Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 2125; Flight Crew Type 1380

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I inadvertently entered Class D airspace at HDC. I've landed at that airport dozens of times but not since last October. Apparently in January an ATC control tower was activated. I wasn't aware of that and while diverting to HDC to land during thunderstorm conditions and flying on partial panel due to an inflight instrument air pump failure (although in VFR conditions) I had little to no time to obtain airport information except to consult my chart (current electronic chart on Foreflight mobile) which showed HDC as an uncontrolled airport.This apparent airspace issue occurred because I was unable to understand ATC (New Orleans Approach) [and] possibly the controller tried to give me the tower frequency but I was unable to understand it. I heard 125.70 but thought he was giving me the AWOS frequency; or UNICOM which is 122.70 (Tower at HDC is 120.57.) Prior to trying to contact New Orleans Approach my radios had worked perfectly on this three hour flight. My electronic chart; which was downloaded just 3 days prior; didn't show HDC as a towered airport (despite there being a tower for 6 months apparently.) I got a briefing prior to departure; but I had not intended to land at HDC until thunderstorms prevented us from reaching [our original destination;] so [I] didn't get airport information for HDC. Landing at HDC was a last minute decision to get on the ground and avoid rapidly developing thunderstorms. This type event could be prevented if electronic charts are updated more frequently than paper charts! In the information age; pilots ought to be able to rely on the information in electronic charts; especially those suited for ADS-B platforms like Foreflight; which have been downloaded 3 days prior and especially if that information (activation of a control tower) occurred 6 months previously. These EFB type systems are highly touted to pilots as the future of aviation and what all will be using in just two years; but in this case were no more beneficial than paper charts. Electronic charts should be updated more frequently than paper charts; even VFR charts like I was using; or pilots should be warned that they are no more useful than the paper charts.

BE35 pilot reports diverting to HDC due to weather at his destination and discovering too late that the airport now has a Tower. Apparently the Tower was activated over six months ago but current electronic VFR charts do not indicate the Class D status.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Loss of thrust on number one engine at cruise FL340. Completed Engine Failure Checklist during diversion to ZZZ. First Officer flew a great single engine approach. [We] deplaned passengers at the gate. [There] appeared to be a sudden loss of oil pressure.

Boeing 737 Captain reported a loss of power on the #1 engine resulting in an engine shutdown; and a diversion to a suitable airport.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was descending out of 18;000 ft as pilot flying. When hydraulic pumps were selected to high we received a right system hydraulic pressure low light. Checking gauges; right hydraulic pressure was zero with an abnormally high quantity indication. I told the FO to get out the QRH. I notified ATC that we had a hydraulic problem and might have a problem making the assigned crossing. I was given relief from the crossing restriction. I said we were working the problem and would advise them. I then notified the FAs of the situation and would keep them advised. As we worked the QRH it was noted that we would have to do a manual gear extension which would mean stopping straight ahead on the runway. I then advised ATC and would be stopping on the runway and would have to be towed off. I asked that the safety equipment be rolled as well. I then called the FAs. I then made a PA to the passengers and let them know what was going on. The approach was normal and the emergency gear extension accomplished. I landed at bug +5 with a soft touchdown. Rollout was normal and I could feel the gear door bumpers dragging on the rwy. I stopped on centerline approximately 10000 ft down Runway XXR. I made a PA stating for everybody to remain seated. The safety trucks rolled up and we were contacted by them. I asked them to check around the outside of the aircraft looking especially on the right side by the gear. They said they noticed a fluid on the ground but everything else was good. I then talked to the FAs and let them know what was going on. I then made a PA to the passengers to advise them that we were going to be waiting for a tug to come and tow us back to the gate and apologized for the inconvenience. It took approximately 40 minutes for the tug to show up and tow us back to the gate.Right hydraulic fluid loss when pump selected to high resulted in a right hydraulic low pressure light and loss of right hydraulic system.

MD80 Captain reported a right hydraulic system failure which necessitated a manual gear extension with a normal landing and a tow off the runway.


Fatigue; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

During cruise; I was involuntarily falling asleep. I placed my seat in a reclined position and slept for an extended period of time. Flying all through the night and landing at 0845 domicile time cannot be accomplished with alertness without being relieved during cruise for a rest. Although the layover included a very long rest period; the attempt at taking a nap in the late afternoon in preparation for a red eye flight is often fruitless. Afternoon noise in the hotel as well as attempting to sleep during a period that does not fit my sleep cycle results in nothing more than 'toss and turn' for 3 or 4 hours. Provide a cruise relief officer and a rest station in the airplane; or officially allow and promote resting in the cockpit. Provide cockpit seats that facilitate taking a nap. Most of our 757's do not even have a head rest. Taking a nap in the pilot's chair is a painful experience. This aircraft had painfully hard seat cushions. Other solutions might be known and available in the industry.

B757 Captain describes his inability to stay awake during a red eye flight and offers suggestions.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 278; Flight Crew Total 9567; Flight Crew Type 1100

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While in the roll out phase of the landing my student did not maintain control of the aircraft and allowed it to weather vane the into the wind. We partially exited the runway onto the grass and came back on the runway. No damage was done to the aircraft nor runway or taxi way markings.

Cessna-172 Flight Instructor reported student's loss of directional control on landing resulting in a runway excursion.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Entered the DCA River Visual Runway 19 at 3;000 feet and 10 NM out. I Added spoilers periodically to slow for flap adjustments and aid the descent. The Aircraft was fully configured at 2;000 feet and we maneuvered down the river crossing all the visual check points at the recommended altitudes on the Jepp Chart. In the last turn down the river I could not make out the runway and asked the First Officer (FO) if he saw it. He couldn't make it out either. I then asked him to call the Tower to brighten the lights on Runway 19; but we were still on Potomac Approach; who quickly switched us to DCA Tower. At the last visual check point I turned southbound toward where I thought Runway 19 should have been according to the Jepp Plate but we were looking at a 'black hole' at about 500 feet. In all the confusion we got a spoiler caution light as we neared 300 feet. Just then; the FO and I finally saw the two bar VASI for Runway 19; but we were at too great an angle to make a safe landing. Combined with the spoiler warning a second earlier; the angle of bank that would be needed to complete the landing; and a firm insistence from the FO; I went around. The FO quickly cleaned up the aircraft; called ATC for a go-around and we made our way to 3;000 feet and set up for another approach. Though the runway was still not visible; we at least knew where to aim the aircraft the second time around; and made a safe; stable landing. I have completed at least 3 dozen DCA 'River Visuals' as a Captain on the Q400 while working here and a few as a First Officer at a previous carrier on the CRJ 200 but never before at night; the lighting on Runway 19 is terrible and wattage needs to be increased. Perhaps a curved lead-in light system such as the one used on Runway 13 L/R [at JFK] would be helpful. Perhaps training for the 19 River Visual in night VMC conditions in our simulators during initial training and/or LOFTS would be more helpful.

...we were fully configured more the 15 miles out and following the reference altitudes of the approach chart; normal approach...around 500 feet on final I still couldn't identify the runway or proper visual guidance of the runway...I was looking outside most of the time looking for the runway. At about one mile final I saw the runway and I pointed [it out] to the Captain and as he turned toward the runway we got the GPWS Bank Angle warning. At that point we were unable to make a stable landing so I called for a go-around. As we executed the go-around; I looked inside to confirm TO/GA power and noticed that the flight spoilers were fully deployed and I retracted them. I don't know at what point he deployed the flight spoilers. ATC vectored us back again for the visual which we completed successfully.This airport has poor lighting at night and you can get confused between Runway 19 and Runway 15 when they have the PAPIS for Runway 15 on. We would be less susceptible to confusion if they had them off and increased the intensity of the Runway 19 lighting.

A CRJ-900 flight crew flying the River Visual Approach to Runway 19 at DCA at night was unable to pick up the runway environment in a timely fashion and executed a go-around. A subsequent approach was successful. Inadequate runway light intensity was cited as a contributing factor.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 520; Flight Crew Type 250

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Contacted ZZZ Ground requesting VFR Flight Following to ZZZ1. Given squawk code 4227. Depart ZZZ and at around 900 feet ZZZ Tower Controller instructed me to change squawk to 5523. I complied. At 1;500; I was instructed to switch to 121.1 ZZZ Departure. I told ZZZ Departure controller I was level 1;500. He said he did not know who I was. I told him I just departed ZZZ. He told me I should be squawking 4227. I quickly explained that I had been squawking that but got told to switch to 5523; and then I switched back to 4227. 3 minutes later; I had a near midair collision with an aircraft flying westbound while i traveled north-westbound. When I noticed the aircraft; no serious evasive action was necessary to avoid collision as he was slightly above me but i did turn slightly anyways. I attempted to tell ZZZ departure about the event but he was busy and received no answer for a few moments. I told ZZZ Departure about the event again and he told me 'You should be looking out for yourself as you were never radar identified'. Although he never said 'radar contact' upon my departure from ZZZ; I believe he knew where and who I was since he had me change my squawk and I complied. He then told me to file a report on the ground. I asked for his watch manager's phone numbers and called him later that night and was told that it was likely due to the initial switch in squawk code my ZZZ tower and that they had no idea why the controller had changed my code. I understand that may have been factor but I would think that if a controller talks to an aircraft and has him change codes and the aircraft tells them where they are; the controller probably knows where they are and sees them on the radar. It seemed like a systemic failure on the part of air traffic control combined with my misunderstanding that I would be given traffic alerts. I understand that traffic alerts are given on a time permitting basis and for this reason I always remain very vigilant when flying VFR. However; this aircraft was not picked up in my visual scan and with such low separation I would hope that something would advice the controller that a traffic alert is necessary.

The pilot of a Piper PA-28 experienced a near mid collision while in contact with ATC. He had not received ATC notification of the traffic. This may have been caused by ATC confusion with transponder codes and workload.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 150

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Taxi for takeoff at uncontrolled field with fire tanker operations. Airport has runways that cross / originate at the end. RWY 20/24.  Landing Runway 06. The fire tanker reported the right base to RWY 06.  While we were taxing out. This put us in the position of blocking his exit from the runway and path to the fire tanker base.  We called to announce we were crossing the combined ends of the runway to taxi to Runway 06.  From the angle of the taxiway we looked to clear both runways of traffic; we could not see the air tanker until we started to cross the departure end of RWY 06. The tanker did not call his turn to final or short final to RWY 06. Once we started onto the runway and saw the tanker had touched down and was slowing we continued across to clear the runway and exit for the tanker.  The tanker was already slowing down and we had plenty of clearance to cross safely.  Had the tanker announced the turn to final we would have held short of the tanker base and waited to taxi.  Uncontrolled airports; announce; announce; announce to help de-conflict traffic.  When heavy tanker operations are in progress it would be prudent to have a local pilot man the unicorm to help de-conflict traffic; especially taxi traffic when there is a situation like COE where local traffic may impact tanker operations and cause a traffic jam. Had we not moved and the tanker had exited the runway there would have been the need to bring out a tug to back up one of the aircraft.

Medium transport Captain reported air tanker failing to make appropriate traffic pattern calls; resulted in a runway incursion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

In an effort to improve aviation safety I am requesting that the weather reporting capabilities be restored at Cross City Florida airport (CTY). It was only in the recent past that a nearby airport; Perry (40J) restored its weather reporting capabilities after many years of being inoperative. The route serving Tallahassee via Cross City to and from points south are lacking weather reporting stations. The return of 40J as a reporting station has improved safety but weather reporting at CTY is imperative in this remote area. This is a route that has extensive use by the general aviation community with few airports for use as alternates should the weather deteriorate. CTY has been reporting their weather as missing for as long as I can remember. It should be noted that Tallahassee Approach Control has been unable to assist with any enroute weather avoidance. It has been reported to me by controllers on previous flights that the weather radar capabilities at TLH are inoperative or non existent which would allow the controllers to provide such assistance. I fly VFR and have not had any instances that have jeopardized the safety of my flight. Not having CTY as a functioning reporting weather station does not allow for adequate preflight weather planning and precludes its ability to be used as an enroute source of weather. The equipment should be restored at CTY to provide ceiling and visibility reports and TLH Approach Control's radar should be addressed to enhance safety in this high traffic but remote area of Northern Florida.

An instrument rated private pilot expressed his concerns with the lack of weather reporting availability at CTY which is one of only a few airports in an extensive remote area of Northern Florida.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

The First Officer was the pilot flying on this leg and and just prior to reaching the LAR VOR we both noticed symptoms of hypoxia. The First Officer noticed the cabin altimeter was showing somewhere between 12 and 13 thousand feet; maybe a little higher.  There was no associated CAB ALT HI annunciator.  I checked the  annunciators with a press to test and the CAB ALT HI tested normally.  After a few moments of disbelief we elected to don our oxygen masks and requested a lower altitude; which was granted.  I ran the Cabin  Decompression Emergency Checklist.  I elected not to deploy the cabin oxygen masks since we were descending and cabin altitude was now indicated below 12;000 feet.  Crew and ATC communications were  difficult due to the oxygen masks.  Once we reached 10;000 we removed our masks and landed normally.  We did not declare an emergency since we were given a descent.  It should be noted that the left environmental system was MEL'ed under 21-14 and the cabin was quite cold which we assumed was a result of the MEL. The CAB ALT HI is supposed to be our safety net and it did not illuminate.  Had this been working we would have discovered this earlier in the flight.  I don't feel that we could have done anything differently as  a crew.

During cruise flight at FL190 near Laramie VOR I noticed the onset of mild hypoxia symptoms that reminded me of my prior general aviation flying experience at altitudes between 10;000 feet and 14;500 feet without supplemental oxygen.  No red annunciators (to include CAB ALT HI) were illuminated.  I glanced at the cabin altimeter and noticed that the cabin altitude was indicating somewhere between 12;000 feet and 13;000 feet.  I was somewhat in disbelief due to the lack of CAB ALT HI being illuminated; so I asked the Captain to verify that I was reading the cabin altitude gauge correctly.  Upon confirmation of the high cabin altitude; we donned oxygen masks; and requested a lower altitude from ATC which was granted.  Communication was immediately established using the oxygen mask microphones; and our communication with ATC was not compromised.  However; there was significant background noise due to breathing as we left the hot interphone switch on for most of the event.  During descent the Captain ran the emergency checklist for cabin decompression.  The Captain checked all annunciators using the 'press to test' feature and they tested normally.  There were no signs of a rapid decompression or explosive decompression.  No emergency was declared since we were given an immediate descent when we requested it.  At the lower altitude the cabin had descended somewhat to below 12;000 feet.  Because of this and the initial cabin altitude noted at below 13;000 feet; we elected not to deploy cabin oxygen masks.  After descending further; with cabin altitude below 10;000 feet; we removed our oxygen masks and continued normally.  On this particular flight and the leg prior to it (DEN to SHR) the left environmental system was MEL'ed (21-14); placarded; and we reviewed the MEL and associated procedure prior to each departure.  We noted a cold cabin temperature on both legs of the flight and had ensured that the cabin temperature was set to maximum during each flight.  We attributed the low temperature to the inoperative left environmental system and outside air temperature below standard.  The cabin pressurization was checked during the climb checklist on both flights and no anomalies in pressurization during initial climb were noted.  I also observed the Captain test the annunciators prior to each flight and I did not observe any malfunctioning annunciators.The CAB ALT HI annunciator should warn of cabin altitudes in excess of 10;000 feet.  We believe this part of the aircraft's systems failed.  Without this operational our only warnings of high cabin altitude are instrument scan and physiological symptoms.  I believe my prior experience in general aviation flight at altitudes above 10;000 feet and my prior attendance of an FAA high-altitude physiology course (including altitude chamber training to recognize my personal symptoms of hypoxia) helped to identify the issue quickly.  Despite the maximum altitude of the B1900 being restricted to FL250 I believe this training would be useful for other flight crews in our aircraft and would like to request that the company subsidize this training for flight crew members who have not yet experienced it.

BE1900 flight crew reports detecting symptoms of hypoxia while cruising at FL190.  The cabin altitude is noted between 12- and 13;000 feet and oxygen masks are doned and a descent is initiated.  There was no associated CAB ALT HI annunciation although the light tested normally.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff autopilot connected at 1;000 AGL. Flaps retracted on schedule in a 180 degree turn off [Runway] XXR. Noticed that the attitude pitch did not match the flight director command followed by a Level Two 'STAB out of trim' alert.  We then made the decision for an air turn back; notified ATC; transferred control of the jet to the me (Pilot Monitoring) and advised ATC of the need to dump fuel (gross weight-600K LBS.) with a request for a holding pattern at a block altitude of 6;000-7;000 feet. ATC denied the hold and elected to vector us over the water in their radar holding pattern. The QRH was consulted for stabilizer out of trim which led us to a non abnormal alert 'Stabilizer Inop. We then noticed that the stabilizer trim had not moved from the takeoff setting of 8.0 degrees. Fuel dump continued in the radar hold until 522K gross weight; then the cross feed relays failed and forced the dump command to stop. We flew in the radar pattern for about another 50 minutes within about 35nm from ZZZZ until our bingo fuel of 32K; with now a runway change to XXL. ATC was advised of the need for a 20nm final approach and a request of no traffic in front of us. We discussed the go around possibilities; configured on schedule early of the slats/flaps and gear. Aircraft control was then transferred to the Captain and the autopilot disconnected with noticeable pitch down; landed uneventfully. Failure of trim gear fuse pin."

After takeoff autopilot connected at 1;000 [feet] AGL.  Flaps retracted on schedule in a 180 degree turn off XXR.  I immediately noticed that the attitude pitch did not match the flight director command followed by a Level Two 'STAB out of trim' alert.  Elected to keep the autopilot connected thru the turn.  After the flaps and slats were retracted; I disconnected the autopilot and had to use a tremendous amount of strength to overcome the aircraft's desire to pitch up.  I extended the slats with a speed edit of 210 KTS and that relieved some of the nose up tendency and reconnected the autopilot. I then made the decision for an air turn back; notified ATC; transferred control of the jet to the First Officer and advised ATC of the need to dump fuel (gross weight-600K LBS.) with a request for a holding pattern at a block altitude of 6;000-7;000 feet.  ATC denied the hold and elected to vector us over the water in their radar holding pattern. The QRH was consulted for stabilizer out of trim which led us to a non abnormal alert 'Stabilizer Inop.  We then noticed that the stabilizer trim had not moved from the takeoff setting of 8.0 degrees. Fuel Dump continued in the radar hold until 522K gross weight; then the crossfeed relays failed and forced the dump command to stop. We flew in the radar pattern for about another 50 minutes within about 35nm from ZZZ until our bingo fuel of 32K; with now a runway change to XXL. With the First Officer still flying (autopilot on) ATC was advised of the need for a 20 nm final approach and a request of no traffic in front of us.  We discussed the go around possibilities; configured on schedule early of the slats/flaps and gear. Aircraft control was then transferred to the Captain and the autopilot disconnected with noticeable pitch down; but controllable. Landing; uneventful. Inspect Trim drives on a C check if not already done."

Flight Crew reported stabilizer trim failure at takeoff resulted in fuel jettison with failure of the jettison system that led to holding for fuel burn to below max landing weight and a return to the departure airport.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 12470; Flight Crew Type 467

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After reading our ATC clearance Campbell Radio; 122.0; stated an aircraft was on three mile final. We loaded/checked our FMS; completed our after engine start checklists; and taxied from base of the tower-like building that is Campbell Radio but not an actual control tower at CYBL; Campbell River; British Columbia; which; as we understand it; operates as an uncontrolled airport; although Campbell Radio is on the field. We were broadcasting our progress and intentions but heard no responses and thought the other aircraft had landed; although we did not see it; because we were running checks prior to taxi and did not see it during taxi. We announced that we intended to enter the runway at taxiway A and back taxi for runway 30; because it appeared to be necessary; although actually we could have continued on taxiway C to the hold point for runway 30. Our mistake was not checking the airport diagram closely enough! As we crossed the hold line at taxiway A we saw an aircraft on high go around; higher than on a normal approach; which is why we didn't see it where we were expecting to see any aircraft. When we questioned the other aircraft; we received a reply that our call had been heard and the pilot had made a go-around. We made a 180 degree turn back in to taxiway A; at which time Campbell Radio noted to us that we could use taxiway C to reach the hold point for runway 30. There was no other conversation. We taxied to runway 30 announcing our intentions and departed; contacting COMOX control on departure as instructed. There was no conflict as such; but we should have used taxiway C initially and looked more comprehensively for other aircraft and made sure where the other aircraft was. The other aircraft made no calls; other than when we questioned; as far as we are aware.

C525 First Officer reported another aircraft executed a go-around when they taxied onto Runway 30 at CYBL; a non-Tower airport.


Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was a red eye flight ZZZ-ZZZ1. I came in and got my pass down from the night Dispatcher as usual. While briefing myself on the weather I noticed ZZZ Center was ATC zero for the night from XA00z-XD00z per the Flow Constrained Area (FCA) and NOTAMs. When I took my pass down I sat down and immediately got a ACARS for Aircraft X holding for ZZZ1 due to the ATC zero. I then called the Dispatcher that passed the flight to me; and said; hey why did we let this plane go when ZZZ1 is ATC zero; which was approximately 50 minutes from the time I received the ACARS for holding. That Dispatcher said Operations told them it was only valid until XC30z. My issue with this is first off how and why was the flight able to push 20 minutes early? Pushing early pushed them even more into the FCA. With the Center being closed that makes this an illegal Dispatch because per the FCA we knew we were not able to enter ZZZ Center until XD00z; when we had an ETA of entering the Center about 50 minutes before that. My second issue is why did the Dispatcher let the flight depart early? Was this FCA not communicated to the flight crew? Why is the Dispatcher listening to Operations manager pressure rather than looking at the published NOTAMs and FCAs for times. The Operations manager has zero operational control and say in how and when we dispatch our flights. Operations often will tell us things to make their job easier and to get on time performance numbers not based off anything to do with legal dispatching of a flight. Just fueling the flight up for holding due to entering the airspace while it is closed is neglectful. While we were able to get through [it] this time with no diversions; if the Center is going to close for cleaning on a regular basis overnight; we as a company and in Dispatch and Operations need to have better communication about this; We need to establish a better plan of attack for this if it is to be a regular thing. We also need to plan for what is published based off NOTAMs and FCA's not what Operations says. We need to as a group communicate better with each other; with Operations; and to our flight crews to help stop these things from happening in the future. Just because it went off without a diversion this morning does not mean that we can do the same thing in future. I would hope we can learn from this as a group and come up with better ways to handle it.

Dispatcher reported a flight departed early into a Flow Constrained Area (FCA) and questioned company procedures that allowed this to occur.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Several system anomalies - first Captain's lower speed limit band disappeared. Next Speed limit tape with Source Display 1 indication. This came back and reoccurred at least 3 times. Fuel quantity indicators both started intermittently blanking. Then Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) failed intermittently. Then Electronic Engine Controls (EEC) went to ALTN mode on both engines. Both altitude indicators also showed erratic indications - =/- 1000 ft (standby remained stable).We got priority handling to [destination]. Landed without incident.Weather was challenging-strong gusting winds [and] TSTMs approaching. Dispatch sent weather for [an alternate]. After discussing the option we chose to continue to [destination] because weather was similar; we were already descending and the approaches were set up [and] briefed. The time between the 2 airports was equal but changing destination would have required more work and at that point we needed to minimize additional work.

B737NG Captain reported experiencing a number of system anomalies possibly stemming from Air Data Computer issues.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 16800; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Approximately 5 minutes after level off at FL370; noticed smoke emanating from the area behind the Captain's chair. Initiated immediate descent; donned oxygen mask; informed ATC of problem and requested lower altitude.Passing FL250 during descent; the smoke abated. Continued descent to 12000 ft and proceeded to ZZZ for landing.

Falcon 900 Captain reported smoke in the cockpit emanating from the area behind the Captain's seat. A descent was initiated and the smoke began to dissipate on descent.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Total 1208; Flight Crew Type 601

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

My student pilot and I had just entered the pattern from a 45 degree leg to left downwind when a call on CTAF addressed us by call sign; asked our intentions; and said we were 'all over the place'.  I looked to my right and saw another airplane about 500 feet from us; also on left downwind. The pilot said on CTAF that he had just turned from crosswind to downwind and was aware of our entry from the 45 based on our position reports. He said he would extend downwind to allow us to land ahead of him. I can think of three factors that contributed to my failure to see the traffic until so late.First; the CTAF frequency for ZZZ is shared by numerous airports in the area. While I was talking my student through the pattern entry; we were hearing calls for at least four different airports without any silence; so we had to talk to each other over these calls. In such a situation it was easy to miss the one call we needed to hear.Second; the frequency was congested shortly before the traffic conflict by a lengthy and non-standard position report ending with; 'could any traffic in the area please advise'.  This may have been the pilot of the aircraft that conflicted with me; or it may have been an unrelated call at another airport that blocked the frequency.  A colleague who had just landed at the same airport later told me that the same pilot had also called him on CTAF while he was on final; asking his 'intentions after landing'. Third; my student had become disoriented while making a teardrop turn to the 45 degree entry; and I was distracted by helping her get reoriented to the airport and make a correct pattern entry.

Flight Instructor reported a NMAC when they were assisting their disoriented student enter downwind at an uncontrolled airport and failed to see another aircraft on downwind. The instructor reported CTAF congestion due to several airports sharing the same frequency was also a factor.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Company Policy

Due to a re-route; I was scheduled to deadhead ZZZ-ZZZ1. After boarding had completed; Ground Operations requested four people move up from the back of the aircraft to sit in rows 2-8 for weight and balance (X-Zone count). Since the passengers had just finished sanitizing their seat areas they were reluctant to move; so no one did. A second PA was made; specifically telling the passengers at the very back of the aircraft (all deadheading crew members) they were going to have to move up. I was required to abandon my social distancing and sit in row 2. After re-sanitizing my new seat; I sat with a passenger directly in front of me; one directly behind me; and one directly across from me. I had to sit there for about 20 minutes; before takeoff; and waited until the ride smoothed out and moved back to the back of the aircraft to space myself away from other passengers and crew. This event compromised my ability to protect myself as much as possible.Crews need to be specifically exempted from moving to accommodate a Zone count and this procedure needs to be implemented immediately; and pushed to all operational groups.

Deadheading pilot reported that passengers in the back of the aircraft were told to move to seats at the front of the aircraft to accommodate a zone count; which required abandoning social distancing and sanitizing new seats.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Need more space to accommodate 6 feet apart. On this day; [it] was very chaotic during the international check-in. We are really short of manpower to accommodate document checking. Violating the safety standards for us the employees and the customers. Please review cameras to see the amount of people in the same area.

I was scheduled to work lobby for international flights to help them to check in and check their requirement COVID-19 for every single customer. At the kiosk I realized that it was around 200 people and only 2 agents were scheduled to work that area.  I was very concerned about safety and health of myself and others because there was no social distancing and not following CDC guidelines. I talked with Supervisor and asked to please call a union representative. To see the unsafe conditions that the company is operating. I hope you will be able to see the cameras in order to understand the horrible situation.I think all the authorities including health department will be concerned about this very important issue.

Customer Service employees reported social distancing concerns at the airport lobby due to it being overcrowded.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 29

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While working 86; I descended Aircraft Y to cross WHITL intersection at FL350.  I then flashed the aircraft to Cigar (R08) for a handoff.  This is a routine crossing and handoff to MIA R08 sector.  MIA R08 took the handoff and I switched the aircraft to their frequency.  A few minutes later I noticed Aircraft X flashing at me south of the active warning area and coordinated with R08.  After 3 attempts I finally got the controller on the shout line and asked if he/she wanted to descend Aircraft Y underneath or go across the top of Aircraft X at FL360.  I explained that I coordinated with sector 16 (my low side sector) that they can take Aircraft Y to FL340 or FL330. The R08 controller explained that he/she would go over the top at FL360 and put in an interim altitude of 36;000 ft. A few minutes later I witnessed the two aircraft approaching WHITL and notice that Aircraft Y descending below FL360.  As I realized Aircraft Y was at FL357 I advised Aircraft X to turn 30 degrees to the left; as he started to execute the turn the pilot explained that he was responding to an RA climb.  I rogered him and when he was finished I advised Aircraft X to maintain FL360 and process to PLYER intersection on course.  I was advised by the CIC (Controller in Charge) that MIA called and we printed strips on both aircraft.

While working an [organization] aircraft and a Military Recovery aircraft from W168 I did not hear Aircraft Y (In Jacksonville Centers airspace) check on the frequency. Shortly after; Jacksonville Center Controller called to coordinate Aircraft Y at FL340; FL330 or FL360 for the opposite direction Aircraft X at FL350.I replied FL360 approved. Since I had not heard Aircraft Y check in. I interpreted the coordination that Jacksonville Center would stop Aircraft Y at FL360. I had control of the data block and I entered interim altitude of FL360.Conflict alert was activated and I observed Aircraft Y descending from FL360; I questioned the pilot and climbed him immediately. I issued the traffic and again issued climbing instructions.A; D-side at the sector may have caught Aircraft Y checking in. Jacksonville center controller could have been more specific on his coordination. Aircraft Y should have attempted to check in again on frequency when he was not acknowledged at FL410.

Three Center controllers reported an operational error. A Controller requests altitude from another centers sector controller and gives them a choice of altitudes. Receiving controller picks one of the three altitudes. Transferring controller issues altitude to aircraft. Two aircraft have a los of separation due to the aircraft descending into the level aircraft's airspace.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Elevator trim actuator removed per Work Order written up by pilots as binding. It was found to have internal damage to one externally threaded screw (lollypop) when torn down. The actuator was observed prior to tear down to have a very narrow band of free movement in both directions then would lock up being impossible to turn by hand. The actuator was damaged internally in a way impossible during service. Proper testing procedures per the CMM (Component Maintenance Manual) 27-10-01 would have rejected the actuator had they been performed after assembly; also post installation checks per the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) would have found this discrepancy had they been followed. I see no way the externally threaded screw (lollypop) could be damaged after assembly or installation.Where did this actuator come from? Who built it? Who installed it? Are they aware manuals are provided for safe servicing and installation of trim tab actuators?

A Mechanic reported that a Cessna 560XL elevator trim actuator was binding and found to have internal damage.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

After an aircraft swap we picked up Aircraft X. At this time the Captain and I were reviewing the MEL items and noticed that the flaps were going to operate at half rate because of a flap issue. We took off and I called for 'flaps up After Takeoff Checklist.' The Captain responded shortly after saying 'After Takeoff Checklist complete;' at which time we both verified that the flaps had retracted knowing that there was an issue with the flaps. While climbing out of FL180 we received a 'Flaps Fail' caution message. We pulled up the full EICAS and verified that the flaps were indeed up; continued our climb; and ran the QRH flap fail procedure. The QRH called for returning the flaps to the previous position; which was 0; and didn't really address the situation. The deadheading Captain verified that they were up. At this point we decided to continue. The QRH never stated 'land at the nearest suitable airport;' the flaps were at 0; and we were well over our max landing weight. We knew the weather was good and that destination has longer runways. Throughout our flight we discussed what actions we would take if the flaps did not extend during our approach. Sure enough the flaps didn't extended; we declared an emergency; ran the QRH again; notified the flight attendants; passengers; Dispatch; and I transferred to controls to the Captain. After the QRH was complete and we were set up for the approach; we commenced the approach and safely landed. We did not require assistance on the 13;000+ foot runway and our brake temperatures were normal.

The aircraft was dispatched with one of the flap skew sensors deferred; resulting in a continuous 'low flap speed' EICAS message. Crew followed MEL procedures and planned to configure early and advise ATC that we would need to slow sooner on approach and farther out than usual. Climbing out of the departure airport well after the takeoff checklist was complete and the EICAS had de-cluttered; we received a 'Flap Fail' EICAS message. After the pilot flying called for the appropriate checklist we realized that to accomplish the QRH procedure we would have to both slow way down below Vfe and descend since we were now in the low FL200s. Flaps and slats were both indicating 0 on the EICAS. We conferred on our options and decided that they were: 1) Descend and slow; run the checklist and if the problem wasn't corrected; burn thousands of pounds of fuel holding and then land at ZZZ. 2) Continue to our filed destination; burning fuel in the process; configure early as required by the MEL; which would allow us to run the QRH procedure for flap failure if the problem wasn't resolved. Additionally; our destination has a longer runway and the weather was forecast to be very nice. Remembering that a deadheading Captain was on board; we asked him to discreetly look out the window and visually confirm that the flaps were up. He reported back that they were; in fact up; which corresponded to the EICAS indication. We decided to continue not only because of the factors indicated above (longer runway; good weather; fuel burn) but also because we thought it likely that the flap failure message would extinguish when we ran the QRH procedure. We considered that it was highly unlikely to lose the remaining and only flap skew sensor since the 'Flap Low Rate' message is very rare; especially considering that one had already failed on the aircraft previously. Furthermore; we hypothesized that; since the failure occurred long after the flaps were retracted; it was not a problem with the SF-ACEs but actually a possible electronic glitch that would resolve itself upon the completion of the QRH. In other words; the flaps weren't in transit at the time of the failure so it was either the other skew sensor failing or an electronic glitch. We also knew that if the flap failure message was generated as a result of the flaps binding on retraction then system logic would allow us to extend them. When we were handed off to Approach we told them of our MEL and that we would need to 'dirty up' and slow down early. After slowing; we ran the Flap Fail QRH and determined that the flaps had failed although we could configure Slats to 3; which we did. We declared an emergency and requested their longest [runway.] We sent our Dispatcher an ACARS and I briefed the flight attendants and passengers. I did not tell the flight attendants to run their 12 steps because I told them that it would be a 'normal; abnormal landing.' I essentially told the passengers the same thing and prepared them that the approach would seem different to them but for us it was something we train for and that I personally had successfully accomplished on two other occasions. I reminded them to follow the directions of the flight attendants and 'any other uniformed crew member;' remembering the deadheading crew. We advised Tower that we would be coming in fast for their planning purposes. Landing was uneventful and we taxied to the gate without assistance. Passengers seemed relieved but completely un traumatized by the event. I leave it to the company; FAA; and the aircraft manufacturer to decide if we should dispatch with one of the two skew sensors deferred since we lose all redundancy for such a critical secondary flight control system like flaps. This was my second flap failure (in the EMB 170) and the flight attendant's third. Consider that even though the stand-by attitude indicator is deferrable; company policy is that we will not dispatch without it being operational. Perhaps we should take the same conservative approach on this system as well. Note: The simulator training we have received was very helpful in this scenario. In fact; the First Officer did the same procedure in the sim one week prior to our event. We were very proficient with what can be a long and convoluted checklist and the training paid dividends in the cockpit.

An EMB-170 EICAS alerted 'FLAP FAIL' while climbing through FL180 with the flaps already retracted so the crew continued to their destination; declared an emergency after the flaps failed to extend and completed a normal; abnormal landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

During engine start on maintenance ramp the catering truck returned and pulled up to the aircraft. I do not know if he pulled up during or after engine start. The Caterer came walking up to the side of the aircraft WITH BOTH ENGINES RUNNING to get my attention. I immediately shut down both engines. A total lack of communications while starting engines.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

B737 flight crew reported that after engine start ground personnel walked dangerously close to the running engines.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16.0

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Type 389

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Airport; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

The Local Controller had been waiting a long time to get a Runway 28 Left departure hole where they could depart an aircraft. The parallel runway arrivals were showing up at the Final Approach Fix 200 knots plus ground speed; and reducing on final. Tower had asked for extra spacing help from TRACON.  The Local Controller had been able to get crossing arrivals to make room for Runway 28 Right arrivals to exit and that was about it. I observed a Runway 28 Left departure hole coming up and felt that it would be a good time for the departure to depart. I went off line to coordinate something and when I came back Aircraft Z was on Runway 28 Left; with the last visible Runway 28 Left arrival (Aircraft Y) bearing down. I thought okay this will work; until I realized they crossed Aircraft X at an Taxiway Delta. No way was it going to work now.At that exact time; I noticed; and advised Local Control; that Aircraft X was going around. With Aircraft X going around Runway 28 Right; and Aircraft Z now rolling Runway 28 Left with Aircraft Y coming in on final. I immediately went off line to coordinate both arrivals go-arounds with TRACON. Local Control was hoping it would work and had not issued Aircraft Y's go-around yet. Local Control said Aircraft X would be a 265 heading climbing to 3100 feet creating a crossover. I advised Aircraft X would be a 310 heading climbing to 3000 feet; with the Aircraft Z a straight out departure; and approval requested Aircraft Y a 265 heading climbing to 3100 feet. As Local Control heard me coordinate these; they sent Aircraft Y around and issued all the instructions that I had coordinated.  Wait for more space to get the departure out; it was one more arrival away.

We briefed the FMS Bridge Visual 28R SFO and had talked about the option of TA only for the approach. We discussed the problems of doing so; and about the protections lost. We felt it was safer to leave TA/RA selected as we do in normal operations. On intercept to final ATC advised us of traffic that would be on approach for the Left Runway. We had them in sight at the time and the Captain informed ATC of this and that we didn't feel we could maintain Visual Separation throughout the approach. At the time they were at our 8-9 o'clock position but looked as though they would be behind us on final. I hand flew the Approach and intercepted the PAPI when I had it in sight. This put us slightly high on the profile. At 1000 feet we had a TA/RA to climb. My Captain immediately said 'Go Around' and I executed the go around. We were subsequently vectored for a visual to the Left runway and without traffic wing to wing with us on approach.

Two aircraft were on approach to parallel runways. ATC placed an aircraft on the left runway to line up and wait. The arriving aircraft on the right runway initiated a go-around for an RA on the aircraft landing on the left runway. The departing aircraft did not depart in a timely manner so the arrival for the left runway was issued a go-around by Tower.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

We got the aircraft today out of ZZZZ. Since it was the first time I was on it; and I was #3; the mid-galley Flight Attendant (F/A); I was concerned about finding galley items. Even though I had read the warnings about the jumpseat harnesses; I did not think to check it out until it was time to sit for take-off. I did do all of my pre-flight safety checks using my LINK. This harness reminds me of the straps on the old pumpkin seats we used for infants in the 70's. The lap belt as advertised was too short; only barely fitting. The right shoulder harness would not slap back so that it was tight across my shoulder. I couldn't move in a way that would make it lock tight across my shoulder. I did not feel confident it would really hold me in an emergency. I did write it up to the pilots. There is NO excuse for our harnesses to ever be anything more than perfect. Everything else can be second rate; but not them. I do not feel that this airplane is safe flying around as it is. Other F/A's mentioned that theirs had the same issue. This airplane needs to be taken out of service to have all harnesses replaced. Our old harnesses worked just fine. These need to be completely discontinued. Another consideration is that whether or not you fit in a specific jumpseat harness for take-off is not the only consideration. You may be nowhere near your own jumpseat while working the flight and told to be seated by the flight deck. You then take out whatever is available and your life may depend on whether a harness is too short.

The reporter stated that the seatbelt issue started when the B777-200 fleet was configured to an updated style cabin. The reporter stated that these seatbelts are separate lap-belt harness configuration. The reporter stated that the company put out a memo stating that some seatbelts may not fit everyone and they should select a seat that configures to each individual; which doesn't make sense because of seating assignments. The reporter stated that the seatbelt on the assigned seat was too small; and did not allow any freedom of movement. The reporter also stated that this is a safety issue because the seatbelts are difficult to put on because; in an emergency; you don't always have a choice which seat to sit in.

B777 Flight Attendant reported the seat belt was inadequate for safety reasons.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

The Jeppesen taxi chart does not match the actual layout of the EAT airport. The taxiways on the east side of the runway have been renamed A1 through A5; but the Jeppesen chart still has the old designators such as [C; D and E.] Also; Runway 7-25 is very much closed in real life; it has grass growing through it; and big X markings on it. The runway markings for 7-25 have been removed from the pavement. However; the Jeppesen chart still shows it as an active runway.

A passenger turboprop Captain advised the airport page for EAT has not been updated to show the revised taxiway designations which are now A-1 through A-5 vice the previous C; D and E which remain on the chart. In addition; Runway 7/25 has been closed for some time with all markings removed and large X's painted on the surface.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Showed up to originator with MEL for performance computer inoperative. MEL directs the first method to obtain performance data is through the ACARS takeoff and landing performance module. On our aircraft this was functional so we used it. We loaded the ATIS information which was Runway 16L; winds 180/14G20; temp 16/14; wet-good; 29.62. From the loadsheet; we meant to load TOW 121.5. The takeoff data output page gave us 53C/16C Reduced; 116;116;122 which seemed light but we only had 80 people onboard and not a lot of fuel (16.9) so seemed plausible. When we ran the Before Push Checklist using the ACARS data; we failed to notice that the only weight on that page is the Take off weight (TOW) so when the First Officer (FO)called 'Zero Fuel Weight;' I read and responded; ' 104.7 set.' I saw it on the top right line of the ACARS page so it seemed correct. What I did not notice was that this line shows and is labeled TOW! We had accidentally entered the Zero Fuel Weight where we should have entered the TOW. The FO is used to entering Zero Fuel Weight and TOW in the performance computer. And then all he entered in the FMC is the Zero Fuel Weight and the plane calculated the TOW by adding the fuel to it. When you use the ACARS data; you only enter the TOW and never the Zero Fuel Weight so it is completely out of normal practice.  When he called out 'Takeoff Weight' on the Before Push Checklist I'm not sure what happened because I clearly did not verify that specific weight. I believe it was because this was the first time using this method and I couldn't find the number readily and subsequently just paid lip service to the verification thinking it must be right. The end result was that our speeds were off by a good bit. The number when we re-ran them on the performance computer (which was actually functioning fine but was unusable due to the MEL) should have been 127; 127; and 131 for a TOW 121.5 not 104.7. I noticed and commented to the FO that the plane was sluggish on rotation to about 200 feet and; as a result; I did not place any demands on the plane. The speed built rapidly due to strong winds and quickly returned to normal flight feel and characteristics. It was fortunate that we were not very heavy. If we had been going on a long flight and had a large fuel load; the results could have been much worse.  Of course; there is no excuse for not verifying the TOW when prompted on the checklist. My only defense (which is admittedly weak) is that it was an unfamiliar alternative and I was unaware of the pitfalls. I think some things could be done to help Crews. First; in order to comply with the Before Takeoff Checklist items; using this alternative method of data; requires the Crew to return to the PERF INIT page to read the Zero Fuel Weight and then go back to the ACARS module to read the TOW and continue the remainder of the checklist items.  It would be safer and more convenient if the ACARS output page listed the Zero Fuel Weight above the TOW. I know it in the format we have now because for takeoff the physics involved do not care about Zero Fuel Weight for takeoff speed calculations but the checklist demands a crosscheck. It might prevent this situation in the future. Another possible consideration might be removing or moving the Zero Fuel Weight prompt from the Before Push Checklist to the Before Start Checklist or even just move it into the preflight briefing process. The problem is the time we get the Zero Fuel Weight does not permit it this early in our new briefing preflight sequence. That is why I think the best solution is my first recommendation.  Put an entry for the FO to enter Zero Fuel Weight into the ACARS takeoff data input page and then just reproduce it on the output page. At the least; Crews should be made aware that the ACARS output page will not give you an ability to verify Zero Fuel Weight.

B737-700 Captain reports using the zero fuel weight instead of the takeoff weight in the weight and balance computations; a 17;000 pound error; resulting in low V speeds and sluggish takeoff performance.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 4330; Flight Crew Type 115

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Departed SID with special top limit of 2;000 feet. Went into clouds just prior to starting required turn at 710 feet. Had set flaps to up per SOP of aircraft at about 600 feet MSL (i.e.: greater than 400 feet AGL). Set auto-pilot to on to HDG function in ALT change mode. Turn initiated passing 710 feet per SID procedure.Flaps retraction stopped just short of up; auto-pilot disconnected. Horns go off. Communication Aircraft System (CAS) messages for auto-pilot off; flaps fail; stall protection fail.Aircraft in climbing left turn and continuing to bank (i.e.: autopilot disconnected as exactly the wrong moment).Recovered aircraft and went to straight and level flight. Reduced power as altitude was at 2;170 feet by time climb stopped. ATC contacted to ask about altitude. Told them I had a flap issue and would call back time permitting.Realizing that no automatic systems were working (i.e.: autopilot) - went to flying straight ahead and level at 2;000 feet. Then called ATC and asked for straight and level.ATC controller realized I was in trouble. And provided a straight and level; and then a slight climb to 3;000. He did not bother us while we sorted the problem out. This was valuable - as anything he could have asked us would have taken attention away from hand flying the aircraft in hard IFR with multiple failing systems.After reviewing the emergency manual; I reset the flap electronic circuit breakers and the flaps retracted to normal. CAS messages all went away. Auto-pilot came back on-line. Called ATC to let them know we had resolved our issues. And continued flight to better conditions. (Maintenance later determined that the flap potentiometer had a moisture seal issue that caused it to sense a flap misalignment and stop moving to prevent asymmetrical control surfaces).Issue that should be corrected: The blaring horn should be silencable by the pilot. It caused distraction (mental overload) when least needed; and it substantially interfered with communication both in the cockpit and with ATC.Great work by ATC: The controller did not cause further distraction; with questions or directions; right when I most needed time to work out the problem(s). This was perfect. I was already in mental overload and they would not have helped the situation. Their training / intuition to keep quiet to me was spot on.

EA50 pilot reported loss of multiple systems on departure; problem was later traced to flap potentiometer.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On descent into MSP at transition altitude we set altimeter to 29.80 [but it] was 30.80. With all cross checks; we both missed it. At approximately 1000 ft received an EGPWS terrain warning. Executed go around. ATC gave us instructions to level at 6;000 feet. Based on the incorrect altimeter setting; we leveled off at 7;000 ft. ATC informed us of deviation. We realized our altimeter error. Reset and returned for normal landing.We have a good crosscheck system. This was just my error.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

A319 flight crew reported that an erroneous altimeter setting resulted in a GPWS warning and a go around.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

After the route brief was accomplished at SMF; we received a runway change from 34L to 16R. Captain reprogrammed the FMC while I [worked up the takeoff numbers]. After completion; I re-verified the waypoints from the new runway to where it met the common routing from either runway. After departure after FROGO; ATC asked if we were cleared direct REBRG. We initially said we were flying our filed route but then discovered FRA missing. It should have been FROGO; FRA; and REBRG. FRA was there when we did the original route brief; but somehow was dropped when we changed to Runway 16R. ATC said the same thing happened to a previous Company aircraft ahead of us.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

When the flight crew of a B737NG reprogrammed their FMS to comply with a takeoff runway change they failed to note that an enroute fix was not included.  ATC advised and they corrected.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Many failures at once led to confusion. Most concerning was cabin altitude climbing at 400 FPM. Cabin alt passed through 7000 feet and the Capt initiated an emergency descent without departing airway. I articulated we needed to get off the airway to descend. Captain responded by pointing at the TCAS and stating there is no one below us. Reaching FL390 TCAS traffic began showing up on TCAS. When we leveled at FL360 [an aircraft] was 1;000 below us. There was an attempt somewhere in the descent to comply with my repeated statements to depart the airway. [ATC] was informed and an emergency was declared.

Just after I sat down from my break; we heard what seemed like the nose gear door rattle and a fan in the cockpit silence as our ears started popping. We also noticed a status message pop up with the gear synoptic on the EICAS and the NO APU Fire Detector checklist illuminate. We pulled up the AIR System synoptic and saw that the cabin was climbing between 400 and 500 feet per minute and was almost at 8;000 feet. The Captain decided to immediately descend out of FL400; however failed to get off the track prior to doing so. We leveled at FL360 as the pressurization started to stabilize.

Widebody flight crew reports pressurization anomalies at FL400 along with noise and vibration from unknown sources. The Captain initiates a descent without advising ATC and without turning off the airway. ATC is eventually advised and an emergency is declared. The pressurization system stabilizes at FL360 and flight continues to destination.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes prior to landing I was advised by the Purser that a female passenger was having an allergic reaction. A Registered Nurse was looking after the passenger. The EEMK was accessed. Dispatch and [ground-based medical assistance] were contacted via Satcom. The decision was to give the passenger two anti-allergy pills and to continue to destination. The epi pen was only to be used in case of airway blockage. EMTs were to meet the aircraft. Landing and deplaning was uneventful with EMTs meeting the aircraft. A debrief was accomplished after deplaning with the Registered Nurse and the Flight Attendants. The registered Nurse specifically wanted to talk to me to express her concerns. The Stethoscope in the kit fell apart when taken out of the kit and had to be put back together; and the blood pressure cuff was 'out of calibration'. She also expressed concern with the familiarity of the flight attendants with the aircraft (B767-300) emergency equipment and the EEMK contents.

B767-300 Captain reported the flight attendants used the onboard emergency medical kit and a passenger who was an RN to treat a passenger who was having an allergic reaction. Captain also stated the RN reported the quality of the kit was questionable and that flight attendant familiarity with the kit was lacking.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

I; the FA2; noticed smoky haze through light in cabin around first class. Delayed calling cockpit on boarding because I wasn't sure it was anything or just light coming in through windows. Got a little worse and decided to call cockpit though still unclear if I was seeing anything. Then it got progressively worse and spread throughout aircraft until it was very noticeable. All were deplaned. Maybe about 25 minutes later; the cockpit suggested it might have been fluid in air ducts though was not diagnosed officially. Very little odor to me if at all but I have poor senses in that area. This all happened about the time of departure and I called cockpit to suggest I might be seeing haze in cabin and not to back away from the gate. As it got worse; captain could tell it was haze/smoke filtering through cabin and called the mechanics for further advice and then when it got worse; informed passengers to deplane. Aircraft taken out of service.My symptoms: slight headache yesterday; taste in mouth of something; and almost a need to take oxygen and replenish my body of good oxygen. Today; a lot more fatigue experienced throughout the day and slight dizziness at times.

MD-80 Flight Attendant reported a haze during boarding that led to deplaning and the aicraft removed from service.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

After passing FL210 on departure we received an 'L OIL FILTER' EICAS message. We leveled off at FL270 and requested lower. OE Captain was PM and I elected to have him continue as PF while I ran the QRH. Left throttle was retarded to idle and the left engine shutdown IAW checklist when message remained displayed. [While] running QRH began a turn back to [departure airport.] Emergency declared with ATC with request for CRFF to be standing by. FA's briefed and PA made to passengers. We had an uneventful overweight Flaps 20 landing. (309;000 Lbs; 400 fpm) Logbook entry made. CRFF post-landing inspection reported no visible irregularities. Taxied back to gate and deplaned normally.

B767 Captain reported receiving L OIL FILTER EICAS message on climbout. Flight crew shut down the affected engine; declared an emergency; and returned to departure airport.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Was taking a relief briefing on the sector when a Global Express at FL450 requested lower. The working Controller answered; 'We have your request; it will be 9 minutes.' The Global Express answered with 'roger.' After the briefing; the Global Express said they would like an off course vector for lower. I answered; 'Roger turn 15 degrees left vectors for your descent; expect lower in 4 minutes.' The Global Express answered; 'Roger 15 left.' Two minutes later; the Global Express was 7 miles from a Citation at FL430 and said; 'Unable to maintain altitude; need to descend immediately.' I responded; 'Roger fly heading 330.' No answer. 'Global Express fly heading 170.' At this moment the Global Express started descending losing separation with the Citation. [I] told the Citation to 'descend and maintain FL400 immediately.' No response. Went back to the Global Express and said 'descend and maintain FL430.' 'Unable' was the response. The Global Express descended through FL420 and I told the Global Express to descend and maintain FL400. The Global Express answered; 'Roger descending to FL400.' Went back to the Citation and said; 'Climb and maintain FL430.' The Citation response; 'Roger never left FL430.' I put the Global Express back on course after separation was insured. If a pilot has an imminent need; they need to vocalize those needs before it becomes an emergency.

Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event when an aircraft needed an immediate descent; but failed to verbalize the need to ATC.


Just after taking our seats in [the cockpit] the aircraft lost electrical power. I looked at the overhead and noted that ground power was available and selected it on. (I presumed a bad ground power connection at first.) As my eyes passed across the overhead panel I noted and the First Officer verbalized a fault light on the APU master switch. Shortly thereafter; we got an APU AUTOSHUTDOWN ECAM. We followed ECAM procedures and contacted Maintenance. The APU was put on MEL and during that process; we noted a green flashing low APU [oil]. We pointed it out to the mechanic; but thought little of it at the time.After shutting down at our destination; the first flight attendant; informed us that on two of the previous three legs prior to ours; there had been fumes in the cabin that were so strong that passengers were covering their mouths and noses in an attempt to avoid the smell. He said he reported the fumes to the Captains in both cases; but that the Captains did nothing about it.Note that we nor the passengers or cabin crew detected any odors during our flight.We contacted Maintenance and explained the situation. I was asked to and did enter a write up in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) and complete an aircraft cabin odor report as best as I could. (Since I was not on the flights where it occurred; I was unable to answer most of the questions on the report.)Maintenance showed up to the aircraft promptly after my call and found that the APU had been leaking oil and it appeared it had run down the skin of the aircraft and reentered at the APU intake.I was later informed that when Maintenance started the APU after my write up; 'flames shot from the back of the APU because the oil leak was so large.'This event occurred because the APU leaked oil and although the flight attendants made the problem known to the prior flight crew; they did not report it to maintenance.While; I'm not in a position to speculate how the first fumes in the cabin encounter could have been avoided; it seems from what I was told that had the first Captain to be notified of the issue made a logbook entry; notified maintenance; and filled an aircraft cabin odor report; the subsequent problems could have been avoided.

A319 Captain reported an APU auto shut down at the gate due to low oil quantity. The APU was deferred; but later; Maintenance determined that leaking oil likely caused fumes in the cabin on previous legs with a different crew.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 1455; Flight Crew Type 1309

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Aircraft

Cleared [for] takeoff; left turn to the VOR. Taxied onto 19R; lined up on centerline at the end of the runway began takeoff roll. During takeoff roll; on centerline heard a thump. [Though to myself]; 'What the heck?' Rotated; gear up; all normal; up and locked - everything seemed normal. Climb out normal through 500 FT. Climb to cruise normal (climb; speeds; performance; absence of vibration; etc.). Cruise flight normal. Cancelled IFR at the OCN VOR; proceeded directly to the airport. Approach; normal landing; until nose came down; then significant shudder and shimmy in the nose. Hauled back on elevator to lighten the nose; and slowed. Thought was just flat nose tire. In fact; that's what I reported to the tug guy when he called on the radio.Pulled off the runway itself (although not past the hold short lines). When tug guy came up; shut down (kept the engine running up to then so I had radio and lights; for collision avoidance and communications). Then; shut down; came around front to talk with tug guy. That's when I first noticed the prop damage. Prop tips damaged; taxi light shattered; no other evident damage.

Following a 'normal' flight; save for a 'thump' just prior to rotation; the pilot of a BE36 was surprised to discover significant damage to the nose gear and propeller after landing at his destination.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2685; Flight Crew Type 1999

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was on an IFR flight plan enroute to Jackson; TN (MKL) at 6000 MSL. Although most of the route was VMC; I was dealing with a stiff headwind and occasional light turbulence.The aircraft appeared to be maneuvering about 5 NM southwest of my position; at altitudes varying from about 500 feet above to about 500 feet below my assigned altitude. Memphis Center confirmed the other aircraft's position; but was not in contact with the other crew.Based on the other aircraft's speed and maneuverability; I had the impression that it was a light jet (perhaps a small Citation); but we never got close enough to confirm that identification.At about XA18Z; the other aircraft changed course towards my position; and Center approved a deviation to the right of about 20deg. After about 90 seconds; Center cleared me direct to MKL. I believe it was about this point that I was handed off to another Memphis Center controller.At approximately XA21Z; the other aircraft once more changed course towards my position. With Center's approval; I deviated to the right for about two minutes before being cleared direct to MKL.At about XA30Z; the other aircraft again headed towards my position and Center approved a deviation to the right. After about four minutes; Center cleared me direct to MKL and told me to descend to 4000 feet. At approximately XA45Z; what I believe was the same aircraft again headed toward me; but this time (if I remember correctly) it appeared he was about at my altitude and at my 6 o'clock position. When he got within about two miles; I attempted to contact Center but the controller was busy talking to other aircraft. When my traffic advisory system indicated that the other aircraft was within about a mile of my position and closing rapidly; I took evasive action by turning about 60 degrees to the left of my course. As soon as the frequency opened up; I advised Memphis Center I had again changed heading to avoid the other aircraft. (In retrospect; I should have used the phrase 'evasive action' to emphasize how serious I considered the situation.) I also advised the controller that I was concerned that I would soon approach my minimum fuel level (if I remember correctly; inadvertently using the phrase 'critical fuel').The controller voiced no objection to my actions; assured me there would be no further delays and gave me a vector towards MKL. A few minutes later; he cleared me for the visual approach to Rwy 20 and handed me off to MKL Tower. The rest of the flight was uneventful. (Once on the ground at MKL; I asked and Tower said he had not been in contact with the other traffic.)I can't recall having to deviate so many times for another aircraft. As they weren't talking to Memphis Center; I can only speculate why the other crew maneuvered as they did. In any event; under the circumstances; I felt I had no alternative but to take evasive action.

General aviation pilot encountered nuisance air traffic which continued to encroach on his IFR flight plan course. The traffic in question was not talking to any ATC facility.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14700; Flight Crew Type 5600

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Aircraft was pushed back and started via normal procedures. All appropriate checklists were accomplished. There was a delay in obtaining takeoff data due to a change in desired engine anti-ice configuration triggering errors. Prior to aircraft taxi the captain had me visually clear my side of the aircraft. I could not see any ground personnel or equipment; and gave him a clear indication for my side. We obtained clearance from ground control and taxied to the assigned runway.I was recently made aware that the ground crew had not disconnected when we taxied. Obviously; there was a breakdown in communication that resulted in a very unsafe and disturbing situation. Fortunately no personnel were injured.

After the fact; a B757 First Officer was made aware that he and Captain taxied with a ground crewmen head set still attached to the aircraft. Neither pilot saw the person.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Returning to base at the completion of a flight; the Environmental Control System (ECS) unit was turned on. After a few minutes the Medic (in the cabin) stated that there was a 'fog' in the cabin and a strong smell of jet fuel. The pilot; backed up by the nurse holding the RFM ran the Smoke and Fume Elimination Checklist. Since I suspected the smoke was coming in through the cabin ECS ducting; I turned off the ECS. The air immediately cleared and the smell of fuel went away. As we were only then a few miles from the base; we landed back at base and notified Maintenance. Prior to the mechanic arriving at the base; I inspected the #2 Engine Compartment and found oil leaking from bolts on the Compressor Case. The mechanic had topped off the oil earlier in the day and now after less than an hour of flight; the oil level had dropped to the 'add 2 quarts' line. Maintenance actions are on-going.

During return to base in a Bell BHT-222 Helicopter; a medic informs pilot there was 'fog' in the cabin and a strong smell of jet fuel after the Environmental Control System (ECS) was turned on. Pilot found oil leaking from bolts on #2 Engine Compressor Case.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 200

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Time Pressure; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted

I was working in my hangar at ZZZ when I was requested to fly as an instructor with 2 pilot candidates for jump pilot with [skydive company]; which is located on the airport. The airplane in use was a C-182 which was actively flying skydivers that day. It had flown 12 loads; and I instructed the first pilot in command to do the preflight while I oversaw the installation of the second seat and yoke; and got my headset and gear. When I came back to the airplane; the pilot indicated we were ready for takeoff; and we did so. At approximately 2;000 feet in the climbout; I looked down at the fuel switch (this was my first idle time; as I was observing his procedures on the climb-out). The C-182 has a 4 position switch; back is off; to the sides left and right; and forward both tanks. I was wearing sunglasses for the first time in years; but they do not have near vision bifocals; which is why I never wear them. This time I had decided to protect my eyes and try the sunglasses; as the westerly sun was very bright. Rather than switch glasses; I asked the pilot to look down and confirm for me that the fuel switch was on both. He did so. The position looked odd to me; but I figured that we had climbed to over 2;000 feet and the engine was running normally; so I disregarded my gut feelings and proceeded with the task at hand. We flew a routine for about 40 minutes; returned to the field; landed. The second pilot came out; did his preflight while I discussed the previous flight with 1st pilot; and the skydive operator. The second pilot and I took off without incident climbed to 3K altitude; and proceeded north of the airport. I had the pilot doing steep turns; and when he rolled out of the turn to the left; the engine suddenly quit. We immediately set up a best rate of glide; checked the mags; mixture; I pushed the prime switch to no avail; checked carb with no response. By this time; we had descended; and I started to look for a field. We were nearly directly over [name] private airstrip. We frequently fly in here; and I was familiar with the field. I broadcast on the common frequency for ZZZ; [frequency]; that we were making an emergency landing in [name's] field. Things were happening pretty fast; so we ceased attempting to solve the problem; and concentrated on the landing. I told the pilot to give me the airplane; I was familiar with the field (there is a power line crossing the field app 2/3rds of the way down) and I proceeded to make a landing. I felt this was the best procedure as there was little time to discuss the situation. We landed; and I stepped out of the aircraft; put on my near vision glasses; and checked the fuel switch position. It was off. I selected both tanks on the selector; the engine started; did an engine check; everything was normal; and we took off and returned to ZZZ without incident. I told the jump pilot; who had been flying the airplane all day that the switch was off. He said 'Oh; yeah. We've been doing that for a couple of weeks now.' 'We' is he as he was the only pilot at the time. 'I asked him why he would do that; and he told me that he did it to keep the fuel from moving from one tank to the other. This would have been ineffective; as the off position only cuts off fuel to the engine. I told him that a better method would be to select either tank to accomplish this; but turning off the fuel switch was a bad idea. The operators and I handled this in-house by a discussion with those involved; which was an appropriate response to the situation.

Cessna 182 instructor and student pilot reported a loss of engine power due to fuel mismanagement; necessitating a power off forced landing on a nearby airstrip.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Approach called to get higher on Aircraft X to get above or around parachute jump aircraft at 14;000 feet. I approved 15;000 feet. Approach switched the aircraft out of 12;500 feet head on with the parachute jump aircraft. I had to turn the Aircraft X and expedite his climb thru 14;000 feet to prevent a near midair collision. When the Aircraft X passed west of the parachute jump aircraft he was at the same altitude as the parachute jump aircraft. Had I not turned the Aircraft X there may have been a collision with jumpers or parachute jump aircraft.This has been an issue in the past. Approach calls to get higher to top the parachute jump aircraft; and switch the aircraft prior to separation. Approach needs to have a procedure or new routing for departures when they have parachute jump aircraft.

The TRACON Controller got permission to climb an aircraft to 15;000 feet into ARTCC airspace to ensure he climbed above a parachute jump aircraft at 14;000 feet. The TRACON Controller switched the aircraft to the ARTCC frequency still below and climbing towards the parachute jump aircraft. The ARTCC Controller had to issue vectors to the aircraft to avoid the parachute jumpers.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Approximately 4 hours prior to landing EICAS MSG HYD QTY LOW 1. Fault light also illuminated. Hydraulic quantity slowly depleted over the next hour to zero; however pressure and temp was normal. Conferred multiple times with dispatch Maintenance Control and Duty Pilot about possible tow in in ZZZ if needed. After 50 more minutes with a zero quantity reading EICAS MSG  had PRESS ENG 1. Engine one pressure light also illuminated. Followed QRH and continued with engine pump off. ZZZ OPS and ATC arranged for runway XX for our arrival in the event we might require a tow off. During descent when selecting flaps 5 EICAS HYD PRESS system 1 followed QRH; notified ZZZ and ZZZ OPS that a tow off would be required. ZZZ ATC at that point stated they were going to use priority handling on our behalf; we did not request one; and we provided souls on board and fuel remaining. We continued flap and alternate gear extension and proceeded with a visual approach and landing to runway XX; followed by a tow to gate. Runway was closed for approximately 11 minutes.Crew worked great together and we were well prepared for the system loss and reviewed everything ahead of time. Speculation regarding ATC wanting us in an emergency status is it's most likely a local procedure addressing a planned runway closure and airport assistance required for the tow in. ZZZ currently had runway YYR closed so our planned closure left the airport with a single runway.

Captain reported multiple hydraulic system failures on descent. ATC assigned priority handling; allowing the flight to continue the approach and precautionary landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Cargo Aircraft Only (CAO) label discovered during the loading process.

Air Carrier Ramp personnel reported discovering a container with CAO [Cargo Aircraft Only] label during aircraft loading process.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 1

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During our ILS approach to ZGGG; we had a GPS Loss of Signal/GPS Signal Interference for about 30 seconds.We were given a vector heading to intercept the ILS to Runway 01 about 20 miles from the runway. Just as we were intercepting the localizer; 'ADS-B OUT L' EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) alert appeared and the NAV display changed from GPS to Inertial. I was about to switch the transponder to the R side when Approach Control advised us that they had lost our transponder signal. After switching to the R transponder; Approach confirmed that they were receiving our signal. The EICAS alert blanked and the NAV display showed GPS about 30 seconds after the initial signal loss.After landing; we asked Ground Control to advise Approach Control of the GPS interference on the final approach. We had experienced our first GPS jamming/interference event on our previous flight. Due to our short layover in ZZZ and much needed rest; I chose to wait until our longer Guangzhou layover to submit an [ASRS] report per the FOM X.XX Mandatory Report table. The table shows only an [Safety Report] and Security reports are mandatory; the AML entry box has no 'x'. In the research for the report; I reread the entire Bulletin XXX-XX-XX GPS; 'Loss of Signal / GPS Signal Interference.' It was at this time that I discovered that I had misread the Bulletin and neglected to make an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) entry regarding the GPS interference. I have submitted a Security Report for both flights.As stated above; this [ASRS] report is essentially applicable to this flight and our previous flight. The same causes apply to both.The cause of the loss of GPS was most likely due to jamming and/or interference.Neglecting to properly document and communicate the GPS issue was primarily due to my misreading of the GPS bulletin. In a rush to reference the technical part of the bulletin to assist in troubleshooting; I skimmed the administrative paragraphs and missed the 'A detailed AML write up is required for any GPS discrepancies even if the GPS function returns to normal.' I made the mistake of assuming that; because the event was not caused by our equipment; an AML entry would not be required. The lack of an AML entry requirement in the FOM (Flight Operations Manual) X.XX table contributed to my error. The bulletin IS controlling as it was issued subsequent to the current FOM. Additionally; this was our first GPS event experience.Our improper assumptions were additional causes. We assumed that a notification to ATC or [Operations Center] was not necessary because we never had a loss of navigation capability and we had no aircraft system malfunctions.In the future; I will notify ATC; [Operations Center]; document with an AML entry; file a [Safety Report] and a Security Report for a GPS jamming/interference event.Going forward; after a 'Non - Normal' event is complete; stabilized or we are blocked in; a detailed review of the QRH; Bulletin or other source document would be helpful. A slower review during a low workload time would help to avoid this type of mistake. A more detailed review would have led me to make an AML entry; notify ATC and [Operations Center].Additionally; an update to the FOM Table X.XX for the GPS events would help to prevent this type of error.

Air carrier Captain reported possible GPS jamming event during an ILS approach to Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport.