Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 5; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X; a student solo; called up ready for departure. I had Aircraft Y on a 2.5 mile final. I asked Aircraft X if they could accept a no delay departure. Aircraft X responded; 'Say again?' I instructed Aircraft X to hold short. I received a clear read back of hold short instructions. Then I instructed another aircraft on the downwind to extend downwind; with traffic holding in position phraseology. His reply was garbled; but I understood it on position. As the downwind aircraft had a bad radio all flight; I paid no extra attention to the garbled read back. Aircraft Y then asked; 'Is there an aircraft on the runway?' At that time I saw Aircraft X on the runway and sent Aircraft Y around.

I was working the CIC position; primarily monitoring ground control frequency and also listening to the local controller's transmissions in the cab. I heard the local controller ask Aircraft X a student solo; if they could accept a 'no-delay?' this caught my attention because it is a well-known bad practice at this airport to ask a student solo to depart without delay into a small window.I observed an aircraft on about a 2 mile final and glanced at the radar to see their groundspeed. Then I heard the local controller instruct Aircraft X to hold short. Then I heard the local controller issue an instruction to 'continue; traffic holding in position.' moments later; ground control coordinated a runway crossing at a taxiway that local approved; however local did not include a local requirement to advise the ground controller that traffic was holding in position. This also caught my attention because at the time the crossing was taking place I observed Aircraft X on the runway holding in position and the aircraft on final inside 2 mile final indicating 120 knots.After the crossing was complete I didn't hear the local controller clear Aircraft X for takeoff and began to focus my attention on the traffic on approach. The local controller appeared unaware that there was an aircraft holding in position; looking at the taxiway crossing and the radar display. Aircraft X's strip was not moved to indicate that a line up and wait clearance (LUAW) had been issued.I observed Aircraft Y on inside of 1 mile final now and aircraft x still not rolling. I advised the local controller out loud that 'this isn't going to work.' the local controller initially seemed surprised and began to transmit the call-sign of Aircraft Y on final; then unkeyed; then issued go around instructions to Aircraft Y. Then the local controller instructed Aircraft X to exit the runway and contact ground control. My initial reasoning of why this may have occurred was that the local controller didn't move the strip to indicate the runway was occupied with Aircraft X holding in position and forgot they were LUAW. When asked if Aircraft X was given a LUAW clearance the local controller wasn't sure if they were or were not. I filed an MOR (Mandatory Occurrence Report) and Aircraft X taxied back to the runway; completed their first solo flight remaining in the pattern. After landing Aircraft X was given the brasher warning by me who had now relieved the ground controller from the position. The pilot called and advised that it was their first time flying alone and that they didn't understand some of the things the local controller was saying. After being relieved from position I reviewed the tapes to determine if the local controller issued and subsequently forgot about the LUAW aircraft or if Aircraft X taxied into position without authorization. From the tapes I discovered that Aircraft X was not given a LUAW clearance. After the local controller asked the solo if they could accept 'no-delay' the student took a while to respond with 'say again?' and then the local controller issued hold instructions. An aircraft on left downwind was previously instructed to follow Aircraft Y on 2 mile final but the plan was changed and the local controller issued the following to the downwind aircraft. 'Runway ... Continue; traffic holding in position; tower will call base.'After unkeying; the response was garbled and unreadable with two aircraft transmitting at once. Then the local controller issued a touch and go clearance to an aircraft. The response was also garbled and unreadable. Then ground control coordinates the runway crossing and pilots continue to transmit simultaneously causing a breakdown in communication/read backs. During one garbled read back you can make out the Aircraft Y on final asking tower if there was an aircraft on the runway?I believe Aircraft X heard the transmission to the downwind aircraft and then taxied onto the runway. I don't think the local controller ever saw it; or questioned the garbled and unreadable read backs after their transmissions.I recommend a better runway scan and requests for clarification when read-backs are unreadable. Also issue similar sounding call-sign advisory.

A Controller told an aircraft to hold short of a runway; but did not notice when the aircraft taxied onto the runway. The Controller had an arrival less than two mile final and had allowed another aircraft to cross the runway from an intersection.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

On departure; somewhere near FL250; we experienced the illumination of the WHEEL WELL Fire Warning light and the fire warning bell sounded. The initial indication lasted approximately four seconds; extinguished briefly; sounded [again] briefly; and then extinguished with no further indications. Though the pilots immediately reached for the QRH; the indications extinguished prior to the accomplishment of Step 1 in the Procedure section of the Wheel Well Fire Checklist. There was a disagreement as to whether the checklist items applied to this specific situation (was there any relief from the procedures); as a result of the indications extinguishing prior to the accomplishment of the first step in the procedural section of the checklist. After voicing his opinion; the First Officer asked the Captain to confirm his decisions with someone outside of the flight deck. Upon reaching the cruise altitude of FL340; the Captain called Company. After a bit of coordination and discussion via radio and ACARS; it was suggested that we land as soon as possible. We complied with no further complications. Note: The new Dispatch Release appears to have taken off the Operations frequencies associated with points along the route. This was a distraction.

A B737-800 Flight Crew had some internal confusion on how to deal with an intermittent wheel well fire warning. They decided to divert as a precaution.


Check Pilot; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 154; Flight Crew Total 907; Flight Crew Type 752

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Training flight with student pilot training for initial solo. Student used improper control input during takeoff; and caused the aircraft to veer off the runway. Instructor onboard was not able to keep the airplane from rolling into the grass; even with immediate control input in attempt to maintain proper takeoff attitude. Instructor was able to taxi the airplane back onto the runway safely; once control was regained. There were no injuries; and no damage to the aircraft or airport property.

Flight Instructor on a training flight with a student reported a runway excursion during takeoff roll.


While briefing the T-procedure for EWR Runway 4L; we noticed that the ACARS procedure called for a right turn to 010 degrees. The Company's procedure called for a LEFT turn to 010 degrees. With a runway heading of 039 degrees the LEFT turn makes sense.

A Captain discovered his Company's EWR Runway 4L procedure called for a right turn to 010 after takeoff whereas the standard procedure calls for a more likely left turn.


Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During descent for landing; the 'A' Flight Attendant called the cockpit to advise us of an unusual smell in the forward cabin. Not noticing any smell in the cockpit; I asked the First Officer to step back into the galley area and see if he could detect anything unusual. He reported a smell like syrup in the air. Someone noticed that a First Class passenger had opened a container of food and the situation was dismissed. The smell seemed to fade away. A few minutes later the 'A' Flight Attendant contacted the cockpit to report that an unusual (and different) smell was detected in the forward cabin area and that her eyes were burning and her throat was dried out. Once again because of the proximity to the flight deck I asked the First Officer if he would investigate. He reported that there was an unusual smell and that his eyes were burning a little. Since the cockpit door had been opened briefly I could now smell the odor. It was not the odor described in other incidents as the 'dirty socks' smell. It was not like any other odor that I had smelled before. I could determine with absolute confidence that it was not an oily odor; and that it was not electrical or environmental smoke and nothing was visible in the air. By now we were being handed off to Approach Control and were allowed to keep our speed up. I determined that the safest thing for us to do was to initiate the smoke and fumes QRH procedure. We did so and ultimately landed with our oxygen masks on. I elected not to declare an emergency with ATC since our arrival was unimpeded and we needed no special assistance. After landing I selected the packs off and the smell was not detected again. After a few minutes I selected the packs back on using the APU as the bleed source; and again no odor was detected. After blocking in at the gate I talked to a Customer Service Representative who met the flight; talked to the Chief Pilot; talked to the Maintenance personnel there to investigate; wrote up the discrepancy in the logbook; filled out a Cabin Air Quality report; called the Dispatcher; talked to a Flight Attendant Supervisor; and then proceeded to the on airport medical facility to have myself; the First Officer and the 'A' Flight Attendant examined by paramedics on duty there. The First Officer and I determined that our physical condition was suitable to continue the flight; but the 'A' Flight Attendant was suffering some ill effects and was replaced.

The Captain reported that he had a slight eye irritation and dry throat; but the 'A' Flight Attendant's symptoms; which were similar to his; were severe enough that she was removed from the flight. Her symptoms last only about 24 hours. The odor was very localized in the forward cabin.

An A321 Flight Attendant reported an odd non-electrical or environmental odor in the forward cabin during descent. The 'A' Flight Attendant was removed after a medical examination; while the pilots were able to continue flying.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Seattle Center cleared our flight to descend pilot discretion from FL340 to FL240. Within moments the Captain initiated the descent using altitude intervene. We were within 50 miles of top of descent and the cruise descent rate initiated at 1000 feet per minute. Within a minute Seattle Center gave us a frequency change and we checked in with a new Controller. Approximately 60 seconds after checking in with the new Controller we observed an Airbus 380 at our 10 o'clock. It had flown across our path from right to left (we were traveling NW bound on the Chins arrival) at what I would guess was FL360. We were descending through an altitude of approximately FL300 when we observed the Airbus 380. About 60 seconds later we encountered residual wake turbulence from the Airbus 380. About 20 seconds later the A Flight Attendant called over the interphone to indicate she may be injured. She requested medical attention upon arrival and after deplaning. Immediately following the Flight Attendant call I informed Seattle Center of the wake turbulence and possible injuries on the aircraft. About 60 seconds later we were contacted by Seattle Center inquiring about the details of our encounter and severity of injuries. I then initiated contact with Dispatch to relay the request for medical attention. I then followed up with Operations when we were on the ground and clear of the runways that medical staff would be present at our gate. Upon arrival at the gate; medical staff was present. Passengers deplaned; and all of the flight attendants requested to be examined by medical staff.Seattle Center never made us aware of the Airbus 380 traffic and because we were in a descent and well below the altitude of the [Airbus] 380; we were not alerted. I will be more vigilant looking for traffic during descents when my vision is blocked by the airframe with pitch attitudes different than cruise. And I recommend extra vigilance by ATC when the Airbus 380 is in the vicinity of other aircraft. They are rare to see and their wake turbulence profile is much larger than even I expected. This event was my first encounter with the Airbus 380.

B737-800 First Officer reported a Flight Attendant was injured during a wake turbulence encounter on descent into SEA in trail of an A380.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

When I first sat down and reviewed the weather for all of my already released flights I noticed one did not have an alternate and the latest TAF (Day 1 XA:47Z) required one based on the Tempo for Broken 1;500 feet and an arrival of XF:23.  I checked the TAF the flight was released on (Day 0 XA:16Z) and it was not calling for the ceiling so it was released legally but appears the dispatcher missed the conditions in the new TAF.  I informed the dispatcher about the issue.  A bigger issue arose when I went to contact the crew enroute about the issue.  I pulled the last release from the computer which had a time stamp of XB:31 from when the crew picked it up.  The release stated it had the exemption and under alternates it said XXY.  Confused; I called the supervisor. He and I went back and saw another release one under the attachments button with a time stamp of XA:05 from when the previous dispatcher released the flight.  It appears that when the crew picked up the release Sabre updated all their weather; since the new TAF required an alternate Sabre went and added the 1-1-3 exemption behind our backs so to the crew everything looked legal.  There was a TAF requiring an alternate and they had the exemption noted on the release so they didn't need one.   How is this even possible? Who knows how many other flights operated with this exemption added without the dispatcher knowing?  Sabre could have added the exemption without the dispatcher knowing and with thunderstorms in the forecast or even to airport that can't legally use the exemption.

An Air Carrier Dispatcher discovers that one of the flights that was originally dispatched without an alternate required one at the time of departure. The Sabre flight planning software apparently detected the need for an alternate and automatically issued 1;1;3 exemption without the Dispatcher being aware.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

We were in the pattern doing touch and goes.  We were doing left traffic for runway 31 at PVU.  We turned base leg and tower told us to do a right 360 for spacing to put us behind an aircraft on an extended final leg.  After we rolled out of the 360 turn on base at approximately 5300 ft MSL I called tower and told him we were re-established on base and ready to turn final.  Tower then said continue northeast and then turn left back in to follow the traffic.  As he was giving that instruction; I looked out to the right and the aircraft was passing right over the top of us approximately 200 ft above us and right on top of us.  There was no lateral separation.  The controller then directed us to fly northeast shortly then turn back to the left and in behind the experimental aircraft.  By then the aircraft had passed over us so we did as instructed and then turned left to line up on final for 31 at PVU.  If we hadn't been instructed to do the 360 turn and just continued downwind further or if the tower controller just put us in front of the traffic; this all may not have happened.  The controller had a jet line up and wait anyway on the runway and the aircraft had to do a go around anyway.   If we were sequenced in front of the aircraft this probably would not have happened or if he just had us extend downwind further instead of having us do a left 360 it likely would have been avoided.

Pilot reports of an NMAC caused by the Tower Controller sequencing traffic and not issuing traffic.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Helicopter called me airborne off of [a nearby hospital] inside the Class B. At that time a Large Transport aircraft was rotating off Runway 30 departing. The data tags were overlapped. By the time I identified Helicopter's position I realized that the Large Transport was in close proximity. I called the traffic to Helicopter; he said he had the Large Transport in sight. By that time I could see both aircraft out of the window. I asked Helicopter if they tried calling on the ground and they said yes but they could not reach the Tower. So they said they got airborne and then called. This procedure that allows helicopters to get airborne inside the Class B before calling the Tower needs to be stopped. There is another hospital that is 2 mile final 19R. Helicopters depart these hospitals then call the Tower. Departures and arrivals are often conflicting with them with little to no time to separate them. If the departure had been a heavy or the super; the wake turbulence could have caused a crash.

IAD Tower Controller reported the procedure of allowing air ambulance helicopters to depart nearby hospitals non radar with inability to communicate in Class B creates a collision hazard.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I believe I took a point out via landline communications from the N controller on Aircraft Y southbound VFR at 065. I thought the point out was accomplished because the top of my airspace is 060 and VFR traffic at 065 is still a factor for traffic I could potentially have at 060.I was working the V satellite sector. Aircraft X requested an RNAV approach RWY 35 at UAO via the full procedure over UBG. I approved his request and he was tracking direct UBG at 050. I then proceeded to resolve other conflicts and accomplish other satellite landline coordination. While accomplishing those tasks; I observed a CA (Collision Advisory) with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y over the UBG VOR at 050. I immediately issued a safety alert and turned Aircraft X to the right in order to resolve the CA since it appeared Aircraft Y was tracking south-eastbound.If I knew Aircraft Y wanted to descend I would have taken radar contact on him and de-conflicted him with other traffic in my sector. I think we have a cultural problem of being 'too loose' with reference to working aircraft in other controller's airspace.

I was working Aircraft Y; an RV6; descending toward 7S5. Prior to working the aircraft; north informed me that he had pointed out the RV to Newberg (who should have been working him as he was descending through his airspace eventually) but was level at 065. All sectors were very busy. The Newberg Controller was also very busy. Newberg was working an IFR PA44; Aircraft X; doing practice approaches over UBG VOR. The RV pilot did not notify me that he was starting a descent and as soon as I noticed his descent and proximity to Aircraft X; I issued a traffic alert and pointed out the traffic prior to the Collision Advisory being activated. Then I issued an alternate heading of 240 degrees behind the Seminole as they were both close to 050 feet.Newberg was not keeping track of my point out and later asked me 'where that guy came from?' even though he had received a point out. Not really knowing the direction of my traffic he issued a 200 heading to the PA44 who had already turned southwest bound (as I understand it) and descended on his own because he said he was close to the RV6. I leaned over to the Newberg Controller and told him to just keep the Seminole on his previous route as I had vectored the RV6 behind the traffic but Newberg was oblivious. About 15 minutes later Aircraft X asked for the call sign of the RV because of the 'near midair' for his company paperwork.Aircraft Y should have been a point out to me at Hood sector as he would have to descend to 7S5 through Newberg's airspace shortly. He was only 500 feet above Newberg's airspace and did not announce his descent. After the Newberg Controller takes point outs he should continue to be aware of them. I as the Hood Controller should have restricted the RV6 prior to his descent or at lease tell him to advise prior. Also I should have handed off the RV6 to Newberg as I knew he would be descending soon.

P80 TRACON controllers reported a near mid-air collision due to lack of communication and a plan between the controllers.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Elevator trim on the Excel/XLS has a Nose Up; and a Nose Down limit; or 'stop'; just as the aileron and rudder trim have a left and right stop indicator. The range of the elevator trim; indicated by a white arc on the center pedestal; should be clearly marked when rigged properly. This is typically accomplished with grey paint on the plastic trim covering the unused portion of the white arc at the stops. When checking the elevator trim travel on pre-flight inspection; the elevator trim pointer should fully traverse between the nose up and nose down limits; and not go over. If the travel is not proper; there are several possible reasons. The elevator trim could be out of rig; the trim indicator may be out of adjustment or jumped its track; or the elevator trim is not properly rigged. It is also possible that nothing is wrong with the rigging; but the elevator trim indicator was simply not marked after the elevator trim was rigged; or the elevator trim markings have become worn; and it is no longer possible to determine where the nose up and nose down limits are. When picking up an airplane for the first time; if the elevator trim indicator will not traverse the full range of the white arc; or it is not marked properly; it may be impossible to tell which condition you have; only that something is not right. The first time I encountered this situation; I picked up an airplane that had the elevator trim rigged the night before by maintenance. While checking the elevator trim in the Nose Down position; the pointer stopped unusually short of the end of the white arc; and I queried maintenance about it. The maintenance controller confirmed that it was just rigged the night before; but if I was not comfortable with it; they would have it checked again. As it turned out; the elevator trim was NOT rigged properly; and needed to be rigged again. Since then; I have written numerous squawks on aircraft with this condition. I don't delight in doing so; but there doesn't seem to be clear enough guidance on what is proper; and what is not. I have been given many explanations; including that the white arc doesn't really mean anything; the white arc is simply to provide contrast with the pointer (which is also white); and that the elevator trim markings are not an exact science. I have even seen a maintenance corrective action indicating 'no defects noted'; but the nose up and nose down limits on the pedestal were re-marked with grey paint anyway. This begs the question; if there were no defects noted; why was the pedestal re-marked? Most of the time; however; the corrective action has been to check the elevator trim rigging; and re-mark the elevator trim index; usually with grey paint. As mentioned above; one condition that may be encountered; is where the elevator trim will stop short of the Nose Down limit; and go past the Nose Up limit. I have been told by Maintenance Control that this condition usually means that the elevator trim cable has jumped the track on the manual trim wheel; and needs to be reset. The elevator trim cables jumping the track; or getting caught between the grooves on the inside of the elevator trim; causing binding of the elevator trim; is not uncommon; and has been the subject of increased emphasis during preflight inspection in the past. My personal practice is to check the trim prior to every flight; and not just on the first flight of the day; as I have had this situation occur between flights. The CE-560XL/XLS Maintenance Manual provides some guidance on the issue in section 27-90-30; Elevator Trim Travel Checks. The maintenance manual shows a picture of how the elevator trim indicator should be marked; in chapter 27-32-01; Figure 201. Although it appears to be common practice to set the Nose Up and Nose Down limits by blocking out the unused band of the white arc with grey paint; it is my understanding that there is no specific step in the procedural text of the Maintenance manual to do so.In recent conversations with one of our Non-Routine Flight Operations (NRFO) pilots on the issue; he was in agreement that the trim should traverse fully between the Nose up; and Nose Down limits; and not go over. He also warned of a more hazardous condition that may occur. While operating with the autopilot on; when going from Flaps Zero to Flaps 7 or 15; the autopilot will attempt to trim towards the Nose Down position. If there is insufficient trim authority in the nose down position; the autopilot can no longer compensate; and will disengage; resulting in a nose-up pitch upset. The only way of determining on preflight inspection if the elevator trim has full range of authority is to run the trim the full range from its nose up to nose down position. Without a proper marking of the nose up and nose down limits; or 'stops'; it is impossible to determine proper trim range. The NRFO pilot I talked to also informed me that there have been several instances of elevator trim cables rubbing on something under the floorboards beneath the center console; and there has been at least one case of the cable snapping in flight. This has resulted; apparently; in additional inspections; and replacing of rudder trim cables on phase inspections. While replacing the cables is encouraging news; it also highlights the importance of having the trim cables rigged and marked properly; as well as the importance of pre-flight operational checks. The purpose of this [report] is to bring attention to the issue of the elevator trim on the XL/XLS; and to seek standardization for maintenance; as well as guidance for flight crews on what to look for when conducting a pre-flight inspection of the elevator trim. For maintenance; I recommend that if there is no specific step to mark the elevator trim; after rigging; or after a rigging check; that one be added. It seems to be common practice to paint the unused portion of the white arc with grey paint; but the maintenance manual could use further clarification. This would also standardize the practice; and lead to less squawks when implemented fleet-wide. For flight crews; I suggest a Memo informing pilots of the current elevator trim issues in the fleet; how the elevator trim should be marked; and proper pre-flight procedures; to ensure the elevator trim works properly; and traverses throughout the full range of operation.

The Reporter stated the biggest issue with the elevator trim is that sometimes it will trim too far nose down and not enough nose up or vise-versa according to the indication on the pedestal in the cockpit.The Reporter stated that this is only a seven passenger airplane and weight and balance is very sensitive especially when they are flying at a high altitude (ie 43000 feet) and a passenger or flight crew in moving about the aircraft the elevator trim is constantly working. The Reporter also stated when they were on the ILS using the autopilot; when lowering the flaps the elevator trimmed the aircraft nose down to compensate the lowering of the flaps; if the elevator trim was not rigged correctly it would have tripped off the autopilot pitching the aircraft upward. The Reporter stated that when maintenance accomplishes a rigging procedure for the elevator trim system; they may need to repaint the indication stripe on the pedestal in the cockpit. This in not always accomplished because it is not stated in the maintenance manual to do so.The Reporter stated that often when the elevator trim indication is in the take-off position; and when the throttles are pushed forward for take-off they get a 'Take-off' warning indicating that the elevator trim is not set. This indicates that the elevator trim is not set correctly or not rigged correctly of has an issue with the cables and pulleys.The Reporter stated that after talking with his Chief Pilot and other pilots that this is a constant problem with this type of aircraft.

Cessna Model Citation Excel/XLS Captain reported the rigging procedures for the Elevator Trim system were unclear and inconsistent. The 'Nose-up/Nose-down' limits were unclear while accomplishing their preflight checks.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It was brought to my attention that aircraft XXXXX had 6 take-offs and landings with a possible open write-up; one of which was my flight; ZZZ-ZZZ1.Apparently; aircraft had a APU GEN OFF BUS EICAS message. The Captain at the time ran the QRH procedure; the message cleared and called Maintenance. The Discrepancy write up that was in the maintenance logbook read 'INFO ONLY: APU GEN OFF BUS EICAS MESSAGE DISPLAYED.' And the corrective action read 'INFO ONLY: CLEARED MESSAGE AND RAN QRH PROCEDURE' or something very similar. There seemed to be some confusion between either that Captain and/or the Maintenance personnel on how to proceed with the write up because of the way the Discrepancy and Corrective action blocks reads. The way it was written up is similar to how a Ground Reset Guide item is written up in the logbook.I was unaware of this and when I saw the write up; I didn't catch the mistake in the early morning in MCI. I saw the 'INFO ONLY' portion and figured it was a [Company] procedure in which the fault cleared. I have included a photo of the logbook page of this write up which was sent to me by another Captain.

E170 Captain reported aircraft flew six flights with an open write up.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

The new [procedural checklist] method for the 737 fleet is very poorly conceived; designed; trained; and executed. The training on using this procedural method is totally inadequate; not enough stand-alone training is done to train for this radically different approach to proper checklist accomplishment. [Our company] has limited training for the new procedures but; instead; offers limited 'supplemental' (read: unpaid) materials that poorly demonstrate the procedures and techniques. Over all; the new [checklist procedures] are disjointed; incomplete; poorly conceived and designed; and even more poorly organized; and are; bottom line; unsafe. They should be discontinued immediately and totally redesigned or scrapped altogether.Scrap these poorly conceived; poorly designed; and extremely poorly implemented jokes of procedures and return to the 'tried and true;' time-proven procedures that have worked for my entire career at [this company].

B737-800 pilot reported inadequate training on use of new checklist procedures.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was training with a student on an IFR Flight. My student went off course to avoid icing which was a serious safety issue that day. He also had to descend to avoid icing up the wings. The temp was -2 and the clouds were at a low level. We deviated to avoid icing and had very bad signal coverage with Center because of our altitude; [but] we had to act to avoid icing.

GA-7 Instructor Pilot reported he and his student had a track deviation on an IFR flight when they went off course to avoid icing conditions.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft X deviating for weather in Sector 44. Aircraft were supposed to be AOB [at or above] FL280 entering ZLA. This aircraft was above military airspace that was active FL300 and below. ZLA refused a hand off because they claimed they were unable to get the aircraft down for landing LAS. Controller called me over asking what she should do. I told the D-Side to call Nellis for a point out descending. Nellis said unable. I told the Radar Controller to declare a weather emergency and descend the aircraft to FL280. We advised Nellis of this. There were no other options. The aircraft was unable to turn due to severe weather and needed to continue forward.ZLA take the aircraft hand off and descend the aircraft when clear of Nellis airspace. In this instance the 3;000 difference was not that big of deal but refusing a hand off was not the best or safest option.

ZLC Controller reports where a ZLA Controller refused to accept the aircraft because of its altitude.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

We were in CENRAP (Center Radar ARTS Presentation) status during event. Local Control had issued Aircraft X to proceed on course and climb and maintain 12;000 feet. Then Aircraft X was transferred to Departure Control (the position I was currently working). Aircraft X came over to me; stating the following: 'Aircraft X WITH YOU ON COURSE AND CLIMBING.' I responded:'Aircraft X; DEPARTURE; CONTINUE YOUR CLIMB.'I erroneously did not verify the Aircraft X's altitude when he initially came to me; so that was first mistake. Then I told him to continue his climb; which was my second mistake. I told him to continue his climb reference the facility being in CENRAP and was awaiting the radar scope to receive a primary target hit so that I would have a method to radar contact him. I did not anticipate the pilot to climb outside of his assigned altitude which was given to him during his takeoff clearance from Local Control. The pilot was radar identified and continued on his flight.I was shortly thereafter relieved from position and gave the new controller the briefing. Then the Aircraft X climbed outside of our airspace and entered into Center's airspace and was shortly NORDO while at 14;000 feet in Center's airspace.I recommend that I shall continue to work as I have when the facility is not in CENRAP and have the pilot verify their altitude if it is not initially given on first contact. I will also never use the term 'CONTINUE YOUR CLIMB'; as it is not proper phraseology and it does not include an altitude limit to the climb.

MLU TRACON Controller used nonstandard phraseology and did not confirm that an aircraft they received was climbing to the correct altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X was issued an IFR clearance from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with an initial climb to 030.  On departure; the Developmental cleared the aircraft  on course with a climb to 060.  The pilot turned on course but did not read back the on course clearance or the climb to 060.  My attention was taken away from that situation to deal with two other conflicts (converging aircraft).  The CIC pointed out that Aircraft X wasn't climbing; I reissued the climb to 060; but the aircraft was already in a 037 MVA level at 030. Issue RWY heading on departure or a heading/altitude on departure to keep the aircraft clear of high MVA's.  Listen for readback.

R90 TRACON Controller reported an aircraft did not climb fast enough to avoid a lower MVA.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were descending via the SEAVU2 arrival into LAX. On the way in; we received several instructions from ATC intended to delay our arrival; including speed changes and off course delay vectors. Other aircraft in the area were told to 'make a right 360' and 'Approach isn't ready for you yet.' The First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying and had set a hard altitude of 12000 at SEAVU rather than the programmed between 12000 and 14000. We were very busy and when he made the suggestion I agreed because the FMS was projecting SEAVU at 14000 and the winds were shifting wildly in both speed and direction. Aiming for the bottom of the altitude window was a good idea; because it would give us some leeway in case the wind shifted and we were unable to make the 14000 restriction. I didn't have time to clarify with the FO at the time if this was his intention; but I thought it was a good idea considering the circumstances. We had been descending at 270; as assigned by LAX center; and when we checked on with SoCal approach we were slowed to 250. This produced an idle power descent and while it was continuous light; occasional moderate all the way down; the aircraft was pretty much staying on speed. I looked away to change my LIDO chart from the SEAVU2 arrival to the ILS 25L and when I looked back the aircraft had increased speed to 270 and was trending higher. I said; 'Airspeed!' and the FO promptly reached for the thrust levers and the spoilers in an effort to slow back to our assigned 250. The SoCal approach controller asked a preceding aircraft to 'say speed' and he replied '250' and then the controller asked us to say our speed and I responded '270; slowing back to 250. We had some shifting wind and are slowing down now.' The controller asked us to slow to 230; which we did; and then issued 230 knot restrictions to several other aircraft. In an effort to slow down; the FO changed the vertical mode to VS and arrested the descent in order to slow down. I think at one point I saw a positive vertical speed selected but I'm not sure if we ever actually gained any altitude. At this point it became clear that we were operating on two different plans; and with all the turbulence communicating was difficult. I told the FO to continue descending and started to process where we were vertically on the arrival; with respect to the altitude limits since we had 1900 set in the altitude pre-selector and were off of VNAV. After a few moments we got everything sorted out and continued to land. Just outside the FAF; tower asked if we could accept a sidestep to 25R. I had anticipated this; and had calculated performance numbers for 25R so I knew we could accept it. I asked the FO if he was comfortable taking the sidestep and he said yes; so he disconnected the autopilot and lined up on 25R. We were a little slow configuring and I wasn't sure we'd be stable; but we were configured; on speed; and lined up on the 25R centerline at 1000 feet AGL. It was about this time that tower gave us the localizer frequency for 25R and I manually input it into each side and re-armed the approach mode. When the glideslope came in; we were low and got a 'GLIDESPOPE! GLIDESLOPE!' caution and I announced to the FO that he was low. It was VMC and we were in position to land so I wasn't too concerned. In the debrief we talked extensively about what we were both doing. The FO was confused by the 'GLIDESLOPE' message because he didn't realize I had tuned and armed the 25R frequency; which I assumed he would have expected me to have done. He explained that he was just flying a normal visual approach and had picked a spot on the runway as an aim point and was using the FPV to create his own 3 degree reference glide path (which I thought was very clever for someone with only a couple hundred hours in the aircraft). We talked about the confusion on the arrival; starting with the speed deviation. I am confident that nothing we did caused the aircraft to increase in speed. It was just ashift in wind. If the FO hadn't programmed SEAVU at 12000; we would have never made the restriction at 14000 (if we'd had the same increase in speed) because of the shifting winds and reduced descent speed. The FO told me that he was aware of the next altitude; which was at or above 10000; and that since we were already below 14000 (having made the restriction at SEAVU early) when the aircraft sped up; he was just going to manage the descent manually until back on the profile. We talked about how we both could have communicated our actions and intentions better; but that given the circumstances there was little time to talk and in the end it all worked out OK.

Regional Jet crew on SEAVU2 arrival to LAX with speed reduction given a late change to Runway 25R descended below the glideslope on final.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

On flight XXXX we arrived in ZZZ and received an EMRG BRK LO PRES EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) message after engine shutdown. As I called Maintenance Control the Brake On light also went out. Maintenance came out and serviced the hydraulic system 2 accumulator. The EMERG BRK LO PRES EICAS message still came on shortly after turning off hydraulic pump 2. The Brake On light also went out about 5 minutes after the EICAS message. Maintenance worked with Maintenance Control; who believed the issue was an indication problem. I've experienced a similar situation before and was concerned that; like those times; this may not be just an indication problem. I spoke to the Chief Pilot who said he would call and talk to Maintenance Control on his end. I also expressed my concern to the Mechanic. He thought the issue was an indication problem; but unlike any Mechanic I've experienced parking brake problems with before; he figured out a simple way we could check the parking brake together and know for sure.He said he had a jack in the truck; and we could jack a set of main gears up and see if the wheels could be spun with the parking brake set. In this case the wheels did spin; so he knew there was a problem with the parking brake that needed further troubleshooting. If the wheels had not spun I would have been confident that the parking brake issue was an indication problem and felt comfortable flying with the MELs. First I want to give the Mechanic a lot of credit for coming up with a simple and quick way to test whether the problem was with the parking brake indications or with the parking brake itself. In all the times I've seen this problem before I've never had a Mechanic problem solve this issue so simply and so quickly. Second; I'm seeing this particular problem with the parking brake a lot lately. Whatever the cause; there's something going on frequently enough that it needs to be looked into and discussed with the pilots and mechanics. If I hadn't seen this problem before this aircraft would have been flying around with 2 indication MELs and a parking brake that wasn't working for the required 24 hours or 6 applications once the hydraulic pump was shut off.The threat is a parking brake that wasn't functioning properly that could have resulted in the injury of ramp crews. The difficulty with this threat is determining whether the parking brake really isn't working or if it's a brake indication problem. The company needs to put out guidance to pilots and mechanics on how to differentiate between parking brake indication problems and actual parking brake problems.

EMB-145 Captain reported maintenance personnel were able to determine a parking brake indication issue was valid while parked at the gate.


Supervisor / CIC; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was CIC; working combined with CD/FD. Trainee on Local Control (LC) combined with Ground Control (GC) taxied an aircraft from the ramp to the active Runway (33L) with no hold short instructions for the inactive Runway (24). Later; he cleared Aircraft X for take-off from Runway 24. Aircraft X began the turn onto the runway from taxiway 'F'; noticed Aircraft Y crossing down field and stopped his movement. At this point he questioned the controller about the location of the aircraft and the controller aborted his take-off. The aircraft was returned to the runway approach end and subsequently re-cleared for take-off.Had GC not been combined with LC; this might not have happened. Otherwise; as staffing is a very big issue; this is a routine combination of positions that at least at present is virtually unavoidable. I would strongly suggest the increased use of memory aids; awareness techniques and focus.

Taxied for takeoff with ISP Tower controlling all ground and air operations. Most traffic using Runways 33L and 33R due prevailing winds. We asked for Runway 24 (a cross runway to prevailing traffic) for weight and stopping margin considerations. Taxiing across the 33's (we had to hold short of 33R on taxi out); we were cleared for takeoff about 70-90 seconds before we could reach Runway 24 and actually start the takeoff roll. Once taking the runway; verifying the assigned runway; transferring control (First Officer flying); we noticed a GA aircraft proceeding south on Taxiway Whiskey and assumed he would stop and hold short of Runway 24 (our runway) before crossing and continuing east on Runway 10; used as a taxiway during construction work on taxiway Sierra. As we started our takeoff roll; he proceeded to cross the runway ahead of us and we rejected our takeoff. The Tower asked why we rejected and we stated the GA aircraft crossing ahead of us on the runway. The GA pilot asked Tower to confirm he had clearance to cross Runway 24. The Tower confirmed he did. The Tower mentioned nothing about the incident and cleared us to return to the departure end of the runway and take off.I think we; as a Crew; handled the situation; correctly. There were between three to five aircraft in the pattern; plus ground movements. We also requested a cross runway; adding to the Controller workload; especially when single frequency operations are being utilized. There was also a Controller change while we taxied out and the new Controller issued our takeoff clearance. I know Controllers and crews work on expectations of other performance and maybe the Tower thought we'd be ready to reach the runway and takeoff sooner than we did. We were in a heavy plane and needed some time to get moving from the point takeoff clearance was given to getting into takeoff position. That 70-80 seconds may have prompted the Controller to give other clearances on our runway that would keep airport traffic moving while we were actually cleared for takeoff on that runway. However; that 70-80 seconds (and the Controller change) might have been enough time to temporarily forget we were cleared for takeoff while managing ground movements around the entire airport. My suggestion is to wait until we were actually at the hold short line before takeoff clearance was given; especially single frequency operations with only one Controller during high-density operations.

ISP Controller and pilots involved describe a situation where an aircraft is cleared for takeoff and another aircraft with clearance crosses the runway down field. The departing aircraft aborts takeoff.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 27L

Landing; Initial Approach; Final Approach

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While on approach into Atlanta (ATL) we were told to follow a heavy 747 on the visual approach. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying (PF). Upon joining the localizer at 3;000 feet we encountered wake turbulence from the 747. At this point the FO decided to hand fly the approach to stay above the wake turbulence and maintain a path to the runway above the glide slope. We were instructed to maintain 170 knots until the final approach fix and to contact tower at the final approach fix. As the FO was configuring for landing; he called 'Flaps 5; Vee-Approach.' I was immediately confused by what he was asking for and while selecting flaps to the 5 position I asked what he meant. He again said 'Vee-Approach' and I still didn't know what he wanted; thinking he wanted me to select some sort of approach mode. His intention was for me to bug the VAPP speed. At this point he changed the speed selector to FMS speeds to begin a slowdown of the aircraft and by this time the flaps had moved to 5 and the overspeed limit came down to our current airspeed which was just below 180. We then encountered more wake turbulence which increased the speed to 181 knots causing a brief overspeed of the flaps. This was immediately corrected by the FO and he began decreasing to approach speed. Due to the flap overspeed; I was side-tracked thinking about the maintenance implications and a potential event being triggered. Also as the FO was flying; I was paying attention to his approach in reference to the 747 to assure that if we encountered any more wake turbulence; we would both be ready to deal with it. In the midst of all of this happening; I forgot to switch over to the tower frequency at the final approach fix. Just prior to the 500 feet call out; we encountered more wake turbulence; so we again were distracted by this; ultimately resulting in landing without receiving a landing clearance. We realized what happened once we taxied clear of the runway and queried the tower. They responded with taxi instructions; and eventually had us switch to ground control without a mention of the incident. Once I arrived at the gate; and after calling maintenance for the over speed inspection; I called the tower and spoke with Mr. X to assure there was no conflict. He told me that there were no issues whatsoever due to this event and they understood we got distracted by our flight duties and said not to worry about it. This event was caused by a chain of events beginning with the concern for the wake turbulence. If the FO would have made a more specific call out for the speed reduction; the flap overspeed would not have occurred and I would not have been distracted from my PM duties. Additionally; if I would have verified the speed was below company limits prior to selecting flaps 5; I could have potentially avoided the overspeed. As far as landing without clearance; I should have confirmed the landing light switches were turned on at 500 feet; but due to the wake turbulence and overspeed distraction; I overlooked this. The FO also should have confirmed with me that we were cleared to land prior to his callout of 'landing.'

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

ERJ-175 flight crew reported landing without clearance in ATL when they were distracted by several events; including a wake vortex encounter.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27.5

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I have been a controller at ZWY Area E for over [time period deleted] years; and as such; have worked the WATRS airspace through its various forms: non-radar; non-radar with ODAPS (Oceanic Display and Planning System); and ATOP non-radar. I was working the off-shore radar sector Rac82/83 during the day shift. This radar sector manually coordinates with the D88 ATOP controller; feeding the radar traffic to the non-radar controller. Aircraft X had been coordinated down L452; which is parallel to L453; and prior to OXANA; Aircraft X's radar service had been terminated. Alongside Aircraft X; on the parallel airway L453; was Aircraft Y. Both aircraft were at FL370. Aircraft X progressed OXANA at XX00Z. Shortly after that; I noticed Aircraft X's track was proceeding along M325; and not L452. I called Aircraft X in the blind and asked another flight to attempt contact through company channels. In addition; I asked the D88 controller to call Commercial Radio and have the flight contact me. On any other sector I would have attempted contact on Guard; but R82/83 has no guard frequency transmitter!  I could have asked one of the other flights to transmit on Guard to contact Aircraft X; but as circumstances worked out; I didn't need to (such a procedure is more time consuming; since you must explain to the assisting flight exactly what you need; and time was of the essence). Aircraft X was proceeding towards ONGOT; which Aircraft Y was also proceeding towards. They had less than one minute converging at ONGOT. Southeast-bound M325 traffic and southbound L453 traffic require fifteen minutes crossing to be separated. The situation was thus: at best; had I taken no action; we had a 93% loss of separation; at worst; a mid-air collision. Aircraft Y; whom I was still in contact with; was south of PAEPR; and rapidly leaving radar airspace.  I issued a heading of 230 to Aircraft Y both to keep the flight in radar and point Aircraft Y at Aircraft X; thus ensuring that they would miss each other. I later turned Aircraft Y further right to heading 240. Commercial Radio contacted Aircraft X and told the flight to call me on VHF; which Aircraft X did. Once I had contact with Aircraft X; we determined that their flight plan did not match what was in our Flight Data Entry Printout. I established degrees divergence between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y using vectors; and sent them back onto what we had originally shown their routes to be: L452 and L453. My actions prevented any loss of separation. FLM (Front Line Manager) [name removed] looked into the situation and his preliminary investigation pointed to the tower activating the wrong flight plan; which was entirely identical up until OXANA; so there was no earlier opportunity to discover the discrepancy. FLM [name removed] filed a report. Aircraft X told me they had been issued several code changes; and had ultimately ended up back on their original code. While this is not positive proof of a flight plan discrepancy; it is a common occurrence when there is a flight plan discrepancy. Most disturbing in this situation is that ATOP received a position report from Aircraft X; progressing OXANA; estimating NETSS; and ONGOT next.  This is out of conformance with the L452 routing that ATOP was showing; but ATOP did not issue an out of conformance message. I believe this is due to the ATOP-radar present position report being within the lateral bounds of L452 when the message was sent. In a fully non-radar situation; ATOP will inform the controller if a position report is out of conformance; route-wise; if the present position is outside of parameters; or if the next position is outside of parameters; or if the ensuing waypoint is outside of parameters. Here; because of the ATOP-radar; the ATOP did not report the next position or ensuing waypoint as out of conformance; which they were by a dangerous margin. This is unsafe. Also unsafe is the lack of a Guard transmitter with R82/83. Other possible solutions for avoiding a reoccurrence of this type of dangerous situation: R82/83 controllers being required not to terminate radar north of OXANA or PAEPR (a practice which I have now adopted); Flights issued multiple code changes and are heading into WATRS or Oceanic airspace might be advised to ask for a routing confirmation; coordination between R82/83 and D88 being mandated to be effected at ZZTOP; NETSS; and SAUCR (as opposed to OXANA/PAEPR); which would have caught this error.

ZWY Controller describes a situation where two aircraft that he was responsible for were on a course to collide. Controller separated traffic.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 18250; Flight Crew Type 2500

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were at the end of Runway 33 at DCA waiting for takeoff. Tower instructed us to line up and wait. As I was proceeding to line up and wait; Tower issued a different clearance to turn to 280 degrees and maintain 3000 ft. after departure. The co-pilot read back the new issued clearance and for some reason thought we were cleared for takeoff. I lined up and stopped. The co-pilot asked if I was ready to go. I asked the co-pilot if we were cleared for takeoff. He responded; yes. Concentrating on positioning the aircraft to line up on the runway as we were issued a new clearance and the heavy traffic on the radio at that time; I thought I might have not heard the Tower clear us for takeoff. I proceeded takeoff roll down the runway when Tower told us to abort. I believe where the miscommunication started was when the Tower issued us a new clearance while we were taxiing onto the runway; to turn to a new heading of 280 degrees and maintain 3000 ft. but did not tell us to continue to hold. After receiving the new clearance; we assumed we were cleared for takeoff. A very serious lesson to be learned here. If you are ever in doubt or unsure of any communication between you and ATC; always verify.  I have verified many times with controllers in my flying career; but this time I did not. And because of that; a terrible outcome could have happened because of it.

BE-200 Captain reported beginning the takeoff roll at DCA without clearance from the Tower.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 12600; Flight Crew Type 4400

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 13000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

In rear of Aircraft for Crew meal; First Officer flying the aircraft; came to cockpit and noted Fuel flow needles flickering. Noted fuel flow indicator-as well as Outer tank indicators show zero-however; Inner tanks had good quantity and burning normal-tank to engine; valves green; all ok. Earlier in the flight the outer tanks (both LH & RH) had ECAM message which showed low; however we did not burn from Outers and did not transfer fuel. No fuel leak was indicated; so continued as per checklist. #2; RH engine flamed out. [Advised ATC] and requested divert. ATC gave good vectors and landed uneventful.Aircraft is designed to fly tank to engine and burn from all tanks; thus tank to engine inner tank is good.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A300 flight crew reported an engine flamed out during cruise due to possible fuel issue.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

At FL 370 Multiple Lvl 3 aft lower cargo Fire warnings. Declared Emergency; complied with QRH and Diverted to Nearest airport.

An MD-11 flight crew diverted to the nearest suitable airport upon receipt of Level three CRG Fire Aft warnings.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 9098; Flight Crew Type 9098

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I don't know what to make of the most recent bulletin about pilot mask usage and COVID-19. To date there is no concrete directive about mask usage in the cockpit. My own policy as Captain is to direct mask usage at all times possible while in the cockpit other than while eating or drinking or obviously in an emergency while using oxygen. I believe this to be congruent with CDC guidance for when someone needs to be in close contact with someone else who does not live with that person. This procedure is not perfect but the best I can come up with outside of pre-departure rapid COVID testing. As pilots we usually fly with new coworkers on every new trip and to date there is no way to determine that the person you are flying with is not an asymptomatic carrier of the virus.This whole situation is a failure of:The pilot group as a whole: We should do better than thisUnion: Our pilots are more at risk from death or injury from COVID than any other operational threatAirline: The safety protocol enforced outside the cockpit should extend inside as well; no exceptionsFAA: If none of the above will take action the FAA needs to step inMy First Officer on the flight associated with this report agreed in the briefing phase to comply with my directives for mask usage. During the flight I detected a problem though. I generally try to be friendly and conversational not only to pass the time in pleasant way but also to provide a comfortable environment to empower my First Officer to be a helpful partner in the flight.This wasn't to be on that flight and it culminated in my FO intentionally removing his mask on descent into ZZZ. Stating when asked about it that 'It is interfering with my duties.' The interference he was referring to was that I didn't hear the altitude ATC assigned and I asked him to ask ATC to confirm. I don't know how his mask interfered with ATC transmissions.I honestly think he was looking for an opportunity to remove his mask in defiance.I asked him to replace his mask and offered to work the radios if it's a problem.Later at the hotel I restated my objection to flying with someone who refuses to wear a mask and asked if that would be a problem in tomorrow's flight. He stated it would not.  There were no mask issues on that flight; however it was not the most pleasant environment; quite sterile.Mask-less cockpits are dangerous.Unfortunately this is not my first time experiencing the mask resistance in the cockpit.The current guidance on this is weak and shows a lack of leadership on all involved.My experience is that a surgical type mask does not interfere with my duties; is easily and quickly removed if necessary; and by medical consensus prevents contagious droplets from dispersing to a great extent.Please enforce mask usage and prevent the sickness or death of our brothers or sisters in the cockpit.

Air carrier Captain expressed a need for a concrete directive about face mask usage in the cockpit.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport

M54 is an untowered airport with recent heavy flight instruction activity from a nearby college; 2 local flight schools; an active flying club; and flight instructing originating from a nearby Class C airport.  Local custom is Runway 19 is used for light and variable or no wind take off and landing because there is an open field just south of the airport. Just north of the field is a college. When recently flying I politely mentioned the local custom over the radio trying to turn the airport traffic back to using the preferred runway.  A few minutes later I was informed that the AFD (Airport Facility Directory; Chart Supplement) did not mention a preferred runway.  There are still many aircraft on the field flying without radio communication. I think it would be a good idea to publish this local custom in the AFD and post on signage at the departure point of both runways.  Several years ago I had to leave the runway onto the grass while rolling out on 19 to prevent a twin aircraft broadcasting on the wrong frequency landing on Runway 1 from landing on top of me. Had we executed a touch and go we might have had a mid air on climb out.

Flight Instructor recommends publishing preferred runway at local airport.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Controller pilot datalink Communication (CPDLC) instruction was 'Cleared to ZZZ APRT LGA5 EXCEPT TURN LEFT HDG 360 FOR RV THEN AS FILED'. When I received and acknowledged the clearance; I read it to the Captain stating EXPECT TURN TO 360 instead of EXCEPT ....' Nothing more; the Captain read the CPDLC and acknowledged what we briefed. Captain was PF. We were cleared for takeoff from Runway 4 and we commented that usually they state 'turn to heading ###'; however; Tower frequency was too busy to inquire and in the absence of further instruction we turned to the SID heading of 051 degrees. Once transferred to Departure Control; he gave us a heading of 360 degrees. A few minutes later; Departure Control requested to know what heading we were assigned by LGA Tower; and I stated 'We weren't given a heading but CPDLC stated to expect a heading of 360 degrees.'  Nothing more was said. Thirty minutes passed; and I decided to reread the CPDLC and noticed my error of reading 'Expect' instead of 'Except'. No excuses; I was wearing my new glasses and it was light outside; there were no stressors during boarding. I plainly misread the clearance. We read what we think we want to see and perhaps my only recommendation would be: 1. First Officer to be more thorough.2. I wish they (Clearance) could use different verbiage and 3. Tower could reinforce the change to the standard clearance but I know LGA is BUSY.'

First Officer reported a track error departing LGA citing error in reading CPDLC change of initial heading during predeparture briefing as probable cause.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172; Flight Crew Type 1860

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Ramp; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport

We entered LAS ramp at Spot 16 and cleared to Gate X. There was no traffic on (or moving on) the ramp. The Captain (in the Check Airman's opinion) got too close to Taxiway C coming around the corner between Spot 11 and 10. The Captain was concerned about the left wing traveling over the ground service road etc. Even if I was aware of any problem there was nothing I could do as PM; it happened so fast etc. I was turning off the Transponder and making sure the radar was off as we were approaching the gate etc. Again; I was not aware of any problem until the Check Airman debriefed the Captain. Also; no issues (as far as I know) with Ground Control. The Check Airman suggested we file an ASAP report; so here it is. There should be a defined taxi line around Concourse C and Taxiway C; If possible.

Upon landing Runway 1R clearance to gate (upon contacting Ramp Control) was to taxi Spot 16 to Gate X. Upon approach to Spot 11; my opinion was that there was not enough clearance to safely remain on the ramp and clear traffic off Gate X. As a result; the aircraft left the ramp and temporarily went onto Taxiway C; then back onto the ramp to Gate X. Ground Control was not contacted for the temporary incursion onto Taxiway C.

B737 flight crew reported a LAS Taxiway C incursion while taxiing around Concourse C on the ramp between Spots 11 and 10. A taxi line in that area would help maintain gate and taxiway clearance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Close parallel visual approaches to the left and right runways in use. We were cleared for visual approach and cleared by the Tower to land on the right runway. To our left and behind and below us was a CL604 that was cleared for the Visual Approach to the left runway. The CL604 pilot had a foreign accent. When the Tower was about to clear the CL604 to land on the left runway; the Tower Controller interrupted himself to ask the CL604 a complicated hypothetical question about changing the assigned landing runways for both the CL604 and for us and tried to ask the CL604 pilot if he could do the necessary maneuvering and accept a clearance to land on the right runway. This obviously confused the CL604 pilot who was subsequently unclear as to which runway he was ultimately cleared to land on; even though the Tower Controller had tried to dismiss his own question and sort of cleared the CL604 to land on the left runway.This was a terrible plan on the part of the Tower Controller. Both aircraft were below 1;500 feet in a critical phase of flight; the smaller aircraft was behind and below the larger aircraft (us) and was being asked to cross through our wake in order to change runways. We were in the process of final configuration for landing and we could see that the CL604 was still configuring for landing as they still had not extended their landing gear. Adding a cross-over runway change maneuver to two aircraft in such close proximity to each other and doing it in such a circumstance as to force the smaller aircraft to cross behind and below the larger during a critical phase of flight is just stupid. The CL604 pilot was sufficiently confused by the fiasco that they requested clarification of their runway assignment and reiteration of their landing clearance. We observed the CL604's landing gear extending below 500 feet so it seems that their normal procedures were sufficiently disrupted to delay landing gear extension.The Tower Controller apparently wanted to change our assigned runways for the convenience of ground control operations and shortening the taxi routes after landing. This is an unacceptable reason for putting a smaller aircraft in wake; or even confusing a pilot in a critical phase of flight with unusual and unexpected complicated questions having outcomes that are unacceptable on their face. I don't usually believe that there is ever such a thing as a stupid question; but this Tower Controller's question was a stupid question. Provide Tower personnel additional training about wake turbulence procedures and when it is and is not appropriate to expect pilots to be able to mitigate wake turbulence through visual separation. There was no way that bizjet could have completed the crossover to the other runway and avoided our wake and still completed a stabilized approach and landing. Further; instruct the Tower personnel that such a crossover maneuver is the province of aircraft conducting formation flights and that aircraft not identified as a 'flight' are not authorized to conduct formation flight or formation flight maneuvers.

EMB-170 First Officer reported SFO Tower gave a late runway change to a corporate jet following them on short final that caused confusion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On departure from ZZZZ during flap retraction we initially had the EICAS caution message Flaps Primary" which then turned to "Flaps Drive". We continued the climb to FL180 while accomplishing the initial flaps primary then the follow on flaps drive checklists. We informed ATC of our issue and restriction of FL200. I then turned control of the aircraft over to my Check Airman then contacted Dispatch. While on satellite phone the Pilot Flying to match the flap indication which caused a flap overspeed we changed flaps back to up which solve that problem. After conferring with Dispatch; Maintenance Control and the Chief Pilot. Collectively decided to divert to ZZZZ1. When in contact with Center asked for and received FL160 to stall margin versus flap overspeed margin. When in contact with ZZZZ1 we asked for and received permission to dump fuel to bring us closer to max landing (this was in consideration of the max tire speed) due to the speed additive of Vref flaps 30 + 25. After arriving in the ZZZZ1 area we were still too heavy to land and asked for delay vectors to burn down to max landing weight. When we were at weight when we asked for approach and landed without further incident. We could have initially asked for lower altitude to give better stall margin and flap overspeed protection. Dispatch initially suggested an overweight landing but due to tire speed limitation and the speed additive we decided the best course of action was to get the aircraft down to at least max landing weight."

Captain reported a diversion and fuel dumping due to trailing edge flap drive and position sensing/control failure.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Immediately after service - guest in XX6; came to the back galley to ask for water and snacks; but was not wearing his face covering. He came very close to me and my jumpseat; and I quickly asked if he wouldn't mind taking a step back; and thanks. I asked him also to please wear his face/nose covering. He replied that he did not have one. I began to feel very uncomfortable as he was having trouble keeping his distance while also not having a face covering on. I told him if you can go get your face covering at your seat; we'd all really appreciate it and I'll get your waters and snacks ready in the meantime. He said again he did not have one. I told him that we will provide one for you no problem. So I had Flight Attendant (FA) A go and grab one for him and he slowly and reluctantly put it on. He started saying that it doesn't make sense that he was allowed to board without one. I specifically recalled him wearing one before and during taxiing out.He stood in the back galley and was now complying with wearing the mask and I gave him some waters and snacks. He asked for my name and badge number to file a complaint. I told him that this isn't anything personal or something to argue about; it's just our company's policy to wear a face covering and it's something that not only makes me feel comfortable but all the people around you. I also gave him my first name and the flight number. He started to tell me in an argumentative way that it is how I said for him to put his face mask on that was rude especially with asking him to take a step back when he wasn't wearing one at all. I told him that I had nicely asked him and now you're wearing one that we provided; thanks. He explained further that he thinks that I'm 'one of those people on the left.' I simply explained to him that I don't want to argue about this as this is simply just a policy that everyone on board must comply with; that's it! He tried to keep arguing with me and I replied that I'm not here to argue about this; or what I was asking you to do; I'm just grateful that you're now wearing your mask; so thank you. He kept insisting that the crew today is terrible and that he wants to file a complaint. He also kept mentioning that he wasn't wearing one during boarding. Something felt a little off about him; I kept insisting that this is our policy and that we appreciate his compliance. No warning was necessary because the guest complied with wearing the mask from the point when I provided one.The guest claimed he was not wearing a face mask when boarding; even though I recall seeing him wear one. The guest maybe should have an extra reminder the next time he flies regarding the policy. I'm not sure that any action on this is necessary; as he complied.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was argumentative about wearing a face mask during the flight and also would not adhere to social distancing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 12136; Flight Crew Type 2015

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

We left our gate and were instructed to taxi and hold short of the runway. I repeated those instructions. This is an incredibly short taxi. The safety video alone is over 2 minutes. The pre-takeoff duties of the first officer; me; require uploading and confirming takeoff data; getting new runway data with the new weights; confirming all of this with Captain; loading new data; then running entire checklist as well as notifying crew to prepare for takeoff. That notification cannot take place until the safety video is finished. And that video is over 2 minutes long. While all of this was going on; ground informed us we should be on tower frequency. I switched to tower frequency and was immediately berated by tower controller for blocking traffic and not being ready for takeoff. There was an aircraft in front of us who wasn't ready for takeoff either. This aircraft had been told to taxi across the runway and hold short on east side.This type of communication should never take place from an ATC facility. There were all of 2 jets waiting for takeoff and neither jet was ready. The last thing a pilot needs at this critical point is a verbal berating from a tower controller about being ready for takeoff. I have enough experience to realize the immediate threat the tower controller just introduced to the extremely busy and critical point of preparation for takeoff. A new pilot may not. There is little more important than the proper running and preparation for takeoff. On a clear day; it is busy with such a short taxi. Add in any weather and the workload doubles. The requirements of the pilots is extremely great at this particular point. Pilots do not need the additional stress added from a tower controller who thinks it is his job to berate crews for not being ready for takeoff when he is ready to clear them for takeoff.

B737 First Officer reported they were given a short taxi route to the runway which they were not able to comply with do to pre-takeoff tasks.  The flight crew was told by the Tower Controller they were blocking traffic by not being ready for takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 14780; Flight Crew Type 1157

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 12478; Flight Crew Type 1241

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon in-range call to company HQ; I was notified of a problem involving our lone passenger's travel documents with respect to US Customs entry requirements. I then called US CBP directly and was notified our passenger was traveling under the visa waiver program; our company is not a signatory carrier and that our passenger could be denied entry into the US. The PIC and I elected to land as planned as our fuel load did not allow a return to departure point.The passenger was detained; the flight crew was asked to remain on US CBP premises; and the airplane was not released. CBP explained to the crew that in order to carry a traveler under the visa waiver program that person must travel on a signatory carrier. Since our company is not an approved carrier the company could be fined. Eventually; the passenger was allowed entry; conducted his business with my company and we were allowed to fly him back the same day.The PIC and I received short notice of this trip and we asked for passenger's documents as soon as possible. Unfortunately; we were not given any information until the night before a planned takeoff [in the early morning] the next day. The only information we were given was an email explaining passenger was a French citizen who works in Beijing and a copy of his passport was attached. I entered relevant information into eAPIS system and our manifests were accepted.Still; I had questions; are we allowed to carry a French citizen? The PIC and I conferred; he didn't know either. I called CBP directly to give them crew and passenger information and arrival ETA. I specifically told CBP officer our passenger was French. Relayed my exchange with CBP to PIC and we both agreed that with no comments from CBP regarding our passenger's status that we are good to go. In hindsight; I should have made some additional calls to confirm travel requirements of our passenger. I could have called our international trip support provider for advice or the company representative responsible for the trip for additional information. I could have asked for a delayed departure for more information. However; at this point I honestly did not know I needed more information. I didn't learn that our passenger was traveling under a visa waiver until I went in the cabin to explain the issue with US CBP to him and he showed me the actual visa waiver document. Additionally; my first time hearing of the signatory carrier requirement was upon initial contact with US CBP.Lesson learned; don't take the trip unless I am completely satisfied all entry requirements are met.

Corporate flight crew flew a foreign citizen traveling under the visa waiver program into the US. Since their company was not a signatory carrier; the passenger could have been denied entry and the company fined.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174; Flight Crew Type 11500

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

After landing in CRP on Runway 18; we proceeded to taxi to the Gate via taxiways A and L. Upon entering the ramp area we immediately noticed the extreme brightness of the ramp lighting. The brightness made it very difficult to see much other than the lights and the glare caused by them. We had a very tough time orienting ourselves on ramp because could not distinguish any markings such as taxi lines until we were almost directly over the lines. The distance we were able to see surface markings was a fraction of the typical distance needed. The Marshaller was tough to see and the lights made the parking process very difficult. I cannot overstate this: these were absolutely the brightest ramp lights I have ever seen. They were of a white halogen light of a very high lumen output. They were on multiple poles space at regular interval along the terminal and edge of the ramp. Each pole was at a relatively low height; only slightly taller than the two story terminal building. Every light pole had approximately four individual lights; with each light aimed at a different angle. The combination of the spacing and height; along with the varied angles of the individual lights made it nearly impossible to look outside and not look directly into at least one blinding light. If this light system is designed to assist the Pilots in navigating to the gate; it is an epic failure since it actually makes it extremely difficult to see anything other than the lights. I would have to rate this as the worst designed light system I have ever seen. In fact it would have been easier to see if there was no light system in place at all. A possible suggestion to correct this hazard would be to put the lights on higher poles so the light would shine down instead of directly at the oncoming traffic.

A Captain taxiing into the CRP air carrier terminal ramp on Taxiway L was blinded and disoriented by extremely high luminosity white lights. The Captain was unable to distinguish ramp markings and had difficulty following his Marshaller.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Aircraft X; Passenger X who was with her husband stated she was unable to wear her mask due to a medical condition and provided a letter. I explained that she was supposed to inform the gate agent.  She stated; 'The gate agent was rushing us through.'  My major concern was she wore her mask as she entered the plane the forward Flight Attendant later informed me and kept it on up until we were in flight. I politely asked her to cover her nose with the mask and that's when she handed me the letter.In any event I know we have a procedure that passengers go through with medical and we should be notified on our departure report; nevertheless; I never want to be put in a situation like this again and my concerns are how to handle a situation like this in the near future.  I was scared to insist she put her mask on because her letter never disclosed her illness and I didn't know whether her illness/es were a matter of life or death if she was to wear her mask. My other concerns are the risk she could have put my passengers and crew in.Customer did not go through proper channels to clear medical.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not go through proper channels to clear medical in regards to not having to wear a face mask.


Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I had just returned back from a break and the FLM asked me to sit at D76 because the volume was going to have a 10-15min spike that would warrant having a D-Side controller at the sector; and that after the spike in traffic was over he would let me know when I could slide over and relieve the RADAR Controller. Shortly after setting down at the sector (less than 4 to 5 min) I heard the R76 Controller issue a descent to Air Carrier X to FL300. In scanning the URET I noticed that there were a number of RED alerts and told the RADAR Controller 'hey you have some reds over here). He acknowledged my comment by saying yeah they are ok. For me the biggest factor was I could not see the Data Blocks on the RADAR scope because the RADAR controller's brightness settings were to low to see unless you are setting directly in front of the scope and I would estimate less than 24' away. Just a few seconds after I had told the RADAR Controller about the 'reds' conflict alert started going off between Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y. Air Carrier Y was in level flight on J134 Westbound and Air Carrier X was Northbound direct OKK and his Mode C showed the aircraft at FL347 descending to FL300. The RADAR Controller issued Air Carrier Y a 30 degree right turn and then Air Carrier X a 30 degree left turn. The RADAR Controller then asked Air Carrier X to report leaving FL330. Next the RADAR Controller issued the traffic to Air Carrier Y and told the pilot that maybe a left turn would have been better to which the pilot responded with a comment I can not remember. After the traffic was clear; I asked the RADAR Controller why he issued Air Carrier Y a right turn instead of a left turn that would ensure Air Carrier Y went behind Air Carrier X and he said he was try to delay the conflict point in hopes that Air Carrier X would be able to descend below FL330 before the confliction point occurred. The biggest change I would like to see implemented is a change that would prevent the RADAR scope brightness to be turned down so low that only the RADAR Controller can see it from directly in front of the scope. Often when I have asked controllers to turn up there brightness because I can not see there scopes they have responded that I can just forward my calls to them. This negates the point of having a second pair of eyes to assist with ensuring safety. I also feel that the light level on the platform needs to be raised. I understand that years ago the light levels were turned down to prevent glare on the RADAR scopes but with the new technology there is no need for this to be continued. By leaving the light level low on the platform it allows controllers to turn there scope brightness way down and it also leads to fatigue.

ZID D-Side Controller witnessed a loss of separation by the R-Side; listing 'brightness' settings as a causal factor.


Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors

Several jobcards have a note on page one stating 'ALL PART NUMBERS (P/N) LISTED ARE TYPICAL PART NUMBERS (P/N'S) AND MAY NOT BE CURRENT. REFERENCE THE ILLUSTRATED PARTS CATALOG (IPC) FOR CURRENT PART'. I feel that this statement is a disclaimer by the [Powerplant] Engineering Department to relieve themselves of their responsibility; as stated in the General Manual (G/M) 12-20-10 to maintain the accuracy of the Job Instruction Card (JIC).

A Turbine Shop Mechanic reports several jobcards have disclaimers that he feels relieves the responsibility to maintain accurate jobcards.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On the WAPPL4 arrival; we were told to stay at FL290 because of traffic below us; approximately at WAPPL we were told to descend via the WAPPL4; we began our descent and were fairly quickly told to descend via the WAPPL4 except maintain 7;000 at 'HUDZY.' It was a steep descent at that point but we were able to accomplish it. As we leveled at 7;000 at HUDZY we were told that we were supposed to descend via the WAPPL4; 7;000 at 'BUGZY.'HUDZY and BUGZY are too similar sounding and may need to be changed. Since we were significantly high at WAPPL due to traffic; would have been helpful to be given a simple clear altitude restriction for the next fix; like cross WLMOR at FL210 or HUDZY at FL180. It is difficult to configure the airplane for a descend via when you begin too high; then since everything was out of wack we did not think to question the altitude restriction of 7;000 at HUDZY. We should have questioned that restriction since it created a very steep descent rate.

Small Transport Captain reported similar sounding waypoint/intersection names HUDZY and BUGZY contributed to a track deviation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 600

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

We were on a night training flight for night currency. The Pilot Flying was planning to update their night currency. I was acting as PIC (Pilot-in-Command)/CFI/PNF (Pilot Not Flying) in the right seat. We met at the airport approximately XA:45. After preflighting the aircraft we started engines at approximately XB:20. Some engine roughness was noted at startup but was resolved after leaning and run-up checklist was completed.  Additional time was lost waiting for a transient aircraft who was lost on the airport trying to find his way to a gate for exit. I informed the Pilot Flying to hold position until the transient airplane was clear of all runways. We offered assistance via radio to the transient pilot whom we directed to the ramp.We made a normal takeoff on Runway XXL; retracted the landing gear; and entered a normal left traffic pattern. On downwind we extended the landing gear and continued to a normal landing with full stop. We then taxied back for another takeoff and entered the downwind leg. Upon reducing power for the approach we noticed some engine roughness which I attributed to 'pushing the prop' because of our relatively high airspeed and being full rich at minimal power. The Pilot Flying thought it was an engine malfunction so I attempted to adjust the mixture to no satisfaction to the Pilot Flying. I directed the PF (Pilot Flying) to go to full flaps for landing as we were turning final and speed seemed high. We continued the approach to landing and failed to do a 'GUMP' check for landing gear due to our distraction resulting from the engine issue.We did not get a gear warning alarm even though the MP (Manifold Pressure) was at 11 inches. Had that alarm sounded; we would have; if time and altitude allowed; been able to extend the landing gear or otherwise execute a go-around. This is a case of two senior pilots trusting each other to 'take care of business'. The distraction with the engine caused me to forget the pre-landing checklist which I assumed the PF was managing but was really my responsibility as CFI/PIC. The result was a gear-up landing which resulted as a very smooth landing with minimal damage to the aircraft and no injuries to personnel.

BE36 flight instructor reported a gear-up landing after being distracted by engine issues.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18.62; Flight Crew Total 3810.95; Flight Crew Type 537.13

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Aircraft status CCS RDC 8 AFT EE BAY - CCS Remote Data Concentrator 8 failed. Noted IRU L drift delta value increasing to 4.2. Initiated Unreliable Nav checklist and began Post Position plotting. Plot confirmed we were on course with LNAV/Vnav active modes; ANP 0.03 GPS updating. ATC requested us to confirm back on route. Earlier; other crew pair requested and received left 40nm weather deviation at [time] and reported back on route at [51 minutes later].Confirm Assigned Route.NFFF ATC message: ADS indicates that you're approx. 40 miles right of route. We confirmed ON Route cross track error 0.0 GPS updating with ANP 0.03. NFFF ATC message: ADS still showing deviation slightly right of route. (We still showed on course with ANP 0.03.) EICAS: Elec Gen Off R2 followed by Pack R alerts. Also had Heat Pitot C and No Land 3 EICAS which cleared up with Gen and Pack resolutions. (Heat Pitot C remained as a Status message). Noted HDG HOLD roll mode with power interruption; Returned to LNAV.Completed both checklists restoring Gen with R2 Gen CTRL reset per the non-normal and Pack restored using Air Condition Reset per the non-normal checklist. Flight attendants informed/briefed about air and electric issues and normal systems restored. Consulted [Maintenance Control] through Dispatch and talked to 787 Fleet Management via SAT phone.IRU L continued to show drift up to 4.9nm and IRU R had no values. GPS was updating and ANP remained 0.03. Confirmed with Brisbane ADS B position showed us on route. Suspect ADS data earlier was erroneous due to non-normals experienced. ANP with the GPS updating never exceeded 0.03 and we remained on magenta line in LNAV/Vnav.Excellent crew CRM!

Boeing Pilot reported navigational problems.