Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Type 14000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was PF flying in IMC conditions; night during climbout on last leg of pairing for day. PM in left seat questioned IAS and relayed that he was seeing IAS rollback; altitude fluctuate on PFD display and matched in HUD. PF had associated IAS and ALT disagree annunciations matched on bottom of PFD. Both FMC/CDU screens became degraded. Flight Director and map displays were normal. Ex: winds aloft data both on IRS and on FMC were not accurate with report info from PIREPS as relayed by ATC. No Master Caution illuminated. No CBs popped. PM discovered EEC [in] alt mode on overhead; depressed recall then engine light noted. PF sought VMC conditions with ATC and maintained aircraft control and ATC comms. PM performed QRH checklist; comms with Dispatch and Maintenance via phone patch as VHF comm frequencies on release weren't satisfactory. Dispatch recommended ZZZ (close by) and later [continue to destination]. Crew chose to maintain VMC above undercast with good ambient lighting all the way to destination reported with straight-in long runway and VMC conditions. Fuel log with Dispatch; IAS and ALT cross checks with ATC were performed while troubleshooting malfunctioning systems. Landed uneventfully at destination; maintained VMC entire portion of leg. System operated normally on descent after Descent Checklist completion. Air data computer failure of this nature not common. Never experienced kind of indications without associated Master Caution prior to this event. Felt risk of descending into IMC conditions or congested airport environment with degraded flight instruments could have become compounded further with any more malfunctions of PFD instruments PF was monitoring. Both PF and PM had never been exposed to a similar malfunction in training. Exposing this scenario would be valuable. We discussed [previous] pitot static aircraft problems where PF used HUD as only info available to maintain aircraft control and situational awareness. PM PFD erroneous indications matched in HUD and EEC soft alt mode switchover.

At approximately 15;000 feet in IMC; icing conditions; all probe heat and engine anti ice on; PM (me) noticed a/s alt roll back. Queried PF--he had more reliable data; and maintained a/c control. I believe I heard a lone callout of 'airspeed' from the GPWS. I thought; why aren't we getting the stall warning? Tried to analyze all seemingly unrelated malfunctions: Bad data in HUD (269 knot tailwind) and CDU's; checked circuit breakers (all in). No master caution light or display source light illuminated. Noticed EEC's in soft alt; hit Master Caution and ENG remained illuminated. Pilots conferred and agreed that returning not as desirable as seeking VMC conditions to get out of a possible cause (icing conditions). Wanted VMC to analyze the situation; in case it worsened and the only way was to climb. Climbing to better fuel economy altitudes would also buy us more time; and provide more options if we had to divert; once we knew what was wrong. Verified our altitude and airspeed with ATC and requested block altitudes. After being stabilized; attempted contact with Dispatch/Maintenance. Could not raise on several frequencies; got phone patch. Was hoping for an easy fix from Maintenance. Phone patch became unreliable; made contact on VHF. PF continued to verify alt and a/s with each controller. PM made fuel checks with dispatch. At some point Dispatch offered ZZZ as a divert. We did not like this idea as we still did not fully know what was wrong; would have to go into IMC; and it was close so we would have been rushed. ZZZ1 was also not liked as an option for similar reasons and traffic. The previous leg we flew was from ZZZ2 so we knew the further east we went the more VMC we'd have. At one point Maintenance asks if we had a 'display source' light; we did not. When referencing the display source checklist; our problem and overall situational awareness became clearer: With the opposite autopilot on; a DEU failure will cause the erroneous readings (failures) to the other pilots displays. Also it says the EEC's will be in soft alt and to run the EEC failure checklist. We were unable to restore anything; but at least we had a pretty good idea of the nature of the problem. At this point; our original destination; long runways and VMC conditions; seemed like the best option and we were almost there; so we continued to original destination and considered preparations for a safe arrival. At 13;000 feet; for no apparent reason; all of our instrumentation returned.

B737-700 flight crew experiences airspeed and altitude anomalies on the Captain's displays during climb. Crew elects to maintain an intermediate altitude in VMC and continue to destination also VMC. During descent the Captain's instruments return to normal.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Many of our fellow pilots have said to me that many pilots and others have been affected by COVID in one way or another; either necessitating quarantine or even hospitalization. Further; and in particularly our fleet; there is a disruption to the training schedules due to a lack of instructors; hence little; if any continuity. Have the Union and the Company considered shutting down for another month as the surge upon surge rages? There's no need to rush training if pilots will go non-current without the additional flying. Plus an additional month might get us to the beginning of a vaccination.I don't know if I have missed communications or not from the Union or the Company; but what is the plan for vaccinating pilots or other front line employees? Is there a timetable? Where do we stand in the national 'Phase 1' rollout? Has an update to the memorandum on pay during COVID sick leave been considered? Specifically; what happens to the pilot who receives round 1 or 2 of the vaccination and has to call in sick due to side effects. What happens to a pilot who has adverse side effects which lead to LTD? Could this pilot apply for the new LTD benefits and not wait until month X? Is a pilot required to take the vaccination? If yes; what happens if he declines? Where will pilots get the vaccination? Does a pilot have to wait until the Company procures the vaccine? What has FAA medical said about any of this?

Air Carrier Captain reported concerns regarding company COVID-19 related plans pertaining to sick leave; vaccinations; training schedules; etc.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

On the descent on the arrival; we received a clearance to descend and maintain FL180 near. The altitude was selected and confirmed and a descent was initiated. This clearance is uncommon on this arrival and we were anticipating to continue the descent for the expected ZZZZZ Intersection crossing at 8;000. Passing through roughly FL185 we began to adjust the altimeters for the transition forgetting that we were leveling off at FL180. We began the altimeter transition slightly early due to an abnormally high altimeter setting (30.43) and the effects that it has on a VNAV descent path especially with a strong tailwind. As we began leveling off we remembered that we were cleared to level off at FL180 and therefore had the wrong altimeter setting in. We immediately readjusted the altimeter to STD (29.92) which then showed us roughly 400 feet low. We immediately climbed back up to FL180 with the appropriate altimeter setting. No conflict was noted and ATC did not seem to notice. We deviated from our clearance altitude for a total of roughly 20 seconds. This was definitely an example of expectation bias and a breakdown of established procedures. As the Pilot Monitoring (PM); I failed the Pilot Flying (PF) when I did not adhere to sterile cockpit procedures within 1;000 of level off. We had received a confusing radio transmission from Center shortly before the event and it distracted us and caused me to lose situational awareness momentarily. I was also looking at the STAR on the iPad instead of monitoring the level off as I should have. Adhere to established procedures.

Cleared to descend to FL180 while on Arrival. There is a crossing restriction of 8;000 at ZZZZZ Intersection. With an abnormally high altimeter setting I tried to slowly adjust the altimeter so as to make a smooth transition thru FL180 to avoid a pitch over on the vertical path with the strong tailwind. I had forgotten we were told to maintain FL180. We are usually given the crossing at ZZZZZ Intersection prior to this point and would continue descent. After we leveled (at 18;000) I immediately realized my error. When resetting STD on altimeter we were actually at 17;600. I corrected back to FL180. No conflict occurred and ATC seemed not to notice. Flight continued normally. I had an expectation bias and thought I was being proactive for a smoother flight. Lesson learned. Simply trying to make a smoother consistent descent path. Greater situational awareness that we were cleared to maintain 180 and not planning too far ahead for continuing descent as I had expected.

EMB-190 flight crew reported inadvertently setting local altimeter while assigned FL180.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned to deadhead from to ZZZ to perform an unpressurized flight due to lightning strike on a B767 aircraft. Upon arrival in ZZZ Captain and I were taken to the maintenance operations office at the ZZZ hangar where we were given the AML for Aircraft X. At the same time we observed ZZZ crew who was reviewing the logbook for the same issue for Aircraft Y. Upon further examination and having prior experience with such flights we discovered that the aircraft was not configured for unpressurized flight under the provisions of the MEL. We queried the Aircraft Y crew as to whether they had a similar procedure performed on their aircraft and discovered no unpressurized procedure had been performed on that aircraft either. At approximately the same time we discovered our flight plan had been planned for a cruising altitude of FL400. The crew for Aircraft Y had a flight plan for the same. We contacted dispatch to conference and correct the flight plan and revision 2 of the flight plan was issued for 10;000 feet. We advised the local maintenance personnel that the aircraft needed to be configured for unpressurized flight In Accordance With (IAW) an MEL procedure prior to ferry and contacted Maintenance and advised the same. The crew for Aircraft Y did the same. While local maintenance was deliberating over what to do both crews waited for local maintenance and Dispatch to decide on a procedure to proceed.ZZZ maintenance was reluctant to perform any task and told us to write the aircraft up. We advised them that preparing the aircraft for unpressurized flight was a maintenance responsibility and to confer with Dispatch. The Maintenance and Dispatch per a conversation Captain had agreed the aircraft should be properly configured for unpressurized ferry. In the meantime we broke for lunch and waited on a response. During the same period the crew from Aircraft Y contacted their Chief Pilot and advised them of the current situation and explained to them that (paraphrasing) that they became aware through discussions with us that there may be additional procedures that are required to prepare an aircraft for unpressurized flight that they were not aware and that other line crews assigned to those type of flights may not be aware of. During Her discussion she brought the phone to me to explain in further detail to him what was required prior to flight. I explained that we had performed several of these flights recently and had complied with the MEL on those flights and that per the MEL for adequate smoke removal and cooling such procedure should be performed. He advised me that he was at a Chiefs meeting that there would [be someone to] speak with him for further details. I advised him that [this individual] should be very familiar with the reason for performing such procedure because of our past experience performing such Ferry flights. Several hours later Captain receives a telephone call questioning what the problem was and why we were delayed in performing the ferry. Captain advised that there was a procedure and that the aircraft needed to be properly configured for the aforementioned reasons. [The Captain was told] on the phone that 'you make it so hard'. A little while later [the] Captain received notification to return to base and I was advised by the crew coordinator to ZZZ to perform the same flight the following day with a line First Officer. The crew of Aircraft Y returned to the maintenance hangar to check the status of their aircraft to be told that the aircraft was good 'as is' and essentially to take it 'as is'. During this time I was advised by that [maintenance] had told her that she need not concern herself with our advice concerning the MEL procedure and that (we) were 'renegade or rogue'. Captain had questions concerning the proper dispatch of the aircraft and configuration and eventually timed out for crew duty day reasons. Upon arrival to the hotel I pulled up the next day flying assignments and daily recap. The daily recap acknowledged that the crew were 'waiting for maintenance to comply with MEL for unpressurized ferry'. Upon further investigation of the following day's assignment I discovered that I was not to proceed with the ferry of aircraft X and that a line crew had been assigned to the ferry in my stead. Additionally at approximately the same time a line crew had been assigned to ferry Aircraft Y. It needs to be noted that the GPM Chapter 10 requires the Chief pilot flight test be consulted for the assignment of crews to perform Maintenance Ferry Flight [MFF] and to put in place any special procedures or restrictions. Per procedure that discussion would have to of taken place prior to those crews being assigned. The following morning I saw in [dispatch] the flights had departed for ZZZ1. I researched the FMR's of both aircraft and discovered neither aircraft had any MEL or maintenance provisions applied that would have configured them for pressurized flight. After the aircraft arrived in ZZZ1 local base maintenance personnel advised us that no pre-Ferry BOW had been performed in ZZZ and that additional lightning strike damage had been discovered while undergoing inspection at the base. Additionally in the case of Aircraft Y as it concerns the spotting message; the type of flight crew required was noted as being a 'Supervisory Crew'; but a line crew was assigned. I believe in both instances this to be a serious infraction of the GPM; MEL; and AMM procedures. I also believe this to be a known intentional disregard for procedures and safety on behalf of the Chief Pilot in his assignment of a line crew to ferry Aircraft X and Aircraft Y the following day after codifying the day prior in his recap that the crew previously assigned was awaiting MEL provisions to be complied with.Furthermore; his assigning me to [someone] in ZZZ under the auspices of performing such ferry when the MEL procedures were completed and at the very same time approving a line crew to ferry the very same aircraft is a concerted and deliberate effort to have a unsuspecting line crew move the aircraft without the corporate knowledge from the previous day. I believe this to be intentional because [the Chief Pilot] had a flight test pilot familiar with the procedures (me) in place at ZZZ and had he wanted to make sure the provisions where complied with he would have communicated that to [maintenance] and had me fly the aircraft. Instead; it appears he engaged in 'shopping' for a line crew to 'move the metal' that was not properly configured for the type of flight to be conducted. Furthermore; the appropriate action once a line crew was approved for such flight he should have made sure they were briefed concerning the procedure for correctly configuring the aircraft for unpressurized flight. These procedures are in place to provide for adequate equipment cooling and smoke removal. Knowingly disregarding the procedure places unnecessary risk upon our crews and company assets. It also places our Continuous Authorization to conduct ferry flights in jeopardy. Nefariously approving/assigning line crews to perform an MFF while capitalizing on their lack of familiarity is outside the bounds of acceptable behavior. I firmly believe these issues need to be investigated and appropriate controls immediately put in place to prevent such occurrences from happening again.

B767-300 Captain reported aircraft were being readied for unpressurized ferry flight not in compliance with the MEL and were being crewed by line pilots vice supervisory pilots.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MKK Tower was told to HFR [Hold for Release] Aircraft X when he called to request his departure. An aircraft was inbound on the RNAV approach; and a second aircraft was about to enter holding over the VORTAC; to await his approach. MKK airport is one-in-one-out because MKK Tower is a contract tower; not operated by the FAA. HCF C enter needs to wait for the arrival or cancelation of an aircraft before a second aircraft may be cleared into the airport.When MKK Tower was told to HFR Aircraft X; the Controller at MKK Tower became argumentative and told me to hold my other aircraft and let Aircraft X depart. The MKK Tower controller also stated that I was delaying the aircraft on the ground. What the MKK Controller did not understand is that holding two aircraft so another aircraft to depart would cause delays to two aircraft; already in the air. The MKK controller also needs to understand that he does not call the sequence; HCF center calls the sequence; and HCF center also grants MKK tower approval to issue release of aircraft.  When MKK tower controller became argumentative; it distracted me from an already busy sector that was combined; without a D-side. I was working R3; R7; D3; & D7 combined. This is unacceptable. I told the MKK tower controller to call the desk because I did not have time to explain air traffic controller procedures to him.  Two Recommendations:First; MKK tower controllers need to be reminded that HCF center controls the airport and the release of all aircraft off the airport. HCF center determines which aircraft; in which order; will also land at that airport.Second; HCF management needs to open sectors when they are busy. D3 definitely should have been opened; and I also think R7/D7 should have also been opened. HCF management needs to staff positions; and not keep positions combined. We work combined sectors because of the short-staffing; and it is definitely a SAFETY ISSUE. HCF management needs to focus on the priority of aircraft safety by opening sectors. Right now; it seems a priority is to remove controllers from the floor to do computer training and recurrent training; and work short. If HCF management is required to have controllers do computer training and recurrent training during the busiest times of the day; overtime should be called to cover all the employees that are removed from the floor to have adequate staffing. Right now; staffing is poor; and it seems it's mostly due to having controllers removed from their positions to do computer training or recurrent training.

Honolulu Center Controller reported that another Controller wanted to change the sequence he had already set up; but was not his right to do so. The reporter described other issues relating to staffing.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 1600

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

This morning I checked AWOS for weather at CEC for a flight from ZZZ1. The report was VFR. In addition; a fellow pilot was at CEC and also advised via telephone that the airport was VFR. I departed ZZZ1 for the short flight to CEC. Immediately upon climbout; I could see that the sky was entirely clear. I made an initial report 5 miles out. When I advised a 1 mile final for 30; another pilot asked me to repeat; and I did so. As I was touching down; the other pilot advised that 'the AWOS showed IFR.' There were no aircraft in the pattern. I taxied off the runway and immediately pulled up the AWOS information for CEC; which showed the airport at VFR conditions. Because I was concerned with the unknown pilot's pronouncement; I took a screen shot of this information. I have subsequently learned that the AWOS service at CEC has recently been criticized by local pilots for showing IFR conditions when in fact completely clear and VFR. I do not know if this has been formally raised with the airport manager. While I do not believe that I was in violation of airspace rules; in an excess of caution I determined to file this report. In 25 years of aviating; I have never filed a report nor had any violations of any kind.

Reporter stated the AWOS is located on the beach and may be indicating false readings based on mist from high wave action or other phenomena associated with location.  He stated other pilots report that it may well report inaccurate during actual IFR causing serious issues.

Small aircraft pilot reported frequent erroneous weather AWOS reports at CEC airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

The RADAR was released to airway facilities. Both of the supervisors on duty refused to release the RADAR due to traffic volume and approaching weather. The first few aircraft that I worked deviated 20-25 miles north and south to avoid thunderstorm activity. I was unable to provide any assistance because of the RADAR outage. This was one of the most potentially disastrous situations I've encountered in 20 years and was completely avoidable. It is my understanding that because we had people here on per diem to work on the RADAR; the facility manager released the RADAR to airway facilities. When the supervisor on duty evaluates the current conditions; the release determinations should be binding.

TRACON Controller voiced concern regarding the facility managers decision to release the RADAR equipment to maintenance during weather deviation operations contrary to the denial of the floor supervisors.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were following a B777 to RWY 8R in IAH. There was a 30 knot quartering tailwind during the approach and our spacing with the heavy started getting closer and closer. Crossing MATON; the airplane started to sink below the glide slope and the GPWS was activated. We followed the go-around procedure and came around for a non-eventful visual approach and landing.

B737 Captain reported sinking below the glideslope on approach to IAH in trail of a B777.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1351; Flight Crew Type 1150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

I preflighted the aircraft and did a run-up prior to takeoff.  Everything was normal in the preflight and run-up.  After applying power upon reaching the rotation speed I aborted [the] takeoff because the engine was not producing enough power and slid off the end of the runway.

PA24 pilot reported his engine was not producing normal power on takeoff roll; so he rejected and ran off the end of the runway.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

95% of passengers had masked removed as I came through the cabin to do trash pick up and food and beverage service.  Passengers were talking and eating as I walked through cabin collecting their used trash and liquids.  Several spoke to me asking for items without their masks on.Company safety guidelines not a priority when it comes to Flight Attendant safety.  Impossible to enforce 6 foot distance and masks during food and beverage service even though numerous announcements regarding wearing mask while FA are in the aisle. Protect the front line employees during this COVID-19 pandemic.  Risking employee lives over a beverage/food service contradicts safety guidelines.

Flight Attendant reported the majority of passengers were not complying with face mask policy.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 25

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Experienced a low speed groundloop upon rollout. Aircraft veered right. No damage was noted to the runway; lights; or median and we verified that no damage to the aircraft occurred. ATIS was calling winds at 350/7; tower reported winds variable at 6 kts. On short final we picked up the windsock which was indicating the wind to be close to the 350/7 reported on ATIS. We considered a go around; and ask for an approach to runway 35; and in hindsight should have. The touch down (wheel landing) and initial rollout was fine even as the tailwheel touched down. The wind must have had enough push to initiate the groundloop at what I'd estimate to be about 20 KIAS and at this point; with little to no rudder effectiveness and the tailwheel locked; we lost command of directional control. We used brakes to control the stop to their max performance. The three wheels maintained contact with the ground throughout the incident and the aircraft came to a relatively gentle stop in the grass. We then taxied clear of the median and to the ramp without incident.

A Kinner Sportster pilot reported a low speed ground loop when a light crosswind caused loss of directional control on landing roll.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was cleared for the ILS Runway 25R from straight in by the DYNR controller.  Aircraft Y was turned base off the downwind by the STAR controller descending to 2200 feet.  Aircraft Y was going to go Runway 24L.  Aircraft Y was not established on final but still on a heading to join the localizer inside of the parallel monitor capture box.  I noticed this; while working PM2 and asked the DYNR controller if he had Aircraft X on frequency; and he did not.  I then asked the PM1 controller if he had Aircraft X on frequency; and he did not.  Subsequently Aircraft X descended out of 3200 feet on the approach and by the time Aircraft X was on PM1 frequency; Aircraft Y was establishing on the localizer.  At this time; Aircraft X was out of 3000 feet descending; next to the Aircraft Y aircraft at 2200 feet.  If the Class Bravo was extended further east  at 2500 feet; the STAR controller would not be inclined to take chances like this.  Further; if there were step downs on both ILS's; like ORD; we could work around this.

SCT Controller reports of a loss of separation he watches happen; tries to make others aware but the aircraft are in a frequency change.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 480; Flight Crew Type 408

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

During a practice approach RNAV XXL ZZZ on IFR flight plan we were cleared for the approach.  We had also been told to change frequency to the advisory frequency of ZZZ so now not in contact with Approach.  We observed traffic on our 5:30 300 feet below and closing fast.  We were supposed to be descending which would have made the closure rate greater. We attempted to reach out to the other aircraft via the CTAF with out any response and then decide to take evasive maneuvers and turned left away from  traffic.  We made a 360 to avoid the traffic all while in VMC and continued the practice approach and reported the miss to TRACON.  when we switched back to TRACON to report the missed the controller was not happy that we had turned and wanted to know why we said we had to take evasive action for a tragic issue and did so to avoid a collision. He said we did not report it quickly enough and the he could not trust us; yet he did not mention the tragic closing quickly on us before we were handed off in the first place.  We discovered the aircraft behind us and closing on our ADSB display and as soon as we turned away from the direction of travel we saw the aircraft.  If we had followed the approach path exactly we would have descended directly into his path but ahead of him.  We never observed the other aircraft slow down or turn away from the similar heading as us.

M20-K single pilot reported an NMAC event during approach with unreported traffic on a collision course.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

HPN airport; holding short of Runway 34; awaiting takeoff clearance; the crew observed the following. A Gulfstream was cleared to land runway 34. The Gulfstream was in the landing flare at approximately 40 feet when tower issued 'go around; go around' to the Gulfstream. We were watching it land when the command was issued. The Gulfstream pitched up and executed a go around as a small Cessna landing runway 29 passed directly under the Gulfstream on the landing rollout. I estimate 50 feet separation; at most. We observed this from about 150 yards away. This was about as close as it gets without an explosion. The Gulfstream returned for a landing and ask 'why the go-around'.  Tower replied; Cessna landed without landing clearance. Nothing else was said between Tower and the Gulfstream. I believe Tower/ATC/Approach made a near fatal error in not recognizing the proximity of the Cessna to the cleared to land Gulfstream. After the event; operations resumed normally with business jets/airliners landing 34 and small aircraft landing one after another Runway 29. I believe during these type of operations a high level of vigilance should exist between only highly experienced Tower/ATC Controllers. I have seen similar incidents happen at HPN. Tower controller seemingly [had] 'lack of experience' or [experienced] 'loss of situational awareness.'

Corporate jet Captain reported observing a near-collision between a Gulfstream landing on HPN Runway 34 and a Cessna landing on Runway 29. Reporter was of the opinion it was an ATC error.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

On the takeoff roll we experienced the notorious 'dirty sock' smell. The smell was quite strong. I elected to continue the takeoff as we were already above 80 knots. As we began our climbout the smell began to fade; and eventually seemed to go away outside an occasional whiff detected by myself or my First Officer. We were unable to put our oxygen masks on during the event as we were task saturated flying the airplane. I sent an ACARS to Dispatch to notify them of the smell and that we would need Maintenance in ZZZ1. Dispatch asked if the smell had been present in the cabin; and after speaking with my flight attendants I confirmed that they had not noticed anything. Upon arriving in ZZZ1 I wrote up the discrepancy as 'dirty sock smell in cockpit only'. ZZZ1 Maintenance deferred Pack 1 and the smell was not noticed on subsequent flights.As additional information based upon my review of the aircraft logbook; this has been a recurring issue with this aircraft; having been written up no less than 3 times in the last month. The Pack that was deferred is also associated with an engine that has had multiple write ups for high LP (Low Pressure) vibration and seems to have a high rate of oil consumption.

EMB-175 Captain reported experiencing dirty sock fumes smell during takeoff.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X departed ZZZ and was instructed to fly heading 070. Aircraft X requested to go off frequency to acquire the ATIS information for ZZZ1. I instructed Aircraft X to squawk a new code and then approved his request to go off frequency and to advise when back on. Aircraft X was about 10 miles from a 4;000 FT MVA area and I felt he would be able to gather the information and return to frequency in time for me to turn him. While Aircraft X was off frequency; I was adjusting his data block and accidentally terminated control and removed him from the STARS. I re-entered the information but I did so incorrectly. I put his call sign as Aircraft Y. About a minute or two later Aircraft X was approaching the boundary for the 4;000 FT MVA. I reached out to see if he was back on frequency yet; but I called out for Aircraft Y because of my earlier mistake. Another Controller asked me if I was watching Aircraft Y and I replied that they were off frequency. I tried to reach aircraft on Guard; but again I called out Aircraft Y. Several minutes later Aircraft X called up and asked; 'Did you mean Aircraft X?' I realized my error and replied; 'Aircraft X climb and maintain 4;000 FT fly heading 340.' His present heading was towards an even higher MVA. I asked Aircraft X if he had acquired the ATIS. He said that he did not; so I just read the ATIS to him myself. Aircraft X reached 4;000 FT safely and then was vectored and landed safely at ZZZ1. I should have either put Aircraft X at a higher altitude or put him on a safer heading. I could also have just read the ATIS information to the pilot initially.

TRACON Controller approved a frequency change to an IFR aircraft to acquire the ATIS information which led to a below MVA event.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During our takeoff roll; the LH FLT SPLR light came on which also resulted in the takeoff configuration warning horn sounding. This occurred around the same time as the '80 knots' callout made by the PM. I called 'Abort; Abort; Abort'; rejected the takeoff; and noted that the max speed we attained was a little less than 90 knots. We exited the runway and returned to the FBO to evaluate what had happened and what our options were. After extensive consultation with my crew; maintenance; dispatch; and the chief pilot; we determined that we could not MEL the flight spoiler given its type of the failure and therefore I elected to terminate the flight.A takeaway I have from this event is how we conduct our pre-takeoff briefing. My standard brief is that we abort for anything below 80 knots and between 80 and V1 we only abort for an engine failure; fire; loss of directional control; or thrust reverser deployment. I am going to consider revising that statement/plan after this event. In this particular instance; the warning horn came on long after I had set takeoff thrust; and because I am conditioned to associate that sound with the aircraft being unsafe to takeoff; I think an abort is appropriate up to V1 (this is contrary to my current brief). I plan to change my briefing slightly to include this sort of occurrence as an abort-able condition between 80 and V1.

A Bombardier Challenger Captain reported a flight spoiler warning during takeoff roll at about 80 knots. He elected to abort the takeoff and return to the ramp for a Maintenance evaluation of the problem.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Incorrect understanding of new company normal procedures leading to non-compliance. Pilots trying to 'force' old procedure over the new procedure template. Compliance rate is near zero. No formal training on new procedures before introduction; insufficient explanation of differences between triggers; flows; procedures; and policy compliance. Revise or abandon new procedures in favor of a more logical regimen.

B737 Captain reported no formal training on new procedures before introduction; insufficient explanation of differences between triggers; flows; procedures; and policy compliance.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As flight was lining up with the Gate utilizing the DGS; a white; full-size; pickup truck approached from the aircraft right at a high rate of speed and accelerating. Crew was forced to slam on the brakes to avoid a collision. Flight Attendant reported that several passengers in window seats on the right side of the aircraft had been alarmed that we were about to get hit.After the threat was avoided; crew completed parking safely and reported the incident to Ramp Control. A ramp manager was requested. The manager was advised of the extremely unsafe driving. The Chief Pilot was also advised of the situation.

CRJ200 Captain reports a near collision with a high speed pickup truck while attempting to park at the gate using the DGS. A quick by the Captain avoids the collision.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 106; Flight Crew Total 12485; Flight Crew Type 4687

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

SFO was landing and departing on the 28s because of the strong westerly winds at the airport. As our aircraft was slowing down during the landing roll; SFO Tower instructed us to exit at Tango and hold short of 28L. I acknowledged the clearance and we complied. The Captain stopped the aircraft approximately 10-15 feet prior to the hold short line. Shortly thereafter; SFO Tower cleared us to cross Runway 28L and contact Ground. The Captain started to taxi when he applied the brakes heavily and simultaneously said; 'What the??' At that time; I saw an A330 on the landing roll on 28L exiting the runway at Delta. I can't recall if our aircraft actually crossed the hold short line or not; but the fact of the matter is we were given a clearance to cross the runway with another aircraft on that runway; and that's concern enough. Transmissions on the Tower frequency at the time were heavy and there was some blocked transmissions. I informed the Tower what had just occurred; and we were again given a clearance to cross Runway 28L and contact Ground. As we were actually crossing the runway; SFO Tower instructed an A320 on final to Runway 28L to go-around. I contacted SFO Ground on the other side of 28L for taxi instructions to the gate. Of course; the gate was occupied. SFO Ground cleared us to turn right on Bravo and contact company about a gate assignment. Prior to that; I asked Ground if Tower knew what had just happened to us. His response was quite disturbing to me. Ground basically was blowing it off as nothing. His transmissions included statements; 'It's really not a big deal'; the A330 was at 'taxi speed'; and 'Don't worry about it.' I replied that it wasn't that way from our seat. His response continued; 'Tower has a lot of aircraft'; 'Approach was packing several flights on final'; etc. I am really discouraged when a Controller doesn't take an actual (potential) runway incursion seriously. This is obviously still a great concern in this industry. The Captain told me that he could not get a good view of final prior to crossing the runway because of the angle of Tango to Runway 28L. The Captain said that when he started seeing the landing lights from the A330 flight lighting up the runway; he then looked and saw the jet on the landing roll. The Captain also mentioned that he thought he heard Tower instruct the A330 to turn off at Echo. I did not hear that clearance; but again; there was quite a bit of frequency congestion and transmissions being blocked during this time.

After what it seemed a longer than the usual holding time between active runways; mainly due to heavy volume of arriving traffic on both runways; the Tower Controller gave us further taxi clearance to cross Runway 28L. The First Officer acknowledged the taxi instructions. By the way; there was no mention to us on the part of the Tower Controller of any related traffic on Runway 28L. Soon after we received our taxi clearance; I turned on all of our external lights; released the parking brake handle and proceeded to slowly commenced our taxi towards Runway 28L. I would like to add that due to the acute angle where Taxiway Tango (T) intercepts Runway 28L there is a very limited view towards the left approach side of the runway. As we taxied only a few feet forward; prior to entering the runway; I was surprised to see an incoming heavy Airbus still rolling down Runway 28L! Immediately; I stopped the aircraft; just short of the runway; with enough separation from the Airbus to prevent an impending collision. The airliner passed in front of us and exited the runway left onto Taxiway Tango (T). The First Officer consequently inquired the Tower as to the conflicting taxi clearance. A different Controller re-cleared us to cross the runway. Afterward; we concluded that the most likely sequence of events was that the A330 apparently rolled past its expected exit point; didn't say anything about it; and the Tower Controller didn't catch it. Fortunately; we were taxing slowly enough as to be able to stop the aircraft in time. Additionally; the extended landing roll of the heavy airliner also necessitated the Tower Controller to issue a go-around clearance to a A320 that had been given prior clearance to land on Runway 28L. That could have been an added distraction to the Tower Controller. Aside from an additional gate delay issue; the rest of the taxing in to the gate was uneventful.

B757 flight crew holding short of Runway 28L at SFO reports a ground conflict with an A330 landing 28L.  The B757 crew is cleared to cross before the A330 arrives at the same taxiway.  An Airbus on final is issued a go-around.


Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While descending on the Milton arrival into LGA; leveling at 10;000 ft; we received an instruction to fly heading 100 from ATC due to traffic as we simultaneously received a TCAS RA. The RA instructed us to descend; this command was followed and ATC was notified. Following this command resulted in us being at approximately 9;300ft at 310 kts. After we were clear of conflict ATC advised us to maintain 9;000 ft and the aircraft was immediately slowed to 240 kts. Flight Crew was uncertain if this RA conflict resulted in another RA from an aircraft lower; or if it was just an advisory.Late instructions from ATC with regards to VFR traffic avoidance. TCAS RA required an immediate descent below 10;000 MSL without opportunity to slow the aircraft below 250 kts. Recommend better coordination between sector controllers and VFR aircraft operating in the Class B airspace.

EMB-145 First Officer reported exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 FT in response to an RA on arrival into LGA.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

Following two previous approach attempts into ZZZ1 followed by diversions to our Filed Alternates; on [consecutive evening and morning flights] of Aircraft X. I was advised by Dispatch that if the Crew was willing; they would like us to fly back to ZZZ1 and make yet a third attempt. I immediately said I did not feel safe operating the flight as I didn't feel the approach was safe based on the current conditions at the airport; and the weather we had experienced during the last two attempts. I then stated I would not be willing to make another attempt. During the first attempt (Aircraft X ZZZ-ZZZ1) we experienced moderate turbulence; gusty winds; heavy rain; in IMC at night followed by a Windshear Warning and Escape Maneuver at 150 ft. AGL; following this up with a consecutive approach the next morning (Aircraft X ZZZ2-ZZZ1) resulting in an early Go-Around / Diversion to alternate due to Heavy Rain; Moderate to Severe Turbulence on Approach; Strong Crosswinds on Final; Changing (Increasing) Gusting Wind Conditions on the surface and the previous aircraft making a Severe Turbulence Encounter Report on Final with the Controller inquiring as to passenger injuries on board. This led to a phone call from my direct Supervisor; who tried to convince me the operation was safe. I clearly stated to both persons; that our Dispatch Release reads; and I quote.. 'By Signing this Dispatch Release we are affirming our belief that this flight can be made safely'. I was very clear that after my previous two attempts; I did not feel comfortable operating the flight. The Initial Plan was for us to depart in just 30 minutes after refueling; which again I stated I did not feel safe operating the flight. Followed by yet another phone call from my Supervisor who reviewed the weather with me. Explaining things were much better now and we can depart. Again; I expressed my concerns as to the safety of the flight based on recent experience in the storm system; and inaccuracies experienced with the past weather reports that allowed us to dispatch prior. I felt I was being pushed to operate the flight. My Supervisor continued to tell me of other carriers that made it into ZZZ1 today. Once again I explained they didn't deal with what we had to do; and again relayed I was not comfortable making a flight to ZZZ1 today. After some discussion; it seemed my Supervisor was becoming agitated stating that if I didn't fly he would have to. I remained silent as this was not pertinent to my decision. I was again asked to operate - to which I repeated my opinion that I didn't feel it was a safe operation and I would not even go there as a passenger if you asked me to at that time. I was then told I was being pulled from the flight; I was being relieved of all duty pending an investigation and I would hear from someone in the company. The phone call was then disconnected by the other party.I feel this was an attempt to force a flight crew to accept a flight that I had clearly stated I didn't feel it was safe to operate. I feel that this is a violation of the Captain's joint Authority with Dispatch to operate a flight and is in direct conflict with PIC's (Pilot in Command) responsibility and authority. It also seems to me to be in conflict with the creation of a 'Just Culture: required be FAA in implementing a SMS. A pilot should never be coerced to accept a mission he/she feels is unsafe. In this situation; the PIC was being asked to Dispatch into an area where an URGENT PIREP was broadcast via Center Frequencies advising of Moderate to Severe Turbulence reported below 11;000 ft. by an aircraft on Final Approach to ZZZ1. Another aircraft should not be dispatched to fly an approach in Severe Turbulence. The most basic principle is Dispatchers; Managers; and Supervisors need to listen to the people under their charges. Air Carriers need to stress the importance of Safety; by not just stating they have a culture based on Safety; but by actually exercisingone especially when performance metrics may not be met but safety goals will be achieved. As Pilots; I feel we are all mission-oriented; but the need to complete the mission can never exceed operational safety.

CRJ-200 Pilot reported being pressured to accept flight in unsafe weather conditions.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Other Glider

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 917; Flight Crew Type 603

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

My airplane got away from me and struck a parked vehicle. My airplane has no electrical system; hence; it requires to be propped by hand in order to start the engine. After several attempts to start the engine; the engine would die before I could get to the throttle control in the cockpit. I finally cracked the throttle and pulled the prop through with the switch off several times in order to raise the fuel vapors up to the cylinders. I then went back to the cockpit to turn the switch on. Then I went back to the prop to pull it through. The engine immediately started at a higher than normal RPM and the airplane began moving forward rapidly. I ran around the wing struts to get in the cockpit; but the door latch stuck and I couldn't reach the throttle. I then held on to the wing strut healed back as hard as I could so the airplane would go in circles instead of straight ahead until someone could come to help. However; the airplane was too heavy and after several circles I couldn't hold it any longer. The airplane then impacted the parked car.

GA pilot reported losing control of aircraft when attempting to hand crank the engine for start. The aircraft struck a stationary vehicle; damaging the aircraft.


Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

A person came to work and his wife had COVID. He was among several of coworkers in a Kiosk. I went with co-worker Y to Manager's office and explained the situation because we were in the Kiosk with him. We asked if the Kiosk could be cleaned right away before anyone else entered. She said she sent the Supervisor to wipe things down and that the cleaning service would clean/spray it tonight. Co-worker Y said the Supervisor did not wipe it down. This is a potential risk of spreading COVID to many people at work and their families. I gave co-worker Y my own personal can of LYSOL spray to use in the KIOSK.

Customer service representative reported that a kiosk was used by an employee whose wife had COVID. Reporter was advised the kiosk was cleaned; but another employee stated the kiosk was never cleaned.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 700

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While flying northbound along 101; after passing KSFO; KSFO tower (I'm pretty sure this happened before being handed off the NORCAL) instructed me to turn left and remain south of Sutro tower to avoid a TFR [sporting event]. Before starting the flight I called 1-800-WXBRIEF for a standard briefing and specifically asked about TFRs for this route of flight at the time it was flown. The briefer explicitly told me there were going to be no [sporting] TFRs. So; then I was surprised when the controller told me to avoid a TFR that Flight Service didn't know about. There was only about two hours difference between the time of the briefing and the time of my flight so I find it hard to believe that this was a surprise pop-up TFR. After all; the schedule is known well in advance to the rest of the United States; why doesn't Flight Service know about it? It seems I would get more authoritative TFR information by checking the Giants schedule online rather than calling Flight Service.Clearly there is something broken in the dissemination of TFRs to Flight Service. This is a problem that should be easily fixed. There is no excuse for this to happen.

The solo pilot was surprised to be advised in-flight that an sporting event TFR was in place around the ballpark when his weather briefer had been specifically stated that no TFR was planned during the flight briefing two hours prior.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X was slow to roll off of Runway 30L with traffic landing on Runway 35 approaching the box on the converging runway. I issued a without delay departure to Aircraft X; but they were still slow to roll as Aircraft Y approached the box.When we have a departure bank we should not be landing on Runway 35. There are appropriate times to land Runway 35 but not when the tower has departures.

MSP Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation with a departure rolling slowly and an arrival on a converging runway.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were cleared for the visual 20 about 10 miles out. I entered downwind at 3000 ft at flaps 20 at 180 knots. We had a crosswind at 52 knots pushing us out a little bit. I turned base around four miles out. I thought I was a little far out so I delayed adding more drag gear or flaps. But I did set in 2000 Ft in the altitude alerted. As I descended down I just forgot the field elevation was over 1300 ft. I noticed we were getting low passing 1100 ft so I stopped the descent which was at 940 ft. I immediately climbed back to 1200 ft and configured the aircraft for landing gear down flaps 30. Then flaps 45. We were still 4-5miles out turning final and established for landing at 1000 ft so there was no need for a go around. The aircraft was only below a 1000 ft for no more then 20-30 seconds; if that. I noticed the altitude getting low and corrected immediately. I was not thinking of field elevation when I set 2000 Ft in the altitude alerted. First Officer was the pilot monitoring and was looking for the obstacle that was out about 5 miles ahead of us.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight crew flying visual approach into RST went below 1000 feet AGL about 5 miles out. They corrected back to profile and completed a normal landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 7485; Flight Crew Type 3720

In this opportunity let me submit the following report to inform about the event TCAS/RA from the Flight into DEN. On our approach to Denver's airport we were given radar vectors from the right to land at runway 16R; everything was going as usual; on the last Vectors to intercept final approach  the controller asked us if we had the field insight to complete visual (we were completely on a visual condition) to runway 36R so we answer YES could make a VMC approach to runway 36R; she also told us that simultaneously approaches where in progress to runway 16L and she ask us if we had a Boeing 737 in sight (to our left) with the traffic being  100% insight we gave the controller the traffic insight. We intercept final and suddenly the TRAFFIC  alert system detected the other airplane so IT gave the Advisory TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC  like 3 or 4 seconds later gave the Resolution Advisory DESCEND; DESCEND I performed the maneuver by disconnecting the AP and descending to successfully perform the maneuver. I calculate approximately we were 1800 ft AGL and the maneuver lead us to lose about 400 ft until we heard the respective 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT 'of the airplane system; after that I just level the airplane to recover the flight path and landed with normal procedures. I would like to add to the report that all the time we has visual contact with the other traffic; what my logic takes me to; was that both systems sensed we were going to make the impact because of the proximity; time and speed of both aircraft but we were VMC all the time with the separation to the parallel runway. In conclusion they are still machines that's why they sense such events.

A320 crew received an RA while on a parallel approach. Uneventful landing completed after 'Clear of Conflict.'


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 618; Flight Crew Type 24

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I departed on an IFR flight. At approximately 300 - 400 feet AGL; the tower called and advised that they were not picking up my transponder. After several unsuccessful attempts at recycling the transponder; I tried to pull and reset the transponder breaker. At this point the entire electrical system failed and I lost all radio communication. I was approximately 12 miles west of the departure airport and turned around and headed back to the airport. I observed the green light gun signal from the tower and proceeded to a left downwind for runway 28L. Upon turning base; I attempted to lower the flaps with no success; as they are electrically operated. On short final; I realized I would not be able to stop the airplane and executed a go-around. I again picked up a left downwind for runway 28L and extended the downwind to give myself more time to slow the airplane and use a more shallow descent. Upon touching down; I exerted maximum braking pressure to try and bring the airplane to a stop before reaching the runway end. The wheels locked and the plane began to skid so I released pressure to get the wheels rolling again and not lose directional control. The wheels kept locking up intermittently and as I approached the runway end; it was apparent that I would not be able to stop before reaching the end. I swerved to the right to try and avoid the runway end lights but hit one of them with the right main landing gear strut. The airplane came to a stop in the grass approximately 30 yards past the runway end. Minor damage to the right landing gear strut aluminum cover but no damage to the strut itself.

A general aviation pilot reported a transponder problem that led into a complete electrical failure that resulted in a no flap; no radio return to the departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17.8

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure

Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were paired almost exactly side by side for the right and left runways. There was a heavy B777 that had preceded both to the left runway; with a southwest wind. Aircraft X announced they were 'on the go.' I gave standard missed approach instructions; heading 280 and 3;000 feet. Once they had read back and were climbing; I inquired if it was for a TCAS RA for the parallel traffic; since it could have easily been for wake turbulence. They keyed up with some sort of mechanical voice I am not familiar with in the background and said yes; it was a TCAS RA.After coordinating with TRACON for the go around; I resumed working traffic. I eventually called over to the ramp where company of Aircraft Y parks and asked the Ramp Controller to confirm a coordinated TCAS occurred with Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y pilot said they did not have an RA. I guess if one (below) is in TA mode; the one on top could still get the RA and climb. I do not have a suggestion; as I am not certain myself or any other controller fully understands how the TCAS beast exists in our National Airspace System (NAS).

A Tower Controller reported an aircraft initiated a go-around due to a TCAS/RA it received for parallel runway traffic that it had in sight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Total 6245; Flight Crew Type 3867

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I did not declare an emergency with ATC. We were already near Top of Descent with no traffic ahead. Getting medical attention was not time critical. The greatest risk was in the deplaning of our other passengers.While enroute to ZZZ; I was notified that 'A man in [seat] XX1 had declared that he had a high fever prior to boarding; and that he now felt very ill.' I queued an ACARS to Dispatch 'call me med' and waited for more information. Once I got this additional information and spelling of the man's name; I sent the message and spoke with Medical and Dispatch in attendance. In the meantime; I got another call indicating the man now said that he just had high blood pressure and would be okay. The load was light and we agreed to move the man to the back row and to move other passengers forward. The Flight Attendant's temperature strip was inconclusive. This information was passed to Medical. We issued the man an N-95 mask; and he wore it. The advice from Medical was to provide Tylenol and continue to ZZZ. Paramedics would meet us at the gate.IMPORTANT; it was then that FA called back to say there was an identity mistake. The actual seat assignment was XX6; not XX1. This meant that the passenger's name was incorrect during the Dispatch/Medical call. The incorrect passenger name is omitted to avoid confusion. I sent the correct name to Dispatch via ACARS.On approach to ZZZ; the man aspirated on the carpet and floor next to the last row and could not wear a mask. FA's notified me of this on taxi-in.Because of the concern for COVID-19; we made the decision that we would have passengers deplane quickly; then allow either the paramedics to the passenger; or allow the man to deplane. Inflight Supervisor and Customer Service Supervisor were at gate and aware of the de-boarding plan. The paramedic overruled the plan and rushed aboard. He proceeded to escort the man passed all the economy passengers and then blocked the jet-way several moments to get him into a wheelchair. I ordered the First Class cabin to deplane after the paramedic passed on his way to the back. I'm glad I did.The aircraft was towed away for disinfection. I checked in with Flight Ops enroute prior to landing and told a call would not be required. Checked in with Chief Pilot on the day after to determine COVID-19 result. There was no answer as of this writing.

Air Carrier Captain reported a passenger became ill during the flight and the crew was concerned it could be COVID-19.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

In the terminal area of MGGT; we were told that we were number three for the approach and that we were to hold at AUR VOR and to expect three turns in holding. After the second turn of the hold; approach told us to slow to minimum approach speed and exit hold cleared for the ILS Y 02. The weather over the airport was clear (we could look down and see the airport) but there were numerous clouds during the teardrop approach and we were mostly IMC. There was a flight ahead of us doing the ILS Z 02 approach. We were aware of their position on TCAS but couldn't really see where they were on the approach without a depiction of their teardrop on the Nav display.  We were at max landing weight and had the airplane configured and slowed as much as possible. As we approached the turn fix out on the AUR 220; it was becoming clear we were going to have a conflict; and soon had a TCAS RA as we began a turn to intercept. We followed the TCAS guidance and immediately  had a clear of conflict. We contacted ATC and were talking to a new controller; and requested a climb and turn to avoid the terrain ahead. They gave us a climbing left turn and radar vectored us for another approach. I think we had an inexperienced ATC controller as he was replaced by someone else as we complied with the TCAS RA guidance. This was a potentially bad scenario. Being cleared for an approach and having another aircraft on the opposite ILS tear drop approach. We were boxed in with not too many ways to get out; with high terrain in all quadrants but especially in the sector we were in. A missed approach can happen anywhere during the approach; not just at minimums.

Air carrier Captain reports being cleared for the ILS Y Rwy 02 from AUR just after another carrier is cleared for the ILS Z 02 at MGGT. This results in the reporter turning from the southwest to intercept the localizer while the other aircraft is turning from the south to intercept the same localizer. A TCAS RA results and the Captain climbs in compliance with the RA and is vectored for another approach by a different Controller.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 720

Confusion; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Procedure; Software and Automation

We were flying; from ZZZ to QRO (Queretaro; MX). During preflight inspection; the FMC database was current as well as both pilots' Electronic Flight Kits. While in-flight; the weather was reporting clouds at 1;200 feet 5 mile visibility and light winds. The runway in use was [Runway] 09. While in cruise flight; Mexico Center informed us to expect VOR DME 2 for RWY (Runway) 09 approach in QRO. The aircraft was set up; and the Pilot Flying (Captain) completed all briefings. While in cruise flight; Mexico Center gave us a late descent clearance which is very common on this flight that required LVL/CHG mode and speedbrakes to get back on path. While we were descending to our first cleared altitude (around 14;000 feet MSL); Mexico switched us to QRO Approach. Upon contact with QRO Approach about 15-20 miles out; they advised of a traffic on a ten mile final; and informed us to now expect the VOR DME 1 RWY 09 Approach. We were recleared direct to QRO VOR; provided another descent; and then shortly thereafter; Approach cleared us for the approach. The First Officer went into the FMC and configured it to fly direct to QRO VOR. After the aircraft was established on course to the VOR; the First Officer selected the QRO VOR fix in the FMC and inserted the VOR DME 1 RWY 09 approach after verification with the Captain. Because of the angle the aircraft was approaching the VOR (straight in Runway 09); and relative to the approach procedure (an outbound heading 292 followed by a left procedure turn inbound); an additional procedure turn was required just to begin the approach. The procedure turn would normally be done at the VOR. Due to the FMC not having a procedure turn at the VOR to begin the approach for arrivals from the west; it immediately started auto-sequencing fixes to fly the aircraft directly to the outbound procedure turn DME 10 from the QRO VOR. The First Officer had to re-enter the VOR into Direct To and build a holding pattern into the FMC. There was a missed approach holding pattern depicted on the approach chart; therefore; the First Officer built a hold based on the holding pattern published. The First Officer informed ATC that a procedure turn was required at the VOR and also notified approach that the aircraft would enter holding as published to begin the approach. ATC advised us to descend to 11;000 feet and cleared for the approach. ATC seemed confused as to what we were doing. It appears that they were expecting the aircraft to make a hard left after crossing the VOR (almost a 180 degree turn) into unprotected airspace that contained mountainous terrain. The minimum safe altitude for that sector is 12;800 feet and if the aircraft would have flown that; there could have been a CFIT event. Once the aircraft entered the holding pattern; making a procedure turn to enter the crew selected IMM EXIT and the aircraft completed the current holding pattern; just a procedure turn; and exited the hold to fly the entire approach as planned and expected. There seems to be an issue regarding the Jeppesen Charts; and FMC database for this specific approach. The FMC did not contain any proper procedure to join the approach legally. Also the FMC sequencing the approach could have presented multiple issues including CFIT; TCAS; or lost of Situational Awareness.

We were heading to MMQT to shoot the VOR 1 approach from the west. We were headed direct to the VOR with the approach loaded after that. Approximately 9 miles prior to the VOR the airplane started a left turn to join the outbound portion of the approach. This was not appropriate or legal. We turned the airplane back towards the VOR and realized there was nothing loaded to turn the airplane around to join the approach legally. There is also no procedure turn depicted on the chart. There was a holding pattern at the VOR and a missed approach procedure associated with the approach. We decided to enter the holding pattern at the proper altitude and told the controller we were doing that. That allowed the airplane to turn around and we were able to join and commence the approach that way. The rest of the approach was uneventful

Air carrier flight crew reported they were cleared for a VOR approach which required a procedure turn. There was no procedure turn published on their charts or contained in the FMC.


Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

On arrival into DCA via TRUPS ONE we were vectored off course prior to RANJR. We were then cleared direct to RANJR. Due to the workload briefing and reviewing the descent and approach; and increased cognitive load due to less familiarity with flat panel interpretation (particularly scale setting and screen clutter); I forgot to engage LNAV after executing [the direct to RANJR clearance]. ATC detected the deviation and cleared us direct to direct PJAAE; Cross PJAAE at FL240; and then descend via the arrival. My alert First Officer noticed that the [charted] crossing at PJAAE was between FL230 and FL210; so we would NOT be in the arrival envelope crossing PJAEE. He questioned the controller who modified the clearance to cross PJAEE at FL230; and then descend via. During this time we reviewed the way the TRUPS ONE track overlays the ROSSLYN LDA and planned our transition. (We had briefed landing Runway 1 prior to Top of Descent.) The way in which the TRUPS ONE arrival overlays the ROSSLYN LDA approach leads to confusion and distraction; it is difficult to reconcile the way in which these two approaches are integrated. We did not want to delete the redundant points early because we were not sure how ATC would clear us. This resulted in additional workload and distraction as we reconciled these two procedures and how to make the transition while ensuring that the descent parameters were being met--which required using speed brakes. Meanwhile; while we were in the midst of analyzing and briefing the approach while simultaneously confirming the airplane was complying with the arrival; ATC asked us twice if we were proceeding to a fix not on our arrival. Upon questioning; ATC acknowledged their error. However; this caused additional distraction and workload as our attention was drawn away from reviewing and briefing the approach. At this time; we received a vector off the descent and onto the RIVER VISUAL; in the vicinity of STAND. The combination of all these factors led to overlooking the speed restriction at STAND with which we did not comply. Upon receiving clearance for the RIVER VISUAL we were instructed to maintain NO LESS THAN 170 KTS to 5 DME. The absence of information or control relative to other traffic led us to believe that we were first for the field so I kept up our speed.We were then switched to the Final Controller who asked if we had a B757 in sight four miles ahead. This was the first mention of preceding traffic. We reported that we did not have the traffic in sight and were instructed to go around. Altogether this descent/approach combination seems poorly designed and poorly understood and executed by ATC. I accept responsibility for missing the direct clearance and speed restriction but believe the construction of the TRUPS ONE arrival; and its integration with the RIVER VISUAL was a mitigating factor.

A B757-200 flight crew was stymied by the complexity of the TRUPS RNAV STAR; confusing inquiries by ATC; an unfamiliar control panel display; vectors on and off the STAR; lack of familiarity with the procedure and--bottom line--the workload requried to monitor and comply with all the above. A directed go around due to separation with preceding traffic resulted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Declared Emergency

Flight attendants reported strong fumes in the rear of the airplane that were making both the crew and passengers sick. Symptoms included: sore throat; headache; and chest pain. They requested medical assistance meet the plane. The Captain declared an emergency with my support in case an evacuation would become necessary and to expedite our taxi to the gate.

During taxi for takeoff the B757 Captain declared an emergency and returned to the gate after the aft cabin developed strong fumes making passengers and flight attendants ill.


Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Wake turbulence encounter while on RNAV Y Runway 27 approach to SAN. We were approximately 4 miles from FAF (Final Approach Fix) at about 3000 ft when the aircraft rolled violently to the left beyond 60 degrees. The PF (Pilot Flying) applied full right aileron and pulled up to get out of the wake vortices's. I notified ATC (SoCal Approach) and asked if there was an aircraft ahead of us. They said there was an Airbus. After landing I called SoCal approach to get more information. The Supervisor looked at the radar data and told me that we were 5 miles in trail of an Airbus A319 and this met their separation requirements. I asked him about our flight path and he said there was no noticeable course or altitude deviation on the radar. I told him that had we been informed that there was an A319 ahead of us we would have adjusted our flight path to stay above the wake. Evidently ATC is not required to do that. Fortunately we had no passengers and no one was injured.At the time of the incident radio communications was very quiet so ATC did not seem to be dealing with a heavy workload and I feel they would have had time to tell us of the traffic ahead. While ATC may not be required to give a wake turbulence warning I feel that there are enough variables and unknowns about this phenomenon that flight crews need as much information as possible to insure safety.

CE-560XLS Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into SAN 5 miles in trail of an A319 that resulted in a 'violent' roll.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

While I was working local control/ground control combined; I overheard the non-radar approach controller approve a request from the ZLC sector 31 controller to have Aircraft X descending to 9;000 feet direct GABBY from the southeast for an ILS approach. The IFR flight progress strip clearly showed the projected inbound radial of Aircraft X to be in a 9500 foot Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA).When the Aircraft X came over to approach's frequency; the approach controller issued a clearance to Aircraft X to 'cross GABBY at or above 9'000 feet cleared for ILS approach.' the weather was such that there were low ceilings to the southeast and it was obvious the aircraft was did not have visual contact with the ground. There is a misnomer in this facility that 'if it works for the center then it must be ok for us' or; 'if the center makes a particular request (usually altitude related) then it must be ok since the center asked for it.' I've had this same situation happen before this controller and other controllers and I advised them to speak to competent authority to get the authorizing IFR aircraft below the MIA issue resolved. Their response is 'I talked to other controllers or see other controllers do the same thing.'Our letter of agreement with ZLC clearly shows what altitudes aircraft will be assigned over coordination fixes. The one referenced above says aircraft will be descending to 11;000 feet or instructed to cross GABBY at 11;000 feet. This should be adhered to as it causes confusion when a lower altitude is requested that is below our MIA'S; but the center says that that altitude request meets their MIA'S. Have the appropriate center officials compare their MIA charts with TWF'S MIA charts to identify/correct discrepancies.

During this event; I was working as approach. ZLC called and coordinated Aircraft X direct GABBY down to 9000 feet for the ILS Runway 26 approach. Our Letter of Agreement with ZLC states that GABBY should be coordinated at 11;000 feet. Our MIA in that area is 9500 feet. I asked if 9000 feet was good and they said yes; that works for them. I cleared Aircraft X to cross GABBY at or above 9000 feet on the ILS; and they were at or above 9000 feet until the transfer of control point. I was then told an hour and a half later by a controller that we cannot use that altitude even if ZLC says it works for them. I later called the Center Area and talked to the controller that coordinated 9000 feet. He said that 9000 feet works for their Minimum Descent Altitude.I would share what information each facility has and what their minimums may be for certain airspace; or airways; so that we can make sure that they are not descending below prescribed altitudes.

TWF Approach controllers approved an aircraft entering their airspace at an altitude below their Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

I was working Mulford/Grove combined during [a busy period]. Weather extremely VMC and all the travelers returning; everyone was out flying and it was ridiculously busy. For nearly 2 hours; I was overloaded with no assistance for the first hour. Short staffing and Supervisor lack of awareness contributed to not receiving any help. VFR aircraft not talking to anyone were flying and doing air work at altitudes they had no business being at - but are now allowed to because the Bravo altitudes were raised so high; without any corresponding Charlie airspace changes to protect our traffic into Oakland. I was using what I felt were overly safe altitudes to separate arriving IFR traffic from the mess of VFR traffic in the way; but even my 'overly safe' precautions weren't enough: I told Aircraft X (call sign estimated - the last three digits are correct though) to track the approach course inbound but maintain 4;500 [feet] for a target that was below 3;500 [feet]. It was too high for Aircraft X to make a stabilized approach; but I had to keep him safe and vectors weren't going to help the situation. I tended to other conflicts for the other runway; and when I looked back the Collision Alert went off as the VFR target climbed extremely fast to 4;500 [feet]; headed directly for Aircraft X. I told Aircraft X to climb immediately for traffic. He waited about 4 seconds to respond - which it seemed just about every single aircraft had been doing the entire session - and then asked 'Verify you want Aircraft X to climb?' I screamed 'Yes; climb now!' The aircraft maybe had 300 feet separation when their targets merged. This is just one example during that session; but I had at least 2 similar situations that I was able to resolve just a few seconds sooner than this one; avoiding such a close call (but it was still close). Oakland doesn't have the passenger enplanements to get Bravo airspace; but the arrival sectors Mulford/Grove are by far too complex and dangerous to only be using the Charlie airspace that we currently have. With the implementation of the new Bravo airspace at SFO that raised the base altitudes; VFR aircraft are doing overflights and practice maneuvers at altitudes that directly conflict with arrival traffic. All it takes is a moment of distraction; sector overload; or frequency congestion for a major disaster to occur. This is the Swiss Cheese model in full effect. We've been complaining about it for months now; but I guess it's going to take a major disaster to get the airspace changed. I nearly had 3 today in one session; and I was firing on all cylinders.

NORCAL TRACON Controller reported an unsafe situation attributed to IFR/VFR traffic and the lack of Class B airspace overlying the large airport in the airspace.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 310

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

While operating under visual flight rules and using the RNAV (GPS) 31 LPV guidance for reference; all GPS reception was lost. On about a 2 mile final there was an aural annunciation that stated: 'Terrain System Not Available.' That was accompanied by a 'TER N/A' on the PFD and 'NO GPS POSITION' on the MFD. The aircraft was equipped with Synthetic Vision and that reverted back to the Blue/Brown attitude indicator. Since I was in VMC and VFR; I continued the landing visually and taxied to the ramp. Once on the ramp I pulled up the 'Alerts' window on the G1000 PFD. There were multiple messages including 'GPS NAV LOST - Loss of GPS navigation. Insufficient satellites;' 'ABORT APR - Loss of GPS navigation.' 'Abort approach.' 'AHRS1 GPS - AHRS1 not receiving any GPS information.' The pilot of another aircraft which was equipped with a Garmin glass panel said that he experienced the same failure while taxing to the ramp. My concern is the fact that this was a WAAS approach on a robust system with redundant GPS receivers in a brand new aircraft. If I had been in IMC; I would have been above the MDA prior to the VDP. The missed approach segment is GPS based so I would have been unable to execute the published missed approach. The fact that a failure like this occurred; while hopefully very rare; exposes some potential problems with widely utilized and heavily relied upon GPS navigation for critical phases of flight.

The reporter states that the other aircraft that also lost GPS capability at the same time was G2000 equipped and also quite new. On the ramp the GPS begin to show more satellites available but very slowly. The system was turned off to reset and then showed a full array of satellites after about five minutes. No NOTAM's for GPS outages were in effect at the time.

C172 pilot experiences a loss of GPS reception during a VMC RNAV 31 LPV approach to HIO and continues to a landing. Had the weather been IMC the missed approach procedure would have required an operational GPS.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

I've had four go-arounds in the last 440 hrs. One in November; one in December; one in January (?); and one in March. Here's my observation; as pilots we want to notify ATC as soon as possible of the G/A. The problem is that ATC immediately likes to give us turns and altitudes. The problem from a pilot's perspective is that it's much busier than just after takeoff and ATC normally just leaves us alone on during a takeoff. Yes; I understand the need to ensure separation *if* it's an urgent need; but if it's not an urgent need; how about allowing the a/c on the G/A to at least get the gear doors closed; count to 10 potato and then have ATC issue heading and altitudes?

Air carrier pilot reported of numerous go-arounds that he has had in the past few months. Pilot reported that he would like ATC to give him some time so the aircraft can get configured before giving instructions.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

While at 34;000 FT MSL in clear air; we experienced a strong jolt of turbulence that spilled drinks in cabin/galley. Seat belt sign was off - no turbulence reported or indicated in our paperwork. We had just passed another [air] carrier aircraft going opposite direction 1;000 FT above us approximately three miles to our east. (Possible wake turbulence). We asked flight attendants (F/A) if they were ok; they said no one was hurt; but after flight; one F/A said she had bumped her shoulder in the galley.

B737 First Officer reported a 'strong jolt' of wake turbulence at FL340 when they passed another aircraft going in the opposite direction at FL350.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 90

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Had an unsafe nose gear indication and asked for a fly by of Tower to have them look. They said gear appeared down but they could not confirm locked. Recycled the gear and made another fly by; still appeared down. Had no green light for nose-normal green for mains; red unlocked light was on; used back up blow down system the try make gear lock; no change in indications. [I] advised Tower to contact Local Repair Shop to come out and standby if gear collapsed and to move aircraft from runway. At this time the airport had one runway closed for construction and only one runway was open. Advised Tower that after landing; one of two things would happen; either the gear would collapse or it would stay down. In the event it stayed down I would shutdown on runway and have shop block gear down before towing aircraft. On final I heard the Tower give an air carrier taxi instructions. I told Tower I could go around and let the carrier out as I did not want to block the only operational runway. Tower also asked if I would like to have the fire trucks standing by and told them OK. They said to go ahead and land. I did so and the gear held. I shut down both engines and was able to coast clear of the runway. The shop blocked the gear down and towed that aircraft to the hangar. A few hours later I got a call from the FSDO; they wanted me to submit a log entry showing the problem as being fixed. I have never in 40 years of flying had this type of request. I called the Tower later and asked them why and how the FSDO was notified. They said new FAA policy was that anything like this had to have an MOR report that is sent to FSDO and entered in a data base. The FSDO office then contacted ATC who told me this incident was listed as an Emergency on the MOR. At no time did I declare an emergency or ask for any type of priority handling. My concern is that the Tower declared this an emergency when it was not. What happened to the concept of 'pilot in command'? Had this happened at an uncontrolled airport there would have been nothing done and no report filed. There seems to be a policy in place that is going to make pilots feel that their every move is watched and being questioned. This is going lead to distrust of the system and pilots not making proper decisions if they think that it will lead to possible enforcement actions or second guessing of decisions made in the aircraft.

General Aviation aircraft experiencing landing gear difficulties questioned ATC's 'emergency' declaration that resulted in inquiries from the local FAA FSDO.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 600

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While in level cruise flight at FL200 left engine stopped producing power and began to surge. Pilot activated low boost pumps. Condition continued for another 15 seconds. Pilot initiated failed engine restart procedure. Pilot disengaged autopilot; changed fuel tanks; selected high boost momentarily to determine if a primary engine pump had failed. Condition continued. Engine continued to surge for another 5-10 seconds; and then began producing power again. Pilot had lost 400 FT of altitude. Engine began to run normally; pilot initialed climb. Controlled asked to confirm altitude. Pilot responded that he was dealing with an engine problem. Controller queried if the pilot needed assistance. At this point engine was running normally; all cockpit engine indications were normal; pilot declined assistance and reestablished cruise flight at FL200 and reengaged the autopilot. Pilot elected to land short of original destination. Controller questioned the reason for the diversion. Entire event lasted 30-45 seconds. Altitude lost; 400 FT; reason for engine power loss; undetermined. Fuel quantity indicators showed fuel in tanks. All other engine indicators were normal. Pilot; who is an A&P and has owned that aircraft suspects trapped water in fuel bladders; aircraft was parked outside the night before and it had rained. Pilot had double sumped all drains specifically because of that fact. Pilot sumped tanks after landing; no contaminants were found. Pilot took fresh fuel; re sumped tanks; no contaminants found; and continued to destination without incident.

A C414's left engine quit at FL200 apparently because of water in the tank but after a restart it ran normally so the pilot diverted to a nearby airport for an inspection and fresh fuel.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After climbing through 10;000 feet when departing ZZZ and navigating to join the RNAV SID; the #1 F/A (Flight Attendant) reported a strong odor of burning plastic near the mid galley area. Ovens were empty and the source of the odor could not be identified. Both pilots were beginning to smell an odor of smoke in the cockpit; as well. Oxygen masks were donned by both pilots; and Quick Actions Smoke and Fumes procedures performed. Flight attendants called again and advised pilots of difficulty breathing. [Advised ATC] and we returned to ZZZ; which was about 50nm East of our position. Threat and Error Management methods were discussed and employed and task-loading concerns addressed. The first officer became the pilot flying and landed the aircraft in ZZZAn off duty pilot for another airline appears to be the first person to detect odors. He stated he first smelled the odor when engines reached FLEX power during the takeoff roll. Therefore; odors may be associated with high engine power settings.Identify and repair faulty engines or seals. If this occurred during a trans-Atlantic flight; we would not have enough crew oxygen and PBEs (Protective Breathing Equipment) to land safely considering we could be two or more hours from a diversion airport. Should more PBEs be added to our aircraft until fumes incidents are corrected?

A330 Captain reported returning to the departure airport due to fumes in the cabin and cockpit.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 2500

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 310

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

After cleared for the BDEGA ONE star and established in the descent (clearance was 'descend via...') Norcal Approach informed us to expect Runway 28L at KSFO and Runway 28R is on request. We were level at the final altitude of 11;000 feet MSL and 1 NM past CORKK intersection we failed to confirm that Runway 28L was programmed in the FMS. As a result the FMS directed the aircraft toward the routing for Runway 28R; which was previously loaded in the FMS by the crew. Norcal Approach queried us to confirm we are on the Runway 28L transition and issued a right turn to heading 140. We updated the FMS with Runway 28L; the remainder of the flight transpired with nothing significant to report. The flight terminated as scheduled at KSFO.Heading into SFO is really a pilot nightmare. It is a general consensus that no matter what you load in the FMS you will get a different clearance. For example during this arrival and approach we had the ILS to 28R programmed and the Quiet Bridge Visual approach programmed in and yet we got a third approach issued to us (as is the norm). This causes distraction in the cockpit during the descent and arrival phase of flight that is already busy with other required checklists. As a prudent pilot; I have an approach set up and an arrival and approach briefed at the top of descent so that both pilots can focus on other required duties. When the arrival and approach info changes from what is expected it causes undue stress and distraction in the cockpit which further leads to pilot error. Frequently on arrival to SFO; the ATIS lists three approaches in use. It would be helpful if expected arrival and approach information could be pushed out to pilots sooner; by the top of descent from cruise altitude so that the cockpit could be already configured for descent and both pilots can be focused on flying the aircraft along the required flight path instead of having one pilot reprogramming and the other pilot now briefing a new approach during the arrival phase. With most commercial traffic having access to digital media it would be helpful to have a PDC clearance sent one hour out from landing issuing the arrival clearance; or at a minimum have the center pass the expected arrival approach to aircraft prior to transitioning into the arrival phase. With SFO being a melting pot of aviation and with English as a second language for most international carriers; giving more time to understand the expected arrival and approach would benefit many.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

Descending on the BDEGA ONE STAR into KSFO; corporate jet flight crew received clearance to Runway 28L which had not been programmed in the FMS. After aircraft turned toward routing for Runway 28R; ATC issued vectors and crew reprogrammed the FMS. Ongoing problems associated with changes to expected routing on KSFO STARS were noted by the reporter.


EMP missiles installed on all [airline] aircraft. Just kidding; there is no corrective action that can be taken other than hopefully spotting a drone before striking it.

Air Carrier pilot reported an NMAC with a drone while inbound to LAX.