Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The morning of the event; the captain and I were expecting a reposition flight. I was the first to arrive at the aircraft; and found a mechanic on board. The mechanic greeted me and said that we would be deploying the Air Driven Generator (ADG) during the flight. I initially accused the mechanic of making a joke; but the mechanic insisted that it was not a joke. I was told that this would be an operational check flight which is considered a group 1 Non-Revenue Flight Operation (NRFO).  Immediately; I became very uneasy about the operation as I had never experienced this; but due to my relatively short time with the company; I could not say that this was or was not something that is sometimes done. I asked the mechanic if this happens sometimes and was told yes. I asked why the aircraft was left in here in the first place and was told that there had been a problem on the aircraft in that when any generator came online the main battery circuit breaker would open. The mechanic went on to say that the problem had since been fixed. I voiced a concern of the ADG deployment possibly causing the problem to reappear since there had obviously been no way to test the system's reaction to the ADG output; but was told that the part that was causing the problem had nothing to do with the ADG or any other generator and that it would not matter which generator came online as the generators themselves were not the problem. I went to inform the captain; who I met just beginning their walk down the jet bridge. I asked the captain if this had ever been experienced during their time with the company and was told no. We both went onto the aircraft where discussions ensued in the flight deck between the captain; mechanic; and me concerning the operation. We were given to dispatch which described the flight as being dispatched as a group 1 NRFO due to it being an Operational Check Flight (OCF) of the ADG. The captain and I reviewed the FOM regarding group 1 NRFO and OCF's being considered a group 1 NRFO; and believed we were authorized to do the flight based upon the information we were given. The captain began making the necessary phone calls as I am familiar with due to my experience with having flown group 1 NRFO flights a number of times before. I began to work on some routine FMS operations; cockpit organization; and applicable checklists; but simultaneously listened to each call concerning the flight. I voiced concern regarding the specific procedure that we were to follow. We were told that no specific procedure existed; and were instructed to deploy the ADG late in the descent phase of the flight and make a note of the ADG output readings on the EICAS electrical page. It came to be determined by company personnel over the phone that written authorization for an OCF was required and must be carried aboard the aircraft. The company faxed the written authorization in for the OCF and it was placed aboard the aircraft. After the receipt of the authorization neither I or the captain had any further concerns. Also aboard the flight were 2 company pilots and one company flight attendant who were originally deadheading to our destination on a later flight but were allowed by crew scheduling to leave early. The captain discussed this with the dispatcher prior to departure who approved them to be aboard and added them to the dispatch release. We then went on to complete all procedures and checklists required prior to departure and proceeded to depart the airport. Upon arrival; we parked the aircraft at the hangar as directed. The captain and the others went on their way; and I took the employee bus to the terminal complex to continue my assignment. Two days later; my assigned trip was completed and I went home. That next morning; I received a call from the manager of flight operations at which time I was notified that the captain and I had been misled and the flight was incorrectly dispatched. No threats; errors; or undesired aircraft states occurred in the event.In the future; on every group 1 NRFO I am assigned to operate; I will compare the listed operation(s) to the list of group 1 NRFO in the FOM.  If further clarification is needed or if I feel any concern whatsoever; I will call any one or combination of the following company personnel before proceeding:1)Chief Pilot2)Vice President - Flight Operations3)Director - Operations Control and Flight Support4)Director - Flight OperationsIf I still feel any concern; I will request to be removed from the operation citing safety concerns.The company could consider reclassifying OCF's as group 2 NRFO.

During a repositioning flight; the flight crew was asked to an Operational Check Flight (OCF) and deploy the Air Driven Generator (ADG). There was some confusion weather the flight was dispatched properly.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During climb above 18;000 FT; HYD1 LO QTY advisory message was displayed. I called for the QRH procedure which instructed us to monitor the quantity which was low; but not empty. I messaged both Dispatch and Maintenance to advise them of the situation. En route; the quantity decreased into the amber range and E1 HYD PUMP FAIL advisory message was displayed; and the electric hydraulic pump came online and held 2;900 PSI. The QRH procedure was completed and we briefed the Hydraulic System 1 failure in case it would be required. The pressure held constant at 2;900 PSI until our descent at 18;000 FT. The pressure fluctuated and dropped from 2;900 and the Hydraulic System 1 failure caution message was displayed on the EICAS. We declared an emergency and had to slow to 250 KTS per the QRH and advised ATC of our speed reduction. We completed the QRH procedure and began our approach after confirming that the Flight Attendant was ready. The landing was uneventful; but we did require a tow off the runway as the nosewheel steering is not operational with a Hydraulic 1 failure. All equipment was in place before landing and we were safely towed to the assigned gate where Maintenance discovered the hydraulic leak. We briefed expectations before the emergency occurred; so everything went quite smoothly. At one point I transferred the controls to the First Officer so that I could coordinate between the company; ATC; and the Flight Attendant.

During climbout; we got an EICAS message indicating low hydraulic quantity #1. We ran the QRH and kept going while monitoring the hydraulic system. In cruise we then got another EICAS message indicating that the engine driven hydraulic pump had failed. We noted that the electrical pump turned on and then ran the QRH for this. Still; we continued because that's what the QRH instructed but we prepared for a Hydraulic System 1 failure. During descent we got the Hydraulic System 1 fail message and noted the pressure was fluctuating from 2;900 PSI to as low as 800 PSI on Hydraulic System One and the electric pump was turning on and off. We then ran the Hydraulic System 1 failure QRH and then declared the emergency. We flew to destination and completed the checklist and landed safely. We had to be towed from the runway because we followed the QRH which indicated not to taxi due to lack of steering from the loss of Hydraulic System 1. We were towed to the gate and Maintenance noted there was a leak in the hydraulic line on the #1 side and that we were still leaking skydrol. The Captain entered the write up into the logbook and I left to go complete my next flight.

EMB-145 flight crew experiences low hydraulic system quantity during climbout and complies with QRH procedures. As the quantity decreases the engine driven pump fails and the electric pump takes over. During descent for landing at destination as the quantity continues to fall the electric pump fails. An uneventful landing ensues with a tow to the gate.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

There are insufficient amount of B787 qualified technicians in [Company] to meet the needs of service. We now have 8 to 11 B787 through flights a day and the lack of qualified techs in [Company] hinder and have a negative effect on the operation. On top of this; we have technicians that do not even have an A/P license which again has a negative impact on the assignments and the operation as well as placing the undue responsibility on those that are qualified.Everyone should at minimum; hold an A/P license to work in [Company]. More B787 classes should be made available for either signing up or junior manning technicians to these classes.

Technician reported that a lack of qualified personnel is causing delays and excessive workload.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 424; Flight Crew Type 31

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

This was a return flight to the plane's base after a work related training flight. Our first approach to land runway 24 resulted in a go-around due to undesirable lineup on short final. On our second approach winds were from 300 degrees at 10 knots; gusting 25 knots. Tower notified us of wind shear experienced by the aircraft that landed before us. Standard procedural aircraft checks and proper configurations were made prior to landing with no abnormalities present. The landing was acceptable given the conditions. However; upon landing both pilots heard something come from the right side of the aircraft. This was at first thought to be a flat tire. However; handling tendencies were not consistent with a flat. Shortly after landing tower alerted us that possible landing gear problems were observed. The plane continued to handle fine. It wasn't until rolling further down the runway that the plane sank to the right and the right prop struck the ground. At this point both pilots shut down and secured the aircraft and made sure no one was injured.It seems a bolt that served as part of the gear broke. Preflight inspections did not reveal anything out of the ordinary as everything appeared intact and consistent with multiple prior preflight inspections. I am unsure at this point what caused the gear to collapse. My only assumption is that the bolt in question failed as a result [of aging].

PA23 pilot reported the right main landing gear collapsed on landing roll resulting in a prop strike.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Manuals

At cruise altitude we noticed an Amber followed by a Red Boxed 'A' on both PFDs. After following Cessna procedures we disconnected autopilot. Ailerons were very stiff/difficult to move control column. We briefed passengers in accordance with Flight Operations Manual procedures and declared an emergency. Landing at the divert airport was uneventful.

The reporter stated that the Amber 'A' indicated a minor aileron mistrim. The Red Boxed 'A' indicated a major mistrim requiring a control force in excess of a 25 LBS. When the Boxed Red 'A' appeared the aircraft started an uncommanded turn which took significant force to counter. The Captain was the pilot flying but gave the aircraft to the First Officer for a short time which is when he realized how serious the problem was. The crew decided that an immediate divert was necessary and so completed the QRH then landed at the nearest airport. The reporter has not heard what caused the event.

Myself and coworker were asked to work a Cessna CE-560 so we flew out that night to be onsite the next day. The squawk was at 41;000 feet; the Aileron Trim had frozen and could not be moved. They had a hard time keeping the plane from turning and declared an Emergency Landing. Once back on the ground the Aileron Trim seem to operate normal. We inspected the Aileron and Trim System and everything operated normal. The only thing we found was large amounts of grease around the actuator and history of trim actuators on related aircraft doing the same thing. We were asked to remove the actuator and install a serviceable one; then ship the old one back so they could test it.

Reporter stated the Aileron Trim Actuator housing is mounted to the left wing fixed trailing edge. Reporter stated the trim housing is basically a sheet metal box that is routinely greased with a specific Cessna approved grease. When he looked at the Trim Actuator on the incident aircraft that had declared an Emergency; he could not believe the amount of grease covering the area where the trim housing and sprockets were suppose to be. He could not see the chain or sprockets attached to the housing. The Trim box housing interior was also completely packed with grease that was oozing out of every opening of the actuator. Reporter stated that not only is the amount of grease an issue; but he believes the type of grease being used to lubricate the actuators actually retains water and freezes under certain conditions. The same grease is used on their Elevator Trim Actuators that also have a history of freezing-up.

A Cessna 560 First Officer reported the PFD displayed an Amber 'A' followed shortly by a Red Boxed 'A'; and then it entered an uncommanded turn. With autopilot OFF as per the QRH; significant forces were required to control the aircraft so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted. Technician reporter suspects the grease used to lubricate the aileron trim actuator retains water and freezes. The same grease is used on elevator trim actuators that have a history of freezing in flight.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 8200; Flight Crew Type 1100

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

The SIC; who is my new boss; was the flying pilot. Prior to reaching ART we were cleared 'after ART; fly the HABBS3 arrival; expect Runway 24L.' I entered the HABBS3 in the FMS. It showed the arrival only as far as the HABBS Intersection; and I read aloud the part for 24L; HABBS at or below 16;000 FT. As I checked and entered 16;000 FT at HABBS on the FLT PLN page; and answered calls from ATC; also; prepped the performance numbers and pulled up the ILS 24L chart; I saw the flying pilot enter the ILS 24L in the FMS. When I looked back at the flight plan page; not only did the waypoints for the ILS 24L appear; but also additional waypoints from the STAR after HABBS Intersection.We had already discussed that in Canada; ATC expects pilots to adhere to the vertical restrictions of a STAR; even without stating 'descend via'; as in the USA. The flying pilot stated that fact several times; so I knew he was aware of it. The airplane was on autopilot this whole time; and after the FMS was set up; I saw him reviewing the STAR vertical restrictions; which were now also displayed on his FMS VNAV page. Somewhere around HABBS were we told to descend to 8;000; then later 6;000; and later 4;000. I can't remember exactly where each clearance was given; but I was setting up the ILS in the radios and finishing the Approach Checklist while we were abeam the airport; and then passing it. We looked very high; and saw we were only descending at 900 FPM. So I pulled up the STAR again to look at it. I should have been faster and spoke up sooner. By the time I saw exactly where we were and what altitude we should have been at (4;000-2;300); we were given a vector off the STAR; to intercept the ILS. The Controller asked us if we had been flying the HABBS3. I answered 'affirmative' and he announced that we should look again at some of the numbers on it; we had missed some (altitudes; and the 220 KTS). At this point; our LOC and GS needles were up; runway was in sight; but the flying pilot started a quick descent all the way through the GS; down to 1;900. Before I could say anything; the controller came on again with the altimeter setting; and said his system was showing a low altitude alert. I told the flying pilot we should have been at 2;500 at that point; he climbed up and we finished the visual/ILS approach without further incident. These altitude deviations could have been prevented with a more specific approach briefing and more specific statement aloud of what altitude and speeds were required at each point. I admit that I was way less assertive than usual because the person flying is my new boss and I feel have been scrutinized for everything I do or say each of the few times I have flown with him; and rather than inviting discussions; he tends to tell me his decisions without interest in my opinions. He also sounded completely confident in knowing what was expected on the STAR; stating several times that; 'that's how it is in Canada... you have to follow the vertical guides on the STAR etc.' I should have been vigilant; as with other people I fly with; to ensure they were flying the right profile.

A Corporate Jet First Officer; the Captains Supervisor; failed to comply wit the CYUL HABBS3 altitude constraints; first crossing some waypoints high; then receiving a low altitude alert prior to the Runway 24L Final Approach Fix.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

I had just assumed the Local control position when I observed an unknown target on the radar level at 7;500 feet northbound cut through the eastern edge of our airspace. I transmitted in the blind in an attempt to reach out to the pilot; but was not able to. He exited to the north to an unknown destination. No traffic was affected.This is a persistent problem at BJC; with incidents appearing to be on the rise. We have a VFR corridor that is located on the extreme eastern edge of the airspace with a ceiling of 7;500 feet. The biggest issue this creates is the IFR aircraft are supposed to be at 7;000 feet the final for 30R; but sometimes they will be slightly higher. When we are on Runway 12L; the departures are put right in the face of any aircraft flying this corridor. The safety issue here is obvious. Something needs to be done about this.

A Tower Local Controller reported an aircraft fly through the airspace without making contact.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

We received an RA to climb heading into ZZZ. As we were approaching ZZZ about to begin our final decent; we were told my Approach that a C172 was 500 ft. below us to our 1-2 o'clock. We saw the traffic on TCAS but could not visibly see the traffic. We made ATC aware that we were looking for traffic. As the Pilot Flying; I realized that the aircraft was climbing and the nonflying pilot saw this as well. As this aircraft came to about 2-300 ft. below us; we received the RA to climb which I did and let made ATC aware of this. After we were clear of conflict ATC told us the traffic should no longer be a factor. I'd suggest with VFR traffic that close it should have been given a lower altitude or maybe a heading to turn to; to avoid situations like this from happening in the future.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-XRJ pilot crew reported an RA approaching their destination and followed the TCAS guidance.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were given a taxi instruction from Gate X to Runway XXL via 'Romeo; Yankee; Uniform; Kilo cross [Runway] Y; to XXL' but we taxied Romeo to Yankee; taxied on Y past Uniform (apparently missed it) and crossed [Runway] Y at Yankee. The ZZZ Ground Controller caught our mistake and gave us amended clearance to XXL via 'Victor to Kilo; Kilo to XXL.'I believe I simply misheard the Ground Control clearance; because I briefed the taxi route as I executed it; and I believe the FO repeated it to Ground without anyone questioning it. It was only questioned after we crossed Runway Y; and the Controller realized we were not on K but on Y taxiway. So; either I simply misheard; or I was tired and did not catch the error; and the FO did not catch it either. Either way; my error.This shows how easy it is to get a clearance wrong; especially when you have not flown into a particular hub airport in nearly a year. It points out how we have to stay extra vigilant; especially in these COVID-19 times; because crews are not flying as much; and ATC controllers are handling multiple sectors/tasks; so even if one repeats the clearance the way you believe it is; the ATC Controller may not catch the error.

Air carrier Captain reported miscommunication with ATC resulted in a taxiway incursion during taxi-out.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

I was on a return trip in a North American AT-6 when my engine coughed. I immediately looked down to switch my fuel selector from left reserve to the right tank; the fuel selector was on left; not left reserve. I also saw that I had plenty of fuel in the left tank. Once on the right tank; I began using the manual wobble pump. After several pumps and no response; I declared an emergency; and turned for ZZZ; which was directly off of my wing. Once in contact with Tower; having gotten the gear down and established on a safe approach; I resumed manual wobble pump. On final the engine resumed; and I landed safely. I was able to taxi to the FBO under my own power.

AT-6 pilot reports possible fuel starvation at 4;500 feet and after switching tanks; turns toward a nearby airport. The wobble pump is used during approach and the engine resumes normal operation; but the approach is continued to landing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 200

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

On a training flight with a student; we had alternator failure an hour into our lesson. I did not notice the ammeter reading negative until the transponder began to flicker on and off. When I was troubleshooting; I asked the student to look at the ammeter; since it was on his side; and he told me that it was showing a negative reading; and that there was a red light. I immediately turned towards ZZZ1 and began to reduce the electrical load; hoping to lengthen the amount of time that we would have a working radio. At this point I checked into our traffic avoidance system; and noticed that there was heavy traffic at my airport of intended landing. I queued up Approach and told them the nature of my situation. I told them I wasn't sure if I would have enough battery to safely make calls to get into the traffic pattern; considering my transponder was dying. A few minutes later; right after they transferred us to Tower; who quickly cleared us to land; we lost all ability to communicate. We were unable to use our electric flaps on the landing. I taxied back to the ramp and gave Tower a call to see if I needed to fill out any paperwork; and they told me that they had taken care of it. In retrospect; I should have caught the failed alternator sooner. My student had noticed the light; but did not know what it meant; and his yoke was in the way for me to notice it. During our cruise checklist; that is one of the items that we check; and I did not notice anything wrong when we did the checklist 20 minutes prior. Additionally; after noticing the issue I could have just completely turned off the master switch and used pilotage to get us close to [the airport]; after which I could have turned the master back on and then used my radio. I had never had this happen before; so I was trying to make quick; confident decisions.

C172 Instructor Pilot reported returning to departure airport after experiencing alternator failure.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff left main gear indicated red after gear handle placed up. Kept speed under 230 KTS and followed QRH Landing 5 procedure. Red light stayed on. [We] declared an emergency with departure. Called Dispatch on comm 2. After putting gear handle down all gear indicated green. Briefed flight attendants and made PA to passengers. Landing uneventful; had ARFF check around left gear area said all looked normal. [I] taxied back to gate with ARFF in tow. Landing was not an overweight landing.

On climbout; first leg of a three day; after the gear handle was selected up; we noticed the left gear indicator light remained red while the other two gear lights were out as is normal. The gear door open light was out. We performed the QRH procedure which did not solve the problem; i.e. after cycling the gear; as the procedure calls for; the left gear light remained red. We declared an emergency. The Captain elected to return. Upon lowering the gear we had three green lights. We landed well under maximum weight and uneventfully.I don't know what might have caused the problem; but it seems unwise to me that the procedure calls for cycling the gear in order to obtain a safe up indication after having put it down and gotten a good down and locked indication. Prudence would suggest that with a gear indication problem once a safe down and locked indication is received the gear handle should not be moved again. Simply return with a safe indication and land. The Captain and I discussed exactly that but decided to follow the procedure exactly as published even if unwise.

MD82 flight crew experiences an unsafe gear up indication on departure and cycles the gear in accordance with QRH procedures which is unsuccessful. Gear extends normally and flight returns to departure airport. The First Officer questions the wisdom of cycling the gear down then up after a safe down indication is received.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I returned an aircraft to service after an Annual Inspection. I was assisted by a licensed A&P. Apparently; the A&P failed to properly safety the oil filter. Upon returning from a flight; oil was noted on the cowling. During investigation; it was discovered that the oil leak was from the oil filter; which was not safety wired properly and had become loose. A number of hand tools were also discovered on top of the engine. It was an oversight on my part before the engine was cowled after inspection. I'm disappointed that I can't rely on a licensed A&P; so; in the future; much closer quality control on my part!

Technician reported that another Technician failed to install the engine oil filter correctly; causing an in flight oil leak.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; Company Policy; Weather; Procedure

On approach to landing I received an ACARS message from the Dispatcher to call when I landed about returning to ZZZ. After landing and parking checklists were complete the crew and I began to turn the aircraft back to ZZZ. I called the Dispatcher. [Dispatcher] said there was going to be issues getting back into ZZZ. Dispatcher said they had 1 TAF from the national weather service that was legal for Dispatch; and 1 TAF from [Company] that was NOT legal for dispatch; and would I be OK with using the legal TAF.The other issue we had is that ZZZ was advertising ILS Runway X approaches. I was a high minimums Captain; and would be needing to go down to CAT 1 Minimums to land in ZZZ. Exemption requires the use of autopilot down to DA/H. The ILS Runway X into ZZZ requires hand flying the approach from the final approach fix. So the issues we had were two fold. 1. Questionable use of a TAF for legal dispatch and 2. We couldn't shoot an approach into ZZZ when we got there. I told [Dispatch] that I was not comfortable departing with this information; and from the tone of voice; I gleaned that Dispatcher agreed with the decision. Dispatcher said I'd need to speak to the Manager on Duty; and told me before I was transferred that there was 1 [Company] mainline high mins Captain holding to see if he could be allowed to shoot the Runway XX ILS into ZZZ--in an effort I felt to give me as much information to justify my decision to the Manager on Duty.When Dispatcher connected me to the Manager on Duty; it went straight to voicemail and then disconnected. While I waited for a call back; I reached out to 2 company check airman; to get their thoughts and feelings about the situation. Both thought that this was HIGHLY irregular and said they felt that I made the right decision in NOT dispatching with the information. After reviewing Op Specs; it states that the national weather service is an approved source OR 'a source approved by the national weather service in accordance with 121.101 b2. Now for the FAA representative on this panel; my interpretation of the intent of the Op Spec is that if the national weather service weather is not available for that destination; then another approved source can be used. I do not believe the FAA intended for [Company] to be able to pick and choose the TAF source to suit our needs on different days of the week from different sources. As I stated on the phone if something were to go wrong with our flight; the FAA would point to the two pilots and say 'you had more conservative weather; why didn't you go with that.'The FAA representative on this panel needs to hold the company to account and advocate changes in either the Ops Specs or in the FOM or both. Picking and choosing TAFs to fit our needs is NOT a SAFE practice; and leads our airman down the primrose path to a situation. I spoke with the Chief Pilot on Duty and subsequently the manager on duty. I felt [Chief Pilot] was disingenuous at best on the phone and I felt pressured to fly. After I had made my decision not to fly; I felt that he was pressuring me by giving arguments to go in order to reverse my decision and get a departure off the ground. He said we could use the alternate TAF because it was newer (not much newer) than the [Company] TAF. I told him I don't think it's legal or prudent to depart for ZZZ when they are advertising Runway X when we can't shoot that approach. [Chief Pilot] then said that this was totally 'normal and standard' and 'that's why we have alternates.' I told him first that this is not normal or standard; that I had spoken with 2 company check airman in the last few minutes who agreed with me that they have NEVER heard of doing something like this; and that I should NOT dispatch. I also told [manager] that; no sir that is NOT why we have alternates. We have alternates so that in the event we arrive our destination and the weather has deteriorated to the point we can't shoot an approach; that we have a plan and fuel to proceed to and land at a new airport safely. We don't dispatch aircraft to airports that we can't shoot an approach to. I pointed to Op Spec C55 which states that you don't get lower weather min credit for CAT II ops unless you are CAT III engine inoperative certified. I pointed to this rule and said that this is the FAAs intent that we can't dispatch to an airport that we can't shoot an approach to. [Chief Pilot] disagreed and pressed on. He said that they would call ATC and see if we could shoot the Runway XX approach. This was absolutely absurd and irresponsible in my opinion. TRACON isn't going to change the entire traffic flow for ZZZ; ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 just so 1 aircraft can land that hasn't even dispatched yet. I asked him on the phone if he had confirmation from the FAA that we would be allowed to shoot Runway XX; he only pointed to the previously mentioned [company] mainline flight which a high mins Captain that the Dispatcher had referenced. For the FAA to consider; I have no idea what that flights situation was. They could have been holding for extended periods; they could have gone missed and been min fuel or emergency fuel; etc. I have no idea why or if in fact they are going to shoot a Runway XX approach. I can't base the decision to dispatch my aircraft on unknown rumor and innuendo from things that [Chief Pilot] 'heard.' [Chief Pilot] has been an Assistant Chief Pilot for years; he knew exactly what he was doing to smooth talk on the phone to get a new Captain on high mins to change their mind and dispatch. This was at best irresponsible. Finally; new weather TAF came out with improved ceilings AND most importantly; ZZZ started to advertise Runway XX approach. ONLY with this new information in hand did I make the decision to dispatch for ZZZ. I want the FAA member to recognize that these were not actions of a safety conscious airline to conduct business by picking and choosing which TAF source suits us for that particular day; and to pressure ANY Captain especially a new Captain to dispatch to an airport that they can't shoot an approach for! I'm just shocked that this happened. As a follow up; while flying this week; I ran into a senior Standards Check Airman known as one of 'the elites' I told him how the company tried to pick and choose which TAF source to use and the Runway X issue at ZZZ. He confirmed it was a good decision of mine NOT to dispatch and that I took appropriate action. Also a pilot here who used to be a dispatcher said that often times dispatchers will use the alternate TAF sources on releases and the pilots here don't even notice this practice. If weather is coming from an alternate source; it should state clearly on the release either in the TAF language or in the remarks. Recommendation1. The FAA rep needs to either amend Op Spec and or the FOM to state that picking and choosing TAFs is not approved or allowed. FAA needs to amend Op Spec and or the FOM to state WHICH weather sources are approved. the language of Op Spec is so overly broad and I feel that the company and the ACP / MOD Lombardo took advantage of the vagueness of language to pressure departure. Op Spec's intent is that IF the national weather service doesn't have a TAF for a destination that we can then reach out to another source. I.e. we fly to fort de France the national weather service doesn't put out a TAF for this destination; so we can reach out to American Airlines or purchase a TAF. Its intent isn't to willy nilly pick which one is most convenient. The ERC and FAA need to insist that if we have multiple TAFs that we should be REQUIRED to use the more conservative TAF. 2. The FAA needs to amend rules that we cannot and should not dispatch to airports that we can't shoot approaches to. 3. The MOD / ACP needs to be spoken to that this is not acceptable. Having an 'operational discussion' is a thinly veiled excuse for pressuring a captain to fly. 4. The FAAalso needs to institute a policy that once a PIC has made a NO GO decision with the Dispatcher; that should be the end of the conversation. The Manager on Duty should not have an 'operational discussion' with the PIC; because that's been used as a veiled attempt to pressure the pilot to fly. Our PICs are fully capable in conjunction with dispatch to make that decision; and it should stand.I flew with a pilot within a few days of this incident who said that this same [Chief Pilot] pressured him to fly previously as well. It's clearly a pattern; it's clearly out of bounds; and it needs to stop. I would have thought that this would be common sense; but apparently it's not; and we need language to protect this from happening again. I'm very disappointed that I even have to write a [report] on this issue in the first place.

Air carrier Captain reported being excessively pressured to dispatch a flight to an airport that was below legal weather minimums.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Some time at departure time; FA#2 (Flight Attendant) and I detected strong aircraft fumes in the galley area where we were standing/sitting. The smell was strong enough where we both were bothered physically by the smell of fumes. For instance; I experienced a strong burning sensation in my nostrils and throat and a tingling sensation on the upper part of my head. Because this was the second flight in a row that FA#2 and I were exposed to aircraft fumes; I remember once again covering my mouth and nose as fast as possible. Again; because I needed to take a breath I uncovered my mouth. This time; I noticed that my throat and nose really burned longer than the previous time. Since then; I have felt a slight burning sensation in the back of my throat. In case the question should arise why I didn't report this to the Captain is basically because this type of situation would not have rendered any assistance from him as I assume that he has no control or procedure to prevent it. I did asked FA#1 if she had smelled aircraft fumes in the forward galley or cabin area. At this moment I truly do not remember if she said yes in regards to this flight or the previous flight. But I do remember that she did confirm that she had also smelled aircraft fumes in the forward part of the aircraft where FA#1 is upon departure from the gate. Yet; I did informed FA#1 that FA#2 and I would probably be filing some kind of report as both times we experience physical discomfort. Although procedure says to fill out reports and e-mail to my union; I'd like my employer to know that I was unable to fill out a report as the options on the report does not permit me to file as an illness or injury for employee. May I suggest that the report be updated to include the option for a crewmember to be included as an option in the category that says 'Customer Injury/Illness' to be changed to Customer/Crewmember Injury/Illness.'

[Report narrative contrained no additional information.]

B737 Flight Attendant reported experiencing extreme fumes in rear of main cabin and galley area.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

After being cleared for a close in visual approach to [Runway] XR in ZZZ we got switched to Tower. We were high but descending at a good rate to get on to the glide slope. We were switched to Tower while we were configuring for landing. After I dialed the frequency but before I made the switch I moved to extend the next flap setting. I didn't come back to flip the switch and was distracted by ensuring proper configuration and getting stable. We were configured and stable at 1;000 feet; but we missed the 500 foot call which is when I also double check we're cleared to land. We landed and pulled off the runway uneventfully. I recognized the error and flipped the switch. I said only our call sign and Tower just told us to cross [Runway] XL and taxi to the gate. We called the tower to apologize and he told us it was no issue and that he gave us the green light.It was late. I was tired. I was too focused on monitoring the flight path and not on doing my other core duties. Proficiency may have played a role as I haven't been flying super frequently. I didn't trap the error using my other reminders.

Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Uneventful flight; descent; and approach. However we landed [Runway] XR without Tower radio transmitted landing clearance. Spoke with ZZZ Tower via telephone after arriving [at] gate. Tower had given us a green light to land.Our day started with a XA45 local push out of ZZZ2 to ZZZ with a 2.5 hour sit in ZZZ then flight to ZZZ1. At each briefing we talked about the threat of a long day and the later than normal hours of operation for both of us. Both of us had been up early in the day. Approach into ZZZ1 was a visual (backing up with ILS). The approach was stable by 1;000 feet AGL; but high and fast prior to this. VFR conditions and it was still daylight at ZZZ. I believe fatigue and the concern about fatigue effecting performance were our biggest threats. PF was focusing on flying the approach and I believe got tunnel vision about the task of flying a stable approach and landing. The PM was backing up the PF concerning the approach; etc. Not contacting the Tower was a mistake; obviously. Believe both got too focused on the specific task vs. the overall situation. What I would do differently: fly a longer downwind with a stable approach being reached at a higher altitude.

Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance from Tower and stated that fatigue and lack of recent flying contributed to the event.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 91; Flight Crew Total 15600; Flight Crew Type 5500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 4200

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft was in IMC conditions; just in the tops of a layer we were in at 39;000. Weather radar showed very weak; low intensity very widely scattered small returns approximately 40 NM north of our position. Without warning we were in heavy precipitation; then very pronounced turbulence; and a strong updraft that carried the aircraft very rapidly 300+ feet above our assigned altitude. Objects in the cockpit floated off the surface they were laying on; and I was hanging in my seatbelt as the autopilot returned rapidly to the assigned altitude. Encounter was reported to ATC and company dispatch. Aircraft and crew were safe and undamaged after the encounter. Ops normal the rest of the flight.

B747-400 flight crew reported a strong updraft in oceanic airspace that caused a gain of 300 feet in altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 148; Flight Crew Total 9955; Flight Crew Type 6131

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Just north of AMA at FL340 I was informed that a passenger (PAX1) was totally unresponsive and unconscious. I heard the FA make an announcement over the PA requesting any medical personnel that may be on the aircraft. Within minutes the FA had 3 separate medical professionals assisting her in the cabin. All three medical professionals came to the same conclusion that the [PAX1] showed signs of an apparent drug overdose. A very very weak pulse; unconscious. The FA mentioned that [the PAX1] may have already passed or was very close to death from the medical professionals' initial observations. The medical professionals were requesting the use of the Enhanced Emergency Medical Kit (EEMK.) Around this time we [advised ATC of our situation.] Later on the ground I was told that one of the doctors who administered a drug from the EEMK that helps to counteract overdoses; said [the PAX1] reacted to it positively. One doctor had to hold [the PAX1's] head in such a way so that she would not choke; while the other was trying to get some vital signs with not much success. I talked with the FAs numerous times and even one of the doctors who said that it very difficult to get any pulse and that we needed to land as soon as possible. In between all my conversations with the FAs; I was in touch with our dispatcher and MedLink. MedLink requested information about [the PAX1] many times and I replied each time. But VHF communication was difficult. I heard their request loud and clear but my transmission was broken and unreadable. I tried a different frequency but had basically the same issue. Frustrated with the communication issues with MedLink; and limited information from the cabin; [knowing] that we need to land ASAP; I decided that I needed to look at a few diversion airports. ABQ had a line of thunderstorms between us and the airport. Dispatch discouraged us from diverting into PUB. COS was my next closest airport so I advised dispatch that we were diverting in to COS. I heard MedLink ask what the difference between COS and DEN and I responded that it would get us on the ground 15mins sooner. As we flew farther north I could see the approaching thunderstorms near DEN; and thought DEN may not have worked.To compound things as we were diverting into COS; the FAs called the cockpit and notified us of another passenger (PAX2) who fell unconscious and that one of the doctors was attending to this person's ailments; and thought that they may need to use the Automated External Defibrillator (AED) to revive [PAX2]; but they elected not to use the AED. Between the two incapacitated passengers; 3 O2 bottles; an EEMK; and a Sharps Kit were used.Also during descent I could hear the FAs preparing the cabin/galley for landing. I checked in with them approximately 10 minutes before landing to make sure the cabin was ready. The FAs confirmed that the cabin was ready for landing.Once on the ground in COS we expeditiously taxied to the gate where we had the EMTs standing by. At the gate the EMTs were quick to attend to the ill passengers. I was very surprised to witness PAX1 walking off the aircraft; however; with much assistance. The husband insisted that his wife was now able to complete their journey but I refused to allow them any further travel on my flight.I was informed that the other ill passenger [PAX2] who was unconscious was diagnosed with food poisoning the day before and passed out on the flight due to dehydration. She was admitted back on board the flight.

A B737 flight crew were notified while enroute of two ill passengers; one of whom was thought by medical professionals on board; to be very close to death. They diverted and landed in an emergency condition. EMTs were waiting at the gate and successfully treated both passengers.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Total 1380; Flight Crew Type 531

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

It was a beautiful morning to fly at ZZZ. Winds reporting 000 at 00 kts. sky clear visibility +10SM. My student and I taxied to Runway XX with intentions to do some landing practice (pattern work). We did a run up in the 'run up area' at Runway XX and Taxiway XX intersection. The run up was normal; good mag drops; carb heat worked; engine gauges green; vacuum suction at 5hg; and alternator charging etc. We pulled up to the [Runway] XX hold short line and got our take off clearance; lined up on the runway and applied full power; checked engine instruments on the takeoff roll; and they were all still in the green. Airspeed came alive; at 55 kts. and we rotated. Everything seemed normal; after we reached approximately 500 ft. MSL I heard a change in the sound of the engine. I then glanced at the tachometer and noticed the RPM had dropped approximately 400RPM. When I saw that; I reached for the throttle pushing it forward thinking the student may have pulled it back a little on accident. I then realized the throttle was all the way forward. I immediately pulled the throttle to idle and the prop completely stopped. That's when I knew this was real. I looked in front of me and didn't see a good place to safely land the aircraft; so I opted for a field to my right on the northeast side of the airport. Everyone was okay and no damage was done to the aircraft.

During a flight training lesson at ZZZ; we lined up on Runway XX and came to a complete stop. I was on controls; we went full power with brakes; then released brakes and began the take off roll. After rotation my Instructor instructed me to put in more right rudder; because I was to the left of the runway; and to put the nose down some to get to 80 kts. The plane was at about 70 kts. I was focused on trimming the plane and getting my nose down some to get to the correct climb speed. Towards the end of the runway I felt the plane drop some. The Instructor immediately took over controls. I am not 100% sure; but I think we were about 500 ft. on the altimeter. The Instructor pushed on the throttle; I guess to make sure throttle was full. The prop stopped and the instructor called Mayday Mayday Mayday. The Instructor banked the plane steep towards the field to the right of the runway. The instructor landed the plane in the field right outside the airport fence. I do not think there was enough runway to land on the runway and I do not think we would have made it above the power lines if the instructor would have tried to land straight ahead. I honestly do not know what caused the engine failure. During preflight inspection I did not see anything abnormal. There were 6 qts. of oil; I did not see any oil leaks; the wires looked fine; the belts on the spinner was there and had tension; there were no contaminates when I checked the fuel 3 sumps; both fuel tanks were at the tab which is 17 gal. per tank. Fuel selector was on the left tank; electric fuel tank was on. I am not sure how the problem arose or contributing factors. I think my Instructor made a great judgment call and grateful that we landed safely.

PA-28 flight crew reported an uneventful forced landing shortly after takeoff due to engine failure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

We arrived at the aircraft and noted in the logbook there had been maintenance done on the fuel tanks for a fuel indication issue. I looked at the fuel quantity and noticed the right side (which had been the problem tank) indicated more fuel than the left. I remember it showing about 1;600 in the left tank and about 2;200 in the right. We needed 6;800 per release so I added 3;000 LBS of fuel. I closed the refuel valve on the right tank briefly to let the left tank fill to balance with the right. After fueling was done we were showing 7;000 on board; equally balanced. Before takeoff we had to once again transfer fuel to balance the tanks; but I don't remember which direction we had to transfer at that time. When we were cleared for takeoff we had about 3;500 per side. During the takeoff roll I noticed the aircraft pulling to the left when I transferred controls to the SIC. He rotated for takeoff and noticed the plane banking left like the fuel as out of balance. We then both noticed the right tank quantity had dropped to about 3;200 LBS and was fluctuating. He then re-trimmed the plane to compensate for the perceived imbalance. As we continued the departure both tanks indicated as balanced but it was still flying like it was out of balance. We elected to level at 21;000 feet to troubleshoot. I transferred fuel from the left to the right even though it indicated an imbalance. This seemed to help the control imbalance but it was now indicating an opposite imbalance. I attempted to contact the company on multiple iPhones but could not get the Wi-Fi to work. Eventually it connected and I called the Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) to explain our issue. At this time I was unsure how much fuel we had in the right tank for sure; and thought we probably had less than indicated. I informed the ACP we would probably need to stop short of our destination and thought maybe airport ZZZ would work and I would call him back. We made some more calculations with the fuel and decided we didn't want to go all the way to ZZZ either. We were thinking of ZZZ1 but when I called the ACP again he asked if we could go to ZZZ2. We decided that would work as well and climbed to 28;000 feet and got a new release and clearance to ZZZ2. As the flight continued the right tank quantity seemed to correct itself and decreased closer to the same amount as the left. We landed at ZZZ2 with about 2;200 LBS indicating in the tanks and with our calculated fuel burn it should have been closer to 3;000 LBS remaining. If the landing fuel was correct we were about 700 LBS less than we should have been. Had we continued to [our destination] I estimate we would have landed with about 1;300 remaining (our min reserve fuel) so I feel we made the right choice to divert not knowing the exact quantity of fuel in our right tank.I should have been more concerned with the existing imbalance of the fuel when I arrived at the aircraft. I dismissed it because maintenance had been working on the fuel system and signed it off as released. Also; if I were to encounter this again I would request topping off the wings so I can personally verify the accuracy of the fuel load following maintenance. I do not know the procedure the mechanic used to confirm the amount was accurate so I would like to verify it myself from now on.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

HS-125-800XPC flight crew reported fuel quantity and imbalance issues in flight that caused them to divert.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Referring [to] log page; found damage to inboard thrust reverser heat shield and subsequently found bore scope plug on engine not installed. Log page indicates bore scope plug locking feature was not working correctly. Referring [to] work card; performed the required inspections for the re-installation of bore scope plug as required.

Technician reported that engine bore scope plug was not installed correctly; causing damage to engine heat shields.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Master Warning illuminated with CAB ALT annunciation came on through 14;000 feet.

First Officer reported a Master Warning light with CAB ALT light and elected to make a rapid descent and air turn back to a precautionary landing.


The crew and I finished loading the outbound and I was standing by the push tug ready to dispatch. After getting the signal from my lead and crew that we are ready to dispatch I made the call to the flight deck and the flight deck responded to stand by they are calling for clearance. Flight deck called back stating clearance approved do I want the brakes? I also was ready and said yes cleared to push release brakes; here we go and I proceeded with the push *NOTE: standard push from gate XX on a wide body is partial alpha taxiway to the north line dispatch; I proceeded with the push and noticed Aircraft Y on Tow in the south line international side so I slowed the push for caution. The aircraft was a 777 I believe. At that time the Aircraft Y on Tow was approximately gate XX approaching gate XY at that time I am committed with my push already towards alpha. Then all of a sudden I observed the Aircraft Y on Tow accelerated to get ahead of my push and turned onto alpha taxiway causing me to interrupt my dispatch. If it was not for my experience and training I identified the aircraft as a larger 777 with a longer wingspan; then; I suddenly slowed to stop and reversed my tow just in time thus avoiding a major wing clip accident and possible passenger injury.

Ramp employee reported another tow team with an aircraft in tow accelerated to get ahead; requiring evasive action to avoid a ground collision.


Air Traffic Control Military 8; Air Traffic Control Radar 20

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing; Procedure

I was working enroute Center for two hours and 20 minutes with heavy to moderate traffic without the help of a D side. Sector XX.  Normally this would not be a problem but during the coronavirus situation there is a skeleton crew of controllers in the area and we are short staffed. Training in the area was also underway.  Also; we had no management in the area acting as a Supervisor.  We had a Controller-in-Charge position staffed by one of the FPLs in the area.  After working 2 hours of heavy traffic I began to tire and was transposing callsigns and missing check-ins.I asked one of the controllers working another less busy sector to swap positions with me.  I just could not work that volume of traffic anymore. The Controller was kind enough to swap with me. I was mentally drained. The culture does not generally allow for complaints of this type.  After my break (which I am on right now) I will do it all over again.  If this continues the risk grows of a Controller contributing to error within the airspace. This is normally not necessary.  This is a very busy time of the year and it is unbelievable that the FAA would allow this lack of staffing and allow the normal flow of traffic.  This situation routinely happens at ZZZ (Center) in Area X; I am not sure about the other areas; but I have heard similar things from other controllers.

Center Controller reported becoming fatigued due to working heavy traffic for an extended period of time and cited low staffing levels as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 360; Flight Crew Total 18900; Flight Crew Type 1230

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 700

We were performing air work southeast of ZZZ in the 10;000 to 17;000 of altitude block. I had just given trainee nose high unusual attitude when we received traffic warning from ADS-B in/out avionics installed in aircraft. I looked out left side of aircraft (direction of traffic warning) observed airliner slightly below our altitude. I took control of aircraft and rolled wings level and began a climb to avoid airliner.

L-39 flight crew reported a NMAC during unusual attitude training.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Air Carrier X was cleared for takeoff. I leaned back to look to the east; around the LCL 5 RADAR scopes at a prior departure and returned to the ASDE. I crossed the aircraft at Taxiway D and then S without scanning the runway. The AMASS alerted and I instructed the aircraft at Taxiway S and D to hold their position and then went to Air Carrier X and saw that the aircraft was aborting and I confirmed that he was. I then instructed Air Carrier X to exit the runway and contact ground. I cannot figure out why I did what I did. I somehow confused Air Carrier Y the previous departure with Air Carrier X. I used the techniques for visual reminders with the flight progress strips that are prescribed and I feel that they are good. At ZZZ we cross our own runway's. This puts us on an island as far as teamwork goes. It is difficult at times to be attentive to what is happening at the position just a couple of feet away. At the time of this event; the controllers on either side of me did not recognized what I had done. I cannot say that the outcome of this would have been different if I was working LCL 3 and 4 combined or not. Would I have been a little more engaged do to the increased workload; or not? I also cannot see the departures when we are in an East configuration due to the height of the RADAR displays blocking the view.

Local Controller described an aborted takeoff event when he cleared a landing aircraft to cross the departure runway. The reporter acknowledged that he confused the two aircraft being controlled.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

There were severe turbulence reports up higher and ATC had us at much lower altitudes from reports but we still encountered moderate/severe turbulence which started at FL220. Aircraft rolled right and left excessively and had to turn the autopilot off and regain control. I used a fair amount of time to access aircraft controls; hand flying and not forcing the issue and was also not sure if this was a turbulence issue alone. Aircraft has an on going deferred issue with the number two rudder PCU inoperative which was a real concern and complicated our assessment. The initial goal was to fly the airplane; navigate and communicate to ATC our issue. But we had a secondary communication issue; not knowing that the number one VHF radio started dropping out the last two digits in both frequency windows. Trying to communicate with ATC was a real issue; we lost communication with TRACON and went through four frequency's trying to relay our problem and inform them we would not be descending on schedule for crossing restriction. This radio issue continued with Approach and Tower; but we were now aware of it and when frequency changed we corrected it. We initiated a right turn talked with ATC; got vectors; reported the severe turbulence; advised that we would not comply with crossing restrictions because of the turbulence without a turn. TRACON seemed very satisfied with our decision and had no issues and we did not declare an emergency. We were vectored in for a visual approach with normal landing and park at gate. At gate we informed Maintenance of the moderate/severe turbulence and the number one VHF radio. Phone call was made to the Duty Manager; TRACON; and the North East Chief Pilot later in the day. Seat belt sign was on; no injuries at all. The aircraft did not overspeed; inspection was done and no damage found. The VHF radio was replaced. I have checked the box that I exercised Captain's Authority because while regaining control and accessing the aircraft; I knew not descending initially would be in conflict with our ATC clearance.

Air Carrier Captain reports being dispatched with an inoperative rudder PCU and encountering moderate to severe turbulence. The aircraft rolls excessively and he questions the role the inoperative PCU may be playing. VHF communication problems are also reported.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During engine start First Officer introduced fuel at N2 20% and N1 rotation but no ITT (Inter Turbine Temperature) increase. He then mentioned this looks strange [to] which I replied looks like a hung start; let's go ahead and shutdown and motor the engine. A call came over the apron frequency; saying our engine was on fire. I said let's continue to motor; First Officer said hey we are already at 60 seconds. Just after the First Officer said that another call came in saying you guys are still on fire on the apron frequency. At that point the First Officer suggested we run the Emergency Damage/Engine Fire On The Ground checklist. We ran the checklist through the fire push then we got another [call] saying fire still coming from the engine and fuel on the ground. At that point we fired both bottles into the right engine. I told apron to call the fire trucks fearing the fire was not out and fuel on the ground and the safety of the passengers. Fire trucks came. I made my second announcement letting the passengers know the fire trucks were only taking a look to make sure we are good to return to the gate. Firefighters examined the engine and only noticed black smoke; no fire. They followed us to the gate under tow. After the event the Fireman said he thinks that firing our bottles was the best decision; and that was the end of his narrative. Dispatch was notified and Operations. Arrival announcement was made as normal. Passengers didn't seem shaken; were only concerned when they'll reach [destination] and when is the next flight.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported firing both bottles into #2 engine after they experienced a hung start and an engine fire on the ramp after pushback.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[We were on] a ferry flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ. Upon arrival I as Pilot in Command (PIC) was informed that [the carrier] did not inform United States Customs and Border Patrol. A Customs Officer bordered the airplane and advised me as PIC; I had landed without a clearance. He took my Airman Certificate number and wrote it down and advised me I am personally liable up to $5000 in fines. I am writing this report to clear my certificate number from any violation or sanction. A process should be created and followed to prevent future incidents such as this one.

B767-300 Captain reported that US Customs had not been advised by the carrier of an arriving ferry flight from an international departure point.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 370

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on a training flight to complete my Bi-annual Flight Review when a near miss collision occurred with a [single engine turboprop]. My aircraft is a [homebuilt/experimental] and we had been out performing maneuvers when we returned to my home airport of Greeley Weld (GXY). As we flew to GXY I listened to the ATIS and the winds favored runway 17. I was west of the airport and maneuvered to fly south of GXY in order to enter the runway 17 left downwind. While flying to GXY we heard an aircraft that was ahead of us entering the runway 17 pattern. We also heard the [single engine turboprop] call that he was on the VOR approach and was 2 miles NE of the GILL VOR. As we entered the runway 17 left downwind I was at 5500 feet altitude and was flying at 100 mph. The airplane ahead of us in the pattern was turning final and there was another airplane that called that they would be entering the pattern behind us. No further reports came from the [single engine turboprop]. I flew the downwind 3/4 mile east of runway 17 and maintained 5500 feet. About mid-runway the [single engine turboprop] filled the entire wind screen climbing in front of us from our lower right to our upper left. We never saw the [single engine turboprop] climbing in front of us until it appeared and I would estimate it crossed in front of us within 100 feet distance. The [single engine turboprop] was angled roughly toward the center of the airport; turning right; and climbing fast. I saw the [single engine turboprop] continue climbing behind and to my left. I completed the landing on runway 17 with no damage and taxied to my hangar without incident.  My flight review was completed and signed off. During the flight debriefing the instructor verified that I was at the correct altitude the entire downwind. The VOR approach calls for a minimum altitude of 5300 feet and the missed approach calls for a left turn. We have no idea why he climbed in front of us in a right hand turn.

The pilot of a small aircraft reported a near mid air collision with a single engine turboprop aircraft that performed a missed approach from the VOR-A Approach into Greeley Weld; CO.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.3

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Declared Emergency

Well I am not sure how to fill out this report; however this information needs to be put out to pilots/NBAA/NASA/ALPA and especially other controllers.  I did not work a single one of the aircraft that had an emergency.  I am simply one of the controllers on our area safety team and believe this event needs to be investigated.  On [date removed] there was a significant weather event at ZJX.  A stalled cold/warm front had been moving across the area southeast bound very slowly.   This is not uncommon for this time of year and we had many center wide TMI's in place to make the traffic complexity manageable considering the weather and increased volume due to holiday travel.     There was an odd meteorological event that took place causing multiple aircraft emergencies all in the same sector and all in a period of about 5 hours.  According to the pilots there was a 30 degree temperature change at altitude FL360-FL430 on the edge of the front.  This is significant at altitudes such as this because aircraft are usually in the top of their operating envelope for performance at these altitudes before engine anti-icing or turbulence become a factor.  Multiple aircraft experienced loss of engine power; loss of pressurization and engine icing.  What we do know is that from about a five hour period there were 6 emergencies in the central area alone.  There were multiple other emergencies throughout the center that had to do with pressurization/engine failure/lost power. I am bringing this to the attention of [Name removed] not because we continued to allow aircraft to fly into this area but simply because we had no information available to us to warn the pilots.  In most weather related emergencies turbulence/icing/lightning are issues.  Even in areas of CAT; SIGMETS are usually disseminated.  So we usually have some indication of potential hazards.  The only information we had was an area of moderate to heavy precipitation.  This happened in ZJX in 2009 as well.  A significant line of weather with dramatic pressure / temperature change and there were multiple pressurization emergencies.  One controller had more than 6 in a row.   Pilot training (Advisory circular);Controller training.  Investigate the hazard by NASA. Not to just assume these things happen.  Notification of potential hazards to flight via NOTAMs; FSS and the SIGMET/PIREP service.  Briefings to the user group of potential hazards associated with cold fronts create potential power loss/pressurization issues.  I only want this phenomenon to be made known.  It happens rarely but when it does there is a significant amount of risk introduced into the system that could be mitigated.  Similar to the micro-burst situation in the 80s; we didn't know if it existed for sure.  I believe this was a similar event.  Without this information being disseminated to the users there is potential for loss of life.  I am happy to disclose an identified copy of this report if needed and to help answer any questions you may have.  Thank you all!

ZJX Controller describes situation related to severe weather that has six aircraft declaring emergency because of the weather.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 50

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 315; Flight Crew Type 6.5

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

We performed the pre-flight inspection of the aircraft and found no discrepancies. I was functioning as the CFI for the pilot flying who was a certificated private pilot; instrument rated; and with a prior endorsement for complex and high-performance aircraft (ASEL) operation.After our engine run-up; we were cleared for take-off. The aircraft accelerated normally however shortly after we began our takeoff roll; the nose gear retracted and the propeller struck the runway. The fuel and electrical were immediately shut off and the Tower was notified. We immediately noted that the gear handle was in the up position. At no time did either pilot move the gear handle. The aircraft checklist was used for all phases of flight; however; the up-position of the gear handle was apparently missed. I believe that somehow the gear was placed in the up position prior to our flight and this was simply overlooked by both of us.Contributing factors included not following the initial checklist to the letter which called for confirming that the gear handle was in the down-position and the incorrect expectation that an aircraft which had been flown earlier in the day would not be expected to have the gear-handle in the up-position.

[No substantive additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.]

When the Instructor and Student pilots' aboard a C172RG failed to note the gear switch was in the up position prior to starting their takeoff roll they experienced the collapse of the nose gear and a sudden engine stoppage when the prop struck the runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 118; Flight Crew Type 524

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was the Captain on Aircraft X (ZZZ-ZZZZ) on date.  I just wanted to give some details regarding ZZZZ's refusal to allow us to enter the country without a negative COVID test; and to give a well-deserved kudos to those who helped us.Upon arrival in ZZZZ; we were walking towards the customs area when we were approached by a man from the 'health department.' He asked us for our COVID-19 test results; which (according to our information) were not required for crews in ZZZZ. When we told him that we didn't have a test result; he said we could not proceed further; as a negative COVID test was a requirement for entry into Country.Two airline employees arrived to assist us - the Station Manager X and another employee Person Y.  Both were outstanding and went above and beyond to try to help us.  They spent considerable time attempting to explain to the health department official that crews were exempt from the COVID requirement.  This did not matter to the official; who insisted that 'All passengers must have a negative COVID test prior to entry.'   Manager X explained that we were crew; not passengers; and therefore were subject to the crew exemption.  He stated that he understood that there was an exemption; but he refused to change his position and stated that we couldn't proceed.Several calls were made by Manager X; attempting to get someone to explain to the health department official that we were exempt.  Someone then called the official on his cell phone; resulting in a somewhat spirited conversation.  After the call; the official decided that if we'd had a COVID test in the last 14 days we would be allowed to enter.  When we said we hadn't; he said if we'd had the vaccine; he would let us in; but of course we hadn't had that either.  Manager X pulled us aside and said that this official was simply trying to make a name for himself; and she again apologized; even though it was clearly not her fault.  It occurred to us later that perhaps he was fishing for a bribe; but while that's very common in small GA airplanes; I've never had that happen as part of an airline crew. Unfortunately; I was not able to get the name of the health official.By this point; we had the Flight Operations Manager involved; and he was working on getting us seats on the plane back to ZZZ as it was clear we weren't going to be allowed into ZZZZ.  Manager X and Person Y were both doing an outstanding job of keeping us informed since neither the F/O nor I spoke [the foreign language].We proceeded back to the gate while Flight Operations Manager got our seats worked out and worked with dispatch to make sure the outbound crew didn't leave without us.  As we were leaving; the health department official made one last offer - we could proceed; but he would 'Send a doctor to your hotel room to give you a COVID 19 quick test.'  A quick discussion with my FO; confirmed my thoughts that this was a bad idea.  Needless to say; we declined his offer.  When we arrived at the airplane; FO was physically standing at the bottom of the stairs to make sure that they wouldn't close the door before we arrived.While it was a frustrating endeavor; we couldn't have navigated this successfully without Flight Operations Manager; Station Manager X; Person Y; Dispatch and the outbound crew of Aircraft Y.  The crew desk was on the ball as well as I received a couple of pairing change alerts as we walked to the gate.  My FO; did an outstanding job; especially considering it was his first trip after OE.

Air carrier Captain reported they were not allowed into a foreign country due to not having proof of negative COVID-19 test results; nor proof of having been vaccinated.


Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft; Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

When we take arrival of A319/A320 aircraft; these aircraft always arrive with the number 1 engine (Captain's side) running. The pilot's procedure is to leave this engine running until the passenger loading bridge is moved into position and the ground power is hooked up and turned on.This creates a situation where the potential for aircraft hose ingestion is increased. Additionally; this requires that one of the wing walkers remain giving the 'Engine Running' signal for the safety of [any] passersby; thus slowing the offload process. The team lead cannot give the 'Safe to Approach' signal because this engine is still running; but in spite of this the wing walker on aircraft right tends to take it upon themselves to open the pits and move the belt loaders into position without that signal. Also; we find that the main cabin door is opened and passengers begin to deplane while the engine on that side is still running; exposing them to undue noise.Airbus aircraft are the only aircraft exercising this procedure.

A Ramp Agent reported A319/A320 aircraft left engines remain running after gate arrival until the jetway and ground power are connected. During this delay passengers are exposed to engine noise deplaning and ramp agents become impatient then approach the aircraft with an engine still running.


Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Staffing

Everybody up the line from me failed to do their jobs and created an unsafe environment for ORD traffic. Out of the 4 arrival sectors into C90; I was the only sector with weather on my approach. I made my Supervisor aware that the small holes in the weather I was depicting were quickly closing; and inquired as to why I still had a long stream of ORD traffic coming towards my sector. I commented that the traffic should be rerouted to another arrival sector; any other arrival sector; as none of them had weather as I did. The Supervisor did absolutely nothing. My D-Side and I did the best we could to coordinate with C90; as the pilots were deviating further and further off of the arrival; getting close to departure sectors. In one instance; we coordinated two aircraft deviating east through a departure sector; and the coordination was successful with C90; as they had no departing traffic at the time. While I was coordinating with C90; my D-Side; and the pilots; the Supervisor was in my ear telling me how to run my traffic; and had apparently decided that I had been correct all along and we should give the pilots last minute reroutes to another sector. I advised him that coordination had already been done with C90 for those two airplanes; and transferred communication to C90. Moments later; C90 called and put us in the hold until 'we could figure out the best plan of action for our aircraft.' It became quickly apparent that there was no plan. The TMU did nothing to reroute this traffic; and neither did the supervisor despite my concerns that things were going to go south very quickly. At that time; I had several ORD arrivals in my sector; all deviating around weather so I had to re-clear all the aircraft back to the arrival to hold.  An A320 at the time was approximately 6 miles ahead of a Phenom 100; both aircraft going to the same fix to hold.  The Phenom was level at 160; I believe. The A320; ahead of the Phenom; same direction was leaving 170 for 120. Conflict Alert was activated and at that time and I realized that the A320 had significantly reduced his speed in anticipation of entering the holding pattern; so the Phenom was closing the gap between them. I told the A320 to expedite through 150 and report leaving 150; which he did; but there may have been one hit inside the bubble; if at all. To be quite honest; I was far too busy to be overly concerned about 4.95 mile separation instead of 5 mile separation; especially since; while working all the traffic that should have not been inside my airspace in the first place; getting slammed in the hold. Vectoring and amending altitudes of every single airplane to try to get them back to the arrival holding fix; having my Supervisor give me contradictory instructions to what had already been coordinated; I also had a formation flight breakup in my airspace. Recommendation; I understand it is a weekend day; and people may be in an end of the week 'lull' but we have jobs to do. The TMU should have been the first line of defense and had the foresight to reroute these airplanes further out so that they were not being vectored around the only weather in the arrival sectors and flying through departure sectors; they failed. The second line of defense should have been my Supervisor when I told him plain and simple that sending the airplanes through my airspace was not the best of ideas. It became apparent that nobody cared. I'm not sure exactly what I can recommend to rectify this type of event. You can't teach common sense.

ZAU Controller experienced a loss of separation event when handling heavy ORD arrival traffic was complicated due to weather deviations; the reporter claiming the Supervisor and TMU failed in their responsibilities.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 281; Flight Crew Type 18

We were on a short cross country flight during which we were practicing commercial training maneuvers and procedures. At one point my instructor told me to shut down the right engine; which I did; but when she told me to restart it the engine wouldn't restart. At that point we had unsuccessfully attempted all the restart procedures we shut it down and secured it. We then called Approach and asked for priority handling to a nearby airport where we made a single engine landing.

When the instructor pilot and her commercial student aboard a BE-76 were unable to restart the right engine after a training engine shut down exercise they diverted to a nearby airport and landing safely on the remaining engine.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Departing on RNAV SID departure. Nav Mode; VNAV Mode; and autopilot armed. In a turn to the right on departure SID. Noticed the amber low speed cue moving up airspeed tape. Saw pitch limiters come up. Throttles were full forward. Disconnected autopilot in order to lower nose. When autopilot disconnected; momentarily got stick shaker. Pushed nose down. I believe captain put in flaps. We continued on course with no deviations. Low speed cue lowered; speed increased to 230 (our limit on the departure). Reengaged autopilot. Should have started scanning sooner once I saw low speed cue climbing on speed tape; instead of assuming the automation would handle it.

EMB-175 First Officer reports getting slow during the first turn after takeoff with the flaps retracted. In VNAV/LNAV with the autopilot armed; the speed continued to decay until the autopilot is turned off and the nose is lowered.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft X came onto my frequency; enroute to ZZZ. I gave him an initial descent and reviewed the NOTAMs for ZZZ (where he was landing). I observed a number of new NOTAMs that I had not seen before. Among the NOTAMs was this one:'ZZZ 07/025 ZZZ RWY 1/19 ..CLSD.. 1507[day]XD22-1508[day]XD20EST'I asked the pilot if he had the current weather and NOTAMs and for his approach request. He replied that he had weather and NOTAMs and was planning a visual approach. Since the pilot said he had the NOTAMs; I confirmed with him that he was aware of the NOTAM for the runway closure. He replied that he was not familiar with it. I decided to read him that NOTAM and the other NOTAMs since there was a disconnect.The way the NOTAM is written is ambiguous. The 'EST' at the end of the termination time caused me to think 'Eastern Standard Time.' I questioned the time of the time of the NOTAM since there was no 'Z' or 'EST' next to it. I told the pilot we would look into the situation and let him know.I asked the CIC to investigate the NOTAM. He called the airport manager who confirmed that the time was LOCAL time (XD:20). Since it was approximately XA:30; we understood this to mean that the runway was still open and would be open for approximately 3 more hours. I passed this information on to the pilot who intended to land on that runway. The pilot cancelled IFR a number of miles away from the airport and I terminated radar services and issued a frequency change.Another aircraft; Aircraft Y; on the ground at ZZZ called for his clearance and told me he was planning to depart runway 28 since the primary runway was closed. I passed on the information we received from the airport manager to Aircraft Y about the runway being open for a few more hours. Prior to obtaining his release; Aircraft Y called on the frequency again to report that he witnessed Aircraft X change runway at the last minute because runway 1/19 was indeed closed. Aircraft Y told me that the Aircraft X was on approximately a 2 mile final and had to abandon his approach to landing and circle to the other runway to avoid hitting personnel and equipment on the runway.Another aircraft; a VFR Cessna; who was flying over ZZZ reported that he observed 'a dozen vehicles at the approach end of runway 19'. Change the format for NOTAMs to remove any reference to 'EST' as this can easily be confused with 'Eastern Standard Time'. In this case; the issuer meant for 'EST' to mean Estimated. This ambiguity caused a lot of confusion. Apparently even the airport manager was confused about the start time of the NOTAM since he told the CIC the runway was open until XD20 Local time.Better communication needs to be put in place when runways are closed. There should be no doubt or confusion about the status of a runway. The airport manager should have known the runway was closed at that time and should have been very specific in stating that the runway was currently closed.

While working as CIC the controller asked me to help clarify a NOTAM. The NOTAM stated that ZZZ RWY 01/19 would be closed for a week starting today. The NOTAM ended with EST after the published times. I called the Airport Manager to determine whether the closure had started or not; as we were close to the published time. The Airport Manager advised me that the runway was open; not closed; and that it would close at XD20 local. I informed the controller the runway was open. The controller informed the pilot and switched the aircraft to advisory frequency. We then heard from the pilot that someone told him on UNICOM that he could not land on his intended runway of 01/19. The pilot landed on another runway and we were then told that there were a dozen vehicles on the approach end of runway 19. I informed the OMIC [Operational Manager in Charge] of the situation. Runway closures should be more prominently displayed when in effect; not just buried in the NOTAMs.

Controllers report of the letters 'EST' in the end of a NOTAM and the confusion it cost. The Controller thought EST meant Eastern Standard Time; but actually meant estimated. The Controller had aircraft going into the airport to a closed runway thinking it was open. The Controller checked with the Airport Manager who said it was open. An aircraft had to make a missed approach due to men and equipment on the runway.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

I have noticed that while wearing the face mask for prolonged periods; I feel my self gasping for air and sweating. Also; I see myself having a dry nose which leads to a runny nose while on the aircraft. Once off the aircraft; the symptoms pass. The hyperventilating is my main concern; I can't catch my breath like normal and it's a grave concern at this point.

Flight Attendant reported experiencing physiological issues after wearing a face mask for prolonged periods.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 298; Flight Crew Type 16

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Our aircraft was a Diamond DA20. It is not IFR qualified; however; multiple other instructors advised to file IFR flight plan for training purposes and just advise ATC of the aircraft. On the initial climb; there were clouds in the vicinity; but rest of the route was clear below 9;000 ft. Our cruise altitude was 6;000 ft. At 4;000 ft; ATC instructed us to climb to 6;000 ft. As the clouds got closer and unsure if we were going to clear them; I advised ATC of the aircraft certification and that we may need a vector around. Previous days to this; it was a 'ok copy no problem; let us know if you need something'. Tonight it became an issue and the controller did not agree/understand. I advised that both pilots are IFR capable; just the aircraft is certified VMC only. He then instructed me to contact [ATC] at the conclusion of my flight. My student and I discussed the matter. I should have applied what I was taught; but went on word of mouth happenings from other instructors. I am fully aware of the rules now and will comply with all policies and procedures and no longer file IFR in a VMC only aircraft. I was not intending on breaking any rules; just simply doing it so my student could get more experience talking with air traffic control. I will ensure I go back to the flight school and advise everyone about this matter and that we cannot file IFR in a VFR only aircraft.

DV20 flight instructor reported incorrectly filing an IFR flight plan in a VFR only aircraft.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were on the KLNDR2 RNAV ARRIVAL into DFW just prior to DIETZ at 11;000 FT when we encountered some extreme wake turbulence. The wake turbulence rolled the aircraft; pitched downward; and disconnected the autopilot. We immediately informed ATC of the situation and started to level the aircraft at approximately 10;700 FT. ATC immediately gave us a descent to 8;000 FT so we continued on down. We were told that we were six miles in trail of a 737. The event occurred due to not enough separation between us and the 737. After speaking with ATC on the telephone; they did not think that a 737 wake could be that strong. I believe more separation would avoid future events.

EMB-145 Captain reported 'extreme' wake turbulence six miles in trail of a B737 on arrival into DFW.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 8155; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

We were being radar vectored by Spokane Approach Control for the visual approach to Runway 21 at night in VMC conditions. We were cleared by Approach Control to descend to 9;000 feet MSL. Before reaching 9;000 feet we were cleared to 6;500 feet MSL. We discussed that the MSA for our sector (southeast) was 5;300 feet and that the EGPWS display didn't show any threats. We continued the descent and leveled off at 6;500 feet. The EGPWS still did not show any threats while level at 6;500. A few minutes after leveling at 6;500 (approximately 20 NM southeast of the airport); the EGPWS highest elevation number on the ND map turned yellow and we immediately got an EGPWS 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up' warning. No EGPWS caution was issued prior to the warning. No red or yellow terrain was ever displayed on the ND map. We immediately executed a CFIT recovery maneuver and leveled off at 7;500 feet MSL. We did not notice if radio altitude was displayed during the event. We immediately notified ATC of the EGPWS terrain warning and that we were level at 7;500 feet. ATC responded by asking if we received the warning while descending to 6;500 feet. We replied that we were in level flight at 6;500 feet when the warning occurred and they said that they showed 6;500 feet as a 'good altitude' for the area we were in. The rest of the approach and landing were completed without incident. After landing; we entered the event in the aircraft maintenance logbook because we were unable to definitively determine that the warning was valid and we wanted to ensure that any potential issue with the EGPWS system was investigated by aircraft maintenance.

A300 Captain reported receiving an EGPWS terrain warning on a night visual approach to GEG airport. It is not clear whether this was a valid warning or an equipment malfunction.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1100

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was being vectored for the ILS 30L approach to CPS. While approaching the final approach fix; and before being established on the final approach course; I declared a missed approach. I told the Controller that my GPS failed to display the required final approach course. I was vectored by the Controller while I re-configured the GPS approach display. Following this; I informed Control I was prepared to begin the approach once more. This second time; the approach was concluded without incident.

Pilot reported their GPS failed while on an approach.