI fix. Airspeed was 180 KIAS slowing to 170 KIAS per ATC instructions. Captain and First Officer called the airport so ATC Approach Control told us to cross the fix EELPO at 3;000 feet and cleared for visual approach to [Runway] 8R. ATC identified preceding aircraft 4 miles ahead. Upon intercepting the glideslope near the fix REIGN; the aircraft unexpectedly encountered moderate wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft. Aircraft started rolling in both directions at approximately 30-35 degree bank angles. Pilot Flying immediately hand flew the aircraft to regain control as the Autopilot Fail warning message appeared on the EICAS. Aircraft was leveled off and pilot flying stayed slightly right of the localizer and above the glide path to avoid any more wake. Pilot Monitoring immediately reported the wake to ATC and to identify the preceding aircraft. Aircraft was a 737-900. Pilot Monitoring told ATC of our new flight path to avoid any further wake. Captain checked with Flight Attendant to ensure no one was injured - none reported by her. Approach Control handed aircraft over to IAH Tower who asked if we needed assistance - Captain reported none needed. Aircraft back on proper visual path to Runway 8R before Final Approach Fix MATON. Final approach and landing normal. Normal exit and taxi to the arrival gate.Threat was the unanticipated encounter with wake turbulence during the approach. Spacing from ATC was normal for typical operations in IAH. [Loss of control] was the sudden roll of the aircraft with the Autopilot Fail warning message on the EICAS with Pilot Flying needing a quick recovery to maintain altitude and heading.Spacing minimums should be reviewed and revised with ATC given the amount of wake turbulence the 737-900 series put out in our flight path. There wasn't enough separation allowed given the event.

EMB-145 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to IAH 4 miles in trail of a B737-900.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Potomac Approach put us close behind [Aircraft Y]; reported as 4.6nm in trail. Also reported that [Aircraft Y] was slowing. I had been assigned 210kts. I started to slow all the way to final approach speed to try to get additional spacing. Continued to approach at final approach speed from the 10nm fix into the airport. At 3nm DCA Tower placed an [Aircraft Z] out on 19 for departure. I used as much of the river as possible to get additional spacing but they didn't clear [Aircraft Z] to take off till we were at 2nm. At 1nm the Tower stated to the [Aircraft Z] that they needed an immediate take off. At 500ft AGL and rounding on final to runway [Aircraft Z] was still not aligned with the runway. I initiated a go around and we notified DCA Tower. We were given a heading off to the East and then vectored around for another approach.

PCT place a medium transport aircraft behind a heavy transport aircraft which landed on DCA Runway 19; but that did not allow the next aircraft's takeoff before it was on close in final. The medium transport aircraft executed a go-around.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2340; Flight Crew Type 350

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

This was not a safety of flight event. I was flying to TRK on an IFR flight plan. I had departed prior to sunset; although we were running behind schedule so I knew it would be getting dark upon arrival. I have done this before; never circling at night per the 'old' approach limitation and for terrain clearance safety reasons. As the flight progressed I was handed off to Oakland Center for approach services. At that time I asked what approach to expect and picked up automated weather at destination and was told that approach procedures to TRK were not authorized at night and it was up to pilot discretion if I wanted to accept a clearance. 'What' I thought? It wasn't even night yet and this had never applied to straight in approaches in the past at TRK. When I asked if it was night the ATC controller could not confirm and told me that the information was not posted and made available to them. I asked if there would be additional paperwork if I accepted the approach and said that I thought it was not 'night yet'. ATC did not have a comment or any guidance. I accepted the approach clearance. I believed that it was not the end of civil twilight at that time (therefore not technically 'night'); weather reported was approx 3;000 broken and well above straight in minimums for the runway 20 approach and winds were calm so circling would not be necessary. I flew the approach and broke out into visual conditions cancelling IFR upon visual contact with the airport and runway at approximately 9;000 FT; well above approach minimums. I landed without incident. After landing and shutdown I reviewed and discovered the new footnote on the new approach plate and also checked my arrival time and discovered that due to the confusing NEW footnote and approach limitation I may have accepted an approach clearance I otherwise shouldn't have. Even the airport management was unaware of this 'NEW' change; so were the aircraft that landed after me. Pilots were confused and many shared my frustration that not only is the footnote very misleading but should have been supplemented with a NOTAM or other change notice and clarified. Pilots do our best to be familiar with all available information; but with the constantly changing landscape it is sometimes difficult when a procedure has always been authorized and all of a sudden is updated such as this scenario without any additional NOTAM or info made available. Chart change NOTAM notices should include new approach limitations such as this. This particular change should be clarified in the briefing strip as well and not as a footnote at the bottom of the approach plate. Last; if an approach is not authorized and it is not an emergency; ATC should not be authorized to issue an approach clearance.

CE525 Captain is informed by ATC that night instrument approaches are no longer authorized at TRK. The reporter accepts an approach clearance believing that it is not officially night time and breaks out 3;000 FT above airport elevation and cancels IFR before landing uneventfully.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

We pushed back out of Gate XX without being able to use headsets with the Pushback Crew due to safety related to lightning around the airport. It was raining heavily. We started the #2 engine during pushback as directed by hand signals. We received the set brake signal and disconnected. During pushback; I noticed that an (other carrier) aircraft had been pushed out of Gate YY on my left side. After our Pushback Crew left; we started the #1 engine and ran the After Start Checklist. We then noticed that now another one of our aircraft was being pushed back out of XY; the gate next to us in between us and (other carrier) aircraft. I felt it was sort of tight; but noticed no pushback restrictions on the airport information page. The visibility was very bad and we waited for the pushback next to us to be completed.We called Ground Control for instructions. Ground advised us of traffic to our right taxiing behind us and cleared us to taxi to the area between Spot X and Y after they passed. The First Officer looked for that traffic while I checked the clearance to my left. With the driving rain and the darkness I couldn't see very well. At this time the aircraft off Gate XY had stopped for a few minutes. I made the assumption that the aircraft had been positioned to give us enough clearance to turn away from it as it is usually the case. I gently added thrust when I felt a light bump. I didn't even realize that I contacted the other aircrafts wingtip. It felt more like my brakes were locked. As I turned I heard a pilot reporting that he got hit and I initially thought he got hit by lightning. He then asked to taxi back into Gate XY. That is when I realized that it was actually us who hit him. We immediately asked for instructions to taxi back to our gate; Gate XX.The visibility due to the driving rain was bad and what contributed to the situation was the fact that 'no headset pushbacks' were in progress. That means that the other pilots also had no communication with their Pushback Crew. The other aircraft had scimitar winglets while we just had the normal winglets. I don't know if there was a Wing Walker; but apparently that aircraft was positioned to where our wingtips almost touched. A contributing factor may have also been that the ramp was uncontrolled and yet after pushback we asked for and received taxi instructions calling out other traffic; but not the one next to us. I made an assumption that the Ground Crew would not ever position an aircraft this close to an already pushed back aircraft; based on my experience here at Company. I wrongly made the assumption that they could see our and their positioning better than I could.

We pushed back from Gate XX with no communication with the Ground Crew. It is their procedure to not use headsets when there is lightning in the area; which there was. Another Company aircraft started to push off Gate XY as I was starting the engines. The Captain and I both commented that it seemed odd they would do that because of the close proximity to our aircraft and another that had also pushed off YY. I started both engines; performed my after start flow; ran the Before Taxi Checklist and cleared my wing before we moved from our position. The Captain pulled forward slowly and cautiously before making a slight right turn. I felt the airplane shudder a little bit and we both thought it was the brakes. After that; the other aircraft involved reported over Ground frequency that they had been 'hit' by something. Come to find out it was our left winglet that had struck their right winglet. We both pulled back into the gate.

B737-700 flight crew reported striking wing tip of another aircraft during taxi.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Logbook Entry; MEL

This report is filed to report an FAA violation.Aircraft X arrived with a piece of fire seal sticking up and out from between the left engine inboard fan cowl and strut panel. Upon further investigation; it was discovered that the wrong fire seal part number was installed on this panel. The fire seal for the left side of the engine was installed on the right side of the engine and when the fan cowl was opened and closed; the seal was damaged; crushed; and cracked; causing it to stick up and out.Aircraft X was removed from service due to the correct part being out of stock. This fire seal is driven and must be installed.

Technician reported that an incorrect fire seal was installed on an aircraft; resulting in damage and an FAA violation.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was on a vector descending to 5;500 feet for the GPS approach. Aircraft X read the heading and altitude assignment correctly. Aircraft X was issued a base turn heading 060. After traffic passed below Aircraft X at 4;000 feet; I began to Precision Turn Altitude Clearance (PTAC) Aircraft X for GPS Approach. It was at the moment when I finished transmitting that I realized Aircraft Y was leveling at 5;000 feet. Immediately; the pilot read back the clearance. However it was incorrect due to the pilot stating 'maintain altitude until established in the localized... I immediately told the pilot to disregard the PTAC and to climb to 5;500 feet. I then told the pilot to 'check their altitude immediately' and that the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) in the area was 5;400 feet. I received no response so I repeated the climbing instruction with an amendment to maintain 5;400 feet instead. I then asked the pilot to read back the altitude assignment. The pilot did not read back the numeric altitude. I then instructed Aircraft X to join the final approach course upon reaching 5;400 feet. I observed Aircraft X reach 5400 feet quickly and safely. Aircraft X was cleared for the RNAV/GPS Approach and landed without incident.I recommend having a quarterly conversation with the local flying community around BTV's airspace. There are a multitude of flying clubs and academies that can benefit from a conversation with BTV ATC. The format for these conversations could include in person tours; sit-downs; or e-mail correspondence. Events like this can be avoided; in my opinion; by explaining the importance of understanding altitude assignments; approach information for our lengthy; step-down; ILS and RNAV/GPS Approaches and expectations. Most of the flying community around BTV flies in and out of uncontrolled airports."

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended below the assigned altitude and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft X flew the RNAV RWY 10 approach at PKB followed by the missed approach with holding. The missed approach procedure was climbing to 030 direct to CAPNA and hold east of CAPNA. The pilot checked in on the missed level at 030 direct CAPNA. He entered the hold at CAPNA. After a couple of minutes; I noticed the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) flashing 031 and when I saw it I assumed the computer had his trajectory going eastbound; thinking that he was going to continue eastbound toward CKB where the MVA's get higher. I asked my Radar Controller where the 031 MVA area began; and after we pulled up the TAV map; it appeared that the aircraft may have already entered the 031 MVA area on the map. Upon seeing this; the Radar Controller climbed the aircraft to 040 without incident. I am not sure if the aircraft flew in the higher MVA area or not. I think we both assumed that since the missed approach procedure specified 030; that it would be a good altitude. Use our TAV map for altitudes; not the ones depicted on the approach plate.

Center Controller reported an aircraft that entered a MVA at a lower altitude.