Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Starting our taxi in Denver; Ground Control gave us instruction to taxi to Runway 34L via F and WA. While taxiing on Taxiway F; my Captain asked for the Before Takeoff checklist. I was accomplishing the before takeoff checklist when my Captain commented that the aircraft ahead of us may have missed the turn to Taxiway WA. Not thinking anything of it; we continued to taxi on Taxiway F. When my Captain was about to turn to Taxiway WA; I commented and pointed to a direction sign in front of us that indicates that Taxiway WA is still straight ahead (arrow pointing up to WA). My Captain also saw the sign and decided to go forward as indicated by the direction sign. As we continued forward; my Captain and I realized that we actually missed Taxiway WA because of the misleading direction sign. The Ground Controller noticed that we did exactly the same thing as the previous aircraft that missed Taxiway WA. The Ground Controller then gave us another instruction to turn inside the WA deice pad and follow the next aircraft on WA. We then taxied on WA to Runway 34L without further incident.We believe that the direction sign just pass Taxiway WA is misleading. The direction sign should be placed just before the Taxiway WA right turn and the direction arrow should be indicating a right turn instead of a straight ahead arrow.

Air Carrier Pilot reported the taxiway signage is misleading at DEN airport.


Non Pegasus B757; map showed slight displacement at TIST Runway 10 Hold Short; but quick position reference (Q10) was not available in the database. On takeoff in Day VMC with unrestricted visibility; GPWS alerted due to map shift. All terrain was in sight at all times. I increased rate of climb slightly but did not fully accomplish escape maneuver. If memory is available; quick position reference data should be available for all regular destination airports.

B757 First Officer detected a slight FMC position error taking Runway 10 at TIST for departure and elected to continue the takeoff in VMC. A GPWS terrain warning is generated just after rotation; but the departure path is visually clear.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 2000

During my 48 years of flying; 36 as an airline pilot; we have all witnessed major improvements in equipment and technology. Most were fully tested and vetted prior to the introduction into the flight decks of our passenger aircraft. The latest such technology is the iPad. My comments need to be prefaced by stating that computers are a revolutionary technology with which I am very comfortable and in the use of which I am extremely well versed. That being said; the rush to put the iPad into full use aboard our fleets; WITHOUT BACKUP PAPER MANUALS ON BOARD; is an extremely poor decision and could lead to unintended; very bad conclusions. There needs to be several more years of testing; training and evaluation prior to their full stand alone implementation. There needs to be several training and checking cycles during which the electronic pad is used as the primary information and reference source. Data should be collected; evaluated and codified to determine the practicality and desirability of full implementation. The collected data needs to be compared against a base line established from training and checking session using the existing paper manuals. This is the only means to determine the feasibility and safety of full implementation. The data collected must be the evaluations of LINE PILOTS ONLY; and must not be allowed to be skewed by the inclusion of data related to line check airmen; pilot instructors or standards Captains. These individuals are highly trained in the use of the iPad and their jobs require daily usage. This is not the case with the average line airman.You are strongly urged to prevent our airline from 'RUSHING TO JUDGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION' of the iPad without far more training and evaluation.The potential for an aircraft accident or incident related to premature implementation is not acceptable.

An A320 Captain expressed concern about the proposed implementation of iPads as the sole flight deck source of information and data currently provided through paper documents and publications. The reporter believes an extended period of vetting; with the paper documents retained as backups; should be required to insure reliability and provide flight crew with adequate opportunity to gain facility and confidence in their use.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On final; ATC advised windshear alert -30 knots at 200 feet; Company in front of us reported windshear and advised 'going around'. We received a windshear alert and commenced a go-around. Several aircraft were forced to go-around leading to frequency congestion and concerns about fuel and diversion airports. Forecast weather did not require alternate fuel. Initially ATC sent us to hold with the expectation of getting right back into KLAS. As we entered holding; ATC said getting back into KLAS would be delayed with windshear and microbursts overhead. We attempted to ACARS Dispatch with diversion plan; received 'NO COMM' message. Requested ATC clearance to ZZZ; we were given a heading and began setup and briefing for descent into ZZZ. We expected to land with 4;700 pounds of fuel. ATC later advised us that landing ZZZ was not an option as we were number seven in line due to other diverts. Controller suggested ZZZ1. We advised ATC Minimum Fuel and asked for and received vectors to ZZZ1. Field was VFR and we landed on Runway X with 4300 pounds of fuel. Based on our fuel and available information; landing at ZZZ1 was the safest course of action. Once on the ground we worked with Dispatch; the Chief Pilot in the Operations Center and local FBO to obtain paperwork and authorizations for return trip to KLAS.

Air carrier Captain reported inability to communicate with Dispatch during a diversion.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A KC135 was handed off from East RADAR to West RADAR on a heading of 210; inbound for the airport requesting ILS approach to Runway XXL. I was training a Developmental who accepted the hand off and turned the aircraft to a heading of 220. At that same time there was a B212 helicopter maneuvering in the southeast practice area. The Developmental instructed the B212 to fly no further west than their present position. There was no response from the helicopter. The KC135 advised that he had traffic at his 12 o'clock and five miles same altitude. The developmental told the KC135 that the aircraft was a helicopter and would maneuver no further west then his present position. The KC135 advised that he was climbing for traffic. The helicopter reported the KC135 in sight when the aircraft were 2 miles and 700 FT apart. The helicopter was told to maintain visual separation from the KC135. The helicopter did not respond.

I was training in West RADAR. A KC135 was IFR and level at 030 on a 210 vector for an ILS Runway XXL. A VFR helicopter was maneuvering approximately 10 miles southeast of the airport. The altitude was approximately 029. The KC135 reported traffic at 12 O'clock and 5 miles at same altitude. I tried to reach the helicopter and instruct him to maneuver no further west than his current position anticipating that with a slight turn; the KC135 would pass by him with sufficient lateral separation. The helicopter did not respond to my transmission. I turned the KC135 10 degrees to a 220 heading and informed him that the helicopter would remain southeast of him. I said this to the KC135; because I was confident that I would be able to reach the helicopter. Instead; it took two additional transmissions for the helicopter to respond with the traffic insight and I instructed him to maintain visual separation/caution wake turbulence. During my attempt to regain communication with the helicopter; the KC135 advised that he was climbing to avoid traffic. He leveled at 040 and then descended back to 030 once he knew the traffic was maintaining visual separation. The KC135 stated on frequency that if he would not have climbed; he would have 'hit that guy' Later investigations showed that the KC135 passed 700 FT above and 2 miles laterally from the helicopter. I should have taken more positive control and turned the KC135 farther away. I should not have been so fixated on regaining communication with a helicopter; when I could have easily turned the aircraft I had direct communication with. I recommend more monitor time with CPC's to gain more perspective and professional knowledge of the position.

TRACON Controller providing OJT described a NMAC event when IFR military traffic took evasive action to avoid a VFR helicopter conducting practice maneuvers. Traffic had been issued by the Developmental.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 16500; Flight Crew Type 150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

No conflicts with other aircraft that I know of; I did a very careful pre-flight and run-up following every letter on these checklists. The aircraft just came out of paint. All surfaces were removed by the paint shop and I found out later that settings to the pitch system were compromised prior to re-installation. On takeoff when the aircraft lifted in the air; full nose down command was required; I was hitting the stops on down elevator. I reduced the power and landed straight ahead on the remaining runway.  I taxied clear of the runway and went back to the paint shop. The next day fixtures were brought out to the paint shop and it was found the trim jackscrew and the rod end for the trim tab were way out of adjustment.

Piper Cherokee pilot reported difficulty with aircraft pitch control immediately after takeoff due to an improper rigging of the pitch trim system. Pilot reduced power and and landed safely on the remaining runway surface.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During an operational line check by [Instructor]. It was brought my attention that while covering all items on the checklist ; I did not physically have the checklist in hand to review. And this is true. We are of the mindset of on-time. And in a busy environment like [Airport]; our attention is definitely on our surroundings and traffic if weather is VFR. The [aircraft type] Checklists are simple; and memorization occurs quickly with repeated flights along the same routes.This was an observation; not a detection.[Instructor] agreed that its almost too simple. Except that FAR Part 135 requires that the checklist be 'used' at all times during operations. While most pilots have learned that a checklist is a verification procedure; and not a work list; in 121 and 135 it is indeed a work list. And the Regulations dictate that we use them for all phases of operations. [Instructor] would like to let the committee know that he considered conversation with the pilot as counsel; and that no further action is necessary in that regard for the pilot.I spoke at length with [Instructor] on this issue; and the conclusion for me is 'complacency'. We fly the same plane; route; profile; speed; frequencies; all of it over and over. It can become as if we were the autopilots. The danger here is that irregular use of the normal checklists can lead to other areas where we let our guard down. Listening for our call sign; automatically dialing in the next frequency; Using Beta and Braking unreasonably hard to make the first turn off are all potential places where things can and will go wrong when we become complacent.My personal recommendation is to place Card Stock (Not laminated) Normal Operations Checklists in the aircraft. If they get bent and beat up or get lost it means they are being used. Cheap to replace. Very Cheap. Using an Ipad for checklist is cumbersome at best. If you wear glasses; its an annoyance. and you have to either go back and forth from approach plate to checklist (go forbid you tap the wrong thing); or use multiple devices thus increasing rather than lessening the pilot workload.

C208B Pilot reported not physically having the checklist in hand to review during operations; and recommends the use of a physical checklist in addition to an iPad.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While on our descent into ZZZ; we noticed a very fine hairline crack in the left windshield. After looking at it for a few seconds; we then saw that it was visibly growing. This was followed immediately by a 'L WSHLD HEAT' caution message. It was the First Officer (FO) leg; so I reached down for the QRH. After about 30 seconds; there was a loud 'pop' sound. I looked up to see that the left windshield was completely shattered. I ran the non-EICAS QRH for a shattered windshield. It was not clear to me if the core ply or inboard ply was shattered; so opted to choose 'Yes' when I reached that question to be conservative. We informed ATC of the situation; I felt I had sufficient control over the cabin altitude and cabin pressure differential pressure. They assigned us 10;000ft (as I recall) and asked if we needed lower yet. We responded 'negative' and were able to descend via the rest of the ALDAN 1 RNAV arrival. As we descended below 8;000ft; I was able to complete the QRH. The FO landed the aircraft with no problem. I finally had a chance to notify [operations and maintenance] after blocking in.

While on our descent below 10;000 ft; the FO and I were already task-saturated with managing the shattered windshield QRH when a flight attendant called to tell us that the passenger sitting in seat 1A was having trouble breathing. The passenger claimed that her throat was swelling/closing and that she was about to use her EpiPen. She was also asking for paramedics to meet the aircraft at the gate. At this point; I believe we were descending through 6;000 ft and on a 10 mile left downwind for runway. I immediately [advised] ATC and told them the details of the situation. ATC told us that paramedics would be waiting for us at the gate. They reassigned our landing runway which was much closer to our arrival gate. I made a PA; stating that we have a medical emergency; and asked passengers to remain in their seats until our sick passenger was off the aircraft. A flight attendant told me that there was a doctor onboard offering medical assistance; which I granted. After loading the new approach and performing the runway change items; the flight attendant called again to tell us that the passenger now claimed to be feeling better. She opted not to use the EpiPen and wanted to cancel the request for paramedics to meet the aircraft. I thought that that request was ill-advised and decided that she would get the medical attention she initially requested. We landed and taxied to the gate with no delay. Paramedics were standing by at the gate. After blocking in; I left the seatbelt sign on; while the passenger walked off the aircraft. The paramedics said that the woman refused medical attention. The flight attendants told me that the passenger did not use any emergency equipment; her own or the company's. The only thing she received was some water. I finally got a chance to inform OCC of the situation after we blocked in.

Bombardier CRJ Captain reported a shatter windshield associated with a 'WINDSHIELD OVERHEAT' message and a passenger medical emergency during descent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 10100; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On departure we were executing the LADYJ FOUR (RNAV) departure. Climbing through 10;000 our FMS began to accelerate beyond 250 knots around OROSZ Intersection as programmed in the FMS. The LADYJ departure indicates that 250 knots shall be maintained until advised by ATC. We briefed this and were aware of it; however; the way the information is presented is not on the pictorial of the chart and I believe it leaves a significant gap for error; because the flight crew must either assume that the Controller will issue normal speed; or the flight crew must constantly ask for normal speed with subsequent controllers. Also; all aircraft are programmed to accelerate to climb speed above 10;000 feet which requires a non-standard method of selecting manual speed versus having the MCDU command speed appropriate to the airspace and configuration of the aircraft. Selecting manual speed could result in a low speed event in the subsequent climb. Just passing OROSZ the Controller issued normal speed; and I believe this was a non-event. On further research this departure is mentioned as a poorly designed departure and I would hazard to guess there are numerous safety reports on it.

Air carrier First Officer reported the FMS began to accelerate beyond 250 knots above 10;000 feet while on the LADYJ FOUR (RNAV) even though the programmed SID requires 250 knots until advised by ATC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 30300; Flight Crew Type 5600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

The flight was an empty ferry flight. The flight plan showed 7.8 Fuel Over Destination (FOD) for arrival. The Weather was marginal with a long wait for departures. I called dispatch to bring the FOD up to 10K; which was granted. After departure; we were cleared to climb to FL400 by ATC. Approximately 45 minutes into the flight; a left engine duct leak light on the overhead panel illuminated. The associated 'Left bleed duct leak' EICAS message also appeared. We followed the QRH which had us shut off the left engine bleed; left pack; and the isolation switch off.  Since the left side was affected; the APU bleed air switch was also turned off.  We continued with a one pack operation. I reported this issue to Maintenance Control and dispatch. I received no response from either of them.  I entered the discrepancy in the aircraft logbook. {Some time later} I noticed a change in pressurization in my ears. I looked up to at the pressurization panel in time to see the right pack off light illuminate along with eicas messages 'right pack off'; and 'right pack temp'. Being unable to maintain cabin altitude; I asked the F/O to request a lower altitude from ATC while he worked the problem. ATC was told of our pressurization issue. ATC gave us a step down descent to a lower altitude. While descending; the F/O worked to restore right pack operation. Of course; the cabin continued to climb. Once we received the 10000 foot cabin altitude warning siren; we donned O2; declared an emergency; and asked for and received 10000 feet. ATC asked for souls on board; and fuel on board.  The cabin eventually reached approximately 17000 feet. All passenger cabin O2 masks were deployed. Once we reached 10000 feet msl; and being more stable; ATC asked us if we wanted to divert. Initially we told them no; and that we were trying to restore right pack operation. Once flight was stable at 10000 feet; we followed the QRH in an attempt to restore right pack operation. Our FOD was now reading 5.6. We told ATC that we would keep them informed of our intentions once we were able to possibly restore right pack operation. We were able to restore right pack operation and asked for a climb to FL220. The fuel savings was significant and allowed us to continue to destination. We cancelled the 'emergency aircraft' designation; and continued without further issues. A logbook entry was made and Maintenance Control was informed of our status via ACARS. We arrived at the hangar with 7.4 FOB.

A B757-300 Captain experiences a left engine duct leak light on the overhead panel at FL400 on a ferry flight. QRH procedures are complied with and the left pneumatic system and pack are shut down. Some time later the right pack overheats and shuts down. An emergency descent is initiated to 10;000 feet where the right pack is restored and the flight continues to destination at FL220.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Weather; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Company Policy

A line of extreme precipitation was sitting just outside the northwestern boundary of the sector extending from the adjacent Center airspace southwest to northeast into Atlanta's airspace. Aircraft at all altitudes were deviating around this line when I first sat down to work the sector. At first; I was getting point outs from both adjacent sectors for aircraft that were flying along my northern and northwestern boundaries. However; as the line of precipitation grew and solidified; the aircraft that were being pointed out to me by adjacent sectors were now deviating further into my airspace for longer periods of time. I stopped accepting point outs and asked sectors to hand the aircraft off instead. There were multiple aircraft that were handed off to me that had incorrect altitudes for their direction of flight without prior coordination and approval. There were several situations of deviating aircraft within my airspace that caused situations of converging traffic at the same altitude. Flights in my airspace at 32;000 ft. and 34;000 ft. were also experiencing continuous chop to turbulence and were causing additional workload by requesting climbs to 36;000 ft. and above. Because of the bad rides at 32;000 ft. and 34;000 ft.; this increased the complexity of separating the converging traffic at 36;000 ft.; etc. All of this was occurring while the TMA (Traffic Monitor Alert) showed the sector in the 'green' with a low traffic count below 10; even though I was working 16 plus aircraft. The complexity of the sector started to intensify as I was being relieved for a break due to aircraft calling for different altitudes as well as other Center controllers calling on the line for coordination. The sector should have been at least flagged as yellow in TMA and reflect a more accurate projection of the increasing volume aircraft which continued to be routed into my airspace for the weather deviations. There is a known issue with TMA for two sectors which keeps it from accurately depicting projected traffic volume. Because of this; spikes in traffic volume at these sectors goes unnoticed by TMU (Traffic Management Unit) and management and no corrective actions are taken in a timely matter to ensure the controller is not overwhelmed. Often the sector volume and complexity builds quickly and creates an unsafe situation where the controller is over tasked before management takes notice.The TMA and ERAM (En Route Automation Modernization) systems need to be corrected so that the TMA works as intended. This Center is currently trying to use a mitigation by having the west area supervisor run a FEA (Flow Evaluation Area) to look at traffic volume for the sector; however; it is not effective. FEA information is only displayed on a desktop at the supervisor desk and is not displayed in the Status Information Area where the sector team can see it. CICs and FLMs (Front Line Managers) have not received any training on how to use the system that creates FEAs; nor is there any written procedure on the use of the FEAs. The FEA does not show the agreed upon sector volume thresholds indicating when the sector is 'Red.' A 'Red' sector is described in the SOP that requires TMU to notify the area Front Line Manager or Controller in Charge of the traffic volume projection.

Center Controller reported weather deviations caused their sector to become overloaded; and Traffic Management software was not working correctly.


Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 1500

At [hospital helicopter pad] following the completion of a [medical] transport; the crew and I completed our walk around and started the aircraft...with all required lights on. I completed the takeoff checklist and after making the required calls (stating our location; direction of departure; and destination); I increased collective and established the aircraft in a stable hover in order to perform hover checks. As I was preparing to slide left with the left side crewmember (our paramedic) clearing my slide; he advised me to hold my position immediately because another [helicopter] was about to land on top of us.Eventually the other aircraft saw us and he/she slid to their left and established their helicopter in a steady hover at approximately 30 feet up; 40 feet to our 9 o'clock. They remained in that hover for approximately 30-40 seconds and then waved off to the south. I attempted to contact that aircraft on the common frequency but they did not answer.When they were clear and out of their turn and heading back to the north; I departed to the south and made a turn out to the west; enroute...for fuel. I contacted flight communication and cleared to the west without them saying anything to us or advising us of another aircraft in the area. If it weren't for the paramedic seeing the searchlight of the other helicopter and his timely call; I am fairly we certain that we would have been hit by the other aircraft. The other aircraft should have been up on the helicopter common frequency. Also; the pad is not big enough for two aircraft to be turning in such close proximity without having direct communications with each other.

Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter attempting to land on the same hospital helipad from which he was lifting off.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

When stairs were brought up to the aircraft; I went aft to disarm the doors. After disarming the doors; I went to the lavatory and while in the lav I heard the 1L door begin to open. The door motor didn't sound as though it had run as long as a normal cycle (only for a second or less); and when exiting the lav I looked toward the 1L door to see that it was just slightly cracked open. The ground crew continued opening the door after a short delay. When the door resumed its upward motion a few moments later; it began to bind on the CRA [stowable Crew Rest Area] and the CRA moved noticeably aft as the binding got worse. The door stopped about 24 inches open and was clearly binding on the CRA. Maintenance boarded and began to examine the problem; stairs were positioned at the 1R door; and deplaning was accomplished without incident. A maintenance writeup was made regarding the problem. Preflight in ZZZZ had been normal; the CRA was secured with latch in the 'LOCKED' position. I did note a prodigious amount of bedding present in the CRA (full to the ceiling) and removed/replaced the bedding during preflight. During postflight (following the incident); I was able to see into the bunks with the CRA deployed several inches and they were packed with a large amount of bedding material as well. Maintenance noted as they entered the CRA (and cleared out the bedding material) that the latch was still secured in the 'LOCKED' position even though the CRA was deployed several inches. Likewise; the handle used to bypass the electric deployment motor and manually deploy the unit was fully in (stowed). The 1L door operation was normal and door arming was accomplished without incident or note of abnormality. There was never any visual indication in flight that the CRA had deployed; nor was there any EICAS indication. Upon arrival in ZZZZ1; the CRA was stowed at the time of door disarming. (The design of the plastic around the arming handle is such that it is fairly apparent if the CRA is not stowed). I later learned that a maintenance review showed a writeup a day prior to the incident describing damage to the 1L door plastic caused by the CRA. It appears this may have happened more than once. My best guess is that the bedding constrained within the bunks when the CRA was closed exerted some pressure upon the locking mechanism. Motion of the 1L door as it opened created just enough movement in the structure for it to spring free a small amount. I don't know if the lock pin itself was broken; as we departed the aircraft before maintenance had started troubleshooting.-If initial opening of the door upon block-in was accomplished by the operating crew; it would be readily apparent if something inside the aircraft was obstructing the door's travel. -During preflight; the CRA is stowed and the bunks are not accessible for inspection. Additionally; since the bunk shrinks as the CRA is stowed any materials inside have the potential to be compressed upon CRA stowing. As such; materials other than the bunk cushions should not be stowed in the bunks themselves. -Crews have become accustomed to difficulty closing the CRA. The electric motor seldom works and sometimes it takes two crewmembers working together to successfully stow the unit. [Consequently]; the forces created by compressing bunk contents (not necessarily additional materials; but potentially a binding or compression of the cushions themselves) may not have been deemed unreasonable upon closure. Design improvements to the CRA such that the standard deployment and stowage mechanisms are used would allow for better crew recognition of an abnormal condition. -Spare/used bedding accumulates in some aircraft to the point that there is little additional space to stow it. This creates issues and often leads to creative solutions; none of which are ideal. (Such as stowing bedding within the bunks themselves).

When ground crew attempted to open the 1L door of the reporter's cargo configured MD11 the door bound up on a partially deployed flight crew rest module.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 300

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

Lost cabin pressurization at 15;000 FT. Announced my intentions to ATC to descend to 10;000 FT. Received no immediate response. I initiated my descent and reported again; 'emergency descent. Descending to 10;000 FT.' At 14;700 FT; ATC acknowledged my transmission and cleared my aircraft to 10;000 FT.

A PA-31 lost pressurization at 15;000 FT; so the pilot declared an emergency and began a descent to 10;000 FT before ATC acknowledged because they were slow responding.


Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 703

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 20100; Flight Crew Type 85

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

When climbing out on the ORD2 departure after reaching 10000 ft the 250 knot speed restriction was accidentally exceeded. The restriction was lifted while we were approaching 13000; but we were already not complying with the 250 knot restriction.

Pre-departure briefing included the speed restriction of 250 kts until cleared to accelerate on the ORD2 departure. Nonetheless; the airspeed bug drove the flight directors pitch down to accelerate as we climbed above 10;000 ft. All 3 of us missed that I followed the flight director and accelerated to ECON climb speed of roughly 300 kts without clearance to accelerate. It only occurred to us that we had inadvertently violated the speed limit when ATC said 'resume normal speed'. The rest of the flight was unremarkable.

Air carrier flight crew reported exceeding the speed restriction that limits aircraft to 250 knots until 13;000 feet on the ORD2 SID.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors

The flight was slightly delayed for maintenance at gate when ready for push. When door reclosed and announcements repeated was doing compliance check for cabin secure. Passenger was in emergency exit row. You would think exit row passenger of all passenger would be willing and able to comply with crew instructions. This man should never be allowed to sit in an exit seat again! At the time of walk through his seatbelt was undone was under his feet in aisle and newspaper was under his feet. I requested he stow bag and laptop and fasten seatbelt and asked if newspaper was trash could I take it for him. He said no he was reading it so I asked him to remove it from floor in exit row so no one would get hurt if we actually had to use exit; then I continued down aisle. On passing him on my way back he still had not complied with one thing I said. I seriously thought about removing him from exit seat; but did not want to escalate situation. So I made the same request AGAIN. He told me he was keeping his laptop on his lap because he could. I was wrong. I then informed him that I was not wrong and that it was in my manual as such and I would be happy to show him. Finally he said I will put it away but you are wrong and then told to LEAVE HIM ALONE. I talked to the CA of the situation. CA told me to show him in magazine where it is required to stow laptops. I didn't because as I said it would have escalated. This sort of behavior is unacceptable in exit row passenger. This man was of course one of the airline's [high] mile passenger. It is a shame because they hold a status that we cannot do our jobs. Something truly needs to be done. Our hands seemed to be tied and I have a plane full of passenger to protect. When these passenger disobey federal regulations there should be repercussions.

CRJ-200 Flight Attendant reported a passenger in an emergency exit row was defiant and non-compliant when asked to stow his laptop and remove newspapers from the exit row floor beneath his feet.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 3475; Flight Crew Type 340

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Chain of events. ZZZ Ground cleared me to taxi from FBO. 'Taxi to Runway XX via Taxiway 1; Taxiway 2; Taxiway 3; cross Runway XY.' On Taxiway 3; approaching Runway YX/XY; I was looking down at my checklist; when I looked up; I was startled to see a regional jet on relatively short (1 mile?) final for Runway YX. After I crossed XY/XY; the regional jet landed without incident.Human Performance Considerations. First; when taxiing; one needs to be focused outside the airplane. When approaching a runway; slow to look for landing/departing traffic. If I had seen the regional jet earlier; I may have either increased taxi speed; determined no speed change was required or called Ground and advised that I would wait for landing traffic.With the pandemic; until recently; commercial air travel has been significantly reduced. Tower personnel may have been reduced as well. I believe one Controller was handling Ground and Tower. With activity picking up; ATC needs to be staffed appropriately as well.

GA pilot reported a conflict after being told to cross a runway; and while crossing observed an aircraft on short final. Pilot cited distraction and ATC staffing as contributing factors.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

During taxi out; passenger wouldn't put his seatbelt on.  His Mom told me to 'Force him to put it on.' I declined.  The Dad and Mom both attempted to put seatbelt on their son; but no success.  He screamed and refused all of the way out to runway.  I asked the Mom 'How old is your son'?  She told me that he was 4 years old.  I then told her that he also has to wear a face mask.  Her response was; 'Good luck with that.' Another Flight Attendant also tried to get compliance from them; no luck as well.  I called the CA to inform him.  The other FA informed the Mom that we were going to have to return to gate; and remove them.  We returned to gate; and [they] deplaned.

Flight Attendant reported a child would not wear a seatbelt; nor a face mask and was eventually deplaned.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Myself and the B Flight Attendant (FA) noticed an odor in the back of the AC (Aircraft) shortly after boarding started; halfway through boarding; we tried notifying the CA (Captain) several times to let him know about the odor and finally called the A FA because they were not answering the call in the flight deck. When the B was able to talk to the CA and voice our concerns they were told it was moth balls and that the smell had been up in the boarding area as well. When we asked if we could get some fresh air in the back galley by cracking the aft AC doors the CA said no. The smell continued to get worse and the B and myself started to experience irritation in our throats and noses we concluded to that we weren't okay pushing back until we knew for certain what we were smelling and/or causing the irritation. The B FA went forward to let the CA know along with the A FA at this point boarding was almost finished. Approximately 5 minutes after the B went forward to ask for an in-flight supervisor to come the plane; I was still in the aft galley of the aircraft; the D FA made their way back to see if they could smell what we were smelling; by this time my nose; eyes; throat and face were burning/itching; along with shaking hands. The D FA could smell an odor as well and I went forward to get some fresher air by the boarding door and also let the CA know my symptoms were getting worse. When I went into the flight deck to show him the type of reaction I was having he said someone is on the way. A CSA (Customer Service Agent) supervisor was the first to come to the plane; by this time I was also starting to experience flushing of my facial skin and hands along with burning/itching on the front of my shins and continued shaking of my hands and arms. I stayed by the boarding door for the remainder of the time trying to get as much fresh air as possible. In flight supervisors; mechanics and some others came to the plane. A PA was made that a strong odor was being smelled in the back of the AC and that it smelled like moth balls if a PAX had an item in their carry on that they thought may be causing the odor to please ring the FA call button; someone in the back of the AC did ring their button and a carry on was identified where the odor was coming from. It was removed from the plane and put underneath as checked baggage. At this point I was still experiencing the same symptoms and pulled myself for safety reasons from flying the rest of my trip. Reserves were called to take myself and the B FA places. Once off the aircraft; fire/paramedics came to look both of us over. I was still experiencing symptoms; vitals were taken and when asked what we were exposed to; I could not answer that question because whatever was causing the reaction was not identified it was just put under in the belly of the AC. I was told that the symptoms I was experiencing were all consistent with being exposed to some kind of irritant. After the medics left we went out to see if fresh air would help it did help some but came to the conclusion that since we were unsure of what we had been exposed to we would like to be further evaluated. We were taken to the Medical Center per our request to be further examined. While there they took vitals; blood and had a physical examination. It was determined that whatever we were exposed to was causing an allergic reaction. I was treated and released.It concerns me that the bag was removed from the AC and just put under with all the other passenger luggage; we have NO IDEA what we were exposed to; was it even SAFE for this item to be in the belly of the AC; was it a hazmat item that could be a safety/security risk? Maybe the policy needs to be looked at regarding the removal or carry-on luggage and why it is being removed. Could we have potentially put other passengers and crew at risk?

Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported having a reaction to fumes coming from a passenger carry-on bag; and questioned the safety of relocating the bag to the checked baggage compartment of the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

On climbout; cabin temperature began climbing [and] we were unable to control temperature. All zone temperature indicators eventually read 99 with actual conditions well above. Aircraft side panels were boiling hot. No EICAS messages displayed. Contacted maintenance control for assistance in trouble shooting situation - USELESS. Unable to control temperature and concerned about the extreme heat decided to divert to [an alternate airport].

B767 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after the cabin temperature rose to dangerously high levels and could not be controlled.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 255; Flight Crew Type 220

Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

The student and I conducted a complete pre flight of the aircraft and all procedures appeared normal. However; upon sumping the engine sump for fuel; the butterfly clip may have gotten stuck on the cowling. However this was easily overlooked as no more fuel was spilling from the sump. Normal startup; taxi and runup procedures were performed and no abnormalities occurred. Upon takeoff total power loss was encountered at about 50 FT AGL. I; the Instructor; immediately took over and safely landed the aircraft on grass inside airport property. No damage was inflicted on the aircraft; airport property; or beings during the event. The cause of the power loss is still unknown; however I can say I learned a valuable lesson. A thorough preflight is key to a safe flight. Checking ALL engine components is required and cannot be overlooked.

PA28 Instructor Pilot experiences a power failure at 50 FT AGL with the student at the controls. The Instructor takes control and successfully lands on airport property with no damage to airport or aircraft. Fuel starvation is suspected.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 25

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft bounced at slightly higher speed than normal upon landing. Over correction applied and aircraft left runway.

Pilot of a light single engine aircraft reported a bounced landing at higher than normal speed resulted in a runway excursion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 4500

While I personally approve of Air Carrier X trying to update its IT and giving pilots iPads and the new Jeppesen Pro program; and I understand that the company would like to rid itself of paper charts over time; I do not think the new Ram mount is a good product. I tried several different ways to mount the device and could not find any position it did not interfere with something. First; when it is on the window; not only does it interfere with visibility; but it interferes with the possible need to open the window and the release handle. When the mount is placed on the preferred location on the cabinet door of the storage box; it either interferes with that same handle for the window; the crank for that window; the yoke; or it hits your knee. I feel it is a very unsafe device and should not be used. Under a perfect situation; it may work. But if you have to get the window open in an emergency; or if you have to react suddenly to control inputs such as an engine failure; I feel that Ram mount would be in the way. It may work with some aircraft; but I do not feel it works well with the B-777. It's a hazard.

B777 Captain expressed concern about the design of the iPad mount; stating it interferes with other components.


Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Cleared to taxi via C; B5; B; G; D to Runway 19L.  Once established on Taxiway B; First Officer (FO) advised he was heads down to load final numbers into FMC for takeoff while I was looking for signs marking Taxiway G.  I passed Taxiway G thinking it was B7; but realized my mistake as I could see no further angled taxiways to my right.  I stopped the aircraft to obtain an amended clearance from Ground Control; and was re-cleared to taxi via B; Z; and D.  This was my 13th trip into LAS this month; with most departures previously operating from Runway 1R.  Prior to gate departure on this flight; I briefed the hot spots and expected runway; but did not brief an expected taxi route as it is unpredictable due to construction.  Although I missed the turn; traffic was not a factor and at no time were we near a runway intersection or in danger of incurring on a runway.Contributing factors were poor or non-existent markings to indicate Taxiway G from Taxiway B; and difficulty in reading the 10-9 airport diagram on my iPad due to bright sunlight conditions.

A B737 Captain taxiing to Runway 19R on Taxiway B at LAS missed Taxiway G thinking it was B7. Reporter cited airport signage and relatively dim iPad in bright light as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 300

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

On route to our destination ZZZ Airport; we started to accumulate ice at FL270. The Captain proceeded to switch on both Engine anti-ice switches as well as airframe anti-ice. A couple seconds later our left engine began to roll back. About a minute or so after that; the right engine began surging but did not roll back completely. We then [Requested Priority Handling] and asked ATC for help to the nearest suitable airport. We then were cleared to descend to 11;000 ft. I started my descent and tried to keep the right engine turning by keeping a low power setting. Meanwhile; the left engine kept surging so I pulled the left throttle to flight idle. While in the descent the Captain ran the emergency checklist items and handled communications with ATC. ATC then cleared us to descend to 4000 ft. and vectored us for the ILS Runway XX at ZZZ. Passing through 10;000 ft. we noticed that the right engine had stabilized and was able to provide sufficient power for landing while the left engine would also provide sufficient power at a lower power setting. The landing phase was uneventful.

Falcon 20 First Officer reported a dual engine rollback while encountering icing conditions; which required a descent and diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 6250; Flight Crew Type 775

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While providing a sightseeing trip to a friend in order to see a specific home from the air I lost track of my altitude and was at one time 350 feet lower than I should have been. The Tower Controller had approved a descent from 1;500 feet to 1;000 feet in order for me to be able to take some photos. When I noticed my altitude; while trying to provide her a good photo; at 650 feet MSL over the water and at times I estimate 650 feet AGL over the land. I violated 91.119(b) in that; 'Over congested areas; an altitude of 1;000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2;000 feet.' To correct; I immediately applied power and climbed back to altitude over the water.At no time was the aircraft in any danger of hitting the ground or do I believe I was 'zooming.' The aircraft never banked more than 15 degrees and only exceeded slightly more than 1G at approximately 90 knots IAS.For me the worst part was not in the violation of FAR 91 regs; but as an experienced CFII and pilot of over XX years and XXXX hours; I lost situational awareness and lost 350 feet of altitude without realizing it. If a student of mine had done this; I would have immediately called his/her attention to it before a 100 feet deviation.A contributing factor was not flying regularly due to the Coronavirus. I was not as proficient as I should have been. Three weeks earlier I had flown a solo warm up flight but obviously this was not enough. In the future I will give myself more proficiency flights and humble myself and fly with another CFI to keep my skill level where it needs to be.

Pilot reported while on a sightseeing trip they went too low; pilot eventually caught the mistake and climbed back to a normal altitude.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Aircraft

I work the #X position regularly on the aircraft. Personal observation of the close proximity in which #Z and #X [Flight Attendants] sit; facing each other; is of grave concern to me; due to COVID-19. While occupying the jump seats at XX; true social distancing isn't possible. Depending on height it can be a challenge to sit without our knees touching or without adjusting our feet under the jump seat. All a non-issue; pre-pandemic.The #X flight attendant does not have a door arming or disarming responsibility. There's no reason for the #X's preflight; inflight; or boarding duties to change. I'm suggesting for safety and health reasons the #X Flight Attendant is temporarily relocated to an unoccupied jump seat at door Y for takeoff and landing.

Flight Attendant reported concerns with the close proximity of occupied jump seats during takeoff and landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While taxiing out; Tower informed us that we had a new clearance and to contact Clearance Delivery on our #2 radio and monitor TWR. Just prior to contacting clearance; someone on tower stated revised clearance coming via CPDLC. We received the clearance within seconds of hearing that transmission. We uploaded the new clearance using the load prompt; re-entered the departure rwy; SID; arrival rwy and STAR. However the concern with the procedure is that there appears to be no way of verifying that the new uploaded departure is accurate. When we reviewed the new route we did notice a change to the first fix. However; unlike our procedures at the gate where we verify the clearance against our release there is no way to do this using this procedure when a change comes via CPDLC. Did the fight crew miss something? Or is this an accepted risk that the crews/company are expected to take?

B767 First Officer reported receipt of a revised route clearance via CPDLC during taxi out that was uploaded to the FMC via the load prompt; but was concerned that this procedure did not allow the flight crew time to adequately check the route as they normally done at the gate.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 22000

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On climbout the aircraft hit what must have been wake turbulence as there was no weather in the area or rough rides reported. The aircraft was rolled 45 degrees left and pitched nose up as we approached our 7;000 FT climb clearance. The pilot flying disengaged the autopilot to regain control and we subsequently climbed to approximately 7;400 FT during recovery. The turbulence was reported to ATC but no mention of altitude was made.

B737-700 Captain reported wake vortex encounter on climb out from SEA that rolled the aircraft 45 deg and pitched the nose up.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Approach gave us a heading to intercept the 28C localizer.  Captain turned to that heading but didn't not select a different NAV mode.  I assumed he was waiting for wings level to select NAV.  At wings level; he did nothing so I asked if we were cleared for the approach.  He thanked me and selected NAV.  At that point I believe we were too far to intercept the course.  Approach asked if we were going through course.  They gave us a heading to the south to reintercept.  Captain left autopilot on and the aircraft was slow turning and I didn't take the plane and turn the autopilot off.  Approach called traffic 1;000 ft above on the 27L approach.  We had the traffic and were given an additional turn south; and decent to 4;000 ft and recleared for the Visual for 28C. [Reporter stated a contributing] cause was end of a 4 day trip and we were tired.  Also; we had more discussion in sterile [cockpit] than normal as an aircraft ahead of us had reported a drone approximately 400 ft below them on final.  I was uncertain which aircraft this was relative to our position on the approach; so we were discussing that. [Reporter resolves to] pay closer attention.  Disengage autopilot to correct more quickly.

I was pilot flying.  We were vectored to the ILS for runway 28C in ORD. We were instructed to join localizer for 28C. I was planning to use LNAV  and VNAV until outside the final approach fix. As we turned to vector to join; I paused before hitting LNAV because usually the aircraft would turn towards course immediately and if you wait it will fly the heading and then join. Approach had us a little too close for that and with 15 knots of wind from south we flew through the course. The FO pointed that out and I turned at same time as approach gave us another heading to join. We were also given a lower altitude. Auto pilot was on. We then joined the localizer and continued the approach. We were vectored close in and with the 15 knot cross wind; pushed through localizer. I needed to do better monitoring of where the course was.

Air carrier First Officer reported approach clearance deviation resulting in ATC assigned vectors to restart the approach for an uneventful landing.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

CLT was in late night configuration; landing and departing on only Runway 5. We were cleared for visual approach to Runway 5. CLT Tower cleared us to land on Runway 5. The controller seemed flustered with the work load of only using Runway 5 for both landings and takeoffs. During rollout after landing on Runway 5; Tower instructed us to turn left unto D; left on M; hold short of 36R. The First Officer read back instructions to turn left on D; left on M; hold short of 36R. We expedited off the runway as instructed; turning left at D; left at M; and holding short of 36R. Another aircraft was cleared for takeoff and another was cleared to land; with the Tower Controller sounding flustered with all radio calls to the aircraft on Tower frequency.The Tower Controller then told us to 'on Mike cross Runway 5' which is not possible since M does not cross Runway 5; but instead crosses Runway 36R; [the runway] we are holding short of. The First Officer responded to the Tower Controller by asking; 'confirm you want us to cross Runway 36R on Taxiway Mike' The Tower Controller responded; in a highly irritated and flustered tone 'negative cleared to cross Runway 5 on Mike'. Runway 5 was the Runway that an aircraft was currently taking off on with another landing on short final. The First Officer responded to the Tower that we were holding short of Runway 36R on Taxiway M as instructed; not short of Runway 5.I stayed put and told the First Officer we would sit there holding short of Runway 36R on Taxiway M until the Tower Controller got themselves figured out and gave us a proper clearance to cross the correct runway. After about a minute of barking orders at the other aircraft on frequency; the tower instructed us; correctly this time to 'Cross Runway 36R on Mike; taxi to the ramp' we read back the instructions; and now; having been proper clearance to cross the proper runway; we crossed Runway 36R and proceeded to the ramp without further incident.Of particular concern to me with this event is that the Tower Controller; twice in a row; even after we queried the error after the first mistake; gave us clearance to cross a runway we were not holding short of; but rather the runway that was in use with an aircraft both actively taking off and landing at that time. Runway 36R intersects Runway 5 and this could have led to a very bad situation if we or another aircraft crossed the active runway with an aircraft currently on departure roll and one on final. I believe this would be a good learning experience for the Tower Controllers in CLT since in other instances if we or another crew was not paying attention it could have led to a very bad situation.[I suggest a] better late night procedure for CLT Tower; having another controller working at that point could have helped out the controller working Tower; as they were clearly overloaded by the level of operations they were handling at the time. Have CLT Tower use this as a learning experience to better their operations.

Pilot reported landing at CLT then being issued incorrect crossing instructions from the Tower Controller. Pilot questioned Controller twice; then sat there until the Controller figured out where they were and corrected the instructions.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Flight is a military charter. Ride along agent called to give me estimated cargo numbers; which includes 711 bags at 70 lbs each. I entered the planned numbers in the computer; and advised the agent that we had a max of 15;000 lbs rear. Would like to have at least 10000 lbs aft; with the balance forward. I also asked him for a passenger count and weight. At this time all he had was the passenger count and advised me; 'They look like about 200 lbs each.' I told him that I would show this as a plan; but would need the exact numbers. Sometime later; the agent called back with the pallet weights. I advised the agent to hold on because the weights he gave me well exceed the max numbers I gave him for the rear to the amount of 27145 lbs vs the 15000 lbs max I gave. Once I entered the numbers; I advised him I still needed the passenger weights. I also advised him that we were good with the count. A few minutes later the airport agent called to advise we only has 4500 lbs; plus the PS aft. I advised him that the agent had already called in numbers and that they didn't match what he had given me. He said to hold on and he would call me back. The station agent called back to advise me that yes; there was only 4500 lbs of military aft; I told him that means we are about 19000 lbs shy of the total cargo weight. He then told me to show 9054 lbs on each pallet forward. I asked multiple times; are you sure; uncomfortable with this. I entered the numbers; which meant we are now nose heavy. While I was working on this; and came up with the solution of moving a pallet aft from front; I noticed that the flight showed off the blocks. I verified this with the station agent; and he said yes they were taxing. I advised him to hold on and let me see if I can balance the flight. The only way now to balance the airplane was to move all passenger from business to coach as well as blocking 2 rows. I advised station agent and he said to go ahead and do that; he would let the flight attendants know. At no time were the weights final before the airplane pushed back; which I thought that was procedure with the ride along. I sent copies of the computer record as well as messages to the cockpit and advised the station agent to verify. I received no confirmation of this at all either from the station agent or on board agent. I also am uncomfortable with the fact that the weights on the pallets mysteriously went up 4500 lbs each to make up for the missing weights; that's a lot of bags on a pallet! The flight returned to the gate since the Captain did not want to move all the troops out of business; to move 2 pallets front to aft.

A military charter departing a foreign station with a ride along agent to report aircraft status; repeatedly relayed incorrect weight and balance cargo loads. After departing the gate the aircraft returned to move pallets because the station agent reported the correct numbers which put the aircraft out of CG limits.


Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

When we were about 120 or so miles from our destination we got an EICAS Spoiler Fail message. We ran the QRH which stated that we were to land at the nearest suitable airport. We talked it over with Dispatch and Maintenance and came to the conclusion that it was more than likely a switch error; but decided to divert per QRH. We landed without further issues.

An EMB-145 flight crew diverted in accorance with the QRH after receiving an EICAS Spoiler Fail message.


Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was working the East Arrival position with moderate to heavy traffic. The weather was VFR. I took a handoff on an E145 that was descending to 11;000 FT and 250 KTS. The aircraft was inbound for landing and Runway 26 was in use. When the E145 checked in I descended the aircraft to 8;000 FT. Shortly thereafter the E145 advised that he had a Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC) with a turboprop at or around 10;000 FT. I did not issue traffic on a target that I observed after the E145 declared the NMAC. I was very busy at this time and the traffic that I observed after was a VFR aircraft that appeared to be doing aerobatic maneuvers within the confines of [two victor airways]; between the altitudes of 8;000 and 10;500 FT. After the pilot declared the NMAC; I asked the Supervisor in charge at the time for a Radar Handoff/Assist due to extreme workload and moderate to heavy traffic; and received a help shortly after; and all service was normal without further issues. I also advised the Supervisor that the pilot had declared a NMAC on frequency at the time of the incident. I asked to be relieved from position and was relieved of position. I then listened to the voice replay of the incident and then the radar replay of the incident. At the time this occurred I did not observe the traffic being a factor for the E145 and did not issue the traffic; due to workload. When reviewing the radar; I noticed that shortly after this the VFR aircraft called another sector and was positively identified as a VFR Texan that is based out of [a nearby military] airport. I believe that the Texan was performing aerobatics within the confines of an airway outside of Class Charlie airspace; which is very crucial piece of airspace due to arriving and departing aircraft entering and exiting our airspace. I was told that the Military understands the high volume of traffic in this area and are briefed to not perform aerobatics in this area; as they have a north and south MOA in our airspace that has been delegated for their pilots to do these types of maneuvers. I believe a briefing should be sent to the [military airports] squadrons ASAP to prevent further issues such as these.

A Local Controller received a report of an NMAC between and E145 under his control and a turboprop aircraft later identified as a VFR Beechcraft T6-A Texan military trainer that appeared to be performing aerobatics.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Crew notified me at local time; flight ZZZ to ZZZ1 while off the gate and reported that they had a Number 2 Engine Control Light illuminated. Crew informed me that they probably had to return to the gate and could not go. I reported that they did not; under MEL 73-11-1(C); and to place both Electronic Engine Controls (EEC) in the ALTN Mode. I was under the thought that they were talking about the EEC NORMAL (ON) MODE. I asked if all was 'OK' in the ALTN Mode and they reported 'Yes'. When I was going to order my parts; I read the discrepancy again and I realized that I may have misunderstood them and spoke with my Manager and the Dispatcher and explained the situation. We contacted them on Commercial Radio and asked if the light was still illuminated after the deferral and prior to takeoff. They reported that it was and extinguished just prior to lift-off which is normally the way this system works. I then knew that I was indeed wrong and misunderstood the crew. I then made arrangements for the B737-700 aircraft to be brought to (ZZZ2) for repairs.I can only say that I wish the crew was more assertive and adamant in their thinking that they had to return; according to the NOTE in the MEL; and maybe things would have come together and I would have realized my misunderstanding at that point and just dispatched Maintenance; as is proper procedure. I know that the aircraft cannot go with those lights illuminated; as I dealt with these types of discrepancies for almost 12 years and I am quite familiar with these aircraft systems. This was just one time I thought different and no one contested me. I am not placing blame but no one else caught it either except for me; after reviewing my work which is also a policy of my own each day throughout the day.

A Maintenance Controller reports how miscommunication and misunderstanding between himself and a B737-700 flight crew led to a takeoff departure with both Engine Electronic Controls (EEC) in the Alternate Mode. Number 2 Engine Control Light had illuminated after pushback.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I started opening the Tower for the business day. The FLM was there and informed me that the ASOS was not working so she was there to give a Dash 8 the current information to allow him to depart on time. The Dash 8 started taxing out so I asked him if he had the weather; he said he did but I also gave him what was most current on the weather screen. The Dash 8 then asked if I could give him his IFR clearance. Because I know that it is hard to contact the Center from the ground at the airport; I gave the Dash 8 his clearance. I did not clear him for take off or reference any release type information. I immediately called the Center and told them that I had issued the clearance to Dash 8 and said they should be calling them shortly for a release. A minute or two after that I heard the Dash 8 departing from the runway so I asked him for a tops report. The Dash 8 gave me a tops report I then told him to have a good flight. Shortly after the Dash 8's departure someone from the Center called and asked if we released the Dash 8. I said no. The Controller asked if we saw the Skylane. I said no; and that I could not even see the runway. The Center then called back and said that a Skylane departed the same time that the Dash 8 did. I was not aware that there was even another aircraft out by the runway. There was fog limiting the visibility to less than 1/4 mile and there were no broadcasts by the Skylane that he was even moving about the airport or that he was going to depart. Because the FLM was in the Cab at the time she started looking into what happened. I will never issue a clearance before we open again; even if it is a nice guy thing to do.

I was CIC and in the equipment room to check the recording devise. I went to Tower Cab and noticed a Controller sitting at the Local Control position and my FLM sitting at the desk. Apparently; Local had issued an IFR clearance to a Dash 8; which I was not aware of. At this time of morning the normal task is deciding who will work which position at start of opening of the Tower. Apparently; a hold for release was not given or coordination with the IFR authority was not done. About five to ten minutes later; we were advised there was an issue with an IFR departure taking off with out a release. A Hold For Release (HFR) should have been given.

Before official opening; a Tower Controller gave a clearance; as a courtesy; to an Air Carrier that then failed to get a release from the controlling Center before departing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Total 19429; Flight Crew Type 1515

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Total 2725; Flight Crew Type 277

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

We were vectored to the final approach course well outside the final approach fix for the ILS 24.  We were solid IMC; and although I don't recall the precise conditions; it was night; approximately 500 overcast and several miles visibility; light winds; and drizzle.  As we were on an intercept heading perhaps ten miles from the FAF we noticed that we did not have any glideslope indication.  A little closer to centerline; the GS appeared; but was somewhat erratic in that it did not stay on the peg as one would expect at that range.  At three to four miles from the FAF; the GS indication darted down to center; and the flight director captured it.  The autopilot started a pitch down to follow the GS indication.  All this happened very quickly.  I called out a warning; as did the captain; and the SIC/PF hit the TOGA switches to disengage the approach mode.  This also commanded a pitch up and climb power. By the time the pitch; power; and configuration were returned to values appropriate to terminal area operations; the aircraft had climbed from the initial altitude of 2;000 to 2;700.  This missed approach was announced to ATC as well as a report of the failed ILS signal.  ATC responded that they did indeed have a failure light for the approach and would reset the system.  We were vectored back to the procedure for a normal approach and landing.This was a situation that went from a hint of a potential issue to a full scale hazard in the blink of an eye.  The PF [Pilot Flying] responded instinctively with the universal response to an approach gone wrong by commanding TOGA.  However; as the initial and missed approaches share the same altitude; any missed approach climb before the final descent is initiated represents an altitude deviation.FD approach mode logic is structured to make inadvertent disengagement of the approach mode very difficult; and the approach mode is normally terminated with a landing.  To disengage the approach mode prior to landing takes a procedure that; although quite simple; is never practiced and therefore is not a reflexive action.  Another viable option would have been to disconnect the autopilot and ignore the FD while flying the plane raw data until the FA/AP were reconfigured appropriately.  Of course; timely notification of the failure from ATC would have been helpful as well.  All these items were covered in our post flight debrief.The whole crew; as individuals; have also recommitted ourselves to greater diligence in day to day operations so that any future untoward events will not constitute such a surprise; allowing for quicker capture of errors and tighter margins to be maintained.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B747-400 First Officer and relief pilot reported executing a go-around after an altitude deviation on approach to WRI when the ILS signal malfunctioned.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56.7; Flight Crew Total 660; Flight Crew Type 360

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was heading to Pennsylvania from Colorado and the weather was getting bad and cloud cover was getting bad so I stopped in Muncie; IN to look at the radar to see if it was better south. Up until then I was on Flight Following but since the weather was getting bad I decided to head south then east if the weather was looking better. I wasn't on Flight Following since I wasn't sure I could continue and I was using my GPS for the airspaces. The GPS wasn't looking right however; but I didn't think much about it until I was looking at a runway on my left and right. I was split between Dayton and Wright-Patterson and my GPS wasn't showing I was in their airspace; so I knew I was committed at that point and the GPS was not functioning properly. I quickly got the frequency for Columbus Approach and called them and they told me that there may have been a problem and they gave me a phone number to call when I landed. I stayed with Flight Following the remainder of the flight and the GPS started to work when I got to West Virginia and has been working correctly ever since. I called the number I was given and talked to the Controller but he said someone else may call back but that did not occur. The Controller thought that perhaps everything was ok; but I wanted to submit this report.

BE35 pilot reports an airspace incursion flying over DAY due to a GPS malfunction. The runways are detected visually but the airspace is not depicted on the GPS display.


PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 163; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 10800; Flight Crew Type 1600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

In the preflight setup; everything was uploading properly: route; winds; ATIS; etc. The First Officer entered the expected Runway (05L) and departure in the FMC. We called for our clearance and were cleared via the runway and departure we anticipated. With all doors closed; ready for pushback; we awaited our 'numbers' [Takeoff Performance DATA.]The hard copy of the data appeared on the printer and we waited for the uplink to the FMC; but it did not appear. The First Officer pressed the 'request' prompt for the performance data for Runway 05L (which was the runway already entered in the FMC). We reviewed the hard copy of the [performance data] and the First Officer asked if it was okay to manually enter the data off the paper while we awaited the uplink. I said it was; and he entered the data manually. Flaps 1; no reduction. We pushed back; taxied to and took off Runway 05L. A few minutes after takeoff; an FMS PERF INIT load prompt appeared; and we received a hard copy of [performance data] for RWY 05L. It was; however; for FLAPS 5 and 'Improved Climb.' Huh? We reviewed our original [hard copy printed data] and realized it was for Runway 05R. We took off with the wrong data in the wrong configuration. We later discussed the potential 'worse case' scenarios - particularly at such a critical; high altitude/mountainous airport.

We also discussed how to effectively review the performance data prior to and after loading the FMC to avoid this type of mistake in the future.

When their FMS automatic performance update for takeoff from MMMX failed to appear in a timely fashion; the flight crew of a B737 manually programmed the FMS based on an ACARs hard copy and took off. After successfully departing they received the automatic update and discovered they had taken off on 5L although their manually loaded performance data was for 5R and had utilized flap and power settings inappropriate for their actual takeoff.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors

After tire was ordered through stores using the correct number by another mechanic; I arrived to assist in the tire change. The tire delivered had green wheel covers which are used on 900ER carbon brake tire and wheel assemblies. We proceeded to replace the tire and wheel assembly. As my fellow mechanic was putting away equipment I proceeded to fill out the tire and wheel assembly change record form and made a log and signed off the log for the #4 tire being bad. During the entire time neither myself or my fellow mechanic looked at the delivered tire part number. We were [later] notified by management that a wrong tire had been found installed and was removed earlier in the month.We need to be more diligent in verifying correct part numbers for tire and wheel assemblies are correct before installation. 737-800 and 900 carbon brake tires will have the same green covers on wheel assemblies.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Maintenance Technicians reported installing the incorrect wheel assembly on a Boeing 737-900.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Rwy 25L HKG we encountered wake turbulence passing 800 feet on departure behind a B777.  Approximate 30 degree bank left and loss of roughly 5 degrees of required climb pitch attitude with decreasing airspeed.  We disconnected the autopilot; recovered from the upset; re-automated; re-established ourselves on the departure SID; and notified ATC of the wake turbulence upset.  No issues with ATC were noted for being off track and we were still able to make the min 205 speed at Prawn intersection.

B747-400 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing VHHH in trail of a B777.


After push back; ATC advised us that it would be about 20 minutes prior to clearance for take off. We began taxi on one engine; and Captain (CA) then commanded shutdown of APU with the comment that we would perform a cross bleed start of #2 engine at the appropriate time. While waiting for the appropriate time to start #2; I forgot that the APU was off. CA called for #2 start; which I then did by the 'normal' steps of selecting engine #2 start/stop to start. I then started the timer. Neither of us remembered the need for a cross bleed start. During #2 start I was dividing my attention between preparing for departure and monitoring the engine start. I recall hearing an engine sound that I don't usually hear during engine start; and I focused my attention more carefully on the EICAS. I noticed the #2 temp rising beyond what I normally expect; with the N2 temp approaching max (red tick). I verbally noted this to the captain. I reached for the #2 start/stop in preparation to shut down the engine and it was then that I realized the problem was a result of not properly executing the cross bleed start procedure. I verbalized this to the captain also. The captain promptly increased power on the #1 engine to assist the cross bleed start; which resulted in an immediate decrease in N2 temp on #2. At this point the #2 start proceeded normally. At no time did #2 temp reach or exceed limitations; and no EICAS messages were annunciated before; during or after the start. Rest of the flight proceeded normally.As a new First Officer (FO); I have done very few and infrequent cross bleed starts. This lack of recency and experience contributed to my forgetting that the APU was off and a cross bleed start was required. Further; allowing myself to be distracted/multi task during the start led to delayed identification of the problem.How I will prevent this from happening in the future:-when I turn off the APU (per CA command) with the expectation of a later cross bleed start; I will bring up the ECS page on my MFD display as a reminder.-I will also note 'cross bleed required' on a piece of paper and put it on the engine start/stop switch; as a reminder.-during any engine start I will not divert my attention away from the EICAS until the start sequence is complete.

Embraer ERJ-175 First Officer reported attempting to accomplish a crossbleed start with the operating engine at idle thrust.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

A321 parked at gate [at] ZZZ. At near passenger boarding completion; with PCA (Precondition Air Unit) attached to aircraft and operating; Flight Attendant [reported] uncomfortably high cabin temperature. We then started the APU. Within 2 to 3 minutes; both First Officer and I smelled a strong burning rubber odor; followed immediately by a call from the Flight Attendant stationed in the aircraft aft that the cabin was filling up rapidly with smoke. After visual confirmation; I shut down the APU and initiated an emergency deplaning and requested ARFF (Air Rescue and Firefighting). I then switched off all power to the aircraft except the utility bus. The First Officer did a quick exterior inspection and requested ground personnel to disconnect PCA. No external smoke or fire observed. We completed an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log) entry and smoke and odor form. We then proceeded to another assigned aircraft. No passengers or crew members reported medical conditions associated with the smoke and odor event. Unknown cause at the time we left aircraft to fly spare aircraft.

We were preflighting our aircraft at [the] gate in ZZZ with external ground air connected. During passenger boarding with the main cabin door still open; we started to smell burning rubber. Shortly thereafter; flight attendants reported visible smoke in the cabin and we noticed it on the flight deck about the same time. Captain shut down the APU and initiated an emergency deplaning. He requested through Company Operations that they [advise the airport] and request ARFF (Air Rescue and Firefighting) for us. Captain then switched off all power to the aircraft except the utility bus. I went outside the aircraft looking for signs of smoke and notified baggage loaders to get out of the cargo areas. I did not see any source of smoke. Captain completed an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log) entry and smoke and odor form. We then proceeded to another assigned aircraft. No passengers or crew members reported medical conditions associated with the smoke and odor event.We are not sure if the smoke was coming from the aircraft APU or if it was coming from the jetway air conditioning system. Maintenance was still unsure of the source of smoke at the time we changed aircraft and departed.

A321 flight crew reported deplaning and requesting ARFF due to strong burning rubber odor and smoke onboard.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Routine Training flight. We followed proper procedures by announcing our position with the intent of performing a simulated engine failure to a touch and go at Mulino airport. We were on frequency of CTAF and asked if there were any gliders or jumpers at Mulino. No response! A little closer we announced again asking if there was any traffic; jumpers and gliders at Mulino. Again; no response. We climbed to 2700' over Southwest corner of Runway 32 with the intent of performing a simulated engine fail to touch and go.As we were descending; in our second turn we heard the jump plane pilot say there were open canopies EAST of Runway 32. We looked and saw jumpers between 1800-2000' and on our westbound heading flew NW away from the runway and airport. We were west of runway and jumpers were east of runway. We were scolded by the jump pilot to read the sectional chart. The chart is clearly marked with glider and jump symbology.What troubles me is that the jump pilot monitors both Approach and CTAF. We were on frequency and announced and heard no reports or follow up jumper advisories. If we were in perceived conflict the Jump pilot can very easily shout out jumper traffic if he is monitoring the CTAF.The responsibility for see and avoid is on us but advisories for jumpers is additional responsibility for jump school personnel. My suggestion is for the jump pilot to make multiple advisories and have a ground spotter on CTAF who can call out to any aircraft in the pattern who cause a conflict.

GA flight instructor reported being surprised by skydivers while in the pattern at Mulino State Airport after requesting information several times over the CTAF frequency.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

RNAV visual arrival into PSP for Runway 31L. Approaching CEKMA intersection; ATC called out traffic (north bound) and gave us present heading (265 degrees) & level off at 5000 feet. Traffic was spotted off our right and ATC cleared us for visual. Started descent/ configuring and turned toward ULALE intersection. Lost traffic and then it appeared along our projected path and TCAS conflict alert and resolution resulted. TCAS flight path resolution was followed and traffic appeared below us; flying toward us and underneath us. Aircraft changed direction in uncontrolled airspace as we were approaching PSP airport flying RNAV visual arrival. Mountains on both side of valley congest arrivals and local traffic. ATC communication for all traffic in the valley; near PSP airport would help. Giving VFR traffic greater separation in case of course reversals. Don't lose sight of traffic on visual separation.

Cleared RNAV visual 31L PSP. Between CEKMA and ULALE on 265 course. SoCal noted traffic at unknown altitude headed north. I felt uncomfortable with the proximity of the traffic and requested a 240 heading; mindful of the rapidly riding terrain to our west. Approach cancelled. Assigned 4000ft. Traffic located visually; headed away from us. Re-cleared RNAV visual 31L. Took a heading direct ULALE and began appropriate descent. Approaching ULALE; sudden RA (Resolution Advisory) and 'Climb' 'Climb'. TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) noted traffic 200 ft below us; within a mile; and headed in our direction. Complied with RA. Traffic passed 200 ft directly below us. Re-cleared app. Normal Landing.The offending traffic was operating legally in Class D airspace and not using flight following.After we sighted the traffic; and at the same time we turned to ULALE to resume our approach; the traffic made a sudden left turn (initially away from us) to south; 'as though they were cutting donuts in the sky'. That left them headed exactly toward us and 200 ft. below us. This explains the sudden RA with no preceding TA (Traffic Advisory).Why; in spite of Controller concerns; is the area around PSP still Class D? This airspace must be upgraded so that both flight following and transponder are required. An airliner with approximately 160 souls on board; while complying with all ATC instructions and taking proactive action to avoid traffic before TCAS alert in an area of onerous terrain came within 200 ft of midair collision. Change the airspace designation ASAP at PSP before lives are lost.

Air carrier flight crew reported an airborne conflict with non-participating traffic while on approach to PSP.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On day one of a four day trip; I was advised [later] on to provide information about [a] flights performed a few days prior. Today; at the conclusion of that trip; is the first opportunity to file this report.[The] flight was scheduled ZZZ to ZZZ1. On initial climbout; the aircraft presented ECAM - VENT SKIN EXTRACT VALVE FAULT. I was Pilot Monitoring. The Captain asked me to run the ECAM. As I preceded; the procedure was leading me to put the aircraft into an unpressurized configuration. We discussed the problem and decided to return to ZZZ because we would not have the fuel required to get to ZZZ1 at 10;000 feet and ZZZ was the closest airport in point of time. We were under max landing weight and therefore preformed a normal landing and taxi in to an available gate.At the gate; the Captain wrote the discrepancy into the maintenance log. Maintenance decided they could apply an MEL. Once the MEL procedures where complete; we expected to retry our flight to ZZZ1. Once refueled and signed off by Maintenance; we departed on our second attempt.After our second takeoff; there was an appreciable high wind noise level that we both commented on as different from our first flight and as being very unusual. As per the MEL procedure we expected the same ECAM; got it; and cancelled it as per procedure. As we climbed however; I noticed that the cabin was climbing higher than normal and higher than what I would have expected. We decided to continue to monitor the cabin pressure. Passing approximately 15;000 feet altitude; as we monitored the cabin altitude; we heard a pop; followed by a significant increase in the cockpit wind noise and saw and felt the cabin climbing significantly high at approximately 3;000 feet per minute. We requested priority handling and requested a descent to 10;000 feet. Cabin altitude reached 12;500 feet at its highest point; before we could reverse the cabin climb in our decent. Once under 10;000 feet; crew O2 was no longer needed; passenger O2 had not deployed and passengers no longer needed O2. We were again below max landing weight; so we returned to ZZZ; performed a normal landing; and taxied into an available gate. Maintenance personnel took the airplane to the hangar.Maintenance may have wired open the wrong door. Otherwise; there could have been an additional failure in the system. I can only speculate on a cause for the events of these flights; because I have been given no further details on the aircraft's maintenance. The Captain and I reacted to the situation as best as we could; trying to interpret the information being presented to us as quickly as we could. If we could have determined sooner that the cabin pressurization would fail; we may have been able to avoid an emergency descent.

A321 First Officer reported performing two air turn backs that were caused by a malfunctioning Cabin Pressure Control System.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 2.0

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Experienced a malfunction (frozen/unresponsive) of my EFB (Tablet). In the attempt to get the tablet restarted/responsive; I entered class bravo airspace prior to receiving clearance. The airplane (C-310) was newly purchased; and significantly faster than anything I have been flying recently.

A pilot unaccustomed to the speed of his newly purchased Cessna 310 became distracted while attempting to reboot his frozen Tablet EFB and entered Class B.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Upon arrival the First Officer discovered a tool stuck to the top of the right wing at the wing to fuselage fairing. The tool was there throughout the duration of the flight. The aircraft had come out of maintenance and this tool was not removed prior to flight. The tool was also missed during the preflight inspection.  Despite flight at .77 Mach and a steep descent at 3;500 fpm with speed brakes deployed; the tool remained attached to the wing. Upon discovery; maintenance was notified. The tool was approximately 8 inches long and metallic. It appeared to be a metal pick or pry bar. It could have separated on taxi and damaged another aircraft's tire. Or; it could have been deposited as FOD on the runway with possible dire consequences. The tool could have also been ingested into the number one engine; again with dire consequences. During flight at FL360; the tool could have fallen from the aircraft and killed someone on the ground. Better accountability of tools after maintenance is completed.

EMB-145 Captain is informed his First Officer after post flight inspection; that a tool is stuck to the top of the right wing at the wing to fuselage fairing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

The dangerous goods agent presented an explosives box that was damaged and we had the box removed. The First Officer inspected it first. While inspecting it the DG agent pointed out that the box was crushed and that it did not look good. They informed me and we all agreed to have it removed. It looked like whoever strapped it down had crushed it. The person who strapped down this DG box strapped it down too tight and damaged the box.

B757 Captain reported a damaged Hazmat explosive box refused as cargo.