Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 2400

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

This was our first flight of the day and the first leg of the trip. Preflight; pushback and start were completely normal and to SOP. Both engines were started and the Pre-taxi checklist was completed prior to starting to taxi. The weather was clear and all ramp areas were dry. There was a company 737 pushing at about the same time from an adjacent gate. When given taxi clearance from Ramp Tower; we were instructed to transition to the Charlie line for a west taxi to avoid the 737 taxing east. We began our taxi and I visually cleared the right side of our aircraft and verbalized clear 'right' to the Captain at least two times while we were moving toward the Charlie line. Once we were established west bound on the Charlie line I looked forward. The Captain was looking left to ensure we were going to be clear of the 737 taxiing east. In my peripheral vision; I detected movement to our right. I saw a baggage tug with three or four carts in tow traveling toward us from right to left perpendicular to our path at a high rate of speed. I yelled 'watch out' to the Captain. The Captain immediately applied full brakes and abruptly stopped the aircraft preventing a collision with the tug. The tug driver appeared to have been looking at a white sheet of paper while he was driving and the tug driver swerved right toward the west at the last second when he finally saw us. The tug driver continued south without stopping. Ramp Tower witnessed the incident and called us to ask if we got an identification number off the tug. I commented to Ramp Tower that we just had a close call with the tug and we thought the tug number was. About the same time; the Captain asked me to check on the flight attendants. We received a call from the Purser that a flight attendant who had been standing while doing her Cabin safety checks had been hurt. We asked if medical attention was needed and the Purser said yes. We told Ramp Tower we needed to return to the gate and to have the EMTs meet us at the gate. We coordinated with Operations to return to the Gate. It took several minutes to get ground personnel to park us and the jetway back to the aircraft. We blocked in approximately five to seven minutes after the incident. The EMTs arrived shortly thereafter. The Captain stepped back to the Cabin upon completion of the Parking checklist. He asked everyone to remain seated to allow the EMTs to attend to the [injured] Flight Attendant. The EMTs removed [the injured] Flight Attendant from the aircraft.

Pushback from gate was uneventful for a west taxi. Started both engines and completed all checklists prior to calling for our taxi clearance. One of our 737s had pushed from an adjacent gate and was set up to taxi east. When we called Ramp Tower for our taxi clearance; we were given 'taxi around the 737; taxi west on the Charlie line; contact Ground'. We were complying with those instructions and as I was looking left to ensure proper wing tip clearance from the 737; my First Officer yelled out to watch out for the fast moving baggage tractor towing four carts; coming from right to left. I looked up in time to see him zipping by while reading a paper. I had no option but to apply maximum braking on the aircraft to avoid the impact. He swerved away and continued on his merry way. Ramp Control saw it all happen and immediately asked us if we saw the vehicle number. [We thought we saw the vehicle number] but the paint was streaked and scraped quite a bit so we could not be certain of it. Ramp Control told us they were trying to track down this ramp serviceman right away and asked us if we needed any assistance.When I executed the rapid stop; our flight attendants were walking in the aisle performing their safety checks. We received a call from our Purser; letting us know that our 3rd Flight Attendant was down in the aisle and needed medical attention. We immediately let Ramp Control know that we would need to return to the gate and that we would need paramedics. Ramp Control was very helpful in getting us back to gate and sending medical help.Upon return to the gate; I asked for all of our passengers to remain seated while the paramedics tended to the [injured] Flight Attendant. After completing our Parking checklist I opened the cockpit door in time to see one of our passengers tending to the Flight Attendant. I assume she was a medical professional that was helping out. A Flight Attendant Supervisor came on board and fulfilled the requirement to have three flight attendants on board while FA was taken off by the paramedics. He also took her bags back to the domicile office after our replacement arrived. I also spoke with our other two flight attendants. One injured her back but chose to continue. The other reported that he was not injured and also chose to continue. I also called our Duty Manager and filled him in on what had happened.

A320 flight crew reports a near collision with a tug pulling carts during taxi from the gate. Hard braking is used and the tug driver swerves at the last second to avoid collision. A Flight Attendant is injured and the flight returns to the gate for medical assistance.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned a Fan Air valve Remove and Replace. We proceeded to get all the Maintenance Manual (MM) references called out for in the paperwork. When reading the paper work in the MM it calls for the installation of long and short collars on the Thrust Reverser (TR) actuators. The issue is that in all the references attached; and the references for doing this job; the collar part numbers are not listed anywhere. The TR open up and deactivation process; also do not show these collars. In the Boeing Illustrated tool and equipment manual shows a massive sling; which we don't own here. The tool crib found TR locks that worked; but not listed anywhere.The second issue we had that day; is that on the TR open up; states that a minimum of 2 pieces of equipment are necessary to hold the cowl open. I do not believe that the structure is strong enough to be used as one of the hold open pieces; when someone is working in that area (Up inside the fan air valve area); and that a lock MUST be installed to prevent bodily harm. We do not currently own the sling that's called out for in the reference; and the second part number was not able to be found by stores either.  I have supplied ASAP rep with all references listed above. Please help; before someone gets harmed; and or killed under the cowling.

When accessing the Fan Air Valve; Maintenance was unable to secure the Fan Reverser in the open position per the Maintenance Manual because the proper tooling was unavailable.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS RWY 10

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While approaching the initial fix (IF) TNNER for the San Juan; Puerto Rico ILS Runway 10; we heard a commercial airline pilot ahead of us report that his cockpit had been illuminated by a green laser near TNNER.  Approach Control warned us of this laser strike. We asked for clearance to proceed to waypoint REMSY (IAF) instead of TNNER (IF) to allow us to avoid the area where the green laser strike had been reported. Immediately after being cleared to REMSY; our cockpit was illuminated by a very bright ground based green laser coming from the 1:30 clock code position at about six to eight miles from our position. We reported the green laser strike to ATC at approximately (XA:33) Z. The Approach Controller asked if either pilot had sustained any eye injury. We responded that we did not believe we had sustained any eye injuries. I estimated the laser to be approximately four miles southeast of TNNER; or 260 degrees at 8 NM from the SJU VOR. I estimate the source to be on the ground between the 436 feet tall tower and the 489 feet tall tower (shown on the SJU ILS Runway 10 Approach plate).  The green laser was an unnecessary distraction during a critical phase of flight (approach; configuration change; visually searching for arrival traffic; attempting to locate the runway visually; conducting the landing checklist; landing; etc.).  Law enforcement never met us at the airport to take a report. It did not appear that anyone at the FAA  or law enforcement were interested in gathering facts immediately after the event in order to pursue the perpetrators.  The San Juan; PR; TJSJ/SJU-1; (date); Station Information Page (SIP) 3.0; Note 6 says; 'Numerous LASER events have been recorded in area' as a warning to pilots. It seems like laser strikes have become so common in the area of the San Juan Airport that officials just accept this fact. Is law enforcement aggressively investigating these laser strikes in an attempt to hold the perpetrators accountable? Fortunately; tonight; the laser strike caused only a momentary distraction to the pilots. What happens when a persistent series of laser strikes causes the pilots eye injury; disorientation; and/or loss of aircraft with all passengers onboard. Will the FAA and law enforcement treat the event more seriously after such a catastrophic event?Will the FAA; FBI; NTSB; and/or law enforcement aggressively investigate and pursue the perpetrators who are pointing high intensity green lasers at commercial airline cockpits flying into San Juan Airport.

Air Carrier Flight Crew reports Green Laser strike on approach to airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12.0

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 29.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

Aircraft X was on the ground requesting an IFR clearance. I instructed the aircraft to Hold for Release and then issued the clearance and to advise when ready for departure. After listening to the recording of the incident; I did not receive a read back of the hold for release. I then cleared Aircraft Y for an ILS approach. Right after Aircraft Y passed the final approach fix Aircraft X comes off of opposite direction. I immediately issued a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and he replied that he was looking for traffic. I then issued traffic to Aircraft X to which he replied 'we see the traffic passing underneath us.' I informed Aircraft X that his instructions were to hold for release. I also instructed Aircraft X to maintain VFR. I then advised him of additional traffic inbound to which he replied 'we're just going to cancel and return to ....'I should have been clearer to the aircraft on the ground that he is not released for departure due to inbound traffic.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Two ZID Center Controllers reported that an aircraft had been issued an IFR clearance that was supposed to hold for departure; but departed into traffic landing opposite direction.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 400

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

While transiting northbound approximately 200-250 yards off the coast (waterline); I experienced a slow loss of engine power. Turned toward isolated stretch of beach and prepared for a precautionary landing to the south as wind was from that direction. Throttle was wide open with about 1/3 power. I initially thought the cause could be carb ice. Very shortly after wheels touched power increased to what seemed to be full power. Lifted off and made a turn; approximate 30 degree; toward north and about two thirds of the way into turn the power reduced again. Turned back toward beach again and another precautionary landing. As wheels touched; aircraft bounced hard twice. Power was restored after approximately 3 second of rolling on mains; tailwheel never touched. Power seemed to be fully restored. I quickly deduced that there must be a partial fuel blockage. I pulled up straight ahead and climbed to approximately 500 FT to make a very gentle turn to the right toward a nearby airport. I was able to climb to approximately 800 FT but had two more episodes of slow engine power loss during this phase. A violent back and forth rocking of wings seemed to help clear the engine and power was at least partially restored. After arriving at the airport and checking all possible causes; the fuel tank was drained of remaining fuel; the line and valve were removed from the bottom of the fuel tank. The strainer in the tank was found to have a small amount of water and was partially plugged with a trash and a flaky substance. Parts were cleaned and reinstalled.

A J3 Cub lost power at about 800 FT just off the coast; so the pilot attempted a beach landing. Upon touchdown power was restored; (happened twice) so he maneuver vigorously to clear a fuel line; then flew to nearby airport where water and debris were discovered in the fuel tank.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 8175; Flight Crew Type 450

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Evacuated

As we finished our before takeoff checklist we proceeded with a standard takeoff; power was set; gauges were checked and we proceeded with our rotation. As soon as positive rate gear up we heard loud noise as the gear was being retracted; then we had CAS message for hydraulic a low volume as well as rapidly decreasing. At 400 FT and within seconds of this occurring we lowered the landing gear. We proceeded with the checklist called Approach and informed them of the situation and request return to the station. We climbed to 2;000 FT and it was an unrestricted visibility night with no cloud cover. We were cleared to land on Runway 10. The checklist was followed for a hydraulic failure on the A System with no hydraulic volume. Since the primary breaks did not work nor were full flaps available or spoilers; according to the checklist; we proceeded using the emergency brakes which slowed down the aircraft to more or less 60 KTS. As we realized the runway was coming to an end we turned into the grass area to help stop the aircraft. We hit the PAPI light system for Runway 28 which was not illuminated. Once the aircraft came to a complete stop we checked on the passengers; as no one was hurt and we proceed towards the exit of the aircraft.

CE750 Captain experiences Hydraulic System A failure as the gear is retracted on departure. The gear is extended before complete system failure and the flight returns to the departure airport after complying with checklist procedures. Flaps and spoilers are inoperative with the loss of the A System along with normal brakes. The crew is unable to stop on the 11;000 FT plus runway using emergency brakes and a runway excursion occurs.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15.3

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was conducting OJT on Local Control (LC) when my trainee instructed Aircraft X to cross runway 28L at taxiway Delta while Aircraft Y was on a 2 mile final for that same runway.  Aircraft X cleared Rwy28L and came to a stop; but was still clear of the runway as well as the hold bars; and Aircraft X was un-impeded to continue forward.  Aircraft Y was in the flare and about to touch down on runway 28L about 1000 feet down the runway from the approach end; when the CIC approached the trainee and told her to 'send Aircraft Y around.'  The trainee wasted no time and sent Aircraft Y around.  As the trainer; I thought that I had missed something and that maybe the CIC had seen a vehicle enter the runway somewhere.  Aircraft Y was literally about to touch down on RWY28L and the reason the CIC gave for sending him around was that Aircraft X had stopped and was in the 'safety area' of RWY28L.  I believe that sending Aircraft Y around at such a critical phase of flight coupled with the fact that the runway was clear by every definition of the term; led to a very unsafe situation.  Perhaps additional training is needed.  I'm not sure what could be done to prevent this from happening again short of training for the individual who was on CIC at the time.  It seems that they have a different idea of what 'runway clear' means.  What we don't need; is to be creating unsafe situations.

I had just taken over CIC a minute or two previous; and as the Front Line Manager (FLM) left the cab; I plugged in CC1 position to monitor Ground Control.  OJT was taking place at Local Control; with a Local Assist; so I thought it was best to listen to Ground. Traffic was fairly complex; with visual approaches to Runway 28 Left & Right; departing Runway 1 Left & Right; with a mix of Runway 28 Left departures.  Local Control had crossed Runway 28 Left with Aircraft X at Taxiway D; while traffic was a two mile final.  Aircraft X came to a stop half way over the hold position line for the Runway Safety Area (RSA).  Ground reached out to Aircraft X; about the time Aircraft Y was over the approach lights; without a response.  I leaned over to the developmental and said send Aircraft Y around. They did as soon as I said.  Since I was not monitoring Local; I did not hear the readback; however Aircraft Y arrested their rate of descent at the threshold and leveled for 1000 feet or so; than began a slow climb out.  While they were being sent around; Aircraft X checked in on Ground and was given instructions to taxi.The clear of runway issue is a widespread problem in that it has been allowed to go too far with the controllers here at SFO.  Nobody seems to have the pucker factor anymore that this is sacred ground (Runway and RSA); and is the most important part of our job.  Work from the airport out!  There was a recent go around where the pilot took themselves around; due to the slow crossing of a previous arrival. There are many times when the FLM it seems is allowing this to go on in front of their eyes; either ignorant to the actual rule; or too tired from the bouncing around they do between office time and tower cab time; and the multitude of personalities and idiosyncrasies they have in the workforce.  Forget when a CIC is in place; they have no idea how to remove their own personality from the equation to stand up for what is right. I would like to see some rehashing of the rules to get people back on track.  It has all gotten so convoluted that I am not sure anyone knows what is happening most of the time.I really do not know what else to say.

An SFO Controller and CIC report of a go-around caused by an aircraft not exiting the runway completely in the CIC's eyes; but was clear enough in the Locals eyes to let the operation continue.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The DGS [Docking Guidance System] system (the not recording an out time until the aircraft moves part) is new at LAX. Even newer at Gate XXB; our gate. Today we released brakes at 51 and started pushing immediately. The system is supposed to record an out time when the aircraft moves. That would be X51 local; X52 at the very latest. But it showed an out time of X58! Pay wasn't a factor here as we arrived at ZZZ early. But flight time is. I realize that cheating the flight crews out of pay isn't an FAR violation. But lying about the flight time is a direct violation of FAR 117. This flight time was recorded at least 6 minutes; maybe 7 minutes short of what it actually was. Once again; a direct violation of FAR 117. Even though I can't speak for all of the gates; if the company is lying about every flights time by 6-7 minutes that could be a serious FAR flight time violation.

Captain reported that Company DGS [Docking Guidance System] system is not recording flight time correctly for FAR compliance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 3934; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was flying with my son who is a student pilot. He was sitting left seat. I was PIC sitting in right seat. Weather that day was calm with occasional gusting winds due to weather conditions. We were practicing take offs and landings at ZZZ1 (home airport) and ZZZ. Winds at ZZZ were light and variable. At time of incident; wind were less than 5 knots coming from 270 (crosswind). We were on our second landing for this trip at ZZZ. I was talking him through a normal landing; we were set to touch down approximately mid field. As we were touching down; a heavy gust came from behind. This pushed our touch down location further down the runway. With plenty of remaining runway to finish the landing safely; the student pilot braked too hard and locked up both main wheels. This caused the plane to skid and blow both tires. There was no property damage other than the main tires. The plane was disabled on the runway. The student radioed to TRACON to notify them the airport had a disabled aircraft on the runway. Shortly thereafter; the airport manager arrived on site and closed the airport. It took 45 minutes to move the aircraft off the runway at which time the airport was reopened. Both tire were replaced by an onsite mechanic. The aircraft was then flown back to ZZZ1 without further incidence.

Cessna 172 pilot reported an incident when excessive braking on landing resulted in two blown tires.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141.47; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 9699.97

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were descending on the ZZZZZ1 STAR. Just prior to level off at a higher altitude; the controller cleared us to descend via the STAR to 12;000 feet. The PF pointed to the altitude as I set it. However; he went out of VNAV to FLCH because he thought he heard descend to 12;000 feet now. I was busy with a frequency change and getting the new ATIS; and I missed the change in pitch mode. When I looked up; I noticed we were approaching 15;000 feet even though the fix just ahead of us had a at or above 16;000 foot restriction. I called it out and the PF immediately leveled off at 15;000 feet. I immediately informed the Controller and asked if he wanted us to climb back to 16;000 feet. He said we could just 'descend to 12;000 feet.'  There was no conflict with other traffic.I believe this occurred for a number of reasons. It was a very difficult 3-day pairing made longer because of COVID. We were all exhausted; it was a high-workload environment; and the PF had not flown in over a year. He had trouble hearing ATC the entire trip which we attributed to his being off a year. Obviously; there was a breakdown in Verbalize; Verify and Monitor. Lesson learned: especially when tired and in a high-workload environment; strict adherence to SOP is essential.

Air carrier Captain reported the PF overshot the assigned altitude during arrival and attributed it to fatigue; workload and the PF had not flown in a year.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

I'm writing this report many hours after it happened so there's some fogginess as to the exact timing and actions of all that happened. It all happens so fast when you're in the moment. The following is my best recollection. BOS Tower had just cleared us for Takeoff (TO) on runway 9. First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying. EPRs set to 1.05; we started to roll. We did a low speed Reject (approx. 20-30Kts) due to NAV: ADR 1 Fault. Tower then cleared us to make the next left at 'K'. I wouldn't say that we were completely past 'K' but when transitioning from the TO to Reject to Taxi phase all in the span of a few seconds and a few hundred feet; I'm not expecting a clearance to turn off at an 'unnatural' reverse high speed taxiway that is almost abeam my present position. At this point; we were pretty much abeam 'K'. It was super dark; no 'K' intersection lighting; 'K' is a reverse high speed (almost a 130 degree turn) so there were no taxi lines to even clue us in on guidance when getting off from Runway 9. Also; since we were on the runway; the iPad displayed my departure SID and not the taxi chart. When I'm on a runway; I'm not even attempting to fumble with my ipad while simultaneously trying to taxi off an active runway. Normally; once I'm off the runway do I start to consult my taxi chart. When ATC issues a clearance to 'make the next left'; I'm typically not looking abeam my position but up forward more. I moved forward and held short of 4L. The aircraft on a few miles final for 4L was told to [go around]. No separation was lost; as verified by our conversation with ATC when we called him.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Aircrew of a jet transport executed a rejected take-off. Tower cleared aircraft to clear runway at a specific taxiway but due to the night conditions; lack of line guidance; and close proximity of the taxiway; the crew could not see the required taxiway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While taxiing to the runway; Flight Attendant called the flight deck and informed me that there was a passenger with a 'smart bag' on board and that it had a non-removable battery. She said that she had just reviewed the regulations concerning smart bags and realized that the bag was not authorized in the cabin. I informed the Captain and we returned to the gate where a customer service agent disassembled the bag enough to remove the battery. The Captain said he had been aware of the bag but thought it was authorized because the battery was not removable. The event was caused by a misunderstanding of the rules. A contributing factor was the unusual situation of a bag with non-removable battery. A habit of taking the time to reference the regulations when there is a doubt may be a good way to avoid such mistakes. Also asking other crew members for input; as I was not aware of the situation until we were taxiing.

CRJ-700 First Officer reported receiving Flight Attendant notification during taxi of an unauthorized smart bag in the passenger cabin.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

On descent through about 11;000 FT into [destination]; Captain pulled power to idle to begin slowing. We received an 'Engine Oil' aural warning along with master warning; triple chime; and left engine oil pressure message. Captain continued to fly the airplane; and we discovered that the engine was spooling down. I pulled out the QRH and ran the 'Single Engine' procedures checklist. We didn't declare an emergency right away; the Captain continued to fly and did the radios; while I ran the checklist. We decided to attempt a relight since we were on a downwind. I completed the single engine procedures; determined that no damage was suspected. I then complied with the relight procedures in the QRH. When I pressed the start button; nothing happened; the N2 never spooled; and it remained at 0 the entire time. I pressed the button for about 10 seconds; decided it wasn't to be. I completed the checklist; which then led to a Single Engine Landing checklist. At this point the Captain declared an emergency. I completed the Single Engine Landing checklist. I then called the Flight Attendant and we discussed the situation; and I gave her the details and instructions depending on what our outcome would be. I then made a quick PA alerting the passengers to the presence of the emergency vehicles that would be out as a precaution. We then entered about a 10 mile left base; landed and taxied to the gate without any further incident. Everyone seemed to be happy as they got off the airplane. I think we handled it well; tried to relight the engine; then decided that it was best to move on and prep for a single engine landing. We communicated well with each other as well as the passengers.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported on descent they received a left engine oil pressure warning; likely as a result of a flameout. A restart attempt was unsuccessful and the flight landed after declaring an emergency.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working a combined position; just had a possible loss of separation with 2 other aircraft and was writing down that information when I heard the collision avoidance alarm go off. I noticed that Aircraft X was directly over Aircraft Y with 500 FT separation. I quickly issued traffic and Aircraft X said he had an RA. I did not see the resolution. I don't know if he climbed or just leveled off. Staff a hand off; sequencer or extra set of eyes to help out when it's that busy.

TRACON Controller described a TCAS RA event between an IFR and VFR aircraft when distracted by other duties; the reporter stated an extra set of eyes would have been helpful.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

During a visual approach to runway 33L in Baltimore; the Approach Controller advised us of traffic to be aware of; Aircraft Y at 1;000 feet MSL that was moving from right to left and would be crossing 'mid-field'. Now on tower frequency; we saw Aircraft Y and were informed that its pilot had us in sight and was instructed to maintain visual separation with us. At first it appeared far enough away to not be a factor. However; as Aircraft Y crossed the airport property; its trajectory seemed to be on a perfect collision course with where we would end up in the event of a go-around; and uncomfortably close. My main concern was how close Aircraft Y was to our airplane on short final as it crossed 'mid-field' and that; if I had to go around; what the reaction time of the controller would be 1. processing the situation; 2. reaching Aircraft Y's pilot and; subsequently; 3. Aircraft Y's pilot's reaction time. Although I did not voice my concern to the controller; I did quickly discuss with the first officer options if we had to go around. My estimation is that a collision could have happened within 5-7 seconds of the initiation of a go-around; even accounting for my planning. We landed without a TCAS alert and without incident. At the gate; I telephoned the tower to discuss my concerns. I asked what their plans were in the event of a go-around. The controller (didn't get name or specific title) informed me that this situation happens several times daily and they would have immediately instructed the helicopter pilot to take evasive action. He said that they have discussed the scenario several times before and have actually had traffic alert issues in the past; but perhaps could revisit it given the close proximity this time. End phone call.A simple solution is for ATC to have Aircraft Y pause until a potential go-around by the airplane is not an issue or have Aircraft Y take a different route altogether. I'm not trying to get anyone in trouble. I just think that this situation isn't necessary. Why allow such an elevated risk? Could there be some complacency here because of how frequently helicopters are allowed to do this? And; if so; how much reaction time is sacrificed due to complacency?

Pilot reports of a problem with a helicopter that would be in conflict with them as it crossed midfield and they were on short final. The crossing aircraft looked closer to the pilot then midfield and he was concerned how close they would be if they had to make a missed approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During the approach briefing for RNAV GPS 35 at AVL; I had pointed out to the Captain that due to obstacles and terrain characteristics in the vicinity of AVL; ATC would keep us high until very close to the station. As anticipated; Atlanta Center kept us at a high altitude (I do not remember exactly; but well above 15;000) until about 12-15 miles from the station. Upon being handed to Asheville Approach; and considering the terrain; night time; and the need for sufficient airspace to descend to a reasonable altitude in order to execute an effective and stable approach; I requested radar vectors for the RNAV GPS 35 (glideslope for the ILS was out of service). Approach instructed us to descend to 6;000 and to a heading that would put the aircraft on a downwind to Runway 35.  Subsequently; the Approach Controller gave us a heading that put the aircraft on a left base leg to Runway 35; and instructed us to descend from 6;000 to 5;100. During this descent; the GPWS issued an aural TERRAIN caution. We immediately initiated a climb; advised ATC of the situation; and stopped the climb at 6;000; at which point the GPWS silenced. In addition; we advised we had the field in sight; and were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 35.  The minimum sector altitude corresponding to the left base leg to Runway 35 stated 6;200 ft. We should have queried ATC of the validity of the instruction to descend from 6;000 to 5;100.  From a CRM standpoint; The Jeppessen AVL Airport Reference Page alludes to the fact that a high rate of descent in the vicinity of the airport may cause a GPWS activation due to mountainous terrain in the vicinity (We did not exceed 1500 fpm); hence an emphasis on this matter during the approach briefing; in conjunction to minimizing the rate of descent to; perhaps; no more than 700 fpm; more than likely would have avoided the situation.

Air carrier First Officer reported a CFIT event during approach under Approach Control which was followed by an uneventful visual landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

There was a line of storms and weather moving generally north to south along the Pennsylvania/New Jersey border. Our flight was given clearance to fly a route at 10;000 due to many of the departure fixes being closed by NY Center. After departure; we began planning our best route across the weather using the aircraft radar. We were being vectored; and decided the best action was to fly northbound; parallel and on the east side of the weather; to cross at a more advantageous place to the north; based on ATC advice and a PIREP. We thought there was a better place to cross just south of COATE; but ATC told us it was unavailable.As we began penetrating the outer layers of the weather; the turbulence became occasional moderate and a lot of static built up in the radios (we tried both Comm 1 and Comm 2); at times making communication very difficult with ATC. There was a point of confusion where ATC cleared us 'resume own nav; direct LAAYK (I think) when able' while we were on a vector. We hadn't gone far enough north to accept direct LAAYK; which would have involved a turn west and directly into the weather. We probably misinterpreted this clearance to mean we could navigate on our own (deviations) until we were able to turn direct LAAYK. So we turned more to the north/northeast to continue paralleling the weather and wait for a good place to cross.A few minutes later while we were in the clouds; again with severe static on both radios; the radar picked up red returns right in front of us. We were unable to communicate with ATC and chose to take the safest action available to us; and self-deviated briefly to the left; and then once past the red; back to the right which would have rejoined us with the original course we were flying. A few miles further north; ATC assigned us a vector to the west; and said that on their radar they thought there was a gap there. We were not seeing a better situation materializing to the north; the heading was outside the sweep of our radar; so we decided to accept the turn to the west to get a look. By the time we rolled out of the turn we were in the weather; and the best option was to continue and get through it. While on the western heading we encountered moderate turbulence; and although the autopilot did not deactivate; we encountered some up/downdrafts causing airspeed gains of around 40 knots; followed by an altitude loss of around 300 ft. I maintained attitude and worked to return to the assigned altitude and appropriate speed.Clarify instructions with ATC prior to action when there is any doubt. Communicate better with ATC when needing to take deviations. Communicate with ATC when having radio issues (static) and attempt to pre-warn that I may need deviations while unable to contact them. Have a backup plan. Be more assertive with ATC when an assigned or suggested action is not the best option in my opinion.

EMB-175 First Officer reported encountering moderate turbulence; precipitation; and static in the VHF radios during flight over eastern Pennsylvania.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I'm noticing a very concerning trend on our marshaling throughout our system. I have seen numerous times where when parking at the gate; the Marshaler isn't even looking up at the cockpit anymore. They seem to be focused on the chocks! Now with the new Ops coming out; I'm even more concerned for safety. I have had a few instances were either one or both engines were running; and the Marshaler gave the all clear signal; while my hand was showing the 'not clear' (fist) in the window. Of course they didn't see it; because again; they are so focused on the chocks! I had a couple of incidents where both engines were still running; icy ramp; stopped aircraft with 'do not approach hand in window.' Shortly; thereafter; the Blue External Power Available light illuminated! In other words; they were plugging in external power on an icy ramp with the #2 engine still running! Have we forgotten that the front of the engine has suction! I believe we had warning markings for the engine footprint at one time. I have talked to the Ramp Supervisors after these situations. They all agree training and flow through is an issue. There are a few Ramp Agents out there that do know how to marshal safely; and understand hand signals; but they seem to be fairly rare right now. With the winter season upon us; I hope we can address this expediently; or I fear someone is going to get hurt! Whoever is training these Ramp Agents perhaps needs to evaluate their own training skills. These Marshalers are not following a simple procedure that we have done for decades. If not; I fear someone is going to get hurt at some point! Let's put safety first on this one please!

Air carrier Captain reported numerous SOP violations in ramp operations that could lead to injury.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 233; Flight Crew Total 8079; Flight Crew Type 7158

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Initial setup and brief was LINKK arrival; with visual ILS 27. Weather was clear; with excellent visibility. At TOD IAH changed to East flow; and we were given the NNCEE arrival. Approach control said expect RNP Y 9. We requested 8R since our parking gate was on the north side. Were told 'standby; we'll see'. Frequency change; and no reference to 8R request. Then cleared RNAVP Y 9 via HOWLN; maintain 200 knots. I observed Pilot Flying choose RNAV Y 9; with HOWLN transition. Other radio calls and congestion and nonstandard speed change prevented from looking into the LEGS page to see it tie into the HOWLN we were proceeding toward. Immediately after TEXXN we realized it did not turn and turned the aircraft with heading select.Approach queried about being outside the turn as our actual heading turned through approximately 330. Approach control said maintain current heading'. I immediately asked what heading do you want; we are currently in the turn. First response was 260 heading. We initiated a turn reversal; then approach said; I see you are in the turn; turn right 060; descend 3000; cleared the visual runway 9. I acknowledged. Soon thereafter were given 'maintain 6000; turn heading 100.' Responded with climbing back to 6000. Controller asked if we were still visual with 9. (It was perfectly clear; with unusual 30+ mile visibility). Responded yes; still visual. Re-cleared the visual runway 9. Flew the visual to an uneventful landing."

First Officer reported failure to complete FMS setup following three approach clearance changes.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 100

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

At approximately 8 miles from N47 flight following was terminated and I switched from 125.15 to 122.8 which is the CTAF for N47. At that time I began to announce my position and intentions for N47 on 122.8. I continued to self-report 5 additional times up to and including my final approach to runway 26. Audible on 122.8 were other aircraft at fields other than N47. No other aircraft from N47; or en route to N47; were heard on the CTAF at any time during this incident. On final to runway 26 I was headed into the sun and had some minor sun glare issues. Upon touchdown and beginning roll out; and while still on the active runway; another aircraft taking off downwind passed over top of me by an estimated 150 feet horizontal and 35 feet vertical separation. I could not see this aircraft approaching as it blended into the background and the sun glare. Witnesses on the ground (including two CFI's) report the offending aircraft taxied out to runway 8; turned onto the runway without stopping/looking and immediately proceeded to take off downwind. The identity of the offending aircraft and/or pilot could not be established. There were no injuries or damage as a result of this incident.

GA pilot reported observing another aircraft takeoff opposite direction during rollout at non towered airport.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assigned WOTRO FL290; mistook it for WINER at FL290.

We received a descent clearance to cross WOTRO intersection on the arrival at FL290. On the LEGS page; WINER intersection (the intersection after WOTRO) was charted to be crossed at FL290.I mistakenly thought that ATC wanted us to cross WINER at 290; and descended accordingly. ATC asked us during the descent if we would make the crossing at WOTRO; we were a couple thousand feet high at this point and realized the error.  The Controller advised us to just give him our best rate down; which we did.I think we crossed WOTRO approximately 1000 FT high. The Controller handed us off to ABQ and our flight proceeded uneventfully.

Crossing altitude restriction charted at later intersection was assigned to earlier intersection; which flight crew mistook and descended late.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 5900; Flight Crew Type 890

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On the RIPKN1 arrival to BWI I had two wake turbulence encounters while following a B-737.  The first occurred at 9000 feet msl between CAPKO and RAVNN; and the second occurred at 4000 feet msl between RAVNN and RIPKN.  I noted to the controller the first wake turbulence encounter that caused the aircraft to roll approximately 30 degrees to the right with significant turbulence. Shortly after that encounter I was switched over from Center to Potomac TRACON.  The second wake turbulence occurrence was much less severe; but resulted in a delayed turn initiation to a heading of 310 degrees for vectors to runway 15L.  I made a radio call to the controller noting I would be slowing due to wake turbulence of the aircraft ahead on the arrival.  The TRACON controller then instructed me to turn to the heading of 310 for the arrival.  Several minutes later; the TRACON controller contacted me explaining the danger of the late turn and I agreed with his input and continued on.  I did not make any response and I do not believe the final controller realized the extent of the wake turbulence encounter.  Essentially my distraction by the wake turbulence encounter led to diminished situational awareness during the final stages of the arrival to BWI.  I was thankful for the TRACON controller's diligence but it was my responsibility to maintain better awareness during that stage of flight.

Eclipse 500 pilot reported deviating from assigned heading on arrival into BWI when he experienced wake turbulence in trail of a B737.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 970

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

The precautionary landing in question occurred on DATE. We prepared for takeoff and it seemed like another routine local flight with one of my students out of ZZZ. My student wanted to bring his son on the flight and I did not have a problem with it since we were in weight and balance. The density altitude was at 800 feet. When taking off Runway XXL; the student advanced the throttle to takeoff power; and I noted that the oil pressure; temperature; and RPM was in the normal operation range. The takeoff roll seemed a bit sluggish; but I thought it was because of the passenger's extra weight. At appropriate rotation speed; the student pitched the nose a little bit passed (Vy) attitude (closer to Vx) during the takeoff. I instructed him to pitch the nose down toward the proper (Vy) attitude; during the climb; the stall warning indicator activated. I crossed checked the airspeed and RPM. The rpm read 2100; which is below the normal engine operations; and the airspeed was reading 55 KIAS. Again; I instructed the student to keep pitching the nose down and noted that he was at a regular (Vy) attitude. I crossed check the airspeed and rpm; and we were indicating between 48-50 KIAS and 1800-1900 RPM. At that time; I took the flight controls; contacted ATC; and advised them that we needed to head back to the airport as soon as possible.While decreasing the angle of attack; the aircraft started to sink; and the stall warning horn continued with the RPM and airspeed not rising. I gave the plane an ample amount of time to recover from the unusual state we were in. I felt it was very uncommon for the aircraft to be performing like it was making a high-density altitude departure. ATC gave me the option to either try to make the left traffic pattern or head back to the airport. Because of the 15 degrees offset departure leg that is the practice at ZZZ; and the commercial buildings positioned southeast of Runway XXL were in my flight path; I believed the best course of action was to [advise ATC] [then] head immediately back towards the runway in the interest of safety. Once I [advised ATC]; I made a 30 degrees right bank and pitched the nose down to ensure I was not going to stall. I turned the aircraft around and landed on Runway XYL to ensure that I had plenty of distance to come to a safe stop. Once I landed the airplane; I exited on taxiway and told ATC why I [advised].

CE-172 Flight Instructor reported an uneventful air return landing due to a critical engine malfunction shortly after takeoff.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

While climbing through 16000 we noticed that the left engine oil temperature gauge was rising to red line. The temperature stopped rising and went back down into the green arc; but continued to bounce between the green and yellow arc. We had leveled off at FL190 and the temperature continued with the same indications. The temperature eventually spiked past red line until the gauge was pegged out. At that point we decided to perform a precautionary shutdown of the left engine and return to [base].

SA-227 Captain reported that after the left engine oil temperature indication became erratic during climb the crew performed a precautionary shutdown and returned to base.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

On approach into ZZZ; the FO (First Officer) was hand flying the RNAV approach at night in VMC. He got low on the profile coming through the 'Cut;' we got an amber 'too low terrain' alert. I told him to level off. After the cut we continued and landed. We discussed the incident after engine shutdown.I should have said something sooner before the warning. I saw him start trending below the vertical path but thought he would correct it. The FO got hired [recently]; and had only been into ZZZ on IOE (Initial Operating Experience) during the day. I was at the end of a 12 + 15 duty day. He got on the trip after I had flown a turn so this was his first pilot flying leg that I had observed. I had never flown with him before.

Air Carrier Captain reported the First Officer descended below the approach profile and they received a terrain alert.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

On takeoff Captain raised landing gear and nose gear failed to retract resulting in an ECAM. Captain accomplished ECAM which resulted in normal gear indication but ECAM read 'Landing gear gravity extend.' All indications other than left over ECAM were normal with gear up. Captain contacted Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the Duty Manager to discuss further action. All three parties as well as the crew felt that the aircraft was 100% and ok to continue. Flight was normal and uneventful. Dispatch declared an emergency upon our arrival on our behalf. Gear was extended normally and a normal landing and taxi to gate was accomplished.

A320 First Officer reports nose landing gear failure to retract after takeoff. After ECAM actions nose gear is retracted with ECAM reading 'Landing gear gravity extend'. Landing gear extends normally during approach at destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 429; Flight Crew Type 300

Before departure the aircraft in front of me asked tower or ground to activate their VFR flight plan and tower responded for them to contact PHXA (Phoenix Approach) which seemed a little confusing to me as they should be given a Prescott Radio frequency.I requested a VFR departure direct DRK (Drake VORTAC) then NW. It was busy prime time for training and two runways were in use with one controller on 125.3MHZ. While on upwind from Rwy3R I was instructed to fly runway heading then that was amended to turn left above and in front of and above a departing C172 on upwind of RWY3L to a heading of more than 300 or 330. After turning left Direct DRK and while climbing I was alarmed by the converging traffic on my ADSB display and I felt a bump that is consistent with small bump of wake turbulence from another aircraft. I begin wagging my wings looking for the traffic but I did not see anything and continued in the general direction towards DRK. Then I heard an aircraft report that he had taken evasive action to avoid traffic that I assumed was me. I attempted to report my location on the frequency. This was very scary as I did not visually see any traffic. Tower said that he thought I was going over to PHXA and I replied negative I was VFR.I never did see another aircraft but it was scary seeing what was displayed on the ADSB and watching everything converge to DRK; feeling the wake and hearing another pilot had to take evasive action. I think there was a lot of traffic converging to DRK for the VOR12 approach into PRC and next time I will just depart the area without going to DRK as there is a lot of converging traffic and multiple agencies (approach and tower/PRC and PHXA). Since PRC tower assumed I was going over to PHXA maybe something was assumed and that I was being watched on radar and or separated from other traffic. Since perhaps I asked to depart the area by going to Drake Vortac (DRK) it might have been assumed that I was going over to PHXA and this might have added to the general confusion of my intentions.

PA28 pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in the vicinity of PRC airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

[We were] on the FLIPR TWO Arrival at 10;000 FT over Virginia Key (VKZ); following 747-400 approximately 1;000 FT above our altitude. Aircraft encountered wake turbulence. [We] could not maintain altitude; pitch or roll [and] abruptly lost approximately 300 FT; rolled left and right; pitched nose down. [We] turned off course [and] recovered control of aircraft. Informed ATC; passengers; and flight crew reported no injuries. Landed and received ACARS message for Severe Turbulence Logged incident in logbook. ATC caused this by too close spacing. Also; no wind at altitude was a major contribution. Amazing that 24 hours later; same flight; same place; ATC tried to put the flight too close to 777 heavy; different winds. ATC needs more spacing.

We were at level flight at 10;000 FT; clean configuration; 250 KTS; inside of FLIPR on the FLIPR 2 arrival. I noticed an aircraft 8 miles ahead of us about 11;000 FT descending. I asked ATC the aircraft type and they responded it was a 747. I noticed there were calm winds so I began a speed reduction to 220 KTS to provide for more spacing. We continued and a few moments later we ran into the 747 wake turbulence. The aircraft rolled sharp right pitched down and began to lose altitude. I corrected as trained we lost about 400 FT; and were off course about 30 degrees about a 340 degree heading. We contacted ATC got a lower altitude to 8;000 FT and than a turn to 280 degrees heading off course. To my knowledge no one was hurt. The seat belt sign was on and all flight attendants were in their seats.I wish ATC would let you know when you are behind a Heavy and not only when there is minimum separation of 5 miles. This way the pilot could better look at all the factors such as wind at altitude; the heavies relationship to your aircraft to name a few. I feel 10 miles should be a minimum for separation behind a Heavy.

B737-800 flight crew reported wake vortex encounter in trail of a B747-400 on arrival to MIA that resulted in loss of pitch and roll control and 300 FT altitude excursion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

About 3-5 minutes after takeoff I noticed an odd smell; something like plastic permeate the cockpit. I looked back and at first I didn't see anything; but a few moments later I looked back and saw what looked like a mist building in the cabin. At this point I decided to return. I asked the First Officer to tell ATC we needed to return. He did this and then he also told them that we had smoke in the cabin. I then turned around and told the passengers that we were returning. They agreed we should; and also said it smelled like plastic. I'm not sure at what point but I asked the First Officer to declare an emergency as well; and he requested the fire trucks with ATC. At this point I had the First Officer look in the back of the QRH at the non-EICAS message producing checklist; which directed him to the smoke/fume removal checklist. We then executed this checklist; which included dumping the cabin which we did. Around this time I called the Duty Manager (after trying to connect to Maintenance); told him of the situation and also told him that we needed to dump fuel since we were over max landing weight. After we hung up I told ATC of our intentions to dump fuel; and they said that was fine. We executed the fuel dump checklist at about 3;000 FT over the water. We ended up landing at about 29;970 LBS. (Max landing is 30;000 LBS). We landed uneventfully; taxied in (followed by the fire trucks) and off loaded the passengers. They seemed fine; were happy with returning.

G200 Captain experiences smoke with a burnt plastic smell shortly after takeoff. After declaring an emergency they return to the departure airport. Fuel is dumped so as to land below maximum landing weight.


Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

We were filed to RDU on the South Boston Four Arrival via ROA. The last ATC Controller prior to Approach Control cleared us direct to ALDAN (a fix on our filed route and the STAR). We understood the clearance to be 'direct ALDAN; comply with the arrival and arrival speeds.' When we were handed off Approach Control asked if we were flying the ALDAN ONE Arrival?  We answered 'no; we're on the South Boston Four' and he replied. 'OK; that explains it.' We never understood the Controller to say expect the ALDAN ONE or plan to fly the ALDAN ONE Arrival (a different arrival than originally filed). Both arrivals have the same early fixes at ROA; ALDAN at 12;000 FT and BILLA. After BILLA the Approach Controller gave us heading and altitude vector which we were expecting while flying the South Boston arrival. The vector was given to comply more with the ALDAN ONE arrival the Controller thought we were flying. We never changed the arrival information in our FMS (flight plan) and complied with all crossings and speed restrictions on the SOUTH BOSTON FOUR arrival landing northeast on Runway 5L at RDU. There needs to be better clarification between ATC and pilots as to which arrival to fly into RDU being that both arrivals have the same fixes starting at ROA on the two arrivals in question.

Confusion reigned when ATC cleared an E-170 flight crew direct to ALDAN; a fix on both their filed South Boston STAR into RDU and the 'ALDAN' STAR--which includes several common fixes. At no time were they cleared 'via' either STAR. The flight was eventually vectored for an approach and the confusion never satisfactorily resolved.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flying on A321S when [Flight Attendant] #3 showed me that her exit at 2L is partially blocked by a row of seats. There is no protective position if an evacuation happens. You cannot grab assist handle to get into protective position. We approached the Captain who was a bit shocked to see this. Then the Captain asked a maintenance person who stated that the blocking of the exit should not be. Also stated that he had never seen this before today. The row adjacent to exit needs to be removed for safety reasons. Please review this aircraft for our safety.

Flight Attendant reported concerns over an A321 interior modification that now has seats blocking the L2 door and could cause egress problems during evacuation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Wake turbulence encounter with resulting 40 degrees bank before correction. Plane ahead was Boeing 737 on same SID.

Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on departure out of BWI in trail of a B737.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Once on final for [Runway] XXR; we got a TCAS RA event from what appeared to me an (other carrier) aircraft that overshot the final for XXL. We did not have the transponder in TA mode because we were never given a Traffic Advisory from ATC; and did not have the aircraft in sight as instructed by our guidance. The RA instructed us to Adjust Vertical Speed. It commanded approximately 1500 FPM descent. We were at flaps 10 and 1;500 feet AGL. As we descended per the RA we continued to configure the aircraft. We were below 1;000 feet by the time we got to flaps 30. The aural glideslope warning sounded. We knew we needed to go-around but couldn't because of the aircraft above us. When I looked at the ND (Navigation Display); I saw the red square showing the intruding aircraft right above us at +5. It was at 800 feet when we got the clear of conflict aural message and elected to go around.The (other carrier) aircraft; in my opinion; went through their intended final for XXL. A contributing factor was the lack of notification by ATC.

While descending through approximately 2;000 feet AGL on the visual approach and on the ILS glideslope to Runway XXR in ZZZ; we received a TCAS RA Descend. The conflicting traffic was slightly above and behind us on Runway XXL. We believe the Descend RA extinguished at approximately 800 feet AGL (although a review of the FRM (Fault Reporting Manual) afterwards says it should be inhibited 'below approximately 1;100 feet radio altitude'). After following the Descend command and by the time the command extinguished; we were not in a stabilized position to land. We executed a go-around. We were not informed about the traffic by Approach and therefore did not meet the requirements to switch to TA Only for Runways XXL and XXR in ZZZ. We were vectored around for a normal landing on XXR. As we switched to ZZZ Tower; another aircraft in front of us also experienced a go-around for the same situation.Presumably the conflicting traffic met the requirements to switch to TA Only because they keyed up on the MIC and said they didn't overshoot and we should/can switch to TA Only. However; we didn't meet the requirements to switch to TA Only.  ATC never asked us to report them in sight; presumably because they were behind us! So; what happens to our RA resolution when the conflicting traffic is in TA Only and transgressing on us? Presumably they can't be offered an RA resolution (which would likely have been for them to climb). If they had climbed the Descend RA 'pressure' on us could have been alleviated sooner. Instead we were forced lower and lower. And all of this was close to the ground. Even though the RA inhibits reaching 'approximately 1;100 feet radio altitude' the conflict with the other aircraft still exists; and we were pretty sure we were below 1;000 feet before the RA extinguished (as evidence by being already slightly into the 1;000 feet white tape). When the RA finally went away we executed a go-around from about 600-800 feet; but the traffic conflict doesn't magically go away.This event occurred right as we were configuring to land; so we never had a chance to fully configure prior to 1;000 feet AGL; as maneuvering for the RA was taking up our attention. The time in the RA resolution mode was more than momentary. It seemed long and sustained enough that it felt like it would just RA us into the ground. As I now knew a go-around was imminent there was a slight moment in my mind I thought about going around right then and there; but the RA continued. I can see where a Crew may be spring loaded to go-around even though the Descend RA is still present.The FO recognized that the traffic showed '+500' on the MFD display. The FAA defines a Near Midair as 'an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft...' We were likely very close to meeting that definition.There was a slight tail wind at altitude for aircraft joining final from left base to runway XXL allowing for increased potential for overshoot. Maybe a very slight overshoot by the other aircraft and the tight sequencing by ATC created this incident; but we can't be sure. It's possible ATC was sequencing aircraft too tight.

B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported receiving an RA on approach requiring an evasive maneuver.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X is a parachute operations aircraft. This aircraft operates in the close vicinity of the LGA MILTON FOUR Arrival in the area of BEUTY (FIX). The request of the operator and PIC is to climb to 13500 and operate the jump ops. The LGA arrivals cross BEUTY at 10000. This is a conflict of airspace as the jump ops and the arrivals cannot operate at the same time.ZNY has had countless conversations with the PIC and owner on the need of an agreed to Letter of Agreement (LOA). We have met to make this happen. Soon after the ZNY Facility created a LOA based on our conversations. There has not been an agreement to date. Not because of the need to change information in the LOA but more so the vocal reluctance on [the owner] to sign and agree to a LOA. This event the issue was the PIC did not notify ATC that all the jumpers did not jump when the PIC stated jumpers away. He requested to hold at 12000 for a second. This turned into almost two minutes. At this time the LGA arrivals were stuck high and multiple coordination was needed to be done based on the lack of communication about the jumpers. This area has too much volume to allow a safe operation without clear and precise communication. There are many documented times that this is an unsafe location to have this operation above 9500. Terminate operations above 9500.

ZNY Controller reports of a skydiving operation in close proximity to an arrival route into LGA. Controller states aircraft pilot did not advise when all jumpers where out. The Controller reports that IFR aircraft were stopped at altitudes to keep them away from the jumpers and this made them high on the approach.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The parachute jump area was active VFR/145 at XS90. This area is controlled by AUS app and they notify SAT app and ZHU RND sector 92 when active. The jump plane was climbing in the area southbound and spilled out of the depicted protected airspace. Meanwhile Aircraft X was on the SETZR SID from SAT climbing to FL230. As the targets began to merge I turned Aircraft Y to MERCR intersection on the SID to pull south and issued an initial heading of 15 degrees right to help expedite the vector. This turn kept him an addition 2 miles south of the depicted jump area (the SID takes departures along the southern boundary of jump area). After reevaluating the situation I stopped Aircraft Y at 14000 below the jump plane at 14500. Aircraft X was climbing unusually slow. Majority of the time jets will top this area. As soon as I un-keyed the jump plane began a decent. Aircraft x responded to RA and reported seeing traffic 400 ft above.This has been an ongoing issue for slow climbers or turbo props on this SID with the parachute jump areas active. As stated above the jump are sits just off the SID were the east departures off SAT intercept on a northeast heading then turn east on SID. This jump area is located within SAT app who owns 13000 and below and AUS app who owns 12000 and blow and our 92 sector. I do not have control for turns from SAT until out of 13000 and have active MOA at 8000-12000 south of the SID. For many reasons this is an unsafe place for jump are:1) In a major departure corridor for SAT app.2) Jump planes spill out of depicted area.3) SAT app does not ensure departures top jump planes.4) AUS app does not keep them in areas.1) Don't allow parachute jump operations in or near a major departures or arrival corridors.2) Move SID south.3) Cap jump area altitude to 12000/13000 and SAT app should be required to ensure separation via alt or vector before shipping to 92 sector.4) AUS app needs to monitor their jump planes to prevent spilling out.

ZHU Controller reported a NMAC between an air carrier and a jump plane due to the proximity of the jump area to the SID routing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Upon exiting the Terminal C Ramp area on Taxiway B at Intersection K; we were instructed to taxi to Runway 4L via Taxiway B to D; giving way to a B757 exiting at Taxiway S. As we came around the corner on Taxiway B; we mistakenly veered onto Taxiway S which angles off to the right and parallels Taxiway A and B; we thought we were on Taxiway B. About the time we realized it; Ground told us to rejoin B at G. No further mention was made; and the remainder of flight operations remained normal. This intersection is poorly designed and the lighting at Intersection B/S should be designated as a hot spot.

The Reporter stated that the crew had great difficulty at the intersection of B; S and D determining exactly which taxiway they were on. They had begun their taxi at Terminal Charlie and were cleared to Runway 4 but progressing around the corner they lost situational awareness and could not clearly determine from the chart or taxiway signs where they were to transition to B. The Reporter suggests a hot spot on the airport diagram so that crews will look closely at the chart in that area.

A pilot reported that while taxiing to Runway 4L from Terminal C on Taxiway B at the B; S and D intersection he mistakenly entered Taxiway S because of poor signage and a confusing airport diagram.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3900; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We thought we were cleared to descend out of FL430 after responding to and reading back a clearance to descend. As we passed through FL420 ATC cleared us to FL400 with the statement that the previous descent clearance had not been for us. No known loss of separation. We subsequently determined that clearance had been for a similar call sign. My guess is that our readback was either blocked by the other aircraft or ATC did not realize it was us acknowledging the clearance. I believe contributing factors include: We had not been made aware of a similar call sign upon checking in on the frequency. Fatigue we had already completed nearly 9 hours of flying including an ocean crossing in what was a back side of the clock operation for our circadian rhythm. Our failure to adequately monitor the frequency.

A small transport crew acknowledged a descent clearance and began a descent that was intended for another aircraft with a nearly identical 'N' number. No warning of a similar call sign had been given.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On the Arrival we encountered a line of weather that was moving west to east and were given deviations to maneuver around the weather while lining up for downwind on Runway 18R. ATIS was calling for +RA on the field with wind shear advisories in effect. The Captain and I reviewed the wind shear procedure and precautions well in advance of arriving into the area. Once we were cleared for the approach to 18R; Tower warned of possible wind shear on a 1 mile final to runway 18R. At the time we were on roughly a 4 mile final and planned to carry an additional 5 knots of airspeed. Winds were reported as 250 at 11 knots. At roughly a 1 mile final (300' AGL) we encountered about a 20 knot loss of airspeed along with a Ground proximity Warning System (GPWS) 'GLIDESLOPE' alert. As the Pilot Flying (PF); I recognized the wind shear and immediately pushed the throttles up to correct the situation while performing the wind shear procedure.Although I think we safely aviated through the problem and recovered safely on the second approach; here's what we both learned from the debrief. While performing the wind shear escape maneuver as the PF I said; 'wind shear' but did not make it 100% clear to the Captain what I was doing. There was some miscommunication between the Captain and I whether or not we were doing a wind shear escape or a go-around. We did not receive a 'Windshear' warning from the GPWS.

Widebody Aircraft First Officer reported performing a successful windshear escape maneuver; but noted a possible lack of communication with the Captain as to whether he was performing a windshear maneuver or a go-around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Airport; Company Policy; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related

During our taxi in; we noticed a great deal of FOD on the #1 engine side of the Safety Zone.  Before entering the Safety Zone;  I stopped the jet; set the parking brake; and signaled to the Ramp Agents that there was FOD in the Safety Zone (apparently they did not notice the FOD until we brought it to their attention).  It was obvious that an effective FOD walkdown had not been done prior to our arrival.  After one Ramp Agent picked up the largest; most obvious pieces of FOD and cleared the Safety Zone; we continued to taxi into the Safety Zone.  When we shut down the jet; I noticed a great deal of additional trash and FOD in and around the Safety Zone.  The area outside the BWI Maintenance Offices and Maintenance vehicles appeared very much like a trash dump with garbage and FOD littering the ground immediately in front of the BWI Safety Zone.  Much of the FOD was in and appeared to have blown into the Safety Zone.  I did a FOD walkdown; mostly within the Safety Zone; and I picked up the following items:  1 newspaper page; 2 bin slips; 1 transfer tag; 1 paper bag tag; 1 piece of carbon paper; 3 plastic bag tags; 1 receipt; 1 paper label; 1 cigarette butt; 1 yellow plastic zip strip; 1 red plastic stir stick piece; 1 elastic strap; 1 orange zip strip; 11 pieces of black plastic; 2 pieces of safety wire; 1 metal threaded bolt; 1 white plastic piece; 1 metal staple; 1 metal rivet; 1 rubber/metal baggage leg; 1 metal can top; 1 small metal bar; 1 red leather strap; 1 metal lock; 2 zipper pulls; 2 metal washer pieces; and 8 stones.   Unfortunately; the large amount of FOD in and around the Safety Zones (50 pieces today) is typical in BWI.  There are short periods of time when FOD awareness in BWI seems to get better (after it is brought to the attention of Leadership); then things seem to quickly go back to the usual lack of concern.   A FOD Program cannot operate effectively with an occasional 'shot in the arm.'  Everyone needs to remain engaged; be proactive; and aware at all times in order to have an effective FOD Program.  The proper signals must come from top Leadership personnel and be reinforced by the Supervisors.  The BWI Station Manager needs to take full responsibility for implementing an ongoing effective FOD awareness and FOD Prevention Program.  It should not continuously degrade (as it has been doing) into a program typified by apathy and noninvolvement.  The FOD awareness and FOD Prevention Program needs to be proactive and not reactive.  Everyone needs to participate in the FOD Program.  The Station Manager; Manager of Ramp and Operations; the Ramp Supervisors; and Ramp Agents need to be properly trained and need to actively participate in the FOD Program.  It needs to be a regular habit; not an occasional event.  In general; the BWI Ramp Agents are working hard and effectively in many areas.  The Supervisors need to be in the loop; and when there is a break in the action; get the Ramp Agents out into the Safety Zone and flight line to get a FOD walkdown complete before every jet arrives; and again before every jet departs. It does not take very long to do an effective FOD walkdown.  We just need to have a renewed awareness in the FOD Program to make it work effectively.  Please help us to keep the FOD under control by noticing the FOD; retrieving it; and resisting the temptation to just walk past a pile of trash/FOD anywhere on the flight line.  Even if the trash/FOD is not in the Safety Zone; if it is anywhere on the flight line; it will end up in the Safety Zone when the wind starts to blow.  Let's take some pride in our station; and clean up after ourselves.  Thanks for helping to keep our engines FOD free.

A B737 Captain reported the chronic failure on the part of ground crews at BWI to inspect for and remove FOD in the safety zones of gates used by their jets.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I was working the D position on this turn (ZZZ>ZZZ1>ZZZ). I came onboard with a slight headache; throughout the trip it got worse; due to the bad smell onboard. During boarding; a passenger came onboard and asked right away 'Do you guys smell that sulfur smell?'  I smelt it; but not strong enough to worry about it.  Once we closed the boarding door; the smell became stronger and the air seemed a bit hazy; but still I didn't think much of it.  The A FA had a clogged nose; so she didn't smell anything throughout the trip.  During the flight I walked around the aircraft and every time I would walk up to the front; the smell would catch me off guard and the headache would worsen.  Once we landed in ZZZ1; the FAs in the aft said that upon landing and taxiing; the smell became really bad; almost unbearable.  We informed the Captain and Maintenance came onboard.  They blasted air in the aircraft; which made the smell dissipate. Then they tried recreating the scenario by closing the aircraft doors and testing one engine at a time.  The smell did not come back; so we decided it was again safe for boarding. Upon arrival back to ZZZ; the FAs in the back said that there was slight smell; but not as bad as before.

Flight Attendant reported a 'sulfur' type odor during multiple flight legs. Maintenance action at stop over greatly improved the conditions.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

SCT TRACON East sector flashed Aircraft X to me a CAT 2 inbound arriving from the NE. There was a busy stream of arrivals inbound and I had yet to take the flash on the aircraft because per the LOA SCT shall either sequence the CAT 2 arrival or coordinate something else via an APREQ. The controller at East did not verbally coordinate; and next thing I knew the aircraft was on my data block (I did not take the flash) and talking to me. According to the LOA with SCT Paragraph 5 c (1) (e) TRACON Shall: Complete a radar hand off on Class B Airspace CAT 1 [and] tower approved CAT 2 arrivals inbound from the NW at or descending to 2500 MSL. Also paragraph 5 c (2)(b) Tower Shall: When tower CTRD [Certified Tower Radar Display] is operational sequence and assume control for descent at or South of Mt Soledad all Class B airspace CAT 1 and tower approved CAT 2 arrivals. I sequenced Aircraft X aircraft in behind a B737 arrival at Aircraft X's 9 O'clock; which the pilot had in sight. When I called the East Controller to ask; 'Isn't a [aircraft X type] a twin engine?' the response was 'I don't know'. There was no verbal communication and the hand off was forced onto my tag with an OK function. This is not the proper hand off procedure; I was waiting for the EAST controller to call and coordinate the un-sequenced Aircraft X arrival; which I would have approved had the coordination been done in a timely matter. To prevent a re-occurrence I would suggest the wording in the LOA be changed to specifically say. 'TRACON Shall Sequence all CAT 2 aircraft inbound to land; unless otherwise coordinated.'

SAN Tower Controller describes a situation where the TRACON Controller forces a data block onto their position symbol and switches the aircraft to Tower's frequency without any coordination. SCT East Sector Controller violated the LOA between the two facilities.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

During takeoff; we performed a rejected takeoff at approximately 75 knots for an ECAM 'No 1 Eng Oil Filter Clog'. Maintenance then replaced the oil filter and cleared the write up. During the subsequent engine run up; using 'B igniters' there was no light off on the #1 engine. MEL procedures were accomplished and a second takeoff was performed. At  level off cruise altitude of FL 330; oil bugs were set to 16 quarts on each oil gauge to match the indicated oil quantity readings  on the engines. Approximately 15-20 minutes later; engine #1 oil quantity was noted to have decreased to about 13.5 quarts; with engine #2 oil quantity holding steady at 16 quarts; 5-10 minutes later the quantity decreased to approximately 12.5-13.0 quarts on the #1 oil quantity gauge. All # 1 engine indications appeared normal at this time and remained so for the rest  of the flight. The First Officer opened the cockpit door and smelled fumes and noticed reduced visibility in the cabin area. We made the decision to land at the nearest suitable airport. Company divert ACARS message was sent and we coordinated a [diversion] with Center. Oil quantity continued to decrease to about 12 quarts before landing. We smelled fumes in the cockpit; so both of us donned our oxygen masks. We made an uneventful landing. After exiting the runway; Crash Fire Rescue performed an inspection of our aircraft and found no leaks or smoke coming from the airplane; so we continued our taxi to the ramp. Additional; related information noted on the first leg of the day; flying the same tail number; was that during the pre-flight the #2 HP valve was found to be stuck and eventually got fixed; and also we got a ECAM for a Trim Tank Isolation Valve stuck closed message right after takeoff (TT Isolation Valve should have opened at slat retract). Maintenance told us that this airplane had been on the ground for some time before our flight.

Approximately an hour into the flight; while accessing the cabin for a bathroom break; I became aware of reduced visibility in the cabin due to fumes and we immediately shut the flight deck door; and made provisions to divert. The smell of fumes became more prominent in the flight deck itself and we donned our oxygen masks. We had just enough time to make appropriate notifications and complete normal checklists prior to an immediate and uneventful landing.

A300 Flight Crew reported a decrease in the #1 engine oil quantity in cruise with subsequent fumes and reduced visibility. Flight diverted without further incident.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 1441.82; Flight Crew Type 945.43

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I ate my crew meal and 30 min later started vomiting aggressively. I did not make it to the lav and was in the cockpit when the symptoms started. As soon as I could I went to the lav and vomited again. The flight attendant was in the cockpit with the Captain who was on oxygen. I came back to the cockpit and said I was starting to feel better because I thought I got it all out of my system. We continued the flight and landed safely in ZZZ. That night I was nauseous and vomiting all night.

B777 First Officer reported becoming ill after eating a crew meal.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 1835

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Winds at the [4;500 MSL elevation; in mountainous terrain] airport were reported 250 at 11 gusting 16; a 90 degree crosswind to either Runway 16 or 34. With no other planes on frequency; I announced my position 10 miles out; northeast of the field descending out of 7;000 intending to enter a downwind to Runway 16. A minute or two later; I heard another plane report 20 miles south; also landing Chester. I thought he said he was a J-3 (Piper Cub); a much slower airplane than mine. Turns out he said CJ-3; which was unfamiliar to me; but is a Citation Jet. Had I known that; I'd have let him land first; but the outcome would likely have been worse had I done so. I then reported 5 miles NE. The CJ-3 then reported his intention to make a straight in to Runway 34; so I decided to turn downwind for 34 so that we'd both be using the same runway to reduce potential confusion to any other planes coming in. I reported turning downwind; but I believe I said; 'Downwind to 16'; my original runway choice. At that point; the CJ-3 reported his intention to circle while I landed. I then reported turning base to 16; but corrected it to Runway 34. I then reported turning final to 34. At just about the point I was about to flare; a plane that had not been talking reported his intention to take off on Runway 16 at Chester. As I looked at the opposite end of the 5;500 foot runway; I could see a plane moving from the run up area towards the departure end of 16. Incredulous; I emphatically repeated my call advising I was '...on short short final landing runway 34 Chester.' The thought of a go-around went through my mind but I decided it would have been more dangerous as the hot day made for a 7;500 foot density altitude; meaning that my plane would likely climb very slowly; and depending on where the other guy lifted off; could potentially put us at the same altitude with a much higher closing rate. A go around would have put us 'low and slow'; near the stall speed (not very maneuverable) while I waited for the gear to retract. Conversely; the long runway (5;500 feet) meant that I could be down and stopped in less than half the runway; and dramatically reduce our closing rate; if he actually took off. As I flared; the other pilot lined up on the runway. As I slowed my plane; I moved to the left half of Runway 34. The other plane; a Cessna 182; then took off on the left half of Runway 16; so apparently he saw me in time to abort his take off; yet decided to take off anyway. He never said another word. The CJ-3 crew tried to get him to give his position so they could avoid him and start their landing approach. He said nothing. They tried to get him to give his tail number but he wouldn't reply. We got his tail number from the man in the FBO where the pilot had just paid for his overnight parking before departing.

Multiple factors resulted in a breakdown in important CTAF communications at a high altitude airport resulting in the reporter's C-210 landing one direction while a C-182 took off the opposite direction on the same runway.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was pilot not flying. The First Officer; the pilot flying recently completed his first 100 hours in type and is new to the 737. We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 1 via the National 3 SID. On initial climb; the pilot flying failed to maintain adequate course tracking and flew into P-56. Contributing factors included the following. The aircraft was misfueled by almost twice the planned fuel load; 33;000 LBS actual versus 18;000 LBS planned. Pre-takeoff duties thus included conversations with Dispatch and the load agent to ensure aircraft could [legally] depart Runway 1; and then land at an appropriate landing weight at destination. Simply put; we were heavy. Finally; we were mindful more than usual of our departure time due to the presence of a VIP passenger. During takeoff; as the pilot flying rotated the aircraft; he remarked; 'The nose is really heavy.' After liftoff; he appeared to be preoccupied with trimming the aircraft. I stated; 'Get that turn going; crank it over.' He turned left immediately to recapture the course. Once we were established in the turn; ATC asked if we were on course. I replied that we were in the turn and reintercepting. I noted that our track appeared to be west of both fix D341C and GTN; both of which I had input on the fix page during our pre-takeoff briefing for the engine failure procedure. During the climbout I was advised by ATC of a possible violation and provided a phone number to call. Once I arrived at the destination; I called and was advised that we had in fact violated area P-56. In the future; especially at DCA; I will reinforce how important it is to precisely fly the SID. Further; I will be more likely to intervene and take the aircraft if required.

On the rotate command; the nose was very heavy and did not initially respond. After takeoff the nose continued to feel heavy with the yoke in my lap and feeling slightly mushy and somewhat sluggish to respond.  I began the left turn increasing bank to 30 degrees as we accelerated.

A B737-800 flight crew; distracted by sluggish pitch response; failed to turn in a timely manner when flying the National SID off Runway 1 at DCA and briefly entered P-56 while correcting. The aircraft had been fueled to 33;000 LBS of fuel vice the flight plan required 18;000 LBS.


Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

We were at 13;000 feet; 8 miles from ZZZZZ on the arrival into ZZZ. ATC called traffic and we responded; looking. We saw the traffic on the box showing 400 feet below us and ahead of us. We got an aural traffic alert from the box. Then got RA CLIMB. We complied to climb and got to 13;300 feet. Then heard clear of traffic. Told ATC we got RA and had to climb. When clear; told ATC we were going back down to 13;000 feet.

EMB-135LR First officer reported an NMAC event during arrival.