Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was working as an OJTI to my trainee on the Desert sector. Traffic had been busy all day and mostly complex; definitely a busy day. Runway 13 was in use at the airport and visual approaches were being utilized. Aircraft X was an IFR on a left downwind for PSP. My trainee cleared Aircraft X for a visual approach to runway 13R like normal. Aircraft X turned base approx. 8 miles NE of the airport and was descending. Multiple other things were going on around the airspace forcing both the trainee and I to keep our scans going all around the airspace. My trainee picked up a target exiting the Banning Pass (mountain pass approx. 15 miles west of PSP) low level (I believe at 4;000 feet in a slow descent) and issued traffic to Aircraft X.  Aircraft X acknowledged the traffic. Only a few seconds went by before I stepped in and issued a traffic alert to Aircraft X and told them to maintain 4;000 feet. At the time I issued the traffic alert; the radar showed Aircraft X at 4;100 feet and the unidentified target at 3;500 feet. Aircraft X responded 'We're already through 4;000 feet '. I don't remember the exact time that Aircraft Y called us for advisories; but he said where he was and his altitude; and I immediately knew that the target was him. Aircraft X said 'We're descending'. I believe I said 'Aircraft Y on frequency descend to 2;500 feet immediately; do you have the aircraft at 11 o'clock and a half mile in sight?' I received no response; but I observed the target descending rapidly. I received no word from Aircraft X on if they were responding to an RA; which is why I continued to try and resolve the situation. At this time; both aircraft were in rapid descents to try and avoid each other; one listening to my recommendation; and the other not. I found out later that Aircraft X had responded to three RAs; but did not advise me; which to me is understandable given the altitude and the proximity. I observed both targets merge; one showed 2;200 and one showed 2;300.Aircraft X finally came back and said 'OK; we got him now; he's right over the top of us'. The pilot for Aircraft X said they would like to be re-sequenced for an approach in which I complied. I took over for the trainee until Aircraft X was switched to the tower. Radar coverage in the Banning Pass is non-existent below 6;000 feet. We can pick up aircraft around the pass if they are at 5;500 to 5;000 feet; but they usually are intermittent hits. At 4;500 feet and below; our radar will only pick them up once they are at the intersection of Interstate 10 and Highway 111. This intersection is absolutely in the arrival corridor for PSP when they are landing 13R. It's also right in the departure corridor for 31L. This is about here we picked up Aircraft Y on radar. However; when we are working other aircraft; our scan cannot be on one spot 100% of the time.  The trainee picked up the target in time to issue traffic; but his lack of experience led to him not giving a traffic alert right away; which is why I stepped in. Aircraft Y did not call us for advisories when in the pass; where we could have given him instructions to remain clear of the arrival corridor; and by the time he called; the scenario was already happening.  There is no requirement for Aircraft Y to call. Aircraft Y was more than legal being where he was; even though he was in the TRSA; participation is entirely optional on the part of the pilot. PSP is a slow airport in the summer time; but a very busy airport; not just for IFR's; in the winter. My recommendation is to create a Class C airspace around the PSP airport that would protect these aircraft from VFR pilots transitioning through their area. Protect the arrival and departure corridors for these aircraft who do not have much room to maneuver due to terrain. The TRSA around the airport does absolutely nothing to promote safety and protect the aircraft trying to take off and land at PSP. This may be my first report on the issue; butit is definitely not the first time a target has appeared from Banning and converged with an aircraft attempting to land at PSP. I'm not sure how many other reports have been filed for this problem; but it is absolutely a dangerous situation.

I was training on Desert Radar when I cleared Aircraft X for a visual approach to runway 13R at PSP. There was an unidentified VFR aircraft that popped up at 3;500 feet coming out of the Banning pass northwest of PSP. There is no radar coverage for aircraft in the Banning pass below about 5;000 feet. I issued traffic to Aircraft X. When Aircraft X was about 2 miles from the traffic my instructor keyed up and told Aircraft X to maintain 4;000. Aircraft X advised that they were currently descending through 4;000. That is when Aircraft Y called up for flight following. My instructor told Aircraft Y to descend immediately. Aircraft X kept descending responding to an RA. Both targets were indicating about 2;500 feet when the targets merged. Aircraft X reported seeing Aircraft Y in a steep climb to just make it over their aircraft. Aircraft X then said they would need to abandon the approach and was vectored back around for another approach.There is currently a TRSA over PSP. Aircraft Y was skirting around the 4 mile Class D that surrounds PSP before eventually calling ATC because they saw Aircraft X heading right at them. There needs to be a Class C at PSP. The TRSA is useless for protecting aircraft departing and arriving to PSP. Aircraft are not currently required to call ATC for transition through the TRSA. It is only a matter of time before one of these VFR aircraft hit an airliner arriving or departing PSP. The area surrounding PSP during the winter months has a very heavy volume of VFR aircraft. Most of the VFR aircraft do not call for flight following leading to dangerous situations regularly for the IFR aircraft in the vicinity of PSP airport. There are only a few TRSA's left in the country; I feel that is because everyone has realized how useless they are at keeping departing and arriving airliners safe from VFR aircraft not talking to ATC.

Four reports from an SCT Controller providing training; his trainee Controller and the crew of an airline aircraft documenting a near mid-air caused by an aircraft coming out of the Banning Pass and conflicting with the airliner turning final for PSP.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 134; Flight Crew Total 3256; Flight Crew Type 1485

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240.17; Flight Crew Type 6419.85

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Indianapolis Center sent a reroute via CPDLC 'proceed direct to IOW. Rest of route unchanged.' IOW was previously a fix further down on our cleared flight plan. We accepted the clearance and loaded to fix via the load prompt on the CPDLC page displayed on the FMC. We quickly noticed that the path to IOW; displayed on the MFD; did not represent the general direction we believed IOW to be. We did not make the turn and instead queried ATC via voice communications and asked for a heading to allow time to analyze the new route. We investigated further and found that the IOW sent and loaded via CPDLC was in fact the identifier IOW for the ILS 07 in Ottawa Ontario (CYOW). We loaded the correct IOW manually and informed ATC of the discrepancy. The flight otherwise continued normally.

Cruising along and CPDLC uplinked clearance to proceed direct IOW. Flying pilot selected the 'load' prompt from CPDLC message; and verified that IOW was then displayed as the top waypoint on page 1 of legs. Which it was. We both verified this and selected both the execute prompt on FMC and the 'accept' prompt on CPDLC; as I was verifying the clearance with ATC on the radio; as I have some mistrust of the system. The aircraft immediately started a right hand turn to what turns out to be the Ottawa Canada ILS DME identifier for RW 07 in Ottawa. We immediately recognized an obvious error in location so just put the MCP into heading select mode and steered a few degrees back to IOW (as in Iowa City; Iowa); which was directly in front of us. There was only a very minor wiggle of course; not even a fraction of a mile. However; now this new IOW fix is in the legs page on top; so we pull up the IOW fix a few legs down; but could get it to overwrite the position 1 fix. We asked for a heading from ATC just to mitigate that threat; and alerted them to the issue of duplicate IOW. Eventually we had to delete Both IOW fixes and reinsert the correct one. Problem resolved. Took a little time to figure out exactly what and where the duplicate IOW fix was. Significant to note; however; is that we are being instructed to ALWAYS use the load prompt from CPDLC to insert new routing when available. However; in this case not only was the wrong fix inserted; but there was no duplicate fix warning page that we normally get when inputting fixes into the box by hand. When IOW is inserted by hand; the box comes up with two options and shows the lat/long coordinates of both; making you select further which one you want. This page did not come up when cpdlc injected IOW into the fmc; and in this case turned out to be incorrect. I think at the exact time of the event; the IOW fix in Canada was slightly shorter distance than Iowa city; so the box defaulted to the closer fix. Perhaps. By the time we figure all this out; we were almost to IOW. ATC was notified of all this; and the aircraft; flight; and passengers were not put in an unsafe condition; because we caught the issue immediately.

B737 flight crew reported receiving a CPDLC that contained a fix for a nearby ILS when the fix needed was an enroute waypoint.  The spelling was the same for each location.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

A Gulfstream G650ER was scheduled from ZZZ to ZZZZ. The flight was planned close to the aircraft maximum range which depart from ZZZ with 48;200 lbs of fuel and land at ZZZZ with 6;728 lbs of fuel. At 955 NM from destination; ATC advised crew to descend from FL143 to FL116; which was 2 hours prior to their planned descend. Crew explained to ATC several times that they were unable to descend due to fuel performance but ATC repeatedly advised them to follow the level restriction. As aircraft was only allowed to enter the next airspace by lowering to the desired altitude; crew followed ATC instruction and expected the contingency fuel to be used up. Estimated landing fuel was calculated to be around 5;200 lbs upon arrival.At 450 NM from destination; crew were instructed to slow down by ATC which further reduced the estimated landing fuel. They continue explained that further delay would put the aircraft into a fuel critical position. At 100 NM from destination with; ATC instructed the aircraft to make a right orbit and they were number 7 for arrival. Accepting the clearance from ATC would put aircraft in a position to forfeit the diversion option to alternate airport. As the weather was closing in with an active cumulonimbus clouds; lightning activity and gusting ground winds; PIC signified the urgency to avoid critical fuel situation. Aircraft were then expedited to number 3 for arrival and landed uneventful with 4200 lbs arrival fuel. Brief event description was provided to ZZZZ airport and crew submitted an occurrence report to Company Safety Department.The Operational Flight Plan was reviewed and arrival fuel was close to the margin on the Company Minimum Reserve quantity. Chief Pilot performed a briefing to subject crew on Operations Manual Policy and Procedures for In-Flight Fuel Management.

A Safety Manager reported the crew of a Gulfstream experienced a low fuel situation.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

We were descending via the ANTHM3 landing Runway 10 at BWI. The FMC was programmed correctly; autopilot 2 was engaged and the aircraft was managing the STAR as published. Event began approximately 16;000 feet outside of EAGLL in a managed descent. The ANTHM3 has multiple altitude and airspeed restrictions; the final altitude is 4;000 feet at STRPS. The altitude restriction at EAGLL is: -13;000/+12;000; then ROKTT is: 11;000; distance between EAGLL and ROKTT is 23.7NM. We were with Potomac Approach on frequency. Approximately 16;000 feet descending via the ANTHM3; outside of EAGLL; Potomac Approach revised our clearance; 'descend to 11;000 for traffic; then continue descend via ANTHM3.' PM (Pilot Monitoring) read back the clearance verbatim. PF (Pilot Flying) decided the managed descent would be sufficient; however PM understood the clearance to descend immediately to 11;000; which would level the aircraft just prior or at EAGLL. After a brief discussion to ensure we both understood the revised clearance; PF set 11;000 in the altitude selector and pulled for OPEN DES. The aircraft was nearing 11;000 at or shortly after EAGLL. Satisfied that the instructions were understood; PM shifted attention to another task. We were in a higher than normal workload and at some point PF reset the altitude selector to 4;000 and inadvertently pushed the selector to manage the descent. Both pilots distracted by an ATC call did not realize the aircraft began to descend to 4;000. With 4;000 set in the altitude window; there was no altitude warning horn. Potomac Approach inquired our altitude as we slowly descended through 10;500. The PF stopped the descent at 10;300 and began to climb back to 11;000. Potomac Approach revised our clearance again to maintain 10;000 until ROKTT; then descend via remainder of ANTHM3. We were handed off to another Potomac Approach Controller and PM advised the new altitude. Potomac Approach reaffirmed the revised clearance; we continued the STAR and approach to landing as normal and uneventful. Both pilots are highly experienced in both total time and time in type. Both pilots had flown together; have mutual respect for each other; used SOP and CRM. The issues that led to the event are: the timing of the revision led to confusion; both pilots understood the revised clearance differently; but assumed they understood it the same; another similar sounding call sign on ATC led to slight distraction; PM multi-tasking in a higher workload environment. Lessons learned are: PM should have paused other tasks at altitude changes to confirm and back up PF. PF confirm altitude changes with PM to ensure both pilots are in agreement of descent mode/initiation.

Air carrier pilot monitoring reported confusion attributed to not understanding ATC clearance; and ATC altitude changes from the procedure while on the ANTHM3 landing Runway 10 at BWI.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I arrived at the aircraft as relief pilot an hour before takeoff for a cargo flight to ZZZZ. The FO was at the aircraft and had completed much of the cockpit preflight. Because it was a cargo flight I went through the cabin and secured the overhead bins and many of the storage /catering carts. The Captain arrived and we went through the standard cockpit flight preparation prior to departure. After we pushed from the gate and initiated the engine start; I realized I had not done the Pre-Fight Walk Around Inspection. I asked the FO if he had completed it and he said he had not. He thought I was doing that when I was actually securing the cabin for departure. I told the Captain I forgot to do the walk around. The Captain got clearance and we turned around on the ramp and went back into the gate. The Agent came back; hooked up the jet bridge and I went out and completed the walk around inspection. We re-accomplished all the pre-departure checks and ended up departing to ZZZZ about XX minutes late. Most of the delay was a result of getting personnel back to park us and recalling another push crew.I think that because it was a cargo flight; I was possibly distracted by some non-standard items in the cabin and got out of my habit pattern. Like most of us; I haven't been flying too much but the bottom line is that I simply forgot to do the walk around preflight and realized it after the push.In the future I will report to the FO that the walk around has been completed and as the FO I will verify with the relief pilot that it has been complete. I have been flying airplanes for XX years and have never forgotten to do a walk around inspection.

During the pushback from the gate; the flight crew realized a communication error occurred resulting in the non completion of the pre-flight walk around duties by a pilot. A return to a gate commenced to complete the required tasks. Contributing factors may have been one crew member being newly experienced to three-four pilot crew tasks combined with a multi month period of not working. Making the crew cross information in this specific area a mandatory portion of any preflight operations area briefing; crew text preflight contact; or aircraft boarding process.

Air carrier Relief Pilot and Captain reported forgetting to do the pre-flight walkaround and cited communication; distraction and lack of recent flying as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 940

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was practicing a partial panel approach and used my backup steam gauges instead of the primary glass display. It has been awhile since I used my backup instruments. I misread the altimeter by 1;000 ft. and got lower than intended. My safety pilot did not call out the issue until I dropped to around 500 ft. I've only switched to a glass display 2 years ago. The lesson I learned here is that remaining competent on older backup instruments is a skill that needs to be exercised regularly.

AA5 pilot reported misinterpreting his altimeter; resulting in a deviation from his assigned altitude.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

Equipment / Tooling; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Aircraft was in the hangar for maintenance when I walked by the tow bar and noticed that it had standard AN Bolts installed in the head where shear pins should have been installed. I then tagged out this E-190 tow bar. I then called the GSE (Ground Service Equipment) vendor for it to be fixed. They never showed up to fix the bar. I then went to the gate to get a serviceable bar. There I found 2 more tow bars also with AN bolts installed. I tagged these out as well and notified my supervisor and manager. Towards the end of the shift I noticed that all the tow bars that I tagged earlier in the night had the tags removed and were not fixed.  I received a follow up email from management tonight saying that [the GSE vendor] had no supervisor on duty Sundays and that another employee from dayshift was going to check the bars. This is a serious safety issue someone is going to get hurt or Aircraft damage is going to happen.The GSE vendor employees seem to be inadequately trained; understaffed; and do not have the parts to fix the equipment properly. Also; the employees have a very hard time understanding what you are telling them is broken due to language barrier. There needs to be someone in charge on shift at all times at the Vendor GSE shop. The employees need to be retrained on the equipment they are maintaining and have access to parts. Need to communicate to employees that it is not all right to pull out of service tags without properly fixing the equipment. If the Vendor cannot properly maintain our equipment then it should be brought in house to the [company facility] GSE department. Safety needs to be made a priority at [our company].

Maintenance reported that 'unserviceable' tags were removed from several tow bars and; the tow bars were put back into service without being repaired.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working all four arrival gates at AR3. I had Aircraft X descending on the LDORA2 RNAV arrival out of about FL190. Aircraft Y is made yellow on my scope and DR4 gets on the landline and says 'Aircraft Y I forced on your scope is direct MTJ at 170; can you force your Aircraft X down?' I responded 'Wilco'. I then told Aircraft X to expedite his descent through 160 to help the controller out. The two aircraft were on converging courses about 14 miles apart. I put a *T line on Aircraft Y to MTJ to find out that direct was not close to my arrival; but directly head on. I had to vector Aircraft X off the arrival to a 090 heading to avoid a loss of separation. I then heard the DR4 controller issue a heading of 260 to Aircraft Y; but had I not taken immediate action they would not have remained separated.The D01 SOP Pre-Arranged Coordination Procedures 'Look and Go' language is way too vague and gives departure controllers too much leeway. I feel this causes problems and events like this far too often. The old language was far more restrictive in that it only allowed 'Look and Go' on Denver departures I believe. This is not adequate either; but I believe a happy medium could and should be reached.

D01 controller describes a situation where an aircraft is displayed on his scope by another controller. Displaying controller asks other controller if he can miss his displayed aircraft. Separation is ensured by the controller turning his traffic 90 degrees away from the displayed traffic.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 0; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I went into the control room to relieve the RX2 Controller at XA00Z.  I received a position relief briefing and there was nothing out of the ordinary that was given to me.  There were a couple of frequency notes given to me with ZZZ1 [Center]; but other than that there was nothing different from normal.All during this time apparently ZZZ2 [Center] was ATC-0 and we in Area X were never told about this going on.  When I came in that evening there was no notice; and no one was told that a Zero event was going to be taking place.  The Controller on RX2 that I relieved was never briefed about ZZZ2 [Center] being ATC-0.  When I took control of the position I had Aircraft X on frequency and he was turning towards ZZZ [VOR]..ZZZ [Airport].  This is the routing that per the LOA we give to ZZZ2 [Center].  The aircraft was level at FL340.  After a few minutes I gave the aircraft a crossing restriction to cross ZZZ [VOR] at 100; what we give these aircraft again per the LOA.  His route of flight was going to clip Airspace X if the aircraft stayed up high before meeting the restriction.  I placed a PVD [Plan View Display] on Airspace Y that auto-directed to Airspace Z as normal for that time of night.  When the aircraft started to descend the point out had still not been accepted; so I called to the sector and got no answer.  I tried a few times to no avail.  I then tried to call ZZZ2 [Center] Airspace X and got no answer from anyone.The Controller on the low side RX1 said the Shout Lines with ZZZ [Approach] were down; maybe the ZZZ2 [Center] lines were down as well.  By this time I had hollered for the FLM to come down and explain if they knew what was going on; and it was then I was told that ZZZ2 [Center] was ATC-0.  At this time the aircraft had already entered ZZZ2 [Center] airspace without approval; and my main focus was to handle the aircraft towards ZZZ [Airport] approach.  We pulled up the approach plate at ZZZ [Airport] and I told Aircraft X to maintain 110 to not enter approach's airspace and gave the aircraft I think XYZ.AB to switch over.  Not two minutes later; ZZZ2 [Center] comes back up and helps me with necessitating the hand-off.  Not at any time was anyone working traffic aware of this issue with ZZZ2 [Center].  After this aircraft handling was done; I called Area B controllers and asked if they knew about the ZZZ2 [Center] Zero event and they said no that they had not heard anything.  Area B also is adjacent to ZZZ2 [Center] airspace.Later the FLM came back down to let us know the ZZZ [Approach] lines were back up and running.  This makes this Zero event even more frustrating to us in Area A since the routing and altitude that we give ZZZ2 [Center] aircraft going to ZZZ1 Approach requires us to call ZZZ Approach for a Point out.  So during this Zero event; we had no clue that we were actually in it; and then if we did know we would have had to do extra work just to get the procedure to work with ZZZ Approach.Another part of this is that the controller on RX1 never knew about this event as well because he had a ZZZ [Airport] departure at FL230 during this time as well; and according to the ATC-0 procedures we are to Radar Identify the aircraft when they come over to us.  I cannot be sure that this was done.  This aircraft... I don't recall the numbers or where he was headed.   Communication is a big deal in what we do.  It is highly irresponsible to not be told about something as important as an ATC-0 event in the facility.  All I needed was to know was who and when and we could have handled this situation the correct way.  We have routing for this exact situation; we have the procedures posted in the area; but if no one tells me what is happening then this type of event will continue to happen.

Center Controller reported an ATC Zero event at another Center facility resulted in communication issues and an airspace violation.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was receiving a position relief brief to take the PACR Sector. I was told that there was an aircraft in the departure list off SNA and that SNA Tower was coordinated with to miss the VFR traffic that was southeast bound along the shoreline at 3;500 FT. I had a slight question in my mind about what the exact coordination was; but I did not ask and took over the control position. The departure aircraft (a B737) came off of SNA climbing southbound; and did not call off the departure end at the normal hand off time. I assumed that SNA Tower was keeping the aircraft to give the 3;500 FT traffic (a C182). The B737 called me climbing out of 2;400 FT for 7;000 FT; and was on a converging course with the VFR traffic. The B737 did not call the traffic in sight or mention anything about the traffic. I immediately issued the traffic call; 'traffic 1 o'clock 1 mile eastbound along the shoreline at 3;500 FT; verify you have traffic in sight; if not in sight advise you stop your climb at 3;000 FT.'  At this time the B737 was out of about 2;600 FT; and although I did not think he would be able to stop the climb; it was the first and best response I had at the time. The B737 said searching for the traffic and then called in sight and requested a turn to the left. I said approved as requested. The C182 also called the traffic in sight. The B737 questioned the situation but did not call an RA or say that it was a problem; just that it is very hard to get VFR traffic along the shoreline in sight during the initial departure phase of flight off of SNA. I don't believe that we currently have a good solution to either stopping departures off SNA or giving the Tower traffic and expecting them to give the initial call to the departure aircraft. I believe that the B737 should have been stopped at 3;000 FT for the traffic and immediately switched to Departure for traffic calls and more controlled separation. I don't know what the answer is; but if situations like this continue to occur it is not an appropriate method for the airline customer.

SCT Controller described a conflict event between a SNA Air Carrier departure and a VFR overflight; the reporter suggesting some type of improved procedure between the Tower and TRACON.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action

Takeoff configuration warning. During takeoff roll approximately 130 kts the takeoff configuration warning activated. Takeoff weight was 161;000 lbs. Full aircraft. 24k power. I was the Captain and the First officer was Pilot Flying. The flaps; LE devices; and speed-brake were all in the correct position. The configuration warning then stopped. At some point I said 'continue'. This all happened in a short period of time. The takeoff configuration warning came back on about 147 kts. The aircraft was accelerating normally and there was not much runway left; 3000 ft. The configuration warning being intermittent it seemed the safest course of action was to continue the takeoff. We made an otherwise normal takeoff and continued to LAS. On the approach to LAS the LE Flaps transit light stayed on. We also got a low airspeed warning due to the amber band/min speed being incorrect. We made a normal 30 flap landing using the HUD AOA as a backup. Later; Maintenance determined that the LE flap up micro switch had malfunctioned. This was written up previously; a few days before. Perhaps more should have been done to understand why it happened the first time.

B737 Captain reported a faulty leading edge slat micro switch caused two takeoff configuration warnings during takeoff roll.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On arrival at the departure gate; I inquired about station provision of international documents - Hawaii Reference Guide; plotting chart; and AIREP forms. Agent had no idea what I was talking about; claiming that the Hawaii flight is a domestic operation. The FOM clearly includes Hawaii operations under the flag operations description; and Hawaii is specifically addressed in the international operations sections of FOM - to include the need to use a plotting chart on random routes and the AIREP form when making non-CPDLC (Controller Pilot Datalink Communications) position reports. On this flight; the SATCOM system was placarded INOP which meant I would need to make position reports - thus; the need for an AIREP form. The Hawaii Reference Guide includes both plotting chart and AIREP forms as required paperwork to be checked prior to departure. I called Operations to ask for an AIREP form; but was told that they had no idea what I was asking for. We have been operating Hawaii and ZZZ1 flights out of ZZZ for years. If the FOM is going to require certain forms and documents; it would be very helpful to have these documents and forms available at the departure station. The same situation is now occurring in HNL as well - no international forms are being provided since they state that flights to the mainland are considered 'domestic' flying. But random routes are occasionally used and position reporting is still required. If there is no requirement for an AIREP form to be used in the CPDLC environment; the FOM and reference guides should be updated to reflect that their use is no longer required.Conflicting treatment of Hawaii operations - domestic for some purposes; international for others. Lack of clarity on what forms and documents are actually required to be used or made available for Hawaii operations. Lack of availability of international forms and documents at departure stations for international operations. If the FOM requires the use of documents and forms on international flights; it would be very helpful to have those forms actually available at the departure station. The mixed status of Hawaii operations - considered international flag operations by the FOM for some purposes but not for others - causes confusion as to which rules actually apply. This needs to be clarified.

Air carrier Captain reported documentation and forms required for the flight operation were not stocked at the departure station and was forced to depart without them.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Cleared for takeoff on Runway XXR at ZZZ. XX passengers. Aircraft GW about 125;000 lbs. Aircraft accelerated normally using auto-throttles. At about 80 knots; the Right Bleed Trip Off light illuminated. I immediately began the rejected take off procedure. The airspeed may have gotten as high as 90 knots before spoilers and brakes began to decelerate.  The aircraft slowed to taxi speed; we turned off at the first taxiway; and returned to the gate. No secondary indications or warning lights. No indication of hot brakes.Recency may have been a minor factor.  I had only flown once in the last 30 days. Maybe I could have begun the rejected take off even sooner if I had flown more recently and more often. Still; I think my reaction was pretty good. I believe my decision to abort was a good one.Recency could have been an issue. As soon as I saw the light; I checked the airspeed at 80 and decided to abort. Maybe if I had been flying more regularly; I could have caught the light and reacted even sooner. At any rate; the aircraft GW was 125;000; the deceleration was controlled; and another aircraft was immediately available.

Cleared for takeoff. Everything normal and as I said the 80 knots call we got an amber light. Captain asked what have we got; I responded with amber bleed trip light. He elected to reject at approximately 85-95 knots. Cleared runway at A taxiway .Technically speaking; we were just above 80 knots and should have continued but the Captain elected to reject the takeoff. We both discussed it at the gate and both agree that a lack of recent consistent flying may have caused 'quick trigger.'We could have done another quick reject/departure brief holding short to emphasize what reject procedures are.

Air Carrier flight crew reported the Right Bleed Trip Off light illuminated during takeoff roll resulting in a rejected takeoff.


In preparation for water service toward the end of cruise; I grabbed a cold cup sleeve from the AFT galley overhead compartment on Aircraft right. The sleeve of cups was noticeably warm. Using the back of my hand; I felt the bottom of the compartment and recognized the surface directly over the galley light that is mounted under the compartment was extremely warm. Upon further inspection; the surface above all lights in the AFT galley that were mounted to illuminate the counter area were extremely warm. (Note: By this stage in flight; the lights had been on constantly for multiple hours.) I shared this observation with my FA (Flight Attendant) Crew and they said it wasn't uncommon for the surface to be so warm within this gallery configuration. While we didn't determine any imminent danger; the temperatures generated were remarkable and concerning.Determine if the extreme temperatures being produced are a potential hazard (melting plastics; burned fingers; fires; etc); and if so; mitigate and/or eliminate the hazard. Determine (perhaps in conjunction with the lighting manufacturer) what causes the increased temperatures: type of bulb; duration of lights being used; type of material around the bulb; etc. Investigate the lighting on this specific tail number. Investigate the lighting on all the aircraft with this same galley interior. Make a plan. Execute plan. Communicate any new actions or responsibilities FAs.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported galley lighting configuration may cause overheat condition near light fixtures.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 2184; Flight Crew Type 55

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Winds were out of the east at 10-15 kts in VFR conditions; and the aircraft was oriented directly into the wind. The helideck of the platform is located on the south side of the superstructure; with obstacles to the north. Upon departure from the platform; the aircraft began an unexpected right yaw and began to drift in a southwestern direction. Once the aircraft began to rotate; I as the First Officer took control; believing the PIC (Pilot in Command) to be disoriented; as I had not heard a verbal acknowledgement after taking control. On the second or third spin; I was able to regain directional control through the application of left pedal and slight left cyclic while oriented to the east into the wind. I then lowered the nose in order to gain airspeed and was able to regain full control and recover the aircraft at roughly 50 feet AGL. After establishing a climb; I coupled the flight controls to the flight director; began a turn to the northwest; and relinquished controls back to the PIC.We then began an analysis of the aircraft; checking for any warning/cautions/advisories; any unusual vibrations in the flight controls; or any indications that an aircraft limit had been exceeded. None were present; and based on this information we continued our flight as planned. We made two more subsequent stops to drop off passengers and cargo; and terminated our flight. We conducted a normal shutdown; and then noticed we had used transient power; seven seconds into a two-minute power limit. Maintenance was notified; and we as a crew notified our Supervisor of what had taken place.

On takeoff; the helicopter began a right yaw. I continued to increase power to ensure we were clear of all structure. The helicopter continued to yaw to the right at which time the second in command said I have the controls. He was on the clear side away from the all structure. I relinquished command of the controls to the SIC (Second in Command) though I followed him through in all his inputs. The tail rotor seem to have lost all effectiveness. I received at least two revolutions and then the aircraft stabilized and started to fly. I saw torque values of 120% and the main rotor RPM somewhere below 100%. At that point I perceived we had not exceeded any transient limits since there were no caution or warning lights visible. The aircraft began to climb normally. We reduced power and flew away with no further incidents. From the beginning when the aircraft started to yaw I was holding right cyclic increasing collective pitch and adding left pedal prior to the SIC taking the controls. He continued with the same but said he added more left pedal. When in level flight; we checked all functions of the aircraft and found no problems; and still no warning or caution light. The aircraft acted normal in all modes of flight.

S-76 flight crew reported loss of tail rotor effectiveness on takeoff.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Work Refused

It's not a particular event but a series of events. Basically I refused to fly for this company based at ZZZ; because the owner refuses to comply with 135 regulations and expected me to fly against the law. It was not easy to fly the little bit I did for them; but to my knowledge; the flights I did were legal. They were legal because I would get into an argument till he either got another pilot or did things right. The truth is that he is never there to exercise operational control because he is a pilot for [an airline]; so he is gone most of the time. The company operates under a Letter of Authorization; so there is no Director of Operations; no Chief Pilot; no Director of Maintenance; and only he can exercise operational control; but in reality it's his secretary who knows nothing about aviation; who calls the shots in this company while he is unavailable. It was a constant argument about time off and duty. He considered a day that I didn't fly as time off; and he also expected us to be on call that day. [The owner] occasionally flies the Lear while nobody is looking. He also expects me to plan and execute flights beyond the airplane capability; in this case its fuel limits; he says to disregard the 'Predicted' fuel amount shown by the FMS; and to just pull the power back and I will arrive at destination with plenty of fuel....he said he had done it many times. It seems stupid to continue a flight to an airport when the FMS is telling you that you are landing with less than safe amount of fuel. This man shouldn't be allowed to operate any aircraft; let alone manage a [135] and try to force pilots to fly in an unsafe manner. I have been doing this for 35 years and operate within the law; which this guy was not expecting when he hired me last September 2017. I put in my two weeks notice. I don't work for crooks.

Air taxi Captain reported the owner 'refused to comply with 135 regulations and expected me to fly against the law.'


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 133; Flight Crew Total 643; Flight Crew Type 380

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

My student and I were flying a routine cross-country flight. After crossing over ZZZ airport; both my student and I noticed a faint 'winding' sound and started to smell a burning smell that was electrical in nature. We did not notice any smoke inside the cabin. Originally thinking it was an electrical issue within the cabin; we reverted back to past training on troubleshooting electrical issues within the cabin. During our troubleshooting process; we climbed 300 feet high of our assigned altitude of 6;000' feet MSL (Mean Sea Level) accidentally. At first we shut down the electronics via the master switch; then turned all switches off; then master on; and subsequently the other electrical switches but couldn't find any evidence of smoke or fire in the cabin; however we still smelled the same level of the burning smell that was electrical in nature throughout our troubleshooting process. After troubleshooting the interior electrical system; I noticed the 'M' bus amps indication as yellow flashing and '-6.0'. We did not check to see if there was a 'Low Volts' indication on the PFD (Primary Flight Display) since we automatically assumed the issue to be related to the alternator and the sense of panic was starting to take over. We did however find the 'Low Volts Annunciator' checklist; and started that checklist since we assumed the issue to be related to the alternator. At that time; ATC (Air Traffic Control) started to consume my mental processes and asked if we wanted to divert; and if we wanted to declare an emergency. Since I was unsure of the burning smell and was leery of an engine fire; I decided to declare and emergency and was reminded ZZZ airport was behind us; I forgot to squawk 7700. While that was happening we totally switched gears to landing mode because ZZZ was so close; and we did not complete the 'Low Volts Annunciator' checklist to its entirety. We diverted to ZZZZ and during final approach to land on Runway XX at ZZZ; ATC asked if we wanted emergency vehicles there to meet us. Again; because I was leery of an engine fire; I asked that emergency services be there. After a normal landing without incident; we found a parking spot; shut down the aircraft and waited for emergency services. I called the Local FSS (Flight Service Station) to close our flight plan; and called one of the flight school owners to notify our situation. When the fire services came; they checked for any signs of fire and found no signs of fire. Even with all electrical power shut off and the engine shut down; we still could smell the burning smell that was electrical in nature from the front right of the engine cowling. After some time; the owner of the flight school called with one of our contracted mechanics (A&P/IA) (Airframe & Powerplant/Inspection Authorized) and we walked through some checks. We found that when the master switched 'on'; the 'Alt Field' circuit breaker popped; and with a second check; it popped again. The general consensus was the alternator was the suspected; but not confirmed; issue. Before we left the aircraft at ZZZ; we tied down the aircraft; secured the control lock; closed all windows and doors; and took walk-around photos of the aircraft parked. We found no damage to any surfaces on the aircraft and no visible signs of any fire. The day after; a mechanic was flown out to the aircraft parked at ZZZ. The mechanic found the 'power' lead of the alternator to be disconnected and in turn grounded itself to the alternator which cause the alternator to 'burn' out; this the confirmed case of alternator failure.

Flight instructor and student flying a C172 aircraft encountered alternator failure inflight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 220

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Miss interpretation of RUUDY 4 departure procedure. The altitude at WENTZ was supposed to be a hard altitude of 1;500 FT MSL and I misread it as 'at or above 1;500 FT.' I overshot the altitude by 200 FT. There was no conflict.

EMB100 Captain reports exceeding the WENTZ crossing restriction during the RUUDY4 departure from TEB. The departure procedure was misread as at or above 1;500 FT at WENTZ.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were scheduled to operate a flight with a show time [before 5 am]. As we were walking out the door; I received a phone call from scheduling. They stated our show time had been pushed back [6 hours]. They still have us scheduled to complete our trip; which has us scheduled for a 14:27 hour duty day. FAR 117 has us a maximum duty day of 12 hours plus the two hour extension if we agree to it. They are circumnavigating this rule by converting us to short call; which is not reflected on our schedule allowing them to add four hours to the RAP; which brings us to 16 hours of duty. As line holders; this should not be allowed. We were not notified until we were leaving the hotel; which resulted in us being ready to go; and unable to go back to sleep. They knew about this last night and did not contact us. They should not be allowed to do this; the FAR 117 rules exist for a reason. Converting us from line holders to a RAP of 16 hours when we are awake for the entire portion is not okay.

Air Carrier First Officer pilot reported that after resting and getting ready for an early morning flight; scheduling called and pushed back the show time past the maximum duty day.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft X was refueling eastbound with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z.  Aircraft X's data block reflected FL270B300 and RVSM capable.  The Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z aircraft flight plans were non-RVSM capable thus making the Aircraft X's flight during the refueling status non-RVSM as well.  Aircraft X's remarks stated FL270B290 so I don't know why it was changed to 4000 feet block unless it was someone's misguided attempt to protect for the non-RVSM status.  We corrected the equipment modifier for the Aircraft X flight to reflect it's non-RVSM status and informed the next controller that Aircraft X was RVSM capable and only the refueling aircraft were not.  We also informed Aircraft X to let the controller know when they split up that he was RVSM capable.Correctly reflect in the flight plan the status of all aircraft flying in a block formation of its RVSM status.

ZME Controller describes a refueling flight that is non-RVSM capable due to the two aircraft that are refueling are not capable.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 400

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

During my pre-flight for my survey mission I checked TFR's that may be a factor via my iPad and the ForeFlight App.  Nothing was found.  Foreflight says they update TFR information direct from the FAA every 15 minutes.  I then flew from the PVU airport towards my photo site.  During the climb I saw nothing that resembled a fire in the area.  As it turns out there was a firefighting TFR right off my left side surface to 12;000 MSL.  I missed it by about 3 miles; maybe a little less.  I only missed this TFR by luck; since I had not yet reached an altitude where I felt I could reach Salt Lake Center I did not have a flight following.  I worked my photo mission and on my way back to PVU ATC asked me if I was aware of the TFR ahead of me.  He helped me avoid it on the way in.  I feel a lesson can be learned from this.  TFR's appear out of nowhere without much warning. Foreflight is a great tool however from now on I will take the extra few minutes to call a briefer and make sure the areas I am working in contain no sudden TFR's.  The TFR finally appeared on Foreflight nearly 45 minutes after I landed; it had been in effect for nearly 7 hours at that point.

Aerial Survey pilot reports discovering airborne that a firefighting TFR exists in his area that is not displayed on his iPad with a Foreflight application.  Notam's were not checked prior to flight and the TFR did not appear on the iPad until seven hours after it had been activated.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft X departed OKC enroute to [destination]. We were cleared for the MUDDE1 departure to MUDDE; then direct to RBUKL. Sometime between MUDDE and RBUKL; we were instructed to depart FAWNT heading 220. FAWNT was not along our route; so believed that PHAUP was the fix that the controller stated. We read back 'depart PHAUP heading 220'; and the controller accepted our readback. Sometime past FAWNT; and prior to PHAUP; the controller asked us why we weren't flying the 220 heading that he instructed. We stated that we hadn't arrived at PHAUP yet. He stated that we were 25 miles (approx) past 'FAWNT'; and instructed us to turn to a heading of 240. We complied and turned to the heading of 240. We asked if the spelling of the fix was P.H.A.U.P. he stated 'no; I don't have time to discuss it'. Afterward; we referenced the arrival chart and realized that he must have been referring to the FAWNT intersection; and he must have not known that we were cleared from MUDDE to RBUKL; bypassing FAWNT. No other events occurred; and the flight arrived safely and on time.Controller was not aware that we were cleared from MUDDE directly to RBUKL; therefore bypassing FAWNT. The name of the fix 'FAWNT' sounds similar to the fix 'PHAUP'. The clearance was read back; referencing the 'PHAUP' intersection; without correction from the controller. Alleviate similar sounding fixes on a departure; arrival; and approach procedure. Or; until then; controllers spell out the name of the fix; to alleviate confusion or error.

On arrival we were cleared direct to RBUKL and shortly after that we were given after PHAUP head 220. While still on the arrival the controller came back and said that we missed our turn to the heading but we were nowhere near PHAUP yet. He said he told us FAWNT not PHAUP. It was very hard to even understand it after he called us back. Nothing came of it and no traffic was near us. He said no problem at all but we still wanted to make sure it was known. It was just a radio communication misunderstanding because the fixes both sound so similar on the radio. We continued and landed without incident.Just a radio miscommunication on 2 different fixes that sound very similar on the radio.Try to change similar sounding fixes on the same arrival.

An aircraft was instructed to depart a fix on a heading. The aircraft acknowledged the clearance but read back a different similar sounding fix. The Controller did not catch the read back error. The aircraft did not turn to the heading the Controller wanted due to the communication confusion.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff on Runway 19R. They self cancelled; and exited the runway. I returned them to the end; and told them to expect a few minutes for departure due to traffic on the intersecting runways. The Controller working those runways then called to give me the intersection earlier than I expected. He had an aircraft departing 25R; and I got control of the intersection after that. I had an aircraft on final for 19R; about 3 miles out. I asked Aircraft X if they could take it on the roll; and got an affirmative. I then told them position and hold; don't plan on stopping; to get them out in front of the lander. I issued traffic to both the lander and Aircraft X; and cleared the Aircraft X for takeoff as soon as the departure traffic passed through the intersection; and I had control of it. All of this worked as planned; and would have been fine a short time ago. However; with the 'virtual intersection' rules now in effect; I forgot to use those; and had traffic landing the virtually intersecting Runway 25L that was about a half mile from the inner edge of the go/no go box. This was Aircraft Y; landing 25L. They landed without incident; and there were no proximity problems; however I did not properly apply the rules; and had a procedural error. Had I waited 3 or 4 more seconds; I would have still been able to depart in front of the lander; but would have been legal. After 20 years of not having to think about the landers to the non-intersecting runway; other than if they were going around; I simply forgot the new rule.On my part; do not try to push the traffic out quite so quickly. If I had waited; it still would have worked. We were not in delays; and no one had been waiting long. I relied on my past experience; which usually works great; but not in a case where the rules have changed. I rushed; and had an undesired result. I would recommend that we have a phase-in period for major changes like this; however. In the past; when there has been a rule change that was totally opposite of what we were used to; we were given a 30 or 60 day window where the rule was in effect; but if you used the old procedure; they considered it a learning experience; and reminded you that we had new rules. If this was the case; I would have just had one of those learning experiences.

Controller reports loss of separation  due to 'Virtual Intersection' rules that were not executed correctly.


On arrival into IAH we were given an altitude to descend to on the arrival. After arriving at the assigned altitude ATC called out a traffic advisory at between our 10 to 12 o'clock and 500 ft above us. We got a TCAS TA and were still unable to locate the 172. Then we were given a TCAS RA to climb which confused myself and the Captain because the traffic was 500 ft above us. This caused a moment of delay and then I responded to the RA by disconnecting the autopilot and climbing. We then got and RA to descend which I then did and then another to climb. I could see the traffic on the MFD was still to our 11 o'clock position so I made a climbing turn to the right to get out of the situation. Once I did that the RA went away and ATC asked us about our altitude deviation. The Captain replied that we had responded to an RA and we returned to our previous course and altitude. The separation provided by ATC was inadequate. We were unable to acquire visual contact with the 172.

CRJ-700 crew received conflicting commands during an RA. This followed a traffic advisory from ATC. Following a second RA vertical command reversal; crew turned away from traffic displayed on their MFD to resolve the conflict.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4433; Flight Crew Type 2800

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Regarding a flight in the Hudson River NY Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA): I have flown here regularly since 1982. Many times. Today's observations: The tour helicopters think they own the airspace and routinely MISS required transmissions and do not fly as the SFRA indicates. While southbound at 1000 feet approaching the Statute of Liberty; no less than TWO tour helos climbed up through 1000 feet and across my path without transmitting. After a course reversal south of the VZ; headed northbound at 1000. There was a banner tow with a banner heading southbound below me. I transmitted 'hey you're on the wrong side'; and I heard a reply 'I'm in the middle of the river'. Two more tour helos crossed my path as they did course reversals over the GW bridge from northbound to southbound without transmitting. The Heliports use the 123.05 CFTAF frequency as their personal ramp frequency; clogging the frequency with 'land at spot 2' etc nonsense. It's time to clarify things: Per the regs at between 1000-1300 I'm supposed to be 'somewhat' protected from these sightseeing helos on 'local operations' from climbing through my 'mandatory' 1000 MSL 'floor'.

PA28 pilot reported observing several tour helicopters deviating from published procedures in the Hudson River Special Flight Rules Area.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Level at 10000 ft. near ZABER intersection; ZABER 6 arrival into CLE. Traffic appeared on TCAS at 10 o'clock position and 400 ft. below. Received a traffic advisory from TCAS followed by a 'monitor vertical speed' followed by a resolution advisory to climb. PF (Pilot Flying) followed advisory and we climbed to 10;300 ft. Advisory cleared.  We returned to 10;000 ft. and I advised ATC of our deviation and a resolution advisory. Traffic was never reported to us by ATC. Traffic not in communication with ATC.

Air Carrier Captain reported responding to a RA; making evasive manuever; while level at 10;000 ft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

I was working West Arrival; vectoring aircraft for the ILS to RWY 28C at ORD. There was adverse winter weather in the area at this time; restricting ORD to a 2 runway arrival operation. Due to this; demand was high; and constant. All day; the RWY 28R glideslope had been out (presumed due to weather issues). During a busy period of traffic; the city wanted to have RWY28C groomed; cleaned and inspected due to the continuing ice conditions. At this point; 28R glideslope was returned to service. I was informed by the main arrival coordinator to begin vectoring arrivals to the new runway; and told the [glideslope] would be fully functional. I made the challenging switch to the new runway; and immediately had a full final to about 40 NM. I noticed the low altitude alert go off for Aircraft X; and issued the warning. Aircraft X arrested their descent; and noted they were having an issue with the glideslope. At this point I noticed Aircraft Y that was also descending well below the glideslope. I immediately climbed them; and issued missed approach instructions. From this point; it was obvious there was still an issue with the glideslope; so I went ahead with the arduous task of reissuing every aircraft the localizer approach for runway 28R. This; along with what was already a busy airspace full of airplanes; Aircraft X and Aircraft Y both then needed to go around for unstable approaches. I was unable to make the coordination with the tower as I was too busy managing my aircraft. At this point the glideslope was taken out of service and deemed unreliable. This caused several ATIS changes; to reflect the equipment malfunction; and approach changes. Along with the rapidly changing weather; I again was oversaturated giving the new ATIS and weather conditions to pilots. It seems the appropriate work wasn't completed to remedy the problem on the glideslope; and nearly caused Aircraft X and Aircraft Y to descend below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) as they crossed Downtown Chicago in IFR conditions. This seems like a serious safety issue. Have some better form of verification equipment is working prior to resuming using that equipment.

Chicago TRACON Controller reported adverse weather and a malfunctioning glideslope caused aircraft to go around.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I made takeoff call outs as normal through rotation. As I retracted the landing gear; I noticed the captain slow our climb rate and point outside. I looked to our 1-2 O'clock position and noticed a flock of Canada geese; approximately 8 in number; flying in our direction. The captain lowered the nose to attempt to fly below the flock; but there was not enough distance and the flock passed directly above the flight deck windows. This was immediately followed by the sound and sensation of impact(s); and the smell of burning meat. We immediately [advised ATC]; and returned to ZZZ; conducting an overweight landing per SOP.Cause: Geese coloration blending in with MVFR overcast conditions; and insufficient time to react once flock was sighted.

ERJ First Officer reported that a bird strike on takeoff resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 440; Flight Crew Type 390

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

The second aircraft; a twin Cessna 310; after hearing me announce left downwind for Runway 24 at LOM; mumbled something about being on a 'wide left base' at Wings. After two minutes with no subsequent transmissions; he appeared directly in front of me on final with no announcement and no response to my calls. The pilot of the Cessna made no response; offered no apology or explanation; and forced a go-around for my aircraft. I called Wings UNICOM and instructed them to obtain the tail number of the offending aircraft; to which they replied affirmatively. The PIC in the Cessna then said 'Give it up; brother' without identifying his tail number. I completed the pattern; landed immediately; and parked (at line service direction) next to the twin Cessna (who had parked his aircraft in a manner not approved by the Wings line crew). I went into the FBO office and inquired as to the whereabouts of the pilot. Another pilot; who had been in the aircraft; stated that the pilot had 'already left the airport' and refused to give any details about the pilot. I returned to my aircraft; having calmed down sufficiently to resume my takeoff/landing practice. Upon departing; the second pilot called me on the UNICOM frequency and apologized for the actions of the other pilot; saying he 'didn't blame me' for being upset. The twin Cessna pilot was either unaware of; or contemptuous of; standard pattern entry practices and radio work at UNICOM airports. I intend to report this incident to the local FSDO in Philadelphia.

PA28 pilot in the pattern at LOM reports an NMAC with a C310 entering on the left base with minimal communication.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

We had two opposite direction GA aircraft with assigned altitudes only 500 feet different than ours. We were level at 6000 feet. GA aircraft crept toward us vertically. We received multiple RAs (resolution advisories). Closest point was zero separation laterally and 300 feet vertically. Incidentally; these aircraft also triggered an RA with the aircraft in front of us as reported on the frequency.

B737NG First Officer reported an near mid-air collision with a light aircraft in the vicinity of RBV at 6000 feet.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Type 3484

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The weather in San Diego was very gusty and continuous light to moderate turbulence down at our vectoring altitude of 2;000 ft.  I was the flying pilot and had the autopilot on as we were cleared for the approach to runway 9. A glideslope dot before intercept I called for gear down; flaps 15; landing checklist and it was completed. At the intercept the airplane began to porpoise as the autopilot struggled with the choppy air to the point where the flight directors were kicked off. I turned off the autopilot; stabilized the aircraft while maintaining the raw data approach. When I looked out the window; the runway and vasi were already insight so we decided to continue on the approach. I asked for the captain to reestablish the flight directors which he was able to do in short order.  We continued to configure to flaps 25; followed by flaps 30 and the landing checklist was completed. When we started passing over the small hill off the end of the runway we received a 'Too Low Flaps' aural warning.  I asked the captain if there was something wrong with the flaps to which he checked the flap handle and confirmed we were ok and should continue. Over the threshold we received a 'Terrain' warning at which point I looked down and saw that the flaps were actually set to 25 and not 30.  I immediately executed a go-around; we climbed up to 3;000 ft; followed ATC's instructions and returned to an uneventful landing on runway 9. In the debrief with the captain; I learned that he had accidentally moved the flap handle from 25 to 40 on the inital flap 30 call of mine; realized his mistake and tried to return the handle to 30 but overshot and ended up back in 25.  I unfortunately missed the error due to heightened focus on hand flying a very choppy approach.

Aircraft at 180 kt; flap 15; cleared for ILS 9 SAN; intercepted glideslope; started down. Hit turbulence sufficient to disengage autopilot. As Pilot Monitoring was attempting to reestablish flight director and auto flight system while configuring aircraft for landing (approximately 1600 ft AGL). Configured the aircraft (I thought) in accordance with of commands. Read landing checklist and checked annunciation. I thought I had seen correct indications but apparently had not. We got a landing warning for flaps. I checked the flap detention and it was in flaps 25 and moved to flaps 30 but actually moved to 40 and flaps blew back. Got another warning for flaps and Pilot Flying (FP) initiated missed approach. Subsequently got a too low terrain warning but we were already in the missed approach.

B737 crew reported executing a missed approach due to 'Terrain' and 'Too Low-Flaps' aural warnings received on short final. Crew determined that the cause was that the wing flaps were in the Flaps 25 position instead of the required Flaps 30 position.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 1474; Flight Crew Type 1015

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

91.205 VFR required equipment oil temperature gauge inoperative. Student did the pre-flight as I was running late to the flight school. I arrive and greet the owner of the flight school as they are getting ready to leave for the night. I tell them (the owners) I am going on a night flight tonight and they tell me to have a good flight. I do a briefing with my student on tonight's flight and we do a complete run-up not realizing the oil temp was inoperative. Once we reach ZZZ only do I realize that the oil temp has stayed in the same position the whole flight. We get back to our home airport and then I see the Discrepancies booklet indicating the oil temperature gauge has been noted.I failed to check the discrepancies booklet before the flight and continued the flight anyways. The owners of the flight school have known of the issue before my flight and failed to notify me of the issue. They continued to fly the aircraft today not fixing the issue.

Flight Instructor reported missing the log book entry for an inoperative oil temperature gauge that was required equipment for night VFR training flight and conducting the flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 14800; Flight Crew Type 700

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

Zone disregarded flight deck direction and put a mechanic in an unsafe situation.The mechanic was working on the TV panel at the entry of the aircraft.  We asked via operations frequency to stop boarding for maintenance.  Boarding continued.  We asked operations why.  The response was that zone had decided we did not need to delay boarding.  The zone person made that decision without asking for additional information. We had asked to delay boarding because the mechanic was being pushed up against an exposed high power panel where he was working by passengers boarding.Who is the final authority of the aircraft once the crew is onboard and passengers have started boarding?FOM states ...The captain's authority is absolute during all flight-related operations including pre- and post-flight decisions. I reviewed the FOM and found references to coordination including dispatch and [operations] but nowhere could I find that zone control had authority.I would like an answer to who has final authority in this instance.

A B737 Captain attempted to stop passenger boarding to protect a Mechanic working near hazardous equipment but a company zone person refused his request; overriding the Captain's authority as described in the FOM.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 95

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

We departed Runway 22 under VFR rules in VMC with the intent of picking up an IFR clearance airborne as authorized by our Ops Specs. Weather was not a factor at all. We made standard position reports on the published UNICOM for taxiing; taking the runway; departing; and direction of departure after becoming airborne and were in communication with the FBO who passed us the current ASOS information and 'no reported traffic' on our taxi call. I estimate we had been monitoring the UNICOM for 7-10 minutes prior to takeoff. After takeoff I climbed straight ahead to around 700-1;000 FT AGL and began a turn to the west towards our next waypoint after the SIC's transmission of our intention to depart in that direction to our next waypoint. At that moment the TCAS gave a 'Traffic; Traffic' alert and our MFD immediately transitioned to a traffic display. I noted a converging target and focused my visual scan on my side of the aircraft while directing the SIC to scan his side. He immediately called out a traffic conflict at our 2 o'clock and slightly higher. I visually acquired a yellow J-3 Cub-like aircraft in apparent cruise at about 1;000-1;500 FT AGL on a southbound heading; noting the aircraft to be stationary in our windscreen. I pushed forward on the yoke to stop our climb and to level off what I considered to be slightly more than 500 FT below the Cub's altitude. Based upon my 3;000+ hours as a fighter pilot I estimate we passed laterally 2-500's in front of the Cub's nose on a perpendicular heading for a total miss distance of around 1;000 FT; though I lost sight of the Cub as we leveled off due to the cockpit ceiling and don't know the precise distance. The Cub took no apparent evasive action. I estimate that had my SIC not seen the Cub and pointed it out to me (and had not taken control of the aircraft as he and I had discussed previously was well within his purview); we would have passed much closer to the Cub and potentially had a mid-air collision. The root cause of this situation was my failure to depart in a standard 45 degree left-hand turn to the south or continue straight ahead to pattern altitude after takeoff from Runway 22. Though I did depart straight out on a 220 heading initially; I should have continued my straight ahead climb while the SIC contacted ATC for our IFR pickup prior to continuing on course instead of turning to the right and west as I did. A contributing factor was the Cub's close proximity to the traffic pattern at a low altitude and his apparent lack of radio communications to/from traffic on the published UNICOM. Potentially the Cub pilot was in a standard upwind leg for Runway 22; but since he wasn't communicating and we lost sight of him I do not know if he was in cruise or entering the pattern. This near mid-air reemphasized the need to follow standard procedures for VFR departures when intending to pick up an IFR clearance. After reviewing the incident mentally; I was surprised the Cub wasn't communicating even though he clearly had a transponder that thankfully tripped our TCAS. Finally; though mistakes were made; the mid-air was avoided through a combination of TCAS and a divided visual scan. Though procedures exist to mitigate this type of occurrence; they do not completely protect pilots and we were fortunate that our systems worked and we were able to visually acquire the conflicting traffic.

King air Captain reports an airborne conflict with J3 Cub after departing VFR from an uncontrolled airport. TCAS provided a timely warning and evasive action was taken. The Cub pilot was without radio or chose not to communicate.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Right engine surge/stall followed by EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) 1100; N2 113.1; and fire smell coming from vents. [Advised ATC] and accomplished the appropriate QRH emergency checklist. Returned to ZZZ and landed safely.

During climb at approximately FL190 a loud boom was heard. There was a pronounced yaw and shutter of the aircraft. The strong smell of smoke was present. The RH EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) was red as was the N2 indication. The RH engine was shutdown utilizing the severe damage checklist. [ATC was and advised and] we returned to ZZZ. The emergency equipment was requested as a precautionary measure.

B767 flight crew reported an engine failure and return to the departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

The Sector feeding us a 3 aircraft sequence from the east. Two SNA arrivals followed by a ZZZ arrival. The first aircraft; Aircraft Y was coming from the north and they were making that aircraft number one in the sequence; followed by Aircraft X landing SNA and Aircraft Z landing ZZZ. They misjudged the spacing when putting Aircraft Y first and allowed Aircraft X to get to close behind. My trainee reached out to them and asked to slow Aircraft X to 190 knots so that we could build some spacing and not feed the next sector a compressing sequence to the final. Even with this 190 knot speed reduction; it was not enough. At this point we are still not talking to Aircraft X. They realized that the spacing is not going to work so he pulled Aircraft X off the arrival and turned him on a northerly heading. Please note that no coordination has been done regarding any of the aircraft. We thought that they were going to either re sequence Aircraft X behind Aircraft Z or do a little zig zag with Aircraft X to build in a couple of miles in between Aircraft Y.But again we were told nothing by the feeding Controller. So Aircraft X was on a northerly heading for a couple of miles and then we observe the other Controller turning Aircraft X on a southerly heading and it appeared that they were going direct to a fix to rejoin the arrival. Aircraft X was allowed to descend to 7;600 feet by the Controller. This is in the handoff Letter of Agreement between our two sectors that the aircraft will be descending to 7;600 feet. At this time Aircraft Z; the third aircraft in the sequence; has a rapid overtake on Aircraft X. Aircraft X was slowed to 190 knots per my trainee's instructions to the sector and it appeared as if the Controller did not slow down Aircraft Z. So the spacing between the two aircraft was compressing rapidly and a loss of separation was likely. During this time my trainee was dealing with other aircraft and coordination involving a helicopter what was requesting to climb to 10;500 feet and maneuver. When Aircraft X checks in; they are over the fix and are not observed in the turn. My trainee sees that they are not joining the arrival; that they are about to enter a Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) of 7;900 feet while at 7;600 feet and also the Aircraft Z behind Aircraft X is less than three miles with a significant speed overtake. My trainee assigned Aircraft X 8;000 feet and issued a heading of 180. The trainee then issued a low altitude alert to Aircraft X. The trainee chose to keep Aircraft X southbound due to the proximity of Aircraft Z behind. If we turned Aircraft X on a westerly heading climbing to 8;000 feet they would have been dangerously close to Aircraft Y and could have resulted in a mid-air. We knew that the EOVM (Emergency Obstruction Video Map) altitude over the peak was 6;000 feet and chose to climb and direct Aircraft X southbound and to an altitude above the MVA knowing the altitude of the EOVM to avoid an aircraft accident. As soon as she issued these instructions to Aircraft X I called the other sector and told them to move Aircraft Z because we were climbing Aircraft X due to high terrain.There is no way that Aircraft X was going to be able to make the turn at the fix to rejoin the arrival. The turn was too sharp. I do not know what the other sector instructed Aircraft X to do because no coordination was done. This is just my assumption.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

SCT TRACON Controller and B737 flight crew reported the aircraft was assigned a heading and route which placed the aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Total 2163; Flight Crew Type 2163

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action

Started the APU and brought the packs on line. Cabin attendants reported a strange smell and the appearance of smoke in the cabin. Called line maintenance to inspect the problem. By the time line maintenance arrived at the aircraft; the smoke and odor had disappeared. Continued boarding the aircraft. Flight departed uneventfully.

Upon starting of APU; Cabin Crew reported faint smoke in cabin. After checking the smoke out; it did not appear to be from a fire (no fire warnings; etc present on flight deck). We called line maintenance out for a check and by the time he arrived the smoke had cleared. The flight went on uneventful and there were zero passenger complaints upon arrival.

A320 flight crew reported that a faint smoke appeared in passenger cabin during preflight with the APU supplying packs. Smoke dissipated prior to Maintenance arrival.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An Aircraft arrived with a logbook item 'MIN MANEUVER SPEED AMBER BAND DOES NOT DISPLAY AT CRUISE ON FO SIDE. CAPT SIDE OPERATES NORMAL'. After some discussion with Maintenance Controller it was decided to use MEL. I completed SP1; SP1A and SP2; Aircraft was downgraded to CAT I status. Additional placards were installed per SP1 for associated systems considered inoperative. Past practice and interpretation has been to install these additional placards as described in the instructions of the MEL; and as read back by the maintenance controller when receiving the MEL who gives a tracking number that is currently being applied. Upon further discussion between the Flight Crew; Dispatch and maintenance; One interpretation of the MEL [was] that when a system is considered inoperative all associated MEL special procedures and tests must be complied with. At the time; some other Maintenance Controllers did not agree with this interpretation but agreed with the past practice. Further discussion ensued and explained that this view was based on the MEL Policy Section; which states; 'The phrase 'Considered Inoperative' as used in the provisos means that an instrument and equipment item must be treated for Dispatch; taxi and flight purposes as though it were inoperative. The item will not be used or operated until the original deferred item is repaired. Additional actions include: documenting the item on the Dispatch release (if applicable); placarding and complying with all remarks; exceptions; and related MEL provisions; including any (M) and (O) procedures and observing the repair category.' More discussions followed with Maintenance and Dispatch Team Lead and it was agreed that his opinion made sense as we all read the definitions section of the MEL. Following that train of procedures leads a Technician to go from the base MEL to - in this case - six other related MELs. This leads to numerous opportunities for procedures to be missed as we are forced to switch between MELs; SPs and Maintenance Manual (MM) references. The Flight Crew is also confused when they have an MEL for a system that specifically calls for two circuit breakers to be opened and collared. Upon their inspection of the circuit breaker panels; they find three; four or five additional circuit breakers collared which are related to the 'considered inoperative' systems. The Crew is left to guess that they must be part of the MEL for the original system. This opens the door for additional errors because the Crew can no longer act as a cross check or second set of eyes on the collared breakers. The Aviation Maintenance Technician's (AMTs) instruction to open the breakers is found in the MM which the Crew never gets a look at in their [computer]; EFB or their release.

A B737-800 Maintenance Technician reported an MEL is confusing when relating to 'MINIUM MANEUVER SPEED' Indication.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport; Airspace Structure

The RNAV 21 Y Approach into CHO at night will cause a 'CAUTION TERRAIN' if there is an attempt to continue visually to the runway near the WUBAK waypoint. Upon descent to the airport; we elected to use the RNAV Y 21  (and terrain display on the MFD) as a matter of prudence and good judgment instead of getting cleared for the visual explicitly because we knew mountains were near CHO and it was very dark. Clearly; I didn't know enough about the mountains because the airplane pointed out the terrain for me. We received this alert due to the 1167 foot obstacle to the east of the approach course within 2 miles of the touchdown zone. We were approximately 1700 feet when we got the terrain caution. I immediately responded with  'climbing' in an attempt to clear the obstacle and re-assess the need for a missed approach. The First Officer reacted by assessing the approach plate and responding that we are clear of the obstacle and we are still in a reasonable position to continue the approach. We both agreed to continue the approach after acquiring the PAPI and continuing to keep the runway in sight. We landed without any further issues.I had briefed the high mountainous terrain to the west of the airport during my approach briefing. A somewhat typical briefing point I suppose for anyone familiar with CHO. There were three very critical points that make this event stand out to me. The first was the speed with which I briefed the RNAV approach. Second; because the approach was a 'backup' to the visual and it was a clear night; I was very complacent and confident that we wouldn't have any issue going into CHO. In my brief I said 'the highest obstacle is 3640 feet to the Northwest. There's a problem with merely briefing the 'highest obstacle.' There are OTHER OBSTACLES! Just because they aren't the highest; doesn't mean they won't kill me. Furthermore; paying attention to any obstacles close to the approach course is paramount. Third; I did not expect an obstacle to be so close to the airport. Especially since I had the runway in sight. Don't brief the plate too fast and read the company chart notes for every airport. Pay attention to complacency with airports I fly to frequently. Obstacles very close to the airport need to be top of mind. If shooting an approach that has a letter attached to it; the most likely reason is that there's something you'll hit if there was a straight in.

An Air Carrier pilot conducting a Visual Approach at night with the airport and terrain received a GPWS alert and continued their approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 7500

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On departure climb from KMSY; we were cleared from FL340 to FL360. At FL355; Captain (flying) pointed out a TCAS target slightly behind (less than 1 mile) and exactly at our cleared altitude of FL360 on both NDs. No TCAS RA was received; so he asked me to confirm with Center if there was an aircraft at our cleared altitude. ATC didn't hear my initial transmission; as I believe the hand mike cord came out of the socket as I grabbed the hand-held mike. Meanwhile; the Captain stopped the climb momentarily at FL355 as ATC asked if we were level yet at FL360. I attempted confirmation again that there was no aircraft at FL360; while the Captain disconnected the autopilot and auto-thrust to keep the aircraft level at about FL355. At this time; ATC directed us to turn right immediately 30 degrees and had another aircraft that wasn't initially on our TCAS; but was climbing to FL350; then descend to FL340. I don't know if that aircraft received a TCAS RA; but I re-established communication with my headset and confirmed we had turned 30 degrees right and were at FL355. ATC asked if we were maneuvering for a TCAS RA; which we weren't. ATC didn't mention any loss of separation; but subsequently cleared us the block FL350-360 momentarily as we assessed the situation. At that time; we both noticed 'TA ONLY' on our NDs; even though traffic mode was selected. We also knew this aircraft had been written up the previous day for this same malfunction (without the phantom targets). Captain then re-selected auto-flight and leveled at FL360.

A320 First Officer reported receiving a TCAS warning for what was apparently a phantom target.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Police / Security Involved

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

A helicopter was flying VFR southbound not in communication with air traffic control. The pilot checked with CPS tower and reported a near miss UAS incident. The aircraft was at 1;400 ft and 7 NW of CPS. The pilot reported that the drone was less than 100 ft from the helicopter and had to take evasive action with a 60 degree banking turn to avoid the drone. There was no reported damage to the aircraft and crew was not injured. The color of the UAS was reported as black and grey; 3x3 ft; 4 propellers with balloons on top. Law enforcement was contacted and police dispatched. UAS checklist was followed and completed. Acn and no further incident occurred.Add law enforcement procedures to checklist. I was also not sure of what was to be expected of me with law enforcement. I used my best judgment and had the police dispatch cars to the possible scene from where the UAS was launched.

A helicopter pilot called ATC after a NMAC with an UAS at 1;400 feet over the STL metropolitan area.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

In cruise flight received RA to climb. We complied with the RA and climbed to 8500 until clear of conflict and descended back to 8000.  Separation was only 300 ft. These types of events are difficult to prevent.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

CE-750 flight crew reported an NMAC event during cruise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 242; Flight Crew Total 4738; Flight Crew Type 4738

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

After landing on Runway 31 we exited at taxiway Tango. We told Ground Control we were going to gate. Ground Control instructed us to 'turn left on Bravo; right on Lima; taxi to the gate.' I have a lot of experience operating out of LGA; however; I have not landed there since the new terminal was built. I taxied south on Bravo and I identified taxiway Lima. It was dark and the new terminal is very bright. I made the right turn on Lima and saw gate straight ahead. I taxied toward the gate and suddenly; out of the darkness in front of me I noticed multiple; 2-3 foot tall; UNLIGHTED taxiway edge posts. I immediately stopped the aircraft and was able to make a hard left turn to barely avoid hitting the posts. It immediately became apparent that taxiway Lima is actually on about a 45 degree angle from off of taxiway Bravo vs what I thought was a 90 degree right turn. For whatever reason; there is an UNLIGHTED; 'false island' between Taxiway Lima and the ramp. Due to the conditions of darkness; a very bright new terminal and gate area; and unlighted taxiway edge posts; it was very easy for me to turn right onto taxiway Lima and then focus on taxiing straight ahead to gate right through the 'island.'

Captain reported on night taxi to gate; crew nearly hit unlit taxiway edge posts which are difficult to see due to bright terminal lights at LGA airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

Prior to the approach the ASOS was reporting 2 SM and fog. We were 40 miles out from the IAF and could see ZZZ. The visibility looked clear and no fog in the area. Center cleared us the approach 25 mile outs from the IAF and cleared us to change to advisory. I hesitated on calling the visual because of my experience with fog. After determining that there was no fog and it was clear and 10 SM visibility. We tried to contact Center to call for the visual approach; but were unable to reach Center due to a NOTAM that ground comm was out. After we landed my First Officer said that ASOS was reporting a 1/4 mile and fog; which was inaccurate. It was clear and with a visibility greater that 10 SM. I was informed by the ground crew that this has been an ongoing problem with inaccurate weather. ASOS needs to be relocated or repaired.

CRJ200 Captain reported ASOS was broadcasting inaccurate weather.