Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After we had landed for a scheduled fuel stop. I was told to get off of the plane to ask the handler on the process for the Duty Free receipts for passengers and myself and the Flight Attendant (FA). It was determined that the handler per the customs agent only required the completed Duty Free forms and receipts. I went back to the back to use the restroom; while the passengers were providing the handler with their completed forms; and the majority of the passengers (except the lead and his wife) wanted to get off the plane to stretch their legs and use the restroom. When I came back up front; the Captain advised me he had ordered the fuel; and I was advised to watch this carefully when the truck showed up so I did once the fuel truck arrived. In addition; he went into the FBO; but before I was given a piece of paper at this time from the Captain that had instructions on contacting Clearance that included the following: 'contact 121.7 when 45 mins prior to ETD' at the same time I was also told to watch the fuel. The Captain had written XA:30 for the departure; but we had just landed at XA:03; and when I looked at the time when he walked away from me; I noticed that it was already XA:20. I still had to get the plane ready for departure; obtain the Oceanic Clearance; and watch the fuel. So; I Immediately contacted Oceanic.I contacted Oceanic Clearance and after confusion with the estimated departure time as given of XA:30 by the Captain (CA) Pilot Flying (PF); it was determined that the new estimated time would be XA:40 and I was to wait on the frequency for an amended clearance. The PF then showed up at XA:25 and wanted to know if I obtained the clearance. I replied 'no'; because I was told to standby for a re-route. I was watching the fuel at this time while still listening for Oceanic to call me back. The PF then told me to enter the flight plan as originally filed; and he took over watching the fuel. I advised the Captain that according to the FMS; if we took all of the fuel that he requested that we would be overweight for takeoff and Taxi. We then had a short discussion about this and the issue involved the weight of the cargo was higher than estimated on the flight plan. (Note: takeoff weight was 74;600 per the FMS). I was then told to enter the original route into the flight plan that we currently had even though I was still waiting for Oceanic to contact me with the re-route. The Captain watched me enter each fix from our original flight plan. We then closed up; and I was still waiting on the frequency for Oceanic to call me back since they had last told me to standby earlier. I was then told to call Oceanic again and ask them if we could start engines. I did; but no answer. I was then directed to call the Tower to ask them. I complied; but the Tower asked us if we had the clearance and I replied no. We were advised by the Tower that he had our clearance and he said he would call Oceanic to see if he could give us our clearance. The Tower then came back and told us we could start engines; but that Oceanic had to give me our clearance. It was then decided that the CA would start engines and run the checklist because we were getting close to the XA:40 time constraint while I attempted to speak to Oceanic. CA started the engines; but I do not know if he completed the checklist. I advised the CA that I still did not have the clearance; when I was told to obtain the taxi clearance. I complied and read back taxi clearance; when I heard Oceanic call me. I then went back heads down to obtain the amended clearance from Oceanic as CA taxi[ed] to the Runway. At this point; we were almost to the end of the Runway. I was ordered to just put the first point of the clearance into the FMS by the Captain from the reroute by Oceanic. I then said that we had a departure so I confirmed with the Tower if we should still expect the departure before I placed the first point into the FMS as directed. The Tower said yes. The Tower thensaid if I wanted that I could read back the clearance to the Tower to ensure it was the same thing he had. So I did; and we both had the same re-route. At this point; we are now holding short and I was advised by the CA to tell the Tower we were ready for departure. I replied to the CA that I had not even looked at the departure yet nor had we run any checklist. The CA replied he had looked at the departure and I was told to run whatever checklist I felt necessary; but we had to get airborne. I was then stopped and told again to tell Tower we are ready. I made three attempts at least to express that we were not ready because of checklist and the departure briefing; but I was ignored and ordered to tell ATC that we were ready. The CA said again that he looked at the departure. I asked him what page was he on so I could pull it up quickly and he said he did not know. I pulled it up quickly on my iPad myself; then took a glance at my Nav Display; and completed the checklist as best as I could as we began the takeoff roll. Once airborne; the Captain immediately started shouting that the departure was incorrect. The Captain kept saying we need to turn left; but the FMS was showing a right turn. I kept saying do not turn left and to follow the departure. He kept saying this isn't right and he turned the auto throttles off. We were getting slow; when he kept saying he was going to turn left; and I said stay on the departure AND DO NOT TURN LEFT. He then selected direct to ERABI in the FMS as we were still in heading mode on runway heading whereby deleting BIVES and DISUR off of the departure. At some point; I said we need to turn right and go to ERABI. We were given a higher altitude and at some point while level at 6;000 feet; we managed to get an over speed warning indication because we were now at 340 kts and 6;000 feet. We continued airborne. Once at cruise; the CA obtained the Oceanic clearance from me and the weather to input on his master sheet. I then asked him when he was all caught up with everything that I wanted to talk about what had just happened. About 20 minutes had gone by and we than started to discuss the issues that had just happened and what had happened earlier while flying the approach into Shannon. It was determined at cruise that the CA was looking at the incorrect departure on his iPad. He was looking at the departure off of [a different] runway; and he never compared his plate with the FMS. Even though he told me at least three times that he had looked at this as he is taxing onto the runway. I never [saw] him compare the FMS with his departure plate. Unless I'm asking him to verify something with me. I had also not had the opportunity to do so either because I was task saturated with many different tasks; or my request for a brief or to look at the departure was ignored. I also brought up the fact that the CA either disregards what I say; ignores me; and/or will not answer me when I make a point or ask a question. It's to the point that I am so used to this behavior that I do not really know if he is hearing me or simply ignoring me. He replied that he is going to ignore me if he thinks that what I'm saying or asking is stupid; or if he thinks I should know the answer already. I told him that this is really bad CRM. He acknowledged and seemed to understand my point. I also brought up that I tried over and over to get him to slow down and stop so we could accomplish our tasks; but he's like a bulldozer rolling all over me and not stopping. So; I asked him what I need to do the next time to make him listen to me. He advised me to maybe just remind him that he's focusing on time constraints and point to my watch; and say 'we don't want [a previous incident] to happen again'. He apologized to me and said he really made a huge mistake and he was glad that I would not let him turn left like he was insisting on doing so. We then talked about the over speed issue and I asked him what he was going to do. Hesaid he did not know. I told him that he should at least talk to maintenance and tell him what happened because we busted a limitation on the plane; and he told me he would.Both pilots should be on the same page. Fixating on time and not following SOPs should never happen. If time is going to be an issue; take and accept the delay in order to accomplish appropriate checklist; follow SOP's; brief; and review the FMS. Recommend CRM classes and review the dangers to hazardous attitudes. Emphasis this should be a team effort and both CA and First Officer can learn from each other. The behavior of outwardly ignoring the other pilot; and disregarding any input is very serious. In regards to the over speed issue. I do not believe that anyone was ever told that the plane was actually in an over speed condition. Emphasis should be placed that maintenance should be notified when a limitation has been exceeded to determine if an inspection is required by maintenance before another flight is taken. I shared my point that the lack or refusal to acknowledge or respond on his part in not allowing for proper CRM to take place. This lack of CRM is causing issues because it is getting to the point that I am ALWAYS being ignored and I do not know if the PF is hearing &/or understanding important things that I am saying or suggesting. I again stressed that this is really bad behavior; and is causing a breakdown of practicing good CRM & in my opinion poor Aeronautical Decision-Making.

G-IV First Officer reported poor CRM procedures from the Captain that resulted in possible track deviation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I had a catastrophic engine failure taking off in the first flight since a major overhaul of my Continental IO520CB engine.I feathered my left engine; and continued the takeoff; entered right traffic; came around and landed back on the takeoff runway; runway XX.I suspect the mechanic/IA who performed the field overhaul failed to properly torque the piston rods to the crank shaft.  I have not had the engine disassembled to confirm my theory.Additionally; I feel the mechanic created this situation by not performing the overhaul in a timely manner.  He would work for a few hours; leave the hangar and not get back to the job for days or weeks.  This caused him to lose track as to where he was in the overhaul process; and consequently; miss a very important step.The engine is not repairable; a total loss; but I made it back safely.

BE-55 pilot reported an engine failed during takeoff. Pilot feathered the propeller and returned for a safe landing.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Upon receiving the aircraft; there was an open write-up for the left main gear not showing in the down and locked position. Maintenance had not been to the aircraft yet. We called Maintenance and asked if it was okay to power up the aircraft. Upon powering up the aircraft; the gear was showing down and locked. On the walk-around I noticed that the proximity sensors had a lot of dirt on them. Maintenance cleaned the sensors on all the gear and we left on schedule.It was a routine flight until the gear was extended for landing. The left main landing gear was not showing down and locked and we received an EICAS message for the misconfiguration. We aborted the landing; but continued to fly over the runway to have the Tower take a look at the gear. The Controller told us that the gear 'looked different and did not appear down.' We performed a go-around and started the QRH items once we leveled off. The Flight Attendant was also notified at this time. We followed the QRH; and were unsuccessful at getting the left main gear to show down and locked using the normal; electrical override; and free-fall methods. We also tried to side slip the aircraft. We did one additional low approach to have the Tower and emergency personnel take a look; but they could not verify if the gear was down. An emergency was declared and we requested Crash/Fire/Rescue services. The Flight Attendant prepared the cabin for a possible emergency evacuation on the runway with the idea that the left main gear may collapse. We verified the QRH was complete; confirmed the cabin was prepped; and briefed our intentions for both an uneventful landing; and landing with the gear collapse. We landed without incident; and came to a stop on the runway. Maintenance was there and pinned the left main gear and confirmed that it was locked. We then taxied to the gate under our own power.Once parked at the gate; Maintenance looked at the gear proximity sensor and the Mechanic said the gap looked too large and would cause it to give a not down and locked indication. He was able to close the gap a small amount by pushing on the sensor with his hand; and that gave the gear a 'down and locked' indication. When he released his hand from the sensor it returned to the red box with diagonal stripes.

ERJ-145 crew received an unsafe gear indication during landing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Student's solo flight to [the] practice area was incident free until he entered spot 2 taxiing back into parking. Myself and another instructor were standing beside [the parking spot] talking while their aircraft was being fueled. The student taxied into spot two and continued his taxi between the two lines of 172's. The fuel truck was completing his fueling and was parked in front of the aircraft's nose pointed south. At about 100 feet away from the fuel truck; the student slowed the aircraft but did not stop. The student kept taxiing the aircraft and was within 20 feet of the fuel truck. At that point the other instructor and myself saw that he was not stopping. We both ran out around the backside of the fuel truck about 30-40 feet in front of the aircraft and gave him the signal to stop. The fuel truck was also beeping his horn trying to get the student to stop as well. The student stopped and his right wingtip was within 5-10 of the fuel truck. The fuel truck then backed up; did a three point turn and went the other way. The student seemed confused as to why we stopped him from taxiing forward to park. Instructor with guidance from Safety has built a ground lesson and will thoroughly brief the student on taxi procedures while in the parking areas while operating the airplane solo. Including the sections in the operations manual about taxiing and taxiing around fuel trucks. Instructor will also review ground operations hand signals associated with taxiing. Using airport diagram and Google Earth; instructor will give student scenarios while operating an aircraft safely in the parking areas.

Flight Instructor reported observing a solo student pilot taxi in close proximity to a fuel truck.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 200

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was working with a student in his personal airplane. We were performing the GPS/RNAV 17 approach at MIO. We were inside the final approach fix; IJEDY descending from 2;500 feet MSL. My student; a private rated pilot; made the announcement we were 5 miles north at the final approach fix for the RNAV/GPS 17. A crop duster was departing 35 (Winds were calm) and announced he had us in sight and he would be making a left turn to the west. I observed this airplane departing; and told my student that if necessary I would take control of the airplane but didn't think this would be necessary. About that time I observed a second airplane; a Mooney directly below us and slightly to the right; estimated at 150-200 feet [from us]. He had made no calls up to this point. I made a call on the radio saying I had the crop duster [in] sight and a Mooney on final; to let the crop duster know he had opposite direction traffic besides us. It was then the Mooney made an announcement. He continued the approach and landed in front of us; causing us to go around. He apologized and said the he was on VFR flight following; that ATC did tell him he had traffic; but he thought we were just maneuvering. We had been on this approach since we intercepted MEBIE; IAF. I feel his reliance to ATC VFR flight following; his lack of seeing and Avoiding and his improper pattern entry at a non-towered airport were contributing factors.

C150 instructor pilot reported an NMAC on approach to MIO; a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Upon receiving our dispatch briefing in ZZZ operations (ops) for our ZZZ/ZZZZ flight; we proceeded to the airplane and met our flight attendants. We were told by the lead flight attendant (f/a) that all coffee makers had the circuit breakers (c/b) pulled and collared; and had inoperative (inop) stickers on them. As the paperwork we had received in ops showed that the airplane had no deferrals; I was quite surprised. We called ZZZ maintenance to investigate the problem. I also discovered a ferry permit in our cockpit; showing that the airplane had been ferried from ZZZZ/ZZZ January 2015 due to a potable water leak. When ZZZ maintenance showed up; they told us that the mechanic who signed off on the work as being complete; had gone home; but that they had called him back so that he could complete the work that he signed off on as being completed in the first place. The MEL card was 10 pages long and the mechanic had only completed a small portion of it; and then just signed it off as complete. We still had coffee makers with c/bs collared; lav water heaters inop; every coffee maker with an inop sticker on it. I'm concerned that this work was signed off as being complete by the mechanic; when it clearly was not. We were delayed an hour while the mechanic was called back in; and got to the airplane; and completed the work he was supposed to have done in the first place. While not a problem that resulted in an unsafe airplane; I am concerned that more of this type of problem is going on without our knowledge. Coordination or Communication; Dispatch; Maintenance.

After receiving a Dispatch briefing indicating their aircraft had no deferrals; a Captain was informed by the lead Flight Attendant that all coffee makers on their B767-300 had Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) pulled and collared with Inoperative (Inop.) stickers on them. Lavatory water heaters were also inoperative and the MEL Card was 10-pages long. Maintenance had signed-off work as being completed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 9200; Flight Crew Type 850

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We took off for a maintenance flight after performing not only scheduled inspections; but also installing an overhauled GPS and Multi function display. We filed for FL270. We initialized our equipment as normal and following checklist procedures. Right after passing 10;000 feet we noticed a problem with pressurization; so we changed to final altitude of 16;000 feet; then we requested 14;000 feet. Right after we leveled off; we were notified that we were at 13;600 feet; even though both of our altimeters were reading 14;000 feet. They made us switch transponder from alt mode to normal mode (C to A mode). We checked our first intersection; a little off but within tolerance; but reaching ZZZ VOR the airplane past a few miles then started turning southeast bound with a left turn taking us off our filed flight plan for a few miles (8 to 10 NM). ATC immediately called our attention vectoring us to a heading of 270 degrees and after a few miles they wanted us direct to ZZZ1 VOR. It was then when we realized that our GPS system and multifunction display had our airplane located like 50 miles west of the airport. Our immediate action was to cancel IFR and request VFR flight following back to the airport. After landing; maintenance crew took action to troubleshoot; finding out that our GPS antenna was damaged and not working properly; we evidently were not receiving satellite signals. We called the Center supervisor to explain what happened and apologize for the inconvenience we caused; I also provided all my contact information including my pilot's certificate number.

CE550 Captain experiences track and altitude deviation during a maintenance test flight after scheduled inspections and the installation of an overhauled GPS and Multi-Function Display unit. The GPS antenna was found damaged on post flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

We were on the final portion of [our] flight; at 36;000 ft inbound to join the arrival to Lima. In order to sequence another aircraft ahead of us; Lima Control instructed us to slow to .77 Mach and fly heading 265. Shortly after complying; I informed Lima that we would soon need a turn back on course for a No Fly Zone ahead. (No Fly Area NFA1 for depressurization contingencies). Lima instructed us to maintain heading. I repeated my concern but Lima instructed us to switch to the next Lima frequency. I immediately checked in with the next Lima controller; stating that I needed a turn for the upcoming No Fly Area. Lima instructed to maintain heading. Since the other aircraft was now adjacent to us on the airway and a left turn might have put us in possible conflict with it; I immediately suggested to start a right turn to return to the airway. Lima responded to maintain heading 265 for 6 minutes to join another airway. Upon realizing that Lima intended to take us through the No Fly Area; we simultaneously started an immediate right turn and announced 'PAN; PAN; PAN. [We are] turning right. You are flying us into a No Fly Zone that we cannot do for our aircraft type'.  The controller then replied; 'Roger; turn right to 090'. During the turn; the controller gave us direct to a fix. Since this would have deleted altitude step downs on the arrival; I informed Lima that we wanted to proceed to a different fix to join the arrival. Lima approved this. The arrival; approach and landing were subsequently completed without further incident. Suggestions include reminding Lima Control of certain aircraft's limitations from transiting the No Fly Zones. Also; have No Fly Zones printed on the STARS to alleviate jumping from charts and apps in the iPad to cross check. Lastly; print reminder in the ops pages that No Fly Zones' boundaries can be placed in legs 2 of the FMC for HSI map display by inserting NFZ01 through NFZ08 for NFA1 and NFZ10 through NFZ15 or so for NFA2.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported being vectored by Lima Control into a 'No Fly Zone.'


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

In cruise approximately 50 min into flight at FL330 with no prior abnormalities noted the throttle quadrant began a very loud grinding with a considerable vibration with no throttle movement. After a few seconds a faint smell of hot rubber began emitting from the quadrant so First Officer (FO) and I performed our memory items for smoke/fumes in cockpit. I then took control of the aircraft and radios and asked FO for the QRH; we agreed upon the 'air conditioning smoke fumes' QRH since it wasn't electrical and smelled like it could have been in the Air Conditioning system and he began to run it. I contacted ATC; requested a lower altitude and began a descent. As FO started the QRH I disconnected the auto throttles; [and] the smell immediately dissipated with no further signs but the grinding and vibration continued but at a lesser intensity. Immediately we noticed the number 1 engine rolled back slightly; I applied power and it responded and all engine indications where normal except the left EPR was slightly lower. At this point the vibration in the quadrant increased. As I began reviewing the situation and current flight conditions (clear; no icing or precipitation) the number 1 engine began to roll back even further. FO and I agreed to discontinue the Smoke/Fumes QRH since there was no evidence of such and we started to focus our attention on the number 1 engine. I asked FO to run the 'engine flameout failure shutdown' QRH (severe damage). I would like to note that the sequence from throttle issue to engine shutdown all happened very quickly; only a couple minutes. As FO worked the checklist I verified our distance to [destination] to be about 250 miles so I chose [an alternate] off our wing at approximately 60 miles as our diversion airport. I then contacted Center; requested lower and asked for the divert to [the alternate]. I also requested ATC to pass along to [Company the details] of our situation and that we were headed to [alternate]. FO finished up with the initial checklist and prior to continuing into the S.E. Approach Landing checklist I asked him to brief the Flight attendants with the emergency info; then give the passengers a quick brief. I would like to also add that the feedback that we received from the flight attendants and the passengers were all very positive and appreciative of the level of calmness and information provided by FO. He did a great job keeping everyone relaxed and in the loop. Once the briefings were complete FO continued into the S.E. Approach Landing checklists as I continued to fly and communicate with ATC. I then contacted Approach and confirmed our situation and we requested fire rescue; I also decided to stop on the runway and not taxi clear due to the continued vibration emitting from the number 1 engine. We were then cleared for landing; a visual backed up by the ILS. FO took over the radios and we finished the checklist and the landing was made uneventfully. At brake set I made the 'remain seated remain seated' announcement and had fire rescue sweep the aircraft while monitoring them on the radios. Fire Rescue gave us the all clear and I made a quick announcement to the passengers then we proceeded into the gate under our own power. The rest of the operation was uneventful through the de-planing. We debriefed with the flight attendants and I then began communicating with company ops. I think the entire crew did a great job performing their individual jobs. It was a particularly difficult sequence due to the changing initial issues; auto throttles to engine shut down; but we performed safely and efficiently.

MD-80 Captain reported diverting to a nearby airport after shutting down the #1 engine.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47.3; Flight Crew Total 143

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

On the way back to my home airport; I heard a loud bang and using a flashlight I realized that I had hit a bird. This caused a massive increase in pilot workload. I continued my flight to my destination and there seemed to be no control issues on the aircraft. Due to the increased workload I forgot to complete the Decsent and Landing checklists. This caused the mixture and boost pump to remain in the cruise setting. Wanting to get the aircraft down I set the aircraft up on a downwind entry onto XXR. I thought I had the runway edge lights in sight. I turned final and got myself set up for landing and realized it was the taxiway off to the right of the runway. I corrected right and lined up for final on the unlit XXR. 100 feet off the ground the engine of the aircraft sputtered and quit. I made a safe but extremely hard landing. On the ground the mixture and boost pump were put in the starting engine position and the starter was engaged. The engine started right up without further incident. At the time of landing the airport Tower was not operating and the field was uncontrolled. Upon inspection of the aircraft there was no damage to the aircraft other than cosmetic.

A DA-20 pilot reported a bird strike at 3;500 feet at night and then during landing the engine quit because the mixture and boost pump were not configured for landing. Following a hard landing he was able to start the engine and taxi to ramp where he found no damage.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64; Flight Crew Total 8460; Flight Crew Type 300

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During cruise flight at FL330; RH Fuel Filter Bypass Caution segment light illuminated. While reaching for the Emergency Checklist; the LH Fuel Filter Bypass caution segment illuminated. Immediately requested a descent to FL240 and direct to ZZZ. Center cleared as requested and we declared an emergency due to the possibility of a dual engine flameout. Emergency procedure depicts; 'LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE'. We were cleared down to lower altitudes and issued a visual approach to ZZZ1. Called the CTAF/UNICOM frequency to determine landing runway. Entered a modified high; left downwind to base leg. Landed under power and taxied to general aviation parking area. Fuel Filter Bypass Caution segments stayed illuminated until engines shut down. After one hour on ground; temp +40C; started the engines and ran at idle power for 10 minutes. Shutdown and sumped both tanks and found very minute amount of water in one sump. Continued process until fuel was clear and correct. Refueled with 60 gallons each side and allowed to sit overnight for at least 12 hours. Previous fueling was 312 gallons with PRIST [anti icing fuel additive]. Advised previous fueler to check their fuel truck PRIST injector and filters. Next morning; again sumped both tanks; started and performed an extensive runup. Takeoff was normal and climbed over airport to 15;500 MSL to pick up IFR clearance. All systems operated normally at FL230 with no issues. Landed with no further issues. Maintenance at home base will sump the tanks several more times and inspect/replace the fuel filters.

Dual fuel bypass lights at 33;000. Notified Center. Performed emergency checklist; 'land as soon as practical'. Declared emergency. Given vectors to ZZZ1; 54 NM north of current position. Landing uneventful; engines continued to run normally. Continued to destination the next day after adding fuel with PRIST and sumping tanks to confirm no water. Normal flight.

CE-525 flight crew experiences a dual fuel filter bypass caution lights at FL330 and diverts to the nearest suitable airport. Fuel icing is suspected and the last fuel supplier is contacted to check their fuel truck for proper PRIST injection.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 8400; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

After an uneventful departure; cruise and descent phase of flight while receiving radar vectors to the RNAV/GPS RW27 final approach course and descending through 4;500 feet altitude to the assigned 4;000 feet altitude we experienced a runaway pitch trim in the nose down direction. The aircraft immediately entered a greater than 3;500 FPM descent. I brought the throttles to flight idle while disconnecting the autopilot/trim disconnect switch to minimize the descent rate and manually returned the aircraft to the assigned altitude. We descended below 3;000 feet during the event. We notified ATC of our situation and intentions during the recovery. The flight continued to the destination without further incident under manual control. ATC handled our dire situation in a positive way providing assistance as requested. Upon arrival we had the aircraft inspected and found autopilot/electric trim operational abnormality.

King air C90 pilot experiences runaway trim during descent to 4;000 feet; resulting in momentary loss of control and descent below 3;000 feet. The autopilot/trim disconnect switch is used successfully to regain manual control.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 10

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

A fellow flight instructor and I were landing at Arlington airport when we experienced a runway incursion. On final approach to Runway 16 we noticed Aircraft Z holding short of Runway 16 for takeoff. Moments later; on short final over Runway 16 at approximately 50 ft. I heard a radio transmission 'Aircraft X; you got Aircraft Y taking off on 34'. The source of this transmission is unknown; but we think it was Aircraft Z.There is no forward visibility when landing this type of biplane; and since I could not see the unidentified Aircraft Y; we aborted the landing and executed an immediate go-around at low altitude over the runway. We adjusted course to offset to the right of the runway so we could attempt to spot this aircraft since we could not see over the nose. That is the first time we saw the white Aircraft Y who was in the takeoff roll heading directly towards us. We announced on the radio that we were going-around due to opposite-direction traffic on the runway. We saw Aircraft Y make a left and right swerving turn on the runway in an apparent attempt to get to one side of the runway and then immediately after that we saw Aircraft Y continue the takeoff roll as he disappeared from view underneath us.We continued to fly a normal pattern for Runway 16. Announcing our position at each leg of the pattern.Upon turning downwind we observed the subject Aircraft Y flying upwind for runway 16. We asked the pilot what his intentions were. We were concerned he may stay in the pattern and cause additional collision risk. An unidentified aircraft; presumably Aircraft Y; responded 'Runway 34 is the calm wind runway. Winds are CALM! I guess I'll just depart to the west. Aircraft X; give me your tail number!' This was the first transmission that we believe came from the subject aircraft. We chose not to respond to this aircraft; and focused on keeping the traffic in sight; and our aircraft under control.Moments later another unidentified aircraft transmitted 'The AWOS is reporting winds from the south. The winds are not calm. I'm about to takeoff on 16'The subject Aircraft Y left the area; and no further radio transmissions were heard from that aircraft. We landed safely on Runway 16. After touchdown we noticed the windsock showing a light wind; 5-10 mph; from the south; favoring Runway 16.I believe the Aircraft Y pilot used the existence of a calm wind runway designation to attempt to force aircraft to use another runway that was not optimally aligned with the local winds. This pilot did not follow 14 CFR 91.113. It is clear Aircraft Y's pilot had an operable radio; but did not use it to announce his intention to use a runway that would create a collision hazard. I believe the local calm wind runway policy may have also affected Aircraft Y's pilot's judgement; and created a confirmation bias that caused him to do what he did.Arlington Airport is busy. The airport has a local reputation of sometimes being out of control. Some locals call it 'Anarchy Acres'. I know flight instructors who will not let their students go there alone. I have seen pilots landing on runways that are not in use by the majority of traffic. I've heard reasons like 'It takes too long to taxi to my hangar; so I just use runway X every time.' These are hazardous attitudes. This kind of activity makes me concerned for the general safety of all pilots flying at this airport.As this airport becomes busier and busier the FAA should evaluate the need for a control tower at the field to prevent a serious accident from happening. Alternatively; the FAA or the City should study the flow of traffic at this airport to help better understand why these events happen. The cost/benefit analysis of the calm wind runway guidance should be re-evaluated; especially since there are crossing runways at this airport with a track record of similar problems in the ASRS database.

Pilot reported encountering opposite direction traffic at uncontrolled airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Total 4934; Flight Crew Type 3400

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I was the IRO on my break. About an hour into my break I smelled smoke and looked up and smoke was coming from seat 3A in front of our rest seat. I pushed the FA call button to alert the flight attendants and got up and asked the passenger to move from the seat. The ISM came over and said she shut off the electric power to the seat. The smell of the smoke was electrical. I opened up the seat to find out where the smoke was coming from. The smoke dissipated fast after power was removed and I felt around for hot spots. I found no real hot spots. The ISM brought over the halon extinguisher and I moved out of the way for her to spray the spot where the smoke was coming from as a precaution. Myself as well as the flight attendants helping all felt around to make sure we felt no heat. After we felt there was no more fire threat I went over to the flight interphone and called the Captain; [who] was on the SATCOM with Dispatch as well as [Maintenance] about the situation. [The Captain] relayed the questions [Maintenance] had to me and I answered their question. [Maintenance] advised to keep the IFE power switch off and felt since the smoke was gone and there was no heat from where the smoke was coming from; we all agreed it was safe to continue. We believed the malfunction was from the seat motor and the threat was over after power was removed from the seat. The Captain was confident that the problem was over [and] asked the rest of the crew if we all felt safe to proceed. We all felt safe to proceed and I asked the flight attendants to continually check the seat area around the seat motor to make sure there was no more heat while the flight continued.

B757 Relief Officer sitting in the cabin noticed smoke coming from another cabin seat. Smoke subsided when power was removed from seat.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 9500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Declared Emergency

Got to the gate in ZZZ and noted Maintenance was working on aircraft. They were getting ready to perform a Ground Pressurization Test and asked us to remain at the top of the jet bridge while they performed their test. The test was due to a previous write-up for pressurization leak. Maintenance completed their test and signed-off the logbook along with our ETOPS sign-off. We then loaded the aircraft and proceeded on our leg from ZZZ to ZZZ1. On climb out above 17;000 FT we started to get a really loud air leak sound and could not determine where it was coming from; but it was very pronounced. We discussed the fact that this airplane had just had the pressurization check performed back on the ground in ZZZ to try to find the leak and the fact that the leak still existed even though all indications for cabin pressurization was normal. We also discussed whether it was prudent to continue the flight. Captain talked to the flight attendants in back [of cabin] multiple times to find out what 'they' were also hearing and feeling [and if] what sounded like a possible pressurization leak and also eventually a vibration coming from somewhere on the left side of the aircraft. After talking to Maintenance; Dispatch and the Flight Attendants in the back of the aircraft and based on the noise that we could hear and the vibration that we could feel; we agreed that the best course of action was to not continue this ETOPS flight and to return to ZZZ as soon as possible; therefore an emergency was declared and we came back to ZZZ and performed an uneventful overweight landing. After returning to ZZZ; we switched to a different aircraft; re-boarded and then departed to ZZZ1. Climb and cruise within first 30 minutes of flight. Use of Captain's emergency authority [and] priority handling from ATC.

Reporter stated they were flying a B737-800 ETOPS aircraft. The aircraft did maintain normal cabin pressurization up through 34;000 FT; but the loud air leak squeal and cabin vibration; especially on the left side of the aircraft; was not making the passengers happy or comfortable; so they returned to field. No abnormal engine vibration was noted. He does not have any current information as to what the corrective action might have been.

Before we accepted it; aircraft came in with maintenance write-up concerning a loud squeal coming from Door-1l while operating above FL300. ZZZ Maintenance advised that significant debris was found around door seal and was removed. Door seal was cleaned and aircraft pressurized to 1.5 PSI on ground; no squeal was heard and aircraft returned to service. Departed ZZZ; upon climbout passing FL180; loud squeal was heard coming from Door-1l. Cabin pressure was normal to FL340; squeal increased in volume and could be heard through cabin.[We] elected to return to ZZZ; initiated phone patch through ZZZ2 ARINC to Dispatch and Maintenance Control to advise/discuss intentions. Cleared to ZZZ arrival at 17;000 FT; squeal stopped descending through FL250. Advised ATC of need to hold and burn off fuel to preclude Overweight Landing. During hold; experienced very pronounced and unusual vibration coming from Door 1l (1-Left) vicinity for about 10 seconds duration. Flight attendants advised vibration was felt all the way to back of aircraft. Declared emergency; requested clearance to airport and performed overweight landing without incident. Weight and Balance. Air Return. Mechanical.

A Captain and First Officer report a very loud squeal sound and vibration could be heard and felt throughout the cabin as their B737-800 ETOPS aircraft climbed through 17;000 FT. Emergency declared and aircraft returned to departure airport. Cabin pressurization had remained normal.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

At FL410 and 1:30 hour into flight crew attempted to balance wing fuel. After fuel was balanced and switches returned to normal position; fuel continued to transfer out of left tank into right tank. Emergency/Abnormal checklist showed two procedures (A & B). Crew selected and completed procedure B of FUEL QUANTITY ASYMMETRY abnormal checklist which was for no fuel leak evident. Fuel continued to reduce on the low side. Crew also noticed that fuel did not increase at a like amount on the high side. X-BP amber warning light remained illuminated contrary to checklist. Crew then suspected both a transfer and a fuel leak problem and completed Emergency/Abnormal Checklist Procedure A which was for fuel leak and called for associated side engine shut down. Left engine was shut down and fuel in left tank stabilized at 2;000 pounds. Emergency was declared and divert to nearest suitable airport was accomplished. Single engine landing accomplished without incident. Initial maintenance inspection found bad fuel transfer valve actuator and multiple fuel leaks in left wing.

A DA-2000 fuel imbalance could not be equalized with normal or emergency procedures so an emergency was declared; the associated engine shut down and the flight diverted where a failed fuel transfer valve along with fuel leaks were discovered.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after gear up we received an EICAS message L HYD SYS PRESS in addition the status page Indicated RF for the Left Hydraulic System. We determined we had lost all the Left Hydraulic System fluid; I advised ATC of the problem; I declared an emergency and informed ATC we intended to return. I requested the First Officer run the QRH. We secured the Left Hydraulic System as per the checklist. We also advised Dispatch informed the flight attendants and made an announcement to the passengers. I requested one holding turn to run the after takeoff; arrival checklist and review the landing adjustments due to the loss of the Left Hydraulic System. We made a normal ILS approach and landing. We had requested the emergency equipment stand by. I turned the APU on and after we exited the runway ATC requested we stop and wait for the emergency personal to inspect the aircraft. I shut the engines off and kept the brakes off. I was than informed the left landing gear had some smoke that was subsiding coming from around the brakes. The Emergency Personal cleared the aircraft to be towed to the gate.

Turning to 270 heading climbing through about 2;000 FT; noticed caution lights on the EICAS. [We] noticed L HYD SYS PRESS light. Rudder ratio and hydraulic quantity [were] also on. We ran the L HYD SYS PRESS QRH checklist and returned to a landing. Declared an emergency; called CFR and advised Dispatch on ACARS that we were returning. The Captain preformed the landing.

B757 flight crew experiences the loss of the Left Hydraulic System fluid shortly after takeoff. After complying with QRH procedures an emergency is declared and flight returns to departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Dispatch unable to calculate airplane take-off performance with TOGA power and APU Bleed Air. Due to MEL 'AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE UNIT SYSTEM (ATSU) ETOPS Aircraft' we were not able to receive takeoff performance data through the ACARS system; we needed to speak with Dispatch. Dispatch ran the takeoff performance with flaps 3 and flex power setting (photo with 1 in lower right corner). We noticed the available stop distance remaining (ASDR) was 378 feet so asked Dispatch to recalculate the takeoff performance using TOGA power. This time the ASDR was even less; at 324 feet. Finally; we asked for performance data using flaps 3; TOGA thrust and APU air bleed. The Dispatcher told us there was no option available to him to input TOGA power and APU bleed air that he would have to do those calculations manually. Note that the last photo provides data for flex power with APU Bleed Air. We ended up departing without APU Bleed Air performance data; which could have expanded our very small margin for a safe departure.  How it possible is this company is unable to adapt to changing weather and takeoff parameters by not having the ability for its dispatchers to calculate takeoff performance in all non-standard configurations? There are multiple variations in flap configuration; power settings and bleed configuration that increase the capability of the Airbus quite effectively; as every other operator of the Airbus is likely aware. A company that relies on its longevity as a term of legitimacy should be aware of these capabilities and understand this critical concept of calculating takeoff performance from relatively short fields in warmer weather conditions. As a crew member who is reliant on corporate staff to accurately calculate my takeoff performance data on a consistent basis I feel not only extremely let down but also that this operation is not as safe as it should be. I do not appreciate my life being exposed to any more danger than already is inherent in the job and I demand this company do better!Additionally; when the Dispatcher told us he would have to manually calculate the takeoff data using APU bleed air; at first I was waiting for him to tell us to stand by; but my First Officer; who was on the phone; appeared to sound dejected as if he realized the Dispatcher maybe was not interested in calculating the numbers manually?? I cannot say for certain as I was not on the phone with the Dispatcher; however; at no time did I discern the Dispatcher taking any kind of initiative to calculate our performance data manually. Ultimately we pushed back with the TOGA power; flaps 3; engine bleed air data. Had the Dispatcher taken the time to calculate the APU bleed air; TOGA; flaps 3 data manually we might have experiences a slightly higher margin of safety than we did. As evidenced by the photo of the TLR printout; 'APU BLEED ON' is possible. So why is it that the Dispatch was not able to input this configuration into his computer? If the answer has anything to do with the 737 not having this same capability (I have never operated the 737 so do not know) then (airline) is doing a great disservice to itself; its passengers and ground employees as well as the crews who operate the Airbus. Perhaps 'Do Better' should be part of the corporate mantra. The Airbus is a very capable aircraft when managed properly. The fact that (airline) does not have the capability to compute takeoff performance using bleed air taken from the APU instead of the engines is both disheartening and counterproductive to operating as safely as possible. Recommend learning how to compute takeoff data using APU BLEED AIR.

Captain reported difficulty in obtaining takeoff performance data.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 280

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were given the RUUDY 4 departure up to 2;000 FT. I don't believe we crossed WENTZ at 1;500 FT; instead we went straight to 2;000 FT.

Beechjet 400 First Officer reports possibly exceed 1;500 FT on the RUUDY 4 departure from TEB prior to crossing WENTZ.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 25; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 10; Flight Attendant Total 25; Flight Attendant Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant; Person Other Person

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Prior to boarding our flight there was a sudden and very strong odor that developed very quickly throughout the cabin. All 4 flight attendants and a commuting pilot (pre-board)all smelled the odor similar to what I relate to fuel or hydraulic fumes.  I went quickly to inform the Captain in the flight deck and immediately all 4 Flight Attendants and commuting pilot deplaned on to the jetway. Our lead Flight Attendant felt dizzy and my throat and eyes were burning. At that time; the passenger agent opened the door leading from the terminal to the jetway to begin boarding and she immediately started waving her hand in front of her face and asked us what the awful smell was.  Those of us on the jetway didn't even realize that the fumes were still around us so we proceeded to exit the jetway into the terminal. The agent delayed boarding and called to report the incident.  Our Lead Flight Attendant called flight daily ops to report it as well. Maybe it was 20 minutes before the fumes dissipated and the cabin crew went back on the aircraft to begin boarding for the flight.

A321 Flight Attendant reported very strong fumes during preflight. Maintenance action required a delay to dissipate fumes.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were dispatched with a planned arrival fuel of 3225 lbs. 2194 lbs was our planned reserve fuel; and a minimum tanker figure of 1031 lbs was included. Weather was forecast and observed VMC and an alternate was not required. We flew economy speeds for the entire flight. As we descended on the arrival; we were told that ZZZ had unexpectedly gone into holding. An expected time approximately 30 minutes in the future was given. I calculated the fuel burn and; at our holding speed; we only had enough fuel to hold for approximately 15 minutes; equating to about two turns. We queried ATC as to the reason for the hold and he didn't specify other than to say 'they just called us on the phone' and that it was most likely due to volume into ZZZ; as the weather was completely fine (overcast at 11;000 to the best of my recollection). I kept calculating the fuel and was growing increasingly concerned. As we turned downwind on our second turn in the hold; I queried ATC how much longer it would be; we had to divert right away if we couldn't get into ZZZ. Holding for five more minutes past this point showed us landing at ZZZ with 2500 lbs.; 300 over reserve. They cleared us out of the hold back to ZZZ. We immediately declared min fuel and they informed us it would be about a 12 mile final to the runway; which gave us a bit more margin than forecast. We descended via the arrival. We encountered unforecasted clouds that required us to activate wing and cowl anti-ice; further increasing fuel burn. We were also slowed on the downwind leg to 160 knots; forcing us to drastically increase drag and; thus; fuel burn. Additionally; our downwind was extended a bit. We touched down in ZZZ at 1900 lbs of fuel; approximately 300 lbs into our reserve.I continue to believe that our reserve fuel figures are completely insufficient; and that takeoff fuel calculations; while possibly fitting a definition of 'legal;' are absolutely unrealistic. There is no way we can account for a go-around and have 45 minutes of extra fuel remaining; even with our tanker fuel. I spoke to our dispatcher after landing; who told us that she is not allowed to put extra fuel in hold for 'anticipated' holding. She can only put it in if she knows ZZZ will go into holding. Neither the dispatcher nor I had any indication at all that ZZZ would go into holding that day; as the weather was forecast to be close to ideal; and the flight plan was completed approximately 2.5-3 hours prior to this event. We unexpectedly had to burn 600 extra pounds; plus the hold; on our way into ZZZ that day.In the future; when landing with 'normal' loads into airfields where we are planned to arrive with min tanker plus reserve; and holding instructions are given; I will carefully consider an immediate divert. I do not feel that this is a proper way; however; to conduct fuel planning; and I believe the fuel policy should ultimately be revisited carefully with the input of current line pilots and line check airmen.

CRJ-900 Captain declared minimum fuel after unexpected holding on descent to their destination. The Captain attributed fuel issues to unrealistic company fuel reserve policies.


Beechcraft / Beech Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 122; Flight Crew Total 27163; Flight Crew Type 247

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While flying at 11;000 feet on an IFR flight plan on V23 approximately 30 miles south of BTG VOR; I found myself converging on a very large area of many flocks of migrating geese. I made a turn to the left keeping my eye out and on the flocks watching all of them as they passed off the right side of the aircraft inadvertently turning 30 degrees as ATC indicated. I was contacted by ATC of the deviation and realized in my attempt to divert from the geese; I inadvertently flew off course resulting in a deviation of the flight planned clearance route. Upon notification from ATC; I resumed navigation back to V23 keeping an eye to the sky for more geese. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

BE-99 pilot reported a track heading deviation after an evasive maneuver to avoid a flock of birds near BTG VOR.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Upon gear retraction; ECAM message received for loss of Green Hydraulic system. TOW weight was about 166;000 pounds. Declared emergency; diverted to [nearest suitable airport] due to long runway; and unlimited visibility. Gravity extended gear; landed overweight approximately 156;000 pounds. Uneventful landing. Tow in to the gate due to no nose wheel steering.

A320 First Officer reported loss of Green Hydraulic System upon gear retraction. Flight diverted to nearest suitable airport featuring a long runway and good weather.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 150

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

VFR direct flight took us northbound just east of Columbus; GA at 8;500 MSL. Approaching Class D/R3002 airspace (Lawson AAF MOA) I checked current altitude restrictions on our dual GPS moving map system with satellite XM NOTAM updates; and another system with active ADS-B information. My Dynon SkyView system showed active restricted airspace from 8;000-14;000 MSL and from surface to 4;000 FT. We descended to 7;500 FT to avoid these areas; but did not realize that a third layer of restrictions was active between 4;000 and 8;000 MSL. The moving map display made it difficult to discern all three layers of the active restricted airspace (R3002 A; B; C). After the flight I discussed the error with Atlanta TRACON. In hindsight; I should have either avoided the MOA altogether; or have been in VHF contact with Columbus ATC before passing through the area.

RV-7 pilot reports inadvertent entry into R3002 due inability to see the individual A; B; C areas of R3002 on his moving map display. R3002B was active.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While security screening of passengers baggage the TSA staff found 2 containers of Glass Cleaner.

Load personnel reported TSA found Hazmat cleaning solution in passenger baggage.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Hazmat can improperly built (loaded) Class 4.3 which requires separation from Class 8. Both of these class shipments were present and did not have required separation. These items were actually right next to each other. All of the Hazmat items were secured under a net. (First Officer) FO noticed lack of required separation and brought to attention of ramp agent. Ramp agent arranged items correctly and re-secured the net. Improper Hazmat can buildup (loaded).

A-300 Captain reported Hazmat shipment incorrectly loaded. Flight crew had Hazmat cargo reconfigured in accordance to Hazmat regulations prior to departure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 2199; Flight Crew Type 216

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Communicated with tower for takeoff instructions and cleared to takeoff. After takeoff; tower instructed pilot to contact Center and report back to tower. Problems with initial communications with ATC due to HF not functioning properly and then going to the use of a satellite phone. By the time communication [is] established with Center; tower was no longer within communication range. [Soon after]; plane developed engine trouble and the right engine was shut down and feathered in accordance with the emergency checklist. Fuel to the right engine was stopped. The pilot elected to return to departure point rather than proceed to destination. The rest of the flight was conducted on the left engine and a single engine VFR landing was made. Oceanic flights should be allowed to use satellite phones for communications rather than HF radios or at least the pilots should be given a choice.

C421 pilot reports difficulty contacting Center using an HF radio after departing on an overwater flight and believes that pilots should have the option of using a satellite phone. Less than an hour after after takeoff an engine problem develops and the right engine is shut down and the flight returns single engine to the departure point.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was nearing the end of the KKILR3 Arrival into MSP; 12L transition; being vectored on a left downwind for Runway 12L. Several headings from ATC were given and complied with. A descent to 4000 feet was given with a slow to 210 knots or faster when reaching 4000 feet. At 4000 feet; we slowed to 210 knots. During this time; four different aircraft ahead of us were told they had exited the bravo airspace when being changed to the Tower frequency. This was noticed by us and extra care was taken to not do the same. While being given the final vector to join the localizer course and being cleared for the ILS 12L; we were told to cross WASHY (FAF) at 3000 feet. To the best of my knowledge; 3000 feet was set and 4000 feet was maintained until passing abeam HAMML to avoid leaving bravo airspace. When being told by MSP Approach to contact the Tower; we were told that we; 'still exited the bravo airspace for a second but were back in now.' Tower was contacted and the rest of the flight was accomplished without incident. I am not aware of the controller's motivations here; but this does appear to be a bit of a set up. When being vectored onto an approach in IMC and icing conditions; a flight crew does have a few things on their mind. Being assigned a speed of 210 knots is suspiciously 10 knots faster than is allowed below bravo airspace. Four aircraft in a row were given the same descent to the final approach fix being told to hold 210 knots. All were told they exited the bravo. ATC appeared to take no action to avoid this confusion with any subsequent aircraft. Despite recognizing this and taking our own precautions; we were told the same. If the Approach Controller assigned a 200 knot speed; this would be a non-issue. If a slightly steeper intercept was given with instructions of maintain 4000 until HAMML; cleared for the ILS 12L; again; this would be a non-issue. If a descent to 3000 feet is given outside of HAMML; a crew is likely to descend to get down to 3000 feet to avoid being above the glideslope at a high workload time period. It's not a shock that so many crews did this. Some other items of note: Being more than 10 degrees off the localizer means glideslope indications are not reliable to the flight crew. The approach plate for 12L shows two rings at 5nm and 10nm showing the MSA altitudes; not the class B altitudes/floors. The Class B airspace chart is horrible to read and understand in real time; but shows the floors of the Class B. Also; the distances on this chart are measured from MSP VOR. The distance being monitored on the approach and the distances on the approach chart are from the IPJL localizer. This is also a time when a crew is managing icing conditions in IMC; communicating with ATC; configuring the aircraft; running checklists; etc. In the future; when being given vectors and step downs in bravo airspace at MSP; I will advise the Approach Controller than I am unable to maintain faster than 200 knots.

Air carrier pilot reported ATC did not provide adequate guidance to remain within Bravo airspace.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181; Flight Crew Type 2086

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162.53; Flight Crew Total 358.25; Flight Crew Type 358.25

SNA Tower advised us holding short Runway 20R that we would be given an expedited takeoff after landing traffic. After position and hold clearance; SNA Tower clears helicopter on north ramp for takeoff and then also clears us for takeoff.I initially couldn't see the helicopter because of the center windscreen divider; but after 60 knots I picked up the helicopter gaining altitude about half way down runway just north of our intended track. My guess was helicopter came within 500 feet laterally and at our altitude of 200 ft. As we approached V1 speed; I mentioned to flying FO (First Officer) to look out for the helicopter. We continued on course without evasive action; but this event at this airport is unsatisfactory for 121 aircraft and performance runway issues. At altitude we both agreed this was very uncomfortable spacing and we have no formal training for low altitude separation maneuvering.

We were cleared to line up and wait on 20R after a landing [traffic]. Tower cleared a helicopter to take off from the Northwest pad followed by clearing us for takeoff without delay due to a GA jet on final. During takeoff I noted the helicopter lifting off in uncomfortably close proximity to our right wing. While there was no collision or perceived immediate need to maneuver; we were uncomfortable with the helicopters proximity during our rotation. If the helicopter were to drift towards us we would be required to maneuver at low level toward a closely spaced GA Runway. At cruise; we evaluated the taxi diagram and scale and observed that both west side helicopter pads are within 500' of aircraft taking off of Runway 20R. Traffic avoidance of helicopters while taking off of a short runway is an unnecessary threat which can cause loss of control on takeoff; rejected takeoff followed by possible over run or collision with the helicopter or other GA aircraft on the smaller runway.

A319 flight crew reported a near mid-air collision with a helicopter during take-off.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft; Human Factors

The permanent EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) mount restricts Pilots ability to move the flight controls in violation of CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) part 25.777(a)(c) which states Cockpit controls:(a) Each cockpit control must be located to provide convenient operation and to prevent confusion and inadvertent operation.(c) The controls must be located and arranged; with respect to the Pilots' seats; so that there is FULL AND UNRESTRICTED MOVEMENT OF EACH CONTROL WITHOUT INTERFERENCE from the COCKPIT STRUCTURE or the clothing of the minimum Flight Crew (established under 25.1523) when any member of this Flight Crew; from 5 ft. 2 in. to 6 ft. 3 in. in height; is seated.I am 5 ft. 9 in. and according to the US Navy I am anthropomorphically average and was not restricted from flying any aircraft in the Navy during my service. I have never had any issues with any control restriction until the EFB mount. Additionally I sit in the recommended position per [Company manual]. Oddly enough this makes the restriction worse as the slightly higher seated position further restricts ability to lift outside arm.The ground steering tiller AND the flight control yoke are adversely affected when the EFB is mounted in either vertical or horizontal position. The only option I have been able to find acceptable is to NOT mount the EFB and leave it on my bag or on glare shield. Both are susceptible to inflight movement; not ideal; likely against AOM/FRM guidance; but greatly preferable to not being able to move controls freely. I have previously reported this issue but was rebuffed by EFB Team who stated the design had an STC (Supplemental Type Certificate) and met requirements. I most strongly DISAGREE and sincerely believe this issue needs a fresh look by parties not desirous of particular outcome.

Air carrier pilot reported that an Electronic Flight Bag mount interfered with the movement of the flight controls and could be a potential safety risk.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 0.5; Flight Crew Type 0.5

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Loss of engine power during initial climb.

Cessna 150 Student Pilot reported loss of engine power in climb led to an off airport landing.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft X was taxied to Runway 14 at intersection F. I wrote 'F/14' on the flight progress strip and I verbally told Local Control that Aircraft X is at F intersection. As I was working I heard the Controller in Charge tell Local control to stop that aircraft. I spotted Aircraft X rolling past the hold short line at Taxiway F and Runway 14 as Aircraft Y was moving at a high speed on Runway 14 approximately 500 feet from intersection F. I loudly spoke 'STOP STOP'. Local Controller successfully got Aircraft X to stop just short of the runway edge.This is a firm reminder of the importance of scan and situational awareness. The Controller in Charge did a fantastic job jumping in just in time to prevent Aircraft X from entering Runway 14. I will continue to remain focused while working in the Tower. We need to identify each aircraft and find out their location before we issue control instructions.

Aircraft Y was VFR was on a GPS full stop approach to Runway 14. Aircraft X was at Runway14 intersection F awaiting departure. Aircraft X's VFR flight strip was marked with the proper 'intersection' departure markings per the Standard Operating Procedure. I looked at Aircraft X's strip when it was handed to me and I mentally noted he was an intersection departure then set it in my bay. Aircraft Y was almost over the threshold when Aircraft X called ready for departure. I had previously cleared Aircraft Z to land. When Aircraft X called ready; I immediately told Aircraft Z that his landing clearance was cancelled and told him to continue because traffic would be holding in position. Then I then told Aircraft X to lineup and wait without looking at his strip again. I went back to see Aircraft Y about to touch down between C1 and F taxiway intersections. Ground Control told me to stop 'that guy' (Aircraft X).I then realized I had forgotten he was at the intersection. I told Aircraft X to hold short. Aircraft X had already crossed the hold short lines; but he stopped before entering the actual runway. Aircraft Y saw this and said he was going around. I told Aircraft Y to go around and enter left close traffic. I then told Aircraft X to cross Runway 14; and to taxi full length Runway 14; via Alfa; which he did. I then cleared Aircraft Z to land. Aircraft Y came back around and landed behind Aircraft Z without incident.I can say I probably got distracted when Aircraft X called ready and I looked up to check my radar scope to see if Aircraft X was far enough out to cancel his landing clearance and would have enough time to get my departure out. Once I saw Aircraft Y cross the threshold I mentally noted it was now okay to put Aircraft X in position. I believe I got distracted with the whole process. I don't believe anything other than rescanning my strips or scanning the taxiways. I was scanning the runway to see Aircraft Y was landing instead of looking mid field where Aircraft X was.

SRQ Tower Ground Controller reported observing the Local Controller clear a departing aircraft on to the runway with landing traffic on short final.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 500

Dispatch had our flight filed through the center of a tropical storm. The captain called dispatch and requested to be re routed around the storm to the north; this caused a significant departure delay; however it was actually shorter than the original flight time by two minutes.  I have major safety concerns regarding this routing. First; we were able to look at the flight plan well ahead of time at the hotel. In Lagos it is common for us to not be able to access the internet or for it to be so slow we can't use it.  It's also common to not have access to a flight plan until 90 minutes prior to departure. If any of this would have happened we probably would have flown the filed route without fully realizing how bad the weather was. The route they filed us through included KZNY SIGMET Hotel 2 for frequent thunderstorm tops above FL500. CNVC 22172 for FL440 to FL490 broken coverage; increasing convection associated with tropical storm Fay with max sustained winds 50kts with gusts to 60kts.CNVC 21109 for FL420 to FL470; broken coverage; convection with circulation around subtropical storm Fay. KZNY SIGMET Golf 2 for the tropical storm; intensifying with frequent thunderstorm tops FL500.  All of our training and policies with regard to turbulence mitigation and avoidance as well as thunderstorm avoidance would have to be ignored to fly through our original route. Our training guidance is to stay at least 20nm upwind of a moderate or greater radar echo and 1nm per knot of wind on the downwind side. The FOM states 'Airborne weather radar is designed as a weather avoidance tool and is not a weather penetration system.' The AFM has a caution note that states 'CAUTION: weather radar should not be used for penetration of thunderstorm areas where the precipitation between aircraft and target is moderate to heavy.' None of these policies would have been possible on our original route.  Furthermore; it would also have been impossible to comply with AD 20XX-XX-XX regarding ice crystal icing.  'Operations in ice crystal icing can cause unrecoverable loss of thrust and engine damage due to ice crystal icing.' it also states 'flight is prohibited within 50 NM of amber or red radar returns that are displayed below the aircrafts' flight path.' As a crew we were all wondering if the dispatcher had even looked at the weather; or perhaps used a flight plan from the previous flight.  There was an obvious disregard for safety of flight on our original route. I have screenshots of the weather and our originally filed route but I am unable to attach them. Please contact me if they will be useful.

First Officer reported Dispatch planned their flight through the center of a tropical storm in the Western Atlantic.  Flight crew requested a re-route.


Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was the PIC and flying pilot. During our assessment for our approach into ZZZ; we mentioned the high rate of unstable approaches into ZZZ as noted on the airport page.  I even stated I would be slowing and configuring early to make sure we met the stable approach criteria.  When cleared for the approach and about 20 NM out; I started slowing and configuring. The next thing I realized was we were getting high on our vertical path and I was unable to safely catch up.  As we passed 1;500 feet AGL; I told the First Officer (FO) to prepare for a go-around. I dove for the path but found myself 40 knots too fast as we approached 1;000 feet AGL.  At 1;000 feet and no hope for safely recovering; I told the FO to advise ZZZ Tower we were going around.  A go-around was completed to a second successful approach to a full stop.We briefed it; we were completely aware of the high frequency of unstable approaches into ZZZ and still fell victim to my poor energy management.  A three week gap of no flying prior to this trip took the sharpness out of my flying.  I 'chair flew' a departure the evening before to help mitigate my lack of frequency but my lack of focus during the approach led to this situation.

Air carrier Captain reported the lack of flying was a factor in experiencing an unstabilized approach.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 1646; Flight Crew Type 958

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

On IFR flight plan; cruise configuration at 4;000 feet MSL in contact with SHAW TRACON. Glider appeared off my left wing from above and within 500 feet. Don't know if glider pilot could see me under and below his wing - also in my blind spot due to canopy. I can't see an aircraft descending from above. Asked Approach Controller if the glider was indicated on radar. Got response from trainee Controller that no aircraft was on radar near me - Supervisor Controller responded that glider operations in the GAMECOCK I MOA all week - information provided via NOTAM for area. Supervisor Controller informed me I should have NOTAM and should be looking for gliders. I did not respond on frequency but instead contacted the SHAW TRACON OIC the following Monday and asked that they review this as a safety event. Gliders are difficult to see and are not required to contact the airspace controlling agency (operating inside MOA). These aircraft should operate transponder even if VFR to increase overall safety of all aircraft.

AA5 pilot reports an airborne conflict with a glider at 4;000 feet inside the Gamecock I MOA while on an IFR flight plan. The glider was not talking to ATC; had no transponder and was not visible on Radar.


Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Had a near miss with a drone while on final into MSP.  On the Date about XA30 we were on final to runway 12L at MSP and I noticed something fly past the left side of the aircraft.  I did not see it clearing and asked if anyone else on the flight deck saw that.  We had a airline pilot in the jump seat and he stated that he saw it and it was definitely a drone.  We were on the visual for 12L at MSP at about 2;800 feet just inside WASHY (the final approach fix); just left (north) of the final approach course.  The drone was fairly large and yellow.  I did not see the exact configuration as it passed by so quickly.  The drone went passed us on the left side of the aircraft from nose to tail.  I did complete a post flight walk around to verify we did not hit it and found no indication of any kind of impact on the aircraft.Drone operating at altitude and in airspace not authorized.

Air carrier flight crew had an airborne conflict with a UAS while on final approach.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Event started with LC2 requesting a ZILLI (southbound) SID from the South Controller (LC1). LC2 was told to follow the ZILLI in the slot (LUAW). LC1 had one ZILLI in a departure roll while another ZILLI was slowly going into LUAW. LC2 misunderstood and followed the wrong (first) ZILLI and ended up side by side with the second ZILLI. This was legal since they are on diverging heading; however; not preferred by the Departure area controller since it takes extra time and space to build the needed three miles. As the Assist; called the Departure area controller to explain and apologize. The line was busy. I called LC1's Assist to ask if they had called the Departure area controller to do the same. They said no. I then turned to the CIC who said that he was on the line talking to the Departure area controller. As I turned around and sat back down; I heard Aircraft X say that they had been cleared for takeoff; but had observed the RWSL 'Red' lights on and traffic was crossing downfield. I observed traffic crossing at taxiway AA and BB downfield. I had not heard the crossing or takeoff clearance instructions by the LC2 Controller who was also training. Perhaps the use of the memory aid when traffic is crossing or the runway is unusable.

LAX Tower Controller reported two side by side departures and a runway crossing that were not coordinated correctly.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The 'MDA' was set in the altitude preselect instead of the 'stepdown altitude'.  We were flying as Co-Captains. My role was PIC and the other pilot's role was SIC. On this leg; I was the nonflying pilot and the SIC was the the flying pilot.  The weather at JFK was marginal VFR. ATC was using the ILS 4R and the RNAV GPS Y 4L approach. We were assigned the RNAV GPS Y 4L approach. Throughout our flight; I was privately admiring the proficiency; professionalism and airmanship of my Co-captain. He was doing an excellent job in the performance of his duties and his conduct of CRM. We conducted the CANPA procedure. As we approached the REPRE stepdown fix; the SIC called for the MDA altitude instead of the stepdown altitude. Since we were in VMC conditions; I set the MDA in the altitude preselect without verbal question. I do remember thinking; for just a flash of a second; 'Oh; he's having me set MDA; and he's going to mentally adjust the descent rate for KRSTL (the final approach fix)'. I then proceeded to observe the VMC conditions outside the airplane; especially noting the surface winds and the whitecaps on the ocean surface; and updated the SIC of my observations.During our descent; we received the 1000 foot call out from the radar altimeter and then the gear warning horn. We noted that as being out of the ordinary and lowered the gear. Shortly thereafter;  we received the low altitude alert from JFK tower. I advised the SIC that we were too low; at MDA and just approaching KRSTL (the final approach fix). About the same time; there was an autopilot trim caution message which the SIC corrected by disengaging the autopilot and retrimming the airplane. Being in VMC we remained at that altitude and continued for an otherwise uneventful landing. Even though both pilots were completely engaged in the approach and procedure; the assumption was; by both pilots; that the descent would be adjusted for the proper altitude at KRSTL (the final approach fix). Both pilots missed it. If the flying pilot would have called for the stepdown altitude instead of the MDA; 'AND'; if the monitoring pilot would have insisted on; or corrected; the altitude selection for the stepdown altitude; the whole altitude deviation situation would have been avoided.

Distraction caused by the PITCH TRIM caution message on approach.While Descending on the RNAV GPS Y to 4L; we began our descent from REPRE at 2000 thousand feet. And outside of the final approach fix KRSTL we descended below the clouds and proceeded visually to 4L. Shortly after breaking out of the clouds we received a PITCH TRIM Caution message; and with the caution message I noticed the aircraft begin to pitch up. I turned off the autopilot and got the trim under control. The aircraft was always stable. However due to the distraction we noticed that we had descended below 1500 before KRSTL. We were on the visual approach; so we corrected for the descent using the PAPI. We didn't descend below our minimums at anytime until we established the aircraft on the PAPI. We landed without incident and proceeded to the gate.

A air carrier crew flying a CANPA profile descent on the to JFK set the RNAV GPS 4L MDA. The crew; distracted by a PITCH TRIM caution; returned to the profile after ATC called a low altitude alert at less than 1;000 feet before KRSTL.


Other / Unknown; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Passenger in XX2. Saw him sleeping with no mask on. An announcement kind of woke him up so I finished the job by saying Sir; that woke him up and I said I'm just going to need you to wear your mask. To which he said that he just had surgery on his nose for cancer and that the mask hurts. I told him I was sorry for his nose and then said but it is our policy. He started to get a little [bit] of an attitude and said something about our policy. At that point I found a way to end the conversation because it was going nowhere. Then I went and explained it to the A Flight Attendant.We both believed giving him a warning would cause a bigger scene and we only have about 40 minutes flight time left. So far no one has complained about him; but if someone does we will have to issue the warning at that point.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger resisted adhering to face mask policy. No further action was taken for fear of escalating the situation.


An Aerostar checked on my frequency and advised that he had smoke in the cockpit and was declaring an emergency. I asked the pilot his intentions and he wished to land immediately at the closest airport. The Aerostar was not yet in my airspace. I began offering airports to the pilot; and he advised that he had visual with an airport 'at his 10 o'clock.' The pilot began a sharp turn and rapid descent towards an airport. My D-Side completed coordination with all affected sectors including the sector that the aircraft was in and the Approach Control into which the aircraft was descending. The pilot later advised that the smoke had cleared in the cockpit and he determined the source to be a heater. He advised that he wished to continue to his original destination.

Enroute Controller described what may have been an airspace infraction when an aircraft declared an emergency; started an immediate descent and turn toward the nearest airport.


Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Software and Automation

On takeoff with ENGINE FIRE/FAILURE; EFB content locker crashed. Came back up with spinning wheel and eventually was able to get the QRC to run the checklist. Pulling paper QRHs off this fleet would be a giant mistake; in my opinion. This is not the first time I've had to report the EFB and associated apps.

B757 Captain reported EFB content crashed while doing checklists for an engine fire. Reporter recommends retaining the paper copies of the QRH on the aircraft to mitigate this situation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 232; Flight Crew Total 8581; Flight Crew Type 6555

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I as the Captain had a very positive crew briefing with a professional attentive in-flight crew. I couldn't imagine starting off a flight any better. I ask my First officers (FO) what their plans were for meal service and then shared this with both Purser and the galley person so as have a plan and to work out reasonable expectations. The Relief Pilot did not want to eat until after the first break. Both the First Officer and I said 'if you have our snacks or cold breakfast we will take that now so as to unburden you until after the passenger meal service is complete. Unfortunately only the hot meals were aboard so we all agreed that 45 minute after takeoff (ATO) our food would be put in the oven to be eaten at XA:15 ATO. This is my typical communication while finding the right balance and compromise to promote a positive working together atmosphere. Forty-five minutes after takeoff; I called and verified the meals were being heated and he said yes. (XA:30 ATO) about forty-five minutes after the meals being heated I needed to use the rest room and thought this was a good time since the meals should have been ready 15 minutes ago. This would also minimize the cockpit door from being opened and also reduce disturbing the passenger service flow. During this door opening the galley person seemed just a little off and spoke almost too quick to understand and said something about our meals and that he put the wrong ones in but that he had them in now and they needed another seven minutes; I said cool; no worries and the door closed.(XB:15 ATO) Another forty-five minutes goes by and we still have no meals.(XB:45 ATO) I called the galley person and asked about the meals and he said 'we would get them when he was finished with his service' with a firm no-option tone.I immediately called the Purser and informed him the situation and we needed to get our food and was looking for assistance and support from him. It was at this time the Purser stated; 'you need to understand; our procedures; our manual and our training is that the customer comes before the pilot.' I used a firmer voice and said; 'I don't care about the passenger service; we need our food'. Basically his response was sorry that's the way it is! I decided to ACARS Dispatch to get the Duty Manager and an In-Flight supervisor in on the situation. Being refused food and not being contacted or checked in on by the Flight Attendants during the flight (not once) seemed unreasonable; but more importantly it was now deliberate and unsafe. I now realized there was a deliberate 'threat' building here by my very own co-workers and that I needed to address it. I asked to have In-Flight re-assign both the Purser and the Galley person to positions in the aft cabin and to send it over the ACARS. I felt this prudent to defuse the situation and get our food and beverages and that we needed a new Purser and Galley person who understood human physiological needs and 'Safety of Flight' issues. My request was denied by In-Flight operations stating they contractually cannot do that. I sent a message to Dispatch and said ok then I told them I would do it and sent them the details. (XC:00 ATO) Attempting to use 'all resources' to effectively manage this situation; I was going back and forth with dispatch on ACARS for 15 minutes trying to resolve a now serious distraction to the safety of our flight. I am now shocked to find out the Purser actually went on his break and was asleep in spite of my repeated requests for us to have food and knowing this was a major issue. When I called to have the Purser come to the cockpit so I could inform him of the crew position changes I was informed he was on his break and asleep. I am not sure which female Flight Attendant answered the phone but she hesitated when I asked to speak with him; in fact she seemed disturbed that I would call and wake him during his break. At this time I gave a direct order to this Flight Attendant to wake him and have him come to the cockpit with no delay. This was done and the Purser came into the cockpit and I informed him that the company is aware of the situation and that [another Flight Attendant] is now the Purser and that I allowed her to select our new galley person. The original Purser was speechless during my entire briefing as I informed him how both he and the galley person's behavior was appalling; disgusting and unsafe. He didn't respond and was expressionless. It didn't seem to bother him one bit.The Assistant Chief Pilot met the flight and was informed of the situation. He was professional and supportive. A Supervisor for the Flight Attendants then arrived. First Officer from my flight was present. We had a quick introduction and went to the first class cabin where all the Flight Attendants were sitting. Both supervisors were introduced and I went ahead and told them exactly what I thought of their behavior and how it negatively affected the flight. I told both the Purser and the galley person their behavior was disgusting; unprofessional and unsafe. I then repeated to the In-Flight Supervisor what the Purser had said to me: 'you need to understand; our procedures; our manual and our training is that the customer comes before the pilot.' I also explained about the three hours of no food in sight and then asked the supervisor to confirm if the above statement was true and his thoughts.In response; and without hesitation; Inflight Supervisor stated unequivocally: 'That's a true statement.'The Assistant Chief Pilot; did not appear happy with that response from the supervisor and jumped in to explain about 'Captain's Authority.' I was so disturbed by the statement that I informed the [Chief Pilot] was leaving because it was pointless to continue this dialogue. At this moment; I realized this is a much bigger issue.

B-757 Captain described an unsatisfactory working relationship with the Purser and the galley person during an oceanic crossing.