Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

While operating a seaplane in conjunction with a private yacht the engine quit while in level flight. The seaplane was over calm water and landed without damage. The yacht dispatched a tow boat and recovered the airplane on board.Subsequent investigation found that fuel was not being delivered to the engine (Total Time Aircraft and Engine was 59.25 hours). Fuel present on board was 4.0 gallons as indicated on the EFIS (Electronic Flight Instrument System) and visual sighting of the tank. The Pilot Operating Handbook lists unusable fuel as 1 gallon. Subtracting the listed unusable fuel leaves 3.0 gallons providing over 30 minutes of fuel at cruise settings with the indicated fuel quantity (for 5 GPH). The fuel filter was checked for blockage and found to be partially obscured (estimated blockage less than 50%); but still capable of fuel flow. The threaded fuel filter cover was found to be snug; but not requiring significant wrench torque to open (an O-ring provides the primary seal for the cover). Fuel was added and the engine started and ran normally. Further investigation found the inlet head for the fuel pumps exceeds the maximum specified in the Rotax engine installation manual. The measured distance from the bottom of the tank to the inlet fuel filter was found to be 14 inches (310 mm); exceeding the maximum of 10 inches (250 mm) specified in the Rotax document. The problem is easily avoided by allowing for a greater margin of unusable fuel. Unfortunately in an airplane with limited useful load the additional weight is a consideration. A modification of the fuel system to meet Rotax engine specifications is the real solution. It would also help to have a factory specification for torque to secure the fuel filter housing cover.

A 2014 Searey LSA Elite pilot reported an engine failure followed by a successful calm water landing. Troubleshooting revealed fuel starvation because the fuel line from the tank to the fuel pump filter inlet was too long resulting in low head pressure when the fuel quantity got low.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 40650; Flight Crew Type 74

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Precautionary right engine shutdown because of fuel contamination.

CE560 pilot reported shutting down right engine in flight because of fuel contamination.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 69; Flight Crew Total 1880; Flight Crew Type 550

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Picking up an aircraft from maintenance at ZZZ. Upon rotation and initial climb; control forces became heavy and the aircraft tried to deviate right. As the aircraft accelerated after gear retraction and flap retraction; the control forces became stronger to the point that holding a heading became difficult. Autopilot and yaw damper failed to engage. It was required to trim ailerons to the left to an unusual degree to relieve control forces. I contacted Departure and told them that I was having control issues and it was hard to control my heading. Requested return to ZZZ. I stated that I was not declaring an emergency; but I needed to come back as soon as possible. Vectors were given to return. In the process of returning; the control situation seemed to become better; then worse. I informed ATC that my situation was degrading. Priority was given and ATC vectored me around to land. Upon slowing to land I gradually brought the trims to neutral. Upon touchdown the control forces were slightly better; but the imbalance still existed. I vacated the runway; was given taxi permission to the ramp. Upon cleaning up the aircraft I re-checked all of the trim axis and checked the controls for freedom of movement as had been accomplished before departure. All control forces appeared normal. All checks on controls and auto-pilot were satisfactory before departure. Aircraft sent to maintenance on the field.

PC-12 pilot reported the Autopilot and Yaw Damper failed during their initial climb resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During descent the left engine oil quantity showed six quarts and decreasing as we progressed toward landing. A deadheading pilot confirmed smoke was trailing from the engine with the throttle at idle. We requested a straight in approach.  We briefed the flight attendants and flew a visual approach with the left engine at idle. Upon exiting the runway we shut down the engine; CFR confirmed the engine was secure; and we taxied to the gate.

An A320 flight crew requested assistance and landed straight in at their destination when they determined the left engine was losing oil quantity.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 4030

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We were descending through 15;000 FT near GRAMM Intersection on the RIIVR2 arrival into LAX. Autopilot and seatbelt sign were both on. We encountered wake turbulence with caused one moderate jolt including a 10 degree roll to the right. One other jolt occurred seconds later. We asked ATC what aircraft we were following. SCT said we were following a B747 eleven miles ahead. Flight Attendant was in the aisle picking up trash. She said she went to the floor. Upon landing I was informed by her of the event and that she was feeling a mid-back pain. She did not ask for medical assistance at the time; but feared she would be sore the next day and would therefore be filing a report.

Air Carrier Captain reported encountering wake vortex 11 miles in trail of a B747 on approach to LAX; resulting in turbulence and roll. One Flight Attendant reported back pain as a result.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was not working at the time of the event. I was told about the event after the fact. After hearing about the event; I watched the replay and realized it was controller error. Aircraft X was initially told on upwind to keep his pattern tight and the Controller would try to get him another touch and go ahead of a regional jet. On downwind; the Cessna was told to expect to follow the regional jet and report the jet on 4 mile final in-sight. The Cessna reported the CRJ in sight abeam the numbers; and the Controller told the Cessna 'Runway 27 cleared for the option.' The Cessna shortly after turned base into the oncoming regional jet. The controller took no action. The regional jet reported the traffic to Tower. Tower asked Cessna to verify the CRJ was in sight; Cessna affirmed. The regional pilot told the Cessna he was not supposed to [turn] base in front of him. Separation was .14 mile and 100 feet. The controller then cleared the Cessna for low approach; separation was .06 mile and 100 feet. The Cessna got low enough to the runway to drop off the radar; when the Controller asked Cessna to confirm he was doing a low approach; which the Cessna affirmed. I was told that the CRJ was not clear of the runway while the Cessna was doing low approach. CID does not have ASDE-X. Ground and Local position were split.

A Controller reported a Cessna was supposed to follow Air Carrier traffic on short final but turned into the traffic due to incomplete instructions from the Local Controller.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

We were at FL390 north of the VOR when the Right Hydraulic Level Low EICAS message came on. We ran the QRH checklist for that. Hydraulic quantity was 24. Shortly after that; the Right Hydraulic Low Pressure EICAS message came on. I started running the QRH checklist for the Right Hydraulic Low Pressure. We talked to Center and asked for lower and asked to divert. We declared an emergency. I then informed the passengers.When we were handed off to Approach Control; they told us the runway was partially closed and there was 7;100 FT available. We elected to go to [a further airport] for a longer runway. The aux hydraulic pump was on and hydraulic pressure was fluctuating between 0 and 1;500 PSI. The landing gear came down normally and; after landing; we had to use the emergency brakes. We stopped on the runway but could not taxi due to no nose wheel steering and only having emergency brakes. The fire trucks met us and the passengers were given a ride to the FBO and the SIC rode with them. I stayed with the plane while they towed it to the ramp. There was a significant amount of hydraulic fluid leaking from the belly of the plane.This situation was caused by mechanical failure of the hydraulic system. Once this occurred; we followed the emergency checklist.

[No additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]

A Gulfstream 200 flight crew declared an emergency and diverted due to right hydraulic system failure. Diverted again when their original diversion airport had inadequate runway length due to construction.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

We were cleared to descend via the BOSSS RNAV STAR by DEN ARTCC enroute to DEN. Crew executed 'Descend Via' and aircraft did a good job of managing the descent; meeting all altitude and speed constraints all the way down. Upon initial contact with Approach Control over QUAIL at 17;000 FT Controller stated; 'Air Carrier X you are way too low; did the Center give you something else?' Both pilots (panicked) double checked the chart to verify and confirm altitude constraints at QUAIL. The aircraft was exactly where it was supposed to be with respect to charted altitude and lateral position for the BOSSS1. Controller issued a radar vector without an altitude to maintain other than the published STAR final altitude; crew queried her and she later assigned 13;000 FT.Later Controller advised we had done nothing wrong but; 'the Center should have known we were landing north and should not have cleared you for the BOSSS. We didn't know what was going on; we just opened up here.'We continued to a visual approach to Runway 35L without incidentThis is not the first time I have witnessed this type of confusion between DEN TRACON and DEN Center. Either the TRACON has not informed the center that the aircraft has been launched via radar vector rather than RNAV SID or the center assigns a STAR that is inconsistent with airfield direction. I have had the first Center Controller ask if we are on a heading and then apologize stating that Departure Control didn't tell him we were being radar vectored and not on RNAV. It seems like the two don't have a mechanism to know what the previous entity has assigned the aircraft. The Center Controller that assigned the arrival (which we were filed for) should have known that it was inconsistent with north landings and re-cleared us for the appropriate arrival. RNAV procedures while efficient and sleek from the ATC perspective pose significant threats and risks to the aircrews in the form of potential for pilot deviations and errors which affect safety. They should not be further complicated with threats generated by inefficiencies from within ATC. Better coordination and synergy MUST be undertaken by ATC to mitigate these threats and increase the margin of safety when operating these complex and demanding SIDS and STARS.

The Captain of an A320 expressed concern about the latest in a string of apparent miscommunications between DEN Center and DEN TRACON with respect to landing direction and the inappropriate STAR by which they had been cleared to descend by Center which then came as a big surprise to TRACON.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Dirty sock odor descending into ZZZ. [Suggest] aircraft filtered bleed air.

Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event of 'dirty socks odor' during descent to destination.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After I finished loading the flight I got a message saying that a Hazmat quick pack was added about 50 minutes before departure. I added the Hazmat to pit 2 with a planned 16 bags. I then called the Zone Controller to make sure they call the ramp and tell them to secure the hazmat with 16 bags. I then did my other flight and got busy with a flight. After I finished my flights I looked at all my finalized flight and noticed that Flight X did not have 15 bags minimum with the Hazmat and had just taken off.

Load planner reported miscommunication by Zone Controller resulted in an aircraft departing with incorrectly loaded HazMat cargo.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On descent we received a Pitch trim fail amber light. We completed the QRH procedure which did not correct the problem. After completing QRH we had Autopilot Fail amber light. [Advised] ATC and asked for delay vectors so we could complete the QRH. We were the only aircraft in the area so we did not need receive priority handling. When QRH procedure was completed we received vectors and completed visual approach uneventful. Briefed the Flight Attendants (FA) with yellow emergency 3 mins to landing and expect normal landing and taxi to the gate. The Passengers were not briefed as the FA were are already in their seats with the cabin secured. Flight was completed without out incident. Captain complained about sore biceps after landing.

The First Officer reported that the crew received a Pitch Trim Fail light and then an Autopilot Fail light. They completed the abnormal procedure and landed without incident.


ATC Issue All Types; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

We were sequenced behind a B-737 doing a visual to Runway 33L. As they landed Tower cleared another B-737 to line up and wait on 33L and; once the arrival exited the runway; the Tower cleared the holding B-737 for takeoff. They almost immediately aborted the takeoff and said they would clear at Tango. Tower told a taxiing aircraft to hold short of Tango so the B-737 could clear. Although there was sufficient room to do so they stopped before clearing the hold short line.I asked if we were still cleared to land and Tower advised the B-737 to move forward and clear the runway. They began moving and I felt they would be clear before we touched down so I continued. As we were in the landing flare we passed behind the B-737 and were rocked by a huge blast of jet wash. The aircraft was momentarily pushed sideways but I took action to recover and regained centerline alignment. The landing roll-out was routine and we cleared the runway.I radioed the Tower to inform them that we had encountered a lot of jet wash in the flare. Even though the B-737 was moving I was surprised by how much turbulence we encountered. I suspect that they gunned it right then for some reason even though they were moving or they were single engine. I should have elected to go around when I thought to inquire if we were still cleared to land regardless what the other flight was doing. An aircraft so close to our intended touchdown point should have been a clue for the possibility of jet wash. Just wasn't expecting that much.

As the reporter's A320 was on short final a B-737 cleared to depart the same runway prior to their landing rejected their takeoff but failed to clear the runway completely. When asked to expedite clearing the resultant jet blast struck the A320 as they flared causing momentary destabilization from which the reporter recovered and landed safely.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

After arrival; I noticed that the BTMS readouts were 3 and 4 on the left main gear and 1 and 5 on the right. I wrote up the 1 and 5 on the right main brake readouts. When Maintenance trouble shot the discrepancy they found the hydraulic line quick connect to the right inboard brake was not connected. They reconnected the line and the system operated normally for the subsequent flights.

CRJ-200 Captain noticed abnormal brake temperatures after arrival. Inspection revealed right inboard brake quick disconnect line not connected.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Enroute from TEB to ZZZZ we were given direct to an intersection and accidentally flew to a different intersection. Our route was TEB ELVAE COL DIXIE PREPI OWENZ LINND AZEZU L453 PAEPR..... Along airway L453 there are 2 fixes with similar sounding names; LEXAD and LEXIM. Before PREPI we were given direct to LEXAD but we heard and saw LEXIM along our route. We both confirmed LEXIM and read back to ATC direct to LEXIM. Neither ATC nor us caught the error. About 10 minutes later we were asked what we were flying to and I responded LEXIM. He asked when we were given that clearance and I mentioned it was given to us earlier. He asked if LEXIM was even along our route and I confirmed that it was. He mentioned that there should not have been 2 fixes along our route with such close spelling and that it was their fault for the error. It was then that he said we should have been going direct to LEXAD. He said to continue to LEXIM and he would try to work out direct to LEXIM. Before freq handoff I apologized and asked if we had a problem. He said nothing to apologize for and thanks for bringing the situation to his attention.

A Fractional Captain reporting being cleared direct to LEXAD intersection. The pilot read back LEXIM another fix on their route. ATC did not notice the read back and the pilot proceeded to the wrong fix.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

East and abeam around Kalispell MT we were cruising at FL330 with light chop and occasional moderate. We heard another aircraft on our Center FREQ report better rides at FL320. So we decided to request FL310. We had our request granted and the FO (PF) began a slow descent around 500-600 fpm. I would like to preface this by saying we had already asked the FAs at this time to stow the galley carts and be seated prior to the descent due to the occasional moderate at FL330.  In the descent as we reached FL320 we encountered the beginning of the severe turbulence. The aircraft shook violently with our airspeed going +/- 20-30 kts at times. PLIs were appearing on our attitude indicator and the VSI was going up and down +/- 300-500 fpm.  Once I could actually get my arm stable enough to reach a PTT switch I reported it to ATC all the meanwhile we were still descending towards FL310.  ATC asked if there was any A/C damage or injuries. I told them to standby as we were still in the middle of experiencing all this. Level at 310 the turbulence did not stop. I immediately asked for a climb higher to which we were initially assigned block FL310-FL330 again. We began our climb and I told ATC that we wanted FL350. The severe continued again through FL320 with the same symptoms as mentioned above. Finally climbing through FL320 it was back to just moderate and as we got to FL350 it was just continuous light chop.  I finally had the time to call back and make sure everyone was ok. FAs reported that they were both ok and just had some spilled liquids in the galley but no damage; and that all the PAX were ok as well. I then notified ATC of no damage or injuries. Made a PIREP with ATC as well as notified our Dispatcher via ACARS of the encounter.  Rest of the flight was uneventful. On the ground I contacted Dispatch; as well as Maintenance for the required severe turbulence aircraft inspection write up; and I also was connected with the on-duty chief pilot to report the event as outlined in the FOM.

EMB-175 reported encountering severe turbulence in the vicinity of FCA VOR at FL320.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 10

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 10

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Practicing taxi in tail dragger and lost directional control in taxi; and ran off runway 20 ft. into cornfield at slow speed. Lack of adequate rudder control. Maybe 15-20mph. Zero aircraft damage. Continued practice and ground school instruction in advance tail wheel flying.

While practicing taxiing; the aircraft departed the grass runway and came to a stop about 20 ft. off the grass in a corn field.

GA flight crew reported a loss of aircraft control resulting in a runway excursion.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The DEN airport information pages provide a set of procedures for when a flight crew can (and should) change the TCAS from TA/RA to TA only. The airport information pages for SFO also have procedures for changing the TCAS from TA/RA to TA only. The problem is that these two procedures are significantly different. I don't know who is responsible for establishing these procedures (FAA; Company; Local ATC; etc.); but shouldn't these procedures be standardized throughout our system; if not in the entire US? These procedures are established to enhance Safety and are important. They should be standardized throughout our system.

Air carrier flight crew reported the procedures for changing TCAS settings from TA/RA to TA only are different for DEN and SFO airports; and suggested that they be standardized.


Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were flying the LNDRE 2 Departure from DAL. We had just passed LNDRE and FW Center said proceed direct JJANE. We were confused at first since we did not see JJANE on our route of flight. ATC then queried if we had been cleared direct to a fix and we replied no; we were proceeding on the departure. ATC then informed us we were about three miles south of course and to proceed direct JJANE. At this point we finally realized our departure was missing some points. We reprogrammed the FMC and proceeded on course. We were never informed of any loss of separation.This was our second trip together this month and it was the last leg of this trip. We were both very comfortable with each other. Although we had done all the checklists; in hindsight we made at least five errors in spite of having plenty of ground time and not being rushed. 1. When the FO programmed the FMC; he failed to select the correct transition. In fact I believe no transition was selected so at a quick glance it looked correct since it did show the departure and final point. The routing in the FMC went from LNDRE direct to ZALEA rather than via the transition points.2. When I checked route of flight in the FMC I do not recall verifying the specific transition. Obviously I didn't.3. When I briefed the departure from the FMC; the FO failed to notice that I had not briefed all the points on the transition. Note: I also did not compare the points with the chart either which I usually do. 4. The false expectation my fellow Crew Member wouldn't make a mistake after several quality flights together.5. Fatigue. This was the second day in a row of very early report times. Additionally I had just completed 10 days with grandchildren and started the trip less rested than normal. (I would not have called myself fatigued!)

Air carrier Captain reported a track deviation when the fatigued crew failed to notice the transition was not loaded for the departure.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Flight had one cargo item of Hazmat and one quick pack Hazmat item was added 10 minutes before departure. I called the Ops Agent in ZZZ and told them that a quick pack Hazmat was just added but that they should only load it if they have the 15 bags. I then looked at the bag count and it showed 9 bags total. I repeated to the ops agent to let ramp know not to load both Hazmat items. He stated that they would both be held off and he would talk to them. After that I worked some of my other flights and checked this particular flight after about 10 minutes or so and noticed that the quick pack Hazmat item was loaded. I then immediately informed my shift manager which then told me to file a report.

Dispatcher reported a communication breakdown with Operations Agent regarding the removal of noncompliance Hazmat.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Takeoff was uneventful as First Officer was pilot flying. Passing 10;000 feet; de-sterilized FA's (Flight Attendants); turned off lights as we continued climb. Switched from [Departure] freq to Center. Upon check in with Center; appx 12-15000 ft; I noticed a medium burning electrical smell; didn't mention anything at first to see if smell would dissipate; it didn't. Appx 3-5 mins later; passing FL180 in climb felt a continuous strong vibration under my floorboard followed by a loud 'Thud' which sounded like a metal door hitting a door frame. It was at this point that the burning smell got worse. I told the FO (First Officer); he has the [aircraft] while I called the #1 FA. I asked him if he heard or smelled anything. He did in fact confirm the strong vibration coming from under first class galley. He did not smell anything but the #4 FA in back of plane said she smelled a light burning odor. It was at this point that I realized something was going on. I told FO we're going to turn back to [the departure airport]. I told [Center]; we need to head back for a mechanical problem. I then called #1 FA back and told him we are returning; no evacuation; planned and will be on the ground in 15 mins; he had no questions and I told him to start getting cabin ready for landing.Upon landing; and talking with our local company maintenance; he concluded quickly that one of our blower fans for extraction valve for avionics cooling had malfunctioned.

A321 Captain reported returning to departure airport after experiencing vibrations and a burning smell.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Two of the new lift up bins popped open during landing.  One was over 2D & 3D with stuff precariously positioned; so I got out of my jumpseat and ran to lift it back into a closed position while we were still traveling at a great rate of speed braking during landing.  (Passengers thanked me for 'saving their lives.')  Bin was EXTREMELY HEAVY - WITH NO ASSIST LEVER - AND HAVING TO LIFT AT SUCH A HIGH RATE OF SPEED DOWN THE RUNWAY IS NEVER A GOOD THING!  Bin in the back was around 25ABC or so - passengers unbuckled - stood - to close. BINS POPPING OPEN ON LANDING - very dangerous - having to get out of my jumpseat to prevent injury to passengers - could easily cause injury to flight attendants AND passengers alike.  This is a lose situation - if you leave it open and remain seated it is very dangerous - if you stand to close - it is very dangerous. DID NOT HAVE THIS ISSUE WITH THE OLD BINS.

Flight Attendant reports that the new lift up style bins installed on her aircraft are prone to popping open on landing. In this instance she stood up to close it just after the aircraft touched down. Passengers closed a second bin that had popped open.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Climbing through approximately 11;500 feet the Master Warning illuminated along with the Cabin Altitude warning. I turned ATC over to the First Officer; the PF; who stopped the climb and coordinated a descent back to 10;000 feet while I executed QRH emergency procedures. We declared an emergency for an immediate return to our departure airport. There were no further complications and we landed on Runway 8 approximately 10 minutes after receiving the warning.

An MD-82 suffered a pressurization problem climbing out of approximately 11;500 MSL. They declared an emergency; conducted appropriate QRH checklists and returned uneventfully to their departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

We had to de-ice due to some residual ice on winglets; leading edge of the wings; leading edge of the tail and horizontal stabilizers. Proceeded as per SOP with de-ice procedure and appropriate checklists. During taxi to the runway I requested a Runway Performance Change Checklist; since the assigned runway was different from the one discussed in the briefing; and the First Officer reading through the checklist positioned flaps on 2 as per takeoff performances. We realized that was not standard procedure for the post de-ice taxi to set the flaps which shall be positioned at the right configuration during the 'before takeoff checklist'. I requested a Before Takeoff Checklist immediately with no other issue.The checklist dedicated to the de-ice procedure requires the crew to verify flaps settings against the takeoff performance data and verify the actual position during the 'runway performance change checklist' when the flaps are supposed to be up.The very confusing De-ice/Anti-ice Checklist could have posed a serious safety issue; affecting the anti-ice fluid; in case of actual freezing precipitation or prolonged taxi on contaminated surfaces. Revise and update the appropriate checklist which is very confusing

ERJ-175 Captain reported a discrepancy between the De-ice Checklist and the Before Takeoff Checklist.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was told this was a wake remnant error and then while I was in with the supervisor watching and listening to the error he said it was also an error because I did not ensure the CRJ was on a 270 track; not heading; which I gave. I was advised he was on a 260 something track so I didn't have my 30 degrees. So here is the situation; I had B767 heavy descending on the north downwind going to 30L for a visual approach. CRJ was coming in from the northeast going to 30R for a visual approach. I got the heavy below the CRJ and crossed him in front of the CRJ's path probably 4 or 5 miles in front of him and got him across the localizers where they reported the airport in sight just as they were crossing the right localizer on a base heading. I told him to turn towards the airport and cleared for the visual to 30L. As soon as I did that I came back to the CRJ and turned him to a 270 heading and descended him to 40 and then asked him to advise the airport in sight. The CRJ advised the airport in sight and I cleared him for the visual to 30R and called traffic for him about the heavy that was now at his ten o'clock and 4 miles. He advised him in sight but I felt that I had the appropriate separation or less than a 30 degree intercept on both aircraft and didn't think wake turbulence was a factor so I did not tell him to maintain visual separation. I don't think that wake remnant separation should be something we should be having to worry about. It is confusing and I don't think that with standard wake turbulence that we are putting aircraft in dangerous positions.

M98 Controller was advised of a 'Wake Remnant' separation error; the reporter noting that this separation criteria should not be a controller evaluation criteria.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

ATC slowed us to 210; 190; then 170 KIAS; and then vectored us at 4;000 feet on a base leg for the visual approach to [Runway] 34L. As we rolled out on our base leg vector heading; a B737 was 3 miles ahead; at our 11 o' clock and about 1;000 feet above. ATC had us follow that traffic; cleared visual approach 34L. In the flight deck; we discussed the options to increase our separation; and reduce wake turbulence; behind the preceding aircraft. We decided to make the turn as square as possible without blowing through the localizer (visual approaches were also being conducted on the parallel Runway 34R); and stay one dot high on the glide path. We made a square turn to intercept the localizer; but the aircraft was still only about three miles ahead. As we began our descent below 4;000 feet; we encountered wake turbulence. Significant control inputs were required to correct for the resulting 'Dutch Roll' motion (wing lateral roll/rocking motion coupled with tail wag directional motion). The turbulence lasted for approximately 15-20 seconds; as we raised our glide path to about one dot above; which allowed us to exit the wake turbulence by about 3;000 feet. We maintained a higher glide path for the rest of the approach; keeping us clear of the turbulence for the rest of the visual approach to landing. Although the aircraft remained under positive control throughout the turbulence encounter; and within stable visual approach parameters for the entire approach; the motion was very uncomfortable and noticeable to everyone on board. Checking with our flight attendants after the event; no one in the cabin was injured; but a lot of passengers were understandably giving the flight attendants weird looks. Both flight attendants had recognized the motion as wake turbulence as it was occurring.A busy airport can present challenges with aircraft separation and wake turbulence avoidance; especially on visual approaches. ATC requested a specific speed for sequencing; presumably to fit us in behind the B737 and in front of other arrivals. Under other circumstances where the preceding aircraft is at the same altitude or lower; three miles of spacing behind a B737 may not have resulted in wake turbulence. It is a larger aircraft but not a heavy. However; in this case; the higher altitude of the preceding aircraft guaranteed that we would start out below its glide path; at least until we could cross its glide path to become established on a higher glide path. Therefore; the spacing really was not adequate for wake turbulence avoidance; since additional time should have been allowed for the vortices to dissipate prior to our crossing of the preceding aircraft's glide path (and those vortices). We suspect ATC was not accounting for the higher altitude of the preceding aircraft when they stacked us in so close behind the preceding aircraft. In the future; we will be more assertive and ask ATC for a lower speed; or for delay vectors; prior to the visual approach; even if that means ATC has to work harder to fit us in somewhere else in the sequence.

E175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SEA in trail of a B737.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While searching for our runway in visual conditions. Our assigned altitude was 3000 autopilot engaged; 3000 set in preselect; verified and then initiated descent to 3000. The autopilot was engaged and preselect altitude had changed to 1900. We both were certain we confirmed 3000 prior to commencing descent.  While we were looking for airport; we received an 'obstacle' call from EGPWS. I immediately added thrust and began climbing. Just as I added thrust; approach replied assigned altitude 3000. We returned to it; saw the field; conducted a stable visual approach; and landed normally.Cause: Fixation of both pilots outside the aircraft trying to visually find the airport. Instead of one of us playing close attention to aircraft instruments. Always prioritize aircraft state and constantly cross check instruments when in any phase of flight; but especially during the critical phases.

CRJ-900 Captain reported descending below assigned altitude on approach to PIT and receiving an obstacle warning from the EGPWS.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 350

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors

I was cruising at 1500 feet enroute to my destination. There was a high overcast ceiling with very good visibility below. My heading was approximately 180. I noted something odd ahead of my flight path. On looking closely I realized it was a smoke plume from a rocket launch. The white smoke trail went straight up and disappeared into the overcast. I turned slight west to pass by rather than over the launch site. The wind was calm; so the smoke trail stayed visible for a long time. I noted a large number of vehicles at the launch site and a small group of people near the base of the smoke trail. I saw no subsequent launch. I continued to my destination.My guess is this was a launch of an amateur rocket with a club; etc. viewing. Neither Flight Service nor I can find a NOTAM for this activity. I was very glad I wasn't over the site during the launch.

A pilot reported the need to take evasive maneuvers to avoid an amateur rocket launch.


Supervisor / CIC; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Clearance Delivery and CIC. I had turned around to make changes to the ART to reflect the correct position assignments. The Local Controller was a newly certified Controller. Traffic was very light. Runway 4L operations had been suspended for snow removal along the outer edges. One airport operations vehicle and two snow plows were on Runway 4L. The Local Controller had been told during the relief briefing of the Runway 4L operations and had the 'runway buster' in the correct position. The BE30 had been taxied to Runway 36 for departure. The Local Controller instructed the BE30 to cross Runway 36 and cleared him for take off. A couple of seconds later I heard the Local Controller scream 'Cancel Takeoff Clearance.' At that time I turned around to see what was happening. A BE30 came to a stop about 2;000 FT down the runway; and one of the snow plows was exiting the runway near mid field. Once all vehicles had cleared the runway; the BE30 was cleared for takeoff. Scanning the runway would have prevented this from occurring. More importantly; the BE30 could have been cleared for takeoff on Runway 36; as there was nothing preventing it.

Tower CIC observed a takeoff clearance being cancelled and an airport vehicle on the departure runway.  The reporter noted the Controller apparently failed to scan the runway prior to issuing the takeoff clearance.


Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after thrust reduction [the First Officer] asked 'Do you smell that'? I; at the same time; smelled a 'Dirty socks odor'. This is the 2nd time that in flight I have smelled this odor. [The First Officer] called the flight attendants and they reported the same odor FWD and Aft in the cabin. I told the [First Officer] to don his O2 mask and put mine on also. As I was the Pilot Flying; I handled ATC and flew while [the First Officer] contacted Dispatch through ACARS and sent a return to field message. I told ATC we needed to return to ZZZ and was quickly given a vector back to ZZZ. I noticed my mask's face shield was rather cloudy/dirty and hard to see out of. We returned fairly quickly. At 1;000 feet AGL I had to remove my mask in order to see well enough in order to land the aircraft. My mask was off for approximately 5 minutes. After clearing the runway and stopping I put my mask back on. We taxied to a gate where we were met by paramedics.After deplaning and speaking to paramedics on the jetway; I noticed several symptoms. I felt dizzy and lost my balance approximately 4 times; where I had to hold the wall of the jet way to steady myself. I could think of what I wanted to say but the word would not come out of my mouth. I could talk but not say exactly what I wanted to. I also had a sore throat. I felt disoriented and overwhelmed. I finally sat down on the edge of the jetway. I saw three men in suits standing together a little ways further up the jetway. None of them introduced themselves or offered any assistance. The whole crew was taken to [a local hospital] by ambulance. I was released approximately 5 hours later. I have had multiple health affects since that day. It was determined that the APU had an internal oil leak. The aircraft had another fume event on the line during passenger operations on a [recent flight]. This is an ongoing and known problem. This problem can be addressed by taking seriously the health risks caused by TCP (Tricresyl Phosphate) in the engine and APU oil. The Airbus aircraft have a high risk to the bleed air system because the APU air inlet is on the bottom of the aircraft and is easily able to ingest oil into the bleed air system where it is heated up and can enter the cabin and cockpit as a neurotoxin. To this day; I have no memory of actually landing the aircraft.

A319 Captain reported a fumes event shortly after takeoff which resulted in an uneventful return to departure airport. Captain experienced physiological issues which were treated at local hospital.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

During the takeoff roll; under 50 KIAS; the left engine failed to produce power. The left engine manifold pressure only reached between 20-25 inches and the RPM reached 2000-2200. This caused the airplane to yaw to the left. The takeoff was aborted and we returned to the gate. End of incident. Left engine failed to produce power for takeoff.

C402 Captain reported rejected takeoff due to inadequate engine power.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 23045; Flight Crew Type 11935

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Non-compliant passenger.During our flight I was informed of non-compliant passenger; Passenger X seat XX6; who apparently was continually reminded of face covering policy. Flight Attendant woke passenger to remind them to mask up. I was informed of this during a bathroom break an hour before landing.  The passenger followed the Flight Attendant to first class cabin to complain about being woken up.Captain made PA 'reminding all passengers of policy.'I told the passenger we need to get a commitment for mask and he agreed and then made a complaint about being hurt by Flight Attendant.Flight continued without further incident and Customer Service Supervisor met aircraft.

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was not complaint with face mask policy during flight.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Plane came in with PROX SYS 1 fault. Went through MDC (Maintenance Data Computer) to isolate which PROX sensor was faulting. After confirming [the] fault; [the] aircraft was sent to [the] hangar. [I] jacked [up the] aircraft and upon closer and more proper inspection of target; [I] found that it was installed backward. This caused the target to be a lot closer to the sensor. After comparing it to the adjacent targets and confirming with tech data; we concluded that the target was definitely installed incorrectly.Because the aircraft only recently exited from heavy check; we assume it happened during that process as it could easily be overlooked. [I] removed [the] target; flipped it; re-installed; and performed all adjustments and operation checks in accordance with all [of] the appropriate tech data. It is not uncommon to see planes exit heavy check with small mishaps causing big problems and thereby delays. There could perhaps be a more thorough process in order to return these aircraft to service.

Technician reported a proximity switch target that was improperly installed during the heavy check process; caused a #1 System Prox Fault.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 244; Flight Crew Type 17000

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Taxiing to the active Runway 21 in ABQ; we accomplished the throttle burst and Before Takeoff Checklist before taking the runway. We set takeoff power and began the takeoff roll; the 80 knot call was made and all indications were normal as we proceeded with the takeoff. Reaching 108 knots the Takeoff Warning horn sounded and the Takeoff Configuration Warning light illuminated on the forward panel. A reject was initiated at 110 knots. As we were coming to a stop abeam F1; I cleared the runway at F1 intersection and stopped. Tower was notified during the reject and a passenger announcement was made after the aircraft came to a stop. Brake cooling information was loaded into the OPC and it was determined that we had a 75 minute wait period; 30 minutes of which had to be away from the gate area. An inspection of the fuse plugs was also required by a mechanic. We contacted Ground with this information; and they had us hold on Taxiway J between E and C taxiways for our 30 minute wait period. Passengers were informed of our time and we proceeded to Taxiway J.Company was notified of our situation; and we requested a gate be available once our 30 minute period was complete. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted at this point to coordinate Contract Maintenance. Once at the gate; a Contract Mechanic arrived to inspect the brakes. Since we had an additional 45 minutes of brake cooling to comply with; I asked Maintenance Control if they could have the Mechanic try to determine the cause of the warning. There was no prior history on this aircraft. Required logbook entries were made with the pertinent information; and since the brake energy was over 18.5 million FT/LBS; a logbook entry was made for that too. The trim setting was 4.7; flaps 1; speedbrake handle was down. After the systems check and tire inspections were complete; and logbook signed; we continued with no further issues.I felt there was resistance from Maintenance Control to have Contract Maintenance perform a check to determine cause. Granted; an 'Info Only' entry could have been sufficient; but to have the warning come on at that speed; I felt it needed to be addressed further.

B737 Captain reported a rejected takeoff in ABQ at 110 KTS in response to a takeoff configuration warning light for an unknown reason.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 10500; Flight Crew Type 300

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Approximately 45 min prior to departure as pilot in command I was in the process of obtaining the PDC. We have 2 methods whereby this can be obtained. One is through our on board FMS system. The other is on iPads thru ARINC (Aeronautical Radio Incorporated). I chose to use the iPad. I saw the clearance for departure as the LULUZ 2 with ABQ transition and programmed the FMS as such. Unknown to me at that time what I now think I had done was looked at the filed route and mistook it for the cleared route. On the iPads the ARINC PDC is formatted as follows. The first line in small non bold print is the ATC clearance. Located immediately under that in much larger print and in bold is the ATC filed route. What I believe now is that while filling out my TOLD card my eyes going back and forth to the iPad I mistakenly looked at the bold print and wrote down the LALUZ 2 ABQ transition. That made sense as it was what I filed. The actual clearance was the FTHLS 2 ABQ transition. With the actual clearance printed in the small print I believe my eyes focused on the bold printed line which was the filed route.So we departed 7R and once airborne engaged the autopilot and selected NAV. The aircraft crossed the first fix SPRKY and proceeded NE to FORPE. Soon after beginning the turn the controller called us to verify we were on the FTHLS 2 Departure. We stated we were given the LALUZ 2 as we believed was the truth at that time. He instructed us to turn to a 080 heading and join the FTHLS 2 Departure which we complied with immediately. As the flight continued and I had time to reflect I made the determination after reviewing the iPad PDC that I had mistakenly programmed the filed route as opposed to the cleared route.Approximately an hour later when on with ABQ Center were given a phone number to call upon arrival. I immediately called upon arriving and spoke to the supervisor at PHX Approach Control. I told him everything I have stated here. I also asked him to confirm that at no time did we bust an altitude or have any other traffic conflicts of any kind. He assured me that he had reviewed the event and that there no traffic conflicts or altitude violations of any kind regarding this event.

It was interesting that the PHX controller on the phone stated that they have as many as 3 departure issues every week by airlines and part 91 alike. I would like to see the formatting change on the ARINC (Aeronautical Radio Incorporated) iPad PDC application; and I would like to see PHX adopt similar procedures like other major airports do; such as naming the first cleared fix when cleared for take-off; or adding the departure name with the take-off clearance.

A corporate Challenger 605 flight crew reported they flew the wrong departure from PHX when they failed to see a change in the PDC using the iPad.


When paper work errors are discovered or revealed through and to the ASAP (Aviation Safety Action Program) program; there is no mechanism in place; or appears to be none; that insures the error is corrected as part of the ASAP program. As a QA (Quality Assurance) Auditor I regularly do ASAP follow up investigations to ensure compliance with policies and procedures. As a result of my investigations; I find outstanding paperwork and AML (Log Book) errors and or omissions that require correction. These uncorrected errors or omissions are the very same errors disclosed during the ASAP report and investigation. Errors brought to Maintenance Management's attention go uncorrected. [For example]; Aircraft X door slide error not corrected after several attempts to have it corrected. Refer to [maintenance] event XXXX AML XXXXXXX; no balancing entry made after numerous attempts to have maintenance comply. These are just TWO 'still open' errors for example.I do not know why these errors are not monitored and or corrected before an ASAP is closed. I do not know why Maintenance personnel and supervisors did not take action to correct errors brought to their attention. Do not allow disclosed AML errors and other general paperwork errors to go unchecked and corrected through the ASAP program. Put stronger enforcement program in place to insure compliance.

Air Carrier Quality Assurance Auditor finds corrections not made to procedures after Aviation Safety Action Program Report (ASAP) closed out.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On arrival into BOS (QUABN 3 RNAV); we were given a clearance of UROWT at 11;000 feet then descend via the QUABN 3; 4R transition into BOS. Between UROWT and QUABN; ATC gave us a heads up that a VFR aircraft was at our 1 O'clock position; opposite direction; at 6;000 feet climbing to 12;500 feet.  We began to look for the traffic that we had on TCAS; [but] before we could locate it; we got a climbing TCAS RA with a vertical speed of about 2;000 fpm; which I responded to immediately; and the captain notified ATC. The RA then adjusted vertical speed to nearly level then gave us another climbing RA this time of about 1;500 fpm.  I again followed the TCAS RA; this time after following the guidance of the RA it cleared us of the conflict. The captain let ATC know both times about the TCAS RA and they were indifferent about what we had done.  We proceeded to follow the rest of the QUABN RNAV arrival with altitude and speeds on target.ATC should [have] never cleared VFR opposite direction traffic through an altitude that another aircraft was on.  ATC should [have] been more diligent in diverting the two airplanes away from each other.

The controller seemed unconcerned about the conflict. I thought it weird that they would have traffic climbing to an altitude above our bottom altitude but didn't have time to query the controller about the instruction given to the VFR aircraft.

EMB-145 flight crew reported they responded to an RA on descent into BOS when ATC apparently cleared a VFR aircraft through their altitude.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Passenger walked on the plane with her smart bag. I asked her if the battery was removed. She said no; it cannot be taken out because it's dead. I tried as well; the battery could not be removed. We told the gate agents. Captain said the bag is not going. [NAME] got his charger to see if they could charge it then remove the battery. Finally the battery was removed. The guest was not happy with the drama. This did cause a delay to close the door. I did relay that the battery needed to be addressed before closing the door; to the gate agents as soon as she walked on the plane. Guest should be required to prove the battery can be removed upon check in.

B-737-900 Flight Attendant reported passenger with Lithium Ion battery powered smart bag unable to remove dead battery prior to flight.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Originally planned and cleared for ZPLYN3 RNAV ARRIVAL (south flow); ATC began our decent to FL270; then we cleared direct NIIXX or QUAIL on the BOSSS2 RNAV ARRIVAL (north flow). We were then cleared to descend via the new arrival. The direct fix and the lowered altitude restrictions shortened the route and changed the vertical profile. Originally I was profiled to make the altitude restriction at QUAIL 250 knots FL220-170. Now ATC's late arrival change had me trying to make the BOSSS2 QUAIL restriction of 250 knots FL190-170. As well as trying to keep up with ATC's late demands; we are trying to go over the expected runway data; only to have it change and do it all over again. All these late arrival and approach changes creates too many added demands and distractions to our already busy requirements.As we approached QUAIL trying to make the new lower altitude window we attempted to request for speed relief. We could not ask for relief as ATC beat us to the mic inquiring about our speed as we were approaching QUAIL. It is hard to tell what our speed was over QUAIL as the fix drops out while approaching the fix and in the turn. My guess is we hit it between 250-270 knots and began the turn at 290 knots. We were then handed off to the next controller who took us off the RNAV arrival with vectors and altitude assignments for a visual approach to 35R. There was no traffic problem and no incidents involved with the late arrival assignment and speed deviation.ATC needs to expect these problems when they begin changing arrivals and changed restrictions last minute. Consideration must also be given to the fact that the [aircraft's] technology does not handle tight RNAV SIDs and STARs well. More importantly are the limitations on the pilot's work load on the [aircraft]. RNAV arrivals should not be assigned unless ATC can begin the initial descent as a DESCEND VIA from beginning to end without changing arrivals. If ATC can't do this; [older aircraft] pilots should announce 'UNABLE RNAV' to avoid the added responsibilities with the added distractions and work overload.

Due to a distance-shortening vector and late change of STAR clearance; crew was above required airspeed when crossing a fix. Crew had been unable to contact ATC for speed relief due to saturated frequency. ATC provided vectors to achieve required spacing.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

We departed TKPK Runway 7 as cleared. We were advised of traffic that would be passing over the airport at 1;500 FT. Approaching approximately 800 AGL; what appeared to be a cabin class; low wing Piper or maybe Cessna passed our flight path-it was definitely a low wing twin. The aircraft did not appear on our TCAS until it was in front of us and reporting 500 FT above us. As pilot flying; I intuitively pushed forward on the yoke lowering the nose and reducing climb rate. Neither the Captain nor I obtained visual on the aircraft until it was in front of us. Can't say for certain lateral distance but I estimate it at less than half a mile. Only warning received was an amber alert on TCAS but not until shortly before we had visual contact. They had come around the east side of mountain that is on the northeast side of Runway 7 and was passing north to south. After they had passed safely by; we resumed normal flight. Tower reported other traffic as a twin otter which seems to raise other issues due to conflict between the type of plane we saw and the type reported by Tower.No takeoff or landing should be allowed when other traffic reported in area. Also since Approach Control and Tower are same person; different frequencies; maybe both frequencies should be monitored when traffic is in the area.

...We were cleared for takeoff and advised we may see traffic left to right passing over the field at 1;500 FT. I acknowledged this report. [I] had no problem with the traffic report since he would be over the field and should not be a factor. I had briefed the First Officer on what to expect after departure since he had not flown to TKPK before. Due to rising terrain just north of the field we don't just go direct to GABAR Intersection. We would fly runway heading to about 1;000 FT or more then turn to a northerly heading till we cleared terrain before on course to GABAR. That puts us about three miles or so offshore and away from small aircraft traffic flying along the shoreline. ...after raising the gear handle to the up position; I did my usual quick scan of rate of climb/airspeed for indications of a normal climb. At approximately 800 FT to my horror I saw traffic at 12 o'clock directly off our nose and above us which we were approaching rapidly. We estimated distance less than a mile ahead at 1;500 FT.

An air carrier jet departing TKPK had a close encounter with a cabin class twin transiting the area.


Working ARF during the Company's mid inbound. The B777; Air Carrier Y was on final; cleared for the visual approach and talking to Memphis Tower. Air Carrier X was also on final; cleared for the approach and I thought I had switched him to Memphis Tower as well. When my Supervisor asked if I was still talking to the A310; Air Carrier X; and did I have 4 miles; I stated 'He's talking to the Tower; I don't know' then went back and tried to switch him to the Tower again. He answered with contacting the Tower. When I put up the splat T; it was less than the 4 miles needed since the B777 is a B weight category.  I'm not sure there's really any sort of recommendation to solve this. The RECAT wake turbulence standards are all new and something we're still getting used to. If anything; maybe move the letters that indicate the category some where else. The B is easy to read as a RNAV Heavy aircraft.

M03 Controller described a loss of wake turbulence separation when the frequency transfer to MEM Tower was uncertain; the reporter suggesting new RECAT identifiers/information for the Data Blocks.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 88; Flight Crew Type 20000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC headed us into a thunderhead and would not give me higher to get over; or a change in heading to avoid it. I offered to do a 360 or reverse course; etc. ATC told me to fly through it. I did not. I went from a 360 heading to 050 for a brief period for safety and told him what I was doing. ATC offered me higher in 10 miles. That would not have worked at all. Finally he gave me from FL340 to FL350. I needed FL410. He was task saturated and (other carrier) was also on frequency with the same problem and same response. I know there was a lot of conflicting traffic; but he was limited in his ability to think outside of a straight line. We managed without a TCAS RA or TA; and no conflict resulted.

We were vectored east and were given direct to FLO. After turning direct; we would have gone through the overhang of storm. Captain asked for a turn but Controller was busy. We made a turn to avoid overhang and notified Controller.

B737 flight crew reported deviating to avoid a thunderstorm without clearance when ATC could not allow a turn or climb.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While being vectored for the ILS; we received a GLD UNSAFE caution message [Ground Lift Dump]. This occurred while being advised by ATC that the WX had just degraded to FZRA; followed by -FZRA. We completed the QRH and decided to divert (this was when we were advised that the precipitation had improved to -FZRA). We as a crew decided to continue to our alternate; which had better weather. Once in contact with approach; we declared an emergency and asked for ARFF; which was provided. My first officer was the pilot flying for the entire event; and commanded the autopilot off when we broke out on the approach (about 2500 FT). Although the aircraft was challenging for him to control; he performed an excellent landing under the conditions. We had an otherwise normal rollout; taxied to the gate and shut down the aircraft. The station made the jetway available and the passengers were deplaned (their overall impression of our handling of the emergency was overwhelmingly positive). We inspected the aircraft and gave the write up to Maintenance Control. After this I participated in a Safety debriefing with the Company; after which we were deadheaded to continue our trip.

CRJ200 Captain experiences a CAS message for GLD unsafe during vectors for the ILS; at the same time precipitation changes to FZRA. With the Ground Lift Dump failure; spoilers began deploying inflight uncommanded and the Captain elects to divert to a nearby alternate.


Flight Crew Total 9673; Flight Crew Type 1104

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted

At FL340 [over North Atlantic] the right engine rolled back from commanded EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) of 1.60 to 1.38. All other engine indications on the right engine decreased in proportion. We had no EICAS messages or other abnormal indications. Throttle movement had little effect on thrust. We were able to maintain altitude and airspeed but the left engine EPR increased to max EPR. We ran the checklist and called the IRO on break back to the cockpit.We tried to call dispatch on the SATCOM. We were unable to get SATCOM voice to work. We got a phone patch through ZZZZ1 radio on the HF; and started to conduct a conference call with dispatch and [Maintenance Control]. Halfway through the phone patch we were disconnected. The first officer sent an ACARS message to dispatch to call us on the SATCOM while I tried to reestablish communications with dispatch via the HF. The dispatcher was unable to call us on the SATCOM but we were connected again via HF. After consulting with [Maintenance Control] we [advised ATC of our situation]; offset 15 north of track initially descending to 33;500. We then got a clearance below the tracks from ATC; followed shortly by a clearance to proceed direct to ZZZZ. The landing was uneventful. We never regained more than approximately 25% thrust on the right engine.

I was on break in cabin asleep when a flight attendant woke me up and stated I was requested back on the flight deck as soon as possible.The airplane seemed to be holding altitude and speed when I first arrived; so we agreed that we should attempt to call Maintenance Control before diverting. I started looking for an appropriate QRH procedure; the flying FO flew the aircraft and the Captain handled communications. After describing the loss of thrust Maintenance Control asked us to reset the EECs. The two buttons that we reset however; were the Thrust Limit buttons. We stated that fact to Maintenance Control; but the phone patch got cut off. The Captain attempted another phone patch and got through to dispatch; but it was cutting in and out and was very hard to communicate. We had started to run the Engine Limit or Surge or Stall checklist before diverting; but flying the airplane and the degraded communications with Dispatch took precedent for a while. After diverting; we discussed several checklists to run since there was no EICAS; status messages or specific checklist heading that exactly fit our situation. We eventually ended up running the Engine Limit Surge or Stall checklist; but elected to keep the #2 engine running. We flew back to our alternate; checked the abnormal landing distance charts for and overweight landing since we were going to be about 2;000 lbs over weight and briefed a flaps 20 landing. The Captain also made a PA to the passengers explaining the situation and talked to the lead Flight Attendant several times. The flying FO made an uneventful; smooth landing and then we taxied to the gate.

B757 flight crew reported experiencing an EPR malfunction reducing its thrust while on a North Atlantic crossing. Flight diverted with an uneventful landing.


Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During our landing; about 1-2 miles from the FAF (final approach fix); we were at 2900 ft I noticed a drone flying above us. It was close to us; seemed like 50 ft above. It was hard to tell if it was flying to the opposite direction or just standing. Any way we passed below it. I immediately informed ZZZ tower about it. We continued and landed at the destination.

An air carrier flight crew was on final approach descending past 3;000 feet when they noticed a UAS above them and notified ATC.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[Aircraft X] was a ZZZ1 flight and the ramp had already planned the loading and was ready to load. I checked the loading to see if the Hazmat was loaded correctly. There were a total of 3 pieces all planned in Pit 3. I noticed that two of the pieces; Items 3 and 5 can not go into the same pit they needed to be separated. One piece was Hazmat Class 5.1 and the other Hazmat Class 3. I contacted ZZZ Ops and advised them of it and to have the ramp lead call me. He called and Item 3 was held off due to not enough bags (15 bag minimum) to separate and load it into another pit. He also advised that Item 3 item did not have a bar code on the package to scan.

Air Carrier Ramp Personnel reported removing one of three Hazmat items during preflight due to Hazmat a loading violation.


Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 31L at night in VMC (25;000 SCT/10 miles visibility.) I flew the visual with a VOR 31L as a backup. I flew the VOR 31L ON LNAV+VNAV. I was at 1;400 FT with 10 miles visibility and the runway in sight. DFW Tower radioed he had an altitude alert; I climbed to 2;000 FT. I was on visual approach and continued to landing. I had PAPI in sight and was following the VOR 31L profile and my altimeter was set correctly to 30.10. Local pressure was rising rapidly at the time of arrival; with surface winds at 300 18G28; moderate turbulence and windshear advisories in effect.

DFW Tower issued a low altitude alert to an aircraft on the VOR Runway 31L approach during a night approach in gusty; turbulent weather conditions.


Visual Approach; Vectors; Direct; STAR KOLTT 1

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC created an increased workload due to multiple ATC created threats while approaching ATL in the early morning following a red-eye flight. Recommend Atlanta TRACON works to reduce the occurrence of these threats to pilots by increased training in how their control actions affect pilot workload and flight safety. We were on the KOLTT 1 RNAV STAR. The NOTAM says East flow expect runway 9R. We set up 9R in the FMS; ILS and briefed the arrival; approach and taxi plan for 9R. I also briefed 8L too because the NOTAM is not followed much of the time and ATL gives pilots last minute runway changes. ARTCC gave us a last minute shortcut on the STAR direct to ERLIN and then shipped us to the TRACON. When we checked in with ATL TRACON and they told us to expect runway 8L so we had to set up the flight deck automation for 8L. We were descending after passing the last STAR waypoint (STRMM) when we were given direct to the FAF SCHEL and cleared for the visual approach after calling the field in sight. Our speed was still 250 and ATC did not slow us down. I was reluctant to slow because one of our crews was violated for slowing down on their own while approaching the final approach course in ATL. As we were approaching the FAF and still needed to slow down and go down I was used the speed brakes and slowed to 230 to put in the first flap setting.While approaching SCHEL and reaching 2;900 ft ATC asked us if we had the 757 traffic in sight and that there was a 60 knot overtake. This was the first mention of traffic. And it looked to us like ATC had cut us off by sticking another 8L arrival right in front of us. We had to scramble to slow down by dropping the gear early and slowing back to our final speed early. Our job was made more difficult because our TCAS display stopped working and we could not see the range of our traffic on the TCAS display which would have helped us with spacing. ATC greatly increased our workload and made what should have been a 'boring' approach very workload intensive which reduced safety margins.Specific ATC threats that increased our workload were:1) late runway assignment (different from the NOTAM guidance)2) shortcut vectors on the STAR while we were descending in VNAV to meet a crossing restriction (ERLIN at 250 knots; 10;000ft)3) direct to the FAF in ATL without slowing us down4) sequencing traffic very close to us unexpectedly without warning which was 60 knots slower than us as we approach the FAF ATC should have slowed us down and given us a heads up if they are going to put a plane ahead of us that close to us on final. Additionally; some consistency regarding speed instructions is needed in ATL. Specifically; if ATC is going to violate crews for slowing down on their own; then every flight needs to be slowed down explicitly by the TRACON. When a controller gets mad at crew for slowing down on their own and then that crew gets violated; don't expect other crews to slow down early on their own.

B757 First Officer reported he was concerned with ATC procedures on arrival into ATL that increased workload.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 235; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 4925

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Was in pilot crew bunk and smelled electrical odor same time got call from flight crew of odor in First Class Galley and First Class area. Turned off galley power and odor seemed to dissipate. All flight crew returned to cockpit. After returning to cockpit electrical odor was again noticed in cockpit and a call from Purser saying odor noticed again in First Class and Business cabin area. We elected to declare an emergency and divert. [We] went through smoke and fire checklist and made normal landing. Electrical odor dissipated and aircraft was looked over by fire rescue when all clear we parked at gate.

FL380 flight attendants in First Class Galley reported electrical odor. Exact location could not be found but seemed to spread into the Business Class Galley as well. The Captain was awakened from his break and a decision was made to divert. An emergency was declared and we were given a descent and a short approach. Emergency trucks did not observe any external indications of fire so passengers were kept in their seats and we made an uneventful taxi to the gate.

B777 flight attendants and pilots detected an electrical odor in First and Business Classes so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted to an enroute airport for maintenance. The flight later continued on the same aircraft.


Shortly after departure from ZZZ we were given radar vectors for the climb after we notified ATC that we were unable to make the next altitude at the next fix on the departure.About five minutes into the climb there was a scratch-pad message re-syncing other FMC (Flight Management Computer) followed by timeout reselect; autothrottle disconnect and EICAS message and autopilot disconnect and EICAS message.After reselecting FMC everything appeared normal and I reselected the Autopilot and connected the auto throttle and reengaged VNAV (Vertical Navigation).Shortly thereafter same happened again with the loss of all initial information in the CDU (Control Display Unit) and no waypoints in either route 1 or 2 and a magenta line through VNAV mode annunciation. The FO (First Officer) notified ATC that we were working a 'problem' and received further climb and heading instructions. The FO loaded all the information back into the CDU and I reengaged the automation. Received a direct to a fix on our route from ATC and continued the rest of the flight without further incident.I think we had a dual FMC failure where the left one recovered fast enough to not trigger an FMC EICAS message.

B747 flight crew reported a possible dual FMS failure during climb that resulted in a course deviation.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Coasting in over ZZZZ I had just returned to the cockpit after using the restroom. The Captain (who just returned from his break) and first officer were discussing the EICAS Hyd Low Quantity for the Center Hydraulic system.  The Status page indicated that the Center Hyd quantity was now at .47 or 47 percent.  We referred to the QRH HYDRAULIC QUANTITY checklist which simply stated that the quantity was low and that was the end of the procedure.Watching the quantity over a short period of time; it was apparent that the system was continuing to lose fluid.  It was also apparent that we could possibly need to accomplish the loss of HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE.  Loss of this system would have meant the loss of center auto pilot; some spoiler panels; center stabilizer trim; normal flap operations; normal gear extension/retraction and no automatic speed breaks.  Maintenance was contacted via SATCOM; it was suggested that removal of system pressure by turning off all pumps we might retain C Hyd fluid for use during approach and landing.  All three pumps were selected off and the quantity stabilized at 43 percent.  We also confirmed that if we lose center system pressure that once we extend the gear; we will not be able to retract it.We had reviewed all applicable landing; climb and cruise charts and QRH procedures for a loss of center hydraulics pressure if it became necessary.   We coordinated with dispatch our intentions to continue. We requested a 25 mile final to configure the aircraft for landing. Once established on the long final we reselected the pumps back on. Configured to land or C System quantity was down to .13 or 13 percent. System pressure was maintained throughout the approach and landing and we were able to make a precautionary landing.We taxied to the gate with [Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF)] following with no other complications. After landing/parking checks complete the quantity returned to a .31 or 31 percent.

B767 First Officer reported they slowly lost the center hydraulic system quantity; but landed uneventfully at their destination.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Traffic complexity was high; and there was a large amount of offline coordination and Hand Off to Radar communication taking place; as well as Hand Off training occurring at this time. Trying to anticipate needs; projecting ahead; we called from the Hand Off to the next sector (SCT-VLY) with an APREQ of Aircraft Y high but descending on the KIMMO2 Arrival (not yet on frequency; 5 miles east of PMD at 140; vectored off course by ZLA-17 for traffic considerations). Even when Aircraft Y came on frequency we were unable to descend immediately; due to Aircraft X converging northbound; descending through 128. A couple minutes later; SCT (VLY) says: 'Aircraft Y turn left heading 180 for a guy south of SLAPP' - we did so. The R-Side already having descended the aircraft to the expected handoff altitude without an APREQ of 080. As Aircraft Y made the turn; it was observed that the aircraft missed an opposite direction aircraft by about 3 miles and maybe 1;000 feet; not a point out; not known then if IFR or VFR.  Shortly thereafter; there was this same 'limited' BCN 1015 observed about 130 eastbound; south of PMD; with Aircraft W descending (about 120) on the LYNXX8 Arrival into VNY/BUR with a air carrier trailing; descending to 140 - that's when we had FD/CD print out a strip of the aircraft flight plan: [showing the routing of Aircraft Z.  We had just dealt with another aircraft; on our frequency at FL230; after accepting a point out from SCT-VLY of still another aircraft climbing out slow & low on the same NUAL8 departure that was very tight - not sure we could have provided ZLA their desired 5 miles; happy to be able to use 3 miles; only safely getting the heavy down through traffic by a left vector as soon as we were told that the Buckhorn MOA was no longer active. I advised the R-Side to turn heavy left after his efforts to expedite the descent of the aircraft were considered insufficient.  With the discovery of Aircraft Z's possible flight status as IFR (possibly there was a VFR climb involved?).  We weren't sure what course of action to take as that was the first moment complexity began to lessen; and there were no longer any IFR proximity issues to still consider.  We're not sure if minimum separation was maintained throughout that period of high complexity.The issues are hard to grapple with; but reporting the event to Management; ideas of airspace/LOA changes were immediately brainstormed among a few controllers. Taking the hand off of the heavy so high; that far away; repeated; I would have issued a control instruction to ZLA prior to accepting the hand off or made them keep it in their airspace until passing PMD to fight through their own traffic concerns in their own airspace. Recommendations heard were to require aircraft landing VCV to be no higher than 140 at our Antelope airspace boundaries. I don't know that I agree with that; preferring instead for an LOA change whereby ZLA sectors within Area B's jurisdiction communicate with each other better; not just between Sector 3 with 4; and then 17 with 18; but also unlike the current expectation of Sector 3 in the future better coordinating with Sector 17.In lieu of our facility telling their facility how to run their airspace; I believe I will be very unlikely to accept a hand off from Sector 3 until it crosses the Sector 17 boundary so they are not unaware of pressures on criss-crossing demands at PMD. I have often recommended; in the past; of the use of ZOREN intersection for a NUAL8 climb out route over SLAPP to stay south of PMD and then next fix (DAG; HEC; BLH); and; it's possible that could have helped relieve some of the pressure the system seemed to face today.  It just felt like 'expeditious' became more important than 'safe' and/or 'orderly' - pushing they system too hard; not recognizing pressures put on the system until it was (almost) too late. If staffing had permitted; maybe an overhead could have been utilized effectively.  In today's scenario; I eventually dismissed the trainee from the hand off in order to try to respond more quickly to sector demands; but; that's also when complexity issues dissipated.

I was training a CPC-IT on Valley and we had Aircraft X climbing slowly toward PMD.  We did not issue a point out to Joshua Approach on the slow climbing traffic and they happened to have Aircraft Y high on then KIMMO2 arrival inbound to SMO.  We had already shipped Aircraft X to ZLA Sector 4 so we reached out to Joshua and had them turn Aircraft Y to a 180 heading to deviate away from Aircraft X.  The vector was not enough to ensure separation and standard separation was lost.The loss of separation lands on me for not being more proactive with my trainee.  If we would have issued the point out to Joshua when we realized how slowly Aircraft X was climbing we and Joshua would have had more time to formulate a plan that would work better.

Controllers describe a situation where an aircraft is not pointed out and a loss of separation happens.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 805; Flight Crew Type 775

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was doing an instrument approach in to CVO with a student. RNAV 35. We had made normal radio calls; 10; 7; 5; 2 and 2 miles out.There was one plane in the downwind who had called #2; landing behind my student and I on Runway 35. When we were below the LPV minimums and the student had removed the foggles; somebody on the ground holding short of Runway 35 called out 'there is about to be a mid air collision for the 2 planes on final.'My student and I both were looking out straight ahead and to the sides and saw nothing. Out of nowhere a plane [Aircraft Y] came over the top of us; from behind and to our right and almost clipped our left wingtip.To our knowledge; there was only one plane in the downwind aside from us on short final and 2 planes holding short of 35 ready to depart. My student confirms that they saw Aircraft Y land on Runway 35 and taxi off with no radio calls.We did everything right; making all the appropriate radio calls. Aircraft Y made no calls and we never saw them on ADS-B or out the window. The pilots from on the ground from two different planes both confirmed that Aircraft Y made no radio calls and that I and my student were doing everything correctly.I never saw Aircraft Y visually or over ADS-B. The student was under the foggles for the approach but when he went visual; we still never saw a plane near us.I can confirm nobody was departing Runway 17 at the time because there was already 1 plane doing pattern work for 35; and the plane who called out the near midair collision from the ground; had just completed a taxi from 17 to 35 on the ground because it was the runway in use.This was within feet of hitting our wing from above. Not only was this incredibly unsafe; but the fact that no radio call was made ever is even more concerning.

GA flight instructor reported an NMAC during final approach to CVO non-towered airport.  Reporter stated the other aircraft never made any radio calls during the approach which contributed to the event.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 27R

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

Coming down the FYTTE5 the FMS lost GPS causing the aircraft to continue straight during a turn on the arrival. We noticed the issue and contacted ATC and were then given headings to join ILS Runway 27R. Not much we could have done we saw it as soon as it didn't sequence and contacted ATC to let them know we just experienced a FMS/GPS failure. The newest revision of software we think might have affected the sudden drop in GPS calculation causing us to go off course. We resent the position and then all matched for the points on the approach backed up with the DME for the approach.

Air carrier First Officer reported loss of GPS/FMS navigation capability during the arrival.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During cruise; ECAM alerted crew to System Yellow Low Hydraulic Pressure. Proceeded with ECAM/QRH/follow up Standard Operating Procedures. Consulted with Dispatch/Maintenance via airphone. All agreed best action return to departure airport. Declared emergency with ATC. Returned for [an] uneventful landing.  Mechanical failure of Yellow Hydraulic System.

A320 Captain experiences the loss of the Yellow Hydraulic System pressure during cruise flight. ECAM procedures are complied with and after consulting with Maintenance Control; the flight returns to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

On lift off ECAM for Captain pitot and engine 1 reverser unlocked. PFD indications were scrambled. No FD guidance; no auto thrust; no auto pilot. Airframe vibration at 5000 feet 250 knots. Declared emergency vectored for immediate rnav approach. Unable to load rnav approach in FMGC. Abandoned approach and took vectors for the VOR approach. Loaded frequency/course manually in both RMP's. Landed and got ECAM gear system disagree. Taxied to gate.

Took off and had 2 ECAM's for captain pitot and engine 1 reverser no other ecams. No heading commands for FD no auto pilot no auto throttle no altitude commands open com v/s or altitude alerts unable to load the approach for the first officer. tuned VOR APP. Had an airframe vibration for a minute or two slowed to 180 vibration stopped. On captain PFD kept getting symbols that you get with control check on the ground. On landing we got a third ECAM Landing Gear system. At no time did we receive an ECAM that would help us just 2 in the air then one on the ground we declared an emergency stayed close to the airport. We flew the VOR APP with manually tuned radios; as that was all we had. ILS OTS. Normal landing had trucks meet us told flight attendants and passengers.

A319 flight crew experiences ECAM's for Captain's pitot and engine 1 reverser unlocked at rotation. Many autoflight functions are not available and the crew elects to return to the departure airport. With the ILS OTS the RNAV is chosen but cannot be loaded in the FMGC. The VOR approach is then chosen and tuned on the RMP's. After landing a landing gear disagree ECAM is displayed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 177; Flight Crew Type 1205

During climbout; we noticed the flap indicator showed the left TE Flap at 1 degree with the right flap at zero (the selected position). Previously we had hand-flown the aircraft through cleanup and had noticed no asymmetry. The flaps had indicated full up and VNAV had engaged with no speed restriction. We found that the left TE (Trailing Edge) Position Sensor circuit breaker was popped; and concluded that we had no asymmetry; just a failed indicator. We elected to continue to [our destination] without changing anything. Upon descent; the flaps did not respond to handle movement. I elected to reset the popped circuit breaker; which restored flap indicator operation (both flaps indicating zero).Unfortunately; the flaps still did not respond to handle movement. We requested a delaying vector and performed the QRH procedures for Trailing Edge Flap Disagree and Alternate Flap Extension. We recalculated landing data for the Flaps 15 landing; completed all checklists using the QRH and landed uneventfully. At the gate we wrote-up the popped/reset circuit breaker (which remained in) and the alternate flap extension in the logbook; and gave the aircraft to Maintenance. In total; landing was delayed by about 5 minutes.

B737-700 Captain reported flaps did not respond to handle movement; QRH procedures were followed for alternate flap extension to uneventful landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 71; Flight Crew Total 1423; Flight Crew Type 1423

Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Total 905; Flight Crew Type 905

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Laser

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

About 15 miles west of ORD on arrival we were exposed to a laser beam from the left front of the aircraft.  I was Pilot Monitoring; my First Officer (FO) was flying; and I reported the location to ATC.  About 5 minutes later I experienced an intense nauseous feeling.  I thought I was going to be sick.  The intense nauseous lasted maybe 5 minutes and then I started feeling somewhat better. My FO [advised ATC]; we landed and taxied in without incident.  Medical personnel met our flight and checked my vitals; all being normal.  The upset stomach was still present but not as bad as it was in the air.  Side note...The flight was X hours and 10 minutes; about 90 minutes into the flight we ate a crew meal.  I'm not sure whether the nauseous feeling could be food related or if it was because of the laser.

Experience a laser event followed by a pilot incapacitation followed by an inflight [urgency situation] on approach into ORD. Arrived at the gate and was evaluated by EMS. Had to wait an hour for crew transportation to the hotel. Arrived at the hotel after midnight. Stayed up to record the details of the flight. Called [operations] around XA:00 to say I was not rested physically or emotionally to operate the flight tonight that had a hotel pickup time of XB:00 followed by a X hour flight.

Air Carrier Pilot Crew encountered a laser while on final approach; reported that the Captain became ill after the event. First Officer completed a normal landing.