Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 20

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Surviving seven minutes of inadvertent IMC.I was attempting to return a rental airplane to an airport.... I was the pilot (military test pilot and civilian pilot) and had one passenger (military test [pilot]; instrument rated...). The field did not have weather reporting and the nearest weather stations (20 NM west and 15 NM south) reported BKN008. Having flown in the morning with a low scattered layer; the ceiling appeared to be higher than what the nearby reporting stations indicated. The terrain west...is quite flat; with a small 100-200 FT ridge in the vicinity. The highest obstacle on our route of flight was an 850 FT MSL (450 FT AGL) tower. We briefed a low altitude scud run; remaining above the obstacles and below the cloud deck. We also briefed crew coordination; involving obstacle avoidance and lookout. My passenger's role was as copilot in this single-pilot aircraft.The airplane was not fit for IMC flight; as the gyroscopic pitch and bank indicator was not functional and the directional gyro precessed at a rate of about 10 degrees per minute. It was acknowledged that we were partial panel before takeoff. Shortly after takeoff; we started to enter clouds at 350 FT AGL (650 FT MSL). This was not as anticipated. I called out that I was losing sight of the ground to my copilot who announced 'continue'. Thinking it was indeed a broken or scattered layer; I hesitated pushing the nose over and when I looked up as I watched the ground reference disappear; I realized we were 100% IMC. I immediately started flying instruments and climbed to 1;500 FT MSL; well above any obstacles in the area. Immediately after leveling off; my partial panel scan broke down and the airplane entered an unrecognized right descending spiral. Seeing the VSI descent rate increase to 500 FPM; I pulled back on the yoke and the rate increased to 1;000 FPM; accompanied by increasing airspeed and airframe noise. I glanced at the turn/bank indicator and we were above the standard rate mark. As I realized we were in the 'graveyard spiral;' I rolled left to center the turn/bank and pulled back. Our altitude had dropped to 1;300 FT MSL in the 10-15 seconds the spiral lasted.... After realizing we were in a graveyard spiral; my mind raced [with] flash memories of past incident reports and the knowledge that we were about to die; leaving our wives to deal with our stupidity for the rest of their lives. Survival instinct kicked in as I thought; 'my last conscious act in this world is not going to involve letting us die in this...little airplane.' Through effective crew coordination from our military training; my copilot helped my scan improve and he was calling out values of parameters I wasn't watching. I attempted to execute a turn to the west in order to clear the 100-200 FT ridge... I was not able to make a coordinated turn using the turn/bank needle and the ball and the wet compass. I was getting confused by the compass and why I couldn't maintain a heading or make a decent turn. At the same time; my copilot was using his cell phone to verify our position over the ground. We were clear of obstacles; but still over the ridge. I announced that if we were going to live; we needed to descend. I announced that I wanted a steady heading descent at less than 500 FPM to 1;000 FT MSL. This was done with only one excursion past 500 FPM. At 1;000 FT MSL; we did not have ground contact. Starting another descent; this time to 800 FT MSL; I announced 'contact; continuing' at 900 FT MSL. We were above trees at about 350 FT AGL and my copilot verified 'contact' as we descended past 850 FT MSL. We were completely VMC at 800 FT MSL. Total time in IMC was seven minutes. We continued our flight west and landed uneventfully.Human Performance Considerations: The perceived pressure to get the plane back to its home field played heavily into this incident. Decision to takeoff should have been aborted with nearby weather less than VFR minimums and no local AWOS. Decision to takeoff should have been aborted with acknowledged partial panel. We rationalized it by saying 'we're going to stay VMC.' Decision to not push the nose over upon entering the base of clouds perceived concurrence to continue from a qualified navigator made it very difficult to push the nose over at 350 FT AGL. Lack of proficiency in model I normally fly 4th generation fighter airplanes and a complex; IFR capable single engine piston. The IMC capabilities of both are quite different. Though legally my IFR time carries over to all platforms; the scan and workload are not. Lack of proficiency in model; basic piloting skills broke down. I think I couldn't make turns because I was channeling my attention on the turn/bank indicator; VSI and altimeter. I rarely; if ever; looked at the ball. I have no recollection if I was coordinating turns or not; I imagine not. Other factors [include] a lack of local weather reporting. The cloud base we entered was 200 FT lower than the nearby AWOS stations led us to believe. What saved our lives [was] effective crew coordination. Thank you to my copilot and his military training. Commit to the instruments even though I haven't flown partial panel in eight years; thorough IFR training and military background was a huge factor in our survival. Preflight planning though some aspects were poorly planned; I feel that our knowledge of the terrain and obstacles in the area was a key factor in our survival. Physiology training we're required to attend every four years and I just had my refresher a month ago. Acknowledging the incipient spiral was difficult based on inner ear sensations....

A well-qualified pilot inadvertantly entered IMC in a non-IFR equipped aircraft; became disoriented; lost aircraft control at 1;500 FT MSL and descended to 1;300 FT MSL. With the copilot's assistance; pilot regained aircraft control and descended to VMC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190.65; Flight Crew Total 681.50; Flight Crew Type 681.50

While on WINCO2 SID from MIA between FORKK and BORLE and climbing through approximately 9;000 feet; observed a drone off the right wing at approximately 4;000-5;000 feet. Reported it to Miami Departure. I was able to see it because sunlight was reflecting off of it.

B737 first officer reported a UAV to departure control.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

4 mile final approach and cleared to land Runway 28R in full landing configuration; message displayed a LG AIR/GND FAIL message. QRH indicated possible loss or degradation of multiple systems including braking; nose steering; and thrust rev. We were in a safe position and altitude to request an immediate right base for Runway 30. We executed a left turn for the right base while still in landing configuration-gear down flaps 45. ATC cleared us to land 30. Upon landing; all systems functioned normally and the message extinguished.Not my area of expertise but presumably a faulty air/ground sensor(s).Improved maintenance procedures could help prevent such events. Maintenance department should trouble shoot malfunctions beyond; 'could not duplicate.'

Air carrier Captain reported receiving an alert for the air/ground switch on final approach to OAK.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 4750; Flight Crew Type 2450

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

ZZZ was reporting 300 OVC and wind 050 at 11 kts while at the gate. I discussed this with the dispatcher at the gate because I am high mins and the weather was at my mins. The only suitable approach was an ILS to XX which gave us a 6 knot tailwind. We both agreed that the flight was dispatchable and to give it a try and if it didn't work out to come back to ZZZ1. While getting vectored into ZZZ the controller reported that the wind was now 070 at 13 gusting into the low 20's. We knew that this would make it more difficult but decided to give it a try since the flight in front of us made it in on their second try and it was still within limits of the aircraft. Once we were and final with the LOC captured we both observed that the localizer needle would swing almost a full dot left and right; with the flight director and autopilot banking 20-25 degrees to attempt to follow it. Initially we thought it was just struggling with the wind but it continued the whole way down. When we finally broke out at 300 ft we were not at all aligned with the runway; we were quite a bit right. It quickly became apparent that no landing attempt should be made. After going missed we both decided that another attempt was useless because the wind was increasing and at the time we thought that maybe the ground equipment wasn't so good and trying an RNAV would not work because of the low ceilings. We decided to head back to ZZZ1 since I had discussed that ahead of time with dispatch and the FO (First Officer) and I had also talked about it too. After turning on final in ZZZ1 the localizer/flight director/autopilot did the exact same thing it did in ZZZ and it was now obvious it was actually the aircraft that had the issue. At one point the controller had asked us if we were on XYR instead of XYL since we were apparently off course. A quick check of the frequency and we confirmed we were. At that point I turned off the autopilot and hand flew the approach; flying a heading that worked at the times that the needle seemed to be steady. We broke out just below 1000 ft and I continued the approach visually and landed without incident. I should also note that both times the frequencies were identified and no other aircraft reported issues.Although it was obvious from the first approach that something was off; it wasn't obvious until the second approach exactly what it was. Unless the issue started with our flight; a prior crew should have written up the issue with the localizer.I believe we did the right thing by not attempting another landing in ZZZ with such low IFR conditions and somewhat unreliable navigation equipment. When it became clear on approach to ZZZ1 what exactly the issue was; looking back now; we should have asked for an RNAV approach. At the time I knew the weather was fairly low at most airports nearby and although we did have a decent amount of fuel; was somewhat anxious to get on the ground since if the weather continued to get worse; as it was forecasted; would then be forced to fly another approach down to minimums instead of breaking out at 800 or 900 and having plenty of time to align the aircraft with the runway. Having to go missed and be re-sequenced in ZZZ1 could easily turn into an extra 15 or 20 minutes.This aircraft in particular needs to be thoroughly checked and fixed. I felt this was dangerous to be flying in IFR conditions with that equipment. In an area with significant terrain the deviations that I can imagine happened in ZZZ without us being aware initially could be catastrophic. I feel that because I had so much time in the plane that I was comfortable hand flying it for the entire approach and able to compensate fairly well with the issue. I would be concerned how a newer crew with little time in the plane would have flared.

EMB-145 First Officer reported an unstable approach occurred due an aircraft equipment malfunction.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 50

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

During final approach; while tracking inbound on the GPS XXR approach course; the landing gear failed to extend. I requested to return to the practice area to troubleshoot the problem. The emergency gear extension checklist was used to verify all of the simple causes of no gear extension and no indications that the landing gear was extended. No breakers were blown; and the navigation light rheostat was checked to determine the gear lights were not dimmed for night operations.The emergency gear extension handle was activated; and from the sound and reduction in airspeed; it was evident that the gear extended. However; there were no gear lights to verify this. These should have come on as per the checklist. We informed Approach Control of no gear down indication and requested a flyby of Tower; to verify the landing gear position. An option for XXR was requested with a plan of using a soft field technique to verify the position of the gear with the option of a go-around if the gear gave any indication of weakness with a light touch down. The mains touched lightly and were firm; the nose was let down softly and held. It was my plan to declare an emergency if the gear gave any indication of an unlocked condition in the event I made a go-around which was not necessary.We were cleared to taxi to our FBO after touch down which we did without incident. In retrospect it may have been better to declare an emergency earlier in the event the gear had not been down and locked which was an inaction based on my assessment of the situation at the time. Aside from this inaction; I believe everything possible was done to inform ATC of the situation; and deal with it in an appropriate manner. Maintenance later determined the cause of the event was an inoperative landing gear selector switch which was not allowing power to the landing gear system.

PA28 instructor reported encountering a landing gear extension anomaly during final approach.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 99; Flight Crew Total 10870; Flight Crew Type 5000

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We were operating to ONT. And filed and cleared for the KARLB2 arrival into ONT. At cruise altitude and prior to descent; Center issued a clearance to proceed direct to COAZT and to cross COAZT at 16;000 feet. As Pilot Monitoring; I read back the clearance fully; to proceed direct to COAZT and cross COAZT at 16;000 feet. We started the descent a bit early due to some turbulence and in the descent Center asked if we were going to be able to make our altitude restriction at 16;000 feet. I responded that we would be able to make COAZT at 16;000 feet and he told us that we had been cleared to cross GOATZ at 16;000 feet; not COAZT. My First Officer and I believed we both heard 'cleared to COAZT; and cross COAZT at 16;000 feet' and after initially reading that back we were not queried by ATC. So I assume that ATC thought we said GOATZ. We were then given a new clearance to proceed direct to POXKU and descend to 7;000 feet. The rest of the flight was uneventful. I believe this deviation was due in part to having two fixes on the same arrival being so similarly named. Even with our noise reducing headsets it was very difficult to tell the difference between GOATZ and COAZT. I would strongly urge one of these fixes to be renamed to prevent further miscommunication and deviation like ours.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported navigating to the wrong fix due to similar sounding fixes (GOATZ and COAZT) on the same RNAV STAR.


ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

FA's (Flight Attendants) initially advised of unresponsive passenger with the implication that she was not breathing and potential divert. More details to follow. Called back in 5 mins; pax responsive now with paramedic and doctor attending. Sent [request for land-based physician to call me]. FA called back about the same time as [Dispatch] and juggled the two calls. FA provided info from Medical form and indicated neither medical personnel had credentials with them; but wanted to start an IV. [Ground-based medical resource] was very concerned with BP (Blood Pressure) and HR (Heart Rate). Finally was able to provide that info after about 10 more minutes. FA's also advised pax was on O2 and IV. Initially asked for Priority Handling as pax was improving and did not feel [a more urgent flight status] was necessary. ATC wanted to know the nature of the [adverse situation] and seemed reluctant to provide priority handling. Provided the info to them and they seemed less than cooperative. Eventually after discussing with FO (First Officer) and FA's we elected to declare [an urgent medical situation] after Center and approach denied our request to land opposite direction. Our thoughts were; we had previously had a pax who was unresponsive and was now on O2 and had an IV in. Figured it was better to [an urgent situation] and later learn it was not necessary/required than the opposite (and then learn we needed the priority it affords us). Paramedic was very helpful and FA's did a fantastic job as did the Dispatcher. [Ground physician link] also very responsive and helpful. Landed uneventfully and taxied to gate and deplaned pax. Only real issue was that we told station personnel that we would plan a normal deplane as the passenger had improved significantly. Upon arrival at the gate the EMT's wanted to immediately come onboard and get [ill passenger] off the aircraft; so that was a bit confusing. Otherwise it was textbook abnormal event.

A320 Captain reported receiving less than he felt was appropriate cooperation from ATC during a passenger illness event.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 15; Maintenance Technician 20

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

September 2014 was assigned to an Airbus A321 with Job Card (J/C) XXXX09 for # 1 and # 2 Engine Wash. This task was accomplished I.A.W to the letter of J/C XXXX09 as witnessed by inspection department. This aircraft flew for 31-days with no issues to VSV/Bleed problems. Suspect undocumented maintenance was performed between September and October 2014. As stated; with nut missing; this condition would be impossible in this timetable not to have a failure. Event took place at ZZZ Hangar north side. Found during an A-Check. Suspect undocumented maintenance performed at multiple maintenance station visits between September and October 2014. Reference Logbook for Non-routine Line log 'remove and replaced actuator rod end bolt and nut Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 75-32-41-400. No other defects noted; signed by Inspection. [Recommend that] all maintenance require proper documentation.

During an A-Check Right-hand (R/H) engine inspection; it was discovered that the bolt that connects the VSV actuator to the Stator vane bellcrank was partially backed out and missing the nut. Verbal notification [given] by Inspection Supervisor. Suspect undocumented maintenance between the dates of September 2014 thru October 2014. [Maintenance] Removed and Replaced (R/R) Right engine VSV actuator rod end bolt; washer and nut per AMM 75-32-41-400. No other defects found. Inspected by a different Inspector. Technicians being made aware of impact of undocumented maintenance.

Reporter stated he was the Inspector who observed and signed-off the visual inspection for the installation of the bolt and nut assembly that connects the VSV Actuator Fork End to the Stator Vane Bellcrank input rod (lever). They are required to install a new bolt; washer and locknut whenever maintenance performs an engine wash or VSV lube procedure. Because of the known high vibrations that the V2500 engines produce during operations; coupled with the constant movement of the Stator Vane Bleed ring; the connecting bolt at the VSV Actuator Fork End to the Stator Vane input rod would fall out within two flight cycles if the locknut was not installed. He noted again that the aircraft flew for thirty-one days after their sign-off without any VSV discrepancies.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) and an Aircraft Maintenance Inspector give their perspective as to why a locking nut that secures a VSV Actuator Fork End bolt to the Stator Vane Bellcrank input rod on a V2500 engine was found missing during an A-Check Inspection. The A321 flew 31-days without any VSV discrepancies on the right engine. Undocumented maintenance or sub-standard aircraft hardware are believed to be contributors.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While taxiing outbound a tug vehicle crossed our taxiway and failed to yield. We had discussed this as a threat and common area for vehicles to do this. This vehicle tug had plenty of time to stop and ran the stop sign to cross in front of us on Taxiway A. I had to brake hard to avoid collision with the vehicle and the aircraft stopped approximately 10 feet from the roadway crossing with the tug directly off the nose. I notified Ground of the incident.Vehicle drivers operating recklessly and failing to yield right of way to aircraft on taxiways. Install cameras and enforce violations of vehicle operators who risk the safety of aircraft while taxiing.

Air Carrier Captain reported tug failed to yield while taxiing; resulted in hard braking to avoid collision at ORD airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 53; Flight Crew Total 6321; Flight Crew Type 1472

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was circumnavigating the Las Vegas Class B airspace after departing ZZZ and flew to the west side of the Class B at 3900 feet. The floor in this area is 4000 feet. My destination was HND. I contacted the HND Tower and was given instructions to enter a midfield downwind for 17 Right. Tower called out a 737 at my 12 o'clock and 500 feet above that was landing at LAS Runway 1. I had that airplane in sight. I was concerned that I would encounter wake turbulence from the jet as I crossed his flight path at only 500 to 600 feet below. I adjusted my crossing angle by approximately 10 degrees to the left to lessen the chance of an aircraft upset. I may have inadvertently brushed the edge of the inner ring of the Class B airspace as I was flying parallel to it. My eyes were on the jet not the moving map. There were no other airplanes in close proximity to my position at that time. The terrain around the Las Vegas Class B is mountainous with little vertical room to maneuver. My actions were based on my [many] years of experience and my desire to fly in a safe and proficient manor. I did encounter the wake turbulence; but it was an up and down series of jolts and not a dreaded wing roll; because of my actions. I believe that the best way to prevent the chance of an encroachment would be to fly a greater distance from the Class B inner ring.

SR22 pilot reported a possible Class B incursion after altering course to avoid a wake turbulence encounter with a B737.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Our facility has been back on a normal schedule for around 2 months now but we are operating extremely short staffed due to the amount of people out due to the pandemic.  This is forcing those of us that still come to work to work harder.  I was working GC and LC combined since this is now the 'new normal.'  I commented to the CIC who was also working FD (pre-pandemic we would have had a Supervisor a GC; a FD; and a LC). 'Why did the TMC switch flows when we have a 7 knot tailwind?'  He agreed that it was an early call but this happens a lot and I believe it happens because ZZZ TRACON is still on 5 days on and 5 days off and they don't have the staffing to open positions which is causing ZZZ to operate in a way that I believe introduces more risk.On the west side we normally have three runways but one is closed due to a construction project; and numerous taxiways are closed as well.  In a north flow we are forced to land on Runway XXR when we would normally not do this and the East side keeps all the departures.  This causes the situation that happened to me.  Aircraft X goes around and I issue the standard 340 and climb to 3;000; he went around due to the tailwind.  I then issue instructions on GC to alleviate a conflict there.  I then notice a suppressed data tag of a west bound departure off of the west side (Aircraft Y); and issue Aircraft X a further turn to 270 and coordinated with the departure controller.  The suppressed data tag was a huge factor in me not seeing the east side departure heading west; and the conflict on GC was another distraction.ZZZ TRACON needs to return to a normal schedule so they can staff their final monitor positions.  ZZZ does not need to be departing west bound departures off of the east side when ZZZ1 TRACON is landing XXR; especially when the weather is marginal like it is today.  Additionally; ZZZ TRACON does not need to be landing XXR at all; because that forces us to depart XYL which involves multiple crossing on Runway XXR (more risk).  ZZZ TRACON needs to land the normal arrival runways and if they can't do this due to their staffing then they need to return to a regular schedule.  Most of us here are fed up with what is being asked of us and the safety of the system is quickly eroding to appease the users demands and ZZZ's TRACON staffing.

Controller working Ground and Local combined reported a conflict resulting in an aircraft having to go-around.  Reporter stated Tower does not need to be departing westbound aircraft off the east side of the airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

At 80 KTS Captain called '80 KTS.' On crosscheck; First Officer's side airspeed indicator read 0 with an AS flag. I replied negative; Captain called for reject; assumed control of aircraft. Reject was announced over radio. Aircraft was cleared off runway and returned to ramp for maintenance. Maximum observed ground speed was reported by jumpseater to be 110 KTS.

Aborted takeoff due to First Officer having no airspeed indication. [We] aborted at 110 KTS. Tower was notified and taxied back to gate. Maintenance found faulty Mach airspeed indicator on First Officer's side. Brake cooling chart was used. Instrument was removed and replaced; new instrument was tested and found to be airworthy. Logbook filled out and signed off; taxi out and takeoff was uneventful.

B757 flight crew experiences a failure of the First Officer's airspeed indicator during takeoff and the takeoff is rejected by the Captain. Mach airspeed indicator was found to be defective and was replaced by Maintenance.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1550; Flight Crew Type 800

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flight planned SJC VINCO V107 PXN ... During IMC climb transition to level at 6;000 MSL; TRACON assigned a heading which was essentially direct VINCO Intersection. Nearing the intersection; I was cleared pilot navigation to join V107. I (too) quickly noted position on moving map display; and then engaged GPSS and alt hold. As the aircraft began its turn; I turned to check the wings and tail for icing; as the aircraft was in cloud tops and temperature was slightly above freezing. A few moments later; I noted that the turn was continuing well beyond the expected heading; and immediately disengaged the autopilot while beginning a turn back toward the V107 course. Simultaneously; NCT TRACON called to ask heading. I confirmed the turn on course and the Controller noted that the heading had been almost the reciprocal of the expected heading. At this point; I recognized the problem. When I engaged GPSS; the GPS had not yet sequenced from the SJC-VINCO leg to the VINCO-PXN (V107) leg. The GPS was attempting to reestablish itself on the first leg inbound to VINCO; and GPSS had commanded a near-360 turn. The correction is simple: before engaging the automation; ensure you know the state of the automation.

BE35 pilot reports engaging the autopilot and GPS without verifying the waypoint after being cleared to join V107. The aircraft attempts to turn back to the previous fix (VOR) before it is detected by both ATC and the reporter.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5230; Flight Crew Type 4260

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Cleared for position and hold [on the runway]. While taxiing into position; aircraft started to skid to right side of runway. Used differential power on left engine to bring aircraft around into position. Aircraft went past centerline; takeoff clearance cancelled; exited runway and positioned short of the hold short line. Subsequently cleared for position and hold and then take-off.

A general aviation pilot reported that strong winds from surrounding weather caused the aircraft to drift off the centerline on a wet runway while lining up for takeoff. The pilot cancelled the takeoff request and re-attempted the departure successfully.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.8

Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was training a developmental that had 140 plus hours on local control. RWY 23 was active and Aircraft X was in the right downwind. Aircraft Y was on the right base to RWY 23. Aircraft X was instructed to make a left 360 when they were midfield. As they were rolling out of the 360 I pointed the aircraft out to the developmental. She instructed them to make another tight left 360 and they acknowledged. We did not tell Aircraft Y about Aircraft X in a 360 abeam the numbers. We did tell Aircraft X about Aircraft Y and they would be number 3 to follow. I told the trainee traffic for one is traffic for another but we never called it on frequency.We had an aircraft on short final so I scanned gear and the RWY. A helicopter was operating on the east side of the airspace. They called up to tell us they were tracking RT3 northbound and they were going to be hovering on about a 3 mile final for RWY23. As I scanned back to the northwest; Aircraft Y keyed up and said they had traffic directly ahead and inquired what they were doing. They also said they took evasive maneuvers to avoid. At this point I keyed up let Aircraft Y know the traffic was now behind them and they were cleared to land. I told Aircraft X they were #2 and cleared to land. I saw out the window what was happening but the helicopter was still talking blocking the frequency. Aircraft X flew at least another mile in the downwind from when being instructed to make a 360 and when they started it. Aircraft X complied with the first 360 appropriately.The ATM and two people for an ECV audit were upstairs. Additionally; the CIC/GC/FD positions were combined and there was a position relief briefing in progress. A90 had called twice over the shout line to coordinate an arrival to RWY29 at the same time. Change my scanning techniques. I saw Aircraft X abeam the numbers and they went to the rwy. The helicopter called so I looked and scanned their flight path before going back to Aircrafts X and Y. I could've reached out on guard to see if either aircraft were monitoring.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

BED Tower controllers reported an aircraft was supposed to make a 360 on downwind; but did not and caused a conflict with a helicopter.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Equipment / Tooling; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

While removing and replacing the #2 Main Wheel Assembly (MWA); [two maintenance technicians] were notified that there was no nitrogen available on the field. It was later discovered that a NOTAM was put out on this situation but no one was notified. While searching for nitrogen; the Ground Handler found some across the field. When he brought it to the airplane; [the maintenance technicians] found that the adapter was not set up for our tooling. While attempting to remove the adapter that was excessively tight; the wrench slipped off the nut and impacted [one of the technician's] finger causing a laceration. He then applied First Aid; finished the MWA replacement. Went back into the airplane to change the bandage at which point he was directed to go to the doctor to get further care which resulted in 3 stitches; a tetanus shot; and anti-biotic. He then remained in ZZZ while [the other technician] continued the trips until the aircraft returned. [The injured technician] then finished the mission and returned home.

A Maintenance Supervisor reported that during a tire change on a Boeing 757; a Technician lacerated his finger when attempting to change a fitting on a nitrogen cart.


Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

A C414 was inbound to SPH from the east northeast. The pilot was told to expect a visual approach and was asked if they had the weather and NOTAMS. The pilot replied he had weather and NOTAMS. SPH is located on the boundary with MLU low and SHV Approach; so I pointed the aircraft out to SHV as landing SPH and expecting a visual approach and the point out was approved. The pilot cancelled his flight plan about 15 miles from SPH. About 10 minutes later; the pilot checked back on VFR and said that the NOTAMS he had did not indicate that the airport was closed but that SPH was in fact closed. He informed me that he was on the Unicom frequency and they were trying to open the airport for him. I first called SHV and asked if they were showing SPH closed to which they replied that they were not and would check in to it. I looked at the NOTAMS and the first 2 NOTAMS were for a taxiway being closed and the second was for the PAPI lighting being out of service. The third NOTAM was Airworthiness Directive (AD) closed. The forth and fifth NOTAMS were for Tower lights out of service about 6 and 9 miles from SPH. By having the AD closed as the third item; there was confusion on my part and the pilot's part that the airport was in fact closed. If the airport is closed; the other items on the NOTAMS become irrelevant as they are part of the aerodrome. Either the other outage NOTAMS need to be replaced by AD closed and reinstated after the AD is reopened or at the very least the AD closed should be the first NOTAM. Also I question whether the pilot was confused (as I was initially) by what AD meant. As many abbreviations as there are for items around the airport and now the added ICAO abbreviations can lead to uncertainty of what is actually out or closed. The second item that could have prevented this would have been the Status Information Area for both MLU low and SHV correctly indicating that the Aerodrome was closed.

ZFW Controller described an event where traffic inbound to SPH confirmed receipt of all NOTAMS; was released to Unicom frequency only to discover the airport was NOTAMED closed.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was the PNF/FO (Pilot Not Flying / First Officer) and sitting in the right seat for our passenger flight from LAX on Aircraft X. On taxi out we received a 'traffic' call from the TCAS. According to a Phenom Newsletter; this is a known issue caused by certain asphalt/concrete material in the ramp/taxi way material affecting the radar altimeter. I followed the instruction of the newsletter article and turned the TCAS to Standby and we continued to taxi. We were told 25R for takeoff and crossed 25L and was holding short of 25R at F when we were cleared for takeoff. We were not expecting it since tower didn't inform us to expect an intersection takeoff. I was expecting to taxi across and full length for 25R. Because of this and alternate heading given by the tower other than what was published on SID I forgot to turn the transponder back to Auto. After takeoff I called positive rate and the PF (Pilot Flying) called gear up. As soon as I selected gear up we immediately received a 'TOO LOW GEAR'; this startled us. I looked down to make sure the gear was coming up and we were not sinking and hit the OK button. About the same time we got a yellow message telling us that the transponder was in standby. Realizing my mistake; I turned the transponder back to Auto. I noticed at that time we were also above 400ft; so I called [flaps retract] and selected flaps 0. At that same time I saw that our speed was approaching 180kts and called to the PF to watch his speed. He acknowledged it but not in time to keep the speed from exceeding the 180kt flap speed limit. We received one 'High Speed' aural warning and reached 185kts before the flaps retracted fully and red/white barber pole disappeared. On the way to [our destination] we discussed the article about the TCAS calls on the ground and the Radar Altimeter and how we never had the 'Too Low Gear' before on takeoff. We monitored the Radar Altimeter on the way into [our destination] and it worked perfectly. But considering the 'Too Low Gear' warning we decided to write that up along with the flap overspeed. In hindsight maybe we should have thought about an MEL for the Radar Altimeter. I will do this in the future when I get these spurious TCAS alerts when on the ground. How are we to tell if it is the material in the asphalt/concrete or if the Radar Altimeter really has issues? Should there be an email or another article be put out to rescind the previous article? Also LAX tower should give some notice to pilots if there are going to assigned an intersection takeoff.

EMB505 Captain reported a TCAS alert for traffic during taxi; a 'too low gear' warning on climb out; and a flap overspeed.


Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Control column seemed a little stiffer than normal on rotation during takeoff; but not unsafe.  During landing; control column seemed to stop at a point during flare while arresting the descent prior to touchdown. I had to add significant additional back pressure; and the column freed and the flare was completed. Touchdown was normal. Writeup was made in the maintenance log.

A B757 Captain reported the control column stiff on takeoff; but binding during land which required significant force to overcome in the flare.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Upon takeoff after gear up was commanded we got two master cautions; LDG INOP; and WT ON WHEELS. We also had a Master Warning for Fuselage Door. We verified the indication on the ED and saw red indications on L2 and R2 doors. We checked cabin pressure and asked Flight Attendants (FA) to visually inspect the doors. The FA's said the doors looked normal. Next I began the QRH for WT ON WHEELS which required no crew action and a note that the gear may not retract.  LDG INOP procedure was going to lead us to Alternate gear extension. We began planning for a return to [the airport] or a diversion. We used ZZZ radio to communicate with Maintenance and dispatch. Maintenance had no solution for our situation. Dispatch and I discussed a plan for another airport; weather in the area at that current time was 1/2sm SN FZFG VV006. Initially we decided to head for ZZZ [airport] because the weather looked the best but after reevaluating plate notes and services we felt that ZZZ1 would be a better choice. Enroute we determined that the main gear were still extended; we checked the alternate verification and saw two green lights for mains no green for nose gear. We discussed configuring early to see if we would be able to get normal green lights by use of normal gear extension. At about 30 miles we attempted to extend the gear normally. We selected gear down felt no transition and saw no lights on the normal landing gear indicator. Next we conducted the alternate landing gear extension procedure; we were only able to use floorboard lights to determine that the gear was extended. I would say that the anti-skid test was inconclusive because one of the lights would go out in 3 seconds while the other took closer to 6. About 5 minutes out I asked the FA's to prep the cabin for a brace and possible evacuation. We landed uneventful; stopped on the runway and pinned the gear and were towed back to the terminal.

The APU wasn't working as the WT ON WHEELS was still telling the plane we were in the air.

Dash 8-400 flight crew reported receiving warnings for LDG INOP; WT ON WHEELs; and FUSELAGE DOOR. Flight diverted to a suitable airport; and landed safely.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

We taxied into a very tight gate; a tow in. It was night. As we approached the pushback tug; we were blinded by the very bright LED headlights. All night vision was gone; [we were] in a tight area. We stopped and called Ops to have them tell the folks to turn off lights. They said lights do not turn off. We turned on all of our external lights to taxi in. The Assistant Station Manager came up and we talked about it. The Captain who was taking over the aircraft heard us; and also spoke of how it blinds us when the ramp is wet and the glare. We were informed that all Company ground equipment have the lights hard-wired to ON if the equipment is running. As everything is going to be extremely bright LEDs; they need to be OFF. Imagine trying to see the Ground Crew; equipment; Safety lines and all other threats while looking into LED headlights. The ground equipment; at least the pushbacks; should have a way to turn off lights or should be turned OFF at all times as we approach it!

Air carrier Captain reported being unable to see out cockpit window at night during taxi into gate due to ground equipment headlights shining into cockpit.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We had another issue with CPDLC clearance out of JFK. Clearance received normally; but said; 'Cleared to SAAME via route clearance. SKORR3.RNGRR. This is a REVISED CLEARANCE..'  We confirmed routing and could not find any difference from filed routing.  Also; the clearance came across as two pages - 2/2 and there was no LOAD option for the revised clearance (We were able to print the clearance this time). After cycling through the two pages several times and several minutes later; we noticed that the clearance showed three pages and there was a LOAD option on the third page. We called Clearance Delivery and requested a full route readback to prevent any chance of a conflict/deviation. ATC stated there was no revised clearance; it was as filed. We asked if we were the only ones having a problem; or were other flights having issues and ATC responded; 'The problem is that your company filed you the SKORR3 SID; that SID is only for runways 31 and the computer kicks it out because it doesn't know what runway we are using at the time of processing. Everyone else does not file a SID.'  After confirming the route clearance we departed without problem. At this point I have little confidence in the CPDLC process in JFK due to the issues of late.

The Captain reported that Dispatch filed the SKORR SID out of JFK that was rejected by the ATC computer resulting in confusion for the flight crew when receiving their clearance.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

At FL270; approximately one hour after takeoff; flying in icing conditions with wing and engine anti-ice systems selected 'ON'; the right pneumatic duct overheated and the right pressure regulating shutoff valve closed. Followed QRH procedures and opened the isolation valve per the checklist. Approximately 30 minutes later; the left pressure regulating shutoff valve automatically closed; leaving the aircraft with no pneumatic air supply. Attempted to restore the left side pneumatic air supply per the QRH but was not successful. Immediately [notified] ATC while simultaneously starting the APU and both pilots donning oxygen masks. Requested to descend out of icing conditions and get the cabin altitude below 10;000 feet. No more icing conditions after descending below FL190. After descending below 17;000 feet; the aircraft started re-pressurizing with the APU pneumatic system. Aircraft was being stored for over one year in the high desert in Southern California. Aircraft parts fail at a higher rate when placed in adverse weather conditions after being stored for such a long period of time.Very difficult to prevent this type of event when the aircraft is stored for such a long period of time.

B757-200 Captain reported a pneumatic duct overheat and a pneumatic shutoff valve closed; leaving the aircraft with no pneumatic air. Flight diverted to a nearby suitable airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 2900

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56; Flight Crew Total 12700; Flight Crew Type 3400

Workload; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We were cleared to line up and hold on Runway 1R at SFO (A to A1) and in same call; Tower told us 'I have a reroute for you'; I replied; 'roger; Aircraft X cleared to line up and wait; and did you say you have a reroute?'; Tower replied; 'yes please advise when ready to copy.' I told Pilot Flying (PF) (the captain/PIC) that 'I am heads down'; then told tower; 'ready to copy.' The PF taxied to line up and wait while I remained heads down and copied the reroute; which was a new SID. So I remained heads down and reprogramed the FMS with the new SID. As soon as I completed and reviewed the SID (chart to FMS confirmed); I asked the PF if he was ready; and he replied 'yes'; so I told tower 'Aircraft X is ready to takeoff.' Tower then cleared us for takeoff Runway 1R. As the PIC started to add power; he said 'what the;' and I looked up (from monitoring the cockpit CAS messages; parameters; airspeed; heading; etc per SOP) and saw that we were on Taxiway L. The PIC immediately reduced power; I do not believe we even accelerated above 40 knots; and he taxied ahead to Taxiway G and stopped. I advised Tower that we were on G; and requested to taxi back for takeoff. Tower cleared us to back taxi on the runway and to line up and wait. The flight was then completed without any issues.This was caused because of the late change in our reroute. I do not believe that ATC should ever issued a new clearance when also clearing an aircraft to line up and wait. We should have been given the new clearance while holding short of the runway. If that had happened; we could have both worked on the new clearance while stopped with the park brake set. Then when clearance was reviewed and read back; we could have then been cleared to line up and wait; or cleared for take off. This way both crew members could have been looking outside during aircraft movement.

While taxing to Runway 1L for the TRUKN 1 SID on Taxiway A; Ground control changed our runway to 1R and the SID to NITE 1. As we entered the new runway and SID into the FMS we lost our orientation and misstated Taxiway L for Runway 1R. We were than given our takeoff clearance and began our takeoff role; we immediately notice that we were on Taxiway L and aborted the takeoff. We then advised the tower and held short of Runway 1R at Taxiway M. We were then given a new takeoff clearance and departed with on further incident.

A Corporate flight crew became distracted when SFO issued a new SID and departure runway while taxiing at night. Thinking that Taxiway L was Runway 1R; the takeoff was begun. The Captain detected the error and rejected the takeoff.


Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ILS-T approach to Runway 9R. Approach Control vectored us to intercept the LOC closer in than normal. While trying to catch the glide slope; the flight director went to altitude hold. At that point we got slow during the momentary level off. The autopilot was then disconnected in an attempt to try to catch the glide slope manually. As we approached 1;000 FT AGL; we still had not captured the glide slope and therefore were not established in a stable approach. A go around was executed and Approach Control vectored us around for a normal approach and landing. These vectors may have been acceptable under VMC; but the field was IMC; so I should not have accepted the vectors and stayed with the full published procedure to give us a more standard descent rate prior to intercepting the approach. As for getting slow; that was the result of the rushed procedure; but I should have caught it earlier and not let the airplane get below minimum maneuver speed for our configuration.

Briefing was conducted while I was out of the cockpit; VNAV approach to an ILS; PF disengaged the auto pilot early during the approach. IMC conditions. Flaps 1; speed was reduced to about 190 KTS; followed by Flaps 5 then Flaps 15 without reducing speed any further. ATC gave a short turn to intercept localizer; VNAV was no longer valid; the airplane flight director gave indication to level off as it did not reach the next point for further descend. Thrust was advanced by the Auto Throttles to maintain altitude.PF used the speed brakes and I saw thrust HOLD on the FMA; indicating that the thrust levers are de-clutched.I called 'SPEED LOW; SPEED BRAKES DEPLOYED.' No action from PF; no action or directives from PM.Airspeed was a couple of knots above the yellow hook; I felt that this is an imminent stall. I reached out and stowed the speed brakes and advanced the thrust to prevent a stall close to the ground. Still no action; direction or comment from PM.The aircraft leveled off and speed regained. The PF let the airplane level off; with no apparent plan. PF proceeded to intercept GS from above. PM was very calm composed and cool; he gave her no commands or suggestions.I noticed that the airspeed now was almost at the barber pole; 180 KTS; which is Flaps 30 max speed. Again I announce the 'speed is high' again no action; I announced 'selecting speed brakes' speed was reduced to appropriate approach speed; I then stowed the speed brakes and armed them for landing.At 1;100 FT above the ground I saw that we will not be established on the GS; IMC conditions and autopilot disengaged. I announced 'GO AROUND' PM said 'GO AROUND.'PF still flying manually press the G/A; thrust advanced. While the airplane was still sinking approximately 300 FT per minute towards the ground PF said 'Positive rate of climb; gear up' I said 'we are sinking. Pull up pull up.' When I saw a positive rate of climb; I said 'now you can ask for gear up.'I made sure 7;000 FT was set in the altitude window for go-around. Autopilot was re-engaged. Both PM and PF set STD alt setting which resulted in an amber indication on both sides as the transition altitude was 8;000 FT; 1;000 FT above G/A altitude. The difference was about 300 FT and the PM said it is OK we can follow the altimeter and that he was OK with it. This added to the work load.On the second attempt; again the PF disengaged autopilot. Again she was not slowing down the airplane while configuring for landing.I said 'Flaps 5; set speed; Flaps 15; set speed; Flaps 20 set speed.' We were still in IMC conditions. Airplane landed with no further anomaliesSuggestions:Conduct briefing with all crew members present in cockpit. Stress the benefits of auto pilot use during high work load or high stress periods. Stress SOP; procedure call outs i.e. Flaps 5… set speed. Challenge ATC directives…do not jump on their suggestion without analyzing the threat. Do not take short cuts which will bring you above the glide slope if you are not comfortable. Be aware that VNAV only works with predetermined route; SID or STAR and is invalid if you are vectored away from your FMC route. Procedure should be implemented to read out FMA changes; i.e. thrust HOLD; VNAV SPD; VNAV PTH; VNAV ALT etc.

B777 flight crew describes a go-around for an unstabilized approach from different perspectives.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I completed a hydraulic A and B reservoir drain and filter change. AMT #2 was troubleshooting #2 engine fire loop issue and left to retrieve parts to affect a repair. After clearing tools and equipment used for the reservoir task; I proceeded to the cockpit to power the hydraulics and perform a leak check. These tasks were a part of a [routine] check so I deployed the flaps to perform a leak check and the flap inspection required. The initial lack of knowledge that an open thrust cowl interferes with the transition of the flaps; contributed to the incident.

A Maintenance Technician reported the trailing edge flaps were lowered and made contact with the open engine cowling.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The pre-departure checklists have the following added to the header of the checklist: 'NOTE: This check is to be done at the gate or hangar prior to taking the aircraft to the gate at the discretion of the Lead or Supervisor. The purpose of this form is to guide technicians through the crew's pre-flight checks to improve our on-time departure rate.This form does not require documentation in [Company Documents] or the use of the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual). However; if a discrepancy is found as a result of this check; it must be documented.' This is clearly instructing maintenance personnel to perform maintenance activities without documentation in the aircraft paperwork system and is also stating that it is acceptable for maintenance personnel to perform maintenance activities without manual references. I believe this to be a violation of the federal aviation regulations and feel encouraging our workforce to perform any maintenance activities without documentation or proper manual references would diminish our safety and compliance culture.In order to have an acceptable pre-departure checklist per the [CFRs] (Code of Federal Regulations); an internal document should be added to AMM chapter X stating the checks to be performed and proper manual references; These checks should be properly documented as having been accomplished in our maintenance paperwork system.

Air carrier Maintenance Supervisor described maintenance requirements without a published procedure.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

There is always a debate on window serviceability when determining limits on acrylic windows. For example; today A B767-300 aircraft had small cracks in the [cockpit] L3 Window [#3 Left]. Our Air Carrier Engineering Document 56-11-00 for B767 aircraft states no V-chips or cracks are permissible in any glass pane. There are no published limits for acrylic windows in our company Engineering Document. Can one assume that glass limits pertain to acrylic; or do acrylic windows have different limits. If so; when do cracks becomes unserviceable in acrylic windows? Suggest [Engineering] clearly define serviceability of acrylic windows in company Engineering Document 56-11-00 for B767; or remove all references to glass; thereby only having a window pane limit regardless of its construction [material].

A Line Mechanic reports that no published serviceability limits exists for V-chips or crack damages in their Engineering Document 56-11-00; for cockpit acrylic windows on B767 aircraft. Only glass window pane damage limits are published; raising question of when do cracks become un-serviceable in acrylic windows.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

After takeoff [with] First Officer flying; smoke in cockpit followed by report of smoke in cabin. Declared emergency and returned to land overweight at 140;000 LBS. Upon landing; smoke had dissipated and returned to gate. Aircraft out of service and departed later on inbound aircraft. I had a very experienced First Officer along with another MD-80 Captain in the jumpseat that I had flown with as a First Officer. Jumpseater was very helpful to the both of us. The flight attendants were very experienced and did their jobs as required. The First Officer continued to fly while the jumpseater and I ran the checklist. On short final I took control of aircraft and made normal landing.

On climb out; smelled slight pack odor. At approximately 9;000 FT; Flight Attendant called and said they had smoke in the cabin.

A MD-82 cabin filled with smoke after takeoff; so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where the aircraft was removed from service.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flight cleared to descend via CHSLY2 RNAV arrival into CLT. Set bottom altitude to 6000 [feet] msg per procedure; Cockpit workload high due to weather in area. Between WHIZE and CAATT intersection I noted speed error at CAATT intersection. As pilot flying; I intervened and selected speed of 210kias and vertical speed in order to correct error; this left aircraft in an un-managed vertical mode with altitude set at bottom altitude (6000). Descent below 9000 occurred prior to CAATT intersection before First Officer trap error at 8800 feet. Aircraft was returned to minimum altitude of 9000 feet simultaneously with call from ATC; whom trapped the error as well. No loss of separation occurred and flight proceeded normally to landing. High workload environment led to not monitoring altitude constraints properly by pilot flying. In addition; full use of automation was 'dropped' in order to intervene with perceived error in FMGS. Due to high work load; pilot flying was task saturated. Fortunately Pilot Monitoring trapped error early enough as to not lose separation. Keep two pilots in cockpit in future in order to trap future errors.

On the CHSLY2 RNAV arrival to CLT; Captain selected open descent after WHIZE and had his hand on the vertical speed knob. I assumed he would push to level off at 9000 to make the restriction at CAATT. When he did not stop the descent I said; 'It should be 9000 at CAATT.' By the time he reacted we were at 8750. We immediately climbed back to 9000 and were already leveling off when ATC asked about our altitude.

Air Carrier flight crew reported becoming distracted during a high workload descent on the CHSLY 2 RNAV into CLT; and descended below the descent profile.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Logbook Entry

This report is submitted due to concerns regarding return-to-service preparation of our long-term stored aircraft.  This aircraft had a number of issues which precluded an on-time departure and caused us to question the true airworthiness of the aircraft.  Specifically; the aircraft had massively incorrect fuel loading; such that it required ~4+ hours to move fuel to the appropriate; legal-for-flight; locations.  Second; upon the first engine start; we were surprised to see to ECAM Caution messages for 'ENG 1 (and ENG 2) REV INHIBITED.'  Thrust reverser operation was; indeed; inhibited; so we encountered another half hour+ delay while computer settings were changed to allow thrust reverser operation.  (Maintenance Control advised that these messages were likely the result of a release-from-storage checklist item being left undone/missed.)  Our total delay ended up being five hours as our Dispatcher and us concurred that additional fuel was required for our flight to ZZZ due to incoming weather; which added another 20 or 30 minutes to the delays. Our concern is that the number of time consuming and potentially unsafe items we encountered in successfully launching our aircraft suggest that either the team at ZZZ1 was rushed to accomplish these tasks; and/or given insufficient time or staff to complete them.  Another possibility is that the appropriate training and task cards were not been provided?  Regardless of the causes; with so many aircraft coming back into service; it behooves us to look into the events of this return-to-service flight so as to preclude them from occurring again; thus enhancing flight safety.  Simply suggesting an investigation or evaluation of what transpired in this return-to-service flight so as prevent compromised flight operations going forward.

Captain reported long delay due to fuel imbalance and thrust reversers inhibited caused by human factors during return to service from long term storage.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Engine cowling was left open during startup causing a blade to strike and damage the cowling. We were in the process of doing multiple engine starts to complete leak checks and tail rotor track and balance after maintenance was completed. During one start the aircraft failed to start and an amber GOV light illuminated on the warning panel. Mechanic opened the engine cowling and investigated while I completed powering down of the aircraft. The Mechanic returned to the cockpit moments later and asked me to attempt the start again. As the blades began to rotate the cowling was struck. I immediately aborted the start. My complacency of following company policy and completing a check of maintenance done and a walk around was directly responsible for the cowling being damaged. I needed to slow down and complete these tasks even after being asked to try the start again.

AS-350 pilot reported the rotor hitting the cowling causing damage to blades during a maintenance check.


Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were working on Aircraft X. The task was to accomplish work order XX. We were told the new oxygen generators are in a box; in stores. After looking inside the box; I saw none of the paperwork was filled out. When I questioned the supervisor about this; he went to check on my issue. He came back and said he called inspection and they made one sheet to cover all these generators and we were good to go for install. After further review by the techs on my crew; none of these units in the box were usable for the Work Order and would have been expired prior to the run-out date listed on order XX. I did not ever see any blanket sheet for the box of oxygen generators. I have no idea how many of these were installed on the aircraft by the prior 2 shifts.

We are working Aircraft X performing the oxygen generator date check. We have conflicting dates on the oxygen generator service life. Work Order XX states the service life of the generators is XX years and makes no mention of the YY year units mentioned in MM XX. All oxygen generators we changed are the required type.

Maintenance crew reported the required documentation for the replacement parts was incorrect.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

At the time; I was working Tower CIC. I was monitoring the Local position and the Flight Data/Clearance Delivery/Ground Control position. I observed the arrival sequence on the D-BRITE prior to the loss of separation and advised the Local Controller to watch the speed of the E190 aircraft. An E145 checked on frequency without incident and appeared to be on a normal profile with regard to slowing speed and descending from 3;000 FT MSL. The E190's speed was still indicating 310 and rapidly overtaking the E145. I did not expect to talk to the E190 because of the overtake. We observed the E190 make the turn to final and as he did; he contacted the Tower. The Local Controller tried to determine if the E190 had the E145 in sight and requested that he slow down. The E190 did not have the E145 visually and indicated that he was slowing rapidly. I advised him to break out the E190. At the same time West RADAR was trying to talk in Local's ear with regard to whether the E190 saw the E145 or not. I again; much louder; told him to break out the E190 and he complied. I believe the West RADAR Controller failed to account for the high tailwind on the base leg and did not maintain situational awareness prior to transferring the E190 to the Tower. He was also slow to take corrective action; considering both aircraft were IMC and those conditions were known to him via prior PIREPs. My recommendations would not be appreciated at this point in time because of the current philosophy with regard to the 'new generation' and personal responsibility and pride in doing the job.

Tower CIC described an over-take event resulting in a loss of separation. The reporter indicated the RADAR Controller failed to take into account several factors.


Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload

Fatigue; Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the arrival; we were given a vector and then a direct to DSNEE. As we were still in the high teens; I suggested opening the speed window at 280 KIAS (assigned speed) and then spinning it down below 250 passing around 12-13000' (due to the Captain's relative inexperience). Sometime below 15000'; SoCal Arrival asked if we wanted the SNA 20R RNAV Z. We had already setup and briefed for the ILS but we discussed any benefits to switching and decided against it. I informed SoCal of our desire for the ILS and crosschecked my instruments and noticed we were descending through approximately 8700' still doing 280 KIAS. I gave a corrective command and immediately pressed ALT HOLD (Altitude Hold); spun back the speed to below 250 KIAS; and deployed the speed brakes. I did not say; 'My Aircraft' but time was of the essence. We slowed and continued the arrival and landing uneventfully: there was no communication from SoCal referencing the deviation.Using SPD INTV (Speed Intervene); without its protection; coupled with the distraction of SoCal's request set us up for the deviation. Additionally; the Captain is new to both the seat and the airplane.[I] suggest using all available automation to the maximum extent. We could have instead entered speeds into the CDU at the abeam waypoints and allowed the aircraft to gradually decelerate on its own (or the DESCENT page speed).

I was flying. Received a vector off the arrival. Chose to use speed intervene; 280kts. Just before I went to reduce speed to 250kts for 10;000; ATC asked if we wanted the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) Z. We had set up and briefed the ILS as I had been refused the RNP Z on a prior flight. First Officer (FO) and I got distracted discussing the pros and cons of accepting the RNP Z; descended below 10;000 ft. doing 280kt. The FO caught it. We leveled off; used speed brakes; got below 250kts; and continued decent. I am a new Captain. About 150 hours on the 737; which I haven't flown. I haven't flown in the last 2 months. These factors mainly contributed to a narrowing of the big picture. Additionally; I was tired. It was night. Last leg of 3 day pairing. More than anything; don't use speed intervene without a lot of extra caution. Putting the speed in the FMC is the better way to go; it only takes a couple of seconds longer.

B737 flight crew reported exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 feet after planning to slow from an assigned 280 knots several thousand feet above 10;000 feet to accommodate the Captain's relative inexperience.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On climb GEN 2 faulted and would not reset. Tried to start the APU in accordance with QRH. APU would not start. Returned to departure airport for maintenance.

A300 First Officer experiences a generator fault during climb that will not reset. When the APU will not start the flight returns to the departure airport for maintenance.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted

The ASOS weather on the field was 110/05 4 sm BR clear skies temp 13/12 alt 29.85. We attempted the first approach; where ATC kept us at 2;800 feet until the FAF; per their requirements.  First Officer descended using the automation to approximately 300 feet. The autopilot pitched forcefully down and to the left. He disengaged at the shaker; I took control and executed the go-around. During this attempt; we had the runway lights in sight. I remained at the flight controls for the second attempt where at minimums the field was not in sight; a second missed approach was executed. Center was contacted; with their assistance; we decided on [a nearby alternate] as the diversion destination based on weather and proximity. We began a climb to 5000 feet with approximately 1300 pounds total fuel. Dispatch was notified. We landed at [the alternate] with no further incident.Upon reaching minimums on the second attempt; we noted the fuel quantity and took action to find an alternate airport.Weather was not as expected at the destination; no alternate was provided based on the expected weather at the time of arrival.If presented with this set circumstances [again]; I would not attempt a second approach. I would divert to an alternate airport with better weather.

Weather was showing in the flight release; and on the ASOS at the field it was clear. They had another airplane do a visual just 20 minutes before us; but the low lying clouds came in and [the ASOS] wasn't reporting it.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported an autopilot anomaly forced a go-around and the weather deteriorated during the second approach; resulting in a minimum fuel diversion to the nearest alternate.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I went to the office in ZZZ to get PPE. No one was there. A sign on the door said they were in the gate area distributing supplies; but no one came to our aircraft; so this meant that they left for the day; most probably. This information should be sent to Person X to let him know that his directives are not being followed.Put the supplies in the crew room as previously stated in memo; or have the office manned appropriately; or put masks at each gate for crew access.

Air carrier Captain reported being unable to obtain PPE (Personal Protective Equipment).


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 8

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was working local south when I placed Aircraft X into line up and wait on runway 9R with a practice approach on a 6 mile final as an aircraft was clearing the runway down field. I then noticed Aircraft Y approaching opposite direction of my runway. I immediately told Aircraft X to exit the runway.  Aircraft Y then turned in between the parallels and went westbound and eventually landed runway 9L. I also broke the ILS approach out to the south as I did not know what Aircraft X was going to do next.Communication and coordination needed to happen sooner as to alert me that the aircraft turned towards my runway.

TMB Local Controller puts an aircraft into position on an active runway in between an aircraft rolling out and one on final. The Controller then notices another unknown aircraft approaching opposite direction; he tells the aircraft that is in position to exit the runway and then the arriving aircraft lands on a parallel runway. Controller did not know anything about the opposite direction arrival.


Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After takeoff on a RNAV departure going north; the Captain and I reached 1;000 FT AGL and starting cleaning up the airplane. The Captain lowered the nose and called for flaps 1 followed by flaps up and the After Takeoff Checklist. As I was going through the checklist; I noticed that the nose was still being lowered and reached a 0 degree pitch with a 1;000 FT/ per minute descent rate. I pointed out the issue to the Captain just before we receive a 'Don't Sink; Don't Sink' message from the GPWS. The Captain immediately corrected and returned to a normal climb/acceleration profile to reach 250 KTS and continue the climb to 10;000 FT.It seemed that the Captain was in a hurry to reach 250 KTS (no known reason) and failed to scan his instruments while doing so. We had no ground or air references to assist in knowing the current attitude of the aircraft. I could have delayed the After Takeoff Checklist and continued the monitor the Captain's hand flown departure until he had stabilized the pitch at a proper speed and climb rate. The only thing I can think of to keep this from happening again is for the company to require all RNAV departures in IMC conditions to be flown by the autopilot. I personally do not like this course of action but it would have kept us from getting the GPWS warning (if the automation is set to climb in SPEED MODE) and in a positive rate of climb while accelerating.

During initial climb the Captain of a CL600-2D24 triggered the GPWS system with an unnoticed 1;000 FT FPM descent at 250 KTS. The aircraft had reached 1;000 FT AGL and the First Officer had begun reconfiguring the aircraft for climb when he noticed the deviation and notified the pilot flying just as the GPWS activated. The condition was then immediately corrected and a normal climb profile established.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X was at 11;000 feet and asked for 12;000 feet to climb over weather. He wasn't able to level at 12;000 feet and asked to descend to 9;000 feet. Opposite direction traffic was level at 10;000 feet and was inside of TLH Approach Control. It was handed off to me and asking for a climb to 12;000 feet. The aircraft were head on and approximately 5 miles apart. Aircraft X leveled at 11;000 feet and demanded 9;000 feet for weather. I called traffic at 10;000 feet and head on.Aircraft X advised he was descending without ATC clearance because of weather. I advised the Aircraft X that he was either declaring a Weather Emergency or he was having a pilot deviation. Aircraft X declared he was 'deviating'. Separation was lost. Management said it was 0.0 lateral and 600 feet vertical. Aircraft X descended through traffic and into TLH approach. TLH approach wanted to talk to the aircraft. I shipped him and waited for management to decide how to handle this error. They told me to read the aircraft the Brasher warning which I did about 15 minutes later when TLH approach handed the aircraft off to me.Later when I solicited a PIREP from the pilot of Aircraft X; he said Light Rime Ice and Light Turbulence during the time he descended through traffic.

ZJX Controller reported an airborne conflict occurred when a pilot descended for weather even though he had been advised of opposite direction traffic below it.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

While on a visual approach to Runway 9L ATC advised us of traffic in our 10 o'clock southbound at that time we got a TCAS TA ATC instructed the traffic to turn east the traffic maintained his heading south at that point we got the RA to descend I followed the TCAS guidance and descended until clear of conflict. Once clear of the traffic we continued the approach maintaining a stabilized approach to a normal landing. The non-flying pilot did acquire the conflicting traffic as he passed approximately 150 feet above us. The conflicting traffic failed to follow ATC instructions.

Air taxi pilot reported an NMAC with another aircraft because the other crew did not follow ATC instructions.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 163; Flight Crew Type 2302

While climbing out from the ZZZ airport; during the after takeoff checklist the first officer noticed green 'gear down' lights were illuminated along with the red 'gear disagreement' lights. Along with that; we could tell there was a vibration and the gear must still be down. We ran the appropriate checklists; sent a message to dispatch requesting data to support our initial idea that we may have plenty of gas to continue to [our destination] additionally sent a message to [Maintenance Control] to get their input and whether to continue to [our destination] or return to ZZZ. It took a while to hear back from both entities (in fact; we never did hear back from [Maintenance Control]); and; after brainstorming; decided to continue to [our destination] as the safest course of action. Landing with plenty of gas along with great weather and the security of knowing; after multiple attempts; the gear would in fact stay down and locked.

B737 Captain reported being unable to retract landing gear.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.3

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Working Departure East (A); north flow; moderate departure volume; high complexity. Prior to the MVA incident; the session was already complex and outside of normal operations due to SEA departures stopping at 6000 to accommodate Aircraft A maneuvering north northeast of Mercer Island at 7500. This was workload intensive as it involved verifying the abnormal initial altitude on initial contact; communicating to the departures when they could expect higher; responding to an increased amount of aircraft requests for higher; issuing traffic advisories as necessary; all while avoiding first Aircraft A at 7500; then the arrival leg descending to 10000; then getting the aircraft climbed and on course.Aircraft B photo mission approved inside Seattle Class Bravo airspace. North/south lines at 4200; north of SEA to approximately 8NM south. Initially responded to automated point out from Final. Subsequently told by Supervisor that SEA departures would be stopped at 3000 to accommodate the photo mission. Asked if I was okay with the arrangement; responded that I do what I'm told. Was not comfortable with the arrangement and complexity of the sector; however; it was clear that my assessment of the situation did not matter.Aircraft X on a 020 heading (per LOA) at 3000 turned east to avoid Aircraft Y on SUMMA Departure turning towards Aircraft X at 3000. Also turned Aircraft Y to the north to increase likelihood of maintaining separation. Busy scanning all my other traffic; overloaded; noticed Aircraft X now headed towards 3200 MVA. Issued climb and turn to the south to parallel the increasing terrain. Not sure if Aircraft X cleared the MVA or not; but pretty sure they entered at 3000. Subsequently; got Aircraft X above the MVAs; climbed as traffic permitted. Aircraft X requested deviations for weather; so I coordinated that and gave control to ZSE. This was good; because as I was attempting to recover from the events; I inadvertently transferred communication to ZSE with the aircraft at an uncoordinated altitude of 11000.Aircraft Y subsequently climbed to 7000 to avoid Aircraft A and turned on course; which put in conflict with Aircraft Z on a vector to PAE descending through 7000. Controller on P Sector brought conflict to my attention; turned Aircraft Z to the north to avoid/turned Aircraft Y to the east southeast and climbed further to avoid. Handed Aircraft Z to the P Sector and switched him on an uncoordinated heading/altitude. Aircraft Y subsequently climbed and on course.Told the Supervisor I wanted off position; not sure how long it took; maybe 5 minutes +/- a couple. Subsequently hit the stop departure light for SEA departures for my sector due to overload and not wanting to introduce any more traffic into my airspace. Forgot to brief relieving controller that the stop departure light was still activated.I feel like I was set up for failure on this session. My scan was exaggerated. Airplanes were at altitudes vastly outside of normal. It was during at least a moderate departure volume. I had already been working a complex situation with just Aircraft A. Between the photo mission and the [law enforcement] mission there was an unnecessary amount of complexity in the sector. At some point after the SEA departures were stopped at 3000; I remember a controller coming over and indicating to me that they were going to be my departure coordinator. I can only assume this was the Supervisor's attempt at mitigating the additional complexity that was being introduced by the photo mission and the additional restriction on SEA departures. I have no idea where that controller was during the subsequent events; but he did not speak to or help me in any way. To my knowledge he was not plugged in or physically near the departure sectors.Seattle TRACON seems willing to go to any length to accommodate photo missions in the airspace; regardless of the impact and/or complexity that accompanies the situations. Obviously; the [lawenforcement] mission will be (and should be) accommodated; but that should subsequently factor in when determining whether to allow additional special operations in the airspace. I believe the photo mission operators are promised things by Managers and/or Supervisors who are not completely in tune with the operation. Seattle TRACON should execute a [safety review] pertaining to this session and these events. I believe this [safety review] should include interviews with the controllers in the room at the time of the event; because not everything pertaining to it was recorded on a frequency or briefing. The facility should determine a better system for evaluating and approving; OR DENYING; aircraft with photo missions into the Class Bravo airspace. Supervisors should be more cognizant of what their controllers are communicating to them with regard to actually allowing these operations in real-time. At the very minimum; it should become SOP for all departures to be assigned straight-out; or the Seattle Departure; if they are going to be stopped at-or-below 3000 for any reason.

S46 Controller reported departures were stopped at an interim altitude for a photo mission and they were unable to climb one aircraft; due to workload; which flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Staffing; Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Our original aircraft arrived 1 hour 15 minutes before departure with PACK 2 inoperative and on MEL. 30 minutes before departure we called Operations asking for catering. 10 minutes [prior to] departure we called Operations again for catering and were told they were 'having challenges today' with no time estimate for their arrival. At this point we were fully boarded with cabin and cockpit temperatures slowly climbing due to the inoperative PACK and high outside air temperature. The gate ground air was equally insufficient. 45 minutes after scheduled departure catering finally arrived at the aircraft as cabin temperatures had rose to 80F and the cockpit was at 88F.As catering finished we received an ECAM fault message for PACK 2 overheat; in spite of the fact that the PACK 2 selector switch was off in accordance with the existing MEL procedures. Line Maintenance arrived within minutes to address the problem. With PACK 2 already on MEL it was determined that more time was going to be needed to troubleshoot the issue. With cockpit and cabin temperatures continuing to rise to 90F I made the determination that we would need to deplane the aircraft. In short order an aircraft swap was arranged.At the next aircraft with cockpit and cabin temperatures again on the rise (the cockpit at one point reached 90F with the cabin at 80F); we waited 45 minutes AFTER being fully boarded for a fuel truck to arrive after numerous efforts by Operations to get us a fueler. We eventually pushed back 3 hours and 37 minutes late mostly due to catering and fueling related issues.We had briefed an anticipated taxi to 27L via Y and S. It was now pass midnight with no ground traffic when we were cleared to 27L via N and S and cleared to cross 27R. Holding short for departure Tower offered us a departure from S3 or full length. It was at this point I realized that I was holding short at the old end of Runway 27L off of N and not the new runway end at S1. For whatever reason my iPad had not been showing me a moving GPS ground position. We accepted the amended clearance to depart full length; continued the taxi to S1 and departed without further incident.By this point in the flight I was starting to feel the effects of fatigue after being in two cockpits for over two hours at or near 90F while trying to address vexing and needless delays. This [was] on the heels of about 6 hours sleep following a red-eye arrival that morning.

A321 Captain reported a Pack Number 2 failure requiring an aircraft swap; resulting in a rolling delay causing fatigue to become an issue.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

This is more of an FYI regarding the new software being uploaded into the ACARS. During our preflight we got to experience the new software. It took us a few minutes to get familiar with it. Before the flight started; we scrolled through all the screens. One screen in particular caused an issue; it was the screen marked >7500. I don't recall selecting anything; but somehow Dispatch immediately send an ACARS message asking to call him. So I immediately picked up my cell phone and called. He said he received a hijack message absent any info but the flight number and thought it odd since we're at the gate and had barely started boarding. I assured him all was fine and that we were just scrolling through the new ACARS screens. While on the phone with the dispatcher; I tested the DNES button by pushing it; oddly enough; he got no message; so I'm not even sure if that function is active yet.I reviewed the ACARS bulletin associated with this update. It states that a 7500 message is auto sent if you leave the page up for 2 minutes. The only other possibility is the send button marked DNES was pushed which happens to be next to the RETURN to menu button. It's hard to figure because it seemed as if I went through those pages fairly quickly. My best guess that I got interrupted just long enough by the boarding agent; maintenance or the flight attendant. I'm sure this will happen more often as pilots begin to encounter the new software. Personally; I think there should be a requirement to manually SEND such a message and/or the SENT (DNES) button (key 5L) is moved away from the RETURN button (key 6L). I can't imagine a situation wherein you can get to this page; yet not have the extra micro second to hit the SEND button. If the threat was that great; I can assure you that you'd never get to that page to start with. It is also confusing as to what 'DNES' stands for. Why not just label it 'SEND' because such a message should be an assurance of intent.This is a good FYI; because the last thing we need to happen is for someone to be scrolling through the screens enroute and unintentionally leave the >7500 page up while attending to other duties.

A B757 Captain discovered after a new ACARS software installation that when an ACARS screen marked '>7500' is left up for more than two minutes; 7500 code is automatically sent to alert Dispatch of an unwanted situation.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This flight landed ZZZ with a planned gate of XX. The gate was available at the time that the aircraft landed. The aircraft received instructions to enter the alley and approached the gate. However; due to manpower issues with ramp service; there were no ramp employees immediately available to marshal the aircraft into Gate XX. This apparently caused a pushback conflict with [another] aircraft on the concourse. Station Operations personnel and Ramp Leadership were working together to find available ramp employees to marshal the aircraft in; when we noticed that contract personnel who were employed to ground handle Company Y; had decided to come over to XX and marshal the aircraft into the gate. Not only did they use improper marshaling signals; they stopped the aircraft very abruptly short of the stop mark.

Air carrier Ramp Personnel reported being short staffed and unable to marshal an aircraft into the gate; resulting in a third-party ramp service improperly marshalling the aircraft in.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft Y was departing north from DCA. My aircraft; Aircraft X; was subsequently departing 2.5 miles in trail behind Aircraft Y. I did not receive a strip that indicated Aircraft X was maintaining Visual Separation with Aircraft Y and communications transfer was delayed. I gathered Tower was trying to establish Visual Separation before frequency transfer since they coordinated with me that they had stopped Aircraft X at 2000 ft. Aircraft X was already 3 miles north of DCA in an area where the Minimum Vectoring Altitude is 2100 ft. On initial contact; I climbed Aircraft X to 4000 ft reference Aircraft Y. Aircraft X continued on his flight without further incident. Tower should better understand that 2000 ft is not an appropriate altitude to level off a departure in a north operation because of the 2100 ft Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

PCT TRACON Controller reported receiving an aircraft from Tower at 2000 feet; in an area with a 2100 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude.