Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

I worked as the forward flight attendant on the flight. My colleague was the aft flight attendant. The passengers boarded in a normal manner and we received the 10;000 feet chime. Things were going normal up until this point. About 15 minutes after the 10;000 feet chime; my colleague mentioned to me in the galley area that she was feeling light-headed and tired and I agreed. The night before; we both received little rest because the hotel shuttle arrived 30 minutes late to pick us up from the airport. Then; we had to be up that morning to get on a predawn shuttle to work a flight with a sunrise departure.After my colleague told me she was feeling light-headed; I commented that my ears were popping. We were both feeling light headed and my ears were popping repeatedly. We were still in the galley preparing for service. Then; I noticed that the oxygen masks in the forward flight attendant jumpseat were hanging down. I said 'look;' as I pointed toward the oxygen mask. My colleague said 'OMG; this isn't good.'We both immediately looked out at the cabin and realized all the oxygen masks had dropped down. My colleague immediately locked her beverage cart and ran out to the cabin area to get oxygen and then proceeded to help passengers get their oxygen masks on as well. Some passengers had already started to put their oxygen masks on. I turned my attention to the forward flight attendant oxygen mask and was trying to get oxygen for myself; but the oxygen masks over the forward flight attendant jumpseat were extremely tangled. I realized I would not have time to untangle the masks and get oxygen. The light-headed feeling I had was intensifying at this point. After fumbling with the masks for about a minute; I looked out at the cabin and saw that most of the passengers in the cabin had their oxygen masks on or was in the process of putting it on. I tried calling the flight deck; but could not reach them. I didn't hear anything. I tried calling again and heard a static noise. I hung up the phone.I wasn't sure if the Captain and First Officer were okay at this point. Since I was working as the forward flight attendant and my oxygen masks were inoperative; I joined my colleague; who was sitting in I think seat 9B. My colleague was sitting in that row because she was feeling light headed and didn't think she would remain conscious enough to reach the aft jumpseat (row 20). I later learned that my colleague has a compromised respiratory system so it was a good thing she sat in the closest available passenger seat. I sat next to my colleague and she immediately proceeded to help me put on my oxygen mask. I was still feeling light headed at this point. At this time; all passengers in the cabin are donning oxygen masks and the cabin is hazy; with the smell of something burning. The cabin was still visible; but the atmosphere was hazy. My colleague and I are looking out at the window; trying to figure out how close we are from the ground. After I donned the oxygen mask for about 4 or 5 minutes; I got up and made sure the entire cabin was okay and proceeded to help mothers with crying infants put the masks on their babies/small children.The flight deck calls and I rush to answer the phone and they informed me that the plane lost cabin pressure and asked how the passengers were doing. I informed them we had on our masks and they said okay and hung up in a hurried manner. Since I had some oxygen; I was able to relay the message to the passengers over the PA system and instructed them to still keep on their masks and remain seated with their seatbelts fastened. I then began securing the rest of the galley because by this time; I had received enough oxygen and wasn't feeling as light-headed as I was earlier. My colleague at one point cautioned me to sit down and take more oxygen referring to the term 'point of useful consciousness;' but I think at this point; I was running off pure adrenaline. I stowed away the cart (which my colleague had locked earlier) and other items that were on the floor in the galley. I then heard the emergency chimes. My colleague and I had already prepared the cabin and my colleague said; 'We only have 13 minutes for these masks.' I immediately called the flight deck and informed them that we had 13 minutes on the oxygen masks and inquired if we would be landing soon. The captain then responded that we were coming up on 10;000 feet so we would be okay without the oxygen masks. I relayed the information immediately to the passengers and could visibly see the relief on peoples' faces when I announced they didn't need the oxygen masks; but if by choice they still wanted to wear the masks; that was more than fine. About a minute later; the flight deck made the PA announcement that we would divert and that the plane had lost cabin pressure and they would provide more info upon landing. The flight deck then immediately called me personally and said it would be a normal landing and not an emergency landing. They asked me to call them back once everyone was secured and I did. Everyone remained seated with their seatbelts securely fastened. Upon landing; I commended the passengers for their cooperation in my announcement. The passengers were truly a great bunch; despite the circumstances. Everyone had remained calm. As the passengers exited the aircraft; they commended my colleague and me for our diligence and help throughout the entire situation. We had all landed safely. Maintenance came on board immediately. My colleague and I informed the flight deck and Maintenance about the oxygen masks above the forward jumpseat being inoperative at the time. We (crewmembers) went over the whole series of events and checked amongst ourselves as fellow crew that we were all okay. I contacted my manager and spoke with her briefly once all passengers were off the aircraft. My colleague and I were deadheaded back. It was a scary situation; but my colleague and I handled it in a calm fashion and remained professional. Things we learned from training definitely kicked in and we were grateful to have worked as a team in this unfortunate situation. We were all just grateful that we landed safely.

At 10;000 feet we received our double chime and proceeded the sequence of events in preparation for the cabin beverage service. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes into this phase of flight; as I was completing my beverage cart preparation; I noticed that I was feeling dizzy and had a slight pain in the center of my forehead; as we as some pressure in my ears. I turned to [the other FA] and said ; 'we must be really high in the air; I'm feeling dizzy' she replied; 'yes; my ears are popping too'; as she began squeezing her nostrils and shaking her head; trying to release some of the pressure in her ears.Within seconds [she] pointed to the forward FA jumpseat; I looked over at the forward FA jumpseat; then turned to the cabin; staggering as I turned; and noticed that every oxygen mask had deployed. I replied; 'Oh my god; this is not good'.I ensured that the brake on the service cart was locked; when I looked at the oxygen mask at the forward FA jumpseat; all that I saw was knotted strings and tubing; there was no way we would be able to disassemble the knots in the strings and use those mask; my time of useful consciousness was diminishing at a rapid pace.I was heading down the aisle to the first available empty passenger seat; which was located in row 8 or 9 (seats A and B). As I made my way through the aisle; feeling somewhat disoriented and short of breath; I noticed a cloudy haze as well as a very offensive strong odor in the cabin; I [was] instructing passengers to 'Pull that string hard!; place the mask over your nose and mouth!; keep your seatbelts fastened! Keep the mask on the baby! The passengers remained calm and complied with my instructions.I took my seat; donned my oxygen mask immediately; and fastened my seatbelt. Shortly after; [the other FA] joined me; and I assisted her with her mask as well.[The other FA] and I continued to visually monitor the cabin. I reminded [the other FA] that I was concerned with our time of useful consciousness (since I was feeling dazed and observed that the decompression had taken [some] effect on us both) and that we only had 13 minutes of fixed oxygen; so we looked out of our window to try to calculate approximately how rapidly we were descending; anticipating an emergency landing. In the next few minutes we received a call from the flight deck; [the other FA] accepted the call; I continued to take oxygen; because my breathing was still a little labored. The Captain made an announcement that we had lost cabin pressure; and that we would be making an emergency landing. In the next couple of minutes another call came from the flight deck followed by an announcement by the Captain and the forward FA. We were informed that we were approaching 10;000 feet; this would be a normal landing; and that it was ok for those passengers that would like; to remove their oxygen mask. Some of the passengers did remove their mask; while some continued to keep them on.At this time I removed my oxygen mask; got up from my seat and began monitoring the passengers; asking if everyone was ok; and if they needed any further assistance. As I continued through the aisle; we received the double chime and I proceeded to the aft FA jumpseat. As I was still feeling the physical effects of the decompression. I felt it necessary to continue to administer oxygen to myself so I again donned the aft FA jumpseat oxygen mask until we were parked at the gate. Upon landing; [the other FA] and I commended the passengers for their cooperation; and we thank them. The passengers also thanked us and commended [the other FA] and myself for the excellent service that we provided.Once the last passenger exited aircraft; Maintenance came onboard. [The other FA] and I explained the situation concerning the oxygen mask deployment at the forward FA jumpseat; and we reviewed the sequence of events as they took place in the cabin with maintenance and our pilots.

Two CRJ-900 flight attendants described the events following a cabin depressurization detected by dropped masks. Prior to seeing the masks both flight attendants experienced hypoxia symptoms.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During climb out; passing 13;500 FT; felt airframe vibration and noticed #2 engine vibration indicator had jumped from .3 to 3.0. [We] contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. With their concurrence; decided that the safest course of action was to return; which resulted in an overweight landing.

On climb out; #2 engine experienced high vibration. With concurrence of Dispatch and Maintenance Control; we returned uneventfully.

B757 flight crew experienced high vibration on the number two engine during climb and elected to return to the departure airport for an uneventful landing.


First Officer; Pilot Flying; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Tower cleared us for immediate takeoff from Runway 26R with company traffic on a 5 mile final to same runway. The Captain set the thrust to approximately 70 percent N1 and selected thrust on the mode control panel (MCP) but autothrottles would not engage. I set thrust manually and called 'thrust set' and we continued the takeoff roll. Immediately after takeoff the Captain noticed as he transitioned inside the aircraft that he did not have command bars and at about 200 to 300 feet gave the aircraft to me as I appeared to have normal modes displayed on my ADI. I called for heading select at about 500 feet and turned to our assigned heading. At 1;000 feet I called for VNAV and noticed the airspeed bug was at the barber pole not at the appropriate flap setting. VNAV armed but never became active. At 2;000 feet I called for center autopilot to command; the Captain selected the C mode switch but it would not engage. He then selected the right autopilot and it became active. We continued the climb via FLCH and remained in ALT HOLD at all cleared altitudes as VNAV would still not engage. We never received any EICAS warning; caution or advisory messages as well as no status messages. There were no overhead lights associated with inoperative equipment or systems. The only indication was a 'NO AUTOLAND' on the ASA [Autoland Status Annunciator]. The Captain selected R on the instrument source select panel as well as FMC R on the NAV select and redirected the right side instrument data to his displays. We then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and explained what had occurred. They elected to have us continue and we concurred as the weather was good both enroute as well as our destination. The Captain resumed pilot flying duties and I resumed pilot monitoring duties. We completed the flight and everything else was uneventful.

A B767-300 appeared to have suffered the loss of the left FMS during the takeoff roll when the autothrottles failed to engage and the Captain lost his command bars. Control was passed to the First Officer who was pilot flying until alternate power was provided to the Captain's flight instruments. After consultation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control they continued the flight to destination.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

[City] was IFR and Final West was split off and busy. Center called and APREQ'ed Air Carrier Y stopped at an altitude above Air Carrier X while continuing to fly the ground track of the arrival. The aircraft were an exact tie at the entry fix to my airspace. To split the aircraft up; so both could descend; I turned Air Carrier X; the slower aircraft; to heading 060 with a descent to 4;000 FT and slowed them to 220 KTS. I then turned Air Carrier Y to heading 040 and used altitude separation until they were established on diverging courses; then descended him to 4;000 FT. I switched the heavy to final West who turned Air Carrier Y to heading 030 and slowed them to 210 knots. I observed this and when I had more than 5 miles separation I turned Air Carrier X to heading 340 to pass well behind the heavy. I observed Air Carrier X pass behind Air Carrier Y's wake turbulence with more than 5 miles separation. I was later informed Air Carrier X called to complain and ask why they had been vectored in the wake of a heavy. [I] recommend Center review the LOA between Center and TRACON and comply with the LOA; especially during peak traffic times.

TRACON Controller described a pilot filed NMAC event while vectoring successive departure aircraft; one aircraft vectored behind a heavy B747; reporter claiming appropriate separation existed.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

An E135 was on a vector toward the ILS approach for Runway 36L. He was descending from about 3;500 FT to 3;000 FT approximately 5 south of GKY within the Bravo. He went into Conflict Alert with a VFR at approximately 2;000 FT. I watched him climb to about 2;200 FT and he was climbing slowly as many do since they are below the Bravo. The E135 was in a normal descent already slowing his descent to level at 3;000 FT. The aircraft were not climbing or descending at any rate which should have caused the Conflict Alert to go off and were about 5 miles apart still. Since the VFR was not a factor; not climbing at a high rate or anything like that and they were still altitude wise 1;200-1;400 FT apart; traffic was not issued; just another false alert as has been the case with this new system. I issued instructions to a couple other aircraft and when I looked back at the E135 the VFR traffic had now climbed to 2;700 FT and they were about 1 mile apart. I issued traffic at 10 o'clock and the E135 said he was responding to an RA. The Conflict Alert and Low Altitude Alert were going off much more since we changed to the STARS system. Yesterday approximately 60% of the arrivals at DAL on a north flow during one session went into Low Altitude Alert. So much that I just stopped issuing them to the Tower. I talked to our National TAMR (STARS Representative) and explained what happened with the E135 and he said 'I know we are getting a lot of those'. This is a problem as when you get so many false CAs or LAs. After you have so many or observe that it is false; you tend to look the other way as it was not a factor. Then when it is needed and is actually for real; you can't tell that it is real. This has been ongoing since we changed to the new system. This needs to be immediately corrected.

D10 Controller voiced concern regarding the continuous; and sometimes false; Conflict/Low Altitude Alerts that are occurring with the new STARS system.


Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While working the Coordinator position; I was coordinating a local IFR clearance and a radar hand-off with ZZZ1 Approach.  I do not recall hearing the initial contact with Aircraft X; as I was off-line from monitoring the H position on voice lines. The last radar scan I completed with the aircraft was when it was descending from approx 9;600 to what I believed was SOP; 8;000. After completing my coordination functions; I scanned the radar again and observed the Low Altitude Alert activated on the aircraft. I immediately advised the Controller of my observation and she took corrective action. The aircraft climbed without further incident.  The pilots are aware of the terrain in the vicinity as depicted on the approach plates and could have questioned  the lower altitude. Controller advised pilot of an assigned altitude of 8;000; he advised he read back 3;000.  I was not able to confirm or deny without listening to audio tapes.  Therefore; it is difficult to make a plausible explanation for this section.

Tracon Coordinator reported a Flight Check aircraft received a low altitude alert while descending to 3;000' when the intended assigned altitude was 8;000'.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 15000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 234; Flight Crew Type 298

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While cruising at FL310; we both were heads down and observed a bright white flash. Neither of us recognized what had caused it. About 30 seconds later; we both witnessed another bright flash which we confirmed was arcing on the R1 window. 10 seconds later the R1 window shattered with numerous spider cracks encompassing the entire window. The First Officer (FO) put on his 02 mask and I put mine on at that time as well. We were unable to confirm if the cracks were on the inner or outer pane; due to the darkness in the cockpit and the extensive amount of cracks.I [advised] ATC and requested priority handling into [destination]. I took control of the aircraft and requested the FO to pull out the QRH. By the time we had gotten through the checklist; we had descended to 10;000 feet. The pressurization was maintained in the cabin and no abnormal condition existed in the aircraft. The checklist called for continued normal operation for our condition. I [advised ATC] based on not having confidence in the structural integrity of the window.Not having any experience with a shattered window at night; donning the O2 masks may have been premature; however; it was done to err on the side of safety.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported descending to a safe altitude after the First Officer's cockpit window shattered at FL310.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 11000

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The Controller told us to file a report because 'the FAA was looking into 321s not making the climb restriction.' Controller also mentioned something about 'using Runway 01R with this SID and having other options.' And also said they are looking into us knowingly accepting a clearance we cannot make. The fix in question is RIOOS on the Trailer 9 SID at or above 13;000 MSL without a speed requirement. Once airborne if the Controller needed the altitude and was unable to offer a delay vector then I could slow down (i.e. climb faster) or add power to make the restriction. As far as takeoff options were concerned; the wind was 330/20G27KT; so a takeoff on 26R at our weight would not be a safe option. We were heavy and the FMC did predict we would be lower than required at RIOOS; at 320 KTS. The cost index was set to 55 and I had programmed the current temperature; which would give the FMC a better prediction; but it is still just a prediction to use for information on the ground. A NOTAM for LAS stating that ATC will not offer vectors or reduced speed to make the climb restrictions; and making RIOOS a mandatory altitude with a speed requirement.

A321 Captain reported being unable to meet crossing restrictions while on the Trailer 9 SID.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Approach Control vectored us in too close and too high to get properly established on the ILS to Runway 27. I was PM; and said to my F/O; 'this isn't going to work by 1000 ft' (we were at 3000 ft MSL and the PF was urgently configuring the flaps to 30 degrees). I told Approach Control; 'we're going around.'  The PF added power; but allowed the nose to pitch up too high; giving us an 'airspeed' vocal warning. I know the PF corrected somewhat; with the pitch; by lowering the nose; but again; the nose pitched up and we got a second airspeed vocal warning. I was moving the flap lever to 15 degrees (I think?) when we got the first airspeed alert. After the second warning; the PF pushed aggressively down on the yoke to get airspeed back. I said 'level off;' with his more aggressive maneuver; which he did (and airspeed was accelerating; now). We got vectors back around for another approach and landed without incident.Mishandling on the PF's part of a go-around maneuver; and my own mishandling; as a Captain; not to take controls and be ready to help 'coach thru' a dramatic maneuver as a go-around; which is rarely done and unexpected.

We decided a go-around was more appropriate. I commenced the go-around and asked for flaps 15. I asked for flaps 15 a second time. At this point we got an 'airspeed too low' warning. I corrected the airspeed and once again asked for flaps 15; and once again got a second 'airspeed too low' warning; and corrected the airspeed. At this point I maintained level flight; and the Pilot Monitoring; and I configured the aircraft for clean and level flight. We were vectored around for another approach and landed.The approach should not have been continued. I should have commenced the go-around once it was apparent the glideslope was too low. There was a clear disconnect between the Crew. Only one was flying the aircraft and the other was talking to ATC. The go-around maneuver was not completed together; in a timely manner; resulting in the error. The Pilot Monitoring and Pilot Flying coordination was lost. We seldom perform go-around maneuvers; and can be caught off guard. We briefed the go-around procedures on the Jepps; but we should mentally or verbally go over the maneuver.

B737-700 flight crew reported letting the airspeed get low on a go-around maneuver from an unstabilized approach.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Several military aircraft were flying within the designated refueling track. Two of the aircraft were tankers; one of which requested to depart back to base and requested a climb to 39;000 FT. That aircraft was given the requested clearance. Shortly after the other tanker reported he was responding to an RA and would be back within the assigned block altitude shortly. No other aircraft were involved and both aircraft continued on without further incident. Working military aircraft is an uncommon event in our airspace and there has always been some sort of confusion as to how to properly clear military aircraft apart and out of the active airspace. In this event it involved much more than just two aircraft that were flying inside of this airspace. The only recommendation is that controllers need a definitive answer and training on what exactly to do in these instances; especially when it is uncommon in our specific airspace.

ZAU Controller described a TCAS RA event involving a military tanker operation break up maneuver. The reporter suggested increased training for facility personnel covering these types of procedures.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 131; Flight Crew Type 12000

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.2

On descent into PDX; descending via the TMBRS 2 RNAV Arrival; around the VANTZ point; at approximately 11;600 ft and 250 knots; I noticed motion to my right in the F/O's (First Officer) forward windscreen. Looking to the right; I momentarily saw a light aircraft pass within several hundred feet to the right-side of our aircraft; and very close to co-altitude. The traffic was past us before we had time to react. I reached for the yoke; but the conflict was over before I even had time to maneuver. We did not receive a TA; RA; or even a TCAS target; nor did we receive any warning from ATC. The traffic appeared to be a Piper Cherokee or similar type aircraft.We reported the near miss to Portland Approach and asked if they had the traffic on radar. They said no but they had previously seen a primary only target.We continued uneventfully to PDX and reported the incident to Dispatch and ATC Management upon landing. We conferred with the F/As (Flight Attendants) to see if any passengers had reported seeing the aircraft pass by us; but no comments were made; nor questions asked by the passengers.We were VFR and looking outside to acquire the airport. The traffic approached from a head on aspect and apparently did not have a transponder on. We did not see the traffic until it was on right in front of us. The conflict happened very quickly with no TCAS or ATC warning. It was very close; way too close.A heads up from ATC that there had been a primary only target on radar ahead of us would have been helpful. But; it would have been even better for the uncontrolled GA aircraft to have a transponder on so we received a TCAS alert and target.

[B737] checked in descended via the [TMBRS] arrival and was told to expect RWY 28L. After acknowledging the read back; I continued to scan my radar and do other duties. As I looked down at [the B737]; I noticed a very faint blue primary target which at first appeared to be a history trail. My radar is not adjusted that bright for that. Immediately after; [the B737] called and reported an small aircraft passed adjacent to his aircraft at the same altitude. I called Seattle sector controller and asked if he was painting a target and he replied no at first. I do not recall seeing traffic; but the small aircraft was there.

B737 Captain and a P80 Approach Controller reported a NMAC with a light aircraft in the vicinity of PDX. Light aircraft reportedly did not have an operating transponder and ATC was unaware of their position and altitude.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

After a 2 landings; we came in for another landing. We had 3 green gear down confirmed. When we touched down the gear collapsed.

DA-42 pilot reported the landing gear collapsed after landing with three green lights.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 380

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was taking a student on his first cross country night flight toward his private pilot license. With over 35 hours of flight time at this airport; I entrusted the student to taxi to the runway. The aircraft was equipped with a G1000 system which was still adjusted to 'day' brightness. After monitoring the initial completion of the taxi sequence; I proceeded to attempt to adjust the brightness to night mode. Not being very familiar with the system; I spent nearly a minute of head-down time looking for the adjustment knob. When I looked up again; we were on the active runway and I advised him to immediately taxi off of it. This occurred at a runway hot spot which is poorly lit and not adequately signed. Our taxi clearance called to taxi via E - A - B - cross runway 23 to runway 30. This was read back; but the student missed the right turn onto B and entered the runway. There is no sign indicating the location of taxiway B. I regained control of the situation and the rest of the flight continued without issue. After the flight we reviewed runway hot spots and hold short lines. No aircraft was landing or on the runway at the time. This has not occurred since.This issue could be prevented by correcting the hot spot with signage and lighting.

An instructor reported the student pilot taxied onto FDK Runway 30 at Taxiway A because he missed the signage at the Taxiway A and B intersections which is a hot spot with poor signage and lighting for night operations.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64; Flight Crew Total 8372; Flight Crew Type 1357

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was planning to fly from the ZZZ airport to my home on the lake a distance of approximately 5 NM. I was solo; and did a weight and balance and determined I needed 45 pounds of ballast in the nose anchor compartment; and confirmed it was there. The winds were very light out of the south and I took off on Runway XX and turned towards my home. I went to do a 'splash and dash' on the lake before going to the house so after climbing to about 500 ft. I reduced power and did my pre-water landing checklist. On touchdown I immediately did a water loop with no injury to me or any other property; and minor damage to the plane. I must have let the nose get too low; and possibly was hit by an unnoticed boat wake. Since I had lake specific recurrency training on [Date] and [Date1]; have done [Number] water landings; [Number1] in the last year and [Number2] in the last 90 days I do not know what else I should have done.I did notify the tower that I had a problem and was heading back on the water to the seaplane ramp. They called the fire department and asked them to launch a boat to assist if needed. When I got to the seaplane ramp their launch vehicle; trailer; and boat were on the left side of the ramp. I tried to call the tower to ask them to have the equipment moved; but could not raise them. I then tried to get up the right side of the ramp; and the right main gear went off the ramp and was damaged. I feel personnel should not block runways; taxiways; or seaplane ramps when trying to help.

Seaplane pilot reported that during touchdown; the plane did a water loop; possibly as a result of the nose getting too low.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Just before Flight Attendant boarding a passenger came up to me and asked about his seats. He was traveling with his wife and 3 young children. His 2 youngest were twin girls approximately 4 months old and were lap children. He asked me if his seats were correct and I told him no he could not be seated in a single row because there were not enough oxygen masks and took his seats to the customer service representative. I then relayed what happened to the crew when the Captain said; actually for this flight this is fine. Since we are only flying 16000 feet and below the oxygen masks will never deploy and therefore they can all sit together. I then asked him if he was sure. He said he was absolutely sure so I let the agent and the family know that the Captain said that since we were flying below 16000 feet [they] could sit together. I am still not certain I did the appropriate thing in this situation. This procedure is not in our manuals and we need clarification if this is correct.

Flight Attendant informed a family with three small children they cannot all sit in the same row due to oxygen requirements. When the Captain was informed he stated that actually it would be OK on this flight since they would not be flying above 16;000 feet. The family traveled in the same row.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 44; Flight Crew Type 44

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I am a solo student currently working to get my Private Pilot Certificate. I was flying back to ZZZ1. I needed to Divert due to [weather] at ZZZ. I chose to divert to ZZZ which was quite busy at time of incident due to bad weather at ZZZ1. I approached ZZZ noting the high volume of traffic in the pattern. Traffic was flowing to Runway 12 making it the main landing runway at the time of the incident. As traffic was unusually high; I made the call to remain North of ZZZ until the pattern had cleared up. I did exactly that; while making all the necessary advisory calls on the frequency. As I exited my hold to join the left downwind for Runway 12; I noted the aircraft I will be following was Aircraft Y (I received this information using an in cockpit ADS-B receiver). Upon reviewing traffic info on ADS-B receiver I was looking out of the window to try to make a visual reference with the traffic I was following. Unfortunately I was not immediately able to make visual reference with Aircraft Y however I did verify adequate separation using ADS-B. As I joined the left downwind for Runway 12 I diverted my attention to any possible hazards coming from the within the traffic pattern (causing me to divert my attention to the left). As I did this and have determined the left side of me to be clear I made the call to enter the left downwind for Runway 12. At this point I realized there was a low wing twin engine aircraft about 150 ft. above me heading in the opposite direction (upwind). I immediately realized it was Aircraft Y I was following. He had made a 180 degree turn from his downwind to attempt to rejoin. Although while doing that he flew right into the flow of traffic in the pattern. I quickly called up on the radio to try to understand if he had seen me. He replied something along the lines of we had you visual - all good).

C-172 Pilot reported a near mid air collision while on approach to landing following a diversion caused by thunderstorms.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working [Sector X] and we had just combined our west side airspace. I was working X and Y sectors. According to our LOA; ZZZ was supposed to give us aircraft over ZZZ1 crossing 11 DME from ZZZ1 at 11;000. I had Aircraft X as an overflight to ZZZ2 at 9;000 and crossing roughly 5 or so miles east of ZZZ1. I took radar on Aircraft Y from west of ZZZ1 who was inbound for landing at ZZZ2; one of our satellite airports. 10 miles in trail of him was Aircraft Z also landing at ZZZ2. Aircraft Y checked on and said he was descending to 10;000. Aircraft Z also checked on descending to 10;000. ZZZ did not APREQ (Approval Request) descending; as both aircraft were not level when I took the handoff. They also did not APREQ the wrong altitude for direction of flight. There was zero coordination from ZZZ on these aircraft.We called to ask them to discontinue this practice and leave arrivals at 11;000. At first they agreed; but then proceeded to continue giving 10;000 with zero coordination. This continued throughout the night. When the midnight controllers started working; they again ran into the same issue with zero coordination and descended aircraft into our airspace. We tried again to tell ZZZ to discontinue this operation; but they refused and said they were instructed by their Operations Manager to give these aircraft 10;000. This was all taking place while ZZZ was ATC zero / ATC limited during the coronavirus pandemic. So we were working multiple overflights at 10;000 westbound while ZZZ was assigning 10;000 to eastbound arrivals with zero coordination. This was a very dangerous practice and with no coordination we were lucky this didn't result in any losses of separation. Luckily at the time; my overflight Aircraft X was at 9;000 and I was able to verify Aircraft Y's altitude and made sure he was stopping above. They got within 6 miles of each other; with a closing speed of over 600 kt. This entire operation from ZZZ; being ATC zero and ATC limited; has been handled very poorly. ZZZ has refused to comply with our contingency plan and we have been stuck with only 10;000 and below. I know this is a dynamic situation and we are not used to this. However; it should not mean that ZZZ can just throw our contingency plan as well as the 7110.65 out the window. I would recommend ZZZ [to] comply with the contingency plan. I would also recommend ZZZ [to] comply with the 7110.65 regarding altitude for direction of flight and approval requests. We have an ongoing problem with ZZZ being unable to comply with LOA's and it's starting to become a dangerous situation. As of [this] date and time; ZZZ is still not complying with the contingency plan.

TRACON Controller reported problems with overlying Center not complying with LOA and the contingency plan.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Arriving SEA; ATC cleared us to follow aircraft ahead to visual approach 34L.  We were given 170kts to final fix due to ATC spacing us just over 3 miles behind a B737.  I was Pilot Monitoring; the First Officer the Pilot Flying had our plane on autopilot using heading select and vertical speed to navigate onto the localizer and glideslope.Just as the plane was joining the localizer; a mild buffeting was felt followed by a rapid roll in direction of the turn. Aural warning 'Bank Angle' annunciated.  The First Officer immediately disconnected the autopilot and reduced the bank angle to normal parameters.  The rest of the approach was uneventful.On visual approaches; especially with close spacing; fly above the path of the preceding aircraft.

While on dogleg to final for RWY 34L; descending to 2;400 feet MSL following preceding B737 by 3.5 NM encountered wake turbulence while on autopilot.  As autopilot initiated turn to join the localizer the aircraft encountered the wake turbulence causing a rapid roll to the right (in the direction of the turn).  The aircraft rolled past 30 degrees of bank and an aural warning 'bank angle' sounded.  The Pilot Flying recognized the excursion and disengaged the autopilot and reduced the bank angle to normal range.  Pilot Flying continued the approach and landed uneventfully.Consider staying above preceding aircraft's altitude/flight path to avoid wake turbulence or increase range between aircraft.

B737-900 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence on final approach to SEA in trail of a B737.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; MEL; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Logbook Entry

I troubleshot a #2 engine anti-ice valve discrepancy on an A320 aircraft. I reactivated the valve for troubleshooting and determined that there was good voltage to the valve. I manually actuated the valve and noticed a sticking in the 'Closed' position and determined the valve was bad. We did not have a valve in stock so I was told to defer the discrepancy. I mistakenly deactivated the valve according to MEL 30-27-01A instead of MEL 30-27-01D. At this point in time I do not know how I made this error. My only thought is that due to poor lighting in the cockpit I mistook the 'D' for an 'A'. Aircrew noticed improper anti-ice valve indication on engine start. I did not thoroughly review which MEL had been applied to the aircraft. Proper MEL was applied [after a] gate turnback. Suggest [I] thoroughly review and make sure I understand which MEL has been applied to the aircraft.

A Line Mechanic reports he mistakenly deactivated #2 engine anti-ice valve according to MEL 30-27-01A; instead of MEL 30-27-01A. Flight crew returned the A320 aircraft to gate after noticing improper anti-ice valve indication during engine start.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Traffic was exchanged by ZZZ Approach between myself; at 6;500 feet; and a RJ at 6;000 feet. Soon after I did get the traffic in sight; at my right front and 500 feet below. The RJ suddenly reported an RA and 'climbing'. I observed the traffic pitch upward. I began a left turn to avoid. The Controller firmly questioned the actions of the RJ numerous times. As I began a descent; I observed the RJ suddenly pitch downward.  I stopped my descent. Traffic passed ahead of me at less than a mile and maybe 200 ft. below.  Controller questioned me about the incident. Appears that the RA was incorrectly interpreted.

PA32 pilot reported an RA event that required evasive action.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I requested clearance from ATC while on the ground in OPF. The clearance was 'cleared to TAPA via the MIAMI 2 Departure; BEECH; BAAMA (this is how the waypoint was pronounced by ATC and how it was read back); ZQA; then as filed.' The waypoint BAAMA was spoken as a word; not spelled out letter by letter. OPF Clearance Delivery confirmed that the clearance was read back correctly. This clearance was a partial re-route as the waypoints BEECH; BAAMA; and ZQA were not included in the original flight plan (the original flight plan was: 'KOPF DCT SKIPS BR53V RAJAY A555 COY G633 GABAR UG633…'). While airborne we received a radio call from ATC requesting that I confirm our flight plan route. ATC asked what I showed as my next waypoint after BEECH. I confirmed with ATC that our next fix is BAAMA (we were positively navigating to BAAMA on course; as per our clearance as we understood it). ATC then gave us a heading of 120 degrees and told us that BAAMA was actually in that direction. ATC then gave us a phone number to call Miami Center for a 'possible pilot deviation.' We were not deviating off our charted course; were in NAV mode; and were at out appropriate altitude. Knowing that we were in fact on course to BAAMA I poured over the enroute charts again and found a second waypoint of an identical sounding name (BAHMA). It was then our assumption that Clearance Delivery meant to clear us to that identically-pronounced waypoint. However; the clearance did not have this waypoint connected to any of our airways (which would have allowed us to see that BAAMA was not the right waypoint); and it was also a waypoint that was newly included in the reroute (not listed on our original flight plan; which would also have told us that BAAMA was incorrect). I would have asked for clarification on the spelling of BAAMA from Clearance Delivery had I not found this fix acceptably aligned with our route of flight. Contributing to reinforcing our use of the BAAMA waypoint was the fact that after that waypoint; the flight path was smooth and connected seamlessly to our remaining flight plan; so flying to BAAMA made perfect sense to us. The fact that there was another 'BAAMA' waypoint (spelled 'BAHMA') was not known to us; as these factors; combined with the fact that the clearance was read back correctly and the waypoint in question had a seemingly straightforward pronunciation; we input the BAAMA waypoint into the reroute per our understanding. When we landed the Captain called the phone number given to us by ATC. We explained the situation regarding the miscommunication during the receipt of the clearance due to the identically pronounced waypoints within close proximity. The Supervisor at the Center understood how the confusion occurred and said that ours was a good explanation of why the deviation occurred. I have learned much from my mistake. In the future I will always obtain a full phonetic spelling of all fixes read over a radio received ATC clearance; even when positive reinforcing information confirms my confidence of the fix; the pronunciation is seemingly straightforward; or the waypoint positively aligns with the route of flight. These reinforcing factors are not sufficient to guarantee the fix is accurate. The fact that there could be duplicate waypoints with the same pronunciation in the vicinity warrants increased vigilance.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

When a Clearance Delivery revision to their filed clearance included the fix BAAMA or BAHMA the flight crew of a Citation X found the former in a logical position to suit their overall route and were on course toward it when they were questioned by ATC and given a vector. Only after searching diligently did the crew discovered BAHMA; the fix intended by ATC.


During taxi in onto the north side of Ramp 3 in Atlanta; we were cleared to enter on the left side of the ramp (east) and taxi to the gate. As we were taxiing into the ramp I looked to the left and noticed several vehicles yielding to us. Lights were on. I called clear left and just before the First Officer was to say something; I noticed an object moving from the right in my peripheral vision. I looked up and saw a tug pulling 2 baggage carts and the operator of the vehicle texting on a cell phone and heading at a fast speed directly toward us on the north roadway. I slammed on the brakes bringing the aircraft to a stop with the nose just over the entrance. The driver just happened to look up and slammed on the brakes making a hard right turn back into the ramp. It's amazing the driver didn't flip the tug over. Driver missed hitting us by about 15 FT. Had I not stopped and/or had the driver not looked up; would have struck the nose of the aircraft and may have been seriously injured or perhaps killed. Driver then started laughing and drove on out and started texting again. I continued taxiing into the gate with no further issues. Taxi speed was normal; scans were normal; sterile cockpit and procedures adhered to. Jumpseater on the jumpseat made no comment even though I insured that he speak up if he saw anything. 'It's just the way things are here the ATL' [it] is becoming the normal acceptance of this type of behavior. This is a threat that is intimidating to crews. It speaks of futility of reporting events because of multiple issues regarding philosophies of the airport management. 1) Management needs to enforce safety policies with real consequences. 2) Law enforcement needs to patrol these areas constantly. 3) There needs to be a commitment on the behalf of baggage handlers and tug drivers to insist that safety always is the primary goal when operating in a dangerous area. I have been told by numerous tug drivers and ramp agents that management pressures them into hurrying between concourses to deliver baggage because of the costs involved. They feel threatened if they don't comply. Change these issues and maybe these types of events won't occur in the future. As it is now it appears a serious accident is imminent.

Regional jet Captain reports a near collision with a tug pulling baggage carts at the entrance to ramp three at ATL. The tug driver was reportedly texting while driving.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

After takeoff Aft Flight attendant called to inform us of a cabin odor. This was the first flight of the day and it rained all night so we thought it might dissipate after a short time. We leveled at FL190 and were in need of Engine Heat. With that the smell returned and was stronger. We could smell it in the cockpit; my eyes started to burn and the First Officer said he had a headache. We did the QRH procedure. Informed the dispatcher via ACARS. Our destination was so we proceeded to destination. Short hold for sequence then landed. At the gate I met with the crew and all of us had symptoms; so we called EMS to evaluate our conditions; which led to a trip to the hospital for checkup. EMS personnel entered the aircraft at the gate and had to leave because of burning eyes and throat. Evaluation dictated not to fly for 2 days. I've had cabin odor before but this was the worst by far.

After the 10;000 feet level off announcement I went towards the back of the aircraft to begin the service. 1/2 way down the aisle I smelled a strong 'dirty sock' odor which got stronger as I got closer to the back galley. The 'B' flight attendant asked if I smelled the odor; which I confirmed. 'A' flight attendant was notified who in turn notified the flight deck. Over the course of maybe the next 15-20 minutes the smell subsided somewhat. (Never completely went away); but 1/2 way through the flight the odor came back even stronger than initially; this time more irritating. The flight deck was notified again by the 'A' flight attendant. This time they stated it was noted in the cockpit as well.  I developed a headache and sore throat and eyes. Very strong pungent 'dirty sock' odor in cabin during takeoff (it dissipated somewhat-never went away-just lessened) but came back even stronger midway through the flight. Do not know the cause or how to prevent such an occurrence.

A319 flight crew and flight attendants detected a foul odor during takeoff and in flight. The odor subsided initially then returned even stronger. The flight continued to destination where the crew was taken to a hospital for evaluation and released.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

In the myriad of distractions that accompany preparation for a flight we were afforded an additional one just prior to departure. My roles on this flight were as [a Check Airman conducting a line check] as well as the third required crewmember.About 40 minutes before departure time we got a Right Pack Temp EICAS message. The First Officer reached up and turned the pack off. I instructed him to get out the QRH and run through the correct procedure. He said that only applied in the air. I corrected him and we completed the procedure with no luck bringing the pack back online. We then called for the onboard mechanics that reset the pack in the E&E bay but it tripped again. They spent the next 20 to 30 minutes trouble shooting the problem. Because of the ensuing delay the First Officer advised that he may run into an FAR 117 Rest/Duty Time issue if the delay continued. I called Scheduling to run the numbers on when his duty would expire and found that we had a little less than 90 minutes before we lost him. There were no reserves available. The mechanics wound up resetting the pack again and asked us to leave it off until the departure roll. I reminded them that the pack was an ETOPS Significant System and if we lost it after takeoff we would not be able to enter ETOPS airspace. On concurrence with the Captain I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and we agreed to do an ETOPS Verification Flight on the system. Dispatch worked up a non-ETOPS contingency route that required us to add fuel. With the Captain's concurrence we added 900 LBS of fuel which brought us up to the Max Performance Takeoff Weight on the original flight plan. While all this was going on the First Officer got the ATIS and loaded the info into the performance computer on the ACARS. He then loaded the Weight and Balance information. Unfortunately he loaded the Takeoff Fuel into the Zero Fuel Weight boxes of the performance template. This produced a Max Takeoff Gross Weight significantly lower than what it really was. He then left the cockpit for several minutes. The Captain went to retrieve the performance data and was having difficulty understanding how to do it. She had primarily been flying other routes and said she had only seen the performance template once or twice since IOE. I showed her how to retrieve the data and we reviewed it together. Both of us missed the MTOGW error. We read the 'Cautions' and made the incorrect assumption that if we were less than Planned Gross Weight we were OK...similar to the -200 aircraft. What the Cautions were trying to tell us just didn't click. Even the low V speeds and large stop margin didn't register as a flag. In addition the Captain did not follow the SOP procedure by setting the V2 speed estimate on the MCP. This would have been another flag. She later had me explain how to do it. In our printed flight plan package we did not have the paper copies of the TLR Takeoff data to use as a backup/crosscheck. When we referred to the downloaded copy on my tablet we discovered it only had Takeoff data for Runway 3 even though the forecast winds favored Runway 21. Dispatch should have provided that information also. On departure--since the First Officer did not select Runway 21 at Intersection F takeoff data--the Captain elected to use the full length. On the takeoff roll the First Officer called Vr at 131 KTS; but the Captain delayed the rotation until 146 KTS. She rotated at a normal rate. I didn't see the initial pitch but she lowered the nose immediately and accelerated before pitching up again. I believe this may have been when we scraped the tail skid which we discovered after landing. After positive climb was achieved she accelerated at a shallow climb angle. It was obvious to all of us that something wasn't right. She kept the pitch angle between the buffet margins and accelerated through the flap indications on the EADI speed tape. After the flaps were up she accelerated and climbed normally; opting for a higher climb speed of 260 KTS. There were a few other issues that might have helped flag the error. The Captain failed to record the actual ZFW and MTOGW next to the planned weights on the flight plan per FOM procedures. Also if the 'Load' function worked on the aircraft and had propagated the data directly to the FMS we might have caught the erroneous ZFW and Gross Weight there. To help eliminate the error going forward the following procedures might be considered: Highlight or mark in bold border or print the two critical numbers; ZFW and MTOGW; on the Weight and Balance. Modify software not to accept ZFW data outside a reasonable range of weights. Create a positive crosscheck procedure by both crewmembers of the ZFW and MTOGW data before uploading to the FMS.

During our preflight duties I entered the wrong zero fuel weight into the ACARS performance page. I entered the fuel onboard into the zero fuel weight prompt. The fuel on board is located underneath the ZFW box on the weight and balance sheet; and I transposed the two numbers when entering it into the ACARS computer. This error was not caught by any of the three flight crewmembers. ...This [error] resulted in a V1; Vr; V2 speed too low for the actual weight of the aircraft. As we approached Vr; the aircraft did not rotate as normal. Due to this the pilot flying kept the aircraft on the ground for a longer time in order to obtain flying speed. At no time; as observed on the speed tape; did we get any closer than approximately 20 KTS from the red stall warning snake. As a result of this lower takeoff speed; the tailskid was scraped upon rotation. ...Since there were no indications from the Tower; no abnormal pressurization; no abnormal flight controls; or reports from the cabin indicating that we had in fact dragged the tail during takeoff; we elected to continue the flight....The TLR that was provided did not have Runway 21 data; so we did not have the ability to cross check that data against the ACARS provided data. Due to the compressed time after dealing with the maintenance issue; I stepped out of the cockpit to perform the walk around because the 3rd pilot was busy getting the plotting chart ready. Once I came back to the cockpit; the Captain and Check Airman (3rd pilot) was discussing the performance ACARS printout; so I assumed that the speeds that had been entered were correct. My schedule during the last 3 months had been mostly on the 767MW and the 200Fs; which uses the TLR. On the TLR if you weigh less than planned take off weight; you can always go with the speeds provided. But on the 300ER; where ACARS provides the speed this is not the case. Due to this; the warnings that were provided were erroneously ignored. This was a First Officer line check; but there was a substantial amount of instruction between the Captain and Check Airman in the operation of ACARS. The Captain of the flight mostly flies [one of our cargo contracts] so she was not very familiar with this performance system. So when I returned from the preflight walk around; when they were in the midst of this discussion; I incorrectly assumed that the speeds that had been set were correct....When Check Airmen are conducting line checks or observations; be more of an observer than actively participating/interrupting for teaching moments. Let the crew finish up their flows and procedures. Then interject if there are procedural or technique issues. By having a Check Airman and the Captain involved in teaching moments during the normal flow of things; the remaining First Officer is outside of the loop and it becomes difficult getting back into the normal flow of a normal cockpit crew.

Multiple factors assailed the flight crew of a B767-300ER which resulted in flawed performance data and a tail strike on takeoff due to a planned takeoff gross weight much below the actual.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 11907; Flight Crew Type 8661

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

In Flight Planning noticed a more northerly (almost Polar) random route than normal. Upon crew change enroute as International Relief Officer (IRO); We began planning for radio comms; procedures and analyzing for upcoming route requirements from Russia to Destination [India]. After assessing our route which was more 'easterly' than normal; I realized we were flight planned over high terrain (mid 20's) with NO corresponding Terrain Critical Depressurization Procedures (TCDP) Procedure/Escape Procedure for that routing in the Operating Manual. I expected to be on our normal TCDP routing and pages for Terrain Crit.Notified Dispatch about an hour and a half prior to reaching that point as to my concern and that we did NOT and were not going to fly over high terrain on that particular routing Without TCDP Procedures in the event of an Emergency and requested Reroute over appropriate airways. Dispatch said he would check for TCDP Procedure on that filing and could find NO Escape/TCDP Procedure for what they had filed. We recommended reroute to Dispatch and worked on reroute with Dispatch and ATC over M875 with appropriate TCDP. In conclusion; I was surprised and concerned that [software] would plan a route over high terrain with NO TCDP/Escape Procedure. After we discovered this and called it to Dispatch's attention. Dispatch [re-filed] for both Flight who was on the same routing ahead of us.There should be Software or checks to preclude this type of filing by [computer software]/Dispatch on routing without appropriate TCDP Procedures.

A B777 crew enroute to Western Asia over an easterly routing; realized the high terrain beneath their route offered no emergency high terrain escape procedures. The dispatch software apparently contained no check for flight contingencies over high altitude terrain.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Carrier X was on the Portland River Departure which is a RADAR vectored SID. Air Carrier X was filed TIMEE.J15 which is a left turn out to join. DH8's are to be turned out of the departure corridor at 3;000 feet due to jet departure climbing out to 9;000 feet. I issued Air Carrier X a 'left turn to TIMEE to join J15' out of 4;000 feet because that is when the aircraft checked up on departure. I observed Air Carrier X start to make a right turn out into the north departure corridor I reissued the left turn to TIMEE and Air Carrier X seemed kind of confused and was out of around 7;000 feet. This is during our morning departure rush and I told PDX ATCT to 'hold departures' because Air Carrier X was having trouble navigated. The ATCT said that they had two jets to go and then departures would be held. I then told the ATCT to stop all departures at 6;000 feet due to the DH8D being now directly into the departure corridor opposite direction climbing out of 7;000 feet. This was a very unsafe situation for the ATCT to not hold departures when requested by the Departure Controller. There could have been an in flight emergency or another situation that was going on. The Departure controller is the IFR authority here at PDX. Air Carrier X finally went direct TIMEE and I was then able to resume normal departure operations. The ATCT needs to be aware that during certain situations outside their airspace sometimes aircraft need to be held on the ground. This needs to be reminded to them that this should be an immediate action and not when is convenient to them.

P80 Controller voiced concern regarding PDX Tower's failure to hold all departures when directed due to previous departures route/heading confusion.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Arrived at MIA and followed DGS to stop.  Before I could set the brakes and shut down engines; fwd cargo door was opened.  Noise and lights distracted me as I noticed the immediate danger of a cargo door open in front of a running engine.  We shut engines down quickly; and then I noticed jet had rolled fwd a couple feet.  Stopped jet; set brakes then.  This jet has a parking brake that requires an unusually hard pedal press to get the brake latch....some are like that. I called ops and reported to them the ramper's safety violation.  I would've gone down to ramp to talk to ramper; but that is not possible on an international arrival. Very unsafe; very distracting; especially during a critical phase when parking jet near buildings and equipment and workers.

Before the Captain set the parking brake and both engines still running; a ramper opened the cargo door. This distraction; warning lights; engines running; cargo door open diverted our attention for a moment and the aircraft rolled forward a foot or so past DGS stop lights.

B767 flight crew reported ground crew was active around the aircraft and had opened a cargo door before they set the brakes at the gate. Parking brake failed to set on the first try and the aircraft rolled a few feet past the stop point.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

While being vectored to LOC 27 by SAN Approach Control; we received an abbreviated Terrain Warning. We were in a turn to a 240 heading to intercept 27 LOC and descending to 4;000 FT MSL until established on final. Passing approximately 4;400 FT MSL; and in our right turn to final; we received an abbreviated 'Terrain; Terrain' EGPWS Warning. We were just north of course between OKAIN and VYYDA; approximately near the 2;709 FT Tower area. We were aware of the terrain; and for that reason the First Officer was in a gradual descent. In this particular aircraft; the warning messages over the speaker system are very loud; so when the EGPWS Warning occurred; it definitely got both of our attention. At that moment; I was identifying the LOC frequency with my head down focused on the COMM panel. I immediately reached for the controls; but realized the First Officer was still flying; so I stopped. He started to bring the power up and disconnected the autopilot; but the warning never continued and stopped prior to him accomplishing these tasks. Clear of the conflict; we both then verified our altitude and looked at the terrain monitoring system; which showed 1;700 FT as a safe altitude and all terrain on the scope was green. We continued the approach without incident. In this case; the system may have performed as required. Although; our only concern is that we were well above minimum vectoring altitude and in a slow descending turn. I'm sure that being in a descent; turning into the rising terrain and maybe even some GPS error all contributed to the warning. We just wanted to let you know about the situation so that others would be aware and/or in case this aircraft had any history of this kind of previous event. Again; we respected the EGPWS Warning and were prepared to perform the terrain avoidance maneuver since it was at night. We did not complete the initial part of the terrain avoidance maneuver because before we could do it; the Terrain Warning had stopped even prior to 'pull up' and terrain contact was no longer a factor. I think we do a very good job of highlighting these kinds of possible situations. Having flown into SAN over the last 12 years; having descended over that particular hill many times; and knowing it was there even at that moment; unexpected warnings do occur and every now and then we need to be made aware of these possible events. In the event; this was an erroneous EGPWS Warning do to software or GPS issues. We just wanted to highlight the aircraft in case it has had previous unexplained events.

I was the pilot flying on downwind vectors for the LOC 27 SAN abeam OKAIN in a slow descent above scattered/few clouds. Just prior to base turn; I noticed the lights to the right on top of a hill and crosschecked it with the known charted hilltop 2;709 FT; just north of VYDDA and Terrain display of 2;800 FT. I am writing this up more as an informational report. We certainly believed terrain contact was no longer (or ever really) a factor and continued the approach. Check on the GPWS logic; perhaps a note on the 10-7 or approach chart.

A B737-300 crew reported a partial EGPWS TERRAIN warning at 4;400 FT near a charted 2;709 FT hilltop north of the SAN LOC 27 VYDDA intersection while the aircraft was on profile and in a slight descent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 116; Flight Crew Type 116

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I approached LVK from Altamont Pass (VPALT) where I began my descent from 4;500 feet MSL. I had been in contact with Norcal Approach most of my flight from JAQ. Just before this point approach informed me of IFR traffic in the vicinity of LVK and to stay clear of it. I asked if an alternate route was advised; approach did not suggest one. I don't remember exactly what they said. I feel it worthy to note that 1-3 miles before reaching VPALT the aircraft magnetic compass started rotating wildly in both directions while my attitude of flight was level and unaccelerated. The Bluetooth GPS (Dual) for my tablet; located in full view of the sky on the dash that I was using for navigation; had also lost its signal. At this point I maintained my heading and used the headings on my flight log and landmarks that I was already familiar with on previous flights to Livermore. The compass regained its sanity a minute or two later; the GPS regained its signal roughly 7-10 miles from LVK. I remember having to force the app (iFlight Planner) on my iPad to close and re-open it. About 10 miles out from LVK I was advised by Approach to contact Livermore Tower. I promptly did so. Tower instructed me to make a right base entry for a 2-mile final to Runway 25R. I had the airport in sight. Being aware of IFR traffic on the approach path I stayed north of Highway 580 until I was two miles out and proceeded to turn base (heading 160 roughly). Tower then proceeded to advise me saying 'what I'm going to have you do is..' or something to that effect and gave me a list of at least three instructions that were difficult to make out due to noise and the rapidity he gave them. I made out 'left turn' and 'follow Cessna' and couldn't understand why I would be directed to turn head-on into approaching traffic so I missed the rest of the details and I informed Tower that I didn't understand; I was also occupied with planning my turn to final and seeing and avoiding traffic. Tower then immediately asked me to turn east and I promptly did so. Soon after Tower asked me if I saw the Cessna. I saw it at my 10 o-clock on the approach to 25R in roughly 300 feet at my altitude. Fortunately the approaching Cessna was descending on final while I maintained the TPA of 1;400 feet. It was under me by the time our ground paths intersected at which point I reported that it was under me. I was then instructed to follow it. At this point I had to make a 160 degree right turn to make final and I was already past the approach path for 25R. I made a hard right turn lowering the nose. Tower informed me that I had crossed the approach path of 25L inappropriately. I was able to recover to a proper approach path and I had the Cessna in sight on final ahead and below me. Tower informed the Cessna that I was close behind on final. The Cessna announced a go-around. I continued my approach and landed uneventfully. Contributing Factors: I was in a critical phase of flight nearly needing to turn final when Tower advised me of his plans. I may have understood incorrectly but what I heard seemed inconsistent with safety and normal pattern procedures when on right-base. I was fully expecting to turn right not left or east first. Flying east on a 250 approach (160 R turn) made the turn to final dangerous and avoidance of the 25L approach path impossible. I figure a 45 degree angle ideal and 90 degrees the maximum. I'm not certain but it's possible that Tower instructed me to 'REPORT 2-mile base for 25R' but I didn't hear the report part and that; while I was still on the same transponder code assigned by Approach and not instructed to squawk VFR; LVK Tower may not be equipped with radar making them unaware of my position unless I reported it. I assumed Tower was aware of my position. I may have missed the report instruction because of the compass and GPS events but I do recall the Controller speaking too quickly and in a muffled tone. It's not the first time that I've heard controllers sound likethey have marbles in their mouths. No offense but for those that don't hear this muffled fast language every day it may as well be Greek at times. My past two experiences at Livermore several months ago were very easy approaches. Tower instructed me to make straight-in approaches and the worst that was unexpected was a last-minute runway change which I handled just fine. So the different VFR approach and IFR traffic definitely tested my metal and I think the Controller's as well. I also didn't have much recent flying time within the last 90 days; though I had last flown a local flight at JAQ just over two months prior. I give the Tower Controller credit for staying with me; queuing me to look for the Cessna I was supposed to follow.

A pilot reported a near miss in the LVK traffic pattern after he became confused by ATC's instructions to establish him in the traffic pattern and he could not get timely clarification.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I had just sat down to work sectors with heavy weather by the boundary of two sectors. Almost every aircraft in the sector airspace was deviating for weather. As I was sending clearances to other aircraft and getting multiple messages about moderate turbulence I received I got a message in my sector queue. Upon reviewing the message it alerted me to the fact that Aircraft X was level at 35;000 ft. instead of 34;000 ft. as shown in the coordination window between the sectors. The Controller advised he had also just sat down at the sector.When I called the other Controller to confirm altitude on Aircraft X; the Controller said that he was showing a radar hit of them level at 35;000 ft. When I alerted him that Aircraft X was supposed to be at 34;000 ft.; the controller tried to reach Aircraft X on frequency; but Aircraft X was no longer on frequency. As soon as he said that I sent a CPDLC message to Aircraft X to descend to and maintain 34;000 ft. Aircraft X had an immediate conflict with Aircraft Y that started as soon as Aircraft X progressed the boundary fix with an approximate crossing conflict of 4 minutes. While waiting for the Aircraft X pilot to acknowledge their descent clearance via CPDLC; I called ARINC and requested a phone patch with Aircraft X. As I waited to be connected I probed Aircraft Y to descend or climb; but was unable to move Aircraft Y due to the fact they were deviating left of course; making the conflict with Aircraft X worse; and also crossing traffic at both 34;000 ft. and 36;000 ft. While I waited to be connected via phone patch; Aircraft X finally acknowledged their descent clearance. Upon connection of the patch Aircraft X reported level at 34;000 ft. Aircraft X also had two other pieces of traffic at 35;000 ft. eastbound that were more than 30 minutes out.Upon review of the coordination between the previous controllers at the sectors it was confirmed that Aircraft X was approved by the sector controller at 34;000 ft. and the controller had forgotten to descend him causing an immediate lack of separation. Ensure that all relief briefings are accurate and the post brief period of 5 minutes is ensured so that aircraft are at the correct altitude entering oceanic airspace.

Center Controller reported a traffic conflict between two aircraft when one aircraft had not been given clearance to descend.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft X was approved for an opposite direction arrival to runway 22R.  He was cleared for the visual approach and switched to the tower at 12 miles out.  Aircraft Y was an IFR departure off of 4L.  The tower controller forgot to get a release for Aircraft Y and cleared it for takeoff with Aircraft X within 10 miles and called to let me know that they were turning the aircraft out towards his destination to the east.Recommend facility wide review of opposite direction procedures.

Baton Rouge TRACON controllers reported an unsafe operation relating to opposite direction operations.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I am very concerned to have discovered recently on multiple A319 aircraft with new slimline seating; that multiple jumpseats have been improperly installed at door 1L. Most recently on aircraft nose number X I found that both jumpseats [cushions] at 1L inboard and outboard were not fastened or bonded to the seat itself. Mechanics put 2 screws in each jumpseat to fasten the cushion to the seat but this still left extremely sharp edges around all sides of the seat which resulted in a minor cut to my finger but could do much worse if left unfixed. The jumpseats were properly fixed by bonding down all the edges at the next stop. I had 2 fears 1. This could potentially be extremely dangerous in an emergency or turbulence because one of our flight attendant brace positions is holding on to the jumpseat which could result in severe injury due to not being attached and/or sharp edges and 2) the fear that since both jumpseats on aircraft X were improperly installed that this issue could be more widespread than just this one aircraft. My second fear was realized when I showed up the next morning on aircraft nose number Y to find the exact same problem with jumpseat 1L inboard.

A319 Flight Attendant reports that new jumpseats being installed in her company aircraft do not have the cushions attached to the seat; exposing sharp edges that can cut fingers.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

We were climbing to FL230. I was the PM. We had just confirmed a clearance when the master caution illuminated. This was caused by the number one fuel filter bypass light. I advised the FO to continue to fly; and I started to use my QRH to run the checklist. However; I went to the QRH and found the engine oil filter bypass checklist. I didn't verify with the FO the correct checklist; but instead started to run the checklist.As I completed the checklist; I was instructed to secure the engine as the light had not extinguished. I advised Center we had to shut down an engine; and requested a lower altitude. We also asked to return to [departure airport] as we were only 75 miles away. We gave ATC our souls on board and fuel on board.I briefed the flight attendants and the passengers of our plans; and sent a message to Dispatch via ACARS.During our descent; the FO queried the checklist we had used; and it was then I discovered I had used the wrong checklist. I then read the fuel filter bypass checklist. We discussed whether we should restart the engine and continue to [departure airport]. I decided that due to the note about possible erratic engine operation and flameout due to fuel contamination; it was safer to continue with the number one engine secured; as the weather was good. We used the one engine inoperative landing checklist; and landed without incident.Upon identifying the fuel filter bypass light; I should have asked to the FO to confirm whether we were using the correct checklist to manage the malfunction. By having both of us in the loop on the QRH; I don't believe this would have happened.

I was the PF on a daytime flight. On climb out we got a master caution light. The Captain announced that we had a 'filter bypass' light and I glanced over and saw the light. Being relatively new to the aircraft; I would have had to think for a second about which type of bypass it was (i.e. oil or fuel); but the Captain immediately told me to continue flying the aircraft and he would get the QRH out and run the oil filter bypass checklist. We slowly retarded the throttle; as directed by the QRH. The light was still on; so then it told us to run the engine shutdown checklist.We completed the engine shutdown checklist and the Captain [advised] ATC [of the situation and] we would like to return [to departure airport] as we were still pretty close. He also briefed the flight attendants and advised Dispatch.As the Captain was doing those things; my mind went back to the filter bypass light. I couldn't remember right offhand where the other bypass annunciators are; but these are in close proximity to the fuel pump switches. As I looked up again at the overhead panel; I said to the Captain; 'Is that an oil filter bypass or a fuel filter bypass?' He immediately recognized the error and said it was a fuel filter bypass light. He turned to the fuel filter bypass checklist in the QRH and we ran it. At this point we were already headed [back] as an emergency aircraft so we were committed to the plan to return. I raised the question of whether we should restart the engine since it wasn't a required shut down in the correct checklist. The Captain said he would like to keep it shut down since we were close; weather was not an issue and we could still have potential issues with the engine due to the fuel filter bypass status.We got the ATIS; set up for and briefed the approach and landing. Once the briefing was complete; checklists accomplished and we were on vectors for the approach; we transferred the aircraft from me to the Captain for the single engine landing. At some point ATC asked us if we wanted equipment standing by and we said yes as a precaution. The subsequent approach and landing were without incident. We taxied to the gate and accomplished the parking checklist. Maintenance was performed on the aircraft and an MEL applied related to the fuel filter bypass light and we again departed for. The subsequent flights had no further issues.More familiarity with non-normal annunciations. Taking the time to make sure the proper checklist is used with similar checklists. I believe a contributing factor is that the fuel filter bypass light only says 'filter bypass' and the oil filter bypass annunciation only comes up on the upper Display Unit (DU) during that non-normal situation. (I.e.; it doesn't annunciate when you do the lights test so you basically never see it until you have it in the air.)

B737-700 flight crew reported running the wrong checklist in response to a fuel filter bypass light master caution; resulting in an unnecessary inflight engine shutdown.


Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Upon arriving in TUS we were initially cleared the RNAV. We were then cleared for the visual approach to Runway 21. As we approached the airport we were notified of traffic at our Ten to Eleven O'clock. We had a visual on one of the aircraft and the tower gave us a no indication the traffic would be an issue as we were established on final. As we approached the tower gave us the go around command. The captain executed an immediate go around without delay. We were unaware that the go around was in reference to that traffic as it was not stated in the initial command. As we climbed on the go around to 7000 ft. The captain saw the aircraft that he a continuous visual on approaching under us and climbing into our path from his vantage point and at the same time we received an RA that commanded us to descend. We ignored this command because it would have descended us right into the path of the oncoming helicopter and maintained a visual separation.Runway construction at current airport and use of runway's conflicting procedures and practices at neighboring military base. Military controllers and pilots should be more aware of the procedures and how they can interfere with airports close proximity.

ERJ-175 flight crew reported receiving a TCAS RA descend command towards traffic during an ATC directed go-around.


Manuals; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Comparing FDC NOTAMs between our Dispatch Monitor and WSI I found instances where NOTAMs were in our system but no longer valid in WSI. I also found instances where NOTAMs were in WSI that were missing in our system. Here are some examples found today. I had to manually delete the following NOTAMs that were no longer in WSI but still in our software: FDC 4/0889 CMH IAP PORT COLUMBUS INTL COLUMBUS OH. ILS OR LOC RWY 28L AMDT 29... ILS OR LOC RWY 28R AMDT 4... ILS OR LOC RWY 10L AMDT 19... ILS OR LOC RWY 10R AMDT 9A... ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA APE VORTAC UNMONITORED. 1402210551-1408210551EST FDC 4/1011 MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL KANSAS CITY MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 27 AMDT 3... MISSED APPROACH CLIMB TO 1600 THEN CLIMBING RIGHT TURN TO 4000 ON HEADING 330 AND RBA VOR/DME R-137 TO BOWLR INT/RBA 17.62 DME AND HOLD. TOP VORTAC OUT OF SERVICE. 1402211433-1408211433EST FDC 4/1006 MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL KANSAS CITY MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 9 AMDT 14... RADAR REQUIRED FOR PROCEDURE ENTRY EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH SUITABLE RNAV SYSTEM WITH GPS TOP VORTAC OUT OF SERVICE. I had to manually add this NOTAM that was in WSI but not in our system: FDC! FDC 4/0535 MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL; KANSAS CITY; MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 9; AMDT 14... ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA; TOP VORTAC UNMONITORED.The automation that adds/deletes NOTAMs in our system does not seem to be working. To provide [relevant coverage] the system could be fixed or at the very least dispatchers could be notified that it is not working and a procedure put in place to make sure that the NOTAMs in our weather packet are complete and valid.

A Dispatcher advised that the commercial service providing flight planning services and/or flight crew tablet generated flight info frequently conflict with one another as to current FDC NOTAMs.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 540; Flight Crew Type 150

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Incursion Runway

While I was en route on an IFR flight plan; I was cleared for the visual approach to my destination from Center. I entered a left downwind for [the] runway and made a normal landing. During my taxi back down the runway; I noticed the taxi way was closed from the runway to the ramp. The barricades were about ten foot from the edge of the runway blocking the taxiway. I pulled up next to the barricades and shut down the aircraft. I was there to pick up a prisoner from the local Sheriff's Office. I pulled up the NOTAMS for the airport on my Ipad and found the airport to be closed. During my flight planning I do not remember looking at the NOTAMS for this airport. However; at no time did ATC ever advise me that the airport was closed and the runway was not properly marked for a closer. There were no X's or barricades at either end of the runway that would notate an airport closer. The runway was properly marked with; center lane markers; and thousand foot touch down area. I was also advised to expect the visual approach to [the] runway from ATC. The only indication that I had that the airport was closed were the barricades on the only taxiway; which I only noticed after landing.ATC did ask if I had the NOTAMS and weather; which I informed them that I did. They told me to report the field in sight and to expect the visual approach. Once I cancelled in the air; I was given my new squawk code for my flight to my next destination.I took off; and picked up my IFR clearance in the air; with the squawk code I was given prior to landing.

A pilot reported discovering after landing that the airport was closed. He acknowledged failing to read the airport NOTAMs and adding that the only visible barriers were from the runway to the taxiways. The runway had no X indicating closed.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Aircraft X was eastbound from ZZZ Approach level at 070. There was an aircraft squawking XYXY that was in a CA with Aircraft Y at 069 flying northeast and maneuvering. There was an aircraft nearby squawking a similar code (possibly XXXY) that was maneuvering as well. I issued the traffic to Aircraft X which was approximately 6 miles away and told the pilot that the aircraft is currently flying northeast. I also told him that I am not sure what instruction to give him to help him in the situation since the altitude is unverified and if I turned him right (which would put the aircraft behind the current flight path of the XYXY code) and then the other aircraft turned to the left; it would turn him right into the other aircraft. I then cleared the aircraft to maneuver vertically and horizontally as necessary to ensure he kept clear and instructed to remain at or above 032.Within the next couple of minutes; I updated Aircraft X on the traffic and that the targets are likely to merge and we needed to do something. Another aircraft tried checking on so I said to maintain radio silence and returned to Aircraft X to issue a traffic alert. I gave him the position of the aircraft in the traffic alert but no control instruction because I wasn't sure what the other aircraft was going to do since it was maneuvering laterally and vertically. At some point; the pilot informed me that he was climbing and I observed 074 in the data block. The targets merged with approximately 500 feet of separation. Once the aircraft was behind Aircraft X I informed him of the other aircraft's position and gave him discretion to return to 070 when he felt it was safe.I then called ZZZ Approach and asked if they were talking to an aircraft east of the field squawking XYXY to which they said that they weren't. Shortly thereafter; Approach used the landline to call and say that they were and I told my D Side that I wanted to talk to that aircraft and put them on me. A little bit of time went passed and they still hadn't put the aircraft on me so my D Side asked once again. Shortly thereafter Aircraft Y came on my frequency and I asked him if he was in the aircraft squawking XYXY. The rest of this portion isn't exact wording or everything that was said on frequency but I will give the gist of it. He told me no that it was his wingman.I explained to the pilot that he had just merged with Aircraft X at the IFR altitude of 070 and that I understand they are training but if they can accomplish their mission at VFR altitudes that would be better. He said that he knew that aircraft was there and they try and frequently change altitudes. I said that if this situation happens again and he knows he is going to get that close to another aircraft while he is talking to ATC; that he should tell the controller so we know what is happening. I explained that I was unable to tell the other aircraft how to avoid the collision because I didn't know what Aircraft Y was doing. Aircraft Y also didn't know that he was in my airspace even though he was talking to Approach and that he was ask them to transfer their flight to us next time.Due to the very pleasant and professional conversation that I was able to have with Aircraft Y on frequency after the occurrence; I do believe that he will take the steps that I mentioned of telling whatever controller he's talking to that he plans on coming extremely close to another aircraft so that we can safely resolve the situation. Due to the difference in air frame; Aircraft X had no chance of getting away from the situation if Aircraft Y hadn't seen Aircraft X for himself. If there is formation work occurring outside of ZZZ Approaches airspace on VFR aircraft in a normal IFR corridor; Center needs to be in communication with that formation. While this situation ended well; it did not need to develop into a traffic alert situation and could have easy been mitigated if any of the aforementioned suggestions would have been done.

Center Controller reported an NMAC when a VFR military trainer was at an IFR altitude and came close to an IFR aircraft.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

The illumination of an amber warning light indicating a fault in the auto speedbrake system. Low speed rejected takeoff at approximately 55 KTS [when] I observed the amber 'speed brake do not arm' warning light illuminate. A low speed abort was initiated at approximately 60 KTS. The First Officer confirmed the warning light illumination. Passengers and crew were notified; relevant QRH checklist was completed; Dispatch and Maintenance were contacted. The 'auto speed brake' and 'speed brake load alleviation' systems were assigned MEL's. We then continued the flight.

B737-700 Captain reports an amber 'speed brake do not arm' warning light at 55 KTS and rejects the takeoff. Maintenance MEL's the 'auto speed brake' and 'speed brake load alleviation' systems and the flight departs.


We diverted due to loss of oil in the number two engine.

A B737 diverted due to loss of oil in the right engine.