Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During the climb level at FL 230; there was a loud pop and the First Officer's forward windscreen shattered from the electrical lead to the heating element and spreading out in many directions throughout the windscreen. Upon examination; it appeared that the outer panel was primarily affected. While I don't believe that anything struck the airplane; however; the place from where the cracks emanated looked like a bullet impact and was located right where the electrical lead attached to the power source for the window heat. There was no loss of pressurization. While the load bearing panel of the windscreen appeared to be intact; Dispatch was contacted and the we expressed our concern that we felt the aircraft had become un-airworthy and we reached a unanimous consensus with Dispatch that a return to our departure airport would be the most prudent action. The QRH actually guides the crew to continue normal operations if no differential restrictions apply. I will tell you this went counter to some common sense perspectives both the First Officer and I discussed. To our reasoning; there was no question that once the aircraft was on the ground; it would be considered un-airworthy and the damage not covered by an MEL. Furthermore; it just went counter to common sense to climb from FL230 to FL390 staring at a cracked and broken windscreen even though; from an engineering point of view; that may have been possible. Furthermore; if we felt the aircraft was in any way un-airworthy; continuing for another hour to a destination made no sense since we were 15 minutes away from a major Maintenance and pilot base. I also had some concerns as to what had caused the explosive force that had cracked the windscreen and did not feel comfortable not understanding why it happened. We relayed our thoughts to our Dispatcher who concurred. With the three of us on the same page; we elected to be more cautious than the QRH and divert to the nearest suitable airport which was our departure airport. We returned uneventfully; entered the discrepancy into the logbook; spoke with Dispatch; and were transferred to another aircraft. The passengers were all transferred to the new jet and we flew the remainder of the schedule without incident.

When the outer pane of First Officer's windshield shattered as they were at FL230 on their way to FL390 the flight crew of a B737-700 elected to return to their departure airport for maintenance and a fresh jet.


Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

[We] received erroneous takeoff configuration warning when thrust levers advanced for takeoff. Immediately discontinued takeoff at approximately 30 KIAS and taxied clear of runway. Configuration appeared correct - flaps set at 1; LED's set for takeoff; stab trim set at 6.06; speed brake lever down; parking brake off. [We] recycled flap lever; speed brake lever; and trim. Visually inspected spoiler position to confirm spoilers stowed. Momentarily advanced thrust levers to ensure takeoff configuration horn and lights indicating proper configuration. Received no further warnings and all indications were normal during second takeoff attempt.

B737-800 pilot reports a low speed reject for a takeoff warning horn. All inputs to the takeoff warning system are checked and cycled and no anomalies are noted. The second takeoff attempt is successful.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Cruising at 10;000 feet 12 NM north northeast of the Putnam (PUT) VOR my FO was exposed twice to a laser illumination on the starboard side of the aircraft and cockpit. The two successions happened at a 30 second interval. He had the intuition to not look directly at the beam; however he had mild spotting in both eyes that went away within 5-10 minutes of exposure. There were no injuries on board. Reported incident to Bradley TRACON.

The flight crew of a corporate aircraft were exposed to laser illumination several times during cruise flight. One crew member experienced minor side effects that dissipated within 10 minutes. Event was reported to ATC.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 183; Flight Crew Type 141

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Landed Runway 34 at RNT; turned left toward Taxiway A. I expected a clearance to taxi south on A and hold short of 34; as I was going to the southeast corner of the field. Instead; the Controller said something like; 'Exit Runway toward Taxiway Alpha and immediately hold short.' For whatever reason; I 'interpreted' this clearance to mean the clearance I was expecting. I turned toward A and was looking south; the direction of intended travel. Another aircraft was traveling south on A and approaching from the north. I did not see them because I did not look both directions. The aircraft had been given clearance ahead of me and I was intended to hold and let them pass. Instead; I continued onto A and cut them off. The Controller immediately called for me to hold position and the other aircraft stopped as well. We came within thirty feet of colliding. The other aircraft was able to pass and then I received a clearance to continue; following them. I apologized to the Controller and carefully followed the subsequent clearance to parking. The cause of this problem was my fixation on the expected clearance. I've heard before about the clearance you hear vs. the clearance you expect; but I have never had this happen before. It's important to fully listen and comprehend the clearance you receive. In my case; it included words like 'Taxiway Alpha' and 'hold short' that I did expect; but not in the same arrangement I expected. Therefore; even if a clearance sounds similar to the expected clearance; or starts off the same way as the expected clearance; the pilot should carefully listen to the entire instruction. Another factor in this problem was my failure to look both ways before entering the taxiway. I looked only in the direction of intended travel. The pilot should always check for conflicting traffic in all possible directions. If I had listened carefully to the controller's instructor or had looked in both directions; the conflict would have been avoided. I am thankful to the other pilot who observed the situation and stopped; and to the controller for quickly identifying and giving an additional hold position instruction. Their actions prevented this problem from becoming a collision.

A pilot landed on RNT Runway 34 and expected to hear a clearance on Taxiway A to his parking; His expectation overrode the actual clearance which was to 'Exit on Taxiway A and hold.' He did not hold and a near collision with another aircraft occurred.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.75

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned to work the Local Control positions combined. We had been briefed earlier with regards to new nationally imposed midnight shift procedures. We were not in midnight shift procedures. Ground Control and Clearance Delivery/Flight Data positions were combined with CIC. After approximately an hour; it was determined by projected traffic count that we were in a period of significantly reduced traffic and the decision was made to combine most positions to avoid frequency changes and improve service. As I recall; I was mainly working arrivals and there was no need to change frequencies in order to provide a safe and efficient service. Ground Control 4 position remained open the entire time. The midnight shift controllers arrived at the appropriate time and the positions were transferred in accordance with the new imposed procedures. I was informed that a meeting was scheduled in order to discuss the non-adherence to new nationally imposed procedures for midnight shift procedures. This meeting was cancelled; however I was informed that I would not be allowed to work anymore midnight shifts or be assigned CIC. I recommend that if the FAA requires strict compliance to a national directive that they need to be more clear on their requirements and that the briefings be more comprehensive and concise. I also think that if the agencies intention is to maintain two controllers in the operation at all times; they need to authorize increased staffing at all facilities and assign more controllers on the midnight shifts.

Denver Tower Controller reported the facility has not been in compliance with the new nationally imposed midnight shift procedures.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was Pilot Flying and had an uneventful flight until I approached the flare on Runway 12 in MIA. Captain was Non Flying Pilot (NFP). As I brought the aircraft into the flare; the auto-throttles retarded the thrust to idle as normal. The Captain and I were waiting on the main gear to make contact with the runway as normal; as I listened to the radar altimeter count down from 20 and 10 at a normal descent rate. That's when I began to experience irregularity with the aircraft handling. Suddenly; the left wing dropped aggressively causing the left main gear to slam to the runway. The momentum from that impact caused the aircraft to roll to the right and then the right main made firm contact with the runway as the left main came off the ground. At that point; I decided the aircraft was not in control to land and I initiated a go-around. Honestly; it happened so fast that in the heat of the moment I don't remember if I hit the TOGA button or not; but I must have missed the button because I don't recall the TOGA thrust mode becoming active. I did however firewall the thrust levers because of how fast the event was unfolding; and the need for thrust immediately. While I was advancing the throttles; the Captain called for a go around also. The auto throttles appeared to disengage from my overriding input. The engines were at idle already from the flaring position the aircraft was in; and it took about 5 seconds for the engines to spool up. In the mean time; the aircraft nose gear made contact with the runway; but the aircraft seemed to balloon back off the runway from the rebound. The airplane felt like it was starting a porpoise-like oscillation. I was able to regain control of the airplane; and stabilized the aircraft in ground effect until the engines were producing thrust and we started to climb. From there; we were able to successfully go around. We departed back southeast bound and were vectored for a visual approach to Runway 09. I landed the aircraft without incident and we taxied to the gate without further incident. We decided it would be prudent to have Maintenance come out and inspect the aircraft for a possible hard landing. There was no sign of visible aircraft damage on our post flight inspection. Afterwards; the Captain and I discussed what had happened a bit more. I explained to the Captain I all of a sudden lost control of the airplane as it suddenly seemed to lose lift on the left wing causing an abrupt and uncontrollable roll. We agreed we had probably encountered wake turbulence in the flare. A heavy 767 had landed just prior to our arrival; and the rotation I experienced felt consistent with wake turbulence I've experienced in flight.There isn't much to be said about the event itself; as it was not predictable and I had to react out of instinct to get the airplane flying again. However; this was the first time I ever had a go-around in the airplane in the year and a half I've been flying for [this airline]. The event itself and the go around were a lot more intense than I expected; and I think that adds to part of the confusion my mind faced during the event. I think I expected a successful landing; and the thought of a go-around had never crossed my mind so I wasn't mentally prepared for having to do it. I wish now looking back I had seen one before in real life; as impractical is that may be. I also learned to always anticipate a go-around from a landing. Even down as far as 10' above the ground - in truly the worst place I would have to go-around; it could happen. Practicing a go around in this condition may be helpful as a sim scenario in the future. Also; the heat of the moment in the go-around itself. I would have liked to be more 'automatic' with the go around procedure. I need to review that mentally more often so when I have to do it again; I'll be completely ready to act than be startled. In the sim; I would always know when it was coming. Even if it didn't happen; I was fresh and ready for anything. Most of that I would say is expecting a successful landing and an error on my part; but I haven't done a go-around for over 6 months in any capacity. An SOP refresher in AQP might be a nice integration for irregular operations.

ERJ-175 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence at touchdown in MIA that resulted in a left and right roll so a go-around was executed.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

After service; Flight Attendant B informed me that there is a chemical smell permeating the back galley. Flight Attendant B described it as a strong; pungent; metallic smell. I agree with the description after smelling it. Flight Attendant B said she feels light headed and nauseous. We both have a metallic taste in our mouths and headaches. I called the Captain from the back galley and alerted the Captain to the smell. He recommends that we clean the area with club soda and Sanicom wipes. Flight Attendant B wiped down the floors and the air vents are helping move the smell. The Captain suggested asking the passengers in the back if they can smell it; but they are all currently sleeping. We have requested a cleaning crew to meet the aircraft. We also asked for Maintenance and an Inflight Supervisor and decided to keep [Catering] from opening the aft door until the smell was investigated.The plane was met by three Inflight supervisors as well by Aircraft Tech; Maintenance and Captain XX who is a friend of mine and is well versed in the emergency medical I had on another [aircraft] with a toxic smell. Maintenance mopped the area well and both doors were opened for circulation. I believe the determination was made that a now discontinued form disinfecting solution was over used by contract cleaners causing a build up of excess product in the entry door vents and surrounding areas causing the toxic smell.Flight Attendant B was pulled from the flight and was replaced due to still feeling nauseous and light headed. The smell did not return on the next two flights.

After deicing in ZZZ and a lengthy tarmac delay (over 45 minutes from pushback to takeoff); Flight Attendant B began to feel extremely light headed; nauseous; and had a headache. Right after takeoff; Flight Attendant B had to leave the jumpseat to go to the lav due to nausea and had some ginger ale to prevent passing out. After about 15 minutes; Flight Attendant B began to feel slightly better but realized she had no appetite and had a metallic taste in her mouth. Upon further assessment; she realized that a strong chemical smell was the cause of nausea and the smell was not dissipating. Flight Attendant B began service with Flight Attendant C in aft galley. After service; Flight Attendant B and Flight Attendant C were both sitting on the aft jumpseat and the strong odor continued. Flight Attendant A came to the aft galley and Flight Attendant B mentioned the strong odor and that it was causing headache; nausea; and lack of appetite. Flight Attendant A confirmed the smell and Flight Attendant C did also. Flight Attendant A wanted to call the flight deck to report it to the pilots. The Captain advised cleaning the entire aft galley; which seemed unrealistic. Flight Attendant B felt that it was likely a cleaning solution and possibly on the floor of the galley. Flight Attendant B covered the aft galley floor in seltzer water and mopped up the seltzer with C folds; with Flight Attendant C's assistance. Flight Attendant B spent the rest of the flight in the cabin and front galley where the smell was not present. Flight Attendant B requested that an Inflight Supervisor be present to witness the odor; and mentioned that she would ask [Catering] to thoroughly mop the floors with water in ZZZ1. Flight Attendant B used peppermint oil to help with nausea and light headedness during final descent and used a nuisance mask to prevent inhaling further fumes when on final descent. The fumes were noticeably stronger near the jumpseat and in the corner by the aft entry door. Upon arrival in ZZZ1; Engineering; Inflight Supervisors; and Maintenance were present. After Flight Attendant B identified the smell/taste as acetone and explained the morning in ZZZ; Engineering discovered that the issue was a disinfectant used on the lavatories and floors; which; when mixed with glycol from deicing; caused a strong odor of acetone and this was a known issue so the cleaner was being phased out.

B737-700 flight attendants reported chemical odor permeating the aft galley causing the B Flight Attendant to experience physiological issues and removal from subsequent flights.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

I flew with a First Officer who could not use the cellular service on his iPad to download the flight plan; weather; and etc.; before his flight. WiFi was not available in the terminal. I tried to upload my information to him via Bluetooth but that did not work either. His iPad was not recognized by my iPad. The following day; he called the iPad help desk. They told him that he had gone over his monthly allotment of cellular megabits and that his iPad was locked out. His request to unlock it was denied. He was instructed to get a loaner iPad for his next sequence and was informed that he would have to wait until the new cycle starts before his iPad would be unlocked again for cellular service. He was able to download everything on one of our legs because the terminal had a WiFi service; but on other legs I was the only one to download flight information.I don't agree with the company's decision to just lock up an iPad. This is an important tool for our flight planning. Somebody artificially decided what our monthly cellular allotment is. We often don't have a choice and have to use cellular service to download everything. I personally am close to exceeding my own allotment because in the last two weeks I have flown four trips. I suggest that the company increases our cellular allotment or gives us some extra megabits when approaching a limit. Just taking away the only device we have in the middle of a trip is unsafe. The company is not giving us enough cellular allocation. Many airports don't have WiFi available. [I suggest] increasing the cellular allocation.

B737-800 Captain reported the Company iPads are at times unable to obtain flight plans and weather information because the allocated data plan had been exceeded.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 9150; Flight Crew Type 540

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

During a charter flight descending on the FERNANDO 5 arrival; weather was clear at our altitude; and while our destination did have a ceiling at the time; it was VFR. We were commenting on the current ATIS about the very low altimeter setting. If I remember correctly; it was 29.67. We were talking about how we should be in worse conditions then the continuous light turbulence we were experiencing. I was the pilot not flying sitting in the right seat for this leg of the trip. North West of Fillmore California near PIRUE Intersection; the aircraft entered an area of severe turbulence. The aircraft was in a descent nearing an assigned altitude of 11;000 FT at a speed of approximately 270 KTS on an assigned heading off the FERNANDO 5 arrival when sudden; intense downdrafts and updrafts disengaged the autopilot. The pilot flying's headset was flung off; inaccessible down in the foot well area. Airspeed was reduced; and we tried to maintain altitude; but descended to approximately 10;600 FT.I was able to communicate with ATC; to inform them of our situation; offering the reason for our first loss of 400 FT initial deviation from the assigned altitude. We called back to the passenger and he said he was OK; although looked shaken. As we leveled again at 11;000 FT; a second; violent and longer period of extreme turbulence was experienced. The aircraft was predominantly buffeted up and down more than side to side; but certainly a significant event. I had my iPad sitting on my right leg; but had not strapped it down yet since we were still above 10;000 FT. It flew past me and ended up behind the cockpit. My coffee cup flew out of the cup holder and ended up under my seat; and my sunglasses flew out of my shirt pocket and were found down by the left seat rudder pedals. I'm sure I hit my head on the sun visor; but don't remember it happening. I glanced back to check on our passenger and saw him now surrounded by many items normally stowed in seat pockets or some of the cabinets; papers; eyeglasses; pillows; etc. With the pilot flying's headset off; we shouted options not knowing if more extreme turbulence was still to come and we elected to request a turn toward the coast and lower altitude. We were given another heading toward the coastline and assigned 8;000 FT. ATC was very accommodating during this period; and gave us a block of airspace from 11;000 FT to 8;000 FT. Somewhere in this; I took the controls and the pilot flying was able to retrieve his headset. I then turned the aircraft back to him and we had ICS communications again. During this descent and for the duration of the flight; the aircraft was still in moderate to light turbulence. The turn to final and the landing at our destination was uneventful. We had Maintenance do a turbulence inspection on the aircraft before we flew it again; and no damage had been done. I guess Cessna builds strong airplanes! In reviewing our actions during the turbulence; I don't know if there was anything that we could have done differently. The low altimeter setting was a clue to us; but I underestimated the violence that was to follow. The pilot flying did a masterful job maintaining control of the aircraft under some very extreme circumstances.

[This report contains no additional information.]

A CE-560XL encountered severe turbulence at 11;000 FT while descending on the FERNANDO 5 Arrival into Southern California; but damage was not discovered during a post flight airframe inspection nor did any occupants sustain injury.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was the Captain (Pilot Monitoring) during an arrival to SNA. We were flying the OHSEA2 arrival. We had descended to 5;000 feet to meet a crossing restriction. We were at 250 knots and I thought it was a good time to slow; since we had a level portion of the arrival. At this time; ATC radioed the instruction; 'Slow to 200 knots; you are below the Class Bravo.' We complied immediately; but it seems we should have already been at 200 knots. There is no depiction of the Class B on the arrival chart; nor is there a speed restriction depicted; as there were further up on the chart. We were over open water and on an IFR arrival designed for Turbojet aircraft. My personal solution going forward was to mark my chart with the 200 knot restriction and make sure I program it in the FMS that way as well as to pay more attention to other arrivals when operating at airports in the vicinity of [the] larger; Class B airport. While it looks like the waypoint LAXBB may be named to indicate that airspace; it is not noted as such on the chart. Furthermore; there is no published speed restriction at LAXBB; and I believe this would be a good charted solution to alleviate the threat for all pilots.

Cleared to descend via the OHSEA 2 RNAV STAR landing 20R into SNA. After leveling at 5000 feet in between LAXBB and KLEVR ATC instructed us to 'maintain 200 knots beneath the Bravo'.  Our speed at the time was 250 knots. The Class Bravo is not depicted on the OHSEA 2.  Depicting the Class Bravo or mandating a 200 knot speed limit at LAXBB would be helpful for situational awareness.

EMB-175 flight crew reported exceeding 200 kts below LAX Class B airspace while flying the OHSEA2 RNAV arrival into SNA.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Had a problem with my autopilot; received a warning from ATC and the tower and I ended up significantly below the glide slope on my first approach before I made appropriate corrections. I did a go around and completed the second approach manually without incident.I will be working with an avionics expert to determine the cause. In the future I need to be more diligent monitoring the autopilot activity and monitoring the glideslope and making faster manual corrections as needed.

The pilot of a Piper Aerostar reported an autopilot problem on approach that resulted in a descent below the glideslope before receiving an alert by ATC.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Conducting RNAV visual approaches; a large air carrier aircraft was cleared for the RNAV Visual Runway 26R. That aircraft turned early off the approach on top of company aircraft. I turned the first large aircraft away from the finals; the aircraft came close to other aircraft on the [Runway] 27L final. This incident caused me great stress and emotional trauma when this happened; I did the best I could to resolve the pilot error. I told Supervisor I did not want to do those RNAV visual approaches and he commanded that I shall use them. I asked to be removed from position; and another Controller offered to get me out. I left the facility shortly thereafter; administrative leave. I don't know why this keeps happening; this is a known issue with the larger aircraft; and this was at least my 4th time this similar incident has happened. This I was not able to save the error from happening this time.I fear the continuing of these approaches; will lead to a significant event were possible life will be lost; and I want nothing to do with them. Let the air carrier go perfect them at a slow airport; and bring them here. I hope this never happens to me again; the next time could end my career.

An A80 Controller reported the RNAV 26R Visual is dangerous because flight crews do not fly it properly and he feels great stress and emotional trauma while working the RNAV because of the inflight conflicts which develop.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

I was conducting an SIC (Second in Command) checkride. We had just executed a missed approach out of ZZZ off the VOR-A. As we were climbing northwesterly on the missed; we got a TA for traffic at about our 2 to 3 o'clock. They were slightly above our altitude and began turning to the north as we leveled off and began heading more westerly. As we were visually searching for that traffic; we got another TA for traffic slightly below us and at 12 o'clock. We began to climb in order to climb above their altitude and continued our turn towards the west/south. I was unsure of their direction of flight and it ended up being southwesterly. We got to within 300 feet of vertical separation at the closest. Between the missed approach and the initial traffic; we were caught off guard by the second traffic alert. My suggestions is once traffic is in sight; ensure one pilot is monitoring that traffic; while the other monitors the instruments (and other traffic displays).

PC-12 pilot conducting a checkride reported a NMAC while executing a published missed approach. They received  a TCAS/TA for an undentified VFR aircraft; leveled off; then had to respond to a TCAS/RA for another unidentified VFR aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Manuals; Procedure

Landing at JAC; cleared for VOR RWY 1 approach. Dispatch had us tankering fuel so we were heavier than need be. We looked at the landing data and determined if the runway was dry we could take up to a 5 knot tailwind. If it was wet we could accept no tailwind. Our plan was to fly the approach and depending on the wind either land on RWY 1 or circle to 19. Ceiling was 6;000 overcast. On Tower we twice asked for wind updates and each time were told the winds were calm. We elected to land on RWY 1 which was dry. When we asked if the PAPI was out; we were told they leave it off during day/VMC. The Captain did a nice job; although the VVI was around 1;000 FPM through most of the approach which we attributed to high altitude and heavy weight. We stopped uneventfully. On turning off the runway we saw the 10 knot wind socks were fully straight with at least a steady state 10 knot tailwind.Between tankering fuel; lack of PAPI and the Tower not reporting the actual winds (they stayed pretty steady) we felt like we had several links in a potential accident chain in place against us.Tankering fuel into high altitude; short runways; might not be wise. Tower not reporting accurate winds could have caused a problem.

A large passenger jet flight crew dispatched with tankered fuel to JAC was rightfully concerned about runway length (6;300 feet); field elevation (6;431 feet); ATC's SOP of not operating the PAPI during daylight/VMC; landing gross weight and wind direction.  Following a safe landing they were shocked to see the wind socks indicating at least a 10 knot tailwind although; when winds were requested during the approach; Tower had replied; 'Calm.'


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4900; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I'm currently the only full-time company paid pilot in a part 91 operation. The C.P. is not currently flying; but was taking care of administrative duties. Over the past 13 months; I've tried at least once a month to get involved with Jeppesen updates and maintenance program to help learn the C.P. duties as I am supposed to takeover when the current C.P. leaves. He has always said that is his only duties right now and he has it covered. Any maintenance problems I've had over the course of my employment here; we've always gotten them fixed ASAP; no questions asked and been in a few times for 'routine and scheduled maintenance'... After gaining information one day that lead me to believe the C.P. may not be keeping the a/c up to date with Gulfstream rec services; I was finally able to get myself access to Gulfstreams maintenance website. Once on there; I found our A/C was overdue on several items such as oil and filter change; oil bypass valve inspections and many other miscellaneous inspections. I immediately contacted the company owners and cancelled a flight for later that day and got on the phone with our Gulfstream maintenance people. Then; after all that I had been doing to make sure corrective action was taken to get the plane fixed ASAP; I flew it straight to a maintenance facility. Once I got there and it was being fixed; it dawned on me that there could have been an issue with me flying it to maintenance after I had found out about the overdue inspection items. I have been discussing and researching whether or not it was airworthy items or not; since it was recommended manufacturer items to be checked and or inspected. At no time did I feel safety was jeopardized; but I always go by the books and that's why I cancelled all passenger flights until corrective action was accomplished. Maintenance told me it was no big deal; and if I got it down there they'd start on it right away. However; looking back; I should have first called my local FSDO and made sure there were no issues with me flying it to Maintenance before I departed.

Corporate pilot reported ferrying the aircraft to a maintenance facility without fully checking airworthiness.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Entered the runway and was cleared for takeoff. Advanced the power levers normally and stated; 'Set power.' The First Officer set the power and we continued down the runway. Then the aural warning 'autofeather' sounded and I looked up and the green autofeather light was not on. The autofeather arming switch was in the 'on' position. I called 'abort' and rejected the takeoff and exited the runway. I called the Flight Attendant off of the runway and told her what happened and that we were going back to the gate. We completed the after landing check and taxied back to the gate; wrote up the aircraft. I then called Dispatch who transferred me to Maintenance Control; and downed the aircraft.

EMB120 Captain experiences an aural 'autofeather' warning during takeoff and rejects the takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 500

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

During climb through FL230; about 20 minutes into flight.  We believe we encountered two compressor stalls; one on each engine; at separate times; within 60 seconds of each other. We departed in heavy rain; +25 C. There was a large weather system that stretched [over the South].  During climb we encountered heavier than anticipated and continuous light turbulence; occasional moderate. OAT at FL230 1*C TAT.  Engine; Wing; Brake A/I was on.  Aircraft was climbing at 250 KIAS; fluctuating -20KIAS due turbulence.  First event on Number 2 engine; we felt and heard a thump; followed by a small yaw movement. Within 60 seconds we felt same on Engine Number 1.  We immediately leveled at FL250; reduced power and turned igniters ON Continuous.  All engine parameters were observed to be normal with no indications of any aircraft abnormal (no fault warning lights or messages). Using the aircraft synoptic pages; a thorough systems check showed all aircraft systems normal.  We continued climb to altitude with igniters ON until out of weather system.  All systems were continuously monitored for any anomaly. No further discrepancies were noticed. Flight was continued (2.4 hours) to home base uneventfully.  On our postflight we inspected Number 1 and Number 2 engine intakes. No damage visible. Company Maintenance was informed of event. Upon review of engine computer data; by the engine manufacturer (Pratt & Whitney) it was determined that the Number 2 Engine flamed out 6 times and automatically relit each time.  It was also determined that the #1 Engine flamed out once and relit automatically.  Both flameouts occurred simultaneously.  Pratt & Whitney determined that the engines operated exactly as designed and ran with nearly perfect parameters for the remainder of flight.  They determined that the flameouts occurred due to environmental conditions. It is obviously a disconcerting feeling now knowing that we could have potentially lost both engines; in poor weather conditions.  I am thankful that the aircraft and engines are so highly advanced that they relit themselves with only two discernible small yaw movements as our only clue that an event even occurred.  The relit were so spontaneous that by the time I looked up to the engine gauges there was no indication of any power loss.  At the time of the event we were being vectored around areas of stronger precipitation by ATC.After 13 years of flying advanced corporate jet aircraft it is easy to become complacent with the reliability of modern jet engines.  Engine flameouts are commonly thought of as things from the past; or just practice in our bi-annual recurrent simulator training.  Obviously this not the case.  It is still possible to have an engine flameout under the right environmental conditions; in this case heavy precipitation; turbulence; and possibly my high climb angle and desire to climb above weather quickly contributed to this event that is 'not supposed to happen'. It is unfortunately not practical to say that in the future we will avoid this type of event again by not flying through heavy precipitation.  Flying through weather is part of the job and at times you may find yourself; as I did; in heavier than anticipated weather conditions.  We had flown into the weather system and landed 1.5 hours earlier.  When we departed the inflight conditions worsened.  Ceiling and visibility was 1;000 feet and 1 with +RA on departure.  Winds were NE at 15 with gusts up to 26 knots (7;000 foot Runway X was used for departure).  There were no reports of windshear or thunderstorms at the time of departure.  The weather was within normal operating parameters.  In order to prevent this from happening ever again I will be more pro-active about finding a better route through and around weather.  In this case we departed on our filed flight plan route which turned out to contain the worst of the weather.  We spoke with the Tower Controller to coordinate vectors immediately after departure.  He passed us off to Departure Control who initiated the first deviations.  We were then handed over to Center who also helped vector us around the heavier precipitation.  Unfortunately we were not getting a good radar return; from our on board radar; for the 5 miles directly in front of us.  I think we inadvertently wandered into an area of extreme precipitation.  In the future I would look to re-file the flight plan route so that it would depart us in a more favorable direction.  I was not the PIC on this particular trip and did not file this flight plan.  That is no excuse as I am a seasoned Captain.  I should have been more proactive in prompting or recommending to the PIC that better options were available.  ATC was most likely already overloaded due to the massive weather system and it is not fair to them for us to blast off into the system and start asking for reroutes.  They were very helpful and accommodating nonetheless.  They're vectors kept us away from the worst areas.  Ultimately the safest option is to just delay the flight until conditions improve.  As I mentioned above I am thankful that our aircraft is so advanced and reliable that a potentially disastrous event only lasted barely seconds in our engine computers.  I will rely on them in the future but also do my best to avoid the potential re-occurrence by avoiding the worst weather.

Both DA-2000 engines flamed out then automatically relit without crew knowledge or intervention as the aircraft climbed out to FL250 after takeoff in heavy precipitation and turbulence.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight operated from ILM with [an early morning] departure time. Arriving at the gate preparing for first flight of the day procedures the Captain briefed an MEL for an APU fault status message and NOTAMs for lights that were out of service on the field. The Captain also briefed the need for a takeoff alternate for the weather and made the necessary calls to Dispatch. I took care of my duties; preflight walk around; departure setup; etc. We had a busier than normal morning given the MEL and weather on top of our normal duties but with time management and working together we were able to push back from the gate on time.With an early morning departure the tower would not be open until [later] so we received our clearance from Washington Center after our pushback. After running our checklists we began our taxi out to the runway. I made standard radio calls for an uncontrolled field on taxi. For the time of day the airport environment was rather visible with a well lit ramp area; and bright aircraft taxi lights. We departed Runway 35 without having keyed up the airport lighting system. We completed our flight successfully and without further incident.Looking back on our flight I believe that I did not activate the airport lighting system because the visibility did not seem to be an issue as I could see the taxi/runway environment and I did not think to activate the lights. Upon departure I could visibly see '35' on the runway; the center line; and the edge of the Runway.The Captain and I were both not aware that we had departed without airport lighting on until later the same day we were notified a ramp agent had informed [another] crew of our departure. They notified their Chief pilot; who contacted [our carrier].The event occurred as we were departing an uncontrolled field in which we had sufficient visibility that neither I nor the Captain thought to key up the airport lighting system.

Regional Jet First Officer reported they failed to activate runway lighting on an early morning departure from ILM because lighting seemed sufficient.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

Upon boarding at XA:19 it was found the aircraft had hot air flowing and unbearable for customers and crews to be onboard. Cleaners were off the airplane. Pilots arrived shortly after and [I] told them the airplane was too hot. Due to the temperature and horrible condition Aircraft X provided the airplane was never appropriately cooled until we had both engines on and it was nearly unbearable to the crew and passengers being forced to wear a face covering during extreme heat conditions.Also showed the spraying took place at XA:24 and that time was not accurate as the cleaners were not onboard the plane when we arrived. I cannot confirm it was actually accomplished by the time frame.

Flight Attendant reported aircraft being hot during boarding and that the aircraft did not cool off until the engines were started.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Normal day; normal passenger operations; on Aircraft X; performing ZZZ to ZZZ1 flight. With APU being under MEL; started engine number one at the gate according to normal checklist. Cleared to push out of the gate; to the blue line. The initial push back was mostly smooth. Aircraft pushed on a slant angle on the green line and stopped. Tow truck driver contacted the flight deck; stating that he will pull us to the blue line. Since then; the mild tensions and sounds were sensible as if it felt that the angle of pulling forward to the blue line was kind of steep. I; personally; could not see the tow truck from the right seat. Shortly after; we heard a bigger noise and aircraft started to move forward that followed immediately by the driver asking us to set the brake in a rushed voice; Captain acted promptly; and we stopped the aircraft on time and smoothly. I personally did not feel any impact. We stopped with an angle on the blue line. The driver mentioned that the tow bar broke and he is going to disconnect and contact the ramp safety. We communicated with the Ramp; Operations and MX (Maintenance) Control. Captain communicated with the flight attendants and made an announcement to the passengers informing them about the nature of problem. Within 10 minutes or so; with the supervision of our MX personnel on the ground; a new tow truck; new tow bar and a new driver towed us back to the same gate. This time it was very smooth. We found out that a scratch line and a shallow dent exist on the lower right-hand side of the aircraft. It happened by the shallow impact of the fuselage with the roof of the tow truck. Captain wrote up the damage in MX logbook. Dispatch and Flight Operations have been informed. Everybody acted professional during and after the event. Don't know if the tow bar breaking happened because of the angle & the tension exposed to it; or it was the material failure. Tail swap happened shortly after; and we performed the same flight on ship (tail). If a tow truck driver is not happy with the location of the aircraft or if for some reason they are in a tight spot; or any other unusual issue; they can always consider us as a team and communicate any unease with us; so we all figure out how to get out of it. My assumption is that if we were unhooked from the tow bar on the green line; the entire event could have been avoided. It could only cost me a simple radio call to the ramp; I guess.

These are my recollections as I remember them: We were operating Aircraft X operating out of gate X. Aircraft X was operating with MEL APU Inoperative applied. We complied with procedures for engine start with external pneumatic air source & completed the appropriate normal checklists. Ramp tower assigned us a push back onto the blue line. The push back seemed normal with the exception that the AC (aircraft) was at an odd angle. I attributed this to the push crew having to avoid the construction adjacent to N11. The tug driver announced that he would get us over to the blue line & proceeded to turn the jet that direction. At this point I could sense some stress on the tug/towbar combination but nothing that seemed abnormal. As the driver proceeded towards the blue line the noise the towbar was making got louder until we heard what I'd describe as a pop or snap. At this point the jet rolled forward due to forward momentum & the driver or wing walker said set the brakes. I estimate the jet moved forward about 10 feet as I was applying the brakes. We verified that there were no injuries to any of the push back crew & were informed that everyone on the ramp was safe. I stopped the jet as judicially as I could; taking into account that the FA's (flight attendants) were probably standing; conducting their safety demonstration. The driver announced he needed to have the Ramp Safety Supervisor conduct an inspection & we called Line Maintenance to survey the situation. We called the cabin to verify there were no injuries to guests or crew & subsequently a PA was made by me to inform the guests of our situation. Line Maintenance asked us if we could taxi the jet back to gate under power which I declined; not knowing the extent of any possible damage. A new towbar & tug was connected to the jet & we were towed back to gate. After the checklists were completed I proceeded to do a visual inspection; where I found an approximately 5 foot scrape on the underside of the fuselage; outboard of the right side nose gear door. I made another PA from the L1 door area informing the guests that there would be a tail swap & what our new gate was; then made an AC logbook entry describing the damage I observed. The flight proceeded as normal to ZZZ1 after a 2 hour delay to get everything ready on the jet we swapped into. Not sure if time was a big factor or not. The ramp personnel did not seem rushed but we did push back several minutes after departure time due to the jet being fueled late. Parking an A-321 at [this] gate with the current construction process ongoing may present a challenge to the push back crew due to the longer fuselage & trying to avoid the construction area adjacent to gate. My biggest suggestion would be for the push back crew to communicate any difficulty they may be having with any ground operation. In this circumstance we could have easily stopped the jet; set the parking brakes; & requested a taxi from our current position. We strive to comply with directions given; however; sometimes we need to ask to amend those instructions to meet the current situation.

Flight crew flying A321 aircraft report contact with tow tug during pushback.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 3314; Flight Crew Type 1130

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was hand flying on vectors for the ILS and intercepted the localizer and the glide slope and had the needles centered and [everything] was going great. The radio broke squelch and the noise was very loud. Since I have always flown very centered approaches. I thought I could divert my attention for a moment to deal with the radio. Wrong. When I looked back at the localizer it was almost full deflection to the left. I over corrected and flew across the Localizer and then had the needle almost fully deflected to the right. I started correction and noticed I was below the glideslope and immediately added power and recaptured the glideslope. I was still IMC and thought it would be better to declare an early 'missed Approach'; straighten things out and come back and try again. The Tower did not respond and I saw the runway and said 'airport in sight' and no response from the Tower. I called 'airport in sight' again and the Tower asked 'if I wished to land' and I said 'yes' and landed without any further issues.The Tower was upset that I called an early 'missed approach' 2 miles before the missed approach point; the swings and they were also concerned about the mountains on both sides of the inbound course. I was also aware of them.

Cessna pilot reported heading and altitude deviations on an ILS approach due to cockpit distraction.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 50

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

VFR flight inbound to Isla Grande Airport (SIG); while approaching local visual reporting point (Levittown water tank); approximately 1 to 2 miles southwest of the field; a radio controlled (R/C) airplane was doing acrobatic maneuvers at our approach altitude of 1;000 MSL. The R/C airplane had reached approximately 1;100 of altitude and was quickly descending on what appeared to be a spin maneuver. A collision didn't happen because we were about 500 FT north of the airplane but certainly a considerable risk to airplanes inbound to Isla Grande Airport. The situation was reported via radio to the Local Controller as other airplanes were also coming inbound to Isla Grande. It appeared the R/C airplane was being flown out of an R/C strip that is located in the area. Users of this R/C strip should be advised of the hazards of doing this type of R/C flying to airplanes in the vicinity.

PA28 instructor pilot reports sighting a radio controlled aircraft above his altitude and in close proximity during a visual approach to SIG. The sighting was reported to the Tower.


I refused the aircraft due to multiple electrical problems after we lost ground power at the gate due to a repeat of 150 amp ground electric circuit breaker popping. Earlier in the day the battery charger circuit breaker had popped. The APU generator was inoperative. The cargo compartment heater fan and recirculation circuit breaker's had popped and were on MEL. I felt there was a larger problem than what was being addressed by placing items on MEL instead of trying to find the cause. With that many repeat electrical problems the aircraft should have been removed from service to find the real cause of the problem instead of letting it continue in revenue flight.

MD-83 Captain reported turning down an aircraft that had multiple persistent electrical issues that were deferred instead of resolved.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Captain (pilot not flying) returned to the cockpit from rest break 1+15 before landing. First Officer (pilot flying) had finished his rest break at 4+05 before landing. Relief Pilot returned to cockpit from his 2nd rest break during initial descent phase 25 minutes before landing. Landing occurred after 9 plus hours of flying [dusk to dawn]. Upon returning to cockpit Captain reviewed NOTAMs and field report. Crew specifically discussed 1;380 meter displaced threshold due to construction on approach end Runway 28; and the ILS glidepath 28 and PAPI Runway 28 out of service. Notably; there was no change to the minimums to any approach to SBGL. Crew also checked the weather and noted low broken deck and 5;000 meter prevailing visibility; well above non-ILS minimums. Crew learned SBGL was landing Runway 28 from Brasilia Center about 45 minutes before landing and loaded Arena 1A Runway 28 arrival in FMC. At hand off to Curitiba Center at ARENA Intersection crew was cleared the Arena 1A arrival as expected. Crew verified step down fixes and airspeeds per the STAR; and specified a hard 2;500 FT at the last fix (EUJE) instead of 2500A3500B. Setting the lowest allowable altitude was intended to assist with transition to the RNAV Runway 28 approach; which began at EUJE. At hand off to Rio Approach Control crew was cleared to 'descend via the Arena 1A' for the RNAV Runway 28 approach. At some point the Approach Controller gave the local altimeter; which the pilot not flying (Captain) read back as 'QNH 1024'(hp); pilot not flying failed to check this against the ACARS weather printout which was (est.) 1014 hp. Failing to verify the altimeter setting was a significant error; as a habit pilot not flying (Captain) normally does verify ATC vs. ACARS weather at non-US destinations to compensate for heavily accented English and/or poor radios. The pilot flying (First Officer) briefed the RNAV Runway 28 approach during the descent while above 10;000 FT. As had been the case during previous flights using this arrival; it is difficult to keep autoflight/FMC in VNAV Path when reaching each step down fix. Nonetheless; Captain had flown the arrival previously without difficulty both as pilot flying and pilot not flying to a stabilized final. During the descent Rio Approach Control directed crew to slow prematurely to 170 KTS when passing about 7;000 FT which complicated energy management and required speed intervene to override FMC speeds. To comply; the pilot flying called for gear down passing through 5;000 FT when starting the turn at ERNA Intersection. Up to this point the arrival had gone normally. After rolling out of the 110 degree turn at ERNA; the aircraft was once again out of VNAV Path in a descent to the programmed ERNA crossing altitude of 2;500 FT. The pilot not flying (Captain); trying to be helpful; reengaged VNAV as the aircraft was on the path; but pilot not flying did not immediately speed intervene. Consequently; the autothrottles very quickly moved forward to attain the FMC programmed speed of 220 KTS. This caused the nose to pitch up; airspeed loss as throttles were disengaged and retarded; and an unstable condition for the pilot flying (First Officer) who clicked off the autopilot to regain control. The pilot flying (First Officer) resumed the descent to EUJE; but just over 2 NM prior to that fix at about 2;700 FT altitude the Controller stated that we needed to cross EUJE at 1;700 FT. The controller was using the EUJE crossing altitude published on the RNAV Runway 28 IAP; while the crew was using the min crossing altitude published on the STAR since we had been cleared to 'descend via' the Arena 1A arrival. The Captain had flown this arrival previously to ILS; VOR; and RNAV finals and had; for safety; always used the higher EUJE crossing altitude on the arrival without eliciting any comment from Rio Approach Control. The Captain reset the altitude window to 1;700 FT and directed the pilot flying to descend to meet the restriction; stating to the pilot flying; 'She's trying to tell you that you have 2 miles to descend 1;000 FT.' Captain assisted by deploying spoilers as pilot flying lowered the nose. While pilot flying (First Officer) met the 1;700 FT crossing restriction performing a hand flown descent; he overshot and descended 200-300 FT below (as indicated on the altimeter). The mandatory altitude from EUJE-to-FAF is 1;600 FT. At this point Captain took control of the aircraft and became the pilot flying until landing.Captain's decision to intervene was based on his knowledge of First Officer's normal flying skills vs. the observed fatigue-induced task saturation and channelized attention that resulted in an altitude deviation. Further; Captain realized he had contributed to the First Officer's task saturation by trying to assist for what he perceived as slower than normal situational awareness by First Officer (pilot flying) after passing ERNA. In retrospect; the appropriate response to the Controller's altitude clearance at EUJE should have been 'unable'; 'go around'; or 'going missed approach' (although we were not yet on the final approach segment). Captain's decision to continue approach was based on: 1) VMC conditions (hazy; 4 miles visibility and ground contact); and familiarity with the flat terrain/water from EUJE to Runway 28. (However; Captain was not familiar with a very small prohibited area (SB (P)-319) directly beneath the final approach; just inside the FAF. The Relief Pilot pointed this area out in the debrief. The altitude deviation occurred about 5 miles prior to this prohibited area.) 2) Deviation occurring 5-6 miles outside the FAF allowing plenty of time to recover by the FAF and still fly a stabilized approach. Had this deviation occurred in IMC or in unfamiliar terrain; Captain would have gone around. Failure to do so in this case may be attributable to either complacency (due to familiarity) and/or mission hacking. While neither was intentional or premeditated; both are unacceptable. Further; at the time of the altitude deviation and the Captain assuming control of the aircraft; the Relief Pilot suggested: 'We could go around...' Captain did not take this comment as directive; but still should have given it greater consideration. Between EUJE and FAF Captain climbed back to 1;600 FT until FAF and then descended via the VNAV path; but purposely stayed high to account for the displaced threshold; and verbalized this to the crew. Runway 28 was visually acquired at about four miles. As we neared the runway and saw the displaced threshold it was apparent that the Captain (pilot flying) had not compensated enough for the displaced threshold; resulting in a stabilized; shallow; dragged-in final. While the aircraft was continuously in a safe position to land with the runway in sight; this was non-standard. A safe touchdown occurred beyond the displaced threshold in the touchdown zone; followed by normal rollout and taxi-in. During taxi-in the Relief Pilot noted the altimeters reading about 250 FT above field elevation using 1024 hp. When crew reset the ACARS altimeter of 1014 hp (est.); the altimeters read field elevation. This means that we may have deviated up to 400 FT below the EUJE-to-FAF restriction of 1;600 FT due to two separate errors: (1) the Captain copying and reading back the wrong altimeter setting to Rio Approach Control; and; (2) the First Officer flying below the EUJE 1;700 FT restriction. This was a serious deviation and would have been avoided if the Captain had directed a go around or stated 'unable' when the controller made the radio call to cross EUJE at 1;700 FT. Fatigue; VNAV automation limitations (ergonomics); VNAV crew proficiency; ATC radio comprehension; and ATC STAR/IAP design and task saturation channelized attention during descent outside the FAF; resulting in an altitude deviation. 1) Captain accepted clearance for the RNAV Runway 28 approach because the aircraft was capable and we are encouraged to practice RNAV procedures when possible. However; given the temporary displaced threshold Captain should have requested the LOC Z Runway 28 approach; which has higher minima and the same crossing altitude restriction at EUJE (2500A3500B) as the Arena 1A STAR. This would have avoided both the altitude deviation and possibly mitigated the dragged-in final. 2) Captain asked the Station Operations Agent to confer with the SBGL Tower or Rio Approach Control Supervisor to ascertain their expectations regarding the EUJE crossing altitude differences between the Arena 1A arrival (STAR) vs. the RNAV Runway 28 approach (IAP). 3) Fleet Captain and training staff should address how they want crews to deal with an RNAV/VNAV approach to a temporary displaced threshold. The Training Department currently teaches crews to fly the VNAV path; and to not use VDP procedures or to drive toward the runway once reaching the DA/MDA. However; the only way VNAV path will work with a large displaced threshold (1;380 meters in this case) would be to adjust the FMC Runway XX crossing height upward (higher) to create a normal threshold crossing at the temporary displaced threshold. However; we have no procedures for making this adjustment. 4) Consider whether higher RNAV Runway 28 minimums would be appropriate during the period of construction and temporary displaced threshold to Runway 28. The current RNAV/VNAV minimums are 298 FT AGL; LNAV minimums are 302 FT AGL. These minimums occurred 1.7 NM from the temporary displaced threshold if the VNAV path is flown. Otherwise; crews might be restricted to using the ILS/LOC Z Runway 28; which has non-ILS minimums of 502 FT AGL. I believe the RNAV Runway 28 minimums should be no lower than the Localizer Z Runway 28 minimums while the temporary displaced threshold is in effect.

On RNAV (GNSS) Runway 28 to SBGL I observed altitude deviation from VNAV path. I did call deviations and suggested go around and that we have ample fuel for go around; but I haven't been assertive to the level I should have been.

Flight crew describes an arrival and RNAV 28 approach to a displaced threshold at SBGL. A mis-set altimeter and ATC adjustments to speed and altitude result in deviations below the initial approach fix altitude and the Captain assuming pilot flying duties.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

First officer conducted preflight walk around; reported icy ramp and difficulty walking on slippery surface; we discussed this with Dispatcher as she was on the phone with me regarding an issue (non- related to event).Determined we could safely taxi the aircraft to deicing bay by applying extreme precaution during taxi ops. Non-movement area was fine; as well as taxi to pad 1; but upon being cleared into pad line 1; as we attempted to line up on proper reference line; aircraft did not respond to tiller input and began to slide towards deicing trucks/cherry picker. I asked the First Officer to make radio call to move trucks while applying full reverse thrust in an effort to stop our forward movement along with full right tiller; that worked after approximate 3-5 seconds. [We] stopped the aircraft; advised deice crew; they made a comment they saw what was happening; but were unable to get the trucks to move out of the way in that short time span. We were able to get the nose wheel to gain traction after the event and turn into the lane requested by deice. I made a PA to our passengers as required regarding deice procedures and a brief explanation as to why they heard unusually loud engine noises. Subsequent de/anti-icing was normal. We made radio reports to deice crew; ATC GRD; and made a phone call to our Dispatcher reporting the conditions in the deice pad. No contact was made with any ground equipment; all engine indications were normal throughout the remaining time spent on ground; taxi; TO; cruise; descent; and landing.NIL braking and essentially nil steering capability in deice pad lane 1. In hindsight; several things come to mind. I should not have taken an angle on the parking line; and avoided any movement in direction of the equipment. In other words; I should have crept into a 90 [degree] turn to join the line; and paralleled all ground equipment. Secondly; a better job cleaning that area; or at least better communications with the ice man regarding how poor the conditions were. Thirdly; there was no reason for using the line closest to the equipment when we could have had a buffer zone in any of the lanes away from the equipment; I would have requested lane 2 or 3 to maintain a no transgression zone until we were stopped in the proper location.

Weather conditions at time of event and the preceding night consisted of light freezing drizzle and were verified during walk around by a thin coat of ice covering ramp area. Captain and I discussed conditions during briefing and the appropriate caution was demonstrated during the taxi out to deice pad. While taxiing out with ground we indicated the need for deicing and we were directed to the designated area consisting of multiple lanes for deicing. Upon reachingthe instructed lane; the captain turned to intercept parking line and indicated that the aircraft was not responding to tiller input and brake application. The aircraft began to slide and was approaching deicing equipment. Unable to stop aircraft with braking alone; the captain used reverse thrust to aid in stopping the aircraft. We instructed the deice crew to move equipment in case the aircraft could not be stopped in time. The event duration was only about 3-5 seconds and did not result in any impact with deice equipment or ground crew vehicles. Engine parameters remained stable and no malfunctions were evident. Subsequent aircraft deicing occurred and a normal takeoff and flight followed. The braking action was reported on all taxiways as being good to fair in spots which was verified as we taxied out to deice pad; However; the deice pad seemed to have degraded conditions and contributed to the degraded braking action which was considered to be nil.Possibly include braking action reports in deice pad or a check of conditions. However; I believe we were the first or one of the first aircrafts to deice that morning; which meant there was not much information to be relayed to us which also contributed to the event. Also; the Pad consisted of several open lanes for deicing; however we were instructed to intercept the line closest to where equipment was parked. Had we transitioned to a lane not as close to where equipment was parked there would have been a greater buffer area in case poor braking conditions were encountered.

A319 flight crew reported NIL braking action and traction at the deicing pad.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 7397; Flight Crew Type 3123

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

Flight was under VFR conditions in accordance with FAR Part 91. There was one passenger on the Plane who was also a Pilot.We landed with gear extended and three green lights. The Passenger/Pilot can attest to this. So can the Tower operator who said during my report that 'we saw you lower the landing Gear on Down Wind'. The Approach; Landing; and Touchdown were uneventful. As we were rolling down the runway the nose dropped and shortly thereafter the main landing gear collapsed. Somehow; the Landing Gear Switch ended up in the Retract Position.We were clearly rolling down the runway with weight on all three gears. The Squat switch should have prevented retraction. There are two squat switches either one of which should have prevented retraction. But the Shop Manual only calls for the adjustment of one. If that switch failed; the other may not have been adjusted and would do no good.

Landing gear retracted during landing rollout. Landing gear switch was reported as up by pilot.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Event occurred at the top of descent (while squawking 1200 with Mode C) during a routine intra-state repositioning flight.Twenty nautical miles after crossing directly over Tampa's Class Bravo geographic center-point; we initiated a VFR/VMC descent from 10;500 feet while continuing to fly southwest.We were avoiding local traffic visually; monitoring local TPA TRACON radio; TCAS as well as ADS-B (participating traffic). Inside the 30 mile Mode C ring there was only one other aircraft in our vicinity; which we maneuvered to cross five miles in trail. No traffic conflict occurred.Thirty nautical miles southwest of TPA we reversed course while continuing to descend to 1;600 ft. We also flew to be 500 ft. below TPA's 3;000-10;000 ft. twenty nautical mile outer shelf.At that time we proceeded to contact TPA on their local TRACON frequency. We informed TPA who we were; where we were and what we wanted to do.Tampa's TRACON Controller asked us if we knew that we had entered Class B Airspace without a clearance. I responded 'no' and said we had remained at 10;500 ft. until crossing beyond and outside of the twenty mile 10;000 ft. ring and that we had then re-crossed the same 20 mile ring at 2;500 ft.; which was 500 feet below the outer shelf's floor.He replied; yes you did; but that the Southwestern Control Airspace at Tampa now extends all the way out to the 30 NM Mode C Ring. My First Officer and I simultaneously expanded out our VFR Charts utilizing the EFB Foreflight on iPads to discover this to be true. I acknowledged the Controller's reprimand apologetically and said it would never happen again.My First Officer and I had thoroughly reviewed the flight to be conducted; including a standard briefing with Flight Services; but had not detected this change from the standard Class B configuration. At the time of our transgression we had our VFR and GPS maps zoomed in to cleanly display traffic on our navigation devices.This was very embarrassing. A lesson learned; which will be put into practice during all subsequent flights.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

LR55 flight crew reported that their failure to correctly read airspace parameters resulted in a Class B airspace incursion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Traveling in level cruise at FL370; smooth air; Mach .80 we experienced an aircraft Mach speed exceedence. With no noticeable wind change the aircraft accelerated; uncommanded; up to Mach .84. The A/T system made minimal; if any; changes to the cruise power setting. The Captain (PF) immediately spun the Mach speed way back and extended full speed brakes. This was the point at which the A/T finally brought the power back. We stabilized the aircraft; configured the automation and continued to the destination with no other abnormalities.We possibly could have reacted more aggressively and sooner; but we fully expected the A/T system to respond correctly to the speed increase and reduce power accordingly. Aside from that; I cannot see anything else that could have prevented the situation.I don't know what we could change to prevent this situation again.

Air carrier First Officer reported a Mach speed exceedance during cruise.  First Officer stated the increase in speed was uncommanded and there was no noticeable wind change either.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167; Flight Crew Total 10760; Flight Crew Type 4378

During high speed regime of takeoff roll (at approximately 120 KTS) lost my ND (Navigation Display) and lower MFD display as well as FO (First Officer) ND. This was followed by a Master Caution Warning and 'Checklist Incomplete' message on upper MFD display. After takeoff; recovered all lost screens. Had briefed crew prior to takeoff that this was [a known issue with this aircraft] and that there was possibility that we would lose our ND displays on takeoff and that I would not abort for this as per Bulletin. I had a similar event several months ago on [another aircraft] on takeoff roll; also in high speed regime. This is a long term issue it seems and yet it continues. Getting Master Caution warning lights however is new. This is a very serious and confusing situation that could lead to an inadvertent high speed abort on a wet runway at speeds approaching V1 (Takeoff Decision Speed); and yet it persists to be an issue? Why?

B777 Captain reported loss of cockpit displays during takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 17862; Flight Crew Type 9669

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

While reviewing the maintenance status of our aircraft I saw there were multiple instances of FCU (Flight Control Unit) failure with multiple resets that would temporarily fix the issue only to have the FCU fail again. After consultation with my dispatcher; Maintenance Control; my flying partner and the FAA inspector riding with us to ZZZ1; I refused the aircraft since we were scheduled to fly to ZZZ1 where the weather was forecast to be at minimums. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and said they had a replacement FCU and immediately started pulling circuit breakers in front of the FAA inspector riding with us to ZZZ1. At this point I left the cockpit to give the two mechanics room to work on the FCU and went into the cabin to make a PA to the passengers and let the CSRs know we would be delayed for at least an hour while the FCU was replaced. We finally departed for ZZZ1 almost 1.5 hours late after maintenance had replaced the FCU and successfully run their tests. I did notice that during their test; there was a Red Autopilot Failure ECAM present for much of the time.43 minutes into the flight at cruise in smooth air; Autopilot 1 disconnected. I confirmed that neither one of us had accidently bumped the side stick and neither one of us had our hands or any objects near the stick. I reconnected AP1 and it remained engaged for about 10 more minutes when it again disconnected. I again reconnected AP1 and it remained connected for about 5 minutes when it again disconnected. This time when I tried to reconnect it I received a FCU channel 2 failure and Autopilot 1 failure. I gave the aircraft to my first officer since I had also lost FMGC1 with no map display. Our display showed -FD2 and with my FD on 2FD2. The first officer's FMGC remained normal and AP2 connected successfully. The ECAM had no action items so I referred to the QRH which did have procedures for airborne system resets. Before attempting the resets I established a phone patch with Maintenance Control to discuss the procedure in light of the past history. Maintenance Control agreed with attempting the reset on FCU2 on the 141VU panel. I confirmed the CB location and had my jump seater cycle the CB per Maintenance Control's instructions. The reset was unsuccessful. We then performed a reset on FMGC1 on 49VU to regain FMGC1. This was only partially successful and my FD display returned to 1FD2 but the FMGC remained in independent mode. I conferred with my flying partners on our options. Taking this aircraft on to ZZZ1 with weather at minimums was not feasible. We elected to divert and with the dispatcher's concurrence proceeded to ZZZ2; reviewing the overweight landing checklist and landing data provided by our dispatcher; where we landed about 11000 pounds overweight. Since my FMGC was only partially usable I elected to let the F/O make the landing. I have had previous experience with FMGC failures where the FMGC fails totally at the last minute creating un-needed confusion in a critical phase of flight. Since the F/O's systems were normal and he was a very experienced Airbus pilot; I had no hesitation letting him perform the landing. Landing and rollout were normal. A ZZZ2 mechanic met us at the gate and printed out about 12 inches of maintenance failures from the MCDU and made sure he understood exactly what the failures were. We proceeded to the spare aircraft that was towed from the hangar right behind us as we were taxing in.When we arrived at the new gate; the CSR had to manually input my file number and the F/O's to check us off. When I pulled up the release information it showed me fit but showed NO next to the F/O. We had to manually input the FIT information and eventually called the dispatcher to get it accomplished. As we were getting ready to push; the release showed a new Release 3 which I had not signed off; and discovered the Dispatcher had made a new release without informing us. I had to reconnect my IPAD to download and sign the new release. About 1.5 hours later; after having to wait for a new Release we taxied out. When the final weights arrived; the weight manifest did not include the jumpseater. We had to call the station with the jump seater's credential information to have him included in the weight manifest. The CSR had failed to do this at the gate. After multiple calls to the station and to dispatch; after almost 30 minutes off the gate; we finally had it corrected.We proceeded to ZZZ1 where the weather had continued to get worse. We had two alternates. Eventually one of them went below minimums so it was dropped. We discussed our options should the approach into ZZZ1 not be successful and elected; rather than attempt another approach at ZZZ1; we would proceed on to the other where the weather was at CAT1 minimums. We successfully flew a CAT2 autoland into ZZZ1 with weather right at minimums. This aircraft was not autoland limited into ZZZ1 where as the original one was. We arrived at the gate in heavy snow; almost four hours late. Our FAA jumpseater told us we did a great a job handling all of the issues.To top off the night; we had to take Cabs; including flight attendants from another flight waiting at the curb; to the hotel as the roads were snow blocked and the hotel van was not operating. Our cab barely made it to the hotel dodging sliding cars stuck in the snow.

A320 Captain reported refusing an aircraft with a history of FCU failures. The FCU was replaced by Maintenance; but failed enroute and the crew elected to divert due to low visibility at their destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 1510; Flight Crew Type 435

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

About one hours and thirty minutes [into flight] at FL380; I saw the oil pressure on number one engine was lower than normal and I told the Captain about it; now he was aware about the indication and we briefed the check list just in case of loss [of] oil pressure. [A] few minutes later we got the three indication that confirm we completely lost the oil pressure; we ran the check list and we shutdown the engine declaring an emergency with [ATC]; requesting an immediate descent to FL240 and requesting vector direct to [an alternate airport]; as the best option for us because we know the area and also we knew that [the alternate] airport have good facilities for this type of emergency. 35 minutes later we landed safely in [the alternate] airport and we took our passengers back to ground safe. The Captain and I we were so professional and we were focused on the all phases of the flight; that is the only way that pilots can handle this kind of situation.

Hawker 800XP FO reported shutting down an engine in flight because of loss of oil pressure. Flight declared an emergency and diverted to an alternate airport.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Received GEAR DOOR EICAS MESSAGE and DOOR annunciation on the forward panel after gear retraction. We referenced the QRH; declared an emergency and returned for landing. Great job by crew and ATC. Maintenance suspected the left main landing gear door did not close after retraction. The jet was taken out of service.

A B757-200 flight crew declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport following receipt of GEAR DOOR EICAS warnings after gear retraction.


Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was informed of an airplane swap just after I had gotten the flight plan and release. The rest of the flight crew had to gather their things switch terminals A to C. We were now hurried to get out on schedule. I get to the airplane and maintenance is on board finishing the de-fueling procedure. I get in the cockpit to review several MEL items. The right A/C pack; both FMS units; GPWS; and a fueling valve are deferred. The flight is boarded and we do the normal before start checklist. I check to make sure the headings are matched up and the IRS switch is in ATT mode. The First Officer tells me that due to the FMS units being out; we used ATT mode to get a display on attitude and heading indicators. I agreed that we were not using the IRS's anyway and it made sense. We pushed out; taxied and started takeoff roll normally. Just before 80 KTS First Officer notices the heading indicators are not correct (215 instead of 176). I decided to continue with the takeoff and just visually turned to an approximate heading. Once airborne; I quickly realized that slewing the heading indicators was not an easy task. We requested a return to the airport and I visually flew the aircraft around the pattern and landed. We returned to the gate without any problem. I believe I missed the heading check when taking position on the runway because we needed to turn off the operating pack per MEL. I also thought we could correct the headings once airborne. There is no MEL FMS out guidance and we did not get any malfunction warnings to lead us to the QRH.

MD83 Captain reports being dispatched with both FMS units inoperative and discovers during the before start checklist that the IRS's have been aligned in the ATT mode; which seemed reasonable. During takeoff heading errors are discovered but the Captain elects to continue. Once airborne; correcting the heading errors is found to be difficult and the flight returns to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Total 12700; Flight Crew Type 3700

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

This [report is to advise of one of] ever more frequent occurrences on new airport arrivals across the US. ATC is making unrealistic demands for descents and speeds by altering the vertical [navigation constraints] on charted arrivals. These changes are being made with no warning or expect clearances. As per SOP we as pilots are adhering to our 3 to 1 profiles and the expected altitudes on the charts and then with no warning ATC is changing the vertical and/or airspeed constraints with no regard to the ability of the aircraft to complete the task. This event was one such occurrence.While descending on the TWSTD ONE RNAV Arrival into IAH we were given such a [clearance]. It was apparent that the controller was completely unaware that the clearance issued was not possible given the position of the aircraft on the arrival. Outside of MENTL at FL360 we were given a descend and maintain FL240 clearance with which the flying pilot complied by selecting the descent mode of VNAV. The aircraft was below the 3 to 1 path at that time so the aircraft began a 1;000 FPM descent until reaching the desired power off VNAV path and 280 KTS for the assigned arrival. This path was planning to cross MENTL as charted above FL240 while planning to cross the next waypoint constraint; WHACK; at 280 KTS between 17;000 and FL200. The VNAV path was planning to cross WHACK at approximately FL190 within the window and on speed.At approximately FL260 and 26 NM from WHACK the Controller issued a clearance to cross WHACK at 12;000. This clearance came with no prior 'expect' clearance and was just over 7;000 FT below the VNAV path planned crossing. That left us only increased airspeed and flight spoilers in order to increase our descent rate. Immediately we questioned the clearance altitude as well as the planned arrival with the controller and he confirmed both as correct. The flying pilot immediately began an open descent and extended the spoilers to assist in losing altitude. I explained [to ATC] that the issued clearance was outside of the aircraft's capabilities. With the new and unexpected much lower altitude clearance programmed into the FMGC; it was again clear that the Controller had put us in bad position. Using all measures at our disposal we were not going to be able to give the Controller both the altitude and the airspeed. I made the Controller aware of this and explained to him that the planned crossing was much higher than planned by the assigned arrival. He seemed confused as to why it would not work. When I reminded him of the charted altitudes he said that they were not using those altitudes today. I explained that we would need a heads up if that were to be the case in the future. There were no NOTAMS to this effect it was just another controller change to a charted arrival at the last minute. It is obvious that the aircraft would not be able to lose 14;000 FT in 26 NM while maintaining 280 KTS. It was clear that the altitude was most important to the Controller so the Captain used all available tools to make the 12;000 foot crossing although doing so required crossing at a higher airspeed than planned. After [the first controller] stated that they were not using the altitudes on the arrival the next controller issued a 'descend via' clearance! It appears that the controllers need some education on what the aircraft performance limits are and also need to be on the same page with each other. This type of issue has become a problem across our system with the many newer arrivals. The newer arrivals work; for the most part; as they are written and designed but; when the controller alters either altitude and/or speed constraints; it becomes extremely difficult or even--as in this case--impossible to comply.

We explained that the clearance did come as a surprise. His comment was that he gave us clearance in enough time to make it. We discontinued the conversation as it was a distraction. We finally made the crossing restriction after speed relief.

An A320 flight crew took exception to ATC's frequent modifications to complex STAR crossing restriction; in this case the TWSTD RNAV STAR to IAH.  Reporter believe controllers must be informed/trained with respect to aircraft capabilities in climb and descent and the impact that high or low speed constraints make on possible rates of climb.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

During pushback we were given clearance to start both of our engines from the pushback crew. I gave the First Officer the command to start the #2 engine. As the pushback crew brought the airplane to a halt during a routine SOP pushback; I heard 'set brakes' via the Flight Interphone System; I responded with; 'brakes set' and as I said this my First Officer brought my attention to an ACARS message we had just received stating something similar to 'flight number not recognized.'My First Officer stated something to the fact that he wasn't sure why we were receiving that ACARS message. The next thing I heard was 'brakes; brakes; brakes!' via the Flight Interphone System. I immediately applied full brakes and felt the airplane slightly jerk. The pushback personnel informed me that the airplane had rolled forward up against the handle of the tow bar.I set the parking brake and shut down the #2 engine (#1 engine had not yet been started). I had a brief discussion with the pushback personnel that there were no injuries and no obvious damage; but the tow bar was stuck due to the nose tire being up against it. We contacted maintenance and multiple maintenance personnel quickly appeared and inspected the situation.I was informed by maintenance personnel that they had installed the bypass pin; disconnected the handle from the tow bar; pulled the tow bar handle out from being stuck against the nose wheel; and reattached the handle to the tow bar. Multiple maintenance personnel inspected the tow bar; nose wheels; tires; steering and nose gear. We conducted steering tests; and re-inspected the nose tire. Maintenance could find no damage with any items.Maintenance did not want to write up any discrepancy because they said there was no discrepancy to write up. We also did not write up any discrepancy due to advice from maintenance personnel. We then continued an SOP pushback; disconnect and release and taxied out to the runway with no further issues; and continued the flight to the final destination.Although I am uncertain; I can think of only two possibilities that could have caused this. Either the parking brake somehow got released or I never got the parking brake set after pushback. I would guess it was the latter. We were very fortunate that there were no injuries or damage. I also feel very fortunate to have a pushback crew that was very alert and communicated; 'brakes; brakes; brakes!' in such a timely manner.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

During pushback brakes were not set as ground crew disconnected the tow bar. Aircraft rolled into the tow bar before stopping.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

On taxi out ground traffic failed to give way to taxiing aircraft. First Officer saw this and applied brakes heavily. Ground traffic was right to left. Flight attendant was injured with the sudden stop. Returned to gate. First Officer applied brakes without saying a word. We discussed the issue. I relayed that a verbal warning should have been given [to me].

Normal pushback and engine start. Ramp cleared us to contact Ground Control. I noticed a white van was driving eastbound on the service road between taxiways. The van was not yielding to us and that caught me off guard. Collision looked imminent and I reacted by applying brakes. The van continued eastbound and I reported the incident to Ground Control. As I was talking to Ground Control; the Captain stopped the airplane and was talking to the cabin. I learned the #4 Flight Attendant was injured; so I got on radio #2 to tell [Operations] that we needed to return to the gate for a injured Flight Attendant. We taxied back to the gate and awaited ramp crew to park us. Once parked; paramedics attended to the injured #4 Flight Attendant and took her off the airplane.

A321 flight and cabin crews reported a flight attendant was injured during taxi out when the First Officer abruptly applied brakes to avoid a collision with a vehicle.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During the SID climb departure it became immediately apparent that AHRS headings had both malfunctioned and were 30-45 degrees off from each other. NAV information was extremely unreliable. DG Fast Slave did not work on either AHRS and autopilot could not be used. Mag Compass was only immediate heading source. When ATC cleared us on a heading it was way off due to MFD map error. Down track VOR's were given but again displayed info was erroneous and direct course could not be flown precisely even with raw data green needles. It was during an attempted direct to a VOR that we began to deviate toward another aircraft in the vicinity of 34;000 FT. ATC Controller put us back on a divergent heading so conflict would not occur. We got no TCAS warning or loss of min separation indication from the Controller. Finally at higher altitudes and in smooth air; mag compass settled down enough to steer a reasonably accurate heading. Right AHRS also settled down enough at cruise to use in conjunction with autopilot.

The Reporter stated that the at no time during this event was a system warning or error displayed. Also; even though the left and right FMS information was divergent the two systems did not transition to independent operation. The C750 wingtips are only about 4 1/2 to 5 feet off the ground and so a magnetic anomaly near the end of LGA Runway 13 may affect the compass systems. At cruise altitude the navigation systems were not usable but after the reporter noticed the 240 kt crosswind in the left FMS he realized that was the offending system and put the two systems in independent operations. At that time the right FMS displayed correctly and was utilized for navigation. Eventually the left FMS also became usable.

Both of a CE750's AHRS malfunctioned after a LGA Runway 13 takeoff and required ATC vectors referencing the magnetic compass until the compass systems returned to normal at cruise operating independently.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

Aircraft X was climbing out of around 24000 ft on the RNAV departure to his filed altitude of 28000 ft. When he checked on; I cleared him direct. The pilot requested to remain on their flight plan route and to stop climb at 26000 ft to burn gas. I hit previous route and after coordination entered his new final altitude of 26000 ft. When I hit previous route I received a UTM (Failed Transfer) message to the next Center sector. Several minutes later when the next sector took the handoff the route changed back to direct and the altitude reverted to 28000 ft. I coordinated with them to make sure the correct information was passed; but it was unnerving to have the aircraft's flight info change with no warning when the handoff was accepted.Whatever bug that is causing the UTM needs to get fixed. This happens fairly frequently; and while usually just an annoyance; this could be a real problem if the controller were busy and did not notice the UTM. Usually it is just the flight plan that is a little off; but in this case both route and altitude were passed inaccurately.

ZFW Center Controller reported that after handing off an aircraft to the next sector the aircraft's amended altitude and route reverted back to the original information.