Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

Approximately 40 miles southwest of PUB at FL370 we encountered moderate mountain wave activity followed very shortly by severe turbulence. This encounter lasted for approximately 10 minutes with the severe turbulence lasting about 3 to 5 minutes. In my over 20;000 hours and 40 years of flying experience I have never encountered turbulence of this severity lasting for such an extended period of time. In cruise flight I attempted to use WSI but was unable to achieve a WIFI connection. Therefore I relied on my preflight data and our flight plan; which showed the worst ride conditions to be approximately the Grand Canyon area. During preflight a conversation with the inbound crew indicated this was the area they encountered the worst rides. In the vicinity of Durango; CO; we began to hear aircraft reporting mountain wave activity and some moderate turbulence over the Rockies. I turned on the seat belt sign and instructed the F/A's via intercom to clean up the cabin and take their jump seats. We also started to pick up light mountain wave and light to moderate chop as we proceeded east. During this time we were watching a 125-knot tail wind slowly bleed off to a 54 knot quartering tailwind. The turbulence and chop seemed to increase but the mountain wave seemed to settle down a bit. The wind bleed off reminded me of an experience I had in the same vicinity when I had less than 100 hours on the 737. That time wind shift had led to an aircraft over speed. So this time we used the opportunity to talk about 737 throttle response and spool up time. To back up my earlier instructions and make an impression on the passengers to stay in their seats; I made a PA instruction the F/A's to take their jump seats. I followed this up with an intercom conversation with the F/A's checking to make sure they were seated; the cabin was secure; and telling them how long I thought these conditions might last. At some point during this time we inquired from ATC about the rides lower as the mountain wave continued. We were told that the rides were about the same at all altitudes. Having hit a fairly smooth area; we decided to stay at FL370. The mountain wave activity started to pick up in intensity. I attempted to contact ATC for clearance to a lower altitude; but the frequency was blocked with other aircraft enquiring about or reporting ride conditions. Finally with the airspeed bleeding off in mountain wave; without clearance; I instructed the F/O to initiate a turn 30 degrees right to avoid lower TCAS traffic ahead of us and to begin a descent to FL350. The turn was never completed as we flew into the area of severe turbulence. Auto throttles and autopilot both disengaged as the aircraft became uncontrollable. I took control of the throttles as the F/O struggled to maintain a wings level attitude and some sort of reasonable descent. I was finally able to [advise ATC]; state we were leaving altitude; for severe turbulence. ATC cleared us to descend to FL290. At times during the event the aircraft was virtually uncontrollable with uncommanded bank angles reaching 30 degrees or greater; which the F/O stated he used full control deflection at times to return the wings to level attitude. Airspeed fluctuations of plus and minus 20 knots or greater were on going and at one time we experienced a brief stick shaker. The severe turbulence encounters continued frequently; becoming less frequent as we descended. The moderate to severe turbulence finally ended at about FL295 and was a much more comfortable moderate chop at FL290. ATC cleared us further down to FL270 where the ride was reasonably comfortable but still choppy. We spent 2 to 3 minutes reengaging the automation and getting settled back on course. We then assessed the aircraft condition from the flight deck finding it to appear normal. A call was made to the F/A's checking if they were okay; enquiring about the condition of the aircraft and the passengers. I instructed the F/A's to walk throughthe cabin and check on the aircraft and our passengers. They reported back that the aircraft was a mess; but appeared structurally sound. None of the passengers were reported as injured; however several had become sick and vomited and concern was expressed for two pregnant passengers.We were over southeast Colorado and 800+ miles from our destination. I told the F/O I wanted to divert to ZZZ. He expressed valid concern about flying back into the vicinity of the turbulence. I felt we were below the worst of it and other aircraft were departing and landing at ZZZ. We informed ATC we wanted to divert to ZZZ. They cleared us direct. I called the F/A's on the interphone; once again and checked the condition of the passengers and aircraft. I informed them of our diversion; time to landing and my intention to have CFR meet the aircraft. I explained that I anticipated a normal landing; that we would stop the aircraft and have the rescue vehicles check it's condition prior to proceeding to the gate and that I would use the 'remain seated' PA. I followed this briefing up with a similar briefing to the passengers. The QRH was consulted for severe turbulence encounters finding that the only checklist was applicable only during the actual event. The Electronic Engine Controls (EEC) had also disengaged and the QRH procedures only applied on the ground.A normal landing was made. We cleared on the high speed taxiway and stopped the aircraft. The 'remain seated' PA was made. The CFR checked the aircraft visually finding no abnormalities. We taxied to the gate escorted by the CFR. During taxi ATC passed us a phone number to call after arrival. EMT's; fire personnel and many company staff met us at the gate. During post flight we completed our checklists and pulled the Digital Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder circuit breakers. I than went to the main cabin to check on the condition of the aircraft and passengers and meet the emergency personnel as they entered the aircraft. Log entries were made for a severe turbulence encounter; EEC trip off and pulling the breakers.This event occurred in clear air with little real warning. Frequency congestion contributed to our inability to request a timely descent; but we probably would have encountered severe turbulence even if we had descended to FL350 earlier. A working WSI system available in the aircraft would have been beneficial but would not necessarily have prevented the encounter. Provide a working WSI platform with an own ship position indicator such as on the Jeppesen FD-Pro airport page. An enhanced system to send via dispatch or automatically updates to aircraft enroute.

After the event the reporter thought that the turbulence may have been beyond severe; but Maintenance found no discrepancies and released the aircraft for flight with a different crew.

We were filed at 370 and that is the altitude we flew the flight. The flight was mostly smooth until approximately 170 miles southwest of ZZZ. We encountered a couple pockets of light turbulence and the Captain asked ATC for ride reports ahead at lower altitudes. ATC advised us that there were reports at all altitudes of light; with some pockets of moderate chop; and some reports of light mountain wave. At that point the Captain asked the flight attendants to take their seats. At the onset of turbulence I immediately slowed the jet to .76 mach. The Captain and I agreed that the ride at 370 was just as good as a lower altitude. ATC informed us that east of ZZZ the rides improved to light chop. As we continued east the Captain and I were commenting about the wind changes. We had 100 knots on the tail; then 120 knots; it was up and down. There was nothing abnormal at this point in the flight. Just prior to the severe turbulence encounter; the windspeed began to decrease to 85 knots and was trending down. I also noticed that the direction of the wind was changing rapidly. The wind was shifting from westerly to southerly at approximately 60 knots when we encountered the severe turbulence. First; the autothrottles disconnected; followed by the autopilot disconnecting. I then took manual control of the jet. It became immediately apparent that the jet was becoming increasingly uncontrollable. At this point; I made a 30 degree turn to the right and began to descend. It was nearly impossible to do both keep the wings level and descend; so I was just trying to keep the jet from an upset position. The jet was violently rolling from left to right and I was using both aileron and rudder to keep the jet flying. I instructed the Captain to operate the thrust levers; as I needed both hands to try and control the jet. We continued to descend and from what I remember; gained full control of the jet around 30;000 feet. I estimate the event lasted approximately 5 minutes. Once out of the severe event; the Captain called the back to see if there were injuries; and at that point we knew the cabin crew was not injured. I slowed the jet down in the event we had any structural failure and we decided to divert to ZZZ to get the jet inspected and have the injured passengers receive medical attention. The Captain coordinated with the back and I flew the jet. We completed the severe turbulence checklist and we requested ARFF upon landing. We also informed the passengers that emergency vehicles would be present upon landing. I landed the jet; we taxied clear of runway and had the jet inspected for obvious damage. We asked to be followed to the gate as a precaution.

B737 flight crew reported diverting after encountering a severe mountain wave over the Southern Rockies.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

60 miles southwest of RIDGY on the KORRY 3 arrival; ATC issued a crossing restriction; 'cross RIDGY at FL270.' When selecting the KORRY 3 out of the FMS; RIDGY has an assigned crossing altitude of at or above FL270. The pilot flying selected 27;000 [feet] in the altitude alerter and then selected VNAV. Both of us thought the FMS was programed correctly. ATC informed us about 15 miles from RIDGY that we were high and issued us a clearance to descend to FL240.  We immediately started a descent and crossed RIDGY 8;000 to 7;000 feet high. The FMS never started the descent due to the fact that RIDGY was programmed to cross at or above FL270. The proper altitude programming in the FMS at RIDGY should have been cross RIDGY AT FL270.  When selecting STARS out of the box; make sure the waypoint doesn't have a pre-assigned above or below designation.

Narrative contains no addtional information.

Cessna jet flight crew missed an ATC assigned crossing altitude by relying on an FMS programmed restriction which was 'at or above' rather than 'at' the crossing altitude.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 250; Flight Crew Type 10

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While conducting a commercial maneuvers' training flight with my instructor; we encountered a near midair collision. We had been remaining in the pattern at TTA for some time; completing about five landings before the incident occurred. We were monitoring the CTAF frequency for the airport and making calls for crosswind; down wind; base and final as you would in any non-towered environment. To confirm we were on the correct frequency; at the time we the incident occurred; there was a helicopter circling the field about 1;500 feet higher than we were who was responding to our calls and giving us his position. For the details of the specific incident; we were conducting a power off 180 degree landing (commercial training maneuver). While on base and turning to a short final; I caught a glimpse of an aircraft just to the right of that nose of the aircraft and at close to our altitude; who appeared to have the same descent rate we had. Essentially; the aircraft incorrectly entered the pattern (made a straight in for runway 21) without making any radio calls and completely ignoring ours. I took immediate evasive action and conducted a climbing right turn to the right with full power; and flew away from the field; where I conducted a 360 degree right turn to ensure the aircraft was on the ground and off the runway. We completed that final touch and go and returned to [base]. It is my strong belief that this individual displayed a total disregard for aeronautical decision making; proper planning; and was complacent enough to fly right into our path of flight and show no sign of realizing he/she had done so.

PA28R student pilot reported an airborne conflict with another aircraft at TTA; a non-Tower airport.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.6

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was working Arrival sectors combined during evening arrival push. It was very busy with multiple IFR inbounds as well as VFR advisory services. I had just finished resolving conflicts with a preceding aircraft landing BFI and the VFR targets in the area. When I turned Aircraft X towards the localizer; I noticed one of the previous VFR targets had turned slightly more towards the North and climbed. Since it appeared the VFR would directly conflict with Aircraft X; I chose to turn Aircraft X to the left away from the VFR. Through a few vectors I basically gave Aircraft X a left 360 to join the ILS approach.Approach later called for a point-out on a VFR target that I believed was involved in this occurrence; so I asked the controller for the callsign and they identified the aircraft as Aircraft Y. I asked the approach controller to pass along that the aircraft had flown outbound along an active approach course for BFI and that such actions are not necessarily the safest way to operate.Even with the turn; FALCON indicated that the closest proximity between the aircraft was 1 mile laterally and 200 feet vertically. Once again; the timing of this event immediately following my previous report illustrates perfectly the continuous nature of this problem. Aircraft Y was close enough to four IFR arrivals to cause the Conflict Alarm to sound as they flew the localizer and then finished it off with a proximity to the fifth aircraft which required evasive maneuvering to avoid a potential collision. While Aircraft X did not mention a TCAS-RA; I have no doubt one would have resulted had I not issued traffic and a vector away from the VFR.Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solutions are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

S46 TRACON Controller reported having to vector an aircraft off of their final approach course to avoid an unidentified VFR target.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 36300; Flight Crew Type 4965

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

[Enroute at] FL360; Purser called to inform me there was a short duration smell of burning plastic across rows 46-48. The strong smell diminished lasting a few minutes. I reported to Dispatch via ACARS after telling [the Purser] to [alert] F/As (flight attendants) throughout the cabin to look; smell; and touch for any signs of fire; smoke fumes and report back to me immediately if there were any changes. [The Purser] and I discussed the possibility of a hot charger. [About half an hour later; the Purser] reported rows 26-28 ABC; smelled not like burning plastic; but 'cilantro'. The sweet smell moved forward to row 23. [A few minutes later; the Purser] reported that row 26 DE turned to a faint electrical; burnt plastic smell. I asked her to check for hot chargers. She said row 26 DE had two piping hot chargers which were now disconnected. The smell went away. [About an hour later; the Purser] called me and said the hot electrical smell was back; and very strong in the row 23-28 area. I told her to wake the passengers and make a PA to have all chargers disconnected from the outlets. I informed her I was diverting to [a nearby alternate]. I gave her time to [the alternate] and that an emergency evacuation might not be necessary; based on the current situation; but that could change. I told her to advise me if the situation got better; worse or stayed the same. [ATC] gave us discretion to 10;000 feet and we started down. F/O (First Officer) did a masterful job setting up the FMC (Flight Management Computer). [We advised] Dispatch our situation. We landed and stopped between [the runways]; [and were] informed there were no hot spots or indications of fire. We proceeded to gate. The report at the gate was no hot spots. We deplaned normally via the jet bridge and went to our hotel.

B777 Captain reported diverting to an alternate after the Purser reported electrical burning odors related to hot chargers in the cabin.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 12800; Flight Crew Type 750

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Began approach to Rwy 23L. Thunderstorms and rain in the area; night; in and out of IMC. Significant turbulence on approach. Selected gear down; flaps 20 approx. 2300 ft. Prior speed 180 had been assigned. As we were light our ref was only 133. Due to the wind shear; our deceleration was taking longer than usual so at about 170kts I called for flaps 30; speed v-ref +5; landing check list (MAP was already set at glideslope intercept altitude). This took place at approx 1500-1700 ft AGL as I wanted to be configured early due to the turbulence. At about 800 ft AGL I disengaged the A/P and re-briefed our missed approach maneuver in case we experienced windshear. The turbulence smoothed out a bit and the FO (First Officer) 500 ft call was on speed sinking 600. We were aligned with the centerline with minimal if any crab required. The cadence of the flare maneuver and power reduction was normal (this was also reaffirmed by the FO) other than that I left the thrust levers slightly cracked open as this sometime seems to helps smooth the landing of a light aircraft. The wind sheared to a tailwind near the end of the flare maneuver and we had what may be a hard landing. The wind changed dramatically enough that I believe we were the last aircraft to land on 23L; though there may have been one more aircraft close behind us. While stopped on the taxiway the FO picked up the new ATIS (issued after our landing); which changed the assigned runway to 5R. The new ATIS wind was 330/9 gust 19.  After parking and securing the aircraft; I informed the mechanic of a possible hard landing and made an entry in the logbook stating such. I did make a slight pitch adjustment when the sink occurred; being mindful not to over pitch. Had I been quick enough to add a bit of power as well; especially with the thrust levers not fully closed; I may have been able to arrest the descent

B747-400 Captain reported they had a hard landing when the wind shifted just before touchdown.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was on D9. R9 was working about 6 inbounds to ATL on the HONIE arrival with minimal in trail requirement. The first aircraft in line; Air Carrier X descended early; and that plus his loss of the higher altitude tailwind caused the second aircraft in line to begin to overtake. The R-Side slowed the second aircraft (Air Carrier Y) to 250 KTS and turned them 15 [degrees left] to counteract the overtake. This then caused the third aircraft (Air Carrier Z) to begin to overtake by a 130 KTS difference. Air Carrier Z was told 'begin your speed reduction' referring to the 250 KTS assignment at HONIE. Air Carrier Z's speed did not change much and when he began to get close to Air Carrier Y; R9 issued 'Air Carrier Z just maintain one six thousand.' His Mode C showed 16;800 FT at that time and he did not respond. R9 again said; 'Air Carrier Z; just maintain one six thousand.' He responded; 'Unable.' I said to R9; 'Unable? What does that mean?' R9 transmitted; 'Air Carrier Z; unable?' He responded; 'Unable; we are through 15;600 FT;' and he continued descending; intending to cross HONIE at 14;000 FT. R9 issued; 'Air Carrier Z stop your descent and turn 20 degrees right.' About that time the aircraft lost separation. 'Begin your speed reduction' is an ambiguous clearance; should use 'reduce to 250 KTS.'

ZTL Controller described a loss of in trail separation with ATL arrival aircraft; claiming the phraseology used by the RADAR Controller was a bit ambiguous.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

In my opinion as well as most other flight attendants that I have spoken to recently-there has been a drastic increase in the amount of personal alcohol that is being consumed on our flights. I started to take notice in mid-January when I had to write up a PAX who became intoxicated brought on by his own sake and Japanese beers. He stated that he bought them in the airport specifically to enjoy on our flight. My next incident came out of ZZZ and a gentleman was eating his deli sandwich and had a Bud Light out on the tray table. I have been picking up mini bottles of liquor that we do not sell. Mini bottles are being sold next to the kiosk in ZZZ1. A PAX in front of me at a restaurant in ZZZ2 bought a 22 oz can of beer. None of these restaurants are opening the alcohol that is purchased - allowing and making customers believe that it is alright to consume on board. It is not. It is a FAR. This needs to be addressed. The easiest solution I see; is adding another sentence following our demo announcements after saying smoking is not allowed. Consumption of personal alcohol is not as well. Or reinstating placards on the jet bridges saying that it is a finable offense; maybe passengers will heed their consumption. Our terminals are all becoming overridden with bars that line all concourses. We need to be able to monitor some consumption. In my opinion it is getting more out of control than I have ever seen.

Flight Attendant reported and observed an increase in the number of incidents of intoxicated passengers who have brought alcohol onboard flights for their own consumption during the flight. They recommended adding a sentence to the required passenger demo to include a warning about the prohibition against the consumption of any alcohol not purchased onboard.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 5217; Flight Crew Type 5217

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Flight attendants reported 2 possible inebriated passengers acting belligerent not wearing masks and disturbing surrounding passengers. Flight attendants requested personnel meet the aircraft upon arrival in ZZZ.

Air carrier Captain reported that two passengers who were possibly inebriated were acting belligerently and not complying with face mask policy.


Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I have been on the 767 fleet for over 18 years.  Historically we had an active program to inspect ducting and excessive recirc fan noise that had some success.  I have noticed that...once again that the noise on many planes; especially the 757-300 is so loud you can't hear.  I was hesitant to write it up initially as all pilots told me it was typical.  However it has gotten absurd so I did write it up on another flight.  The mechanic had no knowledge of a service bulletin to inspect ducts etc to reduce noise.This is a safety hazard.  The noise cycles based on high and low pressure bleed positions and is not same as heard on the ground when using APU.Is there still an active maintenance program to inspect 757's that have excessive noise or one to continually inspect these on an ongoing basis?Also I have flown with many copilots who possess noise cancelling headsets.  I have seen 3 or 4 versions of these including Dave Clark and U Fly Mike.  What I have noticed is while they use the headsets to cut down on ambient noise; they can't hear me often nor respond to my comments including configuration issues on takeoff and landing.  This mish mash of headset equipment options seems to differ on each flight.  There is no hot microphone for interphone.  My hearing isn't what it used to be but having the equivalent of a vacuum cleaner running in the cockpit [while] trying to communicate with ATC is a risk to safe operations.I would like to propose reinstating the 757 pneumatic noise service tips/bulletins as they are apparently not being done.  I'd also like to propose installing noise cancelling headsets in the 757 fleet as the noise is overwhelming.

A long serving B757/67 Captain stressed two factors which compromised flight crew communications. First; there is ambient noise from the air conditioning system/recirculation fans. Second; the use by some crew members of noise canceling headsets in order to lower the ambient noise; which restricts the precise communication of vital command and response exchanges between the Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring. The reporter believes the second factor is the result of the attempt to mitigate the impact of the first. He further believes that previous programs in place to monitor and mitigate the source of excess ambient noise have been abandoned; thus providing the impetus for the use of the personal noise canceling headsets. Finally; he believes the use of some of the personal headsets precludes utilization of some features of the OEM equipment intended for use during emergency conditions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Type 11000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Tower CIC/Cab coordinator. A SR22 [was] on routine VFR arrival procedure to Runway 12L. A B737 holding in position Runway 12R awaiting traffic to exit for departure. The SR22 enters left base and is cleared to land Runway 12L; read back landing clearance Runway 12L. On base aircraft turns outbound opposite runway and then realizing his mistake turns back towards the airport. The SR22 was very high and it was very difficult to see exactly which runway he was lined up for. Local Controller issued traffic to the SR22 on the B737 holding in position on Runway 12R. The SR22 acknowledges and states traffic in sight. Roll-out traffic exits and the B737 is cleared for takeoff. The SR22; still very high dives down for landing but is apparently lined up for 12R. The B737 has just started take off role and states that he is aborting his takeoff. The SR22 touches down mid way down Runway 12R and exits. The B737 is told to hold by Local Control and holds in position. When the runway is clear the B737 is cleared for takeoff and departs normally. Use of extreme caution with this procedure as it is very difficult to verify the aircraft's position on final; especially if they are high. Also; pilot training to know he can't land over another aircraft on the same runway.

Holding short of [Runway] 12R; we were monitoring the Tower frequency and heard a Cirrus aircraft being cleared to land on 12L. After the Cirrus read back cleared to land on 12L; Tower then cleared us into position for 12R. Once in position we were then cleared for takeoff. The First Officer was flying and he pushed up the power and I noticed a shadow on my left side. I then thought the sun was on my right and something was not right. I then started looking for the reason for the shadow and looked up and there he was over us and he landed right in front of us on OUR runway. We immediately aborted the takeoff and told Tower we were aborting. Cleared for takeoff and small single engine aircraft over flew us and landed on our runway.

Tower Controller described an Air Carrier aborted take off event when VFR traffic assigned a parallel runway landed over top the Air Carrier in position.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 9800; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

The recent notice - NAFB 16-03 flight advisory GPS interference testing illustrates a continuous disregard for safety of our nation's airspace navigation system. The coverage area of this test effectively grounds all GPS-equipped aircraft in the Southwest flying IFR since they may experience unknown signal loss. As explicitly stated in this notice Phenom 300 aircraft are grounded; since they are singled out to not fly in that area during this time.Another example is all aircraft operating above FL240; which requires DME. Since GPS navigation systems provide DME; an aircraft flying above 240 would also be affected and grounded.At the time that ground based NAVAIDs are being decommissioned and our government is promoting GPS based systems as primary navigation sources; the repeated interruption of GPS signals by our military [is] threatening the safety of our aviation system.

A pilot reported concerns regarding the continuing disruption of GPS signals by the military testing jamming equipment.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

We were asked to call the airport in sight roughly 20 miles out and then they cleared us for the visual approach. We asked for direct WOREX; the FAF on the ILS - as I was using that for a backup to the visual. After being cleared for the visual approach we descended down to 3100 ft; which is the crossing altitude for WOREX - due to the rising terrain the GPWS went off several times because of the peaks and valleys as we crossed over them. The weather was VFR; 10-15 miles visibility and no ceiling. Instead of climbing back up to a higher altitude we maintain 3100 feet clear of terrain; intercepted the LOC; established ourselves on the ILS and completed the visual using the ILS as a backup. I turned off the autopilot inside the FAF and hand flew the airplane to a normal landing. The rest of the flight was uneventful and normal. Both crew member immediately realized what was happening and why. Many times going into UNV; the Controllers are 'in a hurry' to clear us for the visual and hand us off; which was the case today. We both agreed to maintain current altitude as we were clear of all terrain; had extremely good visibility of our situation and surroundings and had the airport in sight; there was also no additional threats to the flights safety. On these outstation airports; simply ask for vectors to final and don't let the Controllers push you into a visual approach.

EMB-145 Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to UNV airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

I relieved the previous Controller and started working traffic. I was told that it was hard to communicate with Aircraft X because of his low altitude and the BUEC [Back up radio] was OTS. When I sat down Aircraft X was non-radar.  I saw the code for Aircraft X and tagged the data block up with the aircraft. A fter identification the MSAW flashed and I realized that the aircraft was in a 6;500 feet MIA box level at 6;000 feet MSL.  I immediately climbed the aircraft to 7;000 feet MSL for the remainder of his flight.Recommendation: We have been trained to check the MIA.  It was a mistake and no recommendations needed.

ZLC ARTCC Controller reported realizing an aircraft was at the wrong altitude for his sector an initiated an immediate climb.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 0; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 0; Flight Attendant Total 0; Flight Attendant Type 0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I wanted to report a serious safety issue that occurred. Our flight was in the process of landing; and I was seated in the very rear of the plane; two rows in from the back. During the landing process; our plane hit turbulence and two large metal containers flew out of the rear of the plane and hit the gentlemen next to my chair. I asked him if he was injured; he held his head; and didn't response. I asked him again; and he said he'd be ok. Thank God this wasn't worse.Several times during the flight passengers got up while the seat belt sign was off. Several passengers were told to sit down; but after not speaking English; were allowed to continue waiting for the laboratories to open up. When this event occurred these large containers flew out at a fast speed; and I honestly think could have killed any passengers; had any been breaking the rules at that point. [I observed that] the latches holding these bins in were clearly not closed. I find this to be a safety issue; not only because there obviously wasn't proper training on ensuring the safety of the passengers by closing the latches; but I also feel there should be safety mechanisms that should alert flight attendants if these latches are not closed while the bins are in place.

A passenger reported that large metal containers from the galley were displaced in turbulence and made contact with a passenger's head.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

As I approached this airport for landing as a fuel stop; I called 15 miles inbound and made initial contact with tower. On right base I requested to land long to proceed to east end of 11;000 feet runway to my fuel supplier to take on fuel. I was approved to land as requested. Proceeded to fuel supplier. Truck pulled up and driver notified me that airport would be closing [in fifteen minutes] but that they would do a quick fueling and that I would get out on time. Gave line crew my fuel instructions and went into office to start writing out my payment check. The manager behind the counter repeated the notice that airport would be closing [in fifteen minutes] but that they would get me out before closure. As we watched fuel crew fill my 5 tanks (I had 1;000 miles to my destination) it became obvious that they would not be finished before the closure time. The manager said that she would call the tower and airport manager and 'Get me out' once fueling had been completed. Once fueling was done; she was still on the phone with airport authorities. She made a hand motion for me to get moving while she completed securing permission. I got in the plane; started up and started moving toward the taxiway; approximately 800 yards; until I could clear new building construction in progress and be seen by the tower.During that taxi time I called to notify ground where I was and what was being requested on my behalf. I did not receive a radio reply. I called again as the tower could now see me coming out from behind the new buildings and approached taxiway A. Still no reply. No other radio talk either but this is not strange for this small quiet airport. I moved 300 yards to the hold short line of runway and called ground once again; with no response. Switched to tower and called three times with no response. Knew that my radio was transmitting as I saw the TX indicator light. There was no other radio traffic; nothing moving on the runway or taxiway; no men or equipment working anywhere on the airport. There has been pavement repair work ongoing on the taxiway A for the past year; but not today. I thought; that when they close a class D airport; the tower must close as well. I treated my departure as an uncontrolled field departure; announced my intentions; took off and joined my filed departure route. Time was now [fifteen minutes past airport closing time].   Climbing out on course; going through approximately 8;000 feet; with a filed cruise altitude of 180; I felt that I had to attempt to contact Center somehow to let them know who I was; where I was; get a squawk code and activate my flight plan. It dawned on me that I had a main transmitter that had failed in some manner; but that I had a hand held VHF transceiver on board. Found it in my flight bag; tuned to the Center frequency and made contact. Got the flight plan activated; picked up a squawk code and was then told to contact tower at [departure airport]. Center gave me a phone number to call. I dug my cell phone from my flight bag and attempted to phone the number provided. At the time; I was 40 miles out from the airport and was out of cellphone range. I tried to make contact with the tower with my hand held radio but was also out of range at this time. Right about now my main vacuum pump decided that it had worked long enough and just died. Low vac alarms and lights started flashing. Just what I needed to further complicate my flight. I then decided to first fly the airplane; get to altitude; establish cruise; engage autopilot and THEN try to sort out the vac and radio problems. While completing my climb; I could hear other transmissions on my hand held as well as center talk.I then tried to transmit on my main radio and heard a reply on my hand held. I knew then that I could talk on my main radio and receive on my hand held. Now; to sort out why. I discovered that the noise canceling headset that I had been using had failed in receive mode. My spare was in a padded case; under the rear seat; blocked from my reach by luggage; an oxygen tank; life raft; tool box. Could not be reached in flight my me as single pilot. I made a note of the tower phone number and to call them when I landed. I continued to troubleshoot the lack of reception and found that the speaker switch on the audio panel was in off position. The plane had just completed an annual inspection and major avionics work. I do not normally have the speaker on when I use a noise canceling head sets. Turned it on and was back to full radio function without having to use a portable radio with limited range. As I do have a standby electric vac system; I turned it on and restored vacuum function.I completed the balance of my flight as filed; transmitting on my main radio and listening on speaker. Immediately upon landing; I called the tower [at the last departure] reached the tower supervisor. He told me that the controller that had been on duty had left for the day. He was on duty. I identified myself and gave the reason for my call. He said that he knew nothing about any incident occurring that afternoon. No report had been passed on to him by the afternoon controller. He suggested that I call [on a specific date] as he would be on duty at that time. I did just that; called and reached a very unhappy [controller] and after starting to apologize and attempt to explain what I believe had happened; he told me that he had already filed his report. I said that I guess any further explanation would not be beneficial and terminated my call.In rethinking the chain of events that led up to my violation of ATC instructions; I submit the following:I wonder why the controller did not state that the airport would be closing in 15 mins when I called in on base leg stating that I was going to fuel. I had sufficient fuel onboard to fly to another airport. I do realize that he had no obligation to do so and that I should have known about this closure before hand.When I got the notification of this closure at the FBO while fueling; I should have remained in the office until I was informed that a departure had been approved and by whom. I was too eager to make my IFR departure clearance time slot. I should have asked for the tower phone number at that time; called and stated my request and asked for a departure clearance myself.After starting my taxi from the fuel pumps; I should have recognized a communication problem while on the ground by the fact that there were no transmissions of any kind to be heard. If an inoperative radio that prevented all communication; get it repaired before further flight. My emergency standby radio is just for that purpose… An in flight emergency. I could have moved a few pieces of luggage while on the ground; reached my spare headset and resolved this problem after troubleshooting.

The pilot of a C210 reported departing after airport closure due to miscommunication with local airport personnel and ATC.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 150

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 200

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

The PIC (non-flying) pilot for the leg was on board the running helicopter so we could cool the interior for a passenger leg; I (SIC-flying) had just escorted the passenger to the awaiting aircraft for the trip. I strapped into the helicopter and proceeded to do the final checklist items prior to take off from a non-movement area when the PIC called ready for takeoff. The controller told us to proceed to the intersection V/B in the movement area; however we thought it safer to depart from the non-movement area due to personnel and equipment between us and the intersection. The PIC asked for an amended clearance and told them that we would not 'hit anything' on our departure; [but we were] told to standby. During this period; several aircraft were also receiving ATC instructions on the frequency as several [aircraft were] departing at close intervals. Through the radio chatter; over the intercom the PIC told me we were cleared to go; I queried him and said 'I didn't hear them tell us departure from the non-movement area is at our own risk; cleared for take-off' and his reply was 'you won't hear that here'! At his insistence; I proceeded with the take-off; flying a direct course to [our destination]. He immediately contacted departure control with our altitude and on course heading which was met with 'who is checking in'; I knew then we had taken off without a clearance. After some initial vectoring we were cleared on course and prior to the hand off were told of the possible deviation and given a number to call.I should have insisted on clarification; however was hesitant due to his experience and my relatively low time against the demeanor of the Captain and the need to meet our passenger's itinerary. Our normal protocol is everyone should be clear on ATC instructions however this one fell through the cracks.

Called tower to get departure instruction VFR helicopter flight. I requested on Ground frequency to depart from the non-movement area. We were told to contact Departure. (later surmised this was for another aircraft with the same last three [call sign]; broadcast on the local frequency and ground.)The Tower was on a single frequency and we were transmitting on Ground. We picked up to a hover in the non-movement area and intended to call the Tower on the local frequency to check our departure status. The Tower then asked for our departure direction and desired course. I responded with takeoff into the wind 300 then 040 to [our destination]. I took this to mean that departure was approved; knowing as usual that this is at our own risk.We then departed squawking the assigned code from our VFR clearance issued by the Tower and called Departure only to discover that they were not expecting us. We were issued vectors; complied; handed off to another sector and then were advised to make a phone call back to Tower after landing.I made the phone call and talked to the controller in charge. It was pointed out that we were not issued 'departure from the north ramp will be at your own risk.' With both Ground and local frequencies in use; my transmissions and others were partially blocked as well as some Tower conversations. This led to the misunderstanding of contact Departure and our premature takeoff lacking the above phraseology.

Helicopter flight crew reported taking off without clearance due to communication confusion in the cockpit.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 8900; Flight Crew Type 660

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The incident took place at Bogotá Eldorado International airport. We were on Taxiway A holding short of Taxiway L preparing to depart Runway 31R. Tower Control then issued taxi instructions 'position and hold Runway 31R'. We asked the Tower if they meant 'line up and wait 31R' and Tower reissued 'position and hold 31R'. We then believed the Tower Control meant 'line up and wait'. We then taxied the aircraft into line up and wait on Runway 31R. When on the runway; we noticed an aircraft on a modified base to final for Runway 13L. We immediately called the Tower about the approaching aircraft (approximately 4 mile final). Tower the issued a go around to the aircraft for Runway 13L. The aircraft were never in danger of collision. After the go around we were allowed to depart Runway 31R with out incident. It's my belief the incident was 100% caused by language barrier and non standard ATC phraseology. I believe Tower meant for us to 'hold short' of Runway 31R and should not have used the word 'position' in their clearance which was the old phraseology for 'position and hold'. The situational awareness was made worse by the Tower in giving ATC instructions to the arriving aircraft in Spanish which did not allow us to have a more clear understanding of the intentions of ATC and aircraft in the traffic pattern.

We were cleared via M; R and A to Runway 31R for departure. We were instructed to hold short of Taxiway L; which is located about 1;000 FT prior to the approach end of Runway 31R; and is the last intersecting taxiway on A. Holding short for about 3 to 5 minutes; Tower instructed us to 'taxi position and hold;' which we interpreted as to mean the obsolete wording of 'taxi INTO position and hold;' now ('line-up and wait'). After starting to taxi; the Captain asked the First Officer to confirm that we were cleared to taxi onto the runway and hold. The First Officer asked the Tower; 'confirm taxi into position and hold;' which the Tower acknowledged: '(call-sign) taxi position and hold.' We then performed our takeoff checklist; including turning the nose wheel landing light and white strobe lights to 'ON;' and taxied on to Runway 31R and lined up. While doing so we saw another airplane on short final (approximately 500-800 FT AGL) on the opposite Runway 13L. At this point the Captain stated; 'This does not look right;' and then asked the Tower; 'Bogota Tower; should we be on the runway? We are on the runway!' SKBO Tower answered; '(call-sign) hold your position!' then in Spanish ordered the other airplane to go-around. We were subsequently cleared for takeoff. I believe the following contributed to the runway incursion: 1) non-standard and heavily accented phraseology by Tower (who may have meant 'taxi and hold short Runway 31R.) 2) Ambiguity by the First Officer to clarify the Tower clearance (he should have asked: 'confirm (call-sign) is cleared to line up and wait Runway 31R). 3) Loss of some situational awareness by B767 crew (us) because we did not know there was another airplane on final; since the communication between that airplane and Tower was in Spanish.

B767 flight crew reports being issued reports being issued a position and hold clearance by SKBO Tower. After double checking the crew lines up on Runway 31R and observes and aircraft turning final for Runway 13L and advises the Tower. The Tower issues a go around to the landing aircraft.


Final Approach; Initial Approach; Initial Climb; Climb

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

I have two questions/concerns: 1) We could use some clarification regarding minimum altitudes to begin turns after departure from MIA. The problem seems to be centered upon the different altitudes in the Obstacle DP on the [Page] 10-9A and those on the SIDS. The differences are significant and need to be reconciled. 2) Can anyone shed light on the Note #5 in the header section of the 11-3 ILS or LOC RWY (Runway) 9 chart; 'Autopilot coupled approach not authorized'? As per the AIM and Company's FOM definitions; a coupled approach refers to any approach performed by the autopilot. This is obviously not the same definition as an auto landing. There are currently exist 2 NOTAMs concerning autopilot usage; one for ILS RWY 9 and one for the ILS RWY 26L. Neither refer to auto landings. If the FAA meant to restrict auto landings on Runway 9 it should be clearly stated in the header notes or in a NOTAM. The way it is currently written leads one to believe ILS or LOC approaches to Runway 9 must be hand flown.Poorly written Jeppesen notes.Clarify with succinct verbiage.

Captain reported being confused and asking for clarification with departure procedures out of Miami and additionally on arrival regarding the term;  'Autopilot coupled approach not authorized.'


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47; Flight Crew Total 14244; Flight Crew Type 10578

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 126; Flight Crew Total 10019

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On final approach to ZZZ XXL ILS we received a TCAS RA. Normally we get that when an aircraft is on final to XXR. We could not find the other aircraft. We then received an RA to climb and did so. I looked straight below us out the right window and saw the intruder. He was directly below us appearing to also flying to XXL. We got to about 400 feet directly above him before we got the RA. We notified ATC and they responded that the aircraft was on the ILS to XXR. He obviously wasn't. We discontinued the approach and eventually landed on XYR. Fortunately we had not taken the advice on the 10-7 page and selected TA only. If we had; we would have had a midair.

Cleared ILS XXL approach; was not informed that there was an aircraft on XXR; did not hear the aircraft on the XXR approach or the airplane  was not on same frequency. Received a TCAS RA; 1st Officer looked out window and told me that there was an airplane below [us].  Followed TCAS RA; flew the missed approach. Didn't turn the TCAS to TA only because we were on an ILS approach and we were not informed of traffic on XXR.

A320 pilot crew reported receiving an RA on final approach and executing a missed approach. Crew reported RA was late; ATC did not issue traffic advisory and transponder was not in TA only mode as per company policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 355; Flight Crew Type 349

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Departed and started to head east. Flew 50 miles when visibility started to deteriorate slightly. Flew over a ravine [and] made emergency landing in a field due to IMC conditions.

C177 pilot reported landing in a field after encountering IMC weather conditions in flight.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1 on Aircraft X operating as Flight X the forward captain side window heating element started to spark; and smoke could be seen coming from the unit. The crew quickly shut power off to the unit; followed the appropriate checklist; and pulled the circuit breaker for the windshield heat. [We advised ATC]; and we headed directly to ZZZZ1 airport. The office was contacted via sat phone and informed about our situation and talked to Name about further actions that may be needed. While on approach; the Controller started to vector us around; and we told him that we were unable and were flying directly to the field for a visual approach. The Controller then tried to vector us behind other traffic; and we told them unable and told them of our intentions of flying a visual pattern to the airport and that we needed priority handling as we had requested it. The aircraft landed safely; and the fire department looked over the plane. An inspector met the crew; and contact info was given; and we were told to have [Operations] reach out to him.

Captain reported an electrical failure of the cockpit window heat caused a diversion and precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1576; Flight Crew Type 800

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Descending with vectors from the LARKS8 arrival on an IFR flight plan from ZZZ to APA.  Encountered severe clear air turbulence at approximately 12;500 MSL in the descent over the front range of the Rockies.  Turbulence came on immediately with no prior turbulence. Could not maintain assigned altitude or heading.  I reduced speed to maneuvering speed; deployed the gear and maintained wings level. I reported to Denver Approach that I was below assigned altitude and encountering severe turbulence. I was cleared to a lower altitude and turbulence abated at about 8;500 MSL.  I made a pilot report to Denver approach.  Landing with gusts to 30 kts out of the west was uneventful on runway 28 at APA. This was the worst turbulence I have experience in the Cessna 425 and I have several hundred hours of time in type and have flown the LARKS8 STAR often.

Cessna 425 pilot reported he encountered severe clear air turbulence on descent to APA on the LARKS8 Arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188; Flight Crew Type 11000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were not rushing and the entire crew was content with what was happening timewise. Everything seemed normal as we started and taxied for takeoff. All checklist were completed in a timely manner; but when the before takeoff checklist was performed; I missed that the FO had placed both engine bleed switches off and the APU bleed on. When I looked to verify; I saw two switches one direction and the APU switch in the opposite direction and my brain just did not register that all three were wrong.I have absolutely no idea why the FO would reverse all three switches; but he did. A key factor in this is that the FO's employee number would imply that he has been with the Company for over nine years; yet he has only been here from another carrier for about half a year and is new to the 737. So; there is an implied level of trust based on employee number and there is no requirement for him to tell me he is inexperienced. I was not watching him like he was a new guy; but I should have been. I noticed a problem with the air conditioning system not putting out much air as we were climbing and then at the 10;000 foot checklist I noticed the pressurization problem. I leveled the aircraft; examined the AC system and found the switches reversed. Resolved problem according to checklist; repressurized the aircraft and continued.

B737-700 Captain failed to notice that the relatively inexperienced First Officer had improperly set the engine bleed and APU control switches on prefight. The error was caught and corrected when performing the 10;000 foot checklist.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Climbing out of ZZZZ; around FL200; we noticed rhythmics jolts in the aircraft and saw the Number 1 engine surging with a high EGT. After addressing the problem with the immediate action items followed by the QRH checklist; we no longer had control over the engine and decided to return to ZZZZ. FO in the right seat was PF; CA in left seat; PM; managed the situation; ran immediate action items and set-up the return; FOs in the observer seats ran QRH; obtained weather and performance; contacted Operations and company. CRM and task distribution worked exactly as they should. Due to the still unusually high EGT; we shut the engine down in our descent. We landed normally.

B747-400 First Officer reported noticing 'rhythmic jolts' during climbout followed by a Number 1 Engine surge and high EGT.  Flight decided to return to the departure airport and shut down the engine during the approach.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 6250; Flight Crew Type 630

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Distraction

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

RUNWAY INCURSION - MILITARY HELICOPTER HOVERING OVER ACTIVE RUNWAY BLOCKING LANDING TRAFFIC I was the First Officer; non pilot flying crewmember on a flight carrying 1 passenger to AVQ landing about on Runway 30. After touchdown; the crew saw a hovering helicopter 3-5 feet above the ground; on the runway centerline; halfway down the runway.  Evasive action by drifting right of centerline was required to avoid collision during rollout.Multiple calls were made to the Unicom before arriving in the pattern and in the pattern; announcing runway number and airport called.  The helicopter pilot later confirmed that he heard our call for upwind leg.  No response was received to any of our calls.  Due to the dark color of the helicopter (Olive Drab) and the dark runway; the helicopter was not visible to either of us until after touchdown; when it was visible against the horizon. There was not enough time to stop before the helicopter while remaining on the runway centerline.  However; there remained about 10-12 seconds of time to slowly drift to the right of centerline to pass by the helicopter using a smooth evasive maneuver.

An air taxi crew landed on AVQ Runway 30 after proper CTAF arrival communications then after touchdown saw a military helicopter hovering over the runway centerline halfway down but were able to swerve around the dark aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During my after start procedure; the corner of my eye caught the circuit breaker panel behind the Captain's seat and I noticed that CBP-1; D2 'RCCB; APU BATT' was tripped. We received no indications of anything abnormal. No EICAS messages; nothing abnormal on the AC or DC synoptic pages. We were running behind because of an aircraft swap and we were working as hard as possible to get the flight moving as quickly as possible. I asked the Captain if we could please take a few moments and contact Maintenance Control about the breaker. The Captain spoke with the Dispatcher and later Maintenance Control; who directed the Captain to reset the circuit breaker and once it stayed back in; said that we were 'all set' and that 'some airplanes just do that during the power transfers.' Looking back; I did not have a warm cozy feeling about this and I regret departing without a more appropriate resolution.I was not fully satisfied with the Maintenance Controller's directive as it was lacking appropriate diagnosis and formal corrective action. I felt pressured to depart from many sources; including my fellow crew; especially now having the 'blessing' of Maintenance Control. The flight was uneventful and the circuit breaker did not trip again until we arrived at our destination. When we arrived and when the power transferred from the engine generators to the APU during engine shutdown; the same breaker tripped again. The Captain contacted Maintenance Control and once again they directed him to reset it. The Captain petitioned the Maintenance Controller for a more official resolution and a logbook entry was made. Maintenance directed the Captain to balance the entry with a corrective action; and while I don't remember the exact wording; it was essentially an info-only 'no action required per [Maintenance Control.]' Frankly I find it unfathomable that Maintenance Control can not only allow; but encourage the continued operation of this aircraft in this condition. Maintenance Control's failure to appropriately diagnose and correct the condition causing the circuit breaker to trip. Additionally; timely performance pressure from the operation and fellow crew members that rushed my decision making and failed to allow time for me to formulate an argument for why we should not be departing.Investigate why Maintenance Control is giving directives to reset circuit breakers without first determining the cause in accordance with CFM Ch. 4. Provide more clear guidance for crews who encounter similar situations; to educate us on whether we should refuse such directives from Maintenance Control or whether they are appropriate. Evaluate whether resetting circuit breakers outside of an established fault reset procedure with the intention of departing is safe; smart and legal.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported noncompliance to MEL and GMM procedures regarding the multiple resets of circuit breakers without proper maintenance action.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 13900; Flight Crew Type 2000

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Confusion

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Approximately 6 NM prior to our NMAC we were issued VFR traffic at 12 o'clock; opposite direction; maintaining 4;500 FT MSL. Our TCAS confirmed the approximate location of the issued target and of an aircraft indicating 500 FT ABOVE our altitude of 4;000 FT MSL. Shortly after the traffic was issued; we obtained visual contact with a single engine Cessna type aircraft and advised the Controller that this traffic was in sight. At a TCAS range of 2.5 NM; suddenly and without ANY indication from the intruder aircraft; we observed the nose of the Cessna pitching rapidly down (10-15 degrees) and rolling slightly to his right. We received an RA to descend; followed immediately by an RA to increase descent. As the intruder aircraft disappeared under the nose of our aircraft; we received a climb RA. We responded to the climb RA and advised New York Approach of the RA maneuver. It is my firm belief that had we initially responded to both descent guidance commands we would have not been able to avoid the Cessna vertically. The only reason that descent guidance was not followed was that we had that aircraft in sight and realized he was committed to an unwarranted extreme avoidance maneuver of his own. After receiving a clear of conflict advisory; I requested an explanation from the Controller who queried the Cessna pilot for a reason for his action. It was at that point that I realized he was actually being flight followed by New York Approach and in contact with that Controller. The pilot of the Cessna stated that we 'appeared to be at his altitude'. The Controller responded; 'Sir you just dove through his altitude'. In this instance; 'see and avoid' proved to provide the only fail-safe method of avoidance. The pilot of the other aircraft who was operating VFR and maintaining an appropriate VFR altitude elected to maneuver contrary to his originally correct orientation without verifying with the Controller flight following him of our altitude assignment.

A close encounter--the result of authorized 500 FT vertical IFR/VFR separation--turned into an NMAC when the pilot of a light plane; apparently believing their altitudes to be equal; initiated aggressive avoidance maneuvers with respect to the reporter's Global Express. The reporter expressed his belief that; based on his visual observations; the initial TCAS RAs which resulted would have aggravated the event.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were descending on the BLUZZ1 Rnav arrival. We had been cleared to Descend Via and had set 3000 in the attitude window. We were in LNAV and VNAV. We had just reviewed a new ATIS that indicated Runway 9 and the 36s were in use. Previously it had been 27 and the 36s. We had loaded 27 thinking it was a possibility. We received a drag required message. Our position was passing SPKER at about 14;500. Our speed was about 10 knots fast. Speed brake was extended to slow the aircraft. Understanding that we were where we needed to be; I began to load 36R in the FMS. While doing this the aircraft continued to descend instead of lose airspeed. As a result we got down to 13200 at the BLUZZ intersection before returning to 14000 at LTOWN. I can only think that changing the approach while near an altitude restriction had resulted in a negative outcome. We corrected back to the path as soon as we realized the deviation. On the human error side I believe I chose a poor time to change the approach in the FMS. I should have done a better job monitoring the correction to the proper speed. I made the mistake of thinking the frag required message would be resolved by the speed brake without any altitude deviation. The system issue is that it appears that changing the approach may have affected the ability of the aircraft to maintain the path.

We realized we were at 13200 feet prior to LTOWN; disconnected the autopilot and climbed back to 14000 ft. We are not sure why the autopilot did not respect the altitude restriction; but the Captain and I surmise that it might have something to do with him loading the FMS approach because there was a change in runways from what was expected (27 changed to 36R).

Air carrier flight crew reported their aircraft descended below an RNAV Arrival crossing restriction when a runway change was entered in the FMC.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

The pilot monitoring preflight procedure was completed by myself and preflight checklist was completed as normal.  During initial climb we noticed that the landing gear took longer to retract than normal but then retracted with no abnormal indications.  On approach in ZZZ the landing gear handle was selected down and we both noticed that the main gear dropped but the nose gear was taking longer than normal.  Shortly after this the 'gear disagree' warning message and aural alert displayed.  This lasted for just a few seconds before the nose gear dropped and the 3 green landing gear indicators were displayed.  A normal landing was completed in ZZZ without any issue.  Upon the shutdown flow by the First Officer he noticed that the hydraulic pump 3A switch was in the off position.  Upon further investigation we noticed the 3A switch was very loose and could easily flip from the on to off position without any much pressure from us.  We contacted maintenance to let them know of the slow gear retract and extension and the loose hydraulic pump 3A switch.We believe the 3A hydraulic pump switch may have worked its way into the off position during taxi for takeoff or during the takeoff roll due to high vibration.

Flight Crew flying CRJ-200 experienced problems with gear retraction and extension.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 6407; Flight Crew Type 2944

Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

While on the ZZZZZ 4 arrival; about 5 miles prior to ZZZZZ; we checked in with ZZZ approach who assigned us Runway XXR RNAV visual approach.  We normally get ILS XYL; and were briefed for this.  There was some confusion about the assignment; so I confirmed; at which point ATC gave us RNAV Visual XXL.  I loaded the RNAV XXL into the FMC; but shortly after realized there was an RNAV Visual; like we would use in ZZZ1.  There was a short discussion about how to get the waypoint sequenced correctly; due to the multiple FMC changes; but we got it sorted.  At some point prior to ZZZZZ1; the Captain asked about it being a hard 6;000 feet crossing (not 'at or above'); then he turned off the autopilot.  I was not prepared for all the cross-checking  challenges that I was now responsible for. This was my first leg in 2.5 months; but felt 'up to speed' for the flight up until this point.  As we approached 6;000 feet; the Captain did not arrest his descent rate and flew through the altitude.  I announced that he was 300 feet low.  After a few seconds; I couldn't recognize him correcting; so I announced it again.  He called for additional flaps and began to recover to 6;000 feet.There was no terrain warnings; nor ATC involvement.  We landed normally.  ATC said the runway change was due to winds; but winds were reported as calm upon arrival.

Air carrier First Officer reported the crew experienced an altitude deviation while the Captain was hand-flying the approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Clear day on SUMMA departure; requested a VFR climb to the southwest side of Mt. Rainier through 17;500 then proceed on course; all terrain in sight. Cleared as requested. FO as PF ; pointed jet to southwest side of the mountain; but a 50 kt wind out of the southwest showed the aircraft track direct to the mountain. I noticed this and was about to ask the FO to turn slightly right of course; when we received a terrain warning; which he complied with and warning went away. Terrain always in sight; but we should have adjusted to ground track into the wind to avoid the warning.Better ground track to compensate for wind.

Air carrier Captain reported terrain alert during climb.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 104; Flight Crew Type 104

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I was coming to land on Runway XX. There was a 5-kt. crosswind from the right and I corrected for the wind. I was about 70 kt. in the final due to the crosswind. I rounded out and touched down. Due to the crosswind; the plane went towards the right of the centerline and I tried to correct it by turning left. The plane went more towards the left of the centerline and I tried to correct it back towards the center. I lost control at this point and the plane kept moving towards the left off the runway and into the grass. The plane leaned forward; slowed down; and came to a full stop in the grass. I shut down the magnetos; shut off the fuel; fuel pump; and master. Then I called the CTAF frequency and called the flight school. I think overcontrolling the plane with foot brakes on made me lose control and go off the runway.

PA-28 pilot reported a loss of control during the landing rollout due to improper crosswind correction technique and the aircraft departed off the left side of the runway; stopping in the grass.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 93; Flight Crew Type 93

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

[I] saw that the local marine layer; with low clouds; was beginning to come in on the north side of the airport. Local AWOS indicated 'few clouds at 600.' [I] misjudged their distance and thought they were further away than they were. Wind was coming from 330 at 8 KTS; so I took off to the north into the wind. I immediately saw my mistake as the low clouds loomed in front of me. They were right above the north end of the runway and directly in my flight path; seemingly lower than reported on the AWOS. Thinking quickly; I turned crosswind at 425 FT MSL...to help get turned around as quickly as possible. As I turned crosswind; I clipped the edge of one of the clouds and was briefly in partial IMC. Once clear of the cloud; I turned downwind and departed to the south.A mountain range was very close to the airport; meaning very high terrain within a short distance. Failure to maintain situational awareness could have been deadly. A more prolonged incursion into IMC; or focusing so much on avoiding clouds that I forgot about the high terrain; could have resulted in a crash. The best choice would have been to remain on the ground; but I did not want to get myself and my two passengers stuck there if the airport went IFR.The next best choice would have been to use the opposite runway and takeoff to the south; but I did not think about taking off with a light tailwind since I had never done so previously. I was engaged in rigid thinking that I must always takeoff into the wind; no matter what. My failure to judge how far away the clouds were was primarily the result of a lack of experience judging cloud distances and relying on my instructor to verify cloud clearance for me during training.

C172 pilot misjudged the proximity of clouds and inadvertently went into IMC immediately after takeoff from a non-towered airport. Pilot was able to regain visual flight and clear nearby high terrain after completing a turn to downwind.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working [two sectors] combined. An A320 asked for a lower altitude because of choppy ride conditions. The A320 was at FL310 which is the lower limit of my stratum in that area. I put an interim altitude of FL310 in the data block; and entered an assigned altitude of FL290 and initiated the hand off to the sector below me. The hand off was accepted and the interim altitude was taken out by the lower controller and I gave the A320 the descent. Shortly after the A320 started their descent and were passing through FL304; the pilot of the A320 advised that 'he had traffic at FL290 right in front of him at his 11 o'clock. I didn't see a limited data block because FL290 was below my altitude limits so I tried to quick look [the lower sector] twice; not realizing they were combined with [another sector]. Just as the A320 showed FL302; The CA started to flash and I saw a PC12 level at FL290 right below the A320. I immediately advised the A320 to maintain FL300 and called [the lower sector] but they were in the middle of a transmission; I then received a call from what I think was the D-Side at [the lower sector] and I advised that I had stopped the A320 at FL300. I never saw the A320 go below FL300 and I do not believe there was a loss of separation; however; if the A320 had been descending faster and/or had not been paying attention to the traffic either through his TCAS or visually this would have been a loss of separation with a very low MOC. The RADAR targets were very close to being right on top of each other. The A320 pilot didn't say he received an RA so I believe he was just watching his TCAS or had visually scene the aircraft. This is my second facility. If there was one thing that bothered me most about the way traffic is worked at [my first Center] it would be the use of what we call the 'flash through' or interim altitude procedure. This procedure in my mind is dangerous and should not be used the way it is used here. Basically; if you have an aircraft that wants higher or lower; the procedure here is to put in higher or lower the data block and flash to the next sector. The next sector then accepts the hand off and takes out the interim or assigns another interim they can accept the traffic at and the transferring controller assigns the aircraft that altitude. To take this one step further; if the aircraft is close to the boundary of another sector; the initial receiving controller can elect to 'flash the aircraft on to the next sector'. There have been plenty of times when I have seen this procedure create confusing situations and also more work for controllers through the resulting coordination. It is extremely easy to create an unsafe situation with this procedure as seen with the above example with the PC12 and the A320. I have tried voicing my concern about this procedure since I started training on the floor and it has taken me a long time to even begin to become comfortable with it. This procedure is so ingrained that it is almost impossible not to participate in it and still work traffic. Obviously; because it is the accepted practice here; it is difficult to voice my concern and have it met with open ears. I think it is a misconstrued use of AIT procedures and I would like to see this procedure stopped or at least used with more restriction.

Enroute Controller described a near separation loss; claiming the facility 'flash through' procedures are dangerous and should be terminated.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Staffing; Weather; Company Policy

[This] night was an overall failure across many levels. Coming on shift I was told that traffic volume was expected to be very light with no weather. The night was okay until around evening. Traffic was picking up and weather was building in the sector. At no time was the area ever briefed on a plan to re-route aircraft or about aircraft that were coming our way. It was just all dumped on us and we had to figure it out. At the super high sectors I had terrible rides; a very high volume of traffic (over a full page on the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET)); and almost every aircraft I had was deviating. Our staffing was very low and there was no one to help except for my Assist with his instructor. Once his instructor got pulled off training to go help someone else who was completely down the tubes; it was just me on the Radar with an Assist trainee that has 0 sectors under his belt. He was helping me search for traffic; pointing things out; etc. I sat there and felt like I was fighting for my life multiple times during that session.We have four main flows in those two sectors going south. North bound there are two flows. One on the west side that runs north one on the east side. The majority of flights going south were deviating far east. A few would try to pick their way through the weather area; but they would end up taking hard turns to avoid large pockets. A Sector to the east had all their traffic re-routed into our airspace travelling northbound. An adjaent Center was supposed to re-route all their metro traffic to us north bound; but only about half had the new routing. There was no spacing given to us; and as I was told; none requested from Traffic management Unit (TMU). Stacks of 2 and 3 going to the same airport happened over and over. I don't understand how that situation was allowed to transpire. I'll continue the rest of this in bullet statements to make it easier to follow along.Why was that amount of aircraft allowed to come through those sectors when we're always preached at about Supervisor's not wanting sectors to get 'RED'? Why is the only recourse or fix action for me to shut off the sectors around me when I know they're working just as hard as I am? Is that really the way to solve the issue? Why is staffing so low; or planning so poor; that we're at the end of a weather night with no one to help?Why did no one see that aircraft weren't staying on their routes? Where was the 'playbook' that should've rerouted them over another airway? Why are we told over and over and over that the Command Center is over riding what our weather and Traffic Management folks recommended? Why weren't any flights capped? Why didn't we have spacing requirements on the arrivals that we were taking? Why wasn't the adjacent Center required to have the arrivals on proper routing?This is not how any ARTCC is supposed to be run. It was all completely reactionary and dangerous. Time after time during that session I felt like I and the aircraft under my control were in a dangerous situation. After asking for a Journeyman Assist I was provided one approximately 15 minutes later. Up until then; it was me and an Assist trainee with zero sectors to his name.This center combines and de-combines sectors based on staffing and not on traffic volume. This exact scenario happens time after time after time. We're always told 'We're looking into it' or 'We're doing a system review' or 'just shut the other sectors off if you're too busy'. Is that really the answer? This needs to be fixed. It's a systematic failure of the National Airspace System (NAS). The Command Center has a large roll in this and they need to be held accountable.There is going to be a serious aircraft accident if these systematic issues are not taken care of. I could not have handled an emergency or any other task added on during this session. I was working very hard and half way through the session I felt completely worn out. If there are going to be mass re-routes; require the aircraft to be on the routes they need to be on. Give us at least 5 miles in trail. Don't let a sector stay combined with 46-50 aircraft in the arrival list. If Traffic Management Unit sees that every aircraft is deviating off their routes by 60-75 miles; then start changing routes. Cap aircraft altitudes. Use miles in trail restrictions to give us a fighting chance.Have Operation Managers be engaged in what's happening in the Center. Have the Supervisors give us a heads up when they know we've got 10-15 aircraft heading our way that are all going to deviate opposite flow across all our traffic. Why is it that I have no idea we're getting offloads deviating until I get a mass of aircraft handed off to me? Pre-plan.The last thing I'd add is a statement that I made in the previous block. I feel like this center combines and splits sectors based on manning and not based on traffic. On heavy staffing days we're constantly required to split sectors when they're 'green' or 'projected to go yellow'. We're told by the Supervisors that 'The Operation Managers watch their sectors like hawks' and 'They can't justify leaving them split'. [On this] night I worked those two sectors combined and I know they were 'red'. On top of that; no one liked their ride and they all wanted to deviate; along with route changed for multiple aircraft.I was set up for failure by all the people/groups that are supposed to be there as a back-stop for safety. My Operations Manager told me that the Command Center was mad that we weren't taking more aircraft and that he was having to do paperwork to explain what was going on. Why doesn't he have the ability to manage the Center? Why isn't he looking at the flows and looking at the red sectors and calling the Supervisor asking what is going on and what can they do to help?

ZDC Center Controller reported their shift was under staffed and overloaded with traffic due to weather deviations. The Controller reported the Traffic Management Units did not properly manage the traffic situation.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was working LCC [Local Control Center] position. We were departing Runways 36R and 27. We were landing Runways 36R/C. Aircraft X had been cleared to land on Runway 36R approximately at a 10 mile final. I believe 3 aircraft were taxied to depart Runway 36R and 2 for Runway 27. A question arose in the Tower as to our responsibility as to how to coordinate like fixes departing into different departure sectors; as this was the situation I had in front of me at the 2 departure runways. I allowed myself to enter the conversation. My mind got side tracked and fixated on my departure bay. As best as I can tell; this is where I lost sight of the picture and cleared a GA aircraft off Runway 27 and Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway 36R. I had lost track of the fact that I had an aircraft cleared to land on 36R. The ASDE/AMASS alarmed as Aircraft X was on half mile final and Aircraft Y was starting departure roll. I immediately sent Aircraft X around 36R and climbed to 4;000 feet; turned right to 090 heading. I could not visually see Aircraft Y to determine his speed so I did not abort his takeoff clearance. I need to stay out of conversations when working traffic. Particularly when we are in bad weather/low visibility situations. My focus on the situation was compromised by a work relevant question; but I should not engage in the conversation in that situation. My scan broke down.

On very short final; RWY 36R; about 100 feet AGL with the First Officer (Pilot Flying) having disconnected the autopilot in preparation for touchdown after an approach conducted in IMC (RVR 5000 and OVC 002) CVG Tower instructed us to 'Go-Around.' So we did. About the time the gear was transiting to the up position Tower called to give us alternate missed approach instructions. What I heard was 'Climb to 3;000 and turn right heading 060. Because these instructions came during a very busy period in the cockpit I not only misheard the call but got out of our normal procedure for a go-around. As we were turning; Tower again called to make the heading 090 (I think). My FO (First Officer) heard the altitude correctly and was climbing to 4;000; at about 3;400 I told him we needed to stop climbing and descend (more confusion) and we clarified with Tower and were told 4;000 feet; heading 090; and to contact Approach. We automated; configured; ran the checklists; set up the approach and landed without further incident. I'm filing the report because I'm still not sure about the 3;000 or 4;000 feet altitude which would be a possible deviation; and also to bring to the committee's attention that alternate missed approach instructions given immediately after the go-around call are dangerous. I make it a habit to brief or have the FO brief the exact steps of a go-around during the approach briefing and even with that fresh in our mind I still managed to get out of order. In this case the Tower Supervisor (I called after we landed because I wanted to know why we had to go-around) said there was Aircraft Y which departed just before we did and the distances were too close. I don't know where they were headed but I can think of a few better options than what we were given. First: landing would have increased our separation. Second; let us fly the published missed; the one on the chart; in our FMS and the one we discussed and are expecting to fly; and make Aircraft Y (or any departure) move around the missed approach corridor. Here are my suggestions. First; change this form to allow use of the 'enter' key so that I can break up this wall of text and make paragraphs. Second; ask Tower facilities to stop issuing alternate missed approach instructions; or; when they do; issue them prior to calling 'go around.'

CVG Tower Controller and arrival aircraft flight crew reported a go-around due to arrival departure spacing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Departure from VNY. We felt confident in the HARYS2 SID off of RWY 16R and how to properly execute the departure as per company advisory of VNY typical clearance. We were given CVS except maintain 4;000 feet. On departure using NAV and VS on the FGP; we executed the SID to the first fix PPRRY and then the 110 HDG at 4;000 feet. Went to HDG mode on the FGP when established on the 110 degree HDG waiting for the next vector and ALT assignment. HDG 360 was assigned; a left turn. Complied with still at 4;000 feet. ATC then cleared us to FL190 and direct to SLAPP. We started the climb and NFP entered direct to SLAPP. Abruptly; ATC (a different sounding voice) commanded us to turn left immediately to a heading of 190 for low altitude warning alert. We complied. Next ATC turned us back to the right heading 340 and now climb to 14;000 feet. Next climb to 15;000 feet. Then there was an ATC frequency change and the next Controller cleared us to SLAPP and climb to FL190 and resume the departure. The flight was concluded with no incident.Suggestions: I believe there is a lack of clarity; lack of communication and lack of training on this departure. I believed we were turned to the heading of 360 (vectors after heading 110 on the SID) and forgotten or there was an over saturation on ATC's end. This is such a high density area for flying that departure and arrival procedures need to be straight forward; simple and tailored for all flight skill levels.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

First Officer and Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC and immediate turn during departure from VNY airport.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 450

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Aircraft was in cruise on IFR plan in VMC. Another aircraft that was climbing appeared in front of aircraft and slightly to the left from below the nose of the aircraft in cruise. The approaching aircraft was taking evasive action via a hard climbing turn to its right. There was no notice of aircraft in the proximity given by ATC. ATC was notified of the near miss.

A BE36 pilot on an IFR flight plan reported a near miss at 9;000 FT with no advance ATC notification as the unidentified aircraft took evasive action.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

I was working Ground Control when an air carrier called on 121.9 [and] reported smoke in the cockpit. He was located on [Taxiway] Juliet abeam Concourse D so he was on a non-movement area and had not yet called for taxi. I told my Supervisor who then alerted the Fire Department. There was some confusion between the Supervisor and the Fire Department because they called back to the Tower to ask about the situation; but I do not have exact details on what was said. The Fire Department's response was inefficient and seemed to lack a sense of urgency. To my knowledge they were informed that the air carrier was positioned at Spot 10; but the emergency vehicles passed by continued down the ramp area past Spot 10 towards Spot 13. The crew then advised me that he thought the vehicles had passed him so I tried contacting Vehicle X to advise him that they passed the emergency air carrier. It took a few transmissions to finally get a hold of Vehicle X and I directed him back to the emergency air carrier. The crew requested a discrete frequency to speak with Vehicle X; but we do not have one so I gave up 121.9 for their communication. Again; I had a hard time getting a hold of Vehicle X to inform him that the air carrier wanted to communicate to him directly on 121.9. When I did get a hold of Vehicle X; I let him and the air carrier talk and I switched to 121.65 for normal ground operations. The crew had requested us to contact his Operations to provide buses and a tow ASAP because he did not want to deploy the shutes. I relayed this information to my Supervisor who informed me that Operations wanted the air carrier to contact them directly and that we can't do anything from our end to accommodate his request. The air carrier said that he only had a single frequency and he wanted to remain on 121.9 and stay in contact with Vehicle X. I told my Supervisor that he did not want to leave the frequency to call his operations. The air carrier was then able to get their alternate radio working so they were able to contact their operations. The situation was resolved and the air carrier was eventually towed back to his gate. Recommend better training and more frequent emergency exercises for Fire Department in order to shorten response time and become more familiar with the airport layout.Highly recommend the implementation of a discrete frequency that can be used for communication between emergency air carrier and lead emergency response vehicle. This will allow the two to converse without interruption and also free up the Ground Control frequency. Tower would still be able to monitor the discrete frequency from our back-up. Not exactly sure why Vehicle X failed to answer me numerous times when I called; but communication definitely needs to improve. Unfortunately unless I know why he failed to respond; I can't really recommend anything specific.After we relayed the emergency aircraft's request for buses and a tow to Operations; they said that they wanted to speak directly to the pilot of the aircraft. The air carrier only had single frequency capability at the time and was unable to contact their operations. I'm not sure if this delayed the process of getting the buses to the plane; but I recommend the airlines develop procedure in case this situation occurs again. For example; maybe they can establish a liaison to communicate between the pilot and operations; or even have the pilots use their cell phones to call them directly.

PHL Ground Controller describes a rather uncoordinated response by CFR to an air carrier crew with reported smoke in the cockpit and how improvements could be made.