Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

At cruise altitude of FL350 ATC reported moderate turbulence ahead between FL330 and FL290. FL270 recommended as a good altitude. I turned on the 'fasten seat belt sign'; and made a PA to be seated. The first officer began descent to FL270. During the descent I made a PA for the flight attendants to be seated. After leveling at FL270 for about 5 minutes and with a smooth ride I phoned flight attendants to resume duties but left the seat belt sign on.At XA:51 encountered severe turbulence at FL270 with a duration of 15 seconds. After event number one flight attendant reported three injuries. Two flight attendants and one passenger who was in the aft lavatory. Decision made to continue to destination. Medical personnel met flight and attended to the three who were involved.

Air carrier Captain reported they encountered a brief period of severe turbulence at a reportedly smooth altitude. Three people were injured.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

After evacuating the aircraft on a taxiway due to smoke in the cockpit and cabin; neither the Captain nor I wrote-up the aircraft in the maintenance log. We forgot due to being very busy dealing with the aftermath of the emergency that had just occurred. A major threat was task saturation. The company; fire department; and station personnel were constantly calling us; asking us questions; and having us complete paperwork for several hours after the emergency.

CRJ-700 First Officer reports evacuating the aircraft during taxi due to smoke in the cockpit and cabin. The crew is informed a day later that no logbook entry was made.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

During an busy arrival rush weather caused a sudden shift from Visual Approaches to Triple Simultaneous ILS approaches.  We do this a lot at Denver and should be no problem.  The new STARS RADAR and lack of training caused several losses of legal separation and safety issues.  Several controllers were rapidly shuffled from on position to another to open the MO positions.  Position relief briefing were instructed to be short and the 2 minute overlap was waived.  The MO positions were not 'opened' and the controllers were unable to look at and data blocks and therefore could not open.  The controllers and the FLM did not know how to fix the situation due to lack of training and understanding.  Luckily a 'SME' happened to be in the room and even they struggled to get the position working.  About half a dozen aircraft illegally flew an unmonitored; side-by-side; ILS approach.  The TM-in-training (and soon to be FLM) thought that nothing was wrong with the operation.The training for STARS has caused hundreds of problems that have been logged and many more that have not.  Everything from not being able to amend and aircraft's type to the RADAR scope turning off entirely are causing safety problems that do not seem to be taken seriously.  It seems like 'they'll figure it out' was a huge part of unveiling STARS.  This is dangerous and today proved that.  Better training and equipment fixes are needed.

D01 Controller reports of problems associated with STARS equipment not working correctly and having aircraft on final with less than standard separation.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was training a Developmental on Local Control; there was training being conducted on RADAR East. My Developmental departed a helicopter southbound that would remain close to the airport for some time; he switched the helicopter; I recommended that we keep the helicopter on our frequency due to the traffic we had in the pattern and several departures so we could exchange traffic. I coordinated with RADAR to switch the helicopter back to us. The Developmental had Cessna 152 in left traffic for Runway 15; he elected to cross over midfield and enter a right downwind for Runway 15 due to traffic. This is when we noticed that a Cessna C180 was inbound but we were unsure what they were doing as there was nothing in the aircraft's arts scratch pad (one of many automation features overlooked regularly here). We noticed they were approaching the helicopter to the south. We 'reached out' to the C180 to see if they were on our frequency; they were not. We issued traffic to the helicopter but they did not have the C180 in sight; I elected to take over and issue a vector to the helicopter to the east. When the conflict was resolved; I called our Supervisor on a non operational phone to ask if he could remind the training team on RADAR east to switch arrivals to us in a timely manner. At this time the C180 was approaching the airport and now becoming a conflict with the C152 who was now turning right downwind for Runway 15. Again we reached out to the C180 and they were not on our frequency. This situation is not uncommon; arrival aircraft are switched to the Tower often late and the Local Controller has just enough time to issue any pertinent traffic he/she might have; winds; and a landing clearance if applicable. I believe it is the safety culture here that promotes the RADAR Controller to sequence all aircraft to the airport at all costs. I agree with this sentiment that the RADAR Controller sets a sequence to the airport but this should not be at the expense of national airspace safety and efficiency. This philosophy is also reinforced because; the belief that the Tower Controller should not do anything except say clear to land and clear for takeoff. Aircraft are the closest to each other at and around the vicinity of an airport; this is to be expected. Naturally one would think that when aircraft are going to be in close proximity to each other traffic should be exchanged; and this should be done by one controller and both aircraft should be on the same frequency for the sake of situational awareness. By not meeting these concepts I feel that we are introducing an unnecessary risk. The fact is Tower has a significantly better idea of what is/going to occur at and around the vicinity of the airport than the RADAR Controller does. The aforementioned philosophies that are at the root of these situations also believe the Tower should not have any delegated airspace or area of jurisdiction except for those aircraft in the traffic pattern. This is ridiculous. I very much recommend that Local Control be delegated airspace for not only pattern traffic but for all operations occurring in the proximity of the airport. The RADAR Controller should not enter the Local Control delegated airspace without coordination.

Tower Controller described an unsafe event claiming the TRACON should release communications with inbound aircraft to the Tower earlier to avoid conflicts in/near the congested traffic pattern.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Approaching MAJIC; Atlanta Center instructed us to descend via the IVANE 5. As I read back the clearance; my iPad mount came unattached from the window and fell on my arm. This began my distraction from the flight; as I started reattaching my iPad and bracket to the window. Sometime after MAJIC (now with CLT Approach;) we were told to slow to 210; turn left; and descend to 7;000. After that; the controller asked if we were given a descend via clearance; as we seemed kind of low. I responded yes; and then looked at our altitude. We were passing through 9;000 feet. I was then aware I had not been paying attention to our descent profile and was not sure if we missed a crossing altitude earlier on the arrival. I did NOT ask the controller if we had missed any altitudes. As I was unaware of any deviations; I am submitting this as a precaution.First; get Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) hard mounts. Second; I should not have allowed myself to become so distracted by re-attaching my EFB mount. In the future; I will allow it to stay 'dislodged' until we are in a safe environment to reconnect it.

I have had the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) mounts fall on my arm several times. Not only is it startling; but in some cases hurts my arm if it falls a certain way. Luckily it hasn't fallen during the takeoff roll; but I imagine that would be the scariest time for it to fall (or perhaps during the flare in a landing). The EFB mounts are a simple remedy to a potentially serious disruption in the cockpit.

ERJ-175 flight crew reported they had a possible altitude deviation on approach to CLT when they were distracted by the Captain's iPad mount coming loose and falling onto his arm.


MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

A CRJ2; filed BAE.EAU8.MSP; climbing to FL330 (my top altitude); requesting FL340. Traffic was two overflight aircraft; both at FL310 and both direct GRR; the second of which was the MD90. I gave the CRJ2 15 degrees left; entered it into the 4th line of the Data Block; and handed him off to HOR (Horicon Super Hi). I coordinated HOR's control leaving FL320 (although not on a recorded line; the sectors are adjacent) and transferred communications. Apparently after checking on with HOR the aircraft requested FL320 as I saw this altitude entered hard in the Data Block. The next time I looked the aircraft were coming together as the CRJ2 appeared to be back on course. I quickly advised the HOR Controller and very shortly thereafter the Conflict Alert went off. I turned the MD90 left to a 060 heading and it appeared that the HOR Controller also went left with the CRJ2; but I believe it was too late to avoid a loss of separation. My only recommendation would be to effect coordination on a recorded line; perhaps this might have helped in this event.

Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event noting some of the coordination relative to this incident was made without utilizing a recorded land line.


Dassault-Breguet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While flying the RNAV (GPS) Runway 8 at 3R7; we received a GPWS obstacle warning at approximately 600 FT. We executed a go-around and missed approach. Weather was right at minimums; so I was planning to get down to MDA ahead of vertical glidepath. Failed to notice the 720 FT crossing restriction at WEBAC; so if we had continued down to 500 FT; we would only have had a 152 FT clearance near a Tower located 3 miles from the runway. We shot another approach; but the weather prevented a landing. We diverted to our alternate. Autopilot was on; with vertical speed mode engaged when the event happened.To prevent this in the future I will plan a more careful review of the approach plate and will fly close to the generated VGP rather than using the 'dive and drive' technique.

With full automation engaged; we briefed and used Vertical Speed to 'dive and drive' down to the MDA of 465 FT. As we were leveling off at MDA we got an EGPWS 'caution obstacle' warning. The EGPWS didn't 'know' that we were leveling off; so it gave us the alert. We did get below the WEBAK altitude of 720 FT just prior to the fix by about 60-70 FT. A more thorough review of the approach chart [would have been advisable and we shouldn't have used the 'dive and drive' technique to get down to MDA.

When the two Captains of a Falcon failed to note the 720 MSL crossing restriction at WEBAC while conducting the RNAV (GPS) Runway 8 approach to 3R7 they descended too quickly and triggered an EGPWS warning. The performed a MAP and diverted to their alternate airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

First Officer advised of possible bird sighting on approach. I searched and saw a black drone 'bobbing' up and down traveling northeast under our nose. Reports made to Tower.

B737 Captain reported sighting a drone while on approach to Burbank airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft

Approximately 5 nm from the top of descent enroute to ZZZ we received a call from the Flight Attendants that they was a strong odor in the middle of the cabin. I asked the Flight Attendants to investigate and report back. We contacted ZZZ Center and indicated that we may have a problem and would like to start our descent into ZZZ early in anticipation of a potential ZZZ1 divert and that we would provide additional information as it was given to us. The flight attendants then reported back and indicated that there was an intense burnt plastic smell coming from the gasper vents in the vicinity of rows 29-32. Additionally; the flight attendants indicated there was an intense burnt plastic smell in the aft galley. At this time; we could detect a faint smell similar to what the flight attendants described in the flight deck. We donned our O2 masks requested priority handling. We initiated a diversion into ZZZ1 and started the Smoke/Fumes checklist. We were only able to get through cabin service bus; inlet and extract valves and were to the point in the checklist where you isolate one pack when we had to abandon that checklist and focus on the required checklists and duties to safely land the aircraft. We landed uneventfully on ZZZ1 runway. We were met by ZZZ1 CFR. We stopped the aircraft on taxiway; ventilated the cockpit via the DV windows and chatted briefly about whether we should try to continue isolating systems or completely shut down the aircraft and be towed in to the gate when the No. 1 ENG bleed and 1 Pack faulted. We selected both ENG1 bleed and Pack 1 off and additionally turned off the ENG 2 bleed and Pack 2 off. We queried the flight attendants if the smell was still present. The flight attendants indicated the smell had dissipated. We deemed it safe to taxi to the gate. We were met by ZZZ1 CFR at the gate and they completed thermal imaging. They determined that it was safe to disembark the passengers normally. All 5 crew members were examined at hospital. To the best of my knowledge; the tests did not reveal any injury related to the fume event for the 5 crew members involved. I assume the other crew members were given similar treatment. All crew members acted in an extremely calm professional manner and I am extremely grateful for their efforts.

Captain reported being notified of a 'burning plastic odor' in passenger cabin. Flight deck crew detected same odor in cockpit and executed a divert.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 19000

FLO Airport; On approach to RWY 01; last 1/4 mile of approach. Tree tops VERY close to aircraft. Aircraft was exactly on PAPI vertical guidance indication. First time this happened a month ago; I thought it was my overactive imagination. A second approach to this runway a month later confirmed my perceptions that the trees have grown well into the approach path; and there is now little vertical clearance to spare. Airport management needs to investigate whether Part 139 clearance criteria are still are still being maintained for this runway.

Air Carrier Captain believes that the trees just south of Runway 01 at FLO have grown too tall and are interfering with a normal glide path to the runway.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working IADFC combined with IADFE and IADFW. Arrival aircraft CRJ-900 from BARIN in the scratchpad said Runway 19L so I planned for CRJ-900 to be number 1 for 19L. GLF2 was on a right base for Runway 19C. When I cleared CRJ-900 for the visual approach to Runway 19L; the pilot advised me that he was assigned Runway 19C which was conflicting with the scratch pad information. Since he was already on a base turn only about 6 miles out I did not want to change his runway to the runway that was indicated on his scratchpad and that I was vectoring for; so I amended his heading to pass behind GLF2 and turned the aircraft to a 170 degree heading to join the final for Runway 19C. He then saw the airfield and I proceeded to clear him for the approach. CRJ-900 saw GLF2 but I did not say 'maintain visual separation' because I thought I had enough divergence and I was gonna bring him through the localizer and bring CRJ-900 back around to give him plenty of room to follow GLF2. Since I did not say 'maintain visual separation'; I lost separation because I did not quite have 45 degrees opposite course divergence separation. Ensure scratch pad information matches with the runway you assign.  Possibly even restate the runway assignment when the aircraft checks in with the Final Approach Controller.

PCT Controller experienced a loss of separation event when failing to note the incorrect runway assignment scratchpad information in the data block.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 8

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working North and South radar combined like always. I was informed by the PIKE sector that the Buckeye and Brush Creek MOAs would be active beginning at XA35Z. I informed the local controller; and adjusted the memory aid to reflect the MOA status. I normally also turn on the MOA map on the radar scope to give myself a more obvious reminder; but I failed to do so on this occasion. At about XA47Z; Aircraft X made an initial call requesting IFR to LEX at 040. I RADAR identified Aircraft X; and told the pilot to maintain VFR. I then pointed the aircraft out to the PIKE sector; who approved direct at 040. I then cleared Aircraft X direct to LEX at 040. I believe I had around 1.5 miles separation from the Brush Creek MOA at the closest point. I realized what I had done about 45 minutes later when PIKE sector called back to advise that the MOAs were going 'cold.'I failed to maintain my normal procedure of turning on the MOA map when they are active. In the future; I need to be more diligent in my own standard procedure to avoid a similar situation from occurring.

HTS TRACON Controller reported of an airspace violation with a VFR aircraft and a MOA. The aircraft came too close to the airspace. The Controller did not turn on the MOA display on the scope which is something he normally did. Controller believes this led to him forgetting the airspace was hot and the possible airspace violation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 3466; Flight Crew Type 110

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Entered mid-field left downwind from the southeast for landing Runway 22.... After establishing left base leg I initiated the landing checklist configuring initial flaps; mixture; props; carb heat; fuel selector and checking master/ignition switches; but paused running the checklist when I noticed the runway lights were not illuminated. Although the runway was visible; it was the beginning of dusk and I turned my attention to activating the pilot controlled runway lights with 3 clicks on (radio frequency). After a couple unsuccessful attempts I turned my attention to finishing the base leg and accomplishing the turn on to final while scanning for traffic. Once on final I focused on scanning the airport environment for ground traffic and deer activity in vicinity of the runway/taxiways. I continued the approach and in the landing flair I sensed it was taking longer to touch down and the airplane was lower than I expected when I remembered not completing the portion of the landing checklist for gear and final flaps; but the airplane settled on to the runway before I could initiate a go-around.Factors contributing to the event:  Not completing the landing checklist once initiated; my normal flow  Being distracted by non-critical concerns.  Not Initiating the landing checklist before/or on the downwind leg; my normal flow; instead waiting until the base leg.  Not checking GUMPS on final; my normal flow.  Out-of-sequence/interruptions of normal flows.

C-182 Pilot interrupted the Landing checklist to turn on pilot-controlled runway lighting; scanned for ground traffic and deer activity; and touched down without extending the landing gear.


Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Runway 10R at FLL has unsafe airport lighting. The runway is a bridge.  This bridge has no red hazard lighting on the elevated edges of the bridge. There is nothing to warn you that you are on the edge.  The runway has a hole between the runway and taxiway; and there are no red hazard lights around this hole. Taxiway J9 has a sign that is too far away from the turn off from the runway. The sign is about 500 feet west of the turnoff. This sign leads you to believe that the turnoff is after the sign but this is not true.  The runway wall south of the H concourse is lit with blue taxiway lights. These light should be red to tell you that a hazard exists. The wall's red reflectors are not lights.  By the time your landing lights illuminate the reflectors it is too late.Please have the airport light the hazards on 10R with red lights; move the J9 sign and put red lights on the wall before someone gets hurt on this runway.

An Air Carrier Captain expressed specific concerns about the environment surrounding the new Runway 10R/28L at FLL which is significantly elevated in order to allow it to run over a freeway system at the east end. Of concern were insufficient lighting designating steep drop offs; mis-located turnoff signs; the failure to use red lighting to highlight threat areas; and the use of reflectors rather than red lighting as the reflectors are not illuminated by landing lights in a timely manner.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

During the arrival phase into BZN at an ATC assigned altitude of 11;000 ft; we received a GPWS 'Pull-up' warning while in IMC conditions. I was the flying pilot; and we were on an ATC assigned vector. We complied with the GPWS recovery procedures of the SOP; climbed to approximately 12;000 ft; and reported the altitude deviation to ATC. The flight then continued to BZN without further incident.

Level at assigned altitude of 11000 ft we received a GPWS Terrain warning. We followed SOP escape maneuver and were quickly clear of the event. We were on RV (Radar Vectors) and level. I recommend ATC raise their MVA.

Air Carrier flight crew reported a GPWS alert while in IMC conditions on radar vectors.


Briefing student pilot on depressurization routes in South America; they brought an issue to my attention. The South America section of the flight manual still has old depressurization escape route pages. There are two concerns with these charts:1. These pages should be copied into the SKBO (Bogota) Jeppesen pages for quick reference for arrival and departure flights in and out of SKBO.2. There are 3 pages that describe the procedures in a different format that the other traditional escape route map formatted pages with text and map all on one page. Having to flip back and forth between a map and text page is unnecessary and burdensome; especially with an emergency requiring an escape route. These could be combined onto one single page that is formatted like all the other South America and Greenland terrain depressurization escape route pages.Bogota is challenging enough. Making the critical information easier to read and more accessible is essential to a safer operation.

B-767 Captain points out conflicting/out-of-date depressurization escape routes in the South America section of the flight manual.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working Local Control at Andrews Tower and also training a developmental. We received word from the Front Line Manager (FLM) in charge that there was a tour coming out on the airfield and they would need to get on the runway. When the 'tour' did proceed out onto the airfield that callsign was Airfield2 Plus 1. The plus 1 in the vehicle tour was a Motor coach. Airfield 2 plus the motor coach were instructed to hold short of RWY 19R which was the active runway at the time because of a helicopter inbound for a practice approach. The only other traffic inbound was still approx. 30 miles out. After the helicopter departed we had the Airfield 2 plus 1 proceed onto the active runway. They were on the runway for 6 minutes. Also; RWY 19R is the only runway at Andrews being used for fixed wing operations as the other runway (19L/1R) is restricted because of a sink hole that was discovered below the surface of that runway. The airfield vehicle and motor coach bus also only proceeded onto the active runway and drove down the runway full length; exited the departure end and then returned to their original station. The tour was coordinated only before it happened. I think we were all pretty shocked to see a motor coach as part of this tour and driving down an active runway.I do not feel in any way that Air Force personnel should make a request to put a bus with people on board onto an active runway. Especially; as it is the only runway that we can use. I felt the situation was not safe for public safety and whoever was on that bus nor for pilots using the runway.  I also was concerned about the fact that being as it is the only usable runway at Andrews; it is not worth the risk of something going mechanically wrong with that bus and having it possibly break down on the runway or be stuck out on the runway. I definitely recommend that this type of 'tour' never happen nor be approved again. There are times that I feel the Air Force approves tours and such things without completely thinking about the ramifications of these events. They also do not coordinate some of these events until the last minute.

An ADW Tower Controller reported something they had not seen before. The airport vehicle plus one wanted permission to enter the runway. Permission was granted. The plus one was a motor coach on a tour of the airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Anchorage was in a Runway 7/33 configuration with Runway 7L/25R closed; training on Final West; moderate inbound traffic; VMC. ANC Tower CIC coordinated with the A11 OS/CIC for an opposite direction departure for Aircraft X. ANC Tower was advised that there would be a 25 minute delay for the opposite direction operation and to expect release reference several inbounds. The Local Controller circumvented the CIC coordination by contacting the training team on Final West and getting a release for the opposite direction departure. This resulted in five aircraft having to be delay vectored to avoid conflict. The North Radar Controller was advised by the South Radar Controller to RED LIGHT the Tower to protect the operation. Immediately after the red light was instigated; the Local Controller [requested] a release for Aircraft Y that if the red light had not been activated; would have departed into conflict with Aircraft X. Opposite Direction Operations are inherently risky and must be well managed. The Local Controller must not by pass CIC coordination or unnecessary risk will be introduced to the system.

A11 TRACON FLM reports of opposite direction departure request by ANC Local Control. Local is told to expect release in 25 minutes due to arrival traffic. Local then coordinates a release with another sector and obtains the release. Aircraft are vectored away from the departure. Local then requests a release on another jet for departure; which would be in conflict with the previous departure.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 28.5

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

When the traffic started to build in the north departure sector [the controller] should have taken some action to prevent the absolute meltdown of the area that occurred soon after. We had airspace hot; and in addition were told to block some airspace for a flight to orbit north of BAE VOR. That aircraft kept spilling out of the protected area. Later some of us were told that the aircraft doesn't actually have to stay inside the area; rather we need to miss that aircraft (rather than the airspace). This sort of assignment of airspace is extremely dangerous and should never be approved; and if absolutely necessary; should be clearly noted to both the flight crew and the controller what exactly is supposed to be happening. In addition; ZAU TMU may have been pushing extra aircraft out the north departure sector; or the airlines were filing it but either way the sheer volume and complexity of the airspace pushed the sector team past the limits of safe operation. I blame the sup for not doing enough to protect the controllers. This [controller] is notorious in the area for not having the knowledge that he should regarding ATC. If he did anything to flow traffic or reroute aircraft or anything it was invisible to me. I worked the BAE sector for an hour in some of the most complex and busy traffic I have seen in years. This should never be allowed to happen. Aircraft were leveling for minutes at a time; calling in unanswered as we tried to figure out how to sort the ac out; climb them; miss overflight traffic and airspace and monitor the flight and his reserved altitude. Fixed Miles in Trail off ORD north when there is hot airspace in the north area. I suggest 25 in trail per stream regardless of departure point at least! Just having the TMU aware of our military airspace does nothing as the TMU is staffed with very low time; inexperienced folks. They have little or no concept of sector saturation. There need to be hard and fast rules regarding airspace and departures in the north area. With the OSH airshow coming up; and staffing numbers low and senior controllers few and far between; I can foresee IFR days when the safety of the sectors will be threatened.

ZAU Controller reported of a shift that got out of hand due to traffic overload; and in the opinion of the reporter; the Front Line Managers lack of action.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 335; Flight Crew Type 100

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

In cruse receiving flight following from OKC Approach. Approach issued traffic advisory; 8 O'clock; same altitude; remarked traffic was a 'fast mover'; type unknown and he was not talking to traffic. Student immediately spotted traffic behind our left wing. As the CFI I took command of the aircraft and initiated a climb to evade traffic; and reported a climb to ATC. The military aircraft went behind us about 400 ft away; at nearly the same altitude and filled up both rear windows of our aircraft. The military aircraft did not appear to take evasive action. I reported to approach that the aircraft went behind us; and ATC asked what type of aircraft it was. After the evasive maneuver; we were at 5;900 ft on the altimeter and descended back to our VFR cruising altitude of 5;500 ft; and resumed flight back to ZZZ.

C152 instructor pilot reported a NMAC with a military aircraft in the vicinity of GOK airport.


Maintenance Inspector 4.5; Maintenance Technician 10

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft came into shop for work. In the course of repairs; kerosene smell was detected in fuel tanks; suspected Jet A contamination within the Avgas. Sent out a sample from the aircraft and also a sample directly from the fuel farm going into a brand new red plastic fuel container; had analyzed for levels of Jet A contamination.Aircraft came back 1.76% contaminated with Jet A. Fuel farm sample came back with 1.96% contamination. Reported findings to Airport and [fuel company]; was denied any claim or responsibility.Customer now requires teardown inspection per Lycoming SB. We have several other customers that appear to also have been affected.

Contacted reporter regarding this incident. The reporter mentioned that he heard of several other instances at this airport where the fuel used on non-turbined powered aircaft smelled like Jet-A. He also said the Aero-shell company has refused to take any action regarding this incident and has stated that the process used to collect the suspect fuel and have it tested by a lab was not done properly even though the aircraft owner used a brand new fuel container to collect the fuel directly from the aircraft fuel tank as well as the fuel dispenser at the fuel farm. The engine on the subject aircaft was torn down and inspected in accordance with the Lycoming Service Bulletin which requires that to be done if Jet-A fuel contamination is suspected. No damage was found however.

Mechanic reported finding Avgas contamination with Jet A and reported it to both the Airport and Fuel Company.


Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While providing OJT we accepted the RADAR hand off on a CRJ2 from the S Sector over the western portion of our airspace; descending to 6;000 FT; our sector owns up to 5;000 FT. The CRJ2 was eastbound. We accepted the hand off on a CRJ7; from the Sector; over the eastern portion of our airspace. The CRJ7 was westbound at 6;000 FT. Neither aircraft checked on to our frequency. We continued working our arrivals; when a short time later we realized that the above aircraft were on opposite direction vectors; converging at the same altitude. We attempted to make contact with the aircraft; neither one responded. We told the S Controller that we weren't talking to either aircraft; and alerted him to the conflict. The S Controller stated that the aircraft was turning. After several seconds; we noticed that the aircraft were still converging; neither one turning. We again called the CRJ2; the aircraft which the S Controller stated that he had switched and got no response. I again told the S Controller that we weren't talking to the CRJ2 and told him to turn the CRJ7; as the aircraft were a conflict. I issued a turn and descent to the CRJ2 in the blind; which the aircraft didn't comply with. It seemed obvious to me that the CRJ2 was never on our frequency. We selected another frequency that is occasionally used for our sector; and still got no answer from the CRJ2. We attempted to reach the CRJ2 on 121.5 with no answer. The aircraft passed by each other; within about 2 miles at the same altitude. Only after the aircraft had passed; did another sector locate the CRJ2 on their frequency. We finally got both the CRJ2 and the CRJ7 on our frequency after the error had occurred. We then worked both aircraft into Runway XX without further incident. Recommendation; the S Controller should not vector aircraft head on; at the same altitude; hoping that the W Sector will descend one of them into the W's airspace. In this case; it is my opinion that either the S switched the CRJ2 to the wrong frequency; and/or the CRJ2 read back the wrong frequency. In either case; we (the W) were unable to resolve the conflict for the S because we weren't talking to either of the aircraft; both of which were still in the S's airspace. The S Controller should have used positive separation; in this case vertical; to ensure that this situation would not have happened. Additionally; after the error had occurred; there seemed to be some confusion in the RADAR room over which frequency we (the W) were using. We were using frequency standbys. This is what we'd been using for the 30 minutes prior to the incident. Management stated that we should be using another frequency; which we had never been informed we should be using. During the incident we tried the other frequency; to see if the CRJ2 was there; and he was not. There should never be confusion over which frequency a sector is using. A sector should use their standard frequency; unless an outage is posted in the SIA. The only outage that was posted was the standbys. We were briefed by the previous controller to use standbys; and so we did.

TRACON Controller providing OJT described an opposite direction conflict; reportedly due to the Controller's inability to communicate with either aircraft. Other information indicates the possibility of wrong standby frequency assignments.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

With the COVID-19 threat; the airspace was very empty and we were being vectored to an ILS in ZZZ in VMC. I was the Captain Pilot Monitoring and we discussed the option of a visual approach while being vectored on final because of the extremely low flight density. In anticipation of the handoff to ZZZ Tower; I tuned the #1 radio to XXY.Z and accidentally set that as the active radio frequency prior to receiving a final vector and approach clearance from ATC. The radio chatter was so light that I never realized I had gotten ahead of myself by activating this frequency. We flew east over ZZZ1 and I began to feel it was strange we were not being vectored when ATC called us on XAX.B. I immediately switched back to XAY.BB (approach; and we received a vector and clearance to get back on the approach). We made a steeper than normal turn (about 40 degrees) to get back due to ATC's request we were expeditious. We became stabilized for the rest of the approach.Loss of usual busy ATC talking cues due to COVID-19 event. Fixation on potential visual approach. Errors: Changed frequency to Tower prior to receiving vectors and clearance for approach. Missed ATC instructions which caused us to overshoot our turn to final.Company procedure is sufficient. I personally need to maintain my vigilance; especially when in abnormal airspace situation such as that created by the COVID-19 outbreak.

I was pilot flying and the Captain was pilot monitoring. We were on approach and the Captain changed to Tower frequency too early and we missed our vector. We were given a new heading and landed without issue.Captain changed frequency early.

Air carrier flight crew reported an erroneous frequency change that resulted in a track heading deviation.


Deplaning; Safety Related Duties; Boarding; Service

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

During boarding a passenger came on not wearing his mandatory face mask. I asked him to put it on. Before closing the door for pushback; same passenger came to the front to use the lav. In front of the C D [flight attendants] and Ops agent I asked him to put his mask on again. He stated he was eating. I informed the Captain and Ops I told him twice now to wear his mask. The Captain made an announcement about masks and Ops talked to him. He stated he was eating and didn't have to wear the mask. During the flight he continued to eat and never wore his mask. Even to use the lav a second time or when he got into the overhead bin. I called the Captain and asked for a Supervisor to meet the plane. The passenger walked off with no mask on.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy.


I was pilot flying. Being radar vectored on base leg for the ILS. Aircraft configured flaps 2; 180 KIAS; and weighing around 169;200 LBS. I 'cleaned up' the approach as usual by clearing the STAR to populate the intermediate waypoints on the instrument approach. Did not get the expected results and asked the Captain to 'clean up' the approach for me. At this point all NAV info was lost. FMS went blank with PPOS with blank lines. No info in secondary flight plan; RAD NAV; or anywhere else; map not available on ND with PFD normal. [We] tried to restore localizer with manual RAD NAV page and manual hard tune on RNP with no luck. Autopilot; autothrust and normal aircraft control present. I was assigned pilot flying duties since I was flying at the time. The Captain told Approach of NAV failure and we were radar vectored to assess situation. We had to abandon the approach due to lack of NAV capability and weather of 300 BKN and 3 miles in rain. Approach Control told us of local weather around nearest airports. Captain called Operations to advise situation. We conferred and came to a mutual decision to divert due to lack of navigational capability to shoot an instrument approach. Divert airport's weather was VFR. [We] landed safely without incident. All NAV was lost when approach 'clean up' was attempted second time. IRS realigned on ground in divert airport and all NAV/GPS systems returned to normal. [We] flew the same aircraft for three more flights and approaches. This time in VFR conditions; tried exact same procedure to 'clean up ' approach by clearing STAR and it worked like it was supposed to; EVERY time. Investigate this possible FMS/NAV glitch on Airbus Fleet. I have heard of this happening to other people; but am not sure if they had 'enhanced' airplanes like we did. Include alternate radio NAV aide tuning in Pilot Handbook for quick reference during situations like this. Also; don't allow Chief Pilots to question Captain's decision to divert and state that 'our policy is not to divert'.

On heading to intercept ILS; attempted to clean up flight plan i.e. sequence the approach. We lost navigational ability; a few moments later both ND's showed map not available. Diverted to the nearest suitable VFR airport. After lengthy conversations with Maintenance and two check pilots could not determine a cause or a fix.

Airbus flight crew experiences loss of all navigational capability during approach while attempting to clean up the flight plan. Both FMGC's fail along with the ability to manually tune a nav aid. Flight diverts to a VMC airport.


Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Completed ZZZZZ 3 STAR heading NW; instructed to descend to 6000; then instructed to turn right 030 and descend to 4000 inside ZZZZZ1 intersection then very quickly instructed to turn to 110 heading and cleared for the ILS XXR Approach; maintain 4000 until established. I was hand flying using the flight director. Once cleared I attempted to switch to green needles and asked for the FCP to select APPR mode. I overshot the localizer by about a 1/4 deflection. Captain immediately instructed me to continue turn back to localizer. During the turn we descended to about 3200' between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ2; 3 things I believe contributed to this event. Relatively quick instructions from ATC to transition from the ZZZZZ 3 STAR from the NW heading. My recollection was first right turn to 030 and descent to 4000 then right turn to 010 and clear for the approach. Second; PF [pilot flying] failure to anticipate what ATC was planning to instruct me to do. I should have anticipated that we could be instructed very quickly to turn base then final inbound and descend in quick succession. Third; we were still IMC while descending on the base leg prior to turning final then instructed to turn to 110 just at that time we broke out and it was visual conditions but I believe we did not call airport in sight. I was trained to switch from white (GPS) needles to green localizer needles when turning inbound then select approach mode when cleared for the approach. When I reached down to switch needles from white to green I first accidentally selected the BARO knob then reached up and selected the NAV knob. I turned the NAV knob right but needed to turn it left which distracted me momentarily and caused another slight delay in my turn inbound. A confusing aspect which was explained to me after landing is with two FMS's you turn one click left to select green and with one FMS full right to select green. I was unaware of this difference and instinctively went right turn which did not select the green needles. I then switched back left and finally got the green needle. These two very short distractions and delays was enough for me to not turn inbound on the localizer at the correct time and I overshot the localizer course inbound about a 1/4 deflection. I need to brief with the Captain prior to an approach to make sure that person is clear on how I plan to execute the approach. I also need to brief myself on the unique function of each aircraft so I know which direction to turn based on the equipment installed in each aircraft. During training all the sims are simply one click left on the FO [First Officer] side to go from white to green needles. After the flight my Captain who was excellent informed me there is a difference between single and dual FMS equipped aircraft with regards to that technical step. I felt prepared and ready to make this approach but need to continually try improve my ability to think ahead and anticipate we may get instructions from ATC earlier and quicker than I was anticipating.

CRJ200 First Officer reported confusion changing selection on FMC resulted in excursion from altitude and track.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Max GW TO and First Officer was PF. Just after liftoff Number 3 engine had a compressor stall and over-temp of 745 degrees (PW engine). Also; abnormal loud sound (thump) with gear retraction. Flew engine out profile; requested vectors straight out; declared Mayday and ran ENG 3 EGT HI checklist and eng compressor stall checklist. Contacted Dispatch; dumped 125;000 [pounds] of fuel and got vectors for the ILS. Had another abnormal sound during gear extension. Compressor stalls again on Number 3 engine on final. Normal landing. Shut down engine 3 after clearing runway.

This was the F/O's leg. Engine start and taxi out normal. We had to hold short for approximately 10 minutes to burn down to Max T/O weight (reduced from 630.5 to 629.2 for MEL'd items.) T/O roll was uneventful until gear retraction. We encountered a violent compressor stall on Number 3 engine with a level 3 ENG 3 EGT HI Alert displayed (745 deg C). After selecting the Confirm Engine Out prompt we requested and proceeded straight out and leveled off to accelerate and clean up. After Slat Retract we ran the ENG _ EGT HI checklist and retarded the affected engine throttle to idle. (The Level Three Alert was displayed for about 90 seconds). The vibration stopped and the engine parameters all returned to normal for idle power on Number 3. We declared a MAYDAY with Tower and advised we would like to be vectored for fuel dumping and a return for landing. We elected to leave the engine running as indications were normal but not to push the throttle forward fearing the outcome. After climbing to the designated altitude (3300-3900 Meters) we initiated fuel dumping per the checklist from approximately 199.0K to 70.0K which brought us to approximately 493.0K GW. We were approximately 40 NM out and requested approach vectors. Prior to fuel dumping we SATCOM called Dispatch and advised them of our plan. We selected the divert prompt on ACARS and set up for an ILS to the longest runway. We requested a return to the airfield and shot the ILS approach (Approximately 490.0K). On short final we had another minor Compressor Stall event on engine Number 3 so on landing rollout we shut down engine Number 3. Fire crews were waiting for us and followed us to parking. The landing was very smooth and taxi in normal. On post flight no visible damage noted.

MD11 flight crew experiences compressor stalls and high EGT on the number three engine at gear retraction. An emergency is declared and fuel is dumped before returning for landing at maximum landing weight.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

VFR aircraft on 5 mile XXL final reported aircraft 200-400 ft. above him. I used binoculars to locate said aircraft and finally made visual contact with the Class C violator when he was 1-3 miles passed XXL final approach course; heading north bound.

Tower Local controller reported a VFR aircraft on 5 mile final reported a NMAC with an unidentified VFR aircraft.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188.53; Flight Crew Total 710.43; Flight Crew Type 710.43

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

My weather radar was turned on as we taxied to the runway. On takeoff Runway XXC in ZZZZ; just as the First Officer pushed TOGA; we got a PWS (Predictive Windshear) 'Monitor Radar Display' aural and all the PFD and ND and light associated with the PWS alert system. I rejected the takeoff at maybe 10 knots. We exited the runway. There was no weather; just light drizzle; and no adverse weather or turbulence from other aircraft reported. We determined it was safe to try again. Next takeoff on Runway XXC; as the First Officer was just starting to push up the throttles we got a 'Windshear ahead' aural and all the PFD and ND and light associated with the PWS alert system. Again; I rejected the takeoff and we exited the runway. [Another aircraft] had just departed 5 minutes before us with no reported windshear or turbulence. We then contacted [Maintenance Control] who could find no issues with the aircraft. It was determined we should return to a gate and have local maintenance run some checks. They ran all the checks they could; plus two more that [Maintenance Control] added. In the meantime; I'm chatting with the local maintenance guy; he's telling me about a B787 that did a high speed abort for windshear; the week before; at least he thought it was a B787. We also felt very confident this was not an actual windshear event and my First Officer was wondering if it could have something to with this airports new microwave sensing system. That was all being discussed when Maintenance reported that the aircraft had passed all possible tests and no defects were found. We elected to accept the aircraft. We were released and about to push. I didn't notice that Maintenance had left the weather radar on; and after the door was closed; again we got the PFD and light associated with the PWS alert system; but no aural. We called Maintenance back and they cleared the messages. We start to push again; and again we get the PFD and light associated with the PWS system but no aural. I then noticed the radar was on. I turned it off and the warning displays went away. We decided to run the radar well in advance of takeoff but after engine start. The departure proceeded normally.

B787 Captain reported a rejected takeoff due to a false windshear warning.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 155; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 1250

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Approaching BIL level at 7;000 FT in VMC. We were about 5 south of airport awaiting clearance from ATC for an approach. I noticed traffic at one o'clock departing the pattern at BIL climbing towards us on TCAS. As we proceeded the traffic continued towards us but ATC said nothing. We eventually got a TCAS climb and climbed approximately 4;500 per TCAS direction. The other traffic continued to climb into us on the TCAS. As I told ATC of the TCAS climb the Controller pointed us out as traffic to the aircraft causing our TCAS climb. I inquired if the other traffic was VFR or IFR and was told it was VFR. The Controller was controlling us and in radio contact with the other aircraft; but never attempted to prevent the TCAS event. As I watched the map display the other aircraft came within 400 FT of us on the TCAS. It's disconcerting that ATC did nothing to prevent this avoidable TCAS event.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A320 Captain reports a TCAS RA approaching BIL at 7;000 FT with a VFR departure; both talking to ATC. ATC makes no attempt to prevent the conflict and the A320 climbs 4;500 FT at TCAS direction.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Leveling off at FL 340 received a LVL 2 'Eng 2 Loop A' fault.  Turned on overhead lights and gave First Officer [FO] the aircraft and comm.  Pulled out the appropriate QRH; and on first decision tree had an unsatisfactory engine fire test.  Continued with appropriate decision tree branch after confirming with FO; resulting in fire warning and referral to Engine Fire Severe Damage checklist.  Performed phase ones; and shut down engine.  Diverted to closest airport and planned and executed an ILS approach. Cleared runway after landing and had aircraft inspected by fire department who reported noticing no combustion/damage on the engine; cleared to taxi to gate with fire department escort.

MD-10 Captain reported inflight shutdown of #2 engine when they received a 'Loop A' fault.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was working pax window inspection on aircraft. The cabin check had the APU on along with the packs for cooling the cabin. I had my ear plugs because I was working the pax window inspection card outside. I was inspecting the windows on the left side of aircraft fwd of the eng. A mechanic called down and asked if the wings were clear for flaps; I looked at both wings and gave him the clear sign. Several minutes went by I completed the window inspection fwd of the wing so I moved the ladder and tool box to the aft side on wing. I positioned my ladder to continue with the inspection. I climbed the ladder and started with the inspection again. With ear plugs in APU running and packs on I didn't hear him call out or see him for movement of the flaps and I couldn't see the beacon on because I was up against the fuselage. Once I saw the flaps moving down I jumped off the ladder but could not move out of the way before the flaps contacted the ladder. A person needs to keep in eyesight with all flaps moving; and be in contact with the person who is moving flaps and to the position that they are moving to.

I was in the cockpit working on some Avionics cards on the cabin visit. Another mechanic said they needed the flaps lowered. I asked if they were clear; he responded they were clear but he said; let him double check. When he told me they were clear; I lowered them. He then said to stop because he lost sight of someone at the wing. He then came back and told me they were clear. I lowered the handle and they began to move. While in transit to full down I heard people yelling STOP! I then moved the flap handle towards up while killing the hydraulic pump. By then it was too late. Someone had moved a ladder under the flaps and the left inboard trailing edge flap came down on the ladder and broke the trailing edge flap.This was a breakdown in communication between myself; the mechanic clearing the flaps and the mechanics on the ground. I should have had a spotter I could see out the First Officer's window the whole time before I lowered the flaps. Someone could have been injured by this incident. The aircraft damage was later found to have a broken bellcrank and bent pushrods that drive the trailing edge; as well as the flap trailing edge.

B737 Maintenance Technicians reported the flaps were lowered onto a ladder that was positioned under the trailing edge of the flaps.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

In cruise at FL340 a loud sound of air started coming from behind the flight deck door. It was an abnormally loud sound and followed promptly by a call from the forward flight attendant. The flight crew verified normal cabin pressurization and door indications and the Captain (pilot monitoring) answered the call. The forward flight attendant determined the sound was from the forward galley area. The flight crew contacted ATC to receive a lower altitude in case a pressurization problem were to arise. [We requested priority handling] as the cause of the loud airflow was unknown and the intended airport of landing was ZZZ.During the descent there were no abnormal indications on any aircraft systems; the only indication was the loud noise. On the descent the flight crew had communicated with the flight attendants; passengers and sent the information to dispatch. At this time all aircraft indications remained normal; dispatch informed us an additional CRJ900 was available at ZZZ1; and our current weight showed over max landing weight for ZZZ. ZZZ1 was approximately 25 minutes from our current location and would allow us to burn fuel to land below max landing weight. As all systems remained normal; ZZZ1 seemed to be the best alternative. The aircraft landed at ZZZ1 and maintenance was called with write up. Flight was changed to the available aircraft and continued on to [original destination].Earlier in the day the forward cargo door had failed to shut (caution indication) initially by the ground crew; but was indicated closed and locked (green) after a second attempt. Not positive what caused the sound; but it could be an option. The passenger door seal was visually inspected upon landing; but nothing significant was found.

The First Officer of a CRJ-900 reported hearing a loud sound of air escaping from behind the flight deck door.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Left pack was deferred on airplane. Some kind of maintenance issue caused cabin alt to rise; resulting in the cabin alt amber caution message.On climb out; Aircraft X; we were climbing through about 25;000 feet and received a 'CABIN ALT' amber msg. We noted the cabin altitude was climbing through about 9;800 feet; and ascending at a fairly rapid rate. The Captain called for the 'CABIN ALT' msg Immediate Action Checklist; so we ran it. It then stated to go to [a specific emergency checklist]. It said the same thing and step 7 said to turn 'PASS OXY ON'. We selected it ON and the passenger oxygen masks dropped. We descended to 10;000 feet and completed the 'CABIN ALT' checklist; and got the cabin pressure back to a normal altitude. We decided to return back to ZZZ as a precaution. Looking back; it may have been more appropriate to initially run the abnormal checklist (since it was only a caution message); but given the cabin altitude seemed to be rising at a rapid rate; the Captain decided to proceed with the Immediate Action Checklist to remain on the conservative side of safety. We returned to ZZZ and decided to land about 2;000 lbs over weight so the uneasy passengers could get off the airplane.Would initially run abnormal checklist as opposed to Immediate Action Checklist. On Immediate Action Checklist; it only says 'CABIN ALT Msg or Emergency Descent Procedure' and then leads to [another emergency checklist].

CRJ-700 First Officer reported executing the Cabin Altitude checklist for a amber caution message when the Abnormal Checklist may have been more appropriate.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were filed on the SKNRD4 into IAH. Clearance routed us on the ZEEKK1 arrival. Enroute we were recleared back to the SKNRD4 arrival. Houston center then re-cleared us onto the ZEEKK1 arrival again; then to the DOOBI2 arrival. Prior to being switched to IAH approach were cleared to descend via DOOBI2 arrival. We set the bottom altitude of 8;000 ft and began the descent. We checked in with IAH approach and let them know we were descending via the DOOBI2. They acknowledged our check on and told us to expect runway 8L. We queried approach control on the runway assignment again because the DOOBI2 is usually used when IAH is landing in a west flow. Approach confirmed runway 8L and said we should be on the SKNRD4 arrival. We were given a heading and a descent to 10;000 ft. Both the DOOBI2 and SKNRD4 share waypoints but they have different altitudes. To the best of my knowledge no vertical or lateral separation occurred. The frequent changing of arrivals was confusing to the flight crew as well as may have confused or led to a breakdown in communications between IAH center and approach controllers. Less clearance changes may help this event from recurring.

EMB-175 Captain reported confusion in the cockpit resulted when Houston Center and TRACON changed their arrival assignment multiple times.


Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 902; Flight Crew Type 716

Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Climbing through 2;000 FT I smelled a strong solvent odor in cockpit. Fuel was dripping quickly from behind copilot panel onto floor (and copilot's feet). Immediately turned back toward my departure airport; contacted Tower (had been handed off from Tower to TRACON Approach - switched back to Tower without contacting TRACON); and informed them that we were returning due to a fuel leak. Declared emergency and prepared our fire extinguisher in case fuel ignited. Landed uneventfully; rolled off runway; and shut everything down. Fuel leak was due to a hole in the fuel line to the fuel pressure gauge. This pressurized fuel line passes through the firewall to the gauge in the panel. A much safer design would be to mount a transducer on the engine side of the firewall - apparently that is done on later models of the same plane. We will investigate retrofitting that type of gauge.

An older model M20 developed a fuel leak in the fuel pressure sense line behind the copilot side instrument panel; so the pilot declared an emergency returned to the airport he had just departed.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

While preparing to depart Montrose we were taxiing to runway 31 giving position reports of the status of our intentions to take off at runway 31. No aircraft responded except for a glider south of the field and we advised we were going north upon takeoff. Upon reaching the runway we scan the area I cleared the left area and my PM (Pilot Monitoring) in the right seat cleared the runway approach area. We then made another announcement that we are taking runway 31. Upon lining up with runway 31 we had an aircraft yelling at us [that] we had cut him off and was going around. At this time we had advanced the throttles and I looked at the TCAS and now saw an aircraft approximately 2 miles away at 700 ft AGL. Upon landing [a company representative] called and advised me that two witnesses and I called the company and advise them of what had taken place and gave their version of what they saw. [Personnel at the local FBO] saw both aircraft (they were physically at the approach end of 31 and heard the commotion on the radio they then stated that we were airborne before the small Cessna 172 was even at the threshold going around. I have the contact information of the two witnesses and both myself and my PM (Pilot Monitoring) did not see any aircraft in the area nor did we hear any transmissions before we announced taking the active runway. Again once we knew anything was happening we were already on the takeoff roll and the other aircraft advise they were going around. I feel we followed all SOP's and standard VFR callouts and the aircraft was just not seen or heard before he said he was too close and commented on the price of kerosene.

Upon beginning taxi; I PM (Pilot Monitoring) began making position and intent reports on Unicom/CTAF as we began our taxi to rwy31. A glider responded to our initial report stating he was 5SW of the airport and were we going to conflict with him. I discussed our routing and stated there was no conflict; which he acknowledged. I announced we were 'taking the active runway; 31; at Montrose' as we approached B-1 onto B; and there was no response. Both crew members scanned the area and the TCAS. After we crossed the hold short bars on B1; and about to make our turn to align on the runway; a Cessna stated his position as 'short final'. I confirmed his position on TCAS as being more than short final and his relative altitude as 800 ft and then 700 ft above us. I stated that we would be out of his way in plenty of time. He then made a comment about kerosene costs and stated he was 'going around'. As the aircraft was still behind us; we continued a rolling take-off. When I made the 'V1' call; I observed that the aircraft had yet to reach the runway. After our landing at [the destination airport]; the PIC received a call from the company indicating that the pilot of the Cessna had contacted the company. The PIC then contacted two witnesses and just asked them what they saw; which coincided with the events. It appears that the Cessna pilot was angry that we had departed in front of him and executed a go-around to prove a point. According to second hand information from the FBO; the pilot was quite angry.Had the Cessna made position reports; there would have been dialogue as to when we were going to depart; and if he had felt uncomfortable; we would have delayed our departure; just as there had been dialogue with the glider. Due to our size; we should have been visible to the Cessna as we taxied out; thus reinforcing the need for position reports. This entire episode could have been avoided with proper AIM position reports.

Business Jet flight crew reported that upon taking the runway at MTJ a GA pilot announced that he was going around. The crew reported that this was the first transmission from the GA Pilot.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 7976

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Incursion Taxiway

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

The taxiway centerline markings on ORD Taxiway K; K3 and A9 are worn off.  The line is almost gone in a number of locations.  At night using a 737 taxi light; it's very hard to see where you are going.  This area is away from the large bright lights of the terminal; and is a mass of darkness with a lot of blue lights.  It's even worse on a night when it is raining.

B737 First Officer reported the centerline markings on several taxiways at ORD Airport are worn and difficult to see at night.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Declared Emergency

TAIL COMP TEMP HI red light illuminated on climb at approximately FL200. Leveled and accomplished red box steps and the light extinguished. We declared emergency; decided return to [the airport] was best action; requested ARFF. Did the QRH procedures; TEST briefed flight attendants and PA to passengers. First Officer flew aircraft and handled communication and coordination with ATC. The TEMP HI red light re-illuminated and extinguished two more times; and the PRES FLOW light also went on then off. CFR's mandate the Captain land aircraft emergencies; so I took over as pilot flying and asked First Officer to review and insure QRH and checklists were performed satisfactorily. We discussed factors pertinent to our situation: overweight landing; hot day; crosswind; reported wind shear; required landing distance; post landing PA; communications with command; operations contact; etc. Then concentrated on flying visual 17R; ILS backup and exited runway in front of awaiting ARFF. Their exterior inspection saw nothing abnormal; so we requested they follow our taxi to the gate. Maintenance came into the cockpit immediately; but no ground personnel arrived to connect PCA on this 100-degree day; for a long time. Maintenance inspected the tail compartment and said the temperature taps were badly blackened; so the aircraft was taken out of service. Company policy leaves continued flying to the flight crew's discretion after an emergency. First Officer and I discussed and noticed we were feeling fatigue effects due to the arduous emergency; and decided the safe and sensible course was to remove selves from further piloting today. Recalling my football days a hundred years ago; it took a couple post game hours before one felt bruises and damage. So it was this day. Once the whirlwind of the emergency slowed; the strain of its impact was felt and like a NiCad battery; I rapidly lost all charge (well within my 14 hour duty day). Had we continued Piloting; this unplugging would've coincided mid flight where we'd be handling weather; possible divert; etc.; which was the situation that day (and maybe another emergency). Company pay adjusted our schedule approximately 7 hours less than the original sequence; in essence; monetarily penalizing us for self-removal. Hopefully that's not the intent; but it's disconcerting the perceived 'reward' for our job of successfully handling a taxing and stressful emergency; is to get pay docked. This is clear financial disincentive to any pilot in the future; to self-remove after similar emergencies. Coercing a spent pilot to ride a cockpit just to protect a pay month is a severe compromise to flight safety.

An MD-80 TAIL COMP TEMP HI warning illuminated climbing through FL200 so the QRH was completed; an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure where the aircraft was removed from service because of heat damage.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Washington Center held us up very high due to a B52 passing underneath us right to left. We were on the new GIBBZ1 arrival which has 9 step down fixes with speed constraints. Our FMGS reverted to a descent speed mode of .67 Mach instead of the desired .76/280. The First Officer began trying to remedy that situation while the Center gave us a descend via the GIBBZ1 arrival. We proceeded to immediately chop and drop to get back on the profile. I told ATC we were unable to comply with the altitude constraints. ATC said to cross IGGGY at or below 13;000 FT then descend via the GIBBZ1. We crossed IGGGY at approximately 12;300 FT and were supposed to cross MOSLE at 11;000 FT and 250 KTS. I thought the First Officer was going to go back to managed descent but she stayed in selected descent and was trying to get the aircraft slowed to 250 KTS at MOSLE. By staying in selected descent we crossed MOSLE at 10;600 FT instead of 11;000 FT. We then reverted back to managed descent mode for the rest of the arrival and there were no further problems.ATC basically set us up for problems on the brand new arrival with the late descent as a descend via clearance with no possible way for us to make the points. The First Officer also spent too much time heads down trying to change the desired speed in the FMGS instead of just selecting 280 KTS. There are so many different altitude windows and descent points with various types of descent criteria (between altitudes; at altitudes; at or below altitudes) that if you are very rushed like we were; it is very difficult to determine which one you are not going to make. This arrival has fixes that are very close together and will work in a managed descent mode only if everything works perfect from the beginning of the arrival. If ATC leaves you high (this sector of Washington Center is notorious for just that); then they are setting the Airbus crews up for mistakes. In the future; I will insist that this arrival be flown in selected speed and managed descent to avoid any confusion with the FMGS descent mode. Any other way just leaves too many ways to get confused and cause errors.

When they received a late 'descend via' clearance on the GIBBZ RNAV STAR to IAD; the flight crew of an A319 was unable to comply with the multiple altitude and airspeed restrictions and required ATC re-clearances to complete the arrival; citing the complexity of programming changes in a manner that satisfies the restrictions and the capabilities of the aircraft and the FMGS.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 23200; Flight Crew Type 3500

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Two different drone operations from one company at the ZZZ airport were (once again) a problem. [They were] far too close to operating aircraft in the pattern at this airport. This particular event was the result of having to go around on very short final due to an airplane entering the runway directly ahead of our airplane. I asked my student what his plan was and he correctly advised and performed a go-around. I asked how he was to execute this maneuver with another Cessna rolling on takeoff almost under us. Once again; a proper reply was to offset to an upwind leg climb out and announce our intentions on CTAF. The problem (once again) is the drone (UAS) people feel it safe to operate directly in any and all airspace at the ZZZ airport; causing an unsafe environment for this far too busy airport. There's plenty of unused parking lots for drones to operate (away from airports); and I feel it just a matter of time before there will be a HUGE problem with a very likely collision or incident of trying to avoid these UAS operators. The FBO I work for at this facility is a non-pilot [and not a] flight instructor; and has no idea how unsafe an act this UAS operation causes. All of my concerns and reports to ZZZ1 ATC have resulted in no action what so ever. Hopefully; I won't need to make further reports; but rest assured that doing nothing will likely not end well with this UAS operation at ZZZ.

CFI reported UAV conflict in the traffic pattern area.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

After landing on Runway 22L we exited the runway via Taxiway P; E and held short of Runway 22R at E. We were talking to Tower on Frequency 128.80. Tower advised to cross Runway 22R on E and contact ground on Frequency 121.9 once crossed. The Captain taxied across Runway 22R and I was contacting ground on 121.90 when we realized there was an Air Carrier Y coming strait at us on Taxiway E. The Captain stopped immediately and I tried to contact ground. Ground Control was very busy and I was unable to get a response from him. I continued to try and contact ground by saying something along the lines of ground Air Carrier X I think our tail is still across the hold short line on Runway 22R and that there was an aircraft coming strait at us from Taxiway E. I believe ground still did not respond. By this time the Air Carrier Y was about 50 feet in front of us and still coming. I said to the Captain; 'he's going to hit us.' The Captain then turned on every light we had so as to have the Air Carrier Y stop. I yelled on the radio multiple times to 'stop!' The Air Carrier Y kept coming. Ground still did not respond. I then again said the Air Carrier Y in front of us stop you are going to hit us. A voice came on and said; 'I can see my wing I'm fine; I'm not going to hit you;' I said 'yes you are; STOP!' The Air Carrier Y kept coming slower; but turned to cut the corner of Taxiway E and B; exactly where we were sitting. By the time the Air Carrier Y went past us; it's front tires were about 5 feet left of the taxiway line (cutting the inside of the corner) I would calculate the winglet of the Air Carrier Y was about 5 feet from our front windshield. My Captain kept the lights on the whole time and never moved the airplane; if he would have moved there would have been a collision. Once the Air Carrier Y passed I was finally able to get taxi confirmation from ground to continue to the gate.I believe the event occurred because the pilot of the Air Carrier Y was arrogant. This is most prevalent in my mind because of the tone of voice that was given when he said; he would not hit us. Also Ground not realizing that Tower had cleared us to cross and contact Ground Control. This is a hotspot on the airport.Suggestions: Ground and Tower to have better communication between each other. More vigilance from pilots to not continue when another pilot advises to stop.

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a ground conflict during taxi-in at BOS airport.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

My student and I were cleared for the RNAV 18 from Tower we were told to report the FAF. At this point we were roughly on a 13 or so mile final. I hear Tower talking to another aircraft that was VFR wanting to practice approaches and also shoot the RNAV 18. Tower then told this aircraft to also report the FAF and advised them there is a Warrior on a 9 or 10 mile final and to look for us. The pilot responded that he does not have us in sight yet. I advised Tower that we are still in fact farther away than 9 miles. We had a strong headwind so our ground speed was pretty slow. Tower said we were still cleared for the option and to still report the FAF at this point we were at the fix half way between the FAF and the IAF. Tower again advised the other traffic that we were an 8 or less mile final and to report and he has us in sight. The Cessna still responded he didn't have us in sight so Tower told them to do a right 360. I then reported that we are .5 away from the FAF. At this point I got a traffic notification and I looked up [to see] the Cessna is at the same altitude off my right nose and passed right in front of me at the same altitude. I then took the controls; banked right and pushed the nose forward. The other pilot [said] 'holy crap I see them now' and I let Tower know we were going off course and low. Tower didn't seem like they were paying attention. Or seem to ask about it. We then continued on with the approach and went missed and Tower didn't ask us about it. When I reported going missed we didn't hear back from Tower till after several calls.

Piper Warrior instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft on final approach at LSE.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Upon departure from taking off at ZZZ below 1;000 feet the Captain called both of flight attendants asking us if we smelled fumes or felt anything and we did not in the main cabin. He said he smelt it very strong in the cockpit. About 10 minutes went by and the Captain called us again; told us they were smelling it again and stated they were going to have to [request ATC assistance] because the dirty sock smell was very strong in the cockpit. Before we landed in ZZZ1 we prepared the cabin for [landing]. Made sure everybody was seated; safe and their seatbelt was on; checked the lavatories insuring there was nobody inside. The Fire Marshall met us at the gate in ZZZ1 and that is when the oil smell started to smell inside the main cabin. The Fire Marshall came onboard then we deplaned everybody.

Flight Attendant reported Captain notified cabin crew of fumes in the cockpit.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1000

The city of Conway; Arkansas has a new municipal airport (CXW - Cantrell FLD).  This airport is not depicted on the Memphis sectional (dated 18 SEP 2014 to 2 APR 2015). The airport is listed in the Airport/Facility Directory South Central U.S. The old city airport (CWS - Dennis F Cantrell FLD) is still being used and is depicted on the Memphis Sectional and A/F Directory. When conducting a NOTAM search using DINS after typing in CWS the search returns that there are 'no' NOTAM's for this location. A search of CXW only returns OBST Tower information for the new airport. Both airports have the same name which could cause confusion during radio communications. Pilots operating in the area of the city of Conway may not be aware that there is a new airport that is not depicted on the sectional and that a CWS NOTAM search does not address the new airport. Recommend that the airport manager create a NOTAM effective immediately for both airports explaining that the new airport is not depicted on sectional and to reference A/F Directory for correct frequencies and airport names.

Instructor pilot reports that Conway AR has a new airport designated CXW and an old airport designated CWS and both are named Cantrell Field; but CXW is not on the sectional and Notam's are not available for CWX.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working AP1 and CIC (Controller in Charge) in the tower cab with a controller who is in training; not fully certified.  We were the only two controllers on duty due to COVID leave. We had adjusted the schedule in an attempt to accommodate training for the MIT with only one other CPC (Certified Professional Controller) scheduled for that shift.  I had been on position for 2 HRs and 30 Minutes at the time Aircraft X called up in near the border of the 095 and 070 MVA South East of ZZZ at 5;700.  The pilot was requesting vectors back to ZZZ and they were already in the clouds.  The transmissions were quite.  I issued an IFR clearance to ZZZ via radar vectors at 7;000 and did not issue a heading to fly.  I should have issued instructions to climb to 7;000 and then issued 'Reaching 7;000 cleared to ZZZ Airport via radar vectors.'  I also did not hear clearly his first transmission if he had the weather and should have issued the Runway; Wind; and Altimeter.  Aircraft X was not able to reach 7;000 due to icing.  I issued a suggested heading to get him to a lower MVA.  Once in the lowered MVA I issued 6;000 and heading to fly.  He then informed me he needed lower.  I mentioned I could not give a lower altitude due to the MVA.  I mentioned if he was requesting priority I could issue suggested headings and MSA from the EOVM (Emergency Obstruction Video Map) and he notified ATC.  It took me a moment to be able to identify the correct altitude to issue off of the EOVM map.  The altitudes listed were so small I could not read them on the scope in the Tower without zooming in the map.  This was the first time I can remember having to use the map in years.  Aircraft X made it back to ZZZ and landed safely.  No weather depicted on the map.Recommend that we not be pushed or pressured to accomplish training on days when we are minimally staffed so that we are not on position over 2 hours.  This pressure appears to be coming from above the facility level and then is manifest through management locally.I also believe it would be best to have a refresher training from outside the facility on use of the EOVM map; with a scenario on our map; to help with confidence in use when the rare occasion presents itself for its use.I appreciate the detail on our EOVM map; but would suggest that the altitudes that we should be issuing; during these types of situations; would be large enough to easily be issued without the zooming in and out.

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft that was below the MVA; issued a climb; but could not reach the assigned altitude due to icing.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 4400; Flight Crew Type 120

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1300

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

As we taxied to the active runway that we requested from Ground Control. An intersection departure was approved. He told us to contact Tower upon reaching the hold short line at the intersection. We contacted Tower and informed him we are ready for departure. He gave us instructions to line up and wait. As we began to enter the runway I noted that another large Airbus or Boeing was also lining up at the beginning of the runway. It is not uncommon that they line two planes up on the same runway at the same time. Usually when one is on a takeoff roll and the second plane in sequence is asked to line up after the takeoff roll begins of the plane on the runway. Before we were fully lined up I gave another look at the aircraft at the beginning of the runway and noted it had started its takeoff roll as we were given take off clearance by the Tower and began our takeoff roll. I advised the pilot flying to hurry I think that plane is taking off.At this point the aircraft at the beginning of the runway had aborted its take off and advised Tower he aborted due to another aircraft on the runway. The Tower seemed very confused at this point as to who was taking off and what was going on. We were already airborne when the Tower again said to us we are cleared for takeoff. I responded we have already taken off. I told him you already gave us takeoff clearance. We continued out the on the SID and changed frequencies to Departure Control.

International Tower issued duplicate takeoff clearances to two aircraft on the same runway with one at the beginning of the runway and the other on an intersection departure.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Only learned about it listening to archives on [the internet.]   FLM was signed on to both Local Control and CIC.  Numerous times the FLM LUAW aircraft; which is not allowed under regulations.  The Local Controller can only use LUAW procedures when they are not also assigned to any other position.  The position needs to stand alone.  Due to low staffing levels; only Developmental was in the cab during the incident. Refresher training for the FLM and all the trainees at the facility.  Any of the trainees watching might think this is an accepted practice.

ARR Tower Controller reports of a FLM that is having aircraft line up and wait [LUAW] while working Local Control combined.  This is against FAA policy.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 1171; Flight Crew Type 375

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

As I was returning home from flying [aerial survey] I had no issues or weather to avoid. Once I was about 25 miles East of ZZZ I attempted to go around some thunderstorms and work my way into ZZZ. I experienced some turbulence and decided to turn back to ZZZ1. During this time I realized that I could not pitch the nose forward and my elevator seemed unresponsive to my control inputs. I ended up being able to pull the yoke back and pitch up but not able to do the opposite. I was able to control the aircraft using power settings and trim to divert to ZZZ1 and land safely. As maintenance is being done it has been discovered that the battery was not latched in place and thus fell onto the elevator control wire; burning it in half. The rudder control was close to also being burned through. I believe this could have been a much worse situation. I also believe the company I work for does not do adequate maintenance on their aircraft.

Cessna 177 pilot reported that the battery came loose and burned through the elevator cable.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1230; Flight Crew Type 200

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I left for ZZZ on an IFR flight plan. I almost didn't file for this flight; but a last minute look at the weather helped me decide that it might be easier to already be in the system if the weather should get any worse. When I was handed over to approach; the controller advised me to expect the visual into ZZZ. I acknowledged and continued inbound. I was showing 15 minutes out. Moments later I got the automated weather and it was advertising 700 feet and 5 miles visibility with winds 080 at 7 knots. I asked for the GPS 17 approach into ZZZ using ZZZZZ as my initial approach fix. All was going well; and I was still trying to decide if I would do a straight in approach or a circle to land. Just prior to ZZZZZ I listened to the weather again. Now it was 500 feet overcast; too low for a circling approach. I was going to have to do straight in. The winds on the ground were advertised as almost a direct crosswind from the east and less than 10 knots; but I noticed that my winds aloft were anywhere from 20-28 knots from the northeast. I was established on the approach now and inbound to ZZZZZ1. I listened to the weather once more. Now it was 400 feet. I knew that ZZZ1 as well as ZZZ2 were still great options; so I decided to continue on and see what it looked like when I got to minimums. I had noticed I was a dot low on my glide path; but the tailwind; rapidly changing weather on the ground; and the decision to either abort or continue the approach had taken much of my attention. Half a mile from ZZZZZ1 I crosschecked my altitude and the MDA at ZZZZZ1. Much to my dismay I saw that I had already descended well below the MDA for this approach; as I was at 2;400 MSL when I should have been at 3;000 crossing ZZZZZ1. I powered up and advised Approach I was going missed. He asked me what I wanted to do and I requested to try the approach again. I was solo in the plane; and knew I could perform better than what I had just done. At this point I was already planning to go missed on my second try because I saw what the tailwind was doing to my approach profile and knew I didn't want to attempt a landing from that position. However; I didn't want to let my previous failure define my morning. My second approach went much better and I ignored my LNAV+V glide slope indication until I crossed ZZZZZ1 inbound. My biggest mistake was failing to thoroughly brief the approach and note that the MDA difference between ZZZZZ2 and ZZZZZ1 was only 100 feet. Upon reaching ZZZZZ2 the first time; I allowed myself to begin a descent without having a firm number in my mind that I was descending too. Even though I was hand flying; that altitude should have been put into my altitude pre-select box. I shouldn't have used my glideslope indication at all until crossing ZZZZZ1; and I should never have been okay with it showing I was low without turning more attention as to why. Even though my 530 was giving me an advisory glide path; this approach is a non-precision approach and should have been treated as such right from the beginning. My failure to recognize this initially; led me to see what I wanted to see; instead of what was actually happening. I did go missed the second time and diverted to ZZZ1 to wait for an improvement in the weather.

Beechcraft Baron pilot reported descending early during a GPS approach.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 95; Flight Crew Type 2

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Passenger

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

After completing checkout on the C162; I loaded up with a passenger for a flight to TEB. I have completed all of my flights to date near or within the SFRA and had a FRZ clearance; but this was my first time using the Leesburg maneuvering area as a solo pilot. I was familiar with the procedures and squawked the egress code; intending to request flight following once cruising. I intended to fly directly north from JYO until clear of the SFRA as shown on the Garmin G300 glass panel moving map GPS. I allowed my passenger; a student pilot; to assist with navigation and before departure; assisted him in inputting TEB as the destination. As we flew north; I allowed the passenger to utilize the G300 secondary display as well as Foreflight on his iPhone. Unbeknown to me until after the incident; the G300 was on the 'weather' screen rather than the normal moving map GPS display. The weather screen displays the Class B rings but does not display the SFRA ring or the Leesburg maneuvering area. I mistakenly remembered from my preflight; however; that once I was past the second Class B ring I could turn toward TEB and clear the SFRA. In reality; this took me on a path that entered 1 mile into the SFRA. After clearing the second ring; I turned to direct TEB heading. Shortly after turning; I heard Potomac Control on the Guard frequency alerting the aircraft egressing Leesburg that they were entering the SFRA and to turn north. I replied and complied immediately. The passenger indicated afterward that he thought I might be leaving the maneuvering area based on what he saw on Foreflight but didn't say anything out of deference and hesitation. I informed him that he should never hesitate to highlight a potential error to a pilot. While the G300 is a standard Garmin system and easy to use; I should have taken the time to display the desired screen before departure. Additionally; I should have input a waypoint clear of the SFRA to display a flightplan that would have clearly marked the necessary flight path. Finally; while moving map GPS greatly aids navigation; I should have established a clear visual landmark to remain clear of the SFRA. Highway 15 and the river island at Point of Rocks; MD provide an excellent landmark and I will use them in the future. Garmin might consider displaying the SFRA boundaries in addition to B/C/D airspace by default on the weather screen in addition to the moving map.

C162 pilot reports misinterpreting his Garmin300 while departing the DC SFRA to the north and exiting the Leesburg maneuvering area. ATC announces the error on guard and the reporter turns back on course.