Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Total 2571; Flight Crew Type 855

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 94; Flight Crew Total 1395; Flight Crew Type 469

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

This morning while departing we experienced an engine roll back. The FO ran the runway item checklist as I taxied out onto [the] runway. As I started to apply takeoff power all engine indications were normal. Upon reaching close to firewall [I] noticed we [were] not at the usual torque numbers. I then verified the throttle and advanced it full forward. At this point the indications went back to normal and we had reached Vr. We rotated and I instructed [the FO] to watch our torque-meter and notify [me] if it changed at all; and if it did we would be making an immediate turn back to [the] runway. Shortly after passing through 500 ft AGL and in a left turn to a 090 heading he stated that indeed the torque was rolling back. As previously briefed I executed a left turn back to [the runway] and landed without issue.

PC-12 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after experiencing a power rollback shortly after takeoff.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Cleared to land in CLT on 36L; we were in visual conditions with Flaps 15. I was the pilot flying and after I made my 500 foot callout; ATC announced the surface winds were 190 degrees 11 gusting 17. Since it was too late to configure to flaps 35; the Captain called for a go around. Several other planes were also going around. So; ATC had a high workload and was sending us several miles away from the airport. They were still unsure as to whether to turn the airport around. ATC told one aircraft that they were waiting to decide if the tailwinds were due to storms in the area or if they need to turn the airport around. Due to fuel concerns and the uncertainty of how long it would take us to land; the Captain called Dispatch and we went to our alternate.

Dash-8 First Officer reported proceeding to an alternate after weather conditions at destination caused delays.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 39; Flight Crew Total 4642

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

I departed in a helicopter. We were filed IFR direct to SBN. After departure we were in IMC conditions. I was notified by Center that they had lost my transponder signal and for me to recycle the transponder; which I did. The results were negative. Center then told me to continue and that they would advise when they picked up my signal again. I continued on to SBN as instructed and approximately 10 minutes later Center contacted me and stated that they have me on radar again; I acknowledged.Approximately 11 miles out from SBN I had not heard from Center on assigned frequency so I attempted to contact them twice. The results were negative so I changed to an alternate frequency and they acknowledged my call. I advised that I was requesting vectors for the ILS Runway 09R approach into SBN. By this time I was about 2 miles South of the KNUTE final approach fix. I realized that I needed to turn left to get outside of the FAF (KNUTE) but received right turn which gave me a ninety degree intercept of the final approach inbound course. When cleared for the approach which was simultaneous with the turn I armed the approach and glide slope functions on the autopilot. By this time the aircraft had flown over the FAF and through the final approach course and made a very steep turn to the right attempting to get back on course. The aircraft then flew through the course going south at which time I put hands on the controls and attempted to turn the aircraft back left onto the final course. At that time I disengaged the autopilot to gain control of the aircraft and that's when the aircraft went into an unusual attitude for a moment.I got the aircraft back under control and reengaged the autopilot in the heading mode and declared an emergency; began a climb; asked for the nearest VFR. ATC said the best he could do was vector me over the airport to see if I could see the field. I told him that I could not see the field since we were above the initial altitude assigned and that we could not see the field at that time. I then asked for another approach; the RNAV (GPS) 09R approach. The controller acknowledged and said he would have to give me a vector 180 degrees. I turn to the West as instructed and set the aircraft for the RNAV GPS 09R approach. The controller said something about the FAF for the ILS Runway 27L so I questioned him again and he said you are doing the ILS Runway 09R approach again aren't you? I told him that I had requested the RNAV GPS 09R approach; but that I would set the aircraft for the ILS Runway 09R approach again. He acknowledged the ILS Runway 09R approach and stated he was sorry for the turn earlier and that he was not used to helicopters and that he normally deals with airplanes.While being vectored for the approach I noticed that we were paralleling the inbound course approximately two miles to the south. I asked the controller prior to turning us to intercept the inbound course I would like a turn to the south to allow a normal rate of turn to intercept the inbound course. The controller acknowledged and gave me a turn to the southwest; followed by a turn to the northeast then cleared for the ILS Runway 09R approach. I engaged the approach and glide slope modes on the autopilot and the aircraft turned on course. While on the approach I heard Center talking to another aircraft inbound for SBN. The aircraft asked Center where was the location of our aircraft and they answered that they did not know. I immediately contacted Center and advised that we were over KNUTE (FAF). The controller acknowledged and stated the options to cancel our flight plan and said that he forgot to tell me to maintain 3;000 feet until established on the localizer inbound and again apologized for the turn earlier. The remainder of the approach was a non-event and landed at SBN.I believe the problem with the lost communications and radar contact is due to being on the edge of Center's area of coverage; for the altitude I was assigned. However; the initial vector and approach clearance was inexcusable; no aircraft in IMC conditions should be turned onto the final course outside of the approach gate. The excuse of not being familiar with helicopters versus airplanes is not valid; all Category A aircraft fly an instrument approach using the same parameters. In the future I will not allow ATC to put me and the passengers in such a dangerous position. I believe the controller which was directing the aircraft that early morning should receive additional training.

An IFR Helicopter flying the SBN ILS 9R IMC was vectored too close to the final approach fix which caused erratic autopilot behavior. The pilot executed a missed approach and was vectored back for a successful approach. While enroute SBN; communications with Center was erratic because of low altitude flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach to Runway 4R in BOS; at night with marginal VMC weather conditions being reported on ATIS; approaching intersection MILTT switched to BOS Tower frequency 128.8. Tower was informing the aircrafts ahead of us that there was a tall vessels in the approach area. [Having both flown in to BOS many times] we both have encountered this situation before. We immediately reset our descent minimums and re-briefed the approach and landing. We expected to land as the reported ATIS weather conditions were well above the minimum requirements for a tall vessels landing to Runway 4R. As is usually the case when a tall vessels enters the safety area at BOS the Tower Controller and preceding aircraft (maybe not BOS based crews or familiar with this procedure) appeared to be caught off guard without a plan or alternative course of action for this situation. The result was a BOS tower directed go-around to multiple aircraft (including ours) both ahead and behind our aircraft. BOS tower did not issue a reason (such as the ships height exceeded the maximum 144 ft. for Runway 4R) and the radio frequency was too congested to inquire. When we were switched back to Approach Controller we were initially told to expect the RNAV approach to Runway 4R and we were issued a vector consistent with a Runway 4R approach. As additional aircraft checked on to Approach frequency from the tower directed missed approach two aircraft originally behind us in landing sequence declared minimum fuel. ATC vectored those aircraft ahead of us for a subsequent landing. This resulted in additional vectoring for our aircraft to reshuffle the landing order. After setting up and briefing the RNAV approach to Runway 4R the Approach Controller reported an RVR of 2200 ft. for Runway 4R. We along with another company aircraft informed the controller that we needed 6000 RVR to execute the RNAV Runway 4R approach. Approach then told us to expect the ILS to Runway 33L an issued a heading consistent with a downwind for Runway 33L. The Approach Controller did inform us that coordination needed to be done with BOS Tower and it might take some time. At some point in this extended process (my recollection) an aircraft [from a different airline] had to divert due to its fuel state. After setting up and briefing the ILS to Runway 33L at BOS we were informed that we would be going back to Runway 4R in BOS. Probably because by now the tall ship had cleared the channel. This involved lengthier vectoring and eventually we reached the point where we had to declare minimum fuel ourselves. We reset and re-briefed the Runway 4R approach in BOS. This was the fourth briefing and set up we had to preform within 30 minutes. We touched down with 300 lbs. of fuel (~3 minutes of flying time) above our calculated bingo fuel of 8000 lbs. for ZZZ.These multiple go-arounds and diversions appeared potentially unnecessary; costly; and potentially dangerous. A more timely notice to the BOS Tower Controller of an approaching tall vessel should have allowed sufficient time to develop and execute an alternative approach and landing Runway plan. This information should be relayed to aircraft on Approach frequency and not sprung on unfamiliar crews on short final to landing. There must be existing technology that can be utilized or procedures developed to alert the Tower Controller well in advance of a tall vessel entering an area that impact arrivals to Runway 4R in BOS. This is especially crucial at night in IMC conditions during busy arrival times.

B737-8 Captain reported Approach Control procedure regarding tall vessels affecting landing aircraft needs to be updated to eliminate unnecessary multiple go-arounds and diversions.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

We departed LAS uneventfully using the bag count that we were given. Airplane flew and acted just fine. Enroute we got a message from dispatch that the bags that were supposed to be in CP1 were actually in CP4. No action taken on our part. Discussed event with FO and thought no more about it. Trip continued without trouble.In the future I as well as other pilots should pay closer attention to where the bags are actually placed and not just rely on the paperwork. Also it would be helpful if the paperwork was given to the crew ONLY AFTER ALL THE BAGS ARE LOADED. The calling up and reporting that 20 extra bags are added to CP1 as an example are just disruptive and generally go without consideration.

An A319 crew received a message from dispatch enroute advising of an error in their weight and balance due to bags being placed in a different container than utilized during the calculations.  The flight continued uneventfully to destination.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Prior to pushback; I had removed a can of water from the wall side cup holder so I could put a cup of coffee there and set the can near the nose wheel tiller. I had planned on moving the can; but began a conversation with the Agent; my First Officer; and the Flight Attendant Crew. Unfortunately; I never moved the can and we accomplished our checklists; completed our pushback and engine start duties; and cleared the Ground Crew off after both engines started. We completed our After Start checklists and called for taxi. We were given a left turn out to taxi to the departure runway. I attempted to turn the tiller left and added power but the tiller wouldn't turn. I attempted to turn the tiller right and had full turn authority. I attempted three more times to turn the tiller left but to no avail. We asked the Ground Crew to come back out to the plane and check that the nose gear pin had been removed even though we were sure we saw them take it with them when they departed the plane with the tug. The Tug Driver checked the nose wheel area and assured us with hand signals that the nose gear pin had been removed. I then attempted once more to turn the tiller left and again; it would not turn. We then asked and received clearance to return to the gate; which we did. We elected to taxi slowly back in as we were in a straight line to the gate area and wouldn't have to make any turns. Once we shut the engines down and informed Operations of the situation; the Tug Driver entered the cockpit and told us what that everything looked normal to him in the nose wheel well. I attempted once more to turn the tiller left before I was going to call Dispatch for a patch to Maintenance Control when my hand slid off the tiller slightly and came in contact with the can of water I had repositioned some 20 minutes prior. I removed the can from under the tiller and the tiller moved freely. We talked to Dispatch about what our procedures were for departing and if they needed new paperwork. They informed us they didn't; our Agent cleared the gate return times and we pushed back; taxied out; and took off without incident.

A B737 Captain set a water can next to the steering tiller and after taxi out was unable to steer so returned to the gate where he found the water can; removed it and regained full steering control.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure

SETZR1 RNAV Departure was assigned during pushback. We briefed and ran Departure Plan Checklist and I thought the bases were covered. There was a clue during taxi; that the First Officer thought LNAV was required for takeoff. But I didn't engage him for his reasoning; we just set up for an HGS takeoff at my request. SAT Tower simply cleared us for departure on Runway 04. No additional instructions; as I recall.On departure I was flying Runway Heading as I expected. The First Officer asked me if I wanted LNAV to proceed to the first fix (VAUHN) and I said no; just runway heading. He said we were supposed to go direct and I said 'Are you sure?' He said 'YES!' So; I said ok; and we engaged LNAV and started the turn. Then he checked in with SAT Departure. They were polite as there were no traffic conflicts. They reminded us that we were supposed to maintain runway heading; (or an assigned heading; per the SID) for our clearance.In retrospect I should have asked my First Officer to go ahead and contact Departure Control in order to verify our clearance. (Let ATC be the tie-breaker.)

Air carrier Captain reported a misunderstanding between the Captain and First Officer whether to fly runway heading or comply with the RNAV Departure procedures which resulted in heading deviation.


Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was shooting the Fairbanks International ILS 20R approach and was between CIGNI and HOSAN.  I'm not sure of the exact altitude; but somewhere between 1;300-1;800 MSL on the glide slope the Tower on 118.3 radioed me a low altitude alert warning and said to climb immediately.  I put power in and immediately climbed losing the glide slope.  I had Ground contact at this point and I did not believe the Tower's warning that my altitude was too low; but I complied with their directions and climbed.  Once I climbed 300-400 feet; I could see the runway lights; so I continued my approach and made a normal safe landing on the runway.  The visibility issues were due to smoke and the visibility at the time was 2-3 SM.  After I taxied back; shutdown the plane; and unloaded my passengers; I called Fairbanks Tower to ask them about the low altitude warning.  When I told them that the needles were centered and it happened between CIGNI and HOSAN I was informed that the Tower's radar alert system sometimes gives erroneous readings and that between those 2 fixes on the ILS 20R was a common place for the erroneous warning to happen.  Having analyzed my response to this situation I think a better response to this event in the future would be to go missed on the approach.  I did not go missed because I was very familiar with this approach and I had ground contact at the point of the warning.  In the future I plan to climb anyway; go missed and come back and try a different approach the second time.

Pilot reported being advised of a Low Altitude Alert; climbing; seeing the airport visually; then landing.  Tower advised ATC sometimes gets erroneous alerts at the aircraft 's position.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Descending on the HILEY SIX arrival into MIA. FO flying. Cleared to deviate left or right of course for weather. 10;000 to 8;000 at 210 knots Flaps 1. While turning to avoid a large build up the autopilot was turned off. Flaps 1 speed was exceeded. Turned base for approach expecting LOC approach to 8L. ATC parallels 8L course on a 090 heading. Looking for the visual. High on approach a go-around was made. A turn to a 140 heading and climb to 4;000 clearance. Captain advises FO of assuming control. FO acknowledges control. Captain inputs turn control before FO gets to neutral on controls. Captain continues turn to proper heading causing a 'dual input' aural. Resequenced for approach landing made.

Flap Over speed. During this flight; I was the pilot flying. I am new to the Airbus and prior to this event had accumulated approximately 45 total flight hours.The Aircraft's autopilot was engaged until prior to this event.On our arrival to the Miami Airport we were given the 'HILEY SIX' arrival with crossing restrictions of 280 Knots and 13;000 feet as depicted at 'BTOGA' as depicted on the arrival. We advised Air Traffic Control that following 'BTOGA' there were storm cells over 'HILEY and KAINS' intersections and that we wanted to deviate to the west. ATC advised that that was not possible due to departure flow leaving the Miami airports.At his time ATC advised us that we were to expect the LOC 8L approach instead of the ILS 12 approach that we had preloaded into the aircraft's navigation system. With this new runway assignment; the aircraft's navigation system was reprogrammed and we briefed the approach procedures.As we finished loading and briefing the new runway; we advised that we needed to deviate from course as the storms were in our way.Initially; ATC had us flying between the build ups; and then gave us a speed restriction of 210 Knots and a descent of 11;000 to 8;000 feet. While trying to slow the aircraft down and descending; I was using the spoilers and with the VLS speed approaching our aircrafts speed; I called for Flaps 1.ATC assigned a southerly heading that would have us fly into the face of a storm; so the Captain called for an immediate autopilot off; right turn. (Of note here is that this was becoming a rough bouncy ride due to the storms that we were approaching.) I complied and made mistake of lowering the nose while turning. This resulted in a rapid acceleration of the airspeed that I failed to notice as I was visually trying to avoid the worse of the storm. At this time the aircraft's audio over speed horn sounded and the airspeed had increased to approximately 265 knots. At this time; I immediately leveled the aircraft and slowed to below flap extension speed.After arrival at the airport gate; Maintenance was notified; and the flap over speed event was documented in the maintenance log.Additionally on this LOC 8L approach; I executed a go around as I was too high and fast to be established and stable for the landing. During a turn to the north; the Captain called for the aircraft control and I was not quick enough to release my side stick and an audio dual input alert sounded.

While encountering turbulence and deviating for large build ups; the crew experienced a flap overspeed; then was caught high and fast so executed a go-around. There was some confusion as the Captain assumed aircraft control during the go-around.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 2651; Flight Crew Type 254

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Pilot's (3 aboard - PIC/Instructor/Pilot in passenger seat/rear); departed LGB on a recurrency training flight. The chosen route of flight was along I-710 (Long Beach Freeway); I-5 (Santa Ana Freeway); I-10 (Santa Monica Freeway); then westbound along the Hollywood Hills. Pilot's departed LGB via the North Downey helicopter arrival/departure procedure. Pilot was level at 1;800 FT; northbound along I-710; approximately halfway between I-105 and I-5 when the pilot; flying from the left seat; noticed a low wing airplane at their 3 o'clock position and altitude; on a collision course. Pilot executed an evasive maneuver to avoid a mid-air collision which resulted in the airplane over flying with approximately 50 FT of clearance. Regular position reports were being transmitted on 123.025 as recommended on the Los Angeles Helicopter route chart. Prior to the training flight; as well as with the 2 previous training flights; collision avoidance; in conjunction with emergency procedures; as well as the selection/s of altitude use; were discussed. Congestion and use by other law enforcement; news media; tour and general aviation aircraft made the selection and use of an altitude that did not correspond at a 500 FT interval a logical choice. The floor of the Class Bravo in the area where the incident occurred is 2;000 FT. It appeared to all pilot's that the aircraft was flying just beneath the Class Bravo to avoid obtaining clearance to fly westbound when it was spotted. The pilot also was not making position reports on 123.025 as recommended while flying in the LA Basin. Although all pilots were actively conducting collision avoidance procedures; none could conclude any logical reason for the aircraft's position; heading and altitude when noticed.

Northbound helicopter pilot experiences a NMAC at 1;800 FT beneath LAX Class B along I-710. Evasive action is taken with the westbound aircraft passing 50 FT above the helicopter.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

D01 coordinated to bring Aircraft X in through the NW corner of the airspace at 120 to avoid some glider activity around Kelly Air Park (off the LOA).  This aircraft was already 5-10 miles from the NW corner and pointed at COS.  Aircraft Y has been doing aerial survey lines VFR extending 15 miles N of COS to 10-15 miles S of COS for several hours at 145 or higher.  VFR Aircraft Z had an inoperative Mode C and was transitioning from somewhere south of PUB to APA.  Aircraft Z was restricted to 115 due to the inoperative Mode C. Other aircraft were in other parts of the airspace as well.  Aircraft Y advised that he was finished with his survey lines and was ready to return to base while at 130.  I tried to turn him to a heading of 030 to get him out of the arrival corridor for his descent and told him to descend to 110.  However; he advised that he was not done with his lines and still had to continue on a line.  I told Aircraft Y to continue his line; but forgot to advise him stop his descent.  Aircraft Y continued N; then turned NW while descending.  I had to issue a vector to Aircraft Z to keep him out of the AFF airspace; and he requested to descend.  I agreed; and then issued traffic.  I turned Aircraft X to H110 to descend him and avoid the Aircraft Z; then realized that Aircraft Y had finished his line and started descending--taking a turn I did not anticipate.  Aircraft X initiated a TCAS RA for Aircraft Y; who was about 1.5 miles S of him. Aircraft Y had Aircraft X in sight; but I do not remember if it was before/after the TCAS RA.I was likely fatigued because I was trying to get training for a trainee and took very few breaks to make this happen.  I tried to ensure breaks for the other CPC and trainee; at my own expense.  In hindsight; this may not have been the best plan with regards to myself.  I could have also prevented this if I had required D01 to bring Aircraft X in on the LOA--which would have brought him in on the E side of the airspace; long after Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z.

COS Controller reports that due to accepting an aircraft on other then LOA procedure they ended up having an operational error and TCAS RA Event.


Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Our flight had departed LAX and was climbing via the DARRK1 departure. At approximately 11;000 ft; the aircraft encountered wake turbulence and rolled to the left and then the right. The angle of bank did not exceed 30 degrees. The First Officer contacted the flight attendants; who informed him no injuries were sustained by passengers or crew. The First Officer reported the wake turbulence encounter to ATC; who responded that our flight was following a heavy 777 and that our courses would diverge soon. The flight continued without further incident. Upon arrival; I notified Operations and the Chief Pilot; in accordance with Flight Operations Manual.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing LAX in trail of a B777 that resulted in rolls in both directions.


Climbing through around FL230 or so got a level 1 hydraulic message quickly followed by a level 2 hydraulic 3 fail (nearly all fluid gone). Told Center we would like to return to departure airport and made a descending left turn towards the airport. Landed uneventfully after manually extending the gear.

MD-11 Captain reported returning to the departure airport after experiencing loss of the Number 3 hydraulic system.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While on climb out shortly after the 10;000 foot checklist; I noticed our oil pressure was in the amber range. The Captain checked the left engine oil quantity on the MFD and it indicated 2 quarts. I started the Low Oil Pressure checklist which lead to the Precautionary Engine Shutdown checklist. We secured the engine; [advised ATC] and headed back ZZZ. I called Flight Attendant and told her what the situation was; made a PA; and we continued to land safely in ZZZ. I cannot answer this as I am not a mechanic and do not know why the engine lost oil. I feel like we took all appropriate actions in a timely manner. If this happens in the future; I would maybe try to slow down a bit and delay the flaps 22 extension to short final as we were heavy and airplane wouldn't hold altitude after we extended the gear down/flaps 22. We retracted the flaps back up to 9 to be able to hold altitude which worked well; and then re extended the flaps to 22 on short final. I think overall; we did what we were trained to do and the Captain even made a smooth landing. After landing; we taxied in and parked with no issues.

Air Carrier First Officer reported an engine shutdown due to oil pressure loss.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While enroute from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1; we encountered an area of convective activity near the ZZZZ VOR that continued beyond the ZZZZ VOR. After analyzing the information provided by our radar and HUD systems; we decided to deviate approximately 80 miles east-north east from our filed routing. We made the appropriate request with ATC and the request was approved. As we made our deviation around the area of embedded thunderstorms; we encountered continuous light and occasional moderate turbulence; as we expected we would. As we were emerging from the weather; we received a couple of moderate jolts followed by a brief period of severe turbulence. The autopilot (AP2) kicked off and we began to descend at a rapid rate. As Pilot Flying; I assumed manual control of the aircraft; and gently arrested the descent; being cautious not to over stress the aircraft. Once the aircraft was back in control; (approximately 500 feet below) I began to climb back up to our assigned altitude (10400 M). During this event; ATC queried us about or reason for descending. The Captain; pilot monitoring; responded to the ATC inquiry; explaining that we had encountered severe downdrafts that had forced us off our assigned altitude. As we proceeded away from the weather; ATC handed us off to another frequency. The controller on the next frequency; who spoke better English; continued to inquire about our event and also asked for more details about our aircraft; departure point and destination. This controller also stated that there had been traffic directly below us. We had been closely monitoring our flight path and radar displays and we never saw any TCAS returns from another aircraft. Upon arrival in ZZZZ1; we conducted a thorough debrief about the event. The Captain contacted Maintenance; Operations; and the Dispatch Office to complete all of the requisite tasks.It's difficult to say how this could have been avoided; as we followed the appropriate TS avoidance procedures. We were using all of the tools at our disposal to the best of our abilities and we still ran into severe turbulence. Our radar was displaying light-moderate returns and showed us clearing the heavy returns by more than 40 miles. Perhaps we could have chosen a different path of deviation that would have taken us several hundred miles to the south and west of this weather system. A path further to the E-NE would have put us near Country X airspace. Having real time Radar pictures from a WiFi connection would have been extremely helpful. It would be nice to see a larger picture of the weather system to help us make a better informed decision.

Flight Crew reported turbulence caused a loss of aircraft control; requiring evasive action to regain aircraft control.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was OJTI on the R-side with a trainee. It was the first day back from weekend and within 30 mins of the beginning of our shift. Traffic; WX; radios; etc. was not a factor with the exception of a terrible understanding of the rules/responsibility of the trainee/tower; by the trainee; during the application of visual separation between an arrival and a departure. Aircraft Y was inbound to GCK for runway 17 approximately 7nm due east of the field with the runway airport in sight cleared for the visual approach and I believe switched to tower frequency. Tower then calls and requests release on Aircraft X off runway 17 and offers to provide visual separation. Without any hesitation; the trainee approves the call and releases Aircraft X. Simultaneously; I got up out of my chair from behind/adjacent the trainee to see for myself where Aircraft X was headed which was on course to ARV which I had no idea where it was at. Immediately; I asked the trainee where this airport was and he responded to the north/northeast. A discussion quickly ensued about whether or not this was acceptable since the tower was providing visual separation. This happened so quickly; I didn't have a chance to stop it before we hung up with GCK tower. However; I quickly figured out where this destination was and I could have prevented this by calling back to the tower. I went against my better judgement by not doing this wanting my trainee to rise to the occasion to fix the situation he created not knowing at the time he didn't understand that the tower is providing visual to get the aircraft off the ground but 'doesn't care' after he's in the air and that it's our job as radar controllers to ensure separation after the departure phase. I wanted the trainee to see and work through the mess he created. After departure; Aircraft X flew right towards the inbound Aircraft Y of course; the trainee simply watched the situation before I keyed up to turn the Aircraft X 20R. Separation had been lost at that point and trainee did not perform as expected. I take full responsibility of the loss of separation and wish I would have handled this differently. I definitely learned something as a relatively new OJTI in how far to let a trainee go. Although I was just filling in as an instructor and only trained this trainee 2-3 times now; I wish I would have had a better understanding of the knowledge of this trainee. Although I never would have guessed at this stage in his training; in his mind; visual separation takes care of everything.

Aircraft Y Was inbound from the east for a visual approach to GCK; reported the field in sight and was issued a clearance for the visual approach. He was then switched to GCK tower and radar service was terminated. Very shortly after GCK Tower called and requested a release for Aircraft Y for an on course departure to the north east offering to provide visual separation. I issued the visual separation phraseology and hung up. The tower released Aircraft X almost right away and in his climb came within 2 miles of Aircraft Y.It was my understanding from training that the Tower was responsible for separating the aircraft by ensuring they can visually maintain separation. I don't know how they thought they could visually maintain separation in the manner they applied it. I was told that I was wrong in my interpretation and that they only care about getting the aircraft off the ground and that as long as they had the separation they needed leaving their airspace that they didn't care about the rest. I should have issued a heading with the approval for visual separation which is what I will do in the future to ensure that something like this doesn't happen again.

ZKC Developmental Controller releases an aircraft from a Tower controlled airport and instructs the Tower to use visual separation. Aircraft comes onto ZKC Controller's radio and Controller is confused on how the Tower provided the use of visual separation.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 211; Flight Crew Total 2727; Flight Crew Type 1669

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 204; Flight Crew Total 8835; Flight Crew Type 1710

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Approximately 20NM from waypoint; we received a reroute clearance due to military activity in the area. The clearance uploaded into the FMC and was interpreted by FO (First Officer) and myself to fly Direct to TERYY; Direct to [remainder of the route.] We both read and confirmed with each other before executing the route. I then proceeded to go direct to TERYY. After the completion of the turn towards TERYY; KZAK sent a message 'Confirm Next Waypoint.' I used the REPORT page of the ATC page and said we were Direct to TERYY. KZAK uploaded a new clearance that similar to the previous clearance except at the end of the message it read; 'you were cleared DCT TERRY after 20N160E. For my clarity you are now cleared DCT TERRY.' We accepted the new clearance and proceeded direct TERYY. FO and I went over the original clearance and we did see the line 'At N20E160 cleared route clearance DEST:ZZZZVIA. TODIRECT. TERYY[Remainder of the route]The 'At N20E160 cleared route clearance' line was separated from the main body of the new clearance which caused us to miss the part of the message that we were supposed to fly directly to TERYY after N20E160.

Shortly before passing N20E160 on our flight plan; we received a reroute via CPDLC. We printed the message; discussed the change and loaded the FMC via the load prompt in the CDU. After the change was verified; we executed the change. Then; noting the first point was direct to TERYY; we selected direct to TERYY on the legs page and executed it. About 3 minutes later we received a message to confirm next waypoint. We replied that it was TERYY. About 3 minutes later ATC sent us what looked like the same route clearance but with a note at the bottom indicating the first clearance was to go direct TERYY after N20E160. Sure enough; at the top of the text; separated by a few lines from the rest of the route clearance was the statement 'at N20E160 cleared.' Both of us missed this detail. When I showed the messages to the IRO (International Relief Officer) when he got up; he looked at the message and he said he didn't see what we did wrong. Not until after I pointed out the part about 'at N20E160' did he see our error. Bottom line; we misprogrammed the reroute. However; since the 'at N20E160' is not located next to the rest of the reroute; it is very easy to miss. Having it separated by even a few lines makes it very easy to miss when verifying the correct clearance is loaded and executed.

B787 flight crew reported a confusing clearance revision via CPDLC led to a track deviation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

When inbound to RKSI and just checking into ICN approach control.  We were filed for the KARBU 1P arrival and ATIS was saying landing Runway 33R and 34; and this arrival is for those runways as well.  ATC on initial contact clears us for KARBU 1N which is for Runway 15 and 16 and he said information X current.  So [the first officer] pulled up new ATIS while I was changing over to KARBU 1 N arrival; all while being over KARBU.  KARBU 1P goes 267 degrees to NOTIN then 231 degrees to SI 857; which is what was in the FMC and we were filed for.  So while I was pulling up KARBU 1N which is KARBU 267 degrees to EGOBA then 266 degrees to SEL; we had a dual FMC failure; autopilot disconnected; auto throttle disconnected; all sorts of EICAS messages and FMC saying timed out standby.  Once we had FMC coming back and could pass along to ATC that we had an FMC navigation problem we did.  Then ATC preceded to put us on a vector and so never flew the arrival and he then said landing Runway 33R.  I believe we were off course due to what was planned and in the FMC and would have had us left of course; due to not being able to get the FMC to change the arrival due to the failure.  After shutdown we wrote up the [FMC] and I spoke with maintenance.

While descending on the karbu1p arrival into RKSI; the controller gave us new arrival instructions. The pilot monitoring was loading the new arrival into the CDU when we experienced a dual CDU failure. At that point we were unable to comply with the controllers instructions. After what seemed like an eternity; the pilot monitoring was able to explain our situation and he issued us a heading. We then were able to recover CDU operation and landed normally.

A B747 flight crew experiences a dual FMC failure while attempting to enter a new arrival per ATC instructions during descent into RKSI. Radar vectors are requested from ATC and received with normal FMC operation regained later in the descent.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Departing out of JAC; clearance was GEYSR5 departure climb to 16;000 ft. then as filed; we were to go out to NALSI crossing at 14;000 ft.; the turn was a very tight 180 degrees and the autopilot started turn before reaching the fix; at 11;800 ft. was able to keep mountains in sight; and directed flying pilot to widen out turn radius and increase climb rate; same time tower acknowledges terrain clearance warning. We got no GPWS warnings and had plenty of airspace to compensate which I acknowledged to tower; there was no issue with ATC.My suggestion is to have NALSI a flyover fix; especially in IFR; or program the FMS to make it a fly over fix and add that to our briefing. There was weather moving in to the area but we were able to maintain visual with the mountain peaks to avoid. Rest of flight was uneventful.

Pilot reported that ATC issued a terrain clearance warning while aircraft was turning in the vicinity of mountains.


Beechcraft King Air Undifferentiated or Other Model

While conducting a training flight in the Leesberg practice area; approximately 3-4 miles north of Mid Florida Airport (northwest corner under the class bravo airspace); at an altitude of 4;500 feet MSL; on a heading of approximately 360 degrees; I noticed a King Air aircraft closing in quickly; I would say it was less than a half mile; slightly northwest of our position. It appeared to be at the same altitude and was closing in very fast in our direction. I immediately took the controls and added full power and proceeded with a steep climb to avoid the King Air. All the while I had [been] making routine position reports on the practice area frequency of 123.5. I immediately switched to 121.1 approach control to see if there had been any traffic alerts being issued; upon doing this I heard the pilot of the King Air ask ATC 'Did you just see that cirrus go 100 feet over my head?' ATC's reply was one word 'no.' I checked to ensure our transponder was ON; and was in ALT mode; squawking 1200. Also; I know that this King Air was on an IFR flight plan. Please forward this to the Orlando TRACON.I'm not going to suggest people were not doing their jobs; but this is the closest I have ever come to an another aircraft while airborne.

An SR20 flight instructor and student suffered an NMAC with a King Air while on a training flight.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While on climb out; I began to rapidly accumulate moderate rime icing at 6500 feet MSL at IMC conditions that continued on up to 9000 feet MSL. I activated the TKS system on high to address the airframe icing after reconfirming cabin heat/defog was off.About 5 minutes after turning on TKS; I noticed a burning sensation in both eyes and felt slightly disoriented as though under the effect of alcohol. Although I had checked all cabin airflow sources prior to takeoff due to anticipation of icing conditions; I immediately rechecked them and noticed the overhead air vent was not fully closed; producing a slight airflow directed towards my head. I closed the vent and coordinated a descent to MVA to get below the freezing level once clear of the restricted airspace. The burning sensation in my eyes cleared up about 5 minutes after closing the vent with the disorientation clearing about 10-15 minutes later. No other issues were noted once cabin airflow sources were cut off.Modify TKS system so airflow tainted with TKS from either the propeller or wings is not allowed to flow into the cockpit.

The pilot of a C208 reported that while operating in icing conditions; became physically affected by the use of the TKS anti-ice system.


Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Event occurred during preflight/ground operations in ZZZ after checking the ADG (Accessible Dangerous Goods) container and receiving the Captains signature on the aircraft DG manifest. As I returned a signed copy of the aircraft DG manifest to the Ramp Agent I also handed them the red/white striped DG paper-work folder. Neither myself or the Ramp Agent recognized this and we departed ZZZ for ZZZ1 without the folder on board aircraft. I still retained a signed copy of the aircraft DG manifest in my pocket; but did not have the red/white folder. The event was recognized in ZZZ1 when the Ramp Agent could not find the red/white folder. It was an oversight and mistake on my part.Overall; It was a momentary brain lapse that caused this. One Contributing factor was rapidly changing weather conditions (snow/visibility) captured my attention/thoughts. While starting/thinking ahead is important; this could have been prevented by simply slowing down and handling one task at a time.

As a B757 crew we potentially performed a take-off below take-off minimums on Runway XXR at ZZZ. At show time the weather was 10SM vis/CLR skies. However; about 10 minutes prior to pushback a snow storm moved into the area and the weather began rapidly changing. We decided to de-ice/anti-ice. This; along with getting stuck behind addition de-icing aircraft on the ramp; led to delays leaving ZZZ. As we finally taxied we continued to monitor for new ATIS information. As we waited to depart behind an aircraft in front of us; the visibility dropped to 1/2 SM. It was originally my take-off as the FO (First Officer); however my Captain made the decision to perform the takeoff himself due to the snowy conditions and changing visibility. While waiting on the taxiway; behind an aircraft in front of us; my Captain checked the page for takeoff minimums on Runway XXR at ZZZ. He saw that 1/2 SM was the Standard Takeoff mins for that runway. However; after reviewing it later it was determined that he misread the chart as 1/2 SM was the STD mins for 3 or more engine aircraft and 1 SM for 2 engine aircraft (we were operating a B757). I did not look up the page for myself and therefore did not do a good job at backing up the Captain on the decision to depart. However; we departed ZZZ on XXR without incident. Later; After discussing what occurred; we recognized that taking off with 'Adequate Visual Reference' required 1/4 SM vis. We could both definitely agree that we had more than adequate visual references to take-off as the HIRL and runway marking were easily visible throughout the takeoff procedure. However; neither of us was 100% sure that those mins (1/4 SM) applied to us in that situation. We are continuing to do research and reach out to knowledgeable resources.

Air Carrier flight crew reported gate departure without required Hazmat document folder. Flight crew did have a signed copy of the DG manifest but not the required company folder.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working CIC and watching the traffic. Training on West RADAR was in progress. We observed the Center descend C680 through our airspace without coordination. We had traffic at 8;000 FT in close proximity as the aircraft descended out of 10;000 FT. Because of the controller program; there seems to be an attitude that deals don't matter anymore. This is not the first time I have seen the Center not coordinate for aircraft cutting through our airspace. There needs to be some balance between an attitude of punishment as there previously was; and what is in place now.

TRACON Controller observed the associated Center descend an aircraft through their airspace without coordination; the reporter noting a Controller attitude change regarding separation after the advent of the ATC ATSAP program.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.5

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

Aircraft X descending on radar vector OKC RWY35R from DECKK from 15;000 feet to 7;000 feet. My co-worker was working this aircraft in my airspace with approval. I had just had a VFR come into conflict with my IFR arrival and the Supervisor suggested that I allow my co-worker to work this second arrival into OKC to alleviate workload. We stopped Aircraft X at 7;000 feet to avoid an unidentified VFR aircraft maneuvering at the time around 5;000 - 6;500 feet. My co-worker vectored Aircraft X to the west of the unknown aircraft and issued traffic. Aircraft X reported aircraft in sight and was told to maintain visual separation; descend and maintain 4;000 feet. Aircraft X reported traffic no factor and continued his descent. The unknown aircraft then reversed course and became in direct conflict with Aircraft X. Aircraft X abruptly began to climb in accordance with a TCAS/RA. The unknown aircraft began a steep and fast descent at approximately the same time. Separation was regained and Aircraft X landed at OKC without further incident. A third co-worker watched the unknown target become identified by OUN Tower. We never had any contact with this unknown aircraft.Inform the flight school of the danger of maneuvering in this area when multiple aircraft are inbound to OKC final and OKC Satellite airports. This is a constant problem with Airlines and other GA aircraft performing TCAS/RA maneuvers or being vectored away from VFR practice area aircraft causing delays to air traffic. Suggest to the flight school to either call for flight following; fly at a lower altitude or maneuver elsewhere. This is not illegal but highly dangerous. This happened three times today.

I was the OJTI working the airspace adjacent to the occurrence. My trainee transferred Aircraft Z to the NW/SW/FR CPC on vectors to PWA RWY35R level 6;000 feet in accordance with the 'flow.' I had seen an unknown aircraft maneuvering at 5;500 feet south east of IRW on the IRW160R [at] approximately 20 miles. I brought this to the attention of the NW/SW/FR controller since we had an incident where an unknown aircraft about two hours earlier had come into conflict with two different airliners in two separate incidents. My co-worker acknowledged traffic and was currently observing and tracking the target. As Aircraft Z came closer to the unknown aircraft; the unknown traffic began to climb and level at 6;000 feet. My co-worker issued traffic and I believe a safety alert. Aircraft Z reported aircraft in sight. Due to the abrupt nature of the unknown aircrafts flight path and altitude my co-worker could not suggest whether to descend or turn. He told Aircraft Z that he was able to maneuver left/right or climb/descend to avoid traffic. Aircraft Z decided to descend immediately to 4;000 feet. Later; I watched the unknown target become identified by OUN Tower. We never had any contact with this unknown aircraft. This aircraft is suspected in two other close proximity events today and ATSAP reports were filed on both events.

OKC Approach Controller reports about two different events involving flight school aircraft that gets in the way of arrival traffic to primary airport causing RA.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X was on short final and the CPC-IT looked with her binoculars and noticed that the aircraft had its gear up and notified the pilot. The pilot did not know that his landing gear was up. She did an excellent job saving a possible accident from happening. Everything worked like it should have.

LVK Controller reports of an aircraft on final without its gear down.  Local Control Developmental advises the pilot the gear isn't down and pilot cycles gear; lands safely.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On approach the hydraulic gauge began fluctuating randomly with simultaneous MAP lights and noises in the jumpseat area. Immediately we slowed; lowered gear; and flaps in preparation for landing. Tower was notified of our status and notified of assistance needed. The left hydraulic light remained illuminated but the right light went on and off with associated fluctuations in its gauge throughout the approach; landing; and taxi to the ramp. At 500 feet full flaps were deployed and successfully set. Identification: noises; gauges; and annunciation lights made us aware of the event when it began. Cause: hydraulic leak from lines being chaffed due to insufficient vibration isolation. Response: slow down; lower gear; extend flaps; QRH (Quick Reference Handbook); notify Tower. Suggestions: maintenance action that has been learned from past experiences of the same situation and preventative actions taken to eliminate recurrence.

Flight crew flying an SA227AT observed fluctuating hydraulic gauge and noises. Landed without incident.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 4333

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 18500; Flight Crew Type 12000

At cruise during a normal systems check the Captain noted a decreasing Green Hydraulic System fluid level. Shortly after we became aware of the decrease the situation resulted in a HYD Green System Reservoir Low Quantity ECAM. We completed the ECAM steps; referenced the Flight Manual; conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and evaluated our landing performance. With their inputs included we determined the appropriate course of action was to continue to destination. Flight attendants and passengers were advised. We used the gravity gear extension procedure as per the Flight Manual and executed a normal landing. We taxied clear of runway and were towed to the gate.

In cruise flight; Green Hydraulic System began to lose fluid. We first noticed this during routine periodic system review and got to watch it drain before our eyes. Fluid depleted and ECAM triggered. ECAM procedure was followed; Flight Handbook procedure was reviewed; Dispatch and Maintenance Control were conferenced; and we discussed our options; deciding that proceeding to destination was the best available choice. Remainder of flight was uneventful and routine. Flight attendants were briefed; ATC and destination airport were advised; and passengers were informed. Approach and landing were normal; with consideration of unique requirements of the procedure. We landed; taxied clear of the runway; shut down the engines; and were towed to the gate by company Maintenance personnel. Flight concluded without any further occurrences.

A320 flight crew reports loss of Green Hydraulic System pressure at FL340 due to loss of Green System fluid. Crew elects to continue to destination and lands normally after using alternate means of landing gear extension.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Approximately 30 min outside of ZZZ; the FA called the cockpit informing of a strong odor near the galley of the aircraft. The FA noticed the smell and indicated 1 passenger also noticed the smell; believing it may smell like burning rubber. However; there were no other indications of problems; additional smells or smoke in the cabin. Over approximately the next 10 minutes; we coordinated with the FA to obtain additional information; having the FA inspect the cabin further; the outside of the aircraft from any vantage point possible and inquiring about the smell with other passengers. During that time; we reviewed nearby airports for a potential immediate; emergency divert. Ultimately; the FA came back with no additional indications that anything was abnormal; nor did any other passengers notice any issues. However; she and the one passenger continued to believe there was an abnormal smell in the front of the aircraft. By this time we were 20 minutes or less to ZZZ. In my mind; we either had two choices - ignore the issue because of lack of information or be extra cautious and [notify ATC] into ZZZ; to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible; in the event something hidden and not yet identifiable was occurring. We opted to [notify ATC]; coordinating with ATC to have fire meet us on the ground; to do an outside inspection of the aircraft upon landing. We did not consider another airport at this time; as we were already so close to ZZZ and were set up for an arrival there. During the arrival; we continued with all normal checklists; however; we did not run any emergency or abnormal checklists. Admittedly; this may not have been done due in part to haste; however; we also did not have enough information to identify what; if anything we could do or what issue we could address with any additional checklists. During the approach; I made an announcement to the passengers; informing them of the potential issue and a possible evacuation on the ground; if anything was found to be abnormal. However; I stressed the fact that we were simply being very cautious and did not anticipate any issues. Additionally; I sent a quick ACARS message to Dispatch regarding the situation. Upon landing; we quickly exited the runway; taxied across another runway and proceeded to park on an adjacent taxiway; all per ATC instructions. We were put on a discreet frequency with fire; who surveyed the outside of the aircraft. Fire reported no abnormalities. I also called back to the FA; who reported no change in the cabin. Based on this information; we continued taxi to the gate; with fire in trail. The passengers deplaned normally at the gate. The cause of the event was the FA reporting a strong odor; possibly the smell of something burning; with one passenger also believing to smell something similar to burnt rubber. Contributing to the difficulty in determining how to proceed was the lack of any additional supporting evidence to any actual smoke; fire; fume related event in the cabin; inclusive of no physical evidence to the same or any additional passenger confirming an issue. Also; there were no cockpit indications of any issue with the aircraft; either sensory or via any aircraft alerting system. I'm not exactly sure how/if this event could have been avoided. What I believe it comes down to is having to make a difficult choice of what to do in a situation where only very limited information is available. For us; those choices were to ignore the situation because of lack of evidence or proceed to the ground in an expeditious manner; where further outside and inside evaluation was possible. We chose the latter; with an abundance of safety; while not being over alarmist being the main objectives.

CRJ-200 Captain reported Flight Attendant notification of burning rubber odor in the passenger cabin.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 500

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

I am a Flight Instructor and my Instrument Student took off late morning. We were on an instrument flight plan in VMC conditions in a Piper PA-28/G. On our second approach and 45 minutes into the flight we had engine failure. We were on the GPS 30 with my student at the controls and under the 'hood.' We were 1.5 NM from the airport on; off-center final to Runway 30. The Landing Checklist had been completed. So the fuel pump; landing light; was ON. Mixture was rich. The wind conditions reported was calm. We were on the CTAF and I declared a mayday and engine failure on this frequency. Immediately recognizing the problem as engine failure I took the controls and instructed my student to switch fuel tanks. At this point we were 400 to 500 FT AGL. I immediately banked the aircraft 90 degrees to my left and aimed for a field. I adjusted the throttle to no avail. I deployed full flaps due to airspeed and the shortness of the field. At this point we were around 88 KTS. I saw a berm in the field and wanted to miss it so we touched down just after. I brought the yolk fully aft and used max braking to avoid the telephone poles and road at the end of the field. The airplane started to skid and came to a halt 60 FT from the pole. We turned everything off before exiting the aircraft.

A PA-28 instructor took control of the aircraft from his hooded instrument student pilot and made a safe off airport landing after declaring an emergency because his engine quit at 800 FT.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were taxiing from the FBO to Runway 30 at IAD.  The airport was not very busy but we had been given several taxi and hold short clearances along the lengthy taxi.  We were southbound on Zulu taxiway and were to hold short of Echo.  We were actively looking for Echo and I had asked my partner where Echo was; his first explanation was erroneous and he quickly corrected himself but with a vague description.  Or at least my understanding was vague.  I had asked for clarification so he was looking down at the chart for the exact location again and during this time we had taxied into the intersection of Z & E.  We could then see the signs but it was too late; we were there.  About that time ground spoke up and stated the obvious and scolded us for the mistake.  He said it was ok and don't worry about it.  While we were passing through Echo we looked closely and noticed a lack of taxiway markings for Echo.  I think local ground controllers take for granted that some operators go that route a lot and are familiar with signage.  We were slightly mentally tired however we were vigilant but just missed it.  I really don't feel fatigue played too much of a role in this event.  We were looking around and couldn't find the signs for Echo until it was too late.  It would have been helpful to have a chart in front of me to read.  My captain was just as confused as I was about where Echo was.  With only a few seconds to digest the info and find it on the chart then try to locate it on the airport was definitely a challenge.  One that we failed.  My question for this is why can't Dulles improve their taxi signage?  It seems other large airports do better.  Especially where there are very large taxi apron areas.  It can be difficult to distinguish which specific taxi lanes are meant for which signs.

Citation First Officer as the pilot taxing the aircraft; reports a taxiway incursion at IAD due to lack of painted taxiway markings.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

During our approach in to RSW we were being vectored by ATC for weather avoidance. We began our vectors for Runway 24 RNAV approach once we were clear of the weather. ATC gave us a clearance to proceed direct to ODERY the IAF for RNAV RWY 24. We mistook that for RODDE an IF on that same approach. To us it sounded like RODDE and standard entry and verification procedures were followed. ATC recognized that our track was off very quickly and provided vectors to the final approach course. A normal approach and landing followed.I felt it would have been very helpful if the controller had indicated that the fix was an IAF. In addition it also would have been helpful to have the fix spelled to us. I heard the controller do that for the aircraft behind us and it went better for them. It would be helpful for ATC to keep in mind that we don't go to some of these smaller airports on a regular basis like we do our hubs were we know every approach and most of the fixes by heart.

B737-800 Captain being cleared direct to ODERY on the RNAV Runway 24 at RSW; but believing the clearance is direct RODDE on the same approach. ATC detects the error and issues a vector.


Aircraft / UAS; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176; Flight Crew Total 2559; Flight Crew Type 2559

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 4053; Flight Crew Type 4053

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

While executing a visual approach to [Runway] 1 Right backed up with the RNAV gps we saw what at first we assumed was a bird.  Once it was about to pass directly over the aircraft it was clearly a drone; we were passing through 4;100 feet MSL and descending I would estimate it was less than 100 feet above us and directly overhead.  We reported it to the Tower and continued without incident.

On final approach into LAS we observed an object/possible drone around 4;000 feet MSL. The object passed about 100 feet directly overhead. We reported the event to Tower and landed uneventfully.

Air carrier flight crew came within 100 feet of a drone while on final approach at LAS airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 900

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

During the ILS approach to Runway 4R at JFK; VFR traffic approached and passed below our aircraft approximately 400 feet as it followed the coastline south across the 4R Final Approach Corridor. The flight crew had the VFR traffic in sight prior to the TA; and was not warned of the traffic by JFK tower. Just as the pilot monitoring queried the Tower (Local) Controller; the crew received a traffic advisory TCAS annunciation. Tower responded that the traffic was 'no factor'; when upon the PM challenged him and declared that; 'The traffic was most certainly a factor!' While the PM was telling the Local (Tower) Controller that the traffic was indeed a factor; the air crew received a resolution advisory to level the descent in the approach. The resolution advisory lasted approximately three seconds long; and then indicated that we were clear of the conflict. Since we were right at 1;000 feet AGL; the flight crew elected to continue the approach and land the aircraft without going around. The PM informed the Local Controller that a Hazardous Air Traffic Report (HATR) would be filed.After the aircraft was parked at the gate; the Captain called JFK Tower via landline to discuss the situation; the Captain asked if that is a VFR corridor; and the Tower Supervisor replied that it was. The Tower Supervisor informed the Captain that there is no requirement for VFR traffic to contact JFK Tower at that location as VFR traffic travels south along the shoreline.Obviously; somewhere in the air space planning meetings within New York Approach Control and JFK airspace; it has been agreed that this location is to be afforded the opportunity to follow the coastline in a VFR Corridor. (Rockaway Beach).Since this location is 3 miles from the threshold to Runway 4R; aircraft on approach profile are around 900 feet above ground level. It is incompatible to allow VFR traffic surface-500 feet AGL below this approach Corridor. This places VFR traffic 400 feet or less vertically away from air transport category aircraft; most of which are required to follow resolution advisory guidance in a TCAS event.The FAA needs to immediately hold a review to determine where class B airspace should extend out over the water to afford the appropriate traffic clearance requirements. Continuing to allow VFR traffic to cause RA TCAS advisories on approach to Runways 4L and/or 4R; is grossly negligent and requires prompt action to prevent future HATR risk.VFR traffic is allowed to approach within 3 NM of the threshold of 4R at 500 MSL. VFR traffic is merely required to contact JFK Tower within 8 nm. VFR traffic should be pushed further offshore and not allowed to follow the coastline there without being vectored by Local (Tower) and/or NY Approach Control.

EMB-145 Captain took issue with the VFR corridor below the Runway 4R approach path at JFK. The VFR traffic at 500 feet causes a TCAS RA with the EMB145 passing over at 900 feet.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Initial departure was normal and we were vectored to a heading of 080. Chicago Departure Control (125.0) told us to contact Chicago Center on 120.35 which my First Officer read back with our call sign (Air Carrier XXXX). My First Officer checked in with Chicago Center as (Air Carrier XXXX). The Controller directed us to turn to a heading of 360 and climb to FL190 which my First Officer read back to include (Air Carrier XXXX). A few minutes later we were handed off to another Chicago Center frequency where we checked in with (Air Carrier XXXX). The Controller; using (Air Carrier XXXX); cleared us to the CWA via an intersection then direct to the airport. My First Officer read the clearance back (with Air Carrier XXXX). I told my First Officer that clearance can't be correct and ask for a clarification which he did. The Controller gave us the same clearance. This time I told the Controller (Air Carrier XXXX's) destination. There was a pause. Then the Controller said the previous clearance was for (Air Carrier XXYX) and we should return to our previous frequency. We attempted to contact Chicago Center on 120.35; but got no response. At this time; I took us back to 125.0 (Departure) and my First Officer checked back in as (Air Carrier XXXX) and said we were handed off incorrectly. The Controller instructed us to turn to a heading of 090 and climb to 16;000 FT. At the time we were climbing through 12;500 FT. Following the new vector; we proceeded to our destination without further complications. Throughout this mis-communication event; I didn't hear (flight XXYX) on any of the ATC frequencies. Because; when we initially received the heading of 360; I was a bit suspicious something wasn't right. However; my suspicions were suppressed when several radio calls were answered with (Air Carrier XXXX). I then thought the heading was for traffic. During the past 18 months or so; I have noticed two things about call signs and ATC. First; our company has a lot of flights with similar call signs (only one digit difference) in the same airspace at once. This leads to numerous read back/call back errors (I note an average of about 3/trip). Second; ATC will mix-up a call sign (transposing digits in a flight number or using an incorrect digit) where it is normally caught by the aircrew. Our Company is not the only carrier this happens to. Suggestions; with my initial suspicion that the Controller might have us on frequency in error; we should have verified to the Controller that he was talking to.

Air Carrier with ZAU described a very confused communications event involving four digit call signs and attempts to communicate with ATC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4900; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were cleared by TIW Tower to circle west to land on Runway 35 from our LOC 17 approach. We were also cleared for touch and go on Runway 35. During our turn to base; the Tower called us; but when we replied; they said; 'Disregard.' We continued our circling approach in compliance with the AIM when we heard Tower transmit to another aircraft on 'short final' for Runway 35 as we were turning final. When our right (high) wing was up in the turn; we saw a much faster moving aircraft approaching on a straight-in final approach. At nearly the same time; the Tower told us to go-around; which we did; immediately. Tower then further instructed us to side-step left of centerline during our go-around and offered us to return for a low approach. Our training flight required a landing from a circling approach; so I asked the Tower for another lap in the traffic pattern to accomplish a touch-and-go. The Tower refused; stating; 'Unable touch-and-go. Climb to 2000 [feet] and contact Seattle Approach.' I could sense the anger and frustration in the voice of the controller. We departed the airspace with our training mission failed.The controller failed to properly sequence arriving traffic and allowed us to turn base-to-final in front of faster moving traffic flying a long final approach causing a near midair collision. The controller then became angry and denied us further services. Thus; we felt it safer to leave the airspace than to deal with a stressed controller who had already demonstrated an inability to handle the current volume of traffic at the airport.

C172 flight instructor reported a near mid air collision after being cleared to land in conflict with another aircraft on short-final.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X had been issued direct to CABYA for the RNAV 6 approach into 0A9. The aircraft had been tracking direct to the fix for approximately 30 miles before I cleared the aircraft to cross CABYA at 5;300 and advised he was cleared for the approach. The aircraft was well clear of terrain at his altitude and direct to CABYA. I go on and do a couple of other position related tasks and notice Aircraft X well south of course about to enter 6;700 MVA. I issued the aircraft a turn to 360 to clear the aircraft of the MVA. The aircraft may have entered the 6;700 MVA; but was quickly clear of the MVA as I had caught it just as he was about to enter the higher MVA. Once I got the aircraft clear of the terrain I asked why he had gone off course. The aircraft told me he was just setting himself up to be straight in outside of CABYA. I advised the aircraft that if he has been cleared direct a fix that he has to navigate direct the fix and if he wants other routing he needs to let me know in advance and I can set them up to be above the MVA. The pilot acknowledged. I should have noticed the southern turn of the aircraft before I did. I had assumed the aircraft who had been tracking for 30 miles direct the fix would still be direct the fix.

TRI TRACON Controller reported a small transport tracked off assigned route; entering higher MVA.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

I was D side training on sector 25 with an R side who is lazy and incompetent (example: he doesn't believe in EFCs (Expect Further Clearance). I wasn't aware their use was optional; but to him it is). He did a traffic call; didn't use 'heavy' or 'caution wake turbulence' despite me telling the D side that it should be done that way. The controller rolled his eyes and said they were fine. About 90 seconds after crossing 1;000 feet below a Heavy on directly opposite courses; Aircraft X reported he got wake and asked if that was a Super. The R side seemed confused and said the rides were reported smooth. I tried to explain to the R side what the pilot was asking but he said 'it's all good'. I didn't report it to management as they were not in the control room but instead hanging out elsewhere (I think chatting with the Operations Manager).There was another wake event; where I was again D side training on R20. The R side trainee called traffic and did not say heavy or caution wake turbulence as an aircraft passed opposite direction; 1;000 feet below a heavy. I told the R side trainee to give him a wake turbulence advisory and he said he hadn't been taught to do that. While he protested; the pilot came back and said he 'got bounced around pretty good from the wake of whatever that was'. Then the R trainee panicked a little. The supervisor was notified but said he didn't care because nothing happened.Cover wake events in training for new hires. Cover wake events in refresher training. Tell the Supervisors to man the desk or leave a CIC (Controller In Charge). Tell the Supervisors we care about these so we can track the occurrences accurately. Hold the CPCs (Certified Professional Controller) to a minimum standard; or fire them. As a matter of interest; this CPC R side had just been talked to regarding his phraseology and had an airspace violation; both in the previous week.

ZMP Center Controller reported that another Controller does not follow procedures; is lazy; and incompetent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Total 1618; Flight Crew Type 9

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 10400

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Assigned ZZZZZ Visual to Runway XX at ZZZ. Briefed use of VNAV in accordance with Approach Briefing Guide. Prior to ZZZ1 VOR; instructed to descend from 4;000 to 3;000 ft. MSL and FLCH was utilized. Upon crossing ZZZ1; pilot not flying; while also saturated with LCA (Line Check Airman) duties; set 1;500 ft. for ZZZZZ1 and then touchdown zone elevation while slowing and configuring aircraft. We did not notice FLCH was still engaged until ATC provided an altitude alert at 900 ft. MSL. Pilot not flying/LCA took command of aircraft and performed a momentary level-off before giving aircraft back to original pilot flying for a stabilized approach and landing.

Pilot not flying is an LCA (Line Check Airman) conducting an Initial Operating Experience flight for pilot flying; who is a transition First Officer from the other aircraft builder.Assigned to fly the ZZZZZ Visual Approach to Runway XX at ZZZ. Installed the RNAV V XX procedure in FMC and briefed RNAV/visual approach procedures. ATC cleared us direct ZZZ1 and cross ZZZ1 at 3;000 ft. LNAV was engaged to fly direct ZZZ1 and FLCH was engaged to descend to 3;000 ft. Crossing ZZZ1; pilot not flying entered 1;500 ft. in MCP altitude window for ZZZZZ1 crossing altitude. While descending on profile; aircraft was slowing to 180 kt. and configuring for landing. PM was tracking the configuration changes and verifying on course with LNAV; and then selected TDZE after passing ZZZZZ2 intersection. Pilot flying was having difficulty finding the runway which was out his right window behind [of] his shoulder line. Pilot not flying looked outside to acquire runway to direct pilot flying to look in the right direction. At that moment; ZZZ Tower Controller called 'Altitude Alert' for our flight. Pilot not flying looked inside and noticed altitude was 900 ft. crossing ZZZZZ1; below the 1;500-ft. altitude that was programmed in the FMC. Pilot not flying then also noticed that VNAV was not engaged but the aircraft was descending in FLCH; so was therefore not on the VNAV descent path. Pilot not flying took control of the aircraft; leveled the descent; and continued to follow the LNAV course to line up with Runway XX. Once aligned and in proper position to land; pilot not flying gave control of aircraft back to pilot flying; who conducted a stable visual approach to a safe landing.

B757 flight crew reported an incorrect selection on the auto-flight system control panel resulted in a descent below a crossing altitude during final approach and an altitude alert from ATC.


Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Manuals

On departure climbing through approximately 3;000 FT we encountered a flock of large birds. We were not able to avoid hitting some of them. I was the pilot not flying. We took a strike to the radome and we took one through the left engine rendering it inoperative. We immediately declared an emergency and returned to the field. It happened very quickly so I ran through the checklists while the pilot flying quickly got us on the ground. There was a lot of vibration and that combined with the impacts was quite startling. While we accomplished everything required; I think it may have been more 'textbook' if we had more time and the situation wasn't as alarming. We landed uneventfully; cleared the runway and shut down the remaining engine. While the large flock may not have been avoidable; I learned something that will help me in the future. We train exclusively on the 900XPC. I am very familiar with the 900 Emergency Checklist; but I realized that the different layout of the 800XPC Checklist was disorientating for a minute. I went to the pages where I was certain the appropriate checklists were located but they were not there. While this normally would not be a big deal; under the stress of this situation it added a little further stress. I am planning on spending some time to become more familiar with 800 Emergency Checklist as well as Abnormal Single Engine Checklist layout. The new QRC checklists should help.

After takeoff an HS-125-800 struck a flock of large birds shutting down the left engine; so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport. The crew trained on the XP900 QRH which required some adjustment because of formatting differences from the XP800 QRH onboard.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 252; Flight Crew Total 13066; Flight Crew Type 7756

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Total 8841; Flight Crew Type 5436

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff at level off at FL300 we got both L & R RECIR Fan EICAS Messages L & R Recir Fan Inop lights on overhead panel. QRH is Pilot Awareness only. States 'Indicates the fan is failed or not operating.' We turned off both L & R Recir Fans. Both EICIAS messages and inop lights (overhead) extinguished. Turned both Recir Fans back on one at a time. Right Recir Fan EICAS and Inop (overhead) stayed extinguished. Left Recir Fan EICAS reappeared. Turned off Left Recir Fan. Continued with right Recir Fan on with no EICAS message or Inop light on overhead. 90 minutes later - burning smell in the cockpit. Shortly thereafter smoke appeared coming out of the grasper vent behind FO (First Officer) seat above Jumpseat. No EICAS messages. Immediately turned off right Recir Fan - Smoke immediately stopped and smell subsided. Contacted Dispatch; [Maintenance Control] and [Operations] via Sat Comm. All agreed most likely burned Right Recir Fan and ok to continue unless subsequent further issues. [Operations] checked and relayed via ACARS that this is a common occurrence on the 767-400 and as long as no additional smoke; ok to continue. No further issues remainder of fight. Normal approach and landing in ZZZ.

At FL300; we simultaneously got 'L RECIR FAN' and 'R RECIR FAN' EICAS messages. L and R RECIR FAN INOP lights were both illuminated on the overhead panel. We referenced the QRH which said PILOT AWARENESS and turned off both switches. We discussed any possible options and elected to turn on each switch; one at a time - INOP lights extinguished in both switches. In short time; the L RECIR FAN EICAS reappeared and knowing what the QRH stated; we turned off this switch- it remained off. Around 1.5 hours later there was an electrical smell in the cockpit; followed by a quick billowing of grayish white smoke. There was no associated EICAS; however; the Captain directed me to turn off the R RECIR FAN switch. The onset of smoke stopped and the smoke and electrical smell subsided. We followed the [flight manual] protocol for this event and agreed to continue. Over time; I experienced a rapid onset of a raw throat; sneezing and coughing. During a visit to my AME; he thought the symptoms could be related to electrical smoke inhalation and diagnosed my condition as Tracheal Bronchitis.

B767-400 flight crew reported a recirculation fan failure in the flight deck resulting in smoke and fumes event.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After completion of a heavy Maintenance visit; the aircraft should have had a functional check flight completed per the [General Procedures]. Multiple Rudder Hinge fittings were replaced; left and right elevators removed; two elevator servos replaced; and aileron servo replaced. The adjustment of these primary flight controls can affect flight characteristics. [Company] management released the aircraft for revenue service.The Supervision in ZZZ Maintenance are under pressure to meet ETR (Estimated Time of Repair) times and misinterpret items in our manuals in order to meet those times. After 3 [Reports]; no training or results have happened when I file them. This aircraft left with revenue passengers aboard and had multiple issues after takeoff. There was a bad Flap/Slat Control computer; a bad hydraulic pump; and two air conditioning pack issues. These problems could have been found on a Functional Check flight and repaired without the endangering paying passengers. Training on our [General Procedures] would help.

Maintenance Technician reported air carrier released aircraft after replacement of critical flight control items without a pre-revenue check flight.


Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Approaching visual to [Runway] 35 in AGS on right base to final; terrain warning went off at 2000 feet. Sink rate was not excessive and plane was leveling off at 1700 [feet]. Warning went off again and [pilot] disengaged autopilot. Flight conditions were visual; no terrain; [and no] towers or buildings were in sight or close. [We] landed with no issues.

CRJ First Officer reported  a terrain warning at 2000 feet during visual approach.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

This is a general report on an anomaly that may occur in all WAAS GPS units that; I believe; should be addressed. After some 35 years flying the 'Steam gauges' in GA aircraft and airliners I have transitioned to state of the art GPS based navigation with the new equipment in Aircraft X. When flying satellite based approaches with WAAS augmented vertical nav there is no warning should the vertical nav feature fail or if the parameters; whatever they may be; are not met. There is no 'flag'. Sometime during the approach a 'NO GP' may appear but with the equipment that we have; dual GTN 750 txi's; it appears much too late in the approach. To be safe the 'NO GP' warning should appear when the approach is selected and the equipment cannot provide vertical path guidance. I have one unit that presents glidepath information as soon as the approach is selected. On the second unit there is no glide path information at all. Good or bad. Both units have the same current data bases. But again; the unsafe situation is the failure of the unit to produce a 'flag' or warning that vertical guidance; for whatever reason; is not available.

Twin Engine Corporate Captain reported there is no Warning' flag or indication; in this particular model navigation system; if the Glide Path or Glide Slope do not capture during the approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 13300; Flight Crew Type 390

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

At FL360 and rerouting toward a gap in a line of radar returns. Several aircraft had used the gap with success. Before I got near the gap I entered in IMC conditions and experienced light to moderate chop. Suddenly my EFIS displays (two) and the Multifunction Display went blank. Attitude and DG information were displayed on these tubes. The Multifunction Display can be used after channeling information with a toggle switch. However; it was dead also. I felt the circuit breakers for a popped one but couldn't find one out. I also reset both inverters to try to bring them back on line. Then I noticed my altimeter was descending. I transitioned to a tiny peanut gyro standby display for attitude information. By then my attitude was in a steep descending turn probably from the turbulence initiating the unusual attitude while I was troubleshooting. I throttled back and gently tried to regain a safe descent rate and attitude. The standby gyro was difficult to use because of its size and location. ATC inquired about the descent and I told them I lost my displays and needed to land. They asked if I wanted to go to the nearest airport. I picked ZZZ as it was the most appropriate. I entered VFR conditions and landed without incident at ZZZ. I left it there to have a Mechanic look it over first. I had one passenger and he was OK. If I were to do this over again I would have skipped the troubleshooting and gone straight to the standby gyro. If there were two pilots; then the second pilot could have troubleshot the problem while the first was concentrating on attitude of the plane.

The Reporter stated that the most probable cause of the instrument loss was a cloud to cloud lightning strike which apparently hit one the propellers where damage was found. All instruments returned to normal on the ground. His aircraft was not actually in a weather cell; as best he could tell at the time; and so he assumes cloud to cloud lightning.

A Piaggio P180 took an apparent lightning strike on a propeller while IMC at FL360 and subsequently all EFIS data was lost. While troubleshooting; the aircraft entered a descending turn which the pilot arrested using his Standby Gyro; then diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174; Flight Crew Type 1877

During climbout from ZZZ; we had an electrical irregularity resulting in loss of VHF1; Yaw Damper; four of our six CDS display screens; as well as other less important observed failures. During troubleshooting we discovered that a safety pin attached to a piece of luggage had somehow hooked around the Standby Power CB (Circuit Breaker) and pulled it out. We consulted with [Maintenance Control]; but they could not advise us to reset CB as this conflicted with Flight Manual Guidance; and that resetting the CB could only be done using Captains Emergency Authority. After assessing our situation and available options; I decided the safest course of action was to reset the CB.Had we not reset the breaker:We would lose all the electrical system functionality and redundancies that the Standby Bus provides.We would be down to 2 of 6 cockpit displays (1 was deferred inop prior to flight).We would be down to one VHF radio + ACARS.I only made this decision because I was confident there was no underlying electrical problem; this CB is not on the list of reset-prohibited CBs; and resetting it was a much safer course of action than simply diverting with multiple degraded systems. To be clear; I would not have reset it if there was any doubt of the reason why it was out. After resetting the CB; we observed all affected systems return to normal operation.

B737 pilot reported a loss of VHF1; Yaw Damper; four of our six CDS display screens and found it was a CB that was pulled out due to luggage moving it.  Pilot reset CB and everything went back on line.