Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

One morning a mechanic and I were assigned to work on the last aircraft of the night. Once our plane arrived we did a couple of other tasks on our aircraft and then went to lunch. After lunch the mechanic and I began preparing to work on an 800 hour lubrication job. We were approached by our supervisor to see how far we were along and I told her we had just began. She then let me know that our aircraft was the first for departure. In order to help the process move along I removed the access panels in order for the mechanic to lubricate both gears as while he got all of our tools required ready and began the lubrication. While lubricating the left gear I believe someone mentioned to the mechanic that we had nose gear tires to change and that we should go ahead and lubricate the nose gear so that the tire change could be performed. So he did. Once we moved back to I was asked to help another mechanic close a cowling because I remember the mechanic I was working with hitting his back on the bottom of the aircraft while I was on the lift and asking was he doing okay. After I was off of the lift from helping the mechanic I checked on the other jobs of the Flight Operations Manual (FOM) and radio license to see if we had access to the area and we did not; due to training being done. After that I asked my partner if he was finished with the left hand main gear lubrication he said we were good because he seemed to be finishing up the right he informed that we just had to re-secure the right hand over-wing panel. My supervisor came over to ask what we had left to do and I let her know just the right hand over wing panel. After the mechanic re-secured the over-wing panel we signed off paperwork and were still waiting for the training to be done for replacement of FOM and radio license. I asked could I access the area because they were the last two jobs not completed and was told trainers just needed ten more minutes. Another mechanic replaced the radio license while I replaced the FOM after training was done due to having to have the plane out for leak check and departure. My partner and I then helped another mechanic with leak check and closing of cowlings before the plane was taxied to the gate.I was called by my supervisor and was told a panel was missing as well as another had been found off of the aircraft and that the aircraft was AOG (Aircraft on Ground). I then remembered that my partner and I did not double check and make sure the panels were re-secured.In between helping out on other jobs and my partner trying to move quickly and get the plane out on time he and I didn't double check and make sure the wheel bin access panels were totally re-secured. I was distracted by other tasks and tired and my partner may have been flustered by having to hurry up and finish the task and when I asked if were we good I assumed he had completed the task in full including securing all panels associated with the task.According to our supervisor the panel found was installed and the other has been ordered to replace the missing panel.Avoiding distractions in the middle of tasks. Double checking work performed and taking your time while completing tasks.

In their haste; two mechanics neglected to secure two panels that were removed to accomplish main gear lubrication job cards.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208.52; Flight Crew Total 16449.8; Flight Crew Type 1950.18

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While conducting preparations for arrival into MEX; crew discovered the following charting error: All ILS and RNP (RNAV) approach charts to Runway 05R depict the final course to as 055 degrees. However the 11-0 MAVEK Transition to ILS DME2 Runway 05R dated Date depicts the ILS Runway 05R localizer course as 053 degrees (a discrepancy of 2 degrees).Of note: Course 053 degrees corresponds to the depicted final course to the VOR DME Runway 05L/R (13-1).

Air Carrier Captain reported a discrepancy between approach charts referencing the final approach course for this runway.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Upon taxi in on Charley to spot 2 nearing spot 5 run up area; Aircraft X taxied onto Charley directly in front of us from South West Ramp. Aircraft X was very difficult to see as they only had nav lights on and were buried in the lights of aircraft doing run ups at spot 5. I saw Aircraft X pull onto Charley to [Runway] XXL with approximately 50 ft. or less to spare pulling onto Charley and took controls and immediately applied brakes to stop. Ground Controller issued taxi advisory immediately after I had stopped aircraft. I had all lights on during taxi at time of event.Crew could of done a better job listening to other aircraft taxi instructions to maintain better SA (Situation Awareness).

Instructor Pilot reported another aircraft entered the same taxiway resulting in emergency braking.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Undeclared hazmat notification from company. Better training of ground loaders.

Undeclared hazmat notification from company. Ground crew loaded unmanifested hazmat.

B777 flight crew reported learning from their Dispatcher that hazmat had been loaded on the aircraft without the proper documentation.


Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was pilot flying on leg 4 on day 2 of a 3 day trip. It was visual conditions departing on time. Immediately after takeoff while re-trimming we hear 'ding' 'trim' then saw a red warning of PTRIM MAIN INOP. I continued to maintain control of the aircraft on the RNAV departure. I noticed trim wasn't working correctly. Captain (CA) maintained radios and got out QRH to start procedure. We had to get ATC to let us level out. We ran the QRH. If it failed but Auto Pilot (AP) would still engage then we could continue? AP did engage and did appear to be working. CA then got dispatch and maintenance on [commercial radio] while I monitored flight. After explaining all we had done then looking at whether or not a reset may not be successful in destination we decided to turn back. Once we started to return the aircraft began an uncommanded climb from 2900. I then disconnected AP and used backup trim to get aircraft back in control. AP was used again in descent. Aircraft was out of trim and additional messages; AUTO TRIM FAIL and AP ELEV MISTRIM were presented. I told CA I wanted no delays and wanted to [advise ATC]. So we did and proceeded directly to the airport for the visual to runway 26L. Landed uneventfully.Threats; Long duty day after min rest; previous day had maintenance issue and gate return.Immediately land and deal with indications on the ground. Do not continue flight with a master warning.

EMB-145 First Officer reported a failure of the aircraft's pitch trim system during climbout. All appropriate abnormal checklists were accomplished and the crew returned to the departure airport; where an uneventful landing was accomplished.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

From the time we loaded the flight plan in until ready for push back; the Dispatcher; had sent us three revisions. [The Dispatcher] offered no specific explanation for all the changes. I cleared the FMS and we told [the Dispatcher] to push the current flight plan to the FMS. (The FMS would not respond to another request for uplink). Only when we got the progress report; did we realize that the 'prog' did not match what was in the FMS. I attempted to uplink another flight plan into route 2. When we got the uplink; it was the same as what we had in route 1 and did not match the 'prog' report. We contacted dispatch via ACARS and told [the Dispatcher] to confirm the latest route filed. We told [Dispatcher] we were still getting the old version. (It turned out the prog report was 'correct'). [The Dispatcher] pushed the correct route to the FMS. We checked it and loaded it to route 1. Approaching the fix; I was to go on break and briefed the Captain on the next way point. It was a left turn direct to AKNOV in Amazonica airspace. I did not feel comfortable about it; even though it was the 'correct' route. I went on break. The Captain later briefed me that he inquired to Bogota about the route. They had no idea we were about to proceed to AKNOV and did not like it. The flying crew contacted dispatch and got approval to fly the flight plan. We do not know where the 'error' occurred. Did ATC not coordinate properly; or did dispatch not get proper foreign clearance for that direct routing to AKNOV? At one point; the Dispatcher said 'Apparently there are canned routes'; as if [the Dispatcher] had no clue that crossing an FIR with no FIR fix; and not on an airway was not well received by Bogota and Amazonica. Perhaps the Dispatcher needs more training? In my hundreds of flights; I have never seen such a direct point to point off airway with no FIR fix. There should be a notation on the prog report and any FMS uplink that identifies the route number and revision. It may be more foolproof than looking for an error by looking at 40 waypoints. Three revisions from sign-in to push back seems extreme. We never got notice of revision 2; by the way. Dispatch should have required direct verbal contact with the Captain.

B777 First Officer reported that the revisions sent to the aircraft resulted in issues with entering another FIR.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

In regular cruise flight at 13;000 feet; the right hydraulic fail annunciator began to occasionally illuminate. After about 2 minutes it illuminated fully. Hydraulic pressure was still normal (2;000 PSI). The Captain advised ATC of the failure and the prediction that there would be no effect on the continuation of the flight or handling. Approximately 2 minutes later; the left hydraulic fail annunciator began to flicker as well. At this time hydraulic pressure began to fluctuate. Within 2 minutes the left hydraulic annunciator was continuously illuminated and the hydraulic pressure gauge was fluctuating around 400-800 PSI. At this time; [ATC was advised] and the Captain began requesting weather information for the destination and possible alternates.Limitations on the aircraft with a full loss of hydraulic fluid included needing a manual landing gear extension; operating with existing flaps and a loss of hydraulic Nose Wheel Steering (NWS). [Destination] was reporting at the time of the incident winds from the north at 3 KTS; visibility of 1.5 NM and ceiling 600 OVC with braking action reported fair. The declared alternate was reporting higher ceilings and visibility (unknown specifics) but 30 knot winds. Given all of the factors; the Captain elected to continue to and terminate in [the original destination]. Upon reaching radio range; dispatch was informed of the situation. The decision was to attempt a no NWS taxi to the ramp if braking action permitted; otherwise shutting down on the runway.A consultation was made with dispatch whether the preference was to land on Runway 35 for reduced towing distance or on [the other] runway to deliver freight. Due to the low amount of freight onboard; the decision was made to land on Runway 35. Reaching 25 NM from the airport; the Captain executed a successful gear extension. A non-eventful [approach to] Runway 35 and landing was executed with flaps retracted without incident.After landing; it was determined that the surface braking was quite sufficient for a no NWS taxi to the ramp. After shutdown; the Chief Pilot was consulted to verify no further action was needed before releasing the cargo. A statement was given to an airport operations representative and the aircraft was secured. Maintenance and operations were briefed on the event; the maintenance log was written up appropriately and the event concluded without incident.

SA-227AC Captain reported loss of hydraulic fluid in cruise flight.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.2

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 71; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

[Aircraft Y] was under my control landing LGA at 4;000 feet MSL on a vector across the localizer for runway 22 for spacing on final. HPN was departing runway 16 on the SID climbing to 3;000 feet MSL. [Aircraft X] departed HPN in the climb and did not turn per the SID but instead remained runway heading. I did notice the blown SID off of HPN and began to issue [Aircraft Y] a traffic call to point out [Aircraft X] climbing to 3;000 feet. Mid-transmission; I stopped my traffic call since I realized [Aircraft X] was now at 3;500 feet on the next radar sweep. As I began to issue the traffic alert to [Aircraft Y]; he keyed up right before I did and responded to the RA he received on Aircraft X still in the climb (now at 3;800 feet) and began his evasive maneuver to turn/climb away from the aircraft in conflict. Targets were approximately 1.2 NM and 300 feet separated at the closest instance. No recommendations can be given since the pilot that departed HPN deviated from the HPN runway 16 SID's turn/altitude published. The climb through 3;000 feet from the J328 was a fast climb rate. Thus; the RA that [Aircraft Y] responded to was obviously the right move steering the aircraft away from [Aircraft Y].

We were just about to load passengers when my first officer called me to tell me we had a DC tie failure. This led to an flight director to shutdown; an hx fan failure which caused the left pack to overheat and fail. After running the checklist it was determined that we would wait until we got into the air to reset the left pack to let it cool down and try to reset the pack in flight.On the taxi checks the pilot flying and the non flying pilot reset the flight director for takeoff configuration. We selected the left pack and left bleed while on taxi and it still showed as failed so we deselected the bleed and pack for the left side and decided to wait until airborn to try to reset again.With left pack failed the n1% were split by 10-15% being high on left side so pilot flying tried to keep n1 balanced during takeoff roll. At 400 feet the flaps up yaw damp on call was made as normal. On Climb out I continued to monitor the n1 guages to maintain balance. The flight director was selected for nav mode and I continued to follow the command bar directions which did not command the right turn from the SID.  At acceleration height I called for climb check and at the same time ATC called to see if we started our turn. We advised we were starting turn and turned at less than standard bank for passenger comfort. While in the turn and climbing at 3;500 feet per minute ATC then advised a turn to heading 350 in which I selected the autopilot on in heading mode. Close to roll out on the 350 degree heading the non flying pilot noticed traffic on the right both high and low. Traffic low was a blimp off the departure end of the runway and to the west; traffic high was jet traffic on a converging course. We also noted at this time that the autopilot had not captured the 3;000 feet as selected in the altitude select. I then clicked off the auto pilot and agressivly nosed the airplane down for a descent to maintain seperation from the higher jet traffic. Once leveled off at 3;000 feet we continued to recieve radar vectors for another 10 min until being told to go direct to JFK VOR. Enroute to JFK we reselected the autopilot on and continued to closely monitor all climbs and level offs until cruise altitude. At this point I called for the QRH cheklist for pack failure. The non flying pilot was to run the checklist while I Flew the plane and ran the radios. We got the left pack back online and continued for a few more minutes. Shortly after crossing the JFK VOR the flight director went off line in flight. I elected at this to hand fly the aircraft until we reached [our destination airport] as I suspected there was an issue with the flight guidance system. Upon dropping off our passangers I then called maintenance about the pack failures and DC tie failure. We discussed possible reasons for DC tie failures. We conducted a quick evaluation consisting of turning off a DC hydraulic pump and turning it back on. We discovered there was a spike in the system which was determined why the pack and flight director had failed. Maintenance suggested if it happened again; were we lost the flight director on the ground;to shut the airplane down to reset the systems of the autopilot. I also called our company saftey manager to discuss the chain events that led to the RA. I also called the director of operations and discussed these items with him as well. Upon contiuing our day the autopilot system seemed to work normally but we had one more occurance of DC tie failure before the end of our duty day. The cause the the problems were multiple system malfunctions before takeoff that led to erroneous readings in a high traffic voulme environment causing crew to have to take evasive actions to avoid conflict. We fly SIDs and STARS on a daily basis and rely on the auto guidance system to give us correct information. To prevent this from happening in the future the non flying pilot and I have discussed how we could change the after takeoffscan of the instrumentaion and the priority of what should be handled first in a situation like this.

N90 TRACON Controller and both pilots report of a RA and a loss of separation  due to the aircraft climbing above its assigned altitude. Pilots report of a problem with the aircraft that took their attention away from the altitude deviation.


Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

This past week; I flew out of DCA. They had implemented the new LAZIR RNAV SID off of Runway 1. We did this departure on several occasions during the course of the 3 day trip. There were NO violations and we did NOT intrude into P56; however I was advised to file an ASAP regarding the Departure. I feel that it comes uncomfortably close to the prohibited area. IF the FMS were to malfunction and suddenly revert to Heading Select mode or something strange; there would be little to no time to correct the course and a P56 violation would be an almost certain outcome. While this may not affect the safety of flight; I believe it puts the flight and the crew at unnecessary risk. I was a safety report was the best why to express my thoughts and concerns regarding the departure. I was also told people were looking for opinions on this departure.

An E-135 Captain expressed concern that the recently inaugurated LAZIR RNAV SID out of DCA brings using flights too close to P-56. Reporter believed any disruption of RNAV capability would make an incursion difficult to avoid.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

My student and I departed on a training flight to the southeast practice area where we were going to run through Private Pilot maneuvers (stalls; steep turns; engine out; ground maneuvers and landings). After climbing to 035 and completing steep turns; we set up to do power on stalls and climbed to 050. We then set up to do power off stalls. After completing 4 power off stalls; we still had significant altitude and I decided to give student an engine out by pulling the mixture. The student set up the aircraft for best glide and selected an airfield that was about three miles away and ran through the restart checklist. Every 1500 feet I would advance the mixture and push forward on the yoke to make sure the engine was staying primed. We then simulated part of the forced landing checklist (ELT; squawk codes; emergency calls) and performed the landing brief.The student chose to try to get to the airfield by going down the downwind then realized that student was too low and close to the runway to safely make it to the field. I asked student what the backup plan was and student selected a field to right of the aircraft that student could easily turn into. Student turned the aircraft to the field and I estimated that student could easily make the landing and that student had the engine back and to do a go-around. I advanced the mixture and the engine sputtered and died and the prop stopped. The student announced that I had the controls and I pointed the airplane to the field that student had selected. I checked the mixture in; shut off valve on; then attempted to restart the engine with the key. After two attempts; I determined that we were too low and shut off the fuel valve and pulled the mixture and landed the plane in the field.There was no damage to the plane; no injuries to myself or my student; and no property damage. Fuel levels were still visible and greater than half way from the top of the tanks (well over 1/2 full; I didn't have a fuel stick to check total actual levels); oil level was still at 5 qts. We were able to later restart the airplane and taxi it closer to the property owner's barn with permission.The biggest thing that I learned was that I will not pull the mixture to simulate an engine out any more. That was the mistake that I feel caused this. In the future; all engine outs will be initiated by pulling the throttle. Though this has been common in my training from private to commercial; it put us in a dangerous situation that I could have avoided.

At the altitude of 4;000 feet my Instructor pulled the mixture in the aircraft to simulate an emergency landing. At that moment I trimmed the plane all the way; pulled the carb heat and pitched the airplane for 60 kts. Next I looked for a place we could simulate the landing and we were just 2-4 miles from [an] airport. We were descending approximately 500 feet per minute. The closer we got I realized that I was too low to make the obstacles. I made the error of not looking at the altitude of the field. Therefore; I looked to my right and there was a large field and I pointed to my instructor that at that moment the safest decision was to do the field on the right. My instructor said that was a good decision and I started my turn to the field.My airspeed was 60; my right hand was on the throttle; which at the time it was all in. My left hand on the controls and my feet on the rudder. A few seconds later my Instructor looked at me and said 'you would have made it' and he decided to end the simulation by putting the mixture all in. However; the engine would not work and my instructor said 'my controls' I restated 'your controls' and he took charge of the plane. He tried turning the engine on a couple times and the propeller would just not move at all. It happened in a matter of seconds. Since I had already lined up the airplane to the field; my Instructor worked hard to fly the airplane until it touched the ground where he applied the brakes after he had landed it safely. We turned all the systems off and removed the key from the starter. We opened the doors and got out of the aircraft. We called the flight school and they came to get us and to see the airplane.

C152 Instructor and student pilot reported a forced landing resulted when the engine failed to start following a simulated engine failure.


The [Duty Manager] allowed two flights with the same flight numbers to launch and be in the air at the same time.  We were notified of this; and subsequently changed [one of the flight numbers] to a flight number that should have been given to the aircraft in the first place (prior to launch).Preventative Measures: Possibly give the [Duty Manager] some type of automation tool that would bring to their attention that two flights with the same flight number have the potential for being in the air at the same time.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported discovering there were two Company flights with the same flight number in the air at the same time.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Before pushback the APU was started with the GPU. The GPU did not have enough power to start the APU and power the airplane. Power to the airplane was interrupted. We notified Maintenance and they come out and looked at it.  We're not sure if it's related to the event that occurred but might be useful. After takeoff the airplane would not pressurize in the automatic mode. We leveled the airplane at 10;000 and went to the QRH. The airplane would pressurize in manual mode. We contacted Maintenance to see what if they had any input; and they requested we return.  We attempted to burn as much fuel as we could prior to landing but still needed to land overweight. We  used the manual mode to depressurize the airplane during the descent. The Captain made the landing and touched down at 96 feet/minute; well below what was required for an overweight landing.   Threats included the pressurization controller and the possibility in not catching it after takeoff. We noticed it soon enough that oxygen or passenger oxygen was not needed. Other threats included the overweight landing. There were QRH recommendations that were helpful. The situation was handled with the correct amount of urgency. We worked well together to resolve the cabin pressurization issue and the overweight landing. This was a situation where we did not need to rush and make a mistake and therefore we didn't.

EMB145 First Officer reports a power interruption during APU start with a Ground Power Unit. After takeoff the aircraft will not pressurize in the automatic mode and Maintenance Control requests that the flight return.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Type 15000

Workload; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Sat in ZZZ for hours for a delayed flight coming from ZZZ1. During the swap; the outgoing Captain informed me that the Crew that brought the aircraft into ZZZ1 said that upon landing the right thrust reverser malfunctioned. The delay was due to Contract Maintenance MEL'ing the right thrust reverser. During pre-flight I checked the logbook; Release; and stickers as well as looked up the MEL on my EFB. During this time the 'A' Flight Attendant informed me that a passenger was refusing to wear their mask and creating a scene and that the CSR had been called. Eventually the passenger was removed and an updated report was sent to the aircraft. During the distraction I neglected to click on the hyperlink in the MEL in the Maintenance portion labeled MEL SP#XX Thrust Reverser System. If I had I would have noticed on that a Circuit Breaker for the #2 Engine should have been pulled and collared. Upon landing in ZZZ2 I informed the outgoing Captain of the MEL. During my commute home I received a text from said Captain that he found the wrong CB had been collared and that he had written it up and ZZZ2 Maintenance was fixing the issue. Upon reviewing the SP#XX I can only assume that the CB for the #1 Engine had been pulled instead.

Inbound Captain advised that they had received the aircraft late in ZZZ due to Thrust Reverser MEL applied in ZZZ1 on previous flight and then further delayed on their flight due to a Passenger refusing to comply with mask requirements.In reviewing the logbook I found that the MEL sticker in the front of the logbook was not completed. The MEL number was not entered; the Special procedures performed were not entered and the circuit breakers pulled and collared were not entered.   When I reviewed the logbook entry; the special procedures were references SP-XX.  I also observed C/B's  #2 Engine TR Sync Lock and #2 Engine TR INTLK pulled and collared.I then reviewed the MEL and SP-XX and discovered the following errors.1. SP XX calls for the #2 Engine TR Sync Lock c/b and the #2 Engine TR Control c/b to be pulled and collared.  the Control C/B was NOT collared as prescribed in SP XXnd the INTLK c/b WAS collared contrary to SP XX2. There was no MEL sticker placed on the Inoperative TR lever.3. There was no MEL sticker placed above the respected N1 gauge.I contacted Maintenance Control to confirm my understanding of the MEL regarding the incorrect Circuit Breakers and they confirmed the wrong circuit breaker had been pulled.  Notified ZZZ2 Maintenance and entered the discrepancy in the logbook. ZZZ2 Maintenance arrived and corrected the circuit breaker configuration and signed off the discrepancy I had entered. Missing information on the logbook sticker was also corrected.I have long felt that our MEL is VERY inadequate when it comes to circuit breaker identification.  In this particular instance the nomenclature is correct and was just applied incorrectly by the Mechanic; but if the C/B locations were included  it would have been much more apparent to the Mechanic as well as flight crew that the two C/B would not be immediately adjacent to each other.  I have brought this to the attention of Flight Ops previously with regards to other MEL's and have been advised that changes are slated for a future revision that has been delayed due to aircraft out of service returns; COVID and other issues. I also feel it should be reinforced to flight crews that MEL compliance is not solely the responsibility of the Maintenance department and that we should always verify (to the limits of our abilities) those aspects of MEL compliance which we have ready access to on each airplane we accept regardless of previous crews acceptance of the aircraft.

Two air carrier captains reported delays due to incorrect MEL procedures performed by maintenance and a passenger not complying with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12.1; Flight Crew Total 826; Flight Crew Type 78.7

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I returned to ZZZ; from a flight in the local area. The landing was routine and I asked the Tower for a taxi back for pattern work.I taxied back to Runway XXR; took off and flew a normal right hand pattern; but was high on final approach and elected to go around. At approximately 900 feet AGL the engine lost power completely.I immediately lowered the nose; went to best glide of 80 mph and advised the Tower. I initiated a right turn to avoid a housing subdivision that lies just beyond a grove off the end of the runway; intending to land in the grove or; if possible; in an open area just north and east of it. I added carb heat and switched fuel tanks from the right tank to the left tank. It became clear that I had enough altitude to reach the airport boundary so I continued the turn and lined up for [Runway] XYL. Altitude was sufficient to reach the runway threshold. The engine regained power just before we touched down. I had practiced this scenario many times at altitude and knew that 900 feet of altitude would most likely enable a return to the runway depending upon wind conditions. This was even more likely in this case because the wind was from the northwest and helped push the aircraft back towards the runway due to the right-hand pattern. In addition; I had reached 900 feet much closer to the end of the runway than usual due to the go-around. I likely would not have made the runway from a normal ground-level takeoff as I would have been farther away from the end of the runway by the time I reached 900 feet AGL.The aircraft has two 20 gallon fuel tanks with 18 gallons usable in each tank. The aircraft was fueled after landing and took 15.5 gallons in the right tank and 13.8 gallons in the left tank. The right tank was the most-full tank when configuring for arrival from my local flight; but the left tank would have been the most full tank after the first landing.This occurrence was most likely caused by the fuel intake port in the right tank un-porting due to the deck angle of the climb on the go-around. No issues were found with the fuel system by the maintenance shop.It could have been prevented by using the most full tank during the go-around or refueling before starting pattern work.

Pilot reported fuel starvation caused loss of power and an immediate landing.


Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Approaching IND on downwind for 23L; Approach gave us a heading of 330 (base leg). I asked the First Officer if Approach asked if we have the field; what did he want?  I always ask the pilot flying if you have it visually; do you want to accept it visually? He responded yes. On base Approach called traffic orbiting downtown and we were still on a heading of 330. Shortly thereafter we were given a heading of 260 and Approach asked if we had the field. I said affirmative. As he cleared us for the visual; he called out the orbiting traffics position on the left and additional traffic on the right. We were at 3;000 outside of the outer marker which you cross at 2;700. I queried the First Officer about pressing the app/land tile which he hesitated to press. I mentioned it a second time and he pressed it. My attention went outside the left window looking for the helicopter traffic. I came back inside to cross check; I noticed we were approximately 700 FT low on the visual and glideslope.  I immediately announced step 1 and step 2 simultaneously and said; 'You're low pull your nose up.'  Approximately 3 seconds later Tower mentioned a low altitude alert. We're visual and all parameters stable on glideslope prior to 500 FT. Uneventful landing. There was no need to go around as the First Officer corrected the situation well before the 500 foot call.  Configured and on speed. First Officer mentioned to me in the blocks on the debrief that the traffic on the right was at 3;500 and felt the need to get below him. I mentioned to the First Officer the need to capture the glideslope and visual aids as the primary task because that is where controllers expect you to be on a visual while on final. The aircraft was final configuration at the outer marker.

Turning final on a visual; descended to 1;000 AGL 6 miles from runway resulting in a low altitude warning alert from Tower. Stopped descent at 1;000 AGL till 3 miles and continued down 3 degree glideslope. All speeds and configurations normal and stable. Scanning for traffic resulted in being lower than planned on visual turn to final.

Flight crew reports descending to 1;000 FT AGL six miles from the field on a visual approach to avoid traffic orbiting near the final approach course. ATC issues a low altitude alert.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On the downwind to [Runway] 34 in ROA; we requested the ILS rather than the visual approach. We were being vectored for the ILS when we saw another aircraft climbing out of ROA. The aircraft stopped climb and we were turned to from a 170 heading to a 270 heading and tracked through the valley at 5;200 FT. We did not receive a TA or RA. The other aircraft resumed climb and we were told to expect the LDA 6; but declined and requested the ILS 34. We were vectored back to the south over the mountains. A few minutes later we received a GPWS warning 'Too low terrain; Pull Up'; I executed the escape maneuver and the First Officer advised that we received a GPWS warning at 5;200 FT the Controller seemed confused. We returned to the assigned altitude and continued to be vectored for the ILS without further disruption.

EMB-145 Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert while on vectors for an approach to ROA. Reporter feels this was controller error.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X advised me they were at Runway XX ready for departure. I told the aircraft the wind 'turn right heading 295 Runway XY cleared for takeoff'. The pilot replied what sounded like 'uh 295 cleared for takeoff' in the recording. I watched the aircraft depart and when it appeared to me that it was in a right turn I told the aircraft ' heading 295 contact departure'. I looked away and almost immediately the approach controller called me and asked me what the aircraft was doing. I looked at the radar scope and realize the aircraft was now in a left turn at approximately 5200 ft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. I told the approach Controller he should be turning right; and then tried to call the aircraft thinking he might possibly still be on my frequency. The approach controller reached out to that aircraft and realized it was on his frequency and took immediate corrective action. I watched the radar replay and listen to the audio after listening to the audio several times I realized pilot could be saying 'left 295' however all that I can actually hear is 't 295'. In a situation where I hear what sounds like 'uh' from the pilot try to re-verify the instruction.

Tower Controller reported an aircraft turned the wrong direction after takeoff and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion

Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

I had two flights within 2 days with the same problem. The drain tube for the left pack in the tailcone area are getting frayed and accumulating water and/or spraying water on the electronic components. The problem manifested itself on an earlier flight; The aircraft was pulled from service due to a fuel panel leak discovered by Maintenance while they were fixing the drain tube issue. The water was actually creating a rain forest in the tail cone area. Everything on the left side of the aircraft's tail cone was saturated with water. It was spraying water similar to a mister all over everything! Note: An industrial vacuum was brought in remove the moisture. On a different flight; the following day; we had to call Contract Maintenance (30 minute response time); to fix the issue. When accessing the APU Fire Control Panel; the door was filled with water and the panel was very moist. A lot of water on the ground was evident. This flight that was already delayed inbound and we incurred almost an hour waiting for the fix. I am not criticizing the Contract Maintenance; just the problem this small drain tube created. The discovery of this issue is relatively simple. Water on the ground near the left; aft area of the plane and when opening the access panel; you get wet. My concern is the mixture of water and electronic devices together. A false alarm could occur in-flight with a soaked APU Fire Control unit. The tailcone on a long flight could have problems with cables; electronics; and other components freezing in this area. We all know the fleet is getting older; however; I am concerned about this drain tube and the possible consequences.

Maintenance action during the diversion simply addressed the obvious indications but did not attempt to find the root cause. After their arrival at the originally filed destination; the First Officer conducted a walk around and found water in the aft; external APU Fire Control panel. That finding began an investigation into the water's source and ultimately the tail compartment was opened where was a rain forest type mist was seen. Maintenance then found the leak and it was corrected. The reporter is concerned about aging aircraft and the fact that tail compartment inspection may be overlooked. Flight crews do not look in the tail compartment as part of their preflight; and Maintenance may not either leaving that area un-inspected for long periods of time. The reporter mentioned that there was so much water that the possibility of frozen flight control cables crossed his mind.

During climbout after the aircraft checklist had been accomplished through cleanup; a Battery Charger light annunciated. It was subsequently observed that several additional circuit breakers had opened to include two windshield anti ice circuit breakers. Over the next eight minutes; the cabin crew communicated during three separate calls to the flight deck that there had been water discharged onto an aft cabin flight attendant jump seat; the cabin and lavatory lighting was not working; and the lavatories were not flushing. The QRH procedure for the Battery Charger did not indicate abnormal volts or amps but based on a review of all of the reported malfunctions; a decision was made to land at a divert airport.Maintenance met the aircraft during our divert on the previous leg and investigated the inbound write up which described all of the aircraft events observed during the climbout. They opened overhead panels and the aircraft E&E compartment and found no evidence of a water leak. They then began focusing on the electrical issues in the write up and decided to change the battery charger. The cause of the malfunctions that required the divert was unknown so all of the events observed on the flight deck and described from the cabin crew were included in a single write up. Maintenance described their corrective actions and procedures but did not address the water leak that was described by the flight attendants in the aft jump seats. Since their corrective actions only addressed the electrical malfunctions as no water leak was evident after their investigation; it would have been appropriate to divide the observed and described events into two write-ups - one for the water; one for the electrical. We departed without correct documentation related to the water leak described by the cabin crew.

A MD-83 diverted because of electrical anomalies but continued after maintenance action only to discover later that a tail compartment airconditioning leak was spraying water on electrical components in that area which was not examined by Maintenance.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We were executing a ferry flight.  I was the pilot flying and the PIC of the flight.  The aircraft was being ferried due to striking an object on the ground during taxi.  Maintenance had replaced the right wingtip before our flight.  We had been trying to go for around 3 hours; and had previously returned to the gate to fix a mechanical issue.  This time everything was good to go on the taxi out and we felt good about getting  the flight done.  Takeoff was normal.  Visibility was unrestricted; no ceiling; winds less than 5 knots.  Our departure required a 19 degree turn to the right.  When I started to roll right I realized something was definitely  wrong.  The aircraft was not flying like it should have been.  The aircraft barely responded to my aileron input; and I was having a very difficult time relieving yaw forces.  The ball was all the way to the left.  If I applied left rudder we were flying sideways.  I was constantly trying to trim away control forces but the aircraft was not responding to inputs in a way that made sense.  I was putting 1/2 [aileron] deflection to the right and a large amount of left rudder to stay somewhat straight.  The force required on the controls was easily double normal input force.  By this time we were at 4;000 MSL. (Due to the empty aircraft our climb rate was very very good.  I have ferried a number of EMB-120 aircraft before; empty; and have not experienced any unusual handling).  I had no idea what was wrong.  Our gear was up; but we had not made any changes to the configuration of the aircraft; besides some power reduction.  I told my F/O we were not going to DESTINATION AIRPORT; and to declare an emergency and tell them we were leveling off.  ATC had us make a right turn to fly down the (uninhabited area).  We raised our flaps and performed an after takeoff check.  We tried to 'zero out' the trim by moving it to its neutral setting and then re-trimming the aircraft; but that did not help.  We took a moment to check the  aircraft configuration and make sure we had not missed anything and could find no reason or indication of abnormal operation of any component.  At that time; while already having chosen to make a precautionary landing in ORIGINATION ARPORT I decided we needed to make an immediate return to  field.  There was no telling what was causing the abnormal flight characteristics; or if it may get worse.  We were immediately cleared for approach to the longest runway.  We ran a before landing checklist and set V-Speeds.  Landing was uneventful.  The aircraft handled better during the approach than the climb out. Something was obviously wrong physically with the aircraft.  This aircraft had been damaged on the ground the day before and repaired.  Had I been briefed or trained about ferrying an aircraft with unusual flight characteristics I would have been fine continuing to the destination.  I was not informed of any  unusual flight or handling characteristics of this aircraft and therefore elected to return to field.  Maintenance had a very cavalier attitude in regards to the flight.  The aircraft had a number of write ups; by myself; before the flight departed.  I felt like they wanted me to just bring the aircraft to [destination] and fix  things there.  This is not how things should go.  You should not have to explain to people why you must follow FARs.  We made sure to get all the write-ups fixed or added to the ferry permit beforehand; but I can tell you they (Maintenance Control) did not want to.  We had to return to the gate after we found a problem on taxi-out.  Everyone I talked to made it seem like they were upset about having to fix this aircraft; including the controllers on the phone.  This attitude is dangerous.  I feel that if they did not care about the airworthiness of the aircraft on paper then they most likely did not consider the physical airworthiness of this aircraft; which resulted in me finding out it did not fly very well on my own.Aircraft that have been damaged need to be ferried by someone familiar with what is wrong with the aircraft and how it will fly.  I suggest that check-airman or someone trained to fly damaged aircraft; who have been briefed by an engineer familiar with the aircraft in question fly future ferry flights with damaged aircraft.  I was provided a ferry permit documenting what had been done to the aircraft but was not informed of any irregularities with the handling of the aircraft.  Without any information from the company (Dispatch; Maintenance Control; Mechanics on site) there is no way to discern whether the strange way the aircraft flew was to be expected or was a sign of something very bad about to happen.  There is no  way to know!  At the least the PIC should get a briefing on what is wrong with the aircraft and any expected difficulties with the flight before being asked to ferry an aircraft.  With no information as to abnormal handling; most  pilots will elect to land ASAP if they find something wrong with how the aircraft flies.

EMB-120 Captain on a ferry flight declared an emergency shortly after takeoff and returned to departure airport after experiencing abnormal flight control response that may have been related to previous ground damage.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway XXL

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

ATC turned us onto the approach while still at 4;000. Told us to 'maintain 3;000 till established cleared ILS [Runway] XXL. FO (First Officer) put in 3;000 in the altitude selector and I acknowledged it. Once established; instead of selecting 2;700 feet for the FAF altitude he rolled the altitude selector to 3;300 and started a slow descent. Stated he was going to just control the altitude himself. I thought that was strange; but let him do it figuring it was just a technique he liked to do.As we approached 2;700 feet; he was still descending at ~700 FPM; so I realized he was going to blow through the altitude. I told him he needed to stop descending and return to the FAF altitude until we intercepted the GS. The first time I said this he seemed confused and didn't really do much. I said more sternly that we needed to climb back to the proper altitude. This time he initiated a climb back to the proper altitude and we were still stabilized and fully configured by 1;000 feet AGL. ATC did issue us a low altitude alert as we were climbing back to the proper altitude and we got a single 'Glideslope' callout from the aircraft.The cause was the FO's improper use of the altitude selector and VS (Vertical Speed) mode. Contributing was me allowing him to do the method he did instead of asking him to just put the FAF altitude in the altitude selector till GS intercept.I should have insisted that the FO put the FAF altitude in the altitude selector; especially in IMC. I also told him afterword's that he could have just stayed at 3;000 once established and intercepted the GS from there since at that point we were already close to GS intercept.

Cleared ILS [Runway] XXL; we were given an intercept heading and told to maintain 3;000 feet. The Controller kept us close and fairly high before clearing us for the approach. We were at 4;000 feet when cleared. Captain was PM (Pilot Monitoring); First Officer was PF (Pilot Flying). Once established; PF started down with vertical speed to capture glide slope by 2;700 feet at ZZZZZ. PF moved altitude knob up to 3;300 feet from 3;000 feet instead of to 2;700 feet causing us to go below published altitude by almost 500 feet. Was immediately corrected and aircraft was stabilized. Given a close proximity intercept; task saturation was high with intercepting; radio communications; and configuring aircraft. Should have cross checked better and stated intentions more clearly (PF to PM).If crew starts to feel rushed or task saturation is high; ask for longer final or a more stable intercept from ATC. Never let cross checking suffer due to task saturation; should always come first. PM should state approach intention more clearly while getting established. Don't have tunnel vision (Example Focusing on getting configured and not having correct altitude set).

CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving a Low Altitude Alert from ATC after they descended below the glideslope intercept altitude.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

During the takeoff run off of XXL at ZZZ I had my hands near the flight controls should the situation require a quick transfer of controls. This is something I do regularly during takeoff and landing. Just after making the 60 knots call the Captain; who is the PF (Pilot Flying); said something to me. I glanced over in his direction and noticed he was looking directly at me and not the runway. He then said something to the effect of 'what are you doing get your hands off the controls'. During this exchange the aircraft deviated about 10 to 15 ft. to the left of centerline of runway XXL. The captain had to make an abrupt correction to the right causing the aircraft to swerve. I asked both flight attendants if they felt the aircraft swerve on takeoff to which both said that they did feel the aircraft swerve on takeoff. I suggest an emphasis on crew coordination as well as the importance of appropriate conversations during critical phases of flight.

Air carrier First Officer reported aircraft deviation off runway centerline during takeoff roll.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

[We were] at cruise; near TRM; FL240 as assigned by ATC; received Resolution Advisory (RA); 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC;' followed immediately by; 'DESCEND; DESCEND.' Captain flying disengaged autopilot and descended; First Officer monitoring notified ATC that we were responding [due] to an RA. First Officer observed an FA-18 merge from high-to-low; pass co-altitude at 1;200 FT; left to left; opposite direction; then the FA-18 abruptly climbed back above FL250 to re-enter it's block in a Presidential TFR near PSP. ATC then said; 'TRAFFIC ALERT!'; but the event was already over. ATC informed us that; 'it looks like he went below his altitude.' Total altitude deviation estimated to be approximately 300 FT; from FL240 to FL237 back to FL240. Maneuver was assessed to be fairly benign with no passenger disruptions noted. Captain and First Officer observed an additional FA-18 approximately 4;000 FT above; 8 miles; at our 11 o'clock position; in-flight refueling from a KC-10. This flight appeared established in the Presidential TFR and was not a factor. Having situational awareness of both fighters; the First Officer then informed ATC that we were climbing back to FL240 and ATC acknowledged. Captain climbed the aircraft back to FL240 and re-engaged the autopilot. We continued on to our destination and landed uneventfully.Conduct TCAS training for military fighter pilots for a better understanding of flight path geometry; rates of closure and the requirement for a commercial airliner to respond to a Resolution Advisory.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]

An air carrier crew level at FL240 near PSP; took evasive action from a F-18 TCAS RA after the fighter strayed from the Presidential TFR airspace.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Today; I experienced a loss of engine power; while practicing power off-stall with my student. Power was restored; after I declared emergency with Approach Control. Tower accommodated our emergency; when it became an 'urgent' situation by giving us [the requested] runway. I landed the airplane safely there.

C172 instructor experiences a loss of engine power while practicing power off stalls with his student. An emergency is declared with Approach Control and a safe landing ensues.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Accomplished go-around below 1000 feet due to aircraft spacing created by approach and tailwind; which resulted in an unstable approach. Subsequent approach uneventful.We were asked by ATC to slow to 160 knots on final. This was because of an aircraft 2.5-3 miles in front of us. We also had a 30-knot tailwind. We were using full automation and aircraft was not able to maintain 160 knots with flaps at configuration 2. In addition to the tailwind; the Autothrottles was actually increasing at a time that it should have been decreasing because of the increased speed. The increase in thrust could often be contributed to not being in the approach phase...but this was not the case. We were in fact in the approach phase. The First Officer disconnected Autopilot and Autothrottles and lowered the gear and flaps prior to 1000 feet. The airplane was above the Glideslope below 1000 feet. This resulted in an unstable approach in attempting to 'catch' the Glideslope. We conducted a go around at approximately 750 feet.As a result of the 30-knot tailwind; we should have lowered the gear further out to help maintain the speed. However; it is unclear as to why the Autothrottles was increasing at a time that it should have been decreasing to lower the speed.

Visual approach 37-knot tailwind and an aircraft placed 2.5 miles in front of slowed to 160kts by ATC. Autopilot was unable to maintain glide path with tailwind /160kts/ CONFIG 2/ in the APCH MODE (approach mode) pitch was causing airspeed to increase when Autothrottles began to increase thrust for an undetermined reason; worsening the situation.

A319 flight crew reported executing a go-around due to an unstable approach resulting from inadequate spacing and 30-knot tailwind.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 700

Time Pressure; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

In the upwind Rwy XXL; at 200 ft. instantaneous loud popping and vibration was heard by both pilots. RPM maintained 2150 RPM's and both engine instruments were in green. Immediately upon noticing possible engine problem I as the Instructor took over 'flight controls' and completed a 'positive exchange of controls'. I maintained positive aircraft control flying the upwind. I communicated with ZZZ Tower immediately with a 'Pan-Pan' call and was given an immediate clearance to return to Airport and made the decision to start turn back towards Airport environment. ZZZ Tower offered assistance to any Runway; I declined. Requested Runway XXR; was cleared to land; landed XXR and landed safely. Taxied back to parking without incidence.

Flight Instructor reported while on upwind there was excessive engine vibration and a 'loud popping' noise so they returned to the airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 700

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was on Final approach after calling out turning Final Runway 21; Second call Aircraft X on Short final Runway 21. After first call on Final I saw Aircraft Y pull slowly onto the runway and stop; that's when I cancelled Short Final. Just as I was preparing to go-around he started moving and in my judgement I could land if he kept going. He lifted off as I touched down with full brakes and speedbrakes out. I was gaining on him as he climbed to 100 feet and by the time I made the second to last turn off he was 200 feet above and maybe 300 feet in front of my aircraft.Additional realities information. I never heard Aircraft Y announce anything; entering Runway; or even my call to him after I landed close to him. The heavy cross winds were a very big issue for me on the approach to this downhill runway. I know it well and with 160 at 22 knots on a 21 Runway I had 50 degree left crosswind and yaw angle for lineup. I knew I would get a major downdraft at the end of this runway so I elect to land at the 1000 feet marker. My landing speed is normal 100 knots plus 1/2 the wind makes 110 knots approach speed. That is the reason my ground speed and distance is long and fast. I was gaining on him even at his 100 to 200 feet. I also want to point out that as a NON controlled airport no one should pull on the runway and stop for even 10 seconds with an aircraft on final at 110 knots. Since his information indicates he is a commercial pilot I'm sure he realizes that there is no excuse to be on the wrong Frequency XYZ.00 or to stop as in Position and HOLD like you might get at a Towered airport.

Private pilot reported while on short final another aircraft entered the runway and began to takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 193; Flight Crew Type 193

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After landing on Runway 5 I was instructed to turn left on Taxiway A2 and hold short of Runway 9L; which I understood and read back. A2 comes out of an intersection which is a little confusing on its own with 5 spokes - it's an intersection of Runway 5 and an abandoned runway nearly perpendicular (which isn't well marked on the ground) with Taxiway A2 coming out of the north part of the X. Once I positively identified A2 and started taxiing on it I saw two sets of runway hold short lines within about 40 feet of each other. Naturally my first thought was I needed to clear the active runway I was on; then hold short of the next set of lines marking the next runway.Unfortunately; in this case they were reversed - the first set was to hold short of 9L and the next set was one for traffic coming from opposite direction to hold short of runway I was coming from. Essentially; there is no area where you are clear of both runways - you are either clear of one or of the other. As I crossed the first set; I made a comment to Tower about how small this holding area was; at which point he of course told me to stop; which I already was since I got to the place I thought I needed to be; between the two sets of lines. Obviously as I looked out of the side window it was clear that I made a mistake; so I apologized and no action was taken.Safety was never in question in this case since I could clearly see the actual runway I needed to be clear of which was still about 130 feet away; but technically I did cross the hold short line so that pretty much makes it a runway incursion. I review this kind of stuff all the time and I can recite you all the airport markings. If you gave me this question on a quiz I'm sure I would answer it right; while sitting in a comfy chair at home. But in this case expectation bias and a confusing intersection; especially after getting beat up in the pattern for an hour on a windy day ended up leading to this mistake.I've actually been flying out of this airport for a couple of years; and this intersection has confused me in the past; again because of the abandoned runway; it's just with normal operations I don't get go through it very often; but even being ready for it; it takes some time to figure out which is a taxiway and which is the abandoned runway. I think some better markings on ground; or even some traffic cones would help. As far as the hold short lines I think it would be more clear if they were combined; instead of having an area in between; but I think the fact that connector taxiway is reasonably short; runway safety areas overlap so it may not be possible.

General aviation pilot reported the placement of hold short lines on Taxiway A2 for runways 5 and 9L at BOW airport are reversed; causing aircraft to cross the hold short lines of Runway 9L in order to clear Runway 5 on the taxiway side of the lines.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.8

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was the R Controller on Razorback High and Drake Ultra High (22/19). I had only been on position for approx 10 minutes. Aircraft X was handed off to me climbing to FL230 southeast of TUL. Aircraft X was climbed to FL280. Aircraft X reported that they were waiting for Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z; both flights of 4. Aircraft X wanted to delay at FSM VOR. I cleared Aircraft X to FSM; and amended their assigned altitude to FL260. Aircraft X entered the hold at FSM. While flying on their outbound leg; Aircraft Y was handed off to me climbing to FL230. The R1/2 Controller appreq'd Aircraft Y; flight of 8; non-standard formation; 6 miles in trail. I also assigned Aircraft X FL270B280; their requested altitude. During this time; Sector 19 was being split off from Sector 22. I was unable to provide a recorded briefing to the R19 Controller due to the complexity and volume of my traffic. Sector 19 was split and it took approx. 3 minutes to complete sector transfer. There were numerous other aircraft at this time requesting weather deviations; frequency changes; and other traffic had to be moved for the military aircraft. I also was being relieved by another controller; who I elected to instead sit on my D side. I accepted the hand off on Aircraft Y; and climbed them to FL260. Aircraft X; after a position and altitude check; accepted MARSA with Aircraft Y flight. I then assigned Aircraft Y FL270B280; and switched them to tanker frequency. I then cleared Aircraft X to maneuver as necessary to join with Aircraft Y. Aircraft A; a SGF departure was level at FL250; southbound toward FSM. Aircraft Y was slowing their climb rate; and so I descended Aircraft A to FL240 and turned them 30 degrees left. There was no known conflictions between Aircraft A and any other aircraft. I accepted the hand off on Aircraft B; a ZZZ departure; heading toward TUL. Due to the military flight joining; and Aircraft A being turned in their direction; I elected to leave Aircraft B at FL230. The R1 Controller called and asked about a Mode C intruder; on code XXXX and climbing. Code XXX was climbing out of FL240 when I noticed the code. My limited data block filter was set to FL228B352. He was concerned about the proximity of Code XXXX and Aircraft B. Code XXXX was Aircraft Z flight; also departed TUL and joining up with Aircraft X. Code XXXX was approx 12 miles from Aircraft B; and climbing and I do not believe any separation was lost; however; both the R1 controller and my radar team were concerned about the random code. I queried Aircraft X about the code; and he informed me that they were part of the Aircraft Y flight (Originally Aircraft Z; however; they joined into a single flight). At this time; Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z (squawking code 1147) were at least 15 miles apart; 2000 feet or greater apart in altitude. I had no communication with Aircraft Y; and had no radar identification. Aircraft X informed me that they were still joining up; and I advised Aircraft X to tell me when they were fully established in the refueling formation. It took approx. 30 miles for all the aircraft to join with Aircraft X. After the event; I talked with the R1 Controller. He stated that Aircraft Z and Aircraft Y departed TUL to join with Aircraft X. TUL approach called and stated that the two flights joined together into a single flight of 8. Aircraft Z (now the only data block ZME had) continued onto FSM. The R1 Controller handed Aircraft Y flight to me; and I joined Aircraft Y and Aircraft X in a refueling formation. The known tracks; and their coordinated formation standards were separated from all aircraft. However; Aircraft Y and Aircraft X did not join. They were not in the coordinated 6 miles separation and were many 10's of miles apart and many 1000's of feet in altitude apart. This created a serious safety concern; and the Aircraft Z flight (Code XXXX) was in close proximity to Aircraft B. While I do not believe any separation was lost; this type of operation created a very unsafe situation. I was not able to communicate with 1/2 of the aircraft flight; nor did I know exactly where they were located. There was no indication from either the Aircraft Y flight lead or Aircraft X that the formation was in fact split; and joining from different locations; all outside the coordinated 6 miles. It appeared that the Aircraft Z flight (code XXXX) did not fly directly to FSM; nor join with Aircraft Y; but instead flew eastbound until north of FSM; putting them into a possible confliction with Aircraft B. There needs to be better communication with the military aircraft and air traffic control regarding their intentions. Communication between Aircraft Z and Aircraft Y was inadequate as to their intentions; and the communication with ATC was also inadequate. Aircraft Y was essentially flying around in Class A airspace with no separation being provided between them and other aircraft. These two flights should have never joined together prior to refueling with Aircraft X. Radar and communications should have been established with Aircraft Z. There should also have been some indication from the Aircraft Y lead that he only had 1/2 of their formation with him; and the other half was 20 miles away. Regardless of how the aircraft became separated; ATC should have been informed of the other aircraft positions. By the time I was made aware that these aircraft were not established in their formation; there was no longer a possibility of collision. Essentially I had aircraft in my airspace and did not know their altitude or position. This situation was completely unacceptable and created a serious hazard.

ZME Controller reports of a problem with two flights of aircraft attempting to join up with a refueling aircraft.  The flights were never close enough to be a standard flight and caused a conflict with other aircraft because they were so far apart.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1020; Flight Crew Type 60

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We had filed IFR to get out of GFK. No ice had been reported by [another of] our aircraft that had left prior to us; in fact; one even reported above freezing temperatures aloft. It began to rain as we taxied out. Temperature on the ground was +1 Celsius. I decided to stay in the pattern since the aircraft was wet and not risk hitting a freezing layer on the departure and freezing the moisture to the fuselage; knowing from the weather briefing that there were several freezing levels above us. Other aircraft currently in the traffic pattern had reported no ice; so I was set on staying close by. As soon as we hit traffic pattern altitude the ice reports began to roll in from other aircraft in the pattern. In the 900 feet we climbed to traffic pattern altitude; the temperature had dropped to -1 Celsius. The rain froze to the fuselage and we called Tower to make a full stop. We performed a no-flap landing and had an uneventful arrival back at Grand Forks.

A PA-44 pilot took off in rain at +1C and was surprised when ice started to form as they approached pattern altitude and the temperature had dropped to -1C.  They remained in the pattern and landed ASAP.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On the final approach; we extended the landing gear and only had two green lights; main landing gear; [and] no nose wheel indication. We cycled the gear and never got a nose wheel down and locked indication. We initiated a low approach and asked the Tower to check the landing gear. We tested the lights and verified the nose wheel light was working. After this; we [requested priority handling] and completed the gear failed to extend checklist per the QRH; never getting a three green indication. We executed another low approach in which we had a flight and another aircraft on the ground; as well as the Tower; advised that it appeared the nose wheel was down and at 90 degrees. After this; we successfully landed the aircraft on Runway XX; pinned the gear and taxied to the [Company] ramp. We notified Maintenance Control and [Dispatch] after passengers disembarked.

GIV Captain reported encountering a nose gear indication malfunction on final approach to landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 389; Flight Crew Type 3000

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

New shutdown procedures for -800 series aircraft call for nose wheel and right main to be chocked and tail stand installed before chocks signal is given by Marshaller and notes that it may take up to two minutes for the Captain to receive this hand signal. On three out of four legs flown in an -800 on this trip; the Marshaller gave the chocks signal immediately after shutdown and far too soon for the tail stand to have been installed. Unless there are multiple ramp agents available to immediately (within three to five seconds of shutdown) install two sets of chocks and the tail stand; the likelihood of the 'chocks in signal' to be received by the Captain becomes increasingly low as this new procedure has become the norm. In fact; on the one leg where I actually got a proper signal; the lead Marshaller actually disappeared for nearly a minute before coming back to give me the signal. I was just about to leave the flight deck to go see if the chocks were actually installed at all (and if the tail stand was installed before de-boarding began) and might have missed the signal. Odds are that this procedure will break down and the signal missed far too often; posing risk of the very problems the new procedure is designed to mitigate. Recommend a separate signal for chocks installed; followed by the Marshaller remaining in sight with his hand in the air until a different 'tail stand installed' signal in given.

B737-800 Captain reported that several ground crew members were not complying with the new company policy.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 200

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

While flying [a short flight] in a Nieuport experimental; the VW engine began to fail. Carried out a precautionary landing in a vacant grass field. Fixed loose battery wire. Flew aircraft out.

Experimental Nieuport aircraft pilot reports engine failure and lands in a grass field. A loose battery cable is properly connected and the aircraft departs.


Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Preflight of the aircraft was normal. As the ramp agent attached the pushback tug to the aircraft he asked us if we could straighten the nose wheel. I told him over the headset that I could but would have to activate the nose wheel steering to do so. I then instructed him to make sure he and all equipment was clear of the nose wheel to which he said it was. I then turned on hydraulic system power and activated the nose wheel steering via the tiller. I then disengaged the nose wheel steering and turned off the hydraulic power. The ramp agent then appeared to unhook the tug from the airplane and reposition the tug to hook back up to the airplane from off the left side of the nose wheel on an angle. He then hooked up the airplane to the tug; lifted the nose of the airplane; and said he was ready for pushback. We obtained a pushback clearance and he proceeded to push us back normally. After the pushback was complete I set the parking brake and told him he was clear to disconnect. He unhooked the tug from the airplane and set the nose of the airplane down. As he slid the 'tray' of the tug out from under the nose wheel it felt to us in the cockpit as if the nose wheel was turning as the tug slid out from under it. Obviously we could not see the position of the nose wheel from the cockpit during any of this. The ramp agent then informed us that the nose wheel has turned 180 deg and we then called maintenance control. We never touched or activated the nose wheel steering or hydraulics after the initial time in the gate when the ramp agent asked us to straighten the nose wheel.

The Captain of an Embraer reported that after push-back the nose wheel was completely turned around.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 283; Flight Crew Type 6

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

While flying westbound approximately 8 miles north of P03 at 8500 feet MSL we encountered a small grey UAV (possibly a Hunter) followed by Aircraft Z acting as chase. UAV was slightly below us and crossed in front of us from left to right. Aircraft Z crossed underneath us. Collision avoidance was taken by climbing and turning to the Southwest. Approximately 8 minutes prior to the event I called on CTAF 122.8 of our location over P03 and received no response. After seeing the UAV and Aircraft Z I called once again on 122.8 and no answer was received. The UAV and Aircraft Z continued to the North and no change in altitude or direction was seen.

Pilot took evasive action to avoid a UAV and the chase airplane behind it at 8;500 FT near a local airport.


Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working R46 combined with low traffic complexity and volume. I had both of my frequencies on and in my headset; (126.22 and 118.42). I heard a tone in my ear and looking up I saw that it was something transmitting on 126.22. At first I thought it was an unusual stuck mic since a pilot had just transmitted. Upon investigation; I found out that the frequency that I had heard the tone on was released to maintenance. When asking why that frequency was on at the sector; one of my coworkers said they had been informed by the OMIC desk when opening the sector; that we could use that frequency. I would recommend that if a frequency is Released To Maintenance (RTM); a note be made on the ESIS board displayed in the area. Also; maybe the OMIC desk should utilize their TV for their own ESIS board so this miscommunication doesn't happen again. Another suggestion; when a frequency is RTM have the supervisor/CIC temporarily take it off the VSCS so these tones can't be heard; and can't be harmful for the controller.

ZBW Controller experienced a loud tone in his/her head set only to discover that an assigned frequency had been released to maintenance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Other sea plane

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 19

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Name; owner of a Cessna 501 hired a pilot to fly the plane and move it to another airport for maintenance. The aircraft had been sitting in a hanger for some time. A local A&P completed some maintenance on the aircraft to prepare it for flight. The airplane was ramp checked with the mechanic present and all of the systems were working properly. The airplane is equipped with a transponder and Mode C. A request for a non ADSB flight leaving the area was filed and granted. The paperwork was on board. There was a unintentional mistake on the printed form and a extra character was included in the tail number. Name; together with the pilot boarded the plane and departed ZZZ around XA:10. The plane was given a squawk code and it was entered into the transponder. Approximately 8-10 minutes into the flight; the right engine oil pressure registered low on the gauge. The low oil pressure alarm sounded. The emergency procedure checklist was used and the engine was shut down. The plane turned back towards the departure airport. Two way communication with the controller handling the plane was lost. The plane descended and tracked off course to the south. Attempts by the pilot with made to contact the controller without success. The controller noticed the airplane off course and was heard on the radio attempting to establish two way contact with the pilot. This was unsuccessful. The plane entered Class B airspace without permission. The controller requested a squawk ident and a turn to the north. The pilot complied with the request. The controller vectored the plane back to ZZZ and handed it off [to] Tower. Tower cleared the pilot to land and taxi to parking. The plane landed and parked. Two way radio communication was never re-established.

Pilot reported that during a flight to another airport for maintenance; the aircraft had an engine lose power and was shut down; and communications were lost with ATC.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was on an IFR flight with my student to ZZZ. Upon departing ZZZ1 my student mentioned that the aircraft engine didn't sound right. I was unable to detect a distinctive difference to be of any concern; so I decided to continue the flight. At 5;000 feet and roughly 10 NM away from the ZZZ airport on the XXX; there was an audible bang from the engine and a loss of 300 RPM from the engine. I tried exercising the throttle with only 2;300 RPM at full throttle. I reduced the throttle and ran through the engine roughness checklist. None of the items on the checklist remedied the loss of power or engine roughness. The mag check resulted in roughly 1;000 RPM drops for both; but the engine continued to operate; just at reduced power. I made the decision to divert to ZZZ airport. I called Center to cancel IFR and go into ZZZ under VFR. I was able to land the aircraft without further incident. It is important to note that the mag check on the run up was within limits. This event could have been caused by a maintenance issue. I think that it is important to heed the alerts from all of those on board. I could have paid more attention to my student mentioning the noise from the engine. I might have been able to detect an issue before we were enroute.

Instructor pilot reported a rough running engine coupled with power loss and elected to divert to make a precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 1800

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

During landing; student pilot had the controls; under instruction. Student pilot made an otherwise good approach from the pattern; to the runway centerline. As student pilot began round-out; and to gradually reduce the power; the student pilot unexpectedly veered to the left. Aircraft touched down on the grass and instructor applied corrective pedal in an attempt to avoid striking runway edge lights. As aircraft decelerated and corrected towards runway centerline; the edge of the left landing gear struck and knocked over two of the runway edge lights. Aircraft was inspected to have no damage. Notification was made to the airport manager the following morning.

C172 flight instructor reported the student pilot drifted and touched down adjacent to the runway edge. While correcting back to the runway; contact was made with runway edge lights.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Air Carrier Y was on the RNAV arrival landing BUR. I was stepping this aircraft down reference other aircraft in the area. Air Carrier X Flight ABCD was an OXR arrival at 4;000 feet that I was vectoring to final due to the ILS being out of service. I had another OXR arrival that was being vectored to follow and was stepping down reference other traffic. Air Carrier X Flight ABCE was enroute to SBA at 6;000 feet from over VNY. The Controller who was working Air Carrier X Flight ABCE requested direct to the IAF for SBA. I said unable I need him on the route. I was trying to vector Air Carrier X Flight ABCD between several VFR aircraft while trying not to vector too far south to avoid an MVA at 4;300 feet. I switched Air Carrier X Flight ABCD with a last heading of 260; which was read back. Then Air Carrier X Flight ABCD asked if that last call was for Air Carrier X Flight ABCD; which I responded in the affirmative and shipped the aircraft to Approach. At this time I did not realize that Air Carrier X Flight ABCE took the frequency change for Air Carrier X Flight ABCD. When I realized that Air Carrier X Flight ABCE was not on the route as I had coordinated and expected I tried to turn the aircraft twice with no response. I then turned Aircraft X immediately and descended the aircraft to 5;000 feet. He responded and stated that he was receiving a TCAS RA and I issued a traffic alert. In this event I assumed that Air Carrier X Flight ABCE would be on the route that had been coordinated; however the previous Controller issued a heading instead which put the aircraft head on with my arrival. If he had been on the route they would have passed with about 4 miles of lateral separation. I got distracted with my OXR sequencing and avoiding VFRs while trying to vector to final with the ILS OTS. When I noticed the conflict; I had time to save it and tried to turn the Air Carrier X Flight ABCE out of the way; however the aircraft was not on frequency due to him taking his company's frequency change.The first thing that NEEDS to happen is to get the company to change their call signs. I personally have had several incidents with similar sounding call signs with this particular company and all depart around the same time. I have brought this up multiple times with no response. I don't understand why we still allow this to happen. I talked to the Controller working the adjacent sector and he apologized and said that he thought I understood that he put the aircraft on a heading.

SCT TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict resulting from similar sounding callsign confusion.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I released Aircraft X to 130; SYD [Subject Your Discretion] with the inbound ROVE. Aircraft X checks in saying he's flying runway heading; despite his filed flight plan and assumed clearance to be KSAF..ZZZ. I ask him if he was assigned runway heading by SAF and they said no. He appeared unsure what to do. Had a little back and forth with him and basically told him to turn on course. I tried not to imply course guidance below the MIA as best I could; but he was flying directly at mountainous terrain immediately NE of the airport and needed to start his turn. This has happened more than a few times at SAF lately; though I don't know if it's purely pilot action or in concert with tower instructions. Scary situation for him and me both though. Pilots simply don't appear to respect the terrain; and when they file routes; they just expect ATC to take care of the problem. Incidentally; I had planned on putting in a new route to ZZZ for him for weather; but never got around to it before SAF called for release because my workload was too high with traffic with the combined sector 94.This appears to be a pilot problem; and someone is going to get themselves killed eventually. From my end everything was normal until he checked in.

ZAB Controller reported of traffic coming off SAF airport that do not know where they should be heading and enter a lower MIA [Minimum IFR Altitude]. Controller states this has happened more than a few times and is concerned that the terrain is higher on the route they are flying as opposed to what they file.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22.2; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 9.1

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The landing was excellent; Rollout of the aircraft was straight and smooth. When reaching for the toe brakes; I had a left brake but no right break. The toe brakes are little round pads on the top outsides of each rudder and are not easily identified with your toes even with soft sole shoes which I wear to fly in. I did not realize my foot had slipped off or was not on it properly until it was too late. The aircraft took a left direction as I was wishing to slow down. I let go of the left brake and caught it/straightened it with the right rudder. Right after I had it straight; I removed my right foot to lift it higher up to engage the right brake. The aircraft took a sharp left direction went onto the grass which with then full right rudder and the right brake did not help. The slope away from the runway is very steep and the aircraft was not able to be brought back up onto the runway; so I kept it straight and aimed at the taxiway; With the airplane tailwheel not willing to provide steering since it was on grass and the slope was still steep; the aircraft slid over the other side of the taxiway. The aircraft refused to turn right with all my efforts; so my next choice was to hit trees and or a building; so I choose to ground loop the airplane to avoid the trees and building. NO damage was done to any property including taxi signs or even lights. The aircraft came to a stop 180 degrees to the landing direction. No one was hurt in any manner since the speed was not very fast. The right gear leg collapsed as it stopped and the prop hit the grass and broke one of the tips. The engine was shut down and everything was turned off. The Runway XX is a challenging runway since there is zero room for error.

Private pilot did not have proper foot placement and lost control of the aircraft during the landing rollout. The aircraft  had a prop strike and right main gear failure.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Other CFI-G

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 800

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I went to the ZZZ area to pick up a Super Viking that a customer wanted me to fly/train with him to ZZZ1.  The aircraft was coming out from an annual inspection and I inspected it as an airplane out of serious maintenance. I noticed some play in the prop blades but it was consistent on all blades; and coming out of inspection; I assumed that it was the way the prop was.When we landed in ZZZ; I had the prop inspected by a mechanic who found the prop 'questionable' and recommended not to fly the aircraft. Prop was dismounted and sent to a prop shop which found the prop non airworthy. I had never seen a broken prop and I pride myself to inspect and teach to inspect CS props very carefully.  Maybe we should have more documentation about props.

BL-17 pilot reported the propeller had excessive movement in the blades and decide to have maintenance inspect it after a flight and it was found to be non airworthy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3500

Distraction; Time Pressure; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

April 2013; I called Maintenance at my airline to report a Cargo Door light on the panel that would not go out. After talking to Maintenance and checking that the bayonets were in place on the cargo door they issued me a MEL for the door under the assumption that because the bayonets were in place the light was not properly working. This was repaired after a few days when I pressured the mechanics to repair it or I would refuse to fly the aircraft on the next flight. [Approximately] twelve days later; I had the same problem and was given another MEL from a Mechanic who claimed to have discussed it with the Director of Maintenance (DOM). While legal; I felt this MEL should not be available as the design of the cargo door requires that it be properly secured or it could possibly take off the tail. Pressure was placed on me by the mechanics to fly an aircraft that I deemed unairworthy and unfortunately between the pressure and the overall fatigue of the cargo schedule I departed with a legal; yet stupid; cargo door MEL.

Reporter stated the cargo door is approximately 4.5 feet x 4.5 feet and located just aft of the left wing. There are two warning lights for the cargo door. One light on the forward Annunciator panel that reads 'Cargo' and a second light indicating 'Door Unsafe'; located behind the co-pilot's yoke. The 'Door Unsafe' light is difficult to see in flight. Reporter stated both lights had been placed on an MEL deferral. One of the MEL procedures requires verification that the bayonet type door locks are in the locked position. Pilots have to crawl over the loaded freight inside the fuselage to view the bayonet latches with a flashlight. There are at least ten locking latches visible on the inside; but none visible on the outside of the aircraft. The inside handle for the cargo door can be removed; exposing only a [door cranking] stem. The handle lever has a nearby pouch for storage.Reporter stated that a common problem on all Metro's is the Door Warning lights tend to flicker and stay 'On'; sometimes in flight or while taxiing over rough terrain. If the lights don't go out; they have to return to the gate. His concern is in-flight turbulence and shifting freight against the door causing the door latches to unlock and the outward opening door to depart the aircraft; striking the very close Horizontal Stabilizer.Reporter stated he discussed the MEL deferral with their Director Of Maintenance (DOM) who told him the Cargo Door Warning Lights MEL would be removed from their MEL List because he; as DOM; also did not believe such a deferral was safe a practice. They fly single pilot operations.

A pilot describes why he believes the current MEL practice of deferring both Cargo Door Warning Lights on their Fairchild SA-227 aircraft is an unsafe practice. They fly single pilot operations.