Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 240; Flight Crew Type 40

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

When approaching the Somerset Airport (SMQ) under an IFR flight plan; it was VFR conditions and we canceled our IFR flight plan to continue the approach and landing at the airport under visual conditions.  We were cleared to switch over the common traffic advisory frequency and we did.  We attempted to turn on the airport lights by clicking the mic 5 times but nothing happened.  We tried multiple times by clicking fast and slow but could not get the lights to turn on.  We entered a standard pattern at the airport as we COULD see the beacon.  We looked in the airport facility directory but there was nothing published about the lights.  We also checked the approach plates but no further information about the lights.  We finally were able to get a hold of someone at the front desk in the FBO and they turned on the airport lights.  As it turns out; the lights were on a different frequency that was unpublished.  There was no NOTAM in regards to the airport lights.  We further found out after we landed that the airport lights frequency have been switched multiple times in the recent past.  I feel like this is extremely dangerous as we were under an IFR flight plan and flying at night.  Had there been any sort of emergency; we would not have been able to land (most likely).  There should either be a NOTAM about the lights or they need to be published.

C177 pilot reports inability to activate the runway lights at SMQ during a night visual approach.  Communications are eventually established on Unicom and the runway lights are turned on.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

At the start of the event; the First Officer (FO) was the flying pilot; and autopilot 1 was engaged due to autopilot 2 being MEL'd. Earlier in the day the aircraft had IR#1 (ADIRU) deferred; along with several associated items; and the aircraft was refused by multiple crews. However; just prior to our flight the Air Data Inertial Reference unit (ADIRU) was signed off cleared from the Maintenance log.We were level at FL320 and had just received a clearance to climb to FL360 with Center. We were IMC and in light to moderate chop. We went to 'thrust climb open climb' and initiated a climb. As the engines went to climb power we started a slow climb. I noticed the airspeed on my PFD begin to slowly increase. As we climbed; it appeared the aircraft began to accelerate past a normal climb speed of about Mach .78. Over the next several seconds I made a few of calls the FO to 'watch the airspeed' which were acknowledged and corrections made. According to my airspeed tape the aircraft was now nearing MMO and the speed was still slowly accelerating. At about this moment; the FO and I realized there was a discrepancy in our indicated Mach. Due to [the fact] that we were IMC; in turbulence; low vertical speed (we were heavy and engine anti ice was on); and that the trust was at climb power; it took us several seconds to decipher what speed indications were correct and what action we should take. An ECAM Caution 'NAV - IAS Discrepancy' was alerted.A few seconds later; the high speed CRC warning sounded; Master Warning flashed; and red ECAM appeared. At this time either the high speed protection logic or the First Officer disconnected the autopilot and the First Officer began manually flying the airplane. The First Officer leveled the airplane and we immediately requested a descent on our Center frequency. We got no reply. The request was repeated and again no reply.The First Officer and I agreed to start a very shallow descent as we began to make sense of the situation. Both a lower altitude (because it widens the margin between high-speed and low-speed regimes) and a lower attitude (because it allows you to fly more 'pitch & power') was the best option for us. Several more radio calls were immediately made to Center to advise of our climb clearance deviation and to notify them of our problem - still no reply from ATC.The First Officer and I agreed that the Captain's airspeed; the CRC over speed warning; and Master Warning were all related; but inaccurate; indications. We followed the ECAM and switched the Captain's Air Data to #3 on the Switching Panel.Over the next 30 seconds or so; several transmissions on both the Center frequency and 121.5 were made to advise ATC that we had descended back down. We leveled back at FL320 as indications returned to normal and the continuous over-speed chime stopped.After another minute or two; we were finally able to reestablish communication with ATC and explain why we had descended and leveled back at our previously assigned altitude of FL320. [Manual] procedure was followed and ADR 1 was turned off. The flight continued to our intended point of landing.In debriefing the situation; I believe the First Officer and I did an excellent job assessing the situation. An immediate reaction to a high airspeed indication; Master Warning; and CRC is to reduce thrust to idle and pitch the nose up to bleed excess speed. If the crew would have not recognized other indications by cross checking all flight instruments; it is likely we would have ended up in an Alpha Floor (low speed / stall recovery situation) which would have likely caused larger issues.It is possible that the Captain's Pitot Tube had also become blocked; essentially making my airspeed an altimeter where it indicating airspeed increased with a gain in altitude. This is how the flight instruments were acting. This same scenario had a fatal outcome for [another air carrier].

A320 Captain reported receiving erroneous airspeed indications climbing to FL360 in IMC; possibly as a result of pitot icing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 9700; Flight Crew Type 1300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Preflight review of radar showed widespread isolated thunderstorms over the sea. Takeoff and initial climb and associated checklists were completed uneventfully. The autopilot and autothrottles were being used as I flew the aircraft and the First Officer monitored. We both had our radar selected on at varying ranges and tilt angles; no echoes were noted in the departure path. A fuel balance transfer was underway as we approached FL240. As we climbed through FL240 we both noted the appearance of St. Elmo's fire on the radome. Shortly thereafter; we encountered moderate chop and liquid precipitation. I asked the First Officer to secure the fuel transfer and place the cowl and wing anti-ice systems on; which he did simultaneously; the autopilot disengaged and the left hand windshield heat shut itself off. I advised that; 'I have control of the aircraft' and proceeded to fly the aircraft with the autothrottles still engaged. After approximately 2-3 minutes; I re-engaged the autopilot when the chop subsided. The aircraft and its systems were functioning normally with the exception of the left-hand windshield heat; which could not be reset. I consulted the MEL; which noted that the aircraft could be dispatched with one side inoperative provided flight into known icing was avoided. We agreed that we could continue safely and proceeded to do so. We landed at destination uneventfully and disembarked our passengers. After the passengers boarded their bus at the base of the aircraft stairs; I proceed inside the FBO to pay our bill. After exiting the FBO; I proceed to walk around the aircraft from the front right side; (nearest the FBO) in a clockwise direction; ending at the boarding stairs. In my haste to depart; I neglected to notify Maintenance of the inoperative windshield heat and flew the aircraft [on one more leg]. After arriving; while completing post flight duties; it was brought to my attention by the First Officer that there was damage to the radome. Logbook entries and Maintenance notifications were made at this time.

G-IV Captain is informed of damage to the radome at the conclusion of the second leg of flying; that likely occurred on the first leg and was not detected due to a preflight inspection that did not include the radome. A window heat failure that occurred on the first leg also was not entered into the logbook until the end of the second leg.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46.9; Flight Crew Total 858.3; Flight Crew Type 181.8

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

I was cruising at 7;000 FT on an IFR flight plan in clear conditions flying direct to my destination. While in contact with Approach Control; the engine suddenly began to run rough. I immediately initiated a 160 degree left hand turn to be on course directly to the nearest airport. I contacted Approach and declared an emergency due to a rough running engine. Approximately 20 - 30 seconds after the engine started running rough; the engine returned to running smooth again with all engine instruments indicating in the normal operating range. I informed Approach that the engine returned to normal operation and they asked me if I wanted to continue on to the nearest airport or fly to my original destination. I requested to continue on to my destination and landed without incident. After landing and taxiing to the ramp; I performed an engine run-up including a magneto check and found that the right magneto was not operating properly causing the engine to misfire. The aircraft was immediately grounded. Upon inspection by the mechanic; a bearing in the right magneto failed and caused the magneto to 'come apart'. Both the left and right magnetos were re-built and the aircraft has been returned to service. Although I followed the correct protocol of 'aviate; navigate; communicate;' I chose to disconnect the autopilot so that I could initiate the 160 degree turn to the nearest airport immediately. In doing so; with the distraction of making the turn; communicating with Approach; richening the mixture and reducing power; I climbed approximately 200 FT above my assigned altitude of 7;000 FT. In hindsight; if I had kept the autopilot engaged and input the nearest airport into the Garmin GNS 430 WAAS; my workload would have been reduced as I dealt with the emergency situation and I would not have climbed above my assigned altitude.

Cirrus pilot experiences a rough running engine while at 7;000 FT on an IFR flight plan and turns immediately toward a suitable airport then informs ATC. After 30 seconds the engine smooths out and the reporter elects to continue to destination. After landing a faulty magneto is determined to be the cause of the engine anomalies.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

[Company] Duty Officer informed CA (Captain) and FO (First Officer) (me) via company email that after block-in of a revenue flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1 that ZZZ1 offload crew discovered [Aircraft X] had unmanifested ADG in position 12L. The container at 12L was labeled as IBX (International Box Volume); but actually contained 321 pieces of flammable gas (this info provided via Duty Officer in same company email). It was my understanding based on standardized DG (Dangerous Goods) procedures pre-flight that [Aircraft X] did not have any DG loaded.The cause of Hazmat violation was improper tracking of DG materials. DG unmanifested in non-DG labeled container.I suggest more vigilance and thoroughness when handling; tracking; and loading DG.

First Officer reported undocumented transport of Hazmat cargo due to improper DG tracking.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight XXX was a flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 on a Boeing 777 with a flight crew consisting of a Captain; First Officer; and International Relief Officer. I was the respective First Officer on this flight. We had an additional crew member from the FAA riding the jumpseat for observation. There was nothing notable about the enroute portion of the flight. There were three breaks scheduled for the respective crew members. The IRO took the first break; I took the second break; and the Captain took the third break. The breaks were just a little under two hours. Upon returning from my break I was briefed by the Captain before he took his break and we proceeded normally as the IRO exchanged seats with the Captain. The FAA Observer engaged the IRO and myself in conversation from the middle jumpseat much as he did when the Captain and I were on the flight deck while the IRO was taking his break. As we somewhat ran out of things to talk about; the FAA Observer moved from the center jumpseat to the jumpseat on the right. There wasn't much conversation for an extended period of time between any of us. At some point I inadvertently dozed off what felt like to be a very short period of time. I was awaken by the FAA Observer. The flight proceeded normally after that point.It was brought to my attention that the FAA Observer allegedly felt that I was asleep for ten minutes or more. I find it odd that if I was indeed asleep for that period of time and that neither the FAA Observer nor the IRO said anything to me to wake me up. How could the FAA Observer being an additional crew member recognize that I was asleep and then proceed to allow me to remain in such a state? I question his time frame on his allegations because of this. Nonetheless; I should have been alerted immediately by the IRO and/or the FAA Observer if either one of them saw that I had indeed fallen asleep. I openly admit that I did doze off; and it was not intentional. There is one more item that I find odd. The FAA Observer never did debrief me or have any discussion with me after the flight regarding sleeping.After analyzing the event and trying to determine the contributing factors as to why it happened there were some threats that stood out. First; I did not sleep well during my pre-departure nap in Honolulu. I had planned for two hours and thirty minutes; but at most I may have slept thirty minutes. Secondly; the breaks are very short on the HNL-ZZZ leg. Finally; this was my first trip on this model of 777. Up until that point all of my flights have been on a different 777 model. I feel that the rest facilities on the other model are superior to that on [this model we were flying this day]. I have become accustomed to having a bunk or a lie flat business class seat. The rest facility in [this model] is a just a seat that somewhat reclines. I found it very uncomfortable and noisy based on its location. Needless to say I didn't rest very well on my short break. I had another ZZZ trip just after this one and to mitigate the possibility of not getting the proper rest in the rest seat I gave myself a four hour period to take my pre-departure nap in ZZZ to get more rest at the hotel.

B-777 First Officer fell asleep due to fatigue.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 122; Flight Crew Total 11853; Flight Crew Type 2836

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We departed without a required NOTOC (Notice to Captain). I got distracted when going through all of the ACARS messages that happen right after load complete and acknowledged the doors closed (which they were) and the NOTOC onboard; but it wasn't. All of the normal load complete messages plus the new 'CPDLC can be used again message' came in a very rapid succession; which may have set us up to feel rushed even though we actually blocked out about 5 minutes early. I plan to include a checkbox on my yoke note pad for the NOTOC to prevent a recurrence; but I believe this was an isolated incident not a systemic issue.

Bottom Line Up Front: We took off without the NOTOC onboard the aircraft. The aircraft completed loading early. Therefore; once the load manifest was requested; a continual series of ACARS aural cues (dings) ensued. The series of aural cues and associated ACARS messages to read and acknowledge were: Electronic load manifest (which did indicate a NOTOC); load complete message; acknowledgment message; performance data; as well as a new message (reminding us we could now use CPDLC in flight). These messages came in rapid succession and even through we were not behind timeline to block out on time; it may have contributed to a false sense of being rushed; as during a typical preflight the load manifest is requested; then the ELM and other associated messages come some time later. I did see/recognize the NOTOC required status. However; I didn't recall seeing the load supervisor provide one to us and I did not confirm with the Captain whether it was onboard. I can't attribute this lapse in procedures to one specific event/distraction. My intent is to put a NOTOC check box on my yoke note to prevent this occurring in the future.

B-757 flight crew reported aircraft departure without required Hazmat NOTOC document due primarily to perceived time pressure and workload.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight plan block fuel is 145;000 LBS. On their own accord; and without any authorization; ZZZ fueling over fuels the flight to 148;800 LBS. ZZZ fueling citing issues such as 'the fuel pumps were not turned off in time'; or 'the Fueler was in the cockpit at the time of fueling and by the time they went back to the fueling station outside; the aircraft was over fueled'ZZZ fueling has consistently over fueled flights; to the point where it is routine and most actually laugh at this recurrence. ZZZ fueling must be held accountable and the over fueling has to stop and be put in check. I would like to ask that a one-week period of ZZZ outbound flights be looked at and see how many flights were marked 'over fueled'.Action has to be taken on these ZZZ over fuel events. Accountability and recourse are required if these events are to be halted. The amount of money wasted on these events is staggering.

Cargo air carrier Dispatcher reported the aircraft was over fueled by 3800 pounds without crew or Dispatch authorization.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While taxing out on the Blue line to Spot 66; we had switched from ramp to ground and were instructed by ground to taxi to Runway 16C via Taxiway Bravo. An Airbus was on the orange line behind us talking to ramp we think with instructions to join Taxiway Whiskey and park at [gate]. The Airbus was taxiing very fast and came up behind us off our right in the neutral zone past Spot 66 to join Taxiway Whiskey. I also had clearance in to the neutral zone beyond Spot 66. If it wasn't for my First Officer seeing the Airbus at the last second we would have slid right to join the taxi line beyond Spot 66 to continue to Taxiway Bravo and collided with the Airbus going to occupy the same space.The Blue and Orange lines need to continue to join taxi line Bravo or Whiskey. This will give pilots guidance on the ground on where to taxi so that they don't cut the corner and have a conflict with one another.Also there is a dead zone between Ramp and Ground control at the same spot so that both parties control the space but cannot provide conflict resolution when multiple aircraft are on different agencies frequencies.

B737 Captain reported ambiguous ramp and taxiway markings and the use of different frequencies in a hot spot area resulted in a critical ground conflict.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On our flight to Asheville we asked to fly the full GPS 34 Approach. I asked to do this because we were very early and the First Officer was scheduled to take his first PC. I asked if he felt comfortable with GPS approaches and he said that he hadn't really done any since initial simulator training. I felt this would be good experience for a new First Officer to see how to load a full GPS approach into the FMS and good training to remember all the procedures and callouts on a non precision approach. The weather was VFR. The only challenger was gusty surface winds. Asheville Approach was happy to allow us to fly the full GPS 34 APCH. We were cleared to the fix TUXDO at 6;000 FT and cleared for the full GPS APCH. We crossed TUXDO at 6;000 FT and did the published procedure turn and began our descent to 5;000 FT. Once inbound from TUXDO to UMUXE we began our descent to 4;000 FT. If I recall I dialed in a vertical speed down 1;000 FT to descend from 5;000 to 4;000 FT when crossing TUXDO. On our level off and 4;000 FT we got a GPWS Terrain Terrain Pull Up. The GPWS warned us once and then silenced. I did noticed my Radio Altimeter flash to about 900 FT. We were configured at flaps 20 at this point. I would estimate we were 6-8 miles from the UMUXE fix at the time. It was a VFR day and I could see there was no terrain to worry about and did not execute a GPWS escape maneuver. We continued to make a normal approach and landing. If the weather was IMC or in night conditions I would have had no choice but to execute a GPWS escape maneuver. This troubles me because we flew the published procedure.GPWS warning activated once. Looking outside I noticed terrain was close but not an issue. I inquired Asheville Approach Control on the ground in between flights to ask if this is a common occurrence. The Controller never heard of it before but did see an issue with the approach as well. With the altitude of 4;000 FT between TUXDO and UMUXE he said there is terrain around TUXDO at 3;200 FT which is what we must have been over when our GPWS went off. I want to stress that we followed the approach chart as published and were not low. I think the issue with the GPS 34 Approach is there needs to be another intermediate altitude between TUXDO and UMUXE. The chart shows there is 12.6 miles between the two fixes. We began our descent crossing TUXDO and were at 4;000 FT 8 miles away from UMUXE. The descent to 4;000 FT should begin closer to UMUXE to avoid that terrain. Like I said before if the conditions were not VMC we would have had to perform a GPWS escape maneuver. A pilot should not be put into a position where terrain clearance is an issue when they follow the published procedures.

An Air Carrier EGPWS alerted TERRAIN PULL UP near AVL GPS 34 TUXDO Intersection at 4;000 FT; an authorized altitude; but continued the approach noting in IMC or night conditions they would have executed the escape maneuver.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X on VFR advisories on a converging course with Aircraft Y on an IFR flight plan. Aircraft X was issued a 135 heading and instructed to intercept the shoreline and follow the shoreline to the field; for traffic [Aircraft Y] inbound from the west. Aircraft X took the heading and continued on that until about 3 miles east for final; Aircraft X was then observed making a south turn towards final; disregarding their issued instructions. Aircraft Y was on a visual approach and had been switched to the tower. I issued [Aircraft Y] traffic to Aircraft X and canceled advisories so they could switch coms to the tower.We need to make a procedural change that removes their glide-to-land restrictions over water or we need to find a way to make the restrictions stricter so that they cannot fly across the water in a single-engine aircraft. [Aircraft X Company] is a consistent safety problem for us; we really don't have much control over them. When they are IFR; they complain that they cannot remain legal unless we keep them within a certain proximity of land due to their [type aircraft] single engine glide-to-land requirements; their preferred flight path is opposite direction to the arrivals and often creates a problem for us especially when vectoring multiple aircraft for sequence to final. If we put them on a vector for traffic that does not comply with their restrictions they cancel IFR and VFR advisories and resume own navigations as a rogue 1200 code flying right through our arrival corridor; forcing us to separate and often delay our IFR aircraft from a VFR aircraft that we have no control over. Because of this we often comply with their requests and issue vectors that allow them to remain within their glide-to-land; rather than deal with a VFR aircraft that we have no control over and cannot predict their actions; but this increases our work load tremendously as we typically wouldn't put aircraft head-on with each other as part of our normal operations. This also leads to problems for the IFR inbounds trying to make a stable descent to the runway. We often have to delay their descent so they can top the [company] aircraft; which leads to an unstable quick descent for them. As you can also see by my report; they disregard ATC instructions when on VFR advisories without notifying us. In short; we don't have much of a fighting chance to keep our operations safe with Aircraft X Company flying around as they do. This is an ongoing everyday problem at HCF which leads to high-tensions and hostility between our controllers and Aircraft X Company pilots as well as other pilots and Aircraft X Company pilots that often have to deal with delays; RA's; and general unsafe situations to accommodate for a single air carrier that is unwilling to play by the same rules that everyone else does.

HCF Controller reported about a conflict between a small aircraft and a large aircraft that came close together. According to the reporter this happens all time and is because of a procedure the small aircraft company uses.  The small aircraft does not have required over water equipment and tries to stay close to shore causing conflict with arriving and departing aircraft. Controller wants the company to play by the same rules as everyone else.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 244; Flight Crew Total 1084; Flight Crew Type 136

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

A STUDENT WITH APPROX 450 HOURS TOTAL TIME AND 12 HOURS OF FLIGHT TIME IN THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED WAS COMMENCING A SINGLE-ENGINE GPS (LPV) APPROACH TO RUNWAY XX.  THE LEFT ENGINE WAS DEEMED THE 'OPERATIVE ENGINE' WHILE THE RIGHT ENGINE WAS DEEMED THE 'INOPERATIVE' ENGINE.  THE RIGHT ENGINE HAD BEEN SIMULATED AS FEATHERED/SECURE BY SETTING THE PROP LEVER TO APPX FEATHER DETENT; WHILE THE THROTTLE WAS SET TO APPX 8' MANIFOLD PRESSURE; SIMULATING A ZERO-THRUST CONDITION.  THE STUDENT WAS STABILIZED ON THE APPROACH AND INSTRUCTED TO REMOVE THE VIEW LIMITING DEVICE AT APPROX 300' AGL.  THE AIRCRAFT WAS SLIGHTLY RIGHT OF RUNWAY CENTERLINE WHEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED UNDER VISUAL FLIGHT CONDITIONS. ONCE PROCEEDING UNDER VISUAL CONDITIONS; THE STUDENT CORRECTED THE AIRCRAFT TO CENTERLINE AND REMAINED ON THE GLIDEPATH UNTIL REACHING APPX 1/4 MI DISTANCE FROM THE RUNWAY. AT THIS TIME THE STUDENT WAS HIGH ON THE GLIDEPATH; SLIGHTLY LEFT OF CENTERLINE AND ELECTED TO CLOSE THE LEFT THROTTLE (SIMULATED OPERATIVE ENGINE) AND DESCEND TOWARDS THE RUNWAY.  THE STUDENT FLARED THE AIRCRAFT AT AN ALTITUDE DEEMED TOO HIGH AND TOO SLOW BY THE INSTRUCTOR WHO STATED 'YOU'RE FLARING TOO HIGH.' THE STUDENT THEN PITCHED THE AIRCRAFT NOSE UP IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THE SINK RATE. AT AN ALTITUDE ABOUT 20'AGL THE SINK RATE WAS INCREASING AND THE INSTRUCTOR COMMANDED THE STUDENT TO INCREASE POWER. THE STUDENT INCREASED POWER APPROX 2;000 RPM.  AT THIS TIME THE STALL WARNING HORN HAD BECOME AUDIBLE. THE INCREASE OF POWER DID SLOW THE SINK RATE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS BANKING TO THE RIGHT WITH THE INCREASE IN POWER SO THE STUDENT APPLIED LEFT AILERON TO STOP THE BANK TO THE RIGHT. THE  AIRCRAFT TOUCHED DOWN HARD WITH THE RIGHT MAIN WHEEL; RIGHT WING LOW; FOLLOWED BY THE LEFT MAIN WHEEL AND BOUNCED BACK INTO THE AIR.  POWER TO THE LEFT ENGINE WAS STILL APPLIED AS THE STUDENT FAILED TO RETARD THE THROTTLE AFTER TOUCHDOWN. BECAUSE POWER WAS APPLIED TO THE LEFT ENGINE ONLY; THE AIRCRAFT BANKED TO THE RIGHT AND PITCHED UP. AT APPROX 10'AGL WITH THE STALL HORN STILL AUDIBLE THE INSTRUCTOR TOOK THE CONTROLS FROM THE STUDENT LEVELED THE WINGS AND ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO TOUCH DOWN ON THE RUNWAY APPROXIMATELY ON CENTERLINE BUT AIMED AT THE SIDE OF THE RUNWAY AT APPROXIMATELY A 45 DEGREE ANGLE. BY THE TIME THE THROTTLES HAD BEEN RETARDED THE AIRCRAFT WAS ABOUT TO GO OFF THE SIDE OF THE RUNWAY.  THE INSTRUCTOR GENTLY APPLIED LEFT RUDDER TO BRING THE AIRCRAFT BACK TO THE RUNWAY AND TO AVOID STRIKING THE PROPELLER WITH A RUNWAY LIGHT. THE AIRCRAFT PARALLELED RUNWAY 04 IN THE GRASS APPROX 20 FEET RIGHT OF THE RUNWAY EDGE. THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED PARALLEL TO THE RUNWAY AND THE INSTRUCTOR SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGINES WHILE GENTLY SLOWING THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT TRAVELED THROUGH GRASS AND TALL WEEDS UNTIL COMING TO A REST APPROX 400' FROM THE EDGE OF RUNWAY 33/15. ONCE FULLY STOPPED THE INSTRUCTOR NOTIFIED THE TOWER OF THEIR INTENTIONS TO SHUTDOWN THE RADIOS AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND EXIT THE AIRCRAFT TO EXAMINE ITS CONDITION. NEITHER THE INSTRUCTOR NOR STUDENT WERE INJURED AND NO IMMEDIATE DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS REMOVED FROM ITS LOCATION AND TOWED TO THE MAINTENANCE FACILITY WHERE A MORE THOROUGH INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED. UPON COMPLETION OF THE INSPECTION; THE AIRCRAFT WAS DEEMED AIRWORTHY AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. WHAT CAUSED THE EVENT IS THE STUDENTS IRREGULAR LANDING PATTERN AND THE INSTRUCTOR'S RELUCTANCE TO [TAKE] CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT. TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES THE INSTRUCTOR SHOULD TAKE CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT SOONER AND LATER EXPLAIN TO THE STUDENT WHY THE CONTROLS WERE EXCHANGED.

BE-76 flight instructor describes a hard landing and runway excursion during a multi-engine training event.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft received multiple changes to clearance and ended up off the arrival due to ATC vectors.  Aircraft ended up left of approach corridor on the RNAV arrival; crew thought they were on course but ATC issued corrective vectors for arrival.  Aircraft was cleared direct to outer marker and executed approach without incident.  Landing and taxi in were uneventful.Language is a continuous threat in Mexican airspace.  Their command of English is virtually nonexistent and they regularly use Spanish in communication with aircraft.  In addition; they at times issue clearances that are not able to be followed and then are upset when the aircraft are unable to comply with these clearances.  This inability to follow clearances has everything to do with aircraft performance.  On numerous occasions I have brought these issues up to our company and every time I am told nothing can be done.  These communications come from our management personnel who never fly.

Pilot reports of ATC vectoring them off course and multiple changes to the clearance.  Pilot describes bad use of the English language in Mexican airspace.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During the takeoff roll; just prior to rotation (within five to Ten Knots of Vr) we were still on the runway when I received about a two second Stick Shaker event. By the time I recognized what was happening we were at or above Vr so I concluded that the safest course of action was to continue the takeoff for several reasons.1.) When the event occurred we were still on the ground and any stall indication we would be receiving must therefore be erroneous; 2.) We were past V1 speed; 3.) Not least of all we were running out of runway. I feel confident that if I needed to stop the aircraft within the remaining amount of runway I could have; but was unnecessary under the circumstances. Once we were in the air (at about 300 feet AGL) we then got several EICAS messages. 1.) Stall Prot Fail; 2.) AOA Limit Fail; 3.) Windshear Fail; 4.) AT Fail (Auto Throttles). The aircraft was operating normally with the exception of the Auto Throttles; so after transferring the controls to the F/O; I referenced the QRH to determine the best course of action. Other than avoiding any uncoordinated flight the QRH did NOT mention landing at the nearest suitable airport so we continued on. We followed the checklists for descent and landing and added the required landing speed corrections and had an uneventful flight there after. We ACARSed Maintenance to give them a heads up.

EMB-170 Captain experiences a stick shaker during takeoff; after V1 prior to Vr and the takeoff is continued. Once airborne EICAS messages for Stall Prot Fail; AOA Limit Fail; Windshear Fail and AT Fail are annunciated. After referencing the QRH the flight continues to destination.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 16700; Flight Crew Type 700

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Departure correctly coded in FMS and displayed on MFD. Briefed departure procedure emphasizing distance (2.3 NM) and maximum altitude (2;000 FT) for noise abatement; planned climb speed (140 to 2;000 FT) and requirement for anti-ice on. Planned to hand fly the departure until established at 2;000 FT and heading 280. First flight with SIC. After takeoff he questioned flap retraction sequence and anti-ice ON timing; so I selected autopilot on; verified LNAV/VNAV MODES captured; and monitored his actions. On autopilot; climb rate decreased to VNAV command; resulting in the aircraft starting a turn to 280 HDG beyond 2.3 DME from TEB but prior to reaching 2;000 FT. This is standard for PROLINE4; but it was too late to correct things by the time I observed the error. A better way to have managed the automation would have been to select FLCH instead of VNAV so the airplane would have maintained an adequate rate of climb. On initial contact with Departure we were climbing through 1;850 FT and were advised we should be at 2;000 FT.

While departing TEB to the north on the TEB 8 departure; DA2000 Captain reports climbing slowly and reaching 2;000 FT after turning to 280 degree heading.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 800

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

In flying return flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 at 3;000 feet; we were anticipating B clearance into the ZZZ 1;500 feet shelf northeast of ZZZ VOR. This expectation was due to the fact that clearance was received shortly before going the same route but opposite direction; and that ZZZ was landing Runway XX; so arrivals would not be a factor in receiving clearance.  We were receiving VFR flight following from ZZZ1 followed by ZZZ1 [TRACON]. Upon hand off to ZZZ Approach frequency from ZZZ1 [TRACON]; the frequency was extremely congested. We established two-way communication and made initial Bravo request with ZZZ around ZZZ [VOR]; but only received 'radar contact' in return with no further clearance. I queried the Controller at least two more times for clarification; but communication was blocked and the frequency was extremely congested. We initiated descent near ZZZZZ [Intersection] to avoid the 1;500 feet class B shelf; but may have penetrated the B airspace in the descent down to 1;400 feet MSL.  We remained below the floor of the Bravo and received no further communication from ZZZ until handoff to ZZZ2 Approach near ZZZZZ1 [Intersection].Contributing factors leading to this possible deviation are that the PF was the senior pilot on the flight and is very experienced in the area but may have been somewhat out of practice as COVID has significantly decreased flying. Also; the Controller seemed to be slightly overwhelmed; possibly working multiple frequencies; we weren't anticipating the business of the frequency although we should have known better. Additionally; the strong tailwind increased ground speed; although the descent was rapid; the ground covered during descent was greater than normal. Finally; as we just flew the same route the opposite direction; we were (falsely) anticipating the B clearance.While these factors are no excuse for possibly entering the airspace without clearance; the notion that business is picking up again means we all need to be more diligent in our planning and flight execution. As Captain; I should have anticipated not receiving the B clearance; and planned descent accordingly.

Pilot reported a Class B airspace violation and cited ATC communication issues and the co-pilot's lack of recent flying as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 13349; Flight Crew Type 1078

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Workload; Training / Qualification; Fatigue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

After flying all night; with weather in the immediate area and the autothrottles were inoperative; we elected to fly the RNAV Runway XXR. We were vectored around several thunderstorm cells. While on the West side of the IF; we were vectored to fly direct to the IF to intercept the runway and fly the approach. Level at 3000 ft and cleared for the approach; I was very focus on maintain proper speed for the leg of the approach. With turbulence in the area; it was a little difficult to get the right power setting to maintain an approach speed within 10 knots of the target speed.  As we flew over the second waypoint; I started down. The FMS was showing I was about 200 ft high at the final approach fix (FAF). I continued the approach. As we started to breakout; we both decided we were too high to continue the approach to land. I elected to commence the go-around. Cleaned up the aircraft and requested a 2nd attempt.  On our second attempt; we were vectored for the ILS XYR; GS out of service approach. The Captain set up the approach and briefed me on it so I can maintain my focus on the throttles. Level at 4000; we were cleared to descend to 3000 ft and cleared for the approach. I started to reduce the power and call for slats and flaps. I started descending down to the MDA; while trying to control the speed. The speed was fluctuating a lot. I am assuming because of the continuous light turbulence.  We crossed the FAF at 2500 ft; I selected 1000 ft on the VSI. Just as we were breaking out; I heard a 'Too Low. Terrain'; I immediately pushed the throttles to the breaking bar to commence the CFIT recovery.  As I pulled back on the throttles I can see the yellow numbers above the N1 indicators on engine number 1 & 2. Once cleaned up and level off; I elected to have the Captain land the aircraft. The Captain requested the ILS RWY XYR approach. I set up the approach; briefed and he landed without any further events. I did notice the Captain was very focus on the power setting to help control the speed. We are never flying a plane with the autothrottles inoperative. To add to it; after flying throughout the night; we had to fly an approach in IFR conditions; with thunder storm cells around the immediate area of the airport with continuous light turbulence. Might not sound like much; but when it happens. It turns into a handful.

It would appear that with the autothrottles on MEL; the weather; flying off hours and the glide slope inop and not managing our speed and descents without autothrottles proved very fatiguing to both pilots.We fly with autothrottles 99.9% of the time and without autothrottles both pilots were so hyper focused on maintaining airspeed we were fatigued and way behind the aircraft as a result. In the future given these circumstances I will not accept the aircraft without autothrottles.

A MD-11 with MELed autothrottles was flown all night and arrived at an IMC airport with only non precision approaches. Following two go-arounds; one after an EGPWS warning; the fatigued First Officer gave the aircraft to the Captain.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Total 11548; Flight Crew Type 4766

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 4142

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were being vectored for arrival in SFO for 28L. We had leveled off at 4000 ft and were asked to call visual on RJ traffic that was at our 11 o'clock and descending to cross in front of us for RWY 28R. We had visual on the traffic and then were given a turn to intercept 28L ATC asked if we had the field in sight. We responded that we had a visual on the field and visual on the traffic. ATC then cleared us for the visual 28L and said to maintain 180 knots to the Bridge. We read back the clearance and put in 1800 ft in the altitude window. I clicked off the automation and started to descend and make a slow turn to intercept the runway centerline of 28L. Just as the descent was commenced we received a TCAS RA Descend command. I started the descent and complied with the RA. I looked out my right window and saw the RJ turning into us and descending so I kept the descent going and started a turn away. When the RA cleared we reestablished ourselves on the visual for 28L while keeping an eye on the RJ (Regional Jet); who was still crowding us on our approach. No communication was received from Tower of any potential conflict. Shortly after crossing the bridge we had another RA Descend command from the same RJ who was now over top of us and could not be seen. I complied with the RA and kept the speed up to try to get some separation horizontally as well until the RA cleared. Still no call from Tower and we landed uneventfully. I have to believe that the RJ never saw us and was lining up on the wrong runway. Or they were just very confused!

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported receiving an RA from a nearby regional jet on parallel approaches to SFO Runways 28L and 28R.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 67

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

My student and I were conducting a routine multi engine training flight. As part of this flight we had decided we would be doing a full engine shutdown; feather and in air restart. We shutdown and feathered the engine at 4;000 feet. About 1-2 minutes elapsed before we briefed and began to run through the engine restart procedure. When we engaged the start; we only got a half rotation from the propeller. We tried a couple different restart variations; priming; different throttle and mixture positions; but we still had the issue of not getting enough power to turn the engine over enough times to unfeather it. After 3-4 start attempts; all of the electrical components in the cockpit became inoperative. Avionics; intercom; transponder and transponder were all inoperative. After all the avionics and intercom shut off; we began to troubleshoot the issue. We recycled the avionics master; minimized electrical load and squawked 7600 in the event the transponder was still transmitting. I knew we needed to start back towards the airport regardless of whether we got the electrical system back up; because the likelihood of us getting the engine restarted with a clear electrical issue was slim to none; seeing as getting an engine out of feather takes a significant amount electrical power. Our next course of action was to get in touch with ATC. We did not have cell service at 4;000 ft.; (altitude at which the shutdown occurred) so we started a slow descending left turn (into the good engine) in hopes of getting service. I was not going to let us go below 3;000 [ft.]. At around 3;500 ft. I got enough cell service to call ZZZ Approach; using the Bluetooth on my headset and phone to talk with them. I told ZZZ Approach we had experienced an electrical failure and that we were also single engine. At this time I also [received priority]. Approach was able to give us a heading to fly to intercept final and during that time while we proceeded towards the airport; we ran through our engine securing checklist and single engine approach and landing checklist; we briefed the landing and determined I would fly the final approach and landing. With the checklist and briefing done; all that was left was to fly the approach. We got our landing clearance over the phone; got the gear down and established a final approach speed of 125 MPH. The landing on Runway XX was uneventful; with the aircraft touching down in the first 3rd of the runway. ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting) units were on alert and followed us down the runway to where we exited at Taxiway XX. As we were coming to a stop on [Taxiway] XX all our avionics turned back on; so we were able to contact Ground to get our taxi clearance back to the [FBO]. An air guard fire personnel did a quick check of the aircraft; asked if we were ok and then we were able to taxi back to our flight school ramp without incident.

PA-23 instructor pilot reported loss of all electrical power after shutting an engine down for air restart training; requiring a return to departure airport.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals

Early afternoon 201309; Avionic's Maintenance Controller X notified me that an incorrect Part Number (P/N) XXX-913 [Audio Control Panel] was installed on a CE-560XL; Aircraft X. After verification that this was correct; I notified the Maintenance Director. We noted the aircraft was in flight and we then cancelled all future flights until this could be corrected. I ordered and set up Maintenance to have the Correct P/N XXX-915 installed. I then verified this with the CE-560XL Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 23-50-00; Figure 01; Revision 27; P/N XXX-913 Mod D and G for the S/N range for our CE-560XL aircraft with no IPC 'notes' that should be installed on Aircraft X.  Per Avionics Maintenance Controller X; this is incorrect because all of our aircraft have a Honeywell HF Systems installed.  IPC Item 2; P/N XXX-915 Mods D and G; [with] Note 2; is acceptable for aircraft with Honeywell HF Systems.  But the IPC shows the ['Effective'] S/N Range for [P/N XXX-915] is beyond Aircraft X's Line S/N range.  The IPC is not accurate. This was caught because there was a mismatch report that showed twelve days earlier; that P/N XXX-915 was removed and P/N XXX-913 was installed.   [Recommend]1) The Aircraft Manufacturer's CE-560XL Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) is not accurate for P/N XXX-913 and     P/N XXX-915 [Audio Control Panel] and should be corrected.  2. Our Maintenance Computer software also lacks in areas; the information that shows installed components is not always accurate; for this particular issue it shows a XXX-915 with two different S/Ns installed into the #1 position.

Reporter stated the mismatch in Serial Numbers (S/N) was found by company personnel that handle the paperwork review of parts that clear aircraft for Return to Service (RTS). One of their Avionics Maintenance Controller's [Controller X] recognized that the S/N in the Cessna Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) for the Honeywell HF System [Audio Control Panel] that was replaced on one of their CE-560XL aircraft; was not an accurate S/N for the aircraft's manufactured Line Serial Number. Adding to the problem was the software they use in their Maintenance Computer program that all their Technicians use; does not always give a Serial Number (S/N) range for parts that are 'Effective' on a particular aircraft. In their case; the software information in their Maintenance program was limited and the Cessna IPC information was also not accurate.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes the lack of information in their Maintenance Computer software program and the confusion from conflicting information in the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) that led to an incorrect Audio Control Panel being installed in a company CE-560XL aircraft.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

I was doing traffic pattern with my student when [another aircraft] made a radio call saying that he was 6 miles east of the field going to enter left downwind for 09. However; that was the last call my student and I heard from him. We had been doing pattern work for the previous 45 minutes following a Cessna in the pattern. My student had made a radio call saying that we were turning left crosswind for 09. As he was about to make a call saying that we were turning downwind; I looked out the right window to make sure we were clear and that is when I saw [the other aircraft] banking to the right. I immediately took control and banked the plane hard to the left and pushed the nose forward to get some airspeed. [The other aircraft] didn't make a proper entry and also stayed close to us at about our 4 o'clock. That is when he got back on the radio asking if we saw him and I responded yes we did and that we had been following the Cessna. I climbed to about 1;000 feet MSL and informed him that we will extend downwind to let him land. I extended a few miles downwind and began turning base and then final while making the radio calls. However; when I said I was on final; [the other pilot] said that he thought that I was 'confused' and was on the upwind. I definitely wasn't as I was on final. What he meant by that; was he wasn't going to get off the runway; and that's exactly what he did. He landed and instead of taking the closest taxi way; he purposely stayed on the runway forcing us to do a go around. I understand that it is not set in stone of how to enter a traffic pattern at an uncontrolled field and that radio communication at one is not required however; I believe that [the other pilot] violated 91.13 careless or reckless operation. The pilot of [the other aircraft] almost caused a midair collision and created a potential hazard on the active runway. Also; there were two other planes in the pattern besides me. This sort of behavior was just unacceptable and dangerous.

A flight instructor and his student pilot experienced a near-mid-air-collision when another pilot entered the traffic pattern without proper radio usage.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Dispatch

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure

I was the operating Captain on an MD-82 aircraft; flight ZZZ-ZZZ1. There was rain in the ZZZ1 area and we had ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 as alternates. The aircraft had three MEL items for problems with the right main fuel tank indications. The Cockpit Indicator would blank out and was considered inoperative and deferred; the Wing Indicator was inoperative; and therefore the Main [Fuel] Totalizer was inoperative. First Officer and I had flown this aircraft two days prior with the same MEL items. We determined the Cockpit [Fuel] Indicator was accurate and I made a logbook entry to Maintenance at that time stating that the right main indicator was accurate and correct. We got the MD-82 aircraft in ZZZ1 and flew it to ZZZ. We had all the proper sign offs and all the Fuel Quantity Indicators in the cockpit matched the numbers given [to] us by the Mechanic. En route to ZZZ the indicators once again appeared to us to be accurate and correct. We were scheduled for a 40-minute turn in ZZZ; but it stretched to 46-minutes due to the Fuel Verification procedures. At the gate in ZZZ; our [Fuel] Indicators read 9;050 LBS on the left and 4;150 LBS on the right [wing] with 3;600 LBS in the center; [equaling] 16;800 LBS; our release was 21;600 LBS. The Contract Mechanic made several trips to the cockpit to transfer fuel and to verify the correct fuel was onboard. He made several comments that the right tank was full (9;250 LBS) and the wing indicator and the main indicator in the cockpit was 'screwed-up.' He made a logbook entry that stated our fuel was 9;050 LBS left main; 9;250 LBS right main and 3;600 LBS center; for a total of 21;900 LBS. He confirmed the readings and the total fuel on board to us several times. We discussed the difference between the drip-stick reading on the right tank and the indicator reading and he assured us the tank was full and the indicators that were deferred were wrong. I had told Maintenance two days prior that the [right fuel] indicator appeared correct. They had not cleared the entry and continued with the MEL for the [Fuel] System which indicated to me that the indicator problem was intermittent in nature and had now shown up to us. Looking back at the history it appeared that the indicator was intermittent. We departed the gate with the right main tank indicating 9;050 LBS; the left indicating 4;150 LBS and the center at 3;600 LBS. We had a logbook sign off by a Certified Mechanic stating that the right main was in fact full and contained 9;250 LBS. Due [to the] intermittent nature of the indication problem; the multiple assurances by the Mechanic that the right main tank was full; and the logbook sign off stating it was full; we felt the right indicator was now incorrect and trusted the Maintenance procedures to tell the correct amount of fuel we had on board. First Officer was flying the leg to ZZZ1. Upon rotation it was very evident that we had either a flight control problem or a very large fuel imbalance. First Officer had to use nearly full right aileron to maintain wings level. We cleaned up the aircraft and slowly accelerated. We complied with the usual changes to our route of flight that we get from Departure (This added greatly to our workload at a critical time. These changes are well known and the company doesn't try to file us a different way or do anything to make it easier for us on departure because we always make it work. This time we once again made it work. You are welcome.) After some intense discussion with the First Officer; we agreed that the flight control issue was indicative of a fuel imbalance. Our indicators at the time showed 9;050 LBS in the left and 4;150 LBS in the right; we were burning center tank fuel. First Officer stated that it flew like the fuel indicators were correct and maybe the Mechanic had made a mistake on his calculations. I agreed and we immediately began to crossfeed fuel from the left tank to both engines by shutting off the boost pumps on the right main tanks and the center tanks. As the fuel quantity in the left main tank decreased; less and less aileron was required to maintain wings level. We knew we had a fuel imbalance. When the fuel quantities in both wing tanks were 4;100 LBS; the plane was perfectly in trim and flew normal. Our math and the airplane convinced us we had been shorted 5;000 LBS in the right tank and that the fuel indicators had been correct on the ramp and were correct now. I coordinated with ATC and got a more direct route to ZZZ1. I contacted Dispatch and got updated fuel burn for the new routing. We were to land with 6;200 LBS and had ZZZ3 for a good alternate. No one had been missing the approach at ZZZ1 as it was just light rain and no convective activity. We elected to continue on to ZZZ1. The approach and landing was normal and uneventful. We shut down at the gate with 5;500 LBS. Our Quantity indicators showed 2;750 LBS in the right and left main tanks. Either the dripsticks on the right wing are wrong; or the Mechanic made a huge error in determining how much fuel we had. Due to the Maintenance procedures in place; my Company dispatched me with an aircraft that had a 5;000 LBS lateral fuel imbalance. Instead of fixing the indicators or troubleshooting a bit more when I told them two days prior that the indicator was correct; they continued with the MEL and relied on a Contract Mechanic to verify and certify the fuel load. He; as an agent of our air carrier; sent us out with an aircraft that was 3;500 LBS over the Lateral Fuel Imbalance limitation. It could have been very bad. Thanks to the First Officer it was not. There are a few more things that this event highlighted for me:1)-I had a terrible time contacting Dispatch from over ZZZ4. The [flight] phone was slow to connect and broke up on his end. I got a patch through ZZZ5 and it was poor. Once we connected I got some good advice from Dispatch such as weather; routing options; and suitable land short options. He did ask if we had had the fuel verified in ZZZ; which was rude and a waste of time! I have had several instances of poor contact with Dispatch. The Frequency Chart seems totally out of date and useless. 2)-I asked Dispatch to have Maintenance meet us at the gate to talk to us. I wanted them to determine how much fuel was in the right main at shutdown. We called Maintenance after gate arrival and all the passengers had deplaned and were told there was a Mechanic assigned and he was on the way. The Mechanic showed up and told me he was going to dip the tanks and would sign off the Fuel Load. I asked him how much fuel was in the right main before he started and he said he had no idea as he just began transferring fuel. There was still a possibility that we had a flight control problem. If the right main tank had 2;750 LBS and the indicator said [that]; then we would know for sure that the Mechanic in ZZZ was wrong or that the dripsticks were wrong. The ZZZ1 Mechanic just jumped in [and] destroyed the evidence that the indicator was correct. They do not check with us before they begin work. The reporting codes we send are sometimes vague and a face to face explanation could save some time and duplication in effort. Here it would have preserved the proof of a fuel imbalance and eliminated the flight controls from discussion. [It was] very difficult to contact Dispatch from aircraft. Difficult to hear; [radio] frequencies don't work. Delay in establishing contact.

Reporter stated the MD-82's he flies have standard gauges and that over the years; he has found the gauges to be extremely accurate. Either they are working or crapped out. This was only the third time in twelve years that he can remember dealing with an MEL for the fuel gauges. Fuel gauges at the wing fueling bay are repeaters of the cockpit gauges. They do a Fuel Tank Quantity Test on the first flight of the day. Mechanics perform the fuel drip readings; flight crewmembers are no longer present during the drip check.Reporter stated his air carrier only fuels and 'drips' at the gate; because the slope and elevation on the ramp at their gates have already been surveyed. He had the aircraft for four legs and the fuel gauges were accurate on three of those legs. All three cockpit fuel gauges; including the totalizer; were within 100 LBS of indication. Since their incident of having a 5;000 LBS lateral fuel imbalance; his air carrier has revised their fuel dripstick maintenance procedures and added training.

Captain reports a 5;000 LBS wing lateral fuel imbalance on their MD-82 was noticed upon rotation; requiring almost full right aileron to correct. The right main tank fuel gauge and Totalizer had been deferred and the fuel tanks dripped for quantity. Captain noted the MD-82 had a maximum allowed lateral fuel imbalance of 1;500 LBS.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

While climbing above FL320 to FL400 we 'out-climbed' the pressurization ability of the aircraft and received a DIFF PRESS Warning message. The cabin pressure did not exceed 8.6 PSI. About 30 seconds before the warning; I noticed our climb rate to be above 3;000 feet per minute. I glanced at the cabin pressure and saw it was at 8.4 PSI with a 600 FPM climb. I asked the FO (First Officer); who was pilot flying; to reduce the climb rate as there had been company communication recently that it was possible to exceed the cabin pressure differential limitation while flying with few passengers during the pandemic. We had four passengers aboard. About 10 seconds after the FO went into vertical speed mode to reduce the climb rate; we received the warning. We followed the QRH procedure which got the pressure differential under control and controlled the pressurization in manual for the remainder of the flight as per the QRH. I sent an ACARS to the Dispatcher and to Maintenance and had [them] meet the aircraft at the arrival airport. The recent pandemic has seen us carrying fewer and fewer passengers and as such; we are seeing aircraft performance everyday that we would have rarely seen. As such; we are not conditioned to look at the climb rate of the aircraft in regard to the pressure differential. There had been some recent company communication that reminded us of this issue which I remembered when I saw the rate of climb of the aircraft versus the rate of climb of the cabin pressure. I merely noticed and asked the FO to reduce the rate of climb too late to stop the warning from occurring. After the event; I went and looked at the memo again and will pay more attention to reducing my rate of climb once above FL300 from now on. The QRH procedure works well in reducing the pressure differential. The problem is that it does not address this particular situation (out-climbing the pressurization). Once we got the differential under control the QRH guides you to manual pressurization operation for the remainder of the flight even though I assume there is nothing actually wrong with the pressurization. Perhaps adding a line into the QRH to direct you back to automatic pressurization if you simply out-climb the system would reduce the workload of the pilot monitoring versus having to operate the system manually while maintaining the same level of attention required of the pilot monitoring.

As we were climbing through FL320; a 'cabin differential pressure' warning message populated. Pressure was 8.6 and never exceeded 8.6. Both the Captain and First officer were able to detect an increase in differential pressure due to the high climb rate resulting from low passenger and cargo load. First Officer was correcting high climb rate when the warning message populated. Later the Captain addressed the message with the QRH. Aircraft was in control at all times and the error was detected successfully with no negative consequences.Differential pressure warning message due to very low passengers and cargo load; resulted in excessive high climb rate above FL320.Suggestions: Better monitor climb rate during low passenger loads.

Air carrier flight crew reported that during climbout; the aircraft rate of climb exceeded the pressurization system rate of climb resulting in a warning message. The crew reported an extremely light passenger and cargo load due to the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the event.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 2300

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

Chain of Events:Advised by Tower upon approach that a runway inspection was being conducted; cleared to overfly the runway at 800 feet MSL; then make left pattern until runway inspection was completed. I descended to the 800 feet but; upon level off; was subsequently blinded by the sun (I was flying west and it was approaching evening). As a result; I was sun-blinded and didn't see the altimeter for a few moments -- when I could see it again it was unwinding toward 450 feet as I approached the runway. I immediately added power and pulled up to regain the assigned 800 feet I was to overfly the runway. No violation occurred as I did cross the threshold (and did overfly the runway) at the assigned 800 feet. Apparently the tower controller concurred; remaining cheerful; friendly; and very helpful in cutting short my pattern to expedite my arrival as the runway inspection was concluded (I was allowed to turn downwind; cleared to land; after only needing to overfly a few feet of the runway).Human Performance Considerations:I was sun-blinded upon level off; as the sun then appeared suddenly in my flight path after being shielded by the roof line in the descending approach. I had not yet trimmed the aircraft for level flight; so it seems the manual pullback on the yoke was relaxed without my awareness while being distracted/blinded by the sun. I was aware of the hazard and tried to look to the side for orientation while reaching to block the sun with the visor and my hand; whereupon I regained sight of the altimeter and corrected.What can be done to prevent recurrence:Remember to preemptively pull down visor in such an approach. (It is my habit to do so; but didn't this time because it didn't seem quite late enough to worry about it.) I'm sharing this to alert others to this potential problem.

Pilot reported sun in eyes interfered with seeing the altimeter; resulting in a descent towards the ground at low altitude.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on midfield downwind on left traffic for Runway XX with the Student Pilot at the controls; I; the Instructor; realize of a traffic coming from the west slightly higher than traffic pattern altitude descending and heading towards our airplane. I announce 'I have control' and I commence a pitch down to avoid otherwise an impact from the other airplane. The traffic never appeared on TCAD [Traffic Collision Avoidance Device] and I presumably did not have an operational transponder since the flight was not tracked by any software. After evasive action; the traffic joins the downwind very close to us while I am inquiring in frequency to attempt to communicate with that traffic. I established communication with the traffic and I arrange the sequence for the arrival to the runway ahead of that traffic.

SR20 flight instructor reported an NMAC while operating in the pattern at a non-towered airport.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While on the SUNST Arrival and inside of FUZZY; we were attempting to slow to the 250 KTS crossing restriction; we were currently at 267 KTS. Descending to the next waypoint; we got high on the profile due to moderate turbulence and ground heating and the aircraft did not want to come down. We reached a speed of 274 KTS trying to get down as to make the next crossing restriction. IPUMY at 11;000 FT and 230 KTS; we were able to make the altitude; however; the speed was still at 250 and decreasing.  ATC asked us to slow further to 210 KTS and we did quickly. The remainder of the flight was normal.  During times like this; I believe that slowing out from the FUZZY to 250 KTS would have given us some room to deal with the turbulence.

An air carrier aircraft on the LAS SUNST RNAV Arrival missed the IPUMY 230 KT speed restriction as the pilot attempted to slow the aircraft in turbulent; ground heated air.


Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flight to ZZZ. We executed two missed approaches into ZZZ because of winds in excess of 50 knots at ZZZ. After the second missed approach we proceeded to the planned alternate; which was PIT. When we left ZZZ for PIT the winds on ATIS at were 240 at 20 knots gusting 34 knots. When we were approaching we received ATIS and winds were 270 at 30 knots G53 knots and gains and losses of 20 knots on final were reported. We briefed 28L visual approach and talked about all the ramifications of very gusty winds on final. We had fuel for the first approach and one very quick go around and return to PIT if absolutely necessary. We discussed using my Captain's authority to land above the 50 knots and the possibility of an unstable approach using [Company] and FAA policies and go-around procedures. We did not have the fuel to go anywhere else.We intercepted final for 28L and Tower reported the winds gusting to 44 knots and down the runway (I don't remember the exact winds; but I do know they were gusting to somewhere in the mid 40 knots). We were experiencing light and occasional moderate turbulence at this point. Tower cleared us to land on 28L. We intercepted the localizer and glide slope on the ILS 28L. We were 5 to 10 knots fast at 1;000 feet and I was correcting. At approximately 600 feet we experienced a 20 knot gain in airspeed. I pulled the throttles back some; but not all the way to idle; to avoid flap 30 over speed. I was hesitant to pull them all the way back to idle in case the airspeed suddenly dropped off so I pulled the nose up slightly to bleed airspeed which put us above glide slope. We did not meet stable approach criteria at 500 feet; but I was confident in my ability to land in the situation and a third go-around was going to put us very fuel critical. It was a smooth landing at approximately 1;500 down the runway. I felt like we had to land if it could be done safely. 28L is 11;500 feet long and at this point I was only going to go-around if I became convinced that I couldn't land safely. Our rate of descent was never excessive (1;100 FPM max) and we didn't land out of the touchdown zone. We slowed and exited at high speed taxiway F5 from 28L.In hindsight; I would have preferred a better alternate; but I had no way of knowing that PIT's winds would change so drastically from forecast.

One lesson learned is that ZZZ advised us that they were reporting winds to us on final that were a 2 minute average. We asked for spot winds on the second approach at ZZZ; but at 500 feet the winds reported to us were still above 50 knots. They sounded like the exact same winds that were reported on the first approach; so we are unsure if we actually received spot winds. While 2 minute average winds are helpful to analyze current conditions and max gusts; when winds are near limits; it would be preferred to receive exact winds when requested during the approach.With respect to the approach at PIT; I think Captain did a great job briefing his intentions and making a difficult decision to continue the approach knowing he would be second guessed. No one wants to be in a position where you have no option; but to land due to insufficient fuel and Captain was able to avoid that scenario. He did an excellent job flying a safe approach and landing in very challenging conditions and received many thanks from the passengers as they deplaned in PIT.The winds at PIT were not forecast to exceed or even approach 50 knots. After checking the PIT ATIS while on downwind at ZZZ and seeing suitable conditions; we did not expect to arrive and find winds beyond limits at PIT or we would have looked for other options. My thoughts about avoiding this in the future are focused on the wind callouts by ZZZ Tower. I am not sure if it is FAA procedure to call out winds that are a 2 minute average that may only be for the gust factor; but I would like to know if we would have been able to land legally if we received spot winds less than 50 knots. Also; winds indicated on the PFD never exceeded 50 knots and I wonder if we could use those winds; along with other information for situational awareness; to make a decision on a safe and legal landing.

B737-800 flight crew reported an unstable approach as a result of gusty winds at the end of a divert from another airport also experiencing gusty winds.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Maintenance

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

During Pre-Flight/Cargo onload; Got APU auto shutdown. Within 15-20 seconds; Maintenance Personnel rushed into cockpit and stated 'APU Fire; Pull the Fire Handle and Discharge agent'. Captain complied immediately with request. Maintenance personnel professional throughout entire evolution.

[Narrrative 2 contains no additional information.]

During preflight; a DC10 APU auto shutdown and shortly thereafter Maintenance personnel entered the flight station declaring the APU was on fire; so both fire bottles where discharged.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 310; Flight Crew Type 70

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Engine quit at approximately 200 AGL on final approach. Hard landing on grass a few feet before threshold of runway. Aircraft rolled onto runway. Speculation that the problem occurred due to right fuel tank being used instead of switching to both tanks prior to entering the traffic pattern. Possible carburetor ice; carburetor heat does not function robustly; on run up; addition of carb heat only drops rpm by 30-40 rpm. Other possibility is that the fuel outlet on the right tank unported and air was drawn into the line.

The reporter indicated that the installed engine is a Lycoming O-320. The cause was not confirmed; however five gallons of fuel was found to be present in the right fuel tank. Also; the tank feeds from the forward and aft sides of the tank. Since the rpm drop is very low during the run-up test of the carb heat; the reporter suspects that carburetor ice may have been present.

The pilot of an amateur built experimental aircraft reported a loss of engine power on final approach that led to landing just short of the runway. Carburetor ice may have existed and the carb heat control may be inadequate.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was doing a rigging check for Aircraft X. My pre-flight was thorough to make sure the aircraft was safe to fly. I did the run up and control check and everything appeared to be normal. At this point I made the decision to fly and contacted ATC for a VFR clearance to the northwest at 4;500 ft. The taxi; takeoff and climb and initial cruise were all normal with no abnormal indications. Once I was clear of the Bravo airspace at 4;500 ft. I then proceeded to do a set of steep turns to verify the rigging of the aircraft. As I was rolling wings level from the left steep turn I noticed the aileron controls seemed to be jammed. I initially used rudder to stop the turn and then began to go through all the controls. At this point I realized that the entire control stick was jammed. I then began troubleshooting and started with the emergency checklist to see what it said and then I pulled up the POH on my IPAD to see what the POH said. There was nothing listed so I then began trying to control the airplane and see what I could do. I had rudder to control turns and throttle to control pitch. I then tried flap settings to see how the aircraft would respond at this point I realized flaps 50 was about the most that I wanted to have a good pitch attitude and maintain control. I notified ATC and declared and emergency and explained what was going on. ATC gave me vectors for the ILS XXL and I was able to join the localizer using the rudder to guide the aircraft. I contacted Dispatch to talk with a mechanic to see if they had any ideas as to what I should do that could possibly clear the jam in the control stick. At this point I knew I was going to have to land the aircraft with the configuration I had. I proceeded towards the airport on the ILS XXL and eventually saw the airport. At no time did I enter clouds during the flight. ATC gave me the ILS just in case. Once I was across ZZZZZ inbound to ZZZ; ATC handed me off to Tower. Upon contacting Tower; they alerted me that the winds were 160 at 8 kts. and offered me clearance to land [Runway] XY. I accepted the clearance then began a turn towards [the] lake to set up for a wide base to XY. At this point I was using power to descend and flaps at 50% to descend as stable as possible. I turned final and felt the approach was almost as stable as a normal approach and continued to the runway. On the final I used power and rudder to adjust the aircraft and make it as straight and as stable as possible. I touched down relatively flat and firm and this jarred the controls loose. The remainder of the rollout and taxi was normal.

An SR-20 pilot reported jammed flight controls but was able to safely land with control of rudder; thrust and flaps.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were descending into DAY. The weather in the area was heavy and extreme precipitation was displayed on radar. Aircraft are both requesting detailed information about weather and information on DAY. The DAY weather and RVR were rapidly changing due to thunderstorms in the area. Numerous times over the course of the descent into Dayton; the Dayton METAR; wind; altimeter; RVR; and RBDT (Windshear Ribbon Display) feeds were lost on the NIDS (NAS Information Display System) and relevant information was not able to be passed onto the pilots in a timely manner. This issue has been reported and noted for months and still is creating safety issues for us in the most extreme weather. The NIDS needs to be fixed. Attached is a picture from another instance of the NIDS with big yellow Xs over the relevant information and just blank information for the RVR.

CMH TRACON Controller reported their NIDS (NAS Information Display System) routinely fails to depict current adverse weather conditions.


Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is my second week operating with the new SOP's. The training and implementation have been nothing short of a disaster. Last trip; neither of us had received any training on the SOP's; and the self-study was completely insufficient. This week; both of my flying partners had received training and were attempting to help me learn the new SOP's but have different interpretations on how they were to be applied and the written guidance did not clear up the issues. The new; and untrained; procedures are horribly distracting. At one point; we were so distracted by the new calls; we could not remember whether or not we had been cleared to takeoff. On two occasions; we had radio frequency problems because of the switching of #1 to primary; which is awkward for the cockpit design. In one case; because of old habit patterns; my Co-Captain was setting up the radios for ATIS and the FBO; and accidentally switched the #1 radio frequencies; losing both the current and former ATC frequencies. We had to look at an approach chart to regain contact with ATC. (We were off frequency for a very short period of time - maybe 1 minute- and as far as we know there were no missed calls; and no loss of separation; but it's embarrassing.) The problems are made worse because of the frequent changes of SOP's. Many crews I've flown with (and myself included) were just barely proficient with the last changes to the SOPs and now we're further confused by the latest. The calls in the cockpit are a mix of 3-4 revisions; none a 100% what is the correct callout. The TR check is an invitation for [an excursion]. Many will ignore the new policy completely; considering it unsafe (and I think it is unquestioningly unsafe!); others will begrudgingly do it; while commenting on how unsafe it is. The new SOPs have some good things in them; but the complete lack of training and half-hearted implementation plan have created an unsafe environment. What could have been positive; if trained and implemented well; has become a hazard for crews; passengers and innocents on the ground. I feel lucky that the worst mishaps this week were a couple radio mis-tunings and having to ask repeatedly if we were cleared for takeoff or landing (since we were so distracted by the new procedures/callouts). The poorly conceived changes; lack of meaningful training and haphazard implementation are aligning the Swiss cheese; and removing barriers to unsafe conditions. I do not know how to repair this... it seems like attempting to put the toothpaste back in the tube. The first two immediate changes are that the TR check should NOT involve the pilot flying's hands leaving the throttles. The way we had done the checks for years is the far superior method. This current method is an invitation to put a plane off the side of a taxiway. Second; we should go back to the #2 radio being primary. While I understand the rationale for it the other way; and actually think the rationale is not bad; decades of practice and the configuration of the aircraft are better suited to #2 being primary. As for the rest of the SOP changes; maybe the entire fleet needs to be parked until the crews can be adequately trained. And in the future; abrupt changes should not be made like this... it's just not safe.

Business jet Captain laments new SOP's that have been implemented without any formal training and only a written guide describing how the new procedures should be accomplished.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Enroute to ZZZ I obtained the latest weather. The winds strongly favored Runway 21. The runway is 4;300 long. However the displaced threshold for Runway 21 reduces the length to 3;803 which is less than the minimum runway length allowable for dispatch in the Sovereign. I reviewed the release and confirmed that Dispatch had planned this runway for us and it showed the reduced length of 3;803. I reviewed the feasibility notes and there was no reference to runway lengths. I reviewed the Sovereign section of the FOM and ZZZ is not listed as an airport that we can go to with a shorter runway. Before we were able to come to a resolution we had a red engine vibration L CAS message and diverted. Dispatch should not have planned us for this runway. Their planning program should not allow landings to be planned in that direction. During preflight we should have taken a closer look beyond the fact that the runway is 4;300 FT long. The feasibility notes should be updated to alert CE680 crews that it is not legal for them to land on Runway 21 due to its displaced threshold.

CE680 Captain reports being dispatched to ZZZ Runway 21; which is too short for his aircraft due to a displaced threshold. Before a resolution could be reached; a red engine vibration L CAS message is displayed and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was working Aircraft X as an upgrade lead on Gate in ZZZ; and there was a quick pack box in the gate cart; when time to scan it the scanners went out when I tried to load it then the scanners came back on a few minutes to departure and when I scanned the quick pack box it didn't show me specifically that it was a hazmat after the scanner started working; so after the trip went out I was informed to contact load plan; then the Supervisor came in to confirm that it wasn't a hazmat after calling cargo; and cargo told him it wasn't a hazmat; then after the trip left then the Supervisor called load plan afterwards; and they told him it was and that the aircraft had to return to secure the hazmat.

Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported a Hazmat load configuration error after gate departure. The aircraft was summoned to departure gate to correct load configuration error.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

The Agent started boarding the aircraft before the 'Security Checklist' was completed. This happens frequently. From the [operations manual]; 'Prior to boarding; the Agent must ensure that the Cabin Security Search... Inflight; and Flight Deck Security Search...are complete.' In addition; due to having to verify weather and Release items in order to properly brief the FAs; I had to brief the [Lead Attendant] after boarding had commenced. She was distracted by Customers while trying to listen to me. This entire situation created distractions from flight deck and cabin crew duties. The number of passengers on the flight was around 50 so there was no reason to rush boarding other than to meet unrealistic Company timelines.The ontime originator program is sacrificing safety every morning and the pressure to board throughout the day; especially during crew changes; is doing the same. It happens regularly that boarding begins before the crew is ready. Flight Attendants agree to being rushed for boarding out of fear for being reprimanded for delaying a flight. Agents are forced; by company policy; to push boarding on top of unready crews out of fear of being reprimanded for not starting the boarding process in accordance with Company policy.Flight Attendants are required to thoroughly accomplish safety and security inspections. Personal observations indicate they are rushing through their duties for fear of being reprimanded for causing a delay. In addition; when Flight Attendants are feeling rushed they are not able to 'hear' my briefing. The pressure the Company puts on agents to begin the boarding process on an unrealistic timeline is transferring to the crew and causing safety and security issues.The [company's suggested first five minute guide] is physically impossible many mornings. I challenge you to start at the top of the jetway; walk to the aircraft; do introductions; get a realistic accurate look at the weather; stow bags; accomplish internal security inspections; sign the security checklist; have the Flight Attendants sign the security checklist; and brief them on the weather and the day. The Agent should now verify the security checklist is complete and then walk to the top of the jetway and start the boarding process. In a perfect world; sitting behind a desk; this may seem reasonable (I say not; but for argument's sake; let's assume it is) to move on. In the real world; there are additional discussions/distractions that occur; Provisioning; Maintenance; deice; Dispatch; fueling; MEL items/review. With these additional real world distractions for Flight Attendants and Pilots; the boarding process has already begun before they are ready for boarding and before I can properly brief them. Many times boarding has begun without the Flightdeck Crew knowing.Managing distractions; risks; etc. is of paramount importance to Safety and is an accepted duty of our profession. However; the decision making as to whether the Crew is adequately prepared does not reside with the c\crew. It resides in an artificial; unrealistic timeline based on Company policy and enforced by heavy handed tactics. Technically; the Agent is supposed to verify with the Flight Attendants they are ready to board (many times that does not happen). When it does happen; Agents are pressuring them to board when they may not be ready. Flight Attendants then reluctantly agree out fear of a 'phone call' for delaying a flight. Discussions with Agents show they are rushing/pushing the boarding process for the same reason. Safety and security is being seconded to the ontime/early push every day.In the past; Employees were able to work together and tasked with making appropriate and safe decisions without fear of reprimand. That is not longer the case. A solution: the responsibility for determining all preboard safety; security; and policy requirements have been accomplished should reside with Captain. This is the ONLY person on the aircraft that has the unquestioned authority to determine the readiness of the entire Crew and completion of all preboard requirements with an unbiased view. Flight Crews are responsible for making sure the aircraft is secure; safe; and ready for Passengers. The Captain is ultimately responsible for the Safety and security of Passengers and Crew. This responsibility begins upon arrival to the aircraft.

A B737 Captain assessed what he believes to be excessive pressure on operational personnel to achieve on-time departures; often at the expense of required aircraft security and crew coordination duties.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 570; Flight Crew Type 21

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was taking off carrying 5 passengers on a VFR flight [that] takes approximately 15 minutes. According to the flight manifest I had 33 gallons of fuel on board the aircraft; 14 gallons in the inboard main tanks and 19 in the tip tanks. It's company policy to utilize only the fuel in the tip tanks; switching back and forth upon the completion of each leg. I had my right tip tank selected before takeoff and it seemed to be in its proper detent. After rotation and climb to approximately 300 feet AGL my engine started surging violently. I immediately pitched down and landed safely on the remaining runway. I was able to taxi back to the ramp and upon investigation of the fuel tanks it became clear that the 10 gallons I had in my right tip had drained into the main tank. This is due to a common problem with the Cherokee Six 300 in which the fuel bypasses the selector and drains from the tips to the mains if the fuel selector is not secure in its detent. Due to our high number of operations per day; and the pressure to maintain a schedule I believed the fuel calculations on my manifest as well as the fuel gauge indication rather than taking the step to visually inspect the tank. The detent on the fuel selector was not where it appeared to be; I felt it lock in place; the selector arrow pointed directly at the placard labeled 'R TIP' but unfortunately it wasn't as secure as I had thought.

PA-32-300 pilot reported violent surging shortly after takeoff that resulted in landing on remaining runway. Reporter stated the wing tip fuel selector was slightly out of its detent; allowing fuel to drain to the main tank.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Weather

The three windows that face north in the tower cab are encased in ice.  They are completely opaque. There is no view of the NW quadrant of the airport; which includes the departure end of Runway 01L.  This condition started early this morning XA:00 and continues through the present XS:15.  There are aircraft operations being conducted with multiple snow removal teams in the immediate vicinity and that part of the runway/taxiway/airport and is not viewable from the tower.I recommend taking steps to remove the ice from the tower's windows as soon as possible.

Tower Controller reported of windows incased in ice. Controller reported that the windows in a certain area of the Tower were opaque. Reporter stated that part of the airport was not viewable from the Tower cab due to the ice.