FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Rwy 05

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

On the ROKTO 3 arrival into CYYZ we were at 7000 feet and ATC advised us 'cleared direct to DULPA and descend to 3000 feet until established cleared for the ILS 05.'  By the time we were given the altitude it looked like we were going to be high so flaps and speed breaks were used to establish a better decent.  When looking at the arrival earlier we had not noticed the crossing restriction at DULPA of 3000 feet because the location of the name and restriction is not located next to the fix.  As we were approaching DULPA the First Officer looked at the approach plate and noticed we were within the 13.9 DME from YTP or inside the fix XIGAN which allows to descend to 1900 feet so he set 2000 feet.  The DULPA fix is on the approach plate but it does not have the 3000 foot restriction on the approach plate.  The needle was alive as we went threw 3000 feet I am not sure if we missed the altitude at DULPA or not.  The FO was just going by what the approach plate said and that ATC had said 3000 until established.  As we leveled off at 2000 feet ATC asked us to level off at 2000 feet until the glide slope and later told us the next time we come into CYYZ we should intercept the glide slope at 3000 feet.  Later when we arrived at the gate we looked over the arrival and approach plate to see if we had missed anything and saw on the arrival where DULPA is at 3000 feet; but it was not anywhere on the approach plate.  I believe if the arrival chart could be changed so the restriction of 3000 feet at DULPA was clearer that would help and I also believe DULPA at 3000 feet should be added to the approach plate.

ERJ170 Captain reports descending to 1900 feet prior to glide slope capture during the ILS Runway 05 at CYYZ after being cleared to 3000 feet until established cleared for the ILS.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

On the SHFTY TWO arrival into RSW the MCDU is wrong! It appears to be auto sequencing; which is something it should not do. Also; I believe this has happened in ATL as well if I remember the last Union update. According to the arrival after reaching LBV you are supposed to take a 228 heading for Runway 24 (see note 2 on the arrival). If you put this arrival in and then put the RNAV 24 runway in; the box puts in LBV direct RODDE; which is the IAF for the approach. But again this is not what you are cleared; you are supposed to take the 228 heading that is on the arrival. We caught this during our descent brief and asked ATC what they wanted; they concurred that after arriving at LBV they expect us to be on the 228 heading not direct RODDE. I do not know why the box is auto sequencing things now; but it is not right; please put an alert out to the crews about this arrival.

An A320 Captain reported that the aircraft's FMGC database fails to comply with the published 228 degree heading outbound from LBV on the SHFTY RNAV STAR to Runway 24 at RSW.  Reporter advised when the RNAV(GPS) RWY 24 approach is selected it reprograms the 'heading and associated route discontinuity' prior to RODDE waypoint on the approach to a continuous leg; sans discontinuity.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While in holding pattern the aircraft was hit by lightning. Autopilot failed to stay connected in a turn and we climbed 200 FT at the same time we received an ECAM message that the right engine stalled. The holding pattern [was] too close to convective activity.

An A319 was struck by lightning while in a holding pattern at 14;000 FT and made a precautionary landing after a RT ENG STALL ECAM alerted and the autopilot disconnected causing an altitude excursion.


Inspection; Testing; Work Cards; Installation

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Went out to Aircraft X for turnover; there were 6 mechanics assigned to do the workload. There was a [Malfunction A] and a [Malfunction B] that needed to be changed. There was one mechanic from swing shift at the airplane. The swings mechanic was asked which engine had [Malfunction A] and what engine had [Malfunction B]. The swing shift mechanic said [work on Malfunction B] was done and gestured towards the #2 eng - which the removed [component] was placed near the paperwork table by the # 2 eng. The #1 eng needed [Malfunction A addressed] which we were standing next to during the turnover. I assumed [Malfunction B] was on #2 eng that needed leak check. We finished up [Malfunction A] on #1 eng and pushed out plane and leaked checked #2 eng. The A/C left ZZZ and lost oil pressure on #1 eng. Then diverted to ZZZ1. Actually the #1 [component] was changed and was the eng that should have been leak checked. The write up in the log book for tracking purposes did not specify what eng it was; the job card did not specify what engine and I was going by the swing shift turnover which the mechanics that changed the [component for Malfunction B] were not present.A lack of communication between mechanics; leads; supervisors. The mechanic that performed the job was not present on what eng or what needed to be accomplished. So I assumed only leak check on #2 eng was all that was needed so we just focused on [fixing Malfunction A].Better communication; Eng clarification of Job card.

I was PF (Pilot Flying) climbing through FL 270 when we got an indication of low oil qty on L engine. FO (First Officer) took over as PF while I linked through Dispatch to [Maintenance Control]. It was decided that with all other indications being normal; we would continue. Ten mins later; oil pressure started to drop slowly so we turned around to air abort back to ZZZ. After 10-15 mins oil press dropped enough to trigger an ECAM alert which called for engine shutdown. ECAM and QRH were completed to secure the engine while we [coordinated] with ATC and request to divert to ZZZ1 which was the closest airport. Dispatch was notified and coordinated our arrival there. We made a visual approach to Rwy XX with myself being PM (Pilot Monitoring). We landed at max landing weight with plenty of rwy. Taxied clear of the active to have ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting) inspect us before we taxied to the gate under our own power. Oil was evident under the L engine as noticed by ARFF. Once at the gate; we deplaned the pax and Mx took over the a/c.The a/c hadn't flown in a few days and had some Mx work done. It was difficult to determine whether the indication of low oil quantity was correct until it was verified by low oil pressure. Maintenance oversight?

A321 Flight Crew reported a loss of oil quantity followed by loss of oil pressure causing the number 1 engine to be shut down and a diversion.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Human Factors

APU deferred requiring a GPU and bottle start. Ramp was short one person. ACARS is not available; so had to use the ACARS backup form. Despite all this; we blocked out on time. Ground crew tried to push airplane back with towbar as they normally do; but tow bar was bent and couldn't be used. No other towbar was available. I suggested to ground crew that if they made sure all ground equipment was clear; including moving the jet bridge back as far as it would go; we may be able to taxi out of gate. This was done. Cleared left side as far aft as I could see; noting that wingwalker was behind the wing. I then focused my attention on the marshaller who was to my left. Wing walker was no longer in my line of sight. Cleared to taxi which required a tight right turn. Began taxi; observed stop signal from marshaller. As I applied brakes;I felt aircraft jolt as it struck jet bridge. Damage was to left winglet half way up; approx 6 inches in length; one inch deep. Sent photos to MTC. Submitted to alcohol and drug testing. Aircraft was deplaned and flight cancelled.Ground crew short one member. Didn't know it at the time; but ground crew had never performed an airplane power out. This was a nonstandard procedure for them; which explains why the wingwalker was behind the wing as this is where he normally stands for a pushback. Rainy weather made it more difficult to see compared to a clear day. Maybe because of my interest in being on our way and making it all work; it didn't even register in my brain that the marshaller didn't have wands. Since she is normally driving the tug she normally doesn't have wands. As I reflected on this event I realized in a close quarters situation like this; I normally pay more attention to the wing walker then the marshaller. This eliminates the delay from wingwalker to marshaller to me which I think contributed to this incident. Other times I have seen the wingwalker give the stop signal while the marshaller is indicating the taxi signal.

CRJ-200 Captain reports damage to the left winglet during attempt to taxi out of a gate after the push back fails due to a bent tow bar. The flight is cancelled.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Flight Plan on Dispatch Release; KXNA DCT RZC DCT GAGLE DCT SZW DCT OCF V159 LEESE DCT [ZZZ1]FMS Flight Plan; KXNA DCT RZC DCT GABLE DCT SZW DCT OCF DCT ALADN DCT CUSAB DCT SHIMM DCT LEESE DCT [ZZZ1] (note that Victor Airway 159 is not in FMS database)ATC Clearance; HIFIL4 Departure as filed; Climb 5;000 to feet; Expect FL 370 in: 10 minutes; Departure Frequency 121.0; Squawk 5661.We neglected to catch a waypoint fix input error while programming the FMS for a ferry flight. We didn't discover the error until we were queried by ATC during climb-out to our cruise altitude. I input the route and had entered 'GABLE' as our second fix instead of 'GAGLE'.I input the route into the FMS and checked it for accuracy. The only thing I don't recall doing; which likely would have lead me to catch the input error; was checking the total route mileage against the mileage on the flight plan. It's one of the additional FMS programming steps used in long range navigation that is not really addressed for general FMS programming. Despite the fact that 'GABLE' and 'GAGLE' are in the same general direction from RZC VOR; had we checked; the total mileage for the route would have been different between the FMS and the flight plan.Additionally; on most revenue flights; we likely would have had an FMS 'insufficient fuel' message due to the erroneous total distance; but since it was a ferry flight that had been fueled the night before for revenue service; we had 4;700 lbs. of extra fuel onboard; more than enough to cover the extra mileage.As we climbed out of XNA; we were given ATC clearance to deviate as necessary around local rain showers; and then cleared direct 'GAGLE'; which I read back as 'GABLE'. Once clear of the shower activity; we erroneously proceeded direct to 'GABLE' instead of 'GAGLE' using the FMS. After a couple of frequency changes during climb-out; we checked in with a Memphis Center controller who asked if were still deviating around weather. After I responded we were direct 'GABLE' (which I assume he understood as 'GAGLE'); he responded that we should check that; as it didn't appear that we were direct. As we looked at the route and the FMS; the controller cleared us direct to SZW. Shortly thereafter; we discovered the original programming error and I announced to the controller that we had discovered and corrected the problem. The controller did not seem concerned and gave us another frequency change.

MD80 Captain reported a track deviation that involved confusion between two similar sounding fix names.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Landed ZZZZ RWY XXL; Exited RWY at TWY K6. Cleared to cross RWY XXR. After crossing RWY XXR I joined TWY B behind a private B747-800. The 747 was taxiing very slow which required more low speed braking. Once clear of the 747; I continued to the [Company] ramp. This involved numerous low speed turns. As I approached our gate; we received a Level 2 Alert 'Brake Overheat'. The config. page showed No.4 and No.7 as being over temped. I advised ground crew to keep personnel away from the Rt Main Gear because of the hot brakes. I was advised that No.4 was spitting fire. I also observed that CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) was coming to the aircraft. Maintenance used dry chemical to extinguish No.4 and CFR flushed and cooled brakes with water. Long slow complicated taxi in a heavy airplane.

MD-11 flight crew encountered brake overheat following long slow taxi to gate after landing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 15

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Was in the in the flare to landing. Aircraft bounced once; increased angle of attack to arrest oscillation. On second touchdown; tail came down first and a loud snap was heard. Taxied off the runway and saw the damaged tail spring. It broke just at the top of the tail wheel head. Total time in service is 600 hours approximately.

Pilot reported a bounce on landing and on second touchdown; the tail wheel spring head broke and required replacement.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

We encountered either clear air turbulence or wake turbulence at cruise altitude of FL400. We were not in any segmented areas and there were no adverse ride reports. Two Flight Attendants were thrown around and slightly injured. We had just inquired about the rides and were told occasional light chop by ATC. The Flight Attendants refused any medical attention numerous times. We asked; but requested removal from duty upon arrival at destination.

We leveled at our cruise altitude of FL400 and inquired ATC about ride reports several times. The report stated back was occasional light chop. We released the FAs to perform their duties. About five minutes later we encountered a 30 degree roll and 100 ft loss in altitude and what seemed to be wake turbulence or clear air turbulence. We were on top of a thin cirrus layer. I called back to check on the F/As and they reported that the B and C were in the back galley and were tossed around and received injuries.

B737 flight crew reported two Flight Attendants were slightly injured when clear air turbulence or wake vortex was encountered at FL400.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 126; Flight Crew Total 11901; Flight Crew Type 1425

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While in cruise at FL390; left generator failed.  We complied with QRH which directed us to reset generator.  After about 3-5 minutes; generator failed again.  APU was deferred so QRH directed us to land at nearest suitable airport.  We considered ZZZ; ZZZ1; ZZZ2; and ZZZ3.  ZZZ was closest so we returned to ZZZ and made a normal landing with one generator.

B757 Captain reported the left generator failed during cruise which resulted in an air turn back.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

O2 control on/off cable with the following reference C208 35-00-01 which is very vague nowhere in this MM states anything about these flap switch guards. Tested O2 system ops check good. Once again nowhere in the MM states anything about these guards for the flap switch system or testing the flap switches after removing the guards to access the O2 cable. When aircraft landed pilot reported flaps inoperative at zero. Notified Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control asked me to verify flap switch guards and realized that they were in the wrong position causing the flap system to fault. Repositioned the flap switch guards to original position I/A/W TDA 2750E002 ops check good. C208 MM needs to be updated; also need better  maintenance bulletin procedures.

Caravan 208B pilot reported flaps inoperative after landing; caused by flap switch guards in the wrong position after maintenance to replace the O2 control cable.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Upon selecting flaps 30 and running the Before Landing Checklist; we realized the trailing edge flaps were frozen symmetrical between flaps 25 and 30. The approach was continued with no roll or adverse aircraft handling. A normal landing was executed adding a few knots (approximately Vref15). Upon further review; a go-around should have been executed; the appropriate checklist in the QRH run; and then returned for the approach and landing.

[Report narrative contains no additional information].

B737-300 flight crew increased Vref speed and landed after encountering a trailing edge flap lockout between flaps 25 and 30 on approach.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Operating on the right pack only initially. During the climb out we received a right engine bleed air duct warning message. We ran the QRH. Realized that we would not have any pressurization or air conditioning systems with both PACKs being inoperative so we returned back to ZZZ.We returned due to losing our last PACK which caused us to not have any pressurization or air cooling.

CRJ-700 Captain reported loss of pressurization after takeoff.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

When we taxied out at MSP we were told to taxi via P; M; hold short of Runway 12L. I taxied toward Papa at a slight angle. As I was about to turn onto P; I had to get on the brakes fairly aggressively. There was another CRJ 200 taxiing fast down P in the other direction with no lights on other than NAVs and a beacon. I only saw one NAV light at first as most of the aircraft was blocked by my window post. I immediately made a hard left inside of the opposing aircraft onto taxiway Q. Ground was very busy and seemed not to notice the two opposing aircraft stopped wingtip to wingtip. We were only able to clarify our taxi instructions with him. He issued the same instructions as before and we went on our way. I'm sure the other aircraft was most likely doing as they were told; but a fast taxi without headlights was beyond dangerous and stupid.

A CRJ-200 Captain described a close encounter with an opposite direction taxiing aircraft on the ground at MSP.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

As the crew arrived at the gate; later than scheduled; I was one of the first to make it down the jet bridge. As I was descending I saw 4 people getting secondary screening in an area off an elbow in the jet bridge. As I continued down to the aircraft door I witnessed an airport security person escorting a passenger off the aircraft. I was surprised as the plane had been on the gate for nearly an hour; this could not be a passenger still deplaning on arrival. As I entered the aircraft to stow my belongings I noted that the FAMs were already on board. I recognized this as a violation of FAR 121.391; minimum crew on board before boarding. I then went back up the jet bridge to inform our Security/Gate Agent that a person had been boarded without any crewmembers on board. Agent said that they were secondary screening some passengers and that the passenger was not a security issue. In an effort to expedite boarding they were put on the jet bridge and told to wait. The passenger somehow made it down; on to the plane in spite of personnel in place. The CA and Purser arrived moments later and I informed them. The CA discussed the situation with the lead security agent and the purser and it was agreed not to have to re screen the plane to expedite departure.First problem I see is the pressure to expedite boarding to make up for a delay. Second; allowing passengers onto the jet bridge while the plane is being serviced by many airport workers. I assume the passenger saw the FAM's go onto the Aircraft and assumed it was okay to do the same. The airport security person at the door may have thought she was another FAM; or may have been distracted and had his/her back turned as the passenger walked on.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported that Federal Air Marshals were allowed to board prior to the crew boarding.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This flight canceled due to duty limitations. Management is impeding the Part 117 rules by punishment of its pilots. The company has implemented a policy of not providing accommodations to the individual pilot whom did not provide the airline with a duty extension. In these specific occurrences the airline will provide the other 3 crew members with a hotel. This policy is simply retaliation for compliance with Part 117. These occurrences effectively punish that individual employee; for Part 117 compliance. This practice is clearly unsafe and is absolutely blatant pilot intimidation. In some cases a young pilot with a family may not be in a situation to afford extra hotel cost during the month. Furthermore; after speaking with the Chief Pilot; it was clear that they would never have recommended this practice. This policy has been implemented by some other entity within the company. This practice should stop as it is unethical and inappropriate. Furthermore; it could be construed as discrimination in the workplace. This policy was implemented on said pilot last night after he complied with Part 117. In order to retain and hire pilots the company must pay competitive wages and improve pilot scheduling. Pilots are worked to the maximum flight hours and maximum duty hours. The airline has a severe pilot shortage and few available reserve pilots.

Captain reported conflicting company policy and FAR duty-day limitations.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I realized I didn't have my apron; which contained my EFB; while on the van; heading to our overnight. Because of our service procedures changing on an almost daily basis; during this chaotic time; my routine was disrupted and I inadvertently left it on our previous airplane. I knew we weren't going to be serving on our flight so I didn't get my apron out and stow it like I normally would; therefore I didn't realize it was missing until I was getting my van tip out of my bag.

Flight Attendant stated preoccupation with COVID-19 concerns resulted in forgetting to bring the EFB to work.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Aircraft X asked to taxi to runway 24 full length; issued: 'Aircraft X taxi to runway 24 via alpha; sierra; B4; cross RWY 33L join taxiway echo. Stay to your right for opposite direction small aircraft inbound to the ramp.'  Aircraft X responded 'You want me to do my run-up on A1?' I said 'Negative!' and then repeated the taxi instructions issued before; very slowly. Aircraft X responded 'Roger.'  At this time I cleared another aircraft for take-off from the mid-field intersection; advising him the prior touch & go would be in right traffic. I then cleared another aircraft to land on runway 24 at which point a small aircraft on taxiway S saw Aircraft X enter runway 24 and announced it on the frequency. I observed Aircraft X had not followed his instructions and proceeded straight out via A1 and turned right onto runway 24. Aircraft X veered to the right when he observed the small aircraft departure opposite direction. The small aircraft also veered to the right and passed Aircraft X at an altitude of approximately 300 feet. Aircraft X was advised to exit the runway and was issued a Brasher warning.Even if ground had been open; I believe this event would have occurred.

I received taxi clearance and proceeded to A1 intersection. This is the taxi clearance used during the construction on Sierra and Alpha taxiways. Upon turning onto runway 24 for back taxi; I realized an airplane was taking off on runway 24; and did an immediate 180 degree turn back to A1. Ground control contacted me with the corrected clearance; which I followed. It was Sierra; B4; cross 33L; Echo; and hold short of 33R. With a crossing clearance of 33L; I was holding short of runway 24 at Echo for run up. Ground control contacted me and told me to contact the tower on landing by phone. I thought they meant to contact the tower when landing back at ISP; not at my destination of GON. I left my plane at GON for maintenance; and called the ISP tower after the drive back to ISP. I was told to contact the ISP tower supervisor the next morning.I think the problem was caused by misunderstanding the initial taxi clearance; and not giving back a proper read back on initial call up to ground. My performance was affected by being used to the construction taxi clearance; and not listening properly with a read back to ground control.

Controller and pilot report a runway incursion that happened due to communication; leading to a NMAC with departing traffic.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

While in cruise flight; approximately 20-25 minutes into flight; the Chief Flight Attendant called the cockpit and said that all the flight attendants had noticed a strange smell of 'dirty rancid socks' at about row 6 and further back. All the flight attendants wanted to tell me what they smelled and were clearly concerned. I asked if there actually dirty socks or anything to account for the smell. They reported in the negative. I asked if it smelled like deicing fluid and they said no. (We had deiced prior to takeoff due to moderate accretion of mixed ice on arrival on the previous flight.) I told them that an airport was straight ahead and that we may divert and to keep me updated frequently. I asked the First Officer to contact Operation Control through the Operation Control frequency. Operation Control did not come up under repeated calls. (We later heard that it hadn't been monitored). He then made contact by relaying through Airport Operations frequency. I typed messages to Dispatch informing that we may need to divert and asked if there was a history of fume events on the aircraft. I called back to the flight attendants and asked if the fumes had dissipated. They said it 'may' be less strong; but it was still there. I asked if the passengers had smelled it and they said yes; but had not reported it. They reported that a couple felt ill. Remembering the Union Safety Committee admonition and the Director of Flight's update on the fume events ('We are continuing to address each and every one of these air quality issues by immediately removing an affected aircraft from service.') to treat these events [as a] QRH Fume event and land at the nearest suitable airport; I decided to divert. I was concerned that we; the passengers and crew; were being exposed to TCP neurotoxins. I ordered O2 masks on; transferred control of the airplane to the First Officer to perform the flying duties; declared an emergency; and descended into the divert station. I informed the flight attendants and the passengers that we would be landing as a precaution in 15 minutes due to an unexplained odor in the cabin. There was little time to continue with the QRH Fume procedures or contact our contract medical service. We were vectored by ATC for a visual approach. I saw the runway first and resumed flying duties; landed; taxied to the gate and was met by paramedics. On taxi in I ordered the bleeds and packs to be shutdown. At deplaning; the flight attendants clearly seemed worried about TCP exposure. You could see it in their faces and eyes. We were checked out by paramedics and most of the crew was found to have elevated pulse and BP; and low O2. We declined transport to the hospital; being advised that we should call 911 if we felt ill at the hotel. They strongly recommended that we not continue flying at that time. The flight attendants were surprised after landing because a least two of the passengers; from row 6 and 11; hadn't sought medical treatment from the EMT's. They had reported feeling ill in flight. I faxed a cabin air quality report from the hotel.

The Reporter stated that because of the heightened 'dirty socks' awareness he did not hesitate to respond to the perceived neurotoxin threat although he First Officer attempted to talk him out of responding. His personal physical condition as determined by the paramedics was slightly elevated blood pressure and pulse; and oxygen level at about 90. The Reporter has been in contact with three other crew members who reported no lingering effects although all were to told to seek medical attention if they felt the need. The Reporter's Company did not report to him what was discovered and he personally wonders if maintenance outsourcing is a component in this problem. He was told that of the 'dirty socks' events; maintenance reported the causes as follows: 58% APU; 30% engine; the remainder unknown.

An A320 Captain declared an emergency and diverted after flight attendants and passengers reported a dirty rancid sock smell from row 6 and beyond. Paramedics discovered elevated BP; heart rate; and low O2 levels.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 320; Flight Crew Type 46

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

I departed ZZZ at the controls of Aircraft X with Aircraft Y in tow.  The glider pilot requested a 3;000 feet AGL tow and desired to 'box the wake' after reaching 2;000 feet AGL.  After reaching 2;000 feet AGL (2;400 feet MSL); I noticed conflicting traffic during my visual scan of the area.  The conflicting traffic was Aircraft Z.  When I first noticed the traffic; it was at my 10 o'clock position and approximately 1-2 NM distance from my aircraft.  The aircraft was heading westward in straight and level flight; and I was heading southward and climbing approximately 300-400 fpm with Aircraft Y in tow. I determined that my aircraft and Aircraft Z were converging to a near-collision.  The Aircraft Y pilot requested via radio to begin 'boxing the wake;' and I replied with distance and direction information about the conflicting traffic and instructed the Aircraft Y pilot to postpone the maneuver.  The Aircraft Y pilot replied that he did not have visual contact with Aircraft Z.  I decided to continue southward without releasing Aircraft Y and performing an evasive maneuver because the Aircraft Y pilot did not have visual contact with Aircraft Z.  I was concerned that; after releasing from the Aircraft Y the Aircraft Y pilot would maneuver in conflict with Aircraft Z. I did not level off because doing so abruptly could result in the glider overshooting and 'kiting' above my aircraft; leading to controllability issues.  Additionally; a turn to the left or right would further place my aircraft and Aircraft Y in a collision course with Aircraft Z.  I deduced that; barring any change in flight path by either my aircraft or Aircraft Z; Aircraft Z would pass behind me and at the same altitude. Aircraft Z ultimately passed behind Aircraft Y in tow by approximately 100-150 yards and at an altitude approximately 100-200 feet below the altitude of Aircraft Y in tow.  I continued southward and Aircraft Z continued westward.  At no point during the encounter did Aircraft Z pilot appear to have my aircraft or Aircraft Y in tow in sight.  The Aircraft Z pilot did not make an evasive maneuver and did not yield to my aircraft or Aircraft Y in tow.  The Aircraft Z pilot did not attempt any radio communications during the encounter.  I received the impression that the Aircraft Z pilot was completely unaware of the near-miss; despite the very small margin and my aircraft appearing almost directly in front of the Aircraft Z pilot's view. 14 CFR Part 91.113(d) states that an aircraft towing or refueling another aircraft has right-of-way over all other engine-driven aircraft.  This is undoubtedly due to the fact that aircraft engaged in towing are far less maneuverable than other aircraft.  I believe that this near-miss incident demonstrates the large difference in maneuverability between aircraft towing other aircraft compared to other engine-driven aircraft.  I found myself significantly limited in my options to safely avoid Aircraft Z.  Despite having the right-of-way; I was prepared to take evasive action.  'See and avoid' is a responsibility of every pilot; despite right-of-way rules.  I chose not to alter my flight path because I believe that doing so would increase the risk of collision.   ZZZ is marked with a symbol depicting its status as an area of glider operations on the VFR sectional chart and Terminal Aeronautical Chart.  Adjacent to this symbol is a box that reads 'Caution Intensive Glider Activity' and provides the radio frequency used for glider operations.  I have noticed that many powered aircraft transition through the area without communicating with glider and tow plane pilots.  The high volume of glider traffic; as well as the difficulty of visually identifying gliders; makes the area potentially dangerous for transitioning powered aircraft.  I urge pilots transitioning through glider operations areas to plan accordingly; communicate with local traffic; and exercise extreme caution.

Pilot of an aircraft that is towing another aircraft reports of a near miss with a third aircraft. Pilot speculates that the third aircraft never saw the two aircraft formation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 150; Flight Crew Type 150

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Moved onto taxiway prior to receiving ground authorization. Ground control explained to me that proper procedures required me to contact ground before movement onto a taxiway. Then I received notification to hold at runway entrance and held there. Ground then switched me to tower frequency and cleared me for takeoff and to contact departure on what I thought was frequency 123.0. I crossed onto the runway and tried to communicate with 123.0 and did not get a response. I patiently waited for a response on 123.0 but did not get one. I returned to tower frequency and he gave further instructions. Traffic was delayed because of my wait on a misread frequency. In retrospect; I should have contacted tower more quickly when no response was received. More communication training will occur with me during my future Instrument Rating coursework.

C182 pilot reported a taxiway incursion as well as confusion and communication issues during the interaction with ATC.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 16500; Flight Crew Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Smoke in cockpit at FL 190 caused by wiring ground in pilots yoke.  Notified ATC authority and initiated emergency descent.  Diverted into ZZZ. ARTCC aided with initial vectors.  Arrival and landing normal.  Smoke cleared after circuit breakers popped.  Repair made next day by Company 1; and cleared for flight.

Pilot flying Cessna 421 aircraft reports smoke in cockpit and makes emergency landing.


Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

We were on a Visual Approach to Runway XX.  Intercepting the glideslope; I called for gear/flaps 15.  Calling for flaps 30; I looked at the flap gauge and saw the yellow Leading Edge Flap Transit light on.  I looked up and saw a yellow Slat #6 light. We executed a go-around to run the checklist. ATC gave us instructions and then asked 'State reason for the go-around.'  We cleaned up the gear and got the flaps up to 10.  I was hand flying and checking for a controllability issues and the FO got the QRH out. We ran the checklist and setup and briefed the change to flaps 15 and ran the brief for landing again for flaps 15. The FO also did a visual check of Slat 6 and saw that it matched the others. ATC gave us instructions numerous times while running the checklist.  We were vectored back in for the visual to Runway XX and were instructed to maintain 180 knots until final; we started our second approach.  Glideslope intercepted; I called for the gear and flaps 15. I was flying at 148 to 155 knots as we were heavy and on glideslope.  At approximately 1500 ft we got a 'Airspeed Low' call out. I was at 145 knots.  It only lasted for a moment.  It looked like a logic error to the both of us as the speed was well above the stall warning or approach to stall; but we bumped the speed 10 knots flying at 150 knots.  That is when we realized that we had fat fingered the Vref15 plus 15 and had done the usual plus 5. We had 134/139 in the box not 148/153 we should have.  No further problems were encountered and we made an uneventful landing. Maintenance found a bad sensor on the #6 Slat and a MEL was issued.The QRC and brief are still very new.  ATC chatter did not help.  We talked it over and beat ourselves up over our screw up.  We are just not sure how it happened; but we both messed it up somehow. We handled the situation fine and we both learned a valuable lesson from the experience.

B737 Captain reported the leading edge flap transit light illuminated as flaps 30 was selected. Maintenance found a faulty slat sensor after landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was Captain and PF (Pilot Flying) of Aircraft X. Our scheduled time for arrival was XXXXz. The flight's departure was delayed due to ATC; other than that; we took off with no issues. Approximately 200 miles out of ORF; the FO (first Officer); (PM [Pilot Monitoring]); had started to get ready for the approach phase in the usual manner; ATIS and contacting OPS at ORF and then setting up the FMS for the arrival.Conditions at ORF were VFR conditions with few clouds at 4;500 feet; visibility 9 SM; and winds from the S at 6 knots. Runway in use was ILS Rwy 5 and glideslope out of service. Based on these conditions we had decided to back the up the visual approach with the localizer approach. Per company procedure; we'd built the approach; bugged the speeds and finally briefed the approach; after which; I'd called for the approach checklist to the line.We had a normal gradual descent. Reaching 8;000 feet and we were about 15 miles out from CALEY; (IF) for the localizer approach. We were cleared for the approach. During our approach; ATC advised us there were heavy to extreme precipitation passing thru 5 miles final moving northbound. We'd verified their call with the aircraft weather radar. We continued the approach because the ATIS was still advertising that the airport has VFR conditions. 3 miles out from the FAF I had the airplane fully configured and stable. Around 0.7 miles out the final approach fix; I proceeded to select HDG sync; HDG mode; V/L and NAV; (only on the left side PF); Pilot Monitoring kept his FMS on pink nav and pink path with the VTA. As it shows in our CMF when performing Localizer approaches.As soon as I had pressed NAV we captured the back course on the FMS. At that time I had to cross check my side with the FO then I commanded for an immediate missed approach; at which time; when we executed the missed approach we encountered the extreme precipitation and then I proceed to disconnect the autopilot and climb outside the heavy precipitation. Then I commanded the flaps to be retracted to a Flaps 2 and gear up and proceeded to speed up. I commanded to set FMS Nav on my side first but the automation went into yellow needles; indicating we were operating on a single FMS. That caused a bit of confusion as my First Officer was advising ATC of our go-around while trying to reconfigure the FMS into each side operable.As a result; during the climb out to 2;000 feet we heard an overspeed warning for the flaps. I told my First Officer to retract the flaps completely and to request a heading to stay away from the heavy-extreme precipitation. ATC told us to climb and maintain 5;000 feet as we then we heard one more overspeed warning and I disconnected the auto-throttles to adjust the power and eliminate the overspeed condition. Around 4;000 feet we had the aircraft controlled with a heading mode and FLCH to 5;000; and stable. I called for the go-around checklist and made an announcement to the FA (Flight Attendant) and passengers advising them of the go around and to prepare the cabin for the landing. ATC advised us the extreme precipitation had passed. I then requested vectors to final for RNAV(Z) Rwy 5. We configured early; briefed the approach; again and preformed the appropriate checklist. ATC vectored us to the FAF and cleared us for the uneventful landing.

On approach to Norfolk Virginia the ILS glideslope was out; we set up for a localizer only approach; on final the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) showed back course. We were in instrument conditions so we executed a go-around. Our altitude was only about 1;000 feet below the missed approach altitude. We followed the procedure of retracting flaps to two during the initial segment of the go-around; as the landing gear and flaps came up we leveled off the speed built quickly enough to cause a flap over speed warning. Pilot flying reduced power; and we requested a higher altitude from air traffic control. Then; we received vectors for another approach which resulted in a successful landing. The captain wrote up the flap over speed and maintenance inspected the aircraft.

EMB-175 flight crew reported overspeeding the flaps on go-around.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Warning Area (W-122) went active and about fifteen minutes later I let two aircraft transition through the airspace without providing a point out to Giant Killer. I noticed the issue when the aircraft were about 10-15 miles inside of W-122 and I immediately called Giant Killer to make a point out. They said point out approved.  The contributing factor was that TMU put out a restriction for no parallels via the AR's and to help comply with this; I provided a shortcut for the two aircraft in question and forgot to point them out to Giant Killer when I did so.I should post a reminder at the sector that W-122 is active so I'm reminded of the active airspace.

ZDC Controller reports of two airspace violations due to forgetting that the airspace was active.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 177; Flight Crew Type 5600

We were on a heading of 070 passing 10;000 ft for 8;000 ft being vectored for a Visual Approach to Runway 01R approximately 25 miles south of Las Vegas. We received a TCAS alert within two miles off our nose without an altitude. Both of us scanned in front of the aircraft; and after just a few seconds we saw a glider pass directly over us going left to right approximately 200 ft above our altitude. We immediately reported this to Approach Control but they seemed unconcerned. Approach said they had numerous reports of glider activity south of the field but never warned us of it. They said because the gliders were outside of the Class B there was nothing they could do. We would have appreciated a heads up especially considering that the frequency was not busy at the time.   We see many warnings on ATIS that do not materialize. More of an effort should be made to warn Flight Crews of potential threats if they are in progress.

We were on the KEPEC on a clear day; nothing unusual and the radios were rather quiet. Descending out of 10;000 ft; some 25 miles south of 1R; we received a TCAS Alert (solid amber no altitude) about two miles at our 11 o'clock and appeared to be moving towards our nose. Both sets of eyes went out. Very soon after; I picked up a glider traveling south on a direct intercept patch approximately 200 ft-300 ft above our altitude. There was no time to react. The glider at the point of intersection began a left hand turn towards the east going belly up to us. It appeared quite clearly the glider never saw us. As the Pilot Monitoring I immediately radioed Approach. This was the second glider we had seen (first was approximately one minute earlier off our right wing and was no conflict). Approach came back very non-concerned saying 'yes; we've had numerous reports of gliders;' and when pressed further; the Controller stated there was nothing they could do for the gliders were outside Class B airspace. Knowing gliders were in the area with quiet radios it is unacceptable that Approach did not pass along this key piece of information to arriving Pilots? Had we hit; there would have been loss of life. If no one reports and follows through with this and the gliders continue to choose to operate in the path of arrival traffic to Las Vegas; it may be only a matter of time.

B737 Flight Crew experiences a NMAC with a glider at 10000 feet 25 NM south of LAS during arrival. ATC was aware of the gliders in the area but did not inform the crew. A TCAS TA was the first indication of traffic with no altitude indication.


Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

While in cruise; I smelled a strong electrical odor on the flight deck. I conferred with First Officer and she confirmed this as well. Not more than a few minutes later we received a call from our Flight Attendant stating there was a strong electrical smell and the cabin was hazy. I instructed [the] Flight Attendant to turn off ALL electrical components off in the cabin. We then completed the; Fuselage Fire or Smoke; Unknown Source checklist; declaring an emergency and diverted and landed without further incident.

DHC8-100 Captain reports smelling electrical fumes during cruise flight; which is confirmed by the First Officer and the Flight Attendant. The crew elects to divert to the nearest suitable airport while completing applicable checklists.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We departed ZZZ on a part 91 day VFR local pleasure flight with one adult passenger in this 1979 Cessna 172N aircraft flying approximately east south east. The weather appeared to be six plus miles visibility with some cirrus clouds; winds under 10 kts. with what seemed to be an occasional thermal. Approximately ten to fifteen minutes into the flight; was at about 1;800 ft. and began a gradual turn to the right.As the yoke was first being moved clockwise; or perhaps shortly thereafter; a pop was felt; the yoke then had no resistance whatsoever with the control yoke ending up being all but fully deflected to the right where it remained at that moment. A vibration in the airframe began. It was a light though consistent somewhat disconcerting vibration. Even with the yoke as it was (all but fully clockwise at that time; in other words; the yoke was about 90 degrees clockwise from level) the aircraft was not banking right. The left rudder pedal may have been instinctively depressed to pick up the right wing after the snap occurred; but uncertain. The aircraft now appeared to not be entirely controllable as the yoke and inputs to it did not seem to be having the effect which they should have.Thereafter; if the yoke was moved counterclockwise; especially if moved past neutral to the left; a distinct buffet of unknown nature was felt; and the yoke was immediately returned to the position which resulted in the least vibration; about ninety degrees clockwise. Not being a mechanic there was significant uncertainty as to what actually was broken and what effect it could have on the flight characteristics of the aircraft. When a shallow climb was introduced or the pitch was increased; a distinct buffet of unknown nature was felt and the climb with the associated pitch and power increase was immediately discontinued and not attempted again. When a very shallow descent was introduced the ongoing vibration seemed to decrease or cease. When the engine rpm was decreased slightly the ongoing vibration also seemed to decrease. That said; no further attempts were made to bank or turn left or climb or increase the pitch or power. All turns thereafter; which were slight with little bank; to the right; were accomplished with slight rudder pressure.7700 was squawked and ATC was advised on guard. Center responded promptly to the call. Due to the limited and questionable control problem; along with the ongoing vibration and buffeting issues; the best course of action at the time appeared to be not to continue the flight back to the closest and seemingly most prudent airport as it would have required a flight directly over a densely populated area. The next closest airport considered potentially usable in the situation appeared to be ZZZ1. However; ZZZ1 was much further than ZZZ (about 18 NM vs. about 10 NM); although few homes along the route it required a flight over water which would have necessitated a climb and a left turn. Due to the buffet experienced during the prior attempted climb; local knowledge of many times there being turbulence where the water meets the land; the distance (would something else happen during that longer travel time?) and the buffet experienced when a left turn was attempted previously; ZZZ1 did not seem to be a good choice at that time.There was an acceptable looking farmer's field which required a slight turn to the right and was just prior to the populated area of ZZZ2 and ZZZ2; it seemed to be the best choice. The aircraft was maneuvered slightly right using slight rudder pressure. After the turn was completed a gradual descent at reduced power was begun. Communication with Center was lost due to the descent although an airliner relayed our communications with Center.During the descent at reduced airspeed a very minimal amount of flaps were introduced to see if any negative effect was experienced. No negative effect was experienced. The descent continued; doors were propped opened; fuel was turned off;mixture to idle cutoff; mags and master switch off which all then culminated in an uneventful though spirited landing on a farmer's field. The airplane came to rest seemingly undamaged. Aircraft was exited normally and moments later Center called to my cell phone in order to check status and get information. FSDO's and local law enforcement were notified and responded accordingly.

C172 pilot reported a complete loss of aileron control that resulted in a forced landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We departed 17 minutes early due to thunderstorms approaching the area and the pilots potentially going illegal. Unfortunately this information was not fully communicated to us during the pre-departure briefing and we seemed to leave rather suddenly without being asked if we were ready to go. I was working in Business Class and my jumpseat and assigned door are pretty far away. We still had a pre-departure cart out and my galley was unsecured when we began to push back. Also making things more complicated was the fact that we were at a hard stand or remote gate. Passengers just sort of arrive in spurts when the buses get them to the airplane. This results in a very complicated boarding process. We were also understaffed by 1 Flight Attendant. We finally got things locked up while taxiing and I got in position for the safety demo. Another Flight Attendant armed my door (1R). This happens frequently because of the nature of where flight attendant Number 2 is assigned to work so far from their jumpseat. I did not have time to translate the announcement for the safety demo. We had trouble with the video which lost audio halfway through. The Purser attempted to restart it and then decided to do a live safety demo. I know she called the flight deck to let them know we were having trouble with the video. They told her to do a manual or live demo and we did. During the demo the flight deck came on the PA to tell us to take our seats for departure. We weren't finished with the demo yet. They came on again to tell us to prepare for immediate departure. We barely finished the demo and had to take our seats for departure. I did not have time to translate the required announcements nor do a full compliance check prior to taking my seat which is behind me.

B767-300 Flight Attendant reports a rushed departure to accommodate the flight crew's duty limits and approaching weather. The reporter did not have time to translate the required announcements nor do a full compliance check prior to takeoff.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The BOI RNAV STARS are not safe. The guidance we have received from our OM is even worse. Aircraft X filed for FL180 as a final altitude. [Name removed] has instructed that we shall not take an aircraft off of the RNAV STARS into KBOI. The SPUUD1 arrival (which this aircraft was assigned) has a minimum crossing altitude at BROPH of FL220. Throughout the day; there were reports of continuous moderate turbulence at FL200 and above. Had I been working the aircraft in that sector; instead of 40; I would have been forced; based on direct guidance from an Operations Manager of ZLC; to climb this aircraft into moderate turbulence conditions.These RNAV STARS were not created with the input of the people who actually fly the routes; or the controllers that actually work the position. These RNAV STARS; for the safety of the NAS; must be decommissioned as I have suggested on many reports about these procedures. From starting these approaches below the MIA; to insufficient clearance with restricted airspace. I don't understand what excuses Airspace and Procedures could possibly be spinning in order for [reporting body] to not respond to these concerns. I have yet to get two consistent responses in any of my conversations with this person; and I wonder if your dealings are any different. Every time I bring a concern to him; he dances around the issue; changing his responses and standpoint based; not on facts; but whatever he can say to get me out of his office. There is no way for me to hold him responsible for the answers; either lies or exaggerations; or perhaps unknowing inconsistencies; as he is well above reproach from anyone at this center; and is my superior. I just hope you're able to get real answers; and aren't be spun on his web like all of us are on the control room floor. I would be interested to know if there are steps being taken; or if legitimately; my concerns are unfounded and safety is not being compromised. I realize my suggestions are not inherently correct just because I'm the one that filled out the report; but if these procedures have been deemed by the committee; not Airspace and Procedures; to be safe; then I can stop wasting your time by bringing them up.

ZLC Controller reports that the RNAV STARS into BOISE are not safe. Controller states that from starting these approaches below the MIA; to insufficient clearance with restricted airspace the procedures are unsafe.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 270; Flight Crew Type 20

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

During approach in to OWD; I was in IMC being vectored to final at 2000 feet. Once cleared for the GPS 35 approach; I began my descent along the glideslope to the FAF which was CUPUG at 1700 feet. The rain was sufficiently heavy that it was impacting my static ports. I was seeing sudden swings in vertical speed and substantial variations in indicated altitude that slowly returned to normal; but I remained on/near glideslope as indicated by the LPV guidance. Due to the turbulence and rain; it was a high workload situation. Not far beyond the FAF; OWD reported a low altitude alert. I reported that my altimeter setting was correct and that I was on the GPS glide path. I was one dot low on the LPV glide slope. At about this time I also had visual ground contact. This was consistent with PIREP from a previously arriving aircraft observing ceilings at 1700 feet. I struggled to maintain a stable descent rate as I continued the approach and remained low on the glideslope but on-scale. The Tower issued two more low altitude alerts; presumably because my varying descent rate was causing a predicted insufficient altitude combined with being a little low on the glideslope. With each low altitude alert; I added some power and back pressure on the yoke; which I needed to do anyway to bring the glideslope needle back down. I didn't note the exact altitude I had the runway in sight but it took me a few moments due to lack of familiarity with the area. I would estimate 600-800 feet AGL. The PAPI was indicating 3 red so I leveled out to get 2 white and two red and continued to a normal landing. The aircraft's GPS provides forward looking terrain alerts and none were received during the approach.A lesson learned from this is that I should consider alternate airports if the rain is heavy enough to affect instruments or considered use of the alternate static source. I should have more seriously considered going missed upon receiving follow up low altitude alerts. My logic was that as long as I had the LPV glideslope I was protected; but if I desensitize myself to that useful tool then I may not help me in a situation in which I made a mistake in setting up or interpreting the approach.

GA pilot reported receiving several low altitude alerts on the GPS 35 approach to OWD during heavy rain.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 6100; Flight Crew Type 1150

Distraction; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I am a Part 135 pilot. I was asked by the owner of our company to serve as a safety pilot for a Part 91 owner. Normally; the owner of our Part 135 company flies with this Part 91 owner and has done so for a few years. Outside of this particular flight; the owner of the Part 135 company I fly for; and I operate as a crew on a two-pilot jet aircraft. We've been doing this for years now and have our crew resource management roles down pat. Each of us is comfortable with our expectations of; 'who does what.' That in mind; before this particular Part 135 flight; I attempted to set expectations with the owner/pilot - who had years of experience - and thought we were moderately successful in doing so. Knowing this Part 91 owner/pilot had been flying routinely with the Part 135 owner; who is also the co-Captain of the two-crew jet that we fly; I thought the cockpit procedures during this Part 91 flight would be very similar to what we do in our jet. After my crew resource management briefing; because I don't normally fly with this owner; I wrapped it up by saying; 'If I'm doing something you normally do; or I'm not doing something you expect; speak up clearly and let me know.' I reiterated that we haven't flown together so I wanted to ensure there were no dropped expectations or sloppy crew resource management processes.On the outbound leg of our flight; everything proceeded smoothly; but; I did notice that with route changes; neither one of us was entering them into the FMS. In our jet; if the autopilot is on; the guy in the left seat (PF) would enter route changes in the FMS. When he was hand flying; the PNF would enter route changes - the PF's role is heading; altitude; and airspeed. I asked the owner/operator; 'who normally does this when he flies with the other pilot?' - the person I fly with on our jet. The Part 91 owner/pilot indicated the PNF enters this. This was a different CRM process than what I would have expected given the pilot that normally flies with this Part 91 owner was the co-Captain of the jet we fly; the person I normally fly with who; as a crew; we have developed very tight role/responsibility expectations. This was different in the Part 91 owner's airplane.During the outbound leg; it also became clear that there were other CRM differences. Given an altitude assignment; both the PF and the PNF (me); reached up to set the new altitude when the PF was hand flying. This was different as well. We were either a jumble of hands reaching for the same knobs; or a complete lack of action from either of us on route changes; or loading procedures. While this is not normally a major problem; each time we were faced with the lack of action behavior; I would ask what the PF would like me to do. The answer was always; 'you go ahead and do that.' Over time; it became clear - or so it seemed to me - that the co-Captain that I flew with as a crew in our Part 135 airplane; performed most of the tasks in this Part 91 airplane that were the PF's responsibility.This is very important because it sets up a crew dynamic where the PF abrogates some of his PF responsibilities to the PNF; more so if the PNF takes on more of the PF's responsibilities; less so if the PNF does so only at the margin. A contributing factor in this dynamic is that the PNF is a professional pilot and the Part 91 owner/pilot is not. There's a natural deference that happens from the Part 91 PF to the Part 135 PNF. Many of us have been in this situation: The Part 91 PF gets into an increasingly marginal safety situation; the Part 135 PNF (the safety pilot) coaches the PF as he flies; then; all of a sudden; the PF lets go of the yoke and says; 'you got it.' In these cases; along with the Part 91 flight I was acting as a safety pilot on this day; the PF assumes a 'student' posture and the PNF assumes a 'Flight Instructor' posture. Again; although you can be completely out of process on CRM Roles and Responsibilities; this should not be an in surmountableissue. On this particular flight; however; it exposed a knowledge gap I had on RNAV (GPS) procedures that the 'student' PF did not challenge; even though he flew this particular procedure two or three times per week.We were cleared for the RNAV (GPS) Z RWY XXL approach into ZZZ. Over the past few years; many new process and procedure changes have been integrated into the system. At our Part 135 operation; we receive no formal training on the changes. Environmentally; we absorb the knowledge of changes through magazine articles; email alerts; and during performance of our annual Part 135 check rides at our contracted providers. I've highlighted this risk area and suggested it would be good if our pilots could take a formal course during our annual requalification training specific to changes in Arrival and Departure procedures; along with the broad range of approaches that are now available. I am not alone with this concern; which was evident one day when a Part 121 carrier completely blew the 'descend via' requirements on a STAR into ZZZ. On this day; the PF executed the approach by selecting the step down altitude; then manually stepping down. I took it upon myself to incorrectly discuss how the PF could just capture the glide slope and follow it down; much like an ILS. When the GS did not become active; I 'told' the PF to step it down manually as if it was a LNAV only approach. Reviewing the approach chart while he did this; I looked up and noticed the CDI was pointing opposite of the intended approach course and that we were turning to a southerly heading rather than the 238 heading noted on the final approach course. We were IMC when this happened and while were we sorting it out; we became VMC; however; I asked for a missed approach. The TRACON controller said to contact the tower instead; which we did. We located the airport visually; contacted the tower; and were cleared to land. Afterward; I asked for a debriefing with the PF and we spent about an hour reviewing the sequence of events. I realized during our debriefing that over the past few years I've never flown an LP approach. We routinely fly ILS; LPV; LNAV/VNAV approaches. During this approach; I read LPV in my mind rather than LP; which it was. I didn't clearly read the approach plate; and we didn't brief the approach together as we should have.What should have been a non-eventful arrival into ZZZ; turned into a breakdown in the cockpit due to several factors and exposed my knowledge gaps; which were not challenged by the PF. Sorry for the long narrative; but; this 'error' includes many nuanced perspectives.

B350 pilot reported CRM issues and his unfamiliarity with LP approaches.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Our route clearance was changed by Clearance Delivery and we were given Newark One departure; radar vectors to PARKE. After Departure gave us a heading to 270; they then cleared us to SBJ; climb to 11;000 FT. It was not on the flight plan and I thought there might be some confusion from the original clearance and the modified one we received. I told the Controller it was not on our flight plan and he said he was tired of hearing that; it was in fact on our flight plan. He then cleared us direct to PARKE. He said it was in black and white and we needed to read the clearance better. Upon further review of the Newark One; there is a reference to PARKE: SBJ R302 PARKE. I did not think there was a PARKE transition; just radar vectors to fix/route as per the wording on the departure. Since the Controller was frustrated because this happens often; I feel the wording of the departure and/or the clearance needs to be modified to reflect the fix transition; not just radar vectors to fix/route. While I was entering the new fix into the FMS; the PF stopped the climb momentarily at 5;000 FT. As soon as I saw this I instructed the PF to continue climb to 11;000; at this time the Controller also noticed our level off and told us to continue climb. This was the second leg of IOE for the First Officer. Change the wording of the Newark One departure and the wording of the clearance to reflect a transition to the initial fix.

No PDC received. Called Clearance Delivery; given Newark 1 RV direct PARKE; and read back. Off Runway 22R EWR; switched to NY Departure. They gave direct SBJ after previous vector; read back that SBJ was not in our clearance; ATC said it was and that 'everyone' misses it with some frustration. Then he gave direct PARKE. Rest of flight remained uneventful and no further instructions from NY Departure.Clearance Delivery should have given instructions more clearly if they wanted flight to fly the PARKE transition. We read back RV PARKE. Also Newark 1 departure does not clearly define the different departure points as transitions like it seems to be interpreted by departure.

MD11 flight crew departing on the EWR1 departure and expecting Radar vectors to PARKE is instead cleared direct SBJ by NY Departure.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were on a 757-300 taking off. I'm flying Flight Attendant 2 and sitting at 4L jumpseat. On takeoff; I felt a loud thud and the galley floor begins banging and vibrating really bad every time we hit turbulence on the climb out it would happen. I contacted the flight deck and told them my concerns and it was basically ignored. I told the other crew what had happened and since there were no bumps happening at this time; they couldn't feel anything.A little later in the flight we were standing in the galley talking and we hit some bumps. Again; the whole floor started vibrating and banging again. The crew looked at me and was like; OMG!!! The Lead contacted the Captain himself and told him what was going on.  Again; the Captain basically ignored our concerns.We get to our destination and the pilots leave. After everyone deplaned I asked the new Captain if our Captain had written anything up about our concerns. NEGATIVE! We told him and the new crew taking it over what had happened. It was something that obviously happened taking off since the previous flight to that destination was uneventful and this wasn't happening.A Maintenance guy was on the plane for some other reason but we told him and he was like; 'The Captain probably didn't write it up because if he had and it wasn't something that could be obviously seen; they'd have to pull the plane out of service to find the problem.' He said he'd tell the crew taking over and for them to report it if anything happens on their flight. I'm like; 'Are You Serious?' Does a plane have to go down before you investigate an obvious problem? What if something catastrophic happens on their flight? Nobody would know because it wasn't written up.Anyway; we had our three hour sit time and were on our new plane heading back to the previous airport for our layover. The same Maintenance guy for some reason was on our plane again and came and told us that when they opened up the cargo on the other plane; bags were everywhere. Something came loose or broke loose in the cargo hold holding the bags and they went flying everywhere. REALLY????My point for this report is when we have safety concerns about something and report it to the flight deck; they need to take us a little more seriously! This could have been something much more serious and had a far worse outcome..

A B757-300 Flight Attendant reported a loud thud on takeoff and a banging; vibrating floor during flight in turbulence. Maintenance later found something in the aft cargo broke loose scattering the contents.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

I was assisting on a aileron servo change for Aircraft X. We were directed by maintenance control to change the servo on the left hand side of the aircraft. During the job setup we pulled all maintenance manual reference's to do the work. We needed an Aileron collar per the maintenance manual which we did not have. We continued to go ahead with the work as per the direction of our lead mechanic. During the course of the night we used a socket to prop up the aileron to keep it from drooping down and to aid me to give more help in removing and installing the left hand aileron servo. We contacted Quality Assurance (QA) to do a pre-installation inspection and was given the ok to install the servo. After we had installed the servo we had to perform a torque on both main bolts at this time another QA inspector came to relieve the night shift inspector. The oncoming QA inspector witnessed the torque of both bolts. At this time we were ready to install 2 cotter pins we ordered earlier from the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC). QA stated the cotter pins look to short so he went to the hangar to look for some longer cotter pins and he instructed us to pressurize the hydraulic system and check for leaks as he was looking for cotter pins. [A technician] and I went up to the cockpit to make sure the hydraulic system was fully pressurized on the aircraft. I went down to check for leaks and [the technician] come off the aircraft and asked me if the socket we had used as a prop was removed. At this time I noticed the socket was jammed into the lower part of the aileron and breaking the fiber laminate. QA returned and we told him of our issue. We had forgotten the socket was still holding the aileron from drooping. We had also rushed to power up the aircraft without checking the work area for tools. Since the aircraft was on the gate and due to fly in a few hours we felt rushed to get the task finished so we would not add to any delay of the flight.We had our supervisor and manager document the event and pictures were taken during this time. We were allowed the continue working on the aircraft to finish up the installation.  Once we had found out we did not have the tool we needed to perform the task we should have stopped. Also to notify our superiors that the task could not be performed due to the missing tool.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Maintenance technicians reported discovering damage to the left hand aileron of an A320 due to a socket being used as an improvised tool.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 584; Flight Crew Type 17000

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The takeoff in ZZZ was uneventful until just past 80 kts. IAS (Indicated Air Speed) Disagree flag appeared on both ADIs (Attitude Director Indicator). I noted about 5-10 kts. difference and continued takeoff. We continued climb normally but noted Captain and FO (First Officer) airspeed and altitude readouts diverging with Captain's matching the Standby Instruments. ATC was notified and we got vectors back to ZZZ while running the Airspeed Unreliable Checklist. Dispatch; [Operations] and Maintenance were notified. We landed uneventfully and Maintenance informed us the problem was a broken FO AOA (Angle Of Attack) vane. Maintenance stated that they get cracked by ladder stands and fail during takeoff sometimes. A spare aircraft was provided and we continued to ZZZ1. I was surprised that pitot-static instruments were effected by an AOA problem. FO did nice job flying the aircraft. I would like to know more about the AOA system and how it drives altitude and airspeed displays.

B737 Captain reported airspeed anomalies during takeoff which resulted in a return to departure airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The First Officer is a recently hired pilot and is still getting up to speed in the E190. He tends to get behind; especially when it involves vertical navigation. On about an 18 mile final for the ILS 4R; approach advised us that there was a 'tall ship' in the harbor; which meant that the ILS was no longer available. They offered us the LOC 4R and we accepted. I (the Pilot Monitoring) briefed the approach as best as I could; but the First Officer never got the airplane set up and the descent started in time. We got high on the approach and I told him to go around at about 800 to 900 feet. We returned for an uneventful ILS approach and landing. Additionally; there was an FAA inspector on the jumpseat. We got high on the approach and elected to go around because we were still in IMC.

An EMB-190 Captain was advised by ATC of a ship in the harbor during preparation for the ILS 4R at BOS with a new hire First Officer flying. The approach was changed to the LOC 4R; but the First Officer was unable to get stabilized and a go-around was initiated from 800 feet. The next approach was a successful ILS to 4R.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was working Del Mar Sector; Aircraft X was IFR; inbound to OKB on the GPS RWY24 approach; intending an IFR missed approach. Aircraft Y departed and began climbing for skydiving over OKB. Based on Aircraft Y's performance on previous days; I estimated that Aircraft X would pass the airport before Aircraft Y was ready to drop skydivers. I pointed out Aircraft X to Pacific Sector; who works Aircraft Y; and shipped Aircraft X to the advisory frequency; which Aircraft Y monitors; so the two would be able to communicate their intentions to each other. Aircraft Y climbed much faster than in days prior; and turned inbound to drop skydivers over the airport as Aircraft X was also approaching the airport. Aircraft X checked back in with me not on the published missed approach; but 'offsetting for skydivers.' The result was an IFR aircraft executing other than the published missed approach; below the MVA. I asked Aircraft X if he was VFR and he concurred. While I don't know if; on the advisory frequency; he offered to alter course for the skydivers; or if Aircraft X just dropped anyway; either way it was an unsafe situation for an IFR aircraft to be in. The pilot should not have had to alter course; whether voluntarily or not; as he; on an IFR approach; is entitled to fly the published missed approach when necessary. The whole operation of Aircraft Y skydiving should be closely reviewed; as it has an enormous impact on IFR traffic and is highly unsafe to VFR traffic as well. The area where Aircraft Y drops skydivers is extremely busy and the altitude he drops from impacts four different sectors: he drops from 13;000 FT; on V458; which is right on the VISTA arrival into LAX; where air carriers need to be descending out of 14;000 FT; affecting ZLA Sector 12; and possibly Sector 21 if the aircraft are stuck high too long; it affects Pacific Sector who works the jump aircraft and VISTA arrivals; it affects North Sector who owns airspace in the area; and it greatly affects Del Mar Sector who works all the traffic in and out of OKB; NFG; and CRQ; all of whose IFR procedures are hindered by the skydiving. Aircraft Y skydiving should have to move their jump zone to a less congested area. If it does continue; Del Mar Sector needs to work the aircraft as they have the most traffic underneath the zone; and we need to be able to instruct the pilot to 'hold jumpers' for IFR traffic.

SCT Controller reports a situation where an IFR aircraft offsets its missed approach for skydiving activity.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

I was the Relief Pilot flying with the Captain in the left seat as pilot not flying. We copied a convective SIGMET in the vicinity of LPLA. As we approached a line of severe weather we requested a deviation via CPDLC. No response from LPPO. We contacted Santa Maria on HF for an altitude change (climb) and a course deviation (left/north). Our request was denied. The Captain immediately directed me to take action to avoid a red radar return. I took a 45 degree cut away to the left as the Captain declared a PAN; PAN; PAN and told me to descend 300 FT. We broadcast emergency advisories on VHF and HF; turned on all lights and called Santa Maria on HF. We deviated about 50 NM left of course. We avoided all weather then cut back to fly direct on track at 30W where we reported back on track. Two other aircraft contacted us during our deviation. We arrived at 30W four minutes late. We complied with all standard MNPSA [MINIMUM NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION AIRSPACE] procedures. I sent Dispatch a message reporting continuous moderate chop and that we had deviated. The Captain took the correct actions to avoid severe weather. The flight continued without incident. We should not dispatch aircraft into conditions of severe weather or else have Dispatch give aircraft sufficient warning so as to coordinate a reroute before we have to deviate without clearance. We should not send multiple North Atlantic flights on the exact same routes so that a deviation cannot be coordinated with ATC because there are too many flights in close proximity.

A B767-300 flight crew had to declare an emergency in order to avoide severe weather in the North Atlantic.


Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On our air carrier B757s there are two kinds of brakes installed on the aircraft; both with the same part number. There is one kind; which is prone to cracking; I presume due to heat distress; and one that isn't prone to cracking. Most aircraft are slowly getting the type that doesn't crack; but there are still many of the type that does crack installed on the fleet. At about mid-morning; I was assigned to ride brakes on a Boeing 757; which was being moved from one gate to another at the terminal. I started my walk-around and noticed that this aircraft had one of the 'bad' brakes installed. I bent down and saw a crack in the brake; I then took a closer look and saw more cracks. Later on that day I went to deliver another 757 from the hangar to the terminal; aircraft at approximately one hour later. This too had a cracked brake; so I informed management. I was then informed that had I not been going to lunch; that I would be changing that bad brake. After lunch; and several aircraft later; I was again given another 757 to deliver. This aircraft too I viewed as having a cracked brake installed; with several of the cracks visible. The word was then passed to the Manager on duty; who came running out and informed me in no uncertain terms that I shouldn't be looking at that part of the brakes; and the walk-around I was doing was too detailed. He told me; I shouldn't be bending down to look through the spokes on the wheels; and only a general inspection should be performed to look for obvious damage. The Manager on Duty also informed me; that as I had found it; I would be changing it; and they'll get someone else to 'ride brakes'. He then told me [that what] 'I'm doing is a disservice to the night shift guys; and the overtime mechanics.'  I set about to change the brake; which; it turns out; had five cracks in it. The new replacement brake from stock showed up; but this too was of the 'cracking type' and indeed had five cracks in it also.  Of note: this new one had an airworthiness tag on it. It was only upon the delivery of a second brake from stock; was I able to use it to replace the bad brake on the aircraft; as this newer one was the type that doesn't crack. I was also informed by the manager on duty; that three guys on night shift would be getting company letters; a form of discipline; as a result of my diligence. Today I was informed by another member of the management compliance team; a Mr. X; that my inspections are too detailed and [that I] should not be looking that closely; and bending over to look at brakes; [because that] was not what a 'general' inspection should be covering. The next day I was also given the brake Manufacturer's maintenance manual showing that cracks are permitted. Unfortunately I don't have any way of accessing this manual; nor does anyone else except; it seems; the manager of the brake shop. Our air carrier Maintenance Manual does tell me to look for cracks when the wheel is off; the compliance manager told me that 'The statement; when the wheel is off would be my out at a hearing.'

Reporter stated his Management was trying to make him feel guilty for finding cracked brakes that other mechanics had missed. His Supervisor showed him a Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) from the brake Manufacturer (MFG) that said cracks in the backing plates from lighting holes was acceptable. But he could not sign-off the cracked brakes because his air carrier's Maintenance Manual (M/M) says no cracks allowed.Reporter stated his air carrier revised their M/M to allow cracks in the shaded areas on the Brake Assembly. The MFG has re-designed the B757 Main Landing Gear (MLG) brake with a heavier (thicker) backing plate supposedly to handle the brake's heat buildup.  Letters of discipline to the three mechanics for missing the cracks were rescinded; since their company revised their M/M.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports that after finding numerous cracks on several B757 Main Landing Gear (MLG) brake backing plates; he was informed he should not be looking at that part of the brake during his walk-arounds. His air carrier Maintenance Manual (M/M) did not allow any cracks; but the Brake Manufacturer did.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Type 2033

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 118; Flight Crew Type 6803

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Departing ZZZZ on the ZZZZX departure we suddenly encountered a flock of very large birds striking at minimum 3 birds. There was no time to avoid as they were not tightly bunched and spread over a large area. Upon impact; mostly on my (First Officer) side; I immediately began to monitor engine performance. With all engine indications appearing normal; I then noticed my airspeed indication quickly dropping. I then quickly compared mine to the Captain and STBY airspeed indicators and determined mine was erroneous. Within seconds my airspeed indication dropped into the red band and triggered the stick shaker on my side. It would remain on the entire time until the landing roll out. I then announced to the Captain [that] we have airspeed unreliable and began the associated immediate action items. After that we quickly discussed the condition of the aircraft and its fly ability. The Captain continued flying the aircraft while I began coordinating a turn away from the terrain and requesting a level off and a return to the airport. The aircraft was stable; we were comfortable with the Captain's airspeed; altimetry; and attitude indications along with the STBY instruments; clear of terrain and heading out over the water. We then [requested priority handling]; as I quickly ran through the Airspeed Unreliable QRH. As the Captain was flying the plane I was tasked with handling all the managerial duties. I quickly [briefed] the FA's (flight attendants) without a cabin evac prep; as discussed between the Captain and myself. I reprogrammed the FMC (Flight Management Computer); sent an ACARS (Aircraft Communications addressing and Reporting System) divert report; made a quick PA (Public Address); then set up for the approach back to the field. The stick shaker was extremely distracting and added to the stress of the situation; but feel we did a good job flying the aircraft first then working the situation while expediting a return to the field. We then flew the XR approach and landed in a normal configuration; but overweight. We then taxied to a remote pad and were met by fire and rescue. An exterior inspection revealed that the FO (First Officer) side AOA (Angle Of Attack) vane had been broken completely off; with the FO pitot tube taking a direct hit and clogged as well. In addition to significant bird remains and smears all around the FO side and on the pitot tube; we also noted an impact area on the number two engine nacelle/lip area indicated by blood. We then deplaned the passengers; secured the aircraft and handed it over to Maintenance; then proceeded to the terminal.

On climb out after ZZZZ departure at approximately 1800 ft altitude we were struck by at least two large birds (flock of 7 to 10) on the front/right side of the airplane. Immediate activation of the stick shaker as well as the loss of the F/O's (First Officer) flight instruments as experienced. F/O called out 'unreliable airspeed' and stated/accomplished the steps. We took stock of our status. Flight control appeared normal. Captain's flight instruments; including airspeed appeared to be normal and matched the standby instruments. We notified ATC; [requested priority handling] and asked for air return. F/O notified Dispatch via ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System); [briefed] the F/A's (flight attendants) and made a passenger P/A (Public Address). We discussed an overweight landing and briefly looked at the non-normal configuration landing chart as a reference. Stick shaker/yoke vibration was continuous. Approach and landing were uneventful.

B737 flight crew reported encountering multiple bird strikes after takeoff.


Temperature - Extreme; Excessive Humidity

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Company Policy; Airport; Aircraft

The Captain and I were scheduled to depart ZZZZ in a 737 MAX. The flight was full and we knew we had max takeoff weight issues for runway limit. The outside temperature was 16 degrees C and winds were variable for Runway XXR. On our first pushback; we did not have our load closeout and we pushed from gate and began to taxi; even while seeing potential overweight issues. After calling ZZZZ Operations; we received our load closeout and ran the numbers. The temperature increased to 18 degrees C and that significantly degraded engine performance at our weight and required configuration. We noticed that we would be overweight by about 1;100 pounds. We discontinued taxi; messaged Dispatch via ACARS and coordinated a return to gate for overall reevaluation. Dispatch and the flight planning team determined we needed to offload passengers and associated bags and that would fix the problem.Now; enough time elapsed that we needed more fuel and needed a new ATC flight plan clearance. ZZZZ Clearance informed us that we had no clearance in the system and we needed to contact Dispatch. We did that via ACARS as well as through ZZZZ Operations. This disconnect with the clearance occurred more than 10 times over a 4 hour period before they finally got a clearance through ZZZZ ATC. We were told that the issue was that ZZZZ ATC did not like something in the clearance request that ZZZ1 Dispatch submitted. However; ZZZZ ATC would not talk to ZZZ1 Dispatch; nor tell them what was wrong with their submission. ZZZZ ATC would only work through ZZZZ Operations; who does not submit flight plan clearance requests and had no idea what is required. We; the aircrew; decided to not push back until we had our clearance and a valid load closeout. It began to rain during our delay and I requested approximately XX different updates based on new weights; temperatures and runway conditions. Also during this 4 hour delay; Dispatch and the flight planning team repeatedly pulled off many passengers and bags. This required continuous updates for accuracy. The passengers were told to deplane after X hours and were given a time to be back at the gate for departure. We got everyone back on board; received our flight plan clearance; a valid load closeout and departed via ZZZZ Runway XXR. The flight was uneventful and we landed safely in ZZZ2.The main issue on this flight was planning and execution by the company. The company tried to leverage the 737 MAX in an environment where it does not need to be flying with full loads and the flight planning team tried to execute an inherently flawed plan. In ZZZZ; rain is constant; but the temperatures and winds that day were very moderate compared to what routinely occurs in the summer months. Even at 18 degrees C; the 737 MAX is extremely weight limited at this airport's altitude. The 737 MAX should not be flying in ZZZZ during even moderate temperature months with full passenger and cargo loads. The ATC flight plan clearance issue is a procedural or communication issue between the company and ZZZZ ATC. ZZZZ Operations should be able to intercede in these situations and fix any issues that come up; but training and awareness is required. Ultimately; this was a non-issue due to the more time-consuming weight issues associated with this flight. Our flight planning departments must continue to gather data related to the 737 MAX during normal operations at all airports throughout the year. This data will lead to an executable annual route schedule for the 737 MAX and ensure smooth operational tempo while maintaining appropriate safety margins.

B737 MAX First Officer reported numerous performance and weight issues caused a delay and required off-loading passengers and baggage multiple times and multiple clearance requests before departing.