Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 700

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Cleared to takeoff VRB; climb maintain 2000; heading 090??. We climbed out as directed. During our climb; ATC allowed us to climb a few miles off shore at a low altitude. To us; this put us beyond our power off gliding distance to the shore. We then tried to contact tower and request a better heading towards the shore and advise him that we were not equipped to be this far out. He ignored our request and in fact gave us a heading of 100??. This heading put us even further off shore. He then notified us that we were in violation and gave us a number to call Miami Center upon landing. After we complied with his new instructions; now even further beyond what I was comfortable with; approach then gave us a heading of 180?? and an altitude of 4;000. I then made one final attempt to request a better heading to bring us closer to shore; which was denied. Upon that request; the controller informed us that we were well within gliding distance to the shore. The problem with this is the shore was a crowded beach. This was not a suitable landing point. So; although he may have believed we were within gliding distance of the land; we were not within gliding distance of a suitable landing point that would guarantee no harm to any civilian on the ground. This often is the departure procedure out of this airport and I always have to request a different vector; which is often denied until I am well out of my range of gliding distance to a suitable landing spot. A Cessna should not be multiple miles off shore without the proper flotation equipment. I was trying to follow one regulation and it led to the violation of another. As the final authority to the safety of the flight; I believed I was doing the right thing. This departure procedure should be tailored to different category of aircraft. Single engine aircraft have no business being vectored multiple miles out over the Atlantic Ocean without the proper equipment.

A C172 Flight Instructor laments being vectored too far off shore by VRB tower without over water equipment. The reporter does not see a crowded public beach as a suitable landing point but ATC does not see it this way.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 4375

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[This] was my second flight since the implementation of the new before takeoff checklist and the taxi before final weights. I thought maybe; I'd have a different reaction to this checklist after getting used to it which is why I did not write a report on the first leg. But instead; my thoughts about it only intensified. I have been a first officer on this plane [for years]; and I would consider myself above average with multi tasking. That being said; this checklist is a complete distraction! I felt out of the loop and very confused by this overly complicated checklist. With all the extra talking; instead of feeling like everything was set; it made me feel like I was missing things more important to the safety of flight. Fortunately; I did not miss anything; but I definitely felt uneasy. I have no issue getting final weights on taxi out. I believe that can be safely managed. I do have a problem with this overly complicated checklist with extraneous verbiage while taxiing out during sterile cockpit. Even in the Computer Based Training (CBT) show casing this new procedure; the Captain clearly isn't even listening to the First Officer (FO) reading all this stuff. He just responded 'SET' and never even looked up. This is not what CRM is. It says something to me that they could not even make this look like a crew effort while they are in a simulator and probably did or could have done many 'takes' to make it look right. That was my experience in real life too. It is way too much talking and the Captain; despite having done the required training; did not know the required response making it even more distracting. The fact that there isn't a prompt in the checklist to set flaps is crazy! I have read the amended flight manual; and realize the Captain is supposed to call for it before the checklist; but if they don't; and won't if they aren't following this new procedure closely; then we are taxiing out without flaps even set at all. I just feel like this is a recipe to really mess things up. Having the incorrect flap setting is a real concern. I have read safety bulletins stating that tail strikes are on the rise; and I believe with this convoluted checklist we will see more mistakes rather than less. I'm not sure what the problem was the way it was (also changed fairly recently) just simply stating to the Captain the takeoff weight; the planned; and the difference. We have already briefed the departure before running the preflight checklist. Rehashing that on the taxi out is totally unnecessary and distracting. We have always just briefed if there was a runway or departure change. It worked well; and far less distracting than having to read off of this big checklist which is physically larger than it ever was now that it's not folded and blocks the FOs peripheral view of the taxi out. I'm sure this will fall on deaf ears; but I'm just throwing my experience out there and sincerely hope that this verbose checklist does not cause an incident.

A B737 First Officer reported confusion and lack of confidence in a new before takeoff checklist procedure.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

We were given our load sheet by the ramp crew and nothing looked out of the ordinary. They had amended an original count of 22 bags in R1 to 24 in R1 and it was correctly crossed out with a single line and initialed by the ramp agent. Due to VHF NO COM the captain had to call for numbers. The performance solution came back with a valid solution and we departed.While in cruise we got an ACARS message from Dispatch that we had been given a false load report and we had 22 bags in R1 that were not reflected on our load sheet. We asked dispatch to rerun our takeoff numbers with the correct number of bags and it turned out that we had departed out of CG to the rear and would have needed to move 100lbs to F1 to be within CG. We did have a uniformed jumpseater from another carrier who had come up to the flight deck prior to departure. He believed he was going to be up front so we had verified his status and checked his required documents to occupy the jumpseat. The captain asked Dispatch to rerun the numbers with the jumpseater in the flight deck jumpseat instead of the cabin and that put us in CG. As we had verified his status the captain asked him to occupy the jumpseat for landing. We landed without incident.Possible solution: An automated system which links the bags scanned by the ramp with the hand reader to the ACARS system or to Dispatch.

We were 660 pounds off in our calculations. The result was an aft CG out of limits. However moving a jumpseater who was riding in the back of the airplane to the jumpseat up front had resulted in a CG within limits.

While in cruise flight; DHC8-400 flight crew received word from Dispatch that they had departed with an incorrect load report and that the correct load would have put the aircraft out of CG limits for takeoff. However; the revised load report did not reflect an occupied jumpseat which had put the aircraft within CG.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Airport; Procedure

I was working arrival/final radar.  Aircraft X was turned to the airport and cleared for a visual approach to Runway XX right about 6 miles south of the field and switched to the local controller.  Aircraft Y was turned about 3 miles west of Aircraft X on a base for Runway XX Left.  Aircraft Y advised the field in sight and was turned on a heading to join and cleared for the visual approach to Runway XX Left.  Shortly after I observed Aircraft X going through the Runway XX Right final approach course and encroaching on Aircraft Y.  Local then called and told me that Aircraft X said he was cleared for the visual approach to Runway XX Left.  After reviewing the tapes Aircraft X was cleared for visual approach to Runway XX Right and read it back.  However when Aircraft X originally checked on he was told to expect Runway XX Left.I would probably have to say that expectation both on my part and the pilots part led to the event.  The pilot expected the left runway because that's what he was told when checking in.  I expected him to fly the visual approach for the right runway because that's what he was cleared for and what he read back.  Not sure that I have any recommendations other than to be more aware and expect the aircraft to do what you think they won't do.

An aircraft checked on frequency and was told to expect the left runway. When the aircraft reported the airport in sight the Controller cleared the aircraft for a visual approach to the right runway. The aircraft read back the clearance that he was cleared for the right runway. The aircraft intercepted the left runway final approach course. The aircraft thought they were cleared for an approach to the left runway. There was traffic slightly ahead lined up for Left Runway.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 34 Left

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

At approximately XA30 Pacific Standard Time; an Airbus crew flying to RNO encountered an unstable approach to landing. During this event; the Airbus was occupied by two cockpit jump seaters as well as a full cabin of passengers and cabin crewmembers.At the time of this incident; RNO was arriving traffic to the North and the crew were reassigned the 'Rusme 2' Arrival which provides a terminating fix/approach transition over the 'Spoon' intersection to the KRNO ILS 34L. Winds aloft; during descent and arrival; presented a tailwind scenario for the crew.With little success in slowing and/or configuring the aircraft for a stabilized approach and landing; this flight crew crossed 1;000 feet RA at 181 knots with ONLY Flaps 2 and Gear Down. Further; the aircraft was not on Glideslope and the Pilot Flying attempted to complete S-turns (night ops in a terrain-ridden environment) to induce drag and recover a failed approach.As an observer in the center jump seat; I decided to give the crew the 'benefit of the doubt' regarding the decision to call a Go-Around at and after 1;000 feet RA. Astonished that neither crewmember called a Go-Around despite an insufficient landing configuration AND an approach speed in excess of 50 knots; I stated; 'Guys this doesn't look good; come on; Go-Around' at approximately 800 feet RA.At this point; the First Officer agreed with my assessment; the Captain; however; continued to 'fight-the-approach' until the First Officer stated; 'Go-Around.' At approximately 700 feet RA; the Captain enacted the Go-Around procedure.The Captain was the Pilot Flying. My judgement/opinion suggests that the resulting unstabilized approach was the direct result of (1) the Captain's decision to disregard the recommended '210 knots' speed limitation at 'Spoon' (crossed this fix at 250 knots); (2) the Captain's decision to delay gear extension despite being high on the glideslope and unable to slow due to the prevailing winds aloft; (3) the Captain's decision to stow the speed brakes after establishing 'Flaps 2' (without gear down); and (4) the Captain's and/or First Officer's limited understanding or lack of respect for the 'stabilized approach' criteria. This data/recount is provided to the best of my knowledge despite being almost [a few] days old.

During approach; a cockpit observer suggested to the flight crew that a Go-Around was warranted during to an unstable approach condition. Flight crew executed a Go-Around.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3950; Flight Crew Type 350

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While in cruise flight; I began to notice undesirable engine trends and indications of an impending failure or forced shutdown. I adjusted my destination from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with ATC. Upon further evaluation and worsening engine indications; a change of destination from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 was requested with ATC and approved.As I turned toward ZZZ2; I was forced to shut down the ride engine and requested priority handling with ATC. An approach to land was made on Runway 13 with no event and no injuries to passengers or crew. We then exited the runway and parked at the FBO as if it was a normal flight. I then contacted WX Brief and asked them to contact Center; relay my phone number; and confirm I was safe on the ground. Center Controller then contacted me to verbally verify we were safe on the ground in ZZZ2. I would like to thank the professional and extremely helpful Center Controller. It helped in a truly troubling situation.

Beech F90 Captain reported diverting due to deteriorating engine parameters which caused an in-flight shut down of the right engine.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 298; Flight Crew Type 3500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

On short final to Runway 18; we received a GPWS 'Too Low Terrain' Alert. The pilot flying initiated a go-around. Aircraft was on glide slope and airspeed. The visual was backed up by the RNAV glide slope. The PAPI was showing two red over two white.[This] could be an anomaly with the GPWS. There was a NOTAM on the RNAV for Runway 36 approach; noting terrain warnings and that the approach was no longer authorized.

The flight crew of a B737 received a GPWS Terrain warning for no apparent reason on short final to Runway 18 at BHM. They appropriately executed a go around.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was flying the airplane on final approach; and Approach Control told us to maintain 180 knots to 5 DME and contact Tower.  As soon as we contacted the Tower; we were asked our airspeed; and replied 180 knots.  Then Tower asked the airplane ahead for their airspeed; which was 140 knots; and at that point the Tower told us to slow to approach speed.  I looked on TCAS and noticed the airplane ahead to be fairly close; and I knew that we had to slow quickly.   I disconnected the autothrottles and pulled power to idle; and as we slowed final flaps were set at 30 degrees. The auto-pilot was engaged on the localizer and glide slope.  I had forgotten that I had disconnected the autothrottles; and then noticed that the airspeed indicator was flashing because the airspeed was too slow.  I pushed the power up and the stick shaker burbled momentarily; and the speed recovered quickly.  What a disappointment to me that I allowed this to happen.  One thing that I pride myself for is my respect for airspeed; and I have always paid particular attention to the airspeed on approach and landing.   What I did wrong is that I may not have mentioned to the other pilots that I had disconnected the auto-throttles.   What I also did wrong is that I left my normal pattern of flying an approach: I never disconnect the autothrottles before I disconnect the auto-pilot; but I did this time. By leaving an established habit pattern caused me to forget what I had done. I will remember this.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

During approach; the pilot flying disconnected the autothrottles to expedite speed reduction; and aircraft slowed undetected to below reference speed.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 1015; Flight Crew Type 600

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Misunderstanding of communications found the airplane at an altitude not expected by the controller. I had planned an IFR flight to ZZZ; but wanted to perform a high altitude pressurization test at FL270 in the area before heading for ZZZ. I filed a routine IFR flight plan and while picking up the clearance discussed the 'special request' with the clearance delivery controller. My understanding from the conversation was that he would coordinate with the approach and center controllers. I was released and vectored to the north at my initial altitude of 3000 feet. I was then given at or below 3500 feet due to conflicting traffic given a vector (after a brief interaction about on-course heading.) At this point I was handed off to center. When I checked in with center; I stated that I was at 3500 feet and 'heading for 270'. The controller cleared me to 270.(This is where the divergence of expectation probably arose.) I continued flying north and initiated my climb towards FL270 and heard nothing from the controller again until I reached about FL220 when an aircraft was overtaking me in the vicinity and he asked me what I was doing at that altitude. I was instructed to immediately descend below 18;000 feet at 17;999 feet to maintain VFR; I questioned this and suggested that I would be better at 17;000 feet and upon further clarification I was requested to fly at 17;500 feet.The controller made a number of comments to other aircraft that he had a VFR aircraft in IFR airspace. I descended as instructed; I was given a phone number to call to discuss with a supervisor when I landed; and after some back and forth was given routing and instructions for the flight to destination which continued uneventfully.I believe that the confusion must have occurred because I understood that I was on an IFR flight and was anticipating the climb to FL270 and the controller was not. I believed that the controller had heard about my intentions from the ground controller following the discussion I had with him. I was surprised by the direct climb to FL270 because normally there would be some intermediate stops; but assumed that because this was a check flight; the current controller was going to handle the flight directly. Hearing nothing more from the controller I assumed I was still following the last clearance. In retrospect; what the controller might have cleared me for was a turn to a heading of 270 and not an altitude of FL270. He was expecting a turn and I was expecting a climb; but this is only a guess since I didn't hear anything for about 6 minutes. Moving forward I will be sure to clarify all expectations with the every controller along the flight when performing 'non-standard' flights such as this. I will also be clearer on the flight intentions with the controllers before starting the flight.

PA46 pilot reported filing an IFR flight plan with a plan to climb to FL270 enroute for a pressurization check. At some point the IFR part of the flight plan was deleted and a heading of 270 was interpreted as a climb to FL270. The misunderstanding was not detected by ATC until the reporter was climbing through FL220.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150.85; Flight Crew Total 11020.28; Flight Crew Type 8807.82

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

After checking in with Denver Approach;  we were given a descend from 13;000 to 11;000 feet.  As we began the descent;  we received a GPS Primary Lost message on the navigation display and the GPS accuracy went from HIGH to LOW.  We also received the alert message NAV ADS-B RPTG 1 (and 2) FAULT.  Turning onto the final approach course;  the GPS accuracy returned to HIGH; but the ADS-B Fault periodically returned.  We landed the aircraft without any other issues.  Denver stated that it may have something to do with the 5G network.

On descent via the TBARR3 arrival into Denver we experienced dual GPS failure and dual NAV ADS-B RPTG 1 and 2 FAULTS.We checked in with Denver approach and we were given a heading 070 degrees and clearance to descend from 13;000 to 11;000 ft.  Approach advised that several aircraft were reporting 5G navigation interference on arrival into DEN.  We then experienced DUAL GPS failure and dual NAV ADS-B RPTG FAULTS in systems 1 and 2.  It was an intermittent failure about every 30 seconds for about 2 minutes until it finally failed.  We were approximately 30 miles southwest of DEN at this time. We subsequently heard several other aircraft report the same anomalies.The aircraft was on autopilot and continued to descend and level at 11;000 feet normally. The weather was 3;000 broken; 500 scattered and 1 3/4 miles visibility. We planned to fly the CAT I ILS 35L.  I discussed the issue with the First Officer and decided to continue with our plan to fly the ILS approach.  We received vectors to final and flew an uneventful approach and landing.I'm reporting this because I'm not sure if it was related to the 5G bulletins we have received over the last week.There were no NOTAMs that indicated that 5G would be an issue.

Air carrier flight crew reported loss of GPS signal while in descent to Denver airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 4500

Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Returning from aerial mapping mission to base; ATC instructed us to proceed direct to our destination (FXE) from our current location which was just south of PBI at an assigned altitude of 2000 ft MSL. After entering Boca airport's Class D; ATC advised us that 'radar service is terminated; squawk VFR; frequency change.' After switching and realizing we were still on the edge of Class D without establishing communications with tower; we turned southwest to clear the airspace expeditiously. We then contacted the tower at our destination airport prior to entering their airspace. Having just flown through PBI's Class D per approach instructions; we assumed they were coordinating with the other towers along our route. It was unclear why ATC terminated our service after their instructions sent us into controlled airspace.

C206 pilot questioned why PBI TRACON terminated radar services as they were still in BCT Delta airspace.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was working Final radar when the PA46 checked in on course to PGD. The pilot requested the RNAV Runway 33 Approach at PGD. I coordinated with the Tower and they approved the approach. I gave the aircraft a 160 heading in order to comply with his request. The pilot followed my instructions and flew the 160 heading. The pilot then asked for lower; and I descended him to 2;500 from his original 3;000. A couple miles later he asked me for lower again. I advised that I was unable to descend him any lower because of the antennas [in the vicinity] and that was the [initial] altitude of the approach he was requesting. When the pilot got abeam the final approach fix; I cleared him to '...turn right direct PETSE; four miles from PETSE; cross PETSE at 2;500; cleared RNAV Runway 33 Approach'. The pilot read back; 'Turn direct PETSE; cleared approach'. I didn't see anything wrong with that because the altitude is published on the approach plate. After a couple of sweeps on the radar scope; the pilot descended from 2;500 to 1;500 MSL less than half a mile from the antennas at SERFS. When I noticed it; I told the pilot that he was supposed to cross PETSE at 2;500 and that was why I could not descend him any lower. His response was; 'OH'. I notified my CICR regarding this issue and he called PGD Tower to notify the pilot to call our facility; which he didn't do.

Despite repeated attempts by the TRACON Controller to make him aware; the pilot of a PA46 failed to comply with the altitude constraints associated with the RNAV (GPS) Runway 33 approach to PGD. The pilot also failed to contact the facility to review the incident as requested.


Beechcraft / Beech Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Captain was hand-flying visual to runway 24; right-hand traffic; using 'Snowflake' guidance from the FMS because there was not any other electronic guidance available. There were several GA aircraft in the pattern. We were told that we would be number two following a Citation. We had visual contact and separation from the Citation and we were cleared to land on runway 24. There were at least GA aircraft making left-traffic and a Caravan behind us. A Beechcraft; was making left-hand traffic and told to extend his downwind to follow the RJ. Apparently; he told the controller that he thought the Citation was the RJ. He quickly turned base and final. This put him on a collision course with us. On TCAS; we observed the Beechcraft on downwind and expected him to comply with ATC's instructions. We were in the final stages of the visual approach below 1000 ft AGL when we received a TCAS warning; promptly followed with a 'Don't Descend' RA. When we received the warning; I stretched to look over the nose for traffic and saw the [Beechcraft] just below our nose and intercepting the final approach course. I noted his position and the Captain called for a go-around. The go-around call was coincident with the 'Don't Descend' RA. We executed a successful go-around and returned for a safe landing. After landing; the tower began to ask us questions about the incident. He said that he was also going to file a report.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ flight crew reported a General Aviation aircraft turned early; resulting in a TCAS RA and subsequent go-around.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 10300; Flight Crew Type 1400

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Approach called out traffic for us to follow; however at no time did we receive a caution for wake turbulence. I thought I saw the aircraft to follow and it looked like a heavy aircraft. As we turned to final we encountered wake turbulence which was very abrupt and rolled the aircraft about 15-20 degrees and gave us a good shudder. We were assigned a speed and I told the pilot not flying to tell Approach that we were slowing because of a wake turbulence encounter. Approach acknowledged and we also asked the type of the aircraft and we were told that it was an A320. A short time later we were told to increase our airspeed to 170 KTS until the FAF. I told the pilot not flying to tell ATC I wouldn't increase speed because of the wake from the previous aircraft. We were told to discontinue the approach and given a turn off the final and climb instructions.

A Citation Excel encountered wake vortices from an A320 on approach into CYYZ.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2040; Flight Crew Type 1500

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

My plane developed navigation system problems while enroute IFR to SNA. ATC provided vectors. Upon intercepting the localizer the glide slope receiver failed converting the approach to localizer only. Along the approach Nav #1 (glide slope) then failed completely. Fortunately I was able to continue with Nav #2; DME and visual cues. During the last moments of the approach Tower advised I check altitude as they showed me at 500 FT. Inside DYERS with DME the minimum is 440 FT. I think I was okay however while somewhat distracted by equipment failure and concerned about the health of my remaining navigation receiver I might have lost some altitude while maintaining visibility and may have broken minimums.

The pilot of a Piper PA28 experienced navigation radio problems while on an IFR flight plan. ATC provided assistance and altitude monitoring during his approach and landing.


Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

I was working a flight to LAS. I was the flying pilot. The flight was dispatched without an alternate as one was not required. TAFs predicted wind gusts in the low 30 knot range. We were given 1100 hold fuel.The flight was proceeding without issue and the latest METAR reported gusts to 35 knots. The winds were nearly aligned with runway 25L. We were expecting this runway for landing. Once we began out descent on the KEPEC STAR we began to experience continuous moderate turbulence with occasional bursts of MOD-SEV. Unpleasant; but not unusual for mountainous airports. We were also experiencing significant shifts in wind; especially as we descended below the Front Range around the red rock area. On downwind; we received a current wind report of approximately 48 knot gusts; nearly aligned with the runway. At this point we decided it was safe to continue the approach as the wind did not exceed aircraft limitations. On approach to 25L configuring the aircraft was challenging; though not impossible. We were able to achieve a stabilized approach by 1000 feet.On descent below 1000 feet; wind shifts became increasingly significant. At one time; I was utilizing a near 30 degree crab for cross-wind to the left only to have it soon dissipate and come from the right. Airspeed became increasingly more challenging to maintain; even with significant over-ride inputs to the auto-throttles. At around 200 feet airspeed; glide path; and descent rate became impossible to maintain; the approach became unstable; and I initiated a go-around. On our climb out; I overheard several other aircraft initiating go-arounds for wind shear from various runways. We even overheard a 737 who was beginning their third attempt- a dangerous; unsafe situation to place yourself in. In my opinion; LAS had become unsuitable.At this point a decision had to be made. We were not dispatched with an alternate; but did have some extra fuel. The closest suitable airport was ZZZ. We ran the numbers in the FMS and calculated 2800 LBS on touchdown. Subtract an additional 500 LBS for approach and potential en-route deviations and you end up with 2300 LBS. Below reserve fuel; but certainly not unsafe. The First Officer (FO) and I discussed the options and determined a diversion to ZZZ would be the safest course of action. This decision was solidified given other aircraft had made several landing attempts without success and my confidence another landing attempt would also result in failure. Given our fuel situation; one more attempt would eliminate our chances of diverting. The FO notified ATC of our intentions and I informed the flight attendants; passengers; and dispatch of our situation and we continued to ZZZ. We experienced continuous moderate turbulence for the entire flight with bursts of MOD-SEV; especially as we descended through the mountain pass near the ZZZ1 area. On our descent; we were told to maintain 210 knots. A significant wind shift again occurred and I was forced to override the auto throttles to prevent a low-speed situation. In doing this; I accidentally advanced the throttles into the MAX detent. I immediately returned them. This was not intentional and was an error in my part. We began to receive some vectors in the terminal area. Given our fuel supply; we advised ATC of a min fuel situation per Flight Operations Manual requirements. This was prudent as we did not want to be given further delays. ATC agreed.We landed in ZZZ without issue and with approximately 2300 LBS remaining. We taxied to the gate and deplaned to wait for Maintenance to clear the MAX thrust application. We then boarded and continued to LAS with revenue PAX onboard in the evening after the high winds subsided. We incurred a delay; but completed both flights. Ultimately; I am glad we made the decision we did. Several aircraft in the LAS area followed suit. Given the circumstances; it was certainly the safest course of action.

Air Carrier Captain reported that extreme winds at LAS created unsafe landing conditions. The flight diverted to a nearby airport with more safe conditions and landed normally.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1856; Flight Crew Type 20

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was given the SID and cleared to FL150. During the initial climb; I had a Trim Runaway and I tried resetting the autopilot but it happened again. In terms of my GPS issues it was not responding to my inputs. So by me dealing with that and I got behind the aircraft and violated my altitude and heading. On the climb on the departure I believe I had asked ATC for Direct to Destination but I was given a heading instead. On the trim runaway it pitches the nose of the aircraft down; so I had to disconnect the autopilot etc. And long with trying to handle the trim runaway and disconnecting the autopilot and I made the deviations. Also; while being vectored to ZZZ; Center notified me that the weather had dropped there and there were airplanes holding so at that point I decided to go to ZZZ1. However; I was being vectored around a bit; so at that point I decided to land at ZZZ2 as it was right of me about 10 miles. So as to obtain fuel; as I had to take off with minimum fuel as possible in order to meet the climb gradients. My apologies. I should have notified ATC of my Trim issue and GPS issues sooner. This was my first time flying into ZZZ3. In terms of learning from this incident - I should have had another Pilot with me instead of Single Pilot operation into a challenging airport such as ZZZ3.

PC12 pilot reported diverting due to a trim runaway and weather falling below minimums at destination airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 70; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I'm a student pilot who had a solo flight planned from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I preflighted and proceeded with my run up; I got the ATIS information; contacted Ground and was cleared to taxi to my hold short point of the runway. I noticed my transponder was displaying a transmitter failure message and it asked me to restart it which I did. I also sent a picture of it to my Flight Instructor. After I restarted it; it displayed the VFR code of 1200. My Instructor told me if it happens again I should let him know. I taxied to the hold short line of XX and Runway XX as instructed by Ground. I switched to Tower and relayed my intentions; but I got no response; oddly enough I could hear them talk to other pilots on the frequency. I also noticed that my transponder relayed the transmitter failure message again. I restarted it; and it held for a while but then kept on showing the same message. I then unplugged my headphones; plugged it back on and kept switching from Ground to Tower frequencies but to no avail. I contacted my Instructor and told him what was happening; he contacted Tower and they gave me the light gun signal to taxi onto the runway and exit through the taxiway. I couldn't squawk the radio failure frequency because the transponder kept failing. I taxied back to the hangar and had a couple of instructors waiting for me. While I taxied back to the hangar; the avionics completely shutoff. I was able to taxi back successfully and was taken care of by two of my instructors.

C-150 Student pilot reported electrical failure during taxi for takeoff.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

One of our flights out of ZZZZ had to be re-crewed but FAR(s) were broken because the flights were not properly staffed to augmentation. Since ZZZZ is not a hub; the plan of action was to strip other flights departing from ZZZZ to ensure all flights left on time but with minimum staffing. This plan was given approval from the manager on duty. As the pairings were updated the published aircraft staffing guidelines were followed; unfortunately; the guide did not include augmented staffing requirements. FAR(s) were broken but unfortunately at the time the pairings were being updated the system did not alert us that augmented staffing was required.In fact; for [the re-crewed] flight; the system alerted the flight as being overstaffed. Although alerts were shown that there were open positions after checking the staffing guidelines; it appeared as if the alert was false; which happens often with the program. I [have] an example of an alert for [another] flight alerting an open position but it is fully staffed. Alerts are also typically reviewed by shift supervisors and managers. A copy of the staffing guidelines used that night and pairings for the flights that were modified show that there was no alerts saying that augmented staffing was required.

Dispatcher reported flights a procedure to augment the staffing was put in place but did not go into action and resulted in FAR violations.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Visual approach; backed up by RNAV/GPS; 24 into ZZZ. Night time VFR. Cleared for the visual approximately 20 miles away from the field. PF (Pilot Flying) proceeded direct to ZZZZZ; FAF (Final Approach Fix) for the RNAV 24. No FPA (Flight Path Angle) or PAPI (Precision Approach Path Indicator) present. Shortly after ZZZZZ PF arrested descent; to slow and configure the aircraft. When speed and configuration were appropriate; at approximately 2000 ft AGL a greater than normal descent rate was initiated in order to intercept the visual descent path for the runway. Shortly thereafter; an amber GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) ground proximity message appeared; followed by GPWS pull up message. Due to the familiarity with the approach; and visual confirmation of terrain; PF elected to arrest descent; until warning canceled. A normal approach to landing was completed thereafter.

Air Carrier Captain reported initiating a greater than normal descent rate in order to intercept the visual descent path and activating the GPWS warning.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On climbout from IAD; Potomac Departure gave us a climb to 11;000. Then we switched controllers and checked in; and the new controller gave us 'climb and maintain 14;000.' A minute later; we heard the same controller tell another pilot 'traffic at 2:00 climbing to 13;000.' We were seeing an airplane at 10:00 on the TCAS descending toward us. Then the controller told us about traffic at 10:00; 15;000; descending to 13;000. We were trying to get clarification as we climbed out; but there was a lot of confusion between [the other aircraft; the controller]; and us. I was the pilot flying; and I reduced my climb rate to about 200 feet per minute as I went through 12;400. At 13;000; I started to level off; because I could see that we had a conflict. Shortly thereafter; I heard another voice say; 'Aircraft Y; level off; LEVEL OFF.' The aircraft was at 14600 and we had remained at 13000; even though we had been cleared to 14;000. Those pilots were asking for clarification and so did we. Then the second voice told us both that there was training going on; [the controller] had it settled; and handed us off to Center. If I had not leveled off early; we would have been at 14;000 when they got called to level off at 14;600. They were directly above us on a crossing path. That pilot asked about how it happened; because they had been cleared to 'descend via' and they were on the path. Make sure ATC has good training; and good supervisors. This was way too close. If I hadn't seen what was happening; we very likely could have had a midair collision.

Air carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict during climbout from IAD airport due to ATC training error.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X [flight] got handed off from ZLC they passed along that they were low fuel. Aircraft X was a flight of 6. With the weather being poor and the visibility being 4 miles an instrument approach is what they were requesting. That being said; their TACAN and ILS were both out of service. The only way they were getting in was a visual to [Runway] XXR. So I vectored the flight behind the [civilian] aircraft coming from the south. Giving them block altitudes above the MVA so they had proper spacing amongst themselves. As I was stepping Aircraft X down they kept wanting lower and lower in order to get the visual approach. I stepped them down to 5000 and they descended to 4800; I gave them an LOA (low altitude alert). Then after fixing that issue I gave them 4500 once they were in the 4500 MVA. Turned them to final and I noticed that they dropped below 4500. So I gave them another LOA and told them to maintain 4500. I asked them numerous times if they had the airport in sight. They said no so I climbed them to 8000 and told them to fly heading 100. Aircraft X flight 2-5 reported the field in sight and at that point I cleared them for the visual. Aircraft X 6 didn't get the airport so I turned him away from the mountains and climbed them. After that I gave him a new squawk code and split Aircraft X 1 and Aircraft X 6 up. After clearing Aircraft X 6 to ZZZ and verifying his altitude I sequenced the two flights to get the visual behind another arrival. When we have airplanes that are low fuel and have no approaches we need to get those approaches fixed. Tech ops or who ever was fixing them need to understand the situation on hand.

TRACON Controller reported having to break up a flight of 6 fighters to get them to land.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The First Officer was flying and I was pilot not flying. As we were passing 10;500 in the climb we heard a loud bang and saw that the Captain's side windshield had completely shattered. We informed ATC and stopped our climb and slowed down. The First Officer continued to fly the aircraft as I ran the associated QRH. Given that the damage to the windshield was extensive and as we were not sure if it might get worse we decided to air return to our departure airport as the safest option. I declared an emergency and informed ATC of our intentions then briefed the Flight Attendant made a PA to the passengers and informed Dispatch via ACARS. We then set up for the approach and ran the in-range and landing checklists. We also reviewed the overweight landing technique. Since it was the Captain's side windshield that shattered I chose to have the First Officer land the aircraft since he had clear visibility out his windshield and I did not. First Officer McBee made an outstanding landing on centerline; in the touchdown zone at 100 FPM decent on the VSI at touchdown. We taxied to the gate where we deplaned the passengers; worked with Operations to get their bags off and then repositioned the aircraft to allow inbound flights to use the gate. I then contacted Dispatch; Maintenance; and the Chief Pilot's office. After the flight we did a thorough inspection for any sign of bird-strike and found none. I later spoke to the Flight Attendant who said they had heard the windshield shatter in the cabin but the passengers had remained calm throughout.

When the Captain's side window shattered at about 10;500 MSL on the climbout the flight crew of an E-145 opted to return to their departure airport for maintenance.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During approach to Teterboro on the ILS Runway 6 at approximately 2000 feet MSL in VMC just inside VINGS intersection; a large red drone crossed underneath the aircraft from left to right approximately 500-800 feet below. The flight crew barely noticed anything other than a brief flash of color in an area where there should not have been any aircraft and there was no TCAS traffic indicated. Shortly after landing; the flight attendant reported seeing a large red drone pass underneath the left wing; close enough to be able to see the rotors spinning on the drone. The flight attendant was located at Seat 5; mid-cabin on the left side of the aircraft and had a fairly good view of the area to the left and below the aircraft. Without knowing the size of the drone; it would be difficult to estimate the lateral and vertical separation from the target but it is fairly clear the drone was well above the 600 feet AGL limit. Teterboro ground was advised of the encounter during taxi which prompted a follow-up call to the flight crew from New York Approach Control Operations who took a report. Company was notified and an Operational Incident Report was filed. As pilots; we have become quite accustomed to looking for conflicting FULL SIZED aircraft traffic and relying on TCAS to provide an additional layer of awareness and safety. In a large metro area; at relatively low altitude; close in to an airport; it is just not part of the normal traffic scan to be looking BELOW the aircraft unless helicopter traffic has been called or TCAS indicates a potential threat. The new reality is that low altitude drone aircraft are increasingly invading arrival and departure corridors around airports due to proliferation of the devices; lack of awareness or training of the operators; and lax oversight by the FAA that has ALLOWED the proliferation of these threats to aviation safety. Their small size; haphazard flight paths; and unregulated operations make them an extremely difficult threat to identify and mitigate while in flight. Greater vigilance is required by all participants in this issue.

Corporate jet Captain reported a near miss with a UAV on approach to TEB Runway 6 at 2000 ft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was flying the aircraft at .79 Mach in managed cruise mode at FL390. We were cleared to FL240 twenty miles before the TOD as depicted on the Nav display. I set 24000 on the altitude selector window and the Captain verified it. I then check the PERF on FMS and made sure I had .78/300 programmed properly. Once I verified it; I then pushed the altitude push button to start the descent to FL240. I told the Captain I was starting down and verified the FMA changed to DES mode. Once I verified that; I looked outside to see how far below us an existing cloud layer was and the Captain and I decided to switch on the Engine Anti-ice. After selecting the Anti-ice on I then came back to my instruments to make sure my descent path looked good. This is when I noticed the aircraft went into a climb at approximately 3000 FPM and was passing 39600. I verified it using the Captains VVI (Vertical Velocity Indicator) and immediately disconnected the autopilot and slowly and gently pushed the nose over and started the aircraft back down towards the cleared altitude of FL240. The altimeter read about 40;100 before I could get the descent started. So we exceeded the ceiling of the aircraft. We were then given a descent to 11;000. We checked that all data was correct and re-engaged all automation and all was fine for the remainder of the flight.When this occurred; I was only off the gauges for about 10-15 seconds. We both checked all the FMS entries and both the FMA and the perf page said the data was correct and showed were in fact in the descend mode of operation; yet the aircraft entered a climb! I strongly believe there is a software abnormally which needs to be researched. Can I get feedback as to whether this has happened before on our aircraft? If there is a history of this; I believe there should be a message released and Airbus should research this problem.The only action that could have stop this was to stare at the instruments and make sure that the VVI went down and stayed in the down direction. Otherwise this is a very strange event that occurred at a very bad place inflight.

The climb rate approached 3000 FPM and the maximum altitude reached was FL401. There were no pilot entered errors on FCU or in the FMCG (Flight Management Control Guidance) and I could not find any discrepancies that would have caused the aircraft to climb rather than descend.

A319 flight crew reported the aircraft climbed for unknown reasons to FL401 after an autoflight descent was programmed and initiated from FL390.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 51; Flight Crew Total 811; Flight Crew Type 291

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted

A VFR flight plan was active and flight following had been established. I was in conversation with my passenger about the local area and providing an estimated time to our destination; 1.5hrs. My passenger suddenly slumped to the side and became unresponsive. I [advised] Approach and followed their guidance to [the nearest airport]. After shutdown medical personal assisted in transferring my passenger out of the aircraft and began CPR.

Navion pilot reported diverting to the nearest airport after his passenger became unresponsive.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Number 1 Flight Attendant reported an odor in the forward galley; I went back to investigate and inhaled the odor while attempting to identify its origin. After about 20-30 minutes being exposed to the odor; I became light headed; nauseous and developed a sore throat. I assessed my fitness for duty and determined I was not fit to continue.Once the odor was verified by the other crew members; Maintenance was called address the issue but they were not able to smell the same odor all 5 crew members had identified. Due to the disagreement; we remained on board inhaling the fumes/odor which caused my crew and I further discomfort.As soon as the fumes were confirmed; I should have walked off the airplane.

Air Carrier First Officer reported a fumes event during pre-flight at departure gate resulting in health issues.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During descent prep; MEM ATIS was calling for landings on rwy 36L; 36R and 27.  We set the FMS up for ILS 27.  We were flying the BLUZZ ONE RNAV ARRIVAL.  We were instructed to abide by the altitude restrictions on the arrival.  We descended to 10000 feet prior to BLUZZ for altitude restriction at COPEN as depicted for landing rwy 27.  When handed off to MEM APPROACH we were told to expect rwy 36R; which changes the arrival altitude restrictions to 14000 feet at LTOWN.  We queried ATC about the altitude and they told us not to worry about it.  We were on course at all times.  The crew should of asked MEM Center what runway to expect.

Wrong arrival transition flown; resulting in descent to an incorrect altitude. Four thousand foot altitude deviation.Arrivals with descent 'windows' and multiple runway transitions may reduce ATC workload but can significantly increase flight crew workloads. As such; when landing multiple runways that trigger significantly different transitions off the same arrival; ATC should be required to state the appropriate RUNWAY transition; not just landing direction; e.g. 'descend via the BLUZZ1 arrival; Runway 36R transition'.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported deviating from charted altitude on arrival to MEM; citing confusion regarding runway assignment.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Routine Inspection; Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

As I was conducting an exterior pre-flight; Crew Chief handed me Dangerous Goods Form paperwork. [Flight crew] had received an ACARS message to expect DG to be loaded on aircraft. Later we received a message that no DG was loaded onto aircraft. Confused called for crew chief to come to the flight deck for clarification. Crew Chief confirmed no DG loaded on the aircraft. Confusion on paperwork [cause the DG uncertainty]. I would recommend that the actual hard copy of the paperwork not be given to the flight crew until the Crew Chief confirms that the DG is actually going to be loaded onto the aircraft. If for some reason the DG is removed from the aircraft then it should require that the Crew Chief come to the flight deck in person to verify to the flight deck crew that in fact there is no DG on the aircraft. I did place a call to our Dispatcher to coordinate a call with the Load Control to try to get a confirmation as to whether we did or did not have DG on the aircraft. After about a 3 minute hold they came back on-line and said they were unsure after speaking with Load Control. You could hear frustration in the Dispatcher's voice as they shared this happens more times than you would think. Given that we are dealing with DG and Load Control and Dispatch are far removed physically from the event I believe the Crew Chief is the best resource for the actual verification of DG onboard an aircraft.

Air Carrier First Officer reported a communication breakdown between flight crew and ground personnel regarding the uncertainty of whether or not DG cargo was loaded on the aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

When we; the crew; entered the aircraft; there was a whiteish haze in aircraft. It smelled kind of sweet and wired. First Officer said smelled like Freon. We got off [the] plane advised CSA not to board.  All of us flight attendants ended up with a headache between our eyebrows. [It] diminished through the flight and by the time we got to ZZZ; mine was mostly gone.

B737-900 Flight Attendant reported haze and odor during aircraft preflight. Flight Attendant crew reported experiencing physiological issues.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Third day of OE; first time on reserve. Planning a flight to ZZZ; an unfamiliar airport on an unfamiliar route. Multitasking trying to get all the preflight tasks done; while loading the plane; rushing to go as we were already late. We had two boxes of dry ice for which Hazmat paperwork needed to be completed. Failed to email a copy of Hazmat paperwork to Dispatch prior to takeoff.Recalled not sending an email during the afternoon following the flight.Caused by being new to the route; inexperienced dealing with Hazmat procedures; being rushed to leave.Realized my error and decided to submit a report.I will slow down; not let myself to be rushed by external factors. I will send out the email as soon as the Hazmat paperwork is completed.

Air Taxi First Officer reported flight crew inadvertently departed without complete required Hazmat documents.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Upon gate arrival; flight deck door swung open and Captain said get everyone off this is a fume event. We deplaned as normal and flight attendants 1 and 3 began to experience symptoms immediately.

FAs 1 and 3 were finishing gate arrival procedures when Captain swung open flight deck door and asked 'do you smell that'? I replied 'smell what?' Just as I said that the pungent odor hit us (Number 1 and 3 FAs) and then lingered at galley and entry door area. We opened [the] door as soon as an agent arrived to deplane the passengers.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported that at gate arrival the Captain ordered immediate passenger deplaning due to a fume event. Flight Attendant crew reported experiencing physiological issues.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were holding short of Runway XXL at ZZZ; ready for takeoff; when Tower said; 'I have a 'slight' reroute for you; advise when ready to copy.' We copied the route; loaded it in the FMC; verified the route; took a quick glance at the fuel and took off. Once we leveled off at our final cruising altitude of FL370; it became readily apparent that the reroute took us several hundred miles out of the way and we may [now] be landing below our required minimum fuel due to possible weather deviations. I noted that the weather at ZZZ1 was VFR and contacted Dispatch via crew cell. We agreed the weather was acceptable and removed JFK as the alternate allowing us to land with the required fuel minimums. As it turned out; we did land with the required fuel including JFK as an alternate; albeit not with; in my opinion; an acceptable margin of safety. 6.4 [was] required [and we] landed with [approximately] 6.6.Expectation bias played a huge role here along with being ready to take the active when we were given this 'slight' reroute. A 'slight' reroute suggests an additional fix; maybe two - not the extensive reroute we were given. [This reroute was a] significant change.To mitigate this happening again; I need to remind myself that ZZZ during July and August is a huge thunderstorm magnet and reroutes are common. And as a Captain; I set the pace and am completely responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. I should have taken the time to taxi to a place where; after loading and verifying the route; I could call Dispatch; verify the route in detail; and possibly return to the gate for additional contingency fuel.

A321 Captain reported accepting a reroute just before takeoff that resulted in a marginal fuel situation at destination.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

After experiencing a rapid decompression; we began our [rapid] descent prior to advising ATC of the need to descend. At some point after the [rapid] descent began; ATC queried us on our altitude. At that point I advised ATC that we were in an 'emergency descent'. After further clarification; ATC cleared us to descend and maintain 11;000. Shortly thereafter; we diverted to [a nearby airport].

The pilot of a PA-46 reported a cabin decompression; followed by a rapid descent that was not coordinated with ATC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201.03; Flight Crew Type 9839.83

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175.57; Flight Crew Type 3858.92

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Taking off out of EWR on [Runway] 4L; given a level off at 4;000 feet. Encountered wake turbulence at 3;500 feet; went through our altitude of 4;000 feet to 4;600 feet before recovering back down to 4;000 feet. Notified ATC [of the] altitude deviation.

B737NG flight crew reported overshooting their cleared altitude departing EWR after encountering wake turbulence.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

During preflight it was not noticed that the FMS had the wrong aircraft database load on it. The date was correct but the database load was wrong. Entered in the FMS was a load for a [different model aircraft]. And not the load for a 767. Later; in the day after a turn. I had the same airplane and this was brought up to my attention. The wrong database was loaded on a previous flight and was not solved before our flight. And; on our flight it was not noticed as well. Just adherence to the [flight manual] and; a not hurried approach to the cockpit set up.

Was made aware by the following crew that Aircraft X had a [wrong] database installed.MX installed an incorrect database and I failed to catch it on my preflight. Aircraft had flown in from ZZZ so was not caught by prior crew either. No mention of Database installation in 20 day MX history so I believe the AC has flown a number of flights with the incorrect [database].MX adherence to procedures and a more accurate preflight on my part.

B767 flight crew reported incorrect database installed in the aircraft.


Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

On Date we had a bag come down to the bag room with out a tag; When the tag came down it had hand written fire arms on it. I received the bag about ten minutes [prior] to departure. I tried to call Management to figure out if its safe to load. We did not have one on duty. This put me in a position of guessing if it was safe to load.

Air Carrier baggage ground personnel reported a personal bag arrived with a hand written 'fire arms' note and without required firearms forms attached.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On approach into ZZZ at approximately 7000 feet my (First Officer's) windshield made an exploding sound and the entire windshield cracked. I could not see through the windshield; however I was the non flying pilot and the Captain continued the approach and normal landing.

A-319 First Officer reported right cockpit windshield cracked during initial approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared into the Alleyway to proceed to the gate from ramp control. As one taxis in; that gate is on your right. Unknown to us; at a gate (on our left); a B747 had taxied in sometime before us. However; they did not taxi the entire way into the gate. They had stopped short of the gate; and were in the process of being towed in by a tug the rest of the way. We were cleared into our gate by ramp control. As we were clearing the area to our right; I saw a blue flash in my peripheral vision to the left -- and saw the right winglet of the 747 dangerously close to our left side. I told the Captain to 'STOP' which he did abruptly. A wing-walker/marshaller was also giving the stop sign. It seemed like the B747 tug team pushed their aircraft backwards during their tow-in. If we had continued straight ahead; our left wing would have gone under the B747 wing by several feet.  When we queried ramp; the controller only said; Yeah; they usually take forever to tow-in that B747. We were cleared in by this same ramp controller -- never apprised of the tow-in in progress.

A319 First Officer reports a near collision with a B747 during taxi into an alley gate. The B747 was under tow into a gate on the opposite side of the alley and may have been pushed back slightly. Ramp Control did not mention that the B747 was under tow.


General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

I was the Captain and pilot flying. Very shortly after liftoff on an RNAV departure; my Navigational Display went blank and various other indications on my PFD and the Upper DU (Display Unit) intermittently blanked and reappeared. Whenever my flight instruments blanked; the entire Fuel Quantity display 'box' on the Upper DU also blanked; and we got an amber Display Source in the lower left corner of my PFD. This cycling occurred fairly frequently during the first 14;000 feet of climb and much less frequently during the latter portions of the climbout. Sometimes the instruments were blank for a longer period of time; and other times they cycled repeatedly for very short periods of time. We were also in light to moderate turbulence during the majority of the departure and climbout to FL300; for what that's worth. My Flight Director briefly drove out of view once and returned maybe 10 seconds later; and the autopilot clicked off once. The First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) completed the QRH non-normal checklist for Display Source. As I recall; the instruments did not blank at all during our short time in cruise; but in the descent; they started cycling and blanking again. The closer we got to the ground; the more often they tended to blank. We had frequent blanking and cycling on downwind and on the approach.I wrote it up on the ground. It was [previously] written up with a sign off of 'Removed and Replaced #1 DEU;' and it was written up [a few days later] with a sign off of 'Reset DEU-1 Software.' In response to our writeup; maintenance ran several tests; but all tests were normal. [Maintenance] also reseated something down below; but could find no obvious cause for our problem. Due to no known cause for a known recurring problem with our non-deferrable flight instruments; I refused the aircraft for the next leg.

B737-800 Captain reported refusing to accept an aircraft after experiencing autoflight display anomalies that had occurred at least twice in the recent past.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 139; Flight Crew Total 18200; Flight Crew Type 8778

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I began my day at XA00 local as a short call reserve. At approximately XB00 Crew Scheduling called and assigned a XE00 departure from ZZZ to EIDW. About 4 hours into the flight; or about XI00 body-clock time; I felt extremely fatigued and struggled to remain awake for the next 3 hours of the flight. The First Officer admitted to also feeling very fatigued. On arrival into EIDW I missed several radio calls and was generally not alert. This flight is unaugmented and departs every night from ZZZ at XE00. This flight and the ZZZ - ZZZ1 flight; also unaugmented and departing at XE30; are routinely in open time because no one wants to fly them because of the fatigue factors involved. They are therefore almost always flown by reserves; many of whom are called out; as I was; from short call status. I think this practice of flying late night flights that impinges on the WOCL (Window of Circadian Low); unaugmented; in an international theater is unsafe and should not be allowed for safety reasons.

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing extreme fatigue and missed radio calls during a late night into early morning flight.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A B717 was in front assigned 290+ by previous sector. A Challenger was in trail assigned 290-. I climbed the Challenger to 330 and handed off to Ultra High [Sector]. Ultra High climbed the Challenger and gave aircraft normal speed out of 340. I gave the B717 normal speed and climbed him to 330. At the time the Challenger was above the B717 and climbing. I based my decision on aircraft performance. I thought a B717 normal speed would be 290 or greater and with the Challenger's reduced speed; he would climb faster than the B717. I haven't listened to the tapes yet to see if Challenger checked on 290 or less and I don't know what the B717 'normal' speed was for the day. I was not feeling well that day and decided that I should go vertical with everyone. The Controller at the sector next to me offered his D-Side 3 times and I declined each time. I did not think the B717 would out climb the Challenger and I didn't think the Challenger would catch the B717. I didn't ensure anything. In fact; I took away the insurance that was there. I have no idea why. I am not ever bothered to have help. I have no macho issues. I was aware of my limitations that day and still declined help. I will be totally honest here; I was going to call in sick that day because I had a sore throat and didn't feel sharp. I went to work because it was a holiday; holiday pay. I am so disappointed in myself. I am having issues with medical insurance and as a result I received numerous medical bills that very morning and decided I needed the holiday pay; which I really don't. I am a very safe controller; I couldn't not go to work today; our area has had so many errors recently. I am totally at fault but I still would like to know what the 'normal' indicated was for the B717 yesterday. Also; I want to know if the data block from the Challenger had dropped off my scope. I still feel like I let my area and supervisor down. I am disappointed in my judgment. Use sick leave as appropriate [and] never declined help.

Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event listing a number of contributing human factors.


Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During the enroute climb at approximately FL270 on Aircraft X ZZZ1-ZZZ2 we encountered visible moisture below 10 deg c so I turned on the Cowl Anti ice. Immediately; my PFD red flagged the following; RA; FMS1; flight director and lost my bearing pointer; I took a second to evaluate the situation and quickly realized we were going into RVSM so I notified ATC that we had lost instruments and we needed to descend which we did. We transferred controls on the FCP to the FO (First Officer) side and quickly realized we had lost all pitch modes and the vertical speed wheel. We also noticed the speed knob and heading bug wasn't working. We decided to hand fly and I started communicating with ATC and Dispatch/Maintenance through the ZZZ3 operations. I started to look for possible failures in the QRH that may help explain what we lost and a solution with no success. I decided ZZZ3 was a good diversion airport but still was trying to figure out the problem so we slowed down. After some time looking through the QRH and trouble shooting the FCP I decided it wouldn't be safe to continue to ZZZ2 and into hurricane conditions with the instrument failures we had so I called for the diversion to ZZZ3. We were VMC the whole time so I didn't feel the need to declare an emergency. I notified the FAs (Flight Attendants) about our situation and assured them they were safe and this wasn't an emergency. I made a brief announcement to the passengers that we were diverting for loss of some of our instrumentation. We successfully landed in ZZZ3 called maintenance and did an aircraft swap. I made a passenger announcement both on the plane after landing and at the gate explaining what happened and what they could expect as well as made myself available at the new gate for questions in case anyone needed reassurance. After the plane swap we continued into ZZZ2 without incident.Unknown. Multiple equipment failures. Possible QRH for FCP failures.

Air Carrier Captain reported after turning on engine anti-ice the aircraft lost several functions on the Captain's Primary Flight Display (PFD) and diverted to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 147; Flight Crew Total 15474; Flight Crew Type 11910

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I am requesting the company ban 'single layer neck gators.' I do not want them used aboard my aircraft because the ones that I have seen; that are single layer are so thin you can see through them and I do not believe they are effective at protecting anyone.  I believe they are unsafe for surrounding crew and passengers.I had taken the time to ask questions; of a couple of passengers; regarding the 'neck gators' they were wearing. They were single layer. I did tell them I was not comfortable with the 'neck gators' since they were only single layer and a Gate Agent provided the masks we have; for their flight.

Air carrier Captain reported requesting the company ban single layer neck gators as they do not provide adequate protection.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While level at 6;000 Approach issued a descent to 5;000 FT. 5;000 was entered into the altitude selector and verified by both pilots; vertical speed -1;000 was selected. While discussing the arrival...; ATC asked us to state our altitude and why we were climbing. When we looked at the altitude we were at 6;500 FT. I immediately got the airplane down to the new assigned altitude of 5;000 FT. The main threat for this approach was that they were using the...visual to [Runway] 29; which neither the pilot not flying or pilot flying had done in several months; so while discussing the arrival we got off on altitude. We were also in between scattered layers of clouds and continuous light to moderate chop.It would have been wise to actually ensure that the aircraft was descending to the selected altitude before returning to the arrival briefing. Even though the instrumentation showed 5;000 set and vertical speed -1;000 selected we should have actually ensured that the aircraft was in the descent.

Given a clearance to descend; EMB-145 flight crew entered the descent altitude and set 1;000 FPM descent rate in FMS. As the crew briefed the approach; ATC alerted them to the fact that the aircraft was climbing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 109

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10200; Flight Crew Type 5000

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Line selected Bridge Visual to R 29-v and added points GRITY; DOOIN; LAWNE. Altitude constraints of 2;800 [FT] at GRITY; 1;700 [FT] at DOOIN; and 500 [FT] at CHUMR. As depicted on App Plate. Briefed arrival; approach and miss/reject well before descent. Completed checklists and arrival went smoothly. ATC gave us direct and descend to GRITY at 2;800 [FT] and then slow to 180 KTS. After GRITY cleared to descend to 1;700 [FT] and maintain 180 to DOOIN and cleared the Bridge Visual Runway 29. Crossed DOOIN with autopilot off. After DOOIN we began to slow further to managed speed (REF); gear down and landing flaps configured. Followed vertical guidance from FMC to cross CHUMR at 500 FT. FMC vertical guidance seemed to be taking us lower than necessary so used shallow descent and eventually leveled at 1;000 FT MSL. This was right around LAWNE. NOTE: Airport and runways in sight the entire time. Approximately 20 KT headwind while on northbound course. At about the same position as LAWNE; ATC advised receiving a LOW ALT Alert and to check altitude. We acknowledged and maintained level flight until after turning toward CHUMR. At which point we continued descent to a normal landing. Lateral profile was maintained throughout the procedure but vertical straight from 1;700 [FT] at DOOIN to 500 FT at CHUMR takes aircraft too low over LAWNE.

After LAWNE; Tower directed us to begin a left turn direct to the runway (dogleg final); thereby turning inside the next checkpoint Bayonne Golf Course. We crossed CHUMR at 500 FT and continued for a safe landing. After engine shutdown and parking checklist complete; we reviewed the approach page and realized we were not supposed to begin our descent from 1;700 FT to 500 FT until the Bayonne Golf Course.

A flight crew on the EWR Bridge Visual to Runway 29 descended to 500 FT after LAWNE and ATC advised them about a low altitude alert. After landing the crew realized the descent from 1;700 FT should have begun after Bayonne Golf Course.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

On climbout; just as I went back for my rest break; I was called back to the cockpit. The Captain and First Officer were running the checklist for Engine Oil Pressure. Oil pressure on the left engine indicated zero accompanied with an amber 5.0 vibration. We were directed to and completed the Engine Failure or Shutdown and secured the left engine. The First Officer completed an uneventful single engine landing and came to a stop on the runway. Landing weight was 196;200 lbs. ARFF equipment inspected the aircraft and followed us to the gate.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]

Three cockpit crewmembers and a Flight Attendant describe the events leading up to an in flight shut down due to no oil pressure and high vibration. Flight returns successfully to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

My partner and I picked up an airplane from maintenance that we had written up 2 days prior for an airspeed disagreement during takeoff that resulted in a RTO.  Maintenance had found debris and bugs in the pitot system. During the takeoff roll; we both were looking for any speed abnormality; but all instrument indications were normal; until climbing through approximately 500 FT MSL; when we got an amber boxed ALT indication on both PFD's. This was followed immediately by an amber boxed KIAS indication; with our instruments showing the left side nearly 40 kts higher than the right; and several hundred feet higher in altitude than the right side indication.  We decided right away to return to the field; requested this from ATC; and also assistance in verifying altitude and airspeed read outs from them.  Left side altitude seemed to match ATC's altitudes within a couple hundred feet at each altitude request; but the speed seemed faster than it should have been for the power settings used. At one point early on; as we still climbing to ATC assigned 3000'; our airspeed showed a 40+ kias difference; and altitude difference of nearly 1;000 FT.It was really difficult to establish whose a/s and altitude indications were correct; as we were trying to figure out where to level off; querying ATC on our altitude and airspeed (they gave us ground speed read outs that didn't match the airplane's ground speed readouts on either the pilot or copilot's side at all); and flying into IMC conditions.  In addition; the standby attitude indicator never consistently matched either side's instruments; another confusing element that went against expectations.  Once established in straight and level flight as we were vectored onto a downwind; after a minute or so; both airspeeds and altitudes gradually matched up.  With each subsequent descent; the right side instruments lagged grossly behind in indicating a descending altitude; with indicated speeds diverging as well. My copilot did an outstanding job of running all the necessary checklists. When we got to the part in the QRH where it directed us to select REV to revert to the 'correct' side's instruments; we opted NOT to do this; because we still could not determine that one side or the other was giving us the correct indications.  This judgment call was based on typical power settings not matching up with expected airspeeds; as well as ATC altitude read outs not matching either side's altitude indications with enough accuracy to give us confidence.  We briefed that we'd fly the approach (ILS as a back up to a visual) using known power settings for our weight and the outside temperature; and use the AOA as a reference all the way down; being ready to go missed immediately with any sign of a stall shaker or buffet. We expected the right side airspeed to show slower; as it had been throughout most of the flight; but during this approach; once fully configured and stabilized; the right side KIAS actually indicated about 15 knots FASTER than the left; and appeared to now be the more accurate speed to follow based on the power setting and AOA indication.  VERY con fusing; very mind meddling.  We mostly followed the AOA and landed without incident.I thought we handled this very well in terms of procedures; checklists; pace; communications; and utilizing resources. I will say that this incident defied all kinds of expectations in terms of the instrument errors we were seeing. In training; with a little time and thought; altimetry and airspeed errors can usually be worked out and the faulty side isolated (using REV to select the 'good' side).  This situation wasn't clear cut at all; and as a matter of fact; after landing; we realized that on the previous flight in which we'd written up the airspeed mis-compute; the higher airspeed side was the reverse of what it was for 80% of this flight. I did realize as I was writing the narrative above that we never actually briefed the ILS approach; which weended up flying until about 5 miles out. We'd seen the airport on downwind and were planning a visual; but lost sight of it as we were vectored over the water.  We could have briefed that a little better!

All instruments were normal throughout the takeoff roll. Shortly after rotation; I (as the non flying pilot sitting in the right seat) noticed the amber 'IAS' and 'ALT' warnings on both my PFD and the left side PFD. After comparing airspeed indicators and altimeters I noticed that our airspeeds were approximately 40 KTS different from each other and our Altimeters were approximately 700-1;000 feet different from each other. At that time we told ATC that we wanted to return and started asking them for Airspeed and Altitude readouts from their radar. All of our information from that point on was unreliable. ATC continued to give us airspeed and altitude readouts that were consistently 40 KTS different than all three of our indications and +- 800 feet different from all three of our altimeters. We ran the appropriate checklists and returned.We believe that the information from our instruments was most accurate on the left side during climb out; but after leveling off at approximately 3;000 feet and returning; we believe the right side became more accurate on approach and landing.Two days prior to this event we had this same aircraft. That day; we executed a high speed abort due to the same amber IAS warnings. Maintenance worked the discrepancy and returned it to service documenting that they 'Purged a large amount of bug and vegetation debris from the pilot side pitot system.'

HS-125 flight crew experienced pitot static system malfunctions shortly after takeoff and returned to the departure airport. None of the airspeed indicators appeared to be functioning normally and AOA was used for the approach.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

MEL; Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft

ERJ-175 aircraft had an MEL that required the Ram Air Valve to be secured 'Open' and the Number One Pack to be kept 'Off' and the aircraft had to be operated at less than FL310. The Synoptic Page indicated that the Ram Air Valve was 'Closed'. We called Maintenance and the first Mechanic could not figure anything out and seemed somewhat lost. A second Mechanic arrived at the aircraft and was able to determine that the aircraft did have issues. The previous [flight] crew reported that the temperature was so hot in the cabin that they almost had to declare a medical emergency. They also reported that the flight deck was cold while the aft cabin was extremely hot. The Mechanic looked at the Maintenance Synoptic Page and determined that the Number Two Pack had a bad temperature sensor and it had recorded eight hits in flight that day and over 140 total in the preceding days.Maintenance took an inspection panel off of the belly and tried to confirm the position of the Ram Air Valve. They instead discovered a plastic bag zip tied to the inlet and the valve was in a position that wouldn't allow them to confirm the position of the Ram Air Valve. When Maintenance tried to operate the Number One Pack; it made a lot of noise and a burning electrical smell was noticed inside the aircraft as well as outside by the pack. When an MEL states a maintenance procedure; it should be confirmed that it has been done correctly. The aircraft flew in with multiple issues and the Synoptic Page indicated that the Ram Air Valve was closed when it should have been open. The MEL called for the Number One Pack to be 'Off' while the Number Two Pack to be used; but there were over 140 messages of issues with the Number Two Pack. [We] refused to take the aircraft until the mounting safety issues could be determined.

Reporter stated the EICAS Synoptic Page can be difficult to display on their ERJ-175 aircraft; adding to the frustration when trying to determine what the system problems are. He believes a Temperature Sensor for the Number Two Pack was replaced; but given the number of discrepancies on the aircraft; he doesn't know if other parts were also replaced. After he refused the aircraft for safety reasons; he was given another ERJ-170 aircraft and departed. He has eighteen years flying experience with regional carriers.

A First Officer describes why he refused to accept an ERJ-170 aircraft that included an uncontrollable overheated cabin; a very cold flight deck; an MEL Maintenance Procedure (M) improperly applied to Number 2 Pack with a plastic bag zip tied over the Ram Air Valve inlet and a Number 1 Pack that was noisy with a burning electrical smell inside and outside the cabin.


Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight was scheduled to operate on Aircraft X with MEL 28-X-XX which indicates that both center tank boost pumps are inoperative; thus limiting the usable fuel load to the wing tank capacity of 17.2. I planned the flight for a max fuel of 17.2 with 1.6 in tanker. Approximately 40 minutes before [the] scheduled departure time; the Operations Agent called to say he was unable to run weight and balance numbers due to an error message when attempting to enter the fuel information. He said he was getting an error when trying to put zero in the center tank column; and he couldn't leave it blank either; so he wasn't sure how to proceed. Because I was unfamiliar with the specific issue and the operations software; I transferred him to the Ground Operations Coordinator for assistance.Shortly after; he called back to say they were able to make it work by removing the tanker fuel and using the minimum planned fuel of 15.6; so I sent a new release for a departure fuel of 15.6. About 10 minutes after [the] scheduled departure time; the Operations Agent called again and said the Fueler accidentally fueled the aircraft to the original planned 17.2 instead of the 15.6 indicated on Release 2. I generated another release with a minimum planned fuel of 17.2 and moved the tanker fuel into dispatch add/contingency to prevent the earlier issue with tanker fuel. Operations called back again saying that he could not get the numbers to work again. He confirmed for the second time that the aircraft had 17.2 FOB and no fuel in the center tank. Before sending him to the Ground Operations Coordinator a second time; I suggested he try doing a manual weight and balance; and said I would run numbers on my end as well. I sent the Captain an ACARS message informing him that I was calculating his takeoff numbers manually [and] asked if he'd like me to send them via ACARS. He said yes and that the Operations Agent was working on manual numbers as well. About 10 minutes later; the Captain called and said the Operations Agent was new; and had told the Captain he wasn't comfortable doing a manual weight and balance by himself; so he went to find another Agent/Supervisor to help. The Captain then told me that he had instructed the Fueler to put 500 lb. of fuel in the center tank; even though the MEL specifically states that center tank fuel cannot be used and should not be planned; if not already present; due to no working boost pumps.Upon receiving this information; I told the Captain that I would send his weight and balance numbers; but I needed to speak with the Operations Agent again as soon as he returned because the aforementioned center tank fuel that I was previously told was not there; was indeed the problem and it needed to be moved into the ballast column in order to make the numbers work. A second Operations Agent called not long after and I explained to her that I needed to send another release with the center tank fuel in ballast; and that the wing tanks which I was originally told were full but were actually at 16.66; would need to be topped off in order to depart with fuel in the center tank. That would bring the planned departure fuel to 17.8; with 17.2 of that [being] usable fuel.The flight had still not departed 40 minutes later when the Captain called to say they had just pushed the gate but needed to reduce the minimum fuel for takeoff by 300 lb. I agreed and sent him the amendment over ACARS while on the phone; and he then informed me that he; 'Declined to have the wing tanks topped off because we're already so late and they overfueled us anyway;' then said he had to go and ended the call. Right after; I sent another ACARS message asking the Captain to confirm water service had been completed if they were not airborne by XA57 per tarmac regulations. According to ACARS; the flight was airborne with 16.8 FOB.The main issue here stems from poor communication between the ground crew/fuelers and Operations; the Captain and Operations; and also between the Captain and Dispatch. It appears that neither the Captain nor the fueler informed Operations that fuel was added to the center tank; which explains why the agent kept getting an error when trying to perform the weight and balance. Had the Captain informed the Operations Agent or the Dispatcher of the center tank fuel and the fact that the wing tanks had not been filled; the paperwork could have been adjusted to reflect this and the delay would have been minimal; if at all. Another issue is that center tank fuel should not be added when the wing tanks are not full. The Captain either did not read or did not comprehend the parameters of the MEL; which contributed to the delay.

Dispatcher reported poor communication between the various parties involved caused the aircraft to be fueled incorrectly.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 7

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After listening to the recording; it appears that this aircraft had a faulty Mode C.  His altitude showed he was level at FL320 in the previous sector; then his Mode C showed him at FL375 and someone changed his data block to a hard altitude of FL380.  I never saw any of this.  When I took the handoff; I observed him at FL376; I assumed he was climbing to FL380.  When the aircraft checked on to my frequency; I missed the initial call that he was level at FL320.  I flashed the aircraft to the sector 71 (ALO); the data block autos flashed to 76 (ARL).  However; I technically violated the 75 (COTON) sector since the aircraft was at FL320.  We didn't have any other aircraft in the vicinity; so luckily we didn't have a situation; nevertheless; this is a major concern. Active listening and not assuming you hear what the data block says.

ZAU describes situation where he did not hear the initial call up with altitude and assumed the aircraft was doing what he thought it should be doing; when it wasn't.