Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

While on the RIIVR RNAV STAR into LAX; we were cleared direct to GRAMM intersection. The PF briefed the ILS for Runway 25L and 24R; not knowing which was to be assigned. We continued on the arrival approaching RUSTT intersection at which point we were told to expect the ILS for 24R. Having already loaded the ILS for 25L (hopeful thinking); I proceeded to load the change in the FMS. Referring to the RIIVR Arrival; I didn't see a transition for the North complex and questioned SoCal if they still wanted us on the RIIVR Arrival; to which they responded 'affirmative'. At this time; we were approaching 14;000 feet MSL with VNAV selected. SoCal instructed us to expedite down to 10;000 feet and cleared us direct to SKOLL intersection. The PF selected 10;000 feet in the window and we both acknowledged the selection. As the PNF; I returned my attention to trying to load the FMS with the ILS for 24R; but couldn't find the transition from the RIIVR arrival. With the ILS 24R in the FMS; SKOLL intersection; did not appear. During this confusion; the controller came on with a very harsh scolding of our failure to expeditiously descend to 10;000 feet. Because I did not put a direct to SKOLL command in the FMS yet; with VNAV still active; the aircraft was maintaining 14;000 feet until passing HABSO. The Controller then came back with the statement that it looked as though we were lining up for 25L and instructed us to turn right to a heading [I've forgotten] to intercept the ILS 24R LOC. The PF immediately deselected VNAV; descended to 10;000 feet and made the turn to intercept the LOC for 24R. All this occurred within approximately a 30 second time frame. The remainder of the flight continued as planned.After landing; we debriefed the event quite extensively and in doing so; realized that there is a RIIVR transition for the ILS 24R in the FMS on the second page of transitions. Had I not focused on the Arrival and spent more time on the approach chart; I should have caught the oversight. It was also discussed that once an altitude clearance is assigned while on an arrival; deselecting VNAV should be a consideration. We both concluded that the combination of the time constraint and the 'colorful briefing' by the Controller only added to what had already become a high stress environment.

Prior to reaching RUSTT intersection on the RIIVR2 arrival; we were told by SOCAL to expect the ILS24R and to expedite the descent to 14;000 feet while maintaining 300K.The pilot monitoring asked the Controller if our clearance called for us to remain on the RIIVR2. SOCAL confirmed to remain on the arrival and to 'expedite the descent to 10;000 feet MSL.'[While] focusing on correctly programming the FMC; I did not realize that VNAV was still in 'PATH' and the autopilot had begun to shallow the descent to accommodate the 14;000 feet altitude restriction on the arrival at HABSO. This unexpected autopilot transition back to a VNAV descent occurred after executing the correct arrival and transition in the FMC.The Controller then told us to fly direct to SKOLL and cleared us for the ILS24R approach. The pilot monitoring reentered the ILS24R into the FMC which caused the transition from the arrival to the approach to drop out of sequence. I asked the pilot monitoring to enter any transition into the FMC just to get the fixes back into the FMC. After complying with my request; the pilot monitoring then executed a direct to SKOLL and we proceeded to fly the rest of the approach.

The flight crew of a corporate CL-605 cleared via the RIIVR STAR to LAX was caught short when Approach Control advised them to expect Runway 24R vice 25L as depicted on the arrival. Difficulty reprogramming the FMS for the new ILS resulted in autoflight remaining in VNAV PATH and the aircraft leveled at 14;000 feet instead of expediting to 10;000 feet as requested by Approach.


Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was acting as Check Airman instructing a Captain on his first trip on the North Atlantic. Shortly after passing DOVEY we were asked by ATC; via CPDLC; what altitude and mach we were requesting at 50 west. We replied; via CPDLC; FL360; mach.78; which were the altitude and speed we were already using. A moment later we received a clearance to maintain FL360; mach.78. This was uplinked into the FMC via CPDLC. We checked then loaded and executed the clearance. I'm not sure why we did this since we were already at that speed and altitude. As soon as we executed the clearance; I sensed something was wrong. I checked the legs page and was shocked to discover that all waypoints from N42 W60 to Atsur were gone; with a route discontinuity after 60W. I have no idea how this happened; everything up to this point was normal and by the book. After a few choice words we set about fixing this. We had time since we were some distance from 60W. I started to load waypoints manually but decided maybe it would be best to uplink the route; which we did. This worked fine but before I activated and executed; I put the plane in heading hold. It was at this point that we received another CPDLC message from ATC telling us to re sequence our waypoints and verify our next after 60W. Once executed and back in LNAV I made the mistake of starting the route at 60W which probably would have been fine except we had been on a one mile right offset; so now the offset was slowly coming out over 150 miles or so. I am quite sure we never moved left of track or more than one mile right offset. After 60W we were on course and all was normal. I can only think that when we loaded the uplinked CPDLC clearance it somehow affected the FMS route. This seems strange since the uplink did not include routing.

An air carrier flight crew on an eastbound north Atlantic flight suffered the loss of route/legs data in the FMS when they uploaded an overwater mach and altitude clearance from ATC via CPDLC.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While refueling Aircraft X the aircraft fueler [at ZZZ] noticed fuel venting out of the outboard right wing vent. He immediately stopped fueling and quickly began to contain what he estimated to be 3-5 gallons of fuel located beneath the wing tip. I; PIC; asked the fueler to stop any further fueling; ensured the fuel was being contained by FBO staff; contacted the Assistant Chief Pilot on duty; wrote a report and notified Maintenance as directed by guidance written in the FOM. The aircraft was immediately grounded as 'Aircraft on Ground'. This write up was a repeat [on date] where no defects were noted and the aircraft was released for flight. We had to contact Maintenance to determine what was previously accomplished on [date] with the same mechanical issue as there was no data on the company log book. After the fact. Had we known that nothing was found or repaired previously; then we would have been more vigilant while trying to top off the wings for further fuel spills specific with this aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Bombardier Challenger flight crew reported fuel spill during refueling.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 100

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Departed ZZZ on IFR flight plan level at 4000 ft. on vectors to assigned routing. Above Class D but below the floor of Class B. Approximately 15 nm NW of departure airport my oil pressure indication went to zero; red light flashing attention getter. As I was doing a little troubleshooting I made a call to departure that I may need to return to ZZZ. I think my transmission was blocked with by another aircraft or departure control talking. As the oil pressure started to fluctuate up to the green range and back to zero; I noticed ZZZ1 off the left wing about 8 miles or so and made a turn towards it. At the time my passenger was quite concerned about everything going on and was a distraction to me. About that time; departure control gave me a turn and asked my altitude and gave me a climb to 5000 ft. While reassuring my passenger; my altitude had climbed 350 ft. above my assigned 4000 ft. I told ATC I needed to return to departure airport due to oil pressure indicating problems and they cleared me direct. Landed and confirmed the instrument was malfunctioning. My distraction from focusing on flying the airplane was problem; also not verifying ATC did not hear my first request to return to the airport was an issue.

C180 pilot reported oil pressure indication problem in flight.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

VNY currently has a single runway RWY 16R. RWY 16L is closed due to construction [on nearby taxiways]; and is temporary taxiway Tango. I was in the middle of a training session that I had to take over because the traffic volume had exceeded the CPC-IT's current level. Ground Control had requested multiple times to cross a tug escorted by airport operations that needed to cross RWY 16R twice due to restrictions for jets on temporary taxiway tango.There were multiple VFR aircraft waiting to depart along with 4 IFR departures waiting at the end. 6 inbound VFR aircraft and a string of IFR arrivals approaching. We had requested SoCal to pull two aircraft out of the arrival sequence because there were 5 aircraft already sequenced to land and spaced out for a little more than minimum runway separation. And there was no room for the first two jets.While we were in recovery mode SoCal called the tower on the tower phone to ask us why we were not accepting aircraft; and added to the complexity and frustration to an already hectic situation. With a single runway and busy traffic SoCal does not provided us with adequate spacing to accommodate VFR. There are restrictions to having 7 miles of in-trail spacing and a speed restriction of 170 kts; however a majority of IFR aircraft on a busy Sunday afternoon will be given the visual approach alleviating the need to put in spacing and speed restrictions.While still in recovery mode we were able to get some of the crossings accomplished and was able to begin getting some of the departures out. When Aircraft Y was on a mile final and Aircraft Z was on a 5 mile final; (I had to slow both of the arrivals down) I asked Aircraft X what their departure request was. They responded right crosswind. I then asked them if they can take an immediate with the intention to use LUAW after Aircraft Y passed. I canceled Aircraft Z's landing clearance and advised them that Aircraft X would be going into position and departing prior to their arrival.Multiple people in the tower; including myself; noticed Aircraft X emerge from behind an IFR [departure] holding short of RWY 16R. Aircraft Y was over the VOR north of the field. Aircraft X crossed the hold bars; and I said on frequency 'No; no; no...' Aircraft X stopped prior to the runway edge line. I gave Aircraft Y go-around instructions and pattern altitude 2;000; prior to reaching the airport boundary. I then put Aircraft X in position and departed them on a right crosswind. Then cleared Aircraft Z to land.Aircraft A was entering the right traffic pattern from the Southwest. Aircraft Y at the approach end offset to the right. I immediately instructed Aircraft A to make a left 360 immediately; and called the Aircraft A traffic to Aircraft Y and to turn to the downwind. There was additional traffic inbound to BUR on the RWY ILS that crosses over the VNY airport at midfield. I noticed Aircraft Y climbing through 2;220 I then immediately called the BUR traffic that was at 3;200 and reiterated that the pattern altitude was 2;000. I then sequenced Aircraft Y to follow Aircraft Z.I could have waited 10-15 seconds to ask Aircraft X if he could take an immediate departure which Aircraft Y would have been closer and more apparent; but I was trying to pre-plan to know if I could get Aircraft X out for departure between the two [jets].When VNY is in a single runway operation; do not allow a workaround to not require the spacing and speed restriction to IFR jets.SoCal should not blindly prioritize IFR aircraft over VFR aircraft that have been waiting to arrive VNY. They continue to slam visual approaches with 3 or 4 VFR aircraft on final already and no space to put the IFR which often times ends with a VFR aircraft being sent around.

VNY Tower Controller reported separation and runway issues relating to a runway closure at Van Nuys airport.


Upon arrival I cracked L2 and noticed the ramp agent having difficulty opening the door. After she left I opened it myself (fully) and it would stop at the halfway point (it was getting hung up).You could open the door; but at the point where we switch our hands; the door would suddenly stop. If you put your hand back on the control handle and pulled the outer edge of the door back towards you; you could push the door past its sticking point.I asked the other two FAs (flight attendants) to try the door (without telling them what was wrong) and they both said it was unsafe. I told our inbound CA (Captain) who said 'Well I don't know anything about doors and how they work so... I can write it up but then maintenance will have to come out and they're contract.' I told him to please do that.Contract Maintenance came out and he noted my concerns but said the aircraft would have to be pulled from service to have it fixed and seemed to think I should just work harder to open it. I explained that the door not opening properly could result in a slide malfunction. I finally had to tell him I was an Instructor...and he started to listen. I shared the same concerns with the CA. With pressure mounting; and knowing the aircraft needed attention from [Company Maintenance]; I agreed to work the flight given that I knew how to get the door to function and felt confident that in an emergency (given my having felt the door myself) I could get it to function...but what if a passenger had to do it? I told the CA that we HAD to have it addressed in [the next station]. Contract Maintenance said 'It opens eventually...it closes; and the annunciator light functions...I can't ground the plane.'Upon arrival in [the next station; Maintenance] sent an apprentice who also noted the issue but said 'If you just pull here and push here you can get it open...' Again I had to explain than FAs are trained and held accountable to opening fully functioning doors. If a FA opens the door and stops halfway; they do not pass...so we can't put them in situations that are counter to their training. Everyone kept saying 'it's up to you; what do you think?' I finally said 'I think it's unsafe and needs to be pulled from service and fixed.' Thankfully they did just that.I made the best decision I could in the moment considering the peer pressure and safety culture encountered. What concerns me is that there was so much ambiguity.. back and forth; asking what I 'thought' and how I 'felt'. While I am comfortable making those decisions; not only are they not mine to make; most FAs wouldn't have the capacity to do that. It's ambiguous social pressure. Add-to-that; I shouldn't have had to explain I was an Instructor. FAs may not be able to articulate as much about the doors; but they know what's right and what's not. I think pilots need to learn how to use the doors and what constitutes 'functioning'.. Pilots do not have to operate exits every year. Also [Maintenance] should do the same. Everyone needs to know equipment use to the standards we are tasked with performing... otherwise what's the point in having a standard? There shouldn't be ambiguity in situations like this: If the door doesn't operate as it should; the door gets fixed... IMMEDIATELY; PERIOD. There's so much ignorance of each department's interaction with equipment which leads to a lot of peer pressure to stay on time.

B737-700 Flight Attendant reported requesting maintenance action for a malfunctioning main cabin door.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 3800

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Descending to BOS; First Officer (FO) pilot flying; cleared to descend via QUABN 3 RNAV. WX indicated low CAT 2 mins; so a CAT 3 autoland was briefed by the Captain and transfer of control from the FO was decided to occur once the next ATIS was updated. Through transition altitude; Approach descent checklist was completed and altimeters were set to 29.96 (in error but read back by both pilots. The altimeter seemed correct at the time).Final ATIS indicated VFR at the field and the FO briefed the normal CAT 1 approach as a backup to the visual and never turned control over to the Capt. Level offs were made via the descent at 11000; 7000 and 3000 without any reports of deviation from ATC. A further descent to 2000 was issued and after descending (out of 3000); we were contacted by ATC with a low altitude alert and the correct altimeter setting of 29.28. An immediate climb was made to return to 2000 once the proper altimeter indicated we had actually descended to approximately 1600 feet. Clear night visual was maintained with good visibility of shore lights and no GPWS warnings occurred.A long duty day preceded the event and after debrief of the incident; we were surprised that there was no previous indication of a deviation at our level off altitudes even though the incorrect altimeter was set at those times. We also commented during the initial descent out of 3000 that the altitude seems a little low but after checking that the glide slope intercept was 1500 feet; it seemed that the 2000 was not out of order.Further approach to landing was normal.

The GPWS and Enhanced GPWS did not signal a terrain conflict. After reaching the assigned altitude of 2000 ft.; we resumed the approach. The weather conditions at the time were VFR night. The surface was a well lit suburban/city environment making the terrain visible and distinguishable.During our Threat/Error debrief; both the First Officer and Captain noted how easily the chain of events lead to the low altitude alert issued by the controller. We were also surprised at how easily we bypassed several checks and observation which could have quickly lead to our discovering the incorrect altimeter setting. Also a contributing factor was the length of our duty day. At the time of this event; we had been on duty for approximately 10 hours and some 11 hours 30 minutes awake for the Captain.

An A320 flight crew descending for a planned CATIII autoland at BOS incorrectly set their altimeters to 29.96 when the actual pressure was 29.28. A low altitude alert was received from ATC as they descended to 2000 MSL (or 1320 MSL with the correct pressure setting) at which point their altimeters were corrected; they climbed back to 2000 and completed a visual approach consistent with the now improved weather.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After takeoff; tower advised a different [Company Aircraft] to contact departure. Since we knew there were no other Company airplanes airborne in the vicinity; I queried the tower as to whether they intended for us to contact departure instead. Tower replied 'negative' and told us that someone else had taken our squawk code. Tower seemed very confused as to which Company flight was airborne. Tower again told a different [Company Aircraft] to contact departure; and that crew advised that they were still taxiing to the runway. At that point Tower directed us to squawk 1200 and again mentioned that someone had taken our squawk code. At about this time I pointed out to her that we were still flying the runway heading and maintaining 3;000 feet (our takeoff clearance). Tower then told us to contact departure. I immediately switched frequencies and advised departure of our heading and altitude and that we were squawking 1200. They gave us an immediate left turn to the south and a climb to 8;000 feet. They assigned a new squawk code and the rest of the flight was uneventful.It seems to me that somehow the tower controller got the squawk codes for two Company flights swapped. Although Tower cleared us to takeoff using our correct callsign; Tower seemed to have it in her mind that the other Company flight was actually airborne.I really can't say what caused our squawk codes to be swapped. The Captain and I followed FOM procedure perfectly with regards to both of us listening to a voice-issued ATC clearance. We read back the clearance and assigned squawk and received a 'Read back correct.' I really don't see any way we could have mistakenly put in an incorrect squawk code that just happened to be exactly the code assigned to another Company aircraft on that same ramp on that same night.

Air carrier pilot reported confusion resulted when ATC swapped their squawk code with another company flight.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

At cruise; pilots noticed oil quantity declining in left engine. When it got to 8 quarts; they pulled left throttle to idle; turned around; descended and headed back to ZZZ. [Left] engine remained at idle and oil quantity remained at 8 quarts for the remainder of the flight. [The cause was a] high pressure oil component leaked.

B787 First Officer reported loss of left engine oil quantity; resulting in a return to departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working a helicopter on the full ILS Runway 5 approach into the MEB airport. A small transport aircraft had been doing parajump work at 10;000 over the MEB airport for most of the day.  The small transport pilot had announced minutes prior that jumpers were away; and he began heading northeast bound back into the airport.  As he was descending; he told me that the last jump was a HAHO [High Altitude-High Opening] and that jumpers would be in air over MEB for at least 10 minutes.  At this point; the helicopter was nearing a 5 mile final into MEB.  Luckily; the [helicopter] pilot heard this on advisory frequency and came back to my frequency.  I then gave the pilot holding instructions to allow the jumpers to safely get on the ground.  This was a very dangerous situation; as a) I was not told that the jumps would be HAHO's (the jumper pilot said it was a 'last minute thing'); and b) I have no way of knowing for sure when the jumpers are on the ground; so I can allow aircraft to continue inbound. It is paramount that jump aircraft advise the controllers when HAHO jumps are in effect.  The pilot should also follow the jumpers to the ground to allow controllers to know when they are on the ground.  Also; these jumpers did not have transponders.  FAY airspace is saturated DAILY with jump activity; it is not unusual to have more than 6 jump aircraft in our airspace at once.  Pilots and controllers must be on the same page to prevent dangerous situations from happening.

FAY Approach Controller reports a high altitude jump created a conflict with helicopter traffic approaching MEB and holding instructions are issued.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

The purpose of this report is to advise that at Barrow airport (BRW); [Commercial Charts] and NOS airport diagram plates indicate that the PAPI for Runway 07 is located on the left side of the runway. While approaching Runway 07 at BRW; however; I noticed that the PAPI is actually on the right side of Runway 07.I suggest that the appropriate airport diagram and information charts be updated to show the correct location of the BRW Runway 07 PAPI.

A pilot reported that the BRW PAPI is located on the runway's right side; but a Commercial and NOS charts for BRW indicate it is located on the left side.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 8930; Flight Crew Type 1363

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 197; Flight Crew Total 6121; Flight Crew Type 1278

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Shortly after takeoff received a call from cabin stating that they were experiencing smoke and fumes in the cabin primarily by door 3 left. Continued with the after takeoff profile and checklist; continued climb to above 10;000 feet. Received a second call from the cabin regarding the smoke and fumes; and sent one of the relief pilots to the cabin to assess the situation. As the cockpit door opened and closed we immediately smelled the fumes coming from the cabin. Shortly thereafter; the relief pilot called to report a fireworks-like smell in the cabin; no smoke but plenty of fumes. At that point we elected to return to ZZZ; [notified ATC;] and commenced fuel dump. Approach offered us an immediate return to Rwy XXR; but I declined since we did not have smoke and the situation did not seem to be escalating. We dumped fuel as we flew the downwind for rwy XYL. We made a SATCOM call to dispatch and requested landing data be uplinked for rwy XYL at our projected landing weight after fuel dumping. We experienced several status messages; and a pack overheat as we turned final. We turned the pack off and continued the approach to a normal landing; taxi in and parking. Excellent CRM and coordination with ATC and dispatch made this a successful and safe return to field.

Very shortly after takeoff; while the airplane was not cleaned up; we received a call from door 3R that there was a very strong odor smell of electrical burning; plastic burning; and smoky smell. We did not smell anything in the cockpit at that time. We set up a blocker to send an IRO (International Relief Officer) back to investigate and immediately upon opening the cockpit door the smell entered the cockpit. We discussed and agreed to air return at that point. The flight attendants accurately described it as the smell of 'fireworks.' We ran the checklists and procedures to return back to the airport and landed without further incident. During our return the right pack was turned off when the airplane printed out 'right pack overheat' off the printer.

B777 flight crew reported air return shortly after takeoff due to fumes in the cabin.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X departed CUT VFR. Called airborne asking for IFR to BIL. I issued squawk. Noticed aircraft filed alt FL080. MIA [is] FL093. I asked pilot if he would be able [to get to] FL100 as a final altitude due to MIA [Minimum IFR Altitude]. He responded negative and that he was IMC climbing through FL075. I instructed him to maintain VFR and reminded him he did not have an IFR clearance. I alerted the FLM [Front Line Manager]. I was given a D side.Aircraft X descended to FL073 and said he was trying to stay VFR. I asked if he could see the ground. He said yes and there was a cloud layer at FL076. I called RCA Approach; whose airspace he was in to see if they had a lower MVA [Minimum Vectoring Altitude] that would help. They did not. I asked pilot if he would be able to maintain terrain obstruction clearance and climb to FL093. He said negative. I asked intentions. He said he'd try to stay VFR until I could give him a clearance. I suggested he turn back to his departure airport. He said he thought he could stay VFR.I told him the general direction and altitudes of the MIA's that we're going to stair step down to the west as he flew out of the Black Hills. I explained what those meant in relation to the ground or obstacles. He descended to FL071. I suggested a course due west that would get him to lower terrain quicker if he could maintain VFR on that heading. He said he would. He asked about mountains and I re-explained the area terrain. He asked about the MIA that was no factor and I responded. He crossed the boundary into my FL090 MIA and was at FL073 so I knew he was above terrain and obstacles in that area. I [tried to advise for the pilot] and issued him an IFR clearance with a climb to 9;000 [feet]. He complied.The pilot called in and the FLM made sure he understood VFR flight rules.

ZDV Center Controller reported an aircraft departing VFR; needing IFR; and entering a lower Minimum IFR Altitude area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is an informational report; we did not deviate from any policies or procedures. We flew the aircraft with MEL 30-21 applied for the Number 2 PRSOV valve on the Number 1 engine. During flight we briefly turned on the engine anti-ice and we received the ECAM message 'ANTI ICE ENG 1 VALVE CLOSED: Avoid icing conditions' by the time we received the fault we were clear of clouds and we maintained clear of icing conditions for the remainder of the flight.We entered the discrepancy in the logbook; because under the MEL the engine anti-ice should be operative. Contract maintenance was called and ultimately worked on the plane over the next couple of days. We assisted contract maintenance for several hours during those days with engine runs. We were only there to provide assistance with starting and shutting down the engines during the required testing. They were unable to determine what the issue was and ultimately maintenance secured both valves closed on the Number 1 engine and applied MEL 30-21. We were then able to operate clear of icing conditions on the third day.Over the course of this situation; a couple areas of concern came up. First; MEL 30-21 requires maintenance to secure the inoperative valve open using AMM TASK 30-21. However; that same task card is used on MEL 30-21 which calls for the valve to be closed. I have not seen the task card; but it seems like having one task card for two opposite tasks may cause confusion when completing the maintenance procedure. The other concern that I have is that there didn't seem to be clear enough direction on which valve is considered 'Number 1' and which one is considered 'Number 2'. The valves were referred to by number and by 'forward' or 'aft'. It seemed to take a while to determine which valve was which and that leads me to believe that the documentation may not be clear enough. If there is confusion on which valve is which; then it would be possible to accidentally secure the wrong valve in the open position when applying the original MEL 30-21; which would cause the failed valve to remain in the closed position and prevent the engine anti-ice from working. I am not saying that this is what happened in our situation; because from the information that I have gathered; the correct valve was secured correctly. I don't know why we received the ECAM message; but I am sure that we shouldn't have received it.It would be worth reviewing these MELs and Task Cards to see if they need to be revised or if additional guidance needs to be provided. I am curious why we received that ECAM message with the original MEL; because according to the MEL the system should have operated normally.

A First Officer of an A320 reported his concern about the application of an MEL procedure for engine anti-ice.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 208; Flight Crew Type 128

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Dispatch

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Emergency Landing on Runway XL from a departure on Runway XX. Sequence leading up to event. Preparing for a morning sport flight I had normal Briefer contact; pre-flight; warm up; and ATC communication and clearances to begin the flight (missed taking out cowl vent covers). When cleared for departure on Runway XX; noticed slightly elevated Cylinder Head Temps for a cool day; but not abnormal for a warm day. After rotation and climbing during departure; I became alarmed to see the CHT's in the 230F range and understood that there could be problem; because CHT had elevated abnormally quickly. Attention brought to engine warning light by flickering that indicated oil pressure on low side of acceptable (which this can happen with this engine for a brief second or two). Once warning light flicker stopped for oil; I could see the EIS data again indicating the CHT's was in 240F range where I decided to reduce some throttle to cool engine and make a call to ATC for landing. Before I made the call to ATC some steam or smoke was observed coming from the right side of engine area. Made the request of ATC and clearance provided to make an Emergency Landing as I was turning toward Runway XL/XYR and reducing throttle. While turning I noticed that EIS indicated that the highest CHT was at 290F; but did not appear to get higher. Communication was kept with ATC to make sure all traffic was on hold for landing on Runway XL and intersecting Runway XX; which was confirmed.  Landed close to Taxiway Echo and immediately exited on Taxiway Echo; which ATC provided clearance and communicated to do what I needed to do. I stopped on Taxiway Echo. Inspection showed cowl covers in; radiator fluid all over the engine/aircraft; and radiator overflow hose had a hole. No Fire; so began to push aircraft back to hangars. Airport staff and Emergency Crew arrived and inspected engine resulting in the same conclusion. A&P Mechanic inspected; that same afternoon; while in phone communication with the Aircraft's Distributor Mechanic.  They determined that the engine was fine and hose replacement and adding coolant was needed to repair the aircraft.Preventative Action - Be more thorough during preflight with checklist.-Be more cognizant of normal CHT Temps for different outdoor temperatures and trust instinct.

A LSA/Sting Sport radiator over flow hose had a hole in it so after takeoff the cylinder head temperature rose while ATC reported streaming fluid. An emergency was declared followed by a uneventful return for landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

On departure from MDW; assigned runway 4L. Upper altitude 3;000; we experienced moderate to severe turbulence. It was extremely windy; gusting 30 plus kts. We departed within moments of a B737; and were assigned the same departure and altitude. The autopilot was engaged at 1;000 feet AGL; a normal procedure; it failed to capture the assigned altitude; and may have exceeded altitude by as much as 400 feet. The auto pilot was deselected; and flown manually back to 3;000 feet. At some point it was also found that the number 1 FMS had gone to 'Maneuver' mode; from the previously selected 'Nav' and would not reset. This was only noticed after the aircraft was being manually flown. The copilot side auto pilot and the number2 FMS was then selected; and appeared normal.I am not sure how or if the FMS failure might have contributed to the incursion; but it was very coincidental; that the 2 events happened together. The incursion may of only been caused by the 'general' turbulence; or by the wake from the departing B737. There were several attempts to reset the FMS; such as pressing Nav; Fltplan; Fuel buttons; etc. The unit was eventually powered down; and then seemed normal.There was no ATC exchange about this; only prior to take off 'caution wake turbulence'.I discussed the situation with my copilot; no other corrective action could have been taken in the circumstance. I will discuss the FMS failure with the manufacturer ASAP.

A Lear 60 Captain reported overshooting assigned altitude departing MDW in windy and turbulent conditions. Wake turbulence from preceding B737 may have also been a factor.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Ground Personnel; Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

Flight departed in violation of MEL. Center fuel (structural check) plus ZFW exceeded maximum allowable ZFW.Weather was Low IFR with rain negatively impacting arrivals and departures. Gate Hold procedures were in effect. At pushback; ramp stated taxi times averaged :30 minutes. Flight initially taxied using RLS 01 with legal fuel load including :45 taxi fuel. Single engine taxi procedures were used. Ground estimated we were number 25 for departure so we shutdown. Our initial route was stopped for weather; received reroute that was longer distance and resulting REMF (Remaining Fuel at Touchdown) was under :60. Called Dispatch to discuss Releasing Short and seeking airborne return to original route once clear of weather instead of returning to gate for additional fuel. Decision was made to return and add fuel. We had been off the gate for just over 1 hour.Upon return to gate; we were advised boarding door would be opened to comply with regulations. About :45 minutes elapsed before refueling started. RLS03 Plan Gate fuel was 25.3. Fueled to 28.5/Fuel sheet called for 28.4. We received updated Final Weights showing TOW CHG +2697 CALL [dispatch] also 8200 LB SC FUEL INC.  Sent Dispatch ACARS: RLS3 shows 25.3/FOB 28.2/Are we OK to continue. Received ACARS: Good to continue. RLS 4 will be ready in a moment. Simultaneously received ATC reroute back onto Original RLS01 route(shorter routing). We reprogrammed FMC and satisfied that we were OK to continue; we departed. We did not notice additional ACARS MSGs from [dispatch] that we were not OK to continue until after we were airborne.  While enroute; we learned that multiple errors/events happened that contributed to departing not in compliance with MEL 2802D. SC fuel weight plus ZFW not exceeding Allowable ZFW is a fairly simple concept that I missed during all the other activity that occurred in this lengthy delay on the first leg of a long duty day at the beginning of this 4-day pairing. After gate return; coordinating/communicating updates with ATC; Dispatch; Station Ops; Customer Service; Flight Attendants and passengers got fairly busy. Dispatch informed us after departure; that load planning made a clerical error while removing the SC fuel weight from Line 11 of the Planned Weight Manifest. That error generated a fuel sheet that was 3.0 higher than intended by RLS03. We also learned later that when we queried Dispatch if we were OK to continue; another Dispatcher answered us while our Dispatcher was momentarily away from his desk.The Structural Check fuel section; FOM 4.40.7; states: the weight of structural check fuel plus actual ZFW is controlled not to exceed maximum ZFW. Simple and straight forward in hindsight; but I missed it during this operation.  The MEL Placard/Flt Planning restrictions: C. might be reworded to state this specifically; not just that it must be included in ZFW Calculations.  Because I received an updated Final Weight message and [dispatch] replied OK to continue; I was satisfied that all requirements had been met.

The dispatcher stepped away from his desk for a brief moment. While he was away; the crew on Aircraft X sent an ACARS message indicating that additional fuel had been boarded beyond the 2000 lbs allowance. I quickly glanced at the details page and determined that the additional fuel was within the defined weight limits. I then sent the crew a message that they were 'good to go and release 4 would be available momentarily' to allow for continued taxi while a release 4 was being generated. Immediately after sending the message; the dispatch of record returned to his desk; at which time I advised him of the additional fuel boarded. He immediately responded that there was a weight issue with regard to the center tank fuel boost pump on deferral. He then sent several messages to the crew to advise of the weight issue and not to proceed; to which the crew didn't respond until after airborne.

Air Carrier flight crew; dispatchers and load planners reported a flight departed over the maximum authorized weight with a fuel pump inoperative.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X was inbound to PDX to do touch and goes. The aircraft appeared on course to enter towers airspace through the VFR arrival gate described in our Letter of Agreement. Tower accepted the handoff on the aircraft and seeing no conflicts I had Aircraft X contact Tower. At this point Aircraft X was still 3 miles outside of Towers airspace. I began to notice that Aircraft X had turned to a track that would not position him through the gate. I called Tower on the line to advise them that the aircraft had turned and was not making the gate and they responded 'no problem'. The Tower had departed Aircraft Y and turned them to a 240 degree heading shortly after talking to Aircraft X. When Aircraft X checked on with Tower he asked to fly 020 heading and Tower missed it. Tower asked Aircraft X if he would turn to the east and they responded 'we want to fly 020 and tower missed it. Aircraft Y and Aircraft X ended up opposite direction of each other same altitude and less than a mile apart. Aircraft Y advised tower that they had responded to an RA due to Aircraft X. Tower logged the RA and upon review of the incident by Quality Assurance it was determined that I had an operational deviation because the aircraft had not entered towers airspace through the VFR gate. Tower acted with gross negligence launching an aircraft into known traffic that was on their frequency. They had up to 3 minutes to issue control instructions to separate the 2 planes but did nothing.Re-training the tower controllers on use of divergent headings when there is known traffic on a track directly at the departure heading.

TRACON Controller handed off a VFR aircraft to the Tower. The TRACON Controller believed the VFR aircraft would proceed through a VFR entry point as in the facility procedures. The Tower Controller allowed the VFR aircraft to deviate away from the prescribed route. An IFR aircraft departed from the airport and was issued a heading by the Tower which placed it into conflict with the VFR aircraft. The IFR aircraft received and responded to a TCAS RA for the VFR aircraft. Facility Quality Assurance personnel charged the TRACON Controller with an Operational Error.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Type 1814.5

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

I had started to look at release 1 in Ops; when the Captain (CA) walked over and said that he had spoken with Dispatch to request different routing and Cost Index for better rides. He said that release 2 would be on the way and suggested we go ahead and go to the plane.  Got to airplane; and downloaded Release 2 while getting the plane ready. While loading the box; I noticed that our ZFW seemed very light at 96.0; but knew we had a light load and continued prepping for the flight. Also; I was surprised that our Gate fuel had gone down about 4K lbs from R1; but thought that it was due to the Cost Index and route changes. Our gate fuel from R2 was 25.2 - fueler put on 25.8 (over fueling by 600 lbs). Final weights came up; said we had a DROP in TOW CHG of -2588 lbs. Verified Takeoff speeds/weights. They were off by about 30k lbs from the original planned data. We verbalized this difference and verified the uplinks again; requesting new Takeoff data at our new weight of 150.8. Especially with the [company] saying that our overall weight had gone down; we completed our checklists (although we later realized that we should have asked Dispatch about the weight change). Single engine taxi out; no line; cleared for immediate Takeoff. On climb out; FMC fuel landing at ZZZ shows 5.0. We both commented that that was lower than expected (with the center pumps still on) and started verifying the details. We double checked R2; it REMF (Remaining fuel at touchdown) of 5.0 - ok that checks. [Documents] shows landing in ZZZ with 5.6. So; we thought we must have a wind shift somewhere. As we continued to climb out; the FMC forecast landing fuel in ZZZ continued to drop; 4.9; 4.8; 4.7; 4.6. Within about 15 minutes; both the CA and I saw the trend and start looking for where there is a FMC loading issue - possible extended final in ZZZ; insufficient winds; incorrect transitions. At that point; our tailwind was even greater than forecast and yet we still could not find why the fuel was dropping. We checked the Fuel used function on panel - fuel usage is even (the same) for both engines; and what was forecast to be close to the burn on OFP (Operational Flight Plan) - so no fuel leak. And the crossfeed was verified closed.We contacted dispatch about the situation. Everything was loaded correctly; and we left with more than our planned gate fuel and yet we still showed landing in ZZZ well below [performance] REMF values.After telling us to standby; it took dispatch over 30 minutes to get back to us.Over that time; we double checked the final weights number(s). When compared with the OFP ZFW the final weights showed a ZFW of 125.1 where the OFP showed a ZFW of 96.1! Almost 30k lbs more than the [performance] ZFW. Now we had Takeoff numbers for 150.8 (ZFW plus fuel); so Takeoff performance wasn't ever at risk. But now we weighed more than planned and our fuel burn was much higher than forecast.Now that we knew why our fuel was showing lower than OFP. Eventually. The FMC settled into a REMF fuel at ZZZ of 3.8; when the center tank was empty - barely FAR 45min. Dispatch finally got back to us and said that they had over three people look at it and couldn't figure why; when the ZFW was entered into [the computer] - it would kick back and put in a different number.We continued to discuss our options in coordination with Dispatch. Due to our forecast low fuel state if we continued to ZZZ; we elected to divert to ZZZ1 for more fuel - in the interest of safety.Since we had plenty of fuel to go to ZZZ1. Stopping for fuel was better than pushing on to a bad outcome. Dispatch confirmed that we should stop in ZZZ1 for fuel.We coordinated with ATC and Dispatch; changing our destination to ZZZ1. Went to ZZZ1; landed uneventfully; and went to [the] gate. Although there was a short wait for the fueler; we were only on the ground for about 30 min and departed with same Passengers and bag load (no changes). While a new gate fuel of about 11.0; we continued on to ZZZ. We landed uneventfully approximate 45min after schedule.

Aircraft was released and planned to operate on time to ZZZ. It was released prior to me taking over the shift. About 45 minutes after taking over the desk the captain called me and said he was not pleased with the route that was filed because of possible turbulence enroute. He asked me to produce another flight plan preferably over ONL to remain north of the forecasted turbulence. He also asked for Cost Index 75 and REMF of 1:15 at ZZZ. I briefed him on the latest weather enroute . I planned the new route and included his requests; cancelled his original plan with Center and sent Release #2. While they were pushing back; the captain sent an Acars message saying he was pleased with the routing and thanked me. After about 45 minutes in the air he sent an Acars message indicating the REMF at ZZZ showed 3.7 and that the ZFW was showing 96.0+ and not 125.0+ that was on the original plan. I checked the [flight plan] and it showed 96.0+ with an increase of 29.0+. The [flight plan] did not indicate an alert for that flight; nor did the Load planner call and indicate a large increase in the ZFW prior to departure. I spoke with the Load Planner and he could not understand the why the ZFW reverted back to 96.0+. The captain never called me by phone or Acars that there was a major discrepancy in the ZFW from Release 1 when loading the revised flight plan. After a short discussion; it was agreed that the flight would stop at ZZZ1 for fuel and continue to ZZZ.

B737 First Officer and Dispatcher reported a flight plan discrepancy regarding ZFW led to a precautionary diversion for additional fuel.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

We were flying an aircraft with the seat belt signs and lights reversed. I have flown for seventeen years. Sometime during the latter part of the flight the seat belt sign was turned ON and OFF as light turbulence came and went. Apparently; with the reversed configuration (as opposed to our legacy aircraft) one of us turned the seat belt sign OFF when we meant it to be ON. During the 18;000 FT transition flow this was missed and the pilot not flying read the checklist which only calls for STATUS - CHECKED. Both he and I missed that the seat belt sign was off; rather than on. The flight attendants didn't notice this either; and when we landed I (thought) I turned the seat belt sign OFF; but in fact was only then turning it 'ON' for the first time since 18;000 FT. As passengers were deplaning; a passenger identified himself as an FAA Inspector; and asked us why the seat belt sign hadn't been turned on during descent and landing. He was concerned because during descent some people had been up using the rest room and he thought we were too far long in our descent for people to be up. To my knowledge; all passengers were seated after the 'Flight attendants; prepare for landing' announcement was given and the seat belt sign double-chime at 10;000 AFL. The inspector was concerned that cross-checks had degraded in that none of the flight attendants or the pilots noticed the seat belt sign was off. I told him it was likely due to the reversed position of the switches; and that yes; I may have missed it. It was close to midnight; and though fatigue was not a factor; having been on duty for ten hours or so may have contributed to missing this item. Most likely reversed switch positions on east metal and not close-enough checking of seat-belt sign indication out of 18;000 FT. Closer attention to detail; never fly east metal again. Can that be arranged? Also; do you know how sluggish CFM's are on the ground? You practically need TOGA power to get above 10 KTS on the taxi!

An A319 seat belt sign OFF and ON switch positions are reversed between Airbus aircraft. The seat belt sign was ON during cruise and OFF for landing.


Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We landed safely at OTH and turned right to exit the runway.  Tower informed us there were yellow chevrons on the pavement; meaning we were not authorized to taxi off of Runway 4 at that location. Tower then gave us taxi clearance to our gate.The chevrons; which lead up to the intersecting runway; were not easy to see.  There is pavement leading up to runway 13 that looks like a taxiway available for exit; but it actually leads up to the start of runway 13.I will confirm a turn off of the current runway onto an intersecting runway with ATC before the Captain initiates a turn.  I will brief this threat in the future; prior to landing in OTH. The intersection past A is not a taxiway; it is pavement leading up to a runway.

Poorly painted yellow chevrons are painted on the overrun. Not listed on Jeppesen plate as unusable. Shows up as gray on Jeppesen plate and looks like a taxiway. Closer examination shows that it ends at A - HS1 refers to taxiing on A.Should have rolled to the end of the runway and exited at the end instead of on the crossing runway. Jeppesen plate should note that runway 13/31 is not usable for taxi/takeoff or any operations past taxiway A.

After landing at OTH; an air crew turned off the runway at an unusable intersecting runway. Poorly painted yellow chevrons are painted on the overrun. Not listed on Jeppesen plate as unusable.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We were climbing out of ZZZ with vectors. Cleared from 3;000 to 6;000 feet. We both called out 5;000 for six thousand feet to go. I was head down turning on the radar; there was weather ahead.  The 3rd crew member in the jump seat called out altitude.  I looked up as we were climbing through 6;200 feet.  Pilot flying recovered about 6;300; then quickly returned to 6;000.  ATC asked us to confirm our altitude; which we did at 6;000 feet. Pilot fling was hand flying the airplane; which caused the altitude deviation.  His scan missed the altitude; even though we both confirmed 1;000 feet to go.  My suggestion is to have the autopilot on in low altitude high congestion areas.

I was Pilot Flying. Weather build ups in the area. Several step climbs. Pilot Monitoring was working radar. I was visually looking at weather. We both called 5;000 for 6;000 feet in the climb. I got distracted and overshot the assigned altitude by about 300 feet and made an immediate correction back to assigned 6;000 feet. ATC asked us to confirm 6;000 feet. No further issues. Continued uneventfully to destinationDue to COVID-19; our flying has been down considerably. I was hand flying to try to keep up my scan and hands on skills. I got distracted in the climbing turn while looking at build ups. I should have engaged the autopilot instead.

Flight crew reported overshooting altitude and then returning to assigned altitude. The Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.


A CRJ2 checked on my frequency (Departure) and immediately said they had received 'moderate wake turbulence' from the preceding departure. I asked the pilot to file a report on this event. The North Departure Controller had a wake turbulence report on Navajo position just a few minutes before this. This happens every day as PHX Tower uses 6;000/airborne and visual separation on every departure whether they are busy or not. I've filed several wake turbulence reports and I am actively trying to get my fellow controllers to report this every time. This is an unsafe procedure at PHX and a smaller aircraft is eventually going to have an accident due to wake turbulence at a low altitude. Stop visual departures on large aircraft.

P50 Controller voiced concern regarding the Tower wake separation techniques used with subsequent departures claiming the procedure is unsafe and results in wake turbulence encounters.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Our flight was [known] to be going through a SIGMET Area calling for several aircraft reporting severe turbulence from FL240 to FL380. I have flown this trip many; many times in fact just a week prior to this event and noticed the routing to be fairly East of our usual filed flight plan. I saw on our release a 4 around the about mid flight indicating moderate turbulence. I advised the flight attendants (all) to remain seated until I called them. On our climb out passing through FL220 we started encountering moderate turbulence with the winds from the north quickly escalating from 40 knots to at one time 152 knots just in a few thousand feet of climb. We were filed for FL390. Being light the performance page (FMC) indicated our max cruise of 39;800. Of course we are limited to FL390 per SOPs. We were asked if we wanted direct. Since our dispatch and questioned the ride to ATC indicated smooth at FL390 we accepted. The winds aloft at FL390 were approx. 330 at 60 knots. I noticed a little light turb with an occasional moderate 'bump.' The Static Air Temperature (SAT) temp would change from minus 53 to minus 48 and you could feel the aircraft 'swelling' like riding up then down but only about 200 (continued below).My first officer had downloaded the winds aloft chart on his iPad prior to launch and it showed the jetstream really pouring down the middle of the western U.S. then a surge looping up to the Northeast. We had been originally filed east of this surge and now were in the eastern edge of this loop. I asked my First Officer if we might head east toward our original filed route since it appeared bumpy. ATC said it should be smooth at FL390 with some light chop. We discussed it further amongst ourselves when we entered an area of moderate turbulence and the aircraft was trending a climb in excess of 1;500 feet per minute and then 1;500 descent per minute. I immediately got on the PA and said [flight attendants] take your seats as I didn't know if they stayed seated. I earlier told them to use their discretion on service that it was told to us by ATC light turb. The aircraft altitude alert was going off and on as we went through these gyrations of climb and descent through our assigned altitude. I asked ATC for a lower altitude and a turn to the east but was told unable. We started down and turned east at which time the ATC controller obliged our request giving us a block altitude of 390 to 370. We began our turn and descent and were still in this severe 'mountain wave' as we continued turning east bound. Finally after what seemed forever the aircraft became stable in a constant rate descent of about 1;500 feet to FL370. I asked for direct a fix on our original flight plan. Believe it or not the rest of the flight was very smooth. I contacted the flight attendants to see how things were in the back. They never got up out of their seats and I never turned off the seat belt sign so everything was tidy in the back.In my aviation career which spans over 40 years I have never seen anything like that incident before and pray it doesn't happen again as it was a very sobering experience.In the future I will be more in line with what routing the dispatcher has for us as he has more information at his than I do at mine even though it was [thought] to be a smooth ride.

An Airbus flight crew encountered extreme Rocky Mountain wave activity at FL390 with climbs and descents in excess of 1;500 feet.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 220

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Depending on how the FAA interprets FAR 91.303; I may have inadvertently performed what might be considered as aerobatic flight over a congested area. In the afternoon I was on my way to ZZZ airport to fly; I had a couple of friends ask me to fly over so they could see my aircraft in flight. Being well aware of the requirements Part 91.119; safe altitudes over congested areas; and also always wanting to be friendly to non-flying public who may not enjoy aircraft noise; I maintained an altitude allowing above 91.119 minimums. I had always assumed aerobatic flight to be linked to the angle of 30 degrees. As I flew over the house; I orbited at bank angles meeting Part 91.307 (c) and altitudes meeting Part 91.119. Prior to and during this time; I visually and electronically (TIS and ADS-B) cleared the area for other aircraft. Based on my proficiency (I used to fly USAF fighters very low level at 500+ knots) and currency; I considered all maneuvering was conducted safely and smoothly. I ensured that any flight exceeding the limits of Part 91.307 (c) was conducted over open fields and above 1500 feet; per Part 91.303. Later; while reviewing the FARs in preparation for conducting a biennial flight review; I realized that the bank and pitch angle limits I used for aerobatic flight were only stated in the paragraph for parachute requirements; and that aerobatic flight was defined as 'an intentional maneuver involving an abrupt change in an aircraft's attitude; and abnormal attitude; or abnormal acceleration; not necessary for normal flight.' I am not certain what legally defines 'abrupt' changes or 'abnormal' attitudes; however; I expect the FAA to use the most conservative values; especially with their special emphasis on maneuvering flight; so that is why I am filing this [safety report].As a result; I am immediately implementing two changes to my flying:1) Restrict all flight over congested areas to a maximum of 30 degrees bank and <10 degrees of pitch.2) Stress wording of FAR 91.303 and this lesson into all future Flight Reviews that I conduct; in addition to discussion I currently provide about maneuvering flight mishaps.Bottom line; my major emphasis is to ensure flying will remain safe and to be a positive role model for all aviators that I come in contact with.

RV-7 pilot reported maneuvering over a congested area at 1;200 ft and later considered he may have violated FAR 91.303 with 'intentional maneuver involving an abrupt change in an aircraft's attitude' during the flight.


Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Captain was pilot monitoring. FO (First Officer) was pilot flying. Passing through 4;000 feet MSL on climbout from ZZZ we noticed a fuel imbalance developing - right wing main tank fuel indication already 400 pounds lower than left wing. Right wing main tank fuel appeared to be feeding at approximately twice the rate of the left and it appeared that the center tank fuel was not feeding at all. Engine fuel flow readings appeared normal and equal. By 10;000 feet MSL the imbalance had increased to the point that the IMBAL alert was activated. We coordinated with ATC to level off at 12;000 feet MSL in order to reduce fuel flow and begin taking appropriate action. Upon leveling at 12;000 feet MSL we observed the right fuel tank quantity feed rate appear to normalize and then observed a 50 pound increase in right main tank fuel quantity. Fuel imbalance at that point was 1;100 pounds. We initiated the IMBAL checklist in the QRH. Observing what then appeared to be normal tank quantity indications for a crossfeed operation; we coordinated with ATC to continue our climb and proceed on course to the destination knowing we would also coordinate with Dispatch and maintenance promptly to determine if proceeding to ZZZ1 was advisable. As soon as we established climb fuel flow settings and pitch attitude; the right main tank quantity began to decrease again at what appeared to be the same abnormal rate observed during the initial climb. We then requested priority handling initiated the return to ZZZ (nearest airport) and started the APU as a precaution. I advised Dispatch; the cabin crew; and the passengers of the situation using SOP. As soon as we stopped the climb to initiate the return to ZZZ the right main fuel tank indication again stopped decreasing at an abnormal rate. We concluded the IMBAL checklist and for the remainder of the flight we observed no further indications of abnormal rate of decrease in right main wing tank fuel. During the descent; I spoke with the flight attendants and they confirmed that there were no visible indications of fuel leaks on either wing or engine. We landed uneventfully at ZZZ with a total imbalance of 1;220 pounds with 8;370 pounds in the left wing; 7;150 pounds in the right wing and 13;470 pounds in the center tank - 29;000 points total. The aircraft was below max landing weight at touchdown. ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) personnel were standing by as requested. After landing and before further taxi; ARFF personnel inspected the aircraft closely and reported no leaks; no visible damage; and no abnormalities. We shut down the number 2 engine as an additional precaution and requested that the ARFF vehicles follow us to our gate. Maintenance personnel were debriefed in person at the gate upon arrival.Captain suspects suspect faulty fuel crossfeed valve.Reporter recommends company consider revisiting the IMBAL checklist in light of this particular malfunction.

B73-800 Captain reported an uneventful air return due to an airborne fuel system malfunction during initial climb.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I punched in and went to the west break room. My name came up and I was assigned to Gate X for a departure; it also listed two part timers that were a later start time. I then went to my locker and got my company issued radio and scanner. I walked over to Gate X stopping at a nearby gate to pull the trip up and see who my crew was. As I was signing in I noticed the aircraft was being marshalled in. I closed down the computer to assist in the download and arrival of the aircraft. When I arrived to Gate X there were two guys from training and a bag runner who was behind the engine and looked shaken up. I inquired what had happened and was told he walked behind the engine while it was still running and was knocked over form the jet blast. I proceeded to assist in the downloading and scanning of inbound bags.

Ramper reports arriving at his assigned gate just after the aircraft arrives to be informed that a new ramp employee has walked behind a running engine and was knocked down.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13.6; Flight Crew Total 237; Flight Crew Type 103

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Landed at home airport with 7 knot crosswind. Was down and as I reached to raise the flaps up a gust of wind lifted the plane. As I was raising flaps I had also added aileron which caused the airplane to yaw/turn into the wind; by the time I had recovered I was off runway and hit [a] runway light. I didn't anticipate the wind being blocked by buildings and amount of crosswind that I would experience between and beyond buildings. In hitting the runway light a small amount of the left landing leg [fairing] was [wrinkled] just above step on gear leg. I didn't see any other damage to plane. I inspected the [broken] landing light and reviewed the surface of the runway for debris without walking onto surface and watching for traffic. Didn't see any on the runway. Wind was 270 at 7-9 knots. Landing on runway 36. 30 degrees flaps 65-70 knot landing speed for crosswind.

C172 pilot reported a loss of directional control after landing in a light crosswind.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We were on the TAMMY4 arrival ELD transition into MEM. We were given a 'descend via' clearance. Everything was going fine until the descent to cross TAMMY between 16;000 and 10;000 FT; followed 2 miles later by ROCAB at 10;000 FT and 230 KTS. Three things happened in fairly quick succession that contributed to me missing the crossing restriction. I was looking at the vertical guidance supplied on the MFD (the green data) and it was showing the descent rate that I was currently doing. It didn't seem right so I did some mental math and increased my descent rate also checking for the snowflake which wasn't showing (found out later that it had fallen out when the FMS had briefly gone into roll mode).Then ATC gave us a runway change which distracted us and when we had answered we both realized that we would not make the crossing restriction and notified ATC immediately. I believe the root of the problem was that: 1) I didn't realize the snowflake was disabled; 2) I originally thought the green VNAV info on the MFD would give me the bottom of the 16;000 to 10;000 FT envelope since ROCAB is so close to TAMMY and 3) I was distracted with the runway change and lost awareness for enough time to not make the restriction. Contributing factors included: hurrying because we had been delayed; there were new arrivals in Memphis--this was our first time on this arrival landing to the North; some weather deviations; and an early morning report for duty. Our errors included: not remembering that the snowflake will become disabled if the aircraft goes into the roll mode; not catching that the snowflake wasn't coming up because it was disabled; not using the range to altitude (banana bar) to it's fullest extent; not holding off on worrying about the runway change until past the crossing restriction; not realizing that the green VNAV data on the MFD wouldn't necessarily give me the bottom of the altitude envelope at TAMMY even with ROCAB being so close; finally; not backing up the automation with good old math. As a result we crossed ROCAB on speed but about 4;000 FT high. I do not believe that our briefing was to blame because we completely briefed and cross checked the arrival with the FMS but the automation was where I made my mistake. In the future I will make sure that the primary sources for descending via an arrival are the snowflake and mental math--not the green MFD VNAV--because that is giving information for the next fix only and with an altitude block not necessarily the bottom of said block.

The Captain advised she had been commuting into MEM on another air carrier jump seat shortly after this event and was told that carrier had bulletined the flight crews not to accept the TAMMY arrival because of the same issue; the FMS' failure to 'look ahead' to the more restrictive fix and instead simply provide guidance to the higher altitude in the 'crossing window.'

On descent into MEM we were assigned to descend via the TAMMY ONE arrival. The Captain placed 10;000 FT in the altitude alerter so that we would have vertical guidance on the way down. Approaching TAMMY Intersection to cross between 16;000 and 10;000 FT we noticed that we were going to be too high to cross ROCAB Intersection at 10;000 FT. We immediately advised ATC and were told that it was no problem and to further descend for the approach into MEM. The descent info provided to us via the green descent box on the MFD only gave us descent info to reach TAMMY at 16;000 and not ROCAB at 10;000 FT.We believe the major contributing factor to this event was the complexity and vagueness of the arrivals into MEM. The descent info provided to the crew was inaccurate due to the FMS wanting to cross TAMMY at 16;000 and not ROCAB at 10;000 FT. These arrivals are unlike any descend via's I have flown as they allow too much leeway and too many areas to mess up. Also on the MFD the Green Attitude information next to TAMMY Intersection seems to cover up the altitude information next to ROCAB. These charts are difficult to read as well and with the controllers having issues as well it is causing a much higher workload than should be required to achieve a successful outcome.

The First Officer advised the fleet utilizes a Collins FMS but was unaware of the exact model. He also suggested there were ongoing anomalies and/or 'unfamiliarities on the part of the flight crews' with the operation of the system that have gone unaddressed by either the manufacturers or the airline. He was 'reasonably certain' that any runway change they received was simply another northbound runway parallel to the one in their original clearance and not 'from a southbound to a northbound' runway that would have affected the necessary altitude at which they would have had to cross TAMMY to meet the restrictions at ROCAB. He clarified the 'snowflake' as being a descent path indicator similar to a glideslope which; had it been activated; should have shown their relationship to the vertical path necessary to meet the crossing at ROCAB. The 'banana bar' provides the point along their LNAV path where they would reach the altitude in their altitude alerter. He further advised the aircraft is not equipped with autothrottles which makes flight crew awareness of their descent path more critical in that full VNAV autoflight capability is not available. This lack also illuminates why the presence of the 'snowflake' becomes a critical factor.

While flying the TAMMY RNAV STAR to land North at MEM; the flight crew of a CRJ-200 arrived at TAMMY too high to make the crossing restriction of 10;000 FT and 230 KTS at ROCAB; only two miles beyond TAMMY.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

B737NG was on short final Runway 35; within 1/2 mile. Learjet 45 was on a visual approach behind B737NG; the data tag did not indicate that the Learjet 45 was following or had the B737NG in sight. When Learjet 45 first checked in on my frequency; the separation was 3.75 miles; and the Learjet 45 was 70 KTS faster than the B737NG. In this situation the Learjet 45 needed to be 4 miles in trail of the B737NG; when the B737NG crossed the threshold. I called the traffic to the Learjet 45 in hopes that the pilot would be able to get B737NG ahead of him in sight so that I could apply visual separation before the required radar separation was lost. There was only about 4-5 seconds for this to be accomplished. The Lear 45's reply was 'looking.' Because he was unable to get the leading aircraft in sight in time; the B737NG crossed the threshold before I could send the Learjet 45 around. Right as the B737NG crossed the threshold the Learjet 45 reported the B737NG in sight. The Supervisor was aware of the situation the whole time; and told me to tell Learjet 45 to maintain visual separation and allow the Learjet 45 to land. I told the Learjet 45 'maintain visual separation; caution wake turbulence;' and allowed him to land.I requested time to complete my ATSAP report on the next day at the beginning of my shift; but was not given time to do so. I again requested time the following day at the beginning of my shift; but again was not given time to do so. There was little to no chance for me to fix the situation before the loss of separation. The TRACON Controller needs to either give more in-trail spacing so that I can meet the required radar separation; or have the trailing aircraft get the leading aircraft in sight before they change him to my frequency.

A loss of separation occurred when the Learjet; number two on final; was unable to declare the preceding B737NG in sight in a timely fashion.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

At or about 2;000 feet AGL we got 2 EICAS messages and the auto brakes clicked off. The messages were RH brake fault and LH brake fault. I was the pilot flying so I took the radios and the captain checked the QRH. Upon checking the QRH the captain did not believe that a go around was necessary. He stated that the QRH had a ground reset procedure and there was a note that said to expect asymmetrical braking on landing. He also stated that it said if appropriate see the next page. I agreed that in that case a go around was not necessary and we could land normally knowing that we had almost twice the amount of required landing distance even if there was an issue. I had repeatedly considered going around but I was thrown off by fact that the messages were blue in color. That was one of the main reasons that I agreed with the captain's assessment. After landing and relooking at the QRH we realized our error; the QRH says to accomplish the checklists not 'when appropriate'. Upon landing in the rush of talking on two different frequencies and accomplishing the necessary after landing items I delayed looking at the status page to check the brakes. Upon reaching the ramp; we got a brake overheat message. The Captain immediately stopped the aircraft and asked me to call for fire trucks. I did so and then ran the QRH for Brake overheat. I then informed ops of the fact that we needed to be chalked and eventually towed in. The captain let the flight attendants and the passengers know of the situation and to remain seated. I sent a message to dispatch informing them. The fire department arrived and cooled the brakes with fans and we were towed to the gate with no further incident.This could have been prevented by being more conservative with our decision after the fault appeared. It was a rushed process that led to a faulty decision. Colors of indications are very prominently relied on in our training; I will not; focus so much on the color of the message from now on but will simply make the cautious decision to go around and dig deeper if something like this ever happens again.

I gave the radios to the First Officer (FO) while I checked the QRH. The QRH had a ground reset procedure; to expect asymmetrical braking; and directed me to reference page 13-10 when appropriate. In a rush on short final I believed this meant if needed. The FO asked if we were good to land. I decided that since the messages were advisory and they were faults; I assumed that only one channel of the brake control modules were inoperative we would have normal braking and we had nearly twice the amount of runway as our factored distance so I said yes. As I taxied into the ramp area the BRAKE OVERTEMP message illuminated. I stopped; did not set the brake; and had the FO run that checklist and check the brake temps. The outboard brakes were hot the inboard brakes were indicating a little more than the outside temperature. We had the ground crew hook the plane up to the tug so we could release the brakes. We also had the fire crew inspect the plane with their thermal imaging equipment. The fire crew also put fans by the wheels to help cooling.Had I told the FO to just 'go around' I would have handled the situation appropriately. If I did not rush the decision; I would not have made the error of not doing the checklist properly.

An ERJ-175 EICAS alerted BRK LH FAULT and BRK RH FAULT when the landing gear were lowered. The crew incorrectly decided the EICAS was an advisory alert because it was colored blue. After landing; overheated brakes required the aircraft be chocked while Fire Crews cooled the brakes with fans prior to a tow to the gate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Time Pressure; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Procedure; Weather; Human Factors; Aircraft

We were approaching Orlando thru an area of multiple thunderstorms. The final Approach Controller was very busy and you could hear he was a bit tense. We were approaching the inbound localizer course for 17R at 6;000 FT which was 2;000 FT high since we were just outside ONNER Intersection. My copilot was trying to get a request in for lower; but the frequency was congested. As we approached at 6;000 were were getting higher by the minute. We finally were cleared to 4;000 ft. I selected FLCH  4;000 FT with full speed brakes. Shortly after we were cleared to maintain 4;000 till established on final cleared for the approach. I was in Flight level change descending from 6;000 to 4;000 when given the ILS approach clearance maintain 4;000 till established. I wanted to set up LAVS to the feather; so we would comply with the next two fixes HAMMY (3;000 FT)  & TUFFE (2;200 FT)  I selected LOC; Altitude to 200; VNAV; Speed. The VNAV did not engage. As I was focused on the LAVS setup the ac had just descended below 4;000 FT; so VNAV would not engage. We descended to about 3;700 FT and I hand flew the correction and approach. The weather was VFR. We landed without incident. In retrospect Using VNAV initially would have been a better choice considering the timing of clearance and aircraft rate of descent. Also FLCH would have worked also if I continued using it and not changing to VNAV. Changing methods of descent from FLCH to VNAV in such a time compressed event is not a good idea

When ATC held them high and then cleared them for the approach while still descending at a rapid rate; the pilot flying of a B737 elected to use FLCH and full speed brakes to attempt to get on profile. When utilizing the 'LAVS' procedure (Lateral nav mode/Altitude to which descending/Vertical navigation mode/airSpeed) to configure avionics for the approach VNAV was selected but; due to the high rate of descent; they had already passed through the last useable crossing restriction and; thus; VNAV would not engage. In VMC at the time; they then disconnected the automation and landed without incident.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Part 91K flight; upon arriving into VNY (VMC 6 SM) cleared to land on [Runway] 16R from the ILS 16R approach; we noticed a Cessna 172 on a left downwind. On Tower we heard that a Cessna had us in sight and they were going to follow us. At that time; as we were stable; on course; on slope fully configured; I noticed the Cessna on left downwind turning left base. They were headed right for us. I queried ATC about the traffic and they replied that they were following us; but they were talking about a Cessna on right traffic but that wasn't clear. However; the traffic was at our 10 o'clock position; perpendicular to us; flying straight towards our final. We were about 2 miles out on final; about 800 FT AGL; 140 KTS. They were approaching within 50 FT vertically and within 1;000 FT horizontally from our aircraft; still flying towards us now approaching our 9 o'clock position. If they were landing 16L they seemed to be too close to us; so we executed a missed approach. We flew a right traffic pattern at 2;000 FT per Tower instructions. When we asked the Tower about the traffic again; they claimed they were landing the left side and that traffic was on a different frequency; thus the confusion. However; we don't recall being told at anytime from Tower that we were to look for traffic landing the parallel. I am not certain if we received a RA (Resolution Advisory) but I'm certain I heard TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC numerous times. With my workload so high I cannot recall if I heard the RA because we already had the traffic in sight and we were evading the situation. Upon landing; we called the Tower and they apologized for not telling us about the traffic; but claimed it was very common for parallel operations in VNY. He wasn't sure if the Cessna ever had us in sight. Make sure the Tower personnel are aware that separation requirements for these two runways are not acceptable distances for [company] operations and that better precautions should commence ASAP.

Upon arriving in VNY we were cleared for the ILS 16R approach. At the Marker we were instructed to switch to VNY Tower which we did. VNY Tower cleared us to land on Runway 16R. We noticed a single engine Cessna on a left downwind. On the Tower frequency (119.30) we heard that a Cessna had us in sight and they were going to follow us. During this phase of flight inside the marker proceeding visually; we were fully configured and stabilized on the approach to land. We then noticed a single engine Cessna on left downwind turning left base and heading right toward our direction of flight on our glide path. We queried ATC about the traffic and their reply to us was that the traffic was following us. The aircraft in question was at our 10:00 position flying straight towards our final. We were approximately 2 miles on final approach; approximately 800 FT AGL; 135KTS. The target was approaching within 50 FT vertically and 1;000 FT horizontally and moving toward our 9:00 position. For an aircraft landing on the parallel Runway 16L they were too close to our position and in the interest of safety we executed a go-around/missed approach. Per Tower's instruction we flew a right traffic pattern at 2;000 FT MSL. We queried the Tower once again about the traffic and they replied that the traffic was landing on Runway 16L and that the traffic was on a different frequency; thus the confusion. To our recollection we were never informed by the Tower that we were looking traffic landing on the parallel. After we landed we phoned the Tower and they apologized for not informing us about the traffic; the Tower stated that it was common practice for parallel operations. The Tower wasn't sure if the Cessna traffic ever had us in sight since the Tower Controller worked a different frequency.

Corporate jet landing VNY executed a go around after being confused with regard to traffic. The Tower was referencing one Cessna while the flight crew was concerned over the proximity of another Cessna.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion; Fatigue

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

The fatigue call that was made by myself and my First Officer was predicated by a very long day the day before as well as schedule changes on the day of the fatigue call.  On [date 1]; we flew 9.1 hours from ZZZ to ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 to ZZZ3.  We had 30 minute or less turns the whole day; both passenger legs required lav services; and refueling was required at each stop.  On approach into ZZZ1 we also had to break off the approach as the aircraft in front of us slowed down more than ATC anticipated.  On approach into ZZZ2 we picked up ice and frost underneath the wing clinging to the bottom of the cold soaked fuel tanks.  We attempted to start the process for de-icing; but multiple aircraft had to be moved on the ramp for that to occur per the FBO.  By the time the passengers arrived and bags were loaded the majority had melted and I used my hands to remove the rest.  The flight down to ZZZ3 was 4.0 hours due to headwinds and we arrived at night time.  The next day was only supposed to be one leg from ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 then it grew to include ZZZ4 to ZZZ5 once we got to the hotel.  Only about 30 minutes prior to departure from ZZZ3 the next day were we informed that the day had grown to ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 to ZZZ6 to ZZZ7 and then once we arrived in ZZZ4 it had grown again to include a 4th leg back to ZZZ5 from ZZZ7.  On our way into ZZZ7 we were informed by ATC that ZZZ Center would be going ATC zero for COVID cleaning and once we landed no clearances could be issued northbound.  This would necessitate staying in ZZZ7 for the night and a show at XM:0X am to arrive at ZZZ5 for the passenger leg at XP:00 am.  The fatigue from [Date 1] and [Date 2] would have only been amplified by the early show and so we decided it was not safe to continue as scheduled once we arrived in ZZZ7 for the night.  The fatigue was further evidenced by the fact that while we were getting our bags out at ZZZ7 we discovered that a passenger [bag] from the ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 leg had been missed and was still in the aircraft.

Air Taxi Captain reported calling off a flight due to fatigue from a grueling schedule they had for a couple of days.


Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

We experienced a possible oven fire with dense black smoke. Another Flight Attendant and I were the firefighters. We had the Halon extinguisher at the ready. Along with the PBE; we first smelled an acrid smell in the mid galley area. I started to investigate it further and we called the cockpit to inform them. They said to keep them posted. At first we didn't see smoke; but the distinct smell was present. Called the cockpit again and asked about the further use of the oven and instructions on the circuit breakers and if we should start pulling them. I went back to the ovens and opened them and there was no visible residue or food on any of the racks. The top racks in both ovens we loaded properly with the breakfast entrees on the top level. There was nothing that was being trapped or food residue that was being 'burned off' if you will. Literally a minute or so after we hung up with the cockpit the left hand mid galley oven started to release a plume of black smoke. It was coming out of the seals around the oven door and appeared to be coming from the side of it (mesh type vent in between the two ovens) as well. The other Flight Attendant grabbed the Halon; I grabbed the PBE and had them at the ready. The other Flight Attendant called the cockpit and relayed the possible serious situation with heavy smoke coming from the oven. The pilots then gave me instructions to pull all the circuit breakers and cut the power to that side of galley which I did. [I also pulled the] power to the chillers on the opposite side. It happened all so very quickly that we did not have time to don the PBE before the decision was made to declare an emergency landing and land. We kept the oven door closed to minimize the smoke coming into the cabin and we opened the vents in the galley and jumpseat area. I got up again and checked for hotspots on the side of the galley walls closet area at the rear of the oven as well as the compartment above the closet area. I did not feel any heat that wasn't 'normal'. The cockpit then called and gave us instructions and advisory; 'We will land and if needed will evacuate on the TARMAC.' The other Flight Attendant and I decided to keep the equipment with us for landing. The PBE behind my back and the Halon extinguisher in-between us. We landed safely. The cockpit called me at door two left and asked us what the status of the oven was. I informed him of the following; 'The smoke seems to have stopped coming out. There's a small amount of residual still in the galley but it seems to have stopped coming out.' He then said; 'Ok we will then taxi into the gate.' I said; 'Okay; thank you' and hung up.Once we landed he called the Lead and asked her to make an announcement to keep the passengers in their seats while the firefighters entered the aircraft and checked the oven and galley area. The firefighters along with the CSR said they could smell it once the aircraft cabin door was opened. The firefighters checked out the galley and oven and like us couldn't see anything that was obvious. They checked with a heat sensor and that checked out ok. They turned it over to our mechanics. The mechanics came in and asked various questions. We relayed the same information to them -once we turned on the ovens approximately 7-10 minutes later the left hand oven started to release black smoke. We told them how we could smell an acrid type smell heavy black smoke appeared and that passengers also could smell it. They proceeded to take the oven rack out of the casing and there was a patch of black residue on the ceiling top part of the oven casing that was visible and when the Mechanic touched it he said; 'This looks like charcoal.' The fan was compromised and appeared to be setting itself on fire. We gave them their space to work and began the debriefing with the Lead. [We then] called Inflight Supervisor and crew scheduling.We took inventory of how we were all feeling and what we were feeling. The other Flight Attendant and I decide that as a precaution we should probably get checked out since we inhaled quite a bit of the dense black smoke. Our anxiety level was high and felt that we would not be in the right frame of mind to continue working a flight that day unless the doctor who checked us out said it would be ok. The Purser did come back to the mid galley to check the situation during the unfolding event and confirmed yes there was an acrid smell and indeed we needed to confer with the cockpit. We all worked well together and as a crew naturally followed our emergency procedures (the very ones we practice at recurrent every year).

A B757 mid-galley oven fan failed causing a great deal of black smoke in the cabin; but not knowing the cause inflight an emergency was declared and the flight diverted.