Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Ferry flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. After takeoff from ZZZ; I retracted the gear and tapped the brakes to stop the wheel rotation. I did not realize that the left caliper had stuck and had locked the wheel at this time. Upon landing at ZZZ1 on Runway 13 the left brake caliper was locked up and would not release. This caused the aircraft to start to skid sideways to the left and ultimately finished with a slow ground loop. There was zero damage to the aircraft; and after stopping I tapped the brakes a couple times and the left caliper released. Upon inspection; it was noted that the caliper had some corrosion and did not retract to release the left brake.

Pilot flying SeaRey aircraft encountered seized brake upon landing.


The Center went to DARC that evening against the recommendations of the West Area workers since there was a line of weather moving towards the center during the course of the late night shift. Because of the location of this weather; I believe that some of the aircraft were off their original routes after deviating. There was a lack of flight plan information being given out to the controllers from ETMS strips during the busiest time of the shift. All the info on aircraft was being manually coordinated through the D-Side from ZMP and ZKC to us. There was also a computer glitch that showed two aircraft coming from ZMP whom we started tracks on swapping beacon codes. Therefore we had to cancel tracks and start them on new beacon codes. This happened twice. When controllers tell the supervisors that they would not recommend going to DARC during weather moving into range; they should seriously consider rescheduling the computer going down.

ZAU Controller described a supervisory decision to change to DARC operations with weather moving coupled with other computer anomalies; the reporter suggesting supervisors heed controllers recommendations regarding DARC scheduling.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

The 757 fleet (and possibly others) has a deferral that allows the aircraft to operate for a specific number of cycles if a passenger cell phone or other electronic device falls down a gap in the cabin sidewall into the cargo pit and cannot be located. Maintenance usually tries to look for the phone; to include disassembling some of the cargo pit panels - but if they can't find it in a 'reasonable' amount of time then a deferral is created and additional flights are authorized.The FAA website says this about devices with lithium batteries: 'Devices containing lithium metal batteries or lithium-ion batteries; including - but not limited to - smartphones; tablets; cameras and laptops; should be kept in carry-on baggage. If these devices are packed in checked baggage; they should be turned completely off; protected from accidental activation and packed so they are protected from damage.'We have provisions for Dangerous Goods being shipped as freight; being used by crew on the airplane; as part of installed equipment; and being carried by passengers or crew on their person; in carry-on bags; and in checked bags. There are no Dangerous Goods provisions providing for lost dangerous goods floating around the airplane somewhere.The concern here is the potential for damage and subsequent fire. We won't even let a passenger move a seat if they drop their phone in the seat - yet somehow; it's okay to drop a phone into the cargo area where it could easily be damaged by the cargo loading system or something else? How is this safe? Or even legal? If a lost device with lithium battery gets crushed and catches on fire; we are not going to be able to fight that fire.I'd like to know specifically what kind of risk analysis (if any) was done for this deferral.

B757 Captain reported concerns with the deferral of lost lithium battery powered electronic devices in the cabin.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Sector 82/83 was combined; there was weather south of my airspace in non-radar in Sector 88. The amount of traffic that was routed down L453 and L452 was beyond too much to be able to coordinate properly with other sectors and talk to the aircraft at the same time. I had a hand off come over so I could concentrate on communicating with the aircraft. In the hour that I sat at the sector there was 8 planes routed over L453. L452 had 15 aircraft routed at the same time as the aircraft on the parallel route. This is entirely unreasonable to have that many aircraft filing on those two routes especially when there is weather south of the airspace and side by side cannot be done. The workload was too much for me and the Hand Off Controller. The planes were deviating south and the routes were bad going to their destinations. Many planes had to be re-routed or given an even altitude southbound (IAFDOF) in order to coordinate all of this traffic. Washington Center was late on sending hand offs and giving us wrong for direction aircraft in order to keep them all separated. There were 23 planes in the course of less than an hour that were going southbound. ZDC's TMU should have seen that they were handing off 15 planes to us and given us some time between these aircraft or had a restriction on their board. We do not have the same kind of separation standards that they do in radar and they should know this.   When it is proposed to have as many aircraft as there were over one fix there needs to be a restriction in place so this doesn't happen again. There is weather over the ocean and ZDC should be able to provide at least 10 minutes between planes at altitude. Wrong for direction should only be used as a last resort.

ZNY Controller reports of an overabundance of traffic that is diverting due to weather along two usable routes.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was tasked with [working several] aircraft with autothrottle inop; hgs (Heads-Up Guidance System) display inop; L2 window heat inop and engine control light write up along with the other regular task cards.  While working on [aircraft X] I accomplished step 1 (battery replacement) and since there was no part sent for the second step; I then went to work on [aircraft Y] with window heat and engine control light issues.  Meanwhile got notified that the part for the second step on [aircraft X] (battery charger) had showed up.  Went back to the first plane to complete step 2 for battery charger change.  During removal missed pulling one of the two circuit breakers both labeled battery charger. The charger cable terminal lug contacted and shorted damaging the contact terminal. Notified lead and supervisor of the issue immediately.  Engineering desk was consulted and came to consensus to re-terminate a new contact lug or replace the run for that charger cable. There was a lot of work scheduled for the night.  Parts were not all present at beginning of the shift.  While working between the AOG (Aircraft on Ground) write ups for aircraft [X and Y] I missed pulling one of the breakers labeled battery charger.

A Maintenance Technician neglected to fully remove power from the battery charger; resulting in shorting of the contact terminal that required replacement.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Type 2209

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Upon takeoff from Runway 25 at DEN; we encountered moderate wake turbulence. The aircraft rolled approximately 30-40 degrees right; then left repeatedly for approximately 10 seconds. Full deflection was used on the control wheel in both directions. We took off behind a B-757 which was approximately 3 miles ahead. No injuries or other incidents afterwards.

B737NG Captain reported encountering wake turbulence 3 miles in trail of a B757 shortly after takeoff from DEN.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During descent into our destination the aircraft lost all hydraulic fluid from its right side system. This caused the crew to lose autopilot; powered rudder; yaw damper; and partial spoilers in the air and on the ground; steering and co-pilot brakes. The crew ran appropriate checklists and notified ATC. Long ILS vectors were performed and a full stop landing was performed. All normal checklists were also performed and no aircraft or ATC limits were broken. The crew performed a normal landing in standard configuration (flown by the instructor pilot). Crash response met the crew at the jet and terminated the landing with no negative effects.

Military KC-135 instructor pilot reported the aircraft's right side hydraulic system failed during descent for landing. Checklists were completed followed by an uneventful landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Type 16000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Type 258

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

At the final approach point on the Localizer to Runway 06; I was configured and began descent.  I believe the ceiling was 500 feet at the time of the approach with our LOC minimums at 490 feet or so; so we knew it was going to be very close to minimums.  I had set a higher descent rate than we probably needed and we received a low altitude warning call from the Tower just prior to reaching the missed approach altitude. We acknowledged the call from Tower and they asked us if we had the field in sight. We told them that we were at 500 feet and had the airport in sight. We did cross the MDA at 500 feet with the field in sight. We landed with no difficulties. I think the proper descent rate would have avoided the entire situation. Tower would not have been concerned with our altitude and we would have reached the missed approach altitude at about the same time that we got the field in sight for landing.

The Captain was flying the Localizer 06 due to the G/S being OTS. Visibility was reported two miles and might have been a little better. As we were approaching minimums for the LOC approach; Tower issued a low altitude alert and asked if we had the runway in sight. Initially I responded 'negative.' Just as I said that; I checked my altimeter and called 'minimums.' At that point we both saw the runway; and the Captain responded 'runway in sight; landing.' I reported 'runway in sight' to the Tower; in order to correct my statement given a second or so earlier; and to give them a Pilot report on the visibility. We did not descend below the MDA for the approach until the runway was in sight and descent was necessary for a normal landing. I think the low altitude alert was generated because the initial descent rate initiated by the Pilot Flying was greater than necessary considering the speed; distance; and headwind conditions. This put us down at LOC minimums; farther out from the runway than the point where an aircraft on the ILS would normally be. While we remained in compliance with the legalities of the approach procedure; we could have done a better job with a shallower descent angle to make the approach more stable; and avoid the distraction of the alert from the Tower.

B737-300 flight crew triggered an ATC low altitude alert when they descended steeply on a localizer approach. First Officer cited unfamiliarity with non-precision approaches in older technology aircraft as a contributing factor.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was training at the BEARZ D. Aircraft X was on frequency (don't remember where he departed) at 14;000 to BMI. He stated '14;000 is right in the tops; requesting a climb to VFR-ON-TOP.' The radar trainee was unfamiliar with the procedures and her instructor directed her to use the EDST [En-route Decision Support Tool]. VFR-ON-TOP procedures are indexed on the ZAU reference page; my trainee located the paragraph in the 7110.65 (kudos to whomever compiled the reference page. In this instance; it worked flawlessly and was a great help) and the four of us were able to discuss the VFR-ON-TOP clearance. The trainee fumbled through the phraseology the first time; then I corrected her and showed her the phraseology example listed in the 7110. We had no other traffic and she issued the appropriate clearance. The pilot reported reaching VFR conditions on top; and after corrections from her instructor and me; she issued the appropriate response. 'Roger; maintain VFR.' Aircraft X leveled at 14;500.We initiated a handoff to EON (sector 44) and the R-side transferred communications thusly 'For further VFR flight following; contact Chicago Center 120.12.' My trainee and I discussed VFR on TOP and its applications. I explained that it's an IFR clearance and the appropriate computer entries. Later the EON controller called and questioned Aircraft X's clearance. Based on her explanation; I believe Aircraft X did not fully understand his clearance that after reporting reaching VFR ON TOP and the R-side's clearance 'Maintain VFR;' he was VFR. I don't believe it's clear that while VFR-ON-TOP is an IFR clearance; once the pilot reports on top and is instructed to maintain VFR; whose responsibilities are what? I don't think I've seen phraseology 'Cancellation of IFR received.' I thought it was odd an IFR aircraft requested an OTP clearance; climbed to a VFR altitude; was told to maintain VFR.

ZAU Controller reported issuing a VFR on top clearance and confusion ensued as to what the pilot and Controller responsibilities were.


Rockwell Aero Commander Twin Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An Aero Commander on a 180 degree vector climbing to 9;000 and a CRJ7 on 310 degree vector descending to 6;500. These vectors provided adequate lateral separation. I pointed the CRJ7 out to the Aero Commander and he said that he had him in sight when they were 4-5 miles apart on diverging courses. I then told the Aero Commander to 'maintain visual separation with the CRJ7; when able proceed direct ZZZ.' I left the CRJ7 on the same heading and [with] a clearance of 310 degrees descend and maintain 6;500. The Aero Commander read back something like 'roger we'll miss him going direct ZZZ.' I then told the Aero Commander 'read back visual separation instructions.' The Aero Commander then said something like 'affirmative; we won't hit him going direct ZZZ.' I had my 3 mile 'J' ring up and then edge of the CRJ7's target touched the 3 mile 'J' Ring. The CRJ7 also reported the AC50 insight and the field. Come up with some better solution as to how the visual separation instruction acceptance is supposed to be done by the pilots. If the pilot says Roger is that good enough? If they pilot says Roger we won't hit him is that good enough? Do the pilots need to read back 'call sign will maintain visual separation with the ....' If the last sentence is the case; then the FAA needs to brief the pilots flying in the NAS. A lot of the times I won't clear somebody on course like I did in this situation in conjunction with maintain visual separation instructions because of the confusion with the rules.

TRACON Controller voiced concern regarding the 'Maintain Visual Separation' phraseology and the read back requirements from flight crews; indicating flight crews responses often do not comply with the latest FAA requirements.


Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

While at cruise at 40;000 FT we has a CAS message stating we has lost our autopilot; yaw damper and ventral rudder; a dutch roll started and an emergency descent was initiated and ATC advised of our actions. Aircraft was descended to 10;000 FT where we leveled off and diverted. ATC was advised of same and a normal landing was made. While in the emergency descent ATC was clearing us to flight levels that we could not stop at; we advised ATC to turn us if they needed and they did.

EMB505 Captain at FL400 experiences failure the autopilot followed by the yaw damper and the ventral rudder. An emergency descent is initiated and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 31

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft; Airport; Weather; Human Factors

Landing to take on fuel. A crosswind from the left at 45 degrees was reported on AWOS. Runway in use   is 100 feet wide. Landing I lost directional control. An experienced local pilot later said that strong gusts were occurring at the time of this incident. The resulting ground loop caused the plane to exit the asphalt surface. I felt I had avoided any major damage up to that point. However; as the aircraft left the paved surface; the starboard main gear wheel sank into the dirt. This caused the nose to strike the ground. The aircraft came to a stop with the nose; starboard landing gear; and starboard wing tip supporting the aircraft with the tail about 15 feet off the ground.Major contributing factors were; gusting crosswind. [I perceived the crosswind to be manageable] however did not factor the strong gusting wind. [The lesson learned was to] pay close attention to possible gusting crosswinds. The larger vertical stabilizer on the C-180 contributed to the weather vane action of the aircraft.

C180 pilot reported a loss of control and runway excursion while landing in gusty conditions.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 452

On takeoff; began turn at 1;000 feet to the south traffic warning indicated traffic same altitude. Instructor took controls and began a descending right turn. Instructor reported to Tower and Tower said that airplane was talking to Approach.

SR20 Flight instructor reported a NMAC on climb out.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1980; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While flying IFR in VMC my aircraft we experienced an Airspeed Fault Capsule advisory light and Flight Path Stabilization (FPS) caution light. I attempted to reset the Airspeed Fault Capsule advisory light but was unable to do so for more than a few seconds. My airspeed indicator was reading approximately 90 KIAS while my copilot's was reading 110 KIAS. At this point I had the crew members in the back read the emergency procedure. I followed the procedure to control the axis manually and took our stabilator out of the auto mode; which is required by our operators manual because continued flight above 70 KIAS with the stabilator in the auto mode is unsafe; and slewed it to 0 degrees per our emergency procedure. When I took this action the other pilot was not ready for the aircraft to climb when I slewed the stabilator from 8 degrees down to 0 degrees. This action made the aircraft climb out of our assigned altitude of 11;000 feet but not more than 200 feet above. I made the call to Center that I needed to turn around and return to [departure airport] and that I was not declaring an emergency. I was unable to reach Center and was relaying through my sister ship that was located on the same airway but was at 12;000 feet and 5 or more miles behind me. When we got word from our sister aircraft we started our turn and the aircraft climbed again to approximately 11;400 feet. I believe this to be because the handling characteristics of the aircraft changed due to me slewing the stabilator to 0. After making the turn my airspeed indicator was erratic and was displaying between 0 and 140 KIAS while my copilot's remained steady at 100 to 110 KIAS. I could see our sister aircraft on the airway high and to our right side and that is why Center called a pilot deviation and asked me to contact them when I landed. In hindsight I should have declared an emergency.

UH60 flight crew experienced two altitude excursions after disconnecting the stabilator from the auto mode due to a Flight Path Stabilization caution light. ATC advised of a Pilot Deviation due to the proximity of an accompanying helicopter in trail and 1;000 feet above the reporter's aircraft.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

On climb out at approx 13;000 feet and 310 knots heard a thud and the aircraft rolled slightly left. Captain disconnected autopilot and stated we had a control issue and we should declare an emergency. We were approx 50 miles north of [our departure] and so elected to declare an emergency and return. I checked hydraulics; flight control indications and pressurization and everything appeared normal except for a slight amount of left aileron trim being required for level flight. The handling issue got significantly better as we slowed so we suspected structural damage. As we returned we discussed possible scenarios involving aircraft handling deteriorating as we slowed for landing and how we may handle it. We were initially assigned [the left runway] but requested [the right] due to its longer length. I briefed the flight attendant as per [company SOPs] and informed her to expect a normal landing. As we slowed to 200 knots handling returned to normal and we landed normally. Upon post flight inspection; there was a large section of the thrust reverser that had been ripped off.

During climb out at approximately 13;000 feet and 310 knots we heard a thud and the aircraft rolled slightly to the left. I disconnected the autopilot and stated; 'we have control issue and need to declare an emergency.' We were approximately 50 miles north of [the airport] and elected to declare an emergency and return. I told the FO to check the hydraulics; flight control indications; and pressurization and everything appeared normal except for a slight amount of left aileron trim required for level flight. The FO called the FA; dispatch and operations to let them know we were returning. The FO told the FA we were a Emergency. The handling issue got significantly better as we slowed. We suspected structural damage. As we returned; we discussed possible scenario's involving aircraft handling deteriorating as we slowed for landing and how we may handle it. We were initially assigned [the left runway] but requested [the right] due to it's longer length. Upon post flight inspection; the entire bottom half of the left engine thrust reverser section had been ripped off. We deplaned the passengers and apologized for the inconvenience. We took pictures of the damage; and filled out paper work. Operations told us we have another plane and we could start boarding.

CRJ200 flight crew reported hearing a thud passing 13;000 FT. As the aircraft rolled slightly to the left the Captain corrected with aileron. An emergency is declared and the flight returns to the departure airport; where post flight inspection reveals a large section of the thrust reverser has been ripped off


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 350

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

First of all; I do not know what the local time was at PKMJ. The time/date noted above are Zulu time. Attempting to depart PKMJ. Destination was ZZZ. Cell phones do not work there. Was unable to use HF to pick up oceanic clearance. Aircraft Y also on the ground was having the same problem. I tried to use a satphone to pick up clearance. Discovered no one answers the published 'last chance communications' phone number. I tried to use ACARS and was advised (via ACARS) that they couldn't give us a clearance that way. As a note; the ACARS message stating they couldn't issue the clearance was longer than the clearance would have been. I overheard PKMJ radio advise the Aircraft Y to attempt to get a clearance using an 800-number by satphone. Apparently; no one told San Francisco that most satphones won't dial 800-numbers. PKMJ radio advised us that SFO wanted us to depart and attempt to pick up a clearance in the air via HF or satphone. We were given a primary and backup HF frequency. We departed and immediately started trying to pick up a clearance via HF. The primary frequency did not work so we attempted to establish contact on the backup frequency. It worked!! We had to climb to 9;500' to establish communications; but we had finally started communicating with SFO. The SFO radio operator then tried to get us to call back on the primary frequency (that we had already unsuccessfully tried). She also advised us that our takeoff clearance was canceled. I could see my First Officer getting very frustrated. I intervened and advised SFO that we were already airborne and that we were not changing frequencies again and that we wanted our clearance to ZZZ. It took a while; but we finally got our clearance. I later had our Dispatch attempt to call the 800 number several more times. I tried several more times; even at later dates. No one ever answered. This has the potential for some serious safety issues. We were close to having to return to PKMJ for a seriously overweight landing. On the return leg from ZZZ to PKMJ; which was going to continue to ZZZ1; I requested a functioning phone number in case our HF problem recurred. I got a different number. The same HF problem came up. We called the 'new' phone number and someone actually answered. When we explained our needs; the first thing we got was the 'use the HF' lecture. When we explained our HF problem; we got disconnected. We finally got through via HF; but clarity was terrible. Someone needs to advise SFO radio that this is the 21st century. There is a reliable means for backup communications for clearances and position reporting called 'satphone'; but it only works if someone answers the phone and actually wants to help. The other problem is that PKMJ has a very small ramp. There can be a lot of people moving around on it; especially if an Aircraft Y is loading/unloading. HF radio operating manuals caution the operator to not transmit if there are people in proximity of the aircraft. It's almost impossible to comply with this restriction. I wonder how many times ramp personnel and passengers have been unknowingly exposed to HF RF energy from this process.

Reporter stated the problem would have gone away if someone just answered the phone.  Pilot did not want to use HF due to people around the aircraft at the time and elected to use telephone.  Call using SATCOM was eventually successful; but ATC was adamant that the correct procedure was to use HF.  Pilot stated if no one is going to answer the last resort phone number why publish it.  Pilot ruled out that it was not his aircraft having a problem and called dispatch. Dispatch also received no answer to the phone call.  B737 crew also had similar communication problems.  Pilot has flown into PKMJ 3 times and has had problems 2 out of 3 times.

Pilot reported HF/SATCOM communications issues when departing PKMJ (Marshall Islands) airport.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 19R

Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

While flying the FOOXX5 RNAV arrival; we were given direct FADDI intersection on the ILS Runway 19R into TPA. We broke off the STAR at approximately the DARBS waypoint.Upon crossing the shoreline at approximately 5;000 ft. I noticed a black object at our 12 o'clock. For the first second or two I suspected it was a bird and made a comment to my First Officer that I had sighted a bird straight ahead. Very quickly after making that comment I noticed the object wasn't moving as a bird would.Immediately after noting the strange movement of the object it began moving rapidly to the aircrafts 9 o'clock. It made this movement in a swift; sweeping motion and ended up passing outside of my window. The object was far enough away that I deemed it unnecessary to change the aircrafts lateral or vertical flight path. It was far off the left wingtip of the aircraft; and we were moving much faster away from it than it could from us. The object was however close enough that I could see it was a man-made machine.While the black object was abeam the aircraft I could note it had the appearance of a drone. It appeared to be a drone that used rotors for flight. There was a light on it that appeared to have a yellowish tint. It appeared to maintain a constant altitude and move laterally on a linear plane.I have never owned or operated a drone; but from what I have seen from friends and on the internet it appeared to be a drone one would buy for personal use. Being that our location was the near the shoreline I would assume the operator was filming the beach.

Air Carrier Captain report a NMAC with a UAV.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 120

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Flew from a CTAF airport with no issues; normal landing. Stopped to pick up a passenger. Normal engine start; back taxi on 30. Normal takeoff roll. At about 50 feet above the ground; the engine starting surging; from full throttle to idle to full to idle at about 1 second intervals. Changed gas tanks; tried both mags; checked primer lock; all was normal; engine still surging. Had enough altitude to go around about 1/2 the pattern; landed safely about mid field on RWY 30 and taxied back to the ramp.  Taxiing back to the ramp; my right wing tip hit the rudder of a parked PA-28.  I was obviously distracted by my situation; and could have been more careful; or possibly stopped on the runway or just off the runway and shutdown without attempting to taxi back to a parking spot. I would also note that the other aircraft was parked such that his rudder was at the edge of the taxiway; so anyone taxiing by on the taxiway center line would have struck his rudder.

After takeoff a GLST engine began surging so the pilot returned to land and while taxiing to the ramp distracted; his wingtip struck a PA-28 rudder which protruded in the taxiway.


Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

There are several concerns regarding the long term wearing of face coverings on an airplane. There is a reduced oxygen environment while in-flight. It is difficult to breathe normally with more layers and there are many studies that I am concerned that our company and the CDC do not take into account. The time of useful consciousness at 41;000 feet does not allow enough time for customers to get on supplemental oxygen and take off their face coverings at the same time. Time of useful consciousness is roughly 9-12 seconds. If a face shield is worn in addition to a face covering it takes even longer for non-trained customers to don O2 masks. In addition; the face covering takes away senses of smell to properly detect issues on board the airplane in the event of a biological mishap or a potential fire. Security concerns remain regarding covering a passenger's face along with flight attendants for cockpit entry and exit procedures to properly verify identities. Wearing a mask during critical phases of flight continue to be concerns when it comes to quickly communicating.

Flight Attendant reported concerns regarding face mask policy and how passengers would react in the event of a rapid depressurization.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Approximately one hour into flight; at FL320 we heard 3 loud grinding noises coming from behind and below the cockpit. Shortly after that we smelled a burning electrical odor and the Lead FA confirmed the odor in the FC galley. Crew accomplished Smoke/Fire/Fumes checklist then coordinated to have IRO find the source of the odor. No smoke or fire was observed. All galley carts were pulled; ovens turned off; and utility busses off as a precaution. Odor was intense but isolated.  Coordinated with Dispatch and turn back to ZZZZ. Asked Dispatch to provide landing data for overweight landing; flaps 30;and Runway 27L; as well as have emergency equipment standing by. IRO returned to cockpit and began running Diversion checklist. Lead FA was called to give her a brief; with no evacuation anticipated. FO flew the aircraft; while I communicated with ATC; Dispatch; and FA's. On descent; passing FL190; the right engine PRV EICAS illuminated with bleed light on overhead panel. Captain and IRO did checklist; shutting off right bleed and right pack. On base to final; the right autopilot EICAS and caution light illuminated; so FO flew approach manually. A smooth touchdown with approximately 300 fpm descent rate was made; and on rollout; the right center fuel pump EICAS and overhead light came on; with 5.1 fuel in the center tank. The fire equipment observed no abnormal conditions as we exited the runway; and followed us to the ramp as we taxied to the stand. Once parked; the fire crew and mechanic came aboard with a thermal detection unit; indicating a hot spot from underneath the galley floor. They opened the E&E compartment to discover the galley chiller motor in there had disintegrated. No fire or other damage in the E&E was noted. The chiller was deferred; and maintenance was accomplished; to address other write-ups. Attempt to phone the Operations Manager on the ground failed; but was able to work with Dispatch on SATCOM for new flight plan and dispatch. Took off and flew to ZZZ uneventfully. Documentation of write-ups were attempted; but because of ACARS re-initiation; some did not get into the system; including the primary reason for the diversion. Maintenance Release was issued with address of maintenance work done on the ground at ZZZZ.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767 flight crew reported detecting fumes in the cabin and flight deck an hour into flight. Flight diverted to an enroute airport and landed safely.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While working the Local Control position during the night time session; I noticed a call sign of an aircraft; moving along the center taxiway in between runways. I looked and observed that it wasn't an aircraft that matched up with the target. It was a vehicle. A discussion ensued between myself and a supervisor regarding the previous events concerning false targets popping up on the ASDEX [Airport Surface Detection Equipment; Model X] matching up with a previous departure. The target would end up being a city ops vehicle patrolling and carrying out their regular duties.  We've also noted that when it has occurred on other occasions; the educated guess was that the city ops vehicle was holding somewhere west of taxiway hotel in the dirt when the false target began to float across the ASDEX. On this particular occasion; the target didn't just float across the screen; it actually tagged up with the city ops vehicle and continued to keep the tag of Aircraft X. The Supervisor directed me to ask the city ops vehicle to turn off their squitter for 1 minute and to then turn it back on. The city ops vehicle complied and the Aircraft X tag remained attached to the vehicle. The only time the tag disappeared from the vehicle was when the city ops veered off into the safety area to avoid exiting aircraft who just landed. While the vehicle drove east along Taxiway Hotel; the Aircraft X tag remained connected to the vehicle. The obvious safety issue is when the weather is not VFR and we aren't able to confirm the immediate identity of the false target. I recommend the active investigation on the matter to determine whether it's a software; hardware; or any other type of issue that is causing these false targets. Maybe it's a city ops squitter issue and not an ASDEX issue.

A Tower Local Controller reported an airport operations vehicle tagged up on their ground radar with as an with an aircraft call sign.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 243; Flight Crew Total 2565; Flight Crew Type 243

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were on the ground in PIT after push back from the gate. Ramp gave us taxi instruction V5; V; hold short of E; then contact ground. FO switch FRQ to ground 121.9.  Ground told us; 'we never gave you the instruction to taxi.'  We told ground we were given taxi instruction from ramp and ramp told us we never gave you the instruction to taxi. We told ground we were given taxi instruction from Ramp and Ramp told us to hold short of E then call ground. Controller told us to turn right on Delta and hold short of W; you have a wheels up time; then controller came back and gave us the number to call. I did call the number; controller told me; 'We'll listen to the tape and then take the appropriate action.'

My CA and I were very surprised by this response as we had followed taxi instructions and our aircraft was the only aircraft taxiing/moving on the south side of PIT at that time. There was no danger to our aircraft or any other aircraft whatsoever. The south ramp; taxiways and runways were completely free/empty of other aircraft operations at the time. PIT was using 10L for arrivals (10C for departures) at that time.

Captain reported being told specific taxi instructions to a runway by Ramp Control. The crew taxied as instructed then contacted Ground Control. Ground informed the crew that they did not have clearance to taxi as they did. Flight crew then received different taxi instructions from Ground and were given a phone number to call.  Pilot called the number and was told they would look into it.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

As the local sector Controller; I observed a hand off that was inbound East of the RNAV arrival. I then observed VFR traffic converging at the same altitude; so I called ZZZ Sector XX and advised him of the conflict. He did not take evasive action on his own. He said; 'What do you want me to do?' Although the aircraft was still under his control and in his airspace; I told him to turn the Brasilia EMB-120 to a 170 heading and expedite to 120. At this time the aircraft were approximaetly 8 miles apart and both at 15;300. The Controller acknowledged; but delayed the instructions; and did not transfer communications until both aircraft were in my airspace and converging at 12;500 with 2 miles of separation. I immediately issued a 'traffic alert' and a hard heading of 120 and the EMB-120 reported the traffic in sight. I then issued visual separation instructions and coordinated with adjacent sectors. I feel very strongly that VFR aircraft are ignored in the Center environment and the situation could have been catastrophic had ZZZ kept communications one minute longer. The EMB-120 did not report and R/A and will probably file a near mid-air collision report. Management was notified. I recommend all Centers take classes on obligations to miss air traffic including VFR. We are bound to keep IFR aircraft safe from other IFR traffic as well as VFR but I think this is ignored across the country. I also feel that the Center Controller was derelict in his duties and did not care that the aircraft were in conflict.

TRACON Controller described an IFR/VFR conflict resulting from the Center Controller's reported 'inaction' with regard to separating the aircraft in question.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 204; Flight Crew Type 11200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Type 5000

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

While at cruise; the A Flight Attendant called the cockpit and stated that he could smell a strange odor in the cabin. He said the odor was not present on takeoff; but had developed over the last few minutes. I told him to have the other Flight Attendants check and give input; and to try to make a determination if they thought it was smoke; fumes; or fire. There was no odor in the cockpit; and the report from the cabin was inconclusive; so I told the F/O to put on oxygen while I walked back into the cabin and see if I could smell anything. At first I smelled nothing and the F/As said that it was most noticeable when walking from the back to the front of the aircraft. Upon doing this; I thought that possibly there was a very slight odor just forward of the wings; but even then it was impossible to classify it. None of the crew thought the odor was from an electrical issue; smoke or fire. I thought maybe it could have been something in carry-on luggage; so we opened the bins and checked. We just could not say with any certainty what it was. All four Flight Attendants said they were concerned about it because they had never smelled anything like it before. I told them that we would most likely be diverting; but that I needed to coordinate with the F/O and Dispatch before making a final decision. I returned to the cockpit; we discussed the situation; and got a phone patch with Dispatch. We decided to divert. While enroute we ran the Smoke; Fire or Fumes Checklist; and diverted. Fire trucks followed us to the gate; and we deplaned all the Passengers and their belongings normally.Company Maintenance was unable to find anything wrong with the aircraft. The discrepancy was signed off and the aircraft returned to service. I contacted the Chief Pilot on Call to review the situation; we reboarded the aircraft and continued to [our destination] with no further issues.

B737-800 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate after noticing a slight odor in the cabin.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This [report] is regarding the incident where I and my partner taxied Aircraft X from gate to Company hangar. We were given the route to hangar from ATC Ground 'ALPHA; ALPHA 7; TANGO; WEST GATE; YANKEE; YANKEE TO HANGAR'. When we approached [the] west gate; we noticed on the right side of Taxiway Yankee; beside [another] hangar; before making a right turn to the a hangar; a huge bank of snow aligned with the number 2 engine. The snow bank was about 25 [feet] left [of] the taxi blue lights and about 50 [feet] long. I screamed to my taxi partner to veer to the left to clear the number 2 engine. Once arriving [to hangar]; [we] performed out post-taxi walk-around and inspected number 2 engine for possible impact damage. We inspected and found no damage.Event occurred because [the] city's cleaning operations didn't plow snow off Taxiway Yankee towards blue taxi lights.

Reporter stated that during taxi of aircraft from gate to hanger; aircraft almost made contact with snow bank that had not been plowed off taxiway by airport personnel.


Fatigue; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Confusion; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach ILS 09R; tower broke us off approach suddenly with right turn to 180 climb to 3;000 feet.  First Officer (FO) dialed in heading and about 600 FPM climb since we had less than 1;000 feet to climb.  When I looked at FMA and the aircraft was not responding; I informed him so and advised him to hand fly.  He was hesitant to do so and continued to attempt to get the autopilot to follow his commands.I then told him we've got to follow ATC's instruction and said let's do a soft go around.  He was hesitant but finally clicked off the auto pilot however did not go to Takeoff Go-Around (TOGA). His speed was around Vapp so I told him to disconnect auto thrust and increase his speed.  Our altitude was 3;300 feet so I told him to level at 3;000.  At this point I think he disconnected the Auto Thrust but left it in Climb.With altitude alert sounding and answering ATC; I saw speed increasing.  I said to pull thrust to idle.  He was hesitant again so I retracted flaps as speed approached overspeed limit.  I believe we were 10 knots over speed limit for flaps 2.  Hand flying; the aircraft speed kept increasing to about 300 knots and descending to 2;000 feet.  At this point I said 'my aircraft'; got thrust to idle and climbed back to 3;000 feet; hooked the auto pilot back up. Rest of flight was back in the green.

Shortly after descent commenced; ATC canceled approach clearance and told us to turn to 180 and climb to 3;000. I set 3;000 on altitude alerter and 180 on heading selector and spun up Vertical speed (VS) to around 300 fpm up. Either at the same time or shortly after I initiated that action we captured GS and that pilot action had no effect. My thinking was still in the simple change of heading and altitude mode; (level flight at altitude); and due to what I believe was fatigue; (not from the previous night's sleep of which I got 8 1/2 hours; but from the cumulative effects of 4 very early morning days in a row).In obvious retrospect a 'soft go around' would have been the appropriate action; however between just a simple climb and turn instruction and my thought process; I again tried to effect the change; this time with a pull on the altitude controller to activate open climb mode; (at which time it I must have moved it to 3;300 feet); and another pull on the heading selector; both to no avail. That was about when I disconnected the autopilot and commenced a turn. In the climb the airspeed would not increase because we were not in the correct mode but there was at least sufficient climb to raise the gear to reduce drag. Moments later the captain stated we should be at 3;000 feet; and reset the alerter which then started the attitude alerter blaring. The captain stated I should have done a soft Go Around and as I was already high; it seemed counter intuitive to do that but I realized my error and attempted to do so but apparently with all the noise and problems; I only got the Thrust Levers to the MCP detent vice the Takeoff Go Around detent; thus compounding an already poor situation. Trying to correct altitude and bring on an increase in airspeed; I started a descent. As I had obviously lost the bubble; with me now descending the aircraft; the Captain took controls; leveled the aircraft and returned to 3;000 feet by disconnecting auto thrust. Total altitude lost was around 800 feet. Having completing 2 prior nearly perfect go-arounds in the past several months; (one for a vehicle that tower didn't think would stop short of the runway; and the other for no-contact at minimums); I thought I was prepared but was certainly not. With over 35 years of flight experience; and having never committed an error this egregious let alone having the other pilot taking the controls has been a humbling experience.

A321 flight crew were issued go around instructions just prior to glideslope capture. The fatigued First Officer incorrectly performed the go around maneuver causing the Captain to take over and return for another approach. The highly experienced First Officer also attributes his poor performance to a lack of Mode Awareness.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

The PIC and I briefed the SHEAD 8 RNAV departure and missed the routing note. We checked all waypoints and altitudes in the flight plan and discussed that we would use RNAV and VNAV on the departure. We set FL210 in the altitude select.  Prior to SHEAD waypoint climbing through FL196 we were told to maintain FL190. I put FL190 in the altitude select and we were returning to FL190 when ATC told us to climb to FL230.  Enroute we were contacted by Oakland Center and given a phone number to call on the ground. Check; check; and recheck departure page. Can Jeppesen put a ceiling altitude of 'between 14000 and FL190 at SHEAD?'

The reporter states that the ATC clearance received did not contain a FL190 limit and only the routing note described this limit.

BD700 First Officer reports missing the routing note on the SHEAD 8 RNAV departure from LAS; resulting in a climb above FL190 before receiving clearance to do so.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Procedure

I was commuting to work and I did not get on my first two tries so contacted the company asking for a positive space or to mark me as call in honest. There was still one flight that would get me to my show time but it was full with a listed jump seater. The company agreed to positive space me but the gate agent would not put me on the flight as she said it was full. I went back and forth with the gate agent and the company but was not able to get on that flight. They did positive space me on the next flight which landed two hours after my show time. I rushed to the gate where the FO had appeared to have everything done and the FA had boarded. We pulled the jet bridge; blocked out; and I looked over the log books and paperwork as well as asked the FO some questions about the weather to make sure I was in the loop. We did all the checklists and the flight went normal. When arriving the FO was flying but I did brief several options as far as the taxi in (including taxiway B). I had mentioned taxiing was the most stressful part of upgrade and to please keep an eye on me and comment on any mistakes. The landing was good but a tad long so I took the airplane over and exited on the first taxiway we came to. From my view it looked like a normal small airport winter taxiway. I could see patchy snow but it looked like what I was used to seeing all winter. I had not yet called for flaps up after landing so the FO was also heads up as far as I know. Neither of us could find the NOTAM for the taxiway being closed and it was not on the AWOS. We were barely turning onto taxiway B as our nose wheel became stuck but our main tires were still on the active runway. At the time I was extremely surprised (as from my view) in front of me it looked fine. I called ATC to let them know we were mostly stuck on an active runway. I called ops and asked for a tug. I made an announcement for the passengers to remain seated with their seat belts on as well as calling the FA. I then notified dispatch of the situation. The tug came out but it quickly sheared a pin and they did not have another good quality tug. After coordinating with dispatch; the ground crew cleared a safe pathway for the passengers to deplane onto a bus. I talked to maintenance and they faxed over paperwork to use a tow truck to move the airplane. Contract maintenance was able to move the airplane a few feet back to the active runway. We taxied to the gate as normal. An inspection was done by contract maintenance at the gate as the airplane had no damage.In the future I will not so quickly exit a runway. I will evaluate the situation more especially if tower is closed. I will not assume the snow is thin and patchy as it appears but will know it could be ice. I believe it would be helpful if there were signs and lights (especially for night time) showing this taxiway is closed. It would also be helpful to put it on the automated weather once tower leaves. Once I was able to look behind the airplane I could see we barely entered a foot of ice but from my view in front of the flight deck it looked very different.

I landed the aircraft then transferred the controls to the captain. We were slowed for a turnoff onto the B taxiway. From our point of view there was patchy snow that would be present during fairly typical winter operations. The captain initiated the turnoff onto the taxiway and we became stuck on ice; with the tail partially blocking the runway. There were no NOTAMs on our paperwork indicating that taxiway B was closed. Tower was closed when we landed. ATIS/ASOS did not report the closure at all. We called operations and had them send a tug out. The tug was unable to pull us out. A tug was used to remove the aircraft. No damage occurred to the aircraft.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported they had no information reporting that a taxiway at their destination was closed. After landing and turning onto this taxiway; the aircraft became stuck in deep snow.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 197; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 2700

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

After takeoff and through about 8;300 feet both GPS stopped receiving/or jammed signal. All associated equipment that uses GPS stopped functioning. (i.e. Ads-b.) ANP reverted to no GPS accuracy and map shift occurred. We remained in the RNP area for the departure; but just by a couple of; 0.1 nautical miles. GPS signal returned through 16;000 feet. ATC was advised.

Air Carrier Captain reported possible GPS jamming during departure from the DEN area. A few thousand feet higher the GPS signal returned to normal. ATC was advised of the interference.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

This does not pertain to any particular flight. I have done several LGA arrivals and departures recently and have noticed the lack of proper phraseology with the LGA Ground and Tower controllers. Several times I have heard and been told for a taxi instruction on taxiway DD to 'Hold short of the wind sock'. I do not believe this to be an acceptable clearance. I am assuming they mean the wind sock located near certain taxiways however; if you are not familiar with the airport; this would be very confusing. I have also been told 'hold short of the white concrete' approaching a runway. I have no idea what this means other than the gray concrete has a lighter shade in that area so maybe that is the white concrete.The Tower Controllers continue to issue runway turnoff instructions to aircraft that are still at a high rate of speed on the landing roll out. I am routinely issued turnoff instructions while still decelerating at speeds over 100 knots. This is distracting and a significant safety issue. Furthermore; pilots should be able to turn off the first available taxiway that is safe for them to make without having instructions dictated by the Tower Controller during a high task load phase of flight.When operating into for landing; I have heard the Tower Controller clear aircraft for takeoff on the intersecting runway while we are still in our landing roll-out without us being told to hold short. Maybe LGA Tower has some exemption that they can do this; but I do not understand how a Controller can make a visual judgment call that any aircraft will be stopped and turning off one runway prior to rolling through the intersecting runway intersection without a LAHSO clearance. This is a major safety issue and I see it on almost every landing and departure when the setup us land runway 4 and depart on 13. There is a lack of proper phraseology and clearances on the part of the LGA controllers.LGA controllers need to follow proper phraseology and not issue instructions regarding wind socks and white concrete for taxi instructions. If they have authorization to clear aircraft to takeoff on a runway before an aircraft landing an intersecting runway (without a LAHSO clearance) has stopped and cleared the runway then pilots need to be made aware of such authorization. It is very unnerving to be rolling out after landing only to hear them clear an aircraft for takeoff.

Air Carrier Captain reported controllers at LGA routinely use improper unclear phraseology to taxi aircraft.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On ILS XXR approach; just outside the FAF and cleared the approach.  The Pilot Flying selected '0' in the MCP before glideslope capture (approach mode was armed).  I did not catch this.  The aircraft was in 'level change' with the autopilot off and airspeed set at 'target.'  As we approached 1;000 AGL I said we are getting low and reached for the gear handle as a suggestion.  We continued configuring as the Pilot Flying descended following 'MCP' speed rather than 'APP.'  We broke out of the weather right at 1;000 feet AGL.  I believe we finished configuring below 1;000 feet AGL; and moments later received a GPWS 'glideslope.'  The Pilot Flying leveled off and continued the approach visually. The bottom line is that; I should have caught the early selection of '0' and directed a go around for being too low on the approach. Don't get complacent just because it is your home base and stick with the procedures.

We were being vectored for the ILS XXR approach and the aircraft was at 170 knots; Flaps 10; and descending to 1;600 feet MSL. In the descent; Level Change; 170 knots; Heading Select to join the Localizer; and Localizer was armed. Still descending in Level Change and Localizer captured; we were cleared for the approach and I armed approach mode. What I had thought was glideslope intercept; I put zero in the altitude selector and the aircraft continued descent. Upon reaching 1;000 feet MSL; we realized that we were not on glideslope and leveled off. Pilot Not Flying had the field in sight and told Tower that we had the airport in sight when he gave us a low altitude warning. We continued the approach and made a normal descent to landing.Outside of final approach fix glideslope intercept. Verify MCP selections and do not select zero in the altitude selector until you verify proper glideslope indications. We descended below glideslope prior to glideslope intercept altitude.

When the flight director indicated Localizer Capture outside the final approach fix; a B737-300 First Officer selected zero on the MCP in the Level Change Mode and at 1;000 feet AGL; seven miles from the airport; the EGPWS alerted GLIDESLOPE and ATC issued a low altitude alert.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On climb out; First Officer noticed the flaps were still out at 300kias. We slowed down and retracted flaps and continued to destination.  FO saw flaps at 9. Crew did not complete after take off checklist correctly.  Slowed and retracted flaps. Crew should be more vigilant after take off and completed checklists. Also as you climb through 10;000 feet; check your configurations again.

Air carrier flight crew reported they failed to retract flaps after departure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3860; Flight Crew Type 3300

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On a leg while in radar contact with Boston Approach I was asked to make a correction to the right to avoid a small TFR which led me into a Class Bravo area I was not warned or cleared to enter. I was told to contact the Norwood Tower to continue; I did so and was vectored out of the protected area then turned back over to the same Boston Controller and continued on to [destination].The Norwood Tower told me to call Boston Approach; I did so and after a conversation I was asked for my license # etc. I have never experienced a controller leading me into protected airspace without a caution that I was about to enter. I kept the same transponder code all the way to [my destination].

Piper pilot was told to call Approach Control after being vectored away from a TFR and into the Class Bravo.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

About 20 minutes into flight at FL240 FA (Flight Attendant) informed us that [a] passenger was having trouble breathing and eyes were rolling into the back of her head. We were approximately 30 miles from ZZZ and weather was VFR. I gave FO (First Officer) controls and [advised ATC] and began to divert to ZZZ. I informed ATC of situation and requested medical at ZZZ. I informed Dispatch; passengers; and FA we'd be on the ground in less than 10 minutes. We landed at 43000 lbs and taxied to gate where medical was standing by. I had passengers remain seated while medical tended to passenger. Passenger was taken off aircraft and to hospital.

EMB145 Captain reported a diversion due to passenger illness.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I am relatively new to this aircraft with about 350 hours in type.  Additionally; the First Officer (FO) had about 150 hours in type.  After flying the SEAVU2 Arrival with significant delay vectors and speed control; both fast and slow; from TNP all the way in to final approach; we were given 3 different runway assignments (25R; 24R; then 24L).  On third assignment; after being cleared visual approach to 24L; we were then told maintain 250 kts.  Due to significant wake turbulence from preceding aircraft; we told the controller we were unable to maintain 250 kts.  The situation at this point was that we were in night VMC; passing through about 4;000 feet; trying to reprogram the FMS; maintaining visual separation from aircraft we were to follow; aligning with the new runway and ensuring we did not impinge on the south side flow to 25R.  The controller expressed displeasure at our inability to maintain 250 kts.  Further coordination resulted in a speed of 230 kts but frequency congestion prevented better communication of the situation.  Additionally; the workload was too high to continue into the final approach fix at 250 kts.  While I sincerely appreciate the job the SOCAL controllers do in getting us in to LAX; I have a reasonable expectation to be in a position to make a stabilized approach.  That expectation would not have been met if we complied with the controller's request.  Either we are all working to achieve stabilized approaches or we will continue to have pilot/controller difficulties.

A319 Captain reported difficulty complying with ATC speed request because of workload which was heightened by multiple runway changes and wake turbulence from preceding aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 410; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Retracting flaps on schedule after takeoff; LE Flaps Transit light remained illuminated with trailing edge flaps in the up position. Ran the QRH checklist; which in our circumstance allowed for cycling flaps to position one and then up in an effort to correct the indication. The procedure produced no immediate result; but after a period of approximately seven minutes; the indication went to normal. At that point; sent ACARS to Dispatch; stating that I felt a normal landing configuration; as allowed per the QRH; would now be appropriate for landing at [destination]. Dispatch agreed. While configuring [for approach] all indications was normal until flaps 15 were selected. At that point; LE Flaps Transit light illuminated as the trailing edge flaps went to position 15. At airspeed of approximately 152 KTS; the aural warning 'Airspeed Low' sounded. A go-around was initiated with a climb to 3;000 FT. We requested vectors for a ten mile downwind. Ran the QRH Leading Edge Flap Transit Light Illuminated Checklist; ran OPC data; briefed flaps 15 landing; and accomplished the Descent Checklist. Fuel at this point was approximately 6;000 LBS. Stopping margin was approximately 750 FT with maximum braking; target speed was 149 KTS. I briefed the First Officer that if we were unable to maintain the OPC generated target speed without the 'Airspeed Low' Aural Warning sounding; we will divert. After configuring to flaps 15 and while slowing to 149 KTS; the 'Airspeed Low' Aural Warning sounded at approximately 153 KTS. I executed a go-around; and the First Officer requested vectors for [a nearby airport with longer runways]. We received vectors and a climb to 6;000 FT. We were asked by ATC if we would like to declare an emergency and we did. We ran all data and checklists as before; briefed [Approach]; and sent a message to Dispatch. The OPC generated an adequate stopping margin with minimum braking and no requirements for using brake cooling procedures. I briefed the First Officer that I would fly ten knots above target speed all the way to landing flare and would use Autobrakes 3 as a compromise to provide adequate stopping margin and avoid generating excessive brake temperatures. Landing was uneventful. Fuel at landing was approximately 4;800 LBS. Although not required; emergency vehicle took brake temperature measurements after landing. Temperatures were well within limits. Subsequent taxi to gate and parking was uneventful. Company Mechanics told us that erroneous signals related to slat #5 were sent to other aircraft computer systems; which caused the aircraft to be unable to sense what flap configuration it was in; which then resulted in erroneous warnings. The reason that this could occur should be addressed.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information]

A B737-700 flight crew reported LE Flap Transit light after takeoff that went out; only to reappear on arrival. They diverted to a nearby airport that had longer runways and landed without incident.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On arrival to the jet; it was noted that an open item existed in the Logbook. The inbound flight had a runaway [electrical] overheat on the L2 window. We were unable to placard the window due to enroute icing conditions. The Mechanic did some troubleshooting and found multiple faults in the system. He changed out a computer; resetting the system. The problem was deemed corrected and signed-off. The Captain and I were finalizing the Before Taxi Checklist when the Overheat light associated with the L2 window came back on. We turned the switch 'Off' and called for Maintenance again. When Maintenance arrived 15 minutes later; the L2 window was still extremely hot. They pulled the Cannon plug and the window started cooling down. Was told if that happened airborne; the window could shatter. For unknown reasons the Temperature Controller did not automatically shut down power to the window and placing the switch to 'Off' did not shut down power either.  Multiple mechanics and differences of opinion; an hour later the jet was taken out of service. The debate was whether it was a faulty window or the Window Heat Controller. As we were leaving the jet; the mechanics were replacing the Window Heat Controller in the cockpit. Checking the Aircraft Maintenance History; I noticed the actual fix was replacing the window. I am concerned if this occurred airborne there is a chance for a major incident. I was briefed recently by a Captain that this happened previously to another B737 and to be ready to pull the cannon plug if we had an uncontrollable window overheat. Coincidentally; these issues are now popping up since we started using the RAM mount attached to the window. I did not previously hear of this issue in the twelve years I have been on the jet. Maybe a step should be added to the QRH if there is an uncontrollable window overheat to remove the cannon plug from the window; as that is the only way to ensure power is removed. Maybe we should not attach a RAM mount directly to the window; as this could needlessly damage it. I doubt the engineers planned those stresses to their design. Everyone I fly with thinks the approved RAM mount is problematic at best. Besides potentially damaging the window; there is a chance of the mount falling off during a critical stage in flight. That is unsatisfactory! I have also seen numerous damaged and unusable window shades. I had it happen to myself and heard complaints with the [RAM] mount hindering both yoke and tiller movements. Obviously we all figured out how not to do that again. But one time was one too many. Lastly; I have seen placements of the RAM mount where I did not have much visibility out of the Captain's window. Again; a major safety issue. There are better and safer alternatives to our current RAM mount. Hopefully common sense will prevail. Preflight.

A First Officer reports about a recurring runaway overheat of their L2 window on a B737-800 aircraft that was previously signed-off. Pilot noted the Overhead P5 Window Heat switch would not shut off electrical power to the window. He also questions whether or not the recent use of RAM mounts on the windows are a contributor to the overheat conditions.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

I was working sector 32 where I had accepted a point out on Aircraft X (I don't remember the call sign so I'll call it Aircraft X) northbound going to Boston. There were a flight of military fighters southbound at FL240B250. I had a JFK arrival Aircraft Z (don't remember the call sign I'll call it Aircraft Z) who was at FL220. The sector above me who was working Aircraft X had some traffic he was trying to separate and in order to help I descended Aircraft Z to 140 to give him a lower altitude on Aircraft X if he needed it. Aircraft Z was still in sector 18s airspace and I did not have time to call and get control. As the situation seamed to resolve itself; a minute later we saw that Aircraft X was in conflict alert with Aircraft Y (not sure on the call-sign) and Aircraft Y's altitude was showing FL230B240 in sector 18s airspace with Aircraft X just clipping 18s airspace going northbound. Both myself and the sector working Aircraft X missed that the flight plan on the high altitude map showed the missing sector 18s airspace; but on the low altitude map which they didn't display shows Aircraft X's route of flight just nearly hitting sector 18's airspace. It was in this airspace that sector 18 who didn't get a point out from Aircraft X and didn't see a data block; descended Aircraft Y from FL240B250 to FL230B240. This route that Aircraft X was on was a reroute for VIP airspace. This route which will keep clear of 1 traffic flow is a new route to us and not what we are used to seeing. We all anticipated Aircraft X to be going to a particular fix that we use regularly and he was not. I think what would help in the future would be negotiated routes during SAA/VIP airspace and having the sectors better briefed on the changes and how it could affect them.

I accepted Aircraft Y a flight of 4 on a heading to enter W-105. Upon initial communication they asked for the block FL230B240 for weather. I descended him as requested and he began flashing with Aircraft X that was not shown on my scope.I can wait an additional minute after asking to issue the descent to be certain I have cleared all boundaries in an area where there are so many adjacent sectors.

Five Boston Center Controllers reported a loss of separation when a flight of aircraft were descended through an aircraft's altitude.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 14450

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 564; Flight Crew Type 7000

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

[We were] approaching El Paso from the north-northwest. At 13;000 FT MSL; cleared to MOLLY; thence ELP. Approach Control cleared us to MOLLY; then the Molly 2 RNAV Arrival. As pilot not flying; I read it back; and observed the First Officer select the MOLLY 2 RNAV Arrival; then go to the LEGS page. I see MOLLY at the top of the first page; concurred; then the First Officer executed. The First Officer said we were cleared to descend via the arrival. I didn't remember that; so queried Approach. They confirmed we were cleared to descend via the arrival. Before we initiated the descent from 13;000 FT; our current altitude; Approach said; 'Air Carrier XXXX; heading 110.' The First Officer selected 110 in the heading window; and selected 'Heading select'. As we were no longer on the RNAV arrival; I asked Approach Control what altitude we were cleared to descend to. They replied; 'Descend and maintain 6;000 FT.' We turned to heading 110; and began a descent to 6;000 FT. When we had initially switched to Approach Control and attempted to check in; they did not respond immediately. There were several other aircraft they were handling on the frequency; and it took two or three radio calls and maybe two minutes for them to acknowledge our checking in. When we arrived at the gate; the Ground Controller asked us to call. When I called; the Controller asked initially; 'Were you cleared to descend via the MOLLY 2 Arrival?' I said 'yes; but only after we verified the descend via clearance'. He then said; 'We saw your aircraft turn northeast after we gave you the clearance; that's why we gave you the vector; it was probably our mistake.' I was confused as to whether he had been concerned about our altitude or our lateral clearance; and asked him what this was about. He stated it was just the direction the aircraft initially turned that caused them to give a vector in lieu of the approach clearance and he wanted to verify what we understood. Better coordination between Center and Approach Control. We were given no indication; either on our flight plan; or from Center that we may expect an RNAV arrival. Approach Control had initially offered an RNAV (GPS) approach to a runway; after a lengthy check-in process. We declined; of course. We were then; hastily; it seemed; to be given the RNAV arrival; which caused a short term heavy cockpit load.

RNAV arrivals should not be issued late by ATC; nor should they be accepted by the crew if insufficient time is available to review; brief; and program the new arrival. In this case; the arrival was not complex; I had anticipated its being issued due to a preceding aircraft being assigned it; and it was manageable to comply with the clearance. However; this ATC clearance was basically pointless; and added needless complexity in close proximity to the field. In retrospect; I believe we would have been better off not accepting the RNAV arrival; but remaining with our original clearance or asking for vectors.

ELP TRACON issued an air carrier the MOLLY 2 STAR which caused confusion for the crew and a conflict for ATC but was in accordance with a ZAB letter of agreement.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Determine source and solution for odors/fumes.

If not already done; maybe a closer monitoring of the aircrafts that show continuous symptoms on this issue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 13; Flight Crew Type 13

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I completed DRONE inspection at location [within ZZZ Class C airspace]. I failed to research airspace. The violation was discovered through my company's monthly airspace review. In the future; I will always make sure that I review the airspace before flight.

Remote pilot reported a failure to research airspace and operated UAV in restricted airspace without authorization.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Approaching ZZZ (50 minutes into flight); Captain's airspeed tape went to zero and altimeter jumped to 250 ft. high at FL340. FD (Flight Director); AT (Autothrottles); and AP (Autopilot) went away accordingly. Captain's airspeed slowly recovered and failed multiple times. Priority handling was asked with no firetruck response needed. Diversion was coordinated with Dispatch to ZZZ. First Officer's data was always correct. Approach and landing were uneventful. ZZZ Approach and Tower were very helpful with groundspeed calls to verify airspeed. The courier compartment was wet when we arrived at the plane and an E&E Inspection was accomplished for water intrusion before departure. [This was probably caused by] ADC failure.

A300 Captain reported diverting due to unreliable airspeed and altitude indications.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 12600; Flight Crew Type 2500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

After cleared to cross runways 35C and 35L on Taxiway Zulu by the Control Tower; we were told to taxi to the ramp via Juliet; Yankee. We were not asked to contact Ground. We turned right to follow the arrow on the taxiway sign to Juliet; turned left on taxiway Yankee; and taxied to the ramp. As we turned onto the ramp; we saw a sign that said JY (Juliet Yankee; which intersected with Yankee from Zulu; which went to the ramp. Nobody said we had done anything wrong; nothing was said on the radio; but I found the signage very confusing at the Ramp with taxiways Juliet and Yankee right next to taxiway Juliet Yankee. I do not go to DFW often; but the taxiway naming in that area could be improved.

Flight crew reported a taxiway incursion at DFW airport and cited taxiway signage as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54; Flight Crew Total 850; Flight Crew Type 54

Workload; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 2799

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

At the gate; Captain and I had a thorough rejected takeoff brief. We also discussed the gusty crosswind threat and decided to conduct a Flaps 5; max thrust with reduced V speeds and rotation at Vr max; along with a rolling takeoff. We were cleared for takeoff while turning onto [the taxiway] for XXL. The Captain gave me control of the throttles upon entering the runway after we confirmed we would be doing a rolling takeoff. After the Captain aligned the aircraft on the centerline; he gave me the controls to continue the takeoff. I increased the throttles to 40% for stabilization and the aircraft began yawing to the right. I was unable to correct the yawing using left rudder and advised the captain that I had no directional control. He stated that he had the aircraft and was rejecting. He closed the throttles; disconnected the autothrottles and also put in the reversers as the aircraft yawed back to the left. Once we had the aircraft stabilized; I advised tower that we were rejected the takeoff and advised the passengers to remain seated. The tower asked if we needed any assistance and after determining we didn't have any serious engine indications; we said no. They advised us we could take any taxiway off the runway. We took the reverse highspeed and proceeded to the run up pad for XXL to assess the situation. Once there; the Captain spoke with the flight attendants; passengers and maintenance. It was decided that we would return to the gate and change aircraft. We returned to the gate; briefed maintenance personnel and then debriefed the rejected takeoff.

Cleared for takeoff while approaching XXL hold short. As per briefing; we had Flaps 5; max thrust; with reduced numbers and with a plan to rotate at Vr max for wind shear precautions with a rolling takeoff. We executed a transfer of throttle controls to FO (First Officer) for right seat takeoff; as I lined up aircraft; stating we would do a rolling takeoff and I would lineup aircraft on runway. FO pushed throttles towards 12 O'clock position. I finished lining up aircraft on centerline and verbally transferred controls to FO. FO acknowledged aircraft control and we began a normal takeoff roll. I visually verified throttles in 12 Oclock position; as we transferred controls. As the thrust on #1 engine reached approximately 40% N1 the #2 engine seemed to lag behind somewhat to 30%-35%; the aircraft began drifting right of centerline. The aircraft continued to drift further right and the FO stated that rudder was ineffective to correct the steering. There were no indications of engine difficulties other than the right side engine seemed unresponsive to the throttle commanded position. The throttle position never went past the 12 Oclock position and the approximately 40%N1 range. As the aircraft turned to approximately 30 degrees right of centerline; the FO said she had no directional control. I then stated 'I have the aircraft; rejecting' and closed the throttles; disconnected the auto throttles and used the tiller to regain directional control and engine reversers to slow the aircraft down. The FO called the tower stating we were rejecting takeoff on XXL and then made a PA to keep flight attendants seated. Tower directed us to make any left turn and we complied stating we did not require any assistance. We insured checklists were completed and agreed to taxi to a holding pad to continue our discussion as to what happened. The rejected speed was approximately 25 to 30KTs. We taxied to the XXL holding pad and then contacted FAs (Flight Attendants) and then I made a PA to passengers. We then conferred with each other and to maintenance and all agreed that a return to the gate was our best course of action.

B737 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff after experiencing uneven thrust and loss of directional control.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passenger X came on [and] complained of feeling motion sickness [and] asked for motion sickness med. I replied we don't carry [them]. She then asked for aspirin. I gave it to her. She went to the restroom several times during flight; at one time she stated that she [soiled clothing item] and she needed to discard it.  I gave her a sick bag to put [it] in.  I also told her she needed to put a mask on while on plane. Every time she used [the] restroom she did not have a mask on or in her seat.  She did not have a seat mate; [since] I had moved him during boarding. I also asked her 3 times to put her mask on in her seat.  Halfway through flight she began to feel better but on landing asked for sick bag.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with COVID-19 mask requirements in flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4850; Flight Crew Type 250

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were climbing out on the TEB 8 departure from Runway 24. We were supposed to level at 1;500 until 4.5 DME from TEB. I was the pilot not flying. We had briefed the departure and I had the text on my knee board. I called out 500 FT for 1;500 FT. While I was contacting Approach the pilot flying started the turn to a 280 heading but did not level off. By the time I could take control we had already reached 1;800 FT. The altitude alerter was set at 1;500 FT. For some reason the pilot flying thought she could continue the climb to 2;000 FT once we started the turn. The Approach Controller did not acknowledge the deviation and asked us to climb to 4;000 FT. It was just a mental error on the pilot flying because we had discussed in detail that I would let her know when we passed 4.5 DME and I would change the alerter to 2;000 FT and we could continue the climb.

As the First Officer and pilot flying this leg; I briefed the TEB8.TEB departure procedure; heading 240 to 1;500 FT; then right turn to 280 up to 2;000 FT until the 4.5 DME fix. This was incorrect and neither I nor the Captain challenged the brief. (The correct departure procedure was climb to 1;500 FT heading 240; then right turn to 280; maintain 1;500 FT until reaching the 4.5 DME fix; and then climb to 2;000 FT) I initially looked at the departure procedure but did not have it in front of me on takeoff. The Captain had the copy of the departure procedure on his lap. Being the first time I have flown the TEB8; I asked the Captain to watch me and make sure I was doing the right thing. He said he'd walk me through it and we continued to get ready to depart. Prior to departure I selected 2;000 FT in the altitude selector and he changed it to 1;500 FT but neither of us queried each other. On departure; I climbed to 1;500 FT on runway heading 240 degrees; made a right turn to 280 degrees and started to climb to 2;000 FT. After deviating 400 FT; the Captain made the call out '1;500 FT; 1;500 FT' and I immediately acted to correct my altitude. At the same exact time as the deviation; NY Departure cleared us up to 4;000 FT. They did not comment or query the deviation. It happened very quickly. Upon reflection; I can see that we failed in our CRM response as a crew. I should have had the plate in front of me the whole time for reference and should have taken more time to make sure I was reading it correctly. The Captain assumed I was more familiar with the departure and was distracted by traffic calls and ATC communication which led to him not catching the altitude deviation sooner.

An EA50 flight crew deviated from the TEB departure by climbing through the 1;500 FT restriction. First Officer was not clear on the procedure.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28.8; Flight Crew Total 2040; Flight Crew Type 1200

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was flying to CDW. I was about 3 miles east of MMU and around about 1;500 MSL and talking to MMU Tower. The sun had just fallen below the horizon. ATIS at CDW was calling about 4 or 5 miles of visibility and it was hazy. West of my area; there were almost no clouds. CDW seemed to have what appeared to be an overcast/broken layer at what I would estimate to have been 4;000 FT. The light seemed very flat and there was a sort of 'graininess' to the scenery. This is an area that I have been flying in for over 20 years. I am very familiar with it and I have [flown into CDW many times].In order to be 'ahead of the airplane' and to give the greatest amount of time for the CDW Tower controllers to be aware of my arrival; I always ask MMU Tower to allow me to switch frequency to CDW at their earliest practicable convenience. MMU instructed me to switch frequency to CDW Tower while still about 2 miles outside of CDW's Delta airspace (while still in MMU's Delta). CDW was using [Runway] 22 and I was predisposed to expecting that (mistake Number 1). I switched to CDW Tower frequency and announced that I had the information and was landing. The Controller asked me to set up for left downwind 22 entry. I was already west of the extended Runway 22 centerline and was caught unprepared (mistake Number 2). I asked if I can have right downwind 22 entry and I was clearly told by Tower that he needed me to be on left downwind 22. I confirmed and tried to get my visual cues. The only way I can describe the visibility and visual cues of that instant was that they were extremely strange. After 20 seconds of scanning the land features to no avail; for the first time in my flying life; I was having a hard time discerning where I was in relation to the CDW airport. For some reason I came to the false conclusion that I must have changed headings by accident and may have wandered too far east towards TEB. I immediately turned about 90 degrees left to the northwest and flew in that direction for what I believe to have been 30 seconds. Then I looked at my GPS and realized that I had made a mistake and I initiated a 180 to the right and headed southeast. About a minute later I located CDW. I estimate that I was 4 NM to the west of the airport and concluded that I was far enough away that I should not interfere with close traffic (mistake Number 3). A short while later I saw a low-wing aircraft at my 1 o'clock; opposite direction; approximately 200 FT higher than me; and approximately 400 FT horizontal from me. I suspect that he was flying the right crosswind for 22. I saw him at least 5 seconds before we passed each other. I was sure that we would pass each other without incident; as a result I did not make any sudden maneuvers in order not to surprise the other pilot. About 10 seconds after we passed each other; I heard a pilot report to CDW Tower that an airplane passed directly in front of them. I immediately transmitted to Tower that I believe it was me (and announced my call sign). I volunteered that information immediately in order to not have tensions run high while people were trying to ascertain where the situation was taking place and who the involved parties were.I was reprimanded by CDW Tower and he asked why it was that I headed west and then east (which he said he saw on the radar). He went on to say that his instructions are to be followed and that if he instructed left downwind entry; I had to do as he instructed. After I landed; it was apparent that to compound matters; he was coordinating an aircraft with some difficulty which was coming in from the west. Once I heard that; it all made sense to me. He wanted the aircraft with the difficulty to be alone in the western quadrant and that is why he sent me to the eastern quadrant.In my attempt to be 'ahead of the airplane'; I allowed myself to ask for a frequency change too soon and had not fully grasped the visual cues of the CDW environment and surroundings.

BE36 pilot reports becoming disoriented while attempting to enter the pattern at CDW when the Tower instructs to enter a left downwind when the reporter was expecting a right downwind. While maneuvering northwest of the field a NMAC occurs with an in bound aircraft.