Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We departed on a Class II international trip. The previous day (with a different Second in Command); we had tested the HF radios by receiving a time hack on the WWV atomic clock HF frequency. We had a good operations check and assumed the HF radios were working properly. The day of the trip; we again tested the HF by receiving a time hack on the ground; however; we could not transmit on the primary and secondary frequencies at the time due to our close proximity to the FBO hangars. After departing and prior to coast-out; the Second in Command (SIC) (also an experienced Captain who happens to have a lot of experience with HF in the military) attempted to test the HF radios using the Primary Frequency and a Secondary frequency while I flew the plane and managed the VHF radios. Prior to coast-out; the SIC determined that the HF radios were not transmitting. We reviewed the Operations Manual to make sure we were operating the HF radio properly and to make sure we weren't missing anything. We determined that we were operating it accordingly and that we had tried everything we could in order troubleshoot the problem. We briefly discussed our contingency options again prior to coast-out (including returning to our departure airport) and informed Center of the issue.  Center informed us that there was a flight right behind that we could relay our position with until we got back in radar contact. After that; there would be a southbound flight that was paralleling our course that would relay for us until we reached our destination.After discussing this with ZZZ Center; the controller also assured us that this was a legal option. We made radio contact with the relaying flight on the VHF air-to-air frequency. After we were confident we could continue to communicate and relay; the SIC and I again discussed our options and contingencies and we both elected to continue. We relayed our positions successfully until we reached ZZZ Center on VHF again. Our next contingency plan was that if we couldn't relay with another flight we would divert as ATC did not have any northbound traffic for us to relay with in order to return state-side. During this time; we briefed the passengers on the possibility of [diverting]. I transferred the controls to the SIC so that he could fly while I coordinated with ATC; relayed our position; plotted our course; and kept up with the NavLog in an effort to reduce each other's workload. He had worked hard attempting to troubleshoot the HF radios; meanwhile having me manage the radios and navigation allowed me to handle the lost HF event. Once talking to ZZZ Center; we made VHF contact with the southbound flight and we were confident that we could continue relaying position reports; we elected to continue to our destination via relay.We recorded each waypoint along the route on the NavLog and plotting chart; and successfully relayed each one. The other flight in turn would verify that each reporting point was received by ATC. Once we were within range of ATC; we contacted via VHF; they confirmed radar contact; we again exchanged the flight controls (I resumed pilot-flying duties and the SIC resumed pilot-monitoring duties) and we continued the rest of the way to our destination on VHF radios in the radar environment. The rest of the flight was uneventful. After deplaning our passengers at the destination; I called Maintenance Control to create a write-up and MEL the HF radios. The MEL restricted us to VHF communication. The log was completed and the MEL was complied with. My next call was to Operations to inform them of the issue and restrict the aircraft to 'Class 1 navigation only' until maintenance could fix the HF radios. The remainder of our scheduled trips were within radar service areas; so there were no additional operational issues concerning the HF radios and the MEL. As a side note; despite being a stressful situation; I believe the SIC (another Captain) and I handled the situation quite well all thingsconsidered. We communicated; risk assessed; and split duties effectively. If ATC hadn't assured us this was a legal option (it sounded like we weren't the first one to have this problem) or other flights had not been willing or able to help us relay our position; then we would have definitely had to have returned to our departure airport or diverted  after burning off a bunch of fuel to get the plane below landing weight.These HF radios probably have not been exercised in over a year due to COVID-19 international travel restrictions and lack of Class II flying. While we did test the HF the previous day by receiving a time hack; we did not check the transmit function of the HF radios. We checked the HF radios reception the previous day by receiving the time hack; however; we did not test the transmit function of the radio. Checking the transmitter the day before would have allowed us to MEL the HF earlier and prevent this trip from occurring on this tail number. Also I would recommend that as we continue to develop  training scenarios as part of our  recurrent training programs; that we include Class II navigation scenarios to supplement that training. In a normal year (without pandemic-level travel restrictions); we don't individually get to perform very many Class II trips. I believe including Class II training scenarios; including what to do during lost-comm events as well as other emergencies such as single-engine failure; depressurization; and medical emergencies); would be extremely beneficial in building decision-making processes in a Class II environment.

During the departure; I told the PIC that I would conduct the FMS navigation check and the HF check. The FMS navigation check was conducted almost immediately using a VOR.  The HF check was another story. On deck at departure airport; I was having issues getting a radio check on the ground with ZZZ Radio; but after discussing with maintenance; we collectively thought it was interference from the hangars right at the ramp.  An air check was required.  We could hear the HF clock on 10000 MHz but just could not raise ZZZ Radio.As the departure airport is very close to the ocean; we coasted out as I was attempting to get the HF to work.  Both HF radios seemed to be having a common issue with transmitting; this despite being able to hear intermittently HF traffic.  I was able to tune the radios but continued to fail in any contact with ZZZ Radio.  (HF1 seemed to not electronically tune as I pressed to transmit; HF2 seemed to tune pressing transmit; but no one could receive).  While the PIC flew the plane (and spoke with ATC); I continued to trouble shoot the radios exhausting all system knowledge.  We even pulled the manual out to make sure I was not missing anything.During my troubleshooting of the radios; the PIC was provided an option from ATC of relay with other aircraft.  Specifically; there was another aircraft very close by our position.  The other aircraft pilots agreed to take our HF relay if we needed that option.  At this point; I reported to the PIC that our HF radios were failed.  We were pretty much at the final fix prior to HF operations (20 minutes after takeoff). We both discussed the options prior to committing to the HF relay.  We could turn around and head back.  We could relay with other aircraft.  We could also pick up another relay that could take us all the way down (or perhaps back to ZZZ if we wanted that option).  We decided to continue with company to keep the flight going safely.  The clients were kept informed.  ATC was kept completely in the loop.As we entered radar control; ATC called to tell us that there were no northern flights that could help us get back but there was an Air Carrier flight which was willing to relay HF the remaining way.  Since the remaining oceanic airspace had 3 more fixes; we decided that this was a safe option allowing us to keep the mission on track.  With ATC facilitation; we contacted the flight while in radar control and established the link for our HF relay.  The HF relay with the Air Carrier took us into ATC airspace.  The rest of the flight was uneventful. Primarily; we both felt comfortable that we could continue to our destination safely. Secondly. This HF teaming; thanks to ATC; [and other flights] allowed our passengers to get to their destination with all the COVID restrictions compliances intact for their entry (a significant travel issue). Cause; aging equipment. I am not sure that this HF failure can be avoided.  Perhaps we need to do more checks of our equipment and keep them at a higher standard of repair and readiness.

Fractional jet crew reported their HF Radio did not work during a flight through non radar airspace so they relayed required position reports through other aircraft.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176; Flight Crew Total 18562; Flight Crew Type 15356

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

The recent change in the flight attendant assignments on the B767 has created an unsafe condition in the cabin. With the removal of the flight attendant in the B zone galley; there is no longer a crew member in position when the pilots need to utilize the restrooms at doors 2 left and right. In the past it was common practice to have a restroom locked off prior to the pilots walking through business class to use them; so that the pilots would not have to wait in line for a restroom. Now this is no longer possible which exposes the flight crew to possible unhappy passengers as we now need to cut in line in front of them. There is no longer an available cabin crew member being present in the immediate area in the event of a conflict or safety issue between pilot and passenger should one occur.Additionally; there is no longer a flight attendant in position to assist a pilot utilizing the crew rest facility at seat 7d should a safety issue occur. Passengers are now free to loiter in the b zone galley area; just steps away from the rest facility at seat 7d. This creates an unsafe condition in that the flight crew member sitting in seat 7D would have no warning or assistance against any unsavory passengers that are now free to assemble in the mid galley area to plan a hostile attack against them. As an LCA (Line Check Airman); I am constantly utilizing seat 6d for my crew rest due to double augmentation of the cockpit crew. This seat is easy to view from the mid galley area and would be easy to reach in less than a second should a hostile force decide to attack. Additionally; pilots are now completely alone while they use the restroom in that area; in the low light condition of cruise flight. Passengers from the aft cabin are already utilizing these restrooms unchallenged; posing and additional safety risk.Not to mention the reduction in service we now will offer to our Business customers; the people we need to please the most.A flight crew safety issue [has been created] on the B767 by removing a cabin crew member from this area; and this should be corrected immediately.

B767 Captain reported company policy change that created an unsafe condition in the cabin and crew rest area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated

During vectors to ILS Approach aircraft HSI/Compass failed. First Officer was flying pilot at time of event and the auto pilot was engaged. The weather was in and out of towering cumulus clouds; cloud bases at approximately 2;500 FT and visibility was 10 plus mile. We were in a descending left turn to heading 320 degrees and altitude 5;000 FT MSL. As aircraft started to level and fly heading 320 degree both First Officer's and Captain's HSI began spinning causing aircraft to enter approximately 25 degree right bank turn. 'EFIS COMP MON' amber CAS illuminated with associated master caution during event. The autopilot continued to follow the HSI till I (Captain) disengaged and leveled wings using attitude indicator along with outside visual references. I (Captain) took over pilot flying duties for remainder of flight. After turning autopilot off; our heading varied from assigned by approximately 30 degrees and altitude was 200 FT low. While avionics failure was occurring Approach tried calling several times to assign lower altitude and intercept heading vector; but we were unable to initially respond. When we cleared clouds on the north side of final approach course we had a clear view of runway. We advised Approach that we had avionics failure and needed a visual to airport. Approach cleared us for the visual approach approximately 15 miles from runway. Soon after; leveling wings; on final approach course HSI headings returned to normal and all cautions disappeared.

CRJ700 Captain experiences dual HSI failure during approach with the autopilot attempting to follow the spinning HSI's. The Captain assumes control and levels the wings and once in VMC a visual approach is requested. Once established the HSI headings return to normal.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 1950

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

This report describes an incident resulting from cancelling an IFR clearance too soon (when I saw the runway but was not yet on the ground and had to go missed and did not have a clearance).  Bad planning on my part. I had filed and had read the notams and saw that RWY XXL was closed except for day VFR.  I did not also notice that RWY XXR was completely closed.  When asked by Approach for the type of approach desired; I requested an Initial Fix on the RNAV XXL approach; told them I knew the runway was only open if the field was VFR and if it was not VFR at the time I arrived I would be landing on XXR.  They cleared me for the approach.  The local ASOS was reporting VFR.  When I reached the circling minimums; I saw the runways and cancelled my IFR clearance.  That was my mistake (really the second mistake - first was missing the NOTAM on the XXR RWY).  As I approached XXR; I saw the X at the end and knew I could not land.  I announced on CTAF I was circling to land on XXL and as I began the circle; I realized that the field was not VFR; so I could not land on XXL either.  At that point; I changed back to Approach and announced I was missed approach and asked for vectors for the ILS [alternate airport]. Approach complied and gave me a new clearance with vectors to final and I flew the approach and it all worked out. There were no comments about the cancellation and the new clearance or whether I was IMC or VMC when I asked for the new clearance.  I was VMC when I asked for it; but I could not remain VFR.  By the time I got it; I had been in IMC and was back in VMC.The cause of my problem was at least threefold:(1) I planned a trip to an airport with a runway only open in VFR.(2) I did not read the NOTAMs close enough to find the second closed runway. (3) I cancelled my clearance before I was on the ground to avoid having to make a phone call.  To prevent a recurrence; read NOTAMS carefully and don't cancel IFR until on the ground!

BE35 pilot cancelled IFR clearance prior to landing and subsequently had to get clearance for an approach to an alternate field. Pilot failed to see NOTAMS regarding runway restrictions at the destination airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

The Captain was flying an autopilot coupled ILS approach to RWY 16R. The visibility was 2 miles in rain with about a 1;000 foot ceiling. While the surface winds were approximately 160 at 30 kts; there was a 45 knot direct cross wind that was causing speed fluctuations about 5 to 15 knots until about 800 AGL. Turbulence was moderate until about 800 feet AGL. We intercepted the ILS about 18 miles out and shortly after we were told to contact the Tower at FINKA (FAF). The First Officer was working the radios and he switched to the Tower outside of FINKA. The Seattle Tower soon asked us if we were on frequency and we were cleared to land. The landing was uneventful. Once we cleared RWY 16L we were told by Seattle Ground to contact the Seattle TRACON Duty Manager by telephone. It would appear we were the cause of a near miss because the FO switched the radio frequency from Final Approach to the Tower too soon (SEA Approach Control's opinion). We were never instructed to switch to the SEA Tower exactly at FINKA by ATC. We were told to contact the Seattle Tower at FINKA (there was nothing about monitoring SEA Final). Anyway; there was an aircraft that went Missed Approach at Boeing Field due to wind shear and we were told to do a Go Around (we never heard the call because the FO had switched the frequency to the Tower prior to FINKA). According to SEA TRACON; our failure to monitor the SEA Approach Control Frequency caused way too many problems. It would appear from the conversation; he did not think we were capable of flying into Seattle on a daily basis. [Name removed] told us that we should have known to monitor the SEA Final Approach Control Frequency until FINKA. I have asked several Captains who fly for [Airline] and are based in SEA about this and they knew nothing. There is nothing on the 10-7; 10-9; Approach Chart; etc. The First Officer performed just like he would at LAX; SFO; DEN; DFW; etc. What SEA Approach Control wanted us to do seems to be some form of 'Tribal Knowledge'. I think the cause and contributing factors have been covered above. It should be stated; there appeared to be some wind shear issues at Boeing Field. We were never alerted by ATC that I can remember to monitor the SEA Final Approach Control Frequency until FINKA. We were just told when handed off to the SEA Tower to contact them at FINKA. As the Flying Pilot/Captain; I think this whole Near Mid Air incident 'stinks'. Is ATC trying to cover themselves because a situation became a 'Perfect Storm'? I have flown into Seattle since 2002 on a regular basis and since 2008 on an almost weekly basis in all types of weather. This is the first time I have heard anything about monitoring the final approach frequency until FINKA until after the fact. I would recommend a meeting with the SEA ATC Facility Manager and get the official procedures from him. I would issue an ALERT Message. And there probably need to be some notes on the 10-7; 10-9; Approach Plate; Flight Release; etc. regarding what SEA Approach Control wants pilots to comply with when flying the ILS to 16R; 16L; or 16C. From my perspective; I think we flew the flight very professionally. I was shocked and surprised when we were told to contact the SEA Approach Control Duty Manager on arrival at the gate. I think my First Officer would share my opinions too.

Air carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict on approach into Seattle with an missed approach aircraft from BFI that was not identified due to an early frequency change to the tower.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were en route to PHX on a part 91K flight with two passengers on board. Our clearance received from clearance delivery was 'Cleared to PHX via XXXXX 1 departure Flight Plan Route.' Flight plan was entered and reviewed and all was found to be correctly entered into the FMS. Enroute we received several 'cleared direct to' changes and also some deviations due to weather. Shortly after passing NAVHO intersection on J11; which was our filed route; ATC questioned if we had missed a turn on the arrival. We were confused by the question and informed them we were still on J11 to DRK and then joining the MAIER 5 arrival from Drake. He said he showed us on the MAIER 5 arrival already and we should have been heading toward PANTD intersection and descending accordingly. We informed him we were cleared as filed originally which was J11 to DRK and then the arrival. He thought we were joining the arrival at CORKR. After landing and clearing customs I was reviewing the En Route chart for J11 and the plate for the MAIER 5 arrival I noted that several intersections are on both the arrival for PHX and J11. I think a previous controller must have cleared us direct one of these intersections with the intent that we join the arrival from there. In our minds we thought our original route was unchanged and went direct to the intersection and continued on the airway instead. Either we misunderstood the change of which transition we were to use for the arrival; or the controller assumed we were to join the arrival from the new fix we were cleared direct to. I am not completely sure what caused the misunderstanding. The resolution ended up being the controller cleared us direct to BRUSR further down the arrival and to resume the arrival from there. We tried to discuss it further with the controller but he didn't seem to want to. Nothing more was said regarding the event.I don't recall hearing the controller specifically state to join 'such and such transition' with any of our re-routes. I feel either the controller or we as a crew assumed the wrong instruction and assignment which resulted in an apparent deviation from the expected routing. It is confusing utilizing the same intersection names for the arrival as the names on the airway. One could easily assume they are still on the airway while the controller is assuming you are on the arrival already. The main problem in this instance was communication of what transition ATC wanted us on. I did not look at the CORKR transition for the MAIER 5 arrival because we were not assigned it. Because of this I didn't realize the airway and arrival shared several waypoints that could become confusing.

The confusion seems to be that they added the point CORKR in the mix; and we thought we'd resume the arrival via DRK after that; and they thought we'd finish the same arrival from just CORKR. So when we didn't make an anticipated turn after CORKR; they queried us and we mentioned DRK was next; they just gave us a turn further downstream to BRUSR.

A flight crew filed J11 to DRK then transition to the PHX MAIER 5; but ATC assumed the crew transitioned at CORKR because that waypoint is designated CORKR.MAIER with waypoints common to both J11 and the MAIER beyond CORKR.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 17119; Flight Crew Type 1350

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 3281; Flight Crew Type 300

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

While positioned on the ramp at FBO in ZZZ the aircraft I was operating came in contact with a parked aircraft.At brake release and at idle power I asked the pilot in the right seat if we had clearance from the winglet of the aircraft on our left which was on a tug. The pilot not flying told me that we had clearance and I released the brakes and rolled forward. The pilot not flying then told me to stop and I immediately applied brake pressure. My aircraft didn't move with the exception of the forward lurch from the brakes. I set the parking brake and then shut down both engines.I exited the aircraft and walked around to the right wing and observed the winglets of both aircraft in apparent contact with each other. Sometime later after the tugged aircraft was pushed back we observed no damage to my aircraft and that was further supported by four independent maintenance technicians and inspectors. There was however damage present to the Challenger that was still on the tug.

The crew; including dispatch; notified the FBO of our departure time; and request to be online; in the several days leading up to our departure.Upon arrival; we requested the aircraft be fueled. Upon passenger arrival; the marshaller and wing walker escorted the passengers to our plane; they then subsequently left without informing the crew. We then proceeded to start engines normally; and contacted ground for our taxi clearance.Upon block out; the PIC asked if our right wingtip was clear of obstacles. As I looked up I determined there was not enough room for wing tip clearance; and called for an immediate left turn. The PIC then applied brakes; but it was too late and we made contact with a Challenger; wingtip to wingtip. Maintenance personnel inspected our plane and determined there was no damage; and a logbook entry was made.

Gulfstream V flight crew reported impacting another aircraft's wingtip at the start of taxi.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

As we got on the plane; I noticed a smell in the cabin. I was near the cockpit door and kept getting hints of a greasy/rotten smell. It went away for a little; but when I walked towards the back of the aircraft; the smell got stronger. The pilots asked if I wanted cleaners to come on; but the smell was something I recognized. It smelled like dirty socks. The pilots started the APU to see if it would clear it up. The aft door was open for catering reasons. I stayed on the aircraft in the front galley talking to the mechanics about another issue while the B and C Flight Attendants went into the jet bridge because the smell was so strong in the aft. After a few minutes; the smell seemed to dissipate and so we gave the okay to board. I noticed a slight headache; but thought it would go away. We started boarding and finished in about 30 minutes or so. During that time I was getting the galley ready for the flight. Once I stood still; I felt a little fuzzy headed and confused. The headache turned into a dull pain at the base of my neck that started to almost make me nauseous. There were supervisors who showed up to the aircraft; since we reported an odor earlier. The call was made to deplane after all three of us were feeling the same symptoms. I was still confused and my head hurt; so I wanted to get checked out by a doctor. As I was speaking to people; I noticed that my speech was very broken and slurred and I couldn't find any words or make any sense. The captain made an announcement to deplane and (supervisor who showed up to the gate) said I should get off the aircraft; since it was a safety situation; so I sat in the jet bridge as the rest of the guests deplaned. We then started the process to get checked at the hospital and run tests. We called [medical company] and gave them our information and symptoms. We ended up being seen almost four hours later at hospital near the ZZZ airport. There should be a more concise checklist to follow when an odor/air quality incident occurs. Also; I felt like we were not taken seriously at first and our symptoms got worse; being exposed to possible contamination for a longer period of time. Especially when we all had similar symptoms at the same time. I understand that there are false alarms; but if there's a way to get more information to crews; hospitals and clinics about these incidents; we can all learn more and be more informed about being safe in the workplace.

We took over the aircraft from the inbound flight. My crew and I entered the aircraft. I proceeded to the aft cabin and upon reaching the last two rows; I smelled dirty socks. I knew what the odor meant since I had an air quality issue on a MD80 aircraft XX years ago. At that moment; the APU was just turned on as I heard the air conditioning blowing; the L2 door was opened because the two caterers were still catering the flight's provisions; and there was one fleet service personnel who just finished cleaning the lavatories.After I put my flight bags away; I immediately grabbed a safety card and started fanning my face. I proceeded towards the forward door to get fresh air when the B Flight Attendant asked me if I smelled the odor. I told her that I am aware of it and it is an air quality issue. I also told her that I'm getting off the aircraft to get fresh air and she should do the same. The A Flight Attendant also mentioned about the odor as I reached the forward galley. Before I got off the aircraft; I told the flight deck crew that I smelled dirty socks in the aft cabin and mentioned that it is an air quality issue.I was on the jet way when I heard the captain mention; 'Call fleet service and tell them to spray the aft lavatories.' The mechanic arrived to check on a separate issue when I heard the flight deck mentioned to the mechanic about the odor in the aft cabin. The mechanic checked the cabin for the said odor; but he told us that he did not smell anything. I went back inside the aircraft to see if I could still smell the dirty socks; but the odor dissipated. We started boarding. I was in the aft galley organizing the beverage and food carts when the A Flight Attendant old me that an In flight Supervisor is going to speak to me. He made his way to the aft galley and asked me several questions: what happened; how was I feeling; do I want to continue on with the trip or get off. I told In flight Supervisor about the dirty socks odor and mentioned to him that I felt out of it like I was drugged and I have a scratchy throat with a bitter aftertaste. I hesitantly told him that I think I'm okay to continue with the trip. I told him to speak to the B Flight Attendant because she was not feeling well. All the passengers were boarded and seated. A Fleet Service Personnel came to the aft galley and asked me which lavatory needs to be sprayed. I told her that both lavatories don't need to be serviced. An announcement was made that all passengers need to deplane because the mechanic found an issue with the aircraft. The B Flight Attendant and I were in the aft galley while the passengers began deplaning. The In flight Supervisor notified us via interphone to get off the aircraft because the paramedics are coming to assess us. We told him that we could wait until the passengers have deplaned; but he insisted us to come forward. The B Flight Attendant and I reached the first class cabin while the A Flight Attendant was in the jetway. In flight Supervisor told us to get off the aircraft and I told him that we need to have a minimum crew onboard since the passengers are still deplaning. He insisted that 'It's okay.' I was hesitant and I told the B Flight Attendant that she could get off first since we still have a minimum crew (i.e. In flight Supervisor; a non-revenue Flight Attendant; and me). However; In flight Supervisor insisted that both B Flight Attendant and I should get off the aircraft since the paramedics are arriving soon. He reassured us that; 'It's okay' to get off the aircraft and he mentioned that the non-revenue Flight Attendant; was on medical leave so she couldn't substitute as a working crew. Both the B Flight Attendant and I deplaned and waited for the paramedics to arrive at the jetway.The paramedics arrived and took the oxygen saturation of the A and B Flight Attendants; but none of our other vital signs were taken. They said that they couldn't really do anything for us; but they offered to transport us to the ER. I declined the ambulance ride because I thought that I would have to pay for it. In flight Supervisor told us to call [medical company] to report our incident. I contacted [medical company] and spoke to a nurse about my symptoms. The [medical company] representative told me that she would call me back within an hour for an authorization and health care facility information. It is also worthwhile to mention that none of the crew received individual case reference numbers. We waited for over an hour for the call from [medical company]; but no call back was made. Hence; I called them back to follow up on our status; but the representative told me that there were a few cases in queue and she assured me that she would call me back soon and send me an email about the health care facility information. I called [medical company] again and told them that time is of the essence for the blood test to be drawn and we need to know the facility ASAP. We finally received our respective emails containing the health care facility information.My crew and I arrived at the Emergency Department. The front desk mentioned that they were expecting us. We gave our urine samples to the ER tech. Nurse ushered us to the treatment room; notified the lab for blood draw; and began our individual assessments. Approximately four hours post exposure; the A and B Flight Attendants Carboxyhemoglobin levels were drawn then they were put on high flow oxygen while I was administered 10 liters of oxygen before the lab technician drew my blood. The ER physician assessed our lung sounds and spoke with us individually. When our Carboxyhemoglobin results became available; the physician told us that all three of us have a 'slightly elevated level'. I asked if our urine samples would be tested for TCP metabolites; but he dismissed that ER techs usually collect urine samples as expected and no further testing is required. I also asked the physician if he would order a serum cholinesterase test for us; but he said it wasn't necessary unless each one of us or one of us had a cardiac medical condition.1) Install air quality sensors in all aircraft.2) Create an air quality algorithm for the flight deck if there is nothing in place yet.3) Provide more education to all flight attendants about air quality awareness: what to look for; what symptoms could occur; and post exposure procedure (notifying [medical company]; pertinent lab tests; etc).4) Improve post exposure algorithm (e.g. expedite approval from [medical company]; educate affected crew to go to a health care facility immediately while waiting for the insurance approval).

A319 Flight Attendant crew reported  persistent 'dirty socks' odor in passenger cabin during boarding. Maintenance had passengers deplaned. Flight attendants received medical treatment for physiological symptoms.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Staffing; Procedure

I was conducting OJT on all radar positions combined during a TRACAB operation due to staffing and equipment outages. BMG shout line was Out of Service so all coordination had to be done through a dial line. We took the handoff on Aircraft X from IND Approach landing BMG. We cleared the aircraft for the RNAV RWY 17 and switched them to the tower after the inbound had been coordinated. When Aircraft X was just inside the IAF; BMG tower called and said something like 'Aircraft X lost approach guidance can he make a right 360 to rejoin?' Since the aircraft was IFR and the weather was solid IMC we advised BMG 'negative; put him back on us.' When Aircraft X checked back on he was north bound at 3000; the developmental assigned heading 360 and 3000; then attempted to coordinate with IND Approach since the aircraft was quickly approaching the boundary. After the developmental's second attempt and IND not answering I yelled over the line that Aircraft X has experiencing difficulty and was re-entering the airspace so we could get back to the aircraft and determine exactly what was going on. The aircraft advised their auto pilot entered the hold over the IAF instead of commencing the approach; which is very different than the info BMG tower passed to us. The aircraft went into IND airspace approximately five miles without coordination before being turned back towards BMG. The aircraft was re-cleared for the approach and landed without incident.There is a history of HUF and IND management having a poor working relationship and some sort of power struggle to see who has the bigger stick. This has degraded to the point that; in my opinion it is now negatively affecting the workforce and is manifesting itself in ways such as IND refusing to answer the land line and waiting until the last possible half mile to take hand offs. As controllers we are expected to be professional at all times. Management needs to lead by example and settle whatever grudge they have so we can work safely and efficiently.

HUF Controller reported an airspace violation due to communication problems with another facility and the aircraft pilot.


Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Company Policy

Flight to PHX. Upon receiving our clearance in Airport ZZZ; we noticed that recently dispatch has been filing us at 10;000 feet between Airport ZZZ and PHX. The Captain and I believe this is an issue for the following reasons. 10;000 feet on the PINNG1 arrival brings you right through the VFR practice area and the VFR sky diving areas for E60 and P08 airports. In this specific instance; there were two [small transport aircraft] both at 12;500 feet dropping skydivers around the BRDEY intersection. I noticed the Aircraft on the TCAS and prepared for evasive action. Aircraft was instructed multiple times that we were coming from below; he decided to drop sky divers anyway and began to descend resulting in our Resolution Advisory (RA). I followed the RA and the Captain and I noticed 2 brightly colored skydivers within 1500 feet of our wingtip - to the point we could see the arms and legs of the divers. ZAB came over the radio and was sternly advising them not to drop but they did anyway and then descended VFR in our direction. This was just one of the RA's among the many TA's we got on this flight. The area in the vicinity of IWA; P08; and CGZ is an extremely dense training ground (designated by the Arizona Flight Training Work group) for multiple flight schools. Flying through this area at such a low altitude is extremely unsafe and should be avoided. Especially around two of the busiest skydiving airports in the United States. From now on; a discussion will be taken between the Captain (CA); dispatch; and myself about amending the altitude on these flights to a safer altitude - 14;000 - 16;000 feet above the GA conflicts. Both the CA and I agree flying 10;000 feet on this flight is an unnecessary risk which should be mitigated. 5 TA and 1 RA is too many for such a short flight. The altitude filed on these flights should be reconsidered.

Air carrier First Officer reported multiple TA's and RA's on the flight to PHX at 10;000 feet and suggests filing for a higher altitude on this route.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight ABC was taxing into Gate X when a baggage tug who was driving on the service road making a right turn from behind Gate Y failed to yield to the aircraft almost causing the aircraft to collide with the tug and baggage carts which would have been fatal for the driver as well as significant damage to the aircraft. Myself and wingwalkers tried to stop the aircraft which eventually slowed down to avoid colliding with the tug and carts. This is a common issue at this station which goes unreported and when it does; no disciplinary action is taken so it keeps on happen.

Ground employee reported a near collision between an air carrier aircraft and a baggage tug vehicle after the tug failed to yield to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 1000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I advised Tower of my position 7 miles to the Northeast of the airport which coincidentally aligns me with the final approach. On my flight path to ZZZ; tower advised me to join over the [VFR waypoint] which was approximately in my 10 o'clock position. At the time I noticed another aircraft on my ADS-B screen at a co-altitude in that area. That aircraft was cleared for the left base. I advised tower that I am in a 6 mile final and that turning would put me head-on with that traffic on the wide left base. Tower controller with an unprofessional manner said that he did not want me on final. I complied with his instructions; and after rolling out on a heading to the [VFR waypoint] I was then forced to execute a hard turn back to the right to avoid a head-on collision with the traffic that I previously pointed out to the controller. The concern that I have here is that this same controller on more than one occasion has given me vectors that conflict with other traffic and at times seems to have a loss of situational awareness.

GA pilot reported an airborne conflict as a result of ATC not providing adequate separation between aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Some Safety Concerns:We continue to prevent smart bags with lithium batteries from being loaded but unfortunately there is no way to monitor how many bags are getting by. When an RSE identifies a smart bag there is no process that informs the RSE if the bag was inspected; who inspected the bag and if powered by lithium was the lithium battery was removed. Smart bags are becoming harder and harder to detect or determine if the bag is powered by lithium batteries. This is creating an unmanageable threat.

Ground Agent reported current level of lithium ion battery powered smart bags continue to be accepted as checked bags with batteries installed in violation of Hazmat company procedures and DOT regulations.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 1194; Flight Crew Type 805

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Incursion Runway

At the intersection of Taxiway 1 and Runway XX at ZZZ; during engine run-up following annual inspection; while engrossed in monitoring the engine and mag drops; the aircraft slid beyond the hold short line without my detecting it.

PA-28 Pilot reported being distracted and taxiing the aircraft over the runway hold short lines.


Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

After pushback and engine start the ground crew requested 'brakes set' and I responded 'brakes set; cleared to disconnect headsets.' Shortly after the tug was disconnected we noticed it appeared to be moving forward towards the aircraft. As the tug continued forward the ground crew was hand signaling for 'brakes set' and I hand signaled back 'brakes set' and confirmed the [parking] brake was set. The tug continued and the radome was hit by the tug window which cracked. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and were towed back to the gate. Maintenance arrived and inspected the aircraft. He noted a 2 inch diameter delamination of radome. When I went down to look at the aircraft; the ground crew advised the plane had rolled into the tug.After further reflection; I realized I had forgotten to turn on the HYD System 3 electric pump. Moreover; then realized it was a first flight of the day; so we started engine one first; not engine two. Thus; although the parking brake appeared set; there was no pump supplying pressure and the accumulator may not have held; allowing the aircraft to have possibly rolled forward.Possible suggestion is to start engine two on all starts so hydraulic pressure is always available. Also changing procedure for hydraulic pump three selection. Do other operators have a different procedure for HYD three pump.

The reporter confirmed that he had; in fact; failed to turn on the electric pump for the #3 Hydraulic System. He further advised it is SOP to do so for all starts; not only during the first flight of the day. The purpose of starting the left engine first on the initial flight is to test the functionality of an unspecified fuel valve.

After pushback and engine start on the aircraft's first flight of the day the CRJ-700 rolled forward and struck the disconnected tug despite the parking brake appearing to be set. The flight crew failed to power the #3 Hydraulic System electric pumps which provide the only source of brake pressure when the #2 engine is not running.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36.6; Flight Crew Total 81.3; Flight Crew Type 81.3

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was descending down to pattern altitude of 1;600 feet to enter the pattern at ZZZ. I saw an aircraft on Foreflight via my ADS-B receiver that was northeast of ZZZ at 1;600 feet. I initially thought that the aircraft was probably inbound to ZZZ. I made my announcements on CTAF; but never heard the other aircraft make any announcements. Once I was at 1;600 feet; my IPAD showed that the other aircraft was at the same altitude (pattern altitude) and basically on a collision course with me. I went full throttle and started an aggressive climb. By the time the aircraft passed directly underneath of me I was only 500 above it. We were only 2 miles from ZZZ airport; well within the class E surface area. (Other aircraft tail number was Aircraft Y.)

Pilot reported taking evasive action to avoid a collision with an aircraft operating without communications within the Class E Airspace.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Approaching DC SFRA I experienced intermittent electrical failure. During this time; GPS Navigation devices were inop. I restored power; however; comms were unreliable. Attempted to contact Potomac Approach on 132.77; but was unsuccessful.   During this time I inadvertently entered the DC SFRA for a few seconds. After exiting; Potomac Approach contacted me and informed me that I had entered the SFRA. In cockpit; distractions were the cause of the unintentional flight into the airspace.

RV-8 pilot reported an electrical power interruption resulting in GPS failure and an airspace violation.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Approximately 20 minutes after departure I received a call from the Flight Attendant that we had a couple passengers that weren't complying with the mask mandate and asked me to make our announcement reminding passengers of the Federal mask mandate. I made our announcement. Just prior to going through sterile flight deck period the Flight Attendant called again with passenger seat numbers X3 and YX4 and asked me to relay non mask compliance to the station. We made several attempts to contact Operations. After being unable to do so I sent an ACARS to Dispatch notifying them of mask non-compliance and asked them to have a CSR meet the aircraft. Being so close to the destination we elected to continue to the destination. After landing we tried several more times to contact Operations on taxi in and were unable to do so. Upon arriving at the gate the CSR came on board and informed me they had LEOs waiting at the counter and the TSA had been notified but she wasn't sure if they were sending a representative to speak with the passengers. She requested keeping the passengers on board for several minutes; so they could make sure everyone was prepared to receive the passengers. Given the all clear; the passengers disembarked without incident.The Flight Attendant mentioned she made multiple announcements and handed the passengers the information describing the penalties for non-compliance that are included in the packs of masks/alcohol wipes. It sounds like she made every available effort per SOP to have the passengers comply with the mask mandate. As states continue to withdraw mask mandates I foresee this becoming an increasingly widespread issue. I thought the idea of handing the passengers the information card was a very smart idea as seeing this in writing may carry more weight. Perhaps aircraft can be stocked with additional copies of these cards to hand out. Also our current guidance on the mask mandates in the flight crew memo make this policy sound like it is just per company policy. Updated guidance stating that this is a Federal mandate may make it more clear to the passengers that this is a serious federal violation. Every day we see passengers wearing masks that are not allowed on our flights and have to be given masks the meet standards; gate agents policing masks that required standard would also be helpful.

Air carrier Captain reported passengers not conforming with face mask policy during flight and had personnel meet the aircraft on arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 35

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was operating a skydive jump aircraft and had entered the pattern for landing on Runway 30. We enter the pattern at a high rate of descent and enter on a high right 45 degree entry for right traffic for Runway 30. I had announced my position on a high right 45 degree entry and then on entering downwind at 2000 feet AGL and descending. There was no one else announcing themselves on CTAF and I did not see any other traffic in the pattern. As I was descending through 1500 feet AGL on downwind a Piper Cherokee suddenly passed just in front and to the right of me in level flight. I did not have time to maneuver and passed behind and below the Cherokee as I continued on downwind in the pattern. I attempted to make contact with the Cherokee on CTAF but did not get any response. I landed without incident. I believe the cause of this incident was the Cherokee flying through the traffic pattern of the airport without reporting its position or responding to my reports. I believe the traffic may not have been monitoring the CTAF despite being within 2 NM of the airport and at pattern altitude. Also contributing was the hazy conditions and the sun's position low in the sky; making it difficult to see any traffic.

King air pilot descending in the traffic pattern experiences a NMAC with a PA28 at 1500 feet overflying the airport. The King air pilot was descending at a high rate and making position reports while the PA28 pilot was apparently not on the the CTAF. Visual contact occurred too late to evade.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Going to Leon; Mexico the first officer and I briefed the VOR DME 2 Runway 13 prior to our descent. We knew we had 2 threats so we talked about the terrain and the weather doing the briefing. The weather was 2;300 feet broken with some scattered clouds at a 1;000 feet there was some good buildup's to the North and northeast of the airport. And we knew that there was terrain North of the field. The First Officer (FO) had her radar up scanning for weather and I had terrain up on my side. I was the pilot flying and had magenta on my side and she was backing me up in green conventional.In the descent we were already direct MANTA a fix given to us by the previous controller Monterrey which was just before the initial approach fix for the approach. As we were in the descent there was a buildup in front of us so we ask ATC to deviate 30 degrees to the right of the buildup and ATC granted the deviation. At that point ATC handed us off to approach control there in Leon; we told them when we checked in that we were deviating for weather but now we were clear of the weather and would like direct Manta which is on the approach and the fix just before the initial approach fix. Approach control told us just fly a heading of 195 degrees; and we did but then we told him that again that we would just like to go direct Manta which was only 35 degrees of our nose. And he denied us again and told us just fly heading 195 for vectors to join. So we complied with his instructions.On that heading there was some clouds but nothing convective and no buildups just broken and scattered clouds. We did ask him for lower and he ask if we were VMC and we told him No that we were IMC. So he told us ok stay at that altitude which at 14;000 feet. At that point we were in and out of the clouds. At this point he started giving us step downs in altitude. Vectoring us on a 195 heading to join the 123 inbound. At that point we slowed up even more to reduce workload. We both understand when workload goes up SA goes down. We did not bust any altitudes given to us in the step downs; he gave us 12;000 feet then 11;000 feet the lowest was 9;000 feet which he was vectoring us inside the 335 radial on the approach. The altitudes he gave us also match on J13 which was to our right. The controller had complete confidence in his vectoring and stepdown. And this altitudes that we were going to where the same altitudes that we briefed.I was uneasy because the only altitude we could reference was off of J13 and we were in-between J13 and the 335 radial off of BJX. The (FO) was scanning for weather and backing me up but had no DME at that time and I was scanning terrain and adjusting the MAP ring in and out. Terrain mapping was showing normal but At this time I did not feel good about the vectoring and step downs; and at that point I notice the RA starting to count just before I could say anything to my (FO) we got a EGPWS terrain warning.I immediately pitch the aircraft up and advanced the power levers to max. We climbed to 12 or 13 thousand in not sure what altitude. In the climb the FO told the controller that we got a terrain warning and the we were executing a miss approach and climbing. After level off we were 2 miles just southwest of the field in the clear. We demanded from approach that we go do East to set up for a different approach we were at 12;000 feet 200 knots. Clear skies we went out about 5 miles then turn back West with their approval. We brief the VOR DME 1 Runway 13. We could see the runway from our position just a few scattered clouds we did the entire approach without any incidents.The lesson learned this day was we had some good threats which was the weather and the terrain but we had a good plan to trap these threats we planned on getting down early slowing the aircraft early and starting the approach at manta and shooting the DME arc CAMPA approach to Runway 13. After our deviation around the weather being denied twice to go to Mantato start the approach was frustrating. The controller was persistent on giving us vectors to join. How much should we have challenged him about going to Manta for the approach? We don't want to hinder there operation nor do we want to compromise our safety. I will for now on be even more vigilant about taking vectors in critical terrain airports. The 10-7 remarks talk about the EGPWS may go off at lower altitudes but when we got the EGPWS we relied completely on our training that we got out of [ an advanced] Training program. I am so thankful for the program for it is real world training.

A flight crew deviating for weather on approach; twice requested and were twice denied clearance to a fix on a charted instrument approach. Instead the controller issued vectors and stepdown altitudes. They received an EGPWS warning. They executed the Escape Maneuver and then returned and flew a different approach in VMC conditions.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

PUI (Pilot Under Instruction) had gone for a cross country flight to ZZZ. As PUI was approaching through arrival; PUI was routed northbound and then cleared to land on Runway XXC. As PUI is approaching on final he felt the need to wind correct; as he touched down it seemed that the wind and left turning tendencys got him yawing to the left; causing a loss of directional control; having to go around. Unfortunately at the point of go around PUI hit the runway edge light; leaving damage to the right gear strut.PUI should have requested a different runway if he felt unconfortable; as well as should have gone around earlier. PUI as well felt a little windshear so he decided to go around even if it was a little late.

C-172 Single Pilot reported a go-around on landing due momentary loss of directional control . The right main landing gear struck a runway edge light in the process of the go-around.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing

Aircraft X was approaching the ZZZ1 boundary. I intended to point him out to ZZZ1; but was distracted by an aircraft with multiple requests in the area. I did not have a D-Side. Additionally; I was distracted by a discussion with my Supervisor about whether we would retain our health care coverage while not being paid. This was of great concern to me because I have multiple health conditions that would quickly deplete my savings if I were to lose my insurance. I realized Aircraft X was within 10 miles of ZZZ1 and attempted to call ZZZ1 with the point out but it took several attempts before they answered. Aircraft X was within 3 miles by the time they answered and took the point out. Have better staffing so that there is a D-side when [sectors] are combined. Start paying ATC their salaries.

A Center Controller working a combined sector reported that they were distracted by a conversation with the Supervisor over pay issues and made a late point out to the adjacent facility.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Early morning departure. Show up to plane. No logbook. Continue to load box; set up for flight etc... aprox 20 min before departure Maintenance Technician shows up and hands us the logbook. Only problem- it was the wrong logbook. I caught this error and called the Mechanic back. I explained to him this could have been a huge mistake if it this error was not trapped. He told us they were over worked; too many planes on the ground; too many jobs to do with not enough staff; and he was told to deliver it to Gate XX where we were located. The plane he was actually looking for was on Gate XY. He didn't seem to get the message that no matter how rushed he felt; he needed to slow down and do proper work and not take short cuts. He leaves.New Mechanic comes to the plane with our actual Aircraft Logbook; and he repeats the same complaints that the first Mechanic had. They have more planes on the ground each night with more work orders than mechanics to do them. He also said they were pressured by supervisors to get work done even though they feel rushed and make mistakes because of it.As a Pilot who flies into ZZZ quite often; this is now becoming our problem too. I'm not a fan of mechanics taking short cuts because they are being pressured to complete or sign off unsatisfactory work. This should be a red flag to the safety department to start some digging into the maintenance technicians operation in ZZZ.Fun fact: the only other time I've had the wrong logbook delivered to the plane was also in ZZZ. [Cause is] Rushing of maintenance technician personnel. Look into ZZZ maintenance technicians.

Air carrier Captain reported a mechanic brought the wrong logbook to the aircraft and another mechanic subsequently brought the correct logbook.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This unsafe event was detailed and documented in another report.  We recommended all scheduled ISP radar outages be cancelled until proper; safe procedures could be put in place.  The controllers and manager of ISP tower did not agree to release the ISP radar for maintenance today due to our documented safety concerns.  After great pressure from N90; the New York District ordered ISP tower to release the radar despite our strong safety concerns.  As with all ISP radar outages; without proper procedures in place; it was chaotic and dangerous.   Controllers were arguing; disagreeing; and ignoring each other in the heat of the uncertainty of the moment.  A newly checked out Certified Professional Controller (CPC) said 'I hate this; I'm uncomfortable; I have no idea how to work these airplanes'.  At one point an ISP tower controller called the supervisor at New York TRACON (N90) ISP area to ask what he considers the ISP tower airspace.  He did not know and said he would call back.  Nobody seems to know.  The NAS is designed to avoid two controllers working airplanes in the same airspace; yet we are doing this routinely when the radar ISP is out of service.  It is unclear what our airspace is or how we are to work planes and coordinate between facilities.  Some use the back up radar; some don't.  Some hand off aircraft; some don't. Some point out aircraft; some don't.  ISP tower and N90 are often working aircraft in the same airspace and when the tower tries to coordinate we are rebuked.  Today I saw many aircraft too close together; on two different frequencies; without proper coordination.  I saw numerous airspace violations if you go by the legal standard of Class C airspace is always Class C airspace as we have been told by Atlanta.  Class C never reverts to Class D as N90 seems to believe.  The procedures in our LOA were written in 1992 when back up radar was not available and we worked non-radar.  Back up radar is available; certified; and both facilities are using it; but in a haphazard way personal to each controller who takes the position.  ISP tower has drafted procedures to be added to the LOA to create an orderly and safe environment when working with back up radar.  N90 will not schedule a meeting to address this issue.  It would seem we need intervention to get a meeting scheduled and get this issue resolved.  The parties must be brought to the table and procedures agreed upon before the next ISP radar outage can be scheduled.  The FAA is rolling the dice with the lives of pilots and passengers each time the ISP radar is taken out of service and we are forced to invent ways to control airplanes on the fly.  The union has filed Article 65 protections for the bargaining unit; the agency now assumes all responsibility for this dangerous game they are playing which endangers the flying public.  My recommendations; which were documented in another report; are to cancel all pending radar outages until we can establish back up radar procedures; have our LOA amended to reflect the new procedures; and brief them to both facilities.  We have draft proposals of both the new ISP tower back up radar procedures and new LOA procedures prepared.  Both have been forwarded to N90 and we have had some constructive feedback on our plans for when back up radar is in use; but cannot enact those plans without an LOA change.  There is still no meeting scheduled; just word from N90's manager that we cannot do any of our planned radar procedures until the old; defunct LOA language is removed.  We had asked for a 'pen and ink' change to allow for safe and orderly back up radar use today; but N90 has shown no interest in meeting or rectifying this dangerous situation.  To reiterate; we have only non-radar; Class D procedures in our current LOA; while we are actually a Class C and we are using certified back up radar.  We are working without procedures; most have no idea what our airspace is.  Only a meeting between facilitiesand an LOA change can fix this very; dangerous situation.  S-O-S.

An ISP Controller reports of the ISP radar being released to Maintenance by the New York District office against the Controller's request. The Controller describes the airspace as chaotic and dangerous without the use of the ISP radar system.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Filed and cleared for the SERFR1 RNAV STAR. We were given numerous step-downs while being cleared to follow arrival. As we approached MENLO ATC told us to expect the Quite Bridge 28R approach. ATC requested that we call the airport or San Mateo Bridge in sight. After descending below 5;000 feet for 4;000 feet; I called the airport in sight and we were cleared for the RW28R Quite Bridge approach. On the SERFR1 Arrival the crossing restriction for MENLO is 230/4;000 feet. On the Quite Bridge approach MENLO's crossing restriction is 5;000 feet. I called NORCAL approach on the phone after we landed. The controller I talked to said we did nothing wrong. And he emphasized that there was an issue with the different altitude restrictions at MENLO and they were trying to correct the discrepancy which was causing confusion. He said we had nothing to worry about. He was very helpful and informative.This should be brought to the attention of all that fly into SFO to be careful of this difference in altitudes at MENLO transitioning from STAR to Quite Bridge Approach.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

Air Carrier flight crew on the SERFR1 Arrival into SFO; descended below 5;000 feet enroute to the MENLO fix prior to being cleared for the Quiet Bridge visual approach. Crew noted that are different crossing restrictions for the MENLO fix on the SERFR1 Arrival and the Quiet Bridge Visual Approach.


GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 1L

Landing; Initial Approach; Final Approach

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

We flew a long pattern to Runway 1L arriving from the north and sequenced behind all other traffic. We were cleared for a visual approach well south of MacDill; already slowed to 210 kts. We intercepted the glide slope and flew an extremely smooth and uneventful approach. I remember thinking that it was awfully quiet; but not unusual since we were the last on approach. Mostly; I was glad to be done with a turbulent day and appreciative of the nice weather in Tampa. Only after clearing the runway did we recognize the error; as Ground Control had not been preset on Radio 1. We were cleared to taxi to our gate after a slight hesitation from Ground. Not as an excuse; but as a factor; Approach did not send us to Tower prior to landing.

B737 Captain reported landing without a clearance.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

B757 was on the arrival to JFK. C208 was climbing to 13;500 FT for skydive activity in the vicinity of CCC. I was working the RADAR position at Sector 32. I gave the B757 direct to ROBER which is a left turn away from CCC in an attempt to keep these two flights away from each other. C208 was up and down all morning and his climb out had been relatively close to CCC. I made several traffic calls to both aircraft. C208 reported he was 2 minutes from jumpers away and wanted to change frequency to Approach. I told C208 to report the B757 in sight before I would release him from the frequency. C208 reported the traffic in sight. I noted C208 was still on a southbound heading and flying right into the path that the B757 was heading towards ROBER. I asked C208 where he was going and on what heading. C208 said he was in a left hand turn back to CCC and was heading 360. This left hand turn was unexpected and in my mind a poor decision made by the pilot. He was aware due to my several traffic calls that the conflicting flight was to his east heading southwest bound. A right hand turn would have been appropriate. The left turn put the two aircraft nose to nose at almost the same altitude because C208 was climbing and the B757 was descending. I reported to the B757 what C208 was doing and the pilot for the B757 said they were climbing in response to a resolution advisory. The B757 reported the conflict was over and was now descending to 12;000 FT as previously cleared to. We have had many issues with the skydive activity over CCC. The pilots for this company seem more concerned with changing to Approach frequency instead of working with Boston Center to alleviate conflicts. CCC is a busy point with the numerous arrivals to JFK. I reviewed the Letter of Agreement with ZBW and N90 Skydiving and I believe there needs to be some changes. There have been recommendations made in the past to make the jumper aircraft climb North of CCC; but were unsuccessful. I think that if skydive type aircraft want to climb into ZBW airspace then they need to do so north of CCC. If this is not able to be done then they need to remain within 3-5 miles of CCC. Right now the LOA; in my opinion; is not restrictive enough concerning the climbout procedures for these aircraft. That airspace is way too congested with big aircraft to allow skydive activity in that area [to] go unrestricted.

ZBW Controller described a conflict event when a parachute drop aircraft was instructed to maintain visual separation with an inbound air carrier to JFK. The reporter claims current procedures don't adequately cover needed responsibilities.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Visual approach to unfamiliar airport. Airport environment was in sight but not landing runway. Chain of events started with my concern about the landing runway performance in the [aircraft]. I focused too much on the actual runway then misread/didn't see important information on ILS approach chart to [Runway] 24. Briefed highest obstacle south of CCC [VOR]; but missed Tower next to centerline. Thought RIZER was at 1400 feet; it's 1271 feet. While on left base outside of RIZER; realized that we were 2 dots high. Descended to catch glideslope while still on left base. Tower called a low altitude warning. I looked at my chart to check altitude and received a GPWS obstacle warning. Instead of an immediate go-around; I looked out to see where Tower [was] relative to our position and extended centerline. Then GPWS 'obstacle; pull up' prompted immediate go around while at 1000 feet. Tower told us to go runway heading and 2000 feet while I was climbing through 2000 feet; cleaning up the aircraft and turning to runway heading. I pulled thrust to idle to prevent flap overspeed but still hit 2700 feet before descending back down to 2000 feet. First Officer notified Tower of altitude deviation. We were then vectored for another visual approach. Second approach and landing was in moderate turbulence; but completed.All would have been avoided had I studied the approach chart more in depth; then briefed and executed an ILS instead of a visual. I haven't been to Islip in a long time and never in visual conditions. I was focused more on the [aircraft's] landing performance in gusty crosswinds. It was poor judgment after a long day. I know to immediately execute a go-around from a GPWS alert; but had a delayed reaction to it.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a GPWS obstacle warning on approach to ISP airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MEL; Logbook Entry; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Procedure

We operated two flights with an incorrect MEL applied. Flights A and B were operated under the incorrect MEL. MEL XX-X-XX was applied to Aircraft. The correct MEL should have been XX-X-XY.  Due to flight deck wipe down I did not review logbook and MEL closely enough nor did I make sure I communicated completely with FO for confirmation.I need to remember to utilize CRM when it comes to MEL compliance.

Air carrier Captain reported operating flights with an incorrect MEL applied. The flight deck sanitizing process was cited as a reason for not closely reviewing the logbook and MEL.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Eagle (F-15) had exited Warning Area 105 on IFR flight plan. Aircraft was not able to be handed off to us due to automation issue. We attempted numerous times to get control of aircraft data block; but the computer was not letting us take control of the information. Eagle (F-15) was pointed out to Sector 47 descending to 110 direct BAF airport. Approximately 5 minutes after we started working on getting control of the data block for automation purposes; the RADAR Controller was able to drop the data block track on Eagle (F-15). When he dropped the data block from our scope; it automatically removed the data block from Sector 47. The RADAR Controller immediately started another track and was in the process of making a manual hand off to BDL Approach Control when Sector 47 put traffic on his scope; G150. Aircraft were approximately 12 to 15 miles apart on converging courses. Sector 47 had already sent G150 over to BDL Approach Control; so we had no way of turning the aircraft away from Eagle (F-15). BDL Approach Control called us and issued descent clearance to Eagle (F-15) to 8;000 feet. Closest proximity with both aircraft at 110 is approximately 9 miles. The automation issue of not being able to get control of the data block to ensure proper automated hand off is the bigger issue between the two aircraft. If we did not have to make all of the attempts at getting control of the data block; when the original data block finally did get removed; it would not have dropped off Sector 47 radar display. The data block dropping off Sector 47 scope makes the issue worse; and then ultimately the Radar Controller at sector 47 forgetting about the Eagle (F-15) flight at 110 did not help. Ultimately; in my opinion; all of this would have been avoided with proper automation and hand offs for Eagle (F-15).

ZBW Controller described a probable airspace separation event when the automated hand off efforts failed.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Taxied to runway and everything was normal. Was cleared in position and hold did before takeoff checklist. Receive takeoff Ok aural message. Cleared for takeoff to fly heading 270 and around 40 to 50 KTS received No Takeoff configuration warning on EICAS. I called to abort; my aircraft since the First Officer was pilot flying. I told him to tell ATC that we were aborting and taxied clear of runway. After clearing I checked flap position; trim; parking brake; and spoiler. I noticed spoiler fail message on EICAS and that spoiler was showing open. I also noticed that a circuit breaker was popped out and it was the spoiler indication circuit breaker. We then got clearance to return to gate after talking to operations; and Ground Control. Once at gate I wrote in logbook that on take off roll received warning message no take off configuration warning and that spoiler fail message also appeared and that circuit breaker had popped and that abort was around 45 KTS. I then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and told them. We ended up changing aircraft and went on with our day. I think spoiler was not indicating correctly; maybe some short or something with spoiler indicator; to make it think it was open when it actually wasn't. Don't think it could have been avoided.

EMB145 Captain receives a No Takeoff; configuration warning on EICAS at 45 knots and rejects the takeoff. A spoiler indication circuit breaker was found tripped along with a spoiler fail message on the EICAS. Flight returns to the gate for an aircraft swap.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Cleared for pushback off gate. Advised Guideman/tug driver cleared to push; tail south. Parking brake had been previously released at push back crew's request. We were given clearance to start engines and when we reached a position of tail at approximately 230 degrees; about a 45 degree angle to yellow line; push back crew stops aircraft and says push complete ; set brakes. I advise him that we are not tail south; we are not on the yellow line and that I could not make a turn out from this position due to the aircraft next to us. I told him we need to be on the yellow line to ensure clearance when we leave the gate area. His answer to me incredulously was 'I've been pushing this way for weeks and haven't heard any complaints.' I again tell him there is no way I can turn out from this position because of proximity to the aircraft. Next thing we hear is him yelling 'set brakes; set brakes'. The tow bar had been disconnected without clearance and evidently we started to move. We advised ramp tower of what was going on and asked them to take a picture or ensure it's recorded. I tell Guideman that he was not cleared to disconnect and that it was a very serious safety issue. He then continues to argue with me and tells me he cannot push me back any further with the engines running; saying his tug couldn't do it. Rather than continue the argument I asked him if he wants us to shut down an engine which his reply was yes. There was silence for a short time then someone else comes on the headset and apologizes for any issues and then prepares us for further pushback. Restarted engine and push back was completed tail south on the line; no problem.It was a very unusual occurrence and was a very serious safety issue with disconnecting without clearance and to think it was ok to leave the aircraft in that position and then argue about it; not only the unsafe pushback but the perceived attitude of the person on headset about it. This isn't the first time I have had to tell the pushback crew to put us on the yellow line but not to this extreme. I have to question the training and oversight of the pushback crews to ensure a proper and safe pushback.Pushback crews not trained properly and not understanding importance of accurate push as cleared. I believe it has to do with training and oversight of the pushback crews. There is a reason for the yellow line and they need to understand that in relationship to aircraft on gates and aircraft taxiing on taxiway. My impression is they don't get it and as I stated; that is a training and supervision issue.

B777 Captain reported concern with SOP adherence during pushback.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

ZZZ-ATL routing was …DAWWN BEORN.Hobbit2 but we put …DAWNN BEORN.Hobbit2 in the FMS by mistake. We caught it after about 5 miles direct to the wrong fix DAWNN and advised ATC. No one asked for a phone number or anything.Typo with the clearance it was kind of an abnormal morning cause we were rushing once we got to the aircraft. We did the clearance verification; but overlooked the typo on DAWNN (DAWWN)..

Air carrier Captain reported typing the incorrect letters of a fix name DAWNN vs DAWWN.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Initial departure clearence was received and loaded into FMS (Flight Management System) by copilot. Once both pilots were in cockpit; copilot communicated clearance to PIC with note we were cleared to FL190. Upon taxi out; I requested copilot to brief departure and verify altitude with ATC. ATC confirmed with terminology that we were cleared to FL190 however comply with OAK5 departure. We took that as use OAK5 for lateral guidance however climb to FL190 for vertical guidance. Upon passing through 2;000 feet we were advised of the deviation. We corrected and were handed to another controller who also confirmed deviation.Suggest that departure plates be designed to indicate 2;000 feet as top altitude. Also; that ATC should not advise of a higher altitude until they are ready for us to fly to that altitude. Very confusing on what they are wanting us to do. FMS also only shows that we should be above 1400 feet. Not between 1;400 and 2;000 feet. So unless immediate action is taken directly after take off by pilot flying; FMS and flight director will automatically instruct pilot to fly to the FL190 as cleared by ATC. As well as instruct auto-throttles of a power setting almost impossible to level off with at such a low altitude.

GIV Captain reported altitude deviation on climb out.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 640; Flight Crew Type 200

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While flying a brief flight through the SFRA at approximately 1;400 FT MSL; the aircraft's engine began to run extremely rough. Flight through the SFRA in this area requires navigation around the Class B SFC airspace while remaining below 1;500 MSL. Within several seconds of the beginning of engine roughness airspeed began decreasing with engine performance. The limited altitude of the flight left very little time for decision making and the runways at a major airport were clearly visible and definitely the closest runways. After trying to resolve the engine roughness through the application of appropriate controls (fuel pump; mixture; carb heat; and power changes); I made the decision to declare an emergency and divert to and land at the nearby airport. This was the safest course of action given the issues as understood at the time. Due to the early morning time of the flight; no other traffic was observed or heard over the radio during the entire period. ATC passed us to Tower which cleared us to land on any runway. We made an uneventful landing. Upon landing; we were cleared by the fire crew and met and interacted with security. We then attempted to understand what had gone wrong and ran the engine for an extended duration on the ground and were unable to replicate the issue. Following this; we filed a flight plan and were cleared to depart for our original destination. Upon landing; we tried again to replicate the problem on the ground and were unsuccessful. A Mechanic was asked to review the plane and perform an aircraft run-up. This was accomplished and an entry in the aircraft log was procured as a result. Later in the day we attempted a flight to return the aircraft to its home airport for a thorough review by the aircraft's primary Mechanic. Shortly after takeoff; the problem reappeared less than 5 miles from the airport prompting an immediate return and uneventful landing back the departure airport. The aircraft will remain the distant airport until a thorough mechanical review is complete and the problem has been identified.

A PA-24 at 1;400 FT in the ZZZ SFRA made an emergency landing at a major Class B airport because of a rough running engine. The engine appeared normal; so he continued to his filed destination where a Mechanic cleared the aircraft. On the next departure; the problem appeared again forcing a return to land.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 14585; Flight Crew Type 858

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Gate is a tow in gate for 777s. We entered; shut down the engines; then waited for headset contact. The tug and driver were waiting in the alley; and the tug pulled up; but nothing for 10 minutes. Then when he finally connected the headset; he said; 'Ok; we're all set.' Nothing close to SOP verbage and flight manual required statements such as configured; or ready for tow.We proceeded with the tow; the tug driver obviously did not know SOP and required procedure for a tow. This is where it got scary.We were being towed into [the] gate. Next to us was a 737 parked on the left. The driver started the turn into the gate very early- cutting the corner; to the point the L wing tip was very close to the 737; and the wing walker was not looking at our plane; just at the tug and tug driver! They had no idea the wing was very close to the 737.Now; even more scary. The tug comes to a stop; then next thing I know; he unhooks the tow bar; the plane lurches backwards; and starts to roll backwards; without setting the parking brake! I immediately; and gently set the brake; and simultaneously stated; 'Parking Brake needs to be set!'The airplane moved backwards; and there was an extreme chance for major injury; as the main wheel chocks were being set; and for major aircraft damage. Thankfully; none of this was the case.The tug driver obviously did not know SOP; had no idea of the safety implications of not following SOP. The [early morning] arrival did not help. Good thing we were alert or this could have ended disastrously.

B777 Captain reported an unsafe situation developed during tow in to the gate as the tug operator did not comply with SOPs.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was on the second leg of a two leg day. This was my first time flying with this Captain. We switched planes before the second leg. I would like to note that this aircraft had arrived two days earlier and this was its first flight of the day. This was a conventional.We had a normal pushback and taxi to Runway. The Captain was the Pilot Flying and I was the Pilot Monitoring. We were cleared for takeoff and I immediately noticed I had no airspeed on my side. I took a quick glance to the Captain side and saw his airspeed indicator was moving. I immediately said 'I have no airspeed I have no airspeed' (twice). We were no faster then 65-70 knots. Expecting the Captain to reject the takeoff I said a third time; 'I have no airspeed.' By this time we were approximately 80 knots. The Captain said nothing and continued the takeoff. Just after takeoff at approximately 400-500 feet (inhibited prior to that) we received a Master Caution light along with the EICAS message (IAS DISAGREE). The definition (Captain and First Officer's airspeed indications disagree). We continued to climb to our initial altitude of 5;000 feet and clean up the aircraft. Tower handed us off to Departure. It was about this time that my airspeed came alive but didn't match his. Just prior to me contacting Departure Control I turned to the Captain and said 'Do you want me to tell them we are coming back?' He replied; 'no.' I said; 'I'm not comfortable taking this plane. I want to go back.' He said; 'Let's just continue we can always stop someplace else along the way.'This was now the second time I was ignored. We contacted Departure and continued to climb while we were trouble shooting the situation. It was determined that his airspeed and the standby were the same and mine was wrong. Mine was reading 30 knots faster. Now passing 10;000 feet plus and continuing to climb I said again; 'I'm uncomfortable with this. I want to return to the departure airport. We are out over the ocean at night with storms all around us this is where bad things happen.' He said; 'Calm down and run the checklist' and continued to climb. I said 'I am calm; I just don't understand why we are still climbing.' I asked him for his QRH. Captain has 757 and First Officer has 767. (Seriously a pain and needs to be changed.) He said you have the plane. Not a problem for me; but you can see why this was an issue. I was asked to fly a plane with bad indications while he pulled out his QRH. I first ran the procedure for IAS DISAGREE. It basically says go to the AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE checklist. This is a MEMORY ITEM on our fleet. The Captain was already hand flying the plane and both flight directors had gone off prior by themselves and came back on. Determining that my side was the problem and his flight director was matching on his side I was comfortable with it being on. I completed the QRH procedure and my side was still wrong. At some points it was within 7 knots but was still wrong and did go to a higher spread again. During this time the EICAS message would go on and off with the Caution light the entire time to landing. At approximately 15;000 feet I said a third time; 'I am uncomfortable I want to go back.' At FL190 he said; 'Tell them we want to come back and declare an emergency.' We were over FL200 before we started down. I complied and we were put on an arrival and were given a turn direct an arrival fix. The Captain asked me to contact Dispatch. I switched briefly to Com two and told Ramp we were returning and asked him to pass it along and I would contact him on the ground for a gate. The Controller did ask if direct the arrival fix was OK or if we wanted direct to the airport. We said it was fine. ATC asked if we wanted ARFF and Captain said; 'NO'. He later changed his mind. On the decent the Captain asked me to get the dispatch frequency. I was busy and didn't get to it and honestly didn't think it was important enough to take me away from monitoring the aircraft. At 8;000 feet he asked me again so I got it for him. The Captain said to monitor radio #1. He went off to talk to Dispatch but was still flying the plane and never gave me control. At this point we were able to see the airport. We configured and made a normal landing and taxied to the gate. After we parked at the gate and all checklist were completed I asked the Captain why he didn't stop on the runway when I told him three times I had no airspeed. His reply was; 'I didn't hear you.' I found this entire event to be completely unacceptable and my input meant nothing. It was at this time that I packed my bag and walked off the aircraft. I contacted Dispatch and advised them of the situation and I would be happy to fly to the filed destination with a different Captain or I would need to be replaced. The Dispatcher was completely professional with me and asked me to call the Duty Chief. I called and explained my situation. He supported my decision and we hung up. I then spoke with my Director of Flight. He understood my decision and we agreed to talk the next day. I would like to note that the aircraft was taken out of service and the maintenance records indicate the First Officer's pitot tube was clogged.

A B757 First Officer pitot tube was clogged which prevented accurate airspeed during takeoff and climb; but the Captain refused to reject the takeoff or return until well into the climb. After returning; the First Officer removed himself from the flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

I made several ferry flights this morning and experienced a total GPS outage while circumnavigating south of the MSP Class B airspace. Specifically; I was flying the 2;300 feet corridor. While in the vicinity of the MN Zoo and Lake Alimagnet; 7 nm off of FGT; I experienced a total GPS outage on all flights. The aircraft were equipped with Garmin GTN 750 avionics experienced the failure. One aircraft had a Garmin 530 WAAS and did not lose the GPS signal; but did experience a brief MSG annunciation that lasted just a few seconds.

Small aircraft pilot reported GPS outages and issues flying between FCM and SGS  airports during multiple flights involving different aircraft types and GPS systems.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While configuring on final; the Captain (CA) selected gear down and flaps 15 about one and a half miles outside the ILS marker. Speed was 170; autopilot was off; autothrottes on. Vref was set at 144 knots. As the aircraft continued to slow; the CA called for flaps 25. I then noticed both the amber min maneuver bar and red min airspeed bar were rising close to our current speed. I asked the CA if he wanted flaps 30. He set his bug speed back to 150 knots. I had set flaps to 25. At that point; the red bar rose above our indicated speed of 150. I looked at the speed window and saw 'a150'. We simultaneously got the 'airspeed low; airspeed low' callout; and the throttles were advancing. We executed a go-around uneventfully. On the subsequent approach; we configured early and slowly looking for reoccurrence; but approach and landing were normal.We suspect a flap indication malfunction.Closely checking the position of the red bar for reasonableness throughout configuration; and be ready to execute go around with conflicting indications.

B737-800 First Officer reported an airspeed deviation during approach that resulted in a go-around.